On Selective-Opening Attacks against Encryption Schemes

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Abstract. At FOCS'99, Dwork et al. put forth the notion of 'selective--opening attacks' (SOAs, for short). In the literature, security against such attacks has been formalized via indistinguishability-based and simulation-based notions, respectively called IND-SO-CPA security and SIM-SO-CPA security. Furthermore, the IND-SO-CPA notion has been studied under two flavors – weak-IND-SO-CPA and full-IND-SO-CPA security. At Eurocrypt'09, Bellare et al. showed the first positive results on SOA security of encryption schemes: 1) any lossy encryption scheme is weak-IND-SO-CPA secure; 2) any lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability is SIM-SO--CPA secure.

Despite rich further work on SOA security, the (un)feasibility of full--IND-SO-CPA remains a major open problem in the area of SOA security. The elusive nature of the full-IND-SO-CPA notion of security is attributed to a specific aspect of the security game, namely, the challenger requiring to perform a super-polynomial time task. Not only do we not know whether there exists a scheme that is full-IND-SO-CPA secure, but we also do not know concrete attacks against popular schemes such as the ElGamal and Cramer-Shoup schemes in the full-IND-SO-CPA model.

The contribution of our work is three-fold.

1. Motivated by the difficulty in understanding (un)feasibility of the full-IND-SO-CPA notion, we study a variant of this notion that is closer in spirit to the IND-CPA notion but still embodies the security captured by the full-IND-SO-CPA notion. We observe that the *weak* form of our variation does not introduce any significant change to the weak-IND-SO-CPA notion; that is, the *weak* form of our notion is equivalent to the weak-IND-SO-CPA notion.
2. Interestingly, we can show that a large class of encryption schemes can be proven insecure for the *full* form of our notion. The large class includes most known constructions of weak-IND-SO-CPA secure schemes and SIM-SO-CPA secure schemes and also popular schemes like the ElGamal and Cramer-Shoup schemes.
3. Our third contribution studies the complexity of SIM-SO-CPA security. Complementing the result of Bellare et al., we show that lossiness is

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not necessary to achieve SIM-SO-CPA security. More specifically, we present a SIM-SO-CPA scheme that is not a lossy encryption scheme (regardless of efficient openability). Since SIM-SO-CPA security implies weak-IND-SO-CPA security, it follows as a corollary that the converses of both the implications proved by Bellare et al. do not hold. Furthermore, as a corollary of our techniques, on a slightly unrelated but useful note, we obtain that lossiness is not required to obtain non-committing encryption. Previously, at Eurocrypt'09, Fehr et al. showed a construction of a non-committing encryption scheme from trapdoor permutations and this scheme was, as noted by the authors, possibly not lossy. Our scheme amounts to the first construction of a non-committing encryption scheme that is provably not lossy.

1 Introduction

Public-key encryption (PKE, for short) notion forms one of the most principal cryptographic notions. For PKE schemes, indistinguishability of ciphertexts under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) are usually viewed as strong notions of security both conceptually and in practical applications. However, there is a natural setting where these standard notions do not necessarily imply security. Namely, note that on one hand it is easy to see that a PKE scheme continues to be IND-CPA secure even if an adversary is given multiple ciphertexts of multiple plaintexts; however, on the other hand, if the adversary sees *openings* (that is, not only the plaintexts but also the coins used) of some subset of the ciphertexts of its choice, then, somewhat surprisingly, it is not known whether IND-CPA security is sufficient to ensure privacy of the unopened plaintexts. This subtlety was first pointed out by Dwork et al. in [DNRS99], and such an adversarial attack is called a selective-opening attack (SOA, for short).

Dwork et al. [DNRS99], besides bringing to light the subtlety of SOA, also investigated SOA security of commitment schemes. SOA security of PKE schemes was studied by Bellare et al. in [BHY09].

The three flavors of SOA security. SOA security of PKE schemes has been studied under various notions in the literature. The simulation-based security notion is dubbed SIM-SO-CPA security. The two indistinguishability-based notions are dubbed weak-IND-SO-CPA security and full-IND-SO-CPA security; the two indistinguishability-based notions are together dubbed IND-SO-CPA security. In this work, we study certain aspects of both the simulation-based and the indistinguishability-based security notions. Below, we provide a quick and pertinent glimpse on the state-of-the-art for these notions to keep in mind; then we explain these notions informally.

Bellare et al. [BHY09] solved a longstanding open problem by showing how to construct SIM-SO-SOA schemes. In fact, they showed that every lossy encryption scheme is SIM-SO-SOA secure and that SIM-SO-SOA security implies

weak-IND--SO-CPA security. However, despite much work in the area, *we still do not know whether or not full-IND-SO-CPA security is feasible and, in particular, if existing techniques to build weak-IND-SO-CPA schemes and SIM-SO-CPA schemes can be useful to achieve full-IND-SO-CPA security. It is also not known whether lossiness is necessary for SOA security.* Thus, SOA notion still houses many more challenging open questions.

IND-SO-CPA security. Let us review the structure of IND-SO-CPA security. At a high level, the adversary gets a vector of ciphertexts. Then, the adversary chooses a subset of ciphertexts of which it receives openings. For the rest of the ciphertexts, the adversary gets either the actual plaintexts or randomly chosen messages (conditioned on the revealed plaintexts), and he is challenged to tell them apart. More specifically, the IND-SO-CPA challenger first chooses a public-key/secret-key pair and gives the adversary the public key. Then the adversary presents a description of a joint distribution over message vectors. Then the challenger would sample a message vector from this distribution, encrypt each message component, and give the adversary the resulting vector of ciphertexts. Next, the adversary chooses a subset of the ciphertexts to be opened (where, 'opening' corresponds to revealing both the plaintext and the random coins used in generating the ciphertext). The adversary, then, besides the openings to the chosen subset of ciphertexts, is given *either* the plaintexts of the remaining ciphertexts *or* a message vector that is freshly sampled from the specified (joint) message distribution, conditioned on the message components already opened to. The objective of the adversary is to tell them apart.

Note that depending on the message distribution, sampling conditioned on an arbitrary subset of messages can be an inefficient process that could render the IND-SO-CPA security experiment inefficient. It is easily conceivable that achieving IND-SO-CPA security when the message distribution does not have an efficient resampling algorithm can be challenging: in its proof of security, the reduction to some underlying hardness assumption might have the onus of providing resampled message vectors, a computationally inefficient task. This gives rise to two flavors of IND-SO-SOA-security: one, where it is required that the message distribution specified by the adversary has efficient resampling algorithm this flavor of security is called *weak*-IND-SO-CPA security; the other, where there is no such requirement on message distributions this flavor of security is called *full*-IND-SO-CPA security[1].

SIM-SO-CPA security. The aforementioned technicality in the definition of the indistinguishability based notion of IND-SO-CPA security (namely, the full-IND -SO-CPA notion), and the fact that there is no known full-IND-SO-CPA secure PKE scheme, motivated continuation of the study of the alternative formulation of SOA security: the simulation-based SOA security notion by Bellare et al. [BHY09].

[1] The nomenclature 'weak' and 'full' were already used in earlier works such as [BHK12].

State-of-the-art. With multiple flavors of SOA security taking shape in the literature, Böhl et al. pursued an important and useful question, in this line of research, of relationship between the many flavors of SOA security [BHK12]. In detail, they showed that SIM-SO-CPA security and full-IND-SO-CPA security are isolated. In other words, they showed a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme that is not full-IND-SO-CPA secure, and (under the assumption that a full-IND-SO-CPA secure scheme exists) a full-IND-SO-CPA secure scheme that is not SIM-SO--CPA secure. On the positive side, as mentioned above, after many years for which achieving SOA security eluded researchers, Bellare et al. showed that SIM-SO-CPA security is already enjoyed by every lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability [BHY09]. Furthermore, they also showed that weak-IND-SO--CPA security (which is trivially implied by SIM-SO-CPA security) is enjoyed by every lossy encryption scheme.

Discussion. Owing to the complex state-of-the-art of full-IND-SO-CPA security, SIM-SO-CPA seems to be better understood, achievable, and thus preferable to use in practice. However, on the other hand, there exists no proof of unfeasibility of full-IND-SO-CPA security. Thus, there is no concrete reason to forgo this notion entirely, and it thus becomes an important and intriguing open problem to either construct a full-IND-SO-CPA secure scheme if one exists, or to discover further evidences of unfeasibility of full-IND-SO-CPA security.

The above discussion pertains to the motivation of our first result that we will discuss in Section 1.1. For the second question that we pursue, we continue to study the complexity of SOA security, now in relation to the perhaps most related primitive, lossy encryption [Hof12]. Towards better understanding the complexity of SOA security, a natural question is whether the 'lossiness' is necessary for SOA security. In particular, we question whether the converses of the implications proved by Bellare et al. hold.

1.1 Our Contributions

Result 1. Variant of full-IND-SO-CPA closer in spirit to IND-CPA. Motivated by the elusive nature of full-IND-SO-CPA notion, we study a variant notion that is closer in spirit to the IND-CPA notion but still embodies the security captured by the IND-SO-CPA notion. We observe that the *weak* form of our variation does not introduce any significant change to the weak-IND-SO-CPA notion; that is, the *weak* form of our notion is equivalent to the weak- IND-SO-CPA notion.

Result 2. Insecurity of standard schemes like ElGamal and Cramer-Shoup and of known weak-IND-SO-CPA secure and SIM-SO-CPA secure schemes w.r.t. variant full-IND-SO-CPA notion. Surprisingly, although the variation on the weak-IND-SO-CPA notion showed no significant change, we show that a large class of PKE schemes, namely the class of PKE schemes with public-key space having a Σ-protocol (formalized later), can be proven insecure for the *full* form of our variant of IND-SO-CPA notion. This class subsumes many popular PKE schemes such as the ElGamal [Gam84] and the Cramer-Shoup [CS98] schemes

and most known constructions of weak-IND-SO-CPA secure and SIM-SO-CPA [BHY09, HLOV09, PVW08, Hof12] secure schemes.

Details on Result 2. In the IND-CPA notion due to Goldwasser and Micali [GM84], the adversary is challenged upon two messages; then it gets a ciphertext encrypting one of the messages chosen at random; the adversary's objective is to guess the plaintext from that known set of two messages. On the other hand, in the IND-SO-CPA notion recalled earlier in the Section, the challenger first chooses a vector of messages from an adversary-specified distribution, and gives the adversary their encryptions; the adversary then gets to see openings of a subset of the ciphertexts it chooses; for the remaining ones, he is given *only one of the following two: either* the plaintexts of all the unopened ciphertexts *or* a freshly resampled messages conditioned on the opened plaintexts.

Observe here that the message distribution specified from the adversary is possibly of 'high' min-entropy. Hence, in the event that an adversary against full-IND-SO-CPA security is given a resampled message vector, *the vector of actual plaintexts is 'hidden'*. This is in contrast with the IND-CPA game where the adversary gets both messages (including the actual plaintext) that it is challenged upon.

In this work, we study an alternative formulation of IND-SO-CPA security notion that is a more natural extension of the IND-CPA game, and study the new notion, more specifically in relation to the existing notions. To distinguish between the new and the existing notions, we rename the existing weak and full notions as '*weak single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA*' and '*full single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA*' games, respectively. We present the corresponding two new notions as '*weak both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA*' and '*full both-vectors-given IND-SO- -CPA*' games.

To corroborate the already acquired intuition that the variation is not drastic, we also observe that, just like full single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA and SIM-SO--CPA security notions are separated [BHK12], the new full both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA and SIM-SO-CPA security notions are also separated. We provide a detailed note on the separation in the full version.

[BHK12] offers an informative inference that, given the separation result in [BHK12] combined with the positive state-of-the-art on SIM-SO-CPA security [BHY09], simulation-based notion is perhaps the 'more appropriate' formulation. From the separation between full both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA security and SIM-SO-CPA security and our evidence of unfeasibility of full both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA security further corroborates the above inference in [BHK12].

Result 3. Lossiness vs. SOA security. For our final result, we continue the study of complexity of SOA security, now in relation to perhaps the most related and better studied primitive, lossy encryption [BHY09, HLOV09, PVW08, Hof12]. As mentioned earlier, Bellare et al. showed that

1. every lossy encryption scheme is weak-IND-SO-CPA secure;
2. every lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability is SIM-SO-CPA secure.

Thus, towards understanding the complexity of SOA security, a natural question is whether lossiness is *necessary* to achieve SOA-security; that is, do the converses, stated below, of the implications proved by [BHY09] hold:

1. "Is every weak-IND-SO-CPA secure scheme also a lossy encryption scheme?"
2. "Is every SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme also a lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability?"

We answer both the questions in the negative.

Details on Result 3. Most existing constructions of weak-IND-SO-CPA secure and SIM-SO-CPA secure schemes follow the general paradigm of lossy encryption [BHY09, HLOV09] (except for the constructions that aim to achieve special additional features such as CCA, identity-based encryption (IBE, for short), etc. [FHKW10, BWY11], since some of the instantiations of the generic solutions provided in [FHKW10, BWY11] may not be known to be lossy; we shall expand on this later in the full version).

While at the face value of the definitions of SOA security and lossy encryption it seems that the answers to the above questions are affirmative, as mentioned above, we prove otherwise. In fact we prove a stronger result: we show a SIM-SO--CPA secure scheme that is not a lossy encryption scheme (even without efficient openability). Since simulation-based security implies weak-IND-SO-CPA security, the negative result proves that the converses of both the implications proven by [BHY09] do not hold.

Furthermore, as a corollary of our techniques, on a slightly unrelated but useful note, we obtain that lossiness is not required to obtain non-committing encryption. We remark that [FHKW10] gave a generic construction of NC-CPA secure scheme from trapdoor permutations; as remarked by the authors, this construction is possibly not lossy. We give a first construction of NC-CPA secure scheme that is *provably* not lossy.

1.2 Our Techniques

We now present at a high level our technical approach in achieving the aforementioned results (ignoring some of the subtleties that are handled in the proofs).

Equivalence of the existing and new notions for weak-IND-SO-CPA security. The fact that weak both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA notion is equivalent to weak single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA notion follows trivially from their definitions.

(Un)feasibility of new notion of full-IND-SO-CPA security. We show that if a PKE scheme has a public-key space $\{\mathrm{pk}\}$ for which there exists a Σ-protocol, then the scheme is not full both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA. To prove this, we construct an adversary which specifies the following particular distribution: Given the public key pk, the adversary specifies the distribution as a uniform distribution over the Σ-protocol transcripts for the statement $\mathrm{pk} \in \{\mathrm{pk}\}$. Then,

once the adversary receives a vector of three ciphertexts (corresponding to the three messages of a Σ-protocol transcript), it opens only the first ciphertext. Later upon given the actual plaintext and resampled message vectors, the adversary runs the special-soundness extractor of the Σ-protocol to recover the witness, namely, the secret-key. The adversary consequently will be able to decrypt every ciphertext, thus breaking full both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA security of the scheme in question. All known schemes achieving (the existing notion of) IND-SO-CPA security [BHY09, HLOV09, Hof12, PVW08, FHKW10, BWY11], which are based on the general theme of lossiness, (except for the schemes that aim to achieve additional features such as CCA, IBE, etc. [FHKW10, BWY11], since some instantiations of the generic solutions provided in [FHKW10, BWY11] may not be known to be lossy) are subsumed by our negative result.

Complexity of SIM-SO-CPA security with respect to lossy encryption. For the second result, we first give a very simple counterexample. Namely, we construct an ElGamal-like SIM-SO-CPA scheme that is not a lossy encryption scheme. However, one can argue here that this scheme satisfies some sort of 'computational lossiness' (which shall formally define later), and, for all practical purposes, this computational lossiness is all that is required of a lossy encryption scheme. In light of this argument, we present another, but more technically involved counterexample. The core idea for this construction stems from the following observation. For a PKE scheme to be a lossy encryption scheme, the following condition, called 'lossiness of ciphertexts', needs to hold: there exist special public keys (called lossy public keys) such that for any such public key, and any message, a ciphertext – called 'lossy ciphertext' – generated to encrypt that message is lossy. That is, such a ciphertext can be opened to any plaintext message. The crucial point here is that lossiness needs to hold even for the ciphertexts that are honestly generated using the encryption algorithm (but with a lossy public key). On the other hand, in the SIM-SO-CPA security definition, the simulator is required to be able to open the ciphertexts to any given plaintext message; however, the simulator needs to be able to do so only for the ciphertexts that are generated by the simulator himself. Thus, it is conceivable that there could exist a simulator that generates malicious ciphertexts and that it is able to equivocate only those ciphertexts. This is the subtlety we build upon to construct a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme with a simulator that works by building malicious ciphertexts. Furthermore, we show for this scheme that for honestly generated ciphertexts, for any malicious public key, there does not exist an opening for at least one message, with some non-negligible probability thus disqualifying the scheme from being a lossy encryption scheme.

Other related works. In [BDWY12], Bellare et al. studied the complexity of SIM-SO-CPA security with respect to IND-CPA security of PKE schemes. They showed that a large class of IND-CPA secure PKE schemes, including ElGamal, do not achieve SIM-SO-CPA security. In [HR14], Hofheinz et al. studied the relationship between IND-CPA security (resp., IND-CCA security) and IND-SO--CPA (respectively, IND-SO-CCA security); they showed that while IND-CPA

and IND-SO-CPA notions are equivalent in a generic model of computation, IND-CCA security does not suffice to achieve IND-SO-CCA security. It has also been shown how to achieve SOA-secure encryption with additional features such as IND-CCA security [HLOV09, FHKW10] and IBE [BWY11]. SOA security for commitments is also an active area of research and there had been many advancements in understanding the complexity of this primitive in terms of feasibility and impossibility results [BHY09, DNRS03, ORSV13, Xia11].

2 Background

Notations. In this paper, we usually consider vectors of length N, for $N \in \mathbb{N}$, and we point at the components of such vectors at indices i with the set of indices in question, called the '*index-set*'. Also, we denote the set $[N] \setminus \mathcal{I}$ as $\overline{\mathcal{I}}$. If a vector of messages $\mathbf{m} = (m[1], \ldots, m[N])$ is specified only at indices specified by an index-set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [N]$, then we call such a partially specified message vector as a '*partial vector*' and denote it by $\mathbf{m}_{\mathcal{I}} = (m[i])_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \in (\{0,1\}^{\lambda})^{|\mathcal{I}|}$. For any $\mathcal{I} \in [N]$, let $\mathbf{m^0}_{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\mathbf{m^1}_{\overline{\mathcal{I}}}$ be two partial vectors. Then the (whole) vector resulting by placing $m^0[i]$ at the ith index if $i \in \mathcal{I}$ and by placing $m^1[j]$ at the jth index if $j \in \overline{\mathcal{I}}$, is denoted by $\mathbf{m^0}_{\mathcal{I}} || \mathbf{m^1}_{\overline{\mathcal{I}}}$. Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a distribution over $(\{0,1\}^{\lambda})^N$. We say that a partial vector $\mathbf{m^0}_{\mathcal{I}} \in \text{Supp}(\mathcal{M})$ iff $\exists\ \mathbf{m^1}_{\overline{\mathcal{I}}} := (m^1[i])_{i \in \overline{\mathcal{I}}}$ such that $\mathbf{m^0}_{\mathcal{I}} || \mathbf{m^1}_{\overline{\mathcal{I}}} \in \text{Supp}(\mathcal{M})$.

Below we recall the definition of efficiently resamplable distributions. At a high level, these are joint distributions $\mathcal{M}$ over components of message vectors with the following property: Conditioned on any subset of the components, the rest of the components are efficiently samplable as per $\mathcal{M}$. More precisely:

Definition 1 (Efficiently resamplable distribution). *Let $N = N(\lambda) > 0$, and let $\mathcal{M}$ be a joint distribution over $(\{0,1\}^{\lambda})^N$. We say that $\mathcal{M}$ is efficiently resamplable if there exists a PPT algorithm $\mathsf{ReSamp}_{\mathcal{M}}$ such that, for any $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [N]$ and any partial vector $\mathbf{m}_{\mathcal{I}} := (m[i])_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \in \text{Supp}(\mathcal{M})$, $\mathsf{ReSamp}_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{m}_{\mathcal{I}})$ samples from $\mathcal{M}|_{\mathbf{m}_{\mathcal{I}}}$ (i.e., from the distribution $\mathcal{M}$ conditioned on the ith component being $m[i]$ for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$).*

Opening oracles. In our definitions, like in [BHK12], upon providing the adversary with a public key and a vector of ciphertexts, we provide him with an opening oracle to allow adaptive queries. Such an oracle is a stateful functionality that takes one argument. When queried with a set of indices, it responds via the corresponding openings of the ciphertexts (i.e., the plaintexts encrypted in the ciphertexts at the specified indices and the randomnesses used in generating these ciphertexts). When queried with the string '$\mathsf{get\ queries}$', it returns the set of all indices it has provided openings for since its instantiation.

Plaintext vector, Resampled message vector. Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a joint distribution over vectors of messages. Let $\mathbf{m^0} := (m^0[i])_{i \in [N]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$ and let $\mathbf{c} := (c[i])_{i \in [N]}$ be such that $c[i]$ is and n encryption of $m^0[i]$ (under some public key). Under this notation:

1. we call $\mathbf{m^0}$ as the *plaintext vector*.
2. Let $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [N]$ be a subset of the indices. Consider a message vector $\mathbf{m^1}$ such that $\mathbf{m^1}_{\mathcal{I}} = (m^0[i])_{i\in\mathcal{I}}$; let the rest of the components of $\mathbf{m^1}$ be sampled according to $\mathcal{M}$ conditioned on the components at $i \in \mathcal{I}$ being $\mathbf{m^1}_{\mathcal{I}}$. We denote the way $\mathbf{m^1}$ is sampled via $\mathbf{m^1} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}|_{\mathbf{m^0}_{\mathcal{I}}}$ and we call $\mathbf{m^1}$ as the *resampled message vector*.

2.1 Existing SOA Definitions

We now recall the existing definitions for various flavors of IND-SO-CPA security. All the definitions here below are taken almost verbatim from [BHK12]. However, the definitions have been slightly renamed in order to emphasize the difference between the existing and the new notions. The new definitions are described below[2].

Definition 2 (Weak Single-vector-given Indistinguishability-based SOA Security). *For a PKE scheme* $\mathsf{PKE} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathrm{Enc}, \mathrm{Dec})$*, a polynomially bounded function* $N = N(\lambda) > 0$*, an opening oracle* $\mathcal{O}$*, and a stateful PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, consider the following experiment:*

Experiment $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},b}$:
1. $(\mathrm{pk}, \mathrm{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}$
2. $(\mathcal{M}, \mathsf{ReSamp}_{\mathcal{M}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathrm{pk})$
3. $\mathbf{m^0} := (m^0[i])_{i\in[N]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$
4. $(r[i])_{i\in[N]} \leftarrow (\mathsf{Coins}_{\mathrm{Enc}})^N$
5. $\mathbf{c} := (\mathrm{Enc}(\mathrm{pk}, m^0[i]; r[i]))_{i\in[N]}$
6. $\mathbf{O} := (m^0[i], r[i])_{i\in[N]}$
7. $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{select}, \mathbf{c})$
8. $\mathcal{I} := \mathcal{O}(\mathsf{get\ queries})$
9. $\mathbf{m^1} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}|_{\mathbf{m^0}_{\mathcal{I}}}$
10. $out_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{output}, \mathbf{m}^b)$
11. *if* $out_{\mathcal{A}} = b$*, then return* 1*; otherwise return* 0

where, the oracle $\mathcal{O}$ *uses* $\mathbf{O}$ *to answer the queries of* $\mathcal{A}$*. We say that* PKE *is* weak single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA *secure if, for any* $\mathcal{A}$ *that always outputs an efficiently resamplable distribution* $\mathcal{M}$ *over* $(\{0,1\}^\lambda)^N$ *with corresponding efficient resampling algorithm* $\mathsf{ReSamp}_{\mathcal{M}}$*, the following is negligible:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{weak-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A}} \tag{1}$$

$$:= \left|\Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},1} = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},0} = 1]\right|. \tag{2}$$

[2] We recall that Coins_A denotes the space of randomness of an algorithm A.

Definition 3 (Full Single-vector-given Indistinguishability-based SOA Security). *For a PKE scheme* $\mathsf{PKE} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathrm{Enc}, \mathrm{Dec})$*, polynomially bounded* $N = N(\lambda) > 0$*, an opening oracle* $\mathcal{O}$*, and a stateful PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, we define experiment* $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{full-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},b}(\lambda)$ *analogously to* $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},b}(\lambda)$ *with the only change the adversary is not required to provide a resampling algorithm; i.e.,* $\mathcal{A}(\mathrm{pk})$ *just outputs a message distribution* $\mathcal{M}$*. We say that* PKE *is* full single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA *if, for any such* $\mathcal{A}$*, the following is negligible.*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{full-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A}} \tag{3}$$

$$:= \left|\Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{full-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},1} = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{full-singleVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},0} = 1]\right|. \tag{4}$$

Definition 4 (Simulation-based SOA Security). *For a PKE scheme* $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{soa}}_2 = (\mathsf{KeyGen}^{\mathrm{soa}}_2, \mathrm{Enc}^{\mathrm{soa}}_2, \mathrm{Dec}^{\mathrm{soa}}_2)$*, a polynomially bounded function* $N = N(\lambda) > 0$*, an opening oracle* $\mathcal{O}$*, and a stateful PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, a PPT distinguisher* $\mathcal{D}$ *with a boolean output, consider the following experiments:*

Experiment $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}$:	Experiment $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}$:
1. $(\mathrm{pk}, \mathrm{sk}) \leftarrow \mathrm{KeyGen}$ 2. $\mathcal{M} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathrm{pk})$ 3. $\mathbf{m} := (m[i])_{i\in[N]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$ 4. $(r[i])_{i\in[N]} \leftarrow (\mathsf{Coins}_{\mathrm{Enc}})^N$ 5. $\mathbf{c} := (\mathrm{Enc}(\mathrm{pk}, m[i]; r[i]))_{i\in[N]}$ 6. $\mathbf{O} := (m[i], r[i])_{i\in[N]}$ 7. $out_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{select}, \mathbf{c})$ 8. $\mathcal{I} := \mathcal{O}(\mathsf{get\ queries})$ 9. *return* $\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{m}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{I}, out_{\mathcal{A}})$	1. $\mathcal{M} \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}$*;* 2. $\mathbf{m} := (m[i])_{i\in[N]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$ 3. $out_{\mathsf{Sim}} \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}^{\mathcal{O}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{select})$ 4. $\mathcal{I} := \mathcal{O}(\mathsf{get\ queries})$ 5. *return* $\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{m}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{I}, out_{\mathsf{Sim}})$

where, the oracle $\mathcal{O}$ uses $\mathbf{O}$ to answer the queries of $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}$ and uses only $\mathbf{m}$ in $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}$. We say that the scheme is SIM-SO-CPA secure if for every adversary $\mathcal{A}$ there is a PPT algorithm called the simulator Sim such that, for all PPT distinguishers $\mathcal{D}$, the distributions induced by the experiments $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}$ and $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}$ are statistically close. That is,

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathsf{sim-so-cpa}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}} := |\Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}} \to 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}} \to 1]| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

Assuming knowledge of the standard definition of lossy encryption (the definition is recalled in the full version), we provide here a new definition of lossiness, called 'computational lossiness', that we informally define below. A formal definition appears in the full version.

Definition 5 (Computational lossy encryption (Informal)). *A scheme* $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}, \mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}, \mathrm{Enc}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}, \mathrm{Dec}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}, \mathsf{Opener})$ *is said to be a computational lossy encryption scheme if it satisfies all the*

properties of a lossy encryption scheme except for the following: for every 'lossy ciphertext', the randomness output by the opening algorithm Opener *needs to be only computationally indistinguishable from the actual distribution of the random coins for ciphertext.*

2.2 PKE with Pseudorandom Ciphertexts

We now define PKE schemes with pseudorandom ciphertexts [CLOS02, BC05]. Roughly, these are the schemes with a property that for any plaintext message a randomly generated ciphertext is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform random string of the same length.

Definition 6 (PKE with pseudorandom ciphertexts). *A PKE scheme* $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}^{\$}, \mathrm{Enc}^{\$}, \mathrm{Dec}^{\$})$ *is said to have pseudorandom ciphertexts if, for* $(\mathrm{pk}^{\$}, \cdot) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}^{\$}$*, for any plaintext message* m*, the distribution ensembles* $\mathrm{Enc}^{\$}(\mathrm{pk}^{\$}, m)$ *and* $U_{\mathrm{cipherLen}}$ *are all computationally indistinguishable, where the ciphertexts of* $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$}$ *are of length* cipherLen*.*

In [CLOS02], Canetti et al. also provide a simple construction of such schemes based on trapdoor permutations. Briefly, the construction in [CLOS02] is as follows. With the public key as the description f of a trapdoor function, encryption of a bit b is: $f(x), b \oplus HC(x)$, where x is chosen at random from the domain of f and $HC(\cdot)$ is a hard-core predicate of f. Notice that for this scheme, the distribution of encryption of a random bit b is itself a uniform distribution over strings of the same length as the ciphertexts.

We now define PKE schemes with decidable public-key space. Roughly, for such schemes, it is easy to verify whether a given string is a 'valid' public key; i.e., whether a given string lies in the public-key space or not.

Definition 7 (PKE with decidable public-key space). *A PKE scheme* $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{deci}}$ *is said to be public-key decidable if there exists a PPT algorithm that given a string* $\mathrm{pk}^{\mathrm{deci}}$ *outputs 1 if there exists some randomness with which the key-generation algorithm outputs* $\mathrm{pk}^{\mathrm{deci}}$ *as a public key, and outputs 0 otherwise (that is, the public-key space is efficiently decidable).*

We will be interested in PKE schemes with decidable public-key space and pseudorandom ciphertexts. We shall denote such a PKE scheme by $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$. Note that if we use certified[3] trapdoor permutations instead of any permutations in the construction of [CLOS02] discussed above, we get a scheme that enjoys both – decidable public-key space and pseudorandom ciphertexts.

3 New IND-SO-CPA Definitions

In this section, we propose our new definitions for indistinguishability-based SOA security. In comparison with the existing definitions, the new ones differ from the

[3] A trapdoor permutation [BY96] is certified if one can verify from its description that it is indeed a permutation.

existing ones in the following respect: in the existing definitions, corresponding to the ciphertext vector given to the adversary, the adversary is given only either the actual plaintext vector or the resampled message vector; on the other hand, in the new definitions the adversary is given both the vectors that it is challenged upon, thus being closer in spirit to the IND-CPA notion as discussed earlier.

Definition 8 (Weak Both-vectors-given Indistinguishability-based SOA Security). *For a PKE scheme* $\mathsf{PKE} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathrm{Enc}, \mathrm{Dec})$*, a polynomially bounded function* $N = N(\lambda) > 0$*, an opening oracle* $\mathcal{O}$*, and a stateful PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, consider the experiment that is identical to* $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},b}$ *except for the following modification in* $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},b}$*: 1.* $out_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{output}, \mathbf{m}^b, \mathbf{m}^{\overline{b}})$.

We say that PKE *is* weak both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA *secure if, for any* $\mathcal{A}$ *that always outputs efficiently resamplable* $\mathcal{M}$ *over* $(\{0,1\}^\lambda)^N$ *with corresponding efficient re-sampling algorithm* $\mathsf{ReSamp}_{\mathcal{M}}$*, the following is negligible:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{weak-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A}} := \left|\Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},1} = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},0} = 1]\right|.$$

Definition 9 (Full Both-vectors-given Indistinguishability-based SOA Security). *Given PKE scheme* $\mathsf{PKE} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathrm{Enc}, \mathrm{Dec})$*, a polynomially bounded function* $N = N(\lambda) > 0$*, an opening oracle* $\mathcal{O}$*, and a stateful PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, the experiment* $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{full-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ *is defined as* $\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{weak-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ *with the only change that we do not require the adversary to provide an algorithm for re-sampling; i.e.,* $\mathcal{A}(\mathrm{pk})$ *just outputs a message distribution* $\mathcal{M}$*. We say that* PKE *is* full both-vectors-given *if, for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, the following is negligible:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{full-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A}} := \left|\Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{full-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},1} = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Expt}^{\mathsf{full-bothVect-ind-so}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A},0} = 1]\right|.$$

4 Equivalence of Weak Notions and (Im)possibility of Full Notion

In this section we give a strong evidence of (un)feasibility of the new notion. Namely, we show that every PKE scheme that has public-key space that has a Σ-protocol is not fully secure under the new notion. Thus, our tweak on the security definition has made it easier to prove (un)feasibility for full security. On the other hand, for weak security, we show that the new notion is in fact equivalent to the old notion.

4.1 Equivalence Between Old And New (Weak) Notions

Theorem 1 (weak-bothVect-IND-SO-CPA ⇒ weak-singleVect-IND-SO-CPA). *If* PKE *is* weak both-vectors- given IND-SO-CPA *secure then it is also* weak single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA *secure.*

This implication is almost trivial and the proof appears in the full version.

Theorem 2 (weak-singleVect-IND-SO-CPA ⇒ weak-bothVect-IND-SO-CPA). *If* PKE *is* weak single-vector- given IND-SO-CPA *secure then it is also* weak both-vectors-given IND-SO-CPA *secure.*

Proof Sketch: This implication also almost immediately follows from the definitions. However, for completeness, we present a proof. Briefly, the implication is derived from the following two facts about the experiments in question. Firstly, since both the experiments concern the weak model, in each of the experiments, an adversary also presents an efficient algorithm for resampling. Secondly, the only difference in the two experiments is the following. An adversary in the singleVect experiment receives only one message vector (namely, either the actual plaintext vector or the resampled message vector); on the other hand, an adversary in the bothVect experiment receives both the message vectors (in a random order). Thus, in our reduction, an adversary in the weak-singleVect-IND-SO-CPA experiment, who gets only one vector of messages, can sample the other vector of messages by itself. However, note that the reduction cannot identically simulate the bothVect experiment since among the two message vectors an adversary receives in the bothVect experiment one is definitely the actual message vector, and in the event that the only message vector received by our reduction is the resampled message vector (from its own experiment), it can never give the adversary in the bothVect experiment the actual message vector. This difficulty can however be easily overcome via a hybrid argument using two more hybrid games. A more detailed proof appears in the full version. □

Theorem 3 (full-bothVect-IND-SO-CPA ⇒ full-singleVect-IND-SO-CPA). *If* PKE *is a* weak both-vectors- given IND-SO-CPA *secure then it is also* weak single-vector-given IND-SO-CPA *secure.*

Proof Sketch: The proof is similar to the proof of (Theorem 1). □

4.2 Impossibility of Full Security

We show that any public key encryption scheme for which the public-key space has a Σ-protocol is *not* full-bothVect-IND-SO-CPA secure.

If {pk} *has a Σ-protocol, then the PKE scheme is* **not** *full-bothVect-IND-SO-CPA secure.* At a high level, we prove this negative result by showing an explicit full-bothVect-IND-SO-CPA attack on any PKE scheme with a public-key space that has a Σ-protocol. The attack stems from the idea that upon receiving

the public key pk from the challenger, the adversary can specify the message distribution to be a distribution that is statistically close to uniform proof-of-knowledge (via the Σ-protocol) of a secret key *corresponding to the public key* pk. It specifies this distribution simply as the output distribution of the simulator of the Σ-protocol. Now, the core idea crucially relies on the special-soundness property of the Σ-protocol. (Recall that special-soundness implies existence of an efficient extractor that, for any theorem statement, given two proof transcripts with the same first-round message but with distinct second-round messages and corresponding third-round messages, the extractor computes a valid witness to the theorem statement.) The rest of the idea then is for the adversary to ask to open the ciphertext corresponding to only the first-round message. Then the two vectors of messages given by the challenger would be two random Σ-protocol proof-of-knowledge transcripts with the same first-round message, and, with all but negligible probability, with distinct second-round messages and corresponding third-round messages. Then the adversary can run the Σ-protocol extractor to compute the witness, which in fact is a secret key corresponding to the pk in question. Then the adversary can decrypt any ciphertext and break full-bothVect-IND-SO-CPA of the PKE scheme with probability negligibly close to 1. The full formal proof of the following theorem appears in the full version.

Theorem 4. *Let* PKE *be a PKE scheme such that* {pk} *has a Σ-protocol. Then* PKE *is* not full both -vectors-given IND-SO-CPA *secure.*

5 Relationship between SOA Security and Lossy Encryption

[BHY09] presented the first positive results for SOA security of encryption schemes. The constructions presented crucially used lossiness of encryption. More specifically, they proved the following implications.

Implication 1. Every lossy encryption scheme is weak-singleVect-IND-SO-CPA secure.

Implication 2. Every lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability is SIM-SO-CPA secure.

In the study of complexity of SOA-security, a natural question then is whether the converses of these implications hold too. Namely:

Question 1. "Is every weak-singleVect-IND-SO-CPA secure scheme a lossy encryption scheme?"

Question 2. "Is every SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme a lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability?"

These are the questions that we investigate in this Section. We answer these questions in the *negative*. In fact, we prove a *stronger result*. Namely, we give a concrete construction of a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme that is not a lossy

encryption (even without efficient openability). Since every SIM-SO-CPA security trivially implies weak-singleVect-IND-SO-CPA security, it follows as a corollary of our result that none of the converses of the implications proved by [BHY09] hold.

The road-map for the rest of the section is as follows. We shall first give a very simple construction for a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme that is not a lossy scheme. However, although this scheme is not lossy in the traditional sense, it satisfies 'computational lossiness' defined in Definition 5. Arguably, this for most practical purposes, computational lossiness suffices, and thus it seems that this counterexample does not give a clear answer to our question of whether lossiness is necessary for SOA security. This brings us to our next counterexample; although technically involved, this counterexample gives a convincing answer to our question of whether lossiness is necessary for SOA security.

Construction 1. Our first construction of a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme that is not lossy follows. Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order p. Let g be a generator of $\mathbb{G}$. We shall denote the scheme as $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}, \mathrm{Enc}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}, \mathrm{Dec}_1^{\mathrm{soa}})$.

$\mathsf{KeyGen}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$: Choose $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Set $\mathrm{sk} := x$ and $\mathrm{pk} := g^x$.
$\mathrm{Enc}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$: On input a message $m \in \{0,1\}$, sample random coins $(r, R_1, R_2) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{G}^2$, and proceed as follows. If $m = 0$, then output (g^r, pk^r); otherwise, output (R_1, R_2).
$\mathrm{Dec}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$: On input a ciphertext (c_1, c_2), check if $c_2 = (c_1)^{\mathrm{sk}}$. If so, then output 0; otherwise, output 1.

Fig. 1. A SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme that is not a lossy encryption scheme

We shall first show that $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$ is a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme but not a lossy encryption scheme.

Theorem 5 ($\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$ is SIM-SO-CPA secure). *Assuming DDH assumption holds in $\mathbb{G}$, $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$ is SIM-SO-CPA secure.*

The full proof appears in the full version. We give a proof sketch here below.
Proof Sketch: Recall from Definition 4 that in order to show that a PKE scheme is SIM-SO-CPA secure, we need to show existence of a PPT simulator such that, for every adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the output of the simulator is computationally indistinguishable from the output of the $\mathcal{A}$ in the real world. We shall construct such a simulator $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}}$ for $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$.

Recall that in the real world $\mathcal{A}$, upon receiving a vector of ciphertexts, chooses a subset $\mathcal{I}$ of ciphertexts and sees their openings. On the other hand, in the ideal world, the simulator first needs to output $\mathcal{I}$; then it receives the plaintext messages to which it needs to show openings to of the ciphertexts.

The idea for simulation is that $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}}$ would run $\mathcal{A}$ by providing a tuple of ciphertexts $(c_1, \ldots, c_N)$ where every c_i is an encryption of 0. That is c_i is

computed as $(g^{r_i}, \mathrm{pk}^{r_i})$. Then, upon $\mathcal{A}$ choosing the subset of the ciphertexts, $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}}$ would receive the plaintext values for which it needs to provide openings to. If for any ciphertext c_i, the plaintext value to which it needs to be opened to is 0, then set the opening (randomness) of c_i as $(r_i, R_i^{(1)}, R_i^{(2)})$ for some random $R_i^{(1)}, R_i^{(2)} \in \mathbb{G}$. Otherwise, to provide opening to 1, claim that the randomness used was $(r_i', g^{r_i}, \mathrm{pk}^{r_i})$ for some random $r_i' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$.

Note that the only differing factor in the outputs of the real and simulated worlds is that while an encryption of 1 is $(r_i', R_i^{(1)}, R_i^{(2)})$ for independently random $R_i^{(1)}, R_i^{(2)}$ in the real world, in the simulated world, encryption of 1 is $(r_i', g^{r_i}, \mathrm{pk}^{r_i})$. Note that this difference directly corresponds to being given a non-DDH tuple and a DDH tuple, resp.: $(g, \mathrm{pk}, R_i^{(1)}, R_i^{(2)})$ and $(g, \mathrm{pk}, g^{r_i}, \mathrm{pk}^{r_i})$. Thus, from the DDH assumption, the scheme $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$ is SIM-SO-CPA secure. □

Theorem 6 ($\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$ **is not lossy).** $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$ *is not a lossy encryption scheme.*

Proof. The proof is straight-forward. Note that every $g' \in \mathbb{G}$ belongs to the public-key space of $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$. Also for any public key pk, a ciphertext (c_1, c_2) can either be of the form $c_2 = c_1^{\mathrm{sk}}$ or not; hence, a ciphertext decrypts to either 0 or 1 and not both. Thus, $\mathsf{PKE}_1^{\mathrm{soa}}$ is not a lossy encryption scheme.

Our scheme is described below. The two ingredients we use to construct this scheme are a lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability and a CPA secure PKE scheme with decidable public-key space and pseudorandom ciphertexts. Note that the assumption that lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability exists is without loss of generality while considering Question 1, since if no lossy encryption scheme exists then the answer to Question 1 is trivially negative. For Question 2, however, we only need to assume any lossy encryption the reason being the following: looking ahead, our approach is to take any lossy scheme, that is already known to be weak-IND-SO-CPA secure, and modify it such that the modified scheme is still weak-IND-SO-CPA secure but not a lossy encryption scheme. The approach for constructing such a weak-IND-SO-CPA secure scheme is the same as the approach below for constructing a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme and we omit the details). For the same reason as for Question 1, this assumption too is without loss of generality when we consider Question 2.

Let $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}, \mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}, \mathrm{Enc}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}, \mathrm{Dec}^{\mathrm{losPKE}})$ be a lossy encryption scheme. Let $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}} = (\mathrm{KeyGen}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, \mathrm{Enc}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, \mathrm{Dec}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}})$ be a CPA-secure public key encryption scheme with decidable public-key space $\{\mathrm{pk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}\}$ and with pseudorandom ciphertexts. We construct a scheme $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}} = (\mathsf{KeyGen}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}, \mathrm{Enc}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}, \mathrm{Dec}_2^{\mathrm{soa}})$ as follows.

Theorem 7 ($\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$ **is SIM-SO-CPA secure).** *Let* $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}$ *be a lossy encryption scheme and* $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$ *be a public-key-decidable CPA-secure encryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts. Then* $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$ *is SIM-SO-CPA secure.*

The full proof appears in the full version. We give a proof sketch here below.

Proof Sketch: We construct such a simulator $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}}$ for our $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$ scheme.

$\mathsf{KeyGen}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$:
- Run $(\mathrm{pk}^{\mathrm{real}}, \mathrm{sk}^{\mathrm{real}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}$.
- Run $(\mathrm{pk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, \mathrm{sk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}) \leftarrow \mathrm{KeyGen}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$.
- Set soa-pk := $(\mathrm{pk}^{\mathrm{real}}, \mathrm{pk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}})$ and soa-sk := $(\mathrm{sk}^{\mathrm{real}}, \mathrm{sk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}})$.

$\mathrm{Enc}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$: On input a message m, proceed as follows.
- Sample $r \leftarrow \mathsf{Coins}_{\mathrm{Enc}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}}$ and compute $c^{\mathrm{real}} \leftarrow \mathrm{Enc}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}(\mathrm{pk}^{\mathrm{real}}, m; r)$.
- Sample a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$.
- Compute $c_b^{\$,\mathrm{deci}} \leftarrow \mathrm{Enc}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}(\mathrm{pk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, r)$ and sample $c_{\overline{b}}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\mathrm{cipherLen}}$.
- Output $(c^{\mathrm{real}}, c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, c_1^{\$,\mathrm{deci}})$.

$\mathrm{Dec}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$: On input a ciphertext $(c^{\mathrm{real}}, c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, c_1^{\$,\mathrm{deci}})$, proceed as follows.
- Compute $m \leftarrow \mathrm{Dec}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}(\mathrm{sk}^{\mathrm{real}}, c^{\mathrm{real}})$.
- If there exists $b \in \{0,1\}$ such that $r := \mathrm{Dec}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}(\mathrm{sk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, c_b^{\$,\mathrm{deci}})$ *and* $c^{\mathrm{real}} = \mathrm{Enc}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}(\mathrm{pk}^{\mathrm{real}}, m; r)$, then output m; otherwise, output $\perp$.

Fig. 2. A SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme that is not a lossy encryption scheme

We begin by providing a high-level sketch of $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}}$. Recall that the underlying primitives in our construction of $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$ are a lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability and a public-key-decidable encryption scheme. Also recall that we know from [BHY09] that every lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability is a SIM-SO-CPA secure scheme. Thus every lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability has a SIM-SO-CPA simulator associated with it. With this, to build the SIM-SO-CPA simulator $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}}$ for our $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$ scheme (which is built by using a lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability and public-key-decidable CPA-secure encryption scheme) we naturally extend the SIM-SO-CPA simulator of the underlying lossy encryption scheme.

It is helpful to first recall at a high-level the SIM-SO-CPA simulator of the underlying lossy encryption scheme. Let $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}}$ be the SIM-SO-CPA simulator of the underlying lossy encryption scheme with efficient openability $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}$. $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}}$ first samples a lossy public key. Then it encrypts a tuple of dummy messages and gives the ciphertext tuple to the adversary. Upon receiving an index-set $\mathcal{I}$ from the adversary and the values to be opened to at these indices from the opening oracle, it runs the PPT algorithm Opener ensured by the lossy encryption scheme to open the lossy ciphertexts at these indices to the requested values. Finally, it simply outputs the output of the adversary. With this, indistinguishability of the simulated output from the output of the adversary in the real experiment follows from indistinguishability of real keys from lossy keys of the lossy encryption scheme.

Now, having recalled the structure of $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}}$, our simulator $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}}$ is a slight modification of $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}}$. Roughly speaking, this modification directly corresponds to the modification to the underlying lossy scheme $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}$ introduced in our $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$. Recall that the modifications to $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}$ were basically two-fold: one was to append the public key $\mathrm{pk}^{\mathrm{lossy}}$ with the public key $\mathrm{pk}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$ of the public-key-decidable encryption scheme $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$; the other

modification was that, while encrypting, besides encrypting the plaintext with the (real) public key of the lossy encryption scheme to get a ciphertext c^{real}, append two more components to this ciphertext – namely, an encryption of the randomness used in generating c^{real} and a random value from $\{0,1\}^{\text{cipherLen}}$, in random order. The corresponding modification to the simulator $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}^{\text{losPKE}}}$ would be the following: $\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\text{soa}}}$ also appends the lossy public key with a uniformly sampled public key $\text{pk}^{\$,\text{deci}}$ of the $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\text{deci}}$ scheme. Then, to construct a ciphertext, it would first construct a lossy ciphertext c^{lossy} (with some dummy plaintext); then it would compute openings r_0 and r_1 of this lossy ciphertext to 0 and 1, respectively, encrypt both r_0 and r_1 in a random order using $\text{pk}^{\$,\text{deci}}$ to get $c_0^{\$,\text{deci}}, c_1^{\$,\text{deci}}$. The resulting ciphertext is thus $(c^{\text{lossy}}, c_0^{\$,\text{deci}}, c_1^{\$,\text{deci}})$.

With this, the simulator can open each ciphertext to both 0 and 1 as follows. To open to $m \in \{0,1\}$, it would output the pre-computed opening, r_m, of c^{lossy} to m and also an opening of the one between $c_0^{\$,\text{deci}}$ and $c_1^{\$,\text{deci}}$) that encrypts r_m (with a pretense that the other ciphertext component was randomly chosen from $\{0,1\}^{\text{cipherLen}}$. With this, from the indistinguishability of real keys from lossy keys of the lossy encryption scheme and from the pseudorandomness of the ciphertexts of the $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\text{deci}}$ scheme, indistinguishability of the simulated output from the output of the adversary in the real experiment follows. □

Theorem 8. $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\text{soa}}$ *is not a lossy encryption scheme.*

The full proof appears in the full version. We give a proof sketch here below.

Proof Sketch: We begin by providing some intuition to the proof. Recall that for $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\text{soa}}$ to be a lossy encryption scheme, there must exist algorithms $\mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\text{soa}}$ and (possibly inefficient) $\mathsf{Opener}^{\text{soa}}$ such that the following holds:

1. public keys, called lossy public keys, sampled using $\mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\text{soa}}$ are computationally indistinguishable from those sampled using $\mathsf{KeyGen}_2^{\text{soa}}$, and,
2. for a ciphertext, called a lossy ciphertext, generated using any lossy public key can be opened to any bit value using $\mathsf{Opener}^{\text{soa}}$.

The idea would be to show that no pair of algorithms ($\mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\text{soa}}$, $\mathsf{Opener}^{\text{soa}}$) can satisfy these properties for our scheme. Assume for contradiction that there exist such a pair of algorithms ($\mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\text{soa}}$, $\mathsf{Opener}^{\text{soa}}$).

We rely on the following facts about our scheme.

1. A public key soa-pk of our scheme consists of two components $\text{soa-pk} = (\text{pk}^{\text{real}}, \text{pk}^{\$,\text{deci}})$, where the second component is easily decidable. Thus:
   - A lossy public-key output by $\mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\text{soa}}$ is such that its second part is still within the public-key space of $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\text{deci}}$.
   - Any ciphertext generated using the second component of soa-pk (regardless of soa-pk being real or lossy) cannot be opened to two distinct plaintexts.
2. Consider $\text{soa-pk}^{\text{lossy}} = (\text{pk}^{\text{lossy}}, \text{pk}^{\$,\text{deci}})$ sampled using $\mathsf{FakeKeyGen}^{\text{soa}}$. As per our scheme a ciphertext generated using $\text{soa-pk}^{\text{lossy}}$ consists of three components: $(c^{\text{lossy}}, c_0^{\$,\text{deci}}, c_1^{\$,\text{deci}})$, where c^{lossy} is an encryption using pk^{lossy} of the plaintext with randomness r and one of the other two components, say $c_b^{\$,\text{deci}}$, is an encryption of r using $\text{pk}^{\$,\text{deci}}$. This has the following implication.

- In order for the $\mathsf{Opener}^{\mathrm{soa}}$ algorithm to open such a ciphertext to both 0 and 1, it has to be the case that $c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$ and $c_1^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$ are encryptions of openings of c^{lossy} to 0 and 1 (in some random order).

From the above observations on your $\mathsf{PKE}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}$, we have the following. Let $c = (c^{\mathrm{lossy}}, c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}, c_1^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}) \leftarrow \mathrm{Enc}_2^{\mathrm{soa}}(\text{soa-pk}^{\mathrm{lossy}}, m)$ for $m \in \{0,1\}$. Recall that our encryption algorithm works by choosing one of $c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$ and $c_1^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$ uniformly from $\{0,1\}^{\mathrm{cipherLen}}$ (and by computing the other as an encryption of the randomness r used in generating c^{lossy}). For concreteness of discussion, let the random string be $c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$. From the above observations, for (any) algorithm, and in particular for $\mathsf{Opener}^{\mathrm{soa}}$, to open c to $1-m$, the following condition must hold:

- there must exist an opening r' of c^{lossy} to $1-m$ such that there exists an opening of $c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$ to r'.

We can show that this condition does not hold with non-negligible probability over the choice of $c_0^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$. The subtlety however to make this argument work is the following. It is possible that, for $\mathsf{PKE}^{\mathrm{losPKE}}$ there are multiple openings of a lossy ciphertext to either 0 or 1. Furthermore, for $\mathsf{PKE}^{\$,\mathrm{deci}}$, the number of ciphertexts encrypting one message could be different than the number of ciphertexts encrypting another message. We shall discuss the subtlety in detail and get around it to still make the argument work in the full proof. □

Furthermore, as a corollary of our techniques, on a slightly unrelated but useful note, we obtain that lossiness is not required to obtain non-committing encryption. Details are given in the full version.

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