Chapter 7
Changes in the Perception of Latin American Immigrants in Host Countries During the Great Recession

María Ángeles Cea D'Ancona and Miguel S. Valles Martínez

7.1 Natives' Perceptions of Immigrants and Economic Momentum

Is it only in times of economic crisis when host countries' perceptions of immigration turn negative? Moreover, do motives related to *material interests* solely explain opposition to immigration (or a proportion of it) during times of economic turmoil? Based on population studies with different emphases, the literature reviewed offers a variety of responses. Some authors have underlined that competition for scarce resources triggers ethnic prejudice (Allport 1954; Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995); that it magnifies the imagined or estimated number of immigrants; or that it may lead to appeals to restrict their entry – or even that immigrants should be expelled from the country (Castles and Kosack 1973; Walker and Pettigrew 1984; Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Bommes and Geddes 2000). More recently, it has been concluded that competition for scarce resources is the main cause of social conflict in disadvantaged neighborhoods, extending to the second and third generation immigrant population (Kleiner-Liebau 2011). Also, while stable economic conditions help reduce perceptions of threat and prejudice, negative economic expectations for the future reduce tolerance toward immigrants and minorities (Sari 2007). In the same vein, it has been stated that low wage laborers and economically vulnerable groups express greater anti-immigrant feelings than those who are well-off (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Pettigrew et al. 2007; Clark and Legge 2009), including immigrants themselves. The Eurobarometer 53 collected in 2000 (SORA 2001) highlighted negative attitudes towards those belonging to ethnic minorities in the European Union. In the U.S., the study of Telles and Ortiz (2009) showed that Mexican-Americans with lower education showed the greatest

M.Á.C. D'Ancona (✉) • M.S. Valles Martínez
Departamento de Sociología IV, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología,
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
e-mail: maceada@ucm.es; msvalles@ucm.es

M. Aysa-Lastra, L. Cachón (eds.), *Immigrant Vulnerability and Resilience*,
International Perspectives on Migration 11, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-14797-0_7

rejection towards immigration. On the contrary, more educated respondents exhibit lower levels of ethnocentrism; place more emphasis on cultural diversity, and are also more optimistic about the economic impacts of immigration (Bobo and Licari 1989; Citrin et al. 1997; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Cea D'Ancona and Valles 2014).

Nevertheless, these are neither the only factors nor are they universal results. Citrin et al. (1997) also found that an increase in optimism about the economy coincided with an increase in opposition to immigration. Burns and Gimpel (2000) state that personal and national economic outlook play only a small role in predicting whites' attitudes toward immigration. In Spain, the greatest increase in opposition towards immigration also coincided with a period of economic growth and a greater demographic presence of immigrants (Cea D'Ancona 2004; Cea D'Ancona and Valles 2008, 2014). As noted by Portes and Rumbaut (2006), periods of intensive immigration are always marked by stiff resistance from the host population, who see the waves of newcomers as a threat to the integrity of the national culture. Brücker et al. (2002) connect racial attitudes in Europe with the defense of cultural homogeneity; Cachón (2005) does so with nationalism.

The economic threat (immigrants take jobs from natives, end up on welfare and increase the tax burden) is an important factor explaining the rejection of immigration, but there is also a cultural threat. People who wish to reduce the flow of immigrants into their country often see the newcomers as a menace to cherished cultural traditions (Simon 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Using data from the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS) in the U.S., Chandler and Tsai (2001) also found that college education and perceived cultural threats (especially to the English language) have the most impact upon views on immigration. Other variables are political ideology, economic outlook, age, and gender. Race, income, and fear of crime appear to have negligible effects.

It is also important to take an ethnocultural view of national identity. Analyzing the 1996 GSS and focus groups, Schildkraut (2005) shows that Americans who take an ethnocultural view of national identity (that is, to be American is to be born in the U.S., to live in the U.S. and to be Christian) are more supportive of restricting immigration. Wong (2010) uses the 1996 and 2004 GSS to show that those who define the American community in exclusive terms are more restrictionists, more opposed to birthright citizenship, and to extending citizenship rights to legal permanent residents. Also, *ideology* has higher impact upon attitudes to immigration than other factors (political conservatives hold more negative attitudes toward current immigration than are political liberals). One exception is when immigration is framed as a national threat to security (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012).

7.1.1 Relevance and Feasibility of a Comparative Perspective: United States and Spain

The relevance of Latin American immigration in the U.S. and Spain, as well as its different degrees of integration in both countries, explains the interest in the comparative analysis of perceptions and attitudes towards these immigrant group. The rejection of immigration depends not only on the economic and material position of the native population (Brader et al. 2009; Valentino et al. 2013) but also on the characteristics of the immigrants (their ethnicity, their economic and job status, cultural and religious distinctiveness, and population size). The latter is evident in Europe, where the fear of loss of national identity is prominent in explaining xenophobia. This is manifested primarily in the greater rejection of immigrants who are perceived as different and less able to integrate into Western societies, i.e. Muslims (Schnapper 1994; Sartori 2001; Strabac and Listhung 2008). By contrast, Latin American immigrants are perceived as closer and more able to integrate in Spain (Cea D'Ancona et al. 2013); but not in US where "Latino immigrants are the «new Blacks», having been stereotyped and stigmatized as the perennial and inassimilable underclass" (Davies 2009: 378). The problem lies in the lack, in both countries, of fully comparable surveys on Latin American immigration and attitudes toward immigration in general. As Muste (2013: 398) states, in his article about the dynamics of opinion on immigration in the United States, 1992–2012, "Public opinion about immigration has undergone substantial change over time but inconsistent coverage of immigration in public opinion surveys has limited our understanding of opinion change". Other authors (Lapinski et al. 1997; Segovia and DeFever 2010) share the criticism (referring also to academic survey organizations such as American National Election Studies (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS)) that few questions have been asked about immigration and that those questions have not been preserved in the time series.

In the U.S. most survey organizations began assessing opinion on immigration when the issue became nationally prominent in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Spain, a country of emigration till the late 1970s, it was not until 1990 when various series of specific surveys on attitudes towards immigration began to be collected. These surveys were conducted by an independent organization, ASEP (Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos), and a public center, CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). From 2007 the Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia (OBERAXE) has been funding annual opinion polls on attitudes to immigration in order to follow the evolution of racism and xenophobia. These survey data is collected through face-to-face interviews carried out by the CIS from 2007 to 2012 (The analytical reports, by Cea D'Ancona and Valles, are published by OBERAXE and the surveys can be accessed in the CIS database). Although the data available does not allow for a detailed analysis of changes in opinion regarding specific immigrant groups, it does for views and attitudes towards immigration in general, before and during the current crisis. This is why we begin by providing an overview of attitudes towards immigration in general, and then move to Latin American immigration in particular.

7.2 Changes in Attitudes Towards Immigration on Both Sides of the Atlantic: Surveys in the U.S., Europe and Spain

7.2.1 Transatlantic Surveys

Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) survey (a telephone poll) has been conducted yearly from 2008 to 2011 to sound out U.S. and European public opinion on a range of immigration and integration issues. Spain is one of the European countries included in the last three surveys but it was not polled in 2008 (the countries included this year were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy). The more general *2013 Transatlantic Trends* survey is the twelfth in that series (beginning in 2002) where, for the first time, immigration questions were preceded by questions about foreign, security and economic policy. Drawing from these data sets for the period 2009–2013, the following key findings are highlighted to provide context to the comparisons in this chapter.

The first contextual data related to the perception of the crisis on both sides of the Atlantic is available in TT Topline Data 2013, thanks to question Q21 whose wording was "And regarding the extent to which you or your family has been personally affected by the current economic crisis, would you say that your family's financial situation has been... (greatly affected, somewhat, not really, not affected at all)". Whereas in the U.S., in the first three years of the crisis (2009–2011), two-thirds or more of respondents declared they felt affected by it, in Spain this feeling gradually increased, to reach a peak in 2013. The average European figures show that Spain is part of the group of countries most affected by the crisis. However, there is also another group (northern European countries) whose populations have been less affected by the Great Recession (Fig. 7.1).



Fig. 7.1 Personally affected by the Economic Crisis 2009–2013 (US, Spain, EU11)
Results for EU11 are based on eleven European Union member states: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, United Kingdom, Romania and Sweden

The *Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2013 Report* also points out that this economic crisis drove negative attitudes toward issues like immigration. "A majority (64 %) of those who felt personally affected by the economic crisis also considered immigration to be a problem (only 16 % saw it as an opportunity). Of those not affected by the economic crisis, 47 % considered immigration to be a problem while 26 % perceived it as an opportunity". In the U.S., perceptions of immigration as a problem have changed less than in the case of Spain: 54 % of Americans in 2009 and 47 % in 2013, compared to 58 % of Spaniards in 2009 and 44 % in 2013. The strongest pessimism was registered in the United Kingdom (66 % in 2009, 64 % in 2013). At the same time, the optimistic attitude ("immigration is more of an opportunity") has seen an upward trend among both Americans (39 % in 2009, 46 % in 2013) and Spaniards (36 % in 2009, 44 % in 2013); and above all in Germany (48 % in 2009, 62 % in 2013). Lower percentages of optimism are found among British respondents (27 % in 2009, 29 % in 2013) or Italians (32 % in 2009 and 2013); although the weakest optimism was recorded in other European countries, such as Turkey (18 % in 2013) and Slovakia (16 % in 2013).

When asked about whether "immigrants take jobs away" (from native-born citizens), growing agreement was recorded among respondents in the United States from 2009 (52 %) to 2011 (57 %), followed by a downward trend in 2013 (50 %). In the case of Spain, agreement has followed a downward trend every year from the start of the crisis (43 % in 2009, 33 % in 2013). Except in the United Kingdom, Europeans polled repeatedly over those years (in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) expressed disagreement rather than agreement with the statement that immigrants, in general, take jobs away from native workers in those countries.

When the question refers to the statement: "immigrants are a burden on social services", respondents in the U.S. and U.K. were the most worried in 2011. In both countries 63 % of their polled populations were in agreement; but in 2013 a downward trend of 6 and 7 % points respectively was recorded. Respondents in Spain were less worried in 2013 (41 %) than in 2011 (55 %). But other European countries maintain a similar degree of agreement at both dates. That is the case of France (55–57 %), Germany (46–49 %) and Italy (51–52 %). Spain, relative to other countries, has registered more positive opinions towards immigration, even relative to the U.S.

On the issue of integration (over the most recent years of the current crisis), majorities on both sides of the Atlantic maintained or increased their optimism about the success of immigrant integration in general. The evolution of this opinion in the United Sates was as follows: 59 % (2010), 56 % (2011) and 61 % (2013). Similar figures were recorded in Spain: 54 %, 62 % and 63 %. Italian respondents jumped from 37 % in 2010 to 59 % (2011) and 60 % (2013). But public opinion in France, Germany or the U.K. was more evenly split, with almost every figure fewer than 50 %. On the other hand, when the focus is on the integration of "children of immigrants who were born in [COUNTRY]", both Europeans and Americans respondents elevated their positive percentage of answers. That is, the children of immigrants were considered to be "well" or "very well" integrated into the society

to where their parents had emigrated. But the trend followed from 2010 to 2013 is downwards in the cases of the U.S. (79 %, 74 % and 68 %), Spain (78 %, 72 % and 73 %), the U.K. (68 %, 66 % and 55 %) and France (54 %, 59 % and 43 %). Only Germany's positive responses grow (50 %, 54 % and 59 %), and the opinion in Italy fluctuates (65 %, 77 % and 66 %).

Certainly, when other more specific groups of immigrants are evaluated, greater variations appear. That is the case of Muslim immigrants, seen as less well integrated than immigrants in general, both in Europe and in America. In the U.S. 45 % in 2010 and 50 % in 2011 viewed this group well or very well integrated (Hispanic immigrants: 65 % in 2010 and 59 % in 2011). Similar figures for Muslim immigrants were collected in France. Spain recorded the minimum percentage in 2010 (21 %) and 2011 (29 %). Data in the rest of the European countries polled fell in between. On the other hand, another interesting variation appears when populations in these host societies are asked about legal and illegal immigrants. The former only cause worries to 1 (or fewer) out of 4 respondents, no matter the side of the Atlantic or the year. But the latter are viewed negatively by 6 out of 10 in the U.S., and by 7 or 8 out of 10 in the European countries polled.

A final key finding selected from the TTI data sets refers to government management of illegal immigration from the point of view of public opinion. Among the Europeans respondents included in the TTI (2008–2011), majorities of Italians (around 55 %) and British (*circa* two-thirds) stated that illegal immigrants should be required to return home. This is also the option with greatest backing among Spaniards in 2011 (57 %), however only 48 % and 49 % chose this option in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Nine percentage points was also the increase recorded in France, from 2009 (35 %) to 2011 (44 %), while in Germany 52 % in 2009 (and 50 % in 2010 and 2011) preferred legalization. Americans appear more evenly divided: 49 % opted for legalization in 2008 and 2011 (44–45 % in 2009–2010); compared to 43 % and 47 % supporting return in 2008 and 2011 respectively, (48–47 % in 2009–2010).

7.2.2 Spanish Immigration Surveys

In Spain it is possible to analyze changing attitudes towards immigration before and during the Great Recession, due to specific annual surveys that have maintained the same sample base (not panel design) and questionnaire design: the "face-to-face" OBERAXE-CIS surveys, which enable the same indicators to be tracked longitudinally until 2012 in the Spanish population aged 18 years and over. Applying three multivariate analytical techniques (factor, cluster and discriminant) to the set of indicators in each survey gives us a typology of attitudes towards immigration, whose changes are described in Cea D'Ancona (2004, 2007) and in the series of annual reports on the evolution of racism and xenophobia conducted by the authors of this chapter from 2008 to 2013. Figure 7.2 shows the drop in explicit rejection of immigration from 1993 to 1996. From 2000 rejection rose again, with noticeable

increases in 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2011. In 2011 this amounted to 40 % of the sample. But unlike the 2009 and 2010 surveys, in 2011 the profile of those classified as having ambivalent attitudes towards immigrants was closer to tolerance than rejection; in particular it highlights their greater acceptance of living with immigrants; the approval of immigrants being granted rights, and the fact that those with ambivalent attitudes are also the least resistant to a multicultural society (Cea D'Ancona and Valles 2013). The change in this ambivalent profile coincides with increasing education and income; respondents' position left of center on the political ideology scale; a greater confidence in people; and less recent experience of unemployment. These variables led to a more open attitude to immigration. The higher average figures define tolerant individuals, while the lower ones define those adverse or resistant to immigration (more elderly people; the less educated; those in less qualified jobs and with lower income; those ideologically on the right; firm religious believers; those distrustful of and without personal experience of emigration).

Figure 7.2 also shows that rejection of immigration increases as does the perception of an excess number of immigrants; and the view of immigration laws as being "too tolerant", while the opinion of "unrestricted acceptance of political refugees" decreases (in surveys which include these indicators). Moreover, the view of facilitating the entry of immigrants "only with a contract" increased.[1]



Fig. 7.2 Indicators for acceptance of immigration in Spain related to immigration policy and other topics. CIS (1993–2005) and OBERAXE-CIS (2007–2012) surveys (total percentage of respondents)

[1] In the Special Eurobarometer 380 (TNS 2012a), Spain stood as the third most favorable to labor immigration (51 %), behind the Finns (56 %) and the Swedes (60 %). As for political asylum, the most favorable countries were Sweden (95 %), Denmark (92 %) and the Netherlands (91 %). Spain stood in eleventh position (85 %).



Fig. 7.3 Changes in agreement over the effects of immigration on the labor market. CIS (1991–2005) and OBERAXE-CIS (2007–2012) surveys (percentage of total respondents)

In 2011 the perception of an excess number of immigrants dropped slightly, at the same time as their actual presence in Spain starting falling. However, the desire for a tougher immigration policy remained stable. Not so in 2012, when the perception of the presence of immigrants continued to wane, contributing to less rejection (a three point decrease). This is in consonance with the news provided by the social media (Cea D'Ancona and Valles 2014).

In Spain the consideration of immigration as a problem and threat is also crucial in explaining xenophobia. This takes on special significance in four key areas: employment, access to basic social rights, preserving one's culture, and the fear of increased crime. Times of economic crisis, and the decline in economic resources and employment, tend to activate stereotypes that have traditionally encouraged xenophobic discourse: "immigrants take away jobs" and "immigrants contribute to lower wages". This is evidenced by survey data collected in Spain.

Figure 7.3 shows the upward trend in both beliefs, and the drop in recognition that "immigrants cover necessary jobs" (which the Spanish do not do). In turn, there has been an increase in opinion favorable to the expulsion of immigrants in long-term unemployment (29 % in 2005 to 50 % in 2011) and the discourse on preference in the workplace: "when hiring someone, people prefer to hire a Spaniard before an immigrant" (62 % in 2007, 69 % in 2011). Both items are included in the OBERAXE-CIS surveys and their trends are associated with the increase in unemployment in both the native and immigrant population (unemployment rates stood at 11.3 % in 2008, rising to 21.5 % in 2011 when the surveys were run) (see Chap. 3).

7.2.3 North American Immigration Surveys

In his analysis of public opinion on immigration in US, integrating trends from ANES, GSS, Gallup, Pew, and media surveys from 1992 to 2012, Muste (2013)

reveals a pattern of rapid, sharp increases in anti-immigrant sentiment in response to events such as the 1994 election (Bush vs. Clinton) and 9/11 (the terrorist attacks), followed by declines over several years that stabilize at lower levels. Concerns about competition for jobs and border enforcement rank high, whereas fears about other immigration impacts have declined or stabilized, and support for deporting illegal immigrants is already low in the United States. The analysis begins with questions about respondents' preferred levels of immigration before moving to perceptions of the impacts of immigrants on the economy and society.

In all surveys, majorities support reducing immigration levels. According to the *General Social Survey* (GSS): biennial surveys of face-to-face interviews, 34 % (in 2008) and 35 % (in 2010) were in agreement with the existing level of immigration. Proponents of reducing the number of immigrants dropped from 53 % to 49 % (2008–2010), although earlier, in 2000, the figure was only 42 % of respondents. In the *Gallup Poll* (telephone surveys) since 2002, support for reducing immigration has ranged from 39 % to 51 %, with high points during the 2005 congressional debate over immigration and in 2009 following the onset of the recession, then a decline to just 35 % in 2012.

Regarding the impacts of immigration and immigrants on the U.S. economy, culture, and in general, the surveys analyzed by Muste (2013) indicate ambivalence over the impact of immigrants. Growing beliefs in immigrants' positive impacts coexist with steady concerns about employment and crime. Since 2001, between 52 % and 67 % have said that immigration is a "good" rather than a bad thing (Gallup), with positive opinion dipping slightly following 9/11 (10 % points) and the 2008 economic crisis (6 % points). From 2001 to 2007 beliefs that immigrants would worsen the economy rose from 32 % to 46 % (Gallup).

The greatest consistency and negativity in public opinion on immigrants' impacts concerns jobs. In 2004 and 2008 about 45 % of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that it was "extremely" or "very" likely that immigrants would take away jobs (ANES: *American National Election Studies*). From 2001 to 2007, about one-half of respondents believed immigrants would not have "much effect" on job opportunities (Gallup), but some one-third of respondents thought immigrants would make opportunities "worse".

And when asked about illegal immigrants, public opinion on policy is also ambivalent, and responses influenced by references to immigrants' location and job status. From 2006 to 2012, solid (but somewhat unstable) majorities favored allowing currently illegal immigrants to continue working in the U.S. and not be deported (Gallup). In contrast, opinion toward potential illegal immigrants outside U.S. borders is overwhelmingly negative: between 50 % (in 2008) viewed that spending on border security should be increased (ANES) and 58 % said that "controlling and reducing illegal immigration" was a "very important" "foreign policy goal" in 2004 and 2008 (ANES). There is also strong support for states acting in the area of immigration policy, with about 60 % approving the Arizona immigration law's citizenship verification component over the 3 year period since its passage in 2010 (Pew: telephone interviews).

In this review of survey trends, economic problems in 1991–1992, 2001, and 2008–2010 did not increase opposition to immigration. By contrast, opposition increased in the wake of bitter debates over immigration policy in 1994–1996 and 2006–2007, and the events of 9/11. Muste (2013: 400–402) states that "opinion about immigration levels is clearly sensitive to events directly relevant to immigration, such as the 1994 election and California's Proposition 187, and to national security (9/11) concerns. Economic downturns, such as that beginning in 2008, appear to foster moderate restrictionism at most".

7.3 The Specificity of Latin American Immigration on Each Side of the Atlantic

7.3.1 The Dual Perception of Latin American Immigration in Spain

The fact that Latin American immigrants are the second most numerous in Spain (27.1 % in 2012, 29.8 % in 2008) after Europeans is an important factor to consider when analyzing attitudes towards immigrants and their integration. Also, it is about this group that Spaniards think when discussing immigration. Figure 7.4 shows that, when asked, "When talking about foreign immigrants living in Spain, who do you immediately think about?" (a question not included in the 2012 survey), the mention of Latin Americas has been increasing, halving the previously dominant response: "Moroccans (North Africans)". In the case of the Latin American population, this development is in line with their greater presence in the statistics of foreigners with residence permits; however, this is not the case of Morocco, whose mention in excess during the 1990s contributed to the news of illegal immigrants in dinghies arriving on Spanish beaches (Cea D'Ancona 2004). As regards specific mentions of Latin American immigrants in the CIS-OBERAXE surveys, the two most frequent references in 2011 are to Ecuador and Colombia (6 % and 3 %). These were the two most numerous Latin American nationalities in Spain from 2006 to 2012. The highest figure was reached in 2006: Ecuadorians: 12.5 % and Colombians: 7.5 %. These two are followed by Peruvians (3 %) and Argentinians (2.9 % of the 3,021,808 foreigners with residence permit in Spain in that year).

The importance of Romanian immigration from 2007 on (after their inclusion to the EU) meant Latin America lost its relative weight, falling to slightly lower figures in 2012 (7.2 % Ecuadorians and 5 % Colombians, closer now to Bolivians and Peruvians, with 2.9 % and 2.6 % respectively of a total of 5,411,923 foreign residents). In the nineties the Argentinians were the most numerous Latin American nationality in Spain (representing 3.4 % of the 538,984 foreigners in 1996) and the image of the Latin American immigrant which was most widespread (arousing a higher percentage of sympathy). However, at that time Peruvians and Dominicans also had a similar weight (3.3 % each) (see Chap. 1).



Fig. 7.4 Growth in foreigners (Central-South America and North Africa) living in Spain, plus mentions of Latin American and North African (Moroccan) immigrants in the CIS 1993–2000 surveys and the OBERAXE CIS 2007–2011 (percentages)

On the mention of immigrants, it should be noted that an eminently economic connotation (racial classism or class racism) is prevalent. However, even within the group of those considered by the native Spanish population to be economic migrants, there are distinctions; nuances that are better captured in qualitative cross-sectional analysis. The following reflection made by an Iranian immigrant in one of the discussion groups for the MEXEES II (2010–2011) project may serve as an example: "many Spaniards, when people talk to them about immigrants, think about Arabs, Muslims, Africans: those are the immigrants. A person from Latin America is perhaps not as much an immigrant as a Moroccan".

When mentioning specific immigrants, ethnic distinctiveness intervenes, as this is the first thing to be noticed. Skin color acts as a first barrier that prevents the acceptance and integration of immigrants. In turn, a specific culture: Chinese, Japanese, Muslim, Native American is associated with a stigma which is attached to the person, even if it does not fit reality. This is the mark of an "irreducible difference" (Wieviorka 2009: 100), which can lead to distance and racism. Its effect is more harmful amongst those who have Spanish nationality, either from having been born in the country or having arrived at an early age (with their parents or through international adoptions). The "you never stop being an immigrant" argument – even though you feel Spanish – is also corroborated with regard to North American society, in opposition to Alba and Nee's Assimilation Theory (2003),

which advocates the gradual loss of ethnic identification over time, which ends at the third generation. The study by Telles and Ortiz (2009) shows, however, that most of the fourth generation of Mexican-Americans identify themselves as non-white and feel that others stereotype them as Mexicans. In addition, Mexican immigrants and U.S. Mexicans with dark skin experience racial discrimination.

The mention of Latin American immigrants is also reflected in the OBERAXE-CIS surveys, in a question about which immigrants do they prefer (are more likeable), followed by the opposite question: which immigrants do they like least. Latin Americans are first in likeability (referred to generically; specific to "Argentineans", "Ecuadoreans" and "Colombians", although in 2012 the reference to "Argentineans" lost ground, as it did in the MEXEES surveys). By contrast, the "Moors" or "Moroccans", along with the "Romanians" (often associated to the Roma community, due to their large number), are the immigrant groups which arouse most phobias or rejection in Spaniards, and are at a significant distance from the rest. When asked why, the most common response continues to be "because of their relationship with crime" (20 % in 2012); "they are bad people" (10 %); "they don't integrate, they form ghettos" (10 %); "because of their customs and ways of life" (9 %); and, "they're violent, aggressive and cause problems" (8 %).

Qualitative research from the MEXEES projects (Cea D'Ancona and Valles 2010; Cea D'Ancona et al. 2013) goes further, recording that, in contrast to Latin Americans, the fact that they do not adapt to customs or ways of life is particularly highlighted. More specifically, it is stated that they invade public areas; and that they do not respect minimum rules of community living ("they don't know how to behave"). Mention is made of specific nationalities, such as Ecuadorians, recorded before the crisis: "it is very rare to see Ecuadorians with Spaniards". In favor of Latin Americans, both before and during the crisis, testimonials have been gathered (repeated among both natives and other immigrants) which stress that this group is very respectful (details such as giving up their seat to an elderly person on public transport, or simply beginning any request with "please").

The discourse on integration[2] ("you have to integrate and adapt, and learn Spanish, if necessary, and do whatever it takes to integrate") has led in Spain to a preference for Latin American immigrants because of a shared language; a determining factor in integration, according to Portes and Rumbaut (2006), but also religion and customs. Referring to Latin American immigrants, one hears: "proximity", "similarity", "you can talk to them"; "at least they understand you"; "a past that unites us"; "half of them have Spanish blood"; "they have names like ours"; "they have our culture". Cultural proximity is also argued when justifying the preference for Europeans: "we share the same culture"; "the same values".

[2] When OBERAXE-CIS surveys pose hypothetical assumptions in order to allow the entry of immigrants or not, the cultural criterion (translated by the indicator "adaptation to the lifestyle of the country") continues to be the main one, slightly ahead of the economic and employment criterion (e.g. "they should have a job qualification that Spain needs"), both before and during the economic crisis, with an average score of 7.8 in 2008 and 7.95 in 2012 (for the economic and employment criterion, mean percentages are 7.2 in 2008 and 7.4 in 2012).

It is precisely the cultural proximity attributed to them which enables both groups of foreigners (European and Latin American) to be perceived as more easily integrated into Spanish society, particularly if they have a high level of education and professional qualifications (Cea D'Ancona et al. 2013: 218–254). At the opposite extreme are the Muslims, commonly perceived as more distant and less able to integrate within European societies (Sartori 2001; Strabac and Listhung 2008; Kleiner-Liebau 2011).

7.3.2 *The New Perception of Latin American Immigrants in the U.S.*

According to Brader et al. (2009) negative Hispanic stereotypes have been gaining relevance in the U.S. They state that 1996 can be considered the turnaround date, when "the impact of negative black stereotypes on attitudes toward immigration faded, while the impact of negative Hispanic stereotypes increased dramatically". They explain this change by measuring the effects of *affect* (of the native majority towards Asians, Africans and Hispanics); the so-called dimension of ethnocentrism, following Kinder and Kam (2009), and comparing these with the effects of socio-economic variables, or fear of difficult economic times (the so-called dimension of *material interests*). Although the fieldwork coincided with times of "great economic anxiety" (just before the 2008 election campaign), the cited authors' "*racial animus*" has proved to be a more powerful predictor than factors related to "*economic threat*", when forecasting opinion on the effects of immigration on the American economy and culture.

Moreover, these authors state that (beyond "*general ethnocentrism*") it is the attitudes of white Americans toward Hispanics which reveal the greatest effects on each dependent variable examined. That is, the negative perceptions of immigrants regarding employment; the opinions opposing toughening migration policy measures; or those in favor of granting social benefits to immigrants. The results of this study tally with those reported by other researchers (Segovia 2009; Pérez 2008; Burns and Gimpel 2000), which also show that Americans increasingly think more about Hispanics when discussing immigration, and that these thoughts are mostly negative.

In a recent contribution, Valentino et al. (2013) complement the previous analysis, using their 2008 internet survey and ANES surveys (to replicate their findings with data from 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008). They also adopt, as a new focus of attention, the presence in the press of news reports on groups of immigrants from 1985 up to the present. They note that in the case of *Latinos*, greater media attention (since 1994) tallies with the growing demographic weight of this group, as well as certain legislative milestones or other such events (such as the 1994 adoption of Proposition 187 in California, aimed at curtailing many of the social benefits received by "illegal immigrants"). In other words, they attempt to

compensate for the lack of perspective or historic demographic contextualization in previous studies, together with including the role of the media in shaping attitudes towards immigration during specific periods in the past.

Again they argue that this is a "*group-specific affect*" (and not general *ethnocentrism*) on the type of attitudes with greatest predictive power of opinion on immigration policy in contemporary American society. They recognize that this "*group-specific model*" or "*context-dependent theory of opinion on immigration*" is not as satisfying as a theoretical framework based on a general ethnocentrism that would predict opposition to immigration in any social system. They express their self-criticism noting that observing how exo-groups become the focus of attention at specific times in history cannot be translated straight into the proposition: majorities oppose all policies that benefit any exo-group. They insist that their theoretical model "requires more information about the social and historical context and debates about particular policy domains before one can fully explain opinion shifts or variation across society at any point in time" (Valentino et al. 2013: 164).

Similarly, another school of thought contends that contemporary anti-immigrant hostility is grounded in stereotypes of particular immigrant groups and their portrayal by parties and the mass media. For example, Branton et al. (2011) also uses the 2000 and 2004 ANES survey to demonstrate that correlates of non-Hispanic whites' attitudes to immigration changed in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. Specifically, media exposure of *Latinos* became a significant predictor of attitudes towards immigration only after September 11th, suggesting that portrayals of immigration shifted after the attacks.

As put forward at the start of this chapter, Latin American immigrants are the "new Blacks", having been stereotyped and stigmatized as the perennial and inassimilable underclass (Davies 2009: 378). The essay "The Hispanic Challenge" by Huntington (2004a) is an example of the discourse that demonizes *Latino* newcomers: Latin American immigration emerges as the great threat to national identity, previously anchored and secure in white, Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. This is an argument embedded within his wider construct of "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington 2004b) and retreats into old stereotypes of *Latinos*' lack of initiative, self-reliance, and ambition; their laziness; mistrust of those outside the family; and devaluation of education. A very controversial set of works, those of Huntington, where the "use of data is highly tendentious and misleading" (Etzioni 2005: 485); his hypotheses do not resist the test "with data from the U.S. Census and national and Los Angeles opinion surveys" (Citrin et al. 2007: 31); or Huntington's picture of Mexicans does not resist "evidence that Mexican Americans are in fact assimilating culturally" (Telles 2006: 7).

7.4 Final Observations

The comparison between Spain and the U.S. shows similarities and differences in perceptions of Latin American immigrants. Unlike the U.S., their acceptance in Spain is greater, since they are seen as closer to and better integrated into Spanish

society, sharing a common language, religion and culture, as well as historical ties. Along with Spain's more remote past of American colonization, we can link the more recent Spanish emigration to Latin American countries for economic and political reasons. But not all Latin American immigrants are equally accepted. More favored are the *Latinos* rather than the Indigenous American immigrants, as well as those who are better-off. Ethnic discrimination is still present in both countries, as in the whole of the European Union, as revealed by the Special Eurobarometer 393 (TNS Opinion and Social 2012b).

Ethnic discrimination, then, is combined with economic discrimination or class-based racism ("everything depends on your wallet"; better if you are also white). Skin color identifies a country; a particular socioeconomic strata. Those who do normal jobs look better than those who do jobs that natives do not want to do, as this work is socially discredited: observations that show that the famous 'vicious circle' still exists, underlined by Gunnar Myrdal in his famous work, *An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem and the Modern Democracy* (1944). It is the lower social status of blacks which explained the prejudice against them from the white majority and other ethnic groups. Attitudes became more negative, the more their social status deteriorated.

The crisis itself has not affected the specific perception of Latin Americans in Spain, although it has of immigrants in general. They are blamed more, for instance, for the deterioration in the labor market and social benefits. There is an increased desire for their expulsion and a discourse on preference (of natives vs. immigrants regarding access to work or social benefits). This is so to a greater extent among people with less education,[3] in a worse economic and employment situation (exposed to greater competition against the immigrant population), more conservative, and advocates of national identity. However, recent survey data gathered in Spain in 2012 shows that the rejection of immigration in general has declined three points since the most critical point recorded in 2011, despite the worsening economic crisis. This has also contributed to a lower perception of the presence of immigrants and the fact that the media is talking more about the return of immigrants and the emigration of Spaniards than immigrants entering the country.

So, as in the U.S., economic threat is a key factor in explaining xenophobia, but so is the cultural threat. The latter works in favor of Latin American immigration in Spain but not in the U.S. And in both countries rejection increases, the more threatening the immigrant population is perceived, due to their group size, ethnic features, or economic, religious or cultural situation. The more time spent living in Spain, the more the mutual acceptance between natives and foreigners, but also the decline in their numbers and the increased presence of immigrants who are seen as more easily "integrated". Nor should we forget the waning presence of immigrants

[3] In the light of the evidence on stereotyping and ethnocentrism, the education effect is more likely to highlight differences in tolerance, ethnocentrism, sociotropic assessments, or political correctness than is exposure to competition from immigrants (Citrin et al. 1997; Card et al. 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2013).

in political discourses and the media in 2012, compared to 2010 and 2011, coinciding with local and national elections. As Sari (2007) also maintains, the perception of immigration as a threat increases when presented as a "problem" by politicians and the media.

References

Alba, R., & Nee, V. (2003). *Remaking the American mainstream*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Allport, F. H. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *Pacific Sociological Review, 1*, 3–7.

Bobo, L., & Licari, F. C. (1989). Education and political tolerance. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 53*, 285–307.

Bommes, M., & Geddes, A. (2000). *Immigration and welfare*. London: Routledge.

Brader, T., Valentino, N., Jardina, A. (2009). *Immigration opinion in a time of economic crisis: material interests versus group attitudes*. Resource document. Center for Political Studies. University of Michigan. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1449415. pdf. Accessed 16 Oct 2013.

Branton, R., Cassese, E. C., Jones, B. S., & Westerland, C. (2011). All along the watchtower. *Journal of Politics, 73*, 664–679.

Brücker, H., Epstein, G. S., McCormick, B., Saint-Paul, G., Venturi, A., & Zimmermanne, K. (2002). Managing migration in the European Welfare State. In T. Boeri, G. Hanson, & B. McCormick (Eds.), *Immigration policy and the welfare system* (pp. 1–167). New York: Oxford University Press.

Burns, P., & Gimpel, J. G. (2000). Economic insecurity, prejudicial stereotypes, and public opinion in immigration policy. *Political Science Quarterly, 115*(2), 201–225.

Cachón, L. (2005). *Bases sociales de los sucesos de Elche de septiembre de 2004*. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.

Castles, S., & Kosack, G. (1973). *Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Card, D., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2012). Immigration, wages and compositional amenities. *Journal of the European Economic Association, 10*, 78–119.

Cea D'Ancona, Mª Á. (2004). La activación de la xenofobia en España. Madrid: CIS/Siglo XXI (Monografía no 210).

Cea D'Ancona, Mª Á. (2007). *Inmigración, racismo y xenofobia en la España del nuevo contexto europeo*. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. OBERAXE.

Cea D'Ancona, Mª Á., & Valles Martínez, M. S. (2008). *Evolución del racismo y la xenofobia en España [Informe 2008]*. Madrid: OBERAXE. Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración.

Cea D'Ancona, Mª Á., & Valles Martínez, M. S. (2010) *Xenofobias y xenofilias en clave biográfica: relatos entrelazados de autóctonos y foráneos*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.

Cea D'Ancona, Mª Á., & Valles Martínez, M. S. (2013). *Evolución del racismo y la xenofobia en España [Informe 2012]*. Madrid: OBERAXE. Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social.

Cea D'Ancona, Mª Á., & Valles Martínez, M. S. (2014). *Evolución del racismo y la xenofobia en España [Informe 2013]*. Madrid: OBERAXE. Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social.

Chandler, C. R., & Tsai, Y. M. (2001). Social factor influencing immigration attitudes. *The Social Science Journal, 38*, 177–188.

Citrin, J., Green, D., Muste, C., & Wong, C. (1997). Public opinion toward immigration reform. *Journal of Politics, 59*(3), 858–881.

Citrin, J., Lerman, A., Murakami, M., & Pearson, K. (2007). Testing Huntington: Is hispanic immigration a threat to American identity? *Perspectives on Politics, 5*(1), 31–48.

Clark, J. A., & Legge, J. S. (2009). Economics, racism, and attitudes toward immigration in the New Germany. *Political Research Quarterly, 50*(4), 901–917.

Coenders, M., & Scheepers, P. (1998). Support for ethnic discrimination in The Netherlands, 1979–1993. *European Sociological Review, 14*(4), 405–422.

Davies, I. (2009). Latino immigration and social change in the United States. *Policy Journal of Business Ethics, 88*, 377–391.

Espenshade, T. J., & Hempstead, K. (1996). Contemporary American attitudes toward U.S. immigration. *International Migration Review, 30*, 535–570.

Etzioni, A. (2005). The real threat: An essay on Samuel Huntington. *Contemporary Sociology, 34*(5), 477–485.

Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2010). Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration. *American Political Science Review, 104*, 61–84.

Hainmueller, J., & Hopkins, D. J. (2013). *Public attitudes towards immigration*. Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration. London: University College. Discussion Paper Series CPD 15/13.

Huntington, S. (2004a). The Hispanic challenge. *Foreign Policy, 141*, 30–45.

Huntington, S. (2004b). *Who are we? The challenges to America's national identity*. New York: Simon & Shuster.

Kinder, D. R., & Kam, C. D. (2009). *US against them*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kleiner-Liebau, D. (2011). Aprender del dilema alemán. In L. Cachón (Ed.), *Inmigración y conflictos en Europa* (pp. 151–198). Barcelona: Hacer Editorial.

Lahav, G., & Courtemanche, M. (2012). The ideological effects of framing threat on immigration and civil liberties. *Political Behavior, 34*, 477–505.

Lapinski, J., Peltola, P., Shaw, G., & Yang, A. (1997). Trends: Immigrants and immigration. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 61*, 356–383.

Muste, C. P. (2013). The polls-trends. The dynamics of immigration opinion in the United States 1992–2012. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 77*(1), 398–416.

Pérez, E.O. (2008). *Juan for All?* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Pettigrew, T. F., Wagner, U., & Christ, O. (2007). Who opposes immigration? *Du Bois Review, 4*(1), 19–39.

Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2006). *Immigrant America*. California: The University of California Press.

Quillian, L. (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat. *American Sociological Review, 60*, 586–611.

Sari, O. L. (2007). Perceptions of threat and expressions of prejudice toward the new minorities of Western Europe. *Journal of International Migration and Integration, 8*, 289–306.

Sartori, G. (2001). *La sociedad multiétnica*. Madrid: Taurus.

Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. *The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83*, 133–145.

Schildkraut, D. J. (2005). *Press one for english*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schnapper, D. (1994). The debate on immigration and the crisis of national identity. In M. Baldwin-Edwards & M. A. Schain (Eds.), *The politics of immigration in Western Europe* (pp. 127–139). London: Frank Cass.

Segovia, F. (2009). *Social factors influencing the immigration policy preferences of European Americans*. Dissertation thesis, University of Michigan.

Segovia, F., & DeFever, R. (2010). The polls-trends: American public opinion on immigrants and immigration policy. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 74*, 375–394.

Simon, R. (1993). Old Minorities, New Immigrants. In P. I. Rose (Ed.), *Interminority affairs in the U.S.* (Annals of the American Academy of political and social science, Vol. 530, pp. 61–73). Thousand Oak: Sage.

SORA. (2001). *Attitudes towards minority groups in the European Union*. Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.

Strabac, Z., & Listhung, O. (2008). Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe. *Social Science Research, 37*, 268–286.

Telles, E. E. (2006). Mexican Americans and the American Nation. A response to Professor Huntington. *Aztlán: A Journal of Chicano Studies, 31*(2), 7–23.

Telles, E. E., & Ortiz, V. (2009). *Generations of exclusion: Mexican Americans, assimilation, and race*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications.

TNS Opinion and Social. (2012a). *Special Eurobarometer 380/Wave EB 76.4. Awareness of home affairs*. European Commission. Directorate-General Home Affairs and co-ordinated by Directorate-General for Communication.

TNS Opinion and Social. (2012b). *Special Eurobarometer 393 / Wave EB 77.4. Discrimination in the EU in 2012*. European Commission. Directorate-General Justice and co-ordinated by Directorate-General for Communication.

Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., & Jardina, A. E. (2013). Immigration opposition among U.S. Whites: General ethnocentrism or media priming of attitudes about Latinos? *Political Psychology, 34*(2), 149–166. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00928.x.

Walker, I., & Pettigrew, T. F. (1984). Relative privation theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 23*, 301–310.

Wieviorka, M. (2009). *El racismo*. Madrid: Gedisa.

Wong, C. J. (2010). *Boundaries of obligation in American politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.