Chapter 7
Role of Non-traditional Donors in Humanitarian Action: How Much Can They Achieve?

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7.1 Introduction

The global architecture of international humanitarian assistance has been for years dominated by a specific group of donor countries, who started to build up their national aid systems back in the 1950s and 1960s. These highly developed economies, members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (DAC OECD), associated predominantly with the concepts of 'the First World' or 'the West' is referred to as 'traditional donors'.

However, since the beginning of the 1990s, following the globalisation of international relations and gradual shifting of wealth to emerging economies, new actors have appeared to play an increasingly important role at the scene of humanitarian donor community and to influence the established ways of the provision of humanitarian aid.[1] The first remark that needs to be made about this group of humanitarian donors is that it is highly diverse in terms of geographical location, cultural and religious background, economic and political power and volume of budgets, which they are able to allocate to humanitarian assistance. Some of them have been donors for a long time, with far larger funds dedicated to foreign aid than certain DAC countries. Some have ceased to receive Official Development Assistance (ODA) in recent decades (like Poland), whereas some continue to be

Opinions expressed in this paper are individual opinions of the author.

[1] Kristalina Georgieva: "The world is changing at a pace and a magnitude that we can hardly grasp and all this affects the scale and nature of the humanitarian challenges we face nowadays." in: ICRC (2011): *Discussion: what are the future challenges for humanitarian action.*

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P. Gibbons, H.-J. Heintze (eds.), *The Humanitarian Challenge*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-13470-3_7

ODA-eligible while at the same time acting more and more frequently as donors, often using their own experience in internal disaster response. It includes the BRICS[2] countries, new EU member states (so called "EU-13"),[3] Turkey, selected Arab states as well as some of the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia like Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan.

The variety among these donors is, in fact, reflected in a number of different terms attached to them like "non-DAC donors", "non-traditional donors", "non-Western", "new" or "emerging donors". For the purpose of this article we will use these labels interchangeably, however it should be noted that none of them seems to be fully accurate or accepted by all representatives of the group. Poland and other post-communist countries of Central Europe would probably not be satisfied with the title "non-Western donors" due to their Western-oriented political aspirations. For some, which like for example Czech Republic[4] have recently acceded to the DAC OECD, the term "non-DAC donors" will not be ideal. Other countries with a long history of aid donorship like the Gulf States (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005a, p. 7), could easily oppose to such labels as "new", "emerging" or "non-traditional". It is also worth pointing out that the above-mentioned terms were actually coined by the "traditional club" of donors, at the key humanitarian and development policy fora, to which very few "non-traditional" donors belong.[5]

One could ask why is it important to discuss the phenomenon of expanding humanitarian donorship, especially if 'new donors' share in the overall global Official Humanitarian Assistance is fairly limited. The debate is however meaningful as it has a direct bearing on the coordination of the present plethora of humanitarian actors, both at the policy level and operational level in the field. Misunderstanding of each other's values or intentions while engaging in humanitarian action can lead to duplications, gaps or inefficiencies in response, which in turn create risks for the perception of humanitarian actors and their principled approach, not to mention negative consequences for the beneficiaries. Furthermore, better comprehension of "new" donors' agendas seems of particular relevance in connection with other parallel processes influencing humanitarian system nowadays, i.e. reduction of aid budgets by some 'Western' donors due to the global economic downturn of the early 21st century, interaction between counter-terror and aid interests as well as the UN integration and its impact on humanitarian space.

[2] Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

[3] EU-12 recognition as 'non-traditional' donors is not universal (e.g. in GPPi (expand acronym and reference) they are not qualified as "non-traditional donors"). For the purpose of this article, the assumption is made that EU-12 member states are still considered as "emerging donors".

[4] The Czech Republic became the 26th DAC member state in May 2013.

[5] Although referred to in some publications about "new donors", in this article South Korea has not been qualified as one due to its more than 3-year DAC OECD membership and extended participation in the multilateral humanitarian system.

Much has already been written about the emergence of new donors, from the Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI HPG) series entitled *Diversity in donorship* (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005b) issued in 2005 and later, to more recent studies, including Development Initiatives' work (e.g. the report *Non-DAC donors and humanitarian aid* (Smith 2011)), Global Public Policy Institute's research summarised in the paper *Humanitarian Assistance: Truly Universal. A Mapping Study of Non-Western Donors* (Binder et al. 2010) or report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies entitled *Emerging Powers. Emerging Donors* (White 2011). Whereas the primary work on "new" humanitarian donors was mostly based on review of primary sources or existing studies and complemented by interviews with government officials or representatives of international organisations, succeeding publications comprised additional analysis of quantitative data, particularly FTS[6] data on humanitarian funding, or even more advanced econometric methods to verify hypotheses concerning aid allocations of "new" donors (Fuchs and Klann 2012). Furthermore, thanks to the latest HPG ODI reports, the research on the changing landscape of humanitarian donorship was supplemented by two important aspects: field level analysis (Harmer and Martin 2010) and a historical approach (Davey 2012).

Moreover, it should be mentioned that research on "emerging" humanitarian donorship is only a part of wider academic efforts to describe, understand and explain the role of "emerging" foreign aid donors. However, as Fuchs and Klann suggest (Davey 2012, p. 2), it is the humanitarian response where the influence of these "emerging" donors is the most palpable due to the fact that the significant majority of countries provided at least some emergency assistance. The Haiti earthquake in 2010, to which over 100 states responded,[7] was by far the best example of donor proliferation and showed that humanitarian aid giving can be "a common pursuit" for all nations irrespective of their economic status (Harmer and Martin 2010, p. 1).

This article is by no means aimed at presenting the whole picture of changing humanitarian aid architecture. It rather intends to highlight selected findings of the above mentioned research and to add several new observations, notably referring to the international response to the Syrian crisis and other recent developments on the international humanitarian agenda. First, we will focus on the humanitarian policies and motives of "emerging" donors (Sect. 7.2). Later, we will look at the institutional set-up and financial allocations characteristic of their humanitarian aid systems (Sect. 7.3). In the concluding part, taking into account "emerging" donor features described in Sects. 7.2 and 7.3, we will attempt to answer the title question, "How much can new donors achieve?", by assessing opportunities and barriers to their enhanced engagement in humanitarian action. Since the voices coming from

[6] Financial Tracking System—global, real time database on humanitarian funding, managed by UN OCHA, http://fts.unocha.org.

[7] FTS data: http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10c_C91_Y2013_asof___1306182204.pdf, accessed 6 October 2014.

traditional donor fora have been prevalent in the current debate about new donors so far, the article is also expected to provide a perspective that originates from a non-traditional donor country's experience.

7.2 Policy Frameworks and Motives for Engagement

As much as the lack of a specific legal basis for humanitarian action is not rare in the donor world (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005c, p. 26), it is quite common that the well-established aid givers define the objectives of their humanitarian action and commit themselves to the four fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Their strategic or planning documents often indicate thematic or geographical priority areas. The very first trend observed in case of "new" donors is that they are active in the provision of humanitarian assistance, however many of them do not possess specific policy frameworks devoted to their understanding of humanitarianism, its principles and priorities. Out of the studied examples only the Czech Republic published two planning documents related specifically to humanitarian aid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic), whereas in some cases (e.g. Poland, Hungary) chapters on humanitarian action would be included in the wider development cooperation strategy. According to the available studies, in other "emerging" donor countries humanitarian assistance does not appear to be defined in strategic policy documents. Only a limited number of "new" donors, namely EU-13 donors, Brazil and Mexico, committed themselves to the internationally recognised definition of humanitarian action enshrined in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. This might stem from the will to maintain high flexibility of emergency response, the limited importance attached to humanitarian action within the whole foreign affairs system or simply concentration on operational aspects of humanitarian action instead of its policy dimension.

Due to the lack of policy frameworks, learning about "emerging" donors' understanding of humanitarianism can be quite challenging and requires more complex studies involving interview methods as well as field level analysis. Nevertheless, the researchers have so far presented several examples of how "non-traditional" donor countries perceive humanitarian aid and, to a significant extent, their approach seems to be different in comparison to "Western" donors. First of all, many "emerging" donors tend to understand their engagement in humanitarian action through the prism of their religious orientation, e.g. through the tradition of Islamic principle of *zakat*, which requires all Muslims to share a part of their income with people in need and shapes the functioning of Islamic charity organisations. Another example is India, where the concept of *daan*, present in Hinduism, Buddhism and other *dharmic* religions, exerts influence on humanitarian giving (Meier and Murthy 2011, p. 7). In spite of the formal adherence to the "Western" definition of humanitarian aid (i.e. commitment to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid or Good Humanitarian Donorship principles) by Poland, the

distinction between humanitarian aid and support to Christian minorities worldwide might not always be clear to the wider public.

Besides religious interpretations mentioned above, a number of non-traditional donors view humanitarian action as an expression of solidarity, the maintenance of friendly relations or an element of South–South cooperation (Binder and Meier 2011, p. 1138), while putting an emphasis on priorities and sovereignty of affected states as well as avoiding donor-recipient hierarchy, which can be traced back to the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) founded in the 1950s. Adherence to the rule of non-interference with other countries' domestic affairs could influence the "new" donors' understanding of humanitarian aid. They are often reluctant to fund protection operations (Binder and Meier 2011, p. 1138) and tend to reduce the concept of humanitarian action to short-term disaster response, while more political, long-term response to conflicts and protracted complex emergencies would remain out of scope of their humanitarian operations. India and China are "new" donors, for which disaster management aspects of humanitarian activities seem to be particularly strong (Meier and Murthy 2011, p. 6; Binder and Conrad 2009, p. 12), although in case of China this can be partly explained by the high profile of disaster management in domestic policy rather than its close relations to the NAM, to which China is only an observer country. In many "new" donors countries the distinction between humanitarian assistance and other types of foreign aid (e.g. peacekeeping operations, development assistance) is not entirely clear (Binder et al. 2010, p. 26).

What are the other rationales behind becoming a humanitarian donor? The factors underlying the decision to enter the humanitarian enterprise—as in the case of well-established donors' motivations—are a mixture of availability of resources (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005c, p. 12), genuine desire to help and a set of political, economic and security considerations. Used as a soft power instrument, humanitarian assistance can be seen by aspiring political powers such as India, Turkey or the Gulf States as an expression of their leadership or significance regionally and even globally. It can well be interpreted as a way to build a secure regional environment by peaceful means. Strengthening involvement in humanitarian action might also be a method of manifesting a country's adherence to a particular governmental organisation and its values—this is a factor that could have influenced EU-13 member states to increase their humanitarian funding. In other instances, getting involved in humanitarian response would be perceived as an opportunity to promote "new" donor's expertise and technology transfer in a particular field. China, for example, is a country with a history of multiple types of disaster, where disaster management plays an important role domestically. This background is thus conducive to Chinese participation in the international fora on disaster risk reduction or International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) (Binder et al. 2010, p. 13; Binder and Conrad 2009, p. 12). Last but not least, like in traditional donor countries, domestic politics and media have a bearing on humanitarian decision-making, which can translate the flow of aid from Gulf states' to disaster-prone countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan or the Philippines, from which many of their migrant populations originate (Binder and Meier 2011, p. 1142).

It is also apparent that some "non-traditional" donors attach importance to the military and political approach to humanitarian assistance, as opposed to the "Western" vision encompassed in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles or Oslo Guidelines and MCDA Guidelines (Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies 2003). India's government relies to a great extent on its army while providing humanitarian relief domestically and abroad (Meier and Murthy 2011, p. 13). Qatar, Turkey and the Dominican Republic endorsed the so called HOPEFOR Initiative aimed at promotion of use of military and civil defense assets in disaster response, which many traditional donors have seen as a risk for civilian-led humanitarian efforts. Turkey's "aid package" for Somalia in response to the 2011 famine included not only life-saving humanitarian assistance but also parallel development of closer political, business and academic relations (Özerdem 2013). Fuchs and Klann found in their research that "new" donors' emergency aid is more politically motivated than that of "traditional" donors, though both groups provide humanitarian assistance on the basis of a certain balance of needs-approach and self-interest (Fuchs and Klann 2012, pp. 1 and 29).

"Emerging" donors' preference for bilateral engagement, described in more detail in part III, is also reflected at the policy level, as their dialogue with the chief humanitarian organisations at the Geneva, New York and Rome fora is often poorly institutionalised and restricted to the G77 engagement in ECOSOC or the General Assembly. It is frequently the case that "new" donors' Geneva- or New York-based diplomats responsible for humanitarian action deal with a much wider agenda including human rights or peace-building and rarely receive instructions from the capital pertaining to solely humanitarian issues (Binder et al. 2010, p. 25). This way, their involvement in the international humanitarian debate driven by well-prepared humanitarian diplomats from "the West" is rather scarce or limited to several points of friction between the G77 plus China and the EU plus other representatives of the "Western world".

Whereas "new" donors' presence at the well-established UN donor policy debates might be considered inadequate, their rising engagement in alternative coordination fora should not be forgotten. It can be observed that more and more often regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the African Union or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) become active players in international humanitarian response. To give two examples, OIC's involvement was instrumental in response to the Somalia famine in 2011, whereas the series of Syria Humanitarian Forum in 2012 and 2013, chaired by OCHA, were co-facilitated by OIC, LAS and ECHO (IASC 2013).

7.3 Institutional Set-Up and Aid Allocations

There are two more factors lying behind the difficulty in learning more about "new" donors' engagement in international humanitarian action. The first one is linked to the complex and unclear humanitarian aid management structures in many of these states. Whereas in well-established donor countries and non-DAC EU donor countries the leading, coordinating role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the provision of humanitarian assistance and formulation of humanitarian policy is quite evident, in "new" donor countries many ministries or national agencies are involved in the process of aid decision-making and their actions are not necessarily coordinated. With the exception of Russia, where humanitarian aid is managed by the EMERCOM (*Agency for the Support and Coordination of Russian Participation in International Humanitarian Operations*) and Brazil (Binder et al. 2010, pp. 12 and 17), where Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates humanitarian contributions from other ministries, management structures, decision-making and coordination processes seem to be not sufficiently understood in all "non-traditional" donor countries analysed in the GPPi paper series, i.e. in China (Binder et al. 2010, p. 14), India (Meier and Murthy 2011, pp. 9–15), Saudi Arabia (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, pp. 11–13), South Africa (Binder et al. 2010, p. 20), Turkey (Binder et al. 2010, p. 21) and UAE (Binder et al. 2010, p. 23). What is more, fragmentation of the humanitarian aid system in the majority of these countries is widespread, with Saudi Arabia featuring as a powerful "new" donor with an extremely complex and fragmented scene of humanitarian actors (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, pp. 11–13).

The second factor complicating the understanding of the broader picture of "new" donors' humanitarian action is the incomplete reporting of their humanitarian funding to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) managed by UN OCHA. It is true that several non-DAC donors (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE) have been sending information on their aid flows to the OECD DAC since the 1970s, however the majority started to do so only in the 1990s and 2000s (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, pp. 11–13). The UAE constitutes quite an outstanding example of aid transparency among "emerging" donor countries. Not only did the UAE's authorities establish the Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid in 2008, with its major task of collecting and reporting aid flows, but it also became a first non-DAC donor to report the data in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) format. Russia is the first BRICS country to report its data on ODA to the OECD Development Assistance Committee for 2010 and 2011 flows (DAC OECD Statistics). FTS is much more popular within the remaining BRICS. The EU-13 countries' humanitarian aid transparency standards were significantly ameliorated thanks to their reporting to the EU on-line humanitarian aid database, 14 points, and later EDRIS, from which the data is automatically transmitted to the FTS.

Despite the above mentioned efforts, the OECD and UN statistics do not present a complete picture of "new" donors' engagement in international humanitarian response. This stems from the irregular reporting pattern as well as discrepancies in

the criteria, definitions and timeframes of information supplied to the aid databases. It is also probable, as Smith suggests (Smith 2011, p. 20), that the "real" figures of humanitarian aid flows of "new" donors are higher than the ones reported in the FTS, which stands in contradiction to the value attached by them to the visibility of foreign aid initiatives.

Looking at the geographical distribution of "emerging" donors' humanitarian spending referred to in the studied literature, two major trends are highlighted. Firstly, "non-traditional donors" tend to concentrate their humanitarian resources on a limited number of crises, in particular those located in their region or area of influence (Harmer and Martin 2010, p. 19) as well as high-profile emergencies with extensive media coverage like the Syria crisis, the Pakistan floods or the Haiti earthquake in recent years. At the same time, a gradual departure from the pure humanitarian "neighbourhood policy" towards engagement with a growing number of recipient countries is discernible (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005c, p. 5). The first trend can be observed in Fig. 7.1, in particular in case of Russian allocations to Central Asia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2012 or the Turkish, Saudi Arabian and UAE's responses to crises taking place in the Muslim world (Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, oPT) or political hotspots (Myanmar and Syria in 2012, Syria and Mali in 2013). None of the "emerging" donor countries presented in Fig. 7.1 has South Sudan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as appeared in 2012 or 2013 among the three priority geographical directions of humanitarian aid flows, whereas these two states rank as top recipients of the major, well-established donors such as ECHO, Sweden, United Kingdom or United States. "New" donors' inclination for visible involvement in large-scale, media-covered emergencies could be best observed in 2010, in which in all top five non-DAC donors (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, Russia and UAE) had Haiti and Pakistan among their top three recipient countries (Smith 2011, p. 17).

Analysis of "non-traditional" donors humanitarian flows in a longer time perspective, as undertaken by Development Initiatives (Smith 2011, p. 18), indicates that several countries have a stable position among top recipients of "new" donors' humanitarian aid, however the majority of recipients appear only once or twice in these statistics, which further compounds the irregular pattern of their decision-making. One of the explanations can be that "new" donors predominantly respond to arising or aggravating crisis situations, notably natural disasters, less frequently focusing on protracted crisis, which require multi-year donor engagement. Although the "traditional" and "non-traditional" donors' choices of key recipients of humanitarian aid do not seem to converge, it can be noticed in Fig. 7.1 that in 2012 and 2013 the Syria crisis appears to be of particular interest for many representatives of both donors groups.

It can be also noted that United Nations funding priorities, formulated by means of Consolidated Appeals (CAP), are not necessarily indicative for "emerging" donors' decision making processes, as they tend to provide the bulk of their assistance to recipient countries not covered by the CAP (e.g. Russia's funding to Central Asia or South Africa's funding to Cameroon).

BRAZIL		CHINA		CZECH REPUBLIC		INDIA		POLAND	
2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013
Somalia	Ethiopia	Zimbabwe	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	Yemen	Yemen	Syria crisis	Syria crisis
Niger	*no data*	Syria crisis	*no data*	DRC	Myanmar	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	Afghanistan	Mali
Kenya	*no data*	Lesotho	*no data*	oPT	South Sudan	*no data*	*no data*	oPT	*no data*
RUSSIA		SAUDI ARABIA		SOUTH AFRICA		TURKEY		UAE	
2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013
Tajikistan	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	Cameroon	Haiti	oPT	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	Syria crisis
Kirgizstan	oPT	Somalia	Mali	Somalia	*no data*	Somalia	*no data*	Yemen	Yemen
DPRK/Syria	DPRK	Myanmar	Somalia	DPRK	*no data*	no data	*no data*	Somalia	Afghanistan
ECHO		FRANCE		SWEDEN		UNITED KINGDOM		UNITED STATES	
2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013
South Sudan	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	Syria crisis	South Sudan	South Sudan	South Sudan	Syria crisis	Ethiopia	Syria crisis
Syria crisis	DRC	Niger	Mali	DRC	DRC	Syria crisis	South Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
Somalia	South Sudan	oPT	oPT	Somalia	Somalia	DRC	DRC	South Sudan	South Sudan

Fig. 7.1 The top three humanitarian aid recipients of selected "non-traditional" and "traditional" donors in 2012 and 2013. *Source*: Financial Tracking Service, 30.06.2013, *No data*—when less than three recipient countries indicated in FTS. *oPT* occupied Palestinian Territories

The last remark has much to do with another trend of "new" donors' allocations linked to the channels and modalities of aid. In many of the studied articles it is observed that, with the exception of EU-13 donors, who provide a large portion of their aid through contribution to the EU budget or contributions to the UN agencies, and South Africa, "new" donors generally have a preference for bilateral channels using government-to-government and in-kind aid approaches. The reasons cited in the literature are multifold—e.g. higher visibility of bilateral cooperation, strengthening friendly relations with an affected country through humanitarian assistance or insufficient understanding of multilateral funding instruments.

Working with NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements is very much dependent on a particular "non-traditional" donor country humanitarian aid system. There are examples of exclusion of these partners from humanitarian funding abroad like in India (Meier and Murthy 2011, p. 14). Apart from support through multilateral channels, Czech Republic, Poland and Turkey rely to a significant extent on non-governmental organisations operating in crisis-affected regions and obtaining government funding (e.g. Czech People in Need, Polish Humanitarian Action or Turkish IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation). Furthermore, it is characteristic of Gulf States and Turkey to provide resources to the plethora of Islamic charity organisations, whose achievements and methods of work are mostly unfamiliar to Western actors. Saudi Arabia provides large amounts of funding to the national Red Crescent Society and is capable of mobilising outstanding funds from private sources in Public Campaigns (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, pp. 13 and 14).

It is hard to deny that the "new" donors' preference for bilateral channels is being gradually balanced by the increased involvement of some of them in the multilateral humanitarian system. The UAE seem to be the most prominent example of profound engagement in not only bilateral but also multilateral humanitarian action, both at field and policy level. It is one of very few non-DAC donors present in the donor support mechanisms, i.e. one of three non-DAC donors (along with Russia and Poland) participating in the OCHA Donor Support Group and the only one in the UNHCR Donor Support Group. It organised a series of high-level humanitarian conferences called the Dubai International Humanitarian Aid & Development Conference & Exhibition (DIHAD).

Another example of "non-traditional" donors' engagement with multilateral humanitarian aid system is presented by Kuwait, which hosted—in cooperation with the United Nations—the International High-Level Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria on 30 January 2013. During the conference, Amir of Kuwait, His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah announced Kuwait's pledge of US$300 million, which has been duly committed through multilateral channels (including over 90 % of this sum to UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, ICRC, UNRWA and Syria Emergency Response Fund managed by OCHA), making Kuwait the sixth largest humanitarian donor in the first half of 2013 and the largest non-DAC donor within the same period (OCHA Summary Report).

To some "emerging" donors providing humanitarian aid through UN pooled funds appears to be useful way of responding to an emergency, when they do not possess in-depth knowledge, close relations or diplomatic representation in an affected state. It can also be helpful in avoiding administrative burden connected to the bilateral projects. These might be the reasons for the *Haiti Emergency Response Fund* being so popular with non-traditional donors in 2010, when such countries as Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Tunisia, and the Republic of Congo featured among the top donors to the pooled fund.

The trend of growing recognition of multilateralism is taking place not only because some "emerging" donors see it as advantageous, but also because of systematic and increasing outreach efforts by international humanitarian agencies as well as established donors to build partnerships with their aspiring counterparts. Endeavours to involve "new" donors include both fundraising by UN agencies and high-level collaboration and policy dialogue. Promotion of international financing mechanisms, such as OCHA-managed pooled funds, has been one of the outreach strategies (Harmer and Martin 2010, p. 9). In particular, the success of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) established by OCHA in 2006 is worth highlighting, as it received support from an exceptionally numerous group of 126 UN Member States. Other attempts to broaden the donor base comprise the creation of liaison offices (e.g. OCHA Gulf liaison office in Abu Dhabi), the organisation of "partnership seminars" (e.g. UN OCHA outreach meeting in Warsaw in 2010), and giving more visibility to "new" donors' contributions or adjusting geographical representation of the staff.

"Emerging" donors tend to have preferences or prejudices against selected humanitarian organisations, which is not unusual among well-established donor governments either. WFP has succeeded in establishing a very good partnership with Brazil, a "new" donor specialising in food assistance, bringing about a tangible result in the form of *The WFP Center of Excellence against Hunger* opened in Brasilia in 2011 with a view to leveraging WFP and Brazilian expertise in combating malnutrition. Russia is the largest non-DAC supporter of OCHA's work from 2010 to 2012 and a member of the OCHA Donor Support Group (OCHA). On the other hand, in 2010 India was revealing a somewhat sceptical approach towards OCHA (Meier and Murthy 2011, p. 27).

Despite notable examples of "emerging" donors' engagement in the multilateral channels described above, it is evident that gaps in partnership strategies and buy-in of the multilateral system among emerging donors such as China or India still exist, showing why better understanding and mutual dialogue is needed between the "non-traditional" and "traditional" donor world.

7.4 Conclusions: Barriers and Opportunities for Future Engagement

Having analysed different characteristics of non-traditional donors—their policy frameworks, motivations, institutional set-ups and aid allocations—we are now better prepared to address the title question "How much can they achieve?" The question seems vital for "new" donors themselves, just like it is important for a decision-maker, when entering a new business, to know the risks and what is at stake.

It is to be admitted that much more complex research should be conducted in order to answer this question with the selection of criteria of achievement and varied perspectives and including the field perspective to capture "new" donors' impact on delivery of aid to beneficiaries. Nonetheless, based on the analysis in Sects. 7.2 and 7.3, we will attempt to indicate major opportunities and barriers, which can determine the level of achievement of "non-traditional" donors in the international humanitarian system.

Firstly, it should be noted that the increasing humanitarian support from "new" donors has come just in time to complement the limited funding capacity of "traditional donors" suffering the consequences of global economic downturn during the early 21st century. Hence, "emerging" donors can potentially fill the looming funding gap and contribute to maintaining or improving coverage of humanitarian needs.

Secondly, it is evident that "non-traditional" donors can play a role in selected humanitarian crises, where "Western" actors have limited access. In such complex emergencies as Somalia, where humanitarian space is dramatically shrinking and UN actors are under constant pressure, the presence of "non-Western" donors may be more willingly accepted as is the case with Turkish involvement in that country. Similar observations could be made about the protracted crisis in Darfur or cyclone Nargis back in 2008.

"Emerging" donors can also be of importance in responding to crisis situations or in building disaster preparedness in the regions unpopular with the largest "Western" humanitarian donor countries. Russia's support to Central Asia can be given an example in this respect.

Despite the evident opportunities for further "new" donor involvement in the international humanitarian aid system, certain barriers persist. First and foremost, the largest barriers to "non-traditional" donors lie in the system itself. With over 150 years of history, the humanitarian system seems to be utterly congested, which impacts on coordination and effectiveness of assistance to people in need. The emergence of a plethora of new actors from "new" donor countries seems to intensify this phenomenon.

Furthermore, the humanitarian system is monopolised by "Western" donors on many levels and like in the economic theory of monopoly, there are considerable barriers to entry for new-comers. In spite of the undeniable higher profile of "emerging" donors in the international humanitarian system, a significant

imbalance in their representation in crucial governance mechanisms and humanitarian policy debate fora is a fact. A number of CAP projects implemented by actors originating from non-DAC countries is much lower than that of UN agencies or "Western"-based NGOs. There are only a few EU-13 based NGOs that have qualified to sign a Framework Partnership Agreement with DG ECHO, let alone NGOs based away from the EU member states that are not eligible for the granting process (ECHO Framework Partnerships Agreements).

However, it should be underlined that these are not only the inherent features of "Westernised" humanitarian system that prevent "new" donors from better inclusion. Many of their characteristics described in Sects. 7.2 and 7.3 of the article act as impediments to further involvement in multilateral emergency response or reduce their capacity to obtain funding from UN or "Western" donors' resources. Such hindrances as unclear policy frameworks, negligence of policy aspects of humanitarian assistance, a low level of institutionalisation of "new" donors' national aid systems and last but not least shortage of professional humanitarian staff, if not addressed, can slow down the "non-traditional" donors' march into the international humanitarian aid system and produce an alternative system with very few points in common with the previous one.

In order to avoid further fragmentation and divide of the humanitarian scene, greater openness, mutual respect and knowledge about each other is needed on both sides. The rhetoric of "impeccable" performance of "non-Western" donors, which can have an intimidating effect on "new donors" or be perceived as paternalistic, should rather be replaced by frank sharing of experiences and lessons learnt. On the other hand, "new" donors could make more effort to formulate their humanitarian policy with a view to determining what their approach to humanitarianism is, as well as to start influencing the international humanitarian system to a higher degree.

There are more and more crises, during which close interaction of "traditional" and "non-traditional" donors is inevitable, both at the field and policy level. Politically visible crises mobilise high-level attention and create a window of opportunity for strengthened dialogue and concrete actions to improve donor coordination just like the lessons learnt from the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis contributed to reinforcing collaboration between OCHA and OIC.

While looking for common approaches to humanitarian aid, two important notions should be taken into account at all times. First: since both groups of "traditional" and "non-traditional" donors are highly diversified, there is no "one fits all" solution and each partnership requires dedicated preparatory actions and unique methods of implementation. Second: in spite of evident risks of normative clashes, special care should be taken in order not to compromise the fundamental humanitarian principles.

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