Chapter 9
The Protection of Civilians in African Regional and Sub-regional Peace Operations

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9.1 Introduction

Over the last century, violence in Africa has threatened the lives of countless civilians. By the end of the twentieth century, the continent experienced a substantial surge in the number, scope, and intensity of armed conflicts. These included genocide in Rwanda, two civil wars in Liberia, state collapse in Somalia and extreme violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), among others. These violent skirmishes, which coincided with new postcolonial boundaries and political restructuring, necessitated a substantial shift in Africa's peace and security architecture.

Today, the potpourri of ethnic, political, and religious conflicts in places like Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, along with protracted conflicts in Somalia, Darfur, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have kept Africa at the epicenter of global peacekeeping. As of April 2014, 7 of the 16 global peace operations are deployed to Africa with an excess of 87,442 total personnel (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014). Since 2003, the AU has mandated roughly 40,641 military and civilian personnel in the six peace operations under its authority; the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES), the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AISMA) and the Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique (MISCA) in the Central African Republic (UN Security Council Resolution 2121 (10 October 2013) S/Res/2121). An additional 30,424 forces have contributed to UNAMID; the joint AU–UN mission in Darfur. This is the highest number of African peacekeepers deployed since the creation of the AU in 2002 (Lotze 2013).

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The AU shows no signs of deceleration. In fact, the AU has increased the pace of its peace operations in a concerted effort to better operationalize AU principles of non-indifference (African Union 2000).

9.2   A New African Peace and Security Paradigm

The African Union's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), adhered to a strict philosophy of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states, meaning that leaders did not get involved, even if a neighboring state was in conflict. This prevailing posture of non-interference combined with a massive surge in the number and scope of conflicts at the end of the 1990s necessitated a peace and security regime; one that would be capable of deploying robust responses to protect human rights and mitigate future mass atrocities (Williams 2009).

In response to the atrocities unfolding around the continent, African leaders recognized a need to craft new policies to better address insecurity. By the end of the twentieth century a proliferation of peace operations were deployed to the continent—many into situations where there was little peace to keep and where belligerents were actively targeting civilians. Because international responses to these crises were often slow, many regional actors such as the Economic Community of African States (ECOWAS) took matters into their own hands to try to plug the widening security gap. Perhaps the most notable example of a robust regional response was the deployment of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia (Adebajo 2002; Barnett 1996, 2002; Gershoni 1997) when Charles Taylor's rebellion caused violence and displacement that was spilling over to other parts of the ECOWAS region. Nevertheless, despite the fact that ECOMOG saved the lives of tens of thousands of civilians, it was plagued by accusations of ineffectiveness, corruption, and human rights abuses (Aboagye and Bah 2005).

This evolving climate of insecurity necessitated a substantial overhaul of African peace and security architectures. Coinciding with the creation of the new African Union (AU) in 2002, the development of international legal norms such as the Protection of Civilians (POC) and the Responsibility to Protect (Evans, Annan et al) led to the gradual paradigm shift in African politics from a culture of sovereignty towards a culture of concern over human security (Acharya 2001; Oberleitner 2005). These changes reinforced the concept that peace and security, human rights, and good governance were inextricably linked to economic development and were therefore essential to the new African political narrative. To this end, African leaders have gradually shifted away from a strict adherence to the policy of non-interference towards a doctrine of non-indifference that incorporated POC and R2P. Accordingly, the AU and its five sub-regions have each undertaken initiatives to reform their peace and security architectures to: (1) transition conflicts and governments to stability and peace, and (2) to prevent and respond to violence against civilians.

Interestingly, efforts to overhaul AU and ECOWAS peace and security architectures coincided with a surge in demand for peacekeepers in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and others (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2005). As Mark Malan aptly notes, efforts by African governments to overhaul existing institutions and to build new structures for peace operations while also dealing with complex international and civil conflicts were like "trying to build a fire brigade while the neighborhood burns" (Malan 2008).

But, who has the authority, willingness, and capacity to protect civilians from atrocity crimes? As UN peacekeeping capacity becomes increasingly overstretched, it has become critical to bolster regional and sub-regional peacekeeping capacities.

Against this background, this chapter examines African regional (AU) and sub-regional (ECOWAS) peacekeeping efforts to prevent and responding to violence against civilians. Specifically, it examines each institution's peacekeeping willingness, and capacity to protect civilians from atrocity crimes—a particularly timely query as increasingly complex intra state conflicts compel new solutions. Perhaps more importantly, it highlights a gap between the African Union's normative ambitions and its actual ability to provide solutions in the field.

9.3 "Operationalising" African Peace and Security Paradigms

The failure to protect civilians in the 1990s was the catalyst for more in-depth, widespread attention to the protection of civilians in UN peace operations, which led to an assortment of new mandates, policy statements, and planning efforts to mainstream protection into peace operations, particularly in Africa (Williams 2010; Williams and Bellamy 2014; Dersso 2010).

While the concept of the Protection of Civilians (PoC) first came to the fore in 1999 with UN Security Council Resolution 1265, a deeper attention to protection took root in 2008 when the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations authored the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, also known as the "Capstone Doctrine," to outline guidance for future peacekeeping missions. The Capstone Doctrine encouraged additional scholarship on guidance and doctrine for peacekeeping operations and a great deal of scholarly literature, policy documents and UN resolutions to examine the efficacy of peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians were created between 2007 and 2010.

Attention to PoC has gained traction at the UN, yet progress in developing protection policies, and guidance at the AU has been noticeably slower. At the institutional level, the AU made a robust commitment to human security under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which stressed the AU's right to intervene in crisis situations (African Union Constitutive Act 2000). Nevertheless, normative frameworks and political aspirations and statements have not yet translated into concrete, effective operational capacity in the field.

9.3.1 Establishing a Continental Force: The African Standby Force (ASF)

African leader's outrage over the atrocities of the 1990s—specifically international outcry over the genocide in Rwanda—in conjunction with the introduction of the R2P norm in 2001 and the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002 led to convincing calls for more effective African peacekeeping models. Accordingly, in May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) adopted a policy framework on the establishment of a continental force, the African Standby Force (African Union Roadmap 2005a). The proposals contained in the framework were used as a basis for a protocol to establish the ASF and a Peace and Security Council (PSC) for strategic decision-making at the ASF level. African leaders adopted the protocol in December 2003. However, neither the ASF nor the five sub-regional forces, described below, are considered "standing armies." Like the UN, ASF forces are made up of contingents from force contributing member states, which can be called upon by the PSC as needed (African Union 2005a).

To understand the evolution of peace and security in Africa, it is important to understand the interworking of the five sub-regions that make up the African Union. These five regional entities are responsible for implementing the peace and security mandate of the African Union at the sub-regional level and also link to the broader African Peace and Security Architecture. Accordingly, the ASF provides for five standby brigade level forces, one from each sub-region: the East African Standby Force (EASF) in the East, the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in the West, the North African Regional Capability (NARC) in the North, the SADC Standby Force (SSF) in the South, and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (FOMAC or ECCAS) in Central Africa. These five sub-regions provide the building blocks of the larger continental-wide African Standby Force.

Effective command and control of the ASF requires collaborative and integrated force command, control, communication and information systems (C3IS). In the March 2005, the AU adopted the document entitled "Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force." The first Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF negotiated between 2003 and 2005, established a strategic level management capacity for the ASF and outlined that each sub-region would deliver a brigade-sized unit (African Union 2005a). It also intended to clarify the schedule guiding the development of the various components of the African Standby Force. Perhaps more importantly, Roadmap I sought to unite the sub-regions under a common objective to stop genocide and mass violence through its six mission scenarios. In the context of a mass atrocity or genocide, a Scenario 5 mission involves a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation (police, military, and civilian) in an environment with low-level spoilers possessing the ability to escalate. Scenario 6 is a rapid intervention to respond to mass atrocities or genocide and is considered the most aggressive and swift mode of intervention (African Union Roadmap 2005a). To provide the capacity needed for a mission under Scenario 5 or 6,

Roadmap I highlighted the development of military components. Perhaps most importantly, the first Roadmap sought to improve vertical relationships between the five sub-regions and the AU and promoted horizontal relationships between the five sub-regions to focus on fixing interoperability gaps (Boshoff 2010).

Roadmap II, which started in 2008 focused on two core areas: (1) further refinement of ASF Scenarios 5 and 6; and (2) specifically creating a mission headquarters that would support a stand-alone mission with a peacekeeping, preventative deployment mandate; that is, a mission similar to a Chapter VI UN peacekeeping force (African Union 2008b). Roadmap II also emphasized a more streamlined mandate-creation process, better communications and intelligence capabilities, and improved strategic lift capability. Perhaps more significantly, Roadmap II called for more robust civilian and police components—for a more multi-dimensional force. It is important to note that military and civilian interoperability was a prerequisite for receiving international donor support (Author interview African Union 2011). For example, the United States and France have supported ASF military components and Canada and Germany augmented civilian and police capacity.

At the time of writing, Roadmap III was underway. For the third and final Roadmap, the AU has outlined two main goals: (1) finalizing the Rapid Deployment Capacity component of the ASF, giving the AU a rapid reaction style force like UN Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (2) and perhaps most critical is streamlining the Protection of Civilians into the mandates of all future AU operations (Eurocamp Amani Africa Evaluation Report 2010; African Union 2011).

9.3.2 The African Standby Force: Mission Scenarios and Lessons from the Field

When designing the African Standby Force (ASF) the AU took note of the fact that contemporary conflicts produce diverse types of violence and mass atrocity crimes. Accordingly, the AU created six mission scenarios encapsulating six levels of violent conflict and the anticipated responses to each scenario:

Scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission;
Scenario 2: AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission
Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission;
Scenario 4: AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peacebuilding)
Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers
Scenario 6: AU emergency intervention, for instance, in the case of genocide, when no other help is available (African Union 2005b; Elowson and MacDermott 2010).

In 2010, the AU mandated each of the five sub-regions to conduct training workshops to address the challenges and progress of overall force development. However, it remains to be seen just how effective these workshops have been. To date, there has been limited public information on the outcomes of these ASF training exercises.

In the context of preventing mass atrocity crimes, Scenario 6 is the most critical. However, Scenario 6 is also the least developed of the ASF scenario capacities. Establishing the ASF as a crucial and effective player in the prevention of atrocity crimes requires field-testing so that the ASF can reach contemporary standards.

One exercise that took place early on in the development of the African Standby Force was "Amani Africa," which consisted of a field exercise to test strategy, operations, and tactical performance. Military planners remarked that while Amani Africa was well executed, it exposed critical strategic, operational, and tactical gaps. Four of these gaps are described here. First, military planners noted that each peace support operation should have a functioning strategic headquarters. Second, planners noted that collecting and verifying intelligence was an absolute prerequisite for a successful mission, so that troops could adapt to complex changing environments. Third, planners noted that the five sub-regions and their respective member states needed better Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to clearly define roles and expectations. Finally, planners noted that the AU and member states that deploy as part of the African Standby Force need clear bilateral agreements and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that link the AU with the five sub-regions (EuroCamp Evaluation Report 2010). The AU is planning for Amani Africa II, which will be held in Lesotho in October 2014 with a final After Action Review and Exercise Report due in March and May 2015, respectively.

9.3.3   The Five Sub-regions

Africa's five sub-regions, which make up the larger African Standby Force, are responsible for implementing the peace and security mandate of the African Union and link to the broader African Peace and Security Architecture. These regions play a critical role in the ASF's operationalization. The sub-regions are commonly referred to as either a "Regional Economic Community" (REC) or a "Regional Mechanism" (RM); however, they are not the same thing. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are Economic groupings of African Member States, generally by region. The Regional Mechanisms are clustered as a military capacity. For instance, the RECs include the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMSEA), the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Eastern Africa Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The RM's or military sub-regions include the East African Standby Force (EASF), the ECOWAS Standby

Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), the SADC Standby Force (SSF), and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (FOMAC or ECCAS).

The AU tasked each sub-region to deliver a brigade-sized military unit as well civilian and police components to complement existing military units and provide additional personnel, materiel, and funding to the larger African Standby Force to make it more multi-dimensional.

While the eastern, western, and southern regions have contributed a brigade-sized unit, the northern and central forces are developing at a much slower pace, simply because they did not have existing infrastructure (African Union 2009). The uneven pace of development in each sub-region has resulted in difficulties coordinating operations, allocating responsibilities and tracking the overall progress of the ASF force development. (Møller 2009; IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis 2011). To further complicate matters, each sub-region has had different standardization requirements, which result in discrepancies between member states. As a result, synchronizing training exercises between troop contributors has been difficult (AFRICOM Operation Cohesion Benin 2010).

Additionally, severe funding shortages mean that most sub-regions—with the exceptions of those who have relatively wealthy member states such as Nigeria in the ECOWAS sub-region and South Africa in the SADC sub-region—do not have the materiel needed to conduct peace support. Additionally, most sub-regions have limited knowledge about conducting peace operations, especially at the senior mission leadership level. As a result, the most likely prospects for deploying a peace operation are reliant upon a handful of powerful member states like Nigeria and South Africa which have well-developed militaries, superior command and control, and modern military hardware (Holt et al. 2009).

On the civilian side, the AU has required a roster of (at least) 300 readily deployable civilian personnel in conjunction with the military deployment. These police and civilian constituents run operations in "substantive" areas such as civil and political affairs, humanitarian affairs, human rights, election monitoring, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), among other administrative functions (de Coning and Kasumba 2010).

9.3.4 Learning from ECOWAS?

ECOWAS has always been more aggressive on peace and security matters than its neighbors. These intentions were reflected in the 1990s during a spate of conflicts in the sub-region. Thus, ECOWAS is a noteworthy case study on two fronts. First, ECOWAS has in-depth experience with military intervention. Second, it is recognized as having a progressive peace and security arrangement; one underpinned with a mandate to intervene politically and militarily in a member state under four key scenarios (1) if there is a serious threat to sub-regional security, (2) if a humanitarian disaster is imminent (3) if citizens' human rights have been violated or are

being threatened (4) in the case of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government (Abass 2012). Operationally, ECOWAS was the first sub-region to deliver a full brigade to the African Standby Force (ASF). It also acts more aggressively on peace and security matters compared to its sub-regional counterparts; perhaps a result of its peace enforcement activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding substantial criticism of ECOWAS' human rights abuses in both conflicts, ECOWAS did exhibit a strong resolve to thwart sub-regional threats rather than wait until violence escalated. For example, from 1990 to 2003, ECOMOG interceded in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire to stop the escalation of violence without any clear legal mandate guiding its military operations. Such actions are consequential because ECOWAS was intervening at a time when states did not typically interfere in the affairs of another state.

As noted above, ECOWAS developed its military operations ahead of its sub-regional peers and was the first sub-region to deliver two separate components to the African Standby Force: (1) a rapid reaction "Task Force," designed to deploy within 14 days for up to 90 days without support and (2) and a longer term, multi-dimensional Main Brigade, which would take over from the Task Force. Alternatively, if peacekeeping forces were needed for longer than 90 days, ECOWAS outlined three options:

1. The Task Force would remain deployed as part of the Main Brigade.
2. The Task Force would return some troops to the Force Contributing Countries if no longer needed.
3. The Task Force would integrate forces into an African Standby Force (ASF) mission or UN mission.

ECOWAS tested and certified the operability of this model in 2009 and 2010, through the field-exercise "*Operation Juigi*" (Ghana Armed Forces 2011). ECOWAS was the first sub-region to test these frameworks; therefore, other sub-regions applied ECOWAS' experiences as a model of sorts.

One noteworthy outcome of testing interoperability between the Main Brigade and the Task Force was that it clarified roles and responsibilities. In theory, these practices could ease regional or sub-regional organizations transition to a larger, multi-dimensional operation, such as a UN operation.

However, despite proactive military/peacekeeping efforts, the deeply rooted sociopolitical and cultural tensions between ECOWAS' Anglophone and Francophone member states stirred rivalries and intensified power disparities. For instance, in early ECOMOG operations, Nigeria tended to dominate the peacekeeping landscape as it supplied the majority of troops.

In fact, in 1998, Nigeria almost single-handedly managed ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone with over 90 % of the ECOMOG force made up of Nigerian soldiers. A common viewpoint in the 1990s was that ECOMOG was a "Nigerian" force, not one that was representative of ECOWAS as a sub-region (Francis 2009; Nigerian Tribune 2010). Critics accused Nigeria of acting unilaterally to showcase its military power on the international stage. Indeed, these tensions influenced how ECOWAS force contributors worked together, which negatively affected cohesion

and collaboration for integrated missions. Others noted that Nigeria was merely responding to on-going pressure to take the lead role regional security, noting that if Nigeria had failed to act, it would be criticized, but if Nigeria did act, it would be characterized as being too "dominant."

Of course, the problem with any unilaterally led peace operation is that it risks creating further discord. To address these concerns in future operations, the AU has created Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between the AU and its member states to manage expectations between force contributing countries and avoid these kinds of tensions. However, it remains to be seen if the sub-regions are actually abiding by the MOUs; to date, in regional groupings many countries, like South Africa, Chad, and Uganda, have intervened in ways that definitively seem partisan. What's more, in most cases, African nations are acting less on a regional basis and more on behalf of an AU-led mission, which has both an AU and UN mandate. However, the international community appears unwilling to tackle such challenges at present.

9.4 Challenges and Opportunities for African Regional and Sub-regional Peace Operations

The need to swiftly address peacekeeping challenges from within is critical now more than ever; genocide, war crimes, coups d'états, post-election instability and innovations in warfare technology and increased flows of mercenaries and small arms have exacerbated an already fragile security environment in Africa (Aning and Bah 2008).

Since the 1990s, peacekeeping paradigms have unquestionably been transformed for the better. Within the context of current and anticipated conflicts on the continent, evolving norms like the Protection of Civilians, the Responsibility to Protect and African laws of intervention, codifying the right to intervene, have helped prioritize human security and the protection of civilians. As discussed in this chapter, both the AU and ECOWAS have made significant progress advancing their peace and security architectures at the institutional level and African leaders have demonstrated significant focus on human security challenges. However, the majority of progress to date has been about creating concepts, institutions, and frameworks with less success to date in operationalization. There remains the need to improve strategic coherence with stronger analytical capacity and communication across the five sub-regions, and to enhance strategic partnerships with outside actors, especially the UN (Mbaye 2008).

Indeed, there are numerous advantages and disadvantages to deploying regional and sub-regional peacekeepers to African conflict zones. In times of crisis, the UN has become more dependent upon regional organizations to conduct peace operations. More broadly, regional organizations can help the UN implement its ambitious mandate to uphold international peace and security. When deployed in conjunction with a UN peace support operation, a regional force can augment an

under resourced and over stretched UN mission. Additionally, regional peace support operations likely bring local knowledge and expertise and a stronger resolve to stop conflicts in their own region; thus, they may be able to bring political capital to facilitate peace operations. Regional forces also tend to be more in tune with the complex cultural, social, and political dynamics, which often underlie a conflict. On a practical level, regional peacekeepers bring local expertise and language skills. In exceptional circumstances, regional forces that incorporate powerful member states may also provide additional equipment and funding, although this is not typical for many African nations. Operationally, regional organizations may also be less encumbered by the logistical and political limitations that are endemic to so many UN peace operations. They can also deploy faster than a UN operation, which can typically take between 6 and 12 months to become fully operational. It is unlikely that a UN led intervention would have fared better in an environment like Liberia. Thus in hindsight, regional operations were perhaps the best course of action at the time as UN interventions were mostly ineffective during the same time period and on a similar scale. Two significant examples of the UN's well-publicized failures are UNOSOM II's struggle to reconcile Somalia's fighting clans in 1993–1994 and UNAMIR's failure to stop the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

One clear disadvantage to using regional forces to protect civilians is the lingering political, structural, and cultural challenges between Africa's five sub-regions, which contributes to an already fractured institutional landscape. Additionally, overlapping economic and military memberships have led to queries around interoperability and who is ultimately responsible for responding to security threats. As many of Africa's previous conflicts have been trans-boundary, quickly spilling into neighboring countries, regional peacekeepers will continually have to address peace and security threats through the lens of permeable, constantly shifting borders.

9.5 Conclusion

Long ago, Confucius wrote "…study the past if you would define the future" (Li 1999). Indeed, history is our greatest teacher. In the realm of regional peacekeeping, attention to planning, resource development, conflict prevention through early warning and incorporating lessons learned are keys to shaping future success in Africa, where a constantly evolving sociopolitical environment dictates security on the ground. Of these, lessons learned is perhaps a timely and critical investment, which should be made to capture shortfalls and successes and disseminate them to a wider audience. In the absence of any sort of "knowledge management," mistakes will surely be repeated, and this will ultimately affect the credibility and legitimacy of the mission on the international stage.

"African solutions to African Problems" can only be achieved when appropriate guidance, planning tools and training mechanisms are in place and used as a comprehensive "toolkit"; one that is continually refined to reflect changing scenarios on the ground. When conducted in partnership with the guidance and support of the

UN, as well as regional and national actors, the AU can indeed be a model to follow, particularly in situations where rapid intervention to stop mass violence becomes necessary.

The AU has acknowledged that no single factor has contributed more to Africa's socioeconomic challenges than the prolongation of armed conflicts. As such, the scope and complexity of peace operations essential to stopping violent outbreaks will require improved processes, protocols and planning with protection included at every stage. Additionally, African regional peacekeeping will require more robust human and financial capacity and clear-cut, practical, thoughtful leadership. Perhaps more crucially, the AU and sub-regions will need to improve cooperation and collaboration, to avoid duplication of efforts and squandering of precious resources.

9.6   Recommendations for Policymakers and Scholars

1. **Assertively disseminate and implement lessons learned** from peace support operations. This will be especially important for sub-regions, like ECOWAS, which have a strong history of intervention, but with limited analysis of lessons learned. Indeed, a deeper analysis of those lessons learned from early interventions, including experiences, challenges, and best practices, would go a long way to inform the refinement of protection strategies in African peacekeeping missions. Capturing rarely told success stories is another positive way to share what works and what does not work.

2. **Provide resources to bolster regional efforts**: As is evidenced around the world, particularly in Africa, civilians remain the primary casualties of violent armed conflict. Emerging trends suggest that lower intensity conflicts such as those resulting from political coups and disputed elections may become the norm in Africa—a fact confirmed in Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and other states. Given these emergent trends the international community needs to put more resources behind regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms. In this vein, special considerations should be made to increase the roles of police and civilians to improve cooperation in all five sub-regions.

3. **Include an Early Warning component in all peacekeeping operations**: While the AU is slowly incorporating the Protection of Civilians into its peace operations, they should also focus on robust Early Warning mechanisms in tandem with protection efforts to measure the onset of conflict and develop appropriate, proportional responses. If Early Warning indicators are in place, early responses could involve an array of measures prior to sending in troops. Both the African Union (CEWS) and ECOWAS (CEWARN) have included early warning mechanisms as part of their broader peace and security architecture. African institutions also need to collaborate with regional and sub-regional stakeholders, civil society, NGO's and others, on conflict prevention and analysis and should avoid working in isolation. With better cooperation among early warning actors the

AU Peace and Security Council could catch warning signs in the early stages and make informed recommendations on the best course of action to take. A more thoughtful, proactive, stance that emphasizes prevention is a critical first step to protecting civilians.

4. **Improve Joint Planning**: Joint planning has been a monumental challenge for the AU and the RECs, perhaps the most challenging to date. On several occasions the UN Security Council has rejected plans for an AU deployment due to information gaps and inadequate planning. When the AU has collaborated with internal departments REC/RMs or the UN, there have been positive results; two examples are UN–AU collaboration in Somalia and the ECOWAS–AU collaboration in Mali prior to being subsumed into the UN operation. Collaboration can and does work, but positive results cannot be attained without adequate capacity as well as buy-in from member states and external investment in resources to strengthen the AU strategic headquarters in Addis Ababa and the sub-regional planning centers.

5. **Adjust the six mission scenarios**: As noted earlier, the six ASF deployment scenarios were developed in 2003 reflecting responses to a now-outdated model of conflict. Today, conflict dynamics in Africa are rapidly changing, perhaps becoming even more complex since the end of the 1990s. Combating elusive terror networks, stopping piracy, and addressing coups or uprisings from disputed elections and humanitarian disasters require a very different response methodology. For example, a response to piracy or Al-Shebaab in Somalia will differ from a response to tackle Al-Qaeda networks in Mali, Boko Haram in Nigeria, or religious cleansing in the CAR. The AU will need to urgently focus its strategic attention and resources, bolstering relevant capabilities to address new threats.

6. **Improve UN/AU-REC relationships**: The AU-REC relationship has always been somewhat fragile; thus, the future form and function of AU peace operations will be contingent upon the relationship between the AU and its five sub-regions. Notwithstanding obvious gaps in operational capacity, there are cultural and political disparities which frame how the regions work together. One of the most critical barriers to the progress of the African Standby Force has been the tension between the AU and the five sub-regions as well as tensions within the sub-regions themselves. Competition over resources and uneven development persist. These should be managed in order to encourage progress. Consequently, it has been difficult for the AU to coordinate peace operations particularly as peace and security protocols or guidance have been internalized unevenly by AU member states (Amoo 1992; Mwagiru 1995; Hestermeyer 2008). However, evidence suggests that future peace operations in Africa will demand the AUREC have a close working relationship, both militarily and politically to respond to conflict situations. Under the current ASF concept, peace operations capabilities are supposed to reside with the RECs/RMS, to be made immediately available to the AU when called upon. However, to date most responses have been led by powerful member states, such as Kenya and Uganda in Somalia and Nigeria in earlier ECOWAS interventions. The AU will have to find better ways of working with member states to create a model for deployment that highlights the REC model and minimizes ad hoc member state responses.

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