Chapter 1
Introduction: Vulnerability and Resilience of Latin American Immigrants During the Great Recession

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The Great Recession is the deepest economic crisis faced by capitalist economies since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The consequences of the Great Recession are visible in many areas of people's lives. Inequality has increased as millions of jobs have been eliminated and unemployment rates have dramatically risen. Even considering a positive outlook, recovery of employment to pre-recession levels is still several years away in some countries. The crisis occurred at the height of a Latin American migration to regions around the world, with main destinations being North America and Europe, particularly the United States and Spain. The impact of the Great Recession on the immigrant population has been notable. This volume seeks to describe some of these consequences on Latino immigrants by comparing their experiences on both sides of the Atlantic using multiple disciplinary lenses.

1.1 Latin Americans in the United States and Spain

When the Great Recession began, there were approximately 214 million migrants worldwide (UN 2009). Of those, 38 million lived in the United States and about 6 million in Spain. Latin American immigrants comprised about 38 % of the immigrant population in Spain and 53 % in the United States. The U.S. and Spain are the two countries among the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

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Development members (OECD) that received the most immigrants in the period from 2004 to 2008: 5.5 and 3.7 million, respectively (OECD 2010). Spain is the country of the EU with the highest proportion of foreign born population (12.3 % in 2010; Eurostat 2011). In addition, the U.S. and Spain have the highest number of immigrant workers from Latin America and the Caribbean: 11.3 million in the U.S. and 1.7 million in Spain in 2011.

Most emigrants from the Americas (82 %) in 2010–2011 resided in the United States; notably, 99 % of Mexican emigrants resided in the U.S. during that time period. However, there was a greater likelihood for migrants from South America to reside in Europe than in the United States. Spain accounted for most of the Southern American immigrants in Europe in 2011(57 %) (OAS 2012). The large presence of Latino immigrants sets the stage for the emergence of the "New Latin Nation" (Portes 2006) in the U.S. and Latin American communities in the European Union. We refer as "Latinos" those citizens born in Latin America and the Spanish speaking Caribbean. Massey (1993: 454) has pointed out that under the term "Hispanic" or "Latino" "are a disparate collection of national origin groups with heterogeneous experiences of settlement, immigration, political participation, and economic incorporation". Nonetheless, there are also signs of convergence. Diverse mutually-reinforcing forces tend to group all Latinos into an ethnic group (Portes 2006). First, there is a common culture, grounded on language and religion. Moreover, the power of the state is bent on turning Hispanics into a "real" ethnic minority. Nagel (1986) demonstrated long ago that the state can manufacture ethnicities and even races by the simple expedient of cataloguing and treating people "as if" they belonged to the same group. Something of the sort is happening with Latin American immigrants and their descendants in U.S. and also in Spain. Younger immigrant generations (1.5 and second generations) tend to identify themselves with this ethnic label more than with their parents national origins. It is then "quite possible that what started as a label of convenience used by Census officials to group together diverse Spanish-speaking groups becomes a sociological reality" (Portes 2006: 74).

There are notable differences in the processes that led to the concentration of Latino immigrants in the U.S. and Spain. We identify differences in at least four areas: (1) historical and contemporary Latin American migration flows to the U.S. and Spain; (2) development and implementation of diverse immigration policies; (3) proximity of the destination country to Latin America; and (4) characteristics of migrant populations such as sex composition, level of education, labor force activity rates, and sector of employment.

The United States has a longstanding tradition of immigration; in contrast, immigration is a recent phenomenon in Spain. As a consequence of the diverse development of immigration flows over time to both countries there are large cohorts of second and third generation descendants of Latino immigrants in the United States, but not in Spain. The presence of settled co-ethnic networks in the host country has an impact on labor market integration of new immigrants (affecting job search strategies, creating co-ethnic niches that lead to segregation in some industries, etc.). Immigrants from Latin America have been a key component of U.S. immigration since the late nineteenth century (Massey 1995). Latin American

immigrants were mainly Mexican workers responding to changes in the American economy that demanded large amounts of unskilled workers who could be hired at low wages (Portes and Bach 1985). They were followed by other groups of Caribbean migrants (e.g., Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Dominicans among others), and later, during the 1970s, by more Mexicans as well as other Latinos (Durand and Massey 2010). This migration flow, especially among Mexicans, developed migration specific social capital, which facilitates the subsequent migration of members belonging to a social network (Massey and Aysa-Lastra 2011; Flores and Aysa-Lastra 2011).

By contrast, Latin American immigration to Spain is relatively recent. It starts in the late 1990s. The total volume of immigration increased almost fourfold from 1.1 million in 2001 to 5.3 million in 2011. The proportion of the immigrant population went from 2.7 % in 2001 to 11.4 % in 2011. Immigrants with Latin American citizenship numbered 344,700 in 2001 and 2,029,200 in 2011, which means that the Latino immigrant population in Spain multiplied almost six times in the first decade of the century. In 2001, 32 % of immigrants were Latino, and this figure grew to 39 % in 2011. This immigrant growth is explained by an increased demand for low skilled workers in the construction sector (mostly for men) and in personal care services (mostly for women).

The U.S. and Spain have implemented different migration policies in the last decade. Until late 2004, Spain did not have a suitable policy device for managing immigrant flows. The result was clear: there was a boom in unauthorized immigration. Estimates of unauthorized immigrants in early 2005 approximated 1.2 million people, which accounted for about 40 % of total immigration in Spain (Cachón 2009: 143). The Foreigner Regulation (*Reglamento de Extranjería*), approved in late 2004, launched a set of mechanisms to manage the flows and marked the beginning of a change in the migration management model (ibid: 161–198). It was complemented by a process that allowed more than 565,000 regularizations of unauthorized immigrants. As a result, Spain experienced a substantial change in the traditional model of strong and irregular immigration typical of Southern Europe (Laparra and Cachón 2008). By January 2011, there were approximately 250,000 undocumented immigrants, equivalent to 5 % of all foreigners in Spain. The United States presents a different picture. While, there has been no overall change in immigration policy in the U.S. since 1986 when the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed, we have witnessed an increase in state and local anti-immigrant legislation that escalates surveillance and racial profiling of immigrants, particularly Latin American immigrants, which account for a large percentage of the estimated 11.7 million unauthorized immigrants residing permanently in the U.S. (Passel et al. 2013). In 1986, IRCA included an amnesty for undocumented aliens which was carried out as a regularization process (CBO 2006). But there have been substantial changes in the 1990s and 2000s, as a period of increasing restrictive regulations centered on national security and border enforcement. In addition, administrative changes have drastically modified the way the State has shaped the public discourse and the dynamics of the Latin American migrant flow to the United States (Massey and Pren 2012). Moreover,

differences in immigration policies between both countries are reflected in the modes of entry of unauthorized immigrants. In Spain Latino immigrants usually enter as tourists (with or without a visa) and then overstay working as irregular immigrants until they apply for regularization. Several extraordinary regularization processes were carried out until 2005. Thereafter, there is a permanent individual regularization process by settlement (*arraigo*). In the U.S., although there are a number of visa overstayers, the majority of undocumented immigrants has crossed the border without authorization and has stayed in irregular status.

Access to citizenship through naturalization processes differs in Spain and the United States. In the U.S., there are different categories and time requirements. The general regime specifies that immigrants (green card holders) can apply for citizenship after 5 years of continuous legal residency in the United States; spouses of U.S. citizens, after 3 years; and immigrants who serve in the military can apply sooner. A large proportion of immigrants to the United States from Latin America are granted permanent residency based on the principle of family reunification. In 2010, there were approximately 40 million foreign born persons living in the United States. Of those, 21.2 million were from Latin America; notably, 32.1 % (6.8 million) of the Latin American immigrants were naturalized citizens. Between 2007 and 2011, 3,764,837 naturalizations and 5,395,024 legal permanent residencies were granted in the U.S. About 40 % of naturalizations and legal permanent residencies were granted to Latin American immigrants. In Spain, the general regime requires 10 years of continuous legal residency in the country to apply for citizenship. However, there is a special regime for Latin Americans and for immigrants from countries or groups to which Spain has had relations in the past (e.g., Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, etc.). Latin American immigrants can apply for Spanish citizenship after 2 years of continuous legal residency in Spain. Between 2007 and 2011, 473,897 naturalizations were granted through continuous legal residency, which is equivalent to 10 % of the average annual number of immigrants for the period. Eighty-two percent of the naturalizations were granted to Latin American immigrants.

Another difference is the "proximity" of the U.S. and Spain to the region. The U.S. has both geographical and historical proximity to Latin America. For example, Mexico shares a border with the U.S. and a long history with the country dating back centuries. As with the U.S., Latino immigrants to Spain have historical proximity, but most importantly, cultural proximity, as the Spanish language helps facilitate the integration of Latino immigrants into Spanish society. In the U.S., English poses a barrier, to the economic and social integration of Latino immigrants (Connor and Massey 2010).

Latino immigrants to Spain and the U.S. differ by their national origin, sex composition, and educational levels. Most Latino immigrants in the United States were born in Mexico (57 %), Central American (17 %) or Caribbean (14 %) countries. In contrast, most Latin Americans residing in Spain are from South American countries; individuals from Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina account for two thirds of Latino immigrants in Spain (see Table 1.1). Differences in the sex composition of Latino immigrant populations in both

Table 1.1 Distribution of Latin American immigrants in Spain and the United States by country of origin (2011)

	Spain		United States	
Country of origin	% Latin American	Growth rate in the last decade (2001–2011)	% Latin American	Growth rate in the last decade (2001–2011)
Countries	1,650,243	289.6 %	12,086,358	24.5 %
Ecuador	21.8	158.3	1.1	30.5
Colombia	16.5	211.6	1.6	16.0
Bolivia	12.0	2,889.8	0.2	31.4
Peru	8.0	277.1	0.9	38.5
Argentina	7.3	270.1	0.4	35.8
Brazil	6.5	526.0	0.9	62.6
Dominican Republic	5.5	190.9	2.4	8.9
Paraguay	5.3	N.A.	0.0	N.A.
Venezuela	3.6	259.3	0.4	48.5
Cuba	3.3	121.8	1.9	9.4
Uruguay	2.6	523.6	0.1	92.1
Chile	2.5	257.3	0.3	8.4
Honduras	1.9	N.A.	1.1	52.7
Mexico	1.5	236.7	38.3	23.1

Source: Spain: INE, Municipal population register, January 1st 2011; United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2009; own estimations

countries as recently as 2011 are striking. In Spain, 54.8 % of Latino immigrants are female versus 31.5 % in the U.S. The educational level of economically active Latino immigrants in Spain is somewhat higher than in the U.S. In Spain, Latino immigrants have an average of 11.3 years of schooling, compared to 12.5 years among the native Spanish population; Latino immigrants in the U.S. have an average of 10.9 years of schooling, compared to 14.3 years among Americans (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2012).

The labor force activity rates of native and Latino immigrant populations differ between the two countries as well. In 2011, 57.4 % of the Spanish population ages 16–64 participated in the labor force while 63.7 % of Americans did. Latino immigrants have higher activity rates than native populations in both countries but with notable differences. In the U.S., their labor force activity rate is 70.5 % (and has remained stable over the last decade), while in Spain, it is 83.3 % (and increased five points between 2001 and 2011). The higher activity rate of Latino immigrants in Spain is due to the very different behavior of Latino immigrant women, as immigrant men have similar rates in both countries (approximately 86–87 %). While Latina immigrants in the U.S. have a participation rate of 50 % (lower than American women), in Spain, their rate reached 81 % (30 points higher than Spanish women). This high activity rate among Latinas in Spain shows that their migration trips are consistent with their own labor projects; and, that they found opportunities in sectors that have traditionally been occupied by women, such as

services and domestic service specifically. Latina immigrants' lower participation in the labor market in the U.S. compared to Spain might be explained by their role as tied migrants (most coming for family reunification) and having young children in the household, among other barriers (Granberry and Marcelli 2011).

In both countries the activity rates of Latinos have a positive relation with education: higher educational levels result in higher activity rates. In addition, in the case of Spain, the activity rates of Latinos are high at all educational levels. The difference in the global activity rates for Latino immigrants in the U.S. and Spain are partially explained by two factors: first, the higher educational levels of Latino immigrants in Spain versus Latino immigrants in the U.S.; and second, the higher levels of female Latino immigrant participation in the Spanish labor market.

The sectorial and occupational distribution of Latino immigrants in both countries is quite different; but in both countries, there is a concentration of Latino immigrants in low-skilled jobs. Before the 2008 crisis in the U.S., Latino men worked primarily in construction (26 %), services (27 %), production (12 %), and transportation (11 %) jobs, while Latino women were employed in services (48 %) and production (15 %). Also, about 5 % of Latino men and women worked in agriculture. The arrival of Latinos to nontraditional settlement areas in the U.S. has diversified their presence in different sectors (López-Sanders 2012). In Spain, Latino men were concentrated in construction (27 %), services (56 %), and industrial (10 %) sectors, while Latinas were employed almost exclusively in the service sector (93 %). Moreover, due to the important Latino immigrant growth in the last decade, their presence is increasing in a growing and diverse number of occupations (Cachón 2009).

1.2 Great Recession and Immigration

The roots of the Great Recession, which still many economies continue to face 6 years after the onset of the financial crisis, are linked to the deregulation of the financial markets implemented during the years of flourishing neoliberalism in the developed world.. We can also link the crisis to the increasing income and wealth inequalities that are produced in parallel to the implementation of neoliberal policies (Bonica et al. 2013; Pfeffer et al. 2013). Moreover, from the standpoint of international labor migration legislation, the Great Recession takes place at a time of restrictive policies on both sides of the Atlantic and produces what Hollifield (1992) has termed the "liberal paradox": times of increasing demand of immigrant workers in destination countries, but in a period of restrictive immigration policies that limit the entry of new labor migrants.

The years before the crisis set the conditions leading to the perfect storm: a deep transformation of the structure, size, and significance of the housing finance sector in the U.S. and the real estate boom in other parts of the world (Fligstein and Goldstein 2012) as well as changes in the global financial system (Stiglitz 2009).

The economic crisis that began in 2007 is the deepest since World War II and the Great Depression (Elsby et al. 2010; Elwell 2013). The collapse of housing and mortgage-backed securities (subprimes) markets in the U.S. produced a financial earthquake that threatened global financial markets. The onset of the crisis is marked by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing in September 2008. Banks and other financial institutions panicked and months later, the U.S. government rescued (i.e., "bailed out") "too big to fail" financial institutions and large banks (Blinder 2013a). Remarking on the need to bail out financial institutions, Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve Chairman, said "in our judgment, the failure of AIG would have been basically the end" (Madrick 2013). Despite the bailouts to major financial institutions, consumers and businesses significantly diminished spending. This created a downward spiral in the economy, and the most severe crisis in global capitalism took hold (Fligstein and Goldstein 2012). These negative events were followed by the burst of the housing market bubble in several European countries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain), which was generated by low interest rates associated with the adoption of the euro in 2002.

We can say that the Great Recession is an economic phenomenon that is mutating: in the words of Robert Zoellick (2009), President of the World Bank, "What started as a financial crisis, became an economic crisis, is now becoming an unemployment crisis – and to what degree does it become a human and social crisis?" Castles and Miller (2010) point out that the changing character of the Great Recession has influenced immigrant laborers in different ways. The initial focus of the crisis was on the *real estate crisis* as a result of the U.S. housing market collapse in 2006–2007; over the course of 2007–2008, the crisis mutated into a general *financial crisis*, with banks in critical situations, many requiring bailouts financed by the State in order to survive. By late 2008, the core sectors of the economy started to weaken and the world was confronted with an *employment crisis*. We stress that these episodes are now being followed by anti-immigrant times and increasing discrimination toward immigrants, particularly those identified as undocumented migrants. Despite some signs of recovery, many regions have so far experienced a jobless recovery.

Although there are diverse opinions on governments' responses to the Great Recession, for us public policy responses to these important changes in the economy have been "too little, too late" (Madrick 2013) and ill designed. Some of the implemented policies have deepened the effects of the Great Recession (Krugman 2009, 2012; Hetzel 2012). However, we can distinguish the different paths followed by the U.S. (under the Obama Administration) and in the European Union (under the leadership and pressure from Germany's Angela Merkel) (Blinder 2013b). Key differences emanate from the policies adopted by the Central Banks and the absence of policies aimed at economic growth: the Federal Reserve in the United States has implemented limited expansionary monetary policies and the government approved an economic stimulus (ARRA), while in Europe the monetary policies have been restrictive for the entire euro zone and there have not been substantial and significant stimulus policies (at least until the last months of 2014). Moreover, the problems in the structure of European Union political institutions



Fig. 1.1 GDP Growth Rates for the U.S., Euro zone, Spain, Mexico, and Colombia (2004–2014) (Source: National BLS, INEGI, DANE and Eurostat)

and the resulting lack of governance regarding the euro are needed to be addressed (Habermas 2013).

The implementation of different monetary policies has determined the different trajectories of growth in both economies in recent years. In the U.S. and other regions of the world, the growth rate over time follows a V shape; in the European Union, the growth rate over time follows a W shape (see Fig. 1.1) (Roubini 2009). In other words, as a consequence of restrictive fiscal policies, after 2010 we can observe for the EU economy the W shaped recovery defined by Arpaia and Curci (2010: 38) as: "episodes in which output growth resumes after a sharp contraction, but for few quarters only, and falls back into recession before the recovery takes hold". For Spain, this decline in GDP is even more important. To put these trends in perspective, it is important to note that some immigrants' countries of origin (e.g. Mexico) suffered an important decline in GDP caused by the decline in the U.S. but have experienced a notable recovery. Colombia, as many other South American countries, never registered absolute declines in GDP (or negative growth), however, the rate of GDP growth diminished during the crisis and, currently, has again increased.

It is important to underscore that this crisis differs in important ways from many other recent economic downturns (Castles and Miller 2010; Tilly 2011). It is the first crisis of a global scale (Martin 2009) and consequently it has affected every country in different ways. These two characteristics are important for our analysis of the Great Recession on international migration and Latin American immigrants. The global character of this crisis is particularly significant in migration because migrants were particularly burdened with difficulties in finding alternative destinations. Another relevant aspect regarding international migration is that this is the first time we observe a combination of high international migration and a global

economic downturn. Therefore, the comparisons with earlier economic crises must be tempered by the recognition that twenty-first century international migration has certain novel characteristics (Rogers 2009).

The consequences of the Great Recession go beyond increasing unemployment, the destruction of family wealth and patrimony (Wolff et al. 2012), and the resulting increasing inequality and poverty among those in the weakest tiers of societies (Card and Raphael 2013). It has triggered structural and cultural changes (Grusky et al. 2012; Hall and Lamont 2013; Danziger 2013), prompted grass roots movements voicing social concerns and discontent with the current situation and the implemented restrictive social policies (e.g., Occupy Wall Street in U.S., or 15 M demonstrations in Spain); and, promoted financial regulations (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act –HR 4173) and improvements in the financial architecture of a unique currency in regions with economies of diverse size such as the euro zone.

The Great Recession is having a large impact on international migration. We believe that we are only beginning to observe the important structural changes that this global recession has set off. However, several studies have shown that although Latino marginality was exacerbated during the Great Recession, the negative effects of this economic shock are additional to longer trends in declining in earnings, worsening of health conditions, increasing gaps in education, growing residential segregation, and rising poverty rates. Illegality and marginality, resulting in increasing racialization and criminalization of Latino immigrants are potent barriers to their integration (Massey 2012: 6).

1.3 Immigrant Vulnerability and Resilience During Economic Downturns

The aim of this volume is to present studies that analyze how Latino immigrants have responded to the Great Recession. The Great Recession has imposed constraints and challenges on almost all social segments in several countries. However, its effects on Latino immigrant populations in the U.S. have been more palpable due to the deterioration of the labor market, U.S. immigration policy in the twentieth century, rising anti-immigrant sentiment and increasing racialization of Latinos in their host communities (Massey 2013; Menjívar and Kanstroom 2014).

A basic feature of most immigrant groups is their subordinate position in the social structure and the fact that their placement in this position tends to socially construct them as subjects with "objective vulnerability" (Portes 1978). This ascribed vulnerability creates conditions in which immigrants are more easily exposed to acts of discrimination and stigmatizing processes. However, from these objectively subordinate positions within the social structure of host societies, immigrants individually and collectively act, not only looking for "exits" or paths to escape from their current vulnerable position, but also they look for "voice" in an

attempt to improve their situation (Hirschman 1970). As an example and in contrast to vulnerability, it is important to underscore the visibility of immigrant ethnic resilience, especially during crises such as the Great Recession.

Vulnerability and resilience are not antagonistic concepts within migration studies. In other areas such as disaster or environmental studies, vulnerability and resilience are placed at the ends of a spectrum aimed at evaluating conditions within a structure. Moreover, the use of vulnerability and resilience in developmental psychology also differs. Resilience within this framework is conceived as an outcome: that is, as the individual accomplishment of a goal, even if risk conditions of failure were present. In this sense, being at risk, or experiencing a series of negative conditions, is related to one's vulnerable condition.

In the field of immigration studies, resilience should be considered as the capacity of individuals, and not of social systems or institutions; it is a capacity that derives from the social capital defined as "those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere" (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993: 1321). Social Capital can adopt different forms: value introjection, reciprocity transactions, bounded solidarity, or enforceable trust (ibid), and all of these are relevant in migration studies.

Moreover, resilience should be conceived as a process, a reaction, and a form of resistance exercised by the actors within a "field of possibilities" that are marked by the social structure that tend to construct vulnerable subjects. There is an "ambivalence" (Simmel 1950) in which immigrants and immigrant communities are placed: vulnerable subjects (discriminated and stigmatized) according to their position in the social structure (class, race and ethnic perception and identification, gender and any other social characteristic) that responds to the diverse strategies in which they exercise their resilience, their expectations, and their capacity for action to protect themselves or minimize the effects of their vulnerable condition. The ambivalence that triumphs in the relations between the "foreigner," and the majority group in the host society "is the mirror of an asymmetric power relation in which none of the parties is not totally destituted of power, neither can it exercises it without limits" (Tabboni 1997: 241).

1.3.1 Roots of Immigrant Vulnerability

The vulnerability of individuals or social groups has its foundation in the "holy trinity" of inequality (Massey 2007): class, race and ethnicity, and gender. Frequently, these inequalities are combined and create additional interactive and multiplicative negative effects. Moreover, the ways in which these inequalities operate change over time. Immigrants and natives face vulnerabilities caused by these inequalities, but immigrants have an additional constraint: the discrimination suffered as a result of their immigrant condition; immigrants crossed a border and entered a State in which they are not citizens, making them a more fragile social

subject. Immigrants are socially constructed as vulnerable subjects, as powerless agents. This is the origin of what we have denominated the "discriminatory institutional framework" (Cachón 1995): the exercise of the State to establish borders and "manage" (recognize, guarantee, or deny) individual rights and distinguish between the insiders and the outsiders.

In short, the "discriminatory institutional framework" shows a series of institutional constraints that delineate paths, place barriers, and establish preferences for some groups over others. In addition to these institutional constraints, the market and the host societies offer different opportunities, which vary over time, to different groups. Immigrants take into account these constraints and opportunities in conforming their strategies or resilient behaviors, individually and collectively, to value their different forms of "capital" (human, social, etc.) and to confront discrimination (Cachón 2009).

The vulnerability of a person or group, such as immigrants, is determined by the absolute or relative deprivation of symbolic, social, emotional, or material resources or the difficulty or impossibility to use them in a specific historical context due to institutional, political, economic, social, or cultural constraints. This effective lack of resources is what makes some groups of immigrants more vulnerable than others. Causes and circumstances for migration also impose vulnerabilities on immigrants. Forced migrants or those who were obligated to leave their countries of origin due to threats to their lives, physical integrity or freedom, and victims of human trafficking are at additional disadvantage. The former is likely to be deprived of social networks in destination that facilitate their integration; and in addition the latter is deprived of fundamental rights. In general, immigrant vulnerability decreases over time with acculturation and integration progress. However, these processes follow a "segmented assimilation" (Portes and Zhou 1993; Haller et al. 2011) that traps immigrants in the lower social tiers. In summary, the condition of being an immigrant makes them "categorically unequal" citizens (Massey 2007).

In addition to their immigrant condition, another fundamental feature that defines immigrant vulnerability is the class component, as immigrants are concentrated in the lower segments of the working class. The immigrants' working condition, although not common among all immigrants, is a key element to understanding immigration and immigrant vulnerability. The concentration of immigrants in lower occupational categories shows this trait among the majority of immigrants in destination countries. In many cases, this working character is a consequence of having crossed a border, thereby becoming an immigrant. Immigrants experience downward social mobility by working occupations with lower prestige that require less qualifications than employment in their countries of origin (Chiswick 1978; Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2013).

Capitalism, in all its stages, always requires supplies of vulnerable and disadvantaged workers (Sassen 1988). Hicks's argument is clear: "the commodity economy has never been able to do without servants" (see Moulier-Boutang 1998). Consequently, there are growing segments in the labor market that are more flexible, cheaper, and docile. Massey (2007, 2009) points out, for example,

that in the United States, Mexicans are being socially constructed as a "better underclass." We could argue something similar regarding any other immigrant recipient country: its government looks for certain characteristics in particular immigrant groups, builds a discourse, and implements policies that result in the construction of a "better underclass" (Telles and Ortiz 2008).

Several authors from different perspectives have recognized the labor segmentation of the immigrant labor market (Piore 1979). This labor market segmentation has produced, in the long run, the marginalization of specific immigrant groups. Although in general there are no rigid barriers based on race, ethnicity, or nationality, certain groups are overrepresented in disadvantaged positions. In the case of immigrants, their marginalization is not entirely explained by specific factors such as education, length of stay at destination, or labor market experience.

We argue that the Great Recession deepened existing immigrant vulnerabilities due to the deterioration of the labor market, and also exacerbated discrimination practices and stigmatization of immigrant communities through the implementation of restrictive immigration laws accompanied by austerity measures adopted from the neoliberal economic framework prevalent since the 1980s.

1.3.2 Immigrant Resilience During the Great Recession and Anti-immigrant Times

In an adapted and malleable notion of resilience (Brand and Jax 2007), we noted its relation to social capital and the need of defining it as a process, as a reaction, or as an act of resistance of the agents within a "field of possibilities" delimited by their position in the social structure. Resilience and its corresponding strategies can be included within Hirschman's definition of "voice": "any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly to change, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention to forge a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion" (Hirschman 1970: 30). As Lamont et al. (2013) point out, "Responses to stigmatization can be individual or collective and they take a variety of forms such as confronting, evading or deflating conflict; claiming inclusion; educating/reforming the ignorant; attempting to conform to majority culture or affirming distinctiveness; wanting to 'pass' or denouncing stereotyping; and engaging in boundary work toward undesirable 'others' when responding to stigmatization." Lamont and his colleagues show that responses from those who are stigmatized are related to cultural myths about national belonging. In our case, we must ask ourselves how cultural myths about national belonging are built and how ethnic, specifically Latino, belonging is built in different contexts like the U.S. and Spain.

Immigrants are active agents that build their identity in a negotiation process with the social context in which they place themselves and are placed by others (Barth 1969), a process referred to as "boundary-brokering" (Massey and Sánchez 2010). In many cases, immigrants develop reactive identities. Because they face barriers through stigmatization and discrimination, instead of trying to "blend" into their host communities with the mainstream culture, they develop identities that associate themselves with "their" group and belong to a "new" community. Portes and Rumbaut (2001: 248) highlight the growth and effects of reactive ethnicity: "The discourses and self-images that it creates develop as a situational response to present realities. Even when the process involves embracing the parent, original national identities, this is less a sign of continuing loyalty to the home country than a reaction to hostile conditions in the receiving society". If the State does not support the emergence of selective acculturation, then these resources will come from the assets and social capital of families and communities. "The irony of the situation is that many immigrant families are doing for American society what it will not do for itself: raising law-abiding, achievement-oriented, and bilingual citizens in the teeth of the obstacles steaming from intransigent nativism and forceful assimilation" (ibid: 276).

These reactive processes bring a base for collective action (both to show solidarity to a cause and to increase visibility and gain leverage in the political arena), although the effects of reactive processes at the individual level might be less visible. However, at the individual level, there are exceptional cases of selective assimilation, as observed in the cases of Marta Tienda, Raquel Torres, Luis Donato Esquivel, or Dan-el Padilla (see Portes et al. 2009). We can gather hundreds of similar histories that show how individual and family resilience and the capacity of immigrants to overcome obstacles and achieve goals in adverse contexts and situations. Nevertheless, even in these exceptional cases we can identify the vulnerability of their initial position in the social structure, in terms of class and perceived ethnicity in the destination countries.

Crosnoe (2005) has shown that the children of Mexican immigrants who develop certain forms of resilience based on closer ties to their families and communities overcome the limitations of educational resources and contextual risk factors imposed by the stratified U.S. public education system. Resilient undocumented immigrant students face many stressors and barriers, but many overcome these obstacles, become academically successful role models, and continue to make a difference in many lives (Coronado 2008; Perez et al. 2009). We can even point out that even some behaviors that are seen as marginal or deviant are in fact acts of resilience (Rios 2012). "Resilience keeps people energized and helps them maintain their commitment and overcome difficult situations" (Bhagat and London 1999: 360). And this shared energy and commitment might be a precursor for collective action.

Collective action is the most fertile field for ethnic resilience. A central argument in the studies of social capital is the importance of cross-ethnic ties. In other words, one's social network can serve as a resource for action, and for racial minorities, social ties to Whites are a form of social capital (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Social

capital arguments imply that there should be mobilization benefits to having cross-cutting ties: providing information, normative expectations, and motivations that encourage political participation. As shown by Santoro et al. (2012: 228), "Mexican Americans are more likely to be active across both cultural and political dimensions if they have cross-cutting ties."

We can enhance our understanding of social resilience by "considering whether and how stigmatized groups may be empowered by potentially contradictory contextual forces—more specifically, by cultural repertoires that enable their social inclusion" (Lamont et al. 2013: 129–130). Paradoxically, neo-liberalism may encourage stigmatized groups to make claims based on human rights (Kymlicka 2013). Moreover, it has been shown that societies that adopt multicultural perspectives do not hinder immigrant engagement with society and government; multicultural societies not only provide recognition to immigrants, but also foster their emotional and cognitive engagement, as manifested in their greater political participation (Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

There are historic experiences that illustrate how social resilience channeled through collective action movements has led to beneficial 'turning-points.' The movement led by Dolores Huerta and Cesar Chávez with the creation of the National Farmworkers Association in the 1970s (right at the moment in which civil rights laws were being passed) is one of those turning-points. Chavez's famous phrase "*Sí se puede*" still resonates in today's Latino demonstrations. The key moment for the revival of collective resilience is the announcement on December 16, 2005 of Law HR4437 (The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act) in California. This stringent anti-immigrant proposal, presented by Congressman J. Sensenbrenner (R-WI), denied immigrants any possibility of legal integration into American society. This law triggered an unprecedented mobilization and the sudden and massive politicization of the Latino community (Santamaría 2007). A variety of grass roots organizations participated in these national demonstrations, including Latino organizations, immigrant rights defense organizations, and human rights organizations. A significant, novel feature of these demonstrations is that students and unauthorized immigrants were active participants in the marches.

The mobilization of Latino immigrant students did not received enough support in Congress for the approval of the DREAM Act (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors), but it has achieved an Executive order from President Obama in 2012 that delays the deportation of 850,000 unauthorized young Latino immigrants (Passel et al. 2014). Several groups supporting immigrant rights continue to support comprehensive immigration reform in the U.S. While a bipartisan proposal for immigration reform was being negotiated and prepared in March 2012, 350 organizations concentrated before the United States Capitol and claimed "the time for immigration reform is now," and assembled a demonstration in Washington later that month under the slogan "March for America. Change Takes Courage." March 21st 2010 is a day to remember in the history of immigrant rights in the United States. At the time of this writing (October 2014), immigration reform is included on the legislative agenda. However, it is likely to be blocked by the

Republican Party in the U.S. House of Representatives. President Obama has promised, once again, to issue executive orders on immigration policy before the end of 2014, if the Immigration Reform is not passed by Congress. Latino demonstrations in favor of immigration reform and immigrant rights will continue to be the "voice" of millions of marginalized and stigmatized Latinos immigrants.

1.4 Structure of This Volume

This volume presents research that examines the effects of the Great Recession on Latin American immigrants. To this end, our team of American and European colleagues, using an array of disciplinary approaches, has taken into account changes in the labor markets and social contexts in the two main destination countries for Latin American immigrants and considered developments in these immigrants' countries of origin. We emphasize immigrant vulnerabilities and describe immigrants' strategies to cope during the Great Recession and use a comparative perspective to identify the similarities and differences that are being produced in the Latino immigrant population on both sides of the Atlantic.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first part, titled "Effects of the Great Recession on Latin American Immigrant Labor," begins with two chapters examining labor market trends for Latino immigrants during the Great Recession in the U.S. and Spain. These chapters, authored by María Aysa-Lastra and Lorenzo Cachón, compare employment and unemployment data among naturalized citizens born in Latin America, Latin American immigrants and natives. The analysis shows immigrants' employment sensitivity to labor market contractions and underscores the significant impact of the Great Recession on male Latino immigrants and their flexibility to maintain employment status even if forced to accept jobs of lower quality. In Spain, the deep and very long employment crisis has provoked many Latin American immigrants to return to South America.

These two chapters are followed by an analysis on Latina women employment in both countries. Sonia Parella (Chap. 4), using an intersectional approach, shows the role of Latino women during the Great Recession. The Great Recession largely affected sectors in which males were predominantly employed. For women the loss of employment was less severe -in some cases, they even became the main sources of income for their households. However, the informality and conditions of their employment, particularly domestic employment, are still of concern, especially in the case of undocumented migrants at risk of deportation.

In Chap. 5, Cristina Bradatan and Neeraja Kolloju study labor trends of highly skilled Latin American immigrants during the economic decline. They compared data from the labor surveys in both countries before and during the Great Recession. Their analysis of Latin American immigrants and natives with bachelor's degrees and advanced professional education shows that although higher education serves as a risk premium against unemployment, Latin American highly skilled immigrants faced higher unemployment rates in both countries relative to natives.

In the closing chapter of this first part of the volume, Cecilia Menjívar and María Enchautegui (Chap. 6), provide data on the confluence of economic recession and restrictive immigration laws focusing on the salient case of the state of Arizona. They focus on employment and daily routines of Latino Immigrant workers. They complement their quantitative analysis with qualitative interviews on how stricter law enforcement (e.g. SB 1070, 287(g) and LAWA) and internal border control, criminalization, insecurity and limited opportunities in the labor market further increased undergroundness and vulnerability of Hispanic foreign born non-citizens in undocumented niche occupations (e.g., housekeepers, maids, cooks, farm workers and construction helpers). The chapters in Part I shed light on the diversity of Latino immigrant experiences during this period.

The second part of the book, "Understanding Immigrant Adaptation in Difficult Times," aims to explore how Latin American immigrants adapt and develop social mechanisms in times of high unemployment, increasing discrimination (Massey 2009), and changing host societies' perceptions towards immigrants. It begins in Chap. 7, authored by María Ángeles Cea D'Ancona and Miguel Valles Martínez. They analyze changes in the perception of Latin American immigrants in receiving societies during the Great Recession and discuss how material interests (economic and material position) and ethnocentrism shape the opinion of Americans and Spaniards towards immigrants in the U.S. and Spain, before and during the economic downturn. Their results show that immigrants who are perceived as having indigenous roots or poor, (i.e., "class-based racism") rank lower in natives' perceptions. This trend is more pronounced in the U.S. than in Spain.

Continuing our investigation of the effects of the Great Recession on attitudes towards Latino immigrants, in Chap. 8, Meghan Conley examines the impact of the Great Recession and criminalization on Latin American immigrant identity building and malleability. Her analysis focuses on the effects of law HB 56 in Alabama in 2011. She argues that immigrant scapegoating is predictable during periods of economic insecurity and, as a consequence, restrictionist state legislation proliferated in the absence of federal immigration reform. She describes how the majority of these state laws and local efforts to regulate immigration required law enforcement officers to determine citizenship and immigration status of individuals. These practices evolved in the racialization of Latinos as "those not belonging." She argues that the implementation of Alabama HB 56 resulted in the harassment of Latinos and their constant fear of what she calls the "enforcement lottery," but that Latinos' resilient strategies as a response to their imposed vulnerability resulted in acts of resistance and civil disobedience, organized trainings on immigrants' rights across the state, and the formation of people's committees.

To continue studying the importance of immigrant organization as channels for voicing immigrant resilience and fostering immigrant integration in Chap. 9 Héctor Cebolla-Boado and Ana López-Sala compare the Spanish and American approaches to immigrant organizations. Based on survey data, they studied the impact of the Great Recession on immigrant organizations in Spain. Their argument centers on the stability of these organizations, because many of them are the product of a top-down policy on immigrant integration. The Spanish government

during the economic and immigration boom, as part of its immigrant integration policies, financed and fostered immigrant organizations. However, during the Great Recession, the government imposed fiscal austerity policies. These measures resulted in reduced budgets in all areas, but particularly in those deemed not basic or strategic for economic recovery. In this scenario, Cebolla and López-Sala observe that many organizations disappeared and those still providing services to immigrants have changed their scope from immigrant integration in Spain to programs that support the return of immigrants to their countries or origin.

Once we have presented how the Great Recession has affected immigrants' opportunities in the labor market, and how immigrants responded to the economic and social challenges imposed, we then turn to the third part of the volume, which focuses on the effects of the economic downturn on transnational practices and remittances, and the voluntary and forced return of Latin American migrants to their countries of origin. In this section the authors present data on the economic and social conditions in Latin American countries, remittance sending patterns, and how the prevailing anti-immigrant climate in the U.S. and some European countries can be counterproductive for the maintenance and further development of transnational practices in a global society. In Chap. 10, Jorge Durand and María Aysa-Lastra critically examine variations in the development rankings among Latin American countries, changes in the demographic structure leading to population aging, employment and wage trends, and the interrelation of these factors to future prospects for intra-regional migration as well as international migration to traditional destinations.

In Chap. 11, Manuel Orozco provides new evidence on the temporal impact of the Great Recession on remittances to Latin America. Moreover, he explores the current financial position and remitting behaviors of migrants living in the U.S. using data from three cross-sectional national surveys. His analysis indicates that in 2013, migrant recovery from the economic downturn was modest and that Latino immigrants' financial and economic vulnerability is still high. Despite this modest recovery and their vulnerable position, Latin American and Caribbean immigrants were able to increase their remitting capacity between 2009 and 2013.

One of the core elements in the literature on transnational practices is immigrants' remitting behavior; however, immigrants' maintenance of regular engagement with their communities of origin also depends on immigration policies. In Chap. 12, Ninna Nyberg Sørensen carries out an analysis of pre and post-recession contexts for migratory projects. She argues that the negative effects of the Great Recession coupled with the intensification and diversification of migration control have limited the opportunities of development for vulnerable communities whose migrants remain undocumented. She brings a broad vision of historical migration patterns and places the Great Recession in the context of neoliberal changes in the political economy that are shaping current migration trends from Latin America. She claims that pre-recession patterns of migrant recruitment, remittances and return migration, have been transformed due to the hardening of U.S. and European immigration policies in practices characterized by danger, debt and deportation for many migrants.

The concluding chapter provides a comparative analysis of the effects of the Great Recession on Latin American immigrants and their responses and problematizes immigration and immigrant integration in uncertain times and under uncertain circumstances.

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