

Fethi Mansouri *Editor*

Cultural, Religious and Political Contestations

The Multicultural Challenge

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Part I
Histories and Politics of Multiculturalism

Chapter 1

The Multicultural Experiment: Premises, Promises, and Problems

Fethi Mansouri

Abstract This introductory chapter reflects on current debates about the challenges faced by multicultural societies in coming to grips with the interrelated societal tasks of facilitating migrant settlement, nurturing cultural diversity and pursuing inclusive citizenship. In doing so, the chapter will explore the development and deployment of the concept of ‘multiculturalism’ from a comparative and historical point of view and will proceed to discuss its key assumptions, achievements and challenges. The chapter will also touch upon the key theoretical paradigms debated in this book and will attempt to synthesise conceptually how its three sections interconnect dialectically and empirically.

Keywords Cultural diversity • Cosmopolitanism • Migration • Multiculturalism • Social cohesion • Social justice • Human rights

Against an absence of new articulations of post-Westphalian approaches to citizenship, the rise of human mobility is engendering, among other reactions, new forms of inclusion/exclusion for ‘non-citizens’, ‘forced migrants’ and all those considered ‘outsiders’ (Agier 2011; Gibney 2004). These forms of exclusion are especially pronounced in relation to the political community (state) where claims for cultural rights, equality and active participation are made and contested by minoritised ‘Others’. Today across many émigré societies, minority groups in general and migrant communities in particular are demanding greater accommodation of their distinctive cultural identities as a way of enacting their aspirations for justice and equality (Modood 2013; Vertovec 2010; Benhabib 2002; Barry 2001). So far the consequential ethical dilemma and policy challenges have revolved around ways of ensuring that such claims are sustained without the risk of engendering cultural relativism, cultural ostracism, and the creation of segregated communities. The latter in particular is purported to carry within it the possible emergence of dual attachments and a weakened sense of belonging to the wider society. Indeed, in much of the contemporary literature on this subject it is increasingly argued (c.f. Modood

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2013; Harris 2013; Steiner 2013; Mansouri and Lobo 2011; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) that one of the main difficulties facing multicultural societies is the extent to which they are able to reconcile commitments for cultural diversity with securitised social cohesion agenda. Put differently, how can pluralism at the cultural and religious levels be supported without the unwanted consequence of erecting new forms of social exclusion, cultural racism and intercultural tensions?

Taken together, this book aims to address these inherent tensions and related questions central to the ‘multicultural challenge’, with a focus on diversity and its ethical and policy ramifications. This discussion will be undertaken not only horizontally across a range of multicultural societies but also vertically within the diverse cultural systems of minority groups themselves. To this end, the chapters in this book tend to display an eclectic yet useful variation in theoretical, disciplinary and methodological approaches. Some authors rely on abstract critical theoretical analyses of how particular dimensions of diversity such as religion and sexual identity have been approached in specific political contexts. Others bring in more empirical data-driven accounts of key challenges facing minoritised and at times marginalised groups in their quest for social integration and cultural acceptance in various social milieus.

Yet, in terms of its overall approach, the book charts a somewhat distinct epistemological pathway—to the growing literature on all matters multiculturalism—by introducing three unique conceptual and methodological features. First, it brings a much stronger empirical basis to discussions of multiculturalism, which have tended to be rather abstract in much of the scholarly debates spanning various disciplinary traditions across the social sciences and humanities. Using such diverse empirical foundations, the book’s various contributions usefully apply complex theoretical concepts into prominent and carefully selected case studies. Second, the book’s overall epistemological approach is overwhelmingly multidisciplinary. To an extent, this contrasts to how multicultural debates have been approached and tackled across the social sciences with a tendency for the single disciplinary tradition to provide the main conceptual framework. This volume incorporates well-conceptualised contributions from education, sociology, cultural studies, philosophy and political science. And in many cases, these differing disciplinary insights come together in the same chapter providing a multi-faceted account to what is a complex social phenomenon. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the book exhibits global perspectives with empirical insights from multicultural societies in North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe included, even if the individual case studies under examination in each of the book’s chapters are locally situated.

Against this theoretical and methodological variation, the overall arguments pursued in this book and discussed briefly in this introductory chapter, relate to three key contested domains in the broad multicultural question. First, the question of *premises*, which will engage with the historical, philosophical and normative foundations of the multicultural project that culminated in the formal adoption of a suite of multicultural policies in Canada, Australia and subsequently other émigré nation-states during the second half of the twentieth century. Second, this chapter will reflect on the enduring *promises* of multiculturalism both as an ideal for recon-

cing notions of justice, human rights and difference within liberal states, and as the basis for social policies aimed at supporting migrant settlement through the preservation of heritage culture. This particular feature of multiculturalism has attracted deeply polarised debates (Mansouri and de B'beri 2014; Jupp and Clyne 2011) about how such reconciliation should be pursued and the extent to which a liberal interpretation of multiculturalism can tolerate certain group claims that might simultaneously impinge upon rights of individual members of those very minority groups. And it is within the third domain *problems* that we see many of these debates being transformed into outright criticism and rejection of the basic assumptions underlying multiculturalism namely an acceptance of and support for cultural diversity. These three interrelated dimensions of the multicultural debate will be approached in this volume not merely from abstract intellectual viewpoints, but more importantly from comparative, transnational and empirical perspectives that touch upon social policy, justice, human rights and education.

1.1 Premises of Multiculturalism

The deep philosophical foundations underpinning multiculturalism go a long way back in history and certainly cannot be linked solely to the policies introduced in Canada and Australia during the second half of the twentieth century (Taylor 2013; Kymlicka 2010; Mansouri and Lobo 2011). Indeed, many old civilisations such as the Egyptian and the Roman as well as medieval civilisations such as the Ottoman Empire had to grapple in their own ways with cultural and religious diversity. In the case of the Ottoman Empire for example, the central state had introduced social policies, in particular the *Millet* system, to regulate and protect cultural rights and in the process extend a degree of social justice to minorities within the larger empire (c.f. Parekh 2005). This social contract within the Ottoman Empire rested on certain obligations on the part of those making the claims, and corresponding rights extended to them in return by the central state. In many ways, this arrangement was akin to a modern citizenship approach with its emphasis on “contributory rights” (Turner 2006). A few centuries later, and in his 1795 essay *Perpetual Peace*, Immanuel Kant discussed similar ideas in terms of a cosmopolitan law/right that would provide a guiding principle to protect people, especially during times of conflict, and this cosmopolitan right was to be grounded in the principle of universal hospitality. Further to the foundational work of Kant, the philosophical writings of Emmanuel Levinas (Davis 1996) on ethics, and Jacques Derrida (Still 2010) also on hospitality, provided an even sharper theoretical framework for approaching and understanding the relationships among (diverse) people in their everyday lives.

Indeed, for Levinas, the foundation of ethics consists in the obligation to respond to the Other through a sense of responsibility, of “goodness” and “mercy” to overcome the Other’s state of vulnerability. Likewise, Derrida (1978, 1997, 1999) approaches this responsibility to “care” through a notion of “hospitality” as the foundation of human ethics and as a readiness to welcome the Other into one’s

home. In this sense, ethics amounts to a pure and unconditional hospitality in our relationships with the Other. These theoretical approaches to ethics and hospitality hold out the possibility of an acceptance of the Other as different but of equal standing. Yet in contemporary societies such philosophical assumptions no longer seem adequate to overcome the inherent tensions in relation to obligations extended to individuals and groups who do not formally belong to a particular political community. Within the modern state, such dilemmas are conveniently dealt with under the citizenship framework with its inclusionary and exclusionary capabilities. But national citizenship approaches remain state-bound and are yet to embrace more post-national and global agendas. Therefore and from a more contemporary approach to cosmopolitanism, a key argument advocated by Appiah, among others, is that a citizen of the world should neither “abjure all local allegiances and partialities in the name of a vast abstraction humanity, nor should s/he take the nationalist position of rejecting all foreigners” (in Lenz 2011: 415). In other words, a more sustainable approach to such contested attachments, would be a partial or rooted cosmopolitanism, which reflects the hybridity and intermingling of cultures whilst ensuring contentious, cross-cultural dialogue and negotiation of difference within societies and across nations (c.f. Appiah 2005; Delanty 2006; Kymlicka and Walker 2012).

But away from these quintessentially philosophical debates and intellectual discourses, multiculturalism was thrust into the public arena in the wake of emergent international human rights frameworks. These were reflected most notably in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Refugee Convention (1951) and associated international instruments aimed at protecting minority rights from the possible excesses of the nation-state and the social injustices perpetrated by dominant groups. The call for intercultural understanding, social acceptance and mutual respect for human dignity can be seen as the unintended promises of subsequent multicultural articulations.

1.2 Promises of Multiculturalism

Linked to the notion of premises, the enduring *promises* of multiculturalism remain at the level of incorporating migrants and newcomers into dominant mainstream societies. Multiculturalism, in many ways, was conceived of as a vehicle for replacing racist, assimilationist approaches to managing forms of ethnic and racial hierarchy within post-War Western societies. Indeed, as Kymlicka (2012: 3) argues,

From the 1970s to mid-1990s, there was a clear trend across Western democracies toward the increased recognition and accommodation of diversity through a range of multiculturalism policies (MCPs) and minority rights. These policies were endorsed both at the domestic level in some states and by international organizations, and involved a rejection of earlier ideas of unitary and homogeneous nationhood.

Therefore, and at the level of social and, political and legal manifestation, the multicultural promise was unequivocally about a promotion of empowerment, justice and respect for all irrespective of cultural or religious backgrounds.

And the multicultural promise at this level was facilitated and anchored within existing institutions of the émigré society most notably citizenship frameworks. This articulation of multiculturalism in countries such as Australia (see Chaps. 5 and 12), Canada (see Chap. 4) or New Zealand (see Chaps. 3 and 7) has engendered more positive than negative social outcomes despite the caricature portrayal of multiculturalism that has dominated media and some academic discourses. The early and enduring promise of multiculturalism at this level can only be adequately understood and appreciated when accounted for within its proper historical context. Indeed, the multicultural promise should be seen as the third wave of global emancipatory movements that started with decolonisation in the 1950s, followed by the US-inspired civil rights movements in the 1960s, and culminating with a rejection of assimilationist policies in favour of multiculturalism during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Kymlicka 2012). At the heart of all of these transformative social movements were ethical commitments to diversity, social justice and human rights (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Therefore, the so-called “retreat”, “crisis”, or “utter failure” of multiculturalism elaborated further below, tended to be discussed almost exclusively rhetorically rather than analytically, and often with no basis for objective inquiry or credible evidence.

1.3 The Perceived “Problems” of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism has been debated and critiqued frequently at the turn of the twenty-first century, with many theorists, public commentators and political leaders making various, and at times contradictory, attempts to at least “rethink” it if not “abandon” or “reject” it altogether. In the context of Europe in particular, and as Taylor (2012: 2) argues

[...] anti-multicultural rhetoric in Europe reflects a profound misunderstanding of the dynamics of immigration into the rich, liberal democracies of the West. The underlying assumption seems to be that too much positive recognition of cultural differences will encourage a retreat into ghettos, and a refusal to accept the political ethic of liberal democracy itself.

Yet others still argue for the need not only to preserve multiculturalism but to align it even more strongly with its original functions and objectives, in particular in relation to supporting migrant settlement and cultural diversity (c.f. Jakubowicz and Ho 2013; Modood et al. 2006; Ivison 2010; Kymlicka and Bashir 2008). This return to the core of the “multicultural ethos” can be pursued through a restatement of the importance of its cosmopolitan tendencies. This task is even more pressing in the context of cultural racism and xenophobia, which threatens the rights and safety of some members of our contemporary societies in particular those adhering to the Muslim faith.

But one of the key problems in the contemporary debate is that both proponents and opponents of multiculturalism remain indifferent to the inherent tension between multiculturalism as a socio-political ideology and multiculturalism as a demographic reality in our globalised societies. The latter has historically presented

serious challenges to governments everywhere but particularly in Western émigré societies where levels of cultural diversity are visibly high. The challenges relate to how to accommodate such diversity with its underlying notion of “difference” as articulated by migrant groups, while maintaining an overarching sense of belonging to, and inclusion within, the society at large.

Some Western governments have adopted specific social policies to deal with rising levels of diversity. Multiculturalism was conceived as just such a policy: a progressive integration tool aimed at managing cultural diversity in a way that offers some protection to migrants’ cultural rights. Some (e.g. Ivinson 2010) might argue that this “protective” agenda contains within it the seeds of tension, as it lays the foundations for a more communitarian approach to managing diversity. Perhaps it is this communitarian manifestation that led to the fair amount of criticism since multiculturalism was introduced formally in the 1970s. At the philosophical level, the criticism was related to the implicit cultural essentialism of multiculturalism and for its perceived role in producing separatist “ethnic” enclaves. Tied to this, the leaders of Germany, France, the UK and other countries have recently expressed strong criticism of multiculturalism, which they declared as counterproductive to social integration and in some instances as “an utter failure” (Mansouri and de B’beri 2014; Taylor 2012). Criticisms of cultural essentialism in multicultural policies have been made even in countries known for their high levels of cultural diversity and progressive social policies such as Canada and Australia. Furthermore, while multiculturalism has addressed some key problems of unidirectional assimilation and acculturation, the continuing expectations often made of migrants relating to formal attachment and belonging have been left unchallenged.

Generally, multicultural policies did not take into account the fact that migrants often live in “transnational communities” with transnational connections allowing migrants to maintain collective identities and practices. These and other political implications of transnationalism represent significant challenges to national citizenship. To cater for these multiple identifications, alternative frameworks for citizenship were explored and developed throughout the 1990s, such as post-national, multicultural and intercultural citizenship. These will be discussed briefly under Sect. 1.3 below, but before that we need to explore some of the practical outcomes of a failed policy towards the accommodation of cultural diversity in pluralist societies.

One of the most obvious problems that has resulted from this so-called crisis of multiculturalism especially post 9/11, has been a sharp increase in identity politics as well as more pronounced forms of racism towards specific cultures and faith communities, especially Muslims (Mansouri and Marotta 2012). Because of the prominence of security concerns in the media and the false association of a whole religion with violence, current debates about citizenship in Europe, North America and elsewhere have become disoriented and confuse cultural and religious diversity with terrorism threats and other security risks.

It is at this level that new calls for adopting “forced” assimilation policies are being articulated once again with a complete disregard towards the basic recognition of individual rights and group claims especially when these relate to culture and faith. In the following section, a brief outline of the book structure and the

individual contributions from various theoretical and empirical perspectives will allow a more nuanced examination for these tensions in the context of differing historical, social and political contexts.

1.4 Book Structure

1.4.1 *Part I: Histories and Politics of Multiculturalism*

The first section of the book provides a deep contextual and conceptual context for the current predicament of the multicultural experience. Kivisto, writing about multicultural inclusion and national identity in the US, argues that the very concept of multiculturalism is a mode of incorporation predicated on the core values of liberal societies. Part of Kivisto's argument is to remind those who have contributed to the backlash against multiculturalism, that multiculturalism is not a means for promoting group- or self-segregation, nor for advancing an "anything goes" sort of cultural relativism. For Kivisto, multiculturalism is premised on the moral assertion that solidarity at the level of the societal community (or nation) can be achieved and that simultaneously difference (ethnic and religious) can be recognized and embraced. The argument mounted by Kivisto, is that multiculturalism is viable, even if not inevitable, and that its future will be shaped by the outcome of political contestation between its defenders and critics.

Focusing on the tension between these two camps in the context of New Zealand, Morris recounts a recent Cologne District Court decision (2012) to ban the circumcision of male minors and examines the responses from Muslim and Jewish communities, governments, and NGOs. As is often the case with these attacks on diverse cultural practices, Morris argues that these debates, clothed as they are in the politics of competing human rights and professional medical and legal discourses, reveal hidden dimensions of prejudicial cultural, legal and political norms that serve to restrict the freedoms of minority communities. Morris discusses these problematic discourses and examines their inadequacy in comprehending religious communities and their practices in contemporary multicultural and formally "secular" societies. The problem has been and remains a lack of a more nuanced and plausible framework for the appreciation of the formation of intergenerational religious identities. Morris calls for the adoption of a "new" model of cultural human rights, determined at the level of the individual rather than the collective: focussed on a child's right to full participation in a religious community along with the implications this may have for our understanding the nexus between multiculturalism and human rights.

Discussing the links between cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and universalism, Imbert engages with Appiah's work on cosmopolitanism as (put simply "universality plus difference [...]") to examine the challenge of cultural accommodation within multicultural societies. The problem for Imbert is that multiculturalism has always engaged with the question of acknowledging difference, but not the question

of universalism. Imbert finds that multiculturalism is not grounded in a universalism found in the value system of a group that imposed its hegemony through belittling or excluding others: this mistake often leads to a dynamic of resentment in the encounter among “hosts” and “Others”. Resentment, as discussed by Imbert, Modood, Kymlicka and others, is characterised by displacement and the impossibility to belong or change. This is an important and often unseen dimension of multiculturalism that needs to be analysed more thoroughly; particularly its potential to blend with established resentments shaping the economic and political landscape of the new society where immigrants settle. Some of these problems are analysed in more details in the second section of the book dealing with multiculturalism in key societal domains.

1.4.2 Part II: Justice and Education as Key Dimensions of Multiculturalism

Disenchantment, a concept not too dissimilar to Imbert’s idea of “resentment”, is taken up by Grossman, who draws on Paul Gilroy’s work on multicultures and conviviality, as a framing concept for ethical sociality. Grossman uses this framing concept to examine how contemporary approaches to engaging communities in the effort to mitigate violent extremism and terrorism might productively be reshaped. Drawing on recent research into community perspectives on radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, Grossman explores Gilroy’s analysis of the “citizen/denizen” discourse as this plays out in current approaches to engaging Australian Muslim and other communities around issues of extremism and terrorism: focusing in particular on the realm of counter-narrative discourses and their aftermaths—which counter-narratives are heard, which aren’t and what stories have yet to be told? Grossman’s central argument is that the current structure and trajectories of counter-terrorism narratives limit their efficacy. There is a real need, instead, to open up counter-narrative strategy to multiple micro-narratives that work with the commonalities and overlaps found in Gilroy’s notion of “convivial culture”; this direction offers better and more enduring prospects for counter-terrorism and the future conditions of multiculturalism.

Roose and Possamai’s contribution touches on two important and critical issues pertaining to the “crisis of multiculturalism”. First, the extent to which there is a real policy “retreat in multiculturalism” as opposed to a mere rhetorical “backlash” inadvertently amplified by excessive media and academic attention. Second, they examine this question in the context of the recent debate around legal pluralism in western societies and in particular the case of “Shari’a” in Australia. The challenge here is that the growing numbers of Muslim migrants living in supposedly secular cities, will eventually lay claims to a form of religious accommodation that reflects jurisprudence principles articulated within Islamic Law. This conundrum has become known in the literature as the “twin tolerations” question (Stepan 2000: 8) pertaining to “the minimum degree of toleration democracy needs from religion and

the minimum degree of toleration that religion needs from the state for the polity to be democratic”.

Moving away from these discourses of contestations, resentment, disenchantment, and counter-terrorism, Rata engages critically with culturalist and postcolonial theories to explore the idea of “localised knowledges” as a decolonising and liberating tool confronting disciplinary “Western” cultural knowledge. Rata argues that this approach often confuses the historical origins of knowledge with its epistemological status. She reminds us that young people who are denied access to powerful disciplinary knowledge in the belief that such knowledge is “Western” are denied both the means to move beyond experience and the means with which to criticise and change the localised world of experience, i.e. culture. Rata’s fear is that these young individuals are left in the binaries of “self” and “other”, “colonised” and “coloniser”, “ethnic” and “Western”; reified and ahistorical categories that confine them to the world of experience and deny them the means to transcend the limits of culture. Rata argues strongly that a way forward for multiculturalism is to ensure that young people in pluralist societies have access to the powerful disciplinary knowledge required for educational success while at the same time being able to maintain or eschew cultural affiliation with the historical ethnic group as they wish.

Tsolidis, on the other hand, discusses neoliberalism as a driver of education in many émigré societies, and its potential effects on the promises of multicultural society. Within neoliberal approaches to education, the logic of the market is applied and parents are positioned as consumers with the responsibility of choosing the right school for their children. For Tsolidis, when markets and school choice are critical educational drivers, ethnicity takes on new meaning in marking some students as more or less desirable. This can be seen for example for “Asian” students who are often represented as extremely diligent and policed by overly ambitious parents who pay more attention to their academic achievements than their overall development and happiness. This understanding of “Asian” students has been fuelled by exposés of so-called “Tiger mothers”. Yet despite their reputed academic prowess, these students have been seen as a trigger for “white flight”. Tsolidis reveals that having a high percentage of “Asian” students is understood as a threat to the culture of a school premised on the virtues of an all-rounded liberal education. The character of the student population is critical to the market ethos that dominates education. With regard to the constitution of a “good” school, some ethnicities are seen as more valuable than others because they achieve good results. However, if high-achieving “non-white” students are seen as “taking over” a school this can shift the balance the other way. Tsolidis builds her analysis on current debates in the Australian media about school choice and explores this coverage as a means for understanding exclusion and racisms in the education sector.

Shifting the debate to continental Europe, Armillei discusses multiculturalism and the management of cultural diversity in Italy, focusing on the case of the Romani gypsy community. Armillei examines the policies of the Italian government towards the Romani community in the interrelated spheres of education and social justice; reminding us that these policies have also been deployed when dealing with other marginalised migrant communities. Presenting an analysis of the *via Italiana*

(the “Italian way”) of promoting intercultural education, Armillei’s appraisal of current policies reveals an essentially ethnocentric and assimilative approach to educational and social policies that positions the majority/dominant group as the point of departure and end for managing cultural diversity in Italy.

Moving away from these substantive issues of justice and education, the following section provides reflections on the more performative dimensions of multicultural belonging. Such performativity relates more specifically to spatial practices of everyday life; multicultural sexuality and cross-cultural networking.

1.4.3 Part III: Performing Multicultural Belongings

What does it mean to come of age in an era of anti-multiculturalism? How does such an environment shape the ways young people of diverse backgrounds come to feel “at home”—in the nation, in the city, in their neighbourhoods, and in their national identity? Discussing findings from her study of youth in the multicultural suburbs of five Australian cities, Harris explores how the politics of belonging is lived through the spatial practices of everyday civic life for those who have grown up during the multiculturalism backlash of the 1990s and 2000s. Harris finds that despite these conditions young people position themselves at the forefront of reimagining national belonging—their practices are more indicative of the successes of multiculturalism’s legacy in everyday spaces, which the more popularised discourse of its failures obscures.

Low and Pallotta-Chiarolli, on the other hand, argue that post-White Australia, Australia’s multicultural policies and community action enabled its culturally and linguistically diverse population of migrants and refugees from non-Anglo-Celtic background to gain citizenship rights. Yet, absent from these multicultural histories are multicultural gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender Australian narratives. Low and Pallotta-Chiarolli argue that in 2014, there still exists the silencing of sexual and gender diversities in heterosexist multicultural discourses, community spaces and services. The authors ask whether “reclaiming multiculturalism” can sit comfortably and confidently with “global citizenship and ethical engagement with diversity” without engaging with and including sexual and gender diverse histories, heritages and contemporary realities. Low and Pallotta-Chiarolli address this question by exploring three examples of how the reclaiming of multicultural queer histories and contemporary realities is occurring as part of refashioning a multiculturalism that engages with diversity. First, they present the work being done to uncover and recover pre-colonial and pre-Christian histories and heritages; second, they discuss the work of ILGA (International Lesbian and Gay Association) and AGMC (Australian GLBTIQ Multicultural Council) in addressing the rights of multi-faith, multicultural GLBTIQ peoples and communities. Third, they examine the Asian-Australian publication, *Peril* and related examples of other Asian-Australian/multicultural literary media that represent multi-sexual multi-gender realities.

Focussing more explicitly on cross-cultural networking among migrant youth, Effene, Mansouri and Mikola explore the extent to which the direction of official

Multicultural and Social Inclusion policies in Australia reflects the social attitudes and networking practices of migrant youth. The chapter pays particular attention to the Federal Government's "Anti-Racism Strategy", announced in 2012 as part of its Multicultural Policy. On a theoretical level, direct efforts to mitigate racism have the potential to augment strategies that reaffirm pluralism and address disadvantage often associated with the migrant experience. To explore the extent to which such top-level discourses have empirical founding in the social lives of migrant youth, Effenev, Mansouri and Mikola draw on data collected from a longitudinal research project on social networks, belonging and active citizenship among migrant youth. Their findings suggest that there is a persistent tendency among migrant youth to point to their social distance from Australians of Anglo origins who are perceived as symbolising Australia's mainstream—representing an inclusion/exclusion binary constructed along racialised lines that persists today. The migrant youth surveyed in this study point to a number of instances of racism that weaken their overall feelings of belonging. These manifestations of racial discrimination can preclude the emergence of a genuinely inclusive society that supports and nurtures cultural diversity as a significant part of the Australian national identity.

This section, and indeed the book, concludes with the contribution of Boese and Phillips who discuss multiculturalism in Australia as a contemporary policy framework and practice that has been the subject of sustained criticism and debate. They focus on the resettlement experiences of newly arrived migrants and refugees to show how Australian multiculturalism has become a limited symbolic cultural space where "ethnic Others" are permitted to display their minority ethnicity to the white ethnic majority group. They argue that the official and public meanings of multiculturalism today remain constrained by its past, specifically the historical legacy of White Australia and the contested but still entrenched remnants of the term "assimilation". As a result, new arrivals and existing cultural "Others" are expected to gradually "blend in"; a euphemism that in effect veils a form of cultural assimilation. This process occurs at the expense of acknowledging the everyday realities of cultural diversity, and the possibilities for a more proactive, reciprocal and ongoing cultural, political and social exchange within and between all diverse communities of Australia. Boese and Phillips argue that a more transformational form of multiculturalism has emerged, termed "(re)multiculturalisation". (Re)multiculturalising, in this regard, points to a multi-layered process and seeks to encapsulate some of the ways in which multiculturalism operates within Australia today across a variety of public and private settings.

1.5 Conclusion

It is perhaps heuristically not very helpful to describe and discuss "multiculturalism" in terms of "failure", "retreat" and "rejection", nor should this contested term be paraded as an all-encompassing solution to all that is ill with modern societies. In fact, neither its "protective" claims vis-à-vis migrants nor its "liberal"

expectations from majoritarian groups are sufficient to provide conclusive arguments in the ongoing debate about cultural claims of minority groups.

This is why this book is not simply about multiculturalism as a social policy tool aimed at supporting migrant social integration and engendering broader social harmony. Nor is it about multiculturalism as conduit for dealing with more complex cultural diversity often linked to migrants and minority groups with different cultural and religious backgrounds. These issues listed above are indeed very important to our societies and worthy of dedicated volumes that explicitly examine their many diverse applications and implications. This book, however, is concerned with how individual human beings living in increasingly globalised cities are able to develop a multitude of attachments: to their heritage culture; to their national political community; to a globalised human society; and to a set of universal values that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state (Kymlicka and Walker 2012; Beck 2011). It is this multi-faceted engagement that often results in tension at the personal, national, transnational and global levels. Yet, human beings, throughout human history (Parekh 2005) have exhibited an unrivalled capacity to overcome and to prevail over such difficulties. What will be the exact future of multiculturalism in diverse societies is not perhaps the most critical question. Rather, a more inherently intriguing question relates to how multiculturalism and its many related concepts (cosmopolitanism, interculturalism; transculturalism) will evolve as they are critiqued, challenged, contested, reshaped and even reclaimed. Indeed, the premises, promises and problems of multiculturalism are the very characteristics that will ensure the concept will endure one way or another because it is an empirical impossibility to slow it down let alone reverse the cross-cultural encounter.

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Chapter 2

Multicultural Inclusion Confronts Questions of National Identity

Peter Kivisto

Abstract This chapter examines the role of national identity in shaping the prospects for multiculturalism—a topic that has received surprisingly little attention in the scholarly literature on multiculturalism thus far. It does so by examining the US immigrant experience, with the underlying assumption that its response to diversity should be viewed as but one variant of a common experience in contemporary liberal democracies.

Keywords Assimilation • Liberal nationalism • Multiculturalism • Monoculturalism • National identity • Nationalism • Social solidarity

In her posthumously published *Responsibility for Justice*, Iris Marion Young (2011: 120) observed that, “As a term and a concept, solidarity need not connote homogeneity or symmetry among those in relations. Some people use the term to imply identification with others or the unity of a group, but such usages can and should be challenged”. Rather, she contends, “solidarity is a relationship among separate and dissimilar actors who decide to stand together for one another”. As such, it stands in contrast to common origins, which is an inherited relationship rather than one that must be created.

Jeffrey C. Alexander (2006; see also 1997, 2001, 2013), the preeminent theorist of solidarity today, would clarify Young’s contention by observing that in the real world, although homogeneity “need not” define solidarity it definitely does in many instances. Indeed, in his work, which builds on a line of thought rooted in Durkheim and Parsons, he contends that an inevitable and inherent tension exists between parochial and civil modes of solidarity. Moreover, the two do not exist in a neat symmetrical relationship, insofar as parochial solidarity appears as a “natural” form

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of belonging, rooted in the givens of biology, history, and/or tradition, while civil solidarity is seen as existing, when it does and to the extent that it does, as an emergent and aspirational phenomenon.

In modern societies, characterized by increasing levels of diversity, one of the central issues that needs to be addressed concerns the willingness of core groups to expand the boundaries of what Alexander calls the “civil sphere” in a manner that permits heretofore marginalized and excluded groups to move from the periphery to the centre. This, in a nutshell, constitutes what Alexander understands incorporation to entail. What is distinctive about a multicultural mode of incorporation, in contrast to assimilation and what he calls “ethnic hyphenation”, is that it permits outsiders to enter into the civil sphere with their “polluted qualities” intact, rather than requiring them to park those qualities in the private realm. This is made possible insofar as the core group engages in a process of reevaluation of outsider qualities, which are no longer viewed with disgust, but rather as meriting respect (Alexander 2006: 450–57; see also, Seidman 2013). Whereas assimilation and ethnic hyphenation amount to treating the particular qualities of the core group as expressions of the universal (see Chap. 4 for more on this point), multiculturalism is predicated on the assumption that the various particularities of distinct groups, both from the core and the periphery, must be recognized if a more universal solidarity based on a common humanity is to be possible. When this occurs, nobody remains quite the same in the process. Moreover, the cultures of both core and outsider groups do not remain unchanged as a result of an ongoing dialogue across difference predicated on mutual respect.

Assimilation, ethnic hyphenation, and multiculturalism are ideal types, and in the real world, they can be found in mixes reflecting the distinctive features of various societies (Alexander 2006: 256). In this regard, it is necessary to recognize the fact that whichever mode of incorporation is advanced, this occurs within the boundaries of the nation-state; where national identity confronts and must be related to a range of identities based on factors such as class, race, religion, gender, sexual identity, and region. With this in mind, this chapter examines what I consider to be a topic that has not received the attention it merits, namely the role of national identity in shaping the prospects for multiculturalism. It does so by examining the US immigrant experience, with the underlying assumption that its response to diversity should be viewed as but one variant of a common experience in contemporary liberal democracies.

David Hollinger (2006: 23–24) considers solidarity to be “shaping up as the problem of the twenty-first century”, and paralleling Young and Alexander’s emphasis on choice, he contends that solidarity can be “an experience of willed affiliation”, one that he characterizes as “active” and “performative”. Like Alexander however, he sees this type of solidarity vying with a less voluntaristic type in which “communities of fate” often witness solidarity within the ranks based on homogeneity. Problems arise, he contends, when people begin to question the bases of collective identity by asking “who are ‘we’?” The act of asking is a reflection of feelings of deep unease—of anxiety about what the answer might be, an anxiety that those who are, as Hollinger (2006: 25) puts it, “supremely confident” about those collectivities to which they are attached and those they are free from.

2.1 Who Are We?

Given the way Hollinger posed the question, Samuel Huntington's (2004) last publication, *Who Are We?*, will no doubt come to mind. This is a work that Alan Wolfe (2004: 2) characterized as "Patrick Buchanan with footnotes". Similar assessments have been offered by many others, and insofar as this is true, one might ask whether there is anything to be gained by rehashing the book. I would argue that it is worth yet another examination, not simply in order to analyse it as a piece of flawed scholarship, but to read it as a reflection of unease about the state of national solidarity. Put another way, it can be read to glean insights into the underlying dynamics of the fear experienced by an unabashed nationalist (Huntington described himself "as a patriot and a scholar" in the volume's preface).

His motivation for writing the book revolved around two perceived threats: to the security of the US and to its national identity. Given that it was written shortly after 9/11 and that for many in the west who have endorsed his "clash of civilizations" argument the immediate challenge at hand was depicted as a contemporary parallel to the centuries earlier threat of "barbarians at the gates of Vienna", one might have assumed that the security challenges foremost on his mind would be those posed by militant Islamists. Yet this is not the case, for what preoccupies him is the presence of increasingly large numbers of Hispanic immigrants, with Mexican immigrants being seen as most significant due to their sheer numbers.

Central to his argument is the claim that from its founding up to the present America has been defined in terms of an Anglo-Protestant culture, stressing that he is not talking about any particular *people*, but about a particular *culture*. Despite this focus on a distinctive culture, Huntington rather curiously does little to describe either the origins or the content of Anglo-Protestant culture. He does point repeatedly to a historical linkage between what he refers to as dissenting Protestantism and the American Creed. However, he reveals no appreciation of the implications of the fact that from the beginning, the British Protestants who played such an instrumental role in shaping a new national culture were comprised of widely divergent groups with often competing and contradictory values, as David Hackett Fischer's (1989) now classic study attests. Though he cites this work, Huntington (2004: 42) glosses over the differences in order to conclude that they forged a "common culture"; by which he means a homogeneous, singular culture. He also fails to consider that competing cultural values might exist as a result of the development of what Rogers Smith (1993) has termed "multiple traditions" that have arisen as a consequence of a variety of non-egalitarian ideologies. Likewise, he fails to make clear precisely what he means by the "American Creed".

As to cultural contents, nowhere does Huntington develop a sustained analysis. He observes that Americans are inclined to see good and evil in stark dichotomous terms, value individualism, support the work ethic, embrace moralistic values, and harbour notions of social reform only insofar as they are tied to the transformation of individuals. Despite this sketchiness, he is prepared to assert without qualification that this culture has been "remarkably stable" over time (2004: 67). It had

managed to be so despite the huge migratory wave extending from 1880 to 1924. Given the substantial increase in the size of the Catholic and Jewish populations during this Great Migration, one might have expected Huntington to characterize the impact of these newcomers as eroding the hegemony of Anglo-Protestant culture, resulting in a recasting of national identity to one that was at once more inclusive, and in terms of the significance attributed to national origin and religion, less particularistic. In his reading of that history, however, it is the immigrants alone who changed by adapting and embracing the existing national culture without in any significant way transforming it. In short, they assimilated, if assimilation meant that they simply abandoned their old world cultures, replacing them with that of the new world. In the case of Catholics, it meant that they abandoned Roman Catholicism for something Huntington (2004: 92) calls without elaboration “American Catholicism” (on the nexus between religion, nation and multicultural politics see Chaps. 3, 4, and 6). Presumably, this new form of Catholicism constituted a transvaluation of a religious belief system sufficient to render it a parallel institution to the panoply of Protestant denominations.

If this is an accurate reading of the US’s past, it would be reasonable to conclude that a nation so capable of absorbing immigrants without appreciable change to the existing national culture would be able to do so again today. This ought to be especially true of the largest immigrant population in the US; particularly since Mexicans are overwhelmingly Catholic. Huntington, however, finds the presence of such a large number of Mexican immigrants deeply troubling, and it’s not because of their impact on the economy or competition with natives over jobs, housing, and so forth. Rather, they are seen as posing a clear and present danger to the capacity of the nation to maintain its core Anglo-Protestant cultural identity. The source of the problem with Mexicans can be simply attributed to their “culture of Catholicism”, a term that Huntington uses but fails to define. Given that the Irish, Italians, and Poles arrived in the country during an earlier era with similar cultures of Catholicism, and they ended up, in his view, becoming American Catholics, why does Huntington think that Mexicans won’t follow the same pattern of inclusion?

The answer he offers is that they are refusing to assimilate and are being encouraged to refuse by advocates of multiculturalism. Whereas in the past the receiving society’s sole accepted mode of incorporation was presumed to be assimilation, today the goal of assimilation is being challenged by an ideology that seeks to denigrate Anglo-Protestant culture. Huntington (2004: 171) regards multiculturalism as “basically an anti-Western ideology”, that argues that “justice, equality, and rights of minorities demand that [their] suppressed cultures be liberated and that governments and private institutions encourage and support their revitalization. America is not and should not be a society with a single national culture”.

Critics of Huntington have faulted him for what they see as his chauvinism in defence of a version of nationalism that preserves the cultural hegemony of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (the WASP), the nation’s charter group. Eric Kaufmann (2004) contends, however, that he is a civic and not an ethnic nationalist. While the culture persists, it is seen as available to newcomers, who can become members of the societal community insofar as they are willing to embrace its cultural heritage—and,

of course, in the process, abandon their own. This is what he means by distinguishing between the people who make up the composite population of the nation and its shared, unified national culture. His fear is that a very large immigrant population today is refusing to enter into this bargain, encouraged by multiculturalism's spokespersons, who can be found both within segments of the leadership stratum of immigrant groups and within the ranks of liberal elites in the host society. In this, his view of how solidarity is achieved at least implicitly parallels that of Young, Alexander, and Hollinger insofar as he considers it to be a matter of volition.

From Huntington's perspective, there is no prospect of maintaining solidarity with one's ethnic group and simultaneously becoming an American (unless, of course, the group in question is the core WASP group). It is an either/or proposition. Solidarity is, in effect, a zero sum game. To the extent that people remain attached to ethnic group identities, they will continue to be detached from full immersion in the national culture. It's a matter of choice, and thus if Mexicans resist becoming American on cultural terms that presumably crystallized fairly early in the nineteenth century, they have only themselves to blame for their continued marginalization. They are agents shaping their own lives, and from his perspective as scholar patriot, they are making the wrong decision.

A curious feature of his account is that he never takes seriously the fact that members of the host society are also agents with the capacity to determine to some extent who does and who does not become—to use the language of Talcott Parsons (2007)—full members of the “societal community”. In a section of the book devoted to white nativism, Huntington (2004: 310–11) borrows from what he refers to as a “neutral” definition of nativism as entailing opposition to minority groups on the basis of their “foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections”, adding to that description opposition to blacks as not truly a part of American society and to minority groups that it is believed might become a majority. He is at pains to distinguish the vast majority of white nativists from extremists such as members of the KKK or the Aryan Nation, and offers a sympathetic portrait of those who perceive the presence of a large Hispanic population as constituting a “threat to their language, culture, and power [...]” (Huntington 2004: 316).

He never takes into consideration the possibility that the actions of nativists can deter newcomers from opting into US society by creating a toxic environment for them, one that makes clear that they are not welcome and that places various impediments to their incorporation. Prejudice, discrimination (both individual and institutional), stereotyping, scapegoating, and the like are simply not factored into his narrative of forging and sustaining national identity. Thus, he is incapable of explaining the differential barriers to incorporation confronting various ethnic groups—failing to appreciate the contrast between those for whom the issues of race and/or religion loom large versus those for whom these aspects of ethnic identity have proven to be less salient as handicaps to inclusion. There are two key problems with Huntington's account. The first has to do with the inadequacy of his description of the process by which newcomers and their offspring adjust and adapt to their new homeland. The second concerns his static depiction of national culture.

2.2 Incorporation as a Social Process

Turning to the first shortcoming, what we know about the immigrant experience is that, as Robert Merton (1976: 11–2) has pointed out, it is one of those paradigmatic examples of ambivalence, situations where a social role contains “conflicting normative expectations”, a consequence of having “lived in two or more societies and so have become oriented to differing sets of cultural values”. I would simply note first that this is a dual ambivalence: for immigrants are often ambivalent about both their ethnic group and the receiving society. Second, a resolution to ambivalence is often not accomplished during the lifetimes of the immigrant generation, but rather occurs as homeland ties and familiarity with its culture becomes more attenuated for subsequent generations.

How should we understand incorporation into the receiving society as a social process? In the first place, it involves both immigrants and natives. Second, it is a process with a political dimension that has often not received the attention that it merits in US scholarship—from the Chicago School to recent work on boundaries by Richard Alba and others. It is with this in mind that it’s worth examining the argument that Roger Waldinger (2007, 2008, 2011) has been advancing for the past several years, which can be read as a call to recognize the role of the state in determining who is permitted to become members of the societal mainstream and under what parameters. He stresses that borders matter and states are the arbiters of who has a legitimate right to cross their borders—either to exit or to enter—and who does not, and in the case of the receiving society, in determining who will and who will not be given the opportunity to become a member of the national community. Meanwhile, the citizenry expresses its views about the expectations it has for newcomers to prove themselves as worthy and loyal members of the polity. Succinctly put, “States seek to bound the societies they enclose: they strive to regulate membership in the national collectivity as well as movement across territorial borders, often using illiberal means to fulfil liberal ends” (Waldinger 2007: 343).¹ Taking issue with the portrayal of the global economy as borderless when it comes to would-be migrants seeking to improve their lives, he points to the fact that states are willing to go to extraordinary lengths to control their borders in the interest of preventing unwanted migrants from “crashing the gates” (2007: 346). The contemporary immigration policies of the US, like those of every other liberal democracy, are exclusionary—seeking to preserve the binary divide between insiders and outsiders.

This leads to his understanding of the role of the state *vis-à-vis* those on the inside. The overarching state interest remains the same: to maintain control over a population. In the case of those residing within the boundaries of the nation, the state seeks to “cage” that population, “constraining social ties beyond the territorial divide, while reorienting activities toward the interior” (Waldinger 2008: 9). Viewing migration as first and foremost a political phenomenon, he contends that states strive to transform foreigners into nationals. Unlike assimilation as it is conventionally

¹ See Chap. 10 for an account of the micro politics of migrant belonging, situated, as it is, within these larger state and societal processes aimed at defining the parameters of nationhood.

understood, which stresses the decline of the ethnic factor and the entry of newcomers over time into the societal mainstream, Waldinger (2007: 347) describes the transformation as a form of “political resocialization”. Assimilation entails the emergence of new patterns of relatedness between newcomers and established residents in which the former are brought into the orbit of the latter’s social world, in some instances on more-or-less equal terms and in other instances in segmented fashion. Being transformed into a national of the receiving society involves acquiring an identity that makes people insiders, a process that simultaneously distinguishes them from outsiders, including citizens of their former homeland. This happens regardless of whether the newcomers end up in the societal mainstream or on the margins.

The internal and external aspects of national identity need not necessarily operate according to the same ideological script. Waldinger thinks that at present the US is becoming increasingly inclusive internally, while remaining externally exclusive. This was not always so, for historically the nation was exclusive both internally and externally, the former being seen most obviously in the extended effort to exclude African Americans from full societal membership, first during slavery and then during the Jim Crow era. Internal exclusivity shaped perceptions of national identity, defined in terms of race (white), ethnic origin (Anglo-Saxon), and religion (Protestant). This led to demands for newcomers to assimilate by shedding their pasts and transforming themselves into WASP clones. This prospect differentiated European-origin ethnics from blacks and other racial minorities insofar as only in the case of the former was it possible to “become white”. That the cultural elites of earlier periods of American history were confident about their capacity to so transform immigrants, for an extended period from the founding of the republic up to the beginning of the twentieth century, when a more pessimistic view of the incorporative capacity of the nation took hold, the nation’s immigration laws were inclusive in terms of religion and national origin. Waldinger does not spend time addressing shifts in immigration laws, because his central point is simply that once national identity took shape, so too did the distinction between citizens and aliens.

While this particular binary has not changed over time, the internal change that has transpired over the course of the past century has resulted in a pluralistic rendering of national identity in which ethnic groups have come to be seen as a legitimate part of the political and cultural landscape. At the same time, Waldinger concurs with David Hollinger’s (1995) post-ethnic America thesis, which stresses the options people have in regard to ethnic attachments, ranging from distancing to embracing. The result is that the nation has witnessed a shift from internal exclusivity in the past to inclusivity, but one in which the significance of individualism tends to preclude the possibility of the hardening of ethnic group affiliations and allegiances. Put another way, ethnic pluralism has been recognized at the same time that its salience has declined, particularly vis-à-vis national identity. The result is liberal nationalism, which ought to be viewed as the “doctrine best suited to the normal, multicultural America of the early twenty-first century, and therefore the view most likely to be internalized by the new and candidate Americans of our times” (Waldinger 2007: 347).

In Waldinger's sketchy discussions, he, at least implicitly, describes the current situation in terms of states and citizens mutually reinforcing any particular stance on newcomers. Yet, the reality is more complex since democratic states do not act in an environment free from internal tensions and conflicts, and the opinions of citizens are inevitably divided. Perhaps a starting point for a richer empirical perspective might derive from an assessment offered by the late John Higham (1994: 1289), who while viewing the nation-state as an entity that "will remain for a long time the strongest political structure in the world", nevertheless considered it to be "under siege" with "the abounding trust it once enjoyed eroding", the net result being that though strong it is "less capable of dominating the subgroups within their boundaries". This viewpoint offers a corrective to Waldinger's account insofar as it accords the social its due in relation to the strictly political and it grants a level of agency to ordinary people—both citizens and immigrants/ethnics—who have the capacity to question the legitimacy of the state and the justness of its policies and actions, and can therefore potentially undermine, subvert, or resist its capacity to "cage". But this, of course, cuts both ways since those citizens most hostile to newcomers and diversity can pressure the state to enact more, rather than less, repressive measures.

If I read the history of American immigration and the integration of migrants into the society's mainstream correctly, while some newcomers have been prepared to abandon old world ways entirely (at least as much as they could muster) and others have resisted the lure of the receiving society and worked hard to remain unpolluted from its culture, most have sought to negotiate the terms of incorporation. They have, as John Bodnar's (1987) synthetic account of the Great Migration argued, done so pragmatically. They have often been prepared to comply with the expectations and demands of both the state and majority population in many arenas of everyday life, but at the same time they have been prepared to make demands of their own in an effort to play a role in defining their distinctive version of American identity. These varied narratives have generally sought to find room to some extent for the persistence of elements of the ethnic factor.

2.3 National Identity and Expanding the Boundaries of Inclusion

Elsewhere I (2012) have argued that multiculturalism ought to be viewed as a form of claims-making, expanding on Giuseppe Sciortino's (2003: 264) argument that multicultural claims constitute "political claims expressed by actors on behalf of a social category". The actors in question are the more or less legitimate representatives of the category in question, in this case ethnic and other marginalized groups, and are generally individuals who hold leadership roles within their respective groups. What Sciortino broadly termed a social category, I prefer to call a *community of fate* (recall that this is also the term used by Hollinger), and contend further that the claims revolve around concerns about the *fate of the community* and well as

its place in the national imaginary. Although a precise definition of the term “community of fate” does not exist, for our purposes it will suffice to note that one is typically born into this sort of community involuntarily and that members of the community experience various levels of marginalization and stigmatization. They understand the individual and the group as involved in, to borrow from Michael Dawson (1994) a “linked fate”.

Claims-making takes place within the public spaces afforded by liberal democracies, where efforts can be made to mobilize support in the court of public opinion. But claims-making is also directed at the state, for success often requires specific legislative actions or court decisions to translate multicultural aspirations into concrete institutionalized practices and policies. In this regard, Alexander and Smelser (1999: 15) aptly call this “civil-society discourse”, which simultaneously advocates on behalf of ethnic identities and solidarities while also constituting a performance that affirms one’s identity and voice as a citizen of a democratic polity.

It is important to note that what I am calling multiculturalism refers to a phenomenon that claims-makers may or may not have dubbed multiculturalism. They may have called it pluralism, or simply made a case that what they were seeking involved what they understood to be fair terms of integration or, more simply, an effort to protect something of value from one’s heritage. Understood in this way, multiculturalism is not a new phenomenon, but can be found *avant la letter*. Immigrant groups are not the only claims-making ethnic groups. Indeed, indigenous and ethno-national groups often make more potentially far-reaching demands than immigrants.

Defenders of diversity from Horace Kallen’s (1924) call for cultural pluralism to contemporary exponents of multicultural theory such as Will Kymlicka (1995), Charles Taylor (1992), and Bhikhu Parekh (2000) have been concerned first and foremost with providing rationales for preserving difference in contemporary heterogeneous modern societies. And they have criticized attempts by hegemonic groups in those societies to undermine difference by promoting agendas aimed at insuring a form of assimilation that for newcomers involved a loss of connectedness to their particularistic identities. What those defenders have paid insufficient attention to is the fact that many such “ethnics”, seen more clearly with each succeeding generation, have voluntarily opted out of a thick connectedness to their ethnic past, rather than being forced to do so (see also Chap. 4 on this point). Ethnic practices generally persisted, though in attenuated form. Such practices were reflections of what Herbert Gans (1979) called “symbolic ethnicity” as people exercised what Mary Waters (1990) has called “ethnic options”.

How do we account for this steady decline of the ethnic factor, despite persistent efforts by ethnic leaders to protect and enhance ethnic identities and allegiances and despite greater acceptance of diversity by the mainstream society? In considerable part, this was due to the individualism so central to American social values, a cultural framework that stressed resistance to obstacles to the ability to forge one’s own sense of identity and purpose. If ethnicity limited opportunities, growing numbers of ethnics were prepared to either exit from ethnic involvements or minimize

them considerably. Thus, there was a widespread rejection of the idea that the ethnic group constituted a boundary within which aspects of ordinary life, such as the choice of marital partners, friends, leisure-time activities, organizational memberships, and so forth were to be determined. Another factor contributing to this trend involved changes in the class structure of American society, particularly the rapid expansion of the white collar, professional middle class. During the first half of the past century, ethnicity and working class identities could be seen as mutually reinforcing, but this linkage began to give way as a consequence of generational upward social mobility and growing affluence within the working class, particularly its unionized sector.

As these changes transpired, people experienced their sense of self increasingly in terms of multiple identities, which could be competing, complementary, overlapping, or intersecting, and which led to a growing compartmentalization of individual identity. What this meant for ethnicity was that, far from being highly salient, it became a less consequential element of most people's identity kits. Such was the case during what was dubbed an "ethnic revival" in the 1970s. While some portrayed this episode in terms of the reaction of working class white ethnics responding negatively to what they perceived to be the unwarranted benefits that had accrued to black Americans as a result of the civil rights movement, others emphasized the more symbolic nature of the revival. They described it as a "roots" revival that endorsed a narrative of national identity emphasizing the diversity of the American people while redefining the status of its various components. No longer were those who could trace their ancestry to the Mayflower an elite; now whether one arrived with the Puritans or came through Ellis Island (and, insofar as there was a heightened sensitivity to racial differences, Angel Island), their place in the nation was to be valorised rather than questioned (Kaufman 2004).

This, in turn, had an impact on national identity: both about what it meant to be an American and who was to be included in the compact. While it is not possible to offer empirical detail here, pointing to one important transformation will have to suffice—one that directly challenges Huntington's belief that Protestantism alone shapes the nation's religious identity. After World War II, the idea percolating for some time took root that the US was a Judeo-Christian nation, and not simply a "Protestant empire" (Herberg 1960). To the extent that people embraced this idea, a shift took place from an earlier period when the relationship between the Protestant majority and Catholics and Jews, the two most consequential minority faith communities, revolved around whether or not the former would exhibit tolerance from its position of privilege or whether the three faith traditions would be seen as equally valid expressions of religious conviction. For this to happen, two interrelated things had to occur. First, the previously stigmatized qualities of Catholics and Jews had to be seen in a positive light (Alexander 2006). Second, if these two traditions were to be so embraced, it would mean that the idea of Protestantism as the one true religion no longer held, but instead a more ecumenical sensibility was called for, one that was prepared to accept the prospect of rethinking how people understood their own tradition on the basis of an ongoing interreligious dialogue.

2.4 Past and Present

Stephen Warner and Rhys Williams (2011) have suggested that something similar may be developing today, albeit in embryonic form, with efforts by Muslims and their allies from the Judeo-Christian community suggesting a further expansion of the circle of solidarity by depicting Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as part of a shared Abrahamic religious tradition or as religions of the book. Needless to say, in the “age of terror”, this development confronts serious challenges, but the earlier enlargement of the nation’s religious identity (which, too, continues to have those prepared to challenge its validity) in a way that relocated Catholicism and Judaism from the periphery to the centre and in so doing changed the heretofore hegemonic status of Protestantism, constitutes an empirically-grounded rebuttal of Huntington’s central claim about the persistent hegemony of Anglo-Protestant culture, which, as Richard Alba (2010: 167) observes, “obliterates the contributions of Catholics and Jews to the mainstream cultural core”.

The post-1965 immigrants began to arrive in large numbers at precisely the time that a new narrative of national identity took hold, which can perhaps account in part for the fact that they entered a nation that was more sympathetic to newcomers than was true in the past. This is not to suggest that those hostile to immigrants have become inconsequential, for we have abundant evidence to dispute overly optimistic accounts, from various efforts at the local and state levels to crack down on the undocumented to the decade-long legislative impasse on substantive immigration legislation reform. But, as the results of two major studies on the second-generation have concluded, there are grounds for a more guarded optimism, seen in a variety of indicators that suggest these children of immigrants are getting a foothold in their homeland that may set the stage for entry into the mainstream (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Kasinitz et al. 2008).

And, more germane to the concerns about national identity raised by Huntington, their worldviews appear in key respects to parallel those of the native-born. To cite but two studies that support this assessment, I point first to an explicit testing of Huntington’s thesis by Jack Citrin and colleagues (2007), which found that Latinos are acquiring English-language skills rather quickly, while simultaneously proficiency in Spanish is declining; Hispanics and Anglos exhibit similar levels of religiosity and dedication to the work ethic; and that patriotism has grown while levels of intense commitment to ethnic identity have declined over time. These findings are not only supported, but amplified in Deborah Schildkraut’s (2011) broader study of Americanization, which concludes by pointing out that there is no empirical evidence to support those who think that as a consequence of the pernicious impact of multiculturalism today’s immigrants are committed to their ethnic differences at the expense of a shared national identity.

At the same time, though the evidence is sketchier, it would appear that today’s newcomers, like their counterparts from an earlier era, are pragmatists intent on fitting in while simultaneously reshaping the national character. But what that national identity will look like—how it will be modified by their presence—is something we

will only fully understand with the passage of time. In no small part, the outcome will depend on the willingness of the members of the receiving society to forge ties of solidarity with the dissimilar actors Young (2011) describes in making room for the expansion of the civil sphere. This would entail valorising, rather than seeking to overcome, ethnic diversity and making room under a nation's sacred canopy for heretofore marginalized religions.

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Chapter 3

Multiculturalism, Rights and Religion: The Individual's Human Right to Participate and Belong

Paul Morris

Abstract The discourse of multicultural and multi-religious recognition in contemporary societies seemingly advances in inverse proportion to oppositional campaigns designed to limit the rights of religious and cultural minorities. In this chapter I intend to explain this apparent paradox and suggest possible remedies for future deliberation and discussion. The case study for this analysis will be the recent legal, political and popular interventions over infant male, ritual circumcision that began in Germany. I understand this case to be part of wider political and legal debates, in Europe and beyond, over dress codes, butchering, different ritual calendars and practices; debates that seek to define—and restrict—the acceptable levels of religious and cultural difference in post-Christian, ostensibly secular, democracies.

Keywords Religious recognition • Cultural rights • Human rights • Multiculturalism • Circumcision • Secularism

All contemporary nation-states are multicultural and multi-religious in having citizens that identify with a range of cultures and religions. The very process of modern nation-state formation entails developing institutions and policies that create homogenous national cultures fostering a moral and values consensus (see Chap. 2), which in turn provides the foundation for cooperative, political and social life. The inevitable tensions between the constructed, national cultural consensus and the unprecedented diversities of contemporary multicultural realities within nation-states has led to multicultural political and social theories, legislation and policies that recognise cultural and religious rights, in particular those of minorities.

Will Kymlicka's (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* offers one such influential and sophisticated response. Beginning with the citizen, Kymlicka acknowledges that we are “cultural creatures”, formed as autonomous

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individuals—a necessity for the “good life”—within specific cultural contexts and that these creates for us our sense of identity, of belonging to a community, and of cogent life choices and narratives (1995: 76). Cultures are significant only in their necessary support for the identity and community of liberal individuals in the liberal state (1995: 76). Kymlicka subscribes to a concept of “culture” that focuses on national and ethnic cultures, privileging the liberal forms of these, arguing that the state should intervene to oppose illiberal cultural beliefs and practices (1995: 101) (Chap. 4 explores this aspect of liberal multiculturalism in more depth). His novel rationale for the state’s responsibility to rectify the “unchosen inequalities” that arise from being part of a minority culture is that they did not elect to be part of the nation-state in question (1995: 109). Migrants, however, are for him in a different category and must accept the legitimacy of the “state enforcement of liberal principles” and should assimilate to the “national culture” as part of their immigration contract (1995: 170).

For Kymlicka, the majority religious culture simply forms part of the national culture (“societal culture”)—an argument that is examined in Chap. 2 of this volume—and minority religions are aspects of their respective ethnic cultures and he has little to say specifically about religious diversity or religions. Religious affiliations and identifications are often more deeply foundational than Kymlicka’s notion of culture and are understood in terms of sacred legacy or inheritance, and of a loyalty that is equally significant to an individual as their autonomy. This privileging of culture over religion requires further consideration and many scholars claim for religion the same functional and conceptual space as Kymlicka’s notion of culture: identity, community; life purpose and existential meaning.

Multiculturalism as a pluralistic political theory is developed by Bhikhu Parekh in his *Rethinking Multiculturalism* (2000, see also 1997). He seeks to acknowledge the contributions of theorists such as Kymlicka (1995) and Raz (1998) but argues that they too easily dismiss cultural diversity in favour of their “absolutised” liberal viewpoint. Parekh, also a liberal, recognises that there really are differences between cultures with different values, moralities, meanings and visions of the good life. While he understands each culture as specific he considers cultures to be both dynamic and to reflect human universals. Every culture thus reflects a dialectic between universal humanness and very particular historical experiences. Although he still subsumes religion in culture, his concept of culture is broader than most liberal theorists and acknowledges a profound embeddedness (Parekh 2000: 275–89, 295–335). Further, he sees every culture as characterised by “internal plurality”; and contends that interactions between cultures are opportunities for a new openness to diverse cultural discourses in the public realm. Parekh (2000) writes that “since multicultural societies represent an interplay of different cultures, they cannot be theorised or managed from within any one of them”. Committed to both liberalism and multiculturalism and understanding them to be “moderated” by “the logic of one by the other”, he moves beyond liberalism to the multicultural “community of citizens” that is simultaneously a “community of communities” (Parekh 2000: 275–89, 295–335).

It is interesting that many of the illustrations selected for analysis in Parekh's study are religious concerns, including free speech and religious defamation; the role of religion in public life; and an extended discussion of female circumcision. His multicultural analysis draws on historical, textual and religious contexts to clearly set up the need to balance citizenship with cultural/religious rights. Tensions between these two cannot be settled by the imposition of any single logic, he insists, but can be addressed pragmatically by discussion, negotiation and agreement and he considers that the very discussion itself will broaden, "moderate" and ultimately transform and extend public discourse (Parekh 2000: 340–44).

Charles Taylor has directly addressed religion and multiculturalism in his writing on the nature of the secular and acknowledges that migration necessitates a re-examination of the range of "spiritual families" that must be heard. He envisages that by becoming seen as legitimate "interlocutors" in public debates about "the exact regime of rights and privileges", these communities will be changed and deepen their political participation in democracies. That this will entail conflicts between competing goods or goals that will have to be balanced, he acknowledges, but he considers that we "we have the wrong model" of secularism, in that, "we think that secularism (or *laïcité*) has to do with the relation of the state and religion, whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state to diversity" (Taylor 2010).

Multicultural theory has indeed generated a more inclusive and enhanced level of public discourse that is less "overwhelmingly monological" and that acknowledges the need to balance individual democratic rights with religious and cultural rights. Yet whether the public sphere has been permanently broadened or is more hospitable to religious claims is debateable (Taylor 1994: 32).

The discourse of multicultural and multi-religious recognition in contemporary societies seemingly advances in inverse proportion to oppositional campaigns designed to limit the rights of religious and cultural minorities. In this chapter I intend to explain this apparent paradox and suggest possible remedies for future deliberation and discussion. The case study for this analysis will be the recent legal, political and popular interventions over infant male, ritual circumcision that began in Germany. As will become clear I understand this case to be part of wider political and legal debates, in Europe and beyond, over dress codes, butchering, different ritual calendars and practices; debates that seek to define—and restrict—the acceptable levels of religious and cultural difference in post-Christian, ostensibly secular, democracies.

These discussions of religious difference usually commence with legislative or policy changes, or court cases, and via populist media reporting inform public discourse on multiculturalism and religion (for examples, see Chaps. 6 and 9). For instance, recently, Mr Justice Baker, tacitly acknowledged a rabbinic court (Beth Din) by incorporating the religious court's ongoing involvement in a divorce settlement into his High Court judgement. This perfectly sensible and relatively minor issue was reported in *The Times* (1 Feb 2013) as a "landmark decision" under the front page banner headline, "High Court opens way to Sharia divorces", although the case did not deal with Islam or Muslims. Or, the recent report in a Dutch

newspaper that Geert Wilders, leader of the 15 seat Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), has revived his campaign for a total ban in Holland on Jewish and Muslim butchery as part of the electoral promotion of the party. In my own country, New Zealand, there was an attempt to remove the “ministerial exemption” that allowed Jews to follow religious directives on animal slaughter in 2010. Religious rights, framed within the discourse of a benign and enlightened multiculturalism and on the surface protected under existing human rights legislation—both in terms of the acknowledgment of religious rights and the prohibition of discrimination on religious grounds—turn out to be extremely vulnerable whenever concerns do arise; under the weight of widespread public opposition and calls to greatly restrict religions from legal and other so-called experts. Human rights law generally proceeds from universal rights, making subsequent exemptions for particular designated groups. This, like the ministerial exemption to pre-slaughter stunning in New Zealand for Jews, all too often proves to be fragile. And like all exemptions, this can be vulnerable to the pressure for universal policy applications, political change, and conformist populism.

3.1 The Cologne Decision and Its Aftermath

Recent tensions over ritual male circumcision that began in Germany with a court decision in May 2012 have led to, and fed into, debates across the globe about this particular practice and the human rights of the children and families involved. In our globalised juridical world the impact of this comparatively minor court decision reverberated around Europe and beyond, raising concerns about how deeply embedded multicultural protections of religious and cultural rights really are and what level of assimilation is currently being proposed for minorities in order to ensure recognition, emancipation and equality.

In November 2010 a Muslim surgeon, Dr Omar Kezze, performed a ritual circumcision on a 4-year-old boy, Ali al-Akbar, at the request of his parents. This was performed using a local anaesthetic in a Cologne hospital. Two days afterwards the boy was taken to the University hospital as the wound was bleeding. Staff informed police who reported the incident to the local prosecutor’s office. Press reports indicated that the mother had complications with her residency papers and was hospitalised in a psychiatric unit after jumping from a third floor window. The prosecution service charged Dr Kezze with a breach of the criminal law, namely, of causing assault and bodily harm (German Criminal Code 2013: §223.1, §224.1). The Cologne District Court¹ refused the case² and acquitted Kezze on the grounds that

¹ Amtsgericht, or trial court.

² Docket no. 528 Ds 30/11.

there had been no medical error and there was uncertainty at the time over the legality of circumcision.³

That would have been the end of it except the public prosecutor appealed and the case was referred to the Cologne Regional Court.⁴ The higher court unequivocally acquitted Kezze: noting that a physician using a scalpel in a hospital did not constitute the use of a dangerous weapon nor was there any wilful wrongdoing. The Regional Court, however, went on to consider the necessity to balance what it viewed as competing human rights; namely, the fundamental rights of the parents of freedom of faith and conscience (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 2012: Art 4.1) and *the natural right and duty of parents to bring up their child* (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 2012: Art 6.2) *versus the* rights of the child (Günzel 2013) to “*physical integrity*” (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 2012: Art 2.1, Art 2.2). The court concluded that in this case the latter outweighed the former; “circumcision for the purpose of religious upbringing constitutes a violation of physical integrity and self-determination” (Landerricht Judgement 2012). The judgement further decided that a “child’s body is permanently and irreparably changed by the circumcision” and that there was an absence of consent, as he did not have the “intellectual maturity to give it” (German Criminal Code 2013: §288). The child therefore could not decide his religious affiliation at a later date, as a non-circumcised person, and that his parents’ right of education had not been “unacceptably diminished by requiring them to wait until their son is able to make the decision himself whether to have a circumcision as a visible sign of his affiliation to Islam” (Landerricht Judgement 2012).

This decision removed the earlier uncertainty about circumcision, effectively criminalising it on males under the age of consent—currently 18—for religious reasons, and as inconsistent with the “best interests of the child” (German Civil Code BGB 2014: §1627). The judges contended that restricting male circumcision to informed adolescents was not a restriction of their freedom of religion, but rather the upholding of the child’s right to this very freedom. It is this last point that I will return to and challenge below. The decision, even if not technically a legal precedent, had huge implications for Germany’s more than 4 million Muslims and more than 100,000 Jews (Fateh-Moghadam 2012).

The fallout has been extensive and global. The Knesset Diaspora affairs committee had an emergency session in Jerusalem. There were press statements from German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her ministers and protests from Jewish and Muslim representative organisations in Germany, Europe and beyond. The Central Council of Muslims in Germany described the decision as “blatant and inadmissible interference” in the rights of parents, while the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland called the decision, “a dramatic and unprecedented intervention in the right of religious communities to self-determination”. The issue was raised at the European Parliament in Brussels where Muslim and Jewish leaders lodged an official complaint in terms of the “affront to their basic religious and human rights”. The Secular

³Specifically, under Section 17, Mistake of Law, akin in English law, to there being no *mens rea*.

⁴Landgericht, a higher court, with a professional judge and two lay judges.

Medical Forum, an atheist lobby group responded by advocating a universal ban on “non-consensual circumcision”, endorsed by celebrity atheist, Richard Dawkins. Twenty members of the US Congress wrote an outraged public letter to the German ambassador in Washington and there were editorials and commentary in leading media outlets worldwide. Two Swiss hospitals suspended all circumcisions, the governor of Austria’s Vorarlberg province advised the same, and Norway’s Ombudsman for Children’s Rights proposed that Jews and Muslims replace circumcision with a symbolic non-surgical ritual. The German court decision was linked to the proposed ballot referendum to ban circumcisions in San Francisco⁵ and Russell Crowe, the New Zealand Oscar winning actor, is reported to have tweeted filmmaker Eli Roth, “I love my Jewish friends, I love the apples and the honey and the funny little hats but stop cutting your babies”. An article in *The Guardian* asking whether it was time to ban circumcision prompted hundreds of responses, and on 20 August 2012 criminal charges of committing bodily harm were filed against Rabbi David Goldberg in Northern Bavaria for performing a circumcision.

The debate filled the blogosphere, legal and other columnists and commentators brought to the fore obscure legal scholarship and the very worst of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and racist prejudices. A poll showed 60 % of Germans equated circumcision with genital mutilation, a comparison, however, that the Cologne court refused to draw. By a 56–35 margin, Germans told the *Focus* magazine poll that they supported a ban on circumcision. The country’s Child Protection Agency hailed the decision as a landmark for children’s rights. Media commentary in Germany and elsewhere in Europe for the most part supported the decision of the Cologne court. The online claims that the practices are barbaric and non-European and that “foreigners” must give them up if they want to be accepted by their co-citizens were rampant and make for sobering reading and viewing.

3.2 Religion and Consenting Adults

In this second section I return to, and focus on the issue of consent. The Cologne judges insisted that for circumcision to be lawful it must be the personal choice of a male over the age of 18 and, even if this is extended with a version of the Gillick competency test to include younger aware teenagers—this requirement for consent was pivotal to the judgement. The Court insisted that “the religious freedom of the parents and their right to educate their child would not be unacceptably compromised if they were obliged to wait until the child could himself [sic] decide to be circumcised”. This is also reflected in the recommendations of the Royal Dutch Medical Association and advocates of law change in Scandinavia and elsewhere. While there is clearly an inconsistency in that both the Lutheran and Catholic churches in Germany offer public religious rituals that include children long before they are of age to make binding legal commitments under German law, the law’s

⁵ 28 July 2011, Superior Court Judge Loretta Giorgi ruled that the proposed ban (November 2012 California ballot) violated the US constitution’s guarantee of religious freedom.

inconsistent application is beyond the scope of this chapter. My contention is that this view—that religion can be taken up as an adult by free choice and that this is the ideal of religious identification and commitment—betrays a lack of understanding of the actual nature of religion and the ways in which it functions.

Religious formation, to use the more technical and useful term, within a given community, is not something held off until the age of majority—religion does not function like that. Part of the difficulty in grasping this is simply the levels of secularisation, in the sense of the lessening of the public knowledge and influence of religious institutions, reflected in legislation and public discourse. We can have some idea of this by looking at the English, or New Zealand, courts, where increasingly there is a general recognition that religion is a migrant, marginal or minority concern that deviates from secular norms; and that on balance with other rights, particularly those of the child or minor, religious rights come off as secondary and deemed less significant than 'real' rights—such as the sacrality of all choices except religious ones and that of the sovereign, secular, self-determining individual.

An idea of how far we have travelled can be seen from the judgment of Justice Farwell at the Chancery Division in London in 1902, "one of the first and most sacred duties of parents is to imbue the mind of children with some religious belief, and this is done not merely by precept and instruction but by unconscious influence of everyday life and conduct" (Hall 1966: 290). This contrasts dramatically with recent debates about the traumatic effects of coerced infant baptism (Deseret News 1996; Daily Mail Reporter 2010; Satterfield 2012). These are not new issues and resonate with the sixteenth century debates about adult baptism and consent. Christian parents believe that baptism removes the stain of original sin but it is equally the marking of the entry into a community undertaken in the parents' view in the very best interests of the child. It allows the child to participate and belong to their community. The meaning of the ritual is as much religious/theological as it is sociological. It is an ongoing marker of community. Recently at the christening of a friend's child, the Greek Patriarch began, "let all those who are not baptised leave". The very boundaries of religious community (ecclesia) that the infant was to join were publicly articulated—should I stay or should I go? It might also be debated whether baptism is more or less traumatic than circumcision carried out with an anaesthetic.

The evidence on religious formation is very clear and it is an issue well understood by scholars of religious studies. Children brought up outside of religious communities do not, and cannot, as their liberal parents so often insist, make free religious choices as adults. Brought up without religion and community the chances of taking up religion are very significantly reduced. There is a tiny minority of adults who do take up religion as a result of their own choice but they are a very small in number and an exception. To deprive a child of being part of a religious community is most likely to deprive that person of that religion, and an increased likelihood all religion, for life: since religion is about formation within a community. The fact that this is so can be seen as a very good thing, as did the late Christopher Hitchens, or it can be seen as a tragedy, depending on your perspective. I refer to this phenomenon

as the “half-life of religion”. Each generation of non-practice and affiliation allows a fading glow that while it persists does so ever more dimly.

My research in New Zealand on this subject is revealing.⁶ Among students who received no religious background—defined as no instruction, observance, or membership—more than four out of five of them currently have “no religion” and do not consider themselves as part of any religious community. There is a statistically small minority of those who did not have a religious formation of any discernible kind who do find their way to religious communities via potential or actual friends, lovers or idealism or naivety, but they are statistically small. Of those who did grow up within a religious community more than half continue at the same perceived and reported levels of religiosity as their parents, with another 20 % declaring themselves as open to religion but not actively involved—believers without belonging—that is, religiously deinstitutionalised. For some this includes religious cultural and ethno-religious identities and solidarities. Just over 18 % of those who did have religious formations become “more religious than their parents” and these in our study included Christians, Muslims and Jews. It is interesting to note that many of these described their parents as “nominally religious”, or their families as “Christian in name”, or as not very religious Muslims, or “watery Anglicans”, or Jewish but not really observant, or as not active in the community. But what is significant is that these backgrounds, albeit later appreciated to be insufficient or inadequate, point to providing the necessary foundation for increased religious identification and practice. The scholarly literature on conversion bears this out. The growth by conversion of the newer Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestant churches in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands is from other denominations rather than the non-affiliated and the figures for “no religion” in Europe and North America show explicit generational decline.

And, of course, religion is not the only irreversible choice that parents make: educational, locality, religious, social and recreational activities and so on. It might well be considered that to be part of a community, to have a religious identity, is in the best interests of the child—in terms of the welfare principle—and that this should only be thwarted by the state if the child’s health or safety is threatened seriously and there is a risk of suffering if they don’t intervene.

Religious formation in this sense is akin to a language, and not being part of a community is like not having a mother tongue and just as you can indeed learn a language as an adult and even learn it well it cannot be a mother tongue but only ever a second language. This issue is also reflected in debates amongst indigenous communities where not having the right to live and grow as part of a community, learning language, customary practices and spiritual traditions is a denial of identity and community. In summary, liberalism in the sense interpreted by the Cologne judges is corrosive of religion and a choice for later turns out to be no choice at all.

⁶A study of 100 level religious studies students, conducted each year since 2000.

To give the judges and the majority in agreement with them the benefit of the doubt, understanding them to be well-meaning and benign, it is still the case that they misunderstand religion and evidence an advanced secularity that blinds them to the nature of faith and formation within a religious community. It is hard not to see this gap having further consequences in Europe and beyond (see, Pollack et al. 2012; Niemelä 2006; Davie 1994, 2000; Pickel and Müller 2009; Fuller 2002; Hervieu-Léger 2000; Voas and Crockett 2005).

3.3 Human Rights

Let us briefly examine the human rights issues, including the limits and extent of parental consent regarding children, the power of the state to intervene in parental decision-making in the treatment of minors, bodily integrity, and what might actually be in the best interests of the child. For example, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC), 1989, Article 19, states that parties are to take “all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse” (OHCHR 1989). I do not consider ritual male circumcision to be an act of violence, nor to cause injury, it is not abuse, and certainly not sexual abuse as usually understood in the Convention. There are those that do not agree and consider male, infant, ritual circumcision as all of these and more (Benatar and Benatar 2003). For example, Professor Neville Turner from Monash University, in an article, “Circumcised boys can sue” (Turner 1996) likens male circumcision to gender reassignment in terms of being “major, severe and irreversible”; this is rhetorically and polemically incendiary, male circumcision is actually routine and not major, takes only a few minutes, causes discomfort and clearly some pain, although anaesthetics are often utilised, and there is, of course, a growing business in reversal of the loss of part of the foreskin. I neither consider infant ritual male circumcision to be the criminal mutilation of a minor, nor do I consider this even to be the issue at all. It is also important to clearly distinguish between female genital mutilation and infant male ritual circumcision as these are increasingly conflated in the legal and advocacy literature.⁷ Even the Cologne judges referred to the effects on Ali as “minor” bodily harm.

This is a legally complex issue with parallels to infant piercings, prophylactic tonsillectomies, cosmetic orthodontics, even vaccinations. I had 4 perfectly healthy wisdom teeth removed at 13 so I would not have protruding front teeth like most of

⁷Although many commentators conflate female and infant male circumcision (for example, MacDonald 2004) there are significant differences including purpose and medical implications. See, Webber and Schonfeld (2003) who argue that female circumcision is undertaken for quite different reasons and that it is vital that these form part of the discussion.

my father's family. All the above are routinely undertaken in the judged best interests of the child.

UNCROC 1989 is understood to mark a turning point in children's rights. Article 24, Section 3 states "[...] parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children" (OHCHR 1989). This was directly formulated to combat female genital mutilation but has been utilized in relation to traditional tattoos and piercings and there is a growing tide of opinion and advocacy that seeks to formally include male ritual circumcision under this article (Langlaude 2007). Two immediate questions arise from Article 24. Is circumcision traditional? And, is it prejudicial?

It is certainly traditional, found in Genesis 17:9–11 and Leviticus 12:3 for Jews.⁸ It is deemed unnecessary for "Christians" in Galatians 5:3–4⁹ and the Roman Catholic Church declared circumcision a mortal sin in the fifteenth century, a decision later overturned. It became a fashion for Protestants in Victorian Britain and the US under the new hygiene regimes as a cure for just about anything and everything. There is an extensive Jewish and Muslim legal literature on circumcision and the rationale for particular laws and commandments but these too are not the central issue here although they make for fascinating reading, particularly in relation to the understood benefits of male ritual circumcision. Whatever reasons Jews adduce for the practice, it is important to note that circumcision has been for Jews a marker of the boundary lines of the community, a marker of identity in relation to St Paul and his new community; a sign of the covenant; and still a custom near universally practiced among both religious and secular Jews (Thiessen 2011). It is a link of continuity through countless generations of Jews; an official entry into a religious and cultural community. For Muslims too, the practice is near universal and marks membership of a community as mandated by the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad: "law for men and a preservation of honour for women" and has purity associations (Sahih Muslim n.d.; Kueny 2004; Alahmad and Dekkers 2012; Barkat 2009). Circumcision for Muslims and Jews is a sign of belonging, traced back to the patriarch Abraham/Ibrahim. As with all rituals there are a wide variety of practices across Muslim communities. The Jewish and Islamic traditions both see circumcision as a communal boundary marker and in the Bible the 43 references in 39 verses to the uncircumcised are mostly negative. Circumcision is a marker of a child's membership of a community and of a child's participation in a community. It became a significant element in the identity debate for the early churches (see Acts 15) in a Hellenistic world most unsympathetic to it. Some Jews even went to lengths

⁸"And God said unto Abraham: And as for you, you shall keep My covenant, you, and your seed after you throughout their generations. This is My covenant, which you shall keep, between Me and you and your seed after you: every male among you shall be circumcised. And you shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a sign of a covenant between Me and you" (Genesis 17:9–11); "And in the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised" (Leviticus 12:3).

⁹"For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law; you are fallen from grace" (Galatians 5:3–4).

to disguise it.¹⁰ The Talmud records that the consul Titus Flavius Clemens was condemned to death by the Roman Senate in 95 CE for circumcising himself and converting to Judaism, and the emperor Hadrian (117–138) forbade circumcision (see Hoffman 1996; Silverman 2006; Cohen 2005). Since 1843 there has been a debate within Judaism about it (Judd 2007).

Covenantal for Jews (see Deutsch 2012, especially Chap. 3), significant for Muslims, circumcision is also found among other communities, mostly desert communities, for example, indigenous Australians. There are anthropological explanations (Weiss 1966; Paige 1978), evolutionary accounts and psychological explanations like Freud's (Remondino [1891] 2003).

Is circumcision prejudicial? Some boys die as with all medical procedures performed on infants, maximal care must be taken to minimise risks. So, arguably traditional but not prejudicial, but I want to further argue that it can be highly prejudicial to deny a child this traditional practice. These rights are acute in relation to children or minors. Children's rights are usually discussed in terms of the '3 Ps': provision (health, education, sustenance and shelter); protection (from abuse, neglect, bullying, discrimination, safety within a justice system) and participation (freedom of expression, to take part in public life). It is this last P, participation, which I want to extend to include the right to participate in communal life as a full member. So often, the contrast is between the child's best interest and the parental right to the free expression of religion but here I want to emphasise that the right to be part of a religious or cultural group might well be in a child's interests, perhaps best interest. UNICEF does emphasise a child's right to participation in terms of evolving capacity, adoption, separation, name changes, health and education, but has nothing to say about cultural or religious participation (Denniston et al. 2001).

3.4 A New Individual Human Right: The Right to Belong to, and Participate in, a Religious or Cultural Community

In this third section I suggest an individual human rights way of looking at cultural and religious rights. In a landmark 1994 article, Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal argue for a liberal "right to culture" understood as an "individual's right" not to culture per se but to "their own" culture (1994). They note that "protecting cultures out of the human right to culture may take the form of an obligation to support cultures that flout the rights of the individual in a liberal society" and that this can entail the recognition of a "group right" to maintain a culture, that is presupposed by the individual's right to their culture (Margalit and Halbertal 1994:

¹⁰"They built a Gentile-style gymnasium in Jerusalem. They also pulled forward their prepuces, thereby repudiating the holy covenant" (1 Maccabees 1:15).

491–95). They understand this to be limited only by the “harm principle”.¹¹ This is a suggestive way to explore individual and group religious rights.

Cultural rights as group rights historically have been exceptions to universal codes in relation to specific communities, that is, they were tolerated as deviations from universal human rights norms; special arrangements to accommodate minorities. These exceptions have proven and are proving to be extremely fragile. Like kosher butchering in Scandinavia and more recently in New Zealand exceptions can be ended, not renewed, or simply cancelled. The current situation in Europe where kosher butchering has been outlawed in Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland; religious calendar exemptions for public examinations have ended recently in France along with the possible ending of elective funding for religious communities and their religious education; the banning of minarets in Switzerland; and of course, the *burqa* and other religious restrictions in France; the global backlash against multiculturalism is ever more evident. We are entering a new era of forced assimilation and the rejections and de-legitimization of religious and cultural differences. Also evident is our post Protestant bias, reflecting philosophical dualism, of according less constitutional protection to religious practices rather than beliefs.

The principle of democracy is the right to participate in the political process however attenuated that might be. I am suggesting an extension of this basic right for all to participate in their cultural or religious communities. This right would include the individual right of every child to be part of a community and be formed by belonging to that community. This would be the child’s right rather than simply a parental one. This has a particular resonance in the discussions and debates over indigenous communities, indigenous languages and customs, and a right to be part of a community. Two asides follow: a brief discussion on the medical literature; and a comparison between the European and American contexts concerning circumcision; followed by concluding comments.

It is important to note that the medical evidence, much of it technical, uses standard medical frameworks to evaluate what is essentially a religious practice rather than as a medical procedure or intervention. Without religious and cultural reference these evaluations greatly distort matters, and, of course, circumcision fares poorly from a purely medical point of view. While circumcision was near universal in the US (Glick 2005) and UK (see, Darby 2005) numbers have dropped dramatically over the last two decades and continue to do so.¹² This departure from the recent past has been accompanied by steady decline in medical support for universal infant male circumcision. The long awaited report of the American Academy of

¹¹ The test case for the limits of parental choice is that of Jehovah’s Witness parents who refuse “a necessary for life” blood transfusion for their child. Here there is no ambiguity regarding harm to the child, if they do not receive the blood transfusion they will die. This is the justification for intervention. It is important to note that for some Jehovah’s Witnesses the harm as a result of the blood transfusion (denied eternal life) not because of death.

¹² In the US down from 80 % two decades ago to approximately 25 %, in UK 8 or 9 %; 10–20 % for NZ and Australia; 90 % in Nigeria and Philippines, 60 % in Korea, 100 % in Saudi, Jordan, Afghanistan and Israel and Palestine, and 30 % globally (WHO and UNAIDS 2007).

Paediatrics, Circumcision Taskforce (2012), argued that while there should be parental choice for cultural or religious reasons, circumcision should not be universally recommended (American Academy of Pediatrics 2012). It also reported that there were some “minimal medical benefits in terms of infections and cancer rates”. They concluded that the health benefits outweighed the risks although they did recommend the use of anaesthesia.¹³ The Australian College of Physicians’ report (2010) is more negative: it too withholds support for universal circumcision but, further, fails to identify any real health benefits to the practice, although it leaves open the possibility of parental choice on religious grounds. This report has generated a series of direct and indirect responses, such as Sydney University’s Brian Morris in the *Mayo Clinic Proceedings* who along with his co-authors argues that the life-long protection from infection and disease afforded by infant circumcision justifies what they describe as an “equivalent to childhood vaccination” that should be a “routine procedure” for all boys (Morris et al. 2014). Recently, circumcision has been taken up by the World Health Organisation as central to its HIV-Aids campaign in sub-Saharan Africa (See Tobian and Gray 2011).¹⁴ At least ten Zimbabwean MPs have been circumcised as part of a campaign to reduce HIV and Aids cases. In summary, the current debates within the mainstream US, UK, Australia and UN expert medical opinion acknowledges the potential medical benefits of circumcision for the control of the spread of HIV-AIDS, particularly in Africa, and tends towards parental choice for religious minorities. On the other hand European medics and jurists are often vehemently opposed to all forms of circumcision, including infant male ritual circumcision, and view it as a gross violation of the rights of children who society should protect from bodily harm and unnecessary torture.

The differences in European and American responses to the issue of circumcision from the courts, officials, commentators, and public opinion, requires an explanation. It is clear that while Western Europeans generally understand governments to be benign and supportive of citizens in the pursuit of the lives, Americans have a stronger sense of keeping government out of personal, community and family lives. Reading the literature on the debates about circumcision, the European medics, academics and professional medical associations are nearly universally opposed to the practice, a view supported by public opinion. In sharp contrast there is public

¹³“Systematic evaluation of English-language peer-reviewed literature from 1995 through 2010 indicates that preventive health benefits of elective circumcision of male newborns outweigh the risks of the procedure. Benefits include significant reductions in the risk of urinary tract infection in the first year of life and, subsequently, in the risk of heterosexual acquisition of HIV and the transmission of other sexually transmitted infections” (American Academy of Pediatrics 2012).

¹⁴This is the largest meta-study to date: “adult male circumcision decreases human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) acquisition in men by 51–60 %, and the long-term follow-up of these study participants has shown that the protective efficacy of male circumcision increases with time from surgery. These findings are consistent with a large number of observational studies in Africa and in the United States that found male circumcision reduces the risk of HIV infection in men. There appears to be substantial evidence that removal of the foreskin reduces the risk of male heterosexual HIV acquisition”. They also report that there is “no significant differences in male sexual satisfaction or dysfunction” among those circumcised.

and professional support in the US for the practice being a legitimate issue of parental choice. The dominant American view seems to be that it really is none of the government's business—consistent with the view that state and religion should be separate and that the state should be neutral concerning religion. José Casanova (2009) adds to this the considerably lower socioeconomic demographic of Muslim immigrants to Europe compared to the better situation of Muslim migrants to the US and their position as migrants in a nation of migrants. Further, he argues that there are marked differences between American and European understandings of “the role of religion and religious group identities in public life and in the organisation of civil society” and that “Western European societies are deeply secular, shaped by the hegemonic knowledge regime of secularism” (2009). Casanova contrasts “Christian/secular Europe” with “Judeo-Christian/secular America” contending that migrants, particularly Muslims, are more alien and less able to readily integrate in the European context than in the more religious American context (Casanova 2009).

There is a very different situation in the State of Israel (Medinat Yisrael). In 1998 Ben Shalem, an Israeli NGO, “opposed to the cutting of infant genitals”, petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court to issue conditional orders against several ministries with broadly similar argumentation to that of the court in Cologne. The appeal was first answered in 1998 by the Israeli Attorney's Office. Based on this answer, the Israeli Supreme Court delivered its two-sentence rejection of issuing conditional orders on May 30, 1999. The Attorney's Office reply begins by placing significant emphasis on the importance of circumcision as a religious tradition. It goes on to explain that according to Jewish sources,¹⁵ the circumcised penis symbolizes the brit (bond or covenant) between God and Abraham's descendants. It explains furthermore that circumcising 8-day-old boys is a religious commandment (*mitzvah*) that is “higher in importance than the entire commandments of the Torah put together and that the act itself represents the completion of the human body by human deeds”.¹⁶ Their main contention is that circumcision cannot be considered in terms of medical malpractice because it is not a medical procedure at all,¹⁷ this they understood “reflects the common understanding of the brit in Israeli society”, and of course circumcision is carried out by a *mohel* (a specially trained circumciser) rather than a physician.

I consider that every child has the right to participate in a religious or cultural community and that the state should only intervene when there is serious risk of

¹⁵ In the Bible and beyond, “uncircumcised” (*arelim*) has been a derogatory euphemism for gentiles (See, for examples, Joshua 5:9, I Samuel 14:6 and 31:4, and Isaiah 52:1). *Pirkei Avot* 3:15, “One who breaks the Covenant of Abraham, even if he has Torah and good deeds, has no portion in the World To Come”. In Kabbalistic traditions, it is regarded as essential to opening the body and soul to the Divine.

¹⁶ Here the Attorney's Office quotes Rabbi Aaron Levi from his *Sefer ha-Chinuch* (Book on Education), “the completion is handmade and is not complete in birth. The hint being, that physical and spiritual completion follows only by human actions”.

¹⁷ According to the laws regulating a medical procedure defined in Article 1 of Israel's Medical Directives (1976, cited in Paz 2012).

injury or harm. This is a universal, individual human right—the right of a child to be part of a community, and not just any community but the specific community in which they live. This right is the context for the debates about circumcision.

3.5 Conclusions

The secular context of modern states is most significant for our explications of multiculturalism. The secularity of public institutions, increasingly including those that are formally Faith-Based Organisations or have religious origins, leads to the incomprehension of religious claims or sensibilities, particularly as they relate to the religiously inscribed body or physical rituals. This incomprehension leads multicultural policy in the wrong directions and consistently makes false conclusions about the religious life of citizens and residents: religion is something that you will overcome *en route* to becoming a fully rational, mature, secular citizen who can make archetypal Protestant moves to spiritualise and symbolically reduce ritual and physical custom to poesis and the metaphorical.

Of course, as with other human rights, the right to belong and participate will sometimes need to be balanced against other rights but a full recognition of this human right and a more accurate and sophisticated and less banal view of religion would generate a more balanced contest.

At the time of the controversy, Chancellor Angela Merkel, a renowned opponent and very public critic of multiculturalism insisted that circumcisions could continue in Germany, and in December 2012 the Bundestag adopted a law, an amendment to the Civil Code that explicitly permits non-therapeutic circumcision to be performed under certain conditions,¹⁸ by a vote of 434–100, with 46 abstentions. Her reason was that “Germany was not to be a laughing stock” (Jones 2012). Here the Nazi past ran up against contemporary events and not to be a “laughing stock” is not a particularly good reason to allow such practices (see Judd 2007).¹⁹ This was reported as an unpopular decision according to polls conducted at that time indicating that the majority of Germans oppose circumcision (TNS-Emnid, *Focus* magazine, 56 %), and that levels of anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish feeling were at around 20 % and increasing.²⁰

¹⁸The new law, which introduces restrictions on the practice for the first time, requires that the procedure be carried out by a medically trained and certified practitioner such as a *mohel*, or ritual circumciser, or by a medical professional, and that anaesthetic be used if needed. For a child over 6 months old, the procedure must be done in a hospital.

¹⁹The Nazis claimed that “circumcision had a metamorphosing effect. Supposedly the removal of the foreskin transformed the individual, a claim they emphasized in their use of the terms deform or disfigure when describing the rite”. It is interesting and important to note that the Nazis never sought to ban circumcision. The Catholic Church in the 1930s could not accept that the Son of God, a circumcised Jew, was “deformed” or “degraded”.

²⁰For example, the “expert” opinion included: Germany’s Child Protection Society (*Kinderhilfe*) denounced the ritual as “a blank check for religiously motivated child abuse”; Wolfram Hartmann,

What is evidenced by the circumcision case is the continuing fragility of cultural rights, the levels of hostility and the bending of expert legal and medical advice to oppress minority religious communities. This is exacerbated by the failure on the part of secular authorities to grasp religion or religious formation at all. The value in considering a universal right to belong and participate in a particular community on parallel with language, culture and family would also seem to be worthy of further discussion. The ever more secular religious half-life of Europeans is increasingly mutating into a specific form of intolerance, and the professional, legal and scientific endorsement of prejudice.

There is both a considerable reduction in religious affiliation across the West and increasing numbers of “nones” that parallels the equally dramatic decline in circumcisions together with the rise of organised opposition to both religion and circumcision. The pressures generated by our current financial crisis and the attendant austerity measures increase racist, anti-multicultural sentiments. We are at a critical point where there is growing incomprehension at religion and religious rituals and increasing secularisation necessitating the rethinking of religious rights lest they be lost.

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director of the German Academy for Paediatric Medicine, warned on 17 July, in response to Merkel's statement, that circumcision causes “lifelong bodily and above spiritual injury”; 2 days later, a spokesman for Germany's Humanist Association dismissed circumcision as “a relic of times long gone” and demanded that Muslims and Jews stop it; 613 German doctors and lawyers signed an open letter to Merkel published July 21 2012, proclaiming that “religious freedom cannot be a charter for violence”, and that circumcision violates the “right of children to bodily integrity and sexual self-determination”.

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Chapter 4

Multiple Multiculturalisms: Resentment, Religion and Liberalism

Patrick Imbert

*Where multiculturalism has not yet become a poisoned term—
as I think is still true in my own country of Canada—I would
argue that the fight for diversity can and should be still fought
in the name of multiculturalism.*

(Kymlicka 2012: 214)

Abstract This chapter discusses multiculturalism as an ideology and social policy aimed at supporting migrant integration and cultural adaptation within émigré societies. It anchors this discussion largely in Tariq Modood’s (Multiculturalism. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007) book *Multiculturalism*, which studies the complexities of multiculturalism and its relation to religion, mainly Islam in the UK. Modood believes “multiculturalism (to be) the political accommodation of minorities formed by immigration to Western countries from outside the prosperous West”. With this definition, evoking Europe’s position toward Islam, he rejects Kymlicka’s arguments that are mainly based on a secular perspective, and argues that Kymlicka’s ideas are not suitable for a European context. For Modood, resentment is an important component of encountering the other. So resentment along with displacement and the possibility to change (and to belong or differentiate), is an important and often unseen dimension of multiculturalism. Consequently, Modood’s *Multiculturlaism* reveals the need for theoreticians of multiculturalism to better account for the nexus between religion, culture and economic development and wellbeing.

Keywords Multiculturalism • Liberalism • Religion • Resentment • Secularism • Islam • Accommodation • Human rights

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4.1 Introduction

The role of multiculturalism is to help newcomers and their descendants function and participate actively in their own development as well as in the development of their new country. Hence, more thoughtful insights about cultural and economic participation should be presented by theoreticians of multiculturalism. In the context of the knowledge-based society—where importance is given to a population with specialized skills, university degrees and professional diplomas, as well as partial or complete proficiency in more than one language—linking culture, economic development and wellbeing is essential. It can be made practical by establishing guidelines for recognition of degrees and diplomas as well as ways to improve knowledge for immigrants whose skills do not correspond to the level necessary for an active participation in the new society. This important step can only be beneficial for immigrants and for the society where they chose to settle. It helps prevent many educated people from having to work in poorly paid jobs, or to open small convenience stores while hoping that their children studying in the national school system will make it. This situation is well illustrated in Dionne Brand's novel entitled *What we all long for* (2005). Economic development should be part of theoretical approaches to multiculturalism. Yet, often it is not. As we will see when discussing Modood and Kymlicka, theoreticians of multiculturalism tend to separate religion and culture from economic development and wellbeing.

Modood focuses on religion, culture, values and the state in the UK. Kymlicka proposes a much more thorough reflexion on multiculturalism in his two books published in 1995 and 2007, and in numerous recent articles. He deals with theoretical as well as practical problems and does not shy away from comparisons between Canada, Latin America and Europe. He effectively deals with religion, values, identities, the state, and in contradistinction with Modood, he escapes dualism. Escaping dualism is an important basis for developing a theory of multiculturalism which can be applied to laws, regulations and daily encounters. It avoids falling into the conflictive binaries opposing individual and the group, person and nation. Kymlicka develops a dynamic triangular relationship between individual rights and minority rights, and the majority group. This dynamic relationship is implemented in the Constitution of Canada and in its numerous local and daily applications. He does not, however, fully link culture and economy.

For an economic perspective on migration and immigration, one has to read Saunders' (2010) *Arrival City*. Saunders is not so much concerned with culture as with the rejuvenation of cities by migrant flows inside a country or between countries and continents. Hence, if we want to develop a broader picture of what immigrants are looking for (control over their life) when they decide to reorganize their life and that of their children, we need to discuss more thoroughly multicultural approaches and the ways they theorise accommodation. Only then, will we be able to invent new ways to live peacefully and efficiently together in countries which need to reinvent themselves rapidly. New technologies, new aspirations, the increase in access to schooling colleges and higher education, particularly for women, the legitimacy of geographic and symbolic displacements, and globalisation in general

call for new ideas. This is why I will discuss religion and the state, the various linkages between the majority group, the minority group and the individual, values and relativism, national identities, the situation of immigrants and their desire for self-directed change, and finally culture and economy.

I will develop a critique of Modood and Kymlicka. Because Kymlicka is a world-renowned theoretician and a fundamental reference when it comes to multiculturalism, other researchers have tried to challenge him by proposing different visions of multiculturalism outside of a North American context. Like Bonilla Maldonado in Colombia (2006), they sometimes propose a philosophical basis rooted in non-liberal thinking that is linked to illiberal behaviours and traditions. Like Modood (2007), they try to make room for a religious perspective and its recognition in the UK. As the perspective by Bonilla Maldonado has already been discussed (Imbert 2010), I will concentrate on Tariq Modood's (2007) book, *Multiculturalism*, and compare it with Kymlicka's perspectives, and then contextualize their approaches with that of Saunders and its focus on economic development.

4.2 Religion and the State

Modood defines multiculturalism very differently from Kymlicka (1995, 2007). For Modood, multiculturalism is "the political accommodation of minorities formed by immigration to Western countries from outside the prosperous West" (2007: 5). Modood is concerned with multicultural citizenship in the context of post-integration and poly-ethnicity in the UK. His account is based on a kind of recognition and belonging that goes beyond culture and mere cultural rights:

They are interpretations of the idea of equality as applied to groups who are constituted by differentia that have identitarian dimensions that elude socio-economic concepts. The realization of multicultural equality is not possible in a society in which the distribution of opportunities is restricted by 'difference' but it cannot be confined to socio-economic opportunities. (2007: 153)

His objective is to turn a negative difference into a positive one while emphasizing the maintenance of cultural difference and its attributes for many generations to come (2007: 32). As a consequence, he advocates the implementation of parallel systems of representation, for Muslim groups in particular. They have to be represented in political parties, trade unions and various bodies (2007: 135): "[...] multiculturalism can take a hybridic, multicultural, urban melange form; but it does not have to and indeed should not exclusively do so if one or some groups are not comfortable with that (for the time being)" (2007: 121). His ideas can be linked to cultural essentialism and dualism. He is also inclined towards a more militant type of multiculturalism that differs from Kymlicka's model of active participation, which recognizes specific rights but not parallel systems of representation. Kymlicka's approach leads to transformative societal and individual processes and respect for minority groups as well as for the individual, a model particular to a liberal multiculturalism efficiently organized in Canada.

Modood outlines his concept of multiculturalism and claims that “[...] beginning with a larger idea of multiculturalism tends, as I will illustrate in the next chapter, in the case of the philosopher Will Kymlicka, to distort, even marginalize, some of the specific contemporary issues in relation to the politics of post-immigration, especially in Western Europe” (Modood 2007: 3).¹ He then insists that “the novelty of contemporary multiculturalism is that first it introduces into Western nation-states a kind of ethnic-religious mix that is relatively unusual for those states; especially for western European states” (2007: 8).

According to Modood, Kymlicka recognizes that the state can never be neutral and that procedural liberalism is an illusion. In procedural liberalism, as it is understood by Charles Taylor (1994)—who also considers this neutrality to be an illusion—the private life is a project separate from that of the public life and the state is neutral and has no moral purpose. It is capable of incorporating all forms of culture because it considers these cultures to be equal in value. Dignity is universal and the individual has the right to form their own identity. Taylor (1994) argues that procedural liberalism has to be replaced by substantive liberalism aligned to a multicultural perspective, to better harmonise equality and difference, and to develop a complex relationship between the individual, minority and majority group.

While Modood and Kymlicka agree on the pseudo neutrality of the state, the paths of these two thinkers diverge widely. Modood emphasizes the fact that the state cannot be neutral towards religion and that state support should go beyond cultural exemptions, such as those granted to Sikhs about wearing motorcycle helmets, as underscored by Kymlicka in *Multicultural Citizenship* (Modood 2007: 26). Modood wants to go beyond exemptions. He forwards the idea that the state should be linked (while it is not clear what this linkage would entail or how it would work practically) to religion, Islam in particular, because certain cultures are centred on religion. He goes as far as to criticize the “secularist bias” (2007: 27) inherent in Kymlicka’s liberal approach to multiculturalism. The example of state cooperation with religion that Modood cites is taken from Germany where different religions are recognized through fiscal strategies (it is not specified what these strategies are but it could in part be linked to a tax that every declared Catholic or Lutheran pays on top of their state tax to assist churches to thrive). He also notes that Kymlicka highlights the intolerance of Islam in its rejection of apostasy or atheism (1995: 156). Such intolerance, notes Kymlicka, does not comply with liberalism, based not only on freedom of religion, but also on freedom of conscience and the right to disagree. Modood rejects this argument especially when it concerns the right to dissent and to disagree with religion for he claims that it positions Muslims outside of multiculturalism. He believes that one does not have the right to leave Islam. For him, it is something that might work in North America but not in Europe. He concludes by saying that the state may not be linked to one religion, that is, for him, a Christian one, and that

¹ Naturally, this does not help to reconsider important and very contested European problems, that is the participation and recognition of founding minorities in diverse European Nation-States, a situation which lead to many wars, exclusions, the Shoah and the recent “ethnic cleansing” by Serbia of Muslim minorities in Bosnia.

[...] the state may need to desist from exclusively promoting one religious community but this does not imply the privatization of religion or a separation between religion and the state but may require forging a new, positive relationship with a marginalized religious minority. (2007: 30)

As this has not yet been realised, Modood claims that the political integration of Muslim immigrants, especially the Muslim post-immigrant groups, is a major problem in countries such as Great Britain.

Hence, Modood displaces the basis of Kymlicka's multiculturalism, which aims to recognize specific rights, linguistic ones for instance or the right to manifest religious symbols qualified by Modood as exemptions. Recognizing religion not only as a legitimate spiritual expression but as an all-encompassing public way of life related to distinctive laws and regulation is not what Kymlicka has in mind. It is not what the liberal government of Ontario had in mind when groups of fundamentalists Muslims asked for Shari'a law to be recognised in family courts in Ontario. This demand was rejected because all religious groups need to conform to the Canadian and Ontarian laws as they apply to all citizens. In Kymlicka's multiculturalism, the recognition of specific rights is not designed to be a parallel system of rights, laws and institutions. Although Modood compares Muslims to other minority groups such as Black, gay and other ethnic migrant groups, none of these groups call for a broad accommodation leading to parallel systems of laws and institutions, such as Shari'a law (see Chap. 6 in this volume for more on the recognition of Shari'a law in multicultural societies).

4.3 Protecting the Minority from the Majority and the Individual from the Minority Group

Modood agrees with Kymlicka's emphasis on the duty to protect minority groups from the majority. Yet he criticizes Kymlicka's assertion that the individual has the right to be protected from the minority group. Modood's argument and the rhetoric he uses when commenting Kymlicka's approach are worth quoting:

This means that the state must guarantee the rights of not just those who dissent from the dominant religion² but also those who dissent from their own religion, or from a particular, institutionalized interpretation of it. Maybe so [...] but it is not an argument for treating groups formed by religion (*millats*) differently from ethno-national groups. (2007: 29)

His rhetorical dismissal of the protection of the individual from the minority groups through the use of the expression "maybe" demonstrates a refusal to further discuss the matter. It shows that his conception of multiculturalism is intended to reinforce the coherence of minority groups at the expense of individual rights. Modood goes further in his criticism of Kymlicka stating that,

[h]e argues that giving the group (or some of its members) the right to restrict the behaviour of its own members can be potentially unjust and so multicultural citizenship should be primarily about giving groups the right to protect themselves from persons or forces external to the group. (Kymlicka 1995: 35–8), (2007: 29)

²For Modood, it is the Christian religions in the UK.

His choice of the words “can be potentially unjust” as opposed to Kymlicka’s warning “this raises the danger of individual oppression” (1995: 36) is symptomatic of a rhetoric trying to reduce the importance of the individual and his potential as a subject constituted by and for himself.

The most important bias Modood demonstrates, however, is in the way he completely distorts Kymlicka’s clear argument about collective rights; distinguishing internal dissent and external protection. He “forgets” individual protection, the idea expressed in the first part of the sentence, by arguing to eliminate individual protection. In fact, he links the idea of restricting individual rights criticized by Kymlicka, to the idea that “multicultural citizenship should be primarily about giving groups the right to protect themselves from persons or forces external to the group”. This argument is based on the elimination of one option, internal protection. Hence, Modood reduces a complementary perspective into a dualistic conflictive perspective. As is the case with any dualistic opposition, the argument is reduced to the domination of one over the other: similar to how the male/female duality results in the domination of the male, as demonstrated by feminists through deconstruction of traditional male discourse. Moreover, Modood is incorrect in claiming that “groups have the right to protect themselves from persons” (2007: 37). Here, his objective is to present the person, the individual, as a threat to the group. This is the opposite of Kymlicka’s position that underscores the threat of individual oppression by the group.

But who would these individuals be, what are these forces? Modood does not give any details. He distorts Kymlicka’s well-balanced argument based on the importance of Human Rights. Kymlicka insists that the goal is not to give all the power to a minority group and nothing to the individual. In this context, Kymlicka emphasizes the fact that “liberals [...] should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question or revise traditional authorities and practices” (2007: 37). He then differentiates between different duties and says that, “[i]t is one thing to require people to do jury duty or to vote, and quite another to compel people to attend a particular church or to follow traditional hierarchical gender roles. The former are intended to uphold liberal rights and democratic institutions, the latter restrict these rights in the name of cultural tradition or religious orthodoxy” (2007: 36). What is intolerable for Modood, as for most people who argue in favour of religion, is the fact that people could leave the group and its religious ritual. They forget that the right to leave is a basic democratic right as was already underscored by Fermin Toro in 1839 in a text entitled *Europa and America*.

4.4 Values and Relativism

Tariq Modood fights for a multiculturalism that allows for full participation of religious groups in public sphere. He considers the enclosure of religions in private domain to be discriminatory, in particular against Muslims (2007). Again his arguments are surprising. He first states that “recognition is not beyond the scope of moral principle” and that “child sacrifice, cannibalism and sati (widows’

self-immolation) would be unacceptable for just about everybody and clitoridectomy would also be unacceptable for many” (2007: 67). The relativism of “about everybody” and “for many” is notable. He then states that “conservative views which do not lead to harmful or unlawful actions cannot be a bar to multicultural recognition” (2007: 71). However, one could argue that they are harmful in that they do not recognize the equality between men and women, a basic principle in many national Constitutions or in national and regional regulations. He then gives the example of the conservative churches in the US that take active part in political campaigns and “introduce religion-based issues into politics, such as positions on abortion, HIV/Aids, homosexuality, stem cell research [...]” (2007: 74). However, he fails to mention that such issues are against multicultural policies and aim at imposing a homogeneous view of society by banning the public manifestation of the other. He simultaneously criticises the Christian right “as a potential domestic obstacle to the civic integration of Muslims and Islam in the US” (2007: 86) without seeing the contradiction between his arguments. He then suggests that these social values and norms (including equality between the sexes) are negotiable and that “they are constantly being reinterpreted, realigned, extended and reformed” (2007: 80). For Kymlicka, however, multiculturalism is neither linked to arbitrariness nor to relativism; rather it is an extension of Human Rights.

In Canada, multiculturalism is linked to core values which have to be respected. Recently an investigation was conducted in an Islamic school in Toronto where teaching material originating in Iran was inappropriate such as referring to Jews as “treacherous” and “crafty” and encouraging boys “to keep fit for jihad” (Bell 2012). Multiculturalism is a Canadian value among other Canadian values and its basis is to treat all immigrants and non-immigrants alike, that is respectfully. The goal is to help everybody enter the mainstream and penetrate centres of power, and not to encourage children to dream of excluding or killing others and considering others as inferior or dangerous because they do not refer to the same religion.

We can note that in Modood’s book (2007), Muslims share core values which are linked to Islam. These values are not open to discussion, although Modood pays lip service to the possibility of change in the future. Modood’s perspective is in direct contradiction with the views of Kymlicka and Taylor (1994). Taylor and Kymlicka insist that there are values such as freedom of speech (and *Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie are part of this freedom), gender equality, etc., that are not negotiable in a liberal democracy. Moreover, Taylor affirms that cultural values are not relative because, in the context of the nation-states, the culture of each host country, having been around for a long time, has something particular to offer to newcomers. For Taylor, it is not enough that we accept the initial hypothesis claiming that values are equal, which creates the risk of falling into absolute relativism. We must go further and encourage an understanding of different values and of both their importance and their consequences. Thus, what is even more important than the recognition of these values is to know how to perceive others and how to envision dynamic and efficient relations from constitutional, institutional and practical points of view in the context of an established society, which has values but which is open to accommodate some difference brought by newcomers. All liberal societies share basic

values that are not negotiable, such as the rejection of torture, the refusal of mutilations like clitoridectomy, equality between men and women, non-discrimination against sexual orientations, etc., say Taylor and Kymlicka. We can also include in this list the protection of the individual against the group, be it a majority or a minority group (on this subject see also Chap. 7 in this volume).

Even if substantive liberalism affirms the state's non-neutrality—which leads to the development of a type of multiculturalism ready to defend not only individual rights, but also those of minorities—it cannot accommodate certain illiberal minorities. They oppress certain subgroups or individuals within their group, or demonstrate behaviours or values which are discriminatory against certain members of their group (a situation emphasized by Kymlicka in his 2007 book entitled *Multicultural Odysseys*). They subject their members to the authority of traditional hierarchies, religious or not. Some of their practices, like clitoridectomy or a fatwa promoting murder, among many others, are not acceptable in a liberal democracy based on the respect of Human Rights. In contradistinction with these illiberal minorities, Kymlicka and Taylor understand multiculturalism as a dynamic process of active participation in an established liberal and democratic society which has been chosen by newcomers because of its values, its economy and other opportunities. Both sides, those long-established citizens and newcomers, need to blend and to learn to share cultural differences peacefully so as to give access to the basic principles that first attracted people to the country in question.

4.5 National Identities

In Modood's book, the call for the negotiation of values and norms tries to prepare the reader for the rejection of the claim that in the new society, which is the UK, certain core values are of great importance. His view is that national identity is weak in contemporary Britain. Modood emphasises that in Canada, in Australia and Malaysia multiculturalism has been coincidental with “a nation building project” (2007: 147). In the UK, it is the opposite:

But is the goal of wanting to become British, to be accepted as British and to belong to Britain is not a worthwhile goal for Commonwealth migrants and their progeny, what then are they supposed to integrate into? And if there is nothing strong, purposive and inspiring to integrate into, why bother with integration? (2007: 151)

This perceived weakness being the opposite of the view of Britain as the centre of a powerful empire can be linked to what the Canadian writer Margaret Atwood described in her book entitled *Survival* about Canada in the 1979s. At that time Canadian identity was perceived as weak because of the sequel of British colonization and the impact of US cultural and economic influence. This alleged weakness however—based on a capacity to digest many cultural influences—, was turned into strength, thanks to a multiculturalism that incorporated a purposive nation-building dynamic and to processes reinforcing the knowledge of Canada's past and contemporary role in the world. The idea of a weak Canadian identity was underscored by

Neil Bissoondath in *Selling Illusions* (1994). In this book, Bissoondath rejected the first version of multiculturalism and its bureaucratic, dualistic and essentialist perspectives, which did little to help immigrants participate actively in Canadian society. Yet, Bissoondath's goal was to reinforce the integration of immigrants in Canadian society that is exemplary in upholding democratic values.

In Modood's book, claiming that British identity is weak helps him argue that there are no core values worthy of attention in the UK and that they cannot be connected to meaningful definitions: "Brown wants to derive a set of core values (liberty, fairness, enterprise and so on)³ from a historical narrative yet such values, even if they could singly or in combination be given a distinctive British take, are too complex and their interpretation and priority too contested to be amenable to be set into a series of meaningful definitions" (2007: 152).⁴ Efficiently managing cultural encounters, however, is always complex, as emphasized by Finkenthal (2008) and by Fontille and Imbert (2012). Even more astonishing, in a display of what could be qualified as a reverse colonialist perspective, Modood acknowledges the use of the dualistic argument of "either...or" to dismiss any basis for sharing core values: "Definitions of core values will either be too bland or too divisive and the idea that there has to be a schedule of value statements to which every citizen is expected to sign up is not in the spirit of a multilogical citizenship (Brown 2005 cited in Modood 2007)".⁵ Let's consider the shift from multicultural to multilogical citizenship, which is not problematized, commented upon or explained. Moreover, we have to note the next argument: "National identity should be woven in debate and discussion, not reduced to a list" (2007: 153). Naturally, it is not in the spirit of anybody, and particularly not in the spirit of Gordon Brown to reduce national citizenship to a list.

In relation to national identity, Modood distinguishes between two definitions of multiculturalism: a broad definition that includes new social movements (such as gay and feminist) and founding minority groups who have been part of a nation since its creation, or for a long time (such as Afro-Americans in the US or French Canadians in Canada); and a more restricted definition that corresponds to post-immigration multicultural realities. From the outset, one can say that Modood does not have a full grasp of multiculturalism in Canada and of its link to national identity. It is particularly clear when he speaks of the Francophone minority in a recent article written with Nasar Meer (Meer and Modood 2012). These authors say that for Canadian multiculturalism

³Here is Gordon Brown's sentence: "When we look at history and at the values and ideas that shape British national identity, I would want to stress a belief in tolerance and liberty, a sense of civic duty, a sense of fair play, a sense of being open to the world" (Roundtable 2005: 1).

⁴Here is the answer to this claim by Gordon Brown: "To get back to Tariq's broader point, I am not proposing some formulaic list of values that embodies Britain for the next 200 years. Equally, I don't think it's good enough just to have all these ideas floating around and to say the debate is an end in itself" (Roundtable 2005: 6).

⁵This sentence and the reference to Brown, is not clear. Is this said by Gordon Brown? No. Is it in the roundtable? Not even. So, why is there a reference to Brown after this sentence? Let's also note that it is a roundtable and that Gordon Brown is only one of the many participants whose names are as follows: Neal Ascherson, Billy Bragg, Gordon Brown, Linda Colley, David Goodhart, Eric Kaufmann, David Lammy, Tariq Modood, Roger Scruton.

[...] the focus was from the start on constitutional and land issues in a way that informed definitions of nationhood and related to unresolved legal questions concerning the entitlements and status of indigenous peoples, not to mention the further issue of the rise of a nationalist and secessionist movement in French-speaking Quebec. (Meer and Modood 2012: 180)

However, the Québécois are not part of a multicultural policy. As emphasized by Pierre Elliot Trudeau in his essay published in 1967 and entitled *Le fédéralisme et la société canadienne française*, the Francophones and the Anglophones are the two founding nations of Canada and are at the root of bilingual policies⁶ but are not part of multiculturalism. In Trudeau's view, multicultural policies were thought of as a means to break the dualistic nationalism of the two founding groups by recognizing the importance of other voices and generating new dynamics in Canadian society, which could pull Canada out of a dangerous political conflict. If, however, Francophones are not part of multicultural policies and regulations, they are linked to them, just as Anglophones are, because multiculturalism is relational and connective. It deeply transforms the context of the social and political life. The consequence is, for instance, that Québec as a mostly francophone province (but a linguistic minority in Canada) created its own version of accommodation for immigrants. This version is called interculturalism (Bouchard 2012) and is similar to Canadian multiculturalism except that the children of immigrants have to study in francophone schools (Law 101) (on European interculturalism see Chap. 9). Hence, they do not become unconscious agents of assimilation by reducing the percentage of French speakers in Québec. This decision is also meant to help immigrants integrate with francophone minorities of Canada (and the francophone national majority in Québec).⁷ Hence, one of the core values of the minority and a very important feature of its national character, French language, is protected while it gives the opportunity to children of immigrants, most of whom speak the language of their parents, to become trilingual, as they all learn English as well. Being trilingual is an important advantage in a globalized world that no longer relies only on power relationships limited by the borders of Nation-States.

4.6 Immigrants and Self-Directed Change: Active Incorporation

There is no place in Modood's book for the hopes and aspirations of people who immigrate, and whose objective is to actively participate in the new society and perhaps overcoming limits imposed on them in the home country or within the religion that shaped their early years. This was an important criticism made by

⁶This is only one element in the complex vision aiming at protecting group rights that has been outlined by Trudeau and then theorized by Kymlicka. Modood then opposes the Australian model in which multiculturalism “[...] developed more as a means to better integrate new immigrants” (Meer and Modood 2012: 180). This was, however, an important aim of Trudeau's vision and of all the multiculturalist policies in Canada.

⁷Hence, interculturalism in Québec is very different from interculturalism in Europe.

Kymlicka when he considered European cases (except the UK) and the way immigrants have been considered and settled. Kymlicka understands that European perspectives on migration have been constructed antagonistically. For example, in Germany, the Turkish and the Kurdish workers have not been seen, from the outset, as potential permanent citizens but as temporary workers. This is what led Angela Merkel to declare multiculturalism a failure in Germany a few years ago. From a Canadian point of view, there has never been a consistent multicultural policy in Germany or in any European country except in the UK. This is well emphasized by experts on internal and external migrations, such as Doug Saunders in *Arrival Cities* or by Quebecois journalist Rima Elkouri in 2009 in an interview with Algerian immigrants. In the daily newspaper, *La Presse*, Elkouri clearly pointed out the wish for active incorporation to be related to a desire for *lack of differentiation* (2009). She follows Algerian immigrants in Montreal over a period of 6 months. Sabrina, an immigrant from Algeria, claims to have come to Quebec to live differently than she did in her native country: Sabrina explains that in her workplace in Alger, only she and one other woman didn't wear the veil. "*La deuxième est aussi rendue ici, à Montréal!*" (The second one is also here, in Montréal). She asks herself serious questions when she sees veiled women here in Canada. "*Je n'ai pas fait 6,000 km pour vivre comme là-bas*" (I did not travel 6,000 km to live the same way that I did there) (2009: 3). As for her husband, Hocine, he "*parle désormais de l'Algérie comme de son 'ex-pays'*" (he now speaks of Algeria as his former country) (2009: 3). In other words, he doesn't feel like a stranger in Canada, but does with regards to Algeria. More and more, the place of birth becomes secondary for people who migrate with the goal of having a different life in a democratic society that expands possibilities and allows for the application of accumulated knowledge and self-definition.

4.7 Modood's Rhetoric: Between Ellipse and Contradiction

Although Modood strategically uses theories and concepts related to fluidity, such as his recognition of identities as being relational (Benessaïeh 2010), his reading is often based on an essentialist interpretation of texts and discourses. For instance, despite his attempt to demonstrate that a modernity based on homogeneity has evolved into the formation of multicultural societies, he presents a stereotyped image of minority groups, "[s]ome women, he writes, focused on their sexual differences from men and postulated that women were naturally more caring, consensual and empathetic" (2007: 1). In fact, these static and pseudo-natural attributions are what most feminists criticised and discarded in the 1970s because it was perceived to be a weapon that allowed men to keep them away from the public sphere. This allows Modood to present all Muslim women as if they rejected the West. He emphasizes the fact that Muslim women "challenge leading forms of feminism which portray the wearing of a headscarf as a form of oppression but regard the sexualisation of public space [...] as emancipatory" (2007: 42). Modood neglects to mention the fact that most feminist groups criticise media processes and advertisements for their sexual exploitation, nor does he recognise the fact that many Muslim

women criticise the oppression imposed on them by traditional religious groups or by Muslim men.

Modood also tends to neglect important situations through the use of elliptical language. When, for instance, he writes about the “*Satanic Verses* affair” of 1989, he fails to mention the fact that through a fatwa Salman Rushdie was put at risk of being killed by anyone who could successfully carry out the murder, an act of hatred intolerable for liberal democracies and an order rooted in the worst kind of orthodoxy negating Human Rights values and any multicultural perspective. The word “affair” is used strategically to avoid discussing an unacceptable phenomenon in a religious Islamic orthodoxy.

Modood’s arguments are often based on sentences glossing over what could be negative for Muslims in the conflictive world he is leading us to. When talking about extremism, he emphasizes that it enters the domestic arena from outside: “The government having created the political extremism through its foreign policies [...]” (2007: 139). Hence the British and the US governments are to be blamed for Jihadist sentiments (2007: 150) and for the fact that 22 % of British Muslims agreed to the London bombings. Needless to say that this dualistic and one-sided perspective on foreign policy are not present in Kymlicka’s work, because multiculturalism is not about foreign policy but about building together a better life inside the new country. Yet, these resentments expressed by immigrants should be seriously taken into consideration and be dealt with by implementing educative policies that make immigrants aware not only of cultural differences but also of the fact that resentments produced in the society where they migrate to can be very different from that of their original country. This problem is well dramatized in a Canadian novel entitled *Cockroach* by Rawi Hage (2010), an immigrant from the Middle East. For the second-generation, resentment is certainly related to the process of accommodation within the new society and it should be linked to new studies dealing with multicultural perspectives and economic processes, but so far it remains as a research project (Imbert 2014–2017).

Some arguments are based on contradictions such as when Modood claims to privilege post-immigration while also claiming that he nonetheless gets some of its inspiration from the very groups he is not considering, namely rooted Afro-Americans and their long, hard battle for recognition. He also says that if Muslims deserve recognition, one is almost inevitably prioritising religion over other features (2007: 133) while saying (2007: 134) that religious dimension may not be the most salient one for Muslims: “it can be a sense of family and community or for collective political advancement [...]” (2007: 134). He nonetheless prioritises this identity (2007: 109) in his book.

Modood goes awry when he says that Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is anti-immigrant. But it is his dislike for Kymlicka’s liberalism and secular multiculturalism that compels him to make such accusations. The motif behind Modood’s negative representation of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism may come from his initial assumption that immigrants arrive in the prosperous West feeling different or inferior. It is nonetheless useful to be aware of this feeling and important to recognize that it can lead to resentment. And resentment (Angenot 1997), and its control or elimination

through successful active participation in the new society for instance, is one of the basis for establishing a world that is founded on sharing and on security. Resentment can be studied and sometimes avoided “by choosing people who have proven they can integrate into Canadian society and meet its labour market needs” says Stephen Harper (Manila 2012: A4). He explains “The Canadian Experience Class fast-tracks permanent residency application for skilled foreign workers and graduate students who have spent time in Canada on temporary permits or student visas” (Manila 2012: A4). Yet, the objective of Modood’s book is particularly tied to European situations and policies or non-policies such as not recognizing from the beginning immigrants as future citizens but only as temporary workers as was the case in Germany. These contexts and situations are very different from the Canadian and Australian contexts. Hence Modood calls for the following:

[...] today the appropriate response to the new Muslim challenges is pluralistic institutional integration, rather than an appeal to a radical public-private separation in the name of secularism. The approach that is being argued here then consists of: 1. the extension of a policy of difference to include appropriate religious identities and organizations. 2. A reconceptualisation of secularism from the concept of neutrality and the strict public/private divide to a moderate and evolutionary secularism based on institutional adjustments. (2007: 78)

But what does evolutionary secularism practically and clearly signify for Modood? According to his demonstration, it is secularism that admits the progressive influence of religion within or on the State. In other words, we have here a power struggle between diverging theoretical views pertaining to religious and secular perspectives.⁸ The religious perspective in Modood’s book aims at transforming the basis of liberal democracy according to specific elements particular to traditional Muslim culture. We can point out, for instance, the predominance of the group over the individual, the negative view on the self-belonging and on having the right to leave the group, the inability to theorize an inclusive and complex society whose established majority and minority groups have something important to say to newcomers. Modood also forgets values linked to Human Rights, and also notably, as it was stated by Sabrina in the interview of *La Presse*, the fact that people came as immigrants to change their lives, to go beyond restrictions imposed in the country they left, and to expand economically, educationally and culturally.

⁸ Indeed, we must not forget Bissoondath’s criticism at the time of the publication of Boyd’s report in Ontario, which suggests recognizing of the decisions of the Shari’a Courts in family affairs. Bissoondath criticizes the Boyd Report and appeals to “*la séparation de l’État et de la religion, à la liberté des musulmanes; à la solidarité sociale et juridique de notre société*” (the separation of State and religion, the freedom of Muslim women, and the social and judicial solidarity of our society). Bissoondath comes close to Alain Touraine, suggesting that “*concrètement, nous ne pouvons reconnaître de droits culturels qu’à la condition que soit accepté ce que nous reconnaissons comme nos principes fondamentaux, c’est-à-dire la croyance dans la pensée rationnelle et l’affirmation qu’il existe des droits personnels qu’aucune société, aucun État n’a le droit d’enfreindre*” (concretely, we can only recognize cultural rights if what we consider to be our basic principles are recognized, that is the belief in rationality and in personal rights that no society and no State has the right to jeopardize) (Bissoondath 2005: 118).

Modood fails to mention this possibility in his book, which focuses mainly on the problems of post-immigration experienced by second- and third-generations, that is, by the youth born in England who have felt the very real sting of exclusion. If so, we could suggest that the reason behind resentment felt by these generations might be a failure to use Kymlicka's theories and to translate them into policy, although Kymlicka underscores that his theories cannot be applied without thoughtful reflexion anywhere due to very different power relationship and historical misunderstandings (2007). This resentment might also be linked to serious problems not related to multicultural policies, such as the absence of decent housing and schools, the strong presence of racist discourse and attitudes, the control of certain professions by power groups; these conditions tend to prevent the active participation of immigrants and their descendants in the mainstream. All this demonstrates the need to correlate culture and economy. Hence, what Modood's book offers is not a thorough argumentation against Kymlicka's multiculturalism. Rather, it makes the case for the need to study and take seriously the existing resentment among second and third generation migrants.

4.8 Culture and Economy

Many immigrants want to realise the potentials that were suppressed in their country of origin and that can be actualised in their new country. As the Algerian couple point out, this desire is the valorisation of the individual and its multiple potentials: "*Ici, l'individu a une plus grande liberté. La société algérienne est plus codifiée*" (Here the individual has more freedom. The Algerian society is more codified) (2009: 3). The valorisation of the individual happens with the possibility to realize one's own potential in a public space that allows one to blend in with others. Many immigrants wish to blend-in in the knowledge-based society (Imbert 2010), and build new lives based on intercultural encounters and hybridity and not on defensive reactions against their new society. This dynamic is perhaps more common in Canada, Australia and the US than in Europe. It is the product of accommodative laws, multicultural practices and regulations. These contexts afford space and time to people from very different backgrounds to participate in, and to have access to, the benefits of the new society. As emphasized by Joan Delaney in 2006, "Even though most of his family members are Muslim, Boudjenane says that 'because his sister-in-law and niece are Christians, the whole family celebrates both Christmas and Ramadan. That's what being Canadian is all about', he says".

This desire to succeed and to be recognized is well-emphasized by Doug Saunders in *Arrival City: The Final Migration and Our Next World* (2010) but not in Modood's (2007) book and not too evidently in *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995) by Kymlicka. Yet this desire is what really powers peoples to migrate, to work hard and to find in themselves the resources to reinvent themselves and their world. In his book, Saunders analyses "the creation of a new culture between village and city, and thus, the hybridization of traditional cultures into a new one where women in

particular have a new role and where youth can aspire to a better future where they can expand their capacities and be rewarded socially and economically for it” (2010: 47). He not only analyses regulations and policies that allow one to own a piece of land, or a small house or to create a shop, but also the semiotic use of space. In the UK, space allows for the organization of a private small business and for the family to live together upstairs because streets in the suburbs are made of small townhouses where people can create a business and have the apartment upstairs. In France, on the contrary, the huge state run apartment buildings in the *banlieues*, cannot be organized in this way because they are far removed from the creative activities of the people in the street. In this case, work and family life are disconnected and cut from the street and its dull and empty atmosphere. For Saunders, the dwellings organized by new immigrants “[...] are not mere slums housing the outcasts and failures of the urban society, nor are they temporary encampments for transient labour. They are the key mechanism for the city regeneration” (2010: 47).

Both Modood and Saunders speak of the very poor, the rejected, and the despised, in the context of Asia, Europe, the Americas and Canada. Yet their perspectives are very different. While Modood starts his thesis by stating that the immigrants he speaks of are poor, he never analyses their perspectives and strategies to progress economically and educationally. He develops a thesis founded on the desire to build up a coherent and militant group on the basis of religion. Saunders analyses the strategies of migrating people and immigrants in the light of the search for a better future and of the challenges and obstacles they encounter. A pragmatic, down to earth, postcolonial and liberal perspective (Saunders) is very different from that of the discursively left-leaning and religiously traditional Muslim perspective (Modood). Modood, however, sometimes recognizes that through immigration, immigrants often gain a lot economically, “groups such as the Indians, Chinese, Koreans and some other East-Asians, for example, are developing a more middle-class profile than whites” (2007: 44), a fact also acknowledged by Saunders in *Arrival City* (2010).

Although Modood recognizes that many immigrants succeed in getting a better economic life, he does not really elaborate the means and the kind of cultural accommodation that makes this success possible. Neither does he talk about Muslims, in particular, succeeding in their professional fields. This is, however, the main focus of Saunders in *Arrival City*. Saunders (2010) studies the means taken and the adaptive capacities, cultural and otherwise, that allow whole populations to improve their lives by moving from rural areas to arrival cities (sometimes terrible slums) either in the same country or to other countries. There are many differences between the traditional life in the countryside and life in arrival cities. Among those, one can speak of the use of time and the organization of the week. Many immigrants succeed in businesses because they work in their shops 7 days a week and long hours every day, while people born in the host country tend to close their shops earlier. This means that, for instance, the Muslim way of life that includes five prayers a day has to be changed in the scramble to build and keep a successful business. Hence, culture not only signifies a set of traditions of fixed rituals but the ways in which groups use time, have access to rest, and this influences attitudes towards

time and space. How migrants make new use of time and space in their destination can facilitate their success in an urban setting, deriving wealth from production, consumption and efficiency in services and among the competition. It is also worth examining the ways in which traditions and self-identification can foster business and competition in the new society. There are many factors behind migrant work: migrants may want to get rich or pay for an education for their children; discrimination may keep them from finding unionized paid work; they usually all want to be able to compete more efficiently in an urban context and/or in a liberal capitalist society.

Many of these societies changed certain municipal regulations in the 1980s a situation which can be linked to a competition between religious and knowledge-based liberal discourses (Imbert 2014). Canada, for example, decided many years ago to stop the mandatory closing of stores on Sundays, the Christian day of rest, and to engage in a 7 day weeks of work and shopping. It is worth noting that the 7 days a week production/consumption cycle is part of societies that are no longer largely based on industrial production, but rather on services and on knowledge-based professions that allow productivity and exchange of ideas and information through networks often accessible from home. Hence, one can now use time productively 24 h a day, so that the time of rest is now dependent on this production and consumption pace. This leads individuals to rest at different times and to have their meditative period adapted to a constant change of timetable. This may be one of the reasons behind the dissemination of yoga which can provide a time and space of rest and spiritual wellbeing more easily accessible than religions and their fixed periods of spirituality and meditation. This aspect of culture, related to time and space, the spirit of innovation and business ethic, and their significant impacts on daily life and economic wellbeing, especially in the context of the biggest migration the world has ever seen, is neglected by both Modood and Kymlicka; migration pertains not only to poor people but also to educated specialists in many scientific, economic and cultural fields. For them, to start a new life in another country is less of a problem particularly when they see that many countries such as Canada compete to entice them to join other Canadians in a stimulating life full of potential for themselves and for their children.

This very contemporary dynamic is explored by many researchers such as Vivek Wadhwa (2012) showing that nowadays many people hesitate to immigrate to the US because immigration regulations are over-bureaucratized and receiving a green card can take years. This red tape jeopardises the dynamic that allowed so many immigrants to create Silicon Valley and many important start-up companies, and eventually end up in the *Fortune 500* directories of big companies among which 40 % have been founded by immigrants or children of immigrants. The Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, is keenly aware of this fact and the Government of Canada has recently switched its attitude from a passive operation accepting people on a first come first served basis “to one where newcomers are chosen according to how they can benefit Canada” (Manila 2012). In migration and post-migration, it is very important to recognize the links between culture and economy, between culture and access to professions. The strong contemporary relationship

between culture, economy, work and housing, encounter with alterity, global competition and the knowledge-based society changes the whole dynamic. The switch from rural areas to cities and megalopolis as well as the fact that now, all over the planet, millions and millions of young people go to college and university and have professions in demand is not emphasized enough. Further, Saunders (2010) suggests that these young people with skills and degrees who are ready to emigrate are the most ambitious and energetic among their population. They are ready for change and wish to actively engage in a life based on change and geographic as well as symbolic displacements. Naturally, this attitude is not always displayed by people who were born in a traditional area, who were expected to stay within this space and who were forced to move due to wars or other negative and unforeseeable impacts. One has to distinguish the goals of immigrants and those of refugees.

4.9 Conclusion

Tariq Modood's book entitled *Multiculturalism* is not about accommodation and multiculturalism unlike Kymlicka's or Taylor's perspective. It is a book trying to convince readers to accept an all-encompassing religious way of life in a secular democratic liberal society—presented as a society based on “radical secularism” (2007: 132)—while simultaneously saying that “there is no special problem with Islam” (2007: 132). This book is one among many others that are trying to define another path after the impact of the well-structured and complex but not complicated theories developed by Kymlicka during the past 20 years and their influence on the reorganization of institutions and socioeconomic dynamics in a liberal social-democratic Canada and worldwide (Arocena 2012).

Other books such as Bonilla Maldonado's (2006) deal with the new multicultural Constitution of Colombia and criticize the fact that one cannot accommodate illiberal traditional indigenous groups in Kymlicka's perspective (Imbert 2011). Reading Bonilla Maldonado, one can see that if he refers to Kymlicka's research, he recontextualises it so as to adapt it to Colombia, which has almost no immigrants but many emigrants. Hence, the multicultural Constitution of Colombia is only applied to founding groups, that is Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups, a situation very different from what happens in Canada.

Moreover, as Kymlicka himself emphasizes in *Multicultural Odysseys*, multiculturalism is linked to the recognized importance of Human Rights by states and people. Multiculturalism seeks to expand these rights, a goal with which a group of important Colombian thinkers agree fully (Parra et al. 2010). Multiculturalism does not seek to restrict rights through the imposition of traditions or regulations which are incompatible with a liberal democracy and it is not intended to accept illiberal traditions such as abandoning sick or old people alone in the jungle. Hence, these books, that of Daniel Bonilla Maldonado and that of Tariq Modood are interesting because they show how thinkers can de/recontextualise theories and practices for religious and political purposes. Yet, they are not particularly useful for implementing

efficient and peaceful policies and practices in a democracy turned towards a future based on sharing Human Rights and giving access to all to the possibility of expanding one's capacities and of creating a new life where one belongs to oneself.

Multiculturalism is a framework that enlarges the cultural, economic and political arena and fosters access to multiple elements in society such as work through antidiscrimination legislations, through public discourse, etc., but it also establishes limits. These limits are based on the recognition of established values such as the belief in individual rights that no society or state institutions have a right to jeopardise. As stated in the introduction, the role of multiculturalism is to help newcomers and their descendants to function and to participate actively in their own development and in the development of the new country. Consequently, a multicultural state tends to foster exchanges and *métissages*, which means that many Muslims should be able to live their faith in a new context based on limits that are different from those imposed in their country of origin. Multiculturalism opens new doors for immigrants, especially for Muslim immigrant women (see, however, Moller Okin 2008) whose perspectives are much broadened by the opportunities offered to them in their new country.

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Part II
Justice and Education as Key Dimensions
of Multiculturalism

Chapter 5

Disenchantments: Counter-Terror Narratives and Conviviality

Michele Grossman

History, in the human sense, is a language net cast backwards.

George Steiner (1975)

Abstract Drawing on recent research into Australian community perspectives on radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, this essay adopts a critical terrorism studies approach in considering the orientation and engagement strategies of counter-terror narratives in multicultural societies. Paul Gilroy's work on multicultures and conviviality (*After empire: melancholia or convivial culture?* Routledge, London/New York, 2004; *Crit Q* 48(4):27–45, 2006) is used as a key lens through which to think through issues surrounding counter-terror narrative discourses, their impacts and their aftermaths: which are heard, which aren't and what stories have yet to be told. What do counter-terror narratives' current trajectories and limits tell us about countering violent extremist futures?

Keywords Counter-narrative • Muslims • Terrorism • Discourse • Denizens • Multiculturalism • Conviviality

This chapter takes up the opportunities offered by critical approaches to the study of terrorism (Jackson 2007; Jackson et al. 2009) to examine the disposition and impacts of successive waves of counter-narrative theory and strategy since 9/11, particularly in relation to the challenges of countering violent extremism in the context of contemporary multicultural state polities and the lived experience of culturally diverse

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societies. The primary argument advanced in this discussion is that successive waves of counter-narrative theory and strategy have, through a continuing commitment to the ambivalent positioning of Islamic belief systems and adherents as alien to “Western” values and ethics, created fissures in counter-narrative messaging that foster the emergence of alternative narratives within communities that reframe and re-narrativise terrorist events and actors in concerning ways.

Mainstream approaches to counter-narrative thus potentially both undermine the social cohesion of multiculturalism that is so critical to the task of repealing violent extremism in contemporary nation-states, and also create an environment in which highly salient modes of alternative narratives continue to flourish. At the same time, they also miss opportunities to develop new counter-narrative strategies that move beyond the “negative case” of agonistically conceived storytelling by responding to community desires for more affirmative narratives around belonging, cooperation and conviviality.

The analysis developed later draws significantly on two sources: first, the theoretical work of Paul Gilroy (2004, 2006) on multicultures and conviviality, discussed in detail throughout this chapter (see also Chap. 10), and second, primary research with an Australian national sample conducted by Hussein Tahiri and Michele Grossman (2013) on contemporary community views concerning the prevalence and mitigation of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism in the Australian context.

Within the critical terrorist studies framework, postcolonial and cultural studies analyses of terror and counter-terror—their genealogies, antecedents, dispositions and critical and cultural manoeuvres—have played an important role in helping to reframe issues of terrorism and counter-terrorism in relation to the history and politics of modernity, discourse, representation, and the geopolitics of domination and globalisation. For example, Boehmer and Morton, in *Terrorism and the Postcolonial* (2009), investigate:

What is in fact at stake in the constitution of terrorism as an object of knowledge in the social sciences and humanities? [...] How do we interpret the colonial contours we discern within the dimensions of present-day terror? What exactly does the emerging field of terrorism studies reveal about the political and cultural values of contemporary Western culture and its histories of violence? (2009: 8)

Meanwhile, others such as Morey and Yaqin in *Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation* (2011) and Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (2013) in *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations* turn their attention to the representational frames and discourses in popular and media culture within which, resourced by a relentlessly iterative “clash regime” (Adib-Moghaddam 2013) (see also Chaps. 2 and 9), seemingly incommensurable images and rhetorics of “Muslims” and “the West” are circulated and deployed, and with what effects.

In line with this critical strand focusing on the relationship between imperial pasts and present modes of terror, Paul Gilroy, in *After Empire* (2004) and again in his essay “Multiculture in times of war” (2006), explores the impacts of postcolonialism’s aftermath on former imperial powers. His discussion includes a

focus on the problems posed by fidelity to anachronistic structures and institutions that have failed to keep pace with deep and sometimes radical economic and cultural change on a global scale. Gilroy's analysis centres on what he diagnoses as the pathology of British melancholia for the imperial past, which he understands to oscillate between two poles of collective social affect, mania and mourning. This national pathology, he argues, produces an epistemically and sometimes materially violent rejection of the multicultural British present, one that is accompanied by deep-seated fear, anxiety and apocalyptic fantasies concerning global multicultural futures. Forged in the smelter of post-9/11 analysis, Gilroy's prescription for how Western nation-states might move beyond the transnational ills of postcolonial melancholia rests on the antidote of what he terms "convivial culture", to which I return below.

While significant work has been done on analysing the discursive and material politics of both terrorist narratives and those state and quasi-state narratives that oppose them (Jackson 2005), less attention has been given by postcolonial and cultural studies critics to the culturally and politically strategic field of *counter-terror narratives*, which seek to diminish or redirect the influence of narratives embracing violent extremism. Gilroy's analysis in *After Empire* becomes useful in thinking about the limits and possibilities of contemporary counter-narratives of violent extremism in Western countries at a time when, increasingly, national narratives of tolerance and social cohesion are vying for oxygen and impact with transnational narratives of threat, fear and uncertainty. In some cases, both narrative modes are driven by the same or different tiers of government in a given national context. In other instances, state-sanctioned communications continue to promote discourses, however ambivalent or qualified, of social cohesion that are vigorously offset or undermined by popular media representations of cultural difference as risk, threat and incommensurable "Otherness". These are frequently aimed, particularly in the context of terrorism, at Muslim communities and Islam more generally (Yasmeen 2008; Rane et al. 2010).

If "immigration as war" is a dominant frame for Britain and Europe in the current global climate, as Gilroy argues it is (2006), then public modes of narrative and storytelling are a crucial theatre of operations for the waging of this conflict. And state-sponsored counter-narrative strategies focused on violent extremism—bound up as they are with wars at once discursive and material, virtual and embodied—are a critical part of the mix. Like other stories that belong to but also exceed the limits of those communities in which they take shape and are transformed, they are caught up in a language-net of histories and horizons never entirely of their own making. I ask here whether it is possible to "reclaim counter-narrative" by thinking, along with Gilroy, about what the concept of convivial culture might offer to the task of reorienting counter-narrative strategies toward the horizon of living with and in multicultures, and what this might mean for engagements around mitigating violent extremism. A key premise explored in this chapter is thus whether, as Gilroy proposes, "solidarity and diversity" can co-exist in a post-9/11 world (Gilroy 2006: 29) (on this question's application to the US see, also, Chap. 2).

In the Tahiri and Grossman (2013) study, *Community and Radicalisation*, interviews and focus groups conducted in 2011 with more than 500 participants in every Australian state and territory, including both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, suggest that while, as I go on to explore later, mainstream counter-narrative strategies in Western countries continue to position Muslim citizens ambivalently in relation to inclusive counter-narrative orientations, such strategies continue to ignore other, salient grassroots narratives that constitute a less well-recognised but powerful alternative mode of ‘counter-narrative’. These alternative narrative streams consistently attempt to reposition and reframe key events and key political moments in ways that complicate and trouble standard counter-narrative messaging around the perils and impacts of violent extremism.

5.1 Counter-Terror Narratives

As its generic name suggests, counter-narrative exists only in relation to its opposing term a variety of positional or relational discourse, at once overtly constructed and implicitly normative, that seeks to disrupt, dismantle or speak back to other narrative trajectories that exert discursive power. Counter-narratives have a long history as objects of study in the realm of resistance discourse theory and practice, particularly in relation to subaltern narrative frameworks that struggle against hegemonic forms of knowledge and discourse saturating a given field of social power relations (Bamberg and Andrews 2004).

Counter-narratives are thus always at some level *strategic* narratives, with certain aims and targets in mind. They are designed to resist, reframe, divert, subvert or disable other stories and other voices that vie for or already command discursive power. In the discursive force-field of opposing violent extremism, counter-terror narratives are intimately bound up with a grammar of terrorism that has “in recent years become the bass note to Western government rhetoric” (Boehmer and Morton 2009: 6). These stories use both cognitive and affective strategies to actively reposition and reclaim the allegiance of those who embrace or support narratives that justify or extol violence by claiming a religious basis in Islam for their actions (Al Raffie 2012). Proponents of counter-terror narratives see them as one kind of intervention in a suite of preventive strategies intended to forestall violent extremism at the early stages of terrorist radicalisation and recruitment (NCTb 2010), or, in some cases, to win back the “hearts and minds” of those already aligned with extremist perspectives (Jacobson 2010: 73). Cognitively, they seek to undermine the political and religious logics of neo-jihadist narratives; affectively, they work to reduce these narratives’ psychosocial seductions.

In 2010, a significant public policy report, *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (CVEN)*, was published by the National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in the Netherlands. The report drew together the work of a consortium of counter-terrorism researchers, analysts and government officials from throughout Europe, the UK and the US. *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives* documented a

comprehensive approach to developing and disseminating counter-terror narratives as a tool for challenging “modern terrorism” (NCTb 2010: 1).

As the introduction to this report notes,

The reasons for individuals to buy into and act upon a violent extremist narrative are subject to much debate and little agreement. Suffice it to say that substantial resources are being invested in order to tackle exploitable grievances and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable groups, the latter of which involves deepening the acceptance of the pluriformity of ideas as an essential element to democratic society. This form of prevention focuses on the vulnerability of possible receivers of the narrative and—in line with the comprehensive approach—thus complements the repressive measures directed at the senders of the narrative. One way to increase the resilience of potential receivers to the violent extremist message, given that eradicating the availability of extremist narratives in the information age is unrealistic, is to diminish the attractiveness of the narrative. This could be done, for example, by undermining the credibility of the sender, exposing contradictions in the narrative, or by promoting alternatives by those best suited to do so. (NCTb 2010: 5)

This passage helps make visible some of the key assumptions underpinning contemporary approaches to counter-narrative. Counter-terror narratives are explicitly aligned with the “soft power” (Nye 2004) paradigm of community-focused counter-terror initiatives. “Soft power” strategies in countering violent extremism focus on perceived individual and social vulnerabilities; legitimate some (but not all) grievances as root factors in the resort to terror; emphasise prevention rather than sanction; and seek to deliver alternatives and solutions through multiple channels, including government and community spheres of influence.

Yet, notwithstanding their alignment with soft power, contemporary counter-terror narrative strategies remain limited in key respects. Perhaps the most important of these is that they tend to be uniformly trained on countering neo-jihadi narratives as part of the “global counter-insurgency” against Salafi jihadism (de Graaff 2010: 37), despite widespread acknowledgement of other modes of terrorist narrative, including, for example, region-specific liberation movements and right-wing extremism (NCTb 2010). The “Muslim/non-Muslim divide” was rapidly instigated by pronouncements made early on in the Bush administration’s “war on terror” following 9/11:

If [President Bush] was really declaring a full scale war on terror, his target list should have included the ETA in Spain, the Hindu/Marxist Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Maoist rebels in eastern India, the Kurdish PKK and so on, which it obviously did not. The U.S.-led GWOT [Global War on Terror] was aimed at a single special brand of terrorism, i.e. Islamist or jihadist terrorism: not only al-Qaeda, but also the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hezbollah and similar terrorist organisations. Consequently, although many western leaders [subsequently indicated] that the war on terror was neither a war against Islam, nor a crusade [...] many got the impression that the crucial post-9/11 global divide was one between Muslims and non-Muslims. (de Graaff 2010: 36)

Various contributors to *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives* go on to critique this transnational narrative turn, often in sophisticated ways that highlight the importance of distinguishing between varieties of Islamic history and scholarship and both old and new varieties of jihadism, including those that explicitly endorse terrorism and violence.

Yet such a critique, while useful, is only part of the problem. As Michael Stohl has astutely noted, “Terrorism remains communicatively constituted violence in which how the audience reacts, and the political effects of the reactions, are the core process of terrorism” (2008: 13). Beyond the need to widen convincingly the discursive net of extremism to include non-neo-jihadi forms of terrorism, contemporary counter-narratives against violent extremism are also failing to address other, critically important social and cultural narratives now besieging many modern democracies—amongst them extremist nodes of xenophobia, racism and ethically evacuated media reporting. These are successfully eroding cultural tolerance and genuine democratic pluralism, and in the process paving the way for the kinds of social and political alienation and disenchantment with contemporary democratic pluralism that can contribute to support for extremism.

Moreover, contemporary counter-terror narratives need to avoid undermining their own premises of democratic debate and an open field of ideas and expression by remaining committed, as they still appear to be, to the rigid binarisms of “Islamic” versus “Western” regimes of value and meaning. This makes even current approaches to counter-terror narratives agonistic rather than atomistic in orientation, lapsing into stultifying dualisms rather than attempting to fragment or implode narratives of violent extremism within their own terms and logics.

5.2 The First Wave: Macro-narratives of “Myth” Versus “History”, “Them” Versus “Us”

We can more fully understand the orientation and also limitations of contemporary counter-narrative models by exploring two key waves in their development. The first wave developed over the decade following September 11. In this period, Western counter-narrative strategies designed to disrupt, mitigate and repel explanatory frameworks for and justifications of terrorism focused almost exclusively on what the literature (for example Casebeer and Russell 2005; Lia 2008; Halverson et al. 2011; al Raffie 2012) terms the “Al-Qaeda” or “Islamist extremist” narrative, which may be characterised more expansively as a variety of neo-jihadist (Lentini 2009)¹ narrative that sought to motivate, condition and reinforce the commitment of potential and actual recruits to violent extremist platforms and action. Overwhelmingly, the first wave of counter-narrative strategies was bound up with trying to understand and undermine the *religious and historical* dimensions of radical Salafi Islam, with correspondingly less focus on neo-jihadist narratives that linked domestic social and political grievances, marginalisation and

¹Peter Lentini (2009: 1) defines “neo-jihadism” as “a distinct late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century form of ideological expression, subculture, and militancy that combines novel understandings and interpretations of Islamic theology and jurisprudence, with other non-Islamic forms of social organization and interaction”.

disfranchisement with a religious call to arms in order to fuel pro-violence sentiment against its perceived adversaries.

A prime example of the thinking behind these initial mainstream efforts to disrupt and counter an older generation of extremist Islamic narratives appears in a 2005 article by Casebeer and Russell of the US Naval Postgraduate School; their contribution was published while Osama bin Laden was still the public face of Al-Qaeda and before the rise of AQAP (Al-Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula)'s internet-savvy *Inspire* magazine in 2010. Strongly inflected by Michael Vlahos's *Terror's Mask: Insurgency Within Islam* (2002), Casebeer and Russell argue that terrorism has now become a naturalised rather than exotic feature of everyday public discourse, one consumed by the threat of radical Islamic and specifically Al-Qaeda militancy. "Confronting the Al-Qaeda narrative", they write, "must be a critical mission requirement of any strategy to [...] come to terms with the phenomenon of Islamism [...] and to understand how radicalised groups use violence to achieve [their] ends" (Casebeer and Russell 2005).

An essential part of this is a "comprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell" and the means by which the narrative reach and appeal of Islamic-inspired terrorism is built and consolidated. The aims here are straightforward: to gain, through counter-narrative, entry into what the authors call the "OODA-loop" of the "adversary" (OODA is a combat term which stands for "observe, orient, decide, act"). Adopting a curious combination of literary structuralism, Proppian folk typology, Popperian critical rationalism and Aristotelian rhetoric, "Al-Qaeda" narratives are analysed for the foundational tropes and structures identified by Vlahos (2002: 8), who discerns four elements' of "Islamic fundamentalist narrative":

1. A heroic journey and a mythic figure
2. The rhythm of history captured as epic struggle and story
3. The commanded charge of renewal, and
4. History revealed and enjoined through mystic literary form

Viewed through the lens of postcolonial cultural inquiry, the problems posed by this narrative scaffolding are numerous. Prominent amongst them is the mobilisation of the pervasive imperialist trope in which "we" (the West, the white, the Judeo-Christian) have "history" whereas "they" (the Oriental, the dark, the Islamic) have merely "myth" and "story". This trope is further expounded upon in Vlahos's own gloss on the religious and cultural antecedents of Al-Qaeda, despite his vigorous critiques of neo-imperialism and the West:

The major message of Al Qaeda and the Taliban is essentially Ibn Taymiyyah's message brought forward seven centuries with all its passion intact. How could this be? We tend to seek authority for our thought in something we call 'modernity'. Modernity is understood as 'what is best is newest', but underlying this postulation are existential foundations. These tell us that knowledge is progressive and in a constant state of revision, so that our current understanding of truth is what most closely approaches 'absolute truth'. Thought within Islam, in contrast, more closely resembles thought in Antiquity. A thousand years after its codification, Greco-Roman civilization still focused on the interpretation of received truth. Knowledge existed in a world where truth was already absolute; even though it might be embellished, its main body was meant to be embraced and inhabited. (Vlahos 2002: 10)

The emphasis on features of myth and epic definitively locates contemporary Islamic neo-jihadism purposefully in the camp of the pre-modern, despite widespread acceptance by both Muslim and other scholars of Al-Qaeda as a uniquely modern phenomenon, drawing on modern intellectual sources of textual interpretation such as Qutb and Azzam² and deploying decidedly constructivist approaches to the formation and dissemination of its key tropes and narratives (Lynch 2006). As Roxanne Euben (1999: 154) perceptively remarks, Qutb, for example, so influential in the “phenomenon of Islamic resurgence” “is not a critic of modernity per se [...] but an opponent of post-Enlightenment rationalism. [His arguments] must be understood as a [...] dynamic critique rather than a scripturalist reflex” (1999: 155). Such an argument thus forecloses analysis or understanding of the socio-cultural complexities of these narratives and their purchase on modernity, a critically risky oversight that reveals the extent to which an investment in delegitimising the very modern (even postmodern) political rhetoric of neo-jihadist insurgencies falls back illogically on cultural and historical anachronism (Euben 1999).

These investments reveal the extent to which this first phase of counter-terror narratives merely replicated, rather than complicated, Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) notorious “clash of civilisations”. Indeed, Casebeer and Russell’s solution to combating the putative enchantments of Islamic fundamentalist “myth-making” is hardly less pre-modern in its resort to the succour of Aristotelian narrative principles. While conceding its “simplistic” nature, they nevertheless assert the value of Aristotelian *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* as a narrative counter-weight to the threat of terrorist inducements from afar. Western culture’s Greco-Roman antecedents (for which Aristotle serves as the metonym) are thus pitted against the elusive typology of Islamic fundamentalist myth-making, which can nevertheless be defeated if one only has the right tools to crack Al-Qaeda’s culturally obscure codes. Their confidence that the terms of classical Western culture can provide the required antidote to militant neo-jihadist narratives typifies the early wave of anti-terror counter-narrative strategies and their heavy reliance on “the paradigm of incommensurability and [...] opposition between ‘modern secular knowledge’ and ‘Islamic knowledge’” (Euben 1999: 164).

In many respects, this paradigm is a variety of what Paul Gilroy calls the new “culture talk” of the post-9/11 environment. The new “culture talk” for Gilroy is really the “old racism talk” dressed in politically correct clothes, a discourse that “smuggles in the old xenophobics of race but relocates them outside the biogenetic and into the discourse of ‘untranslatable customs’ and ‘incommensurate cultural differences’” (2004: 158). These “untranslatable and incommensurate differences”, which threaten both by their nature and by their number, are then compressed into the same binarisms by which Empire managed and repressed its Others. Such resurgent dualism was identified in Britain in the late 1990s by Yunas Samad, who noted that the

[...] neoconservative combination of social authoritarianism and race, national identity and patriotism leads [neoconservatives] to redefine biological racism to one based on culture and being British [The] new racism wanted to replace multiculturalism with a pluralism in which separatism would prevent cultural contamination. (Samad 1998: 64)³

²I am indebted to Joshua Roose for bringing this point to my attention.

³Again, I am indebted to Joshua Roose for directing me to this source.

More broadly, this trend was well exemplified by early approaches to counter-terror narrative strategy, which saw “two important story-sets: the ones our adversary is telling, and the one being told implicitly and explicitly by us” (Casebeer and Russell 2005). Rather than hollowing out the fundamentalist narrative from within by using a variety of deconstructive or rhizomatic tactics (Deleuze and Guattari 2004), the first wave of counter-narratives mounted a Manichean assault on the posited “structures” of neo-jihadi storytelling as a contest between a disarmingly familiar (and therefore reassuring) rationalist Western *telos* in one corner and a crafty, shape-shifting neo-Orientalist Islamic *mythos* in the other.

By underestimating the complex ways in which neo-jihadi narratives operate transversally across both tradition *and* modernity, received knowledge *and* radical or heterodox interpretation, the first wave of counter-terror narratives foundered, particularly in the context of the flatter structures and hypertextually oriented nature of the Internet and social media platforms, an observation tellingly brought out in Arshin Adib-Moghaddam’s reframing of the contemporary “clash regime” by which neo-orientalist discourses of Islam are sustained:

Today, the clash regime multiplies itself in the networked spaces of the Internet and travels effortlessly along the ethers of a technologically globalised world. [...] Any critique of the clash regime must [therefore] account for culture and counter-culture, containment and stabilisation, salience and flexibility, conservatism and upheaval, reification and change. (2013: 267, 275)

Both counter-terror and also pro-terror narrative strategies have now shifted precisely toward more constructivist, less centralising models of design and delivery (Lynch 2006). This has pleased those analysts who believe that such developments have dealt a fatal blow to a centrally managed Al-Qaeda master narrative “brand”. As Lisa Merriam put it when reflecting on the differential leadership influence of Al-Qaeda’s Al-Awlaki versus bin Laden, “The lack of brand leadership, lack of a celebrity brand face, splintering brand focus and fragmenting brand strategy are some of the ‘thousand cuts’ that have felled the al-Qaeda brand” (Merriam 2011). Yet Merriam here misses the critical importance of how various discourses of extremism, and not just in the sphere of terror either, are striving to reinvent their messages using the discourse and tactics of postmodern fragmentation for storytelling and also for combat—as the appeal to and resourcing of home-grown “self-starter” acts of terrorism makes clear. The dividing line between the solitary and the solidary, as we are seeing in the reconfiguration of neo-jihadist movements such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, for example, is becoming more blurred by the hour, and this is symptomatic of the creatively and peculiarly postmodern energies (Euben 1999) that can underwrite varieties of contemporary terrorism today.

First-wave counter-terror narratives are thus now seen increasingly by many intelligence experts as flawed because they reproduce an un-interrogated dualism that deploys a retrofit, agonistic model (recalling Huntington) that either fails to resonate with or actively antagonises key sectors of cosmopolitanised and densely intercultural societies. As Michael Stohl has observed, the price for such radical oversimplification in the early days of Al-Qaeda’s emergence was high:

Rather than recognizing the multiple audiences for both bin Laden's message through the attacks and the need to address those multiple audiences in the development of a response, the Bush administration responded with a message to what it conceived as its base. The political expediency of equating terrorism with 'evil' and to focus on one particular evil such as bin Laden is clear in the mobilization of political support of the home audience and much of the international audience in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. The early black—white imagery of good versus evil employed by George W. Bush generated immediate elite and public support from that base in the initial stages of response. However, ignoring the political conflicts that underlay the terrorism created fissures in that wider audience over time. Refusing to consider how bin Laden's message resonated with supporters, why wealthy Saudis as well as poor Pakistanis, Indonesians, Egyptians and recent European immigrants responded to the message, lost valuable public support from the vast majority of the populations of nations around the globe. (Stohl 2008: 13)

This view is by no means universally accepted amongst counter-terrorism strategists, however. For example, some continue to advocate developing a sustained climate of community fear, rather than tolerance, as a potent weapon in countering violent extremism. As one American counter-terrorism expert put it in a discussion of metropolitan community policing, states should aim at "creating a shared sense of threat in which society as a whole fears the same fears" to successfully combat local extremism (Downing 2007 in Kosseim 2011: 10). This commitment to a shared fabric of fear as a unifying attribute of otherwise diverse societies inevitably falls back on strategies of cultural reductionism and outright xenophobia to sustain its narrative power: since it must tell over and over a powerfully negative and hostile story about an out-group to foster a tenuous in-group sense of solidarity, sanctuary and security. This is of a piece with the broader agonistic mode of storytelling about multiculturalism and immigration that Gilroy sees as a classic case of the "Powellite folk analysis" now streaming throughout Europe. In this discourse, the "strangers" both without and within who occupy the badlands of xenophobic nationalism and cultural puritanism are demonised to assuage the resurgent anxieties of societies for whom the capacity to delimit and manage "difference" has starkly declined in recent years as the normative experience of socio-cultural heterogeneity has intensified. As Gilroy (2004: 137) argues,

Today's new hatreds arise less from supposedly reliable anthropological knowledge of the stable identity and predictable difference of the other [and more from] not being able to locate the Other's difference in the common-sense lexicon of alterity. Different people are still hated and feared, but the timely antipathy against them is nothing compared to the hatreds turned toward the greater menace of the half-different and partially familiar. To have mixed is to have been party to a great civilizational betrayal. Any unsettling traces of the resulting hybridity must therefore be excised from the tidy, bleached-out zones of impossibly pure culture.

Thus the half-different and partially familiar—for example, second- or third-generation British Muslim citizens—are, no less than more recently arrived immigrants, routinely designated as either actual or potential "traitors, [...] doomed in perpetuity to be outsiders. Becoming an enemy terrorist only makes explicit what was already implicit in their tragic and marginal position, irrespective of where they are born" (Gilroy 2004: 134). In effect, such individuals and groups become what Gilroy calls "denizens", constructed as eternal fringe-dwellers regardless of their

citizenship status and length of tenure, whose claims to national belonging and accountability are predicated upon and limited by evermore proscriptive diagnoses of cultural particularity and exclusion. To be a denizen is to be mongrelised: midway between the full rights and recognitions afforded to citizens and the absence of those rights and recognitions in the case of so-called aliens. Denizens are halfway between presence and absence, to be in a place, but never really of it, a third term that ignites a sense of threat and discomfort wherever and whenever contemporary binaries of national entitlement and community belonging are affirmed.

5.3 The Second Wave: From Macro-narrative to Micro-narrative

It is this positioning of Muslim individuals and communities in diaspora, “citizens” by law but “denizens” by decree in relation to concerns about violent extremism and terrorism, which the second wave of counter-narrative thinking now addresses. As touched on briefly earlier, an international consortium of counter-terrorism experts convened by the Netherlands National Coordinator for Counterterrorism organised a forum on “Counter-narratives and the performative power of counterterrorism” to explore new approaches to developing and disseminating counter-narrative messages. The findings and conclusions of this expert group tell, for the most part, a new story with an old and predictable conclusion.

In the second wave, contesting the structure and impact of jihadist narratives (though no longer ascribed exclusively to Al-Qaeda) remains a key focus, and once again, four layers of *jihadi* storytelling are identified: the *political*, the *moral*, the *religious* and the *social-heroic*. So far, so familiar. Yet there are changes too. One of these is an emphasis on the primacy of the political rather than the religious dimensions of neo-jihadi narrative, which concedes the failure of earlier approaches to sufficiently acknowledge what Gilroy sees as the “links between the appeals of political Islam, domestic racism and domestic social disenfranchisement and marginalisation” (2004: 154). There are signs too of a shift from the constricting dualisms of “us” versus “them” and a stronger appreciation of the need for more nuanced narrative strategies, multiple audiences, and the localised design and delivery of counter-narratives that rebut *jihadi* suasion but also understand and engage with its frames and trajectories.

In essence, the key movement between counter-terror narratives Waves One and Two is a shift from a single, centralised macro-counter-narrative to multiple, pluralised micro-counter-narratives. This interest in the power of micro-counter-narratives is driven by several factors. It is now widely acknowledged that government-initiated counter-narratives are highly ineffective as a means of dissuading those still thinking about whether or not to engage in violent extremism (NCTb 2010; Tahiri and Grossman 2013): they lack community credibility, are not nimble in using or resourcing multiple communication channels and strategies, and their messages cannot effectively be controlled across the multiple spheres in which counter-narratives must circulate. In addition, social media and the Internet have

completely transformed the rules of engagement with storytelling and audiences by pro-violent and anti-violent extremist proponents alike.

Given these recalibrations in contemporary counter-narrative strategy, it is reasonable to ask how the second moment envisages engaging Western Muslim communities to develop and mobilise effective counter-narratives from within their own contexts and circumstances. Yet this is precisely where the limits of counter-narrative thinking—and with them the limits of multiculturalism in counter-terrorism contexts more broadly—are revealed. “Impossible” as it is for governments to “aspire to control and employ a central-counter-narrative”, this more recent approach now says the effort to “promote multiple narratives” should be achieved through selecting “various carefully chosen partners”, including the “stimulat[ion] of the Muslim community to take ownership of certain areas of the issue” (NCTb 2010: 9).

This latter statement is troubling in its ambivalence and wariness toward making common cause with Muslim communities in the struggle against violent extremism. In this articulation, half-in and half-out, and definitely without an “access all areas” pass, Muslims remain, as always, denizens in the realm of countering terrorism. For example, why will “the Muslim community”—which this expert group would be well aware certainly does not exist as a unified field—be encouraged to take carriage of “certain areas” in countering violent extremism but not others? What kind of “ownership” of the “issue” of violent extremism will be “stimulated”, and how? What are the freedoms and limits of such ownership, and how will the “Muslim community” know which areas are theirs and which are off-limits?

The second wave of conceptualising counter-terror narrative is in its early stages, and there are no answers as yet to these questions. The locution here however, gestures implicitly towards the well-worn structures of imperial control in the colonies, in which “native” administrators and local rulers—without whom the colonisers came to realise they could not function—were offered very limited forms of local power that would extend but never threaten the dominion of the distant metropolitan centre. Indigenous colonial administrators and leaders were also denizens under imperial rule, in their place but no longer of it, flickering only erratically across the retina of empire’s gaze when their utility flared into momentary focus. In this sense, to paraphrase Gilroy, the “new pluralism talk” of counter-narrative strategies Wave Two sounds suspiciously like the “old Islamophobic talk” of counter-narrative strategies Wave One in its refusal to acknowledge that the “issue” of countering terrorism is already and everywhere “owned” by the vast majority of Muslims who deplore terrorism and who are amongst its most visible victims in the vicissitudes of daily lived experience via the cultural and political aftermaths of 9/11.

5.4 Counter-Narratives and Conviviality

A further question is why counter-narrative strategies continue to invest so heavily in countering *jihadi* narratives to the exclusion of other, more domestically inflected and damaging discourses that it would profit democracies concerned about

home-grown terrorism to attend to. The most pervasive and corrosive of these narratives is that of globalised commercial media, which continues merrily to foster a perceived link between Islam and terrorism in popular consciousness (see also Chap. 6). Where is the state-sanctioned counter-narrative to that? In his fascinating *Terrorism: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*, Joseba Zulaika argues that the discourse of terrorism “must be disenchanted if it is to lose its efficacy for all concerned” (2005: 1). The recognition here of narrative’s power to enchant and seduce is well-founded. Yet, as noted above, widespread disenchantment is already present in other quarters for many in the community, who profoundly distrust mainstream media and the stories it tells, or fails to tell.

This has impelled the re-narrativisation of key moments in the recent history and discourse of terror, including 9/11. These alternative narratives, rather than contesting or countering dominant narratives of terrorism’s causes and impacts, work either by radically reframing the interpretation of such events, or by simply storying them out of existence altogether. For example, in line with the myriad of internet-based conspiracy sites and social resistance movements devoted to 9/11 sometimes known as “9/11 truthers”, a number of the 537 respondents in our recent national study exploring Australian perspectives on radicalisation and extremism, *Community and Radicalisation* (Tahiri and Grossman 2013) saw 9/11 as a complete fiction or invention, “photoshopped” into existence by a global media conspiracy in thrall to Western governments bent on bringing global Islam to its knees. While some of our study participants believed that these attacks took place but felt that subsequent discourses on 9/11 were a media “beat-up”, others questioned whether the attacks were completely invented and then peddled by media organisations around the world. For this group of participants, conspiracy theory around the events of 9/11 in particular was a strong narrative driver, with many citing “conspiracy”, “conspiracy theory” and “government trickery” as the main rationale for the perceived link between Islam and terrorism:

September 11 was fake, if it was real they would have blown up the White House, think about it, it doesn’t make sense to blow up the Twin Towers and kill innocent people. (Focus group participant)

They already have that perception about Muslims, it could have been anyone. We never knew who did September 11, probably done by George Bush. (Focus group participant)

How can we be so sure that they actually did it, still a lot of confusion about 9/11—I’ve seen documentaries made by locals, by non-Muslims. (Focus group participant)

Moreover, a number of participants reframed news stories of terrorist aspirants in African or Middle Eastern training camps as a tale not of social, political or religious heroes or combatants—the territory of classic neo-jihadi narratives—but as victims of kidnapping, brainwashing and drug-assisted coercion who were therefore not responsible for their actions or their beliefs:

I have heard that they drug them before they do that, a bit of drug before the act, they numb them, and they are usually young, and don’t know better, [at an] early age they are kidnapped. (Focus group participant)

It’s like if you tell a twelve-year-old that it is good to die for your religion, it is good to die for your religion, it is good to die for your religion—[then] if you ask him if he would kill people, he will say yes. (Focus group participant)

They have interviewed failed suicide bombers, those that sent them are the strong decisive ones, and the bombers are patsies, coerced, bullied, and when they've failed and come back—a lot of them were brainwashed, actually. (Focus group participant)

For others, however, the concept of “brainwashing” was more aligned with being misled through ignorance, lack of education, choosing the wrong path or being influenced by the wrong people or environment:

They are being inculcated to believe these things. They are looking for answers to questions and if these people who try to brainwash them give them answers to their questions, they will believe them. (Focus group participant)

These contributions reference broader, critical alternative narratives from within a Western modern, not anti-modern, frame of reference, and they exert influences and meanings that counter-terror narrative efforts ignore to their cost.

5.5 The Third Wave? Contesting the “Negative Case” of Counter- Extremist Narratives

A major theme emerging from our study in relation to what kinds of counter-narratives work best was a question as to whether counter-narratives are desirable at all, or whether fresh alternatives are required. A significant proportion of community leaders, government stakeholders and focus group participants suggested that the time may have come to replace or supplement traditional approaches to counter-narratives, which many respondents saw as potentially or actively divisive through their emphasis on the “negative case” narrative, with more affirmative, positive narratives focusing on the positives of what unites Australians from many different cultures and backgrounds. They also believed that *assertive* narratives of national identity and unity would help limit the success of extremists in setting an agenda against which traditional counter-narratives are inevitably perceived as reactive rather than proactive:

Radicalised Islam is a social movement, a banner, it connects them to a big picture. To combat that social movement, you have to replace it with another, a big banner of a call to cooperation that others can see as a way of building a better way/world. (Focus group participant)

Governments should produce not a counter-narrative but an assertive narrative of who we are as a society and what we stand for and need to protect. (Government stakeholder)

I went to the ECCV⁴ state conference, and a guy from Italian background was talking about Islamophobia and saying it's unacceptable, we have to combat it, and that's the first time I've heard a non-Muslim do that, and it makes you feel better—it made me feel, wow, somebody cares. We need to hear more positive voices. (Focus group participant)

We are looking for unity in the wrong places—not our skin colour or our accents, but the fact that we are Australian—national identity is the only thing that unites us as Australian. Otherwise we are all too different. We need [narratives that recognise] the fact that living together here peacefully is really what binds us. (Community youth leader, new arrival background)

⁴Ethnic Communities Council of Victoria. Victoria is an Australian state and home to the nation's second largest capital city of Melbourne.

In a similar vein, many community-based participants felt that such narratives need to concentrate on bridging or eliminating the “us and them” mentality that current Australian discourses on culture, identity and belonging, particularly on the political and media fronts, are thought to have helped shape:

What they need is a lot of the reputable [Muslim community] leaders to do a lot of the talking—this would break down the ‘us and them’ mentality and show it is just about ‘us’. (Community leader)

Imam [name]—he does a great job, I’ve attended his events, and he doesn’t talk about non-Muslims and us, he talks about mercy and humanity, he feeds the hungry no matter who they are, they donate blankets to churches for the homeless. (Focus group participant)

A large proportion of community-based participants, including many who were Muslim-Australians, thought the main challenges in developing strong counter-narratives to violent extremism that specifically addressed neo-jihadism were related to the quality, orientation and public profile of Islamic religious and community leaders in Australia and overseas. They wanted to see stronger relationships between moderate Muslims and youth, better representation of moderate Islamic views in public forums, and more effective measures to limit the influence those leaders whom they saw as inciting division and extremism within communities:

Those young people don’t emerge in a vacuum, they are supported by others, those who are teaching them, so stop the teachers, change the environment. [...] The policy lesson here is provide or establish youth centres for Muslims and let them socialise with imams who do not have these views and can develop trust and relationships in different settings and get different views. (Focus group participants)

However, there was also a fairly strong view amongst some participants that counter-narratives were a responsibility for Australian communities in general and should not be produced by or aimed at Muslim communities alone:

On occasions when people say things that are racist or anti-Islam, there are people who will stand up against Islamophobia. When you get that support, you are more likely to care about the people and your country, and we need more proper and moderate leaders to come into the spotlight. (Focus group participant)

It should not only be the Muslim community doing this. It should be each and every human being. Extremism doesn’t derive only from Islam—it can derive from one person to another, one religion to another, one culture to another. These counter-narratives should be by everyone for everyone. (Community leader)

There was also support, particularly from government-based participants, for ensuring that counter-narratives are designed for emotional rather than purely logical impact and are highly tailored to localised, even intimate social contexts. They felt that aiming counter-narratives at families, friends and communities that bear the brunt of anti-extremist interventions would be helpful, rather than concentrating on out-dated and abstract “master-narratives” of countering extremism:

Also the consequences need to be quite personal—some people have said to us that if such a [terrorist] act occurred here, the biggest victims would be Australian Muslims themselves in terms of harassment, victimisation and targeting long after the actual event was over. (Government stakeholder)

I'm quite keen on the idea that mothers have the capacity to influence in an early stage – the multicultural mothers can put a lot of guilt on the kids. The mothers have the capacity to engage emotionally with socially distanced young people. Bringing it back to the effect on their immediate family can be powerful. (Government stakeholder)

5.6 Counter-Narrative Futures

Where, then, should counter-narratives go? A very recent report by the Qatar-based Soufan Group (QIASS 2013) on new thinking in countering violent extremist narratives replicates our own findings and also some of those of the Netherlands report in a number of key respects. This includes the Soufan Group's emphasis on decentralised micro-narratives that understand differences within as well as between communities and audiences; stronger and more creative use of social media and Internet platforms; more emphatic use of grassroots community leaders and influencers to design and deliver counter-narrative messaging; and, critically, a focus on strengthening skills in critical thinking and analysis that can disrupt the distortions of extremist interpretations of Islam in particular. Yet the Soufan Group's analysis parts company with the Netherlands' discussion of 2010 in its emphasis, *without qualifications*, on joint community-government initiatives in the counter-narrative arena. "Ownership of CVE programs is important", they write (QIASS 2013: 16), pointing to a successful program in Minneapolis/St Paul in the US between community organisations and local authorities, supplemented by support from the Department of Homeland Security, to drive counter-narrative initiatives at the local level and build trust with relevant communities. That this ownership is conceived of as fully shared, rather than restricted or qualified with respect to Muslim community involvement, highlights the shift from the ambivalence of the Netherlands report to the resolute rhetoric of inclusion moving forward.

This, then, is the third wave of counter-narrative futures: partnerships between communities and governments that do not make Muslim citizens into "denizens", but instead work to build cooperation, trust and a common sense of purpose, which is in many ways an affirmative narrative of its own. There is always a slight risk that affirmative narratives can descend into uncritical modes of vacuous nationalist sentiment and anti-diversity grandstanding. However, a counter-narrative strategy that uses contemporary energies around multiple micro-narratives to find and work with the commonalities and overlaps that animate Gilroy's notion of 'convivial culture' might offer better and more enduring prospects. Conviviality, argues Gilroy (2006: 40),

Is a social pattern in which different metropolitan groups dwell in close proximity, but where their racial, linguistic and religious particularities do not—as the logic of ethnic absolutism suggests they must—add up to discontinuities of experience or insuperable problems of communication. [...] There are [a range of] commonalities [...] that intercut the dimensions of difference and complicate the desire to possess or manage the cultural habits of others as a function of one's own relationship with identity. Conviviality

acknowledges this complexity and, though it cannot banish conflict, can be shown to have equipped people with means of managing it in their own interests and in the interests of others with whom they can be induced heteropathically to identify.

Gilroy's concept of heteropathic identification holds out the most promise for where counter-narrative thinking can best train its energies for the future. Rather than conceding either to the liberalist tendency to sweep cultural, religious and social differences under the carpet of national unification around precepts of democracy, freedom or civic engagement, or the reactionary tendency to harden the battle lines of identification with one group or race or culture at the expense of others, counter-terrorism's multiple micro-narratives can be used to support the small, uncertain, cumulative steps that are the only sure way to influence heteropathic sociality from below—which is where it must occur to have any real impact. There is much evidence of this happening already in communities across Australia, some of it documented in our study (Tahiri and Grossman 2013). But the efforts to resource and harness this, to nurture and mobilise and grow it, are still at the stage of crawling rather than walking.

The ethics of Gilroy's conviviality lie in its willingness to engage with not only the structural but also the perceptual terrain of cultural difference, neither fearfully suppressing nor uncritically celebrating multicultures, but instead examining, living with and working through difference on many levels in the service of finding those commonalities and overlaps that can create usable crossings rather than unbridgeable chasms. As Gilroy observes, "exposure to otherness can involve more than jeopardy" (2006: 40). This is a lesson not yet fully learnt by current counter-narrative thinking, but it holds the most promise for a new kind of "OODA-loop" (Casebeer and Russell 2005), in which observations of and orientations toward difference and multiculturalism can produce new kinds of decisions and actions that will eliminate the negative dialectic of difference by which both contemporary pro-violent and anti-violent extremist narratives are currently characterised. This is a lesson well heeded as we prepare for new challenges and new stories in countering the complexities of violent extremism across the globe.

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Chapter 6

Between Rhetoric and Reality: Shari'a and the Shift Towards Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Australia

Joshua M. Roose and Adam Possamai

Abstract This chapter explores the schism in Australian multiculturalism between explicit and publically-stated rejection of Islamic law as it relates to the personal domain on the one hand, and the embracing and promotion of Islamic finance as opening an avenue to prosperity on the other. We argue that this schism aligns closely with the functioning of neoliberal multiculturalism; where the cultural dimension of ethnicity, or in this case, faith, is only so valuable in the political arena as the tangible economic benefits it can offer. The chapter therefore seeks to explore the key concept of neoliberal multiculturalism as a way of better understanding contemporary Australian multicultural policies.

Keywords Australian multiculturalism • Legal pluralism • Multiculturalism • Neoliberal multiculturalism • Shari'a law

6.1 Introduction

Multiculturalism in Australia has faced considerable challenges over the past decade. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that the policy is “in retreat”. Others however argue that Australia maintains the world’s best multicultural policies and that multiculturalism is engrained in Australia’s social fabric. A great deal of the focus upon multiculturalism has related to the existence of a highly diverse and rapidly growing Muslim community (also the subject of Chaps. 4 and 5), that from 2001 to 2011 almost doubled in size (ABS 2001–2011 in Peucker et al. 2014). One issue in particular that has cut to the heart of the debate about Muslims in Australia has been the issue of legal pluralism, and whether Shari’a, Islamic law,

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should be in anyway formally recognised within the secular system. Turner (2011: 174) argues that “the possibility of legal pluralism is an important test of the limitations of multiculturalism or at least public support for multicultural policies”. Kymlicka (2005) similarly argues “the Sharia tribunal issue has become a lightning rod precisely because it is a symbol of these larger unresolved questions about Islam and liberal multiculturalism”. The answer from Australian politicians, the public and most Muslims has been a resounding no. Yet key components of Shari’a, in particular related to Islamic finance have been publically celebrated, pushed and even defended by non-Muslim Australian politicians and bureaucrats. Islamic finance is seen not only as “good” for the country (Black and Sadiq 2011), but as a key plank of Australia’s multicultural platform.

This chapter will focus on and explore the schism in Australian multiculturalism between explicit and publically stated rejection of Islamic law as it relates to the personal domain on the one hand, and the embracing and promotion of Islamic finance as opening an avenue to prosperity on the other. The chapter will grapple with the dimensions of contemporary Australian multiculturalism, seeking to determine whether the concept of a “retreat from multiculturalism” has any currency. Are Australian multicultural policies as expansive and positive as suggested by Banting and Kymlicka (2013)? Or are they cynically exploitative of difference as a market based mechanism of distinction? What are the potential implications of Australian multicultural policies for the development of mutual recognition and respect between Muslims and non-Muslims in the wider Australian community? While perhaps not answering these questions in full, the chapter seeks to explore the key concept of neoliberal multiculturalism as a way of better understanding contemporary Australian multicultural policies. Blindly waving the flag of Australian multiculturalism in the face of dynamic new challenges without self-reflexivity has the potential to cause ongoing damage to those it claims to benefit, including minority communities.

6.2 Bipartisan Support for Australian Multiculturalism

At the level of political rhetoric, Australia might be considered to enjoy an unparalleled bipartisan support for multiculturalism, with leaders of Australia’s major political parties publically stating their commitment to the policy. Speaking in the lead up to the 2013 Federal Election (and before his newly elected government subsequently sought to repeal elements of the Racial Discrimination Act), right-wing conservative Tony Abbott stated at a Ramadan function that multicultural Australia was a “beacon of hope to a divided world” and signalling a strongly integrationist approach warned that “I am the sworn enemy for anyone who seeks to divide Australian over Australian on issues of class, gender, birth place, race and particularly over faith” (Abbott 2013). In a 2011 speech launching the then-Labor government’s new multicultural policy titled “The Genius of Australian Multiculturalism” the Immigration Minister at the time, Chris Bowen, argued that “without doubt

[multiculturalism] has strengthened Australian society". He sought to distinguish a unique Australian approach based on respect for Australian values, a citizenship-centred approach, the economic benefits of multiculturalism and an emphasis on social inclusion:

Multiculturalism is about inviting every individual member of society to be everything they can be, and supporting each new arrival in overcoming whatever obstacles they face as they adjust to a new country and society and allowing them to flourish as individuals. It is a matter of liberalism. A truly liberal society is a multicultural society. (Bowen 2011)

The Australian government multicultural policy developed by the Labor government and as yet unchanged by the Liberal government is titled *The People of Australia: Australia's Multicultural Policy* and outlines the Australian approach. Early on it states:

The Australian Government is unwavering in its commitment to a multicultural Australia [...]. Multiculturalism is in Australia's national interest and speaks to fairness and inclusion. It embraces respect and support for cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. (DIMA 2011)

The policy outlines four key principles that shaped the then Labor Government approach. These are based on celebrating diversity within the bounds of national unity (1), commitment to a just and inclusive society with government services responsive to the needs of all Australians (2), welcoming of the trade and investment benefits of multiculturalism (3) and promotion of tolerance and acceptance and protection against discrimination (4) (see Chaps. 12 and 13 for more context and analysis of Australian multiculturalism).

Despite the Government's public pronouncements claiming its success, scholars over the past decade have consistently noted a "pattern of retreat" in Australian multiculturalism (Joppke 2004, 2014; Turner 2006; Jakubowicz 2006; Poynting and Mason 2008; Fozdar 2011; Colic-Peskar 2011). Poynting and Mason (2008) argue that the underlying foundations of Australian multiculturalism have shifted from being based on "consent", often purchased with state resourcing for immigrant community needs, to one based on a "new integrationism" in which integration becomes a demand imposed on migrant communities by the state:

The pursuit of the 'War on Terror' since 9/11 has increasingly seen the intrusion of the state into cultural, and especially religious, matters of minority populations, overwhelmingly amongst Muslims, in Australia. Pronouncements are now routinely made by political leaders of what is acceptable in a sermon, for example, and what is 'extreme', 'radical' or unacceptable. Religious leaders themselves have been identified by state actors as exemplary or beyond the pale and to be replaced. (2008: 232)

In contrast to this, recent research by Banting and Kymlicka (2013: 8) utilised a "multicultural policy (MCP) index" to test the strength of multicultural policies viewed by both proponents and critics alike as "emblematic of multiculturalist turn". Eight indicators used to build the MCP index for immigrant communities included constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum, the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in public media, exemptions from dress codes, allowance of dual citizenship, funding of ethnic organisations and bilingual education and

affirmative action for disadvantaged groups. On these measures, tested for in 1980, 2000 and 2010, Australia scored the highest of 21 OECD nations with a score of 8 in 2010. This remained equal to the 2000 score and built on 1980 (5) (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 25). By this MCP index, Australia has the strongest multicultural policies in the Western world and has maintained these over the past decade.

6.3 Shari'a and Legal Pluralism in Australia: Political Discourse

The debate about Shari'a and legal pluralism in Australia, as in other Western nations including Canada, the UK and the US, is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is clear that Western secular nations are facing a variety of challenges in coming to terms with the presence of large and growing Muslims populations seeking to live with reference to the principles of their faith. Levey (2010: 145) considers that these challenges have emerged because Muslims were not party to the original compacts between church and state that defined a secular society, while Turner (2012: 1059) argues:

The specific issues surrounding Muslim minorities in non-Muslim secular states can be seen as simply one instance of the more general issue of state and religion and modern liberal societies. In this context, there is an increasing awareness of the limitations of the Westphalian constitutional solution, the Hobbesian social contract and Lockean liberalism as political strategies to manage conflicting religious traditions.

It is in this international political context that Australia is situated in relation to Shari'a and legal pluralism and is shaping its response. The issue of Shari'a first arose in the context of debate about Muslims adherence to "Australian values" and loyalty driven by the conservative government of John Howard (1996–2007) (see Chap. 10 on multicultural governance during the Howard era). In a speech to leaders of Australian Islamic schools the former Federal Education Minister Brendan Nelson stated that those who don't want to live by Australian values "can basically clear off" (in Hawley 2005). Echoes of similarly phrased public sentiment were a trademark feature of Howard government ministers throughout this period. Speaking in a 2006 speech to right wing think tank, the Sydney Institute, then-Australian Treasurer Peter Costello (2006) criticized a "mushy misguided multiculturalism" and stated:

There are countries that apply religious or Shari'a law Saudi Arabia and Iran come to mind. If a person wants to live under Shari'a law these are countries where they might feel at ease. But not Australia.

And the citizenship pledge should be a big flashing warning sign to those who want to live under Shari'a law. A person who does not acknowledge the supremacy of civil law laid down by democratic processes cannot truthfully take the pledge of allegiance. As such they do not meet the pre-condition for citizenship.

The Labor Government that took office in 2007 under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd sought to avoid the politicisation of Muslim community politics that occurred under the previous government (Roose 2010). In October 2009 however, a minor

controversy erupted when the honorary legal advisor to the Australian National Imams Council (ANIC), Hyder Gulam, called for recognition of Shari'a in a similar vein to Aboriginal customary law. Although supported at the grassroots by some in the community legal sector in Melbourne, this prompted a response from the Attorney-General Robert McClelland that "the Rudd Government is not considering and will not consider the introduction of any part of Shari'a into the Australian legal system" (in Zwart 2009). The legal profession appeared to move on irrespective of this proclamation when in May 2010 the firm at which Gulam worked appointed Sheikh Mohamadu Nawas Saleem Australia's first "Shari'a consultant" (Lawyers Weekly 2009).

The bipartisan rejection of legal pluralism was evident when Speaking in May 2010, prior to his election as Australian Prime Minister (from September 2013), Tony Abbott stated in a radio interview:

No, there's no way that we should have Shari'a law here, just as if I may say so, I think there is limited place for any traditional aboriginal law in our system of justice. You've got to have one system of justice for everyone [...].

These events—relatively minor in light of the controversies to come—reveal a resolute refusal to engage with the issue of Shari'a and legal pluralism by successive Australian Governments on both sides of the political spectrum.

6.4 The AFIC Controversy

In April 2011 the Australian Government called for submissions from the public, community groups and representative organisations to contribute to the formulation of Australia's multicultural policy. In response to this, the President of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC), Ikebal Patel (2011), wrote a submission to the inquiry titled *Embracing Muslim Values and Maintaining the Right to be Different*.

In the submission Patel (2011) attempted to address the critique of legal pluralism with reference to the work of both modern Muslim and Western non-Muslim scholars by arguing for the notion of "twin tolerations" proposed by Alfred Stepan (2000). These are "the minimum degree of toleration democracy needs from religion and the minimum degree of toleration that religion needs from the state for the polity to be democratic" (2011: 8). Patel argued further:

Muslims in Australia should accept the Australian values, and Australia should also provide a 'public sphere' for Muslims to practice their belief. It takes two to tango. This approach demands a compromise from Islam, which should be open to other values, and also to make a similar demand of Australia. It is not only Australian Muslims who should reconcile these identities, but also all Australians. (2011: 8)

Just over a month later when the submission was made public along with many others it was this submission that made national headlines and prompted an

immediate reproach from the Attorney-General. With no allusion to further dialogue Robert McClelland (in Karvelas 2011) stated:

As our citizenship pledge makes clear, coming to Australia means obeying Australian laws and upholding Australian values. Australia's brand of multiculturalism promotes integration. If there is any inconsistency between cultural values and the rule of law the Australian law wins out.

He would state further to this that there is “no place for Shari'a law in Australian society” (in Hole 2012). The level of political hostility to the AFIC submission forced Patel to immediately back away from his remarks and to reiterate the loyalty of Australian Muslims. In an interview shortly after, Patel would state his support for secularism, recognising Australia as a predominantly Christian country, claiming further:

I am a very strong believer in the separation of religion and state and at the same time I am a very strong believer in civil law—the Australian legal system—taking precedence [...]. I would have changed some words in retrospect, and the use of the word ‘Shari'a’ would have been taken out. (in Merritt 2011)

Less than a year later (and 4 days before the joint migration committee senate hearing on “the Inquiry into Multiculturalism in Australia”) the new Attorney-General Nicola Roxon would reiterate McClelland's earlier perspectives about Shari'a almost verbatim. In referring to an inheritance case involving a Muslim family before the courts of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Roxon (in Karvelas 2012a) would state: “There is no place for Shari'a law in Australian society and the Government strongly rejects any proposal for its introduction, including in relation to wills and succession”. Once again the Attorney-General made reference to the citizenship pledge (Karvelas 2012a), highlighting the belief that calls for Shari'a originate external to the nation. Speaking in 2012 the current Attorney-General George Brandis (in Karvelas 2012b) stated the primacy of Australian law:

The Coalition does not believe that sharia law should be accepted or recognised in Australia. It is logically possible for somebody to do something that is both consistent with Australian law and consistent with sharia principles. The question is: are they obedient to Australian law?

The recent history of Attorney-General statements on Shari'a from both sides of the political divide strongly suggest that irrespective of the appearance of dialogue through public inquiries, that the outcome in relation to Shari'a and legal pluralism was a foregone conclusion—it would not even be contemplated or engaged with on political grounds.

It is clear that at the level of national political discourse that government from both sides of politics have utilised political rhetoric about Australian values as a blunt instrument to reject Shari'a and legal pluralism. The more eloquent and sophisticated voices of former high ranking members of the judiciary, including former New South Wales Chief Justice Jim Spigelman (Merritt 2012) and former Australian High Court Chief Justice the Honourable Sir Gerald Brennan (2012), have similarly dismissed Shari'a publicly, claiming that no basis exists for its formal recognition and integration (on the role legal discourses in the extension of religious intolerance see, also, Chap. 3). Any attempt at dialogue (irrespective of its anecdotal

level of community support or opposition) has been immediately shut down by the government, with those proposing it castigated in the media and reminded of the conditional nature of their citizenship. Public debate is shut down, in a distinct contrast to the Habermasian notion of engagement between religious and non-religious groups in the public sphere (Hussain and Possamai 2013).

6.5 Sharia in Everyday Life: The Reality

Opposition to Shari'a and legal pluralism in Australia has been driven by the perception that accommodation poses a threat to Australian values, democracy and the secular nature of the legal system. National level political discourse is yet to move beyond a desultory good (us) versus bad (them) binary in which Shari'a must be rejected on the grounds of its argued incompatibility with Australian law. Parashar (2012: 576) argues that this debate has been carried out in an information vacuum about the actual practice of Shari'a and legal pluralism in Australia. While Black notes that there is a considerable variety of views across Australia's diverse Muslim communities, with the level of support for legal pluralism not known:

What is advocated seems to range from 'everything' to certain discrete aspects, notably family and inheritance, banking, finance and commerce, to 'nothing'. Views are diverse and sometimes divisive amongst Muslims just as amongst non-Muslims. (2012: 74)

The debate about Shari'a homogenises what is in effect an incredibly diverse, nuanced concept. A key authority on the Shari'a, Wael Hallaq argues that this is a point lost in contemporary debates:

Our language fails us in our endeavour to produce a representation of that history [of Islamic law] which not only spoke different languages (none of them English, not even in British India), but also articulated itself conceptually, socially, institutionally and culturally in manners and ways vastly different from those material and non-material cultures that produced modernity and its Western linguistic traditions'. (2009: 1)

In seeking to move beyond national political discourse about Shari'a it is important to understand the holistic nature of the concept and its role in the everyday life of Muslims and to build a base of knowledge about its practice at the everyday level. Shari'a is defined literally as "the path to the watering place" (Kamali 2008: 2), a metaphor in the desert culture of early Islam for achieving salvation. Abdullah Saeed (2006: 43) notes:

Shari'a represents the divine guidance contained in the revelation communicated to the Prophet in his sayings and deed (Sunna). In the context of Islamic law, Shari'a refers to the totality of this guidance contained in the Qur'an and Sunna and generally expressed in their commands and prohibitions.

Hallaq states importantly, that the Shari'a does not distinguish between law and morality (2009: 2), that they are in effect, one and the same. The practice of Islam and the Shari'a are hence inextricable from one another, bound together as they are in a moral code, and feature in the everyday life of Muslims, guiding familial and wider social relationships irrespective of the prevailing secular law. Prominent

Iranian scholar Hossein Nasr explores the holistic dimension of the Shari'a and Islam stating that:

Religion to a Muslim is essentially the Divine Law which includes not only universal moral principles but details of how a man should conduct his life and deal with his neighbour and with God; how he should eat, procreate and sleep; how he should see at the market-place; how he should pray and perform other acts of worship [...]. (1966: 95–6)

This extends to financial and business dealings, which should be undertaken ethically in line with principles spelt out in the Quran and Hadiths (practices of the Prophet). Given the all-encompassing nature of Islam and the Shari'a, it should come as no surprise, as Turner argues that “the sociological fact is that Shari'a is already operating in modern secular societies” (2011: 174).

Adherence to religious law is not unique to observant Muslims. Saeed (2008: 162) notes that religious laws can be found in all three of the monotheistic religions that trace their roots to Abraham: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. However, in Western contexts, he argues, “Muslim law is pushed into the realm of the unofficial, the extra-legal, the space of cultural practice or ethnic minority custom rather than as officially recognized law” (2006: 58). More recently Ann Black (2010: 65) has argued that Shari'a is the:

[...] dominant normative force in the lives of many Muslim Australians, however its operation and regulation is essentially underground. It is not subject to scrutiny by anyone other than its participants, nor is it subject to the protection of Australian laws and processes.

A failure to engage with shari'a as a powerful social factor shaping the lives of Australian Muslims may be politically convenient, yet constitutes a negative approach to governance.

6.6 Shari'a and Financial Opportunity: A Powerful Contrast

There exists a stark contrast between the political discourse surround Shari'a and legal pluralism and Shari'a-compliant Islamic finance in the Australian context. This was first noted by Black and Sadiq in 2011 when they argued:

It seems that Islamic banking and finance laws are 'good' Shari'a worthy of adoption, whilst personal status laws (marriage, divorce, separation, custody of children and inheritance) are not. (2011: 388)

Media analysis by Possamai et al. (2013) found that this was reflected in the Australian media over 4 years from 2008 to 2012, with financial Shari'a viewed in a very favourable light and the legal dimensions of Shari'a, in particular *Hadud* punishments represented extremely negatively.

At the level of national political discourse, it is worth noting that just months after the Attorney General's October 2009 statement that the Rudd Government would not consider the introduction of any part of Shari'a into the Australian legal system, the Australian Federal Agency, Austrade, released a detailed document

titled “Islamic Finance” (Australian Trade Commission 2010). This document states in its introduction:

Islamic finance is one of the fastest growing segments of the global financial services industry. Shari'a-compliant financial assets have been growing at over 10 per cent per annum over the past 10 years. Measured by Shariah-compliant assets of financial institutions, the global Islamic finance industry is estimated at US\$822 billion in 2009.

The document not only outlines specific opportunities for Islamic finance to become an “important element” in Australia’s aspirations to be a global financial centre, it actively markets the size of Australia’s Muslim population (it “exceeds the combined Muslim population of Hong Kong and Japan” and engages in great depth with various components of Shari'a compliant finance including *Muraabaha* (an alternative to interest), *Ijara* “similar to hire-purchase” and *Sukuk* “Shari'a compliant financial certificates of investment” (Australian Trade Commission 2010: 5–8).

In May 2010 the Assistant Treasurer Nick Sherry (2010) launched a book titled *Demystifying Islamic Finance—Correcting Misconceptions, Advancing Value Propositions*. Speaking at this event he stated:

We are taking a keen interest in ensuring there are no impediments to the development of Islamic finance in this country, to allow market forces to operate freely. This is in line with our commitment to foster an open and competitive financial system, and a socially inclusive environment for all Australians. We also recognise that Islamic finance has great potential for creating jobs and growth.

Importantly, in strong contrast to the stifling of debate about legal pluralism, Sherry (2010) called for greater dialogue:

Some of the issues of concern include open claims that Islamic finance is used to spread terrorism, that it is a vehicle to promote the world domination of Islam over other faiths, or that it is designed to replace conventional financing. So we have a challenge in front of us – and that is to continue the community dialogue, to increase awareness of the truth and to highlight the facts.

In October 2010 the Australian Government Board of Taxation released a discussion paper titled *Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance* to inform recommendations to ensure Islamic finance products “parity of tax treatment” with conventional finance products (2010: vii). This was followed in April 2013 when Bernie Ripoll, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer stated in a speech that the “Australian Government regards the introduction of Islamic finance products into the domestic market as a way to open our financial services sector—and our economy—to new opportunities for growth” (2013).

Work continues to be undertaken to make Australia “Islamically competitive”, with tight regulation slowing down the entry of Islamic banking and finance (Farrar 2011: 413). Irrespective of such constraints, Islamic financial institutions are breaking new ground in Australia. In February 2010 the Westpac Bank launched a commodity trading facility for overseas investors that operated according to Islamic principles (Johnston 2010). In March 2012 *The Australian* newspaper revealed that The National Australia Bank was considering selling over AU\$500 million in Islamic bonds (Henshaw 2012). In October 2012 Australian owned Islamic finance company

Crescent Wealth (whose advisory board features a variety of prominent non-Muslim Australians including Emeritus Professor Dianne Yerbury AO, Nicholas Whitlam and Ross Cameron) partnered with the “Bank of London and the Middle East” to create a portfolio of Shari’a compliant companies in which Muslims could invest (Crescent Wealth Press Release 2012). In December 2012 the same company launched an Islamic compliant superannuation option, potentially the first of its kind anywhere in the world. Speaking to the success of Crescent Finance is that in the June–September 2013 quarter, the company’s Australian Equity fund was the best performing in the country and rated by Bloomberg as the best-performing Islamic equities fund in the world for the same period (Rose 2013).

It is clear at both the level of political discourse and government flexibility in dealing with Shari’a that significant differences exist between legal pluralism and financial opportunity. It is also clear that there is “space” for Shari’a and that Australian legal frameworks are far more willing to make accommodations where a financial imperative exists to do so.

6.7 The Artificial Division of Shari’a

This chapter has sought to test this political discourse about the “genius of Australian multiculturalism”; and the Australian multiculturalism policy against an issue at the forefront of challenges facing multicultural societies: Shari’a and legal pluralism. It has revealed that political discourse about Shari’a and legal pluralism has been strictly one way, with proponents of legal pluralism effectively shut down in public debate. This appears to both support and contradict the government’s multicultural principles. The political rejection of Shari’a and legal pluralism on one hand appears supported by an emphasis on “national unit” in the first principle, but it does not reflect the emphasis on responsiveness to CALD (Culturally and Linguistically Diverse) communities outlined in the second principle of the Australian multicultural policy.

In contrast to the debate about Shari’a and legal pluralism, the Government has been overwhelmingly positive and receptive to the idea of Shari’a-compliant finance, publically supporting its introduction, positing the potential economic benefits, releasing publications designed to facilitate its entry into and development within the Australian market, and working with Australian and overseas based Muslims to assist the passage of Shari’a compliant measures through regulatory and legal frameworks. These activities appear to sit comfortably within the third principle of the multicultural policy, that of the potential for economic, trade and investment benefits.

The treatment of Shari’a then would not appear particularly inconsistent with Australia’s multicultural principles. At the level of political rhetoric and support multiculturalism has evolved significantly from a vision based on inclusion to one based on integration and economic growth.

6.8 Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Practice

It is argued here that the genesis of this division lies in the shift in Australia towards *neoliberal multiculturalism*. To do so we draw upon Kymlicka's (2013) work on the topic. As Kymlicka notes, the "first-wave" of neoliberals were critical of multicultural policies (MCPs) as an example of state intervention in the marketplace on behalf of special interests. More recently however, neoliberal actors have identified the potential for multiculturalism to integrate minorities into global markets, making them both effective and competitive actors (2013: 11–12):

[...] neoliberals have found a way to legitimize ethnicity, and to justify MCPs that shelter those ethnic projects, and to re-interpret these policies in line with neoliberalism's core ideas (enhancing economic competitiveness and innovation; shifting responsibility from the state to civil society; promoting decentralization; de-emphasizing national solidarity in favour of local bonds or transnational ties; viewing cultural diversity as an economic asset/commodity in a global market).

Walsh supports this sentiment in the Australian context, stating that "Australia presents a critical case for charting multiculturalism's relationship with neoliberal government" (2012: 281). Australian government policies on multiculturalism have long discussed the positive economic benefits that may come from diversity. In isolation, the enshrining of economic benefits in Australia's current multicultural policy arguably does not constitute a neoliberal shift. However it is in the selective practice of the multicultural principles that the shift is evident. When one component of an entire and holistic belief system—the economic dimension of Shari'a—is enthusiastically embraced by politicians, while the other—the cultural and civic—vehemently rejected without any attempt to engage with the concept, it may be argued that we are witnessing a key effect of neoliberal multiculturalism. As Kymlicka succinctly states:

Neoliberal multiculturalism for immigrants affirms—even valorises—ethnic immigrant entrepreneurship, strategic cosmopolitanism, and transnational commercial linkages and remittances, but silences debates on economic redistribution, racial inequality, unemployment, economic restructuring and labour rights. (2013:110)

In the Australian context, one might also add legal pluralism to this list. Kymlicka draws upon the work of anthropologist Charles Hale, who in writing about the origins of neoliberal multicultural policies in Latin America noted:

The great efficacy of neoliberal multiculturalism resides in powerful actors' ability to restructure the arena of political contention, driving a wedge between cultural rights and the assertion of the control over resources necessary for those rights to be realized. (2005: 13)

In effect, Australian Muslims have been denied the right to even talk publicly in the political arena about the cultural and legal dimensions of their faith. While at the academic level much has been written about Shari'a, any Muslim leader who dares to discuss legal pluralism publicly is placed at the centre of national media attention and lectured on respect for Australian values. In its treatment of Shari'a, the Australian Government's actions, irrespective of national proclamations and political rhetoric, signal a shift and a retreat from the original precepts of multiculturalism. Kymlicka states:

The original aims of multiculturalism—to build fairer terms of democratic citizenship within nation-states—have been replaced with the logic of diversity as a competitive asset for cosmopolitan market actors, indifferent to issues of racial hierarchy and structural inequality. (2013:14)

Walsh considers that this has played out in the Australian context:

[...] as a strategy for managing diverse immigration, the policy has undergone a veritable sea change from being framed within a national sociocultural context to a transnational economic context. (2012: 297)

We argue that we are seeing a vigorous assertion of neoliberal multiculturalism where the cultural dimension of ethnicity, or in this case, faith, is only so valuable in the political arena as the tangible economic benefits it can offer. The concept of legal pluralism and the accommodation of Shari'a in Australian courts, even if only the civil sphere in areas such as arbitration and dispute resolution offers no such economic benefits and will likely continue to remain unspeakable in contemporary political discourse.

6.9 Conclusion

This retreat from a multiculturalism concerned with accommodation of different minority communities and movement towards an Australian variant of neoliberal multiculturalism has a variety of potential implications yet to be engaged with adequately by scholars. As the evidence makes clear, one aspect of Shari'a will not simply cease because politicians say it does not exist. Shari'a is shaping the civic and social lives of many observant Australian Muslims and by extension, the wider Australian Muslim communities. This political discourse could, on one hand be deeply damaging to Muslim perceptions of their belonging and place in Australia. Multicultural policies may be seen as increasingly irrelevant amongst observant Muslims who may choose to insulate themselves against the extremes of contemporaneous debate and remove themselves from wider society, breaking down social cohesion and the development of trust, mutual respect and belonging with their non-Muslim neighbours. As Kymlicka (2013: 19–20) argues,

[...] multiculturalism is most effective when it attends both to people's citizenship status and to their market status. Either, on its own, may be inadequate. On the one hand, social liberal forms of multiculturalism may fail if they leave their intended beneficiaries excluded from effective market access [...]. On the other hand, neoliberal reforms that expose minorities to market reforms will also fail if minorities lack a robust citizenship standing that enables their effective political agency.

In another negative light, the lack of self-reflexivity and openness to dialogue at the political level may stunt the development of Australia's intellectual and social capital. Legitimate and strong cases both for and against legal pluralism exist and we do not argue for one or another here. However a refusal to engage with observant Muslims about this will ultimately only serve to undermine the preconditions for the

growth of collective intellectual development and social capital, including trust, dialogue and mutual respect and recognition. This lack of reflexivity and incapacity to grow intellectually and adapt to alternate cultures may work against Australia's national interests in the long term. Other nations, such as England, are actively seeking to cultivate the development of Islamic finance and enterprise. Speaking in October 2013, Boris Johnston, the Lord Mayor of London (the same city that faced devastating terrorist attacks in 2005 and subsequently in 2013 at Woolwich) went to remarkable lengths for any Western politician to win opportunities for his city, stating proudly his great-grandfather's Muslim faith and announcing a £100 million fund to encourage technological start-up companies from the Muslim world to move to London. This came shortly after the Prime Minister David Cameron announced a £200 million Muslim bond (Sukuk) and said that the London Stock Exchange would launch an Islamic Index alongside the FTSE (in Chorley 2013).

Kymlicka points out that local Muslim communities—or at least those individuals with the capital to do so—may embrace the opportunities of neoliberal multiculturalism, while maintaining their Islamic public identity. In referencing the experience of indigenous groups (such as the Maori in New Zealand) utilising neoliberal multiculturalism for self-empowerment it is noted:

The point, rather, is that where these democratic and decolonizing impulses have gained political recognition—where forms of multicultural citizenship are in place—then indigenous people are capable of taking advantage of neoliberal reforms to enhance their status as market actors, *and to use their enhanced status as market actors to further strengthen their ethnic projects of indigenous self-determination.* (Kymlicka 2013: 18)

This is seen in the case of Crescent Finance, which is forcing non-Muslim businesses to take them seriously and hence challenging negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims in the public sphere. This may have a flow down, “top-down” effect and empower Muslims, while providing impetus for some recognition of Shari'a in other legal and social contexts. Islam and Muslims, due to the holistic nature of the Shari'a, with its prescriptive economic, cultural social and legal dimensions, may in fact thrive in an Australian neoliberal multicultural environment as their status as market actors increases. Research utilising Australian Bureau of Statistics data between 2001 and 2011 by Peucker et al. (2014) suggests that we are seeing the emergence of educated and financially successful Muslim elites with the necessary capital to shape Australia's political trajectory. The extent to which these developments will benefit members of Australia's Muslim communities without such capital remains to be seen.

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Chapter 7

Multiculturalism and Education

Elizabeth Rata

Abstract This chapter examines the contemporary debate between supporters of culture-based education and the social realist argument for a curriculum that takes children away from the immediate world of experience, that is, “culture”. Arguing that the dilemma for a culture-based curriculum—and the multicultural politics of which it is a part—is that it excludes children of minority groups from the disciplinary knowledge which would afford them entry into the world of abstract, objective thought containing the potential for criticism of the very world from which the child comes. The argument also recognises, however, that a child’s experience may be an important *pedagogical* resource for entry into the world of disciplinary-based curricular knowledge.

Keywords Culture-based education • Multicultural education • Intercultural education • Social realism • Disciplinary knowledge • Enlightenment • Liberalism • Indigenous knowledges • Local knowledges • New Zealand • Biculturalism

The relationship between the individual, the ethnic or cultural community, and the broader society is a key theme in the debates about multicultural politics. It is an issue that surfaces in education with the problem of persistent under-achievement by some immigrant and indigenous minority groups in all education sectors. For example with respect to Maori and immigrants from the Pacific Islands in New Zealand, while “the participation rate in bachelors and higher qualifications has increased for all young people; Māori and Pasifika continue to participate at higher levels in non-degree qualifications and at lower levels in bachelors and higher qualifications” (Ministry of Education 2014: 45).

This chapter examines the contemporary debate between supporters of culture-based education on the one hand and the social realist argument on the other, with examples from New Zealand illustrating the various points of difference. Social realism argues for curricular knowledge that enables children to move away from the immediate world of experience, that is, “culture”, while at the same time recognising that the world of experience may serve as both a motivating and exemplifying

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pedagogical resource in this process. While both approaches support increasing access to educational achievement for children from disadvantaged minority groups they disagree about the cause of the under-achievement and how it is to be addressed. In the final decades of the twentieth century multicultural politics gained ascendancy because that approach was seen as the means to maintain both cultural communities and the integrity of the wider society. Its redistributive policies that targeted disadvantaged ethnic and indigenous groups included culture-based schooling. This was promoted as the means by which the symbolic resource “knowledge” could be more equitably distributed. This is illustrated by a recent early childhood study in New Zealand which showed how Maori sustainable ecological principles, in the main universal principles, could be incorporated into the curriculum (Ritchie 2013). Interestingly this study also illustrates the crucial point of difference between the two approaches. The cultural approach emphasises the location of sustainability in the intertwined whakapapa (genealogy) of the indigenous people and the land.

Since the turn of the century, there have been growing concerns about whether the recognition of difference reinforces, indeed creates, an essentialised difference that then becomes politicised. Critics of multicultural politics argue that the recognition of difference reifies race/ethnicity enabling boundaries to be built between social groups, with these divisions becoming fixed within government policies and practices. Such practices may be seen in the way on which the principle of the “Maori guardianship of knowledge”, promoted in New Zealand’s Tertiary Framework policy (Tertiary Framework 2003) affects research activity and accountability (Rata 2013). Research using Maori participants or on “a topic of particular interest to Maori” (University of Auckland’s Ethics Applicants’ Manual, 2009: 10) must seek prior agreement from the Maori community. The researcher’s tribal affiliation is also required.

The existence of an institutionalised ethnic category makes wider processes of integration increasingly more difficult. This has weakened the faith in multiculturalism as the political project to maintain modernity’s progressivism and social justice ideals. It is a loss of faith most markedly demonstrated in anthropologist Roger Sutton’s (2009) powerful reconsideration of “the contrast between progressivist public rhetoric about empowerment and self-determination and the raw evidence of a disastrous failure in major aspects of Australian Aboriginal affairs policy since the early 1970s” (2009: iii). In New Zealand the shift away from biculturalism (that country’s version of multiculturalism) is most vividly illustrated in the growing public objections to “co-governance” in local and national politics (NZCPR 2013).

The rejection of multiculturalism by politicians such as David Cameron in the UK and Angela Merkel in Germany (see also Chap. 3) is part of a shift back to the idea of the liberal social contract as the response to multiculturalism’s failure to balance the relationship between individuals and society—a focus found in the nationwide constitutional “conversation” held in New Zealand in 2013 (NZCPR 2013). In the classical liberal model, cultural and ethnic communities are seen as organisations of individuals who are free to join and to leave the group rather than an indivisible category of people with political interests ascribed to the group (on liberal multiculturalism see Chap. 4). The liberal model ascribes political status to the individual as a citizen,

rather than ascribing political rights to the group. That fundamental difference between the liberal idea of the voluntary membership of a particular community and the indivisible ethnic group recognised by multicultural politics is at the heart of the multiculturalism–liberal debate. The former is a political system for integrating people who do not share a common history, either in terms of cultural affiliation or genetic descent (i.e. race or ethnicity). The latter looks to the past for its membership criteria.

The intractable nature of the difference, however, does not mean that the initial problems that multiculturalism was designed to overcome have lost any of their potency. Those marginalised people who experience poverty, exclusion, discrimination, and educational failure are often indigenous and immigrant groups, recognisable by their ethnic identity and their cultural practices. Experiences of discrimination occur because of this difference. Ignoring the difference does not make the serious disadvantages experienced by groups and individual members of those groups disappear. Those problems remain and must be addressed for the sake both of the disadvantaged groups themselves but also to maintain the moral legitimacy of the democratic social contract. The social justice imperative that characterises multiculturalism is also a fundamental democratic ideal, one which suffers with the existence of marginalised and disadvantaged groups. It is in the interests of both types of politics to find equitable solutions to the relationship between the individual, the ethnic or cultural community, and the wider society. Indeed New Zealand's bicultural project was grounded in the moral imperative of redistributive politics. Former prime minister, Helen Clark, had expressed this imperative when she spoke of biculturalism as the way to the "good" society, based upon "the principles of justice, equity and partnership" (*New Zealand Herald*, 27 January 1995: 3). This is not a new problem for modern society of course. Indeed the discipline of sociology arose in response to explaining the basic questions of modernity: "what is the way in which the individual is embedded in wider groupings?" (Macfarlane 2002: 5). In the shift from the status relation of traditional societies to the contractual relationship of modern society, what forms of cohesion ensure that society maintains its integrity? The alternative is a fragmentation into historical social groups bounded by traditional ethnic and cultural ties.

From the late nineteenth century national education systems have played a major integrating role in the cohesion of modern societies (Ramirez and Boli 2007). New Zealand adopted a pragmatic approach. Its 1877 Education Act contained exemptions from compulsory schooling. Catholics who objected to the Protestant view of history could withdraw their children from History classes. Those Maori tribes that had fought against the colonial government were not compelled to send their children to school although by the turn of the twentieth century this exemption was no longer required as universal schooling became widely accepted.

By the 1970s however, the failure of those systems to include all groups equitably led to a loss of faith about whether education did provide equal opportunities or simply reproduced the disadvantages experienced by historically oppressed groups. For those on the Left who took the "cultural" turn, eschewing class analysis to focus on identity as the primary socio-political category, the answer to minority group

disadvantage was to be the politics of recognition, i.e. multiculturalism (Rata 2012a, b). Culturalists argued that the purpose of education should be to promote the identity of the oppressed group through culture-based schooling. The development of the kaupapa Maori education system in New Zealand is one example of this approach (Rata 2012a). Yet, even this system has failed to grow beyond a core of committed Maori. For example, numbers of kohanga reo—the early childhood Maori language centres based on kaupapa Maori philosophy—have declined rapidly from the peak of 767 in 1996 to 464 kohanga in 2009 (Education Counts 2009). The decrease has continued with enrolments down 2 % between 2012 and 2013 despite a 6.2 % increase in Maori early childhood at the same time (Education Counts 2013).

By the late 1990s, growing concern within the sociology of education emerged about whether culture-based education was, in fact, the solution to the persistent intergenerational under-achievement of minority ethnic and indigenous children. The concern contributed to the emergence of what is referred to broadly as the social realist approach (Maton and Moore 2010; Barrett and Rata 2014). This approach addressed two main questions: “what should be taught at school?” and “how could access to that knowledge be ensured for the children of the working-class and minority groups?”

Both social realists and cultural theorists address the same problem of minority group under-achievement, but explain the problem differently and provide quite different solutions. Culturalists argue that the purpose of schooling is to socialise children first into their ethnic, cultural, or indigenous group (Smith 1999). This provides the knowledge and primary socialisation that will afford the foundation for the child to enter the wider society. Social realists, on the other hand, argue that the purpose of schooling is to teach what cannot be taught at home or in the community. It is to teach the higher-order powerful knowledge developed in the disciplines of the arts, humanities, and sciences (Young and Muller 2013). As a distinctive approach in the contemporary sociology of education, social realism can be traced to the seminal works of Michael Young (1998, 2008), Rob Moore (2007, 2013) and Johan Muller (2000).

Drawing on the intellectual heritage of Emile Durkheim and Basil Bernstein (Moore 2013), social realists differentiate higher order or powerful knowledge from the social knowledge or culture of the family and local community, i.e. the knowledge acquired through experience. The first is referred to variously as disciplinary, scientific, objective, academic and esoteric, with the knowledge of experience also going by a number of referents including social knowledge, everyday, folk, doxic, commonsense, popular, or culture (Rata 2012a). Social realists argue that the purpose of schooling is to teach epistemic knowledge, the type of knowledge unavailable at home, certainly less available to those from working-class and minority group backgrounds. For example, Young argues that “schools are places where the world is treated as *an object of thought* and not as *a place of experience*” (2010a: 25). This is not to say that social realists are unaware of the importance of social knowledge, i.e. culture. Its importance is seen in that it is the means by which a child is socialised into his or her family and community. It is also the means for a community’s

cohesion. It is the knowledge that strengthens culture. This explains the purpose of culture-based education to the wider politics of multiculturalism; such education contributes to the group's distinctiveness thereby supporting its claim for recognition. In contrast, epistemic or disciplinary knowledge, through its universalism, objectivity and critical capacity, serves to challenge, and hence, change, culture. This goes against the imperative of multiculturalism which is to reinforce the distinctiveness of the ethnic group by reifying its immutable culture. For that reason multiculturalism and social realism are necessarily hostile in their understandings of the relationship between individuals, communities and society.

There are, however, some points of agreement. Both social realists and cultural theorists concur that disciplinary knowledge is produced within a socio-historical context. For the former knowledge becomes independent of that context, as a result of its generative principles and concepts and through procedures of scrutiny and critique (see for example, Moore 2007; Young 2008). The debate between the two approaches centres on that notion of the separation of "text" from "context". For cultural theorists the social basis of knowledge means that knowledge remains tied to the knower. It is, therefore, always subjective and in the interests of the "knowers"; always from the standpoint of the knowledge "producer" (Maton and Moore 2010). In contrast, social realists, argue that knowledge can become separated from its producer and from the context within which it is produced, and is therefore objective and universal. This process of separation is traced to Emile Durkheim's differentiation between the "sacred" as the collective representations of an internally consistent world of concepts and the "profane" or everyday world of practical activities (Muller 2000; Moore 2013). According to Durkheim (1983: 86):

In the history of human thought there are two kinds of mutually contrasting truths, namely, mythological and scientific truths. In the first type, all truth is a body of propositions which are accepted without verification, as against scientific truths, which are always subjected to testing or demonstration.

In this understanding, culture is, like science, a symbolic order of collective representations, but it is not, as with science, knowledge separated from its producers. Whereas cultural knowledge remains connected to the social community in order to serve socialising and cohesive functions, science has developed within disciplinary communities in order to *change* society by developing new understandings and by standing in a critical relation to the socio-political order. It is these disciplinary communities that establish the conditions, thereby objectifying and universalising the knowledge. The sociality of knowledge is developed within social and historical conditions with the knowledge objectified through the use of disciplinary concepts and procedures. Indeed objectification is the mechanism by which knowledge is separated from its producing conditions, thereby to exist as a material "product". Crucially the knowledge "object" can be universalised, and made available to all people regardless of the time in which they live and the culture into which they were born. In other words, the objectified knowledge is no longer "culture" but "science". It is also significant that the processes of separation, objectification, and universalisation that enable science are authorised, not by the scientist who creates

the knowledge and is socially located, but by disciplinary concepts and procedures of scrutiny and criticism.

The cultural-based approach to education understands the purpose of education differently from the social realists. The concept of localised “knowledges”, also referred to as voice discourses and standpoint approaches (Moore and Muller 2010), conflates the knower with the known and rejects the concepts of objectivity and universalism. Indeed an indigenous theorist refers to objectivity as dehumanising (Smith 1999). The development of various forms of localised epistemologies such as “red knowledge” (Grande 2004), kaupapa Maori knowledge (Smith 1999), Africana knowledge, and “Southern knowledge” (Connell 2007) provides the theoretical justification for culture-based schooling. It also contributes the intellectual rationale for the distinctive “voice” of the ethnicised group to be recognised as the authority for the knowledge created by this “voice”. The concept of the “Other” is central to this process in that it creates the essential character of the ethnic or indigenous group as distinctive and separate from all other groups.

In order to establish the theoretical “Other”, scientific or disciplinary knowledge is positioned in relation to ethnic or indigenous knowledges; that is, science is also conceptualised as cultural knowledge with its potential to serve as the ideology of its respective cultural group. In the case of science, because this type of disciplinary knowledge was first developed in the West, the knowledge is understood by post-colonial or culturalist writers as “Western” knowledge (e.g. Connell 2007). In this approach each group’s knowledge is relative to that of any other group—to be judged only within its own terms and not according to a universal standard. According to cultural theorists, all knowledge is the knowledge of the group which developed the knowledge. It remains linked to that group’s social and historical circumstances so cannot be known and judged by the “Other”.

These group “knowledges” or voice discourses stand in opposition to the knowledge of the group’s historical political opponents. Hence, in New Zealand for example, kaupapa Maori knowledge is positioned in opposition to Western knowledge, understood as the knowledge of the coloniser (Hoskins and Jones 2012). This is the logic justifying culture-based education such as the kaupapa Maori system. Its purpose is to decolonise the indigenous group in order for that group to recognise its distinctiveness, and following from that, to position its political voice in that distinctiveness—in the politics of difference. For this reason, the kaupapa Maori system must retain and develop its separateness given that the rationale for its existence is that it is essentially different. In this way, culture-based education promotes a particular relationship between the individual and society with the individual understood in terms of that person’s group membership.

One of the issues for writers in the modern period, including early ones such as Immanuel Kant ([1781] 1993), Hegel ([1820] 1967) John Stuart Mill ([1859] 1985), Emile Durkheim (1956) and Antonio Gramsci (in Muller 2000) was to explain the role of education in the individualisation that is the characteristic feature of modernity (Friedman 1994, 2000). Kant used the phrase “the strife of the dialectic” ([1781] 1993: 488) to describe the existentialist position whereby children are turned to face the world to engage as free thinkers but at the same time remain linked affectively

to their families and communities. He called this strife “a necessity of reason” regarding critical thinking as impossible without the faculty to objectify and criticise one’s own circumstances—the first political act of the free person. Crucially this makes knowledge always political because the critical faculty is an act of self-authorisation. No longer bound by the liturgies of the priest, patriarch, and politician, the critical individual is the author of his or her own thought (Kant [1784] 1990).

From this contradictory position, the individual is able to mediate the relationship between the world and the family through the development of his or her own identity as a separate and autonomous individual. This is the person who is simultaneously attached to, and separated from, the kin or ethnic group. Such partial loyalty (Rata 2012a, b) makes possible the idea of a common universal humanity as well as the possibility of reflexive objective thought—fundamental features of modernity. The child is able to move outside the confined world of the particular where learning is based on experience to the world where experience is treated as an object of thought (Young 2010b). The school’s role is to enable this separation, not to enlarge the experiential world of the family and community as is the case for cultural-based education. Hegel also saw education as the means to take the individual beyond the immediate world of the family and community, saying that

[...] education bears upon the child’s capacity to become a member of society. In its character as the universal family [...] society’s right here is paramount over the arbitrary and contingent preferences of parents. (Hegel [1820] 1967: 148, paragraph 239)

Despite the tendency by contemporary cultural theorists to claim that Western writers position the individual and society in opposition (Smith 1999), early modern writers about society were well aware that “no man is an island”. John Donne had made that clear in the late eighteenth century. John Stuart Mill also understood that individuals must become social if the liberal idea of the social contract was to be viable. Like Kant and Hegel, schooling was to involve taking children out of the immediate kinship circle, out of the world of the particular and the local. Mill talked about education,

[...] taking them [i.e. children] out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns—habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another. ([1859] 1985: 181)

But how was Kant’s dialectic individual–societal relation to be achieved? To answer this question, social realists turned to the ideas of Emile Durkheim, whose central concern was with the nature of the social. Sherwood D. Fox, in his introduction to the 1956 edition of Durkheim’s *Education and Sociology*, points out that Durkheim’s analysis of education contains the foundation of his sociological realist position on the *mutually constructive relationship of society and the individual* (my italics); for Durkheim, “it is possible to individualize while socializing” (Fox in Durkheim 1956: 33). Individualising was essential because while knowledge is developed within communities of thinkers, it is the individual who thinks. But this is not the lone scientist who must generate ideas in isolation. It is in the sociality of

the canon that collective representations of a discipline are generated. According to Durkheim (1995: 15),

Collective representations are the product of immense cooperation that extends not only in space but also through time; to make them, a multitudes of different minds have associated, intermixed, and combined their experience and knowledge. A very special intellectuality that is infinitely richer and more complex than that of the individual is distilled in them.

Individuals become socialised as thinkers within the sociality of knowledge. The fact that the induction into epistemic communities occurs in a very social place—the school—is of immense significance. In culture-based schools the child is re-socialised into the knowledge of the group’s culture and into social relations with his or her primary community. In schools that serve the nation-state and its contractual society, the child is socialised into two different orders; first into the sociality of knowledge that comes from disciplinary communities; second, into the social relations of other people who are also entering this epistemic community. The child at school meets others who are there, not because they are related in kinship or belong to the same ethnic or indigenous group, but because they are being socialised into a new modern community; the universal community envisaged by Enlightenment thinkers. Entering this wider world, however, requires the capacity to think in abstract, objective ways. According to Gramsci, this was the job of the school,

[...] to accustom [the students] to reason, to think abstractly and schematically while remaining able to plunge back from abstraction into real and immediate life, to see in each fact or datum what is general and what is particular, to distinguish the concept from the particular instance. (1986: 38 in Muller 2000:7–8)

Without the ability to think in abstract ways, the child is confined to the world of immediate experience, unable to conceptualise that experience objectively and therefore criticise and change it and unable to enter social worlds that are not known from experience. The school should be subversive of culture because it offers a way out of the immediate by providing the means by which the immediate can be objectified. The act of objectification is the act of separation. It is the alien world of the school, alien in that it is different from the home. Yet the child must also be attached to the particular because that world is the place of primary socialisation.

This is a central problem for schooling, one that affects children from the working-class and minority groups particularly; how to cross into the alien world of the school. Sufficient links exist between home and school for the middle-class child to enter into the “strife of the dialectic” which regulates the relationship between the particular and the universal. Yet working-class and minority students are confronted with two distinct worlds (Bernstein 2000). According to social realists who draw on the ideas of Basil Bernstein in tackling this issue (Moore 2013), the task of schooling must include a pedagogy that provides a link (Young 2010b; Young and Muller 2010; Morais and Neves 2011; McPhail 2012, 2013) between the two worlds while at the same time *interrupting* the relationship between those worlds. While culture-based schooling is equally concerned with the alienation of the minority child, the solution is to make the school an extension of the home. Social realists object to this arguing that while it solves the alienation problem it

creates a greater one. Young people who are denied access to powerful disciplinary knowledge are denied the means to move beyond experience.

This dilemma creates a formidable pedagogical task. When students have not encountered abstract knowledge, teachers have a double pedagogical challenge, one that requires that “clear conceptual map” (Winch 2013: 138) if the challenge is to be met. They must introduce the child to a new form of cognitive activity, one in which abstractions, represented by the symbols of literacy and numeracy, are the starting point. If these symbols are not found in the child’s experience, as may occur especially with working-class and disadvantaged children, the process can be bewildering and even alienating (Bernstein 2000; Bourdieu 2004). And yet, if the first levels of abstract thought and their symbolic representations are not understood, it is unlikely that the child will be able to progress to the next levels (Vygotksy 1962).

Vygotksy (1962: 85), however, recognised that, although the spontaneous of the everyday world and scientific concepts are distinct from each other, they are also “related and constantly influence each other”. This complex relationship may well be the pedagogic site for mediation between the context-dependent knowledge of students’ experience and the context-independent knowledge of the academic subject. It is important to note however, that Vygotksy (1962) maintained his emphasis on the importance of instruction. Accordingly, “school instruction induces the generalising kind of perception and thus plays a decisive role in making the child conscious of his own mental processes” (1962: 92). Referring to his research which found that instruction usually precedes development (1962: 101), Vygotksy described “processes of instruction” (as) “awaken(ing) and direct(ing) a system of processes in the child’s mind” (1962: 102), leading to his conclusion that “the only good kind of instruction is that which marches ahead of development and leads it” (1962: 104).

A pedagogy that recognises the need to motivate students may well acknowledge a place for students’ experience but by using that experience to illustrate the abstract ideas already introduced in the academic subjects. *This is not the same as starting with experience or as using experience as the source of knowledge itself which is the approach taken by cultural-based education.* Vygotksy justifies including a student’s “meaning-making” in his understanding of the nature of the relationship between experience and scientific concepts as one that “allows for both a universalising form of knowledge and the constitutive development of local meaning-making” (Derry 2014: 11). He insists, however, on the primacy of direct instruction in academic concepts. This point is important for social realist theorists who advocate for a “powerful knowledge” curriculum but one that also has an engaging pedagogy and a progressive social justice purpose (Maton and Moore 2010; Young and Muller 2013; Barrett and Rata 2014).

The “strife of the dialectic” offers individuals the means to be partially loyal to one’s ancestral group and partially loyal to those one does not know. In contrast, children who have no way out of the immediate group are left in the binaries of self and other, colonised and coloniser, ethnic and “Western”. These reified and ahistorical categories confine young people to the world of experience and deny them the means to transcend the limits of culture. In addition they are denied the means with which to criticise and change the localised world of experience, i.e. culture, and the

means to enter the culture of modernity. This is the way of thinking and being that is the means by which the alienation between the particular and the universal may be overcome. In contrast, education systems that use disciplinary knowledge liberate students, not only by what is taught but because what is taught “liberates the person from the limitations of the present and the particular” (Bailey 1984: 20) and provides the means to accommodate the strife of the dialectic that is the existential condition of modernity.

Democratic politics can accommodate the dissent that results from critical thinking because the political system itself operates on that dialectic of strife. In the case of democracy that dialectic arises from the structural contradictions in each of the three elements of the democracy regime. The first element, the nation, is an imaginary that contains the idea of continuity but has a population who do not share a common past. Second, the state, the nation’s regulatory framework is simultaneously the capitalist state producing inequality and the democratic state, regulating equality. The third element, the citizen, also contains these intrinsic contradictions—the citizen is simultaneously the unequal worker and the equal subject. Lacking this structural dialectic, traditional groups must either maintain total loyalty or fragment.

Children in the education systems of democratic nations can be educated into the type of knowledge that changes the world. They will enter a democratic politics that has the strife of the dialectic just as they will acquire this way of being as their own existential condition. Abstract thinking not only provides the intellectual tools of objectification and criticism, but it provides a social community—a “culture” but one unlike the kinship or ethnic culture of groups that draws on the past for their cohesion. The knowledge “culture” is future-oriented, universal, and inclusive. It is based on disciplines that allow us to see the world in new, previously unthinkable ways. Having access to this world brings the child into the sociality of knowledge; into a way of thinking that, because it is based on provisional thinking, cannot offer the guarantee of stability that traditionalism offers. As compensation, it offers access to the unthinkable, to the “not-yet thought”, and does so from a foundation in the “coalitions of minds” (Collins 2000: 7). This is the knowledge built up over centuries through the cooperative endeavours of individuals working in social contexts and relating to other individuals according to the social mores of the discipline’s procedures:

The guiding ideas elaborated by our civilization are collective ideas that must be transmitted to the child, because he would not know, how to elaborate them alone. One does not recreate science through one’s own personal experience, because it is social and not individual; one learns it. (Durkheim 1956: 48)

Durkheim’s ideas speak of the latent philosophy in the disciplines as “a system of cardinal notions which sum up the most characteristics of things as we conceive them, and which govern their interpretation”. He calls this philosophy “the product of the cumulative work of generations, that must be transmitted to the child, because it constitutes the very framework of the intelligence” (1956: 50). This is the universal knowledge inheritance most vividly captured in Bourdieu’s phrase: “A twenty-year-old mathematician can have twenty centuries of mathematics in his mind” (Bourdieu 2004: 40). The task for education is to include the children of minority

groups in this inheritance, knowing that entering into the world of abstract, objective thought contains the potential for criticism of the very world from which the child comes. This is the dilemma, not only for culture-based schooling, but for the multicultural politics of which it is a part.

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Chapter 8

“The Only Blonde in the Playground”: School Choice and the Multicultural Imaginary

Georgina Tsolidis

Abstract The title of this chapter draws on a comment made by a colleague explaining her choice to leave inner city Melbourne and move to a country town. She did not want her son to be the “only blonde in the [school] playground”. Unlike many suburbs of Melbourne that are home to large ethnic minority communities (commonly not blonde), regional Victoria is imagined ‘white’. This evocative comment is taken as a starting point for an exploration of how markets and school choice intersect with cultural difference to make some schools more or less desirable in the public imagination. Current debates in the press about which students have access to sought-after Government schools are drawn on to illustrate the salience of ethnicity in representations of schools and their communities and the impact of this on decision-making about school choice. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of heterotopian space, the argument is made that with regard to the constitution of a “good” school, some ethnicities are seen as more valuable than others because they achieve good results. However, if high-achieving “non-white” students are seen as “taking over” a school this can shift the balance the other way.

Keywords Multiculturalism • Marketisation • White flight • Racism • School choice • Heterotopia • Whiteness

School markets have become entrenched in Australia and this approach to education enjoys the support of conservative and less conservative governments alike. Market forces are coupled with increased accountability and transparency measures. These measures, it is argued, are a critical way of providing parents with information that will allow them to make informed choices when selecting schools. The process allows for supply and demand to instigate change because the community will recognise underperforming schools and vote with their feet, thus forcing schools, on pain of closure, to change their approach. This market logic assumes choice, and yet for many families exercising choice may not be possible. The ability to choose

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schools and the basis for selection of schools remains a complex issue responsive to a range of factors including class and ethnicity.

The impact of marketisation is dramatic within the government sector, where a form of self-sustaining residualisation has emerged. Some government schools manage to perform at similar levels to those achieved by elite non-government schools. These performance levels are linked to “creaming”; that is, using different means of attracting the types of students likely to do well academically. In turn, these students create a culture of success that reinforces itself because these schools attract more applicants than they can accommodate and thus are able to select students on their own terms. In this way, choice becomes the prerogative of the schools rather than the families. Applicants need to pass tests to enter such schools or make a case as to why they will be good for the school, for example, through their musical prowess. The corollary of this dynamic is that other government schools are often constructed as “safety nets” for families that cannot exercise choice and in this way become associated with students less likely to succeed. This binary between “good” and “bad” schools, once set up, becomes self-fulfilling and entrenched.

Given the premium attached to education, it is not surprising that high-performing government schools are sought after. For many families that cannot afford the high fees charged by elite independent schools, high performing government schools provide an important opportunity for upward social mobility. There is ready debate about the types of families that access these schools. Some commentators argue that the middle class has the cultural capital required to get their children into these schools because of their existing social networks that inform them of entry requirements. Similarly they can afford to ready their children for entry by providing music lessons or coaching for entry examinations. The middle class can afford to live in the areas where these schools are located, and, importantly, the middle class has aspirations and understands and values education as a means of attaining these (Teese 2007; Campbell et al. 2009). Yet the argument that it is mainly middle class families that access high-performing government schools needs to be further examined. Implicit is the assumption that working class families are somehow less motivated to enter university and do not have requisite knowledge about how best to do so. This debate also raises the hoary issue of how ‘working class’ is constituted and its relationship to factors such as, “race”/ethnicity and gender. These factors intersect and in so doing challenge taken for granted assumptions about who has high educational aspirations and achievements (Goyette 2008; Ball et al. 2011; Bodovski 2010).

In this chapter access to high-performing government schools will be considered in relation to racialised minorities, and the recent commentary that these groups are “taking over” such schools. In particular, Chinese and Indian students are seen as displacing “white” students, whose parents go on to pay the high fees required by elite independent schools. This has prompted some commentators to ask whether this “white flight” precipitates a form of quarantine in independent schools (Mavisakalyan 2012). These minorities are also seen as shifting the school ethos away from western models of liberal education (an extension of this debate is considered in Chap. 7). Thus, even when minority students perform well academically,

they are judged to be bad for other students. The relationship between school choice, class and ethnicity is a particularly pertinent issue given Australia’s history of migration. This relationship is important because a strong motivation for settling in the country has been the educational aspirations that parents have for their children.

School choice debates have the potential to tell us about racism and how communities are imagined. It is in this sense, that this topic becomes the canary in the multicultural mine. If parents feel uncomfortable about their child being “the only blonde in the playground” what does this tell us about social cohesion more generally? (see Chap. 12 on race hierarchies and social cohesion in Australian multiculturalism). Debates about imagined community (Anderson 1991) and the role of schools in their constitution, draw attention to the value of whiteness. For some parents, paying expensive fees to enter “quarantined” independent schools or moving out of the cosmopolitan city to a rural town imagined as culturally homogeneous, seems worth the price. This opens the lid on the role of schooling vis-à-vis multiculturalism. In the past, schools were understood to enact multiculturalism through social cohesion policies directed at all students (Tsolidis 2008). With the dominance of market forces, there is the possibility that school choice has become ethnicised and that this overlay has lain bare who we constitute as part of our community (on the intersection of market forces and multiculturalism see Chap. 6). School choice, markets and cultural difference will be explored with reference to policy introduced by the Australian federal Labor Government along with debates in the press about “white flight”. These explorations are framed using Foucault’s notion of heterotopian space.

8.1 Government Schools as Heterotopias

In his influential lecture “Of Other Spaces” (1986) Foucault differentiates utopias and heterotopias. He argues that utopias are unreal because they represent an ideal or perfected form of society. By contrast heterotopias exist within society but remain contested and are characterised by their capacity to capture multiple representations simultaneously. He argues that;

The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986: 25)

Foucault illustrates this point by example of the cinema. Through a flat screen placed in a rectangular room, a myriad of different, incompatible places are brought into the same space and experienced by those within it. Foucault also suggests that heterotopias occupy a space between all other places. At one extreme heterotopian space is illusory and evokes another place of desire. At, the other extreme, heterotopian space is compensatory because it seeks to impose order onto an existing landscape understood as chaotic. Between utopias and heterotopias, there are mirrors. Foucault describes the mirror as both virtual and real. It offers a “placeless place”, and because of this placelessness the mirror remains utopian. A mirror however is

also real, and by looking into it we can see ourselves against the position we occupy. We are at once real where we stand, while looking at ourselves standing somewhere else. In this sense the mirror is heterotopian because it captures multiple representations—the here and the there—a simultaneous presence and absence.

In a similar fashion government schools are heterotopian; they capture multiple representations of what a school should be. It is anticipated that these schools, regardless of their resources, can provide all students with the opportunity to succeed, irrespective of the students' background and needs. There is an ideal that students from government schools should be able to achieve the marks necessary to enter prestigious universities alongside students who have attended elite independent schools. Schools as heterotopian spaces are also intended to capture cultural difference and through policies informed by multiculturalism, work towards social cohesion. There is an illusion that a sense of respect for, and exposure to, diversity exists and benefits all students, and at the same time there is an imposition of order through teaching that inculcates a sense of national belonging framed through dominant discourses. In this sense government schools are part of the paradox of liberalism whereby respect for difference is eulogised, but not to the point where dominant institutional practices, including those that constitute Australianness are destabilised (Tsolidis 2010, 2011).

8.2 Marketing a False Sense of Order

School choice is strongly associated with neoliberalism and the concomitant shrinking of government. Privatisation and the imperatives of the market are intended to provide “the consumer” with the capacity to choose, including, in its most extreme form, through voucher systems. Choice is said to create good schools because it links to market forces of supply and demand and makes schools responsive to what parents want for their children. In Australia, government and non-government schools are presented on *My School*; a public website that brings together critical information on all schools, including centrally administered student test scores related to literacy and numeracy (referred to with the acronym “NAPLAN”). This is intended to supply parents with information that will inform their decision-making. While this style of public review of schools is associated with conservative governments, in Australia *My School* was established and championed by the Labor Party (representing the left of the political spectrum in Australia), with the then Minister for Education, Julia Gillard, stating that it would promulgate reform (AAP 2010)—this, despite strong opposition to the website from teacher unions and some principal and parent groups.

The *My School* website provides information on 10,000 Australian government and non-government schools. The first version of the controversial website was criticised because it did not provide enough context that may go some way to explaining discrepancies between schools. In particular there was concern about the amount of information that was provided on the socioeconomic status of school

communities and financial information, particularly for non-government schools, which would shed light on differential resourcing (Bonner 2010). The website was re-launched in 2011 and made responsive to a new Index of Community Socio-Economic Educational Advantage (ICSEA). This allows schools to be compared in relation to “students from statistically similar backgrounds” (ACARA 2011). The new ICSEA also included information on the proportions of students from a “language background other than English” along with the previously included information on remoteness and indigeneity.

Many who were wary of this initiative were concerned that a culture of “teaching to tests” would proliferate, and that those students deemed likely to jeopardise the overall school score would be excluded from high performing schools, thus feeding the polarisation between “good” and “bad” schools (Leslie 2010). This shedding of students likely to bring down averages would be accompanied by attempts to attract students seen as most likely to achieve high scores. There are indications that these fears were warranted. Recent research suggests that, amongst other things, curriculum and pedagogy has been shaped by this testing system, the results of which shape the character of schools in the public imagination (Dulfer et al. 2012). Marketisation, school choice and the ranking of schools and students, makes the pre-emptive judgment about a student’s capacity to perform on high-stake testing increasingly significant. The emphasis on representing good performance is so intense that schools use various means to regulate their image, including controlling which students sit for relevant tests (Barrett and Minus 2010; Maguire et al. 2011; Ravich 2010). Students for whom English is a second language and those considered to have a learning disability are amongst these (Topsfield 2010; Dulfer et al. 2012).

8.3 High Performing Government Schools: Unreal Utopias?

The *My School* website provides information on schools, including results for literacy and numeracy tests. The literacy and numeracy tests that distribute students and schools along league tables are intended to place order over chaos. In Foucault’s terms these function as the mirror that allows us to see ourselves here, in the place where we are, and there, in the place where we want to be. In this way the *My School* website becomes a “placeless place” with very real consequences for students and their families. Providing a sense of order on a diverse range of schools through the *My School* website is likely to affect government schools more than non-government schools because the public’s perception of particular government schools can create huge demand for some and threaten the viability of others. The *My School* website produces an imaginary whereby government schools are judged as though it is the curriculum or the pedagogy that produces good results, when it is more likely that these results are the product of pre-emptive judgment about the types of students most likely to compete well on high-stake testing. Establishing this potential in students is commonly, but not solely, done through entry testing.

Government schools that are select entry achieve some of the best school examination results, sometimes out-performing elite independent schools. In Victoria, for example, Mac.Robinson Girls School consistently achieves the highest VCE results of all Victorian schools (Leung 2006). In 2011 it was again ranked number 1, a feat the Principal attributed to the hard work of staff and students, rather than the fact that the school has a selective cohort (Mac.Roberston Newsletter, Dec 2011). Other government schools, which are not formally select entry, also achieve strong results. Much like select entry schools, these are notoriously difficult for prospective families to access. High demand for entry is managed through testing for accelerated programmes, commonly in the sciences; policing the boundaries of unpredictable school zones; and specialised curriculum pathways, such as music and language curriculum, understood to identify students with aptitudes for academic success. Real estate agents use such schools to leverage the sale of properties in their zones. The demand for housing stock near these schools is so high that couples will begin to seek properties on the birth of their first child. Families will misrepresent where they live so that their child can attend the school. Enrolling students likely to succeed is coupled with strategies to exit students who are deemed a risk. Strong counselling, pressure to perform and a limited curriculum often work to discourage certain types of students (Tsolidis 2006). Getting a child into a select-entry or high performing government school occupies parents over long periods of time. Those who have not managed to acquire property in the relevant school zone turn their attention to subject selection and preparing their children for the entry examinations, including through coaching.

There is an interesting paradox developing as some government schools—deemed most desirable because of student achievement—are simultaneously becoming less favoured by some parents, because they enrol large numbers of “Asian” students. Unlike “white flight” whereby parents flee because they fear racialised students will lower academic standards, here we have a situation where parents flee because of high-achieving students, particularly Chinese and Indian students, who are represented as a threat to the school ethos. The fact that parents flee to expensive independent schools brings home that this is a debate about who accesses limited resources—relatively inexpensive government schools that achieve excellent academic results—as much as it is a debate about the character of the schools these parents want their children to attend. This argument will be illustrated through press commentary below and then discussed further in relation to what is constituted as a desirable school ethos.

8.4 The Colour of Good Results

“New arrivals chase a place at the top” (Milburn 2010) was the title of a newspaper article in which the author described the scene outside the hall where hundreds of students were waiting to sit the examination that would determine whether they could enter one of the four Victorian select-entry government secondary colleges.

These students were described as “mostly Asian”, migrants whose families had moved to provide children with a better education and more opportunities in life. The article states that some students, again “mostly Asian”, travel for 2 h in order to attend such schools. Other high-performing government schools are also described in this article as “Asianised”. A real-estate agent is quoted stating that Chinese families are outbidding others and buying properties near these schools with the result that the percentage of sales to Chinese families has increased from 30 to 50 in 10 years. Representatives of coaching colleges are quoted stating that 75 % of their clients are “Asian”. The explanation provided by the journalist is that migrants have high aspirations and work hard to achieve these.

In 2010 newspapers ran articles with the following headings “Segregation in the school system” (Patty 2010) and “Top school’s secret weapon: 95 % of students of migrant heritage” (Patty and Stevenson 2010). In these articles journalists assure us that this was not a debate about biology or race, nor one about who deserves to attend high performing government schools. This is about “a clash of cultural attitudes about the purpose of schooling” (Patty 2010).

In 2011 there were press reports (Milburn 2011) on research conducted by Ho (2011) that made a link between the visibility of Chinese and Indian students at high performing government schools to “white flight”. Ho argues that most students at select entry government schools are from China and India and other Asian backgrounds. Ninety-three per cent of students at Mac.Roberston Girls School and 88 % of boys at Melbourne High School are described as having a language background other than English and are “mostly Asian”. Similar figures are given for Sydney. These high percentages are contrasted to the fact that only 8 % of the Australian population “speak an Asian language at home”. Drawing on Ho’s research the newspaper article states that the sheer number of “Asian” students makes these schools unattractive to other parents. Ho (2011) is quoted as stating;

The ‘white flight’ from these schools must partly reflect an unwillingness to send children to schools dominated by migrant-background children, which simply further entrenches this domination.

The Principal of Melbourne High School, Mr Ludowyke is quoted as affirming the diversity at his school. He comments;

Melbourne High and Mac.Rob have played a pivotal role in providing opportunities for newly arrived migrant communities. They’re part of the success story of multiculturalism in Melbourne. (quoted in Milburn 2011).

8.5 “Tiger Mothers” and the Need to Be Human

In these articles attention is drawn to the clash between what parents want for the children and how they understand the role of education. There is concern that overly ambitious parents drive their children to such extremes that the bar has been raised beyond the grasp of other students who wish to live well-balanced lives. This image

of Asian students as over-zealous has been fed most recently by the publicity given to the notion of the “Tiger Mother” after the publication of Chua’s book (2011). In 2011 *The Australian* newspaper published an article titled, “Tiger mums not good for human children” (Soutphommasane 2011). This drew on a Chua’s book explaining the difference between western and Chinese or Tiger mothers. Tiger mothers discipline their children, which results in their high achievements. This discipline is represented as “tough love” and good academic results are the product. Soutphommasane (2011) states;

In any case, excellence shouldn’t be understood crudely in terms of the rote learning of musical pieces and university entrance scores. It matters that we should nurture a love of knowledge (or music) for its own sake. It matters that we should equip children to express their individuality.

The view that “Asian” students are driven to excel academically at the expense of being “human” is promulgated in most of the newspaper articles referred to here. With reference to select-entry and high performing government schooling, the argument is that a high percentage of students with these values threaten the culture of a school premised on the virtues of an all-rounded liberal education. This has been made evident by the introduction of a range of measures at Melbourne High School intended to mitigate against the idea that good marks are all that matter. According to the Principal these measures are designed to challenge the image of his school as a “hot-house for swots” and to address “a problem with parents pressuring their sons to drop out of sport and other co-curricular activities to focus on study” (Milburn 2010). The school has also relaxed entry requirements, admitting some students on the basis of strong performance in areas such as sport or community service at the Year 10 level. The Principal stated that he was trying to convince parents that students’ involvement in a range of activities enhanced their academic performance.

This newspaper commentary on high performing government schools and “Asian” students raises several important issues. The form of “white flight” referred to is not linked to the perception that minority students will lower academic standards. On the contrary these students are considered to be academically successful to the point where the nature of what is constructed as a desirable school ethos is jeopardised. So much so, that some parents are choosing to pay much higher fees so that their children can attend elite independent schools instead. The desired school ethos is linked to forms of liberalism that stress the importance of cultivating the whole person so that they can be active citizens (Nussbaum 1997). In an ideal sense, liberal education aims to be holistic, catering for academic, social, physical and cultural development. A school with a good ethos will provide opportunities for students to excel in sports, debating, theatre and music for example, as well as support them through their academic studies. Within this type of education, the aim is to produce good citizens. Active citizenship assumes that individuals can be independent, critical and creative thinkers who can collaborate as well as be self-motivated.

So-called Asian students are represented as driven towards academic excellence, including by overly ambitious parents, to the exclusion of other activities. They are more comfortable with swatting than with playing football and they are drawn to

forms of learning that emphasise regurgitation rather than analysis and critique. These stereotypes are somewhat intimidated by the principal of Melbourne High School, who is at pains to explain how his school is challenging students to broaden their curricula and explaining to parents how a wider range of activities enhances academic success. Principals are often caught between the paradox of maintaining a school’s reputation for academic excellence and providing forms of education linked to liberalism, which are desired by many parents. By making a strategic link between co-curricula activities and academic prowess this school principal may be killing two birds with one stone.

The importance of being human is expounded by Soutphommasane (2011) discussed above. Nussbaum (1997) distinguishes between a liberal and humanist education and links the latter to a capacity to function as a global rather than national citizen. The aim of preparing students for global citizenship is one that makes stark the contradictions within liberalism. Most particularly, it fails to link liberal ideals to the unequal power relations that determine what is good citizenship and who decides (Tsolidis 2002). The chimera of “fair play” that underpins liberalism is less opaque at the global level than it is at the national level.

8.6 How White Is the Working Class?

Commentators in the press discussed above, draw attention to segregation and its possible impact on our society. There is some agreement that students are distributed amongst schools in ways that are creating ethnic segmentation. This dovetails with class, although commonly there is scant reference to the two issues in tandem. One article however, contained the following statement;

The co-director of the Centre for Population and Urban Research at Monash University, Bob Birrell, said the successful students largely represented middle- to upper-middle-class families from Asia who put a heavy emphasis on education and professional achievement. He said selective schools were not providing assistance to the vast majority of families. ‘In NSW we are entrenching advantage within one particular ethnic group. If the NSW government was serious about equal opportunity, it would put some geographical boundaries to ensure better access to [top] schools’. (Patty and Stevenson 2010).

Birrell’s comment taps a familiar refrain that draws attention to the relationship between academic success, ethnicity and class. In Australia there is a commonsense constitution of the “working class” as white. This is juxtaposed, to “middle class” rather than “upper class” because Australians, including the very wealthy, allude to some sense of egalitarianism. “Working class” and “migrant” or “ethnic” are often used to denote separate categories despite the fact that historically, the massive post-World War II migration programme—that changed the demography of the nation—was prompted by the need for an industrial workforce. “White” is a shifting signifier and does not necessarily take its meaning from a specific phenotypical characteristic. Instead it is marked in relation to “Australian”, constituted at a particular juncture: for example, after World War II southern European immigrants were marked

as not quite white because they were the most distinct from the Anglo-Celtic majority at the time. As the so-called white Australia policy relaxed, the constitution of “non-white” too shifted (see Chaps. 11 and 12).

In Australia, the trade union movement and the political left (both aligned with working class identity) have a history of opposition or ambivalence towards migration and minorities. Historically this has been linked to concerns about an expanded industrial workforce with limited experience of unionism and the likely impact of this on wages. This ambivalence was played out through the Labor Government stance vis-à-vis asylum seekers. The Labor Government’s rhetoric, policies and practice are at least as draconian as those advocated by its conservative opposition. By contrast it has been a vocal but small group of “wet” Liberal Party politicians who have advocated most strongly on behalf of asylum seekers (Georgiou 2011). This failure of the left to come to terms with race/ethnicity has been argued more generally as a failure to critique neoliberalism from outside “the fog of white identity” (Allen 2001).

Symbolic whiteness works between categories of class. Gillborn (2010) argues that white supremacy relies on the discursive construction of the white working class as disadvantaged. He builds his case using Critical Race Theory and the understanding that factors such as class, race/ethnicity, gender and sexuality intersect to produce what he refers to as shifting interest-convergences. Because of this, such factors need to be read against each other in the context of dominant discourses at any given time. Gillborn states;

The most high profile and persistent discourse currently surrounding race and education in contemporary Britain projects the image of White working class children as victims of ethnic diversity. (2010: 8)

He attributes this to a range of issues including the suspicion surrounding multiculturalism and the sense that the race equality agenda has gone too far and, as a result, poor white students, particularly boys, have become victims. He concludes that the white working class is a beneficiary of whiteness, even if at times, it remains not “quite white”, that is, on the periphery of the most powerful groups.

While race in Britain and Australia may be represented differently, some of the same issues remain relevant. In Australia whiteness has been given meaning through the brutal colonisation of indigenous peoples. Additionally immigration policies have been used to keep Australia white (see Chaps. 12 and 13), exercised most diligently in relation to the “yellow peril”. The infamous phrase, attributed to Caldwell, the first Minister of Immigration; “Two wongs don’t make a white” provides another dimension to not being quite white (Tsolidis 2001). Nonetheless, the issues identified by Gillborn in relation to the UK resonate within the Australian context where there has been a backlash against multiculturalism, the strident re-inscription of nation, including through education policy, and the pitting of “real” Australians against an ethnicised Other. These trends were made most obvious during the Cronulla riots (see Chap. 10) and the ensuing discourses of expulsion (Tsolidis 2010).

Debates about the types of students who access highly sought after places in high performing government schools need to be seen in this context. This is a competition

for limited and extremely valuable resources. A place at a high performing government school is likely to set up a student for life and comes with a much lower price tag than that required at elite independent schools. Marking students who compete successfully for such places as “Asian” is differentiating them from Australians, particularly the “battlers” (white working class) for whom the country is seen as gradually becoming less lucky. “Fair go” is an important element of current education policy. It represents the possibility that schooling can act as a social leveller—a claim that sits at the heart of debates about school choice and the role of government schooling more generally (see, for example, Chap. 7). The argument is made that all students are entitled to good schooling and it is public transparency through the *My School* website that will provide the catalyst for change. In a market system it is the “consumer of education” who has the responsibility to choose, thus the onus shifts to students and their families because it is up to them to choose wisely. In this environment, there is no such thing as an “ordinary” school (Maguire et al. 2011). To be successful in the market, schools must represent themselves as being desirable. And while academic success is a critical criterion, other factors come into play. The ethnic make-up of the school population is one such factor (Ho 2011). There is a precarious balance between enrolling minority students, perceived as being good for academic results, and keeping the culture of the school comfortable for those whose priority is a sense of whiteness.

8.7 How White Is Our Social Imaginary?

Recently I was sent an email joke that was originally titled “First day at school in Birmingham”. It was circulated to me as “First day at school in Coburg”. Coburg is a suburb north of the Melbourne Central Business District, known for its large Middle Eastern population. The joke involves a teacher reading the roll that includes names such as Achmed El Kabul and Abdul Alu Ohimi. The teacher then reads out Mi Cha El Mey Er, which is greeted with silence. The punch line is the response from a student named Michael Meyer who didn’t recognise that his name had been read out.

Hage (1998) argues that Australia is imagined as white and that this imaginary is critical to the construction of a hierarchy that determines some members of our society more valuable than others. He describes as least desirable those who conjure a sense of the third world. It is these “third world looking” people who are treated with suspicion and given the least respect. This being more the case in times when there is a so-called war against terror that places Muslims, or those assumed to be Muslim, in the most vulnerable position (see Chap. 5). Hage argues that there is a particular type of cultural capital that if accumulated, makes individuals and communities less “third world looking”. This symbolic whiteness can be accumulated by virtue of birth, for example being Christian rather than Muslim Lebanese, or it can be accumulated through factors such as wealth, a willingness to assimilate or through education.

Marketisation, school choice and social justice intersect with ethnicity and the accumulation or perceived diminution of symbolic whiteness. One dimension of this process relates to the accumulation of symbolic whiteness; becoming educated as a means of upward social mobility, including for (racialised) minorities. Another dimension is one that threatens a sense of whiteness because your child is “the only blonde in the schoolyard” or the teacher no longer pronounces Michael Meyer in a familiar way.

Schooling is instrumental in feeding the social imaginary. There is a complex relationship between schooling, community and ethnicity, evoked through the anecdote about the blonde child and the playground described at the beginning of the paper and the circulated email described above. This relationship, however, becomes more complex in relation to high performing government schools. In this context, some “third world looking” students are more valuable than others because they have a reputation for having strong aspirations, and look to achieve these through education and being studious enough to gain the academic results required. It is these students who are both sought after because they contribute to an academic culture of success—particularly in government schools where academic segregation is more pronounced—and simultaneously condemned for taking over such schools and altering their culture. They do not leave enough room for “Aussies” who have more realistic aspirations and holistic views about what constitutes a good education. The complex relationship between class and race/ethnicity needs to be considered when schooling is explored particularly given its role in reflecting and shaping the social imaginary of Australianness. At what point do so-called “Asians” come to be considered as Australian?

8.8 Conclusion

Foucault describes heterotopian spaces as those capable of juxtaposing several incompatible sites in the same place. I have argued that government schooling can function as a heterotopian space because at one end, there is the desire to create opportunity, so that all students can access a university education regardless of their background. At the other extreme there is a desire to impose order onto chaos through accountability and transparency measures so that parents can select a school for their children on sound criteria and in so doing exert pressure on so-called under-performing schools to change. Foucault argues that the mirror sits between utopias and heterotopias. The mirror is a “placeless place” because it is simultaneously real and illusionary. We can hold a mirror and look into it because it is real. Yet, it also creates an illusion by allowing ourselves to see ourselves somewhere where we are not. I have argued that it is the *My School* website which acts as the mirror, the “placeless place” that sits between heterotopias and utopias. In relation to government schooling it captures the utopian desire of providing all students with an opportunity to enter university, while also functioning to impose order over chaos. Rather than offer transparency that enables parents to make real choices, the *My*

School website contributes to a form of residualisation within the government system by consolidating the segregation between “good” and “bad” schools. Some government schools are high performing, either because they are formally select-entry schools or because they use less formal means to “cream” the students perceived to have the most academic potential. This process of concentrating students understood to enhance a school’s test results is ethnicised; with some minorities deemed to be a good investment, for example “Asian” students.

Once the proportion of “Asian” students rises to a particular level, however, their presence is seen as altering the culture of the school, inhibiting its capacity to attract other families. Nominally this is linked to the idea that “Asian” students work against a school’s capacity to offer a well-rounded liberal education. Arguably “white flight” or not wanting your child to be the “only blonde in the playground” is linked to racialised discourses that present the “tiger mother” and her “dragon children” as somewhat less than human. This is a form of racism that distinguishes on the basis of success rather than failure. The fear that students will contribute to standards falling because English is not their mother tongue, or because their parents are not well educated has been replaced with a fear that success achieved through a form of driven hard work is altering a desirable school ethos. This is a “neurotic imaginary” that works to “dehumanise ‘Asians’ and makes them appear as if they are superhuman” (Hage 1998: 221). As the momentum towards segregation continues to gather speed, we need to consider the cost of not sharing school spaces and how students who no longer study together are going to live and work together as adults. One of the issues that must be addressed is the racist discourses promulgated, including through the press, about the Asians who are represented perpetually as Other. There is a particular need to consider how we are educating all students for a globalised world and whether aspirations to particular forms of liberal education are adequate and meaningful in this context.

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Chapter 9

A Multicultural Italy?

Riccardo Armillei

Abstract This chapter discusses the approach the Italian Government is taking to cope with an increasingly diverse population. It focuses particularly on the circumstances of the Romani communities in the sphere of education and social justice, but also deals with marginalised migrant communities. Based on fieldwork conducted in Rome between 2011 and 2012, and an analysis of relevant secondary sources, this chapter draws attention to the educational system and its capacity to deal with ethnic and cultural diversity. Analysis of the *via Italiana* (the “Italian way”) of promoting intercultural education enables an appraisal of current ethno-centric and assimilative policies, together with related social inclusion strategies. The position of the Romani peoples, in particular, functions as a magnifying glass with which it is possible to analyse Italy’s overall approach towards cultural diversity. The discourse on ‘interculture’ in Italy is also placed in the broader context of the ongoing international debate about the “multiculturalism” versus “interculturalism” paradigm.

Keywords Multiculturalism • Migration • Institutional racism • Interculturalism • Intercultural education • Italy • Romani peoples

9.1 The Italian Context: Between Interculturalism and Monoculturalism

For many years Italy was as a country of emigration; only in the last few decades did we see an inversion of this trend. Since the 1970s Italy has moved from being a net exporter of migrants to a net importer (Bonifazi et al. 2009). As Britain, West Germany and France closed their frontiers to immigration in the 1980s, Italy became a transit country (Myors et al. 2008). Each year Italy continued to grow as a global destination for migrants and today it counts among the European countries with the

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highest volume of immigrants on its territory. In January 2011, there were around five million immigrants in Italy, amounting to 7.5 % of the national population (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica [ISTAT] 2011). At the same time an influx of illegal immigration has also developed (Rocchia and Scassiano 2008). Despite this situation “Italian law and policy in the area of immigration are still struggling to catch up with this phenomenon” (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions [COHRE] et al. 2008: 11).

The multicultural paradigm that developed in many parts of Europe in the 1970s has never taken root in Italy. At the beginning of the 1990s, instead, a lively debate on intercultural issues started to emerge. The growing presence of foreign students had prompted the Government to introduce a new paradigm, particularly within the Italian educational system. In 1995 the *Ministero dell’ Istruzione, dell’ Università’ e della Ricerca* (Ministry of Education, Universities and Research [MIUR] 1995: 109) issued a document, the *Circolare Ministeriale* (Ministerial Memo No. 205/90), which for the first time introduced the concept of “intercultural education” (see Chap. 7 on conceptions of “multicultural education”), with the following definition:

The primary goal of intercultural education is the promotion of a *constructive coexistence* within a composite cultural and social framework. Not only does it entail acceptance and respect of the other, it also promotes the recognition of cultural diversity while encouraging dialogue, mutual understanding and mutual transformation.

In 2007, Italy even claimed its own model of cultural diversity: *La Via Italiana per la Scuola Interculturale e l’Integrazione degli Alunni Stranieri* (“The Italian way to intercultural schooling and the integration of foreign students”).

According to this document issued by the MIUR (2007: 8–9), the Italian school system is guided by four main principles: (1) Universalism: in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ratified by the Government in 1991, education is promoted as the fundamental right of every child; (2) Communal schooling: all students are enrolled in “normal classes”, thus avoiding the creation of “special or separate classes” for foreigners; (3) Centrality of the individual in relation to the “other”: the educational project places particular attention on the uniqueness of each student; (4) Interculturalism: in adopting an intercultural perspective, diversity *in all its forms* is considered a paradigm of school identity. The Italian intercultural model is based on a “dynamic conception of culture” which acknowledges ‘cultural relativism’ while promoting social cohesion and the building of common values.

Yet, despite the theoretical push, “both the media and policy reports suggest, if not affirm, that Italy is struggling with the overall social inclusion project” (McSweeney 2011: 4). On top of that, “interculturalism” has gradually become a vague general term, used to define a vast range of initiatives, all differing in their motivations, intentions and results. There is now an established intercultural rhetoric, which is used in many projects that define themselves as “intercultural” but too often employ the terminology uncritically (Interculture Map 2006, para. 3). In particular, the situation of the Romani peoples in Italy provides a clear example of the failure of this approach. The fact that these communities have not yet been recognised as a *minoranza storico-linguistica* (“historico-linguistic minority”)—like

numerous other well-established ethnic groups—a status that would have enhanced and protected their language and culture, represents one of the main contradictions in the implementation of genuine intercultural practice.

In addition, public institutions still tend to categorise the Romani peoples as “nomads” or unsettled immigrants, although most are Italian citizens. The research conducted with Romani communities in Italy reveals the limits of interculturalism (in theoretical detail and practical application alike) and the associated underlying schemes aimed at their assimilation. The Government’s avowed commitment to guaranteeing all ethnic groups equal treatment failed to champion the presence of this vulnerable minority and its unique culture. Besides that, immigration is still treated by the Government as a socioeconomic “emergency” rather than a structural phenomenon with potential cultural and economic advantages (Intercultural Dialogue 2007). Romani peoples, and immigrants more generally, have effectively been expected to assimilate and conform to the dominant culture.

Intercultural discourse in Italy, therefore, is founded on very shaky grounds. Despite evidence of increasing cultural and religious diversity, Italy can hardly be defined as a multicultural society; particularly since multiculturalism is a concept that has always been absent from Italian public policy and discourse. In fact, as argued by Allievi (2010: 85), Italy should be rather considered “a monocultural and monoreligious (Roman Catholic) country”. Interculturalism is still predominantly theoretical in character and not supported officially, in the sense of being incorporated into the nation’s history. Furthermore, a major issue in Italy has been the absence of a coherent social inclusion policy across the board. The prevailing trend is merely to devise policies that promote a balance between the preservation of national identity and a vague idea of social integration.

9.2 The Emergence of the Intercultural Paradigm in Europe

Particularly after the economic “miracle” of the 1950s in Europe, a lively discussion on topics related to linguistic problems in schools started to emerge. This was certainly more prominent in countries where the immigration flows had been higher, such as France, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands. Later, starting from the 1970s, the first experiments of a so called “pedagogy for foreigners” were introduced. This represented a new subject which over time became target of strong criticism mainly because of its “assimilatory/compensatory” approach. Only in the 1980s, though, the “theoretical considerations and practical intervention strategies with respect to intercultural pedagogy slowly began to form” (Portera 2008: 483). Europe was becoming increasingly diverse.

The internal building of the European Union, as an economic and political alliance, had initially favoured a gradual process of liberalization of goods, capital and services. But gradually and over time it had also enhanced the free movement of people from different member states, and consequently engendered more intercultural contact as well. These intercultural encounters—sometimes collisions, as

described by Huntington in his controversial book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) (see also Chap. 2 in this volume)—have then turned into every day and tangible socio-cultural phenomena. For instance, according to a recent survey conducted in 2007 by The Gallup Organization, commissioned by the European Commission DG Education and Culture, “two-thirds (65 %) of respondents in the 27 EU Member States were able to recall some interactions with at least one person either of a different religion, ethnic background or nationality (either EU or non-EU) than their own” (The Gallup Organization 2007: 4).

Such increased intercultural contacts prompted the EU member states to start investing in some cross-cultural paradigms, many of which have recently been declared a failure (Emmett Tyrrell 2011). Moving away from these unsuccessful ‘cross-cultural’ approaches, EU member states began to pursue and implement the concept of interculturalism, which emphasises “the idea of a fruitful exchange between different cultural groups that will enrich the whole society” (European Commission 2009: 3). Taking account of European cultural diversity became particularly important after the 9/11 terrorist attack. In fact, during the following 3 years (2002–2004) the Secretary General of the Council launched an integrated project, titled *Responses to Violence in Everyday Life in a Democratic Society*, which aims “to help decision makers and others to implement consistent policies of awareness-raising, prevention and law enforcement to combat violence in everyday life” (Bourquin 2003: 3). In this context, *Violence, Conflict and Intercultural Dialogue* was “the fifth in a series of publications designed to acquaint the reader with recommendations or instruments used to launch Council of Europe (COE) activities and projects on violence prevention”.

The intercultural approach not only aimed to support a strategy of recognition and respect for human diversity, as implied by multicultural theory, but it also presented “an interpretation of cohabitation that valorises positive dynamics of exchange and redefines the notion of identity” (Pompeo 2002: 134). This new strategy was also committed to the creation of the best conditions for the “other” to fully develop its own subjectivity. Furthermore, it did not focus only on the foreigners but also on the locals, thus leading to a *logica dei rapporti* (“logic of relations”) which, even if it did not eliminate social conflict, it enhanced cultural exchanges and borrowings (Susi 1995: 31).

According to a recent document issued by the COE (2011, para. 1),

rather than ignoring diversity (as with guest-worker approaches), denying diversity (as with assimilationist approaches) or overemphasising diversity and thereby reinforcing walls between culturally distinct groups (as with multiculturalism), interculturalism is about explicitly recognising the value of diversity while doing everything possible to increase interaction, mixing and hybridisation between cultural communities.

The challenge proposed by the intercultural approach marked an epochal shift. Multiculturalism simply promoted the pure coexistence of multiple cultures (Pompeo 2002), whereby people were basically allowed to keep their own values but risked marginalisation and ghettoisation as a result of the “ethnic mosaic” dynamic embedded in multicultural theories (Bissoondath 2002). Interculturalism, instead,

endorsed a perspective aimed at facilitating genuine cross-cultural communication, developing the ability to interact with others in dialogue and conflict resolution, in the reciprocal, positive and constructive management of diversity.

This new approach is now playing an important role in fostering a new European identity and citizenship (Vidmar-Horvat 2012). The year 2008 was even proclaimed *European Year of Intercultural Dialogue* by the European Parliament and the member States of the European Union (EU), with the aim of developing a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives and practices and of increasing socio-political participation and equality. During the same year the *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* was launched by the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs, arguing that interculturalism should be the preferred model for managing cultural diversity in Europe. Multiculturalism, a policy that was now defined as “inadequate” was thus replaced by this “work in progress and work of many hands” approach (COE 2008). As Kymlicka (2012) noticed, the new intercultural trend was also welcomed by the UNESCO in its 2008 “World Report on Cultural Diversity”, which somehow signed the beginning of a more global consensus.

9.3 “Multiculturalism” Versus “Interculturalism”

In recent years a heated debate has developed around the concepts of “multiculturalism” and “interculturalism”. Particularly, scholars from émigré societies such as Canada and the UK (e.g. Kymlicka 2012; Meer and Modood 2012; Taylor 2013), are now trying to analyse and compare the two approaches at times implying a distinction between a “bad multiculturalism” and a “good interculturalism” (Kymlicka 2012: 211). Drawing on the analysis of Meer and Modood’s (2012) work, which at the present recognizes multiculturalism as a better political orientation to cultural diversity, Kymlicka (2012) explains that there is “very little intellectual substance” underlying the trend to approach interculturalism, as a new, innovative, realistic approach, compared to a supposedly tired, discredited, naive “multiculturalism”.

Contrasting the claims in the 2008 EU “White Paper” regarding post-war Western Europe embracing relativist and segregationist multiculturalism, Kymlicka suggests that “interculturalism” was basically introduced “as a remedy for failed multiculturalism” (2012: 213). While multiculturalism is now “offered up as a sacrificial lamb, a handy scapegoat for popular discontent” (2012: 214), he argues, interculturalism could be better described as a form of “political rhetoric/theatre”. The main purpose of this shift from multiculturalism to interculturalism was just a way to create and establish a new narrative/myth. Another Canadian scholar, Charles Taylor (2013: 2), seems to reinforce perfectly Kymlicka’s viewpoints. As Taylor puts it, in fact,

[...] the European attack on “multiculturalism” often seems to us a classic case of false consciousness, blaming certain phenomena of ghettoization and alienation of immigrants

on a foreign ideology, instead of recognizing the home-grown failures to promote integration and combat discrimination. (2013: 2)

According to Taylor, the current anti-multicultural rhetoric in Europe would reflect “a profound misunderstanding of the dynamics of immigration into the rich, liberal democracies of the West” (2013: 2). Taylor explains that although initially immigrants tend to create networks with people of similar origins and background in order to adapt to the new environment, their major motivation is to find new opportunities. It is only when their hopes for integration are frustrated that a sense of alienation and hostility to the receiving society can grow. It is thus a failure of the host society to implement multicultural policies which would radicalise certain segments of immigrant communities. As a matter of fact, Kymlicka (2012: 214) argues,

[...] the evidence suggests that popular discontent with immigrants is in fact higher in countries that didn't embrace multiculturalism, and there's no evidence that adopting multiculturalism policies causes or exacerbates anti-immigrant or anti-minority attitudes.

What seems to emerge from the analysis of the work of these scholars has a two-fold implication. On the one hand, claims regarding the superiority of interculturalism over multiculturalism cannot be proven theoretically or empirically. On the other, interculturalism does not yet offer a “distinct perspective”. As a consequence, “at present, interculturalism cannot, intellectually at least, eclipse multiculturalism, and so should be considered as complementary to multiculturalism” (Meer and Modood 2012).

Although the standpoints expressed by the supporters of multiculturalism can be quite understandable,—especially in the light of the Western European failure in implementing “real” multiculturalism—the discourse made by Kymlicka, Meer, Madood and Taylor refers to a very specific context which at the moment seems to be extremely sensitive to the topic. There is, in fact, an ongoing ideological battle between “multicultural (Anglophone) Canada”, which represents the majority of the population, and prevalent “intercultural (Francophone) Québec” (see also Chap. 4). This open confrontation has a long history of separatist movements behind it. The largely French-speaking province of Québec has been openly aspiring to independence for decades. The sovereignty question promoted by Quebecers can thus account for why interculturalism has been chosen over multiculturalism. Taylor (2013: 5) suggests, “multiculturalism could never take in Quebec” and finds highly understandable a call for interculturalism instead. At the same time, though, he also stresses the fact that there are no real differences between the intercultural and multicultural approaches.

Despite the fact multiculturalism seems to be described here as the right approach to follow, the Canadian case is not free from internal criticism. For instance, Muslim Canadian Congress founder, Tarek Fatah (in Davidson 2011: para. 3), on the subject of the 2006 Toronto 18 terrorist plot, argues that “Canada has been too tolerant in allowing Muslim immigrants to settle into closed communities, some of which preach Islamic values and a hatred toward the West”. Wong (2010) refers to the non-acceptance of multiculturalism by a consistent part of mainstream Canadian society. Other problems, often associated with multiculturalism, such as the devel-

opment of ethnic enclaves, and the correlated risk of creating a mere mosaic of cultures rather than practical were also reported in a number of studies (e.g. Kunz and Sykes 2007; Qadeer 2003; Preston and Lo 2009). In 2003 Fawcett (ii) even claimed that instead of working towards equality for all individuals, multiculturalism in Canada was devoting itself to “a subtle form of cultural gerrymandering”.

But the Canadian model is not the only “successful” multicultural paradigm to face criticism today. Australia, also considered one of the forefathers of multicultural policies in the 1970s, has been experiencing a series of ups and downs over the years. Particularly it faced its darkest time during the “Howard era” (see Chap. 10 on this period in Australian multicultural politics). For more than a decade, during the conservative Howard government (1996–2007) era, “the idea that Australia is a multicultural society has disappeared completely, leaving a bare recognition of cultural diversity as a demographic fact, rather than any sense of a multicultural policy framework” (Jakubowicz 2009: 9). Hage (2000: 18) arguing that Australian multiculturalism has a “white-centric” past and an assimilationist present, coined the definition of “White Multiculturalism”, where the dominant culture plays a central role in mixing the migrant cultures, which are depicted as mere voiceless ingredients. In other words, just like the previous “white Australia”, “multicultural Australia” has also been the result of a top-down political action, driven by the desire to assimilate European immigrants within the dominant culture (Tilbury 2007) (see also Chap. 8 on the historical contingencies of multiculturalism in Australia).

9.4 The Negative Representation of Migrants in Italy

Concern at the media’s role in disseminating “ideas of racial superiority or incitement to racial hatred” (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2012: 5) was particularly high after the national elections of 2008 when a right-wing coalition led by Berlusconi capitalised on fears about immigrants and public safety concerns to win elections (Sciortino 2010). Since then, despite its obligations under international human rights law, the Italian government kept reinforcing discriminatory measures against immigrants, which became a security issue for the nation (Chiarini 2011). A moral panic-oriented approach was particularly visible with regards to the arrival of “boat people” from North Africa which stimulated alarmism among Italians with fears of an immigrant invasion. The migration cooperation announced with Libya in May 2009 is a clear example of the government’s willingness to set aside human rights to advance populist anti-migrant policies. The introduction of a “pushback” policy brought to a rapid decrease of asylum applicants, as stated in a recent report by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2011: 9). Identification and expulsion procedures were also intensified.

In 2008 the Italian Government had also launched an extraordinary initiative, the so-called *Emergenza Nomadi* (“Nomad Emergency”), to tackle a number of threatening situations that had emerged among the Romani communities living in “nomad camps”. As Amnesty International (2012: 6) noted, “high-profile crimes allegedly

committed by people of Roma ethnicity from Romania [were] extensively reported in the news, instigating aggressive anti-Roma rhetoric by local and national politicians”. The Romani peoples’ presence came to be associated with crime and treated simply as a security issue (on the racialization and criminalisation of minorities see also Chap. 5). The 2007 EU enlargement had contributed to raise public fears of an influx of immigrants from the new member States of Romania and Bulgaria (Sigona 2010). According to the European Network against Racism (2010), the ensuing years saw a dramatic increase in the vulnerability of migrants to racism and discrimination, a trend affecting all nationalities and ethnic groups.

As remarked by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ([OHCHR] 2007: 23), “when crimes are committed by persons of foreign origin or belonging to the Roma or Sinti communities, their nationality or ethnicity is particularly emphasised”. The negative exposure of vulnerable minorities in the Italian media is reinforced by the general tendency of journalists not to cover instances where they are victims. This emerges from a 2008 survey by Sapienza University of Rome: “Only 26 out of 5,684 television news stories about immigrants did not relate to crime or security issues [...] The media present a virtually one-dimensional image of immigrants in Italy” (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2011: 11).

Recognizing the strategic role played by the media in shaping the way public opinion perceive immigrants, and cultural diversity more in general, in 2007 the *Ordine Nazionale dei Giornalisti* ([ODG] National Order of Journalists) and the Italian Press Federation adopted a code of ethics, the *Carta di Roma* (“Charter of Rome”), in order to improve the handling of issues relating to asylum-seekers, refugees, victims of people trafficking and migrants (ODG 2007). European Commission against Racism and Intolerance ([ECRI] 2012: 23) welcomed this initiative, noting that the *Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali* ([UNAR] National Office on Anti-Racial Discriminations) had also set up a centre for monitoring the use of discriminatory language in public discourse. But the media were not the only actors responsible for inciting hostility against minorities. Concerns were also expressed over an increase in racist and xenophobic rhetoric by certain politicians. Instead of taking a clear stand against racial discrimination, they contributed decisively to stigmatising immigrants. In 2009 another body, the Observatory on Xenophobia and Racism, was set up by the Italian Parliament with the aim of combating racism and intolerance.

Despite such actions taken by Italian officialdom to tackle outbursts of racist intolerance in public discourse, no penalties were introduced for these offences. Besides the *Carta di Roma*, which only recently identified the Romani peoples as “particularly vulnerable groups”, another code of conduct for journalists has existed since 1993. Nevertheless, as argued by ECRI (2012), not only have these codes never been systematically enforced, but journalists who breached them rarely incurred penalties. There is little public awareness of the Observatory on Xenophobia and Racism or its role. So far, few politicians have faced criminal prosecution for xenophobic statements. As for UNAR itself, this body doesn’t observe the principles of independence and impartiality, either *de jure* or *de facto*. It is still not adequately resourced or financially autonomous, and it is dependent on the Department for Equal Opportunities of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (ECRI 2012).

9.5 Interculturalism in the Italian Educational System

Education is a fundamental right as specified in the Italian Constitution. According to Article 34 it should be available to all, compulsory and free for at least 8 years. Schools should play a key role in creating thoughtful, caring and productive citizens. The Professor of Social and Intercultural Pedagogy at Roma Tre University, Massimiliano Fiorucci, argues that despite its limits the

Italian school system has been one of the main bastions of democracy, interculturalism and citizenship in the past few years. School represented the only place everyone always had access to. Too often, though, schools were asked to respond to situations that did not fall directly under their mandate. Consequently, they could not always provide the most appropriate solutions. (Personal communication, 20 December 2011)

According to Naletto (2009: 249), the education system “plays a very strategic role in the development of intercultural dynamics: it can help foster the elimination of stereotypes, prejudices and racist behaviour”.

In the past two decades in particular, the MIUR started to pay specific attention to the growing presence of foreign students within Italy’s educational system. The first important measure fostering the inclusion of foreign pupils in the system was Circolare No.301 of 1989. This memorandum, entitled “Inclusion of Foreign Students in Compulsory Education: Promotion and Coordination of Initiatives in Support of the Right to Education”, was aimed at improving Italian-language knowledge and valorising the student’s native culture (Fiorucci 2011). A year later, another significant document was issued—Circolare No.205, *Compulsory School and Foreign Students: The Intercultural Education*—which contained additions to Circolare No.301/89 (Rossi and De Angelis 2012). For the first time, intercultural education was presented as a new methodology and a model for synthesising school activities. Several other memoranda were later issued with the twofold aim of monitoring foreign students’ presence in the education system and bolstering the prevention of racism in all its guises.

Circolare No.73/1994, entitled *Intercultural Dialogue and Democratic Coexistence: The Planning Commitment of the Schools*, represented the first systematic effort to shape what would later become “The Italian way to Interculture” (Rossi and De Angelis 2012: 9). This new approach was mainly the result of work undertaken by the National Observatory for the Integration of Foreign Students and Intercultural Education, which the MIUR set up in December 2006. In 2007 the Observatory compiled a document which to this day constitutes the key work of reference on the detail of school integration policy. *The Italian Way to Intercultural School and the Integration of Foreign Students* was a very progressive publication. By stressing a positive response to cultural diversity, this report highlighted a deliberate commitment to incorporate non-Italian pupils in ordinary schools, thus avoiding the establishment of separate places of learning (UNAR 2012). Unfortunately, as Fiorucci (2011: 193) argues, “a great part of this document is yet to be implemented”.

With specific regard to the schooling of Romani children, inclusive approaches had been in place since the 1950s. At that time, schoolteachers, acting mainly on a

voluntary basis, initiated the first experiments in inclusivity within the system of compulsory education (Rossi and De Angelis 2012). The first really systematic schooling of Romanies began in 1965 with the creation of *Lacio Drom* (Good Trip) courses. But, as Fiorucci (2011: 187) argues, these “special classes” ended up with Romani children categorised as “special” and “different” (see Chap. 8 on ethnicised segregated school spaces). Only in 1982 were these classes abolished. In 1986 the MIUR issued Circolare 207, officially extending compulsory schooling to all Romani children (Rossi and De Angelis 2012). During the 1990s, in line with the advent of intercultural education in the school system, legislative acts confirming the right to an education started to favour the generic category “foreign students”, which embraced the non-Italian Romanies. The intercultural paradigm became increasingly important over the years and was a key element in several significant initiatives at the European level (UNAR 2012). Despite this, Romanies continue to be treated differently from other foreigners.

9.6 The Limits of “The Italian Way” to Intercultural Education

In recent years a number of intercultural initiatives and projects have been launched with the aim of entrenching educational inclusivity. Still, implementation of the intercultural approach in the State’s education system has lacked institutional impetus. A recent study of social inclusion practices within the Italian education system noted that 90 % of initiatives were engineered by Third Sector associations (or “not-for-profit” sector) in partnership with local authorities and schools (Gobbo et al. 2009). One result of this *modus operandi* was an intrinsic fragility. These actions were generally “carried out on the basis of annual funding, without any continuity or final evaluation of their efficacy” (Gobbo et al. 2009: 6). Only recently did local authorities request final reports on the associations’ activities.

In the past two decades a number of legislative steps have been taken to guarantee increasing autonomy for educational bodies. Probably the most important of these are Law No.59 of 15 March 1997 apropos teaching and cultural pluralism, and Presidential Decree No.275 of 8 March 1999 governing educational methods, organisation, research and development (Gobbo et al. 2009). But the gap between “declared principles and the actual availability of resources and teaching training activities” (Caneva 2012: 36) undermined the prospects for managing change. The freedom granted to schools implied that they had to finance their own projects and their new educational functions. Unfortunately, though, “principals and teachers have not always succeeded in securing the necessary resources” (Gobbo et al. 2009: 4). According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ([OECD] 2011: 3), Italy remains among the members of the OECD with the lowest investment in education as a percentage of GDP.

Scarce funds impacted on teaching quality. Although the body of law seemed to be advanced, at least with respect to the principle of legitimising cultural diver-

sity, there were “still important loose ends to do with transition from the planning and explanatory phase to that of practical implementation” (Rossi and De Angelis 2012: 41). Besides, the fact that the school system was the first institution to test socially inclusive practices in its management of foreign students meant that intercultural measures could only be introduced tentatively (Santerini 2006). As Gobbo (2011: 15) observed, interculturalism was basically used only as a sort of “palliative treatment”, not to create any stable and durable framework of inclusion policies:

While the intercultural education discourse and the “good practices” aim to build a climate of respect, dialogue and critical reflection on ethnocentric assumptions, classroom teaching and learning are still often defined in terms of “problems” or “emergency” that teachers have difficulty answering.

Further, the documents on interculturalism produced by the MIUR gave only very general instructions and some basic principles, leaving the key task of implementing them to schools and teachers. As a result,

[...] although theoretically teachers accept the [diversity] principle, they have difficulty in appreciating and positively reinforcing students’ differences in their teaching programs, and in managing some cultural and religious claims by immigrant families. They do not always succeed in overcoming their ethnocentric approach and culturally constructed views. (Caneva 2012: 34)

This particular aspect was also emphasised by Cortellesi (2009) in her contribution to the *Libro Bianco sul Razzismo in Italia* (White Book on Racism in Italy), she concluded: “It was often the school initiatives and the teachers’ conduct which drew attention to the ‘chronic differences’ of immigrant teenagers” (2009: 107). The precariousness of teaching quality in Italy was recently confirmed by Professor Fiorucci,

[...] the teacher’s role is now considered low-grade, in a system where, by contrast with other countries, there is no possibility for professional advancement. [...] Most teachers, except for the new ones, know nothing of pedagogy, didactic precepts, or how to work cooperatively. (Personal communication, 20 December 2011)

Things have not changed much since 2000, when Marco Brazzoduro wrote an article condemning the fact that teachers were generally left alone to face new educational challenges (Brazzoduro 2000). Unsurprisingly, over the past decade the schooling system lacked an evaluation process: “The assessment of scholarly institutions was generally confined to inspections instigated by the Ministry of Education. This activity, though, lacked any regularity” (Associazione TreeLLLe 2002: 36). It was not activated by the need to introduce regular testing of educational processes and outcomes (see Chap. 8 for a case-study look at the impacts of institutional evaluations on ethnic segregation in the sector). A decade later, a study released by the OECD (2011: 5) revealed that neither inspections nor evaluations were carried out. The only reporting that schools are required to submit to higher-ranking authorities is the “*rapporto di conformità*” (compliance certificate) confirming that they are obeying the law and various procedures. In educational practice, the “Italian way to interculture” was basically left to the discretion of

each school and the keenest teachers. It remained more a declaration of intent than a suite of policies (Santerini 2006).

9.7 Impressions from the Field

My research reveals entrenched disenchantment with intercultural practices over the past decade in Rome. While the previous centre-left mayoral administration displayed some interest in championing cultural diversity, at least in theory, its successor—the right-wing Alemanno’s mayoralty—erased this topic from council’s program. Yet, despite different rhetorical stances, actual policy remains consistent. A representative from the Culture Office of XII Municipal Hall confirmed this point:

At the moment the city council is not promoting any type of multicultural or intercultural theory. The policy enacted by this administration is definitely no different from that carried out by its predecessor. Both are based on the payment of millions of euro for forced evictions, constantly shifting the problem from one place to another. This is the only real policy on Romani culture. (Personal communication, 24 April 2012)

Interviews conducted by representatives of several NGOs operating in the “nomad camps”, and involved in promoting inclusion projects within the school system in Rome, offer an insight into the intercultural approach:

Today it makes no sense to talk about interculturalism. For instance, the previous administration had launched the so-called *menu etnici* (ethnic menu) into school canteens. [Then Mayor of Rome Gianni] Alemanno replaced this with the “*menu regionale*” (regional menu). *Pasta all’amatriciana* was promoted as a mark of Roman identity. [...] Interculturalism is not on the political agenda: rather, it is a problem. The Government finds it vexing that there are more foreign students in a class than Italians. As a consequence, many a Bengali mother is not allowed to enrol her kids in the neighbourhood school because it already has too many foreign children. They have to go to another school much further away. (Ermes, personal communication, 3 May 2012)

A similar view was expressed by a social worker from the organisation Casa dei Diritti Sociali (House of Social Justice):

Schools today basically consider foreign students a nuisance. In Italy the concept of interculturalism vacillates between folklore, exoticism, disregard, denial and an approach that merely tolerates the “Other”. Intercultural schooling is still at an embryonic stage in Italy. (Personal communication, 20 December 2011)

The difficulties public authorities encounter in implementing an intercultural approach also emerged from interviews with a representative of Rete Scuole Migranti, a large network of Third Sector organisations funding L2s, schools of Italian as a second language for immigrants:

The Italian Government’s inclusion policy is completely inefficient and contradictory. It rests on a very inadequate normative framework. [...] The “migrant flow” decree was a failure. The State-run Employment Offices are extremely inefficient despite rampant

unemployment. There are no housing policies. Educational policy is also a failure: 30 per cent of foreign kids fail compulsory school; 18–49 per cent are lagging behind; 16 per cent drop out of the education system altogether. The new measure on linguistic integration demands that immigrants know Italian in order to get a residence permit, but there are no public funds for training courses. [...] Italian-language schools, staffed by volunteers, were launched in Rome in 1984–85; but the first institutional intervention was only in 1997! [...] As well as teaching Italian as an L2, we offer a wide range of socialising opportunities, intercultural exchanges etc., but with very limited funds, and the spaces we use are also inadequate. [...] Can we really then speak of interculturalism in Italy? Systemically, the answer is no; but there is certainly a sprinkling of qualified initiatives in this sector. (Email, 21 June 2012)

The State school system has not yet proved capable of giving Third Sector activities enough support and of ensuring courses in Italian are available to all immigrants, so how can they be expected to sustain their own languages and cultures, as implied by intercultural theory?

By way of concluding this outline, an interview with a prominent Romani intellectual provides a privileged insight into the intercultural issue:

Cultural recognition is surely important, but it represents only the final stage. Before we get there, we really need to promote Romani self-determination. Many projects are initiated today for our people. These are carried out by organisations which work *for* the Romani peoples, but not *with* them. [...] It is time to move from mediation to participation, from multiculturalism to interculturalism. A multicultural society becomes intercultural when there is active participation. [...] We are at risk today of losing our culture and our identity. If we do lose them, what are we going to cling to? We will be basically swallowed up by the rest of society. My plea today is for cultural diversity, interculturalism, active participation, intercultural democracy and recognition as a cultural minority. (Nazzareno Guarnieri, personal communication, 21 April 2012)

9.8 Concluding Observations

Despite its official adoption, the intercultural approach in Italy over the past few decades has been vaguely conceived of and poorly executed (Fiorucci 2011; Gobbo 2011; Santerini 2006). Non-recognition of cultural diversity was plainly visible in terms of not only the Romani communities but the broader immigrant population. The school system and public institutions in general found it extremely difficult to commit themselves deeply to a positive cultural diversity agenda. Paradoxically, spending on the “camps policy” initiative, forced evictions and emergency measure grew over the past two decades. Public funds are basically used to promote a “fake” inclusion (Massimiliano Fiorucci, personal communication, December 20, 2011). Continuous monitoring of available resources was also lacking. The Third Sector emerged over time as an important agent to fill the gap and “patch things up”. But the intervention of volunteer-based organisations relies on limited funding and resources even if at times they managed to deliver a number of valuable intercultural services in support of fringe communities. Perhaps their major effort and impact was in the area of teaching Italian language as a second language, as opposed to

promoting foreign languages and cultures. A monocultural and assimilationist attitude still predominates in Italy, together with widespread racism against “Other” communities.

In the past few decades growing scepticism has emerged in Europe at large with regard to multiculturalism. This trend was observed in Italy as well as, although in Italy’s case multicultural policies have never been implemented. Instead, interculturalism was increasingly promoted as the most appropriate strategy for dealing with cultural diversity. But the development of this new paradigm lacked a solid foundation, nowhere more so than in relation to the Romani communities. In the past decade, the Italian Government signed several international agreements and proclaimed its commitment to empowering these peoples.¹ Yet, Romani communities, and immigrants more generally, are still considered “security” issues and treated solely through the application of extraordinary actions. Politicians refer to the idea of national “insecurity” in order to convey a political willingness to pursue a more ‘muscular’ approach towards diversity and “Othered” communities. As predicted by Agamben (1998), though, emergency measures lost their initial provisional character and morphed into a “new permanent political category” (Sigona 2002).

In fact, even within the so-called intercultural paradigm, the associated principles and values such as positive and constructive management of diversity, dialogue and conflict resolution, mutual learning, exchange and identity transformation, are all absent from the nation’s socio-political arena. The plight of the Romani peoples clearly underscores the weakness of the “Italian way” vis-à-vis cultural diversity.

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¹ In 2011, for instance, a “National Strategy” was launched introducing a number of measures to enhance their social inclusion. This commitment, which was a mere response to a larger European Union’s initiative, aimed at transcending the 2008 “Nomad Emergency” but remained mostly on paper.

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Part III
Performing Multicultural Belongings

Chapter 10

At Home/Out of Place: Young People's Multicultural Belongings

Anita Harris

Abstract What does it mean to come of age in an era of anti-multiculturalism? How does such an environment shape the ways young people of diverse backgrounds come to feel “at home”—in the nation, in the city, in their neighbourhoods, and in their national identity? Discussing findings from a study of youth in the multicultural suburbs of five Australian cities, this chapter explores how the politics of belonging is lived through the spatial practices of everyday civic life for those who have grown up during the multiculturalism backlash of the 1990s and 2000s. It examines the contradictory picture that emerges of a new generation claiming a right to multicultural citizenship and forging productive diversity within the urban multicultural, and yet simultaneously positioned as “out of place” within civic life.

Keywords Belonging • Multiculturalism • Everyday multiculturalism • Multicultural citizenship • Racism • Youth

Up to three quarters of the children of industrialised nations live in cities increasingly subject to rapid global flows of peoples and cultures (Nilan and Feixa 2006). Unlike previous generations, young people today now routinely encounter those of different backgrounds in their everyday lives and must find ways to share civic space and create new kinds of collective national and local identifications. But little is known about their strategies for living well with difference and creating inclusive forms of belonging, or about the conditions that militate against social cohesion and active citizenship for young people of diverse backgrounds. How, and where, do they develop a sense of belonging or connection to where they live? How do they come to feel at home?

These questions about belonging are particularly germane to the experiences of young people of immigrant or refugee background who have grown up in Australia in the past 10–15 years. Young people are the most culturally diverse group in Australia; they most frequently and routinely interact across difference, are most comfortable dealing with a large range of cultural groups, and celebrate expanded

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notions of national identity (Ang et al. 2006). They are the inheritors of the hard-fought “recognition and rights” multicultural politics of their parents’ generation and longstanding bipartisan implementation of robust multicultural policy. But they have also come of age in a time of global and national political debates about tighter regulation of immigration, border security and citizenship: a situation described as “the multicultural backlash” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). So even while they may have a strong sense of entitlement to belong and sophisticated conceptualizations of Australianness, they are attempting to operationalise these in a political environment that has increasingly constructed them as outside the nation and as objects for integration (Harris 2013). This chapter investigates precisely this contradiction: how we might understand young people’s own capacity to feel at home against efforts to position them as out of place. It first considers their experiences of exclusionary practices in public places, and then explores the ways that counter-claims of national belonging become possible through locally engendered processes of inclusion and cohesion forged in the multicultural neighbourhood.

The chapter’s theoretical contribution is to scholarship extending analyses of multicultural citizenship to encompass the everyday politics of belonging (Yuval Davis 2006; Vasta 2013). It builds on the work of theorists who have argued for a move in citizenship studies away from an exclusive focus on legal and formal status, rights and civic knowledge towards a closer investigations of “routines, rituals, norms and habits of the everyday through which subjects become citizens” (Isin 2008: 17). As Isin and Turner (2007: 16) argue, there is a need to examine everyday acts of citizenship in the context of city spaces to understand exactly how and where belonging is contested and produced. This chapter works within this frame by offering a focus on the everyday acts through which inclusion and recognition are negotiated, and attention to the civic spaces where these processes are enacted.

10.1 Growing Up Under Schizoid Multiculturalisms

Australia is widely perceived as a multicultural success story. It is amongst the most culturally diverse of the Western democracies, with a population comprising approximately 46 % who are either overseas-born or have an overseas-born parent (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012), and growth is driven primarily by overseas migration (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2011). Multicultural policy has had strong bipartisan support since the early 1970s, and Australia routinely scores above all other rated nations on the Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting and Kymlicka 2013) (on this point see also Chap. 6). It is known as a country almost entirely free of ethnic conflict and ghettos, and large-scale longitudinal research reveals high levels of popular support for multiculturalism and strong indicators of social cohesion (Markus 2013) (see Chap. 13 for an extensive history of multicultural governance in Australia, and Chap. 6 on its key policy dimensions).

Since the late 1990s however, there has also been a profound political shift away from support for immigration and diversity and increasing concerns about threats to

core values, social cohesion and border security. The “controllability” of difference has become a matter of global political urgency (see Vasta 2010), and in Australia this has become manifest through more stringent citizenship tests, immigration processes and asylum seeker policy, reduction in funding for multicultural services, new education programs for national values, and an ongoing public debate about the negative effects of diversity on social cohesion and strong national identity (Tate 2009). The latter has been framed as a return to a kind of integrationism (Poynting and Mason 2008; Jupp 2009). As Turner (2007: 10) suggests, while previously “cultural hybridity had received some level of assent as a defining feature of the Australian national imaginary”, more recent times have seen a renewed account of the nation as fundamentally grounded in white Anglo-Saxon stock and a set of associated imagined core values. An integrationist agenda invokes the right of some to determine the inclusion of others according to their compatibility with this essentialised, homogenous national character and its values (Poynting and Mason 2008).

A current generation of culturally diverse young people has come of age in this rather contradictory environment. Those born or arriving in Australia from the 1990s onwards have faced an environment of considerable hostility towards immigrants and refugees, primarily framed as a struggle for control of the nation and its core character and values. Such young people have had no lived experience of an era before the retreat from multiculturalism and have grown up in an atmosphere of enhanced entitlement on the part of some to determine the make-up of “their” nation (Hage 2000). But while they may have less ready access to a discourse of hybridity as legitimately Australian, they also experience an everyday environment of the unremarkability of diversity and cohesion. In a practical sense their presence is deeply embedded, simply as a result of Australia’s taken for granted immigration history, the legacy of multicultural policy and the mundane reality of “unpanicked” multiculturalism (Noble 2009) as experienced in daily Australian life. Drawing on empirical research with young Australians of diverse backgrounds, this chapter considers how these complexities play out in young people’s efforts to achieve belonging, and suggests how an understanding of their experiences and practices can contribute to theoretical debates about citizenship and the situated politics of belonging.

10.2 About the Study

This chapter draws on research into young people’s strategies for intercultural living, participation and cohesion in Australia’s most culturally diverse neighbourhoods in five Australian capital cities (Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney). All of the neighbourhoods where the young people lived were originally inhabited by Indigenous peoples and some maintained relatively large Indigenous populations as well as a longstanding white Anglo community and a couple of prominent post-war migrant communities (for example Italian or Greek). All had been shaped by Asian settlement from the 1970s and Middle Eastern and Eastern

European migration in the 1990s. From 2008 several of the neighbourhoods had had the greatest intake of any municipality in their state of settlers from the Horn of Africa, South Asia and Afghanistan. Approximately one third to one half of the residents were overseas-born in these neighbourhoods, and around half spoke languages other than English: figures that are significantly higher than the city averages around the time of data collection (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008). The neighbourhoods also tended to score high on the scale of disadvantaged areas according to the Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008).

In-depth, semi-structured interviews were held with 107 culturally and linguistically diverse youth in these neighbourhoods, sourced through local high schools and community and youth services. Around five youth and community workers in each area were also interviewed to provide background and context. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 outline the key features of the participants. Notable is that while a majority was not born in Australia, most had lived there all their post-childhood life (62 % were either born in Australia or had lived there for over 5 years).

Table 10.1 Gender and age

Male	51 %
Female	49 %
14–16 years old	25 %
17–19 years old	37 %
20–22 years old	28 %
23 and over	7 %
<i>(Data on age missing)</i>	3 %

Table 10.2 Regions of birth and religion

Born in Australia	21 %
Born overseas	79 %
Lived in Australia 5+ years (o/s born)	41 %
Region of birth	
Africa	42 %
Australia	21 %
Middle East	15 %
Europe	9 %
Asia	7 %
New Zealand and Pacific	6 %
Religion	
Christian (unspecified)	37 %
Muslim	33 %
Catholic	10 %
No religion	9 %
Hindu	3 %
Sikh	1 %
<i>(Data on religion missing)</i>	7 %

Data were collected between 2010 and 2012. The participants were asked about the extent and nature of their intercultural relations, the ways they and others used their local and city spaces, strategies for and feelings of inclusion and participation, and local and national identity. Data were entered into the NVivo software programme and coded by responses. They were then analysed according to themes anticipated theoretically as well as those generated through the data collection process.

10.3 Out of Place in the Nation

One of the most powerful effects of the shift to integrationism and the retreat from multiculturalism is said to be the construction of some people as entitled to adjudicate on the rights of others to membership in the civic body and the nation state (Hage 2000). Efforts for exclusionary forms of “boundary maintenance” (Yuval Davis 2006) are everyday ways of managing belonging and citizenship. In a practical sense, this is shown to be manifest through an increase in practices of public racism, which, as Noble (2005: 115) argues, function as “the active, affective regulation of the inappropriate existence of others”. This kind of racism or harassment, according to these theorists, works to delineate national belonging by regulating the physical presence of others in specific civic spaces (see also Chap. 12). How might such practices be evident in the everyday life experiences of young people of diverse backgrounds in Australia?

There was a disturbing frequency with which the young people in this research reported being the targets of exclusionary practices in public places (see also Chap. 12). Overall, 75 % said that they had either experienced or witnessed this kind of racism in a public space. It was in the public spaces of their cities, including public transport, the streets and the beach, that these young people experienced the greatest policing of their right to belong and to be treated as entitled to be present. This is a finding consistent with other research that has established that young people experience and report incidents of public racist harassment more than any other age cohort. For example, the IsmaU report into prejudice against Muslim and Arab Australians has found that youth feel particularly at risk of harassment (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2004: 3); and a large scale quantitative study of racism in Australia has found the youngest cohort to have the highest rates of reported experiences of racism (Dunn 2004). Everyday racism in the street in particular is more commonly reported by young people than those in other age groups; often it is two or even three times more likely to be reported by youth than those who are middle aged or older (Dunn 2004).

Many young people in this research spoke of incidents in public places, often on public transport, where they had been told “go back to your own country”. This was generally reported by young people who were visibly different; for example, Katherine (Karen, Indigenous Burmese; Brisbane) was told by a fellow passenger

on a bus that “no one needs you, it’s full up, why do you come here, it’s full up, Brisbane is full”. Flora (Filipino/Maori background; Perth) was walking down the street with a friend in a headscarf who was told, “You’re a terrorist, get out of my country”. Jonathan (Afghani background; Adelaide) reported that “Since September 11th, my sister was walking down the road and some guy just beeped her and just said, ‘You bloody Muslim, go back to your own country’”. And Jamila (Eritrean background; Melbourne) had stopped wearing a headscarf because of the public abuse she had suffered, saying that people would drive past blowing their horns and scream, “Go back to your country, fucking terrorist”.

The participants also reported other experiences of exclusion in public space that were not overt racist attacks, but had the effect of positioning them as outsiders, whose right to appropriately participate in the space was put under question. Some discussed how they struggled to freely engage in that most iconic Australian leisure activity—going to the beach—because of looks and comments they were subject to that made them feel like unwelcome outsiders. For example, Kim (Afghani background; Adelaide) said that

at the beach, whenever I go there, people obviously are, Australian people mostly—I could say they are Australian people—for me, whenever I go I don’t feel like I am part of these people or I am part of this group. I think it is because me, being a Muslim, or having a different belief or different thought.

Louise (Vietnamese background; Perth) provided more insight into how these feelings of not being part of the group were entrenched. She reported that when she was at the beach, she often saw efforts to exclude others from the Australian “group” by calling into question their ability to be in the space properly:

A lot of Africans coming in jeans, shoes, hats, big shirts, baggy pants, and I always see everyone looking at them and pointing at them, like ‘Why would you come to the beach wearing that?’ I was like, well, if they want to they can. It’s not like there’s a sign saying you have to wear this to the beach, otherwise you’re not allowed on. But I always see them pointing it out and then I see Asians fully clothed and everyone’s looking at them and like, ‘Oh no, tourists’. I know what it feels like being called a tourist when you’re really, being born here all my life.

Louise suggests that even when there are no explicit signs that regulate how one should look or behave at the beach in order to fit in as a proper Australian, young people of diverse backgrounds are subject to other subtle messages about how to look right so that they can be seen and treated as an unremarkable member of the national body rather than an outsider, intruder or “tourist”.

Another participant, Karen (Filipino background; Brisbane), had visited the beach on the Australia Day that immediately followed the Cronulla riots that had occurred approximately 2 months prior (a 2005 Sydney riot instigated by white Anglo youth seeking to “reclaim their beaches” from those of migrant background). She described feeling as though her family was somehow “noticed” as a presence requiring regulatory action rather than as simply people who may be visibly different but nonetheless Australian and therefore entitled to be present:

We went out the next Australia Day, and even though we did it every single year, we went to the beach, and it felt like people were staring at us. I felt completely unsafe and I was just waiting for someone to come up and start something violent. I just felt like we stuck out so much, but not just that, that people were noticing. No matter if you're born here, but if you look different, if you're not Anglo Saxon and you go out on a day like Australia Day, people are like, 'Oh, what are you doing here, you don't look Australian' or whatever. But if you don't go out, they're like, 'Why aren't you celebrating Australia Day, you're so un-Australian'.

Karen suggests that the integrationist and white nationalist agenda (Hage 2000) that shaped the Cronulla riot made legitimate other kinds of subtle exclusionary practices. While she had often felt that she "stuck out" because she was not "Anglo Saxon", she now felt fearful and vigilant because Cronulla had given others permission to stare and potentially "start something violent". She also indicates how young people such as herself are placed in an impossible position of being obliged to perpetually demonstrate efforts to be Australian by being present in iconic Australian public spaces and public celebrations even while they are reminded that they can never truly belong because of the way they look.

As Noble (2005: 114) suggests, "our ability to be comfortable in public settings also rests on our ability to be acknowledged as rightfully existing there: to be recognized as belonging". Such denials of acknowledgement of the entitled presence of others are not easily accounted for when measuring public racism, but these kinds of exclusionary practices had a profound effect on young people's sense of belonging. The most dramatic examples included physical and verbal abuse and being ordered out of public spaces, but also damaging to their sense of belonging were more subtle experiences of being looked at in suspicious ways, being given "signs", having strong feelings of insecurity and out-of-placeness invoked. As Thomas (2011: 107) elaborates, these practices not only educate some young people to avoid spatial transgression, but can serve to construct them as illegitimate members of the nation. They are everyday acts of exclusion that function to regulate citizenship and belonging.

10.4 Multicultural National Belongings

However, young people were also engaged in some critical counter-practices centred on declarations of national belonging that refuted these processes of attempted exclusion. Somewhat paradoxically, in spite of routine experiences of everyday racism that served to position them as outsiders, they simultaneously expressed very positive feelings of belonging to the nation. Ninety-one per cent said that they felt like they belonged in Australia and 83 % said that they felt Australian. At the same time, only 6 % described their "cultural background" as "Australian". Some typical answers to questions about feeling Australian were statements like:

Jane (Filipino background; Adelaide): I definitely do feel Australian.

Luke (Afghani background; Adelaide): I sure do, yes.

John (Afghani background; Melbourne): Definitely. [...] I'm proud of it.

James (Samoan background; Adelaide): Yeah, definitely.

Against efforts to regulate their rightful presence, they were thus making strong claims about a right to belong, but also about their particular experience of hybridised national identity. This is consistent with research that shows youth embracing and actualizing more expansive, multiple and flexible notions of nationality and belonging and hybrid identifications, and moving away from traditional and especially monocultural ideas about citizenship (Ang et al. 2006; Maira 2009; Colombo and Rebughini 2012). Many insisted on inhabiting a hybridized Australianness that did not dilute or complicate, but rather enhanced their national belonging. For example:

Kim (Afghani background; Adelaide): I do (feel Australian). When I came to Australia, when I saw these two different cultures and these two different religions, so I accepted both, so I step between both. I'm really Australian too.

Afrisha (Sierra Leonean background; Adelaide): I'm an African, chilli eating Australian.

Flora (Filipino and Maori background; Perth): I describe myself as Australian, Filipino, Maori. If someone says, 'Where are you from?', I say, 'I'm Filipino-Maori but I was born here. That's exactly how I say it. So I say I'm Australian.

These young people suggest that they feel secure in their national identities and actively claim a right to belong as hybrid subjects. This is evident in their very assertive, sometimes even defiant or slightly defensive language of "definitely" feeling Australian. This seems a strategy to manage the discursive effects of the retreat from multiculturalism and the everyday expressions of integrationism they were confronted with. This was also evident in some of the ways they resisted the idea that anyone else had a right to adjudicate on their inclusion. Several made statements of explicit refusal to accede to the authority of others to determine belonging. For example, Malcolm (Ethiopian background; Melbourne) said:

I have a firm belief that as long as we accept the fact that we don't fit in or we don't belong here, stuff like that, then we're always going to be in a losing position to those who give us those vibes and give us those ideas that we don't belong here. So I think it's about us telling them, Australia is as much mine as yours. That's the only way we're going to get around it.

And Afrisha (Sierra Leonean background; Adelaide) said: "we're home now, we should feel Australian. We should feel Australian. We are Australian". In this statement, she claims a right to belong and to feel at home in the Australian nation; but taken with a different emphasis, it also suggests that she and others like her are what the home of the Australian nation has become. These examples indicate the desire of these young people to make claims of ownership of the nation on their own terms, as entitled citizens, for whom "Australia is as much mine as yours".

What then makes possible these young people's strong articulations of belonging against frequent efforts to construct them as out of place? It is of course possible to argue that these kinds of statements are purely rhetorical or performative, operating as a kind of defensive or symbolic gesture against exclusion. However, recent scholarship in the area of everyday multiculturalism provides an alternative prism through which to view such declarations. This approach suggests that the lived reality of productive relationality in culturally diverse neighbourhoods fosters conditions

where belonging is made real, even during times of backlash. In spite of their experiences of exclusionary practices in some public spaces of the city these young people articulated a strong sense of national belonging, and it is arguable that this in turn was partly forged through their experiences of local belonging to their multicultural neighbourhoods.

10.5 Multicultural Local Belongings

Theorists of visceral cosmopolitanism (Nava 2007) and everyday multiculturalism (Wise and Velayutham 2009) have drawn attention to the significance of mundane practices of interaction and sharing place in local diverse communities in understanding where larger issues of national belonging are worked out, even in conditions of a retreat from multiculturalism. For example, Gilroy (2004: xi) argues that we can only adequately theorise more abstract notions of cosmopolitanism, conviviality and changing forms of national identity in superdiversity through analysis of “the processes of cohabitation and interaction that have made multiculture an ordinary feature of social life”. Others such as Wise (2005) and Lobo (2010) also argue that productive relationality and shared belongings are made real in the everyday experience of an “interethnic habitus” that is forged in culturally diverse neighbourhoods.

It was in their local areas, where diversity was normalised and social relations were often experienced as both open and respectful, that young people in this research were best able to articulate and enact a right to be present. The young people reported high levels of comfort with the diversity in their local environments: 89 % felt that the cultural diversity in their area had a positive impact on them and 83 % said they regularly hung out with people of different backgrounds in their neighbourhoods. Eighty-one percent thought their neighbourhoods were good places for young people to live in. Although several of these neighbourhoods were stigmatised places, the young people reported a strong sense of safety and community. They described positive neighbourly relations and a productive communal culture. They elaborated on how they felt able to fit in and be part of an ordinary or commonplace diversity (see, Wessendorf 2010) in their areas and what enabled them to feel comfortable in the streets and spaces of these multicultural neighbourhoods.

Afrisha (Sierra Leonean background; Adelaide): I feel I fit in to the western suburbs. I think blend in just fine. [...] I feel fine there. I don't feel like I stand out in any particular way. That's alright.

Billie (Maori background; Sydney): I feel safe. I feel welcome. I feel really welcome [...] I feel—when I'm in this area, I honestly feel a lot of pride because these people are so amazing. They make me feel so happy and joyful all the time.

Duc (Vietnamese/New Zealand background; Sydney): when I walk around [name of neighbourhood] I feel like I can blend in because everywhere I walk I know people with different religions, cultures, background or how they grew up or anything.

Further, they described their local multicultural contexts as places where recognition and respect were mostly productively negotiated through everyday interactions across difference. This was made possible because no one group dominated and

people tended to accept the right of others, and of difference, to be present. For example Sam (Sudanese background; Brisbane) described the difference he had experienced between living in Sudan and then Egypt, and living in a diverse Australian suburb thus:

[...] where I come from, there's always only two groups [...] Then coming here, there's a whole heap of groups. So you can't start problem with anyone. All you can really do is get to know everyone, because it's pretty interesting.

This did not mean that there was no conflict or that people necessarily liked one another, but there was a regard for others as equally entitled to be there. Young people took for granted the heterogeneity of their areas, and were disinclined to perceive it as “unusual, undesirable, temporal” (Back et al. 2008: 19). As Malcolm (Ethiopian background; Melbourne) said about his neighbourhood:

[...] you actually have to learn to appreciate and respect different cultures and different faiths, political views. You don't have to agree with them, you don't have to love them but in order to live here and live amongst people in a harmonious way then you've got to actually respect it.

Some specifically contrasted this with their experience in other parts of the city. For example, Kim (Afghani background, Adelaide) said:

Basically when I wear my scarf, sometimes I feel like people will judge me differently and they will treat me differently. But in my neighbourhood they are really nice people. When I'm going out, they respect me, they treat me as everyone else. So I feel really comfortable about living there.

It is arguable then that these local experiences of respect and acceptance of the right of diverse others to belong in turn went some way towards supporting their capacities for flexible conceptualisations and articulations of national belonging. This everyday lived experience of feeling at home in what Hage (2000: 210) calls “the multicultural real” in turn likely scaffolded their capacity to claim a right to belong to the nation. Their lived experience of the ordinary diversity in Australianness and practices of local belonging enacted “in everyday lives, away from the heat of moral panic and state- and media-driven anxieties about social cohesion” (Noble 2009: 51) clearly fostered their ability to also feel at home in their national identities as hybrid subjects. It was here that they were developing the competencies for inclusive belongings and expanding identities and were able to position themselves as rightfully present, even while in the civic spaces beyond their neighbourhoods they routinely faced efforts to construct them as outsiders.

10.6 Conclusion

A contradictory picture has emerged here of young Australians of diverse backgrounds growing up under conditions of everyday diversity *and* a multiculturalism backlash, which inevitably situates them as both “at home” and “out of place”. There are several conclusions to be drawn from this paradox. First, it is important to

know the extent and depth of exclusionary practices as they are enacted upon young people in the public spaces of Australian cities. There can be a tendency in scholarly, public and policy debate to imagine young people as ideal hybrid subjects who do not face the challenges experienced by past generations of immigrants, and as therefore in some ways embodying and embracing a “post-multicultural” turn (for an overview see, Fortier 2008). It is important therefore to further investigate the nature and extent of the exclusionary practices that occur with disturbing frequency and cast a threatening shadow over these young people's everyday lives as they attempt to move around their city spaces.

Second, what is also evident is how belonging, and not just exclusion, is also experienced and constructed spatially. For young people, it is the local neighbourhood space that is perhaps most critical in facilitating belonging. Because of this, it is vital to understand more about how young people enact local citizenships and see how their “right to the city” is first and perhaps best exercised in the immediate space of the local neighbourhood. This is important in the context of the emergent sociology of cosmopolitanism (Kendall et al. 2009). While there has been a cautious optimism amongst some about the open and unpredictable nature of the city and the ways that an urban environment used by many can be a space for productive crossings and meetings (for an overview see, Sandercock 2003), for these young people, the picture was very different. For example, the central business district or public transport were not experienced by them as open and unmarked spaces of unstructured encounter, but were already shaped by a “mainstream” sensibility, and as a result they felt very uncomfortable with unpredictable crossings. It is their local literacies that need to be scaled up, in order to get beyond a more adult-centric notion of cosmopolitan city space.

Finally, their expressions of national identity and their experiences of local belonging indicate that we are beyond a point of reasserting a model of multiculturalism as simply tolerating or even celebrating difference or recognizing minority practices and rights. They attempt a new imagining of a multicultural Australian citizenship built on an acknowledgement of the entitled presence of others as legitimate members of the nation, and the relinquishment of the notion that the majoritised determine inclusion, even while sometimes the best they can do is make strong assertions and try to keep to safe spaces. This is vastly different from a multicultural politics grounded in respect for the non-confrontational private practice of cultural difference at home and adherence to common values and allegiances in the public sphere. These young people position themselves at the forefront of the shaping of flexible and multiple conceptualizations of national belonging, which is the legacy of Australian multiculturalism and testament to its success in the everyday spaces of local diverse communities, even under conditions of backlash.

Finally, this chapter supports a turn towards theorising the everyday politics of belonging in order to understand possibilities for multicultural citizenship. By looking closely at the everyday practices of social actors in different civic spaces, it is possible to ascertain how young people negotiate larger and more abstract questions of citizenship in their daily lives. As Erel (2011: 2065) observes, the neighbourhood and the nation are structured by specific governmentalities that regulate belonging,

but these are produced through contestation amongst individuals and groups. Citizenship and belonging emerge here as not merely categories of legal status or identity, but as made up of a range of acts of local and national membership practised in specific sites.

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Chapter 11

“And Yet We Are Still Excluded”: Reclaiming Multicultural Queer Histories and Engaging with Contemporary Multicultural Queer Realities

Lian Low and Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli

Abstract In this chapter, we contend that reclaiming multiculturalism entails engaging with and including sexual and gender diverse histories, heritages and contemporary realities. We explore the ongoing dilemmas, concerns and strategies in placing “multisexuality” and “multigender” on the “multicultural” agenda in Australia, particularly in relation to policy development and research. We discuss how “reclaiming multiculturalism” and the promotion of “global citizenship” requires a reclaiming of multicultural queer histories and heritages, achieved through decolonising research projects, postcolonising socio-political activist networks, and publications that engage with multiplicity in identities and communities, or “multiple lifeworlds”.

Keywords Multiculturalism • Multicultural policies • Ethnicity • Gender • Sexuality • Heteronormativity • Intersectionality • Queer

Post-White Australia, Australia’s subsequent multicultural policies and community action enabled its culturally and linguistically diverse population of migrants and refugees from non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds to gain citizenship rights (see also Chaps. 8 and 10; for a history of multicultural governance in Australia see Chaps. 12 and 13). Yet absent from these multicultural histories are multicultural gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (GLBTIQ) Australian narratives (see, for example, Low 2005; Pallotta-Chiarolli 1999b, 2008b). In 2014, there still exists the silencing and exclusion of sexual and gender diversities in heterosexist

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multicultural policies, discourses, community spaces and services. In this chapter, we contend that “reclaiming multiculturalism” cannot sit comfortably and confidently with “global citizenship and ethical engagement with diversity” if it does not engage with and include sexual and gender diverse histories, heritages and contemporary realities. We explore the ongoing dilemmas, concerns and strategies in placing “multisexuality” and “multigender” on the “multicultural” agenda in Australia, particularly in relation to policy development and research. As Cope and Kalantzis state:

[...] people are simultaneously the members of multiple lifeworlds, so their identities have multiple layers, each layer in complex relation to the others [...]. We have to be proficient as we negotiate these many lifeworlds- the many lifeworlds each of us inhabit, and the many lifeworlds we encounter in our everyday lives. (1995: 10–11)

Likewise, we discuss how “reclaiming multiculturalism” and the promotion of “global citizenship” require a reclaiming of multicultural queer histories and heritages, through decolonising research projects, postcolonising socio-political activist networks, and publications that engage with multiplicity in identities and communities, or “multiple lifeworlds”. First, we challenge the exclusion of contemporary multicultural queer realities and the research undertaken to explore this absence. Our core example is a community consultation research project on same-sex attracted young people from culturally and linguistically diverse communities hosted by the Centre for Multicultural Youth and Victoria University and the resulting report, *Teaching Diversities: Same-sex attracted young people, CALD communities and arts-based community engagement* (Harris 2011).¹ We then analyse the meanings and deployment of multiculturalism when it fails to address gender and sexual diversities, the “ethnic excuses” used to maintain a heteronormative and gendernormative status quo. In the final section, we examine two examples of sites of local, national and global inclusion and engagement by analysing the work of ILGA (International Lesbian and Gay Association) and AGMC Inc (Australian GLBTIQ Multicultural Council): two networks addressing the rights of multifaith, multicultural GLBTIQ peoples and communities. In addition, we discuss *Peril*, an Asian-Australian arts and culture publication, as a case-study example of direct and specific incorporation of multisexual multigender realities.

11.1 Challenging the Exclusion of Contemporary Multicultural Queer Realities

Since the 1980s many postcolonial feminist and queer theorists have been challenging the heteronormative and gendernormative framing of multicultural policies, programs and practices, pointing out their operationalisation of the rhetoric of inclusion, social justice and diversity while simultaneously displaying a lack of

¹ See Gay and Lesbian Health Victoria CALD section for a comprehensive list of the available resources/research reports: <http://www.glhv.org.au/library?keys=&topic=36&format=All>.

proficiency, and exclusion and discrimination against non-heterosexual and genderqueer members of culturally diverse communities (see Anzaldúa 1987; McLaren 1993; Pallotta-Chiarolli 1995, 1999a, 2004; Trinh 1991). Indeed, Harris posits that while the problem of the twentieth century was “racialised segregation and oppression”, the “problem of the twenty-first century” is “the further marginalization within already marginalized groups [...] the history and occurrence of homophobia and heterosexism” whereby the more privileged heteronormative and gendernormative group members downgrade, discriminate and oppress other less privileged group members (2009: 431). Or, as Freire (1990) succinctly explained, the oppressed become the oppressors.

Thus, what needs to be reclaimed is the awareness that multiculturalism must explore the interweaving of “multiple lifeworlds” and advocate for those living on the borders of socio-cultural groupings based on ethnicity, gender, sexuality and other variables of personal identity. This is a living contemporary multiculturalism that engages with intersectionalities involving “the crossing of an indeterminate number of borderlines [...] multiple in its hyphenation” (Trinh 1991: 107). The borderlands where multiculturalism needs to engage with diversity and advocate for the marginal within the marginal is a space where one can find “an overlay of codes, a multiplicity of culturally inscribed subject positions, a displacement of normative reference codes, and a polyvalent assemblage of new cultural meanings” (McLaren 1993: 121). Multicultural policies, programmes and practices must engage with, support and affirm individuals with multiple identities from multiple lifeworlds, upholding them as sites of confluence and intermixture, rather than expecting them to “self-scissor” and then assimilate to one “world” at the expense of another. As Trinh writes:

Multiculturalism does not lead us very far if it remains a question of difference only between one culture and another [...]. To cut across boundaries and borderlines is to live aloud the malaise of categories and labels; it is to resist simplistic attempts at classifying; to resist the comfort of belonging to a classification. (1991: 107–108)

Being GLBTIQ and raised within an ethnic/religious group requires the negotiation and interweaving of varying and multiple regulations, expectations and social codes in relation to gender, sexuality and ethnicity (Pallotta-Chiarolli 2005a). Identity and belonging with its consequent regulations, expectations and codes come from a person’s predominantly heteronormative and gendernormative ethnic/religious families and communities; predominantly Western/white middle class GLBTIQ communities; and predominantly heteronormative and gendernormative wider social, political, educational, media and health institutions and systems. Savin-Williams (1998) presents three main developmental tasks of GLBTIQ young people from diverse ethnic/religious backgrounds that are not necessarily experienced by GLBTIQ young people from dominant Anglo-white backgrounds. First, the young person needs to cultivate both a sexual identity and an ethnic/spiritual identity. Second, the young person must resolve or manage any conflicts that may arise in claiming allegiance to an ethnic/religious reference group and to GLBTIQ communities; and third, the young person needs to negotiate any stigma and discrimination

encountered because of the interconnections of homophobia, racism, sexism, anti-religious mind-sets and classism.

For many GLBTIQ young people from diverse ethnic backgrounds, their ethnic/religious community and family can nurture a cultural identification, offer a deep sense of ethnic heritage and spiritual values, and provide a sense of self within the context of a family that shares a youth's struggles and oppressions from the wider society; such as racism, Islamophobia and classism (Beckett et al. 2013; Greene 1997; Hooghe et al. 2010; Jackson and Sullivan 1999). The poem "Conversation with My Grandmama", by Annie Ling (1992) provides a powerful and positive example of the identity-forming processes discussed above, as well as an example of global citizenship. The title of Ling's anthology, *Mei Tze is Also My Name*, is indicative of her claiming of her Chinese-Malaysian identity alongside her Chinese-Australian identity. She transcends both the traditional world of her grandparents in Sibul, Malaysia, and the Chinese-Australian world of her parents in Sydney, Australia. Simultaneously, she claims her dowry, "I want my gold as in Chinese tradition", and talks about her "lesbian existence". She challenges her grandmother's gender and lesbian constructs and challenges Western society's constructs of ethnicity, gender and lesbian sexuality. She draws from all socio-cultural constructions to devise a multiple or *mestizaje* (Anzaldúa 1987) identity that cuts through any stereotype of homogeneity within any one category. She can connect across time, geography and cultures to voice her particular identities with both her significant and societal others.

To date, and despite over 30 years of theorizing, dialogue and activism, there appear to be two main approaches in multicultural policies, programmes and practices, neither of which attempt to directly address and engage with the multiple lifeworlds of multicultural queers. The first is *Exclusion*: where multicultural and multifaith GLBTIQ individuals and communities are deliberately excluded from multicultural policies, programs, events and welfare. The second is *Indirect Incorporation*: where multicultural policies, programs, events and welfare are worded and organized in such a way as to be open to interpretation and application as including sexual diversity and gender diversity: yet this is never explicitly stated to avoid antagonising those in power, the gatekeepers, of multicultural organizations and sectors who may be homophobic and transphobic, and possibly sabotage/veto the whole policy.

A third approach, however, is beginning to make inroads within some multicultural research, sectors and organizations, and it is the approach that demonstrates an "ethical engagement with diversity": *Direct and Specific Incorporation* whereby multicultural research, policies, programs, events and welfare directly and specifically include and affirm sexual diversity and gender diversity, and directly address homophobia and transphobia. For example, the Victorian Government's *Victorian Refugee health and wellbeing strategy: Consultation summary* identifies GLBTIQ refugees and asylum seekers as having particular needs (Department of Health 2013). The response of Government and service providers alike, however, shows that this acknowledgement "is not reflected, in any systematic way, in policies, programs and the delivery of support services to this population" (Noto et al. 2014: 3).

This third much-needed approach was also evident in a community consultation research project on same-sex attracted young people from culturally and linguistically diverse communities funded by Victoria University in collaboration with the Centre for Multicultural Youth. The co-author of this chapter, Lian Low, was a research assistant in the project. Together with another research assistant, Greig Friday, they interviewed 25 focus group participants and conducted nine one-on-one interviews over a period of 4 months. The resulting report, *Teaching Diversities: Same-sex attracted young people, CALD communities and arts-based community engagement* (Harris 2011) provided concrete examples of the complexity of living as a culturally and linguistically diverse young person in a Western context. Below are Low's summary of some of the themes and recommendations that arose from the consultation as a reflection on the ongoing need to “reclaim” a multiculturalism that actually lives up to its claims of ‘ethically engaging with diversity’.

Religion: and its impact on homophobic views within Christian and Muslim faith communities. An inversion of this however can be found in the GLBTIQ communities where religious participants feel they have to hide their religious identities:

I guess for me it's more about my faith background than my ethnicity [...] I go out in the gay bar and I meet somebody, not saying my name [...] because I'm thinking that they might think that I'm some crazy guy or some terrorist. (Egyptian gay male, Muslim, 26)

Identity and isolation: in relation to geography, religion, culture and the queer communities. Participants discussed the frustrations of prioritising aspects of identity in different contexts.

This is what my mum said a few days after I came out, ‘Aussies or white people can be gay, but as a Vietnamese person there's no such thing, you're not allowed to’. (Vietnamese gay male, 25)

As the above quote illustrates, some participants talked about experiences whereby family members stressed to them that coming out would bring shame on their families or community members. These participants called for role models of GLBTIQ individuals from their own cultures, but also cultural advocates and allies who are not GLBTQ.

Racism in the wider society and within the queer communities: some participants felt uncomfortable and unsafe when entering spaces dominated by white people (similar findings are reported in Chap. 10 in relation to non-Anglo Australian youth; on “whiteness” see Chap. 8), including the queer scene. Most respondents advocated for having anti-racism campaigns in the GLBTIQ communities examining the systemic ways in which white privilege oppressed culturally diverse GLBTIQ members. Furthermore, participants recommended addressing online racism on GLBTIQ dating websites and setting up online safe spaces. A few participants also observed a “racial fetishisation”, or exoticisation of their cultural and racial identities.

Education around the history of sexualities and gender identities from non-white, non-western perspectives: some young people highlighted how colonial practices and perspectives impacted upon the histories and identities of sexual and gender diverse communities:

I think there's this assumption that people of colour, communities that aren't white, don't have a queer history, and that's so wrong. There's the Fa'afafines from the Islands which are basically trans men and there's heaps of queer culture in non-white culture—like in Indigenous, Asian and black cultures. (PapuaNewGuinean/TSI/Scottish genderqueer participant, 21)

Another example of “direct and specific incorporation” and “ethical engagement with diversity” is *We're Family Too: a report into the effects of homophobia in Arabic-speaking communities in NSW* (Kassisieh 2012). A range of individuals and organisations tied to the Arab community and the GLBTIQ community in NSW collaborated to investigate the effects of homophobia on Same-Sex Attracted (SSA) people from Arabic-speaking backgrounds in NSW, while also drawing attention to racism and stereotyping within NSW's GLBT community. The report also examines how SSA people from Arabic-speaking backgrounds in NSW provide support for each other, and recommends a range of initiatives that can address the effects of homophobia and racism in multicultural communities.

11.2 The Meanings and Deployment of Multiculturalism in (Not) Addressing Gender and Sexual Diversity

To date, multiculturalism is largely defined and deployed in ways that maintain heteropatriarchal selective cultural/religious heritage and traditions. Policies, programmes, festivals, commemoratives, and welfare systems are being used to establish and develop a multicultural community's culture/faith in Australia by producing heteronormative and gendernormative cultural narratives and discourses. A main way that this is done is by constructing and upholding the discourse of “the authentic religious migrant/refugee experience” as heteronormative, devised and policed by hegemonic gatekeepers of various multicultural communities, organizations and systems.

When attempts are made to resist, shift or negotiate these meanings and deployments of multiculturalism, what Pallotta-Chiarolli (2005b) has called “The Ethnic Excuses” are activated and enacted. These include: “We've got enough to handle with racism and sexism in our multicultural school/health service/organisation. Homophobia is too much and very different for our community”; “This is a moral issue that our multicultural religious families/communities will object to”; “It's racist to challenge ethnic people and communities on their homophobia as you're not respecting their traditions or their rights to their beliefs”; and “Our ethnic and migrant/refugee families will be offended as it's contrary to their cultural heritage and maintenance of cultural traditions that as a multicultural school/health service/organisation we are committed to”.

In the above four examples, a hegemonic and homogenizing construction and depiction of multicultural families and communities is put forward as the authentic, singular voice, perspective and experience, one, which, is beyond reproach and debate by Anglo groups, as well as by some ethnic groups towards other ethnic

groups, as that would be deemed racist. In other words, the accusation of “racism” can be used to silence groups outside the challenged group when they endeavour to debate or critique its queerphobia, as per example four above. We argue that it is actually racist and ethnocentric to dismiss/stereotype whole ethnic communities as queerphobic without acknowledging the diversity within those communities, including GLBTIQ migrants and refugees themselves, and the significance of other factors apart from ethnicity that encourage homophobia among migrant/refugee communities (Pallotta-Chiarolli 1995).

Indeed, some Western political leaders are mobilising “suspected attitudes towards homosexuality” among migrant and refugee communities in “state practices of exclusion”, the denial of citizenship, and the erosion of multiculturalism as national policy due to the “alleged incompatibility” of Islam (see Chap. 6) and other faith and value-systems of incoming migrants and refugees with the “democratic values” of Western countries (Kosnick 2011: 132). A critical deconstructionist approach would ask and address the following questions: how have these conclusions about the queerphobia of an ethnic community—and the inappropriateness of challenging this—been drawn, and for whose purposes and gain; who was consulted; who was silenced; who are the gatekeepers and how would/could we access alternative voices; what surveys, research and discussions have been held and by whom and where; how have discourses of “morality”, “offence” and “racism” been co-opted and applied here? Wouldn’t some families consider the emotional, verbal and physical abuse and violence that GLBTIQ members of their cultural communities are experiencing as “immoral”, “offensive” and against their religious values of love, duty of care and peace? How would an “ethical engagement with diversity” create a greater awareness of the diversity of experiences, perspectives and realities that challenge the hegemonic and homogenous “authentic migrant/refugee” discourse? How do we engage community leaders and members in, and provide access to, debates and texts and examples of a *range* of lived realities of gender and sexuality within their own cultures in Australia, in countries of origin, and across a range of cultures? How can we utilise existing texts and call for a greater *range* of representations of gender and sexuality issues in culturally diverse texts, in media representations of ethnicity, and of course the incorporation of a diversity of ethnicity-gender-sexuality issues into mainstream Anglo-Australian texts and representations?

11.3 Reclaiming Multicultural Queer Histories and Heritages

As part of undertaking the above critical deconstruction and broad questioning of contemporary communities in global, national and local contexts, it is important to access and promote cross-cultural anthropological, historical, pre-colonial, religious and cultural codes, biographies and narratives in relation to sexualities and genders in order to open up a broader base of knowledge within which to situate

historical, colonial, and contemporary Western, Christian constructions (see, for example, Drucker 2000; Massad 2008). We need to ensure that we are presenting multicultural persons and communities in Australia as not only end-products of various political, cultural and social processes, thereby rendering them solely as passive victims, but also as having various amounts of decolonising agency, such as resisting, negotiating, manipulating past borders and boundaries, and embarking upon new processes of queer re/identification and re/claiming queer spaces (Pallotta-Chiarolli 2004).

Homosexuality is sometimes viewed in multicultural communities as a symptom of “Westernization”, representing the “moral decadence” of Western society (Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010; Shannahan 2010). This becomes particularly pertinent and poignant in a “multicultural queer” person’s decisions regarding “coming out”, a prevalent Western construction of publicly declaring and openly living one’s sexuality within one’s family of origin, rather than closeting or concealing it (Hammoud-Beckett 2007; Pallotta-Chiarolli 2005b). As part of our processes of decolonising queer histories and heritages, we need to ask and address: why is homosexuality considered by some multicultural individuals and communities to be a Western “sin”, “sickness”, and/or “crime”? How has colonialism and Christianisation erased, or ignored, or re-written pre-colonial and pre-Christian sexual and gender diversities? (Aldrich 2002). What knowledge and realities of global queer histories and heritages can be researched and reclaimed, and indeed have survived, persisted and thrived as post-colonial queer identities/cultures/communities? (see, for example, Murray and Roscoe 1997; Tamale 2011; Vanessa 2007). Researchers such as Eprecht and Egya find that many pre-colonial cultures were “historically more accommodating to sexual difference than present-day homophobes allow” and in the case of African countries, “it is the dogmatic intolerance of same-sex sexuality that is ‘un-African’ in the sense that it largely reflects imported Christian missionary ideology and colonial law” (2011: 369). Indeed, as Shoko argues in the case of Zimbabwe where President Mugabe has used Christianity and pan-Africanism or African nationalism to discriminate against homosexuality, colonial legislation was “imposed on indigenous peoples without interest in or inquiry into the indigenous view of homosexuality” (2010: 645–46); these indigenous views are being increasingly made available and enacted in contemporary African settings as ongoing forms of resistance and decolonising. As Hamilton writes, the homophobia displayed by diverse Africans “largely reflects the victory of the rightist Christian rhetoric” as well as the overwhelming success of colonialism that it has until recent queer activism largely erased any pre-colonial queer knowledges and realities and positioned itself as the authentic historical knowledge and reality of a colonized country (2012: 87).

That particular [Christian] God came to Africa [and Asia and the Pacific Islands] to pave the way for colonialists and to pacify Africans for domination by European colonial powers. We have to wonder how consistent Mugabe is when he uses a foreign religion (Christianity) while speaking a foreign language (English) to claim that it is un-African to be gay. (Mutua 2011: 460)

Alongside these profound questions and processes of decolonising heteronormative and gendernormative histories, how do we avoid another layer of colonising and racist practices in undertaking this excavation and archaeology? As Atluri (2012: 721–22) points out, the “same colonizing power that fuelled a system of monetary debt and instituted colonial laws that criminalized diverse sexualities throughout the global south can now refuse economic aid to formerly colonized subjects in the name of championing sexual ‘rights’”. In particular, reclaiming and proclaiming multicultural queer histories means being mindful of four problematic and racist/colonial dehumanizing interpretative processes. The first is *Pedestalling (mythologizing?)*: where pre-colonial queer histories and heritages are upheld as perfect and unproblematic, thereby divesting them of individual and socio-cultural complexity. As Lewis (2011: 215) writes, “pre-colonial African societies exhibited numerous examples of repressive and coercive constructions of bodies and sexuality”. The issue is not to pedestal or demonise but to make visible the multiple ways sexualities and genders were codified, judged and experienced. Second, we need to avoid *Exoticising (Othering?)*: where pre-colonial queer histories and heritages, and their ongoing forms in contemporary settings, are only studied and highlighted as curiosities or entertainments, as points of contrast and difference to Western-centric norms and understandings of sexual and gender diversity. Third, we need to be mindful of *Demonizing (crusading against?)*: where precolonial queer histories and heritages are displayed and studied as pathological and problematic, particularly when contrasted to Western “civilized” understandings of GLBIQ identities, politics and rights. Finally, we must be alert to *Re-interpreting (appropriating?)*: where pre-colonial queer histories and heritages are reconstructed and adapted in contemporary settings to showcase and work for Western GLBTIQ constructions of identities, rights and global citizenship. As Tamale (2011: 26) states, “there is an underlying resonance between the respective structures of Western and African societies that compels us not to completely reject or dismantle Western theoretical scaffoldings because they provide some useful tools for researchers to reflect upon and to develop insights concerning African sexualities” while simultaneously there are “nuanced specificities” that do differ and need to be respected and addressed; such as in the imposition of Western terms such as gay and lesbian, their assumption of sexual binary rather than sexual fluidity, and their use in global systems/markets of consumption and commodification.

11.4 Sites of Local, National and Global Inclusion and Engagement: The Work of ILGA and AGMC

There is a need to provide a diversity of mental, emotional, physical and spiritual spaces and places where the multiple selves and multiple lifeworlds can come together to share similar and differing joys; negotiate the multiple and interwoven phobias; share understandings with others from one’s own groups and other groups

regarding living and loving in diversity; and plan political, social and other actions and strategies. The establishment of the AGMC Inc (Australian Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer Multicultural Council; agmc.org.au), ILGA (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association; ilga.org) and the many multicultural and multifaith GLBTIQ social and support groups are a testimony to the need to engage with people's lived experiences of negotiating and interweaving multiple identities, multiple group allegiances, multiple community belongings and undertake political and community action (Pallotta-Chiarolli 2005a, 2008a).

AGMC Inc was established in 2004 and has held conferences, forums, film nights, dance parties, sat on local, national and international boards, participated in ethnic, queer and mainstream media, and produced its own recommendations and strategies for the inclusion of multicultural GLBTIQ identities and issues into multicultural, mainstream and GLBTIQ community policies, programmes and practices (Chang and Apostle 2008; Pallotta-Chiarolli 2008a). Indeed, AGMC has sometimes been a catalyst for finding intimate partners who share similar joys, challenges and understandings in regard to living and loving in diversity. Thus, from discussion forums to dance-parties, it caters for the internal diversity of needs and interests within their specific multicultural groups.² By 2008, amidst debates and contentions within the ECCV (Ethnic Communities Council of Victoria) that AGMC was not privy to, it achieved recognition and was granted membership into the ECCV and thereby became a member of FECCA (Federation of Ethnic Communities Council of Australia). Since then, it has had stalls and given papers at FECCA conferences.

Thus, AGMC is a pertinent example of ethically engaging with diversity; as it provides a space and place of support and action situated on the borders between ethnic, mainstream and queer organizations, policy developers, and service providers. AGMC also engages with global citizenship by being a member of ILGA which reports on and engages with global, national and local policies, actions, and support services throughout the world with sub-groups in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, South America, Europe, the UK and USA.

Thus, these two organizations are examples of addressing seven significant factors in the successful negotiation of people's various identities and communities, and the extent to which they feel safe, comfortable and confident in being visible. First, they provide strong local, national and global support networks and friendships with other GLBTIQ people of same and/or similar cultural and religious backgrounds. Second, they provide access to, and participation in, both the GLBTIQ and ethnic communities while allowing members to transcend both to live with a code of their own. Third, by being able to select how "out" or anonymous to be as members of these organizations and in participating in their events, forums and actions, GLBTIQ people are able to have control over how, when and if to "come out" or "invite people to come in" (Hammoud-Beckett 2007). For example, AGMC auspices the Queer Muslims Network in Australia wherein some of its members only ever discuss and connect anonymously via the internet forums. Fourth, these

² See <http://www.agmc.org.au/multiculturaldirectory/> for listings of groups.

organizations obtain media coverage of multicultural and global GLBTIQ individuals and events, films and other resources, and assist in making them available in queer, ethnic community and mainstream papers, television, film and music such as the documentaries *A Jihad for Love* (Halal Films 2007), *Parents Reborn* (Cipelletti/AGEDO 2009) and *Courage Unfolds* (International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) Asia Program 2011), and which have all been shown by AGMC at public events with discussions and festivity. Similarly, educational, workplace and health systems can access these sites and their resources in order to address racism, sexism and homophobia equally, consistently and in interconnected ways via policy development, professional development programmes and pastoral care of clients, students and staff (Savin-Williams 1998). Finally, these organizations are meeting the needs of GLBTIQ people from diverse ethnic/religious backgrounds who want queer community organisations and services, GLBTIQ venues, papers and other media/internet avenues to promote and implement policies and practices that cater for their diverse cultural backgrounds. These include schools, GLBTIQ community services, ethnic community services and mainstream health services, all of which need to undertake research into and resourcing their multicultural, multisexual populations (Yip 2008).

11.5 *Peril*: A Specific Example/Site of “Ethical Engagement” with Diversity

Peril is an online Asian-Australian arts and cultural magazine which was founded in 2006 by Hoa Pham (editor) together with editorial advisers Tom Cho and Dr Tseen Khoo. Together they chose the provocative name because it referenced the derogatory labelling of the wave of Chinese immigration to Australia in the nineteenth century (Pham 2006). Accordingly, *Peril* has lived up to its name and publishes culturally savvy and political material that engages with Asian-Australian themes, otherwise not covered by the wider Australian media. The genre of material that is published are by established and emerging writers and include non-fiction, literary fiction and non-fiction, poetry and blog posts, which are inclusive of gender and sexually diverse themes, and the editors past and present are gender and sexually diverse members of the Asian-Australian community. At the time of writing this chapter, *Peril*'s editors were Lian Low (Editor-in-Chief and Prose), Eleanor Jackson (Poetry) and Owen Leong (Visual Arts) (Peril 2012). In 2014, they are Lian Low (Editor-at-Large), Eleanor Jackson (Editor-in-Chief and Poetry), Nikki Lam (Visual Arts) Juliana Qian (Prose, guest editor) and Jarni Blakkarly (Politics and Arts). Furthermore, *Peril* also has editorial advisers and board members that govern its operation.

In a guest blog post on an Asian-American blog site, *The Plaid Bag Connection*, Hoa Pham, an established author and playwright, observed that in 2006, the gatekeepers of publishing houses were majority white Australians who were still reluctant to publish culturally diverse material. This lack of publishing opportunities provided the impetus for *Peril*'s founding editors to create a space for

Asian-Australian perspectives (Pham 2012). For example, in 2008, Alice Pung edited a ground-breaking anthology, *Growing up Asian in Australia*. Prior to the book's publication however, Pung was advised by a publishing industry person that her original introduction was too heavy and would scare away bookshop customers—it detailed the invasion and dispossession of Australia's Indigenous peoples, the White Australia policy, and also included information about the racist violence towards the Chinese during the 1850s and 60s. Pung strategically took this advice so that she could “infiltrate” popular, everyday culture with “stories about how integral Asian-Australians are to our national identity” (Pung 2009). Not only did Pung accomplish this goal, she also succeeded in infiltrating the VCE (Victorian Certificate of Higher Education) high school curricula with stories that included queer Asian-Australians stories (Low 2008; Law 2008; Ayres 2008). *Peril* published her original introduction in 2008.

In *Peril*, we have featured articles that analyse, interrogate, subvert and disrupt assumptions of Asian-Australian identities and representation. The magazine primarily features work by Asian-Australians, however *Peril* also accepts work by non-Asian-Australians as long as the work relates to Asian-Australian interest. For example, in Issue 8, the theme was “Why are people so unkind?” This quote came directly from legendary Sri Lankan Malaysian Australian singer, Kamahl, from a line in a song that he is best known by. In his interview with *Peril*, Kamahl talked about his extraordinary career in show business, while also divulging personal experiences of racism in the industry (Quan 2009). Other content included Owen Leong's interviews with Japanese-based artist Pyuupiru who powerfully documented her experience of sex reassignment surgery and another was with emerging artist Haruka Yamada, whose work explored female fantasy, cross-dressing and sexuality (Leong 2009a, b). Low features an interview with anti-racist, queer, cabaret troupe, the Ladies of Colour Agency (Low 2009). The poetry submissions were overwhelmingly represented by viewpoints about race and racism in Australia. Pung's original introduction, as discussed above, is published in this edition. Benjamin Law, a Chinese-Australian author who had recently released his second book *Gaysia*, about his travels in queer communities in South, East and South-East Asia, wrote a discursive piece on ultra-conservative Filipino-American media commentator, Michelle Malkin who, while having experienced racism herself, has advocated racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims post 9/11 and “has also referred on one occasion to her ‘fellow Asian-Americans’ as ‘dishwashers’ and ‘people who can't even speak English’” (Law 2009).

While *Peril* from inception had always been inclusive of sexual and gender diversity in terms of content and representation, this understanding and prime objective was tested when a person involved with the development and production of *Peril* had, after 1 year of involvement, raised her discomfort in working on *Peril* projects which promoted queer agendas. Her reasoning stemmed from a religious moral and ethical framework whereby sex was only to be between a man and a woman, not before or outside marriage. To justify her queerphobia however, she was happy for *Peril* to be queer-friendly. The board and editors discussed her concerns at great length over a few weeks. Yet, they could not see where the boundary lay between the “queer-friendly” and “promoting a queer agenda” on the spectrum.

The claim that there can be a difference between “queer-friendly” and “promoting a queer agenda” was problematic. How can there be a queer agenda when as a society we are constantly surrounded by propaganda that is heterosexist, transphobic and queerphobic? In the end, we agreed that *Peril*'s editorial policy since the beginning has been to embrace diversity and in particular marginalised voices such as queer voices, and she had to decide whether she could work with us from that standpoint. She ended up handing in her resignation. In *Peril*'s mission statement, we now explicitly state that we are inclusive of people of diverse sexualities and genders.³

11.6 Multicultural Does Mean Multisexual and Multigendered, Just as Advocacy Does Mean Academic!

Multicultural community and organization leaders can play vital roles in encouraging the recognition, reclaiming and emergence of local, national and global multicultural queer persons, organizations, communities, histories and issues in their policies, programmes, and practices. In this chapter, we have discussed and demonstrated how multiculturalism is *not* about exclusionary, homogenising and assimilative policies and practices that deny, exclude and separate (see also Chap. 2 on this point). To continue to ignore the relevance and importance of the interweaving of sexuality, gender and ethnicity is to continue to allow GLBTIQ members of multicultural, multifaith communities to suffer from silence, isolation, and verbal, emotional, psychological and physical violence. By upholding a heteronormative and gendernormative version of the migrant/refugee story as the “authentic” and only narrative, and by dismissing any attempts to challenge homophobia and transphobia as racist or in contravention of multicultural rights, is to condone oppressions, to be oppressors, even as we cry out against being oppressed (Freire 1990).

This chapter addresses the reality that within the mainstream multicultural sphere, sexual and gender diverse identities are excluded, invisibilised and forgotten, not always intentionally. We have provided a thorough assessment, critique and analysis of this here, drawing from available theoretical discussions, our own experiences and work. Our participation in the symposium “Reclaiming Multiculturalism: Global Citizenship and Ethical Engagement with Diversity” and subsequent authoring of this chapter directly speaks to this absence.

We have provided examples of Australian empirical research reports and resources and where to find them. Many of them are community-based and mention the paucity of research in the area of multicultural queer. We have aligned ourselves with the theories of reclaiming multiculturalism and the emergence of multicultural queer communities and identities in Australia. This scholarly field of research of

³In the international realm, we also wish to acknowledge an online English-language website that engages with the intersections of gender/sexuality and/queer identities, *Fridae*, that publishes work from within the Asian region and the diaspora.

intersectionalities and the multiplicity of identities in relation to queer subjectivities is an “emergent” area that requires far more theorisation. Indeed, we acknowledge that the theoretical *mestizaje*/borderland work of, Pallotta-Chiarolli, is one of the few available in Australia, and requires critique, development and broader engagement by more scholars. As Low reflected:

As the current body of work is young and still at the grassroots, the theory is emerging as we live it. For example, it was only a decade ago that the peak body for individuals/groups from a Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer multicultural background—AGMC—was established. (Personal communication Dec 2014)

Thus, the theoretical frameworks, such as the work of Anzaldúa (1987), are emerging and evolving within an Australian diasporic and multicultural context. Yet, as Low has reflected from her experience writing and editing for online publications, “the mainstream is only now catching up with the discourse on the multiplicity of identities and intersectionalities when the work has been in the arts (for e.g. William Yang’s *Sadness* which had iterations as a performance (1992), book (1996) and documentary (1999), Christos Tsiolkas’ (1995) *Loaded* and the subsequent film *Head On* (1998), grassroots communities and on the internet for years”.

We conclude with the words of Trinh who warned over 20 years ago that unless we engage with the heterogeneity in our societies, we reduce the efficacy and beauty of “the creative interval” that would further expand and affirm our multiculturalism in policy, theory, research and action. The “creative interval” is made up of spaces and places to be creative, subversive, resistant, where new journeys and ways of seeing or being act against and between dominant problematic discourses:

as long as the complexity and difficulty of engaging with the diversely hybrid experiences of heterogenous contemporary societies are denied and not dealt with, [...] the creative interval is dangerously reduced to non-existence. (1991: 229)

We see our advocacy work on intersectionalities and multiple identities as interwoven with our academic work on intersectionalities and multiple identities, thereby situating ourselves in the borderlands of “the creative interval”.

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Chapter 12

Migrant Youth and Social Policy in Multicultural Australia: Exploring Cross-Cultural Networking

Libby Effeney, Fethi Mansouri, and Maša Mikola

Abstract This chapter explores the extent to which the direction of Australia's official multicultural and civic integration policies, reflects the social attitudes and networking practices of migrant youth. The chapter pays particular attention to the Federal Government's "Anti-Racism Strategy" announced in 2012 as part of its Multicultural Policy. On a theoretical level, direct efforts to mitigate racism have the potential to augment strategies that reaffirm pluralism and address disadvantage often associated with the migrant experience. On an empirical level, it is important to explore the extent to which such top-level discourses have actual founding in the social lives of migrant youth. Therefore this chapter presents the empirical findings of an empirical longitudinal on "Social Networks, Belonging and Active Citizenship among Migrant Youth" (Australian Research Council Linkage project 2009–2013). Migrant youth in this study pointed to a number of instances of racism, which act as significant barriers to cross-cultural networking. Analysis of the data shows, among other things, that there is a persistent tendency among migrant youth to point to their social distance from the metaphorical "Aussie Aussie" people of Anglo origins who are perceived as symbolising Australia's mainstream. Such manifestations of racial discrimination preclude the emergence of a genuinely inclusive society that supports and nurtures cultural diversity as a significant part of the Australian national identity, as well as the stated objectives of its social policy repertoire.

Keywords Multicultural policy • Multiculturalism • Civic integration • Social inclusion • Anti-racism strategy • Migrant youth • Racism

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12.1 Introduction

Multicultural Policy and the Social Inclusion Agenda were key pillars of the Australian Labor Government's (2007–2013) social policy repertoire.¹ They represent a blended approach to diversity that balances civic integrationist and multicultural perspectives (Banting and Kymlicka 2013) (see also Chap. 10). Broadly, the policies were aimed at fostering positive community relations by supporting cultural diversity and addressing socioeconomic disadvantage (see Chap. 4 for an argument in favour of this approach). Both of these policies identified young people as a critical demographic focus for their implementation (DIAC 2011; ASIB 2012). Despite this apparent focus, little has been done to empirically gauge their actual relevance and efficacy in regards to their key target group, migrant youth. This paper begins to fill this gap by exploring the extent to which top-level social policy discourses reflect and resonate with the social attitudes and networking practices of migrant youth. It is premised on the idea that empirical dynamics are the best touchstone for effective social policy. Specifically, this chapter looks at the extent to which the purported aims of the Labor Government's Multicultural and Social Inclusion policies speak to the cross-cultural networking practices of migrant youth in Australia. The analysis draws upon data collected as part of the ARC (Australian Research Council) Linkage Project (2009–2013) "Social Networks, Belonging and Active Citizenship among Migrant Youth" (Mansouri et al. 2013).

The first part of this chapter briefly outlines the Labor Government's Multicultural Policy and Social Inclusion Agenda, and critically appraises their compatibility, given that they are supposed to act in the context of, and in concert with, one another. Conceding that there is a measure of incompatibility between the two approaches, it goes on to argue that the new "Anti-Racism Strategy" announced in 2012, represents a practical step towards bridging the two policies, and promoting a more socioeconomically inclusive, multicultural Australia. The chapter will then anchor this discussion in an analysis of data from the ARC study. It explores the respondents' cross-cultural networking practices, and considers whether these practices resonate with the Multicultural and Social Inclusion policies. Specifically, the data is analysed in order to gauge community engagement and participation—which are key indicators used to measure civic integration, as espoused by the Social Inclusion agenda—and cross-cultural connections (an important component of the Multicultural Policy) among the migrant youth. The analysis will elucidate migrant youths' perspectives on whether Social Inclusion and Multicultural parameters facilitate actual feelings of belonging and engagement in the Australian social milieu as a whole.

¹ With the election of the conservative government under Prime Minister Tony Abbott in September 2013 the Social Inclusion Unit was disbanded, but the Multicultural Policy, *The People of Australia*, remains in place. The clear direction to be taken by the new government is yet to be elucidated, and so this chapter will concern itself with social policy under the former Labor Government.

12.2 Multiculturalism and Social Inclusion in Australia

Since the early 1970s Multicultural policy has been applied as a means of addressing cultural diversity in Australia. Over time, multiculturalism as “a set of practical policies aimed variously at improving the absorption of migrants and harmoniously integrating a culturally diverse society around liberal democratic values” (Brahm Levey 2007: 1) has taken on symbolic significance in debates about Australian national identity. Such embroilment in issues of national identity has tended to compromise multiculturalism as a policy agenda and call into question its utility. Political retreat from multiculturalism in the 1990s was backed up by distrust in aspects of multicultural policies by social critics and political analysts who argued that it is divisive (Brahm Levey 2007) and works against the harmonious integration of migrants (Modood 2007). As the Howard conservative government came to abandon its rhetorical use of “multiculturalism” in the late 1990s, civic integrationist notions such as citizenship, social cohesion and integration were touted as viable alternatives for government focus (see Chap. 10). In such an atmosphere, the newly elected Labour Government of 2007 announced the Social Inclusion Agenda as a key social policy with an all of government approach. It did so in concert with a reaffirmation of Multicultural Policy in 2011.

In recent years, Australia’s Multicultural Policy and Social Inclusion Agenda have developed in line with critiques from academics and practitioners, who argue that they fail to work in concert to address the specific disadvantage resulting from the migrant experience (Boese and Phillips 2011). In particular, these critiques point to entrenched processes of racially and culturally based exclusion in Australia. They argue for the need to challenge racism and discrimination directly, in order for the blended policy approach—which layers multicultural policy and a civic integrationist agenda—to remain apace with the needs of such a diverse country (Mansouri 2011; Vasta 2007; Dunn and Nelson 2011; Berman and Paradies 2010). The recent Anti-Racism Strategy was developed in response to these critiques and represents a potentially significant step towards encouraging genuine multicultural inclusion (AHRC 2012b).

12.2.1 *Australia’s Multicultural Policy*

There were many reasons for the introduction of multiculturalism in the 1970s by the Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, and its later implementation under the Liberal government of Malcolm Fraser. A multicultural reality, or what Parry and Lee (2011: 298) call “descriptive” multiculturalism was one of these reasons. Indeed, in 1967, new immigrants in Australia began lobbying the government for their cultural, ethnic and linguistic rights to be supported by funding for service provision. Also in this year, Australian Indigenous citizens were given full voting rights. By the early 1970s, thanks to movements in the US and South Africa, it had

become untenable internationally and in Australia to keep explicit racial clauses in government policies. At the ceremony proclaiming the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam referred to Australia as a “multicultural nation” for the first time in the history of federated Australia. And so it was, in 1978, under the Government of Malcom Fraser, that the first Multicultural Policy was implemented. The term multiculturalism, defined as “cultural pluralism” by the Fraser government had “an attendant focus on social cohesion” (Boese and Philips 2011: 190). Yet, despite these developments, race and racism did not cease to exist on a prescriptive level in all of Australia’s policies and social institutions, nor at the normative level of the national ethos (Pardy and Lee 2011: 298).

From its inception, multiculturalism as a government policy was concerned with *managing* migrant settlement and cultural diversity. Policymakers adopted an Access and Equity approach as expounded in the Galbally Report of 1978 (see also Chap. 13), which acknowledged the significant settlement needs of migrants and highlighted the need to foster multiculturalism through ethnic communities and all levels of government. It called for a focus on the recognition of heritage culture, equal opportunity and adequate services for migrants (Galbally 1978). In this period, multicultural policy was premised on a broader social justice agenda designed to address the social and economic disadvantages experienced by recently arrived migrants (see Chap. 13). Many support services for migrants were established, including language and social services, workplace and welfare assistance, and access to media in the first languages of migrants (Special Broadcasting Services). In short order, superficial understandings of culture “led to celebrations of exotic food and folkloric traditions in schools, local government services, state-funded cultural production, and many other spheres” (Poynting and Mason 2008: 235; see also Chap. 13). In this context, resentment grew among white Australians of British descent who became concerned with “cultural extinction” (Hage 2003: 61) or “cultural invisibility”. A growing popular backlash against multiculturalism started to emerge and with a loss of bipartisan support for the policy during the 1990s, Australian government rhetoric began to shift (see also Chap. 10).

At the turn of the century, in reaction to the symbolic significance that multiculturalism came to have in debates about what it means to be Australian, the conservative Howard government sought to underplay its importance by removing it from government use. As Mansouri noted, the primary, popular critique levelled at multiculturalism at this time was “that migrants have been able to access the rights associated with Australian citizenship and more broadly the Australian way of life without having to assume the social and civic responsibilities necessary to a cohesive society” (2013: 4). In this atmosphere, Australia’s social policies for migrants took a civic integrationist turn, beginning to emphasise notions of citizenship, social cohesion and integration. This manifested as the “New Integrationism” (Poynting and Mason 2008) of the Howard government, which focussed on “an assumed core culture that saw it as binding the nation together—western civilization, English language and Anglo-Saxon cultural roots” (Schech and Rainbird 2013; Tate 2009; see also Chap. 10). In this spirit, official multicultural policy faded into rhetorical

obscurity in 2006, and a socially conservative civic integrationist agenda was pursued. This culminated just a year later with the introduction of the citizenship test, representing what some describe as an attempt to tie a national character to the prerogatives of government and “dictate the cultural choices of Australians in civil society in the name of ‘our values’” (Brahm Levey 2007: 10).

On 16 February 2011, after more than a decade of the perceived marginalisation of multiculturalism from politics—what has been dubbed a “retreat from multiculturalism” (Joppke 2004; Uberoi and Modood 2013; Banting and Kymlicka 2013)—the Labor government announced “The People of Australia” the country’s first official multicultural policy since 2006. This announcement reaffirmed the Federal Government’s commitment to multiculturalism. Then minister for Immigration, Chris Bowen, publicly announced in an address to the Sydney Institute, that he is “not afraid to use the word multiculturalism” and is “proud of what it means to Australian life” (Bowen 2011). He also argued for the distinctiveness of Australia’s multiculturalism, or what he described as “the genius of Australian multiculturalism” (2011). This latest articulation of multicultural policy is underpinned by four principles: celebrating and valuing diversity; maintaining social cohesion; communicating the benefits of Australia’s diversity; and responding to intolerance and discrimination. The five key initiatives of this policy are the establishment of the Australian Multicultural Council (AMC); the National Anti-Racism Partnership and Strategy; Access and Equity Strategy; Multicultural Art and Festivals Grants; and the Multicultural Youth Sports Partnership Program (DIAC 2011).

Whilst welcoming the Government’s reaffirmation and commitment to multiculturalism, some critics warn that the increased complexity arising from the plurality of social contexts and negotiations of differences is often absent from policy and programs aimed at supporting cultural diversity (Noble 2011; Walsh 2012). Noble argues that diversity is most often assumed on the basis of the number of ethnic groups born overseas or arriving in Australia, but that there is little examination of the intermingling “that ensues, [so] we are left with the sense of diversity as the juxtaposition of enduring differences” (2011: 830). Academics and practitioners who conceptualise multiculturalism argue that there is a need for deeper multiculturalism; they argue for “recognition” (Fraser 1995) but they also argue for broader, socioeconomic justice and “redistribution” of capital (as per the Galbally report), as well as the need for genuine and substantive political “representation” of culturally diverse and marginalised groups (Mansouri 2013)² (see also Chap. 13 on “critical multiculturalism”). A deeper multicultural policy that is cognizant of every migrant’s agency, challenges racism and systemic discrimination, and promotes anti-racism initiatives.

In line with this, in August 2012, the Labor government announced the National Anti-Racism Strategy, which was launched under the slogan “Racism. It stops with me” (AHRC 2012a). Its main aim is to encourage all Australians to reflect on racism. It focuses on public awareness, education resources and youth engagement.

²This may be dubbed the three Rs of legitimate democratic governance of culturally diverse or ‘multicultural’ societies such as Australia.

The Strategy suggests that racism can take many forms, whether it is systemic, institutional or interpersonal. The forward to the strategy states, “we all have a role to play in taking action against racism wherever we see it” (Szoke in Australian Human Right Commission 2012). Essentially, the strategy promotes individual responsibility. It acknowledges the distinct disadvantage resulting from the migrant experience, and that government services and programs must be responsive to the needs of culturally diverse communities. This may be seen as a significant step in bringing discussions of race, racism and issues of difference and barriers to socio-economic inclusion in Australia into the mainstream. Beyond such recognition, however, exactly how this policy is to be executed by the government remains to be seen.

12.2.2 Australia’s Social Inclusion Agenda (2007–2013)

The Social Inclusion Agenda was announced in December 2007 by the newly elected Labor government under Kevin Rudd. It was a “whole of government” policy aimed at addressing persistent socioeconomic disadvantage across Australian society. Essentially, this is a civic integrationist agenda, which has conceptual and practical antecedents in Hawke-era “Social Justice”, Keating-era “Social Justice cum Cosmopolitanism” and Howard-era “Social Cohesion” (Jakubowicz 2010). The key aspirational principles of this Agenda are to adopt an integrated approach to reduce disadvantage, increase social, civil and economic participation as well as provide a greater voice and opportunity for people. Social Inclusion policy is said to operate in three ways: improving the quality of essential government services particularly in areas like education and training, employment, health and housing; ensuring those services work more effectively in the most disadvantaged communities; and developing partnerships between governments, businesses, not-for-profit organisations and the community and engaging disadvantaged communities to help find solutions to address their particular needs. The indicators used to measure the outcomes of the policy’s objectives are: Resources, Participation and Multiple and Entrenched Disadvantage.

The introduction of the discourse of social inclusion by the Rudd and Gillard governments since 2007 marks an attempted third way between the politics of multiculturalism and its implied recognition of ethnic/racial disadvantage and the redistributive logic of the politics of social cohesion associated with the national values so effectively touted in the preceding Howard era (Chiro 2011). Social inclusion as a policy was directed toward encouraging community belonging, with “the emotional force of belonging [becoming] tied to prescribed core national values” (Harris and Williams 2003: 216). In other words, it is argued that implicit in the Social Inclusion approach is the idea that while anyone can potentially belong, “belonging is conditional to ‘the Australian way’ a standard that cannot be met through passing a dictation test—or even by adopting a prescribed lifestyle, though that comes closer” (Harris and Williams 2003: 216).

The Social Inclusion Agenda focused on undifferentiated citizens/residents and largely ignored or failed to name multicultural issues. Only one of “the eleven aspirational principles elucidated in *Social Inclusion Principles for Australia* (2009), is concerned with cultural and linguistic diversity” (Chiro 2011: 27). Critiques of Social Inclusion often point to its broad and vague scope and its limited tangible impact. Some scholars argue that the Agenda is “meaningless” and used “as a panacea answer to a myriad of problems, while turning a blind eye to the very processes of racially or culturally based exclusion” (Boese and Philips 2011: 193; Vasta 2007). Overall, while the primary aim of this agenda is to “ensure social and economic outcomes”, its approach largely ignores demonstrable processes of racialised disadvantage.

12.2.3 The Latest Buzzwords of Social Policy: Anti-racism and Social Networks

Much scholarly critique posits that the Australian Government’s Multicultural and Social Inclusion policies do not speak to one another, nor do they act in concert for a common purpose. Poynting and Mason argue that there has been a “shift from multiculturalism as a state assisted and demanded by immigrant communities to ‘new integrationism’ as a state imposed and demanded of immigrant communities” (2008: 232). The fallout from such a shift is supposed to be covered by the Social Inclusion Agenda. Yet, as contributors to this volume Boese and Philips (2011; and see Chap. 13) poignantly ask, what does a Social Inclusion Agenda have to offer multicultural Australia if it is not cognisant, in its premises, of entrenched, racialised processes of social exclusion in the country? Beyond mere lip service in the Social Inclusion Agenda, multiculturalism requires recognition of disadvantages faced by newly-arrived, as well as second- and third-generation migrants. Indeed, the ideal of a multicultural society is to deepen universal solidarity, and celebrate social inclusion, in part, as an achievement of diversity.

On this note, while the Anti-Racism Strategy is an initiative under the Multicultural Policy banner, it is heavily imbued with the premises and aims that inform the Social Inclusion Agenda. Indeed, not only does it call for full recognition of racialised disadvantage, but it also recognises the need to couple this with a focus on employment and education, access and equity. It states that “[Racism] works against our goal of building a fair, inclusive community” (AHRC 2012a: 5). The Government Strategy defines racism in the following way: “It often manifests through unconscious bias or prejudice. On a structural level, racism serves to perpetuate inequalities in access to power, resources and opportunities across racial and ethnic groups” (AHRC 2012a: 4). Such recognition clearly states the need to address racism and intolerance in order to achieve “social inclusion” for all in Australia. In terms of policy, this may tentatively be seen as a theoretical step toward more substantively bridging (and effectively blending) multicultural and civic integrationist approaches.

But as some have argued, a critical reflection on the totality of policies, programs and strategies is needed in order to change the broader social discourse on diversity, inclusion, disadvantage and racism. Such reflection may provide insight into “the overt and covert racism within institutions and in everyday experience” (Berman and Paradies 2010: 221). On a theoretical level, the Anti-Racism Strategy’s direct effort to mitigate racism does this; it was borne of critical reflections on the layered multicultural and civic integrationist trends in Australia’s governance of diversity, and has the potential to augment strategies that reaffirm pluralism and address disadvantage often resulting from the migrant experience. Yet, while racism has been made explicit in the social policy agenda of the federal government, it remains to be seen how this strategy will be affected at a grass roots level. In saying this, one key strategy of the Government’s social policies that has been touted over the past decade at both federal and state levels³ is encouraging young people to participate in a range of social networks.

In order to explore the relevance of this policy trajectory, and its attendant focus on participation in social networks, on the lives of migrant youth, this paper analyses and discusses data collected on the cross-cultural networking practices of this key demographic. Stemming from a social capital approach to civic integration, which has gained much traction in Australia and elsewhere, there has been a suggested link between engagement in diverse networks and broader social cohesion. Such a premise is particularly visible in the Social Inclusion Agenda, which utilises parameters linked to individuals’ abilities to network and act socially, such as participation and engagement, to measure policy outcomes. Policy documents tend to link low levels of participation and engagement to structural and entrenched disadvantage.⁴ The Multicultural policy highlights inter- and cross-cultural social networks as a key means to celebrate diversity and encourage substantive multicultural inclusion. And yet, recent reports on network formation and engagement trends amongst culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) populations suggest that migrants and refugees, as well as young people from CALD backgrounds, engage predominantly with ethnically homogenous groups (Willoughby 2007). The 2010 Australian Bureau of Statistics report (2010) also reveals that, in friendship groups, 73 % of respondents have friends of the same ethnic network. For the purposes of this paper, the data is analysed in order to gauge the attitudes of migrant youth toward cross-cultural networking and the behavioural manifestations of these perceptions, that is, their level of participation and engagement.

³In policy terms, engagement with social networks is seen as a key means of promoting and achieving social inclusion, and cross-cultural networks in particular are promoted by the People of Australia Multicultural Policy (as well as at the state level in Victoria in the 2009 Victorian Multicultural Policy “All of Us”, which endorses commitment to “bringing together people across cultures and faiths” and in Queensland’s Multicultural Policy (2011); particularly the “Inclusive Communities” initiative which advocates for young people’s access to and participation in a range of multicultural networks).

⁴After the implementation of the Social Inclusion Agenda in 2009, the Commonwealth Government developed a national Social Inclusion Measurement and Reporting Strategy to monitor social exclusion.

12.3 Methodology

The ARC project *Social Networks, Belonging and Active Citizenship among Migrant Youth*⁵ (2009–2013) explored the social “integration” of migrant young people in Australia. For the purposes of this study “integration” is understood in ideal terms as a process through which individuals and groups are able to maintain their cultural identity while actively participating in the larger societal framework (Korac 2003; Ager and Strang 2008). Specifically, the study focussed on the multiple social networks, both formal and informal, and the networking practices of the participants (Mansouri et al. 2013). The project was carried out in collaboration with two industry partners (the Centre for Multicultural Youth and the Australian Red Cross). It employed a triangulated design, using secondary data analysis together with the generation of qualitative and quantitative data sets.

Participants included young people from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds, and who spoke a variety of languages. They had varying lengths of residency and/or citizenship and arrived to Australia via various migration pathways. The participants were residing in Melbourne, Victoria or in Brisbane, Queensland. The project specifically focused on youth of African, Arabic-speaking and Pacific Island backgrounds. These groups have often been linked to a heightened sense of marginalisation (Mansouri 2005; Mansouri and Kamp 2007; Mansouri and Marotta 2012) and have been given negative media attention (Windle 2008; Nunn 2010; Nolan et al. 2011), particularly in respect to crime and public disorder (White et al. 1999) (see also Chap. 5). They have been described as problematic, unable to integrate and potentially a major threat to social cohesion in Australia.

The quantitative data analysed in this study comes from a *Formal and Informal Social Networks* survey, which was designed to elicit data that gives a broad picture of the networking practices of the sample group. The survey was administered to 484 respondents. It includes empirical indicators commonly used in social capital research, and explores quantitative engagement in various social networks, as well as norms of trust and reciprocity. The survey data was subjected to descriptive statistical analysis using SPSS software. In addition to the quantitative surveys, qualitative interviews and focus groups were conducted with 103 young people. The interview questions were designed primarily to elicit data about the meanings that individuals ascribe to their choice of social networking behaviour. The qualitative data was subjected to systematic thematic content analysis with the help of NVivo software. For the purposes of this paper, one specific area of the dataset is explored; the participants’ cross-cultural networking practices. First it collates and presents a

⁵The term “migrant youth” in the project was defined as an age-specific category (15–23 years of age) comprising Australian and overseas-born youth. Such a definition of migrant youth cuts across generational definitions of migrants (Skrbis et al. 2007) and practitioners’ requirements for a comprehensive and inclusive treatment of the category of youth that responds to their everyday realities. It is during late adolescence and early adulthood that individuals commence the process of integrating identities into coherent wholes (Damon and Hart 1988) and developing a sense of self.

summary of the relevant survey and interview data. It then analyses the material in order to gauge the most dominant theme espoused by the participants in terms of their attitudes toward cross-cultural networking and the behavioural manifestations of these perceptions.

12.4 Findings

12.4.1 *Trends in Cross-Cultural Networking*

The quantitative datasets suggest that all three participant groups have a desire for cross-cultural engagement, even if, for the majority, their current social networks are ethno-specific. The survey gauged participants' attitudes to cross-cultural engagement by asking whether they like being involved in activities happening outside of their family or ethnic group. Participants could choose "yes", "no" or "sometimes" as their response. The African and Pacific Island participants displayed the greatest interest in cross-cultural networking. 55.1 % of Africans responded "yes", with 37.1 % responding "sometimes". Of the Pacific Island participants, 55 % responded "yes" and 38.4 % responded "sometimes". Among Arabic speaking youth, interest in cross-cultural engagement was lower. 34.3 % responded "yes" and 47.6 % responded "sometimes", leaving nearly a fifth of the Arabic-speaking survey sample, or 18 %, saying they do not like to socialise outside their family or ethnic group.

Participants' interest in cross-cultural activities increases with the length of time spent in Australia. Overall, 53.5 % of newly arrived participants, 58.6 % of participants who have lived in Australia for 6–10 years and 60 % of those that have lived in Australia for over 11 years indicated that they are interested in participating in cross-cultural networks. As per the findings above, interest among Arabic-speakers was lower yet indicative of this trend; 36.4 % of the newly arrived like taking part in activities outside of their family/ethnic group, this figure increases to 40 % for those that have lived in Australia for 6–10 years, and to 42.9 % for those who have lived in Australia for more than 11 years. A similar trend, but on a smaller scale, occurs amongst Pacific Islanders. Interestingly, only 29.8 % of those Arabic-speakers born in Australia are interested in participating; a finding that will receive further attention in analysis below of the interview and focus group data.

For the Arabic-speaking group, gender also emerged as a significant factor for cross-cultural engagement. Only 26.6 % of Arabic-speaking males indicated that they like to be involved in cross-cultural activities. Among the females however, 41.4 % like to be involved. In comparison, for Pacific Islander and African participants, gender does not represent a significant factor in the participants' desire to engage cross-culturally. The reasons for Arabic-speaking young men—and in particular more recent arrivals to Australia—not forming as many cross-cultural networks as young people in other groups, are multifarious. Lower levels of trust may have influenced this outcome, as Arabic-speakers displayed the lowest levels of

trust of all three groups. The most common response given by the Arabic-speaking participants—38.6 %—to the survey question about trust was that they “can’t trust anyone”. 33.1 % of the Arabic-speaking participants said that people can be trusted. This is in contrast to the Pacific Islander group, of which a majority of 58.9 % said that “people can be trusted” and only 14.6 % said that they “can’t trust anyone”.

The qualitative data highlights that young people usually engage in cross-cultural networks strategically, with different reasons and motivations informing their decisions for forming cross-cultural connections. For many African participants, for instance, cross-cultural engagement represents a means to demonstrate what they perceive as their cultural competency or proficiency in the Australian context. That is, the more multicultural their networks are the more “Australian” they feel. This is a case of “multiculturalism” being utilised as a space or notion that can be appropriated by culturally or racially Othered or marginalised people to produce feelings of belonging (Pardy and Lee 2011: 312) (see also Chap. 10). However, it appears that young people also feel like they are first required to “make an effort” in what is considered to be an Australian scene before proceeding to occupy a multicultural space (similar findings are reported in Chap. 10); as if “multicultural” is somehow founded by the designation “Australian”. Some young people speak specifically about a desire or effort to “make Australian friends”:

The thing is, since I came to Australia I never spoke to a Sudanese or African. I don’t have any Sudanese or African friends. I do interest in that but I was focused on the language first because I don’t know how to speak English at all 18 months ago—so that’s the thing [...]. Yeah, I’m just happy that all my friends are Australian. Even the guys that I live with. (Male, 20, African, Melbourne)

For this young man, creating a space of belonging was premised on the act of distancing himself from his particular cultural or ethnic identity and distancing himself from the language linked to his identity. He arrived to Australia on his own and his decision to network with Anglo-Australians rather than with Sudanese was influenced by the conditions presented to him upon his arrival. He was detained for 7 months on arrival and he made friends with visitors to the detention centre,⁶ which continued after his release from detention.

For Pacific Islander youth, their desire for cross-cultural engagement was often a reaction to the perceived homogeneity and insularity of the actual social networks in which they actively engage. Many craved and celebrated intercultural understanding, and felt that “being multicultural” made you a “better person”, as evidenced one response:

I think now looking back, if we had stayed in New Zealand, I think I would have only been hanging out with my kind of people—Pacific Islanders [...] but we came here, and Melbourne being a multicultural city, I’ve learnt about different cultures, and gained understanding about them, and I think that’s made me a better person. I have become more multicultural. (Female, 20, Pacific Islander, Melbourne)

⁶Most of the people who visit detained asylum seekers in Melbourne are Anglo-Australians, who do not know detainees prior to their detention, but get to know them through the volunteer networks that organise these visits.

As the quantitative data suggest, cross-cultural networking appears to be less of a priority for the Arabic-speaking group, as they often felt that their culture and religion is misunderstood in the national milieu. In saying that, participants did feel that cross-cultural engagement was a good way for others to learn about their community, culture and religion. A strategy to counter stereotypes. As one participant offered his idea about a possible interfaith initiative:

I was thinking we could invite other religions to come and see each other, like for example invite churches to our mosque, like just to talk. (Male, 22, Arabic speaking focus group, Brisbane)

Overall, the data shows that while the majority of participants' desire for cross-cultural engagement is strong, the cultural and/or religious composition of the participants' social networks is relatively homogenous. In trying to understand this discrepancy between the participants' attitudinal patterns and their relatively socio-culturally isolated networking patterns, four major "barriers" to cross-cultural engagement were identified; experiences of racism and exclusion, levels of trust, being too busy and community expectations. While "being too busy" may be seen, for the purposes of this paper, as a more functional reason for non-engagement,⁷ the remaining three reasons relate closely to socially constructed, institutionalised and systemic issues, which mediate the relations between culturally distinct persons and groups in Australia. Indeed, racism, trust and community expectation are intimately connected issues, yet it was racism (including stereotyping and discrimination), reiterated in everyday occurrences in the lives of the youth (see also Chap. 10 on this subject), that was consistently cited as a significant barrier to cross-cultural engagement. Participants in all three groups reported a range of "exclusionary practices" ranging from explicit, targeted racism to more implicit or covert discrimination or exclusion, which in turn affects their willingness to participate in cross-cultural networks.

12.4.2 Primary Barrier to Cross-Cultural Engagement: Racism and Discrimination

Analysis of the data elicited in this study showed that the potentiality for cross-cultural networking by migrant youth is foremost overshadowed by experiences of racism. These experiences are most commonly linked to covert rather than overt exclusion from everyday places by dominant groups in schools or on the sports grounds. Compared to all the other places/social groupings/institutions

⁷Noting that "being too busy" is often used as a general, evasive response when a task or activity seems difficult or unattractive to pursue, and therefore may be bound up with issues of trust racism and identity as well.

listed as options in the survey (ethnic community, recreational, religious, volunteer group and “other”), school represented the site where youth were most likely to feel they did not belong (18.8 % of respondents said that sometimes they feel they do not belong at school). Racist remarks were usually conveyed verbally and in places where young people gathered on a daily basis, such as schools, the streets and on public transport (these findings are repeated in a separate study reported in Chap. 10 of this volume). The survey showed that in terms of belonging, 17.6 % of respondents indicated that sometimes they feel like they do not belong in Australia. More African and Arabic-speaking youth reported feeling a sense of exclusion—19.2 % of Africans, nearly a quarter (22.4 %) of Arabic-speakers and 10.6 % of Pacific Islanders said they sometimes feel they do not belong in Australia.

Even though the indicators reporting general life satisfaction among migrant youth showed that they are generally happy with their lives, and that they are well connected and desire to network cross-culturally as well as within their own ethno-culturally defined groups, reported feelings of belonging showed that their perception of their place in Australia is considerably different to their white counterparts. One participant who was born in Australia and said she goes to school with many “Aussie Aussies”, nevertheless noted, “No I don’t actually [have any Aussie friends]. I have one friend that’s Aussie Aussie [...]” (Female, 18, Arabic-speaking, Melbourne). Another young woman says she has “full white” friends, yet that they do not see her as genuinely Australian, despite the fact that she feels no connection with any socio-cultural context other than Australia:

It is a bit confusing because I think most people consider Australians to be white and so when you have a background but you don’t know much about it so you consider yourself Australian [...]. I think they see themselves as Australian, the girls in my group who are full white, and then they kinda see me as an islander or someone [...] so they don’t really see me as Australian. So yeah, I think it will take time for people to kind of [...] cause they probably think I don’t really feel myself as Australian, that I’m connected to my heritage—but I’m not. (Female, 23, Pacific Islander, Melbourne)

This difference in perceptions between the young female participant and her friends creates a paradox for the former. For while she was born in Australia, and indicates that she feels no connection with another country or culture, her white counterparts nonetheless perceive her as an “other”. This suggests a systemic and entrenched rift based heavily on phenotypic attributes, and which naturally acts to empower a sense of white cultural dominance.

In the interviews, instances of overt and covert racism were commonly reported. In line with the survey findings, young people in the interviews talked most often about incidents of exclusion based on race and culture that they came across daily, most often in schools or in public spaces. A 16-year old Cook Islander for instance mentioned:

Ah [...] well it’s usually around um [...] the Australian kids at school. Like if they’re doing something and then I like [...] wanna sorta just join in for a bit [...] they all say like ‘ah no

you can't do that' and I'm like why, they say 'coz do you see the people around you?' and I'm like yeah, and they're like 'you don't belong'. And then I'm like 'oh, bye' and just walk off and talk to my mate about it. (Male, 16, Pacific Islander, Melbourne)

African interviewees reported a range of “exclusionary practices” ranging from explicit racism in public spaces and schools to more implicit racism, provoked by a dialogue between systemic racism (for instance where they felt that they were not successful in obtaining certain jobs or being promoted because of their race) and internalised racism. These forms of racism were usually reported through young people's everyday experience.

In both samples, Melbourne and Brisbane, verbal assaults on the participants most often occurred while using public transport or while occupying public spaces (see also Chap. 10 on this issue). For instance, certain African participants reported being told to “go home” or that “sickness comes from Africa”. Some African interviewees talked about experiences of more hidden, covert racism, based on a confluence of systemic, interpersonal and internalised racism, not based on overt verbal slurs or assaults as such, but nevertheless experienced in everyday situations.

I feel like any time I want to get a job in a retail job and I walk in [...] it's really [...] I dunno. Maybe it's my colour. (Male, 19, African, Melbourne)

Yeah. If I feel like I go to an area that's like, I dunno, full of white people or full of other races besides mine, I feel very awkward. I don't feel comfortable going through the shopping centres or the streets or anything alone without someone from my ethnicity or cultural background. (Male, 19, African, Melbourne)

Some Arabic-speaking interviewees also spoke about racist attitudes that made them feel uncomfortable, patronised and excluded.

There are a lot of racial issues going on. It's a stereotype thing basically [...] some people look at us like terrorists or something like that. (Male, 19, Arabic Speaking, Brisbane)

Nothing direct, like name calling or group labelling, nothing direct. But there was always that feeling that there was prejudice and a bit of, I don't know, yeah, you never felt—I never felt accepted with that guy. There was always something different between me and the other players in the team. (Male, 21, Arabic speaking, Brisbane)

Another instance of discrimination based on visible difference was obvious for Muslim, Arabic-speaking women wearing the *hijab*. A number of participants said they felt excluded in certain spaces or in certain suburbs. They felt people looking at them weirdly or assuming they don't speak the language.

I think it's harder for girls wearing *hijab*. I find it with mum, like whenever we go shopping people assume that she is somehow dumber or deaf [...] that's rude, offensive. (Female, 18, Arabic-speaking, Melbourne)

The Arabic-speaking focus group in Melbourne involved three young women, with very active lives and high-achieving academic performance. They pointed out that it is not the existence of stereotypes in itself that is problematic, but the fact that almost all stereotypes hold negative connotations. Pervasiveness of negative stereotypes in schools and the constituent systemic racism, from which such stereotypes

are generated and maintained, can place constricting pressures on the academic achievement of young people. One young woman noted:

Even if you do do well, they [teachers] don't try extra hard with you, because they think that you can't achieve more than that. They think you've come from an awful place with no technology, no information at all, that you just don't know anything apart from farming. (Female, 19, Arabic-speaking, Melbourne)

Opposing and countering stereotypes is difficult for young people, and it is a slow process. Often the situation remains unchanged, not only because systemically engrained racism does not permit changes, but also because it is "easier to just fit into that stereotype, because you can't find anything more". Culturally homogenous networks thus are a reality for these participants, because there is a strong desire to fit in somewhere, not because groups would draw boundaries around their ethno-racial groups with the aim to isolate themselves. Cross-cultural networks, even though desirable, are often still impossible in practice for many of the migrant youth participating in this study.

12.5 Conclusion

Reports focusing on the outcomes of network engagement and measuring success of integration for so-called "marginalised" or "at-risk" groups are often parochial in scope, largely ignoring that networks and network engagement are situational and depend on all parties involved. This chapter has shown that there is a desire for cross-cultural engagement and cross-cultural networks among migrant youth, yet this does not necessarily translate into cross-cultural network engagement. Furthermore, there are different motivations for young people to engage in cross-cultural networks.

Policies and reports often assume that Australian society is primarily and fundamentally multicultural and that multiculturalism is a virtue one needs to aspire to in order to be Australian. However, what the studies, programs and policies focusing on settlement outcomes, such as Social Inclusion and Multicultural Policies, often misread is that multicultural society is not only premised upon distinctive cultures and groups, but also that these cultures and groups can never be essentialised. Inclusion approaches and parameters usually overlook the first and second steps in achieving a productive and integrative multicultural model. The first is the ease and certainty of belonging to one's own culture. Until this comfort of belonging is achieved, until the surety about it is attained, the road towards multiculturalism is little more than a road towards assimilation. The second step that is often overlooked in inclusion approaches is the discourse of inclusion/exclusion, which promotes an essentialised social and political understanding about what constitutes the Australian state and identity. Attendant to this are the micro-level, situational, communicative inclusion/exclusion norms played out in everyday social life. When policies promote migrant backgrounds they often for-

get about complexities engrained in the process of belonging to a place one has left and a place that one has arrived to. As many researches have shown, there are no homogenous national migrant identities, as much as there isn't one single Australian identity. Negotiation of identities depends on factors that are beyond outcomes of essentialised models of integrative approaches. This is especially true for migrant youth.

While it is argued that the National Anti-Racism Strategy, as one of the key initiatives of "The People of Australia" multicultural policy, will seek to consult expertise, establish networks, enhance leadership capacities of government and civic society and have common commitments in the development and implementation of social policy in this area, it is unclear how these points will actually tackle racism and everyday racist practices, especially among young people. Even though youth are one of the focus demographics of the Anti-Racism Strategy, and some of the priority settings of the Strategy include schools, the online environment and sport, which are three areas where young people participate heavily. While research in this area exists (Greco et al. 2010; Beelmann and Heinemann 2014), it remains unseen how the Strategy and the Multicultural policy more broadly will come up with effective practical measures to deal with racist practices that many young people experience on an everyday basis in schools and public places.

In terms of designing the direction and implementation of policies like the Anti-racism Strategy, the findings of this study suggest that to successfully support migrant youth in fostering cross-cultural engagement, the service design (and service providers) must be cognisant of specific reasons behind young people's mistrust or lessened desire to network cross-culturally. These reasons often arise from specific situations linked to discrimination, exclusion and a denied sense of belonging. As Philomena Essed argues in her exploration of everyday racism and its reproduction through habitual practices, everyday racism concerns repetitive practices and consists of practices that can be generalized (1991: 3). As noted by Bhavnani et al. (2005), ethnoracial discrimination is a social phenomenon reproduced through social and institutional practices and discourse and as such is multidimensional, context specific and changing. Ethnoracial discrimination and its manifestations are fluid (Hollinsworth 1998), defined and intimately embedded in the historical and contemporary context. It is both the social (discourse/institutional processes) and cognitive (stereotyping) that reproduce ethnoracial discrimination (Van Dijk 1989).

As the findings of this chapter suggest, migrant youth are largely happy with the multicultural status quo in Australia and are indeed "socially included", even when appraised according to the Social Inclusion measurement tools. There is a tendency among young people in this study, however, to experience social distance from "Aussie Aussies" in the Australian social context. This represents an inclusion/exclusion binary along racialised lines that is systemic and chronically manifest in many social settings. Such systemic racialisation does not necessarily negatively impact on the overall wellbeing of migrant youth and their day-to-day life, but persists and lingers as a barrier to cross-cultural

networking, participation and full active citizenship for some. The question for many young people remains as to how one can be socially included in Australia despite being culturally and ethnically different from the “Aussie Aussies”. This highlights the importance of the nature of the social space into which people are to be included, and adds to the argument that it is not only social inclusion that should be a whole-of-government approach; what is also needed is a more proactive multicultural state.

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Chapter 13

Multiculturalising at the Interface of Policy and Practice

Martina Boese and Melissa Phillips

These were the sorts of things that migrant-support settlement groups never talked about. Beyond the practical discussions about groceries and doctors and English classes, there was no other dialogue. She imagined support groups of a different kind. A roomful of women of different generations and languages – Armenians, Greeks, Vietnamese, Sudanese, Chinese – sitting in an AA sort of circle, going on about the things that mattered

Alice Pung (2011)

Abstract Multiculturalism as a contemporary policy framework and practice has been the subject of sustained criticism and debate. Our research on the resettlement experiences of newly arrived migrants and refugees shows how Australian multiculturalism has become a limited symbolic cultural space where “ethnic Others” are permitted to perform their minority ethnicity to the white ethnic majority group. We argue that the official and public meanings of multiculturalism today remain constrained by its past, specifically the historical legacy of White Australia and the contested but still entrenched remnants of the pressure to “assimilation”. As a result, new arrivals and existing cultural Others are expected to gradually “blend in” – a euphemism that in effect, veils a form of cultural assimilation. Based on our recent research findings we argue that such a process occurs however alongside emerging practices of active, reciprocal and ongoing cultural, political and social exchange within and between all diverse communities of Australia. We term this more transformational form of multiculturalism as “multiculturalising”. This notion points to a multi-layered and ongoing process of engagement and negotiation that involves new arrivals

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and long term residents alike and seeks to encapsulate some of the ways in which multiculturalism operates across a variety of public and private settings in Australia.

Keywords Multiculturalism • Critical multiculturalism • Assimilation • Migrant settlement • Refugee settlement • Rural Australia

From the ordinary and every day, to the celebratory and stereotypical, the word “multiculturalism” conjures up different images and various understandings of the lived experiences of people of diverse backgrounds living in Australia. It also reflects a policy domain that at times is highly contested and controversial. Bringing these two elements together, this chapter considers multiculturalism at a local level through the lens of both ordinary lived experiences and government policies (on this approach, see also Chap. 12). Drawing on research situated in regional Australia, a location not always associated with multiculturalism, we contend that *multiculturalising* better explains the active process of engagement experienced at the local level by community members – be they new arrivals or well established residents of an area. It describes the dynamic interaction between policy and practice as a two-way process that deserves more attention in future research on multiculturalism and is best investigated through micro site examples.

Multiculturalism is a well-established policy framework that has become the subject of renewed attention in Australia (Boese and Phillips 2011; Hage 1998, 2012; Jayasuriya 2008; Lopez 2002), as well as other countries of immigration such as the UK and Canada (Ku 2011; Modood 2007; Parekh 2000). As a policy framework, multiculturalism in Australia provides a way to:

[...] manage, foster and celebrate cultural diversity. It recognises the diversity of its different cultures within the context of a society that not only respects its members’ rights to their culture, faith and identity, but also increases their range of choices as well as contributing to their development and well-being. (Babacan and Ben-Moshe 2008: 3)

Access to citizenship has been a central tenet of Australian multiculturalism (Galligan and Roberts 2003) while anti-racism has been ostensibly absent from it (Berman and Paradies 2010) until recently (see Chap. 12 on this point). Multiculturalism in Australia is expressed through federal, state and local government policies ranging from federal and state-level Multicultural Policies (DIAC 2011; VMC 2009), the establishment of Multicultural Councils to the implementation of local cultural diversity strategies. The plethora of policies and guidelines addressing how “Australians live together” under a multicultural rubric are differentiated from immigration policies determining the size and composition of annual migrant intakes (Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs 1988) (see also Chaps. 6, 10 and 12 on the policy dimensions of Australian multiculturalism).

Parallel to the design, implementation and ongoing reforms of these top-down policy arrangements (AMAC 2010), multiculturalism occurs as a bottom-up process and practice. This practice-oriented nature of multiculturalism has been encapsulated in terms such as “everyday multiculturalism” (Harris 2009; Wise and

Velayutham 2009; see also Chap. 10), the “multicultural real” (Hage 1998), “multiculturalism from below” (Werbner 2012) and “multiculturalism 2.0” (Macdonald 2012). Whilst distinctive, each of these concepts share an engagement with the mundane and continuous nature of “doing multiculturalism”. To varying extent, they also recognize the deeply political dimension of such a practice of multiculturalism. Noting that there can be no one blue-print for multiculturalism, even within national borders, Werbner (2012: 200) suggests that:

Rather than thinking of multiculturalism, then, as a discourse that reifies culture, it needs to be thought of as a politics of equal and just citizenship that bases itself on the right to be ‘different’ within a democratic political community [...]. Without a struggle from below, it seems it never will be.

This chapter engages with such a grounded and practice-focused perspective of multiculturalism, as a “discourse as well as a policy” (Modood and Meer 2012: 240) and as everyday practice and negotiation (Amin 2002; Wise and Velayutham 2009; see also Chap. 10) in the context of regional and rural locations. Following historically predominant migration patterns, scholarship on multiculturalism has focused on metropolitan locations. Drawing on research findings from a recently completed project on the settlement experiences of recently arrived migrants in regional and rural Australia, we explore how multiculturalism is experienced, interpreted and embodied by new arrivals settling in regional Australia and by professionals involved in settlement work in these locations. We argue that multiculturalism remains a valuable framework for understanding contemporary Australian society, but it needs to be understood as place-based, contingent practice that includes both the mundane and the implementation of policy at the local level. We expand current conceptions of everyday multiculturalism as dynamic and continuous processes (Harris 2009; Wise and Velayutham 2009; Noble 2009; Colombo 2010) by highlighting the relevance of locally situated settlement stakeholders for a better understanding of the processes and practices that we refer to as multiculturalising.

13.1 Multiculturalism as Everyday Practice and Performance

The notion of everyday multiculturalism has drawn attention to the situatedness of multiculturalism in “Concrete situations of interactions where difference becomes, at least for some of the actors involved, an important element in constructing social reality and in the meaning attributed to it” (Colombo 2010: 258). Everyday multiculturalism occurs hence in “ordinary social spaces within which people of different backgrounds encounter one another, and (as) mundane practices they construct and draw on to manage these encounters” (Harris 2009: 188). It is this multiculturalism as a “social fact” or “fact of life” which occurs when people from different cultural backgrounds are “coming across, bumping into and sharing space” with each other (Pardy and Lee 2011: 300) that has been cast as a practice in contrast to the

theoretical subject of multiculturalism that has been hotly debated and often problematized in the realms of both policy and academia. Hage (1998) described this multiculturalism as “multicultural Real” that exists regardless of multiculturalism policy or its contestation, Noble’s (2009: 50–1) term “unpanicked multiculturalism” similarly captures “the ways difference gets negotiated in everyday lives away from the heat of moral panic and state- and media-driven anxieties about social cohesion”.

Recent claims of the “death” of multiculturalism by policy representatives, especially in Europe, have been interpreted as a new form of racism (Lentin and Titley 2011) whilst the alternative concept of interculturalism (Meer and Modood 2012; Levey 2012) has been interpreted as attempt to sell the substance of multiculturalism in new clothes (Kymlicka 2012) (on the relationship between interculturalism and multiculturalism see Chap. 9). These contestations highlight both the highly politicised nature of the term and the importance of examining the meanings of multiculturalism to its different protagonists, including policy makers as well as those involved in the “doing of multiculturalism” on the ground such as settlement workers. These debates also highlight the nature of multiculturalism as a comprehensive and ongoing project that includes intercultural dialogue and communication (Modood and Meer 2012) as well as the affirmation and celebration of cultural particularity.

Drawing on our research findings in regional Australia we argue that to understand multiculturalism necessitates attention to its different dimensions in practice, and in particular how these are negotiated in place-based dialogue, including between local stakeholders in government and services, and in the locally-embedded, issue-related processes of engagement and negotiation. Our intention is not to blur the distinction between the governance and rhetoric of multiculturalism on the one hand and the – seemingly parallel – everyday practice of multiculturalism on the other hand. We introduce the notion *multiculturalising* as a process that is situated at the interface of policy and everyday practice, of governance and ordinary interaction.

Celebratory rituals such as multicultural festivals and Harmony Day events are often criticised for their inherent commodification and essentialisation of cultural identities and differences, and their emphasis on superficial aspects of the supposed cultural differences of ethnic groups (Phillips 2010). They tend to form part a multiculturalism that exhibits a managed cultural Other while disguising power relations, described by Hage (1998: 160) as the “postcolonial version of the colonial fair”. This approach to multiculturalism has been countered by the notion of “critical multiculturalism” that “replaces cultural essentialism with a relational definition of culture and cultural difference” (Awad 2011: 43). Cultural recognition and economic redistribution are understood as central, interrelated elements in such a structural-relational model of multiculturalism (see also Chaps. 4 and 12). Whether aimed at achieving participatory parity (Fraser 2003) or justice based on an understanding of the structural relevance of cultural claims (Young 2000), critical multiculturalism departs from an understanding of cultural difference as either exotically-attractive or socially-divisive. In this chapter, we posit multiculturalising as a critical multicultural practice, different but not independent from a multicultural policy discourse, which is often underpinned by an ethical judgment on the equal value of different cultures (Taylor 1994). Rather than occurring through a

state-sponsored display and paternalistic celebration of cultural diversity, multiculturalising is understood here as practice and performance that encompasses both the engagement with, the negotiation and affirmation of, difference and diversity that occur “when people are mixing” and the implementation of multicultural policies at the local level.

In scholarship on multiculturalism scant attention has been paid so far to the lived experience of newly arrived migrants and refugees settling into regional communities. It is here, at the coal-face outside the cosmopolitan metropolis, that multicultural rhetoric is put to the test, and potentially turned into a useful vehicle to “trouble” dominant norms through the repetition of “unruly articulations” of the nation (as multicultural) (see Butler 1993; Dunn 2005). Through a site-specific exploration of settlement with local residents, from service providers to newly arrived migrants and refugees themselves, we will analyse different incarnations of and perspectives on multiculturalism including the process of *multiculturalising*. We suggest that multiculturalising is deeply interactive and relational, unsettling as well as ordinary, and never complete. By drawing attention to the interaction between individual community members from different domains as agents, managers and constituents of multiculturalism, we aim to challenge the apparent dichotomy between multicultural policies and their supposed success or failure and the empirical reality of intersubjective everyday multiculturalism.

13.2 Multicultural Policies in the Australian Context

In contrast to some European countries, in Australia multiculturalism has more recently been credited with minimising tensions (Soutphommasane 2012) and lauded as a “success” (Bowen 2012) (see also Chap. 10). Even in those years where multiculturalism was treated with contempt by federal government politicians (see Costello 2006; see Chaps. 10 and 12), it contributed to the “branding” of states such as Victoria, operating as a marketing ploy that provides a competitive edge (VMC 2009). Intergovernmental policy and coordination arrangements in this area remain firmly embedded in federal government control with peripheral consultation on either an ad hoc or specially appointed basis. Debates about the merits of interculturalism and multiculturalism (Meer and Modood 2012) have been side-lined in Australia in preference for a state-driven vision of accommodating a diverse society (Levey 2012). Such diversity is attested in Census statistics and supported by Access and Equity policies (see Chap. 12), with citizenship as the overarching principle of society. As senior representative from the former Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) explained in the interview:

In terms of the way the government is framing multicultural policy now, it’s about recognizing the broad diversity that’s a fact of life in Australia now. So recognizing that Australia is basically extremely culturally diverse, in comparison with say 50 or 60 years ago. So that’s basically just that cultural diversity is a fact. The second thing is placing that multiculturalism around a very, firmly embedding it in a citizenship framework. [...]. So that’s the sort of broad multicultural principles, freedom of cultural heritage expression

within those broad, we could call them Australian or Western liberal democratic, or social democratic or whatever you want call it. Then you move on to the actual access and equity principles [...] this is where the sort of rubber hits the road in terms of what we do. (Senior DIAC Representative)

From a policy perspective, the “rubber hits the road” as the above interviewee describes, when multicultural policies are translated into action on access and equity, aiming to ensure that government services do not discriminate on the basis of race, gender or ethnicity. The 2012 Access and Equity Inquiry Panel Report specifically focused on Australian Government services to Australia’s so-called culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) populations. This report cited lack of engagement and communication with diverse communities as an issue, and recommended “that there be a strong evidence base on the practical outcomes of these policies and the effectiveness of interaction of Australian government services with CALD communities and clients” (Access and Equity Inquiry Panel 2012: 57).

The recognition by government that newly arrived migrants require support to achieve social and economic integration and the consequential statutory provision of settlement assistance was central to Australian multiculturalism from early days. A milestone in the provision of migrant settlement services was the 1978 Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants known as the Galbally Report, which recommended the provision of settlement services as part of a range of concrete measures to support a “multicultural attitude” (see also Chap. 12). The concrete form of provision has undergone changes since then but settlement services remain a key expression of Australia’s multiculturalism, understood as an integrative policy (Galligan et al. 2014). While major metropolitan centres continue to be the primary destination for international migrants, demographers have highlighted that “for the first time during the post-war era the growth of immigrant populations has been greater outside of gateway cities than in them” (Hugo 2011: 152). Boosting regional settlement has been a feature of the Sustainable Population Strategy for Australia (DSEWPC 2011) and recent migration policy reforms at both the federal and state level. Regional and rural settlement is considered to be beneficial for both recent arrivals and the communities in which they settle.

13.3 Situating the Research: Settlement Experiences of Visible Migrants and Refugees

The research presented here is based on selected findings from an Australian Research Council funded Linkage Project, *Visible Migrants and Refugees in Regional and Rural Australia* which examined the interrelated social, economic and political factors that shape the resettlement experiences of recently arrived visible migrants and refugees who live primarily in rural and regional areas.¹ In particular

¹Linkage Project 0883896, in partnership with Municipal Association of Victoria and the Victorian Office of Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship. More details at <http://www.ssps.unimelb.edu.au/research/projects/vmr>.

the project examined the effectiveness of regional settlement and related policies at Commonwealth, state and local levels; the employment experiences and pathways of recent arrivals; and their sense of identity and belonging in regional locations. The Project adopted a multi-faceted methodology to capture the interrelationship of policies; government, community sector and business practices; as well as individual agency that shape the rural and regional settlement of recent arrivals. Specifically, we conducted a national online survey of 106 professionals working in the settlement area; focus groups with 90 stakeholders working in settlement across 8 research sites; 9 community information sessions; expert interviews with 37 senior representatives of government and third sector organisations involved in settlement and skilled migration policy, planning and coordination at a local, state and national level as well as employers; and structured in-depth interviews with 85 newly arrived migrants and refugees (hereafter referred to as “new arrivals”).

Interview participants were identified in community information sessions held in 2009–2010 and in consultation with focus group participants and community association representatives in each area. Snowball sampling was used to identify additional interview participants in each of the eight research sites. The local samples were aimed to represent a cross-section of gender, age, migration streams (skilled, family, humanitarian) and countries of origin to reflect the locally settled groups of recent arrivals. Interviews were conducted either in English or with an accredited interpreter depending on the preference of interviewees. A breakdown of the overall interview sample by region of origin and visa category is provided below in Tables 13.1 and 13.2.

All interview and focus group data was coded and analysed supported by the software NVivo 9.

The next sections primarily discuss responses to interview questions related to identity and understandings of multiculturalism, complemented by answers from focus group and key informant interview participants to questions on multiculturalism.

Table 13.1 Interview sample by region of origin

Region of origin	Female	Male	Total (%)
Africa	12	22	40
South/South East Asia	20	22	49.4
Middle East	3	6	10.6

Table 13.2 Interview sample by visa category

Visa category	Female	Male	Total (%)
Humanitarian	17	25	49.4
Skilled migrant ^a	13	21	40
Family migrant	5	4	10.6

^aIncludes international students and other recent arrivals who have subsequently transitioned to Permanent Residence (PR) within the Skilled Migration stream

13.4 Interpretations of Multiculturalism: Integration, Adjustment and Visibility

Multiculturalism as a policy is generally presented as a positive and substantial move away from earlier periods of assimilation policies. The range of perspectives on Australian multiculturalism held by policy stakeholders, local service providers and former migrants and refugees interviewed as part of this research challenges however such a notion of a clear break with ideas of assimilation.

A senior bureaucrat from the former DIAC was keen to emphasize how newly arrived migrants and refugees were no longer being asked to assimilate:

But we've said to people, and I always said this, when I conduct citizenship ceremonies, I say, you'll see we are not expecting you to forget where you've come from, we want you to bring all the good things about that and make Australia better [...]. And it's a very individual thing. So what multiculturalism is for you is very different to me. But it doesn't make you any less Australian than me, but you bring your things and you put it into your life and your context. And I think giving people the permission and the capacity to do things is big. And it goes back to settlement. (Senior DIAC Representative)

Most settlement stakeholders referred to *integration* and/or *settlement* rather than assimilation but some described migrants and refugees as “assimilating” into the broader community. Even some new arrivals referenced assimilation in their responses to questions about multiculturalism, highlighting their conception that they had to change to become a part of Australian society. Three interviewees from migrant or refugee backgrounds and two settlement stakeholders described settlement as “adjustment”. Significantly, adjustment was only ever described as a one-way process, an action (to be) assumed by the new arrival, as suggested here by a skilled visa holder from India:

I don't like to be known as an Australian, I would like to be known, like, I would like to be an Indian all through my life, but I'm happy to, I just adapt in the situations here, like, if I would adhere [...] to my culture, and if I adhere to the culture then to the values of India more, here, it won't be good, because there are lots of difference between the culture in my place, the culture what I follow in India, and in Australia. So here people are more social, more for, like, what I would say, they are following oriental culture, the western culture. So I have to adjust with their culture, but I would like to (be) known as an Indian, but I will try my level best to adjust to their culture and to, like, live with them. (Nina,² female, Indian)

Another interviewee from South Sudan described settlement as “just a matter of adjustment to the culture and to the system in the new country” (Achol, male). Adjustment may not be a surprising element of interpretations of settlement in a new environment from the new arrival's perspective, yet its prominent role raises the question how different, if at all, the experience of settlement in a country with multicultural policies is from settling in a country without such policies. If multiculturalism is understood as a mere description of cultural diversity, and cultural diversity merely as the coexistence of people from “diverse cultural backgrounds”, the

²Pseudonyms have been used throughout this chapter.

former sits well with the primacy of adjustment as action on the part of new arrivals. Such reductive understanding of multiculturalism as a simple description of the coexistence of people from different cultural backgrounds was evident in the responses of several interviewees.

One point of departure from much prior research was the inclusion of a wide variety of research locations in this research, aimed at exploring differences in how settlement and multiculturalism are experienced across metropolitan, rural and regional sites. The notion of visibility, understood in relative terms as perceiving oneself or being perceived by others as different from a given majority at a particular point in time on the basis of ethnic or racialised markers, provided a central touchstone in this investigation. As we expected, experiences of visibility differed significantly between metropolitan and regional or rural locations. New arrivals perceived themselves as much more visible in regional and rural locations. The nature and interpretations of these experiences of visibility varied however. For one research participant, being positively identified as visibly and culturally different in a smaller regional town made his settlement experience easier:

Others will argue probably in Melbourne is more multicultural, [...] [in my regional town] we do have other people from other nationalities, but it's not that pronounced as compared to Melbourne, so you might argue, well you'll be much easier to integrate in Melbourne because it's more diverse as opposed to here, but I didn't have any problems in integrating in [this town]. Someone told me in Melbourne it's much easier cause there's people even from your country, [...] but here it's less [...]. But the fact that you are minority, people recognize you cause, so, 'oh, you are the African guy here working for the [name of employer], people know you much quickly [...] so in smaller cities you are much more noticeable, and people recognize you and they want to know who you are and what you do and in that way you make friends and you network, so yeah, it depends how you see (this). (Serge, male, Zimbabwean)

Others perceived their visibility and the reactions it provoked as obstacles to feelings of acceptance by the local population and a sense of belonging. Location emerged as a key variable not only in relation to visibility. The interpretations of multiculturalism also varied across different places. While some recent arrivals described their regional location as multicultural, others contrasted it with "multicultural Melbourne" as Serge in the above quote. Beyond this explicit usage of the attribute "multicultural" as demographic descriptor the interview accounts highlighted a range of both positive and negative experiences of regional and metropolitan sites which hint to variations of multiculturalism and multiculturalising processes.

13.5 Performative Multiculturalism

The descriptive aspects of the earlier mentioned celebratory and exhibitory multiculturalism tend to focus on culture, food, language and dress. They are limited in reducing culture to consumables, conflating ethnicity with culture, and entrenching fixed and homogenous notions of either (Castles et al. 1988: 44; Langer 1998). The celebration of cultural diversity as the main benefit of multiculturalism is a key

theme of recent policy statements on Australian multiculturalism (for example AMAC 2010), the framing of diversity as marketable benefit is characteristic of a prevalent economistic discourse on immigration and multiculturalism (Boese 2009). At the grassroots level an “exhibitory multiculturalism” (Hage 1998) is implemented through displays of cultural diversity in one-off events that are typically funded by state and federal government programs. Several settlement stakeholders who participated in this research described activities such as Harmony Day or multicultural festivals as examples of “multiculturalism in action”. These interpretations are often underpinned by an “ethnic-group” model of diversity which is also common in everyday discourse on diversity:

But there’s lots of examples, I think [the] Primary School, some of the photos that have been taken about them lately has been great, with their sporting success, because there’s some Sudanese, there’s a little Nepalese boy, there’s Kooris in the team, there’s a couple of Chinese boys in the background and there’s a couple of little Aussies there, you know, and they are all probably Aussies, you know what I mean, they’re all probably Aussies, but that’s not how people identify. (Settlement service provider, Department of Education)

Whilst appraising the cultural diversity of the school population this interview extract also demonstrates the exclusive notion of “Aussie”, which the speaker only opens up to include children from other than Anglo backgrounds in a gesture of self-correction. Discussions of multiculturalism and cultural diversity often included the stereotyping and essentialising of supposed features of different groups such as the description of Sudanese women as “dressing beautifully” and the Burmese community as “quiet and resourceful”. In the case of this focus group, other participants recognised the stereotypical, homogenised and bounded nature of such representations, which highlights the range and contested nature of perspectives on multiculturalism within communities.

These conflicting interpretations also emerged in the participants’ interpretations of multicultural events. In one regional location a Harmony Day event was described as a “turning point” in local attitudes to new arrivals because it provided a chance for wider community education about newly settling refugees in the area. According to focus group participants, over time such one-off events led to increased levels of acceptance and showed how new arrivals were “embedded” in the community. Across research sites, public displays of cultural diversity were consistently raised as positive examples of multicultural policy in action. One community worker described a festival where “our multicultural friends can be seen in the parade and display some of their goods and wares and dancing and drumming and all of those wonderful things”; a settlement service manager cited the example of a multicultural concert as a moment where many in his community came to show their support for diversity against a minority of racist voices critical of migrant and refugee settlement in the area. The mode of “exhibitory multiculturalism” (Hage 1998) while limited and problematic in its symbolic construction and affirmation of difference by white managers, was thus interpreted as a meaningful opportunity. Understood

as performative multiculturalism it can be seen as a vehicle of normalizing the presence of cultural diversity and multiculturalism (see Butler 1993; Dunn 2005).

Newly arrived migrants and refugees had mixed feelings about performing “their culture” through such events. One interviewee took issue with the lack of dynamic interaction that came along with narrowly interpreting multiculturalism as a display of an Othered culture, where cultural diversity is considered an exclusive attribute of minority cultures.

Sometimes when people are talking about multiculturalism, let us have different groups and they'll come and perform. They'll come with their cultures they will come doing different things and we can see them. But if we can all come together and do and participate and contribute in each every group that will be the best way to go. [...] if you had to have to sit down and you perform [...] [your] dance and I will perform my [...] dance we are talking about different cultures but we are not contributing [...] So when I'm not seeing people really interacting I'm a little bit sad. (Pascal, Togolese)

In contrast, other research participants viewed an increased awareness of cultural diversity in the local community as aide in their incorporation into Australian society. In their view it provided the opportunity for “intercultural dialogue”. A Southern Sudanese-Australian woman felt that cultural events provided her with a chance to:

[...] show myself, I have, I have good things to show it to the world. I have dancing, I have clothes, I have me, I have everything as a Sudanese, that's what I know Sudanese have good things to show. (Agnes, Sudanese Nuer)

Agnes's appreciation of the opportunity to perform highlights her discontent with the common deficit perspective on people from Sudanese backgrounds. The performance of ethnicity grants her a rare and precious window to correct such stereotypical views by constituting another rich and positive identity. Differences in interpreting the value of performative multiculturalism emerged thus across both local settlement stakeholders and the newly settling residents from migrant and refugee backgrounds.

The range of interpretations of performative multiculturalism discussed in this section complicates an appraisal of multiculturalism in a local context (see also Duffy 2005). On the one hand, treating multiculturalism primarily as colourful cultural diversity that can be staged on demand is evidently limited and problematic (Hage 1998), notwithstanding the explicit or implicit espousal of multicultural displays by advisory councils expressed through funding opportunities offered by the former Immigration Department and organisations such as the Victorian Multicultural Commission. On the other hand, the performance of multiculturalism can operate as starting point to an unsettling of a white, local identity and a normalization of multiculturalism. As has been discussed here, performative multiculturalism can assist newly arrived residents to project a more positive identity and settlement stakeholders to convey the multicultural policy message by affirming the reality of diverse local communities. By itself such performative multiculturalism also signals the limited space that is available to recently arrived members of

Australian society. There are however indications of another kind of practice and process of multiculturalism to which we turn now.

13.6 Multiculturalising

Alongside the instances of performative multiculturalism emerged a dynamic process, which was situated in local community-internal relationships. This process involved a range of local stakeholders who engaged with new arrivals primarily through their work. These included settlement workers, ESL teachers but also primary school teachers, health practitioners and multicultural liaison workers at Centrelink, the Australian government's key social service agency, and the Police. We have coined the term "multiculturalising" to distinguish these interactions from the mundane and ordinary nature of intercultural interaction captured in the notion of "everyday multiculturalism". Multiculturalising highlights the process of learning and unlearning that takes place when de facto "White National Managers" (Hage 1998) engage with new arrivals in a realm in-between "panicked" and "unpanicked multiculturalism" (Noble 2009: 50–1). It occurs in places where new relationships are being forged or old interrelationships reviewed between different "local" stakeholders in a locality, in order to join efforts in responding effectively to the arrival of "new" groups of residents and customers.

The role played by organisations involved in settlement services at the coal-face was noted earlier. Many of the stakeholders in regional locations with limited immigration histories emphasized their formal or informal roles of translating what it means to live in a diverse community both to new arrivals and other "local" community members. Significant variance emerged at the local level as to how multiculturalism was understood and what tools and strategies were used to implement multicultural policies. Some focus group respondents were keen to link new arrivals with established groups of former migrants and refugees in their local area. Others tended to attribute diversity to new arrivals and other minority groups in the local population, contrasting the multicultural capital cities with their own towns, or other sites that have had generations of migrant settlement.

Beyond the one-off events classified earlier as performative multiculturalism, various approaches were put forward to improve interaction between new and old residents and to foster the social inclusion of new arrivals. Formal multicultural policy or cultural diversity strategies were either already established or in development in two of the six regional research sites. One state government employee in a regional site highlighted the limited value of multicultural strategies by describing them as "just on paper", signalling the need for accompanying strategies and processes. In a rural site where there was no respective formal policy or strategy in place and recent arrivals were highly visible, the focus group participants identified the need for developing a "multicultural attitude" in the community. A health professional spoke of the hospital as a site for this multicultural mind-set with staff:

[C]om[ing] from a different mindset where they're not used to migrants, they're not used to so many, maybe accommodating, they're not used to a multicultural attitude and a positive attitude to people who don't speak English, so there's so much more work to be done in encouraging best practice. (Health professional)

Some of the observations and insights shared by local stakeholders in service provider and government positions carried an air of arrogance and superiority, associated with notions of elite cosmopolitanism. In many instances however, the focus group discussions between different stakeholders on the challenges they associated with the arrival of ethnic groups they felt unfamiliar with, revealed signs of self-reflection and at times self-criticism, of plans for action and transformation. This included the awareness and problematisation of not knowing enough about the background of new residents and their pre-arrival experiences, the critique of biased service delivery, and plans to create spaces for intra- and intercultural socialising.

Some of the problems local stakeholders identified emerged also in the assessments of the Australian multicultural model by new arrivals. An international student highlighted the limitations of Australian multiculturalism by critiquing current representations of Australia's national identity. He identified a need for investment in raising awareness in Australian society about its diversity.

Well I'd say the idea of Australian ethnicity and identity would have to be changed, because I mean come on they really don't consider Aborigines as Australians. Like the idea of ethnicity would have to be changed a bit like what it means to be Australian [...]. So maybe slowly over time the government should initiate procedures [and] processes like the school level even at the primary school level to get young children acclimatized to the idea of internationalism [...]. Maybe that way because to me multiculturalism all you have different people from different parts of the world but you can accept them. Like if you see someone who is like you but people still ask about her background still ask, 'where are you from?' (Malik)

Echoing Pascal's earlier comments, multiculturalism at the coal-face was described for example as diverse communities coming together to learn "different ways, different cultures, different behaviour" (Susan). Susan was one of the first South Sudanese women to obtain childcare work in the local area. She was pleased with the chance to use her role in the centre to teach children about different cultures whilst experiencing new ways of communication and education herself. The mutual, multi-directional character of learning from each other and across the community was an aspect of multiculturalism emphasised also by others.

I think multiculturalism is kind of, you've got, when you have a few different cultures and they try to live together and they try to share their culture with each other and share their ideas and this kind of thing. And if they can live, all those people can live together happily, and I think it's sort of good, multicultural. (Sunil, Indian)

These examples highlight the intersubjective notion of social existence that is captured in the notion of everyday multiculturalism. It can lead to feelings of acceptance on behalf of new arrivals based on interactions with people that signal interest and understanding.

Hassan, who described such experiences, also noted a disjuncture between this everyday multiculturalism and the official face of Australia's multicultural policies.

He also asked that a more complex vision of multiculturalism be articulated by the government:

People are very keen here they understand who you are because here it's a multicultural society. They understand lots of cultures, lots of people [...]. People need more education, people need more advertisement regarding the multicultural society. Because Australian government accepted that it's a multicultural society. Accepted that you just grant visa for every country, several nations to be the multicultural society. And I think [...] Australian government have to be ready, have to be prepared and have to be just build infrastructure for be a multicultural society. (Hassan, Iranian)

The necessity to engage the broader community and sell multiculturalism to the population more widely was also identified by government representatives who took part in this research. The earlier mentioned incarnations of performative multiculturalism can be viewed as examples of such a marketing attempt or, as we suggested, as part of a strategy of normalisation of multiculturalism (Butler 1993; Dunn 2005). Viewed in this light, the performance of multiculturalism with all its limitations appears as a productive complementation of the multiculturalising processes and the everyday multiculturalism that takes place to a greater or lesser extent in local settings.

The need for political representation, for a voice as a “new” or recent community member, highlights another dimension of multiculturalism which is mostly absent from accounts of everyday multiculturalism and seems diametrically opposed to the aims of performative multiculturalism, but might be achieved through multiculturalising efforts. Saleem described the labour of becoming a part of Australian society while also assisting fellow community members in their integration attempts and explaining his culture to others:

I did many courses, to be honest with you, during the last three years I tried to be very active in order to integrate with the Australian society. I did many things and I got lots of contacts from here [...] from different organizations, non-profit organizations, to support communities, to support new arrivals, so as a community leader I tried and I did my best in order to, not just for myself, for my community also, for my community members also in order to integrate with the society. [...] So we have to integrate with the society, we have to convey our voices to the society. We are here to tell them that we are here, [...] we need job, we need work, we need different stuff, education. So I'm doing my best in order to convey my community members' voices to the public, in order to know about them. (Saleem, Iraqi)

The desire to participate socially and economically as well as to be recognized in their cultural or religious particularity was voiced by several research participants. Tina, a Muslim woman from a South East Asian country savoured the opportunity provided by an adult education provider to raise awareness and knowledge of Muslims' way of life in her regional residential town:

So they want me [...], to have workshops how to teach multilevel class, which I'm doing in the classroom, and also to raise awareness about specific cultures, because I want to raise awareness about being Muslim, so how do how we, being Muslim, like, basically our day to day life, what is the difference or [...] if you're Muslim, how would your day involve, how does that how [...]. Yeah, how different are you than other people and then why you call yourself Muslims? What is it? You know, I just, I want to tell them it's not just about

jihad and all that terrorism and all that. [...] Oh and the prayer rules. [...] Some people are not aware that it's quite a lot of Muslims in [this town]. (Tina, Minang)

The engagement described by Saleem and Tina goes beyond the selling of benefits of diversity to the Australian public. In Saleem's case it extends to seeking the political representation of the voices of recent community members drawing on the earlier mentioned democratic values underpinning Australian multiculturalism; Tina's case demonstrates the close interlinking of cultural recognition and structural justice in a society where Muslims experience discrimination in many spheres of life (HREOC 2004). Multiculturalising practices such as the workshop described in the interview quote are thus responsive to the intersections of economic and cultural injustices and the interrelated needs for recognition and redistribution (Young 2000; Fraser 2003).

Multiculturalising is based on a fundamental acceptance of newcomers, but it extends beyond that to a process of active instigation of social change grounded in an understanding of cultural and economic injustices. Where such a basic acceptance is weakly developed or missing altogether, new arrivals might think little of Australian multiculturalism. Ellen, a visibly different participant in a regional town, articulated her sense of multiculturalism with mixed feelings because of the everyday racism she had experienced from residents and colleagues in the nursing home where she worked (see also Chaps. 10 and 12 on this subject). This highlights the vital role of active engagement with racism and discrimination as part of the multiculturalising process. This inclusion of antagonism as a part of rather than as antidote to multiculturalising efforts emphasizes the latter's continuous, process-based nature.

13.7 Conclusion

This paper has discussed a range of experiences and interpretations of Australian multiculturalism by recently arrived migrants and refugees as well as by other local community and policy stakeholders whose work engages with recent arrivals and their settlement in regional and rural locations. This variety ranges from narrow interpretations of multiculturalism as a descriptor of cultural diversity to the opportunities and limitations of performative multiculturalism to an understanding of multiculturalism as a deliberate and ongoing inter-active process that involves not only "old" and "new" community members, but also de facto managers and addressees of multicultural policies. It is this latter interpretation of multiculturalism as multiculturalising practice that we claim requires more attention in the conceptualisation of multiculturalism which is currently dominated by a dichotomous treatment of policy versus practice. This under-explored dimension has been understood here as deliberate process locally situated stakeholders are engaging in, in more or less "unpanicky" ways (see Noble 2009). Its label "multiculturalising" highlights its nature as process and action rather than as a status in time. Instead of describing

multiculturalism as either the *fait accompli* of merely symbolic “cultural diversity” or as real, banal or ordinary intersubjective social practice, multiculturalising bespeaks a never-completed, conscious process of mutual engagement with and negotiation of difference aimed at achieving a transformation. It comprehends the reciprocal learning and unlearning of dealing with differences and commonalities in different social settings such as the workplace, the childcare setting and the community meeting, which forms part of everyday multiculturalism. Yet it is more than that. Whether limited to the mere identification of racist practice or extending to ensuring the political representation of the voices of new arrivals, it is a process that engages actors on all sides of the public management of multiculturalism. Rather than being experienced as naturally evolving, straight forward, and “smooth sailing”, multiculturalising typically involves intent, negotiation and dissent.

This process of multiculturalising is never-completed for two reasons associated with time and space. First, due to the nature of ongoing migration and refugee movements with “new” groups and “new” differences, new adjustments are continuously required on behalf of all protagonists. This is evident in the difficulties settlement stakeholders mention in relation to working with recent new arrivals as opposed to previous groups. Rather than labelling specific groups of arrivals as incompatible with or particularly challenging to Australian multiculturalism a process of multiculturalising takes as given the never-ending investment in learning about and from each other. Secondly, multiculturalising is never completed because of the intricate interlinking of social change with changes in the life course and thus the biographies of recent and not so recent members of society. Meanings and definitions of “difference” are fluid and changing, as the changing perceptions of visibility testify. So is the engagement with various kinds of difference over a lifetime within and between generations (Kley 2011). Multiculturalising is therefore always an ongoing project, including lessons, mistakes and failures, but with inherently transformational potential. To conclude, rather than bidding multiculturalism farewell and replace it by interculturalism as “enabling political myth” (Kymlicka 2012: 214), multiculturalism remains not only a useful vehicle to “fight for diversity” (Kymlicka 2012: 215) in Australia, similar to Canada. Beyond that, we argue for its validation if understood as a complex, inter-relational and multi-dimensional process shaped by and potentially also shaping policies, interlinking policy and everyday practice.

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