National Symposium on Family Issues

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Editors

Gender and Couple Relationships

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Preface

In her 1972 book, *The Future of Marriage*, Jesse Bernard argued that, within each relationship, there exist two marriages, namely his marriage and her marriage. In other words, Bernard explained, women and men have fundamentally different experiences in their shared relationship. Bernard's review of the literature revealed that marriage had positive implications for men in domains ranging from employment and income to health and longevity, but that married women fared more poorly than both married men and single women. The institution of marriage would have a future, Bernard argued, but only if marriage relationships changed in ways that also supported women's health and well-being.

Over 40 years after Bernard's volume, speakers at the 2014 Annual Penn State Symposium on Family Issues took stock of couple relationships—including how they have changed over this period of time. A primary focus was on contemporary issues pertaining to gender in couple relationships, ranging from their structure—married, cohabiting, heterosexual, and same-sex unions—and their dynamics, including couple dynamics and parenting roles and their implications for men's and women's health and well-being. Throughout, speakers pondered the future of marriage, including whether and how the research of social scientists could best contribute to efforts to promote women's and men's ability to flourish in the context of what has been a fundamental social institution.

The symposium was organized around four central topics: (1) historical changes in marriage and couple relationships; (2) changing work and family roles for women and men; (3) men and women as parents; and (4) gender differences in the health benefits of marriage and couple relationships. Each session included one or more lead papers and commentaries by discussants. As in previous symposia, the lead speakers and discussants represented a range of social science disciplines. Their papers comprise this volume.

Part I: Changes in Marriage and Couple Relationships

In the first paper in Part I, Steven Ruggles, Regents Professor of History at the University of Minnesota, provides a comprehensive picture of changes in women's and men's marriages—and couple experiences outside marriage—beginning in the early 1800s, with a focus on the past 50 years. Ruggles considers both the sociocultural and economic forces that have shaped dramatic demographic transitions

during this period and given rise to the restructuring of the US families—particularly the retreat from marriage. Absent of policy changes directed at stemming the rapid rise in economic inequalities, Ruggles's prognosis for the future of marriage as a social institution in the US is not optimistic. Liana Sayer, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Maryland, examines changes since 1965 in men's and women's time use in the second paper in Part I. Her analyses of national data on time spent in housework, child-oriented activities, leisure and self care, and labor force involvement reveal greater gender equity in time use that can be attributed to women's greater involvement in the labor force and increases in men's time with their children. Sayer argues, however, that the movement toward gender parity appears to have stalled in recent decades, and she suggests a number of reasons why inequities remain—and are more apparent for some groups of women and men than others. In the final paper, Stephanie Coontz, Faculty in History and Family Studies at the Evergreen State College, contrasts the dramatic increases in gender equity since the middle of the twentieth century with the dramatic increases in economic inequity that have accelerated during this time period. Echoing Ruggles and Sayer, she highlights substantial group differences in the gendered experiences of men and women, primarily as a function of their economic circumstances. Coontz concludes that, absence of structural changes that instill in young men, in particular, a sense of confidence about their future economic prospects, the future of marriage looks bleak.

Part II: Changing Work and Family Roles of Women and Men

Part II of this text focuses on women's and men's roles in the labor force, with an emphasis on how partners integrate their responsibilities in and outside the family. In her opening chapter, Janet Hyde, Helen Thompson Woolley Professor, Gender and Women's Studies and Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, builds on a seminal paper published in 2001, in which she and her coauthor, Rosalind Barnett, proposed Expansionist Theory. This theory holds that multiple roles of worker, spouse, and parent are beneficial to both women's and men's well-being. Hyde considers research since 2001 that has provided additional support for tenets of Expansionist Theory, including that multiple roles promote well-being through their provision of human, social, and economic capital, and she also highlights recent work on factors, particularly psychological factors, that may enhance—or undermine the value of role involvement for well-being. Kathleen Gerson, Professor of Sociology at New York University, builds on this latter point, targeting the implications of social contextual factors in the links between women's and men's roles and their well-being. Noting that multiple roles can engender more negative outcomes under conditions of low support and resources, she argues for the need for institutionalized supports for women and men who are juggling the demands of work and care roles. In the third paper, Maureen Perry-Jenkins, Professor of Psychology at University of Massachusetts Amherst, further advances the significance of a focus on context, delving into studies that have examined factors such as timing and culture and class in the implications of multiple role performance. Perry-Jenkins concludes by arguing that the implications of women's and men's work and family roles will be best understood when researchers move beyond main effect models to examine the moderating effects of both person and context characteristics as well as the tim-

ing of role assumptions and role transitions in efforts to understand how couples' work and family roles have their effects. In the final paper in this section, Kevin Roy, Associate Professor of Family Science at the University of Maryland, echoes the conclusions of the other authors about diverse implications of multiple role performance, suggesting that an intersectionality perspective may provide a framework for future study. Further, noting that most discussions focus on the experiences of women, Roy's paper highlights the work and family roles of men.

Part III: Men and Women as Parents

The changing parental roles of men and women—fathers and mothers—including their unique influences on their children's development, are the focus of Part III. The first paper, by Ronald Mincy, Maurice V. Russell Professor, Social Policy and Social Work Practice at Columbia University, and coauthors, Hyunjoon Um and Jo Turpin, is aimed at describing fathers' role in the adjustment of children growing up in economically disadvantaged households. Using longitudinal data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, Mincy et al. document that paternal involvement protects against children's adjustment problems. Findings also suggest that, when paternal engagement is considered, the effects of maternal involvement are attenuated. Natasha Cabrera, Associate Professor of Human Development, University of Maryland, sets Mincy et al.'s findings into a larger ecological model, one that provides an agenda for research on how fathers influence their children's development. Rachel Connelly, Bion R. Cram Professor of Economics at Bowdoin College, also builds on Mincy et al. to focus on children's time spent with fathers and mothers. Using data from the harmonized American Heritage Time Use Study (AHTUS), Connelly shows that both fathers' and mothers' time spent with children has increased in past decades, and she directs attention to the significance of parents' motivations for involvement—such as whether time with children is perceived as a task demand versus enjoyable leisure—for understanding whether and how their involvement has implications for children. In the final paper in Part III, Corinne Reczek, Assistant Professor of Sociology and Women's, Gender & Sexuality Studies at The Ohio State University, expands the scope of discussion of fathers' and mothers' roles, adopting a gendered perspective to question whether maternal and paternal involvement are best viewed as distinct constructs, with illustrative points from family experiences in a same-sex, two-parent family. Reczek also moves the focus beyond childhood to highlight the lifelong effects of parenting experiences for both parents and children.

Part IV: Gender Differences in Health Benefits of Marriage

Part IV turns attention to the health benefits of marriage and couple relationships for women and men—a major concern raised by Bernard in her predictions about the future of marriage. Debra Umberson, Centennial Professor in Liberal Arts and Sociology at the University of Texas-Austin and coauthor Rhiannon Kroeger from Louisiana State University, lead off with an update of research since Bernard published her challenge, suggesting that the health advantages of marriage for men have declined relative to those for women and highlighting the significance of moving beyond marital status to consider the significance of couple relationship quality for health. Umberson and Kroeger also expand the focus of analysis by bringing to

the forefront changes in the contexts of couple relationships, including the rise of cohabitation and same-sex relationships. These new contexts for couple relationships complicate the understanding of the relative health benefits of the institution of marriage for men versus women, but their study can provide novel insights on how gender matters in the links between close relationships and health. Chalandra Bryant, Professor of Human Development and Family Science at the University of Georgia, likewise emphasizes the role of context, including factors such as generational status and sociocultural diversity in the meanings of both gender and relationships—both of which are likely to condition the links between marriage and health. Finally, Karen Lincoln, Associate Professor in the School of Social Work at the University of Southern California, details how an intersectionality conceptual framework serves to situate individuals' experiences within marriage relationships as a function of their connections to dimensions of the larger sociocultural context including the roles of race/ethnicity and class. Building on Umberson and Kroeger, she argues for attention to both sex differences and within-sex gender differences to best understand how and under what conditions marriage has implications for dimensions of health.

Part V: The Future of Research on Couple Relationships

A tradition of Penn State's Annual Symposium on Family Issues is to invite a conclusion from junior scholars that provides insights on the state of the field and directions for research advances. In their chapter, Rose Wesche, a graduate student in Human Development and Family Studies and Cadhla McDonnell, a graduate student in Sociology and Demography, both at Penn State, addressed Bernard's concern about the future of marriage for women and men and the issue of gender equity, asking: "Are we there yet?" Reviewing the evidence presented in the 14 papers within this volume, they conclude that, although gender differences in the health benefits of marriage have declined overall, so too have the health benefits of marriage. Wesche and McDonnell also argue that the future for research on couple relationships includes the need to better understand their diversity. Finally, possibly setting the stage for the next generation of research on couple relationships they emphasize the need for translational studies that can undergird policies and social institutions that support women and men in their efforts to juggle their multiple roles in ways that can enhance their relationships and ultimately, promote positive health outcomes in one another.

We hope that this volume of provocative papers will help to define key issues and spark integrative ways of thinking about the dramatic changes in the US marriages that have emerged—particularly in the years since Bernard pondered the future of marriage. Together, the papers suggest potentially fruitful directions for research aimed at promoting satisfying couple relationships that support the health and well-being of both partners.

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The efforts of many individuals went into planning the 2014 symposium and producing this volume. The editors thank Regina Bures, Sarah Damaske, Kevin Thomas, and Mark Feinberg for presiding over symposium sessions and Neil Sharkey for providing the welcoming remarks. We also are grateful for the assistance of the administrative staff in the Population Research Institute and the Social Science Research Institute at Penn State, including Sherry Yocum, Donna Panasiti, Angela Jordan, Stephanie Eickstedt, and Diane Diviney. Finally, the Symposium and book would not have been possible without Carolyn Scott's organizational skills, commitment, and attention to the many details that go into developing an engaging conference and producing a scholarly volume.

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Part I
Changes in Marriage and Couple Relationships

Marriage, Family Systems, and Economic Opportunity in the USA Since 1850

Steven Ruggles

Marriage Trends

Age at Marriage

There are only fragmentary data about American marriage patterns before 1850. The scattered eighteenth-century community studies based on church records suggest that age at first marriage may have averaged about 23 for women and 25 for men (Wells, 1992; Haines, 1996). Benjamin Franklin (1755/1961) maintained that "marriages in America are more general, and more generally early, than in Europe" and he was probably right: Northwest Europeans of the time married particularly late, and a high percentage never married (Dennison & Ogilvie, 2013; Hajnal, 1965).

Eighteenth-century estimates of marriage age on both sides of the Atlantic are probably understated due to systematic migration censoring. In particular, community estimates derived from church records usually depend on linking baptism records to marriage records, and such estimates exclude people who left the community before they got married. Because of the competing risk of out-migration, late marriages are systematically omitted (Fitch & Ruggles, 2000; Ruggles, 1992, 1999). Conversely, however, some historical demographers have suggested that colonial American estimates could be biased upwards because the communities that have been studied may underrepresent frontier areas and the South, where marriage may have been particularly early (Hacker, 2003; Haines, 1996).

Historical demographers have argued that age at marriage rose in the USA in the first half of the nineteenth century (Hacker, 2003, 2008; Haines, 1996; Sanderson, 1979; Smith, 1979). The available evidence, however, is insufficient to verify that conjecture. More likely, American marriage age changed little in the century preceding 1850. The first reliable national estimates are based on census data.

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

Fig. 1 Mean age at first marriage: US persons born 1825–1969. (Source: Calculated from Ruggles et al., 2010)

The mean age at marriage for the US cohorts born in the late 1820s (and marrying around 1850) was 23.2 for women and about 26.5 for men. This is about the same as the eighteenth-century estimates for women and just a little higher for men.

Figure 1 shows the trends in mean age at first marriage in the USA for cohorts born between 1825 and 1969, based on the decennial censuses and the American Community Survey (ACS; King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010). The measure shown in Fig. 1 is the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM), a life table method that is not affected by mortality or age composition (Hajnal, 1965). Given the high-fertility, high-mortality demographic regime of the mid-nineteenth century, we could expect that census-based estimates would be about a year later than direct estimates derived from church records (Ruggles, 1992). SMAM relies on information about marital status by age, information that was first gathered by the 1880 census; accordingly, for the 1850 through 1870 period I imputed marital status following methods described in Fitch and Ruggles (2000) as modified by Hacker (2003). The estimates are confined to the free population, which means that most blacks are excluded in the period before emancipation.

For people born in the nineteenth century, fluctuations in marriage age were modest. There was a slight increase in marriage age between the birth cohorts of 1835–1839 and 1875–1879, especially among men. For the next two generations, marriage age declined gradually. The post-World War II marriage boom mainly affected people born between 1925 and 1949, who married younger than any previous



Fig. 2 Median age at first marriage: USA, 1850–2013. (Source: Calculated from Ruggles et al., 2010)

generations. After 1949, marriage age increased sharply, especially for women, and the age difference between husbands and wives narrowed. By the late baby boom generation—those born from 1965 to 1969—marriage age for women was substantially later than at any previous period, and marriage age for men was about the same as the previous peak.

Cohort measures of mean marriage age are ideal for describing shared generational experience. The disadvantage of the cohort approach is that we must wait for the cohort to pass out of the marrying ages before we can describe that experience, so the method cannot be used to describe recent change. Moreover, cohort life table measures of mean age at marriage blend the experience of multiple age-groups, blurring the impact of short-run period change.

Figure 2 provides an alternate perspective: The indirect median age at marriage for the population of each period from 1850 through 2013 (Shryock, Siegel, & Associates, 1976), calculated from marital status at single years of age. The median age is consistently a year or so younger than the mean because of the positive skew of marriage age. It better reflects the typical experience of the population, but is not directly comparable with historical or contemporary international estimates of marriage age, which generally use the mean.

The period estimates in Fig. 2 show much more fluctuation than the cohort estimates in Fig. 1, and they reveal the contours of recent changes in marriage age. Age at marriage dipped slightly after the Civil War (which ended in 1865), and then

rose steadily from 1870 to a peak in 1890. From 1890 to 1960, marriage age fell for both men and women. The drop was interrupted in 1940, the only depression year represented in the data. Following the postwar marriage boom, age at first marriage has increased at an unprecedented pace since 1960. During the past decade, the increase has accelerated sharply, reaching a peak age of 29.1 for men and 27.8 for women in 2013.

Prevalence of Marriage

The declining prevalence of marriage is occurring across all age-groups. Figure 3 shows the age pattern of percent ever married among men and women for each successive cohort born since 1935. Among the youngest cohort of women—who can only be observed through age 20–24—only 17.5% have married, compared to 71.4% of the same age-group in the 1935–1939 cohort.

How many of these young people will eventually marry? By fitting marriage curves derived from historical data, Goldstein and Kenney (2001) concluded that about 90% of the younger cohorts will eventually marry. Since then, however, the young have continued to diverge sharply from historical marriage patterns, and Goldstein and Kenney's predictions are not coming true. In the context of rapid change in marriage behavior, the historically based marriage models are inadequate.

People do not have unlimited opportunities to marry, so a delay in marriage necessarily increases the chances that marriage will not occur. Empirically, it has been unusual for a cohort to forgo marriage early on but then catch up in later life. Among the 15 birth cohorts of women I have reconstructed for persons born between 1825 and 1965, there is only one in which the percentage married at age 20–24 did not accurately predict the percentage who had married by age 40–44. That exceptional birth cohort was born between 1915 and 1919; they reached age 18 between 1933 and 1938 and 24 between 1939 and 1943. Under the adverse conditions of depression and World War II during their prime marrying years, many of these women delayed marriage. In the end, however, they did catch up; only 6% had never married by the time they reached 40–44 years old in the postwar years. If this cohort had behaved like all the others, their non-marriage would have been about 50% higher.

There was no catch-up for the other 14 cohorts I examined: In all other periods, the percentage ever married at age 20–24 (with a log transformation) predicts almost perfectly the percentage never married by age 40–44. The scatter plot in Fig. 4 illustrates the tight relationship. We have no way of telling whether this simple relationship will hold true in the future, just as we have no way of knowing whether historically based marriage models developed by Coale and McNeil (1972) and Hernes (1972) have any relevance for the youngest cohorts.

As shown in Fig. 5, for over a century the percentage of women who had not married by their 40s fluctuated in a narrow band between 5 and 10%. This has now changed; the marriage behavior of the 1960s birth cohorts represents a radical break with the past. On the right of the graph, I have projected into the future assuming that the historical relationship between marriage at 20–24 and at 40–44 remains



Fig. 3 *(Top panel)* Percentage of women and men ever married by age and birth cohort: USA, 1935–1989. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010)



Fig. 4 Scatterplot of percent ever married at 20–24 and percent never married at 40–44: US cohorts of women born 1825–1965. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010)

true. We do not know whether younger cohorts will forgo marriage at these levels, but it is plausible; the estimates are very close to the projections of Martin, Astone, and Peters (2014), who use a completely different methodology based on the ACS "married within year" variable. There is no sign that a catch-up is underway for any of the post-baby boom cohorts. Even if they were to suddenly follow a similar catch-up pattern as the 1916–1919 cohort, it is likely that the youngest cohorts would still end up with twice as much non-marriage as the highest levels observed in the American past.

Cohabitation

Is cohabitation a substitute for marriage? Figure 6 shows estimates of the percentage of men and women aged 25–29, who were either married or cohabiting with a partner between 1960 and 2012. By age 25–29, most people have finished their education and have become part of the labor force. The cohabitation estimates for the period since 2007 are based on the Current Population Survey (CPS), which added an explicit question on cohabitation in that year. The 1990 and 2000 estimates derive from the unmarried-partner census category, adjusted upwards to account for



Fig. 5 Percent of women never married by age 40–44 by birth cohort: US women born 1825–1994. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010)

underestimation (Kennedy & Fitch, 2012). The pre-1990 estimates of cohabitation are rougher, and are estimated from household configurations in census microdata (Fitch, Ruggles, & Goeken, 2005).

Cohabitation has indeed grown rapidly, but not as rapidly as marriage has declined. During the 1990s, the rise of cohabitation accounted for almost all the decline in marriage. After 2000, however, the acceleration of marital change outstripped the increase of cohabitation, and the percentage of young adults without partners grew at a rapid pace. Over the entire period from 1960 to 2012, the rise of cohabitation was only one third as great as the decline of marriage, and the number of young adults without partners of any kind roughly doubled. If one focuses on the percentage of women ever married or ever cohabiting rather than the percentage currently married or cohabiting, the rise of cohabitation does offset the decline of marriage (Manning, Brown, & Payne, 2014).

Marital Instability

People are not only getting married less often, they are also terminating their marriages at an unprecedented pace. Until recently, the standard demographic interpretation was that divorce rates peaked around 1980 and have remained steady or



Fig. 6 Percentage of women and men aged 25–29 who were married or cohabiting. (Source: Calculated from Fitch et al., 2005; King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010)

declined since then. This interpretation is correct if we look only at crude rates, but if we only look at crude rates then Sweden has higher mortality than Papua New Guinea (Ruggles, 2012). Recently, Kennedy and Ruggles (2014) showed that if we adjust for changes in the age distribution of married women, a very different picture emerges. Figure 7 shows divorces per 1000 married women, controlling for



Fig. 7 Divorces per 1000 married women standardized by age: USA, 1867–2012. (Source: Kennedy & Ruggles, 2014; These estimates use direct standardization for the period 1970–2012 and indirect standardization for the period 1867–1969; both periods use 2010 as the standard. The 1970–2012 estimates follow the analysis of Kennedy and Ruggles (2014), but they are adjusted to account for the differences between the death registration area and the country as a whole. Missing years were interpolated based on the fluctuations in crude rates)

the age distribution of the married population. The pattern from 1867 through the mid-1980s is similar to the well-known trends in crude divorce rates: There was a long-run gradual rise in divorce rates, punctuated by a sharp spike in 1946, a period of rapid increase in the 1970s, and stability in the mid-1950s and mid-1980s. What is very different from the usual picture is the trend after 1985. Adjusting for age, divorce is now almost 40% higher than it was in 1980 and three times as high as in 1960.

The age pattern of divorce for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2008–2010 appears in Fig. 8. The rapid increase in marital instability has been concentrated among persons aged 35 and older, and especially among those over 50, a phenomenon Brown and Lin (2012) term the "Gray Divorce Revolution." From 1970 to 1980, divorce rates increased at every age, but the age pattern remained essentially similar. The level of divorce in 1990 was almost the same as in 1980, but there was a small shift in the age pattern: a slight decline in divorce for women in their 20s, and a slight increase for those over 40. Over the next two decades, this graying of divorce accelerated. There has been a decline since 1990 in the divorce rate of women aged 20–24. This decline probably reflects the increasing selectivity of marriage; just 13.3% of the women in that age-group were married in 2012. Among women in their 50s, the recent data show divorce rates over twice as high as the comparable rates in 1990.



Fig. 8 Divorces per 1000 married women, by age: US Divorce Registration Area, 1970–2010. (Source: Kennedy & Ruggles, 2014)

Single Parenthood

As the marriage rate declines and marital instability rises, a growing percentage of children are residing separately from at least one of their parents. Figure 9 shows the percentage of infants (under 1 year old) residing without two married parents between 1880 and 2010. The percentage of infants without two married parents declined slightly from 1880 to a low point in the early twentieth century, owing mainly to a decline of paternal mortality. The percentage of infants with single mothers or residing without any parent increased slowly from 1920 to 1960, and rapidly after 1960. Initially, the growth occurred mainly in the percentage of infants residing with mothers only, but the last three decades have seen rapid growth in the percentage of infants only with fathers and residing with cohabiting couples.

Among the co-residing partners, the CPS reports that 78.8% were the biological parent of the infant in 2010. The percentage of infants residing with a cohabiting parent shown in Fig. 9 is consistently smaller than the percentage of births to women in cohabiting unions as estimated from the National Survey of Family Growth (Kennedy & Bumpass, 2008; Lichter, Sassler, & Turner, 2014). This is probably because of the high instability of cohabiting unions; Kennedy and Bumpass (2008) found that most cohabiting unions dissolved within 2 years.



Fig. 9 Living arrangements of infants residing without married parents: USA, 1880–2010. (Source: Fitch et al., 2005; King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010; The category "parent and co-residing partner" was estimated using cohabitation variables in the 2010 Current Population Survey to adjust results from the census in 2000 and 1990 based on the "unmarried partner" category. Pre-1990 cohabitation was estimated from Fitch et al., 2005)

The Economics of Marriage

Family Economies

For most of the nineteenth century, most US production was carried out by families. In 1800, about three quarters of the population was engaged in agricultural work, and a majority of the population lived on farms until 1850. All family members who were old enough contributed to farm production, and farms depended on family labor. Among the quarter of the population that did not work on farms at the beginning of the nineteenth century, most still made their living through the family economy. Most nonfarm production was carried out by family businesses. Among the top job titles were shoemakers, merchants, tailors, physicians, butchers, grocers, bakers, and tavern keepers. In most such businesses, the family resided on the same premises as the shop, and the whole family worked in the business. Like farms, such businesses were usually handed down from generation to generation.



Fig. 10 Distribution of family economies: US married couples aged 18–64. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010; Weiss, 1992; for the period since 1910, the Corporate Family Economy category was constructed using the Class of Worker variable in the census, which explicitly identifies the self-employed. For the period from 1850 to 1900, I assigned self-employed status to any occupation title that was at least 85% self-employed in 1910, and I assigned wage employment for occupations that were at least 85% wage workers in 1910. For jobs that were mixed between self-employment and wage workers, I extrapolated backwards from 1910 based on the trend in self-employment within each job title between 1910 and 1920. For the period before 1850, I assumed that the trend in farm families followed the overall trend in agricultural employment as estimated by Weiss (1992), and I assumed that the percentage of other self-employed occupations was constant)

Figure 10 illustrates the scope of change in the family economy of married couples over the past two centuries.[1] The category labeled "Corporate Family Economy" includes all families with self-employed married men, except for those with wives who had an occupation outside the family business. Most of the couples in this category had farms. Corporate families were in the majority throughout the nineteenth century, and remained important through the first half of the twentieth century.

The traditional family is not the Ozzie-and-Harriet male-breadwinner family that briefly prevailed in the mid-twentieth century (Coontz, 2005; May, 1990); the corporate family predominated for hundreds of years before. We should not idealize

[1] This graph was inspired by a similar illustration that appears in Goldscheider and Stanfors (2014). The term "Corporate Family Economy" was apparently coined by Ryan (1981), and my characterization of change was informed by Mintz (1998).

these traditional families. They were organized according to patriarchal tradition; the master of the household had a legal right to command the obedience of his wife and children and to use corporal punishment to correct insubordination (Coontz, 2005; Cott, 2009; Mintz & Kellog, 1988; Shammas, 2002; Siegel, 1996). In most states, husbands owned the value of their wives' labor, as well as most property women brought into marriage (Shammas, Salmon, & Dahlin, 1987; Siegel, 1996). For 180 years, the authority of the patriarch was enshrined in the decennial census, which explicitly identified the head of each household; not until 1980 was the household head concept abandoned (Ruggles & Brower, 2003).

Male-breadwinner families are those in which the husband worked outside the home and the wife had no occupation listed. In some male-breadwinner households, women may have made some money, but their primary work was child-rearing and housekeeping. The male-breadwinner category represented a majority of marriages for just five decades—from 1920 to 1960—reaching a peak of 57% in 1940. According to the functionalist paradigm that dominated American sociological thought at mid-century, the stripped-down male-breadwinner family was ideally adapted to the needs of industrial society. Echoing ideas proposed by Durkheim (1893/1933), Parsons (1949) maintained that sex-role specialization was essential for marital stability. When Becker (1973, 1981) formalized the specialization concept in his theory of marriage, the equations demonstrated that overall satisfaction from unions is maximized when men work and women do not, and that such optimal arrangements maximize satisfaction for society as a whole.

Parsons and Becker never provided empirical evidence of either functional efficiency or satisfaction flowing from the male-breadwinner family. Not all members of those families agreed that the arrangement was ideal. Many wives in male-breadwinner families, Friedan (1963) argued, felt devastating boredom stemming from a family system that "has succeeded in burying millions of women alive." The male-breadwinner system did not last long; it had already begun to decline when Parsons published "The Social Structure of the Family" in 1949, and represented only about a third of marriages by the time Becker published his *Treatise on the Family* in 1981.

Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the number of married women working outside their families began to increase, and the pace of change accelerated in the middle decades of the century. Dual-earner families have now predominated for almost a half century. Over the past several decades, female-breadwinner families have emerged as a significant new form, and now account for a tenth of marriages.

Labor Markets and Family Systems

The transitions from corporate families to male-breadwinner families to dual-earner families resulted from largely exogenous changes in labor markets. In the mid-nineteenth century, there were few alternatives to family labor. Figure 11 shows the



Fig. 11 *(Top panel)* Distribution of work: US free men and women aged 18–64, 1850–2010. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010)



Fig. 12 Annual wages for selected occupations: New England, 1825–1870 (2013 dollars). (Source: Lebergott, 1960)

distribution of employment for free working age men and women since 1850. The white area at the top of each graph represents persons with no clear labor market activity. Almost 70% of the men in 1850 were farmers, proprietors of their own businesses, or family members working on those farms or businesses. There were relatively few wage-labor jobs available, and about half of them were unskilled laborers, who generally did not make enough money to start a family. There were as yet few factory jobs; in the skilled workers and operatives category, the most important jobs were miners, sailors, machinists, and overseers of slaves.

Wage-labor opportunities were far worse for mid-nineteenth century women than they were for men. The only significant category of female wage-labor employment was unskilled work, which almost exclusively meant work as domestic servants. Self-employment opportunities were also limited; most self-employed women were seamstresses or launderers. The tiny professional and managerial category—accounting for less than 1% of the adult women in the mid-nineteenth century—consisted almost entirely of teachers, who were rarely paid a living wage. The best jobs available for women were the 1.3% in the skilled worker/operative category; these were factory workers, and four fifths of them were located in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states.

New England was the best place to be a wage worker since it had the most advanced industrial sector and labor was in short supply; in the mid-nineteenth century, New England had one of the best-paid workforces in the world (Lebergott, 1984). Even in New England, however, it was difficult to make enough money as a wage worker to live on, much less support a family. Figure 12 shows estimates of New England wage rates for unskilled workers and textile factory workers between 1825 and 1870. The amounts are expressed as 2013 dollars, although that is not

especially meaningful considering the radical changes in the distribution of prices during the past two centuries. Nevertheless, we can safely draw the conclusion that farm laborers and domestic servants, the main forms of unskilled labor, could never have supported themselves on their cash wages; instead, they relied on room and board from their employers, and marriage was not ordinarily an option. Factory workers made much more, and wage rates for mill workers shot up over the middle years of the nineteenth century. The number of factory jobs grew rapidly; there were only a handful of mills in 1825, but by 1850 there were over a million manufacturing workers, and there were 6 million by 1900 (Lebergott, 1984). In the late nineteenth century, clerical jobs for men also grew rapidly, followed by professional and managerial positions in the early twentieth century.

The growth of well-paid wage-labor job opportunities for men undermined the economic underpinnings of patriarchal authority. Once sons had the option of leaving home for the high wages and independence of town life, they had little reason to remain at home under the control of their fathers (Ruggles, 2007). By 1910, the number of male-breadwinner families exceeded the number of corporate families, and the percentage continued to grow until World War II.

Detailed information on the wages of the entire population is available beginning in 1940, and the trends for young men and women appear in Fig. 13. The top panel of Fig. 13 shows the median wages in 2014 dollars of full-time employees aged 25–29; the lower panel is the same, but includes all men and women aged 25–29, not just full-time workers.

The three decades after World War II were a golden age of wage labor for young men. After a brief postwar recession, growth accelerated as the USA came to dominate the world economy. The availability of labor was sharply constrained; immigration had been restricted since 1924, and fertility levels during the depression were the lowest that had ever been recorded, so the new cohorts entering the labor force were small. The demand for entry-level workers drove starting wages up. As shown in Fig. 13, median income for full-time employed men more than doubled in the postwar era, to a peak of $53,000.

The postwar boom in demand for wage labor accelerated the shift away from corporate families, but the percentage of male-breadwinner families began to decline rapidly as the dual-earner marriages grew explosively. Women made considerably less than men, and at first their wages rose more slowly, so the gender gap in wages expanded from 1940 until the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, median full-time wages for women aged 25–29 rose dramatically, from $13,600 in 1940 to $36,500 in 1973 as the percentage of women working full time increased from 25 to 40%. When we look at all men and women—shown in the lower panel—women do not register until 1968, since that was the first year that more than half of 25–29-year-old women were in the wage-labor force.

Before the 1920s, women generally left wage-labor employment when they married, and marriage bars restricting women's employment remained widespread until the 1950s (Goldin, 1990, 1991). Unprecedented demand for wage workers created pressure to overcome institutional barriers to change (Costa, 2000; Goldin, 1990; Oppenheimer, 1970). As the economy heated up and the marriage boom reduced the supply of single women, the marriage bars disappeared.



Fig. 13 Median wages of men and women age 25–29, 1940–2013, in 2013 dollars. (Source Ruggles et al., 2010; King et al., 2010. All graphs based on income data use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) decennial data for the period 1940 through 1960 and IPUMS Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the period since 1962, deflated with CPI-U. The CPS data are adjusted to account for the exclusion of group quarters residents who are not enumerated in the CPS.

Dissatisfaction of women with the male-breadwinner system helped to fuel the supply of married women's employment. The desperate boredom of housewives Freidan described was compounded by technological and demographic change. The increasing use of laborsaving household devices—especially washing machines—together with parity-specific fertility limitation, meant that women in male-breadwinner families had more available time in the second half of the twentieth century than in the first half. As married women flooded into the paid workforce, the stigma that had surrounded married women's participation in wage labor quickly disappeared.

After the mid-1970s, the golden age of youth opportunity collapsed. The last four decades have been disastrous for young men. The median wages of all men aged 25–29 fell almost in half, from $45,000 in 1974 to just $24,000 in 2013. Part of the reason is that fewer young men were working full time than in the 1960s and 1970s. By 2013, a third of men aged 25–29 worked less than 30 h, more than double the level of the late 1960s.

Women fared slightly better. The percentage of women aged 25–29 earning at least $25,000 rose until 2000. This was mainly because the percent of these women working at least 30 h went from 40 % in 1974 to a peak of 59 % in 2000. Full-time women's wages declined in the late 1970s but recovered some ground in the 1990s, and are now just a few percent lower than in 1974.

As Easterlin (1966, 1978, 1987) anticipated, the decline in wages for young men and stagnation for young women was partly a consequence of demography. The massive baby boom generation entered the workforce between the late 1960s and 1980s, and this ended the postwar era of tight labor. The mass entry of married women into the workforce extended the era of growing competition for entry-level jobs. The percentage of women competing in the wage-labor workforce—especially married women—continued to rise until 2000. The rise of married women's employment was at least in part a response to declining male wages; for many families, the dual-earner marriage was essential to maintain income.

Easterlin's ideas about wage competition, however, cannot help explain the continued stagnation of wages after 2000. The cohorts entering the workforce after 2000 were comparatively small, and the percentage of women competing for jobs actually began to decline. Structural changes, however, have helped keep wages low (Massey, 1996; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012). Increasing inequality meant that the productivity gains flow to capital rather than to workers. The rapid decline of wages was enabled by the eroding power of labor unions, declining value of the minimum wage, the computerization of production, and the shift of manufacturing and clerical jobs to developing countries. The growth of inequality over the past several decades hit young people the hardest, since they are competing for the jobs at the bottom of the economic ladder.

When male earnings peaked in the mid-1970s, there were still more male-breadwinner families than dual-earner families. The sharp decline of men's earnings and the comparative stability of women's earnings created powerful new incentives for wives to enter the workforce. By 2000, 70 % of the marriages were either dual-earner or had female breadwinners, and just 23 % had solely male breadwinners.

Marriage and Male Economic Opportunities

Malthus asserted that "it is clearly the duty of each individual not to marry until he has the prospect of supporting his children" (1826, p. 269). Marriage was delayed in the eighteenth-century Northwestern Europe because couples had to either inherit a farm or build up sufficient resources to establish an independent household (Berkner, 1972; Hajnal, 1965, 1982). There is a consensus among demographers that in Western society, entry into marriage has required meeting a socially determined minimum threshold of resources (e.g., Banks, 1954; Easterlin, 1987; Hacker, 2008; Oppenheimer, 1994; Watkins, 1984).

Many studies have demonstrated that the strong connection between poor male economic circumstances and late marriage has continued (Cready, Fossett, & Kiecolt, 1997; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1993; Gibson-Davis, Edin, & McLanahan, 2005; James, 1998; Lichter, LeClere, & McLaughlin, 1991; Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, & Landry, 1992; Lloyd & South, 1996; Testa & Krogh, 1995; Wilson & Neckerman, 1987). Oppenheimer (1988) showed historical fluctuations in the US marriage age have been closely associated with fluctuations in male economic opportunity. She further argued that by the 1990s, rising inequality and the growing difficulty of the career entry process for young men had led to delayed marriage (Oppenheimer, 1994; Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, & Lim, 1997).

The relationship between male occupation type and the percentage marrying by age 25–29 for the period 1850 through 2010 is shown in Fig. 14. In most periods, and especially in the nineteenth century, farmers were more likely to have married than were any other occupational group. That is not because farmers married early;



Fig. 14 Percent ever married by occupation type: US men aged 25–29, 1850–2010. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010)



Fig. 15 Percent married with spouse present by income group: US men aged 25–29, 1940–2012. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010)

on the contrary, future farmers typically delayed marriage while they waited to inherit a farm or build up sufficient resources to homestead or buy a farm. Once a farm was acquired, having a wife was essential: farms could not operate without female labor. Thus, becoming a farmer enabled one to marry but also required one to marry. The second highest percentage married in most periods was among self-employed proprietors; butchers, bakers, and candlestick-makers also needed wives to operate their businesses. Like the farmers, such proprietors often needed to wait until they could inherit or build up the capital needed to establish a business.

As jobs paying good wages began to open up in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, men could increasingly afford to marry at an earlier age. In all periods, young men with higher-income occupations (those paying at least $2500 in 1950) were more likely to have married than were those with low-income occupations (including the jobless). Unlike farming or other self-employment, wage labor did not require that marriage be delayed for inheritance or capital accumulation. The average age of skilled workers in 1870 was 28, compared with an average of 42 among farmers. When young men were in demand, they could achieve comparatively high wages early in life. We can safely infer that the growth of good wage-labor jobs in the first half of the twentieth century was the major reason for the gradual decline of marriage age from 1890 to 1930.

The marriage boom after World War II was fueled by the surge in wages for young men. Even unskilled workers could command wages sufficient to support a family. The differential levels of marriage between occupational groups largely disappeared during the marriage boom years from 1950 to 1970 as shown in Fig. 14. Even those with the worst class of occupations earned enough for most to marry. Figure 15 shows the relationship between wages and marriage for 25–29-year-old

men since 1940. There is a clear relationship between young men's earnings and marriage. Since 1990, men making $25,000 or more were married more than twice as often as those with incomes under $10,000.

Easterlin (1966) argued that the salient threshold in marriage decisions is not the absolute level of income but relative income, defined as the income of young men relative to expectations they formed in their parental home during their teenage years. Easterlin used several measures of relative income over the course of his career (Macunovich, 1998). In his best-known analyses, he calculated relative income as the average income of families with heads aged 14–24 divided by the average income of families aged 35–44, 5 years previously (Easterlin, 1966). This measure had the advantage that it could be calculated from published statistics, but it had several disadvantages. Except for the very peak of the marriage boom, few men became household heads at age 14–24, introducing selection bias that makes the measure unrepresentative of the population. The focus on family heads means that the unmarried are largely eliminated; this is a problem because the people who are already married are unrepresentative of persons eligible to marry. Moreover, focusing on such a young age-group means that many people with high future expected earnings are still in school, and therefore do not contribute to earnings. Easterlin's measure focuses on family income, not individual earnings, which is the theoretically salient issue in male marriageability. Finally, the measure uses means rather than medians, so because of skewed income distributions it is disproportionately affected by the wealthy.

A relative income measure that remains faithful to Easterlin's logic but takes advantage of newer data sources to avoid these measurement issues can be seen in Fig. 16. This measure is the median wages of men aged 25–29 as a percentage of median wages of men aged 45–49, 10 years earlier (that is, when the younger men were teenagers). The measure peaks in 1944, when men aged 25–29 were making almost twice as much as their fathers had made a decade earlier. After 1948, this relative income measure fell precipitously, accelerating after 1970 and reaching a plateau in the early 1980s. For the past three decades, men aged 25–29 typically earned only 60% of what their fathers had made a decade earlier, and since 2010 only half as much.

An alternative measure appears in Fig. 17, which compares the wages of 25–29-year-olds to the wage rates of their fathers 25 years earlier, when the fathers were about 25–29. Parents might use such a comparison to evaluate the marriageability of potential sons-in-law. By this indicator, relative income peaked in 1958, when young men made almost four times as much as their fathers had a quarter century before. Again, relative income collapsed in the 1960s and 1970s, and since the mid-1980s young men have been making less than their fathers had at the same age.

Relative income does not necessarily have to be judged by comparison with parents. It can also be assessed by comparing current income to an ideal based on the affluent. Figure 18 compares the relative income of young men to the income of the top 1%. This measure peaked in 1970, when 25–29-year old men were making almost 13% as much as the average income of the top 1%; by 2012, it was down to 2.7%.



Fig. 16 Median income as a percentage of paternal wage income in teenage years: US men aged 25–29. (Source: King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010; 3-year moving average. Nonwage income assumed to be a constant proportion of total income between 1940 and 1950. Pre-1940 income for the older generation was estimated by assuming that trends for that age-group paralleled trends in an index of money wages (David & Solar, 1977) adjusted for unemployment (Weir, 1992). Accordingly, estimates for the first decade shown should be viewed as approximate)

The spectacular decline in the position of young men is the principal driver of the decline of marriage since the 1960s (Oppenheimer 1994, 1997, 2000; Oppenheimer & Lew, 1995). Wilson and Neckerman (1987) defined men as eligible to marry if they were employed and not incarcerated (see also Darity & Myers, 1995). Even by this minimal standard, the percentage of eligible young men has declined almost 20% over the past four decades. If eligibility includes making enough money to support a family of four at the poverty line—about $25,000 in 2014 dollars—then the percentage of eligible men has declined from 78% of the 25–29-year-olds in 1970 to 47% in 2012. Because of the rise of the dual-earner family, it is no longer expected that men's wages will entirely support a family. That does not, however, mean that the rise of female wage-labor participation has had a countervailing influence on the decline of marriage.

Marriage and Women's Economic Opportunities

The late twentieth century rise of women's wage-labor participation was a profound and unprecedented social transformation. The trend is summarized in Fig. 19. Once again I focus on women aged 25–29, when they were still of prime marriage age and most had finished school. Women who had not married by age 25–29 often worked



Fig. 17 Median wage income as a percentage of median wage income in the previous generation (25 years previously): US men aged 25–29. (Source: King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010; on the estimation of pre-1950 income, see Fig. 16)



Fig. 18 Median wage income as a percentage of the income of the top 1 %: US men aged 25–29. (Source: Alvaredo, Atkinson, Saez, & Piketty, 2012; King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010)



Fig. 19 Percentage of women aged 25–29 employed in wage or salary work: USA, 1860–2013. (Source: King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010)

for wages even in the nineteenth century, and the percentage rose rapidly after 1900. Wage work for married women was rare in the nineteenth century and rose gradually during the first half of the twentieth century. The initial takeoff in married women's employment occurred in the mid-1950s and was among older women whose children were in school or grown. As shown in Fig. 19, the takeoff for younger married women, most of whom had small children, took place after 1964.

The initial rise in women's employment reflected the rapid expansion of demand in the tight labor market of the postwar years (Costa, 2000; Goldin, 1990; Oppenheimer, 1970). The early rise of married women's employment was also a response to dissatisfaction with the male-breadwinner family: For many middle class women in particular, working made their marriages more tolerable. After the mid-1970s, the decline in male wages became a major impetus for married women's employment. Dual incomes were increasingly needed just to maintain family income. In addition, rising marital instability increased the incentives for many women to maintain employment as a safety net (Genadek, Stock, & Stoddard, 2007; Ono & Raymo, 2006; Özcan & Breen, 2012; Schoen, Rogers, & Amato, 2006).

As the participation of women in the wage-labor force increased, the wage difference between men and women shrank. Full-time women's wages at age 25–29 as a percentage of men's wages are shown in Fig. 20. The growth of women's pay lagged well behind that of men in the 1950s and the early 1960s; the ratio between them reached a low point in 1966. From then on, the wage disparity shrank. At least after 1974, most of this reduction occurred because of declining wages for men rather than rising wages for women. It also reflected the growing educational attainment and work experience of women, as well as a reduction in overt discrimination.



Fig. 20 Women's median wages as a percentage of men's median wages: US full-time wage earners aged 25–29, 1940–2013. (Source: King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010)

According to Becker's (1981) theory of marriage, the returns to marriage are reduced when female wages rise and when married women work outside the home; the result is reduced overall utility for both husbands and wives. From the outset, however, the predictive power of the specialization and trading model fared poorly. Shortly after Becker first proclaimed that the male-breadwinner family provides optimal utility for all involved, the great majority of people abandoned that form of marriage. As Ferber (2003) dryly expressed it, "To the extent that the purpose of theory is to assist our understanding and interpreting observed events, Becker's theory, whatever its merits in other respects, was rather untimely."

A few pages after concluding that male-breadwinner families maximize the returns to marriage, Becker advanced the argument that multiple-wife marriages maximize utility for women, because they increase the demand for women (Becker, 1974). Becker's endorsement of polygyny highlights a fundamental flaw of the specialization and trading model: it does not recognize power relationships within marriage, and assumes that an altruistic family head will make decisions that represent the best interests of the family as a whole (Folbre, 1986; Sawhill, 1977). From today's perspective, it seems extraordinary that a theory with such blatantly sexist assumptions and implications was ever taken seriously.

One of the problems with Becker's theory is that many women did not actually find their subordinate role in the male-breadwinner family to be entirely optimal. Men may have found it pleasant to have an unpaid domestic whose chief role was to meet their needs, but we have no reason to believe that women found it equally satisfying to work as unpaid servants. Demographers who see a close connection

between female wage labor and postponed marriage have usually favored an alternative theoretical mechanism that avoids Becker's problematic idea that role specialization is intrinsically valuable for both men and women. I have termed this the "Economic Opportunity" hypothesis to distinguish it from Becker's "Role Specialization" hypothesis (Ruggles, 1997b; Schoen et al., 2002). Rather than reducing the utility of marriage for women, the expanded availability of jobs may simply have provided alternatives to marriage (Goldscheider & Waite, 1986, 1991; Ross, Sawhill, & MacIntosh, 1975). Under this mechanism, the rise of female wage labor could contribute to the declining frequency of marriage even if married women's employment did not reduce the absolute returns to marriage.

There is an empirical support for the hypothesis that expanding economic opportunities for women contributed to the initial increase in marriage age. Studies from the 1970s to the 1990s showed a strong inverse association between local levels of employment and earnings for women and the percentage of women marrying (Cready, Fossett, & Kiecolt, 1997; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1993; James, 1998; Lichter, LeClere, & McLaughlin, 1991; Lloyd & South, 1996; Mare & Winship, 1991; McLanahan & Casper, 1995; Preston & Richards, 1975; White, 1981). Individual-level longitudinal analyses have consistently found that women with career plans have tended to postpone marriage. Using data from 1940 to 1960, Mare and Winship (1991) found that expected employment discouraged marriage among white women but had no effect for blacks. Young women in the late 1960s and the early 1970s who planned to work later in life had substantially lower marriage rates than women who planned to be housewives (Cherlin, 1980). Similarly, Goldscheider and Waite (1986) concluded that "the recent decline in marriage rates should not be seen as resulting primarily from increased barriers to marriage but from decreases in women's relative preference for marriage because of their increased options outside of marriage" (p. 107). Teachman, Polenko, and Leigh (1987), again using data collected in the 1970s, found that women who aspired to have a professional career at age 30 had substantially reduced marriage rates compared with women who had lower aspirations.

Current income and earnings for single women—as opposed to their career aspirations—do not appear to have much effect on marriage. A few studies, mostly using data from the 1980s and later, have found small *positive* associations between the employment or earnings of single women and their likelihood of marriage, suggesting that rising women's employment might actually encourage marriage (Lichter et al., 1992; Oppenheimer & Lew, 1995; Teachman et al., 1987). Sweeney (2002) compared two cohorts, one born from 1950 to 1954 (who mostly married in the 1970s and the early 1980s) and the other born from 1961 to 1964 (who mostly married in the 1980s and early 1990s). She found that women's earnings had a significant positive relationship with marriage in the younger cohort, but not in the older one. This suggests, Sweeney argues, that in recent decades women's wages have become a positive asset that makes women more attractive partners and helps to stabilize unions.

The recent positive association between women's earnings and their likelihood of marriage could also be a by-product of assortative mating. Male earnings are more closely correlated with marriage than are female earnings (Smock & Manning, 1997; Xie et al., 2003). Because of assortative mating, high-income women have access to a more marriageable pool of potential spouses than do low-income women. As Sweeney (2002) suggests, ideally models should control for the earnings of potential husbands, but in practice that is hard to measure. It is entirely possible that within each economic stratum, women may delay marriage if more attractive alternatives are present, even if women in higher strata marry more often than women in lower strata.

Growing economic opportunities had different consequences for different women. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the net effect of growing career opportunities for women was probably to reduce entry into marriage. Before the mid-twentieth century, many women accepted subordinate roles in male-breadwinner and corporate families because the alternatives to marriage were terrible: There were few jobs open to women that paid sufficiently to support independent living. The new wage opportunities in the mid-twentieth century gave women an alternative to marriage, and reduced the pressure to find a spouse as quickly as possible. Large numbers of women had the potential for at least a brief period in which they were independent of the control of either fathers or husbands. Moreover, among women stuck in bad marriages, work opportunities opened an avenue of escape (Ruggles, 1997a, b). In recent years, the net effect of women's economic opportunity has probably reversed. The great majority of women work for wages. Like affluent men, affluent women are attractive potential partners. The ability of affluent women to pay for childcare and house cleaning services mitigates some of the burdens of traditional marriage, potentially increasing the relative attractiveness of marriage.

Educational attainment is a strong indicator of earning potential. For both women and men, the relationship between educational attainment and marriage has reversed over the past 70 years (Torr, 2011). In 1940 and 1950, the highest level of marriage was among young adults who had not completed high school, and the lowest level of marriage was among those with postgraduate education (See Fig. 21). By 2010, precisely the reverse was true: there was a strong *positive* association between education and marriage.

The comparatively high levels of marriage among educated women since 2010 could be taken as evidence for the increasing attractiveness on the marriage market of women with high earnings potential. The fact that the same trend is evident for men, however, suggests an alternative explanation. In absolute terms, marriage rates for the highly educated—both women and men—have declined dramatically, and now are the lowest since 1940. Among the poorly educated, however, the drop has been far steeper. The driving force is declining opportunity for the uneducated, and especially for uneducated men. Men without a high school diploma could once earn enough to marry, but those jobs have evaporated (Cherlin, 2009, 2014).



Fig. 21 Percentage of women and men married with spouse present at age 25–29, by educational attainment: USA, 1940–2012. (Source: King et al., 2010; Ruggles et al., 2010)

Shifting Attitudes and the Second Demographic Transition

There is substantial evidence of a broad shift in attitudes towards marriage in the 1960s and 1970s (Cherlin, 1981, 2004). One major stimulus of attitudinal change was the growing accessibility of effective fertility control. The pill, the intrauterine device (IUD), and perhaps the most importantly legalized abortion dramatically reduced the proportion of marriages resulting from unplanned pregnancies (May, 2010). This in turn contributed to delayed marriage and childbearing, increased educational attainment among women, and increased female labor force participation (Akerlof, Yellin, & Katz, 1996; Bailey, 2006; Goldin & Katz, 2002; Myers, 2012). The availability of contraception and abortion contributed to new attitudes towards premarital sex. In 1969, 75% of the Gallup respondents said that premarital sex was wrong; by 1982, only 38% of the General Social Survey respondents agreed (Harding & Jencks, 2003). For many, the increasing availability of sex outside of marriage reduced the incentive to marry.

The *Inner American* study (Veroff, Douvan, & Kulka, 1981, 2002) conducted representative surveys in 1957, right at the peak of the marriage boom, and again in 1976, when marriage was in retreat. Women were asked what they thought of other women who did not want to marry, even if they had the chance to do so. In 1957, 66% of the respondents described such unmarried women negatively (e.g., self-centered, immature, and neurotic) compared with only 44% in 1976. Among never-married women, the drop was steeper, from 71 to 38%. Men were similarly asked to judge what they thought of men who did not marry, and the change was in the same direction but smaller, from 67 to 50%.

Does the change in attitudes mean that marriage declined because of reduced stigma against remaining single, or does it mean that the stigma declined because more women were choosing to remain single? The answer has to be a little of both. The rise of married women's employment, marital dissolution, nonmarital fertility, and cohabitation could never have occurred without massive attitudinal change. Attitudinal change, however, was at least partly driven by changing behavior.

Changes in behavior and changes in social norms are mutually reinforcing (Axinn & Thornton, 2000). Following the arguments of Oppenheimer (1970), Goldin (1990), and Costa (2000), let us assume that married women's wage-labor participation initially began to rise because of exogenous market pressures. Working wives who disapproved of married women's work experienced cognitive dissonance, and their attitudes probably shifted. More broadly, the friends and relatives of working wives probably also increasingly came to see married employment as acceptable behavior. The declining stigma of married work would have encouraged additional married women to seek employment. Thus, shifting behavior led to shifting norms, which in turn further accelerated shifting behavior.

A comparison of attitudes to married women's work with actual work behavior among ever-married women under age 45 appears in Fig. 22. In 1970, the National Fertility Survey asked such women if they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home



Fig. 22 Comparison of attitudes to married women's work and actual work behavior: Married US women under age 45. (Source: Ruggles et al., 2010; King et al., 2010; Ryder & Westoff, 1975; Smith, Hout, & Marsden, 2013)

and the woman takes care of the home and family" (Westoff & Ryder, 1975). Only 18.5% of the ever-married women disagreed, even though 41% of such women were actually employed. In 1977, the question was repeated in the General Social Survey, and by then 48.1% of the ever-married women disagreed, which was just below the percentage actually working (Smith, Hout, & Marsden, 2013). The next time the question was asked was in 1985, and by then 67.8% disagreed with the idea that married women should stay home, which was significantly higher than the percentage actually working. The initial change in behavior took place at a time when there was still strong disapproval of married women's work among married women, and probably even stronger disapproval among men. Once three-quarters of married women joined the labor force, the shift in attitudes stalled. Indeed, between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of married women who supported the male-breadwinner model of the family actually increased (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman 2011).

Demographers have increasingly recognized an independent role of cultural change in the transformation of the family. The broad intellectual movement sometimes called the "cultural turn" spread from the humanities to the social sciences in the 1980s and 1990s (Nash, 2001), leading some demographers to rethink causal mechanisms. When the Princeton Fertility Project failed to identify a clear spatial association between fertility levels and economic development in the late nineteenth-century Europe, many demographers concluded that cultural explanations had been overlooked in the study of fertility (Coale & Watkins, 1986). Caldwell

(1982) argued that family change was stimulated by new values that place a premium on individual satisfaction, and Preston (1986) made a compelling argument that demographers had neglected the role of cultural change.

The most ambitious cultural argument was articulated by Lesthaeghe (1983, 1995, 2010), who argues that the entire spectrum of recent family change results from the spread of ideas developed by the late eighteenth-century philosophers. According to the theory, the humanistic ideas of the enlightenment "redefined the position of the individual relative to his universe and, in the process, legitimized the principle of individual freedom of choice" (Lesthaeghe, 1983, p. 412). Over the next two centuries, these new individualistic ideas trickled down from the intellectual elite to the masses. The advance of individualism was especially rapid in two periods: first, between 1860 and 1910, and second, between 1945 and 1970. The acceleration of change in these periods, Lesthaeghe argues, was stimulated by economic growth: "Rapid increases of income fuel individual aspirations" and allow "individuals to be more self-reliant and more independent in the pursuit of their goals, which ultimately stimulates self-orientation and greater aversion to long-term commitments" (1983, p. 430).

The result in the first period of rapid change was the first demographic transition, leading to fertility decline across Europe and North America. In the second period, the result was the second demographic transition (SDT), leading not only to below-replacement fertility in Europe but also to the decline of marriage and the rise of married women's employment, divorce, cohabitation, and unmarried fertility (Lesthaeghe, 2010; van de Kaa, 1987). Just as the first demographic transition spread from Europe around most of the world during the twentieth century, SDT theorists argue that the second transition is now spreading as well (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, & Lopez-Gay, 2012; Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006).

In essence, the SDT theory argues that the family is dissolving because everyone has become more self-interested and autonomous in family decision-making. At one level, the SDT theory may be regarded as purely ideational; once the seed of individualism had been planted by Voltaire, Rousseau, and Adam Smith, it was inevitable that the new ideas would grow and spread as an autonomous force through all spheres of life, crushing traditional communal values. At another level, however, it is essentially a structural argument. Although individualistic values had existed in the West for 200 years, most people were constrained from acting on them by economic circumstances. Economic development after World War II meant that residents of developed countries achieved financial security. With their material needs satisfied, people were free to pursue existential and expressive needs through self-actualization. Thus, at its core the SDT theory relies on a structural stimulus to produce cultural change: Rising affluence made it possible for people to pursue individual self-interest, and thereby led to the rejection of existing familial norms.

SDT theory is consistent with some aspects of the US family change. In particular, it provides a plausible contributing explanation of the rise of married women's employment and marital instability in the 1950s and 1960s and the early decline of marriage rates in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Some middle-class married women started working for individualistic motives, including escape from the "devastating boredom" of the male-breadwinner marriage. Some women, newly able to support

themselves, were able to terminate unsatisfactory marriages and achieve independence. Moreover, the rise of marriage age during the decade after its low point in 1959 at least partly reflects intentional delay of marriage by women who no longer had to rely on the support of husbands or fathers to maintain a basic standard of living. In all these situations, decisions were sometimes motivated by a desire for self-fulfillment and individual autonomy.

The other major changes I have described, however, do not fit the SDT model. If self-actualization were the source of family change, then the change would be concentrated among people who had achieved at least a minimal level of financial security. For the past four decades, however, it has been the people at greatest economic risk—both men and women—who have been the least likely to marry and the most likely to cohabit, divorce, and have children without a co-residing partner. As McLanahan (2004) stressed, young people are facing diverging destinies. Among the college-educated and the affluent, the impact of family change is muted. Marriage is still feasible; marital instability is declining; and cohabitation and unmarried fertility can be managed without hardship. It is among those with deepest economic stress and with the least education that the transitions associated with the SDT theory predominate. It is not plausible that massive numbers of impoverished single mothers are actively choosing a path of self-fulfillment.

Perhaps the greatest limitation of the SDT theory is that it does not recognize the role of shifting power relations within the family. Women lacked individual liberty under the corporate family and the male-breadwinner family not because they were ignorant of individualistic ideas, but because they had no means of escape from domination by men. Enlightenment individualism simply did not extend to women: Rousseau felt that women should be "closed up in their houses," where they "must receive the decisions of fathers and husbands" (Blum, 2010, p. 51).

Discussion

The American family was transformed over the past two centuries by tectonic shifts in the structure of the economy. The transition from corporate families to male-breadwinner families was a consequence of the rise of wage labor in the industrial revolution. The transition from male-breadwinner families to dual-earner families reflects the massive increase in wage labor among married women following the Second World War. The decline of the corporate family led to a profound shift in generational relations, as family patriarchs lost control over their wage-earning sons. The decline in the male-breadwinner family led to an equally profound shift of gender relations, as men lost control over their wage-earning wives and daughters.

In the last half century, continuing structural changes have undermined the dual-earner family. The massive decline of relative earnings among young men, together with the long stagnation in earnings among young women, is the most obvious explanation for the unprecedented decline in marriage since the mid-1970s. The declining prospects of youth not only reduce transitions to marriage but also contribute to high marital instability, single parenthood, and cohabitation (e.g., Carlson,

McLanahan, & England, 2004; Duncan, Huston, & Weisner 2008; Heaton, 2002; McLanahan, 2004, 2009; McLanahan & Percheski, 2008; Martin, 2006; Orbuch et al., 2002; South, 2001; Stanley, Amato, Johnson, & Markman, 2006).

Easterlin (1987, p. 165) argued that both the decline of marriage and the rise of married female wage labor "reflect chiefly the struggle of the baby boomers to maintain their economic status relative to their parents." That interpretation is persuasive but incomplete. The initial rise of married women's employment was not a response to declining male wages, since male wages were still going up rapidly when it occurred. Instead, from the 1950s to the 1970s, married women's growing employment reflected labor shortage, and probably also reflected women's widespread dissatisfaction with male-breadwinner marriages. The growing availability of jobs for women in turn contributed to the postponement of marriage and rise of divorce in the 1960s and 1970s.

Gender role conflict further contributed to the decline of marriage (Ellwood & Jencks, 2004; Furstenberg, 1996; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegård, in press). What shifted the balance of power within marriages was not simply ideology. When second-wave feminism burst onto the scene around 1970, the male-breadwinner family was already disappearing. The timing suggests that the rise of married women's employment undermined the economic basis of male authority and led to the rise of feminist ideology (Chafetz, 1995; Evans, 2003). The gender role expectations of men shifted too, but they continued to lag behind the expectations of women from the 1970s to the1990s (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). With new economic opportunities available, many women chose to forgo marriage to men who continued to treat them as subordinate.

Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård (in press) cite research from time-use studies to argue that male attitudes are catching up: Men are increasing their time spent in childcare and (to a lesser extent) in housework. This leads Goldscheider and her coauthors to project a highly optimistic vision of gender equality within families. This gender revolution, they predict, will lead to increased union formation, increased commitment of partners, increased union stability, and a return to replacement-level fertility in Europe. Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård focus on Sweden, and perhaps their vision can be realized there under the benevolent protection of the welfare state. In the USA, the vision of new union stability may similarly be achieved among the educated and affluent, but for most young people, the future is not as bright.

The fading of marriage may be benign for the economically secure, but it is not working well for those at the bottom. For people without resources, the fragmentation of families exacerbates insecurity. Economic inequality is the central cause of the decline of marriage, and it is fraying the fabric of society. In the long run, the only way to address the problem is to institute fundamental reforms that turn back the tide of inequality and ensure that young people—both men and women—have opportunities to earn a living wage.

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Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?

Liana C. Sayer

Introduction

Women's and men's time use remains stubbornly gendered; despite women's movement into paid work, they continue to do more housework and childcare and less market work than men (Man, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011; Sayer, 2010). Women's and men's time is more similar today than compared to the 1970s and earlier, but convergence is due to women changing more than men (Sayer, 2005; Sullivan & Gershuny, 2001). While women continue to do more housework and childcare than men, most women are not putting in a "second shift," because they continue to spend less time in paid work than men (Sayer, England, Bittman, & Bianchi, 2009). Mothers who are employed full time and have preschool age children spend more combined time in paid work, housework, and childcare compared to comparable men, but women do not spend more time than men in paid work and household work in other couple types (Milkie, Raley, & Bianchi, 2009).

Despite apparent equality in work time, the negative consequences of gendered divisions of labor are well-documented (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; England, 2011). Women's higher levels of housework and childcare depress labor force participation, wages, and occupational mobility (Connelly & Kimmel, 2009; Hersch & Stratton, 1997). Women's greater caregiving responsibilities and the "third shift" of necessary emotion work required for smooth family functioning and positive relationships are associated with more stress and morbidity among women (Bird & Rieker, 2008). Men too are disadvantaged by current gendered time regimes. Barriers to dismantling the breadwinner scaffolding undergirding hegemonic masculinity, like the flexibility stigma that penalizes men who take time from paid work for family, hinder men's willingness to prioritize caregiving (Williams, 2010). Men's reduced time in housework and caring may be associated with fatherhood wage

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premiums but also weaker relationships with spouses and children (Elliott & Umberson, 2008; Hodges & Budig, 2010).

This broad-brush story of gender inequality in time use and its implications for well-being, however, are limited; in that, it does not consider how gendered time allocations may vary by education and family status. Education-differentiated pathways into parenthood and marriage and increased likelihood of living alone in young and older adulthood may alter the activities in which individuals engage and the amount of time spent on various activities. Objective and subjective aspects of time may be redefined across the life stage, as women and men transition into and out of employment and family roles. Consequently, gender gaps in time use may be conditioned by education and family status.

This chapter provides new information about gendered time use patterns in three ways. First, it examines if the influences of education and family status on gendered time use patterns vary by historical time. Second, it addresses limitations in existing work that focus only on gender differences between women and men in coupled heterosexual relationships by examining gender gaps in time use among single women and men with no children and single mothers and fathers, as well as married women and men. Last, it considers gender gaps in all types of time use. Prior work examines gender differences in only one or two types of time use. While useful, this work provides incomplete knowledge about how education and family status in particular affect the gender division of labor and whether influences have waxed or waned over time. Examining gender gaps and trends for all adult women and men across all domains of time use is needed to fully understand how and why time use is associated with gender inequality, and why the trend toward convergence appears to have stalled.

This chapter first reviews the dominant theoretical perspectives on gendered time use. It then provides a descriptive overview of trends in daily time allocation of women and men to paid work, housework, childcare, self-care, and leisure. Gender differences at each point in time and change in gender gaps over time are the focus. The chapter then examines how gender gaps in time use are conditioned by educational attainment and family status, and how the influence of these factors has changed over time.

Several factors have contributed to greater similarity since the 1960s in the gender division of labor. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, and related legislative efforts like Title IX, reduced structural and normative barriers to women's education and employment. The development of more effective means of contraception, the legalization of abortion, and the era of "free love" afforded women and men the opportunity to engage in couple and parental relationships outside of legal heterosexual marriage (Casper & Bianchi, 2002). Nonmarital fertility increased, with 40% of births now occurring outside of married heterosexual relationships (Cohen, 2014). Norms changed in ways that emphasized self-reliance and self-fulfillment more than self-sacrifice and caring for others (Coontz, 2005; Gerson, 2010). Demographic and cultural shifts ushered in an era of independent adulthood, evident in data documenting the substantial increase in living alone throughout the life course (Klinenberg, 2012; Rosenfeld, 2007). Heightened demand for women's labor and ideologies of

egalitarianism in women's and men's educational and employment opportunities are associated with increased human capital among women, particularly in education where women now outpace men in earning college degrees (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013). Employment among mothers is now normative, and trend data indicate mothers of newborns are returning to employment more quickly than in the past (Smith, Downs, & O'Connell, 2001). However, the puzzle is why women's progress in all arenas excepting education stalled in the 1990s (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011). This chapter is a first step at investigating what gendered time use trends between 1965 and 2012 portend for the gender revolution.

Background

Time is a social fact based on normative and economic conventions and one that is strongly associated with well-being. Although all individuals have the same 24 h of time per day, how people use and control their time varies by their social location. Hence, time can be studied empirically to reveal its links with structural relations of power and individual behavior. Theoretical perspectives emphasize how available time is constrained by the zero sum nature of the 24 h day, resource differences between women and men, and cultural beliefs about gender that associate caregiving with femininity and breadwinning with masculinity as the dominant influences on the gendered division of labor (England, 2011; Sayer, 2010).

The time availability hypothesis posits that decisions about paid work affect how much time is "left over" for childcare and housework (Coverman & Sheley, 1986). Employment status and (sometimes) spouse employment status are typically used as measures of competing time demands. This hypothesis is supported by much empirical research, but the same studies also document robust and persistent influences of "gender" (Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012; Craig & Mullan, 2013). Employment and hours of market work are negatively associated with women's and men's time in housework, childcare, and leisure, net of marital and parental status, but effects are stronger for women than for men (Sayer, 2005). However, women's average paid work hours are lower than men's, and women are more likely to leave the labor force when their male partners have long employment hours (Stone, 2007).

Gender has pervasive effects at all levels of society and it structures identities, expectations, norms, and institutions. Men and women may have a vested interest in maintaining gendered allocations of paid and unpaid work time because these naturalize and reinforce cultural beliefs about "essential" differences between women and men and sustain men's greater societal resources and status (Charles & Bradley, 2009; Jackman, 1994).

The time availability and gender perspectives were initially framed as competing theories, but empirical results supporting elements of both suggest they are both useful frames (Ferree, 2010; Sayer, 2010). Although used more in research examining time use among married couple households, the perspectives can be usefully adapted to apply to all women and men (Shelton, 1992). Competing time demands

are an issue in all households because only so many activities can be accomplished with the constraints of the 24 h day. Examining within and across gender differences by marital and parental status should offer insight into whether displays of gendered behavior are activated more strongly in couple and/or parental relationships. Social prescriptions for gendered behavior likely affect all women and men, regardless of parental or marital status. Evidence is mixed on whether couples who desire a more specialized division of labor select into marriage, or if instead the institution of marriage constrains options in ways that push women and men into male breadwinner, female caregiver arrangements (Cooke & Baxter, 2010). Transitions into marriage increase and exits from marriage decrease women's household labor, whereas the effects of transitions are the opposite for men's housework, but the influence of marriage may also have waned in recent decades (Bianchi et al., 2012; Gupta, 1999). Parenthood is the role that is more closely associated with women's reduced paid work hours and increased household and childcare work, and men's increased work hours, even among couples with egalitarian patterns before the birth of the child (Grunow, Schulz, & Blossfeld, 2012). This suggests "doing gender" may have stronger effects on women's and men's time use in married parent households compared with singles living alone, single parent families, and married couple families without children.

Some of the theoretical perspectives that have been useful in studying housework are more difficult to translate to gender differences in childcare. Childcare is more enjoyable and more intertwined with intergenerational investments that reproduce class status (Raley & Bianchi, 2006). Hence, it can less often be assumed that mothers want to bargain out of rearing their children, or prioritize employment over housework (Raley, Bianchi, & Wang, 2012). Mother's more often want to control childrearing than housework, because of the ways childcare, but not housework, affirms maternal identities (Macdonald, 2010). Qualitative evidence suggests that investing large amounts of time in childrearing goes to the very identity of being a good mother (Christopher, 2012; Hays, 1996). Time-intensive childrearing is also one way parents can have more confidence in children's intergenerational mobility (Lareau, 2003). Hence, gender differences in childcare time, while gendered, also signal class-differentiated lifestyles (e.g., concerted cultivation versus natural growth) as much as or more than gender subordination.

Leisure differences between women and men support both time availability and gendered perspectives on time use. Women's caregiving responsibilities are associated with a gender gap in leisure only among mothers who are employed full time and who are raising young children (Sayer et al., 2009), as predicted by the time availability perspective. However, women's leisure is of lower quality than comparable men; women more often combine leisure with household chores and minding children, and their leisure is also interrupted more by children than is men's (Mattingly & Bianchi, 2003; Sayer, 2005). These differences are associated with women experiencing leisure as less refreshing and higher levels of feeling rushed among women today compared with the mid-1970s (Craig & Mullan, 2013; Mattingly & Sayer, 2006).

Data and Analytic Approach

I use respondent reported time diary data from five national US studies; the historical time diary collections fielded in 1965, 1975, 1985, and 1998, and the 2003/2004 and 2011/2012 American Time Use Study surveys. Interviews in all studies collected sociodemographic data and detailed information on all activities engaged in over a 24 h period.

The 1965 data are from the American's Use of Time study, collected by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (Converse & Robinson, 1980). This study was part of the 13 country 1965 Multinational Study of Time Use, which was the first systematic attempt to collect comparable cross-national data on time use patterns (Szalai, 1972). The study had a response rate of 72% for a sample size of 1241.

The 1975 data are from the first wave of the Time Use in Economic and Social Accounts Study, collected by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (Juster, Courant, Duncan, Robinson, & Stafford, 1979). Both the 1985 and 1998 data were collected at the University of Maryland (Bianchi, Robinson, & Sayer, 2001; Converse & Robinson, 1980; Juster et al., 1979; Robinson & Godbey, 1999). Each of the studies included a cross section of the US adult population. The response rate for the first wave of the 1975 study was 72% ($N=1519$), the 1985 study had a response rate of 51% for the mailback subsample and 67% for the telephone subsample ($N=5358$, see below for information on the subsamples); and the 1998 study had a response rate of 56% ($N=1151$).

The other source of data is the 2003–2012 American Time Use Survey (ATUS; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). This is the first federally administered time diary survey in the USA. Respondents aged 15 and over are drawn from the outgoing rotation of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and are representative of the American population. Because the ATUS sample is a subsample of the CPS, it has high-quality data on employment and education, and household and individual characteristics. Response rates range from 57.8% in 2003 to the lowest response rate of 49.9% in 2013 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). In this analysis, I pool data from the 2003 and 2004 surveys and from the 2011 to 2012 collections; trends are similar when only 1 year is used for each time point as well as when additional years are pooled.

Time diary surveys conducted in the USA are similar in their objectives: to collect high-quality data on daily time patterns. They differ in sample design and survey administration; however, meaning the historical and contemporary data may not be strictly comparable in two ways. First, the 1965 study was limited to respondents aged 19–64 living in an urban family with at least one adult in the labor force (Converse & Robinson, 1980). In contrast, the later collections were nationally representative studies of respondents aged 18 and older. Studies that have compared a subsample of the 1975 data that corresponds with 1965 sample restrictions indicate that trends are similar regardless of whether the 1975 subsample or the full 1975 sample is used for comparison (Bianchi et al., 2006; Sayer, 2005). The 1965 sample characteristics also correspond with parent characteristics in the March 1965 CPS

(Sayer, 2005). This indicates any trends between 1965 and 1975 are not simply artifacts of sample differences between the two studies. Second, the 1965 and 1975 studies were done in person and had higher response rates but did not cover the entire year. The 1985 collection was more complex in that it consisted of three subsamples: (1) one recruited by telephone with eligible respondents mailed a survey and questionnaire that they completed for the assigned day and then mailed back; (2) the second subsample was recruited and diary data was collected via telephone interviews; and (3) the third subsample was recruited via in-person interviews with diary data collected via pencil-and-paper diaries. Because this last subsample is neither comparable to the 1975 nor the 1998 studies, I exclude those respondents from this analysis. The 1998 and 2003–2012 studies were conducted via telephone interviews, and studies since 1985 have lower response rates compared with the earlier collections, but include diary days over an entire year (Sayer, Bianchi, & Robinson, 2004). However, despite these limits on comparability, sensitivity analyses (not shown) suggest that study design and sample differences are not systematically biasing the time use trends.

The analytic sample consists of 23,297 women and 18,683 men (see Table 2 for specific sample sizes at each time point). I exclude individuals who report a disability and those who are under age 25 or over 59. Individuals who are not in the 25–59 age range are more likely to be retired or full-time students and the time use patterns of individuals in these groups are distinct from those of working age adults. Weights are used in all analyses to correct for nonresponse and adjust for the ATUS oversample of weekend days. Sample characteristics are shown in Table 1.

A number of studies have established the accuracy and reliability of the time diary method (Juster, 1999; Juster, Ono, & Stafford, 2003; Marini & Shelton, 1993). There are four approaches to collecting data on men's and women's time allocation: (1) stylized questions (e.g., questions that ask about how much time on average respondents spend in an activity over a set time period), (2) time diaries, (3) the experience sampling method (ESM), where respondents are contacted at a predetermined number of random intervals across the diary day, and (4) direct observation. The latter two methods may provide more accurate, objective reports of time use because they do not rely on the respondent's memory of activities; however, both are used infrequently because of the large sample size required for ESM studies to yield generalizable results and the higher relative cost (Juster et al., 2003). Consequently, stylized questions and time diaries are the more common methods for assessing time use (Juster, 1985).

Time diaries are thought to be more accurate than stylized questions for three reasons. First, time diary surveys minimize reporting burden because respondents report time use in a way that is natural. In contrast, in surveys that use stylized questions, respondents are asked how much time they spend in an activity in a typical week, a block of time that is not a normal accounting time frame for most individuals. Second, time diary surveys minimize the possibility of respondents presenting themselves in a more socially desirable light; since to do so, they would have to fabricate the bulk of their day (Robinson & Godbey, 1999; Stinson, 1999).

Table 1 Sample characteristics by gender and survey

	Women					
	1965	1975	1985	1998	2004	2012
Single no children	0.18	0.20	0.25	0.21	0.18	0.22
Married no children	0.21	0.22	0.29	0.26	0.29	0.26
Single parent	0.08	0.14	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.14
Married parent	0.54	0.44	0.36	0.41	0.40	0.38
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Aged 20–29	0.30	0.31	0.28	0.20	0.16	0.16
Aged 30–39	0.23	0.27	0.33	0.29	0.27	0.26
Aged 40–49	0.26	0.21	0.21	0.36	0.31	0.29
Aged 50–59	0.21	0.20	0.18	0.16	0.26	0.30
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
< High School	0.40	0.26	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.08
High school	0.41	0.46	0.46	0.34	0.31	0.28
Some college	0.09	0.15	0.21	0.30	0.27	0.27
College graduate	0.09	0.14	0.22	0.24	0.32	0.36
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Not employed	0.61	0.48	0.33	0.20	0.27	0.29
Part time	0.13	0.12	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.17
Full time	0.26	0.40	0.48	0.62	0.55	0.54
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Weekend diary	0.27	0.26	0.29	0.27	0.29	0.29
	Men					
	1965	*1975*	*1985*	*1998*	*2004*	*2012*
Single no children	0.22	0.26	0.28	0.36	0.22	0.28
Married no children	0.18	0.26	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.26
Single parent	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.05
Married parent	0.55	0.46	0.39	0.35	0.44	0.41
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Aged 20–29	0.32	0.33	0.29	0.25	0.15	0.13
Aged 30–39	0.21	0.27	0.32	0.26	0.28	0.26
Aged 40–49	0.26	0.22	0.20	0.32	0.31	0.30
Aged 50–59	0.21	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.26	0.31
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
< High school	0.42	0.25	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.11
High school	0.31	0.37	0.42	0.34	0.32	0.31
Some college	0.13	0.17	0.18	0.27	0.25	0.24
College graduate	0.15	0.21	0.29	0.29	0.32	0.35
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Not employed	0.03	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.11	0.14
Part time	0.15	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.05	0.06
Full time	0.82	0.81	0.75	0.80	0.84	0.80
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Weekend diary	0.30	0.26	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.29

Finally, time diary surveys provide more accurate assessments of time allocations because activities are coded consistently across respondents. In contrast, activities considered work or leisure may vary from person to person in surveys using stylized questions.

Time diary data also have disadvantages. The ATUS does not collect data on simultaneous activities, meaning gender differences in multitasking cannot be examined in the USA. This is a particularly consequential omission for trend studies of gendered time use. Further, although the consistent coding of activities facilitates analysis of time in activities, the US coding typologies do not allow researchers to examine gender gaps in activities that may blend obligatory and discretionary time, such as eating (biologically necessary but may also be social) and outings with children (a blend of childcare and leisure). Additionally, all of the US time diary data are cross-sectional snapshots, preventing causal analyses of how transitions into and out of employment, marriage, and parental status affect daily time patterns. These shortcomings may understate gender differences in housework, childcare, and leisure time.

Time Use Measures

Time use estimates are constructed from the minutes per day reported in specific primary activities on the diary day, divided by 60 to convert minutes into hours per day. Activities are grouped into eight major categories: paid work, housework, childcare, care of adults, shopping and services, civic and religious activities, self-care, and leisure. Results for all categories are shown in Table 2; the analysis then focuses on housework, childcare, self-care (including sleep), and leisure, because these are activities that most respondents do on a regular basis, and they are also the domains most closely associated with historical differences in the division of labor and with well-being. Paid work is included in the descriptive tables to be able to present a complete snapshot of daily time allocations, but as gender differences in work hours are well-documented elsewhere, paid work is not the focus of this chapter.

Housework includes both daily time-consuming activities of cooking and cleaning (house cleaning, meal clean up, laundry, and ironing) and more infrequent discretionary activities (lawn care, outdoor chores, pet care, repairs and routine maintenance, bill paying, and household management). Household shopping and services (e.g., car repairs or going to the bank) are included in the shopping and services category because it is not possible to distinguish grocery shopping from other types of shopping, or determine housework-related services in the historical US time diary studies. The housework literature documents convincingly that core housework takes more time and is also more gendered (e.g., women do most of it) compared with more discretionary housework (Cooke & Baxter, 2010).

Childcare is distinguished into two types of activities: daily and developmental. Daily physical care includes infant and toddler care (bathing, dressing, and feeding),

Table 2 1965–2012 Trends and Gender Differences in Minutes per Day of Paid Work, Unpaid Work, Self Care, and Leisure

	Women											
PANEL A	1965		1975		1985		1998		2004		2012	
	Mean	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*
Paid work	**132**	**223**	**182**	**246**	**216**	**255**	**290**	**284**	**237**	**270**	**235**	**271**
Housework	**244**	**158**	**183**	**148**	**160**	**138**	**140**	**144**	**147**	**144**	**141**	**140**
Core Housework	219	148	163	134	132	120	109	121	113	120	111	122
Cooking	76	55	68	56	56	57	44	56	37	48	40	51
Cleaning	96	77	68	81	57	73	44	80	53	79	52	86
Laundry	48	74	27	53	19	42	21	52	22	50	19	49
Noncore Housework	25	51	19	59	28	65	31	75	35	74	29	66
Outdoor Chores	3	19	5	32	4	23	8	42	2	21	2	22
Indoor Chores	3	29	6	41	5	37	4	37	5	35	3	25
Gardening & Pet Care	4	15	4	15	6	30	7	23	14	46	13	42
Household Management	14	34	4	18	13	38	12	43	13	41	11	38
Child Care	**58**	**85**	**47**	**78**	**44**	**85**	**61**	**104**	**67**	**115**	**64**	**113**
Daily Child Care	49	76	37	65	34	68	43	79	49	92	44	85
Developmental Child Care	9	27	10	28	10	33	18	55	18	49	20	55
Adult Care	**8**	**40**	**9**	**41**	**4**	**26**	**3**	**22**	**14**	**57**	**9**	**44**
Civic & Religious	**23**	**68**	**27**	**74**	**21**	**71**	**14**	**60**	**19**	**65**	**21**	**69**
Shopping & Services	**62**	**85**	**53**	**77**	**62**	**93**	**63**	**99**	**60**	**88**	**51**	**83**
Shopping	18	34	27	48	31	58	32	59	49	78	42	71
Services	44	73	26	45	32	57	31	63	11	38	9	42
Self Care	**641**	**132**	**653**	**152**	**643**	**129**	**632**	**147**	**639**	**148**	**656**	**154**
Sleep	**481**	**120**	**501**	**123**	**482**	**111**	**483**	**116**	**504**	**126**	**517**	**130**
Eating	76	43	76	43	73	48	67	59	69	60	69	58
Personal care	84	59	76	146	88	70	81	91	65	71	69	80
Leisure	**272**	**153**	**286**	**178**	**289**	**181**	**239**	**199**	**258**	**184**	**262**	**190**
Television	**89**	**93**	**120**	**117**	**118**	**119**	**107**	**141**	**124**	**135**	**133**	**145**

Table 2 (continued)

Women												
Cognitive Leisure	60	75	54	96	50	85	32	75	36	72	37	76
Social Leisure	88	107	68	92	69	93	56	96	61	105	54	101
Active Leisure	6	27	15	51	18	56	17	54	13	45	15	50
Cultural Leisure	3	20	2	16	3	19	3	21	6	34	5	31
Spectator	17	45	14	41	20	63	11	35	2	24	2	24
Relaxing	8	26	13	46	10	35	14	51	17	53	16	53
N=23,297	637		604		1,770		508		11,862		7,916	
Men												
PANEL B	1965		1975		1985		1998		2004		2012	
	Mean	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*
Paid work	**412**	**251**	**375**	**273**	**359**	**285**	**352**	**316**	**353**	**298**	**347**	**301**
Housework	**36**	**62**	**50**	**90**	**78**	**117**	**100**	**132**	**87**	**130**	**83**	**123**
Core housework	16	38	18	46	32	67	49	83	34	67	40	72
Cooking	8	20	10	24	16	35	20	39	14	29	16	32
Cleaning	7	20	7	30	14	48	24	65	17	49	19	53
Laundry	1	10	1	14	3	18	6	21	4	21	5	25
Noncore Housework	20	47	32	75	46	95	51	111	52	108	43	97
Outdoor Chores	4	18	7	32	11	43	22	76	13	60	10	55
Indoor Chores	9	35	15	57	16	62	14	63	11	58	7	42
Gardening & Pet Care	2	8	5	23	6	32	6	38	19	58	18	58
Household Management	6	24	5	27	13	48	8	37	10	36	8	32
Child Care	**13**	**36**	**14**	**46**	**14**	**46**	**26**	**66**	**30**	**71**	**32**	**79**
Daily Child Care	7	21	11	39	9	34	16	45	19	54	20	59
Developmental Child Care	6	27	3	16	5	22	10	36	10	37	12	44
Adult Care	**3**	**32**	**8**	**35**	**4**	**26**	**3**	**20**	**14**	**62**	**10**	**46**
Civic & Religious	**17**	**58**	**15**	**56**	**13**	**52**	**21**	**69**	**15**	**60**	**15**	**61**
Shopping & Services	**47**	**77**	**34**	**66**	**41**	**74**	**35**	**79**	**41**	**78**	**38**	**75**

Table 2 (continued)

Men												
Shopping	13	30	14	36	16	39	13	41	33	69	32	68
Services	34	63	20	43	25	50	21	59	8	35	6	30
Self Care	**635**	**124**	**637**	**148**	**626**	**140**	**623**	**176**	**612**	**150**	**627**	**148**
Sleep	**472**	**109**	**484**	**128**	**472**	**122**	**479**	**147**	**490**	**131**	**500**	**125**
Eating	92	46	89	58	79	53	71	67	75	63	75	63
Personal Care	71	47	64	94	75	74	73	94	47	63	52	70
Leisure	**276**	**175**	**306**	**209**	**304**	**203**	**279**	**226**	**287**	**211**	**289**	**218**
Television	**110**	**120**	**135**	**141**	**132**	**136**	**103**	**122**	**151**	**156**	**158**	**169**
Cognitive Leisure	50	66	48	84	41	75	32	82	37	83	36	84
Social Leisure	67	104	68	107	59	97	59	121	49	102	45	99
Active Leisure	14	45	26	82	35	92	38	92	22	74	23	70
Cultural Leisure	7	39	4	28	3	22	6	28	5	34	4	28
Spectator	19	44	14	33	21	60	19	61	3	26	2	22
Relaxing	11	25	11	39	13	51	22	69	21	64	21	66
N = 18,683	495		498		1,447		399		9,350		6,494	
Ratio Women's to Men's Time												
PANEL C	1965		1975		1985		1998		2004		2012	
Paid Work	0.32		0.49		0.60		0.82		0.67		0.68	
Housework	6.83		3.65		2.04		1.39		1.70		1.70	
Core Housework	14.08		9.08		4.10		2.21		3.28		2.80	
Cooking	9.92		6.98		3.54		2.25		2.76		2.44	
Cleaning	14.57		10.09		4.13		1.83		3.12		2.79	
Laundry	34.56		18.63		7.36		3.67		5.81		4.09	
Noncore Housework	1.23		0.61		0.60		0.60		0.66		0.68	
Outdoor Chores	0.87		0.73		0.35		0.35		0.19		0.21	
Indoor Chores	0.38		0.39		0.29		0.27		0.44		0.42	
Gardening & Pet Care	2.58		0.87		0.96		1.10		0.76		0.73	

Table 2 (continued)

	Ratio Women's to Men's Time											
Household Management	2.34		0.78		0.99		1.42		1.35		1.40	
Child Care	4.35		3.41		3.22		2.29		2.23		2.00	
Daily Child Care	6.92		3.43		3.93		2.67		2.51		2.22	
Developmental Child Care	1.42		3.34		2.01		1.72		1.71		1.63	
Adult Care	2.49		1.15		1.03		0.82		1.01		1.00	
Civic & Religious	1.37		1.75		1.61		0.66		1.21		1.35	
Shopping & Services	1.32		1.55		1.51		1.79		1.44		1.36	
Shopping	1.38		1.91		1.93		2.35		1.46		1.33	
Services	1.30		1.30		1.25		1.43		1.35		1.54	
Self Care	1.01		1.02		1.03		1.01		1.04		1.05	
Sleep	1.02		1.03		1.02		1.01		1.03		1.03	
Eating	0.83		0.86		0.92		0.94		0.93		0.92	
Personal Care	1.18		1.18		1.18		1.12		1.37		1.34	
Leisure	0.98		0.94		0.95		0.86		0.90		0.91	
Television	0.82		0.89		0.89		1.04		0.82		0.84	
Cognitive Leisure	1.21		1.14		1.24		0.97		0.99		1.03	
Social Leisure	1.32		1.01		1.16		0.93		1.23		1.20	
Active Leisure	0.41		0.56		0.53		0.45		0.61		0.67	
Cultural Leisure	0.42		0.36		0.81		0.57		1.07		1.14	
Spectator	0.91		1.02		0.95		0.56		0.86		1.10	
Relaxing	0.78		1.23		0.81		0.66		0.81		0.76	

Note: author calculations using American Time Use Survey, 2003–2012

general supervision of children aged five and over, medical care of children, making telephone calls about children, organizing care or events for children, interacting with childcare providers, and travel associated with childcare activities. Developmental activities include teaching children about an activity, playing with children, reading and helping children with homework or other tasks. Developmental childcare may signal parental time investments of greater quality or engagement and is also more discretionary, and perhaps more enjoyable for parents. Estimates of childcare do not include supervisory or "accessible" time when parents are available to children but not actively engaged with them and thus underestimate all parental time caring for children. The ATUS data include measures of the time parents have children "in their care," but this measure is not comparable with earlier collections that include time in simultaneous activities, like making dinner and childcare (Bianchi et al., 2006). Mothers spend more time than fathers supervising and being available to children, meaning the estimates here likely understate gender differences. Time in childcare activities is also limited to a specific set of childcare activities, instead of reflecting time with children in any activity.

Paid work consists of time at work, commuting time, income-generating activities such as making items for sale, and time in work-related activities, such as socializing with clients as part of one's job. Time spent looking for a job is also included as paid work, as is time in classes that are taken for professional training or advancement. Note that individuals who are not employed per CPS definitions may still report time in paid work activities because of the inclusion of income-generating and job search activities.

Self-care includes time spent sleeping, eating, obtaining or performing health-related care, and using personal services (such as getting a haircut), personal or private activities (e.g., intimacy with a partner, using the toilet), and grooming. Because it is associated with healthy functioning, sleep is the primary focus of analyses of gender differences in time use.

Total leisure is constructed by summing minutes per day reported in social and recreational activities, exercise or sports, media use, and relaxing. Seven specific types of leisure activities were also constructed: television, cognitive, social, active, cultural, spectator, and relaxing activities. *Television* consists of minutes per day in passive screen time (watching traditional television or content on the web or an electronic device). *Cognitive activities* include taking classes, art, music, and performance activities, reading and writing for personal pleasure, and general web surfing for pleasure. *Social activities* include attending and hosting parties or receptions and general socializing and communicating with others. *Active leisure* includes sports, exercise, and recreational physical activities like swimming, bicycling, and hiking. *Cultural leisure* consists of going to museums, theater, or arts events. *Spectator leisure* includes attending sporting or entertainment events. *Relaxing leisure* is sedentary time in general relaxation, listening to music, and thinking. Respondents report little time on most leisure types aside from television; preliminary analyses also indicate substantial differences by gender in time spent watching television. Hence, although descriptive results are shown for each of the seven types of leisure, television is the focus.

The chapter first discusses trends in average minutes per day in aggregate and disaggregated types of paid work, housework, childcare, adult care, civic and religious activities, shopping and services, self-care, and leisure. This is done to provide a comprehensive assessment of how gender differences in all types of time use have changed between 1965 and 2013. The chapter then examines how education and family status are associated with gender differences in housework, childcare, sleep, all leisure, and television, and if associations have changed over time.

Trends and Gender Differences in Time use

Table 2 shows women's and men's 24 h time allocation across eight major types of activities: paid work, housework, childcare, adult care, civic and religious, shopping and services, self-care, and leisure. Specific activities, like cooking, daily childcare, sleep, and the disaggregated leisure categories (television, cognitive, social, active, cultural, spectator, and relaxing), are also shown because of the influence these activities have on economic and health outcomes and gender equality broadly. Women's average minutes per day in each activity are shown in Panel A, men's in Panel B, and the ratio of women's to men's time in Panel C.

The overall results suggest remarkable—and to gender scholars disquieting—stability in recent decades. The gender division of paid work, housework, and care work is markedly more similar in 2012 compared with 1965. However, much of this convergence took place by 1975, with smaller changes occurring between 1975 and 1985, and little change since 1985 in most types of time use. The stability in gendered time use patterns resembles the stall in employment trends and the emergence of ideologies of egalitarianism in opportunities coupled with ideologies that women and men are essentially different in their work/family ideals (Charles & Bradley, 2009; England, 2011). The US data mirror trends in other English-speaking and Western and Eastern European countries (Man et al., 2011; Sayer, 2010).

Looking first at paid work trends, women's paid work increased about 2 h, from 2 h 12 min (hours, minutes) in 1965 to just under 4 h in 2012. In contrast, men's paid work declined about an hour, falling from just under 7 h in 1965 to about 6 h in 2012. Most of this change happened prior to 1985. Only 19 min of women's increased paid work and 12 min of men's decreased paid work occurred between 1985 and 2012.

Nonetheless, women's and men's paid work time is much more similar today. In 1965, women did only 30% as much paid work as men compared with 60% as much in 1985 and 68% as much in 2012. Further, the proportion of women reporting paid work activities on the diary day increased about 20 percentage points (32% or women reported paid work in 1965 and 51% in 2012, results not shown). More women engaging in paid work accounts for some of the increase in paid work hours, but work hours also rose by about an hour even when estimates are restricted to women reporting paid work activities. In contrast, fewer men reported paid work hours on the diary day after 1985 (78% in 1965 compared with 66% in 2012), and this decrease in men reporting employment accounts for all of the decline in men's



Fig. 1 Gender differences and trends in housework

paid work time. Men reporting paid work activities indicated they spent about 8.5 h/day at each time point.

Turning to housework, Table 2 indicates that women's housework dropped 1 h 45 min between 1965 and 2012, from 4 h to 2 h 21 min. Similar to paid work trends, only 19 min of the decrease occurred after 1985. The largest drop in women's housework came between 1965 and 1975, when it declined from 4 h to 3 h 3 min. Declines are due not only to slightly fewer women reporting housework (88% in 2012 compared with 96% in 1965) but also less time spent doing housework among those reporting the activity. Trends in men's housework are nonlinear, tripling between 1965 and 1998 (36 min to 1 h 40 min), but then decreasing about 20 min (1 h 23 min) by 2012. Significantly, more men report housework on the diary day: about 70% since 1985 compared with 50% in 1975 and 1965, but even among those reporting, trends are nonlinear. This suggests men's inclination to do housework has increased, but time spent among those doing housework has not shifted as much, and has stalled or perhaps reversed. Gender differences in housework have diminished considerably, but more from women's steep decline than from men's increase. Women did 1.7 times men's housework in 2012 compared with 6.8 times in 1965. This is progress but also suggests gender equality in housework remains more of a distant goal than everyday reality, particularly given the modest decline in men's housework since the late 1990s.

Underscoring continued gender inequities in household labor are the higher ratios for core housework; women do 2.8 times more regular, daily housework than men, whereas the ratio is 0.7 for noncore housework (see Table 2). To highlight this pattern, Fig. 1 graphs gender differences in average daily minutes cooking, cleaning, doing laundry, and in noncore housework, like yard work and maintenance.

In 2012, women did 2.4 times as much cooking (40 min compared with 16 min), 2.8 times as much cleaning (52 min compared with 19 min), and 4.1 times as much laundry as men (19 min compared with 5 min, respectively); declines from ratios of 14.1, 9.9, and 14.6, respectively, in 1965 (1985 ratios are 3.5, 4, and 7.4). Laundry

continues to be the household task men are most resistant to performing (Bittman, Matheson, & Meagher, 1999; Twiggs, McQuillan, & Ferree, 1999).

Gender differences in the ratio of women's to men's time in noncore housework flipped, however, going from women doing 1.3 times more in 1965 compared with only 70% as much in 2012. However, the decline in the ratio comes entirely from men's increased time in noncore activities, about 23 min compared with only a 2 min (nonsignificant) decline among women. At each time point, women reported about 30 min a day of nonroutine housework; men reported 20 min a day in 1965 and 43 min in 2012, with 18 min accounted for by lawn and pet care. The increase may come from the bigger lawns and houses today compared with earlier time periods.

Both core and noncore housework activities are likely a mix of work and pleasure. For example, some women and men may enjoy shopping in preparation for a home-cooked dinner; others (and perhaps the same individuals) may enjoy maintaining the lawn in putting green condition. However, the ability to schedule even those tasks one enjoys when it is most convenient, or when one enjoys them but is not obligated to do them, is consequential for gender equality (Bianchi et al., 2012; DeVault, 1991). An overgrown, weedy yard may earn you a disparaging glance from the neighbors but is nonetheless easier to ignore for a few weeks than an overflowing sink full of dirty dishes, moldering produce, and a filthy bathroom. Some housework has to be done to meet daily needs for food, clean clothes, and maintain some level of domestic hygiene. Meals can be prepared with convenience products and/or supplied with take-out, but even these labor-saving strategies generate dirty dishes. Additionally, some types of housework cannot be outsourced, unless one has a live-in housekeeper—like tidying up the house at the end of the day, unloading the dishwasher, and putting household items away. The urgency and necessity of doing at least some housework oneself and cultural beliefs that encode these types of housework as women's responsibilities as good wives and mothers are key factors underlying still large gender disparities in housework.

Paid work and housework trends among parents are similar to those for all women and men, with the caveat that the division of labor is more gendered among parents. For example, mothers do less paid work (a ratio of 0.57 in 2012) and more housework (a ratio of 1.9 in 2012) compared with fathers and compared with women who do not have children.

Figure 2 shows trends in mothers' and fathers' core and noncore housework, daily childcare and developmental childcare.

In addition to doing substantially more core housework than fathers, mothers also do more childcare. Gaps have shrunk, but mothers continue to devote about twice as much time to childcare as fathers in 2012, with larger gender gaps in daily childcare time (a ratio of 2.04) than for developmental childcare (ratio of 1.46). However, unlike the downward trend in women's housework and the more modest uptick in men's housework that stalled in the mid-1980s, both mothers and fathers have steadily increased time investments in daily and developmental childcare, since 1975. Among mothers, childcare time declined significantly between 1965 and 1975, falling from 1 h 30 min to just over an hour (1 h 12 min). After no change in 1985, mothers' childcare time rose 42 min to 1 h 42 min in 1998 to just under 2 h



Fig. 2 Trends in mothers' & fathers' housework and childcare

in 2004 and 2012. Fathers' childcare was stable from 1965 to 1985, at about 20 min a day, before increasing 41 min by 2012.

Parents have increased time in both daily and developmental childcare activities since the 1970s, in part by reallocating time from housework to childcare (more so for mothers than fathers, as shown in Fig. 2). Mothers do about twice as much daily care as developmental care, but the proportion of mothers reporting developmental activities on the diary day increased 15 percentage points (27% in 1975 to 42% in 2012, results not shown). Among those reporting developmental childcare, the average time investments just about doubled, from 56 to 93 min over the same period.

Fathers' time is more evenly split between daily and developmental childcare time, but they too spend more time in daily care (17 min for daily and 5 min for developmental in 1975, compared with 34 and 21 min in 2012). Additionally, in 2012, 44% of fathers reported daily care on the diary day compared with 32% in 1975; comparable estimates for developmental care are 27 and 20%. Hence, a larger proportion of fathers' increased childcare investments are directed toward daily childcare today than in the 1960s. This suggests that fathers are not concentrating increased childcare time to a select group of activities (e.g., those that are more fun or rewarding) but instead are substantially more involved with the day-to-day care of their children. More of fathers' time caring for children is done with the mother present, whereas mothers are more likely to do childcare activities of all types with only the child present (Craig & Mullan, 2011). Less is known about how parents interpret solo and shared parenting vis-à-vis equity in the division of labor. More solo childcare time among mothers could signal persistent gender disparities in associations of care of children with parental identities and feelings of primary responsibility for children. Nonetheless, although mothers continue to do twice as much childcare as fathers, the trend data suggest childcare is one arena in which progress toward a less gendered division of labor has inched forward.

The data shown in Table 2 and Figs. 1 and 2 are not adjusted for employment, educational, and family status differences, key factors that influence time use. Tables 3 (all women and men) and 4 (mothers and fathers) present regression-adjusted means for housework and childcare. (Trends in sleep, leisure, and television are discussed below.)

Accounting for higher proportions of women who are not employed or work fewer hours than men (either in part-time employment or shorter weekly work hours among full-time women workers) reduces gender differences in housework, as shown in Fig. 3 (predicted housework trends by gender and employment status).

As predicted by the time availability hypothesis, individuals who devote more time to paid work have less time available for housework. The negative association of employment hours and housework time is clearly evident in Fig. 3. Employment hours have a sharper negative association with women's housework, because of gendered reasons for nonemployment and the gendered symbolic meaning of housework. Women's family responsibilities are more often the reason they are not employed, whereas men are more likely to be nonemployed because of health or disability factors that limit their ability to engage in paid work. These same factors likely reduce their ability to engage in (much) housework. The symbolic encoding of housework as feminine also may deter men who are not fulfilling expectations of hegemonic masculinity that require successful performance of breadwinning from engaging in too much housework, whereas it reinforces cultural beliefs that housework is women's work, regardless of employment status.

Figure 3 also indicates that housework differences have narrowed for women and men in all employment statuses, but the gender gap has declined more among women and men employed full-time. For example, gender gaps in housework among full-time employed women and men in 1965 were about 2.5 h (183 min for women and 35 min for men), whereas the gender gap was only 35 min in 2012 (109 min for women and 74 min for men). Among women and men who were not employed at each time point, the gender gap in housework was just over 3 h in 1965 and just over 1 h in 2012. Regardless of employment status, however, the increase in men's housework time stalled in 1985: men who were not employed reported 74 min of housework in 1985 and 2012; those who were employed full-time reported 125 min of housework at both time points. Women too shed housework regardless of employment status, and most of the decline occurred prior to 1985.

Figure 4 shows similar negative associations of employment with childcare: employed mothers and fathers report less time in childcare at each time point than those who are not employed or employed part-time.

For example, in 2012 fathers who are employed full-time report 61 min of childcare, compared with 104 min among fathers who are not employed. Comparable comparisons for mothers are 85 min among those employed full-time and 153 min among mothers who are not employed. Gender differences in childcare time are smaller for parents who are employed full-time at each time, and there is some suggestion in Fig. 4 that gaps may have widened since the mid-1980s. In 1965 and 1975, the gap in full-time employed mother's and father's childcare was about 10 min a day, a difference that is not significant, whereas in 2012, the gender gap in

Table 3 Regression adjusted means of women's and men's minutes per day of housework, sleep, and leisure

Women																		
	1965			1975			1985			1998			2004			2012		
	Mean	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*	
Housework	220	5		166	5	E	150	3	DE	132	6	CD	138	1	C	132	1	C
Sleep	468	5	A	491	5	BCDE	476	3	AB	482	6	ABCD	499	1	DE	512	1	F
Leisure	242	7	A	266	7	AB	277	4	B	239	8	A	247	2	A	253	2	A
Television	70	5		106	6	A	110	3	A	106	6	A	117	1	A	128	1	AB
N=23,297	637			604			1770			508			11862			7916		
Men																		
	1965			1975			1985			1998			2004			2012		
	Mean	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*	
Housework	51	5	A	61	5	A	84	3	B	103	6	B	92	1	B	87	1	B
Sleep	492	5	BCDE	498	5	CDEF	479	3	ABC	482	6	ABCD	497	1	DE	507	1	EF
Leisure	333	8	D	343	8	D	324	4	D	283	8	BC	306	2	C	306	2	C
Television	141	6	BCD	156	6	CDE	144	3	C	106	7	A	161	2	DE	166	2	E
N=18,683	495			498			1447			399			9350			6494		
Ratio women's to men's time																		
	1965			1975			1985			1998			2004			2012		
Housework	4.29			2.73			1.79			1.28			1.51			1.52		
Sleep	0.95			0.99			0.99			1.00			1.00			1.01		
Leisure	0.73			0.77			0.85			0.85			0.81			0.83		
Television	0.50			0.68			0.76			1.00			0.73			0.77		

Author calculations using American Time Use Survey, 2003–2012

Margins sharing a letter in the group label are not significantly different at the 5% level.

Table 4 Regression adjusted means of mothers' and fathers' minutes per day of housework, childcare, sleep, and leisure

Mothers																	
	1965			1975			1985			1998			2004			2012		
	Mean	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*	
Housework	248	6		183	6	E	166	4	E	157	8	DE	148	2	D	147	2	D
Childcare	65	5	DE	56	5	BCDE	65	4	DE	93	6	FG	106	1	G	104	1	G
Sleep	459	5	A	485	6	ABCDE	475	4	AB	476	7	ABCD	495	2	DE	507	2	F
Leisure	247	8	AB	256	8	BCD	259	6	BC	221	10	AB	219	2	A	220	2	A
Television	74	6	A	107	6	B	107	4	B	102	8	AB	104	2	B	109	2	B
N=13,668	407			366			819			266			7014			4796		
Fathers																		
	1965			1975			1985			1998			2004			2012		
	Mean	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*		*Mean*	*SE*	
Housework	62	7	A	70	7	AB	95	4	BC	110	9	C	93	2	BC	90	2	BC
Childcare	39	6	ABC	34	6	AB	30	4	A	67	7	CDEF	62	2	D	73	2	EF
Sleep	498	6	BCDEF	502	7	CDEF	477	4	ABC	488	8	ABCDEF	493	2	DE	505	2	EF
Leisure	334	9	F	328	10	F	304	6	EF	271	12	BCDE	282	3	D	276	3	CD
Television	148	7	CD	151	7	CD	141	4	CD	113	9	BC	144	2	CD	146	2	D
N=9888	336			246			627			157			5096			3426		
Ratio mothers' to fathers' time																		
	1965			1975			1985			1998			2004			2012		
Housework	3.99			2.61			1.75			1.43			1.60			1.63		
Childcare	1.65			1.63			2.17			1.40			1.70			1.43		
Sleep	0.92			0.97			0.99			0.98			1.00			1.00		
Leisure	0.74			0.78			0.85			0.82			0.78			0.80		
Television	0.50			0.71			0.76			0.90			0.72			0.74		

Author calculations using American Time Use Survey, 2003–2012

Margins sharing a letter in the group label are not significantly different at the 5% level.



Fig. 3 Predicted housework trends by gender and employment



Fig. 4 Parents' childcare trends by employment

childcare was about 25 min. Childcare increased among parents in all employment statuses, and increases were sharper for all groups since the mid-1980s. This suggests widespread behavioral changes among mothers and fathers, perhaps triggered by the emergence of norms of intensive mothering and involved fatherhood. This interpretation is supported by detailed analyses of trends in childcare in the USA and Europe (Bianchi et al., 2006; Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg, 2004).

Having a college education and marital and parental status are the other major influences on housework and childcare. Figure 5 shows the 1965–2012 trend in women's and men's housework time by college education. Women with a college



Fig. 5 Predicted Housework trends by gender and college

degree do less housework at each time point, but housework has declined for women with and without a college degree. More-educated women are more egalitarian than less-educated women, are more likely to be employed, and with the bifurcation of employment hours, are more likely to work in relatively longer hour jobs (Cohen, 2014). Both factors work to reduce time investments in housework, as shown in Fig. 5. However, the negative influence of college on women's housework hours has attenuated over time. College-educated women's housework was 23 min lower than less-educated women's housework in 1965, but only 10 min lower in 2012. This is a much smaller difference than the 1 h decline from 1965 to 2012 observed for women with and without a college degree.

Among men, Fig. 5 shows a similar nonlinear trend in housework among college-educated and less-educated men; for both, housework increased from 1965 to 1998, and then decreased modestly. Theoretically, college-educated men are more egalitarian compared with less-educated men and thus should do more housework. However, differences in men's housework by education are not significant. Hence, results point to widespread behavioral change among women and men, regardless of educational status, that worked to decrease women's but increase men's housework.

College more sharply differentiates mothers' and fathers' childcare time, as shown in Fig. 6. Parents with a college education do more childcare compared to those without a college education. Results are similar comparing parents with less than high school, high school degree, and some college, suggesting additional years of education are positively associated with childcare time, but a college degree is particularly influential.

Figure 6 reveals two key findings. First, the positive influence of college on parent's time in childcare activities intensified between 1965 and 1998, but has remained stable since then. Gaps between college-educated and noncollege-educated



Fig. 6 Parents' childcare trends by college

parent's childcare time have doubled, consistent with other research documenting class differences in parenting behaviors (Lareau, 2003). In 1965, college-educated mothers reported about 20 more minutes in childcare than mothers without a college education; in 2012, the difference was over 40 min a day. Among fathers, those with a college education did 16 more minutes of childcare in 1965 and just under 30 min in 2012. Hence, the rate of positive increase in childcare time is stronger among college-educated than noncollege-educated parents.

Second, gender gaps in childcare time are similar comparing women and men by education level. College increases mothers' and fathers' childcare time, but it does not shrink the gender gap in care. Between 1965 and 1985, both college- and noncollege-educated mothers did about three times as much childcare as comparable fathers, whereas after 1985, mothers of all educational statuses do about twice as much childcare as comparable fathers.

Moving back to the descriptive data shown in Table 2, we see that adult care, civic and religious activities, and shopping and services—all activities bundled under the broad category of committed time or unpaid work in conventional time diary typologies—reveal three things. First, as anticipated, few women and men report adult care and civic/religious activities on the diary day. These activities are engaged in by fewer adults, are done every day by a more select group of adults, and thus they are more likely to be "missed" by the one-day snapshot method of the US time diaries. For example, even with the large sample sizes of the ATUS, in 2012, only 12 % of women and 11 % of men reported adult-care activities. Second, gender differences in these activities are modest, counter to findings in the literature that women engage in helping and volunteering more than men (Wilson & Musick, 1997). Differences between the ATUS data and other surveys could be due to the smaller precision in time diary studies of time in activities that occur on a less regular basis. Last, because coding differences between the historical and contemporary time diary data do not allow researchers to distinguish necessary shopping from discretionary shopping, it is more complicated to interpret the meaning of gender

differences in shopping. The trend data shown in Table 2 indicate that women spend more time shopping and obtaining services (an hour a day compared with between 30–50 min among men). Analyses of the ATUS data not shown indicate women spend more time in both grocery shopping and in services, but more research is needed on factors associated with this difference, as well as research on whether shopping and services are related to gender inequality in the same ways gender influences other types of household work, and how women and men make sense of their time in grocery shopping versus other types of shopping.

Looking next at gender differences in self-care, time diary data in Table 2 show no significant trend or gender differences. Women and men report about 10 h 30 min sleeping, eating, and in other types of personal care. Sleep accounts for about 8 of these 10 h at each time point, counter to contemporary popular narratives about sleep-deprived adults. Additionally, results adjusted for employment status, age group, education, and marital and parental status shown in Tables 3 (all women and men), 4 (parents), and 5 (women and men by college and family status) reveal no gender disparities or significant trends in self-care. Results not shown indicate nonemployed and part-time employed women and men devote significantly more time to sleep compared with those who are employed full-time. It is likely disability status or health issues account both for higher sleep time and being employed less than full-time. Similar results are found when comparisons are limited to parents. Studies that have examined the quality of sleep indicate women's sleep is more often disturbed by partners or children and that feelings of stress from too much work and too little time may negatively affect sleep quality more strongly among women than men (Burgard & Ailshire, 2013; Maume, Sebastian, & Bardo, 2010). Gendered sleep inequities may thus be reflected more in sleep quality than quantity.

Gender differences and trends in leisure also do not correspond with popular narratives of 24/7 demands. Unadjusted estimates shown in Table 2 indicate women's leisure declined about 30 min between 1965 and 1998, but then increased to about 4 h 22 min in 2012, not significantly different than the 1965 estimate of 4 h 32 min. Men's leisure did not change significantly, accounting for 4 h 26 min in 1965 and 4 h 49 min in 2012. However, estimates in Tables 2 and 3 do show a gender leisure gap of about 30 min. Adjusting for employment, education, family status, and age increases the gender leisure gap to about an hour (253 min for women compared with 306 min for men, see Table 3). Comparing leisure time in Tables 3 and 4 shows that parents have less leisure than nonparents but the size of the gender gap is quite similar.

Scholars have interpreted the gender gap in leisure as an emerging indicator of the evolving and resilient ways the gender division of labor remained a linchpin of gender inequality (Sayer 2005). Disaggregating leisure into categories that reflect distinct opportunities and contexts for social integration and enhancement of physical and cognitive capabilities afford a more nuanced lens on whether the gender gap in leisure is disadvantageous to women. Tables 2, 3, and 4 indicate gender differences in television time account for over half of the gender gap in leisure. Men spend more daily time watching television compared with women, although the gap has decreased over time. In 1965, the gender gap in television time was 70 min,



Fig. 7 Trends in leisure by gender

with men's 141 min double women's 70 min; in 2012, the gap was 34 min because of larger increases in television time among women than men. Table 4 shows that television time among fathers remained stable, at about 145 min a day, whereas mothers increased television time by about 30 min to 109 min in 2012.

Gender differences and trends in cognitive, social, active, cultural, and spectator leisure shown in Table 2 and Fig. 7 underscore that the television time accounts for the gender gap in leisure. Gender differences in other types of leisure are either insignificant or modest.

Women report slightly less time in active leisure and relaxing, and slightly more time socializing, compared with men. Women's lower time in active leisure is consistent with studies using self-reported long-term time in exercise and sports. These studies attribute differences to gendered caregiving responsibilities that reduce available time or restrict mobility more sharply for women than men (Bird & Rieker, 2008; Nomaguchi & Bianchi, 2004). Larger friendship networks and greater emphasis in women's friendships on talking and sharing may account for the gender difference in socializing. The data also indicate that substantially less time is allocated to these types of leisure than to television. One reason is the lower regular frequency with which women and men engage in these types of leisure. Socializing with others, and attending cultural and spectator events, requires schedule coordination, some travel, and in many cases, money.

Multivariate analyses support the descriptive gender differences and trends. The adjusted means shown in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that employment, education, and family status have similar influences on women's and men's leisure time. College-educated individuals watch less television and engage in more active leisure; employed individuals have less time available for leisure and spend less of that time watching television. Parents have less leisure and spend less time watching television compared to women and men without children. Age differences are modest for both gender differences and differences over time.

Discussion

In sum, the time diary data on gendered time use support two of the most consistent findings from earlier analyses. First, women and men spend time in more similar ways today compared with the 1960s and 1970s. Second, this is because women have changed their daily time use patterns more substantially than men have changed theirs. The high-quality, large-sample, representative findings from the 2003 to 2012 ATUS data reinforce the large body of work documenting these differences. The new finding from this analysis is that about half of the gender gap in leisure time is accounted for by television. One possible interpretation of the gender gap in leisure is that men's protection of leisure time signals greater privilege and power regardless of how they spend their leisure time. The idea is that men are able to watch more television, perhaps because they enjoy it, and the reason men are able to exercise greater preference in their time use choices is because they have higher relative resources and/or power than women. This interpretation frames the gender gap as a story of women's disadvantage. However, another possible interpretation is that men watch more television because they are more socially isolated. The idea here is that employment and family roles connect individuals to others in society. Women have added employment roles to family roles, and more women than men are raising children as single adults. Women's friendship networks are also more expansive and enduring compared with men's. Hence, women are more anchored to both family and employment today than historically, whereas men's connection to families outside of a married partnership is more tenuous. Men may devote a greater share and more time to television because this type of leisure does not require social integration. This framing presents the gender gap in leisure more in terms of men's disadvantage.

This analysis updates trends from 1965 through 2012 and documents remarkable stability in time use patterns over the past 30 years. This period is characterized by women outpacing men in earning college degrees, growing acceptance of married mothers' employment combined with mothers reducing time out of the labor force for caregiving, and growth in the number of single parent and dual earner families, and single-person households. Theoretically, considering these factors in isolation, each should have worked to further reduce gender differences in time use, because women and men allocate time in more similar ways when they are single, when they are not raising children, and when they have similar resources from education and employment. Over the period, however, associations between having a college degree, and entry into marriage and parenthood within marriage, as well as having a stable job with reasonable pay and benefits, strengthened (Cohen, 2014). Families today have "diverging destinies"; women and men with a college degree are more likely to get married and remain married, and to have children within marriage, compared with less-educated individuals. These factors affect time availability and resources, but it is an open question how they affect time use patterns.

This possibility is examined in Table 5 that shows the joint influences of college degree and family status on women's and men's housework, childcare, sleep, and

Table 5 Adjusted means of women's and men's minutes per day in childcare, housework, sleep, leisure, and television by family status and college degree, 1985–2014

Panel A	Women											
	Single, no children											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Housework	131	BCDEF	121	BC	118	B	106	AB	99	A	94	A
Sleep	474	ABC	525	HIJ	540	J	463	A	501	CDEFG	515	FGHI
Leisure	319	IJK	319	JK	335	K	306	HIJK	282	FGHI	299	IJ
Television	132	DEFH	166	I	192		88	ABC	119	CDE	140	FH
N	306		1414		1154		128		912		767	
	Married, no children											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Housework	178	HI	158	EGH	148	EF	153	CDEFGHI	136	BCDEF	125	BCD
Sleep	487	ABCD	521	HI	537	J	475	ABCD	497	BCDE	511	EFGHI
Leisure	291	FGHIJ	298	IJ	291	GHI	278	DEFGHIJ	261	EF	255	CDE
Television	132	EFH	150	H	152	HI	88	ABC	103	BCG	100	BC
N	400		1677		783		117		845		416	
	Single mothers											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Childcare	41	A	99	BC	94	B	49	A	134	EF	120	DE
Housework	142	BCDEFGH	141	DEF	146	EF	117	ABCDE	119	BC	123	BCD
Sleep	476	ABCDE	516	GHI	528	IJ	465	ABCD	493	ABCDE	502	CDEFG
Leisure	305	EFGHIJK	271	EFGH	261	DEF	292	DEFGHIJK	234	BCD	224	B
Television	141	GHI	151	HI	157	HI	97	ABCDEF	103	BCDG	105	BCDEG
N	154		1684		1211		20		391		378	

Table 5 (continued)

	Married mothers											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Childcare	71	A	110	CD	113	D	79	ABC	146	F	139	F
Housework	194	I	173	HI	166	GH	169	FGHI	151	EG	143	EF
Sleep	479	ABCD	501	DEF	513	FGH	468	AB	477	ABCD	487	ABCD
Leisure	264	DEFGH	232	B	231	BC	251	BCDEFG	195	A	195	A
Television	115	CDEG	117	CDEG	123	EF	71	AB	69	A	71	A
N	521		3031		1642		124		1908		1565	
Panel B	Men											
	Single, no children											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Housework	71	A	77	A	77	A	70	A	75	A	65	A
Sleep	462	AB	513	D	513	CD	453	A	492	B	492	B
Leisure	336	FGH	344	H	336	GH	316	EFGH	297	CF	295	CDEF
Television	142	CEFGI	190	L	195	L	153	EFGIJ	185	JKL	187	KL
N	288		1486		1356		120		741		726	
	Married, no children											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Housework	78	A	96	A	89	A	76	A	93	A	78	A
Sleep	479	AB	494	B	506	BCD	470	AB	473	AB	485	AB
Leisure	312	CFGH	320	FGH	315	FGH	291	BCDEFG	274	BCDE	274	CDE
Television	127	HIJKL	172	IJKL	157	EFGIJK	142	DEFGI	153	FGI	158	GIJK
N	289		1290		626		117		845		416	

Table 5 (continued)

	Single fathers											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Childcare	3	A	39	AB	52	BD	11	AB	58	BCDE	68	CEF
Housework	63	A	83	A	96	A	62	A	81	A	85	A
Sleep	456	ABC	494	BCD	499	BCD	448	AB	473	AB	477	AB
Leisure	352	CDEFGH	305	DFGH	274	CDE	331	BCDEFGH	259	ABCE	233	AB
Television	100	ABCD H	133	CDEF	136	DEF	111	ABCD H	128	BCDE	128	BCDE
N	59		501		332		12		89		98	
	Married fathers											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Childcare	23	A	51	BC	62	DE	31	AB	69	EF	78	F
Housework	97	A	90	A	87	A	95	A	88	A	76	A
Sleep	468	AB	493	B	505	BCD	459	AB	472	AB	484	AB
Leisure	276	BCDE	279	CDE	269	BCDE	255	ABCD	232	A	228	A
Television	85	ABCDEFG	116	ABC-DEH	98	ABH	100	ABCH	97	AH	99	ABH
N	391		2710		1700		165		1796		1296	
Panel C	Ratio women's to men's time											
	Single, no children											
	< College degree						*College degree*					
	1985		2004		2012		1985		2004		2012	
Housework	1.84		1.56		1.53		1.53		1.32		1.44	
Sleep	1.03		1.02		1.05		1.02		1.02		1.05	
Leisure	0.95		0.93		1.00		0.97		0.95		1.01	
Television	0.93		0.88		0.98		0.57		0.64		0.75	

Table 5 (continued)

	Married, no children									
	<College degree					*College degree*				
	1985		2004		2012	1985		2004		2012
Housework	2.29		1.65		1.66	2.00		1.46		1.60
Sleep	1.02		1.05		1.06	1.01		1.05		1.05
Leisure	0.93		0.93		0.92	0.96		0.95		0.93
Television	1.04		0.87		0.97	0.62		0.67		0.64
	Single parents									
	<College degree					*College degree*				
	1985		2004		2012	1985		2004		2012
Childcare	14.95		2.50		1.82	4.38		2.31		1.76
Housework	2.25		1.69		1.51	1.90		1.47		1.44
Sleep	1.04		1.04		1.06	1.04		1.04		1.05
Leisure	0.87		0.89		0.95	0.88		0.90		0.96
Television	1.41		1.13		1.15	0.87		0.80		0.82
	Married parents									
	<College degree					*College degree*				
	1985		2004		2012	1985		2004		2012
Childcare	3.13		2.18		1.83	2.53		2.11		1.77
Housework	2.00		1.92		1.91	1.77		1.72		1.88
Sleep	1.02		1.02		1.01	1.02		1.01		1.01
Leisure	0.96		0.83		0.86	0.98		0.84		0.85
Television	1.36		1.00		1.26	0.72		0.71		0.72

Margins sharing a letter in the group label are not significantly different at the 5 % level.

leisure, with television broken out from other types of leisure. Four family statuses are shown: single, no children; married, no children; single parents; and married parents. Data are shown only for 1985, 2004, and 2012 because the proportion of single parents is too small in the 1965, 1975, and 1998 studies to produce reliable estimates.

The bottom line revealed from Table 5 is that the story remains basically the same, but with some interesting twists. Women's housework declined more substantially among married women without children and married mothers compared with single women without children and single mothers. Further, this is the case for women with and without a college degree. For example, married mothers with less than a college degree reduced housework by about 30 min; not significantly different than the decrease seen for those with a college degree. In contrast, single mothers' housework is about 2 h 20 min for those without a college degree and about 2 h for those with a college degree at each time point. Women of all family status types who have a college degree may be less inclined to do housework, and those with a college degree and in a heterosexual partnership may have resources available to outsource some housework. Both compositional differences (the increase in women living alone, the declining number of years spent married and caring for young children, and increased education and employment rates) and behavioral differences account for women's decreased housework. However, influences of gender socialization and perhaps higher standards for meals and cleanliness are also evident in Table 5. Single women without children do less housework than other women, but they also do about 1.5 times as much housework as single men. The gender gap in housework is smaller when comparing single women and men, and largest among married parents (at 1.9), but even the most similar women and men invest different amounts of time in housework (results not shown indicate similar results comparing women and men by employment status, and women and men in the same age group).

Additionally, Table 5 shows the increase in men's housework is concentrated among single fathers. Single men and married men with no children, regardless of education, and married men with less than a college degree did not increase housework significantly. College-educated married men decreased time in housework, albeit joint comparisons of year, college, and family status trends are not significant for any group of men. Results speak to the limited understanding of factors that influence men's housework time and the complicated causal links between gendered social roles of parent, spouse, and worker and housework time. Like mothers, fathers may have opted out of housework to concentrate available unpaid work time in childcare.

Trend data in childcare by education and family status reveal few new insights. College-educated mothers and fathers in single and married parent families allocate more time to childcare activities, but all parents increased childcare time between 1985 and 2012. Comparisons of the 2004 and 2012 data also suggest that only married fathers with less than a college degree continued to increase childcare time after 2004. This could be due to influences of the recession or class-differentiated ideals of fathering that emphasize daily, private care of children among working-class men

and public displays of involved fathering at children's activities among college-educated men (Shows & Gerstel, 2009; Smith & Mattingly, 2012).

Overall, data shown in Table 5 suggests marriage and parenthood widen gender gaps in time use for college and less than college-educated women and men. The cross-sectional trend data provide only a series of snapshots, but this interpretation is supported by European studies of longitudinal panel data (Grunow et al., 2012). Regardless of education, single women and men with no children, married women and men with no children, and single parents have similar levels of sleep, and among those who are single with no children, similar levels of leisure. However, married women with no children and single mothers have only about 90 % as much leisure as comparable men, and married mothers have only 85 % as much leisure as married fathers. Gender gaps in leisure have increased over time, but the majority of the leisure gap is due to men's higher levels of television, and a smaller portion to women's higher levels of socializing. Socializing with others may strengthen social network ties and be experienced as more relaxing than watching television. Even among college-educated single women and men with no children, men spend about 40 min more each day watching television. The only group of women who watch more television than comparable men are married women without a college degree, who in 2012 report about 20 min more television time than married men without a college degree.

What the gender, family status, and education differences in television time signal for gender equality is not so obvious. As noted earlier, the gender differences could signal continued male prerogative to protect leisure time from housework and childcare obligations. It could signal the ways television is easy leisure to do at the end of an exhausting work day, the ubiquity of television across contexts, and way sports interest and knowledge signal masculinity, or the relatively inexpensive nature of television. It could also signal social isolation from relationships and public spaces. Table 5 suggests combinations of these explanations may hold and underscore the need for mixed method approaches to understanding gender differences in leisure.

Inertia in the gender revolution has been explained by the myriad of gendered incentives that push women into societally valued "masculine" activities, like paid work, and pull men away from societally devalued "feminine" activities, like carework (England 2011). Among young adults, shared work and family roles are desired by most but "fallback" positions differ by gender, with women opting into self-reliant lives as singles and men opting into neo-traditional arrangements of combined work and family roles for women but not men (Gerson, 2010). Until the circuits between extrafamilial gendered institutions and the gendered nature of marriage and parenting change, gender is likely to remain the most potent determinant of not just who's doing the housework but also who's watching the television.

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Gender Equality and Economic Inequality: Impact on Marriage

Stephanie Coontz

The chapters on marriage by Ruggles (Marriage, Family Systems, and Economic Opportunity in the USA Since 1850) and Sayer (Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?), like many others in this book, should be seen against the backdrop of two powerful but very different trends in gender and class relations. One trend is the uneven, still limited, but undeniably dramatic progress toward equality in personal life and cultural values. We have seen a growing repudiation of centuries-old hierarchies and role assignments based on gender, age, sexuality, and race. The other trend is an equally powerful movement—accelerated by the Great Recession but predating it by three decades—toward increasing inequality, insecurity, and unpredictability in economic life. This has resulted in substantial losses for the most historically vulnerable and least-educated sections of the workforce.

Increasing Interpersonal Equality and Its Effect on Marriage and Family Life

The spread of the equality revolution is evident in many aspects of family life, including the dramatic increase in acceptance of interracial and same-sex marriage, and the equally substantial declines in domestic violence and sexual assault since the early 1970s. As the National Criminal Victimization Survey (NCVS) changed its reporting in 1992, it is impossible to get comparable figures for the period 1973–1992 and the period since 1993 (Rand, Lynch, & Cantor, 1997). NVCS figures from 1973 to 1992 already showed a fairly steady downward trend, and between 1993 and 2012, rapes and sexual assaults fell by 70 % (Wolfers, 2014). Similarly,

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between 1993 and 2011, the rate of serious intimate partner violence declined by 72%, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, a decline that extended to all racial-ethnic groups (Walker & Wheeler, in press).

Changes in parenting styles also reflect progress toward more equality and democracy in family life. As Sayer (Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?) shows, residential parents have greatly increased their time in childcare over the past 30 years, and men are devoting a larger portion of their childcare time to day-to-day care, as opposed to simply "fun time," than they did in the 1960s. Furthermore, as parenting methods have become less authoritarian, relationships between parents and their teenage and young adult children seem to have improved (Taylor & Morin, 2009).

Most Americans now report a preference for egalitarian sharing of breadwinning, housework, and childcare, although a majority still believes it is more important for a man than a woman to be able to support a family before marrying. This belief is most common among low-income and less-educated individuals, yet husbands in this section of the population have made considerable progress on the equity front over the past 40 years. Such men have to deal with much greater challenges to their traditional masculine identity than most higher income men, because this is the only section of the population where a significant number of wives outearn their husbands. Among families in the bottom 20% of the income distribution, 70% of the working wives earn as much or more than their husbands, compared to just a third of working wives in the top 20% of the families (Glynn, 2012).

Yet sociologist Oriel Sullivan finds that the less-educated men in the UK and the USA, starting from much lower participation in housework during the 1970s, have caught up or even exceeded the housework contributions of the most highly educated men (Sullivan, 2010). A similar diffusion or catch-up effect is reflected in Sayer's chapter (Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?) finding that married fathers with less than a college degree were the only men who continued to increase their childcare time after 2004.

College-educated men still devote more hours to childcare than their less-educated counterparts, and here the gap has grown rather than diminished over the past 30 years. Nevertheless, blue-collar men often spend more time than professional men in hands-on, practical childcare (as opposed to time spent attending children's events and games), and couples with traditional working-class jobs are more likely than college-educated couples to work in split shifts in order to provide childcare. This means that despite the average advantage for college-educated men in hours spent on childcare, a higher proportion of husbands in working-class families than in professional ones actually do a full half of the childcare (Lawlor, 1998).

During the early 2000s, many sociologists concluded that the gender revolution had stalled, but my view is that it is proceeding, even if sometimes in fits and starts, or if slowing in one area while continuing in another. (See for example Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2012, 2014). Those who question the extent of progress often repeat the claim that women earn only 77 cents for every dollar a man earns. This statistic ignores differences in work hours and experience and obscures the gains made by younger women in recent years. Among workers aged 25–34, women's hourly earnings have risen to 93% of men's (Pew Research Social & Demographic Trends, 2013).

The gender gap widens as men and women age and especially after they have children. Numerous studies have demonstrated hiring and pay discrimination against mothers. Nevertheless, a recent examination of male and female earnings between 1970 and 2010 finds a substantial diminution of the gender gap, and especially in the portion of the gap that is likely due to outright discrimination rather than to objective factors such as gendered differences in experience, hours worked, or types of jobs (Mandel & Semyonov, 2014). Much of the remaining gender gap stems from America's lack of adequate work–family policies and the penalties employees incur in many professions when they do not work super-long hours. Women remain more likely than men to cut back on hours or quit work when it is impossible for both parents to work full time, and this, rather than the more blatant pay discrimination of the past, explains a substantial portion of the gender pay gap (Mandel & Semyonov, 2014; See also Cha, 2014; Patten, 2014; Coontz, 2013).

In the absence of paid parental leave, flexible hours, and/or limits on the work week, it is difficult for many couples to share paid and unpaid labor in the egalitarian ways most would prefer, leading them to adopt neo-traditional arrangements as a fallback strategy (Gerson, 2011). When people's ideals collide with how they must behave in daily life, they often engage in a "values stretch" that allows them to justify the discrepancy between the ideals they started with and the behaviors they adopt to cope with the realities of daily life. I believe this tension between people's preferred arrangements and the constraints of contemporary work life helps explain the resilience of beliefs, even among people otherwise committed to gender equality, that women are naturally better at caregiving than men, and men are more suited to the cutthroat world of politics and careerism.

The slowing of convergence in husbands' and wives' paid and unpaid work could stem from resistance to further change on the part of men and/or women. It is equally possible, however, that the organization of work and pay policies prevents men and women from evenly dividing paid and unpaid work. Since the late 1990s, for example, American women's workforce participation, once among the highest in the world, has fallen behind that of many European countries. This change is due in part to the European governments steadily expanding their family–friend support systems, while the USA has made very little progress since passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act (Miller & Alderman, 2014).

It is hard to see how much more men could do at home in light of the fact that on average they work so many more hours for pay than women. In fact, with the exception of families with infants in which the wife is employed full-time, men's total work weeks—combining paid and unpaid hours—are slightly longer than women's. Sayer (Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?) notes that one exception to the slow pace of convergence in the past few decades has been the dramatic increase in men's childcare hours since 1985. The stall or shrinkage in their housework hours may reflect new priorities about how to distribute the limited hours they have outside the job. Such new priorities may explain why fathers in dual-earner families now report higher levels of work–family stress than mothers, evidently feeling increasing desire (or pressure) to share childrearing (Galinsky, Aumann, & Bond, 2011).

Support for the claim that the persistence of gender differences in the division of paid and unpaid work is more due to lack of support systems than to disinterest in egalitarian relationships is found in a recent study by Thebaut and Pedulla (2015). Using a nationally representative sample of unmarried, childless Americans aged 18–32, they asked men and women what kind of family arrangement they preferred, offering different options to each group. The majority of respondents said they would like to share wage-earning, household, and care-giving responsibilities equally with their partner. When respondents were told to assume that supportive work–family policies existed, women in particular became even less likely to want to take primary responsibility for home life. Interestingly, when work–life policies were not mentioned and participants were not explicitly offered an egalitarian option, they reverted to much more gendered preferences.

Whatever the causes of the continuing differences in husbands' and wives' proportion of paid and unpaid work, I would hesitate to describe them as inequities, at least in a couple's immediate personal relationship. These differences certainly *perpetuate* gender inequities on a societal scale, reinforcing stereotypes about women's lower commitment to the workforce and justifying discriminatory behavior toward mothers. They also raise the risk of future personal inequities, since a woman who benefits from such arrangements in the short run is likely to suffer if her husband dies or the couple divorces. Still, couples who adjust to parenthood by returning to a more traditional division of labor often regard this as fair, at least in the short run. They may even see it as a sacrifice on the man's part. Furthermore, some women undercut the household equality they want by acting on internalized norms that lead them to engage in gate-keeping or to devote more time to some tasks than is actually needed or wanted by their partner—for example, spending several hours making something from scratch rather than buying it ready made, or mopping a floor that the rest of the family thinks is clean enough to go another day without attention.

So the dynamics that lead to uneven divisions of housework and childcare among modern couples are very different from those that produced the division of labor in marriages of the 1950s and 1960s. In that era, women as well as men believed that men deserved special privileges and it was a wife's duty to put her husband's needs and desires first (Coontz, 2011). Whatever the remaining inequities between men and women—and there are many—it is hard to overstate how much gender expectations and entitlements have changed.

Increasing Socioeconomic Inequality and Its Effect on Marriage

Overall, I believe that the gender equality revolution continues, but it has interacted with the economic inequality revolution in complex ways. While women at all income levels have benefited from the gains of the women's movement, those benefits have been unequally distributed. For example, college-educated women have entered many professions formerly dominated by men, but working class

occupations remain almost as gender-segregated as the 1950s (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2012). The impressive gains made by women who have been able to take the most advantage of new educational and economic opportunities have in some ways increased disparities in socioeconomic and family life for less-educated women and men, as dual-earner high-income marriages increase their advantages over lower income individuals and couples.

In the 1960s, marriage rates differed only modestly by education and income level, with less-educated women slightly more likely to marry (Cherlin, 2014). Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, women's economic and legal gains destabilized marriage across the board, raising women's sense of entitlement and enabling them to leave—or refuse to enter—relationships that did not meet their expectations. These and other societal changes ensure that marriage will never again be as universal or as stable as in the 1950s. But in the past 30 years, there has been a significant restabilization of marriage among more educated and economically secure women and men (Carbone & Cahn, 2014).

In the past, as women's educational and financial achievements rose, their marital prospects declined. In the nineteenth century, half of all college-educated women never married. As late as 1960, 29% of such women remained single. Today, by contrast, college-educated women are *more likely* to marry than their less-educated counterparts (Qian, 2013). An even more significant increase in marriage rates for the highest-earning females is noted by sociologist Leslie McCall (2013). In 1980, only 58% of such women were married. By 2010, the rate was up to 64%. While the most economically successful women used to be the least likely to marry, the reverse is now true.

There have also been dramatic reversals in the predictors of marital satisfaction and divorce risk—-reversals that have benefited wives with higher education and earnings. In the past, couples in which the woman had more education than her husband had a higher risk of divorce. That is no longer true. Today, the higher a woman's earnings potential, whether she is currently employed or not, the more household and childcare help she is likely to get from her husband (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2012). Unlike the past, couples who share housework equally now report higher marital quality and greater sexual satisfaction than couples who follow a more traditional household division of labor (Sassler, 2014).

A huge class divide has opened up in divorce rates. Among couples ages 25–49, the divorce rate for college graduates is now approximately 50% lower than the rate for those with a high school diploma. As of 2010, a college-educated woman had a 78% chance that a first marriage would remain intact for 20 years, compared to only a 49% chance for a woman with some college, and a 41% chance for a female high school graduate (Copen, Daniels, Vespa, & Mosher, 2012). Divorce rates have been falling for the past 30 years (Miller, 2014). However, nearly all the decline is due to trends among the college-educated (Qian, 2013). Falling divorce rates among the college-educated have led to a restabilization of living arrangements for middle-class children. For both white and African-American college graduates—but only for college graduates—the likelihood that a 14-year-old would still be living with both parents actually *increased* between the 1970s and the first decade of the twentieth century (Carbone & Cahn, 2014).

We see a similar divergence along educational lines in non-marital childbearing**.** Among female college graduates who had a recent birth, fewer than 10 % were unmarried. By contrast, among other women who had a recent birth, 58 % of those with a high school diploma and 66.5 % of those without a high school diploma were unmarried (US DHHS, 2013). Low-income individuals are also much more likely to move in and out of cohabiting relationships, exposing their children to more transitions in household membership (Cherlin, 2014).

How Changing Class and Gender Relations Interact

As Ruggles (Marriage, Family Systems, and Economic Opportunity in the USA Since 1850) argues, these family changes are more a class issue than a cultural one. A critical factor in the decline in marriage and rise of unwed births among the less-educated Americans is their increasing economic insecurity, especially the falling economic prospects of young men with high school education or less. Interviews with low-income individuals reveal that although marriage is still a valued goal, and many low-income couples say they intend to marry, most say that they will not do so until they are economically "set."

Some observers interpret this attitude as indicative of the spread of consumerism and individualism, which has produced unrealistic dreams of fancy weddings and expensive lifestyles. But when sociologists Paula England and Kathryn Edin asked low-income couples who had a child together what it would take for them to marry, the answers they received were hardly the result of extravagant expectations. Almost universally, the couples said they simply wanted to make sure one or both had a good enough job that they would no longer depend on family, friends, or the government to pay their bills each month. Being able to afford a wedding was important to them, but more as a symbol of having achieved that financial floor rather than as an aspiration to a bridezilla type bash. Of the parents who were able to achieve such self-sufficiency 4 years after the birth, almost 80 % did marry, compared to less than 20 % of those who did not meet that bar (England & Edin, 2007). (See also Edin & Kefalas, 2005).

Why do low wages and scarce economic resources lead people to avoid marriage today? After all, people in the 1940s and 1950s routinely married long before they were economically or educationally "set." Poverty rates were higher than today; young people's starting wages were low; and a significant number of couples started married life without access to modern conveniences like central heating or even refrigerators. Yet few of them thought it was a good idea to postpone marriage until they had a lengthy job history, strong educational credentials, and a healthy savings account. Men and women in that era saw marriage as a *route* to attaining economic security and stability rather than as a reward for doing so.

Why is the response of young people today so different? The answer lies in a combination of the two trends I noted earlier. One is the increasing insecurity, unpredictability, and inequality of men's long-term wage and work prospects, which

has undermined the sense that through hard work they will eventually attain a stable economic situation and secure family life. Lack of confidence in *future progress* is a far stronger deterrent to taking on long-term commitments than material deprivation per se. Two is the very real, though still incomplete, gender revolution, which has raised women's expectations of marriage and made it more possible for them to support themselves, though often precariously, outside marriage.

The high marriage rates of the post-World War II era rested on two pillars that have been seriously undermined over the past 40 years. The first was the ready availability of jobs that provided stable employment and rising wages for young men, even those without a college education. The second was the lack of such jobs for women, whatever their educational credentials. The average female college graduate, working full time, earned less than the average male high school graduate. Female workers of all educational levels had much shorter job tenures than their male counterparts, and their wages relative to men actually fell through the 1950s and first half of the 1960s (Coontz, 2014).

After the labor struggles of the Great Depression led to the unionization of much industrial work and the reforms of the New Deal and Great Society provided protections against the worst ravages of poverty, a significant portion of working men were able, for the first time, to attain the American Dream—a dream not of immense riches but of what used to be called "a competency": the ability to sustain a comfortable family life on the basis of one's own hard work. Between 1947 and 1973, the average young male worker without a college education started his work life earning less than the average wage. His wages more than doubled, however, between the ages of 25 and 35. In 1969, only 10% of the men were still low earners at age 30–35. By the time a man retired he was typically making well above the average wage (Levy & Michel, 1986; Danziger & Rouse, 2007).

In the 1950s and 1960s, a young man could start out in almost *any* job, with the expectation that his earnings would improve substantially over time. Even if the job was dangerous, dirty, or demeaning, confidence in future progress imbued him with the sense that deferring gratification, making compromises, and sticking it out would eventually payoff (Levy, 1988). A young woman could marry almost any man and expect him to support a family far better than she ever could, and better than her father had been able to support her mother. Even if her husband's behavior was less than ideal, her lack of alternatives to marriage and lower expectations of equality made her more likely to "stick it out" as well.

Today, the economic trajectories and gender dynamics of young people are far more complicated. For those able to pursue higher education and professional careers, it is more important than in the past to defer long-term commitments until they have achieved their educational and vocational goals. Once that happens, however, the strong financial and professional prospects of educated and high-achieving women and men make them more attractive to each other as marriage partners. Such individuals can afford to wait until they are sure that a prospective partner meets their expectations, and the women in particular have more clout to insist upon a fair and equitable relationship.

For less-educated Americans, by contrast, the economic and gender trends of the past 40 years have raised new barriers to marriage and to relationship stability, creating a particularly difficult set of trade-offs for low-income women. Such women find it difficult to support themselves without pooling income, which encourages them to move in with a romantic partner more quickly than do college-educated women (Sassler, 2014). This in itself raises the risk that the relationship will be unstable. Additionally, their male partners are less likely than in the past to be able to offer economic security as a compensation for less-than-ideal behavior.

As Ruggles (Marriage, Family Systems, and Economic Opportunity in the USA Since 1850) shows, the job and earnings trajectory for young men is now far less favorable than it was from World War II through the 1960s. Aging into a steady job has become less common. In 1969, only 10 % of the men aged 30–35 were still low earners. By 2004, almost a quarter of men that age were still low earners (Danziger & Rouse, 2007). In the 1970s, Americans in their 40s had only a 13 % chance of being poor for at least a year. By the 1990s, that had risen to 36 % (Hacker, 2008). (See also Bertram, 2013; Farber, 2008)

A whole hard-won way of life and set of expectations has been shattered: one in which a working-class man could expect to support his wife and children, on his own salary, better than his father had been able to. Most women now expect that they will work even after marriage. Even when a woman works full-time, few women without a college degree can expect to reach even a moderate level of security unless they have a husband who can cover at least half the family's expenses. Yet men's real wages have been falling, and while women's job tenures have been increasing, men's have decreased. Men's risk of involuntary job loss and/or reduction to part-time work is sharply higher than in the 1950s and 1960s. During the two decades before the Great Recession, the likelihood that a man living in a low-income community would serve time in jail—especially if he was black or Hispanic—tripled, further reducing the availability and earning power of potential partners (Weaver, 2013).

The result is exactly what William Julius Wilson first described in his 1987 classic work, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy,* as a major factor in the decline of marriage—a shortage of marriageable men (Wilson, 1987). Overall, among single adults aged 25–34, there are 115 men for every 100 women, according to a Pew Research Report released October 2, 2014. In that age group, however, there are only 84 currently employed single men for every 100 single women, and only 51 currently employed single black men for every 100 single black women (Wang, 2014).

The changes in job stability, earnings potential, and availability of "marriageable men" pose hard choices for a woman in a low-income community. Her wages—or her government assistance benefits if she is a single mother—are still so low that she has a huge incentive to link up with a man who can contribute to household expenses. However, on her own she also has earnings and educational opportunities she would not have had in the past. So she has to weigh the advantages of marrying against the possibility that her husband might lose his job or misuse the couple's resources, becoming one more mouth to feed and one more body to pick up after. If, as married women frequently do, she curtails her work hours or accommodates her

job choices to her husband's, and the marriage ends, she can end up worse off than if she had stayed single and focused on increasing her own earning power (For further discussion see Budig & England, 2001; Joshi, Paci, & Waldfogel, 1999; Waldfogel, 1997; Smock & Greenland, 2010; Williams, 2014).

Cultural changes have undeniably had some impact. Women at all educational and income levels have increased their expectations of equality and emotional support from their partners over the past 40 years. As someone who has studied the low-expectation marriages of the past, I must say that for the most part these higher expectations are a good thing. In this economic climate, though, the result is a perfect storm. Low-income women expect more equality and intimacy than in the past, but also still need a man who can be an equal or primary breadwinner. Low-income men have fewer paths that lead toward economic and personal stability and fewer material advantages to offer a woman to compensate for any bad behavior. Chronic economic insecurity multiplies the risk of depression, alcohol or drug abuse, and infidelity, all of which undermine relationships. All these conditions foster a pattern of gender mistrust, conflict, and instability that is generated and perpetuated at least as much by structural factors as by individual psychological problems (Trail & Karney, 2012). The absence of the kinds of safety nets for poor and downwardly mobile individuals that are available in many other wealthy countries makes things even worse.

There may be ways we can mitigate these problems. Providing better support systems for women to avoid unplanned pregnancies would help young women improve their educational prospects and prepare for higher paying jobs. Ensuring that women can earn enough and that single mothers can receive enough government assistance that they do not feel compelled to move in with a man to make ends meet might reduce the "churning" that Andrew Cherlin cites as a major problem for children (Cherlin, 2014). Reducing incarceration rates would also remove a major source of family disruption and disadvantage. The surest way though to stabilize family life for all Americans, married or unmarried, would be to extend the gender revolution so that low-income women have access to educational and career opportunities that expand their horizons and to reverse the inequality revolution so that young men and women alike can see the benefits and reap the rewards of meaningful work.

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Part II
Changing Work and Family Roles of Women and Men

Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated

Janet Shibley Hyde

In 2001, Barnett and Hyde authored a paper, published in *The American Psychologist*, entitled "Women, Men, Work, and Family: An Expansionist Theory" (Barnett & Hyde, 2001). In that article, we argued that, contrary to many prevailing theories, multiple roles (e.g., worker, spouse, and parent) are beneficial for both women and men. It is the goal of this chapter to update that work, roughly 14 years later. I evaluate whether the evidence still supports expansionist theory, and I consider changes in gender, work, and family structure as they relate to expansionist theory. One of the pleasant surprises to me as I reviewed the available research is that many relevant meta-analyses have now appeared. Whenever possible, I rely on evidence from meta-analyses.

I focus mainly on the USA and US research, and secondarily on research from other Western nations. The social and policy contexts in which women and men balance work and family vary so radically from one nation to another that it would be difficult, if not foolish, to attempt to characterize patterns across all or most nations around the world.

Expansionist Theory

The Flaws in Traditional Theories

In the original articulation of expansionist theory (Barnett & Hyde, 2001), one crucial part of the argument was that traditional theories of gender, work, and family—functionalist theories, psychoanalytic theories, and evolutionary theories—were simply out of date, based on family structures and work arrangements that charac-

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terized the 1950s but not the twenty-first century. The traditional theories are even more out of date today, not only because of the passage of time but also because of continuing changes in both work and family roles, for both women and men. Traditional theories sought to explain and justify an arrangement of heterosexual marriage and parenting in which the wife stayed home and the husband earned from work outside the home. The wife's education, if she completed college, was purely in the service of her family roles. She did not plan for or embark on a career, and women's employment was problematized. Men's education was important because it qualified them for better jobs and greater earnings. None of these assumptions reflect realities of the first two decades of the twenty-first century.

Massive Changes for Women and Men in Work and Family

Massive changes have occurred over the last several decades in multiple areas: education, employment rates, pay, and the structure of families. Many of these changes were documented in the 2001 article and the pace of change has only continued, if not accelerated.

In regard to education, women now exceed men in attending and graduating from college. In 1955, men outnumbered women in college, 1,733,000 to 919,859 (i.e., about 2:1), but by 2011, women outnumbered men, 12 to 9 million (NCES, 2012, Table 221). Today women constitute 57% of the college students. Even at the level of completing doctoral degrees, women outnumber men by 84,000–80,000 (NCES, 2012, Table 317). Moreover, women have moved substantially into some science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields, for example, women earned 4045 of the PhDs in biology in 2011, compared with 3648 for men (NCES, 2012, Table 317).

Employment rates for women and men, too, have changed dramatically. In 2014, women constituted 49.4% of all the employed workers—essentially 50% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014a). That is, today women are employed at the same rate as men are. Nonetheless, a wage gap remains, with women earning only 81% of men's earnings (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). This represents a narrowing of the gap from 1979, when women's earnings were only 62% of men's. And education pays for women. In 2012, the median weekly earnings for women with less than a high school diploma were $471, compared with $652 for high school graduates and $1165 for college graduates (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).

An interesting phenomenon that may come to have a strong impact on how women and men balance work and family has been the emergence of families in which wives earn more than husbands. These couples constituted 18% of the husband-wife families in 1987 and rose to 28% in 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014b). This pattern may lead to a different set of calculations in regard to balancing work and family. Traditionally, for example, it made economic sense for the wife to be the one to work part-time to manage family work because she earned less than the husband. This calculation changes when the wife earns more than the husband.

Nonetheless, some researchers have concluded that wives' greater earnings will not change the balance of power in the couple relationship (Tichenor, 2005).

Although policy in the USA assumes a nuclear family consisting of a mother, father, and children, families today are considerably more varied than that (Beauregard, Ozbilgin, & Bell, 2009). These variations include single-parent families, same-sex couples and same-sex couples rearing children, and intergenerational families, in which grandparents raise grandchildren. For example, according to the 2010 US census, only 48.4% of the households consisted of a husband and wife (down from 51.7% in 2000) (Lofquist, Lugaila, O'Connell, & Feliz, 2012). Yet, 13.1% of the households were female-headed with no spouse, and an additional 5.0% were male-headed with no spouse. Moreover, according to the American Community Survey, there were 594,000 same-sex couple households in the USA in 2010, which represents roughly 1% of the couple households (Lofquist, 2011). Of those 594,000 households, 115,000 reported having children. I return to a consideration of same-sex couples later in this chapter. The fact that husband–wife households have now dipped below 50% of the households is perhaps the most telling statistic in regard to how the assumptions of traditional theories about gender, work, and family are outdated.

Assertions of Expansionist Theory

Expansionist theory has at its core four assertions (Barnett & Hyde, 2001). (1) In general, multiple roles are beneficial, in contrast to theories that treat them as sources of stress. (2) Several processes contribute to the beneficial effects of multiple roles: buffering, added income, social support, opportunities to experience success, an expanded frame of reference, increased self-complexity, and similarity of experiences. (3) Several conditions moderate the effects of multiple roles: gender-role ideology, upper limits to the benefits, and role quality. (4) Psychological gender differences are generally small; similarities in areas such as workforce participation, therefore, should be likely. Here I consider the newest evidence on each of these assertions. First, however, a note on emerging terminology is needed.

At the time of our 2001 paper, most research assumed that multiple roles were sources of stress, especially for women, something termed *the scarcity hypothesis.* We termed our hypothesis that multiple roles in general are beneficial for outcomes, such as mental health, *the expansionist hypothesis* (Barnett & Hyde, 2001). Since then, other related terms have emerged. One is *work–family interface,* which appears to be neutral or generic on the issue of scarcity versus enhancement (e.g., Powell & Greenhaus, 2010; ten Brummelhuis & Bakker, 2012). The terms *positive spillover* and *negative spillover,* both of which can be either family-to-work or work-to-family, have emerged (e.g., Culbertson, Mills, & Fullagar, 2012). *work–family enrichment* (WFE), which is very, similar to expansionist theory, was proposed by Greenhaus and Powell (2006). The term *work–life balance* is also used to broaden the scope of balance from family to other aspects of life and to include

single persons and couples with no children (e.g., Haar, 2013). Finally, other theorists have framed the issue not as one of multiple roles, but of *multiple identities* (e.g., Thoits, 1983, 1986, 1992).

It is worth considering whether this proliferation of terminology represents the *jangle fallacy* (Kelley, 1927). The jangle fallacy occurs when people think that two constructs are different because they have different names, whereas there are simply two names for the same construct. The result is cloudy thinking and the reinvention of constructs as if they were new.

Let us now consider the core principles of expansionist theory in light of current data.

Multiple Roles Are Beneficial

The first principle is that multiple roles are not harmful for women or men and are, in general, beneficial as reflected in mental health, physical health, and relationship health. Evidence for this assertion has continued to accumulate. Before reviewing that evidence, though, one methodological caveat is in order.

Work–family researchers routinely use causal language when discussing outcomes from correlational or quasi-experimental designs. For example, the title of one article said that it reviewed "*consequences* [italics added] associated with work–family enrichment" (McNall, Nicklin, & Masuda, 2010). The very statement "multiple roles are beneficial" implies causality, yet no researcher has randomly assigned people to occupy one versus two versus three roles. Selection effects are a particular concern. For example, people with worse mental health may be less likely to have a spouse or partner, implying that the direction of causality is from mental health to role occupancy rather than the reverse. I will use the language that is standard in the field, but readers should bear in mind the nature of the designs that have been used. It is also true that several researchers have addressed this question of selection effects empirically and have often found little or no evidence of selection (e.g., McMunn, Bartley, Hardy, & Kuh, 2006).

The other methodological issue is that most—though not all—designs use only self-report measures from a single informant. They therefore do not provide the strongest evidence of relationships among variables. Designs will be strengthened with the use of multiple informants and measures other than self-report, such as behavioral observations or implicit measures.

Mental Health More recent studies continue to show that multiple roles are linked to positive mental health outcomes, although many findings are qualified by role quality, a point to be discussed in more detail in a later section.

In a longitudinal study using the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS), having more roles had a positive effect on mental health, and the partner role in particular had a significant positive effect (Plaisier et al., 2008). In another study, US women who graduated from college in 1993 were

followed 16 years later to assess their patterns of career, marriage, and motherhood (Hoffnung & Williams, 2013). Being a mother was associated with higher life satisfaction than being childfree.

In an analysis of data from the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) sample, occupying multiple roles was positively associated with psychological well-being (Ahrens & Ryff, 2006). Some of these effects, however, were true only for women with higher levels of education. It seems likely that those with more education have jobs with better work-role quality, emphasizing the importance of role quality. When respondents' sense of WFE was measured directly (e.g., "Talking with someone at home helps you deal with problems at work"), it significantly predicted emotional well-being in the MIDUS sample (Gareis, Barnett, Ertel, & Berkman, 2009).

One meta-analysis showed that perceptions that work interferes with family correlated with depression ($r=0.23$) and psychological strain ($r=0.35$) (Amstad, Meier, Fasel, Elfering, & Semmer, 2011). The problem with this meta-analysis, from the point of view of expansionist theory, is that it considered only measures of work–family interference and ignored the possibility of the beneficial effects of combining work and family. I therefore turn to a meta-analysis that examined enrichment effects.

A meta-analysis of 21 studies based in the WFE tradition found that WFE correlated positively with indices of mental and physical health, $r=0.17$ (McNall, Nicklin, & Masuda, 2010). Family-to-work enrichment (FWE) also correlated positively with measures of physical and mental health, $r=0.17$. When depression was examined separately, WFE and depression correlated $r=-0.09$ and FWE correlated $r=-0.19$ with depression. Negative correlations would be expected insofar as high enrichment scores should be associated with low depression scores.

Physical Health A study based on a representative sample of Finnish women between the ages of 30 and 49 found that multiple role occupancy—employee, partner, and mother—was associated with greater self-rated health (Kostiainen, Martelin, Kestilä, Martikainen, & Koskinen, 2009). Pursuing the question of additive versus multiplicative models, the researchers concluded that the effects represented the cumulative (additive) effect of multiple roles rather than interactions between roles.

A study of a national cohort of British women at age 54 found that multiple roles, over the long-term, were associated with better health (McMunn, Bartley, Hardy, & Kuh, 2006). Moreover, women who were homemakers had higher rates of obesity.

A study of married and divorced women in the Netherlands found similar results. Having a job outside the home and having children did not harm women's health (Fokkema, 2002). Better health was associated with being employed part-time and with having older children.

Another study of British women and Finnish women used a large sample from Britain's General Household Survey and the Finnish Survey on Living Conditions (Lahelma, Arber, Kivelä, & Roos, 2002). With the British sample, housewives were more likely to report poor health than other women. Partnered women with children reported better health than partnered women without children. In Finland, this

second effect was not found; married women without children reported as good health as married women with children. Neither were differences found depending on employment status; housewives reported levels of health similar to employed women. The contrast in findings between Britain and Finland highlights the point that researchers should not make universal generalizations based on findings from a single nation.

By now, a pattern should be clear. The effects of multiple roles have been studied far more in women than in men. Doubtless this is because multiple roles—and, in particular, the worker role—have been problematized for women but not men.

Relationship Health When the outcome is relationship health, the findings again support the assertion that multiple roles are associated with better health, although relationship health has been studied less. First, it is worth noting one population-level trend. Levels of marital happiness remained relatively constant for both White US men and women from the 1970s to the 2000s (Corra, Carter, Carter, & Knox, 2009), whereas women's employment rates increased substantially over that period. In that sense, women's employment is not detrimental to either women's or men's perceptions of marital relationship quality.

Research does indicate that men's involvement in the parental role enhances partner relationship quality. In one study, for example, fathers' greater involvement with their preschool children was positively associated with both their own perceptions of relationship quality and the mothers' relationship satisfaction (Schober, 2012).

Researchers are also beginning to use more fine-grained methods in the study of gender, work, and family. For example, using an experience sampling or daily diary method over 14 days, researchers found that greater daily work hours were related to less time spent with children, but more positive interactions with children (Bass, Butler, Grzywacz, & Linney, 2009).

When the outcome is divorce, the results are more complex. Using a longitudinal design, one group found that wives' full-time employment was associated with greater marital stability (Schoen, Rogers, & Amato, 2006). Exploring the complexity, though, another group found that when men are not employed, both husband and wife are more likely to leave the marriage (Sayer, England, Allison, & Kangas, 2011). When men are not employed, however, it is likely that they are unemployed rather than that they are househusbands. Wives' employment does not affect either partner's chances of leaving the marriage as long as the wife reports better-than-average marital satisfaction (Sayer et al., 2011). However, the combination of employment and below-average marital satisfaction makes women more likely to leave the marriage. Clearly men's and women's employment has different meanings in these circumstances. Men's employment clearly is positive, whereas women's employment gives her more economic independence and the ability to leave a poor-quality marriage.

Two distinct theoretical perspectives on work–family interference and enrichment were articulated by Shockley and Singla (2011) using meta-analytic path analysis to determine which was supported more by the data. They termed the first model *domain specificity,* which means, for example, that if a person has the sense

that work is interfering with family (WIF), then family satisfaction should be lower. Family relationships are essentially the victims of WIF. That is, WIF should correlate more strongly with family satisfaction than with work satisfaction. The contrasting model is *source attribution,* which relies on the notion that individuals appraise the source of threats negatively. Therefore, if an individual appraises work as interfering with family, then work satisfaction will decline. If domain specificity is accurate, then WIF should correlate more highly with family dissatisfaction than with work dissatisfaction. If source attribution is more accurate, then WIF should correlate more with work dissatisfaction than with family dissatisfaction. The same logic can be extended to WFE. It might also be the case that one model or the other would hold for women or men.

Overall, the results of this meta-analysis supported the source attribution model (Shockley & Singla, 2011). WIF showed a stronger relationship to job stress ($r = 0.44$) than to family stress ($r = 0.22$). Moreover, WFE was more strongly related to job satisfaction than to family satisfaction. When gender was examined as a moderator, the source attribution model was supported for both males and females, but it held more consistently for women than for men.

Benefits to Children Although our original paper considered only mental, physical, and relationship health benefits to the individual occupying the multiple roles, it is worth considering whether there are benefits to children as well (e.g., Goldberg, Prause, Lucas-Thompson, & Himsel, 2008). For example, in one study of 326 children aged 7–13 years and at least one of their parents, mothers' explicit beliefs about gender roles in the home predicted their children's gender-related attitudes (Croft, Schmader, Block, & Baron, 2014). Perhaps more importantly, when fathers believed in an egalitarian division of household labor or actually displayed the behaviors, daughters had a greater interest in working outside the home and having a less gender-stereotyped occupation.

As for the implicit question of whether early maternal employment (women adding the employment role) is harmful to children, a recent major study concluded that no harm occurs and, in some contexts, maternal employment helps (Lombardi & Coley, 2014). The study used the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study - B (ECLS-B), a large, US national cohort of more than 10,000 children born in 2001. The outcomes involved multiple measures of school readiness at the time of entry to kindergarten, including reading skills, math skills, conduct problems, attentional skills, and prosocial skills. Overall, maternal employment, even before the child reached 9 months of age (early maternal employment), had no effect on the outcomes. In cases of low nonmaternal household income, maternal employment was linked to higher cognitive performance and fewer conduct problems.

Processes That Contribute to the Benefits of Multiple Roles

Research, then, continues to support the assertion that multiple roles are beneficial to mental, physical, and relationship health. What processes account for this effect?

In the 2001 paper, we proposed the following: buffering, added income, social support, opportunities to experience success, expanded frame of reference, increased self-complexity, and similarity of experiences (Barnett & Hyde, 2001).

Buffering The hypothesis is that the negative effects of stress from one role can be buffered or moderated by satisfactions in another role. The hypothesis therefore proposes a statistical interaction. A buffering model was explicitly tested by Gareis et al. (2009), using the MIDUS sample, for the outcomes of mental health and partner relationship quality. In the work-to-family direction, effects were simply additive, with no interaction. However, in the family-to-work direction, buffering, or statistical interaction, did occur. FWE buffered the negative effects of family-to-work conflict (FWC) on both mental health and relationship quality. Similarly, Grzywacz and Bass (2003), also using the MIDUS data, found that family protective factors buffered the negative effects of work–family conflict on mental health.

One question that could be raised is whether a statistical interaction is necessarily required to conclude that buffering occurs. In the language of mediation and moderation, the term buffering has been equated with moderation or statistical interaction. Is that necessarily the only model when exploring buffering from multiple roles? In particular, why does an additive model not count as buffering? If WFE offsets, additively, the effects of work–family stress on mental health, is that not a kind of buffering?

Added Income When wives add the work role, the result should be a net gain in family income, which should reduce financial stress, thereby contributing to health. Consistent with this hypothesis, British housewives reported poor health compared with employed women, but this effect was reduced when education and income were controlled (Lahelma et al., 2002). In addition, family income is positively associated with marital happiness (Corra et al., 2009).

These effects, though, can depend on the attitudes of both spouses toward the provider role. When members of a couple see themselves as co-providers, marital satisfaction is greater, compared with couples for whom the husband is the main provider and the wife is the secondary provider, those who are ambivalent about being co-providers, and those who are mismatched in their attitudes (Helms, Walls, Crouter, & McHale, 2010).

What is perhaps not captured in these studies is the simple reality that wives' earnings are a critical part of family income. Among heterosexual, married-couple families in the USA, working wives on average contribute 29% of the family income (US Department of Commerce, 2011). Substantial financial strain would occur in those families, if the wife's earnings were removed.

Social Support The hypothesis is that multiple roles increase the individual's opportunities for social support, and social support is generally beneficial to health. In a major meta-analysis based on 178 samples, Michel, Kotrba, Mitchelson, Clark, & Baltes (2011) examined what they termed antecedents to work–family conflict. Consistent with the importance of social support, various forms of social support at work were negatively correlated with perceived work-to-family conflict (WFC)

(i.e., work has a negative effect on family). The negative relationship indicates, as predicted, that higher social support is associated with lower WFC. Effect sizes were all moderate for the three forms of support: organizational ($r=-0.25$), supervisor ($r=-0.19$), and coworker support ($r=-0.21$). Family support was also negatively associated with WFC but the effect size was a bit smaller, $r=-0.15$.

In the realm of FWC (i.e., family has a negative effect on work), effects were small. For work social support, correlations were again negative with FWC, as expected. For organizational support, $r=-0.11$, for supervisor support $r=-0.09$, and for coworkers support, $r=-0.11$. Family support values were in the same range.

In this same meta-analysis, gender was analyzed as a moderator variable (Michel et al., 2011). Are the correlations between various antecedents and WFC the same for women and men? For 12 of the 14 correlations, gender was *not* a significant moderator. For example, the overall correlation between job stressors and WFC ($r=0.42$) was not moderated by gender, that is, the correlation was about the same for men as it was for women. In particular, gender did not moderate any of the relationships between social support and WFC, or FWC. Therefore, the main pattern in the outcome was one of *gender similarities* (Hyde, 2005, 2014).

Another meta-analysis aimed to disentangle the multiple types of workplace social support and how these different types might relate differently to work–family conflict (Kossek, Pichler, Bodner, & Hammer, 2011). The researchers distinguished between general support and work–family-specific support from supervisors and the organization. The results indicated generally that work–family-specific support had bigger effects than general support. Specifically, work–family conflict was correlated with perceived organizational support ($r=-0.22$) less than it was correlated with perceptions that the organization was family-supportive ($r=-0.36$). And work–family conflict showed a smaller correlation with general supervisor support ($r=-0.15$) than it did supervisor support on work–family matters ($r=-0.25$). Overall, all four forms of support correlated with less work–family conflict, but support specific to work–family issues showed larger correlations.

Opportunities to Experience Success The hypothesis that more roles allow the individual more opportunities to experience success, which is good for health, seems very sensible. In the 2001 paper, we could find only one study that was directly relevant. I was unable to locate any more recent studies directly testing this hypothesis. It may be that this hypothesized mechanism is simply a specific example of a point discussed below, that role quality is more important than the number of roles. Roles that allow one to experience success should be high in role quality, and roles that allow for few experiences of success should be low in role quality.

Expanded Frame of Reference This one is a good idea, too, but I could find no research pursuing it.

Increased Self-Complexity Self-complexity is a booming research industry. Linville (1984, 1987) originally theorized that people with a less complex cognitive representation of the self would experience more severe fluctuations in affect and self-appraisal, which would have negative consequences for mental and physical

health, whereas people with greater self-complexity would be buffered against the effects of negative life events. Research continues to support the general link between self-structure and emotional experience (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014). Others have extended this approach, considering, for example, factors such as the harmony or disharmony between different identities. In one study, number of identities was uncorrelated with psychological well-being, but identity harmony was correlated with well-being (Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008).

Within the framework of identity complexity, Hodges and Park (2013) investigated whether career and mom are oppositional identities for women, using a set of sophisticated methods including implicit measures. Their evidence indicated that career and mom are oppositional identities in the sense that the traits required for one show only a small overlap with the traits required for the other. They argued that women respond to this conflict by shifting back and forth, activating whichever identity is functional to the situation, and that men do not engage in this shifting activation. Furthermore, they showed that this shifting depletes scarce cognitive resources, impairing executive function, which is needed for complex tasks. Nonetheless, they also found that when a failure occurs in one domain, women activate the other identity, thereby restoring a positive sense of self, which supports the benefits of self-complexity. This study, too, shows that the concept of self-complexity requires a nuanced approach when applying it to issues of balancing work and family.

Similarity of Experiences The idea here is that if a husband and wife are both employed, their daily experiences are more similar than if the husband is employed and the wife is home full-time. The similarity of experience should help the two relate to each other better. This is another idea that seems sound theoretically, but research on it is lacking.

Moderators of the Effects of Multiple Roles

In the 2001 paper, we argued that multiple roles were not uniformly or universally beneficial in all circumstances (Barnett & Hyde, 2001). We hypothesized that there were upper limits to the benefits of multiple roles and that role quality was more important than the number of roles. In that paper, gender-role ideology was mistakenly listed as one of the processes accounting for the beneficial effects of multiple roles, whereas it should have been listed as a moderator. I classify it that way here.

Gender-role Ideology The principle is that women and men should benefit more from combining work and family roles if they hold a liberal gender-role ideology, which is thought to be supportive of these multiple roles. In contrast, those who hold traditional gender-role ideologies may not benefit from multiple roles or even may suffer from them. Gender-role ideology may create different appraisals of the situation in multiple roles. For a woman with a liberal ideology, combining work and family may seem like an ideal state of affairs, whereas for a woman with a traditional ideology, combining work and family may seem like a violation of her expectation that her husband support her and the children and that she stay home full-time.

One study investigated gender ideology as a moderator of the relationship between WFC and marital satisfaction (Minnotte, Minnotte, Pedersen, Mannon, & Kiger, 2010). Consistent with hypotheses, for women with more egalitarian gender ideologies, there was a strong negative association between WFC and marital satisfaction, that is, high WFC was associated with less marital satisfaction. The authors hypothesized that egalitarian women seek to reduce work–family conflict by negotiating a more equal division of household labor with their husband, which creates marital conflict.

In another study of the same sample, husbands with egalitarian beliefs experienced high marital satisfaction when FWC was low, and low marital satisfaction with high FWC (Minnotte, Minnotte, & Pedersen, 2013). In contrast, husbands with traditional beliefs showed little correlation between FWC and marital satisfaction. Husbands' gender ideology played a stronger role than wives' ideology in moderating the relationship between FWC and marital satisfaction, for both women and men.

In addition, some evidence for this hypothesis can be inferred from the work on identity complexity, discussed earlier. An example is a study demonstrating that identity harmony (the perception that multiple identities are not in opposition to each other, but rather are harmonious) was positively correlated with psychological well-being (Brook et al., 2008). A liberal gender-role ideology should create harmony for women between the mother role and the worker role, whereas a traditional gender-role ideology would construe those two roles as being in conflict with each other.

Upper Limits to the Benefits of Multiple Roles The assertion is that, although multiple roles in general are beneficial to mental, physical, and relationship health, there are upper limits to these benefits that may occur if the number of roles is too great or the demands of a role are excessive. An example of the former would be a woman who is married, with a 40 h/week job and two children in elementary school; her mother falls ill and needs her care. Adding the caretaker role makes for too many roles. An example of the latter would be that same woman, but instead of having a mother needing care, the woman is a lawyer in a law firm who typically has to work 70–80 h/week.

One study examined workaholism in a large sample of Japanese dual-earner couples, all of them with children (Shimazu, Demerouti, Bakker, Shimada, & Kawakami, 2011). The researchers defined workaholism as working both excessively and compulsively. For both women and men, those scoring high on workaholism experienced more WFC and more psychological distress. When women were workaholics, their husbands were more likely to experience FWC, but the same was not true of women married to workaholic husbands.

Other researchers have wondered whether individuals can be too engaged or too involved with work. In one study, work engagement was defined as a pervasive state of emotional attachment and motivation toward work, and was associated with higher levels of work interfering with family (Halbesleben, Harvey, & Bolino, 2009).

In a meta-analysis, work hours showed a small but significant positive correlation with work interference with family (Ford, Heinen, & Langkamer, 2007).

However, work hours also showed a small positive correlation with family satisfaction. That is, work hours were associated with more of a sense of interference, but also more satisfaction.

Role Quality is More Important Than Number of Roles A shift over the past decade is that researchers are now seldom simply counting the number of roles and linking that to health outcomes; role quality is now taken into consideration far more than it was in the past, as suggested by expansionist theory (e.g., Davis, Sloan, & Tang, 2011; Houle, Chiocchio, Favreau, & Villeneuve, 2012; Kostiainen et al., 2009; van Steenbergen, Kluwever, & Karney, 2011). Space limitations do not permit me to consider each of these studies in detail. Instead, I will rely on two relevant meta-analyses.

According to the meta-analysis by Michel et al. (2011), both work-role stressors and work social support are significant predictors of FWC. Similarly, family-role stressors and social support are significant predictors of WFC.

The meta-analysis by Ford et al. (2007) showed that family conflict significantly predicted job satisfaction, which they categorized as a cross-domain relationship. Job stress also significantly predicted family satisfaction.

Psychological Gender Differences Are Generally Small

One aspect of the argument in the 2001 paper was the assertion that psychological gender differences are not large nor are they immutable. Therefore, women and men do not have to be forced into highly differentiated and limited roles. Their roles are not constrained by their highly gender-differentiated "natures."

This assertion foreshadowed my proposal of the gender similarities hypothesis, which holds that females and males are more alike than they are different on most, but not all, psychological variables (Hyde, 2005). The evidence came from a review of 46 meta-analyses of gender differences, for diverse outcomes including mathematics performance, talkativeness, aggression, helping behavior, and leadership effectiveness. Of the 124 effect sizes extracted from the meta-analyses, 30% were in the trivial range ($d \leq 0.10$) and an additional 48% were in the small range (0.11–0.35). That is, 78% of the effect sizes were small or close to zero. Thus, the evidence for this principle of expansionist theory is exceptionally strong.

Changes in Work and Family Since 2001

In the larger scheme of things, 14 years is a short time, yet even in that time, marked social changes relevant to questions of work and family have occurred in the USA and many other nations. Among these are the rise of gay same-sex marriage, and continuing changes in women's and men's education, employment, and earnings. Many of these changes were documented earlier in this chapter. Here I expand on gay

marriage, the "New Economy," and the possibility of intersectional approaches to research.

Same-Sex Marriage

As of March, 2015, 37 states plus the District of Columbia had legal gay marriage; an additional small number of states had some other provision for same-sex relationships, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships. The first state to move in this direction was Vermont, which legalized same-sex civil unions in 2000. Then, in June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down all state bans, legalizing same-sex marriage throughout the US. The shift in policy and people's relationships over these 15 years has been dramatic.

Coupled with this massive change is an increasing trend for same-sex couples to be rearing children, whether the children are from a previous heterosexual marriage, from adoption, or from the use of assisted reproduction. It is estimated that about 250,000 children in the USA are being raised by same-sex couples (Lambda Legal, 2014).

The consequence of these seismic shifts is that new categories of people are balancing multiple roles involving work and family. The original articulation of expansionist theory assumed male–female marriages and the potential gender inequalities that so often arise in them. How do these dynamics change—or do they change—for male–male or female–female couples?

The short answer is that we do not know precisely. An important new path for research will be to study same-sex couples balancing work and family. To my knowledge, and to the knowledge of UCLA's, A. Peplau (personal communication, May 27, 2014), no one has conducted such a study. Yet indirect evidence is available from a number of studies.

Two reviews of same-sex couple relationships reached similar conclusions (Kurdek, 2005; Peplau & Fingerhut, 2007). First, both gay and lesbian couples have a more egalitarian division of household labor than heterosexual couples do. Second, same-sex couples tend to prefer equality of power in a relationship, in contrast to the pattern of male dominance found in many male–female relationships. Third, same-sex couples with children still tend to endorse an egalitarian division of household labor and child care, in contrast to heterosexual couples, among whom these tasks tend to become much more gender-differentiated when they have children. All three of these patterns bode well for same-sex couples balancing work and family.

The New Economy

The "New Economy" is characterized by several features: (1) 24/7 employment, the belief that workers should be on call at all hours of every day; (2) nonstandard work schedules, for example, to accommodate customers at all hours; (3) instability

of organizations, with mergers and downsizing; (4) job insecurity resulting from the instability of organizations, with an erosion of the bond between the employer and the employees; and (5) a decline in generous wages and, especially, benefits (Edgell, Ammons, & Dahlin, 2012). All of these can contribute to a sense of insufficiency for workers. For example, their wages may be insufficient to support the family or their job may lack stability and be lost all together. More broadly, these features of the New Economy may make it more difficult for individuals to balance work and family. For example, spouses may have different work schedules and schedule changes may occur with little notice, creating difficulties with parenting. More research is needed on the implications of the New Economy for balancing work and family.

Intersectionality

Intersectionality is not a societal trend, but rather a major trend in academic analyses across multiple disciplines ranging from the humanities to sociology and psychology. Intersectionality has been defined as the theoretical or analytical approach that simultaneously considers multiple categories of identity, difference, and disadvantage (such as gender, race, class, sexual orientation, disability, religion, and so on) (Cole, 2009). Thus, we could examine the intersection of gender and race, or gender, race, and sexual orientation, for some outcome. Intersectional approaches need to be applied to research on work–family balance.

There is a tremendous need to integrate diversity and intersectionality into work-life research. Özbilgin, Beauregard, Tatli, and Bell (2011) have provided a blueprint. They noted major lacunas in work-life research that should be corrected by using an intersectional approach. These lacunas include using gender as the only dimension of diversity in research, ignoring factors such as race, social class, religion, and sexual orientation. Implementation of intersectional approaches will require more attention to sampling strategy; the bulk of research on work-life balance is based on middle-class, dual-earner couples who tend to resemble the researchers. New measures may have to be developed that reflect nontraditional household composition, as well as concepts that may differ between majority and minority cultures. In interpreting findings, an intersectional approach demands attention to power and inequality between individuals and groups, whether between women and men, ethnic majority versus minority individuals, and so on. I advocate adoption of an intersectional approach to future work on work–family balance.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I reviewed an expansionist theory of combining work and family (Barnett & Hyde, 2001). More recent research continues to support its basic assertion that multiple roles are beneficial to physical, mental, and social health, although

there are also upper limits to those benefits. Evidence has accumulated in support of proposed mechanisms that mediate the positive effects of multiple roles on health, such as buffering, added income, and social support. Future research on combining work and family must recognize rapid changes in US society. Perhaps the clearest area in need of research is how same-sex couples balance work and family.

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Expansionist Theory Expanded: Integrating Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Gender, Work, and Family Change

Kathleen Gerson

The shift from a social order organized around separate spheres for women and men to one in which American women comprise half the paid labor force is clearly one of the major revolutions of our time. In a span of several decades, this revolution has reshaped the demographic landscape and upended once taken-for-granted arguments that caretaking mothers and breadwinning fathers provide the optimal environment for promoting psychological well-being. Amid this rapidly developing—but far from finished—gender revolution, Barnett and Hyde's Expansionist Theory was among the first to argue that, contrary to prevailing views, mothers, fathers, and children *benefit* when women and men engage in multiple tasks as parents, workers, and partners (Barnett & Hyde, 2001). If this argument seems less controversial today, that is only because it was so prescient when first formulated.

Though the expansionist perspective is closer to conventional wisdom today, it would be a mistake to conclude that the theories it challenged no longer hold sway. In important respects, the counterargument—that mothers and their families are harmed by the expansion of women's commitments to include paid work along with unpaid caretaking—continues to inform social theory and policy. Gender shifts remain a source of heated debate, and many dimensions of the gender revolution appear stalled. It is thus both timely and important to assess the early contributions of the expansionist perspective, take stock of its relevance at this historical juncture, and consider its theoretical potential going forward.

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Contributions and Unresolved Issues

In 2001, when Barnett and Hyde proposed their theory, prevailing approaches tended to focus on the difficulties women and their households encountered when they tried to combine parenting with paid work. Even when women's gains were acknowledged, journalistic accounts typically depicted harried working mothers barely able to cope with the stresses of juggling jobs, housework, and childcare. Academic research bolstered this view by providing compelling analyses of the costs incurred when mothers had to add a first shift of paid work onto a second shift of domestic duties (Hochschild & Machung, 1989). While these arguments were not inaccurate, they provided only a partial truth that overlooked the considerable benefits that strong employment ties offered women and their families. The expansionist perspective thus offered an important corrective. It countered the bleak picture of stressed mothers and neglected children, recognized the psychological and social benefits of women's move away from a life defined by domesticity, and questioned gender stereotypes based on an assumption of dichotomous differences between women and men (Epstein, 1988). In contrast to classical theories (Parsons & Bales, 1954; Becker, 1981), which argued in favor of gender specialization, and feminist critiques, which emphasized women's "dual burden," Barnett and Hyde pointed to the advantages of blending work and care—for creating more egalitarian gender relationships as well as promoting women's self-esteem and psychological well-being.

The expansionist argument provided a rebuttal to the "bad news" take on social change and offered a powerful counter-narrative that still resonates today. Now that 40% of the US households with children depend on a breadwinning mother, the issues Barnett and Hyde addressed are more pertinent than ever (Wang, Parker, & Taylor, 2013). Yet the rise of women breadwinners makes it even more important to tackle the issues left unresolved. What, for example, are the links between women's expanding commitments and the structure of gender inequality? How do women and men manage the expansion of their public and private responsibilities in the context of growing institutional conflicts between home and work? Perhaps most important, is the concept of roles too rooted in a functionalist paradigm to account for the changing dynamics of gender relationships? For example, the 2010 style guide for *Gender & Society*, a top-ranked journal focused on the study of gender, asks authors to refrain from using the term "gender role" because it signals "an individualist approach" that presumes static roles rather than a dynamic process in which gender is created within interactions and institutional structures (Britton, 2010). For all these reasons, this is a good moment to rethink—and expand—the expansionist argument.

Adding a Sociological Perspective

Taking off from the original insight that pursuing a life path that encompasses both working and caring is psychologically enriching, today's theoretical challenge is to delineate the conditions under which these often conflicting spheres can be reconciled. What social arrangements make it possible to integrate paid work with unpaid caretaking or, alternatively, create obstacles and conflicts that put integration out of reach? In Barnett and Hyde's framework, this means focusing attention on the "conditions that moderate effects" (Barnett & Hyde, 2001, p. 4). From my perspective as a sociologist, this means paying attention to the varying social contexts and unequal social resources that shape people's ability to fashion satisfying strategies for blending work and care. How and why do work and family institutions intersect to create conflicts and contradictions in the lives of workers and parents? How do women and men respond to these socially structured dilemmas as they build their lives over time? What are the social factors and forces that shape the development of varying work–family trajectories? These questions prompt us to investigate both the *social conditions* that either help or hinder beneficial psychological outcomes and the *action strategies* that shape the contours of change.

My research has tackled these questions through a series of studies examining the life paths and work–family strategies of several generations of women and men, including those who pioneered the gender revolution in the 1970s and 1980s, those who came of age in the 1990s and 2000s and grew up in changing families, and those who are now grappling with the growing time demands, economic uncertainties, and relationship fluidity of the new economy. These studies have confirmed the core argument of expansionist theory that women, men, and children have largely benefitted from the growth of employed mothers and more involved fathers. Using the term "gender flexibility" rather than "multiple roles" to convey the fluid, changing nature of people's work and family commitments, I have found that families with flexible arrangements for meeting work and care responsibilities are better equipped to weather the challenges of unpredictable change in parents' job prospects, marital commitments, and financial fortunes. However, my findings also point to a set of institutional obstacles and social inequalities that make an equal blending of work and care very difficult to attain. Some examples from this research illustrate both the attractions of gender flexibility and the obstacles to achieving it.

The Gap Between Ideals and Options

In my study of a group I call "the children of the gender revolution," I interviewed young adults aged 18–32 about their experiences growing up in an era of changing family structures and gender relationships (Gerson, 2011). These interviews explored views on their parents' choices as well as their own aspirations and plans. These young adults reached conclusions that support the expansionist view. Among

those who grew up in a dual-earning home where parents shared breadwinning and caretaking, more than three-fourths believed their parents had chosen the best option. Having two work-committed parents not only provided increased economic resources but also promoted marriages that seemed more egalitarian and satisfying. In contrast, among those reared in homes where caretaking mothers had negligible ties to paid work and breadwinning while fathers remained distant from caretaking, only about a half concluded this was the best arrangement. When domesticity undermined a mother's satisfaction or threatened the family's economic security, children wished their mothers had pursued stronger ties to paid work. Equally telling, those who grew up in a single-parent home fared much better when their custodial parent, usually a mother, was able to meet the dual responsibilities of breadwinning and caretaking.

Given these findings, it is no surprise that most of these young adults hoped to combine marriage, work, and parenting in their own lives. Whether reared in a traditional, dual-earning, or single-parent household, the overwhelming majority of women and men wanted a committed bond where both paid work and family caretaking are shared. Three-fourths of those who grew up in a dual-earner home wanted to share breadwinning and caretaking with a partner. So did more than two-thirds of those from more traditional homes, and close to nine-tenths of those with single parents. Equally important, four-fifths of women hoped to create an egalitarian relationship, and so did two-thirds of the men. Women and men are converging in their view that it is desirable to share work and care.

Despite their preferences, however, most expressed skepticism about the ability to create an egalitarian partnership. Having watched their parents and other adults cope with long working hours, family-unfriendly workplaces, and pressures to be a perfect parent, they doubted they would have the resources to overcome these obstacles. Instead, they were preparing to settle for second-best options. These fallback strategies fall substantially short of most people's ideals, but they take a different form for women and men. Almost three-fourths of women—regardless of their class, race, or ethnic background—were reluctant to surrender their autonomy in a traditional marriage; attentive to the financial and emotional vulnerabilities facing single mothers, they were determined to seek self-reliance through paid work, whether or not they were in a committed relationship.

Young men, in contrast, were concerned about their capacity to succeed—or at least survive—economically. Facing time-demanding workplaces, they were more inclined to fall back on a modified traditionalism that recognizes a mother's right (and need) to work but puts a man's career first. Since the requirements of work collide with the needs of children, these men reasoned, they had little choice but to rely on someone else to be the primary caretaker, even if their partner held a paid job. Ultimately, men's perceived need to protect their economic prospects and identities as earners collides with women's growing desire for equality and financial self-sufficiency.

The gender divide between women's search for self-reliance and men's hope to succeed in an increasingly insecure marketplace is real. It contributes to the persistence of family arrangements that leave most women as primary caretakers even

when they work, and most men as secondary caretakers even if they are involved fathers. However, the persistence of these gender boundaries does not reflect the dominant ideals of most contemporary women or men. They stem instead from the intractable structural and cultural barriers to equality.

The Rise of Diverse Family Strategies

What happens when early ideals and plans must give way to actual choices? To find out how women and men are fashioning strategies of work and care in the new century, I have been interviewing adults aged 35–46, when pressures to build a family life and establish an occupational base are most intense (Gerson, 2015). These adults are working at a variety of jobs (from low-wage service work to hi-tech and professional occupations) and living in an array of family situations, including singles and married and cohabiting couples (both straight and gay). Like their younger counterparts, the majority prefers to combine and share paid work and parenting; yet their strategies typically fall short of this goal, albeit in different ways.

About half the interviewees were engaged in strategies that emphasize each partner's specialization in either breadwinning or caretaking. About a third practiced a form of "contemporary traditionalism," where fathers take responsibility for providing a family's financial base and mothers for unpaid domestic care; but even in these cases, most mothers worked part-time or hoped to return to work as soon as they were able. Another 15% also divided work and care, but did so by reversing traditional gender assignments. These "reversed" (heterosexual) couples depended on a woman's steady paycheck, leaving husbands to care for the children while seeking work they deem acceptable. All of these couples, whether they apportioned tasks in a gender-traditional or gender-transgressive way, were prompted—indeed, forced—to divide responsibility for work and care. The high demands of work and parenting, along with economic insecurities that left primary earners putting in excessive hours and primary caretakers depending on a partner's paycheck, prompted these couples to segment their lives and their relationships despite a preference for a more balanced arrangement.

The rest of my respondents, however, had neither opted nor been pushed to divide work and care with a partner. Instead, they had either avoided childbearing altogether, were left to support and rear a child on their own, or managed to share equally with a partner. Singles living on their own without a partner, including some who are single mothers, comprise about a third of this group. (One-quarter of today's adults may never marry and one-third of households with children are headed by a single parent, usually a mother according to Wang and Parker (2014)). Faced with very different challenges than their married peers, these single respondents were coping with either too few or too many responsibilities. In the wake of job setbacks and relationship difficulties, most single men were wary of commitment and worried that their lack of financial stability left them "unmarriageable" (Wilson, 1987; Edin & Kefelas, 2005). Single women, in contrast, were generally confi-

dent about their ability to support themselves, but they were torn between forgoing motherhood altogether or taking on the task of supporting and rearing a child without the help of a committed partner. These singles face different tradeoffs. Childless singles are not in a position of juggling work and parenthood, but this does not mean they would necessarily prefer to take on more. At the other end of the spectrum, single mothers (and in some cases, single fathers) have little choice but to take on multiple responsibilities, but the circumstances in which they do so pose daunting challenges.

Finally, about 20% of respondents were taking conscious steps to share work and care equally, often against the odds. These "egalitarians" have come closer than any other group to blending work and family. They are thus in the best position to demonstrate the benefits predicted by Barnett and Hyde, and in important respects, they do. Yet, these couples also find themselves engaged in an ongoing balancing act, torn between time-demanding jobs and intensive parenting norms. Faced with this clash, some decided to forgo parenthood to preserve a measure of personal autonomy while maintaining an equal relationship with two taxing jobs. Others chose to have children, sacrificing sleep and personal time to carve out enough time for childcare while also striving to maintain a toehold at work.

Some egalitarian couples, albeit a minority, exemplify the benefits forecast by the expansionist framework. Tellingly, they enjoyed a set of institutional and social supports that made it possible to attain the balance others found illusive. These supports include access to secure, flexible work (for both partners) and a stable network of paid and unpaid caretakers. Such supports at home and on the job allowed mothers and fathers to share work and care, without taxing their personal well-being or the well-being of their relationships. The challenge for all of these egalitarian couples is to sustain their efforts despite the obstacles and difficulties they encounter.

As a whole, all of these patterns show how today's uncertain occupational and family terrain compel women and men to pursue a diverse, often shifting set of work–family strategies. The erosion of predictable work paths in both professional and lower-wage jobs has undermined families' financial security (Kalleberg 2011), while the expansion of options in intimate relationships has created alternatives to permanent marriage (Cohen, 2014; Livingston, 2014). The diverse strategies pursued by my respondents reflect the different contingencies they faced. However, everyone confronted an intractable dilemma of some kind, and everyone needs the options and resources that will help them resolve their specific work–family dilemmas in the way they deem best.

Expanding the Theoretical and Policy Agenda

Developments of the last decade have confirmed the core argument of expansionist theory. Surveys routinely show dwindling support for gender-divided arrangements, with an historic low of 31.7% agreeing in 2012 with the statement that families are better off "when the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes

care of the home" (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011). Indeed, when people are offered a scenario in which a mother with a preschool child is satisfied with her job, satisfied with her childcare arrangement, and the family depends on her income, 75.5% say a married mother should stay at a full-time job and 92% say a single mother should stay at a full-time job (Jacobs & Gerson, 2014). Since new generations are especially likely to support more balanced, equitable work–family integrations, we can expect this trend to continue.

However, the same social shifts that have increased support for more flexible notions of gender and more balanced divisions of paid work and family care have also raised new theoretical questions and policy challenges. As family forms and gender relationships diversify, we need to unpack the meaning of "doing it all." Different types of households create different types of dilemmas and conflicts. Dual-earners, for example, meet their families work and caretaking needs in varied ways. They may all have two employed parents, but their household division of labor can take a neo-traditional, reversed, or egalitarian form. Singles, too, are a varied group, with single parents—primarily women—responsible for both care and economic support and childless singles with no such responsibilities. To complicate matters further, people may move from one category to another as their relationship and job statuses change.

Amid this new family and gender complexity, theoretical analyses need to distinguish between "doing it all" and "having it all." Though often used interchangeably, these phrases have quite different meanings. "Doing it all" is a behavioral measure, while "having it all" implies a psychological state. Feeling satisfied depends, in turn, on possessing enough social supports so that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. Combining paid work and unpaid caretaking is a growing necessity, but there is no guarantee that people will deem it beneficial. The pressing theoretical task is thus to specify the social contexts and conditions that make it possible—or difficult—to blend work and care in satisfying, uplifting ways.

Addressing these theoretical questions raises important policy questions as well. Even the most beneficial social changes are bound to create new challenges, and the gender revolution is no exception. The decline of separate spheres holds manifold benefits for women, men, and children, but it has also led to new institutional conflicts between family and work and new personal dilemmas about to integrate public and private pursuits. Indeed, even as the need to combine paid work and unpaid dependent care rises, the norms and structures of work and parenting continue to grow more stringent and demanding. "Ideal worker" norms, which presume an employee will put his or her job before all else, are stronger than ever (Williams, 2000; Moen & Roehling, 2004), and caretaking norms continue to expect parents to provide intensive care with little public support (Gornick & Myers, 2009; Hays, 1996; Heymann & Beem, 2005).

As the gender revolution continues to unfold, we face an unprecedented opportunity to create the social supports—such as flexibility and economic security in job and career paths, paid parental leave, affordable high-quality childcare, and equal opportunities for women and parents of all stripes. Enacting these policies will not only insure that the benefits of blending work and caretaking outweigh the

costs; it will also meet the economic and emotional needs of twenty-first-century families. If, however, we fail to restructure our institutions of work and care, then time-demanding workplaces and privatized caretaking structures will continue to exact costs, pose difficult tradeoffs, and threaten to undermine the benefits that integrating work and caretaking provides. I am confident that Barnett and Hyde would agree.

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Overlooked Inequalities: Employment, Parenting, and Partnering for Men in Families

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A look at popular literature on work and family life presents a bracing reflection of the stressors that drive contemporary families. The dysfunction between work and home, and the deleterious consequences for women's health, is traced in *Maxed Out: American Moms on the Brink*, (Alcorn, 2013). In *Overwhelmed: Work, Love and Play When No One Has the Time*, Brigid Schulte (2014) turns to counting hours and minutes to find that women have precious little time for quality engagement in what matters most in their lives. And the strange conflicts inherent in parenting are portrayed by Jennifer Senior (2014) in *All Joy and No Fun: The Paradox of Modern Parenthood*.

These volumes reflect the popular vision of expansionist theory in women's lives, 20 years after its origins. But what about men? Are they also overwhelmed, maxed out, and having all joy but no fun? Does expansionist theory address men's experiences in work and family life in recent decades?

In this chapter, I argue that men's experiences as partners and parents have increasingly become bifurcated, as inequalities in income, health, and a range of measures have emerged since the early 1980s. Although men across class and race/ethnicity experience the stress of mismatch between work and family life, they experience it differently—and with distinct implications for their potential as partners and parents.

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Wanting and (usually) Getting it All: Fathers in Middle-class Families

As Hyde argues in "Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated" and in earlier statements of expansionist theory (Barnett & Hyde, 2001), the existence of multiple roles has not been problematized for men in the same way as for women. Responsibilities across parenting and partnering roles in particular are often quite different for men, and stressors and negative outcomes related to an overburdening are likely more limited for men. If expansionist theory reflected a sense that women "want it all," the assumption has been that men may not. If men can pick and choose which roles benefit them more, then why would they "want it all?"

Recent polls reflect the notions that many men have redefined "good" fathering to include hands-on care of children, and that they aspire "to be accepted, both at home and in the workplace, as whole persons" (Harrington, Van Deusen, & Humberd, 2011; Harrington, Van Deusen, & Ladge, 2010). Although this may seem to be a dramatic shift, it has been unfolding for decades. Middle and upper middle class fathers in the Bay area indicated that the package deal of being a father, a husband, a worker, and a homeowner was a commonly-sought and highly-prized goal (Townsend, 2002). In a package deal, men's roles cluster together, in large part guaranteed by social status. It is possible to be an involved father within a residential family, with a married partner and a full-time job with good wages.

As Hyde (See "Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated") suggests, however, role quality is more important than number of roles in expansionist theory. If men's roles cluster together easily, it does not mean that they fulfill each of these roles successfully. The shift in cultural expectations for men's provision and caregiving has not necessarily been reflected in men's choices and behavior, as their increase in time spent as caregivers has only grown slightly since the 1970s (Pleck, 2010). Interestingly, social opinion polls show that adults believe that fathers are doing a worse job as parents, compared with 20–30 years ago—while at the same time acknowledging that it is more difficult to be a father in 2015 (Livingston & Parker, 2011).

For middle and upper middle class men, the most recent and dramatic threat is insecurity introduced by recent shifts in global and local economies. Volatility in jobs and wages means that even middle-class families live under a cloud of uncertainty. Instead of cutting back and saving money, Cooper (2014) suggests that these families attempt to upscale, increasing work hours and stockpiling resources to make it through insecure months. She also argues that women bear the burden of managing this anxiety and planning insecurity strategies for the entire family, as husbands focus on their own personal part of the puzzle. However, middle-class men's efforts as both parents and workers are not encouraged by many. The lack of supportive work/family policies for men, such as the extensive paternal leave policies utilized outside the USA, might provide incentive for a larger set of responsibilities for men (Marsiglio & Roy, 2012). These policies set in motion effects that

change family dynamics over time (e.g., Early paternal involvement due to leave polices leads to more paternal involvement as children grow and age in families).

Undoubtedly, economic insecurity shapes the marriages and intimate relationships of middle-class families. As the cluster of masculine expectations would suggest, however, men with resources remain primarily wedded to the promise and demands of the package deal. Perhaps, the most significant shift for these men is sharing responsibility as the provider with female partners who may, in 2015, be earning more. Although a partner's wages may pose a threat to perceptions of power and control in couples, men also benefit from additional resources in the household.

Men's involvement with children may undergo substantial shifts when mothers are also primary financial contributors to the household. Today, many men in middle-class families take part in dynamic polygamy, participating in multiple families with multiple partners over time. With higher rates of relationship formation and dissolution, middle-class men (and women) may watch the fragmentation of intimacies that once seemed guaranteed in the package deal of American middle-class families (Conley, 2009).

A critical result of changes and instability are adverse health conditions for these men. Only about one third of men felt conflict and stress due to the lack of fit between work demands and family life in the 1980s, but by the turn of the century, over half (60%) of men—especially those in dual income middle-class and above families—felt the impact of conflict and stress (Aumann, Galinksy, & Matos, 2011). Depression rates have typically been higher for women than for men. However, if we explore a broader definition of depression that includes anger, aggression, and risk taking that men more likely express, rates of depression appear to be comparable for men and women (Martin, Neighbors, & Griffith, 2013). What has caused some of the greatest alarm has been the significant uptick in suicide rates. In tandem with changes in unemployment due to the Great Recession, displaced mid-life men, between the ages of 45 and 64, have seen suicide rates climb from 21 to 29%.

Intersectionality, Power, and Diversity

Thus far, the discussion of expansionist theory has been applied only to a limited group of US men who are middle-class, employed, and married. How does expansionist theory apply to fathers who are not employed, and who may not be married or residing with children? Since the late 1970s, men's experiences as fathers have diversified alongside growing income inequality. In fact, one of the fastest growing segments of the US population is that of low-income men, who now encompass 28% of the population (McDaniel, Simms, Fortuny, & Monson, 2013). The emergence of intersectionality as an important development in our understanding of expansionist theory is briefly mentioned by Hyde (See "Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated"). This paradigm shift is critical in moving us beyond a simple focus on middle-class men who are providers and caregivers.

Intersectionality encourages us to examine a full range of diversity. Shifting family arrangements tell us an important story about men in families. Gender has been reconfigured and couple relationships are diversified in family units in recent decades. Only 34 % of the children now live in married, dual-income families (Cohen, 2014). Further, 43 % of the adults live in married couple households, but 40 % live in lone individual or single-parent households. To relegate expansionist theory or the study of work and family dynamics, to a shrinking segment of married, dual-income couples is to misunderstand the very real impact of economic and social changes. It is still the case that the work/family field of research is "haunted by the lives it excludes" (MacDermid, Roy, & Zvoncovic, 2014).

I argue for extending the analysis of expansionist theory to view intersectionality as a reflection of power and inequality, not just diversity. How are gender and couple relationships shaped by emerging inequality and social institutions? For example, the establishment of a national child support system has had varied impacts on men in different family arrangements. For men with resources in the middle and upper classes, nonresidential fathers pay child support which is received by mothers and children. In contrast, low-income nonresidential fathers whose children receive welfare assistance also pay child support, likely lower amounts, but it is not necessarily received by mothers and children. In half of the states, their payments go directly to the state agency to recoup cash assistance. The remaining states have arranged for a small percentage of the payment to pass through to poor families, with only five states passing through the entire child support award.

These fathers face very different incentives to contribute financially to their children's well-being. In my own research, low-income fathers are unable to secure a package deal and unable to take on multiple role expectations in part due to intervention of policy systems that shape fatherhood in new and complicated ways (Roy, 2014). Cory was a young 25-year-old wrestler with two preschool age sons from a former girlfriend. He completed paternity establishment and was immediately served with a child support order. He and his ex-partner had different perspectives on how he was identified to pay child support, and Cory felt disrespected despite his motivation to provide for his sons.

> When I was going for child support, I had second thoughts. I was kind of mad, because I thought she put them on me. And I didn't have no job at the time, but she said that public aid did it. People try to tell her what to do and she do it. It's "he said, she said," because some say the system made her do it, or that she wanted to do it. I really couldn't tell. I was gonna take care of my kids, even with no money. I was going to be there no matter what (Marsiglio & Roy, 2012, p. 118).

Wanting it All but Receiving Very Little: Fathers in Economically Disadvantaged Families

The story of how men across the income spectrum have grown more and more apart is reflected in how their income status has become more and more synonymous with their marital status. An analysis of Current Population Survey data by Bruce

Western and Tracey Shollenberger shows that in the late 1960s, a large majority of households in all income groups included married parents. This was true even in poor households, where almost three quarters of couples were married. By 2010, only 37% of the bottom income quartile of households included married parents, and only 61% of the households near middle-class status included married parents (DeParle, 2012). The pathway of economically disadvantaged women is toward single parenthood; the pathway for economically disadvantaged men is away from marriage as well as away from coresidence.

To borrow the framework of expansionist theory, with lost opportunities for marriage and fatherhood, having multiple roles has been problematic for economically disadvantaged men in recent decades. These are dramatic shifts for couple relationships in families below middle-class status, and for men in particular, usually meaning that not only are men unmarried, but also that they are isolated from their children. Fathers are not a part of their children's daily routines and are often engaged in tense negotiations with mothers of their children. If the package deal does not hold for these men, can their other roles buffer them? Becoming a father still prompts economically disadvantaged men to get a job—these expectations are deeply embedded in expectations for "good" fathers. However, failure as a provider also shapes a man's parenting. Economically disadvantaged men are set up to fail if their lack of good employment further jeopardizes their tenuous hold on parenting.

After the Great Recession, it is a new (old) world of work for economically disadvantaged men. The "mancession" with disproportionate loss of jobs in sectors that primarily employ men faded by 2012, but the transformed economic landscape presents further insecurity for men without resources. For young men in particular, the employment population ratio hit the lowest point in over six decades (Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin, & Palma, 2011). In 1967, young men earned 74% of the weekly earnings of older men, but only 52% by 2009. Educational attainment has become a very clear indicator of the potential of men as providers and family men: By the end of the Great Recession, men with masters degrees or more saw a 21% gain in annual earnings, whereas men with high school diplomas lost 27% in annual earnings (Fig. 1).

An emphasis on intersectionality would highlight incarceration as another social process that has dramatically reshaped the lives and family relationships of economically disadvantaged men, in tandem with growing inequality and economic disparities. Lifetime chances of incarceration have doubled for African American men (to 32% between 1974 and 2001) and tripled for Latino men (to 17% during the same period; Raphael, 2011). Interaction with police, the courts, and the correctional system are game changers for men, as they inhibit men's participation in school, in jobs, and with family members.

As with men in middle-class families, economically disadvantaged men increasingly find themselves involved in multiple households with multiple partners. Research on "multiple partner fertility"—a term seldom used for middle-class men and women in multiple family configurations—echoes the negative outcomes for children and reflect the difficulty of extending limited resources across multiple households. Despite men's limitations as providers and partners, mothers may de-



Fig. 1 Percentage of households in each income group with married parents

velop trust in them as parents (Burton, Cherlin, Winn, Estacion, & Holder-Taylor, 2009), which was often overlooked in decades of prior research on low-income couples. Trust is not simply an interpersonal behavior in dyadic relationships; it is situated in and shaped by family networks and social systems, including policies that may threaten relationships (such as incarceration, child support, domestic violence court, or welfare; Levine, 2013). In response, men in these strained contexts may establish suspended relationships, when they are "together but not *together*" with the mothers of their children (Roy, Buckmiller, & McDowell, 2008). Leon, a 37-year-old father of three boys on Chicago's South Side, described the balancing act that he worked in his fluid relationship with the mother of his children.

> I always say she's my wife. We've been together since seventh grade, and there's nothing stopping us from getting married. We just ain't really right. I'm not working, but she's working. When I was working, she wasn't working. When we go to the zoo, who's gonna buy the food? Who's gonna pay for gas? I want to take them to a show—who's gonna pay for the show? Do I feel left out? Yeah. But I'm going to be with my kids, hoping that me and her will get married.

We find that mothers may not close out nonresidential fathers from their children's lives, but instead recruit them through a process of kinscription, assessing their contributions, efforts, and trustworthiness (Roy & Burton, 2007). As mothers strive to gain men's accountability as parents, they confront interventions from policy systems that may jeopardize the limited control that both men and women have over their family lives (Roy & Hart, 2014).

Finally, changing local economies and relationships impact the health of economically disadvantaged men. Adverse mental health outcomes emerge over the life course. As they move into adulthood, young men face the consequences of being adultified as "men of the house" in single mother households (Roy, Messina,

Smith, & Waters, 2014). The consequences of homicide survivorship and exposure to violence create the potential for trauma and depression (Smith, 2015). More broadly, recent studies show how health disparities impost a huge cost on men of color, especially those who are economically disadvantaged. The direct costs of medical expenditures for African American men top out at $ 100 billion per year, with the indirect costs to health due to loss of productivity and premature death at $ 100–300 billion per year (Thorpe, Richard, Bowie, Laveist, & Gaskin, 2014).

Challenges to Research and Policy on Men, Work, and Families

As we consider Hyde's expansionist model for men in families, there are clear challenges for research and policy. We have moved beyond a "one model fits all" approach for conceptualizing men in work and family life. The rapidly growing diversity of men's experiences as workers, parents, and partners pushes us to recognize inequality as a driver for diversity in families. The men who aspire to and attain a package deal as successful providers, fathers, and marital partners stand in stark contrast to men who are challenged to find part-time work, to visit their nonresidential children, and to nurture long-term intimate relationships.

Even if we can recognize increasing diversity and disparities in men's experiences in work and family, as policymakers and researchers, we lag far behind in our conceptualization and measurement of these experiences. Policies and data sets built on decades-out-of date assumptions about marriage and provide-and-reside fatherhood can do harm to the efforts of men who move on the margins of these worlds.

What is clear is that policies have been established for men who lack the resources to become marital partners and fathers, but often these policies are punitive and designed simply to promote employment and marriage. There are few policy models that move beyond material expectations for fathers, toward transformative relational expectations of nurturance that would apply to men regardless of their income status or social class standing (Marsiglio & Roy, 2012).

In the wake of economic downturn and perceived insecurity, there are few options that promote education and employment for men in families. Men's wages have been flat and falling since the late 1970s, and without access to education, there are few pathways for men to achieve access to good jobs. If provider status remains the lynchpin for men's entrée into family life, the lack of innovative employment options may only feed the trends toward growing disparities in men's experiences in coming decades.

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Women, Men, Work and Family: Action in the Interactions

Maureen Perry-Jenkins

In a 2001 article entitled "Women, Men, Work and Family: An Expansionist Theory," Barnett and Hyde (2001) set out to challenge the prevailing notion in the work–family field at the time that managing multiple work and family roles was stressful, full of strain, induced role conflict, and compromised health. Barnett and Hyde proposed the innovative, and rather wonderful, idea that perhaps managing multiple roles could, in fact, be good for women and men. They supported their hypothesis by documenting the large research base pointing to the positive effects of multiple roles on mental and physical health. This groundbreaking paper refocused much of the work and family research to look beyond only the negative processes linking work and family roles to also examine the potentially positive relationships between them. In Hyde's (in chapter "Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated") recent update of this work, she reviews the findings and conclusions from the earlier article and evaluates whether the latest research evidence still supports expansionist theory, especially when considering some of the dramatic changes that have occurred in work settings, family structure, and gender and race issues, over the past decade. In this chapter, I provide both commentary and critique of Dr. Hyde's latest articulation of expansionist theory, and introduce some new ideas for incorporating expansionist theory concepts into current empirical research on work and family.

Expansionist theory holds, as a core assumption, that "in general, multiple roles are beneficial, in contrast to theories that treat them as sources of stress" (Hyde, in chapter "Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated"). In addressing this thesis and the supporting research proposed by Hyde, the current chapter addresses three key questions in relation to expansionist theory, namely: (1) For whom are multiple roles better? (2) When are multiple roles better? and (3) Under what conditions are multiple roles better? I argue that too often, in our main effect models linking multiple roles to physical and mental health, we fail to examine how key contextual variables, such as social class, race and ethnicity, family structure,

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

Fig. 1 Analysis of study results from Ahern and Ryff (2006)

and gender, may moderate the ways in which multiple roles shape work and family processes. A key premise underlying my comments is that quite often the "truer" story about how work and family are interrelated lies within distinct ecological niches, suggesting that the "action is in the interactions."

For Whom are Multiple Roles Better?

To address the question regarding who benefits most from multiple roles, I turn to the research discussed by Hyde regarding multiple roles and mental health. In summarizing work by Plaisier et al. (2008), Hyde notes that having more roles predicted more positive mental health; and that the partner role, in particular, had a positive effect on mental health. In this study, age, gender, and education were all controlled for the models, raising questions as to how these factors may, in fact, moderate the nature of the relationship between roles and mental health. In the second paper Hyde discussed, Hoffnung and Williams (2013) found a main effect linking multiple roles, specifically when adding on the parent role, with higher-life satisfaction. An important caveat of these findings, however, is that this sample was comprised solely of college-educated women; thus again controlling for age, gender, and social class by virtue of the sampling design. Finally, turning to the final study Hyde reviewed, Ahrens and Ryff (2006) also found that multiple roles were positively associated with psychological well-being. However, as shown in their graph of the interaction between multiple roles, education, and gender, the story is much more complicated. Figure 1 illustrates, the women who reported the lowest levels of autonomy, one indicator of psychological well-being, were women with the highest

number of roles coupled with the lowest levels of education. In contrast, the women doing the best were high on multiple roles and on education. In sharp contrast, the men reporting the highest levels of autonomy were low on multiple roles and high on education. Thus, the story of the benefits and drawbacks of multiple roles appears to vary as a function of both gender and social class.

In summary, the finding that multiple roles are "better for you" or are related to better physical and mental health outcomes may not be accurate for women of lower-social classes, or for men of higher-social class. Clearly, we need more studies that tease apart "for whom" multiple roles may be beneficial or detrimental with an aim of understanding why these differences exist. Only then can we provide greater clarity to the messages we bring to the general public about managing work and family, as well as develop more effective interventions that address the unique needs of different types of families managing multiple work and family roles.

When Are Multiple Roles Better?

An implicit assumption underlying much of the multiple roles literature is that roles are stable over time, or at least our analytic approaches often rest on this assumption. A great deal of data, however, points to the dynamic nature of the roles we enact. In my current longitudinal study (Perry-Jenkins, Goldberg, Smith, & Logan, 2011), the Work and Family Transitions Project (WFTP), that has followed the lives of low-income families experiencing the transition to parenthood and early transition back to paid employment, we find that work and family roles at this time are in major flux. For example, in our second cohort of 207 low-income, pregnant mothers recruited in the third trimester of pregnancy, 31 were married, 80 were cohabiting, and 96 were single at the time of the first interview. By 1 year postpartum, 30 remained married, 58 were still cohabiting, and 71 remained single, meaning that 48 mothers (23 % of sample) changed their marital status and family roles over a year's time. In terms of work roles, the instability was even higher. Across the first year of parenthood, 87 (46 %) maintained the same work role across the first year, 65 mothers (36 %) remained employed but switched jobs one or more times, and 34 mother (18 %) quit their job altogether.

Thus, in only a 1-year time period, we saw the majority of mothers experiencing changes in either their family roles or work roles, and many experienced changes across both settings. The question of how this level of instability is related to both mental and physical health is an important one; and our preliminary results suggest that more role transitions across the first year of parenthood are related to greater anxiety and more depression for new mothers. In short, the key take away point from our results is that experiencing many role changes over a relatively short period of time may be as important, or perhaps more important, for psychological and physical health than the number of roles one holds at any point in time.

Under What Conditions Are Multiple Roles Related to Better Physical and Mental Health

A life course perspective challenges us to consider how the relationship between multiple roles and well-being may differ across time and across major life events. Managing the roles of parent, employee, spouse, and adult child is likely to be quite challenging early in the life cycle when one may have children under the age of five, both parents are holding down full-time jobs, and both may have extended family care responsibilities. In contrast, managing multiple roles later in the life cycle, when one may have young adult children, have achieved secure status in a job and have a spouse with stable employment, would likely be quite different. Thus, much can be learned by examining the implications of multiple roles at distinct times across the life course as family and work roles undergo "natural" transitions, such as: the transition to parenthood, children transitioning to school, transition to empty nest, and retirement.

In conjunction with a life course perspective, an ecological perspective holds that family processes and outcomes may vary dramatically within unique ecological niches defined by key contextual variables, such as gender, race, ethnicity, social class, family structure, and neighborhood. With regard to the notion of multiple roles, an ecological perspective would challenge us to consider how, for example, multiple roles may differ in single-parent households, same-sex households, across different racial and ethnic groups, and for poor, working-class, or middle-class families.

To provide an example of how the intersection of life course and ecological perspectives can inform our understanding of multiple roles, I again turn to findings from the WFTP to illustrate how this approach can add to our knowledge and understanding of multiple roles. The transition to parenthood is a unique time to think about roles since a new role is being added and former roles, such as spouse and worker, are undergoing some serious adjustments. In our study, since we follow new parents from before birth to 1-year post birth, we have the unique opportunity to examine how changes in roles are related to changes in well-being across the first year. All parents were employed outside of the home before birth and planned on returning to work soon after the birth, and all parents were employed in low-income jobs. In addition, our sample represents a unique ecological niche in terms of social class. On average, our mother's annual family income was $21,000, and the majority of our families hovered at the poverty line, despite being employed. The aims of the larger study were to examine how the transition to parenthood coupled with the early return to paid employment soon after the birth predicted levels and changes in parent's mental health (Perry-Jenkins et al., 2011).

To demonstrate how movement into and out of roles over the course of the transition to parenthood is related to mental health we tracked pregnant women's transition to the mother role, temporary leave from the worker role, and subsequent return to their worker roles soon after the baby's birth. We linked these role changes to both levels and changes in depressive symptoms across the same time period. Depression

is a key focus of our project because a large research base points to maternal and paternal depression as significant risk factors, not only for parents, but also for the healthy development of their children (Wachs, Black, Engle, & Polytechnic, 2006). As shown in the first graph in Fig. 2, all mothers, on average, report inflated levels of depressive symptoms during the third trimester of pregnancy. Mothers report a significant decline in depressive symptoms after the birth, but then report an increase in symptoms after they return to work. Thus, adding the parent role initially was related to declines in depression, but adding in the worker role post birth was linked to an increase in depression.

Although our sample was fairly homogenous with regards to socioeconomic status (SES), the sample was quite diverse in terms of racial and ethnic background. We had 77 white mothers, 82 Puerto Rican mothers, and 48 black mothers in our sample. We were interested in examining if there were differences in how mothers of different racial and ethnic background experienced the first year of parenthood. The second graph in Fig. 2 highlights the ways in which trajectories in depressive symptoms varied significantly by race/ethnicity. Specifically, Puerto Rican mothers showed little recovery in depressive symptoms across the first year, whereas Black mothers had a greater decline in symptoms and less of an increase in symptoms upon returning to work. The trajectory for White mothers fell in the middle. The key question then became: Why does change in depressive symptoms differ across these groups? We turned to our qualitative data to try to gain some insight into this question.

In the qualitative component of our study we asked questions, such as: (1) What is your most important role in the family?, (2) What are the responsibilities of that role?, and (3) How did you feel about going back to work after your baby was born? We quickly learned that cultural traditions and values differentially shaped the meaning of both the motherhood role and the economic provider role across racial and ethnic groups. Specifically, African-American mothers had every expectation that they would be working soon after their baby's birth. They fully embraced the provider/work role and, thus, experienced minimal elevation in depressive symptoms upon returning to work after the birth. In contrast, Puerto Rican mothers, on average, expressed much more ambivalence about returning to paid employment after their child's birth. Culturally, there was a much stronger expectation among the Puerto Rican community that new mothers should be home with their babies and, consequently, levels of depressive symptoms did not dip significantly post birth and increased upon returning to work. White mothers were more varied in their beliefs about work and family roles, and their average trajectory fell in between the Black and Puerto Rican groups. These data suggest that simply tallying the number of roles an individual holds tells us little about the meaning an individual attaches to that role, meanings and values that are linked to one's cultural background.



Fig. 2 **a** Average change in depressive symptoms across first year of parenthood. **b** Change in depressive symptoms within racial and ethnic groups

Gender and Expansionist Theory

Hyde (in chapter "Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated") states, "The original articulation of expansionist theory assumed male–female marriages and the potential gender inequalities that so often arise in them. How do these dynamics change—or do they change—in male–male or female–female couples?" (p. 105). A number of empirical studies have begun to tackle this important question. Goldberg and Perry-Jenkins (2007) examined the division of labor among a sample of lesbian couples experiencing the transition to parenthood. Lesbian couples provide a unique context to explore how gender, resources, and constraints (e.g., biology and employment) predict division of labor. These issues were examined in a short-term, longitudinal, study of 29 lesbian mothers who were interviewed twice across the transition to parenthood, once during the third trimester of pregnancy and again 4 months postpartum. All were first-time parents and at least one parent was planning on returning to full-time work. Findings revealed that the division of housework remained virtually equal among lesbian mothers, even after the nonbiological mother returned to full-time employment; a finding that runs counter to the research on opposite-sex couples (Pinto & Coltrane, 2009). In contrast, the division of childcare tasks was more unequal, with nonbiological mothers performing fewer childcare chores than bio-mothers. Some mothers offered biological explanations for this inequity, noting that bio-mothers nursed and were more often home with the newborn. Other mothers attributed the inequity to the work demands of the nonbiological mothers. Importantly, the enactment and meaning of parent and worker roles in same-sex households, while sharing some similarities with opposite-sex households, also have some distinct differences.

In an attempt to tease apart biology from parenthood, in a follow-up study, (Goldberg, Smith, & Perry-Jenkins, 2012) examined the division of labor in a sample of lesbian, gay, and heterosexual adoptive parents. This sample was unique in that couples' gender structure was different but biological relatedness had been, in a sense, controlled for since no parents were biologically related to the child. Results showed that lesbian and gay couples did share more equally than heterosexual couples, but in all adoptive couples, childcare differed as a function of partner's work hours, income, and schedules as well. Thus, gender and family structure moderate the ways in which parents construct and enact family and work roles.

Conclusion

In closing, the literature on how work and family roles and responsibilities play out across the many new and changing family structures in the USA is growing at a fast clip. The findings suggest that the social context of families' lives play a large part in shaping the meaning of work and family roles and the ways in which family members negotiate and enact these roles. Over a decade ago, Barnett and Hyde

(2001) had a significant impact on the work and family field by asking the simple, but provocative question: Might women (and men) benefit from enacting multiple roles? Their subsequent critique of the literature challenged the current zeitgeist of the times, which held that multiple roles were stressful, by presenting evidence that managing multiple roles could enhance well-being and family relationships. In 2015, there is still much data pointing to the ways enacting multiple roles can be beneficial, however, much of the data suggest that there is not a simple direct effect between roles and well-being, as Hyde points out in her review. I challenge Hyde, and all of us who examine gender, work, and family roles, to move to presenting the interactions as the primary story around gender and work, as opposed to focusing on main effects. Main effects can cover up important stories, often the main story, that arises when examining interactions. For example, studies reviewed in this chapter indicate that multiple roles are particularly harmful for low-income women and higher-SES men, making the main effect showing positive effects of multiple roles meaningless. In addition, work and family roles play out in unique ways in the context of gay and lesbian families, as well as in single-parent families, and are likely to play out differently across the life course. As we continue our efforts to understand how enacting multiple roles across both work and family settings impacts the health and well-being of families, I propose that our findings will be most meaningful if we can more carefully specify: For whom, under what conditions, and at what points in the life course multiple roles have unique and significant effects on women and men.

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Part III
Men and Women as Parents

Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors

Ronald Mincy, Hyunjoon Um and Jo Turpin

Secular changes in labor force participation, especially among married women, mean that both parents in poor and working class families are involved in child rearing. Although mothers still play the primary role in meeting children's basic needs (Presser, 2003; Waldfogel, 2006), fathers and mothers may share more equally in other aspects of child rearing, especially as children transition to school (Presser, 2003). We know much about mothering and its effects on child well-being at many stages of the life course, and our knowledge about the role of fathers in the development of infants and toddlers has been expanding (Lamb, 2010; Lamb & Lewis, 2010; Leidy, Schofield, & Parke, 2013; Roggman, Bradley, & Raikes, 2013; Tamis-LeMonda, Baumwell, & Cabrera, 2013). Yet, we know less about how fathers contribute to the rearing of school age children, and how these activities might affect child well-being, independent of the activities of mothers.

The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the independent effects of father engagement in a broad range of child-focused activities with 5-year-old children on behavioral outcomes when the child is 9 years old. No longer infants or toddlers, and on the cusp of school, 5-year-old children have received less attention by researchers. Early school years are an important time in which the developmental gains reached in earlier periods begin to establish patterns of behavior that are critical as children learn and grow (Waldfogel, 2006). How important is parental engagement, especially that of fathers, in reinforcing these behaviors at this stage?

The outcome of interest is the externalizing and internalizing behaviors of children, measured by the Child Behavioral Checklist (CBCL), a questionnaire completed by parents to identify problem behavior in children at age 9 (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001). We focus on the extent to which fathers' engagement in activities known to promote success in school differs from the activities of mothers, and whether fathers' engagement in these activities affect childhood behavior, independent of mother, father and child characteristics and level of engagement.

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Our study relies upon data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Survey (FFS), a longitudinal cohort survey collecting data from parents after the birth of their child with follow up interviews at specified intervals as the child matures. The survey thus provides a unique tool for accessing behaviors and the effect of such behavior as the child grows and develops in a variety of family living arrangements. We limit our sample to children born to married and cohabiting households. Though children born to single mothers and nonresident fathers are a large and growing population, by virtue of their physical separation from their children, nonresident fathers are engaged in activities with their children at much lower levels than their resident counterparts (Amato, 1998; Mincy, Jethwani, & Klempin, 2015). As a result, nonresident fathers are hardly expected to sustain a level of engagement in activities that promote positive behavior approaching equality with engagement of mothers. Despite this limitation, our study contributes to the literature by delineating differences in mothers' and fathers' engagement at a critical point in children's development, and estimating the independent effects of fathers' engagement on children's behavior in middle school.

We organize our chapter as follows: Section 2 examines the role of fathers and mothers, and how parental engagement has changed over time, while considering the increases in mothers' labor force participation and their complex work schedules. Additionally, this section explores what children need and whether equality in child engagement between the mother and father is possible or even desirable. Section 3 describes our data and methods. Section 4 describes the extent to which father engagement in activities known to affect children's behavior differs from mother engagement in the same activities, and whether father engagement affects childhood behavior, independent of the mother's characteristics and her level of engagement. Section 5 summarizes our findings, discusses study limitations, and considers implications for research and policy.

Parental Engagement: Role of Mothers and Fathers

Historical Perspective

Dramatic changes in childrearing practices have occurred over the past four centuries yet their objectives remain unchanged. Parents want to prepare their children to be self-supporting and contributing members of society. During the colonial period, this required that children learn a trade, so that they could follow in the footsteps of their fathers, who were mostly farmers, artisans, and tradesmen (Demos, 1986; Mintz, 1998). In this period, characterized by hierarchy and patriarchy, work centered on the family home, with all family members contributing to the economic well-being of the household. Wives and children remained dependent, with husbands and fathers responsible for overseeing all aspects of their lives. The father led the family in prayer, supervised the education and training of their children, directed their courtships and marriages, and was responsible for maintaining order in the

household (Mintz, 1998). Though a father orchestrated the activities of those within his household, he was not directly involved with the care and feeding of infants and very young children; this remained the domain of the mother (Demos, 1986; Mintz, 1998). Change occurred at the end of the eighteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution moved the work of most men from production in a cottage industry to a factory away from home. Children attended public schools to prepare them to succeed their fathers as factory workers. As a result, fathers became less involved in day-to-day child-rearing activities, including those related to schooling, and the home became the domain of mothers.

From the late nineteenth century to the 1920s, labor force participation among women increased, but the increase consisted primarily of unmarried women, with most leaving the workforce upon marrying (Goldin, 2006). From the 1930s through the 1950s, women's participation in paid labor increased, even among married women. The growth of female workers paralleled the increase in high school graduation rates among women, and new office technologies further increased demand for labor (Goldin, 2006). World War II contributed to the overall trend of more women entering the labor force, but its impact was somewhat limited (Goldin, 1991; Goldin, 2006). Another surge of women entering the labor force occurred between the 1950s and the 1970s, and was accompanied by an increase in part time work, with both phenomena increasing the participation of married women (Goldin, 2006; Stacey, 1997). Since the late 1970s, coinciding with the stagnation of male earnings (Leibowitz & Klerman, 1995; Mattingly & Smith, 2010), participation of women, especially among those with children under 1 year, grew (Goldin, 2006). These latest changes were driven by the increased numbers of women attending university, choosing areas of study with high job demand, and delaying the age of first marriage (Goldin, 2006; Stacey, 1997). Together, these changes have fueled the growth of dual earner households. Less than 5% of married women were employed in 1890 (Goldin, 1991); today, that figure exceeds 56% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). As of 2000, 53.5% of all married couples rely on the income of both husband and wife (Meteyer & Perry-Jenkins, 2010; Presser, 2003). Of those households, 57.7% have children under 6 years of age (Presser, 2003).

A more recent trend affecting dual earner households is the increased number of jobs with nonstandard hours, including rotating schedules and weekend work. For many married and cohabiting couples with children, this has created a further layer of complexity in managing household chores and childcare (Mintz, 1998; Presser, 2003). Working mothers must serve the competing interests of work and caring for children. To avoid childcare costs, fathers have also become more involved in child-rearing, especially when one parent works nonstandard hours and families have preschool or school-age children (Presser, 2003; Waldfogel, 2006).

The Needs of Children

Ages 5–8, classified as early school (Barnard & Solchany, 2002), are a time of dramatic change and development, and school represents a major transition point.

During this period, children still need some parental caregiving but much less than they required at earlier ages. Their language and thought processes begin to develop and grow in what Piaget, (1964) referred to as the pre-operations stage. Despite the development of early reasoning skills at this stage, children are not yet able to translate their knowledge into conceptual thought (Piaget, 1964). Additionally, children must master new vocabulary, which, in turn, develops their language skills and enriches thinking and verbal expression (Waldfogel, 2006).

Leaving the home environment to attend school also requires important changes on the behavioral front, especially for children who have not attended preschool. For these children, school offers a new structure and routine, and for others, it often involves moving into a new school with new children. Secure attachments to parents and other caregivers can help children at this stage manage the new environment successfully. Behavioral and emotional development is a significant part of their overall success. For example, children must learn to engage in healthy competition with their peers, and gain competence and a positive sense of self. They must solidify mental images of family, and must learn how to make decisions (Barnard & Solchany, 2002). One of the more challenging tasks during this period is developing friendships (Waldfogel, 2006), an ability that becomes more important as children move towards their middle school years and adolescence. Forming and maintaining friendships requires that children learn to cooperate and share while respecting the rights of other children and adults in the classroom (Barnard & Solchany, 2002). As children begin to assess the demands of social and nonsocial situations and monitor their behaviors accordingly, they are exhibiting self-regulation, a central developmental achievement (Kopp, 1982).

Self-regulation has been defined by a variety of behaviors including the abilities of the child to self calm and manage emotional distress, to delay in acting upon a goal or desire, and to comply with a request (Kopp, 1982). Early self-regulation can be the result of external monitors, for example, a parent or teacher, but self-regulation is initiated autonomously, with the goal of increased competence as the child matures (Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Kopp, 1982). In general, poor self-regulation skills can result in external and internal problem behaviors. Negative emotions expressed at others are manifest as externalizing behaviors and are the result of underdeveloped self-regulation skills (Aunola & Nurmi, 2005; Eisenberg et al., 2001). Children with externalizing problem behaviors can exhibit anger, frustration, and aggression. Overly strong self-regulation can produce internalizing problem behaviors. Internalizing problems create the opposite effect, directing feelings inwardly. Externalizing and internalizing behaviors have been found to be comparatively stable through the early school years, and both can lead to a variety of problems impacting a child's later success (Aunola & Nurmi, 2005).

Self-regulation plays an important role in the school environment, as children are working to cooperate with their peers in the classroom, learning to share, taking turns, following directions, and controlling attention. Self-regulation can promote school readiness through fostering a balance between cognition and emotion, potentially averting early school failure (Blair & Diamond, 2008). For example, self-regulation is associated with increased motivation and success in school (Blair & Diamond, 2008; Grolnick & Ryan, 1989) and good attention skills have been shown

to predict later school achievement (Duncan et al., 2007). Poor social and emotional skills of one child can distract other children in the classroom. Therefore, mastery is important, not only for an individual child, but also for the other children in the classroom.

Parent–Child Engagement

Children's needs vary with their developmental stage, and parental activities build upon the skills of the developing child. For infants and very young children, a large number of the childcare tasks involve direct caregiving, in addition to play, reading, and skill development with one or both parents. Though fathers are moving slowly toward equal participation in the care of their children, there remain differences in the type and levels of their involvement (Amato, 1998; Meteyer & Perry-Jenkins, 2010; Parke, 2002). Some fathers are quite involved with their children while others prefer a more traditional arrangement (Bonney, Kelley, & Levant, 1999). Research has shown the benefits of father involvement (Brown et al., 2001; Lamb, 2010; Lamb & Lewis, 2010; Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2013) and that infants form attachments to both parents (Lamb, 2010; Lamb et al., 1987; Marsiglio & Roy, 2012). Yet most studies show that regardless of whether the family is dual or single earner, mothers still have more frequent levels of interaction (Brown et al., 2001; Francis-Connolly, 2000; Meteyer & Perry-Jenkins, 2010; Mintz, 1998; Presser, 2003).

Parental engagement can support the development of cognitive and behavioral skills in the child, beginning in infancy (Brown et al., 2001), and is displayed in a range of activities, from nurturance, parental warmth, and teaching skills, to language use, and disciplinary styles (Brooks-Gunn & Markman, 2005). For infants, engagement focuses on caregiving activities. As children grow, their needs expand to include activities to promote school readiness. These might include storytelling, games and play, shared child/parental reading, and special outings. As children reach school age, the focus remains on the development of behavioral and cognitive skills to help prepare them for a successful transition to school. For a number of children, school may be the first time they spend a significant portion of their day away from home and from their parents, who provide all of the child's resources.

The rise of the dual earner household often means that both parents are involved in childcare, especially in poor and working-class families. The involvement of both parents might offer children an advantage. First, if mothers and fathers each have unique contributions to make, or if their behaviors complement one another, more father involvement may offer benefits. Second, if both parents behave in a similar fashion, father involvement may serve to supplement and reinforce maternal behavior. We also allow for a third possibility, that mothers and fathers may do the same things, but may do them differently, leading to different child outcomes.

Parental interaction with infants and toddlers has been studied extensively. Fathers and mothers are similar in some respects and different in others. Like mothers, fathers are sensitive to infant cues (e.g., cries and smiles) and both parents respond similarly when presented with their infant (Lamb & Lewis, 2010; Lamb

et al., 1987). Mothers and fathers are equally apprehensive about leaving their infant in the care of others, and both adjust their speech patterns when talking to their infant (Lamb & Lewis, 2010). There are also differences in parental behaviors, some of which arise quite early. In a small-scale study in a laboratory setting with young infants, father and mother interactions were examined. Results showed that fathers engaged in more physical play than mothers, including finger tapping games such as running fingers up an infant's arm, while mothers were more verbal and their actions more contained (Yogman et al., 1977). Though there were clear differences in their play, both parents provided a responsive and supportive environment for their young infant. Other studies have also found differences between parental interactions, with fathers providing more physically stimulating play than mothers (Cabrera, Fitzgerald, Bradley, & Roggman (2014), while mothers are a more reliable source of comfort, and are more likely to kiss, hug, smile, and hold their child (Lamb & Lewis, 2010; Lamb et al., 1987). These differences are likely the result of gender socialization rather than inherent physiological characteristics (Lamb et al., 1987).

As children move beyond infancy, behavior by one or both parents can be modeled. By providing emotional and financial support, resolving conflicts through compromise, and communicating clearly and openly, a father can model positive relationship behavior. Children who learn through direct observation are more likely to experience positive relationships themselves, including intimate ones. Additionally, parents who support one another's decisions and establish clear and consistent boundaries can help children learn social norms and values, making it easier to adjust to the demands of school and later, the workplace (Amato, 1998).

In a review of the literature on parental engagement, Cabrera, Fitzgerald, Bradley, and Roggman (2014) acknowledge that biological differences between men and women contribute to differences in maternal and paternal behavior, but they also note the role of values, culture, education, and family structure in these differences. Most importantly, they argue that mothers and fathers complement one another. The varying activities and patterns of interactions of fathers and mothers can benefit children by promoting a wider range of social skills (Yogman et al., 1977). In addition to activities and play offered by parents, the relationship between mother and father can impact their child indirectly. A wife with a supportive husband may feel more confident about her capabilities, improving the quality of her parenting skills and thus, her interactions with their child (Amato, 1998).

There is ongoing discussion about the differences between mothering and fathering of infants and toddlers and how each influence child development (Cabrera et al., 2014). However, there has been less attention paid to the differences between father and mother interactions with early school aged children, and how the effects of paternal engagement might differ from the effects of maternal engagement with children at this critical juncture. Compared to the first 3 years of life when children are learning language, locomotion, physical boundaries, and the beginning of regulation skills, age five seems much less dramatic. However, we would argue that many of the skills and behaviors learned at age five continue to build on earlier development, and may help set the course for later school achievement and

successful relationships in life. If engagement can impact school readiness skills for 5-year-old children, their behavior and academic achievement may improve as a result. We hypothesized that father engagement would impact childhood behaviors independently of the mother and her level of engagement. This study addresses these questions in the following sections.

Data and Methods

Data

Our study uses data from the FFCWS, a longitudinal, birth-cohort survey, which is nationally representative of births in cities of 200,000 or more. The survey includes 4898 newborn children and their parents, of which 3711 were born in nonmarital relationships and 1187 were born to married parents, in 75 hospitals across 20 cities (Reichman et al., 2001). The baseline data were collected at hospitals between 1998 and 2000, and successive interviews were completed by telephone when the focal child was 1, 3, 5, and 9 years of age. The response rates at baseline and in each of the following waves were 100, 89, 86, 85, and 72% for mothers, and 78, 69, 67, 64, and 54% for fathers, respectively (Bendheim-Thoman Center for Research on Child Well-being, 2008, 2010).

The FFCWS provides several benefits for studying the effect of father's involvement on child behavioral problems, the most important of which was the rich information about the father as reported by the mother, as well as responses from fathers. These data facilitate a comprehensive understanding of how father engagement plays a role in the development of children. Second, the FFCWS also provides extensive measures of characteristics of parents and children, helping us to avoid confounding variables. Lastly, the longitudinal data make it possible to examine causal relationships between early paternal involvement, observed at the fourth wave when the child was 5 years old, and later child behavior outcomes, observed at the fifth wave when the child was 9 years old, controlling for predictors at birth that would limit the possibility of reverse causation.

Our study used an analytic sample that measures child behavioral problems, the outcome variable of interest, reported by primary caregivers. In the FFCWS study, primary caregivers were asked about the child's behavior at several waves. Our study relies on the most recent wave when children are age nine. In this wave, the FFCWS research team conducted an in-home interview with the child's primary caregiver, 92.4% of whom were the child's mother, regarding the behavior of the child and family involvement. For children not living with either of their biological parents, their new primary caregiver, often a relative was interviewed.

Our analytic sample included 1113 primary caregivers, after excluding caregivers who reported the following conditions: (1) father is unknown/does not know of child in both years 1 and 2, (2) father is deceased, (3) father has primary custody,

and (4) father is not living with his children's biological mother at year 5. In addition, we excluded observations when the primary caregivers did not participate in the primary caregiver self-administered survey, as well as observations when the primary caregiver provided incomplete information on any father engagement measures.

Measures

Children's Behavioral Problems To measure our outcome of interest, child behavioral problems when the focal children were 9 years of age, we used the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist/6–18 (CBCL/6–18). CBCL is a widely accepted measure of behavioral problems for children, ages 6–18 (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001). The primary caregivers were asked 103 items using a Likert-type scale to rate their child's behavior from 0 (not true) to 2 (very true or often true). Among 11 subcategories of CBCL, our study only focused on internalizing problems (anxious/depressed + withdrawn/depressed + somatic complaints, $\alpha = 0.89$), and externalizing problems (rule-breaking behavior + aggressive behavior, $\alpha = 0.92$).

Treatment Variable Our treatment variable, father engagement, is intended as a proxy for age appropriate activities that have been found to promote children's cognitive development and behavior. The variable is an index, comprised of eight separate questions, each measuring an activity that a father may do with his child. All information on engagement is reported by the primary caregiver. Specifically, we attempted to estimate the causal impact of father engagement on internalizing and externalizing behavior problems. To minimize selection bias associated with the relatively lower response rate of fathers, we relied on mother's reports of engagement by fathers. We introduced a control of maternal engagement during the last portion of our analysis to determine if the size or significance of the association between father engagement and child behavior changed as a result.

The engagement measures involved eight age appropriate activities, measured by the number of days per week that the parent engaged in the activity, not the amount of time spent during the actual engagement. Each item was coded 0–7, with 0 indicating that the parent did not engage in the activity during the week, and 7 indicating that they have engaged in the activity every day of the week. The items were: sings songs or nursery rhymes with his/her child, reads stories to his/her child, tells stories to his/her child, plays inside with blocks, toys or Legos with his/her child, tells his child he/she appreciated something child did, plays outside in the yard or park with his/her child, takes his/her child to a special event, activity or outing, and watches a video or television program with his/her child. Scores on the eight items were averaged for an easier interpretation of results. More specifically, our engagement measure is comprised of the total number of days spent in each activity, divided by the total number of activities, in our case, 8. This creates an average.

Control Variables To avoid possible omitted variables bias, we included a number of controls on maternal, paternal, and child characteristics. All control variables were mother reported at baseline. For maternal characteristics, we used five demographic characteristics, including: race, age, educational attainment, household income, and mother's depression. Five dummy variables were created to measure race (white/non-Hispanic, black/non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and other) along with four dummy variables to measure educational attainment (less than high school-, high school or equivalent, some college or technical school, and college or graduate school). Mother's age was a continuous variable, recorded at baseline. We also included a continuous measure of the mother's household income in dollars, a constructed variable that is provided by the research team at FFCWS. In our multivariate analysis, we divided the income into US$5000 increments. Maternal depression was measured based on the Composite International Diagnostic Interview-Short Form (CIDI-SF). Mothers were asked whether they had been feeling sad, blue, depressed (depression), or were losing interest in things that were usually pleasurable (dysphoria) in the past year and whether the feeling had lasted more than 2 weeks. If they answered yes to any of the items, they were asked more specific questions. These included whether they experienced: (1) losing interest, (2) feeling tired, (3) gain or loss in weight, (4) trouble falling asleep (5) trouble concentrating, (6) feeling down, and (7) thinking about death. We used constructed variables for scoring this measure provided by FFCWS. The scale required that mothers have symptoms lasting about half of the day. The constructed variable for the depression measurement is dichotomous, indicating whether or not the mother meets the depression criteria.

To control for paternal characteristics that might affect child behavior, we included two variables: father's employment status at baseline and whether the father was born in the USA. To measure the first characteristic, we constructed a binary variable that was set to 1 if the mother reported that the father was working last week and 0 otherwise. We also included the father's nativity, because a foreign born father might have language or cultural barriers impacting engagement with his USA born child. The variable was based on the father's report at the baseline, but we added more observations of fathers who later reported the status following 1, 3, 5, and 9 years. If the father was born in the USA, we coded the nativity variable as 1 and 0 if otherwise. For child characteristics, we included two binary measures: whether the child was low-birth weight or not (1 = yes, 0 = no, or otherwise) and gender (1 = boy, 0 = girl).

Methods

Before examining the effect of father engagement on child behavioral problems, we considered whether fathers' level of engagement in each domain of activity was different from the mother's level of engagement. The eight engagement activities were categorized into three domains: sing a song, read stories, and tell stories were

called "literacy/language development;" play inside, play outside, take to a special event, and watch TV and video were called "play;" and tells his/her child he/she appreciated something the child did was called "warmth." Then we conducted pairwise t-tests to see whether there were mean differences between father and mother engagement in each of paired domains.

In our descriptive analyses, we wanted a measure of the extent to which fathers and mothers allocated the time they spent with their children across different activities. To accomplish this, we calculated the ratio of engagement in each domain relative to average engagement, as described above. We created separate measures for mothers and fathers. When this ratio is greater than 1 for a particular activity, the parent has above average levels of engagement in that particular activity. When it is less than 1, the parent has below average levels of engagement in that particular activity. Finally, a pairwise t-test was conducted to identify whether the fathers and mothers allocated their time with their children differently across the activities.

Lastly, we used hierarchical multiple regression to estimate the effect of father engagement on internalizing and externalizing behaviors. A common use of hierarchical multiple regression is to understand the effect of an independent variable (or set of independent variables) on a dependent variable when potential covariates have been taken into account. In this situation, the potential covariates (maternal, paternal, and child characteristics) are entered first in the regression equation (Step 1). After this, the independent variable(s) of interest (mother engagement and father engagement in our case) is entered into the equation to see whether the entered independent variable(s) make a significant contribution on the dependent variable (Step 2 and Step 3). Hierarchical multiple regression uses the magnitude of the increase in R^2 to determine if the addition of independent variable(s) improves the prediction of dependent variable.

Surveys with many items, like CBCL/6–18 (103 items) tend to be highly right-skewed and clustered around zero. The same held true for internalizing and externalizing behaviors. We used a logarithmic transformation so the distribution of our residuals approximated normality. Since the log transformation cannot handle the presence of zeros in outcome variables, we added 1 before the transformation in order to make all values positive. As a result, our ordinary least square estimates have the desirable maximum likelihood properties.

Results

Descriptive Statistics of Engagement Measures

Table 1 presents mean values of the eight items included in our engagement measure for both mothers and fathers. Not surprisingly, mothers are more likely than fathers to engage in each of the eight activities with their children, confirming the consensus found in the literature. Table 2 indicates how mothers and fathers allocate

Table 1 Mean values of engagement items for mothers and fathers at age 5

Categories	Activities	Father engagement	Mother engagement	*P*
		M (SD)	M (SD)	
Literacy/language development	Sing a song	3.00 (2.186)	4.76 (2.164)	***
	Read stories	3.05 (2.203)	4.87 (1.981)	***
	Tell stories	3.25 (2.214)	4.36 (2.300)	***
Play	Play inside	3.90 (2.296)	4.85 (2.221)	***
	Play outside	3.31 (2.044)	3.94 (2.102)	***
	Take to a special event	2.66 (1.626)	3.42 (1.724)	***
	Watch TV or video	4.45 (2.258)	5.03 (2.161)	***
Warmth	Word of appreciation	5.64 (1.838)	6.49 (1.126)	***
Total engagement (average)		3.66 (1.379)	4.71 (1.357)	***

Data are from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study
SD standard deviation
*$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$

Table 2 Average amount of time spent per week for engagement activities by each parent

Categories	Activities	Activity over father engagement	Activity over mother engagement	*P*
		M (SD)	M (SD)	
Literacy/language development	Sing a song	0.77 (0.468)	0.99 (0.405)	***
	Read stories	0.78 (0.467)	1.03 (0.382)	***
	Tell stories	0.83 (0.463)	0.89 (0.411)	**
Play	Play inside	1.02 (0.487)	1.01 (0.439)	
	Play outside	0.90 (0.514)	0.82 (0.425)	***
	Take to a special event	0.75 (0.435)	0.73 (0.357)	
	Watch TV or video	1.27 (0.686)	1.09 (0.498)	***
Warmth	Word of appreciation	1.66 (0.671)	1.44 (0.397)	***

Data are from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study
SD standard deviation
*$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$

their time with children across the activities. Fathers and mothers spent average portions of their time playing outside with children and below average portions of their time taking children to special events. In these respects, the engagement of mothers and fathers was the same. Fathers spent below average portions of their time, but more than mothers, playing outside ($M=0.90$, $SD=0.514$), and above average portions displaying warmth ($M=1.66$, $SD=0.671$) and watching TV or video ($M=1.27$, $SD=0.686$) with their children. In contrast, mothers spent average or above average portions of their time singing songs and telling stories to their children, respectively. Father spent below average portions of their time with their children in these activities.

Estimating Effects of Father Engagement on Child Behavioral Problems

A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to determine if the addition of father engagement improved the prediction of child behavioral problems over and above maternal, paternal, child characteristics, and mother engagement, all of which have shown significant associations with child behaviors (Atzaba-Poria, Pike, & Deater-Deckard, 2004; Baldwin & Cain, 1980; Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997; Cabrera et al., 2004; Furstenberg & Harris, 1993; Hawkins, Amato & King, 2007; Lytton & Romney, 1991; McAdoo, 1978; McCormick, Gortmaker, & Sobol, 1990). Results are given in Table 3 and 4. Before analyzing the results, we conducted a variance inflation factor (VIF) test in each step to check multi-collinearity. We found no variables with values of the test statistic above 3 in any step, indicating that multi-collinearity is not a serious problem in our data. We also examined the normality of residuals using a standardized normal probability (P–P) plot. We found the residuals were quite close to a normal distribution.

Internalizing Behaviors Control variables including paternal, maternal, and child characteristics were initially entered in Step 1, and there was a significant amount of variance explained, $R^2 = 0.045$, F (12, 1100) = 3.834, $P < 0.001$. The standardized coefficient of African American was significant ($p < 0.01$), indicating that being African American was negatively associated with internalizing behaviors problems. Household income (measured in units of $5000) was also significantly and negatively associated with internalizing behavioral problems ($P < 0.01$). Having maternal depression is associated with a statistically significant increase in the child's internalizing behaviors ($P < 0.001$). Next, mother engagement at year 5 was entered in Step 2. Doing so did not contribute significantly to the ability of our model to explain the variation in internalizing behaviors as indicated by the value of the adjusted R^2. By contrast, the addition of father engagement at year 5 in Step 3 led to a significant increase in the adjusted R^2 (0.032 to 0.041), F (1, 1098) = 9.952, $P < 0.01$. The standardized coefficient of father engagement was negative and significant ($P < 0.01$), indicating that the father engagement at year 5 had a significant and negative affect on internalizing behavioral problems.

Externalizing Behaviors Control variables including paternal, maternal, and child characteristics were initially entered in Step 1, and there was a significant amount of variance explained, $R^2 = 0.056$, F (12, 1100) = 4.815, $p < 0.001$. The standardized coefficient of the racial category, Hispanic, was significant ($p < 0.001$), indicating that Hispanic children exhibited fewer externalizing behavioral problems than white children. Household income was also significantly and negatively associated with externalizing behavior problems ($p < 0.01$). Male children were more likely to exhibit externalizing behaviors than female children ($p < 0.001$). Having a mother who is depressed is associated with a significant increase in the child's externalizing problem behaviors ($p < 0.05$)

Next, mother engagement at year 5 was entered in Step 2, which significantly improved our models' ability to explain the variation in externalizing behavior

Table 3 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting children's internalizing behavior from maternal, paternal and child characteristics, mother engagement, and father engagement

		Internalizing behaviors					
		Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
		B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β
Control variables	*Maternal characteristics*						
	Race *(Caucasian)*						
	African American	−0.227 (0.067)	−0.128**	−0.230 (0.067)	−0.130**	−0.223 (0.068)	−0.126**
	Hispanic	−0.084 (0.075)	−0.045	−0.087 (0.075)	−0.046	−0.078 (0.075)	−0.042
	Others	0.046 (0.124)	0.012	0.047 (0.124)	0.012	0.061	0.016
	Mother age	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.048	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.059	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.053
	Mother education *(Less than high school)*						
	High school	−0.103 (0.073)	−0.055	−0.112 (0.073)	−0.055	−0.115 (0.073)	−0.061
	Some college	−0.113 (0.076)	−0.060	−0.112 (0.076)	−0.059	−0.118 (0.076)	−0.062
	College or more	−0.012 (0.101)	−0.006	−0.011 (0.101)	−0.005	−0.027 (0.101)	−0.013
	Household income/$5000	−0.012 (0.004)	−0.107**	−0.012 (0.004)	−0.108**	−0.012 (0.004)	−0.114**
	Maternal depression	0.341 (0.076)	0.136***	0.341 (0.076)	0.136***	0.332 (0.076)	0.132***
	Paternal characteristics						
	Father US born	−0.047 (0.066)	−0.024	−0.044 (0.066)	−0.022	−0.033 (0.067)	0.017
	Father work a week	−0.034 (0.098)	−0.010	−0.033 (0.098)	−0.010	−0.040 (0.098)	−0.013
	Child's characteristics						
	Child male	−0.035	−0.021	−0.037	−0.022	−0.038	−0.022
		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.051)	
	Child low birth weight	0.085 (0.102)	0.025	0.085 (0.102)	0.025	0.098 (0.102)	0.029
Independent variables	*Engagement*						
	Mother engagement			−0.009 (0.023)	−0.011	0.043 (0.028)	0.056
	Father engagement					−0.072 (0.023)	−0.118**
	R^2	0.045		0.045		0.054	
	Adj R^2	0.033		0.032		0.041	
	F(sig)	3.834***		0.135		9.952**	

Data are from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study

SE standard error

*$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$ the statistic 12.1

Table 4 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting children's externalizing behavior from maternal, paternal and child characteristics, mother engagement, and father engagement

		Externalizing behaviors					
		Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
		B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β
Control variables	*Maternal characteristics*						
	Race *(Caucasian)*						
	African American	−0.130 (0.075)	−0.065	−0.146 (0.076)	−0.074	−0.140 (0.075)	−0.070
	Hispanic	−0.249 (0.084)	−0.119**	−0.263 (0.084)	−0.125**	−0.255 (0.084)	−0.121***
	Others	−0.097 (0.139)	−0.022	−0.087 (0.139)	−0.020	−0.073 (0.138)	−0.017
	Mother age	−0.011 (0.006)	−0.069	−0.012 (0.006)	−0.077	−0.012 (0.006)	−0.080
	Mother education *(Less than high school)*						
	High school	0.087 (0.081)	−0.041	−0.085 (0.081)	−0.040	−0.098 (0.081)	−0.046
	Some college	−0.112 (0.085)	−0.053	−0.108 (0.085)	−0.051	−0.114 (0.085)	−0.054
	College or more	−0.084 (0.113)	−0.037	−0.077 (0.113)	−0.034	−0.095 (0.113)	−0.041
	Household income/$5000	−0.012 (0.005)	−0.098**	−0.012 (0.005)	−0.101*	−0.013 (0.005)	−0.107**
	Maternal depression	0.209 (0.085)	0.074*	0.208 (0.085)	0.074*	0.199 (0.085)	0.070*
	Paternal characteristics						
	Father US born	0.071 (0.074)	0.032	0.091 (0.075)	0.041	0.102 (0.075)	0.045
	Father work a week	−0.134 (0.110)	−0.037	−0.128 (0.110)	−0.035	−0.135 (0.110)	−0.037
	Child's characteristics						
	Child male	0.262 (0.057)	0.139***	0.253 (0.057)	0.134***	0.252 (0.056)	0.133***
	Child low birth weight	0.088 (0.114)	0.023	0.085 (0.114)	0.023	0.099 (0.114)	0.026
Independent variables	*Engagement*						
	Mother engagement			−0.053 (0.026)	−0.074*	0.000 (0.032)	0.000
	Father engagement					−0.074 (0.025)	−0.107**
	R^2	0.056		0.059		0.067	
	Adj R^2	0.044		0.047		0.053	
	F(sig)	4.815***		4.085*		8.376**	

Data are from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study

SE standard error

*$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$

problems ($R^2 = 0.059$, F (1, 1099) = 4.085, $p < 0.05$. The standardized coefficient indicated that mother's engagement at year 5 was negative and significantly reduced ($p < 0.05$). Finally, the addition of father engagement at year 5 in Step 3 led to a significant increase in the adjusted R^2 (0.059 to 0.067), F (1, 1098) = 8.376, $p < 0.01$. The standardized coefficient indicated that fathers' engagement at year 5 significantly reduced externalizing behaviors problems. However, mother engagement was no longer statistically significant. Thus, the addition of fathers' engagement adds to the explanatory power of our model, but it is hard to say to what degree this effect of mother's and father's engagement on externalizing behavioral problems are independent.

Summary and Implications

We know much about the effects of mothers on children at various developmental stages and are learning more about the effects of fathers' engagement with infants and toddlers. The transition to school, which occurs for many children at age 5, is a critical stage of their development as they adjust to adults outside the home and other children. Additionally, increases in labor force participation among women in two-parent families and nonstandard hours worked by at least one parent in such families, is thrusting more fathers into care-giving roles. Unfortunately, we know much less about father engagement with children as they transition to school, how fathers' engagement differs from mothers' engagement at this critical stage, and the effects of father engagement on children's behavior. This chapter examines the extent to which fathers are engaged with 5-year-old children, differences between fathers' engagement and mothers' engagement, and the independent effect of father engagement on children's behavioral problems at 9 years of age.

Not surprisingly, mothers were more likely than fathers to engage in play, warmth, and literacy activities with their child, although as compared with mothers, fathers allocated more of the time they were engaged with children to playing outside, watching TV or video, and displaying warmth to their children. We found that fathers' engagement added significantly to the explanatory power of a model of children's behavior, which already controlled for the demographic characteristics of parents and children, mother's education, and household income. Fathers' engagement had a negative association with internalizing and externalizing behavior problems, although it was difficult to disentangle the latter association from mothers' engagement. We must interpret our findings with caution, because our model lacked controls for mother's employment status, and relied upon mothers' reports of fathers' engagement rather than fathers' direct reports. Thus, our findings were subject to omitted variables and reporter bias, although they were less likely to be subject to selection bias owing to higher nonresponse rates of fathers.

Nevertheless, future studies should examine the effects of father engagement on boys and girls separately, since our study found that fathers' engagement is independently associated with internalizing behavior problems, which girls are more likely

to exhibit in school. Moreover, although it was difficult to disentangle the effects of fathers' engagement on externalizing behavior problems from the effects of mothers' engagement, boys are more likely to exhibit such problems in school. Some studies have shown that fathers are more likely to engage with their male children, who in turn, have stronger responses than girls to father involvement.

There are some limitations in our findings. This study did not control for whether the children had been placed in daycare at any point in their lives. Daycare can provide an enriching experience for children, but evidence suggests that when children are placed in daycare prior to the age of one, behavioral and academic problems can develop as a result, even in high quality centers (Waldfogel, 2006). Some studies have shown that the effects wane over time. However, not all studies have produced similar findings. Alternatively, children in poor quality daycare also suffer consequences. High quality, center based care offers the greatest benefits to families with children, but lack of affordability and standard hours of operation mean that this option is not available to all families.

Another limitation worth noting is that we relied on maternal reports on father engagement. This had the benefit of keeping our sample size larger as a lower number of fathers participated in the study, relative to mothers. However, maternal reports might be affected by relationship quality. In short, mothers with a better co-parenting relationship with their child's father might be more likely to rate higher levels of engagement, while mothers with a poor quality relationship might be inclined to do the opposite. Relying instead on father reports may create selection bias, and fathers may be more generous in detailing their engagement to appear more involved.

Finally, our findings have some implications for policy. First, encouraging and facilitating father involvement in the lives of children has been a deliberate and growing focus of family policies (e.g., child welfare and child support enforcement) directed toward nonresident fathers. By contrast, encouraging and facilitating father involvement has not been a consistent focus of policies geared toward two-parent families. For example, since the 1920s, the Women's Bureau, a division of the U.S. Department of Labor, has been charged with the responsibility, "to formulate standards and policies, to promote the welfare of wage-earning women, improve their working conditions, increase their efficiency, and advance their opportunities for profitable employment" (Our History, para. 1). In pursuit of this charge, the Women's Bureau has worked to increase skills training, pay-equity, and flex-time options for working women and encourage employer-sponsored child care. It has also worked to expand childcare options for women working nonstandard hours. However, an alternative approach is to improve the quality of father–child interactions for those two-parent families in which the mother works nonstandard hours and the husband provides childcare. To our knowledge, the Women's Bureau has not pursued this option, although its mission states, "The Women's Bureau develops policies and standards … to safeguard the interests of working women; to advocate for their equality and economic security for themselves and their families" (Our Mission, para. 1).

Second, family engagement provides a vehicle for Head Start to incorporate fathers in their services to children from 3 to 5 years old. However, Head Start practitioners note several impediments to engaging fathers. Key impediments include staff and leadership resistance and the risk of compromising eligibility for mothers and children served by the program if applications for head start collected information about fathers' earnings. If our findings about the independent effects of father engagement on child well-being are supported by subsequent research, these impediments must be addressed and overcome.

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Why Do Fathers Matter for Children's Development?

Natasha Cabrera

> "Fathers are biological necessities, but social accidents" Attributed to Margaret Mead in H. A. Minden's (1982) *Two hugs for survival* (p. 22).

Margaret Mead's writings in the 1980s about the importance of fathers to the development of their children have not been completely discarded today. Although most would disagree that fathers are unnecessary and do not contribute to their children's development, the precise ways in which they matter for children remains far from fully understood. The question of exactly how fathers matter for children's development has dominated much of the emerging research on fatherhood and has produced some promising findings. A good example of this work is the study conducted by Ron Mincy and colleagues and presented at Penn State's 22nd Annual Symposium on Family Issues. My task is to provide a commentary of this work. Toward this end, I organize this commentary as follows: (1) provide a brief review of the theoretical underpinnings of what fathers do and how it matters for children; (2) discuss Mincy and colleague's findings in the context of the brief review of how fathers matter; and (3) conclude with some directions for future research.

What Do Fathers Do? How and Why Do They Matter?

Efforts to understand what fathers do inevitably lead us to the decades-old question: Are fathers different from mothers? Are they the same? Are they different or similar in all domains, or do they vary by domain and developmental period? Early research, largely based on middle-class samples, showed more similarities than differences between mothers and fathers. A review of this literature comparing

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father–child and mother–child interactions concluded that there were no consistent stylistic differences on a variety of measures, including in the co-parenting system (Cabrera, Scott, Fagan, Steward-Streng, & Chien, 2012; Lamb & Lewis, 2004). Importantly, children seem to benefit from high-quality parental support regardless of which parent provides it (Cabrera, Shannon, & Tamis-LeMonda, 2007; Roggman, 2004; Ryan, Martin, & Brooks-Gunn, 2006).

Research stressing differences between parents has noted that fathers are more likely to tease their children, engage in rough-and-tumble play, encourage risk-taking, and socialize gender roles (Fletcher, St George, & Freeman, 2013; Grossmann, Grossmann, Kindler, & Zimmermann, 2008; Paquette & Dumont, 2013). These findings suggest that differences between maternal and paternal behavior likely reflect individual differences related to personality, family structure, education, cultural beliefs, and values. The differences might also reflect frequency and amount rather than substance (e.g., more fathers than mothers engage in rough-and-tumble play, especially with sons; Panksepp, Burgdorf, Turner, & Gordon, 2002). Also, fathers, more so than mothers, may encourage their children to take risks in their play (Hagan & Kuebli, 2007) and encourage them to deal with scary experiences (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011). A recent review of the literature suggests that the dimensions (e.g., skills, beliefs, and behaviors) of mothers and fathers are not conceptually unique (Fagan, Day, Lamb, & Cabrera, 2014). Being a sensitive parent, regardless of gender, seems to be important for children's development.

Other differences between parents may emerge over time as parents and children grow and change, but the precise time in which these differences emerge is not well understood. Maternal sensitivity wanes over time, but it is unclear whether this shift also happens with fathers (Laursen, DeLay, & Adams, 2010). The father–child relationship may have stronger effects on some aspects of children's development (e.g., social skills) than the mother–child relationship does (Joussemet, Landry, & Koestner, 2008; Kuczynski & Parkin, 2007). There may also be gender differences in the way boys and girls respond to certain types of behavior displayed by fathers, for example, intrusiveness (Cabrera, Tamis-LeMonda, Bradley, Shannon, & Hancock, 2012; Eagly & Wood, 2013). In some contexts, children's sociability might be uniquely related to fathers' sociability (Bogels & Perotti, 2011). Altogether these findings suggest that gender (of both children and parents) and dispositional characteristics may influence parent–child relationships and their effects on both the other parent and children (Sameroff, 2010). Future research should examine additional domains and contexts in an effort to delineate differences in how fathers engage their children and how it matters for different developmental periods.

This brief discussion on similarities and differences in paternal and maternal parenting behaviors suggests a system of complementarity in the family. Mothers' and fathers' behaviors might complement (or interact with) each other. This conclusion supports Bronfenbrenner's bioecological model that a wide diversity of factors can come into play across time and settings; factors that might lead to both mothers and fathers taking on a wide diversity of roles in childrearing. For example, more fathers than mothers may encourage their children to take risks in play, but mothers more often than fathers may encourage children to take account of the reactions of others during play (Power, McGrath, Hughes, & Manire, 1994).

Further, support for both similarity and difference in paternal and maternal parenting comes from transactional models of human development, which suggest multidirectional effects. Thus, simple additive contributions to children's development are not entirely adequate (Fitzgerald & Bradley, 2013; Lewis, 2013; Sameroff, 2010). The reactions of each member of the dyad reflect the multiplicity of interconnections present in the total family system and generate family system characteristics that challenge reductionist efforts to model fathering or mothering (see also Cabrera Fitzgerald, Bradley, & Roggman, 2014). Moreover, these transactions occur over time and may have different outcomes for each individual within a particular system. There is a relatively new body of research that focuses on the interactive or multiplicative effects of mothers' and fathers' contributions to children's development (Lewin, Mitchell, Hodgkinson, Waters, Beers, & Gilmore, 2014; Verschueren & Marcoen, 1999).

Overall, the findings briefly discussed above offer compelling support for the view that reciprocal and interactive models are best suited for understanding how fathering might be different from mothering (in form or effect). The findings also suggest that compensation effects (positive fathering buffering the negative effects of environmental risk on children) might be domain specific and vary by child's age. Potential interactive effects are hypothesized within theoretical systemic traditions. The Cabrera et al. (2014) model captures the complexities of fathering and mothering (e.g., unique versus multiplicative influences, direct versus indirect influences). The model takes into consideration contextual and individual factors that may move fathers to being more like or more different from mothers and vice versa. In the next section, I use this model to discuss the work of Mincy and his colleagues (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") on the effects of father engagement and children's behaviors.

Understanding How Fathers' Involvement Influences Children's Behaviors

As of yet, there is no comprehensive framework that can be used to understand why fathers parent in the manner they do and how they shape their children's development (Cabrera et al., 2014; Paquette & Dumont, 2013). In efforts to address this gap, Cabrera et al. (2014) expanded their 2007 model of father involvement resulting in a revised model, The Ecology of Father-Child Relationships: An Expanded Model (see Fig. 1, herein referred to as the expanded model; Cabrera et al., 2014). The expanded model is grounded in dynamic systems concepts, as well as transactional and dialectic processes, and presents fathering as broadly contextualized, embedded in dynamic systems, and involving reciprocal processes that evolve through time in cultural contexts. That is, parent–child relationships are embedded in complex, dynamic systems that change over time. The expanded model provides a framework for viewing changes over time, as parents and children age, families reconfigure, and contexts change. This heuristic model is informed by recent research showing the importance of context to understanding what fathers do and why it matters



Fig. 1 The ecology of father–child relationships: An expanded model (Cabrera et al., 2014)

(e.g., Cabrera, Cook, McFadden, & Bradley, 2012; Jia, Kotila, & Schoppe-Sullivan, 2012; Lamb, McHale, & Crouter, 2013). According to this model, fathers' behaviors are directly and indirectly related to children's behaviors through other family relationships and other contextual factors. Moreover, the child is an active participant in his own development and the resulting interaction is reciprocal between the father–child dyads.

Father Engagement and Children's Behaviors: A Longitudinal Analysis

I use the expanded model of father relationships (Cabrera et al., 2014) to present a critical analysis of Mincy and colleague's study (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") of the association between what fathers do and their children's behaviors. This work is timely and of critical importance because it highlights the state of the research on fathering, which is trying to unpack the ways in which fathers are important for children's development. As parents, fathers' contribution to their children's development extends beyond economic to encompass other dimensions (or investments) of parenting including providing safety and sustenance, structure of the home environment, socioemoetional support, and cognitive stimulation (Bradley & Corwyn, 2004).

Mincy and his colleagues (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") use the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing dataset to estimate the independent effects of father engagement in a broad range of child-focused activities with 5-year-old children on children's behavior when they are 9. Mincy and colleagues argue that it is important to understand how the effects of paternal engagement might differ from the effects of maternal engagement with children at this critical juncture and thus model paternal and maternal involvement. The inclusion of both parents and the use of this rich dataset are strengths of this work.

What did Mincy and colleagues find? Consistent with previous studies, mothers reported spending above average portions of their time engaged in literacy activities, whereas fathers were reported as being engaged in more physical play. (The study relied on mother's reports of engagement by fathers.) The children whose fathers were reported as engaging with them more at age 5 had fewer internalizing and externalizing behavior problems than children of their counterparts. However, when paternal engagement was entered into the model, maternal engagement was no longer statistically significant suggesting that these effects might be dependent.

These results are interesting but must be interpreted with caution. First, it is unclear why engaging in literacy activities, as measured by Mincy and colleagues would result in better behavior outcomes for children. The parenting literature suggests specificity of parenting practices/behaviors to outcomes. Thus, we would expect literacy activities to relate mostly to literacy/language outcomes. Perhaps, a better way to test this model is to include measures of social interactions between fathers and children that are related to social skills. Second, engaging in positive activities, such as reading, facilitates emerging self-regulation, which, in turn, promotes social competencies. This would suggest that father engagement in literacy activities as measured in Mincy and colleagues' study might be related to behavior problems through its effects on self-regulation. This meditational hypothesis getting at mechanism of engagement can move us forward to understand how to intervene. Third, the finding that mothers and fathers are different in terms of the frequency with which they read to their children is not in itself a new finding. We know from previous studies that fathers' language skills are more predictive of children's vocabulary than are mothers' language skills (Rowe, Coker, & Pan, 2004; Pancsofar, Vernon-Feagans, & The Family Life Project Investigators, 2010). So, frequency of reading alone does not tell us that fathers' contribution to children's literacy skills is minimal. It rather suggests that we should look to other ways in which fathers promote children's language skills. Fourth, it is important to examine differences by race and ethnicity. Ecological theory emphasizes that the context of fathering is important. Mincy and his colleagues found that Hispanic children's behavior problems were lower than for other children. This finding begs the question of whether other cultural aspects (e.g., beliefs expectations, immigration status) might moderate associations between fathers' behaviors and children's outcomes. Fifth, the dependence of mothers' and fathers' associations is not supported by other studies that show unique and independent effects of mothers and fathers. This finding needs to be furthered examined. Sixth, the reliance on maternal report of fathers' engagement is a step backward to understanding how fathers matter. Although I recognize

that this might be a limitation of the dataset, it is important to acknowledge that maternal report of paternal behaviors (just as relying on paternal reports of maternal behaviors) does not help us to understand why fathers matter.

Conclusion

Fathers, like mothers, are capable of engaging in responsive and nurturing behavior that promotes their children's development. Although there are no conceptual differences between what fathers and mothers do with their children, there is evidence that fathers and mothers may engage with their children in different ways that vary in frequency and intensity, and with characteristics of children and other contextual factors. The question of whether fathers matter for children seems to have been answered by researchers, to some extent. The question that deserves more attention is *how fathers matter*? Answering this question requires that we appeal to theoretical models that can help us to understand the processes by which fathers' behaviors predict children's outcomes. A possible heuristic model is the ecology of father–child relationships: expanded model, demonstrating fathers' influence is contextual and dynamic (Cabrera et al., 2014). For example fathers' engagement with children might relate to children's outcomes through changes in the child (e.g., self-regulation) or through changes in the family systems (e.g., mother–child relationships). Mincy and his colleagues show that fathers' and mothers' engagement in literacy activities is different in amount and dependent on the other parent's engagement. Future studies should build on these findings to examine how different types of father engagement are related to specific child outcomes and whether these effects are mediated through other family processes or through other changes in children's behaviors.

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Changes in US Mothers' and Fathers' Time Use—Causes and Consequences

Rachel Connelly

Introduction

Mincy, Um, and Turpin (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") have provided an empirical analysis which considers the added effect of married or coupled fathers' involvement in child-rearing on two measures of negative behavior in 9-year olds. The authors find that having a more involved father reduces both types of negative behavior. The empirical analysis is well executed, appropriate for the question, and makes thoughtful use of the longitudinal character of the data. In terms of the empirical work, my biggest concern is the very self-selected nature of the sample. The sample includes couples who were together at the birth of their child and are still together when the child is age nine. That is a long time for the population being sampled in the Fragile Family study, and these fathers may be quite different from the average father of the children in the Fragile Family sample.

However, the concern I focus on in these comments is how the research question is framed. The authors begin the paper with the following sentence: "Secular changes in labor force participation especially among married women mean that both parents in poor and working class families are involved in child rearing". Later they write, "The rise of the dual earner household often means that both parents are involved in childcare, especially in poor and working-class families. However, the involvement of both parents might offer an advantage." The clear implications of both these statements is that mothers' labor force participation is the cause of fathers being involved in caregiving for their child and that while it might be a good thing, it also might not be.

Below I consider three points related to these statements: the assignment of direct causality from mothers' employment to fathers' fathering, limiting of this

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phenomenon to poor and working-class families or to dual earner families, and use of the word "however." The word "however" implies that, at least initially, we might have been worried about the reduction in child well-being caused by the increase in mothers' labor force participation. Why would we be concerned that child well-being is decreased when mothers' employment increases? Do we imagine that because mothers are at home fewer hours during the day, child well-being must decrease? Do we imagine that mothers are better at parenting than fathers so that increased father time does not fully compensate for deceased mother time? Do we imagine that there is no child development value to professional childcare time? Regardless of the productivity of fathers' time and professional childcare time, time use research has shown that in the USA mothers are not, in fact, doing less caregiving than they did in the past, despite their increased labor force participation. Instead, both mothers and fathers are reporting more caregiving with their children. Given the increase in both parents' time, it is hard to imagine how the increase in fathers' time can be bad for children.

Trends in Mothers' and Fathers' Time Use in the USA

Let us first consider the evidence on changes in mothers' and fathers' time use in the USA during the period of the rapid increase in mothers' labor force participation. Modern time use research in the USA dates to 1965 with the Americans' Use of Time Study (AUTS) Project which was part of a 12-country Multinational Time-Budget Research Project masterminded by Alexander Szalai. Since then, there have been small-scale time use surveys in the USA in 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2000. Then, after years in the planning, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics initiated the annual American Time Use Survey (ATUS) in 2003 using a subsample of the outgoing rotation group from the current population survey, a nationally representative sample. These ATUS data provide large samples of individuals each year, making it possible to describe detailed time use patterns for various demographic groups, while also stratifying by age, education, family structure, employment status, and even day of the week. Researchers interested in looking at changes in time use over the period 1965 to the present can use the American Heritage Time Use Study (AHTUS), which harmonizes all the US time use surveys so they can be analyzed together.

Mincy, Um, and Turpin are correct in saying that the biggest change over the period 1965 to the present has been the increase in women's employment, especially the increase in the employment of married mothers of young children. In 1965, the average total work time including commuting time of married mothers was 9.3 h weekly and by 1985 it was 21 h. It then hovers between 21 and 26 h through 2008. Married fathers' average total work time including commuting time was 46 h weekly in 1965 and 43 h in 2008 (Bianchi, 2010). See Fig. 1 for the complete time trend from the AHTUS.

Similarly, Fig. 2 shows the time trend of housework of both married mothers and fathers. Based on the timing alone, it seems that mothers' increased employment



Fig. 1 Worktime hours per week of married mothers and fathers. (Data Source: AHTUS as reported in Bianchi)



Fig. 2 Housework hours per week of married mothers and fathers. (Data Source: AHTUS as reported in Bianchi)

time came mostly from a decline in housework time (excluding child caregiving time and shopping and service time). From 1965 to 1975, mothers' employment time went up 6.8 h a week and housework hours declined by 8.3 h. Over the 20-year period from 1965 to 1985, mothers' employment time went up 11.6 h a week and housework time went down 11.5 h per week.

Figure 2 also shows the trend in the sum of mothers' and fathers' housework time. While mothers' time doing housework declined in lockstep with their increased employment time, fathers' time went up more slowly so that between 1965 and 1975 the sum of mothers' and fathers' time decreased. Some things just did not get done. Then from 1975 to 1985, fathers' time increased at the same rate as mothers' time decreased so that the sum was unchanged during this decade. Since 1985 fathers' housework time has essentially remained the same and mothers' time has fallen slightly, such that the sum has again declined, but only slightly.

It is against this backdrop of trends in employment and housework time that we consider the time trend of child caregiving time. Child caregiving time takes a very different path from housework, and while it may ultimately be "caused" by the



Fig. 3 Child caregiving hours per week of married mothers and fathers. (Data Source: AHTUS as reported in Bianchi)

increase in mothers' employment, the connection is certainly more indirect. Figure 3 shows the time trend of mothers' and fathers' child caregiving time (Bianchi, 2010). The timing of the change in child caregiving time is quite different from employment and housework. While the vast majority of the change in the employment and housework trends occurred between 1965 and 1985, the large changes in the child caregiving time did not occur until after 1985. In addition, the time in mothers' and fathers' child caregiving time mirror one another. Figure 3 shows that married mothers increased their child caregiving time from 8.4 h per week in 1985 to 13.9 h in 2008, an increase of 5.5 h. Married fathers increased their child caregiving time from 2.6 h per week in 1985 to 7.8 h per week in 2008, an increase of 5.2 h. Mothers clearly still do more child caregiving than fathers, but both parents (within married couples) are doing more. The level of fathers' care in 2008 is not much different from that of mothers' in 1985.

Causes of the Increase in Parental Childcare Time

Figure 3 leads us to wonder why child caregiving time increased for both mothers and fathers? Researchers from a variety of disciplines have proposed explanations. Ramey and Francis (2009) present an even longer time trend of child caregiving time (starting in 1912) and find that caregiving time has increased throughout the twentieth century. They speculate that increased education and a growing social awareness of the benefits of parental interaction on child development account for the increase in child caregiving time. This explanation seems reasonable, but does not explain the dramatic changes in the 1990s.

Not surprisingly, economists who consider this research question tend to focus on economic factors such as wages, income, and competition. Sociologists focus on the changing norms of parenting and gender roles. Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, and Robinson (2012) focus their attention on the caregiving gap and the question of why mothers continue to do more of the caregiving than fathers. According to Hays

(1996), devotion to one's children now defines "a good woman," whereas in the past it was being a careful housekeeper and helpmate for one's husband. As women's employment increases, they may look for other ways to "do gender" (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, & Matherson, 2003), which is operationalized as "good mothering". Employed mothers strive to prove to themselves and others that their employment will not negatively impact their children's outcomes. They protect their caregiving time, cutting back instead on housework and leisure (Howie et al., 2006).

In a cross-sectional analysis using the 2003 and 2004 ATUS, economists Kimmel and Connelly (2007) showed that mothers with higher wages devote more time to child caregiving than mothers with lower wages. Women's wages increased steadily over the last 30 years (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006) which could explain part of the increase overtime. However, they also show that married mothers whose husband's earnings are higher, spend more time in child caregiving. Overall, men's earnings have been fairly flat over the same period (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006) which removes changes in men's earnings as a "cause" of the increased child caregiving over time.

Economists Ramey and Ramey (2010) argue that the specific increase in child caregiving time in the USA from the late 1990's to today is the result of the increase in the earnings premium associated with a college education, which has led to increased competitiveness for choice college slots. In the face of this increased competition, highly educated parents have ramped up their focus on child development and have responded by investing more time in their children. Ramey and Ramey (2010) use the AHTUS to show that the increase in child caregiving time is greater for both mothers and fathers who are college graduates than for those who are not college graduates (see Fig. 4). The question for our consideration is does the increased competition for college slots explain why the caregiving time of both fathers and mothers has increased? Perhaps it does, but again the path is not necessarily direct. Mothers with the highest levels of education are most likely to be employed. Employed mothers may not have time to shoulder all of the desired increase in child caregiving themselves, so fathers married to college-educated mothers also become involved. In addition, since the increase in time is argued by Ramey and Ramey to be mainly an increase in child caregiving time spent with older children, the traditional gender breakdown of mothers nurturing young children applies less. Since many of these activities are sports-related, fathers may be seen as the more qualified parent to be involved. This would especially be true for those parents who themselves grew up before Title IX increased the number of girls participating in high school and college sports.

However, a closer look at Ramey and Ramey's figure (Fig. 4) shows an increase in child caregiving time since the late 1990's by both college-educated and less-educated parents, especially fathers. How then do we understand the increased child caregiving time of all fathers? Perhaps the increase in mothers' employment and the increase in fathers' housework time softened some of the gender boundaries between men and women, between mothers and fathers. Married young couples today share employment and housework relatively equally before having children



Fig. 4 Time spent on childcare by parents, by educational attainment, 1965–2008. (Fig. 1 from Ramey and Ramey (2010), p. 137, by permission Brookings Institution Press)

(Bianchi et al., 2012; Schober, 2013). Perhaps the experience of more gender neutrality in the workplace and in heterosexual pre-children relationships, combined with the societal emphasis on the value of parental investment in children, has brought fathers to the plate. It may also be that the tasks of modern dual-earner parenting are simply less gendered tasks than they used to be. Who picks up and

drops off the children at daycare may have more to do with what time each parent needs to be at work and where daycare is located than it has to do with "fathering" versus "mothering." Since parents tend to enjoy child caregiving more than housework, we may observe fathers caregiving for children in lieu of the less preferred option of shopping for and then making dinner.

I would argue that once the genie had been let out of the bottle, that is, once it was no longer considered "unmanly" to hang out with one's children—no longer a signal that the man is not earning enough money to support his wife—the result was that parents enjoy spending time with children. Connelly and Kimmel (2015) have shown that fathers enjoy child caregiving activities as much as or even more than mothers do. In response to a 7-point scale where 0 is not happy and 6 is the most happy, fathers score their happiness while child caregiving as 4.96, on average, and mothers score their happiness while child caregiving as 4.94. This compares to 3.67 for interior cleaning for fathers (4.07 for mothers), 3.03 for grocery shopping (4.08 for mothers), and 3.78 for working one's main job (3.99 for mothers). The only activity that scores higher than child caregiving in happiness is participating in sports, exercise, and recreation (5.38 for fathers, 5.31 for mothers). So, child caregiving time makes fathers just as happy as it makes mothers, and so given "permission," fathers are doing more of it.

It seems reasonable to expect that one gets better at child caregiving as one does more of it. Child caregiving, unlike household tasks, involves another interested party, the child. A child who is unhappy that he is with dad instead of mom will usually let his caregiver know his preferences. As dad becomes a more typical caregiver, it may be easier for him to do the job effectively. Having a willing child partner will certainly increase the pleasure that one gets from the activity.

The Consequences of Increased Child Caregiving Time by Fathers

This discussion of the causes of the increase in child caregiving time for both mothers and fathers ultimately brings us back to Mincy, Um, and Turpin's analysis (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors"). Their research question is not to consider the cause of the increase in fathers' time with children, but rather the consequence. Mincy and colleagues ask what is the effect of fathers' participation in parenting on child outcomes? However, as I discussed in the introduction, their analysis sets the scene by arguing that increased women's labor force participation caused fathers' increased involvement. The tone of Mincy and colleague's rendition of the history of mothers' and fathers' time use is often negative, evoking mothers being forced by income needs to enter the labor market, unwillingly leaving their children. Similarly, fathers only begrudgingly spend time with children "to avoid childcare costs, fathers have also become more involved in child-rearing," while "working mothers must serve the competing interests of work and caring for children." My comments have been intended to show that more fundamental changes

have been occurring within married couples with children than low-income women "having to work" and low-income fathers unwillingly being forced to pick up the slack. Fathers across the income spectrum are participating more in child caregiving and for reasons beyond simply that the mother is not around. And all of this is important because fathers' motivation for doing the additional child caregiving has implications for the effect of their time on the children.

Consider a simple thought experiment in which we ask why parents spend time with children and what is the effect of that time on child development. There are at least four distinct reasons why parents may choose to spend time with their children: They (the parents) enjoy that time use; they think it is good for the child; they think it is good for their future relationship with that child; or they are required to by others, legally, or in terms of strong norms connected with child caregiving behavior. Connelly and Kimmel (2015) have shown that parents like spending time with children in the sense that it makes both mothers and fathers happy. Ramey and Ramey's (2010) argument is more about what is good for the children. Connelly and Kimmel (2010) have argued more generally that time spent with children is seen by parents as having a large investment component. Parents invest both time and money in their children so that the children will be successful in the future, but also, so that the parents will be able to maintain a lifelong positive relationship with their adult children. A father's time with his children may be more important than it was in the past for cementing a lifelong bond with his children, since nowadays a father is less likely to still be married to the child's mother over time. It is probably not a coincidence that fathers' caregiving time in the USA increased around the same time that divorce rates were going up. We can formalize this hypothesis by saying that fathers' and mothers' time is less substitutable than it was in the past. If the goal is only to produce "the best child," then the parent who is better at producing "high-quality" children should do the investing. However, if the goal is to have a relationship with one's child, then each parent will need to invest some time.

Next consider the question, how does parent time translate into child outcomes? This is the essence of Mincy et al. (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors"). They find evidence to support the hypothesis that fathers' increased interactions with children, reduces negative behavior in 9-year-old children. This is good news to be sure, but it is hard to imagine that this would not be the case. Consider a simple production function for child quality. The inputs are mother's time, father's time, purchased goods, time of teachers, and others. We expect that an additional hour of mother's time will have a positive effect on child outcomes. Perhaps, there are diminishing returns so much so that the marginal return from additional time could go to zero. But could it actually be negative? Only if we have some view that the child is being smothered by motherlove, but then why would not the mother stop before that theoretical point? She may not stop if her enjoyment of the time together won out over the negative impact of her time or if she had trouble measuring the impact of her time on future child outcomes.

Now consider father's time. Why does not the same argument apply here? What would have to be true for the marginal effect of father's time not to be positive, even if mother's time effect is positive? It could be that father's time is irrelevant

to child development. That seems hard to believe. It could be that father's time has a negative effect on child development. That seems even harder to believe. Like the argument for mothers, the child would have to be smothered with father's love. That argument did not work very well for mothers and seems even less relevant to fathers given the lower time inputs of fathers. There is one more possibility, one that Mincy, Um, and Turpin seek to counter. Perhaps father's and mother's time are substitutes in the production function and not perfect substitutes. What if mother's time is more productive than father's? For this to lead to fathers having a negative impact on child development, it would have to be the case that the last hour of mother's time is more valuable (for the child) than the first hour of father's time and that mother's time would have to go down when father's time goes up. In other words, there would be a need for fixed number of hours of parental time in child caregiving. However, as discussed above, on average mother's time rose during the same period that father's time rose. Employed mothers in the mid-2000s spent more time in child caregiving than non-employed mothers in 1975 (Bianchi, Wright, & Raley, 2005). Also, it seems highly unlikely that the last hour of mother's time is more productive than the first hour of father's time even if they are substitutes for one another. Finally, as Mincy, Um, and Turpin suggest, mother's and father's time may be complements instead of substitutes. Mothers and fathers use their time with children differently. Fathers spent a larger percent of their time playing with children (see Fig. 5a and b from the 2010 ATUS). In addition, Mincy and colleagues cite a number of studies that show that fathers provide more physically stimulating play than mothers.

There is much we do not understand about how married couples use their joint time in child caregiving. Does the relationship of the two parents affect the productivity of their time spent with children? (I suspect it does.) Are there issues that are more acute for poor and working-class families? I have argued that increased women's employment is not unique to this group, nor is the increase in men's parenting time. We do know that many more of the children in the Fragile Family survey are not living with both biological parents than would be true in a nationally representative sample.

Economic theory suggests that divorced parents are likely to underinvest in their children (Willis and Haaga, 1996). What role does a nonresident father have on the behavior outcomes of children? An additional question we might consider is what role do parents' partners who are not the child's biological parent play in the production function of child outcomes? A number of studies have explored the effect on a variety of child outcomes of living in a blended family (Case, McLanahan, & Lin, 2001; Case, Lin, & McLanahan, 1999; Ginther & Pollak, 2004). It would seem that the Fragile Family survey data are well suited for answering all these questions.

Other research questions about how mothers' and fathers' time substitute for or complement each other's time are stifled by the design of the ATUS which collects one time diary per household. Germany and Britain have time surveys that collect information from both members of a couple and these data can be used to answer questions of substitutability versus complementarity. However, the German and British time use surveys do not have child outcome data. Nor is it clear that a single



Fig. 5 **a** Women's child caregiving time. (*Data Source:* ATUS 2010, women with positive minutes of child caregiving, Connelly and Kimmel (2015)). **b** Men's child caregiving time. (*Data Source:* ATUS 2010, men with positive minutes of child caregiving, Connelly and Kimmel (2015))

day's (or even a week) time information is enough to represent general individual time use patterns and as such cannot be used to determine causality with outcome data. It may be that extended observations over longer periods of time are better suited to some of these important questions.

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Re-envisioning Why Fathers Matter Beyond the Gender Binary: A Case for Gay Fathers

Corinne Reczek

Mincy, Um, and Turpin (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") provide new insight into the relationship between fathers' engagement with 5-year-old children, and their subsequent externalizing and internalizing behaviors at age 9. Using data from the Fragile Families and Child Well-being Survey, the authors take on the daunting task to detail, "the extent to which fathers' engagement in activities known to promote success in school differs from the activities of mothers, and whether fathers' engagement in these activities affect childhood behavior…" (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors", p. 141). The Fragile Families dataset provides rich insight into the effects of fatherhood on children over time, and Mincy et al. gives empirical merit to the notion that there is, in fact, a unique influence of fathers on the well-being of children who live in two-parent heterosexual households. As such, the chapter provides inroads into the field of fatherhood studies.

Research on how the effects of fathering differ from those of mothering is an important one that spans across disciplines and decades. Yet, the underlying assumption driving this research question—that we can and should differentiate the effects of fathering and mothering in two-parent heterosexual households—is an assumption I bring into question. In particular, I question the heteronormative logic underlying the idea that motherhood and fatherhood have distinct effects, responding not only to the work of Mincy et al. (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") but also to the broader fields of parenthood and child well-being studies. In this chapter, I first offer a gendered perspective to complicate the idea of fatherhood and motherhood as distinct constructs. Second, I revise Mincy et al.'s research question with a case study of how fathers might matter in same-sex

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families. Third, I make a case for conceptualizing the "long arm of parenthood," a term which calls attention to the ways early life course parenthood has cumulative consequences for later-life parenthood and likely influences the well-being of both children and parents. My explicit aim is to raise questions for researchers and spark ideas for innovative work.

Motherhood and Fatherhood as Distinct Constructs

It is an underlying assumption in family studies that fatherhood and motherhood are distinct, with a unique set of actions, beliefs, ideas, and roles designated to, and done by, men and women; these actions are assumed, in turn, to differentially shape child well-being. The view of motherhood and fatherhood as distinct appears as social fact, whether or not we celebrate it, even as the nature of this difference has changed over time. Previous research finds that there are indeed basic differences in how women and men parent their children, as Mincy et al. (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") show. Most notably, fathers are more likely to play with children in more "physically stimulating" ways, while mothers are more likely to provide "comfort" and verbalization to children. These findings are, as Mincy et al. suggest, understood within the context of gendered norms or roles (i.e., gender role theory) that women as mothers and men as fathers embody. The differences are reflected in our everyday family experiences, public policy, public health campaigns, and the media.

Yet, the sociological perspective is one that takes to task "common sense" knowledge or stereotypes of behavior. For example, when we think about statistical differences in what mothers and fathers do differently at the population level, we are talking about averages in behavior as linked to one's reported sex (i.e., male, female). Notably, very rarely do we actually study *gender* as that would require asking more complex questions about masculinity and femininity. The field of family studies is still busy conflating sex, gender, gender identity, and gender behavior with the actions of motherhood and fatherhood. Thus, what is emphasized in national surveys is the notion of complementary motherhood and fatherhood roles—a Becker-esque assumption that each parent fills his or her role in raising children (Becker, 1981). Many believe we can identify how mothers (females) and fathers (males) are independent, complementary, and distinct as a result of the assumption that men and women *are* distinct and complementary. *Why* motherhood roles and fatherhood roles differ is rightfully not the question Mincy et al. attempt to answer—rather this difference is taken as a social fact. Yet, I believe our task is to drill further down to the question: "What is the meaning and consequence of asking how the sex or gender of a parent matters for child well-being?" In the words of the gender scholar Judith Lorber (1993), it is not a matter of "seeing is believing" but rather "believing is seeing," that is, if we look for gender differences in parenting we will find gender differences in parenting.

The purported distinctness of motherhood and fatherhood is murky. The assumption that men and women are distinct is one that gender scholars have been

attempting to undercut for at least 40 years. The gender role approach—the approach described above and used in most family studies research—has been criticized for placing men and women into discrete roles that are largely unchanging over time (Butler, 1990; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Gender role theory does not account for nor explains the *variation* in fatherhood and motherhood actions and norms, wherein some men provide more love and verbal support than physical play, and some women provide more physical play than verbal affection. Moreover, if motherhood and fatherhood are seen as complementary, how do we account for "missing" parental characteristics for children raised in households with one parent or two parents of the same sex? What is unknown, then, is what it means for two parents of the same sex to be fatherly, or motherly, together. That is, gender role theory cannot help us know whether two men raising a baby are always acting "fatherly" by virtue of being males who parent. Furthermore, what about transgender parents who may transition across the status of man and woman—how do we begin to conceptualize transgender parenthood? My intention is not just to suggest that we must include all family forms for inclusion's sake. Rather, I want to draw attention to nonheterosexual family forms because they can say something important about all family life, advancing our field beyond gender role and gender socialization approaches.

The above questions are difficult to answer when viewed through a gender role paradigm. Another prevailing gender theory—gender relations theory—enhances our ability to tackle these questions. Rather than a gender role frame which posits that men and women are two distinct categories, a gender relations approach views gender as a system of stratification that simultaneously signifies power and structures interactions between and among men and women (Connell, 2005; West & Zimmerman, 1987). This approach suggests that notions of masculinity and femininity—and therefore fatherhood and motherhood—exist within "structures of practice" that produce and reproduce gender inequalities (e.g., unequal childcare hours) (Connell, 2005, 2012). Interwoven institutional forces such as marriage and the workplace, as well as ideological forces such as the idea that men and women are "complementary or opposites" (i.e., women are more loving and men more playful), constrain gendered expectations and behaviors (Ferree, 2010; Martin, 2004). A gender relations approach posits that the statistical differences in men's and women's parenting behavior persist as social practices that constitute a gender order (Connell, 2005; Schofield, Connell, Walker, Wood, & Butland, 2000). In this way, a gender relations approach allows us to think outside the box of the gender binary toward a view of gender as an interactional, relational construct that is ever-changing, with varying meaning in different family contexts. By existing outside the gender binary, we can disentangle what we mean by fatherhood and motherhood as constructs that are not necessarily tied to males and females, but rather as constructs that can apply to either parent. I provide an illustration of the usefulness of the gender relations framework with discussion of the case of same-sex parenthood, below.

Re-envisioning Why Fathers Matter Beyond the Gender Binary

How then can a gender relations framework help us re-envision the research question of "do fathers matter?" A gender relations approach suggests that the gender of one parent cannot be taken out of context of other family members. So, when Mincy et al. (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") (and others) found that men primarily enact parenthood via playfulness and physical activity, this may be unique to the context of heterosexual men parenting with heterosexual women. Yet, the context of *two* men as parents in a household opens an entirely different set of questions not based on contrasting fatherhood to motherhood, but rather one that asks how variation among fathers and the context in which fatherhood takes place influence child well-being. Thus, we may ask: How do different ways of parenting matter in relation to varying gender or sex compositions of parents in a household—man–man, woman–woman, transgender man with a cisgender man.

We have some insight into the answer to this question. In a gender relations framework, gay men may enact alternative masculinities in relation to other gay men that may be more in line with what we consider as "feminine" or "mothering," in ways that straight men—who may be compelled to enact more strictly hegemonic ideals in a heterosexual relationship—do not (Courtenay, 2000). Thus, two men fathering together may enact being fathers in revolutionary ways that blow to pieces our notions of what fatherhood *is*. Two women may enact alternative notions of femininity through being more active with children than heterosexual women typically are, or enact femininity in ways similar to straight mothers. This is unknown, but can be explored with more data on gender, sex composition of parents in a household, and parenting practices. My recent qualitative research on gay and lesbian intimate relationships has shown that the enactment of gender is complicated by sexuality, wherein alternative masculinities and femininities circulate more freely across male and female bodies (Reczek, 2012; Reczek & Umberson, 2012). As soon as we start queering the traditional notion of one man and one women raising a child, we can recognize the fault in our logic of trying to study fathers as an independent force without clear context in which parenting take place. Thus, when we are looking for predictors of child well-being in families that are not heterosexual, does the question of "are fathers uniquely influencing child well-being" become moot? What does it mean for a father to have an independent effect in a household with two fathers? Instead of "are fathers and mothers unique" we might ask: "Are children raised in households of heterosexual configurations worse, or better, off than children raised in other sex configurations?"

Same-sex couples are an obvious example of why asking the question "do fathers uniquely contribute to child health" needs to be reevaluated. I have focused on same-sex couples in this chapter, but there are a range of family differences that can help us refine our questions and better understand all families. Union status and father residence are two examples. Mincy et al. limit their sample to children in married and cohabiting households in order to understand what father engagement

means; the authors leave out fathers who do not live with their children. They write, "by virtue of their physical separation from their children, nonresident fathers are engaged in activities with their children at much lower levels than their resident counterparts" (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors", p.). However, I question whether looking only at residential married and cohabiting fathers obscures a variation in the context of fatherhood that would provide insight into exactly what fathers do, how they do it, and whether their influence is independent of women's?

Extending the Long Arm of Parenthood

In my concluding thoughts, I draw on life course theory, a strong tradition in family scholarship, to call for a second intervention in family studies. Mincy et al. (Chapter "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors") chose to focus on parenting early in the life course of the child, and rightfully so, as this is a critical time for child development. In fact, much effort is made by Mincy et al. to point out how even short periods of time in early life have very big effects later on in the life course—a concept known as the "long arm of childhood" (Hayward & Gorman, 2004). Yet, the effects of parenting early in the life course of a child do not extend only to children, but to parents also. This happens in two ways. First, mothers and fathers continue to parent as children age into adulthood. The relationship between parents and adult children has often been the subject of research on aging—in particular, a great deal of attention is paid to how adult children care for aging parents, a reversal of the early years of parenthood. Parenting early in the life course and parenting later in the life course are separate literatures with different driving assumptions and paradigms. I urge scholars to consider what happens in the years of parenting between early childhood and adulthood, and how we can better articulate the connections between parenting young children and parenting adult children. Given the advancing age of society and the changing needs of both parents and children across the life course, this area is germane.

Second, greater attention should be paid to what I call the "long arm of parenthood," wherein the experience of parenting early in the child's life course has cumulative consequences for parenting dynamics in the child's later life, impacting the well-being of both generations. For example, by merging the long arm of parenthood with an emphasis on a gender relations framework, I question how the "distinctness" of motherhood and fatherhood in a child's early life create gendered parenting when a child is a young adult. How would this differ for gay, lesbian, or heterosexual parents? Many more questions can be explored in this vein, and I believe expanding our framework beyond the gender binary and extending our focus on the accumulating dimensions of parenthood provide opportunities of growth for this field. I encourage us to continue to think through our assumptions as a field about the nature and consequence of gender as a variable and the longevity of

gendered parent–child relationships, moving our research forward toward the next frontier.

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Part IV
Gender Differences in Health Benefits of Marriage

Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving

Debra Umberson and Rhiannon A. Kroeger

> Despite all the jokes about marriage in which men indulge, all the complaints they lodge against it, it is one of the greatest boons of their sex. (Bernard, 1972, p. 17)
> A generation ago, I propounded what I called a shock theory of marriage. In simple form, it stated that marriage introduced such profound discontinuities into the lives of women as to constitute genuine emotional health hazards. (Bernard, 1972, p. 37)

Prior to Jessie Bernard's groundbreaking book, *The Future of Marriage* (1972), few thought—or had the courage to suggest—that gender inequality in marriage was toxic for the health and well-being of women, and primarily to the benefit of men's health. Armed with empirical evidence, Bernard argued that, perhaps most dramatically, marriage was more strongly associated with reduced mortality risk for men than for women, and more strongly associated with psychological distress for women than for men.

Of course, marriage has changed a great deal since the 1970s in ways that may have altered the costs and benefits of marriage for the health of men and women. Demographic change has been profound in terms of increases in nonmarital cohabitation, older age at first marriage, higher rates of divorce, and decreases in marital fertility (Lichter, 2012; Smock, 2000). In addition, gains in educational attainment and employment rates among women have increased women's economic independence, meaning that women are less dependent on men for their very survival (Cherlin, 2010). Amidst these demographic changes, the symbolic meaning of marriage has changed. Marriage is no longer the cultural imperative that it was during 1960s, with disapproval and social sanctions for those who did not marry (Kroeger & Smock, 2014). Over the past decade we have witnessed increasing approval and acceptance of alternatives to traditional marriage, particularly cohabitation and, more recently, same-sex marriage (Cherlin, 2009). These trends further

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reshape the meaning and boundaries of marriage, and raise provocative new questions about gendered experiences of marriage and health. If marriage benefits the health of men more than women in different-sex marriages, what does this suggest about the health benefits of marriage for same-sex male couples and same-sex female couples?

In this chapter, we first provide an overview of empirical findings on gender, marriage, and physical health that are derived from decades of research on heterosexual (hereafter referred to as "different-sex") couples. We focus primarily on the literature concerning marital dynamics/marital quality and health as it is gendered marital dynamics that give rise to gender differences in the health consequences of marriage. Although we do not yet have a body of research on marriage and health for same-sex couples, we briefly review suggestive evidence on cohabitation and health for same-sex couples in comparison to different-sex couples. Second, we make the case that extending research on gender, marriage, and health to same-sex couples can revolutionize our understanding of gendered experiences of marriage and health for different-sex as well as same-sex couples. Third, we provide some empirical evidence about how gendered marital dynamics and health unfold in different ways for same-sex and different-sex couples. We conclude with a look to the future, with attention to the possible ramifications of same-sex marriage for men and women's lived experiences of marriage and the effects of marriage on health.

Gender, Marriage, and Health

Over the past 40 years, countless studies have considered the link between marital status and health, generally reaching the conclusion that marriage benefits health (see reviews in Impett & Peplau, 2006; Waite & Gallagher, 2000). In fact, this basic conclusion is widely accepted by the scientific community and the general public. Indeed, proponents of same-sex marriage often pointed to the health benefits of marriage as one of the fundamental reasons that same-sex marriage should be legalized (Herek, 2006).

Compared to the unmarried, the married report better self-assessed health, have lower rates of chronic illness, are less likely to be institutionalized in old age, are more likely to survive heart attacks, and live longer (see a review in Waite & Gallagher, 2000). Moreover, the general consensus continues to be that the health benefits of marriage are greater for men than for women. In 1990, Ross, Mirowsky, & Goldsteen , presented evidence that unmarried men had a 250% greater risk of mortality than did married men while unmarried women had only a 50% greater risk of mortality compared to married women. Yet gender differences in the health benefits of marriage may have diminished over time. Indeed, while the protective effects of marriage on health are well documented and accepted, a recent review by Carr and Springer suggests that contemporary evidence for gender differences in the effects of marriage on health is "inconclusive" (2010, p. 749).



Fig. 1 Marital status and health: 1972–2005. (Reprinted from Liu & Umberson, 2008)

Gender differences in the health benefits of marriage have changed over historical time, and the nature of this change is highly dependent on whether the married are compared to the never-married or the previously married (Liu & Umberson, 2008). Figure 1, from Liu and Umberson's (2008) study, shows gender differences in the association of marital status and self-rated health from 1972 to 2003, based on the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data.

Figure 1 reports the predicted probability of reporting good or excellent health over the 32-year period and shows that the married report better health compared to all the unmarried groups. Supporting Bernard's (1972) view, the gap between the married and never-married was much greater for men than women in 1972, but the apparent health benefit to men seems to have diminished greatly over time. By 2005, the gap between the married and never-married was minimal for both men and women. So, in this sense, it appears that marriage is not so much the boon to men's health that it used to be, at least when compared to the never-married and when the outcome is self-rated health. Figure 1 also shows a growing gap between the currently married and previously married for men and women.

Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the gendered link between marriage and health may have changed over time, with fewer benefits to men than in the past, but more research is needed to understand these patterns. Given the rise in cohabitation since 1970, it is quite plausible that the never-married group includes many cohabitors, and this may help explain why the health of never-married men has become so much more similar to married men over time. Studies show that cohabitation does not provide the same health benefits as marriage but cohabitation does seem to offer some health benefits. Recent research (relying on NHIS data) has considered the possible health benefits of cohabitation for same-sex as well as different-sex couples, finding that people in same-sex and different-sex cohabiting unions are in better health than the unmarried (including the never-married, wid-

owed, and divorced), but in worse health than different-sex married couples (Liu, Reczek, & Brown, 2013). Liu et al., conclude that "the pattern of poorer self-rated health of same-sex cohabitors is quite robust and does not vary by gender" (2013, p. 40). In contrast, Denney, Gorman, and Barrera also analyzed the NHIS data and concluded that "the cohabitation disadvantage for health is more pronounced for different-sex cohabiting women than for men, but little difference exists between same-sex cohabiting men and women" (2013, p. 46). Thus, the available evidence is inconclusive concerning gender differences in the health benefits of cohabitation for same-sex and different-sex unions.

Notably, most of the studies on marital status and health consider the outcome of self-rated health. This focus on self-rated health is particularly important because gender differences in the health benefits of marriage may be much greater for some health outcomes than others (Robles, Slatcher, Trombello, & McGinn, 2013). Studies on marital status and mortality have consistently yielded results showing stronger protective effects of different-sex marriage for men than for women (see a review in Liu, 2009). Liu (2009) finds a gendered marriage advantage for mortality protection in NHIS data up through 2000; she further reports that the marriage advantage in mortality risk did not diminish (and may have even increased) from 1986 to 2000, and this advantage is clear whether the married are compared to the never-married or the previously married.

Marital Status or Marital Quality?

Why would marriage benefit health in different ways for men and women? Leading explanations focus on interactions between spouses and the assumption than men and women bring different resources to marriage. If men and women provide and receive different resources in marriage—and experience different strains—they may reap different health benefits. A key theme in 1970s research, often cited even today, is that marital status is more important to the health of men whereas marital quality is more important to the health of women (see reviews in Impett & Peplau, 2006; Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001). In this gendered view, women are much more likely than men to provide the care and influence that benefit their spouse's health. Thus, merely being married and having access to a spouse who provides emotional support and care enhances men's health more than women's. However, the quality of close relationships is more salient to women than to men, having potentially stronger effects on women's health and well-being (Peplau, 2001; Wanic & Kulik, 2011). In addition, women seem to be more attuned to and feel more responsible for the well-being of others and, in turn, the constant monitoring and care work involved in meeting a spouse's needs may undermine marital quality more for women than for men (Umberson, Thomeer, & Lodge, 2015b). Thus, daily marital dynamics or marital quality may be more important to the health of women than men.

Recent research on marriage and health has returned to this emphasis on the importance of marital quality and gendered dynamics *within marriage* that have consequences for health. This work emphasizes that a bad marriage is worse than no marriage at all when it comes to health, and takes into account the costs as well as the rewards of marriage for men and women (Umberson, Williams, Powers, Liu, & Needham 2006). Further, this body of work emphasizes that men and women in different-sex marriages tend to influence each other's health in very different ways. In this sense, the renewed focus on marital dynamics and health brings us back to Jessie Bernard's notion of "his" and "her" marriage (1972).

Marital Dynamics and Health: His and Hers

Marital dynamics refer to interactions between partners and are typically summarized in measures of marital quality that take into account supportive (e.g., emotional support) and strained (e.g., relationship conflict) interactions (Burman & Margolin, 1992; Robles et al., 2013). Strained interactions seem to undermine health more powerfully than supportive interactions protect health (Robles et al., 2013; Umberson et al., 2006). Marital dynamics that affect health outcomes also include social control, defined as spousal efforts to influence each other's health. Most of what we know about gendered marital dynamics and health is based on research with different-sex couples; however, a growing body of research on same-sex cohabiting couples suggests how these dynamics might unfold in same-sex couples.

Emotional Support and Relationship Strain

Emotional support refers to the positive and affirming acts of support in relationships such as listening to and encouraging one's partner, and making one's partner feel loved and cared for. Marriage increases the probability that one will have access to emotional support much more for men than for women because women provide more emotional support to their spouse (Umberson, Chen, House, Hopkins, & Slaten 1996). In turn, emotional support has a salutary effect on both mental and physical health (Uchino, 2004). The provision of emotional support is a major component of the emotion work that spouses provide to one another (Erickson, 2005). Relationship strain refers to ongoing sources of stress including relationship conflict and having a critical or demanding spouse. Marital strain undermines health for both men and women but a number of studies suggest that the effects may be stronger for women (see a review in Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001). Humans and primates in subordinate positions are more adversely affected by stress than are their more dominate counterparts, according to Wanic and Kulik (2011). They argue that women's lower status in marriage (and society), along with women's stronger



Fig. 2 Primary pathways: spousal influence on health

interpersonal orientation, may make women more reactive than men to stress in their close relationships.

Social Control

Social control refers to the influence that an individual has over another person's health behaviors (Umberson, 1992). Studies clearly show that the married are more likely than the unmarried to have someone who attempts to have a positive influence on their health behaviors and health, and that person is most likely to be their spouse (Umberson, 1992). But being married is much more likely to increase exposure to social control for men than women. Eighty percent of men in a national survey reported their wife as the primary person who attempted to influence their health whereas only 59% of the women reported that their husband did so (Umberson, 1992). Social control efforts are associated with healthier behaviors that are known to promote physical health (Lewis & Butterfield, 2007; Umberson, 1992). Waite and Gallagher (2000) go so far as to argue that marriage is especially important to men because single men have such poor health habits—including drinking, smoking, driving fast, and not wearing seatbelts; they argue that, "the reason that getting a wife boosts your health more than acquiring a husband is not that marriage warps women, but that single men lead such warped lives" (p. 164). Lewis and Butterfield's (2007) dyadic analysis of married couples reveals the importance of gendered relational interdependence; they found that, compared to men, women's social control efforts led to more positive health behavior change for themselves as well as their spouse.

Figure 2 summarizes the key pathways linking marital dynamics to physical health. Emotional support is associated with better mental health whereas relationship strain erodes mental health. In turn, mental health affects physical health both directly and indirectly by influencing health behavior. Relationship strain also trig-

gers physiological processes such as immune dysregulation and cardiovascular reactivity that undermine physical health both directly and indirectly by affecting health behaviors. By contrast, emotional support can enhance mental health and lead to adaptive physiological responses (e.g., reduced cardiovascular arousal) that protect health. Social control operates primarily by shaping health behaviors that, in turn, affect physical health. These processes are well documented and we refer readers to several outstanding reviews for detailed evidence regarding the various pathways linking marital dynamics to health (Burman & Margolin, 1992; Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001; Robles et al., 2013).

Almost all studies on marital dynamics and health assume gender differences in the pathways shown in Fig. 2. Until quite recently, the general consensus was that marital quality had stronger effects on the health of women than men, even though marital status (i.e., being married) had stronger effects on men than women. But a recent meta-analysis of marital quality and health by Robles et al., concludes that, "In studies that directly tested gender moderation (or provided separate effect sizes for men and women), the gender difference was small and not significant, though in the direction of greater magnitude for women" (2013, p. 175). Although this meta-analysis did not reveal strong evidence of gender moderation, the verdict is not entirely in. It may well be that gender differences in the effects of marital quality on health depend on both timing in the life course and the type of health outcome considered (Robles et al., 2013). For example, a recent study on marital quality and inflammation (a biomarker associated with age-related diseases) shows a significantly stronger link between marital quality and inflammation for women than for men (Donoho, Crimmins, & Seeman, 2013), whereas another study found no gender difference in the impact of marital quality on self-rated health (Umberson et al., 2006).

Moreover, gender moderation in the effect of marital quality on health is only one way of looking at the possibility of gendered experiences of marital quality and health. A focus on gender moderation addresses the question of whether equal levels of marital quality affect men and women in different ways. This gets at the issue of differential reactivity to relationship dynamics. Robles et al. (2013) concluded that equal levels of marital quality have similar effects on most health outcomes for men and women (suggesting similar physical reactions to marital quality for men and women). However, marital quality is not equal for men and women; marital quality tends to be lower for women than men. Thus, even if the effects of marital quality on health do not differ for men and women, absolute levels of marital quality may put women at a disadvantage in terms of health effects.

Similarly, research on social control suggests that women provide more social control in marriage than do men (Lewis & Butterfield, 2007; Umberson, 1992). So, even if social control of health behavior influences the health of men and women in similar ways, the playing field within marriage is not a level one, and that unequal playing field advantages men's health. Moreover, if women provide more emotional support and social control to their spouse, and the provision of these resources is stressful or burdensome, then these marital dynamics may impose some costs for women's health while providing benefits for men's health. Indeed, a growing

body of research on different-sex couples points to the emotion work that women do—that is, work involved in reading, monitoring, and promoting men's mental and physical health (Erickson, 2005; Umberson et al., 2015). There is considerable gender inequity in the provision of emotion work in different-sex marriages, with women doing more emotion work than men, and women reporting that this work is often stressful (Elliott & Umberson, 2008; Erickson, 2005; Umberson et al., 2015b).

What We Can Learn From Same-Sex Marriage

To date, almost everything we know about gender, marriage, and health is based on evidence from different-sex couples, and studies start from the assumption that women and men view and experience marriage in different ways. Gendered experiences of marriage then lead to a different set of costs and benefits for the health of men and women. If men and women approach and experience marital relationships differently, what does this suggest for gendered experiences of marriage for same-sex couples?

On one hand, many studies report that same-sex gay and lesbian (cohabiting) couples and different-sex (married) couples are similar in overall levels of relationship satisfaction and strain (Kurdek, 2004), suggesting that marital experiences might not vary much for same- and different-sex couples. On the other hand, a number of studies find that same-sex and different-sex couples differ in the ways they express and experience emotional and sexual intimacy (Peplau, 2001), and in levels of partner equality (Kurdek, 2004; Solomon, Rothblum, & Balsam 2005), suggesting that marital dynamics would differ for same-sex and different-sex couples, with potential consequences for their health. Also, gendered social control processes unfold in different ways for same- and different-sex couples, with same-sex cohabiting partners more likely to share in the degree to which and the ways in which they influence each other's health behaviors (Reczek & Umberson, 2012). Whereas women tend to provide more social control than they receive in different-sex relationships, cohabiting partners in same-sex relationships (whether men or women) tend to be more balanced in the amount of social control they provide to one another (Reczek & Umberson, 2012). A recent qualitative study of cohabiting same-sex and married different-sex couples suggests both gender and sexual orientation variation in the amount and type of emotion work that partners provide to each other; compared to men, women provide more emotion work to their partner whether their partner is a man or a woman, yet different-sex couples experience much more partner discordance in emotion work than do same-sex couples (Umberson et al., 2015b).

The legalization of same-sex marriage in a growing number of states means that social scientists now have the opportunity to begin to consider gendered experiences of marriage and health in both same-sex and different-sex marriages. Beyond the importance of inclusiveness, analyzing gender, marital dynamics, and health in both

same- and different-sex couples can transform our understanding of gender and marriage more broadly. Robles et al., argue that "same-sex couples afford a unique opportunity to examine the moderating role of gender-linked factors (e.g., interpersonal orientation and domestic roles) without confounds related to gender and biological sex" (2013, p. 37). Other scholars argue that same-sex couples provide an essential "counterfactual" to different-sex couples, a counterfactual needed to provide new insights into gendered experiences of intimate relationships (Carpenter & Gates, 2008; Joyner, Manning, & Bogle, 2013). Umberson, Thomeer, Kroeger, Lodge, & Xu (2015a) argue that:

> Gender almost certainly plays an important role in shaping relationship dynamics for same-sex couples, but gender is often conflated with gendered relational contexts in studies that compare same- and different-sex couples....A gender-as-relational perspective (C. West & Zimmerman, 2009) suggests a shift from the focus on gender to a focus on gendered relational contexts that differentiates (at least) four groups for comparison in qualitative and quantitative research: (a) men in relationships with men, (b) men in relationships with women, (c) women in relationships with women, and (d) women in relationships with men (see also Goldberg, 2013; Umberson, Thomeer, & Lodge, 2015).

Recent advances in the field of marriage and family provide a theoretical and empirical framework for moving toward the analysis of gendered marital contexts and health, and away from a myopic focus on gender difference within different-sex couples.

Theoretical Framework: Gender as Relational

The gender-as-relational perspective is particularly useful for considering how marital dynamics might unfold in different ways for couples with two men compared to couples with two women, or couples with one woman and one man. In the gender-as-relational perspective, gender is viewed as "dynamic and situational, [with] attention to differences among women and among men" (Springer, Hankivsky, & Bates, 2012, p. 1661). Men and women bring cultural ideas and experiences of gender to their relationships. These cultural ideas include notions of women as more emotionally supportive, nurturing, and responsible for the health and well-being of others and men as more independent, risk-taking, and in need of health monitoring (Ganong & Larson, 2011).

The gender-as-relational perspective can broaden our understanding of gendered marital dynamics and health by emphasizing that marital dynamics around health may be experienced differently by men and women depending on whether they are interacting with a man or a woman (Goldberg, 2013). For example, women married to women may be more likely to share in aspects of nurturance and care work associated with femininity, such as monitoring one another's health habits and providing intensive care work to each other when one spouse is ill. By contrast, women married to men may be more likely to experience partner discordance in social control and emotion work, with women providing more and receiving less than

their spouse. Men married to men may provide less emotion work and social control to one another during periods of illness yet experience more partner concordance and equality in these marital dynamics. The gender-as-relational approach takes us beyond a view of gender differences within different-sex couples to consider how men and women experience marriage in relation to health across gendered relational contexts.

Empirical Framework: The Factorial Method

Unbiased gender effects in quantitative studies of relationships are impossible unless researchers include men and women in different-sex and same-sex couples in their samples, suggest West, Popp, and Kenny (2008). However, a major challenge though, to studying gendered experiences of marriage and comparing same-sex and different-sex couples is that same-sex partners cannot be distinguished on the basis of gender. That is, for different-sex couples, in which the partners can be distinguished from one another by gender, analyzing couple-level dynamics is intuitive because researchers can implement methods that produce separate estimates for men and women and can also analyze how men and women's estimates are associated with one another. For the analysis of same-sex couples or comparisons between same-sex and different-sex couples, however, in which partners cannot be distinguished from one another by gender, examining relationship dynamics within and across couples becomes more challenging (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook 2006).

West et al., (2008) have refined a methodological approach that allows for comparison of same-sex and different-sex dyads that accommodates indistinguishable dyads. This methodological approach, which they refer to as the "factorial model," parallels the theoretical emphasis on gendered relational contexts by distinguishing men with men, men with women, women with women, and women with men. To implement the factorial method, researchers need dyadic data for three types of relationship dyads: dyads with two men, dyads with two women, and dyads with one man and one woman. Then, effects for the four aforementioned groups can be estimated by including estimates for partner gender, respondent gender, and partner gender * respondent gender. The factorial method is an extension of the Actor–Partner Interdependence Model (APIM; Cook & Kenny, 2005). The APIM is useful for variables that can vary both between and within dyads such as relationship satisfaction or respondent mental health. The APIM assumes that a given outcome for a respondent will be influenced by his/her own values on some predictor variable as well as his/her partner's values on that same predictor variable. For example, within a dyad, each partner's mental health might be influenced by their own relationship satisfaction as well as their partner's relationship satisfaction. The factorial method has the further advantage of meeting recent calls by leading family scholars for dyadic data in studies of marriage and family relationships (Carr & Springer, 2010).

Comparing Same-Sex and Different-Sex Marriages: An Empirical Example

We recently collected dyadic data from men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages in Massachusetts. We present some of our first findings from these data to illustrate the utility and insights offered by a dyadic analysis of gendered dynamics in same-sex and different-sex married couples. We employ the factorial model to consider marital dynamics and health in same- and different-sex marriages. In particular, we draw on marital quality research on heterosexuals suggesting that women do more emotion work than men, in part, because they are more aware of their spouse's stress levels and needs and, in turn, provide more emotion work to reduce stress for their spouse. The provision of emotion work may be burdensome for women, thus undermining women's health while promoting men's health. Specifically, we address three research questions that will indicate how these marital dynamics unfold for same-sex and different-sex couples and illustrate how the inclusion of same-sex couples can broaden our understanding of gendered marital dynamics that influence health:

1. Does one spouse's daily interpersonal stress (with persons other than one's spouse) affect the amount of emotion work provided by the other spouse and does this effect differ for men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages?
2. Does the respondent's daily interpersonal stress (with persons other than one's spouse) affect the amount of emotion work they provide to their spouse and does this effect differ for men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages?
3. How does the provision of daily emotion work affect physical health (of the spouse who provides emotion work and the spouse who is the target of emotion work) and does this effect differ for men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages?

Data and Methods

Sample The sample for this analysis is based on pilot data from a larger study that is currently in the field. The pilot sample includes 15 gay male couples, 15 lesbian couples, and 15 heterosexual couples ($n = 45$ couples, 90 individuals). All respondents were married between 2004 and 2005 in Massachusetts. We chose Massachusetts as the study site because it was the first state to legalize same-sex marriage (in 2004) and it had a relatively large population of same-sex couples who had been married for at least 7 years at the time of our data collection in 2012–2013. We focused on long-term married couples because we were particularly interested in the marital dynamics of well-established midlife couples, a group for whom marital quality seems to be particularly important to health (Umberson et al., 2006).

Given that same-sex couples have only recently been able to legally marry, the sample composition was carefully considered. Couples were selected for participation on the basis of relationship duration and age. Because our focus is on midlife couples and because marriage was available to Massachusetts same-sex couples only since 2004, we matched gay, lesbian, and heterosexual couples on total relationship duration. All couples were legally married for a minimum of 7 years. Given that couples should be matched on total relationship duration for comparability across groups, we took into account that, due to past legal restrictions, midlife different-sex and same-sex couples with the same total relationship duration would likely differ in total number of years cohabiting as compared to total years married. For example, we matched a same-sex couple married for 7 years but cohabiting for 8 years prior to marriage (15-year relationship duration) with a heterosexual couple married for 10 years but cohabitating 4 years prior to marriage (15-year relationship duration). We included men and women aged 40–60 to keep the focus on health of aging midlife couples. The average relationship duration was 19.60 years for men in same-sex marriages (average age = 50.15), 18.28 years for women in same-sex marriages (average age = 50.16), and 23.53 years for men and women in different-sex marriages (average age = 50.24 for women and 50.36 for men in different-sex marriages). Overall levels of marital strain were similar for same-sex and different-sex marriages.

Data The data include three linked components: (1) a baseline survey, (2) daily diary data, and (3) in-depth interview data. Each of the three data components includes a dyadic design in that data were collected from both spouses within each couple. Spouses were interviewed separately for the baseline and in-depth interviews. Online diary questionnaires were completed independently by each spouse (diary questionnaires were designed to be completed on the same evenings by each spouse). The analysis for this chapter is based on data from the daily diary component only.

The diary component involved completion of a short online questionnaire for 14 consecutive days. The questionnaire, completed in 8–10 min each evening, assessed relationship dynamics (e.g., emotion work and social control provided and received), health behaviors (e.g., alcohol consumption), psychological distress (including positive and negative affect), physical symptoms, and stress and social support from sources other than one's partner for the previous 24-h period. Face-to-face in-depth interviews provided rich qualitative data to further investigate the processes that underlie statistical patterns observed in the diary data. Baseline surveys were also completed at the time of the in-depth interview. Each of the 90 individuals (in 45 couples) completed the in-depth interview and baseline survey, and each was asked to participate in the diary data collection. A total of 36 couples (72 individuals) completed at least 2 days of diary data and are therefore included in the current analysis. Of these 36 couples, 11 include two women, 14 include two men, and 11 include different-sex spouses. Eighty percent of the couples in our analysis completed at least 7 days of diary data, but that percentage drops considerably after day 8 onward (e.g., 75 % had 8 or more days, 58 % completed 10 or more days, etc.).

Therefore, we limit our current analyses to the first 7 days of diary data completion, resulting in 480 observations.

Methods Daily diary methods provide a longitudinal, dyadic analysis of ongoing and fluctuating relationship dynamics that may influence health outcomes (i.e., health behavior, psychological state, and physical health symptoms). This approach provides data on relationship and health processes, as experienced by individuals and within dyads, over time (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003), and is often used to study marital dyadic processes (e.g., Neff & Karney, 2005). To analyze the dyadic diary data for couples, we utilize mixed effects multilevel modeling. Because the dyads are indistinguishable by gender, we cannot run separate models or equations for each partner. Therefore, both respondents and days are conceptually "nested" within couples. Yet, technically, days and respondents are "crossed" with one another (i.e., for each day of analysis there are values for partner 1 and 2) (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). In our models we specify days and respondents as nested within couples and estimate partner number as a crossed random effect. To implement the factorial method concerning gender differences in the effects of each independent variable on each dependent variable, we estimate a series of interaction models leading up to a final model with triple interactions for respondent gender * partner gender * the predictor of interest. First, we run a model with main effects for respondent gender, partner gender, and the predictor of interest. In Model 2, we include interactions for respondent gender * partner gender. In Model 3, we include interactions for respondent gender * predictor. In Model 4, we include interactions for partner gender * predictor. In Model 5, we include all interaction terms from Models 2 through 4 plus a triple interaction term interacting respondent gender * partner gender * predictor. For each predictor, the interaction terms in Models 3 and 4 represent tests for respondent and partner gender effects, respectively. In Model 5, the triple interaction term represents a test for sexual orientation effects.

Measures On each diary day, respondents were asked questions concerning the previous 24 h about stress in a range of interpersonal relationships, not including the marital relationship (interpersonal stress scale), emotion work provided to their spouse (emotion work scale), and how well they felt physically (physical health measure). The *interpersonal stress scale* (range 6–24 with higher scores indicating more stress, alpha = 0.80) asks respondents how much tension or conflict they had with parent(s), children/step-children, other relatives, friends, coworkers, acquaintances, and others (not including spouse). The *emotion work scale* (range 4–16 with higher scores indicating more emotion work; alpha = 0.70) included four items concerning how often: (1) you tried to improve your spouse's mood, (2) tried to make your spouse feel loved and cared for, (3) felt worried or concerned about your spouse, and (4) did things for your spouse. Overall self-assessed *physical health* was based on a single item, "Overall, how well did you feel physically over the past 24 h?" (range from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating better health status).

Table 1 Means and standard deviations. (Averaged over the 7 days of analysis)

	Women with women		Women with men		Men with men		Men with women	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Interpersonal stress	6.77	1.11	6.45	0.86	6.83	1.25	6.51	0.90
Emotion work	11.01	2.19	9.86	2.64	10.61	2.41	9.39	2.30
Physical health	3.32	0.98	3.42	0.98	3.56	0.87	3.50	1.04
Number of days	148		74		184		74	

Results

We begin with a brief overview of descriptive results. Table 1 presents the mean values (averaged over the 7 days of diary data) of the key measures included in the analysis for men and women in same-sex and different-sex relationships (general patterns are described; significant differences are noted). Interpersonal stress is slightly higher for same-sex couples (men and women) than for men and women in different-sex marriages ($p<0.05$). This finding corresponds to previous research showing that gay and lesbian populations experience more stress in family relationships (more specifically, relationships in family of origin) than do their heterosexual counterparts (Patterson, 2000). Men and women in same-sex marriages report doing more emotion work than men and women in different-sex marriages (all differences between same-sex and different-sex relationships $=p<0.05$ or lower). Average levels of self-assessed health are similar across gendered dyadic contexts, except that women in same-sex relationships report significantly poorer health than men in same-sex relationships ($p<0.05$).

Spouse's Interpersonal Stress and Emotion Work Provided by Respondent We first address the question, does the respondent's daily interpersonal stress levels (with persons other than one's spouse) affect the amount of emotion work provided by their spouse and does this effect differ for men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages? The results, presented in Table 2, indicate a significant spouse gender effect (as illustrated by the significant interaction term in Model 4), but no sexual orientation effect (as illustrated by the nonsignificant triple interaction term in Model 5). Specifically, as illustrated in Fig. 3, there is no significant relationship between spouses' stress and respondents' emotion work among respondents whose spouse is a man, but for respondents whose spouse is a woman, spouses' stress is significantly and negatively associated with respondents' emotion work ($0.08+(-0.35)=-0.28$, $p<0.05$). This pattern suggests that respondents married to women provide less emotion work to their spouse on days that the spouse experiences more stress.

Table 2 Mixed effects linear regression of respondents' emotion work on spouses' stress

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Spouse's stress	−0.08	−0.09	−0.02	0.08	−0.00
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Female respondent	0.47	−0.65	1.31	0.52	−3.12
	(0.45)	(0.63)	(1.27)	(0.45)	(2.08)
Female spouse	−0.15	−1.27*	−0.13	2.20#	0.03
	(0.45)	(0.63)	(0.45)	(1.27)	(2.47)
Time	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female respondent * female spouse		2.32*			5.53#
		(0.94)			(3.26)
Female respondent * spouse's stress			−0.13		0.38
			(0.18)		(0.30)
Female spouse * spouse's stress				−0.35*	−0.20
				(0.18)	(0.37)
Female respondent * female spouse * spouse's stress					−0.48
					(0.48)
Constant	10.78***	11.16***	10.36***	9.70***	10.57***
	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.94)	(0.91)	(0.99)
Random-effects parameters					
Partner variance	2.81	2.53	2.80	2.82	2.47
Partner covariance	0.66	0.37	0.65	0.65	0.34
Residual variance	3.03	3.03	3.02	3.00	2.99

Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, # $p<0.10$; $N=480$ diary days, for 72 respondents and 36 couples. Both partner number and diary days are nested within couple but crossed with each other, so partner number is specified as a crossed random effect

Respondent's Interpersonal Stress and Emotion Work Provided by Respondent Next, we consider whether the respondent's exposure to interpersonal stress with individuals other than their spouse affects the amount of emotion work they provide to their spouse. The results, presented in Table 3, indicate that there is no significant respondent gender effect (Model 3) or spouse gender effect (Model 4), but there is a significant sexual orientation effect (Model 5). Specifically, respon-



Fig. 3 Predicted effect of spouses' stress on respondents' emotion work, by spouse gender

dents' stress is significantly and negatively associated with respondents' emotion work for men and women in same-sex marriages, but is not significantly related to the provision of emotion work among men and women in different-sex marriages. The predicted effect of respondents' stress on emotion work for men and women in same-sex marriages, presented in Fig. 4, suggests that on days that same-sex spouses experience more stress, they provide less emotion work to each other.

Spouse's Emotion Work and Health of Respondent Next we consider the question, how does daily emotion work provided by one's spouse affect the respondent's physical health and does this effect differ for men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages? The results, presented in Table 4, indicate that there are both significant respondent gender effects (Model 3) and spouse gender effects (Model 4), but no sexual orientation effect (as indicated by the nonsignificant triple interaction term in Model 5). Specifically, the results for Model 3, shown in Fig. 5a, suggest that spouses' emotion work positively affects health for men but negatively affects health for women. Similarly, the results for Model 4, shown in Fig. 5b, indicate that among respondents who are married to men, spouses' emotion work has marginally significant positive effects on respondents' health. In contrast, among respondents who are married to women, spouses' emotion work negatively affects respondents' health. These results suggest that on days spouses provide more emotion work, men and individuals married to men experience better physical health, whereas the opposite is true for women and those who are married to women.

Emotion Work Provided by Respondent and Respondent's Health Our final question is whether daily emotion work provided by the respondent affects their own health and whether this effect differs for men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages. The results, presented in Table 5, indicate that there are no significant respondent gender effects (Model 3) or spouse gender effects (Model 4), but there is a significant sexual orientation effect (Model 5). Specifically, the results

Table 3 Mixed effects linear regression of respondents' emotion work on respondents' stress

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Respondent's stress	−0.18#	−0.19*	−0.12	−0.16	−0.23#
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Female respondent	0.45	−0.70	1.23	0.46	−3.88
	(0.44)	(0.62)	(1.27)	(0.44)	(2.46)
Female spouse	−0.14	−1.29*	−0.12	0.10	−4.75*
	(0.44)	(0.62)	(0.44)	(1.26)	(2.07)
Time	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female respondent * female spouse		2.38*			9.77**
		(0.94)			(3.25)
Female respondent * respondent's stress			−0.12		0.49
			(0.18)		(0.37)
Female spouse * respondent's stress				−0.04	0.53#
				(0.18)	(0.30)
Female respondent * female spouse* respondent's stress					−1.13*
					(0.48)
Constant	11.46***	11.84***	11.10***	11.34***	12.14***
	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.91)	(0.93)	(0.98)
Random-effects parameters					
Partner variance	2.79	2.49	2.79	2.79	2.48
Partner covariance	0.73	0.43	0.72	0.73	0.28
Residual variance	3.01	3.01	3.01	3.01	2.97

Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, # $p<0.10$; $N=480$ diary days, for 72 respondents and 36 couples. Both partner number and diary days are nested within couple but crossed with each other, so partner number is specified as a crossed random effect



Fig. 4 Predicted effect of respondents' stress on respondents' emotion work for men and women in same-sex marriages

Table 4 Mixed effects linear regression of respondents' health on spouses' emotion work

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Spouse's emotion work	−0.01	−0.01	0.05*	0.04#	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female respondent	−0.13	−0.13	1.17**	−0.06	0.98#
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.18)	(0.56)
Female spouse	−0.06	−0.07	0.01	1.08**	0.82
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.39)	(0.56)
Time	−0.03#	−0.03#	−0.03*	−0.03#	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female respondent * female spouse		0.01			−0.03
		(0.42)			(0.83)
Female respondent * spouse's emotion work			−0.13***		−0.11*
			(0.03)		(0.05)
Female spouse * spouse's emotion work				−0.11**	−0.08#
				(0.03)	(0.05)
Female respondent * female spouse * spouse's emotion work					0.01
					(0.07)
Constant	3.70***	3.71***	3.09***	3.15***	2.82***
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.33)
Random-effects parameters					
Partner variance	0.48	0.48	0.46	0.47	0.46
Partner covariance	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.11
Residual variance	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.40	0.39

Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, #$p<0.10$, $N=480$ diary days, for 72 respondents and 36 couples. Both partner number and diary days are nested within couple but crossed with each other, so partner number is specified as a crossed random effect

suggest that respondents' emotion work positively affects respondents' health for men and women in same-sex marriages. Yet, there is no significant relationship between respondents' emotion work and respondents' health for men and women in different-sex marriages. The patterns for men and women in same-sex marriages, illustrated in Fig. 6, suggest that on days same-sex spouses increase their emotion work they also report better health.

Discussion

Past research on gendered marital dynamics and health has focused almost entirely on different-sex couples. This literature emphasizes that women do more than men to protect the health of their spouse, perhaps particularly when men are under stress (Robles et al., 2013). Women are more likely than men to do emotion work that in-



Fig. 5 **a** Predicted effect of spouses' emotion work on respondents' health, by respondent gender. **b** Predicted effect of spouses' emotion work on respondents' health, by spouse gender

cludes providing their spouse with emotional support and nurturance, and to monitor and attend to their spouse's health and well-being (Reczek & Umberson, 2012; Umberson, et al., 2015b). The provision of emotion work may benefit men's health. Yet, as Jessie Bernard argued several decades ago, the provision of this work may be stressful for women, potentially undermining their own health. The inclusion of same-sex couples in research on gendered marital dynamics and health means that we can begin to consider these gendered processes in a more nuanced and systematic way than has been possible with studies focused solely on different-sex couples. Indeed, leading family scholars increasingly call for the inclusion of same-sex marital dynamics and health (Goldberg, 2013; Robles et al., 2013; West et al., 2008).

We have responded to this call by analyzing some new dyadic diary data that includes same-sex and different-sex married couples. We emphasize that our findings should be viewed as preliminary as they are based on pilot data with a limited number of cases. However, these findings illustrate how the inclusion of same-sex

Table 5 Mixed effects linear regression of respondents' health on respondents' emotion work

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model4	Model 5
Respondent's emotion work	0.04*	0.04*	0.05*	0.04#	0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female respondent	−0.15	−0.10	−0.03	−0.14	0.66
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.18)	(0.57)
Female spouse	−0.06	−0.01	−0.05	−0.01	0.67
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.39)	(0.57)
Time	−0.03#	−0.03#	−0.03#	−0.03#	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Female respondent * female spouse		−0.10			−1.46#
		(0.42)			(0.84)
Female respondent * respondent's emotion work			−0.01		−0.07
			(0.03)		(0.05)
Female spouse * respondent's emotion work				−0.00	−0.07
				(0.03)	(0.05)
Female respondent * female spouse * respondent's emotion work					0.14#
					(0.07)
Constant	3.19***	3.18***	3.14***	3.17***	2.91***
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.33)
Random-effects parameters					
Partner variance	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49
Partner covariance	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.11
Residual variance	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40

Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p<0.001$; **$p<0.01$; *$p<0.05$; # $p<0.10$; $N=480$ diary days, for 72 respondents and 36 couples. Both partner number and diary days are nested within couple but crossed with each other, so partner number is specified as a crossed random effect

couples offers a unique perspective and insights into gendered marital dynamics that shape health. For example, our findings suggest that men and women who are married to women do less emotion work when their spouse is under more stress (and, at least theoretically, in greater need of support). This finding corresponds to recent qualitative work showing that, in different-sex couples, men tend to withdraw when their wife is under stress or feeling upset; men often report that they do not know what to do to help their wife other than to give her space and time to feel better (Umberson et al., 2015b).

The more unexpected finding is that women married to women also reduce the amount of emotion work they do when their spouse is under stress. Previous research suggests that women are very attuned and responsive to each other's needs (Peplau, 2001; Umberson et al., 2015b). In part, this may mean that women are more likely to "feel each other's pain" when one partner is under stress, and this greater involvement may create a reciprocal process that interferes with the provision of emotion work. We explored this further by testing the idea that one's own



Fig. 6 Predicted effect of respondents' emotion work on respondents' health for men and women in same-sex marriages

stress may interfere with how much emotion work is provided. We find no significant effect of respondents' stress on emotion work provision for men and women in different-sex marriages. However, when under stress, it seems that men and women in same-sex relationships reduce the amount of emotion work they do for their spouse (Fig. 4). This finding adds to our understanding of gendered relationship dynamics by suggesting that the emotion work provided by women in same-sex dyads is affected by both their own stress level as well as the spouse's stress level—and in the direction of less emotion work in response to increased stress, whereas emotion work provided by men in same-sex dyads is reduced only when the potential emotion work provider is under stress.

Why would stress lead to less emotion work provision by spouses in same-sex marriages but not in different-sex marriages? Future research should consider the possibility that in the context of greater partner similarity (e.g., in views of relationship needs) and equality, partners may understand and appreciate that, in times of stress, it is more difficult to do emotion work (and other kinds of work as well). Indeed, in these contexts, the stressed partner's spouse may be empathic and give the stressed partner a break from their usual roles and responsibilities. Alternatively, it might be the case that women are more likely than men to express their emotional upset when they are under stress (Simon & Nath, 2004) and this expression/sharing of stress and upset may launch a relationship dynamic in which the potential emotion worker (whether a man or a woman) feels more stress as well—stress that may suppress their ability and inclination to provide emotional support to female partners.

We also considered how the receipt and provision of emotion work might affect daily experiences of physical well-being, and found that the receipt of emotion work varies both by respondent and spouse gender (but not by sexual orientation), whereas the provision of emotion work varies by sexual orientation (but not respondent/spouse gender). Specifically, the *receipt* of emotion work seems to be positive for the health of men but not women, independent of their spouse's gender. Further, the receipt of emotion work is positive for the health of respondents whose partners are men, again independent of their own gender. However, the *provision* of emotion work seems to be positive for the health of men and women in same-sex couples (Fig. 4), but is not significantly related to health for those in different-sex couples. Because we analyzed same day associations between emotion work and respondents' health, it is possible that there is some reverse causality behind the patterns we find. For instance, concerning the receipt of emotion work, it may be that, for men, on days that they are feeling less healthy their spouses respond by increasing emotion work. Alternatively, on days that respondents are feeling healthy, they may provide more emotion work to their spouses. We explored the causal ordering between emotion work and health further by estimating lagged models that regressed respondents' health on the previous days' emotion work, and also respondents' emotion work on the previous days' health. The results were not significant, suggesting that associations between emotion work and health are strongest when measured on a same-day basis. Notably, even though we find that stress of respondent is associated with less emotion work provision among men and women in same-sex marriages, it is respondents in same-sex couples who provide the most emotion work to each other (as shown in Table 1). These findings point to the complex interplay of gendered relationship dynamics that influence health. Previous work suggests that, in response to stress, women are more likely than men to seek affiliation with others, especially other women (Taylor et al., 2000), a response that may benefit women's health—but our findings suggest that women are more likely than men to reduce the amount of emotion work they provide to their partner (male or female) when they feel more stressed and when their partner is stressed.

Past work also suggests that women feel more empathy and a need to provide continual emotional support (emotion work) to their partner (Umberson et al., 2015b) than do men; this emotion work may contribute to higher costs of emotion work for the health of women. Future research should further explore the circumstances in which the effects of emotion work provision are positive and negative for the partner who provides that work. Men and women may benefit from altruistic behavior (such as that offered by emotion work) in the context of long-term committed relationships for a range of reasons that have not yet been explored. For example, the provision of emotion work for a spouse may trigger psychological (e.g., a sense of well-being or purpose) or physiological (e.g., reduced cardiovascular activity, improved immune function) processes that promote health and this process may be more likely to be activated in same-sex dyads, perhaps particularly in the context of greater partner equality.

In sum, our preliminary findings suggest that variation in relationship dynamics and physical well-being sometimes reflects gender of partner, sometimes reflects

gender of respondent, and sometimes reflects gender of the dyad. These results raise fascinating new questions about the ways in which gendered relationship dynamics and health unfold in different and sometimes unexpected ways for men and women in same-sex and different-sex marriages. These findings also support the gender-as-relational perspective, suggesting that the way gender is enacted in relationships is contingent on whether men and women are involved with a man or a woman.

Conclusion

In the early 1970s, Jessie Bernard pointed to significant demographic and cultural changes that she hoped would lead to greater gender equality in marriage, an equality that would play out in equal advantages for the health and well-being of men and women. Has the future arrived? Certainly, the demographic and cultural terrain of marriage has continued to evolve over time, and the recent Supreme Court decision to support marriage equality throughout the United States to same-sex couples is perhaps the most dramatic change in terms of our future understanding of gendered marital dynamics that influence health. We are now at a crossroad for revolutionizing our understanding of gendered experiences of marriage for different-sex as well as same-sex couples. We know that involvement in close relationships can benefit health. And of all close relationships studied, marriage has the strongest effects on health and longevity—at least in heterosexual populations. Marriage may be particularly important to the health of gay and lesbian populations because they face higher levels of stress across the life course, and these life course experiences increase risk for health-damaging behavior, psychological distress, and poor health (Institute of Medicine, 2011). The question of whether or not marital dynamics and health are gendered in different, and potentially more equitable, ways for same-sex compared to different-sex couples stands at the edge of a new frontier of marriage and family research.

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Simplifying the Complex Complicates Our Findings: Understanding Marriage, Singlehood, and Health

Chalandra M. Bryant

Umberson and Kroeger's analysis of marital dynamics and health (in chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving") is intriguing. Using a sample of same-sex and different-sex couples, they explored gendered patterns of marriage, marital quality, and health. The authors began by providing a general overview of findings on marriage, health, and gender. As I read their work, four issues immediately came to mind: (a) context first and foremost, (b) singlehood, (c) longevity of married couples, and (d) diversity. I address each of those issues. Before I begin, I would like to commend the authors for daring to tackle such complex issues and congratulate them for recruiting and collecting data from a unique sample.

Context

The context surrounding the couples was not a part of Umberson and Kroeger's discussion. Ecologists focus on associations between the organisms and the environments in which those organisms are embedded. So must we as social scientists. The study of relationships of any type must (yes, I used the word "must," not "should" or "could," but "must") be couched in context. Context can be operationalized in numerous ways, as for example, individual characteristics, social networks, neighborhood, or culture (Bronfenbrenner, 1986; Bryant & Wickrama, 2005; Leventhan & Brooks-Gunn, 2000). Context also encompasses one's past or the sociohistorical period during which one's formative years were spent. Yet, social scientists rarely consider a time period or an era as a component of context.

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With time period in mind, let's review the authors' sample. The average age of the authors' sample as a whole is about 50 years. Average age in years by sex and relationship are as follows:

Men in same-sex marriages: 50.15	Men in different-sex marriages: 50.36
Women in same-sex marriages: 50.16	Women in different-sex marriages: 50.24

Those averages lead us to believe that the study participants are baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964). However, a more careful review of the sample reveals that the ages of the study participants range from 40 to 60 which means that there is a mixture of Generation Xers (born between the early 1960s and 1980s) and baby boomers. This generational difference is ignored in Umberson and Kroeger's discussion. Generational effects cannot be ignored though, because, "… those born at the same time, may share similar formative experiences that coalesce into a 'natural' view of the world. This natural view stays with… individuals throughout their lives, and it is the anchor against which later experiences are interpreted. People are thus fixed in qualitatively different subjective areas" (Scott, 2000, p. 356). These two distinct generations were likely influenced by the prevailing sociopolitical attitudes of their respective times regarding sexuality (e.g., heterosexuality, homosexuality), sex (i.e., acceptance of or disdain for those engaging in sex outside the confines of marital unions, particularly heterosexual unions), and gender roles (i.e., traditional vs. nontraditional roles).

Imagine an individual discovering his/her sexual identity or becoming sexually active during a time when the sociopolitical climate of this country was largely intolerant of sexual minorities or any family form that deviated from traditional family structure or values. Not only might that make sexual minorities more vigilant and more cautious but it also might contribute to sexual minorities feeling stress. Hence, context may influence view of self (then, now, and later) and how individuals think others see them (then, now, and later). All of that can contribute to the stress individuals carry later in life. Umberson and Kroeger assessed stress by asking how much tension or conflict study participants experienced with "parent(s), children/stepchildren, other relatives, friends, coworkers, acquaintances, and others (not including spouse)" (p.??). There are a few problems with this. The broader social context (e.g., sociopolitical context) is not considered. The meaning of "others" is unclear; it is thus, unlikely that all study participants interpreted "others" in the same way. I wondered how the results may have differed if the item had been a bit more specific and asked how much tension or conflict study participants experienced about their relationships. I agree that such proximal factors should be examined, but the nature of forces impinging upon this group is complex and *multilevel* (Berg, Ross, Weatherburn, & Schmidt, 2013). For example, Berg et al. (2013) found that state laws affecting same-sex relationships and antigay sentiment affected the well-being of their sample of homosexual men. Their findings suggested that the influence of national and local protests against same-sex relationships and laws hindering the rights of sexual minorities may cause stress and negatively impact mental health. If Umberson and Kroeger are not going to include such external (i.e., external to the

immediate family) conflict/tension as a major variable, they can at least include it as a control, because such stress could spill over into relationships.

Generational differences in the acceptance of same-sex marriages are quite evident. Obviously, individuals representing those generations who are in same-sex relationships support such unions, but think about the context in which those couples live or the context in which they spent their formative years. That context reflects the values and views of their generational peers—the people in their proximal and distal social networks. If we simply focus on the views of the general public without differentiating the generations we would come away with the impression that in the mid-1990s, only 27% of the general public was in favor of allowing same-sex couples to legally marry (Pew Research Center, 2012). Generational differences, however, are stark. During the mid-1990s, when many of the Generation Xers were coming of age, 40% of the Generation Xers compared to only 26% of the baby boomers were in favor of allowing same-sex legal marriages. In 2011, that favorable view increased to 42% for the boomers, but for Generation Xers, it increased even more—to 50%. Imagine that you are in a same-sex relationship and your age-matched social network members—the people likely to be your associates, coworkers, neighbors—generally oppose your lifestyle. That may predispose one to feel stress. This could explain the slightly higher level of stress reported by same-sex couples in the authors' study. It is possible that analyses would have yielded more significant differences in levels of stress if generation or age had been carefully examined.

To further highlight generational differences, and thus contextual differences, let us compare Millennials to the Silent Generation. The Silent Generation (parents of the baby boomers) was born around 1928–1945, which means that those individuals are about 70–87 years old today; whereas, the Millennials were born around 1981–1993, which means that those individuals are about 22–34 years old today (Pew Research Center, 2011). These two groups are, indeed, "fixed in qualitatively different subjective areas" (p. 356), and their attitudes/beliefs serve as evidence of that (Scott, 2000). For example, in 2011, 59% of the Millennials, compared to only 33% of the Silent Generation, favored allowing same-sex couples the opportunity to legally wed (Pew Research Center, 2012). Generation Xers tend to "accept … sexual diversity as facts of life" (Foley, 2000a, p. 31, 2000b). As stated earlier, this context may help provide insight as to why the gay and lesbian study participants reported slightly higher levels of stress.

Singlehood

Another topic that stood out to me in the chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving" is how the unmarried or singles were discussed in the literature review. Umberson and Kroeger state that "Compared to the unmarried, the married report better self-assessed health, have lower rates of chronic illness, … are more likely to … live longer"

(p.). Numerous researchers have argued that marriage benefits health. We need to be cautious when espousing statements such as this. Marriages with high levels of conflict and anger are definitely not health-promoting. Marriage can be a source of well-being, but it can also be a source of strain. The authors even acknowledge that it is the quality of marriage, not the state of being married per se that affects health. While the focus for Umberson and Kroeger was on couples, I wonder how health may be effected by the quality of singlehood. It would be helpful to begin by looking at the types of singles.

Few studies acknowledge the various types of unmarrieds or singles. There is a great deal of variance between the four major types of singles (Stein, 1976, 1981): (a) voluntary temporary singles, (b) voluntary stable singles, (c) involuntary temporary singles, and (d) involuntary stable singles.

- *Voluntary temporary* singles are composed of individuals who are delaying marriage, many of whom are doing so in order to complete college and begin their careers. In all likelihood, this group will eventually marry.
- *Voluntary stable* singles are composed of individuals who want to be single for a long time—possibly for life. They may cohabit or live alone.
- *Involuntary temporary* singles are composed of individuals who would like to have a marital partner but have been unable to find one; thus, marriage is delayed.
- *Involuntary stable* singles are composed of individuals who would like to be married but are not for various reasons. These individuals may face singlehood for life, although against their wishes.

If we compare the groups who are voluntarily single to the groups who are involuntarily single, it is likely that those who are in an involuntary situation would report feeling more stress overall and more stress-related illnesses. Again, I emphasize the importance of considering context.

Longevity of Married Couples

As reported by Umberson and Kroeger, numerous studies suggest that the married have better self-reported health than the single, divorced, or widowed (Lindstrom, 2009; Rohrer, Bernard, Zhang, Rasmussen, & Woroncow, 2008). In addition, marriage is associated with lower risk of mortality (Johnson, Backlund, Sorlie, & Loveless, 2000; Liu, 2009). However, little is known about the protective effects of marriage on different levels of health (ranging from excellent to poor). An article written by Hui Zheng and Patricia Thomas (2013), for the *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* caught my attention not too long ago.

Zheng and Thomas plotted the log–hazard ratios of mortality on marital status by levels of self-reported health using data from the National Health Interview Survey. Findings indicate that, compared to those who are unmarried, mortality is lower for the married experiencing excellent health, but the gap between marrieds and unmar-

rieds shrinks as health worsens. Although not a significant finding, it is interesting to note that at the level of poor health, married people have a slightly higher risk of dying than the *widowed and separated*.

Findings by Zeng and Thomas (2013) suggest that the benefit of being married shrinks with declining self-reported health and vanishes at the level of poor health. "In other words, the protective effect of marriage from death decreases with deteriorating health" (p. 135). (Their findings were consistent when objective health measures were used.) This means that marriage might be more important for disease prevention, but when it comes to severe health problems or even recovery from illnesses, marriage might not be that helpful. Types of illness and severity of illness ought to be considered; however, few studies do that.

Diversity

Racial/ethnic diversity, an important element of context, was not considered in the analysis by Umberson and Kroeger (in chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving"). The health disparities literature suggests that African Americans experience poorer health than other racial/ethnic groups (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014; Williams, 2000); yet, the link between marriage and health is rarely explored among this population. My research focuses on marriage using a sample of 700 African American newlywed couples (a project funded by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development). I found that wives experiencing issues specific to women's health at Time 1 were negatively associated with husbands' (not wives') marital satisfaction a year later at Time 2 (Bryant, Bryant, & Wickrama, 2009). Not only is the marriage–health link rarely explored among African Americans, but exploring women's health issues, particularly within the context of marriage among this population, is unfortunately almost never done. Our findings, using a sample of African Americans, suggest that *type* of illness might matter. Sometimes, that is overlooked when researchers examine the marriage–health link.

Going Beyond the Marriage–Health Link

Umberson and Kroeger's (in chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving") discussion goes beyond the marriage–health link. They are tackling an issue that many researchers and laypersons have pondered for decades—the gendered patterns of marriage. They even pose the question, "Why would marriage benefit men and women differently?" (p.) One of my favorite lines from Cherlin's classic article, *The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage*, is "… the breakdown of the old rules of a gendered institution such as marriage could lead to the creation of a more egalitarian relationship

between wives and husbands" (Cherlin, 2004, p. 848). Other researchers have gone even further (but remain consistent with Cherlin) and argue that "Gender-typed expectations in marriage may be shifting toward a context where both men and women expect that their partner will be nurturing and will contribute to the overall emotional functioning of the relationship" (Boerner, Boerner, Jopp, Carr, Sosinsky, & Kim, 2014, p. 10; See also Sullivan, 2006). Perhaps Umberson and Kroeger's statement that "… women seem to be more attuned to and feel more responsible for the well-being of others…" (p.), is no longer *en vogue*. Not all women are nurturing or caring. Reczek's (2012) findings clearly made that point. Ironically, Reczek was using data from Umberson's NIA grant, a sample that consisted of both same-sex and different-sex unions with partners in their 40s and 50s. The study revealed that there were women in same-sex and different-sex relationships who believed that health is a personal responsibility, and therefore, felt that it was not their responsibility to ensure that their partners avoided risky health behaviors. For example, one wife said about her husband, "I'm not his mother" (Reczek, 2012, p. 1118). That wife refused to monitor her husband's food choices even when she knew he was making poor choices; instead, she let him eat what he wanted to eat.

Reczek's (2012) qualitative approach of presenting direct quotes from study participants allows readers to better understand context—the context of the relationship. Of course, quantitative approaches can also include context. Umberson and Kroeger assessed interpersonal stress (as I mentioned earlier) by asking study the participants how much tension or conflict they had with various groups—parent(s), children/stepchildren, other relatives, friends, coworkers, acquaintances, and others (not including spouse). It would have been very helpful to know how much stress or strain was experienced in each of those potential sources. For example, how much stress did the women and men in same-sex and different-sex relationships report was from tension or conflict they had with parent(s) versus children/stepchildren, versus other relatives, versus friends, versus coworkers, acquaintances, and others? Also, which sources of stress were most strongly linked to providing or receiving emotion work? How many of the couples had children? How old were the children? Did the children live with the couples? Such information would have provided context.

Conclusion

The more I delved into Umberson and Kroeger (in chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving"), the more questions I found myself asking. Interestingly, in several instances, as I read I found myself playing the role of devil's advocate—hence—my reference to Zheng and Thomas (2013) who suggested looking more carefully at the marriage-health link and Reczek (2012) who suggested that at least some women in same-sex and different-sex unions believe that health is a personal responsibility. That sounds like breaking down traditional gender roles. Given the unique sample with which

Umberson and Kroeger are working, they have an opportunity to rigorously test notions of gender roles and how gender roles contribute to or perhaps interact with emotion work.

I look forward to reading more of their work. As their title so aptly states, *The Future is Arriving* and their research team is on course to help forge the way. As they forge the way, context can serve as their guide. I admit that omitting context makes analyses easier, but simplifying the complex actually complicates our findings. It can cause us to miss nuanced differences between partners or couples, and those nuanced differences may improve our understanding of the gendered link between marriage and health.

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Intersectionality: An Approach to the Study of Gender, Marriage, and Health in Context

Karen D. Lincoln

The rate of marriage overall has declined in the past few decades. In past years, the decline in marriage among African Americans has been the most precipitous and the focus of many studies (e.g., Cherlin, 2009; Harknett & McLanahan, 2004; Raley & Bumpass, 2003; Seltzer, 2000; Smock, 2000). However, findings from more recent studies report that the number of American adults who have never married is at a historic high. In 2012, 20% of adults, age 25 years and older had never been married (Wang & Parker, 2014), compared to 9% in 1960. The precipitous rise in the number of never-married adults has been attributed to many of the same factors to which declining rates among African Americans are attributed, namely, increased rates of cohabitation, economic circumstances, changing demographics, and shifting societal attitudes about alternative forms of marriage and child-rearing outside of marriage. While the rates of never-married African Americans remain high, the rates for other racial and ethnic groups are increasing. In 2012, 36% of African Americans age 25 years and older had never been married, up from 9% in 1960. For whites, the rate had doubled from 8% in 1960 to 16% in 2012. Among Hispanics, the rates have doubled since 1980 (12% vs. 26%), and for Asian Americans, the rate has increased from 13% in 1980 to 19% in 2012 (Wang & Parker, 2014).

Changes in marriage rates across racial and ethnic groups over time provide important information about factors that might explain more recent trends in marriage. Elliott, Krivickas, Brault, and Kreider (2012) noted that African American men and women were married in greater proportions than white men and women until 1960 for men and 1970 for women. These changes have been explained by structural and cultural factors—including changes in legislation that provide incentives and disincentives to marry, changes in the economy and workforce issues, acceptance of alternative forms of marriage, interracial relationships, access to education and social mobility, incarceration, and drug policies—all factors that influence marital dynamics as well as whether one decides to or is able to marry.

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Despite declines in marriage rates overall and the corresponding rise in the number of never-married adults, studies of the association between marriage and health remain an important area of inquiry because of the salutary effect of marriage on health outcomes. Although the health benefits of marriage are not as large as they have been in previous years, and the benefit is more significant for men, research findings still indicate that overall, those who are married have better health than those who are not married. However, additional studies are needed to accommodate the shifts in marriage patterns over the years and how these shifts might result in differential health outcomes. For example, how might marriage benefit those who have the option to marry but choose to delay marriage? How might marriage affect the health of those who decide to marry due to the removal of cultural or structural barriers? How might health outcomes differ between these two groups, if at all? What are the within-group differences and what are the factors that account for these potential differences? Answers to these questions require a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between marriage and health; one that considers heterogeneity within and between groups.

The increase in marriage among same-sex couples is another example of how cultural and structural changes impact marriage. Shifts in attitudes about same-sex marriage and policies that support and legally recognize same-sex marriage have led to the rise in the rates of marriage among lesbian and gay couples. According to the US Census Bureau, the number of same-sex households grew from 358,390 in 2000 to 646,464 in 2010. Of these households, approximately 131,729 same-sex couples were married (DeSilver, 2013). Undoubtedly these numbers will increase as more states adopt laws that support marriage for same-sex couples. In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage following a ruling by the state's highest court. To date, same-sex marriage is legal (or about to be legal) in 37 states and the District of Columbia. Still, 15 states have constitutional amendments banning gay marriage.

Same-sex marriage presents a unique opportunity to examine the role of gender (as a heterogeneous social construct) and gendered marital dynamics that go beyond using biology as a proxy for gender. Studies that examine how gendered marital dynamics influence health are a necessary extension of current studies of marriage and health. "The inclusion of same-sex couples in research on gendered marital dynamics and health means that we can begin to consider these gendered processes in a more nuanced way than has been possible with studies focused solely on different-sex couples," claim Umberson and Kroeger (Chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving", p. 207). In their study, they consider the experience of married women and men in two different types of unions—different-sex and same-sex. In doing so, their findings reveal the various dynamics that can occur within these unions, and how health is ultimately affected depending on whether the spouse is of a different sex or of the same sex. These dynamics are informed by sex *and* gender, with gendered patterns of interaction being measured. This measurement was facilitated by the inclusion of both different-sex and same-sex couples in the sample. Thus, the interactions between the couples could be determined by sex or gender; by *sex*

if findings did not differ among males or females, or by *gender* if findings differed among heterosexual and homosexual males or among heterosexual and homosexual females. Findings from this study contribute to the extant literature on marriage and health by revealing the complexity of gender effects on marriage and health that would have otherwise been obscured by simply using *sex* as a proxy for *gender* or biology as a descriptor for a social construct that is informed by a cultural context.

Changing Gender Roles

Studies that disentangle sex from gender are a logical next step when examining the influence of gender on the association between marriage and health. The growing number of exceptions to previously defined gendered roles will undoubtedly impact gender effects on health in new and important ways. For instance, the number of stay-at-home fathers has increased from 1.1 million in 1989 to 2 million in 2012 (Livingston, 2014), due in part to high unemployment rates around the time of the Great Recession. Roughly a quarter of stay-at-home fathers (23 %) were home mainly because they could not find a job. The greatest percentage of stay-at-home fathers (35 %) were at home due to illness or disability. In addition to the influence of gender and gender roles on marital quality and health, it is also important to consider the *reason* why fathers have opted to remain at home full-time with their children while their spouse is employed outside of the home. Previous studies of stay-at-home fathers have primarily focused on attitudes toward stay-at-home fathers (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2005; Bridges, Etaugh, & Barnes-Farrell, 2002; Shpancer et al., 2009), marital satisfaction (Zimmerman, 2000), and the psychological well-being of the father (e.g., Rochlen, Suizzo, McKelley, & Scaringi, 2008). Moreover, these studies were either qualitative (Rochlen et al., 2008; Zimmerman, 2000), used convenience samples (e.g., public parks, college students), or typically did not examine the health of both parents. There is also a dearth of studies of stay-at-home parents among same-sex married couples. Given that the effect of gender on marital dynamics and health can take on a different meaning as gender roles become more flexible, additional studies in this area are needed.

The increase in numbers of women in the armed forces is another example of how gender roles have changed over time. The roles for women in the armed forces have expanded since 1973—when women accounted for less than 1 % of the armed forces. Today, women account for 15–20 % of all active and reserve members (Smith & Smith, 2013). More than 40 % of these women have children and 46 % are married. The increase of women in the armed forces over the years dates back to 1973 when the military services had difficulty recruiting and retaining enough qualified males, thereby turning attention to recruiting women. In addition, the movement for equal rights for women, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, led to demands for equal opportunity in all fields, including national defense. The increase in the number of stay-at-home fathers and women in the armed forces are examples of how gender roles are influenced by larger macro forces that instigate, encourage, support, and

reinforce change. Thus, as the social and political economy changes, studies of marriage and health should reflect those changes and be guided by a conceptual or theoretical framework that can accommodate such flexibility and complexity.

Intersectionality and Studies of Marriage and Health

Intersectionality is one potential framework that might be useful for understanding how social, cultural, and political factors impact gendered dynamics within the context of marriage. Intersectionality is the study of intersections between forms or systems of oppression, domination, or discrimination (Crenshaw, 1989). More specifically, this framework highlights the various roles that structural and political factors, racism, sexism, homophobia, race, class, and gender have in shaping the experience of individuals within the context of a marital relationship. Thus, it would be difficult to understand the experience of an African American lesbian without considering how her race, gender, socioeconomic position, and sexual orientation interact and frequently reinforce each other within the context of a larger political, economic, and social structure. Consequently, within studies of marriage and health, an understanding of the nuances of marital dynamics would require an examination of how biology, cultural, social, and structural factors and other axes of identity interact on multiple and often simultaneous levels, to influence: (1) how one's perspective about oneself is shaped, (2) how one relates to others, (3) how others relate to them, (4) differential exposure, vulnerability, and experiences of stress as a result of one's multiple statuses and identities, (5) the dynamics between partners of the same-sex, different-sex, same race, different race, etc., and (5) how these factors ultimately impact health outcomes.

With the intersection of race, class, gender, and other identities, new experiences emerge that potentially undermine the benefits of being a member of a high-status group. For example, on many health indices, highly educated African Americans fare no better than whites with the same or lower levels of education. This is the case for infant mortality (Currie, 2011), homicide and hypertension (Jackson & Williams, 2006), obesity (Coogan, Wise, Cozier, Palmer, & Rosenberg, 2012), and depression (Sturgis, 2008). Not only is high status, as indexed by education, income, and occupation, not protective for the health of African Americans in these instances, it can be detrimental. For example, white women who did not complete high school have a lower infant mortality rate than black college graduates, and the black–white ratio for infant mortality increases with level of education, such that black college graduates have an infant mortality rate that is 2.7 times the rate of their white counterparts (Williams, 2002). To understand these paradoxical findings, one must consider the interaction and the intersection of race, class, gender, and other statuses and the differential effect of these interactions on stress exposure and health outcomes.

Similarly, to understand health outcomes within the context of marriage, it is also important to consider how multiple statuses intersect to influence stress exposure—

including the type of stress—and marital dynamics. Since social stressors are not equally distributed across individuals, but instead are determined by one's position in the social structure, one can see how minority status—as determined by race, ethnicity, gender, income, education, or sexual orientation—might predispose some individuals to certain stress exposures that negatively impact marital dynamics and ultimately health outcomes. In this case, it might be important to consider whether marriage or marital quality can effectively buffer the deleterious effects of social stressors on health outcomes.

One study examined the impact of financial strain and racial discrimination on mental health among married African American couples (Lincoln & Chae, 2010). More specifically, this study examined how stress experienced outside of the home (as well as the interaction between two types of stressors) was associated with marital satisfaction and psychological distress. Findings indicated that marital satisfaction was a mitigating factor in the association between stress and psychological distress, but it was less effective for those who reported experiencing high levels of stress compared to those who experienced low levels of stress. Findings also indicated that the effect of racial discrimination on psychological distress was worse for those who reported experiencing high levels of financial strain compared to those who reported experiencing low levels of financial strain.

What these findings suggest is that within the context of stress, marital satisfaction can be important for the health and well-being of African American married couples; thus the importance of marital quality (vs. marriage per se) and why we should continue to identify the mechanisms that promote health within the context of marriage. However, what is particularly interesting about the findings from this study is that they suggest that marriage, marital quality, or marital satisfaction might be less protective for those who experience certain types and certain levels of stress.

Sexual Minorities and Stress

Sexual minorities experience a unique set of stressors that have implications for health. Empirical studies indicate that prejudice and stigma directed toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals bring about unique stressors that cause adverse outcomes, including mental health disorders (Meyer, 2003). Stigma, microaggressions, discrimination, concerns related to safety (Meyer, Ouellette, & McFarlane, 2011), and concealment (Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, Visscher, & Fahey, 1996) are types of social stressors that result in poor health outcomes for this population. However, what has yet to be investigated are how these types of stressors influence marital dynamics between same-sex couples and how the effects of these stressors might vary depending on other social statuses, such as race, gender, and socioeconomic position.

One study that provides some insight into this question used American Community Survey data to compare demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 27,960 Asian and Pacific Islander, Latino, African American, American Indian and

Alaska Native, and white individuals in same-sex couples in the USA (Kastanis & Wilson, 2014). Compared to different-sex couples, racial and ethnic minorities in same-sex couples were 2.2 times more likely to partner with individuals of another race or ethnicity. Moreover, women in same-sex couples were much more likely to report military service than those in different-sex couples, with American Indian and Alaska Natives and African American women being most likely (15% and 9%, respectively) to have served in the military. Health insurance rates were generally lower for individuals in same-sex couples compared to their counterparts in different-sex relationships. Findings also indicated that racial and ethnic minority individuals in same-sex couples were more likely to have children compared to white individuals in same-sex couples, and that African American, Latino, and American Indian and Alaska Native respondents had lower incomes, lower college completion rates, and higher unemployment rates than white and Asian and Pacific Islander respondents.

Findings from this study highlight the importance of considering race and ethnicity in studies of gender, marriage, and health among same-sex couples, as these factors played unique and significant roles with respect to socioeconomic status, neighborhood contexts, employment status, parental status, health care access, and other factors that influence stress exposure (including military sexual trauma), marital dynamics, and health outcomes. The way in which these demographic and social categories interact will likely differ by the outcome under consideration (for example, mental health, marital satisfaction, and specific chronic health conditions), but nonetheless highlight the need for research using frameworks that can accommodate the intersections of multiple forms of oppression and cultural systems in studies of marriage and health among different-sex and same-sex couples.

Conclusion

The long legacy of studies of marriage and health will continue as society continues to change. Shifting marriage rates and changing gender roles will continue to have important influences on marital dynamics and health outcomes. It might also be important to increase knowledge about health outcomes among the unmarried, since the rates among the unmarried are increasing significantly across all racial and ethnic groups. Given shifts in marriage patterns over time, it is important to include the entire spectrum of long-term relationships—including marriage, cohabitation, and long-term involvements among those who do not reside in the same household—when examining gendered dynamics and health. Such studies will allow for flexibility as determined by relationship patterns, types, and partners while also producing new knowledge about factors that promote health within the context of marital and nonmarital unions. Regardless of the type of union, we are challenged to consider the context in which people experience these unions; this includes the impact of structural and cultural factors, as well as race, ethnicity, immigration status, gender, socioeconomic position, age, parental status, neighborhood factors, and

stress exposure, just to name a few. It is when we situate gendered dynamics within a larger and more comprehensive framework that we will better understand those factors that promote physical health, mental health, and healthy relationships.

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Part V
The Future of Research on Couple Relationships

Are We There Yet? Gender and Equality in Couple Relationships

Cadhla McDonnell and Rose Wesche

Introduction

In *The Future of Marriage*, Jessie Bernard (1972) wrote that there are two marriages: "his" marriage and "her" marriage. What concerned Bernard was not only that individual wives and their husbands understood their marriages differently but also that women as a group did not derive as many benefits from marriage as did men. In order for the institution of marriage to survive, Bernard asserted, relationships would have to change to better support the well-being of women.

The 2014 Penn State Annual Symposium on Family Issues sought to illuminate how marriage and couple relationships in the USA have changed and what the implications of those changes might be for men and women, their families, and society as a whole. In this concluding chapter, we step back and consider the many perspectives and the range of evidence presented during the symposium and throughout this volume, and we address some of the questions that were at the heart of the discussion: How have marriage and couple relationships changed? Do they still benefit men more than women? What changes are needed for both men *and* women to benefit equally from couple relationships?

Below, we evaluate why, for whom, and how much marriage has changed. First, we examine the factors that have driven change in couple relationships and in their larger family contexts. Next, we reflect on how those changes have affected men and women as individuals, workers, partners, and parents and how these effects differ by race, class, and sexual identity. We find that, on the whole, marriage has improved for women, though it remains a gendered institution. For many women—

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and indeed many men—the solutions that the gender revolution promised have not materialized. We find that marriage has become yet another social structure that works well for those with resources, but less so for those without. Finally, we consider what needs to happen to make marriage and couple relationships better for men and women of all backgrounds, and we contemplate what directions future research on marriage and couple relationships might take toward this end.

Historical Changes in Marriage and Couple Relationships

The changes in family structures that have taken place in the 40 years since Jessie Bernard wrote *The Future of Marriage* are part of a greater shift in family structures that began with the industrial revolution. This volume begins with Ruggles's explanation of how the corporate family, in which multiple generations lived and worked together under the leadership of a legally empowered patriarch, was replaced by the male-breadwinner family, in which the husband earns the family income and the wife runs the home (see in chapter "Marriage, Family Systems, and Economic Opportunity in the USA Since 1850"). Although this structure still exists in the USA, it has been largely replaced by the single-parent family and the dual-income family, in which both spouses work outside the home for pay. The rise of dual-income and single-parent family structures is inextricably linked with the increasing rights and freedoms of women within marriage as well as in educational institutions and the labor market.

The move toward women's labor force participation was followed by an increase in income inequality and a decline in the economic fortunes of working-class men. The era of the family wage—when one salary was expected to support a family—is gone (Fraser, 1994). It has become increasingly difficult for young men, especially those without a college education, to obtain the kind of stable and well-paying employment that their fathers and grandfathers took for granted (see in chapter "Marriage, Family Systems, and Economic Opportunity in the USA Since 1850").

The impact of these two social changes—more egalitarian gender norms and growing economic insecurity—on the quality and stability of marriage and couple relationships is complex, and it crops up again and again throughout this volume. These changes are tied to shifts in both the necessity and timing of marriage, and together seem to be changing the ways in which young couples perceive marriage. Marriage is no longer conceptualized as a milestone on the journey toward economic independence, but rather as a "capstone"—a destination to be reached only after financial stability has been achieved (Cherlin, 2010). For the poor who have much less hope of achieving financial stability, marriage has become a desirable but often elusive accomplishment (Edin & Kefalas, 2011), and romantic relationships, cohabitation, and child-rearing increasingly take place outside marriage. Further, when unions are formed, whether they are cohabiting or marital, they often end in separation or divorce (McLanahan, 2004). These breakups are often followed by re-partnering, perhaps with multiple sets of children in tow. Such trends have led to new family forms and structures such as blended families, couples living apart

together, and multi-partner fertility. Yet despite this apparent volatility in couple relationships, marriage remains a cherished social institution in the USA. High rates of marriage, divorce, and re-partnering—higher than in any other developed country—are the result of a deep respect for marriage, combined with a strong commitment to individualism and individual happiness (Cherlin, 2010).

Although changes in marriage and the family have touched all parts of US society, the nature and consequences of those changes vary with race/ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation. Long-standing racial and ethnic differences in family structure and women's labor-force participation continue to influence racial/ethnic differences in marriage and family structures today. Further, changes in the understanding of marriage have extended to a reconceptualization of who should and should not be able to marry, resulting in the legalization of same-sex marriage and the increasing acceptance of same-sex parent families. Whereas the growing instability of couple relationships among the poor has dire consequences for their families (see in chapter "Marriage, Family Systems, and Economic Opportunity in the USA Since 1850"), later age at marriage and greater financial security have allowed middle-class couples to create and maintain more stable unions, leading to what Coontz terms a "restabilization of living arrangements" for them and their children (see in chapter "Gender Equality and Economic Inequality: Impact on Marriage).

Changing Roles

The decline of the male-breadwinner family and the rise of women's labor force participation have led to a convergence of men's and women's roles as partners, parents, and workers. As women have increasingly taken on the role of provider, they have decreased their time spent on domestic work, and men have taken on a relatively larger share of the responsibilities at home. Although income-earning and home-making roles are now distributed more evenly between men and women, rising inequality and the increasing diversity of family structures mean that there remains great variation in the number, types, and quality of roles that individuals undertake. Taking on multiple roles is beneficial for some men and women, but for others, economic and cultural pressures make balancing those roles a challenge.

Men and Women as Workers

Women's increasing involvement in the labor force has had both positive and negative implications for men's and women's well-being, depending on their family structure and the social contexts they inhabit. Hyde (see in chapter "Women, Men, Work, and Family: Expansionist Theory Updated") reviews the research on multiple roles and work–family conflict and finds strong evidence in support of expansionist theory which posits that multiple roles can have positive implications for

physical, mental, and relationship health. Although women's assumption of the additional roles of worker and provider has been beneficial for some women and their families—particularly those who are highly educated and middle class—for others it has only exacerbated competing work and family stresses. Inflexible work hours, poor-quality or prohibitively expensive childcare, low-status jobs, single parenthood, and cultural norms around work and family among other factors make finding and maintaining a balance between work and family difficult and stressful for many men and women (Byron, 2005).

Men and Women as Parents

The role of parent remains the most different for men and women and the one that most strongly perpetuates gender differences in couple relationships. Despite the increasing similarity of men's and women's roles both within and outside of the family, sharp differences remain both in the amount of time that men and women devote to parenting (see in chapter "Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?") and in the popular notions of what makes an ideal mother or father (Hodges & Park, 2013).

Both men and women prioritize the role of parent. Despite the increasing complexity and diversity of the roles that parents undertake, the time that both fathers and mothers spend on parenting has increased (Bianchi, 2000; see in chapters "Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?"; "Overlooked Inequalities: Employment, Parenting, and Partnering for Men in Families"). Since Jessie Bernard wrote *The Future of Marriage*, mothers have substantially increased the amount of time they spend on developmental childcare, while the amount of time spent on routine childcare has remained stable. Over the same period, fathers have increased the time they spend both in routine daily childcare and in developmental childcare (Sayer, see in chapter "Trends in Women's and Men's Time Use, 1965–2012: Back to the Future?"). Nevertheless, as Sayer points out, mothers continue to be the primary caregivers, spending substantially more time in parenting than men.

The reality that mothers continue to be primary caregivers while fathers take on a secondary role, is reflected in and perpetuated by popular ideals of mothering and fathering. The ethos of intensive mothering, which demands that mothers be involved in all aspects of their children's lives, remains dominant in the USA (Vincent, 2010; Hays, 1998). Meanwhile, portrayals of fathers in the media, in parenting resources, and in advertising reveal that the father's role is primarily understood as that of mother's helper rather than as her equal (Wall & Arnold, 2007; Sunderland, 2006; Kaufman, 1999). Men and women appear to internalize these disparate ideals. The transition to parenthood causes both men and women to turn away from egalitarianism and toward more traditional gender-role attitudes and behaviors (Katz-Wise, Priess, & Hyde, 2010). As long as mothers continue to be considered as the primary parents—with fathers as their helpers—the role of parent will be more demanding for mothers than for fathers, and balancing work and family will continue to be more difficult for women than for men.

If parenting is different for men and women, do men and women also parent differently? Whether and why this may be the case is explored in several chapters of this volume (see in chapters "Effect of Father Engagement on Child Behaviors"; "Why do Fathers Matter for Children's Development?"; "Re-envisioning Why Fathers Matter Beyond the Gender Binary: A Case for Gay Fathers"). Mincy and colleagues show that fathers' engagement in early and middle childhood can reduce social-emotional problems later on, though this effect is often dependent on mothers' engagement. Although it is clear that fathers' involvement is beneficial for children, it is far from clear how a father's contribution is different than a mother's or *why* it matters for children (see in chapter "Why do Fathers Matter for Children's Development?"). In order to better understand whether, how, and under what circumstances men's parenting differs from women's, Reczek suggests applying a gender relations perspective to the study of parenting. To this end, studying the parenting behavior of same-sex parents, transgender parents, and other non-heteronormative parents may illuminate the ways in which parenting and gender intersect (see in chapter "Re-envisioning Why Fathers Matter Beyond the Gender Binary: A Case for Gay Fathers").

Men and Women as Partners

In addition to balancing work and parenting roles, men and women in couple relationships also perform the role of partner. Relationship quality and relationship dynamics can enhance or undermine individuals' emotional well-being and physical health (see chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving"). Having a supportive partnership can help couples succeed at work, effectively balance work and family demands, and improve physical health; an unsupportive partnership can have the opposite effects (Barnett & Marshall, 1992; Walen & Lachman, 2000; Zimmerman, Haddock, Current, & Ziemba, 2003). Although emotional support is more important for women's health than for men's, women appear to receive less emotional support from their partners during stressful times (see chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving"). This may result from cultural expectations that women will be supportive and nurturing, whereas men will be less emotionally supportive and in greater need of health monitoring (Peplau, 1983; Umberson, 1992).

Balancing Roles

Many couples in their prime family-building years wish to create egalitarian relationships in which both partners work outside the home and share homemaking and childcare duties equitably. However, combining the roles of worker, partner, and parent—not to mention all the other roles that men and women undertake as family

members, community members, and friends—remains a challenge. Although much of the popular discussion around combining work and family focuses on role conflict experienced by women—especially mothers—the stresses associated with combining roles have also become more salient for men. Men increasingly want full involvement in the home and at work—they, too, "want it all" (see chapter "Overlooked Inequalities: Employment, Parenting, and Partnering for Men in Families"). However, there are many hurdles to achieving a balance of work and family roles. Practical constraints interact with cultural norms to perpetuate gender differences in how couples perform the key roles of worker, parent, and partner.

Combining two paid jobs with the demands of rearing young children can be extremely challenging for couples, regardless of race/ethnicity, class, marital status, or sexual orientation. When challenges become too great, many couples choose to revert to a modified breadwinner–homemaker arrangement, if only temporarily (see chapter "Expansionist Theory Expanded: Integrating Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Gender, Work, and Family Change"). The tendency towards specialization is not driven entirely by gender-role attitudes. Gerson found that, in a substantial minority of opposite-sex partner families, it was the male partner who set aside career for family, and there is also a tendency towards specialization among same-sex couples with children (see chapter "Women, Men, Work and Family: Action in the Interactions"). In part, specialization may be driven by differences in partners' career demands or by personal preferences around work and family roles. However, the fact that it is usually the female partner in opposite-sex couples who gives up or cuts back on her job to accommodate the demands of child-rearing both reflects and perpetuates the continued influence of traditional gender roles and attitudes.

Implications for Policy and Research

Although marriage remains dear in the USA , it is increasingly clear that it is an institution that works better for some than it does for others. Instituting policies to improve the economic fortunes of young men and women, such as supports for education and creating new jobs, will allow them to reach the economic stability that is a precursor to marriage and in turn supports marital stability.

In addition to making marriage an attainable goal for those who wish to pursue it, policy must work to improve the quality and stability of these unions. Currently, the USA lags behind other developed nations in supporting work–family balance (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). Bringing work–family policies in the USA into line with those seen elsewhere would go far towards alleviating the stresses that many Americans experience when work and family roles conflict. Kathleen Gerson's work demonstrates that what prevents couples from creating egalitarian relationships is not a lack of desire to combine work and family in a fair and balanced way, but rather a lack of opportunity (see chapter "Expansionist Theory Expanded: Integrating Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Gender, Work, and Family Change"). The introduction of paid maternity, paternity, and parental leaves for all

workers, along with subsidized, high-quality childcare and preschool, would ease the caregiving burden and enable both parents to continue to work while their children are young. Supporting men's involvement in the family is every bit as important as supporting women's labor-force participation. Men must take on a greater portion of the parenting if the burden of balancing work and family is to be evenly distributed between men and women. For this reason, couples should be encouraged to share parental leave and new policies should continue to be aimed at both parents. Policies that regulate work schedules for part-time and wage workers, limit work hours for salaried employees, and promote flexible scheduling would further enable many fathers to take on more childcare responsibilities. In order to increase father involvement, it is also necessary that women move beyond the ideology of intensive mothering. When possible, women must try to relinquish their position as the primary parent and give up the notion that "only a mother will do." Increasing father involvement may, in turn, lead to greater union stability for parents (Hohmann-Marriott, 2009; Kalmijn, 1999).

From a research perspective, it is important to understand why, when, and for whom marriage is beneficial. The increasing diversity of roles and family structures and the diversity of the US population create challenges for researchers who want to understand how gender shapes couple relationships (see chapter "Simplifying the Complex Complicates Our Findings: Understanding Marriage, Singlehood, and Health"). It also gives researchers the opportunity to compare across groups in order to better understand how gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, parental status, and other characteristics, interact to determine the quality and stability of couple relationships, and how they impact men's, women's, and children's well-being. An example of this approach is Umberson and Kroger's work examining dyadic processes in both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, which begin to disentangle the effects of being a married man from the effects of being married to a woman and the effects of being a married woman from the effects of being married to a man (see chapter "Gender, Marriage, and Health for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples: The Future Keeps Arriving").

In order to better understand why and how gender shapes couple relationships, including in different ways across time and place, we suggest adopting intersectional, life course, and lifespan approaches. Race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, immigrant status, and family structure all influence the ways couples interact and divide roles (Cheadle & Amato, 2011). These factors also interact with one another to inform individuals' experiences (see in chapter "Intersectionality: An Approach to the Study of Gender, Marriage and Health in Context"). An intersectional approach to studying work and family—which acknowledges the increasing complexity of family structures, as well as the importance of power and inequality in shaping outcomes—will enable researchers to better understand which factors matter for balancing multiple roles, and how some characteristics and circumstances help couples successfully balance work and family whereas others hinder that balance.

The interplay between gender and couple relationships varies not only according to individuals' characteristics but also across stages in the life cycle. Individuals' roles as partners, parents, and workers are not static, and neither are their attempts to balance those roles. In order to understand how individuals' multiple roles and

their interrelations change over time, it will be useful to incorporate life course and lifespan perspectives. These approaches both recognize that the human experience is lifelong, dynamic, and contextual, and that differential trajectories and transitions into and out of roles are important focus of study.

Conclusion

In *The Future of Marriage*, Jessie Bernard made two key assertions: that men's experiences in marriage were both different and more beneficial than those of women, and that marriage must improve for women if it was to thrive. Since the book's publication in 1972, the nature of marriage and couple relationships has changed substantially. The notion that men benefit more from relationships than women is called into question by the increasing similarity in the roles that men and women perform. Yet, despite this increasing similarity, women are still considered as the primary parents, perform the lion's share of the housework and childcare, are more likely to sacrifice career for family, experience less leisure time than men, and receive less emotional support from their spouses. These enduring differences lead us to conclude that gender still plays a central role in determining who benefits from couple relationships.

Socioeconomic status has come to play an equally important role in the equation linking marriage and individual well-being. Highly educated, middle-class women have overwhelmingly benefited from changes in marriage and couple relationships. They enjoy more egalitarian relationships, more autonomy, and better health outcomes than in the past. On the whole, middle-class men are also doing well. For men and women on the other end of the education and income distributions, however, marriage has become increasingly unattainable, and couple relationships have become increasingly unstable.

Looking back at Jessie Bernard's analysis after 40 years, we see that marriage and couple relationships have come a long way, but also that much more needs to be done before men and women achieve the benefits they and their children need for full and healthy lives. What holds women back now is not the same as what held women back in 1972. Ideals *have* changed; both men and women increasingly want to balance work and family roles in ways that are enriching, fulfilling, and sustainable for them and their families. What we need now are policies and structures that allow men and women—regardless of their circumstances—to achieve the balance and stability they seek.

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