

Social Indicators Research Series 58

Nathan Andrews  
Nene Ernest Khalema  
N'Dri T. Assié-Lumumba *Editors*

# Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Retrospect

Africa's Development Beyond 2015

 Springer

# **Social Indicators Research Series**

Volume 58

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Editors

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# Preface

In September 2000, the United Nations met to deliberate on its pivotal role as the world propels into the twenty-first century. The major outcome of this UN Summit was the ratification of the UN Millennium Declaration which reiterated the observance of the International Human Rights and Humanitarian law according to the principles of the UN Charter as well as the Treaties of Sustainable Development. Following this Declaration, the UN came up with eight millennium development goals (MDGs) set out as targets which the international community must commit to achieving by 2015. Endorsed by 198 United Nations Member States and over 20 international organizations including the World Bank, World Health Organization, and International Monetary Fund, the MDGs were outlined to address the following eight goals: extreme poverty and hunger; universal primary education; gender equality and empowering women; child mortality; maternal health; HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; environmental sustainability; and global partnership for development.

Since their inception in 2000, the MDGs have attracted numerous debates and controversies. This volume is an important contribution to the debates. It reflects the trend in the field—a growing concern regarding MDGs as achievement targets and the various ways they are being evaluated, in particular (Easterly 2007). Over the past decade, debates on MDGs have rested both on what has been achieved as well as on the slow progress of reaching the targets (Birdsall et al. 2005; Lawn 2010). Some scholars question the viability of the MDGs as achievement targets and consider them incongruous with the realities of life, especially in the developing world (Clemens et al. 2006). Others see them as a “faulty yardstick for judging whether country- or region-specific performances are on track” (Vandemoortele 2009, 356).

This volume focuses mostly on the manner of the centrality of Africa’s development in the broader analyses of the MGDs’ success. There is an increasing concern about Africa, the poorest continent, which has a sizeable population whose future appears to hold, as of the present, little chance of improving. Africa, for instance, represents 11% of the world’s population but is responsible for “more than half of all maternal and child deaths, two thirds of the global AIDS burden, and 90% of

deaths from malaria” (Lawn 2010, 566). Access to Universal Primary Education (UPE), the pace of the HIV/AIDS spread, and response to violence against women have not met expected targets (UN 2011). With the approach of 2015, these challenges increasingly provoke public and scholarly discussions.

This volume is yet another contribution to the debate—but a unique one in many respects. The parties involved as well as the nature of the debate not only introduces new knowledge but also invites responses from readers. This volume is the result of a critical, in-depth deliberation among a group of interested parties whose scholarship not only intersects with the challenges embraced by the MDGs but also foregrounds their future as stakeholders. On January 30, 2014, close to a hundred participants arrived at the University of Alberta main campus to begin a 2-day retrospective look at the MDGs with a special focus on the African continent. Among the attendees were seasoned academics from Canadian universities, NGO and civil society representatives, and emerging scholars from both the continent and its new diasporas. The development of a forum to deliberate on Africa’s future was the vision of the University of Alberta’s African Students’ Association. This vision was spearheaded notably by Nathan Andrews and supported by a diverse team of students, alumni, and faculty members. While a number of scholars, including myself, bought into the initiative, it was these emerging scholars that worked tirelessly to bring the relevant stakeholders together, engaged funding agencies, and propelled the process into a highly successful conference.

The conference was planned to coincide with the University of Alberta’s International Week, an annual event which brings academia and the surrounding community into dialogue. It also attracts internationally renowned scholars and development practitioners at the cutting edge of their fields to the campus to share new knowledge and pressing issues of global importance. The conference revolved around the eight MDGs with critical questions raised about Democracy, Leadership and Governance, Gender Policies, Politics and Practices, Health Challenges, the Post-MDGs Era, Poverty Eradication, External Partnerships and Encountering Marginalized Populations, Climate Change, Food Security, and Environmental Sustainability. The contributions came from a wide range of disciplines including Political Science, History Sociology, International Relations, African Studies, Anthropology, and Women and Gender Studies. Their analyses provide a critical, retrospective look at the MDGs not simply as targets to be achieved but as a set of guidelines for tracking development priorities in a globalizing world. As many scholars remind us, “The MDGs are global goals which are a policy instrument used by the UN to draw attention to urgent but neglected global priorities” (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2013, 20). These scholars enjoin us to avoid holding on to them as clearly set out goals to be technically measured periodically. MDGs, they argue, should remain as “benchmarks in monitoring progress toward important objectives” as well as policy statements “to communicate an important normative objective based on shared value” (Ibid.).

These directions, in my view, were the “normative” tenets which guided our discussions at the conference. They also strongly resonate in this volume. The editors have worked hard to capture the scholarly discourse which engaged African and

Africanist graduate students; University of Alberta scholars; visiting experts, academics, and practitioners in various areas of development; and community representatives. The volume is aimed at a wide audience including students, academics, and practitioners in the field. It draws from a broad range of historical, contemporary, and emerging discourses on African and global development. Its contributors were also mindful of intersectional cleavages such forums must invade and stressed the implications of gender, class, and race, making Africa's postcolonial development conditions in sociocultural, political, and economic contexts central. Both those involved in the discussion on the MDGs as well as those seeking to learn more about them will find in this volume a comfortable level ground. It represents not only an important contribution to the MDG debates but also a strategic resource as we approach "the year of reckoning," 2015.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction: Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Retrospect in Africa

Nene Ernest Khalema, Nathan Andrews, and N'Dri T. Assié-Lumumba

The onset of independence in the 1950s and 1960s heralded a new desire for the promotion of socioeconomic development among the newly independent states. The African populations and leadership engaged in the struggle for freedom had no intention to relinquish their aspirations for socioeconomic uplifting and social progress. They had ideas and resolve to develop the skills, strategies and means to achieve their developmental goals, instead of delegating their roles to others. Thus, African scholars and nationalist political leaders envisioned paths of development that challenged the Western conception of one inevitable and unilinear modernization model (Hettne 1995; Nkrumah 1963; Nyerere 1973) to be applied universally.

However, by and large, in post-colonial Africa, development strategies and prescriptions for achieving them have remained a territory traversed predominantly by non-African actors and interests, mainly in a neocolonial framework. This has incensed public scholars such as Samir Amin (1990) to propose delinking from the colonial structure in order to promote social progress in Africa. Indeed, the colonially designed framework that is used in the post-colonial context reproduces old paradigms that constituted part of the official justification and narrative of the

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colonial domination. The tenet of the argument frames the African people as the perpetually immature beings whose advancement will always depend on the good will of the colonizers. The notion of the “white man’s burden” may not be used because it may no longer be politically correct, but it shapes the development and assistance program.

Innumerable development initiatives have been conceived, concaved, and implemented for many years by Northern interests, exposing how these negligible remedies have fuelled dependency. In this context, knowledge about Africa’s development is framed from particular standpoints pronouncing a pessimistic tone marked with a quest for recycled and repackaged development prescriptions. In advancing this quest, a number of development strategies have re-emerged including a globally embraced notion of advancing the millennium development goals (MDGs). The MDGs were adopted by a number of heads of states in 2000 to address the world’s most staggering development issues (see United Nations 2013a). Meeting the goals, or even substantial progress towards meeting them, promises to produce a healthier, more economically sound world. The normative consensus arrived at in 2000 attracted the attention and support of many organizations and individuals interested in international development.

The Millennium declaration depicts the eight MDGs as the world’s time-bound targets for addressing extreme poverty, hunger, disease, child mortality and maternal health and for promoting gender equality, education, global partnership and environmental sustainability. The most ambitious goal, perhaps, is that of reducing the 1990 levels of poverty by half (i. e. reducing the 30 % of people living under \$1 a day to 15 %) by 2015 (Besley and Burgess 2003). By signing the Millennium declaration, leaders of the world collectively promised a better life to the world’s most vulnerable people. Their collective promise—encapsulated in the MDGs—embraces a vision for the world in which developed and developing countries would work in partnership for enduring global transformation. Unlike the Washington Consensus of the 1980s and 1990s, which lacked overarching global consensus, the Millennium declaration entreated Northern countries to express greater commitments to the world’s most vulnerable people.

Teething social, economic, and political challenges that weaken Africa’s transformation from the so-called “dark continent” besets the possibilities of the MDGs as an all-encompassing prescription. Achieving the MDGs in Africa holds the promise of saving millions of lives; empowering women; addressing the scourge of illiteracy, malnutrition and hunger; and ensuring that Africa’s most vulnerable in the continent have access to high-quality education, economic opportunity, and good health to lead fulfilled lives (Wagstaff and Claeson 2004). Thus, concrete development targets in agriculture, nutrition, education, health and infra- structure are pledged, and promises are specified that if MDGs are fully addressed, African communities will be positioned to raise productivity and compete successfully in world markets, thus improving their livelihoods. For African governments, investing in the MDGs and promoting the private sector collaborations is encouraged and motivated as a new path towards stability and sustained growth. Furthermore, governments are encouraged to engage in fiscal economic activity that will build capital, attract foreign investment and overcome Africa’s current need for external aid assistance.

Recent reports by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund assert that although progress has been made globally in achieving the MDGs, many developing countries, particularly in Africa remain off track to meeting them by 2015 (IMF and World Bank 2009; World Bank and IMF 2010). This is particularly true in large parts of Africa where some states are fragile or emerging from conflict. The continent as a whole is lagging behind on each MDG despite a very encouraging recent rise in the rate of economic growth, an overall improvement in the policy environment, and strong macroeconomic fundamentals. Notwithstanding the need to unpack the metric of measuring progress towards addressing the MDGs, the continent nonetheless has made some progress. Economically, the continent has continued to enjoy an average annual economic growth rate of about 5 % in recent years; the global economic world order is destined to catch-up with the continent. According to UNDP (2013), Africa's impressive economic performance has "rekindled hopes for the continent's future as an important player in the global economic landscape" (4). For example, 40 of 50 countries have accelerated or maintained their rate of progress in at least 11 indicators between the pre- and post-2000 periods, confirming their commitment and effort towards the MDGs (UNDP 2013, 6). Success stories such as Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Namibia are worth noting. According to UNDP (2013), Africa's recent MDGs performance positions the continent as the best performing continent when measured by effort. In their report entitled, *MDG Report 2013: Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals*, UNDP contends that countries such as those mentioned above have led the way in accelerating progress for 16 of the 22 MDG indicators assessed. Additionally, according to the report, the majority of countries in Southern, East, Central and West Africa have substantially improved their rate of progress toward achieving MDGs and feature among the top 20 countries progressing towards addressing the goals. For example, North African states such as, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia lead the way in accelerating or maintaining progress. The report indicates that Egypt leads in 11 indicators, followed by Morocco with 9, and Tunisia with 8 (UNDP 2013, 6).

What worked for countries doing well are effective public policies and the political will of governments to address development challenges. Measures that promote accountable and transparent governance, economic opportunities for the improvised and empowerment of women have also played a role in ensuring that the promises of MDGs are achieved. Sound public policies and investments have proven to be central for achieving MDGs and accelerating economic growth. Additionally, empowering the civil society sector has also assisted governments in focusing actions and expertise that can increase the effectiveness of service delivery, advocating for relevant programs of delivery. Although civil society organizations have been contributing to advocacy and activism, they have become more prominent in recent years, growing in scale and influence and having profound impacts on policy. Indeed, the manner in which the state responds to these changes, and the extent to which civil society actors are recognized and included in policy development are some of the critical factors determining the course of addressing MDGs in the continent.

Externally, engaging closer with emerging players on the continent such as China, Brazil and India has rekindled hope that due to such partnerships, African-centered development priorities will be realized. For instance, next to the traditional donors and international financial institutions (such as IMF and World Bank), China is an emerging financial support provider for Africa (Bräutigam 2010; Christensen 2010; Zafar 2007). Simultaneously, developing global partnerships in the framework of south-south cooperation, new political, diplomatic and economic interactions and engagement between emerging economies (India, Brazil, Turkey, etc.) and other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have shown promise for the continent (see Shaw et al. 2007; Vieira and Alden 2011). Possibilities of good governance and service delivery of social, economic, political, and cultural industries has become increasingly intricate as newer players such as China, India, Brazil, Russia (the BRIC), and to some extent home-grown powers such as Nigeria and South Africa, strive to out-compete traditional economic players of the yesteryears such as the EU, Japan, and US, which are the traditional sources of development prescriptions.

Regarding the argument of new versus “traditional” donors, it is worth mentioning a little further the recent and ongoing debates of the critical issues involved. Considering the abusive historical policies of most of the Western donors as colonial/imperial powers, there are legitimate reasons to tend to articulate the differences and possible similarities in binary terms of bad versus good, exploitative and deceptive versus fair and benevolent motives. However, the comparative costs and benefits to African countries from the categories of donors presented in chronological terms have raised questions about the legitimacy of this categorization. While focusing on Latin America, Robledo (2014) poses broader questions in “New Donors, Same Old Practices? South-South Cooperation in Emerging Countries” that can be extended to other emerging economies that have provided various forms of “assistance” to African countries. From the perspective of the Chinese official position based in the country’s contemporary history, the state ideology and the pledge made at the Bandung Conference of 1955 where African and Asian countries adopted four goals and ten principles that prioritized mutual respect and cooperation, China, for instance made an official commitment toward African countries that is consistent with the Bandung resolutions. However, the nature, goals, extent, and the official and actual “assistance” that China has been providing to African countries has provoked debates regarding the motivations and eventual outcome of this assistance (Brautigam 2009; Woods 2008). The characteristics of the countries that have been targeted as recipients of “aid” and the trends tend to support the arguments that no matter the appearance of immediate benefits and the promise of the new form and sources for “aid” African countries must exercise prudence and vigilance.

Nevertheless, it is evident that given the urgency of the MDGs, with its conditionalities, has borne both costs and benefits, whilst the hegemonic form of development prescribed by Northern interests created policy orphans in most African states. As we are fast approaching the 2015 MDGs deadline, and given

the negative effects of the recent global economic crisis, the impact of the global recession on growth rates, and the reluctance of some international donors to step up their efforts in the current economic climate, it has become clear that the MDGs will not be reached in most sub-Saharan African states (see Conceição et al. 2011).

Progress towards achieving the eight Millennium Development Goals in African countries is marginal at best and poor at worst. In its 2013 report on the progress towards the accomplishment of the MDGs, in six of the eight goals, the United Nations expects that by 2015, African countries south of the Sahara will have made progress insufficient to reach the target if prevailing trends persist (United Nations 2013b). Furthermore, the challenge of meeting the MDGs in African countries is compounded by the grave long-term risk of conflicts; African countries demonstrably require additional resources to intervene in such conflicts since they are particularly vulnerable to the effects of war, global terrorism, and the growing risk of war crimes, human trafficking, and its aftermath. Such discouraging or if you like, sobering reflections on Africa's achievement of the MDGs began to proliferate just a couple of years after the adoption of the goals (see Sahn and Stifel 2003). Despite the fact that several of the goals are certainly lagging behind, there is one campaign that has often depicted Sub-Saharan Africa so poorly that even successes sometimes look like failures. Easterly (2009) identifies a few of such statements in his article (see p. 26):

Africa...is the only continent not on track to meet any of the goals of the Millennium Declaration by 2015. (UN World Summit Declaration in 2005)

in Africa... the world is furthest behind in progress to fulfill [the MDGs]...Africa is well behind target on reaching all the goals. (Blair Commission for Africa, 2005)

Sub-Saharan Africa, which at current trends will fall short of all the goals. (World Bank and IMF Global Monitoring Report 2005, in the foreword by James Wolfensohn and Rodrigo de Rato)

Sub-Saharan Africa, most dramatically, has been in a downward spiral of AIDS, resurgent Malaria, falling food output per person, deteriorating shelter conditions, and environmental degradation, so that most countries in the region are on a trajectory to miss most or all of the Goals... The region is off-track to meet every MDG. (UN Millennium Project report 2005)

At the midway point between their adoption in 2000 and the 2015 target date for achieving the MDGs, Sub-Saharan Africa is not on track to achieve any of the Goals. (UN MDGs report in 2007)

Among all regions of the world it is in Africa that we stand a real risk of not meeting the MDGs by 2015. (a statement by the then Nigerian President, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Davos)

The narratives above have helped to undersell any success sub-Saharan Africa may have chalked over the past decade and a half since the goals came into being. It has been argued that overall the MDGs have not been fair to Africa because they "are poorly and arbitrarily designed to measure progress against poverty and deprivation, and that their design makes Africa look worse than it really is" (Easterly 2009, 26).

This tends to further exaggerate the tragic Africa story and reinforces the role of the West as a saviour (for the normalization of the African experience as tragedy, see Smith 2006). The idea of progress or lack of it, in quantitative or qualitative terms, raises critical questions regarding the reference for the comparison and what criteria and by whom such criteria were conceptualized, designed and adopted. This is not to say the story is rosy, but it is meant to suggest that alternative measurement methods can possibly showcase Africa in a positive light, in terms of outperforming global averages in the progress towards the MDGs (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2013). Having said that, the fact that most African countries will not be able to achieve most of the MDGs in 2015 raises a number of questions for both academics and development practitioners. African countries have only made progress in reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (including non-communicable diseases) and achieved close to parity in girls' enrolment in primary school under the goal of promoting gender equality and empowering women. Other corresponding indicators that corroborate these observations include indices of life expectancy; literacy levels and mortality rates remain especially high for women.

While acknowledging the progressive nature of the MDGs and their integral role in mobilizing resources to aid African countries, there remain concerns, for instance, about the arbitrary way of measuring progress towards the goals. Even where progress is being made (i. e. Mozambique, Bukina Faso and others), improvements are often not evenly shared. Women, the poorest of the poor and those who live in rural areas tend to benefit less. It is therefore imperative to examine its impact on Africa's development post-2015. Eventualities such as climate change, natural disasters, and above all, the global financial downturn were not factored into the promulgation of these goals. Yet, will they be ample scapegoats for the rather uneven gains of these ambitious targets? What potential alternatives could replace the unattained goals once the 2015 deadline is reached? Do African governments have the potential and political will to carry these goals through? With these questions in mind, the overall objective of this book is to assess and reflect on the current state of MDGs in the context of Africa, critically examine the successes, gaps and failures of the stated goals, including lessons learned and possibilities ahead, and most importantly envision a post-2015 (and post-MDGs) development agenda for Africa, led by Africans for Africa.

Our book generally addresses these questions and many more. Collectively, the chapters argue that despite the noble intentions of the MDGs prescription, the goals are mere adaptations and reconstructions of dominant Northern paradigms that exaggerate the value of economic goods and wealth creation founded on a competitive and unequal field of marketplace by making them immutable features of development and its relevant indicators. In this way, MDG prescriptions perpetuate the same old story of African development as the continent strides towards transformation. We argue for the contribution of Africans in articulating what development means for them.

More importantly, we offer an opportunity for African scholars to reflect about what, why, and how the talk about MDGs has contributed to a rethinking of a development vision for Africa particularly since the dawn of development talk in the

1950s, subsequent policies of development in the 1960s and 1970s, and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s in which Northern-centered development ideologies, and their concomitant theories (modernization, dependency, and neoliberalism) have dominated development thought and practice in Africa. We advance the view that African development must be home grown, and an uncritical embrace of the MDGs prescriptions and the like could be seen as blind acceptance of adaptations and reconstructions of Northern paradigms of African development. We further posit that Northern-anchored development ideas about Africa and for Africa that have emerged or framed as *African inspired* development strategies including even the *Lagos Plan of Action*, and more specifically the heavily contested *New Partnership for African Development* (NEPAD) are part of the same old story. These were formulated as others have argued without much input from the African grassroots and can, therefore, hardly escape the charge of being foreign (Gelb 2002; Manby 2004).

The 18 chapters in this volume (excluding this introductory chapter and the conclusion) address fundamental aspects of the continent's prospects of achieving the MDGs. Writing from all applicable disciplines/sectors, both those engaging with the broader theoretical and policy implications of the possibilities of meeting the MDGs, the chapters collectively unearth central challenges of achieving and addressing broader themes of health, social care, education, poverty reduction, gender, and good governance. In this volume, scholars, activists, researchers, and policymakers reflect on the barriers and facilitators of attaining some of these goals, on the basis of empirical evidence collected in the African context.

The book is divided into five parts addressing issues such as empowerment and marginalization, education and access, sociopolitical implications of gendered vulnerabilities, population health and alternatives to social care, and post MDGs partnerships, alternatives and possibilities. A preface by Professor Philomena Okeke-Iherjirika and an introductory chapter by the editors precede these five subsections. Part I presents four chapters addressing marginalization, participation, and poverty issues. The first chapter in this section, Chap. 2 entitled, "Are We Able to Lift the Downtrodden? The MDGs and Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Ghana" by Patricia Serwaa Afrifa examines the Ghanaian government's interventions on the Millennium Development Goal 2. The chapter describes how the *Ghana School Feeding Programme* has addressed the educational needs of Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (OVC) in two children's homes in the Tema municipality in Ghana. Afrifa argues that "with barely 2 years left to the MDGs deadline, it was expected that Ghana's interventions to MDG 2, such as the School Feeding Programme, capacitation grants would reduce the educational challenges of children, especially the orphaned and vulnerable in order to empower them" (this volume). But the conclusion is that the lack of funding inhibits the potential to meet these educational needs, in addition to the fact that over-emphasis of the government's interventions in rural areas does not necessarily auger well for their counterparts in the urban centres.

Chapter 3 entitled, "Urbanization and Poverty in Kinshasa: Thinking Beyond the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)" by Clément Longondjo

Etambakonga discusses the urbanization of poverty in Kinshasa/DR Congo. The chapter focuses on a case study that describes the impact of urban inequality, ineffective governance, and political instability in Kinshasa. Through a synthesis of empirical data, the paper concludes that Kinshasa will not achieve its goals for the MDGs and suggests the need to strengthen transparency and good governance, industrialization and innovations as well as equitable distribution of income as a new agenda to reduce poverty and hunger and provide for all urban residents. Possible solutions include nurturing the informal economy as an integrated strategy to urban renewal.

Chapter 4 entitled, “Trusting the Coalface: Public Trust in South African Local Government and the Millennium Development Goals,” by Steven Gordon and his colleagues deepens the idea of the importance of empowering local communities by presenting the 2003–2012 public opinion data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) on public trust in local government. Chiefly, the paper examines attitudinal determinants of public confidence in local government in order to understand how trust in these political institutions can be improved. The paper argues that although public trust in local government to eradicate poverty and improve citizens’ quality of life is often low on the continent, and in South Africa in particular, when the public distrusts a public institution, citizens are unlikely to cooperate with that institution. The chapter concludes that public trust is driven by satisfaction with service delivery, political efficacy, and attitudes towards social redress, something governments in the continent, especially in South Africa are grappling with.

The two papers in Part II focus on the education and issues of access, empowerment and equity in education. Chapter 5 by Prof. N’Dri T. Assié-Lumumba entitled, “Millennium Development in Retrospect: Higher Education in Africa’s Development Beyond 2015” summarizes the centrality of higher education in the new African development visions beyond 2015. The chapter positions education, especially at the post-secondary education as critical in attaining development objectives and cautions about the dangers of neglecting higher education as a determinant of addressing MDGs. Equally important in this chapter is the question of gender equity in Africa education system. It is argued that beyond the basic level, higher education should be gender-balanced as it provides highly specialized skills and capacity to produce knowledge that is precise and necessary to achieve the articulated goals. Thus, the nexus of higher education and gender equity is a *sine qua non* for socio-economic advancement in Africa, be it in achieving the MDGs or other defined development objectives.

To illustrate a practical example of the importance of education, particularly non-formal education for the most vulnerable in adverse context, Chap. 6 by Serena Koissaba entitled, “Funding Quality Education in Rural Central Tanzania: A Case for Social Entrepreneurship,” examines how local farmers in central Tanzania can develop economic initiatives that will significantly impact their ability to participate in cost sharing measures of financing quality education in the region. Koissaba critically discusses the effects of postcolonial theories that have impeded the construction of a more responsible and accountable system of subsidizing education at the



grassroots, the role of international aid, and alternative methods for funding quality education reform. The findings in this chapter provide an overview of current social and educational policy conditions and explore how the community can become social entrepreneurs empowered to invest in their own education development.

Part III chiefly addresses gender vulnerabilities, empowerment, and possibilities particularly in the context of social, political, and environmental transformation and change. This focus is crucial because the cost of gender gaps in many areas, including education, weighs negatively on socioeconomic growth, fertility, child mortality and nutrition, among other factors (see Abu-Ghaida and Klasen 2004). Chapter 7 entitled, “The African Gender Development Gap: Rethinking Strategies to achieve MDGs,” by Stephen Macharia Magu summarizes progress in the areas of gender equity and posits that countries have largely paid lip service to achieving the MDGs related to gender empowerment. The chapter gives evidence of data on workforce participation, property ownership rates among women, participation in tertiary education, representation in legislatures and other indices that measure gender equality and empowerment. Magu concludes that African women’s inclusion and access to economic, social and cultural opportunities depends on how countries prioritize women’s empowerment in development plans. Thus, countries that do more to strengthen and promote gender equality and women’s empowerment are more likely to achieve rapid economic growth, offer more opportunities for economic development and achieve all the other goals combined more efficiently than countries that do not consider the gender question as important as the other MDGs.

In Chap. 8 entitled, “Women’s Access to Land and Economic Empowerment in Selected Nigerian Communities,” Tayo George and his colleagues argue that despite the many policies around land rights, women remain marginalized both in terms of their access to and economic utilization of land. In the case of Nigeria, this existing challenge has not been made any better by the patriarchal structures that highlight the dominance of men. The authors therefore advocate for women’s economic empowerment through improved systems of land rights since “the implication of lack of land access and ownership rights have tended to compromise women’s access to credit facilities, among others, due to lack of collateral” (this volume). Chapter 9 by Yordanos Tesfamariam entitled, “Climate Change, Vulnerability and Adaptation: A Case Study of Men and Women Farmers in Eritrea,” further uses a similar gender lens as does Magu and George et al. by giving a practical case study of gender dynamics in farming communities in Eritrea. Tesfamariam identifies significant challenges of climate change and coping mechanisms that are currently being used by Eritrean farmers in Berik, Central Highlands and Barentu/Sosona, Lowlands of Gash-Barka. Results revealed that although exposure and sensitivity to climate change affects all farmers, female-headed households were highly impacted by a lack of access to resources. Tesfamariam’s findings highlight a need for governments to empower women farmers by incorporating female-headed households as producers to deal with the most pressing challenge of hunger and poverty for rural women.

Part IV focuses on the issue of population health and alternatives to social care. Four chapters in this section address key health indicators prioritized in the 5th and

6th MDGs including combatting HIV/AIDS and addressing sexual reproductive health and rights issues, access to clean water, combatting maternal and childhood mortality, and addressing prevention, access to health services, and treatment opportunities. The 6th goal envisioned by the United Nations aims at combatting diseases such as HIV and AIDS, malaria, and TB that have plagued the continent for years. In recent years, one of the significant areas of focus has been on equally addressing the scourge of chronic conditions, specifically the reduction in incidence of non-communicable chronic diseases. Over the past decade, chronic illnesses have increased significantly in developing regions around the world, with implications for health service provision. Additionally, the effect of the unprecedented HIV/AIDS epidemic in the continent has been immense. Substantial increases in mortality and morbidity are threatening to overwhelm the health system and undermine the potential of the continent to attain the 6th MDG.

Chapter 10 by Nene Ernest Khalema and his colleagues entitled, “(Ad)ressing Sexual Reproductive Health Issues and its Determinants in Eight Priority Areas of South Africa: Evidence from a Situational Analysis of Millennium Development Goals in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape,” addresses the development indicator of sexual reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and its determinants in South Africa, particularly those relating to its determinants such as extreme poverty, gender-based violence, child mortality, and maternal health. Khalema et al. argue that South Africa has fallen short of addressing key millennium goals related to SRH issues, prioritizing a globalist economic development agenda and sociopolitical stability. Even though the lengthy, yet triumphant transition from apartheid to democracy has had its successes, it has also ushered pressing challenges that urgently demand attention. Of particular concern is the demographic reality of the youth bulge whereby young people between the ages of 15 and 24 years comprise over 40 % of the population. This demographic reality makes the challenge of meeting the MDGs of addressing SRHR even more challenging as many young people become vulnerable to sexual exploitation, teen pregnancy, early marriage, illegal abortions, unsafe rite of passage cultural practices, and sexually transmitted infections (STI) and HIV/AIDS. Utilizing a mixed method approach that included a desk review of policy directives on SRH, secondary quantitative analysis of key SRHR indicators, and a qualitative component that included focus group discussions in both urban and rural contexts, this paper offers evidence about the successes, gaps and failures of the stated goals related to SRH in South Africa. The paper also discusses lessons learned about the structural, socioeconomic, and cultural barriers of meeting the health related MDGs.

Chapter 11 by Mary Ssonko Nabacwa and her colleagues, “Culture, Traditions and Maternal Health: A community Approach Towards Improved Maternal Health in the Northern Uganda Districts of Gulu, Moroto and Kotido,” discusses the challenges of meeting MDG number five: reducing by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio. The chapter argues that improved maternal and newborn health is highly dependent on the maternal health practices of the individual women, their families and communities, influenced by socioeconomic variables including culture and traditions. Thus in order to address and ensure that women have universal access to

reproductive health, progress must be made in how communities understand and conceptualize SRHR. Reporting from a World Health Organization funded study conducted in the districts of Gulu, Kotido and Moroto in Uganda, Nabacwa et al. contend that increased maternal health outcomes are likely to occur if the gap between the community and the health facility is bridged through creating processes for an interface between the health facility and community interface. The chapter concludes that managing the socioeconomic determinants of maternal health including culture and traditions is an important means to addressing health-related MDGs.

Chapter 12 by Furzana Timol deepens the discussion on the burden of disease by discussing the role of water-related characteristics in reducing the burden of childhood mortality and morbidity in South Africa. According to Timol child mortality is significantly influenced by the child's environment, particularly access to quality water. Clean water and sanitation also have a considerable effect on reducing mortality and morbidity. In fact, water is a necessary condition for human existence. Life is therefore sustained. With the burden of diseases falling disproportionately on children under the age of 5 years, the chapter argues that considerable difference in access and quality of water occur across the socioeconomic echelons in South Africa. While there have been overall improvements since 2006, households with children under the age of 5 years continue to fall on the bottom end of water related service delivery. Thus, if the MDGs are to be assessed in terms of what they attempt to encapsulate, evaluating the current water access status must encompass a holistic understanding of the developmental objectives.

Chapter 13 by Catherine Ndinda and colleagues entitled: "Civil Society Activism for the Prevention and Treatment of Non-communicable Diseases in South Africa: Implications for Policy and Practice" summarizes progress made in addressing the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in South Africa. The chapter maintains that NCDs are a leading cause of morbidity and mortality for adults over the age of 40 years with cardiovascular disease being the leading cause of mortality. Presenting a South African case for greater civil society participation in combatting NCD prevalence, the chapter argues that civil society activism around HIV and AIDS has yielded remarkable results in gaining access to treatment in the country. Drawing on qualitative findings among civil society organizations dealing with the NCDs in South Africa, this paper presents findings on the strategies used by such organizations in enabling access to prevention and treatment of NCDs. The findings suggest civil society organizations use a range of strategies in the prevention and treatment of NCDs. The effectiveness of the strategies used also varies. The contribution of the paper lies in its analysis of the strategies and establishing the effectiveness of the strategies in the prevention of and ensuring access to care for different NCDs.

The concluding part of the book (Part V) consists of seven chapters that address post 2015 MDGs agenda, particularly opportunities for new partnerships (i. e. south-south engagement), alternatives to the MDGs agenda, and possibilities of developing new prescriptions that address African development challenges. Chapter 14 by Daouda Cisse entitled: "Developing Global Partnership for Development: Chinese Investments in Africa and Impacts on Sustainable Development" explores

the idea of developing global partnerships for development in China-Africa relations with a focus on Chinese investments in Africa and their impacts on environmental sustainability along the MDGs and beyond 2015. The chapter argues that Africa needs global partners for investments and trade and therefore China has shown interests in engaging in Africa by investing in various sectors of African economies from resources, from infrastructure development projects to agriculture and the services sector. The case for Chinese investment in Africa has implications for Africa in regards to the MDGs, more specifically for natural resources and the environment and sustainable development. The paper highlights these implications.

In Chap. 15 entitled, “Strengthening Democratic Political Leadership and Governance for Africa’s Development Beyond 2015: The case of Uganda,” Evelyn Mayanja focuses on democracy and leadership issues in Uganda. The chapter argues that democratic, political leadership and governance are the best and fastest strategies for envisioning a post-2015 human and sustainable development agenda. Thus, while national and international forces such as climate change and the economic recession are affecting Africa’s progress, democratic leadership and governance, with the sole interest of enhancing citizen’s wellbeing would have averted the appalling living conditions of the marginalized long before the inception of the MDGs. Mayanja concludes by recommending economic reform and structural transformation at national and international levels to foster sustainable development instead of development aid.

Arguing from a different angle the about development aid, Chap. 16 by Cristian Talesco, in “Aid Effectiveness and Development Policies in Botswana: A Successful Story” contend that development aid is most effective when it is directed towards the implementation of development policies, which have been structured by the recipient government. Talesco contends that countries such as Botswana are successful because aid was used effectively to strengthen institutions and to broaden the scope of development, such as by reducing poverty, and improving health facilities and the quality of life. For Talesco, the Botswana experience shows that good governance and absence of corruption is necessary to ensure that aid is used appropriately to empower the most vulnerable—which potentially forms part of the MDGs agenda of halving poverty. Having said that, there is existing evidence that many aid recipients will miss these goals, although increased aid is being seen a way of addressing development shortfalls (Clemens et al. 2007; Collier and Dollar 2001).

In Chap. 17 entitled, “African Women’s Political Participation: Strategies for Positively Impacting Sustainable Socio-Economic Development” Stephen Macharia Magu does a careful review of women’s political participation, especially at the grassroots level, in decision-making, resource allocation and development. The chapter analyzes data from various sources (including the International Parliamentarians’ Unions, UNFPA and the UNDP) to conclude that women are grossly underrepresented in leadership positions. Further, the findings of this synthesis reveal that women make up of only 16 % of the elected leaders both at House and Senate levels. Although Rwanda and South Africa have the highest female

representation of women in the legislature (approximately 40–50 %), many countries south of the Sahara reflect global averages (17 %) representation by women. The discussions of the results point to a need to encourage greater women participation from the grassroots level, to influence allocation of resources, leadership opportunities and present more candidates for leadership positions.

Chapter 18 by Patric Oluwole Ojo entitled, “From Rhetoric to Reality: Bridging the Gap between Aspiration for Democracy and Governance Performance in Nigeria and South Africa,” argues that the major obstacle to development, and thus poverty alleviation, is fundamentally political. He draws this clear relationship between development and democracy throughout the chapter by comparing Nigeria and South Africa. The argument is that “to properly situate governance in the context of achieving the MDGs targets in Africa, it is important to point to the existing analytical congruencies, and also to stipulate the quality of governance that could accurately reflect the reality and performance in terms of people’s expectation in the twenty-first-century Africa” (this volume). In the final analysis, Ojo insists that any discussion of MDGs cannot be devoid of the quest to strengthen regulatory institutions in order to provide necessary checks and balances on agencies and individuals at the forefront of development programing and policy making.

Julie Drolet in Chap. 19 discusses social protection as one alternative to addressing MDGs. According to Drolet, social protection includes mechanisms such as social transfers, social services, and social insurance delivered by the state and/or civil society to mitigate social, economic, and environmental risks for vulnerable individuals and marginalized groups. The chapter proposes that international initiatives and efforts to support *National Social Protection Floors* need to be strengthened. Thus, while social protection is not an alternative to the MDGs with respect to Africa’s post-2015 development agenda, it is rather a framework to work towards achieving the essence of the MDGs, namely establishing security and quality of life for those most vulnerable. A number of social protection initiatives that have been implemented in Africa are successful such as cash transfers related to food security and primary education. According to Drolet, social protection policies and programs, grounded in approaches such as gender-based, sustainable livelihoods, and sustainable development, do not have to expunge the MDGs but rather continue building upon their successful outcomes within the last 15 years in Africa by providing social protection for all. The concluding chapter provides a summary of the main arguments of the book and presents key ideas in moving the development agenda forward post 2015.

Beyond the chapter’s specific focus, a question posed by Afrifa in her contribution to this volume—“Are We Able to Lift the Downtrodden?”—is instructive for our purpose of looking back at what has been accomplished in Africa in terms of the MDGs. While it is often a good intention to develop grand objectives, it is imperative to assess how marginalized populations that might be living on the fringes of development itself feel such initiatives on the ground. There is a plethora of literature on the MDGs worldwide. From the journal *World Development* alone, commentators have been asking several questions including whether or not the MDGs are enough (Hayman 2007), how success and failure can be measured (Fukuda-Parr

et al. 2013), and the circumstances under which the goal of cutting poverty by half is feasible (Collier and Dollar 2001). Others ask how much the poor people around the world would gain from the quick progress towards achieving the health goals (Gwatkin 2005), and another speaking to how unfair the goals have been to Africa (Easterly 2009). With these diverse issues in mind, it is opportune that this collection of papers takes a look at the dynamics on the African continent to reflect on where we are and how we seek to progress towards the already grandiose post-MDGs priorities at the end of 2015.

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## Chapter 2

# Are We Able to Lift the Downtrodden? The MDGs and Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Ghana

Patricia Serwaa Afrifa

### Introduction

Globally, the family is recognised as the institution that has the primary responsibility of socialising and maintaining children. Indigenous to Africa is the concept of absorbing orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) into extended families and within the community through child fosterage (Goody 1982; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985; Opong 2004; Serra 2009). This is a welfare mechanism built into the family structure for the regulations of problems of childcare. Child fosterage refers to the situation where the parenting of a child is temporarily delegated to another household belonging to either kin or non-kin members (Goody 1982; Serra 2004).

This was done for a variety of purposes which included unforeseen and unfortunate events such as parental death, divorce, illness, loss of livelihood, migration, etc. Foster care was also rendered for economic, religious, and political reasons as well as to strengthen kinship ties. It was ultimately expected to respond to deficit in childcare such as education (Goody 1982).

Education is important because it helps individuals make informed decisions that impact their health and well-being. Its importance also stems from the fact that it enhances the development and future sustainability of the child and also for accelerating economic growth. Fiawoo (1978) asserts that educational opportunities for children were enhanced through the institution of fostering of children by their older siblings. Factors that necessitated this kind of fostering include lack of financial support from biological parents and nearness of school in a certain environment as compared to the foster children's natal home (Ardayfio-Schandorf and Amissah 1996; Serra 2009).

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However, modern trends such as globalisation, monetisation of the economy and urbanisation have had great influences on family organisation and its collective responsibility of caring for its young members. Therefore, in the wake of dwindling family support, especially in urban centres for orphaned and vulnerable children (OVC) through kinship fosterage, institutionalized foster care has emerged in Ghana.

The 1992 constitution mandates the state to provide care and support for the needy and vulnerable in the country, especially OVC. In this regard, the Department of Social Welfare runs three Children's Homes in Ghana. However, these homes are inadequate for the over one hundred and seventy thousand OVC in the country as shown in the OVC policy document (UNICEF 2009). As of 2006, the number of orphanages in Ghana stood at one hundred and forty-eight (148). Table 2.1 shows a regional breakdown. These include private Children's Homes, which have been opened to contribute to child fosterage. Unfortunately these homes are plagued with varying forms of challenges of which the lack of access to education is paramount.

Apart from the internal constitutional and legal regimes, Ghana is a signatory to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and for that matter has made various interventions in achieving these goals. With barely 2 years left to the MDGs deadline, it was expected that Ghana's interventions to MDG2 such as the School Feeding Programme, capitation grants would reduce the educational challenges of children, especially the orphaned and vulnerable in order to empower them. A large body of literature (GoG/UNICEF 2003; MOWAC 2004; GoG and UNDP 2007; NDPC and GoG 2012) exist to highlight the significant progress government has made in addressing the educational needs of children in Ghana; however, very little can be said about government's role in educating OVCs in Children's Homes. Drawing insights from two Children's Homes in the Tema Municipality, this paper explores: (i) educational accessibility of OVC in children's Homes and (ii) how government's interventions on the MDG2 (especially the school feeding programme) further helps in addressing their educational needs.

**Table 2.1** Regional breakdown of orphanages in Ghana

Regions	Percentage of orphanages
Ashanti region	13.33
Brong Ahafo region	12.50
Central region	12.50
Greater Accra region	17.50
Eastern region	8.33
Northern region	5.83
Upper East	6.67
Upper West	1.67
Volta region	15.00
Western region	6.57

Source: Department of Social Welfare and Orphanaid Africa (2006)

## ***Methodology***

The study uses both primary and secondary sources of data for analysis. Secondary data were taken from scholarly works done in the area such as books, articles, journals, reports and also newspapers. There was also desktop review of policy documents on the previous Ghana MDG report (with more emphasis on MDG2) as well as the analysis of indicators to assessing Ghana's achievement of the goals. Primary data were collected from institutional homes (in a qualitative study of children aged 7 and 18), directors and caregivers of institutional homes as well as state agencies responsible for social welfare (e. g. Monitory Officers from the Department of Social Welfare).

Purposive and convenient sampling methods were employed in the study. Two institutional Homes were selected in Tema out of about the five Homes to examine the education of children in the Homes. These two institutions were selected to enable a comparison of educational accessibility for children in the two selected facilities. For ethical purposes, pseudonyms have been used for the two institutions, thus, "Caring for the Needy Child" (CNC) Home and "Hope for the Child" (HC) Home respectively. A total of 71 children were selected in both institutions. In CNC Home, 39 children were selected out of the 48 children and 32 out of 38 children were selected in HC Home. In both institutions the children below 6 years were excluded from the study because they were considered incapable of responding accurately to inquiries the researcher intended to make. Seven caregivers in the Homes as well as three monitoring officers of the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) were selected for interviews. Findings from the two institutions showed various differences and similarities in several respects. The research instruments were structured and semi-structured interview guides. Key informants or respondents included directors of the care institutions and caregivers, monitory officials from the Department of Social Welfare, 71 children, and staff of the institutions and residents of the area (where the Homes are located). The interviews were audio recorded and the spinets of the interviews were used for data analysis. Participant observation was used to gather information in the institutions. This also was done through a 3-day internship in each of the institutions. Finally, a non-participant observation was made; the activities of the institutions were observed during three different visits. Content analysis was utilized in the interpretation of data.

## ***Theoretical Framework***

In the light of the study's discussion, it applies the theory of social justice to ascertain its application the educational attainment of OVC in Ghana. The basic assumption of this theory is the promotion of a just society on the principle that all members have the right to access resources within the society. It further challenges the injustice and discourages the promotion of discrimination of individuals based on

gender, race, sexuality or disability in society but calls for the valuing of diversity in society in order to ensure that all individuals have access to equitable treatment, support for their human rights and a fair allocation of the community resources (Tikly and Barret 2011). Social justice theory has been used in diverse ways by prominent scholars such as Rawls (2001) and Miller (2003). Rawls (2001) equates social justice to fairness whereas Miller (2003) focuses on the principles of social justice. The discussion of these scholars adds to the basic assumption of social justice which is equality or availability of equal opportunities for all and sundry.

Education is an essential tool for building human capital. This is because it has the potential for lessening poverty and ensuring social welfare. This will further tie in to Amartya Sen's (1999) assertion of creating a conducive environment for individuals within a society to develop their potential and capabilities. Fraser (2008) further adds that social justice is about "parity of participation" aimed at removing institutional obstacles, such as economic structures, that deny individuals access to resources that they need in order to interact with others as peers. In Ghana, the School Feeding Programme exists as one of the measures to ensure increments in school enrolment, attendance and retention for children in the poorest regions in Ghana. Although this provision is a good intervention for the achievement of the MDG2, it does not include all children, especially the orphaned and vulnerable in urban areas like Tema.

According to Fraser (2008) there are three related tenets of the social justice approach: redistribution, recognition and participation. Redistribution highlights the access to resources, which in this case refers to access to quality education and the potential outcomes that arise from this. The human capital approach explains the relevance of education to national economy. In this regard, Sen's (1999, 2009) concept of capabilities will be useful in terms of understanding the range of cognitive and affective outcomes that contribute to a person's well-being, i. e. that enable learners to become economically productive, healthy, secure and active citizens. This will thus, in the context of this study, apply to the assumption that in the absence of equitable distribution of resources for education for all children in Ghana, their ability to become economically productive, healthy citizens could be curtailed.

Fraser (2008) further describes the second tenant of social justice theory as recognition and explains the need to first identify and acknowledge the claims of historically marginalized groups in the African context such as women, rural dwellers, victims of HIV/AIDS orphans and vulnerable children, refugees, cultural, linguistic, religious, racial and sexual minorities and indigenous groups. In line with the study, it is thus expected that the Government of Ghana's School Feeding Programme will not only concentrate on rural children/those in poor regions but pay attention to all children including the orphaned and vulnerable. This is because although there were indigenous modes of supporting OVC through kinship fosterage for educational motives they have dwindled tremendously (Badasu 2004; Oppong 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004). This has led to the overreliance on institutionalized care to provide education for OVC in Ghana (Apt et al. 1998).

Although reports on the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP) have shown appreciable improvement in educational enrolment and completion of deprived children, especially in rural areas, it does not capture its impact on deprived and vulnerable children in urban areas (NDPC and GoG 2012). This situation shows a wide gap between policy and practice in the implementation of this state provision regarding educational accessibility for all OVC in Ghana. This situation is likely to have dire consequences on the participation of OVC as active citizens of the state in the near future. This situation will be inconsistent with parity of participation for the social justice theory that underlies the recognition and participation of individuals in a society (Fraser 2008).

The next section discusses the MDGs in Ghana and focuses on the School Feeding Programme.

### ***The Millennium Development Goals in Ghana***

The basic objective of MDGs is to transform the face of global development cooperation. In September 2010, Ghana committed herself to tracking these 8 time-bound MDGs and their associated indicators. Thus the progress towards the MDGs have been reported annually since 2002 in many National documents, the Annual Progress Report (APR) on the implementation of medium term Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (GPRSII) and the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA). Additionally, there are reports prepared on a biennial basis that examine trends in the attainment of the goals, supportive environments, challenges and resource needs for the achievement (NDPC and GoG 2012).

To date, five reports (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010) have been prepared. The 2010 report, which is the most recent, captures progress since 2010. The report analyses the goals based on target and indicators for each goal and the extent to which they can be attained by 2015 (NDPC and GoG 2012).

The global overview of MDG performance shows disparities in the MDG performance by regions and the sub-region. In all, Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, remain weak and vulnerable in the attainment of most of the MDG targets.

### **The Millennium Development Goal 2 and Ghana's Education**

Goal 2 of the MDGs seeks to achieve universal primary education with a target of ensuring that children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. Basic Education is very important in Ghana because it helps individuals to make informed decisions that impact their health and well-being. Its importance also stems from the fact that it enhances the development and future sustainability of the child. In developing countries, it has been identified as a key factor for accelerating economic growth. It can be both formal and informal.

The education situation in Ghana has improved over the years. Quantity and quality of schooling has improved. The trend in primary gross enrolment since 1987 has since been flat until 2000. Since 2000, an increasing percentage of Ghanaians of school going age have attended school. For example, the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) increased from 57 % in 1999/2000 to 86.5 % in 2003/2004 (UNICEF Report 2007). However, the country has not achieved total coverage despite the impact of various interventions such as the school feeding programme on educational outcomes (de Hauwere 2008; SEND Ghana 2008; Schultz 1997). The next section discusses the school feeding programme as a measure of achieving universal primary education.

### ***Overview of the Ghana School Feeding Program (GSFP)***

Consistent with various Government of Ghana (GoG) policies such as the Education Sector Plan, the National Social Protection is conceptually designed to provide children in public primary schools and kindergartens in the poorest areas of the country with one hot nutritious meal per day, using locally grown foodstuffs. The three pillars underpinning this project are to:

- (i) Reduce hunger and malnutrition
- (ii) Increase school enrolment, attendance and retention
- (iii) Boost domestic production

However, this study focuses on the second pillar, which is to increase school attendance, enrolment and retention.

According to the annual operating plan of the programme, it began in late 2005 with ten pilot schools drawn from each region. It expanded to 200 schools by August 2006. By the end of December 2006, 598 schools with a total population of 234,800. By March 2007, the programme, benefiting 408,989 pupils daily, reached 975 schools. By the end of the first quarter of 2007, the GSFP had already surpassed the 2007-year end target of 889 schools and 320,000 in the program document. As of March 2007, 975 schools had been reached. As of December 2008, 1/5th of all primary schools were being fed daily at 596,501. Thus since 2008, 1/5th (20 %) of all primary school pupils in the country have been benefiting from the feeding program, a 4 % point increase from 16 % as at July 2008 (GoG 2009).

Despite the fact that the programme has exceeded its target, it has not achieved its objective of reaching the poorest areas (de Hauwere 2008; NDPC & UN 2012). According to the SNV<sup>1</sup> (2008), the region with the highest level of poverty has the lowest GSFP schools, whereas the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo Greater Accra and Central region respectively seem to have a substantive representation of schools on the GSFP, Upper East, Northern Upper West and western regions respectively have lower representation of schools on the programme. Thus although three northern regions are the poorest in the country, fewer schools are benefiting from the school

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<sup>1</sup> Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Netherlands Development Organization).

feeding programme. The objective of the school feeding programme is in line with Fraser's (2008) recognition mode of the social justice theory that seeks to acknowledge marginalised groups, such as the poor.

To find ways of resolving these problems, reports on the GSFP have focused on the challenges, implementation, and evaluation, and have emphasised the fact that it has lost its focus in the poor regions (GoG 2006). Although GSFP is said to benefit more schools in the Greater Accra Region, attention is not paid to OVC in private Children's Homes since the main focus automatically shifts the focus of the programme on such children. The next section, which discusses the findings of the study, further explains the relevance or otherwise for the need for either inclusion or exclusion of OVC in the GSFP.

## *Findings*

This section of the paper focuses on the availability and utilization of education by OVC in the residential homes studied. To put these in a better perspective, the age range of the children and the reasons for the children's stay in the homes were examined.

### **Demographics of the Children in the Homes**

The age range of the children shows that a majority of them constitute the category of individuals that require care and maintenance.<sup>2</sup> This is not exclusive of the fact that they were above 18 years of age (Table 2.2).

**Table 2.2** Age range of the children in the institutional homes

Age (year/s)	CNC home		HC home	
	No. of children	Percentage (%)	No. of children	Percentage (%)
Below one 1 year	3	6.1	–	0
Between 1 and 5 years	10	20.4	7	17.95
Between 6 and 10 years	22	45	14	35.90
Between 11 and 15 years	10	20.4	15	38.46
Between 16 and 20 years	3	6.1	2	5.13
Above 20 years	1	2	1	2.56
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: author's fieldwork

<sup>2</sup>The Legal definition of child as used in the study refers to individuals below the age of 18 years. According to the 1992 constitution of Ghana, such individuals should be maintained until they have reached maturity.

**Table 2.3** Circumstances necessitating the admission of children into the homes

Circumstances	CNC home		HC home	
	No. of children	Percentage (%)	No. of children	Percentage (%)
Loss of mother	10	20.40	7	17.94
Loss of father	3	6.12	2	5.12
Full orphan	3	6.12	5	12.82
Both parents living	29	59.18	22	56.4
Mother (physically disabled)	4	8.16	3	7.69
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: author's fieldwork

This is because within the Ghanaian society, Atobrah (2005) asserts that the definition of a child is not restricted to chronological age alone but extends to the status of the individual. In the cultural context, a person that is above 18 years old and is either married or independent is still considered a child. Therefore the reference to such individuals as children is in consonance with this classification since the children still depend on the institutions for the provision of their basic needs.

Table 2.3 also presents the circumstances necessitating the admission of children in the institution. It is obvious from the profile of the children that not all of them are orphans; the study shows that a majority of children in the institution have both parents living. Children who were full orphans only constituted 6.12 and 12.82 % in CNC and HC Homes respectively. Although the study has shown, as represented in Table 2.3, that varying reasons exist for the admission of children in institutions, parental poverty accounts for the admission of most children in the institutions. In Ghana, surveys such as the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (2008) have shown that parental survival status has greater influence on the child's educational achievement. For instance, information on school attendance of children aged 10 and 14 by parental survival showed the following findings. The proportion of children aged 10–14 whose parents are both living is 67 % and the proportion of whose parents are both living and the child is residing with at least either of them is 88 %. However, parental death did not come out strong as a factor necessitating the admission of children in the Homes but parental poverty.

Thus the inabilities of parents to cater for children whose needs have broadened require that other alternatives be explored. In the past, educational opportunities were a motivating factor for kinship fosterage. Factors that necessitated this kind of fostering include lack of financial support from biological parents and nearness of school in a certain environment as compared to foster children's natal home (Ardayfio-Schandorf and Amissah 1996; Serra 2009). However, due to the lack of support from the extended family as a result of the dispersal of kin and economic hardships even for those who can help, and the lack of social protection from the state, the children were referred to the institution.

The subsequent section explains how the Children's Homes are able to provide education for its inmates.

## Education for OVC

Education is important in the development of children. It is a human rights issue, and as such, is basic to societal and personal well-being. Education provides a means of transmitting norms from one generation to the other (MOWAC/UNICEF 2009). In both institutions studied, it was observed that one of their major objectives was the education of children in their care. Therefore, the question of education and skill transfer were explored in the study.

All the children in the Homes were of school going age. Whereas CNC Home had its own pre-school, HC Home did not have any school of its own. Therefore, the children attended public school outside the HC Home whereas in CNC Home, the inmates in pre-school attended school there and the rest went to school outside the home. In both homes, proprietors provided funding for the education of children. Although the homes sometimes received donations from religious organisations, individuals and other philanthropists, the donations are mostly material (e. g. food and clothing) and little money.

Additionally, sometimes, the lack of the requisite materials and the delay in the payment of school fees affect the performance of the children. One of the children explained that usually their school fees are not paid on time and that compelled them to stay out of school for most part of the academic year. Abena is a 10-year-old girl in primary two. According to her, she has been in the Home for 2 years. She started school at primary one but unfortunately often stays out of school because her fees are not paid regularly. She narrated:

The last time my school fees were not paid fully. So during exams period, I was sacked. I could not take about three of my papers. This had impact on my performance; I did not do well at all (Abena, 10 year old girl).

Another child at HC Home indicated that sometimes when the proprietor travels it becomes difficult to provide certain educational needs. According to James, a 15 year old boy, when the proprietor is not around he finds it difficult to get money from the caretakers to buy stationery such as books, pens, pencils since the caretakers cannot afford them. At the HC Home, although almost all the children in the institution were enrolled in a school, financial constraint was a major problem. This affected their performance in school and accounted for absenteeism. In a focus group discussion held with the children, they disclosed that the lack of funds affected their interest in school. The following comments by some of the children further reinforce this view:

Samuel: Madam, some of us our attendance in school is 2/60. I know it is very bad, but we are helpless.

David: Some of us just don't like going to school, especially Ken.


When asked why this was so, Ken gave the following response:

Madam, can you go to school in jeans? I don't have a school uniform that is why I don't go to school.

The comments made by caregivers and the children show there are challenges that affect the children's school attendance and subsequently their academic perfor-



**Fig. 2.1** The average school attendance of children in CNC and HC homes (Source: author's fieldwork)



mance. Although there have been reports on the government's progress in addressing educational needs of children through the provision of educational materials, a special mention is not made on how the government is addressing the educational needs of OVC in children's homes that by Fraser's (2006) recognition model of social justice theory need to be recognised as marginalised group requiring more attention (Fraser 2008). Figure 2.1 gives a graphical representation of the school attendance of the children in the two institutions. The average school attendance is 30/60 days.

Interviews with the children show that their lack of interest in education is as a result of their caregivers' inability to provide educational materials. According to 10-year-old Yoofi of a CNC Home he could not go school because he did not have a good school uniform. This is because his uniform was tattered and his friends teased him anytime he went to school. This makes him feel very bad in class and generally affects his interest in schooling. The plight of children in these institutions is typical of most children in institutional foster care in the African context—a situation that differs from most developed countries (Barth 2002). Barth (2002) has further shown that children in institutionalised foster care do not have the requisite materials for their education because there are usually too many children to be taken care of by the institution which may not be receiving the necessary support from the state. This affects the education of the children.

Another factor that affected the attendance rate of children was feeding arrangement (especially lunch). In an HC Home, for instance, it was noted that the lunch arrangement had negative implications on the children's academic performance. As earlier stated, children attend a public school that is not a beneficiary of the School Feeding Programme in the country. For this reason, children in lower primary are given GHp50 for lunch. Since the home has limited funds, those in upper primary are expected to walk about three kilometres to the home when it is break time to eat lunch. Coupled with the fact that the lunch may not be ready when they return from school and the fact that they may be beaten when they return to class late, most of the children choose to absent themselves from class after lunch break. In a focus

group discussion held with some of the children, responses such as these were typical:

Where we attend school is quite far from here therefore coming Home to eat lunch, it delays us, and so we are unable to get to school early. Our teachers beat us. This has continued for a long time so for most of us, if we see that we are late, we do not go back to the classroom again. But this is affecting our performance. (Kevin, 13-year-old)

When we come home to eat during break time, we do not get to school on time. But because we will be beaten when we return late, we decide to go and play till school closes then we return home. (Collins, 12-year-old)

These comments show that the children usually stay out of school after the lunch break due to fear of being punished. Unfortunately the caretakers were not aware of such habits because the children loitered about until school closed, and they returned home.

At a CNC Home, upper primary pupils complained that the pocket money of GHp50 given for lunch was woefully insufficient. This was the account some of the children gave:

Before I go to school, I normally eat porridge and bread. When it is lunchtime I go out to buy food at the canteen. The money I have is small but the food is also very expensive. If for instance I buy 0.50GP worth of kenkey, I cannot buy fish, so I may have to eat the kenkey without fish. I do not even think of buying rice because it is much more expensive. Most of the older children are facing this problem. (Abeiku, 14-year-old)

Madam, when I buy food to eat during lunch time, I do not get satisfied, so I am unable to concentrate in class and this is affecting my performance (Naana, 15-year-old).

The fact that children do not have the right mind set to study because they are inadequately fed affects their academic performance as the study has shown. The responses given by the children show the relevance of lunch meals to the improvement of academic performance of inmates. Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) examined the effect of school meals on school participation in Kenya and found that school participation went up in Kenyan pre-schools where a free breakfast was introduced than in comparison to schools where there was none. A study conducted by MOWAC/UNICEF in 2009 showed that meals served at lunch times in school are very useful for improvement in the academic performance of children.

The GSFP as an intervention to MDG2 pays attention to serving meals to pupils. This is geared towards the provision of lunch that is nutritionally adequate for children. School feeding programmes are therefore instituted to help alleviate hunger and malnutrition in mostly rural schools. Additionally, in Ghana, the School Feeding Programme seeks to enhance school security, reduce hunger and improve enrolment and retention among school children (MOWAC/UNICEF 2009). Although this provision is a good idea, one of its weaknesses is the programme's inability to spread its tentacles to OVC, especially those in urban areas like Tema.

This is because children in Children's Homes facing difficulties with lunch arrangements may not have their educational needs met despite the provisions government has put in place. Drawing insights from the tenets (redistribution, recognition and participation) of the social justice theory as prescribed by Fraser (2008), it

can be argued to ensure access to education by all children in Ghana, there is the need for the state to acknowledge all marginalised groups, such as children in rural and poor regions of the country, as well as all orphaned and vulnerable children. This will ensure the creation of equal opportunities for accessing education.

### ***Conclusion and Recommendation***

In conclusion, the paper has discussed the inability of traditional methods of lifting the downtrodden child and the contemporary relevance in residential homes and government interventions in MGD 2 in ameliorating the situation. The study has shown that although both institutions recognise the relevance of formal education, the lack of funding prevents them from meeting the educational needs of the children. Additionally, the over-emphasis of government intervention of MDG2 for deprived and vulnerable children in more rural areas to the detriment of their counterparts in the urban centres affects them. In the light of these various tenets of the social justice theory the following recommendations were made:

- There is also the need for government interventions on the Millennium Development Goal 2 to include children in both governmental and non-governmental residential homes. Such steps will be expected to lift the downtrodden in the society.
- There should be a multiple policy approach to addressing peculiar sets of child care-related problems in the institutions serving as residential homes for deprived children. Policies with regard to Care and Protection of children should be geared towards the provision of support, especially in terms of education for the orphaned and vulnerable children in both urban and rural settings.
- Voluntary associations could be formed, especially in urban areas to provide a family home with the warmth and attachment that characterise kinship fosterage. Studies (Abotchie 2008; Fiawoo 1978) of West African and Ghanaian urbanisation have shown various forms of voluntary associations, which usually have the welfare of the association through mutual beneficial activities that would have otherwise been performed by the kin group. Such organisations can also be restructured to take over some of the welfare functions of foster parents.

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# Chapter 3

## Urbanization and Poverty in Kinshasa: Thinking Beyond 2015 Millennium Development Goals

Clement Longondjo

### Introduction

During the Millennium Summit held in New York in 2000, the 189 Heads of State and Government including the Congolese Government agreed on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce some aspects of human poverty by 2015. The MDGs have called for a reduction in the percentage of people living on less than \$1 per day in 1990 to half by 2015 and eventually changed to \$1.25 in 2005. They have also called for the achievement of full and productive employment and decent work for all, especially for women and young people as well as reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger (UN 2012). If this is achieved, there will be a reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty to 890 million (UN 2012). By signing the MDGs, the international community recommitted itself to launch a concerted attack on poverty and hunger, among other issues, particularly in sub-Saharan African (SSA) cities, the region where the poverty is still a real challenge (UN-Habitat 2010). Reducing poverty and hunger have become a major concern for all humanity. The fight against poverty and hunger through the MDGs appears both as an international development goal and a slogan. In 2005, this was used to motivate the initiative such as the *British Make Poverty History* movement, the *Live 8 Consciousness-raising Rock Concerts* and the *Johannesburg-based Global Call to Action against Poverty* (UN 2012). However, Bond (2006) argues that the implementation processes associated with the MDGs have serious weaknesses.

Notwithstanding the recent improvements in SSA's economy, this has not translated into commensurate reductions in poverty and hunger (African Progress Panel

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2013). Based on this view, the World Bank (2008) observes that the population living in extreme poverty and hunger in the region has increased from 44.6 % in 1990 to 46.5 % in 2001, while the world's other developing countries have experienced a reduction in extreme poverty from 27.9 to 21.3 % over the same period. With barely 1 year remaining until 2015, available data indicate that many SSA countries have made no considerable progress in poverty and hunger reduction (United Nations 2012). Building on this argument, UN- Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon (2007) argues that Africa in general is currently off track and very slow in its implementation of the MDGs. On the contrary, countries such as South Africa and Botswana are on track and therefore are likely to achieve targets 1 and 2 of MDG1 by 2015.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is often represented as a typical case of “natural resource curse”: while its abundant natural wealth makes it hypothetically one of the richest nations on earth, its gross domestic product per head is among the lowest in the world (DSCR2011). In the view of this, the International Monetary Fund (2007) indicates that Congo has a poverty level at 71.34 % and unemployment rate at 73 %. Over 70 % of Congolese work in informal economy. In 2011, DRC was classified as poorest country in the world with GDP per capita of US \$95, or US \$0.25 per day, despite its current high economic growth rate of 8 % with per capita annual income of about US \$210 in 2011 (DSCR2011). Although the country at various levels of government has introduced various policies to achieve MDGs, including poverty reduction strategic documents, it is however worrisome to note that the plan of attaining the MDGs targets in the country still remains in doldrums.

Based on the researcher's personal observation and about 10 years of field work experience in Kinshasa, one is often prompted to ask: why do poverty and hunger remain largely unreduced in Kinshasa? What reasons could possibly account for this abnormality? What adaptation strategies have the local people adopted to cope with poverty and hunger in Kinshasa, and what should be the post-2015 perspectives and development agenda? This chapter discusses urbanization and poverty with regards to MDG1 in Kinshasa. It focuses on targets 1 and 2 of MDG1, namely *reducing the extreme poverty and hunger rate to half by 2015*. It further discusses local resilience through an informal economy amongst the *urban poor* and post-2015 agenda in the city.

## Urbanization, Poverty and the MDGs

Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) is the fastest urbanizing continent in the world and will in 2030 cease being predominantly rural with an urban rate of 3.4 % (UH-Habitat 2010). In 2009, Africa's total population exceeded one billion, of which 395 million, almost 40 %, lived in urban areas. This urban population will grow to one billion in 2040, and to 1.23 billion in 2050, by which time 60 % of all Africans will be living in cities (UH-Habitat 2010). The exceptional growth of many cities in many developing countries is the result of a threefold structural change process: the

transition away from agricultural employment, high overall population growth, and increasing urbanization rates (Gugler 1996), as well as natural population growth. Millions of the world's urban population today has limited access to the human basic needs and live in extreme poverty. The World Bank (2010) argues that rapid urbanization accelerates poverty in cities especially in developing countries; it is estimated that about 30 % of the poor now live in urban areas and is projected that the proportion will reach 50 % in 2035. Based on this trend, Satterthwaite (2003) reported that poverty is becoming an urban phenomenon and is growing rapidly. This is becoming very serious in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2013), Wresinskyi quoted by Ajodo-Adebanjoko and Walter (2014: 364) "*that a lack of basic security leads to chronic poverty when it simultaneously affects several aspects of people's lives, when it is prolonged and when it severely compromises people's chances of regaining their rights and of reassuming their responsibilities in the foreseeable future*" indicated that a lack of basic security leads to chronic poverty when it simultaneously affects several aspects of people's lives, when it is prolonged and when it severely compromises people's chances of regaining their rights and of reassuming their responsibilities in the foreseeable future. Chronic poverty depends also on the duration and intensity in which an individual or household is living in poverty (Satterthwaite 2003). Rural areas experience more extreme poverty where 76 % of the developing world's poor lived in 2010 than the urban area, and significant high rates of extreme poverty that continue to lag on most MDGs are found in the least urbanized regions including South Asia and SSA (Joint World Bank and IMF report 2013). In these places, undernourishment is intimately linked to poverty. It is against this backdrop that the Food and Agriculture Organization (2009) noted that poverty is the principal cause of hunger and undernourishment. The number of hungry people worldwide is estimated to be 963 million or 14.6 % of about 6.6 billion in the world population. This represents an increase of 142 million from the figure for 1990–1992. The World Bank (2013) observes that even though the rates of undernourishment have dropped from 28.7 % in 1990 to 17.9 % in 2010, but over 100 million children aged about 5 years remain underweight. While in upper middle income countries considerable progress was made to reduce the number of children under age of 5 that are underweight from 12.5 to 3 % in 2010, the situation has been worse in low and lower middle income countries where malnutrition prevalence remained highest, either 23 % in 1990 to 24.6 % in 2010 (World Bank 2013).

## Urban Poverty in Kinshasa and MDGs

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009) argues that a large proportion of the Congolese are poor and that poverty is complex including: poor nutrition, low income, inability to access health care and education, scarcity of decent housing, etc. The consumption of the poorest represents just 7.8 % of national consumption and nearly 80 % of households agree they are not able to meet their



basic needs, and the human development index is much lower than the average of African countries (DSCR2011). In Kinshasa, young people aged 15–24 are more affected by unemployment. Their unemployment rate of 32.23 % is significantly higher than the national average 17.8 % (UNDP 2009). Tollens (2002) for instance observes that food situation in Kinshasa in general remained precarious, calorie intake between 1990 and 2001 have plummeted. The proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy increased from 31 to 73 % in 2001. He added that Congolese diet is essentially vegetarian, a high proportion of calories from cereals, tubers, palm oil and pulses. The consumption of meat and fish has very low caloric intake. Most households have one meal a day. Also, 44 % of households have no food reserves, and this proportion is 56 % in urban centers.

The World Bank (2008) reported that the percentage of the Congolese population living in cities has increased from 22 % in 1960 to 33 % in 2007 and poverty is higher in rural than in urban areas (75.72 % against 61.4 %). Poverty has moved from rural areas to become an urban phenomenon. Poverty indicators in the country are higher than regional standards, even though the indicators show that it has improved in recent years (OECD 2008). The Government of the DRC committed since 2008 in developing a strategy to make a scaling to reduce gaps in the achievement of MDGs. To this end, in December 2008, it developed and validated a national plan for MDGs, entitled “Document Advocacy for Resource Mobilization of the MDGs.” This national poverty strategy document revealed the inability of the country to achieve the MDG targets in a stable macroeconomic framework in 2015 and the need for the country to postpone and attain these targets in 2020 but with a commitment to achieve by 2015 if the socio-economic context favored (DSCR2011).

Poverty and hunger remain stagnant in Kinshasa, despite recent improvements in some indicators such as education and child mortality (DSCR2011). There is progress, but much needs to be done in achieving the MDGs in the city. Unemployment is very high in the city, with women and young people as the mostly affected. Seventy seven percent of the population is either unemployed or underemployed (DSCR2011). The International Labour Organization (2009) notes that the global unemployment rate increased to 6.0 % in 2008 from 5.7 % in 2007 and that female and youth are more vulnerable; they are more likely to lose their jobs or to suffer income losses. In view of this, the national data indicate that only 28 % of women receive a salary. This percentage of women in paid employment is less about half of that of men and it is much lower than in Uganda (69 %), in Burundi (77 %) and Rwanda (79 %) (Herderschee et al. 2012). The inequalities have slightly regressed in the city, but it is still higher compared to regional standards; however, women still remain disadvantaged compared to men, as well as children being a very vulnerable social group to poverty in the city (DSCR2011).

The infant mortality rate for children under the age of 5 years is about 15 %; infant mortality rates fell from 126 per 1,000 births in 2001 to 89 in 2008, and the maternal mortality rate increased from 1,289 to 944 per 100,000 births during the same period. Only 22 % of the Congolese population has access to safe drinking water and less than 10 % of population has access to electricity (Herderschee et al. 2012). MDG1 on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger evolves positively through

18 % in 2000 to 13 % in 2010 and in the fight against hunger; the proportion of the population with less than US \$1 per day was 58.8 % (DSCR2P2 2011). A monthly household income study conducted in Kisenso, one of poorest areas of Kinshasa, is US \$71 for an average 8 persons. They spent 39 % of their income on food, followed by 22 % on energy, water and soap, 12 % on transport and 11 % on housing, 8 % on education and 6 % on health (Tollens 2002). Based on the national data, progress has been made in the country in general and Kinshasa in particular as primary school enrollment slowly increased (from 64 % in 2006 to 80 % in 2008) because of the participation of religious organizations and non-government organizations (NGOs) (DSCR2P2 2011).

The level of the Human Poverty Index in Kinshasa experienced an increment of 3 % points between 2001 and 2006, and the Growth Development Product (GDP) is improving (World Bank 2007). The simulations based on data from surveys conducted after 2005 indicate that poverty has declined slightly from 71 to 70 % between 2005 and 2007 and inequality also has moved very little (DSCR1P1 2006). This is very slow; if the same trend continues until 2015, the city will not achieve the MDGs<sup>1</sup> in 2015. The survey on the perceptions of living conditions of households conducted by BERCI (2004) indicates that 73.5 % of households feel poor, which is close to the level of objective poverty 70 %. This has affected the morale of households that believed that poverty would decrease to 30 % in 2010.

## **Resilience Through an Informal Economy Amongst *Urban Poor* in Kinshasa**

Most households in Kinshasa live in precarious conditions or extreme poverty. Therefore, they have adopted the diet schedule called *delestage* (shedding) where children eat once per 2 days. In view of this, Trefon (2004) indicates that “nearly 50 % of Kinshasians (which is what the people of Kinshasa call themselves) eat only one meal per day and 25 % eat only one meal every two days” (12). For the households with 8 children, 4 children eat today and another 4 children wait their turn in the following day. The parents have to eat every day because they need energy to go to work and earn money to take care of the whole family. Built on this observation, Tollens (2002) argues that eating in Kinshasa is more of a challenge today than at any time before. In support to this observation, Herderschee et al. (2013) in their study on employment in the DRC have highlighted the persistent food insecurity in Kinshasa which is compounded by lack of employment. They all appear to have been introduced suddenly, as community-based responses and adaptation to extreme poverty and lack of employment in the formal sector, socio-economic and political constraints and particularly the failing state and formal private sector in providing basic services. They clearly indicate spontaneous social-economic innovations and they fulfill a state bankruptcy due to neo-liberalism policies. This section briefly

discusses a few mechanisms of urban resilience to extreme poverty in Kinshasa. Some of these innovations have been discussed in detail by Tollens and Nzeza. What is particularly interesting is that these socio-economic innovations emerged sometime in the 1990s in response to extreme poverty and unemployment as a means of survival as well as alternative solutions to their day-to-day problems. These include:

(a) ***Les Cambistes: money changers***

There are thousands of people in Kinshasa who exchange foreign currencies in the streets and public spaces commonly called *cambistes* (*outlaw or alternative bankers*). Most of them are university graduates who have not had the opportunity to obtain jobs in the formal sector after their studies and therefore engage themselves in the profession for their survival. This was started by a few women who wanted currency to trade textiles, *super soso*, with cross-river Brazzaville. The activity became a profession in late 1990s with the dollarization of the Congolese economy due to hyperinflation of Congolese currency, *Francs*. Mainly women at first, today huge numbers of men are involved in changing money. Nzeza (2004) and Tollens (2002) described the activities of *cambistes* in Kinshasa. They are largely found in the areas of Kinshasa, along the main roads assembled in the group of two or three people, they sit in front of makeshift stands composed of cardboard boxes or wooden crates covered by a big umbrella. Some of them display openly the bricks of Congolese Francs; this depends on degree of security and surveillance, while they have their cash hidden in a plastic bag under their stand pretending to be selling sweets and cigarettes. Kinshasa actually works in a group of two or three people. *Cambistes* exchange all foreign currencies with a margin of interest for their survival. They take advantage of their clients in different ways such as: not putting enough bills into the bricks, inserting smaller denominations than bargained for, or inserting worn-out bills, and they counterfeit bills; for instance, when a client comes with his currency, the *cambiste* takes the bills in hand, shuffle through her plastic bag of cash and return by use of sleight-of-hand, a counterfeit bill, claiming that she does have enough cash in the bag to make the deal. While all *Kinois* are aware that the *cambistes* practice all kinds of fraud to take advantage of their clients, they still rely on their services due to the complexity and dysfunction of the official banking system.

(b) ***Les mamans manoeuvres or mamans bipupula: Crafty port traders***

Several poor women in Kinshasa are involved in this activity for their livelihoods. This consists of facilitating the grouping of buyers and in the repartition of the produce among buyers in food markets. They split up big produce in smaller parts for a small fee. Nzeza (2004) and Tollens (2002) for instance have also described in detail the activities of the crafty port traders in Kinshasa. When the boat is anchored at the beach, they are the first to board to make deals with sellers in the agricultural produce such as bush meat, smoked fish, manioc, maize, caterpillars and traditional pharmacopoeia. After targeting the produce, they would negotiate with the sellers. They craftily persuade the sellers that unscrupulous port officials

will hoodwink them if they disembark their goods themselves. They take the offensive by combining a maternal attitude with disdain. They cultivate a relationship of superiority by treating the new arrival as villagers, naïve country bumpkins. Based on the above arguments, Nzeza (2004) argues that they “take possession of the merchandise in a kind of blitzkrieg manoeuvres” (25). They double their profit, but also they inflate food prices in the market. Most sellers find themselves with no choice, even though they are reluctant to accept money from the crafty port traders, because they need cash to pay their transport fares.

(c) ***Les Kadhafis or les chayeurs: fuel on the spot—for a price***

Fuel has been seen since the Mobutu era an indicator for price fixing for all commodities. Once fuel prices increase, the prices of other commodities increase as well. Consequently, the Congolese government sets the price for imported petroleum products in an attempt to control inflation, but also to limit the negative impacts on speculation. This has been unsuccessful; Congolese economy is still dominated by speculation and inflation, particularly in the fuel market. Fuel speculators in the city are called *Kadhafis* in reference to Libya’s former president M. Kadhafi, who distinguished himself as the main supplier of petrol to Congo. Nzeza (2004), for instance, described the activities of *Kadhafis* in Kinshasa. He qualifies them as “fuel retailers who always seem to have some fuel on hand even during the shortage periods, in the most unlikely places or at any time of day or night” (Nzeza 2004, 28). They are qualified by their clients as emergency service. Several fuel garages in Kinshasa have adopted a system of rationing by closing their businesses when supplies become low or/and when there are speculations of a price increase; then *Kadhafis* take over, selling fuel up to five times the official price. Similar to money changers, they also take advantage of their clients in different ways through some tricks up their sleeves. Some of these tricks include selling 5 l jugs with wrong bottoms of wax so the purchaser ends up with only a portion of the amount agreed upon, mixing petrol with cheaper fuels, and spreading false speculations about forthcoming fuel increases (Nzeza 2004). *Kadhafis* are very united, especially in cases of external harassment even though they compete among themselves to survive.

(d) ***Malewa: Street food traders***

One of the strategies spontaneously introduced in Kinshasa as a response to hunger and malnutrition as a result of poverty and unemployment is *malewa*. Mainly undertaken by women, street food businesses in the city are a livelihood source for poor households. Street food is not only a way of cheap food consumption in Kinshasa but also as a source of income for poor households (Iyenda 2001). Thousands of women in the city prepare and sell a wide range of ready-to-eat foods and beverages. They locate their stalls along the streets at the intersection of major roads, public places to gain access to the mix of commercial, residential and business properties, to the lorry stations, schools, construction sites and all locations where there is a high number of customers. Consumers range from a variety of social backgrounds, transcending income groups, gender, age and education. Stalls are

made of wood and erected daily by their owners with meat, cassava, fish, chicken, and other food being cooked on the spot. Therefore, it becomes a large source of employment in Kinshasa, offering informal job opportunities for both skilled and unskilled individuals that cannot find a job in the formal sector. Street food traders in Kinshasa operate under inhospitable conditions, with no basic facilities, and under constant fear of harassment and damage to their goods.

**(e) *Les chargeurs*: facilitating public transport**

Getting transport to go to work and to get back home in rush hours is a major concern in many areas of Kinshasa. There is a huge brawl to get into the public transport. This is even worse for women, elders and children who some time spends 3–5 h to get in the taxi. Mostly young men, the *chargeurs* in Kinshasa assemble at bus and taxi stops at the city's transport nodes to facilitate boarding of public transport for a fee. There are three actors intervene in public transport in Kinshasa including drivers, receivers who load passengers on board and collect fares and *chargeur* who help unlucky passengers find a seat for fee. During hours where taxis are infrequent, both drivers and receiver stay relaxed. There is no *queue* to get access to the taxi and there are more passengers than seats. For women, elders and children are difficult to find a seat. Nzeza (2004) argue that those who have neither an aggressive temperament nor physical strength or those who have no tolerance for the unbearable closeness that a collective taxi ride will entail, will have to wait for the accessible taxi. Conversely, solution to this stressful situation is in the hand of the facilitator. Facilitator finds a place for those who do not want to struggle for a seat, he bargains both from drivers and passengers: – the passengers pay him for finding a place and the driver will reward him for having stewarded passengers into place.

**(f) *Charognards or moineaux*: solid waste scavengers**

Several *Kinois* (men, women and children) are making a living through informal activities such as sweeping, itinerant waste deals, recycling and collection of waste. Despite the fact that this sector is prevalent in many cities of the developing world, the intensity and context in which it has evolved in Kinshasa shows the degree of poverty. Solid waste collection in the form of scavenging has come to play an important role in contributing to the urban food basket of a significant number of households in Kinshasa. Scavenging has suddenly emerged as strategies for poverty alleviation and food security for many urban poor. It entails picking recyclable elements from mixed waste where it may be temporarily accessible or disposed of, and then manually dismantling or cleaning the recyclable elements such as bottles, plastic containers, cartoon boxes, and electricity equipment, for resale at different outlets. Scavenging in Kinshasa has a huge participation of children as a means of a survival strategy response to extreme poverty and employment by the urban poor, a strategy that is preferred to begging in the street and stealing.

**(g) *Cireurs*: shoes shiners**

One of the innovations introduced spontaneously in Kinshasa as result of poverty and unemployment is shoe polishing and repair. Thousands of people, mainly children, in the city polish and repair shoes as a survival strategy for poor households.

*Cireurs* walk along the streets, at the intersection of major roads and public places to gain access to the mix of commercial, residential and business premises, schools, and all locations where there is a high number of customers. Equipped with a bag containing repair and polishing products and materials, they ring their brushes to attract customers' attention. Some of them place their stands made of wood and erected daily by their owners with all repair and polishing products and materials. Therefore, it becomes a large source of employment in Kinshasa, offering informal job opportunities for both the skilled and unskilled that cannot find a job in the formal sector.

(h) ***Les groupeurs or commissionnaires: Commission agents***

There are some innovations that have spontaneously appeared in the food market such as *groupeurs*. They involve several men and women in Kinshasa in providing information about where to find quality goods or food with the cheapest prices. Tollens (2002) discussed in more detail the characteristics and activities of *groupeurs* or *commissionnaires* in Kinshasa. They look for goods, reserve them for buyers, group them and store them. They are assisted by “*éclairieurs*” who work for particular buyers or transporters and guide them to places where they can have the best deals. They get paid from both buyers and sellers after making a deal for them, and this is what ensures their survival. Then there are the *groupeurs* or *commissionnaires*, who in the interior look for goods, reserve them for buyers, group them and store them. They act as intermediaries between traders (large scale and small scale), find clients, and propose deals. They may propose the split of loads in order to meet the volume requirements of buyers. They may either buy the goods themselves or just act as mediators or brokers.

They essentially provide information about where food products are, at what price and under which conditions. Among this category of innovation, there are also the *drogadeurs*, informal sector dockers that load/unload boats in makeshift, occasional ports, outside the control of the official port authorities and official, formal sector dockers. Sometimes, they may guide a boat to a particular port location where they can operate without the *tracasseries* usually encountered in the official port of Kinshasa and the *ngundeurs* or *middlemen*, small-scale traders that, during the main marketing campaign, live in rural villages and look out for the cheapest prices and best deals. They may work on their own or on commission for a large scale trader.

The perception of poor as seen by *Kinois* themselves is quite different with common perception. For *Kinois*, poor is someone else, someone who has lost the hope to rise up. They consider being called poor as an insult and derogatory. They prefer to be considered as needy rather than a poor. They believe that any time their lives could be changed for good with the expression *chance eloko pamba* which literally means “luck is nothing” to “one day is one day”. They strongly believe their lives could improve at any time. This positive perception of *Kinois* is rooted by the African social tradition of *ubuntu*, which is translated as solidarity. With African solidarity, it is rare to see an African in the community living in poverty and in total lack.

## **Constraints to Poverty Reduction and Post-2015 MDGs Perspectives**

As earlier said, poverty has not decreased in Kinshasa, despite the internal development aids and recent economic growth in the country. The post-2015 agenda should be process oriented and with transformative outcomes. It should also take into consideration existing inequalities, particularly among the communities and different sizes of towns and cities in the urban context. There are many constraints to poverty reduction in Kinshasa. This paper discusses briefly the main constraints:

### **(a) *Political instability and armed conflicts***

Civil unrest is a critical constraint to poverty alleviation. War is among the critical challenges to poverty and hunger alleviation. It is difficult to meet the MDGs in a conflict country such as DRC that has known over two centuries of armed conflicts. Rapid urbanization in Kinshasa is largely owed to war in the country, which has led millions of people into Kinshasa for safety. Even if there are funds available for food, health and education, the risk may be great for the buildings to be destroyed through war. War zones are not enabling businesses to create jobs. Safety is a huge problem; for example, parents fear sending their children to school because in some areas there are mines buried along the road. The post-2015 development agenda should promote peace and political stability. The implementation of poverty reduction requires political, socio-economic and environmental stability, without which all poverty reduction efforts will be ineffective.

### **(b) *Bad Governance***

Without good governance all efforts for poverty reduction may be in vain, despite economic improvements. Former UN-Secretary Kofi Annan during the World Economic Forum (WEA) regional meeting for Africa held in May (2013) Cape Town South Africa has called for transparency and good governance as a strategy for poverty alleviation in Africa. Poor governance creates inefficiencies and loss of productivities in all sectors. It discourages the creation of businesses and private investments, and therefore encourages capital and revenue loss, as well as job drain. Poor governance leads to the poor performance of small and medium enterprises in the formal sector. It also leads to corruption by government agencies and officials. The post-2015 goals should promote transparency and good governance. Good governance will help Africa out of poverty, joblessness and inequality (African Progress Panel 2013). The national governments need to create a framework for the expansion of the private sector. In addition, the informal sector should be formalized given the importance it has in dealing with poverty in Kinshasa. Fighting corruption, promoting decentralization and the roles of local organizations as well as disarticulation between top-down and bottom-up approaches in local development, involvement of poor in poverty policy formulation should dominate the post-2015

governance agenda. Meeting most of the MDGs in urban areas depends on much-improved performance by local organizations (government agencies, NGOs, community-based organizations and private enterprises).

**(c) *Inaccurate statistics and inappropriate criteria for assessing poverty present***

The Congolese poverty and hunger alleviation policy and strategy documents for both the international institutions and Congolese government are based on estimations and deductive conclusions of the surveys done within a proportion of population. Last census in the DRC was held in 1984 and almost 30 years of civil unrest has left the country without any demographic document. Inaccurate statistics is a big constraint to poverty reduction in Kinshasa. The statistics currently used to assess the number of poor in Kinshasa and the levels of their provision are inaccurate and based on inappropriate criteria. Therefore, post-2015 poverty alleviation and development planning agenda should be based on accurate statistics data.

**(d) *Inequality and redistribution***

Inequality is a real poverty reduction constraint in Kinshasa. The city is one of the most inequitable communities in the world with a growing income gap between rich and poor. The high rate of economic growth enjoyed in the country and the city benefits only a few individuals or groups in power; nothing is benefited to a large segment of population. Economic growth has been unevenly distributed. The African progress report 2013 warned that growing inequality threatens to end Africa and that despite an improving economy overall on the continent, the levels of inequality continue to increase. Post-2015 poverty and hunger agenda in Kinshasa should take account of broad existing inequalities between communities, but also between rural and urban areas.

**(e) *Macroeconomic stability and growth***

Poverty reduction depends first on sustainable economic growth based on good macroeconomic framework and policies. The Congolese economy is unstable and its economic growth is based on agriculture and mining sectors. However, agriculture does not provide enough employment for urban dwellers (DRC, DSCR2011), whereas the mining market is very unstable with fluctuating prices. The post-2015 agenda should promote industrialization. The export-oriented industrialization led to labour intensity and poverty reduction. Furthermore, the constraint to poverty reduction in the DRC, including Kinshasa, is also the deficit of access to basic energy consumption. Access to reliable and affordable energy remains an essential prerequisite for combating poverty and hunger. A significant proportion >10 % of the population in DRC lack access even to the most basic energy supplies and services (DRC, DSCR2011). Besides, climate change is increasingly considered as a present and future cause of hunger and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. Increasing drought, flooding, changing climatic patterns requiring a shift in crops and farming practices that may not be easily accomplished are three key issues (UN 2012).



## Conclusions and Policy Implications

This paper has presented the facts and evidence on urban poverty and hunger in the context of the targets 1 and 2 and of the MDG1 in Kinshasa and revealed the processes through which the agenda of these targets can be met in post-2015. Barely 1 year left, Kinshasa will fall short of achieving these targets. The city knows an extreme and chronic poverty characterized by total deprivation of all human basic needs, which classifies it amongst the poorest cities in the world. The assessment criteria and definition of poverty in Kinshasa need to consider the local context. The *Kinois* should be contacted for firsthand information before any strategies to reduce poverty in the city are implemented. They have experienced extreme, chronic poverty and deprivation of basic human needs for centuries. Poverty in Kinshasa is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. Community-based innovations as responses and adaptation to extreme poverty and lack of employment need to be recognized, documented and disseminated in the other cities in SSA. Among the constraints in achieving targets 1 and 2 of MDG1 in Kinshasa include poor governance combined with political instability, lack of youth employment and nutrition policies, rapid population growth and growing inequalities, among other factors. Above all, the most important entry point for a transformative and equitable post-MDG agenda in Kinshasa will be poverty and hunger. The study suggests the need to promote industrialization, good governance and political stability and peace as new a development agenda to reduce poverty. The informal economy needs to be recognized and integrated into the post-2015 economic policy in the city. The most significant of all for addressing targets 1 and 2 of the MDG1 post 2015 is to move towards an urban policy regime which provides all urban residents the “Right to the City” as adopted by many countries in the developing cities. Recent economic reforms in cities are negatively affecting the enfranchisement of urban dwellers; hence, the “Right to the City” is a way to respond to neo-liberal urbanism, to better empower urban residents and reduce urban poverty and hunger.

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# Chapter 4

## Women's Access to Land and Economic Empowerment in Selected Nigerian Communities

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### Introduction

Studies have been carried out on women's contributions to household and national economy, especially in the area of agriculture and food security (Enete and Amusa 2010; Fabiyi et al. 2007; Sofa Team and Doss 2011). One area that lacks adequate research is gender access and ownership rights to land and its implication on the wealth<sup>1</sup> of women. Theoretically, the Nigerian land use Act of 1978 gives men and

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<sup>1</sup>In this study, wealth and economic empowerment are used interchangeably because both of them represent the economic sustenance of the individual.

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women equal right to access and own land; in practical terms, women unlike their male counterparts are handicapped in making decisions on the acquisition, use and disposal of the very important piece of real estate.

The implication of lack of land access and ownership rights have tended to compromise women's access to credit facilities, among others, due to lack of collateral. Some other implications include deterrence of investment opportunities and inhibition of land transactions that accounts for loss of gains from such transactions (Besley and Ghatak 2010; Isaksson 2011). In developing countries, land provides secured income opportunities for the rural poor and often constitutes the primary source of livelihood (Osabuohien 2014). Rural poor can use their lands for agricultural activities, sale or lease and earn economic returns from such activities. More so, women who constitute the majority of the rural poor, (Danziger 2009) more often depend on land for sustainability.

Women, requiring land for sustainability or put differently, enhancing women's economic empowerment through land right security, has received much policy attention. Efforts have now been put in place to ensure women's land rights in new land-registration and formalization programs (Doss et al. 2014). The Ugandan case has been mentioned, where the government is putting up measures to ensure a far-reaching legal framework to address a history of often land-related conflict and tribal division, end gender discrimination in land access, and provide a guideline to bring about optimum use of available land resources to contribute to social and economic development. Among the most prominent of these frameworks is the recently launched program that addresses land tenure regularization (Ali et al. 2014). These efforts are even more prominent due to the rapid increase in the rate of foreign land acquisition around the world and the consequent displacement of land owners of their inheritance (Cotula et al. 2009; Deininger et al. 2011).

Not neglecting that women are most affected in the case of unsecured land rights, especially due to discrimination against their access to, ownership and control of the land (Kleinbooi and Lahiff 2007), it is important to note that secured land rights have their consequences. This includes that it has the potential to create a high risk of elite capture of large land areas with efficient and inequitable outcomes.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, it can lead to reduced engagement in other human development activities like education, since rural dwellers can take the sale of land as their means of livelihood and withdraw their educational plans. Despite these adverse outcomes, it cannot be denied that the benefits of land rights exceed the adverse implications. Most especially, women currently hold ownership to less than 2 % of the global land (Allendorf 2007).

To confront the issue of land rights, however, there is budding empirical evidence that has observed the micro implication of land rights on women (e. g. Doss et al. 2014; Isaksson 2011; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Interestingly, some of the conclusions of these studies are fragmentary, and their conclusions are targeted at land security and at best, some have focused on implication of land tenure on children's welfare (Allendorf 2007). Thus, we ask an important question, whether land rights

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<sup>2</sup> See Holden and Otsuka (2014).

even improve the wealth of women; this is because not much attention has been aimed at assessing the impact of land rights on the wealth of rural women in Nigeria. The closest study in this regard is Deininger et al. (2006), who examined the economic impact of legislative revision of land rights in Uganda. However, this current study differs markedly in some respect: we are focusing on customary land rights and wealth of women, while they focused on knowledge of new land laws in Uganda and its effect on land security and transferability.

The present paper has valuable contributions. For the global drive towards enhancing women's right to land to have more credence, it is important to understand how these rights affect the well-being of women, and in this case, wealth. This should help guide the policy formulation processes and provide a point of reference, based on empirical underpinnings, for the need to enhance women's land rights. Importantly, an improvement in women's access to land and land rights has a broad consequence on the attainment of the reduction of national poverty. Since women in most African countries are more prone to poverty, an understanding of the role of land in enhancing their welfare and wealth will be insightful for policy action.

Moreover, a study like this that emphasizes women's right from a micro perspective will have important implications for research. In particular, it highlights the micro dimension to the implication of land on individual wealth, unlike other studies that have reached conclusions on aggregate data. Osabuohien (2014) elaborately describes the need for more studies that focus on in-country dynamics and implications of land issues. There are diverse implications of women's limited access to land such as a shift in the household dynamics, roles and income generation that is prevalent based on the fact that in most of these households, women fend for the family, among others. Thus this study focuses on economic empowerment of women, which implies a broad development process that facilitates self-reliance and self-esteem through allowing active participation in development decision-making and achieving gender equality. The main objectives include: to examine the direction of relationship between women access to land and their economic empowerment; and explore how individual and households attributes interact with women's economic empowerment through land rights.

In addition, Nigeria is an emerging key player in the African continent given its socio-economic and political standing, which makes research findings from her insightful for other African countries. Since women in most African countries are more prone to poverty, an understanding of the role of land in enhancing their economic empowerment will be insightful for policy action. In addition, from six pillars' of the Common African Position (CAP) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda adopted January 31, 2014 at the 22nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union; prominent among them is the issue of structural economic transformation and inclusive growth as well as people-centred development. The remainder of the paper is distributed as follows: a brief literature review is presented in the second section, while the third section contains the data and empirical strategy that is applicable for this study. We present the empirical results and discussions in the fourth section, and then followed with conclusions in the fifth section.

## Literature Review

Across the literature, the concepts of *gender* and *land* are two very important issues that have engaged the attention of development scholars. In many African societies, land represents an important cultural resource or a productive factor and capital asset. However, the land rights are an important factor that determines the ability of land to materialize into economic values. By land rights, it implies the variety of legitimate claims to land and the benefits and products produced on that land. This speaks about an individual having the right to drive economic or non-economic value from the ownership and usage of land.

Some African countries are driving at empowering women's access to land, but the outcomes of their programs vary. Ali et al. (2014), evaluated the short-term impact of a pilot land regularization program in Rwanda using a geographic discontinuity design with spatial fixed effects. This program was aimed at regularizing land rights in Rwanda and among their findings include that the program has improved land access for legally married women and has prompted better recording of inheritance rights without gender bias. They also found that the program was associated with a larger impact on investment and maintenance of soil conservation measures, especially for female headed households. The reason why the program had much impact on women, especially female headed households, is that this group had previously suffered from high levels of tenure insecurity, which the program has addressed to some extent.

There is the need to consider the effect of the patriarchal social system on women's perspective to land issues. The patriarchal societal system already subjugates women's rights, and improving their land tenure will be an avenue to improve their economic value. Interestingly, these women already have a conservative attitude towards land issues and would rather decline from land issues than become involved. Kleinbooi and Lahiff (2007) agree and traced women's conservativeness to the patriarchal system of land holding. They also found that few women were willing to challenge the highly gendered nature of land rights within families, and women generally feel excluded from public processes around land.

Studies on land rights and its implication on women have reached diverse conclusions. Nidhiya et al. (2014) studied women's land rights and their implications on children's human capital in Vietnam. They used a matched household sample from Vietnam's 2004 and 2008 Household Living Standards Survey, and found that female-only held land-use rights decreased the incidence of illness among children, but increased their health insurance coverage, raised school enrolment, and enhanced household expenditures toward food and away from alcohol and tobacco. Allendorf (2007) earlier studied how women's land rights promote empowerment and child care in Nepal using the 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey and concluded that women that own land are significantly more likely to have the final say in household decisions, which is one of the indicators of empowerment. Similarly, children from mothers who own land are significantly less likely to be severely underweight.

Wanyeki (2003) proposed that women need not have a sole right to land but they can co-own it, which can also affect their economic values. The author found that women may co-own land with their husband, though this poses some difficulties for the women, especially when women have different priorities from their husband, they run the risk of being handicapped in land decision making on acquisition, use and disposal of this very important real estate. Further discrimination against the less powerful group tends to arise from these biases, so the recognition of equal rights for women and men is fundamental to any process attempting to rectify imbalances that result from privileging one group over the other. Doss et al. (2014) cautioned against the notion that women can co-own land with their husband. They observed from the study of Ugandan households that, though many households admit that land are co-owned with their women, women are less likely to be listed on ownership documents and have fewer rights over the land.

## Data and Empirical Strategy

### *Overview of the Study Site—Ota*

Land is an important commodity for *Ota* indigenes. This is partly because of the large span of land with a small population compared to other settlements in Nigeria. Approximately, *Ota* occupies a land area of 1,460 km<sup>2</sup> (360,774 Acres, i.e. 2,164,644 plots<sup>3</sup>), with a population of about 500,000 people, implying that the ratio of the persons living in *Ota* to the number of available plots is about 1 person to 4 plots. More so, since *Ota* is situated near the boundary of Lagos State and has steadily grown to be the largest industrial town in Ogun State, one of the 36 states in Nigeria (Egwakhe and Osabuohien 2009), there is no questioning why the demand for their land is high.

The location of this study presents an insightful contribution to the discourse on land rights. *Ota*, which is our focus community, is a rural location in Ogun State (one of the South-Western states of Nigeria) and has steadily grown to be the second largest industrial town in Nigeria due to land availability for foreign investors. More than 80 % of *Ota* indigenes have ancestral lands that are used for commercial activities and livelihood. This has given rise to the maxim, “As crude oil is to the *Niger-Deltans* so is land to the *Ota* people,” which depicts the importance of land as a principal economic resource to this locality. Among the main commercial activities that land is used for, is its sale to land buyers. This has remained the stock of trade for the indigenes and has degenerated into some social vile like: resale of land to other investors causes a series of lawsuits and sometimes, irresolvable disputes; *thuggery*, which arises when there is a forceful reclaim of land that has earlier been

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<sup>3</sup>This is about 146,000 hectares (ha) using 1 acre=0.40469 ha.



sold; and peddling of weaponry to the youths for community clashes that are mostly related to land issues.

Prior to the era of industrialization and manufacturing activities that *Ota* is known for today, agriculture was the mainstay of the economy. However, most of the lands in *Ota* are put forward for sale by the indigenes popularly called *Omo onile*—a colloquial expression for the child of the owners of the land—and this has become a booming economic activity. This is despite the large concentration of industries besides Lagos state. It suffices to note that the industrial development of *Ota* which provides employment opportunities for the increasing population of job seekers have attracted a high rate of human traffic and consequent hike in prices of residential accommodation and general cost of living. On the other hand, increasing economic activities in *Ota* have resulted in rapid infrastructural development, in terms of availability of basic infrastructure (pipe borne water, electricity and good roads). The major challenge of the people is the increasing demand for housing, which is being attended to by the establishment of Government Housing Estates in addition to the effort of private developers.

## *Data*

The data for this study are part of a larger project conducted in 2014 to understand the land issues in *Ota*, Ogun State, Nigeria. The data were collected during the project from a total of 22 communities in *Ota*.

The quantitative data include household and intra-household surveys, where both household heads and individuals that are living in the household were those that constitute the survey targets. The questionnaires were administered to a total of 498 individuals; 145 women and 338 men in the 22 communities. The communities are defined household settlement areas that are recognized by the local government. In each of the communities, individuals were randomly selected without any particular sequence. This implies that any individual, who lived in any of these target communities, and they were made to fill the questionnaire. The reason for this is that the *Ota* region did not present an orderly distinction of the districts; this therefore makes it difficult to mark the districts and ensure that people from the districts are made to participate in the survey. We adopted the approach of making the potential respondent fill in the names of their community when filling the questionnaire.

Table 4.1 presents the list of the communities that were covered in the survey. From the Table, it is observed that the number of respondents per communities was unevenly distributed. This is because, apart from some challenges that were encountered during the conduction of the survey such as illiteracy, the sizes of the communities also differ, which was taken into consideration.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Some respondents held some suspicion that the interviewers were government officials, who needed the information for revenue drive or land reallocation.

**Table 4.1** List of communities surveyed and the number of participants

S/n	Community	Survey participants	S/n	Community	Survey participants
1	Ado-Odo Ota	139	12	Atan	34
2	Araromi Illupeju	1	13	Ayetoro	3
3	Asore	5	14	Benja	4
4	Iyana Iyesi	32	15	Dada Asalu	5
5	Afobaje	12	16	Davour	68
6	Agbala Itura	6	17	Egushi	13
7	Agbodike	15	18	Elejigbo	8
8	Aiyekoto	1	19	Fatokun	14
9	Alapoti	21	20	Ileriogo	14
10	Alesigbo	32	21	Iju	15
11	Asore Ala	14	22	Onibuku	42
		<b>Total</b>			<b>498</b>

Source: Field Survey

The survey was such that one member from each household was asked about land issues that are peculiar to their household and ancestral roots. For instance, questions like are there any family rules that relate to how land is distributed and who controls the land were asked. We ensured that the individuals that were selected were adults or youths that are informed about these issues. Some other questions relating to the household, such as household assets, consumption pattern, community factors, were also asked to the respondents. There were also provisions for the respondent to describe the community associations that govern land issues. The survey instrument was created in English and we employed the services of research assistants, who were indigenes and could ask the questions in the local dialect.

Of our primary respondents 69.98 % were male, while 29.81 % were female. The mean age of the male gender was 48 years, while for women, 44 years. In terms of land rights, the *Ota* community does not out-rightly discriminate on who owns the land based on gender. Although, this is not a general norm and practice, but most times, family rules are prominent in presiding over this process. Further statistics reveal that 87.97 % of the male gender had the right of decision over their lands, while 81.13 % of the women also have right of decision over their lands. This reverberates the fact that gender discrimination over land is not a major issue in *Ota*. Other relevant statistics, across gender, are presented in Table 4.2.

### ***Empirical Strategy***

The aim of this paper is to examine the existence and patterns of the effect of land rights on the wealth of women in *Ota*. To achieve this objective, we hinged on the analytical approach of Chiripanhura and Nino-Zarazua (2013), which is the latest empirical study, based on our knowledge, on household welfare in Nigeria. The

**Table 4.2** Descriptive statistics of respondents from the communities studied

	Men	Women
Gender (%)	69.98	30.02
Age (Average years)	48.00	43.00
Children (Average number of children)	4.00	4.00
Age of children (Mean age)	15.00	15.00
Household head (%)	97.00	51.00
Mean years in Ota	22.00	18.00
Education-University (%)	38.48	37.59
Secondary (%)	46.67	46.81
Lower education (%)	14.85	15.6
Household occupant (Mean number)	5.00	5.00
Own land in Ota (%)	86.48	85.16
Plots owned (Mean number)	4.00	2.00
Right over land (%)	87.97	81.31
Legal right-certificate of occupancy (%)	26.88	34.55
Monthly income (Mean amount in Naira)	69,727.00	64,175.00

Source: Field Survey

authors developed an empirical model that takes a logistic nature, where the outcome variable is welfare, which is expected to be explained by the individuals' characteristics (age of the respondent and whether the respondent is the household head) and household characteristics such as the dependency ratio of the household. We go further by including a land rights variable in the model and other forms of household characteristics. Thus, the following benchmark equation is:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Lr_i + \beta_2 PA_i + \beta_3 HH_i + \Phi_i + e_i \quad (4.1)$$

This signifies that the wealth ( $Y_i$ ) of women in Ota, is informed land right ( $Lr$ ), personal attribute of the individual ( $PA$ ) and household attribute ( $HH$ ), allowing for community fixed effects ( $\Phi_i$ ).

The outcome variable ( $wealth - Y_i$ ) is expected to improve with land rights. In this context, we measured the wealth of individuals as the average monthly income. This seems like the closest and most commonly used measure to determine the wealth of individuals in a given setting. This variable is called *wealth1*. From our data, women earn an average income of 64,175 Naira (about US\$399.47), which is marginally lower than that of men with the value of 69,727 Naira (about US\$434.03) as earlier shown in Table 4.1.

For robustness, we apply the strategy of Asiedu et al. (2012), who examined the socio-economic determinants of a particular set of adults in Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. They measured wealth by using a household index that comprised household ownership of consumable durable goods, source of drinking water, type of toilet facility and ownership of agricultural land. In this study, we

**Table 4.3** Items included in the wealth2 measure

	Male	Female
Household assets (mean of the count of assets)	1.02	1.03
Toilet facility (% of modern flush, water closet)	73.73	74.45
Refuse disposal (% using central refuse dump)	59.10	59.31
Rooms in the apartment (% living in a self-apartment)	57.02	59.16
Methods of cooking (% using gas/electric cooker)	24.48	35.71

Source: Field Survey

followed a similar pattern to develop an index called *wealth2*,<sup>5</sup> where we included the following variables: stock of household assets, type of toilet facility, how refuse is disposed, number of rooms in the apartment of the individual and method of cooking. For an overview, Table 4.3 presents the statistics of the items that was included in the index-*wealth2* across gender.

The explanatory variables include land right (*Lr*). Land right was measured following the approach of Isaksson (2011), who studied the determinant of unequal property rights in Uganda. The response to the question “Do you perceive yourself as having right to sell, mortgage or lease total land or owned land,” was used as the measure of land right. This variable is a dummy variable that takes the form of 1 if the response is “yes” or 0 if the response is “no.” Some other measures like the response to the question “how the land was acquired: bought, inherited or given as a gift,” would have been used as a measure of land right. However, some concerns prod this measure. The main concern is that an individual that acknowledges that the land was purchased, inherited or given may not necessarily signify right over the usage of the land. Some family rules can influence the rights over the land apart from the means of acquiring the land. Thus, our measure is further authenticated.

The covariates include personal attributes of the individual (*PA*). In this study, we included the position of the individual in the household (1, if the head and 0 otherwise), age of the individual, the educational attainment of the individual. These covariates were included based on consensus that are being reached on the factors that inform individuals’ earning capacity, income or welfare (Asiedu et al. 2012; Dahl and Lochner 2012; Sesabo and Tol 2005). The other covariate-household composition controls for household size (number of individuals living in the household), age composition (the number of children living in the household) and the number of years that the household has been residing in *Ota*. In line with logical reasoning, we cannot rule out that these household compositions affect the wealth of the household. For instance, a household with more number of occupants (household size) and children will incur more expenditure on sustenance and welfare, which will

<sup>5</sup>The household assets is a count variable of the assets in the respondents’ household. The assets of interest include motor cycle (popular means of transportation in these communities), car, TV set, fridge, air conditioner, beds and mattresses; generator sets (popular means of supply of electricity in these communities).

affect the wealth of the household. Likewise, a household that has had longer tenure in *Ota* will be able to understand the economic condition of the settlement and develop counter strategies to sustain their economic outputs. This may not be applicable in all cases, but at least it reduces the problems of unexplained variation in the model.

The baseline regression model (equation 1) was estimated using the Ordinary Least Square-OLS regression with community-fixed effects and heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. This estimation approach is considered relevant because it controls for unobserved community heterogeneity that can likely occur due to time-invariant community characteristics, which include: community by-laws, land associations dictates, and other informal institutional set-ups that are prevalent in the sampled communities. Since these heterogeneities are likely going to affect the land rights and perhaps, the extent of wealth in the sampled communities; then it is essential to apply a technique that incorporates these issues in its estimation process.

## Empirical Results and Discussions

To begin the empirical estimations, we performed a pre-test to observe the associations that exist between the variables and to determine if there is possible multicollinearity that can affect the efficiency of our estimated outputs. The correlation analysis is presented in Table 4.4, and there was no issue of multi-collinearity from the estimates in the Table. Most of the variables behaved as expected, except for land rights, which exerts a negative association with the two measures of wealth. However, the exact relationship will be established subsequently from our empirical estimations.

**Table 4.4** Correlation test among variables

	Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1)	Wealth1	1.000								
(2)	Wealth2	0.284	1.000							
(3)	Land right	-0.001	-0.075	1.000						
(4)	Age	0.108	0.060	0.220	1.000					
(5)	Household head	0.010	-0.062	0.182	0.269	1.000				
(6)	Education	0.396	0.413	-0.120	-0.202	-0.013	1.000			
(7)	Household occupant	-0.016	0.032	0.162	0.232	0.014	-0.123	1.000		
(8)	Age composition	-0.059	-0.090	0.179	0.521	0.079	-0.264	0.400	1.000	
(9)	Years residing in Ota	-0.220	-0.075	0.067	0.387	0.169	-0.349	0.034	0.271	1.000

Source: Field Survey

## Baseline Results

The result from the baseline regression analysis is presented in Table 4.5. Considering our variable of interest-*land right*, we could not establish a significant effect on the wealth of women in *Ota* communities. This was consistent in all the columns, even when we conducted the analysis in a stepwise form and all the variables were included separately in groups. It is important to note that the wealth of the women was measured as their average income. To support this result, we went further to show a chart of the average income of women with and without land rights (see Fig. 4.1 in the Appendix). This result seems to contradict some extant literature such as Allendorf (2007) and Nidhiya et al. (2014) that land rights enhance women's economic value, especially when considering the average income earned by women.

The behaviour of the other covariates de-emphasizes the role of women becoming household head. The coefficient was negative and significant in the second Column, which connotes that the women earning capacity, reduces by 0.346 when they take up the responsibility of becoming the household heads. The need for women education is also recalled: the variable reveals that income will increase

**Table 4.5** Regression analysis 1

Wealth: Average monthly income	1	2	3	4	5
		-0.108		-0.042	0.027
Land right		(0.676)		(0.873)	(0.922)
	0.021*	0.019**			0.026**
Age	(0.006)	(0.048)			(0.032)
	-0.145	-0.346***			-0.318***
Household head	(0.385)	(0.063)			(0.100)
	0.552*	0.496*			0.480*
Education	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)
			-0.140**	-0.093	-0.057
Household occupant			(0.011)	(0.139)	(0.392)
			0.068	0.038	-0.009
Age composition			(0.257)	(0.593)	(0.916)
			-0.019**	-0.018**	-0.015***
Years residing in Ota			(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.064)
	8.045*	8.528*	11.371*	11.262*	8.644*
Constant	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.231	0.213	0.100	0.076	0.286
F-statistics	11.110	5.670	4.110	1.690	4.120
P-value	0.000	0.004	0.008	0.159	0.007

Source: Field Survey

Note: the values in parenthesis are the probability values of the estimates

The superscripts \*, \*\* and \*\*\* signifies the level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 %

between 0.552 and 0.496 as women become more educated. The other covariates follow expected signs except for years residing in Ota.

We go further to investigate if our result remains consistent when we use another measure of wealth (i.e. the wealth index as earlier defined) as shown in Table 4.8 in the Appendix. The variable land right was still insignificant in all the columns in the Table. The insignificant behaviour of our main variable land right cannot be dissociated from the peculiarity of the community that was investigated. As earlier stated, most of *Ota* dwellers do not use these lands for productive activities, and they even sell the lands to meet urgent needs. If this be the case, then it is not so surprising why the variable did not significantly influence the income of women. Most women that even make use of the land for agricultural activities are older women and they productively use these lands for small scale crop production, which they finally sell at the community market.<sup>6</sup>

For policy relevant recommendations, we go further to establish the effect of land right on the age of women and its overall impact on their wealth. This additional analysis was motivated by the insignificant nature of the relationship between land rights and women's wealth and the possibility that only older women are likely to benefit more from land right security. A new interactive variable, which is the multiplicative between land right and age of women, was developed and included in the baseline regression. This interactive term shows the indirect relationship that is likely to exist between the ages of women and land rights and its effect on their overall wealth. We considered the first measure of wealth in this estimation, since it shows the relative and actual income of women compared to the index measure of wealth.

From Table 4.6, the covariates did not behave out-rightly different from Table 4.5. However, the interactive variable (land right  $\times$  age of woman) and the interactive term became significant and positive in most of the columns. The implication of this result is that older women who have land rights are more likely to enjoy better wealth. This is not farfetched; as previously mentioned, most of these women engage the lands for agrarian activities, and they do not sell it like the male counterparts would do. Therefore, if land rights are enhanced, they will tend to have more and better usage of the land, which will translate to their overall wealth.

To ascertain the consistency of the signs and significant levels of the interactive variables, we conducted a further estimation of the regression as it is in Table 4.6. We controlled for the following variables: the availability of community infrastructure, whether the women own the land in *Ota*, marital status of the women, whether the women are *Ota* indigenes, whether there are family rules governing their lands, having a certificate of ownership for their lands and mode of ownership (by purchase). From the Table, we could not verify the significance of the interactive variable in column 1. In this column, we controlled for community infrastructure (which shows the extent of development in the community) and the result revealed in Table 4.7 that the significance of the interactive variable is sensitive to the infrastructural development in the community of the women. This implies that the extent of development in the community affects the extent to which land rights can inform older women's wealth, since the variable is positive but not significant.

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<sup>6</sup>The community market is a central market that operates essentially on market days – every 4 days.

**Table 4.6** Regression (including the interactive terms)

	1	2	3	4	5
	-0.337***	0.051	-0.318***		
Household head	(0.100)	(0.740)	(0.087)		
	0.498*	0.451*	0.496*		
Education	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		
	-0.063			-0.140**	-0.102
Household occupant	(0.348)			(0.011)	(0.156)
	0.032			0.068	-0.045
Age composition	(0.694)			(0.257)	(0.605)
	-0.012			-0.019*	-0.018**
Years in Ota	(0.114)			(0.003)	(0.034)
	0.010***		0.007***		0.007
Land right × Age of woman	(0.089)		(0.100)		(0.224)
	9.236*	9.179*	9.001*	11.371*	11.254*
Constant	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.264	0.165	0.193	0.100	0.099
F-statistics	4.360	11.830	6.770	4.110	2.100
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.089

Note: the variables—"land right" and "age" are not included because of multi-collinearity that exist when the interactive variable was included. More so, we are interested in the indirect effect of the relationship. The values in parenthesis are the probability values of the estimates. The superscripts \*, \*\* and \*\*\* signifies the level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 %

The interactive variable remained positive and significant when controlling for the other variables, as earlier mentioned. The interactive variable is not sensitive to these variables and remained unchanged despite the inclusion or exclusion of any of these variables. The implication from this is that policies for land rights security for older women will still achieve its outcome despite the behaviour of other control variables.

## Conclusion

Though efforts have been made to unravel the contributions of women to households, communities and the national economy, adequate research on gender access and ownership rights to land and the implication on their economic empowerment have not received adequate attention. This was one of the main motivations for the present study with the main objective of underscoring the relationship between access to land and economic empowerment of women as well as examining how household features can influence women's empowerment through land rights using the case of communities in *Ota*, Ogun State, Nigeria.

Using a quantitative method of analysis based on data obtained from structured questionnaires some important findings from the study are highlighted herein: it was observed that lack of access to land and ownership of land rights tend to



**Table 4.7** Regression (controlling for other intervening factors)

	1	2	3	4	3	4	5
Household head	-0.371*** (0.099)	-0.328 (0.114)	-0.345 (0.112)	-0.339*** (0.100)	-0.444** (0.038)	-0.316 (0.129)	-0.297 (0.165)
Education	0.569* (0.000)	0.499* (0.000)	0.512* (0.000)	0.528* (0.000)	0.462* (0.001)	0.482* (0.000)	0.488* (0.000)
Household occupant	0.018 (0.826)	-0.058 (0.402)	-0.057 (0.434)	-0.078 (0.266)	-0.044 (0.511)	-0.056 (0.410)	-0.033 (0.624)
Age composition	0.037 (0.661)	0.029 (0.725)	0.032 (0.793)	0.040 (0.632)	0.061 (0.471)	0.019 (0.188)	0.011 (0.896)
Years in Ota	-0.010 (0.244)	-0.012 (0.148)	-0.013 (0.126)	-0.016*** (0.074)	-0.014*** (0.073)	-0.012 (0.141)	-0.013*** (0.086)
Land right × Age of woman	0.009 (0.131)	0.010*** (0.094)	-0.013*** (0.100)	0.010*** (0.087)	0.010*** (0.082)	0.010*** (0.085)	0.010*** (0.080)
Community infrastructure	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-
Own land in Ota	-	Yes	-	-	-	-	-
Marital status	-	-	Yes	-	-	-	-
Indigene of the community	-	-	-	Yes	-	-	-
Family rules governing land	-	-	-	-	Yes	-	-
Certificate of ownership	-	-	-	-	-	Yes	-
Land was acquired by purchase	-	-	-	-	-	-	Yes
Constant	8.396 (0.000)	9.208 (0.000)	9.069 (0.000)	9.609 (0.000)	9.708 (0.000)	11.371 (0.000)	9.261 (0.000)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.289	0.256	0.262	0.271	0.276	0.100	0.280
F-statistics	3.650	4.130	3.550	3.830	3.650	4.110	3.660
P-value	0.002	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002


Note: Same as Table 4.3

compromise women's access to credit facilities, among other limitations. The need for advancing the education of women is also highlighted based on the finding that the level of income will increase by about 50 % points as women gain more education. Most of the women that even make use of the land for agricultural activities are older women, and they productively use these lands for small scale crop production. This therefore implies that encouraging younger women to take active engagement in economic activities including agriculture by providing access to land will be useful in empowering women economically.

The policy implication from this study is that, though women's access to land does not show economic empowerment in general, older women can benefit from access to land. This is because older women's access to land will avail them the opportunity of farming and engaging it for other agrarian activities. These women engage in smallholder farming activities and will consequently generate revenue from these activities. This will have a positive effect on their family and their entire household, especially in the case of female headed households. The *Ota* community has its own specific peculiarity such as the "unchecked" land deals that go on by the male gender, which hinders women's participation in issues of land deals and resultant agricultural activities. Younger women do not engage much in agriculture, and it is little wonder the land right does not display a significant effect on women at linear values.

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## Appendix



**Fig. 4.1** Bar chart showing the income of women with and without land right

**Table 4.8** Regression analysis 2

Wealth: wealth index	1	2	3	4	5
		-0.551		-0.042	-0.300
Land right		(0.207)		(0.873)	(0.491)
	0.035	0.040			0.052
Age	(0.004)	(0.012)			(0.006)
	-0.683	-0.654			-0.455
Household head	(0.012)	(0.041)			(0.170)
	0.793	0.911			0.999
Education	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)
			0.024	0.015	0.022
Household occupant			(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.385)
			-0.068	-0.099	-0.150
Age composition			(0.154)	(0.173)	(0.248)
			-0.009	-0.014	-0.011
Years residing in Ota			(0.363)	(0.293)	(0.363)
	-1.139	-1.170	2.891	3.443	-1.684
Constant	(0.146)	(0.244)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.163)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.209	0.251	0.021	0.0519	0.352
F-statistics	10.220	7.380	0.820	1.180	5.900
P-value	0	0	0.0083	0.1592	0.007

Note: the values in parenthesis are the probability values of the estimates. The superscripts \*, \*\* and \*\*\* signifies the level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 %

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# Chapter 5

## Trusting the Coalface: Public Trust in South African Local Government and the Millennium Development Goals

Steven Lawrence Gordon, Benjamin J. Roberts, and Jarè Struwig

### Introduction

The Millennium Summit in September 2000 prioritised responsive, fair and effective government as well as the promotion of democracy. This was reflected in the Millennium Declaration, which included a chapter focusing explicitly on human rights, democracy and good governance, and also acknowledged that good governance within countries was critical for promoting an environment conducive for development and poverty eradication. Despite this emphasis, a recurring complaint against the time-bound targets and indicators that were subsequently adopted as part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is that the governance objective was effectively omitted (Vandemoortele 2011). The eighth MDG makes passing reference to a commitment to good governance as a subsidiary consideration in promoting a transparent and well-functioning global trading and financial system (Target 8.A), though this was not translated into explicit measures for monitoring country-level governance processes (Bergh et al. 2012). The MDGs therefore encompass social and economic rights rather than civil and political rights (Vandemoortele 2011).

As the deadline for countries to achieve their MDG targets has drawn nearer, these exclusions have tended to feature increasingly in debates about the particular content of the post-2015 framework. There has been much deliberation about bringing politics back onto the international development agenda and the specific dimensions of governance that ought to be considered (Bergh et al. 2012, 2014; Foresti et al. 2014). As evidence of the seriousness with which governance is being treated, the UN High-level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda appealed in its final report in May 2013 (United Nations 2013) that good governance be recognised as a

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core aspect of well-being, and motivated for a standalone goal on “ensuring good governance and effective institutions.” The growing salience of the domestic governance theme in ongoing dialogue around the nature of the framework that will guide development priorities and practices over coming decades is partially attributable to the mounting research evidence pertaining to the contributory role of governance processes and dynamics in shaping cross-national variation in levels of development progress. Even though evidence on the direct association between governance and MDG progress remains relatively circumscribed, empirical studies have pointed variously to the nature of institutions, quality of governance and the positive relationship between governance, economic growth and national wealth (Kaufmann et al. 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2013).

More divided views have emerged in respect of how governance would practically be measured. Vandemoortele (2011) for instance argues that the power and global support enjoyed by the MDG targets stems from their measurability and that the inclusion of non-quantitative dimensions such as governance in the post-2015 framework would be a mistake. Conversely, various organisations and groups have provided suggestions on the measurement and types of indicators that could be employed to capture governance (see Foresti et al. 2014). In addition, the inclusion of governance as part of a post-2015 global development framework has raised concern about political sensitivities and whether standalone goals and targets would be met with political opposition (Bergh et al. 2012). Irrespective of one’s stance on the measurement debate, governance is likely to remain a key aspect of the MDG discourse and is a subject that warrants closer investigation and examination in this context.

It is also important to consider that improved governance remains a common request by citizens, most especially those at the lower end of the income distribution. Nowhere is this demand more evident than at the local level, where citizens expect regional or local governments to be open, transparent, encouraging of public engagement in decision-making processes, and responsive to the specific needs of their constituencies. This aligns with two other MDG related themes that have received attention over the last decade, namely (i) the localisation of the goals and targets to ensure that they are suitably adaptable to diverse sub-national realities, as well as (ii) the consensus that investing in decentralised governance is appropriate for promoting the effective delivery of services and infrastructure and for making sustained progress towards development and poverty reduction goals (UNCDF 2005; UN-HABITAT 2006). Devolution of this kind would also, according to the experts, improve democratic participation, political trust and the responsiveness of local authorities (see Bonfiglioli 2003). This has particular resonance in the African context where, for more than three decades, analysts from the UN, the African Union (AU) and Western donor agencies, have advocated democratic decentralisation. Following the 2000 Millennium Summit, a new push was made towards the devolution of government power, and states were asked to develop strategies to transfer responsibility from central to local governments (Olowu and Wunsch 2004). Although many African countries followed this advice, and reformed centralised institutions, public confidence generated in local governments was not forthcoming

(Cho 2010; Mattes 2008). Given the MDG focus on good governance, localisation and decentralisation, measuring and understanding public confidence in basic government institutions takes on a critical importance, particularly in recently democratised countries.

Political scientists have long contended that citizen support for a political institution enables those institutions to better react to change and effectively implement policy (Gamson 1976). Furthermore citizen obedience to, and participation with, government policies is related to such support (Tyler 2001). Public trust has important considerations for social capital, and Putnam (2000) has shown that people with high levels of interpersonal trust may have strong trust in political institutions (also see Putnam 1993). It is important to note that citizen trust in government is linked to a type of social trust (called *linking trust*) which, Putnam (2000) argues, has important implications for individual quality of life (also see Szreter 2002). As public compliance and participation is often essential in programmes to promote education and alleviate poverty, citizen trust in government should be seen as imperative to the developmental debate. But what can be done to improve public confidence in local governments?

Public opinion scholars know surprisingly little about public trust in local government in Africa, and why public confidence is so low. This paper examines public confidence in local government using South Africa as a case study. The study also examines the determinants of confidence in local government to understand what drives trust in local governments as well as trace trends in public trust over the last 10 years. In this chapter, it is argued that the performance of these institutions is an important criterion by which South Africans may judge their local government but that other factors also play a role. Faith in the democratic process and support for the government's social redress programmes also act as important drivers of public confidence. This suggests that improving trust in local government on the continent is about more than just technocratic improvements to the way authorities deliver on basic services such as water and electricity.

## **The Devolution Revolution in South Africa**

The South African transition to democracy in the 1990s could be described as one of the political miracles of the late twentieth century. Until the 1990s, the South African was characterised by racialised legislation that restricted the political, social and economic freedoms of the black majority in favour of the white minority (Du Toit and Kortze 2011). The institutionalised segregation of the country's racial groups at every level of society had a deep and lasting impact on the nation (for a discussion of how this impacted the post-transition economy, see Natrass and Seekings 2001). The main opposition to this systematic racial repression was the African National Congress (ANC), which became the country's dominant political actor and the symbol of black people's liberation struggle over the course of the twentieth century. Following the country's first democratic elections in 1994, and

the end of white minority rule, the ANC became the nation's governing party and has continued to win successive elections.

The 1994 election manifesto of the ANC was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which espoused the devolution of government and encouraged the active participation of the nation's citizens. It was stated that the RDP was a people-centred programme and that "the democratic government will reduce the burden of implementation which falls upon its shoulders through the appropriate allocation of powers and responsibilities to lower levels of government, and through the active involvement of organizations of civil society" (African National Congress 1994, 8). Encouraging the active citizen participation in effect meant empowering local government, and the new significance of local government was further emphasised in the nation's new 1996 Constitution.<sup>1</sup> This approach is broadly endorsed by the global development community and was part of a larger trend towards decentralised governance in Africa in the 1990s (see Olowu and Wunsch 2004).

One of the central objectives of the devolution revolution in Africa was to create subnational governments that were accountable to communities. As the 1990s came to a close, this emphasis on decentralised governance became ever more prominent in African official discourse (Bonfiglioli 2003; Olowu and Wunsch 2004). South Africa was no exception. The 1998 White Paper on Local Government promoted developmental local government, defined as "local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives" (Republic of South Africa 1998, 17). The 2000 White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships encouraged partnerships between community-based organisations and municipalities, arguing that such partnerships would "promote economic development in communities, strengthen democracy and empower civil society at the local level" (Republic of South Africa 2000, 15). When South Africa committed itself to the MDGs at the 2000 Millennium Summit, local governance was at the forefront of the country's developmental strategy.

As the "devolution revolution" in Africa progressed during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, so did criticism of local governments by scholars and experts (see Olowu and Wunsch 2004 for a review of some case studies). In particular, support for local government performance in South Africa waned (Hemson et al. 2008) and public confidence began to decline. According to Mattes (2002) trust in the South African local government deteriorated sharply during the late 1990s. In fact South Africa compared unfavourably with her neighbours on the African continent in terms of public evaluations of democratic performance and trust in public institutions (for a more recent analysis and comparison, see Bratton 2012). It is clear that

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<sup>1</sup>In the Constitution of South Africa, Chap. 7 states that a subnational government must "structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community." In addition, local governments were to encourage "the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government" (Republic of South Africa 1996).



by the early 2000s, South Africans became more inclined to identify their political institutions in a negative light.

The UN Millennium Project advocates promoting political rights and civic participation as a mechanism to hold leaders to account (Camerer 2006; Olowu and Wunsch 2004). In democratic South Africa civic participation has increasingly resulted in violent confrontation with the state. In the mid-2000s public dissatisfaction with local government became increasingly more vocal, and the country witnessed a growing number of protests at the poor performance of subnational governments. Peter Alexander (2010) has labelled the situation following 2004 a “rebellion of the poor,” noting the increasing violence of such protests. On the surface the protests are about the poor provision of services—such as water, electricity and healthcare—but some scholars have suggested deeper causes. Alongside the local government ineffectiveness in service delivery, Atkinson (2007) argues that the poor responsiveness to citizens’ grievances and self-enrichment by local government leaders—councillors and their staff—have driven protests against local government (also see Booysen 2007). These scholars suggest that grass-root protests in the country are based on a desire for greater political efficacy and a desire by communities to hold local government leaders to account.

Senior government officials in South Africa have admitted that there have been failures in the provision of services by subnational governments. The 2009 Local Government Turnaround Strategy report, by the government’s own Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, acknowledged dysfunctionality in many local governments throughout the country. The report indicated some of the main problems facing subnational governments in the country, including weak responsiveness and accountability to communities, the inability to deliver basic services or grow their economies, and limited success in overcoming the legacy of racial inequality (Republic of South Africa 2009, 17–19). These problems are not dissimilar from the ones confronting local governments in other sub-Saharan African countries (Bonfiglioli 2003; Olowu and Wunsch 2004). The report also acknowledged increasing poor relations between local governments and communities. In addition, the report noted that, alongside the rise in protests against local government failures, some communities were also withholding payment for local taxes and services. This suggests a significant crisis of legitimacy for the current system.

## Explaining Determinants in Local Government

It is apparent that South Africa is struggling to achieve the eighth MDG and build subnational governments that have widespread public support. But is confidence in political institutions the sole result of poor performance by local government in the country or are there other factors at work? Askvik (2008), in a public opinion study on trust in the South African government, argues for the importance of identity and performance in explaining patterns of citizen trust. Askvik, however, seems to

ignore the significance of political efficacy, racial transformation and civic participation. The following section will briefly review the literature on explanatory factors for trust in public institutions. Based on this review, a number of hypotheses will be constructed to explain the low levels of public confidence in South Africa. These hypotheses will subsequently be tested using bivariate and multivariate techniques in order to determine their validity.

*The Performance Dimension* In his discussion of how citizens evaluate their governments, Easton (1979) identified two main elements: output and process. The first is the most obvious and refers to the delivery of public goods and is considered the most important determinant of public trust (also see Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). In other words, satisfaction with local government is contingent on public perceptions of their policies and services. According to a study in post-communist regimes by Mishler and Rose (2002), performance is an especially strong indicator of trust in new democratic regimes (Catterberg and Moreno 2006). The second element identified by Easton is more opaque and refers to the political decision-making process. According to Citrin (1974) “to most fans what matters is whether the home team wins or loses, not how it plays the game” (987). Citizens are more likely to view their governments as legitimate if their public institutions are perceived to be fair.

Public evaluations of local government performance should be linked with the ability of subnational governments to deliver public goods (such as water or electricity) effectively. Miller and Listhaug (1999) argue that if government performance is associated with trust in public institutions, “this link must occur through the public’s evaluations of that performance” (211). Scholars of public opinion have found that subjective, rather than objective, indicators of government performance are more effective predictors of institutional trust (also see Christensen and Lægread 2005). The criteria among the public for evaluating service delivery varies and expectations of delivery are often informed by past performance. A negative evaluation may be the result of raised expectations or a shift in citizens’ evaluation criteria. In order to test the relationship between performance and trust in local government, the following hypothesis is put forward:

*Hypothesis 1a* Satisfaction with the delivery of public goods by government will be positively associated with trust in local government.

The UN Millennium Project notes that often governance is poor because local administrations lack the funds and technical capacity to meet citizen expectations (Camerer 2006). Citizens, however, expect their governments to provide stable economic conditions, and consequently macro-factors, like economic performance and levels of unemployment, will influence public confidence in political institutions. Indeed, the role of the economy in altering levels of trust has received a significant degree of attention by scholars (see, for example, Citrin and Luks 2001; Craig 1993). Testing of the relationship between subjective and objective measures of economic performance by these scholars found that subjective measures were better predictors of trust (also see Miller and Listhaug 1999). In order to test the predictive power of performance, it will be important to evaluate subjective public evaluations

of the national economy in South Africa. Given this concern, this following hypothesis is constructed:

*Hypothesis 1b* Satisfaction with the performance of the national economy will be positively correlated with trust in local government.

A review of the objective indicators on economic performance indicates that the South African government has struggled to create jobs and reduce unemployment. In 1990 most South Africans had high expectations of the economic progress that would be made in the advent of the democratic transition in South Africa. More than 20 years later, the standard of living for the majority remains dismal, although substantial economic progress has been achieved. During a recent 2009 national recession more than a million people exhibited wage employment, a movement associated with negative real earning changes (Cichello et al. 2014). In 2011, 52.3 % of South Africans lived below a poverty line of 1.70 dollars per day issued by the Statistics South Africa (Republic of South Africa 2013, 30).

The official unemployment rate is 24.9 % (49.8 % among the youth) with only 40.8 % of 15–64 year olds in active employment (Republic of South Africa 2013, 23). Observed widespread unemployment should not indicate labour market stability. Cichello et al. (2014) have identified using data from the National Income Dynamics Study significant levels of labour market churning in the country between 2008 and 2010, with individuals moving into and out of the labour market as well as across occupations. To alleviate poverty, the country's social welfare net has been expanded, and the total number of grant beneficiaries in South Africa was 15.5 million (31 % of the total population) as of March 2012.

*Political Efficacy Dimension* A decline in trust in local government may indicate the emergence of a critical citizenry, committed to holding their own political institutions to account. Indeed, a number of political scientists have talked about the “doubled-edged” element inherent to political trust (Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Citrin and Luks 2001; Mishler and Rose 2002). However it could also indicate growing alienation from politics and weak political efficacy. In any democracy a number of citizens will doubt their ability to effect political change and influence the political system. Public evaluations of this ability, known as political efficacy, will be associated with public confidence in local government. Individuals that feel that they possess high levels of political efficacy will perceive the political system as responsive to their needs and will therefore be more likely to trust that system. This may be linked to democratic attitudes, Catterberg and Moreno (2006) found that those who expressed democratic views were more supportive of democratic institutions. In order to understand the impact of political efficacy on trust in local government, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2* Individuals with low levels of perceived political efficacy will have low levels of trust in subnational institutions in South Africa.

Existing studies seem to suggest that South Africans view their governments as unresponsive to their needs. Using 2005–2006 public opinion African data, Cho (2010) found that South Africa ranked 10th below Ghana and Senegal on perceived

government responsiveness (also see Struwig et al. 2013, who examine different measures of civic engagement in the country). In order to understand political efficacy in South Africa, this study needs to account for civic cohesion. Civic engagement, and political decision-making, is conditioned by public interest in and knowledge of politics (Carpini and Keeter 1996). According to March and Olsen (1989) individuals that participate in local politics are more likely than those who do not participate to trust local governments.<sup>2</sup> This effect, argues Putnam (1993), is the result of internal effect on participants whereby participants adopt “habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness” (90) (also see Putnam 2000; Szreter 2002). As a result this study controls for civic engagement, including political interest and political knowledge.

*The Ideological Dimension* The history of South Africa exerts a powerful influence on political attitudes.<sup>3</sup> For much of her history as a modern nation state, the government of South Africa has been controlled by members of the white population group, descendants of European settlers. The state engaged in the systematic oppression of the black majority at the economic level, deriving the majority of land and access to skilled employment. Political repression was also used to silence dissent, which included the development of a vast system of administrators and police to control the movements of the majority. Given the different histories of racial groups in the country, it is also important to control for social identity factors. According to Askvik (2008) trust in public institutions in South Africa is an extension of trust in representatives of an individual’s own particular ethnic group. We expect the long history of racial oppression exerts a powerful influence on attitudes in the country, and it is therefore expected that ethnic identity will be a significant predictor of trust in local government. As a result this study controls for ethnic identity.

The programme of racial segregation and subjugation implemented by the pre-transition state resulted in considerable economic inequalities between the nation’s white minority and the black majority in the democratic period (Nattrass and Seekings 2001). Upon coming to power in 1994, the ANC has sought to end racial inequality and has committed itself to a programme of racial redress, aimed at promoting racial equality and political, economic and social advancement of the black majority (also see Du Toit and Kortze 2011). This goal, central to the nation’s Constitution, is part of a platform of developmental responsibilities adopted by the country’s local governments. A lack of support for this programme may indicate an ideological position that is hostile to the current political structure in the country. To test this assumption, the following hypothesis is constructed:

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<sup>2</sup>Putnam (2000) has argued that a tight reciprocal relationship between civic engagement and social capital with those social trusters more involved in their communities. Given the purported association between these two concepts, it is important to control for social trust in a study of public confidence in local government.

<sup>3</sup>For a review of social attitudes in South Africa and a discussion of the lasting impact of the country’s pre-transition history on these attitudes, see the work by Du Toit and Kortze (2011).

*Hypothesis 3* Individuals that support the government's redress programme will be more likely to have trust in local government institutions.

The ideological dimension has been shown to be an important determinant of trust in government in studies of public opinion. One of the most influential was Miller's (1974) examination of the distance between current government policy and individuals' preferred policy positions. Policy distance was found to be associated with government satisfaction, indicating the importance of the ideological dimension in predicting attitudes (also see Craig 1993). More recent analyses have only re-confirmed Miller's study (see for example Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001), suggesting ongoing importance of policy preferences in public opinion studies of political legitimacy. This is the first study (of which we are aware) that tests the predictive power of individual evaluations of racial redress on local government trust in South Africa. Support for the ruling party at the national level may also act as a proxy for support for this redress agenda. Therefore it is necessary to control for party affiliation when examining determinants of public confidence in local government.

## Data and Methods

This chapter draws principally on data from the 2003–2012 rounds of the South African Social Attitude Survey (SASAS) series to better understand subnational political trust in the country. Since its inception in 2003, the Human Sciences Research Council's annual survey series SASAS has been administered to samples of adults aged 16 years and older during the October/November period. The number of respondents in each survey from 2003 to 2012 ranged between 2,500 and 3,300, and interviews were conducted face-to-face. Using data from the 2001 Census of South Africa, the survey sample was designed as a probability-based, nationally representative sample, stratified by geo-demographic categories to be representative of all ethnic and economic groups in the country. The survey instrument contains a broad spectrum of information on socio-economic, demographic and labour-force related characteristics of adult South Africans.

Respondents in SASAS were asked to indicate the extent to which they trusted or distrusted political institutions in South Africa at present. Respondents were asked about a number of institutions including local government, the responses being captured using a five-point scale (reversed, 1 = strongly distrust 5 = strongly trust). Responses to the question on local government were used as the dependent variable in this study. Both bivariate and multivariate analyses were conducted using this variable to determine the predictors of trust in local government. In order to test the hypotheses constructed for this study, a number of independent variables had to be created. The remainder of this section outlines the independent variables constructed for this study.

*Local government performance* was measured subjectively using the responses to five questions on whether respondents were satisfied or dissatisfied with the way

that the government is handling (i) supply of water and sanitation; (ii) providing electricity; (iii) removal of refuse; (iv) affordable housing; and (v) access to health care in their neighbourhood. Respondents were asked to give their answers according to a five-point Likert scale (1=very satisfied, 5=very dissatisfied). A Service Delivery Dissatisfaction Index was created using the mean of these five-point-scale evaluations ( $M=2.86$   $SE=0.02$  Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.72$ ). *Social trust* was measured using three questions<sup>4</sup> on interpersonal trust (a similar approach was employed by Struwig et al. 2013 to measure aspects of social cohesion). Responses to these questions are coded using an 11-point scale of satisfaction (0, completely dissatisfied to 10, completely satisfied). Social trust was then estimated using the mean of 11-point-scale evaluations of these three questions ( $M=4.23$   $SE=0.11$  Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.73$ ).

Scholars contend that there are two types of political efficacy, internal and external efficacy, which are interrelated (Finkel 1985). Internal efficacy denotes a perception that an individual can influence the political system while external efficacy refers to the perception that political elites can be influenced by voters (also see Cho 2010). Taking this dichotomy into account, *voter inefficacy* was measured based on four questions on attitudes towards voting in South Africa. Survey participants were presented with four statements on voting and asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with these statements.<sup>5</sup> Responses were captured using a five-point scale (reversed, 1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree) and converted into the Voting Efficacy Index using the mean responses to these questions ( $M=2.71$   $SE=0.03$  Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.75$ ).

Ideological position was captured using two variables, *political affiliation* and *racial redress index*. Political affiliation was captured at the national level and was constructed using responses from the question "If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?" Based on the responses, four dummy variables were created (African National Congress, Democratic Alliance, other political parties and undeclared/undecided). The *racial redress index* was created to measure ideological alignment with the ANC's programme of creating racial equality and empowering the black majority through redress. Three items designed to measure public support for racial redress were used to create this index. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (i) Redistribute land to black South Africans; (ii) Racial quotas in national sports teams; and (iii) Preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment. The mean responses to these questions were combined using a simple averaging approach to create a five-point (1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree) index ( $M=3.51$   $SE=0.03$  Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.75$ ).

<sup>4</sup>The exact wording of these questions is as follows: (i) "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?"; (ii) "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?"; and (iii) "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?" These questions are derived from the European Social Survey.

<sup>5</sup>These statements were as follows: (i) Whether I vote or not makes no difference; (ii) After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless; (iii) It is the duty of all citizens to vote; and (iv) Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.

Social cohesion has a civic dimension, and in order to capture civic characteristics three variables were constructed to measure this dimension. These indicators were used in a recent study of social cohesion in South Africa (Struwig et al. 2013) and are recognised as an important measure of civic engagement in a society. *Political interest* was measured using a question on how interested an individual was in politics (1 = very interested 4 = not interested at all) and *political knowledge* which was measured using a question on how often respondents felt politics was too complicated to understand (1 = Never 5 = Frequently). *Contact with government* was drawn from the question: ‘During the last 12 months, have you contacted a politician, government or local government official?’ (1 = Yes 0 = No).

Socioeconomic status is controlled for by using a number of objective measures. Educational attainment is measured as a continuous variable (ranging from 0 to 16) based on responses to a question on what level of education an individual had completed. Labour market status was captured using three dummy variables (labour inactive, employed, and unemployed). Census classifications of respondents’ area of residence were used to construct province and urban/rural dummies (urban formal, urban informal, rural formal and rural areas under traditional authority) to control for geographic location. Such objective measures, however, may not adequately capture feelings of economic status. As a result, we supplement these objective measures with a subjective measure of economic status. Respondents were coded into a five-point categorical variable (1 = rich, 5 = poor) based on their responses to a question on subjective economic status. Standard structural demographic controls are also used.<sup>6</sup>


## Results

### *Bivariate Analysis*

Figure 5.1 shows trust in selected institutions in South Africa for the period 2000–2012. Following municipal elections in 2000—which coincided with the 2000 Millennium Summit—public confidence in local government improved. However, after reaching a peak in 2004 (when national elections took place), confidence declined, reaching a nadir in 2007. The data from late 2005 onwards shows a worrisome reversal in trust not just in local government but in virtually all major public institutions. Following the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki in 2008 and national elections in 2009, which saw the election of Jacob Zuma amid promises of reform and community empowerment, public trust in local government rallied. However, results for the period 2010–2012 indicated that trust levels had begun to

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<sup>6</sup> Age was measured using a continuous variable coded as age of the respondent in years at the time of interview. Gender (1 = female; 0 = male) and Racial status (black African, Indian, “coloured” and white) were captured using sets of dummy variables.



**Fig. 5.1** Trust in Political and Social Institutions in South Africa, 2000–2012 (Sources: HSRC Evaluation of Public Opinion Programme (EPOP) 2000–2001; HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003–2012. Note: The reported percentages correspond to the percentage of South Africans aged 16 years and older that indicated that they “strongly trust” or “trust” in each of the following institutions in South Africa at the time of interview)

decline again. In 2012 only 34 % of adult South Africans reported that they trusted their local government.

As can be seen from the figure, local government compared unfavourably to other public institutions such as national government, the judicial system and the police. This corresponds with what was reported by Mattes (2008), who found that South Africans view their local governments as more corrupt than any other government institution and rate the performance of subnational government below other tiers of government (also see Struwig et al. 2013). Low levels of observed trust may reflect the trajectory of the country’s post-transition democracy. Catterberg and Moreno (2006), using World Value Survey data, postulate that political trust in new democracies quickly erodes due to high pre-transitions expectations for economic and social change.

Using bivariate ANOVA testing (results not shown) observed differences in mean public confidence based upon age, political party affiliation and gender were not statistically significant. Although it is not significant, is interesting to note that young adult South Africans were found to have had higher than average trust levels while their older counterparts were far more cynical. Almost half (48 %) of those aged 16–19 trusted local government compared to 35 % of those aged 20–29 and 26 % of those aged 30–39. ANOVA testing revealed that significance group differences based on labour force status, educational attainment geographic location and race existed. Members of the black majority tended to have, on average, higher levels of trust than racial minorities, particularly the white minority. Educated South Africans were also more likely than the less educated to be sceptical about local government. This is interesting given that education has often been positively associated with public confidence in studies on trust in local government (see, for example, Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003).



## *The Multivariate Analysis*

In order to test the hypotheses created for this paper, four regression models were constructed. The first tests the performance hypothesis while the second model tests the association between public trust in local government and the political efficacy indicators. The third model tests the validity of the ideological hypothesis, examining whether attitudes and racial redistribution influence attitudes towards local government. Finally, in order to determine the relative effect of all the variables together, a fourth model was designed that includes all variables used in the previous three models. The results are showcased in Table 5.1, a positive coefficient indicate a positive attitude towards local government in South Africa.

In Model I it is clear that public perceptions of local government are driven by satisfaction with the services provided by the South African government. Dissatisfaction with the provision of basic services, such as water or electricity, in an individual's neighbourhood is negatively associated with confidence in local government. This is consistent with expectations and findings of other studies of institutional trust in South Africa (see, for example, Askvik 2008). Macro-level economic evaluations were also found to be an important predictor of trust. Those who were dissatisfied with the state of the economy in general were found to be more negative in their attitudes towards local government. If the variables capturing collective economic evaluation and dissatisfaction with service delivery are removed from Model I (not shown) then individual indicators of economic position (such as subjective wealth status and educational attainment) become salient predictors.

In Model II the indicators of political efficacy were tested, and the results indicate that those individuals that were confident of their ability to change the political system were more trusting of local government. A low score on the Voting Inefficacy Index is associated with high levels of institutional trust. Political interest was positively associated with public trust as was self-reported knowledge of politics. Contacting a politician, government or local government official was not significantly associated with trust.<sup>7</sup> This indicates that those who were more politically aware exhibited greater public confidence, and that confidence in the efficacy of voting was central to understanding attitudes towards subnational governments in 2012.

In Model III the predictive power of political affiliation and individual evaluations of racial redress policy were considered. Party affiliation was not a significant determinant of public confidence in local government institutions. This indicates that individuals do not identify more closely with their local government if when the party they support holds national power. Support for government-led efforts to redress the legacy of racial oppression in the country did not exert a significant degree of influence on public attitudes. If the dependent used in Model

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<sup>7</sup>If civic contact is included in a base model (not shown) without political interest, political knowledge or the Voting Inefficacy Index then the variable is a highly salient predictor of public confidence in local government. It is apparent, therefore, that the more politically aware and interested individuals are the more likely they are to have civic contact.

**Table 5.1** Ordered logistic regression models on trust in local government, 2012

	Model I		Model II		Model III		Model IV	
	Coeff.	Sig.	Coeff.	Sig.	Coeff.	Sig.	Coeff.	Sig.
Gender (ref. male)	0.106		0.051		0.067		0.106	
Age	-0.001		-0.003		-0.002		-0.002	
Population group (ref. black African)								
Coloured	-0.089		-0.261		-0.277		-0.124	
Indian	-0.016		-0.242		-0.427		-0.104	
White	-0.178		-0.420	**	-0.481	**	-0.386	*
Geographic type (ref. urban formal)								
Urban informal	-0.338	*	-0.408	**	-0.430	***	-0.315	*
Rural, former homelands	0.376	**	0.290	*	0.271	*	0.398	**
Rural, commercial farms	0.287		0.218		0.253		0.274	
Labour market status (ref. employed)								
Unemployed	-0.025		0.097		0.055		0.066	
Labour market inactive	0.178		0.190	*	0.207	*	0.197	
Subjective economic status	0.032		-0.091	**	-0.083	*	0.016	
Years of schooling	-0.019		-0.038	**	-0.023		-0.018	
Social trust index	0.056	**	0.088	***	0.099	***	0.049	***
Dissatisfaction general economy	-0.449	***					-0.465	**
Dissatisfaction service delivery	-0.313	***					-0.254	***
National party support (ref. ANC)								
Democratic alliance					0.035		0.230	
Other political party					-0.350		-0.169	
Undeclared/Undecided					-0.059		0.173	
Racial redress index					-0.032		-0.025	
Political interest			0.115	**			0.077	
Political knowledge			0.142	***			0.132	***
Voting inefficacy index			-0.302	***			-0.251	***
Civic contact			0.131				0.171	
Provincial controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
/cut1	-3.797		-2.155		-3.855		-3.855	
/cut2	-2.467		-0.873		-2.497		-2.497	
/cut3	-1.687		-0.140		-1.714		-1.714	
/cut4	0.717		2.213		0.754		0.754	
N	2258		2260		2243		2205	

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Notes: 1. The data are weighted. 2. Positive coefficients indicate public confidence in local government while negative coefficients indicate distrust

III was public confidence in national government (not shown) then individual support for government-led efforts to redress racial inequality would be a significant driver of political trust. This suggests that although the ideological dimension is

an important predictor of trust at the national level, no evidence of this is found at the subnational level.

In the final model all variables used in the previous three models are included. It is apparent that two of the three hypotheses—performance and political efficacy—can be proven. Political interest is not a significant predictor in this model. Demographic characteristics, such as age, gender and political affiliation, were not statistically associated with the dependent. Social trust was a significant predictor in the final model with a more trusting predisposition, as may be expected given the work of Putnam (2000), resulting in greater public trust in local government. Even controlling for performance indicators as well as a range of socio-economic indicators, residents of informal urban areas were found to be more distrustful of local government than those in formal urban areas while those in the former homelands were found to be more. Indicators of educational attainment and subjective economic status were not found to be associated with the dependent in the final model. Race was found to be weak predictor of trust in local government with only membership of the white minority significantly different (at the 5 % level) from the reference group in Model IV.<sup>8</sup>

## Discussion and Conclusion

This study found that South Africans consistently distrusted their local government more than their national government over the last decade, and that public confidence in local government is low. But what lessons does the South African case have for promoting good governance as the UN Millennium Project requires? The poor quality of services delivered by many local governments in Africa is an important driver of confidence towards the subnational authorities. However, performance is not the sole reason for low public confidence in these political institutions. This study has found strong evidence that non-performance and not easily quantifiable measures are salient drivers of political trust in government at the local level.

In the ethnically diverse nations that make up the African continent, ethnic identity might be seen to have a strong correlation with trust in local government. The legacy of racial oppression still exerts an influence on political debates in South Africa in 2012 and, presumably, will continue to do so in the future. No doubt historical legacies of oppression have relevance to public debates through the African continent. However the indicators included to capture the ideological

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<sup>8</sup>This contradicts the finding by Askvik (2008), using 2006 data, that citizens' ethnic identities was a strong explanatory factor in understanding how much citizens trusted their national, provincial and local governments. Mishler and Rose (2002, 8) argue, 'political attitudes are continuously updated and adjusted as initial beliefs are contradicted, tempered or reinforced by later experiences'. The observed difference between my study and Askvik may indicate a shift in attitudes between 2006 and 2012.

dimension were, however, not found to be a significant determinant of attitudes towards local government in South Africa. Rather levels of confidence in subnational governments in the country are driven by a sense that participation in the electoral process is ineffective. Improving citizens' assessments of their political efficacy is integral, therefore, to building trust in local government institutions.

Elections, in of themselves, are not the key to creating public trust but rather public faith in the integrity and the efficacy of civic participation are fundamental to building trust. Scholars have argued that active citizen participation is vital for the function of representative democracy, the formation of social cohesion and the participatory governance (see, for example, Carpini and Keeter 1996; Hoskins and Mascherini 2008; Mutz 2006). What is required is to link democratic decentralisation and governance not only to electoral procedure but also to more comprehensive models allowing participation in decision-making. It is unlikely that the post-2015 MDG framework will include democracy (or even participatory government) as a distinct MDG goal. In place of state agreement, civil society and the international development community must promote these trends and assist states to improve public confidence in local government institutions.

The formation of political trust in democratic decentralisation is part of a process of long-term state-building and is related to democratic and civic participation in society. The history of the "devolution revolution" in Africa, as Olowu and Wunsch (2004) argue, has witnessed some progressive movement in these areas: moves to more democratic local governance are more widespread and recognition of the necessity of citizen participation more prevalent. In the past civil society groups (such as the UN Capital Development Fund, see Bonfiglioli 2003) have linked social MDGs with goals connected to governance such as empowerment and the enhancement of political efficacy. Such efforts must be deepened and expanded as researchers seek to improve governance on the continent in line with the ambitious agenda that emerged from the September 2010 MDG Summit.

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# Chapter 6

## Millennium Development in Retrospect: Higher Education and the Gender Factor in Africa's Development Beyond 2015

N'Dri T. Assié-Lumumba

### Introduction

By the time independence started in the mid-1950s with accelerated pace in the 1960s, African countries had reversed their initial rejection of European education and were firmly implementing policies toward the expansion of formal education and equal educational opportunity for the African populations. The educational aspirations of the African populations, and in turn emphasized by the governments of the newly independent countries, were consistent with the United Nations' declaration of education as a fundamental human right, as articulated at the founding of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1948. There was widespread recognition of the critical importance of education both as a human right and as an investment in the future.

Political and educational leaders in Africa systematically expressed the need for their respective citizens to exercise their rights to have access to education, acknowledging the ensuing socio-economic benefits. They argued for the development of education as *sine qua non* for attaining their national development objectives for the post-colonial period. They conceptualized and designed policies that were consistent with the broader pronouncements and programs of the United Nations system, and generally, the international organizations, foundations, and industrial countries within their bi- and multi-lateral cooperation agendas.

In African countries, all levels of education were considered to be critically important in the development of human resources needed for the economy. However, basic as well as secondary education were considered important mostly as necessary levels toward the more critical higher education level. The comparative importance

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of higher education was enunciated in terms of the training of highly specialized and qualified human resources, referred to as “manpower” needed for economic advancement (Yesufu 1973). This argument was articulated within the parameters of human capital theory, which was an old notion that was undergoing renewed popularity at the time of the process of decolonization in Africa. There was a convergence of views between African countries and the aforementioned external “donors to African education” and development.

However, an analysis of the evolution from the 1960s to the formulation of the Education for All (EFA) at the 1990 Jomtien conference, the Framework for Action and Education for All at the Dakar conference in 2000, as well as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), shows diverging positions. External actors have increasingly emphasized basic education at the expense of higher education. Furthermore, there has been declining significance of gender as an area of consistent commitment.

Using a historical approach, this paper critically examines the changing patterns of African internal policy articulation and the needs and positions of external actors. It is structured under four headings in addressing the evolution of post-colonial policies of education and development in Africa. The first section reviews the background and history of the United Nations and global engagement for Africa’s development, looking also at the role of education in general, and specifically higher education in the postcolonial era. The second section deals with the development of education in (Sub-Saharan) Africa with a focus on recent historical moments of higher education policy and development. The third section critically examines the MDGs and the conspicuous absence of explicit articulation of higher education. The fourth section deals with higher education with a special reference to the inadequate discussions of gender equity in Africa’s new vision for development. The conclusion summarizes the main arguments and points to the need for examining consistently Africa’s objective conditions and needs amidst the new call for global commitment to create “a world without poverty” in maximizing the lessons learned to articulate the necessary synergy between education and areas of critical importance formulated in the global engagements.

## **United Nations and Global Development Concerns and Implications for Africa: A Brief Historical Background of the Post-Colonial Era**

Education is a universal social institution that takes different forms and contents, reflecting local specificities and historical contingencies. In Africa, however, these specificities have been heavily influenced by the colonial legacies and the continued global-local dynamics that constitute an intrinsic part of education processes and policy formulation and design in both colonial and post-colonial Africa. The current analysis of education must be located within the Africans’ struggle for



decolonization to end the preeminence of the external factors over the local needs and priorities.

The process of decolonization began in the mid-1950s and experienced a momentous acceleration in the 1960s, although it continued through the end of the twentieth century, with the independence of Namibia in 1990 and majority rule in 1994 in South Africa. While the African countries were still embroiled in the liberation struggles, immediately after WWII in 1945, the United Nations was created as the ultimate global organization with various bodies. According to the United Nations' Charter, the Security Council is the only body that can adopt binding resolutions, and it stipulates that under the Charter of the United Nations the member states are required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.

Resolutions adopted by the other bodies, including the General Assembly, are non-binding and are actually referred to as recommendations. Thus, after the 1948 UNESCO declaration of education as fundamental human right, subsequent actions to actualize this framework were more in the realm of moral persuasion of the member states. This is the context in which the United Nations' global calls for development of African countries, among other less advanced countries in the world, should be assessed. The MDGs reflect half a century of the United Nations' effort to serve as the vanguard for the articulation of Africa's development agenda.

As mentioned above, accelerated independence movements of African countries happened while many other states within the continent were still engaged in the independence struggle. It was during this period that the United Nations set an ambitious agenda for global engagement for support toward Africa's development. Thus, the decade during which most African countries earned nominal independence was characterized by grand declarations on ambitious global changes. Subsequently, for instance during the sixteenth session of its General Assembly, on December 19, 1961, the United Nations adopted various resolutions that included or directly focused on Africa's educational and broader socioeconomic development as measured by the development indicators of the time such as GNP per capita. They included Resolutions 1710 (XVI) on the "United Nations Development Decade," 1717 (XVI) on "African Educational Development," and 1718 (XVI) on "Economic Development of Africa."

The United States, as the leader of the Western World, played a determining role in the outcome of World War II and the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan, in the late 1940s and in the 1950s. It also took leadership in the development theories and policies. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the newly independent countries in Africa were in search of the most effective means to promote socio-economic development. In this context, human capital theory and its derived policies as articulated and formulated in the United States had a clear resonance in these countries. Thus, the theoretical arguments, the empirical studies, and the policies formulated in the United States had both domestic and international implications especially in developing countries, with a focus on Africa as the continent that had undergone near complete domination from outside, with devastating and enduring consequences.

The old economic argument (Becker 1964, 1965; Harbison and Myers 1964; Schultz 1977, 1972) that established a direct relationship between formal education and development presented a special appeal for developing countries in general and particularly African countries. Various theoretical works and empirical studies articulated major criticism of human capital theory and its subsequent policies from the time of its renewed popularity to a more recent period (Bowles and Gintis 1975; Carnoy 1995; Klees 2008; Thurow 1977). Nevertheless, at the period of independence, African countries were not inclined to dispute the linear and positive correlation between education and development.

In 1961, the same year the United Nations adopted the aforementioned resolutions, African leaders met in Addis Ababa for a conference aimed at providing a forum for African countries to define their educational needs for development. Education was declared the “priority of all priorities” as it was considered the most effective tool in the struggle to improve living standards, eradicate poverty and, on the whole, promote social progress. In this context, African societies became extremely receptive to human capital theory and its application to educational development. In brief, human capital theory is an economic theoretical framework that aims to provide an understanding of the relationship between formal education and the economy as argued by Theodore Schultz (1972):

Human capital is strictly an economic concept. Although it pertains to particular attributes of man, it is not intended to serve those who are engaged in analyzing psychological, social or cultural behavior. It is a form of capital because it is the source of future earnings, or of future satisfactions, or both of them. It is human because it is an integral part of man. (5)

The basic argument of this theory stipulates that at the individual level, the higher the number of years of schooling, the more productive a person becomes. At the macro level, such as the level of a country, the higher the aggregate level of education of the population of that country, the higher the growth rate achieved by the country. A corollary of this argument is that individual productivity leads to higher income and greater national economic output and growth. With this reasoning, higher education appeared as the logically prized level of education to propel African development.

Thus, the support and demand for higher education were high in African countries. The fact that colonial policies in general neglected or clearly excluded higher education in Africa contributed in increasing the post-colonial impetus to build, often from scratch, and fund new institutions of higher learning, especially the university as a cornerstone for the major projects of national development envisaged by African governments. With the popularity of human capital theory and its application to the foreign policy and development cooperation assistance of international organizations and industrial countries, higher education, and especially the university, were recommended and became *sine qua non* for development everywhere, including in Africa, in the 1960s and 1970s.

Considering the gender focus of some of the MDGs, it is worth recalling some of the global engagements led by the United Nations and the African countries at the continental, regional and national levels.

## **The Development of Education in (Sub-Saharan) Africa with a Focus on Recent Historical Moments and Higher Education Policy**

For the purpose of this paper, indigenous systems of education in Africa do not constitute a major focal point. Suffice it to state that European continent-wide intrusion affected all African social institutions including education. The evolution of African education presented in this section focuses on five broad stages starting with the transitional period between the end of colonization and the beginning of post-colonial experience.

The transitional period corresponds to the struggle for decolonization and equality of educational opportunity and African quest for the integral transfer of the European system in Africa that would be similar or at least comparable to the system that had been reserved for the Europeans. By making this request the Africans wanted the restoration of justice and equal rights that resonated also with the 1948 UNESCO declaration of education as a universal human right. In the same vein the post-colonial universities in Africa were modeled after the European universities (Coombe 1991; Ajayi et al. 1996; Ashby 1966; Assié-Lumumba 1996, 2006).

The second period, situated more clearly in the post-colonial era—even if there were still some colonized countries—corresponded to the 1960s. This is the period during which international organizations and industrial countries along the lines of the Cold War global divide supported the drive for increased education for development in Africa. The period was characterized by the high demand for European inherited education with a clearly expressed preference for higher education, within the logic of human capital theory. At the Conference on Educational Needs of Africa held in Addis Ababa in 1961, African representatives enthusiastically agreed on the educational targets to be reached by 1980 to affirm respect of their citizens' rights to education and to provide the human capacity boost for the economy and broader development. These targets were stipulated as follows:

- Universal free and compulsory primary schooling,
- Secondary education for 30 % of all children finishing primary school, and
- University placements for 20 % of secondary school completers.

The third period, which was the second post-colonial moment, experienced severe economic crises that lasted from the mid-1970s to the 1990s. In this period the confidence in education, with hitherto perceived privileged status of higher education, was seriously shaken, with increasing unemployment among the formally and highly educated. The public sector that constituted the employer was no longer able to create new jobs, and the budgetary deficits made it difficult for them to pay those who were already employed. As a result of the financial shortcomings of the states, they resorted to loans from international financial institutions. This is the context of the reversal in the human capital appeal and the conception of the developmental capacity of education. Thus, international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, exerted considerable pressure to adopt new

policies aimed at curtailing educational budgets, especially for higher education. Under pressure and/or given the objective conditions of the lack of autonomous financial resources, the African states were unable to offer jobs to the graduates of the system.

In the immediate post-colonial period, higher education and state/nation building in Africa developed a dynamic relationship in which the universities were conceptualized, designed, built, funded and managed as predominantly public institutions, a domain of public control with public mission. In the context of economic crises, especially in the 1980s and part of the 1990s, African countries received relatively little support from the international financial institutions for higher education programs. While there are national differences, by and large the loans received were composed of several types, including the following:

1. Investment Loans, which included specific investment loans (SILs) and sector investment loans (SECILs);
2. Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs);
3. Hybrid combinations of an investment of component like an SIL or SECIL with an adjustment component like an SECAL; and
4. Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) focused on macroeconomics and general economic stability.

Thus, they did not deal with specific sectors such as education. However, in the 1980s, by and large, in order to receive SILs, Hybrids, and SECALs which were geared toward education, the countries had to first implement SALs. Only a few countries such as Madagascar, Mali, and Nigeria escaped this rule. According to the argument or expectation, direct foreign investment (DFI) or sector adjustment loans alone would be sufficient to address the need. In fact, such a policy was a statement of the neglect of what has been referred to as the social services, including education. Higher education suffered the most from these policies (Lumumba-Kasongo and Kennett 1992; Lumumba-Kasongo and Assié-Lumumba 1996).

In the context of the crisis of the global economy, African reliance on external “donors” such as the World Bank led to the unwilling neglect of higher education. African intellectuals (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999), students and government officials in general concluded from the education policy of the World Bank group as the effort’s barely hidden agenda to dismantle or qualitatively restructure higher education considered by the World Bank and the like as inefficient, unproductive and in fact part of the African development problems. They considered the cost of the management of higher education, especially universities, or even their rehabilitation as too high.

Thus, the austerity measures prescribed included lay-offs, early retirement and lowering of salary scales for civil servants, including the teaching staff of all levels of the national educational systems. Subsequently, this period also experienced the stagnation and declines in enrollment in many African countries. A vicious cycle was set in motion with situations of low economic performance, lack of prospects in terms of jobs and declining enrollment even at the higher education level because of the anticipated loss in investing in education. Directly or indirectly, in the context

of increasing liberalization, they also recommended a private model in lieu of public funding (World Bank 1991, 1992, 1994)

The fourth period could be characterized as the new awakening about the critical importance of education in socio-economic development and social progress at the individual and national levels. The population that was still vastly composed of rural dwellers or new urbanites at the periphery of the cities realized the absence of alternatives to education for individual socio-economic attainment and social mobility. Thus, demand for education, especially higher education, escalated. The renewed confidence in education as a human right and an investment in the future (Hallak 1990) was the context in which a new commitment to achieve the education-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) arose; however, the call for commitment at the global level was made without the same economic resources and external assistance. Furthermore, higher education was no longer the targeted level for the training of a highly specialized labor force.

The interpretation of the importance of education was articulated on the global scale in “Education for All” at the meetings in Jomtien (Thailand) in 1990. Thus the turning point with regard to the value of higher education occurred in the third period, when there was a shift to basic education.

There were several other meetings and publications that were sponsored by international organizations, including the World Bank, which made statements on renewed recognition of the importance of higher education. They include *African Universities: The Way Forward* (World Bank 1994), *The University in Africa in the 1990s and beyond: A Summary Report* (Association of African Universities, 1997) AAU, World Bank, Washington 1997, the joint report *Revitalizing Universities in Africa: Strategy and Guidelines* (AAU and World Bank 1997), *The Higher Education in Africa: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects* (UNESCO 1998). Of particular significance was *Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril or Promise?* (UNESCO and the World Bank, Task Force on Higher Education and Society 2000). However, by that time the tone that accorded less importance to higher education was solidly imbedded in the international policy discourse and policy recommendation. Thus, the World Education Forum (26–28 April 2000) adopted the Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All (EFA). This forum was followed by the Johannesburg sub-Saharan Conference on EFA on “Meeting our Collective Commitments” as an integral part for the Dakar 2000 Framework for Action for the Education for All. In essence, these meetings reiterated the Jomtien message of de-emphasizing higher education and expressing the focus and preference for basic education frames (Education for All) to be of popular appeal.

Brock-Utne (2000; 2003) argues that in the context of the 1990 Jomtien conference and the adoption of Education for All, “the emphasis on education for all has, in reality, meant that donors willingly, and African governments unwillingly, have given a priority to investing in primary education, resulting in often drastic reductions in higher education funding” (Brock-Utne 2003, 31).

The MDGs further reflected binary conception and the shift to basic education in opposition to higher education.

## MDGs and Articulation of Higher Education

The United Nations' eight MDGs constitute part of the new statements pronounced at the beginning of the new Millennium for global commitments to achieve specified targets by the year 2015. They are listed as follows (<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/the-millennium-development-goals-report-2013.html>):

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger,
2. Achieve universal primary education,
3. Promote gender equality and empower women,
4. Reduce child mortality,
5. Improve maternal health,
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases,
7. Ensure environmental sustainability, and
8. Develop a global partnership for development.

The focus of this paper is to assess the articulation of higher education as the MDGs comes to a close. A brief reference to the achievements is made based on the 2013 Millennium Development Goals Report, referenced above. First, a summary of each goal is made, followed by a brief assessment of the achievements as evidenced in the aforementioned report, also showing the higher education deficit. The lessons learned are expected to serve toward conceptualizing a holistic education system with a clearly articulated, deliberate, consistent, and constructive inclusion of higher education taking gender into account in a consistent manner. African national development agenda planning and implementation are expected to yield transformative change as a permanent corrective mechanism to promote and sustain social progress.

In the first goal calling for the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, three specific targets were set. The first target consisted in reducing by half the proportion of people who live on an income that is less than one dollar a day. The second target focused on the adult population in general, including usually vulnerable groups such as women and the youth in securing quality employment. The emphasis of the third target is the reduction by half of the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

The second goal is to achieve universal primary education with the stipulated target of ensuring that by 2015 all male and female children globally complete the primary level of education. The third goal reiterates the promotion of gender equality and empowering women with the specific target of eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

The fourth goal focuses on the reduction of child mortality, targeting specifically the reduction by two-thirds of the under-five mortality rate. Related to this is the fifth goal of improving maternal health with two specified targets, namely the reduction by three quarters of the maternal mortality ratio and the achievement, by 2015, of universal access to reproductive health.

The sixth is goal is to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases with three specified targets: (1) halt and start the reversal of the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015; (2) achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who require it and (3) stop and start, by 2015 the reversal of the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

The seventh goal of ensuring environmental sustainability states four targets which consist of (1) integrating the principles of sustainable development into national policies and programs and “reversing the loss of environmental resources;” (2) reducing biodiversity loss and the rate of loss, by 2010; (3) Reduce by half, the proportion of people with no “sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” by 2015; and (4) Achieve by 2020 a “significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.”

The eighth goal is to develop a global partnership for development with the six main targets of: (1) Developing “further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system; it includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally; and (2) Addressing “the special needs of the least developed countries,” including “tariff and quota free access for the least developed countries’ exports; enhanced program of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction.” (3) Addressing “the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States;” (4) Dealing “comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term;” (5) Cooperating with pharmaceutical companies to provide “access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries;” and (6) Cooperating with “the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications” (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013).

According to the 2013 MDGs Progress Report “the MDGs have been uneven among and within countries” (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013). This observation about the global situation is also applicable to Africa when countries are compared. The *MDG Progress Report—Africa* of May 31, 2013 “15 of the 20 countries which made the greatest progress on the MDGs were from Africa” and some MDGs are considered “on track” (i. e. 2, 3, 6 and 8); goals 1, 4, 5, and 7 are off track. Even in countries that appear to have registered noticeable advancement, the report warns that progress must be assessed with caution as it is “relative to each country’s initial conditions.” In fact, when all regions of the world are compared using aggregate data, Africa appears as the region with continued challenges and wider gaps between the MDGs and the current and projected state in 2015 (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013).

In discussing the nature of the correlation between formal education and the MDGs it is worth recalling that the aforementioned human capital theory has been criticized for failing to articulate the caution about the positive correlation between

the level of education achievement and socio-economic attainment. Indeed, a higher level of education is not a sufficient condition for socio-economic success both at the individual and societal level.

Nevertheless, the direct and indirect preparation for qualification for jobs, the respective salaries and benefits that affect health and general well-being, the acquisition of knowledge and various forms of life-skill information (Mannathoko 2007) and the preparation and capacity for the use of such information, and so forth, are correlated with the probability of achieving goals such as eradication of poverty and hunger, achieving gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction of child and maternal mortality and the improvement of maternal health, combatting effectively HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. Even the second goal of universal primary education is directly related to higher education. Indeed, there cannot be basic universal enrollment without the solid training of teachers. Increased initial enrollment can have positive cumulative effects on universal primary education only if there is quality education, high retention and low attrition rates, and achievement of functional literacy. These achievement thresholds require well-trained teachers, which is possible only with excellent teacher-training colleges and the like.

## **Higher Education and Imperative of Gender Equity Toward African Development**

Despite the growing number of higher education institutions in Africa, with an increasing component of private institutions, the low number of the youth of higher education age actually enrolled has remained in itself and in comparison to other regions of the world. Statistics continue to confirm the findings by Bloom et al. (2005) that:

For several decades, African countries and their development partners have placed great emphasis on primary and, more recently, secondary education. But they have neglected tertiary education as a means to improve economic growth and mitigate poverty. The Dakar summit on ‘Education for All’ in 2000, for example, advocated only for primary education as a driver of social welfare. It left tertiary education in the background. (3)

There are critical factors that are necessary for the attainment of the eight MDGs in Africa and elsewhere, in the twenty-first century. Higher education, as well as quality and relevant education and research are indispensable to the quest for the real attainment of the eight MDGs in eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and setting up a Global Partnership for Development. Yet MDGs did not articulate in any systematic way the importance of “higher education,” or “university” of any kind, and any other



institutions of higher learning. I am not contending that there is a systematically linear relationship between higher education and any of the MDGs. However, the arguments that sustained the articulations of human capital theory and its policy implications seem evident.

Indeed, in the context of the twenty-first century globalization, there are promises, expectations, and proofs of education as the means for acquisition of cutting-edge knowledge that emphasizes the preeminence of science and technology for performance in the ever-competitive “knowledge economy.” Other things being equal, the individuals with the knowledge and credentials assume positions of power and authority that in turn determine politics, policies and power dynamics as well as social reproduction. At the societal/national level, leverage in the competitive world is determined by powerful human capacity. An important question is how women can be positioned to be significant and equal players equipped with competence, legitimacy and authority.

It was in the context of the global commitment for gender equality, especially following the Women’s Decade that started with the First International Conference on Women in Mexico, the midway assessment with the 1980 Conference in Copenhagen, the final 1985 Nairobi Conference, and the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Even if equal access is achieved, or in a few cases where gender imbalance is favorable to the female population, it does not translate into equality in output and particularly outcome and the value attached, especially with the widespread phenomenon of gender-based disciplinary clusters with unequal societal values. To end systemic and perpetual reproduction of gender inequality, African states have signed international conventions within sub-regional and continental organizations from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) and also worldwide organizations that call for gender equity in specific sectors such as education and labor.

Thus, from the early years of the first independence, the preliminary discussion of CEDAW in 1963 was considered as right on the mark for a systematic alignment of African official discourses and policies on global positions for gender equality. When the OAU was created in 1963, African countries signed or ratified a number of major binding agreements including the historic African Charter on Human and People’s Rights which was later adopted, in 1981, by the OAU. CEDAW stipulated in Article 10 that “parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular to ensure [rights] on a basis of equality of men and women” (United Nations Economic Commission 1995, 29).

African countries obviously adhered to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were adopted in 2000 for measuring development progress in all countries up to 2015. The second target of the MDGs is universal primary education for all (EFA), and the third aims at promoting the right of women and girls to enjoy equal educational opportunities with boys and men.

African countries made great strides in the first two decades that followed their respective political independence, mostly in the 1960s. However, the rate of change has been slow, with major setbacks. The process has been summarized in another study as follows:

These international conventions and agreements have had, and continue to have, an impact on domestic laws, including the constitution and educational reform documents. However, the adoption of these laws becomes significant and meaningful only if they translate into policies articulated in reform documents with actual strategies for implementation. Despite considerable work in the research, design, and legal adoption of reform documents as well as genuine efforts to implement them...assessment of the situation at the end of the twentieth century indicates that, in addition to the historical factors that hindered female enrollment in Africa, another set of factors emerged throughout the last hundred years. The new factors reinforce the effects of initial ones, and together they are entrenched in the systems and persist, sometimes with new dimensions, in the face of new local and global challenges. As a result, one of the main features of educational statistics on almost the whole continent is a low representation of the female population... (Assié-Lumumba 2000, 101)

In Africa, there are cross-national differences, intra-national variations, and distinctive characteristics of the education systems and higher learning institutions. Statistics show sub-regional specificities, for instance, of old patterns of higher female enrollment in Southern African countries and recent similar trends in a few North African countries. However, by and large, African higher education in general, and the universities in particular, exhibit a considerable gender gap of consistent under-representation of the female populations. The following graphic representations of global trends clearly illustrate the dismal African achievement in itself and in comparison to other regions of the world (Figs. 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3).

It is important to recall at least some of the roles of international organizations that deal with African education and their impact on the interface of higher education and gender equality.




Fig. 6.1 Tertiary GER by region (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)




Fig. 6.2 GER-GPI by region (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)




Fig. 6.3 Percentage of female in tertiary education by region (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)

It is worth mentioning that regardless of their respective ideologies, educational policies, and strategies for addressing gender equity, all post-colonial African states made a commitment to redress past inequalities in access and develop inclusive human resource capacity. However, gender equity and related policies of financing of higher education were inevitably affected by the economic crises and the subsequent austerity measures prescribed by the international financial institutions, especially the World Bank.

As indicated above, higher education in post-colonial Africa was designed to serve as an instrument of socio-economic development and subsequently benefited from public support as a national priority. This priority status was translated into institutional building, development of the teaching profession at all levels with higher education fulfilling the mission for all levels, and support services for teaching staff with implications for the gender factor. The services to the student body, including female students, were vital to creating and sustaining enabling conditions for study as most of them were of modest social origins. Mostly because this was conceived as an investment in the future, states provided comfortable subsidies for higher education in the form of full scholarships, travel and local transportation expenses, health care, boarding, lodging, and monthly stipends and living expenses. These programs were important for the majority of the students who were still drawn from modest origins. They were particularly important to female students that required such support to be shielded against major social hindrances.

As a result of the economic crises and these restrictive policies, public support in terms of recurrent budget as well as in capital investment, both from domestic and loan sources, decreased sharply from the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. The consequences were dramatic (Assié-Lumumba 1995, 1996, 1997; Coombe 1991; Saint 1992). These changes had far-reaching implications for women's enrollment and had consequences on the interface of the hitherto effort to reduce the gender gap and future capacity building.

There appeared major contradictions between the stated policies and actual practices (Assié-Lumumba 1991; 2000) of increasing female enrollment as a strategy to close the gender gap. Indeed, enrollment rates declined throughout the 1980s (Assié-Lumumba 1991).

Studies (Assié-Lumumba 2000) revealed a decline of the average annual growth rate of public expenditure, which accounted for the variance of the enrollment rates for primary, secondary, and higher education by 27.06 %, 21.51 %, and up to 89.22 %, respectively. These expenditure trends had a direct impact on gender initial equity policies as increase in public expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure and the percentage ratio of female enrollment show a positive correlation. Therefore, the decline in public expenditure meant lower female enrollment. Thus, by prescribing lower public expenditure on education, especially at the higher education level, the World Bank was indirectly promoting a policy that was inevitably upsetting the trends of increasing female enrollment.

Furthermore, the World Bank's lending policy and priority setting created additional obstacles for any gender equity initiative supported by public funding. Indeed, a study by the Bank's own staff (Subbarao et al. 1994) proved the negative trends in investment in Africa. According to their findings, the World Bank purposefully reduced the relative importance for education throughout the economic crisis and the subsequent solutions that were prescribed. The Bank's official position proclaimed its interest and support for closing the gender gap in increasing female enrollment at all levels including higher education.

These authors argued forcefully, based on statistical evidence, that despite this official position, the actual policies for lending and investment of the Bank became a real obstacle to any increase in women's representation. Thus, as they showed, the proportion of the World Bank's education projects acknowledging gender, with possible policy implication, was 28 % for the period of 1972–1981, while the proportion of total investment in education projects acknowledging gender was 16 % in the same period.

The early 1990s were characterized by what the authors referred to as a “regional shift” in favor of South Asia, for which the Bank increased the education project acknowledging gender from 12 to 38 %, and the investment in the projects acknowledging gender importance from 8 to 65 %. In contrast, they showed that the “total investment in higher education projects acknowledging gender in the sub-Saharan African region during the 1980s decreased to a mere 6 % from 16 % in the 1970s” (Subbarao et al. 1994, 32).

Yet in 1979 the United Nations General Assembly adopted CEDAW, which became operational as of 3 September 1981. Further the United Nations declared a decade for women that spanned the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. In the same period, four international conferences on women sponsored by the United Nations were organized: Mexico in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985 and 10 years later, the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, with the acclaimed Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. It is worth noting that as CEDAW referred to the demographic category of women when dealing with schooling, the higher education level is the most directly connected to the population segment of women, from college-age young women to mature women.

However, in the 2000 Dakar Declaration, “higher education,” “tertiary education,” and “university” were not articulated as requiring urgent action. This position is consistent with the atmosphere that was prevalent in the early 1990s, with the Jomtien meeting, the World Bank policy prescriptions and priorities, and the absence of a clearly articulated place and role of higher education in achieving the MDGs. As a matter of fact, they made very few references to higher education. The few exceptions included Sect. 3.1 referring specifically to ratios of females and males, not only in the lower levels, but also tertiary education as a rare statement on higher education.

Higher education, especially universities and specialized spaces for critical thinking and inquiry, are needed to produce relevant and critical knowledge, the necessary human resources with capacity and vested interest in analyzing the local realities in their relation to the global context, to effectively address challenges in the MDGs. As this author has articulated elsewhere (Assié-Lumumba 2007a, b):

Women's access to and use of their education at all levels is the key to enjoying their human rights and developing their capabilities as social agents. African societies will initiate a process of social progress when they conceptualize, design, implement and evaluate policies that are grounded in a philosophy aimed at systematically maximizing human capabilities and upgrading human rights to learning and knowledge production without regard to gender. (Assié-Lumumba 2007a, 33)

## Conclusion

There is a process underway in discussing the post-MDGs and the new call for global commitment to create “a world without poverty.” This framing already points to Africa as the continent that will need the most attention in the construction of this new global engagement. What lessons can be learned from the achievements and failures of the past and present call for global engagement toward social progress?

The linkage between access to education based on gender and the production of knowledge cannot be ignored. While the considerable production of knowledge in the area of science and technology and the low representation of Africans and particularly women in these areas has led to mobilization of effort, knowledge should be expanded to critical thinking, broader analytical capacity other than science and technology. One must recognize the trends that are likely to accelerate in the twenty-first century: rapidly changing technology making the catch dream a myth, increased globalization, increased and merciless competition at the global level, intellectual production as publication is no longer the monopoly of major publishing houses. African women need to be active participants in these critical areas to produce knowledge, without excluding fundamental research, but not for its own sake. Research must be a tool to contribute to solving problems (Beoku-Betts 2007) including the ones that are articulated in the eight MDGs.

The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) cannot be held responsible for all the structural gender imbalances in the educational system and for the lack of progress in gender parity in educational opportunity, not only in terms of access and retention but also in terms of increased representation in teaching staff. Furthermore, reacting to social policies such as SAPs and MDGs is important, but such reactive instincts will not address fundamental problems. These externally designed resolutions, recommendations and policies are based on neo-classical theories and modernization theories and the global power structure. The struggles, strategies and policies that can have a long-lasting impact on and construct the future of Africa require alternative theories and, research results that can be used to design policies. The consistent, deliberate and equal participation by men and women is *sine qua non*. Thus, it is important give to MDGs and the like the true meaning: they recommend. The true agency for transformative policies guided by holistic and inclusive human-centered approaches is the responsibility and prerogative of African men and women in local and national contexts. The only realistic path for Africa in the search for social progress is to make use of the human resources including all members of society with equal knowledge and readiness to contribute. It is necessary to rethink and reconceptualize Africa’s need by including women’s perspectives and voices. They are still few in number in this early part of the twenty-first century, but they have substantive, powerful, and positive contributions to make. The key argument is that Africans can realize their aspirations that coincided with the MDGs and any global engagements by planting the seed for, and the nurturing of, structural change and permanent corrective capacity by incorporating gender equity in higher education as the basis for the sustained production of relevant knowledge to address current challenges and use innovative impulse to anticipate and respond to new contingencies.

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# Chapter 7

## Beyond Millennium Development Goals: Funding Quality Education Through Building Local Capacity: A Sample from Tanzania

Serena Koissaba

### Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss how post-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) should include the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of social capital and social entrepreneurship that have impeded—specifically economic development and education finance reform at the micro level like poor rural villages in Central Tanzania. Tanzania, like most African states after colonization, was hostile to the idea of *development*. Some popular reasons that try to explain the failure of past development enterprises in Africa are the effects of colonial legacy, the corruption of African leadership, and lack of entrepreneurial skills (Ndianefoo 2011; Ake 1996, 1). The fallout of former African development agendas was the result of the political conditions in Africa that were always poised to reject effective development paradigms and programs (Ndianefoo 2011; Ake 1996). Julius Nyerere was the first president of Tanzania after the colonial era. Under his leadership, Tanzania adopted his model of African Socialism for restructuring the country that also included his Education for Self-Reliance Policy. During his [African] socialist era, Tanzanians were indoctrinated to hate every aspect of capitalism, especially entrepreneurship (Muhura 2012; Rutihinda 2002). Nyerere's government prohibited civil servants from involving themselves in business (Muhura 2012; Rutihinda 2002). After the decline of Nyerere's African socialism and education for self-reliance, the education content in the national curriculum was changed to something that resembled ideologies of privatization and liberalism. Business principles were absent in primary and secondary syllabi. Pedagogy that could equip students to think and design things beyond the ordinary was absent (Muhura 2012).

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The outcome of this decision has formed a generation of Tanzanians who look to be employed rather than possess the agency to become employers.

African leaders like Nyerere were unable to construct genuine development strategies to make their countries economically strong. African leaders turned to the West for economic aids and economic development models (Ndianefoo 2011). Concepts such as *sustainable development* were a mixture of capitalist and Neo-Marxist development theories of the 1950s and 1960s (Ndianefoo 2011; Atkinson et al. 2007). The United Nations quickly began using the concept of sustainable development as a basis for their development outreaches in Third World countries. True socialism is a system in which the state owns and controls the means of production (Caldwell 2011). Nyerere's form of African socialism did in fact control the plan and means of production. He felt that his policies were vehicles to help Tanzanians obtain a quasi-form of freedom and social justice through his self-reliance initiatives. The achievement of social justice depends on effective practice rather than institutional formation alone (Sen 1999). In this article, I discuss preliminary findings of empirical research conducted in a small rural village in Central Tanzania. I explore how the concept of the community as social entrepreneurs can assist in helping a poor farming community become economically empowered and participate in education finance reform within their areas. I give an example of the (1) evolution of the social entrepreneur-opportunity nexus within the research sample, (2) how NGOs can become brokers of socioeconomic agency and (3) how socioeconomic agency impacts one's ability to finance educational reform.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### ***Social Entrepreneurship and Social Capital Theory***

The concept of social entrepreneurship in development initiatives as a tool to show communities how they could finance education in their village was essentially a concept to construct a framework by which local Tanzanians could participate in their own educational and socioeconomic development. Social capital theory is defined in this discussion as an informal norm that promotes partnership between groups (Fukuyama 2001). Although some of the criticism concerning the structure and limitations of social enterprise has merit, the economic function of social capital is catalytic in the formation of formal mechanisms that reduce transactions costs. "It is of course possible to achieve coordinated action among a group of people possessing no social capital," (Fukuyama 2001, 10). This model can also be seen as a model for social justice. "Justice is not concerned with the results of the various transactions but only with whether those transactions are fair," (Hayek 1982, 141). Essentially justice is an issue of fairness. Social entrepreneurship can be used as a tool to promote social justice. There is a need for social entrepreneurship to

facilitate the construction of associations that will infuse ideas and innovation where provision and social services are provided at the grassroots. Estrin et al. (2013), Mair and Marti (2009) and Mair et al. (2012) offer three critical examples of the benefits of social entrepreneurship such as:

1. Social entrepreneurship supports societal objectives and group needs, while building partnerships for enterprise that creates cooperative norms with a nation.
2. Social entrepreneurship offers a view on nation-level social capital that is constructible and growing through use.
3. Social entrepreneurship represents the bottom-up social self-organization that aims to benefit others.

The convergence of social capital theory and the concept of how social entrepreneurship can help form fjords to information and resources at local levels and encourage the development of civil society. Social entrepreneurs create frameworks for markets that can eventually graduate to commercial levels (Estrin et al. 2013; Mair and Mart 2006, 2009; Mair et al. 2012; McMullen 2011). Social entrepreneurship illustrates the root change in social structures anchored in unstable cultural traits and the process and agency of the participants. These theoretical and conceptual theories should be included in practical frameworks that set the priority for public actions on education finance reform and economic development that will yield the greatest returns for rural marginalized communities.

### ***Empirical Research Methods and Sample Description***

Ethnographic research was conducted in a remote village called Mlali located in the Kongwa district in the Dodoma region of Central Tanzania. I draw on field notes, interviews, and reports taken by Koissaba during the research period between 2008 and 2011. Mlali was chosen as the site of the research because it was a small farming community dealing with the outcomes of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. I felt that the target sample was the right size to monitor preliminary tests on how social entrepreneurship could positively impact and empower the local community to fund education initiatives for the poor living in extreme settings. “Social entrepreneurship is the process of employing market-based methods to solve social problems,” (Afuah and Tucci 2012, 460). A school was started a year prior to help provide education to children orphaned by HIV/AIDS.

Mlali was made up of various tribes who settled together years ago to form *community*. It was difficult to create a social cohesion amongst the people of Mlali because Mlali farmers were not a part of groups and networks that could give them more leverage in the market. Their social identity was geographical and somewhat national. Queen Elizabeth Academy (QEA) was a private school that did not receive any funding from the government. The government was responsible for monitoring the curriculum to ensure that the school met national standards.

## Funding Quality Education Through Building Local Capacity

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have focused primarily on issues of access to education within their agenda. Discourse is increasing around the topic of quality education yet the MDG framework does not make higher education and adult learning a priority. Teachers must be prepared to teach in order to provide an environment for quality education. International policy targets like the MDGs have not been fully successful due in part to their limited ability to build local capacity. “One of the gaps in current educational goals is the lack of focus on teachers,” (Shrestha 2013, 814). The teacher’s training colleges in Tanzania are weak. The poor quality of teacher training leads to both teachers and students leaving school. Higher learning has not been highlighted with the MDG agenda. Maybe the reason for excluding higher learning from their framework is due to the massive amount of youth who struggle to achieve an education at the primary level. The MDGs failed to provide a matrix for how it would measure learning outcomes while the findings of MDG reports show that education and training within the target population is not meeting the needs and demands of youth (UNESCO and UNICEF 2013). A major gap in the MDGs is the failure to incorporate local representation and participation of the local communities (including youth and teachers) in crafting their policies. Places like Mlali in Central Tanzania have many children who are out of school. Teachers received poor quality training in their teacher training program. They do not exhibit confidence to break down the curriculum to their students. Secondary and post-secondary education is more expensive to attain than primary level education. Whether the discussion is about access and or quality education, the one thing that remains constant is that there must be a sustainable framework for financing education reform that will include the most marginalized and hardest to reach groups of people.

How can social enterprise help fund quality education and insert capital into the education budget in rural areas? The flow of development aid has flowed in fragmented directions (Sayed and Sprague 2013). The budget of the MDGs to fund education has a baseline, and that baseline is not enough to reach everyone who should benefit from such policies. Local communities have the capacity to contribute to education finance reform through social enterprise initiatives incorporated in the school setting. The old model of school farms established during the British colonial era (in Tanzania) used the labor of teachers and students to work the farms. Farm work or agricultural service learning was emphasized over education. Colonial education policy required participation from the community. They were expected to contribute materials and labor (Phillips and Roberts 2011; TNA E1 68/19/6 III). Teachers would rent students out to work for themselves and others for their profit. This was forbidden under colonial rule, but nevertheless the teachers began to become entrepreneurs, quickly grasping the principles of production for profit from the British (Phillips and Roberts 2011; Phillips 2009a). The idea of school farms as businesses to finance education was a colonial idea. The colonists’ hallmarks still exist in Tanzania. The current education system has its genesis in the colonial era

(Crossley and Tikly 2004). Small NGOs in partnerships with local communities can act as catalyst to introduce private funding opportunities and enterprise networks.

The current structure of international aid relationships disempower locally rooted education reform initiatives (Samoff 2007). The community is not involved in setting priorities and goals in community development programs. The community must be able to own the projects that are being set up to transform them financially. "People cannot be empowered if they are locked into ways of thinking that work to oppress them," (Higgs 2012, 52). The difference in the pilot research model in Mlali as opposed to the old colonial model was that the school farm does not require teachers and students to work but parents and hired farmers do all the work. The children and the school benefit 100 % from the food and funds generated from the business. Labor is not emphasized over learning. The primary goal of the school farm was to act as a working model to show the collective community how they could organize themselves into a network that could do business with national and international stakeholders. This move would allow them to be able to compete for food contracts that could pay more in profits than they received individually. "The economic problem of society...is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality," (Hayek 1945, 519n). Through a partnership with a small NGO, they could obtain contacts and information about available funding and training on how to approach and maintain relationships with investors. "Local partners and businesses provide the "bankable" projects that were previously in such short supply," (Chandy et al. 2013, 8). If the collective community through social enterprise could increase their earning power they could become decision makers in the kind of educational services their children received. The people would make institutional arrangements through the networks that would allow them the freedoms and liberties to participate in social choices (Sen 1999). There has been a shift in the participation and financial contributions of the private sector investments in developing countries like Tanzania at local levels. This change is rapidly due to the convergence of the private sector's attitude towards social responsibility within their finding frameworks for contributing to development agendas. This has spawned the rise of social entrepreneurs and social enterprises to formulate strategic plans to help local communities build their capacity to help themselves.

## **How Does the Social Entrepreneur-Opportunity Nexus Evolve? (An Example from Tanzania)**

The social entrepreneur-opportunity nexus in this paper is based on the social conditions of disadvantaged youth who live with HIV/AIDS in rural Central Tanzania and the desire to strengthen their community's economic status so that they could provide educational opportunities and food to the impoverished youth. Social entrepreneurship is a form of organizing. Compassion is a motivator to begin a social mission such as providing education and food to poor children orphaned by AIDS

in Central Tanzania. The social mission juxtaposed with market-based organizing creates a new identity for social ventures with multiple bottom lines (Afuah and Tucci 2012). The evolution of the social entrepreneurship-opportunity begins with compassion. The desire to try and resolve a societal ill through the creation of social enterprise is an outcome of compassionate acts. Effective social enterprises that employ community development principles that are community centered have the potential to rebuild shattered societies.

The first step the social entrepreneur must take is helping locals understand their capacities to participate in their own development. The second step is to organize the people and their resources behind the idea to form some level of social cohesion. This was difficult in Mlali because other than geography, poverty, and farming there was not a feeling of cosmopolitanism in the area. It was extremely difficult to organize people formally into a network or group that could be used as an institution by which they could pursue economic opportunities. The community was able to define their needs and priorities, but they struggled to believe that they could be a part of something that could repair their bleak disposition.

Queen Elizabeth Academy became the driver that helped the community begin to build trust and solidarity around the idea that it was alright to allow themselves to hope and believe that their lives could be better. The sustainability of the development ventures was embedded in aiding the people to reconstruct their *culture* of failure. Sustainable development can be successfully achieved when there is a balance between economic and social progress, but before that can occur the psychosocial effects of living in poverty and despair must be addressed. The innovation that can arise out of social enterprise is not the formation of business, schools, or profit outcomes, but for citizens internally to begin to actively partner and invest in themselves. One particular way the MDG agenda is important is that the framework is causing many to discuss and address inequalities in our world. Mlali was not a community that operated with a common voice. Their voice had to be excavated with small victories over time. Socioeconomic agency was then birthed and nurtured from within the local population. The community became free to move towards initiatives that can meet their social goals.

## **Global Partnerships: NGOs as Brokers of Socioeconomic Agency**

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are participants in spreading globalization. “Unfettered markets in their current form are not meant to solve social problems; in some cases they exacerbate poverty, disease, pollution, corruption, crime, and inequality,” (Yunus 2007, 5). Poor farming communities like Mlali could benefit from the expansion of free markets and trade. Globalization as a business principle can provide positive alternatives to poverty alleviation. The MDGs agenda is an example of how globalization is working to bring people together from around

the world to create targets that work to address some of the ills facing most of the citizens on the planet. If proper guidelines and oversights are not in place it could be more destructive than beneficial (Yunus 2007). Poverty eradication is a goal of the MDGs. Education reform and poverty eradication has often been viewed in the same context through theories like human capital approach. Tanzania's economic policy has moved slowly from socialist to market-based when the government began to remove price controls while seeing the acceleration in 1996 of aggressive macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms (UNECA 2013). The school farm model at Queen Elizabeth Academy was intended to allow the community to see micro-finance at work at the micro level in hopes that it would motivate the collective group to trust and desire socioeconomic change as a whole. "For [Africa] to reduce poverty significantly it has to be inclusive—ensuring that the poor contribute to and benefit from the growth process," (UNECA 2013, 4). Small NGOs can bypass much of the political bureaucracy that larger NGOs go through because their mission can be centralized to focus on their projects without the pressures associated with foreign policy interests. Private sector investors are partnering with NGOs to brand their companies, to broaden and to achieve their social responsibility goals (Chandy et al. 2013). Poverty eradication and education finance reforms will not be easily or solely remedied with social market mechanisms. In the case of the educational and economic ventures in Mlali, the program encountered resistance on the district level. The district education officers were alarmed by the school's economic enterprises and that the school was generating money to provide quality buildings, food programs, and teacher resource training services all without the help of the government. District education officers visited the school unannounced often to evaluate how well the social ventures were doing, not how well the school was maintaining national education standards. It was feared by the government that the school was a ploy to mask schemes that would empower the local community financially, and the government wanted it to stop. The major issues around the operations of both the school and the farms were that it was known that international private investors were involved in the work.

Education finance reform for the poor children of Mlali was a major aim for starting a private school that could address their educational and social needs while mentoring the masses in how to empower themselves economically. "Equity in educational opportunities is among the most persistent aims of many education reforms in developing countries," (Komba 2012, 495). The quality of education provided in government schools is controlled by the government. The one who controls the funding controls the equity a school will or will not have. The community's attitude towards education will impact their willingness to participate in funding schools in their area. Cost sharing efforts with community members have resulted in inequalities in educational opportunities (Komba 2012). This is where NGOs can act as brokers of socioeconomic agency. NGOs can introduce the locals to investors both nationally and internationally and offer training and mentoring through the formation of sustainable initiatives that could provide financial aid and freedom for the socioeconomic reconstruction of the community.

In order for this brokerage to work, the NGO and community must have an exit strategy for programs. The community must not become dependent on aid from the NGO or their presence long term in the work. The understanding must be that the community is the primary stakeholder in all ventures and that the ownership belongs to them.

Partnerships with aid agencies, NGOs and philanthropists that generate this package of complementary investments are desirable. Small and medium-sized enterprises, which are often toward new business opportunities targeting moderately low-income households, achieve development impact through growth and the creation of new jobs. Although these ventures strive to become commercially viable, they may need up-front, patient capital to enable them to grow to a scale that is financially viable (Chandy et al. 2013).

During the decolonization period of the 1950s and 1960s NGOs were introduced to a new focus of structural transformation of politics, economics, and society (Fowler 2000). Before this time the inspiration came from religious and culturally conditioned values of compassion from like-minded groups (Fowler 2000; Lissner 1977). If projects are set up to depend on the NGOs to set the agenda and supply external funding long term will not succeed. Social entrepreneurs must establish social ventures that merge the need for education finance reform with market-based opportunities that will empower the local people to make social choices. The architecture of the post-2015 development agenda should review case studies of how NGOs and the private sector are working together to build local capacity in hard to reach areas and review how the outcomes of those relationships could be used to help create more sustainable funding sources outside of their financial baselines to reach their goals.

## **Reflections and Challenges in Subsidizing Education Reform Through Compassionate Business Innovation**

Largely, development projects in Tanzania are outsourced to non-state actors such as NGOs (Lange 2008). The legitimacy of the government's ability to provide social services can undermine its citizens' confidence in national government. This was not the aim of the Mlali model. Village government officials in Mlali were just as poor as other members of the community. Farming was the primary source of income for the majority of people. The social ventures established in Mlali impacted everyone who participated equally. Political officials who held positions at the district level were more inclined to hinder the progress of the work by asking for bribes or use their positions to threaten the closure of our work. The liberty to self-organize must be allowed by the state in order for the social initiative to work. Social entrepreneurship is hindered by a lack of stability or even intimidation by those in power (Estrin et al. 2013). Corruption with local government agencies is a barrier to establishing markets in rural areas. A large number of poor people, especially those who live in rural areas, lack access and understanding to savings and credit services



(IFAD 2001). The local bank that could service the research sample was more than an hour drive one way. The bank did not know how to process check or handle international wiring services. Most people who needed to receive and send money used Western Union to provide this financial service. The Western Union in Kongwa did not keep large sums of cash on hand to process wires that were more than 300 dollars. Poor rural people do not put a value on banking systems because they feel that they do not have any money to save so banks are useless to them. Social enterprise programs that work to help bring economic development to rural areas could benefit from interagency collaborations and international dialogue on rural finance agendas.

Under Julius Nyerere's African Socialism and Education for Self-Reliance Policy, he felt that teachers and students should mirror a social unit like that of the family unit (Phillips and Roberts 2011). Local ideas of accountability reflect a patriarchal family mode of leadership (Lange 2008). If the leader provides well for his constituents he is deemed a good leader. "Local traditions and etiquette, in many areas in Tanzania keep lower status people (like women and children) from criticizing higher status people in public," (Lange 2008, 1139). The headmistress of Queen Elizabeth Academy was a woman. The design of the social ventures created an inclusive environment where everyone was welcomed to participate. "If a traditional way of life has to be sacrificed to escape grinding poverty or minuscule longevity, the people directly involved must have the opportunity to participate in deciding what should be chosen," (Sen 1999, 31). Africans have always been active in making their histories. Active does not mean free to make their histories and does not imply a simple collaboration or an opposition (Loomba 2005; Vaugh 1994; Walkowitz 1989) In the Mlali model, the hope was that community would embrace the freedom to accept or decline the opportunity to create sustainable enterprises that would subsidize a quality private school for their children. The construction of a clean safe school where the poorest and most desperate of students were invited to attend was not welcomed by all. Some parents felt that it was inappropriate to be asked to give towards their children's education. Many Tanzanians still feel that it is the government's sole responsibility to fund education and other social services.

## Conclusion

International development goals for fragile countries consistently try and evaluate methods and models for how they can help African countries help themselves. It takes time before sustainable models are developed within poor communities. The effects of poverty are not easily removed from the lives of people living from one day to the next in a hopeless state. One day I was in Mlali, and I could see food as far as the eye could see. Although the community owned the farm land and grew the food, people were suffering from hunger. I asked the community why this was, and they said that the food they grow they must sell it to the government. They said that they were not allowed to eat the food. They had two harvest times in a 12 month cycle. They received meager profits for sale of their food, but the funds would only

last them a month before they returned to their previous state. Queen Elizabeth Academy was in full swing where we had to put students on a waiting list to enroll in the school because the demand was so great. The only meal many of our children had was the meals provided by the school. The need to think business seemed inevitable. My desire to expand the business practices I utilized with the school farm needed to be shared with the community. The investor relationships I made nationally and internationally needed to be shared with those who were ready to move in another level of economic empowerment. I offer six recommendations for policy and practical implications for developing education funding reform through social enterprise. My recommendations are as follows:

- Establish formal infrastructure within the private sector to monitor and evaluate the impact of social enterprise on Tanzanian markets. Tanzania will be able to improve its export competitiveness index.
- Set sound labor policies and strategies that can enhance and encourage foreign and local investors to create decent jobs in rural areas. The Tanzanian development framework should be transparent and accountable.
- Tanzanian farmers living in poor rural communities can increase their profits and market access by formally organizing themselves into unions and civil institutions that will provide representation and leverage for all members.
- The national educational goals of the Ministry of Education and Culture can move beyond access for all and improve the quality of education by partnering with global investors who are working to build the local citizen's capacity to increase their socioeconomic situation.
- Social enterprise allows locals to reduce disparities within the community by protecting the environment and promote micro-enterprise that can aid schools to be more self-sustained. A stronger relationship between education offices within the government and rural school administrators is needed that is free from corruption and has a transparent framework.
- Schools that have a micro-enterprise component are able to improve determinants that affect the school's market value. Tangible effective agendas should be constructed between the Ministry of Education and Culture and education administrators in rural Tanzania concerning best practices in education finance reform, evaluation results, and participate in policymaking schemes.

The findings in this paper are preliminary. This paper is the first in a series of four papers that will develop in more detail the evolution of the social entrepreneurship-opportunity nexus and the quest for community transformation.

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# Chapter 8

## African Gender Development Gap: Rethinking Strategies to Achieve MDGs

Stephen M. Magu

### Introduction

Newly independent African countries burst onto the international scene facing major challenges, especially low Human Development Index (HDI) and socio-economic indicators. In a post-World War II conflict-prone world, social and economic development issues were not as pervasive as war, peace and eventual decolonization. After independence, it was necessary to chart a path towards economic development. Simultaneously, there was a growing theoretical body of knowledge on the effect of colonialism on underdevelopment in these countries.

National unity in ethnically fractured states was an important goal in newly independent countries—often more than economic development. Post-colonial countries generally inherited and integrated their economies with those of former colonial powers. Although a number of countries would later experiment with different economic systems including centrally-planned economies; in the political arena there was some leeway. Politically, there was some urgency towards “transforming a multi-ethnic society into a national society through the instrumentality of the state” (Berman 1998, 333). Nation-building phases in the new states emphasized a strong state; often, state institutions were used as incentives and dens of patronage.

One legacy of colonization was the transformation of economic systems of newly-independent countries. Coleman (1954) finds these included change from a subsistence to a money economy (to increase export of primary products, altering patterns of landholding, means of production, encouraging capital accumulation and increasing individual prosperity); in addition, there was growth of a wage-labor force and the beginning of the rise in a middle class. These changes introduced new developments into the agrarian economies.

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There was a need to improve social indicators denoted by the HDI. African countries remained traditionally focused on agriculture, based on small-scale holdings, with corresponding lack of robust equal property rights. By following dual systems—traditional and rational-legal systems of governance, the female gender had been especially disadvantaged in property ownership. Yet, there were unseen dangers: residual systems in colonies exacerbated backwardness and general underdevelopment. This chapter argues that these systems and practices remain and have caused on-going underdevelopment in African countries.

## Economic Development in Historical Perspective

Scholars and theories from the Global South have long argued that newly independent countries are still economically dependent on the Global North—*dependencia*. Nagle (1988) characterizes dependency as the situation where “some countries became dependent upon stronger, frequently colonial powers, as a result of exploitation, trade and development” (20). Scholarship about access to resources had historic traditions; for instance, Kitching (1989) attributes the search for a means of alleviating “suffering and dehumanization brought by industrialization and rapid urbanization” (2) and with it, other consequences such as colonialism. Such approaches, as Kitching (1989) argues, do not reject industrialization or increase in material prosperity but the ability to do so without human suffering. The achievement of such conditions, the “increase of material well-being-development is seen as perfectly compatible with preserving a society” (ibid).

Economic development has been variously defined. Ezeala-Harrison (1996) conceives of development as “encompass(ing) the process through which societies, or nations, or regions, raise their per capita output and income by improvements and increases in productivity, and how these translate into per capita output and income by improvements and increases in productivity, and how these translate into per capita economic well-being in the society”(3). Chilcote (2003) conceives of development in terms of “multiple dimensions at the levels of individuals and of society as a whole,” (3) countering the 1950s and 1960s view of development as measured by GDP per capita among other indicators.

Africa’s economic development has taken a different trajectory. Arrighi and Saul (1968) observe that the “vast majority of the population of tropical Africa consists of independent producers who do not depend upon wage employment for their subsistence” (143). This production is done on land, acquired through tribal or kinship rights, with subsequent inheritance propagating ownership of land. Economic development in such communities is highly dependent on ownership *and* use of the land. African communities are adaptable to modern market-based systems. In a globalized world with a western-oriented capitalist economic global system, it is important to adapt and meet the challenges of social and economic development.

Revisiting the need for economic development, it is evident that organization of the means of production can determine countries’ trajectories towards economic

development. The underdevelopment that characterized these societies at independence, it was argued, could be overcome; “legacies of underdevelopment and imperial exploitation could be overcome with well-designed development strategies” (Lachmann 2010, 4). There were poorly-designed development strategies; despite their rapid modernization, newly independent countries showed a huge gender-gap, mostly anchored in social and cultural distinctions, forestalling effective and gender-neutral economic development.

## Poverty

Poverty is defined in terms of resources, access and human rights, and the extent to which individuals have these available to them. Buckley and Casale (2006) argue that poverty approximates “denial of human rights, emphasizing that people living in poverty feel powerless and voiceless” (4). It is also defined in terms of the people it affects: “persons, families and groups of persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member state in which they live” (Sheehy et al. 1998, 4). It is also defined as “the inability to provide the basic items necessary for human survival” (Garcia 2011, 7). Kumar (1997) defines poverty as “a welfare concept denoting insufficiency of economic resources to meet certain basic requirements of life” (20).

White et al. (2001) identify four primary manifestations of poverty, namely economic, situational, social and demographic and finally, political causes. Associated variables include low growth/productivity, slow job creation, inadequate productive assets, macro and market instability, market failures, inequalities of income and wealth, globalization adjustment, location (remoteness), environmental degradation, proneness to shocks (disasters/illnesses), household composition, poor human capital, personal dependence and poor safety nets, gender biases, poverty inducing social structures, war, instability and displacement, disempowerment and social exclusion and government failures.

Lundahl argues that population growth was a major cause of poverty; “the human race has an immanent tendency to reproduce, which is so strong that, if it is not checked, will outstrip the growth of food production” (Lundahl 2005, 24) and argued that “a limitation of the birth rate ought thus to be a constant preoccupation for all the civilized peoples” (ibid). In addition to the especially social and economic sources of poverty, most of African women’s poverty is rooted in cultural traditions.

Poverty and underdevelopment for women in Africa has had a long history; it is rooted in cultural traditions and have constrained opportunities for women. Few concerted/targeted programs have reduced or reversed women’s marginalization. The effect Bretton Woods’ economic restructuring programs had on women was neither studied nor well understood; only after the enactment of the programs did the statistics show their full impact: “between 1985 and 1990, the number of people living in poverty increased by 32 million, and it was projected to increase by 84 million by the year 2000” (Rwomire 2001, x).

Rwomire notes that “the number of women living in poverty makes up an overwhelming majority of more than 70 % of the world’s poor. Women living in Africa are among the poorest of the poor” (ibid). White et al. (2001) argue that poverty is not gender-neutral; it disproportionately affects women. They note that “there is a well-above-average chance that the *de facto* household head will be a woman—either a widow, a woman who has been left by her husband or, most frequently, with a husband who works in a town” (White et al. 2001, 19).

In recognition of the effect that underdevelopment, uneven development and general neglect have on women, the MDGs specifically targeted women in two categories (goals 3 and 5), and implied specific attention in another four (goals 1, 2, 4 and 6). The Millennium Project reiterates that poverty disproportionately affects women, noting that in Africa, 80 % of farmers are women, while 40 % of women do not have access to basic education (Millennium Project 2013). It highlights the benefits of women’s educational empowerment: “if a girl is educated for 6 years or more, as an adult her prenatal care, postnatal care and childbirth survival rates, will dramatically and consistently improve” (ibid) and such mothers immunize their children 50 % more often, their children have a higher survival rate (40% more) and they see a reduction in the spread of HIV/AIDS.

## Poverty, Culture and Gender Inequality

Culture in many African societies propagates inequality, which has social and economic consequences. From arranged marriages, dowry and bride-price—“those resources that the bride is endowed with by nature, such as beauty, intelligence and industry” (Sa’ad 2011, 74), lack of self-determination extends to such issues as sex, reproduction, family size, the negative outlook on divorce, ostracization, not inheriting, where women, “as properties of men rather than their equals, women are themselves inheritable items in many traditional rural communities” (Ibid.).

Gendered development and roles are not unique, but more pronounced in African societies. Societies have for eons “assigned” gender roles which Johnsson-Latham (2010) conceptualizes as follows: “from the very start of life in many contexts, power, male privilege and perceptions of gender-specific entitlements result in girls and boys being assigned different sets of rights and privileges. Gender relations assign authority, agency and decision-making power” (41). This assignment leads to “males tend(ing) not only to obtain more material resources in terms of food, healthcare and so forth, compared to their sisters, but also to have non-material advantages” (Ibid.).

Ogbor, on the role of cultural norms in perpetuating inequality, writes that “in Sub-Saharan Africa, socio-cultural norms, which have perpetuated gender inequality in social roles and economic opportunity, are seen as some of the obstacles to entrepreneurial development in the region” (Ogbor 2010, 152). Articulation of these

cultural norms leads to matrilineal societies, where blood/kinship is passed through the mother and control of (marital) property, is reserved for males and their heirs.

In theory, women by virtue of marriage, belong to the *other*, leading to dispossession of property ownership. Culture, by assigning property inheritance to male heirs, propagates inequality since women, to own property, have to depend on marriage. Cultural norms place expectations for marriage of women; by insuring that they are dispossessed of property in their home, it is more difficult to advance socio-economically. Upon marriage, there is no guarantee of co-ownership or co-management of property with the husband; women are thus economically disenfranchised.

## Equality Before the Law: African Governments' Approach

African governments have failed to address women and girls' marginalization at the national policy level. For example, the Kenya constitution, for the first time in 47 years of independence, outlined, but did not enforce, equality between men and women (Article 27, 1–8). Article 27, 6, notes that “to give full effect to the realisation of the rights guaranteed under this Article, the State shall take legislative and other measures, including affirmative action programmes and policies designed to redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past discrimination” (Constitution of Kenya 2010, 25).

Subsequently, article 27, para 8 states that “in addition to the measures contemplated in clause (6), the state shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender” (Constitution of Kenya 2010, 25–26). South Africa's progressive constitution recognizes equal rights for women, yet as Wells (2006) notes, “recently President Thabo Mbeki has stressed the importance of integrating gender into all programs of transformation. The daily reality of gender inequality stands in stark contrast to the progressive constitution and legislation aimed at achieving equal rights and opportunities for all citizens” (78).

Dissonance in legal versus cultural provisions of rights of citizens in many African countries exists. The modern African nation is loath to enforce national constitutions' gender equality provisions. Many African countries fail to effect what Ogbor (2010) refers to as a universalistic/achievement-oriented society, where “laws and rights are supposed to be the same for all members and applied indiscriminately to everyone on the basis of a universalistic principle” (152).

In the context of poverty reduction, this curious interaction between cultural traditions and modern governments have generated the capacity for women to remain marginalized, so much so that in the absence of specific programs that insure property rights, inheritance, equal access and such other provisions that improve the welfare of women, the Millennium Development Goals and their lofty ideals may remain a mere mirage.



## MDGs and Africa's development

A number of African countries achieved significant economic development, trade and job growth, recording improved welfare since 2000 but the majority of the critical indicators including HDI remain stagnant. As far back as 1990, there were debates on what constituted development with the UN taking greater interest, spurred on by governments in the Global South, to encourage the Global North to do more—for example, trade more, share sustainable technologies and increase aid in order to combat increasing poverty.

In 1990, UNDP published the first Human Development Report. In it, the definition of human development expanded; “human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living” (UNDP 1990, 9).

The report contended that such reconceptualization of human development has the capacity to expand other areas of the human experience, for example, improved health, knowledge and skills. It argued for a focus on people as the center of the expansion. More importantly, it recognized that in addition to the actual opportunities for economic development, expanding choices implies freedom to exercise some choices and certain capacities. If such capacities are constrained by social and cultural beliefs, disadvantaging one group over another, it is impossible to achieve economic development.

From the 2000 Summit, under the development and poverty eradication goals, the leaders declared that; “we will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want” (United Nations 2000). The MDGs were as follows: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and to develop a global partnership for development.

The Summit set 2015 as the date for the achievement of the MDGs, with periodic reviews. Progress has been uneven, and in some instances, minimal. For example, the 2013 MDG Report shows that “while Africa is the world’s second fastest growing region, its rate of poverty reduction is insufficient to reach the target of halving extreme poverty by 2015” (UNDP 2013, web).

The goals with “snowball effects” (1, 3, 5 and 7) are not on track. The report raises questions on the plausibility of achieving the goals such as promoting gender equality, while failing on three of the goals that directly affect women (1, 4, and 5). Is there perhaps a disconnect, or a cure-all that would reverse these “off-track” goals? A plausible argument can be made that ensuring equality/equal rights might influence all the other goals. If women and children had equal access they would

have the resources to change their specific circumstance—for example, access to healthcare to improve maternal health.

## MDGs: Unaddressed Cultural Barriers

The MDGs recognize the importance of women's empowerment, but solutions fail to address cultural traditions causing inequality. Discussing general frameworks for women's empowerment is important; however, without property rights, women will continue to be economically, socially and culturally marginalized. De Soto (2000) argues, that "formal property rights hold the key to poverty reduction by unlocking the capital potential of assets held informally by poor people" (18). This argument, however, does not give sufficient recognition to the problem of *assets held informally by poor people*. Do poor people hold these assets uniformly? Who holds the assets? Is it men or women? Are the assets transferable? If they are, what are the transfer patterns (e. g. do women have equal access to these assets?).

The Millennium Summit latched onto an important constraint in the equality between the genders and overall societal progress. However, by not addressing specific governments' approaches to either the formulation of laws supportive of women's equal rights and equal access, or instituting a global compact that specifically targets socio-cultural practices detrimental to women, the role and opportunities for women in society remained unaddressed. Ogbor captures the essence of this argument by stating that "for example, property laws impose constraints on women, who do not always have the rights to acquire and own property. This limits their ability to have access to needed capital for business development as they lack property to use as collateral. This applies also to the labor policies when they lead to discrimination in employment and benefits" (Ogbor 2010, 152).

Without addressing socio-cultural traditions that limit property ownership, achieving MDGs in Africa will lag behind other regions, and by 2015 the MDGs will not be achieved. It is nearly impossible to achieve these goals without addressing the underlying fundamentals of equal access to resources, especially by women.

Most African countries' economies and economic production remain agrarian-based. In countries with 70 % of the population engaged in agriculture, land ownership is very important. Individual property ownership generally did not exist in African societies until during and after European imperialism. Franz and Von Brenda-Beckmann (1979) argue that the "legal and ideological notions of individual private ownership (of property) was seen as the outcome of a long process of evolution and civilisation for the one (individual property rights) or alienation for the other (collective/indigenous/communal property rights)" (20).

Unfortunately, the change from communal to private property ownership was based on colonists' need to expand their economic power and raw materials. Lehavi (2013), writing of the differences between North American and Northeast Asian cultures, argues that "the former has been characterized as high on individualism or autonomy; the latter, as high on collectivism or embeddedness" (295). This holds

across a number of African cultures—property ownership tended to be collective, rather than individualistic. Lehavi (2013) further writes that “cultural orientations are therefore likely to shape views about ownership and property” (297).

Still there was limited property ownership especially that which could be traded off. Sales excluded any “public interest” property. For example, Chamlee-Wright (2003) writes that in the Akan (Ghana) custom

a river could not be owned by a human being...yet the fish caught from the river, or a dock built on the river was privately owned. Such property could then be sold to others. If unsold at the time of the owner’s death, individual property was traditionally absorbed into the lineage, but while living, the owner could make a gift of the property to anyone he or she chose. In the colonial era, individually owned land was relatively rare. (111–112)

Why then is individual property ownership problematic in modern African countries and cultures? Plausibly, there would be less need for attention paid to property ownership practices if there was equal access to other resources, thus levelling the playing field. The commercialization of systems that provide access to resources and their acquisition such as education, healthcare and financial collateral elevates the need to change the way property rights are construed and who has access to them.

Independent of the MDGs, there is increasing evidence that women are beginning to accrue private property. Chamlee-Wright (2003) argues that “individual ownership of land has become more prominent; as they seek alternatives to the subordinate position they hold in traditional inheritance schemes, women in particular are seeing that the acquisition of individual property affords them greater security” (112) especially given the prior conditions of women not inheriting or only inheriting when the husband finally dies. This may be an important change, although it is not clear what role other factors play, for example prior disposable income, to facilitate purchase of such property.

MDGs propagate blanket assumptions, in advocating gender equality, assuming conditions are similar across countries, and that all countries can meet the MDG targets. It often escapes the literature, scholars and policy-makers that not all participants are “culturally willing and able to engage in competitive...relations. Most indigenous peoples...often prefer to maintain their social orders” (Champagne, 2012, 53). Champagne adds that potential solutions to achieving the Millennium Development Goals are often alien and incongruent with indigenous ways of life (Ibid.).

How, then, have successful systems managed to achieve some level of equality especially in property ownership? De Soto’s argument has elucidated that “the diversity of systems, customs and rules with respect to property has conspired to maintain the entrenched poverty of the developing world” (2001: 78), while the “unified, codified and integrated systems of the West...have allowed these societies to mobilize capital to escape widespread poverty of the pre-capitalist age” (ibid). Inability to leverage capital through property ownership drives women towards destitution, insuring that gender equality and equal access, which could help ameliorate the poverty, is not realized.

Women are particularly disadvantaged. Adepoju (2005) writes that in addition to the absence of the formal, rational-legal and codified property ownership structures, access to capital which could improve women's lives remains out of reach, creating a perfect dependency on agricultural systems and patriarchal society. Further, "farm productivity has steadily declined and food security has been jeopardized in areas where large numbers of people, especially men, have migrated...collateral requirements, based on land or property ownership, can accentuate poverty for women, who seldom hold titles to such assets" (Ibid., 50). Not having title deeds makes it difficult to access agricultural credit, extension services and so on. Because it is a vicious cycle, women also lack the proper education to increase productivity, thereby increasing disposable income (Ibid.).

This indicates a need to reconsider how development is *done*. African economic systems are still largely based on the labor-intensive, traditional/agrarian production model. Property ownership is based on traditional society models in favor of fathers, sons and brothers. With the transition to a capitalist economy and individual property ownership, women did not have equal opportunity to own property *and* have collateral to access capital to start/run businesses and farms. Also, based on the traditional models and beliefs, women are discriminated against in education and have lower educational participation rates due to resource scarcity. This is ultimately reflected in the MDGs where the women-specific goals have largely stagnated, especially in countries with distinctly traditional, cultural and enduring gendered roles.

## Closing the Gender Gap: Some Thoughts

Broadly conceived, MDGs were designed to improve human development especially in developing countries. There is a direct correlation between economic activity and productivity and the ability of individuals to fulfil the needs that improve these indicators. A cursory study of different countries' per capita GDP will confirm as much: there are clear positive correlations between per capita GDP and HDI. It follows then, that improving economic productivity will often lead to improved HDI outcomes.

If economic development opportunities and access are constrained by cultural beliefs for half the world's population, HDI changes are difficult to achieve. For example, Platteau (2000) reviews cultural beliefs as development inhibitors arguments.<sup>1</sup> Most African countries' economies, aspects of which are driven by socio-cultural practices interspersed with modernity, are incapable of escaping the

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<sup>1</sup>Platteau quotes Lewis (1955), Meier and Baldwin (1957), Bauer and Yamey (1957) and Hirschman (1957) as being instrumental in examining how cultural traditions/practices negatively influenced and/or stagnated economic development but with recognition of the importance of integration of cultural practices and avoidance of the belief that western technology/development is necessarily superior to that of other countries.

Gerschenkronian *economic backwardness* characterized by low income per capita, amount of social overhead capital, low literacy, low savings rates and low levels of technology (Gerschenkron 1966). It is important to address the overall economic development paradigms and gender-specific issues informed either by socio-cultural and traditional approaches to societies or post-colonial economic and societal structures. Focus should specifically be on their alleviation, to ensure that women especially are empowered through education, access to resources such as low-cost and non-collateral loans and other means to facilitate economic growth.

To remedy the culture-inspired exclusions, it is imperative that governments reverse the situation where “throughout most of the developing world, women lack either ownership or effective control of land, water and other resources” (Gupta 2000, 127) and remedy property-ownership patterns that “still function under the legacy of colonial rule and post-independence reforms that imposed title-deed systems and inheritance laws detrimental to women” (ibid). This includes accessing credit and loans where “lack of collateral based on land ownership, women in many developing countries have no credit or banking services” (Ibid.) and are locked in into traditional production methods in a globalizing world. They cannot effectively compete at scale with foreign, often subsidized farmers. Programs aimed at women’s access to financial services, reviewing laws regarding property ownership and generally, family relations (inheritance, property transfer, etc.) should be considered.

Secondly, it is necessary but not sufficient to articulate a gender equity goal; one way to achieve this is through targeting and encouraging women’s political organization and participation, at civil society and national levels. Traditionally, women have participated in decision-making in African societies. For example, Osei-Hwedie (2001) observes that while in the pre-colonial period gender divisions of labor determined different roles, “women were allowed to occupy political positions such as “headmen”...and they made decisions about women’s affairs in most pre-colonial societies” (163).

This, Osei-Hwedie argues, changed with colonization: “the colonial state, based on indirect rule and the Western notion of gender relations, relied on male chiefs and headmen and gave preference to males in the economic sphere as well, thereby marginalizing females in all spheres of life—a trend that has changed relatively little in the post-independence period” (Ibid.). The role of women in politics should be revived and promoted, up to and including establishment of special seats for women, increasing their representation and other similar mechanisms. It is necessary to overcome the stereotypes of women’s participation in politics and the notion that politics is “a domain in which women are out of place, subject to harassment: those who succeed may do so only by ‘behaving as men’” (Cornwall 2005, 12).

Increasingly, women have gained political power and greater representation in legislative and substantive management positions. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Rwanda, one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, has the highest percentage of women parliamentarians (63 %). Twenty five percent of

the top 20 countries with the highest number of women parliamentarians are in Africa, while only 0.1 % of western democracies are well represented (excluding six specifically Nordic countries).

Third, it is important for the United Nations, working with the African leaders, to recognize that it is not enough to have well-meaning goals that address women's plight that are so generalized that they do not take into account the peculiar differences in societal, national and regional character. The role of cultural changes as a strategy towards accomplishing the gender equality goal should be promoted.

## Concluding Thoughts

MDGs are a good-faith effort to address the challenges of developing countries, change the development trajectory and assist people, according to the UNDP definition, to "expand their choices." MDGs have seen remarkable progress, but there remain challenges to their attainment. The language of the goals, for instance, demonstrates the difficulty of coming to consensus about the international organizations' and governmental responsibility. The goals speak of "eradicating extreme poverty and hunger," "reducing" child mortality, "promoting gender equality and empowering women"—provide no specifics to their accomplishment. Additionally, for example, goal 1 (c), which aims to "halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger," implicitly suggests that half of the population will still suffer from hunger, which disproportionately affects children and women, in part due to cultural traditions, practices and beliefs (United Nations 2013a, b, c). More needs to be done to change statistics such as 40% of all wage-earning jobs in the non-agricultural sector being held by women.

There is need for awareness of constraints to achieving MDGs. The United Nations acknowledges as much: "in many countries, gender inequality persists and women continue to face discrimination in access to education, work and economic assets, and participation in government. For example, in every developing region, "women tend to hold less secure jobs than men, with fewer social benefits" (sic) (United Nations, web). In addition, "violence against women continues to undermine efforts to reach all goals" (Ibid.).

It is important to examine whether there is remarkable difference in the progress towards the achievement of MDGs in countries that have greater cultural equity than those that do not. Disaggregating the MDGs in a way that makes them region-specific, taking into account the different regional and socio-cultural dynamics is also useful. Additionally, post-2015 strategies should emphasize countries and development programs that address the issues of socio-cultural traditions and practices, with a view to having an integral approach towards development, one that leverages the best of cultural practices and achieves the MDGs.

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# Chapter 9

## Addressing Poverty and Hunger Through Gender Equality: A Case Study of Eritrea

Yordanos Tesfamariam

This chapter is a discussion of the relationship between gender inequality and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) based on a research study conducted in Eritrea. Specifically it deals with the first MDG which is eradicating poverty and hunger. It is the thesis of this paper that the surest way to achieve this goal in Eritrea is to create true gender equality in the agriculture sector. In the year 2000 the Millennium Declaration was signed by 182 countries including Eritrea. Those nations agreed to tackle eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by 2015. These goals were stated as follows: to eradicate poverty and hunger, to provide universal primary education, to create gender equality and empowerment of women, to reduce child mortality, to improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, to create environmental sustainability, and to create global partnerships for development. This chapter mainly examines the first MDG of eradicating poverty and hunger in Eritrea by creating gender equality.

This chapter is based on a study that explored the impact of climate change and coping mechanisms on the rain-fed subsistence mixed-crop and livestock-based agriculture of farmers, both men and women, in Eritrea. The study was based on qualitative research conducted by the author during 7 months of field research. Focus group discussions were conducted with groups of men and women separately in 12 villages. A total of 24 focus group discussions were conducted with 140 participants, 56 (40 %) from Berik and 84 (60 %) from Sosona. Interviews were also conducted with 8 elderly farmers, both male and female. In addition, 4 key informant interviews were conducted. Direct observation served as a means of enhancing the information collected in focus groups and interviews. In this research multiple sources of data were approached in order to explore multiple avenues for understanding the participants' lived experiences. Secondary sources were also reviewed

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to cross-check the information provided by participants. Data were analyzed by adapting the theoretical framework developed by Ford and Smith's (2004) vulnerability assessment framework to examine the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of these farmers from multiple perspectives.

About 80 % of Eritrea's population lives in the countryside. According to the National Statistics and Evaluation Office (NSEO 2003), 66 % of Eritreans lived below the poverty line. Solomon Haile, Head of Planning and Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture reported that in 2002, at the national level 47 % of households were female-headed and 30 % of these were located in rural areas (Haile 2002). In Eritrea 95 % of agriculture is rain-fed (Gebremedhin 1993, 2002; Habte 2002; Haile 2002; Mariam 2005). As such, subsistence farmers' men and women are affected by low rainfall variability with recurrent and increasingly longer drought periods. Moreover, agricultural inputs such as land, fertilizers, labour and livestock are essential assets of households and also distress agriculture. As a result yields are either low and/or poor in quality.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), in its Fourth Assessment Report, stated that human-induced climate change was a reality, causing lower rainfall in already dry areas, hotter temperatures and extreme weather. Climate change and related disasters occur worldwide but have particularly severe effects on agriculture in the developing world, having a negative impact on food production (Dankelman 2002; Kasperson and Kasperson 2001; Morton 2007). Neil Adger (2006) argued that "vulnerability to environmental change does not exist in isolation from the wider political economy of resource use" (270). Vulnerability to climate change is dynamic and context specific. It is affected by poverty, gender and societal conditions (Adger 2006; Kasperson and Kasperson 2001; Ziervogel et al. 2006). Irene Dankelman (2002) and Mary Mellor (1997) argued that the impact of climate change was not gender neutral. Environmental problems had a greater "impact on rural women than on men" (Mellor 1997, 195). The vulnerability of women and their capacity to adapt to climate change differed from that of men because their roles, opportunities, and access to resources were not the same (Alber 2009; Dankelman 2002; Kakota et al. 2011; Tandon 2007; Zerai 2002a).

## Gender Ideology in Eritrea

Patriarchal ideologies have strong influences on tradition and culture in the Horn of Africa (Gebremedhin 2002; Tesfagiorgis 2011). The male-dominated structure of Eritrean societies has also been socially constructed by deeply-rooted traditions. These are widely accepted as the cultural norms, values, and guidelines that control the social interactions and relations between the two genders (Gebremedhin 2002; Kibreab 2009). The Eritrean socio-cultural context is complex. There are nine different ethnic groups each with a different ideology about gender roles. In this study the focus is on two ethnic groups, the Tigrinya and the Kunama. The Tigrinya are the majority with approximately 50 % of the country's population in the highland. The Kunama are the minority making up only 2 % of the population in the

lowland, Barentu/Sosona sub-region, Gash Barka of the country. Eritrea is a patriarchal society, with the possible exclusion of the Kunama ethnic group which practices matrilineal relations. Kunama women play prominent roles in their society (Gebremedhin 2002; Tesfagiorgis 2011). Traditional Kunama religion is monotheistic without the formal hierarchies and practices of Islam or Christianity (Ranard 2007). Atsuko Matsuoka and John Sorenson (2001) stated that ethnic groups such as the “Kunama did accord relatively higher status to women, but they were considered primitive cultures, inferior to groups with hierarchical gender stratifications systems,” (121) such as the Tigrinya ethnic group.

## Effects of Social Constructions of Gender

Gebremedhin (2002), Amina Mama (1995) and Judith Butler (1990) argued that gender was a socially constructed category. Men and women are shaped by their use of sexual and gender-related categories within specific cultural and social contexts. These categories define and describe the rules by which the society will and does function. They enable the structuring of social relations such as marriage, child rearing, kinship and economic life. Gebremedhin (2002) and Mussie Tesfagiorgis (2011) argue that in the Tigrinya and other Eritrean societies most inequalities arise from socially constructed gender differences. But in the case of the Kunama, who do not have a patriarchal society, decisions are made by consensus. Gebremedhin (2002) state that most Eritrean ethnic groups assigned different roles to men and women. “Society identifies ‘women’s work’ and ‘men’s work’ and allows a different set of rewards and benefits for men and women” (56). The work that men do is considered to be more valuable than that of women in most Eritrean societies. In fact, division of labour has led to an exclusion of women from rights and from access to resources and has been justified by assigned gender roles; for example, in agriculture women’s labour was considered secondary to that of male farmers in all groups except the Kunama (Gebremedhin 2002).

Berit Brandth (1994) stated that agriculture is male dominated. Farms were inherited by men, meaning that women’s access to farming is through marriage in many parts of the world (cited in Alston 2000). According to Gebremedhin (2002), in Eritrea, long standing agrarian ideology also defined “men as farmers and women as farm wives rather than as partners in the farm operation” (164). Farm women’s roles in Eritrean agriculture are extensive although they differ in different ethnic groups. For example: Kunama women are engaged in all aspects of farming. Tigrinya women, with the exclusion of plowing, participated in all agricultural work like planting, weeding, harvesting, threshing, winnowing and storage, but not plowing. In the Berik highland plowing is done by oxen and only done by men (Gebremedhin 2002; Zerai 2002b). Zerai argued that Tigrinya women were forbidden to plow using oxen. It is believed that handling oxen requires a lot of muscle power and, therefore, was a domain of men (2002b). Farming was seen as requiring muscle and it was believed that muscle was manly. Cultural beliefs such as “crops

do not grow on land plowed by a woman”, or that “if a woman winnows produce, it will be blown away by the wind” are common (Zerai 2002b, 14). In contrast the Kunama women can plow land using camels (Gebremedhin 2002).

## Gender Issues in Agricultural Institutions

Similar inequalities as the above also exist in gender relations and agricultural institutions. According to Anita Spring (2002), during the 1980s and 1990s, women farmers were not represented in Ministries of Agriculture throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Attempted solutions included changing the Ministries to include women in development, agriculture, or rural production. Furthermore, some made program changes so that the Ministries “began to function as a focal point or coordinating unit...other units...began to mainstream women in all their activities, including credit, technical assistance, and training” (20).

In Eritrea since 1993, the Ministry of Agriculture has been supporting farmers. The Ministry revealed that there was “no disaggregated data on women’s participation and access to its services, such as agricultural inputs [and] credit” (Ministry of Agriculture 2002, cited in Spring 2002, 19). Women were also left out of extension programs and commercial farming as these had only male participants. In Eritrea 30 % of rural households are headed by women (Haile 2002; Spring 2002; Zerai 2002b). At the political or institutional level women’s work on the farm is often invisible to the Eritrean Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) because it is hidden by material factors such as ownership of land, physical farm work (like plowing) and decision-making power (Gebremedhin 1996; Spring 2002; Zerai 2002b). Women’s work in agriculture, therefore, has been defined as supportive rather than primary. This view was supported by the Ministry of Agriculture, male farmers and Ministry staff. As a result women were associated with the Ministry of Home Economics Unit (HEU) and the National Union of Eritrea Women. This often resulted in women’s exclusion from the Ministry of Agriculture services (Spring 2002). Women are also not usually entitled to control the agricultural products of their labour (Gebremedhin 2002; Zerai 2002b). The view that women’s work in agriculture is secondary, therefore, has had negative consequences on rural societies, contributing to their vulnerability food shortage households. Moreover, lower adaptive capacity has often been the result, especially in drought and other times of climactic difficulty (Alston 2000).

## Double Vulnerability

According to Gotelind Alber (2009), while climate change has an impact on everyone, women and girls are affected differently from boys and men. Women are the most vulnerable social group in many developing countries. Social factors such as

gender divisions of labour, power relations and culture-specific gender norms and roles result in discrimination in areas of rights and access to resources. Thus women are more severely affected by the impact of climate change, because they often lack the assistance required to adapt.

Clearly, the poorest and most marginalized people are the most vulnerable to climate change and its various impacts (IPCC 2007). Generally, too, the majority of women are also the poorest people in developing countries. They are thus more vulnerable to climate change because they are almost totally dependent on the natural resources available in their localities so in variable climates they are even more vulnerable than the men of their regions. Social and cultural conditions make these vulnerabilities even more severe (Kakota et al. 2011).

As such, it is important to understand current vulnerabilities so that appropriate strategies can be developed to cope with future impacts (Bohle et al. 1994). It is likely that women will continue to support households and communities. Therefore, as these communities adapt to climate change, women's roles in food production and water are of central importance. However, "given the traditionally limited role of women in decision-making processes... women's needs, interests and constraints are often not reflected in the... agricultural sector which are important for poverty alleviation, food security and empowerment" (Gebremedhin 2002, 162). Therefore, without women's voices the solutions considered may be weaker than they would be if the knowledge and understanding of women were to be part of the process.

## Findings

### *Farmland*

The average farm size in the Highlands (Berik) is estimated to be 1 ha. In the Highlands, population pressure and thus farm size are very important. The Gash-Barka has more land, and a much lower population density. As a result the farm size per household is estimated to be 2 ha (Habte 2002). It was found that married women did not have land in their names; rather land was in the names of male heads of households. Women only had land if they headed households with children (divorced, widowed), entitling them to a full share of one hectare of farmland. In Berik single women without children, who had completed their mandatory national service received half a hectare. Furthermore, single females over the age of 25, could receive half a hectare of farmland because they were considered unfit for the army. In Barentu/Sosona, the traditional kunama inheritance of land is matrilineal through female relatives rather than males. Participants in Sosona said that from 2007, a new system was being introduced by the government, and a full-share became two hectares per household. Land distribution is also not tied to the obligation of indefinite national service in Sosona.

## ***Gender Division of Labour***

In both study areas, male and female focus groups were asked whether or not they viewed the role of women in farming as primary or secondary. In Berik and Sosona the majority of males responded that it was secondary to that of males except in women-headed households. Females in both study areas also viewed themselves and their roles in farming as primary when households were headed by women. Even in Berik, the wives of husbands doing indefinite national service regarded themselves as primary farmers because their husbands were not fulfilling their roles as farmers. Among married women there were also differences of opinion. They argued that they had equal partnerships with their husbands and considered themselves as primary farmers. A few married women in Berik among the Tigrinya women, however, viewed themselves as secondary farmers because their husbands plowed the fields, making them primary. The Tigrinya women are culturally forbidden to plow, making them dependent on male labour.

In all Sosona villages, female and male focus groups revealed that women could plow their own land without cultural restrictions. It all depended on their willingness, strength and motivation. Some participants in Sosona said that both husband and wife worked together to plow their land. When asked what percentage of women did plow, the majority of them said they have plowed once or twice but that most often, men did the plowing. They also said in Sosona that there was no shortage of male labour because they were not heavily engaged in the indefinite national military service. In fact, in Sosona they are still able to practice seeking local community help known as *wefera*, in which the able-bodied prepared the land for planting. In Berik, however, it was found that a shortage of male labour was a problem because they were serving in the army. Both male and female participants in Berik further explained that not allowing Tigrinya women to plow was overly restrictive. In fact, households not having male members were vulnerable, especially female-headed households. They often engaged in *sharecropping arrangements* to deal with this shortfall.

## ***Crop Production***

Crop production is determined by climate, rainfall and agriculture inputs such as labour, both human and draught power and fertilizer. Access to land and livestock ownership are also essential for crop production. Cropping calendars are important for timely farming activities, although exact times for plowing and planting are determined by the onset of the rainy seasons. The major activities are land preparation, planting, weeding, cultivation, harvesting and threshing.

**Table 9.1** Food availability seasonal calendar during good, bad and average harvest years

Season	Dry			<i>Azmena</i> short rainy		<i>Kremti</i> main rainy				Dry		
Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Good	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bad	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Average	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Food available	■											
Moderate	■											
Food scarce	■											

Source: Personal data collection (2011)

### ***Crop Yield***

Food availability was an important indicator to find out the number of feeding months that the farmers’ own production produced for their families. Table 9.1 presents a food availability seasonal calendar, dividing food availability for good, bad and average seasons.

Staple grains like sorghum and pearl millet were widely available in good years for 4 months from October until January. In good years, too, moderate availability of food occurred for 3 months from February until April. Even in good years, however, a hunger season lasted for 4 months starting in May until September. In bad years, however, production was at its lowest, and food availability only lasted for the 2 months of October and November. From as early as December to March for 4 months, food was only moderately available.

Food scarcity lasted for 6 months with a hunger season as early as April until September. In bad years purchasing grains from the market was also at its highest. More specifically, food availability was only for 5 months from October to February. Food was moderately available for 4 months during September, March, April and May. Food was scarce for 3 months from June to August. It is important to note that both male and female farmers in Berik and Sozona have never been food self-reliant. Furthermore, the gap between food production and food requirements has been widening. Currently food production covers only about 5 months of food requirements. Six months of food shortage is a long stretch for farmers with low adaptive capacity.

### ***Who Is Most Vulnerable to Food Shortages and Why?***

Farmers identified and ranked vulnerable social groups from most to least vulnerable as: (1) disabled men and women farmers; (2) elderly with adult children in indefinite national service; (3) female-headed households; (4) wives of husbands in

indefinite national service; and (5) vulnerability by family size. The most vulnerable households were those that lacked the assets and resources to diversify their livelihoods in terms of both farm labour and coping with food shortages. This would include the number of livestock owned; farm labour shortages and lack of income generating activities. The least vulnerable were those who had assets and could manage the situation by diversifying these assets and resources.

## Analysis

As humans change the environment, the environment also changes humans. For example, climate change has become one of our most pressing environmental concerns and the entire world is facing its effects. Therefore, the combined social contribution to the negative impact of climate change has itself become a threat to the environment. This is based on the integral relationship between the environment and society. Social justice further elaborates on the complexity exploring how developing and developed countries face the hardships associated with extreme climate change. This is particularly apparent in the developing world, where access to resources and adaptive strategies are limited; therefore, they will suffer greatly.

Eritrea is among the least developed countries in the world and is located in the semi-arid climate of sub-Saharan Africa. Subsistence farmers are affected by low rainfall variability with recurrent and increasingly longer drought periods. The country endures political unrest and unfavorable economic and military government policies that damage the strength of the people and the country as a whole. Furthermore, the impact of climate change worsens the already poor conditions of food sovereignty and rural livelihoods.

In a country where 95 % of agriculture is rain-fed, the narrowing of the rainy season from 4 months to only 2 months is caused by climate change. Food and water are basic needs. Everyone needs them to survive. The quality and quantity of food nutrition is also vital for all households, particularly in women-headed households. However, farmers in Eritrea are struggling just to feed their families. According to farmers in Berik and Sosona even a good agricultural year of production only covers 5 months of food, while the remaining 7 months are divided between 4 months of moderate supply and 3 months of food scarcity (see Table 9.1). This food shortage reality is accompanied by limited government subsidized food supplies which provide farmers in Central Highlands region with 25 kg of sorghum for a family of five for 2 months. This is insufficient in terms of both amount and nutritional value. In addition, farmers face hardships in earning cash in order to purchase food from the government shops and market because very few economic opportunities exist for farmers to generate income. The government subsidized shops exist only in Central Highland; the rest of the regions in Eritrea do not have access to this service including Sosona, Gash Barka.

Adaptation strategies to climate change are related to accessing natural resources; as well as economic, social, political and cultural factors. According to Adger



(2006), “vulnerability to environmental change does not exist in isolation from wider political economy of resources use” (6). The impact of climate change on both male and female farmers is viewed through the lens of multiple stressors that consider the ecology and social environment. This includes climate, politics, economics, poverty, gender, ethnicity, religion and the issue of entitlement to resources.

Although farm women are important food producers and providers, they have limited access to and control of resources. Land-user rights; for example, in the Central Highlands is tied to the political requirement of complying with mandatory indefinite national service for both males and females. Also, married women do not have land-user rights in their names. Instead, land is in the names of the male heads of households (husbands). Women only have land if they are heads of households with children.

This study indicated that, while both male and female farmers are exposed to stressors resulting from climate change in specific contexts and social conditions, the effects of these stressors play out differently based on gender. Put another way, climate change is one level of vulnerability and gender inequality is a second level. This second level of vulnerability also affects women’s capacity to adapt to climate change. Women faced discrimination of gender inequality and specifically in relation to the division of labour. This resulted in women being excluded from the Ministry of Agriculture services. This is what is meant by double vulnerability.

The study findings also demonstrated that gender inequality was a crucial factor as farm women were more vulnerable than male farmers. The difference in responses from male and female participants regarding their vulnerability and adaptability further attests to the importance of a gender-focused study. While both male and female farmers are vulnerable to climate change, however, farm women are more vulnerable to the impact of climate change. They must also face a society that discriminates against them by not recognizing women as primary farmers. For example, Tigrinya women are forbidden to plow, while Kunama women are free from this discrimination due to its cultural acceptance. Research findings also demonstrated that female-headed households in Berik, Central Highlands, were the most vulnerable group, in comparison to female-headed households in Sosona, Gash-Barka for three reasons: (1) Tigrinya women were excluded from plowing due to cultural restrictions. Therefore, they become dependent on male relatives or sharecropping when there were available men in the community; (2) this issue was made worse by the government policy of indefinite national service for the Central Highlands. This removed male farmers from their families, resulting in increased women-headed households carrying the burden of being breadwinners, (3) unable to plow, Tigrinya women were considered to be secondary farmers, resulting in exclusion from access to the support of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and seeds from the Ministry of Agriculture.

The issue of culture, therefore, is very important in the above research as findings vary directly because of cultural, traditional and religious norms. We all generally accept that culture is not static but dynamic. We also understand that traditional cultures take a lifetime to change or evolve. There are also cultural practices that may not change. In the above study the concern was the role of farm women in the

patriarchal society of Eritrea (with the possible exclusion of the Kunama ethnic group who practice matrilineal relations). In any case, the importance of female-headed farms made it clear that cultural restrictions like preventing Tigrinya women from plowing need to be closely re-examined.

The above discrimination of Tigrinya women reduces their yields as sharecropping arrangements dictate that a female would receive 50 % of the output of her farm if she provided seeds and fertilizer. If not, she would only receive 25 %. The majority of farm women, however, do not have access to fertilizer, as the supply provided by the Ministry of Agriculture gives priority to male farmers. Furthermore, farm women lack the cash to purchase fertilizer from the market. As a result, not allowing Tigrinya women to plow and not having access to fertilizer, results in a reduction of their yields, which leads to households food shortages. In this way, gender inequality issues are preventing farm women from fully participating as equal stakeholders. Furthermore, the issue of gender inequality is made worse by government policies. This results in a vicious cycle of poverty and hunger fuelled by gender inequality. However, implementing four key recommendations would lead to increased gender equality and, thereby, would eradicate poverty and hunger.

## **Recommendations and Implications**

### ***Food Scarcity***

Food shortages are alarming in both good and bad years (see Table 9.1). In good years food production only provides food for 5 months. Food scarcity lasts for 7 months with a hunger season as early as April until September. In bad years purchasing grains from the market is also at its highest price. Seven months of food shortage is a long stretch for farmers with low adaptive capacity. Government needs to again begin construction work so that farmers can work during the non-farming season. It is also important to create job and business opportunities so that farmers can obtain credit loans to do business like gardening vegetables.

### ***Government Shops***

Grain and other essential food items are sold at subsidy prices. These shops, however, are only designated for residents of the Central Highlands region. The other five regions in Eritrea do not have access to this service. The government should provide subsidy prices to all regions in Eritrea. As of 2011, the government grain subsidy supply was limited to only 25 kg for a family of 5 for the duration of 2 months. This amount was not enough and suggested that the government needs to make adjustments to both the amount of grain and the duration. This should increase

to 50 kg for a 1 month supply. In order for the government to make these changes they will need to re-evaluate and re-design this program. Annual monitoring and assessment is essential. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) standard is 12 kg of cereals per individual per month. This would mean 60 kg for a family of 5 monthly. The average size of a family according to an Eritrea Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS) is 4.5 individuals per family (National Statistics and Evaluation Office [NSEO] 2003).

### ***Gender Division of Labour***

These are cultural and ethnic influences. For example, in Tigrinya and Kunama, male and female tasks are strictly assigned to either gender. In general, findings show that farm women experience excessive workloads in both ethnic groups. In particular, shortages of male labour in the Central Highlands exacerbate the workload. Women's workloads, in general, also need serious consideration and support of services that decrease their workloads. For example, access to donkeys would help with daily activities like fetching water and firewood.

### ***Gender Mainstreaming in Ministry of Agriculture***

The Ministry of Agriculture is the primary service provider for all farmers in the country. However, female farmers are excluded from the Ministry of Agriculture and are under the jurisdiction of the Home Economics Department or are assumed to be taken care of under the National Union of Eritrean Women programs (Spring 2002). Support for farmers should consider females as primary farmers when they are heads of households. Access to services for female farmers within the Ministry is vital. The Ministry of Agriculture needs to re-design their programs and budgets to include female farmers as heads of households to have equal access to all Ministry services. The Ministry needs to directly place female heads of households as primary farmers under their jurisdiction equal to male farmers.

The above recommendations and implications take into account the fact that any attempts to abolish hunger and poverty by strengthening food sovereignty must begin by addressing gender inequality and by listening to the recommendations of both male and female farmers. Results revealed that although exposure and sensitivity to climate change affects all farmers, female-headed households were highly impacted by a lack of access to resources. These findings highlighted a need for the Ministry of Agriculture to incorporate female-headed households as clients as well as to provide support for diversifying farm livelihoods as their annual production provides only 5 months of food consumption even in good agricultural years. Farmers, both men and women, primarily struggle is to put food on their tables, nothing more and nothing less. In fact, it is a lack of food that faces them throughout

the year in their daily lives. The participants of this research also made it clear that they were not interested in only talking about their struggles; rather they wanted their voices to be heard, and they wanted action. They wanted the government to implement their recommendations. They wanted practical solutions implemented at local levels to help increase their adaptive capacity to the changing of climate. Taken together, these men and women farmers are resilient, hard-working and willing to co-operate with the government, local non-government organizations and international donors to improve their farming so that they could adequately feed their families. In Eritrea, generally, it is clear that authentic social, cultural, religious and institutional gender equality and empowerment is the surest road to eradicating poverty and hunger and among female-headed households in particular.

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# Chapter 10

## (Ad)dressing Sexual Reproductive Health Issues and Its Determinants in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape Provinces of South Africa: Evidence from a Situational Analysis of Millennium Development Goals Indicators

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### Introduction

Addressing *Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights* (SRHR) determinants in South Africa is very exigent because like many other transitioning countries in the South, a large proportion of South Africa's population is impacted by unfavorable economic, political, and social realities as a result of centuries of colonialism and apartheid.

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Emerging from its lengthy, yet triumphant transition from a racist apartheid regime to democracy, South Africa is grappling with extreme poverty, high levels of gender-based violence, and health disparities that challenge the country prospects of meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As one of the signatory nations of the MDGs declaration, South Africa committed itself between 2000 and 2015 to a set of goals aimed at reducing poverty and other forms of human deprivation for the most vulnerable in society. The commitment was later cemented in the National Planning Commission's (2012) *Vision 2030: National Development Plan* (NDP) that:

by 2030, we seek to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality. We seek a country wherein all citizens have the capabilities to grasp the ever-broadening opportunities available. Our plan is to change the life chances of millions of our people, especially the youth; life chances that remain stunted by our apartheid history. (5)

With the NDP and other policy directives as roadmaps to addressing the scourges that apartheid left behind, South Africa's challenge to uplift its majority African population from poverty and economic insecurity was met with an increasing public health pandemic of HIV/AIDS that crippled the health and social care systems. Although the transition from apartheid to democracy has had its triumphs, it has also ushered in pressing challenges that urgently demand attention. The country is dealing with inadequate implementation of good policy directives, poor governance and service delivery, and a demographic reality that threatens to reverse gains made since independence. Of particular concern is the demographic reality of the youth bulge<sup>1</sup> whereby young people between the ages of 15 and 24 years comprise a greater percentage of the population (Adams 2008; Africa Commission 2009; Commonwealth Secretariat 2007; UN 2010; and Urdal 2007). South Africa, a country in transition, has a large youth population (41 % or 10.1 million strong in 2011), but the majority are economically inactive causing what demographers frame as the demographic dividend<sup>2</sup> (Stats SA 2011b). The drop in fertility rates often follow significant reductions in child and infant mortality rates, as well as an increase in average life expectancy. In a typical demographic dividend situation, dependency is reduced and growth surges to an increased working class population. If combined with effective public policies, the demographic dividend can advance rapid economic growth and put less strain on families and communities. The youth bulge in South Africa represents both a challenge and an opportunity for development particularly meeting health-related MDGs that address sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).

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<sup>1</sup>The "youth bulge" is a result of the cohort of young people and prime-aged adults increasing at an alarming rate. Demographic dividend is reaped when there is a large economically active population, supporting a relatively small dependent population. In many countries undergoing demographic transition, youth bulge has been associated with growing unrest, due to the resultant high youth unemployment. For instance, in South Africa, many young adults continue to stay in their childhood households and together with their offspring depend on the support from their ageing generation; which comes with its own unique set of challenges as well as potential opportunities. Demographics show the typical population pyramid of a developing state, with the majority of South Africans younger than 24 years of age.

<sup>2</sup>The demographic dividend is ideally a window of opportunity in the development of a society or nation which opens up as fertility rates decline when faster rates of economic growth and human development are possible when combined with effective policies and markets.

In a recent assessment of South Africa's efforts towards addressing health-related MDGs, the Health Systems Trust (2013) reported that South Africa has cut maternal deaths from 189.5 per 100 000 births in 2009 to 132.9 per 100 000 in 2012/13 falling short of meeting the national target and international commitment to cut maternal mortality to 38 deaths per 100,000 births by 2015. South Africa also committed to reducing the deaths of children under the age of 5 years to 20 deaths per 1,000 births (2 %) as part of the MDGs (Stats SA 2014). For example, various government sector departments implemented their mandated strategies/programmes which either complemented existing development plans and/or strategies. Numerous health programmes and strategies such as the *HIV and AIDS Voluntary Testing and Counselling; Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission; HIV Treatment and Care; Medical Male Circumcision; TB Control Programmes*; and the *National Strategic Plan on HIV, STI, and TB (2012–2016)*, specifically responded to emergent public health issues such as HIV and AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and so forth. As a result of this coordinated effort, significant progress has been made in the health prevention side to ensure that newborn babies are not infected with HIV from their mothers. The national mother-to-child HIV transmission rate was reduced to around 2.5 % nationally, and the country is also making slow but steady progress to reduce diarrhea with dehydration in children under five (reducing the rate to 12 cases per 1,000 kids) (Stats SA 2013a, b; Shisana et al. 2013). Additionally, pneumonia rates also decreased in 2012/2013 at 66.8 cases per 1,000 children showing improvements nationally (Stats SA 2013b).

Broader determinants of health such as poverty, teen pregnancy, and gender-based violence have not dropped significantly (Jewkes et al. 2009a, b; South African Police Service 2011/2012; Stats SA 2008; Willan 2013, 2014) nor has average life expectancy increased tremendously (Dorrington et al. 2012; Stats SA 2011a). The OECD (2013) reports that although South Africa is progressing positively in meeting its MDGs targets in terms of health indicators, per capita incomes, and public services, an extremely high proportion of the population experiences uneven educational outcomes, poverty, unemployment, and disparity in living conditions and income inequality. The impact of economic insecurity has trickled down to young people who make up a significant percentage of the population. Many young people in South Africa are inactive economically and are vulnerable to numerous risk factors such as sexual exploitation, teen pregnancy, early marriage, unsafe abortions, unsafe rites of passage (i. e. male circumcisions), sexually transmitted infections (STIs), and HIV/AIDS (Caraël and Glynn 2011). Attaining health-related MDGs remains instrumental for the country to achieve its potential inasmuch as they would appear as enablers or outcomes of development and thus tied to the South Africa's development plans (OECD 2013).

This paper presents a synthesis of key epidemiological findings of a baseline study that was part of a larger study funded by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and its regional subsidiary in Southern Africa in partnership with the provincial departments of Social Development and Health in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and the Eastern Cape (EC). The chapter begins by explaining the methodological framework that anchored the findings. We then offer the context of addressing SRHR in South Africa and beyond; then a brief review



of literature on determinants of SRHR is provided, linking how demographic and socioeconomic conditions explain trends in SRHR and show the complexity, interaction, and intersection of SRHR and all its determinants. The chapter then discusses key findings related to progress in MDG-related indicators (i. e. population dynamics, fertility, maternal health and child survival, gender-based violence (GBV), HIV and AIDS prevalence and incidences, teen pregnancy, contraceptive use, family planning, and poverty), contextualizing the findings within the provinces of KZN and EC (Government of South Africa 2010). The chapter concludes by discussing challenges [including (infra)structural, service delivery, access] in addressing specific SRHR goals and offers evidence of progress and prospects for a post 2015 agenda in addressing health-related MDGs in South Africa.

## Methods and Data Sources

Utilizing a mixed method approach that included a desk review of policy directives on SRHR, secondary quantitative analysis of key SRH indicators, and a qualitative component that included focus group discussions in both urban and rural contexts; we offer evidence about the successes, gaps and failures of health-related MDGs related to SRHR in South Africa. The paper draws on a large body of theory and research on the multifaceted determinants of SRH, understanding the links between violence, health status, structural inequality, and poverty. The paper also brings together a number of sets of quantitative evaluation and qualitative data from the two provinces to inform policy and intervention efforts.

Quantitative data from a number of sources (including *2011 South African Census data*, *the National Income Dynamics (NIDS) data*, *2012 National Antenatal Sentinel HIV & Syphilis Prevalence Survey*, available *Poverty Household Surveys*, *the KZN Department of Education EMIS*, and other databases) were disaggregated down to district level so that patterns of disadvantaging in these prioritized areas can be understood in depth. The quantitative data triangulated several data sets in order to understand the impact of interventions that aim to address SRH determinants and to understand how this is related to patterns of inequality. A literature review of policy directives related to poverty, maternal mortality, HIV prevalence, gender-based violence to inform policy on sexual and reproductive health for women and those in their care was conducted. The qualitative component (that included focus group discussions with community members, professionals, service providers and health and social care providers) explored the manner in which SRHR issues impact individuals, families and communities in the priority areas. The qualitative data were subjected to content analysis to provide key themes related to SRHR. The qualitative and quantitative data were linked to the policy and practical environment in the analysis phase and through a review of the legislative and policy environment in order to identify the implications of the research for policy and practice and make relevant recommendations. Although there is limitation in coverage and scarcity of data analysed in depth, a summary of baseline information details progress in addressing SRHR issues in KZN and EC. A notable challenge in the preparation of this synthesis has been the limited scope of up-to-date available data in the time of

writing this paper; nonetheless, the information provided herein fills the gaps in knowledge particularly local or district-specific knowledge about progress of health-related MDGs dealing with SRHR in KZN and EC, South Africa.

## The Context of Addressing SRHR

Globally, regionally and sub-regionally there are SRHR policies, guidelines and strategies put in place to ensure effective SRH programming at all levels. These policies, guidelines and strategies are also translated into national, provincial and district guiding documents to address specific issues for each country, province and district. According to UNFPA (2012), Chimbwete et al. (2012) from 1948 to 2011 the world developed and agreed on 21 treaties and conventions which are relevant to reproductive health and rights. These treaties include but are not limited to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* of 1948, *The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* in 1979, *The Convention of the Rights of the Child* of 1989, The International Conference on Population and Development of 1994, *The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* in 1995, *The Millennium Declaration and Development Goals* of 2000 and 2001, respectively, *The MDG Review Summit* of 2010 and the *Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women* held in 2011.

The achievement of the above guidelines and treaties as well as desired SRH outcomes require strong committed leadership that will also be translated into adequate investments in SRH at all levels, effective provision of public goods as well as monitoring and accountability mechanisms need to be also put in place (Coen et al. 2004; UNDP 2010). The Africa region has also developed some policies that seek to guide implementation of commitments SRH interventions in the region, and these include the Africa Health strategy of 2007–2015. This strategy seeks to operationalise global health commitments and also promotes an integrated approach for the delivery of health services as well as strengthening of health care systems (SADC 2008).

Prior to the development of the *Africa Health Strategy* is the SADC protocol on Health. The objectives of the Health Protocol were to harmonise and rationalise resources for the implementation of health objectives of the SADC region. The protocol addressed *HIV* and *STIs*, *reproductive health* as well as *childhood and adolescent health* according to SADC (2008). SADC (2008) further states that the SRH strategy of the SADC region address the main SRH challenges of the region which are maternal mortality, limited use of antenatal care (ANC) services, abortion (safe and unsafe), low contraceptive prevalence rate, high HIV/AIDS and STI infection in the region as well as prevalence of gender-based violence in the region. Other continental and sub-regional policies and guidelines as well as strategies that are in favour of SRH include the *Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa* (CARMMA) of 2009, the continental *Framework on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights* of 2004 (Arthur 2006), the *SADC Framework on the Control of STIs* of 2006, the *SADC Gender Policy* of 2007, the *SADC Protocol on Gender and Development* of 2008, and the *Abuja Call* for accelerated action towards universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment SADC (2008) and UNFPA (2010a, b).

At the national level South Africa has numerous laws, strategic documents, guidelines, and policies, which are in favour of the promotion of SRHR or create a conducive environment for the improvement of SRHR status of the population (National Department of Health 2001; Republic of South Africa 1996, 1998, 2010). According to the Department of Health (DoH) (2011a) about two fifths of maternal deaths in the country are avoidable. To ensure that these deaths are avoided, the country adopted the *Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality* after the Africa Union Commission launched it. The main objectives of this campaign in South Africa are to ensure evidence based programming towards the reduction of maternal and child morbidity and mortality, to strengthen systems to better respond to maternal health issues, to empower community and also effectively involve all maternal health stakeholders, the DoH further states (National Department of Health 2010, 2011). Related to the development of the *National Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality* (CARMMA) is the 2008 strategic plan for addressing maternal, neonatal child and women's health in the country, which ends in 2016 (National Department of Health 2007; Republic of South Africa 2010).

CARMMA was rolled out by (sub) district in each province with the objectives to:

- Strengthen access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services and rights, with specific focus to family planning services
- Advocate and promote early antenatal care attendance/booking; and
- Strengthen human resources for maternal and child health.

Evidence of progress include integrating HIV and SRHR services at service delivery level particularly in public health facilities and clinics, ensuring that voluntary counselling and testing, prevention of mother to child transmission and STI treatment and initiation of antiretroviral treatment have, to a limited extent, been integrated in antenatal and postnatal care services and finally that family planning and contraceptive information is available in most clinics both at the rural and urban centres to avoid unplanned teen pregnancies (National Department of Health 2013). To address some of the key CARMMA priorities, the South African government turned key MDGs into key "presidential priorities," which included improving health outcomes for marginalized populations, combating HIV and TB, strengthening health system effectiveness, increasing life expectancy at birth, and reducing maternal and child mortality rates (Republic of South Africa 2010).

## Summary of Key Findings<sup>3</sup> on SRHR

### *Population Dynamics*

The provinces of the EC and KZN contribute to over 40 % of the national population of South Africa with EC contributing 12.5 % share to the total population of South Africa estimated at 6,620,100 and KZN contributing approximately 25 % of

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<sup>3</sup>The statistics reported here were summarized from Statistics South Africa, Health Systems Trust (2013), the Department of Health.

the total population of South Africa estimated just above ten million respectively (Stats SA 2013b). The population growth rate in the provinces of the EC and KZN has been constant since 1996, with KZN experiencing a growth rate of 2.2 % between 2001 and 2011 (making it the second most populous province in the country) and EC population increased by 283,402 people between 2001 and 2011 (Stats SA 2013b). In both provinces, the total fertility rate is high among the African population at an average rate of 3.0 children per woman. In 2006 the fertility rate for the EC is higher compared to the other provinces especially among the rural areas of the province (Stats SA 2010). In the EC a younger age structure with a third of the population below 33 % characterizes the population. This youth bulge suggests that there are more unemployed youth whose probability of surviving to old age is very low, as few people form the elderly population, estimated at 7 % (Stats SA 2014) In KZN, for every 100 males there are 108 females, and about two thirds of the population is aged between 15 and 64 whilst the population aged below 15 years account for about a third of the population; the elderly, aged 65 years and above, account for about 5 % of the population (Stats SA 2014). This high prevalence of premarital fertility implies a low contraceptive prevalence and high HIV prevalence rate as well as serial monogamous or multiple concurrent sexual relationships.

### ***Infant and Child Health***

Although infant and maternal mortality rate have been declining over the years KZN and EC still have the highest rate in the country. For example, for every hundred live births in KZN, four will die before reaching their first birthday whilst among the survivors, five will die before they reach their fifth birthday as stated by the Stats SA (2011b). This reflects a high probability of surviving beyond age five when one is born in the province. A similar trend is seen in EC where, due to environmental health factors such as contaminated water, an increase in the susceptibility of infants and children to morbidity and eventually death is high. The EC province has high morbidity of infants and children who are admitted in hospitals presenting 48 % and 46.1 % respectively (Health Systems Trust 2013; DHIS 2014; Eastern Cape Department of Health (Ec DoH) 2010). Infant mortality rates have remained very high recording 24.4 deaths per 1,000 live births and children mortality rates recording 36.6 deaths per 1,000 live children. A similar trend is observed in KZN whereby the high infant mortality is countered by the high probability of a child born in the province to survive beyond age five through the less than 4 % cases of infant mortality.

### ***Maternal Health***

South Africa's progress in addressing maternal health has been positive over the years even though maternal mortality is still high in the country (Bradshaw and Dorrington 2011a, b; Garenne et al. 2011; Udjo and Lalthapersad-Pillay 2013;

Stats SA 2012). In the provinces of KZN and EC maternal mortality rates are still high limiting the basic rights of many women. KZN and EC women face three major delays when it comes to seeking care for reproductive health. These include (1) a delay in decision-making at home, (2) a delay in reaching a health facility, and (3) delays in accessing adequate care at a health facility. These factors are common and reflect the vicious cycle of poverty, inadequate transportation infrastructure in remote rural areas, and lack of quality care. Despite the number of measures to bring down the maternal mortality with the introduction of legislation and education campaigns, there is still much to be done, particularly in accessing family planning such as safe abortions, contraception, and information accessible to those who can benefit from them. The ratio of maternal mortality of the province of KZN increased from 65.55/100,000 live births to 68.66/100,000, reflecting an almost doubling of the national target of 38/100,000 by 2015 (Department of Health 2010). The three main causes of maternal deaths in the province include non-pregnancy related infections, obstetric hemorrhage and hypertension. The non-pregnancy related infections include HIV/AIDS, TB and pneumonia.<sup>4</sup> This reflects that KZN and EC are risk areas for communicable diseases and that there are a majority of young mothers, those aged below 20 years, in the province because hypertension is mainly associated with young mothers.

### *Family Planning and Contraceptives Use*

Family planning (FP) and contraceptive use in both the EC and KZN is still a challenge. Despite the good knowledge about FP in the community, the uptake is still very low. Districts with high socioeconomic status (the wealthiest) have the highest contraceptive coverage rates compared to those who fall in the lowest socioeconomic quintile, which are mainly in the EC and KZN provinces. The most common contraceptive methods used are: male condoms, injections (medroxyprogesterone and norethisterone enanthate); pills (oral cycle), IUCD insertion, and sterilization of males and females. Teen pregnancy is still the number one cause for young people (especially girls) to drop out of school (Willan 2014; Macleod-Downes et al. 2008). Factors accounting for teen pregnancy include poor socioeconomic conditions, early sexual debut with low condom and contraceptive use, high learner failure rate, and transactional sex (Panday et al. 2009; Mngoma 2010). There seems to be limited SRH information that is culturally sensitive in schools among both students and teachers. Thus, access to such resources is limited particularly in remote contexts. This is evidenced by the low Couple Years of Protection (CYP<sup>5</sup>) rate as well as data on condom use among males. The CYP rate for EC was reported at 31.3 and for

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<sup>4</sup>Important to note in the analysis of the maternal deaths is that for KZN and to some extent EC, the primary cause of maternal mortality is the non-pregnancy related infections whilst hypertension was the main cause of maternal mortality under the direct causes of maternal mortality in EC.

<sup>5</sup>*Couple-years of protection (CYP)* (Contraceptive prevalence) rate estimates protection provided by family planning (FP) services during a 1-year period, based upon the volume of all contraceptives sold or distributed free of charge to clients during that period. CYP measures the volume of pro-

**Table 10.1** KZN and EC SRHR indicators for FP and contraceptive usage, 2012/2013

Sexual reproductive health indicators	Kwazulu-Natal	Eastern Cape	South Africa
Couple year protective rate <i>in 2012/2013</i>	37.5	31.3	37.8
HIV prevalence <i>in 2012</i>	16.9 %	11.6 %	12.2 %

Source: Khalema et al. (2014)

KZN is 37.5 compared to the national average of 37.8 (Health Systems Trust 2013). Table 10.1 above summarizes key indicators for SRHR related to family planning and contraceptive use.

With regards to male condom use, the condom distribution rate<sup>6</sup> nationally stands at over 350 million male condoms distributed annually and on a demand basis by the Department of Health. On average, 12.3 male condoms were distributed in South Africa per male 15 years and older for 2008/09 and the Department of Health has increased this rate in recent years (Health Systems Trust 2013). Whilst access to male condoms is perceived to be relatively high due to a robust distribution campaign by the departments of health and social development, condom use among males is still relatively not enough.

Our qualitative findings confirmed the modest trend in condom use amongst males. Even though the focus group participants were more knowledgeable about modern family planning methods, utilising this information as a preventative strategy is a challenge in the EC and KZN. Access to most contraceptives was discussed as still a challenge in KZN and EC with the least use of contraceptives perhaps due to cultural and religious motivations with a small number of women using modern methods of birth control. Participants reflected on the applicability and resurgence of indigenous methods of family planning such as virgin testing (*ukuhlolwa*), rites of passage and so forth; a debate on how these could be integrated with modern methods dominated the discussions. This has implications for choice, but also reproductive health rights for women in the two provinces.

## ***Teen Pregnancy***

Teen pregnancy continues to impact South Africa. According to Flanagan et al. (2013) and Holt et al. (2012) approximately 30 % of teens report “ever having been pregnant,” the majority of these pregnancies being among 18 and 19 year olds (quoted in Willan 2014) Recent data from the Department of Health (2011b)

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gram activity from data routinely collected through programs, projects or service delivery mechanisms (clinics, community-based distributors, social/commercial marketing).

<sup>6</sup>The **male condom distribution** rate measures the number of condoms that are distributed by the Department of Health via public health facilities and other outlets in a year to males 15 years and older in the districts.

indicate that teen pregnancy is highest in the EC and KZN, where over one in ten births are to mothers under the age of 18 (Willan 2014). Despite nation-wide awareness and interventions to address unintended pregnancies for young people, the latest figures (2013) show that from April of 2013 to March of 2014, more than 21,000 girls under 18 visited state hospitals nationally, seeking antenatal care. This was almost 10 % of all the women who visited these facilities for antenatal care in the same period. Recent research (Panday et al. 2009, 20) indicates that the Free State, Gauteng and North West provinces had lower rates of teenage fertility while Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape reported high levels of early pregnancy.

Research, however, reveals that the number of KZN and EC teens becoming pregnant remains shockingly high, despite a province-wide campaign to combat the high rates.<sup>7</sup> In EC the situation is not improving as longitudinal data consistently report that the number of learners who became pregnant has continued to increase. Furthermore, the mortality rate for teenage mothers account for 36 % of maternal deaths every year, despite only accounting for 8 % of births (Panday et al. 2009). Mngoma (2010) also reported that in 2002 KZN accounted for 21.8 % of the interviewed girls who admitted to falling pregnant, while the figure stood at 25.8 % in 2008. The hardest-hit in recent months was the UMkhanyakude district in KZN, where teenage mothers-to-be made up 11.28 % of those visiting state hospitals for antenatal care (Health Systems Trust 2013). Teen pregnancy also appears to be a problem that originates with school goers. For instance, pregnancy among teenage learners appears to be a significant challenge for many local schools. Many learners in KZN and EC are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and HIV and AIDS infections due to unusually high levels of poverty. Sensitizing the community on values of girls staying in school and how to reduce unintended pregnancies seems a solution, particularly when the KZN Department of Education EMIS statistics indicate that a high number of teenagers fell pregnant to 10,595 in 2011. Table 10.2 below shows the number of learners who fell pregnant between 2010 and 2012 in the five priority districts in KZN.

**Table 10.2** Number of learners who fell pregnant in KZN, 2010–2011

District	No. of learners who fell pregnant in 2010	No. of learners who fell pregnant in 2011
Ugu	1,153	1,030
UMkhanyakude	1,798	1,798
UThukela	788	788
Zululand	1,203	1,203
ILembe	927	927
KZN	13,725	13,725

<sup>7</sup> Statistics South Africa' General Household Survey 2012 indicates that 4.5 % of girls 13–19 years old had been pregnant in 2011 a slight decrease from 2010 (4.9 %) and 2009 (4.6 %).

## ***HIV Prevalence and Incidences***

The latest report on HIV prevalence by the Khalema et al. (2014), Shisana et al. (2014) reveals that South Africa has the highest number of new HIV infections worldwide with over 400,000 new infections occurring in 2012. HIV prevalence in the country is estimated at 12.2 % (Khalema et al. 2014). At the provincial level KZN has the highest HIV prevalence (16.9 %) and the Eastern Cape (11.6 %) in 2012 (Health Systems Trust 2013). The two provinces and their districts have always had the highest HIV prevalence when compared to other provinces of the country. For example, KZN recorded the highest prevalence in 2004 where two fifths of the women attending antenatal care service were living with HIV. The HIV incidence rate of KZN is almost identical for adults and children and has also behaved the same as the prevalence, having declined but at a slow rate, for it dropped from 2.32 % amongst the adult population in 2010 to 2.22 % in 2011 (Shisana et al. 2013). The implication is that the population of the province might have limited access to dual protection measures. Despite the decline in the HIV prevalence rate, maternal mortality in the province has been increasing with the Department of Health (2011a) reporting that there were 385 cases of maternal deaths reported from the province in 2010 compared to 265 in 2005.

In the EC, HIV prevalence remains a challenge in the province not only killing pregnant women but also the whole population. The proportion of pregnant women accessing ANC services who were infected with HIV increased by 1.8 % to about 30 % in 2009 and slightly declined in 2010 (Shisana et al 2013). The province was cited to have high HIV prevalence by year 2009 relative to the other provinces. It remains evident that the province had an HIV prevalence of 9.9 % in males and 14.6 % in females in 2009. Among the factors correlated to high maternal infection and mortality are the socio-cultural factors that discourage contraceptive use among women, including stigma (Fraser-Hurt et al. 2011). Some other factors that increase the odds of contracting HIV include low socioeconomic status. The still high HIV prevalence, high fertility and maternal and child mortality rates in both provinces require that RH and HIV services should be integrated in order to increase access to and use of these services at the community level to accelerate on the gains that the country is positively scoring.

## ***Addressing Gender-Based Violence (GBV)***

GBV is probably one of the most serious problems that communities undergo, with women and young girls suffering the brunt of this violation. According to recent analyses, GBV is increasingly recognized to be a serious social issue, cutting across class, race, age, religion, and national boundaries (Bjåstad 2008; Jewkes et al. 2009c; Usdin et al. 1999; Bhana et al. 2013; and Thorpe et al. 2014). Although there are limited statistical data on GBV prevalence in KZN and EC, evidence maintains that women and girls in South Africa experience manifestations of GBV in homes,



workplaces, universities, boardrooms and public corridors in South Africa regardless of race and socioeconomic status (Jewkes et al. 2009c; Machisa et al. 2011; Memela and Ayogu 2011; Rumbold 2008; and Watson 2014). Trends in sexual assault data paint a very alarming picture about the nature and extent of GBV in South Africa. There are thousands of cases of sexual assault, rape, violence against gays and lesbians and intimate partner violence reported daily in the country. A Medical Research Council study conducted by Jewkes et al. (2009a, b) reported that:

- Nearly half reported having ever perpetrated domestic violence with one in six assaulting a woman in the last 12 months
- 28 % of men disclosed having ever raped a woman (nearly 75 % by the age of 20 and many multiple times)
- Men who perpetrate violence against women are more likely than their non-violent peers to drink heavily, to have multiple partners and to be HIV infected.

Available trend data from the South African Police Service (2011/2012) show that in 2010/2011, 56,272 rapes of women and children were reported. Recent community-based surveys have also shown that 33 % of women disclosed ever being victims of physical intimate partner violence and 13 % reported having been so in the previous 12 months (Machisa et al. 2011). The prevalence of sexual assault is one of the main indicators of GBV. In the South African Police Service's *Victims of Crime Survey* report, it indicates that victims of sexual assaults are most likely to be assaulted by a known community member. In 2011 and 2012 percentages of 38.4 and 44.1 of sexual assaults that took place can be attributed to known community members respectively. Between the years 2011 and 2012 there has also been an increase of sexual assault that are committed by relatives with 15.8 % and 17 % cases respectively (Victims of Crime Survey 2011, 2012).

According to the statistics released by Stats SA in the Victims of Crime Survey, between the year 2011 and 2012 there has been a decrease in murders that were a result of attempted rape. Of all the murders that took place in the year 2011 it was reported that 10 % of those murders were as result of attempted rape. In the year 2012 the percentage of attempted rape murders decreased to 4.8 %. Even though the data show a decrease in attempted rape murders the percentage is still relatively high (Victims of Crime Survey 2011, 2012).

The *Victims of Crime Survey* also released statistics that speak to the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator of murder. In the year 2011 it was reported that 18.2 % of the reported murders were committed by either spouse or a lover of the victim. In the year 2012 the murders that were committed by spouse or lover of victim increased to 24.8 % of the overall national reported murder cases (Victims of Crime Survey 2011, 2012).

Current data in the province of KZN report a growing trend in new sexual assault cases averaging at between 300 and 1,500 cases in total in 2013. Of all the new

reported sexual assault cases the districts of Zululand and uThukela were above 1,200; Ugu above 1,000; and iLembe above 600, and uMkhanyakude less than 300. Provincially EThekweni district was above 3,300, followed by uMgungundlovu at 1,600 cases. The data indicate the severity of the problem, often claiming women and children as victims.

According to the Mercury newspaper there is high number of reported sexual abuse cases in South African schools. In the year 2011 there were 126 cases while in 2012 there were 97 reported cases, and in the year 2013 there were 82 reported cases of sexual abuse in schools across the country. The province of KZN seems to have the highest rate of reported sexual abuse cases with 72 cases over the last 3 year and it is followed by Gauteng province with 48 cases over the past 3 years. The province of the Eastern Cape has had 36 reported sexual abuse cases over the last 3 years (The Mercury 2014, 3).

Quantitative data on GBV remain an issue particularly because data are not easily accessible or not well coordinated and easily available. Relying on police statistics is also problematic in the sense that most victims of sexual violence and crime hardly report their ordeal, and they stand an unfortunate chance of being re-victimized in the courts. Thus, despite advances in legislation designed to combat violence against women and girls; as well as education campaigns such as the 16 days of activism, gender mainstreaming, and the recent focus on sensitizing men and boys, GBV still negatively impacts and affects most individuals, families, and communities in KZN and the EC (Thomson-de Boor et al. 2013).

Focus group data collected in the study corroborated the reported epidemiological trends. Participants in the EC and KZN reflected on how GBV manifests itself diversely with multiple victims and scars, particularly when national studies such as the Violence Against Women (VAW) baseline study revealed that most women in KZN have experienced some form of violence (emotional, economic, physical or sexual) at least once in their lifetime both within and outside their intimate relationships during their lifetime. The focus group data in this study supported the trends revealed in the violence against women study (VAW) and revealed the invisible nature of GBV issues in EC and KZN families whereby extreme violence remains a private matter and is normalized in the lives of its victims.

In the focus groups intimate partner violence was presented as a routine occurrence that is often silenced and at times overlooked. It was also reported that although still a hidden phenomenon, violence against the elderly and men also exists in most communities throughout the provinces. Qualitative evidence from our study also reveals elder abuse and harassment as a disturbing manifestation of GBV. For instance it was reported that due to seniors' access to social grants and other resources a new form of violence within families had emerged. GBV deprives women, girls, and boys of the knowledge and tools they need to make informed health decisions, and results in their health being devalued, especially in the family. It also puts them at higher risk of violence, which in turn threatens their SRH and increases their risk of HIV infection.

## ***Poverty<sup>8</sup> and Poor Living Conditions***

A Stats SA (2008/2009) report indicated that out of the estimated people living below the upper-bound poverty line in 2008/2009, 23.8 % were in KwaZulu-Natal, 17.0 % in Eastern Cape. Thus, the majority of the population of KZN and EC live below the food poverty line, making it hard to break out from the vicious cycle of poverty. This means that a significant number of the population in EC and KZN live in poverty, suffer poor nutrition, lack or have limited capital (money), live in uninhabitable dwellings or poor housing, lack safe water and proper sanitation, and are unemployed. This manifestation of poverty affects people's social, physical, and mental health and wellbeing.

In the focus groups it was revealed that living in poverty also limits access to safe childbirth, maternal wellbeing, access to basic needs such as transportation, safe foods, livable housing, and can put people at risk of unsafe and risky sexual practices, vulnerability to sexual ill-health, unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, and violence as a result of lack of privacy for exploring and enjoying sexual relationships. Poverty also motivates people to have sexual relationships in exchange for resources for themselves or to support their families. The qualitative data indicate that poverty is perceived to be a factor increasing community vulnerability to situations and behaviours that may put them at risk. Young people for example are perceived to be at a higher risk of engaging in non-consensual transactional sex, especially girls, as a consequence of poverty. Focus group participants reported not being able to access a range of basic necessities such as clean water, food, shelter; and young people were more likely to report lacking these basic necessities, which may make them more vulnerable.

## ***Accessing SRHR Services***

Furthermore, disparities in accessing basic services including SRHR services are evident in the two provinces through differences in socioeconomic status. According to Stats SA (2011a) data, more than a third of the population still lacks access to basic necessities such as clean water, employment, food, and proper sanitation. Such poverty-related factors exacerbate the SRHR situation, particularly for young

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<sup>8</sup>Measuring poverty in South Africa is a contested practice. A variety of indexes are often utilized to indicate levels and severity of poverty. In this report we approach the issue of poverty utilizing the poverty indicators framework that namely assesses the poverty headcount, poverty gap, and severity of poverty by various national and international poverty lines. The poverty headcount refers to the proportion of the population living below a poverty line, while the poverty gap refers to a mean distance of the poor from the poverty line. The severity of poverty is an indicator that takes account of extreme poverty by giving greater weight to those further from the poverty line. We also present qualitative data on poverty to indicate the lived experience of participants about how they experience and manage poverty.

people, who find themselves vulnerable to sexual exploitation, teen pregnancy, earlier marriage, high rates of unemployment, illegal abortions, unsafe rite of passage cultural practices (i.e. exposure to illegal initiation schools for male circumcisions), and STIs and HIV/AIDS. Socioeconomic barriers, cultural barriers, family disintegration issues, high levels of poverty as well as limited knowledge of SRHR exacerbate the problem.

### ***(Infra)Structural Challenges***

Overall major access challenges relate to coordination of HIV and other STIs and reproductive health integration services. Focus group discussions revealed a disjoint between what the interveners are doing to educate and impact the community in terms of SRHR awareness campaigns and preventive measures, and what the communities are aware of or experience of these interventions. It was clear in the conversations with community members that there is limited interaction between the community and those in charge of implementing SRH interventions geared for women and youth. On one side practitioners and implementers spoke about the complexity of delivering services within a context of limited resources and man/womanpower. On the other side, community members spoke of their frustrations with service delivery implementation. Thus, despite excellent policies, legislative frameworks, and implementation plans aimed at addressing SRHR issues within the provinces and subsequently within the districts, such directives are slow to trickle down to practical interventions that impact ordinary citizens.

### ***Challenges in Service Delivery***

The implementation and service delivery components still require more effort on behalf of SRHR practitioners and implementers. For practitioners and professionals in the focus group discussions there was a perceived increase in the workload and complexity of issues community members or clients bring to the table related to SRHR. Professionals, practitioners, and NGO representatives interviewed reported a multitude of issues communities face ranging from increased poverty, sexual violence, GBV, moral degeneration and lack of SRH service access for a number of people within the two provinces.

In the focus groups, educators, health and social care workers reported that as a result of the complexity of issues their clients encounter, this has led to limited delivery of services exemplified by long waiting times for clients at health facilities, decreased supply of medications particularly for family planning and so forth. While HIV supplies seem to be consistently supplied in most cases, for example, it was not the case for GBV counselling, poverty reduction strategies, sexual violence cases, and family planning support particularly for young people. If not properly

addressed, these challenges may lead to a reduction in the number of people accessing key SRH services particularly in rural communities where transportation and other resources are limited. For example, in cases where people have to wait for long hours and they find that the supplies for the services they need are not available, they may not return to seek the service again.

## Discussion and Conclusion

When South Africa signed the MDGs declaration in 2000 with targets to reduce child deaths by two thirds (MDG 4), maternal deaths by three quarters (MDG 5), universal access to reproductive health (MDG 5) and to halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS (MDG 6) between 1990 and 2015, the country made a commitment for change and transformation. The analysis of SRHR indicators and their determinants in this chapter show that significant effort has been made at all levels to address SRHR issues at the policy and local level. South Africa has shown strong commitment to saving the lives of mothers, babies and children. The reviewed data clearly identified progress in preventing maternal deaths and non-pregnancy related infections (i.e. HIV).

The data summarized underscore the importance of SRH services regardless of individuals' socioeconomic status. Access to SRH services is still a challenge particularly for women and girls in rural and remote areas. Compounded by structural challenges such as lack of transportation, poverty-related barriers, and unsafe cultural practices, women, youth, and people with disabilities are particularly vulnerable. Our analysis corroborates empirical findings in the literature (Ramkissoon et al. 2010) that conclude that women and girls (especially in rural and semi-urban areas of South Africa) have compounding risk factors for violence, injury or abuse, challenges in accessing health services, discrimination, maltreatment and exploitation. Furthermore, many women and girls are still subjected to GBV, HIV/AIDS infection, unsafe cultural practices, and socioeconomic barriers which could curb the progress made since the 1994 democratic dispensation and subsequent signing of the MDGs declaration in 2000.

The findings above imply that achieving MDG 5 and 6 will remain elusive if integration of SRH and HIV services is not expedited when issues of SRHR for the most vulnerable and underserved are not proactively addressed. What is also overlooked is an integration of indigenous sexual health knowledge (ISHK) into the preventative efforts. ISHK includes understanding cultural norms and practices about sexuality that complements Western approaches. There is a need for enhanced collaboration between local district authorities, traditional leaders, community health workers, and health professionals around better intervention strategies that are culturally informed and evidence based in order to have a coordinated approach to SRHR programme integration both at policy and service delivery levels.

For EC and KZN to move forward in addressing poverty, HIV prevalence, GBV and related determinants of SRHR, it is critical to attend to and understand not only

the structural barriers women, men, youth living in poverty and those with HIV and/or GBV may face, but also the negative perceptions that stigmatize and continuously marginalize individuals and communities within these contexts (Sen 2010). South Africa has a functioning democracy with an equally functioning health service, good policies, and strong leadership to move the country forward in the post-MDGs era.

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# Chapter 11

## Culture, Traditions and Maternal Health: A Community Approach Towards Improved Maternal Health in the Northern Uganda Districts of Gulu, Moroto and Kotido

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### Introduction

Globally, significant progress towards reducing maternal mortality has been made; however much remains to be done specifically in sub-Saharan Africa (Kendall and Isabella 2014) where no less than 24 of the 46 sub-Saharan countries have achieved a reduction of more than 40 % in maternal deaths since 1990 with maternal mortality still at 500 per 100,000 live birth (WHO et al. 2012).

Uganda's maternal and newborn health (MNH) situation calls for more concerted efforts in order to achieve the international targets of 2015. The maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in Uganda is 435 deaths per 100,000 live births. This translates to about 6,000 women dying every year due to pregnancy related causes. The infant mortality rate (IMR) is 76 deaths per 1,000 live births and a mortality of 137 deaths per 1,000 live births for under the age of five. In relation to other causes of illness, maternal and child morbidity account for the highest disease burden in Uganda. Prenatal and maternal conditions account for 20.4 %; malaria 15.4 %; acute lower respiratory tract infections 10.5 %; and HIV/AIDS 9.1 % of the total.

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Adolescent pregnancy is very high at 24 % and an estimated 820,000 women become pregnant without intending to do so (UBOS 2007).

It is important to observe that most of the causes of maternal mortality are preventable actions that link delays at home, delays on the way to the hospital or delays in the hospital. Statistics suggest that only about 36 % of rural women deliver in a health facility (Ibid.). The status of maternal health in Uganda does not mean absence of legal and policy frameworks.

Article 33(3) of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda recognizes the need to protect the maternal functions of women including reproduction. It states that: "The State shall protect women and their rights, taking into account their unique status and natural maternal functions in society." This provision recognizes that women have rights that arise from their maternal functions; therefore it implicitly places obligations upon the state to protect the sexual and reproductive health rights of women. Furthermore, Article 33(6) prohibits laws, cultures, customs or traditions which are against their dignity, welfare or interest of women or which undermine their status. Therefore any laws, cultures, customs which undermine the health of women including their sexual and reproductive health rights are null and void.

Uganda is a party to key international instruments which place upon her the obligation to provide maternal health. Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides for the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Article 12(2) outlines the steps that should be taken by state parties for the realization of the right to health. These include: the reduction of the stillbirth rate and infant mortality and in effect improvement of maternal health.

The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) calls upon member states to ensure respect for women's and girls' human rights and fundamental freedoms. This instrument was ratified by Uganda on the 30th of July, 1980 without any reservations. The Convention obliges states to ensure the right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions; including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, state parties are obliged to take appropriate measures: to prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status. States are also required to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances. The Convention further obliges states to encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities and to provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.

Within the African context, Article 16(1) of the African Charter provides that, "Every individual has the right to enjoy the highest attainable state of physical and mental health." Article 16(2) obliges state parties to the African Charter to take "the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical treatment when they are sick." The Rights of Women Maputo

Protocol 2003 calls upon state parties to ensure that the right to health of women, including sexual and reproductive health rights, is respected. The Protocol calls upon state parties to prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices against women. Some of these practices included female genital mutilation and other harmful practices to women especially during pregnancy.

Other than the legal framework, Uganda has an active civil society that is engaging the government on maternal health issues. In September 2011, they petitioned the constitutional court (Petition Number 16 of 2011) calling for the declaration of avoidable deaths of women in the process of childbirth an abuse of their right to health. Civil society organizations (CSOs) argue that “non-provision of essential maternal health commodities in government health facilities, leading to the death of some expectant mothers, is an infringement on the right to health of the victims” (Center for Health, Human Rights and Development (CEHURD) 2011). By and large CSOs link the poor maternal health condition in Uganda to government failure to provide the necessary supervised deliveries and healthcare facilities.

While Uganda is a signatory to many national, regional and international commitments and guidelines on the reduction of its high maternal and neonatal mortality and morbidity, improvements have not been forthcoming. A review of the maternal health literature clearly points to the limited problematization of culture and traditions in maternal health. The critical indicators for maternal and reproductive health that include access to family planning services, antenatal services, girl-child education, motivated, skilled health-worker force and functional medical facilities, access to life-saving HIV treatment mainly focus on the supply side and hardly on the demand side that is the woman, her household and community.

## **Culture, Traditions and Maternal Health**

Although, medical causes of maternal mortality are similar throughout the world, some may be precipitated by cultural factors. For example, prolonged or obstructed labour that accounts for about 8 % of maternal deaths is common in populations with traditions and taboos regarding the diets of girls and women. It is worse where girls marry young and are expected to prove their fertility, often before they are fully grown (Turyasingura 1996; UNFPA 1998; WHO 1999). In the same breath, Senah (2003) argues that although conception and delivery are biological events, they are significantly influenced by the cultural usage and nuances of the community. Studies have also shown that maternal health is not only the result of direct, biomedical conditions but also from factors like the household environmental conditions and other factors deeply rooted in culture, structure, institutional and gender relationship (Kyomuhendo 2004).

Takim et al. (2013) argue that, as early as the 1950s, United Nations specialized agencies and human rights bodies began considering the question of harmful traditional practices affecting the health of women, in particular female genital mutilation. But these issues have not received consistent broader consideration, and action to

bring about any substantial change has been slow or superficial. They also indicate that, the international community remained wary about treating these issues as a deserving subject for international and national scrutiny and action.

Turning a blind eye to the effect of culture and tradition on maternal and newborn health has meant that cultural practices that are detrimental to the health of mothers are still being held with esteem. For example, in the Southern part of Nigeria, it is common practice to use cow dung to clear the umbilical cord, this results in tetanus infections. In addition, children are usually not given foods like eggs or meat for fear that they will become thieves, witches/wizards; this leads to the condition known locally as kwashiorkor, which is as a result of lack of protein in the system (Myers 1997 cited in Senah 2003). Similarly, Lori (2009) established that there is a culture of silence related to pregnancy and childbirth. This culture of silence is used by women to protect themselves and their unborn child from harm, a practice normalized and reinforced by elders and traditional healers in the communities. Vulnerability to spirits or witchcraft often precluded women from seeking care for a problem in pregnancy when needed. These findings support earlier research conducted in developing countries articulating the need women express to protect themselves from spirits during pregnancy and childbirth (Chapman 2006; Jansen 2006).

In Uganda, some communities still observe cultural practices that are harmful to women during pregnancy, delivery and the immediate post-partum period. Some of these include: ingestion of herbs to quicken labour; refusing caesarean sections on pretext that women are supposed to deliver normally to prove womanhood; and the culture of silence/non-expression of pain during labour and childbirth (Kyomuhendo 2003). In the same breath Adong (2011) indicated that pregnant women utilized traditional therapies, usually herbal medicines for various ailments and pregnancy/delivery related conditions; herbals were taken to make pelvic bones flexible, heal vaginal tears and treat abdominal pains and fevers to mention but a few. Herbal therapies were also utilized to induce labour, for bathing child and mother and various mixtures used to dress the umbilical cord before it falls off. These sometimes resulted in complications that led to neonatal and maternal morbidity and deaths.

Studies have shown that traditional birth attendants (TBAs) have been the custodian of traditional cultural practices as they encourage use of herbs and home deliveries. Adong (2011) observed that in Uganda, close relatives, TBAs or friends were often preferred to health workers, who were often strangers or outsiders and not recognized as part of the local birth culture. She argued that mothers do not deliberately choose the riskier option of home-based, unskilled care; rather, the environment in which they live to a great extent limits their choices. Individuals are often faced with a challenge of choosing between traditional and modern medical practitioners. In support of the above finding, Nyanzi (2008) argues that in any society, the role of the TBAs often reflects the culture and the social organization of the society. He states that estimates indicate that 60 % of births in the developing world occur outside a health facility and 47 % are attended to by TBAs. In rural Africa, due to cultural adherence, between 60 and 90 % of deliveries are assisted by TBAs. Women's dependence on cultural practices has led them to be in constant conflict

with health workers who do not approve of what they do. Nyanzi (2008) observed that women who consulted TBAs for antenatal care and later moved to the hospital for treatment towards the time of delivery were often ridiculed by hospital midwives for either seeking unprofessional care or combining bio-medical drugs with traditional herbs. These treatments given by health workers rather discourage women from using facilities, thereby increasing home births in most developing countries.

However, not all cultural/traditional practices are bad; some have stood the test of time and have positive values (Idehen 2007, cited in OjuaTakimAsu et al. 2013). OjuaTakimAsu et al. (2013) argue that some positive cultural practices that promote health amongst women do exist in our communities. They indicate that in Efik and Ibibio culture, it is a common practice for mothers to breastfeed their children for a long time and women who have just delivered to be placed on special diets. This is believed to help the woman to regain lost nutrients during pregnancy and delivery, and this really does. Sexual abstinence during lactation is also widely practiced because of the belief that a woman is not fully pure at this time.

Despite the above arguments on the role culture on maternal health, CODESRIA Documentation and Information Centre (CODICE) (2009) indicate that cultural influence on maternal mortality is not recognized as an important factor. Very few researchers have written about this important aspect. Harmful practices such as female genital mutilation were considered sensitive cultural issues falling within the spheres of women and the family. For a long time, governments and the international community had not expressed sympathy and understanding for women who, due to ignorance or unawareness of their rights, endured pain, suffering and even death inflicted on themselves and their female children (Takim et al. 2013).

The above literature shows that there is increasing realization that improved maternal and newborn health is highly dependent on the maternal health practices of the individual women, their families and communities, influenced by socio-economic variables including culture and traditions (WHO 2003).

## **Why Culture, Traditions and Maternal Health?**

The World Health Organization (2003) states that both improvements of maternal and newborn health services and actions at the community level are required to ensure that woman and their newborns have access to the skilled care they need, when they need it. The aim of the WHO's work with individuals, families and communities is to contribute to their empowerment in order to improve and increase their control over maternal and newborn health, as well as increase access and utilization of quality health services, particularly those provided by skilled attendants. The critical issue to improved maternal health is bridging the gap between the community and the skilled health personnel. Managing the socio-economic determinants of maternal health including culture and traditions is critical. It is also important to explore ways of promoting community approaches to improved maternal health.

## Models for Community Involvement in Maternal Health

A number of interventions in Africa have been undertaken with an aim of improving maternal health. In 2003, *Safe Motherhood Action Groups* were established in Zambia as part of a national safe motherhood programme (Ensor et al. 2014). The intervention focused on improvements in women's knowledge of antenatal care and obstetric danger signs, use of emergency transport and deliveries involving skilled birth attendants. It is silent about how culture and traditions influence knowledge of communities on issues related to maternal health practices.

*Clinical and outreach services* have been provided by Faith Based Organizations, health networks and community and congregation-based health programs. In Malawi (Chand et al. 2001), congregations are used to mobilize and promote behavior change to improve health and save lives. The model does not illustrate the methodology on how exactly the behavioral change is caused through faith communities. In situations where church leaders do not have the required knowledge on maternal health such communities will still experience challenges of maternal health.

*Care group models* have been used in Mozambique by World Relief to address some of the gaps in achieving sustainable impact by engaging a network of community health volunteers and training them as behavior change agents. These volunteers implement culturally relevant approaches and learn how to combat dehydration, facilitate the practice of birth spacing and follow good nutrition and hygiene habits (Chand and Patterson 2007). A rather similar model is being used by World Vision Uganda. However, this model does not particularly address cultural issues in maternal health issues. The selection of change agents does not put into consideration some of the custodians of culture, like cultural leaders, yet they are influential if any effort aimed at to change the negative aspects of culture is bear any fruit.

As the above literature review shows, a number of interventions have been made to improve maternal health conditions in Africa, but the majority of them are silent in dealing with culture and tradition issues in maternal health. Royston and Armstrong (1989) and Gordon (1996, cited in CODICE 2009) argued that any serious attempt to improve the health of women must deal with those ways in which a woman's health is harmed by social customs and cultural traditions simply because she was born female. The cultural aspect of maternal health has not been given enough attention as most of the strategies to improve the health of pregnant women and their children are geared towards the medical explanatory model. For example, in Ghana, the 2003 maternal health programme places emphasis on emergency obstetric complications and transportation (UNDP 2007 cited in Takim et al. 2013). Therefore, the driving factor behind this project was managing the socio-economic determinants of maternal health, including culture and traditions, as an important means to reducing the gap between the community and the skilled health personnel. Specifically, the aim of the 2 year project (2012–2013) was to facilitate women to interrogate the roles of culture and traditions towards the improvement of maternal health.

## Theory of Change



Improving maternal and newborn health can be achieved through adopting a community approach. This involves a participatory identification of culture and traditions around maternal health and crafting community-led interventions to counteract the negative cultural practices.

## Approach to Project Implementation

Action research was used to inform the approach to this project. There was a desire of producing practical knowledge that is useful to the women in their everyday lives. The aim was not only to understand and report on how culture and traditions affect maternal health but also to facilitate the local communities and other stakeholders in appreciating positive cultural practices and discourage the negative ones. Within the framework of action research, the research project employed a community development approach. This involves a continuous mutual exchange of views, ideas and opinions between people or groups of people aimed at developing mutual understanding and seeking a solution (Walakira 2010). It involves a continuous mutual exchange of views, ideas and opinions between people or groups of people aimed at developing mutual understanding and seeking a solution (Ibid.).

Planning for the project involved a desk review to gain a broader understanding of the subject of study and to prepare the materials needed for the project and consultative meetings with the different stakeholders. A meeting was held with the WHO technical advisor on maternal health to agree on the project and its logistics. Preliminary meetings were held with a team of technical specialists in obstetrics and gynecology, culture, herbal medicine and maternal health, livelihoods and gender issues. The aim was to develop a multidisciplinary program that would ensure that the technical dimensions of the project are taken care of. The outcome of these meetings was a document that guided the field work in the districts.

The project was conducted in three phases: understanding the cultural terrain (Phase one); consolidation (Phase two); and strengthening the relations between the



health facility and communities for improved maternal health (Phase three). Two phases have been implemented.

Phase one helped to identify issues and recommendations that needed to be acted upon. Some of these issues included: sensitization on culture and maternal health, identifying new roles for the TBAs, working with cultural leaders on maternal health issues, enrolment of men into maternal health, bridging the gap between the community and health facility, creation of a women's maternal health group and training them, establishing district platforms on culture and maternal health, economic empowerment for women to enable them access MNH.

In Phase one, a mixed methods approach was adopted. This involved conducting structured interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and community dialogues (involved dialogue on key cultural practices relating to pregnancy and child birth). A mixed sampling methodology approach was adopted. This involved use of both purposive and cluster sampling methods. Purposive sampling was used to select one sub-county from each district. In addition, this sampling method was used to select participants for community dialogues, key informants and focus group discussion members. Cluster sampling was used to select the 300 women (sample size determined using Yamane's formula

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

) that participated in structured interviews. These were selected using

multi stage cluster sampling. In a given sub county, 50 % of the parishes were randomly selected and 50 % of the villages in each of the selected parishes were also randomly selected. In each village, with the help of the Local Council (LC), a list of women was generated and using simple random sampling; 100 women were selected.

Key informant interviews were held with the district administration including the District Health Officer, Community Development Officer, and Senior Midwives. At the sub-county level meetings were held with the sub-county chief and the sub-county woman councilor. The aim was to build a district consensus and acceptance of the project. The sub-counties and the women who participated in the focus group discussion and dialogues were selected with guidance from the District Health Office. Thirty six (36) women in total were purposively selected to participate using the categories below:

- (a) 10 Women leaders of religious groups—Anglican, Pentecostal, Advent, and Moslems;
- (b) 6 TBAs;
- (c) 6 Cultural leaders' wives;
- (d) 8 women from burial societies and savings groups or any other key women leaders;
- (e) 6 pregnant women, 2 from each of the three trimesters of pregnancy.

A total of six community dialogues were held with the women in each of the districts. The dialogues covered a number of issues including preparation of young women for maternal health issues; preparation of the women for the three trimesters

of pregnancy and time after delivery; role of men in maternal health; household relations and maternal health; danger signs during pregnancy; the pillars of safe motherhood and reproductive health. The community dialogues were complimented with 8 focus group discussions (six for women and two for men) and key informant interviews. The focus group discussions were used to build consensus on pertinent issues concerning maternal health and to ensure that all the women and men had an opportunity to participate. It was also to build group strength particularly in light of the abolition of the traditional birth attendants that has created a realization that their services are illegal. The key informant interviews were held with opinion leaders and districts experts that included the office of the District Medical Officer, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and midwives' associations. The aim of the interviews was to gain a deeper insight on culture and maternal health and community efforts to reduce the negative impacts of culture on maternal health.

Phase two focused on establishing women's groups (Oinakinos women's group in Moroto district, Bungatira Health Volunteers women's group in Gulu district and Kitopolo women's group in Kotido district), supporting their capacity-building and creating a supportive environment for their effective operation. A community dialogue approach was used. Two dialogues were held in the second phase. The first dialogue was composed of women, men, district leaders and other stakeholders. The dialogue facilitated the women as well as men and district leaders to interrogate the finding of Phase one and their implications to the maternal health practices in the districts. In addition, the dialogue provided an opportunity for the leaders and the women to nurture action and support for women's and community positive practices in maternal health. Training sessions were held with the women groups and purposively selected men. The training sessions followed an interactive and participatory pattern through use of demonstrations, group work and skits. The trainees were given an opportunity to make presentations in form of role plays and skits and composed songs on key issues that they considered important from the dialogues and training that could be passed on to their community members. In other words, the workshop used participatory methods not only to involve the participants but to identify the best communication mechanisms for maternal and newborn health care messages to the community.

## **Location of Gulu, Kotido and Moroto in Uganda**

Gulu district is located in Northern Uganda, making one of the districts diversely affected by war for over a decade. Kotido and Moroto districts are located in Karamoja region which is one of the most remote regions of Uganda. The population of focus was the local women in these areas. The focus of the training was on women drawn from various religious groups, TBAs, burial societies, cultural institutions and savings groups and pregnant women. These were seen to be in a better position to pass on maternal health information to their respective communities.

## Data Analysis

After data collection, data generated from structured interviews were edited and coded and analyzed using descriptive statistics using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) Version 17. Qualitative data generated from focus group discussions, community dialogues and key informant interviews were analyzed using content analysis.

## Maternal Health Related Cultural Terrain

Maternal health in the three districts presented unique findings in relation to Prenatal, Antenatal Care, Delivery and Postnatal periods revealing how cultural practices impact on maternal and child health as explained below.

### *Pre-natal Period*

In Moroto and Kotido districts a young woman had no say in choosing her marriage partner as this was left to her parents or elders to decide. In Gulu district, the young woman chooses her partner but she needs her parent's or elder's consent before marriage. Generally the women cited 18–21 years as the acceptable age of having a baby, but the reality is that girls become pregnant as early as 13 years and in some cases especially in Kotido and Moroto the pregnancy happens as a result of defilement or rape that are generally acceptable cultural practices of getting a partner. However, in Kotido and Moroto the trend of parents choosing for a young woman a marriage partner is slowly changing and most women choose who to marry. Girls between the ages of 10 and 15 years are trained in preparation for motherhood responsibilities including maternal health issues.

### *Antenatal Period*

In the three districts, most of the practices around this period are to prevent miscarriages and chances of giving birth to a deformed baby. During this period across the three districts an expectant mother is expected to hide her pregnancy until it is visible. One of the women during the dialogues had this to say: *It is shameful to talk about pregnancy in its early stages.* During the community dialogues a participant said: *Most girls today get unwanted pregnancies, you only identify that they are pregnant when they want to eat sour foods like oranges. They may also refuse to eat certain foods like onions.* Such a woman would only share news of her pregnancy

with her husband. Hiding the pregnancy is one of the reasons why such a woman would fail to attend the recommended four antenatal care (ANC) visits. One of the senior midwives said that, *hiding the pregnancy prevents the early identification or detection of pregnancy related complications like high blood pressure for appropriate interventions*. In relation to this finding, Lori (2009) argues that the culture of silence is used by women to protect themselves and their unborn child from harm, a practice normalized and reinforced by elders and traditional healers in the communities. Vulnerability to spirits or witchcraft often precluded women from seeking care for a problem in pregnancy when needed.

The study also revealed that the pregnancy is protected by adhering to a number of taboos. In Gulu the pregnancy is safeguarded through a number of ways, including refusal of a pregnant woman from touching a razor blade, sitting on hides/skin and eating goat meat. A pregnant woman is also forbidden from taking bitter medicine, and hence discouraged from going to the hospital. Instead she would be given a local herb known as *Raa* to relieve her of any pains. However, a senior mid-wife from Gulu hospital noted that women do not frequently use herbs, but rather use it on the basis of a complaint. A woman is given the roots of *Lucoro* mixed in the yeast of millet flour to prevent joint and placenta pains. Other types of drugs taken during pregnancy include *Okweyo*, *Taalyec* mixed with *Laumeluk*, root of *Lacer* and root of *Kago* found on ant hills. Furthermore, the senior nursing officer in Gulu regional referral hospital revealed that the practice of refusing pregnant women from visiting the latrine is still practiced in the villages. This is aimed at avoiding the baby from falling into the latrine. Similarly studies in Uganda have shown that, herbs are given to pregnant women to quicken labour (Kyomuhendo 2003; Adong 2011).

The study further indicated that during pregnancy women seek services from TBAs or mothers-in-law or elderly women in the communities who administer a wide range of herbs aimed at safeguarding or protecting the pregnancy and also treating any pregnancy related pains and discomforts. The findings indicate that, in Moroto the majority of women (86.7 %) did not seek advice or even attend ANC from qualified health personnel. Similarly studies have shown that TBAs still conduct deliveries. Adong (2011) observed that in Uganda, close relatives, TBAs or friends were often preferred to health workers, who were often strangers or outsiders and not recognized as part of the local birth culture. In support of the above finding, Nyanzi (2008) indicates that, 60 % of births in the developing world occur outside a health facility and 47 % are attended to by TBAs. He notes that in rural Africa, due to cultural adherence, between 60 and 90 % of deliveries are assisted by TBAs.

### **Food Limitations During Pregnancy**

During the FGDs in Gulu participants said that women were prevented from eating eggs because it was believed that the egg will block the membrane and obstruct delivery. In the three districts of study, women are also not supposed to eat offals because is believed that they could make the umbilical cord entangle the baby's

neck. In Moroto pregnant women are not expected to eat offals, amaranthus, eggs, kidney, doves and chicken; while in Kotido participants in FGDs and community dialogues indicated that foods that are a taboo for pregnant women include offals (45.6 %), liver (5 %), eggs (3.7 %), greens (2.5 %), beans, pumpkin, fatty foods and sugarcane.

It is believed that fatty foods cause weight gain, and sugarcane causes increased blood pressure. These food taboos hinder the adequate nutritional intake of the women, thus affecting their health and that of the baby. Interesting to note is the fact that alcohol consumption was indicated by only 8.6 % of participants as prohibited during pregnancy. Similarly, studies conducted in the Southern part of Nigeria, children are usually not given foods like egg or meat for fear that they will become thieves or witches/wizards; this leads to a condition known locally as kwashiorkor, which is as a result of lack of protein in the system (Myers 1997 cited in Senah 2003).

Preparing for delivery also had particular cultural practices attached to it. Women planned for delivery in different ways. For instance in Gulu, a pregnant woman would ensure that she has couch grass locally known as *Raa* in the house. This could be used for cutting the umbilical cord in the absence of a razor blade. *Sim-sim* or shear oil is also prepared for bathing the baby and the mother. In addition, in order to have access to care during delivery, the woman would start living with the mother-in-law, who would provide care during the last stages of the antenatal, delivery and postnatal period. The study revealed that in Kotido, women in urban areas prepare for delivery during the seventh month of pregnancy. However, those in the village do not because they have no assurance of delivering a live baby. If an expectant mother prepared for her child, she was considered to be bewitching the child.

## ***Delivery Period***

The study shows that the majority of the women in Moroto and Kotido were assisted by health personnel during delivery. In urban Kotido, 74.2 % of the women indicated having delivered their last baby in a health facility, while 14.4 % delivered at home, 6.2 % at TBA's place and 5.2 % on the way to hospital. However, earlier studies in Kotido district had indicated that only 17.5 % of women deliver in health facilities.<sup>1</sup> In Moroto (41.8 %) were assisted by health personnel during their delivery, 26.5 % by TBAs, 22.4 % by relatives and 9.2 % delivered without any assistance from anyone.

Although the number of deliveries assisted by health personnel is high, the number of women who deliver without the help of health personnel cannot be disregarded. The study showed that women shy away from health center deliveries due to cultural beliefs such as having to dispose of the placenta in a culturally respectful way which does not happen at the health center. It is believed across the three

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<sup>1</sup>Office of the Prime Minister (2007), Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2008).

districts (Gulu, Kotido and Moroto) that failure to dispose of the placenta respectfully just as a dead child can cause infertility to the woman.

Relations between the women and the health personnel were also identified in this study as one of the issues that prevent women from delivering at the health units. Some women felt that the health personnel are unfriendly. One woman in Moroto during the community dialogues said:

Most mothers who want to give birth in hospital have to be prepared, otherwise those nurses will insult and laugh at you because most of them don't understand that we don't have money and we have never gone to school like them. Some of us have never put on knickers, but when you decide to give birth in hospital you have to buy one such that they do not laugh at you. That's why some of us don't waste our time to go to hospital.

It is thus no wonder that some women still prefer home or TBA deliveries where they feel cared for and supported by loved ones. Walking long distances to access health facilities is also another reason some women deliver at home. In Moroto the study shows that even when women have attempted to go to the hospital, many have delivered on the way. Another reason women prefer home deliveries is that at health centers, the mothers may have to undergo episiotomy and bear the pain plus the stitching that comes with it. So if a mother has a safe home delivery, the family encourages their pregnant daughters not to go to the health facilities.

For home deliveries, findings in Gulu indicated that women would be given local medicine known as *Tea ajuu* and *Kilaumeluk* or a woman's waist would be hit with her husband's leather shoes to prevent the retention of the placenta. A pregnant woman is also given herbs to speed up delivery if she stays for long in labour. In Moroto communities, when a baby came out of the womb in an abnormal position, rituals were performed. For example, if the baby came out of the womb presenting the legs first, grass like the *Nyema*, *Nyekiliye* and *Ekikas* were tied and put by the household entrance. Women talked about these issues in the past and present tenses, an indicator that these are ongoing issues that are passed on from generation to generation.

In cutting the umbilical cord, for a male child, grass roots known as *Boltooro* are used, while for a female child, *Raa* (couch grass) is used among the Acholis in Gulu. For the case of the Karamojong in Kotido and Moroto, a knife is used to cut the umbilical cord for a baby girl and an arrow head is used for a baby boy. A knife is used to cut the umbilical cords of girls because it is expected that when girls grows up they will always use a knife in preparing food for their families. For boys an arrow or spear head is used because when they grow up they could use arrows and spears to hunt for the family.

When tying the umbilical cord, a rope made from different tree barks such as the *Olam* tree in Gulu, and *Nyetapogo* and *Nyekaliye* tree barks in Kotido are used. While in Moroto different clans use different tree barks. The *Ngisingar*, *Ngiloba* and *Ngikilipa*clans use *Etopojo* tree bark; the *Ngingariama* clan uses the *Ekaliye* tree bark, while the *Ngworopom* clan use the *Ebobore* tree bark and the rest of clans mostly use chewed sisal. For a baby girl four rope strands are used to tie the cord; of four strands, two are cut off and the rest remain around the cord till it dries and

falls off. For the baby boy three rope strands are used to tie the cord, of which two (2) are cut off and one remains hanging on the cord until it heals and falls off.

In treating the cord, soot mixed with cow dung, *sim-sim*, sand and shea butter oil are used in the case of Gulu district. In the case of Kotido district, the cord of the baby is cleaned using soot mixed with butter, sand mixed with butter, red soil from the cooking place mixed with oil, while others use spirits to remove the smell. In Moroto district, cow dung was smeared on the umbilical cord to facilitate quick healing of the wound. Oils such as cooking oil and blue band (a vegetable margarine) are used to moisten the wound. An eye ointment was another material applied to aid in the timely healing of the wound and keeping flies away. Some mothers stated that they clean the cord with warm water and bar soap if it was available. It is important to note that some of the methods used to care for the cord could expose the baby to infections. In agreement with this finding, a study in the Southern part of Nigeria revealed that it is common practice to use cow dung to clear the umbilical cord (Myers 1997 cited in Senah 2003).

In the three districts of the study, communities perform various rituals after the baby is born. In Gulu, Kotido and Moroto when the baby is born he/she is kept indoors, and the day they are allowed to be taken outdoors a ritual is performed. The baby boy is kept in the house for 3 days and the baby girl for 4 days among the Acholis in Gulu. This is to ensure that the baby has enough warmth as he/she gets used to the environment. Women were also not allowed to bathe the baby for 4 days if it is a girl and 3 if it were a boy. During this period the woman is trained on how to handle the baby. Keeping a baby indoors on one hand may be good, but on the other hand, it may expose the baby to infections. It also means that, the baby will not receive the tetanus immunization in time.

### ***Post Natal Care***

When a woman gives birth a number of rituals are performed. In Gulu she is smeared with shea butter mixed with hot water to heal the delivery wounds. She does not eat salt for a period of 3 days if the baby is a boy and 4 days if it is a girl. Women are fed on porridge and vegetables such as *Boo*, *Malakwang* and *Oyado* because it is believed that these foods are good for the woman's tender stomach and help the generation of breast milk. The woman is also given some local herbs to drink so that her wounds heal faster.

In some clans in Kotido district a woman is not supposed to eat anything on the delivery day. She is given porridge the next day due to the belief that something bad may happen to the baby for example the baby may die or lose his or her sight. While in other clans a nursing mother is not supposed to bathe until the umbilical cord of the child drops off. It was believed that this prevented misfortunes such as the death of the child. The woman and baby also stay inside the house for 3 days irrespective of the sex. Though this may be intended to keep the baby away from infections, it

may hinder the baby from being taken to the hospital to receive the necessary checkup and treatment including the much needed immunization for polio and tuberculosis.

In Moroto and Kotido once all the rituals are done, a goat is slaughtered, and its meat is eaten by all the family members. In essence this ritual is to congratulate the woman and thereafter, she can resume eating the foods that she had stopped eating due to the pregnancy. After delivery mothers in Moroto are fed on sorghum or millet porridge mixed with milk to help the mothers to produce plenty of breast milk. The mothers are fed on porridge only until the baby's umbilical cord falls off. It is believed that by this time the mother will be able to move her bowels without straining since she had earlier lost a lot of energy during delivery. Foods such as greens and fatty meals are not given, because they are believed to cause the child to pass out watery stool.

Furthermore during a discussion with the Senior Nursing Officer from Gulu regional referral hospital, it was revealed that the practice of women who have given birth to go to their mothers or mothers-in-law is still being practiced, especially in the villages for "first mothers." The separation of the woman from her husband is to enable her to rest, and it is also used as a family planning technique. Other reasons for this practice are mothers-in-law could ensure proper nutrition of the women and proper care to the newborn baby since they were experienced. However, sometimes this practice forces a man to find another woman increasing chances of the spread of HIV and other STIs, in addition to removing the woman from the nearest health facility.

Women were also not allowed to bathe the baby for 4 days if it was a girl and 3 days if it was a boy. It was revealed during community dialogues that a woman was not allowed to bathe her boy child before 3 days, because it is believed that if she touched the private part of that baby he could become impotent when he grows up. However, key informant interviews revealed that women, especially first mothers, were not allowed to bathe the baby until they were trained on how to handle the baby. The baby is smeared with shea butter oil for a period of 3 months in order to protect the baby's skin from skin infections.

## **Additional Findings**

Male Involvement in Maternal Health was an issue for the women. The study indicated that most men are usually unsupportive. The men are always responsible for looking after the animals and have no time for home responsibilities. In Karamoja, culturally it is the women that are responsible for taking care of the family and even putting up the homestead and maintaining it. In Moroto, very few men cared for their pregnant women. A woman during the dialogues indicated that culturally the average man in Moroto views his role as making a woman pregnant and looking after his cattle. The consolidation phase indicated that men feared the mandatory HIV/AIDS tests for women and their partners.



It was also observed that the poor household relations between the woman and the man can lead women to resort to cultural practices to manage their maternal health. It was observed that some husbands are unsupportive, especially in birth preparedness, and this sometimes makes their pregnant wives fear seeking help from health facilities. Sometimes the husbands delay the decision for their pregnant wives to seek medical care and some go to the health center during labor time. Failure to go for ANC may prevent the detection of any problems at an early stage. Some husbands do not provide their pregnant wives with money to buy the required items like bed sheets and some pieces of clothes to carry the baby with and gloves, etc. Household relations can also be violent, and violence has implications to maternal health. Some of those that the women identified include:

- Delivering many children due to lack of negotiation of sexual relations
- Inability to provide for the baby and mother because men just impregnate without taking responsibility for the pregnancy.
- Exposure to HIV/AIDS
- Early pregnancies due to inability to discipline the children
- Killing young girls due to early pregnancies
- Unwanted pregnancies due to marital rape

In agreement with the above, findings from other studies indicate that the decision-making power of women for seeking health services during pregnancy is limited in many ways. The decisions are either taken or dictated by husbands and their relatives. This takes the decision-making process away from the woman, who is directly facing potential complications. Furthermore, societal and familial expectations can influence women's choices to seek care and may lead to delays in seeking essential professional care. Pregnancy and childbirth are perceived as a normal process and in many Ugandan communities women; who deliver in the community with little biomedical assistance are often held in high regard (Neema 1994; Ssengooba et al. 2003). In addition, social responsibilities assigned to women sometimes stand in the way of their using needed services. For example, one of the main reasons for refusing hospital admission during antenatal visits was found to be the need for women to provide for their families and care for young children (Ssengooba et al. 2003).

There was a general recognition of the problems that may come up as a result of delivering from home. These include blockage, over bleeding, poor tying of the umbilical cord, bladder linkage, delayed deliveries, mother to child HIV/AIDS transmission as for the case of positive mothers, retained placenta, anemia, suffocation of the baby due to use of smoke to treat a baby that has swallowed mucus. Generally delivering at home or in the hands of traditional birth attendants has several challenges from the medical point of view that include the following:

- (i) Difficulty in identifying health problems like high blood pressure
- (ii) Failure to identify if someone has twins or not
- (iii) Inability to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV
- (iv) Abnormal positioning of baby may not be detected

The other factor that enhanced the relevance of cultural practices is the poor attitude and negligence of the medical personnel. Several women testified of being medically neglected or witnessing someone who was neglected by the medical personnel. There was a feeling that sometimes the medical personnel diagnose the delivery wrongly. One of the women said that she went to a government hospital, and the nurse refused her to push and then the TBA told her to push and the baby came out. Another woman said that when she went to hospital, the pain was on and off and when the mid-wife checked on her progress and found that the pains had stopped, she directed her to go back home. She went back home and delivered on the same day in the afternoon. Some said that they are operated upon without being given any explanation.

## Summary of Findings

The study shows that, some cultural practices pose challenges to maternal and child health in that in some cases the women fail to access lifesaving services during pregnancy, delivery and postnatal care. In cases where women are otherwise willing to seek health services, the study indicates that barriers such as the need to preserve cultural beliefs and practices, long distances, poverty and fear of some medical procedures keep them away. Therefore a large number of women still deliver with TBAs (mainly women) or relatives, especially the mothers-in-law. On this basis, the study can conclude that women are knowingly or unknowingly the social agents of most of the negative cultural practices around maternal health. It can also be concluded that the power of the TBAs, mothers-in-law and peers over the maternal health practices of women cannot be ignored. Thus, as a way forward, a group of women was mobilized to change the status quo and promote the desired maternal health beliefs, values and practices among both men and women. A review of the group activities during Phase two of the project highlighted the following:

- The women's groups are mobilizing their fellow women to seek maternal and newborn care services from a health facility.
- There is a clear understanding by the women, men and district leadership of the links between the practices at the community level and low deliveries at the health facility and the associated poor health outcomes.

The study has also pointed to the need to involve the district health teams and health workers at the local health facility to improve their understanding and appreciation of women's environment and status. This is illustrated by the dichotomy in the perception of MNH issues between the community and health workers, at least in the northern Uganda context. Table 11.1 illustrates the differences in perception of maternal health issues.

Lastly the study has revealed a sense of powerlessness among women that exhibits itself at two levels. The first level of powerlessness for women is when they are subject to maternal cultural beliefs and practices that are passed on from one

**Table 11.1** A comparison of community and health workers' perceptions of maternal and newborn health issues

<b>Community perspective</b>	<b>Healthy facility/health worker</b>
In Kotido and Moroto, the placenta is given a decent burial	The health unit does not give away the placenta to the mother unless requested for but even then there are fears of infection.
In Kotido and Moroto, the preferred birthing position is squatting and on the ground.	Health facility is lying on the back on the bed
Mutual Respect of/by TBA and they palpate the women using ghee and other herbs.	Suspicious of TBA activities and discourage use of herbs.
Hiding of the pregnancy until it is obvious is valued in the three districts.	Early reporting of the pregnancy is encouraged for detection of any complications.
Food limitations for a pregnant woman including not eating offals and eggs and some green vegetables.	Pregnant women should eat a balanced diet (protein, energy, protective, water e.t.c) giving foods.
Community values a woman with many children.	Encourage family planning

generation to the next by women majorly as peers, mothers and TBAs. Although these maternal health cultural mediums act in good faith, that is to preserve the life of the newborn, most often it is at the expense of the health of the mother and the newborn. The second level of powerlessness for women is in their relations with their husbands, who manage finances and other resources of the home, affecting women's maternal health-seeking behaviors. Women's social, political and economic empowerment is critical for improved maternal health. The establishment of women's groups is geared towards fostering women's empowerment at all these levels.

## Recommendations

The recommendations are an amalgamation of the recommendations by the women and the other stakeholders such as the district leaders. These include:

- Improve the link and the relationship between communities and health facilities.
- Strengthen the capacity of Districts Village Health Teams in maternal and reproductive health. Village Health Teams should mobilize at grassroots for maternal health and newborn health services to the mothers.
- Increase the number of women's groups working on maternal health and newborn issues.
- Build the capacity of the district leadership to discuss and prioritize maternal health and newborn health issues including Gender and Human rights.

- NGOs should support women's groups.
- Provide standards and harmonized health messages to avoid communication of contradictory messages.
- Promote adoption of mother-friendly health services. The health system needs to be more responsive/respectful and amenable to change—can they accept some of the women's desires like birthing position.
- Find creative means of repackaging mandatory blood testing to attract both men and women to the health facilities.
- The WHO should produce accessible information products for global learning and advocacy for women groups, mother friendly facilities and community support for improved maternal health.

## Conclusion

Having a health facility in a community does not necessarily translate into improved accessibility to health care or maternal/child health. Cultural differences, community preferences and health worker treatment and procedures may limit the use of health care even when health care facilities are available. Culture not only has negative effects on maternal and newborn health, but also on the uptake of other reproductive health services including family planning. In addition the study also revealed that cultural practices and perceptions around maternal and reproductive health is one of the major contributors to the strained relationship between health workers and the community, as health workers do not approve of the cultural practices of the community. As a result, the majority of the women are turned away from health center services. Establishing with the community and women in particular and health workers, the beliefs, perspectives and preferences related to reproductive health is particularly important as these different moments are associated with social and cultural values, significance and rites.

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# Chapter 12

## Dimension of Childhood Development

### Within the Millennium Development Goals:

### The Role of Water-Related Characteristics

### in Reducing the Burden of Childhood

### Diseases in South Africa

**Furzana Timol**

Development of children under the age of 5 years forms the most important phase of a persons' life. Growth during this period is the foundation on which subsequent development occurs (Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). Poor development has a compounded impact on the developmental trajectory of individuals, including under-achievement in schools which impacts wage-earning, transfer of deprivation and intergenerational poverty amongst a multitude of other impacts (Waters et al. 2007; WHO 2009). Children's developmental trajectory can be changed though improving their health and well-being (Waters et al. 2007).

Children under the age of 5 years suffer the burden of many easily preventable diseases including diarrhoeal disease, pneumonia, and malnutrition (Smith et al. 1999) making young children among the most vulnerable in society. Diarrhoeal disease has been identified as one of leading causes of child mortality and morbidity globally (WHO 2013). It is estimated that 1.4 million children die yearly due to diarrhoeal disease and 9 in 10 of these deaths can be attributed to inferior water quality, sanitation and hygiene practices (UNICEF and WHO 2009). It is estimated that by addressing these three causes, 94 % of all cases of diarrhoea, 6.3 % of worldwide deaths and 9.1 % of disability adjusted life years can be prevented (Prüss-Üstün et al. 2008). In South Africa, child mortality due to diarrhoea has improved from 21 % in 2006 to 18.4 %, yet diarrhoeal disease still remains the leading cause of under-five mortality (Statistics South Africa 2012). It is estimated that 84 % of diarrhoeal disease in South Africa can be attributed to access to water and sanitation services (Lewin et al. 2007).

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While there has been much focus on improving access to water, few studies consider the role that piped water source plays in child health. Supply type and service delivery, in terms of reliability of delivery, play an important role in improving child health as well. Through the monitoring of water services provision, the health and human rights benefits the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) attempt to provide are protected (Howard and Bartram 2005). This notion of monitoring water services stems from Lloyd and Bartram's (1991) health risk based approach which stresses the primary consideration on coverage needs to be strengthened by considerations of improvements in service quality. This can also be considered in relation to the Human Rights framework for water in which water and sanitation were acknowledged as human rights (United Nations 2010). These human rights are met by means of on-going attainment of universal access to sufficient, safe, accessible, and affordable water (United Nations 2010). As the MDGs in themselves do not address issues of equity and discrimination, incorporating the aspects of monitoring allows for the attainment of human rights but also provide for better reporting of the status quo and the structuring of interventions for addressing people's water needs. According to the WHO's (2008) Guidelines for drinking water quality, consideration of water access and service delivery in relation to health indicators such as diarrhoeal disease provide a means to evaluate the sufficiency of existing systems and policies (Meier et al. 2013).

This chapter discusses the 4th MDG, to reduce by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 the under-five mortality rate. This is considered in context of South Africa and focuses on the primary contributory disease to this rate, diarrhoeal disease. Goal 7 is then considered, target C states; halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.

## **Perspective of Under-Five Mortality in Africa: A Focus on South Africa**

Africa as a whole has shown slow progress towards reducing the under-five mortality rate. Rates vary across Africa with substantially greater achievements noted for North Africa and lower rates noted in Sub-Saharan Africa (Statistics South Africa 2010). Much of the slow progress in terms of meeting the MDG that relate to child health can be attributed to barriers to accessing health care, conditions that determine health (including income, nutrition, water and sanitation facilities) (UNECA et al. 2013).

In South Africa, diarrhoea is the leading cause of under-five mortality with 21 % of deaths being attributed to this easily preventable disease (Nannan et al. 2012). Diarrhoeal disease is classified as loose/watery stool that occurs at least three times a day. Episodes can be mild if the associated fluid loss and dehydration is addressed immediately if not, an individual is likely to experience severe impacts including death (UNICEF and WHO 2009). The contribution of this easily preventable dis-

ease to under-five mortality rates is indicative of both equity and access to basic prevention and treatment (UNICEF 2012).

In South Africa, improvements in the incidence of diarrhoea in those under the age of 5 have been noted. Rates have decreased from 138.0 per 1,000 children in 2001 to 102.1 per 1,000 children in 2011 (Statistics South Africa 2013) suggesting that progress has been made in addressing this key cause of under-five mortality.

With the exception of the South African Demographic and Health Survey/Community survey estimates of under-five mortality rates have decreased.

- South African Demographic and Health Survey/Community survey  
59 deaths per 1,000 births in 1998 to 104 deaths per 1,000 births in 2007 (Statistics South Africa 2010)
- World Health Organisation  
75 deaths per 1,000 births in 2000 to 47 deaths per 1,000 births in 2011 (UNICEF 2012)
- World Bank  
74 deaths per 1,000 births in 2000 to 45 deaths per 1,000 births in 2012 (World Bank 2013)
- South African Civil and Registration and Vital Statistics Systems  
67 deaths per 1,000 births in 2007 to 53 deaths per 1,000 births in 2010 (Statistics South Africa 2013)

Based on all of these figures, even with the decrease in the under-five mortality rates it appears unlikely that the MDG target of 20 deaths per 1,000 live births will be achieved by 2015.

## **What Needs to Change to Get Back on the Right Track: Under-Five Mortality**

Environmental conditions have been found to have a significant impact on diarrhoeal diseases. Globally, nine out of ten cases of diarrhoeal disease can be attributed to unsafe drinking water, poor sanitation facilities and inferior hygiene practices (WHO 2010). According to the *Manual on Environmental Health Indicators and Benchmarks*, in developing countries, infant morbidity and mortality rates attributable to diarrhoeal disease can be used as a primary indicator of the impact of unsafe drinking water (Ahmed et al. 2005).

The ultimate goal of reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds is unlikely to be achieved by 2015. In spite of this, the South African government has established and is likely to continue to establish plans and policies and that will guide initiatives to achieving the ultimate goal. Policies and plans such as the Strategic Plan for Maternal, Newborn, Child and Women's Health, Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement (NSDA) 2010–2024, the Medium term Strategic Framework (2009–2014) and the Campaign for Accelerated Reduction of Maternal and Child Mortality



amongst others. These policies and plans provide short, medium and long term targets ensuring positive trajectories. Longer term strategies put in place by South Africa ensure that these vital issues remain at the forefront of governments' plans long after 2015.

## **Perspective of Water and Sanitation Access in Africa**

An improved water source is defined as water supply that is improved either by nature of its design or through intervention to be protected from external contamination. Improved drinking water includes the following sources: piped water into the dwelling, plot, or yard; public tap; borehole; protected dug well; protected spring well and rainwater (WHO and UNICEF 2014).

Improvements in access to potable water are interconnected with improving the health standing of people in Africa. More than 40 % of households without access to potable water can be found in Africa (UNECA et al. 2013). Portions of people in Africa using improved drinking water sources increased from 56 % in 1990 to 66 % in 2010. This is still far from the 2015 target of 78 % (WHO 2010). While indicators such as this one consider portions of populations with improved access, this does not necessarily mean piped water, more so piped water in the house. Overall, in Sub Saharan Africa, marginal improvements have been achieved in terms of piped connections in the home (Ahmed et al. 2005).

Although this chapter does not focus directly on sanitation, water access cannot be fully understood in isolation to access to sanitation as both services are highly correlated. These improvements in SSA, while having shown some improvements in sanitation access, have largely occurred in urban areas (WHO 2010). A large portion of people in SSA, in particular, still practice open defecation. Furthermore, SSA has the largest portion of its population utilising shared sanitation facilities (Ahmed et al. 2005). Sanitation improvements are largely reflective of the vast inequalities present in SSA, with a 16 % improvement in access to sanitation noted for the poorest quintile compared to a 79 % noted for the richest quintile (United Nations 2008).

## **The Case of South Africa**

Prior to the democratisation of South Africa, policies implemented by the Apartheid government led to vast inequalities, both economic and service related. This left the majority of the country with inferior infrastructure, poor access to services and disadvantaged. At the fall of the apartheid regime, access to potable water was estimated at roughly 59 % (Statistics South Africa 2011).

With the fall of Apartheid, so came the rise of democracy in South Africa. Under the new government priority was placed on ensuring fair and equitable constitution.

With respect to access to water, the Constitution of South Africa under section 27 (1) (b) stated that

“Everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water.” This commitment is furthered in section 27 (2), in that “the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights.” (Republic of South Africa 1996)

As a result a number of acts including The Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997) and the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) were put into law to ensure that these constitutional rights are upheld. Along with a number of frameworks targeted at achieving the MDGs as well as other national objections, these frameworks included the Medium Term Strategic Framework (2009–2014, and previous mandates).

By 2011, South Africa had made substantial progress with respect to this 7th MDG; access to potable water had increased 90.8 % (WHO 2013). This means that not only was the 2015 target of 88.3 % achieved but it was in fact surpassed (WHO 2013). These numbers, however, mask vast provincial inequalities that are present; for example, in 2010 less than 14 % of houses in the Limpopo province, South Africa, were estimated to have access to municipal water in their homes (Statistics South Africa 2011). Access to both potable water and basic sanitation is a priority of the South African government, which set a target of universal access to potable water and basic sanitation by 2014 (WHO 2013).

## Access to Water Is Not the Same as Basic Delivery

Access to improved drinking water sources does not necessarily mean access to basic water. In the South African context basic supply is defined as water sources available within 200 m of one’s home, at a flow of 10 l per minute for communal sources and 6, 000 l of potable water supplied per yard or house connection in areas of high density. In addition, water should be available on a regular, daily basis (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAf) 2008). However, this does not necessarily mean safe water as some sources regarded as improved may not be maintained sufficiently to provide safe water (UNECA et al. 2013).

Access to a tap does not necessarily mean access to a quality water service supply. If the status quo is to be more accurately reflected to ensure substantive improvements have been made, consideration needs to be taken of the source of potable water, quality of water received and the quality of the water service received. In a Strategic Survey on Drinking-Water Quality conducted by the South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 57 % of municipalities were found to have violated the legislated water quality requirements. In addition, it was found that local governments were not familiar with drinking-water standards and did not continuously monitor water quality. This resulted in provision of services that were below the legislated levels (DWAf 2004).

A domestic indicator set to assess stability of water supply indicated by the portion of households that received uninterrupted water access for at least 11.5 months as stipulated by South African water services. In 2009 only 23.6 % of households had attained this standard with an increase in 2010 to 25.5 % and a decrease again in 2011 to 23 % (WHO 2013).

## **A Focus on the Situation of Households with Children Under the Age of 5 Years**

In South Africa, roughly seven million children live in the poorest quintile of households with less than two million children living in the richest quintile of households (South African Human Rights Commission and UNICEF 2011). To fully understand the dynamics surrounding under-five mortality, consideration must be taken of the resources available to households that have children under the age of 5 years.

The following analysis is done using data from the South African General Household Surveys 2006 and 2011. Data are weighted such that they are representative of the country as a whole. In 2006, 27 % of households had at least one child under the age of 5 years in their household; by 2011 this increased to just below 33 %. There are numerous reasons why this is the case; however what is clear is a larger portion of households now home an increasingly bigger portion of the most vulnerable sect of the population.


### **Households' Access to Piped Water**

Households without children under 5 years have better access to piped water overall (89.8 % in 2006 increasing to 90.6 % in 2011) and in particular piped water in the home (48.2 % in 2006 increasing to 50.6 % in 2011) when compared to households with children under 5 years (overall piped water 84.8 % in 2006 to 86.5 % in 2011 and piped water in the house increasing from 40.0 % in 2006 to 41.9 % in 2011).<sup>1</sup> Households that do not have access in the home (or in their yard) travel to obtain their drinking water. Water quality decreases with handling and storage and increases the opportunity for contamination (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 2008). Improvements in both groups have been noted since 2006; however a larger portion of households with children under 5 years continue to travel further distances to obtain their drinking water when compared to those households without children under 5 years.

Nationwide numbers mask significant difference that occurs between provinces. Across the nine provinces of South Africa, in 2006, access to piped water ranged

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<sup>1</sup>This relationship is statistically significant at the 95 % confidence interval with a Chi squared p-value of 0.00.



**Fig. 12.1** Access to potable water by households with children under five years, by province 2006 (Source: Own calculations using GHS 2006 and 2011)

from 99.7 % in Western Cape to 64.0 % in the Eastern Cape. In KwaZulu-Natal province, while 76.8 % of households have piped water access, only 24.1 % have access in their homes. Provinces such as North West have achieved high overall piped access (92.1 %); however piped water in the home remains low at only 19.6 % of households (Fig. 12.1).


Between 2006 and 2011 an overall decrease in piped access by households with children under 5 years was noted (with the exception of Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga). A crucial part of this decrease is a decrease in piped water in the home noted in four of the nine provinces (Fig. 12.2).<sup>2</sup>

## Quality of Water

Issues surrounding quality appear to be related to water service delivery as opposed to water quality. The General Household Surveys collect data on households' rating of water quality, namely is the water safe to drink, is it clear (turbidity), is it good in taste and is it free from bad smells. Questions also cover the need to treat drinking water received from municipal sources.

Little change in the ratings of water quality was noted across the 2 years. High ratings on all four characteristics were achieved for both years. With regard to

<sup>2</sup>There exists a statistically significant relationship between province and access to piped water at the 95 % confidence interval with a Chi squared p-value of 0.00.



**Fig. 12.2** Access to potable water by households with children under five years, by province 2011 (Source: GHS 2006 and 2011)

treatment of drinking water, in 2006, between 12 and 14 % of households utilised the various forms of piped water either sometimes or always. By 2011, the number of households that felt the need to treat their water either sometimes or always decreased by roughly 50 %. In particular, 8.7 % of households that accessed water in their homes felt the need to treat their water either sometimes or always compared to 2.3 % of those who use communal stand pipes. Possible reasons for this decrease could be an improvement in the perceived quality of water households received or a decrease in the dissemination of knowledge relating to the benefits of treating water before use.

## Water Services

Considering only those households with children under 5 years, in 2006, 69.4 % of households that obtained their drinking water from municipal sources rated their water services as *good*. Of households that receive municipally supplied water 60.1 % paid for the water they received. A higher portion of households that paid for the water they used identified their water services as *good* when compared to those households that did not pay for their water.<sup>3</sup> In 2011, the portion of households that utilised water from municipal water and rated the water services they received as *good* decreased to 59.2 %. This indicates an adverse shift in the perceptions of households towards the water services they receive. Furthermore, in 2011 a mere

<sup>3</sup>The difference in percentage is statistically significant at the 95 % significance level with a Chi Squared p-value of 0.00.

42.4 % of households that made use of municipal water paid for the water they received. Although the reasons for non-payment are not captured by the surveys, there continues to be a statistically significant relationship between payment for water and the rating of water services received.

## Interruptions to Water Services

Within the definition of basic supply of water as set out under the Water Supply and Sanitation Policy White Paper of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, an aim with respect to the assurance of supply is for households to experience no more than 1 week of interruptions to supply in a given year (DWAF 1994). In 2006, of the households with children under 5 years that obtained their piped water from municipal sources, 32.0 % experienced interruptions to their water supply in the last year. In 2011 this increased to 36.9 % of households. Of those households that experienced interruptions in the last year, most interruptions occurred for those households with piped access in the yard closely followed by those with access in their houses. In 2011, households that obtained water from communal stand pipes were most likely to experience interruptions followed by those who obtain access from neighbour taps. The primary cause of interruptions for both years was burst pipes. Efficiency in dealing with water supply interruptions is discussed separately due to differences in the wording of questions between 2006 and 2011.

In 2006, 26.5 % of households indicated that their *last* interruption took longer than 2 days to rectify. In 2011, 59.1 % of households indicated that *an* interruption in their water supply took longer than 2 days to rectify. Although the data from 2006 to 2011 cannot be directly compared, it appears that interruptions in the supply of drinking water to those households that obtain their water from neighbours or communal pipes are more likely to experience longer turn-around times in terms of interruption rectification when compared to households whose water is piped on site.<sup>4</sup>

## Under-Five Mortality and Water Supply

Child health is measured by the incidence of diarrhoea among children under 5 years in the month preceding the surveying of households in the GHS. Information collected in the GHS is self-reported incidences of diarrhoea. In 2006, just under half of the children who had experienced diarrhoea obtained their drinking water from a tap in their yard with 30 % obtaining their drinking water from within their homes. In 2011, substantial improvements are noted in the portions of children who

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<sup>4</sup>These relationships are independently significant at the 95 % levels of significance with p values of 0.00.

become ill from the water they receive on site. Roughly half of all children that experienced diarrhoea in the month preceding the GHS obtained their drinking water from communal sources. It is expected that a larger portion of children that experience diarrhoea obtain their drinking water off site due to the contamination that occurs in transportation and storage. The shift in the primary water source for those children who experience diarrhoea from that piped on site to that piped off site suggests there is an improvement made in the quality of water received by those households.

## **Conclusion and Way Forward: Post-Millennium Development Goals**

With less than a year remaining to reach the Millennium Development Goal targets, focus is now on determining whether or not these goals are likely to be achieved. In Africa progress towards reducing both the under-five mortality rate and the portions of people that do not have access to potable water from improved sources has been slow. In South Africa, a substantial decrease in the under-five mortality rate has been noted by various organisations. Although a decline has occurred, by 2011 the under-five mortality rate of 47 deaths per thousand live births is still far higher than the target of 20 deaths per 1,000 live births to be achieved by 2015. Diarrhoeal disease has been identified as one of the key contributors to this under-five mortality rate both for the Africa region as well as for South Africa. Since 2001, rates of diarrhoeal disease in South Africa have decrease by roughly 30 deaths per 1,000 live births in subsequent decades. Environmental conditions including unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation and hygiene practices have been found to be key contributors to the incidence of diarrheal disease. This has been linked to slow progress towards meeting the health related MDGs.

With a growing portion of households housing children under five years, focus must be placed on understanding their situation, their access to water and the service delivery they received in order to unpack the current state of child mortality and the best way forward in trying to reduce this rate.

Given that households housing the very young have inferior access to water particularly within the home, there is a need to explore the underlying correlates of households with young including households' disposable income, family structure and maternal education all of which are likely to contribute to the unequal distribution in access.

Providing water of a good quality can only have the desired health impacts if the water service is rendered and maintained. Ratings of the quality of water services decreased by nearly 10 percentage points between 2006 and 2011 with an 18 percentage point decrease in the portion of households in this cohort that paid for the water they received. The incidence of water supply disruptions increased by 15 % between 2006 and 2011. Households with piped access off site are more likely to

experience longer turn-around times in terms of rectification of interruptions than those with piped access in the home. Linkages between diarrheal disease and water source indicates a shift towards water obtained off site, suggesting an improvement in the quality of water on site as well as highlighting the benefits of on-site water access.

Although the ultimate targets in terms of reducing under-five mortality have not been achieved thus far and appear unlikely to be achieved by 2015, the progress and development that has occurred thus far should not be overlooked. Clear policies and frameworks have been established both in South Africa and across the developing world as a whole to ensure that that beyond 2015, the targets as set by the MDGs will be achieved. Although the MDG target with relation to water has been achieved, quality access to quality water is a key piece to addressing mortality rates in South Africa. While households report their water being of good quality, the quality of service delivery in terms of access, ratings and interruptions appears to be a hindering force towards ensuring water-related under-five mortality is lowered. Individual targets have been set under the MDG sight should not be lost of the ultimate goal, which is to improve the overall lives of people. Beyond 2015, an agenda focussing on monitoring needs to be prioritised. The human rights aspect of the goals needs to be revisited and re-entrenched into policy. This should feed down into programmes that are equitable, sustainable and progressive. Countries, agencies and bodies should continue to strive to not only achieve the set targets but also this ultimate goal through ensuring a fair distribution of quality services that can be sustained.

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# Chapter 13

## Civil Society Activism for the Prevention and Treatment of Non-communicable Diseases in South Africa: Implications for Policy and Practice

Catherine Ndinda, Charles Hongoro, Desire Chilwane, and Zitha Mokomane

### Introduction

Civil society is a term generally used to refer to a variety of formal and informal civic and social organisations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the force-backed structures of a state, irrespective of the state's political system. The sector commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power.<sup>1</sup> Closely related to civil society organisations are *social movements* defined by Brown and Zavestoski (2004) as “informal networks based on shared beliefs and

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<sup>1</sup>[http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what\\_is\\_civil\\_society.htm](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm)

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solidarity which mobilise around conflicting issues and deploy frequent and varying forms of protest” (52). Looking at both definitions, it is evident that although these bodies are referred to by different names, they operate in the same way.

Non-communicable diseases (NCDs)—which are defined as medical conditions or diseases that are not infectious (WHO 2011)—are the leading causes of mortality in the world, accounting for 36 million of the 53 million annual deaths globally (Cesare et al. 2013; WHO 2013). By nature, these diseases, also known as chronic diseases, are long in duration and have generally slow progression (WHO 2013). According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the four main types of NCDs which account for about 80 % of all NCD deaths are: cardiovascular diseases (heart attack, hypertension and stroke); cancer; respiratory diseases (such as chronic obstructed pulmonary disease and asthma); and diabetes (WHO 2013).

The four key risk factors of NCDs are largely driven by four preventable and modifiable behavioural risk factors which are: (1) tobacco use (including exposure to second-hand smoke); (2) unhealthy diets (those high in fats, salt and sugar); (3) insufficient physical activity; and (4) harmful use of alcohol (WHO 2010; Beaglehole et al. 2011). These behaviours lead to metabolic or physiological changes that increase the risk of NCDs such as obesity, increased blood pressure, high levels of glucose (hyperglycaemia) and high levels of cholesterol or (hyperlipidaemia) (WHO 2010; Beaglehole et al. 2011).

It is instructive that three out of the seven Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target health (improving child health; improving maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis [TB] and malaria). HIV/AIDS is among the MDGs that have to be achieved by governments by 2015; NCDs are not included in the MDGs. What recent literature suggests is that alongside the HIV/AIDS epidemic, there has been a growing NCD epidemic (WHO 2011). The co-existence of morbidities from both the NCD and HIV/AIDS epidemics points to the need to understand not only how these epidemics are unravelling but also how civil society activities have influenced responses to the epidemics by the various stakeholders. In the absence of HIV and AIDS and TB, NCDs are the leading causes of morbidity and mortality among adults in many African countries. In South Africa NCDs are a leading cause of morbidity and mortality for adults over the age of 40 years with cardiovascular disease being the leading cause of mortality (Bradshaw et al. 2011).

Although civil society organisations have been contributing to public health for many years, they have become more prominent in recent years, growing in scale and influence and having profound impacts on health policy and issues (WHO 2001). Indeed, the manner in which the state responds to these changes, and the extent to which civil society actors are recognised and included in health policies and programmes, are some of the critical factors determining the course of public health today (WHO 2001). In South Africa, civil society activism around HIV and AIDS has yielded remarkable results in gaining access to treatment in the country. Much less is known, however, about civil society activism and its role in improving or ensuring access to treatment for other major diseases and health conditions that lead

to mortality in South Africa. This paper contributes to the closing of this knowledge gap by examining civil society strategies used in facilitating access to prevention and treatment of NCDs in South Africa.

## Types and Strategies of Health Social Movements

Achieving universal health coverage is not dependent on the nature of the financing scheme or the amount of health spending but on the political will of governments. Civil society organisations (CSOs) or health social movements (HSMs) have made it their mandate to encourage such will. Brown and Zavestoski (2004) devised a typology of health social movements and identified three categories: *health access movements*; *constituency-based health movements*; and *embodied health movements*. Health access movements fight for equitable healthcare access as well as an improved provision of health services. An example of these includes movements seeking national health coverage. Constituency-based health movements seek to address health inequality and equity based on race, ethnicity, gender, class and sexual differences—these include the women’s health movement and gay and lesbian health movements.

Depending on the desired outcome, health social movements employ different strategies in their activism. In their review of four health-based social movements, Keefe et al. (2006) identified the following six:

- (i) Empowering people living with the health condition to gain control of their health.
- (ii) Controlling the terms of discourse by shaping the words and phrases used to speak about the health and social condition.
- (iii) Shaping the research and federal drug approval agendas.
- (iv) Direct lobbying to convince elected officials to approve pilot projects providing direct services to persons with the condition.
- (v) Providing alternative clinical and preventive services to individuals whom are unable to obtain help from traditional healthcare facilities.
- (vi) Attempts at changing laws or their enforcements through a combination of civil disobedience, legal challenges and lobbying. (58)

Civil society organisations have played an important role in the advocacy, prevention and control of NCDs, helping to mobilise public and political awareness, to shape policy responses, as well as to support and deliver prevention and treatment programmes (Mungal-Singh 2012). Mungal-Singh (2012) discusses the following organisations as examples of NCD civil society activism: (1) The World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), which continues to pool and coordinate civil society expertise and resources to present a strong counterforce to the tobacco industry and (2) The NCD Alliance “which brought together the four international federations addressing cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancer, and chronic respiratory disease [to create] the platform for

global collaboration and joint advocacy” (3). Mungal-Singh (2012) credits these two civil society organisations with bringing about the United Nations High Level Meeting that placed non-communicable diseases on the global arena.

### ***South African NCD Policy Framework***

Policies targeting NCDs in South Africa date to the apartheid period (Table 13.1) but these narrowly focused on NCDs amongst the White Population. From 1994 a range of legislations, frameworks and institutional arrangements have been put in place to address NCDs (DOH 2012). The creation of the Directorate for Chronic Diseases, Disability and Geriatrics Unit in 1996 has resulted in the formulation of a range of national guidelines to prevent and control NCDs in South Africa (Bradshaw et al. 2011).

The key document is the *Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases 2013–17* which “establishes the framework for reducing morbidity and mortality from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in the context of broad health reform in South Africa” (Department of Health 2012, 12). South Africa is a signatory to key international and regional resolutions and commitments addressing NCDs. These include World Health Assembly’s Resolution WHA53.17 (2000) on the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases; Resolution WHA61.14 (2008) on Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable disease Implementation of the Global strategy; the Brazzaville Declaration on Non-Communicable Disease Prevention and Control in the WHO Africa Region (2011). South Africa also actively participated in the First Global Ministerial Conference in Healthy Lifestyles and Non-Communicable Disease Control held in Moscow Russia and well as the United Nations High level Meeting on NCDs also held in 2011.

The Vision of the Strategic Plan for the Prevention of NCDs in South Africa is stated as “A long and healthy life for all through prevention and control of non-communicable diseases.” The main components of the Strategy (DOH 2012, 26) are listed as:

1. Preventing NCDs and promoting health and wellness at population, community, and individual levels;
2. Improving control of NCDs through health systems strengthening and reform;
3. Monitoring NCDs and their main risk factors and conducting innovative research.

These strategies form the pillars of programmatic activities by both government and civil society organisations. The targets set for the prevention and control of NCDs in South Africa not only require state intervention but the intervention of different stakeholders in society including civil society organisations. The Strategic Plan is emphatic about using a multi-sectoral approach that not only includes the Department of Health as the key player but also includes other government departments such as Department of Finance, the Treasury, Department of Trade and Industry, Retailers, food producers and civil society.

**Table 13.1** South African NCD policies

Year	Act
1977	Mental Health Policy Guideline
1993	Radiation Control Act: Group IV Hazardous Substances-Exclusion & Examples
1993	Tobacco Products Control Act
1997	National Policy guidelines for Mental Health
1998	National Programme for control and management of hypertension at primary level
1998	National Programme for control and management of diabetes type 2 at primary level
1999	National Guidelines on Primary Prevention and Prophylaxis of Rheumatic Fever (F) and Rheumatic Heart Disease for health professionals at primary level
1999	National Guidelines on management and control of Asthma in children at primary level
1999	Policy guidelines on primary prevention of chronic diseases of lifestyle (CDL)
1999	National guideline on prevention of falls of older persons
1999	Guideline for the promotion of active aging in older adults at primary level
1999	National Cancer control programme – Baseline Document
1999	Tobacco Products Control Amendments Act (Act 12 of 1999)
2000	Norms Manual for Severe Psychiatric Conditions
2000	National Guideline: Cervical Cancer Screening Programme
2000	National guideline on foot health at primary level
2001	National guidelines on Long Term Domiciliary Oxygen
2001	National Guideline on Osteoporosis
2001	National Guideline: Management of Asthma in Adults at primary level
2002	Information on Female Breast Cancer for Primary Level Health Care Providers
2002	National Guideline on Stroke and Transient Ischaemic Attack Management
2002	Mental Health Care Act
2003	Eastern Cape Liquor Act No 10
2003	National guideline on testing for prostate cancer at Primary hospital level
2003	National Guideline: Palliative care for adults – A guide for health professionals in South Africa
2004	National guideline: Early detection of and management of Arthritis in Adults at primary level
2003	National guideline: Prevention and management of Overweight and Obesity in South Africa
2004	The Liquor Act No 59
2004	National Health Act
2005	Mental Health Care Act No 17 of 2002 and its Regulations
2005	Child and Adolescent Mental Health Policy Guideline
2005	National Guideline: A guide for Health Care Personnel in Paediatric Palliative Care
2005	National guidelines: The Management of diabetes type 1 and type 2 in adults at hospital level

(continued)

**Table 13.1** (continued)

Year	Act
2005	Guidelines for the management of epilepsy in adults
2005	Traditional Health practitioners Act (Act 35 of 2004)
2006	National Guideline: Non-Communicable Diseases- A Strategic Vision
2006	National Guideline: Updated Management of Hypertension in Adults at Primary Care Level
2007 amended 2008	Regulations relating to health message on container labels of alcoholic beverages, Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectant Act, 1972
2007	Mental Health Review Board Orientation Guidelines and Manual
2008	Guidelines for the management of Type 1 diabetes in children
2008	Guidelines for the management of epilepsy and seizures in children at hospital level
2008	National Guideline: Management of Substance Abuse and Misuse amongst older adults
2008	Tobacco Products Amendment Act
2008	Western Cape Liquor Act
2009	Long-term care model implementation framework
2009	Diabetes Declaration implementation strategy
2011	Promotion of Physical Activity in Older Persons
2011	Management of Foot Health at Primary Level
2011	Regulations relating to Trans at in foodstuffs
2011	Mini Drug Master Plan 2011/12-2013/14
2011	Electro-Convulsive Therapy (ECT) Guidelines
2012	National Development Plan
2013	Regulations relating to the reduction of sodium in certain foodstuffs and related matters
2013	Gauteng Liquor Act

Source: Adapted from DOH (2013)

In addressing the prevention and control of NCDs in South Africa the Strategic Plan suggests that a multi-pronged approach that moves beyond the clinical focus is required, and specific interventions include:

1. Inter-sectoral collaboration for prevention of NCDs
2. Addressing the use of tobacco and tobacco products
3. Diet
4. Promoting physical activity
5. Reducing the harmful use of alcohol
6. Introduction of human papilloma virus vaccine
7. School health services
8. The role of civil society in promoting health
9. Addressing the main NCD risk factors through interventions with NCDs
10. Control of NCDs through health systems strengthening

The role of civil society is viewed as being critical in addressing the NCD risk factors as well as encouraging individuals and communities to take ownership of their behaviours and actions that lead to the development of NCDs. The Strategic Plan underscores the importance of CSOs in equipping the public with information to help the population make healthy choices, through awareness raising campaigns and community education to raise health literacy.

## Methodology

In the current study we explored civil society activism of organisations that deal with NCDs. The purpose was to understand the strategies that CSOs use in preventing and gaining treatment for NCDs. Key informant interviews (face-to-face and telephonic<sup>2</sup>) were conducted with representatives of eight NCD civil society organisations (see Table 13.2). The qualitative data were subjected to content analysis and constant comparative analysis method (CCM). CCM involves making systematic comparisons across units of data (for example, interviews, statements or themes) to develop conceptualisations of the possible relations between various pieces of data. The idea behind the use of these two qualitative data analysis methods was to identify the key themes emerging from the data, and these are reported in the findings section.

**Table 13.2** Study sample

Civil society organisation	Focus area
The Cancer Association of South Africa (CANSA)	Cancer
The Heart and Stroke Foundation South Africa (HSFSA)	Cardiovascular diseases
South African National Council of Alcohol and Drug Dependence (SANCA)	Alcoholism and Drug Dependence
Industry Association for Responsible Alcohol Use (ARA)	Alcohol abuse
The South African Depression and Anxiety Group (SADAG)	Mental Health
Patient Health Alliance of Non-Governmental Organisations (PHANGO)	Alliance of health-focused NGOs and patient organisations
Children In Distress Network (CINDI)	Advancing rights of vulnerable children and their families
Diabetes SA	Diabetes

<sup>2</sup>These took place when there were time and logistical constraints



## **Findings**

### ***Strategies Used by NCD Civil Society Organisations to Access Healthcare***

It emerged from the study that the most common strategies used by NCDs civil society organisations include:

- Use of media
- Public education
- Advocacy
- Participatory strategies and passive strategies
- Grassroots empowerment strategies
- Collaboration with researchers
- Confrontational strategies
- Partnerships
- Influencing policies on NCDs
- Monitoring compliance

### ***Media***

Media as used by the NCD organisations to raise awareness around NCDs refers to vehicles such as the internet, radio, magazines, social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube), pamphlets and books, television, radio and newspaper adverts. All the organisations had websites where information about their vision, mission and activities were posted. The CSOs had capitalised on the internet to disseminate information about their work. The information contained included articles about the specific NCD, information on where to find help and the contact details of the organisation. One organisation noted that that through various media, it is able to reach about 5.9 million people per year.

The strategies might be used by the specific organisation on its own or in conjunction with partners. In terms of creating awareness, some organisations have latched onto the DOH awareness campaigns to disseminate prevention messages about cancer. Preventing NCDs among those that do not yet have them and those that already have them was cited as a key reason why organisations use the media to disseminate information.

### ***Public Education***

Awareness campaigns also involve having exhibitions at clinics both private and public in order to disseminate information about the prevention of NCDs such as alcoholism and substance abuse. Partnerships are critical in ensuring successful exhibitions and awareness campaigns.

Education campaigns to create awareness around NCDs were conducted by all the eight organisations. The education campaigns were described in terms of: prevention and awareness campaigns, workshops, health promotion, giving talks at schools, clinics, churches, workplaces and communities. The education messages are often about prevention of the NCD and disease management for individuals who already have the condition. Prevention campaigns for substance abuse focus on ensuring those that are not yet exposed to alcohol and drug use remain unexposed. These campaigns also aim at ensuring that those that are already exposed to substance abuse receive treatment to come out of addiction. Essentially, prevention aims to ensure that communities are free of substance abuse whether this relates to prescription drugs or addictive substances. In terms of mental illness the talks in schools focus on how to identify the problem, where to get help and what to do in case of emergency.

### ***Advocacy and Participatory Strategies***

Advocacy strategies cited by the CSOs include activities such as *Sports Against Drug Abuse*, to help prevent the use of drugs and other substances. Advocacy against the violation of children's rights has also involved the use of participatory techniques such as giving children cameras to take pictures that depict the violation of their rights and publishing such pictures. Advocacy has also entailed the use of indigenous techniques of engagement such as the use of imbizos (community meetings) where local leaders discuss issues related to children.

Given the power relations between the children and leaders, at the imbizos children are asked to write down issues that infringe on their rights, and these are then directed to relevant departments such as Departments of Health, Social Development, Education and Home Affairs. Such strategies have revealed the violations of children's rights and helped children to voice their problems and the type of communities they want to live in. The violation of children's rights affects their well-being emotionally, mentally and even physically.

There are core advocacy strategies and then there are strategies within the core strategies. Educating children about their rights is a core strategy. However equipping children with cameras to take pictures of the violation of their rights is a sub-strategy within the main advocacy strategy identified as education. When the pictures taken are followed up with drama by the children who then perform the violation of their rights, the drama becomes a strategy within the broader strategy of education as a form of advocacy.

Regardless of the target audience, awareness-raising aims to change behavior. Awareness-raising by the CSO also aims at educating those living with NCDs and their caregivers on how to manage the condition or where to seek help when a condition arises. For example awareness-raising for depression and anxiety among teenagers aims to help them identify the symptoms of the illness, know where to find help and what to do in the case of an emergency.

While targeting individuals and their caregivers in the prevention of NCDs is important, it is critical to address the environmental conditions that promote the increase in NCDs. Awareness-raising also targets industries and producers of consumer products that can either increase or decrease the incidence of NCDs such as obesity, diabetes, high blood pressure and stroke. The Heart and Stroke Foundation South Africa accredits food producers who produce and distribute foods that are free of cholesterol to use the *Heart Mark*. The accreditation to endorse the *Heart Mark* on food products sends the message that the particular brand sells healthy foods and such perceptions help to increase the sales and ultimately profits of food retailers.

Participatory strategies used by NCD organisations included the recruitment of volunteers to work in the prevention of substance abuse, recruiting graduates of Psychology and Social Work to conduct their internships in programmes dealing with mental health issues such as teenage suicide, depression and anxiety. The use of volunteers and interns were strategies that benefitted both the organisations and the volunteers or interns. The CSOs benefitted by ensuring service provision continued at minimal or no cost; and those recruited as volunteers or interns, while lending their communities a helping hand, benefitted from gaining practical work experience

### *Passive Strategies*

The use of petitions, letters to government, commenting on Health Bills and drawing up Codes of Conduct were part of the passive strategies used in conveying messages about the prevention and treatment of NCDs. Out of eight (8) organisations dealing with NCDs studied, three (3) reported the use of one or more of the passive strategies. Letters were used first to draw the attention of authorities to specific issues and were useful as they served as a record of the issue and what had been communicated about it. Petitions and letters are used by organisations due to limited resources for conducting public campaigns. Commenting on bills and constitutional amendments also fits in this category of documentation produced by activists as part of bringing awareness around NCDs. One organisation, PHANGO, reported that they had participated in commenting on Draft Bills and Constitutional Amendments on NCDs.

Organisations dealing with substance abuse and alcoholism had formulated a Code of Conduct by which all enterprises involved in the production and distribution of liquor must comply. The Code of Conduct is meant to ensure that alcohol was not sold to at risk groups such as pregnant women and minors. It is not, however, clear what happened to enterprises that failed to comply. Attending meetings and making contributions on issues related to NCDs was another strategy that ensured that NCDs were factored into decision-making. Although NCD organisations were invited to some of the meetings, there were some they did not always get invited to. In instances where they received no invitation, and they had information about a meeting, the representatives simply attended to ensure that they lobbied for their NCDs.

### ***Grassroots Empowerment Strategies***

Out of eight organisations dealing with NCDs three reported the use of support groups. In the case of substance abuse individuals dependent on substances are referred to support groups to assist them in the process of coming out of drug or alcohol dependence. Support groups are also used particularly in rural areas where access to mental health services is non-existent or poor. Such groups help individuals to cope with the condition and also learn how to manage the condition without being stigmatised. Support groups are therefore grassroots organisations that help individuals with one or other form of NCDs to cope in the absence of professional help. It is, however, notable that support groups on their own are not a substitute for professional help but rather complement the services provided by the professionals.

### ***Collaboration with Researchers***

Among the NCD organisations selected for this study, three out of eight reported that they used research as one of their activist strategies. Two of the organisations were not directly involved in conducting the research but were partners with collaborators in the studies. One of the organisations conducted its own research into the NCD issues of concern. In terms of cancer, research had established the link between smoking and the disease and in terms of cardiovascular research, studies on nutrition were conducted to establish what foods cause or do not cause cardiovascular diseases. Research was also used to generate evidence on issues affecting vulnerable children and to advocate for children's justice. Thus research was used by CSOs to provide evidence on the magnitude of NCDs, the link between certain behaviours and NCDs and also evidence-based information on how to prevent NCDs.

### ***Confrontational Strategies***

NCD organisations did not employ radical strategies in their advocacy work, but rather strategies that can be considered confrontational. Such strategies were obvious and drew attention of the media, government and communities to the NCD organisations. These strategies included marches, lobbying, and criticising government when it failed in matters relating to NCDs. One of the areas where NCD organisations had come out criticising government was in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) legislation which required funders to show the proportion of Black people that would benefit from the funding. CSOs working in predominantly Black communities would essentially receive more points than those

working in predominantly White areas. This presents a challenge to CSOs whose members are White, although they may have activities in Black areas. CSOs criticised this Bill because it would have severely led to loss of funding as corporates seek to comply with the BBBEE legislation.

### **Lobbying**

Lobbying government to recognise NCDs as critical in the country is also another strategy that has been used. Although the proportion of individuals living with NCDs is not as high as that of people living with HIV and AIDS, the neglect by government of NCDs was leading to an NCD pandemic in South Africa. A key informant, however, noted the current focus by government on NCDs was not so much as a result of non-profit organisations lobbying, but rather the result of a global recognition of the importance of tackling NCDs. Investigating patient complaints was also among the confrontational strategies that ensured individuals living with NCDs received medical attention and that their rights were not violated. In instances where patient complaints were found to be valid, the health facilities were forced to provide care and in some instances the NCD organisation facilitated transfer to a different facility.

### **Marching**

Marching is a confrontational strategy cited by at least two organisations. CSOs mobilised communities to march against drugs in communities as these affected mainly the young people. NCD organisations also mobilised children to march against the violation of their rights and the appropriation of playing spaces by businesses such as sheebens in residential areas. Such marches were accompanied by memorandums to the local authorities to seek resolution to the issues. For example children's marches included handing over a memorandum to the mayor or municipal manager.

### ***Partnerships***

The use of partnerships in the advocacy against NCDs was cited by five out of the eight organisations. The discussion about the stakeholders elicited the same responses to that about partners. The same names mentioned as partners also appeared in the analysis of stakeholder awareness.

When the organisation recommends clients to psychologists, psychiatrists etc., and such professionals in turn do work pro bono for the organisation...Organisations intervene for clients where they run out of money for treatment – this entails making deals with the service providers. (KII\_5)

If you look at the private sector, they are starting to realise the impact they have on the health of the nation and for a number of reasons. Part of the reason has to do with social corporate responsibility requirements...and they know they have to do their bit for community development taking care of the health of the nation...for others it is because it makes business sense. (KII\_7)

Other benefits of partnerships were cited as follows:

- Partnering with the Department of Health has helped CANSA to disseminate cancer prevention messages to a wider audience whereas
- Partnering with professionals had assisted SADAG to provide services to the most vulnerable groups particularly in rural areas;
- Partnering with the South African Police Service (SAPS) helps to prevent drug abuse in communities;
- Partnerships helped in formulating policies to reduce the increase of cardiovascular diseases such as heart attacks, stroke, and high blood pressure. The formulation of policies such as the Anti-Tobacco Laws and the Salt Reduction Bill were formulated in partnership with NCD organisations;
- Partnering with the local authority ensured that the municipalities are aware of how breaching city by-laws affects the well-being of children because children have been able to articulate such issues through whole marches and issuing memos to the authorities.

### ***Influencing Policies on NCDs***

Four out of the eight NCD organisations reported having influenced health policies. The policies influenced included the Children's Act, the Tobacco Laws and the Salt Legislation that was being debated during the fieldwork for this study. Influencing policies also involved commenting on the Bills and providing inputs directly or indirectly to the policy makers. Thus commenting on Bills and influencing the content of policies is one of the activist strategies used by organisations to create awareness and help prevent NCDs.

### ***Monitoring Compliance***

Three out of the eight NCD organisations in this study reported that monitoring compliance was one of their strategies in ensuring the prevention, treatment and care of individuals living with NCDs. An organisation dealing with substance abuse reported that they were involved in monitoring compliance with the Code of Conduct in the marketing and distribution of alcohol.

Also monitored was access to healthcare for individuals with mental illness. In instances where individuals reported that they had been denied care, the NCD

organisation intervened to ensure that care was provided. In other instances, the NCD organisation found an alternative healthcare provider for the affected individuals. Also monitored were patient rights to ensure that these were not violated. The focus was to ensure that their rights were not violated through discriminatory policies or practices. In fact PHANGO had been formed as a result of the neglect of NCDs by the state in the face of the HIV and AIDS epidemic.

### *Other Strategies*

Organisations distinguished prevention campaigns particularly where substance abuse is concerned. There are awareness campaigns that are aimed at preventing the on-set of substance abuse among those that have not started using substances. The second type of prevention is among those who have started abusing substances such as drugs and alcohol or even prescription medication. Strategies that did not fit into the broad categorisations included the use of cartoon characters in the campaign against NCDs, the use direct of direct marketing strategies that involve door-to-door awareness campaigns and the involvement of law enforcement agencies such as the police to create greater visibility. Facebook and Twitter were also used in NCD campaigns, and one organisation noted that it engaged with social media users on different topics related to mental health by offering a discussion platform and question and answer sessions with health experts online

### **Discussion**

The findings of this paper suggest that civil society activism for the prevention of NCDs in South Africa takes various forms. The strategies employed by South African civil society organisations involved in the prevention and control of NCDs are similar to those identified by Keefe et al. (2006). These strategies are identified as empowerment, influencing the discourse, particularly the terminology used in speaking about the health condition, influencing the research agenda, lobbying, providing access to alternative healthcare options and influencing policy shifts in favour of specific NCDs. South African civil society organisations dealing with NCDs use a range of strategies to ensure the prevention and treatment of these conditions. Although the strategies described in this paper do not fit neatly into the existing categorisations of activist strategies, they address the prevention and control of NCDs.

The use of different various forms of media, public education and campaigns all seek to ensure that the public access basic information about NCDs. The assumption is that once the public has information, this will result in positive behaviour change. For example campaigns on substance abuse seek to raise awareness about the harmful effects of alcohol and tobacco in society. In such campaigns activists

seek to ensure that individuals involved in substance abuse and alcoholism will seek help for their condition.

The literature (Brown and Zavestoski 2004) suggests that activist strategies seek to influence the direction of policy. In this paper passive strategies such as writing letters to the relevant directorates of health, commenting on NCD Bills and attending meeting and workshops all help NCD activists ensure that their voices are heard and their concerns are included in policy design for the prevention and management of NCDs.

Like previous studies the findings in this paper suggest that empowerment strategies are among the activist strategies used by organisations dealing with NCD prevention and control. For example the use of the *Heart Mark* by producers of foods creates awareness and empowers consumers to make choices that are less harmful to their health.

While the literature (Brown and Zavestoski 2004; Mungal-Singh 2012; Bradshaw et al. 2011; Beaglehole et al. 2011) does not say much about partnerships, the findings in this paper suggest that the forging of partnerships is a major activist strategy used by NCD civil society organisations. Through partnerships, organisations are able to maximise on the resources at their disposal. A single organisation can only extend its activism as far as its budget can stretch. However when the organisations form partnerships among themselves, with government or the private sector, the pooling of resources helps to spread the message of NCD prevention and control much further than could have been achieved by a single organisation. The partnership between CANSA and the Department of Health in South Africa has helped in the wide dissemination and sharing of information about the prevention and control of cancer in South Africa. In a country where the masses depend on government for shelter, healthcare and social grants, communities are more likely to be receptive to what an organisation that partners with government has to say.

The literature discusses the use of alternative clinical care and prevention strategies. The findings of this study point to the use of innovative strategies in helping the poor access healthcare for NCDs. These include the *Speaking Books* on mental health by SADAG that help individuals to understand the signs of mental illness and the measures to take in addressing the problem.

Also included is the use of partnerships, within which is the issue of cross-subsidisation. Some organisations had forged partnerships with specialists to help provide quality care and prevention for NCDs. In such partnerships, specialists are required to provide care to poor patients pro bono and in return the organisation sends clients who can afford to pay for treatment to the same specialists. In such a symbiotic relationship all parties (civil society, NCD patients and caregivers) benefit.

The literature does not dwell much on monitoring of compliance but this emerges as a key finding in the current study. Civil society organisations involved in the prevention of alcohol and substance abuse monitor retailers to ensure that alcohol is not sold to minors (individuals under 18 years). Civil society involved in activism for mental health monitor health facilities to check whether the sick are provided with care and that this is done with dignity. Where patients do not receive the required



standard of care the civil society organisation intervenes to make the government accountable or to make alternative arrangements to assist the patients' access to the required standard of care.

Civil society also monitors government to ensure that the necessary policies and programmes are in place to address NCDs. Consistent with the existing literature the activist strategies discussed are aimed at creating awareness and resulting in behaviour change. While activist strategies are discussed individually, this paper suggests that a single activist strategy such as media use might result in empowerment, awareness and behaviour change.

Although confrontational strategies are cited, these do not appear to be commonly used by NCD civil society organisations in South Africa. Where confrontational strategies are employed they involve marches to submit a list of demands to the authorities. Such types of confrontational strategies are mild when compared with those employed by civil society organisations involved in HIV and AIDS activism. What emerges is that the use of the social media such as Facebook, Twitter and other forms of new media appear to be increasingly embraced by civil society organisations involved in NCD activism. Social media also seems appealing to the target audiences of the civil society activists as such media is readily available and highly interactive. Individuals needing help can use social media to obtain information, alert relevant groups of crises and rally support for NCD prevention and control. It is however notable that social media reaches a specific target audience and others without access to such media remain marginalised and excluded. Thus other innovative ways of reaching marginal groups are required if NCD activism is to result in the prevention and control of the epidemic in South Africa.

## **Conclusion**

This paper began by noting that a large section of the South African population is affected by NCDs although they have not been accorded the same status in the MDGs as HIV and AIDS. The most common NCDs in South Africa as elsewhere are cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes and chronic respiratory illnesses. Mental illness is what might be considered a cross-cutter because individuals with the key NCDs often present with mental disorders such as anxiety and depression. Civil society organisations discussed address these major NCDs in South Africa. The strategies that civil society activism employs are aimed at empowering communities to take action to prevent NCDs, creating awareness, influencing policy and lobbying government to take action for the prevention and control of NCDs. While the strategies discussed in this paper are similar to strategies employed by civil society organisations involved in activism for access to healthcare, some are not cited in the existing literature. While the existing literature tends to focus on activism for access to healthcare in general, this paper addressed activism for access to care, prevention and control of NCDs.

Civil society organisations, using a variety of activist strategies are involved in the prevention and control of NCDs in South Africa. While partnerships exist between the CSOs and with partners such as business and government, these are inadequate. Such partnerships would be much more effective if these were harnessed on a larger scale in the control and prevention of NCDs. Furthermore partnerships with government remain critical as that is where policy formulation occurs. Stronger partnerships between civil society and the state would be mutually beneficial. The CSOs have the grassroots information in terms of what is happening around specific NCDs and such information can be used to inform policy design. On the other hand, civil society can latch onto the awareness campaigns sponsored by government to create awareness on a larger scale than when such activities are conducted independently.

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# Chapter 14

## Developing Global Partnership for Development: Chinese Investments in Africa and Impacts on Sustainable Development

Daouda Cissé

### Introduction

China is following a distinct path in its development, linked to its political system: a development strategy that prioritizes resource extraction for the global market requires centralized, capital-intensive investments, which can be implemented with authoritarian means if necessary in the Chinese case (Bosshard 2008). In this regard, China's Africa strategy arguably does not reflect the consensus on the need to integrate economic growth, poverty reduction, and environmental protection which has emerged from many UN conferences since the 1990s.<sup>1</sup>

Chinese growth is since spilling-over into other regions of the world. With China's *go out* strategy in the late 1990s, overseas Chinese investments through Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private companies venturing abroad are supported by Beijing's officials.<sup>2</sup> The rapidly accelerating economic relations between China and Africa even at first glance offer many benefits. They allow African countries to diversify their trade, investment and aid relations, and have contributed to the continent's strong economic growth in recent years. China in its need to secure natural resources, which are important for its economic development, modernization and industrialization has tapped into Africa to achieve such goals as supported by the Chinese government. In fact, China has become the world factory and Africa has become the world's factory supplier.

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<sup>1</sup>As the Rio Earth Summit Conference in 1992 stated, governments should rethink economic development and find ways to halt the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and pollution of the planet. However, China followed a classical development path.

<sup>2</sup>MOFCOM: The implementation of *going out* strategy in our country made new development, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/significantnews/200501/20050100013480.html>, accessed on November 25th 2011.

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To achieve economic growth, Africa is in dire need of foreign investments, not the least of which includes Chinese investments. Yet, such investments should not cause environmental problems for Africa; they may, otherwise, inflict long-term costs on African states and humankind more broadly. China with its increasing international weight has a responsibility to have an eye on environmental and sustainable development impacts its investments create abroad, particularly in Africa (Grimm 2011). Chinese investments in Africa are largely concentrated in extractive industries, environmentally sensitive sectors and areas. For more sustainable development, African governments should make sure that such investments do not undermine environmental policies and nature's riches on the continent. Otherwise, they risk jeopardizing their long-term economic growth and prosperity.

Through global partnership and cooperation, south-south cooperation has become an important feature for countries of the South to establish economic ties. Since the 2000s, the MDGs have brought developed, emerging and developing countries together in order to reach common targets by 2015. Therefore, developing global partnership for sustainable development remains crucial for African economies.

This chapter explores the literature on environmental and sustainable development impacts of Chinese investments in Africa. It highlights some prominent Chinese investments in Africa, the discussion around their environmental impacts, the subsequent challenges for China to address the environmental issues that its investments cause in Africa and includes the environmental sustainability aspects in China-Africa relations for more sustainable development.

## **Chinese Investments in Africa**

With Deng Xiaoping initiating political and economic reforms in the late 1970s, China started eyeing foreign countries for Outward Foreign Direct Investment. During that period, overseas investments were part of the government's development assistance or were intended to facilitate trade. In the 1980s, the state council allowed only a few SOEs to invest abroad. In the 1990s, this trend has changed, and China, which has been one of the world's biggest FDI recipients, sees its companies (State Owned and private) venturing abroad. Since early 2000 with China's *go out* strategy, such investments are supported by the Chinese government through state agencies and financial institutions. Outward Foreign Direct Investment has contributed to China's economic growth during these last decades. Among recipient regions for Chinese outward FDI, Africa represents an important destination. FDI in Africa is increasing. But among the investors, Asian countries have become important investors in the continent although most FDI stock is from the U.S. and Europe.


China's willingness to sustain its economic development, ensure its resources security for its modernization and urbanization agenda and to satisfy its large

population’s need for energy has led it to tap into Africa by investing in different sectors; mainly oil and mining. For China, the need to invest abroad is related to: securing resources, accessing new markets for its manufacturing products and learning new technologies. The *go out* strategy has pushed Chinese companies to be internationally competitive players. Such policy allows Chinese companies—facing fierce competition at home—to access resources which support China’s industries and overseas markets to expand their activities in different sectors. Africa represents a huge potential market in this regard.

Chinese investments in Africa have substantially increased over the last decade. China is a leading trading partner for Africa. After the 2009 financial crisis, bilateral trade between China and Africa reached a record of US\$ 127 billion again in 2010 (Shuaihua Cheng and Guoyong Liang 2011). In 2011, this trade volume increased and reached more than US\$ 160 billion. Beijing’s policies following the *go out* strategy that supports Chinese companies to *go abroad* have boosted Chinese investments in Africa that drastically increased in 2010. China’s FDI stock in Africa reached US\$ 13.04 billion in 2010, accounting for 4.11 % compared to 3.8 % in 2009 of overall FDI stock in Africa, with South Africa and Nigeria respectively accounting for US\$ 4.1 billion and US\$ 1.2 billion (Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2010; see Fig. 14.1).

South Africa’s Standard Bank forecasts Chinese investments in Africa to rise by 70 % to US\$ 50 billion and expects Sino-African bilateral trade to reach US\$ 300 billion by 2015. Chinese investments in Africa have been mainly related to resources; thus extractive industries come along with infrastructure projects that today include dam building for hydropower in many African countries. With China’s non-interference

**Fig. 14.1** Share of Chinese foreign direct investment stock in Africa (Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s outward FDI based on MOFCOM)



and *no strings* policies not to attach political conditionalities to invest in foreign countries, African governments have welcomed Chinese investments in the continent. From Africa's perspective, contrary to the traditional investors, China is seen to have a competitive advantage in investing in the continent. Among the most lauded features are long-term perspectives of Chinese capital supported by their government; low cost technology in Chinese investments in infrastructure, construction and information and communications technologies (ICT); and Beijing's no strings policy that imposes no political and financial conditionality. There have been expectations that such investments could contribute to Africa's economic growth and development.

The Chinese government has played an important role in allowing Chinese companies to operate in Africa. Financial institutions such as China Export and Import Bank, China Africa Development Fund and China Development Bank have granted credit lines and loans to central SOEs and private companies for investments in Africa in various sectors: infrastructure, construction, extractive industries, ICT and so on (Brautigam 2011). Chinese investments in Africa offer a number of benefits: infrastructure building, skills transfer, job creation in various areas. But although China's investment contributed to growth and development in Africa, it received criticism regarding social and environmental impacts in the continent.

Contrary to the traditional investors (Europe and U.S.), Chinese investments are concentrated in sensitive sectors and areas with weak ecological policies and governance. China's growth and investment have strengthened the position of resource-endowed countries in the international economy (Gonzalez 2011). Investments in extractive industries have raised debates and discussions about the environmental and sustainable development issues around the world. Consequently, Chinese investments in Africa have attracted a lot of attention.

In Africa, Chinese investments in oil, mining, copper and coal occur in environmentally sensitive zones. The location where extractions take place often experience socio-environmental struggles over the control of space, governance of territory, access to land and water, defence of human and citizenship rights and dissatisfaction over the distribution of the mineral rents (Bebbington et al. 2008). Chinese investment, which has been welcomed by a wide number of African countries, has seen positive and negative impacts on Africa's economic growth. The involvement of Chinese (SOEs) and Chinese private companies in Africa is driven by Beijing's Africa political agenda. China is eager to have access to more resources in Africa to sustain its growth. Such an investment pattern comes along with development project packages. Yet, many African countries (Nigeria, Zambia, Angola, DRC and so on) have benefited from China's investments in infrastructure building, oil, mining and so on. In Nigeria for instance, China has invested in the reconstruction of road and railway infrastructure, as well as the construction of the Kaduna oil refinery in the north of the country (Alden 2007). In Zambia, China has financed the construction of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) around the copperbelt area (Alden 2007, 75). China has financed a number of projects in Angola including the construction of a new airport in Luanda, a refinery project in Lobito, the renovation of the Bequenla railway and the railway linking Namibe and

Menogue (Alden 2007). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will benefit from announced loans totaling US\$ 13.5 billion for infrastructure and mining operations (Carmody 2009).

China's footprint in Africa's infrastructure includes the construction of dams. Today, Africa's new dams are most popularly backed by Chinese funders and dam builders, and China has committed more than US\$ 3 billion to African hydropower projects (Hathaway 2010). In Africa, dam building supporters have a clear message: hydropower is cheap, clean, renewable and an indigenous power source (Hathaway 2010). Africa hosts nearly 150 proposed large dams—most of them for power, water and energy supply (International Rivers 2010).

The withdrawal of traditional partners in dam building and the *know-how* of the Chinese dam industry among other aspects have allowed Chinese dam constructors to benefit dam construction projects overseas. Dams are often the largest water and energy investments in Africa. Every large dam poses economic, social, and environmental impacts (International Rivers Africa Program 2010). The lack of power, water and energy in many African countries has attracted dam builders for hydro-power projects across the continent. Sub-Saharan Africa's power infrastructure has been described as the least developed, least accessible, least reliable, most costly to operate, and, on average highest priced of any region of the world (World Bank report 2010). Populations in remote and rural areas cannot be connected to grid-based supplies and power distribution in major cities has always been a bottleneck for Africans because of the poor and unreliable power distribution networks which lack investments. Most African governments appear to welcome Chinese investments without a strong focus on social, environmental impacts and sustainable development (Hathaway 2008). In Ethiopia for instance, with regards to the environmental impacts of Chinese investments in the country, the Ethiopian government seems to have prioritized its short-term economic growth over the achievement of environmentally sustainable economic growth in the long run (Desta 2009).

## **Debate Around Environmental Impacts of Chinese Investments in Africa**

During recent years, Africa's economic growth has been supported by Chinese investments in the continent. China has gained and changed the political economic strategy in Africa, not least so by explicitly not attaching political conditions (no strings policy) to its overseas operations.

China's political strategy contrasts with the western policies on human rights, good governance, environment and sustainable development and is centred on not interfering in internal affairs of countries where it is operating or investing (Brautigam 2011). The presence of Chinese actors in Africa based on a strict hands-off policy in political and environmental standards has raised debates and discussions about the social, environmental and sustainable development impacts of Chinese investments in Africa (Bosshard 2008). Chinese investors and extractive companies

are accused of undermining good governance, environmental and sustainable policies in Africa.

Chinese investments in natural resources are concentrated in remote areas, inaccessible zones and sensitive extractive industries. Operating in such areas and industries clearly involves social and environmental risks. China's growing presence in extractive industries aggravating environmental degradation and accelerating the exhaustion of non-renewable resources has attracted the world's attention (Gonzalez 2011). Chinese investments in sensitive sectors raise the debate on sustainable economic development for Africa. Concerns around China's environmental challenges linked to extractive industries in Africa have been tackled. In the long run, African governments that have welcomed Chinese investments (over political, social, environmental issues) in ecologically sensitive sectors with weak governance and control systems will endure the environmental impacts that extractive industries involve without enjoying the economic benefits expected for their growth (Gonzalez 2011).

In Africa, there are many examples of the environmental impacts linked to Chinese investments in extractive industries. In Gabon, Chinese oil company SINOPEC operating in the oil industry in Loango National Park has been ordered to stop its exploration project in September 2006.<sup>3</sup> The Gabonese ministry of environment did not approve the environmental impact study and oil exploration in the park which threatened animals (Bosshard 2008). In 2010 in Gabon, an environmental NGO (Brainforest) also campaigned against a Chinese iron ore development project for hydropower with poor environmental guidelines and threatening the Ivindo National park (International Rivers 2010). In Zambia, officials urged the closing down of Chinese mining company Collum Coal Mine Industries for establishing low standard working conditions and failing to implement environmental and safety regulations. Following these complaints and questions about the environmental impacts of Chinese investments in Africa, African governments (Sierra Leone, DRC, Zambia) are becoming more assertive in dealing with Chinese companies about environmental standards and corporate social responsibility (Mol 2011). On the positive side, according to Mol (2011), a number of Chinese projects in extractive industries (oil, mining, copper, coal and so on) in Africa, following criticism and complaints on environmental pollution, have been closed.

In the hydropower sector, Chinese dam construction companies' forays into Africa in order to expand their markets and improve infrastructure building have raised a number of concerns regarding the negative impacts they create in communities where dams are built. Many African countries in their hydropower projects to satisfy their population needs for water or electricity have failed to attract foreign traditional investors. Western investors are concerned about the environmental and social impacts such investments will have on host communities and the zones where dams will be built. To avoid conditionalities regarding the dams projects' environmental and social assessments, African countries, such as Sudan with the Merowe Dam or Ghana with its Bui Dam, have turned to China Export and Import

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<sup>3</sup> See Centre for Chinese Studies (2007, p. 94f).



Bank with fewer environmental and social conditions than their Western counterparts to finance their projects (International Rivers 2008). Unlike Western financiers in the different investment projects in Africa, China's assistance comes with almost no strings attached "as mentioned in China's Africa policy documents with rhetorics such as: 'mutual benefit', 'win-win' cooperation 'non-interference' in African countries" domestic affairs (Holslag 2006). The need for energy in order to provide power to many African households due to the lack of adequate infrastructure in major African cities has led to a Chinese presence in the dam industry, at times worryingly an environmentally sensitive sector in the continent.

In 2003, China Export and Import Bank approved loans worth US\$ 519 million to Chinese companies for the construction of the Merowe Dam in Sudan. The dam will ultimately displace 50,000 people from the fertile Nile valley to desert locations and for which the Sudanese government failed to attract funders for many years (Bosshard et al. 2009). Because of its strategy of non-interference in African countries' domestic affairs, China's activities have been accused of leading to environmental degradation and of lacking respect for the right of people not to be displaced where dams are constructed (Hensengerth and Scheumann 2011).

In Ghana, the contentious Sinohydro's Bui Dam project will flood part of the Bui National park (Bosshard 2008). As the Bui Dam project was environmentally and socially sensitive, Ghanaian authorities found difficulties in finding potential investors (Hensengerth and Scheumann 2011). To meet their political agenda in order to provide energy for the local population, they attributed the project to Sinohydro.

Sinohydro, one of the biggest Chinese dam builders, is committed to global success. Supported by China Exim bank, the company is playing a leading role amongst dam builders around the world. According to Bloom and Poplak (2011), Sinohydro has 240 projects globally, with 100 in Africa (five of them in Botswana), many of them in ecologically endangered areas. Sinohydro's activities in Africa are concentrated in sensitive areas. Although it contributes to infrastructure building, water access and hydropower generation, the Chinese giant company causes environmental and social issues to the host communities where the dams are built.

Botswana faces serious water shortages. As a landlocked country, demand for water in Botswana continues to rise at a high rate. The building of the Dikgatlong Dam, which once completed in late 2011, according to the project's forecasts, was to supply 400 cubic meters particularly in eastern parts of the country (Bloom and Poplak 2011). The construction of the dam at the confluence of Shashe and Tati rivers would certainly allow Botswana to benefit from clean water access and power generation. Yet, environmental issues are extremely important in Botswana, specifically those relating to environmental degradation, water scarcity, the depletion of mineral resources, wildlife resources, and the sustainability of economic activities in rural areas (United Nations System in Botswana 2007). Consequently, the Dikgatlong Dam in Botswana, one of the biggest projects for industrial development under Sinohydro, has been a concern for the local communities living around the dam's zone. To many locals, Dikgatlong, has been an environmentally dubious project that will not create sustainable development for host communities.

Dikgatlong Dam contributes to Botswana's foremost environmental emergency: deforestation caused by free-grazing livestock, as Bloom and Poplak (2011) argue.

Chinese dam builders are yet to become more socially and environmentally responsible within China. The Three Gorges Dam at Sandouping (三斗坪) in Yichang-Hubei province is one of the most dramatic examples with severe consequences for millions of people living around it. Besides being plagued by corruption, high costs of construction, environmental, human rights violations and resettlement difficulties, the Three Gorges Dam's project has displaced more than 1.2 million people and flooded 13 cities, 140 towns and 1,350 villages (International Rivers 2010). People are forced to leave flooded areas for poor lands with unsatisfactory conditions and few job opportunities.

The experience of the Three Gorges Dam about environmental and social impacts has been a frightening symbol among academics, non-governmental organizations, and policy makers for the expansion of Chinese dam builders overseas. According to Mara Hvistendahl (2008), the Three Gorges Dam—the world's largest—had the potential of becoming one of China's biggest environmental nightmares. The massive hydroelectric dam may be triggering landslides, altering entire ecosystems and causing other serious environmental problems—and, by extension, endangering the millions who live in its shadow.

Dam construction by Chinese companies has more often than not been to the detriment of host communities and areas. Africa's dams have done considerable social, environmental and economic damage, often with complete disregard for the human rights of dam-affected communities, and have left a trail of *development-induced poverty* in their wake (International Rivers-Africa Program 2010). Large hydro dams in Sudan, Senegal, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ghana have brought considerable social, environmental and economic damage to their societies and have left a trail of development-induced poverty in their wake (Hathaway and Pottinger 2010). Sadly, these projects have not led to progress in electrifying the huge proportion of Africans currently without electricity. China's engagement in Africa driven by diplomatic, political and economic interests, contrasts with Western investors regarding higher social and environmental standards.

Complaints from international NGOs towards Chinese financial and banking institutions arose, much of it from Western actors, calling for consideration of environmental and sustainable development issues in Chinese operations in Africa. Chinese banks are criticized for not applying higher ethical and environmental standards while financing Chinese companies venturing abroad ("EIB losing out to Chinese banks," *Financial Times*, February 8, 2007).

In the early 1980s, multilateral development banks adopted policies regarding the social and environmental impacts of their projects, the so-called Equator Principles. Based on determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risks in financing projects, the Equator Principles are used to fund the development and construction of major infrastructure and industrial projects. The guidelines of the Equator Principles should serve as the framework for each adopting institution in its own environmental and social policies, procedures and standards related to its project financing. Criticism from Paul Wolfowitz in October 2006, then World Bank

president, was directed to Chinese banks not to apply the Equator Principles while financing projects.<sup>4</sup> The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and several European and U. S. financial institutions complained that Chinese banks apply lower environmental and ethical standards in their loans for foreign projects. This gives a competitive advantage to Chinese banks over their foreign counterparts.

According to the Financial Times, the President of the European Investment Bank Philippe Maystadt criticized Chinese financial institutions: “The competition of the Chinese banks is clear. They don’t bother about social or human rights conditions” (EIB Accuses China of Unscrupulous Loans, Financial times, November 28, 2006). But such complaints about Chinese financial institutions arguably reflect not only moral indignation and environmental consciousness but also fear from Western traditional partners to lose their preferential position and sphere of influence in Africa considering that 80 % of the U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa are resource-based (Mol 2011).

The lack of environmental and sustainable development policies in Chinese financial institutions’ projects overseas do not only cause environmental consequences in their specific projects but also raise questions on their environmental standards in general.

## Challenges

The international and African debates and discussions on the environmental consequences of Chinese operations overseas are finally starting to have an impact. After a series of (at times violent) protests in African countries and the closure of Chinese oil, mining, copper, and coal businesses in Africa (Gabon and Zambia), the Chinese government is increasingly aware of social and environmental issues that Chinese projects create in the continent. The Chinese government, financial institutions and SOEs operating in Africa are aware of the threats faced by their investments’ interests due to complaints and discussions regarding environmental issues.

To respect the countries’ social and environmental policies, Beijing has set guidelines for workers’ rights, community relations and environmental impacts in its projects in Africa (Alden and Alves 2009; Bosshard 2008). The Chinese Ministry of Commerce, which is one of the Chinese offices involved in supporting Chinese overseas investments, has the responsibility to ensure that Chinese OFDI needs are met and is also concerned about Chinese companies’ reputation abroad. Thus, in August 2006, MOFCOM issued recommendations to urge Chinese companies to improve their workers’ safety, respect local policies and adjust to the international environmental and safety standards in their overseas investments projects.

In China’s willingness to protect its national interests while investing abroad, measures and regulations regarding environmental protection should be taken. Their implementation should be checked by the Chinese financial institutions that support

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<sup>4</sup>In les Echos, October 24th, 2006.

companies for foreign investments. To prevent themselves from being accused of colonial style exploitation and taking advantage of weak environmental policies in Africa and to meet Beijing's focus on improving sustainable development and environment policies at home and abroad, they started to implement voluntary and self-regulatory measures (Mol 2011).

Not only should Chinese financial institutions be aware of the environmental impacts of Chinese investments abroad but also Chinese state agencies, SOEs and private companies developing their activities and operating overseas. In January 2008, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), with ministerial status, issued Corporate Social Responsibility for more than 150 Chinese SOEs including the three major oil companies, SINOPEC (中国石化), CNOCC (中国石油) and CNPC (中国海洋) operating abroad.<sup>5</sup>

The commitment of Chinese SOEs to Corporate Social Responsibility has grown in recent years. China National Petroleum Corporation, for example, issued environmental guidelines and adopted the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System and began publishing a Corporate Social Responsibility Report in 2006. The ISO 14001 standard is one of a series of emerging international environmental management standards aimed at promoting continual improvement in company environmental performance through the adoption and implementation of an environmental management system. It defines an overall environmental management system and covers the following key elements: establishment of an appropriate environmental policy, a planning phase and the implementation and operation of the environmental management system (Global Environmental Management Initiative 1996).

The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) office in China in collaboration with local organizations including the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the National Development and Reform Commission try to improve the environmental responsibility and sustainability of Chinese foreign economic activities (Schorn 2009). Thus, specific policies regarding environmental issues in Chinese expansion overseas have been developed through financial institutions (China Export and Import Bank, China Africa Development Fund, China Development Bank) supporting Chinese companies to venture abroad.

China Export and Import Bank is the main financier for Chinese companies investing abroad; in 2004, it developed its own environmental policy and impact assessments. Through such policy, the Chinese State financial credit agency urged Chinese companies venturing overseas to comply with host country's policies regarding sustainable development and environmental protection. In 2007, it issued guidelines for social and environmental impact assessments for its loan projects. Such guidelines were to improve the 2004 environmental policy. The guidelines

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<sup>5</sup>In 2008 major multinational Sinosteel became the first Chinese enterprise to release a sustainability report on its African operation ([http://en.sinosteel.com/Culture/Sustainability/index\\_1.shtml](http://en.sinosteel.com/Culture/Sustainability/index_1.shtml)).

were developed in accordance with the China's Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law, Environmental Protection Law, and Environmental Management for Construction Project Ordinance, and with reference to regulations and procedures for environmental and social assessments of other international financial organizations (China Exim Bank Environmental Protection Policy 2007).

China Exim Bank, through its environmental protection policy, pays a high level of attention to its funded projects' environmental impacts. The environmental policy enhances environmental monitoring and management before, during and after project implementation.<sup>6</sup>

Before the project, China Exim Bank makes an environmental impact assessment, one of the basic requirements and elements during the project review. Funded projects are required to conduct environmental impact studies and obtain endorsement or approval from the recipient country's environmental administration. Projects harmful to the environment and which do not have approval from the environmental administration will not be funded (China Exim Bank Environmental Protection Policy 2007). During the project examination, China Exim Bank examines the project's implementation which takes into account environmental impacts. During the implementation of the project, if any unacceptable negative environmental impacts result, China Exim Bank will require the implementation unit to take immediate remedial or preventive measures and will discontinue financial support (China Exim Bank Environmental Protection Policy 2007).

After the project, China Exim Bank will make a post-project review in project implementation and completion status, and its impacts. The post-project review allows China Exim Bank to revise the measures taken before and during implementation for similar projects. If necessary, the related requirements and policies will be fully revised (China Exim Bank Environmental Protection policy 2007).

In Africa, environmental and social impacts of Chinese investments have received the attention of African NGOs, policymakers and academics. In September 2006, in an effort to make governments pay more attention to the environmental impacts of China's presence in Africa and establish strong environmental regulations, the African Union urged all actors to ensure that China is concerned with the protection of the environment in its investment practices in Africa.<sup>7</sup> International Rivers and WWF offices in the continent work closely with Chinese companies present in many countries, especially in critical areas, such as dam construction, and resource extraction sectors, such as mining and forestry, to adjust environmental policies and make China-Africa economic relations more sustainable.

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<sup>6</sup> 中国进出口关于中国的环境保护政策/About china's Environmental Protection Policy (English translation).

<sup>7</sup> African Union meeting of the task force on Africa's Strategic Partnership with Emerging Powers: China, India and Brazil, September 2006, p. 5.

## Change Is Needed

Although Beijing's priority for economic growth and development is linked to less environmental protection both at home and abroad in those cases where Chinese companies are operating, recently China's focus on addressing environmental policies for better sustainable development has become more visible in Beijing's central government's policies. In November 2011, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Hawaii, Hu Jintao clearly mentioned shifting growth model for better sustainable development.

Interestingly, China has strengthened and improved its domestic regulations on both the protection of the environment and resettlement planning following internal opposition and criticism (Hensengerth 2010). Through China's 12th five year plan, increased emphasis was placed on pollution control, energy efficiency and carbon reduction (Li Wanxin 2011). Although the Chinese government has recently published a white paper on environmental policies and emphasizes that it has put in place protective environmental and sustainable development regulations, the effects of these regulations are limited.<sup>8</sup>

Africa clearly needs foreign investments for its development. But such investments in extractive industries and hydropower projects should not cause ecological degradation and threaten the livelihoods of many Africans. China's investment in Africa should be based on a strategic plan for development that considers communities' needs. In Africa, collaboration between governments—over their political and economic interests—and NGOs should work together to better plan extractive industries and dam building projects to adjust environmental and sustainable development concerns. Together they should put in place guidelines and work towards their implementation through different actors involved in sensitive investing sectors. Transparency and public participation from civil society, NGOs, governments and companies could contribute to sustainable development without jeopardizing people's livelihoods (Cissé et al. 2014). Populations' lives, environmental and economic needs should be taken into account for a better sustainable economic development. To save rural areas where most Chinese investments in extractive industries and environmentally sensitive zones take place, African governments should strengthen governance and public accountability (Hathaway 2010).

Climate change is another important factor which is often not considered by Africa in its high quest for energy. Many African countries often are almost totally dependent on hydropower in improving power distribution and yet many areas have experienced droughts. Renewable energy for power access should be the main focus for African countries to avoid vulnerability to climate change by building hydro-power dams (Hathaway and Pottinger 2010).

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<sup>8</sup> See Economy (2007), for a good summary of China's environmental problems and their link to inadequate governance structure.

## **Environmental Sustainability in China-Africa Relations Through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS)**

Following the world leaders UN summit in 2000, the MDGs launched a global partnership for development and set targets for a prosperous world. Developed and developing countries' policymakers have made global partnership their agenda to work hand in hand to achieve different objectives targeted through the MDGs. Among other aspects, environmental sustainability remains important. Simelane and Chiroro (2013) state that with such a framework and structures, the world leaders were much more focused on creating an environment where sustainable development could be achieved on a world scale. The MDGs have been set to contribute to sustainable development, particularly in developing countries. By 2015, the first round of the MDGs will come to an end and assessments will be made in order to see if targets for various goals set in the MDGs are met. As the period of their existence is coming to an end, one wonders what the world is going to be like after the first phase of the MDGs (Simelane and Chiroro 2013). Therefore, the discussions will be centred on the developments beyond 2015. Vandemoortele (2011) argues that the question is not whether to abandon global targets but rather how to improve the MDG architecture and how to adjust them to the priorities beyond 2015. Sustainable growth linked to sustainable development is one of the main targets mentioned in the MDGs. Future goals must reach beyond traditional development thinking to become sustainable one-world goals that apply to poor and rich countries alike (Carin et al. 2012). However, challenges exist for the sustainable development goals with the profit making focus of, for example, the private business sector or to improve the coherence between macro, social and environmental policies (Carin et al. 2012).

At the global level, there has been little about environmental sustainability to address environmental concerns both natural and man-made. Political and civil society support is needed to meet the sustainable development goals under the MDG framework. Environmental sustainability is high on the UN agenda to prevent land degradation, unsustainable water use and sustainable management of natural resources (United Nations 2012). Climate change, biodiversity, freshwater and health impact of pollution are key areas of interests for the OECD through its environmental outlook 2050 to assess future trends of environmental sustainability (OECD 2012).

Although Africa has been part of the MDG agenda, the continent has not achieved most of the MDGs (Simelane and Chiroro 2013). Therefore, high-level meetings have already been taking place in several African countries for a more comprehensive process post-2015. According to Simelane and Chiroro (2013), the new development framework needs to consider a new approach to development assistance that looks into the dual roles that can be played by the BRICS, either as donors or recipients.

In its growing trade and investments relationship with emerging countries; particularly China, Brazil and India, Africa aims at economically engaging with those

countries based on sustainable development for the benefit of African countries and populations.

Even though China has managed to somehow achieve poverty alleviation, the country faces challenges linked to environmental sustainability (McKinsey & Company 2009); first at home and now in regions—not least so in Africa—where it is contributing to OFDI. At home China's urbanization and modernization have had consequences on people's livelihoods (displacement, pollution and so on) and nature (water pollution, conservation, biodiversity and so on).

Public awareness of environmental issues among Chinese citizens, which has led to protests in many cities and provinces of China, has made the governments (central and provincial) avoid the deterioration of the country's social stability. Towards the development agenda beyond 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (2013) states that countries should respect and protect nature, raise public awareness about avoiding waste, environmental protection and ecological conservation and encourage sustainable patterns of consumption and production.

As there is shift from a growth at all cost to growth for sustainable development (green growth) with more green politics (national and local green policies) and more interest in solving environmental issues domestically, changes are likely to happen in China's awareness about protecting the environment while investing in Africa. From the Chinese central government to the provincial ones, green politics have been developed and should be achieved by both local and central governments. Environmental protection is high on the Chinese government's agenda (through the 12th five year plan, 2011–2015). From 2005 there were three binding targets, and currently there are nine, and national targets from Beijing are decentralised to local governments and should be implemented and enforced by local governments (Kostka and Mol 2013). China's government introduced a Green Credit Policy in 2007, aimed at applying the standards also in their overseas' operations (Cissé et al. 2014).

In its growing footprint in various sectors of African countries' economies, issues related to environmental sustainability around Chinese investments have been mentioned. Therefore it remains essential for China in its engagement with Africa to achieve sustainable development for a better cooperation with Africa. Chinese financial institutions which support Chinese OFDI through Chinese state and private companies contribute to more sustainable investments. Sustainable funds need to be put in place for more clean and sustainable businesses (Kotska and Mol 2013). The increasing financial flows from China to Africa—in the form of investments and publicly subsidized project funding—present an opportunity for the continent, if managed cautiously and strategically (Cissé et al. 2014).

In Africa, environmental policies and regulations need to be developed and implemented and their monitoring is essential to achieve environmental sustainability. Policies and regulations should be both at the levels of direction of projects and in the lending policies of institutions (Cissé et al. 2014).

In order to go beyond the first targets of the MDGs, Africa needs to coordinate its efforts first nationally and regionally and engage with its traditional and emerging partners to reach the goals through the post-2015 MDG agenda. Local, national



and regional strategies should be coordinated and policies harmonized through regional organizations to achieve environmental sustainability in Africa.

On the other hand, more responsible engagement from Africa's partners is needed to address the continent's challenges for environmental sustainability, among other goals. As an important emerging partner for Africa, China should be prompted to have a more responsible role in the continent through sustainable investments which do not hamper environmental protection and people's livelihoods. Transparent financing mechanisms and bidding processes for tenders from the African and Chinese governments and the role of public and private Chinese enterprises which operate in Africa for development projects to respect sustainability norms and standards could improve environmental issues linked to China's engagement in Africa. Feasibility studies that take into account environmental protection and sustainability are important to evaluate and assess investment projects by Chinese companies in Africa. Financial institutions should support and foster investments which comply with environmental norms and standards. Foreign investment rules and the process of foreign assistance have repeatedly undergone changes, trying to adjust to market principles, but increasingly also taking on board environmental concerns; and besides economic viability, environmental impact has become one criterion to assess projects that are presented for funding (Cissé et al. 2014). Evaluation and assessment are necessary before, during and after the investment projects to assess environmental impacts.

It is not to forget the role of respective African governments to elaborate policies and regulations and foster their implementation. Such an approach demonstrates how commitments on policies and financing can be translated into programs that spell out the responsibilities of governments and development partners in implementing them (Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group 2008).

African governments should promote and develop environmental education that could enhance environmental protection and contribute to environmental sustainability in urban and rural areas. The empowerment of the communities, awareness and capacity building through environmental education; particularly in rural areas, which are more often affected by investments in sensitive areas should be emphasized. The majority of the populations in rural areas depend on the resources (water, agriculture, pastoralism; etc.) for their livelihoods. More often, investments in rural areas cause land degradation, water and air pollution, displacement of people, declining agricultural productivity and affect people's livelihoods. The role of the governments, environmental NGOs, private and public sectors and communities is crucial for environmental protection and environmental sustainability to meet the global environmental agreements.

More cooperation between public, private and civil society sectors is needed for a future development which relies on sustainable development and environmental sustainability. Collaboration between public, private and civil society sectors could contribute to policy design for national and regional strategies for sustainable development. Such an approach should integrate the imperative for environmental sustainability with economic and social development programs that promote growth (Centre for Conflict Resolution 2013). African governments should include

environmental policies in their development strategies plans. The role of African regional organizations in achieving sustainable development is important.

African governments' green policies should integrate the regional organizations' environmental policies and other relevant mechanisms for environmental sustainability. In China's engagement in Africa through global partnership for development, Chinese financial institutions and African regional development banks should develop all technical and financial assistance that aim at achieving environmental sustainability. Sustainable finance that supports sustainable investments could enable environmental sustainability in Africa.

In order to contribute to sustainable development and environmental sustainability, the role of the WWF to enable sustainability in China-Africa relations can be seen as positive. The WWF (2013) states that it engages with Chinese and African delegates in:

- Promoting inclusion of environmental protection in the deliberations of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), thus influencing the overall investment portfolio of China in Africa;
- Achieving greater responsibility in supply chains through development of investment guidelines in priority sectors such as forestry, infrastructure and extractive industries;
- Engaging Chinese financial institutions that lend to, and thereby strongly influence, projects in these sectors;
- Undertaking pilot projects; for instance supporting Chinese timber companies in Gabon to ensure that their forest products come from responsibly harvested and verified sources.

## Conclusion

During recent years, China and Africa have strengthened their economic cooperation. Chinese investments in Africa have grown rapidly since the late 1990s and have been welcomed in Africa which needs economic growth and development.

Since the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, environmental and social dimensions of foreign investments have raised debates and discussions between investing and recipient countries.

Thus, despite the generally positively perceived huge Chinese outward FDI flow to Africa, concerns arose surrounding the environmental impacts of Chinese activities in the continent. Environmental issues have so far been neglected in Chinese aid or investment projects that mostly occur in sensitive zones and in sectors such as oil, gas, copper, coal, timber, infrastructure and so on. Environmental risks and concerns should be assessed and considered more in Sino-Africa trade, investment relationships aiming for a better sustainable development outcome. It needs to be mentioned that African countries will not be able to sustainably benefit from Chinese outward FDI until they have established strong environmental safeguards

and regulations to make Chinese companies and investors pay more attention to environmental aspects while operating in Africa. African governments and policy-makers should control the implementation and enforcement of environmental regulatory policies. Recently, challenges from Chinese and African officials to adjust environmental policies and regulations have been taken after severe debates and discussions among NGOs, academics, and policymakers complained about sustainable development and environmental issues around Chinese engagement in Africa.

From China's side, efforts have been made to boost the growth of environmental NGOs. In 2008, China created the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Government agencies and financial institutions supporting Chinese companies venturing into Africa have set guidelines and regulations with regards to environmental issues for companies to comply with and prevent polluting businesses to benefit from loans and credit lines.

In July 2011, in the framework of an environmental management cooperation, the Chinese minister of Environmental Protection and the South African minister of Water and Environmental Affairs signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for biodiversity conservation, environmental management and implementation of environmental policies. However, China's willingness to urbanize and modernize will request rising energy consumption for the Asian giant. This situation will worsen pollution/environmental issues in China and cause threats to foreign countries (African countries included) if we consider that China in order to satisfy its energy supply and security challenges will import oil, gas and coal from overseas. Sustainability of Chinese investments in Africa should be one of the main focuses of African governments for a better economic sustainable development for African countries' economic growth and prosperity.

The responsible management of environmental issues and risks in Chinese investments in Africa by both Chinese investors and African policymakers is needed to bring about sustainable development and reconcile more investments with local communities' livelihoods. This would also enhance Chinese companies' reputation globally. Chinese companies venturing into Africa will need to learn about the concepts of sustainability through their operations and activities in Africa for greener economic prospects.

Through its growing global partnership with emerging economies (China, India and Brazil among others), Africa could achieve sustainable development based on more clean businesses and investments. While 2015 will be the end of the first phase of the MDGs, numerous challenges exist and should be addressed beyond this date.

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# Chapter 15

## Strengthening Democratic Political Leadership and Governance for Africa's Development Beyond 2015: The Case of Uganda

Evelyn Namakula Mayanja

### Introduction

For Africa to develop beyond 2015 in relation to her human and resource potential, it must be governed well by political leaders who “focus with laser-jet intensity on serving their people rather than serving themselves” (Rotberg 2013, 186). The MDGs were initiated with the United Nations’ (2000) millennium declaration: “We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty” by 2015 (4). The MDGs are political goods, central to human security and human rights that accrue with good governance and democracy. According to (Rotberg 2013, 174) political goods include: “safety and security, rule of law and transparency, participation and respect for human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development.” Human security entails meeting basic human needs and preventing threats of hunger, malnutrition, disease, unhealthy environment, war, poverty, and unemployment (Commission on Human Security 2003; UNDP 1994a, b). According to United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1994b), human security is:

a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity...It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities—and whether they live in conflict or in peace. (229)

The MDGs echo civil, economic, and social human rights which include: right to health; to education; access to adequate standards of living—food, clothing and

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housing; and the right to life (Benedek 2012; Harris and Joseph 1995; Joseph et al. 2004; United Nations 1948). According to Langlois (2003) human rights and democracy are inseparable.

We are already in 2015, and Africa<sup>1</sup> remains underdeveloped. It is important to note that, measuring progress on MDGs should be based neither on government reports nor on global development index alone, as they tend to be inflated or unrealistic. The living conditions of people in rural areas and the developing African cities and towns need to form a core part of any analysis. Why did the MDGs project not succeed in Africa? Why is Africa not developing in relation to her human and resource potential? Why does Africa remain poor, hunger stricken, underdeveloped with poor education systems, with crumbling infrastructures, unemployment, high infant and maternal mortality rates, high levels of HIV/AIDS, and with people dying from preventable diseases such as malaria? What is the way forward?

This paper argues that if Africa is to develop beyond 2015 democratic political leadership and good governance are indispensable. Aid without strengthening governance and creating responsible democratic political leadership intensifies Africa's woes. Why has aid in Africa for the last five decades not translated into Africa's con-creted development? Aid fuels corruption; undermines economic growth; stifles the development of a middle class necessary to hold Africa's governments accountable; foments conflicts; chokes the export sector; and creates the aid-dependency syndrome (Moyo 2009). Moyo argues that the cornerstone for Africa's development is "an economically responsible and accountable government" (57).

The paper has five sections. The first one explores Africa's progress on the MDGs and the reasons for the slow progress. The second explores democratic leadership and good governance in Africa. The third highlight Uganda's performance on the MDGs and surveys leadership, governance and citizens' livelihood in Uganda. The fourth suggests, strengthening democratic leadership and governance for envisioning Uganda's development beyond 2015.

## **Africa's Progress Towards the MDGs: General Trends**

The 2013 MDGs progress report in Africa notes that while the continent is the world's second fastest growing economic region, it is still engulfed in poverty and food insecurity exacerbated by conflicts and climate-related hazards (Table 15.1).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In this paper, Africa refers to the 49 countries in the Sub-Saharan region.

<sup>2</sup>"The MDG Report 2013: Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals" gives detailed analysis of national, regional and continental progress on the MDGs. However, the report requires a critical analysis. I suggest that the progress noted must be verified on ground basing on the living conditions of the vulnerable people especially in the rural areas. Retrieved from <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/mdg-reports/africa-collection/>.

**Table 15.1** Africa's MDG performance


Goal	Performance
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	It is estimated that people living on less than \$1.25 a day was reduced from 56.5 % in 1990 to 48.5 % in 2010, about 20.25 % points off the 2015 target. BUT poverty remains high especially in rural areas. <u>Reasons for regress:</u> youth unemployment, deplorable living conditions, limited access to quality education, rural urban migration, and gender inequality.
Achieve universal primary education	Primary enrolment is at 90 % in most countries. <u>Concerns:</u> The quality of education is poor, low completion and high-grade repetition, girls' drop out more frequently than boys.
Promote gender equality and empower women	Women are empowered: more girls in education and women in political positions with Uganda and Rwanda having more women representation. <u>Challenges:</u> Early marriages, inequitable household power and low economic opportunities for women
Reduce child mortality	The mortality rate for children under the age of five declined to 47 % between 1990 and 2011. <u>Challenge:</u> Africa has the greatest child mortality rates.
Improve maternal health	Maternal mortality rate fell to 42 % between 1990 and 2010 <u>Challenge:</u> Africa has the highest maternal mortality rates.
Combat HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and other diseases	The spread of HIV/AIDS reduced from 5.9 % in 2001 to 4.9 % in 2011 <u>Challenges:</u> Malaria and TB remain serious health threats.
Ensure environmental sustainability	Africa's contribution to CO <sup>2</sup> emission is marginal. <u>Challenges:</u> deforestation, struggle for water and sanitation
Develop global partnership for development	Africa's share in the global market remains marginal. Commitment to Aid for trade and disbursements have always fallen short. Africa's contribution to global trade is around 3 % and unchanged since 2000. <u>Challenge:</u> The proportion of imports from Africa has stagnated. Only 14 nations registered an increase of 50 % in exports.

The data in the table is derived from MDG Report 2013: Assessing progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals. Retrieved from [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Regional%20Reports/Africa/MDG%20report%202013%20summary\\_EN.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Regional%20Reports/Africa/MDG%20report%202013%20summary_EN.pdf). (Accessed 6 Jan 2014)

### ***What Accounts for Africa's Slow Progress and Failure to Meet the MDGs?***

Internal and external factors are responsible for Africa's slow progress and failure to achieve the MDGs. According to the United Nations (2013) report "Aid from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was estimated at \$125 billion in 2012, 4 % less than in 2011" (18). The report underscores that between 2011 and





**Fig. 15.1** Official development assistance (ODA) share of gross national income (GNI) in Development Assistance Committee countries (per cent) (Source: OECD April 2013 report <http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/ODA2012.pdf>). (Accessed 6 Jan 2014)

2012, bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa fell 9.9 % as aid was diverted towards the Arab Spring in 2011. In addition, DAC nations reduced their commitment of supporting developing nations from \$134 billion or 0.31 % in 2011 to 125 billion, or 0.29 % in 2012, which many DAC countries did not fulfil (Fig. 15.1).

According to Mbeki (2007) after World War II, Western Europe was set on the road to development and prosperity through the Marshall Plan. Similar interventions enabled some Asian nations to enter their development trajectory, thus becoming tiger economies that supply goods to the whole world. “Why is there an absence of the same resolve to assist poor nations today?” (30). However, this paper argues that foreign aid is not a panacea to Africa’s development beyond 2015. The culture of aid as the lifeblood for Africa should be discouraged and instead, prioritize on strengthening responsible, democratic leadership and governance as a prerequisite for development. Noman and Stiglitz (2012) argue that inadequacy of governance capabilities is the central cause for Africa’s poor economic performance and failure to emulate interventions that are effective in other continents. Norman and Stiglitz maintain that “successful development requires good governance reforms” referred to as “growth-enhancing” (32). Equally, democracy is central for Africa’s situation because of its potential to reduce corruption and neo-patrimonialism (Khan 2012).

De Long and Eichengreen (1991) argue that aid could contribute as “an incentive and as a cushion to make reforms possible” if it “leads to policies that accelerate the move toward market organization, free trade, and financial stability” (5). Moyo (2009) observes that for more than 50 years, Africa has relentlessly received aid leading to a dependency syndrome. She argues that without the threat that aid wells will run dry, African governments will never devise alternatives for economic growth and sustainability, when all they have to do is “sit back and bank the cheque” (36).

Complexities of Africa's development are attributed to her geography, colonial history and instability (Noman and Stiglitz 2012; Rotberg 2013). Yet, Africa is rich with natural resources and human capital capable of engineering development (Schraeder 2000). The United Nations Development Program (2013) report highlights that Africa's challenge lies in ensuring that revenues from the continent's riches trickle down to the disadvantaged citizens, leveraging progress and security. Why do the revenues from Africa's resources fail to transform citizens' living conditions? During the 2011 World Economic Forum, Kofi Annan noted that the poor quality of Africa's leadership risks squandering the continent's rapid economic growth (BBC News 2011). Radelet (2010) observes that economic resurgence in African nations whose economic bedrock is not oil exportation lies in democratic leadership and accountable governance.

## Democratic Political Leadership and Governance

Bass et al. (1990) claim there are as many definitions of leadership as there are people who have attempted the definition. Starrat (2001) argues that there are varied typologies of democracies in nation states with no single representation applicable to all. According to Gastil (1994) the academe does not have a definition for democratic leadership. He defines it as "behaviour that influences people in a manner consistent with and/or conducive to basic democratic principles and process such as self-determination, inclusiveness, and deliberation" (956). Starrat (2001) argues that, democratic leadership "cultivate[s] an environment that supports participation, sharing of ideas, and the virtues of honesty, openness, flexibility, and compassion" (338).

Democratic leadership as used in this paper embraces the above definitions and includes leadership with integrity and humanity that cares for citizens and empowers them as Mandela and Seretse Khama did (Rotberg 2013). Such a leadership respects human rights, adheres to the rule of law, encourages checks and balances, transparency and accountability, and delivers essential services to citizens. Democratic leadership suppresses greed and personal interest manifested in Africa's rampant corruption, and instead improves citizens' wellbeing, promotes economic growth and adheres to ethical principles (Rotberg 2007). Such a leadership, exemplified by Nelson Mandela, is humane, merciful, compassionate, fosters forgiveness and reconciliation for peace in Africa.

Governance is about delivering the political goods—"safety and security, rule of law and transparency, participation and respect for human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development" (Rotberg 2013, 174). Governance embraces political stability, fairness, inclusive and participatory decision-making, combating corruption, nepotism and mismanagement, promoting transparency, accountability and proper procedures (Grindle 2007; Kaufmann and Kraay 2007; Nanda 2006). Good governance implies fostering stable macroeconomic policy, poverty reduction, openness to trade that promotes local investors, decentralisation,

efficient revenue collection, effective judiciary and legislatures (Grindle 2007, 3). World Bank indicators of good governance include citizen participation and voice, accountability; peace; government effectiveness; checks and balances, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2005, 5).

## Political Leadership and Governance in Africa

Without enhancing stereotype arguments where the problem in one African country is generalized to the whole continent, this section examines the main trends of the deficit of leadership and governance as a major cause to the continent's poor performance on the MDGs. It is important to note that not all 49 sub-Saharan African nations experience leadership deficit and poor governance. Botswana has had a stable and successful democracy since her independence in 1964. Great leaders such as Nelson Mandela have a legacy will resound forever in human history (Mayanja 2013).

In contrast, Africa has narcissistic leaders, corrupted by power and self-enrichment. They are “predatory kleptocrats; autocrats, whether democratically elected or militarily installed; simple minded looters; economic illiterates; and puffed-up posturers—that caricaturing or merely dismissing them would mislead” (Rotberg 2003, 28). According to Maathai (2009) lack of principled and ethical leadership hinders Africa's development. Poor governance derails the effective utilization of aid and Africa's resources and precludes African leaders from emulating the effective interventions from other continents (Noman and Stiglitz 2012). Africa is witnessing “a proliferation of kleptocratic and predatory ruling elites” (Ajul 2001, 30). While the struggle for independence was spearheaded by some “first-rate political leaders, the nation-building phase has not only failed to produce leaders of comparable stature, but has also witnessed a decline in the achievements” (Adamolekun 1988, 95). Africa's leaders and their accomplices have broken laws and ethical norms, robbed and plundered aid and resources to accumulate wealth, thus curtailing the achievement of the MGDs (Mbeki 1998). Envisioning “Africa's Renaissance,” Mbeki (former South African President) underscores establishing democratic systems, sustainable and economic development as fundamental factors.

Africa cannot renew herself where its upper echelons are a mere parasite on the rest of society, enjoying as self-endowed mandate to use their political power and define the uses of such power such that its exercise ensures that our Continent reproduces itself as the periphery of the world economy, poor, underdeveloped and incapable of development. (Mbeki 1998, 2)

The continent is experiencing *despotic rule* with leaders using their offices to strengthen personal rule, increasing corruption and hiding the embezzled funds in foreign banks. Personal rule replaces the rule of the law, where patrimonialism is used by the big man who suffocates legal institutions necessary for reinforcing the checks and balances on political and economic anomalies, and instead use ones

power to appoint their cronies in authority positions from which they gather resources for themselves, while ensuring that some resources and absolute royalty are returned to the patron and not to the services of the common good to benefit the marginalized. Van Wyk (2007) wonders whether African political leaders are “presidents, patrons or profiteers” ruling states tagged as “corruptocracies, chaosocracies or terrorocracies” (3). Poor governance and undemocratic leadership suppresses political opposition, elections are rigged and human rights violated. Under the stewardship of greedy leaders, “roads fall into despair, currencies depreciate and real prices inflate, health services weaken, life expectancies slump, people go hungry, schooling standards fall, civil societies become more beleaguered, the quest for personal and national prosperity slows, crime rates accelerate, overall security becomes tenuous and corruption grows” (Rotberg 2003, 29). Scholars point to democratic, ethical leadership and governance as remedies to Africa’s woes (Cartwright 1983; Maathai 2009; Rotberg 2004). Maathai (2009) states that “unless Africans from all levels of society recognize and embrace the challenge of leadership, Africa will not move forward” (111).

## **MDGs: The Case of Uganda**

Uganda is not an exception to the phenomenon of leadership deficit and governance responsible for Africa’s low progress and failures on the MDG (Table 15.2).

### **What Accounts for Uganda’s Failure to Meet the MDGs?**

#### ***Leadership, Governance and Citizens’ Livelihood in Uganda***

Uganda is characterized by political repression, ineffective rule of law, insecurity, suppression of the media and people’s participation, corruption, incompetence, primitive arrogance, patronage, inadequate provision of basic services, and insensitive behaviour among the political elites who manage state affairs (Kobusingye 2010; Tripp 2010). Envisioning the MDGs beyond 2015 necessitates strengthened leadership and governance, gauged from the economic, political, and social transformation of the lives of the citizens (Kobena et al. 2012; Tettey 2012).

When president Museveni came to power in 1986, he observed that Uganda was unfortunate for having bad leadership and initiated the *Ten Points Program* that included democratic rule, transparency, curbing corruption, restoring people’s freedom, and ameliorating the socio-economic conditions (Museveni 2000). Museveni’s rule was considered to be a “hybrid regime” (Tripp 2010). He tackled HIV/AIDS, improved Uganda’s human rights record, and created an impression that his government was on the path to strengthen democracy and governance (Muhumuza 2009).

**Table 15.2** Uganda's performance on the MDGs by 2013

MDGs and their indicators	Present state
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger: number of people earning less than a dollar a day, full and productive employment.	<p>Poverty levels are estimated to have reduced from 33.8 % in 2000 to 24.5 % in 2009/2010.</p> <p><b>Concern:</b> Inequality with a big gap between the few rich and majority poor.</p> <p>Land grabbing is intensifying food shortage.</p> <p>Unemployment stands at 75.4 %</p>
Achieve universal primary education	<p>The pace of progress is insufficient and enrolment level reduced, with gender parity gradually improving.</p> <p><b>Concern:</b> The quality of education is poor—many finish primary school with no literacy. The gross primary completion rate stands at 54 %. The education conditions are pathetic: classes are congested, some classes are held under trees, children lack other basic needs which parents cannot afford (food, water, uniforms, scholastic material).</p>
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases: achieve universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, and reverse incidences of malaria and other diseases	<p>Two decades ago, Uganda was a global leader in the fight against HIV/AIDS, but this has not been sustained. The prevalence of HIV/Aids among the population of 15–49 years has increased from 6.4 to 7.3 % between 2004 and 2011.</p> <p>It is estimated that 353 new infections occur daily and 14.7 every hour.</p> <p>60,000 people die from HIV/Aids annually.</p> <p>Malaria remains a killer disease</p>
Promote gender equality and empower women	<p>Uganda's affirmative action policies has empowered some women to be more politically active. The number of women in Parliament increased from 18 % in 2000 to 35 % in 2012. But, many women are still faced with hard conditions.</p>
Reduce child mortality rate	<p>Between 2006 and 2011, child mortality rate reduced to 34 %. The most common causes of death include malaria 28 %, pneumonia 15 %, anaemia 10 % and other respiratory infections 9 %.</p>
Improve maternal health: Reduce maternal mortality ratio and achieve universal access to reproductive health	<p>Still a big challenge. 16 mothers die daily during pregnancy and child related complications.</p>
Ensure environmental sustainability: integrate the principles of sustainable development into national policies and reverse the loss of environmental resources, reduce biodiversity loss, reduce the number of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.	<p>There is a threatening loss of environmental resources: deforestation for energy supply. Over 92 % of Ugandans rely on biomass for energy needs (charcoal and wood fuel). Reducing land for cultivation is a cause to deforestation. Between 1990 and 2010, Uganda's forest cover was reduced by 37 % declining from 2 to 15 % of the total land area. Other environmental threats include loss of water catchment areas (wetlands), pollution of water bodies and loss of species especially when forests are leased or sold to private investors and over fishing by foreign companies.</p> <p>Environmental degradation is estimated to cost Uganda 4–12 % on national income annually primarily through soil erosion.</p> <p>Declining soil fertility leading to low yields and switching to less nutritious crops.</p>

(continued)

**Table 15.2** (continued)

MDGs and their indicators	Present state
Global partnership for development: deal comprehensively with the debt problems through national and international measures, provide access to affordable essential drugs, and make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication.	Development is threatened by corruption in the public sector. Donor countries are withholding their funding and imposing sanctions on Uganda unless the government prosecutes corrupt officials.  There is exponential growth in mobile phone usage. Internet use is gradually spreading.

The data in the table is based on different reports about Uganda's performance on the MDGs from 2000 to 2013. Report of October 2013: Uganda lags behind in key MDGs as 2015 deadline closes in—Retrieved from <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Uganda-lags-behind-in-key-MDGs-as-2015-deadline-closes-in/-/688334/2037174/-/9hwql2/-/index.html>. (Accessed 6 Jan 2014)

However, Uganda's image as a democratic state with responsible leadership and governance did not last long. Scholars and Ugandans argue that there are two Museveni: the first was a revolutionary and proceeded to reconstruct the state. The second Museveni emerged in 2001 contradicting democracy—bribing parliamentarians to manipulate the constitution; removing the presidential term limit to sustain himself in power; rigging political elections; suppressing political opponents; using security agencies to perpetrate violence on citizens and to instigate fear (Melo et al. 2012). In 2012, Ugandans and their international sympathisers bemoaned Museveni's "slow and continuing shift from constitutional, life style government to patronage based, personal rule" that hampers development (Rotberg 2013, 184).

While the political elites live luxuriously, the quality of life for the Ugandan majority has either not improved since the inception of the MDGs or has done so marginally. About 67 % of Ugandans spend below \$1.20 per day (Anguyo 2013). Survival is the major concern for majority Ugandans to ensure that they acquire food, shelter, and for those who can afford, they invest in educating their children and in exorbitant medical bills. The impasse is aggravated by political leaders who plunder the state and the economy for themselves, lack of accountability and huge government spending without checks and balances (Tripp 2010). The World Bank estimates that Uganda loses more than US\$500bn (about US\$ 2 bn) annually to corruption (Birungi 2010). Birungi notes that in 2005 funds for malaria control, and in 2006, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and the Global Fund to fight AIDS and tuberculosis were embezzled by the Minister of Health. Donor funds totally US\$ 12.7 million earmarked for rebuilding Northern Uganda, ravaged by the 23 years' war and the poorest Karamoja region were stolen from the office of the Prime Minister (Human Rights Watch 2013). Life expectancy is 56/58 (World Health Organization 2012) and health conditions remain pathetic. Patients travel long distances to reach the hospital.

Since President Museveni became the head of state in 1986, despite the numerous scandals of corruption, “only one minister has ever been convicted of corruption related charges, and his verdict was overturned on appeal as the president offered publicly to pay the defendants’ legal costs” (Human rights Watch 2013, 2). Rukandema (2012) argues, “widespread corruption in the civil services is at the heart of poor service delivery in every sector of the economy” (134). Grand scale theft of public money deprives the majority of Ugandans to access education, water, food, and health services. Corruption is an absolute human rights violation, “a direct defiance of the rule of law and accountability, it indicates that the law and its institution cannot be relied on to protect against violations of fundamental human rights or deliver of justice” (Human Rights Watch 2013, 2).

Tripp (2010) argues that corruption and patronage are not only means for self-aggrandizement but also a means for sustaining political control (25). Poor governance, failure to prosecute high-level corrupt officials, Museveni’s long stay in power and political shrewdness are responsible for the persistent corruption. According to Human Rights Watch (2013), “years of evidence indicate that Uganda’s current political system is built on patronage and that ultimately high-level corruption is rewarded rather than punished” (2). Corrupt officials are forced to resign from office, only to be reappointed in key government positions. While the government has the Ministry of Ethics, anti-corruption institutions such as the Inspector General of Government (IGG), the Anti-Corruption Court and the Parliamentary Public Account Committee, the president controls them. Only low level officials are prosecuted. The prosecutor in Anti-Corruption Court remarked, “This court is tired of trying tilapias when crocodiles are left swimming” (Human Rights Watch 2013, 1).

About 85 % of Ugandans practice subsistence agriculture in rural areas. In the past decade, annual agricultural growth rate has been 1–3 % whereas population growth is estimated at 3.3 % which explains the rampant food shortage (Nandala 2013). Income inequality aggravated by corruption, government over spending, and the education system that does not adequately prepare the youth for employment is creating a class of very poor people in Uganda (Kiiza 2012). The very poor are the ones who go to universal primary and secondary schools where the quality of education is despicable. These learners will hardly obtain decent and high-income jobs. The study by Action Aid International Uganda (AAIU) and Development Research and Training indicated that 62 % of Ugandan youth between 12 and 30 years of age are unemployed, and 12 % are chronically poor (Lule 2013).

Museveni who has ruled Uganda since 1986 to date, utters statements such as: I am not going anywhere. It’s me who hunted and after killing the animal, they want me to go. Where should I go? You don’t just tell the freedom fighter to go like you are chasing a chicken thief out of the house (Onyango Obbo 2008). Tettey (2012) observe, “intolerance for dissent and diverse viewpoints by many African leaders robs the continent of alternative, and probably efficacious options for improving the conditions of its people” (31). Multipartyism remains nominal while election fraud subtly takes place. The executive controls the legislature and the judiciary, and the rule of law is replaced by the law of the ruler (Abdul-Raheem et al. 2010).

## Envisioning the MDGs Beyond 2015

What is needed for Uganda to envision the MDGs beyond 2015 and to empower citizens for development? This section explores areas where urgent action is needed to envision development beyond 2015. This process is not linear. It necessitates the use of *moral imagination* (Lederach 2005) to imagine a transformed society that is not yet conceivable and address complex political, social and economic systemic structures. Following Lederach's (2005) logic in transforming protracted conflicts, devising strategies for Uganda's socio-economic growth is like "curving a curve through an active volcano" with the moral imagination that change is possible (118). Approaches to envisioning development beyond 2015 are numerous, multidisciplinary and interlinked, including social, environmental, economic, and political factors (Binns et al. 2012). This paper focuses on strengthening democratic leadership and governance with the conviction that the duo gradually bring other factors into effect. To envision the MDGs, practicalities that need urgent attention are explored namely: a humane economy for sustainable development, structural transformation, development of rural areas and mitigating environmental degradation, education and employment, and pro-Africa economic policies.

## Strengthening Democratic Leadership and Governance

Considering that the major challenge lies with leadership, the best strategy for Uganda is to strengthen political leadership and governance. *Why believe in democratic leadership and governance?* Democratic nations that practice good governance such as Botswana, "the paragon of leadership excellence in Africa," are more developed, grow more rapidly economically, and have people living beyond survival than those ruled by autocratic, narcissistic and corrupt leaders (Rotberg 2013, 37). Poor governance is a root cause to development failure (Maathai 2009; Rotberg 2007). Moyo (2009) argues that development and growth is guaranteed by functional, strong, accountable and transparent political institutions. She attributes Botswana's economic success to the "probity of its political institutions" and ceasing to depend on aid (34).

Although Moyo argues for benevolent dictators to push through reforms, she does not underestimate democracy as a "a leading determinant for economic growth" because it accords citizens access to decision making, strengthens institutions, is an incentive to service provision and regulates leaders' term limits" (40). Equally, economic development is a prerequisite for democracy. Africa needs a middle class to demand for better services, functional institutions and governance, making democracy irreversible (Moyo 2009; Rotberg 2013). Moyo argues that with aid dependency, African governments cripple the development of the middle class, as aid makes them powerful and accountable only to the donors and not the citizens.



Progress on the MDGs cannot be envisioned where there is impunity for corrupt officials, where there is political repression, and where the executive controls all institutions. Great African leaders—Nelson Mandela, Khama Seretse and Seewoosagur Ramgoolam—were democratic, fostered the wellbeing of the people and never violated the constitution to extend term limits even when the citizens wished them to do so (Rotberg 2007). To envision the MDGs, Uganda urgently needs democrats with integrity and a deep sense of commitment to the public good and wellbeing of all citizens regardless of ethnicity and political affiliation. Do these types of leaders exist in Uganda, considering that all Ugandan heads of state have been corrupt and undemocratic and that even president Museveni, who was considered to be a hybrid regime in Africa, fail to deliver? What does power do to leaders? Is the maxim true? Does power corrupt?

Robert I. Rotberg (2013) suggests the establishment of political leader schools to groom a new breed of leaders because without strengthening political leadership, “Africa may well fail to throw off the shackle of its ill-led past” (215). Equally important is the education system that fosters critical thinking, coupled with civic education for Ugandans to know that the way things are is not how they should be and challenge the tactics of their oppressors who violate their rights (Mayanja 2013). Ugandans need to know that their hunger, unemployment, poverty, lack of medical care, the poor education system and disenfranchisement are socially constructed and the leaders are responsible. Unfortunately, Ugandans are getting used to poverty, deprivation, dysfunctional infrastructure, and instead of claiming their rights, they go as far as bribing those in power to obtain services that are their constitutional rights. I concur with Mbeki (1998), that Ugandans and all Africans need to mobilize and take their destiny into their own hands to establish democratic leadership and governance. This must be coupled with practical and well-defined programmes for economic regeneration to ensure that impoverished Africans emerge from abject poverty and inhumane conditions.

### *A Humane Economy for Sustainable Development*

Uganda needs to implement contextualized and human centred development, and an environment conducive to national and personal economic prosperity. Enhancing domestic natural resources and human capital is key to sustainable development (Museveni 2000). The common trend of destroying the environment in favour of development is a major factor in the nation’s failure to meet the MDGs, as it heightens food scarcity, leading to poor nourishment and disease (Maathai 2009). The United Nations (2013) MDG report concedes,

Africa must commit to inclusive, transformative development that reduces income poverty, creates decent jobs, enhances the quality of and access to social services, reduces inequality and promotes resilience to climate-related hazards. Achieving these objectives will invariably put Africa on a trajectory towards sustained and sustainable development. The continent must ensure that the outcomes of its interventions meet the litmus test of economic, social and environmental sustainability. (4)

Uganda's economic growth from agricultural goods, minerals and recently discovered oil would uplift the living conditions of the majority poor if it were not for corruption. Politicians and all citizens in Uganda need to know that corruption is evil, it is killing the innocent, a disease and a form of structural violence to be eradicated more or less like HIV/AIDS (Abdul-Raheem et al. 2010). Poverty, the major contributor to the spread of HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation that is central to the spread of malaria is heightened by corruption. Limiting people's potential to survive, rather than empowering them with opportunities to look beyond their basic needs as a structural injustice, a structural violence that must be urgently addressed.

### ***Developing Rural Areas and Mitigating Environmental Degradation***

Majority of Ugandans live in rural areas and rely on agriculture; investment in agriculture and the development of the rural areas is crucial (Imaka and Klosterboer 2013). Yet, programs such as the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and the Program for Modernizing Agriculture (PMA) are failing due to corruption, lack of relevance and appropriateness to the farmers and poor marketing policies (Rukandema 2012). Contextualized approaches to agriculture are needed "where input supply, credit, production, marketing, processing, supermarkets and exporters are closely linked through public-private partnership" (Rukandema 2012, 138). Investing and improving agriculture is crucial not only to make it attractive to youth, but also increases food production, nutrition, curbs unemployment, especially for women, who comprise the bulk of small farmers and reduces poverty (Binns et al. 2012). Important also is making agriculture compulsory in learning institutions.

Environmental degradation and desertification pose a challenge to Uganda, heightening hunger, water scarcity, poverty and unemployment. Government planning for rural development without destroying the environment is crucial to ensure affordable sources of energy, employment, access to quality education, housing, health care services and improving the infrastructure (Mukwaya et al. 2012). Modernizing agriculture and teaching people modern methods of farming such as intercropping, irrigation, and fallowing to restore the vegetation mitigates environment degradation (Binns et al. 2012). Counteracting land mismanagement and deforestation are important measures to reduce hunger and environmental degradation.

Rural to urban migration combined with poverty and unemployment is a major contributor to the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, especially where there is no access to health care and quality education. Uganda's efforts to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS need to be intensified (Museveni 2000) and living conditions improved, given that poverty is linked to high fertility and mortality rates (World Health Organization 2012).

## ***Structural Transformation***

Social structures resulting from social injustices reinforce Uganda's failure to meet the MDGs. According to Jeong (2003) structural adjustment is fundamental to eliminating social problems and power asymmetry, where the political elite want to maintain the status quo while the majority poor desire a change. Systemic thinking is important to enrich the theory and practice of structural transformation. For example, state microfinances would empower women and teach citizens how to save (Moyo 2009). Taxes are key in structural change and development and must not be evaded. IMF representative, Ana Lucia Coronel, observed that in 2012 alone, the Ugandan government offered tax exemptions worth about Ugshs3 billion (Ladu and Otage 2013). These exemptions could serve as a source of national revenue for funding hospitals, schools and other infrastructure. Equally important is democratic accountability to ensure that revenues benefit Ugandans and not the corrupt few (Ajul 2001).

## ***Quality Education and Employment***

Provision of quality education and employment are engines for sustainable economic growth and development. MDGs focus on universal primary education and gradually move into secondary education. Vocational training and girl education need to be prioritized. Quality education and employment are central to the establishment of a middle class that will make democracy irreversible.

## ***Pro-Africa Economic Policies***

Moyo (2009) suggests African leaders take a broader perspective on local and international trade, while focusing on local and foreign direct investment. Moyo observes that local entrepreneurs are the "life-blood of any economy" and must be given a friendly environment in which to thrive (124). The international community must change its attitude and create a world order that considers Africa as an equal trade partner (World Economic Forum 2012).

African nations need to unite and assert unanimously that Africa is not to be marginalized anymore (Abdul-Raheem et al. 2010). Although African markets are still small with less technological advancement, strengthening an alliance of political forces and regional cooperation would expand the market, making it attractive and competitive to the global market. It is also important that international corporations do not bribe Africa's leaders into dubious dealings to evade tax. African leaders need to forge closer engagement with developed nations and emerging economies like China, Brazil and India to support the continent's development and to learn from them (Moyo 2009; Rotberg 2013).

Economic policies must be just, ecologically friendly, and respectful of human rights and gender. Equally, the public must demand accountability from the leaders. Democratic leadership and governance must have its foundations within the family, schools, playgrounds, places of worship and then to parliament.

## Conclusion

With Uganda as a case study, the paper has argued for the importance of democratic leadership and governance for envisioning Africa's development beyond 2015. Curbing corruption in Uganda is fundamental to any envisaged economic plan. Aid is not the solution to the impasse, especially since politicians often embezzle it in the absence of good governance. The democratic leadership and governance deficit in Africa has been examined as central to Africa's failure or slow progress on the MDGs.

Enhancing domestic natural resources and human capital is central to sustaining progress on the MDGs. People's participation and democratic leadership that encourages transfer of power, expands the middle class and strengthens revenue will ensure better living conditions. Learning from the experiences of developed nations and emerging economies is necessary to support the continent's development priorities. The onus is with all Ugandans to foster democratic leadership and governance of their country.

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# Chapter 16

## Aid Effectiveness and Development Policies in Botswana: A Successful Story

Cristian Talesco

### Introduction

For decades, aid effectiveness and development policies have been of great concern to scholars, social workers, governments and the wider community alike. In particular, there is a need for foreign aid specialists to stay well informed regarding aid effectiveness issues, and to be able to advocate for better development policies. These are often the people who can best help the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) be achieved. Therefore, the scope of this paper is to understand some of the factors that determine aid effectiveness and how development policies can impact the MDGs.

In particular, this paper argues that aid is most effective when it is directed towards the implementation of development policies which have been structured by the recipient government. This practice can help the recipient to strengthen its own institutions and to broaden the scope of development, such as by reducing poverty, and improving health facilities and the quality of life. Nevertheless, this kind of approach implies that the recipient's institutions should already have a dedicated management team, who is accountable, and most importantly, free from corruption. Findings for this essay are based on a case study in Africa, specifically Botswana, and the evaluation relies on an adjusted framework proposed by the World Bank for assessing program and project aid in low-income countries under stress (Manor 2007). The evaluation is divided into two aspects: governance outcomes and non-governance outcomes. Governance outcomes affect the local government and its institutions on the grounds of political stability, corruption, management, accountability, ownership, alignment and harmonization. Non-governance outcomes affect people's lives directly and are related to the achievements of the MDGs: poverty and

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hunger, primary education, infant mortality, maternal health, access to clean water and basic sanitation. In relation to the governance outcomes, the following question is addressed: was governance strengthened? For the non-governance outcomes, the questions to be considered are: what was delivered? Did it benefit the poor?

These questions are answered by making reference to quantitative data obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the World Development Indicators, the United Nations' Human Development Index, the Failed States Index, the Gini coefficient, and other indicators, as well as from existing literature.

## **Botswana: A Brief History**

In 1966, when Botswana became independent from the United Kingdom, it was one of the poorest nations in Africa. It had no financial resources, its infrastructure was inadequate, the country lacked agricultural capacities, and it lacked skilled workers, as the population was mostly uneducated (Johnston et al. 1996). Moreover, only very few roads were fully paved, and extraordinarily only 22 Botswana had a university degree, and just 100 had a secondary diploma. However, Botswana's average growth in per capita income from 1965 to 1998 was 7.7 % (Acemoglu et al. 2003).

Acemoglu et al. (2003) question how Botswana achieved such incredible performances. They identify some of the reasons as due to the good policies of the country, which have been the result of good institutions. In particular, the key figure has been Seretse Khama, who was elected as president of the country in 1966 and remained in power until his death in 1980. Khama had married a white British woman, and was educated in the United Kingdom, where he remained until 1956 before his return to Botswana (Parsons et al. 1995).

Seretse Khama established an accountable government—free from corruption—that was followed up by his successors (Tordoff 1993). After independence, Khama's government was able to properly manage aid and revenues from the diamond industry, which allowed the country to grow faster and more steadily each year (Easterly 2007). Khama was able to establish a government that relied on a way of governing based on consensus. This derived from the pre-colonial institutions—which were not disrupted by the British colonizers—and have maintained the *kgotla*, a community meeting, which aims at determining the majority opinion about specific issues. The same kind of community consensus has been used by the Khama government to decide on social and politically sensitive issues (Lekorwe 1989).

The following presidents have also been able to maintain the same degree of stability that Khama created. Ketumile Masire, who governed from 1980 to 1998, was able to prevent a famine in 1981–1987 when a drought shattered the country's agricultural production (Puzo 1989). Moreover, President Festus Mogae (in office from 1998 to 2008) has been a key figure in facing the spread of AIDS. He suddenly realized that the country's population could face extinction because of the spread of the disease. Hence, he carefully designed a solution with the support of foreign aid agencies and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (UNAids 2008).

Seretse Khama has been a particularly well-known figure in the history of Botswana, because in 1961 he founded the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The BDP counterbalanced the Botswana People's Party (BPP) which was appealing to those who wanted to establish a radical anticolonial structure. Seretse Khama, instead, appealed to the educated elites and the traditional chiefs (Cohen 1979). Khama himself was a chief of the Tswana people, which made up 80 % of Botswana's people. Therefore, the country was ethnically homogeneous; something which has likely contributed enormously to the country's fortune in avoiding internal wars. Moreover, traditional chiefs have not been corrupted by British colonialism. Botswana, in fact, is one of the rare exceptions to the reported mismanagement that can occur by traditional rulers. Usually, colonizers decided to shift power from educated Africans to traditional rulers in order to maintain control over the rural areas. In earlier times, the rulers could not act without the agreement of the counselors. However, colonialists disrupted this established traditional system, and traditional rulers became the law, the prosecutor, and the judge, able to jail people at their will. It seems that colonialism may have contributed to the establishment of despotism in Africa (Mamdani 1996). Nevertheless, for Botswana, the path was different. Pre-colonial institutions were still functioning at the time of independence, and therefore, they were maintained as the check and balance between political elites and traditional rulers (Stevens 1981).

The Khama government in the 1960s and in the 1970s relied on the UK aid assistance, which provided the financial and technical means to develop the country. Nevertheless, since independence, Botswana's economic growth has been consistent, bringing the nation from a low-income country to an upper-middle income country. It has a population of around two million, and is politically stable. Aid has been mainly provided by the UK, and later on other major donors started to contribute, especially Sweden. Aid reached US\$ 244 million during the last 8 years, around 2 % of GNI (World Bank 2013a). Data show that in 1999 GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity was at US\$ 3,900 while in 2011 it was at US\$ 16,200 (Index Mundi n.d.). Such a rise has been due to the exploitation of mineral resources.

However, as Michael Stevens pointed out in 1981, Botswana, on its path to development, had a good amount of luck, accompanied by dedicated and excellent management (Stevens 1981).

## Governance Outcomes

Botswana's development has been based on serious and scrupulous planning. From the very beginning when the British left, and they started to inject money into the economy, the government of Botswana has dedicated itself to sound economic planning, to enable the country to grow. When countries plan their development, they are able to analyze their needs and to understand the options available to attain the best out of aid inflows. Botswana, through its planning, was able to direct such sturdy requests to foreign donors in order to face the challenges of development

and to strengthen its institutions. This has happened mostly because of the accountable management structure that was created since independence from the UK, and later with a strong commitment to implementing the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*.

### ***Management, Accountability and Corruption***

The Corruption Index 2008 features Botswana as the only accountable country in Africa. This means that Botswana has good governance and a low index of corruption that makes the country trustworthy. These parameters are considered by the World Bank as essential to its poverty alleviation mission. Most aid funds are disbursed on condition of good governance, democracy, and improvement of the rule of law. Botswana has been keenly moving towards a poverty alleviation strategy, which has made its aid donations work successfully. The secret is in the aid structure created in the country, which is centralized by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). The Ministry is in charge of planning, budgeting and negotiating aid and debt relief. It structures the National Development Plan (NDP), which is reviewed on a 6-year basis and at each time, the country's achievements and challenges are analyzed. The NDPs consist of programs and projects that the government will implement and the strategies adopted to do it (Republic of Botswana n.d.). The first plan, however, the Transitional National Development Plan (1966), was a list of priorities that the government needed to face, but as there were no resource revenues in that period after independence, the budget for development was strictly related to foreign aid inflows. Foreign donors, therefore, could choose in which area to inject money (MFDP).

In addition, the personnel of the MFDP prepare projects by analyzing data and the issues concerning the population. The Ministry strongly interrelates donor management with development management. By doing this, any time the Ministry prepares a project concerning the population, it can be presented to aid agencies. They then can assess whether to approve the project as a recipient of their aid funds. This first hand approach strongly helped create a robust relationship between the government and its donors. Moreover, most of the planners at the Ministry of Finance have been doing the same job in the same sector for decades; and the same would apply to the private sector (Carlsson et al. 1997). In this continuity, also, lies the success of planning development. Most of the donors felt confident in giving aid because they knew the people with whom they were dealing, and they were confident that aid would be spent in the particular project just as promised, and for the benefit of the population, rather than ever promoting corruption within the government. Donors, by knowing the destination of their money and the project for which it was settled, could also check in on its progress. Nevertheless, when money is sent without the possibility of it being able to be traced to see who benefitted and for what outcome, then most likely the funds will be used by local government personnel for their own private business and pursuits, not for the benefit of the community.

This is not the case with Botswana, which has higher standards and positive results coming from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Since 1996, the government has maintained a positive trend in all the bands, passing through global ups and downs. The most important results have been achieved in terms of Political Stability and the Absence of Violence, and in the Control of Corruption. Both indicators are over 75 %, which means that the country has a stable structure that helps provide confidence within its donors, together with the successful use of aid funds. Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and Voice and Accountability are over 60 %, which again means that the political structure in Botswana works. These data are mostly confirmed by the Failed States Index 2013 which is at 64, ranking the country in 121st place. This is quite positive in comparison to the other African countries, considering also that South Africa is in a worse position, 113th and with a score of 67.6. In particular, sub-indicators of the Failed States Index, such as “Security Apparatus”, “Raise of Factionalized Elites”, “Violation of Human Rights and the Rule of Law”, have a very positive value. These indicators confirm that much of the success of Botswana’s development has been due to the structure created. Having positive governance indicators is the pre-condition for making aid successful. Therefore, all the economic efforts made by the United Kingdom from the 1960s have been encouraging in creating the preconditions for development. In fact, Botswana, by having an independent accountable structure, is able today to finance its development path, relying on little amounts of aid. Botswana was able to escape aid dependency, and in this sense, it appears to be a single rider in Africa.

### ***Implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness***

Commonly speaking, donors are reluctant to allow recipients to manage aid funds, especially when there is a lack of accountability in the recipient government or when corruption is widespread. It is also true that when aid supports country-owned projects, it works much better. This is the outcome of the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, which in 2005 set the five core principles on which aid donors and recipients must build their development trajectories in order to make aid more effective. These principles are: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability. The same principles have been further reaffirmed in 2008 with the *Accra Agenda for Action*, which pointed out the need to implement the principles focusing on three main areas for improvement: ownership, inclusive partnerships and delivering results. Ownership then takes a prime ordinary role because recipient countries improve their institutions, fight corruption, and structure their own plan for reducing poverty. Once this is organized an inclusive partnership between recipient and donor is needed. This partnership needs to be based on alignment, harmonization and mutual accountability. Finally, delivering results is what shows if the partnership works, and it does so when aid was properly delivered and benefited the poor (OECD 2005/2008).

Botswana increased its ownership by structuring—as seen in the previous section—the National Development Plans. These plans made the development path stronger and more successful. The NDPs were also related to the targets of the MDGs. Despite this, Botswana made its public financial management (PFM) systems stronger, guaranteeing that the aid would be invested in a national development strategy rather than relying on donor driven projects. This is very indicative for having good performances. In order to make the PFM stronger, the government of Botswana organized a credible budget related to policy priorities. In other words, aid funds and public expenditures were related to the needs of the country. Alignment, instead, is also referred to the donors, which in turn, should align with the recipient's priorities. That is to say that, donors should be ready to commit themselves with punctuality in the delivery of aid funds. One of the biggest problems in planning for and managing aid funds is the gap between disbursements and estimates. This leads the recipients to not have any real estimate of the aid amount they will be receiving, or when. Donors should commit themselves to providing more predictable aid. This tells us that aid effectiveness, therefore, is not just a burden upon the recipient, but also that the donor should take responsibility for the funded project's success or failure, too. Harmonization is also a core principle of aid effectiveness, which means that donors and recipients should adopt common arrangements to lower the costs of aid management and transaction costs. Botswana was successful in this area, because the government's priorities were mostly harmonized with those of the donors. By sharing similar objectives, the entire group of stakeholders was taken into consideration for the different sectors of aid investment (OECD 2011).

Furthermore, donors and recipients need to have a well-defined, and mutually desired, agenda for results. They should measure progress towards the goals. Both should also reduce the costs of bilateral relations. Botswana has organized a monitoring and evaluation framework. During the analytical session, the findings were shared with the donors. Once this stage was completed, both the donors and the recipient decided upon the strategies to improve the weaknesses, strategies that were then implemented into the subsequent National Development Plan. Nevertheless, this strong dialogue and mutual accountability established between Botswana and its main donors (the EU institutions, the USA, the UK) have been possible because of the willingness of the government to be democratic and open to working closely with its partners (OECD 2011).

### ***Aid and Resource Curse***

The huge inflow of money, which came from both aid funds and resource revenues, could have undermined the stability of the country and its economy. In fact, the theory of the resource curse tells much about the economic patterns of resource abundant countries, which are inclined to grow slower and are more predisposed to internal conflicts and corruption, than are resource poor countries. This happens due

to different possible explanations: the Dutch Disease, poor governance, conflict, excessive borrowing, inequality and volatility (Collier and Goderis 2007). Taking for granted that governance in Botswana works quite well, there appears to be no relevant conflicts since its independence, nor excessive borrowing, hence solely the factors of inequality, volatility and the Dutch Disease may remain a concern.

However, Botswana's government structure was quite effective in diversifying the economy. While inequality remains a problem, volatility of the price of resources has been able to be compensated, by clever investments in the private sectors. The Dutch Disease, which could have heavily affected the country's exports because of the inflows of aid money and the resource revenues, has been faced in a three-pronged way. Botswana promoted economic diversification, the country's public expenditure was not strictly linked to revenue, and the surplus of resource revenues was invested for the future. Economic diversification is the core matter here. In fact, commonly resource rich countries tend to focus on the resource sector; in the case of Botswana, the mining sector, which is very volatile. By heavily relying on resource revenues for public expenditure, this can lead to the so called *white elephant* scenario, where projects' costs subsequently exceed the government's possibilities. Countries like Azerbaijan are a negative example in this sense, as its government relies almost entirely on its oil revenues for its public expenditures. Yet with Botswana, the country was keen to diversify its economy by investing in non-mineral sectors. The government approved a strategy for economic diversification and sustainable growth, which aimed at creating a business friendly environment, by providing many structures, security and incentives. This win-win business environment managed to also attract foreign investors, much to the delight of the Botswana government. Furthermore, the government was also careful in planning public expenditures. Sound fiscal policies have been a must for Botswana. Hence, the government managed to avoid the infamous *white elephants*, and most of the expenditures were based on aid funds, already granted by the donors, and through the current available budget (Meija and Castel 2012).


The government used the surplus from revenues to invest in future projects. By doing this, Botswana avoided becoming dependent on aid and resource revenues. This is why today, Botswana "walks alone" and walks well.

Nevertheless, all of this has been primarily possible for the commitment of the government to a good management of aid and resources. This in turn made foreign donors more confident to give aid. Therefore, good governance in a recipient country is a pre-condition for the ability of aid to be effective and for the success of development policies.

## Non-governance Outcomes

Non-governance outcomes affect people lives, and they are actually the best grounds to see whether aid and development policies have been effective in improving people's quality of life.

**Fig. 16.1** Botswana BWA GDP per capita (current US\$) NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (Source: World Bank)



Botswana, in terms of non-governance outcomes, is still facing major challenges in achieving the MDGs. Nevertheless, Botswana is the only country in Africa which will most likely be very close to complying with the targets imposed by the goals.

Botswana has adopted an aggressive response to eradicate poverty by designing policies capable of including people. The MDGs report is a milestone in this sense as it explains the procedure adopted by Botswana in fighting poverty (UN and Republic of Botswana 2010). Although poverty is still a major concern for the country, very relevant steps have been made towards the achievement of the goals.

This section analyzes specifically: Goal 1, Goals 2–3, and Goals 4–6. The first goal concerns the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the second and third goals deal with the achievement of primary education and gender equality, and goals 4, 5 and 6 deal with health issues, in particular child mortality, maternal health and HIV and AIDS reduction.

***MDG 1: Poverty Reduction***

Since 1966, Botswana has seen a relevant growth of per capita GDP. In 1966 it was at US\$ 77 per head, while in 2012, it reached US\$ 7,191 per head (Fig. 16.1). The average constant growth rate has been 6 % per year, and its GDP jumped to US\$ 14 billion in 2012, while in 1966 it was at US\$ 51 million (World Bank 2013c).

However, these statistics often hide the real status of the people. In particular in many developing countries, very few people see the benefits of this steady growth,


while the main part of the population continues to live in poverty. Therefore, when an economic miracle happens, like in the case of Botswana, we have to see if such wealth is equally distributed amongst the population. If an equal distribution of income is put in place, then people should be able to have at least the “minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency,” as argued by Rowntree (1901, viii). However, poverty is not just a lack of income, but as Sen (1999) pointed out in *Development as Freedom*, poverty is a deprivation of basic capabilities.

Clearly, amongst developing countries there are cases in which people have income, but they are still deprived of opportunities and liberties in terms of political freedom, for example. However, the definition mentioned regarding poverty needs to encompass also the lack of employment, lack of health facilities, lack of education, vulnerability, social exclusion and disability. All these kinds of deprivations generate poverty. By beginning with the definition of poverty, governments try to face such challenges.

Nevertheless, despite its striking economic growth rate, Botswana still has a relevant percentage of the population living in poverty. Unfortunately, important data such as the Gini coefficient and other measures of income inequality are not readily available. Furthermore, interpretations of these data are very often contradictory. The World Bank, for example, has collected the Gini coefficient only in 2 years, in 1986 with a value of 0.54 and in 1994 with a value of 0.61. The value of 0.61 indicates a reasonably unequal country, and the fact that it rose 0.07 points means that although the economy grew from 1986 to 1994, the country became more unbalanced in terms of income distribution (World Bank 2013b). Such a negative trend has been confirmed by a 2005 study on the status of poverty in Botswana made by the UNDP’s International Poverty Centre and the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis. In this study, researchers argued that the Gini coefficient of per capita consumption rose from 0.58 in 1985/1986 to 0.65 in 2002/2003. Therefore, income inequality has increased, and this confirms that the benefits of Botswana’s wealth are still in the hands of the few.

Therefore, the whole measurement of income inequality tells the reader that although Botswana is growing fast, the disparity between rich and poor is still very high. If data regarding income distribution amongst the deciles of the population were readily available, it would be interesting to analyze in depth these disparities by plotting the Lorenz curve. However, the World Institute for Development Economics Research has collected these data per deciles in 1971 and in 1986, and as we can see in Fig. 16.2, the Lorenz curve shows us how big the disparities are amongst the different deciles. If we consider the richest 10 % and the poorest 10 % of the population in both years, the richest 10 % owned more than 42 % of the income of Botswana, while the poorest 10 %, although they had seen a slight improvement in their income, only owned 1.4 % of the whole income of the country. If we then compare those features with GDP in 1971, the richest 10 % owned 42 % of US\$ 126 million, and in 1986 the same 10 % owned US\$ 1.4 billion. It is easy to understand that the richest 10 % of 1971 became richer in 1986 thanks to the growing economy. This is still a relevant feature for disparity considering that the population





**Fig. 16.2** Income inequality in Botswana between 1971 and 1986 (Source: World Institute for Development Economics Research)

only rose by around 3 % a year in the 15 years, from 700,000 to 1.2 million, while the GDP grew much faster, featuring more than 20 % growth a year in the 1970s, bringing therefore more money to the richest 10 % of the population (World Bank 2013c).

Although this shows a negative trend in terms of income distribution, data can be read on a different perspective. The OECD, for example, in its 2003 report on Botswana saw that while in 1985/1986, 59 % of the population was living in poverty, in 1993/1994 this percentage declined to 47 %, which is definitely too little in comparison to the fast percentage of economic growth. Nevertheless, it is a sign that poverty reduction plans are producing positive outcomes.

The government has faced poverty and hunger by investing aid funds into projects for food security. In particular, they have assisted the population in establishing the cultivation of crops, such as maize, rice, and sweet potato. This differentiation in crops avoided food scarcity and dependency on the most common forms of food by also providing a safety net when specific crops are decimated or have a reduced harvest due to disease or the elements.

The government has also invested in the youth, spurring employment through short-term contracts and investing in new graduates. Although the above mentioned data seem critical because they show the huge disparity of income between the rich and the poor, the poverty gap ratio has dropped to 11.6 % in 2002 from a previous value of over 20 %. This indicator measures the intensity of poverty, and estimates the gap between the poor and the poverty line. Therefore, such a gap is much smaller than in the past decades. Nevertheless, nowadays around 30 % of the population still lives under the poverty line (UN and Republic of Botswana 2010). It is also relevant to mention that this 30 % has been highly influenced by the global economic crisis, which unfortunately affected the poverty trend of Botswana.

### ***MDGs 2–3: Education and Gender Equality***

Considering other non-governance areas that are affected by aid assistance—education, and gender equality—which are related to MDGs 2–3, data definitely confirm that development in Botswana is progressing and that aid makes the difference.

Aid invested in education since its independence has brought Botswana to be one of the most educated countries in Africa. This is a highly positive improvement, with most children attending close to 10 years of school enrollment. Therefore, primary education is mostly guaranteed to the whole population. In fact, the UNDP's Human Development Indicators for education show that the mean years of schooling is at 8.9 years, which is more than the 7 years required to complete primary education.

Education has been honored with a very dedicated budget since independence. Most of Botswana's donor countries contributed to this specific sector. The government nowadays continues to heavily finance education, with today seeing around 25 % of public expenditure going to the education sector. Most aid has been initially invested to build infrastructure, schools, to prepare teachers, and to provide equipment and school materials. Just after its independence, Britain provided Botswana's complete budget for education. In the years following, Botswana started to differentiate its education budget through the provisions provided by the revenues of its own mineral exports.

The whole level of education in Botswana has had a huge increase since independence. In 1970, 83,002 pupils enrolled at a primary school, while in 2009 the figure rose to 330,775. Another important figure provided by the World Bank is the percentage of female pupils, which now reaches 50 % of the whole figure. This means that Botswana is not just providing primary education to all, but it is doing it without any sort of discrimination. In fact, female pupils equal the number of male pupils. The same figure would apply to secondary education (World Bank 2013d). Nevertheless, looking at the Gender Inequality Index (GII), the situation is not so positive. This index measures gender disparity, and touched 0.48 in 2012, which is very far from the performances of Norway with 0.06, and as well far from the negative performances of Congo (at 0.68). The GII consists of three areas of analysis: reproductive health, empowerment and labor market participation. By analyzing the values of the sub-indexes of the GII, it is clear that although Botswana provided empowerment of women in terms of education and labor force participation, there is a lack of empowerment within the political arena. The value of the indicator "Shares in parliament, female-male ratio" is 0.08 which means that there is almost no presence of women in parliament, in comparison to Sweden which is one of the best performing countries with 0.80 (UNDP).

However, other indicators: "population with at least secondary education, female/male ratio (Ratio of female to male rates)" has a value of 0.95, which is very close to some of the most gender equal countries in the world, such as Norway, Australia and the USA.

The overall idea is that in terms of education, Botswana has thoroughly developed this area, by investing aid funds first and then its own budget. Nowadays, male and

female pupils are equally enrolled at primary and secondary school. The percentage of female teachers involved in schools equals and sometime surpasses the percentage of male teachers. Steps now need to be taken to provide female empowerment within politics and government areas.

### ***MDGs 4, 5, 6: Improving Health and Reducing HIV/AIDS***

The Gender Inequality Index has two indicators related to the reproductive health area. One is related to maternal mortality and the other to the fertility rate. The maternal mortality indicator unfortunately is still very high, featuring 160 deaths per 100,000 live births, in comparison to Norway that has only an average of 7 deaths per 100,000 live births. Moreover, the “adolescent fertility rate (women aged 15–19 years) (births per 1,000 women aged 15–19)” reached 52.1 in 2010, which is almost double the prescribed limit of 23.8, in order for a country to facilitate very high human development.

These two indicators open the debate over the health situation of Botswana. The country made efforts to improve health facilities; yet it is still facing hard challenges. However, even if the above mentioned data seem negative we have to look at the broader picture. By dealing with a developing country, it is compulsory to bear in mind that by the time the country gained independence they did not have facilities for maternal health, nor health education projects. Everything had been built almost from nothing by investing aid funds first and then revenues, and therefore, even with this seemingly negative data, we can see the success of the steps that have been completed up to here in improving health and in creating facilities. While things could be better, we have to think that they could also be much worse, as in the case of other developing countries with a fast growth rate: such as Nigeria.

Therefore, even though Goals 4–6 remain of concern for the country’s development policies, it is important to acknowledge the steps so far made in improving the health system. Goal 4, which is concerned with the reduction of child mortality, is unlikely to be met by 2015 (UN and Republic of Botswana 2010). The report states that the infant mortality rate will not be reduced to 16 deaths per 1,000 live births by 2015 and that the under-five mortality rate will not meet the target of 27 by 2015. Nevertheless, substantial improvements have been achieved. World Bank indicators inform that the trend of infant and under-5 mortality rates has decreased since independence. In 1966, the values of both indicators were respectively 98.3 and 141.1 deaths per 1,000 live births, while the same indicators dropped respectively to 20.3 and 25.9 deaths since 2011 (World Bank 2013f, g). This highly significant reduction has been due to the health policies introduced since the 1960s. At that time, aid funds were invested in building infrastructure, in training midwives and doctors, and in preventing malaria. Immunization for vaccine preventable diseases has been introduced with the support of foreign NGOs. Later, and specifically since the 1990s, concern rose due to the quick spread of HIV and AIDS. In fact, the increasing veracity of the disease peaked in 1990, with 53 deaths of children under five.

This showed a reverse of the improvements made in infant mortality, due to the ferocity of this unanticipated sexually transmitted infection. Ten years later, the rate of mortality of children under five increased further to 81 deaths. Once again foreign assistance and government planning brought about a change. NGOs have been helping the government to organize projects aimed at avoiding the spread of these diseases from mothers to children. One of the most effective projects has been the “Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission,” which has contributed to the reduction of babies being HIV positive. In the subsequent 10 years, this led to the further reduction of the under-five mortality rate to 25.9 deaths in 2011, which means that if the lowering trend continues, then Goal 4’s aim could be met by 2015.

Those successful percentages have been due to the government’s strong support for such policies as well. In fact, the government has been very effective in keeping the projects going after the initial foreign assistance. Today, more than 90 % of children are fully immunized in their first year of life. Most pregnant women go to ante-natal clinics, and baby deliveries are done with the support of trained midwives and doctors. Furthermore, HIV positive pregnant women receive anti-retroviral therapy to prevent child infection (UN and Republic of Botswana 2010).

When facing problems of child mortality, governments must also address the maternal mortality rate. Goal 5 concerns itself with maternal care, which has fortunately been well planned by Botswana. The target is to reduce the Maternal Mortality Ratio by three quarters by 2015. The 2010 MDGs Report argues that the goal will not be able to be met; however, by taking into consideration the World Bank data, we can see that statistics demonstrate there have been drastic reductions, where in 2005 there were 330 deaths per 100,000 live births, having dropped to 160 in 2010.

This is a very positive trend considering that since the 1990s most NGOs have pushed for aid to be invested in training midwives. Nowadays, 98 % of deliveries are handled by skilled personnel. However, these efforts might be frustrated by the HIV and AIDS spread. In fact, although maternal health care has been effective in reducing maternal mortality, many women will die soon after giving birth, due to the above mentioned infectious diseases. The growth of the female mortality rate per 1,000 adults has had a terrible increase. While in 1997 it stood at 397 deaths, in 2011 it rose to 593. The same situation applies to males. Such a situation also impacts upon the population’s female life expectancy, which was at 66 years in the 1990s, and which actually dropped further, to 51 years in 2011 (World Bank 2013e).

Nevertheless, in terms of maternal health, Botswana made great improvements since the early aid investments. Today, 95 % of the population lives within just a few kilometers of a health facility. Most facilities for maternal, pre and post natal care are free of charge or at very basic cost.

Despite the improvements regarding child mortality rates and maternal health, Goal 6 remains of huge concern to the whole country. HIV and AIDS have undermined the successful path built by Botswana. Proper use of aid funds and revenues has led the country to successful performances until the 1990s. During this decade, however, the situation changed. HIV and AIDS posed a very difficult challenge for further development in the country. All statistics regarding mortality rates began to worsen. The government therefore started to plan how to face such an emergency,

and how to prevent sexually transmitted infections. The government already had almost 30 years of experience in development projects, but once again aid and foreign support became important in providing direction. The 1990s has been the Botswana *annus horribilis* in contrast with the 1980s, the *annus mirabilis*. While the country was growing at an average of 10 % a year in the 1980s, in the 1990s economic growth dropped to an average rate of 3 %. This was due mainly to the consequences of the HIV and AIDS spread. In fact, these diseases particularly impacted upon labor productivity. It reduced life expectancy and the ability of people to work. This is why there was a huge reduction in the GDP growth.

Even though many other indicators were growing fast, especially the ones related to education, anything related to health and productivity was reduced in the 1990s. The government needed some years to understand the situation, the spread of diseases, and to organize solutions. However, it is nowadays on the right path again to achieve HIV and AIDS reduction. Most of the aid projects created in relation to HIV and AIDS over the last 20 years aimed first at prevention, and then at education and information. Counseling, free testing and condoms were made available to the population. Anti-Retroviral Therapy has been put into place, and it reached more than 80 % of people affected by the virus (UN and Republic of Botswana 2010). The government has become so pragmatic towards the issue, that it made available free access to treatment and care for all of those in need. Botswana has been performing much better than its neighbors in addressing HIV and AIDS. Even South Africa, an emerging economy, has run into severe trouble with the spread of the virus.

Additionally, however, malaria and tuberculosis also had to be fought, and today these viruses are very much under control. In particular, malaria has been combated with the use of bed net and by improving water and sanitation facilities. Nevertheless, the rural-urban divide is highly visible when access to sanitation facilities is taken into consideration. Until pressure was raised by NGOs, most rural areas in Botswana lacked wells and toilets, and most which now exist were built post 1990. The rural-urban divide is still an issue today. Nevertheless, the percentage of sanitation facilities available to people has a positive increase. While in 1990, 22 % of the rural population had access to sanitation facilities, 61 % had access in the urban areas. In 2010, this divide was still quite high, with only 41 % of people having access to sanitation, against 75 % in the urban areas. Concerning the improvement of water sources, the performances are more inspiring. In 1990, in most rural areas, 88 % of the population had access to water, while in the urban areas almost 100 % had access. This gap was reduced by 2010, with 92 % of the rural population also having access to water (World Bank 2013h, i).

Overall, Botswana made great efforts in implementing policies that would contribute to reducing child mortality and improving maternal health. Nowadays, the country still has major problems with HIV and AIDS. However, the government's policies have been effective in preventing the viruses' transmission from mothers to babies and have provided people affected by the diseases with retroviral therapy. Both measures have resulted in improving the quality of life of the Botswana people.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, since independence from the UK in 1966, Botswana has managed to attain the very best out of its aid funds. It has done this by creating a transparent structure with high standards, positive governance indicators, and a strong commitment to achieving the principles of the Paris Declaration, together with positive relations and open dialogues with its donors. This miracle has been possible through the trustworthiness of Botswana's government, whose creation lies in its pre-colonial institutions. Such institutions were not disrupted by the British colonizers, and therefore a system of check and balance was maintained between political elites and traditional rulers. This has guaranteed some degree of accountability since the first government was established in 1966. Aid funds also played a crucial role in allowing the first government to organize the initial infrastructures and basic logistics in order to run its development projects.

Therefore, the good management of the 1960s and the commitment of the first president of Botswana, Seretse Khama, even made initial aid very effective and allowed the country to have the right know-how to face economic concerns. Later, in the 1980s and in the 1990s, with the boom phase coming from resource exploitation and the spread of AIDS and HIV, the country faced many problems but which were able to be promptly faced by Khama's successors.

As seen, in terms of governance outcomes, Botswana's story is extraordinarily positive. On this ground, Botswana established strong ties with its donors, and set its own agenda for development. Donors and recipients based their bilateral relationships on mutual accountability. This made donors keener to give aid to Botswana because in exchange, Botswana made available an analysis of its performance results with each National Development Plan, sharing both the positive and negative outcomes. By doing so, Botswana additionally improved its aid effectiveness and strengthened its institutions. The population has benefited from more than 60 years of aid assistance, and unlike other African nations, Botswana has also been extremely careful in escaping economic issues such as the Dutch disease, in consequence of aid inflows and resource revenues. Botswana proved that when a reliable government is ready to differentiate its economy, the long term benefits for the population are more visible than in those countries which exclusively rely on aid or resource revenues.

This is why the trends of the MDGs 1–6 are so very positive. The government has been highly effective in facing and better counteracting the damage of the many global and local shocks over the decades. Therefore, the MDGs are on a successful path to being predominantly completed, mainly because aid and development policies benefited the poor. Aid projects aimed at improving education have been very successful, health conditions have greatly improved, and water and sanitation were made readily available. Although income inequality is still quite high, from statistics we can see that the steady economic growth actually did benefit the poor.

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# Chapter 17

## African Women's Political Participation: Strategies for Positively Impacting Sustainable Socio-economic Development

Stephen M. Magu

### Introduction

Women in many countries account for more than 50 % of the population. Yet their participation in political and legislative processes, the national forum for resource allocation and decision-making processes remains very low. Participation is often constrained by cultural attitudes, institutional barriers and perceptions about women's roles in politics. Advocacy for women's participation in politics has grown, and internationally, various conventions and declarations have been signed, promoting the welfare of women. Literature and statistics show however that women have been disproportionately marginalized and excluded from political participation and legislative processes, relegating their role in politics to merely voting. Even in leading western liberal democracies, women have been excluded from leadership positions (for example, the United States and Canada have not had a female Head of State, and the United Kingdom has had only one).

This research examines the role of women in development, especially at the grassroots level. It ties into the political sphere in that economic development is often about the allocation of resources, a political undertaking. In establishing the role of political participation in decision making, resource allocation and development, this study hypothesizes that for effective participation in the political processes, which will lead to increased participation in decision making, women need to increase their participation in politics, eventually increasing their participation in national legislative processes. The study seeks to close the existing gaps in literature and research by seeking, through analysis of existing literature and women's political participation statistics, to address several research questions.

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Among these, how well are women represented in democratic structures of governance? How have international organizations, institutions and conventions contributed to increasing female representation and participation in democratic institutions? Are there significantly different outcomes in countries where women have larger representation in legislative bodies? What challenges do rural women face when participating in democratic structures? Finally, what approaches can best ensure women's participation in development?

## Women and Development

According to the United Nations' Human Development Report (HDR 2005), one third of Africa's total population lives in poverty, spending less than \$1 a day. The report notes that one third of sub-Saharan Africa's population (~300 million people) lives in countries that experienced a reversal in the Human Development Index in the years 2003–2005. The report highlights the declining life expectancy, diminishing access to educational opportunities by girls and women and subsequently poverty increase to approximately 600 million people by 2015 (HDR 2005).

The 2005 HDR notes that there are 800 million people in the world who still lack basic literacy skills, and that most of these are in Africa and South East Asia. One third of this number is women. Between 1990 and 2000, the world achieved a 6 % growth in literacy (HDR 2005). For the first time, democracy was identified as an indicator and necessary condition towards achieving human development. Participation in multi-party elections is key in human development, and its expansion portends positive outcomes; "more than two thirds of Africans now live in countries with democratic multiparty election systems" (Human Development Report 2005, 20). However, the report acknowledges that even countries that do not have democratic systems of government such as China (with about one-sixth of the world's population) shows an impressive economic growth trend (HDR 2005), whereas countries that have been continuously democratic have often failed to meet all their development challenges.

One of the other important Human Development Indicators that correlate positively with better health, longevity and positive outcomes for communities is education. Women's education is crucial in its own right and has outcomes that translate across the entire family and communities (HDR 2005). A powerful indicator of development is a reduction in maternal and child mortality. Children of mothers with at least an elementary education are twice as likely to survive infant/child mortality as are those of mothers without an elementary education.

Women are instrumental in economic development, not least due to the role that gendered division of labor plays in families and communities in nation-building. While gendered roles are not necessarily fair, women not only carry the burden of managing households, but are increasingly being called upon to become breadwinners and heads of families. Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau (1995), quoting Parpart and Staudt, suggest that "states are shaped by gender struggle; they carry distinctive gender ideologies through time which guide resource allocation decisions in ways

that mold material realities” (p. 6). Women in Kenya are finding themselves with changing responsibilities in adjusting to the new realities of the African state (Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau 1995), but the primary responsibility for meeting the family's basic needs for food, water and fuel remain with women (Mercer 2002).

The role of women in socio and economic development in developing countries has evolved and featured prominently in development and human rights discourses in the last 20 years. The World Bank acknowledges the importance of women in development (World Bank 2013). Yet, as one of the leading institutions in international social and economic development, even the World Bank has been lagging in its recognition of the importance of women in development. For instance, the World Bank produced its first “Gender Equality and Development” World Development Report in 2012. Interestingly, the report noted that with regard to primary education and overall welfare,

gains have not been universal and that progress has been far too slow in some areas. In many parts of the world, too many women are still dying in childbirth, or, at alarming rates, not being born at all. Women continue to lack voice in the household and the ability to participate in decisions that affect them, their families, and their societies; and too often, their economic opportunities remain very constrained. (World Bank 2013)

Other international bilateral and multilateral agencies have continuously impressed governments, civil society and communities to enhance the role of women in ensuring development (UNDP 2003). Women and gender activists have brought to the fore women's equality and parity issues. Increased participation of rural women in grassroots political leadership is intrinsically interwoven with economic development. Grassroots political participation for women would translate into increased capacity for decision making on resource allocation, educational opportunities for women and healthier, more robust families.

### ***Politics and Development: A Historical Progression***

The role of women in development for newly independent states began to take shape in the late 1960s (Mercer 2002). Several approaches evolved over time; they were considered different development approaches in policy to “third world women.” Arising from the critique of past policies on development, the one of the most enduring approaches is “Women in Development” (WID). Various analysts attempt to trace the periods and activities that delineated these development periods.

### ***Women in Development***

The Women in Development approach was informed by the need to give more prominence to women's issues in the development arena (Women in Development: Theory and Practice—Report of the Conference, New York, New York, March 23,

1983). The WID approach was quickly embraced in the early 1970s (Coates 1999) and promoted as a way to address underdevelopment and the limitation of the role of women in contributing to the economic sphere. It called for greater attention to women in development policy and practice. It also emphasized the need to integrate women into the development process, not as indirect beneficiaries, but as active participants. These periods are categorized as welfare, equity, anti-poverty, efficiency and empowerment (Coates 1999).

The Welfare Approach to economic development especially for women rose to prominence between the 1950s through the 1970s. This approach traces its origins to the post-independence period. In most African countries it was a residual model for social welfare under colonialism. Its purpose was to bring women into development as better mothers; this would be their most important role in development. In this approach, meeting practical gender needs in the reproductive role (with regard to food assistance, fighting malnutrition and family planning) were emphasized. Women were seen as passive partners in development and did not appear to challenge the status quo.

The Equity Approach was popular between 1975 and 1985, and is seen as the classic origin of WID. It hinged on gaining equity for women in the development process. Women were seen as active participants in development, and the approach aimed to meet strategic gender needs. The approach utilized state interventions, economic and political autonomy. However this approach was criticized as pro-western feminism. For the first time, though, the subordinate role of women was identified and an attempt made to counter it.

The next WID approach to development was anti-poverty, which was linked to redistribution, growth and provision of basic needs. It had its genesis in the 1970s, but still has some popularity. It aimed to ensure that poor women increase their productivity, and saw women's poverty as a problem of underdevelopment, not a result of their "subordinate" status. Meeting practical gender needs in a productive role, earning an income and initiation of small scale income generating projects were seen as key. However, this approach isolated poor women; but that enabled government and NGOs to focus means of aid to these groups.

Efficiency, which was the fourth WID approach, is the most predominant. It arose post-1980s, and was a response to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). For the third world, these structural adjustment programs forced governments to cut programs to the rural areas and the poor, which adversely affected women. This approach sought to counter this decline by emphasizing women's economic contribution to development and ensure that development is more effective and efficient. Practical gender needs would be met in the context of declining or non-existent social and government services, in order to enable women to access services even as they cost-shared. This approach viewed women in terms of delivery capacity and ability to work extended periods, both at the workplace and at home, and has gained popularity with governments and development agencies.

The 1980s also saw the "conscientization" approach, derived from Freire's ideas of participation in socio-economic and political empowerment. At the same time, institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor

agencies began partnering with states to institutionalize participation (Mercer 2002). Neo-liberalism began gaining a foothold.

From 1970 onwards, the Empowerment Approach, which rose out of failure of the equity approach, and which was actively supported by third world's feminist writing and grassroots organizations, sought to empower women through greater self-reliance (de Waal 2006; Essama-Nssah 2004). It viewed women's subordination as both a patriarchal societal problem and an expression of colonial and neo-colonial oppression. It became popular in the 1990s due to its aim to actualize strategic gender needs through bottom-up mobilization, utilizing practical gender needs as a means to fight oppression (de Waal 2006). For women, it concentrated on strategic development needs as identified by the women themselves and resulted in the *integrated approach*, seeking to integrate awareness and competence into development. It underpinned development thought, policies and programs giving the right and ability for a group to act within specified domains (Essama-Nssah 2004). Consequently, Essama-Nssah (2004) asserts that development is a transformation of the way people think and behave (Essama-Nssah 2004).

This approach has largely been home-grown, achieved through voluntary organizations, has been unsupported by governments but has avoided western feminism critiques. Although generally these are underfinanced, the localization of the needs has translated into more realistic, grounded achievements.

## ***Gender and Development***

In *Gender and Development: Australia's Aid Commitment*, a policy speech delivered by the Australian Foreign Minister, the report notes that since 1976, Australia sought to refine the Women in Development approach in order to provide special funding for innovative women-specific projects, training and monitoring of accomplishment of the WID goals (Australian Agency for International Development 1997). De Waal (2006) notes that during the 1970s, "the poverty approach of the 1970s perceived underdevelopment as the main issue, rather than gender subordination" (p. 220). This has been touted as the beginning of a shift in paradigm in the way development with regard to gender was seen.

The GAD approach to development policy and practice "focused on the socially constructed basis of differences between women and men and emphasized the need to challenge existing gender roles and relations" (de Haan 2009, 156). This approach widens the strategic emphasis to "include women's rights, women's role as active participants and agents in development, and their role as actors with a specific agenda for development" (Asian Development Bank 2003, 16). Part of the strategy of this approach is to deal with unequal position in society.

The two approaches to women's development have gained currency from various proponents. Contrasting the approaches, the WID approach has focused exclusively on women as agents to improve women's status, while the GAD approach recognizes that improvements in women's status require analysis of the relations between men and women and creating allies among men to achieve equity and alter the

social and economic position of women (Asian Development Bank 2003; Reeves and Baden 2002). The GAD approach is seen to be more attuned to the intricacies obtained by socio-cultural relationships.

Modern literary work on participation and empowerment has focused on women and the role of participation in women's organizations leading to individual and collective empowerment (Kabeer 1994; Mercer 2002; Sen 1999a, b). Harcourt (2006) notes that whereas the previous 15 years have brought a change in the status of women, and access to public services such as education and job equality, most developing countries are still saddled with external debts. Governments are unable to meet their commitments to such issues as basic health, education, literacy and funding of programs, due to these external obligations. The most affected persons in the decisions regarding especially education are women and girl children. This, Sen (1999a, b) argues, leads to further deprivation (of the capabilities) of women to access income.

### ***International Backing of Women's Participatory Rights***

In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (United Nations 1998). This has been touted as the equivalent "bill of rights" for women. By 2003, 174 countries had ratified it (UNIFEM 2003). On 4th December 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 41/128 (the Declaration on the Right to Development). On 20th December, 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. And in the year 2000, World leaders met and commissioned the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNDP 2000), which seek to, among others, "eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015" (Goal #3).

From the above, inexhaustive list of conventions, summits, conferences and declarations assented to by governments and nations; the international commitment to women's rights, development as well as equal treatment is there. However, there has been a huge gap in the actualization of these development outcomes (United Nations, Division of the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 1979).

### ***Neo-liberal Approaches to Participatory Development***

Between 4th and 15th September 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, China. It resulted in the "Declaration and Platform for Action" by participating governments (UN Habitat 1995). Items 4 and 5 acknowledged that although the status of women had advanced in the 1980s, inequalities and access to opportunities that severely affected mankind, as well as increasing poverty (UN Habitat 1995, 4 and 5).

Over the last 10 years, the democratic citizenry and sustainable development theory (HDR 2003; Mercer 2002), within the framework of a reformed state has gained prominence. However, a growing body of literature critiques these concepts as just bounded within empty buzzwords, questionability into the efficacy of ending poverty (Mercer 2002; Sachs 2005) and the possibility of local communities effecting socio-economic changes that will stand up to a globalized world. The major question raised by critics of this theory is whether participation is empowering, who defines it and what its measurements are.

The Capability Approach assumes that the capabilities that people have and the exercise of these capabilities will lead to people being able to make choices of lifestyles they “have reason to value” (Sen 1999a, b). This approach underestimates the absence of capabilities and puts most of the onus on governments, proposing that governments have the best intentions towards their people. The Capability Approach encompasses empowerment, viewing poverty as “capability deprivation” (Essama-Nssah 2004).

One of those capabilities is *income deprivation*.” Others include access to educational opportunities, investment climates, political opportunities, access to health and other *public goods* which local development and populations are hardly capable of meeting. Whereas this approach spans both governments and the public, the approach overlooks that capabilities such as access to education and information may not be in the best interests of the government, and therefore, a grassroots approach may equip citizens with these necessary tools to advocate for development (Sen 1999a, b).

## ***Women in National Politics***

Women are generally underrepresented in local councils, legislatures and at the national levels. A review of data from the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) shows a world average of 24 % representation by women around the world (the data combine women representation in both single chamber Houses and with Senates (see Appendix: Table 17.1—Representation breakdown by Gender (both houses, combined), Table 17.2—Parliamentary gender breakdown (Upper House or Senate) and the representation in Table 17.3—Women in Parliament (single or lower house)). Data on regional representation show Nordic countries having the highest representation by women, at 42 % followed by Europe with 24.6 %, the Americas, with an average of 24.2 %. Sub-Saharan countries have a representation of approximating world averages of around 21.3 % (see Table 17.4).

In terms of individual countries, Rwanda leads the world averages at 63.8 % women representation in the legislature, 63.8 % in the lower or single House, and 38.5 % in the Senate, for an average of 49.2 % representation (see Table 17.5) (IPU 2003; Norris and Ingelhart 2001). The World Bank assessment of other variables that affect women paints an equally poor picture: as of 2010, 16.2 % of ministerial-level positions were held by women (World Bank 2013).

In the Kenyan elections of 2003, 16 women were elected to parliament, which represents a paltry 7.31 % of the population, despite demographics which show women comprising approximately 51 % of the population. While this marked an increase of 100 % from 3.6 % in 2001, it is still unrepresentative (IPU 2006). Recognizing this underrepresentation, Kenya's new constitution (promulgated in 2010) reserved at least 47 seats for women, increased representation at County levels and mandated other changes that together, may improve women's representation and also encourage participation (Kenya Law Reports 2010).

In the 2013 elections, 18.6 % of elected parliamentarians were women, far shy of the 50 % threshold, while 26.5 % of elected senators are women (IPU 2013). This indicates some positive changes but is still far shy of, for example, Rwanda. Norris and Inglehart (2001) note that despite the achievements that women have made on other fronts, by 2001 only 9 of the 191 countries of the world had a woman as Head of State or Head of Government. In African, data shows interesting trends. Rwanda and Burundi, racked by internecine ethnic violence, have the highest representation by women in the House and the Senate (See Table 17.5).

Chadya (2003) notes that although women played a major role in the fight for independence, the top leadership in the anti-colonial struggle was held by men, who continue to do so today. Even statesmen such as Julius Nyerere regarded the "uneducated women" who had actively participated in the struggle, as not fit for positions of leadership, and as such they got low-paying jobs, such as "street cleaners" (Chadya 2003, 2).

Ironically, as Masanja (2001) notes, in some African countries, political parties have gone to lengths to encourage participation of women in political activity. In the same socialist leaning Tanzania, for instance, in the late 1960s, the all government parastatals had formed the *Umoja wa Wanawake Tanganyika* (Unity of Women in Tanganyika [later Tanzania]) (UWT) to improve the welfare of women (Masanja 2001).

In other parts of Africa, women's organizations agitating for inclusion of women in politics have been active from an early age. The National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons [NCNC] and the Federation of Nigerian Women's Societies [FNWS] were active before Nigerian independence; however, they could not agree to support women candidates to run for elections (Chadya 2003). This, in part, illustrates that some women stand to gain from the divisions that arise, implicitly supporting a paternalistic society. In South Africa, Bantu Women's League, a wing of the African National Congress, arose from the 1918 women's protest against carrying passes, which was required of black women (Chadya 2003).

In South America, the ability or inability of women to rise to power, and the presence or absence of women in decision making realms has been identified as an indicator and consequence of female subordination in society (Valdes et al. 2003). Despite proven social leadership skills and ability to contribute to social production and reproduction, women remain excluded from a range of places and access, such as public places or power, at all levels of government. Increasingly, countries with democratic governance institutions are seeing an increased level of participation by women in politics (Ibid.).



Some of the issues highlighted that limit women participation in leadership in areas of administration, politics and education include, among others, the insufficient number of women available for recruitment candidacy, mitigating factors to those women qualifying for recruitment but decline/are not ready to apply, gender biased recruitment criteria of candidates running for office, gender insensitive environment for retention and advancement of women already recruited and lack of affirmative action at recruitment and for academic career development (Masanja 2001).

Acknowledging the role of women in development and in leading change, the United Nations Population Fund in collaboration with the YWCA published a training guide entitled *Empowering Young Women to Lead Change: A Training Manual* (UNFPA 2006). In the preface of the manual, the UNFPA notes that

[young] women encounter challenges everyday. Apart from sharing their communities' struggles over limited resources like water, land or jobs, many systematically face discrimination simply by virtue of being female. This includes physical and sexual violence, being kept out of school, disproportionate vulnerability to HIV infection and lack of access to property and other rights. [Yet...] women are continually developing innovative, effective ways to improve their lives. By bringing together their wisdom and creativity, young women are leading change. (p. 2)

International organizations continue to lead the change. The YWCA affirms its commitment to the requirement that at minimum, 25 % in all decision-making bodies at national and world levels be women. It needs to be noted, however, that political representation of women in legislatures and the political sphere cannot be seen as the only indicator of development. The United States, the leading economy in the world, is ranked 67th (see Table 17.5) in female representation.

Higher representation by women in parliaments does not always translate into grassroots development. Maroda (2004) examined the role of women representation and the outcomes of higher representation in political structures, through the lenses of empowerment development theory, capability approach and the psychosocial theories of the difference in the expression of power between men and women. Maroda finds that neither men nor women show a greater tendency to motivation for power and expects that women ought to be as equally represented in organizations and positions that exercise power. However, the expression of power takes the form of *egoistic dominance* among men, and *responsible nurturance* among women. Such responsible nurturance, if applied to leadership, would perhaps play a greater role in the allocation of resources that would insure access to life's basic needs, such as food, shelter, security and clothing; to secondary needs such as schooling, jobs, and equal opportunities.

### ***Defining (Under) Development***

Who defines development? What is the conception of development among women? According to Mercer (2002), among the rural women of Tanzania, to be "empowered" includes building one's own brick and corrugated roof house, access to

utilities and services such as electricity, water supply, and possession of cars or large herds of animals. Implicitly, the definition of “development” becomes thus intertwined with the western concept of development, while at the same time attempting to preserve and uphold local cultural practices.

Literature has previously held that one key aspect of empowerment of women in rural areas in Africa lies in “overcoming internalized oppression” (Mercer 2002). However, Kabeer (1999) asserts that empowerment from the lens of overcoming internalized oppression, remains subjective, since it is informed by a Eurocentric, white-woman measuring rural, poor black woman. The notion of emancipating the women from this foreign, value based judgment completely denies the economic, social and political realities on the ground (Mercer 2002).

While women do not choose to remain in underprivileged and dependent roles, political participation to influence development cannot overlook the role of socio-cultural norms. Rather, as in the case of Oman (Jackson 1999), there is a home-grown women sense of agency that conforms to the societal norms, while economically and politically empowering them and drawing state resources to support their income generation activities.

The question of merely exposing women to information and rhetoric on emancipation and empowerment without changing their capability to access sources of economic sustenance and support has not been seen to work (Mercer 2002). The dual questions of what the measure of oppression and what the women themselves want still remains. The formation of women’s groups has been hailed as instrumental in local development, yet the power balances have not shifted in any sufficient way to shift the balance of power and the dynamics of asset holding.

### ***Women, Participatory Democracy and Allocation of Public Resources***

The contribution of women to development has continuously been measured against the comparable achievement by men (de Waal 2006). Mercer (2002) notes that even where there are grassroots organizations that operate at the community, the cadre of jobs that these organizations accomplish centre on the home, childcare, women’s agricultural responsibilities and community initiatives such as running village educational facilities.

It is notable that an inherently paternalistic orientation of development manifests itself within many communities. Andersson and Roche (2006) note that gender based planning helps ensure that women’s voices are heard, implying that they are not equal development partners, that a favor is extended to them for their needs to be included in community based development. Data collection still remains largely independent of resource allocation processes. Similarly, the allocation of development resources, a substantial function of government (Sen 1999a, b), singularly excludes women owing to their marginal representation in legislative bodies. Political representation, building momentum from the grassroots levels, is critical to

changing the way resources are allocated. In order to achieve this, women need to participate and increase their visibility in legislative and administrative processes, all the way from the grassroots level.

Women need to participate in grassroots leadership to gain greater representation in governance and development. Tremblay (1998), in a study of representation by women in the Canadian parliament, found that women parliamentarians substantively represent women constituents' issues to a greater degree than their male counterparts. The study also found that women parliamentarians try to shape the legislative agenda more favorably towards women than their male counterparts. Although men parliamentarians were found to speak on women's issues, women were found to be more proportionately involved than their male counterparts. It can be thus argued that women may be more predisposed to sustain the needs, wishes and interests of women where direct legislative policy is likely to influence the outcomes for women.

## Conclusions

Development, being the expansion of individuals' choices, cannot succeed if it excludes and/or marginalizes half of the world's population. Countries that have actively involved women in their national development programs, in participatory governance and in political processes (for example, Rwanda), have witnessed rapid economic growth and development. Gendering the role of women in development has shown time and again to be problematic; poor development outcomes for women almost always translate into poor social and economic development. Literature and practice has shown that women with lower levels of education are likely to witness more infant deaths, poor nutrition and inability to provide adequate or proper care to their children and their families, leading to lower life expectancy. It appears therefore, that improving the lot of women is not only good for the women themselves, but also for development of a capable workforce to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century economy.

Women remain vastly underrepresented in political leadership, where a majority of national resources and development plans are formulated and implemented. There is an absence of a crucial voice that could argue for alternative ways of looking at development. The systemic marginalization of women at these levels—not only in African countries but as a general practice across the world—has had significant negative outcomes for a lot of women and countries. The Millennium Development Goals did attempt to address the role of women in social and economic development, but it is not clear that much progress has been made in a way that reverses eons of discrimination and lack of inclusion. It will do countries well to look at examples of countries that have changed the levels and roles of representation of women in their political processes to determine to what extent this model is sustainable.

## Appendix 17.1: Tables and Figures

**Table 17.1** Gender breakdown by gender (single/lower house)

Both houses combined	
Total MPs	45,875
Gender breakdown known for	45,546
Men	35,823
Women	<b>9,723</b>
<b>Percentage of women</b>	<b>21.3 %</b>

**Table 17.2** Parliamentary gender breakdown: Upper house or senate

Upper house or senate	
Total MPs	7,238
Gender breakdown known for	7,166
Men	5,795
Women	<b>1,371</b>
<b>Percentage of women</b>	<b>19.1 %</b>

**Table 17.3** Women in parliament—single or lower house (%)

Single house or lower house	
Total MPs	38,637
Gender breakdown known for	38,380
Men	30,028
Women	<b>8,352</b>
<b>Percentage of women</b>	<b>21.8 %</b>

**Table 17.4** Women in parliament: Regional averages

	Single house or lower house	Upper house or senate	Both houses combined
<b>Nordic countries</b>	<b>42.0 %</b>	–	–
<b>Europe—OSCE member countries</b> including Nordic countries	<b>24.6 %</b>	22.6 %	24.2 %
<b>Americas</b>	<b>24.2 %</b>	23.8 %	24.1 %
<b>Europe – OSCE member countries</b> excluding Nordic countries	<b>23.0 %</b>	22.6 %	22.9 %
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	<b>21.1 %</b>	18.7 %	21.7 %
<b>Asia</b>	<b>19.1 %</b>	13.8 %	18.5 %
<b>Arab states</b>	<b>17.8 %</b>	7.7 %	15.9 %
<b>Pacific</b>	<b>13.1 %</b>	38.6 %	15.9 %

Regions are classified by descending order of the percentage of women in the lower or single house

**Table 17.5** Women representation in legislatures: African countries' ranking on a global scale

World classification									
Rank	Country	Lower or single house				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats*	Women	% W	Elections	Seats*	Women	% W
1	<b>Rwanda</b>	9 2013	80	51	63.80 %	9 2011	26	10	38.50 %
2	<b>Andorra</b>	4 2011	28	14	50.00 %	–	–	–	–
3	<b>Cuba</b>	2 2013	612	299	48.90 %	–	–	–	–
4	<b>Sweden</b>	9 2010	349	156	44.70 %	–	–	–	–
5	<b>Seychelles</b>	9 2011	32	14	43.80 %	–	–	–	–
6	<b>Senegal</b>	7 2012	150	64	42.70 %	–	–	–	–
7	<b>Finland</b>	4 2011	200	85	42.50 %	–	–	–	–
8	<b>South Africa</b>	4 2009	400	169	42.30 %	4 2009	53	17	32.10 %
9	<b>Nicaragua</b>	11 2011	92	37	40.20 %	–	–	–	–
10	<b>Iceland</b>	4 2013	63	25	39.70 %	–	–	–	–
11	<b>Norway</b>	9 2013	169	67	39.60 %	–	–	–	–
12	<b>Mozambique</b>	10 2009	250	98	39.20 %	–	–	–	–
13	<b>Denmark</b>	9 2011	179	70	39.10 %	–	–	–	–
14	<b>Ecuador</b>	2 2013	137	53	38.70 %	–	–	–	–
"	<b>Netherlands</b>	9 2012	150	58	38.70 %	5 2011	75	27	36.00 %
15	<b>Costa Rica</b>	2 2010	57	22	38.60 %	–	–	–	–
16	<b>Timor-Leste</b>	7 2012	65	25	38.50 %	–	–	–	–
17	<b>Belgium</b>	6 2010	150	57	38.00 %	6 2010	71	29	40.80 %
18	<b>Mexico</b>	7 2012	500	184	36.80 %	7 2012	128	42	32.80 %
19	<b>Germany</b>	9 2013	631	230	36.50 %	N.A.	69	19	27.50 %
20	<b>Spain</b>	11 2011	350	126	36.00 %	11 2011	266	91	34.20 %
"	<b>Tanzania</b>	10 2010	350	126	36.00 %	–	–	–	–
21	<b>Uganda</b>	2 2011	386	135	35.00 %	–	–	–	–
22	<b>Angola</b>	8 2012	220	75	34.10 %	–	–	–	–
"	<b>FYR Macedonia</b>	6 2011	123	42	34.10 %	–	–	–	–
23	<b>Austria</b>	9 2013	183	61	33.30 %	N.A.	62	18	29.00 %
"	<b>Grenada</b>	2 2013	15	5	33.30 %	3 2013	13	2	15.40 %
24	<b>Nepal</b>	4 2008	594	197	33.20 %	–	–	–	–
"	<b>Serbia</b>	5 2012	250	83	33.20 %	–	–	–	–
25	<b>New Zealand</b>	11 2011	121	39	32.20 %	–	–	–	–
"	<b>Slovenia</b>	12 2011	90	29	32.20 %	11 2012	40	3	7.50 %
26	<b>Algeria</b>	5 2012	462	146	31.60 %	12 2012	142	10	7.00 %
27	<b>Zimbabwe</b>	7 2013	270	85	31.50 %	7 2013	80	38	47.50 %
28	<b>Italy</b>	2 2013	630	198	31.40 %	2 2013	317	92	29.00 %

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# Chapter 18

## From Rhetoric to Reality: Bridging the Gap Between Aspiration for Democracy and Governance Performance in Nigeria and South Africa

Patrick Oluwole Ojo

### Introduction

Over the past two decades, most African countries have been governed by democratic governments that came about as a result of aspiration for and struggle by African peoples. The aspiration, subsequent struggle and eventual emergence of democratic governments were not accidental but coincided with a particular global phenomenon. During this period, a global consensus was reached which culminated in the Millennium declaration on September 8, 2000 aimed at resolving the multi-dimensional poverty challenges across the world, including sub-Saharan African countries. As a result of this development, eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including poverty reduction, were set forth to address critical issues of education, gender, child mortality, health, and environment which threatens human living standards. By consenting and signing the Millennium declaration, African leaders made the promise to address the socio-economic challenges rampant in the continent since independence. Therefore, there is the convergence of global and regional interests in resolving human development challenges in Africa.

Stemming from the foregoing, this chapter examines and analyzes the issue of democratic governance in Nigeria and South Africa as it provides a framework for understanding and explaining the observable gaps between the performance of and African peoples' expectation from democratic governments, vis-à-vis achieving poverty reduction in sub-Saharan African countries. Extant literature portrays the relationship between democracy and development as mutually reinforcing, thereby giving the impression that once the two occurrences exist, development is guaranteed. But, the failure of the current democratic governments to initiate and sustain sufficient socio-economic development in sub-Saharan African countries,

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constitutes serious threats not only to democratic consolidation in the region, but also to meeting the 2015 poverty reduction target in more profound ways than one extant literature is yet to capture. This point raises several important questions that are examined in this paper. To what extent, for instance, has the opening up of the political space impacted on political and economic governance in Nigeria and South Africa? What are the real and potential dangers of governance challenges to human development in the two countries under consideration? Finally, what are the alternatives for addressing governance challenges in Nigeria and South Africa, especially at a time like now when the complex relationship between democracy and development in Africa continue to generate far-reaching academic and public policy concerns?

The perspective in this paper is that the obstacles to the achievement of development in sub-Saharan Africa; in terms of poverty alleviation which directly affects the living standards of the people are heavily, if not fundamentally political. The author identifies the substantive issue of corruption, manifesting in democratic government's financial recklessness and personal appropriation of state resources as the problem in tackling the menace of underdevelopment generally, and poverty reduction, in particular. The conclusion in this paper is that, the strengthening of regulatory institutions capable of checkmating government's recklessness and other governance challenges, which impacts negatively on the development project, is one important missing link in the current effort aimed at reducing poverty in sub-Saharan African countries.

## **Democracy and Development: Theoretical Framework of Analysis**

The nexus between democracy and development has emerged as a topical issue in society and politics in Africa, as elsewhere, since the end of the Cold War. There are a number of reasons for this development, not the least that the post-Cold War era coincided with the incubation and festering of aspirations for democracy as a universal value (McFaul 2004). The late Twentieth Century period also presented the United Nations Organization with the opportunity to reengage with the whole world in new and special ways that did not only suggest a reassessment of development goals and strategy, but also the coordinated global commitment to support the achievement of human development needs by 2015. Added to these reasons is the implicit perception of democracy, which did not only ignite aspiration for it as a *universal value* (Sen 1999) and the demand for democracy as a *world value* (Gershman 2005), but also the imperative of democratic government as *the only game in town* (Linz and Stepan 1996) as well as the assumption of its impact on the development agenda of nation-states.

The impact of democracy on development is often placed within the context of a supposed positive effect on the development project and transformation programs of states, especially as it concerns the developing countries. It is assumed that democracy

not only facilitates a strong developmental state, but that it also strengthens the capacity of state to confront social and economic challenges (Ake 1996; Diamond 2005; Edigheji 2005; Halperin et al. 2005; Olson 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000). This perspective of democracy as essentially positive player in the development architecture is however facing increasingly strident criticism. The criticisms emanate from the contemporary growth, character and manifestation of the range of unique political regimes in Africa (Van de Walle 2002). Levitsky and Way (2010) for instance, writes of the rise of *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. In this study, they demonstrate how political regimes that experienced political transitions often appropriate state resources as well as political power and use this wherewithal to undermine rather than promote socio-economic development. Similar points had been made by Zakaria (1997), Diamond (2002) and van de Walle (2002). Fareed Zakaria (1997) in particular, writes about the manifestation of *illiberal* democratic states that fulfill the minimal conditions of electoral democracy without substantial transformation to consolidated democracies that have substantive values of democracy and qualities of democratic government.

It should be stated that the quest for and struggle by African peoples for democratic governance are conceived as means to two important ends: to checkmate the consolidation of authoritarian rule once perceived as the clog in the wheel of economic development, and to initiate and sustain human development programs in the continent. Claude Ake (2000) once asserted that the leading role and commitment of the masses in the struggle for the enthronement of democracy in Africa was because of their ultimate desire to harvest the most gain from the restructuring of political and economic power of democratic states. He, in fact, insisted that the masses (the citizenry) must be recognized as the motive force of any serious democratization before the process can succeed. Therefore, aspirations for democracy in sub-Saharan African countries emanated from the popular discourse and believe that the region cannot develop without democracy, and that democracy in Africa ultimately cannot be sustained without development (Ake 1996; Diamond 2005; Hadenius 1992). Therefore, when the *third wave* (Huntington 1991) of democratization assisted political transitions in sub-Saharan African countries, many observers were optimistic that a major turning point in the political economy of the region had come. This optimism was understandable; especially after three decades of post-colonial governance characterized by chronic failure of military autocratic and one-party authoritarian regimes in many of these countries to establish and guarantee developmental states (Amuwo 2008; Edigheji 2005, 2010); abuse of state power by corrupt elites (Diamond 2008; Lewis 2008); a general state of economic decline and mismanagement (World Bank 1989) and above all, rising jumbo external indebtedness (Fosu 1996; Ogunlana 2005; Sichula 2012). Expectedly then, how to tackle the myriad governance challenges and their monumental consequences triggered by autocratic rule has since become one of the enduring expectations of the citizenry from the “new” governments in place in virtually all the countries in the region. However, after about two decades of democratic governance in sub-Saharan African countries, there are observable trends in democratic governance styles which contradict the potential value of democracy as well as work against the peoples’ aspiration

for democratic governments, and indeed portray African democratization in unique context that are different from the same process and achievements in other regions of the world. These unique trends as well as the attendant consequences for sustainable development are generating critical debates about the rhetoric of the capacity of democracy vis-à-vis achieving developmental aspirations of the citizenry from Cairo to the Cape. The analysis of observable gaps between the peoples' aspiration for and performance of democratic governments in sub-Saharan African region as well as meeting one of the most important MDGs, poverty reduction, constitute the preoccupation of this paper.

## **Governance, Corruption and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan African Countries**

The United Nations' (UN) Millennium declaration and the unanimous agreement of about 189 countries in September 2000 to pursue the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have dominated the global development policy agenda since the beginning of the twenty-first century (The United Nations 2013). The unanimous decision to achieve the MDGs for mankind in 2015 represents the global biggest promises, time-bound and quantified targets for tackling extreme poverty in its many ramifications across the world (UNDP 2010; Lawal et al. 2012). This bundle of promises is therefore, a commitment on the part of the international community, under the auspices of the UN, for urgent action agenda which emphasizes poverty reduction as the key to fulfilling progress in human development. However, the achievement of these promises is premised on global partnership through collaborative efforts of national development policy strategies. Meaning that, the achievement of the MDG targets in the respective countries throughout the world, including the sub-Saharan African countries, would be difficult without the primary ingredient of country-level collaboration, in terms of national development initiatives and programs. The formulation and implementation of such collaborative national policies and programs are supposed to be the basic contributions of national governments in the business of achieving the MDGs. It is against this background that the contributions of the democratically elected governments in sub-Saharan African countries, using the comparative case studies of Nigeria and South Africa, is examined and analyzed in this paper. Beyond this, with less than 250 days to the 2015 set target for MDGs, the focus on country performance should shift from achieving the set targets by this year to developing a sustainable framework for the post-2015 development agenda. In this regard, this paper considers political governance as a veritable framework that has the potential to improve on the level of progress recorded in achieving the MDGs, especially, poverty reduction in Africa.

Various national and continental policies and programs aimed at reducing poverty as well as to initiate rapid and sustainable socio-economic development have been espoused and taken by African leaders as evidenced by some important development initiatives and measures to broadly pursue the MDG targets. Such a development

initiative and measures include the establishment of the African Union and the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as well as the various national development policies and programs like Vision 2010; Vision 20, 2020; Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Program (SURE-P) in Nigeria and South Africa's transformation agenda, to mention a few. The effective implementation of these initiated programmes and policies is expected to bolster national and regional efforts towards meeting the MDG targets. In recognition of the special needs of Africa for poverty reduction and accelerated sustainable development, the Millennium declaration called on its member states to support the consolidation of democracy in the region and African states were to take special measures to address the challenges of poverty reduction. The recognition and subsequent commitment of both global as well as regional communities to MDGs in Africa, coupled with national development initiatives, raised hopes of achieving MDG targets by 2015.

However, studies have revealed that while there has been economic growth in Africa, the continent as a whole experienced an increase in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty from 44.6 % in 1990 to 46.5 % in 2001 (World Bank 2000, 2008). Although, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty in 2013 is less than half of what it was in 1990. Yet, more than one billion people worldwide are still poor; inequality and social exclusion seem to be rising in several countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2013). Achieving the poverty reduction target across the world entails a 50 % reduction in the proportion of people living on less than \$ 1.25 per day by 2015. If achieved, the number of people living in extreme poverty would be reduced to 890 million; out of this figure, over 300 million people reside in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2008). As a result of all these situations and expectations, sub-Saharan African countries are expected to ensure and maintain ambitious but achievable development policies and goals aimed at reducing poverty. The responsibility of achieving such development goals has not only fallen on democratic governments, but the expectations are supposed to be anchored by good governance. Recent trends and prospects, in terms of governance and economic activity as well as poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa, calls for sober reflection as a result of an evident gap between economic growth and sustainable development in the region. The imperative of the sober reflection is necessary against the backdrop of the paradox of classical records of economic growth, visible potentials in resource endowment and financial prosperity on the one hand, and persistent strong socio-economic challenges, underpinned by failures of democratic governments to transform the rhetoric of positive relationships between democracy-development and the declaratory development programs to the reality of poverty reduction on the other hand.

It is on record that sub-Saharan African countries' economies expanded at an estimated 4.6 % per year during the 1999–2010, despite this success, more people are living on less than \$1.25 a day (World Bank 2013). According to this report, an estimated 413 million in 2010 compared with 376 million in 1999 represents an increase in the number of poor people in sub-Saharan Africa. The unacceptably high level of poverty as well as the unacceptably low pace of its reduction is causing concern among proponents of complementarity of democracy and development,

political observers and economic analysts, especially at time like now that the MDGs' target year is fast approaching. Sustained growth is necessary, but it is not sufficient to meet the challenges of accelerating poverty level in Africa. The region's high inequality, fostered by corrupt governance styles of democratic governments, weighs down on the growth elasticity of poverty and, therefore, hinders the conversion of economic growth into poverty reduction. Faster reduction in poverty level is possible, but it will require a decline in government's financial recklessness and indeed, improvement in the quality of governance in order to generate impressive outcomes. Improvement in quality of governance and poverty reduction will require rigidity to democratic values; improvements in political will and commitment to anti-corruption initiatives and policies and perhaps very instructive for this paper, strengthening the regulatory institutions for effective performance. Assessing country performance and analyzing the source(s) of challenges to the achievement of MDGs target are critical in understanding and knowing the factors responsible for the slow pace of progress in sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the most important and enduring themes in development discourse in Africa, as elsewhere, is governance (Bratton et al. 2005; Landsberg and Mackay 2004; Matlosa 2005) because the institutional and human capacities of government determine the effectiveness of public policies as well as the strategies for political goods and service delivery. There is therefore a growing understanding that institutions of governance are essential to the success or failure of government to achieve development goals (Acemogolu 2008) as well as the overall transformative program of nation-states. Therefore, governance has assumed the important position of connecting the social contract purpose of government with the developmental aspirations of the citizenry. What, then, is governance? Governance refers to the exercise of political and administrative authority at all levels of government to manage a country's affairs. The UNDP defines governance as "a process of creating and sustaining an environment for inclusive and responsive political processes and settlements" (UNDP 2011). In the context of complementarity between democracy and development, governance refers to an essential part of the broader cluster of institutions working together to achieve the essence of democracy: promoting and sustaining development. Daron Acemogolu categorizes the important elements of governance to include political institutions, state capacity and regulatory institutions of governance (Acemogolu 2008). Thus, the outcome of governance ultimately depends on state capacity, commitment of institutions of government in their engagement as well as the effectiveness of the regulatory agencies in checkmating governance styles. In other words, the process of collective decision-making which determines the effectiveness of the state policies and programs should be moderated by the intervention of public regulatory institutions of governance before the state can sincerely perform its primary assignment.

Consequently, governance institutions of a country may either create incentives for great productivity or serve as an opportunity for public officers to appropriate state resources for their selfish ends, thus engendering resources for socio-economic development, which in turn, threatens the achievement of MDGs. Democratic governance is popularly espoused and acknowledged as one of the keys to development,

arguing that its processes, regulations and institutions play a major role in economic growth and human empowerment (Diamond 2005). The gap inherent in the achievement of the MDGs' targets in sub-Saharan African countries has brought into fore the yet to abate debate about the failure of governments in post-independence African states. This gap also reveals that democratic administrations hardly impact on economic development and have little accountability to their citizens. The strategy of the political regimes is that political leaders maintained political control largely through weak institutions of governance and patron-client networks (Lewis 2008) which sustain personal enrichment of the political leaders rather fulfil the purpose of their enthronement. Hence, African leaders enjoy broad latitude in the use of public resources not only to procure political support through ad hoc redistribution rather than by furnishing collective public goods (Lewis 2008), but also deprive their citizens of the much needed socio-economic services. The consequences of governance failures have been economic stagnation, recurring fiscal crises, and deepening poverty in many of the sub-Saharan African countries.

Because the fight against poverty is not simply a social, economic and technical objective alone but also a political and institutional goal, then, good governance has become an important framework of achieving poverty reduction. The imperative of good governance goes hand in hand with scholars' agreement on the theory that development problems are directly linked to failure in governance (Przeworski et al. 2000) and the prevailing assumption in international development policy that democracy is a principal mechanism to reducing poverty in Africa (Hyden 2007). This perhaps explains why the global campaigns for achievement of MDGs have not simply emphasized the need for larger financial commitment from donor countries but have also focused on the way in which these funds should be managed and spent. Again, this relates to efficient governance through effective public policy management systems in the recipient countries, routed in good governance frameworks. The efficiency of institutions of governance is therefore increasingly becoming important in the focus of development thoughts and analyses, especially when assessing progress in and challenges to the achievement of MDGs' targets in Africa. If the institutions of governance are not working as expected, the population of the "poor people" in the society would not only increase, but their living conditions would also deteriorate and indeed makes them vulnerable to other man-made and natural catastrophes. For instance, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and the ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as in Central African Republic are typical examples of man-made catastrophes where the living standards of the citizens have been greatly affected. Also, the level of poverty, orchestrated by failures of government to provide essential social and economic services, is usually exposed during such man-made conflicts and natural disasters when certain emergency goods and services are required.

Against this background, this paper examines and analyzes the performance of democratic governments in Nigeria and South Africa, considering the recognized governance challenge in these countries. The choice of these countries for the assessment of progress recorded in achieving MDGs' targets in Africa is important for a number of reasons. First, Nigeria and South Africa are the de facto leaders of

West and Southern Africa sub-regions respectively, to the extent that whatever happens in these countries could have ramifications for their neighbors. Second, these countries have not only assumed leadership positions, but have also discharged responsibilities as leaders within and outside their regions. They are particularly influential regionally, as a result of their investment and political engagement across the continent as well as active roles and leadership within the inter-governmental African Union (AU). Third, while Nigeria has an oil-rich, yet to be diversified economy with a huge population of about 160 million people, South Africa has the largest, most diversified, and highly industrialized economy (Cook 2013). This point buttresses their regional and global importance for international relations, including relieving development donor countries of some avoidable responsibilities. Fourth, and finally, these countries exemplify the sample representatives of the type of regimes that dominated Africa's political space in the first three decades of its post-independence years, military authoritarian and restrictive democratic regimes.

Some scholars have argued and analyzed the negative impacts of colonialism on sub-Saharan Africa's underdevelopment, stressing that the colonial powers trained and handed over power to the political elites that are ready to maintain neo-colonial relationships through structurally rigid bureaucracies that were established through colonialism. However, the point that should be stressed here also is that, locating the blame of underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa within the perspective of colonialism alone is an attempt to narrowly rationalize persistent poverty in order to avoid a holistic examination of governance failures. The major point that must be emphasized in this regard is that Africans cannot continue to accept their leaders' deception about colonialism as the unstoppable cause of the persistent poverty as well as hindrance to achieving sustainable development in the region. The thrust of this paper is that the problem of socio-economic crisis in sub-Saharan African countries is symptomatic of deeper and festering governance challenges facing African societies and must be addressed from this particularistic premise. It is important however that the symptom be treated separately from the cause, because it is the evasive tendency to shift the cause on external parties that has fuelled escalation of the diabolical exploits of African governors and driven denial of checkmating governance recklessness. There is an even bigger concern in the twenty-first century, especially in the context of challenges posed by globalization (Hedley 2001). In Africa today, there is sufficient evidence that the globalization process is going to bypass, marginalize or completely neglect millions of people for several decades to come (Ukeje and Iwilade 2012) unless there is a new preoccupation in national, continental, and global policy debate and action focusing on how to improve the quality of human development, especially for the most marginalized and vulnerable social categories in Africa.

Perhaps it is the recognition of the governance challenge and the determination to address the problem that motivated as well as influenced the decision by the Nigerian and South African governments to formulate anti-graft policies and establish anti-corruption agencies in their respective countries. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) were established in Nigeria, while the South African government established about ten anti-corruption monitoring and enforcement agencies. Prominent among

these agencies are: Public Service Commission (PSC), National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Directorate of Special Operations (operates under the NPA), Assess Forfeiture Unit (operates under the NPA) and Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) (Jackson et al. 2009). These anti-corruption agencies were established basically to investigate, prosecute, regulate, monitor and evaluate governance institutions' bureaucratic performance in the public and private sectors (Jackson et al. 2009). A noticeable feature of debate concerning the functioning of these anti-graft agencies in Nigeria and South Africa has been to what extent their efforts have improved the functional capacity and ability of the state to police corruption within its institutions of government. Although, these anti-corruption agencies have been able to record little successes especially in the area of sensitizing the populace to the ills of corruption, yet a lot are still left undone concerning high profile corruption, particularly in Nigeria where billions of dollars in oil proceeds usually disappear between the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

There is therefore the need to strengthen anti-graft agencies in SSA through compulsory enforcement of anti-graft rules to all culprits, irrespective of their status, influence and political power. Strengthened anti-corruption agencies would be capable of checkmating political power as well as economic and financial recklessness of governing elites in the region. Also there is the need to strategize the formulation as well as implementation of development policies and programs with a view to accommodating the vigorous pursuit of MDGs' objectives, especially poverty reduction that would invariably promote the region's numerous social, economic, governance and other aspirations of the citizenry. It is the absence of regulatory institutions capable of monitoring, evaluating and regulating the evolving post-1990s democratic governments' institutional architecture that constitute the missing link in complimentary democracy-development debates which, in turn, creates an enabling environment for the growing gaps between aspirations for democracy and democratic governments' performance in sub-Saharan African countries. Finally, democratic governance should be targeted at achieving its essence because the outcomes of governance go a long way to affecting the citizens' living standards. This imperative would enable democratic governments to separate personal interests from the citizens' desires. The basis of aspiration and African people's struggle for democracy is to better the lots of the citizenry; therefore, the governance goals of democratic governments in sub-Saharan Africa should be the prompting, promotion and sustenance of poverty reduction.

## **Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation**

What I have done above is to take a broad look at the context within which aspiration for democracy in sub-Saharan African countries evolved, understanding it as both the failure of previous autocratic and democratic (apartheid) restrictive regimes to formulate and implement effective strategy for achieving



socio-economic development. Despite the experiences of political transitions that ushered in democratic governments in sub-Saharan African countries, there are persistent socio-economic challenges, evidence of slow progress in achieving poverty reduction in the region. This situation subjects the supposed complementarity between democratic governance and development to critical debate, especially on the development discourse in Africa. The lack of complementarity, largely as a result of governance challenge, creates gaps, which are worth minding, in theory and practice among academic scholars and policymakers. The gaps constitute a threat to politics and development. Potentially, expanding gaps could be a source of destabilizing for democracies that are already diminishing in terms of their qualities of governance through corruption. It also threatens state and human security as a result of frustrations emanating from the failure of governments to provide expected political goods.

In the discussions of democracy and development in sub-Saharan African countries, it is normatively satisfying but empirically unhelpful to predicate socio-economic transformation of the region on the content and context of current political regimes in the continent. That democratic governance is potentially desirable for development does not automatically make it the panacea for resolving socio-economic challenges in sub-Saharan African countries; given the governance styles of the political regimes current on ground. Certain prerequisites are therefore necessary before democratic governments could be better placed to live up to the developmental expectations of the citizenry. That said, however, a narrowly conceptualized or election-focused view of democracy as legitimated by internal struggles and external donors support as well as the assumption of its ability to deliver public goods omits far too many substances. I have also shown that frustration and anger of the citizenry as a result of constraints created by a hostile socio-economic context and the immediate impact on political stability in African societies, portends great shortcoming to the overall achievement of MDGs in the continent. I identify colonial and neo-colonial experiences of African states as the key normative frameworks that have been exploited by post-independence leaders in the region to rationalize persistent poverty in order to cover up the more than 50 years of governance failures and stressed that emphasizing the impacts of colonialism is, in itself, a tactic on the part of political leaders and their cronies to escape the blame of governance failures.

The perspective of this paper is that, the gap between the essence of democracy and the performance of democratic governments in sub-Saharan African countries flows from broader political crises generated by the institutions of governance in the region. The solution to this problem is, therefore, the imperative of reconstructing African political and economic sectors in ways that the state could address the issue of governance crisis. To properly situate governance in the context of achieving the MDGs' targets in Africa, it is important to point to the existing analytical congruencies, and also to stipulate the quality of governance that could accurately reflect the reality and performance in terms of peoples' expectation in the twenty-first-century Africa. A democratic government must incorporate the substantive qualities of good governance into its electoral qualifications before it can effectively perform the

expected roles that are required of it. First, it must be responsive and sensitive to the expectations of the citizenry. Second, it must be responsible enough to fulfil its pre-election promises, because its election must have been based on these promises as well as the decision by the people to confer the social contractual right on the government that is in power. Third, it must respect the sanctity of the constitution and the social contract deal between the governed and governors, and this must reflect in the exercise of power as well as the control of the same by the people through the regulatory institutions of governance. Fourth, and finally, perhaps most importantly, there must be separation but cooperation of powers between the three arms of government, rather than unequal power relationship which breeds collaboration for conspiracy against the citizenry. In this regard, the rule of law must be allowed to operate freely without executive overrule, while the courts of law should also function without presidential influence and interference. Furthermore, the legislature and other regulatory institutions must be alive, committed and uphold not only its oversight functions, but also be willing and ready to checkmate executive financial recklessness.

With these qualities, there will be assurances, as Diamond (2005) demonstrates that the inseparable links between democracy, good governance and development would not only guarantee socio-economic development, but also meet MDGs and other important human development targets in Africa. Related to these assurances is the growing imperative of appropriating the public sphere made possible largely by the empowering characteristics of democracy. Ironically, democratic governments in sub-Sahara Africa have become a critically emergent category through which we may understand the dynamics of governance, power and control in the emerging African political space. As important as democratic governance involvement in the development project is, the implications for socio-economic development and thus state reconstruction, is perhaps much more significant in terms of quality and governance styles. Thus, democratic governance must be recognized not only as capable of freeing African people from dominance by the paternalistic and patrimonial systems but also as capable of reconfiguring the nature of governance within the broader society. It should be noted that the apprehensions of scholars, political analysts and other observers about the performance of democratic governments in Africa are most deeply embedded in this political implication. Any accurate reading of democratic governance in Africa must thus take note of this political ramification and perhaps utilize it as a fundamental framework of analysis. This paper takes due note of this political ramification and pays attention to how the governance styles of electoral democracies can help us understand the socio-economic challenges facing African countries, as well as how these challenges are altering and redefining the conceptualization of democratic governments in their engagements within and with societies on the continent. This occurs within the particular context of governance-specific experiences of democratic government failures, particularly in conflict societies like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, North and South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo, to mention but a few. These situations demonstrate the intersection that can be discerned between governance failures and broader questions of democracy, economic crisis and human development in Africa.

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# Chapter 19

## Social Protection: An Alternative or Not for Africa's Post-2015 Development Agenda Alternative?

Julie Drolet

### Introduction

For over a decade, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been centre stage in development initiatives from policy design to program implementation in the poorest countries around the world, particularly in Africa. The United Nations spear-headed the MDGs with the support of global organizations such as the World Health Organization and the World Bank, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and state leaders. As the 2015 deadline for the MDGs fast approaches, and the overall success of the eight objectives is arguably bleak, the development discourse has now turned to alternatives. One alternative that has become increasingly favoured is social protection. Social protection initiatives include mechanisms such as social transfers, social services, and social insurance delivered by the state or civil society to mitigate social, economic, and environmental risks for vulnerable individuals and marginalized population groups. This chapter proposes that international initiatives and efforts to support national social protection floors need to be strengthened. While social protection is not an alternative to the MDGs with respect to Africa's post-2015 development agenda but rather it is a framework to work towards achieving the essence of the MDGs namely establishing security and quality of life for those most vulnerable. A number of social protection initiatives that were implemented in Africa are successful. Social protection policies and programs, grounded in social development, sustainable livelihoods, and gender-analyses approaches do not have to expunge the MDGs but rather continue building upon their successful outcomes within the last 15 years in Africa by providing social protection for all.

The term social protection, or social security in the field of social policy, recently became popular, although it has been used for many years (Midgley 2014).

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Governments in developed and developing countries are re-evaluating their social policies and programs, re-examining their social safety nets, and seeking new options in the reform of social protection and social welfare systems (Morales-Gomez et al. 2000). Social security is a social and economic necessity to combat poverty and social exclusion, and promote development, equality, and equal opportunity. This is particularly important given that one in five people, or over one billion people, still live in extreme poverty, and that one in seven or 14 % is undernourished, all within the context of demographic change with the world's population projected to exceed nine billion by 2050 (United Nations 2012). Social protection can be defined as limited government income transfers such as government social insurance and social assistance schemes to maintain or subsidize income, or in broader terms to include diverse forms of welfare intervention, the redistribution of resources, and to foster social equality (Midgley 2014). Social protection is a term that describes all initiatives that transfer income or assets to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of extending the benefits of economic growth and reducing the economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable, and marginalized people (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2007). In Africa social services are usually thought to include health, education, social security, social work, and housing, and more broadly sanitation, employment, corrections, and legal services (Aryeetey and Goldstein 2000). However, social policy may have different emphases depending on the country or region but often involves public programs directed at a variety of levels and types of social need and a practical focus on poverty alleviation (Aryeetey and Goldstein 2000). Family and community support networks also play an important role in many communities where there are no formal social protection provisions.

The potential role of social protection became increasingly relevant since the 2007–2009 global economic and financial crisis. There is evidence to support that there has been a fundamental transformation in the world economy, which is unprecedented, and draws implications for nation states and the welfare of their citizens (Perraton 2011). Globalization has been accompanied by the internationalization of social problems where issues that arise in one location become problematic in another (Dominelli 2010). Similarly, Lyons argues that globalization takes us beyond the bilateral and sometimes multilateral relationships evident in earlier periods of colonization and postcolonial arrangements to a situation where the impact of events and decisions in one country or region can have far-reaching effects on the populations of apparently or formally unrelated countries (Lyons 2006, 367). An argument for the need to develop and implement social protection programs during periods of economic hardship in global recessions and in time of economic growth to provide economic and social buffers for the poor are being called for (Davies and McGregor 2009; ILO 2011). As a result of the financial crisis many have lost their homes, their jobs, their savings, and their future pensions. The crisis has shown that social security systems are by design powerful economic and social stabilizers of economies and societies where they exist (ILO 2010a).

The impact of the global economic crisis has negatively affected the progress of the MDGs, renewing calls for a new development paradigm (Chibba 2011), and the long-term impact on human development could be felt longer in many African countries (Conceição et al. 2011). Social protection is not considered a temporary measure to cushion the impact of the crisis, but rather as an ongoing investment to promote sustained, inclusive, and equitable economic growth (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2011). The recent economic crisis has demonstrated the importance of structural progress towards extending social protection in a coherent and coordinated manner at national and local levels (ILO 2011). The concept of development has evolved over time and has been subject to ongoing discussions. With the multiple and interconnected crises the world is facing today with respect to food, energy, and climate, or jobs and employment, the notion of sustainable development has gained forced. There is renewed interest in integrating environmental, social, and economic policies for social development (Drolet 2014; Schnurr and Holtz 1998), which is also referred to as the *triple bottom line* (Sachs 2012). This is a challenge that varies by regions and by cultural and socioeconomic conditions. In Africa, the emphasis tends to be on social development, the relationship between economic and social policies, and the trade-offs between poverty and environmental degradation (Schnurr and Holtz 1999). This conceptual shift of development has implications for the post-2015 development agenda and is discussed later in this chapter.

In April 2009, the United Nations System's Chief Executives Board for Co-ordination (CEB) launched the Social Protection Floor Initiative. Endorsed by UN Member States at the Rio +20 Conference on Sustainable Development, and supported by the G20 and many other fora, the Initiative garnered significant attention and momentum. The Social Protection Floor seeks to guarantee access to nationally defined baskets of essential goods, services, and income transfers that ensure that people are not hungry, do not suffer from treatable illnesses, do not remain uneducated, do not have to resort to unsafe water, and do not remain homeless; it is based on the idea that people who have access to a basic set of goods, services, and transfers are lifted out of poverty or vulnerability and can become more productive contributors to the economy (Cichon et al. 2011). The adoption of the social protection floor concept reflects the emergence of a new socioeconomic development paradigm and a new global contract, in that it guarantees that all workers and citizens have the capacity to participate in economic, social, political, and cultural life (Cichon et al. 2011; Van Ginneken 2011). The significance and importance of this initiative is highlighted in the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation No. 202.

## **ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202)**

In June 2012, governments, employers, and workers of the ILO's 185 member States unanimously adopted the ILO Recommendation Concerning National Floors of Social Protection (No. 202). The Recommendation reaffirms social security as a

human right for all persons and provides guidance for building comprehensive social security systems. This Recommendation includes two parts: (1) the commitment of member states towards national social protection floors; and (2) recommendations in the implementation of national social protection floors. For the purpose of this Recommendation, social protection floors are nationally defined sets of basic social security guarantees, which secure protection aimed at preventing or alleviating poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion. Such guarantees may be achieved through contributory or non-contributory schemes, whether means tested or not (ILO 2012). According to the Recommendation, the social protection floors should comprise at least the following basic social security guarantees:

- (a) Access to a nationally defined set of goods and services, constituting essential health care, including in the case of maternity;
- (b) Basic income security for children, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, providing access to nutrition, education, care and any other necessary goods and services;
- (c) Basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, including in case of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability; and
- (d) Basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons in old age (ILO 2012, 10).

As a priority, social protection floors are to be developed (and/or strengthened) and adapted to national circumstances. A number of steps have been taken to advance this work in many countries. Developing or strengthening national social protection floors includes relevant national stakeholders and development partners as a priority. National dialogues, including governments, on potential options for designing and implementing locally appropriate Social Protection Floors (SPFs), consistent with relevant provisions in the ILO Recommendation, and related initiatives—such as WHO’s work on universal health coverage and existing national development priorities and strategies are underway. Assisting countries to undertake analysis of social protection needs and gaps, optional measures, which would close these gaps, and develop tools to monitor progress and identify possible sources of financing is ongoing in order to increase floors over time. In the context of preparing United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), promoting SPFs as instruments to advance inclusive and sustainable development is considered. Working with national statistical offices to strengthen their ability to collect the data needed to analyse social protection needs and existing provisions, disaggregated by factors such as gender, age, and geographical locality is another priority. The Social Protection Floor Advisory Group (2011) describes a social protection floor that is anchored in shared principles of social justice and in the universal right of everyone to social security and to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of themselves and their families, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary social services. A floor of social protection is economically affordable and can be introduced, completed or maintained everywhere, in accordance with national circumstances. All societies should also develop strategies to enhance



their levels of social security, guided by ILO social security standards as their economies mature and fiscal space widens.

Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008) argue that social protection needs to not only respond to the economic needs of individuals and households but address their social risk and vulnerabilities. Social risks may be categorized as *structural* or *contingent* and refer to situations where groups or individuals are marginalized or discriminated against, and by their nature have longer-term implications for poverty and vulnerability than contingent risk, which is a function of environmental or economic factors, such as an earthquake (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008). Strategies to deal with problems of social vulnerability require a transformative element, where *transformative* refers to the need to pursue policies that integrate individuals equally into society, allowing everyone to take advantage of the benefits of growth and enabling excluded or marginalized groups to claim their rights (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008, 70).

## Human Right to Social Security

Social security is a human right. This right is recognized in numerous international legal instruments, such as the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Drolet (2014) outlines the nature of these rights and provides appendices to the instruments in her recent book. Regional treaties of relevance include the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981), also known as the Banjul Charter, which is an international human rights instrument that is intended to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in the African continent. Although social security is a human right, only a minority of the world's population actually enjoys that right, while the majority lack comprehensive and adequate coverage (ILO 2010a). In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people with access to even the most rudimentary protection is estimated to be less than 10 % (ILO 2010a).

## The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015, were adopted by UN Member States in 2000. The MDGs are recognized widely as a global anti-poverty initiative that helped to set global and national priorities and action to raise awareness and shape a framework for development work across the world (United Nations 2014). The MDGs are referred to as the world's largest promise based on an agreement and roadmap towards poverty reduction and social development through international

cooperation (Hulme 2009). While the responsibility to implement development policies lies with individual nation states, the MDGs were formulated in a process marked by lack of ownership of some developing countries and the lack of responsibility of some developed countries (Rae et al. 2014). According to the South Centre, the MDGs are based on a donor-centric view of development (Akyuz 2014). Debates on the question of what will happen after the target date of 2015 for the MDGs are well underway, with efforts to accelerate progress and to prepare for the post-2015 development framework. Since 2010 UN agencies identified some of the challenges in achieving the MDGs for a number of structural reasons.

Achieving the MDGs is now all the more challenging because the development environment is more threatened now than it has been at any time in the recent past. A global economic slowdown, a food security crisis of uncertain magnitude and duration, the development impact of climate change, all directly affect efforts to reduce poverty and to attain the MDGs more broadly. And, for many developing countries, there is a risk that important advances made can quickly unravel. (UNDP 2010, 2)

The assessment of progress towards the MDGs is based on global averages, and growing inequalities within countries are often concealed (ILO 2011). Beyond 2015 there remains work to be done on poverty, hunger, health, gender equality, water, sanitation, environment, and many other issues that will inform the sustainable development agenda to build on the progress achieved through the MDGs while addressing persistent inequalities and new challenges. The post-2015 development agenda will hopefully improve on the process by adopting a more participatory approach towards goal formulation that promotes ownership and ensures consistency between goals, targets, and indicators, and extends the responsibility for the achievement of development goals and sustainability to the developed world for a truly global initiative (Rae et al. 2014).

A group of researchers at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance at the United Nations University (UNU MERIT) considered the need to evaluate the impact of the MDGs on social policies and the lives of people. In their discussion paper the authors demonstrate that while the MDG experience has been remarkable in directing the international community towards embracing social development objectives in the form of goals, targets, and indicators, the world is still marked by social and economic inequities. The researchers question whether the MDG experience is an indicator that global social governance fails or exists, and if so, is it effective? The term global social governance is defined as the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-border relations between states, cultures, citizens, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the market in the social sphere, including social protection, education, health, and habitat (Deacon et al. 2003; Rae et al. 2014; Weiss 2009). The discussion paper argues that the MDG experiences suggests that global social governance exists and that the MDGs have been an effective tool in creating a global accountability framework for national policies using goals, targets and indicators (GTI approach) to measure progress.

The new development agenda will need to advance sustainable development in order to improve economic and social well-being while protecting the environment, and address issues such as inclusive growth, equality, peace and security, governance and human rights (United Nations 2014). There is a need for global transformational change with common, shared responsibilities for all countries, recognizing that countries have different capabilities. The new development framework post-2015 will draw on experience gained in implementing the MDGs and be concrete, understandable, and inspirational, with time-bound targets, for which measurable indicators can be developed. The International Labour Organization (2011) identified explicit linkages and ways in which social protection accelerates MDGs and beyond into mainstream development policy as a systemic approach.

The Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 produced a document entitled "*The Future We Want*." In this document countries recognized the advances towards achieving MDG targets to eradicate poverty and promote human development, and the need for a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) that are global in nature and universally applicable. In the UN Resolution adopted by the General Assembly poverty eradication is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development (United Nations 2012). Since Rio+20, the UN General Assembly has established a 30-member Working Group to develop these goals. While the MDGs are mainly development goals for less developed countries, the SDGs will include developed countries, thus changing the debate of whose goals these are, and for whom they are, and potentially make new development goals truly global objectives (Raee et al. 2014).

The UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Post-2015 was formed in July 2012 with 27 members, including government leaders and representatives from civil society and the private sector. It was tasked with advising the Secretary-General on the future development agenda. The Panel's proposals consist of five transformational shifts. The new agenda must include everyone. It requires sustainable development at its core in order to drive prosperity and eliminate inequalities while addressing threats to humanity from climate change and environmental degradation. It makes creating jobs and sustainable livelihoods a priority. It establishes that peace, security, and freedom from violence are essential. And it calls for forging a new global partnership to support this transformative agenda. A consultation process involving governments, the private sector, civil society groups, academics, and youth is informing the development of a set of sustainable development goals. The interconnections between environmental, economic, and social challenges, is apparent. The social protection floor represents an effective tool to accelerate the achievement of MDGs and beyond in charting a more sustainable development path by addressing multidimensional vulnerabilities in an integrated and interconnected way (ILO 2011).

## Social Protection Floors in the Sustainable Development Agenda

Following consultations with UN member states and civil society, the Open Working Group has now recognized the need to strengthen social protection floors and social security systems as part of the Sustainable Development Goals. Some countries and major groups defend social protection as a stand-alone goal, others as a component of a larger goal, such as an employment and decent work, poverty or equality goal. In any case, the Social Protection Floors

Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) is a legitimate base to guide possible targets. The possible social protection targets and indicators, to be transformational and make a real difference in people's lives by 2030, must address two issues: (1) universal coverage for all, and (2) adequate benefits, ensuring that at least all in need receive sufficient income support and access to health services according to national levels, as agreed in the Social Protection Floors Recommendation.

A perennial constraint and major contemporary problem is the lack of sufficient economic opportunities for the working age population. Employment, or decent work, is an essential pathway to poverty reduction, even though the majority of the poor work, and the vast majority of the working poor, especially women, are engaged in the informal economy. The links between being informally employed, being a woman or a man and being poor, and on the changing nature of informal employment has been debated in the relevant literature since the discovery of the informal economy in Africa in the early 1970s (Chen et al. 2004). It remains useful because it captures the large share of the global workforce that is not covered by labour legislation or social protection. Poor people working in the informal economy face lower incomes, greater financial risks, lower standards of human development, and greater social exclusion compared to workers in the formal economy. There is a greater need to pay attention to women workers in the informal economy due to gender inequality that intersects with economic deprivation to produce more intensified forms of poverty for women than men (Kabeer 2003). The social protection floor initiative is informed by this reality.

According to a number of studies and reports, there is national capacity to fund social protection floors in virtually all countries (ILO 2014). This can be accomplished through a variety of options. Re-allocating public expenditures is a strategy used by Mozambique to phase out a fuel subsidy to generate savings to fund its social protection floor. Mauritius used a similar strategy to convert military spending into social spending. Some countries have increased tax revenues to finance child benefits and pension schemes. Reductions of debt (or debt servicing) have been used in several countries including Botswana. Increasing social security revenues is a strategy used in Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa. Each country faces specific challenges to achieve sustainable development, particularly vulnerable countries such as least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing states, and African countries (United Nations 2012). The next section discusses a range of social protection schemes in African countries.

## **Essential Health Care in Ghana**

Formal health insurance is relatively new in Ghana, even though support for health care and in bereavement has been provided through traditional informal networks based on social capital and solidarity. Health care has been largely provided on a cash-for-service delivery system, but growing inequalities in the system have led to the implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme. Its mission is to ensure equitable universal access for all residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality of essential health services without out-of-pocket payment being required (ILO 2010b). Health insurance schemes are required to register with the government, and premiums are based on participants' ability to pay. The Ghanaian experience shows that it is possible for a country—whose workforce in the informal economy amounts to 90 % of the total workforce—to successfully address challenges such as insufficient funding, low service quality and exclusion, by introducing multiple social health protection schemes ranging from community-based schemes to a national health insurance scheme for different groups of the population (ILO 2010b). The provision of a comprehensive benefits package covering essential needs including general outpatient services, inpatient services, oral health, eye care, emergencies and maternal care, including prenatal care and normal delivery is another aspect of successful implementation. Concerns remain in relation to access and quality issues.

## **Income Security: Old Age in South Africa and Namibia**

The social pension system is an important source of support for poor households in South Africa. The pension provides a monthly benefit of around US\$ 70 to those beyond the pensionable age and who live in poverty. It is means-tested and tax-financed. Implementation is effective in preventing many vulnerable pensioners from falling into long-term poverty and in limiting the depth of poverty actually experienced. This is particularly true for women in rural households.

The Namibian non-contributory pension aims to reduce poverty among the elderly population similar to the South Africa scheme. Under the present law, a Namibian citizen residing in Namibia (who is not outside the country for a period of more than 6 months), and is above the age of 60 years, is entitled to an old-age pension. Research has demonstrated that the pension has contributed to the improved social status of the elderly in households (ILO 2010b).

## **Income Security: Other Cash Transfers in South Africa**

The Child Support Grant is a major publicly funded cash transfer program in South Africa used to reduce poverty among children in poor households. The Grant recognizes the rights of children and targets poor children, regardless of household

arrangements. In practical terms, it requires an adult to apply for, and collect, the grant (Barrientos and DeJong 2006). The cash transfer grant is paid to the caregiver of a child under 18 years, in contrast to a biological parent, in order to reflect the varied and fluid patterns of care giving observed in South Africa (Case et al. 2005). It is based on a means test and a flat rate benefit of approximately US\$ 34.50 is paid to the caregiver of the child who may be parents, grandparents, relatives, or nonrelatives (Patel 2012). Despite the small amount of the transfer, the child support grant serves to mitigate the vulnerability of poor households with children.

## Cash Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa

Cash transfer programs are increasingly important tools for poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. These programs target the ultra-poor with an emphasis on vulnerable children. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has recently joined forces with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa to collaborate on the project *From Protection to Production (PtoP)* to study the impact of cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa. There is a perception that exists among many officials in ministries of finance and the economy that cash transfer programs are just welfare, charity and/or handouts, and do not have economic impacts. This research project seeks to understand the potential economic development impacts of cash transfers on the rural poor in sub-Saharan Africa. It aims to enhance understanding of how social protection interventions can contribute to sustainable poverty reduction and economic growth at the household and community-levels. The project impact evaluation is focusing on the following social protection initiatives and programs: the Cash Transfers for Orphan and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) program in Kenya, the Tigray Social Cash Pilot in Ethiopia, the Malawi Social Cash Transfer program, the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) program in Ghana, the Child Grant Program in Lesotho, the Zambia Child Grant Program, and the Zimbabwe Social Cash Transfer Program (Food and Agriculture Organization 2014).

## Global Advocacy Efforts

The Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors comprises over ninety non-governmental organization (NGOs) and trade union federations to promote social protection floors as key instruments to achieve the overarching social goal of the global development agenda. Signatories include ActionAid International, Concern Worldwide, HelpAge International, International Council on Social Welfare, International Federation of Social Workers, OXFAM, and many other organizations and groups. The Coalition is advocating for the human right to social security,

defined at least as guaranteed basic income security and access to essential health care, to be realized by 2030, the next target date for the global development agenda. The Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors holds that the social protection floor concept developed by the UN Social Protection Floor Initiative, defined in the ILO Recommendation No. 202 must comprise the social objective of the post-2015 global development Agenda. According to the Coalition:

Well-designed social protection floors will reduce inequalities and proactively enhance gender equality because social protection guarantees have multiple and interconnected beneficial effects which can cause a virtual circle. Better education leads to better work life; access to health care, nutrition, water and sanitation maintains people in good health, and leads to more sustained employment; access to housing fosters stability, civic participation, and access to social service systems; assistance for women when childbearing enhances their prospects for fulltime work and a more consistent work history; lowered unemployment of youth leads to better lifelong work prospects and so on (Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors 2014).

The Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors promotes the right of all people residing in a country to social security, regardless of documentation. This is a challenge for migrant workers who are generally unable to access social protection programs due to their residency status.

## Discussion and Conclusion

The Rio +20 outcome document “*The Future We Want*” stresses the need to provide social protection to all members of society, fostering growth, resilience, social justice and cohesion, and strongly encourages national and local initiatives aimed at providing social protection floors for all citizens (Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals 2014). It further decided that the sustainable development goals are universally applicable to all countries including both developed and developing countries. The social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development are being considered and integrated in a new post-2015 development agenda. For example, the eradication of poverty has social, economic, and environmental dimensions. While there has been progress in reducing poverty in some regions with the MDGs, it is uneven and the number of people living in poverty in some countries continues to increase, especially for women and children in the least developed countries and particularly in Africa. Development-led globalization requires decolonizing the MDGs if the post-2015 global goals are to be truly developmental, and recognize the diversity of African countries with their own human and natural resources (Montes 2013). A more holistic definition of poverty is needed to go beyond the possession of an inadequate amount of income or economic resources to account for interlinked social deprivations. For example, the lack of economic resources can lead to a nutritional deficiency, which in turn, may cause one's health to deteriorate or reduce one's ability to learn. Similarly, being poor can stigmatize a group of individuals, rendering increasingly difficult

their breaking out of poverty and social inclusion. This is particularly important for children who cannot directly claim entitlements or access rights and services (Alexander 2011).

Within this framework the role of social protection measures, and specifically, social protection floors, are being raised in various fora at national and international levels. Promoting universal access to social services can make an important contribution to achieving development gains by addressing and reducing inequality and social exclusion. The question of whether there should be a convergence of the MDGs, SDGs, and the post-2015 development agenda continues to be discussed. The history, background, principles, and understandings of the MDGs and SDGs differ in significant ways, some of which have been presented in this chapter. Social protection was omitted from the MDG targets and indicators, yet the widely-endorsed social protection floor approach can address multidimensional vulnerabilities; it is considered a foundation for inclusive, equitable and sustainable development, and addresses the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainability (Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals 2014). The extension of social protection guarantees is a key initiative in promoting and establishing security and quality of life for those most vulnerable. This chapter discussed a number of social protection initiatives that are being implemented in Africa. There is great promise in social protection floor initiatives, grounded in social development approaches, in Africa that aim to provide social protection for all.

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## Chapter 20

# Conclusion: Africa Beyond 2015—MDG Prospects, Its Discontents, and Implications

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Eradicating extreme poverty continues to be one of the main challenges of our time, and is a major concern of the international community. Ending this scourge will require the combined efforts of all, governments, civil society organizations and the private sector, in the context of a stronger and more effective global partnership for development. The Millennium Development Goals set time bound targets, by which progress in reducing income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter and exclusion—while promoting gender equality, health, education and environmental sustainability—can be measured. They also embody basic human rights—the rights of each person on the planet to health, education, shelter and security. The Goals are ambitious but feasible and, together with the comprehensive United Nations development agenda, set the course for the world’s efforts to alleviate extreme poverty by 2015 (United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon)

When *The Economist* reassessed Africa as the continent of “new dynamics” and “hope for the future,” where there are good opportunities to invest and continue to generate large incomes in 2013, this change in perception signaled a perspective

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expressing strong optimism about where the continent is heading in terms of its development path. The 2013 caption represented a drastic change in the way the magazine has perceived Africa. The same magazine 10 years earlier in 2000 declared the continent as “hopeless” (see Appendix 20.1) and during the eve of the signing of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) declaration where leaders of the world (including African leaders) pledged to address development challenges facing the continent, Africa was viewed as a basket case with little or no hope of recovering. The MDGs declaration signatories agreed to find ways to improve the well-being of Africa’s poorest people and promised new partnerships, initiatives, and actions to materially elevate the world’s most improvised peoples in a continent rich with natural resources (UN 2000).

Arising out of the MDGs declaration and on the basis of further consultations and agreement reached between the UN, World Bank, OECD/DAC, and IMF; eight ambitious, target-oriented MDGs<sup>1</sup> were selected as a set of quantifiable and time-bound goals for dramatically improving the human condition by 2015. This commitment to improve the human condition was re-affirmed at the *Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development* and *World Summit on Sustainable Development* held in Johannesburg in 2002. All this is not new, nonetheless. The MDGs, similar to the International Development Strategy of 1970, clearly represent “a shift in favour of neoliberal, market-oriented measures to counter global poverty and in favour of a non-antagonistic conception of the global community of states which precludes demands for global regulation of trade or redistribution” (Ziai 2011, 41). This tends to downplay the enormous global differences in both resources and power for countries that are deemed to have reached a consensus.

While the MDGs declaration called on all development stakeholders to adopt a goal-oriented approach to policy, planning, and implementation (Saith 2006), it allocated differentiated responsibilities to the various stakeholders and global actors within the development arena. For example, it was emphasized and expected that countries of the South commit to good governance, fiscal economic responsibility, and sound use of natural resources for human development while countries of the North increase their financial assistance in support of the developing countries. Thus, as a gesture of solidarity, the most advanced countries in the world were expected to support a development-friendly international economic system with specific commitments to promote fair trade, reduce the debt burden and promote technology transfer to developing countries. To operationalize the MDGs strategy, a set of quantifiable and time-bound targets for reducing poverty and making the lives of the most vulnerable better was developed. These targets were designed to enable all actors in the development process to shift the focus from how Africa must address MDGs given the constraints to what Africa needs or has in terms of resources (human or otherwise), financial resources, and infrastructure in order to address the MDGs.

The opportunity of diverging from the deficit approach and advancing the continent’s assets as a starting point to a rubicund development path was applauded by African heads of states particularly having experienced slow transformation from colonial rule and subsequent barrage of western-led development prescriptions (such as structural adjustment programs, foreign aid, and so forth) that fuelled dependency

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<sup>1</sup>A full listing of the goals, targets and indicators may be found in Appendix 20.2.

(Clemens et al. 2007). As such, African leaders pledged to support the MDGs and in keeping with its determination not only to move the continent forward, but also to assert greater ownership and authenticity for its development path, the MDGs process seemed obligatory at best.

To solidify this commitment, African leaders adopted two strategies, the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD) in 2001 and the *Lagos Plan of Action* (LPA), among others. In the NEPAD plan, commitments towards greater transparency, democracy, economic reform, accountability, respect for human rights, and periodic peer reviews to assess good governance, progress and to identify areas for improvement were prioritized (Smith 2006). Within the NEPAD framework a wide-ranging framework for economic and social development was implemented, and subsequently the LPA that followed detailed plans for continental investment in its people in the broad areas of health, education, agriculture, gender equity, sanitation, transportation, communications, and clean water. The intent in these MDGs-based strategies was to offer African solutions to African problems of development. Thus, despite some pessimistic views about Africa and its advancement, the continent devised solutions that have contributed to significant improvements over the last century since colonialism. As reports of Africa's "hopeful" prospects dispensed in terms of economic growth, a robust advancement in macroeconomics were felt even as the global economy experienced an economic meltdown (African Development Bank 2011). Furthermore, the MDGs-based African strategies infused a new optimism and conviction within the continent that a bright future lies ahead for the African continent and that Africans will be the crafters of such a future.

The journey for the continent has not been easy sailing and as the chapters in this volume have revealed, more work is needed to quilt this new optimism. Reports from a variety of sources including several chapters in this volume have reported that some African countries are on track to achieve some MDGs. For instance, even though sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have made some progress toward meeting some MDGs, poverty remains a widespread problem. The region (so-called SSA) is the only region that has seen the number of people living in extreme poverty rise steadily from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010, accounting for more than a third of those worldwide who are destitute (Easterly 2009; United Nations 2012). Across the region, almost half the population lives on less than \$1.25 a day (Easterly 2009). While many countries in the region have made progress (i. e. Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Namibia) historical comparisons suggest that the MDGs were overly ambitious, given the low levels these countries started at. Furthermore, poor governance seems to be the order of the day for some African states whereby development and growth is hampered by corruption and strategies of growth and prosperity are not replicated and/or expanded to serve more people in more countries. In a report by the UNDP (2010) it is noted that persistent obstacles and new challenges may hinder Africa's ability to meet the 2015 goals on schedule, particularly in terms of financial resources that are much needed to support some of the interventions related to lagging MDGs.

Having said that, the situation on the continent is not all gloom and doom; in fact recent joint reports by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund suggest that although slow progress has been made globally in achieving the MDGs, many

developing countries, particularly in Africa remain on track to addressing some goals by 2015 (IMF and World Bank 2009; World Bank and IMF 2010). Thus, there has been important progress across all goals, with some targets already having been met, well ahead of the 2015 deadline. For example, steady progress has been made in expanding access to primary education in the region (UNPD 2010). In most countries, according to Unterhalter and North (2011), African women are increasingly gaining more political power in the service sector particularly in government institutions. As it was discussed in Macharia Magu's chapter in the volume, countries such as Rwanda and South Africa have made strides in ensuring participation of women in political institutions by increasing the proportion of seats held in single or lower houses for women. For example, Rwanda claimed the world's highest ratio of women in parliament in 2003 and in 2013 Rwandan women hold 64 % of the country's legislative seats. In Senegal, Seychelles and South Africa, women hold more than 40 % of parliamentary seats, while in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Uganda over 35 % of seats are occupied by women.

In other areas of development, Africa has been the second-fastest-growing region in the world over the past 10 years, with average annual growth of 5.1 % over the past decade, driven by greater political stability and economic reforms that have unleashed the private sector in many countries (International Labour Organization 2011; IMF 2009). The majority of Africa's growth has come from domestic spending and non-commodity sectors, rather than the resources boom (International Labour Organization 2011; AfDB and OECD 2009). Although the debate about the potential of the rising middle class is still inconclusive, it is clear that two percent of the world's middle class<sup>2</sup> and new consuming class come from the continent of Africa and, according to the *Global Development Outlook* produced by the IMF (2009), from 2000 to 2009, 32 million African households joined the world's consuming class. At the point when household incomes exceed \$5,000 measured at purchasing power parity, consumers begin to direct more than half their income to things other than food and shelter. Comparatively, the African middle class still has little to spend by Northern standards. But according to Juma (2011), better economic policies, governance, and use of natural resources, coupled with more business-friendly policies and stronger demand for Africa's commodities from emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa have led to Africa's consistently high growth levels. Juma (2011) reveals that a projected growing middle class [now over one-third of the population according to the African Development Bank (2011)] is shifting global perceptions about Africa's prospects. The traditional focus on eradicating poverty in Africa distracted both African authorities and international donors from serious consideration of ways to promote prosperity infrastructure development: technical education, entrepreneurship and trade (Juma 2011).

Other reports have also pronounced that by 2035, Africa's labor force will be bigger than that of any individual country in the world, which offers the continent a chance to reap a demographic dividend, using its young and growing workers to boost economic growth, making the continent to be having the largest labor force in

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<sup>2</sup>For further discussion about how middle class was conceptualized see Banerjee and Duflo (2007).

the world (McKinsley Global Institute 2012). Currently, African workers are better educated than ever before with 40 % of Africans having secondary or tertiary education. It is estimated that by 2020, it will be nearly half (McKinsley Global Institute 2012). As Africa's workforce grows, the number of children and retired people that each worker supports will become on par with the US and Europe in 2035. Thus, with fewer dependents to support, African households will begin to enjoy even greater discretionary spending power, further driving socio-economic advancement.

## **Moving Ahead Towards the Post 2015 Era...Slowly but Surely**

If the abovementioned trends continue, there is a possibility that some African countries will achieve a fair number of the MDGs to some extent just before 2015. The post-2015 agenda looks promising.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, it failed to properly include the voices of marginalized and indigenous populations even though it was promised "that the agenda would be the product of a participatory, inclusive and bottom-up process" (Enns et al. 2014, 362). Where progress is being made, improvements are often not evenly shared throughout the continent. As chapters in this volume have emphasized, the MDG targets must be interpreted as applicable to each individual country. Africa is not a country; it is a continent of 50 plus countries at different stages of development and as such, multiple approaches and strategies are necessary to advance the development goal in each country.

As strongly contended throughout the book, MDGs are time-bound, and targets for reducing poverty, disease and deprivation in the world will require time. This is the case in spite of the fact that some notable strides have been achieved in Africa, which include near universal primary school enrolment. Africa did put some effort in achieving MDGs. It is noteworthy that 15 of the 20 developing countries that made greatest progress in the MDGs are from Africa (UNDP 2010; UNDESA 2008). In spite of this achievement, the overall progress in MDGs remains marginal. In six of the eight goals, the United Nations expects SSA countries to have made inadequate progress in reaching the targets (UNDP 2012). Even in areas where MDGs were achieved, developing countries remained far below developed countries. For example, reducing the rate of maternal mortality in half in most developing countries does not lead to survival chances of women while giving birth anywhere nearer to their counterparts in developed countries.

MDG 2 of achieving a universal primary education is an example of a goal that is on track in most African countries. While these achievements need to be set in a context of the exclusion of certain key groups like teachers from these deliberations they indicate some elements of success on a constrained agenda. But at what cost has such

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<sup>3</sup>For a detailed list of documents and speeches around post-2015 development agenda in Africa, see <http://www.uneca.org/post2015> (accessed 1 August 2014). For a summary, see <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/foresight%20africa%202014/05%20foresight%20post%202015%20development%20agenda%20bhorat> (accessed 1 August 2014).

achievement been reached? A case study of Tanzania was discussed in the volume by Serena Koissaba on how local farmers in Tanzania develop economic initiatives and use the shares to subsidize formal and informal education for rural women in a country where equal opportunity for women is limited. In Koissaba's chapter, it was revealed that in most rural contexts a classroom of a primary school teacher in front of about 80 primary school learners is still a norm and in most cases this is done in pursuit of the universal primary education goal. A shortage of trained teachers while pushing by all means universal primary education has led to drops in the standard of education. This point was echoed by Assie-Lumumba's chapter where the need to revive post-secondary education, a point that was overlooked in the first phase of the MDGs, was central to ensuring that MDG 2 is addressed. Assie-Lubumba's chapter on education also emphasizes the necessity that a second generation of MDGs beyond 2015 must affirm the centrality of secondary and tertiary education.

The general picture is that most African countries will not achieve most of their targets, in spite of some recorded gains. In fact, as Clément Longondjo Etambakonga's chapter on urban poverty in Kinsasha noted, the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty in SSA has increased, bucking the general trend in most developing countries. Factors associated with failure to meet the MDGs noted at the conference are related to a number of issues, which include failed political institutions, poor governance, climate change and the economic downturn in most of the developed world. Due to the economic downturn in developed countries, developing countries received less than half of pledges that were originally promised in the MDG document.

As stated in several chapters in the volume, the fate of the poor in attaining MDGs lies largely on the benevolence of the rich countries and actors of the world. As has been argued in several portions of this volume this strict dependence must change if the MDGs are to be realized. The map for development in Africa must go beyond dependence on the 'saviour' from outside (i. e. rich countries). And MDG 8 of ensuring a global partnership for developments seems to use "partnership" in a euphemistic manner since not much has been put in place to ensure unequal countries become real partners (Turshen 2014; see also Barnes and Brown 2011). The general recommendations in various chapters in the book were that other avenues should be pursued to finance development in Africa. These include drastic changes in international trade, foreign aid schemes and other neo-liberal prescriptions that are currently biased against poor countries. The theme for better and authentic governance with a touch of international cooperation through strategic south-south partnerships has been recommended as a way forward.

## **Impediments to Positive Development**

Climate change has had a devastating impact on the poor around the world and particularly in Africa. The intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has predicted that climate change will increase the amount of malnourished populations



worldwide by between 40 and 70 million (McMichael and Schneider 2011, 120). The meaning of climate change for poor countries is different from rich countries. This devastation has effectively prevented African countries from meeting the MDGs. In Africa, climate change has meant frequent droughts that have resulted in mass starvation and frequent floods that bring destruction to humans and property. A case of Eritrea is presented in the volume where Tesfamariam argues that like most agricultural sectors in Africa, Eritrea is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture. An estimated 95 % of agriculture is at a subsistence level, which are rain-fed mixed crops and livestock. Thus, drought periods result in mass starvation. Even worse, as Tesfamariam's chapter cautioned, while exposure and sensitivity to climate change affect the general population in developing countries, female-headed households are worse off. Most of the MDGs are dependent on the promotion of gender parity and the empowerment of women and girls, but it should be broadly acknowledged that equal access is the foundation for all other development goals.

For example, MDG 3 on promoting gender equality and empowering women had a target for eliminating gender disparity in education by 2005. This target was missed; yet despite this failure, MDG 3 has prompted a diverse discussion of meanings of gender equality and education, led to new ways for popular mobilization to articulate with UN institutions, and prompted reassessment of the forms of measurement used to assess progress on this MDG. For instance, until equal numbers of girls and boys are in school or increased wage employment exists for women, it would be impossible to build the knowledge necessary to eradicate poverty and hunger, combat disease and ensure environmental sustainability. Millions of children and women will continue to die needlessly, placing the rest of the development agenda at risk. This point was aptly stated by Magu and Tesfamariam in their respective chapters in the book that reducing gender inequality leads to sustainable development. Magu's chapter also challenges whether designated gender indicators are robust enough to push the transformation agenda forward. He further unearths the limitations of measuring transformation in explaining how women's empowerment could be fast-tracked. Women, poorer people, and those who live in rural areas tend to benefit less if they are not included in economic activities. An example of Eritrean women discussed in the volume illuminates the ideal of greater involvement and role of women in the subsistence agricultural sector where inclusive policies enabled women's accessibility to land tenure.

## **Good Governance, Global Partnerships and South-South Cooperation**

The issue of ineffective governance in Africa featured prominently in the chapters. Africa's failure to effectively meet MDGs has been attributed to failed political institutions and ineffective governance. For instance, Nabacwa and colleagues' chapter on uneven allocation of resources and rampant corruption in Uganda revealed that managing the socio-economic determinants of maternal health

including culture and traditions is an important means to addressing health related MDGs. At the same time, a case of Botswana presented by Talesco's chapter advanced the Botswana approach to governance as a "model" that effectively utilized available resources to strengthen institutions and to broaden the scope of development. The chapter cites low levels of corruption and a balance between sticking to traditional leadership and incorporation of western methods of governance, principles which were laid up by its founding president, Sir Seretse Khama. Talesco argues that good governance that is free of corruption is necessary to ensure that global assistance is used appropriately to empower the most vulnerable.

The issue of the importance of South-South collaboration in finding solutions to the African development dilemma featured overtly in most papers in the volume. As was discussed, emerging partnerships between and amongst Southern countries will work insofar as all countries involved benefit equally from the relationship. Questions of whether the new partnerships are any different from the historical partnerships which were premised on the exploitation of natural resources from Africa and selling finished goods expensively were not conclusively answered. Authors have struggled to agree on this issue, but an understanding that the perceived unequal power relationships that have been (re)produced in some of the South-South co-operation efforts must be challenged. The fact that China, India and Brazil are using Africa as a dumping ground for cheap products and that most of the new conflicts looming in the continent are fuelled by economic interest of China (i. e. South Sudan) is problematic.

Nonetheless, Daouda's chapter on China's role in Africa was a case in point. On the one hand, the chapter was more complementary of the role China is playing (or has played) suggesting that China's role as an investor in various sectors of African economies from resources, infrastructure development projects to agriculture and service sector was impactful. Thus, without China in the picture, as Daouda argues, the situation would be different in the majority of countries China deals with. On the other hand, he cautions that whatever role China plays in Africa's development, the post-2015 agenda is Africa's agenda. Thus, as the emerging partnerships for Africa's development are maturing the challenge will be for African leaders to critically understand, unpack, and rethink what these partnerships mean for the majority of Africans. The critical question post-2015 therefore is to assess whether the expanding China-Africa relationship is any better than the historical West-African relationship, and if it is so, how and why.

## **Contemplating Africa's Future: What Next?**

To conclude, the MDGs declaration articulated a bold vision and established concrete targets for improving the existence of millions of people and for saving the lives of the most improvised. In moving forward, one question still persists: whether the MDGs framework has had any influence in changing behaviour and so

influencing outcomes in the desired direction. As Sen (1999) advises us to do, we have in the volume attempted to address this question and we acknowledge that it is hard to answer the question above because it is intrinsically difficult to distinguish the impact of the MDGs framework itself from the strands of thinking that helped to create it. The general hypothesis nevertheless is that the framework has been very influential in the international discourse about development and a useful tool for advocacy. Although its impact appears to be quite varied, the chapters in this volume have revealed that the MDGs framework has indeed impacted policies and resource allocation in developing countries. Evidence from the chapters in this volume shows a good deal of rhetorical support for selected aspects of the framework. The MDGs discourse would appear likely to have more impact given the support many countries have thrown behind it.

Thus, in contemplating the future of MDGs, Africa must focus on the different possibilities after 2015 because there are a number of alternatives. As Pollard et al. (2011) encourage us to do, Africans must challenge the gloom and doom of pessimistic views about Africa's prospects to achieving the goals leading to the looming 2015 deadline. It is time to reflect on the usefulness of the MDGs and what this discourse means for the continent as it thinks about its development. As we have seen in the chapters, poor governance, ineffective institutions, and dysfunctional infrastructure hinder equitable growth. To make further progress, a rethinking of the MDGs prescription is necessary. The fact is that even if all the MDGs were achieved, the world would still have issues of hunger, poverty, mortality and illiteracy (see Poku and Whitman 2011a; Vandemoortele 2011). This cements the need for cautious optimism expressed a few years ago (Poku and Whitman 2011b). Thus, a post-2015 agenda should be more conscious about what works and not just set grand targets for the sake of setting them.

Moving forward we need to unpack what these goals mean for the continent in the continent's own terms because even the post-2015 development agenda failed to adequately ensure the participation of intended beneficiaries (Enns et al. 2014). Critical questions must be asked about the suitability of relying on narrowly-defined yardsticks as realistic mechanisms to achieve inclusive growth as Fukuda-Parr (2008), and Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010) has argued. Furthermore according to Sumner and Tiwari (2009), the current MDGs debate has both hindered and deepened how we think about what matters in the lives of people. Thus if the MDGs lead us to address health disparities, education, gender equity, environmental sustainability at the same time forcing us to address the more difficult-to-measure changes necessary to bring about transformational change, enabling countries to grow out of poverty, address pressing gender, equity, and political economy issues then engaging in the MDGs agenda has been rewarding. Overall, the agenda has led to substantive policy shifts within governments and multilateral institutions, forcing institutions to not simply adopt rhetorical changes to align themselves to global economic hegemony, but enabling new approaches to African development to emerge. Whereas challenges and discontents persist, the prospects for Africa's development beyond 2015 are tremendous.

## Appendices

### Appendix 20.1

Africa in the eyes of The Economist Magazine, 2000–2013

2000	2011	2013
		

Source: The Economist (2000, 2011, 2013)

### Appendix 20.2

The Millennium Development Goals at a glance

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)	
Goals and Targets	Indicators
<b>Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>	
<b>Target 1:</b> Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day	1. Proportion of population below \$1 per day (PPP-values) 2. Poverty gap ratio [incidence x depth of poverty] 3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption
<b>Target 2:</b> Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	4. Prevalence of underweight children (under-5 years of age) 5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption
<b>Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education</b>	
<b>Target 3:</b> Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education 7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 8. Literacy rate of 15–24 year olds

(continued)

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)	
Goals and Targets	Indicators
<b>Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women</b>	
<b>Target 4:</b> Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015	9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education
	10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15–24 year olds
	11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector
	12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament
<b>Goal 4: Reduce child mortality</b>	
<b>Target 5:</b> Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate	13. Under-five mortality rate
	14. Infant mortality rate
	15. Proportion of 1 year old children immunised against measles
<b>Goal 5: Improve maternal health</b>	
<b>Target 6:</b> Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio	16. Maternal mortality ratio
	17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel
<b>Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</b>	
<b>Target 7:</b> Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS	18. HIV prevalence among 15–24 year old pregnant women
	19. Contraceptive prevalence rate
	20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS
<b>Target 8:</b> Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria
	22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures
	23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis
	24. Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short Course)
<b>Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability</b>	
<b>Target 9:</b> Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	25. Proportion of land area covered by forest
	26. Land area protected to maintain biological diversity
	27. GDP per unit of energy use (as proxy for energy efficiency)
	28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) [Plus two figures of global atmospheric pollution: ozone depletion and the accumulation of global warming gases]
<b>Target 10:</b> Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water	29. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source

(continued)

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)	
<u>Goals and Targets</u>	<u>Indicators</u>
<b>Target 11:</b> By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers	30. Proportion of people with access to improved sanitation 31. Proportion of people with access to secure tenure [Urban/rural disaggregation of several of the above indicators may be relevant for monitoring improvement in the lives of slum dwellers]
<b>Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development*</b>	
<b>Target 12:</b> Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system	<b>Some of the indicators listed below will be monitored separately for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked countries and small island developing states.</b>
Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally	<b><u>Official Development Assistance</u></b>
	32. Net ODA as percentage of DAC donors' GNI [targets of 0.7 % in total and 0.15 % for LDCs]
	33. Proportion of ODA to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)
	34. Proportion of ODA that is untied
	35. Proportion of ODA for environment in small island developing states
	36. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in land-locked countries
<b>Target 13:</b> Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries	
Includes: tariff and quota free access for LDC exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction	<b><u>Market access</u></b>
	37. Proportion of exports (by value and excluding arms) admitted free of duties and quotas
	38. Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products and textiles and clothing
	39. Domestic and export agricultural subsidies in OECD countries
	40. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity
<b>Target 14:</b> Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states (through Barbados Programme and 22nd General Assembly provisions)	<b><u>Debt sustainability</u></b>
	41. Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt cancelled
	42. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services
	43. Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief
	44. Number of countries reaching HIPC decision and completion points

(continued)

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)	
Goals and Targets	Indicators
<b>Target 15:</b> Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term	
<b>Target 16:</b> In co-operation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth	45. Unemployment rate of 15–24 year olds
<b>Target 17:</b> In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries	46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis
<b>Target 18:</b> In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications	47. Telephone lines per 1,000 people
	48. Personal computers per 1,000 people
	<i>Other indicators TBD</i>

\*Some of the indicators listed were monitored separately for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa, Landlocked countries and small island developing states

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