Eran Halperin
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The Social Psychology of Intractable Conflicts

Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal, Volume I

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The scope of threats to human security at the dawn of the 21st century is daunting. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, failed states, ideological struggles, growing resource scarcities, disparities in wealth and health, globalizing trends, violations of human rights, and the continued use of force to advance individual, group and national interests, are all complex problems. At the same time, we are witnessing countervailing trends in the growing recognition and endorsement of nonviolent means of resolving differences, the importance of reconciliation processes in human relations, the promotion of cultures of peace, and the building of societal structures and global institutions that promote peace, human rights and environmental sustainability. During the past 20 years, peace psychology has emerged as a specialty in psychology with its own knowledge base, perspectives, concepts, and preferred methodologies to grapple with threats to human security and seize opportunities to promote human well-being. In regard to the problem of violence, peace psychology scholars and activists place human psychology and its links to other disciplines at the center of their efforts to prevent and mitigate episodes of violence and structural forms of violence. In addition to reducing violence, peace psychologists seek to develop theory and practices that promote relational harmony across levels (from interpersonal relations to global networks) and equitable human well-being. The Peace Psychology Book Series recognizes that the emerging and multi-faceted problems of human security challenge us as scholars and activists to develop psychologically-informed theory that will deepen our understanding of the major threats to human security, and create practices that will help us address some of the most urgent and profound issues that bear on human well being and survival in the 21st century.

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Preface

Intractable intergroup conflicts rage around the world and pose threats to the well-being and security of individuals and nations as well as to international stability. They persist for lengthy periods and are refractory to resolution despite attempts to achieve it. An understanding of these conflicts and potential ways of managing, transforming, and resolving them is therefore of utmost importance to human societies. As intractable conflicts are complex phenomena, understanding them requires diverse perspectives of different scholarly disciplines including international relations, political science, sociology, psychology, history, geography, anthropology, and others. In the domain of social and political psychology, one of the most influential scholars of intractable conflicts is Daniel Bar-Tal.

In his work, Bar-Tal has been advancing a social-psychological perspective on intractable conflict. This perspective maintains that conflicts are waged, managed, and sometimes resolved by human beings. Therefore, an understanding of intractable conflicts must take into consideration human psychological processes. The social-psychological perspective recognizes that the context of intractable conflict has implications for the psychology of individual members of the involved societies, yet at the same time, individual psychological processes shape collective behaviors in the context of the conflict. Hence, although psychological processes take place at the individual level, they have implications for the macro-societal level.

Bar-Tal is best known for his contribution to studying the sociopsychological infrastructure that develops in societies that are involved in intractable conflicts. According to his theory, this sociopsychological infrastructure consists of shared societal beliefs of ethos of conflict and collective memory, as well as collective emotional orientations that underlie cultures of conflicts. He has studied the contents of these elements of the sociopsychological infrastructure, the processes through which they are acquired and maintained, their functions, the societal mechanisms that contribute to their institutionalization, as well as their role in the crystallization of social identity and development of a culture of conflict. In addition, he studied sociopsychological barriers to peacemaking and ways to overcome them.

Bar Tal's studies were published in 20 books and over 200 articles and chapters in major journals, books, and encyclopedias. The aim of the present book is to pay tribute to Bar-Tal's contribution to the field in light of his approaching retirement

from his position at Tel-Aviv University. In order to do so, we attempted to bring together some of the many scholars who have been influenced and inspired by his work. These scholars offer extensions of Bar-Tal's work while connecting and integrating it with other prominent theoretical frameworks in social and political psychology. They demonstrate the breadth of influence of Bar-Tal's work on recent developments in the study of the social-psychological aspects of intractable conflicts. It is our hope that bringing these contributions together can further advance and enrich our knowledge in this field.

For us, this book is anything but a standard academic or scientific project. As former students of Daniel Bar-Tal, we consider him a mentor, a close friend, and maybe beyond all that, an inspiration to our work on the psychology of intractable conflicts. Even before commencing with the project of editing this book, we had the impression that dozens if not hundreds of scholars of conflicts around the world share the same feeling. After more than a year of communicating with the various contributors to this book, we can say with certainty that many of them consider Bar-Tal to be one of the most important theoreticians worldwide in the fascinating field of the social-psychological aspects of intractable conflicts. For many of those involved in this book, Bar-Tal is a unique social and political psychologist, who has had wide influence on both research and practice in the fields of political psychology, conflict resolution, and peace studies. Additionally, as we can testify based on first-hand experience, Bar-Tal has educated dozens of young scholars and practitioners, leading them to study conflict from a broad perspective, while utilizing an interdisciplinary approach and diverse methodologies. Many of the chapter authors in this book (in addition to the two of us) are Bar-Tal's former students.

When we began working on this project we intended to publish just one volume. However, when we started contacting potential contributors, it became apparent that so many scholars wanted to take part in the tribute to Bar-Tal, that it became necessary to divide the book into two volumes. The first volume refers to the contribution of Bar-Tal's work to understanding intractable conflicts in general, and the second volume refers to his contribution to understanding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular. The present volume, which is the first in the series, includes 15 chapters by some of the most prominent scholars of intergroup and intractable conflicts worldwide. The first section of the volume presents a general overview of Bar-Tal's theories. Reykowski (Chap. 1) introduces Bar-Tal's theory and main contribution to the field. Then, Elcheroth and Spini (Chap. 2) discuss the generalizability of Bar-Tal's theory to other conflicts, beyond the Israeli–Palestinian case. The next three sections of the volume deal with different aspects of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. The second section addresses the cognitive elements of the sociopsychological infrastructure, namely the ethos of conflict and collective memory. In Chap. 3, Cohrs et. al. offer a new perspective on ethos of conflict, through the lens of the society's social representations. Then, Jost et. al. (Chap. 4) introduce a system justification approach to the ethos of conflict, and Paez and Liu (Chap. 5) deal with the manner in which collective remembering of conflict-related events feeds into the ethos of conflict. The third section of the volume examines three specific central societal beliefs that develop in societies involved in

intractable conflicts and have been discussed in Bar-Tal's theorizing. Vollhardt and colleagues (Chap. 6) address societal beliefs about victimhood, Cohen-Chen and her colleagues (Chap. 7) address beliefs about conflict irresolvability, and Čehajić-Clancy (Chap. 8) addresses beliefs about moral responsibility. The fourth section of the volume shifts the focus to the emotional and affective elements of the socio-psychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. Jarymowicz (Chap. 9) discusses collective emotions like fear and hope, and Dupuis and her colleagues (Chap. 10) discuss collective angst. To complete the affective aspect, Bruneau (Chap. 11) offers an expansion of the toolkit by using neuroimaging techniques in the study of intergroup conflicts. To end the first volume with a more optimistic and to some extent more practical perspective, the fifth and final section includes four chapters dealing with various ways in which Bar-Tal's theorizing can be utilized to promote peace. Tropp (Chap. 12) and then Hameiri and Halperin (Chap. 13) review psychology-based conflict resolution interventions and discuss the ways in which Bar-Tal's work influenced their formulation and utilization. Then, Staub (Chap. 14) highlights the role of passivity and active bystandership in the attempt to overcome evil, and finally, Taylor and Christie (Chap. 15) summarize research in the tradition of peace psychology, which can assist in identifying peace building tools.

<div align="right">Eran Halperin, Keren Sharvit</div>

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Part I
Bar-Tal's Theory of Intractable Conflicts

Chapter 1
Intractable Conflicts—How can they be Solved? The Theory of Daniel Bar-Tal

Janusz Reykowski

For almost 30 years Daniel Bar-Tal's primary scientific interests were focused on one specific subject, though a very complex and very difficult one—intergroup conflicts in their especially vicious form, namely, intractable conflicts. His approach to this complex social phenomenon is very different from approaches that are predominant in social psychology. This is because the main inspiration for his studies was not merely intellectual curiosity—it was his experience of living in a region where intractable conflict shapes the life of everybody who lives there. It was therefore his experience as a concerned citizen who was trying many times to change the course of events to facilitate a peaceful solution of the conflict that shaped his approach. Based on this experience and on extensive research, for which he recruited a large group of collaborators, mainly doctoral students, he has developed an elaborated theory of intractable intergroup conflict that deals with the origin of such conflict, with the mechanisms that maintain it and with the processes that may contribute to its peaceful resolution. It is a general theory that can be applied to various kinds of intergroup intractable conflicts in various places around the world. But unlike other social psychologists whose research is focused mainly on relationships between small groups he has studied conflicts of macro social scale—between nations and large political entities.

His unique approach to intractable conflicts is related to and, to some extent, also driven by his more general conception of social psychology. He believes that social psychology should not limit itself to studies of the relationships between individuals and between small groups—it should also include psychological processes that regulate behavior of large social groups such as nations. Thus, he postulates the extension of social psychology into the societal domain; that is building a sub-discipline—societal psychology. In this chapter, I will discuss Bar-Tal's approach to intractable conflict beginning with his conception of societal psychology. Next, I will review the popular understanding of intractable conflicts and describe Bar-Tal's unique theory focusing on his conception of the nature and origin of such

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conflict, its development and implications of the theory for strategies of resolving such conflicts.

Social or Societal Psychology?

Presenting the rationale for his approach Bar-Tal describes the peculiar changes that occurred in social psychology over the last 100 years. Originally, social psychology was a branch of psychology that aimed at studying human social behavior in the group and societal context. But quite soon the focus of social psychology became narrower: "…suggestions were being made that the emerging social psychology should be limited to individual orientations, leaving aside the study of collective behaviours" (Bar-Tal 2004, p. 678). In the next decades—using Bar-Tal formulation—"individualistic orientations became dominant." Laboratory experimentation turned into the main paradigm of social psychological research. Consequently, social psychologists had to constrict their interests to topics that could be translated into relatively simple models, which allow operationalization and testing in experimental settings.

Truly, this approach was very fruitful. It brought important insights into various areas of human social behavior. But at the same time, it left aside many others. In Bar-Tal's (2004) words:

> Outside the experimental laboratories at the universities and colleges, life has been going on: nations have been fighting their wars, interethnic conflicts have erupted and some have even been resolved, societies have tried to reconcile their bloody past, groups have demonstrated over various issues, people have become unemployed, societies have transformed their political-economic systems, violent acts terrorizing whole nations have been committed, gaps between the poor and the rich have widened, new super-identities have been formed, and globalization has evolved … These situations and events have shaped people's social behaviour…. [but] Readers of mainstream journals in social psychology … will find very few articles that study social behaviour in these social contexts. (p. 679)

There are psychologists who tried to reach outside laboratory, who realized that social psychological knowledge could not be built merely on the classic representative of human nature that is "undergraduate psychology students." Their research deals with behavior in natural situations and takes into account the social, economic, or political context of this behavior (see for example: Klandermans 2014; Elcheroth et al. 2011; Paez and Liu 2011; Reicher 1996). But Bar-Tal claimed that social psychology needs something more. He postulated that social psychology should also study the phenomena of a larger scale, not only social, but societal. A societal approach focuses on society that is "a large stable social system, with boundaries that differentiate it from other societies" (Bar-Tal 2000, p. xvi). The critical factor in shaping social behavior are societal beliefs, i.e., "…enduring beliefs shared by society members" (Bar-Tal 2000, p. xiv). Studies on the development of societal beliefs and their role in shaping social behavior constitute an important subject of societal psychology.

One notable example of a societal psychology problem is ethnic conflict. Large-scale ethnic conflict cannot be accounted for solely in psychological categories because behavior of individuals in the macro-social context is influenced and shaped by economic, social, political, or institutional factors. Thus, the research of this important social problem cannot be reduced to the study of attitudes, opinions, or motivations of individual members of the ethnic groups—it must consider macro level factors. For example, it should take into consideration the role of media, of political organizations, of historical awareness, educational processes, and various others. It means that the research of these phenomena has a much larger scope than predominant research in contemporary social psychology.

There are good reasons therefore to describe it as a kind of extension of social psychology—as societal psychology. Daniel Bar-Tal is the leading figure of contemporary societal psychology. His research on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict should be regarded as the major achievement of this kind of work. He advanced the theory, which makes possible not only the thorough understanding of this specific conflict but also offers a theoretical framework for the analysis of other societal conflicts that become intractable. In fact, Bar-Tal claims that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict can be looked upon as the "laboratory of social behavior." But it is somewhat misleading statement. It could suggest that his studies of this conflict have mainly epistemic goals—obtaining knowledge about human functioning in social conflicts. This is not the case with Bar-Tal. He is not only a researcher but at the same time a member of the society that is both the victim and perpetrator of the conflict. As such, he is dealing with the conflict not only as scientist but also as a concerned citizen who was involved in various undertakings aimed at improving Jewish–Palestinian relations and obtaining peace. Bar-Tal is strongly, one could say existentially, interested in finding a peaceful solution to the intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. He believes that a deep, scientifically sound knowledge of this conflict might help in finding a more rational, more effective, more just approach to the situation in his country. It should be stressed, however, that his personal involvement notwithstanding, Daniel Bar-Tal is able to assume the position of the objective researcher who has something very important to say about intractable conflicts in general and specifically about the Israeli–Palestinian one.

What is Intractable Conflict? Existing Conceptions and Bar-Tal's Unique Approach

The concept of intractable conflicts is a controversial one. Many practitioners dislike the term because it implies that such conflict is impossible to resolve (Burgess et al. 2006; Burgess and Burgess 2006). Does it mean that intractable conflicts that eventually have been resolved were misclassified? According to Burgess et al. (2006) "…the more than two hundred participants in our Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base… agreed that some difficult conflicts persists for a long time, during which they appear to most as impossible to resolve" (p. 173). Thus, according

to this approach intractability can be viewed as a state of mind of observers (or practitioners), who lost the hope that the conflict can ever be resolved.

It seems that typical approaches to intractable conflicts are based on subjective interpretation of the meaning of intractability—conflicts are defined as intractable when they last for a very long time and various attempts at solving them turned out to be futile. Thus, intractability is not a feature of the conflict, but it is the way it is perceived by its participants and/or observers. Peter Coleman, who is one of the most active researchers studying intractable conflicts, takes a somewhat similar position. He characterizes them as "… essentially conflicts that persist because they appear impossible to resolve" and describes five major paradigms employed currently in framing the research in this area (Coleman 2006, p. 534).

(1) The "Realist Paradigm" which is based upon the assumption "that resources and power are always scarce." Human beings are prone to use aggression as a means to obtain control over resources and position of power. Intractable conflicts result from rational, strategic choices and are exacerbated by fear, mistrust, and misperception (Coleman 2006, p. 542). (2) The "Human Relations Paradigm" focuses on destructive relationships "…in which parties are locked in an increasing hostile and vicious escalatory spiral …" (Coleman 2006, p. 543). Fear, distrust, misunderstanding, and hostile interaction are primary obstacles to constructive engagement. Thus, "subjective psychological processes … are determining the course of conflict." (3) The "Medical Paradigm" develops the view that intractable conflict is a kind of disease of the body of politics. It describes this body as a system made of various interrelated parts. Its "illness" can be treated by outside experts that can use variety of means such as crisis diplomacy, peace enforcements, post conflict reconstruction, etc. (4) The "Postmodern Paradigm" is based on a communication metaphor. The conflict arises as a consequence of large discrepancies in subjective definitions of the situation. "It suggests that it is primarily through assumptions about what is unquestionably "right" in a given context that the different groups develop and maintain incommensurate worldviews and conflicts persist" (Coleman 2006, p. 545). (5) The "System Paradigm" assumes that social groups can be looked at as systems embedded in a larger system. Intractable conflicts are viewed as destructive patterns of social system. Coleman observes that system orientation is the least well developed of the conflict paradigms (Jost et al. Chap. 4 in the current volume). It stresses the necessity to look at a conflict as a whole where various parts are interdependent.

These five paradigms differ in their implications for the methods of solving conflicts. The Realist one "highlights the need for strong action" that might inhibit aggressive encounters between adversaries and develop institutions that can regulate the interactions between groups. The Human Relation Paradigm recognizes the central importance of human contacts using such methods as integrative negotiation, mediation, establishing integrated social structure. The Medical Paradigm suggests remedial interventions both on psychological and institutional levels (e.g., unearth "hidden transcript," demilitarizing, and preventive diplomacy). The Postmodern Paradigm emphasizes, "renegotiating oppositional identities" and the System Paradigm requires complex interventions aimed at development mutual security, stability, cooperation, humanization, etc. (Coleman 2006). These approaches

to intractable conflicts seem to be based upon the assumption that "Intractable conflicts can be broadly defined as conflicts that are recalcitrant, intense, deadlocked, and extremely difficult to resolve." (Coleman 2003, p. 5–6). They are focused on various factors that might determine or contribute to intractability. There are, however, many such factors—Coleman (2011) describes 57 of them.

Bar-Tal's approach to intractable conflict is a different one. The difference concerns first the range of the theory that is meant to explain such conflicts. Many authors try to develop a very general theory that is supposed to explain all kinds of conflicts—interpersonal (e.g., between spouses), between small groups, between organizations or communities, between large groups or societies (between countries, ethnic, religious or political groups, etc.). Daniel Bar-Tal' theory focuses on the macro-social (societal) level and identifies factors that are specific for this level.

The second difference concerns the relationship between ordinary conflicts and intractable ones. Various authors take the position that they are basically the same but more intensive and more destructive. "Scholars who study difficult conflicts… tell us that truly intractable conflicts … despite people's best efforts will not go away, [they] are relatively rare but extremely powerful … they tend to wreak disproportional havoc on everything they touch." (Coleman 2011, p. 26). Bar Tal maintains that there are qualitative and not just quantitative or intensity based differences between intractable conflicts, on the one hand, and other intergroup conflicts, on the other hand. His theory describes the specific mechanisms that make intergroup societal conflicts intractable.

Bar-Tal Theory of Intractable Conflicts

Professor Bar-Tal's theory of intractable conflict has a long history—it has been developing over 30 years. During these years he presented the results of his inquiries in various scientific journals, in books, and at international conferences. Recently he has published a large volume with the title "Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics" (2013). This is not only a summary of his and others' research but it contains an elaborated original theory of such conflicts. It should be stressed that this theory was formulated by the author, who has a very intimate first hand contact with such a conflict. In his book, Bar-Tal presents the descriptive characteristics of these conflicts and characteristics of their mechanisms.

The descriptive characteristics of intractable conflicts are based on Kriesberg's (1998) work who described four necessary features of such conflicts: they are *protracted* (they persist for a long time, at least a generation), *violent* (involving violence), *perceived as irresolvable* (people involved in an intractable conflict do not believe that the conflicts can be resolved peacefully), *demanding extensive investment* (military, technological, economic, and psychological). Bar-Tal (2007) adds three more features: intractable conflicts are also *total* (perceived as being about essential and basic goals, needs, and/or values), *perceived as zero sum in nature*

(neither side can consider compromise and/or concessions), and *central* (members of the society are involved constantly and continuously with the conflict).

We may notice that these three additional characteristics of intractable conflicts are concerned primarily with its psychological properties—perception of the situation (*perceived* as irresolvable, *perceived* as being about essential and basic goals, *perceived* as zero sum in nature) and strong involvement in it (demanding extensive investment, intensive preoccupation with it). All seven features are described as the necessary attributes of intractability.

> All of the features may evolve with time and each of them has its own pace of development. Once all of them appear, the state of intractability begins, in which each characteristic adds to this chronic reality. But only when all the seven features emerge in their extreme form, the intractable conflicts appear in their most extreme nature. (Bar-Tal 2007, p. 8)

This approach to intractable conflicts has mainly descriptive value. It enumerates observable features of such conflicts. However, Daniel Bar-Tal's main contribution consists in his theoretical analysis of the "mechanisms of intractability." This analysis is based on very rich empirical evidence, which indicates that these mechanisms emerge as a result of pathological societal adaptation to difficult conflict situations. It is a kind of paradox. Society wants to find effective means of adaptation to such situations and it wants peace, but it develops mechanisms that tend to preserve the conflict. These mechanisms are counterproductive as means of achieving peace (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009, 2011).

The main part of Bar-Tal theory is the characteristics of these mechanisms. He postulates that one of the major consequences of a serious, protracted conflict is formation of a sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict. This infrastructure consists of three main elements: collective memory, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation.

Collective memory is the shared narrative about the past of the given community—its origin and the main events that supposedly shaped the collective identity. But in conflict situations, collective memory is preoccupied with conflict related themes. It contains some explanation of the origin of the conflict and gives an account of its development. It is not, however, an impartial report of objective facts. The memory tends to serve the interests of the given community in conflict—it must justify the community's claims, delegitimize its adversary, and help in glorifying the in-group. It also supports the sense of victimization of this community that presents itself as the sole victim of the conflict and actions of the other side (see also Paez & Liu, this volume; Nets-Zehngut, volume 2).

The term ethos of conflict refers in Bar-Tal's model to the "shared central societal beliefs" that provide the basis for understanding the current state of affairs and serve to set goals for the future (see also Cohrs et al. this volume; Tropp this volume; Jost et al. this volume; Oren volume 2; Sharvit volume 2; Nahhas et al. volume 2). In other words, "…ethos provides epistemic basis for the hegemonic social consciousness …" (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 174). The content and the functions of the ethos are similar to the content and functions of the collective memory. But while the collective memory is the cognitive construction of the past shared by members of the society, the ethos of conflict is the cognitive construction of the present conditions of the society and its goals for the future.

Bar-Tal mentions eight main themes of the ethos of conflict. Four of these themes are the same as themes of the collective memory (justification of the group's goals, delegitimization of the adversary, beliefs about victimization, and enhancement of a positive self-image). The other four themes concern some critical aspects of the current situation. One is security. People develop a common view about the existing threats and about strategies to manage them. The second theme concerns patriotism, which is the belief about importance of being loyal to own country and readiness for sacrifices in its defense. Although patriotism is a quite common attitude among citizens of most countries, in a conflict situation it is likely to get a form of so-called "blind patriotism" that is "…rigid and inflexible attachment … It reflects unquestionable acceptance of group goals, means, …practices … without tolerating criticism of … possible … violations of moral codes." (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 196). Strongly associated with patriotic beliefs are beliefs about unity, i.e., the conviction that in the face of external threats internal discords and disagreements have to be suppressed. They exert on the community members a great pressure to conform.

Bar-Tal claims that, in spite of the fact that the most of the themes of the ethos of conflict are oriented toward its sustainment, there is also a set of beliefs concerning peace. Peace is regarded as a supreme goal. These beliefs seem to have a dual function. On the one hand, it is a somewhat utopian image of the end of the conflict that is not accompanied by realistic program of achieving it. But on the other hand, it is also a means of positive self-presentation to outside observers—the in-group as peace loving people.

The third component of the sociopsychological infrastructure described by Bar-Tal is the collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal et al. 2007; Halperin 2011). The point is that in conflict situations people develop a common sensitivity to certain emotional cues and tend to express similar emotional reactions. Typical reactions in these situations are fear, angst, hatred, and anger. These emotions may facilitate confrontational strategies of dealing with the opposite side (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006; Jarymowicz this volume; Halperin et al. 2008, 2011, Pliskin and Halperin volume 2).

These three components of the sociopsychological infrastructure refer to the "state of mind" of society members that are involved in protracted conflict. But processes instigated by the conflict are not merely psychological in nature. Professor Bar-Tal indicates that there are various changes in institutions that might support the conflict orientation. First of all, when the "… sociopsychological infrastructure crystallizes into well-organized system of collective belief … [it] penetrates into institutions and communication channels of the society …" (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 257). It becomes integrated into cultural symbols, transmitted to the public by media, by cultural products (film, theater, and literature), and, which is especially important, by the educational system (Bar-Tal 1998, see also Adwan volume 2). In his books and articles, Bar-Tal provides many examples how this whole mechanism works.

This theory of intractable conflict illustrates the very essence of the societal psychology paradigm—its specific problems (here—the conflict that affects the whole societies), its conceptual framework (that contains not only psychological but also social, political, economic categories), and also its specific methodology that consists of analysis of various kinds of material, such as surveys, content analysis of

media products, information about functioning of public institutions (e.g., educational systems), political documents, reports on specific events and situations, and many others.

Bar-Tal's theoretical model explains why the given conflict becomes intractable. He makes the convincing argument that intractability is the effect of evolvement of a specific system of interrelated beliefs, attitudes, and emotional orientations. These elements support each other and, in addition, are supported by sociocultural processes. They form a closed system that is highly resistant to any modifications from outside. Thus, we can regard a given conflict as intractable not because nobody has been able to solve it until now, but because the conflict has engendered self-sustaining societal mechanisms—the sociopsychological infrastructure—and induced specific changes in the system of sociocultural institutions. In this theoretical model, the term "intractable conflict" is a theoretical (explanatory) concept. It refers to a complex system that sustains the given conflict. The system is a product of societal adaptation to a conflict situation. It is a peculiar form of adaptation that maintains and perpetuates conflict situations.

Let me stress here, in methodological terms, the main difference between Bar-Tal's and the common approaches to intractable conflicts. In the so-called "common approach," the concept "intractable conflict" is the observational term. It means that it is defined by a number of observable indicators (Carnap 1956). In this case, the main indicator is the lack of any progress in resolving the conflict for a long period of time in spite of various attempts. This indicator is not a very strong one because there is no criterion of length (or criterion of resolution, as well), but there are also other descriptive characteristics that are used as additional indicators—they are supposed to be associated with intractability. In other words, the intractable conflict is looked upon as a kind of syndrome. Such definitions summarize a variety of empirical observations (Lazarsfeld 1959).

Bar-Tal uses this kind of definition as well, but he makes an important step forward. In his theory, the concept "intractable conflict" becomes the theoretical construct. A theoretical construct is a concept that is defined in terms of its relation to other theoretical terms as parts of a common system. Such a system may have a high explanatory value if it contains (at least implicit) rules of correspondence between theoretical and observational statements (Carnap 1956). In Bar-Tal's theory, intractable conflict is defined as an outcome of several interrelated processes and mechanisms that constitute a common system.

How Intractable Conflicts Develop? The Israeli–Palestinian Case

Bar-Tal's theory that describes the intractable conflict as a complex political, cultural, and sociopsychological system, implies that it develops over long periods of time. This means that there might be various "levels of intractability" related to the degree of the development the various sociopsychological, political, and cultural mechanisms that sustain the given conflict. In other words, the "state of intracta-

bility" can be more or less advanced. At the same time, the belief that a conflict is intractable can appear among people in various stages of this development. The appearance of such a belief, the mere feeling that the conflict cannot be resolved, is not a sufficient criterion for classifying it as intractable. It only means that some people (or many of them) have lost their hope for finding its satisfactory solution.

This reasoning can be applied to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The conflict originated long time ago. "The intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians developed about the territory that the two national movements claimed as their homeland." (Bar-Tal 2004, p. 682). But it was not mere a conflict of interests. It was (and still is) a conflict that concerns existential needs and fundamental values on both sides. As such, it was quite early considered intractable. These considerations notwithstanding, during the nineties there appeared a hope that some solution of the conflict could be achieved. After long and bloody confrontations, in four wars and many terrorist attacks, the two sides began to talk and tried slowly, cautiously, to forge some modus vivendi between them. And then, in the critical moment when a major agreement was supposed to be signed (in Camp David in June of 2000) the whole project of reaching a peaceful solution collapsed. Then, a new phase of this very vicious conflict began. This was the new phase of rapid development of the conflict infrastructure.

Bar-Tal (2004; Halperin and Bar-Tal 2007) made a thorough analysis of the sociopsychological processes that led to the development of this new phase of the conflict. This analysis sheds light on the mechanisms of the formation of intractable conflicts more generally. The initial fact was the failure of the peace negotiations in Camp David. Probably, the very fact of failure in negotiations is not the decisive factor in conflict escalation. The critical factor is the interpretation of the failure by both sides.

On the Israeli side, the first reaction to the failure was putting the whole responsibility for the failure on the other side. Putting the blame on the other side is a typical reaction of people who are trying to collectively solve some problem and fail. But in this case, it was not a reaction of individual persons, but a social process. Bar-Tal indicates that the initial information about negotiations was provided by Prime Minister Barak and supported by the whole Israeli delegation. This information had two important elements: it presented Israeli Prime Minister as someone who had done all he could for reaching agreement by making a very generous offer and described the other side (Palestinians) as responsible for failure—they rejected this offer and did not make any a counter proposals. Almost all the country's political, social, and religious leaders accepted this interpretation. Israeli mass media circulated this information time and time again (Bar-Tal 2004, p. 684). It means that the Israeli public received from their epistemic authorities a clear, unambiguous message about who is to blame for the failure of the negotiations. On the basis of this information, the public developed its interpretation of the situation—the belief that the other side is not interested in peace. This belief was widely shared among Israeli public. It became a cognitive frame for interpretation other events.

Very soon, Israeli society had to deal with two important events. First of which was the visit of Israel's opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, where Muslim holy mosques are located. This visit evoked uproar among the Palestinian

people. The second event was the eruption of large-scale physical confrontation with Palestinians—the stone throwing, demonstrations, shootings, and the forceful response by Israeli security forces. This was the beginning of the spiral of violence—Palestinian suicide bombers in public places, and a harsh reaction of Israeli forces in Palestinian territories.

One may wonder what instigated this spiral of violence? Government sources informed the public that the intifada had been well prepared by Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. Such information fitted well with the existing public conviction that Palestinians were not really interested in a just, peaceful solution to the conflict. On the contrary, they were interested in destroying Israel. This interpretation was provided by governmental and military sources as well as much of the media and reinforced by the violent attacks on Israelis by Palestinian fighters. Such collective perception of the situation gave rise to the conviction that Israel was engaged in an existential war for its survival.

One consequence of such conviction is the emotional reaction of fear. It is not ordinary fear that people may feel in various day-to-day situations-fear evoked by a threat to people's personal security and security of their close ones. It is the fear elicited by a threat to the social system. It is existential fear. And again, it was not merely a reaction of individual persons, but a reaction of society. This means that the reaction of individuals was supported and augmented by reactions of other people (see also Jarymowicz, this volume). This social process is of great significance[1].

The second consequence was the change of attitudes towards the adversary and towards in-group members. Bar-Tal describes this change as delegitimization of the leaders of the adversary as terrorists and subsequently delegitimization the whole ethnic group (see also Hammack and Pilecki, volume 2). Therefore, they cannot be treated, anymore, as partners in negotiations and no agreement with them is possible. It means implicitly, that a solution to the conflict can be obtained only by using overwhelming force. Various aggressive means of dealing with the other side are then regarded as legitimate and obtain social support.

There were also changes in attitudes towards the in-group—increase of the sense of unity and patriotism. This sense of unity is associated with the lack of tolerance for dissenters. In a situation of serious threat to the community, solidarity and unanimity are the principal requirements. And the community needs a strong leader. "People look for a leader who projects determination to cope forcefully with the rival and can assure security" (Bar-Tal 2004, p. 688). In the case of Israeli society, they in fact found one.

> In addition, the society developed a sense of victimhood and strong self-focus.
> "Locked within the vicissitudes of the violent conflict, Israelis have difficulty to be empathetic to the Palestinians, to be attuned to their grievances, hardships, needs, or goals. The news reports focus in great detail on information and analyses regarding Palestinian violence against Israeli Jews, while disregarding both in terms of the description and implications, the actions of the Israeli army". (Bar-Tal 2004, p. 690)

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[1] It cannot be denied that the threats to Israel were real and collective fear was a justified reaction. But a response to this situation in the form of ethos of conflict might interfere with the search for the most effective ways of dealing with the situation.

This description illustrates how the main ingredients of the sociopsychological infrastructure—specifically the ethos of conflict and collective emotional orientation—were emerging in Israel. At the same time, there are good reasons to expect that similar processes developed on the other (Palestinian) side as well. For example, a study of Israel and Palestinian educational systems shows that the ethos of conflict has permeated these institutions (Adwan et al. 2013). Processes of this kind tend to forge the conditions for vicious, destructive, and intractable conflict, especially if they develop on both sides.

Implications of the Theory: Resolving of Intractable Conflicts

Under what conditions can intractable conflicts be transformed into tractable ones? Bar-Tal's theory implies that the main precondition of such transformation is change in the system of mechanisms that sustains the conflict, primarily in the sociopsychological infrastructure. The initial condition of such a change is "unfreezing" of the existing system of conflict related beliefs, first of all, the beliefs that belong to the ethos of the conflict. In other words, the existing "rigid structure of the dominant repertoire" of beliefs and attitudes has to be destabilized. Such destabilization may appear "… as a result of new ideas that are inconsistent with the held belief and attitudes …" (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 327). The new idea (called an instigating belief) can induce unfreezing if it is originated or supported by epistemic authorities. The unfreezing opens room for acquisition of other beliefs, beliefs related to peace.

The idea of unfreezing was originally formulated by Kurt Lewin in his conception of psychological change (Marcus 2006). Bar-Tal and his colleagues applied this idea to the context of intractable conflict and tested it (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009). They expected that unfreezing of these rigid beliefs could be obtained by introducing information about the losses inherent in continuing the conflict. In one of their studies, they found that exposure to such information induced higher willingness to acquire new information about possible solutions to the conflict, higher willingness to reevaluate current positions, and more support for compromise (Gayer et al 2009, for more on interventions aimed at unfreezing sociopsychological barriers see Hameiri and Halperin this volume).

Bar-Tal describes the various conditions that might facilitate such a process of change. Referring to Zartman's seminal theory, he describes ripeness of the conflict as one such condition. This is the situation when two parties perceive themselves to be in a harmful stalemate and begin to consider the possibility of a negotiated solution (Bar-Tal 2013). A good example of such conditions is the situation in Poland in 1988 before the Round Table Negotiations, which led to major transformations in its sociopolitical system (Reykowski 1993).

Additionally, the transformation of the sociopsychological infrastructure of the conflict can also be facilitated by major changes in the political or economic context. Such changes may initiate new adaptive processes that might undermine the

ethos of conflict. Bar-Tal (2013) describes a number of these facilitating conditions, but he acknowledges that, "the list of such facilitating conditions is inexhaustible, as different societies may be influenced by different experiences" (p. 331). He stresses however that there are some critical changes that may be necessary for termination of the conflict. First of all, it is a change in perception of the rival, i.e., modification of the attitudes of delegitimization. This is the precondition for viewing the rival as a potential partner. Such a modification would be a major step toward solution of the conflict, as it can facilitate perspective taking and empathy. Another important change should include building trust, at least to a minimal degree, and reinforcing the hope that a solution is possible. In his book, Bar-Tal (2013) presents elaborated characteristics of the factors that can bring about significant changes in the conflict reinforcing system. He also describes peace-building process.

Concluding Remarks

The theory of intractable conflicts developed by Bar-Tal has an important advantage as guidance for actions aimed at conflict resolution because it sheds light on the specific mechanisms of intractability. It differs from other approaches that treat such conflicts as a more extreme form of ordinary conflicts and concentrate on their most prominent characteristics (Coleman 2006)—on aggressive means of dealing with conflict of interests (the "Realist Paradigm"), on emotional reactions in conflict situations (the "Postmodern Paradigm"), or on discrepancies in worldviews (the "Human Relations Paradigm"). Bar-Tal's theory explains the intractable conflict as a consequence of "destructive patterns of social system," what Coleman describes as the "System Paradigm" and concludes that it "is the least well developed of the conflict paradigms." This statement does not seem to be true anymore. Bar-Tal's theory offers a highly developed conceptualization of intractable conflicts that explains their basic mechanisms. This is a major achievement of societal psychology.

But it has important implications for social psychology, as well. Truly, we cannot directly apply the model of societal intractable conflicts to conflicts of different levels (interpersonal or between small groups) because the model contains highly specific elements. But this model may have a high heuristic value suggesting that difficult, long lasting, recalcitrant conflicts of all kinds may have specific psychological infrastructures consisting of particular sets of beliefs and emotional orientations supported by specific contextual factors. In dealing with such conflicts, the primary task is to identify the main characteristics of such infrastructures.

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Chapter 2
Can There be a General Theory of Intractable Conflict?

Guy Elcheroth and Dario Spini

Dialectic Tensions in Daniel Bar-Tal's Work on Intractable Conflicts

Although the bulk of Daniel Bar-Tal's empirical studies focus on the complex socio-psychological dynamics of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the impact of his work goes way beyond this particular context. Generations of scholars from very different conflict-torn world regions have found a source of inspiration in Bar-Tal's writings. This transfer of explanatory models from one context to another is not accidental, and is in accordance with Bar-Tal's willingness to identify similarities across sites that others would see as incommensurable. His scientific ambition to develop a transferable theory of intractable conflicts becomes apparent in his theoretical writing as well as in his active involvement in many international research collaborations and dialogues.

Interestingly though, Bar-Tal's methodological thoughts and research practices lend a pre-eminent role to thick contextualisation of the studied conflict dynamics. They highlight that the general(izable) meant something else to him than psychological processes studied in isolation from their social environment. As a consequence, Bar-Tal's contribution to the social psychology of conflicts is so multifaceted that colleagues or students face the risk of overlooking part of the different scientific sensibilities that feed into his work.

In the present tribute, we will first highlight the complexity of his approach by showing some dialectic tensions that run throughout his monumental life work and discuss the heuristic import of his legacy to a science of conflict. We will then try to show how these dialectic tensions provide a creative impetus to refine our models

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regarding the interplay between universal human motives and the contingencies of particular social contexts, in the study of psychological reactions to violent conflict.

Sceptical Versus Engaged?

The first, and maybe foundational, creative tension that becomes obvious to Bar-Tal's readers concerns his normative outlook on social conflicts. There is certainly a pessimistic bottom line transpiring through many of his writings. The very notion of *Intractable Conflicts*, the title of his most recent book (Bar-Tal 2013) and a core concept of his work, draws our attention to the most dreadful and discouraging aspects of social conflicts. What makes that some destructive conflicts continue along similar lines across entire generations? How can it be that century-old persecutions still put their shadow over the collective behaviour of people in the twenty-first century, that past atrocities fuel current injustices? Such are the questions that have oriented Bar-Tal's analyses of protracted conflicts (Bar-Tal 2007; Reykowski, this volume), collective memories of past victimhood (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Paez and Liu, this volume) and entrenched siege mentalities (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Ray et al., this volume; Schori-Eyan and Klar volume 2). These analyses do not leave much room for naïve idealism or comforting illusions. They instruct us about how difficult it can be for societies that, at one point, have embraced an "ethos of conflict" to move beyond mutually reinforcing spirals of violence and authoritarianism.

However, such lucidity is no excuse for Bar-Tal to accept the intractability of conflicts as a fatality. Maybe surprisingly for someone whose studies highlight the weight of conflictual histories, Bar-Tal nourishes a pronounced interest for conflict resolution, for policies and concrete human actions that can make a difference (Bar-Tal 2009; Gayer et al. 2009; Tropp, this volume; Hameiri and Halperin, this volume). He has never used the academic ivory tower as a refuge, but rather as a place from where to state loudly and clearly his disagreement with the hawkish policies of successive governments of his country, as a place from where to draw attention to the terrible human and political consequences of the prolonged occupation of the Palestinian territories. For Daniel Bar-Tal, there is no contradiction between being a sceptical theorist and an engaged scholar.

Fundamental Versus Applied?

As an academic whose topics of investigation are directly tied to his overt concern, commitment, and criticism of the society he lives in, it seems straightforward to characterize Bar-Tal as an *applied* social psychologist: someone who uses theory not only to describe and understand the world, but to help make it a less desperate place to live in. While such a characterization is probably accurate, it is certainly not sufficient. Bar-Tal is active for peace in his own society, but he is also passionate about the circulation of ideas and transfer of theories. We had the chance to observe

directly how genuinely curious he is, through his contact with colleagues, to learn more about the circumstances of conflicts in societies distant from the one he has inhabited and studied most of his life, and then to try to draw parallels or find a general pattern, beyond particular local settings. In *Intractable conflicts*, Bar-Tal has condensed this myriad of exchanges, and the insights gained from them in an impressive attempt to propose a general theory of intractable conflicts. In the preface to the book, Bar-Tal (2013) spells out the universalist outlook underlying such theoretical integration:

> In the course of personal development, visiting places of bloody intergroup confrontations, and reading much about other conflicts, I became confident that the society of which I am part is not unlike other societies involved in intractable conflicts and that these other societies also develop similar processes and the same general socio-psychological repertoire.
> *(p. VIII)*

To rightly appreciate, then, the statement that Bar-Tal is an academic striving to make the world a less desperate place, it is important to keep in mind that Bar-Tal's world goes far beyond his immediate societal environment. In light of the universalistic ideal that motivates much of his scholarly commitment, transferring theoretical principles across contexts is certainly as central as applying them within one particular context. In a way, we could somehow inverse the well-known Lewinian statement for Bar-Tal's approach: "There is nothing as theoretical as a good observation".

Ideographic Versus Nomothetic?

Such a universalistic ideal certainly fits well with Bar-Tal's academic identity as a social psychologist, a scientific discipline largely inspired by the simple but far-reaching assumption that a human being is a human being. Notwithstanding the tremendous impact of social contexts on human behaviour, most social psychologists seek for commonalities in the way people make sense of and act within their respective social worlds. A similar motive to develop our understanding of how human beings psychologically cope with conflictual and threatening environments *anywhere* is clearly discernable in Bar-Tal's work, as is his ambition to identify and substantiate regularities across societies. But his approach to studying such regularities contrasts with social-psychological research practices that translate a universalistic outlook into a very literal understanding that human beings are interchangeable, or that abstract the psychological processing of conflictual environments from the study of these environments themselves (see Vollhardt and Bilali 2008). His various studies draw upon a fine-grained description of the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and of particular sequences of events within this conflict, prior to the analyses of specific psychological reactions to this context. In other words, while an articulated nomothetic objective runs through Bar-Tal's work, his research practices display an idiographic component, which is unusually strong and developed for the standards of his discipline.

Three Levels of Universalism in General Theories

One publication exemplifies particularly well the idiographic touch in Bar-Tal's work. In 2004, he published a thick description of Israeli society during a turning point of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Drawing on a variety of sources, he describes the sequence of events that led from the failure of the summer 2000 Camp David peace talks to the outbreak of the Second Intifada, a few months later. The peace talks were intended to produce a peace settlement for the Middle East and their failure was consistently portrayed by "epistemic authorities" in Israeli society as due to a lack of genuine will among the Palestinian leadership to find an agreement. In this climate, the peace process was definitely disrupted two months later, after opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, along with a Likud party delegation. Their visit provoked violent riots, which were countered by violent repression and eventually resulted in the first fatalities of the Second Intifada (for more on Bar-Tal's analysis of this period see Reykowski, this volume).

The holistic, eclectic, and highly contextualised methodological approach pursued in this research appears to be a textbook example of a thorough case study, conducted from the perspective of a *participant observer* (Bar-Tal 2004, p. 683), who combines a variety of sources, such as media reports, survey outcomes and first-hand observations. At the same time, the article displays an ambitious attempt to develop a bold theory of conflict escalation, spelling out a series of "general principles of social behaviour". The combination of idiographic and nomothetic elements in this publication makes it an exemplar of the dialectic tensions highlighted in the previous section. We will therefore focus on it as a privileged entry into a more thorough discussion of different levels of generalizability, that is different forms of validity of a theory across sociohistorical contexts.

Interestingly, the study is introduced in Bar-Tal (2004) by four pages of sharp criticism of social-psychological mainstream research, its broken promises, its methodological monoculturalism and its narrow empirical scope, while "outside the experimental laboratories at the universities and colleges, life has been going on: nations have been fighting their wars, interethnic conflicts have erupted and some have even been resolved …" (p. 679).

In contrast to the prevailing deductive method of inquiry, where general theoretical hypotheses are being tested in the controlled environment of the research laboratory, Bar-Tal (2004) issues a plea for using the (uncontrolled) *natural laboratory* (p. 683) of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as an opportunity for an alternative, inductive approach to theory-developing, which starts with the description of the relevant phenomena and then abstracts more general principles from this description, which should stimulate further studies and be tested against observations made in other contexts.

In order to illustrate how these principles are tied to important concepts of Bar-Tal's theory of intractable conflict, the first column specifies to which societal belief contributing to an entrenched ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 175–201) the principles are relevant. In the second column of Table 2.1, three selected general

Table 2.1 Three selected general principles of social behaviour proposed by Bar-Tal (2004), and three different types of inferred universals

Related "ethos of conflict" belief	Hypothesised general principle	Existential universal	Functional universal	Accessibility universal
	"Violence, threat perception (and fear) cause" …	People from different societies are capable to categorize others into foes and friends, and to display heightened receptivity towards information congruent with the perception that those categorized as …	When these capacities are being used in a context of violence and perceived threat, across different societies they serve a similar function of facilitating and justifying actions …	Violence and perceived threat are equally likely across different societies to result in the production of …
Delegitimization of the opponent/ Security	"… homogenized delegitimization of the rival group and its leaders" (p. 686)	… "foes" are malevolent and dangerous	… directed against other groups	… actual delegitimization of out-groups through systematic use of these capacities
Victimization/ Justness of one's cause	"… self perception as a victim" (p. 690)	… "friends" have unduly suffered in the past	… to compensate past wrongs	… self-perceptions and victims through systematic use of these capacities
Patriotism/Unity/ Positive collective self-image/ Peace	"group mobilization, patriotism and unity" (p. 691)	… "friends" share an emotional bound and a motive to stand up for common aspirations	… against internal dissent or impassiveness	… group mobilization, patriotism and unity through systematic use of these capacities

principles of social behaviour are quoted from Bar-Tal (2004), generated following the aforementioned inductive approach. For example, the statement that "violence, threat perception and fear cause self-perception as a victim" (p. 690) is directly related to the development and maintenance of societal beliefs about "victimization", and indirectly to the societal beliefs about the "justness of one's cause", given that the consciousness of past sacrifices and endured injustice is an important component of beliefs about the justness of the current cause (see also Vollhardt et al., this volume; Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2).

The theoretical function of the "general principles" is not restricted here to summarize how Israeli Jews reacted to violence and perceived threat during the run-up to the Second Intifada—it should also help to explain how they reacted to similar events previously, to anticipate how they will react to similar events subsequently, or to extrapolate how other groups react to similar events elsewhere. This method of inductive theorising raises the question of the heuristic validity of deriving general

hypotheses from strongly contextualized observations. Bar-Tal (2004) addresses this point explicitly, in a rather strong statement about the expected universality of these observed patterns:

> It is possible to ask whether the observed patterns of behaviour are unique to Israeli Jews. The answer is that it is highly probable that groups living in a similar context would behave in a similar manner and I assume that patterns of Palestinian behaviour are similar, reflecting a kind of mirror image of the above described Israeli patterns (…) I would like to propose that a context that evokes strong experiences of threat, danger and fear cannot be greatly moderated by other factors because human beings are programmed to act in a particular way in such a context in order to adapt and cope with it. (p. 693)

Such strong assumptions about universal psychological programming might run the risk of circumventing the difficult but necessary task of drawing boundaries between psychological potentialities that are universal, because a human being is a human being, and patterns of behaviour that *cannot* be universally predicted, because they depend on contingent factors and on concrete actors in concrete situations. One of the most systematic attempts, so far, to clarify the significance of hypothesized universals in cross-cultural research has been made by Norenzayan and Heine (2005), who proposed a hierarchy, involving three successive layers: existential, functional, and accessibility. In this classification, *existential universals,* defined as psychological tendencies that are "in principle cognitively available to normal adults in all cultures" (p. 774), but that might not be used for the same purposes or with the same likelihood across different societies. These are the most easily achieved and hence empirically most frequent phenomena. In the third column of Table 2.1, we have tried to make explicit the three existential universals that are implied by the three chosen principles proposed by Bar-Tal. For example, if the principle that "violence and threat perceptions cause homogenized delegitimization of the rival group and its leaders" (Bar-Tal 2004, p. 686) is generalizable to other societal contexts, then this implies first of all that the (cognitive) capacity to categorise others into foes and friends, and to be more receptive towards information congruent with the categorisation of "foes" as malevolent and dangerous, can be found among "normal adults in all cultures".

Since the Milgram's classic study in the early 1960s, social psychologists have moved towards a perception that it does not require a particular type of human being, produced by a particular type of authoritarian socialization, to be able to behave very differently towards others seen as legitimate authorities than towards ordinary people. The growing impact of social identity theory since the late 1970s has further entrenched a consensus that every "normal adult" is able to categorize others into ingroups and outgroups, and to treat information received from or about other people differently depending on how they are categorized. Everyone can do this, and is likely to use this capacity for better or worse. In this sense, it is safe to say that the three existential universals spelled out in Table 2.1 are part of a consensus among contemporary social psychologists. Even those who argue for more contextualized social-psychological theories do so on the grounds that "our nature bequeaths us so many possibilities" (Reicher 2004, p. 927), including the possibility to make (sometimes tragically) consequential differentiations among human

beings, which is not bounded to particularly pathological individuals or particularly uncivilized societies.

In the last column of Table 2.1, we tried to extrapolate the accessibility universals that are implied if Bar-Tal's principles were generalizable in the strictest sense. Norenzayan and Heine (2005) define *accessibility universals* as psychological tendencies that are actually accessible to the same degree across cultures. A particular psychological ability hence constitutes an accessibility universal only if, when, and how it will actually be used (or not) can be predicted by a similar model across different societies. As a consequence, the threshold for identifying accessibility universals is the highest, and their empirical occurrence the lowest.

None of the three inferred formulations appear plausible in light of available studies. Systematic comparative research on so-called "rally effects" (Baker and O'Neal 2001) has shown that the rise of patriotism and national unity is by no way a ubiquitous phenomenon in times of violent crises. Lai and Reiter's (2005) quantitative historical analyses even suggest that clear-cut rally effects might represent very salient exceptions rather than the statistically most likely pattern. Furthermore, recent literature reviews, which distinguish between different ways of categorizing victims of past violence, highlight that the actual variability in responses to victimization is probably much higher than what previous accounts suggested. Notably, some people or groups prioritize narratives of inclusive victimization—that is narratives that explicitly refer to the suffering of outgroups—over narratives of exclusive victimization (Vollhardt 2012). In a related vein, our own research on collective vulnerability has shown that even in highly war-traumatized communities one can still find significant tendencies to recognize that universal human rights of the other side need to be protected and to condemn violations of these rights by ingroup members (Elcheroth 2006). Given the reality of such variability in people's actual reactions to violence, it does not appear to be a promising heuristic road to further look for psychological universals at this level. Rather, more case studies in the style of Bar-Tal (2004) are needed, which take into account the agency of particular actors in the production of particular outcomes, instead of promoting an apolitical perspective on inherently political processes.

At an intermediate level, Norenzayan and Heine (2005) locate *functional universals*. These refer to psychological tendencies that are not necessarily accessible to the same degree in different cultures; but when the psychological ability is actually used, it fulfils the same function across cultures. For example, one may want to extrapolate a functional universal from Bar-Tal's (2004) principle that "Violence, threat perception and fear lead to group mobilization, patriotism and unity" (p. 691). It might then be translated into the hypothesis that when people's capacities to categorize into friends and foes are being used in a context of violence and perceived threat, they serve a similar function of facilitating and justifying action against internal dissent or impassiveness across different societies. To our knowledge, no previous study has directly addressed this issue, or provided decisive empirical arguments to either support or dismiss the three resulting hypotheses. Therefore, if future research wants to further engage with the goal of developing a general theory of intractability, this might be the most promising level to heuristically derive trans-

ferrable hypotheses, and to test them through systematic comparative studies. These might either lend more credence to the notion of functional universals in people's reactions to violence, or clarify our understanding of contextual moderating factors. In that prospect, in the next section we would like to raise a few suggestions regarding contextual factors likely to affect the functions of psychological reactions to violent conflict.

Three Questions About the Contexts of Intractability

What Makes Conflicts Differ from one Another?

Core to the logic of intractability is a restriction of pluralism in the views of the ingroup, the outgroup(s), and the history of their interrelations, and a consequent erosion of collective capacities to conceive alternative values and courses of action (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011). The three selected principles discussed in the previous section all point to the self-sustaining role of violence in conflicts (Elcheroth and Spini 2011): at some point, a conflict is driven by the violent means used to manage the conflict itself, and by the undermining of pluralism provoked by the violence. In this sense, the first qualitative distinction is between conflicts that are still about initial grievances and those that organize primarily around the security concerns and moral grievances created by the armed struggle itself (see also Gurr 2000). The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a prototypical example of long-term entrenchment in self-sustaining violence: while the military occupation is portrayed as necessary by Israeli leadership to address its own security concerns, it creates the core grievances and motives to continue the struggle among Palestinians.

However, even in protracted conflicts, it is still possible to identify partially exogenous factors, that is factors that are not entirely determined by the dynamics of intractability. Let us stress two such factors: symmetry and visibility of conflicts. First, conflicts are more or less *symmetric or asymmetric*. The balance of resources is largely exogenous to the intractability of the conflict, to the extent that it depends on external alliances and geopolitical strategies, more than on the interactions between the different sides in the conflict. It is however a critical variable structuring the psychological and moral climates that result from violence. In three different comparative studies (Spini et al. 2008; Penic et al. in press; Spini et al. in preparation) we have reached a similar conclusion that *asymmetric* violence, not violence *per se*, is the key obstacle to critically question the role of the own group. In asymmetric conflicts, acceptance of human rights violations and denial of responsibilities by members from the ingroup is systematically stronger than in symmetric conflicts—interestingly for both the powerful *and* the powerless sides.

These findings now prompt us to wonder if the functions of friend–foe categorizations too differ between symmetric and asymmetric settings. In symmetric conflicts, they might above all be a means for entrepreneurs of conflict to keep the frontlines meaningful, despite of the objective communities of fate created by

similar suffering on both sides. The fraternisation across enemy trenches between soldiers who preferred to play soccer together rather than to kill each other, as they occurred during the 1914 Christmas truce in World War I as well as in the Sarajevo trenches in 1992 (Broz 2013) and their subsequent repression in order to keep the fighting going, are telling examples of friend–foe categorizations that do not maintain themselves *because* of the course of events on the battle field, but *despite* of it. However, in an asymmetric conflict such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, a strong imbalance in the capacity to harm the other side makes the emergence of any community of fate highly unlikely, because the conflict experience is qualitatively different and the respective stakes incommensurable between opposing sides. In such settings, it is more plausible that friend–foe categorisation serves a central function of existential resistance (a motivation to continue to exist as a group despite of systematic undermining of group life) among the powerless group, and a central function of moral exoneration (a motivation to continue being a moral community despite of systematic harm done to others) among the powerful group.

The second distinction made is between more or less *visible or invisible* conflicts, in the eyes of the international community, that is between conflicts that attract massive attention by policymakers abroad, foreign media, international organisations, or global solidarity movements, and those who do not. Penic et al. (in press) compared political climates after the 1990s Yugoslav wars between Serbia and Croatia. Serbia experienced air raids, economic isolation, moral stigma, and criminal prosecution of several high-ranked political and military leaders including former head of state Slobodan Milosevic. Croatia has not experienced the same level of international surveillance of its war policies. The observed patterns suggest that the unchallenged (post-)war triumphalism in Croatia managed to create what the repressive policies of the Milosevic regime failed to achieve: a dramatic restriction of pluralism and an ethos of conflict that survived over the end of fighting.

Again, it is interesting to speculate whether the functions of friend–foe categorizations similarly vary between visible and invisible conflicts. In visible conflicts, international surveillance provides a permanent external audience (Klein et al. 2007). It creates a need and a strategic opportunity for conflict actors to tie the construction of friend–foe categories to international ideals and commitments, in order to mobilize broader support. In invisible conflicts, such an external audience cannot be taken for granted, which can make things easier for powerful groups and even more difficult for powerless groups. Depending on the strategic interests, functions of friend–foe categorization in invisible conflicts might then include attracting or deflecting attention from violence (especially against noncombatants), granting or denying recognition of a collective identity, and creating or preventing the creation of a legitimate interlocutor for international actors.

Can Intractability be Contingent?

From the point of view of powerless groups, the combination of asymmetry and invisibility is likely to be a worst-case scenario. These are the facilitating

circumstances for mass killings or for military annihilation of one of the sides. In Sri Lanka, when in the post-9/11 "war-against-terror" context of new alliances, the power balance shifted in favour of the Sri Lankan state forces and against the Tamil Tiger fighters, while the international community remained largely uninterested and passive, the grounds were cleared for the decisive military offensive of the government. Here as elsewhere, the resulting context of post-war triumphalism is likely to maintain—and even exacerbate—many features of the previous ethos of conflict (Jayawickreme et al. 2010). On the opposite end, some symmetric and visible conflicts might never turn into full-fledged armed conflict, because the balance of forces opens clear prospects of military victory to neither party, and because significant international surveillance increases the cost of war for both.

The crossing of the symmetry and visibility dimensions of conflicts then mainly suggests three things. First, *intractable* conflicts in the strict sense most likely appear in the two intermediate configurations of *asymmetric but visible* conflicts or *symmetric but invisible* conflicts. While the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a prototypical example of the first type, several armed conflicts in the African Great Lakes region, with their terrible death tolls, are tragic examples of the second type. Second, not all ways out from intractable conflicts are necessarily more desirable than the intractable conflicts themselves: when international surveillance is withdrawn from asymmetric conflicts, this might end the conflict, but potentially under the most tragic conditions. Third, intractability is not an intrinsic feature of the behaviours of the conflict parties themselves. External factors that are likely to shift with the broader international context play an important role.

That is not to say that the behaviour of the conflict actors is irrelevant to external factors. A good historical example is the active role of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress in the way apartheid has been overcome in South Africa: their capacity to draw international attention and mobilize international support against the apartheid regime not only protected the local anti-apartheid movement against the worst-case scenario of drifting into an asymmetric and invisible conflict; the combination of media attention and concrete weakening of the regime through economic and political embargos actually resulted in a situation where the cost of its repressive policies became much stronger to the regime than its expected gains. This constellation then created the necessary incentives for the political negotiations that paved the way for a regime change (Klotz 2002).

Does It Matter How the Groups are Defined?

Intractable conflicts presuppose that the definition of the conflict actors remains stable. Ironically though, conflict actors typically disagree about who is actually struggling against whom. Such disagreements always open the potential for conflicts to evolve through the redefinition of conflict actors or, more realistically,

through new recognitions of old definitions by key external actors. For example, when in the post-9/11 world order, the Sri Lankan government's definition of the Tamil Tigers as a terroristic clique won out over the Tiger's self-definition as the legitimate representative of a Tamil people threatened by genocide, the rebellion lost critical resources and the conflict evolved from symmetric to asymmetric. The opposite shift occurred in South Africa, when in the post-cold war international arena foreign recognition of the self-definition of the African National Congress as freedom fighters won out over its definition by the government as terrorists. Furthermore, internal cleavages, within sides opposed by the main conflict, always bear a potential for a redefinition of the conflict sides themselves. A key move can be when one internal faction claims that being treated or even targeted from the outside in a similar way does not automatically imply a motivation to fight together—"*this is not our war*"— as, for example, Scottish separatists claimed against British participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Elcheroth and Reicher 2013).

Conclusion

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which served as the natural laboratory that inspired most of Bar-Tal's theorizing, is a specific type of a particularly asymmetric and visible conflict, with shifting patterns of internal pluralism and external legitimacy. The intractability of this conflict is likely to be closely tied to a stalemate in the balance of forces shaping international alliances and surveillance. In a broader comparative perspective, such a balance of forces can sometimes be very entrenched and sometimes very volatile; "intractability" should therefore better be conceived of as a descriptive rather than a predictive statement, about a particular conflict at a particular point in time.

While Bar-Tal's critical voice adds to pluralism within Israeli society, his lifetime contribution as an engaged scholar also invites new generations of social psychologists to critically address the problem of intractability in the conflict settings around the world. Bar-Tal's work on intractable conflicts is sceptical *and* engaged, fundamental *and* applied, ideographic *and* nomothetic. Such a broad scope is the theory's main strength, but it could also become its weakness if future applications of the theory choose to bypass, rather than to expand and clarify, the theory's potential bridging function between general psychological principles and contextualized case studies. In future developments of the theory, it will therefore be critical to clearly specify at what precise level social-psychological hypotheses about conflict dynamics are meant to be universal. The assumed level of universality has important theoretical and methodological implications; it should guide the research design as well as the interpretations of findings in future studies inspired by Bar-Tal's work.

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Part II
Perspectives on Ethos of Conflict and Collective Memory

Chapter 3
Ethos of Conflict and Beyond: Differentiating Social Representations of Conflict

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Ethos of Conflict: The Concept and Its Measurement

Violent intergroup conflicts that persist for a long time present difficult challenges to the societies involved. They create stress and threaten society members' ability to satisfy basic needs and withstand the adversary. According to Bar-Tal (1998, 2007), societies adapt to such long-lasting conflict experiences and challenges by developing an "ethos of conflict." This ethos is a configuration of central, socially shared beliefs about the conflict that are connected to the respective dominant narrative about the conflict within each society in the conflict (e.g., Hammack 2006). These beliefs provide society members with a clear and meaningful view of the conflict and the conflict parties, which allows them to make sense of the current conflict reality and reduce uncertainty regarding the future development of the conflict (Bar-Tal 2000).

The ethos of conflict comprises beliefs about eight interrelated themes: justness of one's group's goals, concern about security for one's group, positive image of one's group, victimization of one's group, delegitimization and dehumanization of the adversary, positive emotional attachment to one's group, unity within one's group, and concern about peace (see also Oren volume 2; Sharvit volume 2). Accordingly, when these beliefs are crystallized in society, the ingroup is appreciated as a peace-loving victim of the outgroup (adversary), and the adversary is vilified as

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cruel, inhumane, untrustworthy, and responsible for the violence (e.g., Bar-Tal et al. 2012). Bar-Tal et al. (2012) argue that some of these eight themes are not unique to societies that are engulfed by intractable conflicts but can be observed in other societies as well. However, it is in their combination and strength that they represent the full-blown ethos of conflict.

To measure to what extent society members (in this case, Israeli Jews) endorse the ethos of conflict, Bar-Tal et al. (2012) published a scale that consists of 16 items, 2 for each of the 8 themes. The items were selected from a larger pool of 48 items, partly on the basis of each item's correlation with the total score. The scale was one-dimensional and internally consistent. In terms of social and cognitive correlates, the ethos of conflict scale was related to right-wing authoritarianism, dogmatic thinking, a right-wing or "hawkish" political self-definition, and reduced support for compromises with the Palestinians (Zafran 2002, cited in Bar-Tal et al. 2009). In addition, in nationally representative samples in both Israel and Palestine (see also Nahhas et al. volume 2, on ethos of conflict in the Palestinian society), endorsement of the ethos of conflict was associated with reduced support for compromise and resolution of the conflict (Canetti et al. 2013). The ethos of conflict also affects perceptual-cognitive processes such as selective attention as well as interpretation and evaluation of information (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). For instance, endorsement of ethos of conflict predicted how Israeli Jewish participants perceived ambiguous photos about encounters between Jews and Palestinians. Specifically, the greater participants' ethos of conflict scores, the more they perceived Palestinians to be aggressive, attributed Palestinians' aggressiveness to internal and stable causes, and engaged in positive stereotyping of Jews and negative stereotyping of Palestinians (Bar-Tal et al. 2009).

The ethos of conflict has also been investigated in a different context, namely among Serbs in regard to the Kosovo conflict. In an unpublished study, Medjedović and Petrović (2012) adapted the ethos of conflict scale to the Kosovo context and used 48 items, which again formed a one-dimensional scale. The authors found that ethos of conflict correlated positively with preferences for "pro-conservative" parties (which insist on Kosovo being an integral part of Serbia) and negatively with preferences for "pro-liberal" parties (which are more open to compromise and dialogue with Kosovo Albanians).

Based on the results of these (and other) studies, one may argue that the ethos of conflict is a social psychological barrier to conflict resolution and reconciliation (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011; Porat et al. 2015). It helps a society to deal with conflict, but at the same time the beliefs that constitute the ethos of conflict are one-sided and present the conflict in black and white terms. Specifically, it produces mistrust, hostility, a sense of threat between the conflict parties, and reduced support for compromise, and influences individuals to interpret situations in ways that contribute to the perpetuation or even escalation of the conflict.

The scale developed by Bar-Tal and colleagues (2012) distinguishes between society members in terms of the extent to which they endorse (or reject) the societal beliefs comprising the ethos of conflict. However, the one-dimensional structure of

the scale that has typically been found in empirical studies may suggest greater una-nimity in society members' understanding of the conflict than there actually is. It is an empirical question as to whether the ethos of conflict, in any particular context, is based on only one dominant narrative (or representation) of the conflict that people endorse or reject to different degrees.

If research focuses only on the dominant representation of conflict, and par-ticipants are only able to agree or disagree with this dominant representation, this "over-simplification of social reality" (Elcheroth and Spini 2012) may not do sufficient justice to alternative voices that may exist in society and that are needed for creative conflict resolution. If conflict resolution is conceptualized as a process in which more conciliatory voices within each conflict party become more prominent, we need to look beyond disagreement with ethos of conflict to the different voices that are present in society. The identification of such alterna-tive voices may contribute to a more differentiated conflict analysis and in turn more effective approaches to conflict resolution and reconciliation (Coleman 2003; Shmueli 2003; Wehr 2006). This argument is connected to the concept of "counter-narratives" (Bamberg and Andrews 2004) and the notion that identify-ing counter-narratives can help to diversify the social realities that circulate and are considered in society, which in turn may help develop strategies of change (Grabe and Dutt 2015). More generally, a clear articulation of a group's narra-tive, or understanding of the social situation, can also facilitate collective action, and collective action can play a constructive role in social change toward greater social justice (Subašić et al. 2008; Wright and Baray 2013, see also Cohen-Chen et al. this volume).

In this sense, we suggest that agreement or disagreement with the ethos of con-flict can be based on qualitatively distinct alternative understandings of conflict, to which different subgroups in society subscribe to different degrees. Such a notion of multiple viewpoints may capture the complexity of a particular conflict better than the concept of ethos of conflict alone does. In relation to the actors that can influ-ence conflict resolution, we further argue that in a globalized world, conflict parties are increasingly challenged to seek external legitimacy. Therefore, we consider not only conflict parties' but also conflict outsiders' understandings of conflict to be relevant to conflict resolution and worthy of investigation.

The approach introduced below explores socially shared viewpoints in relation to a conflict, using a methodological strategy that allows for qualitatively distinct al-ternative viewpoints to emerge from the data in a particular context. We first present the theoretical bases of this approach, and then introduce a suitable methodological strategy and summarize findings of two studies on social representations of conflict in different contexts. The first examines representations of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and how those may correspond to the beliefs that are part of Bar-Tal's (1998, 2007) ethos of conflict. The second goes beyond conflict representations within affected societies and investigates representations of the Israel–Palestine conflict among conflict outsiders.

A Bottom-Up Approach Informed by Social Representations Theory

Social representations theory (Moscovici 1961/1976, 2001), a theory of social knowledge and common sense, treats knowledge, values, and behavior as contextualized and culturally and historically grounded. As such, it is a suitable framework for our purposes of identifying representations of conflict in particular societal contexts. Social representations are defined as a society's stock of "concepts, statements, and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual communications" (Moscovici 1981, p. 181).

Research on social representations focuses on the process of social representation as well as the content of social representations. Let us first consider the *process* of social representation. Social representations are actively constructed by social actors, and are located neither at the individual nor at the social level; instead, they occupy the "in-between" space (Jovchelovitch 2007). Inter-individual communication and interaction processes are highly dependent on the different bodies of knowledge that social groups have access to, including different social identities and practices, values, ideologies, and so on. Social representations are supported by historical representations and representational future projects of the relevant social groups (Bauer and Gaskell 1999; Jovchelovitch 2012; Liu and Laszlo 2007; Sen and Wagner 2005).

One main insight from this research is that representations of conflict are intertwined with representations of the social groups in conflict. Conflict not only transforms intergroup relations but also the meanings of the "ingroup" and other social groups. Social identity emerges as an organizing construct that gives coherence to representations, as to whether they justify or challenge the social order (Echebarria Echabe et al. 1994). Social representations of categories can be strategically used for political mobilization (Klein and Licata 2003). Since research about conflict is part of the same reality that it aims to understand, researchers should be careful to avoid an "over-simplification of social realities" where the social categories and the conflict itself become reified (Elcheroth and Spini 2012). Instead, research needs to focus on how groups in conflict are constructed and perceived in the first place (Reicher 2004). In line with this reasoning, Cohrs (2012) has suggested to identify the "ideological groups" that are relevant in a particular context. These groups are based on shared beliefs rather than, for example, common ethnicity, religion, or language (see Bliuc et al. 2007, for the related concept of "opinion-based groups").

Adopting a social representations framework, our approach assumes that social representations of conflict are contested and debated within a society due to the different bodies of knowledge that various social groups utilize. Rather than examining only one dominant conflict narrative, or representation, as implied by the (one-dimensional) concept of ethos of conflict, our aims are to identify the content of alternative, competing viewpoints vis-à-vis the social representation of conflict, and to identify commonalities and differences between these viewpoints. To achieve these aims, an empirically driven, bottom-up approach is needed that allows the content and structure of social representations to emerge from the data.

Previous research on the *content* of social representations has relied on many different methods, including content analysis of media (e.g., Wagner et al. 1999), interviews and focus groups (e.g., Howarth 2002), word associations (e.g., Sarrica and Contarello 2004), ethnographic studies (e.g., Duveen and Lloyd 1993), and questionnaires (e.g., Doise et al. 1999). We suggest an additional method to identify the content of social representations and argue that Q methodology, developed by Stephenson (1953), is well suited for these purposes.

Q methodology is used to examine viewpoints of individuals on any given topic by identifying similarities and differences among individuals (see Brown 1980; McKeown and Thomas 1988; Watts and Stenner 2005). In terms of its epistemology, Q methodology does not rely on predefined concepts, but rather "finds" structure in the data. It is a small-sample, person-centered (rather than variable-centered) methodology that can capture individuality in viewpoints by maintaining a holistic perspective. At the same time, it allows the quantification of qualitative data. Through a by-person factor analysis, it can identify commonalities in viewpoints that are shared across individuals. These features make it an ideal approach to explore representations of conflict that are socially shared within ideological subgroups of a population. In practical terms, Q methodology requires the researcher to specify a "concourse" of statements based on which participants can express their viewpoints. To avoid constraint of the scope of possible viewpoints on the part of the researcher, the concourse has to be comprehensive for the phenomenon in question. In our research, we used a combination of a more "top-down," structured sampling and a more "bottom-up," unstructured sampling of statements (McKeown and Thomas 1988). We drew on models of conflict analysis and framing (Coleman 2003; Entman 1993; Kempf 2011; Wehr 2006) to define the relevant domains on which alternative understandings of conflict differ; these domains share considerable overlap with Bar-Tal's (1998, 2007) concept of ethos of conflict. We then concretized these domains with various contents from public discourse about the respective conflict.

In the data collection phase of Q methodology (called "Q sorting"), participants—preselected for maximizing diverse opinions on the conflict—are first asked to read each of the statements and sort them into three piles: one pile for those statements the participant agrees with, one pile for those the participant disagrees with, and one pile for those the participant does not have a clear opinion about or does not consider significant. Second, participants are asked to sort all statements in a more fine-grained way into multiple categories along a quasinormal distribution, usually ranging from "most agree" to "most disagree," with the middle category for statements of least psychological significance. Third, participants are given the option to move around cards until they are satisfied that the Q sort accurately reflects their viewpoint for the issue at hand. Finally, participants are asked to verbally comment on the reasons underlying their sorting. The Q sort data are then submitted to a by-person factor analysis, and the resulting factors (which represent socially shared viewpoints) are interpreted with the additional help of participants' verbal comments.

Below, we summarize findings of two example studies. The first study investigates social representations of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. The second one examines social representations of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict among conflict outsiders in Switzerland.

Social Representations of the Kurdish Conflict

The Kurdish conflict study (Uluğ and Cohrs 2014) was carried out with 15 Turkish, 15 Kurdish, and 15 Arab laypersons, recruited through snowball sampling.[1] Participants were from Mersin, an ethnically diverse region in the south of Turkey that has received significant amounts of (mainly Kurdish) migrants from the east and southeast of Turkey due to the conflict in that region. Arab participants were chosen in addition to Turkish and Kurdish participants to assess what viewpoints vis-à-vis the Kurdish conflict would emerge in members of an ethnic group that has played a less focal role in the conflict.

Conflict representations were defined across three domains: causes of and issues in the conflict (covered by 31 statements); relationships, processes, and dynamics of the conflict (56 statements); and possible solutions for the conflict (30 statements). The analysis highlighted five different viewpoints. Of these, two quite similar "pro-Turkish" viewpoints emerged. The first, which was defined by Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab participants, could be identified as a "right-wing" viewpoint that emphasizes the political nature of PKK's[2] campaign as a threat to harmony between Turks and Kurds. The second was defined by Turkish and Arab participants and emphasizes external powers and economic factors as central issues in the conflict. These two viewpoints might be seen as different varieties of the "Turkish State Discourse" described by Yeğen (2007). Somewhat larger differences exist to the third viewpoint, defined by Kurdish and Arab participants, which expresses an ambivalent view of the Turkish state (e.g., recognizing the role of misbehavior of state officials yet emphasizing the unity of Turkey and the role of terrorism) and an awareness of recent changes in conflict dynamics. Finally, two viewpoints could be identified as "pro-Kurdish." The fourth viewpoint, which was defined by Kurdish, Turkish, and Arab participants, expresses a democracy perspective that emphasizes the democracy and human rights dimensions of the conflict. The last viewpoint was defined solely by Kurdish participants and emphasizes long-term oppression of Kurds and asserting Kurdish identity and political rights.

We suggest that, although to a lesser extent for the third (ambivalent) viewpoint, all viewpoints are compatible with, and thus may form the basis of, an ethos of conflict in the Turkish context. They seem to reflect, in somewhat different ways

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[1] Ongoing research by the second author of this chapter extends the study presented here by examining viewpoints of political delegates, journalists, and scholars in addition to laypeople.

[2] Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers' Party, the "armed wing" of the Kurdish national movement.

and to different degrees, the core elements of the ethos of conflict: belief in the justness of the goals of one's group, concern about the security of one's group, a positive image of and emotional attachment to one's group, the perception of one's group as victimized, an emphasis on unity in one's group, concern about peace, and delegitimization of the adversary. However, which social categories are constructed as relevant differs. For example, on the pro-Turkish side, regarding delegitimization of the adversary, in the first viewpoint it is mostly PKK which is seen as an organization that ruins the harmony, whereas in the second viewpoint foreign powers are the primary target of blame. Likewise, in relation to victimization, in the first viewpoint the harmonious fellowship between Turks and Kurds is threatened, whereas in the second it is more "the unity of Turkey" that is under attack. Correspondingly, on the pro-Kurdish side, regarding delegitimization of the adversary, in the fourth viewpoint it is the Turkish state that is blamed for the conflict, whereas in the fifth it is mainly the Turkish Army that is blamed as a "murderer of Kurds." In terms of victimization, in the fourth viewpoint, all ethnic identities (Turkish identity to a lesser extent) are victims of the conflict because of lack of democracy, whereas in the fifth it is mainly the Kurdish identity that is victimized. Thus, the existence of an overarching ethos of conflict does not imply that there is no variation within a conflict party in how the conflict is represented. Rather, there seem to be different alternative representations of a conflict that can underlie the ethos of conflict. This is the case for both Turks and Kurds where multiple factors and substantial ideological variation emerged.

It should be noted that, with one exception, the "pro-Turkish" and "pro-Kurdish" viewpoints were not shared only by Turks and Kurds, respectively. In line with the notion of ideological groups (Cohrs 2012), shared belief does not necessarily correspond to shared ethnicity. Because of this, we used the term "Kurdish conflict" instead of another term that is sometimes used, "Turkish–Kurdish conflict." The latter term might be seen as reifying ethnic categories (Elcheroth and Spini 2012; Reicher 2004), and we have shown that there are other understandings of the conflict in addition to an ethnic definition.

Social Representations of the Israel–Palestine Conflict Among Conflict Outsiders

Stakeholders in conflicts are not limited to the opposing parties and directly affected societies. Particularly in the case of intractable, globally relevant conflicts such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, conflict outsiders who are not sharing the conflict's everyday reality may attempt to make sense of the conflict. We consider them to range from neutral third parties to lobby groups with certain interests in the conflict. In countries far away from the conflict area itself, such groups spread their own versions of the conflict: international mediators, politicians, activists, diaspora groups, or people globally identifying with either of the conflict parties. In their attempt to influence public legitimacy of either conflict party abroad, conflict outsiders may ultimately influence the course of the conflict and conflict resolution itself.

There is little research into the conflict representations of conflict outsiders (for one line of research, see Kempf 2011, who studied the "mental models" of the Israel–Palestine conflict among Germans and Austrians). How do such conflict outsiders represent the Israel–Palestine conflict, while being spared of the immediate fear of violence or the need to justify any own, potentially immoral, actions?

To address these questions, Stahel and Cohrs (2015) have explored social representations of the Israel–Palestine conflict among 31 Swiss residents of varying political, religious, and social backgrounds, and with differing levels of self-positioning and activist engagement in the conflict. The sample included members of two popular Swiss activist organizations in regard to the Israel–Palestine conflict, individual activists, members of religious communities (including a pastor and a rabbi), and, as a contrasting group, students and professionals with some interest in the conflict, but no activist engagement. The variation of conflict representations was investigated across three domains: conflict labels, conflict issues and dynamics, and solution process. For each domain, participants sorted approximately 25 statements. In the analysis, we identified four socially shared, qualitatively distinct viewpoints. We summarize them briefly here, including their relations to sociodemographic variables.

First, a conciliatory viewpoint that defines the conflict as *political-religious-ethnic* in nature: It evaluates the conflict according to general human rights principles and an attitude of sharing while clear opinions on concrete issues in the conflict are largely absent (this perspective was defined by emotionally unconcerned participants without physical or personal contact to either conflict party; possibly related to Switzerland's policy of neutrality). A second, dovish pro-Israeli viewpoint perceives an *existential–political* conflict that leads Israel to act in self-defense; the preferred solution involves self-determination for both the Jewish and Palestinian people, a strong belief in peace, and a negotiated two-state solution (defined by Israel-supporting activists and laypeople, mainly Jewish, right-wing, without contact with Palestinians). A third, hawkish-religious pro-Israeli viewpoint defines the conflict as *religious* and sees Israel as acting in self-defense against Palestinian aggression. The Holocaust and security are highly salient issues. The preferred solution involves an exclusive claim of Israel/Palestine for the Jewish people and a one-state solution (defined by Christian Israel-supporting activists or church members, right-wing, without contact with Palestinians). Finally, a fourth, pro-Palestinian viewpoint perceives the conflict as *political-colonial* and Israel as acting aggressively against Palestinian victims in a system of apartheid and occupation. The "only lasting" solution is a one-state solution (defined by Palestine-supporting activists, left-wing, with physical and personal contact with both conflict parties).

The first and second viewpoints reflect alternatives to the ethos of conflict. They either deviate from the ethos of conflict by not conforming to all ethos beliefs, or present different conflict representations not discovered within the affected societies (e.g., in terms of the central relevance of human rights principles). We suggest, as we wrote above, that such more conciliatory voices need to be identified and

highlighted. The third and fourth viewpoints seem to constitute mirror images, or diametrically opposed "ethoses." These viewpoints describe the mirroring of self-justification, which is usually present among the actual conflict adversaries (Bar-Tal 2007; Oren et al. 2004). Here, in line with the concept of ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 1998, 2007), the mirroring refers to central beliefs about exclusive victimization, positive image and justness of goals of parties with which a conflict outsider identifies, concern about security, delegitimization, and positive attachment to a particular group. As an exception, belief in peace appeared only in the pro-Palestinian, but not in the hawkish pro-Israeli representation. Two further interesting findings of Stahel and Cohrs's (2015) study were the ideological gap within the pro-Israeli camp and the existence of a rather abstract, unconcerned human rights perspective of the conciliatory view. We expect this latter viewpoint to be particularly characteristic for conflict outsiders. Overall, the study suggests that the ethos of conflict can "spill over" to conflict outsiders. Whether and the manner in which outsiders' conflict representations are formed in other interesting contexts is left to future research.

Discussion and Conclusion

The studies mentioned above identified the content of social representations of conflict among members of a conflict-ridden society (representations of the Kurdish conflict among Turks, Kurds, and Arabs in Turkey) as well as among conflict outsiders (representations of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict among Swiss residents). In both studies, qualitatively distinct positions toward the social representation of conflict could be identified, which thus go beyond high versus low adherence to the ethos of conflict.[3] Yet, because of space restrictions, the content of the different viewpoints could not be described in further detail here. Our presentation still "over-simplifies social realities" (Elcheroth and Spini 2012), and so we urge readers not to interpret the viewpoints we described in a reified sense.

Our findings help to elucidate alternative voices that deviate from the ethos of conflict or dominant conflict representations. Such minority views sometimes have greater potential for social change (Elcheroth et al. 2011; Subašić et al. 2008) and thus, in the present case, may contribute to conflict resolution and reconciliation. Articulating alternative positions can help to diversify the social realities that circulate in society, and thus might contribute to a more inclusive, more democratic discourse and reduce the power differential that exists in the reification of the dominant representation (Bamberg and Andrews 2004; Grabe and Dutt 2015; Howarth 2006). Also, identifying viewpoints that carry within them positive aspects of intergroup relations, and thus have the potential to be used for compromise, would be a

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[3] Gayer (2012), in a Q methodological study on national identity constructions among Israeli Jews and Palestinians, recently also found two Q factors on each side of the Israel–Palestine conflict.

useful addition to the focus on the negative side of the concept of ethos of conflict and to the "dark theories of intergroup relations" (Liu and Laszlo 2007) in general. Bar-Tal (2011) has started with work in this direction with his conceptualization of the "ethos of peace."

Furthermore, in order to also address positive aspects of intergroup relations, such research could examine our ability to empathize with others' knowledge and narrative construction of the reality of conflict as well as our own (Jovchelovitch 2007; Liu and Laszlo 2007). Understanding the empathic reception of others' representations could be beneficial for deconstructing and counteracting currently held representations of intergroup conflict and provide us with valuable input in the conceptualization of an ethos of peace. Social representations contain information on how we represent things, as well as how we think relevant others represent them (Elcheroth et al. 2011; Gillespie 2008). Incorporating the knowledge of others into our own thinking is important but does not necessarily imply its emphatic reception. There are certain *semantic barriers* (Gillespie 2008) that prevent accommodation of alternative representations and might contribute to the maintenance of ethos of conflict.

Follow-up research needs to look at the determinants and consequences of the socially shared viewpoints identified; this is one strength of the quantitative research on ethos of conflict reviewed above. Our more qualitative approach, having used purposive sampling, does not allow one to generalize the relations between socio-demographic variables and the various positions toward the social representations to the population of interest. Also, in contrast to Bar-Tal's work, which is aimed at developing a general theory of how societies in conflict think, our approach involves a culturally sensitive analysis of the content and structure of shared systems of knowledge and beliefs in a particular context (Liu and Laszlo 2007).[4] It is the methodological approach and the broader metatheoretical perspective that can be generalized across contexts (see also Elcheroth and Spini this volume). Nevertheless, there are various ways in which Q-methodological findings can be translated into measures for further quantitative research (e.g., Danielson 2009).[5] Research along these lines could also fruitfully include a measure of ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal et al. 2012) to study directly the strength of the relationships between various understandings of conflict and ethos of conflict and whether identification with such alternative viewpoints of conflict can predict important outcome variables above and beyond ethos of conflict.

Regarding conflict representations among conflict outsiders, further research is needed to understand the emotional and affective basis of representations in such groups (Greene and Haidt 2002) and whether emotional spillover effects from conflict parties to conflict outsiders exist, for example, through processes of social identification (Tajfel and Turner 1979), because of analogies such as comparisons

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[4] Of course, the empirical measures of ethos of conflict also have to be developed on a case-to-case basis, sensitive to the particular context.

[5] The first and second authors of this chapter are currently addressing this issue in relation to the Kurdish conflict.

or metaphors to more familiar conflicts (Gentner 2003), or due to stereotypes that conflict outsiders hold of the conflict parties or solidarity groups. If social representations among conflict parties fulfill collective functions, such as coping with stress or the justification of violence (Bar-Tal 2000), what functions might they fulfill for conflict outsiders? For example, social representations research suggests that once a conflict becomes a hot media topic, people develop a representation of the conflict to facilitate their participation in everyday communication (e.g., Wagner et al. 2002). Future research could also focus on the ways in which conflict outsiders' representations influence representations within a conflict society, and vice versa. This would link with research on social movements (e.g., Benford and Snow 2000) and, more specifically, international solidarity movements (see also Subašić et al. 2008).

We hope that our short introduction to a bottom-up, social representations approach to conflict that relies on Q methodology will contribute to exciting further studies that complement research on the ethos of conflict. Furthermore, we hope that a focus on alternative social representations that carry within them the potential for positive intergroup relations will ultimately contribute to peaceful social change.

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Chapter 4
Ethos of Conflict: A System Justification Perspective

John T. Jost, Chadly Stern and Joanna Sterling

> *In my view, the challenge that is posed before all of us is to establish a system of beliefs, attitudes, values, and norms that cherish peace, justice, and morality. I know that to many it may look like an unrealistic goal and to others like a long-term goal. I prefer the latter view because it still gives hope.*
> (Bar-Tal 2013, pp. 457–458)

In the history of social psychology, very few authors have contributed as much to a scientific understanding of stereotyping, prejudice, intergroup conflict, oppression, and occupation as Daniel Bar-Tal. For nearly 40 years, his writings have helped to illuminate some of the darkest recesses of collective belief and behavior, throwing light on the myriad ways in which members of human social groups are able to convince themselves that it is legitimate—perhaps even necessary—for them to abuse and exploit others for the sake of the group or the society at large. Much of his work addresses the social and psychological production of evil, including acts of terrorism, torture, and genocide (see also Darley 1992/2004; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Staub 1989). Its aim is to prevent "conflicts that are viciously violent and prolonged" because they "constitute a special threat to the societies involved" and "cause tremendous suffering, which can sometimes spill beyond their borders" (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 1).

In this chapter, we pay tribute to Daniel Bar-Tal's critical, indispensable contributions to the study of prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict. We begin by considering some of the foundational assumptions of Bar-Tal's analysis, before turning to an examination of the ways in which system justification theory dovetails nicely with his analysis of the "ethos of conflict" and the role of conflict-supporting belief systems or ideologies. Next, we seek to articulate

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how the basic motivation to defend, bolster, and justify aspects of the societal status quo—in conjunction with underlying epistemic, existential, and relational needs that drive this motivation—can help to explain how and why seemingly intractable conflicts are maintained by participants despite the immense havoc they wreak. In the spirit of Bar-Tal, we conclude the chapter on an optimistic note by addressing the ways in which system justification motivation may be harnessed to foster social change and to facilitate progress when it comes to the resolution of intergroup conflict.

The Shared Nature of Group Beliefs

Bar-Tal's work in the area of intergroup conflict and its resolution began, in many ways, with a simple but powerful assumption that emerged from the classic social psychological work of Sherif (1936), Lewin (1947), and Asch (1952), namely that:

> Individuals who live in groups hold common beliefs, which define their reality, not only as persons, but also as group members. This reality becomes especially important when group members become aware that they share it. There may be an important difference for the group between the situations when a belief is held by one member of the group, or even by all the members, who are not aware of sharing this belief, and the situations when a belief is held by all the members or a portion of them, who are aware of this sharing.(Bar-Tal 1990, p. 1, emphasis omitted)

When beliefs are widely shared—and especially when people *know* that they are widely shared—they become a *social force* that can motivate prejudice, conflict, and war or (more optimistically) their opposites: tolerance, cooperation, and peace. Why is this?

Perhaps it is because perceptions of reality that are socially constructed and seemingly shared by others around us are quite simply "taken for granted" and, in this sense, acquire a sort of presumptive legitimacy (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Moscovici 1988). In more explicitly psychological language, we might say that *relational* and *epistemic* sources of motivation are intertwined. That is, the things we know (or think we know) are derived from the people whom we like, trust, and identify with, and the people whom we value the most are the ones who make the most sense to us, the ones who appear to be speaking the truth (see also Festinger 1954; Hardin and Higgins 1996; Jost et al. 2008; Turner 1991). The theoretical assumption that relational and epistemic goals are linked is a profound one that has guided Bar-Tal's (1990, 2013) analysis of ideological factors that are capable of shifting intergroup relations in both heinous and heroic directions.

To take one historical example of the heinous direction, Bar-Tal (1990) described in detail the ways in which the promulgation of shared stereotypes and prejudices about Jews contributed to an ideological process of delegitimization, and indeed dehumanization, in Germany between 1933 and 1945 that helped to make Nazi atrocities possible. Like Allport (1954) before him, Bar-Tal observed that there were numerous conflicting, irrational, hateful beliefs in circulation concerning the alleged characteristics of Jews (see also Glick 2002). Nevertheless, these beliefs

were repeated so often by authorities and peers that German citizens came to treat them as obviously, inescapably true. Bar-Tal noted that:

> [Jews] were dehumanized because they were considered to be members of a lower race; at the same time, they were labeled as demons or satans, which are superhuman creatures. They were portrayed as soulless, usurious, sneaky, shallow, insincere, shrewd, materialistic, or rootless. They were outcast because they were also labeled as thieves, corrupters, exploiters, or immoral men… Jews were presented with political labels, since they were viewed as promoters of such diverse evils as bolshevism, capitalism, democracy, and internationalism—all aimed at subverting 'Aryan racial superiority.'(Bar-Tal 1990, p. 96)

It is a distinctive and valuable characteristic of Bar-Tal's thought that he consistently, albeit tacitly, seeks to integrate individual, group, and system levels of analysis (see Doise 1986; Stangor and Jost 1997). For instance, he ties animosities with and between persons and groups to both structural and ideological aspects of the social order, such as economic crises and official policies of anti-Semitism.

The elements of Nazi ideology became thoroughly *internalized* by many citizens of the German population through processes of *persuasion* and *socialization* that came to permeate nearly every cultural practice, including artistic, educational, and political institutions. Bar-Tal (1990) writes, illustratively, that "All of the institutions of the German society formally adopted and practiced delegitimizing beliefs about Jews," and so Germans became "convinced that it was necessary to exclude Jews from the economic, political, societal, and cultural aspects of life and to deny their humanity" (p. 104). Bar-Tal is especially attuned to the ways in which belief systems serve to defend and justify atrocities—planned or committed—on behalf of the group or social system (see, in addition to Tajfel 1981; Reykowski, this volume). Bar-Tal (1990) points out, for instance, "the delegitimization of the Jews not only served as a uniting vehicle and as a justification for an elimination of internal opposition, but also as a justification for a war" (p. 103).

A theoretical sensitivity to the complex interplay of processes occurring at individual, group, and system levels of analysis led Bar-Tal (2013) to incorporate the basic tenets of system justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004) into his thinking, especially the notion that people are motivated to "form a system of beliefs that justifies the sociopolitical system… [and] maintains the status quo" (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 211). Bar-Tal and his colleagues have fruitfully applied the concept of system justification in their analysis of the "ethos of conflict" that legitimizes violence and maintains a seemingly intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (e.g., Bar-Tal and Halperin 2013; Sharvit 2014, see also Cohrs et al., this volume; Tropp, this volume; Oren, volume 2; Sharvit, volume 2; Nahhas et al., volume 2). More specifically, these scholars have identified a number of social and psychological processes—including delegitimization of the opposition, the maintenance of a positive self-image, and faith in the justness of one's own goals—that contribute to the adoption of shared beliefs and ideologies, which function as justifications and rationalizations for the perpetuation of an extremely destructive status quo in the Middle East. Tens of thousands of Palestinians and Israelis have been killed through acts of war, policing, and terrorism over the past several decades

(http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/casualtiestotal.html), and no end to the violence or the policies that promote it is in sight.

It seems counterintuitive that participants in a costly military and civilian conflict would want to perpetuate it on any level, but this is precisely the kind of nonobvious outcome that system justification theory seeks to understand (Jost and Hunyady 2005). In the remainder of this chapter, we therefore hone in on Bar-Tal's insightful observations pertaining to the existence and evolution of an "ethos of conflict" and explore the social, cognitive, and motivational factors that sustain this ethos as a kind of system-justifying ideology. More specifically, we highlight some of the ways in which epistemic, existential, and relational motives for certainty, security, and social belongingness manifest themselves in the tendency to defend, bolster, and justify the societal status quo (Jost et al. 2008). This may help to explain how and why system justification motivation contributes to the development and maintenance of destructive, "conflict-supporting belief systems" under circumstances of entrenched conflict and existential threat. We close by considering—in the spirit of Bar-Tal's inspirational writings about reconciliation, innovation, and social change—a few of the more hopeful prospects for promoting peace.

"Ethos of Conflict" as a System-Justifying Ideology

Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) defined an "intractable conflict" as a long-term, violent disagreement over opposing goals that are central and salient in one or more societies and that is perceived to be existential, unsolvable, and zero-sum in nature (p. 217). There can be little doubt that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is experienced by both sides as intractable in all of these senses. Bar-Tal's analysis of this conflict, which has been a part of his life for decades, is profound, insightful, unswervingly truthful, and courageous. The objectivity of his scholarship is to be admired; in his writing, there are no hints of defensiveness on behalf of his own group or the social and political system in which he lives and works. He is no system-justifier. It seems to us that few inside observers of the Middle East are capable of the kind of critical perspicacity that Bar-Tal has managed to sustain throughout his career.

For instance, Bar-Tal (2013, pp. 201–209) lists and discusses, in considerable detail, eight types of shared group beliefs that contribute—in his own society—to the "ethos of conflict." These include beliefs and belief systems that: (1) delegitimize the enemy, (2) reinforce a sense of longstanding victimhood, (3) maintain a positive collective self-image, (4) emphasize security risks and concerns, (5) cast doubt on the likelihood of peaceful solutions, (6) appeal to national unity and the need for cohesion as opposed to diversity of opinion, (7) demand patriotism and self-sacrifice, and (8) assert the justness of the goals of the group and the system. These, then, are the group-justifying and system-justifying elements of an ideology that "describes, interprets, and explains the conflict and the related issues by making assertions and assumptions about the nature of the conflict, the conditions related to it, the goals that are needed to win the conflict, and the image of the rival and one's own group" (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 210).

As an ideology, Bar-Tal (2013) is surely correct that the ethos of conflict reflects "genuine attempts to give meaning and organize the experiences … that are part of life in the context of intractable conflict" (p. 211). But from the perspective of system justification theory, it is especially significant that the ethos of conflict also expresses "conscious or unconscious tendencies to rationalize the way things are or, alternatively, the wishes of how they should be" (p. 211). In other words, the belief system as a whole "seeks to preserve the existing order of continuing the conflict and thus to maintain the known and familiar"; in doing so, it "rationalizes the importance of its continuation and the rejection of compromising" (p. 211).

According to system justification theory, nearly everyone is motivated, at least to some extent, to defend, bolster, and rationalize aspects of the societal status quo, especially the systems and institutions on which citizens depend (Jost et al. 2004). Presumably, this is because believing that the social system and its authorities are legitimate, stable, benevolent, and just helps people to assuage their epistemic, existential, and relational needs to feel a sense of certainty, security, and belongingness (see Hennes et al. 2012). Conversely, believing that one's social system and authorities are illegitimate, unstable, malevolent, and unjust should frustrate or aggravate these epistemic, existential, and relational needs. Thus, system justification theory differs from several other perspectives in social psychology, which would suggest that *any* belief system—whether it is critical or supportive of the status quo—is as good *as any other* at addressing concerns about uncertainty, threat, and social exclusion (Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Heine et al. 2006; Hogg 2005; Proulx et al. 2012). As a result, system justification theory may help to explain the cyclical, self-perpetuating nature of intergroup conflicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

A System Justification Perspective on the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Intergroup Conflict

Prior research indicates that individuals who are chronically or temporarily high on epistemic needs for order, structure, closure, certainty, and control tend to endorse belief systems that support the societal status quo, such as political conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., Hennes et al. 2012; Jost et al. 2003; Kemmelmeier 1997; Thórisdóttir and Jost 2011). These types of belief systems, in turn, are associated with conflict-supporting attitudes and behaviors. Bar-Tal (2013) writes, for instance, "A close relationship between the ethos of conflict and [right-wing authoritarianism] as worldviews mirrors a conservative orientation of adhering to traditional goals and known situations, closure to new ideas, and mistrust of the other" as well as "holding non-compromising views about conflict" (p. 212; see also Porat et al. 2015).

Similarly, individuals who are chronically or temporarily high on existential needs for safety, security, reassurance, and the avoidance of danger gravitate toward leaders and opinions that are conservative, authoritarian, and system justifying in nature (e.g., Altemeyer 1998; Bonanno and Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2003; Landau et al.

2004; Ullrich and Cohrs 2007). This is consistent with the observation that the increase in terrorist attacks in Israel since the Second Intifada, which was declared in 2000, was accompanied by concomitant increases in both the proportion of citizens who identified themselves as right-wing and the electoral success of right-wing parties and politicians (e.g., Bar-Tal 2004, pp. 687–688; Berrebi and Klor 2008). Research also suggested that high exposure to terrorist events was associated with greater sensitivity to potential security threats from Palestinians, and this sensitivity was associated with stronger support for exclusionary social policies on the part of Israeli Jews (e.g., Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009a, b). Conflict-supporting beliefs, like other system-justifying beliefs (Jost and Hunyady 2005), might serve a palliative function by protecting people from some of the most distressing implications of the conflict. For example, Lavi et al. (2014) found that people who endorsed conflict–supporting beliefs were unaffected by financial damage and reported *less* depression after experiencing home loss as a result of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in comparison with those who were spared these unfortunate experiences.

With respect to relational needs, individuals who prioritize values of conformity and loyalty to their own group tend to be more politically conservative and authoritarian than those who deprioritize these values (Feldman 2003; Graham et al. 2009; Jost et al. in press; Kugler et al. 2014; Piurko et al. 2011). In addition, those who possess a stronger motivation to develop shared perceptions of the world (i.e., "shared reality") with like-minded others tend to be more politically conservative (Stern et al. 2014), and the motivation to share reality with friends and family members who are conservative can lead to increased system justification (Jost et al. 2008).

Hennes et al. (2012) demonstrated that epistemic, existential, and relational needs each contributed significantly and independently to economic system justification, which, in turn, contributed to the endorsement of status quo positions with respect to public policies having to do with health-care reform, immigration, global climate change, and the building of the "Ground Zero mosque" in New York City. In addition, economic system justification mediated the effects of epistemic, existential, and relational needs on support for the Tea Party movement (a conservative movement aimed at defending the capitalist system against governmental regulation and restoring America's "traditional values") and opposition to the Occupy Wall Street movement (a progressive movement seeking to challenge corporate power and promote social and economic justice). Taken in conjunction, the results summarized by Hennes et al. (2012) provide support for a theoretical model in which the heightened epistemic, existential, and relational needs predict stronger ideological defense of the societal status quo and greater endorsement of system-justifying beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) note that conflict-supporting belief systems fulfill many of these same psychological needs by "provid[ing] a stable conceptual framework that allows society members involved in intractable conflict to organize and comprehend the world in which they live" (p. 220).

Intractable conflicts, such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, create situations in which citizens must endure fairly severe levels of chronic stress, pain, grief, fear, threat, trauma, and uncertainty. People who live in societies of intractable conflict

must therefore adapt psychologically to meet three basic challenges identified by Bar-Tal (2007): (1) the deprivation of basic needs pertaining to safety, certainty, and control, (2) high levels of stress, fear, and other negative emotional states, and (3) symbolic and material challenges to group identity posed by members of the "enemy." To address these challenges, societies develop a "socio-psychological infrastructure" of conflict-supporting belief systems, which transmit collective memories and an ethos of conflict that reflects shared, overly simplistic understandings of the past, present, and future. As noted above, these belief systems assume that the other group is at fault for the initiation and continuation of the conflict, while one's own group is cast in a positive light—as the innocent victim of the outgroup's hostility. There are also collective emotional orientations, such as fear and hatred of the other group, that characterize feelings about the conflict and influence the attitudes and behaviors of leaders and followers (Dupuis et al., this volume; Jarymowicz, this volume; Van Zomeren and Cohen-Chen, this volume; Pliskin and Halperin, volume 2). One study found, for instance, that Israeli Jews who experienced more anger and hatred, as well as less empathy and guilt, while thinking about "the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza" were more likely to reject plans to end the conflict and to promote water sharing between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Kahn et al. in press). Thus, conflict-supporting belief systems reinforce the notion that members of the outgroup are dangerous and could strike at any moment while also, through their support for the status quo, increase the likelihood that such attacks will occur.

As Bar-Tal (1998) pointed out, any proposed changes to the current state of affairs could cause individuals to imagine even more disastrous consequences for their own group and its status vis-à-vis the outgroup, risking the possibility of some kind of defeat. From a system justification perspective, real or imagined threats to the status quo frequently engender motivated defense of the system (Jost et al. 2015; Kay and Friesen 2011). Examples of this type of mentality can be found in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. At key stages in the process of negotiation, both sides opted to preserve the status quo rather than "risking" a peaceful solution. In 1967, the Arab League rejected Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's peace overture in which "everything [was] negotiable" and instead held fast to "the Three No's" (no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel; see "Immediate Aftermath," 2007). In 2002 and 2007, Israel rejected out of hand King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia's Arab Peace Initiative, as a "non-starter," despite the fact that it had attracted unanimous support among Arab League members (Krieger 2012).

Once individuals have adopted system-justifying beliefs to cope with day-to-day living in a conflict-ridden society, these belief systems can affect cognitive processing in a manner that sustains (rather than undermines) the conflict. Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) note that the formation of conflict-supporting beliefs can contribute to "selective, biased, and distorting information processing" (p. 220). For instance, Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) observed that Israelis who reported being more politically conservative were (a) less open to learning about new perspectives on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (e.g., hearing Palestinians' opinions about the conflict) and (b) reported greater opposition to compromise in upcoming negotiations, and

both of these relationships were statistically mediated by the adoption of conflict-supporting belief systems, such as beliefs about collective victimhood and delegitimization of the outgroup. Expanding upon these findings, Porat et al. (2015) discovered that endorsing conservative ideology and traditional values predicted the adoption of conflict-supporting beliefs, which in turn was associated with tendencies to seek out information validating prior assumptions and the avoidance of information about Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations.

Furthermore, Sharvit (2014) demonstrated in an experimental situation that Israeli Jews who were exposed to highly threatening, distressing information showed increased activation of "ethos of conflict" beliefs related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, even when the distressing information was unrelated to the conflict. Furthermore, when these beliefs were activated under distress, they facilitated the processing of information that was consistent with and inhibited the processing of information that was inconsistent with the ethos of conflict. That is, information that could contribute to a peaceful settlement was ultimately ignored. Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) wrote that, as a result of beliefs and ideologies that serve to justify the status quo, "peaceful gestures initiated by the adversary, new proposals raised by third parties or by the other side and/or new information about the other side's willingness to compromise, may not get proper attention and consideration" (p. 231).

Finally, the conflict-supporting beliefs have the insidious consequence of perpetuating a cycle of violence (both perceived and actual) that keeps members of both societies in a chronically heightened state of threat. By insisting on the justness of their own cause, partisans are led to support attacks on the "enemy" and to justify such attacks as necessary and desirable. Such attacks invariably provoke counter-attacks, further intensifying feelings of insecurity and the desire to defend the group and the system. A cycle of violence is thereby created, so that the experience of conflict causes feelings of uncertainty, threat, and social exclusion to become chronically activated, and these feelings lead individuals to adopt system-justifying beliefs that sustain popular support for policies that create further violence. This process is illustrated in Fig. 4.1, which highlights the ways in which exposure to


Fig. 4.1 Illustration of model in which exposure to conflict contributes to social and psychological tendencies that are system-justifying and likely perpetuate the conflict

a seemingly intractable conflict contributes to social and psychological tendencies that are system-justifying (rather than system-challenging) and therefore likely to perpetuate the conflict and all of the anxiety associated with it.

Putting all of this together, we hypothesize that persistent exposure to conflict significantly increases feelings of distress and threat in the citizenry. These feelings are expected to magnify existential needs to reduce fear and threat, epistemic needs to restore certainty and order, and relational needs to receive social support from family, friends, and like-minded others. Heightened levels of existential, epistemic, and relational motivation should, in turn, increase the desire to justify the familiar status quo. In the domain of seemingly intractable conflicts, the beliefs that justify the status quo are those that sustain the conflict at hand. Insofar as "conflict-supporting beliefs" characterize the ingroup as superior, their cause as necessary and just, and the interests of the outgroup as illegitimate, endorsing these beliefs reinforces the very conflict that evoked emotional distress in the first place, and the same psychological sequence is initiated again. Future research would do well to identify modes of intervention, so that the cycle of conflict, distress, and system justification may be disrupted or broken.

In more overtly political terms, the model illustrated in Fig. 4.1 suggests that the cycle of violence may strengthen the bargaining positions of extremists, especially right-wing extremists, religious fundamentalists, and authoritarian actors on both sides of the conflict. These actors, of course, are least willing or—because of the constituencies they represent—least able to compromise with the other side. Thus, an integration of theory and research on ideology, system justification, and conflict-supporting belief systems would lead to the prediction that in societies where intense conflict is entrenched, individuals will respond to threat and violence by embracing right-wing belief systems that tend to perpetuate the conflict over belief systems—such as an "ethos of peace"—that would challenge it.

An "Ethos of Peace"? The Potential for System-Sanctioned Change in Seemingly Intractable Conflicts

At first glance, the model illustrated in Fig. 4.1 might present an entirely pessimistic perspective on prospects for peace and reconciliation in the context of a seemingly intractable conflict. Although conflict-supporting belief systems can (and do) reproduce feelings of threat and distress, it is also possible that social influence strategies can be used to sever the connection between feelings of threat and the endorsement of conflict-supporting beliefs. Specifically, when communications are framed in such a way that social change is regarded as congruent with the most cherished ideals and values of the social system, policies of innovation may be viewed through the lens of defending and bolstering the system. For instance, Nam and Jost (unpublished data) found that when messages about the proposed nationalization of a Muslim holiday were described as consistent with American traditions of religious pluralism, tolerance, and freedom of worship, individuals who scored higher on a

measure of system justification were more, rather than less, likely to support the pro-Muslim initiative. These and related findings may provide some basis for optimism that "system-sanctioned" appeals for change, which work with rather than against system justification motivation, could be utilized to reduce animosity in the context of seemingly intractable conflicts (see also Gaucher and Jost 2011). There is also the prospect that once a peaceful solution is regarded as *inevitable* it will be regarded as the "new" status quo (Kay et al. 2002), and people will begin to accept and rationalize the new, more peaceful regime—rather than merely reacting against it as a counterfactual possibility (Laurin et al. 2013). Perhaps it is fitting to end on these more upbeat notions, insofar as they echo the hopeful vision expressed by Bar-Tal (2013) in the epigram we have chosen for this chapter and in his writings about the "ethos of peace" (pp. 338, 400–433).

We have sought to pay tribute to the remarkably generative career of Daniel Bar-Tal and the profound, courageous contributions he has made to theory and research on the development of shared belief systems that promote and prevent intergroup conflict. Bar-Tal's legacy has paved the way for a penetrating analysis of conflict-supporting belief systems, taking into account their social and psychological functions, and in doing so he has laid a strong foundation for research on conflict resolution strategies. Following Bar-Tal's (2013) lead, we have drawn on system justification theory to spell out the ways in which beliefs and ideologies that serve to perpetuate the status quo may address underlying epistemic, existential, and relational needs to maintain a subjective sense of certainty, security, and belongingness. This, in turn, may help to explain why it is so difficult for people to break out of the "cycle of violence" that characterizes seemingly intractable conflicts, such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. At the same time, we keep the faith—along with Bar-Tal (2013) that in the long run it may be possible "to establish a system of beliefs, attitudes, values, and norms that cherish peace, justice, and morality" (p. 457) and, once it is firmly established as a part of the status quo, that human motivation will contribute to its justification and defense.

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Chapter 5
The Collective Remembering of Conflict and Its Role in Fueling an Ethos of Conflict in Society

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Among the more enduring legacies of Daniel Bar-Tal's work is his conceptualization of the psychology of societies in intractable conflict. Bar-Tal (1998, 2007) defines intractable conflict as violent, central/intensive, zero-sum, protracted in time, and perceived as "irreconcilable" (see Reykowski, this volume, for a review of Bar-Tal's theory). Bar-Tal's conception of societal ethos of conflict links the general situation of conflict in society to collective and individual psychologies. His conception of societal ethos is entirely independent from other well-known formulations of societal psychology, like the social representations theory of Moscovici (1961/2008) or the cross-cultural conceptions of Hofstede (1980/2001) or Schwartz (1994).

Bar-Tal theorizes that societies in intractable conflict develop a set of societal beliefs, attitudes, emotions, values, motivations, norms, and practices (Bar-Tal 2011) that function to provide a meaningful but rigid picture of the conflict situation, and hence become *part* of the conflict. These societal beliefs justify the behavior of the society, facilitate mobilization for participation in the conflict, and enable maintenance of positive social identity defined in opposition to an enemy. According to Bar-Tal (2007) eight elements of the sociopsychological repertoire, on the individual and collective levels, gradually crystallize into a well-organized system of societal shared beliefs that penetrate into the institutions and communication channels of society and become part of its sociopsychological infrastructure (see also Cohrs et al., this volume; Jost et al., this volume; Oren, volume 2; Sharvit, volume 2; Nahhas et al., volume 2). These societal beliefs (the justness of one's own goals, the importance of security, delegitimizing one's opponent, patriotism, unity and peace, and positive ethnocentric self-images and belief in one's own victimization, see Bar-Tal 1998) are the building blocks of narratives (László 2008).

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Collective Memory as a Barrier to Overcoming an Ethos of Conflict

In this chapter, we focus on how collective memory fuels current conflict. In addition to the narrative about the present, that Bar-Tal defined as *the configuration of central eight previously described societal shared beliefs that provide particular dominant orientation to a society,* collective memory or narrative about the past plays an important functional role for conflict. Bar-Tal hypothesizes that a society develops a functional psychological infrastructure or ethos of coping. Essential to this societal coping mechanism are formal and informal collective memories, usually associated with a set of self-serving narratives and attributions about the conflict, and collective emotions of hatred, fear, anger, and pride (Bar-Tal 2007; Halperin and Pliskin, volume 2). Bar-Tal's model of collective remembering under intractable conflict is based on the following functional characteristics: hardship, uncertainty, and suffering of the ingroup caused by intractable conflict with an outgroup that furnishes people with collective challenges in terms of satisfying needs, coping with stress, and withstanding the enemy (Bar-Tal 2007, p. 1437). This leads to institutional biases in the construction of an ethos of conflict and collective memories of conflict, and accords well with the literature on collective/social memories (Olick and Robbins 1998) and social representations of history (Liu and Hilton 2005).

Collective memories are widely shared images and knowledge of a past social event (Schuman and Rodgers 2004) that are elaborated, transmitted, and conserved by a group through interpersonal and institutional communication (Olick and Robbins 1998). Social representations of the past help to preserve a sense of continuity, a positive image of the ingroup, and to feed values and norms that prescribe behaviors and define group membership (Pennebaker et al. 1997; Liu and Hilton 2005).

Events that are typical instances of collective memories are usually traumatic or extreme events; most of the time unexpected, painful, and extraordinary. These events affect a large number of people as members of a national collective or other important groups (thus corresponding well to Bar-Tal's ethos of victimization). They are also usually related to important changes in the social fabric or to important threats to social cohesion and values (Pennebaker 1997), or more prototypically, the foundation of the current political system or state (Liu and Hilton 2005). They are thus especially narratable, forming a plot that tells people the story of themselves, often in relation to an outgroup and current challenges facing the ingroup (Liu and László 2007).

Not all wars are remembered at the same level: WW2 and the Vietnam War are largely recalled in US polls as important events, while for Americans the Korean War is largely forgotten (Neal 2005). Vietnam and WW2 were associated with high impact on institutions and subsequent social changes. American casualties in the Korean War were similar to those suffered in Vietnam or in the entire Pacific during the Second World War, but, because American objectives were achieved and the engagement on Korea was perceived as consensual in the USA, the Korean War does not form a useful part of American collective memories (Neal 2005). Societies

in intractable conflict may have less freedom in choosing to elaborate or not elaborate on conflict, because in Bar-Tal's theory, the ethos of conflict is so central and intense that energies are focused on developing a particular account of the history of conflict that justifies the ingroup and delegitimizes the outgroup.

Moreover, collective memory events are largely shared socially, by means of mass media and interpersonal rehearsal—a large majority of people learn and follow events from mass media. As a paradigmatic example, in the case of John F. Kennedy's assassination: "The nation was engrossed in television coverage of the funeral ceremony… and the subsequent funeral procession to Arlington" (Neal 2005, p. 108). Events like September 11, disasters and crisis, which provoke intense shared emotions as surprise, anger, sadness, fear, and anxiety, also induce participation in collective behaviors and rituals, like political demonstrations, worship, and funerary rituals (see Paez et al. 2005). In Bar-Tal's (2007) theory, these are responsible for a collective emotional orientation where fear overrides hope (see Jarymowicz, this volume). A perpetual feeling of threat gives rise to high levels of fear and hatred for the outgroup, which is reinforced with each ritual that remembers one's own dead while ignoring those suffered by the other group. This produces an "ingroup-focused collective victimhood" narrative that justifies one's own agenda while delegitimizing that of the other (Bart-Tal et al. 2007, see also Vollhardt et al, this volume; Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2).

While much of the source for Bar-Tal's theory comes from conflict-ridden Israel, there are other case studies of historical conflicts. Notably, Rosoux (2001), focused on Germany and France in the nineteenth century, where from 1870 on, French and Germans began to define one another by mutual enmity that only began to abate after the two World Wars. While this conflict was not "intractable" in Bar-Tal's terms (there was little violence between Germany and France in the decades from the Franco-Prussian War to WWI), consistent with Bar-Tal, Rosoux (2001) found the following common features of social representations of the past that fed into one of the most violent conflicts of all times:

a) We represent or define our national ingroup as a victim, martyr, and moral model; our heroes, martyrs, and epic battles are remembered. "Our" shameful past war episodes are concealed; references to others as victims, civilians killed, and suffering are concealed. Even in the case of defeated nations, like Germany and Japan after WWII, people share and remember their own suffering, but, conceal, silence, or ignore other people's suffering.

b) National outgroups are defined as aggressors or perpetrators, and the responsibility and guilt of real or symbolic current and past injuries are attributed to these social categories.

c) Recalling past persecutions and martyrs imposes the duty of fidelity and justifies revenge against evildoers. Retaliation appears as legitimate, and social representations reinforce intergroup aggressive action tendencies, war and collective violence being only a rational and justified response to past aggression of the outgroups and ingroup suffering (Rosoux 2001).

War becomes a legitimate form of honoring the memory of ancestors and victims (Rosoux 2001). Hence, these types of social representations glorifying war should lead to positive attitudes towards war, backed by cultural norms favoring a willingness to fight in future wars at the collective level. They (a) explain and justify the outbreak of the conflict and the course of its development. Ontological differences were held to exist between France and Germany; intergroup relationships were marked by natural hostility and mistrust, with each country being the natural and hereditary enemy of other. They (b) present the ingroup in a positive light. Memorials, monuments, and textbooks often gloss over the tragedies of collective violence, and the horrors of war are displaced by emphasis on heroes, glory, and justification of sacrifices. Death and destruction are reevaluated within the sacred task of defending the nation. They (c) describe the outgroup in delegitimizing ways. Usually a negative image of the outgroup justifies violence. Negation of the other as human being, an image of the other as inferior or with animal traits, low or deficient morality, was associated to high tolls of death in Mexican–American war, war with Native Americans, colonial wars, and the Pacific and Eastern fronts in WW2, in comparison with the American civil war or the West front in WW1 (Neal 2005).

Such representations of past collective violence fuel conflict. As Liu and Hilton (2005) state, "A group's representation of its history can explain how its world has come to be the way it is and justify its responses to current challenges" (p. 53). In the case of victorious nations, like USA and Russia, WW2 is represented as a Just War, or a "Great Patriotic War" (Wertsch 2002). Hence, victory in war and glorifying war lead to a shared positive attitude towards war or a cultural norm like willingness to fight in future wars.

Paez et al. (2007) found that vicarious collective remembering contributed to a legitimization of war: young people in victorious nations reported higher recall of WW2 memories, a less negative evaluation of this event and expressed more willingness to fight in a new war for the motherland. A larger cross-cultural survey confirms that a less-negative evaluation of historical calamities (including the world wars), agreement with WWII as just and necessary war, and disagreement with WWII as catastrophe are associated with greater willingness to fight in future national wars (Liu et al. 2012).

In summary, the literature on collective remembering provides support for Bar-Tal's ethos of conflict formulation. There may be some questions about how much the biases in collective remembering are restricted to societies in intractable conflict, or whether such biases are a more general tendency of contemporary states to mobilize social memories in order to compete with other states and to rally their people in facing challenges from rivals. Without a doubt, current events and the political agenda of the leading figures or factions in a state influence the way social memories are constructed (Liu and Hilton 2005; Schumann and Rodgers 2004). In societies in intractable conflict, this political agenda is likely to be more central and pervasive than in other societies.

Co-construction of "Factuality" as a First Step to Overcome CM of Conflicts

We will briefly review ideas related to the ways of dealing with negative historical events associated with strong emotional reactions, particularly, those related to the problem of confronting past crimes, suffering, and the collective learning.

In constructing this review, we should pay particular attention to Bar-Tal's (2000) thinking around reconciliation. The important thing to recognize about societies in intractable conflict is that the conflict is ongoing and central; it is not a thing of the past. In this case, reconciliation must almost always begin at the top with an agreement to cease active hostilities by leaders of the opposing groups. Most of the literature on reconciling collective memories, concern situations where active hostilities have ceased, but where lingering resentments seethe, as in the previously described case of Germany and France in the nineteenth century by Rosoux (2001), or in the current situation involving memories of the Sino-Japanese War and WW2 in China (see Liu and Atsumi 2008). After active hostilities have ceased, these are the important steps to historical reconciliation:

a) Acceptance of facts about events, including others' suffering, is a first step towards the negotiation of a shared representation of the past. This is essential for reconciliation, because historical calamity is universally understood (Liu et al. 2012), and acceptance of nuances of meaning about a collective catastrophe allows the two sides to at least begin to acknowledge one another (Rosoux 2004).
b) Remembering what happened but not maintaining hatred. What is important is to acknowledge the reality of crimes and victims, "to keep it from happening again…" but to forget the emotions of hate and not awakening ancient sufferings in order to justify future crimes (Hayner 2001).
c) Creation of an inclusive narrative that describes different meanings, experiences, and perspectives of the past in a single story.

Such reconstructions of history can help to overcome a past consisting of intense and violent intergroup conflict. One example of reconstruction is the current representation of both world wars in German and French social memory. The meaning of great battles like Verdun—with a quarter million victims—was patriotic and nationalist in the aftermath of World War I. Verdun was construed on both German and French sides as a manifestation of heroism, glory, and the fighting spirit of combatants. After World War II, battles like Verdun became a symbol of a mutual slaughter, with a similar meaning for combatants on both sides. Soldiers who fought in opposite camps gathered in a common tribute. This representation was enacted symbolically when Mitterrand and Kohl, the French president and the German prime minister, respectively, stood hand in hand in front of a French ossuary of dead soldiers (Rosoux 2001).

Another instance of the co-construction of a shared factual social representations are Truth, Justice, and Reparation Commissions (for more on transitional justice see SimanTov-Nachelieli and Schnabel, volume 2), most famously the South African

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). TRC have been established in many countries in order to address human rights violations by dictatorships or resulting from armed internal conflict. Since the 1970s, more than 40 official commissions have been established throughout the world (Avruch 2010; Rimé et al. 2012). Common TRC functions are (a) making efforts to discover the truth about the period of collective violence, (b) recognizing and validating victims' suffering, (c) compensating those affected both materially and symbolically, (d) seeking justice, (e) avoiding new acts of violence, and (f) contributing to the creation of an inclusive collective memory oriented to the future. These functions may contribute to the avoidance of revenge cycles and further war crimes (Hamber 2007, 2012).

In Bar-Tal's theory, they contribute to shifting society away from a collective emotional orientation of fear and hate towards a collective emotional orientation of hope (Bar-Tal et al. 2007). Evidence from the TRC's report from Chile suggests that transitional justice rituals are related to greater hope in society. Moreover, a positive perception of socio-emotional climate in Chile in the aftermath of periods of collective violence was predicted by positive emotions with respect to the TRC's activities (mainly hope) even after controlling for positive evaluation of the TRC and its functions, exposure to violence, and negative emotions (Cardenas et al. 2013). These results confirm that restorative initiatives like of TRC instill hope, but also that positive, future-oriented emotions like hope are helpful for reconciliation and reconstruction, confirming Bar-Tal et al.'s (2007) insights.

TRC-induced memories of past conflict reinforce intergroup reconciliation as it documents factual atrocities committed by all sides involved, asserting that all groups are to blame and "have dirty hands." Sharing blame and victimhood prevents selective victimization and ingroup idealization and opens a space towards dialogue. Gibson (2004) found that people who were more willing to accept the TRC's version of the truth, that is, to accept collective memory declaring that all sides are to blame to some extent, agreed more with reconciliation. Of course, reality constraints imposed limitations on this "relativistic" reconstruction of the past. In some cases, rates of mortality and misdeeds were similar in both groups; in other cases, there was a clear victimized and perpetrator group. TRCs have mainly been used in internal conflicts within a state, and may be less effective as a mechanism for reconciling states (see Liu and Atsumi 2008).

Studies suggest that agreement and salience of TRC's activities improve emotional climate and fuel reconciliation (Paez et al. 2013; Rime et al.2012). However, specific reactions to TRCs are typically mixed. With respect to goals or functions of TRC in five countries of Latin America, results show that even though people largely approved of TRC activities, only half the participants in surveys agreed with the statement that TRCs help to know the truth (e.g., 50 % in Chile). They agree to a lower extent with the idea that the Commission achieved its goal of prevention of future violence and supporting justice (37 % in Chile). The lowest agreement (e.g., 33 % in Chile) was with the statement that the Commission helps in the construction of an inclusive narrative (Cardenas et al. 2013). In the case of Chile, those who

positively evaluated the work of the TRC with respect to the creation of an inclusive narrative were more likely to accept the possibility that victims forgave those who did harm to them than those who disagreed with the work of the commissions. They also agreed more with the statements about the corrective functions of social remembering ("When it comes to this nation's past, we must learn from the mistakes that were made in order to avoid making the same mistake again").

People who positively evaluated the TRC's goal of creating an inclusive narrative perceived a more positive emotional climate (i.e., stressed that political, ethnic, and religious groups feel more intergroup trust). However, agreement with the creation of an inclusive narrative or collective memory did not show a significant relationship with positive emotional climate after controlling for other variables. These results suggest that emotional reactions and the agenda of achieving justice, truth, and the future-oriented goal of prevention of future violence are more relevant for reconciliation than the more past-oriented task of creating an inclusive social memory. Underlining this are the findings that not only did a mere third of five national samples share the idea that the TRC was successful in creating an integrative narrative, but also only 21 % believed that forgiveness can be achieved. These findings suggest that a positive view of emotional climate did not imply a high-level or complete reconciliation, but mainly a pacific coexistence (see Kadima and Mullet 2007 for an African perspective).

People with a positive view of the social climate as well as with a positive attitude towards the TRC's goal of creating an integrative narrative, reported higher positive and negative emotions, such as sadness, shame related to past experiences of victimization and collective violence, as well as hope related to a new political future, and pride for the resilience of victims and efforts to achieve truth, justice, and reparation. Results thus suggest that for some participants in transitional justice rituals, institutional activity to repair the past acts as an expiation ritual, activating a negative moral emotion such as shame and feelings of sadness together with a positive moral emotion such as pride with feelings of hope (Páez 2010; De Rivera 1992). On the other hand, these results suggest that an inclusive memory should emphasize future-oriented and positive expectations emotions like hope as their main features. In fact, experimental studies by Gayer et al. (2009) in Israel are consistent with this idea that focusing on the future is a better argument for taking steps towards reconciliation than ruminating about the past. Moreover, a perception that the Israel-Palestinian intractable conflict is not unchangeable is related to hope and both are related to support for proactive pro-peace attitudes and concessions for peace, both in a correlational and in experimental studies (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014). On the other hand, Latin-American post-conflict data previously described suggest a complement to Bar-Tal's idea of collective emotional orientations of hope versus fear. In post-conflict societies, reactions to TRCs are associated with a mixture of hope and fear rather than a dichotomy between the two. They are characterized by mutual tolerance or peaceful coexistence at best, and the goal of constructing an inclusive, mutually shared narrative of the past is in the short term difficult if not impossible.

Barriers for the Reconstruction of Collective Memory

Successful reconstruction of a violent past into a shared and inclusive collective memory that is future oriented, avoiding hate and selective victimization appears to be more the exception than the rule. There are serious psychological barriers that prevent easy or simple actions to construct a shared narrative of the past that is factual and not loaded with antagonistic emotions

First, the absence of personal and collective guilt is a modal response in perpetrators of collective crimes and violence. It is not realistic to think that a majority of perpetrators should feel guilt and react with reparative and compensation behaviors towards victims. Denial, justification, and other forms of cognitive coping allow perpetrators to share a positive collective identity and reject criticism about human right violations (Cehajic et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2008; Branscombe and Doosje 2004; see also Cehajic-Clancy, this volume). Only a minority feel guilt and the majority could display public guilt and shame only as compliance—public acceptance and private rejection, as the case of Hitler's minister Speer shows (Finkielkraut 1989). The third generation of a perpetrators group could feel more guilt, shame, and responsibility than the generation involved in collective crimes (see Dresler-Hawke and Liu 2006); however, there is a movement in Germany now for historical closure, or drawing a line between the past and present because the current generations feel that their debt to the past has already been paid (see Hanke et al. 2013). Hanke et al.'s (2013) idea of historical closure is consistent with the presence of "defense mechanisms" oriented towards negation, minimization, and positive reconstruction of past criminal collective behavior.

Second, "winners" justice is usually rejected by public opinion on the losing side. Internal procedures appear to be more important for public opinion than external trials and procedures. In Germany, the Nuremberg Trial had a lower impact on public opinion than the normal action of German justice on human right crimes (Evans 2003). At a greater extreme, in Japan, the post WW2 war crimes trials were often perceived as "show trials" and a victor's justice, because the Emperor and other members of the royal family were not indicted even though they were intimately involved with Japanese war efforts (Liu and Atsumi 2008). At the other end of the spectrum, credible leaders are more able to gain a population's adherence to social representations of past that accept past crimes and errors, and reinforce truth and reconciliation trends—like Mandela and Archbishop Tutu in South-Africa (Paez and Liu 2011). Third, groups and societies are better and more accurate at remembering and evaluating collective crimes of outgroups than their own criminal collective behavior. An experimental retransmission of information task "à l' Allport & Postman," found that Portuguese show higher recall of details of massacres by mercenaries in Latin-America in the nineteenth century, when the perpetrators were Spaniards instead of Portuguese. For instance, rapes were mentioned in 58 % of the final description of the original information when the targets were Spaniards and only 13 % in ingroup narratives (Marques et al. 2006). Societies more frequently forget

their negative behaviors and also remember and emphasize more positive aspects of their history. This means that external judges, historians, and witnesses should be more accurate and less reconstructive—but at the same time, their opinions would be less accepted by the perpetrators. This makes the job of international TRCs or war crime tribunals even more difficult than that of national TRCs (Avruch 2010).

Fourth, when dealing with the evidence of collective negative past behavior, people will question the credibility of sources. If critical sources are internal and appear as constructive, people would probably engage in more positive cognitive coping. They would tend not to deny the facts, but rather minimize emotional reactions and question the relevance of events—"these are old stories, they are not important in the present" (see Sibley et al. 2008 for post-colonial evidence). They would also frame ingroup criminal behavior as more understandable in the historical context, attribute negative and criminal behaviour to a minority of black sheep—extreme atypical members of the nation (Marques and Paez 2008)—and minimize the frequency of criminal behaviors. Official reports might overcome some of these collective defense mechanisms but not all of them.

Fifth, more cohesive groups, with higher collective self-identity, should display more cognitive coping and should react more against an inclusive collective memory that does not reflect well on the ingroup (Branscombe and Doosje 2004). Persons highly identified with national and ethnic groups should reject criticism strongly. At the other end, nations with lower levels of collective self-esteem and collective pride should accept more criticism and suggestions of reparation and compensatory actions. But in international relations, the louder voices might be expected to be the ones with higher national identification.

Conclusion

The literature on collective remembering provides strong support for Bar-Tal's model, positioning Bar-Tal's idea of societal ethos of intractable conflict as a special, more extreme case of general tendencies to glorify an historical narrative of the national ingroup, exaggerate its sufferings, and de-emphasize or delegitimize outgroup accounts of history. However, empirical research on the outcomes of TRCs portrays a more complex and nuanced picture of post-conflict societies as having simultaneous hopes and fears than suggested by Bar-Tal's dichotomous analysis of collective emotional orientations. In post-conflict situations, hope and fear appear to accompany one another hand in hand, and the inclusion of such a perspective may be important to acknowledge in the steps towards reconciliation along the way.

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Part III
Specific Societal Beliefs and their Implications

Chapter 6
Victims under Siege: Lessons for Polish–Jewish Relations and Beyond

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Any tourist in a typical Polish city would be surprised by the number of martyrdom-related sites, including monuments, street names, and museums. Victimhood dominates over triumphs in Polish collective memory. For example, in the Polish city of Szczecin—where Daniel Bar-Tal spent his childhood years—there are three streets commemorating martyrdom ("Victims of Stutthoff Street" ["Ulica Ofiar Stutthoffu"], "Auschwitz Victims Street" ["Ulica Ofiar Oświęcimia"], "Katyń Victims Square" ["Plac Ofiar Katynia"]) and only one commemorating victory ("Square of Victory" ["Plac Zwycięstwa"], referring to the allied forces' victory in World War II). There are two streets commemorating defenders ("Defenders of Stalingrad" ["Obrońców Stalingradu"], "Defenders of Westerplatte" ["Obrońców Westerplatte"]), but not a single street has "conquerors" or "victors" in its name—even though Polish military successes in the seventeenth century Battle of Vienna or the twentieth century Battle of Berlin had a crucial impact on world history. Victims, defenders, and losses clearly attract more attention in contemporary Polish collective memory.

"Let innocents' blood drench the abyss! Let innocents' blood seep down into the depths of darkness, eat it away and undermine, the rotting foundations of earth," wrote Hebrew poet Chaim Nachman Bialik in *Al Hashehita* ("On the slaughter"), in a poem that is important for Jewish collective memory (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992a).

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In a similar vein, a Polish song from the times of martial law (1981–1983), *Ojc-zyzno ma* ("Fatherland of mine"), construed the nation's history and presence as follows: "Fatherland of mine, bathed in blood so many times… Oh, how large are your wounds, and how long your suffering persists…."

The dominant focus on victimhood, martyrdom, and constant siege shapes the present-day national identity of both Poles and Israeli Jews. The notion of "siege mentality," coined by Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992a, b), is central to dominant views—or what Bar-Tal (2000) refers to as societal beliefs—among both Poles and Jews, and allows to better understand conflict strategies, responses to social identity threats, hyper-vigilance in intergroup relations, and general hawkishness in both countries. The sense that "the whole world is against us" is not only a mere impression shared by many Poles and Jews but also a powerful mechanism of political mobilization (see also Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2).

In this chapter, we discuss the psychological consequences of such victimhood beliefs in Poland, Israel, and other contexts, reviewing relevant empirical and theoretical work that was inspired by Bar-Tal's pioneering scholarship on these issues.

Bar-Tal's Pioneering Work on Collective Victimhood and Resulting Empirical and Theoretical Developments

Siege Mentality

In 1992, building on an earlier conceptualization of what Bar-Tal first referred to as the *Masada syndrome* (Bar-Tal 1986), he and his student Dikla Antebi published two articles—one theoretical review paper (1992a) and one empirical article (1992b)—introducing a concept that would, a decade or two later, stimulate a new area of social psychological research on collective victimhood. Until then, collective victimhood had not been an explicit focus of study in social or political psychology. Thus, the introduction of the idea of siege mentality, rooted in historical experiences of victimhood and defined as "a mental state in which members of a group hold a central belief that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioral intentions toward them" (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992b, p. 634; see also Bar-Tal 1986), was an important contribution to the field of intergroup relations.

Siege mentality is a particular reaction to a history of collective victimhood resulting in perceived threat posed by other groups and therefore heightened distrust of outgroups. Several of the items in the nine-item measure of Israeli siege mentality (which is strongly correlated with a measure of general siege mentality) developed by Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992b) refer to these historical lessons concerning future threat, such as "There is hardly any country where Jews can live without being disturbed," "There will always be enemies who persecute Israel," and "The Holocaust is not a one-time event, and it can happen again." The measure also

captures the view that nobody would stand by the ingroup in times of trouble (assessed with the reverse-coded item "The state of Israel has many friends among the nations of the world.") and the perceived need for the ingroup's self-defense, including the stance that "all means are justified to secure the survival of the state of Israel." Finally, one item also addresses what Bar-Tal and Antebi theorize to be a consequence of and coping mechanism to deal with the perceived threat, namely an enhanced desire for internal conformity and unity ("In times of danger, there is no place for opposing views."). In sum, the measure of siege mentality includes five facets, namely perceptions of *historical victimhood*, *ongoing threat* in the present and future, *lack of support* by other nations, *justification of (violent) self-defense*, and the *suppression of dissent* in the service of ingroup cohesion. A study among Jewish Israeli university students (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992b) revealed a strong correlation between Israeli siege mentality and hawkishness ($r = 0.46$), as well as ethnocentrism ($r = 0.51$).

Although developed as an individual difference measure, Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992a) also describe siege mentality as a central belief that is held by a significant majority of the population (e.g., in Israel as well as several other countries) with high confidence. Providing numerous examples of how siege mentality is embedded in and communicated through literature, films, education, newspapers, political speeches, and various other societal channels, Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992a) describe how these beliefs are made chronically accessible and have become part of the Israeli ethos that informs social and political decisions. This conceptualization is further elaborated upon in Bar-Tal's important book, published in 2000, on *Shared Beliefs in a Society*, in which beliefs about siege are discussed as one among several other societal beliefs that make up the ethos of contemporary Israeli society.

Perceived Collective Victimhood: Characteristics and Functions

While his earlier work focuses on siege mentality as a particular interpretation and result of collective victimhood, Bar-Tal's more recent writings on this topic have discussed perceptions of victimhood more generally, and focused on how these perceptions contribute to intergroup conflict. Already Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) discussed how a history of victimization and the resulting perception of victimhood held by both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians are among the characteristics that make the conflict so difficult to resolve. In a theoretical paper on the social psychological foundations of intractable conflict, Bar-Tal (2007) describes self-presentations of collective victimhood both as part of the ingroup's collective memory and as a societal belief that contributes to and is maintained by intractable conflict. Notably, perceptions of collective victimhood are described in Bar-Tal's more recent work on this topic more generally. In other words, his more recent writing about collective victimhood is not limited to the specific notion of siege mentality that is one pos-

sible way of reacting to collective victimhood and that was the focus of his earlier work on this issue.

The psychological and social functions of collective victimhood and how they feed into intractable conflict are conceptualized in more detail in an extensive review paper published by Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, and Gundar in 2009. Here again, perceived collective victimhood is defined broadly as "a mindset shared by group members that results from a perceived intentional harm with severe and lasting consequences inflicted on a collective by another group or groups, a harm that is viewed as undeserved, unjust and immoral, and one that the group was not able to prevent" (p. 238). Collective memory is described as essential for the development of a sense of collective victimhood. The authors emphasize that one does not have to experience harm personally in order to develop a sense of collective victimhood. Thus, collective victimhood is understood as a shared belief (including certain attitudes and emotions) that is endorsed through group identification.

"Symptoms" and Functions of Collective Victimhood Bar-Tal et al. (2009) describe how this collective memory of victimhood in the past can make a society and its members "prone to view[ing] themselves as victims in new situations in which they are harmed," such that perceived collective victimhood "becomes a prism through which the society processes information and makes decisions" (p. 234). In addition to this increased sensitivity to cues of threat, other "symptoms of victimhood" that Bar-Tal et al. (2009) mention are affective in nature (anger, fear, self-pity), and behavioral outcomes include revenge and protection from future harm. In his 2009 conceptualization, Bar-Tal also describes siege mentality as a consequence of a general sense of collective victimhood, along with other consequences such as a shattered worldview and the sense that the world is a dangerous place.

These consequences have clear implications for the maintenance of violent conflicts which are further enhanced by another correlate of perceived collective victimhood that Bar-Tal et al. (2009; see also Bar-Tal 2013) describe: collective victimhood implies the justness and morality of the ingroup, in contrast to the destructiveness, injustice, and immorality of the adversary. Thus, collective victimhood, rather than portraying the ingroup as weak, can actually serve to bolster the ingroup's positive self-image—at least in our present-day global society that emphasizes human rights violations—, creating "a sense of differentiation and superiority" (Bar-Tal et al. 2009, p. 244). It is therefore in line with the tenets of social identity theory when the authors posit that social identity can be shaped and defined by a strong sense of victimhood. As an example of this victimhood-based identity, Bar-Tal et al. (2009) note: "The imprint of the past experiences of Poles is an example of how beliefs about victimhood can affect identity" (p. 251; see also Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2013).

By taking a functional approach, Bar-Tal and his colleagues also explain what may appear as a mystery, namely why any individual or group would ever want to portray themselves as victims and even compete over the status as the true victim of the conflict (see Noor et al. 2012; and discussion below). Bar-Tal et al. (2009) provide plausible answers to this question by describing several functions of collective victimhood on the individual, societal, and international level: a sense of

collective victimhood can (1) provide explanations for the conflict and for ongoing suffering; (2) serve as a coping mechanism by being able to make sense of the conflict and associated suffering; (3) provide a moral justification for harm committed by the ingroup; (4) boost the group's positive self-image; (5) foster solidarity and patriotism, as well as mobilize ingroup members for the conflict; and (6) in some cases serve to gain international support.

Empirical Support for Bar-Tal's Conceptualization Some empirical research supports several of these theoretical claims put forward by Bar-Tal and his colleagues. For example, in support of the notion that collective victimhood can serve as a moral justification for harmdoing by ingroup members, perceived collective victimhood of the ingroup among Serbian high school students predicted reduced willingness to acknowledge the violence committed by the ingroup during the war in the 1990s (Čehajić and Brown 2010). Wohl and Branscombe (2008) found in several experimental studies that people who were reminded of the suffering of their ingroup in the past (e.g. Canadian Jews reminded of the Holocaust; US citizens reminded of Pearl Harbor) reported less collective guilt for harmdoing committed by their ingroup toward others in a present-day conflict. This effect was mediated by decreased perceptions of responsibility of the ingroup for this harmdoing, and/or by legitimizing it as a reaction to the outgroup's aggressions. Among Jewish–Israeli samples, Schori-Eyal et al. (2014) found that perceptions of historical victimhood predicted justification of ingroup aggression in the conflict, and that this effect was mediated by conflict-specific perceptions of collective victimhood—thereby demonstrating the link between perceptions of historical and present-day victimhood more directly.

Supporting Bar-Tal's arguments regarding the relationship between perceived collective victimhood and perceived ingroup superiority, Vollhardt and Bilali (2015) found among a Burundian and a Congolese general population sample that ingroup superiority mediated the effects of exclusive victim beliefs (believing that the ingroup has suffered in unique ways, see below) on several negative intergroup outcomes such as social distance from other groups or support of their political and economic exclusion. In other words, perceived collective victimhood, ingroup superiority, and negative intergroup attitudes were all related with each other. Supporting Bar-Tal's observation that perceived collective victimhood can foster solidarity, ingroup cohesion, and conflict mobilization, this study also found that exclusive victim beliefs predicted support for leaders who have the ingroup's interests in mind and make sure the ingroup gets ahead (Vollhardt and Bilali 2015). Other studies find that victim beliefs are associated with ingroup identification, such that victim beliefs tend to be higher among those who highly identify with their ingroup (e.g., Noor et al. 2008b). Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) found additional support for the conflict-mobilizing effects of collective victimhood among a representative sample in Israel, showing that beliefs about collective victimhood predicted both less support for compromises in Israel–Palestinian conflict and less openness toward learning about the adversary's view on the conflict.

The argument that collective victimhood may be functional because it helps gain support from the international community (see also Bar-Tal 2013) has not received

much empirical support though. In fact, in some cases collective victimization can even have the opposite effect: for example, British participants were less likely to donate to victims of the genocide in Darfur than to victims of the Tsunami in Southeast Asia, because victims of the human-made disaster were perceived as more blameworthy and responsible for what had happened (Zagefka et al. 2011). Additionally, as the number of depicted victims (e.g., of the genocide in Darfur) increases, compassion with the victim group decreases due to the regulation of negative emotions (Cameron and Payne 2011). Moreover, several experiments by Warner and Branscombe (2012) showed that third parties have higher moral expectations toward historically victimized groups: for example, they perceive Israelis and Cambodians as obliged to help refugees in Darfur. These studies reveal that the perceived functionality of collective victimhood may be severely undermined by psychological processes such as just world beliefs and emotion regulation.

Recent Developments in Conceptualizations of Collective Victimhood

Since Bar-Tal's first papers on siege mentality and on other ideas about collective victimhood, several other conceptualizations have been developed, largely drawing on Bar-Tal's pioneering work and extending it. Noor and his colleagues (Noor et al. 2008a, b, 2012) described the phenomenon of *competitive victimhood* which describes the tendency to compete with the adversary in a conflict over the status of the "true" victim. Like siege mentality, competitive victimhood predicts negative outcomes for intergroup relations in the context and aftermath of conflict such as reduced empathy and less willingness to reconcile with the adversary. Drawing mostly on the Jewish–Israeli context, Schori-Eyal and colleagues developed the idea of the *perpetual ingroup victimhood orientation* (PIVO), which examines the historical dimension of collective victimhood and the perceived ongoing nature and pervasiveness of ingroup suffering that is specific to certain contexts and also predicts negative attitudes in conflict (see Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2).

Other developments in this area have also begun to focus on the potentially constructive forms and consequences of collective victimhood. This work shows that collective victimhood does not inevitably feed into conflict. For example, exclusive victim consciousness that focuses on the ingroup's victimization and its uniqueness (including constructs such as siege mentality and competitive victimhood) can be differentiated from *inclusive victim consciousness* which entails the acknowledgment of similar suffering that other victim groups have endured (Vollhardt 2012). Inclusive victim consciousness predicts constructive intergroup outcomes such as acting on behalf of outgroups in need or supporting their political inclusion; and unlike exclusive victim consciousness, inclusive victim consciousness is not associated with ingroup superiority (Vollhardt and Bilali 2015). Making people aware of shared victimization with other groups in other parts of the world has also been shown to increase support for victimized outgroups (Vollhardt 2013). Even in the

context of an intractable conflict (specifically, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict), reminding participants of shared experiences of suffering due to the conflict reduced competitive victimhood and increased the willingness for reconciliation (Shnabel et al. 2013). These effects are presumably linked to two alternative lessons of collective victimhood proposed by Klar et al. (2013), namely to "never be a passive bystander" and "never be a perpetrator" (see also Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2).

Consequences of Collective Victimhood for Intergroup Relations in Poland

While most scholarship on collective victimhood by Bar-Tal and colleagues focuses on the role of perceived collective victimhood in maintaining intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992b; Bar-Tal et al. 2009), these authors also note that perceived victimhood exists in other contexts as well and can result from past or present harm, real or partly imagined, and from large-scale violence, "as a result of a one-time event (such as the loss of a battle or war, genocide or ethnic cleansing) or of long-term harmful treatment of the group such as slavery, exploitation, discrimination or occupation." (Bar-Tal et al. 2009, p. 238). Citing work by Jasinska-Kania (2007), one of the examples of perceived collective victimhood that Bar-Tal and his coauthors describe is the case of Polish history and society:

> Similarly, Poles suffered under the yoke of imperial domination by Prussia, Russia and Austria through the centuries and therefore 'a romantic myth emerged that ascribed to the Polish nation a messianic role as the "Christ of nations"', or 'the new Golgotha'. Through its suffering Poland, the blameless victim, atones for the sins of other nations and thereby incurs their debt. The self-image of Poland as the innocent victim of aggression by powerful neighbours has endured throughout the centuries to this day and has an effect on the relationship with Germany and Russia. (p. 237)

Historical scholarship supports the view that modern Polish history was marked by suffering and bloody struggles for freedom (Davies 1981; Snyder 2012). Between 1795 and 1918, Poland was partitioned by its three powerful neighbors and vanished from European maps for more than 100 years. A brief period of independence after World War I ended abruptly with the invasion of Nazi Germany, starting World War II, and the subsequent Soviet invasion of the rest of the country. About 6 million Polish citizens (including 3 million Polish Jews) were killed during the war in extermination camps, concentration camps, prisons, in massacres, executions, through diseases, and malnutrition. After the end of the war, a Soviet-imposed Stalinist regime resulted in a wave of political persecutions targeting former members of the anti-Nazi resistance, political enemies, and even prominent members of the communist party. In 1989, after a peaceful transition, the country was transformed into a democratically governed state. In that respect, Poland presents an interesting case of a society with a sense of collective victimhood that is not currently involved in an intractable conflict.

Consequences of Victimhood-based Identity in Poland

Victimhood-based national identity in Poland has clear negative effects on inter-group relations, affecting attitudes toward (1) other victimized groups and (2) those who deny the perceived unique status of Poles as victims (Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2013; Bilewicz et al. in press).

Competitive victimhood in Poland clearly resembles other historical conflicts such as in Northern Ireland or Israel (Noor et al. 2008a, b, 2012). The only difference is that while in the aforementioned cases collective victimhood can be strategically used in a present-day conflict, in Poland there is no ongoing, large-scale violent conflict with any other of the groups victimized by Nazi Germany (e.g., Jews, Roma, Russians). Competitive victimhood in this case is therefore not the struggle for moral dominance in a current conflict, but rather a struggle for acknowledgment of past suffering.

Polish researchers studying anti-Semitic prejudice found a consistently high influence of competitive victimhood among Poles (in relation to Jews) on anti-Semitic stereotypes and prejudice (Bilewicz et al. 2012, 2013; Krzeminski 2002). The general explanation of this phenomenon is that Poles perceive Jews (and also other victimized groups) as potential competitors to the unique status as wartime martyrs. This is obviously a valid interpretation, but it does not fully explain the relationship between victimhood-based identity and anti-Semitism. Two nation-wide surveys revealed that absolute victimhood (perception of the ingroup as uniquely victimized) and relative victimhood (perception of Poles as more victimized than Jews) independently predicted anti-Semitic stereotypes (beliefs in Jewish conspiracy) and generally negative attitudes toward Jews (Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2013). This suggests that there are two paths leading from victimhood-based identity to anti-Semitism: one being competitive victimhood and the other a general sense of being a victimized nation (rather than a perpetrator nation). In this second path, Jews are possibly perceived as potential threat to the ingroup's status as victims because they may blame Poles for also being perpetrators of several historical crimes (such as the Jedwabne crime or post-war anti-Jewish pogroms, see Gross 2001, 2006). This focus on the ingroup's victimhood and Polish siege mentality mediated the effect of Polish national identification on anti-Semitic prejudice (Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2013; Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012).

Victimhood-based Identity and Historical Consciousness in Poland

The second category of negative consequences of victimhood-based national identity in Poland involves Polish hypervigilance concerning the potential denial of the history of Polish suffering. According to moral typecasting theory (Gray and Wegner 2009), recipients of crimes ("moral patients") are commonly perceived as less capable of performing crimes (i.e., being "moral agents"). Extending this theory to a societal level, one could expect that the dominant, national self-perception of

being a historical victim limits the potential self-perception and acknowledgment that the ingroup was also a perpetrator of crimes toward other groups (see also Noor et al. 2012). This phenomenon severely affected Polish reactions to the usage of the term "Polish death camp" in the international media and political discourse. Although this term is typically used to refer to the geographical location of the death camps on the formerly Polish territories of the General Governments[1], in Poland it is understood as an ethnicization of responsibility: blaming Poles for the deeds of Nazi Germans (Bilewicz et al. in press).

In a qualitative study among Polish students preparing for meetings with young Jews in the context of a cultural exchange program, we observed a prevailing fear of being blamed for perpetrating the Holocaust—expressed in questions and statements by young Poles such as: "Why do you still blame Poles for the Holocaust?", "They say that Auschwitz is a Polish deed, but these were Germans who burned Jews!" (Bilewicz et al. 2012, p. 805).

The fear of being blamed as collective perpetrators also shaped Polish reactions to recently published historical books about the scale of collaboration during the Holocaust. Although most of these books (e.g., Gross 2001, 2006) were devoted to specific events caused by concrete individuals rather than the nation as a whole, they were globally rejected by Polish public opinion and by Polish historians (see Bilewicz 2008 for a summary of Polish reactions to these historical works). A recent study among a nationwide representative sample of Poles in the summer of 2013 showed that more than half of Polish adults (56.5 %) report feeling irritated when reminded about historical crimes committed by Polish people toward their Jewish neighbors, and those who expressed such irritation also tend to share a victimhood-based national identity ($r = 0.18$, $p < 0.01$; Bilewicz and Winiewski 2013). American historian John Connelly, in the context of discussing Polish difficulties with bringing together both the heroic tale of Polish victimhood and resistance with the disturbing tale of Polish indifference toward the slaughter of the Jews, summarized the state of the current debate succinctly: "Poles do not consider collaboration in World War II to be a topic" (Connelly 2005, p. 771).

Positive Consequences of Victimhood-based Identity in Poland

Victimhood-based national identity in Poland has obvious negative consequences, but perhaps even more interesting are the potential positive consequences of this identity on the individual as well as on the intergroup level. Wojciszke (2004) reports a study in Poland in which people who suffered were perceived as moral, likable, and deserving of respect to a greater degree than those who achieved the same results without suffering. This result seems to contradict the basic belief in a just world (Furnham 2003; Lerner 1980), but it is plausible that cultures with a long

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[1] The term was first used in this sense by Jan Karski, a member of the Polish resistance who informed the world public opinion about the mass extermination of European Jews.

history of injustice—due to colonialism, totalitarianism, genocide, or other forms of group oppression—could develop alternative worldviews, treating suffering, victimization, and losses as a specific capital of virtue. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as a "belief in an unjust world" (Doliński 1991; Wojciszke 2004). In this respect, the glorification of victimhood might be a form of adaptation in societies that were deprived of collective control.

Such a "capital of virtue" does not necessarily benefit only victimized members of the ingroup (as in Wojciszke 2004) but could also serve as a tool for fostering positive attitudes toward victimized outgroups, notably refugees. A representative poll (OBOP 2006) suggests that this might be the case: 72 % of Poles agreed that their country should admit refugees because in the past Poles were refugees themselves. Although double-barreled and a socially desirable response, this finding points to a promising avenue for an inclusive, superordinate social category based on historical victimization of the host group (Poles) and current suffering of the newly arriving group (refugees). Two follow-up studies among student samples supported this notion: Inclusive beliefs about Polish victimhood were consistently positively correlated with support for a more pro-refugee state policy (Olechowski 2013).

Two of the authors further explored this idea by focusing on the effects of such an inclusive construal of Poles' past suffering on attitudes toward the largest refugee group in Poland, Chechens. A study was conducted in Łomża, a small city in northeast Poland where several hundred Chechen refugees live. This place is especially relevant for the topic at hand because of a moderate but protracted conflict between Poles and the refugee community, with right-wing politicians arguing to move the refugees to another city and Polish youth publishing a hateful video on the internet about Łomża's Chechens. A representative poll supported the predictions: inclusive victim consciousness (e.g. "The history of Poles and Chechens is similar") was positively correlated with inclusion of the outgroup (Chechens) in the self ($r=0.28$) and with positive emotions toward them ($r=0.35$), and negatively correlated with social distance toward Chechens ($r=-0.38$) and perceiving them as threatening ($r=-0.36$; Olechowski and Bilewicz 2013).

Although not conclusive due to their correlational nature, these results suggest that inclusive victim consciousness can, to some extent, positively shape attitudes toward disadvantaged groups in Poland. This conclusion echoes the writings of Poland's most eminent Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz. He not only coined the term "Poland as the Christ of nations," arguing for a Messianic, suffering role of Poles in the redemption of other nations but he also wrote a moving piece "To Russian friends," where he included them in a superordinate category of people suffering under the Tzar: "your foreign faces have citizens' rights in my dreams" (Mickiewicz 1832).

Conclusion

In this chapter we attempted to show—drawing on and extending Bar-Tal's work on collective victimhood and using examples from the Polish context and from other contexts—that social identities developed around a sense of collective victimhood

can have powerful consequences for intergroup relations. Although the negative consequences of collective victimhood beliefs are more often studied by social psychologists, we suggest that there is a need for a more detailed analysis of the positive potential of such beliefs. A good example of such positive consequences is the hero of the Israeli documentary movie "Despite it All" (Kabin 2007): Jakub Guterman, a teacher at an Israeli high school. Jakub was deeply immersed in Polish culture and Polish literature before emigrating to Israel. His father, a soldier of the Polish Home Army, was killed by the Nazis in the Warsaw Uprising. His son, a soldier of the Israeli Defense Forces, was killed in the Lebanon war. After suffering such tragedies, Jakub decided to engage in Palestinian–Israeli reconciliation groups, visiting schools and teaching about the tragic consequences of hate, together with Arab adults who lost their children because of the conflict. The case of Jakub Guterman—a "son of Polish and Jewish culture," as he calls himself—is a good example of inclusive victim consciousness (Vollhardt 2012). Similarly, the Palestinian doctor Izzeldin Abuelaish, who grew up in the Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza Strip whose daughters were killed during Israeli attacks on the Gaza strip in 2009, has treated patients on both sides of the conflict and engaged in peace activism in response to his experiences (Abuelaish 2011).

Such examples of people who define their victimhood in inclusive ways can serve as moral exemplars. By presenting their narratives we may improve contemporary relations between historically victimized groups. Research performed during Polish–Israeli youth meetings (Bilewicz and Jaworska 2013) and during an intervention program in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Čehajić-Clancy et al. submitted) showed that such moral exemplars can enhance the effects of contact and induce willingness to reconcile between historically conflicted groups. These findings from the Polish and Israeli context could be informative for any conflict situation where exclusive construals of victimhood create a defensive social identity and form a core aspect of the society's ethos of conflict.

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Chapter 7
Hope(lessness) and Collective (In)action in Intractable Intergroup Conflict

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Intractable intergroup conflict is an extremely severe, violent, and protracted form of intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal 2013; Coleman 2003; Kriesberg 1993). Such conflicts include a number of unique characteristics that set them apart from other types of intergroup conflicts. One such characteristic is the perception of irresolvability, which is closely associated with the development of hopelessness. According to the seminal work of Daniel Bar-Tal (1990, 2007, 2013), this lack of hope becomes, over time, an inherent part of the psychological infrastructure of the conflict and thus helps to perpetuate intractable conflict by inducing indifference and inaction. Hope, on the other hand, has been suggested as an important emotion within conflict resolution (Bar-Tal 2001; Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006, see also Jarymowicz, this volume) because it induces constructive and goal-directed behavior (Stotland 1969). We suggest that one behavioral manifestation of hope may be action to achieve social change, or in this context, to achieve peace.

Collective action (e.g., demonstrations, petitions, and riots) has played a major role in countless processes of social change and political contexts. An abundant psychological literature has led to theoretical frameworks for scholars to examine and analyze collective action, and thus better understand this phenomenon (Becker et al. 2011; Klandermans 1997, 2004; Mummendey et al. 1999; Simon and Klandermans 2001; Sturmer and Simon 2004; van Zomeren et al.2008; Wright et al. 1990; for a review see van Zomeren et al. 2012). However, such frameworks may have limited applicability to explain collective action in intractable conflicts because of

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an innate catch-22. That is, while objectively it may seem as if both parties' best interest lies in peace, collective action towards achieving it is highly uncommon in such situations because the intractability of the conflict removes all hope and scope for such social change. Indeed, conditions imposed on the weak group often restrict any viable form of collective action, while members of both the weak and the strong groups are reluctant to violate a preference for the status quo driven by the beliefs of the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2007, see also Cohrs et al.; Oren, vol. 2; Sharvit, vol. 2; Nahhas et al., vol. 2). Thus, collective action in the context of intractable conflict may, at first glance, appear to be rare, not to say impossible.

However, in this chapter, we offer some hope that collective action may not be such an impossibility. We begin by reviewing existing research on intractable conflicts, focusing mainly on the role of hope and despair in such contexts. Next, we present literature on collective action, and discuss its importance in promoting social change, particularly in situations of intractable conflict. Finally, we examine what makes collective action within the context of intractable conflicts unique and rare, comparing and distinguishing it from traditional forms of collective action. We address both sides' hope and scope for change within the unique context of intractable conflict. We end by concluding that hope and collective action in intractable intergroup conflicts may come in small steps, but that they are not impossibilities.

Hope(lessness) and Intractable Conflicts

As mentioned earlier, one of intractable conflicts' main characteristics is that they are deemed irresolvable (Bar-Tal 1998; 2007; Kriesberg 1993; 1998). This general and consensual perception of the conflict's irresolvability drives feelings of hopelessness, a detrimental emotional state within the context of such conflicts. Over time, the lack of hope, experienced due to recurring and failed attempts to resolve the conflict, seeps into the national narrative (Bar-Tal 2007; see also Nets- Zehngut, vol. 2), becoming an integral part of the psychological infrastructure of the conflict. This serves to remove responsibility for the disastrous situation, and uphold positive perceptions of the in-group as always aspiring for peace (Bar-Tal 2000). This raises the question of how hope can be induced and mobilized to change the conflict generally, and more specifically the general and consensual perception of the intractableness of the conflict.

Hope is rooted in envisioning a future goal which is perceived as positive and to which the person attaches importance (Snyder 2000; see also Jarymowicz, this volume). This visualization is followed by a positive change in mental state regarding the future goal (Beck et al. 1974; Snyder 2000; Stotland 1969; Lazarus 1999). Though hope has not been defined as a basic emotion (Averill 1994), it has been pointed at as one of the core emotions needed for human survival, since it drives goal-directed behavior, thinking and planning ways to achieve the imagined situation in question (Stotland 1969). Planning and developing pathways both energizes and directs behavior (Staats and Stassen 1985), and when combined with a sense of urgency regarding those paths, these become action to achieve those goals (Snyder 2000).

Empirical research regarding hope's behavioral tendencies has found it to lead to cognitive flexibility and creativity (Breznitz 1986; Clore et al. 1994; Isen 1990), risk-seeking behavior (Anderson and Galinsky 2006) and problem-solving abilities (Chang 1998; Snyder et al. 1996). As such, a lack of hope may breed inaction, while a sense of hope may enable creative ways to change something about the conflict that holds those involved hostage. Thus, it would seem that when considering a context of intractable conflict, hope has the potential to generate movement by allowing individuals to think about novel ways to achieve peace.

More specifically, Bar-Tal (2001) has discussed the importance of hope within the context of conflict resolution, since it involves conceiving of new paths and behaviors toward the positively viewed goal of ending the conflict, including motivating people to hold conciliatory attitudes. Coleman et al. (2007) discuss the paradoxical cycle of hope and despair in intractable conflicts, in which, though the situation is ever-changing in its volatility, its very essence is seen as constant and unchanging. Subsequently, people and societies involved in the conflict adopt this perception of the conflict as stable, further feeding into its hopelessness and despair.

Hope has also been examined empirically within this context, evidencing its importance in promoting peace. In Northern Ireland, trait hope (Snyder et al. 1991) was found to be positively associated with a higher inclination to forgive the out-group indirectly through the trait inclination of dissipation or rumination (Moeschberger et al. 2005). Halperin and Gross (2011) conducted a nationwide survey among Jewish Israelis during the 2008 war in Gaza and found that the experience of hope regarding the end of the conflict was positively associated with willingness to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinians. Halperin et al (2008) showed that in Israel, hope was positively associated with legitimizing perceptions of the out-group. In Israel, experimentally induced hope led participants to support concession making during negotiations with Palestinians (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014, 2015). Thus, these studies indicate that hope has an important role in promoting peace-supporting attitudes in intractable conflicts.

However, while research on the role of hope in intractable conflict exists, less attention has been paid to action tendencies and behavior associated with hope in such contexts. As stated, hope has been found to predict and motivate behavior (Staats and Stassen 1985) and action (Snyder 2000). This is a hopeful message for those involved in and studying intractable intergroup conflict. That is, perhaps even within intractable intergroup conflict situations, hope may have a key role in motivating collective ways to change the situation, giving rise to collective action to achieve social change.

Collective Action and Social Change

Aside from political (top-down) processes, conflict resolution can also be fostered through psychological (bottom-up) processes. A good example of the latter is the phenomenon of *collective action*, which is typically defined as any action that individuals engage in on the group's behalf to achieve group goals (van Zomeren and

Iyer 2009; Wright et al. 1990). Indeed, individuals' engagement in collective action can change political agendas and instill values, as well as empower members of nations and societies (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement). Put differently, collective action reflects people's capacity to create social change as a group, taking control of their destiny and pursuing the betterment of their position on a large scale.

There seems to be consensus in the broad literature on collective action that it is predicted by at least a triad of motivational variables (for a meta-analysis see van Zomeren et al. 2008): Group identification (Tajfel 1978; Ellemers 1993; for a review see Sturmer and Simon 2004), perceptions and emotional experience of group-based injustice (e.g., group-based anger; for a review see Van Zomeren et al. 2012), and perceptions of the group's efficacy to achieve its' goals (Hornsey et al. 2006; Klandermans 1984; 1997; Mummendey et al. 1999; Wright and Lubensky 2009). Thus, to the extent that individuals identify more with a group, feel more anger on its' behalf and believe more in its' efficacy to achieve group goals, individuals should become more motivated to engage in collective action.

However, collective action does not occur on its own accord and is certainly not a given. Research on individuals' motivations to undertake collective action typically selects research contexts in which collective action is already ongoing, or at least quite likely to occur (Van Zomeren 2013). As such, the research is often somewhat separated from its underlying theoretical assumption that collective action is often simply not an option for individuals. Indeed, social identity theory (Tajfel 1978; Ellemers 1993) suggests that collective action should occur only under societal circumstances that allow for individuals' imagination of a different future (thus allowing hope for the attainment of a fairer future) and a sense of instability and thus scope for social change (Tajfel 1978; see also Ellemers 1993; Mummendey et al. 1999; Van Zomeren et al. 2012). This means that without hope and scope for social change, collective action should not occur. This resonates with our line of thought that collective action is rare in intractable intergroup conflicts precisely because such conflicts are defined by a lack of hope and scope for a positive change.

We believe that this state of affairs (i.e., hope- and scopelessness) converges with the state of affairs found in intractable intergroup conflicts. Two important pointers follow from this observation. First, this may already explain, at least to some extent, why collective action in intractable intergroup conflict is rare, if not absent altogether. Second, this implies that finding a way to *up-regulate* hope (e.g., Cohen-Chen et al. 2014, 2015) may remove an important barrier to collective action and translate an inactive state of affairs to a more active one. Indeed, it stands to reason that once hope is reinvigorated (or at least kept alive), the triad of motivations that predict the undertaking of collective action can be mobilized to increase chances of the occurrence of the collective action. Put differently, hope may be an important *precondition* for individuals to be(come) motivated for collective action in the first place. In this way, an analysis of how hope can bring about collective action in the context of intractable intergroup conflict is not only an important theoretical development, but also points to important practical implications.

Collective Action in Intractable Conflict

As a first step toward applying this hopeful insight, in this section we conceptually analyze how collective action within the context of intractable conflict differs from collective action in nonintractable intergroup conflicts. The purpose of this enterprise is to map these phenomena in order to better understand how hope serves to combine and even integrate the two. We do so by asking a number of core questions, starting with the definition of the group's disadvantage.

What Is the Group's Disadvantage?

Typically, the group's disadvantage addressed by collective action can be viewed as based either in the situation itself (e.g., a group having an external problem that can be solved without changing one's identity; Klandermans 1997; van Zomeren et al. 2008; Walsh 1988), or in the group itself (e.g., societal discrimination, based in a negative group identity; these can only be changed by changing something about one's group). Van Zomeren et al. (2008) suggest that individuals find it harder to engage in action against structural disadvantages because of their internalized sense of disadvantage, coupled with the resistance met when trying to change the in-group.

In intractable conflict, the disadvantage can be defined as a (extreme form of) structural disadvantage (Jost and Hunyady 2002; Major 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 1978; van Zomeren et al. 2008), since it derives from the nature of the relations, as well as the psychological consequences of the conflict. Specifically, the disadvantage includes less or no access to resources, opportunities, and equal rights (such as freedom of movement, expression, etc.). Moreover, there are threats to security and mental well-being, such as extreme levels of fear and anxiety (Bar-Tal 2001, 2007). Thus, the disadvantage can be defined as the instrumental and emotional consequences that intractable conflict has on both groups involved in the conflict. In this sense, intractable conflicts represent a unique type of structural disadvantage that make it comparable at a *general* level with more traditional types of collective action, but clearly different at a more specific level.

Since collective action occurs when there are cognitive alternatives to the status quo, structural instability enables people to imagine these alternatives. However, intractable conflicts are perceived as being irresolvable by those involved (Bar-Tal 2001; Coleman 2011; Kriesberg 1993, 1998), a belief which hinders willingness to partake in collective action. This observation already suggests that structural instability, a precondition for collective action to even be possible in people's minds, is blocked in the context of intractable conflicts.

Herein lies the role of hope, defined as the legitimate possibility to imagine alternatives to the existing status quo, as a bridge between intractable conflicts (which

are inherently perceived as stable) and collective action (which requires a perception of instability). Thus, inducing hope in intractable conflicts (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014, 2015) becomes imperative in creating conditions fostering collective action and civic engagement. And while the fact that decisions are made by leaders and not society members can decrease hope, collective action is an important method used by societies and groups to convey attitudes regarding the conflict to their leaders and decision makers. Typically, the argument made in the collective action field is that *conflict* is necessary to obtain improved outcomes (likely involving negative attitudes), since it induces collective action to achieve change. But due to the conflict context, collective action is a means for the people to encourage decision-makers to make peace, ultimately leading to positive attitude change and a reduction in conflict.

When referring to scope for change, defined as the potential for achieving change in the first place, the different parties in the conflict are directing their actions at the same audience, while they each have different *scope* for collective action. For the weak side of the conflict (e.g., in the Israeli–Palestinian case, the Palestinians, who direct their action at Israel), normative collective action has no (or at least very minimal) scope for change. Therefore, they engage either in non-normative collective action (riots and terror attacks), or do not engage in action at all. However, there is no action directed at their own system (the Palestinian government), and so they have very little scope, and therefore very little hope for change. For the strong side of the conflict (Israel) there is scope for change, but it is directed at group members' own system. Thus, the audience for both sides is the same (Israel). The deviant subgroup (leftists in the Israeli case), have scope in collective action since they are the in-group and can take part in collective action. However, their scope is also limited as they risk excluding themselves from the in-group by engaging in collective action against their own group. Taken together, it seems that intractable conflicts lead both sides to experience disadvantage, while their inherent perception of stability hinders collective action. In such cases, hope may serve as an underlying condition for the emergence of collective action and mobilization for peace.

Who Is the Disadvantaged Group?

Typical collective action contexts suggest that the disadvantaged group engaging in collective action is a low status group suffering from societal inequality (Wright et al. 1990). However, in intractable conflicts, the disadvantage based in the conflict's consequences is experienced by both parties in the conflict. This is an important distinction because it also points to the idea that both sides' actions to work toward the same goal through collective efforts will be of pivotal importance in achieving social change. More specifically, the weaker side is disadvantaged with respect to resources, opportunities, and rights, as well as security, and can on this basis feel relative deprivation on behalf of their group (for a meta-analysis and

review, see Smith et al. 2012). Members of the stronger side, however, may feel deprived of something they feel entitled to, such as security and well-being (Leach et al. 2007; Leach and Smith 2006). According to this logic, the strong side of the conflict can also hold victimhood beliefs about the group (Schori-Eyal 2014; Schori-Eyal and Klar, vol. 2; Vollhardt et al., this volume), and therefore may not necessarily perceive itself as the strong side. It may justify its aggressive policies as self-defense or self-preservation. For example, many Israelis believe Israel is under existential threat and is using every resource it has to defend itself (Dupuis et al., this volume).

Thus, while in traditional forms of collective action one group is clearly disadvantaged, in intractable conflict both sides can be viewed as disadvantaged groups, because they subjectively feel deprived. However, the bases on which these groups claim relative deprivation may differ (e.g., resources vs. security). As such, this phenomenon moves beyond the traditional view of collective action as the disadvantaged standing up against the advantaged. This raises a third question of who the relevant and responsible out-group is in this unique type of intergroup conflict, which has important implications for understanding collective action for change.

Who Is Responsible for the Disadvantage and How Is It Sustained?

Collective action typically requires a high status (or advantaged) group that the disadvantaged can blame and hold responsible for their group's disadvantage (van Zomeren et al. 2008). Therefore, the collective action is directed towards the group who seeks to protect and maintain the status quo. The key implication of this view is that the two groups are in direct competition for resources (as emphasized in realistic conflict theory) and societal status (as emphasized in social identity theory; e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979). By contrast, in intractable intergroup conflicts, the strong side of the conflict may be primarily responsible for the disadvantage, but there is also some responsibility of the weaker side in maintaining it (for inflicting suffering, violence, etc.). Intractable conflict, thus, assumes an asymmetrical but nevertheless bidirectional intergroup conflict that will not be resolved simply through the collective action of just one party. In a way, both sides have veto power over the conflict's continuation, as well as its resolution. Sometimes, the strong group's willingness to concede is overridden by the weak group's veto power. Thus, as the disadvantage itself is somewhat shared, so is the responsibility for the conflict's continuation.

In a similar vein, a traditional view of collective action indicates that the status quo advantages the high status group in terms of resources or power relations. Yet because both groups involved in intractable conflict can perceive themselves as disadvantaged (with at least some legitimate basis), the issue of advantage is more complex in such contexts. For the weak side of the conflict, for example, the disadvantage in maintaining the status quo is quite clear, since the status quo involves

a lack of resources, opportunities, and rights. This leads to a strong and widely accepted aspiration for change. This arguably reflects the typical view of collective action as the attempt of those who lack power to gain power.

Yet, the picture is more complex with regards to the strong side of the conflict. Indeed, one advantage of sustaining the status quo is that it *upholds the ethos of conflict* (Bar-Tal 2000). The ethos of conflict is a prism through which members of society perceive the conflict. It is a way to address conflict-related challenges and serves as a defense mechanism, protecting the group's positive self-image and enabling them to deal and live within the context of an intractable conflict (Bar-Tal 2000; Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Wide acceptance on the strong side that they are disadvantaging the out-group would contradict themes in the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2000), resulting in a dissonance many would find hard to overcome.

Another reason for aspiring to maintain the status quo is the fact that the high-status group also suffers to some extent (though on different bases than the weak side) which leads many people to support the status quo since they believe the existing situation could be worse and is at least bearable. Thus, a lack of cognitive alternatives to the status quo justifies its maintenance; this "advantage" is sustaining a livable situation and is driven by a lack of belief in a better future. Thus, the comparison made by members of the high status group is in fact not an intergroup one (which is most predictive of collective action; Smith et al. 2012), but a *temporal* one. Instead of comparing their situation to that of another group, the high status group compares the existing situation to an alternative and often hypothetical situation which is far worse. Both these processes explain, at least to some extent, why the strong side wants to maintain a violent conflict which otherwise appears as a strong lose/lose construction. It also explains why attribution of responsibility occurs in both directions.

Engaging in Collective Action on Whose Behalf?

As noted, collective action in intractable conflicts holds an inherent, twofold, catch-22. On the one hand, the weak side is deprived of resources, making it difficult to engage in effective collective action given the action's embeddedness in the conflict. Many times there are conditions that do not allow for collective action (at least normative), such as segregation or military rule. Nevertheless, there is a catch-22 for the stronger side as well. That is, in order to deal with the deprivation of security needs, the ethos of conflict is developed. This psychological infrastructure, through which the conflict is perceived, helps society members cope with security threats by justifying the in-group and mobilizing people to continue fighting. As long as the threat persists, societies continue to adhere to the ethos, and engaging in effective collective action would violate the ethos of conflict. This national narrative includes the belief that there is no hope (the conflict is irresolvable). This theme within the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2000, 2013; Cohrs et al. Chap. 3; Tropp, Chap. 12; Jost et al. Chap. 4; Oren vol. 2; Sharvit

vol. 2) supports the status quo by making it the *only* possible situation, while the belief in societal unity plays an important role in justifying the continuation of the conflict. Nevertheless, it is typically members of the advantaged group who engage in a combination of two types of collective action: The first is collective action on behalf of their own group's perceived interests to end the conflict (e.g., Israeli Jews protesting in-group or out-group actions that foster conflict). Importantly, collective action driven by a perception of peace as benefitting the in-group is based, at least partly, on hope; the perception that the conflict can be resolved, leading to action to achieve this goal. The second type is solidarity-based collective action (Van Zomeren 2013), in which the group acts on behalf of the other side (e.g., "Breaking the Silence" movement; www.breakingthesilence.org.il). Ultimately, this group perceives its actions as benefitting both sides, since they both have reasons to yearn for peace. However, people engaging in collective action for conflict resolution are often perceived as deviating from the national narrative (Asch 1952; Festinger 1950; Hornsey et al.2003; Shamir 1997; Turner 1991), often leading to them being branded as traitors.

Additionally, the collective action literature suggests another alternative to the question on whose behalf individuals may act. That is, theory and research (e.g., Simon et al. 1998; Sturmer and Simon 2004; Van Zomeren et al. 2008) suggest that *politicized* groups (e.g., social movements and action groups) can galvanize support from individuals, provided that they are not aligned with only one of the parties involved and can motivate individuals from both sides on the basis of shared moral standards (e.g., Van Zomeren et al. 2011). For example, in the Israeli–Palestinian context the One Voice Movement (www.onevoicemovement.org) runs offices from both sides that work together and among their respective societies to promote conflict resolution, while presenting the self-interest in conflict resolution.

However, it may become unclear who is "negotiating" with whom and on whose behalf, which may hinder collective action for peace. This is due to three elements: First, it is a member of the advantaged group (e.g., Israeli leftists) who is engaging in collective action, deviating from the national narrative and acting in order to end the conflict. Second, the action is aimed towards their own in-group (e.g., Israeli government or mainstream), who are responsible for maintaining the status quo. Third, and importantly for our purposes, there are two benefactors from this action. In addition to the perceived gains for the in-group by ending the violent conflict, the out-group (often perceived as "the enemy" and widely delegitimized) is a major benefactor of efforts for change. Thus, members of the in-group may ultimately end up acting to some extent on behalf of the out-group against the policies and beliefs endorsed by their own group. This may discourage many people, who agree with the need to end the conflict, from actually taking a stand and acting. These people are often disinclined to engage in collective action, since it may be perceived as cooperating with the enemy. Importantly, as stated, actions such as this would constitute a breach of the belief in unity, a major theme within the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2000).

Moreover, while some members of the in-group do choose to engage in collective action for peace, the *type* of action they partake in is also influenced by the fact

that they are in fact deviating from their group's conflict-related narrative. Here, since the target group is in fact the *in-group*, people may be reluctant to utilize various types of action so as not to hurt their in-group (physically and mentally) or relations with it. Often, they may be willing to use more "explaining" such as publishing their views in a newspaper or a social network, or participating in peaceful demonstrations, without using violence or force. These methods are characterized by moderate messages and restrained means, which are easily ignored or marginalized. Many of them utilize the in-group's narrative, and highlight the benefits of conflict resolution for the in-group rather than the out-group's needs or moral misgivings. Thus, while the disadvantaged side has little capacity to partake in collective action, subgroups within the advantaged party may compensate for this inability by acting on behalf of an interest they perceive as shared by both sides: peace.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we used Daniel Bar-Tal's many insights regarding intractable intergroup conflict as a distinctly different context from more traditional collective action contexts. By comparing these contexts systematically, we arrived at two core conclusions. First, collective action requires hope and scope for change, two elements which are, by definition, missing in intractable conflict settings. Second, this suggests that a glimmer of hope must be raised in order to move sociopsychological dynamics toward conflict resolution via the emerging opportunity to engage in collective action. Nevertheless, this hopeful insight from our analysis should not be understood as a solution to inaction in intractable conflict. Rather, we believe it offers a small but significant step to better understanding how to promote collective action for peace in intractable conflicts. Further examination and insight is needed to understand ways to utilize hope as a tool for mobilizing people to partake in collective endeavors to achieve peace and intergroup harmony.

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Chapter 8
Dealing with Ingroup Committed Atrocities: Moral Responsibility and Group-Based Guilt

Sabina Čehajić-Clancy

Introduction

After commission of grave mass atrocities, the task of any post-conflict society is to reconstruct a just and inclusive social and political environment. A key strategy to this is to confront the past by (re)establishing truth, justice, and reconciliation. The question is how. Although the question as to how we *should* react to such grievous collective transgressions is surely a question of morality and political debate, the question as to how we actually *do* react has been long a matter of psychological inquiry. In this chapter, I would like to review the sociopsychological insights into how people deal with knowledge that members of their own group have inflicted grave harm on members of another group. More specifically, I will discuss empirical evidence related to the group-based processes of acknowledgment (vs. denial), emotions (guilt and shame) and responsibility within the theoretical framework on societal beliefs as proposed by Bar-Tal (2000).

Although acknowledgment of the ingroup's criminal acts and reparation for victim groups are often regarded as the main pillars of a sustainable post-conflict reconciliation (Lederach 1997; Minow 1998; Tutu 1999), an all too common reaction of perpetrators is to ignore or misconstrue the ingroup's misdeeds (Cohen 2001; Leach et al. 2012). Such denial of "unwelcome" knowledge, particularly genocidal acts committed by one's group, may reflect a need to protect our group—and hence ourselves—from identity threatening information (Cohen 2001). In analyzing this need to protect own group and its members, social identity theory may be useful (Tajfel and Turner 1986). This social psychological theory proposes that belonging to social groups constitutes an important aspect of the self. Further, it argues that, just as people strive to maintain a positive self-concept as individuals, they are also motivated to maintain or achieve a positive *social* identity, an evaluation of the ingroup as better, superior, and worthy (Tajfel and Turner 1986).

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In situations of atrocities committed by the ingroup, it would be plausible to expect that this need for positive social identity will be expressed through either denying or justifying their group's actions. Indeed, a common reaction to atrocities committed by the ingroup is to repress, forget or simply ignore the "unwelcome" information (Cohen 2001). To put it simply, a common reaction seems to be to deny. People seem to be able to find ways to deny the meaning of what they or members of their group have done. And it is these denials that not only obstruct any reconciliatory process, but also allow atrocities to be committed in the first place (Cohen 2001). By living in a world where the refusal to acknowledge and accept responsibility and a lack of adequate punishment of offender(s) is more common than truth and justice, it simply becomes "easier" to commit horrible acts against others and then deflect their meaning afterwards (Čehajić and Brown 2010). These and related moral disengagement processes not only obstruct reconciliation processes but also penetrate into collectively accepted and shared narratives, which Bar-Tal termed as collective memory (Bar-Tal 2007). One of the functions of such collectively shared beliefs is protection of social identity and justification of group's goals, which, as Paez and Liu (see this volume) put it, becomes an integrative problem of the conflict itself.

The literature on moral disengagement has identified a variety of mechanisms through which individuals can avoid negative self-sanctions while engaging in morally reprehensible behavior (Bandura 1990, 1999). These mechanisms apply to a variety of settings, from cheating in school to evading taxes, but they have been particularly useful in understanding intergroup violence, including torture, mass murder, and genocide (e.g., Staub 1989). By trying to make a culpable group's behavior righteous, people might use various cognitive reconstruals (Bandura 1999). In this sense, Bandura suggested that perpetrators tend to use various moral disengagement strategies while cognitively restructuring the inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one ranging from moral justifications to dehumanization. In his work, Bandura provided us with in-depth and elaborative analyses as to when and why we use such moral disengagement strategies, but Bar-Tal extended the application of these and related MDS through introducing the concept of ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2007). Ethos of conflict, according to Bar-Tal, is not only configured from shared societal beliefs while providing the dominant orientation of the society but becomes a dominant explanation (narrative) of group's past and future behavior (see also Cohrs et al., this volume; Jost et al., this volume; Oren, volume 2; Sharvit, volume 2; Nahhas et al., volume 2).

Besides outright or blatant denial of group's actions, another and often used societal belief for distorting the meaning of such "unwelcome" information is delegitimization, which is of particular importance not only in the execution of violence, and especially of atrocities, but also for the process of justification (Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy 2013). Delegitimization excludes the rival group outside the boundaries of the commonly accepted groups as a legitimate member worthy of basic civil and human rights and indicates that this group deserves inhumane treatment (Bar-Tal and Hammack 2012). It assumes that only the delegitimized group may raise threatening goals and carry violent unaccepted acts. This perception leads

to violence and atrocities by the delegitimizing group because the ingroup tries to avert the danger by preventive actions as well as revenge the already done harm.

In addition to delegitimization of the other, another important moral disengagement strategy seems to be a perception that the perpetrator group, and not the victim group, has suffered the most (Nadler and Liviatan 2004; Noor et al. 2012; Vollhardt 2012). In intergroup conflict situations, members of conflicting groups tend to generate various beliefs that facilitate coping with the situation. Such beliefs are usually biased, because strong motivations—such as preservation of positive social identity—often underlie information processing in conflict situations (Bar-Tal 2000). And indeed, one such societal belief is that of one's own victimization, the idea that "we" have suffered more. Such claims about ingroup victimhood may be regarded as a psychological coping strategy and serve the purpose of minimizing the ingroup's role in the conflict, simultaneously undermining processes which might contribute to reconciliation (see also Volhardt et al., this volume; Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2).

The combination of delegitimization and collective victimhood can sometimes be interpreted as a license to commit immoral and illegitimate acts (called moral entitlement). Groups with a high sense of collective victimhood reason that in order to prevent a trauma from ever happening again, the ingroup is allowed to do everything within its power to prevent it (Bar-Tal 2009). Then, once delegitimization, threat, sense of collective victimhood, and violence emerge, the vicious cycles of conflict are in motion (Bandura 1999; Staub 2003). The repertoire leads to more violence, and the violence in turn widens and strengthens the repertoire.

Group-Based Emotions

From the brief review above, we have seen that different forms of denials and justifications are more common than the readiness to acknowledge that members of the ingroup have harmed the others. But what happens when we are nevertheless forcibly reminded of the crimes that their group has committed and eventually acknowledge the ingroup's misdeeds? Sociopsychological research shows that people can and sometimes do feel various emotions on behalf of their group's actions termed as intergroup or group-based emotions (see also Pliskin and Halperin, volume 2). Group-based emotions have been defined as emotions experienced on behalf of one's own group (Smith 1993, 1999) assuming that any event that affects the group can also affect the self directly (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Smith (1993) has suggested that the extent to which group membership is important for the self, hence the extent to which group members share interests and goals, emotional states are also likely to be shared. The hypothesis of experiencing emotions on behalf of one's group heavily relies on the assumption that the self can be viewed as an exemplar of a group (rather than as an individual) which decreases the relevance of interpersonal differences by increasing the perceived similarity between oneself and other in-

group members (Simon et al. 1997; Simon et al. 1995). Hence, Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) focuses on the collective aspects of the self in comparison to appraisal theorists of emotions who conceptualized emotions primarily related to the personal aspects of the self (Frijda 1986; Scherer 1988).

According to appraisal theory of emotions, a situation or an event will elicit an emotional reaction if it affects individuals' goals, intentions, or motives. Depending on the evaluation (interpretation) of the situation—termed as appraisals—individuals will experience specific emotions. Specifically, an appraisal raises the question of whether the situation affects *me* personally; whether it harms or favors *my* goals; and whether *I* have the resources to cope with it or not? In turn, these appraisals trigger specific emotional reactions, which in turn promote certain specific interpersonal behaviors (Roseman et al. 1994).

Building upon such understandings, IET suggests that appraisals can occur on a group basis (without the situation affecting the self directly) generating *group-based* emotions. Situations that affect one's group (and not necessarily the self) can trigger "individually felt" emotions based on appraisals of how the particular situation is affecting the group (and not necessarily the self). The experience of specific group-based emotions will in turn increase the likelihood of particular intergroup behavior (Smith 1993, 1999).

Understanding the psychological processes underlying our beliefs about the ingroup, the outgroup and the intergroup relations are highly important for conflict resolution and reconciliation but one ought not to neglect the emotional aspects either. In his recent paper, Halperin (2011) has argued and empirically demonstrated how emotions direct our understanding and political positions towards the adversary party and specific public policies. When it comes to dealing with ingroup morally violated behavior, two specific group-based emotions arise as relevant for our understanding of conflict and reconciliation-oriented process: guilt and shame.

Group-Based Guilt and Shame

Similarly and more importantly for conflict contexts, research shows that people can and sometimes do feel guilt or ashamed for what their group has done in the past, framed as group-based emotions (Branscombe and Doosje 2004). Drawn from social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987), this general hypothesis provided the basis for the first theorizing and research into group-based guilt and shame, an emotion that can arise when one is reminded of negative actions perpetrated by the ingroup (Branscombe and Doosje 2004; Doosje et al. 1998; Leach et al. 2002).

Lewis's (1971) distinction between guilt and shame has proved influential. According to Lewis, both emotions are self-conscious and negative, however, with a difference in their focus: feeling guilty for one's wrongdoing is associated with a focus on specific behaviors and their consequences for the other ("I did this bad thing and now the other is suffering as a result"), whereas feelings of shame involve

a greater emphasis on the implications of the wrongdoing for the self ("I did this bad thing and therefore I am a bad person"). Guilt and shame are thought to differ not only in their appraisal focus but also their likely consequences (e.g., Tangney and Fischer 1995). Guilt, with its focus on the misdeeds and their consequences, is thought to lead to attempts at restitution to the victim (e.g., apology, reparation) whereas shame, with its more inward focus, should be more likely to provoke withdrawal or avoidance responses (Lewis 1971; Tangney and Fischer 1995).

However, the precise conceptualization of shame is still under debate. Some have followed Lewis (1971) in regarding shame as the distress that reveals some flaw in one's essential character (Tangney 1991; Tangney et al. 1996). However, others have defined shame as the distress caused by the public exposure of the wrongdoing (Smith et al. 2002). In this conception, shame is linked to a damaged reputation or a loss of respect and honor in the eyes of others (Crozier 1998; Smith et al. 2002). Of course, these two conceptions are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, both aspects of shame may often be evoked simultaneously.

As stated above and drawn from social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987), the hypothesis that people derive part of their identity from their social identities provided the basis for the first theorizing and research into group-based guilt and shame, emotions that can arise when one is reminded of negative actions perpetrated by the ingroup (Branscombe and Doosje 2004; Doosje et al. 1998; Leach et al. 2002). A review of the existing literature on guilt and shame at the group level reveals that shame, unlike guilt, has not only been investigated less but that the expressions of both emotions have sometimes been used interchangeably due to the difficulty of empirically distinguishing between them (e.g., Iyer et al. 2003; Leach et al. 2002). In addition, only a few studies have looked at factors associated with *both* emotional experiences simultaneously (e.g., Iyer et al. 2006; Lickel et al. 2004). Moreover, the important question of what makes people feel guilty or ashamed in the first place remains underexplored.

Correlates of Group-Based Guilt and Shame

Since group-based guilt (and shame) are unpleasant emotions, people might be motivated to avoid feeling them in the first place (Leach et al. 2002). Indeed, an important precondition for guilt and shame to be felt at all is at least some awareness of the ingroup's responsibility for wrongful acts (Branscombe et al. 2002). Those who are not aware, or those who defend themselves from such a realization, have little psychological basis for feeling guilt or shame about their ingroup's actions (Cohen 2001; Leach et al. 2006). If perception of the ingroup's responsibility for past transgressions constitute a necessary and a common antecedent of both emotions, which processes might differentiate them? Our recent research has shown that a critical determinant of the type of the emotion felt is the appraisal of the ingroup's responsibility for some negative behavior. In common with others, we argued that it is not the event per se that determines whether guilt or shame will be

experienced but rather how the event is appraised (e.g., Lazarus 1991; Siemer et al. 2007). Indeed our three studies showed that perception of ingroup responsibility for atrocities perpetrated against an outgroup led to greater feelings of guilt through personal acceptance of ingroup responsibility, whereas it led to greater feelings of shame through a perception of threatened group image (Čehajić-Clancy and Brown 2014). The findings suggest that focusing on the consequences of the ingroup's wrongful actions for the outgroup (through acceptance of ingroup responsibility) may be a more effective strategy for the restoration of intergroup relations than a focus on the consequences of the ingroup's actions for the ingroup (through image threat appraisals).

However, and as stated above, an important precondition for guilt and shame to be felt at all is at least some awareness of the ingroup's responsibility for wrongful acts (Branscombe et al. 2002). Those who are not aware, or those who defend themselves from such a realization, have little psychological basis for feeling guilt or shame about their ingroup's actions (Cohen 2001; Leach et al. 2006, Study 1). Indeed, several commentators concur in proposing that group-based guilt (many studies have not measured shame directly but simply focused on feelings of guilt) arises mainly when group members perceive that they have some responsibility for or control over, their ingroup misdeeds or the subsequent repercussions of those misdeeds (Branscombe et al. 2002; Leach et al. 2002; Lickel et al. 2004). Even though feelings of guilt are negative, the behavioral consequences of this particular emotion can have positive implications for restoration of intergroup relations.

There is also some consensus that feelings of group-based guilt are likely to generate tendencies to repair the damage and thus benefit the outgroup (e.g., Branscombe and Doosje 2004; Doosje et al. 1998; Iyer et al. 2003; McGarty et al. 2005; Swim and Miller 1999). For instance, in four studies in the USA, Swim and Miller (1999) found that European American's guilt consistently predicted reparation in the form of favorable attitudes towards affirmative action policies, and less prejudice towards African Americans. This was supported by Iyer et al. (2003) who also found that guilt was mainly correlated with "compensatory" forms of affirmative action, and not with equal opportunities policies. The latter form of restitution was better predicted by sympathy for the outgroup. Elsewhere, Leach et al. (2006) and McGarty et al. (2005) found that collective guilt of Non-Indigenous Australians about the treatment of Indigenous Australians was correlated with support for official government apologies to the Indigenous community. Pederson et al. (2004) found that both collective guilt and empathy were negatively associated with prejudice towards Indigenous Australians. The research reported above clearly suggests that individuals do indeed report feeling guilty when reminded of their group's reprehensible past. What makes collective guilt a *group-based* emotion is clearly the fact that it is *group's* negative behavior (rather than one's own) that constitutes the basis for the emotion. Stated otherwise, group transgressions are the *cause* of the phenomenon of collective guilt that is then experienced (or not experienced) solely by an individual.

This observation on the phenomenology of group-based guilt (and any other group-based emotion) can thus be translated into a question as to which type of

behavior is group-based guilt likely to provoke: General and/or specific intergroup behavior or rather personally based types of behaviors? If I feel guilty for my group transgressions, will I be therefore endorsing reparations to be provided by my group or rather myself? Our research conducted in post-conflict context of Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that individuals who feel group-based guilt are more likely to endorse both reparations on behalf of one's group but also on their own (where resources and capacities are sufficient) (Čehajić-Clancy et al. 2011).

Although the research cited above has established a link between group-based guilt and support for reparations, the question that still requires empirical examination is what conditions (rather than processes) would facilitate or upregulate such moral group-based feelings? Our recent research (Čehajić et al. 2011) examined the effectiveness of two forms of esteem-enhancing affirmation—*self*-affirmation and *group* affirmation—in helping to overcome the abovementioned impediments to acknowledgment of ingroup responsibility and consequently emotions of guilt. In particular, our studies examined the impact of these manipulations on participants' willingness to acknowledge their group's responsibility for wrongdoing and victimization, ranging from mere harassment and ill-treatment to acts of genocide, and on participants' associated feelings of guilt and support for reparations to the victimized group.

In three studies, conducted in the context of two different real-world intergroup conflict settings with both morality-based affirmations (Study 1) and competence-based affirmations (Studies 2 and 3), we found that the opportunities for self-affirmation increased participants' acknowledgment of the harm their ingroup had inflicted on others. In Study 1, Israelis given the chance to write about an important value showed increased acknowledgment of their group's past and present mistreatment and victimization of Palestinians. In Study 2 (dealing with a specific and relatively recent instance of victimization of an innocent Palestinian) and Study 3 (dealing with the horrific acts of genocide perpetrated by Serbs against non-Serbs), writing about an event which made our participants proud of themselves increased acknowledgment of the group's *responsibility* for victimizing others, which increased feelings of guilt, which in turn increased support for reparation policies. In some instances, the differences between self-affirmation and control conditions proved to be only marginally significant; however, the pattern of self-affirmation effects was remarkably consistent across three studies.

These studies add to the evidence suggesting that bolstering individuals' feelings of global self-integrity (Sherman and Cohen 2006; Steele 1988) can reduce their inclination and need to respond defensively to threatening information. Our results go beyond prior work by demonstrating that self-affirmation can reduce defensiveness about the misdeeds of one's group even when they involve the most extreme forms of victimization including murder and other genocidal acts. The results also provide evidence for another positive consequence of self-affirmation: its capacity to foster and facilitate processes that serve the goal of intergroup reconciliation after a history of conflict and victimization.

The effectiveness of our self-affirmation procedures also sheds light on the nature of individuals' reluctance to take certain steps to alleviate intergroup conflict.

This reluctance, we have suggested, may stem in part from a desire to maintain a positive image of one's group, but it seems ultimately to stem from a desire to maintain a positive image of the self. Even people who have played no direct role in the wrongdoing may nonetheless feel that the wrongdoing reflects poorly on them as individuals—a feeling that may be especially strong in the context of entrenched intergroup conflict settings with a clear demarcation between "us" and "them" that makes individuals view their group membership as a central aspect of their identity. It is that part of their identity that our self-affirmation manipulation makes it less necessary for them to defend.

Group-Based Responsibility

In the context of sustainable conflict resolution and reconciliation, various societal-shared and ingroup-protective beliefs offer a plethora of explanations as to why conflict arise, how they are sustained, and how they prevent any successful resolutions (Bar-Tal 2007). Above I have reviewed specific societal beliefs such as delegitimization of the other, beliefs of victimization, etc., and how they constitute cognitive barriers to group-based emotions of guilt and/or shame. Now, I would like to shift the question from *how* people deal with ingroup committed atrocities to which processes might be even more effective in terms of its effects on reconciliation and peace building.

After commission of grave and mass atrocities particularly those entailing killings of innocent people, the question that arises is whether one can hold all members collectively and morally responsible for crimes committed in their name? Are those who have not done anything wrong or those who have not been even born yet automatically responsible for crimes committed by other members of *their* group? Are they responsible even if they have neither supported nor tolerated the commission of those crimes?

Although there is some consensus regarding the necessity of acknowledgment of collective responsibility for restoration of post-conflict relations (e.g., Minow 1998; Tutu 1999), the question as to whether it is right to highlight the responsibility of all individuals who belong to the perpetrator group can still be debated. On the one hand, it could be argued that the concept of collective responsibility makes no sense if "responsibility"refers exclusively to specific individual conduct. In this view, it would be inappropriate to blame people for something they neither did nor intended to do (Lewis 1948). Unlike with personal or individual responsibility, it is not possible to prove or show the causal link between each and every group member and committed crimes in the case of collective responsibility.

On the other hand, others have regarded collective responsibility as a moral duty to respond to crimes committed in one's name and as a practical category, which is a prerequisite for lasting reconciliation (Dimitrijevic 2006). Even though I agree that acceptance of responsibility for the group's *past* behavior might indeed be an inappropriate expectation, but the acceptance of responsibility for the consequences and

implications of group's behavior could be a plausible ethical demand. The logical definition of this notion depends primarily on the nature of the crimes committed and on the character of group identity. Collective moral responsibility arises out of the fact that people share group membership in various groups, which shape who these people are and that each person is at least somewhat implicated in what any member of the group does (May 1992). Particularly in situations where collective crimes have been committed, speaking about collective responsibility becomes even more plausible.

Collective crimes need to be differentiated from individually committed wrongs. Collective crimes are crimes that have been committed by a significantly large number of people against other social groups and in the name of one's own group. According to Radzik (2001), collective crimes imply collective intent to commit specific acts, collective awareness of the nature of intended crimes, organized effort to realize the intention, and collective awareness of atrocities' consequences. Taking all this into the equation, acceptance of collective responsibility becomes a more plausible and logical concept (Čehajić-Clancy 2012).

Conclusion

It is important to say that nations and states after bloody war, which reflects a history of long covered and uncovered conflict, have to go through a long process of peace building in order to build stable and lasting peace. *Stable and lasting peace* was defined as consisting of *mutual recognition and acceptance after reconciliation process, of invested supreme goal to maintain peaceful relations that are characterized by full normalization with cooperation in all possible domains of collective life that provide secure and trustful coexistence* (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 370). The process of building stable and lasting peace process does not stop with the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Reconciliation pertains to sociopsychological restructuring of relations between past rivals that allows healing from the past wounds of the conflict. This can be achieved through mutual recognition and acceptance, opened and free deliberation about past conflict, and by taking responsibility and correcting past injustices and wrongdoing (Bar-Tal 2013). Thus, reconciliation refers to building new relations that allow moving beyond the experiences accumulated before the conflict and during the conflict. Reconciliation allows forming a new sociopsychological repertoire that can accommodate the past grievances and contentions and construct new views about the rival and the conflict and collective self. It is this new socio-repertoire as a result of reconciliation process that enables building new relations as foundations of stable and lasting peace. Reconciliation implies that both parties not just get to know, but truly acknowledge what happened in the past (Čehajić-Clancy 2012; Čehajić and Brown 2008). Acknowledgement of the past implies at least recognizing that there are two, or more, narratives of the conflict (Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy 2013). This is an important factor in reconciliation, since the collective memories of

each party about its own past underpin the continuation of the conflict and obstruct peacemaking (Bar-Tal 2007). Reconciliation necessitates changing these societal beliefs (i.e., collective memories) about the past by learning about the rival group's collective memory and admitting one's own past misdeeds and responsibility for the outbreak and maintenance of the conflict. And sometimes learning about one's past can lead one to feel various unpleasant but yet reconciliation-beneficial emotions.

Future research should integrate Bar-Tal's theoretical concepts of conflict narratives and empirical research on how such biased but yet shared narratives can be changed so that they accentuate and reveal more positive perceptions of outgroups and more responsibility-oriented discourse in reference to the ingroup. A possible new line of research might go along the lines of moral exemplars (e.g., Bilewicz and Jaworska 2013) and their role in recreating existing biased narratives. Recent research by Bilewicz and Jaworska (2013) showed that examples of morality, particularly those coming from the outgroup, communicate the message of trustworthiness, and possibly outgroup heterogeneity which, in turn, is positively associated with forgiveness. Future research still needs to examine other potential communicative messages stemming from moral exemplars' conduct, such as outgroup humanity or empathy, and its consequent effects on intergroup reconciliation.

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Part IV
The Emotional Aspect of Intractable Conflicts

Chapter 9
Fear and Hope in Intractable Conflicts: The Automatic vs. Reflective Attributes of Collective Emotional Orientations

Maria Jarymowicz

Conflicts are saturated with emotions. Emotions as attributes of collective emotional orientations are considered to be crucial factors leading to conflict intractability (Bar-Tal 2013; see also Pliskin and Halperin, volume 2). But it is important to realize that emotions are also connected with conflict resolution and the peaceful life of contemporary societies (Halperin 2014; Pinker 2011). Obviously, the types of emotions in each case are not the same.

The aim of the chapter is to compare the role of fear (as an emotion of the automatic origin) and hope (as an emotion of the reflective origin) in intractable conflicts. As we pointed out sometime ago (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006), these two kinds of emotions are connected with significantly different ways of functioning in the context of intractable conflicts. The current analysis will be made in reference to (1) the assumption that intractable conflicts are connected with extreme manifestations of the so-called positive/negative asymmetry effect: the stronger influence on behavior of the negative emotions than the positive ones, and also to (2) the assumption that the duality of the human mind (and the evaluative systems) is connected with different regulatory rules—intuitive vs. rational, global vs. analytic, automatic vs. reflective, and each one can dominate human functioning.

Duality of the Human Mind: The Automatic vs. Reflective Basis of Social Behavior

To understand social behavior, we have to refer to psychological and neurobiological conceptualizations of the duality of the human mind (Epstein 1990; Liberman 2003), and to the distinction between the reflexive, impulsive vs. the reflective, deliberative processes (Deutsch and Strack 2006; Kahneman 2011). Each type of regulation leads to significantly different consequences for social living.

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Systems 1 and 2: Fast or Slow Thinking, Reasoning, and Evaluating

There is a tradition of distinguishing the lower vs. higher neuropsychological processes and activities—called "type 1" and "type 2" (Pavlov 1935). The latter—in Pavlovian terms, "the higher nervous processes"—are connected with the development of the new cortex, a necessary condition of human intellectual abilities and deliberative thinking.

The labels "system 1" and "system 2" are used by Daniel Kahneman (2011) in his meaningful monograph on fast vs. slow thinking. Fast thinking, based on automatic rules, cannot be controlled by a subject. Slow thinking is based on more complex prerequisites and rational operations. Each type of reasoning leads to different conclusions, as well as to cognitive and behavioral consequences of different types. For instance, illusions about reality are much more likely to be seen in cases of fast than slow thinking.

A similar distinction between the fast vs. slow processes can be made to characterize human emotions. Emotions—as evaluative processes—depend on appraisals based on implicit or explicit cognitions (Sander and Scherer 2009). Implicit cognition is faster, and explicit is much slower. Thus, emotional reactions can be direct, rapid, and impulsive, or postponed, based on piecemeal analysis and thoughtful evaluative reasoning. The latter takes not only time, but also effort—the reason why deliberative evaluation is only occasionally applied. However, domination of the fast mind activities over the slow ones is not only due to a subject's cognitive laziness but also depends on some basic properties of the mind. The fast appearance of feelings and behaviors is due to uncontrolled neurobiological factors leading to direct, automatic reactions (Bargh 1997; Damasio 1994; Oatlet & Jenkins 1996). Such reactions are important for adaptation and defense in situations of danger (Cacioppo and Gardner 1999; LeDoux 1998).

Emotions with Automatic vs. Reflective Origins

There is no doubt that to understand the role of emotions in social life we have to distinguish between different emotions: animal and human, implicit and explicit, basic and complex, and reactive and deliberative ones (Baumeister et al. 2007; Zajonc 1980). I argue that all these distinctions are connected with the crucial division between the automatic vs. reflective evaluative systems, generating different emotions, which we call the automatic and the reflective emotions (Jarymowicz 2009; Jarymowicz and Imbir 2015). Such a distinction can be made on the basis of emotional brain models (LeDoux 1998; Rolls 2000), according to which emotions are elicited through the lower, subcortical roads, or through the higher, cortical ones. The first type is connected with automatic reactions, and the latter enables reflective evaluative processes to take place. The automatic emotions "bypass the will" (Zajonc 1984; Bargh 1997; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Imbir and Jarymowicz 2013).

Such emotions can easily become dispositional patterns of reaction leading to a homogeneous ("black–white") perception of the world. The reflective emotions arise as a consequence of evaluative reasoning, more or less independent of the primary affective responses, and are connected with a complex, heterogeneous perception of the world. The reflective system permits perception of negative and positive attributes of the same object (Jarymowicz 2008).

What are the bases of the automatic vs. the reflective origins of emotions? We assume that any emotion is elicited as a consequence of an encoded discrepancy between a real state and an *evaluative standard*—a criterion of negativity/positivity, developed in the mind (Reykowski 1989). We argue (Jarymowicz and Imbir 2015) that some evaluative standards are implicit—innate or "collected" in the course of unintended learning—with a special role of biological and social conditioning, while some others have intellectual, reflective origins. It seems worthy to differentiate the following four large categories of evaluative standards. The automatic standards do not need verbalization and operate on the basis of homeostatic or hedonic criteria: the negative and positive emotions are caused by (1) homeostatic disequilibrium/equilibrium, or (2) hedonic or aversive types of external incentives. The reflective standards are verbalized. We distinguish: (3) the Self standards—that is criteria of self esteem and self acceptance (leading to pride or shame, guilt), and (4) general axiological standards, related to abstract concepts of good and evil (leading to negative emotions such as in case of a breach of human rights, and positive ones such as satisfaction resulting from conflict resolution). These four categories of the evaluative standards play different regulative role—as bases of specific (implicit or explicit) emotions and their different behavioral consequences. The fact that some standards operate in an automatic way has a special importance for the dynamic of intractable conflicts.

Fear as a Component of Rigid, Inflexible Collective Emotional Orientations

Fear is considered to be a prototype affective pattern for innate reactions to danger (Plutchik 1980). As a core affect (Russell 2003), fear leads to behavior through subcortical mechanisms—thus, regardless of the subject's cognitive insight and voluntary control (LeDoux 1998). As a holistic emotion (Plutchik 1980; Zajonc 1980) fear dominates over implicit, and then explicit cognition and behavior. In other words, automatically elicited fear leads to automatic consequences—first, on the subliminal, unconscious level, and then on the level of subjective feelings, awareness, and decisions (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 2012; Zajonc 1980).

Once learned, fear is difficult to reduce. There are at least two reasons for this. First, fear is elicited easily by very subtle signals. In an experimental setting, even exposure to an invisible stimulus can elicit a reaction of anxiety, influencing explicit judgments (Murphy and Zajonc 1993). Second, fear is a cause of unconscious learning: classical conditioning leads to reactions of fear to relatively neutral stimuli,

when they are associated with a context of danger and connected with negative reinforcements. Such reactions, often completely irrational, can be learned in an unconscious way—through implicit conditioning. Any neutral stimuli displayed at the same time with the affective one can lead later on to a similar affective reaction—not only when both stimuli can be noticed consciously, but also when both are unconscious (Öhman and Soares 1998).

The latter situation can be especially unfortunate. Let me give an example of experimental data showing the irrational behavioral consequences of subliminal affective conditioning (Jarymowicz 2008). We applied the implicit priming paradigm (Murphy and Zajonc 1993) in which photographs of faces with expressions of negative or positive emotions were used. Each affective face was exposed at the same time next to another invisible but neutral face (for 16 ms). The same neutral face was paired with a positive or negative face: with expressions of joy or disgust (that is emotions considered as universal and basic ones, such as fear—Damasio 1994; Plutchik 1980). After the subliminal conditioning session, the behavioral consequences were tested. Participants were requested to wait for a while (for "the second part of the experiment") and to take a chair nearby. Five chairs were placed in the laboratory. Above the first one, the photo of the neutral face (previously used in an implicit, invisible way) was hung on the wall. What did we find? The participants chose chairs at varying distances from the portrait of the unknown person (probably an unnoticed portrait of a neutral face!). The distance was shorter if this neutral face was previously paired with another face expressing joy, and longer if it was paired with a face presenting disgust. Thus, we demonstrated approach/avoidance behavior as an unconscious reaction to neutral stimuli, conditioned through invisible contact with pleasant or unpleasant stimuli. This result illustrates the power of the process of unconscious conditioning, influencing behavior in a way which is not accessible to the conscious mind, and often completely irrational.

Fear plays a fundamental role as a base of animals and humans defensive (re) actions (Cacioppo and Gardner 1999). But as a primary and purely automatic reaction to a threat, fear can lead to irrational consequences and increase a danger. Such destructive consequences of fear are due to two types of properties. The first one is described in terms of *the positive–negative asymmetry effects* (Peeters and Czapiński 1990): the primary negative stimuli are connected with lower thresholds, and higher reactivity and sensitivity than the positive ones. As Ito et al. (1998) entitled their article: Negative information weighs more heavily on the brain and brain states influence social behavior. The second type of property is caused by the fact that primary fear is easily shared by people. It can happen without verbal communication or articulated beliefs. Moreover, to stimulate the same state of fear in other people, even an explicit emotional expression is not necessary. Facial mini-expressions and mimicry caused by invisible muscle movements are enough (Bourgeois and Hess 2008; Ohme 2003). Thus, fear can easily become a core affect of a collective emotional orientation. And then, the reciprocal interpersonal stimulation reinforces the common orientation, making it inflexible and impervious to any change.

The Origin of Hope and the Limits of Its Regulative Role in Situations of Danger

The notion of *hope* is often understood as a synonym for a global optimistic feeling or belief that the future will be favorable. In the present text, this notion has a distinctly different meaning (Snyder 2000). It does not concern a wishful thinking and belief that the subsequent stages of life will bring something positive. Hope is understood as a positive emotion elicited on basis of reflective information processing, analysis, and conclusions. The subject of thinking is related to an image of particular states of not-yet-existing reality, which are estimated as possible to achieve if a program of particular activities is realized.

Hope is an emotion that depends specifically on human intellectual capacities of two types: (1) the ability to anticipate particular states of future reality and (2) the ability to create programs which lead to the achievement of such states. Hope is elicited if these conditions are verbalized by a subject. The linguistic system changes the emotional mind (Oatley and Jenkins 1996; Rolls 2000; Wierzbicka 1999). On the other hand, hope as an emotion is connected with the secondary affect (based on deliberative appraisal), and has a very special influence on further reasoning: hope as a positive emotion helps not only to perceive the large context of the reality but also to anticipate and create new visions of the future (Isen 1999). Hope is an attribute of the open mind. The open mind generates new ideas for difficult problem solving. However, hope can be elicited only if a subject is willing to formulate questions concerning possible versions of the future, and has ideas about how to achieve particular aims.

If so, an important question arises: could hope become a basis of collective emotional orientations in a situation of an intractable conflict? Such a process has significant obstacles, since it needs a consensus on aims and a program of activities to change reality. And a consensus cannot be reached in an automatic way. It can be achieved only if people talk, generate arguments, and are ready to listen to others and to discuss what is better or worse. Such a discussion of what is the best solution to a given problem is almost impossible on a group or national level, especially if the majority of group members are experiencing strong fear. Fear dominates over thinking—not only explicit, but also implicit, unintended (Uleman and Bargh 1989). To elicit other types of emotions and to change the emotional mind, primary fear has to be reduced (Plutchik 1980).

The Dominance of Hope Over Fear—Is it Possible?

The answer to this question is obvious: we know people who, living in dangerous conditions, act in a way indicating that their hope is really stronger than their fear. So the question has to be reformulated: What features allow hope to dominate over fear in situations such as a serious danger and intractable conflicts?

Studies on the Influence of Reflective Processes on Automatic Ones

Thinking and reasoning generate new information. This information operates consciously only for a short time, but all operations and their results are encoded in the brain and mind. In this latent position, the results of thinking play a regulative role, influencing further cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes. We conducted studies on the influence of reflective processes on automatic ones, including impact on implicit reactions, (Jarymowicz 2008; Imbir and Jarymowicz 2013).

These studies are related to the hypothesis that there are two different types of mechanisms leading to a dominance of reflective reasoning over reflexive reactions: specific and nonspecific ones. Not only can the content of reflections be significant, but also the mere fact that a subject is involved in reflective activity. To illustrate the nonspecific and specific relationships, I will describe the results of two kinds of laboratory experiments. In both, participants are first provoked to engage in reflective thinking, and then their reactions to some automatic implicit stimuli are assessed.

In one type of study, we applied the classic implicit affective priming paradigm (Murphy and Zajonc 1993), with subliminal exposure to faces with expressions of joy or disgust (Jarymowicz 2008). After each invisible stimulus (exposed for 16 ms), one visible neutral stimulus (Chinese ideogram or hexagram), presented as "a symbol of a human trait," were exposed explicitly (for 2 s). Participants were invited to a study on intuition, and told that they would see various Chinese signs on the screen, representing different negative or positive human traits, and their task would be to estimate ("on the basis of intuition") to what degree a trait connected with a given ideogram was negative or positive. The aim of the study was to observe whether the affective expressions of invisible faces influenced judgments about the evaluation of neutral, unknown, Chinese symbols. The rational evaluation of neutral stimuli should be neutral. Thus, it was assumed that the more extreme the estimation (negative or positive) of an ideogram, the stronger the influence of implicit priming on such a judgment would be. In each study on the reflectivity–automaticity relationship, one group of participants was first requested to think about a complex question (for example, "What attributes characterize a typical contemporary teacher? Try to indicate as many attributes as possible" or "What are the good and bad sides of patriotism? Try to indicate as many negative and positives attributes of patriotic attitudes as possible"). The impact of affective implicit priming on judgments about neutral Chinese signs in these groups was compared with the results of control groups. Data showed that the effect of the affective priming was significantly stronger in the control groups than in the groups with previous reflective tasks.

The reflective activity of the mind changes general principles of evaluative processes. We assume that the development of the reflective evaluative system leads to a habitual tendency to deliberate and seek explicit premises for any judgment (Jarymowicz 2008, 2009). It can also be expected that reflective evaluation and deliberative appraisals have a specific influence on automatic information processing.

To address these questions, in another series of studies, participants were first requested to perform a self-esteem task (Jarymowicz 2008). To make the task more complex, they had to evaluate 20 traits (10 negative and 10 positive) twice: first to indicate how important each trait is, and then to what degree each one is characteristic of the self. In the second part of the experiment, participants were told that they were going to see on the screen various Chinese hexagrams, "representing different negative or positive human traits," and their task would be to estimate ("on the basis of intuition") to what degree a trait symbolized by a given hexagram was characteristic of themselves. Before explicit exposure to each hexagram (for 2 s.) one word was implicitly exposed (for 40 ms): one label of trait taken from the list of 20 traits used earlier for the explicit self-esteem task.

The aim of this procedure was to observe whether explicit self-esteem influences implicit self-esteem. In particular, we compared the degree of explicit self-esteem of a given self-trait and the degree of self-reference of an unknown hexagram primed with a label of this trait (called the Implicit Self-Reference Effect, see Błaszczak and Imbir 2012).

The results of several studies of this type gave the same pattern of data: the higher the degree of the explicit self-reference of a given trait, the higher the degree of the implicit self-reference of a hexagram primed with the same trait (regardless of the trait's sign). Such results suggest a strong influence of what we are explicitly thinking on automatic, unintended, even implicit, information processing. In accordance with our expectations, data show that there is not only "one-way" influence of implicit reactions on explicit judgments and behavior (Bargh 1997; Greenwald and Banaji 1995), but also the reciprocal impact of the explicit processes on the implicit ones.

Implications: Necessary Conditions of the Dominance of Evaluative Thinking on Automatic Reactions to the Stressful Situations

The reflective style of information processing makes decisions and behavior more rational. Moreover, when the content of reflections is based on moral concepts, an enemy can be perceived as a human being and a partner of cooperation. However, how can spontaneous, impulsive reactions be replaced by more rational ones? The basic difficulty is related to the fact that the former are automatic and universal, whereas the reflective programs of behavior are based on dispositions and abilities which have to be developed through the voluntary and effortful processes of thinking and reasoning.

Not only the theoretical assumptions, but also the empirical data seem to imply that the regulative role of automatically elicited fear can be reduced as a consequence of conscious, evaluative reflections on a conflict's possible resolution (as we tried to argue some years ago—Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006). In the course of our studies, we try to gather data showing not only incidental but also relatively stable

relationships between the level of development of reflective evaluative standards, direct reactions to stimuli, and attitudes. The results of these studies suggest that formation of the evaluative standards based on reflective thinking creates a habitual disposition which reduces the impulsiveness of reactions to affective stimuli. And some other results show that there is a relationship between relatively high levels of so-called *axiological complexity* (leading to comprehension of abstract moral concepts) and relatively low levels of the typical prejudices towards the outgroup members (Jarymowicz 2008). The capacity to perceive a large spectrum of attributes of a given situation, to apply diverse evaluative criteria, and to formulate new interpretations and anticipations, can become an alternative basis of behavior. Such a reflective potential reduces the role of impulsive reactions to a danger.

Conclusions: New Reflective Evaluative Standards as an Alternative to Primary Fear and a Basis of Hope in the Process of Conflict Resolution

What are the implications of such theorizing on the role of fear and hope in intractable conflicts? The assumption of the duality of the human mind seems to be of great importance. It implies that one system (automatic, holistic or reflective, analytic) can regulate social functioning. Specifically, sometimes fear, but sometimes hope, can dominate people's behavior—individual or collective actors in intractable conflicts. What are the determinants of the latter case? Let us consider some important questions.

1. **What can lead to hope in a situation of intractable conflict?**

Fear is a primary, natural, and purely affective reaction to a danger. Primary affects give no opportunity to control the automatic, cognitive, and behavioral consequences (Imbir and Jarymowicz 2013; Katzir et al. 2010). Fear is an emotion of one option, eliciting defensive actions, regardless of their rational, instrumental aspects, and moral weight. Hope is an emotion caused by reflective reasoning, and as such hope depends on the development of the reflective evaluative system. Once developed, the reflective system makes human functioning generally less impulsive, and makes it possible to analyze different attributes of a given situation and to perceive diverse options of behavior. An activation of the reflective system increases the probability of hope even in such extreme circumstances such as an intractable conflict.

2. **What is the content of reflection that is crucial for open-minded attitudes towards a conflict?**

The other in a situation of conflict is very often perceived as an enemy (Bar-Tal 1989; Bar-Tal and Schnell 2013). This interlocutor elicits automatically negative emotions, and—as a consequence—negative beliefs. How can we perceive an enemy as a partner in negotiation? The primary automatic affective system does not

allow alternatives, and always leads to defense, withdrawal, distance, or attack. Moreover, the automatic system can totally dominate the reflective part of the mind. Thinking and reasoning can be used as instruments to maintain hostile beliefs and generate programs of defense leading to the immediate reduction of fear. However, the same mind is able to generate other types of aims and actions as elements of a peaceful orientation.

Peace, as the consequence of conflict resolution, can be associated in the mind with one's own better life. From a psychological point of view, this option is not the best one to achieve conflict resolution. Ego/ethnocentric motives reduce effectiveness of peace negotiations. Only moral concepts make it possible to understand good and evil in general terms, in contrast to social norms which lead to realization of ingroup expectations. Only abstract concepts such as *justice* and *humanity* can modify fear as the basis of a tendency towards the annihilation or delegitimization of an enemy (Bar-Tal 1989). The formation of abstract axiological concepts related to superior values is the foundation of moral reasoning (Piaget 1965), and among moral principles there is usually no room for a tendency to delegitimize the other.

Moral reasoning changes behavior—first in a voluntary way, but then also as a latent source of behavioral patterns (Jarymowicz 2008). If superior abstract values become connected with the ideal self standards, the moral system makes it possible to perceive the point of view of people who are different, even those who neglect our system of values (as in the case where we vote for human rights for criminals).

3. **How can we develop a reflective basis for the emotional collective orientation of people involved in an intractable conflict?**

Once developed, moral concepts can lead to new types of orientation and affective reactions to a conflict. But this new type of a subject's orientation cannot be automatically shared by others. Emotions with reflective origins can be shared only if people have similar reflections: if they understand the meaning of a given situation in a similar way. This is not easy to achieve, especially as ingroup norms put up barriers against any manifestation of attitudes favorable to the enemy, and lack of hostility can lead to the threat of social rejection (Bar-Tal and Schnell 2013; Markus and Moya 2010).

It seems that there is only one way to develop a reflective evaluative system that leads to understanding life in terms of axiological concepts. It is a relatively frequent moral reflection on good and evil—a task which should be included in the program of any educative system. But usually these systems disappoint us (Bar-Tal 2004; Bar-Tal and Schnell 2013).

To be efficient, there must be moral reflection in general abstract terms, strictly separated from the context of reality. The indirect strategy (Halperin 2014) seems to be not only the optimal one, but necessary when the affective experience of people is due to frequent contact with a real enemy and danger. When deliberation is connected with a particularly painful experience, the automatic reactions of fear and hostility are fast and immediately reduce the capacity for abstract reasoning. On the other side, abstract thinking not associated with a particular experience can lead to a conclusion of what is bad or good in general terms, and becomes a base of

unexpected new insights into real life. Such perspectives help to perceive a current conflict, interrelations with an enemy, and reciprocal actions as more or less useful, worthless, or moral.

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Chapter 10
Collective Angst in Intractable Conflicts: How Concern for the Ingroup's Future Vitality Shapes Adversarial Intergroup Relations

Darcy R. Dupuis, Roni Porat and Michael J. A. Wohl

> In every generation they rise up to destroy us, and we must remember that this could happen
> to us in the future. We must therefore, as a state, be prepared for this.
> —Yitzhak Rabin, *Haaretz*, 27 April 1987

Intractable intergroup conflicts are fundamentally existential in nature (Bar-Tal 2007; Kelman 1987). Beyond threats of physical violence and annihilation at the hands of the adversary group (see Kriesberg 2005), outgroup victories are typically seen as destructive to particular needs and values deemed vital to the ingroup's survival (Bar-Tal 1998). Recent work by Wohl and colleagues (e.g., Wohl and Branscombe 2008; Wohl et al. 2012) suggests that the existential qualities of intractable conflicts elicit *collective angst*, a collective emotion that reflects concern for the future vitality of the ingroup. Collective angst primarily functions to arouse behaviors aimed at safeguarding the future of the group. Because, in intergroup conflicts, the rival group is generally recognized as the primary threat to the ingroup's existence, it is perhaps most common for collective angst to elicit oppositional hostilities. However, collective angst does not always have such negative, conflict-perpetuating effects—when making peace with a rival group is believed to be the best or only route to ingroup preservation, collective angst may indeed set the stage for conflict resolution (Halperin et al. 2013; Wohl et al. 2012).

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In this chapter, we adopt Daniel Bar-Tal's (2007) conceptual framework delineating the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts to set forth collective angst's role in conflict progression, maintenance, and resolution—a role that has yet to be outlined in Bar-Tal's work (for more on Bar-Tal's framework, see Raykowski, this volume). We advance the proposition that the behavioral consequences of collective angst are largely contingent on the specific beliefs held, and appraisals made, by group members in conflict settings. As such, Bar-Tal's work concerning the associated roles of societal beliefs and emotions in intergroup conflicts (e.g., Bar-Tal 2007; Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Bar-Tal et al. 2007) provides an ideal foundation for understanding collective angst's role in conflict settings.

In the first section of this chapter, we introduce collective angst and specify its antecedent conditions. We then position collective angst as a central collective emotion in conflict settings and discuss its relation to belief-based components of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflicts (i.e., collective memory and ethos of conflict). Lastly, we describe collective angst's effects on peace-building and peace-thwarting behaviors.

Collective Angst

> We live in the midst of alarms; anxiety beclouds the future; we expect some new disaster with each newspaper we read.
> —Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Bloomington, 29 May 1856.

A particularly powerful form of anxiety, often referred to as *angst*, involves the experience of anguish and dread at the thought of potential nonbeing or loss of personal existence (May 1958). Recent work has revealed a group-based form of angst, which occurs when the future vitality of one's social group is believed to be under threat (e.g., Wohl and Branscombe 2009; Wohl et al. 2010). Just as all individuals eventually pass away, groups too ultimately meet their demise. High school cliques often disband after graduation. Political parties peter out, as the Whigs and Know-Nothings attest. Even civilizations, like those of the Assyrians and Vikings, fade from the global landscape. It is therefore not unreasonable for members to be concerned that their group might, one day, be no more.

A growing body of research demonstrates that collective angst is elicited by diverse threats to the future vitality of one's group, such as possible indistinctiveness from salient outgroups, changes to the group's current state, and future nonexistence (see Wohl et al. 2012). One of the most common causes of collective angst is the potential loss of ingroup distinctiveness (Wohl and Branscombe 2008). The exchange of group features is inevitable when groups come into continuous contact with one another (see Berry 2005, 2006). This can lead to a loss or dilution of characteristics that define the ingroup as a unique social category. For example, among French Canadians, collective angst is elicited by the belief that French Canadian culture might one day become indistinguishable from the surrounding English Canadian culture (Wohl et al. 2011). People may also worry about their

group's eventual disappearance due to physical threats such as environmental damage, disease, and interactions with hostile outgroups (Wohl and Branscombe 2008, 2009). For example, outgroup hostilities—the extreme case being genocide (e.g., the Rwandan Genocide; the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire)—can be tremendously damaging to the perceived permanence of the victimized group (see Wohl et al. 2010). As we will discuss in later sections, the experience of outgroup hostilities may be among the most potent and long-lasting sources of collective angst in intergroup conflicts.

Importantly, collective angst functions to stimulate actions aimed at protecting the future vitality of the ingroup (Wohl et al. 2012; for functional accounts of emotion see Keltner and Gross 1999; Keltner and Haidt 1999; Mackie et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2007). For example, Wohl et al. (2010) demonstrated that the experience of collective angst among Jews elicited a desire to engage in ingroup strengthening behaviors, such as showing support for Jewish organizations and marrying a Jewish partner. Protective actions can also be directed at external sources of threat such as threatening outgroups. People may, for example, seek to keep their ingroup separate from encroaching outgroups, thus insulating the ingroup from changes that may take place via acculturation processes. Indeed, Jetten and Wohl (2012) found that heightened collective angst among English participants led to greater opposition to immigration in England. In short, collective angst can yield an array of behavioral outcomes; however, it will only elicit a particular action insofar as the person believes that it can contribute to the preservation of the ingroup.

Situating Collective Angst Within the Sociopsychological Infrastructure of Intractable Conflicts

According to Bar Tal (2007), societies in conflict develop a sociopsychological infrastructure that "serves as a prism through which the society members collect information and interpret new experiences" (p. 1436). At the core of this infrastructure are collective memory, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation, each of which functions in an interrelated fashion with the other two components. Collective memories of the ingroup's past include a historical narrative of the conflict, which delineates how the conflict arose and developed and specifies the embroiled parties' historical roles in the conflict (Bar-Tal 2007; Bar-Tal and Halperin 2010; Paez and Liu 2011, see Paez and Liu, this volume). The ethos of conflict comprises a cluster of eight belief themes (e.g., beliefs about ingroup victimization, maintenance of ingroup security, delegitimization of the rival group) that provide the dominant lens through which the conflict is interpreted (Bar-Tal 1998, 2007; Bar-Tal et al. 2012; see Cohrs et al., this volume; Tropp, this volume; Oren, volume 2; Sharvit, volume 2). Groups in intractable conflicts also develop collective emotional orientations, which are shaped by the conflict and the sociocultural infrastructure operating therein (e.g., communication channels, institutional settings; Bar-Tal et al. 2007; de Rivera and Páez 2007, see Pliskin and Halperin, volume 2).

Among the emotional orientations that typically permeate conflict settings are fear, anger, and hatred (Bar-Tal 2007; Halperin 2008; Halperin et al. 2011a; Jarymowicz, this volume). These pervasive emotional orientations are intimately tied to collective memories and ethos of conflict beliefs, with which they interact to shape responses to conflict-related information and events (see Halperin 2008; Halperin et al. 2011a).

We argue that collective angst is a central collective emotional orientation that pervades and drives intractable intergroup conflicts. Intractable conflicts are laden with the kinds of existential features understood to produce collective angst (see Wohl et al. 2012). They are generally characterized by explicit threats to the future vitality of the ingroup, such as ongoing violence, displacement of ingroup civilians, and destruction of revered locations and artifacts. (Kriesberg 2005; Bar-Tal 1998, 2007). Embroiled parties also perceive intractable conflicts as clashes over particular needs and values that are essential to the ingroup's very existence (Bar-Tal 1998). Due to the zero sum expectancies regarding group losses and gains, outgroup victories are perceived to undermine the ingroup's goals and identity, thus calling into question its prospective survival (Bar-Tal 2007; Kelman 1987). As a consequence, group members become preoccupied with the group's potential disintegration or annihilation at the hands of the enemy. In the following sections, we discuss collective angst's relations to collective memories and ethos of conflict beliefs.

Collective Memories and Collective Angst

Groups engaged in intractable conflict generate historical narratives that include, among other thematic contents, collective memories of ingroup victimization at the hands of the outgroup (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Paez and Liu 2011; see Paez and Liu, this volume; Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2; Vollhardt et al., this volume). For groups troubled by long histories of persecution, such as Israeli Jews (see Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992), collective memories of victimization may also reflect harms committed by *former* enemies. Regardless of whether the source of past harms is a contemporary or historical rival, collective memories of victimization typically carry an existential tone (e.g., "they wanted to destroy us"). These memories sensitize group members to the possibility of comparable instances of future victimization at the hands of the current enemy group, thus eliciting collective angst (Wohl and Branscombe 2008). According to Kelman (1992), "a people that, within its recent memory, has come close to annihilation finds it easy to imagine that it may again be subject to a similar threat" (p. 34).

Therefore, even when collective memories reflect victimization perpetrated by historical enemies, the contemporary rival (i.e., the expected source of future harm) becomes the primary target for strategies to preserve the vitality of the ingroup. In support of this contention, Wohl and Branscombe (2009) found that the salience of prominent historical offenses against the US (i.e., the destruction of the World

Trade Center; the attack on Pearl Harbor) evoked feelings of collective angst among Americans. Collective angst, in turn, led to a tendency to forgive the American ingroup for harms committed against Iraqis during the war in Iraq. Regardless of the source of victimization, resultant collective angst elicits a sense of moral entitlement to preserve the ingroup, which often occurs at the expense of contemporary outgroups (see Warner et al. 2014).

In conflict settings, past harms experienced by the ingroup are often transformed "into powerful cultural narratives which become an integral part of the social identity" (Bar-Tal et al. 2009, p. 236). Among Israeli Jews, for example, the conflict with the Palestinian outgroup is colored by a long history of collective victimhood, encapsulated particularly in the collective memory of the Holocaust (see Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Bar-Tal et al. 2009). It is therefore not surprising that collective angst is a central emotion experienced when the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is salient (see Wohl and Branscombe 2008). Through the lens of history, Palestinians are viewed as yet another out-group seeking to destroy the Jewish people—a perspective that elicits collective angst and promotes actions aimed at the outgroup's defeat, thus hindering prosocial intergroup relations and the possibility of peaceful conflict resolution.

As previously noted, Bar-Tal's (2007) model predicts reciprocal relations between emotions and collective memory. Following this view, we posit that collective angst may have biasing and distorting effects on collective memories. As there is little empirical evidence for this converse relationship, future research might examine whether collective angst causes group members to perceive that historical instances of victimization functioned to unify and strengthen the ingroup. Such biasing may occur to bolster the sense that the ingroup can outlast current and future victimization, thus enhancing a sense of the group's immutability in the face of threat.

Ethos of Conflict and Collective Angst

Many of the ethos of conflict's component beliefs are intimately tied to concerns about the preservation of ingroup vitality. For example, specific beliefs form a foundation that binds society members together (e.g., beliefs of patriotism and unity), set forth the group's goals and aspirations for the future (e.g., beliefs about the justness of ingroup goals; Bar-Tal et al. 2012), and outline possible threats to, and conditions necessary for, the protection of the ingroup (e.g., beliefs about security). Because it is beyond the scope of this chapter to comment on the relations between each ethos of conflict theme and collective angst, we use particular beliefs as illustrative examples. We first outline how collective angst may be elicited by beliefs of ingroup victimization and beliefs about the justness of ingroup goals. We then discuss conditions under which collective angst might influence ethos of conflict beliefs, focusing, in particular, on the need to attain closure on beliefs and the transgenerational sharing of beliefs.

Ethos-Based Beliefs as Catalysts for Collective Angst

As previously discussed, collective memories of ingroup victimization elicit collective angst. However, the belief that the ingroup is, or will be, the target of abuses perpetrated by a contemporary enemy group (i.e., beliefs about ingroup victimization; Bar-Tal et al. 2009, 2012) can also function as an important catalyst for collective angst. Wohl and Branscombe (2009) showed that, among Americans, collective angst was heightened by the threat of a future attack on US soil by Islamic fundamentalists. Similarly, Halperin et al. (2013) found that Israelis felt greater collective angst, when they were informed that Israel would not be able to cope with a nuclear capable Iran. By positioning the ingroup as the target of potential harm, such threats call into question the future survival of the ingroup.

Collective angst may be most prevalent among groups in which collective memories of historical victimization parallel beliefs about current and future victimization. For example, in cases of siege mentality, beliefs about historical and contemporary victimization function together to elicit a sense that the world at large harbors extremely negative attitudes and intentions toward the ingroup (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Bar-Tal 2000; see also Vollhardt, this volume, Schori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2), thus arousing doubts about the future of the group. Among Israeli Jews, for example, a siege mentality has deep roots in Jewish history and tradition, and is reinforced by victimization beliefs concerning the current Israeli–Palestinian conflict (see Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Grosser and Halperin 1979; Poliakov 1974; Stein 1978). Operating under the assumption that one's group is the enemy of the world, and therefore a potential victim of large-scale oppression, can be tremendously threatening to the group's future vitality, and therefore a powerful source of collective angst. To protect the ingroup's future, members may become particularly insular and sensitized to outgroup threats. They may also support policies that direct considerable resources, including military expenditures and personnel, toward protecting the ingroup (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992).

Collective angst may also be experienced when beliefs about the justness of ingroup goals are threatened. These beliefs "outline the goals in conflict, indicate their crucial importance, and provide their explanations and rationales" (Bar-Tal et al. 2012, p. 42). All groups have goals or visions for the future, which are often framed as fundamental to the group's existence (e.g., the belief in the ingroup's rightful possession of an historical homeland; Bar-Tal et al. 2012). Outgroups seen as thwarting valued ingroup goals are viewed as a source of threat to the ingroup's future vitality, thus validating the ingroup's injurious actions during the course of intergroup conflict (see Warner et al. 2014). In this way, the defamation and obstruction of ingroup goals may result in actions that drive conflict intractability.

However, outgroups that stand in the way of ingroup goals are not always direct adversaries in the conflict. Global or international organizations (e.g., the United Nations) may, for example, place pressure on groups to compromise on goals when these goals are believed to underpin an intractable conflict. If the goals at issue are of existential significance to the ingroup, such pressure is certain to elicit

collective angst and consequent actions to protect the goals. Thus, when pleas from the international community for peaceful conflict resolution seem to obstruct the ingroup's goals, group members may act in defiance of proposed routes to peace. Accordingly, it may be valuable for future research to examine whether collective angst is reduced when the rival outgroup, or an intervening third party, refrains from placing pressure on beliefs of existential significance to the ingroup (see also subsequent section on *Collective Angst and Conflict Resolution*). If the importance and justness of key ingroup goals are explicitly acknowledged by the outgroup, concerns that they may impede those goals may be reduced, thus mitigating the need to defeat, or act in opposition to, the outgroup.

Collective Angst as a Modifier of Ethos-Based Beliefs

According to Bar-Tal (2007), there is a bidirectional relationship between collective emotions and ethos of conflict beliefs. Therefore, just as particular ethos of conflict beliefs lay the seeds for the experience of collective angst, collective angst may influence beliefs held about the conflict and the adversary group. Porat et al. (2015) suggest, for example, that negative emotional reactions toward adversary groups can impede peaceful conflict resolution by freezing ingroup members' preexisting conflict supporting beliefs (see Bar-Tal et al. 1989; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). Along these lines, we posit that collective angst leads group members to seek closure on ethos of conflict beliefs as a means of maintaining a readily interpretable understanding of threats to the group's survival and the actions required to surmount them. In support of this idea, Wohl et al. (2015) found that Israelis who were high in collective angst were relatively closed to acquiring new information about the pros and cons of renewing the peace process with the Palestinians. Thus, group members' concerns about the future of the group may close the door on new information that might persuade them to see the benefits of new strategies for peaceful conflict resolution.

Although collective angst can prevent the seeking of new information, it may also (perhaps ironically) heighten the desire to transmit beliefs within and across generations. Sharing beliefs among ingroup members serves the goal of group preservation by providing a basis for the mobilization of group-oriented action and by setting forth a foundation for ingroup identity, strength, and continuance (Abelson 1986; Bar-Tal 2000; 1998). Concern for the group's future might, for example, prompt group members to relay beliefs about ingroup victimization to succeeding generations via cautionary tales of historical trauma at the hands of the outgroup. As a result, future generations may be placed on guard against threats and mobilized to take collective action against the adversary group (Abelson 1986; Bar-Tal 1998; Bar-Tal et al. 2012). In summary, collective angst may provide the emotional seeds for the rigidity and widespread transmission of ethos of conflict beliefs, making conflict resolution a difficult task.

Collective Angst in Conflict Resolution

As we have noted throughout this chapter, because survival of the ingroup is typically believed to be contingent on defeat of the rival outgroup, actions elicited by collective angst often contribute to intergroup hostility and conflict intractability. Accordingly, the downregulation of collective angst may be among the most straightforward emotion-based approaches to conflict resolution. If, for example, concerns about the future of the USA had been reduced among American Congress members in the days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks, a sense of moral entitlement to invade Iraq may have been reduced. It is therefore important to identify means of regulating collective angst.

One way to downregulate collective angst may be to reduce or eliminate rhetoric (particularly among group leaders) containing existential threats, such as overt references to the outgroup's hatred for the ingroup and historical defeat at the hands of rivals (see Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992). When the predominant rhetoric in the conflict frames the outgroup as a threat, ingroup members may back policy that has retaliatory action as its main objective. Supporting this contention, Gordon and Arian (2001) showed that during periods in which the majority of Israeli Jews believed that the Arab outgroup's main aspiration was to kill Jews and conquer Israel, there was an overwhelming lack of support for establishing a Palestinian state. However, between 1986 and 1999, as Jews began to see the Arab outgroup's goals as less malevolent, there was a corresponding increase in Jews' support for the Palestinian state. Thus, the reduction of threatening rhetoric among group leaders may draw support away from oppositional policy and retaliatory action, opening the door to peaceful resolution of the conflict.

It is also noteworthy that the peace process may be advanced when the ingroup aims to reduce the collective angst experienced by outgroup members. The rival group's experience of collective angst is, in large part, shaped by the ingroup's tendency to take a threatening versus peaceable stance concerning intergroup relations. Policymakers often believe that threatening the outgroup's existence (e.g., the use of physical attack) will torment them into submission, thus ending the conflict (Gordon and Arian 2001). However, our analysis of collective angst's role in the conflict settings suggests that such threats elicit collective angst in outgroup members, which can promote vengeful actions aimed at defeating the source of threat (i.e., the ingroup). Understanding that the rival group's retaliatory responses can be triggered by threats to their future vitality is therefore critical to preventing a cycle of violence and laying the foundation for conflict resolution.

Whereas the motivational state elicited by collective angst (i.e., to secure the future of the ingroup) is consistent across contexts, its behavioral effects are contingent on an appraisal of the situation and the behavioral repertoire at one's disposal. Depending on context, various avenues may be taken to satisfy the goal of preserving the future vitality of the ingroup. Like intergroup anger (see Halperin et al. 2011b; Reifen Tagar et al. 2011), collective angst can evoke both destructive and constructive responses (Wohl et al. 2012). Destructive responses are likely to be elicited when the survival of the ingroup appears to be contingent on the outgroup's defeat. Constructive

responses, on the other hand, may ensue when (a) a peace process is believed to be vital to the future survival of the ingroup and (b) the adversary is believed to be a willing and trustworthy partner in the peace process. Thus, there are times when group members' concerns about the future vitality of the group can generate, rather than obstruct, opportunities for compromise and hope for peace.

Two studies by Halperin and colleagues (2013) provide empirical support for the proposition that collective angst can both hinder and facilitate peacemaking. In their first study, the existential threat posed by a nuclear capable Iran was made salient among Israeli Jews. One group of participants was informed that Israel had the capacity to prevent an Iranian nuclear attack. The other group was told that Israel did not have the capacity to prevent such an attack. Halperin and colleagues found that collective angst was highest among Israelis who were led to believe that Israel did not have the ability to prevent an attack. Higher collective angst, in turn, reduced willingness to compromise with Hamas—an effect that is consistent with previous research demonstrating antisocial responses to outgroups when collective angst is high (see Jetten and Wohl 2012). Contrastingly, in Halperin and colleagues' second study, the collective angst induced by the inability to cope with a nuclear capable Iran led Israeli Jews to become *more* willing to compromise with the Palestinian Authority. The crucial difference between the two reported studies is the target adversary group (Palestinian Authority vs. Hamas). Israelis hold differing beliefs about the respective adversaries' positions on peace with Israel, viewing the Palestinian Authority, but not Hamas, as a willing participant in the peace process (Halperin et al. 2013; Shamir and Shikaki 2010). This willingness to compromise with the Palestinian Authority was aided by the belief that making peace has the potential to undermine Iran's political currency to launch a nuclear assault on Israel (Zisser 2010).

Thus, when ingroup members believe that peace is an important route to ingroup preservation, and that the adversary is willing to explore peaceful solutions to the conflict, collective angst can boost the desire to negotiate and compromise. However, if the adversary is believed to be an unwilling partner in the peace process, collective angst can thwart the potential for negotiation, thus driving conflict intractability. To summarize, even when collective angst is persistently high, there remain avenues toward compromise and hope for peace. Such routes to peace, however, may be contingent on the belief that the peace process is conducive to the preservation of ingroup vitality.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we used Bar-Tal's (2007) sociopsychological framework of intractable conflicts to describe collective angst's role as a collective emotion that drives intractable intergroup conflicts. We also offered avenues by which collective angst might be harnessed to facilitate peace and reconciliation. Gayer et al. (2009) note that researchers are only beginning to consider how to achieve the difficult task

of replacing a sociopsychological repertoire of conflict with one of reconciliation. Collective angst is one emotion that may have an important role at all phases of a conflict, from the onset of strife to its ultimate resolution. Because the consequences of collective angst depend on group members' conflict-related beliefs, a careful assessment of context is necessary to determine when collective angst impairs the prospect of conflict resolution and when it may be harnessed to facilitate the peace process.

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Chapter 11
Putting Neuroscience to Work for Peace

Emile Bruneau

How can seemingly mild-mannered people be induced to murder their neighbors? What motivates someone to strap a bomb to his body? Why are some human conflicts so seemingly resistant to resolution? The immense human tragedy of ethno-political violence, war and genocide has deeply motivated social psychology, spawning some of the most powerful demonstrations of human susceptibility to violence and conflict, and launching large research efforts to better understand the psychological underpinnings of intergroup conflict. At the forefront of this effort has been the social psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal. Writing from the context of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Bar-Tal has been an academic force in the effort to better understand the psychological processes that grip communities in conflict. Bar-Tal offers a comprehensive description of the array of biases that are at play particularly in conflicts characterized by cycles of violence and failed peace efforts, which include "hot" emotional biases (anger, fear, and (lack of) empathy) (Cikara et al., 2011b, 2013; Halperin et al. 2008; Tam et al. 2007), and a suite of "cold" high-level cognitive biases (devaluation of out-group compromises, uncritical acceptance of belief-confirming evidence) (Porat et al. 2015; Ross and Ward 1994, 1996). The integrated model articulated by Bar-Tal and colleagues suggests that these emotional and cognitive biases are bound together with social factors by an "ethos of conflict," which provides biases with a scaffold and helps to freeze them in place (Bar-Tal 2007; Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011, see also Cohrs et al.; Jost et al.; Oren vol. 2; Sharvit vol. 2; Nahhas et al. vol. 2).

In all, this model provides us with a rich descriptive tapestry of the psychological landscape faced by groups in conflict. Where do we go from here? How do we go from theoretical richness to mechanistic understanding? And how can we proceed from describing and demonstrating these psychological barriers, to effectively dismantling them?

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I will argue in this chapter that one path lies through examining psychological biases at their cognitive roots, by looking "under the hood" directly at neural activity using functional neuroimaging techniques. In particular, I will present some ways in which neuroimaging technologies—functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), in particular—can carry the torch of this research effort forward. In three sections, I will offer some examples of how neuroimaging can (1) help characterize intergroup biases, (2) expand our theoretical understanding of the psychological processes driving intergroup conflict, and (3) aid practical evaluations of conflict resolution efforts.

Neuroimaging to Identify Neural Correlates of "Hot" and "Cold" Psychological Biases

A primary goal of most social cognitive neuroscience studies is to identify the cognitive mechanisms involved in psychological processes: to establish the cognitive underpinnings of bias. In functional neuroimaging studies, the association between psychology and cognition is generally inferred through the demonstration of localized brain activity. This inference can be better justified if the brain region activated by a psychological paradigm is cognitively well characterized. Therefore, a first approach to examining the neurocognitive basis of intergroup conflict is to design experiments with hypotheses tailored to specific brain regions where the connection between functional activity and cognitive process is well established (Fig. 11.1).

By way of illustration, the fusiform face area (FFA) is a small patch of cortex on the underside of brain above the cerebellum that is selectively active in response to faces (Kanwisher et al. 1997). If a psychological prediction can be molded to this cognitive reality—for example, that groups in protracted conflict process enemy faces similarly to how they process animal faces—then this specific brain region may be able to be used to ask mechanistic questions of a specific psychological process (e.g., is dehumanization encoded in lower-level perceptual processing?). This approach has the benefit of linking a psychological paradigm to a strong neuroscience scholarship, which can provide practical and theoretical benefits: the FFA is anatomically indistinct from the surrounding cortex, but it can be localized within each individual after performing a task in the scanner known to activate the FFA (e.g., looking at a validated battery of race-neutral faces versus objects). A "functional localization" makes the inferred connection between a cognitive mechanism and a psychological process less problematic (Saxe et al. 2006a). This example serves as a hypothetical—current imaging techniques and paradigms may not be sensitive enough to detect the FFA responses to human versus animal faces (though the technology and the analysis techniques are always improving in the young field of cognitive neuroscience). However, this overall approach has been used success-

Fig. 11.1 A selection of brain regions potentially relevant to intergroup conflict. Activity in each labeled brain region is relatively well characterized to be selective for a specific cognitive function; included is a classic paper or recent review for each. *Thinking about other people's thoughts/intentions/desires* (*rTPJ* = right temporoparietal junction) (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003); *subjective value* (*VMPFC* = ventromedial prefrontal cortex) (Bartra et al. 2013); *cognitive control of emotion* (*DLPFC* = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, *dACC* = dorsal anterior cingulate cortex) (Ochsner, Silvers and Buhle 2012); *face perception* (*FFA* = fusiform face area) (Kanwisher et al. 1997); *perceived threat* (*Amy* = amygdala) (LeDoux 2007); *pleasure/schadenfreude* (*VS* = ventral striatum) (Cikara et al. 2011a); *physical pain in self and others (i.e., empathy for physical pain)* (*AMCC* = anterior middle cingulate cortex) (Bernhardt and Singer 2012)

fully by a number of groups to examine responses to in-group and out-group faces in a different brain region: the amygdala (Golby et al. 2001; Hart et al. 2000; Lieberman et al. 2005).

The amygdala is an anatomically constrained subcortical brain region that is integral to fear conditioning in mammals, and extends to encompass a broad range of threat associated stimuli in humans (LeDoux 2007; Zald 2003). In one illustrative study (Cunningham et al. 2004), images of White and Black Americans were presented to White participants in the scanner either subliminally (i.e., faster than conscious perception), or supraliminally (i.e., slow enough to be consciously perceived). They found greater amygdala activity in response to out-group (Black) versus in-group (White) faces. Moreover, subliminal presentation of the faces resulted in a strong amygdala response, but when participants were consciously aware of the images, amygdala response was muted, and well-characterized regions of the brain in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) associated with cognitive control came online. These results suggest that the amygdala response is unconscious, and

partially suppressed with conscious awareness through the DLPFC. This overall interpretation is bolstered by evidence that (1) the strength of amygdala activity was associated with implicit measures of bias (IAT d-score), and (2) that modulation of amygdala activity was associated with increased activity in DLPFC.

This study provides a potential cognitive description of the out-group fear response, and also illustrates two potentially useful features of neuroimaging measures. First, they can provide multidimensional measures of bias—i.e., amygdala response (unconscious fear) and the DLPFC response (conscious regulation of negative affect)—that may each be useful in evaluating de-biasing efforts. Second, they provide measures of bias that are unconscious. Both of these implications will be explored more fully in the following sections.

Another approach to better understanding the neural processes involved in psychological biases is to generate research paradigms that are less constrained to the existing neuroscience literature, but that may reveal something new about neural processing. For example, high-level cognitive biases involved in the acceptance or rejection of ideological narratives may not map to well-characterized brain regions, but may instead provide insights into the role of specific brain regions in everyday cognition. In a study from our lab (Bruneau and Saxe 2010), and one of the few neuroimaging studies to examine processes in actual conflict group members, Arab and Israeli participants read short statements that were typical either of the Arab narrative about the Arab–Israeli conflict ("Israel is like a modern day Apartheid state…"), or the Israeli narrative about the conflict ("Palestinians could have a modern state next to Israel, but instead they have chosen violence…"). In a single region within the precuneus (PC), mean activity was higher for out-group versus in-group narratives, and the difference in response to out-group versus in-group narratives correlated with both explicit warmth felt toward the out-group versus the in-group ($r = 0.64$, $p < 0.001$), and Arab–Israeli IAT score ($r = 0.69$, $p < 0.001$). A follow-up study with American political partisans supports these findings: Democrats and Republicans asked to evaluate political arguments supporting out-group legislation (versus in-group legislation) show activity in a region of the PC similar to that seen in Arabs and Israelis (Bruneau, Coronel and Saxe, unpublished).

The results from these studies indicate that this region of the PC may be specifically sensitive to "motivated reasoning" about group ideological narratives. These studies flag this part of the PC as a brain region of interest that could help drive a high-level cognitive bias integrally involved in ideological conflict: the delegitimization of the other side's narrative (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011). What cognitive process this activity represents (e.g., self-referential thinking, autobiographical recall, social cognition) is less clear, as all of these processes (and more) have previously been associated with PC activity. However, since this task generates such strong and localized neural activity, it may help in the process of teasing apart the functional subregions within the PC, which would then provide a better characterized brain region for future research.

In sum, one role of neuroimaging is to help characterize the neural mechanisms behind a psychological bias. These characterizations could help answer novel questions about bias (e.g., How low-level and perceptual is dehumanization?), identify

multiple components of bias (e.g., emotional processing in amygdala and effortful control in DLPFC), or help map a brain region that may be involved in a particular bias (e.g., involvement of the PC in delegitimization).

Neuroimaging to Expand Theoretical Understanding of Psychological Phenomena

A second way in which neuroimaging can contribute to our understanding of inter-group conflict is by broadening and deepening our theoretical understanding of complex psychological biases. While some "hot" biases have rather specific psychological and physiological profiles (e.g., fear and anger), others are inherently ambiguous and multifaceted. Empathy, for example, refers to at least eight different phenomena (Batson 2009) that are likely driven by completely distinct cognitive mechanisms, that in turn motivate very different behavioral outcomes: while empathy defined as self-focused "personal distress" predicts avoidance of others in need, empathy defined as other-focused "empathic concern" predicts the opposite (Batson et al. 2002; FeldmanHall et al. 2015). Understanding which of these empathic responses someone is expressing is therefore important, and it may be possible to accurately and efficiently define and distinguish these processes with neuroimaging. For example, work from our lab and others show that empathic concern and personal distress may be neurally distinguishable (Bruneau et al. unpublished; Lamm et al. 2007).

"Cold" reasoning biases pose an even greater problem. Since high-level cognitive processes are generally opaque to introspection (Nisbett and Wilson 1977), people have a "bias blind spot," making them not just *unwilling*, but *unable* to assess (or even acknowledge) their own biases (Pronin et al. 2004; Pronin et al. 2002). Furthermore, high-level biases inherently describe complex cognitive processes, but are defined by single outcome measures, like reaction time or between-subject preferences. This poses a fundamental problem to fully characterizing the mechanisms of high-level biases, but this problem is potentially tractable with neuroimaging.

To date, few neuroimaging studies have examined high-level cognitive biases, much less in members of conflict groups. However, there is enough known about cognitive processing in relevant domains to allow us to envision the types of imaging studies that could bear fruit. Take, for example, reactive devaluation. Reactive devaluation describes the tendency to devalue, and therefore reject, a compromise proposal if it is delivered by someone affiliated with the opposing group; when the same proposal is delivered by an in-group affiliate, it is valued more highly and accepted more readily (Ross 1993). While the phenomenon is straightforward to measure behaviorally, the mechanism responsible for it is not: at least half a dozen mechanisms, all with potentially distinct cognitive processes, have been suggested to drive reactive devaluation (Ross 1993). For example, reactive devaluation could be generated from effortless heuristics ("The enemy is proposing it, so it must be bad, whatever it is"), or effortful cognitive processing ("That sounds good, but what are their *real* intentions?"). Therefore, the single behavioral outcome measure used

to define reactive devaluation belies the heterogeneity of cognitive processes that could generate it.

An examination of the neural basis of reactive devaluation could start with a number of candidate brain regions, including the DLPFC (involved in cognitive control), and the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ; involved in "Theory of Mind"). Theory of Mind is the ability to think about other people's thoughts—the process of "getting inside their heads." While Theory of Mind tasks result in activity in a network of brain regions, only the rTPJ appears to be *selectively* sensitive to reasoning about other people's thoughts, desires, and intentions (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe et al. 2006b; Scholz et al. 2009). Measuring neural activity in these two brain regions during a reactive devaluation task may differentiate between cognitive strategies: if two participants register equal amounts of reactive devaluation behaviorally (i.e., equally, and more strongly, endorse proposals attributed to the in-group versus the out-group), but subject 1 shows more rTPJ and DLPFC than subject 2, subject 1 may be reactively devaluing more through consideration of out-group intentions, while subject 2 is using a heuristic approach. Ultimately, understanding *how* someone is reactively devaluing, rather than by *how much*, may better inform interventions aimed at decreasing bias. Most importantly, this neuroimaging approach could be similarly applied to unpack the neural mechanisms behind an array of psychological biases that are potentially cognitively heterogeneous, like biased assimilation and the fundamental attribution error.

While the above applications of neuroimaging to intergroup conflict mostly helps extend or solidify our mechanistic understanding of bias, neuroimaging also has the potential to provide a quantitative measure of bias that is directly proximal to behavior and potentially immune to self-reporting biases. In the final section, I turn from the theoretical towards the more practical and explore how neuroimaging could provide prospective and retrospective quantitative measures of psychological biases that could be used to evaluate conflict resolution interventions.

Neuroimaging as a Tool to Evaluate De-biasing Efforts

While Daniel Bar-Tal and others offer comprehensive theoretical descriptions of intergroup bias, many of the specific biases lack quantitative measures. For example, delegitimization describes the tendency to negate the other side's perspective or narrative about a conflict, but this cognitive process has proven difficult to operationalize through psychological measures. Neuroimaging studies, like the one described above with Israelis and Arabs over ideological narratives, puts us on the path towards building a cognitive profile and quantitative measure of delegitimization. Even when quantitative psychological measures have been developed for other biases, these measurement techniques have their limitations, which functional neuroimaging may be able to surmount.

Currently, the most common way to assess intergroup bias is explicitly, with self-report measures. Explicit measures are simple and convenient, but pose well-

known methodological challenges because participants are motivated to present themselves in a positive light (Greenwald and Banaji 1995), and therefore may be unwilling to report their honest views. For example, White Americans who express positive attitudes and behavioral intentions towards Black Americans nevertheless show impulsive avoidance of a Black confederate (Dovidio et al. 2002). In the context of protracted intergroup conflict, demand characteristics may actually work in the other direction—a group's norm about expressions of general out-group antipathy may drive partisans to report *more* prejudice than they actually feel. Either way, the explicit measure fails to capture reality.

An alternative approach to assessing intergroup prejudice, or affect more specifically, is through implicit measures that tap physiological changes (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance) (Amodio et al. 2003; Olsson et al. 2005) or response latency (Dovidio et al. 2002; Dovidio et al.1997). The most widely used response latency measure is the implicit association test (IAT) (Greenwald et al.1998), which has been used to assess implicit bias towards groups, including those defined by race, gender, and political partisanship (Aberson et al.2004; Greenwald et al.2003; Knutson et al.2007b; Phelps et al. 2000). Implicit tests have been shown to be less susceptible to cognitive control: even when participants are aware that the test is being used to assess bias, the effect remains (Kim 2003). There are also limitations to standard implicit measures, however. First, the output is usually a single measure generalized to positivity or negativity, so multiple interacting processes could be confounded. Second, as a difference measure, the IAT does not distinguish between "in-group love" and "out-group hate." Third, what exactly the IAT measures is still debated, particularly since the IAT has been shown to be influenced by priming effects and training (Foroni and Mayr 2005; Kawakami et al. 2007).

Neuroimaging has the potential to sidestep the limitations of both explicit and implicit assessments, providing a measure that is both transparent to demand characteristics and multidimensional. One way to evaluate the utility of neuroimaging measures to de-biasing or conflict resolution efforts is to determine how well they predict relevant behaviors (e.g., willingness to negotiate rather than fight) relative to explicit and implicit measures. If the predictive validity of imaging measures is significantly better than explicit or implicit measures, or if it helps account for enough variance that is unexplained by explicit and implicit measures, then its use may be justified. As proof of principle, neuroimaging measures have been demonstrated to outperform behavioral tasks in predicting outcomes in a number of domains (Gabrieli et al. 2015), including forecasting reading skills in children (Hoeft et al. 2007), which would improve with training in dyslexic children (Hoeft et al. 2011), and even recidivism rates in incarcerated criminals (Aharoni et al. 2013).

Neuroimaging techniques may be particularly effective for interventions targeting "cold" reasoning biases that are more inaccessible to conscious introspection and subject to strong demand characteristics. For example, one proposed intervention involves inoculating people against reactive devaluation by educating them about the phenomenon itself. Bias inoculation has been shown to effectively attenuate or eliminate other biases, such as stereotype threat (Johns et al. 2005), but evaluating the effect of the intervention on a self-report measure like reactive devaluation

is much more problematic than for a performance-based measure like stereotype threat. Therefore, even though preliminary data shows that participants taught about reactive devaluation decrease their expressions of this bias (Bruneau and Saxe unpublished; Halperin et al. unpublished), the demand characteristics are extremely high, making it difficult to distinguish between true belief change and mere social conformity. How can these two possibilities be distinguished?

Neuroimaging has already demonstrated an ability to distinguish between real change and inaccurate self-report—not with studies on reactive devaluation, but through studies on social conformity (Asch 1956; Cialdini and Trost 1998). In one fMRI conformity study (Zaki et al. 2011), participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of opposite gender pictures while undergoing fMRI. After rating the faces, participants were then told how their peers (supposedly) rated the same faces. At the end of the study, participants were then given the opportunity to revise their attractiveness ratings to the same pictures. Behaviorally, participants showed the classic social conformity response: attractiveness ratings increased or decreased slightly if their peers had rated the pictures as more or less attractive, respectively. But the neuroimaging data added critically to this picture by examining activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a brain region shown to provide "neural currency" for subjective value (Levy and Glimcher 2012) across a range of rewarding stimuli, from monetary (Knutson et al. 2007a) and gustatory (Plassmann et al. 2007), to aesthetic (Kirk et al. 2009) and social (Lin et al. 2012). In their study, Zaki et al. (2011) found that activity in this subjective value brain region increased between initial and final ratings if the peer group judged the face to be more attractive than the participant, and decreased between initial and final ratings if the peer group's attractiveness rating was lower than the individual's. In other words, conformity to peer ratings indeed was matched with changes in actual subjective neural value, suggesting that the participants *actually* saw the face as more or less attractive, according to peer ratings.

While social conformity is directly relevant to intergroup conflict (Paluck 2009), the relevance of these studies to conflict resolution goes beyond the specific instance of social conformity—it illustrates that neuroimaging could be used to measure subjective and implicit value that cuts through demand characteristics. For example, a current fMRI study in our lab aims to use the VMPFC value signal to measure how much someone reactively devalues out-group versus in-group compromise proposals, both before and after an inoculation intervention. This could sidestep demand characteristics entirely to provide a measure of cognitive bias immune to demand characteristics.

The above examples illustrate the potential of neuroimaging to retrospectively evaluate the effect of an intervention on biases that people may be unwilling or unable to report. Another exciting possibility is that neuroimaging may be deployed in intergroup conflict settings as a *prospective* tool, to determine which of a set of potential interventions may be most effective for a group, demographic, or individual.

Prospectively assessing interventions is the principle behind focus groups: if you want to know what intervention will best convince people to engage in a particular

behavior—to use sunscreen, to avoid unprotected sex—you can convene a small group of people (a "focus group") and obtain their opinions about a number of different test interventions. The problem with this model is that people are notoriously limited in their ability to predict their own future behaviors (Nisbett and Wilson 1977), making focus groups imperfect predictors of future population-level behavior (Noar 2006). This could result from our tendency to discount the power of implicit processes in decision-making: we may be consciously aware of some aspects of a sunblock commercial (consequences of sunburns), but those may have less of an impact on our eventual behavior than the aspects of the commercial that appeal to unconscious processes (attractiveness of the spokesperson, normative views about the use of the product, and color and shape of the sunscreen bottle). But all of these components of the message are being processed, even if implicitly, and so could potentially be captured with neuroimaging.

Although neuroimaging has not yet been used as a forecasting tool in the context of intergroup conflict, a study by Emily Falk et al. (2011) demonstrates the utility of this approach for a large scale public health intervention. In their fMRI study, smokers with the intent to quit watched ads from three different antismoking campaigns, and then provided their assessment of which ad campaign they thought would be most effective, just like a traditional focus group. Participants were also scanned while viewing the ads to obtain a measure in the VMPFC of their subjective value of the ads. When the ads were actually aired, call volume to the 1-800-QUIT number that appeared at the bottom of each ad was predicted by smokers' neural responses, and not by their explicit self-report predictions.

While using a "neural focus group" to predict population level outcomes could be used to adjudicate between potential public service interventions aimed more at ethnic conflict (e.g., to ease anti-Roma bias in Europe), neural measures could also aid in individual forecasting, akin to the recent trend towards "personalized medicine." Although this has again not been implemented in the context of intergroup conflict resolution, individual forecasting using fMRI has shown promise in predicting the effectiveness of treatments for those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The treatment of choice for PTSD is cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT; as opposed to pharmacological interventions), however responsiveness to CBT is only approximately 50 %. Initial results from a neurodiagnostic study found that activity in the amygdala in response to threatening images in PTSD patients predicted positive outcomes to CBT treatment 6 months later (Bryant et al. 2008). Functional and structural MRI have provided similarly promising results for predicting treatment outcomes for pharmacological or CBT treatment across a number of other neuropsychiatric conditions, including depression (Fu et al. 2013; Pizzagalli 2010), schizophrenia (Kumari, Antonova, Fannon and Peters, 2010; Kumari et al. 2009), and social anxiety disorder (Doehrmann et al. 2013). This same tailored approach could theoretically be applied to conflict resolution programs, to determine which type of intervention might have the greatest likelihood of success for an individual (and which may backfire). Although a long way off, personal forecasting of conflict resolution programs is the type of innovation that functional neuroimaging could enable.

Conclusion

For the past 40 years, Daniel Bar-Tal and others have provided a detailed description of the psychological forces arrayed against conflict resolution efforts. The daunting task in front of us now is determining how to dismantle these psychological barriers to peace. One way forward is to build evidence-based interventions (see Hameiri and Halperin), and then evaluate using randomized control trials (RCTs). RCTs have been implemented previously in field assessments of full-scale social programs, such as inner-city antiviolence campaigns (Webster et al. 2013), antipoverty programs (Banerjee et al. 2013), and "edutainment" aimed at changing norms of intergroup violence and preventing genocide in Africa (Paluck 2009; 2010). Another way to enact evidence-based approaches is through examining the effect of specific, small-scale interventions, such as perspective-taking, emotion regulation, or paradoxical thinking in more controlled or laboratory settings (Bruneau and Saxe 2012; Halperin et al. 2013; Hameiri et al. 2014). While these approaches are rare (Paluck and Green 2009), the results cited above are promising, and have led to large-scale sviolence and antipoverty efforts.

A key difficulty with applying this approach to conflict resolution efforts is that many of the biases that we might wish to mitigate are (1) cognitively complex and operationally un- or ill-defined, (2) subject to demand characteristics (3), and/or inaccessible to introspection. Neuroimaging has the potential to aid in all of these limitations by allowing a broader and deeper understanding of the forces driving conflict, a means to measure them, and a tool by which to forecast their effects.

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Chapter 12
Dismantling an Ethos of Conflict: Strategies for Improving Intergroup Relations

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Relations between groups are not static and do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are continuously influenced by sociohistorical events that occur and the experiences group members have in their social environments. Relations between groups can also shift either in positive or negative directions as social conditions and contexts change, providing glimmers of hope for achieving trust and social integration, or becoming breeding grounds for suspicion and conflict.

Moreover, simply because the potential for improved intergroup relations exists does not mean that positive shifts in intergroup relations will always be achieved easily. Numerous social forces and psychological processes enable group conflicts to become entrenched and protracted, through what has been described eloquently by Daniel Bar-Tal and his colleagues as an "ethos of conflict" (Bar-Tal 2000; 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2012). This ethos is based on a set of beliefs about the legitimacy of ingroup goals and concerns and the delegitimization of the outgroup and its actions. Bolstered by group members' identities, collective memories, and legacies of victimization, the ethos serves as a guiding orientation to the conflict, and to one's present and future views regarding social relations in the larger society. As such, an ethos of conflict can serve as a lens through which group members perceive others and interpret events in a manner that reinforces and perpetuates intergroup conflict, rather than fostering alternate perspectives and prospects for peace (Bar-Tal et al. 2012, see also Cohrs et al., this volume; Jost et al., this volume; Oren, volume 2; Sharvit, volume 2; Nahhas et al., volume 2).

Over many decades, social psychological theory and research have proposed numerous strategies that can be used to promote more positive and peaceful relations between groups (see Tropp and Molina 2012 for a review). Well-established approaches to improve intergroup relations involve promoting contact between groups and creating common group identities, among others. Yet, these kinds of strategies have typically been examined in the absence of protracted intergroup conflict,

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or long after fervent intergroup conflict has dissipated, once members of different groups may be more willing to engage in processes of reconciliation (see Wagner and Hewstone 2012 for a related argument). More work is therefore needed to clarify how such approaches can contribute to the dismantling of conflict between groups, as well as the social and structural factors that may limit their effectiveness.

Social psychological perspectives have pointed to a range of strategies that may help to promote positive relations between groups (see Stephan and Stephan 2001; Tropp and Molina 2012, for reviews), including those that aim to share perspectives between groups (Bruneau and Saxe 2012), affirm the value of one's own group (Sherman et al. 2007; Čehajić-Clancy et al. 2011), and shift one's beliefs about other groups (Halperin et al. 2011, 2012), among others. This chapter focuses on two key strategies to improve intergroup relations from the social psychological literature—promoting intergroup contact and creating a common group identity in order to (a) discuss ways in which these particular strategies may be usefully applied in conflict settings; and (b) articulate some of the challenges that may be associated with their application in contexts of protracted conflict.

Strategies for Improving Intergroup Relations

Promoting Intergroup Contact

One of the most widely studied strategies to improve intergroup relations involves intergroup contact, including a range of approaches that may encourage members of different groups to interact with each other (see Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Importantly, early perspectives assumed that contact between groups held the potential either to heighten or reduce intergroup tensions (Allport 1954; Williams 1947; see also Hewstone 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Thus, rather than assuming that any or all forms of contact would be beneficial for intergroup relations, research has highlighted the conditions and processes of contact that are especially likely to facilitate positive relations between groups.

Optimal Conditions for Intergroup Contact A great deal of social psychological research has focused on the importance of establishing optimal conditions within the contact situation to promote positive intergroup outcomes (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). These conditions typically include establishing equal status between groups in the contact situation, encouraging cooperative interdependence, and fostering support for cooperative, equal status contact through institutional authorities, laws, and customs. Equal status might be achieved through providing members of each group equal opportunities to participate in activities, offer opinions, make decisions, and/or have equal access to resources that are available in the contact situation (see Riordan 1978). Cooperative interdependence might grow from having groups work together toward shared goals, where members of the different groups must actively rely on each other in order to achieve those shared

goals (e.g., Sherif 1966). Institutional support can be induced by having authorities establish norms of mutual tolerance and acceptance and guidelines for how members of different groups should relate to each other (e.g., Cohen and Lotan 1995). Intergroup research highlights the value of structuring contact situations in line with such optimal conditions: decades of research indicate that greater contact between groups typically reduces intergroup prejudice, and particularly when conditions of equal status, cooperation, and institutional support exist in the contact situation (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2011 for a review). Some theorists have also emphasized that these optimal conditions are best conceptualized as functioning in tandem to promote positive intergroup outcomes, rather than functioning independently as separate factors (see Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) .

Emotional Processes in Intergroup Contact Other research approaches have focused on how emotional processes can enhance or inhibit the potentially positive effects of contact. For example, people can feel threatened by the presence of other groups in their social environments (e.g., Pettigrew et al. 2010; Stephan et al. 2009), and they often experience a great deal of uncertainty and anxiety about navigating relations across group boundaries (Stephan et al. 1999). Feelings of threat and anxiety may in turn lead people to avoid intergroup contact (Plant and Devine 2003), or may provoke intergroup hostility and prejudice (e.g., Lee et al. 2004). At the same time, positive contact with members of other groups can help to diminish feelings of anxiety and threat, and nurture positive intergroup attitudes and a greater willingness to engage in further intergroup contact. For instance, in a nationally representative sample of Germans, Pettigrew et al. (2010) observed that larger proportions of foreigners can simultaneously increase both perceptions of intergroup threat and opportunities for intergroup contact, the former predicting greater intergroup prejudice, and the latter predicting lower intergroup prejudice. Other work by Paolini et al. (2004) shows that friendly contact between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland also predicts lower anxiety between members of these communities, which in turn predicts lower intercommunity prejudice. Using a multiethnic longitudinal undergraduate sample in the USA, Levin et al. (2003) have also found that, over time, positive intergroup contact predicted both significant reductions in intergroup anxiety and intergroup prejudice. Meta-analytic research further corroborates these findings (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008), showing that anxiety reduction mediates the relationship between intergroup contact and prejudice reduction, accounting for almost a third of contact's effects on prejudice. Overall, then, more positive intergroup contact typically reduces people's feelings of threat and anxiety toward the outgroup, and reduced threat and anxiety typically predict lower levels of intergroup prejudice.

Although decades of research suggest that positive outcomes may be achieved through intergroup contact, relatively little of this work has focused on the effects of intergroup contact in historical contexts of conflict (see Ron and Maoz, volume 2). It is possible that contact processes and outcomes would differ in contexts of intractable conflicts as compared to other contexts of less intractable intergroup tensions. In part, prolonged, violent conflicts are likely to enhance the salience and

experience of intergroup threat and, therefore, make positive outcomes from contact more difficult to achieve (see Stephan et al. 2009; Wagner and Hewstone 2012). Additionally, the competing narratives, the well-entrenched societal beliefs (i.e., an ethos of conflict), as well as the extremely negative collective emotions involved in such conflicts (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013) pose a serious challenge for a successful implementation of intergroup contact strategies.

Nonetheless, a number of studies show some cause for optimism regarding the positive effects of intergroup contact that may be achieved in post-violent conflict settings. Nearly 20 years following the fall of apartheid, White South Africans' positive contact with Black South Africans predicts their greater support for compensatory and preferential policies that would promote the interests and welfare of Black South Africans (Dixon et al. 2010). Findings from the last decade also reveal that positive contact is associated with a greater willingness to forgive among ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Čehajić et al. 2008), greater trust toward Palestinians among Jewish Israelis (Maoz and McCauley 2011), and greater forgiveness and trust among religious communities in Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al. 2006; Tam et al. 2008). Studies with Black and White South Africans, and with Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, also show that friendly, cooperative, and equal status contact with members of the other community predicts not only more positive attitudes and greater trust but also more positive beliefs about the other community's intentions in working toward peace (Tropp et al. 2015) .

Potential Limitations of Intergroup Contact in Conflict Settings It is important to note, however, that there are a number of challenges associated with the facilitation and enactment of positive contact in conflict settings (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011; Wagner and Hewstone 2012). Indeed, conflict itself—and particularly violent conflict—likely involves the experience of intergroup threat (Stephan et al. 2009), as well as varied forms of negative contact, ranging from intergroup hostility and aggression to displacement, violations of rights, and loss of life (Esses and Vernon 2008; Maoz 2011). Studies of White respondents in Australia and the USA also indicate that greater negative contact may be more strongly associated with prejudice than positive contact is with its reduction (Barlow et al. 2012); this effect is likely bolstered by the tendency for negative contact to make group differences especially salient, thereby exacerbating the degree to which negative contact experiences will generalize (Paolini et al. 2010).

At the same time, some research suggests that prior positive contact may facilitate reconciliation after conflict and such forms of negative contact. Classic research by Oliner and Oliner (1988) supports this general trend, showing that rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust were more likely to have reporting having Jews as friends and neighbors before the war than nonrescuers. More direct evidence comes from surveys of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, which indicate that positive contact experiences with members of the other groups before the breakout of intergroup violence predicted greater readiness for reconciliation following the violence (Biro et al. 2004). Additionally, recent work supports the notion that extensive prior positive contact can buffer against the effects of current negative contact between members of different groups (Paolini et al. 2014) .

Nonetheless, because of conflict—and the distrust, hostility, and negative experiences it can breed—members of conflicting groups often continue to feel threatened by each other (Riek et al. 2006; Stephan 2008). Intergroup conflict tends to be rooted in negative interdependence between groups, whereby the resources, identity, and well-being of one group are threatened (or perceived to be threatened) by the presence or actions of another group (e.g., Deutsch 1949). Such conditions of competition and threat are in direct contrast to the optimal conditions of cooperation and common goals proposed for achieving positive outcomes from intergroup contact. Reducing threat and anxiety between groups is key mechanism through which positive contact can lead to prejudice reduction (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008, 2011), whereas the presence of competition and threat can bolster support for intergroup violence and perpetuate an ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2007; Tausch 2009). Perhaps, then, it is understandable why voluntary patterns of segregation between groups are still likely to occur in post-conflict settings (e.g., Alexander and Tredoux 2010; Tredoux and Dixon 2009), as members of different groups have grown accustomed to distrusting each other and remain wary of engaging in cross-group contact. Even when people from conflicting groups are positively inclined toward intergroup contact, threats to one's safety must also be considered, as people may be putting themselves at risk by attempting to travel from one community to the other (e.g., Institute for Conflict Research 2005) .

Here, institutional norms, authorities, and community leaders can play particularly important roles. Group norms and leaders are instrumental in defining relations between groups and helping group members to learn whether and how they should engage with members of other groups (Abrams and Hogg 1988). In many cases, community norms and authority figures can facilitate positive intergroup outcomes by supporting friendly, cooperative relations between groups when members of different groups interact directly with each other (e.g., Pettigrew 1998), as well as through more indirect channels (e.g., Wright et al. 1997). Yet when long-standing conflicts exist between groups, it becomes a greater challenge for authority figures and community leaders to openly support such efforts, as they are compelled to represent the interests and identities of their own groups, and this often takes precedence over supporting cross-community relations (e.g., Bekerman 2009). Further, if and when authority figures and community leaders reach out across group boundaries, their status and legitimacy as respected authorities and leaders may then be questioned by members of the groups they represent, which can ultimately reduce their influence (Hogg 2001). Thus, a key challenge for establishing institutional support involves how leaders can promote positive relations across groups, while also maintaining status and legitimacy within their own groups.

An additional challenge relevant to the role of intergroup contact involves attempts to establish equal status between groups who have experienced protracted conflict. According to traditional perspective in intergroup contact theory (e.g., Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998), equal status might be established during contact by providing members of each group with equal opportunities to participate, offer opinions and input, and/or receive access to available resources; thus, under conditions of equal status, members of each group would have equal involvement and power to

shape the course and nature of their interactions with each other. But, the concept of equal status can be defined and operationalized in various ways (see Riordan 1978), and status relations may be understood differently among groups approaching each other from opposing sides of a conflict (e.g., Eibach and Ehrlinger 2006) .

In part, opposing groups commonly construe perceptions of the conflict, its history, and each other in different ways, such that each is likely to make judgments that allow their own group to be seen in a more positive light. In Burundi, both Hutus and Tutsis have attributed less responsibility to their own group for the instigation and consequences of violent ethnic conflict between the groups, instead attributing greater responsibility to members of the other group (Bilali et al. 2012). Religious communities like Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, as well as right-wing and left-wing political groups in Chile, have been shown to engage in competitive victimhood, whereby members of one community seek to establish that their group has suffered more than members of another community; such biased perceptions of victimization tend to predict conflict escalation rather than its peaceful resolution (Noor et al. 2008; see also Vollhardt et al., this volume; Shchori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2). Groups may also have different perceptions of progress toward equality, where the historically advantaged tend to focus on how much progress has been made, whereas members of historically disadvantaged groups tend to focus on how much more progress is needed (e.g., Eibach and Ehrlinger 2006).

Moreover, even when objective attempts are made to establish equal status in a contact situation, groups may subjectively experience the contact in different ways in relation to the prevailing status and power relations between groups in the larger society (Saguy et al. 2012; Tropp 2006). Groups that experience power asymmetries prior to contact may inadvertently enact power asymmetries during contact. For example, Jewish Israeli facilitators of intergroup dialogues between Jewish and Arab participants have shown tendencies to dominate, and Jewish participants tend to be more engaged in discussions of coexistence, relative to their Arab counterparts (Maoz 2004). As such, some have argued that groups should be of equal status coming into the contact situation, in order for contact to promote truly positive and cooperative relations between groups (Foster and Finchilescu 1986); otherwise, positive contact between groups of different status may inadvertently lead members of lower status groups to expect equal treatment even in the presence of injustices (e.g., Saguy et al. 2008) .

Creating a Common Ingroup

A second key strategy to improve intergroup relations involves processes of recategorization, where members of distinct groups are encouraged to recognize their common membership in a superordinate category that can include both groups, thereby creating a common group identity (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Gaertner, Dovidio, and their colleagues have conducted numerous studies in laboratory and field settings showing how the development of a common group identity can promote beneficial intergroup outcomes (e.g., Gaertner et al. 1989, 1994, 1996; see Gaertner and Dovidio 2000 for a detailed discussion).

In large part, attitudes toward former outgroup members become more positive due to the same categorization processes that govern other forms of ingroup bias: once former outgroup members become part of a common ingroup, they are afforded more positive attitudes such as those that are typically reserved for fellow ingroup members (Abrams and Hogg 1988). For instance, Jews induced to think of themselves and Germans as common members of "humanity" showed a greater willingness to forgive Germans for the Holocaust (Wohl and Branscombe 2005). Moreover, research suggests that the creation of a common ingroup can contribute to the reduction of intergroup threat: in US-based studies with different racial groups (Black and White Americans) and political groups (Democrats and Republicans), perceptions of common group identities predicted lower levels of threat, which in turn predicted more positive attitudes toward members of the other group (Riek et al. 2010).

Studies have also clarified how, to promote positive intergroup outcomes, the goal of identifying with a common ingroup should be introduced and supported by members of one's own group, rather than being imposed by the outgroup in question (Gómez et al. 2008). In studies with high school students from rival schools in Spain, these authors observed that students reported greater threat when outgroup members represented the groups in terms of a common group identity; this threat was only alleviated when members of their own group also endorsed the inclusion of both groups within a common ingroup.

Recent extensions of common ingroup identity research have been conducted in settings of protracted conflict in different parts of the world. For example, greater identification with a common "Chilean" identity predicted greater intergroup empathy and trust among right-wing supporters and left-wing opponents of Pinochet (Noor et al. 2008b). Similarly, Bosniaks' identification with the common group of "Bosnians" has been shown to predict greater intergroup forgiveness and lower levels of social distance (Čehajić et al. 2008), while Kosovar Albanians' identification with the common group of "inhabitants of Kosovo" predicts greater intergroup trust and lower competition in views of one's own group and others' victimization (Andrighetto et al. 2012); yet, these authors importantly note that it is the relative identification with the common national or regional group over identification with one's ethnic subgroup that predicts such positive outcomes (Čehajić et al. 2008; Andrighetto et al. 2012).

Potential Limitations of Common Identities in Conflict Settings There are also a number of challenges associated with creating common group identities in contexts of protracted conflict. Common group identities may be difficult to envision or maintain among groups embroiled in conflict, as group members would likely be more invested in the interests and identities of their distinct groups as they pertain to the conflict (Bar-Tal 2007). Indeed, conflicting groups often have distinct historical narratives pertaining to the conflict, such that they are likely to interpret the trajectory and nature of the conflict in different ways (Bilali and Ross 2012). These processes could hinder the development of a common identity, even among groups that seek to reconcile following conflict, as they may not agree on the characteristics that should ultimately define the common group (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

   Members of groups that are lower in status or power may also feel the need to protect themselves against being subsumed by and underrepresented within the larger common group (Hornsey and Hogg 2000). While high-power groups often desire for groups to be represented simply as part of a common group, members of groups with less power often show a preference for dual group identities—where both their own group and common group identities are emphasized—to ensure that each group's identity and experience are not lost in representations of the larger group (Dovidio et al. 2009; Hornsey and Hogg 2000). Such preferences for representations of groups may, in turn, feed into distinct motivations for engaging in intergroup contact. For example, in the context of Israeli–Palestinian workshops, Rouhana and Korper (1997) observed that while Israeli participants expressed a willingness to participate to the extent that the workshops focused on mutual liking and understanding, Palestinians expressed greater interest to the extent that the workshops addressed structural inequalities. Similar patterns of findings have been observed in studies with laboratory-generated groups high and low in status, and with respondents from relatively high- and low-status Jewish communities in Israel (Ashkenazim and Mizrahim); in each case, members of both the high- and low-status groups were generally interested in discussing points of commonality between their groups, yet members of the low-status group showed a much greater preference for discussing inequalities and differences in power (Saguy et al. 2008).

   The need for acknowledgment and representation of one's own group's experience also has implications for people's willingness to recognize the extent to which others have suffered due to ethnoreligious conflict. For instance, Vollhardt (2013) found that Jewish participants were more likely to acknowledge others' suffering due to collective violence when their own group's victimization was uniquely acknowledged (Jews) as part of a broader category of victims (Holocaust victims), as compared to when only the superordinate categorization of victims was used. This suggests that the perspectives and identities of each group must be acknowledged in order for group members to become more willing to recognize that their group's experience of victimization is shared with other groups (see also Noor et al. 2012).

   Given the challenges of implementing common group identities successfully in contexts of conflict and unequal status relations, new strategies for their implementation are now being considered. A promising approach has recently been offered by Shnabel et al. (2013), who suggest that framing common identities around shared experiences may be more effective than common identities framed at the level of region or nation. For example, in studies with Israelis and Palestinians, these authors found that inducing a common identity as "victims" or "perpetrators" can decrease competitive victimhood and foster intergroup forgiveness, while such positive intergroup outcomes were not achieved when a common regional identity ("Middle Eastern peoples") was induced. This work indicates the importance of taking into account specific features of the intergroup context—such as status and power relations between the groups, and the nature and contested dimensions of the conflict—when creating common identities, in the hopes of fostering improved relations between groups.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on two key strategies often proposed for improving relations between groups—promoting intergroup contact and creating common group identities—and discussed both potential strengths and challenges that may be associated with their use in contexts of protracted intergroup conflict. Although these strategies have received a great deal of research attention and empirical support, relatively little attention has been given to the ways in which their effectiveness may be constrained by the contours of conflicts between groups. It is important to emphasize that these challenges involve not only points of dispute and differential access to resources but also long-standing differences in perspective, identity, and historical narratives that guide group members' construals of the conflict and of their relations with each other (Bar-Tal 2007). Moreover, strategies such as promoting intergroup contact and creating common group identities are not designed to overlook these differences in order to improve relations between groups. Rather, applications of these strategies in contexts of conflict require attention to the distinct experiences and motivations that members of each group have had in the conflict, as they consider engaging in contact with each other and exploring shared bases of identity. Moreover, consideration of these and other strategies designed to improve relations between groups must be oriented toward fostering alternate perspectives on the conflict in order to dismantle an ethos of conflict and promote the potential for peace.

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Chapter 13
Sociopsychological Barriers to Peacemaking and Overcoming Them: A Review of New Psychological Interventions

Boaz Hameiri and Eran Halperin

Introduction

Throughout the history of humankind, intergroup conflicts have been taking place continuously, constantly, and on a large scale. Research shows that since the Second World War hundreds of violent conflicts have erupted with more than 40 million lives lost (Harbom et al. 2006; Leitenberg, 2006). In his work, Daniel Bar-Tal has focused specifically on one type of intergroup conflict, namely, intractable conflicts. Intractable conflicts are fought over contradictory goals and interests, viewed as being existential, as having a zero-sum nature and as irresolvable, and they deeply involve the conflicting societies, which invest great resources in conflict continuation. In addition, intractable conflicts last for more than a generation, and they are extremely violent (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Kriesberg 1993, 1998). Since these vicious conflicts still rage in various parts of the globe, as in Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and the Middle East, it should not come as a surprise that ending these conflicts peacefully is one of the most important challenges that practitioners, NGOs, international organizations, politicians, and also social scientists have taken upon themselves.

For many years, most social psychologists who studied intractable conflicts, Daniel Bar-Tal among the most prominent of them, focused on describing the unique psychological dynamics of these conflicts. He, for example, offered a theoretical framework describing the psychological infrastructure developed in societies involved in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal 2007) and then slightly revised this framework to consider the psychological infrastructure as part of the psychological barriers for peace that prevent society members from identifying real opportunities for peace (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009, 2011; Halperin and Bar-Tal 2011, see also Reykowski, this volume).

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Yet understanding the psychological dynamics of intractable conflicts is not enough. Hence, various social psychologists have taken the psychological approach one step forward, offering theory-driven, psychological based interventions that aim to increase support for peaceful conflict resolution and willingness to reconcile (e.g., Bilali and Vollhardt 2013; Bruneau and Saxe 2012; Hameiri et al. 2014b; Halperin et al. 2011; Halperin et al. 2013; Nasie et al. 2014; Paluck 2009; Saguy and Halperin 2014; Shnabel et al. 2009).Their goal is not only to understand intergroup conflicts, but also to use the vast knowledge that has been generated through years of research and harness it to the struggle of finding ways to peacefully resolve these conflicts. In the previous chapter, Linda Tropp (this volume) has reviewed traditional conflict resolution interventions (e.g., contact) that have been developed and tested by social psychologists. Tropp has also discussed the opportunities and challenges in implementing these strategies in the context of intractable conflicts. This chapter adds to Tropp's by reviewing only new interventions that have been designed specifically to deal with the psychological barriers to peace in the context of intractable conflicts.

To that end, we begin by elaborating on the sociopsychological repertoire of societal beliefs, attitudes, and emotions that evolve in societies immersed in intractable conflict, and how this repertoire may serve as a sociopsychological barrier to peacemaking when signs of possible peace appear. We then elaborate on the theoretical framework of overcoming the sociopsychological barriers. Following this, we review new psychological interventions that aim to overcome these barriers, derived mainly from Bar-Tal and his students' work in recent years. We suggest that these interventions can be divided into three categories: (1) interventions that provide information; (2) interventions that provide information through experiences; and (3) interventions that teach a new skill. In each category we discuss the possible merits and limitations when applied in the context of intractable conflicts. Finally, we introduce a new line of intervention that can overcome some of the outlined limitations, namely, paradoxical thinking.

Sociopsychological Barriers

Based on the work of Bar-Tal (2013), our point of departure is that intractable conflicts have an imprinting effect on the individual and on collective life in the participating societies. The characteristics of an intractable conflict imply that society members living under these harsh conditions experience severe and continuous negative psychological effects, such as chronic threat, stress, pain, uncertainty, exhaustion, suffering, grief, trauma, misery, and hardship, both in human and material terms (de Jong 2002; Robben and Suarez 2000; see also Canetti, volume 2). In addition, an intractable conflict requires constant mobilization of society members to support and actively take part in it, even to the extent of willingness to sacrifice their lives. In view of these experiences, society members must adapt to the harsh conditions by satisfying their basic human needs, learning to cope with the stress,

and developing psychological conditions that will be conducive to successfully withstanding the rival group.

A basic premise is that, in order to meet the above challenges, societies involved in intractable conflicts develop a set of functional beliefs, attitudes, emotions, values, motivations, norms, and practices (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; for empirical evidence see Lavi et al. 2014; Sharvit 2014). This infrastructure includes collective memories (see Paez and Liu, current volume; Nets-Zehngut, volume 2), ethos of conflict (see Cohrs et al., this volume; Tropp, this volume; Jost et al. this volume; Oren, volume 2; Sharvit; volume 2; Nahhas et al., volume 2), and collective emotional orientation (see Jarymowicz, this volume; Pliskin and Halperin, volume 2), that co-exist in mutual interrelations—they provide the major narratives, motivators, orientations, and goals that society members need in order to carry on with their lives under the harsh conditions of an intractable conflict and support its continuation.

The psychological infrastructure that is described above, together with other psychological biases, serve as a psychological barrier to peace and conflict resolution opportunities. These sociopsychological barriers lead to one-sided information processing that obstructs and inhibits the penetration of new counter information, a necessary condition for the development of a peace process (Arrow et al. 1995; Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011; Ross and Ward 1995). Moreover, in many cases individuals are not even interested in exposure to alternative information that may contradict their held societal beliefs (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011), which are often a result of a long indoctrinating socialization beginning from a very young age, through the educational systems, and is continuously being reinforced by the societal institutions and channels of communication. In other words, society members freeze on the conflict-supporting beliefs and attitudes (Bar-Tal 2013).

In recent years, Bar-Tal, Halperin, and their colleagues have provided empirical evidence for the effects of different sociopsychological barriers on processing of information relevant for conflict resolution. First, utilizing a nationwide survey of Jews in Israel, Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) showed a path leading from holding conflict related societal beliefs (e.g., victimhood and delegitimization) to low readiness to compromise in order to achieve a peaceful resolution, through the mediation of (low) openness to new information. Moreover, Porat et al. (2015) found that participants who were high on ethos of conflict (compared to those who were low) were more prone to acquire information that was biased against an ostensibly new peace proposal, and were also inclined to devote less processing time in general to information regarding the proposal. Finally, Cohen-Chen et al. (2014b) showed that fearful participants were more likely to acquire information that was biased toward rejecting an opportunity for peace, whereas hopeful participants were more prone to acquire information in favor of accepting the opportunity. Taken together, the theoretical and empirical findings reviewed in this section suggest that overcoming the sociopsychological barriers is an immense challenge that can substantially contribute to peacemaking efforts. In the following section we will outline the theory that was suggested in order to overcome these barriers and lead to social change.

Overcoming Sociopsychological Barriers

The Lewinian tradition of action research (Lewin 1946) contended that, apart from being dedicated to rigorous research with epistemic orientation, social psychology scholars should be equally dedicated to finding solutions to social problems. And indeed, in recent years we see a growing effort by researchers to borrow formulated interventions, as well as developing new ones, and to attend to the exceptionally challenging question of how to overcome these sociopsychological barriers, or in other words, how to change the well anchored conflict-supporting repertoire.

It was also Kurt Lewin (1947), who proposed that every process of societal change has to begin with a cognitive change of unfreezing in individuals and groups. Indeed, on the individual psychological level, the process of unfreezing usually begins with the appearance of a new idea (or ideas) that is inconsistent with the held beliefs and attitudes, and causes psychological tension or dilemmas that trigger intrapersonal conflict. This, in turn, may stimulate people to move from their basic positions and look for alternatives (e.g., Abelson et al. 1968; Festinger 1957; Kruglanski 1989). This new idea, that may come from outside sources or may be inferred by an individual, is called *an instigating belief*, as it can lead society members to reevaluate the societal beliefs of the culture of conflict, and in fact, it may lead to their unfreezing (see elaboration in Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009).

The content of the *instigating belief* may come from different domains pertaining to the image of the rival, the history of the conflict, the goals, new threats, a way of thinking, the need for perspective taking, and so on. It may suggest, for example, that the rival is human and could be a partner to negotiations; that the in-group has performed misdeeds that have violated moral codes, or that the conflict's goals are unachievable; or that the costs of the conflict are extremely high and cause critical damage to society. This conceptual principle has led to various interventions developed to unfreeze the minds of society members in order to absorb beliefs that may lead to a change in the held conflict-supporting repertoire. This is a tremendous endeavor, as these frozen societal beliefs and attitudes of the narratives are, as noted, central and held with high confidence by most society members (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009, 2011).

Classical social psychology has tried to create social change using various approaches, as reviewed by Tropp (this volume). Of all interventions that have been proposed to promote positive intergroup relations, intergroup contact is probably the most extensively researched (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). As thoroughly discussed by Tropp (this volume), this approach and other classic social-psychological approaches (e.g., creating a common in-group identity) have their limitations when applied in the context of an intractable conflict. In the following section, we will review and discuss recent interventions that have been developed and tested in the context of intractable conflicts, and as such, are more suitable to the unique characteristics of that context. Based on a new categorization of peace-promoting interventions we have recently suggested (Hameiri et al. 2014a), the main thrust of this review is to outline each category's merits and limitations when applied in the context of an intractable conflict, and to discuss how limitations of one category can be surmounted by interventions from other categories.

Peace Promoting Interventions

In order to organize the current literature of new peace-promoting psychological interventions, we have recently (Hameiri et al. 2014a) suggested the following categorization, based on the nature and goals of the interventions: (1) interventions that provide contradicting information regarding the conflict supporting repertoire or that shed new light over the conflict, the in-group or the rival; (2) interventions that are based on providing an experience through which an individual may infer a conclusion that is different from the held conflict supporting repertoire; and (3) interventions in which individuals are taught a new skill that can facilitate unfreezing of the conflict supporting repertoire. In order to illustrate each category we provide empirical examples derived mainly, but not exclusively, from interventions carried out by Bar-Tal and his colleagues in recent years.

Information-Based Interventions

The first category of interventions, which has received considerable attention in the peace-promoting interventions literature, is based on providing new information that is supposed to contradict, or shed new light over the held beliefs about the conflict, adversary, the in-group, etc. This may be carried out in at least two ways: first, by providing direct information about a given conflict that contradicts or sheds new light over the conflict-supporting repertoire. This information is meant to persuade society members that their held societal beliefs and attitudes are invalid in comparison to the new information that is more accurate and truthful. In essence, the new information is supposed to be very persuasive and even unequivocal in order to lead to attitude change. Second, by providing information about a different context, or information that is not context specific, from which the participants are requested to deduce or draw a conclusion concerning their specific conflict. In these interventions, the aim is either to present information from different conflicts, whether ongoing or from the past, or to provide information about groups or conflicts in general without linking it to a certain context, thereby letting the participants make the necessary link to the present conflict.

As an example for the first type of interventions, Gayer et al. (2009) presented direct information that elaborated on possible future losses for Jews in Israel if the conflict was to continue. Specifically, based on dominant issues within the Israeli public discourse, the researchers transmitted information stating that if the conflict were to endure, it would lead to an Arab majority within the borders of Israeli control, including the West Bank, a situation, which poses a significant threat to the establishment of a Jewish state in the land of Israel. The results of the study showed that the information about possible future losses associated with the continuation of the conflict, and the possible annexation of the West Bank, led to unfreezing, manifested in participants' openness to alternative information, and to higher levels of support for compromises in order to resolve the conflict peacefully.

Another example of this approach is a set of studies conducted by Saguy and Halperin (2014), in which Israeli-Jewish participants were exposed to internal criticism voiced within the out-group, with which they were involved in the conflict, namely, the Palestinians, ostensibly delivered by a Palestinian leader. The researchers hypothesized that the intervention would signal to an individual that the rival out-group was capable of a more balanced and less rigid way of thinking, which is very different from how the out-group is normally perceived in times of conflict (Pronin 2007; Pronin et al. 2004). Moreover, such out-group internal criticism would not provoke much resistance and be quite persuasive as the messages include information that appears to contradict the speaker's objectives, thus perceived as more genuine (Hornsey et al. 2008; Kelman and Hovland 1953). Indeed, results showed that participants who were exposed to such direct information, whether related or unrelated to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, were more hopeful regarding the future relations with the Palestinians, were more open to the Palestinian perspective and narrative, and as a consequence, were more in favor of political compromises.

An example of the second line of interventions, which are based on information that does not directly relate to the conflict, is the indirect emotion regulation approach. In this approach, the aim is to provide general information about the nature of groups or conflicts, without explicitly linking it to a specific context. For example, studies have shown that hatred is based on a core appraisal suggesting that the rival holds stable negative characteristics that cannot change (Halperin 2008). Thus, providing general information that groups are malleable (as opposed to having a fixed nature) would attenuate hatred appraisals. Indeed, in three experimental studies, Halperin et al. (2011) demonstrated with diverse samples (i.e., Israeli-Jews, Palestinians citizens of Israel, and Palestinians in the West Bank) that providing general information about a group's malleability, without mentioning specific adversarial groups, led to more positive attitudes toward the rival group, which in turn led to greater willingness to compromise in order to achieve a peaceful resolution. In another closely related set of studies, Cohen-Chen et al. (2014a) showed that providing general information that conflicts are malleable, rather than fixed, without mentioning a specific conflict, led to higher levels of hope regarding a peaceful ending to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in turn led to more willingness to support concessions (see elaboration in Pliskin and Halperin, volume 2).

Peace-promoting interventions that provide information have yielded impressive results in recent years in lab experimentation, but they possess one major caveat when applied in the context of an intractable conflict, namely, that they may not apply to all audiences. Specifically, providing direct information can result in a defensive reaction by those who have the most negative attitudes and emotions toward the out-group to begin with (Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009); when the individuals hold the conflict supporting repertoire with great confidence and with high involvement (Bar-Tal et al. 1994; Eagly and Chaiken 1993); when this repertoire fulfills important functions for the individual (Eagly and Chaiken 1993); or when the beliefs of this repertoire are underlined by a motivational factor—specific closure needs (see Kruglanski 1989, 2004).

Providing indirect information can go some way in order to circumvent this limitation, but it is no silver bullet. Providing information about the malleability of groups in general may not apply for those who perceive that the out-group is unique and not part of humanity, as they dehumanize (e.g., Haslam 2006) or delegitimize (e.g., Bar-Tal and Hammack 2012) the out-group. Finally, a recent study conducted by Kudish et al. (2015) has shown that the association between the perception that conflicts are malleable with more willingness for concession-making was more pronounced among participants who also perceived that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not unique. Thus, although this warrants further research, it seems reasonable to assume that providing information about the malleability of conflicts in general, may not apply for those who perceive that the specific conflict they are immersed in is unique.

Experience-Based Interventions

A second category of interventions, which has also been researched extensively by social psychologists, is based on enabling individuals to go through an experience that is aimed to unfreeze their conflict-supporting beliefs. This can be carried out in at least two ways: first, by enabling an experience that explicitly or implicitly contradicts the held beliefs and attitudes; second, by enabling an experience that can attenuate the possible resistance individuals are likely to show as a consequence of being exposed to information that poses a threat to their in-group positive image. Importantly, the prime factor in these interventions is the actual experience and not the information that is usually provided as part of the experience.

Possibly the most relevant example of experience-based interventions are those based on intergroup contact (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 2013; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). As discussed in Tropp (this volume), when applied in the context of intractable conflict, interventions based on the classic conceptualization of intergroup contact may suffer from several limitations. In order to circumvent these limitations, several new extensions to the classic conceptualization have been suggested. These extensions include virtual and parasocial contact (Schiappa et al. 2005), extended contact (Wright et al. 1997), and imagined contact (Crisp and Turner 2009). By sidestepping the requirement of actual face-to-face contact, which can be extremely difficult to attain in severe conflicts, these interventions have been shown to have positive effects on intergroup relations in many contexts around the world. However, they have rarely been studied in contexts of prolonged and violent, or intractable, conflicts (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 2013).

Another related example of experience-based intervention is Paluck's (2009) media-based intervention conducted in post-genocide Rwanda. In this longitudinal field study, Rwandan participants assigned to the experimental group listened to a radio soap opera named *Musekeweya,* or *New Dawn*, in which a fictional story of two Rwandan communities was depicted, representing the two largest ethnic groups in Rwanda—Hutus and Tutsis. The soap opera had two main elements: first, a depiction of realistic Rwandan characters, with the day-to-day problems they have

to deal with; second, educational messages about prejudice, violence and trauma in the post-genocidal Rwanda, that were embedded in the radio soap opera. Results showed on the one hand that the experience of listening to the soap opera for a year had a significant effect on participants' perception of social norms regarding intergroup integration, intergroup trust and willingness to cooperate, compared to the participants in the control. On the other hand, the direct messages conveyed had no effect on the participants' personal beliefs.

Another example of experience-based interventions is an ongoing project that tries to disentangle the effects of experiencing the suffering of the other (ESO), or rival. The ESO experience is hypothesized to lead to a more profound understanding and acknowledgment of the "self" and "other" needs, narratives, etc., in order to facilitate a better, empathic, intergroup dialogue. To this end, a group of Israeli Jews visited major sites related to the Palestinian suffering, including the Nakba (the Palestinian's Catastrophe in 1948), and everyday difficulties faced by Palestinians (such as checkpoints); similarly, a group of Palestinians from the West Bank visited the Auschwitz death camp in Poland, as a prominent representation of the Jewish Holocaust. Importantly, the participants did not just receive information about the out-group's suffering, but rather they went through a vivid experience. Utilizing a within subject design, preliminary results derived from the Israeli participants showed that the ESO experience had a significant effect on several important perceptions of the participants regarding the conflict and the Palestinians. For example, following the ESO experience, participants expressed more empathy toward the Palestinian narrative, more willingness to take the perspective of the Palestinians, more willingness for concession-making, and more willingness to reconcile (Sagy 2014; for related intervention see Shechter et al. 2008).

The second form of experience-based interventions borrows from the self-affirmation theory (Steele 1988) and applies it to the realm of intergroup conflicts. The rationale behind this line of thinking is that by enabling an experience, which bolsters a valued aspect of the individual's identity, she/he can tolerate a threat to other specific aspects of their identity. For example, in a series of studies conducted in Israel and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Čehajić-Clancy et al. (2011) showed that enabling participants to experience affirmation of their positive self-image (i.e., by writing a short essay about values important to them) led them to express group-based guilt more freely, which in turn increased their support for reparation following an atrocity committed by their in-group (for elaboration see Čehajić-Clancy, this volume).

Interventions that are based on enabling an experience have been studied extensively, and presented some meaningful results in changing societal beliefs, as well as feelings of empathy and guilt. By enabling experiences, which are only implicitly contradictory to the held societal beliefs and attitudes, scholars were able to circumvent known limitations of interventions that provide information in a more direct manner. Nevertheless, some limitations posed by this type of interventions warrant mentioning. Most experience-based interventions require specific conditions, such as having the opportunity to make contact with members of the out-group, which can be extremely difficult to ensure in the context of intergroup conflict (Bekerman

and Maoz 2005; see also Tropp, this volume; Ron and Maoz, volume 2). Furthermore, the full potential of experience-based interventions, such as the ESO project, can be realized only when group members are willing to participate in such situations (see for example Kteily et al. 2013). However, due to the psychological repertoire developed by members of societies involved in intractable conflicts (see Bar-Tal 2013), the willingness to participate in most experience-based interventions is extremely weak (e.g., Maoz 2009).

Skill Training Interventions

The third category of interventions we propose aims to provide or teach individuals new skills or strategies that can help them overcome emotional and cognitive reactions that lead to freezing and prevent openness to alternative views and information about the conflict, the out-group or the in-group. This can be carried out in at least two ways: first, by training individuals with cognitive reappraisal strategies that can help them to better regulate their emotions in future conflict-related situations; second, by stimulating more creative and open-minded mindsets that can help individuals think less heuristically, less stereotypically, and more carefully regarding various elements of the conflict, and in particular, the rival.

   The first form of skill training interventions aims to help individuals to regulate their emotional reactions, whether by reducing the magnitude of negative emotions (e.g., anger), or increasing the magnitude of positive ones (e.g., hope) when faced with a conflict-related stimulus (see Pliskin and Halperin, volume 2). For example, building on the vast literature of cognitive reappraisal (Gross 2008), Halperin et al. (2013) found that participants who were taught how to better regulate their emotions using cognitive reappraisal, expressed less anger following a real and dramatic event in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a consequence, they were also more supportive of conciliatory policies toward Palestinians both one week and five months after the training had taken place (see also Halperin et al. 2014).

   With regard to the second method, first we may indicate a series of three studies in which participants (Israelis and Palestinians) were trained to be aware of their psychological bias of naïve realism. This psychological bias leads individuals to think that their own views are objective and unbiased, whereas others' views are biased for any number of reasons, such as ideology, self-interest and irrationality. This conviction prevents serious consideration of others' supposedly biased views and leads to the formation and maintenance of a one-sided perspective, thus deepening misunderstandings, disagreements and antagonism between individuals and groups. The results of these studies clearly show that raising awareness of the psychological bias of naïve realism can lead to greater openness to the adversary's narrative regarding conflict-related events and to new alternative information about the conflict (Nasie et al. 2014).

   Another closely related line of interventions that aims to decrease animosity and hostility toward the rival group is based on the use of perspective taking and empathy promotion (e.g., Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). In a typical perspective taking

intervention, a participant is presented with a photograph of a member of the out-group and is instructed to write a short essay from the perspective of this member, as if they were him/her. In situations of conflict, perspective taking, together with empathy are key skills that can change the sociopsychological repertoire support-ing continuation of the conflict. They open a window to the suffering of the rival, to perceive him/her also as a victim and to understand his/her needs and goals (see Brown and Čehajić 2008).

Finally, Vasiljevic and Crisp (2013) devised a novel intervention aimed at teach-ing a new skill that promotes cognitive flexibility, building on the categorization-processing-adaptation-generalization model (CPAG) (Crisp and Turner 2011). CPAG postulates that experiencing diversity that confronts existing stereotypes leads to less heuristic thinking, which in turn reduces individuals' reliance on ste-reotypes when evaluating different groups. In a series of lab experiments, the re-searchers established that their short intervention, in which participants were re-quested to generate five counter-stereotypic combinations (e.g., *overweight model* or *rich student*), reduced prejudice and increased tolerance toward multiple prej-udiced groups. More importantly, in a field experiment conducted in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the intervention led to more positive attitudes and trust toward different out-groups that shared a history of an extremely violent conflict with the participants' in-group.

Skill training interventions have yielded noteworthy and promising results in various contexts both in the lab and in the field. However, possible limitations may still be posed when skill-training interventions are applied in the context of intrac-table conflict. First, in many cases society members are not motivated to change their conflict-supporting repertoire; thus, they do not want to participate in such interventions. For example, individuals may not be motivated to regulate their emo-tions, when considering interventions based on cognitive reappraisal (Tamir 2009) or to suppress negative stereotypes when considering the cognitive flexibility para-digm (Vasiljevic and Crisp 2013). Furthermore, when individuals are requested to take the rival's perspective or to empathize with him, it can backfire and lead to resistance and self-serving behavior (e.g., Epley et al. 2006; Galinsky et al. 2005; Vorauer and Sasaki 2009). Finally, perspective taking, as well as other peace-pro-moting interventions in general, can take their toll even when they are successful as "[individuals] on one side of the conflict can lose credibility with their in-group if they attempt to understand the other side" (Paluck 2010, p. 1172, see also Galinsky et al. 2005).

Paradoxical Thinking: A New Avenue of Interventions

Following the peace promoting interventions and the outlined limitations discussed above, in the present section we would like to introduce a new intervention called paradoxical thinking that overcomes some of the aforementioned obstacles. "Para-doxical thinking is the attempt to change attitudes by using new information, which

is consistent with the held societal beliefs, but of extreme content that is intended to lead an individual to paradoxically perceive his or her currently held societal beliefs or the current situation as irrational and senseless" (Hameiri et al. 2014b, p. 10997). It is this realization that may, in our view, stimulate unfreezing of prior societal beliefs and attitudes as well as openness to alternative viewpoints.

The paradoxical thinking paradigm development is based on clinical psychological treatments in which individuals provided with extreme information or instructions that are in line with their held beliefs or attitudes, may change them even when these attitudes are extremely negative and well-entrenched (Frankl 1975; Miller and Rollnick 2002; Watzlawick et al. 1974). In this case, however, the intervention of paradoxical thinking leads to change even with individuals who do not aspire to change their beliefs and attitudes, as opposed to most cases in clinical psychology.

The basic premise of the paradoxical thinking paradigm is that instead of eliciting inconsistency, as most information- and experience-based interventions aim to do, the provision of consistent, but extreme, new information is intended to induce paradoxical thinking, an intrapersonal tension, leading to the realization that something is wrong in the held conflict supporting societal beliefs. In our view, the special advantage of this intervention is that it does not provide any counter information to induce inconsistency, and thus does not threaten individuals' conflict supportive narratives. It neither arouses reactance nor resistance, and therefore neither results in defensive reactions nor activates defense mechanisms.

As opposed to most skill teaching interventions, we rest on the clinical psychology literature at the basis of the paradoxical thinking paradigm (e.g., Frankl 1975) and argue that this method may be useful even with deeply and personally involved individuals and even when the beliefs and attitudes are held with high confidence, and therefore attempts to change them are met with resistance. In general, the proposed intervention tries not to minimize resistance, but to use the resistance as leverage to create momentum for attitude change (Knowles and Linn 2004; Miller and Rollnick 2002).

The above-described intervention was carried out in a unique field study conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Hameiri et al. 2014b). In this study Israeli-Jewish participants were exposed to a campaign expressing ideas that were congruent with the shared conflict supporting social beliefs (i.e., ethos of conflict; Bar-Tal et al. 2012) but were much more extreme. Results showed that the intervention, although counterintuitive, led participants to express more conciliatory attitudes regarding the conflict, particularly among participants with center and rightwing political orientation. This suggests that individuals with well-established conflict supporting views, in the process of viewing the extreme messages, realize that their beliefs may be absurd and/or unsuitable. Most importantly, participants who were exposed to the paradoxical intervention, which took place in proximity to the 2013 Israeli general elections, reported that they tended to vote more for dovish parties, which advocate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. These effects were long lasting, as the participants in the intervention condition expressed more conciliatory attitudes when they were reassessed a year after the intervention.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have reviewed different types of peace-promoting interventions that aim to unfreeze or overcome the sociopsychological barriers that fuel intractable conflicts. The challenge now, as we see it, is to take these interventions that have been validated in the lab or in small-scale field studies and apply them in real-life settings to lead to societal change. We believe that it is crucial to invest efforts to create messages that can be disseminated to the masses, possibly through educational workshops, the mass media, or online. Future interventions should also try to discover what type of messages affect different people. For example, what messages will be more effective on those who hold the conflict supporting narratives as a central part of their identity and on those who do not have a strong opinion; what messages will be more effective on those who are on the stronger side in an asymmetrical conflict, and on those who are on the weaker side. Finally, more research is needed in order to understand how to minimize resistance to attitude change and how to increase willingness among members living in societies involved in intractable conflicts to take part in such interventions.

Bringing intergroup conflicts to an end is a tremendous and arduous endeavor. Nevertheless, we hope that shedding light on the social psychology interventions that aim to unfreeze the sociopsychological barriers and promote a process of peacemaking will facilitate more research and thinking, and hopefully real-world applications. By convincing societies to use some of the interventions reviewed and new ones that will be developed, social psychologists can make a modest contribution to the joint effort to mend or to bring to an end the destructive conflicts that rage around the world, for which humanity is paying a dreadful cost.

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Chapter 14
Practical Wisdom: Educating for Active Bystandership to Prevent Violence and Build Peace

Ervin Staub

Injustice, violence, and cruelty are rampant in the world. There are genocides and persistent violent conflicts between groups. There are social conditions such as political and economic/financial inequality that can either directly generate and/or give rise to cultures that generate group conflict and violence, or substantial individual violence, as in South Africa and the USA. There are social arrangements that are deeply unjust, keeping many people in dire poverty and limiting the opportunities for creating lives that are reasonably satisfying economically and psychologically. Difficult conditions of life in societies develop, to which people respond in ways that lead to violence by one group in the society against another (Staub 1989, 2011). Are there ways to create conditions that give rise to and maintain peaceful, harmonious, and benevolent societies? Could individuals, leaders, and thereby whole groups, develop the caring and wisdom that would reduce or help to prevent violence both by groups and individuals? Wisdom combined with inclusive caring, caring not only for people close to us but everyone, and the moral courage to express our caring in action even when this is challenging and might have negative consequences for ourselves (Staub 2015), are important to move toward such a world.

Wisdom and Benevolence

Wisdom is defined by Wikipedia as "a habit or disposition to perform the action with the highest degree of adequacy under any given circumstance. This implies a possession or seeking of knowledge of the given circumstances. This involves an understanding of people, things, events, and situations, and the willingness and the ability to apply perceptions, judgments, and actions in keeping with an

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understanding of what is the right course of actions. It often requires control of one's emotional reactions (the "passions") so that universal principles, values, reason, and knowledge prevail to determine one's actions."

Wisdom requires understanding the world, the meaning and potential impact of various situations, and good judgment, decision-making, and action. But "action by the highest degree of adequacy" leaves open the question of the goals of behavior. Adequate to accomplish what aim? Writings about wisdom in both religious and secular traditions suggest that the wise person is good, not evil, that his or her actions are benevolent. This is not a sufficient specification of aims, since wisdom in the form of understanding, judgment or decision, and action also involves everyday matters that have no relationship to goodness and evil. But for our purposes, with a focus on preventing violence and creating benevolent societies, it is sufficient.

As this discussion already indicates, true wisdom is a matter of not only the capacity to understand and judge, but also to act. Aristotle emphasized wisdom that is practical. He wrote in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: It "is bound up with action, accompanied by reason, and concerned with things good and bad for a human being …" There is usually a focus on reason in discussions of wisdom. But often empathy, sympathy, compassion, or, more generally, feelings of connection to other human beings are essential for benevolent choices and actions.

Perhaps a useful general principle would be that wisdom is guided by utilitarian considerations, the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people, including oneself. Wisdom as guided by or embodying emotional and behavioral orientations of caring for the welfare of other people, ideally all people, could provide the understanding, judgment, and motivation for individuals to act in positive ways in their own lives, to work on shaping environments so that they generate positive actions, and to be active bystanders in the service of creating peaceful, harmonious societies and international relations.

I will focus in this chapter on educational practices or interventions from my work that aimed to prevent violence and promote positive behavior. These practices are likely to contribute to what constitutes wisdom. I use the concept of wisdom because it provides a holistic, unitary way to summarize the varied elements of understanding, judgment, and action that are involved. Wisdom enriches individual and group life in general. My aims in the work I will describe have been highly similar to those of Daniel Bar-Tal, both in a general way, to understand the sources of conflict and violence and promote peace, as well as in many particulars.

Bar-Tal's work in psychology started with the study of prosocial behavior (Bar-Tal 1976), which my work and this chapter are also concerned with. His work also focuses on delegitimization of another group and its members. Delegitimization makes it easier for what he has described in violence between groups to happen: people seeing their own group as moral and the other as responsible for conflict and violence and immoral. All this exaggerates the danger from another group and contributes to a "siege mentality" (Bar-Tal 2000, 2013a, see also Vollhardt et al., this volume; Shchori-Eyal and Klar, volume 2). They all have relevance to the work I will describe in this chapter. The knowledge, understanding of oneself and of circumstances, the "education" for accurate judgment and changed attitudes

toward others that I will discuss, are likely to overcome psychological barriers to peace (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011; Halperin and Bar-Tal 2011; Porat et al. 2015) and reduce self-censorship (Bar-Tal 2013b; see also Staub 1989). One element of both these barriers and of self-censorship is ignoring, not reporting positive actions by the other party. Some of the trainings/education I describe may counteract this tendency.

Knowledge, Understanding: "Education" to Prevent Violence and Promote Positive Behavior

Wisdom requires knowledge of the world, other people, oneself, and the impact of circumstances. It is an aspect of wisdom, for example, to understand both basic psychological needs and one's own and one's society's habitual ways of attempting to satisfy them, as well as one's personal values/goals/motives and one's ways to satisfy them. I have proposed two interrelated theories. One of these is a theory of basic psychological needs, inspired both by Maslow's theory of needs and by my attempt to understand why certain conditions give rise to psychological and social processes that can lead to genocide and other group violence (Staub 1989, 2003, 2011). Another is a theory of personal goals (Staub 1978, 1980, 2011, 2015). Individuals develop values that specify what is desirable or not in a general way and personal goals that specify related outcomes. These develop in part out experiences with the satisfaction or frustration of basic needs.

The Frustration of Basic Needs and Destructive Need Fulfillment Difficult social conditions, life problems, and social chaos in society often give rise to scapegoating, frequently but not necessarily by a dominant group of a minority group in a society. They also give rise to vision of a better life for a group. These visions are often destructive, in that they identify some group, usually the scapegoated group, as standing in the way of fulfilling the vision. Such visions have included nationalism, or racial or ethnic superiority transformed into power, or even social equality as in Cambodia. I have referred to these as destructive ideologies (Staub 1989, 2011). Scapegoating and destructive ideologies can initiate the evolution of increasing violence.

In my conception of group violence, difficult social conditions frustrate basic psychological needs in large groups of people. These include the need for security, a positive identity, positive connections to other people (individuals or one's group), a feeling of effectiveness and the ability to control important events in one's life, for some degree of autonomy—the ability to make choices for ones, and understanding the world one's place in it. These needs press for satisfaction. When social conditions frustrate them, people can attempt to fulfill them constructively by working together for shared goals that benefit everyone. Instead, especially when certain cultural characteristics exist, and when destructive leaders offer seemingly easy solutions, psychological and social processes can arise that lead to violence. Members of a group can together scapegoat another group, and create and join with others

in destructive ideological movements. These particular group processes can satisfy basic psychological needs, as people gain security, connection, identity, and comprehension in the group, but do so destructively. As individuals and groups engage in violence, a negative evolution follows. In the end, the violence not only harms others, often to an extreme degree, but also has harmful consequences for oneself and one's group.

Moving from Destructive to Constructive Need Fulfillment: From Violence to Benevolence

Aggressive Boys

These concepts of destructive and constructive need satisfaction also apply, of course, to individual behavior. We have developed a training for aggressive boys, based on the assumption that their aggression is the result of having learned to fulfill important needs destructively (Spielman and Staub 2000). These boys saw people as more hostile, which is a characteristic of aggressive boys (Dodge and Frame 1982; Dodge et al. 1990), seeing hostility when nonaggressive boys do not. They also had less of a prosocial value orientation—seeing human nature as more negative, and feeling less responsibility for others' welfare—than nonaggressive boys. Prosocial value orientation has been related to helpful behavior in varied settings (Staub 1974, 1978, 2003), but this was the first time its relationship to aggression was studied.

In the training, small groups of aggressive boys role-played situations that tended to evoke aggression in them. In one of them, someone took a boy's seat when he left for a while, after he put his bag on a seat at a table where he and his friends were going to sit at lunch. When he returned all the seats were taken. They enacted these situations first in the aggressive way they would usually unfold, and then in constructive ways. They videotaped and discussed their role-plays. In the course of a series of sessions, we introduced ideas about the psychological needs I listed above, noting that all people have these needs. We discussed fulfilling these needs destructively, as they have been doing. Dominance and aggression can help to fulfill needs for effectiveness, positive identity, and possibly others. But they both harm others, and ultimately also oneself, as others may retaliate, come to dislike the person or avoid contact (see Coie and Dodge 1997). We had participants discussing constructive ways of fulfilling basic needs, and practicing constructive actions, which they usually generated themselves and performed in role-plays. Thus, the training provided both, a way of thinking and practice and skills in constructive ways of fulfilling needs.

Our evaluation of the impact of the training showed that in one school, with a supportive environment, both boys who received the training, and aggressive boys who did not, became less aggressive. In another school with a less supportive

environment, where we found teachers acting less kindly toward students, boys who did not receive the training became more aggressive—as judged by teachers and in-school suspensions—but boys who had the training became slightly less aggressive from before to after the training, with a significant difference between the two groups. Boys who received the training also came to see people as less hostile (Spielman and Staub 2000). The training provided information, creating a more accurate perception of other people—not seeing hostility where there is no hostility—and presumably also a more accurate understanding of oneself (greater self-awareness). It had the potential to develop habits of "adequate" behavior, constructive responses to circumstance. All these are elements of wisdom.

Addressing Harmful Behavior (Bullying) in Schools

Bystanders have great potential power to influence the behavior of other bystanders, as well as to prevent or stop harmful behavior. Based on my own and others' past research and theory about inhibitors of bystander action, the power of bystanders to influence the behavior of other bystanders, and real-life examples of bystander influence (Hallie 1979; Staub 2003, 2011), I developed a training of students in schools to be active bystanders, in collaboration with a local organization in Massachusetts. As inhibitors of helping, we used primarily those proposed by Latane and Darley (1970), such as diffusion of responsibility and especially pluralistic ignorance, bystanders not reacting in public, and thereby inhibiting each other from action. In one of my studies which was used as a basis for developing the intervention, participants and a confederate worked separately on a task in the same room, when they heard a crash and sounds of distress from the adjoining room. Different words and reactions by the confederate—without ever going into the adjoining room—led to great variation in the experimental conditions, ranging from about 25 to 100 % of the participants going into the adjoining room.

We applied this training in two school systems, to all the 8th and 10th graders. The student–adult pairs that acted as trainers discussed with the students they trained what past experiences might lead a student to bully others, and the impact on the targets of such behavior. They provided information about the inhibitors of helping and guided role-plays to develop skills in intervening in as positive ways as possible. Students' role-played both active bystandership, and engaging other bystanders as allies in helping. Recruiting others reduces risk while increasing impact, and knowing how to do it should empower potential helpers.

Our evaluation study showed that in the two schools where 8th and 10th graders were trained, harmful behavior decreased by 20 % in comparison to two similar control schools where students were not trained. While harmdoing decreased, active bystandership did not increase on our measures. This may have been a measurement problem or it may be that harmdoers changed as they learned what leads to bullies' actions in general and presumably to their own as well, the impact on victims, and that most other students dislike aggressive peers (Coie and Dodge 1997).

We unfortunately did no quantitative evaluation of the impact of the training on those who might have been most impacted, the student trainers. However, in qualitative evaluation they showed impact, such as one of them saying "Before I became a trainer I used to do such things, and never realized the effects of what I did." (For a description of the training and review of the results of this study, see Staub 2015). The training provided information and the opportunities for experiential learning. It presumably enhanced self-knowledge, awareness of other people and their experience (which would generate empathy), and awareness both of how one's behavior affects others and is seen by others (Coie and Dodge 1997). The earlier discussion suggests that these elements are components of wisdom. It would be useful in evaluating such trainings to both directly assess such components, and the generalization of the effects of the training to other contexts which would follow from greater wisdom.

Working with the Population and Leaders in Rwanda

My associates and I have also worked on reconciliation after the genocide in Rwanda, training groups ranging from the staff of local organizations to national leaders, and creating educational radio programs including a radio drama that has been extremely popular since 2004 and is ongoing.

In the trainings, we provided information, briefly described earlier, about how extreme violence in groups develops (Staub 1989, 2011), the traumatic impact of violence (Pearlman 2001; Pearlman and Saakvitne 1995; Staub 1998), and avenues to healing, reconciliation, and the prevention of new violence (later expanded in Staub 2011). Trainings conducted by the staff of local organizations, which we trained, had a variety of positive effects when assessed 2 months after the conclusion of the trainings. They included reduced trauma symptoms, more positive attitudes by Hutus and Tutsis toward each other, and more "conditional forgiveness" (Staub et al. 2005).

An important aspect of these trainings, which may have been central in making them effective, was the nature of participants' engagement in it. They were told about influences leading to genocide, but they themselves applied the information to events in Rwanda. The same was the case with information about the impact of violence on people, which they helped to generate and test with their own experience. Applying and testing knowledge by one's own experience can lead to what we have called "experiential understanding" (Staub et al. 2005, Staub 2006, 2011). Halperin et al. (2011) also found that providing members of groups in conflict with information that they could apply to their own experience—that the behavior of groups changes as their environments and the character of their leaders change—reduced expressions of hate and increased people's expressed openness to negotiation. For lasting change of this kind, most likely additional experience is necessary, or transformation of the changed attitudes or feelings immediately after the intervention into behavior.

In the radio programs we presented the same kind of information. In a long running radio drama in Rwanda, which started to broadcast in 2004 and is still continuing (similar radio dramas, appropriate to the setting, were introduced to Burundi and the Congo in 2006), such information was first presented as part of the story of two villages in conflict. Later the two villages, formerly in conflict but now reconciled, joined to prevent violence by other groups. Early evaluation, after year 1 and year 2, showed a variety of positive effects, such as increased empathy for many parties, the willingness to say what one believes, and more independence of authorities (Paluck 2009; see also Staub and Pearlman 2009, Staub 2011). Overly strong respect for authority is one cultural contributor to the likelihood of genocide (Staub 1989, 2011).

After many years of broadcasting, the usual empirical evaluation is not possible. Most of the people in the country listen to the radio drama, and there is no appropriate control group. But anecdotal reports indicate strong effects. For example, a young boy, after listening to the radio drama, inspired the people in his village who during the genocide killed many people in a neighboring village, to approach people in that village, to take implements and work alongside them in their fields, and ask for forgiveness. Over time this transformed their relationship (Ziegler 2011).

Often extreme violence begins with progressive increase in the devaluation of a group, scapegoating, and other social events, the importance of which people minimize, both because each change may be limited, and because responding to societal events is highly challenging. Knowing what conditions and influences lead to violence enables people to notice and appropriately interpret such events, making early responses more likely. We also provided information and the example of active bystanders in the radio drama, who attempted to counteract destructive leaders or engaged in reconciliation-related actions. One of the effects of listening to the radio drama was more participation in reconciliation activities, rather than just advocating reconciliation.

The accurate perception of events and understanding how one might constructively respond to them may be regarded as wisdom. However, even early opposition to a group process, especially in authoritarian societies, requires the motivation provided by inclusive caring, as well as moral courage. Part of wisdom is benevolence, but by itself wisdom may not sufficiently embody the qualities or dispositions to move people from benevolence to action under challenging conditions. It would need, therefore, to be enhanced by such qualities. Effective action also requires skills, for example, in engaging other bystanders.

Education to Understand Personal Values and Goals and Moral Equilibration, and Inhibit the Subversion of Morality and Caring

I have proposed what I call "Personal goal theory," initially to help understand helping behavior—why people do or do not help (Staub 1974, 1978). The theory can also help us to further understand violence. In this conception, we can all arrange

our values, which I identify desire outcomes, in a hierarchy. However, this is not a static hierarchy. Circumstances can activate values/goals that are in competition, or activate values/goals lower in the hierarchy and make them dominant over others that are normally higher in the hierarchy and exert a dominant influence.

In an early study (Feinberg 1978; see Staub 1978, 1980), some participants were working on a demanding task when a confederate told them about a very recent highly stressful event. The strength of their achievement, prosocial, and other goals was evaluated weeks before. Those with strong prosocial goals stopped working on the task and listened attentively to the person in distress, while also responding by talking a small amount, a seemingly empathic and helpful response. Those with both strong prosocial and achievement goals continued looking at and working on their task, while also talked a substantial amount. They seemed to want to fulfill both of their motives, but talking a substantial amount may have been in part an expression of their achievement motivation, inappropriate for what a person in distress needs.

Strong moral values/goals that people hold may be subverted when other values/goals are powerfully activated by the environment. This is of special concern when the moral values of people in positions of authority are subverted. Samantha Power (2002) described how difficult it was during the Iraq–Iran war for Peter Galbraith, deeply concerned about the violence, to come to the judgment that it was Iraq, not Iran, that was using chemical weapons. He was an American government official, affected by the strong American support for Iraq, surrounded by people loyal to the government position of support for Iraq.

I have proposed that facing a conflict between a nonmoral motive, such as supporting a repressive and violent system like Iraq in a war, and a moral value, such as respect for the well-being and life of people, it is possible to reduce the conflict by "moral equilibration, a shift to a different moral value or principle" (Staub 1989, p. 147). Or values that are not inherently moral can be proclaimed as moral values and used for whatever purposes they are needed. For example, "loyalty and obedience to authority may become the relevant moral principles" (Staub 1989, p. 147). I have considered loyalty as a nonmoral value, since it can often be in the service of doing great harm. Since then, contrary to my view, Haidt (2001), in his Moral Foundations Theory, has identified loyalty as one kind of moral value. However, leadership groups can appeal to loyalty or patriotism to gain the support of people for immoral ends.

In relevant research, Leidner and Castano (2012) have explored "morality shifting." They note that people normally use the principle of harm and fairness to evaluate their country. They found that people who greatly glorify their country changed to loyalty in evaluating harm done by it. This enables them to see their country as moral in spite of its actions. Such a shift also makes it possible to justify one's own immoral behavior. However, others used harm and fairness even more intensely. Individual differences are of great importance in leading people to do harm, to help others, and apparently in judging whether their group has done harm (Staub 2013, 2015).

The environment activating less moral or nonmoral values and making them dominant over moral ones can take place without awareness. Under the influence of circumstances and people, the subversion of moral and caring values and related emotions, such as empathy and compassion, can be automatic, not examined and processed. Education about personal values/goals and their activation by environmental conditions can make people aware of how all this happens. It can lead to self-awareness. Especially if people are led to consider times when this has happened to them, in general and in the moral realm, the education can lead to experiential understanding. If people then see this happening in themselves, they may stop their moral equilibration or morality shifting, or at the very least they will have to abandon their moral and caring values with conscious intention. And if they see it in others, they can be active bystanders who call attention to it.

Raising Inclusive Caring and Morally Courageous Children: Positive Socialization and Wisdom

The socialization that contributes to inclusive caring and moral courage may be called by varied names. I will call it "optimal socialization" because it also contributes to self-awareness, understanding the world, the constructive fulfillment of basic needs, and wisdom in living life. Children raised with optimal socialization will be more inclined to active bystandership in preventing violence, helping people and producing benevolent societies. We know a great deal about what I call optimal socialization. But to use such knowledge requires transformation in adults, and even more than that, creating social conditions that foster such socialization and impact children in ways that support and advance their optimal development.

To become caring and helpful, children need a combination of love and affection, and guidance by positive values (Eisenbeg et al. 2006; Staub 1979, 2003, 2005, 2015), and firm but not harsh discipline practices (Baumrind 1975), so that they act on values and rules. Making these their own, internalizing them, means that they will later guide their actions. Such a combination can generate love and affection for people. An important component of guidance is reasoning that helps children to understand and respect values and rules. Oliner and Oliner (1988) have found that the parents of rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe tended to use reasoning, even in societies where physical punishment was common. Pointing out to children the consequences of their behavior on other people, both negative and positive, can help them to develop both empathy (Hoffman 2000), as well as a feeling of responsibility for other people's welfare, which is a central influence in helping (Staub 2003, 2005, 2015).

Children need to be guided also to engage in helpful behavior, not only because acting on the values that adults promote is necessary in adopting those values but also because learning by doing, change as a result of one's own actions, is a powerful principle of learning (Staub 1979, 2003, 2015). Guiding them to also engage in helping the "other," people not belonging to their group, or even historically

devalued and delegitimized (Bar-Tal 2013a) in their society, contributes to inclusive caring (Staub 2003, 2015). All this will only work if adults also provide positive examples of, or model, the values and behaviors they intend to generate. Both formal research (Staub 1979), and the study of rescuers of Jew in Nazi Europe, many of whom described having had a humanitarian parent helpful to others (Oliner and Oliner 1988), show the importance of such modeling. Many rescuers also described growing up in families that engaged with "others," people outside their religious or ethnic group, including Jews (Oliner and Oliner 1988). A primary aspect of the training in the Heroic Imagination Project (http://heroicimagination.org/education/) initiated by Philip Zimbardo, which aims to develop heroism, is the use of examples of people who endangered themselves to help others. Another component is to help people understand the nature and impact of situations—to which the concept I discussed earlier, the activation potential of situations for different values/goals, is relevant. The combination of experiences I have briefly described can ultimately lead to caring for all humanity, which currently characterizes only a small percentage of people (McFarland et al.2012).

Optimal socialization affirms children. It enables them to fulfill basic needs constructively. It creates feelings of competence or effectiveness, which fulfills an important basic need, and helps children function effectively in many realms. Competence, in particular the belief that one has the power to influence others' welfare, when combined with prosocial values and other motivators, also enhances the likelihood that people help others (Staub 2003). By enabling children to function with little anxiety, such socialization would lead them to perceive the world as it is, to develop an accurate perception of it. In sum, such socialization would generate wisdom and the capacity for optimal functioning.

Unfortunately, we do not have research that shows what practices promote moral courage, the expression of one's moral and caring values in action (including moral/caring emotions such as empathy, sympathy, and compassion) even in the face of potential or actual opposition or negative consequences to oneself. I have suggested that involving children in developing rules and decision-making both in the home and in school can be useful. It develops the habit of using one's voice, and can lead to confidence in one's values, judgment, and actions (Staub 2005, 2015).

Learning by doing in domains that embody even limited moral courage is also useful. Research on courage, primarily with the military, shows that practices that develop skills and habits can increase the courage required for dangerous activities, for example, by members of the British military dismantling bombs in Northern Ireland (Rachman 2010). Especially important is adults allowing, and even encouraging, children to act on their values, when they want to do so on their own initiative, even when this involves some risk. Many parents discourage such behavior, for example, when a child wants to support an unpopular peer, concerned about the negative consequences to their children. Such active bystandership is an expression of, and can further develop, moral courage.

Altruism Born of Suffering

Victimization in the past often leads to mistrust of other people, hostility, and aggression, both by individuals (Rhodes 1999) and groups (Staub 1989, 2011). But not all individuals (or groups) that have suffered become hostile, aggressive, or distance themselves from other people. Both anecdotal evidence and research (Staub and Vollhardt 2008; Vollhardt and Staub 2011) show that some people who have been victimized, whether in their home, or by political violence, help others. I named this phenomenon *altruism born of suffering* (Staub 2003, 2005). Some report that they do not want others to suffer as they have suffered (Staub 2003). In one study, people who reported suffering inflicted on them in their families or as members of a group even expressed more empathy and showed greater willingness to help than others who reported that they have not suffered (Vollhardt and Staub 2011). This phenomenon also seems present on the group level, and may arise of out "inclusive victim consciousness" (Vollhardt and Bilali in press, see also Vollhardt et al., this volume). Members of some groups that have been victimized have attempted to help other victimized groups or their members (Brysk and Wehrenfennig 2010; Staub 2013).

We have proposed a number of experiences that may contribute (Staub 2005, 2015; Staub and Vollhardt 2008; see also Shnabel et al. 2013). These are: receiving some help or support during one's victimization; being able to help oneself and/or others at the time to some degree; receiving empathy, care, and support afterward; opportunities for healing; and beginning to help others which leads to learning by doing. Love and care before the victimization can increase resilience and also contribute to later altruism. There is some evidence for some of these proposed influences (Staub 2011, 2015; Vollhardt and Staub 2011). The first of these potential contributors suggests that if we are active bystanders, if we help others who are victimized or suffer, we not only enhance their well-being in the moment but also contribute to long-term benefit to them, and to others. Such help, and support and care afterward, says to people that the world does not have to be the way those who have done harm to them would create it.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I described education/training and socialization that can lead to practical wisdom—understanding oneself, other people, the meaning of circumstances, and good judgment. Combined with experiences that develop inclusive caring and moral courage, this enables people to satisfy psychological needs and fulfill goals constructively, without aggression, and can lead to active bystandership to prevent violence and/or build harmonious relations between individuals and groups.

The education and experiences I described focused on generating knowledge, understanding, self-awareness, and awareness and accurate perception of and judgment about the meaning of events. Perception, judgment, and action are also guided

by values and the emotions that are part of values, and make certain outcomes desirable. Knowledge, understanding, values, and competencies/skills can lead to judgments about "right" actions that embody benevolence. To perceive "accurately," make constructive judgments, and engage in constructive actions also requires that anxiety be limited. These processes add up to wisdom of an active kind. Wisdom also improves one's own life, as people make choices and engage in actions that are best for them. Acting on behalf of other individuals, society, and the world, guided in part by enlightened self-interest (Staub 2015), and acting in one's own behalf can have a common root in wisdom.

This chapter also addressed how these dispositions develop in children. However, socialization practices also point to experiences that promote these dispositions in adults, such as engagement and practice that make people confident in their own voice, and enacting values even under challenging conditions and learning by doing. Rather than considering interventions and experiences that develop by piecemeal, different attitudes and behaviors, socialization and later education/experience should attempt to promote wisdom and the benevolence inherent in it, and inclusive caring and moral courage, in individuals and leaders.

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Chapter 15
Promoting Harmonious Relations and Equitable Well-Being: Peace Psychology and "Intractable" Conflicts

Laura K. Taylor and Daniel J. Christie

In the current chapter, we present two constructs, *harmonious relations* and *equitable well-being,* which integrate much of the literature that falls within the purview of peace psychology. We also examine the work of Bar-Tal and colleagues on intractable conflicts and demonstrate how their research identifies a number of obstacles to the establishment of harmonious relations and equitable well-being (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011; Porat et al. 2015). After reviewing the barriers, we examine bridges that can transcend these obstacles and move individuals and groups in the direction of harmonious and equitable relations. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research at the growing edges of peace psychology.

Peace Psychology

Peace psychology advances theory and practice on the role of psychological processes in the prevention and mitigation of direct and structural violence and the promotion of nonviolence and social justice (Christie 2006; MacNair 2012). Contemporary scholarship in peace psychology offers a conceptual framework that shifts the emphasis away from the binary distinction between the pursuit of negative peace, or the absence of violence, and positive peace, or social justice and nonviolence (Galtung 1996), toward a focus on relationships and the promotion of sustainable forms of peace through the nonviolent pursuit of *just peace*, or a peace with justice (Lederach 1997). From this perspective, peacebuilding focuses on how "structures and processes [can] redefine violent relations into constructive and cooperative pat-

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terns" (Lederach 2001, p. 847). The emerging consensus in peace psychology is that sustainable peace requires the continual crafting of nonviolent approaches aimed at the pursuit of socially just relations (Christie and Montiel 2013). Our task then is to identify factors that create, maintain, and restore *harmonious* and *equitable relations* between individuals and groups. In the following sections, we elaborate on the meaning of these constructs.

First, *relational harmony* focuses on the quality of interpersonal and intergroup representations and interactions, including anticipated future encounters. Harmonious relations involve cooperative arrangements at the intergroup level (Stürmer and Snyder 2010) and engender warmth, trust, and the pursuit of complementary aims at the interpersonal level (Cohrs and Boehnke 2008). The concept of harmony, in this case, stresses that although individuals or groups may not have identical needs and goals, discord can be addressed nonviolently and justly.

The establishment of harmony in relationships is geohistorically conditioned. In East Asia and other collectivistic cultures, for example, harmony is often established and maintained through conflict avoidance, though situational conditions can alter this general tendency (Leung et al. 2002). In more individualistic cultures, scholars typically distinguish between conflict and violence, and emphasize the constructive management of conflict (Kriesberg 2006) and attendant opportunities for transforming the content and structure of the relationship toward a more socially just arrangement (Lederach 1997).

In addition, for relationships that have been damaged, there are varying perspectives on how to restore harmony. As usual, more questions than answers arise: How are interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation most usefully conceptualized and measured? How do collective memories play a role in reconciliation processes? Under what conditions are apologies most likely to foster harmony in a relationship? What are the impacts of various forms of justice (e.g., restorative, procedural, distributive) in building harmonious relations? Toward these ends, a number of mechanisms may be likely candidates for establishing, maintaining, and restoring harmony in relationships including perspective-taking, affective empathy and intergroup empathy, emotional regulation, the reduction of anger-related emotions, and promotion of positive emotional states. Peace psychology calls for a geohistorically situated and culturally informed approach to address these questions and to explore how these mechanisms may affect long-term relationships among opposing groups.

Second, to complement relational harmony, peace psychology also focuses on *equitable well-being*, or the pursuit of both procedural and distributive justice so that structurally based discrepancies in rights and life choices are ameliorated. The goal is to create greater access to services and resources for individuals and groups that are at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy of a society. Clearly, the emphasis on relational harmony should not reinforce a status quo of social injustice, but instead be accompanied by critical consciousness.

From our perspective, harmonious relations and equitable well-being are indivisible in the pursuit of sustainable forms of peace; harmony without equity leaves open the possibility of imposing peace through force in hierarchically organized so-

Table 15.1 Barriers and bridges to relational harmony and equitable well-being

Barriers	Bridges
Fear and insecurity	Confidence-building mechanisms
	Opportunities for altruism
	Mutually respectful identities
	Reconciliation processes
Ethos of conflict	Ethos of peace
	Peace education

cieties that have enormous inequalities in hard and soft power, a structurally violent arrangement that is not maintainable without the continued use of coercive control. On the other hand, the pursuit of equity without harmony leaves open the possibility of using violent means to obtain more equitable ends. The twin concepts of relational harmony and equitable well-being comport with Galtung's (1996) conception of peace in which the parties to a conflict pursue (structural) peace thorough peaceful means. In short, harmonious relations and equitable well-being are complementary and indivisible; together they represent a commitment to the pursuit of nonviolent actions to achieve socially just ends (Christie and Montiel 2013).

Table 15.1 presents examples of barriers to relational harmony and equitable well-being along with bridges that can transcend these obstacles, which are discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

Barriers to Relational Harmony and Equitable Well-Being

Intractable conflicts have been described as those in which the competing sides have mutually incompatible goals and intentions (Bar-Tal 2007). Over time, protracted conflicts, lasting at least a generation, are built and reinforced by state and legal structures (e.g., apartheid) as well as sociopsychological infrastructures (Bar-Tal 2007). From these entrenched positions, policies of deterrence, isolationism and separatism gain traction and it becomes difficult to imagine a future of peaceful coexistence and positive intergroup relations. Among the barriers to the resolution of intractable conflicts and the establishment of harmonious relations are fear and insecurity, which foster an ethos of conflict at the societal level.

Fear and Insecurity

After generations of war and violence, fear is a salient group-based emotion that "sensitizes [individuals and groups] to threatening cues, causes overestimation of danger, adherence to known situations, and avoidance of uncertain ones" (Halperin et al. 2008, p. 253, see also Jarymowicz, this volume). This interaction of emotions and cognitions at the group level is particularly salient in contexts defined

by exclusive, antagonistic identity boundaries. The establishment of harmonious relationships between groups may be particularly challenging when collective fear and enemy images dominate the relationship and become prepotent despite positive interactions between rival group members at the interpersonal level (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Moreover, collective fear is closely linked to insecurity in the community (Cummings et al. 2013), a condition in which one's group is not perceived as a safe haven and therefore cannot be relied upon for safety and protection. Insecurity can arise from the perception of threat and the perceived difficulty of coping with associated stressors (Bar-Tal and Jacobson 1998; Lazarus and Folkman 1984). Both the primary appraisal of the level of danger or threat of a specific stressor, as well as the secondary appraisal of the individual's ability to effectively cope or respond, can contribute to feelings of insecurity. The *stressor/coping match* is an important element for alleviating feelings of insecurity (Thoits 1986; Taylor et al. 2013). The ability to cope may also be related to anticipated events. For example, Bar-Tal and Jacobson (1998) suggest that feelings of insecurity are related more strongly to expectations about future events, than current situations. Clearly, when negative expectations about future intergroup relations are salient and one's group is unable to provide protection from threats, insecurity may endure and undermine the potential to foster harmonious relations. To understand and function within a setting of persistent fear and insecurity, society may develop an ethos of conflict as a coping strategy that enables society members to deal with stress and fear.

Ethos of Conflict

Part of a larger *culture of conflict* (e.g., symbols, ceremonies, etc.), an *ethos of conflict* can disrupt efforts toward relational harmony and equitable well-being by reinforcing enemy images, delegitimizing the outgroup, and accentuating the positive virtues of the ingroup (Bar-Tal et al. 2012; see also Cohrs et al., this volume; Tropp, this volume; Jost et al., this volume; Oren, volume 2; Sharvit, volume 2; Nahhas et al., volume 2). *Delegitimization* involves the use of extremely negative social categories to define the outgroup, thereby excluding them from the community of human beings that behave within the limits of acceptable values and/or norms (Hagai et al. 2013). These delegitimizing processes make it easy to deny the adversary their basic human rights and to mobilize destructive actions and violence against the outgroup, all of which prolong antagonistic relations between opposing groups.

In addition to justifying the denial of the opposing group's basic human needs, a focus on the ingroups' goals aligns with a *positive collective self-image* and belief in one's *own victimization* (Bar-Tal et al. 2012). Particularly among dominant groups, these processes lend legitimacy to social hierarchies and block social reform that could advance equitable well-being. This set of beliefs justifies privileges enjoyed by the ingroup, and prevents the realization that harms have been incurred on the other side that may need to be addressed. Consistent with system justification theory (Jost et al. 2004), the ethos of conflict stabilizes social inequality, blocks the idea

of providing concessions to the other side (Porat et al. 2015), and serves a barrier to equitable well-being (for more detail see Jost et al., this volume).

Bridges to Relational Harmony and Equitable Well-Being

The aforementioned barriers are not insurmountable. Peace psychology calls for creative and constructive approaches to social problems. As such, the following section highlights some of Bar-Tal's work that identifies constructs and processes that may be implemented to promote relational harmony and equitable well-being in the context of protracted conflicts. The first set of approaches address how to dismantle the barriers of fear and insecurity; the second set of concepts address the broader cultural issues that sustain an ethos of conflict (Table 15.1).

Overcoming Fear and Insecurity

When fear and insecurity are barriers, actors at all levels may take concrete steps to build harmonious relations. At the elite-level, this is often referred to as confidence-building mechanisms, whereas such actions may be seen as altruism when occurring in the public sphere. Initiatives at both levels may be linked with *hope* and *unfreezing processes*. *Hope* is related to positive future expectations and includes both personal and collective dimensions (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014; Darby et al. in press, see also Jarymowicz, this volume; Cohen-Chen et al., this volume). If the quality of intergroup relations relies on future expectations, hope may also be activated by anticipated relief from negative conditions. Hope frees people from set beliefs about the irreconcilability of the conflict and persistence of intergroup insecurity; hope enables people to imagine a new, malleable future that diverges from a conflictive past and present (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014). For hope to flourish, collective fear must be diminished. The *unfreezing process,* in which groups loosen their mental grip on enemy images, may be stimulated when groups are presented with inconsistent or conflicting information (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009, see Hameiri & Halperin, this volume). That is, the cognitive dissonance and tension precipitated by *confidence-building mechanisms*, or acts that cross conflict lines in definitive and positive ways, may enable individuals to seek new information and redefine relations (Kriesberg 2006). These processes help to restore trust, dismantle the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict, and lay a foundation to build harmonious relations.

Similar to the unfreezing process (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009), suffering may enhance the motivation of individuals to help other members of a society who are similarly disadvantaged, including outgroup members (Vollhardt 2009). Under some conditions, the experience of collective victimization can result in altruistic motives (Staub and Vollhardt 2008; Vollhardt 2009, see Vollhardt et al., this volume). For instance, if individuals perceive a common or shared fate with others (Vollhardt 2012) or can identify with victims of the other group (Stürmer et al. 2005), then intergroup

helping and prosocial behavior across group lines may occur (Taylor et al. 2014). Thus, in settings of protracted conflict, *altruism born of suffering* may be a key process that can promote efforts toward equitable well-being across group lines.

To promote relational harmony and equitable well-being in the face of fear and insecurity, mechanisms must not only enable lower status groups to gain rights, recognition, and access to resources, but also provide security measures and safeguards to protect higher status groups from extreme backlash or loss when restructuring the social order (Tajfel 1984). This form of *mutually respectful identities* focuses on social justice as an essential part of intergroup relations (Dovidio et al. 2009). An approach that encourages mutually respectful identities allows separate groups and affiliations to exist while shaping the political and psychological landscape so that aims are not incompatible, but rather complementary (e.g., security with social justice) (Bar-Tal 2000). For example, in the transition to democracy in South Africa, a focus on the rainbow nation enabled negotiators to achieve the enfranchisement of the black majority through the direct vote, but also included safeguards that protected white minority civil servants in the apartheid regime. This example suggests that mutually respectful identities may not only promote harmonious relations, but may also hold promise for advancing equitable well-being among conflicting groups.

Finally, fear and insecurity may be overcome through *reconciliation processes*. Reconciliation requires transformation of relations among former adversaries through processes that foster a change in societal beliefs by promoting mutual trust, acceptance, cooperation, and consideration of mutual needs (Bar-Tal 2000; Lederach 2001). *Trust* involves the positive expectation about the outgroup's intentions, motives, and behaviors (Tam et al. 2009). Closely linked with trust, *empathy* is the capacity to interpret, experience, and respond to the emotional states of others. Trust and empathy for outgroup members can contribute to reconciliation following confidence-building measures such as reciprocal concessions by political leaders (Kriesberg 2006). These high-level initiatives may also be fostered and reflected through day-to-day helping behaviors or altruism across group lines (Taylor et al. 2014). Thus, reconciliation is "a political, social, cultural, and educational process involving all the society institutions and channels of communication" (Bar-Tal 2000, p. 361). By changing societal beliefs, reconciliation processes may serve as catalysts to build a foundation for more harmonious and equitable relations leading toward the development of an ethos of peace.

Ethos of Peace

Complementing the concept of reconciliation, Bar-Tal (2000) outlines a series of steps and conditions that may promote relational harmony and equitable well-being under the framework of an *ethos of peace*. In public and high-level positions, this includes confidence-building mechanisms such as "unilateral acts of good will, symbolic acts of peace, reciprocal acts of concession, statements by leaders that imply the wish for peace," as well as structural reform that institutionalize more harmonious relations based on social justice, such as "the initiation of cooperative and joint ventures in different areas—political, economic, cultural, academic, or educational"

(Bar-Tal 2000, p. 361). Complementary symbolic and structural changes can help to socialize a new generation in the peace ethos. In addition to the roles that elites can play, popular media, films, books, and cultural messages should emphasize the new symbols and myths of the peace ethos (Bar-Tal 2000). Across different levels of society, an overarching ethos of peace can serve as a framework linking many of the aforementioned bridges for moving relations away from conflict and violence and toward more harmonious relations based on equitable well-being.

A key approach to fostering an ethos of peace is through educating future generations. Thus, in protracted conflicts, *peace education* becomes an important means of intervention (Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009, see Vered, volume 2) in part because young people may have been socialized in an environment that emphasizes ideologies that justify social dominance and exclusion. For example, schools may serve as settings to directly counterbalance the negative outgroup images communicated through the media or other channels (Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009). Moreover, school-based approaches have the potential to reach a whole generation during developmentally formative years. Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009) have outlined a number of educational approaches that have peacebuilding potential. The content of these approaches emphasize empathy and perspective-taking, conflict resolution skills, compassionate communication, reconciliation, human rights, and the inherent dignity of all people, even former adversaries. Peace education can play an important role by promoting critical consciousness among young people and engagement in nonviolent social change that can advance equitable well-being.

Implications and Future Research

Shifting the focus away from negative peace, or the absence of violence (Galtung 1996) and the sociopsychological infrastructure that freezes intergroup conflict, the current chapter emphasizes the multiple avenues for building more positive relations across group lines (Stürmer and Snyder 2010; Tropp and Mallet 2011; Taylor et al. 2014; Vollhardt and Bilali 2008). Yet, linking relational harmony and equitable well-being is not a simple or straightforward task. A key question is, what mechanisms can inspire hope and agency among young people (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009; Cohen-Chen et al. 2014), thereby shifting beliefs and behaviors toward a prosocial orientation that promotes constructive relations with outgroup members? Bar-Tal's legacy of research advances our understanding about how to foster more positive and just relations among former adversaries, suggesting avenues for future intervention and investigation.

First, intervention programs and applied research should identify ways to strategically connect across different levels of society to maximize change potential. In both theoretical and empirical work, Bar-Tal and his collaborators have examined how change can be addressed among elites as well as in the daily life of the populace (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009; see also Hameiri and Halperin, this volume). This vertical integration and coordination across levels of the social ecology is an approach that resonates with the tenets of peace psychology (Christie 2006; Lederach 1997).

Second, given the generational nature of these intergroup tensions, the implementation and the effects of constructing bridges may require *decades of thinking* (Lederach 1997), or long-term visions for a shared future. Thus, the impact of the formal and informal education of youth is an essential area for future study and intervention (Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009). The family should also be studied as the most proximal influence on child development (Christie et al. in press). A cohesive and supportive family context has been shown to buffer youth exposed to intergroup threat from retaliating against the outgroup with aggressive acts, which may prolong conflict (Taylor et al. in press). However, questions remain about how family environments can facilitate a healthy sense of identity, agency, social skills, the capacity to reason and communicate, and trusting relationships with other individuals and groups (Christie et al. in press). Clearly, more research is needed to advance our understanding of ways to promote protracted peacebuilding, or generational changes that incorporate the agency, creativity, and potential of young people as peacemakers (McEvoy-Levy 2006).

These two priorities help to address peace psychology's call for interdisciplinary and cross-cutting research on systemic approaches to fostering harmonious relations and equitable well-being. Studying these constructs among young people is a pressing societal need; conflicts that have persisted for generations require long-term approaches to dismantle and then reconstruct positive sociopsychological patterns, fostering an ethos of peace (Bar-Tal 2000; Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009). An extended timeframe, however, does not negate the urgency of immediate action (Lederach 1997). Addressing both emerging crises and long-term development, and guided by the legacy of Bar-Tal, peace psychologists are well-positioned to take on this challenge of engaged research to build sustainable peace.

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