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MariaCaterina La Barbera *Editor*

Identity and Migration in Europe: Multidisciplinary Perspectives

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Editor

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Editor
MariaCaterina La Barbera
Centre for Political and
Constitutional Studies
Madrid
Spain

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Foreword

In the humanities and social sciences, identity has become a popular lens through which to analyse social and political changes. This is partly in response to research done in anthropology, psychology and sociology and a result of new interdisciplinary research. It is also due to developments on the political left where there has been a shift from class and interests to the recognition of a plurality of identities. The study of identities has moved from taking identities as the expression of underlying, sometimes essential, interests to seeing identities as the temporary outcomes of contingent processes of identification. This is the issue on the Marxist and post-Marxist left where a key division remains between those who argue that class is just one identity among others and those—now fewer and fewer—who argue that we need to return to class in order to understand contemporary capitalism. Another expression of the move from (class) interests to identity is the parallel move from a politics of redistribution to the politics of recognition.

What is more, it is now commonplace that individual persons are situated at the intersection of sometimes competing identities, so that no individual is exhausted by a single identity. For instance, in his book on Europe, "The Other Heading", Jacques Derrida declares himself to be a European, but also both more and less than that: "I am European, I am no doubt a European intellectual … But I am not, nor do I feel, European in every part, that is, European through and through. … I do not want to be and must not be European through and through, European in every part". There is no single identity that corresponds to the name of Jacques Derrida; he is at one and the same time European, Algerian, French, Jew, atheist, male, Parisian, heterosexual, and so forth. This multifaceted character of our identities raises the spectre of intersectional discrimination and oppression where one form of oppression reinforces another. However, even if we are oppressed in more than one way at a time, and even if those dimensions of oppression reinforce one another, there is always the possibility that another part of our identity escapes this oppression.

If identities are the temporary outcomes of contingent processes of identification, we should not speak of identity politics but of the politics of identity. If identities are constituted in an open-ended process, and if there is nothing essential about them, then it matters how an identity becomes articulated and by whom. It becomes a matter of politics, not confined to what we usually understand as political

institutions, but in the sense that identities are constituted through a process of negotiation where that process of negotiation is the very medium through which the identities are constituted. Thus, for instance, Derrida asks about Europe: 'to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name ['Europe'] be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?' If there is no essence to Europe, it matters how it gets represented and by whom, for instance who gets to write its constitution and what goes in there.

As the evidence from this volume shows, the identities of migrants are also contingent, in a constant process of re-articulation and inherently linked to processes of inclusion and exclusion. Migrants migrate—across territories and borders of all sorts. Their identities migrate with them, but are also rearticulated in the process. So are the territories and borders across which they migrate. That is, not only the identity of the migrant, but also the identity of the 'host' country or city is rearticulated when people move from one place to another. As MariaCaterina La Barbera notes in her introduction to the volume, it is important to divorce the image of the migrant from the image of the foreigner who arrives at *our* home, as if their identity—and their difference—can be reduced to their difference from *us*. If we think of identity—whether the identity of an individual or a group, a country or a city—as a contingent and open-ended process of identification, we can think of identity in terms of migrating. It is not just the case that identity and migration are inherently linked, and that therefore we must study the two together; it is also the case that any identity is constantly migrating. This is one way in which we can try to break with the dichotomy of "home" and "away". The point here is not that we can be at home anywhere and everywhere, but that we are never at home. If my identity, as well as that of the country or city where I live and work, is never fully constituted, the very sense of home and being at home is dislocated. There can be no being-at-home because neither the identity and borders of the home nor my own identity can be identified in a determinate way.

What is more, we should avoid the image of an "I"—or a "we"—that negotiates its way through different identifications, as if the subject and its identity could be separated. My identity is constituted through both self- and other-representations, but that distinction between self- and other-representations must also be put into question. Identities are constituted at the level of representation, and we should not think of representations as secondary to, and a reflection of, a non-representational reality. We can therefore think of the politics of identity as a politics of representation: what representations become dominant, and whose representations are they? Self-representations are always also other-representations because they are only felicitous in so far as they draw on existing representations and are taken up, and repeated, by others. My self-representations are never simply mine. If that is the case, the same goes for my identity and subjectivity; these are always-already dispersed in a web of signification, or representation where no agent is fully sovereign. That closes off one possible route for the critique of the way in which, for instance, migrants are represented: we cannot oppose the allegedly authentic self-representations of an individual or group to the allegedly distorted other-representations of them. My identity, and the language through which I represent it, is never simply

my own, never proper to me, never my property alone, and so there is no proper way to represent me.

That may seem like an impasse for critique, but it also opens up the possibility that identities may be re-appropriated by being re-articulated in new ways. This is precisely what is evident in the chapters in this volume: how migrant identities are constituted through an open-ended and contingent process of re-appropriating and re-articulating them. The *hijab* is a good example (see Chap. 14 and 15). If we take representations as constitutive, and if there are no pure self-representations, then the critique of representations of the *hijab* cannot proceed by way of comparing those representations to either an essential meaning of the *hijab* or to the authentic self-representations of those wearing the *hijab*. However, that does not mean that critique becomes impossible, only that it must proceed in a different register. Critique now proceeds by way of opposing one representation to another, showing the contingency of each representation while also seeking to articulate new representations and make those representations hegemonic.

Lasse Thomassen

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Contributors

Salam Adlbi Sibai is PhD in Theory and History of Education from the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. Her research field is Comparative Education. She focuses on Spanish Muslim women's identity in the academic system. She is Spanish of Syrian descent and currently lives in Qatar.

Roberto Solone Boccardi is a PhD student at the Department of Social Anthropology of the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. His dissertation is entitled "Processes of Building and Deconstructing Gender Identities in Contemporary Migration" and is developed within the Program of "Social Anthropology of Cultural Diversity and Citizenship". He is a journalist and a founding member of the Group "Genders, Feminisms and Diverse Anti-Patriarchal Identities" at the People Assembly of Puente de Vallecas, Madrid. He is interested in the bonds between Feminisms and LGBT movements and their common struggle against patriarchy. He is Italian and lives in Madrid.

Anil Al-Rebholz is PhD in Sociology from Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany. She is Research Fellow and Lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the same University. Her research interests include transnationalization, gender, migration, biographical-narrative research methods, Turkish political system and civil society, women's movements and women's NGOs in Turkey, and knowledge production processes. She is Turkish and lives in Frankfurt.

Giovanni Bombelli is PhD in Philosophy of Law from the University of Padua, Italy. He is Assistant Professor at the Law School of the Catholic University of Milan, Italy. His research interests and publications focus on the western notion of "community", the multicultural question related to the European identity, juridical system and the new reticular models of Law, models of "rationality" in Law, relationships between "Language" and "Law". He teaches Philosophical Anthropology at the High Institute of Religious Sciences of Crema, and collaborates with the Center of Research of Brera, Italy.

Lisa Caputo is PhD in Human Rights from the University of Palermo (Italy) and Universidad de Valencia (Spain). Her publications revolve around gender and human rights in the Indian context. Her current research interests include: globalization, migration, and subaltern studies.

Gabriel Echeverría is a PhD student at the Ortega y Gasset University Research Institute of Madrid, Spain. His research focuses on the relation State/migrant, policies of migration control, and undocumented migration. He was born in Ecuador, and raised between Italy and his birthplace. He currently lives in Madrid.

Lorenzo Ferrante is PhD in Sociology form the University of Palermo, Italy. He is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Political Sciences of Palermo (Italy) where he teaches Sociology and Research Fellow at the Department of Politics, Law, and Society of the same university. His research interests are identity, immigrants, and policies migration. His most recent publications focus on the dynamics of new comers in Southern Italy, migration policies, and multiculturalism in Europe.

Ghufran Khir Allah Department of Linguistics, Autónoma University, Spain

MariaCaterina La Barbera is PhD in Human Rights from the University of Palermo, Italy. She currently is Research Fellow at the Center for Political and Constitutional Studies and Visiting Lecturer at the Department of Social Sciences of Universidad Carlos III of Madrid. Her field of research lies in-between Law and Society, Women's and Gender Studies, and International Migration. She currently is PI of the research project "Women in Transit and the Transformation of Gender Identity in the Migratory Processes", funded by the Spanish Women's Institute and the European Social Fund. She is Italian and lives in Madrid with her partner and son.

Nela Milic is a PhD student at the Visual Sociology Department of Goldsmiths University of London, United Kingdom. Her research focuses on the city as a site of spectacle and the culture of protest. She has been Visiting Lecturer at several universities. She is Serbian-British and lives in London.

Paloma Moré is a PhD student at the Ortega y Gasset University Research Institute and the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. Her research is based on ethnographic research on Ecuadorian women living in Madrid that work in the domestic and care sector.

Inbal Ofer is PhD in Modern European History from Tel Aviv University, Israel. She is Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at the Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies of The Open University of Israel, Ra'anana. She is specialized in Spanish social/urban history of XX century. Specifically, she works on processes of internal migration, urban squatting, and urban community formation in the second half of the Francoist period, and on the formation of urban social movements and their relation to the changing concepts of citizenship during the so-called "Transición".

Daniele Ruggiu is Phd in Philosophy of Law from the University of Palermo, Italy. He currently is Research Fellow at the Interdepartmental Research Centre for Environmental Law Decisions and Corporate Ethical Certification (CIGA) of the University of Padua. His main research interests include the Theory of Interpretation (under the philosopher Paul Ricoeur's perspective) and Human Rights, with special attention to the activity of the European Court of Human rights. He studies Human Rights in relation both with migratory processes and with scientific and technological developments.

Francesco Viola is Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Palermo (Italy) where he teaches Philosophy of Law, General Theory of Law and Human Rights. He is President of the Italian Society of Legal Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Studies on Politics, Law and Society. He devoted his research to issues related to justice, identity, democracy, liberalism, multiculturalism, tolerance, religion, pluralism and and human rights.

Lucie Waltzer is PhD in Political Science from the University of Luxembourg. Her research focuses on the salience of social categories and the reconstruction of social relations in a situation of migration. Her current research project focuses on identification processes of Muslim immigrants and refugees from the Balkans in Luxembourg.

Chapter 1
Identity and Migration: An Introduction

MariaCaterina La Barbera

1.1 Identity Construction and Transformation in Migration Processes

Identity has increasingly become an important keyword in contemporary human and social sciences. Since the 1980s, research has intensively explored how meanings, expectations, and conflicts are associated with the different locationalities of individuals and groups; how individuals represent themselves using one or another element that constitutes their identity; how these elements can be categorized; and how multiple identities are compounded and negotiated when they conflict (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The literature on this topic is so rich that it is nearly impossible to present an exhaustive overview of the different contributions in this field (Westin 2010). However, little attention has been devoted to the influence of migration on identity formation and transformation.

Although it has been largely recognized in most cases that the discipline divide does not provide an adequate framework for academic research (Geertz 1983; Fuller 1993), blurring the boundaries between disciplines is actually tremendously difficult because it is often perceived as a loss of power in individual disciplines (Bourdieu 1984). This edited volume brings together scholars engaging in a conversation about the issue of identity formation and transformation in contemporary multiethnic Europe. However, identity is a broad concept that has been defined differently by various disciplines. For this reason, a multidisciplinary approach is a highly complex task that continuously risks to results in misunderstandings caused by different definitions of the concept. Notwithstanding, because a single-sided perspective on identity is not able to address the multifaceted phenomena at stake (La Barbera 2013), a multidisciplinary approach is an appealing challenge that this volume undertakes.

MC. La Barbera (✉)
Center for Political and Constitutional Studies, Madrid, Spain
e-mail: mc.labarbera@cepc.es

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This project was born out of the need to challenge the traditional discipline division and to search for novel epistemologies and methodologies to address the research questions of how identity works in contemporary societies and how identity is negotiated in migration processes. This project is the result of a theoretical and methodological exchange among scholars from the fields of law, social and cultural anthropology, sociology, philosophy of law, political science, pedagogy, history, literature, and linguistics.

This volume is structured around several interconnected issues related to the (trans)formation, (re)construction, and negotiation of identity during migration processes. It addresses theoretical questions related to identity in plural and multicultural societies, the effect of migration policies on marginalizing migrants, the relevance of law and rights to the processes of identity construction; the strategies of identity (re)construction through (dis)identification, the relationship of identity with center/periphery dynamics in postcolonial and globalized societies, membership and belonging as constitutive aspects of identity, and oppositional representations and (re)articulation of identity. Contributions to this volume fundamentally focus on identity as a product of social interaction and address, from different perspectives and methodologies, how identities are constructed, negotiated, and transformed by exploring how interpersonal interactions and institutional framework interact.

The dialectic interplay among self-representation—meant as identification in terms of interpersonal differentiations—and social categorization—meant as hetero-definition in terms of categories that establish boundaries between "us" and "them" (Deaux 1993; Simon 2004)—is one of the main issues explored in this volume. Research shows that although membership is generated by the recognition of oneself as belonging to a group, it is not fixed or definitive. Individuals choose different ascriptions as self-descriptive in different situations and contexts (Stryker and Serpe 1994). Moreover, implying that social categorization and self-representation conflict to various degrees, the notion of identity negotiation (Swann 1987) is used to refer to the processes of conferring meaning to the elements that constitute identity and reaching (explicit or tacit) agreements regarding "who is who" in interactions with others and society at large.

At the crossroad between self-representation and social categorization lies the core mechanism of individual and collective identities. Individuals differentiate themselves by adopting criteria that are shared by the members of a group and by developing a sense of belonging to it. When outsiders recognize individuals' belonging, collective identity emerges (Jenkins 2008). One of the main theoretical issues is whether and how identity can be conceptualized by acknowledging individual features and collective identification when both tend to shift over time. Critics have argued that politicizing identity is counterproductive to the pursuit of social change. By claiming the peculiarity of a group's identity and asking for special group rights, the voice of those in power within the group is allowed to be heard, while people who face discrimination within the group are silenced and further marginalized (Okin 1999). Among political theorists, the debate on identity has shifted toward

the "politics of recognition" (Kymlicka 1999), "hospitable liberalism" (Habermas 1998), and intercultural dialogue (see Chap. 2). However, the main concern is the real feasibility of dialogical governance in contemporary multicultural societies. Indeed, intercultural dialogue does not occur among peer interlocutors. For this reason, argumentation, meant as the core component of dialogue, is not enough. In multicultural societies, identities adjust one to another and are gradually modified. The negotiation of identity, referring to a gradual transformation of identities within new vital contexts, generates new forms of cultural hybridism (see Chap. 3).

Embodied roles, and the specific behaviors associated with them, undoubtedly change over time and across space. Consequently, the perception, representation, and definition of identity also change. This shift is particularly explicit during migration. The research collected in this volume shows that migrants explicitly perceive identity as fluid and multiple. Identity is, indeed, better described as something that individuals "do" rather than something that they "have", as a process rather than as a property (Jenkins 2008). Identity is the result of the negotiation of personal given conditions, social context, and relationships, and institutional frameworks. Following a social constructionist approach (Goffman 1959; Berger and Luckmann 1966), categorizations that rely on essential features have been rejected. A number of studies have shown that the patterns of identification among migrants vary greatly, ranging from identification with one's country of origin, religion or mother tongue to receiving country, neither or both (Berry 1997; Roccas and Brewer 2002; Schwartz et al. 2008; Ramelli et al. 2013). In the migratory context, ethnicity and religion became especially important as identity markers and can be subjectively appropriated (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).

The views of scholars gathered in this volume, most of whom are migrants themselves, depict the arrival in the receiving country as a "total" event (Mauss 1966) because it requires the complete (re)construction of identity. Indeed, leaving their country of origin, migrants lose their social status, family, and social networks. In the receiving country, they find themselves without a history and without an image. Faced with an unknown universe of meanings, migrants feel lost, alone, and without reference points. As much as they strive to become integrated, migrants remain strangers. Moreover, migrants face distrust and hostility. The harsh reality of exclusion differs from the idealized image of the receiving country as a place to better one's life that originally drives migrants to leave their country of origin. Disillusionment and nostalgia contribute to idealizing the country of origin, which is in turn beautified through memory. However, when the migrant returns home, the contrast between the ideal and the real reappears. To a certain extent, migrants live between idealization and disillusionment both in the receiving country and in the country of origin (see Chap. 4). Their new condition is in between, at the borderland, in transit. The process that begins when one leaves his/her own country never ends, and it generates an unfinished condition of not yet belonging "here" but no longer "there".

In the postcolonial globalized world, this condition implies the (re)conceptualization of "home" as linked to the dynamic margins/periphery and the center/metropolis on a local and global scale. Recovering the feminist slogan

"the personal is political", "home" is defined as a geographical, historical, and emotional space that has political implications (Mohanty 2003) connected to material and symbolic resource allocation in multicultural societies (see Chap. 8). The very notion of home is questioned by considering that it can be defined as the place where one is born or where one grows up, the place where the family of origin lives, or the place where one lives and works as an adult in an exclusive or simultaneous way. One can actually have several "homes" that only partially match with the physical places. Nonetheless, the sense of belonging appears to be a crucial step in the processes of formation and identity reconstruction for refugee and migrant women (see Chap. 10). Their desire for roots and stability and belonging challenge the traditional constructs of social codes and national boundaries.

The goals of migratory projects are frequently related to upward mobility in the country of origin. The search for recognition and the feeling of empowerment are crucial to the (re)construction of identity. Because identity formation is a relational (and oppositional) process, recognition is an element that often appears in opposition to other groups or persons. Strategies of identity (re)construction through (dis) identification within the situationally redefined in- and out-group interactions are also addressed in this volume by examining how individuals negotiate their identity within a context of changing meaning of the social category of reference (see Chap. 13). If it is true that the Self needs the Other to self-represent (De Beauvoir 1949), then the question concerns how the Other is selected and integrated into the construction of identity. Belonging or non-belonging to a particular social category is not a straightforward process. Indeed, self-representation mobilizes different levels of belonging that do not reflect a simple dichotomous division between "them" and "us." Belonging emerges from a complex process of appropriation and (re)interpretation of social boundaries that depends on whether those who are on the other side of the boundary may accept or reject the minority group. The Other and the Self are not clearly defined as constant categories, but serve as situational shifting references used in relation to individuals who want to define themselves within the larger interactional context.

Although painful, the condition of being at the borderlands offers opportunities for improving one's life. Indeed, mobility is essentially a search for better economic, working, and living conditions; a search for food, love, and shelter; in other words, a search for happiness. This expectation helps migrants to persist in a process that often worsens their living conditions during the initial phases. However, although migrants perceive mobility as a way to escape a limiting environment, migration policies problematize migration as a destabilizing force that must be kept under control. This representation of the problem greatly influences the construction of identity and generates the resulting condition of urban and social marginality (see Chap. 9). As suggested by the sociological literature (Bourgeois and Friedkin 2001), social marginality is produced in forms of geographical isolation, which in turn generates social distance.

Some contributions to this volume are devoted to exploring the effect of the recognition of rights in the process of constructing identity, in particular how it affects self-representation. Law shapes identities in different ways by establishing a set of

options available for the construction of individual life trajectories (see Chap. 6). Because the rights that migrants can access vary considerably from one country to another, women and non-heterosexual people often undergo drastic and profound changes of personal identity during migration (see Chap. 7). This work also explores how the legal status of migrants influences integration patterns in the labor market (see Chap. 12). Migrant women at the intersection of the gender and ethnic hierarchies of the labor market are often limited by their migration status. Consequently, irregular migrant status caused systematic patterns of discrimination in the labor market, urging migrant workers to accept the lowest-status jobs.

Migrants often become particularly aware of the relational and contextual nature of gender as they attempt to fulfill expectations and behavior that may differ sharply from the expectations in the country of origin (Donato et al. 2006). It is true that all migrants, as they move from one society to another, show more or less subtle alterations of their way of representing themselves. However, in the case of women and non-heterosexual people, migration often leads to drastic and profound changes that substantially modify the most intimate dimensions of individuals life: feelings, strategies of self-representation and social interaction, and ability to imagine and create their own life paths (Nolin 2006). Many of the contributions to this volume use the intersectionality approach (Crenshaw 1989, 1991) to address identity in migration processes at the intersection of different axes of social categorization: gender, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and religion.

This volume also explores the processes of cultural identification and cultural variation in identity construction and transformation, by examining the self-positioning against the ascribed identities, the negotiation of categories for self-identification, and the deconstruction of those categories. As a product of belonging to multiple affiliations, the hybridization of being at the borderlands poses serious challenges to the existing hegemonic culture of society (Bhabha 1994). Re-interpreting practices and discourses of the "cultures" of the country of origin and the receiving country, migrants challenge the essentialist and homogenous representations of cultures and ethnic communities. The identities of migrants are understood as products of intersectional identifications, which require a procedural and dynamic understanding (see Chap. 5). More than a site of discrimination and exclusion, the marginality of being at the borderlands is reinterpreted as a speculative space (hooks 1990; Hill Collins 1998; Anzaldúa 1999; Sandoval 2000; Mohanty 2003; La Barbera 2012). The borderlands are hence described as an "interstitial zone of displacement and de-territorialization that shapes the identity of hybridized subjects" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), which is deemed a particularly adequate conceptualization of identity in postcolonial and globalized societies.

The blurring of "here" and "there" has also perplexed the cultural fixities for those who have lived in the same place their entire lives (see Chap. 6). Recent research shows how the illusion of the essential relationship between culture and place is broken in contemporary societies (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). The detachment of identities from local places is a major concern of contemporary social sciences, which approach the (de)territorialization process as linked to globalization; claim the need to theorize how space is being (re)territorialized; and problematize

the relationship among nation, state, and territory (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Kearney 1995; Cerulo 1997). In particular, the notion of political transnationalism, referring to those political activities that migrants undertake across the borders of two or more countries, endorses the need to reconsider the conceptualization of political communities, their institutions, and their conceptions of belonging (Bauböck 2005). Research shows that transnational political participation is driven primarily by identity concerns and the need for belonging. Despite the positive correlation between the attainment of double nationality and the development of a sense of belonging to the receiving country, the concession of transnational rights distracts from the recognition that full citizen rights are still denied to migrants in most receiving countries in Europe (see Chap. 11).

Migrants in Europe are still the most marginalized Others. However, since 9/11, a shift from migrant to Muslim has occurred in Europe, transforming Muslim veiled women into the Other *par excellence* (Aldbi Sibai Sirin 2012). The supposed antimodernity of Islam (Buiteleaar 2006) is considered to be incompatible with a democratic, secular, and progressist Europe (Erel 2003; Karakaşoğlu 2003). The hegemonic public discourse essentially regards Muslim women as inferior, uneducated, backward, and victims of their culture (Mani 1987, Spivak 1988, Mohanty 1988, Ahmed 1992, Narayan 1997, Yegenoglu 1998). Both the media and social science literature mostly represent Muslim women as passive victims of their religion who are oppressed by the patriarchal structures of their communities (Okin 1999, MacKinnon 2000). Stereotypical images of Muslim women and patriarchal societies are repeatedly used in the media to spread this representation. In addition, the *hijab is* considered as a sign of their unwillingness to integrate into European society. On the other hand, Muslims women consider the veiling to be a crucial practice in constructing their identity as Muslims in European non-Muslim countries (see Chap. 14).

The action of exhibiting one's identity has been defined as identity performance (Klein et al. 2007; Hopkins and Greenwood 2013). In the pursuit of challenging stereotypes that affect a group, its members may present themselves strategically by displaying specific elements of their identity (Ellemers et al. 2002; Barreto et al. 2003; Hopkins et al. 2007; Klein and Azzi 2001). Recent research illustrates the two-way relationship between identity and performance by examining how the display of one element of identity is connected to the perception of oneself as a group "representative" and how behaviors conform to ideal types (see Chap. 13). Markers create and define the boundaries that distinguish similarities and differences. The language, dress, behavior, and occupation of space used for the purpose of identification are largely visible markers of identity. However, their effectiveness depends on a shared understanding of their meaning. In a multicultural social context, misinterpretation of the meaning of markers—and, consequently, of identity—may occur. *Hijab* is analyzed in this volume as a contested marker of identity.

Oppositional representations and (re)articulation of identity is addressed by answering the questions of what the *hijab* means for those who wear it in contrast to how the image of the female body is represented by the media and public discourse. Young migrants react to the victimizing media discourse that depicts them as subjugated to and oppressed by patriarchal systems (see Chap. 14). Through their

narratives, it is possible to resignify the meaning of the *hijab* and transform it from a symbol of oppression into a site of assertion of their oppositional identity (see Chap. 15).

The theory of narrative identity argues that individuals construct their identity by integrating their diverse and conflicting life experiences into an evolving yet continuous narration that provides them with a sense of unity of their vital trajectory (Somers 1994; McAdams 2001). Nevertheless, the process of identity construction of migrants cannot be understood only with reference to subjective meanings attributed to individual biographical experiences (see Chap. 5). This process is analyzed here as the products of the social locations of the subjects as well as the products of the institutional framework, such as migration policies, citizenship regimes, hegemonic cultural norms, values and categories of both the receiving countries and the countries of origin (Vermeulen and Govers 1994; Pessar and Mahler 2003). The negotiation of identities is presented here as a mean through which migrants give meaning to their (some times contradicting) experiences. It is a social practice that can be understood as the combination of discourses, performances, and (dis-) identification strategies constructed on a multiplicity of cultural frameworks and reference systems. Through this practice, migrants manage to assert their agency in the migration context.

1.2 Synopsis of the Chapters

This volume is structured around seven interlocked issues related to identity and migration: cultural diversity, otherness, rights, belonging, membership, differentiation, and self-representation. The first section is devoted to the conceptual entanglements of identity and cultural diversity. Chapter 2 proposes to address multiculturalism as pluralism of identitarian horizons. From a philosophical perspective, Giovanni Bombelli approaches the "multicultural issue" as located between the universality of values and the contingency of possible multiple visions. This approach is presented as a necessary step for conceptualizing intercultural dialogue. Chapter 3 recognizes that intercultural dialogue occurs among parties with different degrees of power. Argumentation and negotiation are considered to be components of this dialogue. Francesco Viola thoroughly analyzes the relationship between collective identities and core values, along with the appropriateness of negotiation as a method to address conflicts of identitarian values.

The second section of the volume addresses the relationship between identity and marginalization, particularly the influence of the conceptualization of migrants as the Other in contemporary European society. Chapter 4 explores the effect of migration policies in portraying migrants as the Other in Europe. Lorenzo Ferrante presents the case of Italy to demonstrate the weakness of European policies in developing effective forms of coexistence and integration among different ethnic groups within the larger debate on multiculturalism and its failure in Europe. In Chapter 5, Anil Al-Rebohlz shows how the interviewees challenge hegemonic and othering

images of Muslim migrant women by generating their own creative way of being Muslim and being young migrant women in Germany.

The third section focuses on how law shapes identity. Chapter 6 considers the role of human rights in formal and informal processes of identity building. Daniele Ruggiu shows how the absence of the right of immigration can create malfunctions in the legal human rights system, which can in turn affect the very notion of European of identity. Chapter 7 reflects on the effect of law in establishing a set of options available for the construction of individual life trajectories. This chapter particularly focuses on the processes of (de)constructing gender identities in contemporary migration. Roberto Solone Boccardi argues that, because the rights to which women and non-heterosexual people have access vary considerably from one nation-state to another, migration implies drastic and profound changes in personal identity.

The fourth section analyzes the link between identity and "home" and how it is affected by center/periphery dynamics. The notions of mobility and subjectivity on the move are approached here. Chapter 8 considers the issue of identity in postcolonial literature. Lisa Caputo challenges representations of the relationship between center/metropolis and margin/periphery as a one-to-one link. She focuses on diaspora, memory, and identity through the work of three "African-Indian" female writers who blur the perception of fixed identity through the narration of their origin, journeys, and "home". Chapter 9 considers the concept of mobility within internal migration processes in Francoist Spain. By examining different interpretations and values assigned to the concept of mobility, Inbal Ofer examines the condition of urban marginality of internal migrants and its influence on the processes of construction of their identity.

The fifth section examines belonging and membership as crucial components of the identity building process. Chapter 10 explores the need to belong as a crucial step of identity reconstruction of refugee and migrant women in London. In this chapter, based on a visual ethnographic methodology, Nela Milic uses images to capture refugee women's desire for roots and stability and to challenge the perception of migrants and refugees in the UK. Chapter 11 analyzes the concession of external voting rights to migrants by their countries of origin as a tool of transnational political participation. By analyzing the case of Ecuadorian migrants living in Madrid and voting in the presidential elections of their country of origin, Gabriel Echeverría critically addresses the relationship between territoriality, identity, and politics.

The sixth section focuses the on strategies of identity (re)construction through (dis)identification. Chapter 12 focuses on migrant women working in the domestic sector in Spain and explores the paradox of the empowerment of migrant women through the self-appropriation and enforcement of the traditional role of women as caregivers. Paloma Moré Corral analyzes the process of identity construction of migrant women who work in the care sector in Spain from an intersectional perspective that considers not only their gender, but also their race and class in both their countries of origin and the receiving country. Chapter 13 addresses the relevance of religion in the processes of identity negotiation, focusing on the refugee Muslim community in Luxembourg. Lucie Waltzer examines how individuals negoti-

ate their identity, and discusses the changing significance of religion and its role in shaping identities within situationally redefined in- and out-group relationships.

The final section concerns the issue of representation and explores the discursive and embodied (re)articulation of stereotypes as a source of oppositional construction of identity. Focusing on the use of the Islamic veil, what Muslimness means in contemporary Europe is explored here. Chapter 14 analyzes the linguistic representation, of the *hijab*, women's bodies, and social integration in the British press. Ghufran Khir Allah analyzes metaphorical structure variations and the ideologies that lie behind each linguistic representation, and underlines the relevance of the religious dimension to the processes of identity construction and social integration within British society. Chapter 15 focuses on the *hijab* as a contested symbol and marker of identity. Salam Adlbi Sibai explores how Spanish Muslim women represent themselves differently from the image of oppression portrayed by the media. The narrative of Spanish Muslim women represents the choice to wear the *hijab* as a tool to oppose both the patriarchal culture of majority Muslim countries and the victimization of Western mainstream feminist discourse.

1.3 Conclusions

Seeking to provide a tentative yet operative definition of the concept of identity, I find it useful to recall the linguistic roots of the Latin term *idem*, 'the same'. Identity is indeed essentially comparative in nature and must be understood as originally connected to inclusion/exclusion dynamics. Identity is intended and best described as a relational and contextual process that refers to how individuals and groups consider, construct, and position themselves in relation to others according to social categories such as gender, sexuality, culture, race, nation, age, class and occupation. Identity encompasses the multiple roles endorsed by individuals in social life that are externalized through the use of markers, such as language, dress, and occupation of space. Drawing on social psychology, sociology, anthropology, political sciences, and feminist studies, the concept of identity that grounds this volume is a complex social phenomenon resulting from constant negotiations among personal conditions, social relationships, and institutional frameworks. Identity refers to the outcome of two main processes: self-representations and social categorization. The combination of these two processes results in the feeling of differentiation from others, the recognition of one's own difference, the sense of belonging, and consequent mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, which are in turn created, maintained, and reinforced through public policies and the law.

"Migration" is used in this volume as an umbrella term that refers to human mobility from countryside to city (internal migration) or across national borders (international migration), and the term includes both the process of coming to a country and the process of leaving another one. Migration is addressed here not merely as the actual time of entrance into the national territory of a country that differs from the one an individual is a member of (read: citizen) because of the birth within the

national borders (*ius soli*) or filiation from nationals (*iuris sanguinis*). Migration is referred to as a process that begins with the arrival into a country but continues during one's (regular or irregular) permanence in a foreign country while one holds the status of alien or foreign resident. In this respect, the endurance of the migrant status for those who were born on national soil (so-called second- and third-generation migrants) and the effect of naturalization raise the issue of whether and how holding *papiers* and citizenship rights alter one's self-perception and social categorization, and thus affect identity formation.

Migration is addressed here as the material and existential condition of being at the borderland, in-between, in transit. The sense of belonging, (self)representation, and (dis)identification that is experienced by migrants is observed, analyzed, and theorized by the authors of this collective volume. The creation of spaces for participation, inclusion, and belonging through negotiation processes is described as a way to maintain emotional, relational, and institutional linkages with one's family, group, country, culture, and religion of origin, while also striving to be part of the social and political context of the receiving country. Strategic (dis)identification and (re)interpretation of the context of origin and of arrival are described as processes of identity negotiation.

Focusing on migrants as "people in transit" reveals that exploring migration is crucial to research on identity. The "in transit" locationality implies the deprivation of "home protection"—meant as one's family, town, social network, or nation-state—and the search for new symbolic and material spaces in which to stay. Through a conceptual and emotional re-elaboration of multiple belongings, being at the borderlands can be transformed from a marginalized condition of exclusion into a fruitful epistemological position from which to interrogate and theorize individual and group mechanisms of social identification and marginalization. As a migrant feminist scholar myself, I depict the subjectivity of being "in transit" as a suffered but fruitful locationality, which could provides a space for developing new political thought and impulses to social change.

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Part I
Identity and Cultural Diversity: Conceptual Entanglements

Chapter 2
Toward a New Lexicon and a Conceptual Grammar to Understand the "Multicultural Issue"

Giovanni Bombelli

2.1 Introduction

This contribution is an attempt to rethink the "multicultural issue". More precisely, I aim to approach multiculturalism in Europe in connection to migration policies. In a preliminary way, I could synthesize my position as follows. Apart from the more immediate problems frequently related to public order, the "multicultural issue" must be rethought beyond its rhetoric on two complementary levels: the socio-legal and the philosophical-juridical ones. Briefly, though I shall return more widely to it, the socio-legal profile of the "multicultural issue" primarily concerns the identitarian theme. In fact, we must situate the contemporary identitarian claims, quests, and demands in a cultural context, characterized by the following elements: a process of de-institutionalization, the transition from identity to mere membership, and the dynamics of re-symbolization. In this way, we can understand the complexity of the categories implied in the debate on migration and, particularly, the notions of "pluralism", "multiculturalism" (strictly understood), "ethnicity" and, finally, "interculturalism". From this point of view, it is also possible to question many theoretical horizons, for instance, the concept of culture and so-called collective rights.

On the philosophical-juridical level, it is necessary to re-examine traditional paradigms, such as subjective rights, the notion of the State and the model of democracy, and, hence, to rethink theoretical figures, the first being the notion of dialogue. The core of my thesis is the following: considering the nexus identitarian sphere-subjective profile, the "multicultural issue" can be pursued, from a philosophical point of view, as a question of sense that is positioned between the universality of the question and the latter's multiple and legitimate historical answers. More specifically, challenging the idea of "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993, 1996), the "multicultural issue" must be addressed on multiple levels of analysis. To grasp its essence, the multicultural question must be understood as a cognitive problem,

G. Bombelli (✉)
Faculty of Law, Catholic University of Milan, Milan, Italy
e-mail: giovanni.bombelli@unicatt.it

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by seriously considering the multiple and distinct *Weltanschauungen* implied in the various cultural models.

To summarize, in contrast to well-known perspectives such as that of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor (1998), I propose a model of multiculturalism, namely "polydimensional cognitivism". I will examine it in the following parts of the chapter.

In this chapter, I schematically explain my argument in four steps. First, I propose a brief overview of contemporary socio-cultural panorama, starting from the "identitarian question". Second, I analyze more closely the "multicultural issue" from two points of view: an empirical approach related to a few categories used in the multicultural debate and a critical approach. Third, I briefly examine certain legal-political impacts of new sociological phenomena on the notion of subjective rights, the State and systems of democracy. Finally, I articulate the core of my perspective, which I name "polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism".

2.2 The Contemporary Socio-Cultural Context and the Identitarian Dimension

As a first analytical step, I intend to rethink the "multicultural issue" beyond the rhetoric of the public discourse. The expression "multiculturalism" is typically assigned different and mixed meanings and contents. It mostly refers to issues concerning gender and ethnic or religious minorities. Hence, in public opinion, it is possible to observe essentially two positions, each one inconsistent with the other.

The first position is normally related—often in a mystifying and instrumental way—to the concept of tradition, which implies a closure towards new socio-legal issues. This perspective, usually ascribed to a conservative perspective, in reality radicalizes the debate and is unable to capture the irreversible and epoch-making dimension of the "multicultural issue". Symmetrically, the second position, grounded in the notion of "dialogue", is normally assigned to a progressivist position and is considered more politically correct. Nevertheless, it frequently seems irenic and, sometimes, a-critically opens to the "Other".

Hence, I propose starting from the identitarian dimension as the main profile of the "multicultural issue". It represents the problem *par excellence* of the western "complex" societies (Bauman 1999) of which the multicultural profile constitutes merely a projection. I will explain my argument using two connected steps of analysis. I analyze, first, two intimately related aspects of the identitarian dimension: the "individual sphere" and "collective subjects". The first aspect is linked to the phenomenon "multiple self-identities" or, more simply, "multiple Self" (Tajfel 1982; Bodei 1987). From this perspective, it is possible to observe how the phenomena of identities contamination—above all implemented by migratory dynamics, which produce mixed identitarian contexts—is interwoven with two elements. The first element is the dissociation processes, caused particularly by the diffusion of new technologies and, specifically, the virtual community (Bombelli 2010, pp. 483–496).

The second element is, from a philosophical point of view, the crisis of the Cartesian subject and the related model of "veil of ignorance" proposed by Rawls (1971).

The dynamics provoked by the "multiple self-identities" produces two contradictory effects. On the one hand, one can observe an apparent fragmentation of identities. This process is known as "multiple identities" or "transcultural identities" and implies the possibility of displaying many contrasting identities simultaneously. From this perspective, the identity is no longer understood as a necessarily natural or ascriptive datum, but as the "result" of a subjective—and then revocable—option. That is to say, the subject can choose the culture, or the socio-cultural context, to belong to, a phenomenon supported by the central role of virtual communication. For example, consider the diffusion of the so-called avatara (Bombelli 2010, p. 508). In this process fades a philosophical-juridical postulate, traditionally undiscussed and typical of modernity: the connections between the individual sphere and a single specific context (i.e., the State or social bodies).

On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically though symmetrically, it is possible to observe a type of radicalization of identities. At a collective level, in fact, these dynamics produce a show of the identity/identities, frequently mythicized or, better, imagined, to say with Benedict Anderson (1983). Along these lines, collective subjects are affected by these new sociological phenomena at least on three different levels. On the local level, we can observe, for instance, the so-called ethnic revival (Smith 1981, 1986), consisting in a recurrent claim to obtain the legal and social recognition of the value of traditions, frequently understood in opposition to a wider horizon, both statual and extra-statual.

Considering a deeper sociological dimension, we should take into account the new social aggregations that spread across Europe in recent decades. We could define these aggregations as "extra-local social formations", that is, social formations usually considered extraneous to the general environment. However, these processes also raise the problem of their self-definition, which constitutes the core of the "multicultural issue". Finally, we must attend to the State dimension, situated between two contradictory dynamics. On the one hand, we observe a crisis of sovereignty, yet on the other hand, we observe a recurrent reinforcement of the communitarian/identitarian profile of the State. For instance, consider the dialectics between the governance of the European Union and its member States and the increasingly relevant role that has been played by Germany and France. In conclusion, it is possible to notice how the contemporary claim for identity generates a continuous oscillation between the local and the global that moreover led to the coining of the well-known term "glocal" (Govers and Go 2009; Mander and Goldsmith 1996).

From a philosophical perspective, I consider that we should analyze the "multicultural issue" with respect to three elements that characterize the contemporary cultural situation (Bombelli 2008a): de-institutionalization, the progressive transition from identity to mere membership and, finally, what we could refer to as the processes of re-symbolization. With the term de-institutionalization, I mean neither only nor simply the crisis of legal and political institutions. I also mean a more radical dynamic and, more precisely, the crisis of the institution as mediation, that is, the crisis of the idea of institutions as a place where inter-subjective relationship

and mutual recognition occur. From this perspective, it is possible to more fully appreciate the transition from identity to mere membership that designates many of the processes previously mentioned. In other words, the concept of identity, according to a classical tradition (Aristotle 1995, 2009), implies the responsible exercise of personal liberty, while membership is to be understood as a "being part of". This transition is a complex dynamic related to the progressive massification of Western societies that developed in the twentieth century. In other words, the contemporary processes of massification imply a type of collective depersonalization, which facilitates the diffusion of models of membership (i.e., association) based on simple and weak forms of social affinity or mutual and reciprocal recognition.

This point strictly connects with the "multicultural issue". In fact, the rhetoric appeal to the notion of culture and identity that notoriously indexes the multicultural debate, is often merely functional for the accreditation of simple memberships, precluding the understanding of the complexity of the identitarian dimension. Finally, the dynamic of the superimposition of identity to membership legitimizes current processes of re-symbolization. They substantially consist of the invention of a political symbolism to create a feeling of belonging. In this respect, the increasingly frequent recall of many symbols of the Western tradition, such as religion, community, fatherland, or working class, seems instrumental to this project.

2.3 The "Multicultural Issue" Closely Considered

To closely analyze the "multicultural issue", I distinguish two additional levels of analysis: descriptive and critical. At the descriptive level, I believe it is necessary to make an attempt of offering a more precise explanation of some lexical categories to show their complexity and trace an *explicatio terminorum*. In fact, the focus on certain categories related to the "multicultural issue" does not seem self-indulgent. Quite the contrary, this focus reveals how the use of specific interpretative categories subtends and legitimizes specific political and institutional options. Thus, the attempt to more precisely pinpoint these categories raises essentially two issues: lexical and conceptual. On the one hand, I will try to organize the debate on this topic with "linguistic hygiene". On the other hand, these remarks will allow me to sketch, at an operative level, a few conceptual lines to begin to successively discuss the "multicultural issue" in its entirety. My focus will be oriented to the following terms that, though theoretically distinguishable, often intersect conceptually and operatively: "pluralism", "multiculturalism", "multiethnicity" and "interculturalism" (Bombelli 2008a, pp. 55–56, b, p. 37, 2010, p. 427 ff.).

The category "pluralism" represents a typical Western category because it is linked with Western history and, more precisely, with modernity (Sartori 2000). In this respect, I distinguish between two intertwined levels: "descriptive pluralism" and "normative pluralism". The former concerns the mere historical fact of the compresence of many cultural, religious, and political visions of the world within Western societies. This level can reveal how contemporary societies are plural compared

with the previous social contexts. Consider, for example, the eighteenth and the nineteenth century social models. Moreover, pluralism represents a problematical sociological profile largely absent from classical socio-political theories, thus producing a watershed between the past sociopolitical paradigms (broadly speaking, until the middle of the twentieth century) and the contemporary one. "Normative pluralism" refers, instead, to the modern historical claims proposed by minorities to obtain political, and legal recognition. In this regard, we must distinguish pluralism from mere plurality, which may also be found, for instance, in the Middle Ages, when the multiple elements of Christian, Islamic, and Hebrew cultures were originally synthesized into a higher, theologically justified unity. Vice versa, I interpret as a sign of "normative pluralism" the presence, in the last centuries, of recurrent demand for legal instruments as a legal guarantee (constitutionals charters, universal declarations, etc.) and, furthermore, the Western history of political parties, trade unions, and so on. Finally, it should be noted that both notions of pluralism here proposed had a common background, constituted by a Western social homogeneity, which, in contemporary societies, has disappeared.

Likewise, I distinguish a similar double profile in the use of the term multiculturalism: "descriptive multiculturalism" and "normative multiculturalism". "Descriptive multiculturalism" concerns the mere presence in our societies of many socio-cultural models, which are different or, better, which aim to be "alternative" to the Western model. The expression "normative multiculturalism" is instead related, in its technical meaning, to the scholarly use of this term as a paradigm for an historical recognition and a cultural legitimatization of many different questions: gender issues, the protection of cultural and linguistic identities, and ethnic identity. Thus, the difference between pluralism and multiculturalism is clarified. While "pluralism" developed within the Western tradition, "multiculturalism" is linked to different *Weltanschauungen*. The new societies in which we live raise the question of their possible interlacement.

Additionally, the category of multiethnicity is highly complex. This category is often superimposed on the concept of multiculturalism and appears to be a hybrid concept. In particular, the concept of "ethnicity" is placed between a biological meaning, in one respect grounded solely on the relevance of physical features, and a cultural profile, based on the importance of language, customs, and traditions. From this perspective, it generates the frequent confusion between racial and cultural membership (Boucher 2001).

Finally, we must consider the category of "interculturalism". Sometimes confused with the aforementioned notion of multiculturalism, it should be understood instead more precisely as the intertwining of cultures. While multiculturalism, in its technical meaning, favors the mere compresence of different socio-cultural models, interculturalism is oriented to their interlacement. As a conclusion of this close examination, we can propose two brief, general remarks: first, all these categories are the product of political perspectives and positions, and, second, from a theoretical-historical point of view, these categories have a Western origin.

At the second level, the critical one, I propose a brief analysis of some crucial categories following the ideal scheme of differentiating between the conceptual,

political and legal levels. I focus on the category of culture, the relationship between the State and new social formations and finally, the highly contested concept of collective rights. The notion of "culture" *per se* raises many problems. Despite the common use of this category proposed by anthropologists *à la* Lévi-Strauss and communitarians (Bombelli 2010), the concept of culture is highly debated not only because of the problematic nexus "universality of the culture-autonomy of the personal sphere" but also with regard to the following aspects: its ethno-anthropological origin (and consequently, its usual reference to and superimposition on the notion of "community"); its different dimensions (in other words: how is "culture" defined, and who defines it?); and, finally, the admission criteria (Barth 1969).

Additionally, the relationship between the State and new social aggregations is highly complex. In this respect, we can distinguish three contradictory solutions that have been historically and concretely adopted (Fleras 2009): the French solution, based on a politics of assimilation; the British model, rooted in the contiguity of cultures that generated a sort of "puzzle-society"; and, finally, that preferred by the American society and tied to the criterion of the melting pot, recently rethought as "salad bowl". More widely, on a theoretical level, the question of the State involves the relationship between the liberal model and the new sociological conditions, focusing in particular on the concepts of "politics of recognition" and "hospitable liberalism" (Habermas 1998; Habermas and Taylor 1998; Kymlicka 1999). Against a universalistic neutralization, the "politics of recognition" is oriented to the social, political, and legal recognition of differences. In other words, it implies the recognition of the equal value of different cultures. In these terms, we should elaborate policies focused on the protection of different socio-cultural models that thus entails rethinking the liberal model as an entirety to create a "hospitable liberalism", which is able to address different identities without renouncing its distinctive socio-legal features. Yet, this perspective is questionable because it remains within a Western framework and has a "concessive" nature: the "other" remains, substantially, a mere "guest" (Bombelli 2010).

Finally, we must address the question concerning the complex definition and the practice of collective rights. Here, we can quickly refer, in addition to the aforementioned difficulty of identifying the boundaries of cultures, another element: the frequent, often subtended equation "culture = community", which, for instance, postulates the problematic protection of cultures such as "natural entities" (Tallacchini 1996; Habermas and Taylor 1998; Kymlicka 1999).

2.4 Political-Institutional Consequences and Theoretical Perspectives

We must place the previous remarks and the conceptual knots discussed so far into a wider horizon. We should consider not only certain crucial legal and institutional dimensions but also their conceptual framework. To do so, I distinguish two tightly interlaced—and consequently interdependent—levels. The first one is a socio-legal

level and entails the notion of subjective rights and systems of democracy. The second level is a philosophical one and is related to the theoretical figure of "dialogue".

At a socio-legal level, we can synthesize the starting point as follows: do the western political, legal and cultural models have the tools to face the new conditions in which we live and to rethink the nexus identity-institution? We can try to answer this question with respect to two connected aspects that structure the modern political-institutional paradigm: the notion of "subjective right" and the model of State or, better, "systems of democracy". The notion of "subjective right" is one of the most important products of the modern Western philosophy. Focused on the guarantee of the individual sphere, the subjective rights belong to the common socio-cultural ethos worldwide, particularly when "translated" as human rights. Thus, the Western notion of the "subjective right" contributes to the building of a type of universal and indefeasible philosophical-legal "heritage" in Western contexts and in countries variously influenced by Western culture.

The new social conditions that are characterized by the "multicultural issue" represent the stimulus to rethink the Western notion of "right". I propose a progressive transition from the concept of right as a guarantee of the subjective dimension, a typical product of modernity, to an identitarian notion of right. Consider, for instance, the famous case of the Islamic veil and the relative debate in France. We could understand "subjective right" as not only a guarantee for the individual sphere but, above all, an instrument whereby everybody can express his or her identity. This understanding does not imply accepting the idea of collective right, nor to consider a "fourth generation" of rights (Bobbio 1990). Although this issue is controversial, a few signals emerge, particularly in debate on the right of "citizenship". Moreover, the debate concerning the limits of citizenship, particularly linked to its formal features, has led to the well-known proposal of "multicultural citizenship" (Kymlicka 1995; Koopmans et al. 2005).

In addition, these new social conditions also call for reflection on the State, which, since the modern age, has been the natural framework within which the subjective right has evolved. From this perspective, it is necessary to pass from the traditional perspective of Lockean origin grounded in a formal-institutional model to a perspective that allows a conceptualization of the State and more broadly, systems of democracy, as a community that reflects the different articulations of society. This perspective can entail, for instance, a radical review of the notion of public order. Furthermore, this perspective would imply, at a legal-institutional level, to rethink certain dimensions of the State, such as the role of education (Habermas and Taylor 1998), while at a more theoretical level, the possible re-discussion of the conceptual couple public/private, questioned by the diffusion of cultural models wherein this distinction is absent.

Finally, the "multicultural issue" requires the re-discussion of the structure of systems of democracy, which represent another peculiar product of the Western philosophical-legal evolution, although is always subjected to revision. Consider, for instance, the historical transition from the "liberal State" to the welfare State. The new social conditions make urgent the question concerning whether and how contemporary systems of democracy can be rethought under the influence of

cultural visions that are radically heterogeneous to the Western model. The challenge is the relationship, new to the Western tradition, between "pluralism", as a peculiar Western concept, and "multiculturalism", in its aforementioned meanings.

2.5 Towards a "Polydimensional and Cognitive Multiculturalism"

The previous remarks introduce my major argument, which is based on the close relation between identity and the "multicultural issue". Identity is a premise and an unavoidable condition for discussing the "multicultural issue". However, the central role of identities should not lead to the misrecognition that the identitarian dimension necessarily exists when multiple visions of the world coexist. This phenomenon is what I term "polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism". My position markedly differs from the previously described notions of multiculturalism and interculturalism because I consider the "multicultural issue" as a cognitive and categorical issue.

More precisely, this perspective does not imply the simple equation "many cultures = many *Weltanschauungen* ". On the contrary, "polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism" involves and advocates a radical re-discussion of certain philosophical and hence legal concepts. It implies corollaries at different levels: philosophical, anthropological, theoretical, legal, and political. First, as a philosophical corollary, the "multicultural issue" postulates a radical re-discussion of the Western conceptualization of "reality" or, better, the "thing" (the datum) that originates in Greek philosophy (Severino 1983, 2000; Weber 1978; Spengler 1991) Consequently, this re-discussion would likely imply a general re-articulation of the Western relation among spheres and ambits of knowledge: for instance, the connections and relationships among law, philosophy, and religion. Second, we must notice the close relation between "polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism" and ethics. In fact, and necessarily given a cognitive point of view, the new visions of reality circulate through relational nets and personal relations. Thus, the "multicultural issue" is also, beyond its social aspects, an ethical issue. From this perspective, we have a moral (almost Kantian) duty to know other cultures. This approach can constitute the theoretical horizon for re-discussing the "multicultural issue" and to renounce mono-cultural conceptual models. Only within this horizon pluralism can transpire; only here it is possible to meet the "Other" and to not only accept him as a "stranger".

Finally, we can more fully understand the theoretical corollary implied by the "multicultural issue", focusing on the fundamental role of the "question of sense". The focus must be placed on the central problem of the meaning of the world and reality elaborated within different cultures, a question that has been removed, or substantially resolved in a functionalist way, in Western societies. Indeed, the universal and problematic dimension necessarily permits multiple and cognitive solutions and therefore, authentic pluralism. This point allows us to better place the

"polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism" that I propose against the position of Charles Taylor and, above all, Jürgen Habermas. The former, following the conceptual lines traced by Hans Georg Gadamer, proposes a fusion of cultural horizons (Taylor 1991, 1992, 1999, 2004), while the "polydimensional multiculturalism" postulates to maintain the different perspectives. In other words, the fusion evoked by Charles Taylor addresses the "question of sense", not its historical articulations. It discusses the problem, not its contingent solutions. Additionally, the perspective elaborated by Habermas seems weak (Habermas 1998), particularly regarding its conceptual horizon (a questionable neo-illuministic model of rationality) and socio-legal effects. Apart from the problematical notion of "dialogue" (never discussed by Habermas), the perspective should be reversed. We must prioritize not the linguistic dimension, but the "question of sense". In other words, the problem of sense illuminates inter-cultural dialogue, and not vice versa. In this respect, it is also possible to question the central role assigned by Habermas to the law and, particularly, to democracy. In effect, multicultural dynamics can also lead to a questioning of the systems of democracy and, more generally, the latter's political and legal institutions.

This point of view allows a fuller appreciation of the legal and political-institutional consequences of the questions discussed so far. Only starting from the cognitive horizon it is possible to understand the issues associated with the "multicultural issue" and then, to adopt more adequate policies. I briefly propose three examples linked to the "polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism": the cultural defense, models of family, and the right of worship. The first question concern, more precisely, the space conferred in the last years to the "cultural defense" in many Courts, particularly in the United States for the so-called "culturally motivated crimes", where culture has the value of legal justification (Basile 2010). We can consider some situations where the judge must decide between the legal "form" of the norm and the "substance" represented by the cultural dimension. Or, better, the relevance of the meaning assigned by a subject (or, more generally, by the community to which he/her belongs) to some practices: for instance, think about the debated question related to the "genital mutilations" (De Maglie 2010; Botti 2009).

At the same time, nowadays, we must acknowledge the extensive diffusion in our social contexts of many models of the family. The challenge for Western societies and above all, Western legal systems, is conjugating two dimensions: the universal dimension based on the familiar relationship and the multiple ways to existentially "translate" this dimension, often structurally heterogeneous in the Western model. Consider, paradigmatically, the progressive diffusion of polygamic families in some Western countries (Zeitzen 2008).

Finally, consider the right of worship. The question is the respect, on the one hand, for the universal dimension of "sense" (understood in this context as opening to the "sacred", in a pre-religious meaning and dimension) and, on the other hand, the peculiar ways whereby humans live this experience. In this case, the polydimensional perspective necessarily implies different forms of worship and, hence, the State's duty to create the cultural spaces and the legal conditions to respect those forms (Blount and Tubbs Tisdale 2001).

To summarize, in all these cases (crime law, models of family, religion), we observe the decisive relevance of what I term "polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism", that is, the crucial role, at a cognitive level, of *different* cultural perspectives in granting a *peculiar* shape to certain fundamental existential dimensions such as individual (or, better, sexual) identity, social or relational systems and, finally, the religious dimension.

2.6 Conclusion

The "polydimensional and cognitive multiculturalism" is a proposal oriented to not only scholarship but also the society at large. At a theoretical level, this proposal could serve as a guide for a wide comparative research agenda, following the lines traced by Max Weber (1993) in *Religionssoziologie* at the beginning of the twentieth century. At a political level, the proposed perspective could be useful for policymakers. Finally, the line of argument developed in this chapter is also directed at public opinion. The global perspective suggested here can offer the cultural spaces and, hopefully, the real conditions to make more aware and adequate collective decisions.

Only from this theoretical framework the possibility of proposing and seriously considering the conceptual figure of "dialogue" emerges. It is frequently evoked in the debate concerning the "multicultural issue" and represents a decisive point for elaborating a real "polydimensional" or "cognitive" multiculturalism. As is known, the notion (or category) of "dialogue" is closely related to Western philosophy (from Plato onwards, for instance, Martin Buber) and from this point of view, raises at least two questions. The first question concerns the real practicability within contemporary societies, and the second question involves the reciprocal character, that is, the possibility for it to be recognized by the "other". So, on the one hand, within a postmodern situation, we must engage cultural models for which there often lacks conceptual space for "dialogue". But, upon closer examination, the challenge is exactly making "dialogue" (in spite of its Western origin) a cultural key for meeting and coexistence, not merely tolerance, among cultures.

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Chapter 3
Negotiation of Identities and Negotiation of Values in Multicultural Societies

Francesco Viola

Conflict can be confronted using a variety of methods: the use of violence (whether overt or masked), the exercise of authority, negotiation or compromise, reasoning or argumentation, and political expression by the vote. The goals of these methods differ as well: to eliminate or defeat the adversary, to reach an agreement with him or her, to regulate or govern the conflict, to remove it, or to transform it into competition. Here, we will deal only with negotiation and argumentation as methods for managing conflicts of identity and conflicts of value[1].

Negotiation is the *de facto* method for managing conflicts of identity as well as conflicts of value. Anyone who abandons his or her country on the path of emigration already knows that he or she will also have to abandon some expressions of cultural identity to attain the approval of the host country. Desire for survival seems to induce people to accept limitations upon their identities or to negotiate forms of cohabitation with other identities. Similarly, in the case of a conflict between values and rights, the method of balancing and weighing legitimate but conflicting demands can lead to the compromising of individual demands in the service of achieving a coexistence within the context of larger exigencies.

However, it is a widespread opinion among theorists (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Offe 1998) that negotiation is not fit for conflicts of identity or value but is only for conflicts of interest. It is true that conflicts of interest can be resolved through negotiation or, in quite a few cases, through the simple dominance of the stronger party. Conflicts of identity, on the other hand, require a level of mutual recognition, while conflicts of value must be faced—at least people believe or hope—with discussion, reasoning, and argumentation. As a matter of principle, managing conflicts of identity and value requires more complex procedures than simple negotiation, yet the indecisiveness and fallibility of such procedures make these conflicts the most dramatic and lacerating.

[1] For a deeper analysis, see Viola (2005).

F. Viola (✉)
Faculty of Law, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy
e-mail: francesco.viola@unipa.it

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History offers numerous examples in which the methods of negotiation and domination by strength have been used in the formation of states. After World War I, for instance, the Treaty of Versailles gave rise to multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; after World War II, the policy of blocs prevailed over the demands of ethnic identities. In these and many other cases, political formations were artificially created or constructed through the development of international treaties, a process proper to the method of negotiation. As is well known, however, Yugoslavia was subsequently broken up, and Czechoslovakia was later divided into two independent states. Such negative outcomes might be interpreted as a confirmation of the inadequacy of the method of negotiation in the management of cultural and ethnic identities. On the other hand, it might be objected that in the above cases the negotiations were not conducted by the interested parties themselves but by others—namely, the victorious states or colonial powers—on the former's behalf or at their expense.

We argue that an ethnic or cultural identity cannot be negotiated. Cultural identity demands to be recognized in its integrity because it is not divisible into several more or less important parts. Another problem with using negotiation in the management of collective identities lies in the witting and voluntary character of negotiation itself. Cultural identities, unlike moral ones, are not formed by free will; that is to say, cultural identities are not of a witting and voluntary construction. None of us choose to be born into a given culture or race, just as none of us choose our parents or mother tongue. Yet, the acceptance of our cultural identity and the recognition of its importance in the constitution of the self and of one's self-respect is a necessary and voluntary step, just as in the case of constructing one's moral identity. In other words, we do not dictate the contents of our cultural identities, but only manage the importance that they have in our lives and therefore the strength of their claim for public recognition.

In the context of everyday life within a multicultural society, marked as it is by relationships among different moral and cultural identities, identities adjust to one another, are more or less gradually modified in their contents, and—unless they are ghettoized or insulated as separate tribes—become true examples of cultural hybridization. In any case, this process of adjustment takes a long time, as should be expected in the creation of new cultural forms, and therefore cannot be configured as a negotiation in contractual terms. Social life generates new identities that are founded on those of the past but that modify them in new ways. These processes are neither witting nor deliberate, as one would expect by extrapolating from the idea of the social contract.

The method of argumentation similarly does not appear suitable for managing relations among different cultural identities. The goal of argumentation is to reach justified conclusions—on a plane of rationality or reasonableness—that each party must accept, even if the argument may stand against his or her interest[2]. By this, we certainly do not mean that a political community should initiate a philo-

[2] According to Rawls, rationality is applied by a single agent peculiarly (but not exclusively) in search of its own goals and interests. By contrast, reasonableness implies the desire to engage in

sophical debate to establish the compatibilities or incompatibilities among its constituent cultural identities as a prerequisite for those identities' public recognition. Methodologically, argumentation is sensitive to the truth, which in the practical field is linked to values of goodness, justice, or correctness. Argumentation implies that there are universal or common criteria of justice that can be used as the basis for judgments about practices and forms of life; it implies, in other words, that there exists a common grammar of good and justice. However, it is this very assumption that is challenged by ethical pluralism and multiculturalism. Because the premises of argumentation would imply that certain cultures or certain elements of a culture may be somehow wrong or perverse, argumentation therefore seems intrinsically incompatible with a cultural relativism that protects the specificity of collective identities.

Some authors believe that moral objectivism is contrary to pluralism because it would lead to intolerance towards those conceptions that are regarded as erroneous (Plaw 2005). This reasoning is not convincing, however, if we consider that the affirmation of a moral value does not imply the right to impose that value on others. Moreover, if moral values and choices were justified and derived merely from a personal whim, we would not have the right to demand their public recognition. Indeed, no one may be duty-bound to satisfy the whims of another. Nonetheless, although all of these arguments hold in the context of ethical pluralism, cultural pluralism cannot be treated in the same way, both because cultures are not chosen in the way that moral values are chosen and because they therefore do not have to be justified in the way that moral values do.

Likewise, while it is legitimate to maintain objectivism in the moral sphere, it makes no sense to speak of cultural objectivism. It cannot be said that one culture is objectively better than another, just as no language is objectively better than any other. Cultures are particular forms of life in which the multifaceted nature of an individual, as well as his or her ability to relate to the world and to others, are expressed in different ways. Each culture has its incomparable specificity. Certainly some cultures are more complex or extended than others. Yet, for those that live within it any given culture fully constitutes the possible forms of expression, identity, and action. Respect for individual cultures is not founded upon a judgment regarding the quality of each individual civilization but rather upon a respect for the people who find their authenticity within each culture. No consolidated culture, whether large or small, can be considered inhuman as a whole, even though it may comprise inhuman or primitive practices. On the contrary, every culture is a particular, although incomplete, interpretation of the general values of humanity. By definition, therefore, no culture, no matter how developed or undeveloped it is, can be considered unintelligible (Jullien 2008).

On the basis of the theoretical reasoning thus far, we can conclude that neither negotiation nor argumentation in its pure form is a method suited to the intercultural dialogue in which the recognition of collective identity matures. Still, it is only by

fair cooperation as such and "to do so in terms that others as equals might reasonably be expected to endorse" (Rawls 1996, p. 51).

working with concrete instances that we can avoid the danger of blindly applying abstract models; in fact, it is clear that aspects of negotiation and argumentation are indeed present within intercultural dialogue, albeit in a mixed and confused way. We do not believe that a general model, suitable to all cases, can be extrapolated for the management of the relationships among collective identities.

First, it is necessary to note that particularism is an essential characteristic of every culture, even of those that are more extended or that aspire to expansion. Even when speaking of "western culture" or "oriental culture" we refer to particularist formations, regardless of how large these categories appear. The cultural forms in which human life manifests itself are not universal. This is why argumentation does not appear methodologically suited to governing the relationships among identities. For example, collective identities aspire to universal recognition even if they do not desire or expect universal membership within their collective culture. By contrast, the method of argumentation seeks universal values and tends to consider particular forms of life as universal models.

The particularism present in every culture demonstrates that the request for public recognition is accompanied not only by a willingness to engage in dialogue with other collective identities but also by a disposition to accept a more comprehensive society in which such a dialogue might take place. In this sense, the problem of recognition is not only a problem of who recognizes whom but also of who asks for and who demands recognition. The request for recognition is only legitimate if the concerned parties are prepared to engage in dialogue with other identities, and this can happen only when they are ready to challenge their own social practices and modify their own points of view. Cultures that avoid change are cultures that are already dead or destined for extinction. Obtaining recognition from a political community entails a dialogue between the petitioning party and an already consolidated order of common values and practices to which people request access and involvement.

Through this dialogue, a difficult but potentially decisive path towards the progressive articulation of universal values becomes possible. The risk of this process losing its direction is always present, as occurs when, for example, a minority would rather remain isolated that engage in dialogue or when a host society seeks only to assimilate the minority without mutual exchange.

The first step, therefore, is the transition to a more comprehensive notion of particularity. To this end, a public ethos is needed. In the case of immigration, for instance, a cultural identity does not only ask another cultural group for recognition but, more importantly, asks for the right to become part of their political community. In short, the request for recognition is a request to participate—with equal rights and duties—in the common life of that community; it is a request for commonality. To be recognized, what is different must belong to what is common, as the recognition of particularity is only possible on the basis of a common horizon. Nevertheless, a political community is certainly not a universal horizon but rather is itself a particular form of common life. The precise aspiration of multicultural societies is to produce a social order that is comprehensive of the different identities that live

within it, rather than producing a form of cosmopolitanism[3]. Each multicultural society has its own particular physiognomy that depends upon the unique circumstances in which it originated—both the history of original political community and the subsequent manner by which cultural minorities were integrated.

In Europe, this process is still at its inception: although large numbers of migrants are present, in some cases exceeding 10% of a nation's population, truly multicultural societies do not yet exist. Much depends upon the situation in which a given political community finds itself. When a political community is cohesive and stable, the full recognition of new cultural identities, once granted, is strong and meaningful, though this recognition is accompanied by a high risk of assimilation. If recognition is absent or defective in such a context, migrants are marginalized and marked by social exclusion. When, on the other hand, a political community is largely disaggregated and unstable, it feels threatened by diverse cultural and religious identities, and recognition—if it is granted at all—tends to be weak and uncertain. For their part, minorities would like the host community to be weak and strong simultaneously: weak as to their own reference values and strong in their capacity for recognition.

In any case, intercultural dialogue is not played out among peer interlocutors, as in an ideal dialogue; rather, some interlocutors are able to exert greater strength or to make the best of an advantageous position. It is for this reason that argumentation, the core of dialogue, is by necessity blended in this context with aspects of negotiation and compromise. It is important to note, however, that the collective search for a common terrain drives not only the petitioning cultural group, but the entire political community to broaden their particular perspectives. This collective progress represents the second step towards the articulation of universal values. A dialogue is only possible when both parties recognize something in common. However, what is common among cultures lies in a capacity that must be developed and is not in an *a priori* condition: the universality of human values is not a starting point but a regulative ideal never to be completely reached.

A specific example of the search for common values is represented by the "Charter of values of citizenship and integration"[4], which was approved by decree in Italy in 2007 owing to the Minister of the Interior Giuliano Amato and the participation and consensus of the principal migrant and religious communities in Italy. Although other European countries have embraced similar initiatives, such as the French *Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration en France*[5], the Italian document is unique in its detail and for having been composed according to a multilateral process. In the Italian

[3] According to cosmopolitanism, the identities of individuals or groups have neither national nor parochial boundaries. By contrast, from the perspective of multiculturalism, different cultural or moral identities can coexist peacefully and equitably in the same political community (Beck 2011).

[4] See http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_integration.pdf [last accessed January 8, 2013].

[5] See http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/N17046.xhtml [last accessed January 8, 2013].

Charter, sensitive issues are addressed, such as the mutilation of the female body, polygamy and religious attire. It reflects a broadening of the Italian political and cultural vision with regard to the scope of citizenship, religious freedom, and the public role of religion. Indeed, diversity forces us to question our own identity and broaden our own perspectives to find a basis for commonality. This legal document has had very little impact in Italy's relations with migrants, for whom conditions have only worsened; this is a political matter, however, which we hope will be transitory in nature.

When people ask to participate in common life, they must be ready to challenge their convictions regarding their own identities and—as Habermas (2005) has shrewdly observed—they must be willing to learn from others. Every broadening of perspective involves the calling into question of one's own specificity; otherwise, there would be no real public discourse but only a tug-of-war in which the winner is the party with more influence or a greater capacity to mobilize the majority. In a deliberative democracy, the majority still requires sufficient reason for their decisions. The democratic constitutional state, founded upon the concept of deliberation, is a form of government sensitive to requirements of reasonableness; it does not imply a theoretical or abstract truth but rather requires an understanding of truth in practical and operational terms, open to fair cooperation, the benevolent reception of diversity, and the integration of such diversity into its common life.

European culture, with its pride for both its secular and religious histories, shows little propensity to welcome pluralism or accommodate difference (Viola 2012). New cultural identities that arrive in the "Europe of rights" represent not only a "cognitive challenge," to quote Habermas (2005) once again, but also and above all an existential challenge. These cultures often value dimensions of humanity that are not considered important within an ethics of rights (if the latter is interpreted as a morality of autonomy)[6]. We refer here in particular to the dimensions of dependence, suffering, vulnerability of the human being and solidarity, upon which Martha Nussbaum (2006) has rightly insisted. Gabriel Marcel (1964, p. 168) has noted that human dignity is more evident to us when we meet a human being in his or her nudity, as the unarmed individual that presents himself or herself in the child, the elderly person, or the indigent. The individualistic ethics of rights does not exhaust the full extent of the human and must exist in dialogue with the dimensions of interdependence and community. Moreover, the negation of rights dramatically emphasizes a dimension of humanity that has a transcultural character, the one that—according to Hanna Arendt (1958)—unites all individuals in the very fact of birth. This "bare humanity" does not exist in a transcendent realm, however, but within specific cultures. Shared humanity is not an *a priori* question of existence but rather

[6] "If a person is to be maker or author of his own life then he must have the mental abilities to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind, and plan their execution. These include minimum rationality, the ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental faculties necessary to plan actions, etc. For a person to enjoy an autonomous life he must actually use these faculties to choose what life to have. There must in other words be adequate options available for him to choose from. Finally, his choice must be free from coercion and manipulation by others, he must be independent" (Raz 1986, pp. 372–373).

a commonality in the primary needs of human beings and in the similarity in their multiplicity of responses. In this sense we can speak of an operational universality of intercultural dialogue.

It must be observed, therefore, that not all human values can be effectively translated into an ethics of rights, if we understand "rights" as traditionally articulated in the western world, and that rights alone are not enough to protect human dignity in its fullest extent. However, this is a western/eastern reciprocal lesson that takes a long time to mature.

In conclusion, we can say that requests for recognition by cultural identities usually have an integral character. That is to say, they aim at the integral preservation of culture. In this sense, cultural identities are not in principle negotiable. Negotiation cannot be excluded, however, because of the "weakness" of the culture requesting recognition from a host political community. Here, we do not mean negotiation in contractual terms but rather negotiation as a gradual adaptation to the new vital contexts that arise in the succession of generations and that give birth to novel forms of cultural hybridism. These forms of cultural hybridism, in turn, generate new cultural identities on the one hand and produce forms of disorientation and existential uprooting on the other.

Alongside this process of informal negotiation, and indeed intertwined with it, a process of intercultural dialogue—conducted according the method of practical argumentation—must likewise occur. This latter process requires a capacity in both parties for self-criticism and the re-examination of parameters in the search for a common humanity, as well as adequate ethical and legal forms of protection. This process is more witting than the former, is expressed in the form of rights and duties, and leads to a redefinition of the social pact, but it also requires a longer time for its realization.

We argued above that political communities—as the result of the intercultural dialogue among different groups—have a fundamentally particularistic nature. The Greek *polis*, the medieval *civitas* and the modern *nation* have been configured as identities oriented towards universal values and not as identities of an ethnic or merely cultural type. Intercultural dialogue does not end with integration but continues inside the political community, becoming a dialogue on the fundamental values of the good life, their interpretation, and their implementation. Intercultural dialogue should gradually shift its focus from identities to values; in this way, a significant, though slow or even imperceptible, transformation can be achieved. By petitioning for the recognition of their identity, a person or a group merely claims a right; in the struggle for the recognition of a value, a conception of human life that everyone can share—a good in itself—is defended.

It is clear that in the case of a conflict of value, practical argumentation is indispensable and plays a central role. However, values, too, are always learned and practiced in particular cultural contexts and are therefore susceptible to different interpretations and applications. Can we really say that negotiation absolutely cannot be deployed in the defense values? Certainly it occurs in parliaments all over the world. Is this a degenerate and deplorable practice? Or is it a practical necessity imposed by the need for cohabitation in a pluralistic society?

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Part II
Identity and Marginalization: Migrants as the Other

Chapter 4
Has Multiculturalism Failed in Europe? Migration Policies, State of Emergency, and Their Impact on Migrants' Identities in Italy

Lorenzo Ferrante

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide a sociological analysis of Italy's migration policies and their impact on migrants' identities in a context in which two aspects overlap: first, the European debate on the failure of multiculturalism; and second, the exceptional flow of migrants from North Africa to Europe through the Italian coast. In territories such as the southern coast of Sicily and Lampedusa, the flow of migrants has created a state of emergency in Italy with respect to defending its territories, security, and national identity. This chapter's hypothesis is that the supposed failure of multiculturalism in Europe corresponds to a political and social crisis related to the idea of Europeanizing territories that wish to maintain, or have not maturely developed, postmodern values of coexistence among different cultures (Bauman 1998). This crisis seems related to the will to find a political solution to a problem that instead requires an assessment of not only the demographic and economic changes in Europe, but also the usefulness of migrants in Europe's new globalized structures.

In a world saturated with information, new technologies, job insecurity, and new working models based on flexibility, increasing globalization has encouraged people to increase the "individualization" of their existence to quickly adapt to new social configurations in which they are exposed to the experiences of difference, multiplicity, and change (Appadurai 2003; Bhabha 2001; Hannerz 1996). This situation stimulates both the cultural construction of the enemy and the social distance among different ethnic groups. Within this framework, this chapter analyzes the ineffectiveness of Italy's immigration policies. Its hypothesis is that Italy reflects European management's inability to adopt truly effective forms of coexistence and integration for different ethnic groups.

On the other part, welcoming positions and the acceptance of all requests for recognitions of difference—irrespectively of the degree of integration and democracy

L. Ferrante (✉)
Department of Politics, Law, and Society, Faculty of Political Sciences of Palermo, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy
e-mail: lorenzo.ferrante@unipa.it

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of the groups that make such requests—often underline the connection between the crises of postmodernism and multiculturalism. In the sociological debate, essentialists vision of difference, culture, and identity are questioned unmasking the residue of ethnocentrism, which is still strongly rooted in some forms of cohabitation proposed by supporters of democratic multiculturalism (Shoat and Stam 1994).

Multiculturalism and multiethnicity pose new questions about the sphere of recognition of the rights of citizenship related to the integration of those who work and contribute to the common welfare with those who view cultural hybridization as a danger that corrodes their identity. There is an ongoing sociological debate that distinguishes multiculturalism from multiethnicity. The first term is used to describe a factual situation: the presence of different cultures, religions, languages, and ethnicities within a single nation-state. It is also understood as an orientation that is favorable, to varying degrees, to respect for different identities and the rights of minority communities under the rule of law and the rules of a liberal democracy. In many cases, the use of the term multiculturalism is used to describe a social reality characterized by the presence of multiple normative reference values, i.e., it refers to a presumed state of modern Western societies defined by the simultaneous presence of a plurality of groups that find their members' recognition and orientation to action as the basis of their membership. The term multiculturalism, used in this way, highlights the sociological effects of globalization that tend to weaken the nation-state, which is the traditional source of identity recognition and social cohesion among citizens of the modern Western world.

Conversely, the term multiethnicity[1] describes a society in which the coexistence of different ethnic and cultural identities makes demands on both native and migrant social actors due to cultural differences and different patterns of social production and reproduction. Therefore, multiculturalism and multiethnicity both evoke prospects of coexistence among people of different cultures, but in daily life, they become crucial issues because "differences" of habits, rituals, unwritten rules, denials and prohibitions related to traditions may become a breeding ground for tension or conflict. In this scenario, the more visible the differences are, the greater the contrast in compliance with the routine behaviors that tend to characterize a group or society, generate a sense of belonging and consolidate social identities. However, differences in actions and behaviors reveal cultural elements that are rooted in history, processes of socialization, approaches to gender differences, and respect for social hierarchies, thereby giving the "host" society a representation of an ethnic group or community as "different" and thus prejudicially opposed to it. In our opinion, this is the focal point behind cultural tensions, which is revealed in the common sense of a risk of bewilderment or loss of identity.

[1] In a previous work, I used the term "ethnic multiculturalism" (Ferrante 2012).

4.2 Multiethnic Societies

Most sociological theory argues that the primary social issue in a multiethnic society is its elites' fear of losing their wealth and social status. For this reason, these strata increase the so-called "social distance" (Bottero and Prandy 2003). However, when "others" become either more numerous or more visible, the original group or community—and the values that it expresses and that give identity and recognition to its members—is perceived to be a minority. At this stage, elites feel threatened with the loss of those values that have guided social actors in the path of identity production and reproduction. These values, indeed, both build a sense of relationships and ensure the meaning of those relationships. In short, they ensure a certain, predictable social life (Fearon 1999).

From this perspective, political and social structures represent a problem for multiethnic, postmodern, and globalized democratic societies in which democracy was founded on monoculturalism. The origins of these problems were already anticipated in the XVIII and XIX centuries by Rousseau and de Tocqueville, who claimed that democracy functions more easily when people live with those who are similar to themselves. The towns, villages, and small societies of that time represented a model of communal society in which it was possible to mediate disagreements between citizens in accordance with previous agreements based on their shared identities. These agreements were made possible thanks to the fact that a single ethnic group shared common values, spoke the same language, professed the same religion, and had a common history.

In our multiethnic societies, the problem is to find a way to make democracy work in a context in which shared common values no longer exist, but rather, religious, ethnic, and cultural differences coexist. Charles Taylor (1992) highlights that demand for recognition is connected with identity and that a demand for recognition presents itself not as a courtesy but instead as "a vital human need." This type of recognition, in contrast to the claims of liberal theory, does not simply entail tolerance and neutrality, but is part of the identification process. There is no such thing as an identity if it is not recognized. According to Taylor, the each person's identity is molded by the presence or absence of recognition. Taylor argues that an individual or group may incur a serious loss if people or society around him reflects back to him, just like a mirror, an image of himself that is limiting, detracting or humiliating (Taylor 1992, p. 42).

Demographic trends show that in the future, many Western countries will face the problem of managing democracy in multiethnic societies. For example, in 2050 the US will be a nation of minorities. Whites will be a minority compared to African-Americans, Asians and Latinos. This social scenario will place the rights and duties of those who now are numerical minorities against those who hold positions of cultural, religious, political, and economic leadership.

Obviously, the failure of the integration policies of multiethnic societies such as Italy, where some center-right political forces have a strong impact on mainstream culture, have become a cultural instead of a political answer to the entire nation's

need to escape from the dilemmas of the present, and the regression of an increasingly older society, which since the mid—1980s has lost hope for a better future. In particular, some populist, right-wing political parties—such as the "Lega Nord", which holds the crucifix and Christianity as "non-negotiable and sensitive" values—present immigration as an image of Islamic danger. Such parties rely on the fears and anxieties of those Christians whose sense of religion is more as a tool to defend local culture and identity than as an orthodox adherence to a faith. This type of policy, which Barber (1995) calls a "policy of populist anger", is a reaction that aims to turn back the clock to return to "our country as it was before", although it is now impossible to restore the conditions of a monocultural nation. Such a reaction denies the evidence of the historical reality of interdependence and multiethnicity, diversity, movement of capital, labor, persons and goods across national borders, and above all denies Lockean liberal tolerance-based ideas of democracy. According to this idea of democracy, multiculturalism involves tolerance of diversity and mutual trust despite differing racial or ethnic roots. Therefore, we assist in the failure of the basic function of politics defined by the sociologist Talcott Parsons as recruitment and the distribution of resources[2].

Alternatively, we face a policy that—as demonstrated by the 2011 mayoral election campaigns in large Italian towns—acts on fear and insecurity by appropriating religious symbols as universal bulwarks of local identity, and implements them in the practice of constructing the enemy. The electoral slogan "Do we want Milan becoming a town of Gypsies? Do we want migrants building mosques wherever they want?" provides an example of this phenomenon.

According to a recent estimate (ISTAT 2011), migrants' contribution to the growth of national wealth represents approximately 9.5 % of Italy's total GDP, thus confirming that the Italian economic structure is now indissolubly linked to migration dynamics. The coordinates of inclusion and exclusion that govern the policies of citizenship show their inadequacy when an excluded group is numerically small by failing to understand that migrants are an important resource for their host countries.

4.3 The Anomalous Identity of the Stranger: Neither Friend nor Enemy

The imbalance between migrants' rights and responsibilities is based on Simmel's (1925) description of the stranger as "the man who today and tomorrow stays", but who can decide to leave. The stranger, at least in theory, retains his freedom to leave. This is a position that suspends him and creates an ambivalent relationship with the natives. He is suspended between involvement and indifference, between detachment and participation. The dedication shown and loyalty declared by the stranger are not seen as trustworthy.

[2] See Parsons' AGIL paradigm.

> Everywhere you go they ask about your paycheck. Only this! It is as if they fear that you eat their bread, the bread that you've earned. This society trusts workers. But towards migrants they are immediately suspicious. There is nothing but the rules and the law! You have to prove that you earn money and not steal it, otherwise you become suspect. You must prove you have enough to live, and you do not steal or ask for charity, which are considered to be the same thing. Neither is allowed, especially when you're an immigrant. An immigrant is only for working. An immigrant who does not work, what are you for? Here's what you are: you're just a paycheck. Without a paycheck, you are not accepted. They do not trust you. Without a paycheck, you are suspected of living on their shoulders. (Sayad 1999, p. 66, *author's transl.*)

The stranger relegates his country of origin to the past but never really abandons it. He gradually transforms his temporary home into a homeland. He is someone who refuses to remain confined in a country far from his own, "penetrating into the world of life" at a time that can be precisely identified, but in a country to which he did not belong "from the beginning". He has settled there without having been invited (Bauman 1991), imposing on others, which is a typical marker associated with an enemy. However, he also claims the right to be subject to responsibility, an attribute that is associated with a friend.

This enhances the imbalance in the coordinates of a stranger's ambivalent recognition as "friend-enemy". He cannot be a friend because he is not "like us". However, he cannot be openly declared as an enemy, both for ethical reasons and for reasons of respect of those universal human rights that the Western world uses as a bulwark of identity (and a marker of difference against the Islamic world). The stranger is physically close. However, he remains spiritually distant. This sticks on the skin of the stranger the sin of incongruities, of which he is the bearer and incarnation. Incongruities upset the order of the world and the anomaly of someone who is friend neither enemy—between the outside and inside—becomes intolerable. He represents the reliability of the friend, the cleverness of the enemy, the fallibility of the order, the vulnerability of the "inside".

4.4 The Erased Identity of the Exiled

When a country falls into the terror of war and extreme poverty—a poverty that the Western world does not know: poverty of food and the hope of a better future for their children—individuals lose the key to their identities and their freedom. For this reason, they are forced to restart their lives somewhere else, in search of that lost key. However, they search without hope because along with that key they have lost their homes. In other words, exile is the search for an unreachable "somewhere else". The result is a feeling of frustration that makes their condition even more difficult. Those who choose exile certainly do not do so without cost. To leave their land, their families, their language, and their history is an enormous trauma. Indeed, an exile takes the road of uncertainty, not knowing where he will land and if he will ever return. Exile is not a tourist trip. It is both permanent anxiety and the fear of dying in a place different from your own land.

Even the encounter with the host country is a traumatic experience. Faced with an unknown universe, the exile feels lost, alone, misunderstood, and without reference points. To express himself and to be understood is almost impossible. As much as he strives to integrate, he still remains a stranger. The looks from others, however, transform him, little by little, away from his own identity. He who comes from far away will do anything to satisfy the gaze of the host country. He wants to be not only what the other wishes to see but also tries to remain faithful to his original identity, finding himself in a fractured situation, between two worlds, two cultures, and two languages. This conflict between who he was, who he is, and whom he wants to be is sometimes very destructive. The exile accords great importance to the glance of those who welcome him because he needs to be recognized and respected. Leaving his country, he abandons his social status, his family and his culture. In the host country, he finds himself without history and without identity, forced to accept any type of material condition. His past life is gone. However, often, he encounters only suspicion and hostility.

It seems paradoxical, the fear aroused by foreigners in rich Europe. There are sophisticated psycho-sociological explanations of the fear of the diversity of persons "other than oneself", which—with their culture or religion—undermine the certainties of Europeans (Bauman 1991).

The hostile reality of exclusion and contempt is very far from the idealized image of the host country. Disillusionment is always strong. Nostalgia then leads to idealization of the country of origin. The distance and the impossibility of return make the country of origin more beautiful in memory. However, when the exile is able to return home, there is an inevitable clash between the real and the ideal. In short, in exile, the migrant always lives between idealization and disillusionment with both the host country and the country of origin. In the end, exile is forever. An exile is never really integrated into the host country, but is far from the country of origin. Exile is a painful condition that must be considered not as pain, but as an opportunity—which, of course, is not always easy.

According to some current research (Ferrante 2011), the phenomenology of immigration follows a different pattern. People are not afraid of difference, but of similarity. The stranger is no longer perceived as different, but as one who wants to be like the natives, who could take the place of citizens, their way of life and their wellbeing. Europeans are not afraid of difference; they are afraid of losing what they have. Some terms more than others are used by the scientific community for defining the sociological debate on social minorities, such as ethnic minorities or the economically disadvantaged, in the underclass. These terms include social isolation and aggregation, define some of the effects of social differentiation, and represent spatial implications. In our research experience, strategies of rump territories occur in local cultures that are different from one another, such as in southern Italy. In such cases, there are specific aspects of orientation and strategies used by different social groups that reside in the same territory. Just as the boundaries, also the mechanisms by which a community restructures its sense of belonging become uncertain. Identity and safeguarding of umbrella identities rework differentiation mechanisms in the context of solidarity "forced" by social events such as

immigration. As suggested by the sociological literature (Bourgeois and Friedkin 2001), spaces of poverty are reflected in forms of geographical isolation, which generates social distance from central institutions of society. However, they are also—and above all—reflected in the way that individuals interpret processes and social structures in their lives and in where they see prospects for the future either by planning and collecting opportunities or creating others.

4.5 Italian Migration Policies

Since 1980, Italy has seen an increase in the inflow of migrants. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, due to its economic situation and labor market conditions, Italy became attractive to a growing number of foreigners. This had an impact on the number of authorized migrants living in Italy, which grew from approximately 300,000 in the early 1980s to 800,000 in 1990 (Melotti 2004). Later, when economic growth slowed and Italy adopted severe measures to reduce public expenditures for the purpose of joining the Euro zone, the arrival of new migrants not only was not stopped, but actually increased. In 2000, the number of legal migrants reached 1,700,000. At the end of 2003, the number was 2,600,000, and at the end of 2009 the number was 3,900,000, that is, 6.5 % of Italy's total population. If we add people who legally resided in Italy to people waiting to register at the civil status offices, it can be argued that at the end of 2009, there were approximately 4,330,000 foreign residents in Italy, or 7.2 % of its total population[3].

To fully understand the scope of the migration phenomenon in Italy, we can examine the younger and potentially more productive population: minors and young adults up to 39 years old. The percentage of migrants in that segment reaches as high as 10 % of the total resident population (Caritas/Migrantes 2009). In 2008, this constant growth in the number of people entering the country made Italy one of the European countries with the largest share of migrants. Although Germany (8.2 %) and Spain (11.7 %) achieved the highest percentages in that year, Italy surpassed Britain in its proportion of foreigners in the total resident population. The reasons that led to this trend of continuous growth, despite the slowdown in economic development and the labor market, were not only the worsening living conditions in less economically developed countries but also the fact that migrants tended to occupy segments of the economy that Italians despised. Moreover, the system that has legalized migrants since the late 1980s has undoubtedly played a key role in attracting irregular migrants. Indeed, in just over two decades, six legislative measures were adopted with the aim of legalizing the position of irregular migrants (in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2009), resulting in a total of over 1,600,000 people being legalized. According to many studies in Italy, at least half of all foreigners

[3] See http://www.serviziocentrale.it/file/server/file/Rapporto%20Annuale%20SPRAR%20-%202010_2011.pdf [last accessed February 11, 2013].

who are legally resident in the country achieved a legal status thanks to an amnesty (Blangiardo and Tanturri 2004).

The amnesties mentioned above have made Italy particularly attractive for the segment of migrants who do not possess the requirements for legal residency in other European countries. Indeed, in Italy the only necessary criterion is to be on Italian soil 1 day before an act of amnesty is published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic. Obviously, this encourages the growth of irregular migration, a phenomenon that has become endemic and is primarily regulated through emergency measures.

Despite the complexity of this situation, the governance of immigration as carried out by Italian laws and policies seems to stand out both for its transitory nature and for its connection with the dynamics of the economic and labor markets. Additionally, these laws paint a clear portrait of migration as a breeding ground for crime. In particular, it was with the Law n.189/2002—known as the "Bossi-Fini" law—that the center-right coalition then in power tried to provide a response to the growing fear that Italian public opinion showed towards migrants. The declared objective of the law was to reduce the number of irregular migrants entering the country by improving Italy's control system both at points of entry and in-country. To reach this goal, Italy decided to link migration to labor market trends. Of course, in a social context in which illegal working conditions are the order of the day for natives, the mechanism introduced by the Bossi-Fini law encouraged illegal work, rather than suppressing it. These are the reasons that the Bossi-Fini law produced fewer results than expected in terms of reducing the number of irregular migrants.

4.6 Migration Policies in Italy in the Season of Humanitarian Emergencies: Between Compassion and Reason

Since 2001, 2100 people from Tunisia have landed in Lampedusa, a small island of 500 inhabitants. In March 2011, the population of residents and irregular migrants was 6,000. The island's economy, based on fishing and tourism, collapsed. Indeed, news and images disseminated by the media reported a situation of a continuous exodus of biblical proportions towards beaches usually visited by tourists. Moreover, fishermen were unwilling to take out with their boats because they wanted to avoid leaving their women, children, and territory in the hands of irregular migrants. Following protests by the local population, the Government offered 1,500 euros for each migrant to Tunisia to take them back[4], but in the end did not retrieve enough money from the national budget, and irregular migrants was moved to tent encampments and temporary centers between Sicily and southern Italy. From there,

[4] See www.ilcorriereditunisi.it/default.asp?ACT=5&content=507&id=32&mnu=32 [retrieved on February 11, 2013].

irregular migrants have slowly been allowed to escape and, having received temporary residence permits, are allowed to enter Europe.

Italy is a country with a strong tradition of emigration, which has been painfully experienced by many of its citizens and their families. Italy is also the European country that, more than any other, has faced emergency landings by irregular migrants fleeing from wars in North African countries, such as Tunisia and Libya, with whom Italy shares intertwined historical and economic interests. The management of these emergencies has fluctuated between compassion and reason. To some extent, compassion and reason can co-exist in the face of tragedies such as the wars in Tunisia and Libya, or the mass drowning that created the largest mass grave of our century, the Channel of Sicily. Confronted by tragic images of capsized boats, who would not dive as the islanders heroically did to save the lives of children and pregnant women? Moreover, who would not understand migrants' hopes to change their own destinies or provide better ones for their children? On the other hand, opinion leaders and populist right-wing politicians ask: Should we transform our country, our home, into a giant refugee camp or an enormous tent city?

Yet we should also ask: who are the thousands of new migrants who enter without knocking at our doors? They are not only Tunisians and Libyans but are also Eritreans, Somalis, Chadians, and Nigerians, fleeing from countries where poverty is made endemic by wars and never-ending guerilla warfare. The poverty from which they escape has been increased by the exploitation policies adopted by Europe and other affluent countries, which sooner or later must pay. This question, which might sound like a threat, is specifically analyzed in paragraph 7.

In the early months of 2011, 25,000 migrants arrived in Lampedusa, 21,500 of whom were Tunisian (Data Report Caritas Migrant 2012). With few exceptions, they were not political refugees but young males who wanted to improve their living conditions, exactly like hundreds of thousands of Italians between the late 1800s and mid—1900s. However, in those earlier times, irregular migrants were a minority, and migrants went to countries in Europe (such as Belgium) or the Americas, which had requested them.

It is unreasonable to manage waves of migrants, such as who arrived in 2011, by resorting to permanent reception centers or tent cities with barbed wire and guard dogs or mounted police. The Italian policy of granting temporary visas to migrants illegally arriving to Italy represented a reduction of pressure on Italy but has fueled a French countermeasure and a dangerous diplomatic crisis between Italy and France[5]. The absolute protagonists of this situation were the prime ministers of these respective countries, pressed on the issue of immigration from the right parties, which also implicated a political consensus crisis. Can reason be dissociated from compassion? When can mercy be devastating for no reason?

[5] See http://www.newspedia.it/immigrati-guerra-diplomatica-fra-italia-e-francia/ [last accessed February 11, 2013].

4.7 The Rights and Duties of Migrants

The hypothesis discussed in this chapter is that European countries' socio-political immaturity in developing postmodern values of coexistence between different cultures stimulates the socio-cultural construction of the enemy[6].

The recognition of minorities involves many problems. First of all, respect for foreigners requires the same commitment on their sides. This implies a vision of cultural and religious interconnection as a guiding process, not a goal. Why allow foreigners the freedom to build mosques in our territory when in "their" territory, churches cannot be built? Why, in the name of respect for other's religious beliefs, do we have to remove the crucifix—which represents my faith—from public places? These questions reflect a more general principle according to which a society recognizes a right if the holder of that right is also the holder of a duty. This seems to justify a legitimate demand for reciprocity, even if no European wants to live in the Arab countries.

The problem that remains is the social assessment of differences, which political organizations assess in terms of interests. In summary: Is it a matter of deciding what type of society we want? Do we want a society in which all groups have the same rights as nationals or a society in which some people have more privileges than others? The latter solution suggests a closure strategy related to the "outsiders", which end with practicing "gated communities" strategies, as we see in the following section.

The question of recognizing the collective identities of different ethnic groups is central to the debate on the definition of multiculturalism. The terms of recognition are split into a public dimension—which refers mainly to the issue of rights and duties—and a private dimension where the perceptive and representational spheres of difference prevail. The two dimensions are not strictly separated, but the private dimension allows the concept of pluralism[7], including the growth and free expression of differences, whereas the public dimension is organized by setting common rules that allow to reach the same level of difference.

Pluralism is not to be confused with multiculturalism. As suggested by Barbano (1999, p. 8), pluralism emphasizes social groups and social aggregations, but is not

[6] This consideration opens new scenarios not only on the relationship between the rights and duties of migrants but also on the very nature of citizenship. In Italy, some research (Barbagli 2008, pp. 106–108) shows that on the security front, migrants in possession of Italian citizenship commit crime not only less than irregular migrants, but also less than native Italians. However, opening the debate on citizenship acquisition requires analysis of the debate on the relationship between migrants' rights and duties, because the underlying problem that arises in terms of relationships among cultures is how a culture can keep its own subjective and collective identity while creating the conditions for recognition and belonging.

[7] The concept of pluralism usually refers to a society where a plurality of ideas, religions, opinions, and beliefs are allowed and protected by the state, contrary to what happens in a totalitarian society. Therefore, pluralism refers to a political sphere that does not stifle the vitality of the private sphere. Multiculturalism, however, may instead be defined as "the pluralism of cultures within the same political society" (Viola 2004, p. 83).

necessarily multicultural. Even monocultural society can be pluralistic if the political sphere does not stifle expression of the private-social. In reality, multiculturalism is the pluralism of cultures within a single political society. Therefore, it is not a problem that concerns pluralism of interests, needs or preferences. However, it does concern cultures, i.e., the symbolic universes that give significance to choices and existential foundations to the people who make them. At the social level, the issue is the social assessment of differences, whereas at the political level, the problem is expressed in terms of protecting collective interests. However, under what conditions does this happen? What types of collective sentiments generate a relationship between different cultures? In the normative dimension, multiculturalism aims to legitimize the demand for public actions that fall within identity policies. Essentially, it refers to attempts to establish good relationships among different cultures, through rules and criteria of equality and mutual respect, based on the principle that no culture can legitimately play a leading role over others. This principle of equal dignity, in its original conception, has a high degree of heterogeneity because it counteracts gender discrimination, race, ethnicity, religion, and political beliefs as forms of structural differentiation, with the aim of protecting the rights of individuals and groups.

On a constructivist basis, there are phenomena of multiculturalism that lead to exclusion or marginalization of groups and individuals that those who belong to hegemonic "circles"—i.e., those with major economic and cultural resources—want to keep "outside", while including individuals and groups considered to be enrich the social configuration, especially when they are placed in higher cultural or economic strata. Accordingly, multiculturalism draws attention to the social relationships between different and new cultures, excluding the idea of assimilation—which is not supported by appropriate, mutually constructive integration policies—and tolerance of different cultures and ethnic groups in the same territory (Berger 1966, pp. 105–115).

The concept of tolerance evokes a sense of tolerating someone with whom you do not feel comfortable and implying an agreement to avoid a fight with him in the same space. In short, it is a separate but peaceful coexistence, accompanied by a judgment of worthlessness and inferiority towards the tolerated. The basic problem that arises in terms of relationships between cultures is to maintain both a culture's own identity and the collective identity, while also creating the conditions for fulfilling the content of the membership. Whether this recognition takes place in terms of reciprocity or respect for otherness depends on how we collectively internalize the common values of coexistence and the degree to which a community is able to perceive differences.

Because of the coexistence of the "homelands" of auto-referential groups, the solution of multicultural differentiation can lead not only to the fragmentation of society and the delegitimization of normative codes but also to the evaporation of a proposed diverse, yet inclusive, coexistence (Berger et al. 1973). It should be recognized that many minorities, especially in cultural minorities, might be limited by decisions made by the majority. Such decisions, which dangerously restrict the existential space of minority identity in an autopoietic circuit, reproduce the

representation of difference and inequality. Differentiation on the basis of group rights can offset this disadvantage because it reduces the vulnerability of minority cultures in relation to majority decisions.

These safeguards ensure that external members of the minority have, once they become members of the majority, the same opportunities to live and work in their own culture. The debate thus seems to move towards a theory that justifies the protection of individual and collective rights, but gives shape to negotiation of the most anthropological inequalities rooted in the collective imagination. To avoid being accused of sociological reductionism, we must assume that every social space has a universe of relations of meaning among individuals, groups, classes, strata and social classes, that is, the cultural elements that shape the generality of social relationships, and specifically that of sociability[8]. In short, the majority must respect minority rights, on the condition that the minority respects majority rights. When a community refuses to provide that respect, then respect for the law, which embodies the rights of all, is required. We live in a world in which our societies inevitably will continue to receive migrants because they are needed. The presence of their cultural traditions produces forms of hybridization that enrich our cultures. To this end, diversity must be respected, but tolerance is not enough, because it does not recognize social integration and national identity. Acceptance of difference only becomes possible if it reinforces a sense of collective identity. The right to be equal but different should be granted. In practice, as well as demanding respect for national laws by people of all communities, it is necessary to combine multiculturalism and assimilation, not only trying to integrate other cultures but also giving them the opportunity to express themselves.

4.8 The Debate on the Failure of Multiculturalism in Europe

Multiculturalism was developed as an answer to mass immigration in Europe, with the aim of celebrating the diversity of religious and ethnic groups as part of a new societal order. These groups can enrich social life, from food to literature, language and so on, transforming monotony into a fascinating variety. This has been partly true. In many countries, the cuisine has improved. For instance, the finest Chinese or Korean chefs in the trendiest city centers offer new tastes. However, many other benefits have been produced in other sectors, too, such as the contribution of workers in construction, agriculture, transport, or other jobs that locals perform only reluctantly. Additionally, over time such workers become middle class, become more established and expand their presence more and more.

[8] Sociability is meant either as (a) the general propensity of humans to establish relations through some type of social relationship or (b) the multiple concrete manifestations of the provision of a group, association, community, or mass, based on certain types of needs and interests.

Multiculturalism, however, has opened new identity conflicts and it is source of accusations of racist practices. It imposes a heavy price on those who view integration with suspicion and want to preserve their identities. They demand not to be Italian or French or German or English, but to remain Chinese or Moroccan in Italy or France. To provide an additional example, Britishness is a hard-to-define concept, and so is Americanness. In both cases, national identity is composed of the identities of several nations. Britain, for instance, is composed of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England. The US, for its part, is composed of 50 states. What unified these identities was a religious (Protestant) bond and an imperialist ideal that is now well-established in local culture as feelings of belonging, pride in the national flag, sacredness of territory, and pride in the nation's role as an international leader.

However, in both England and the US, religious and imperialist bonds are gone. Following the events of September 11, 2001, and the attacks in the London Underground, Western societies have become more insecure. In Britain, the threat came from the Islamic extremist fringes of British Muslims; it was not imported[9]. Tony Blair's "Cool Britannia", in which different ethnic groups and cultures mingled yet maintained their specific identities, seemed to have vanished. Distrust towards all Muslims grew along with the idea that Muslim communities nurtured feelings of hatred towards the West. This situation justified the position of those such as British Prime Minister David Cameron, who says that national values and feelings must be reinforced and protected to be shared with those of different origins. Thus, any form of difference must be erased. In addition, host-country values are not only the confluence point of differences but also the basic principle underlying integration policies.

With a unique synchronicity, two of the major European leaders, Cameron and Germany's Angela Merkel, have declared the failure of multiculturalism in their countries. England and Germany have been considered to be nations that had been able to control social tensions arising out of the coexistence of different cultures within a single territory. However, according to Cameron, the doctrine of multiculturalism encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, detached both from each other and from the host society. This model could not provide a vision of society to which ethnic or religious minorities could feel that they belonged. Consequently, some young Muslims have felt uprooted. According to Cameron, it is time to abandon the United Kingdom's "passive tolerance" towards different cultures and replace it with an "active, muscular liberalism" that clearly states that life in Britain revolves around certain key values, such as freedom of speech, equality of rights, and the rule of law. A passively tolerant society remains neutral in the face of different values, but a liberal country does much more: "It believes in some values and actively promotes them". According to Cameron, Britain needs a stronger national identity to prevent all forms of extremism. In this way, Cameron anticipated a radical change in the recognition of the Muslim community, which receives

[9] In 1991, the percentage of migrants living in England was 6.7%. After 10 years it had grown to 8.3%, and in 2010 it reached 11.4%. In 1991, 2.4 million English residents are Muslims, who have access to approximately 1,500 places of worship.

public funding but about which there exist doubts related to its commitment to the universal human values, including the rights of women and those of people of other faiths[10]. In the same vein, Merkel declared that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany had entirely failed. According to her, the attempt to happily live side by side did not work. She stated that migrants should integrate and adopt German culture and values. Moreover, the term multiculturalism has been treated as synonymous with an ideology that justifies violent practices, such as forced marriage, genital mutilation, amputating thieves' hands and stoning adulterers. The failure of multiculturalism therefore has been justified by the impossibility of sharing common values.

However, this argument omits to mention that this failure of coexistence has coincided with the growth of fear towards Islam, with the change in the coordinates of global order and security as early as September 11, 2001; and with the increased economic gap between the world's rich and its poor. This argument has also underestimated the attitude that poor people could feel deserving compensation, either due to consciousness of the exploitation of their historical colonial pasts or due to the global markets. However, this point has not properly considered the role of religion as a marker of identity[11].

The response of the proponents of migration policies has been to exploit the fear of foreigners to press for the adoption of more restrictive measures related to migrants and their religious expression. It is clear that the European Union is paying for a still-immature collective identity and unfinished search for common roots among the various European member states whose histories have defined their national identities. These cultural tensions generate short circuits when states adopt measures aimed at simultaneously preserving local identities and respecting the rights of migrants. One example of this phenomenon is the April 2011 law in France, a country with a strong liberal tradition, which banned the burka. In recent years, political awareness of the failure of multicultural models has been a novelty. The debate on multiculturalism and, above all, integration policy echoes rhetoric about the concept of the secular state. All over Europe (and especially in Italy), the idea of the "old" secular state, which embraces the idea of religious neutrality of public institutions, has been overcome by the idea of a "new" secularism that should take into greater account different cultural and religious groups' needs to have a defined public role.

However, caution or the inability to specify the powers, awards, public resources, and social status that should be granted or denied to individuals of different cultures leads to an obvious political and institutional deadlock. In other countries, such as France and the Netherlands, multicultural societies have placed a new focus

[10] See the full transcript of the speech of the British Prime Minister at the Conference on Security of Monaco in 2011, available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/ [last accessed February 11, 2013].

[11] Watch the speech of the Chancellor of Germany at the meeting of younger members of her conservative Christian Democratic Union party in October 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 [last accessed February 11, 2013].

on the debate about the secular nature of the state. However, it is that secular nature that has, above all, made topical the current debate on the secularism and neutrality of public institutions, in which the relationship among conceptions of political subjectivity offers solutions to political integration.

Sometimes, multicultural rhetoric is fueled by issues related to religious symbols, as though the public presence of religious symbols, burkas in the streets, and crosses in offices or schools are nothing but a battle between "us" and foreigners, the latter of whom are mainly Muslim-identified.

The question is whether an idea of political subjectivity based on ethnicity or religion, rather than on authentic common civic values, is taking root in native European population. Therefore, whoever is a foreigner or simply opposes membership risks being left out or marginalized. In this scenario, any talk of political integration makes no sense because the inability to make political decisions in some countries, such as Italy, is manifest. It is also clear that other countries are unable to reconsider multicultural models based on the recognition of new political players and their social and public representations, which are linked to liberal principles. There exist two primary models of multiculturalism in Europe: (1) the French republican model, based on individual civic integration and strict secularism of public spaces; and (2) the Anglo-Dutch community-based model, founded on the "recognition" of homogeneous ethno-religious groups and their broad organizational autonomy that actually results in the creation of a sort of "separate" coexistence (Isaac et al. 2008).

In these models, without policy interventions and in the presence of welfare models that are witnessing a deep systemic and resource-based crisis, integration is left to spontaneous processes in which community-based networks are the only agencies of integration because they are rooted in linguistic or cultural communities.

The French model's crisis results less from its secularism, as assumed by multicultural rhetoric, but rather from the fact that it has not been able to keep its promises of equality. There has been much research reporting the great disparity of treatment in the labor and housing markets between individuals with French names or European physical features compared to those who have Maghrebine names or non-European physical features. France, which is a deeply hierarchical society, has been burdened by waves of violent riots in the *banlieues* perpetrated by young migrants and the children of first-generation migrants (Kaplan 1991). These riots have been conducted to claim the respect of the citizenship pact, whose failed application has generated frustration and anger that has been vented destructively in ways that ironically are perfectly consistent with and typical of several centuries of French popular uprisings.

The future of Great Britain and the Netherlands does not seem better. In the name of multicultural tolerance, both countries have followed a more resolutely community-based integration policy. In practice, Britain has imported the style of government used in the British Empire's colonies. The Netherlands has instead extended the "pillar" model of Dutch society to new communities. This model provides a multiple network of social organizations for Protestants, Catholics and, since the 1930s, non-religious citizens. Although community separation, eroded by

secularization, has vanished for the native components of Dutch society, the same has not happened to other communities, especially Muslim ones.

Muslim communities have taken advantage of the model in place to develop fundamentalist networks within which subversive components have been able to proliferate more than in any other European country. The Muslim religious umbrella offers a powerful source of recognition and identity: it manifests itself in migrant communities that are more prone to totalitarian radicalization for the very reason that they are detached from their original contexts.

The activism of Islamic militants, the assumption by younger members of the Muslim community that fundamentalism is an antagonistic element of their identity, the spreading of Internet sites and the proliferation of fundamentalist satellite channels offer many young Muslims the possibility of a full immersion in a cultural universe that is essentially invented and virtual, yet foreign or deeply averse to the cultural, civil, political, and social context in which these individuals live as people subject to discrimination.

These are the contexts that led to the terror attacks in London, perpetrated by young people who seemed to be integrated and to show support for the *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie and the Amsterdam murder of Theo Van Gogh. In similar scenarios, the consequences of the absence of that socio-cultural *metissage* that contributes to an increase in the critical sense, a sense of history and civic values, open the way to supporters of ethnic separation inspired by religious extremism. It is risky to encourage integration of a new generation of migrants (second, third, etc.) into their groups of origin, which on the one hand are strengthened as places for the transmission and preservation of the culture of belonging, thus crystallizing the determinism that religious and cultural identities are transmitted through race because of bloodline. On the other hand, group membership is the refuge for those who feel marginalized or rejected. This is true for those who have fled their country to improve their economic conditions (but in many cases also left to escape a violent or authoritarian existential condition) and who have been driven to re-evaluate their origins. This is not the usual circuit of grievance and fear or security and anti-terror policies, but the consolidation of democratic and liberal institutions in view of societies that in the future will become increasingly diverse and plural. The historical and economic processes of post-modern globalization are moving in this direction.

With migration, the face of Europe has changed, and it is destined to change even more in the future. Today, it is hard to accept the idea that the US could be populated solely by North America's native population. Notwithstanding, there are historical reasons that obstruct the review of this idea because history helps to define national identity. What do the Germans have in common with the Turks, the most populous migrant community in Europe? What do the Germans have in common with the French and the British—who themselves share an embarrassing colonial past—when they have neither French *grandeur* nor British aristocratic traditions? For Bauman (1991), assimilation projects are destined to failure because they destroy the ambivalence of the "different".

4.9 Conclusions

In this chapter, we support the thesis that the supposed failure of multiculturalism in Europe is rooted in the crisis of the political and social idea of the Europeanization of territories, in which immaturity in the development of the postmodern value of coexistence among different cultures stimulates tendencies leading to the construction of the "different as the enemy". We conclude this chapter by envisioning scenarios in which strategies and policies on migration and integration can find balance.

The United Kingdom has developed what is by far the most successful multicultural society in Europe. It has integrated migrants from all over the world for many years, managing to remain relatively free of ethnic conflict and extreme right-wing reactions, as has happened elsewhere. We must distinguish between "naïve" and "sophisticated" multiculturalism. The first encourages relativism—that is, the idea that each migrant can do and preach what he wants, as long as he does not break the law—based on a non-interventionist state model or a *laissez-faire* attitude towards migrants. This is the model that has developed almost everywhere in Europe except in Blair's Britain.

"Sophisticated" multiculturalism does not accept the relativism of values, but instead states the priority of human rights, starting with women's rights, democracy, and freedom, and therefore draws a scaffold that allows for the acceptance and promotion of cultural diversity. This type of multiculturalism is practiced by interventionist states. In other words, it does not allow ethnic communities to develop as they wish, but instead promotes and maintains a constructive dialogue with them and recognizes the importance of history, national identity, and shared values. "Sophisticated" multiculturalism does not accept the *sharia* courts, Islamic courts that overlap religious practices and national law. "Sophisticated" multiculturalism also requires newcomers to learn the national language and pass a citizenship test to obtain citizenship, but does not place impassable obstacles in their paths.

Above all, we must understand that multiculturalism is a way to make national identity compatible with the needs of this cosmopolitan global era. A globalized world must be multicultural, but diversity and inclusion go hand in hand. European patterns of integration, therefore, seem to be in crisis. The primary reason for this is in the lack of integration-related factors that should ground such projects. Without integration, in fact, respect for cultural diversity produces antagonism in practices, values and traditions, where the absence of common ground ends up undermining civil coexistence. The idea that different cultural, ethnic or religious communities can continue to live within the same nation, preserving their traditions, values, and identities, originated in England when different communities arrived from the peripheries of the British Empire. Moreover, multiculturalism established itself in a context of economic growth and strengthening national identity. However, just as in the US, a country of migrants, there immediately developed two powerful factors in national unity: the legal system and the labor market.

Multiculturalism can exist only if national unity is also reinforced, not only on social and economic grounds but also in terms of the shared values that are the basis of citizenship and membership in a shared collective identity. Today, Britain no longer has the same ability to integrate that it had in the past. Neither does France, or even the US. Everywhere, we see the weakening of the consciousness of national identity. Globalization, changing values, and economic conditions have undermined national states so that they are no longer in a position to counterbalance integration with claims of communitarianism, which have become more and more extreme because they were born as a reaction not only to rising xenophobia and Islamism in the West but also to the international tensions produced as a result of September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq.

Recognizing the limits of a multicultural society does not mean giving up respect for and dialogue with other cultures. However, multiculturalism may simply be reduced to tolerance because sometimes it is hidden behind a feeling of superiority. We tolerate those who we consider to be beneath us. The most radical multiculturalism, which defends absolute tolerance, it is often borne out of a feeling of economic, cultural, and social superiority. Respecting other cultures is more complex. For this reason, we propose that tolerance is that which defends the rights of minorities in the name of universal rights, as has previously been done for women's rights (Bunch 1990). A person who calls into question the universal value of human rights in the name of cultural relativism makes a serious mistake because all of our rights have been attained in the name of these universal values. It would not make sense to abandon them. However, we must demonstrate that the universality of human rights can be reconciled with respect for the cultural rights of different communities. This is the only way to live together without conflict.

More restrictive entrance policies will likely worsen the situation of irregular migrants, as in the case of Italy and will not protect national borders. Everyone is fully aware of the limits of common policies on migration and acceptance, but urgent pathways to the reform of the current regulations, especially with regard to the right to asylum, seem to be heavily affected by the fear that populist pressure from anti-migration movements, which is exploited by political parties that lack confidence from voters, especially when they are in power, will lead to a restriction of freedom of movement in Europe. For economic reasons, Italy and Europe as a whole cannot operate without migrants. Our argument is that EU policy should recognize that immigration is useful to the EU. This EU's response, in the form of a new cultural and regulatory stance, would most likely be the first step for freeing immigration policy from identity issues connected to extremism, and preventing the marginalization of migrants, which are now relegated to subordinate and vulnerable social roles on the outskirts of urban, economic, social, and productive spheres of European society.

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Chapter 5
Intersectional Constructions of (Non-) Belonging in a Transnational Context: Biographical Narratives of Muslim Migrant Women in Germany

Anil Al-Rebholz

5.1 Hegemonic Constructions of Migrant Muslim Women's Identity in the European Context

Muslims and Islam have come to represent the Other since their arrival in Europe. The events of September 11 have further spread this public image (Buiteleaar 2006; Erel 2004, p. 37). In the literature, the religious/cultural origins of migrants are generally linked to their integration into the cultures of their host countries. The supposed anti-modernity of Islam (Buiteleaar 2006, p. 260) is therefore considered to be incompatible with a democratic, secular, and dynamic European civilization (Erel 2003, p. 156; Karakaşoğlu 2003, p. 110). Within these essentialistic discourses, women of Islamic origin are depicted as inferior, uneducated, backward, and victims of their culture. Both the media and social science literature represent women of Moroccan, Turkish, and Kurdish origin as passive victims of their religion who are oppressed by patriarchal relations within their communities[1].

Images of Turkish, Kurdish, and Moroccan Muslim females wearing headscarves that portray them as uneducated, uncivilized, not allowed to attend school, as victims of violence from male members of their patriarchal ethnic communities,

[1] The extensive role of social science literature in the diffusion of such homogeneous and reductionist discourses on Muslim migrant women cannot be neglected. In this sense, Turkish migrant women have been the target of homogenizing and essentializing representations in many ways. Indeed, "the debate on foreign women became a debate on Turkish woman" that were represented as "oppressed by her tradition and (Islamic) culture" (Inowlocki and Lutz 2000, p. 307); additionally, no differentiation is made between the women from Turkey regarding their different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. Kurdish women, for example, are also subsumed under the category of Turkish women who are considered to be homogeneous. Furthermore, headscarf-wearing Turkish women have come to represent Muslim migrant women, disregarding both the national differences between Muslim migrants and the differences related to the reception and interpretation of Islamic doctrine and practices from region to region.

A. Al-Rebholz (✉)
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
e-mail: Al-Rebholz@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

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and without rights and freedoms have been spread throughout the German media and public discourse. Furthermore, these images are contrasted with those of German women who are considered to live in more equal gender relations and hence represent the achievements of European civilization (Erel 2003).

To explain the persistence of these hegemonic images in the European public sphere, it is important to embed the analysis in a more general historical context. In this vein, since the 1980s, the Third World feminists have increasingly contested and deconstructed the negative representations of Muslim women in the colonial history produced by Western authors, orientalists, and historicists—including the travel accounts of European women. These critical analyses focus on the colonialist representation of "Muslim women" living in the Middle East and North Africa but can also be applied to the experiences of Muslim women living in Western countries today, because the past colonialist and racist images of oriental women are still influential in today's European public discourse and are responsible for the discriminatory and negative attitudes that Muslim migrant women are exposed to in the Western context (Hoodfar 1997).

These analyses of Third World feminists raise some important issues regarding the hegemonic representation of non-Western women and "Muslim women". In this sense, Chandre Talpade Mohanty talks about the category of the "average Third World woman" created by scientific texts in which Islamic women are depicted as ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, religious, domesticated, family-oriented, etc. (Mohanty 2003, p. 53). These images are further supported by such categories as the "patriarchal character of the Muslim family" and the "tribal kinship structure" (*ibid.*, p. 58). Through these texts, she shows how the "Third-World difference" is constructed (*ibid.*, p. 68). Similarly, Algerian sociologist Marnia Lazreg criticizes the production and representation of an essentially understood notion of *difference*, which is produced on the basis of a "generalized knowledge of North African and Third-World women" (Lazreg 1988, p. 100) in feminist and proto-feminist texts.

Third-World feminists also recognize that these hegemonic categories are not independent from power relations. By appealing to the images of and the discourses on the inferiority of Muslim women, the idea of the West's superiority is being constantly reproduced (Hoodfar 1997, p. 5). For example, by deconstructing the discourses and fantasies regarding the veil, Meyda Yeğenoğlu shows how the European colonial discourses on liberating and civilizing "oriental women" are interconnected with the relations of power and subordination (the desire to conquer and penetrate) by the coloniizing subject (Yeğenoğlu 2003). Moreover, through the reference to the seemingly backward, traditional, family-bound image of a "Muslim woman" living in a patriarchal society, a superior image of Western women is evoked (Erel 2003; Hoodfar 1997), and further demands for gender equality in Western culture are tamed (Hoodfar 1997, p. 16).

In this chapter, I challenge the stereotype of the backward, traditional, oppressed, and victimized Muslim woman that is found in German public discourse. Drawing on biographical narratives of three young migrant women of Kurdish, Turkish, and Moroccan origin living in Germany, I show how my interview partners challenge these hegemonic images of Muslim migrant women by generating their own creative solutions for being a third- or second-generation migrant Muslim woman in

Germany. Through my analysis, I do not want to simply produce a "positive image" of a young Muslim migrant woman, as opposed to the hegemonic representations of her in the colonial and post-colonial contexts. Rather, I want to show the agency that these young women are still denied in their majority culture. Such an attempt necessitates an analysis of their strategies of action and self-presentation, which are embedded in their biographical processes and interpretations. Any analysis must be more complex than just a replacement of the negative images with positive ones.

Moreover, I propose understanding the intersectional identifications of my interview partners as general responses to structural and institutional factors, discursive racism, and the exclusionary mechanisms of the German citizenship regime at a macro level as well as understanding the individual responses at the actor level. The individual responses should be seen, in turn, as a product of the diverse ethnic, family, religious, and cultural affiliations and locations of my interview partners. The biographical experiences and the meanings attributed to them enable us to grasp the individual perspective of my interview partners in the transnational migratory process. These experiences and their meanings also provide insights into each woman's social location, self-evaluation, and self-perception in society.

In addition to the intersectional character of hybrid identities and the multiple belongings of young Muslim migrant women in Europe, the transnational character of their identification processes must also be underlined. The loyalties and social ties of migrants cannot be represented by reference only to the nationstate, because these social ties mostly rely on the multiple social networks and biographical resources provided by the transnational context in which they live, such as experience and knowledge of differing norms and cultures in different national contexts, multilingualism, and multiple socializations. The intersectional constructions of belonging and identity should, therefore, be understood as responses to the hegemonic cultures of both the sending and the host countries. Moreover, the transnational lives and practices of migrants can be conceived of as a challenge to the conventional concepts of culture, community, and identity, which frequently preclude the proper comprehension of the new hybrid (and transnational) character of these practices (Vertovec 1998, p. 3).

5.2 Three Biographical Narratives in Comparison: Life Stories of Moroccan, Turkish, and Kurdish Migrant Women

In the following section, I comparatively present the life stories of my three interview partners[2] with a focus on their sense of belonging, religious identity as Muslims[3], opinions about the stereotyped representations of Muslim women by the German media, and reflections on the integration debate in German public discourse.

[2] All three interviews cited in this article were conducted in German, and the interview passages quoted here were translated by the author into English.

[3] Because these Muslim women had different ethnic backgrounds, these three interviews differ considerably with regard to their religiousness in terms of the five dimensions of religiosity (religious faith, religious knowledge, social consequences of religion, religious practice, and re-

5.2.1 Dilara

At the time of the interview, Dilara (23 years old) was studying for a degree in social work at a university of applied sciences in Germany. She is a third-generation migrant of Turkish origin. Her grandfather migrated to Germany upon the insistence of her great-grandfather, who had nice memories of his youth spent as a migrant in North America. Dilara's grandfather, after a middle-term migration period, returned to Turkey and left his family in Germany. Dilara's grandmother, now retired after working as a cleaner in Germany for 35 years, lives in Turkey and sometimes visits her daughter. Dilara's mother, who belongs to the second generation, had a difficult migration experience. During her childhood and teenage years, Dilara's mother commuted between Turkey and Germany and their different education systems until she finally gave up her high school education at one of the most renowned girls' high schools in Istanbul and decided to live with her family in Germany. When Dilara's mother married Dilara's father in Turkey, they planned to return to Turkey but remained in Germany for medical reasons. Dilara's mother works at the youth welfare office, and her father is a self-employed taxi owner. In addition to her university education, Dilara supervises children's homework at a primary school, where she also occasionally works as a preschool teacher. During the interview, Dilara expressed her hope of getting a permanent job at the primary school.

Although she is a third-generation migrant, Dilara does not possess a German passport and plans to "return" to Turkey. Her feelings of not belonging in German society and the better social mobility chances in Turkey are the two main reasons for her return plans.

> Though I was born and grew up here, I could never say that I am German or that I feel like I am home here. I cannot say this. I get some irritated reactions from my friends like: "Why? You were born here, you attended school here, and you have your friends here." That is true, but I think this is not a sufficient reason to say: "Yes, I am German." I do not even have a German passport because I do not deem it necessary to get one. I will not become German just because I hold a German passport. Even if I had a German passport, I still would be seen as a foreigner because of my physical appearance. So, I think I would not benefit from getting it.

Dilara's experiences of discrimination and exclusion cannot be interpreted with a reference only to her ethnic background. These experiences are also related to her religious and gender identities, which are interconnected with her Turkish origin. Her narrative of these situations also gives important hints about how Turkish Muslim women are seen in German society and what hegemonic constructions of a Turkish Muslim female dominate in Germany.

> We were hanging out with friends. A German boy my age came in. We did not yet know each other. To introduce myself, I wanted to shake hands with him as usual. He kept his hands in his pockets and said: "You are a Turkish woman; you are Muslim. Are you allowed

ligious experience). See Glock 1969, cited in Y. Karakaşoğlu (2003, p. 110). Again, this further indicates, in contrast to the representation of a monolithic idea of a "Muslim migrant", how heterogeneous the Muslim population is with regard to religious orientation.

> to shake hands at all in your culture?" That did not fit with the situation at all. That happens. I am asked such questions like whether am I allowed to meet friends, to go out at all, and other nonsense. I think these people have a fixed image about Turkish girls and women in their heads.

After discussions with people who do not want to give up their prejudices and their one-sided opinions about Turkish women, Dilara has developed an attitude of indifference towards these people and the widespread image of Turkish women that dominates German media.

> I simply think if this person or this group is assuming that Turkish girls and women do not have any rights—no right to go to school, not allowed to go out and meet friends and that they should be excluded because of their religion and headscarf, if they wear one—if they have these images and typologies in their heads, then let them think so. I cannot persuade these people, and it does not matter to me anymore how they think. I do not even try anymore. In the media, all Turkish women are also portrayed as wearing headscarves. If they are persuaded that all Turkish women wear a headscarf, I do not try to show that there is another side.

In addition to her critiques of the dominant image of Turkish Muslim women that is prevalent in German society and media, Dilara also takes part in the debates on migrants' integration into German society. She talks about the importance of the economic transformation from "guest worker" to "employer" that generations of migrants have undergone in German society and complains that this aspect has not yet received much recognition either in public discourse or among people in Germany. Additionally, she states that integration cannot only be seen as a migrant's individual accomplishment but also as the State's responsibility towards its citizens.

5.2.2 Asiye

Asiye (24 years old) is a third generation woman of Kurdish (Sunnite) descent. With her strictly tied black headscarf and conservative, though not veiled[4], style of dress, she looks very pious and religious in accordance with her self-definition and perception. During the interview, she was preparing for her graduation exams in political science and international relations at the university. In her self-representation, she emphasizes particularly her class origin as a daughter of a migrant working class family with few basic resources. She is the oldest of four children (one sister and two brothers). In addition to her studies, Asiye is active in political and social organizations, including Amnesty International and the youth organization of the Green Party, and is also a mentor at the Youth Welfare Office.

Asiye's experiences of being discriminated against due to her class origin and ethnic identity and overcoming these disadvantages through her education build the central themes of her interview. Asiye attended secondary school with the plan to

[4] The veil originally refers to the clothing that covers the whole body of the woman, with the exception of the feet, hands, and face (Hoodfar 1997, p. 7). Asiye is wearing a headscarf, but the rest of her clothing (coat, skirt, or trousers) differs little from the usual dress code. Still, she is perceived as veiled.

obtain vocational training after her graduation. After several unsuccessful applications for vocational training (*Ausbildungsplatz*)—she had not received one invitation for a job interview—she was left with no other option than to continue with her education and attend high school for 3 years. During high school, she became aware that even the children of migrants can be successful and continue with higher education. In this respect, her narrative is illuminative about the experiences of discrimination and the lack of encouragement that the children of migrants are exposed to in the German educational system.

> During the three years of high school until graduation, I discovered that other students had a social background like mine, that of a migrant worker family, but they were at high school from the very beginning. Then, I realized for the first time they were not much cleverer than the students from secondary school. This was really an insight for me: that with a little bit of hard work, anyone can make it if he or she wishes. In contrast, during secondary school I was told "high school is much more difficult than secondary school; not everybody can accomplish the requirements." During our teenage years at secondary school, we were told by teachers from the very beginning that after graduation, we would enter vocational training. I can even recall the cases in which the teachers were rather unhappy if a student wanted to continue with their education after graduation and go to high school. They did not have confidence in many of us; they surely had no confidence in me. I am sure I was probably not as good at that time as I am today. But I find it awkward when children or the youth are not provided with opportunities to develop themselves further.

Asiye maintains contact with many relatives living in other European countries. In addition to German, Turkish, and Kurdish, other languages are spoken among her family members. Despite the multilingualism in her family and the plurality of locations where they live, she feels that she belongs to a small provincial German town and defines her identity as an inhabitant of this small city. Astonishingly, she calls the small provincial town where she lives her "home," despite recounting the discriminatory attitudes and harassment she often experiences in her daily life due to her religious appearance[5]. In contrast to Dilara, who can no longer endure being considered a foreigner, Asiye claims to have adapted to the situation and states that she can cope with such negative attitudes. Nevertheless, the lack of recognition and being seen as "primitive" or "uneducated" by Germans are themes that recur in her biographical narrative. Her experiences are further evidence of the widespread nature of the hegemonic image of backward and uncivilized Muslim women.

> I sometimes find it difficult how a person is treated. Even if a person can speak German fluently and was born and grew up here, the person still will be classified (*in Schublade gesteckt werden*). The feeling is that a person needs to explain and constantly defend herself; I find this difficult. This is not a single experience; I always have such experiences in Germany. If steadily repeated, that can be exhausting. But a person learns how to cope with it. These experiences do not have enduring effects on me and do not influence me negatively. But things like this happen. Sometimes a person is mobbed; on the street, people shout: "Go back to Anatolia! You do not have a place here!" Or sometimes people assume that you are uneducated and cannot speak German, for example. This is a kind of arrogance.

[5] Wearing a headscarf has very negative connotations in the German public sphere and is seen as "evidence of an undemocratic, theocratic and thus dogmatic world view" (Karakaşoğlu 2003, p. 121).

> In the long run, it is a little bit exhausting. But this does not make me insecure and does not influence me that much. A person simply learns how to tackle it because you grow up with that.

5.2.3 Samira

Samira (26 years old) is a second-generation woman of Moroccan (Berber) origin. Like Dilara, she studies social work at a university of applied sciences. She is the oldest of four children in her family. Similar to the narratives of Dilara and Asiye, Samira tells a story of exclusion, discrimination, and treatment as an *Other*. Yet this time, the discriminating actors are not the majority members of German society but the minority groups, including members of her own ethnic community, members of her peer group, and distant male relatives from her own family. These individuals accuse Samira of being "too Germanized." It is interesting to see how Samira positions herself in both communities as a young German woman of Moroccan descent and how she employs diverse and multiple cultural frameworks to construct her gender, cultural, ethnic, and religious identities. Her narrative is marked by her self-representation as a young German artist who is inspired by diverse music scenes and German youth subcultures and by her search for identity and belonging, which resembles a *bricolage* rather than a homogeneous, unitary, and closed notion of identity as it is widely envisioned in its common usage. The following interview passage highlights the multiple sources of her identity, her openness, and her critique of the narrow-mindedness and prejudices of the members of her own ethnic community:

> I was born in Morocco. I am a true Moroccan. Both of my parents are Moroccan. That is why many assume that I have the typical Moroccan characteristics. But during the course of my school life I evolved; I practically changed myself. I had international friends; I saw different ways of life and experienced different cultures, styles, and social environments. I get along well with all kinds of people, because I do not have prejudices. I do not say to people: "You are a punk! Your life is chaos, and you hate foreigners!" That is not me. I get to know people gradually and recognize that they are not like that. Many people are full of prejudices, and they do not want to change their way of thinking. They are narrow-minded and do not want to give anyone the possibility to get to know them. So they remain in their own circle. But I am different. I did not want to hang out permanently with like-minded people, though of course, sometimes I do. But that is not the most real; a whole world exists. Why should I hang out with Moroccan people all of the time?

It might seem paradoxical, but although she is being discriminated against and accused by her peer groups and male relatives as being "too Germanized," Samira does not want to give up her religious identity. Without confirming the clichés about Muslim women either in the physical or in other senses and despite her self-representation and perception as a young German artist with an emphasis on her "modern" style of clothing, Samira defines herself as a devout young Muslim woman. Samira resists the prejudices and stereotypes of Muslims in the German media and denounces the idea that each Muslim is portrayed as a terrorist and that each Muslim woman wears the *chador*.

> At present, the headscarf has come to represent a religious symbol in society, and many things are associated with it, perhaps even some negative things. Because the media always horrifies the population, they produce a preventive paranoia among people. Although a person may not know what a Muslim is and has not ever dealt with Islam, that person only sees what is presented in the media and thinks: "Ooooh my God! That is a Muslim! We should stay away from him or her!" That person gets just one side of the coin. The people who know me as a Muslim think, "She is a Muslim too." Sometimes at my workplace, they do not know that I am a Muslim. They ask, "You are not a true Muslim, are you?" I say, "What do you mean not a true Muslim?" They respond: "You do not believe in it." I tell them, "Of course I do." They say, "But you are so and so." Then, I answer: "A Muslim is not necessarily a terrorist," or "You do not have to automatically wear a *hijab*." I think there are extremists in every religion.

By briefly comparing these three biographical narratives, the following points can be made. In her critique of the integration discourse in the German media, the representation of Turkish Muslim women and the racist grounds of Germanness, Dilara enlarges the boundaries of German citizenship and shows the internal differences inside the Turkish community and the diversity of identities within that community. Similarly, Asiye's emphasis on her local identity as the source of her sense of belonging entails an ongoing critique that can be interpreted as contesting national boundaries and constructing new loyalties and affiliations in a transnational space that are different from ethnic or national affiliations. Her self-presentation consists of her multiple intersecting identifications as a migrant, Kurdish, religious, and politically active young woman of working class origin. Looking at the ethnic and gender boundaries of her own community from a critical perspective, Samira's narrative embodies a modern, chic, young Muslim German woman of Moroccan origin. At the same time, these multiple roles enable her to resist both the one-sided presentations of Muslims as the *Others* in Europe and of Muslim women as oppressed victims of Islam in the German media.

In addition to the differences regarding their individual constructions of religious, ethnic, and gender identities, there are crucial commonalities to these three narratives. The three tell stories about self-transformation and the process of negotiating the sense of belonging where their experiences of diversity, multiculturalism, and hybridization form the central themes. The multiplicity of socio-cultural contexts, spaces, languages, geographies, and ethnicities constitute the intersectional identifications and senses of belonging of these young migrant women.

5.3 Concluding Remarks: Towards the *Intersectional-hybrid* Notion of Identity and Culture in the Transnational Migration Context

Through the interpretation of the three biographical case studies presented above, I conclude that the identity and notions of belonging by second and third generation migrants should be understood as products of intersectional identifications. These identification practices should be seen as embedded in social time and context,

which necessitates a procedural and dynamic understanding of identity (Anthias 2008). To this end, Floya Anthias proposes the concept of translocational positionality through which an intersectional framing for understanding the sense of belonging can be elaborated and identity can be conceptualized as a product of social location and process (Anthias 2008, p. 5). Accordingly, Anthias suggests an understanding of narratives and strategies of identity and belonging as relationally produced and closely linked to the social boundaries and hierarchies that, in turn, might shift and change over time according to social location, context, and geography. Anthias offers a dynamic and procedural understanding of the sense of belonging which focuses on the processes of inclusion, exclusion, access, and participation. At the same time, boundary making is very much related to the hierarchical constructs of ethnic, gender, religious, cultural, and class differences (*ibid*.).

Within this framework, migrants' narratives of belonging are products of biographical constructs, and a biographical research approach offers the most relevant empirical tool to analyze the procedural and dynamic character of identity construction. The context- and time-embeddedness of an individual biographical account, as one of its most distinguishing characteristics, enables the researcher to relate identity production processes to concrete social situations and cultural contexts. Contesting the rigid and static understanding of the concept, identity-building processes can be grasped as the product of "biographical work" (Apitzsch and Siouti 2007, p. 5).

Because the individual biographical narratives are social constructs, biographical research makes it possible to comprehend both the individual subjective processes of suffering and the general societal processes that frame biographical experiences in the migration context. In this sense, biographies refer not only to the individual accounts of subjective experiences, but also to the lived social reality (Apitzsch and Siouti 2007). Through biographical research and case reconstruction, the processes of change and the mingling of individual and societal positioning and identity can be investigated (Apitzsch and Siouti 2007 p. 13). Thus, the identification practices and sense of belonging by migrants cannot be understood only with a reference to subjective meanings attributed to individual biographical experiences. Rather, they should be analyzed as the products of the social locations of the subjects—that is, gender, ethnic, religious, and family affiliations—as well as the products of structural factors at the macro level, such as migration policies, citizenship regimes, hegemonic cultural norms, values, and categories (racism, exclusionary/inclusionary structures, hierarchy between different ethnic groups in a society) of both the host and the sending countries (Vermeulen 2000; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Basch et al. 1994). In this sense, the premises of transnational migration research provide us with crucial insight into the embeddedness of migrant identities and practices in hegemonic categorizations and dominant national cultures, both in the receiving and the sending nationstates.

Criticizing the reification of race, ethnicity, and nation as cultural concepts, Glick-Schiller et al. suggest instead analyzing these concepts as aspects of the hegemonic control of subordinated populations (Basch et al. 1994, p. 16). From this perspective, nationstates are active agents in creating and defining ethnically different groups and in establishing hierarchical differentiation between them through the

help of hegemonic constructions, such as values, norms, utterances, and value judgments. Indeed, transmigrants might have to face or may be exposed to the mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion (i.e., defining an ethnic group as dominant and excluding diverse groups) in two or more nationstates in which they maintain their networks of relationships (Basch et al. 1994, p. 34).

Hybridization, as a product of belonging to multiple affiliations, poses serious challenges to the existing hegemonic culture of society at large. Through selection, adoption, and other innovative ways of mixing cultural elements from the "national cultures" of both the host and sending countries[6], my interview partners not only exercise a deep critique of the essentialist and homogenous representations of their cultures or ethnic communities by the majority but also trigger a process by which the host society should question its cultural/ethnic homogeneity and its monolithic representations[7]. Thus, in the case of my interview partners, the hybridity of their identifications, cultural practices, and biographical experiences become a means of resisting the power and legitimacy of homogenizing ideologies of ethnicity, culture, and nationstate (Werbner 2000, p. 14).

Cultural hybridity and multiculturalism (Apitzsch 2003; Erel 2004) are, on one hand, much criticized concepts with regard to the limits of their transgressive power. On the other hand, these concepts find wide acceptance in the literature, which acknowledges that hybrid forms have an ongoing potential to resist homogenizing ideologies and essentialist discourses on cultural boundedness, ethnic purity, and racism (Werbner 2000; Anthias 2001; Erel 2004; Salih 2003). Identifying two central problems of the discussions on cultural hybridity, Anthias states that it emphasizes the cultural domain as opposed to the material or political domains, and it focuses too much on transgressive elements while underplaying alienation, exclusion, violence, and fundamentalism as part of cultural encounters (Anthias 2001, p. 631). Nevertheless, she underlines the critical potential of the concept of hybridity in challenging static and essentialist understandings of culture and ethnicity. The terms "hybridization" and "diaspora" seek to overcome the "victimology of transnational migrants, empowering them, linking the past and the present" (Anthias 2001, p. 620).

Hybridity is a controversial concept in the German academic environment and in social science literature (Bauschke-Urban 2010, p. 106; Erel 2004, p. 36). One

[6] I do not want to say that migrants are some kind of experts on the culture of their ethnic origin or that they are able to skilfully combine two untouched pure cultures (the sending and receiving countries) and create something new out of them, a much criticized idea in the literature on hybridity. "All cultures are always hybrid, as both Bakhtin or Levis-Strauss argue from different vantage points. […] Hybridity is meaningless as a description of 'culture', because this 'museumises' culture as a 'thing'. Culture as an analytic concept is always hybrid (Friedman 1997; Wicker 1997), since it can be understood properly only as the historically negotiated creation of more or less coherent symbolic and social worlds" (Werbner 2000, p. 15).

[7] The power of hybridity lies in its transformative potential of the minority culture and in the transformation of the majority society (Bauschke-Urban 2010, p. 104). Werbner writes "cultural hybridity is still experienced as an empowering, dangerous or transformative force" (Werbner 2000, p. 4).

of the objections raised against this concept is that it was originally borrowed from the language of natural sciences, where it means the combination of plants (Glissant 2005); therefore, this term implies certain connotations, such as the mixture of races (Bauschke-Urban 2010, p. 106). The image of a mixture of cultures implies that there is already some pure, homogeneous, unitary culture that exists and becomes hybrid as it gets mixed (Bauschke-Urban 2010, p. 105). The critical discussions further note that although the concept is complex, it has become fashionable (Bauschke-Urban 2010), and hybrid forms of culture have gained considerable attention, especially in the arts and cultural industry (Erel 2004, p. 38). Moreover, Homi Bhabha's concept of hybridity, the mixing of national cultures through globalization, has received an insufficient reception in the German social science literature (Baushke-Urban 2010, p. 104). This theory, so the argument goes, has caused a *mingle-mangle euphoria*, which has promoted an understanding of hybridization as the defining characteristic of postmodern aesthetics and situations (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, it has been argued that the promotion of hybrid cultural forms is used in the commoditization of cultural differences (Erel 2004, p. 40) worldwide, especially in the migration context, where these hybrids (or better, the ability to develop new hybrid cultural forms and social practices in the countries of settlement and adapt themselves to the dominant cultures) serve to legitimize value judgments and exclusion/inclusion mechanisms. Through these value judgments, new hierarchies are created between ethnic minority groups according to whether they are capable of integration or not (Salih 2003; Erel 2004). Here I want to differentiate my approach from those in which hybrid cultural forms are primarily used to measure the "integration performance"—assimilable, liberal, open, cosmopolitan, capable of integration, not able or willing to integrate—and generate new hierarchies.

Hybridity is a social practice and discourse through which migrants give meaning to their most controversial experiences. Hybridization can be understood as the mixture of social forms, practices, conducts/visions of life, and identification models composed of a multiplicity of cultural frameworks and reference systems. In this sense, hybridization builds a negotiation strategy through which migrants can biographically handle their conflicting experiences in the majority culture. In this way, migrants remain capable of acting and maintaining their agency in the migration context. Thus, an agency-oriented sociological approach should be developed (supported by the biographical research method) which makes the concept of hybridization beneficial for the understanding of the negotiation processes of (trans) migrants in the dominant national culture. In this vein, deconstructivist approaches of postcolonial and cultural theories that investigate representation processes of identity and identity-building must be further extended by a social theory of agency in general and by research on the strategies of action and identification in the transnational migratory context in particular.

Wishing to maintain the critical potential of the concept of hybridity, I argue that we need an intersectional understanding of hybridity other than the postmodern conceptualizations of it. In this vein, some authors have already drawn attention to the shortages of the uncritical use of hybridity, which neglects the power relations and matrix of social inequalities in which intersectional axes of differences and

identities are embedded[8]. Therefore, I argue that discussions on cultural hybridity should be complemented by an intersectional approach. Anthias, for example, proposes understanding the different forms of the hybrid in relation to unequal resources and power relations that would take into account other axes of social inequality (Anthias 2001, p. 626). Erel develops a similar position, asserting the necessity to consider hybridity and hybridization processes at an intersection with other perspectives, such as gender, class, sexuality, and ethnicity (Erel 2004, p. 45).

Relying on the biographical narratives with second and third generation migrants, I do not consider hybridity as something abstract that can be grasped only at the discursive level; I do not consider hybridity as something promoted and maintained in the name of some postmodern aesthetics/style or political statement. On the contrary, I employ hybridity to signify the concrete biographical experiences of my interview partners. Concomitantly, employment of hybrid forms should be analyzed as an intersectional identification strategy which might serve as a (discursive) framework for the descendants of migrants and give meaning to their controversial life experiences. In this sense, processes of hybridization should also be understood as part of the accomplishment of their biographical work and part of their identitarian positioning as a conscious or unconscious political project. Because identification constructs by biographical narratives should be seen as embedded in time and context, hybridity can also be understood as a processual (Werbner 2000, p. 21) and political concept.

Moreover, the religious identification practices of young second and third generation Muslim migrants cannot be understood with reference to the religious practices of their parents and their own understanding of Islam (Karakaşoğlu 2003, p. 113). In contrast, the newness and hybridity of these practices should be identified[9]. In this sense, the emergence of European Muslims should be discussed (Vertovec and Rogers 1998), which requires a reinterpretation and a redefinition of concepts such as culture, community, religion, and tradition (Vertovec and Rogers 1998; Buitelaar 2006). To be able to grasp the diversity and hybridity of newly emerging practices and the multiplicity of cultural frameworks that young migrants employ in their constructions of belonging, a more "open, fluid and contested, and socially constructed understanding of all these terms" should be employed (Vertovec and Rogers 1998, p. 4).

[8] The intersectionality approach enables the researcher to capture the multilayered character of subordinate relations which are simultaneously operative in the construction of gender identities. Thus, axes of difference cannot be understood in additive ways as if they were separate from each other (Erel et al. 2010). In this sense, their mutually interdependent and interactive character cannot be neglected (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983).

[9] We should, rather, develop dialectical ways of thinking and grasping the interaction between modern forms of life and traditional forms of life and critically rethink our accounts of what is modern and what is traditional (Salih 2000; Apitzsch 2003; Karakaşoğlu 2003). In this sense, Salih, in her research on headscarf-wearing young Moroccan women in Italy, shows how, contrary to expectations, Islam can be modern, as revealed in the narratives of young, educated, "Islamist," Moroccan women compared to the traditional religiosity of their uneducated Muslim mothers (Salih 2003).

Finally, considering the challenges and critiques of a transnational paradigm directed toward conventional migration studies, migrant identities cannot be discussed without referring to their contributions to the emergence of transnational spaces and practices. In this sense, migration studies also need to further investigate the relationship between transnationality and the identity constructions of migrants (Vertovec 2001).

In this chapter, I have shown how young Muslim women, through their multiple constructions of belonging and their reflections on their biographical migration experiences, challenge the dominant images of Muslim women as uneducated, traditional, family-bound, and victims of patriarchal relations, Islamic traditions and their cultural/ethnic background. The constructions of belonging by Asiye, Samira, and Dilara presented above cannot be understood exclusively through their subjective migration experiences. Rather, they should be analyzed with reference to gender, ethnicity, religion, and class identities that intersect with structural factors, such as migration policies, citizenship regimes, hegemonic categories, and discourses and norms of the majority culture on race, ethnicity, and identity. Thus, migrants create their own responses to differing acts of boundary making, the creation of hierarchies between different ethnicities, and the creation of exclusionary/inclusionary spaces in the hegemonic context of national cultures. Through the constructions of multiple, hybrid, and intersectional belonging in the transnational migration context, young second- and third-generation Muslim women radically show that they cannot be understood with reference to reductive culturalist categories denying their agency and subjectivity. These women also constitute an ongoing critique to the homogenous notions of culture, ethnicity, tradition/modernity, and Islam in nation-state contexts.

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Part III
Identity and Rights: How Law Shapes Identity

Chapter 6
The Self and the Other in Post-modern European Societies

Daniele Ruggiu

6.1 Introduction

In the modern age, the phenomenon of differentiation has increased the complexity of European society and rendered more problematic the question of identity, which is again at the forefront of social debate. The crisis of the grand mechanisms of social integration (religion, ideology, politics, and parties) have weakened the ties between the individual and the various forms of moral collective identity (Habermas 1996, 1998). In this context, during the industrial revolution, whereas the relationship of neighborhood and the bonds of solidarity were substituted with the anonymity of industrial relations, we witnessed the retreat of a symbolic universe of certainties (Porcelli 2008). Today, the globalization of economics, finance, technology, and information (and the related risks (Beck 1992)) have precipitated a new crisis of the individual consciousness. Because of the processes of social atomization and anonymization, the subject has discovered himself divided in to a plurality of (increasingly virtual) roles and functions. In this framework the migratory processes represent elements of the further complication of the identity building process.

In this paper, I aim to connect the theme of identity with the analysis of human rights in Europe, and I argue that identity is also shaped by formal structures, such as norms and, in particular, legal norms. Therefore legal norms can be identified as a strong polarity of identity building processes. Indeed, the processes that contribute to the self-comprehension of a political community need formal structures at the summit that operate correctly. Because human rights are expressed in norms of international law (and inform the institutional structure of liberal-democratic regimes with which we identify), they can be depicted as a normative pole of attraction of our identity. Consequently, the impairments of their normative framework are a sign of a deeper malfunction that affects our moral identity. For example, the dysfunc-

D. Ruggiu (✉)
Centre for Environmental, Ethical, Legal and Social Decisions on Emerging Technologies (CIGA), University of Padua, Padua, Italy
e-mail: daniele.ruggiu@unipd.it

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tion of the freedom of movement within the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) passes on other freedoms and rights[1]. I argue that this normative malfunction is due to the absence of the right to immigrate and that this absence causes the weakness of the concept of the "Other" in the identity building process.

In this chapter, I will first sketch the philosophical concept of moral identity and argue that the moral identity of the individual is a complex, relational and temporal phenomenon. With regard to the temporal dimension of the identity building process, I will distinguish between informal and formalized processes. I delineate a draft of genealogy of the modern Self, which includes human rights as a pole of attraction of the identity building process. I will consequently follow the route that led to the affirmation of human rights as moral source during the twentieth century by recovering the thesis of Catherine MacKinnon (1994), who identifies the foundation for human rights in the Holocaust. I intend to show how the normative contradictions of human rights can reveal a deeper short-circuit in the identity building process. From the analysis of the norms of the ECHR on freedom of movement, some chronic malfunctions (particularly the spread of the regularization programs in all countries of the old continent) clearly emerge as evidence of the contradictions that affect not only the normative level but also the very conceptualization of the Self. In this regard, the dialectics of the Self and the Other reveal the intrinsic weakness of the second term of the dyad and represent a constitutive aporia of Western thought. Finally, I will argue that the profound weakness of this concept is reflected in the normative absence of the right to immigrate, the introduction of which would be necessary for the correct functioning of human rights.

6.2 The Concept of Identity

Identity in this paper refers to a process of self-comprehension that affects the moral agent in his individual sphere (Ruggiu L. and Mora 2007). In this regard, the subject of this process is always an 'I', even when his social and collective dimension are at stake (Ricoeur 1999, p. 76). The concept of identity is characterized by three dimensions that are variously intertwined: complexity, relationality, and temporality.

The concept of identity in post-modern societies has become increasingly complex. The plurality of roles, functions, hobbies and social belongings has made identity a collection of different Selves. As noted by Walzer (1991), identity now belongs to a plurality of houses and tribes. The return of the tribe has been observed in post-modern societies (Viola 2000, p. 63), but, unlike in the past, nowadays the Self belongs to several tribes and classes simultaneusly (Walzer 1991, p. 110). I cannot

[1] In this work, I will refer to human rights as those recognized for individuals, groups and associations in relation to the state by international law instruments (such as the Universal Declaration, the International Covenants of 1966, the European Convention on Human Rights, i.e. ECHR), which are enforceable by judicial or quasi-judicial organs such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the UN Committees on Human Rights.

identify myself with one aspect of identity only. I am simultaneously my sexual preferences, the work I do, the hobbies I love, the church where I find peace, the football team I support, the nation to which I belong. I am all of those things at the same time. My identity cannot be reduced to just one of these personal experiences. My identity is all of the faces of the prism. In addition, due to migratory flows, the multiplicity of forms and languages—which makes differentiated societies similar to Babel—is a salient trait of our complex identities (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 223, b, p. 227).

Identity has a relational nature. I define myself on the basis of my relationships, job, gender, religion, and nationality. However, I also shape my identity according to the projected image of myself. The identity building process is founded on the sameness of the subject and the image that he has of himself (Ricoeur 1999, p. 78). The identity building process relationally connects and then identifies the symbol (which refers to the meaning, i.e. its significance) and the subject (whom is defined by that meaning), when the subject recognizes that the image of the Self is the same as himself.

Despite this relational nature identity reveals also a temporal dimension: the 'present' image that we have of ourselves faces the 'past' one, which is still present. In the identity building process, 'I' and a past 'I' simultaneously exist as constitutive terms of the individual (Cassinari 2007; Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 223, b, p. 227). It is a process developing in the dimension of time, at the end of which the Self recognizes what he is. The phenomenon of recognition of Self requires a temporal spacing that allows the Self to simultaneously look at himself as object and subject. In this sense, the Self is always called into question within a process of self-reflection. Thus, duration characterizes the process of identity formation. The growth of the Self does not result in an instantaneous picture. This process can never be concluded. It continuously evolves.

6.3 Informal and Formal Identity Building Processes

This temporally oriented perspective leads us to consider two different modalities of the identity building process: the informal and formal ones (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 223–225, b, p. 227–231). From the first point of view, identity is the result of informal processes that develop in the dimension of time. This aspect of identity formation emerged in the debate between liberals and (neo)-communitarians. In particular, (neo)-communitarian scholars underline the narrative and informal character of the 'I'. According to Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), we can distinguish two ways in which the narrative dimension of identity formation crosses the Self. In the first dimension, identity is expressed by a narrative Self, which is the result of his personal history and the history of the persons he loves, and of those belonging to the same national community. The Self is narrative because the structures of his formation are essentially narrative. In the second dimension, the narrative is the result of people's myths, stories and cultures (MacIntyre 1981). The grand narratives of

a community constitute the pole of attraction of our identity and give us the models with which we identify (Schwemmer 2007, p. 343). Thus, the Self is narrative because the models of identity formation are narrative.

According to Charles Taylor (1993), to understand the state of the crisis of modern identity, it is necessary to analyze the sources of identity in contemporary Western societies. Indeed, identity is not the result of the institutional history of Western countries but rather of the hypes and fashions that characterize the cultural features of modern identity. Taylor attempted to recompose the broken framework of the modern Self by following the three different routes of identity. The first route can be defined as inwardness, the second route as affirmation of ordinary life, and the third as the way of nature (Taylor 1993, p. 147 ff., 263 ff., 379 ff.; Pariotti 1997; Ricoeur 2005). Time, once again, marks the development of informal identity building. Yet, if identity is the outcome of hypes and fashions, should the institutional structures of a country also be considered?

I argue here that the norms that form the institutional structures of liberal-democratic countries influence identity building processes (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 224, b, p. 228). Thus, we must address the formal identity building process. Additionally, formal identity building processes develop through the dimension of time as much as the informal identity building processes do. However, formal processes are characterized by the central role of norms, particularly the legal ones. The citizenship regime is an example of how legal norms affect the construction of individual moral identity (Ruggiu D. 2011, p. 197, 2012a, p. 226–228, b, p. 229–231). Citizenship is a differentiating machinery that helps differentiate those who belong to a given political community from those who do not (Isin 2002; Rigo 2009, pp. 18 ff.). Citizenship not only determines membership by distinguishing citizens and foreigners but also permits (legal) entry into a territory, the enjoyment of public and social services, and the achievement of rights even within the private sphere (Ruggiu D. 2012b, p. 229–230). In this respect, human rights can play a determinant role by enabling the enjoyment of rights (e.g., family reunification, legal duties of the state toward the individual, citizenship) and, in some cases, enabling legal entry into the country (e.g., by assuring the status of legal migrants) (Ruggiu D. 2011, p. 197, 2012a p. 228). Human rights affect both the level of standards of a particular democratic community and the identities of the individuals living within that community.

Additionally, the rule of law (Santoro 2008) plays a meaningful role in determining the identity of individuals. Principles of separation of powers, independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the legality and legal certainty of law, and equality before the law, represent more than a mere formal paradigm in liberal-democratic countries. Moreover, the existence of a multilevel constitutionalism permits human rights to frame substantially the institutional structures of those countries. In this regard, inasmuch as we identify ourselves with liberal-democratic regimes and the norms that shape them, these norms represent a pole of attraction for identity building. Currently, democracy and human rights are concurrent resources for our moral reasoning (Raz 2010; Brownsword 2008, p. 35 ff.). According to this perspective, human rights are a privileged lens through which we can study identity, its contradictions and aporias.

6.4 A Draft of the Genealogy of Modern Identity

To reconstruct the role played by human rights in the identity building process of post-modern European societies, we must briefly examine the paths of the modern Self. In his famous book, *Sources of the Self,* Charles Taylor attempted to elucidate a wide genealogy of the modern Western identity (Taylor 1993). However, as rightly noted by Ricoeur, the moral genealogy of the Self should be distinguished from the narrative of our cultural history (Ricoeur 2005, p. 14). The aim of a moral genealogy is not to shape a history of the mentality but to map the moral framework of the Self's choices.

The moral horizon of the Self's choices can be viewed as a geometric space where some gravitational points emerge and polarize the will. These strong evaluations are called by Taylor "hypergoods" (or constitutive goods) and represent a source of orientation for moral understanding (Ricoeur 2005, p. 12). The constitutive goods operate by catalyzing our desires and choices within a moral topography of the Self (Taylor 1993, p. 90). By doing this, these goods create a hierarchy among goods, placing themselves at top of it. Nonetheless, these constitutive goods represent a source of conflict (Taylor 1993, p. 92). The plurality of heterogeneous goods is an essential feature of our post-modern societies that prevents the achievement of a peaceful cohabitation among Selves. The origin of the identitarian conflict of modernity is traced by Taylor through three different sources of morality across centuries.

According to Taylor, the history of the moral space took three directions: the development of inwardness, the affirmation of the ordinary life, and the emergence of a way of nature. Unlike the reflective state of mind, we can follow the rise, development and decline of the sense of inwardness from a historical perspective. The modern notion of the Self is tightly connected to a certain image of inwardness that sets "inside" next to "outside" and "internal" next to "external". It is a Self in the first person. Being an "I" means being able to locate one's viewpoint "inside" the moral space of the Self (Taylor 1993, p. 150). The motto "know yourself" (γνωθι σεαυτόν) was inscribed in the forecourt of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. In this sense, the internal/external of the consciousness can be regarded as a typical Western distinction that finds its origin in Plato. Plato connected the primacy of thought and reason with self-control and dominion over the Self.

Within the framework of a moral topography of the Self, the place of moral resources was *logos* (thought), generating a sort of "rationalized soul" (Ricoeur 2005, p. 15). This creates a cosmic superior order that renders our good, higher selves accessible only by going outside of ourselves. The space between ourselves and this order of the good allows us to access rationality (Taylor 1993, p. 163). Here we can find the beginning of inwardness because being governed by reason means shaping one's life in accordance with a pre-existing superior order, triggering a phenomenon of internalization. According to Augustine, the "inner man" (*interior homo*) has some common traits with the rational soul of Plato. The "inner man" is the soul. However, by distinguishing between God and good, and between inner look and the memory of God, Augustine inaugurated an inner Self, which

was declined in the first-person singular for the first time. Augustine turns toward a radical reflexivity and inwardness (Taylor 1993, p. 173). Here we find a *proto-cogito*, a sort of "I think, therefore I am" philosophy before Descartes's (Ricoeur 2005, p. 15). With Descartes, we then learn a lay dualism of body and soul. The Cartesian soul did away with embodied experience by objectivizing it and met a sort of lay liberation of the Self. The instrumental control of nature founds morality on physics. The cosmos, as a disenchanted celestial machine, becomes the reflex of the interiority of the Self (Ricoeur 2005). The ethics of Descartes must be detached from the world and the body, and must adopt an instrumental attitude by finding a procedural rationality. A new concept of inwardness, which is based on self-sufficiency and autonomous powers of reason to order the world, emerged and supplanted Augustine's (Taylor 1993, p. 201).

Locke inaugurated during the Enlightenment a punctual Self free from the tutelary powers of authority. Along with the affirmation of the procedural control of reason on the world, we can observe the progressive rise of a political control of the individual. Here, we have complete detachment from oneself, who is able to objectivize itself and achieve dominion over the Self. The conscience becomes the shadow of a punctual 'I' (Taylor 1993, p. 219).

The second route of modern identity has its starting point in the Reformation. Through the rise of ordinary life, we observe the affirmation of the primacy of practical life on the contemplative and speculative one (Ricoeur 2005, p. 15). According to this perspective, the meaning of Christian existence can be found in one's profession, marriage, and family. In other words, the meaning of one's own existence must be found in common life. This perspective implies a positive consideration of both production and reproduction on the one hand, and the refusal of any hierarchy of religious authority on the other (Taylor 1993, p. 273). The rise of the ethics of work –the drive for economic success that Weber identifies as the basis of the spirit of capitalism—gives rise to a form of secularization of the religious ascesis.

A lay ethics was born at this point in time and with it, the individual that identified his dignity with his work and his nature as being of service to practical life. The "vocation without ascesis" of the Anglo-Saxon puritanism contributes to the birth of deism, a sort of "lay Christianity" (Ricoeur 2005). With its faith in a higher providential order, deism helped revolutionize the religious sources of morality but also created a predicament within modernity. From Shaftesbury to Hutchinson, the Self has developed a set of moral sentiments such as generosity and universal benevolence that connect humankind to the cosmic order through an interiorized love in opposition to authoritarian structures of religion (Taylor 1993, p. 323).

The advance of mechanistic science contributed to substituting old and religious views of the cosmos with a new view of nature. A reevaluation of country life and a simultaneous return to nature emerged during the eighteenth century. This new thinking encompassed a type of admiration for the greatness of Creation, a sentiment of peace in front of a pastoral scene, or sublimity in front of a tempest (Taylor 1993, p. 370). Nature is a mirror of our inner landscape. The sentiment of nature is a new source of morality that emerges in the spread of garden art in eighteenth century Europe and finds its apex in the gardens of Versailles.

The great fork between the lay rationalism of the French Enlightenment and the rise of the philosophic German Romanticism can be identified as the basis of the moral state of predicament of the modern Self (Ricoeur 2005, p. 16). Deism, rationalism and romanticism are indeed the sources of a non-pacified morality that generate a permanent conflict.

The moral sources of the modern Self have a nature that allows them to overcome historical vicissitudes and orient individual choices. Ricoeur calls this feature "trans-historicity", indicating that these moral sources are not removed from their time horizon, although they stand at the same time in the moral space of the Self (Ricoeur 2005, p. 23). These sources are not ahistorical or meta-historical but live in the dimension of time and, consequently, can evolve, decline, and above all, embrace new moral resources (Ruggiu 2012c, p. 186).

6.5 The Dialectics of Self and Other in our Conceptual Structures

According to Lévinas, Western philosophy is a history of (conceptual) violence that deletes the concept of the "Other" from its categories (Lévinas 1977, p. 50, 87, 248, 301). This violence not only has a material and destructive dimension but also a conceptual one because it hides in our concepts, ideas, and ideological structures that found our institutions and practices.

In the Western philosophical tradition, identity represents the form of the Being. The Being is, by definition, identical to itself. Sameness and immutability are regarded as a fundamental feature of the Being. Instead, differences belong to the nothingness and introduce the issue of mutability (Heidegger 1976, p. 21 ff., Ruggiu L. and Mora 2007, p. 9).

For Parmenides, the Being becomes absolute identification with itself. The difference, the otherness, is expelled from the level of the Being. Plato understood the importance of including both identity and difference within the Being, not as the absolute contrary of Being (i.e., the Nothingness), but in the relative sense of Becoming. In this regard, we have two different modalities of time because the Being stands on the ground of eternity and immutability, whereas (the being of) entities stand on the level of time and becoming.

Here we face a problem. Indeed, to be identical to itself, the entity should maintain its unity within the becoming, preserving an immutable structure. According to Aristotle, the condition for affirming the identity of something is its permanence as identical over time, without any change or difference. Thus, identity implies the unity of the Self. In this sense, with Aristotle, we have the primacy of identity working on the differences. In fact, identity is a constant obsession of Western philosophy (Ruggiu L. and Mora 2007, p. 13). Change, difference and otherness must be exorcised from Western thought.

Ricoeur noted an ambivalence of our language that masks a philosophical confusion. He noticed that identity has a double meaning. From the first point of view,

identity means selfhood and indicates the fact that any Self has an irreducible specificity, which makes a person a singular and unique existence. This meaning can be expressed by the relationship A≠B. In this sense, I am the result of passing time and felt experience that make me different from everybody. I could have radically changed due to the vicissitudes of my life, which characterize my selfhood but I cannot be confused with anyone. From the second point of view, identity means sameness and indicates the fact that any Self is physically identical to itself aside from any felt experience. This can be expressed by the relationship A=A. In this sense, I am the one in the mirror today, yesterday and tomorrow. In the physical sense, I am the same thing (Ruggiu D. 2012b, p. 253). Selfhood and sameness represent two different aspects of our identity, but they may generate a linguistic confusion. In fact, in the French and Italian languages, we have *Soi-même* and *Se stesso*, where *même* (or *stesso*) stands for same, identical. Thus, in those languages, the Self may be confused with the same, the identical. However, this confusion cannot occur in English and German. For instance *der*, *die*, *dasselbe*, or *gleich* cannot be confused with *Selbst*. Self and same are not overlapping concepts. This leads us to distinguish two senses of identity: identity as *ipse*-identity (or selfhood) and identity as *idem*-identity (or sameness).

This linguistic confusion is the expression of a deeper philosophical confusion. In Western thought, identity has always been understood as sameness, forcing the Other to become the same as the Same. As we have observed above, even though there is an identity link between me and myself (I am identical to myself), this relationship does not exist between me and the other-than-me. The confusion of these two perspectives is at the origin of the conceptualization of Western identity.

Lévinas noted that Western philosophy has elaborated the idea of totality as the kingdom of the Same, as sameness, annulling multiplicity and difference (which he calls separation). Idealism, the philosophical positivism and the model of scientific neutrality, as well as the existentialism of the Heideggerian tradition, have treated the Other as a land of conquest. The Other is the object of the exploitation of the Self. All exceptions are reduced to a homogenizing embrace. This is what Lévinas calls totality. This reduction of the relationship of the Self with the Other-than-self is totalitarianism: the Other loses itself in the totality becoming only a part of the whole (Lévinas 1977, p. 202). Lost in this totality, both the Other and the Self lose their separation, their specificity, their difference, and become the Same. Yet, this situation of moral predicament (Ricoeur 2005; Tayolr 1993) is a situation where identity weakens because the selfhood of the Self and the selfhood of the Other require the separation to remain transparent.

6.6 Human Rights as a Moral Source

Although reflection on human rights is very ancient, picking up the legacy of the modern jusnaturalism of the XVII and XVIII centuries (Facchi 2007), the affirmation of human rights in the international panorama (Zaghì 2002) is a phenomenon

triggered by the disasters of the second half of the XX century. The idea of a general vulnerability of mankind was affirmed when the political, economic, military, scientific and technological threats against humans became intolerable and led to one of the most destructive experiences in the human history: the Second World War. It would be a mistake to found human rights on an uncritical positive idea of man (Zagrebelsky 1992, p. 143; Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 188). The fundamental event that made possible the rise of human rights in the international community was the tragic event of the Second World War, the endless atrocities of the Holocaust (against Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, political opponents and other minorities) and medical experimentation in concentration camps. Without this painful event, the shift from ethical reflection to the practical application of human rights could not have been conceived. "Horror at the Holocaust grounds modern morality. No one knows what is good, but everyone knows the Holocaust was evil. We may not know what human is, but the Holocaust was certainly inhuman" (MacKinnon 1994, p. 114). Human rights arose through a process of unstoppable descent into a moral abyss, at the end of which we found a counter-process that led us to the only option for preventing future atrocities (Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 189). Human rights were affirmed when the conflictualism of the moral framework of the Self radically opposed the Self and the Other, leading toward the simultaneous impossibility of the Self and the Other (Ruggiu D. 2008, p. 414).

It was due to the genocide of the Holocaust, organized by politics, that priorities, consents, and substantial sensitivities were set, and which in turn shaped human rights law as we currently know it (MacKinnon 1994). Only when we understood that the existence of man could be radically endangered did we acknowledged the need to establish limits. Auschwitz has an ambivalent nature. It is an event that tells us what should have never happened by showing us what happened (Zagrebelsky 1992, p. 142). With Auschwitz, suffering found an incontestable human causality: evil is unnatural but essentially human (Lissa 2004, p. 13).

Auschwitz has a paradigmatic nature that renders it capable of encompassing all of the evils of the tweinth century: the two World Wars, Hitlerism, Stalinism, Hiroshima, the gulag, and Cambodian concentration camps (Levinàs 1998, p. 130). The route that led Western thought to Auschwitz passes through the total disavowal of otherness (Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 188 ff.). In this regard, the genealogy proposed by Taylor should be integrated with an analysis of the routes that transformed the Other into the enemy of the Self and created the conditions of the rise of human rights as a new moral source; a sort of journey that will lead us to the depths of the (im)possibilities of the Self.

This route began with Rousseau when he affirmed that man as natural being is only the self-preservation instinct, *amour de soi*, and, in this sense, is devoid of any distinction between good and evil. Only with entry into society does *amour de soi* become *amour propre*, that is, the will to oppress the Other. In this sense, evil should be completely ascribed to society (Lissa 2004, p. 18, Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 190). According to Hegel, the natural and historical space in which we live is contained within the human, insofar as this place comes from its Spirit. Thus, universal history is essentially the history of the Spirit. The shift from *amour de soi* to *amour*

propre is determined by the fight. From this perspective, the conscience cannot become self-conscious without acknowledging the Other that exists in the battle of the Self and Other (Lissa 2004, p. 21). Here, the conflict is internal to the conscience and has a positive outcome: the Other must survive to recognize the victory of the Self (Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 191).

In Marx, the logic of this conflict is further developed and fixed in the societal clash among classes. The Marxian notion of class supplants the abstract idea of conscience (Lissa 2004, p. 25). Class assumes the appearance of the enemy but, insofar as it forms part of the same history, rationality, and horizon, it can never be destroyed.

Another fundamental step toward the conceptual destruction of the existence of the Other was taken by Nietzsche, who interpreted man as will to power (Lissa 2004, p. 27; Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 192). When the world becomes the stage on which every being acts as the center of the forces aimed at expanding the being, we have the premises of the overcoming of all other alternative centers of force. These premises were consolidated in Darwinism when the notion of race became the key concept of the age. Nevertheless, the final act of this process of conceptual fall into the abyss of human thought was concluded by the Nazi European thinkers. Here, we can trace the roots of a sort of negative genealogy of the modern Self.

Immediately before the First World War, Joseph Arthur Gobineau (1853), a French aristocrat and novelist, detected the reason behind the crisis of European society in the mix of races and the degeneration of blood, arguing that crossbreeding with inferior races would cause the superior ones to decline. Paradoxically, only with the help of a Jewish scholar, Ludwig Gumplovicz, we did racialize social conflict. Through Gumplovicz, social history became a history of races. Within this framework, the Self and the Other are two confronting individualities and share no common horizon.

If life is fight, it can be understood only through the friend-enemy polarization. However, the enemy is, at this stage, still vague, enveloped in a nebulous halo (Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 194). The identification of the Jew as the enemy originated with Houston Steward Chamberlain (1899), the husband of Wagner's daughter and representative of those British social ranks that felt threatened both by the liberalism and democracy that the French Revolution inaugurated. Through a type of anthropological novel, Chamberlin portrayed the Jew as the one capable of building improbable messianic and socialist kingdoms, as the enemy. Thus, the Jew became extraneous to Western culture. Germanism and Judaism thus became two conflicting polarities. These authors constituted the ideological labyrinth that fostered the Nazi imagination.

When the enemy is identified with the Other, the *amour propre* becomes willing to destroy the Other, and hate finally finds its target. The destructuration of the conditions of possibility of the Other was realized by Hitler. *Mein Kampf* transformed anti-Semitic hate into the complete dehumanization of the Other, who, stripped of human appearance, could be erased from the history of the world, banished from mankind, as such (Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 196). Here we can trace the impossibility of the person. When hate transcends the logic of self-preservation, Auschwitz becomes

possible. For example, Albert Speer still conceived the possibility of the 'slave state', realizing Germany's desire to dominate Europe and not understanding that the destruction of the enemy is more important than domination. The ways chosen by Nazism were different. In this, we find the complete specificity of Auschwitz: pure destruction *per se*, without any other aim but destruction (Lissa 2004, p. 49). After Auschwitz, the equivalence of history = reason was no longer possible. Hegel was dismantled. The route of to conflictualism between the Self and the Other had finally precipitated the conflict at the core of the Self, leaving a pile of rubble.

In this regard, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 represents not only a different conceptualization of the relationship between the Self and the Other, but a new "goal oriented pathway" (Viola 2000, p. 39) leading to the opposite direction of that reached after Second World War. This shift could not have been possible before, the war in spite of a millenarian debate on the preexistence of human rights (Ruggiu D. 2012c, p. 189). An event was needed that could turn this shift into an unavoidable passage. This event was the *Shoah*, and the moment of this process of consciousness-raising was 1948 and the Universal Declaration. After this non-binding document was drafted, several instruments of international law obliging countries to respect human rights followed, such as the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950 and the International Covenants of 1966 (Zaghì 2002). From this moment on, we can trace a divide that separates two different stages in the history of modern morality. A new moral source of the Self, as well as the Rule of Law, found a formal context and became integral parts of the institutional structures of all European countries. These two elements today define Western society.

6.7 Aporias of the European Human Rights Norms

The migratory processes in Western countries should be considered within the aforementioned theoretical framework, where identity finds itself broken and divided among a plurality of forces and boosts (Habermas and Taylor 2003).

With the affirmation of human rights as a pillar of the political regimes of post-modern countries, a new pole of attraction rises in the moral space of the Self. This pole establishes a strong connection between a formal structure and identity. In this regard, the spread of liberal-democratic regimes and the process of internationalization of human rights are more than a formal occurrence: they represent a novelty in our way of thinking, and of conceiving ourselves and the relationship with the Other. A set of rights is now attributed to the person (Pariotti 2013, p. 4). These rights strongly affect the processes of differentiation within liberal-democratic communities, helping determine the identity of those societies. If the normative framework constitutes a fundamental pole of our identity building processes, it means that there is a tight relationship between identity and the functioning of norms. The question is what happens when a relevant element of our identity ceases to work correctly?

Can a normative contradiction reveal a deeper identitarian short-circuit, that is, the existence of an *aporia* within our concept of identity?

This is the case of freedom of movement within the ECHR framework. In face of migratory processes, not only the norms of free movement but also the entire ECHR framework comes under pressure. In a political community, citizenship (Zolo 1999; Costa 2005) is the most important normative parameter shaping identity by distinguishing who belongs to the state from who does not belong. In this sense, citizenship works as a differentiating machine (Isin 2002a; Rigo 2009). The possession or lack of citizenship determines who can enter a state, who can move within it, who can be expelled from it, and who can enjoy a set of (even private) state-conferred rights. Yet, freedom of movement is a fundamental parameter for determining citizenship (Ruggiu D. 2011, p. 196, 2012a, p. 226, 2012b, p. 233). In fact, because obtaining citizenship depends, as *condicio sine qua non*, on legal residence within a state, policies on migratory flows become mere anticipations of citizenship policies. In this regard, citizenship can be translated in terms of freedom of movement. Indeed, whereas a citizen has the right to move freely within the state of which he is a citizen, an irregular foreigner does not have this right. Whereas the citizen can under no circumstances be expelled, the irregular foreigner can be expelled. Whereas the citizen has the right to enter into and reside in the state, the irregular foreigner does not. Moreover, the fact that in most European countries a citizen is a descendent of citizens (for the sake of the so-called *ius sanguinis*) increases the importance of legal entry into a state. These circumstances render the norms on free movement the "concrete content" of citizenship (Rigo 2007, 2009 p. 87, Ruggiu D. 2011, p. 196, 2012a, p. 226–228, b, p. 234).

The freedom of movement (Ruggiu D. 2009, 2011, p. 198–206, 2012a, p. 228–229, b, p. 241–245) in the ECHR is too loosely established and does not allow to answer to the increasing challenges of migratory flows from developing countries. Additionally, the delay in dealing with freedom of movement is indicative of the difficulty of dealing with this matter. In fact, only with the Fourth Protocol (P4) in 1963 and the subsequent Seventh Protocol (P7) in 1984 was the freedom of movement afforded a place in the framework of the ECHR (Schermers 1993, p. 235; Ruggiu D. 2009, p. 646). However, some relevant countries did not sign or ratify these protocols (e.g., United Kingdom), revealing the contrasts among the member states in this matter (Ruggiu D. 2009, p. 198).

The Convention and its protocols provide to everybody the right to emigrate (art. 2 par. 2 P4), but they do not provide the right to immigrate (Schermers 1993, p. 237; De Filippi et al. 2006, p. 700). This fact has relevant consequences on both the normative structure of the right and the equilibrium of other rights protected by the ECHR. According to the ECHR, a person who legally resides within a country (citizen or legal foreigner) has free movement, and the freedom of residence is protected (art. 2 par. 1 P4). Whereas the citizen *is* regular by definition, the ali*en may* be regular and his regularity is subject to restrictions (art. 2 par. 3 P4). The expulsion of citizens is prohibited (3 par. 1 P4), and their entry into the state cannot be restricted (3 par. 2 P4, Forlati 2009). The collective expulsion of aliens is forbidden (4 P4).

However, this restriction has been interpreted as referring to the expulsion of minority groups only (*Alibaks and others*[2]). In contrast, individual expulsion remains unregulated. There are some (elusive) guarantees for the expulsion of legal foreigners (art. 1 P7), whereas there is no guarantee for the expulsion of irregular migrants (Groenendijk et al. 1998). This is notable because the expulsions normally concern irregular aliens. Because the normative structure of the freedom of movement became jeopardized, the ECtHR began applying other articles of the ECHR that could be interpreted to prohibit the restriction of free movement. These articles are: prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments (Art. 3 ECHR, e.g., *East Africans Asians*[3], *Khemais*[4]), personal liberty (Art. 5 ECHR, e.g., *Amuur*[5]), right to private and family life (Art. 8 ECHR, e.g., *Berrehab*[6]), and equality (Ovey and White 2002, pp.348-349, 358 ff.) (Art. 14 ECHR, e.g., *Gaygusuz*[7]). This case law, which integrates the normative framework of the freedom of movement, indicates the court's efficacy, but it also indicates a state of difficulty that is spreading to other freedoms and rights afforded by the Convention that are being violated in migratory matters.

This normative crisis is evident if we consider the following shortcomings. There is no judicial control on the situation of irregular migrants who are detained (e.g., right to fair trial). The spread of ghettos—where the violations of the fundamental rights of vulnerable persons who live in a situation of irregularity or clandestinely occur with impunity-throughout the continent. Take, for instance, the custom of female genital mutilation (e.g., personal integrity), the celebration of religious rites in cellars and garages (e.g., religious freedom), the diffusion of polygamous marriage (e.g., right to marriage, equality, respect for family life), and the difficulty of guaranteeing the right to education to the children of irregular migrants (Bonetti 2009). In these contexts, we observe the spread of petty criminality and of the risk of terrorist acts (e.g., personal integrity, right to security of the person, property). Think of the practice of extraordinary renditions to interrogate suspected terrorists in countries where torture is not punished (e.g., torture, and degrading and inhuman treatment, life). Consider then the abnormal practice of (illegal) repatriation of asylum seekers without lodging asylum applications (Basso and Neri 2004), or of human trafficking (e.g., inhuman and degrading treatments, life). All of these violations are connected to the current mechanism of control of migratory phenomena that the European human rights system makes possible.

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[2] *Alibaks and others v. Netherlands* (Appl. 14209/88), D & R 59, pp. 274–288.

[3] Appl. 4403/70–4419/70, 4422/70, 4423/70, 4443/70, 4476/70–4478/70, 4486/70,4501/70 and 4526/70–4530/70, *East African Asians v. the United Kingdom* , decision of the Commission of 10 and 18 December 1970, (1970) *Yearbook* 928; Report of the Commission of 14 December 1973, (1994) 78-A D & R 5–70.

[4] *Khemais et autres c. Italie* (requêt 246/07), arrêt 24 février 2009.

[5] *Amuur v. France* (Appl. 19776/92), judgment of 25 June 1996, *Reports of Judgment and Decisions*, 1996-III, 827–859.

[6] *Berrehab v.the Netherlands* (Appl. 10730/84), judgment of 21 June 1988, Serie A, No. 138.

[7] *Gaygusuz v. Austria* (Appl. 17371/90), judgment of 16 December 1996, *Reports of Judgment and Decisions*, 1996-IV, 1129–1157.

The arrival of migrants in most industrialized countries can be considered as a structural phenomenon due to two non-eliminable causes: the flow of migrants escaping wars, political and religious persecutions, and famines in developing countries, on the one hand, and the Western need for cheap labor as an alternative to the delocalization of production and as a tool to compete in the global market, on the other (Bonetti 2004, p. 37). These causes reveal an inner contradiction of liberal-democratic countries: the globalization of the economy, finances and information (and the risks that those phenomena bring home (Beck 1992)) have generated the opening of frontiers for markets but not persons (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 226, b, p. 232). Instead, we observe the adoption of restrictive migration policies. In this sense, the ratio of the normative framework of freedom of movement, which simultaneously answers to two contradictory principles (the personal principle, which is at the heart of human rights law, and the principle of the domestic jurisdiction of the state, which governs the instruments of control of migratory flows) mirrors ongoing migratory policies (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 228–229, b, p. 237). On the one hand, the ECHR protects the free movement of persons and sets forth further guarantees to every person (not just citizens). On the other hand, the ECHR recognizes the wide margin of discretion of states on migration policy and offers scant tools to the judges of the Strasbourg Court (Nascimbene 2002, p. 154). Consequently, those policies restrict the possibility of legal entry into states that fight irregular immigration (Boeri and Spilimbergo 2005). However, because the flow of persons from abroad is constant and the possibilities of legal entry are increasingly strict, irregular immigration increases (Basso and Perocco 2003, Ruggiu D. 2011, p. 206–210, 2012a, p. 231, b, p. 249). In this regard, this contradictory migratory policy reflects symmetrically a normative and less apparent contradiction that we can identify within the norms of the ECHR and which deeply weakens the efficacy of the norms of freedom of movement. Thus, there is the spread in Europe of regularization programs aimed at regularizing a mass of irregular persons who clandestinely live, work, and have families in European countries[8]. This means that the main way to enter European countries is illegally. The spread of regularization programs is thus a smoking gun, as it proves that a significant portion of the population living in Europe is irregular. If this is the situation generated by European policies, we must conclude that there is a progressive and relevant division of the European population into two blocs: one consisting of citizens whose human rights are guaranteed and another consisting of irregular aliens over whom the ECtHR cannot exert its review (or it can exert it, but with increasing difficulties) (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 232, b, p. 249 ff.).

[8] In Italy regularization programs were made in 1982, 1987, 1990, 1997–98, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2009, and finally in 2011 (Bonetti 2004, p. 22, 38 ff.); in Greece in 1997, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007; in Austria in 1990, 1997, 2007; in Denmark in 1992, 1999; in Ireland in 2005; in Luxemburg in 1986, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001; in Switzerland in 1996, 1999, 2000, 2007; in the UK in 1974–1978, 1977, 1998, 2000 and 2003; in Sweden in 2005; in Lithuania in 1993, 1998, 2004; in Spain in 1985–1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and in 2005; in Belgium in 2000; in Poland in 2003 and 2007; in Hungary in 2004; in The Netherlands in 1975, 1979, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2007; in Germany in 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2000; in Portugal in 1992, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004; in France in 1973, 1980, 1981–82, 1991, 1997–98 and in 2006, under the Sarkozy government (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 230, b, p. 246).

6.8 Immigration and Otherness

This state of normative inconsistency has a philosophical origin: the weakness of the concept of the "Other" in our identity building processes. Migratory phenomena force us to face a relevant form of otherness. Our self-comprehension functions differently when we meet an individual being that is either part of an ethnic minority already enjoying chitezinship rights, though only partially, or who is a foreigner without citizenship who is not already integrated into the political community and wants to gain citizenship. In this latter instance, indeed, we face a form of otherness (i.e. foreigners) which is completely other (different). Post-modern Western societies are deeply and unavoidably multicultural. Otherness is structurally part of our contemporary societies. Otherness is a non-provisional phenomenon and is ostensible. This difference is visible. It is in our streets, in our squares, and in our neighborhoods (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p 225, b, p 256).

As Paul Ricoeur underlined, the structure of identity implies the dialectics of the Self and the Other (Ricoeur 1999, p. 75 ff., Ruggiu D. 2011, p. 211 ff., 2012a, p. 232 ff., b, p. 251 ff.). The capacity to understand what one is essential to our identity building processes because one is aware of the differences that separates himself from others (Lévinas 1977, p. 225 ff.). I can recognize myself because I can say what the peculiarities and the specificities of my Self are. In this sense, within the selfhood there is a strong bond between the Self and the Other, whose breach weaken our identity building processes. The inability to distinguish the Self from the Other and to understand their inner differences, is at the base of the modern crisis of identity, particularly in a society where the coexistence of two different social blocks (citizens and foreigners) is a non-eliminable feature.

The relationship that binds the Self and the Other-than-self is characterized by a deep and irreducible separation. This separation is due to the existence of those differences that mutually polarize both. This separation divides and joins two different identities. It separates them because it marks their insuppressible difference, but it also joins them together because their definition of identity requires distance between the two Selves (Lévinas 1977; Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 232, b, p. 252). Without this difference, the Self as selfhood cannot exist.

We have observed in Europe many ways of humiliating the Other, such as the launching of religious wars and, more recently, the dissemination of Nazi totalitarianism and Stalinism. However, there are more subtle and less impressive ways of annihilating the separation between Self and Other, and those ways are ingrained in the habit and custom of our thinking (Grampa 1999, p. 38). This violence may be found in the model of assimilation, in the model of liberal indifference (Pastore 2007, pp. 37 ff.), in some expressions of strong political and intolerant localism and finally, in some expressions of universalism that hide behind the manifesto of cosmopolitan citizenship with an indifferent gaze (Habermas 1999; Ferrajoli 1994, 2001, p. 152, 2007, p.335).

By considering integration as a natural and non-problematic phenomenon and overlooking the problems of every day life, such as legal entry into a given country,

housing, children's education, and cultural practice, the weight of integration is left on the shoulders of migrants (Ruggiu D. 2011, 2012a, p. 235, b, p. 254). According to Lévinas, it is possible to avoid falling into the violence of our concepts by preserving the separation between the Self and the Other. By requiring its presence, the Other justifies and founds the responsibility of the Self. The difference of the Other, its otherness, is the prerequisite of multiplicity. The only way to empower our identity in Western multicultural societies is to preserve the separation with a renewed attention toward difference (Lévinas 1977, p. 219, Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 237, b, p. 254 ff.).

6.9 Conclusions

The weakness of the concept of the Other is at the origin of the crisis that affects the identity building process in Europe. Additionally, this deep weakness affects our way of ruling the relationship between citizens and foreigners, reaching both the migratory policies of European countries and the highest levels of human rights law. In this regard, the normative framework of freedom of movement is riddled with holes. The shortcomings are so relevant and chronic that we have concluded that the violations generated by the freedom of movement extend to other norms set forth in the Convention. The normative tissue of the ECHR is shaken by an earthquake involving numerous, if not all, rights and freedoms. This state of impairment is due to the concurrent presence of the principle of the domestic jurisdiction of the state in the human rights system, which is governed by the personality principle. Due to the personality principle, human rights must be protected by states with regard to both citizens and foreigners. In this sense, human rights must also be granted to foreigners rather than just to citizens. Nevertheless, due to the principle of domestic jurisdiction, states have a margin of discretion in migratory matters. This space of discretion is recognized even by the Convention because in 1950, the Contracting States intended to reserve for themselves the right to control the entry and residence of irregular migrants (Nascimbene 2002, p. 154; Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 228). Consequently, it is difficult to apply human rights to foreigners, particularly to irregular migrants.

From the beginning, the ECHR characterized the freedom of movement through these two contradictory principles. In other words, this state of crisis followed *ab origine* the rights of the ECHR and led them toward an unavoidable outcome: the short-circuit of human rights norms. In this context, the norms of the ECHR appear as a broken framework whose shortcomings became evident in the moment of their application. Nevertheless, these norms make apparent a deeper weakness of thought. The Self is unable to conceive of the relationship with the Other by simultaneously maintaining their differences. The Other enters the space of the Self completely unexpected, notwithstanding that it was widely foreseen. The Other was not foreseen in 1950 when the ECHR arose. It is unexpected now, although two protocols (P4 and P7) have set forth freedom of movement. Surprisingly, the arrival of

the Other passed completely unnoticed from the legal standpoint. The evidence of this predicament, which affects identity building processes in post-modern European countries, is the normative paradox constituted by entering the territory of a state. Legal entry (which is tied to work and entry (Cholewinski 1997, p. 389; Bonetti and Casadonte 2004, p. 352 ff.; Ludovico 2004, p. 728 ff.)) is so strictly shaped that the only way to enter countries is illegally. Who could realistically find a job in a state before entering it (Boeri and Spilimbergo 2005)? These circumstances have generated large numbers of irregular migrants, who are then certified through periodic European regularization programs. If the presence of irregular migrants was not a constant in Europe, we would not need regularization programs. This means that two opposing social blocks, characterized by different types of human rights protections, exist in European societies. On the one hand, there are European citizens for whom human rights are provided and respected. On the other hand, there are migrants living in states where regularity is precarious and human rights can hardly be granted or enforced by a court.

This situation leads to a state of nearly formal inequality (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 232, b, p. 247). However, we cannot provide a plausible explanation for this *status quo*. We cannot explain why our real situation differs so far from the image of our world and of the norms that we suppose govern it. This normative hiatus corresponds to a conceptual *hiatus* that is the absence or the inner weakness of the concept of the Other. One is nothing less than the reflex of the other. If we provided a concrete way of legally entering a state, we would not be grappling with such a glaring contradiction. The absence of the right to immigrate (*ius migrandi*) is the cause of this normative impairment. We are used to thinking of rights as privileges that the state confers to individuals, but they may represent a form of governing and of controlling our world. If the right to immigrate was provided from the beginning, even with many limitations and restrictions, states would have been forced to think of the real absence of such a system: legal entry (Ruggiu D. 2012a, p. 235, b, p. 255). Legal entry is the real unthought-of, the great limit of our conceptual effort.

The ECHR can be regarded as the center of an intrigue that stretches from the spread of regularization programs throughout Europe to the heart of Ourselves, of our concepts, of our identities. In this context, human rights are not a secondary source of our identity insofar as we use them to identify our societies and ourselves. However, this operation of identifying should be coherent and consistent. The question is now whether this contradiction is irreversible and unsolvable. Perhaps the right to immigrate is a counterintuitive solution, too much of a hard jump for our weak reasoning, but if this contradiction is the result of an act of violence, we should wonder now at whom this violence is directed, and whether it is ultimately directed at Ourselves.

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Chapter 7
Processes of Constructing and Deconstructing Gender Identities in Contemporary Migrations

Roberto Solone Boccardi

7.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the cultural variations in the signification of sexuation, sexual orientation, and gender identity. It highlights the multiple frontiers that these representations create among different societies, and discusses the experiences of migrants who have found themselves at the crossroads of diverse, and sometimes contradictory, gendered, and sexualized norms. The starting point of my analysis is that all migrants show subtle alterations of their own habits once they settle into a new society (Crocetti 2008). However, the experience of migration does not affect all persons equally (Koser 2009). My hypothesis is that laws and traditions establish what kind of behaviors are allowed or forbidden depending on our sex, sexual orientation, and gender. Although each society defines its own norms, most of them assign a higher status to men over women, to heterosexual persons over non-heterosexual ones, and to heterosexed bodies over non-heterosexed ones. The resulting structure is what I define as the 'heteropatriarchal pyramid'.

Whereas feminist critics have highlighted the inferior role assigned to women by revealing the male chauvinist and misogynist hierarchies existing in our societies (Millet 1969; Rubin 1975), they have not answered the following question: what happens to those who have not even been assigned a role within the heteropatriarchal pyramid? Even though conservative societies restrict and regulate women's behavior, they at least assign them a role within the patriarchal structure. Instead, in the case of non-heterosexual and non-heterosexed people, most societies have no norms or roles to offer. Non-heterosexual and non-heterosexed people are simply not meant to exist. In the most optimistic scenario, non-heteronormativized persons are ignored as long as they keep their profiles low. As soon as they attempt to gain visibility, they are excluded and marginalized. If they insist on proclaiming their rights, threats of severe discrimination and proactive persecution arise. Not to mention that in many societies the mere existence of these people is considered

R. S. Boccardi (✉)
Department of Social Anthropology, Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), Madrid, Spain
e-mail: robertosoloneboccardi@gmail.com

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unacceptable and refused as sinful and counter-natural. Even their right to live is denied, and they are condemned to die by the hand of the state or due to the violence of the people.

Indeed, each society has not only the power to autonomously regulate the existing sexes, genders, and sexualities but also to establish which sexes, sexual orientations, and gender identities can or cannot exist and acts on them by accepting or denying, promoting or persecuting them. The heterosexual man stands above everyone else, occupying the top position of the heteropatriarchal gender pyramid. The heterosexual man plays a mandatory heteronormativized role and observes gendered norms, though he enjoys more freedom and autonomy than anyone else. He is comforted by a considerably wider—if not infinite—set of options as well as by the privilege of not having to report to any gendered power other than his own. The heterosexual man can easily move through any heteropatriarchal society without the fear of violating any gendered rule posed by any power above him because there is none. His process of adaptation within a new society involves more the public than the private life and does not directly affect his identity or his freedom. However, for women, non-heterosexual, intersexual, and transgendered people migration is a process that usually leads to more drastic and profound changes. Such people must learn the complex network of written and unwritten norms regulating the new gendered vassalage as well as understand their position within it. Once situated in the new pyramid, they must adhere to their new roles and rules.

The first relevant outcome of my analysis is that gender is such a changeable and vulnerable element of identity because it is an infinitely complex and variable cultural construction. Becoming aware of its arbitrariness not only frees us from the obligation to comply with pre-established gender roles but also enables us to deconstruct many other cultural constructions and to ultimately challenge any social organization (Schama 1987)[1]. The goal of this chapter is to recall that—because the degree and type of rights to which migrants have access vary considerably between nations—the process of integration into a foreign society requires migrants to rethink, sometimes from scratch, their gender identities and societal opportunities. In this way, migrants accede, often unwittingly, to a new life. They are reborn into a new gender identity and must reinvent themselves to adapt to it. Through this game of identity manipulation, migrants can transform the experience of marginalization into an opportunity for emancipation.

7.2 The Invisible Frontier

One particular type of frontier, which I am personally experiencing, reveals the arbitrariness of any gender construction. This frontier is the one that divides different legal systems and cultural norms. Determining what is forbidden and regulating

[1] To explore the limits and challenges of the current binary gendered system, please visit the webpage of the artist Naïel: www.naiel.net/. For further readings, see Judith Butler (2004).

what is permitted, law and traditions also determine which options exist and therefore which opportunities are available for the construction of the life-trajectory of each individual (López Sala 2007; Kymlicka 1995b). This truism, which many of us more or less unconsciously assume as inevitable, is questioned in at least two situations: when we consider a forbidden thing meaningful, and when we migrate.

In the first case, in the absence of positive cultural references supporting our expectations, we are led to believe that they are wrong and that we must therefore be repressed. Yet, after harshly punishing and censoring ourselves, we can eventually unveil and deconstruct the male chauvinist heterosexist power relations sustaining unfair gender morals. In the second case, the migrant—who sees how his or her life changes as a result of different penal and civil codes, as well as how the diverse social and cultural structures legitimize or censure behavior—has the opportunity to be aware of the relativity of any legal and cultural system, and of the influence that these systems exert on people's lives. Whereas it is true that all migrants, as they move from one society to another, show more or less subtle alterations of their own habits and opportunities, it is important to remember that in the case of women, people of non-heterosexual orientation, non-heteronormativized bodies, and genders, migration often leads to drastic and profound changes that substantially modify the most intimate dimensions of the individual's life: their feelings, their strategies of self-representation and social interaction and ultimately, their identity, and their ability to imagine and create their own life paths (Nolin 2006).

The law, as much necessary as it is arbitrary, a guarantor of justice and, simultaneously, a potentially oppressive tool, must be revised when the citizenry demands it. Indeed, in a free and healthy society, every person should have the ability and opportunity to innovate these rules and traditions, and be who they are without being forced or required to interpret predetermined gender roles. Conversely, when a society performs an active role in the conservation and validation of past social conventions, it renounces any change that could fulfill present needs. As a result, society will condemn itself to illness and regression. By constantly demanding that its members conform to the gender-assigned, patriarchal construct, societies prevent people from fully evolving and moving forward in the creation of their life trajectories.

As an example of this type of frontier, we can analyze the chaos generated by the differences among national legal codes regarding gender identity, homophobia or marriage equality for same-sex and transsexual partners. Today, Spain is the scene of a migratory phenomenon characterized by non-heterosexual and transgendered young people from all over the world who leave their countries of origin to settle mainly in Madrid and Barcelona. Some authors, activists and journalists call this flow of young people "the gay diaspora" because they escape the social and legal repression that persecutes and/or prevents them from leading normal lives in their own countries[2] (La Fountain-Stokes 2004, 2009; Carrillo 2004; Patton 2000;

[2] Gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual migration flows have always existed within and beyond each country's borders. This is due to displacement from less tolerant areas and the goal of settling in more inclusive cities and metropolises. When such migration flows are large, they are usually

Manalasan 2003). In Spain, on the contrary, the law and society welcome people of all sexual orientations and gender identities, giving them the opportunity to plan their lives according to their aspirations.

In Spain, supported by a tolerant secularized citizenry and the egalitarian legal reforms introduced by the socialist government[3], people who are usually discriminated against elsewhere by heterosexist norms can experience integration and feel supported by the local community in their quest to be treated as first class citizens. However, discrimination still exists outside Spain. Indeed, while a Western, white, heterosexual male faces virtually no restrictions when traveling or move to a new country—looking at a map, the entire world belongs to him—women and those who do not fulfill the social heteronormative expectations do not enjoy such freedom. Their maps are incomplete, with crossed-off countries—those that they are better off never visiting and those in *chiaroscuro*, which are accessible only under certain conditions.

7.3 Manipulated Identities

Gender is variably defined, valued and regulated across different cultures. Therefore, every person is interpreted, described, and classified differently depending on the contextual perception of her or his gender. Whereas many will experience only minor variations in the way they are perceived by distinct societies, communities and groups, others may experience major changes in how they are perceived. Because gender is a complex and changeable cultural construction whose boundaries and contents do not coincide in every culture, persons situated far from the clarity of the standard heteronormativized roles face multiple perceptions of their gendered identities. Additionally, those sitting at the frontier between two or more gender identities, roles and expressions face the risk of being assigned to different—or differently signified—gender categories.

Cross-cultural variations in the hetero-attribution of gender identities or in how certain gendered traits are perceived can be considered one of many folkloristic peculiarities and should not necessarily constitute an issue. However, it does become an issue because gender norms establish important duties, rights and, in heteropatriarchal cultures, punishments. Since heteronormativity renders people increasingly vulnerable the more they differ from it, and male chauvinism limits women's autonomy, when exposed to different heteronormativized gender mainframes (either

described as the "gay diaspora". Spain is not the only country affected by this phenomenon. Canada's massive LGBT immigrations can also be considered a diaspora. While Spain and Canada are receptive to such migrations, Uganda, Nigeria and Russia are chasing out entire generations of non-heterosexual and non-gendered persons.

[3] Gender violence was defined and condemned by a specific law in 2004 (Ley Orgánica 1/2004); *Marriage Equality* was approved in 2005 (Ley 13/2005); the right to be addressed according to the *Gender Identity* instead of the sex assigned at birth was recognized and regulated in 2007 (Ley 3/2007).

within or outside of their societies, communities and groups of reference) women and non-heteronormativized people find themselves at risk of not knowing the rules by which they must play.

The overregulation of gender roles, identities, and expressions in male chauvinist heterosexist societies leads to the construction of different gender categories, models and criteria. Whereas these constructions can substantially coincide with the supremacy of the cisgender[4], heterosexual and heterosexed man, they can profoundly diverge from one society to another in the regulation, classification and signification of the sexuality, identity, role and behavior of cissexual women and people of non-heterosexual orientation, non-heterosexed bodies and non-heteronormativized genders. Raising awareness of the arbitrariness of every construct not only saves us from the obligation to comply with pre-established gender roles by allowing us to question gender dogmas, which ultimately frees us from their captivity; it also enables us to deconstruct many other cultural constructs and any societal and cultural organization at large. However, this revolutionary role of gender bears little resemblance to the common opinion of some of the social sciences that women, for example, are the conservative agents of tradition and language (Billson 1995). On the contrary, in our societies, as a marginalized but progressively empowered gender, women are often the main driving force of most social and cultural change. Non-heteronormativized people are taking on similar roles today.

The path to gender equality exposes both women and non-heteronormativized people to oppression and vulnerability. Additionally, women and people of non-heterosexual orientation, non-heterosexed bodies and non-heteronormativized genders are constantly subjected to very different and conflicting opinions of them, which prevent the development of coherent and socially validated identities. To preserve the integrity and internal consistency of their identities, these people are forced to constantly work to understand and contextualize the mixed messages they daily receive from others. This allows them to reconcile the different images of themselves that society reflects on them. Although we all are composed of multiple identities, when the identities to which we are assigned are degrading and contradictory, we must hold on to a stable reference point that will allow us to maintain the consistency of our beings, prevent us from feeling crazy, and allow us to survive.

Women and people of non-heterosexual orientation in heteropatriarchal societies are doubly discriminated against in the public sphere of their social and institutional interactions, as well as in the intimacy of their private relations. This discrimination results in a combined effect that can seriously affect the construction of their selves

[4] The terms *cisgender* and *cissexual* were coined to define the experience and identity of those who are not "*trans*", as an alternative to the sexist use of the term "normal", which would imply that transsexuals and transgenders are abnormal. Cisgender and cissexual are often used as synonyms. However, they refer to different experiences. "Cisgender" describes a person whose gender role or identity heteronormatively matches, according to the cultural patterns of the society of reference, the physical sex assigned at birth. A cissexual person, in contrast, is anybody who feels comfortable with the sexual anatomy s/he was born with. It is tempting to suppose that, at least, every cisgender is also cissexual; though, many transsexual persons are cisgender during some part of—or their entire—life. In addition, a cissexual person can either be a cisgender or a transgender.

because it acts on a deeper level and in a more devastating manner than it does for any other minorized group. Indeed, discrimination usually considers social communities as a whole, such as in the case of racial and religious prejudices. By affecting every member of a community, discrimination creates bonds of solidarity within it. Members of minorized communities are discriminated against in their interactions with the rest of society and its institutions, but they can usually rely on the support and comprehension of their communities and families.

Gender discrimination individually targets persons, and not just in the public sphere of their social and institutional interactions but also in the intimacy of their private relationships, isolating them from their communities and families. It is in this context that what is likely the main difference between the discrimination suffered by women and non-heteronormativized people appears. Whereas the discrimination these two groups face can be equally tragic in its effects-all of them can be abandoned, repudiated, abducted, assaulted and killed by their own families and communities—it differs in at least one way: heterosexual cissexual women are usually accepted by their families and communities until they fulfill the social expectations of the gender roles they have been assigned. Even in the most extreme of the heteropatriarchal societies, these women possess the opportunity of limited integration through submission and acceptance of the *status quo*, as unpleasant as this can be.

Non-heteronormativized persons are usually deprived of the support of their families and communities as soon as they are recognized as being non-heteronormativized. They are abandoned and exposed to the ruling heteronormativized social group, which constitutes the only legitimate citizenry in heterosexist societies and which includes cissexual heterosexual women. Due to their higher status, heterosexual cissexual women have more opportunities to make culturally approved decisions that can be personally meaningful. Nevertheless, to literally and metaphorically survive, both heteronormativized women and non-heteronormativized persons must fulfill the gender expectations of the community in which they live. In their societies of origin they are forced to comply with more or less marginalized and contemptuous gender identities and roles while being denied equal access to the options available to heterosexual cissexual men[5]. Once they move from one society to another they accede, often unwittingly, to a new life. They are reborn into a new gender mainframe and must reinvent themselves to adapt to it.

Indeed, differences in the cultural constructions of gender roles allow migrant women and persons who do not conform to heteronormativity to rethink, sometimes from scratch, their gender identities and social possibilities. Because the degree and type of freedoms and rights to which they have access changes from one society to another, the need for inclusion in a new society as well as the obligation to comply

[5] Even in the case of the Albanian sworn virgin, once women become the patriarchs of their families, they are still not considered equal to cissexual men nor offered the same opportunities. They are stripped of their sexuality, denied their right to love and are condemned to playing a gender role that they do not identify with in return for improved social status. This situation is similar to the experiences of heterosexual cissexual persons and many LGBTIQ persons of living in the closet.

with its gender norms can considerably alter the life trajectories, opportunities and even self-perceptions of women and persons who do not conform to heteronormativity.

Women and non-heterosexual, non-heterosexed, and non-cisgender people are subject to the continuously changing perspectives of *others* in their native and foreign host societies and are therefore prevented from achieving unified social identities. However, this game of identity manipulation can transform the experience of multiple gender discrimination into an opportunity for emancipation by revealing the arbitrariness of gender construction, whose significance appears modified, reduced, annulled or even inverted once taken out of its socio-cultural context of reference. Additionally, emancipation can be achieved by detecting the cross-cultural heteropatriarchal patterns that recur in the apparent variability of gender constructions globally.

7.4 Performative Gender: Socially Negotiated Identities and Strategies of "Feminization"

As a person of non-heterosexual orientation raised in a society where homosexual men often undergo "feminization"—the Neapolitan *femminielli*—I am well aware of the dynamics of the cultural imposition of gender norms and its psychosocial consequences. In Naples, men who love men are often required by their environment to act as women. They are stripped of their masculinity and expected to fit into the only alternative gender model recognized by the patriarchy to be reintegrated into society (La Cecla 2010).

By being feminized, homosexual men are situated below heterosexual men on the gender pyramid, preserving the superiority of heterosexual men as well as the equation between masculinity and heterosexuality. In this way, the notion of "man" does not need to be reconstructed to include the possibility of different sexual orientations. Additionally, the term "man" will refer to heterosexual men only, thus keeping heteronormativity safe.

What "masculinity" is supposed to mean, and how a woman should act, correspond to cultural constructs whose arbitrariness have been extensively discussed and demonstrated in gender studies (Butler 1990; Connell 1995; Fine 2010). However, I would like to highlight how the strategies of "feminization" of non-heterosexual men reveal interesting new perspectives. First, gender is indeed perceived as a performance. A man who acts and looks like a woman can be accepted as a special type of woman. Second, gender is associated with sexual orientation, more so than biological sex. Third, by "feminizing" homosexual men and assigning them to female gender roles, their homosexuality is annulled. Finally, gender roles are culturally determined and contextually assigned through negotiations among all of the actors involved.

From an anthropological perspective, the construction of the other always occurs in relation to the identity it differs from, because the two constructs mutually affect one another. Alterity is defined in opposition to what is perceived as the constitutive

identity's traits, reinforcing these instead of other traits that could be shared. Consequently, the self is re-constructed in opposition to what has been defined as the other (Amselle 1990; Bauman 2005; Boccardi 2011; Büschges 2005; Cargnello 2010; Castro 1983; Cunin 2003; Fabietti 1998; Olmos 2009; Remotti 1996; Valcuende 1998; Wilson 1998).

Similarly, in heterosexist societies, non-heterosexual and non-heterosexed gender identities have been contemptuously constructed in opposition to validated heteronormativized identities by highlighting their differences and hiding their similarities. The differences in *coitus*' "strategies" and the biological or chirurgical origin of the genitals are therefore considered the constitutive traits of the identity of the "other", eclipsing all of the emotional and meaningful human experience that they share and have in common with the rest of society. The sexualized identities of homosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals, transgendered, and intersexual people are therefore deprived of the opportunity to fully participate in the humanness reserved for heterosexual, cissexual and cisgendered people. Marked by the word "sexual" and a prefix defining it, these identities are described by compound words that explicitly describe sexual actions or conditions. This humiliating choice of words exerts an effect similar to that of the star imposed by the Nazis on the Jews: reminding the observer of a difference with the intention of provoking an adverse response to the idea of the "architectural issues" of sex between men and between women, as well as to the castration (usually associated in the collective imagination with transsexualism) and to the loss of virility resulting from the coexistence of masculine and feminine traits.

Rethinking the processes of construction, validation and attribution of non-heteronormative gender identities within an egalitarian non-heterosexist and non-heteronormative framework implies and inevitably affects the heterosexual cissexual person.

Indeed, because identities are situational and socially validated, any change in the context of reference and in the composition of the validating collectivity will force heterosexed, heterosexual, cisgender persons to restructure the representation of their gender identities in relation to the new context, from binary and heteronormative to plural and a-normative. Additionally, such reconstruction requires new, inclusive and non-heterosexist gender terminology and concepts to be mainstreamed through society.

7.5 A New Lexicon for Questioning Gender Categories: Cahllenging the Heteronormativity

There is currently a lively debate among gender researchers and activists regarding how "gay" people should be properly addressed (Beasley 2005). Indeed, as per the effect of a synecdoche, the colorful rainbow flag, symbol of plurality and diversity, is often paradoxically reduced to a generalist icon of male-homosexual freedom. However, who are the other subjects represented by the flag? In an attempt to deconstruct and overcome the one-size-fits-all image of a male-homosexualized

rainbow, the political discourses developed by activists, researchers and institutions opted to visibilize each and every identity. Four, but sometimes only three, of these identities have been progressively recognized. The labels of gay, lesbian, transsexual and bisexual are usually merged under the acronym LGBT or the discriminating GLT. The latter excludes bisexuality on the basis that it should be considered just a lesser grade of homosexuality or simply an invention. This is an effect of homophobic norms that prevent people from fully coming out as homosexual (Klesse 2007).

The *querelle* between the LGBT and GLT acronyms offers an enlightening example of how the act of naming carries several subtle implications, particularly in such a nuanced context. It is a matter of social justice to take them into account by being extremely careful when deciding what to name and how to name it. This is a duty we should honor when bringing to light what has been buried during centuries of oppression.

Although the LGBT acronym includes a vast majority of the varied people reunited under the rainbow umbrella, it still excludes or hides some of them while forcing others to unwillingly fit into tight boxes. The further we delve into diversity, the more subjects appear, rendering the length of an all-inclusive acronym nearly infinite. If equality is really an aim to be achieved, considering the reasons of each specificity within a common framework of inclusivity should be considered an imperative duty.

Similarly, having a sense of social justice should be considered a mandatory requirement for all those who are involved in developing identity politics. In our case, that would imply posing at least two corollary and sensitive questions: (1) which identities, and according to which criteria, should be included in or excluded from the acronym? and (2) among the included but hidden identities, is there any identity that deserves to be explicitly identified?

7.6 Toward a LGBTIQWA Movement

As an example of the reason why there is a need to pose the first corollary question, we can consider those persons who transitioned from the sex assigned to them at birth to the one they considered consistent with their gender identity. Do they think of themselves as transsexuals once their sexual transition ends? Some of them do not, and while still sympathizing with the LGBT movement, they would not like to be eternally associated with it—at least not with the "T" letter. If they are not heterosexual, many of them would likely still be a part of the movement as "L", "G" or "B". However, what happens when they are heterosexual?

Whereas being cisgender or cissexual does not imply being heterosexual, being transsexual or transgendered does not imply being non-heterosexual. Transsexual and transgendered persons may be lesbian, gay, bisexual or straight like anyone else because gender is not related to sexual orientation. One could be question whether merging LGB and T into the same acronym is appropriate. Would this alliance be beneficial? Or would it promote widespread confusion between gender identity and

sexual orientation, the common misconception that a non-cisgender identity is the effect or the cause of a non-heterosexual orientation?

From a heterosexist perspective, any person whose sexual orientation does not match the sex and gender assigned to them in a heteronormative society can be classified as transgendered. Just a few years ago it was common to refer to people in same-sex relationships as "inverted", implying that at least one member of the couple had adopted the role of the opposite sex. In many societies it is still common to consider same-sex couples as inverted. In Iran, where same-sex relationships are a crime punishable by death, homosexuals are "encouraged" to reestablish binary heteronormativity by changing their sex and gender with government-subsidized surgical interventions, even if they are neither transsexual nor transgender.

If heteronormative order is reestablished by exerting violence on people with "undesired" gender identities and sexual orientations, what happens when the menace comes from a non-heterosexed body?

Recently, the development of interdisciplinary gender studies provided intersexual persons with social and scientific arguments to conquer the taboos associated with their conditions. Once empowered, they began coming out within their communities and organizing themselves in associations, which lead to the addition of a new letter to the LGBT's acronym: "I". Being a natural physical condition, intersexuality should not be exposed to the discrimination suffered by LGBT people when accused of being voluntarily perverted or *degenerate*. Heteronormativity acts on intersexuality by classifying it as an incomplete sexed and sexual status or as a serious illness that requires immediate drastic surgical intervention even when there is no threat to the health of the newborn. Assuming the existence of only two natural healthy sexes is the core of any heteronormative discourse. Therefore, any evidence to the contrary constitutes a major threat and must be labeled as unnatural and sick with the utmost vehemence.

Depathologizing intersexuality would imply recognizing the existence of multiple-sexed bodies, breaking the binary mainframe oppressing non-heteroconforming people. Still, many believe that intersexuality, being a physical condition, differs from sexual orientation and gender identity, and refrain from accepting an "I" at the end of the LGBT acronym. Accepting intersexuality as a healthy condition would question the very founding principles of heteronormativity: the assumption that only two sexes exist and that they cannot coexist. By taking to the extreme the differences between men and women, and by essentializing them as biological in spite of recognizing them as merely cultural (Butler 1997), heteropatriarchal cultures rely on the assumption that only two diametrically opposed and complementary genders exist and that the origin of this difference is natural and divine, biological, and sacred. Therefore, such cultures cannot accept the coexistence in one body of corporal elements that are culturally considered as sexually antithetical. If genitals and other sexualized characteristics determine gender, a person with both "masculine" and "feminine" sexual traits would possess an amorphous gender, indefinable according to heteronormative categories and useless, if not disturbing, for the hetero-patriarchal social order. Intersexuality poses relevant questions to heterosexist biologicists: are there really only two sexes? If yes, why should they

not occasionally mix together? What if sexuation were a nuanced scale or composed of more than two shades?

Pointing to heteronormativity as the source of the discriminating labels that originated with the LGBTI identities, people identifying themselves as "Queer" or "Questioning" refuse to validate heteronormativity by accepting concepts such as homo-, bi-, trans- or intersexuality, alleging that they are only meaningful within an heteronormativized framework. Queer and Questioning persons wonder if it is worth playing by the oppressor's rules by naming every segment of the rainbow according to categories born out of a binary heterosexist vision of the world. From this perspective, as long as people accept labels assigned to them from the outside as part of their own inner identities, they will be defined by their experiences of discrimination and remain hostage to the framework supporting that discrimination. Therefore, Queer and Questioning people believe that the framed identities recognized by the acronym LGBTI cannot represent them and add one or two "Qs" at the end of it to feel included. However, many LGBTI persons consider that a strategy based on the politics of identity is incompatible with the questioning of such identities that adding a "Q" to the end of the acronym signifies. Thus, they refuse to add it.

However, adding a 'Q' could build bridges outside of the "rainbow community". Indeed, not being able to renegotiate the identities we were assigned by a heteropatriarchal society is likely the largest obstacle to forming another potentially fruitful but nonexistent alliance: the one between feminists and the LGBTIQ movement. Feminist groups are largely composed of cissexual women who are heterosexual, cisgender or transgendered. Transsexual women are usually not accepted into feminist groups on the basis that they bring "masculine" energy to the group. Cissexual non-heterosexual men and intersexual persons are similarly banned from feminist groups. Heteronormativized biology is still the main reference used by most feminists to define who and what a woman is, and being a woman is still viewed by many feminists as an essential prerequisite for admission.

Thus far, the feminist and LGBTI movements have developed parallel and complementary discourses. Too often, however, LGBTI activists are not knowledgeable in feminist theory, and many feminists fail to comprehend the varied nuances of each color of the rainbow. The misbalanced relations among the marginalized sexed, sexual and gendered collectives within the heteropatriarchal hierarchy, as well as the lack of opportunities for educated and informed dialogues among them in unfairly repressive heterosexist, male chauvinist environments, sometimes creates misunderstandings in which LGBTI persons have been accused by feminists of reproducing male chauvinism and misogyny despite reproducing heterosexist behaviors themselves[6]. Being part of a marginalized group does not preclude us

[6] A representative example is presented by the *cis-sexist* attacks launched by the lesbian feminist Janice Raymond on the transsexual Sandy Stone in 1979 due to her leading of a feminist group, the Olivia Records. Whereas trans theorists and feminists agree on the disassociation of genders and sexes, trans theorist sometimes present gender as a mold into which we must fit, feminist critics usually understand gender as variable, changeable and arbitrary because it is socially constructed. Gender studies recognize that most people have both feminine and masculine traits

from playing the oppressor role. Additionally, as "not being homophobic" does not imply "not being heterosexist", "not being transphobic" does not prevent us from "being cissexist".

If we assume that both heterosexism and male chauvinism are produced by the same matrix and sustain the same heteropatriarchal gendered pyramid of power, a "W" should be added to the acronym to include the heterosexual cisgender women who are not included in the other categories of the acronym but who are oppressed by misogynist gender norms (Hinds 1992; Munt 1998; Jaggar 1994). Acknowledging the need for a deeper inclusion of LGBTI issues in the feminist agenda, and vice versa, transfeminist theory is attempting to build bridges between all anti-patriarchal movements.

Finally, another possible addition is an 'A' for Ally, to indicate everyone who sympathizes with the movement, as well as for "Asexual", to refer to those persons who do not experience sexual attraction[7].

7.7 Non-heterosexed, Non-heterosexual, Non-heteronormativized: From Identity Politics to a Post-Identitarian Strategy of Supportive Alliances and Inclusive Solidarity

The 'T' shade of the rainbow provides us with an example of the concerns underlying the second corollary question. Should this letter be considered equally representative of transsexuals, the transgendered, and transvestities? Or should each of them be explicitly defined by having their own Ts added to the acronym?

It is not just about playing the alphabet game by adding or removing letters. It is about deconstructing and repairing how these groups are misperceived by society. Most people would likely be incapable of distinguishing a transsexual from a transvestite or transgendered person. However, the identities and experiences that these persons stand for are different. To undergo a surgical and hormonal treatment for sex reassignment is not the same as feeling comfortable in your body but not in the gender assigned by a heteronormative society. Additionally, neither situation is solely defined by the clothes one wears.

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and that different cultures do not agree on what "feminine" and "masculine" mean. Therefore, emancipation would come from depriving these traits of any binary gendered label that they were assigned and not from naturalizing or pursuing a masculine or feminine essence. However, the debate is more nuanced than just described, and many more positions are held, such as those of transfeminist critics who attempt to apply feminist discourses to transgender discourses, and vice versa (Scott-Dixon 2006).

[7] According to the Asexual Visibility & Education Network (2013), "asexuality is a sexual orientation. Asexual people have the same emotional needs as everybody else and are just as capable of forming intimate relationships".

In addition, whereas it is true that all transsexual persons are transgendered, it is untrue that all transgendered persons are transsexual. Therefore, to define every person under the 'T' as transsexual is incorrect because it more suits the prejudices of the observer than the reality of the observed, and it attempts to sexualize their identities as a new form of discrimination. Perceiving the sexualization of their identities, many are refusing to be identified as L, G, B, T or I.

The sexualization of non-heteronormativized persons is indeed another form of discrimination that is widespread in heteropatriarchal societies and also affects heterosexual cisgender women. To escape humiliating sexualized labels, many alternative expressions are being suggested. For example, men-who-have-sex-with-men, abbreviated as MSM, is rapidly gaining credibility in many contexts, such as in health care. Because it does not define the person but only describes a practice, MSM can be used by many men, irrespective of whether they identify as homosexual, bisexual or heteroflexible. Other proposals suggest replacing or completing the terms 'sex' and 'sexual' with terms such as 'love', 'emotional' and 'romantic'. Women-who-love-women, homo-emotional, sexual-and-emotional-orientation, romantic attraction, ambiromantic are just a reduced excerpt of the rich vocabulary that is flourishing to highlight the many other dimensions involved in intimate relationships.

Having such an intense and lively debate that generates a varied number of possible acceptations and positions, I refrain as much as possible from using expressions that could be perceived as controversial. Additionally, I strongly believe that terminology should be appropriate to each context. Even if the political scenario would be better described by terms such as gay, lesbian or homosexual when advocating for equality and rights, a highly specialized context such as that of gender studies should be more receptive, and capable of processing and assimilating terms and concepts that go far beyond the usual and basic jargon employed by politicians, the media and public opinion. With the aim of being as inclusive as possible of diversity as well as of the perceptions of diversity, I prefer to use expressions such as 'non-heterosexual', 'non-heterosexed', and 'non-heteronormativized' to refer to those people whose bodies, sexualities and genders do not fulfill the expectations of a heternormative society. In addition, I play with slight variations of those expressions to avoid proposing them as rigid categories. Instead, I employ them as descriptive, non-normative word choices.

Many of the terms and labels currently used by gender researchers, LGBTIQWA activists, and feminist critics can trigger debates when used outside of their specific contexts, achieving the counterproductive effect of dividing more than they unite. Expressions such as 'non-heterosexual', 'non-heterosexed' and 'non-heteronormativized' have much potential because they are transversal and inclusive. They are vague enough to be applied to all of the concepts and identities we have dealt with, yet they are highly and explicitly critical of heteronormativity, heterosexism and heteropatriarchy.

These terms can be proudly used by those who develop identity politics because they are technically correct in defining all those who identify themselves as LGBTIQWA and not offensive to heterosexual cisgender persons. However, due to the critical potential they imply, they can also serve the purposes of those who identify as Queer or Questioning (Dilley 2002). By asserting the negation of heteronormativity,

these expressions represent potent educational tools that could train us to refrain from regressing to the terms of heterosexuality, heterosexuation, and cisgender as references for defining our own identities, sexual orientations and sexes. Meanwhile –at least until heteronormativity is mainstreamed in our societies and cultures– these terms can provide the LGBTIQWA movement with a more inclusive common lexical ground on which all of the terms defining the diverse multiplicity of sexes, sexualities and genders can exist. While still progressively differentiating in our march toward self-assigned affirmative identities, we would feel represented by refusing to be invalidated by heterocentric perspectives. This climate of advancing specification and stronger alliances, as Raewyn Connell (1995) proposes, would create the perfect scenario for erasing the source of all gender discrimination encompassed by the heteropatriarchy.

7.8 Intra- and Inter-cultural Interactions as a Key to Gender Deconstruction

The increasing interactions among the world's societies do not only occur in the context of progressive political and economic globalization. Each of us, both through the virtuality of social networks and media and through the reality of collective and individual practices—such as migration, tourism or even that xenophile, utopian and overrated cultural consumption or consumerism which is known as cosmopolitanism—can be the architect and the witness of several situations of contact among different cultures.

Because gender is the fundamental principle of social organization in heteronormative patriarchal societies and because it still plays an important role in those societies that are progressively eradicating heterosexism and male chauvinism, it is possible to suppose that all human interactions occur in gendered contexts. Indeed, by determining the gendered identities and roles of every person, as well as by regulating, through gendered norms, how interactions occur depending on the gender attributes of each person involved, gender mainframes exert a constant and ubiquitous influence on intra- and intercultural interactions, most likely even more powerfully than exerted by race and religion.

Whereas gender mainframes usually remain transparent to people in intra-cultural interactions, they emerge as an element of contrast in intercultural relations. Because we are taught about gender constructions from our first days of life, and because the social structures in which we grow up are typically built according to those gender constructions, it is difficult to detect the arbitrariness of "culturally constructed, socially imposed" gender mainframes in our daily intra-cultural interactions. On the contrary, even when intercultural contacts occur among equally sexist societies, the comparison between different gender models will likely result in enlightening reflections about the arbitrariness of any gender representation.

Intercultural interactions do not only occur among local and foreign societies. They can also occur within a society, among its communities and groups, as well as in their interactions with the norms and institutions of the collective "imagined

community" (Anderson 1991) of which they are a part. "Imagined communities" can be either expressions of the ruling social group or constructed according to what is commonly perceived as representative of the society.

Although non-egalitarian societies tend to describe themselves as monocultural—ascribed to a homogenous culture devoid of any internal variation and isolated from the outside—every society is inevitably multicultural. Therefore, egalitarian societies have no other option than to admit and defend their internal cultural heterogeneity, on top of which the heterogeneous cultures of migrated persons lay, as well as the influence of the foreign societies with which they relate.

This overexposure to different and diversified cultures multiplies our gender experiences, allowing us to reflect on the arbitrariness of gender construction. By pursuing the pacific coexistence of different gender models—either locally developed or imported through immigration—while promoting equality, liberal egalitarian democratic and openly multicultural societies provide the best possible context for the empowerment and emancipation of women and persons of non-heterosexual orientation, non-heteronormativized gender or non-heterosexed bodies. It is interesting to note that whereas some migrants continue to comply with the gender patterns characteristic of the society from which they come, other migrants take advantage of the pluralism of the relatively liberal and egalitarian democracies into which they settle and emancipate themselves from superimposed models, strengthening bonds with those who share similar gender experiences irrespective of ethnicity, class, and culture. To recognize that they belong to marginalized identities is the first step in establishing ties with other persons in the same or similar situations. Unraveling the processes of construction and deconstruction of identities thus becomes a necessary operation in intervening more or less consciously with themselves. A process of reinvention is ultimately required to avoid transforming identities into cells in which we look for shelter in exchange for an overrated and overpaid security, and allows them to instead be cognitive vehicles for exploring reality.

Demonstrating, analyzing, and deconstructing the cultural constructions of the societies in which we live requires a complex strategy of estrangement and immersion in them simultaneously. Indeed, we are not able to perceive the arbitrariness of our cultures until we remove ourselves from them. However, it is necessary to periodically return and re-immerse ourselves in them to deepen our experience of their cultural constructs and in this way to understand and unveil the innermost mechanisms that shape our lives (Berger 2009).

7.9 Gendered Citizenships

Seeking the most effective institutional framework to ensure civil coexistence and respect for diversity in a liberal and egalitarian democracy, we should start by analyzing the relationships among the different actors within those societies that explicitly define themselves as multicultural.

From this perspective, interaction with the other involves agreeing not to exercise exclusive rights over a territory, a society or its institutions to live together and share resources with other groups on an equal basis (Kymlicka 1995).

The demand for sharing the administration of the *res publica* with those social actors who until recently were perceived as outsiders or marginal is the leading cause of the insurgence of a collective insecurity that is boosting the return to all-phobic movements in many traditionally democratic societies[8]. Such movements have often resulted in political parties whose main aim is the promotion and defense of what they contextually identify as the genuine identity of the nation (Berecz and Domina 2012). Whereas self-pityingly claiming an institutional reaction to the threat supposed by sharing the administration of the *res publica* with the others—usually described as a menace of decomposition and alteration of the social order–, they also aggressively impose their priorities and identities as the only ones accredited for citizenship and public recognition. Thus, by limiting the recognition of democratic rights only to the collectives identified as eligible according to their subjective criteria—instead of extending them to the entire population–, they convert rights into elite privileges assigned according to racist, heterosexist, and male chauvinist criteria, emptying them of any democratic value. Their simplistic and essentialized vision of nationhood ignores the complex plurality of every society. In addition, it unrealistically and irresponsibly holds on to exclusive monocultures and mono-identities that are idealized as immutable and impermeable, even if they never existed as such (Anderson 1991; Roosens 1989)[9].

Contemporary multicultural societies are therefore currently configured as arenas of conflict not only among identities but also and particularly among different

[8] To start exploring the recent raise of extremist all-phobic parties across Europe and USA, as well as a couple of African examples, about the explosive mixture represented by the fusion of nationalism with heterosexism, please see Faiola (2012), Traynor (2010), Stein (2012), McKaiser (2012), Ford and Allen (2012).

[9] A critique of the mono-ethnoculturalism of the Nation-States can be attempted also by drawing up a morphology of the frontier (Olmos 2009). Through the analysis of the notion of geopolitical and cultural frontiers at different times, contexts and societies, both the regulator role of frontiers in the relationship between identity and "otherness"—the identity of the other—as well as its relation with the processes of constructing, perceiving and attributing identities can be questioned (Troin 2003). In my previous research (Boccardi 2011), through the adoption of alternative and marginalized perspectives as a medium of contrast, I attempted to deconstruct the notions of citizenship and nationality, multiculturalism and civil rights, as well as to re-signify the phenomena of *métissage* and hybridization (Laplantine 1997; Mörner 1967; Ruano 2004) or to explore the difference between minoritized and minority groups or globalization and glocalization. The multiplication of perspectives is indeed a useful strategy in order to question hegemonic and mainstream thinking within social sciences. It can be implemented by promoting interdisciplinary as well as intercultural dialogues and discourses. Academically, fundamental issues should be analyzed considering perspectives from as many disciplines as possible. Working with interculturality and gender, these branches of knowledge should always be considered: anthropology and ethnography, gender and feminist studies, psychology and health, political, and social sciences, philosophy, linguistics, economics and law, literature and theories of translation. Interculturality should be approached by performing extensive multilingual and multicultural research to draw informations from as many societies and cultures as possible.

models of identity. Attempting a simplified binary classification, we can distinguish at least two models. In the first model, the only acceptable identities are those perceived as fixed and validated by traditions, apparently frozen in the shape they were forged by past generations and community founders. The second model questions the existence of homogenous and unchangeable identities and refuses to conform to them as if they were pre-established and pre-assigned (Derrida 2004). Under the latter perspective, identities are changeable, continuously in progress, intersected by multiple frontiers that generate points of contact with a variety of othernesses and identities, and should be validated day by day to adapt them to the changes that will challenge their survival (Anzaldua 1999; González 2006).

In the current scenario, the alarming rise of racist, classist, heterosexist, male chauvinist and patriarchal, intolerant, nationalistic parties can be interpreted either as the effect of the increasing clashes between different identities and identitarian models as well as a reaction to the exclusion of the discriminating claims of the agendas of the major political parties in liberal, egalitarian democracies. In this sense it would represent a symptom of a positive drop, and not of an alarming rise, in the social consensus on discrimination. Excluded by national politics, all-phobic movements can be prompted to seek self-representation (Caldwell 2010; Tibi 2003, 2008; Ye'Or 2007).

Unfortunately, in the case of LGBTIQWA people, prejudices against them are commonly also shared by the wider public, religious authorities and politicians. As argued by Richardson (1998), one of the main characteristics of Western democracies is the hegemonic privilege of heterosexuality. Indeed, as Nuno S. Carneiro and Isabel Menezes ((2007, p. 68) note, heterosexism is often so embedded within a society's institutions, cultures and norms that "an individual's sexual status limits his or her access to citizenship rights". Partial citizenships, conceded according to the sexual status of a person, are also those assigned to women in male chauvinist, misogynist societies. Heteropatriarchal societies thus compose a system of gendered citizenships; a system of multiple citizenships statuses, discriminatingly differentiated and assigned according to the sexed condition of the body, the sexual orientation of feeling and emotions, and gender identity of their citizens.

7.10 Toward a Different Model of Citizenship

To deconstruct the oppressive hierarchical and framed gender structure on which the heteropatriarchy lays, we must escape the temptation to conform to the reassuring, yet tight, identities that are socially hetero-attributed to us. As Raewyn Connell (2005) suggests, we should question those hetero-assigned identities and feel free to create and assign to ourselves our own identities. By nurturing each of our specificities, we will increasingly fragment ourselves into a multiplicity of segmented identities, and by allowing our identities to grow outside of the hetero-assigned box, we will intersect other identities and alterities, initiating dialogues that could develop into alliances. Paradoxically, by progressively enhancing each of our differences,

we would discover more points in common with those we believed was the Other. Nurturing these intersectional bonds would ultimately create a network of solidarity and mutual comprehension within the diverse plural categories into which each society is split, strengthening the interconnections among its members.

In addition, because processes of exclusion and marginalization are directly linked to the imposition of heteropatriarchal discriminating gender identities and gendered citizenships, understanding the processes of identity construction as well as of self—versus hetero-attribution (Deschamps 1997; Vermeulen 1994) should be considered a matter of social justice, and a primary one. Similarly, reconsidering the frontiers between identity and alterity as temporary and situational should be considered a key strategy in the struggle for equality. The perception of diversity as a resource or problem offers a measure of the grade of acceptance of different gender identities, sexualities and sexed bodies and therefore, of a society's maturity. Thus, to guarantee pluralism and democracy, problems arising from the promotion and respect of human diversity should be faced and solved, not instrumentalized or avoided with the aim of preserving an unequal and unfair *status* quo.

Human diversity is not easy to manage. As Will Kymlicka (1991, 1995a, b, 2006, 2007, 2008; Kymlicka and Norman 2000) found, one of the most recurrent issues in multicultural societies is created by the lack of coherence and consistency of the demands claimed by the various voices that pluralism legitimizes; petitions that cannot, obviously, be always satisfactorily and equally seconded. Being able to reconcile the conflicting interests of different groups with the available resources—concrete or symbolic, material or cultural—in liberal and egalitarian democratic societies requires us to be arbiters of complex questions. For example, how should the institutions of a state act in conflicts arising between the collective rights of cultural minorities and the individual rights recognized for each citizen as members of that state? Should the state prefer to protect those individual rights, even if by doing so it violates the autonomy recognized for certain minor or minorized communities or groups? Or should it recognize the collective rights, vehicles of meaningful options, cultures and norms as a priority or, at least, as the context according to which the rights of the members of a community should be defined?

The answers are not simple. Many would be tempted to argue that individual rights recognized by the state should prevail. However, under a transcultural perspective, rights recognized by the state constitute a type of collective rights. They are defined by the majority running the state and express the norms that are specifically meaningful to the ethnic, religious or economic ruling social group. Similarly, laws proposed and established as neutral may instead reproduce cultural bias. Therefore, by applying indiscriminately the norms agreed by the majority of society to all the minor and minorized groups, we would impose certain collective rights over others, condemning those groups to a forced isolation or assimilation until their final extinguishment and extinction.

Pluralism and equal opportunities would consequently come under attack, threatening the rights and freedoms of a part of the citizenry, which would play a role in how the options available to them as members of their communities are progressively reduced and marginalized (Hirsi Ali 2006). Any culture directly affects the

autonomy of its members, which create their own life trajectories by choosing from the options available in their culture(s) of reference. If a culture is marginalized, the options that it offers will also be marginalized, marginalizing the lives of those who identify with it. It is important to remember that this lesson does not apply only to those groups traditionally recognized by the political discourses, such as the ethnic, national or religious communities. Every segment of a population that is discriminated against, segregated, criminalized, inferiorized, marginalized, persecuted or excluded by the rest of society constitutes a minority or a minorized group (Osborne 1996). Women and non-heteronormativized persons offer a good example of this. Irrespective of their origins, beliefs, education, health or socioeconomic positions, they share a common experience of different grades of violence and oppression, which implies, at the least, not enjoying the same opportunities nor having access to the same options that heterosexual cisgender men possess.

The relativity of the individual rights recognized by the state also becomes apparent when different legal systems of several states are compared or when they infringe on human rights. Much has been said regarding the apparent contradiction existing between universal human rights and the cultural relativism promoted by postcolonial anthropology (Herskovits 1948; Juliano 1994; Osborne 1996; AAA 1947; Washburn 1987; Bidney 1974; Schurr 2004). As a result of imperialism and colonialism, cultural relativists began a heath-felt *mea culpa*, apologizing for Western ethnocentrism, racism, sexisms, classism and many other multiple discriminations that affected and are still affecting specific marginalized social groups, recognizing that as an effect of this, not all cultures or their communities of reference are equally valued and empowered around the world or within multicultural societies (Gliozzi 1977; Moré 2007). Whereas cultural relativists are correct in arguing that discriminated communities and cultures should be protected from external interferences and have recognized the autonomy they deserve, we should not go so far as to state that no transcultural judgment can be made. Cultural relativism should remind us of the necessity of correctly situating into the appropriate cultural context any transcultural judgment or action but should never be employed as an excuse to allow any unfair or unequal treatment justified as necessary to preserve a cultural difference. Indeed, even South African apartheid was imposed as a means of preserving ethnic purity and the survival of traditional cultures. Discrimination against women is still justified as necessary to preserve the social order of certain communities, and the same argument is used to criminalize and pathologize non-heterosexed, non-heterosexual and non-cisgender persons.

As Rossberry William (1991) notes, cultural traits are never situated in emptiness. They are always contextualized within the framework of power relations. Cultures are always the expressions of the forces ruling, sometimes hegemonically, a community. Therefore, it should never be assumed for any official national, ethnic or religious culture to be uncritically interiorized and passively accepted by all members of its community of reference. On the contrary, acknowledging the not always fair, liberal and democratic game of powers that underlines the affirmation within a community of certain cultural norms and values should prompt us to submit claims made in the name of the preservation of any culture's purity to the same critical analysis reserved to any other expression of power.

After all, as Virginia Maquieira (1998) remarks by relaunching the invitation posed by Henrietta Moore (1991), the utmost value given by postcolonial cultural relativists to cultural difference itself should be revalued, relativized and de-escalated. Indeed, if we consider that cultural difference constitutes just one of many differences, such as race, gender or class, why should we allow in its name the reproduction of inequalities that we convened to refrain from reproducing in the name of the others? The solution may lay in the redefinition of the notion of citizenship according to fewer common values. Ethno-cultural diversity, for example, should be respected by separating the concept of nationality from that of citizenship (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Brubaker 1992), exactly as it occurred in most democracies struggling between church and state, which successfully lead to non-confessional states respectful of all religions (Weber 2001). In the case of gender, we should dissociate the heteropatriarchal order from that of the state and legitimize alternative perspectives to the heterosexist, *male chauvinist*, and patriarchal ones. By applying this approach, it would be possible to attribute to the state the function of an administrative unit given the main responsibility of being a guarantor of everyone's rights and purged of other superimposed attribution, whether religious, ethnic, gendered or ideological.

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Links

Asexual Visibility & Education Network, http://www.asexuality.org/home/.

Part IV
Identity and Home: Subjectivities on the Move

Chapter 8
Origins, Journey, and Home: The Issue of Identity in the Work of Three Diasporic "African-Indian" Women Writers

Lisa Caputo

8.1 Introduction

Two sets of keywords are particularly important in postcolonial studies, that is margins/periphery and center/metropolis. The first set identifies former colonies such as India, while the latter stands for the former "homelands" such as England. It is easy to understand how these definitions describe a hierarchy in which two completely different and unequal worlds coexist with various power relations. Although these concepts originated during the colonial period, they remain valid and reflect current cultural debates. Postcolonial studies analyze the "intellectual power" dynamics between the margins/periphery and the center/metropolis.

In certain cases, however, the existing consequences of the shared history of Europe and the rest of the world have become highly complex because of internal migration towards different areas of a single colonial empire. During the colonial period, following the economic needs of the homeland, both British and French colonizers facilitated various forms of internal migrations among their empires' different countries. These flows occurred in different periods, as a result of dissimilar politics. The colonial powers encouraged the "free" migration of skilled workers and traders, and resorted to indentured laborers[1], especially after the abolition of

[1] Indentured laborers (coolies) signed temporary contracts, but they often essentially lived and worked as slaves. In his analysis of the various Indian migrations over time and space, Jarayam classifies the different migratory flows from India to Africa into two categories. He speaks about an induced/provoked diaspora and another facilitated by colonial power. The difference lies in the diverse degrees of coercion employed in the migration processes. The coolies or indentured laborers were part of the first group, whereas the small traders and skilled workers were part of the second. The author uses the word "diaspora" as a synonym for "migration", but he underlines two differences between the two terms. First, there is a numerical discrepancy (the migration of a single

L. Caputo (✉)
University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy
e-mail: lisacaputo@libero.it

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slavery. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and, above all[2], the Mauritius Islands were the African countries most affected by these phenomena.

Despite the important consequences of these migrations, the history of East Africa Indians has received scant attention. A deeper analysis of these events would add useful elements to achieving a more complete definition of "postcoloniality". To this end, I will examine several works by Ananda Devi, Nathacha Appanah and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, whom I define as "African-Indian" women writers.

8.2 Widening the Postcolonial Frame Through a Simplifying Definition

Albeit in a discontinuous and complex manner, colonial power and its diversified manifestations produced cultural forms that can be defined as "hybrid" in a broad sense. This "hybridity" affected—and still affects—both the colonized and the colonizers, even when the latter do not acknowledge it clearly. These hybrid forms that originated during the colonial period have been characterized by certain specific aspects, which remain in use and are useful to understand the general setting of the contemporary debate on culture and identity.

To clarify the power relationships between the metropolis and the periphery/ies embedded in this hybridity, postcolonial scholars employ a specific and important tool, that is, a critical re-reading of literary works through which both the writings of the "colonial" heritage and the "new postcolonial" writers' works are analyzed in depth.

Ananda Devi, Nathacha Appanah and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown are postcolonial and migrant authors[3]. They were born in Africa (Mauritius and Uganda, both countries formerly subjected to a colonial power), but they now live and work in Europe,

individual is not a diaspora), and second, the word "diaspora" cannot apply to the displacement of a "dominant" people, that is, the colonizers were not "diasporic" (Jayaram 2011, p. 234 ff).

[2] The Indians who arrived in Mauritius were not more numerous than elsewhere, but, considering the current ethnic composition of the country, they are the largest ethnic group.

[3] "Diasporic" is the term I prefer to use in Alibhai-Brown's case. Conveying an impression of a loss of Paradise and a never-ending search for a "home", the word "diaspora" may add various nuances to the simple concept of migration. However, it is noteworthy to stress a broader meaning than this. In an interesting article, Avtar Brah and Ann Phoenix state: "A related development is associated with valorisation of the term diaspora. The concept of diaspora is increasingly used in analysing the mobility of peoples, commodities, capital and cultures in the context of globalisaton and transnationalism. The concept is designed to analyze configurations of power—both productive and coercive—in 'local' and 'global' encounters in specific spaces and historical moments. [In Brah's Cartographies of Diaspora, Contesting Identities] the intersection of [the] three terms ['diaspora', 'border' and 'politics of home'] is understood through the concept of "diaspora space" which covers the entanglements of genealogies of dispersal with those of 'staying put'. […] Importantly, the concept of 'diaspora space' embraces the intersection of 'difference' in its variable forms, placing emphasis upon emotional and psychic dynamics as much as socio-economic, political and cultural differences" (Brah and Phoenix 2004, p. 83).

where their books have been published. Locating these three authors' origins and ethnic-cultural belonging is far from easy; therefore, the decision to define them as "African-Indian" is problematic[4]. None of them were born on the Subcontinent and they do not share the same citizenship. Their work enters the postcolonial discourse either as an example of an Indoceanic Mauritian identity within the frame of "Francophony"—Appanah and Devi—or as an example of an "eccentric" identity within the English metropolis—Alibhai-Brown. However, the three authors are the result of the above-mentioned internal migrations between different parts of a single colonial empire. Only in this limited and partial sense, that is, by basing this labeling on their ancestral origins, can the three women be regarded as "Indians". Moreover, if we consider their geographical origins, they have to be considered "Africans".

Nonetheless, defining the authors' identities through their ancestral origins and birthplaces may help to identify the different colonial influences that shaped these places. This approach is useful for broadening the postcolonial cultural context in which these three writers and their works are inserted. The migration and its consequences are elements linked to the (new) settlers dwelling in Africa, adding new and different facets to the idea of an "Indian identity". These "doubly hybrid" cultures are characterized by specific phenomena, that is, a mix of nostalgia and hope, the inability to constantly locate their origins—which are often forged by their ancestral language or traditional food—and the need to create a permanent emotional relationship with the "new" place. All of these elements help to thoroughly describe more complex postcolonial geography/ies. The pluralistic relationship amongst the "center" and its "margins" is re-defined by the multiplication of key elements. We are now required to account for two peripheries, namely "India" and "Africa"—which include Mauritius and Uganda—and two metropolises, namely "England" and "France"[5]. This new vision also establishes an emotional hierarchy between real and imagined homelands. In this case, "India" does not evoke an immediate and concrete reality, but rather a broad and vague notion of a homeland shaped by the migrant group's shared memories[6]. Moreover, the relationship with the "new" continent and its different countries produced new images of belonging and identity.

Departing from a wide and radically aleatory conception of what "ethnic" identity is, this paper groups together three writers that are very different from one another. Such a perspective contributes additional value. For biographical reasons—essentially to be a woman, from a former colony, inserted in the general context through marginal belonging—the three authors have repeatedly confronted themselves with identity-related themes. Therefore, they have developed a multifaceted and complex approach to "identity". When explicitly considered, this issue

[4] This labeling is doubly forced, as highlighted placing both "Indian" and "African" within quotation marks.

[5] Two metropolises characterized by two different colonial tongues. It is noteworthy that the authors' choice to adopt a specific colonial language has consequences for both the literary landscape in which these writers are inserted and the number and cultural specificities of their potential readers.

[6] Some African Indian settlers left the Subcontinent before the 1947 Partition. Additionally, some individuals of Indian "origin" never returned to their ancestors' country.

is deepened through the addition of numerous facets and a more attentive awareness of the political implications of its use. These authors' critical stance regarding general concepts such as "culture", "identity" and "tradition" seems to be based on an open attitude regarding differences. This distinctive viewpoint allows for a non-dogmatic approach to these phenomena. This focus will be useful to underline certain elements linked to the general discourse on identity, as well as to dismantle a certain vision of the very concept of identity.

At this point, however, it is necessary to underline certain important differences related to the three authors, which risk being neglected by this generalizing labeling. The two areas considered here—namely Uganda and the Mauritius Islands—differ in many ways. Even before the Indian migrants' arrival, these countries presented various ethnic and cultural settings. They experienced different types of historical backgrounds and specific colonial vicissitudes. All of these factors resulted in significant consequences both for the migrants' lives during the colonial period and for the histories of the migrations—as well as for the "postcolonial" identities—of the three writers. The historical differences are primarily associated with the ethnic compositions of the two areas. The Mauritius Islands were uninhabited until the beginning of the sixteenth century and never had an "indigenous" or "native" people, although settlers arrived in subsequent waves[7]. Consequently, contemporary Mauritian society can be defined as "pluricultural/multicultural"[8]. Conversely, Uganda was already inhabited when the colonizers arrived.

In Mauritius, the double colonization has had, among other implications, important linguistic consequences, whereas in Uganda the most relevant outcome of British rule was the subsequent double migration—which also continues to influence the citizenship of persons of Indian descent. It is worth to emphasize the different consequences on the related linguistic issues. First, despite the British colonization, the three authors use different colonial tongues in their work. Furthermore, especially in radically multilinguistic contexts such as Mauritius, the consequences of the intracolonial migrations render it all the more difficult to define "mother

[7] The Indians arrived in Mauritius during two periods characterized by different colonial powers. At the beginning of the XVII century, the French engaged skilled workers to construct the *île de France* (Mauritius), whereas black slaves were used on the plantations. In 1814, the island became an English colony. In the first half of the XIX century, following the abolition of slavery, the British encouraged the migration of indentured laborers who worked in the sugarcane plantations. The island achieved independence in 1968.

[8] Regarding Mauritius, a fundamental question is to ascertain whether the island should be considered "hybrid" or simply "multicultural". The latter is likely the more appropriate definition. In Mauritius there are various "ethnic" groups, which distinguish themselves from one another through their "spoken" languages. The Indian community is the most numerous group, which accounts for approximately 70% of the total population and represents the dominant ethnic group in a political sense. This main Indian group comprises subgroups that differ according to their ancestral origins and "spoken" language. The "black mestizo" community is the next largest, and the last group are the descendants of French colonizers. The official languages are English and French, used mostly at a cultivated level. Undoubtedly, the common tongue is Mauritian Creole, which is spoken by all islanders, regardless of their "ethnic" origins. See Bhat and Bhaskar (2011, pp. 114–124).

tongue". There are many languages that occupy different positions according to their diverse usage within the society.

Regarding the citizenship issue, it must be emphasized that different historical motivations lie at the origins of these authors' migration to Europe. Unlike Appanah and Devi, in Yasmin Alibhai-Brown's case, migration was not a free choice, but the result of the Indians' expulsion from Uganda, after its independence. Therefore, it is possible to indentify a discrepancy between migration and something definable as "exile". All this bears consequences for the authors' concrete citizenship and their elaborations of what can be defined as "homeland".

Other important differences are linked to the three authors' diverse aims and their dissimilar "intellectual roles". Their different narrative styles stem from these divergences. While Alibhai-Brown is a political commentator, the texts considered here are autobiographical. However, Appanah and Devi describe themselves as writers and their primary literary products are novels.

Appanah and Devi occupy different positions in the Mauritian literary scene. The former is a young and emerging author who has written four novels[9], while the latter has published numerous works and is one of the most incisive voices in Mauritian narrative fiction. While both can speak perfect English, they use French as their literary linguistic medium[10] and are part of "Francophony", an undefined area that groups together authors who use French, even when they were not born in metropolitan France (Ramharai 2008, pp. 19–38). It is interesting to note that both writers have been subjected to similar intellectual interpretations, through which they have shifted from the periphery to the center, as is evident considering the trajectory of

[9] Three of Appanah's works will be considered here. Among them, both her first and last novels are linked to historical events. In her *Les Rochers de Poudre d'Or,* she describes a foundation moment in the island's history, that is, the arrival of a group of Indian indentured laborers at Mauritius (for additional information on the symbolic foundation of the common history of Mauritius, see Valérie Magdelaine-Andrianjafitrimo 2004). In *Le dernier frère,* Appanah locates the friendship between two little boys within the framework of the "deportation" of a group of Jews from Mauritius. In December 1940, a boat called the "Atlantic" arrived at Mauritius, carrying approximately 1500 Jews. The British Foreign Office and the British Colonial Office denied them the right to enter Palestine because they had been considered irregular migrants. Deported from one colony to another, they remained imprisoned in the Beau Bassin's detainment camp until August 1945, when they were finally able to reach Israel. In contrast, *La noce d'Anna*—a story told in the first person—is set in France and narrates the events of a single day. Sonia, the protagonist, is a Mauritius-born writer. On the day of her daughter Anna's marriage, she recalls the phases of her own and interrogates her own feelings, past and future.

[10] This multilingualism is typical of Mauritius. Although the various ethnic groups are identified through their ancestral tongues, their everyday language is Mauritian Creole. The island's official tongue is English, used in the administrative system and schools, which are largely based on the British system. The ancestral tongues are protected by the state and taught both in state schools and institutes managed by the cultural organizations of the various linguistic groups. However, they are not always spoken or understood. For example, when Devi was a child—as she stated in an interview—her mother spoke to her in Telugu, an Indian tongue not common in Mauritius. Eventually, the author completely forgot it and therefore no longer speaks it.

their European publications[11]. Notwithstanding some relevant differences, the two authors have often told the stories of marginal individuals, speaking "in the name of" subalterns[12]. Another common element is that both present a vision of Mauritian nature through an anti-exotic framework. Their descriptions, underlining the violent and unpleasant aspects of nature on the island, are very distant from the image of Mauritius advertised in travel brochures.

8.3 Nathacha Appanah: An Attempt to Escape from "Exoticized" Identities

«You are very simply refused the right to tell your origins to get lost»[13].

In her books, Nathacha Appanah[14] devotes substantial attention to themes such as memories, exclusion and journeys—which can unhinge cultural and social identities. However, "identity" *per se* is not a theme of interest for her. Although her approach to identity is implicit, the final outcome is thought provoking.

La noce d'Anna contains the most explicit elements of a critical reading of the "identity" issue found in Appanah's novels[15]. In this book, through Sonia's voice, Appanah expresses a rejection of an annoying "ethnicized" identity in favor of a

[11] Their novels were first published by Gallimard in its "Continents noirs" series. Appanah's most recent novel was published by the famous Editions de l'Olivier, and Devi's appeared in the Gallimard's series "La grande blanche". Regarding the exoticism implied by the selection criteria of publishing houses, see Waters (2008, pp. 55–74).

[12] In her "Can the Subaltern Speak?", Gayatri Spivak investigated the vicissitudes of the subaltern's "voice" within the framework of official historiography. In the literary frame, however, the "subaltern's voice" is not a particularly controversial issue. In the domain of fiction, while some problems linked to representation remain, something closely resembling the subaltern's voice can be expressed by the creative decisions of authors through an "odd" medium: the language. For example, Devi clearly depicts "marginal" stories but in French, although she states that this would not be possible in real life.

[13] «On vous refuse tout simplement le droit de dire merde à vos origines» (Appanah 2005, pp. 132–133). Unless otherwise indicated, translations from French are mine.

[14] Nathacha Devi Pathareddy Appanah was born in 1973 in Mauritius to a family of Indian heritage. She currently lives in France, where she works as a journalist and writer.

[15] *Les rochers de Poudre d'Or* and *Le dernier frère,* Appanah's two "historical" works, address identities as if these were matters of fact, something exterior as long as they do not result from the individual's inner questioning. There are different identities—"ethnic", social, linked to gender and caste—and they occasionally clash, or may vacillate when subjected to new conditions. In *Les rochers de Poudre d'Or,* for example, the wealthy Indian princess Ganga becomes a poor indentured laborer, and she is ultimately obliged to become her master's concubine. In contrast, some characters simply exist for themselves, and while they had specific ethnic origins and identities, these elements are not key to the development of the story. This is the case in *Le dernier frère,* where the protagonist and narrative voice of Indian heritage, Raj, describes his friendship with David, a Jewish boy, this way: "we were *two children of misfortune* thrown together by a miracle, by accident" (from *The Last Brother,* translated by Geoffrey Strachan, London, MacLehose Press, 2010. The French text reads: "nous étions *deux enfants du malheur* accolés l'un à l'autre par miracle, par accident", Appanah 2007, p. 144, emphasis added). In these words, suffering is the

lighter "personal" identity. The protagonist asserts herself exactly by negating her "ethnic" identity.

As underlined by the Indian-born philosopher, Uma Narayan (1997)—who is now part of U.S. academia–Western scholarship typically has different expectations of "Third-World people". While Narayan speaks of a specific context, some of her considerations might be applied more generally. First, the definition of "Third World subjects" in Western contexts is often extremely broad and vague, grouping together several different situations. On the one hand, this vision obliterates numerous differences. On the other, it identifies other diversities as significant, thus establishing selective criteria. Narayan, for example, affirms that at times she has been accorded various roles—emissary, mirror and authentic insider—based on various elements of her (perceived) identity. Obviously, these roles do not stem from an explicit choice by either Western academia or Third World persons. Above all, they should be regarded as "preoccupations", meaning both "concerns" and "pregiven locations" (Narayan 1997, p. 123).

In this light, these "preoccupations" originate from certain external factors, which define identity and, simultaneously, raise certain expectations regarding the individuals who exhibit these features. However, as individuals can diverge from what others imagine of them, the response to external stimuli is not always the expected one. Uneasiness often arises from this friction at some point.

Sonia very clearly expresses this uneasiness at different moments in her narrative, according different facets to her trouble. The discourse on origins can be read between the lines throughout the novel. "People very often ask me if I'm not sad to live in a country so far away from my own"[16], Sonia says. Her reply is quite mild. She refuses to be captured by pangs of nostalgia, but she does not ultimately perceive her relationship with Mauritius as strong and absolute. She imagines herself as a tree with fleeting roots that come out of the ground. Although the wind may blow the tree away, it can root everywhere (Appanah 2005, pp. 69–70).

The urge to love the country she was born in—a "*si beau pays*" (such a beautiful place)—frequently appears in Sonia's life, and she feels the stress of others' expectations:

> They look at you asking again and again, *as you have to represent your country everywhere, to be its worth ambassador, paid by the Tourist Office*, to say: "Yes, it's wonderful, I'm suffering to live here, yes, yes, what a beautiful country the Mauritius Islands", and above all find a suitable answer to their famous question: "But what are you doing here, far away from sun and sea?"[17].

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unifying element, something that is widely shared amongst humans. Therefore, the aspect boldly underlined is equality, and not a specific version of the identity issue.

[16] «On me demande assez souvent si je ne suis pas triste de vivre dans un pays si éloigné du mien» (Appanah 2005, p. 69).

[17] «[Ils] vous regardent en redemandant encore encore, *comme si vous deviez représenter partout votre pays, en être le digne ambassadeur, payé par l'office du tourisme,* dire: "Oui, c'est magnifique, je souffre d'être ici, oui, oui, quel beau pays que l'île Maurice", et surtout leur trouver une réponse convenable à la fameuse question: "Mais que faites-vous ici, loin de la mer et du soleil?"» (Appanah 2005, p. 85. Emphasis added).

However, Sonia does not find it easy to clearly establish her origin, a "where" that can serve as the sign of an unambiguous belonging. She does not know how to reply to the same old question, which is simultaneously ordinary and indiscreet: "Vous êtes de quelle origine?" (Where do you come from?). Sonia's reply is not an affirmation, but a group of interrelated questions: what exactly does this question mean? This is an obvious enquiry on one's country of birth. However, when someone has lived more years abroad than in her homeland, to what place does she truly belong? Should we refer to here, in the present, or should we return to the amniotic fluid of our birthplace, in a dreamed country—because origins always evoke something beautiful, something wonderful, something as pure as mountain spring water? Finally, Sonia responds:

> For yourselves, for the others, for those who ask you this question, *you have to* hold yourself and be proud of those origins, to have a sparkling gaze, tears in your eyes, a long sigh, *you owe to them* to regret that those origins are nothing but a dim past, *you must not* reject your roots, or you'll be taken for insensitive. You are very simply refused *the right* to tell your origins to get lost[18].

By negating the "ethnicized" identity imposed on her by others, Sonia—the "little stranger", the brown mother of a fair-skinned daughter, the woman clearly identifiable as the "other"—succeeds in creating a personal space for herself free from prejudices regarding her identity and its predictable consequences.

Instead, the recurring theme in *Les rochers de Poudre d'Or* is the disruption of the status quo. Throughout the novel, the characters' initial status changes irreversibly. This passage is symbolized by the crossing of the *kala pani*, the black waters, the ocean erasing the castes of Indians and condemning them to a never-ending torment. All of the Indian characters are the victims of a deep loss. Briefly, they all lose their old identities and become prisoners of a monolithic and simplified new identity, "the laborer". Amid this radical change, the boundaries between "normality" and "madness" blur.

However, the complete and radical loss of reference points does not only affect the Indian characters. The novel only features one chapter written in the first person. It is the diary by Grant, the English doctor on board. This is the chapter in which Appanah most substantially develops the identity issue, using the frame of a neat ethnic opposition. Through an interesting reinterpretation of Shakespeare's *The Tempest,* Appanah describes the doctor's inner disintegration.

She uses this English drama in a rather eccentric manner. On the one hand, choosing an English text is part of the "ethnic" connotation that pervades the chapter. In a certain sense, Grant is entitled to quote *The Tempest* because as an Englishman he has the "right" to refer to this classic—written in his language, part of his hegemonic culture and identity. On the other hand, in this reinterpretation the doctor plays

[18] «Vous vous *devez*, pour les autres, pour ceux qui vous posent cette question, vous *devez* être droite et fière de ces origines-là, avoir le regard qui scintille, la larme à l'œil, le soupir long, vous *leur devez* de regretter que ces origines ne soyent qu'un vague passé, vous *ne pouvez*, sous peine de passer pour une insensible, renier vos racines. On vous refuse tout simplement *le droit* de dire merde à vos origines» (Appanah 2005, pp. 132–133. Emphasis added).

the wrong role. Thus, the opposition between rationality/irrationality characterizing this drama violently reacts against its user. Throughout the narration, a proudly racist Grant begins recalling *The Tempest* but ultimately confuses reality with fiction. The doctor is not searching for something deeper to oppose social constraints, but merely an escape from reality. He locates his shelter "just" in the injustice of the social system. However, Grant's attempt to escape collapses in the face of the inconsistencies of the same colonial mentality.

A particularly important element of this character's psychological evolution/destruction is the reversal of roles. One night, in seeing the sad and terrified Indian laborers descending into the boat's hold, the doctor feels compassion for them instead of anger and contempt—his usual feelings. This is the first spark that will eventually lead him to lunacy. Through this feeling of compassion, Grant begins superimposing the face of an old Indian suicide on Prospero's figure. He then confuses Miranda with a young Indian passenger. He is the first to be surprised by his reinterpretation. He affirms: "and, *strangely,* [the old man who would commit suicide] reminded me of Prospero in *The Tempest*"[19]. From this first event, Grant begins to mix reality and dreams, the old Indian and Prospero. In Grant's destructing transformation, the apex of the tension occurs when he has an erotic dream of Ganga, whom he calls "bold Miranda". This dream forecasts the moment of his total rupture with reality, in which he permanently loses his self-control—that is, when he attempts to rape Ganga (Appanah 2005, pp. 122–123). After this event, Grant becomes lost in the shadows of his mind and decides to commit suicide, just like the old Indian Prospero from the beginning.

It is precisely superimposing the "other" onto a literary character who has always symbolized—white—rationality in contrast to the irrationality/bestiality of the "inferiors" that reveals a dangerous crack in the colonial ideology. By reversing roles, Appanah casts doubt into Grant's life, which eventually leads to his lunacy. Prospero cannot be Indian, a "native", an "indigenous" person; he must be the enlightened white master. Miranda cannot be an Indian woman with a shaved head and remain attractive. By having seen an old Indian as Prospero and desired an Indian "Miranda", Grant relegates himself to the role of Caliban, that is, the wild, the violent, the brute. Maintaining boundaries is the only way that he can escape going mad. The role reversal reveals how fragile the limits of identity are. By affirming a commonly shared humanity, based on an equality that is difficult to hide, this reversal not only destroys the hypocrisy of a power system that denies equality, but also the justification of colonialism as a civilizing mission.

[19] «et, *bizarrement*, [ce vieux qui allait se suicider] m'a fait penser à Prospero dans *La Tempête*» (Appanah 2005, p. 85. Emphasis added).

8.4 Ananda Devi: Hybrid Identities as a Cure for Human Pain

«I feel Mauritian because I'm a little bit African, a little bit European and a little bit Indian[20]».

Devi is often described as a writer who pays substantial attention to the subject of identity[21]. She approaches the ethnic and cultural identity issue in two different ways—that is, implicitly in her literary work[22] and explicitly in her interviews.

Being born outside Europe and telling the life stories of Mauritian subaltern women—therefore fitting into the "not western (women writers)" category—Ananda Devi is frequently regarded as the epitome of diversity. Indeed, the interest in and specific focus on marginalized identities—namely, gender, ethnic or cultural ones—are more linked to the readers/critics' expectations than to the elements clearly visible in the author's work. However, not only does Devi accept these stimuli, but she also reacts to them by deepening her vision about these matters—a vision in which "negotiation" and "encounter" play a crucial role.

In a 2001 interview, Patrick Sultan directly focuses on this key issue:

> I would suggest that we start with how unique your geographical, cultural and linguistic situation is. Because *to a European reader you are like* a writer who "comes from abroad". Therefore, I will ask you to lead us towards this "abroad"[23].

The author replies by recalling her publishing background. She talks about her "belonging", which is difficult to clearly catalog because of its multiplicity and complexity. Devi explains that she has always been exposed to a variety of tongues. She says that her mother's tongue was Telugu, her own mother tongue is Mauritian Creole and her first language is French immediately followed by English. A description of her cultural heritage is similar. On the one hand, the publishers expected an islander's writing from her. On the other hand, in her first novels, "India" played a fundamental role. In this way, Devi cannot be considered either an Indian writer or

[20] «Je me sens Mauricienne parce qu'un peu Africaine, un peu Européenne et un peu Indienne». Interview published on the website Indes réunionnaises, http://www.indereunion.net/actu/ananda/intervad.htm [last accessed August 10, 2014].

[21] Ananda Devi Nirsimloo-Ananden was born in 1957 in Mauritius. Her parents were of Indian origin. Likewise, most of her island compatriots, multilingualism and what she defines as "pluriculturalité" have been part of her life since her childhood. Having grown up in an open-minded family environment, she has always been in contact with the different cultures of Mauritius. Moreover, her parents loved reading; therefore, there were numerous books of different origins in her home. Devi learned to read at an early age and began to write when she was very young. She studied anthropology in London, where she received her PhD. She has written poetry, novels and short stories, which have been published both in Africa and Europe. She lives in France and works as a translator.

[22] There are some exceptions to this reticence. For example, in "Indian Tango" (Devi 2007), the author explores this issue quite explicitly.

[23] «Je vous propose que l'on parte de la singularité de votre situation géographique, culturelle et linguistique. Car *vous apparaissez pour un lecteur européen* comme un écrivain "venu d'ailleurs". Je vous demanderai donc de nous guider vers cet ailleurs» (Sultan 2001. Emphasis added).

a Creole one. She also experienced difficulties in defining her own origins until she realized that belonging to Mauritius precisely means being part of many different worlds. Through a syncretic process, it is possible to extract something new and authentic from this complexity. In opposition to the perspective in which Mauritian islanders are nothing but hybrid people with no belonging, and offering a positive evaluation of her cultural heritage, Devi affirms:

> I'm under the impression of being in a certain way "complete" with regards to Western as well as Eastern culture because I have access to both of them in an intimate way, and, beyond culture, to the streams of thoughts of great civilizations[24].

When Sultan asks her if defining her as a francophone, Mauritian and island writer may be useful to clarify her self-positioning, Devi replies: "First of all, I consider myself to be simply a writer. This is the true permanent feature of my life"[25].

In another interview (Corio 2005), Devi deepens the links between (the subaltern) voice, diverse languages and different places. Focusing on the role of the Creole tongue in her work, the author expands on her vision and includes two important subjects in her discourse—namely the impossibility of traducing pain with words[26] and the translation issue in general. Regarding the first point, the writer speaks about the "silence" typical of all of her characters and that she paradoxically attempts to curb using the linguistic device. She then advances the notion of radical translation, which is closely linked with the writing process, affirming, "the literary act is a translation act, not from a tongue to another, but from a thought to another"[27] (Corio 2005, p. 153). By doing so, Devi shifts from a literary to a political context. Thus, she places her discourse within a "margin-to-center" political and cultural relation. Writing from a country at the margins of globalization also means engaging in an act of translation. For those who do not belong to the Mauritius Islands, she translates a way of being. For the islanders, she translates a way of seeing. However, while she is absorbed in this continuous and varied translating work, Devi asks to her foreign readers to make an effort, too:

[24] «J'ai l'impression d'être d'une certaine manière "complète" par rapport à la culture occidentale et orientale parce que j'ai accès aux deux de manière intime, et, au-delà de la culture, à la pensée même des grands courants civilisationnels» (Sultan 2001).

[25] «Je me considère d'abord comme un écrivain, tout simplement. C'est la vraie constante de ma vie» (Sultan 2001).

[26] On the one hand, this subject is linked to the difficulties related to the subaltern voice (Can the subalterns speak? When the speaking subject is in a dominant position, does s/he speak "on", "about", "in the name of" subalterns? Is this a problem of voice or hearing? On this issue, see Corio (2005). On the other hand, it is linked to the radical impossibility for human beings to fully understand one another (on a rational level). The only form of radical acceptance lies in the body, in human physics, and a true positive liberation can only be obtained by this fulfilling corporality. See, for example, (Devi 2007).

[27] «L'acte littéraire est un acte de traduction, pas d'une langue à autre, mais d'une pensée à autre».

> I ask the foreign reader to take a step towards me […], to accept that some aspects will be foreign and strange for him/her, but that this will not prevent him/her from following the novel's path and understanding it[28].

This request is closely linked to the author's understanding of identity. She strongly believes in universality beginning from a local dimension, as well as the idea that human feelings are the same everywhere. In her view, the setting and the context are only useful elements to the extent that they shape the storytelling, the meaning of which could nevertheless be grasped without them. Unlike other "marginal" writers who translate everything and therefore clearly make themselves understood by others—namely, the ones who live at the "center"—in Devi's case, the reader has to negotiate a text in which s/he has to navigate without any points of reference. In this way, Devi initiates a process of negotiation, which works in a dual direction. This leads to a process of change and participation (Corio 2005, pp. 154–155). Devi places this dialog at the foundation of her writing, when affirming: "there is an agreement with the reader […] I don't say all clearly […] the reader has his/her own path to follow […] a path drawing them closer to one another"[29].

In her statements, she does not deny either her origins in or intense relationship with Mauritius, although she continuously redefines these elements. This (re)negotiation is an extremely important tool to clarify and broaden her "positionality", which could be considered easily established from the "outside" because of its ethnic implications. Moreover, while in her view the relationship with others remains fundamental, the author also strongly affirms her autonomy at two levels—namely as a creator and a person. Ananda Devi, who above all considers herself "a writer", expresses her search and her feeling of autonomy as follows:

> The most important thing is not the other's gaze, but your own, our own demand towards ourselves […] Writing is a lifelong engagement, a continuous questioning[30].

The issues of exclusion, alterity and suffering are central in Devi's work. They are described through a frequently violent and highly poetic style, in which the author occasionally and very wisely inserts Creole elements (Magdelaine-Andrianjafitrimo 2004, pp. 142–165).

In many of her works, Devi places characters at the center of the plot who are marginal and/or trapped by social and ethnic and cultural constrictions, using a narration in which feelings, sensations, and actions do not necessarily follow a rational pattern. The author writes in the first person, and this leaves no space for an objective calmness. It is through a narration deeply intertwined with the actions—and not from an external or potentially rational point of view—that Devi explores and

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[28] «Je demande au lecteur étranger de faire le pas vers moi […], d'accepter que certains aspects lui seront étrangers et étranges, mais que cela ne l'empêchera pas de suivre le parcours du roman et de le comprendre» (Corio 2005, p. 154).

[29] «Il y a un pacte avec le lecteur […] je ne dis pas tout de manière claire […] le lecteur a son cheminement à faire […] un cheminement l'un vers l'autre» (Le Mauricien, 25 September 2011).

[30] «Ce n'est pas le regard de l'autre qui est le plus important, mais son propre regard, notre propre exigence par rapport à soi […] l'écriture est un engagement de toute notre vie, une remise en question à chaque instant» (Le Mauricien.com 2011).

expresses her characters' reality. In describing the events from the intimate perspective of the individual character, Devi's stance deviates from the—presumed—human rationality. The "I" used by the author places the messiness of human thoughts, the lack of clarity that pervades human lives, the turbidity of the human soul at center stage. The very illusion of a human functioning based on logical interpretations of an ordered reality is entirely dismantled. Moreover, the author describes a system in which the "personal level" only exists within the specific society in which human beings live.

While this common human condition is fundamental to Devi's works, the author also underlines differences. For example, she expresses them through the words of Anjali, the protagonist of *Le Voile de Draupadi,* when, referring to her husband's relatives, Indians as herself, as "her" people, she affirms:

> I deeply feel for them a sort of vague, hazy affection, which feeds on occasional solidarities, then dissipates, and then sometimes turns into a very strong sensation of difference. Differences, barriers, odd incomprehensions which stem from proximity, and from temporary, uncontrollable loyalties. Differences, similarities, same Oriental features, same dressing styles, and thoughts, mindsets completely divergent from each other[31].

However, even in a similar manifestation of differentiation, there are shared elements. While in different conditions and profoundly unequal ways, all human beings fall into social trammels and constraints. This common trapped condition establishes a "different equality" or a "same diversity" of human conditions. In a similarly interrelated system, violence is a form of degradation for those who perpetrate it and for those subjected to it. Therefore, overcoming social constraints is a desirable aim for both the "dominant" people and the "subalterns".

Liberation is a particularly complex concept in Devi's work. On the one hand, the author explores and expresses the liberating possibilities implicit in her characters' behaviors and decisions. On the other, this "search for freedom" frequently leads to (self) destruction and death. These specific forms of (self) destructing rebellion/liberation seem closely connected with the subalternity/marginality of the characters. As they face a situation of "difficult diversity", they do not have the means for realizing positive change in their lives[32]. In effect, they cannot acquire a space ac-

[31] «[A]u fond, j'éprouve envers eux une sorte d'affection imprécise, vague, qui s'alimente d'occasionnelles solidaritées, puis se dissipe, et puis parfois se transforme en une très forte sensation de différence. Différence, barrière, étrange incompréhension qui naît de la proximité, qui naît de fidélitées temporelles, incontrôlables. Différences, similitudes, mêmes traits d'Orientaux, mêmes habitudes vestimentaires, et des pensées, des mentalités situées à des pôles les unes des autres» (Devi 1993, p. 131).

[32] Speaking in culture-related terms, it is possible to argue that throughout Indian (Hindu) history, the ideal of self-sacrifice is a valuable one. On the one hand, there is a frequent and troubling relationship between the ideals of self-sacrifice and feminine virtue—"good" women are expected to sacrifice themselves, if needed (and a similar need could arise very often). On the other hand, self-sacrifice may be meaningful for those who choose it according to their cultural and traditional values. However, in the "common Western viewpoint", two deep-rooted opinions exist—the notion of "Third World women" as "defenceless victims of their backward culture", and an ideal of female emancipation connoted by the positive value assigned to visible "activity". In a similar mindset, self-sacrifice loses its liberating potential and, likewise, all positive values. According

knowledged by the others as "equal", a sort of social recognition of the injustice of their position, a compensation for their suffering—albeit only symbolic. Moreover, by definition, they have neither the possibility to assert their rights nor the capability to make their voices heard[33]. The "liberating strategy" of Devi's characters often seems paradoxical because, as the characters acquire awareness of the injustice implicit in the oppressing traditions, their practical realizations of rebellion/liberation may also match the dominant expectations. In other words, in Devi's work, happy endings or rebellions leading towards a "political" empowerment[34] do not often occur, as emancipation is interpreted as an intimate and personal concept[35].

8.5 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: A Difficult Location of the Origins

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown is a politically committed author with an abundant catalogue[36]. The works considered in this study,—Nowhere to Belong (2006) and The Settler's Cookbook (2008)—are autobiographical. The latter is a biography in a broad sense, in which the author recalls the history of African Indians (the *Wahindis* in Swahili) and the stages of her life through her family's recipes. While their focuses differ, there are many similarities between the two texts.

to Devi, instead, this issue is quite multi-faceted and amplified to the extent of considering the renunciation of the world a tool for achieving total liberation.

[33] Framing the question of autonomy in "liberal" terms, they lack both the resources and possibility of choosing among different and meaningful options. Framing it according to subalternity theory, they are excluded from social mobility.

[34] Regarding the unhappy endings of many postcolonial works, see for example Beyala (1987) and Roy (1997).

[35] It is extremely difficult to establish what an "acceptable, proper, convenient" rebellion is. Not only do different forms of rebellion exist, but there are also different evaluations of this term. How visible or intentional must a behavior be be defined as "rebellion"? Does an "intimate" rebellion have the same value as an exterior, "political" one? Is a rebellious act only worthwhile if it produces a positive change in the external social sphere, or is it meaningful even when it reveals itself as a form of intimate consciousness raising? All of these questions are connected to the difficult issue of interpreting women's agency, which is central in many "feminist" studies and/or recent development policies.

[36] Yasmin Alibhai-Brown was born in 1949 in Kampala, Uganda, where she was brought up. Her mother was born in Dar-es-Salaam, on the African coast, to Indian parents. Her father was Pakistani. In 1972, Yasmin left Uganda to move to Oxford. A few months later, the dictator Idi Amin expelled the "Indians/Asiatics" from Uganda, and Alibhai-Brown never returned to live in "her" country. She lives in London, where she works as a journalist and a writer interested in multiculturalism, difference and migration.

In Nowhere to Belong[37], Yasmin Alibhai-Brown describes the ways in which Shakespeare not only influenced her intellectual training, but also her concrete life. However, Shakespeare plays a fundamental role for many postcolonial writers.

Postcolonial pedagogy typically holds a complex attitude towards the classical works of colonial literatures, which are often characterized by an imperial stance towards the "Other". It is a question of studying this literary heritage without internalizing the subalternization implicit in it. It is a question of "actively" accepting an important cultural heritage, which is also essential for formerly colonized peoples, without "abrogating" it but instead making an "appropriation" or even a "subversion from the inside"[38]. In this setting, Shakespeare's works occupy an archetypal role. Specifically regarding the characters of *The Tempest,* one author has spoken of a "Caliban paradigm" (Gandhi 1998, p. 148). The protagonist in this drama is Prospero, an exiled noble who is shipwrecked on an island with his daughter Miranda. The island is inhabited by the wild Caliban,[39] a brutal and monstrous creature who is eventually subdued by Prospero. The colonial vision always relegates the natives—or indigenous or formerly colonized peoples—precisely to the inferior and violent role of Caliban.

However, in her evocative reinterpretation of Shakespeare's work, Alibhai-Brown does not use her colonial tongue—English—to "curse the former masters", but rather to clearly explain the origins and social consequences of certain dangerous ideas that originated in the colonial context and still persist. Moreover, she is interested in expressing her love of Shakespeare, who was an attentive connoisseur of the human soul, especially of the feelings of migrants like her. For the white Europeans, she says, Shakespeare is a consumed artisan, he is music for hearing, an artistic genius, "[b]ut for *us*, for us people of colour [who] *lived* the dramas" (Alibhai-Brown 2006: min 01:39–01:43, emphasis added), the English author assumes a quite different significance. Quoting Rodrigo's words from the first act of "Othello", Alibhai-Brown describes her people as "extravagant and wheeling stranger[s] of here and everywhere", migrants always moving, lost people whom nobody loves, carrying suitcases full of dreams (Alibhai-Brown 2006, min 02:10–02:40).

Shakespeare's works are used as a metaphor to deepen the analysis of various issues—namely the author's private life events, the African Indians' history[40], and the

[37] Nowhere to belong is a one-woman-show Yasmin Alibhai-Brown was commissioned to produce by the Royal Shakespeare Company. The author wrote the text and interpreted it on many occasions. Recently, the show has been performed in different towns around the UK. Nowhere to Belong has been published as an audiobook. I am quoting from my transcript of the text.

[38] In Leela Gandhi's words: "It is helpful to think of this stipulated shift from abrogation to appropriation as a shift from "unlearning English", to the project of "learning how to curse in the master's tongue" (Gandhi 1998, p. 148).

[39] While Caliban is not actually a native of the island, he has been interpreted in this symbolic manner by many anti-colonialists.

[40] Even by neglecting the problem of the "ideological" consequences of hyphened definitions such as "Asian-American", it seems extremely important to underline the political role of official definitions. In Uganda, the Indians were never defined as "Africans". The definitions ranged from a generic "East African Asians/Indians" to "Ugandan Asians", but this community was never clearly

interactions between different cultures. For example, through an interesting re-reading, Alibhai-Brown links Othello's plot with the reality of life both in the Uganda of her youth and in the contemporary United Kingdom. The two are multifarious and complex contexts in which there are continuous intersections and stratifications of identities and prejudices. In both contexts, colonial visions merge with other forms of racism[41].

The 1965 production of "Romeo and Juliet" directed by Mrs. Mann is a pivotal element of both the text and the author's life. Mrs. Mann was a teacher who had just arrived in Uganda with the best of intentions. Puzzled by the "apartheid" existing between *Wahindis* and Africans, the young teacher decided to subvert the rules and stage a dramatization in which the Indians played the Capulets and the Montagues were Africans[42]. Eventually, in a newly independent Uganda ready to alter its status quo, this simple school activity became a real tragedy, precisely because reality prevailed on fiction:

> It was as if both sides knew the universe was changing. The Asian Capulets knew their wealth and colour were no longer enough to protect their status. The African Montagues were looking us in the eye, they were never going to be our servants again. These were future lawyers, ministers, judges. (Alibhai-Brown 2006, min 44:13–44:34)

Unwisely, a 16-year-old Yasmin became a fair-skinned Asian Juliet:

> I so wanted to play Juliet, and would have killed to get the role! Off I went to the audition, bursting with expectation and hope. No other girl even put up her hand. There was no competition. Wise girls! They understood things I didn't. (Alibhai-Brown 2006, min 32:46–33:06)

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acknowledged as "African". This is a highly complex issue. It is likely that both the "Indians" and "Africans" shared the opinion that the former did not truly belong to Africa, albeit for different reasons. The former felt superior to the blacks, whereas the latter perceived the rich *Wahindis* as usurpers of Uganda's resources and the "odd-ones out"—to be expelled as soon as possible.

[41] In Uganda, for example, a system of "differential racism"—complex in its origins and consequences—was at work. The British perceived the "others" from divergent perspectives, which were linked to the dissimilar attitudes towards the degree of "civilisation" attributed to the different colonized peoples. This colonial mindset was reflected in the ethnically mixed context of Uganda. In effect, "India" and the "East" in general benefited of a—partially—positive vision, which took into account their ancient history. Accordingly, the colonizers considered the Indians inferior to themselves, but "only" on a cultural level. The Orientalist vision originated from a similar perception. Orientalism was a complex ideology, which changed during the colonial experience, often merging with simplified forms of racism. In contrast, the British position regarding "Africans" was generally characterised by the notion of "bestiality", that is, an essential difference based on nature itself. Acknowledging that an individual belonged to the human race, to any extent, was strictly linked to skin color. However, for various reasons, Indians had also created an aesthetic-ideological hierarchy based on color. In Uganda, these different colonial perceptions became intertwined, creating a mixed and stratified racist system. In a similar hierarchy, the whites were obviously at the top, the "browns" in the middle and the blacks at the bottom.

[42] For the author and her generation, the love of Romeo and Juliet, so intense and destructive, symbolized times changing and a yearning for a new and more egalitarian society. On the contrary, for Mister Banya, a highly traditionalist teacher, Shakespeare's work entailed completely different meanings. He explained how William Shakespeare—"a very clever man"—ended his drama with the death of both lovers. In Mister Banya's opinion, Romeo and Juliet's original meaning was an exaltation of obedience and tradition, not of love. From a similar perspective, there was no place for mixing between Indians and Africans.

Drawing an example from *The Tempest*, it is possible to say that Mrs. Mann's production of Romeo and Juliet gave rise to or likely increased Prospero's terror of the potential rape of Miranda by Caliban. A similar "rape" would have been simultaneously a violation of Miranda's body and a subversion of the status quo. Alibhai-Brown explains how this opposition between Prospero and Caliban was a widespread subtext in Uganda in the years surrounding independence. She recalls how at times some Africans decided to play the role into which society had relegated them, namely Caliban's. They addressed the Indian girls in the street in this way:

> Hey, you! You, you, daughter of Shylock! How much money has your father sent out today? We know what you are doing. This is our country, and you will be ours too! (Alibhai-Brown 2006, min 29:54–30:09)

Although Caliban was a brute, he was also somehow the original and authentic inhabitant of his country. Prospero—as well as Shylock—were two foreigners subjected to a conflicting destiny. They had to choose to either abandon the new country or change their identity to remain there[43].

The 1965 production of Romeo and Juliet had devastating consequences in Alibhai-Brown's life. Her presumed "immodesty" in kissing a black boy on stage irreversibly changed her relationship with her father and shattered her dreams of becoming an actress. The independence of Uganda, in 1972, eliminated her beloved country from her life. From then on, Alibhai-Brown literally became an "extravagant and wheeling stranger/of here and everywhere"[44]. Nonetheless, these events did not prevent her from finding a place to "root" herself.

Far from being a trivial and private matter, food is an extremely important cultural element. In the event of any encounter/clash between different cultures, food is a way to affirm identity and a fertile ground for hybridization. In this sense, cooking is one of the most important expressions of human identity.

[43] It is noteworthy that Indians identified themselves with the rational and intrinsically good-hearted Prospero, whereas the Africans associated the wealthy *Wahindis* with another foreigner, Shylock, the Jewish usurer protagonist of The Merchant of Venice. In this way, in the symbolic economy of Alibhai-Brown's text, the figures of Miranda—a potential victim of rape by the wild brute—and Jessica—Shylock's daughter who voluntarily moves away and ultimately rejects her religion and her father to marry a Christian—combine to form a powerful trigger for fear. In a similar situation, the disruption of the father's status quo may be provoked by both the exterior—rape—and the interior—the acceptance of a new order, which is estrangement and betrayal.

[44] It worthwhile to briefly quote the suggestive opinion of Dennis Austin Britton, who in his "Returning Othello" stresses the importance of the "here" contained in "Othello". Although his context differs from mine, Britton's assertions expand the boundaries of the belonging of a stranger such as Othello in Venice or the *Wahindis* of Uganda. In both cases, there was a "here", which underlined a share of the right to citizenship, as partial and impermanent as it may have been (Britton 2011).

In her interesting essay "Eating Cultures: Incorporation, Identity, and Indian Food", Uma Narayan[45] demonstrates how food was an important element throughout the Indo-British colonial experience, during which different forms of appropriation occurred. These differences indicate a specific attitude towards "the other". For example, the—creative—British appropriation of curry was a way to incorporate the "good" India. Curry dishes have been included in the British sections of cookbooks since mid-nineteenth century. This process, however, only occurred in the homeland, where these attempts at "incorporation" could not jeopardize the status quo. On the contrary, the rejection of dishes perceived as overly "indigenous" by the British who lived in India was an attempt to reject potential—and dangerous—equality with the natives (Narayan 1997, pp. 165–166)[46].

After Uganda achieved independence, the "intermediate" position and the economic power gained by the Indian community during British rule became a justification for reprisals from the native inhabitants. Eventually, the Indians were obliged to leave a country they considered their own[47].

Initially, East African Asian food stemmed from a desperate homesickness and the difficulties of the lives of Indian migrants. In that time, the dishes were simple and poor. Subsequently, however, this culinary tradition developed through cultural interchanges and included new ingredients as the *Wahindis* economic situation improved.

From the beginning of "The Settler's Cookbook", the author describes herself as an "extravagant stranger":

> Like many other East African Asians whose forebears left India in the nineteenth century, I search endlessly for (and sometimes find) the remains of those days. […] There is no place on earth we can historically and unequivocally claim to be ours, and so we have become adept wayfarers who settle but cautiously, ready to move on if the winds change. (Alibhai-Brown 2008, p. 1)

Immediately after, she says that on leaving Uganda in 1972, she had to abandon most of her things there. However, she took some old kitchen utensils with her, which she still has. The author uses them to prepare East African Asian specialties for her children, who never learned the extra-European tongues spoken by their mother, but who love her food. While they are eating, Alibhai-Brown recalls her memories in a loud voice, and links every dish to different times and places so that her children will remember who they are, after her death (Alibhai-Brown 2008, p. 15).

[45] Narayan was born in a traditional, vegetarian Indian family, Hindu by religion. Although she received her education in a Catholic school and her mother had displayed images of the Virgin Mary and Jesus on her altar, Narayan's family had always respected Hinduism's culinary taboos. The philosopher has constantly felt uncomfortable with these taboos, which are often used in the Indian political frame to set the different communities against one another (Narayan 1997, pp. 170–172).

[46] Incorporation and rejection, however, are not the only approaches towards food. On the one hand, eating "ethnic food" is a clear sign of an open mindset and a positive outlook regarding others. On the other hand, however, this can lead to an oversimplification of cultural and identity issues (Narayan 1997, pp. 180–182).

[47] Regarding the migrations that occurred in East Africa after the independence of Kenya, Tanzania and, above all, Uganda, Jayaram distinguishes between "twice-removed" and "suppressed" communities (Jarayam 2011, pp. 235–236 ff).

In the Introduction to their cookbook "La cucina del buon gusto", Simonetta Agnello Hornby and Maria Rosario Lazzati say:

> […] our cultural and social history has been changed through the invention of cooking. The dishes we learned cooking from our mothers—the ones we are always willing to cook, the ones we miss when we go away from home—have a history wider than the family and the region they originate in. They are the result of millenary inventions and experimentations which have modified our diet, our tastes and our life. […] Cooking makes us feel human[48].

This general statement is particularly meaningful in the context of migration. In a "displaced" people's lives—as in Alibhai-Brown's—traditional food largely coincides with their identity. This helps them to locate a "home" in every place it is possible to recreate the smell and taste of traditional dishes. In this sense, the recipes suggested by Alibhai-Brown are the tales of her people. These dishes evoke collective memories and help to imagine an uncertain future (Alibhai-Brown 2008, pp. 15–17).

As previously noted, Narayan describes the relationship between British and Indian food in terms of incorporation and/or rejection. Postcolonial interpretations, however, should change and/or add new facets to old issues. Interestingly, Alibhai-Brown resolutely labels *Wahindi* food as "mixed" and open to external influences. According to the author, food is a facet of the bilateral interaction between different cultures. Therefore, the *Wahindis* transformed Britain in the same way that Britain changed them (Alibhai-Brown 2008, pp. 15–17).

8.6 Conclusions

Two contradictory understandings of identity have arisen over the course of this paper. This multiplicity and contradiction exist because the notion of identity is an intimately incoherent concept, which can assume multiple facets. Broadly speaking, identity comprises internal and external features. The internal ones are the diverse elements that form an "identity", namely a mix of "conditions" and "decisions". Both elements are closely connected with the broad cultural context in which every individual lives. The conditions—that is, the preliminary characteristics of every person, such being born male or female, white or black, in Italy or in Mauritius, etc.—are "not morally relevant" factors because they result from chance, from an accidental "heritage" and not from a personal decision. On the contrary, decisions stem from a personal elaboration of involuntary conditions, although this pattern is not always and necessarily conscious. Accordingly, the concept of "sexuality" in-

[48] «Attraverso l'invenzione della cucina abbiamo cambiato la nostra storia culturale e sociale. I piatti imparati dalle nostre madri—quelli che cuciniamo sempre e con piacere, che ci mancano quando ci allontaniamo da casa—hanno una storia più grande della famiglia e della regione di provenienza e sono il risultato di invenzioni ed esperimenti millenari che hanno modificato la nostra dieta, i nostri gusti e la nostra vita […]. Cucinare ci fa sentire umani» (Agnello-Hornby and Luzzati 2012, pp. 12–13).

dividuates something very different from that of "biological sex". The relationship with the external context is the "place" where decisions "converse" with conditions through multifarious and different external stimuli. This dialogue always exists, but it assumes a specific role in so-called "multicultural" contexts, as an encounter between different cultures may entail more significant consequences for defining the personal identity of an individual than elsewhere. The external factors coincide with others' positions on the identity of a person, individuating something that could be called an external perception. This perception is often based on external and involuntary conditions to a greater extent than internalized decisions. Both aspects become fundamental to describing the notions of identity expressed by the three authors.

As emphasized above, certain conditions in the global cultural context–perceived through an external perspective—assume an extremely significant meaning. In this case, the "dominant" perception of certain "subaltern" conditions such as "being a woman" and "not being white" trigger a certain viewpoint through which identity is defined as the other woman's burden. This is an ethnic identity imagined through a process of exoticization. This central position occupied by the ethnic is the result of expectations towards "the other women". This "reduced" identity coincides with the phrase "Third World woman", which is a *topos* in the global debate. In this case, the specific biographical factors that characterize the three women writers confine them within a peculiar and over-simplified identity that marks them as different by virtue of a simplifying (pre −) judgment or, at least, of an extremely partial vision. This is the case for a certain type of "foreign" women writers, namely the exotic ones.

In their work, we search for the traces of identity even when we do not have any reason to believe it a subject of interest for these authors. This attitude is the reflex of an Orientalistic vision that still exists in the global space, producing over-simplifying definitions such as "exotic women writers". Due to this simplistic stance, the complexity and autonomy of these authors are erased. It is exactly the diffusion of the *topos* of the "Third World woman" in the global political debate that produces the expectation of finding in the works of these authors—perceived as radically different from "us"—a central role for the issue of identity, both ethnic and gender-related. A similar ethnicized perception is linked to the notion of having a connection with one's "origins", which is perceived as necessary. This perception explains the important role of what could be defined as "the burden of origins". Of all of the elements I could have selected, I opted for this one, underlining a frail—and questionable—element of resemblance amongst three authors who are diverse with respect to birthplace, citizenship, writing style and interests regarding the identity issue[49].

[49] It has been possible to follow a similar perspective because, in my view, all identities are ephemeral, transient and, ultimately, not constraining. To define what I am, for example, the label Italian—while it is much more appropriate or less dubious than that of Indian for Alibhai-Brown, Appanah, and Devi—seems to me of little importance, as it is true that it partly defines me but also limits me.

However, when the internal perspective of the authors is considered, a different understanding of identity prevails, which is based on decisions and relationships with specific contexts. Their personal life stories were characterized by both a partially dislocated and mixed ethnic identity and origins defined as ethnicized because they are all "Third World women". These elements have insinuated the identity discourse into the authors' lives since birth. Therefore, all writers have long been forced to consider this issue, although the consequences of such reflection and the importance of the identity issue vary according to the authors and their work.

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown writes primarily to address this issue. On the contrary, in Nathacha Appanah's work, ethnic belonging is difficult to locate. Even when she speaks on ethnicity, she is not interested in ethnicization. Her novels concern human beings who might be characterized by a specific ethnic origin, but this does not have any relevance in itself. Her writing, which is not characterized by any voluntary "creolization" of the text, cannot be defined as either ethnic or exotic. From an external perspective, it could be defined as "quite Western". Ananda Devi does not write "just to" speak about cultural and gender identity, but she accepts exterior stimuli—as is clear from her interviews—and deepens these subjects, although she seems to find her true identity in writing, like Appanah's Sonia.

These three attitudes are quite different; nonetheless they bear strong similarities regarding certain key features. First, all three authors describe identity both as a flow—that is, as a continuous process of acquisition, search and comparison—and as a multiplicity comprising intrinsic differences, changes and contradictions. Interpreting identity as a flow may be highly relevant in a period in which there is a tendency to draw clear and insurmountable barriers between cultures. On the contrary, the authors considered here demonstrate how boundaries exist to be trespassed and how the specific only makes sense and exists when it is united with the universal.

Closely linked to the first, the second point emphasizes how this continuous dialogue is not based on something "ethnic", but general. The identity—or, better, the identities described by the authors—originate from a personal negotiation with numerous and various external stimuli. The three writers have had to cope with a complex definition of their personal identities since childhood. This factor and their migration experience added a certain naturalness to their perspectives in detecting a common humanity amid differences. Therefore, the trammels implicit in ethnicized viewpoints on identity are counter-balanced by the affirmation of a different and thoughtful personal identity.

The last important common point is the authors' relationships with the concept of origin, voyage and, in general, "home". The concept of home can be regarded as a partial departure from—and a specification of—the identity issue. Undoubtedly, it is a key point in the works of many "migrant/diasporic" authors—even when their origins, interests and intellectual positioning may differ—as it presents emotional and practical facets of great importance. We can approach this issue while bearing in mind the feminist slogan "the private is political". As a clarifying example, consider the words of Chandra Mohanty, a feminist academic of Indian origins but an migrant in the United States. She says:

> What is home? The place I was born? Where I grew up? Where my parents live? Where I live and work as an adult? Where I locate my community, "my people"? Who are my people? Is home a geographical space, a historical space, an emotional, sensory space? Home is always so crucial to immigrants and migrants […] I am convinced that this question—how one understands and defines home—is *a profoundly political one* (Mohanty 2003, p. 126. Emphasis added).

Home—as the place of identity—always has political connotations, especially in migration contexts, where the "private" facet—that is, the interior searching for suitable meanings apt to define the very word "home"—becomes "political". The same definition of "home" is implied in practical and symbolic resource allocation dynamics—in which "practical" refers to multicultural politics in a broad sense, and "symbolic" to the forms of acceptance/rejection that characterize coexistence with "the others" in so-called multicultural contexts. This public preoccupation clearly emerges in the following quotation by Alibhai-Brown:

> I am often invited by true-born bigots to fuck off back where I came from. Where would that be then? Kampala, where I was born? Or Karachi, where my father hailed from but left forever at seventeen to come to his beloved England? Or Porbandar in the Gujarat in India, whence my maternal grandfather was dispatched as a small boy? Or Dar-es-Salaam in what was Tanganyika, where my mother was born and raised? (Alibhai-Brown 2008, p. 11).

However, linking the private to the concept of home is able to offer other interesting perspectives. In *La Noce d'Anna*, Sonia affirms:

> Sometimes I'm under the impression that my country is somewhat here. It's here where my daughter was born, it's here where I'm writing, it's here where I've got my friends. But, deep inside myself, I truly felt at home only with Matthew. With him, I was myself, as pacified, with the ease as well as the fear of disappointing which only exist with the people you love and the countries you hold dear[50].

In one of Devi's novels, the protagonist—a woman called Pagli, meaning "the lunatic"- has her true name and essence revealed through her love for Zil, the fisherman. In *Le Voile de Draupadi,* there are two interesting references to a certain vision of what "home" is, when Anjali—speaking about the feeling of emptiness provoked in her by her son's illness—says: "A whole part of myself was at that moment suspended, stateless and completely orphan"[51]. On the contrary, speaking about her friendship with another woman, Anjali affirms: "She was strong and true. She was a cozy home inside which it would be beautiful to snuggle up or to hide"[52].

In the Epilogue of her The Settler's Cookbook, Alibhai-Brown mentions her mother's death, which occurred in 2006. She expresses the deep feeling of empti-

[50] «Parfois, je l'impression que mon pays c'est un peu ici. C'est ici que ma fille est née, c'est ici que j'écris, c'est ici que j'ai mes amis. Mais, au fond de moi, je ne me suis sentie vraiment chez moi qu'avec Matthew. Avec lui, j'étais moi-même, comme réconciliée, avec cette aisance et pourtant cette peur de décevoir qui n'existen qu'avec les gens qu'on aime et las pays qu'on chérit» (Appanah 2005, pp. 69–70).

[51] «Toute une partie de moi se trouvait à présent en suspens, apatride et orpheline de tout» (Devi 1993, p. 42. Emphasis added).

[52] «Elle était solide et véritable. Elle était une maison accueillante au fond de laquelle on aimerait se blottir ou se cacher» (Devi 1993, p. 107).

ness this event has left in her life. Thereafter, she felt a very strong need to return to Africa. Before 2006, and after many years of absence, she had gone to Uganda, but this visit had left her with a distressing sensation. She describes the impossibility in locating "her own" places, now definitely lost and destroyed. In 2006, her mother's death led her to track down a memory of "her mother's" places. The author describes her 2007 visit to Tanzania, during which she went to Dar-es-Salaam, her mother's birthplace. She says:

> Unlike my trip to Uganda, this one filled in gaping spaces, comforted and reinforced *my multiple identities*. But here too there was a message whispering on the breeze, passing over the ears: "There is no coming back. You don't belong. The place has moved on". (Alibhai-Brown 2008, p. 426. Emphasis added)

However, far from being a confession of a desperate displacement, her words are a description of Alibhai-Brown's belongings, which she encountered after her trip to Tanzania. She concludes her book saying:

> [A]fter my last spell in East Africa I know where I belong. […] London is [a] crucible, th[e] national forge [of fusion, of hybridity]. The city where no one belongs is where I belong. (Alibhai-Brown 2008, p. 426)

According to similar interpretations, there can be several "homes", which only partially coincide with physical places. They can often be found when recalling (freely) chosen and beloved people and places. A similar vision of identity could be triggered anywhere and anytime, but it is naturally linked to the journey—because moving homes produce moving memories.

In 1911, the Greek poet Constantin Cavafy[53] wrote "Ithaca", one of the most beautiful poems on the meaning of a journey. Ithaca is the arrival point *par excellence*. Dreaming of Ithaca kept Ulysses alive. Reaching that small, stony island was the force that led Ulysses and his companions through unknown seas and countries for 10 years. Ithaca was the beloved place—a home—to reach after a trying—and nearly endless—journey.

After many years, Ulysses finally returned to Ithaca, but he did not dwell there. The final lines of "Ithaca" read:

> Always keep Ithaca in your mind;
> to reach her is your destiny.
> But do not rush your journey in the least.
> […]
>
> Ithaca gave to you the beautiful journey;
> without her you'd not have set upon the road
> But she has nothing left to give you any more.

[53] Cavafy, too, experienced migration. He was born in 1863 in Alexandria, Egypt. His father was a Greek importer-exporter who had lived in England and acquired British nationality. In 1870, after his father's death, Cavafy and his family moved to Liverpool, England, only to return to Alexandria in 1877. In 1882, political turmoil caused the family to move again to Constantinople. In 1885, Cavafy returned to Alexandria, where he lived for the rest of his life.

> And if you find her poor, Ithaca did not deceive you.
> As wise as you'll have become, with so much experience,
> you'll have understood, by then, what these Ithacas mean[54].

Long and difficult journeys could teach us to forgive our fate. After them, there is no place for rest, as they give rise to a new conscience, in which the points of departure and arrival blend. Shifting our origins, every challenging journey—both concrete and metaphorical, outside or inside ourselves—creates multiple levels of nostalgia, expectations and worries. The flow produced by this journey—real and imagined, interior or external—is the "place" in which these authors locate the (continuous) discovery of their own identities.

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Chapter 9
The Concept of Mobility in Migration Processes: The Subjectivity of Moving towards a Better Life

Inbal Ofer

9.1 Introduction

The movement across space and across cultural and socio-economic boundaries is intrinsic to all forms of migration. The concept mobility, therefore, is central to our understanding of the processes and the discourses that relate to them. This chapter considers the concept of mobility within the context of the debates about internal migration in Francoist Spain. It examines migration into the greater Madrid area starting in the early 1950s, concentrating specifically on those newcomers who settled in the massive triangle of squatters' neighborhoods *(barrios chabolistas)* that formed on the south-eastern outskirts of the capital.

My claim is that different notions of mobility greatly conditioned the outlook of both the authorities and the migrants on the process of internal migration as a social phenomenon. Such notions interacted with more general discourses on modernization, economic progress, and morality in Francoist Spain. The regime viewed mobility (whether spatial or social) as a destabilizing force that could easily escape its control. These perceptions influenced its outlook on the migrants themselves, and conditioned the policies towards them. Many migrants, on the other hand, perceived spatial mobility as a way of escaping a limiting environment. This view helped them to proceed with a project that during its initial phases often worsened their living conditions. By examining the different interpretations and values assigned to the concept of mobility, this paper attempts to better understand the politics of location undertaken by the migrants themselves and the ways in which the authorities reacted to them.

I. Ofer (✉)
Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel
e-mail: inbalof@openu.ac.il

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Between the years 1960–1973 15% of the general Spanish population changed its place of residence. While rural Spain bled demographically, the major urban centers gained more than 3 million new inhabitants. Sociologist Miguel Siguán wrote in 1966:

> Emigration is the most important social phenomenon we are witnessing nowdays in the Spanish countryside. This is made clear by the wealth of statistics that are being published in relation to demographic changes […]. Its importance can also be seen on a subjective level. Immigration has turned into an issue of major public concern and is referred to in every conversation. (Siguán 1966, p. 533, *author's transl*.)

And yet, despite its great volume and the long-term effects it had on the structure of the Spanish society this internal exodus received little attention from historians. Until recently it was referred to as a mere footnote in another history—that of external migration. If it was analyzed at all it was mostly in economic terms (De la Torre and Sanz Lafuente 2008). And it was rarely integrated into the narratives that attempted to explain the massive changes undergone by Spanish society throughout the second half of the twentieth century[1]. My own research focuses on the three *barrios* of Orcasitas in Madrid (Meseta, Poblado Dirigido, and Orcasur). By examining family-life, patterns of sociability and of work of the newly arrived emigrants I try to understand the ways in which modernization and urbanization were experienced.

9.2 Immigration and the Immigrant in Francoist Rhetoric: The Fear of Unsupervised Movement

An examination of Francoist legislation reveals that references to external migration were most often linked to debates about labor and foreign affair policies. Since the late 1940s external migration was perceived by the regime as a useful tool in the battle to improve the dictatorship's image in the outside world. In a decree published in 1960 it was stated that during the early part of the twentieth century migration of Spaniards abroad was often viewed in negative terms since it threatened to diminish the number of qualified laborers in the prime years of their productivity. But soon this view changed:

[1] This is especially true in the case of migration into the Madrid area, which was in general less studied than migration into other major Spanish cities such as Barcelona or Bilbao. In the case of the literature on Madrid it is possible to distinguish one line of research that critically examines the phenomenon of internal migration within the context of the more general socio-cultural changes undergone by the Spanish society. This line was developed in several anthropological and sociological manuscripts that were published in the 1960s and 1970s. These works provide critical information concerning the changing needs and everyday lives of the newly arrived migrants (García Fernández 1957; Siguán 1959; Cabo Alonso 1961; Alonso Hinojal 1969). One neighborhood that received much attention from investigators is Vallecas. See for example Lorenzi (2007). For the case of internal migration into the Bilbao and Barcelona areas, see Borderías (1993), Bustillo Merino (2005), Cid Fernandez et al. (2008).

> Public policy has been extended […] viewing immigration as process filled with new opportunities encored in individual liberties. At the same time emigration is also viewed as providing powerful connections between countries and enhancing socio-economic and other benefits. Not only for the emigrant and his family, but also for the countries of origin and reception. (Ley 93/1960, *author's transl.*)

This change of opinion had, of course, much to do with the socio-economic profile of those who migrated abroad in two decades following the Spanish Civil War. Over two thirds of those who left Spain during that period were unqualified laborers who did so in search of work in the field of construction or domestic service. From the regime's perspective, the emigration of unqualified male laborers at this stage had several advantages. It would decrease the level of national unemployment and ease social unrest. Since in the initial stages most men traveled alone, the regime hoped to be left with a supposedly less subversive population of women and children, who would be spending in the Spanish market money earned abroad.

Moreover, in July 1956 the regime founded the Spanish Institute of Immigration, which has to regulate migration into and from Spain. The Institute's decreed aim was: "to provide employment and property to the immigrants and enhance their utility as far as the receiving country was concerned". The text went on to warn: "Nor can one forget the grave problems that result from the need to guide and provide for the immigrant's family until such a time in which they are united" (Ley de 17 de julio de 1956). In order to resolve this problem the Institute had to organize a special service that stimulated the immigrants' tendency for saving and ease the transfer of money to their families living in Spain" (Decreto 1354/1959).

From the first moments following the Civil War it was clear—as far as the Franco regime was concerned that internal migration did not exhibit the advantages attribute to external migration. It did not maximize the buying power of the Spanish population, although it did decrease the overall levels of unemployment. Statistics show that in the year 1950 the city of Madrid alone generated 21,454 official job offers. By 1960 the number more than doubled itself. The authorities viewed the newly arrived migrants at the same time as a much needed work force and as disorderly and potentially subversive masses. In referring to the inhabitants of the shanty-towns that formed around the city of Bilbao, for example, a decree that was published by the Ministry of Housing in 1958 stated:

> The hillsides surrounding the city of Bilbao [are covered with constructions] lacking municipal authorization. Nor do they provide [appropriate] living conditions or basic sanitary services. These [constructions] are unhealthy. They defy morality, esthetics and the existing urban plans for the capital of Vizcaya. The immigrants construct unhygienic buildings and divide their living space until they have turned the sacred home, where morality should be forged, into a place of the worst learning. (Decreto de 5 de septiembre de 1958)

This text, and many others like it, reflected the regime's view that unsupervised movement of population contributed directly to spatial crowdedness in certain urban center. The regime's obsession with the movement of population was best expressed in a document of the Spanish Home Ministry, which stated:

> The intense demographic and industrial development of Madrid, and of other urban centers, was enhanced first and foremost by the immigration of those arriving from rural areas into

> the big cities. This process can cause grave imbalances in the division of the population. (Decreto de 12 de diciembre de 1958 por el que se crea una Comisión Interministerial para estudiar y proponer los núcleos urbanos de descongestión de Madrid y demás comarcas de inmigración interna)

And what was true for Madrid was true, of course, for the rest of Spain. Keeping certain segments of the population in their designated places enabled the regime to maintain better control over them. This was done in two ways: first by keeping what was perceived as a reasonable ratio of civilians per security forces. But tying people to their community of origin in the countryside, the authority could also make use of more indirect (and yet highly affective) forms of social control. In this manner priests, teachers and the community of neighbors itself were used in order to monitor individuals and their families. Spatial mobility, then, constituted a real threat to the mechanisms of social control created by the regime.

In order to solve the tensions arising from the growing demand for laborers in Spain's urban centers, on the one hand, and the fears of social unrest, on the other, the authorities distinguished between legal and illegal migrants. In order to belong to the first group, newcomers had to show that they possessed an income sufficient to maintain themselves –and anyone else who joined them– in the city. They needed to prove they had adequate housing and stable employment or present documentation that could otherwise explain their change of residence (such as the need in specific medical services or educational facilities for their children). A certain number of migrants tried to adhere to such requisites by sending first one member of the family to Madrid (usually the husband), while all the others joined him only after he found employment and a place to live. But in reality only a minority of the newcomers could fulfill such conditions prior to arriving at the capital. As far as the regime was concerned, therefore, internal migrants were almost *a priori* allocated the position of criminals. Once they had settled in self-constructed neighborhoods at the outskirts of the major urban centers, the lack of infrastructures and services created real deprivation, dirt and antagonism, reinforcing their constitution as dangerous "others". And yet, as we shall see, through their interactions with each other and *vis-à-vis* local authorities, the newly arrived were also working to position themselves both socially and culturally.

9.3 The Who and How of Migration: Private Lives between Social Capital and Social Networks

In order to understand these politics of location let us first look at the socio-economic profile of those who settled in the self-constructed periphery of Madrid. In a census that was conducted in 1954–1955 migrants into the Madrid area were divided along the following lines: 49 % women and 51 % men. 49 % defined themselves as actively employed in their former place of residence. 71 % as day laborers and 11 % as employed in domestic service. Of the newly arrived, 60 % settled in the self-constructed *barrios* on the Southern outskirts of town and the rest within

the working class *barrios* of Madrid's center. A survey conducted by the FOESSA Foundation (Fomento de Estudios Sociales y de Sociologia Aplicada) in 1960 provides a more nuanced reflection on the shantytowns' population. Shantytowns such as Orcasitas or Palomeras had a much lower percentage of female population than the city of Madrid (50.5 % as opposed to 55 %). The average age of the population was 27, 3 years younger than in the capital. The number of children under the age of 15 was higher in the shantytowns and the number of those over 45 was much lower than in Madrid (FOESSA 1967).

While statistical information indicates that the majority of the people who settled in the district of Villaverde (of which Orcasitas is part) were day-laborers, life stories recounted in interviews show that many families had a more complex socio-economic history than the one reflected by their current status. The interviews expose certain motivations behind the migratory projects that go beyond the purely economic pull and push factors. The decision to migrate is no doubt affected by the expectations for improved socio-economic conditions. However, research has shown that as the indicators of economic growth in the country of origin increase, so does the flow of migrants (Martinez 2000, p. 14). Research conducted in Ireland, Southern Europe and Latin America indicates that the poorest of the poor, those supposedly most influenced by the economic push factors do not tend to emigrate (Massey 1999; O'Gráda and O'Rourke 1997). This is perhaps not so surprising since migration is a project that necessitates certain levels of social capital. But what exactly is social capital? Ángela was born in Madrid. Her parents arrived to Orcasitas from La Roda in Albacete. Ángela recounts:

> My father's family owned meat shops. After the war the Franco Regime confiscated their business for having provisioned the Republican Army. Since he was unable to find work in La Roda my [father] got into business with someone from his hometown. They founded a paint factory close to the Poblado Dirigido de Orcasitas. (Interview with the author, 21/4/2011, Orcasitas, *author's transl.*)

Ángela tells a typical story of Francoist economic repression. Her grandfather was not a known republican militant. He therefore did not lose his freedom, only his business. Founding a new business was a difficult task, but it was within the family's realm of possibilities. However, migrating away from the town where they were well known was the only way to go.

Jesus, originally from the Toledo countryside, settled in the district of Villaverde in 1955. In his interview with historian Julio Fernández Gómez he recounted another typical story of migration in search of anonymity:

> This guy who was in charge of everything back there [in Toledo] started a sausage factory […]. Many of us worked there, but the guy did not pay us social security, he didn't make the most basic payments. I denounced him in 1954. And what a surprise! Since everyone in the village worked with him I was left without work. (Fernández Gómez 2007, p. 261, *author's transl.*)

Jesus did not come from a background of political activism, and it is important to note that his actions were not framed within an oppositional discourse. He did, however, come from an area where agrarian reform planes were put into place between the years 1934–1936. This period, which he experienced as a very young child, was

described by him as "a time of social security". It had clearly shaped his conceptions of right and wrong and his expectations for communal collaboration. Acting on such expectations he soon found himself unemployed. Migration was his only choice.

I would like to stop for a moment and consider these stories in relation to the concept of social capital. Social capital is the capacity of individuals to control and make use of certain resources as a result of their insertion into a network of relationships or other social structures. This capacity clearly results from one's socio-economic status. But what about the corpus of life histories and past experiences of the migrant (and his/her family)? Such stories and past experiences often frame the migrant's early memories without affecting his/her actual socio-economic status. And yet they may offer further clues as to who is willing to accept certain living conditions and who would chose to uproot and re-start life elsewhere. Within the context of Francoist repression more elaborated life histories also aid us in differentiating between different categories of "defeated" (*vencidos*). Although most migrant families suffered different degrees of repression by the regime (lack of work, confiscation of land or family business, etc.), they were not targeted as active republican militants. These individuals and families represented the bulk of migrant population.

Another factor that clearly affected the willingness of individuals to consider migration was the amount and accuracy of the information they possessed about the place in which they wished to settle. Against the background of the accelerated processes of urbanization and modernization undergone by many European societies from the second half of the Ninetinth century, it s clear that one cannot view urban and non-urban communities as two mutually exclusive forms of existence. Studies concerned with the different forms of rural-urban migration provide ample evidence of the existence of varied social networks that tie urban and rural communities, providing migrants with extensive, and yet at times also conflictive information about their future place of residence. Social networks can be based on different affiliations: blood relations, professional ties, personal friendships or common geographical origins. My research in the case of Orcasitas has demonstrated that geographical affiliations played a central role not only in the decision to migrate to Madrid, but also in the decision of where to settle in the city. For the purpose of my research I am compiling a database containing information about over 1000 families that settled in this neighborhood between the years 1950–1961[2]. There is no doubt that for some people the decision to settle in Orcasitas was arbitrary, the neighborhood was simply the last cheap, unsupervised frontier before the actual capital. But the fact that some streets –and later on entire buildings– were populated by different households belonging to one extended family or arriving from the same village indicates that many migrants purposefully made their way into the neighborhood where they already had acquaintances.

[2] The database includes information collected from the files of the Spanish Ministry of Housing concerning properties intended for expropriation between the years 1955–1989. See Fondo Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda, Signaturas 68510-68542.

A similar phenomenon was noted by historians Jose Babiano and Julio Fernández Gómez regarding the migrants' initial decision regarding their work-place in the city (Babiano 1995; Fernández Gómez 2007, p. 289). In the factory constructed by *Standard Electrica* in Villaverde, for example, more than half of the employees came from the same village in Leon. At the factory Euskalduma installed in the same district a third of all the workers in the early 1960s came from Urda in Toledo—the hometown of the company's chief engineer. Once the first migrants settled in the Orcasitas-Villaverde area what historians and anthropologists refer to as the effect of relatives and friends gained weight. Relatives and friends provided information for future migrants, functioning as the first point of contact in the city to those arriving after them. Before moving on, I would just like to point out that social networks functioned as a tool that was meant to aid migrants in their adaptation to and acceptance into city life. And yet, by their very nature such networks at times also functioned to exclude and discipline the newcomers. Or in the word of one interviewee:

> The owners of the business liked this situation. There was always a chance that one of the guys [that you helped bring in] was more rebellious than the others. But they could count on you to [help them] control the situation. You had more seniority and the guys would come to you with their problems. And you would say to them: "it's not important, let it go". They would ask for your opinion because they held you in high esteem since you arranged the job for them. (Fernández Gómez 2007, p. 288, *author's transl.*)

It is not my intention to analyze here the long-term effects the extensive role of geographically based social networks had on the structure and social relations within a barrio such as Orcasitas. However, it is important to note that such effects lasted well beyond the first months or even years. Felicitas, aged 91, arrived at Orcasitas from Albacete. In her interview, she explained the way in which the presence of her husband's friends from La Roda dominated the couple's social lives in Madrid as well:

> Look, since my husband came from Albacete he kept in touch with some friends that also got away and lived here. Some intimate friends. We celebrated birthdays together, we all got together and each year we celebrated Christmas in a different home. It was wonderful. (Interview with the author, 3/2/2011, Orcasitas, *author's transl.*)

Daniel, aged 61, arrived to Orcasitas at the age of 17 from Belmez, near Cordoba. He too explained the ways in which the known geographic characteristics of the *barrio* helped in preserving his own sense of identity:

> One of the most important things for me is the fact that I was never uprooted from the old land. After forty something years here [in Madrid], I still keep my accent and I have no intention of loosing it. I come from a miners' village in the province of Cordoba and when my final moment comes I will say "here lies a man from the village of Belmez". (Interview with the author, 17/3/2011, Orcasitas, *author's transl.*)

Immigration, then, while creating new forms of social relations did not undermine completely the old sense of belonging. For those who wished to maintain such identifications, the existence of village ties within city life had clear material and emotional implications.

But the interviews conducted with migrants also point to other networks though which information about Madrid was collected. Paradoxically it seems that some of the most useful networks were put in place by the regime itself. In 1959 sociologist Miguel Siguán interviewed 200 migrant families who settled that same year in Madrid. 5% of the men interviewed stated that they contemplated the idea of moving to the capital during their military service. It was in Madrid that they received their first professional training. As young, unmarried men, who were fed and housed by the state, they were able to make use of their small salaries in order to enjoy the city's cinemas and bars. In both cultural and economic terms, life in the city seemed to offer advancement. However, it is significant that none stayed on after their service. It was only after they were married that the final move to the city was made. Study periods, student exchange schemes and sporting events sponsored by the Falangist Youth Movement also provided an excellent opportunity to get to know the capital.

9.4 The Why of Migration: Subjective Aspects of Moving Towards a Better Life

All migrants reached Madrid hoping to better their lives. And yet, looking at the photos taken in shantytowns such as Orcasitas in the 1960s, one is left to wonder what exactly the newcomers' definitions of progress were. Prior to leaving the countryside most migrants already constructed a vision of urban life based on notions of modernity, comfort, and the city's image as a place full of new opportunities. Reality of course was more complex. Earnings in the city were higher. And yet, primary products were often cheaper in the countryside. So was purchasing a plot of land for cultivation. Some pastime activities (such as swimming in the river) did not cost anything in the countryside, while other more modern diversions such going to the cinema or musical events were accessible only in the city. As far as education was concerned primary school placements were harder to secure in the city, where some peripheral neighborhoods had no classes at all. Secondary education, on the other hand, was more diversified and more easily financed through scholarships.

In view of this, it is important to understand how migrants prioritized and evaluated the different aspects of their new lives. Work-wise upward mobility could mean several things: it could mean better pay, more possibilities for professional training, and advancement and different working conditions. In a study conducted in Orcasitas 190 migrant families were interviewed by sociologist Isidro Alonso Hinojal. Over half of the men interviewed found work in Madrid as non-qualified laborers. Of those, 40% indicated that they would be interested in finding better jobs – that is jobs that necessitated further professional training. The rest stressed that they were happy with their current employment (Alonso Hinojal 1969, p. 33–34). From the interviews I conducted it is clear that employment stability and the predictability of working hours were valued above anything else in city jobs. Possibilities for professional training and advancement came in a third place. A man, who migrated to Madrid in 1954, explained in an interview he gave years later:

> In the countryside we worked endlessly. Between the middle of June and the middle of September, for example, I could not take a single day off. […] When we got to the factories [in the city] of course we had to work hard. But at half past 7 you would go home. This was unthinkable [in the countryside] where we worked like slaves. (Fernández Gómez 2007, p. 265, *author's transl.*)

This, of course, does not mean that all men worked 8 h per day. By the mid 1960s 31% of the men in Orcasitas reported they worked between 8.5–10.5 h a day and 22% reported working over 10 hours. A major difference for those who did so was the fact that they now earned extra pay for their overtime work.

References to the temporary nature of work in the countryside also abound. Work in the Spanish countryside was always characterized by high levels of instability, especially within those communities that relied on agriculture for their livelihood. Throughout the decade of the 1950s, however, it is possible to discern a change in the attitudes towards work that was paid for by the day or even by the week. A carpenter, who immigrated to Madrid in 1952, at the age of 28 from a village of the Toledo countryside recounts:

> In the countryside we worked more and lived under worst conditions. I was made aware of that when I arrived in Madrid [1946] to complete my military service. I was one of those with a permanent job. I worked all year around. […] But I did my math and it came out I was earning 7 pesetas a day in the countryside in 1951. It was then that I decided I couldn't go on. And the worst thing is that I worked day and night, no holidays. This is why I came to Madrid. (Fernández Gómez 2007, p. 255, *author's transl.*)

In order to understand the refusal to accept working conditions that prevailed –almost uncontested– for centuries, one must take into account the deep changes that took place in the economic and social conditions during the decade of the 1950s. With the admittance of Spain to the United Nations and the renewal of diplomatic relations with the USA, the brute repression of the immediate post war years was giving way to more nuanced forms of social surveillance and control. Following the initial stages of reconstruction in post World War II Europe, external migration of Spanish citizens had picked up again and internal migration (which never ceased) intensified[3]. The flow of information made many day laborers in the countryside more and more aware of the possibilities offered by the construction boom in the cities and those opened by the intensification of industrialization, which took place even prior to the publication of the Stabilization Plan in 1959. Under such conditions the prospects of a different form of work, a city job became more tangible.

In terms of housing too, defining progress was a complex task. A survey conducted in the district of Villaverde in 1956 indicated that 60% of the dwellings in the area were made of wood and cardboard. By 1976, 12% of the houses did not yet have a toilet, bath or shower and only 35% had access to electricity. Despite the district's appearances about a third of the families who settled there in the 1960s

[3] During the years 1940-1960 internal migration never stopped in Spain. The steady flow of migrants during the first decade following the Civil war was much smaller than what would follow during the 1960s and yet it was much higher than the migratory wave experienced in the decade prior to the war (Mart□n Cobera 2008, p. 177–196).

did so after spending a period of time living at the center of the capital. What had precipitated their move into self-constructed *barrios* such as Orcasitas?

Part of the answer, at least, lays in the migrants' definition of home. Of the 200 migrant families who were interviewed in 1959 by sociologist Miguel Siguán almost a half stated that they experienced a sense of losing their independence upon arrival to the capital. While in the countryside many young couples shared a house with their extended family doing so in the city was perceived as a failure of the migratory project. Having an independent house (even if a *chabola*) –not sharing– that was the hallmark of a functioning family and adaptation to city life. In the words of Felicitas, who settled in Orcasitas in 1958: "This is the point in which my life changed. I had a home".

While the internal and the external appearance of the *chabolas* constructed in Orcasitas differed according to the economic status of their owners, all homes had one characteristic in common: in Orcasitas, just as in the other squatter settlements around Madrid's southern belt, most dwellings were divided into a surprisingly large number of bedrooms with lower priority given to the construction of a kitchen and only in some cases to the construction of a bathroom or a living room. The average *chabola* in Orcasitas of the 1950s comprised of 3 to 4 bedrooms, with some reaching up to 7 bedrooms. The average family comprised of 2–3 children with 30% of the families having an additional member of the extended family living in (usually an unmarried brother or sister of one of the parents). While the number of family members might explain the need for more than one bedroom the decision to construct a large number of bedrooms within a relatively small space at the expense of both living room and bathroom merits some explaining.

Close human proximity and the chaotic mixing of men and women of different ages were the hallmarks of the "deprivation" associated by the authorities with the losers of the Spanish Civil War (Ofer 2008). Indeed, spatial crowdedness was an undisputed condition in many working-class *barrios* of Madrid. The lack of privacy and of personal space, translated in everyday life into a lack of toilets, shared bathing and sleeping space, undermined people's sense of respectability and at times even humanity. Many of the testimonies I collected reflected the feeling that keeping men and women of different age groups spatially separated was a precondition for maintaining a "moral family" and a "moral community". As a result, the majority of Orcasitas' dwellers worked even harder than their middle-class neighbors in order to create spatial distinctions within a tightly packed environment. One consequence, as can been seen from the *chabolas*' building plans, was the creation of several minuscule bedrooms where not even a bed could fit, all for the sake of separating adults and children of different sexes and ages.

The initial appearance of the barrio frightened and depressed many new comers. Ángela, who moved to Orcasitas from the center of Madrid in search of larger house, confessed: "I wanted to die. I came from a college run by nuns, everything was squeaky clean. We had all the comforts you could think of. And then they brought me here and I saw the mud" (Interview with the autor, 5.4.2011, Orcasitas, *author's transl)*. But these feelings were soon mitigated by an evolving sense of community. Paradoxically this sense of community was enhanced by the *chabolas* themselves. María, who grew up in Orcasitas, explained:

> Here everything was shared. The houses were all open there were no doors, only curtains. You didn't have to ring. You simply entered and what you saw was there for the taking. It was for everyone – neighbors, friends, family. (Interview with the author, 21/4/2011, Orcasitas , *author's transl.*)

Jesus, who moved to Orcasitas from the center of Madrid recounts: "There were many shanty homes. Some were made of wood, others made of exposed brick. They looked like tiny vacation homes. Life was good then, we all knew each other. Now everything is different, we each live in his or her apartment and it's not the same" (Interview with the author, 17/3/2011, Orcasitas *author's transl.)*.

As researchers we must guard against idealizing an everyday reality that was extremely difficult both materially and emotionally. At the same time we have to acknowledge the fact that settling at the periphery of the capital was at least partially a choice that served specific ends. Jesus' words call to mind the phrases used by the Ministry of Housing quoted above. Both descriptions emphasize the makeshift nature of the *chabolas*, the mud, the use of wood and exposed bricks. And yet a parallel reading also fleshes out the ways in which material reality, supposedly objective, can be manipulated in order to generate subjective images of good/bad, moral/immoral.

Breaking down the different elements that define concepts such as mobility or progress, and understanding how they are being understood and prioritized by individuals is important for several reasons: on the most basic level, it may provide us with a "thicker" view of migratory projects and the reasons behind them. Moreover, it can help us in seeing urban and non-urban life as a continuum of experiences and expectations rather than a dichotomy. And finally, by highlighting the ways in which the material gains subjective value may help us to discern the ways in which historical actors locate themselves and are being located within different narratives.

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Legislation

Decreto de 5 de septiembre de 1958 por el que se concede a Bilbao la construcción de cuatro mil viviendas subvencionadas y se establecen normas de control sobre la inmigración y el chabolismo.
Decreto de 12 de diciembre de 1958 por el que se crea una Comisión Interministerial para estudiar y proponer los núcleos urbanos de descongestión de Madrid y demás comarcas de inmigración interna.
Decreto 1354/1959 de 23 de julio, desarrollando la ley de 17 de julio de 1956 para organización del Instituto Español de Emigración.
Ley de 17 de julio de 1956 por la que se crea el Instituto Español de la Emigración.
Ley 93/1960 de 22 de diciembre de 1960, sobre bases de ordenación de la emigración. http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1960–19443

Part V
Identity and Membership: Where to Belong

Chapter 10
An Artistic Journey Through the Experiences of Refugee and Migrant Women in London

Nela Milic

10.1 Introduction

Using narratives and images, this chapter is based on an ethnography that explores the wish to belong, and examines issues related to migration and marriage. "Wedding Bellas" is a photographic project about female desire for roots and stability, and human need for dressing up to hide personal problems. This chapter uses photography to narrate twelve histories of "brides" passionately attached to the "objects" of their marriage. Wedding dresses are surrounded by other wedding iconography: an event of desperation and illusion shot as on a true wedding ceremony. The chapter focuses on the stories of migrant women that participated in the project, who have been rejected by their partners, by their landlords, or by their employers. But the majority of them has been rejected by the State that refused them the permit to stay in the country. The participants showed an extraordinary resilience and resourcefulness in facing the burden of problems that urged them to escape into the fantasy of stable, rooted, and good looking marriages with "Queen's subjects". London landmarks, such as a lamppost, a tree, a traffic sign, are their husbands. The final goal is to challenge the perception of migrants and refugees in the UK today.

I have been planning to realize the project "Wedding Bellas" since I encountered in 2007 a group of refugee and migrant women in Migrants Resource Centre (MRC) in London. I wanted to capture them on photographs and tell their life differently than in the media, where they are usually portrayed as victims, battered, scarved, bruised, crying, veiled or ethnicized, surrounded by poverty and children. I engaged twelve of them with the idea of creating a calendar for an exhibition and a publication collecting their stories. The project developed at my house and my neighborhood, and around the MRC. The women involved in the project are from Iran, Czech Republic, Argentina, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Italy, Germany, Serbia, Turkey, Bangladesh, Poland, Ecuador, Lebanon, Ireland, and the UK. They posed like on a

N. Milic (✉)
Computing Department of Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK
e-mail: nela011@hotmail.com

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fashion shoot, providing glamour to their dreary everyday—bad press, queuing for food vouchers, immigration controls.

10.2 Notes About the Shooting

As many art projects do, also this one started in a cafe. I was talking about love with a photographer, Sinisa. We referred to the desire to be with someone in a sense that seemed disappeared from our surroundings –someone we can count on, invest in, a person who is going to work on the longevity of the relationship. In a world where all is temporary, Sinisa speculated on the idea that women especially have this craving to belong to someone or something. We burst into laughter imagining women getting married to no matter what, as long as it is rooted, stable and not going away. Our project was born: women in wedding dresses marrying objects like lamps and trees. We engaged a few friends and did the test shoots. We got a small grant to cover the expenses. Yet, Sinisa abandoned the project soon (Fig. 10.1).

The shoots were hard with just an amateur model and the two of us, a photographer and an assistant in East London, where local kids recently beat up a friend. The worries about the territory and safeguarding of our equipment took over the creative labor and I had to stop to rethink the project over. I went back to the participants in the project and I asked them the reasons to keep on. They answered that participating in the project allowed them to feel special like models, to finally wear "THE" dress, to reflect on the constant victimization of refugee and asylum seeking women, to do something for our community, to collaborate as women. The question for them was more why stop than why keep on. For those women, the precariousness of their lives (Butler 2004) left them insecure and almost incapacitated for trust and rely on anyone else but themselves and other women with similar experiences. It was as if men had disappeared from their worlds in any traditional sense, and they only embraced men who had feminine attributes and histories of shaken identities (Fig. 10.2).

Soheila lived in 30 homes, 13 cities and 6 countries. That kind of commotion normalizes restlessness and leaves an impression that she is pathologically unable to settle. She has always been, however, looking precisely for that—a settlement.

Margaret is currently traveling around the world with the school friend she recently got in touch with. They practically do not know each other, but she went with him anyway.

Larisa moved for the third time this year in search of the place she could be happy in. She says her residence in the UK is finally approved and maybe that will make her feel better about her home.

Alenka is going through a personal crisis, as she left her boyfriend who then left her when she changed her mind. During their 2-year break up, he lived in another country.

Dita invented an art with peelings of fruit and vegetable leftovers. She is creating something out of nothing when there is not much material around, but the desire for meaning, even short lived still exists in her work.



Fig. 10.1 Ana

Aneta has four jobs. She wakes up at four in the morning and makes abstract paintings. When you are working so much, the world is an abstract feature that you can only feel through repetition that sustains it.

Olga is an Ecuadorian woman who does not have much patience. She used her Spanish holiday snaps for the personal photo project as she is at our workshop primarily to learn how to better take travel pictures.

Sheida is an Iranian artist with loads of energy and her English is the funniest as she learns it on the go. She is thrown into situations she swims in easily, while people around her do not even know her name.

Iris is a lady with heightened stress due to many jobs and a desire to do them all right. She often gets herpes on her lips and lives with her boyfriend no one seems to like.

Anne is a larger than life teacher, working with children who have learning disabilities. Since she is lesbian, her participation in this project is the most intriguing. Will she send pictures to her family?

Jobeda has always felt a sense of longing for belonging as an outsider not fitting into any community and mentally struggling most of her life. She has reached a stage and an age she no longer cares about what people think of her.



Fig. 10.2 Soheila

Silke almost got married once, but was advised to be careful, as her fiancé at the time might be interested in her visa. It broke her heart. However, she is still trying to find love.

Mary is Irish and lives with Silke. She is a performance artist who organized a local Halloween procession. She jumped into our project on the day we were shooting. We had a dress for her too.

Nela (me), is 39 from Serbia, lives in London irregularly and has worked on suchlike projects for the last 13 years.

For the sake of all these women I continue the project. With no money, no camera as it left with Sinisa, the participants started pulling out too. After concluding that this project is not as naïve and humorous as it looked like, the chickening out began. The ones who married for papers found themselves too close to home. The ones with bad relationships who hoped they were good and will end up in marriage, saw it as re-enactment of the illusion they did not want to experience again. The ones who thought there is still time, wanted to put on the dress when that time



Fig. 10.3 Krystal

would come. What had started to develop as a feminist art movement was now falling apart.

That is until Krystal breaks the ice and sends the photos of herself from Lebanon. She put on her mother's wedding dress to support the project and hugged a street sign (Fig. 10.3). She could not be with us, but since she interacted in order to sustain the momentum we have built, I decided to engage the girls who were passionate about our causes. I talk to a colleague, Tito about helping me. Soheila has a daughter who is a make-up artist and both of them are on board. I enquire about Tito's male presence with the participants in the project and they have nothing against it—the project is ours, he will work for us—a man working for women for a change!

I wrote funding applications and hit Internet sites and car boot sales. An Australian lady responded to my advertisement and allowed me to borrow her wedding dress. "Have wedding dress in cupboard…would like it back though…I think it is about size 12…was almost 10 years and 2 children ago!!!!"

We shoot Larisa in her gown on a sunny day. She was nervous, as it was peak-time on Broadway Market (Fig. 10.4).

Tito and I concluded that we should give the models their pictures and at least take them for lunch. They were standing on the street like clowns, saying "thank



Fig. 10.4 Larisa

you" to strangers as they wished them good luck with their marriages. It might be "our" project, but I put "them" there. It was my responsibility, as a woman, as an artist, and now as an activist they expect me to be. What do I think, asked Maite, from the European Cultural Foundation (ECF). If anything, I am interested in eradicating the culture of national labeling, I answered. As in my previous project "Balkanising Taxonomy"[1], I have been trying to expose the idea of understanding something by classifying it, creating a drawer for it as it has a particular belonging. I wanted to explore the restriction of identity.

However, applying for funding I used the same criteria that I criticize: I wrote that Soheila is Iranian, when she is a Swedish citizen, I call Larisa a refugee, but she is a migrant from a country where many refugees came from, Jobeda is not

[1] See more about the project at http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/balkanising-taxonomy/ [last accessed March 2, 2014].



Fig. 10.5 Margaret

Bangladeshi, she is a Londoner. And even though I do not feel British, this is who I am now. By analyzing the transnational identities of the participants in the project, the discourse of my project widens and begins touching on representation, community, feminism and it looks like it could be a never-ending study.

I bought accessories on Brick Lane Market, I dug out shoes from my graduation and only manage to find one bridal dress in a charity shop but it does not fit for Margaret who is the next on our shooting list (Fig. 10.5). I took one from the theatre I used to work in, and asked Margaret to bring all that can help to liven it up. She brought a veil and dressed in my flat. She was putting on the hoop, and we soul searched how we always wanted to try out being brides. She embraced the challenge of loving the local fountain and did all we ask for shooting: dancing around it, kissing the concrete, talking to passer-bys while people stare at her from the bus. Margaret definitely earned her lunch. And this also meant that we needed funding.



Fig. 10.6 Nela

Our advert proved to be fruitful again and I waited for a seller at Shepard's Bush station. The woman asked me to go to her flat near by. I did so, and realized that I was locked in the car with couple of Romani people I met on Internet. Luckily, we arrived in a home of a large family who show me a dress which train was removable so I can photograph two girls in the same dress. As I purchased it, her sister offered her dress too. But, someone threw up on her at the wedding, and the dress was also muddy at the bottom. While family remembered stories from the weddings, the mother packed the dresses in bin liners with some cleaning spray. At home, I placed the dresses in the bathtub.

The summer passed and the weather did not inspire the participants to go on until next year. I decided to pose myself. Tito took photos of me the way I thought of. We attracted a rough crowd. My veil kept coming off and I could not move in the dress. I had to go to work and the shoot was making me late. We had an argument for the first time. This was when I realized that without funding we did not have the strength to sustain the project (Fig. 10.6).

During the winter, I came back to MRC where I have volunteered as a journalist and an editor since the first issue of New Londoners, a newspaper developed as a response to negative portrayal of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the media. Every year more and more professional journalists join us, as the paper won awards for best London paper and best ethnic minority media in the country. The MRC got new users too. However, they cannot provide photography and every issue struggles with images. More importantly, we do not have skills within the group to take pictures. So, I add photography classes to our funding applications for "Wedding Bellas" in order to improve the group's image archive and knowledge of

Fig. 10.7 Dita

photo taking that can be utilized by New Londoners once our project is over. We got 40,000 € from European Cultural Foundation and started in May 2010 with the wedding season.

The director of the MRC, Ros, asked me to include men in the workshops. I already arranged a female teacher, Dragana, to help me out, but I could not refuse the participation to men. Yet, at the first class, when 20 people showed up, I stressed that the workshops developed from a project about women as we would be making a calendar about the brides.

By July, the participants to the course learned more about "Wedding Bellas". I asked them to model for my calendar and most of them agreed, but now they were able to take photos they wanted to shoot as well. I was making a calendar and they wanted one too—with photos they took by themselves. I worried that it would mean to loose the control over the project. Furthermore, it would be difficult for any curator to take on such a complex artwork. Still, I agreed and reduced the budget for my own calendar in order to increase the expense to workshop materials, which would take on the printing of yet another calendar (Fig. 10.7).

We dressed the girls at the MRC. Dita adored the attention. She suggested poses herself and followed obediently our instructions. Her choice was a cycling post. The observers commented on her dress and some took their photo with her. Others joined us, taking snaps on mobile phones.

The sunny day made Aneta happy (Fig. 10.8). Her tiny physique and simple dress created a different image against the urban landscape. Dita's glorious dress occupied the entire frame. Aneta instead was the bride of portraits.

Yet, on the second day we had to shoot three participants and it was raining. Two of them were friends of mine—Silke and Rosa. Buses passing splashed Olga and she could hardly walk in soaked dress, her make-up was ruined, and she was freezing. But we got the shots for the calendar's winter months.

The postproduction of the project was not exciting and the holiday plans for August took away a few of our participants. Now, we had barely a dozen of



Fig. 10.8 Aneta

photographers who attended Photoshop sessions where we worked on improving the taken photographs. Still, they team up for tasks and make friends outside of class. Yet, many of them interacted only with people during the class, and had no friends but the photography workshop participants. Yemene has been destitute for half of the workshops, and ill for the second half. Marlies has been homeless, but managed to find temporary accommodation around the time we gave her a camera. However, she was evicted for non-payment, and our camera was confiscated with all her things. She became homeless again and was barely sleeping, so she sometimes fell asleep on class. When Olivier walked with us to one of the gallery visits we organized, he picked up the cigarette butts from the street, lit up and smoked them. Angelo, who excelled in class, wanted to help us. We were happy to have him, but could not offer regular work. Tito asked to clarify: "Did you mean any work?", "Yes, any, not photography…" Angelo replied.

The reactions of my European friends defeat me: in her email, Rosa writes: "I do not really feel that I belong to the group you are representing". In the public space, she did not feel she can lend her European status to the women who are second-class citizens and it is hurting me. I am one of those women. Did she always look at me that way?

During the installation of exhibition, at the Gallery of Barking and Dagenham Town Hall. The borough is famous for the headquarters of far-right British National Party-BNP a young man of Pakistani origin attacks me when I explain that the women marry objects because they do not like British man. "Go back to Serbia" he says reversing the time for more than a decade when I arrived to England.

10.3 Conclusion

Our brides' delusional weddings signify the brides' loss of reality; the consequence of their pressured life circumstances. This is portrayed in the images, which lead us to question the reality of the situation presented; is it real or imaginary?

The women are presented as alien, costumed bodies in ordinary spaces. Observed by the public in the streets during the shooting and again in the gallery or at publication, allowing the viewer to identify with the public on the set, the women's dresses are a mark of history situated in the midst of the metropolitan city, interrogating the old constructs of national boundaries, civic laws and social codes.

The white wedding is a type of formal or semi-formal Western tradition. Ironically, the white dress represents innocence and even though in the eyes of the state these women might be guilty for "paper marriage" (marrying British subjects), yet they are innocent at the court of human rights and in their own eyes. The powerlessness to determine their life choices as free human beings is reflected in their lonely wedding photos, but in their singular presence in the image, they gain power as women through the use of humor and fantasy.

The dress symbolizes each women's surrender to love, a submission that is in opposition to who they are. It is this polarity that the project is trying to capture—the trouble of binaries and the clarity in opposition. A bunch of brides hugging the street objects is not a wedding we would recognize as real, but it provided a neighborhood spectacle and encouraged a local debate about impacts of borders on human relationships and social changes in the areas we live in.

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Chapter 11
Between Territoriality, Identity, and Politics: The External Vote of Ecuadorians in Madrid

Gabriel Echeverría

La libertá é partecipazione
(G. Gaber)

11.1 Introduction

The concession of external vote rights to migrants by their sending states has been a growing phenomenon in the last decades (Lafluer 2012; IDEA Handbook 2007; Waldrauch 2005). Along with a number of other modes of political participation of migrants, the diffusion of external vote led to the development of the concept of migrants' political transnationalism and to an interesting academic debate (Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Bauböck 2003, 2007; López-Guerra 2005; Portes 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Martiniello and Lafleur 2008). One of the main disputes revolves around the issue of whether political transnationalism can modify the traditional forms of political participation, membership, and identity (Vertovec 2004). Likewise, external vote has been considered as a way to empower a previously voiceless collective and weaken the connection between territoriality and politics, one of the corner stones of modern political theory (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Escobar 2007; Boccagni 2007, 2009; Ramirez and Boccagni 2008). From a critical perspective, doubts have been raised about the possibility that external vote would expand the boundaries of democracy and challenge the power of national states. (López-Guerra 2005; Nun 2003; Avritzer 2002) As a consequence, the external vote would be a way for the states to reinforce their prerogatives on their nationals and, so, guarantee their loyalty and their remittances. These controversies have been stirred even further by a noteworthy shift in the dynamics of external voting rights. While during the 90s migrants had to fight to obtain the external vote, the last decade saw an ever-growing role of the state in granting it.

G. Echeverría (✉)
Ortega y Gasset University Research Institute, Madrid, Spain
e-mail: gabrielecheverria@gmail.com

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One of the most important issues emerged in the debates of the last decade stressed the need to further inquire into the different aspects of external vote. Indeed, although the theoretical speculations proliferated, there is still a lack of empirical evidence, and important issues remain unexplored. This chapter intends to address some questions that have not been clarified yet, in particular: how consistent is the participation to external vote? Does external vote determine a real and productive empowerment or is it a *façade* concession that ends up having only an "expressive" value? Does external voting determine a shift in the relationship between territoriality and politics?

In order to address these issues, this chapter analyses the existing literature on the topic and presents the results of a Madrid-based fieldwork research. The first section of the chapter discusses some interesting findings, categorizations and concepts related to the political transnationalism and external vote literature. The second part presents the findings of the empirical study realized among the Ecuadorian migrants during 2009's Presidential Election. The fieldwork research was realized in the city of Madrid, on the Election Day, the 26 April. Two are the main goals of the study: first, to evaluate the participation in the so-called "broad" or "expanded" transnational practices and "narrow" or "core" ones (Itzigsohn 2000); second, to find which of the two main reasons for political participation was dominant, i.e. the expressive one (in its belonging version or in its ideological one) or the instrumental one (Nie and Verba 1975). The third part will discuss the findings of the fieldwork in relation to the theoretical framework. In particular, the significance of external vote rights will be analyzed both in terms of its numerical and qualitative participation. The interest of the state in the concession of external vote rights will also be discussed. Finally, some critical remarks will be presented on the interest that leads the state to the concession of external vote rights, and the relationship between territoriality and politics.

11.2 Political Transnationalism: The Theoretical Framework

The concept of political transnationalism has been object of an intense debate in the last decades. This debate led to a specific and limited definition of it. One of the most important issues has regarded the identification of the proper actors of political transnationalism. Discussing the role of the state as a transnational actor, Smith and Guarnizo (1998) proposed the distinction between transnationalism "from above" and transnationalism "from below". In a similar attempt, Itzigsohn (2000) introduced the concept of migrant political transnationalism to address more specifically those transnational political activities where the role of migrants was predominant.

In relation to these and other debates, the concept of political transnationalism focused on the political activities of migrants that take place across the borders of two or more countries. Martiniello and Lafleur (2008), on the basis of previous definitions by Portes et al. (1999) and Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), proposed the following definition:

> Immigrant political transnationalism covers any political activity undertaken by immigrants who reside manly outside their homeland and that is aimed at gaining political power of influence at the individual or collective level in the country of residence or in the state of which they consider they belong. Such power or influence may be achieved by interacting with all kinds of institutions (local, sub national, national, or international) in the country of residence and/or in the home country, by supporting movements that are politically active in the country of origin or by intervening directly in the country of origin's politics (Martiniello and Lafluer 2008, p. 653).

Even after these attempts to circumscribe its range, the concept still refers to a great variety of phenomena. In an attempt to categorize such variety, in relation to the intensity of the transnational practices, Itzigsohn (2000) proposed the distinction between "broad" and "narrow" forms of transnational participation. Similarly, Guarnizo (2000) defined as "core" transnationalism, those activities that occur on a regular basis, following established patterns, and that are integral part of individuals' life and, as "expanded" transnationalism, those that occur on a more occasional way (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999; Guarnizo 2000).

One important critic to this group of "descriptive definitions" came from political theory research and, in particular, from the works of Rainer Bauböck. In his essay, *Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism*, Bauböck (2003) endorsed the need to reconsider the definition of political transnationalism, paying attentions to its effects on political communities, their institutions, and their conceptions of belonging. Trans-border activities, in fact, affect the definition of the entities involved, no matter whether we consider them as "states", "nations", or "imagined communities". A double and parallel process takes place: on the one hand, the sending polity extends into the territory of the receiving state, on the other, democratic receiving countries start to include foreign citizens into a wider definition of the political community. Then, the Austrian political thinker concludes: "Political transnationalism is more than political activity across territorial borders", the concept needs to refer also to "these changing and increasingly overlapping boundaries of membership in political communities" (Bauböck 2003, p. 703). Understood in this way, the concept of transnationalism acquires a specific heuristic value, clearly distinguishable from others, such as "international", "multinational", or "supranational". According to Bauböck, migration is an international phenomenon insofar as it involves a movement of persons between the territorial jurisdictions of independent states. It becomes transnational only when it creates overlapping memberships, rights and practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different political communities.

11.3 External Voting and its Consequences: An Open Debate

Today external voting is an important phenomenon. Since the 1970s, and with increasing momentum, an ever-growing number of countries conceded voting rights from abroad to their expatriated communities (Lafluer 2012; Tintori 2012;

Martiniello and Lafluer 2008; Escobar 2007; IDEA Handbook 2007; Waldrauch 2005; Nohlen and Grotz 2000). As for the other forms of political transnationalism, this can be explained by a variety of factors and conditions, mostly related to globalization, which have been widely studied by social scientists in the last years (Mügge 2010; Portes et al. 2002, 2007; Vertovec 2004; Guarnizo et. al. 2003; Levitt 2001; Portes 2001; Faist 2000; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Glick Schiller et al. 1994; Soysal 1994). To address this complexity, Itzigsohn (2000) stated the necessity to take into account the interests and initiatives of three fundamental actors: states, political parties, and migrants.

According to globalization theorists, states—especially "peripheral" ones—are characterized by large internal pressures, such as economic instability and social polarization. These conditions increase the need of foreign capital. For these countries, therefore, emigration can represent both a sort of "depressurization valve" and, because of the phenomenon of remittances, an important source of capital. As Bauböck (2005, 2007) noticed, the return to the home country could represent a positive and cost-free injection of human capital. Moreover, the presence in host countries of emigrate communities could constitute an important instrument of lobbying for the sending governments. Finally, sending countries need their emigrants in order to perform nation-building processes and reinforce state prerogatives. "The electoral inclusion of citizens living abroad", in fact, "is supported by ethnic conceptions of nationhood that conceive of the polity not as a territorial state and its inhabitants, but as a community that may be dispersed over several states" (Bauböck 2005, p. 684).

For all these reasons, states have today, more than ever before, a specific interest in keeping alive the relation with their emigrants. The will to maintain the influx of remittances, which is somehow the most evident and crucial issue, represents only one part of the explanation. A number of diversified public policies directed to emigrant communities have, then, proliferated in the last decades. The most significant are: the concession of external vote and dual citizenship rights, the building of representation channels for emigrants in national politics, the development of government-led remittances projects and, finally, the encouragement of nationhood and sense of belonging (Calderón 2003). In Hirschman's words, states, in need of resources, find ways to stimulate "loyalty" (Hirschman 1970).

Itzigsohn (2000) emphasizes the specific interests and the role of political parties. As political actors, these have to confront the growing importance of the emigrant communities and their ability to influence politics at home. For this reason, they are getting more and more involved in transnational electoral campaigns, in obtaining emigrants' economic support and consensus, and in developing strong relations with migrants associations and networks.

Finally, it should be underlined that emigrants are involved in transnational political participation in order to satisfy their individual needs (Itzgsohn 2000). These, using the classic distinction by Nie and Verba, range from the expression of identity or ideological membership—the so-called "expressive" participation—to the need to achieve specific purposes—the so-called "instrumental" participation (Nie and Verva 1975). Moreover, for emigrants the interest in participating to

transnational political activities is linked to their will to maintain the bonds with their countries of origin.

The study of external vote is particularly interesting not only for the geographical extent of the phenomenon, but also for its potential implications in the expansion of citizenship and democratic participation. First of all, the disconnection between territoriality and the concession of political rights has to be identified as a crucial issue. Indeed, the transnational vote implies an expansion of the political community beyond the fiscal borders of the state. As a consequence, the role of residence, which is usually crucial to concede such rights, loses importance. The external vote "is symptomatic for a broader transformation of territorial and membership boundaries that circumscribe democratic citizenship" (Bauböck 2005, p. 683). Concerning the democratic participation two main critics have been posed to transnational vote. On the one hand, those who vote should be linked to a political community and continuously participate to its political life. A more radical version of this argument comes from theorists of deliberative democracy who consider the external vote as a reduction of the democratic process to a simple and individualistic electoral event (Nun 2003; Avritzer 2002). On the other hand, those who participate to collective decision and the selection of representatives should have "some future stake" in the political community, otherwise their participation could be irresponsible (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Bauböck 2007; Rubio-Marín 2006). To say it with Hirschman (1970), it is not entirely clear why those who opted for the "exit" must keep "voice". Against these critics, Bauböck (2007) opposes two arguments and adds one in favor of external vote. The first argument is related to the technological transformations. Nowadays, the easy and cheap accessibility to powerful communication tools by almost every migrant makes it possible for them to substantially and continuously participate to the political life at home. The second one, connected to the first, emphasizes the increased ability of contemporary migrants to invest in their countries of origin, send remittances, and plan a future return. Finally, transnational participation is often the only possible one for migrants due to the substantial limitations they find to participate in the host countries.

As this brief overview has shown, the debate concerning political transnationalism and, in particular, external vote, is wide open. There is, however, unanimous agreement among researchers on the overall scarcity of information and the need to conduct further studies in order to improve the understanding of the phenomenon. The actual limits, especially for cases other than the US, concern the actual participation to political transnationalism and the motivations that drive such participation. Moreover, it is necessary to understand the effects and consequences on political institutions and procedures. Important questions remain unanswered, such as: does political transnationalism challenge the state or, on the contrary, serve its interests? Does it make democratic procedures more accountable, transparent, and open to previously excluded segments of the population? Is it a phenomenon that contributes to a deepening of public deliberation and democracy?

The aim of this chapter is to offer some elements of analysis to the debate on external vote. The focus is centered on migrants, addressing the following main questions: how consistent is the participation to external vote and other forms of

political transnationalism? What motivates such a participation? Does external vote determine a real and productive empowerment or is it a façade concession that ends up having only a symbolic value? On the basis of the collected data, this study will discuss the impact of external vote on the "spatiality" of politics. The leading question will be: does external voting determine a shift in the relationship between territoriality and politics?

11.4 The Ecuadorian Diaspora and the Concession of the External Vote Right

Ecuadorian emigration is a relatively new phenomenon, limited to a well-defined period of time. Yet, as it has been noticed, the magnitude that the flux acquired between 1999 and 2001 makes it particularly relevant and interesting to be researched (Ciriano and Cubillo 2008). The dramatic change in the migratory pattern of Ecuador was mostly determined by the deep economic and financial crisis that hit the country and culminated with the freeze of private bank accounts in 1999 and the dollarization of the economy in 2000. Yet, the massive emigration flux was also the result of a long-term process of social and political conflict characterized by the slow but continuous erosion of the political system, corruption and economic inefficiency (Echeverría 1997; Acosta 2002; Ramírez and Ramírez 2005).

One of the most noticeable effects of the crisis was a sudden and massive flow of Ecuadorian emigrants. Until 1998, this pattern was quite limited and registered numbers of emigrants were inferior to the thousand per year. Things changed in 1999 when the flux reached hundreds of thousand (Boccagni 2007). From this moment on, and for the next decade, around 10% of the population left the country. The remittances sent by migrants soon became the second source of national income, passing from 794 in 1998 to US$ 2318 million in 2005 (Herrera 2007). The three most important destinations were Spain, the United States, and Italy. However, Spain received the largest part of the flux. In 2008, Ecuadorians living in Spain were 458.437 (I.N.E 2008) being the third most important migrant community. Among these, 51,4% were women and 48,6% men. Regarding their geographical distribution, the majority of them reside in the Community of Madrid (32,2%), while other significant communities are present in Cataluña, Valencia and Murcia (Herrera 2008).

Ecuadorian migrants obtained external political rights at the end of the 90s. Due to some political ambiguities, though, the first external elections were held only in 2006 (Ramírez and Boccagni 2008). The government of the then-elected President Rafael Correa inaugurated a new era in the relationship between the state and emigrants. The radical change in the rhetoric, which substituted "betrayers" for "heroes", was followed by a number of initiatives and investments on behalf of emigrants. The expatriate community was designated officially as the Fifth Region of the country (in addition to the traditional four) and its participation to domestic political life was strongly encouraged.

The new Constitution, approved in 2008, emphasized the role of the emigrate community and recognized external vote at the top level of the jurisdiction. Article 63 states that "Ecuadorians abroad have the right to choose the President and Vice-President of the Republic, their national representatives, and those for the external electoral college; they will be eligible for all charges. Resident aliens in Ecuador have the right to vote after 5 years". Moreover, article 62 specifies: "The vote is optional: for citizens between 16 and 18 years old, Ecuadorians who live abroad, members of the National Army and Police, and persons with incapacities."

Furthermore, the government decided a reorganization of the institutions and structures devoted to deal with the emigrate community. This process led to the creation of the Ecuadorian National Secretary of the Migrant (SENAMI).

11.5 External Vote Participation

Table 11.1 compares the data on Ecuadorian population in Madrid (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, I.N.E.) and the official data on participation to external vote (Consejo Nacional Electoral, C.N.E.). As it can be noticed, on the one hand, the Ecuadorian population diminished throughout the last years, passing from 152,370 in 2006 to 127,524 in 2009. This reduction can be explained by a number of factors, such as the return to Ecuador, data adjustments, and internal migrations within Spain. On the other hand, while the number of persons with the right to vote reduced between 2006 and 2009, the number of those actually registered to vote increased, as an effect of the Ecuadorian government's efforts in this direction.

The effective voters in 2006 elections were 19,957, a number that decreased in 2009 to 14,774. In spite of the efforts made by the government to encourage migrants' vote and the unprecedented electoral propaganda displayed in Spain by the Ecuadorian political parties, this decrease represents almost 5% if compared with the previous elections.

Table 11.1 Electoral participation in Madrid

	2006	2009
a. Ecuadorian population in Madrid	152,370 71,500 Men 80,870 Women	127,524 61,764 Men (48.5%) 65,760 Women (51.5%)
b. Ecuadorians entitled to vote	125,659	128,571
c. Ecuadorians registered to vote	32,740	36,163
d. Actual voters in Madrid	19,957	14,774 6841 Men (46.4%) 7933 Women (53.6%)
e. Participation among the registered (d/c*100)	60.95%	40.5%
f. Participation among the entitled (d/b*100)	15.88%	11.49%

Own elaboration from: I.N.E. Padrón Municipal (www.ine.es) and C.N.E (www.cne.gob.ec)

Coming to discuss the participation percentages, it is important to distinguish two different records. On the one hand, there is the participation percentage among those who were registered to vote (those who, being entitled, went on through the registration process at the Ecuadorian Embassy in the months before the vote). On the other, there is the participation percentage among those who were entitled to vote. The first record, the one used with emphasis and pride by the Ecuadorian government and media, showed extremely high percentages of participation, especially considering that we are talking about an external vote. In 2006, 60 % among the registered voters went to the polls, and in 2009 more than 40 %. Nevertheless, the second record, the percentage of effective voters among those who were entitled, the data dramatically falls to 16 % in 2006 and to 11 % in 2009. As such, the external electoral participation can be considered overall reduced and shows a decreasing trend.

11.6 Political Life and Transnationalism

The fieldwork was conducted on 26 April 2009 in the city of Madrid using the exit-poll method. A 39-question survey was randomly given to migrants. The general purpose was to explore the different aspects of the political life of migrants and, specifically, their transnational political life. In particular, this survey scrutinized the reasons, approaches, levels of information, and expectations of the people that participated. The two main goals were to evaluate the participation in the so-called "broad" or "expanded" transnational practices versus "narrow" or "core" ones (Itzigsohn 2000; Guarnizo 1997); and to discover the main reasons for political participation, i.e. the "expressive" one (in its belonging version or in its ideological one) or the "instrumental" one (Nie and Verva 1975). The questions were divided into four main blocks. The first block inquired into the socio-demographic data, work, studies, and migratory experience; the second one into the transnational ties and activities; the third one into the political life of migrants and specifically into their transnational activities, ties and external vote experience; the last one into the identity and belonging feelings and the overall evaluation of the migratory experience. By the end of the day, 196 surveys were collected. Out of these, 185 were considered complete and valid to be analyzed[1].

Among the 185 interviewed migrants, 103 were women and 82 men with an age between 30 and 59 years old, with a prevalence of those not reaching 40 years old. The level of education was higher both in comparison to the Ecuadorian population (Herrera 2008) and to the Ecuadorian migrants in Madrid, since 81.1 % had 12 years of education. This record confirms the results of most research on political transnationalism participation (Guarnizo et. al 2003). Regarding the occupation, there were

[1] The surveys that have been considered valid were, at the end, 185 that, regarding a universe of 14,774 voters, represent the 1.25 %.

Table 11.2 Participation to civic or political activities in Spain

	Percentage
Spanish organizations devoted to solidarity activities towards Ecuador	4.1
Sport clubs and ludic associations in contact with Ecuador	9.3
Initiatives of Ecuadorians to help Ecuador	3.1
Initiatives of Ecuadorians related to politics	1.0
Initiatives to collect and send money to Ecuador	1.5
Public political demonstration	1.5
None	79.4

Table 11.3 Political participation

In Ecuador	Percentage	In Spain	Percentage
Political party	23.8	Spanish Party	7.7
Political association	3.3	Ecuadorian Party	0.5
Workers union	2.8	Migrant Association	7.1
None	70.2	None	84.6

not significant differences between the electors and the non-electors. Concerning the legal situation, there were three main groups with a similar numerical weight. 32% had a temporal residence permit; 30.1% had a permanent residence permit; finally, which is really relevant, 37.7% had already achieved dual nationality. As to the residence length, 85% had been in Spain since more than 7 years, which means that they had arrived between 1999 and 2002, at the time when the economic and political crisis in Ecuador reached its peak. This percentage decreased in the following years, probably in connection with the introduction of the visa requirement and the bettering of the economic condition at home.

The vast majority of the interviewees maintain strong and regular transnational relations with their home country. Nevertheless, the bulk of these relations are confined to the familiar ones. Seventy-five percent communicates on a weekly basis with their familiars, 70% sends remittances. Eighty percent said to be "informed on how things go in Ecuador", but also in this case, mostly on familiar issues. Only 16% said to be informed on political matters. Forty-one percent said they built a house in Ecuador, another 40% expressed the intention to do it. Finally, 50% said that goes back to the country of origin on a regular basis.

Table 11.2 shows the level of participation in civic or political activities connected to Ecuador while living in Spain. The most relevant result is that 79.4% said that had participated to none. If we sum the other voices, it is possible to say that 19% engaged in some kind transnational activities in the last year.

Table 11.3 focuses, more specifically, on the degree of participation in political activities or associations in Ecuador and Spain. It shows that political participation was already low in their home country: the 70.2% answered that they did not participate to any. Nonetheless, the record regarding membership to a political party is not marginal. The 23.8% gave a positive response.

Analyzing political participation in Spain, it was found that the number of the non-participants increased, reaching 84.6%. Only 0.5% said they are part of an

Ecuadorian Party, whereas, 7.7% said they participate in a Spanish one. Finally, 7.1% was member of a migrant association.

Using Itzigsohn's (2000) categories, it is possible to say that, although the 100% of the surveyed participate to "broad" transnational political forms, as all of them voted, only 19% participate to "narrow" transnational political forms. If we put this figures in relation to the whole population of Ecuadorian migrants in Madrid, not only the registered, it comes up that those who voted were no more that the 11%, and that those who engaged in "narrow" transnational political activities were less that the 2%. Even if this last percentage is based on a mechanical transposition that is not methodologically valid, since it is based on the assumption that those who did not vote do not participate in other forms of political transnationalism. As it is not very likely that among those who did not vote there is a hidden universe of active and regular transnational political activists, it is possible to attend at the general indication it suggests: that only a very small number of Ecuadorian migrants participate in "narrow" transnational political activities. Moreover, it seems that the migratory experience halved political activism, which passed form 30% in Ecuador to 15% in Spain.

11.7 Transnational Vote

Referring to the information gathering process before the vote, the majority used family and relatives networks. The media occupied the second place while more interactive channels such as public debates or meetings with candidates processes had a marginal role. Only 3.8% used the channels established by the Ecuadorian government, for instance, the SENAMI or the Consulate. When inquired on the utility of the external vote, 92.3% was in favor. The reasons for this overwhelming support were inquired by the survey and respondents were asked to express freely. This provided an interesting range of motivations that have been re-aggregated according to their "rationality" into 5 main categories. 26.6% said: "To make our voice heard"; 10.9%: "To improve migrants' conditions"; 18%: "Because it is our right". These three answers are characterized by an emphasis on the migratory condition and seem to assert the will/right to be listened to by the Ecuadorian government. The focus of these migrants, tough, seams to point more to Spain than to Ecuador. On the contrary, 13.3% considered important to vote for "the future of Ecuador". Only 11% indicated their motivation as: "to elect a specific candidate".

Asked on the motivations that took them to the polls that day, the two most important reasons were: "the fear of getting a penalty"[2] (19%) and the idea of vote as "a civic duty" for the Ecuadorians, that reached the 56,7%. As it can be noticed, "expressive motivations", both in terms of identity or membership, and short term "instrumental motivations" (the fear for penalty) were the most significant. On the

[2] In Ecuador, voting is a mandatory duty for citizens. Many migrants were not informed that it was optional for them.

contrary, political or ideological "expressive motivations" and long term "instrumental motivation" played a marginal role. Indeed, only the 12.8% answered, "I want to support a specific candidate", and the 4.9% "it is a way to influence Ecuadorian politics".

The survey also inquired on the level of awareness among the voters about the possibility to vote for the first time in the upcoming Spanish local elections. The vast majority was aware of it and 73.6% affirmed the intention to exert the "new right".

Finally, electors were asked to self-position themselves on a right-left political spectrum. The intention of this question was to investigate the degree of political involvement and polarization, as well as to appraise familiarity with these categories. While a majority of 34.5% did not answer, 48.8% positioned themselves at left, and 20.7% at right. Yet, discussing about this question with the other researchers that helped to collect the data on the Election Day, a shared feedback was that most respondents appeared uncertain and confused.

11.8 Identity and Membership

The bulk of the interviewed migrants maintain diversified social relations. Those with Ecuadorians are important but not unique. Although it is possible to register a prevalence/preference for latino friends, the relations with Spaniards are not marginal. These data allow to deduce a certain degree of social integration, or, at least, to exclude ethnic segregation. Asked about their national identity feelings, the 65% answered to feel only and proudly Ecuadorian. Nonetheless, a non-marginal 30% reported to feel half Ecuadorian and half Spanish. This last record, once crossed with the data on the naturalization process, allows ascertaining a positive relation between the obtainment of double nationality and the feelings of double membership.

On the basis of the collected data and bearing in mind the limits of the accomplished empirical work, it is possible to advance some general conclusions and partial answers to the research questions. Transnational political participation among Ecuadorian migrants in Madrid appears to be reduced in its "broad" forms, and very reduced, or even marginal, in the "narrow" ones. There is an important degree of transnationalism in the field of familiar relations. On the contrary, political participation is, in general, sporadic, badly informed, and, overall, superficial. When it exists, participation is driven mostly by identity concerns or the need of membership, as well as by personal instrumental goals. Very few migrants have a specific interest in Ecuadorian politics, keep themselves informed on a regular basis, or actively participate. It is also possible to argue that the migratory experience entail a decrease in political involvement and that transnationalism, at least until now, does not seem to constitute a substantial alternative. So far as identity issues are concerned, migrants' orientation seams to remain firmly directed towards their country of origin. At the same time, however, a positive correlation between the obtainment of the double nationality and the development of feelings of belonging to the Spanish community was unveiled.

11.9 Conclusions

In the first part of the chapter two main theoretical issues have been addressed. First, the significance of transnational vote, both in terms of numeric participation and in terms of migrants' motivations and rationales. Second, and in close relation with the previous one, the transformative capacity of this phenomenon at a macro-social level. In particular, the main focus has been on the possible influence of political transnationalism, and in particular of external vote, on democratic processes and the relation between territoriality, identity, and politics.

Regarding the first issue, an important finding of this study, that is consistent with recent research (Lafleur 2012; Escrivá Chorda et. al. 2009; Itzighson and Villacrés 2008; Boccagni 2000), refers to the limited participation of migrants to the external vote, and, more in general, to the various forms of political transnationalism. This statement does not aim to deny that a relevant portion of migrants participate in political transnational activities and perhaps even benefit from it. Rather, it highlights how such a relevant portion tends to represent a rather small part of the migrants' communities.

Furthermore, the distinction between "narrow" and "broad" political transnational practices seems important for two reasons. First of all, there is a substantial quantitative difference between the two in terms of participation. The number of migrants who engage in "narrow" political transnational activities is reduced. The results of the fieldwork estimate that only 2 % of the Ecuadorian population in Madrid participate to those activities, while more than 10 % is involved in "broad" political transnational activities. The second aspect concerns a qualitative difference. The "narrow" forms of political participation, because of their implications, are regularly associated with migrants deeply involved in transnational political life. They are often part of political parties or members of migrant associations, are highly politicized, and handle accurate, first hand, political information. This allows them to have a relevant political impact both on their countries of origin and their host countries. On the contrary, the "broad" forms of political participation, such as the external vote, do not seem to have a relevant impact. The majority of people participate to them occasionally and in an insubstantial way, they handle partial and indirect information, and show low levels of politicization. Accordingly, their participation has minor effects on their lives both in the homeland and host countries.

These two forms of political participation reveal different individual motivations. In the "narrow" practices of political participation, it is possible to recognize a precise and instrumental political will. Participation responds to the purpose of achieving political goals, and determines social changes, and power shifts. In the "broad" practices, as we observed in the case of external vote, participation is, for the vast majority, determined by expressive motivations, related to identity issues, and to the will to feel part of the origin community (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). "Broad" political transnationalism forms offer to migrants, without demanding too much, the possibility of recognizing themselves as part of a "community of destiny". This aspect, of course, is very important for migrants, especially if we consider

the difficulties related to the migration process. The direct observation of migrants during the external vote days gave to observers an immediate sense of the symbolic relevance that these events represent for their participants (Boccagni 2007). The political happening becomes a national celebration, an occasion to meet compatriots, to show flags, and patriotic symbols.

In relation to the transformative potential of political transnationalism on democracy and on the relation between territoriality and politics, two main ideas are discussed below. If, as it has been shown, participation to transnational political activities is, on the one hand, very limited, minimal when referred to "narrow" forms, and on the other, motivated mostly by expressive reasons, one should wonder whether it has any impact on the development of migrants' democratic participation and empowerment. The results of this study suggest that the "broad" forms of political transnationalism, such as the external vote, which are the most important in terms of participation, seem to be, at the moment, mostly "atrophied" forms of political participation. Even though they offer the opportunity to express identity and find recognition, they seem to be unable to generate participative processes oriented to obtain empowerment and social changes. Participation to external vote responds only partially to the "expressive" function of political participation, as it accomplishes belonging and identity expression but not ideological, and fails when it comes to the "instrumental" function. One could argue that the external voters participate "to be someone" and not "to achieve something". The reasons for this "atrophied" character of political participation from abroad could lead us to question the very possibility of a full-fledged transnational political life. The idea that emerged from the fieldwork is that, apart from the important issue related to identity that makes the country of origin important for migrants, their quotidian battles, their day-by-day efforts, their individual and collective interests are mostly related to the country where they reside, the city where they work, and the neighborhood where they live.

It is the dialectic with the immediate and material surroundings that influences their demands and projects. On the basis of these demands and projects, motivation to participate, engage in activism, and challenge the *status quo*—in one word, politicization—can originate. In Schmitt's terms, it would only be within a specific territory that the majority of subjects develop those "friend/enemy" relations that, from his point of view, constitute the fundamental category of "the political" (Schmitt 1998). In this sense, politics, intended in a broad sense, seems to be one of those "forms of social life" that require physical proximity (Urry 2002). Consequently, doubts remain on the possibility of political transnationalism, and, in particular, of its massive expressions, to determine substantial transformations in migrants' political participation and the development of democracy. Although important effects on the legislation of countries of origin and governments have been described, these do not seem to have strong social effects on migrants' everyday life.

Another interesting debate, in relation to the development of transnational political practices, questions whether, such practices, as they determine an expansion of the citizenship borders, could produce a separation between territoriality and politics (Itzigsohn 2000). Yet, is it true that modern politics determined a connection between territoriality and politics? The character of modern politics is not, or not

principally, the connection between territoriality and citizenship, but, instead, the connection between a "national community", identified with a territory, and citizenship. In modern times, "to be" on a territory has been seldom connected to the possibility to achieve full citizenship rights. More often, these have been conceded on the basis of belonging to a national community. This condition has been determined, depending on the case, whether, on the basis of the birth (*ius solis*), or on the basis of consanguinity (*ius sanguinis*).

Understood this way, the modern relation between territory and citizenship does not seem to be challenged by transnationalism. What happens with transnationalism is the expansion of the citizenship rights to the national community that resides abroad. In this sense, the transformative capacity of transnationalism is rather reduced. Instead, it tends to reaffirm the modern paradigm that requires individuals to be part of a national community in order to obtain political rights. A real rupture of this paradigm is not located in the disconnection between territoriality and politics, but quite the opposite in the concession of citizenship rights on the basis of residence. The efforts made by sending states, like Ecuador, to offer transnational rights to their migrants, often accompanied by a patriotic rhetoric on the novelty of such rights and the generosity of the state, in the end, hide the interests of those states in securing the flux of remittances.

On the other hand, the emphasis on transnational rights keeps the attention away from the fact that in most receiving countries full citizen rights are still denied to migrants. In this sense, talking from a normative point of view, while there is no intention to oppose the external vote, it seems important to stress that a real, transcendental change in migrants' life could happen with the affirmation of the residence citizenship (Bauböck 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Rather than focusing their efforts in fomenting the political affiliation of their emigrants, sending countries could be more active in the negotiation with receiving countries of the full incorporation of their nationals. By exploiting migrants' need of identity and evoking the evergreen myth of the nation, transnational political participation crystallizes their political orientation towards the country of origin, and can lead to an "atrophied" political life.

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Part VI
Identity and Differentiation: Strategies of (Dis)Identification

Chapter 12
When Your CV is "To Be a Latina Woman": Re-articulation of Stereotypes and Re-construction of Identity of Ecuadorian Women Working in the Care Sector

Paloma Moré

12.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the influx of Ecuadorian women in the Spanish labor market's feminized occupations, and links this process with the construction of migrant women workers' identities. The empirical basis of this text is twelve in-depth interviews with Ecuadorian women living in Madrid—selected with representative and theoretically based criteria[1]—who have worked or are still working in the domestic and care sector. This text also draws on ethnographical research based on participant observations conducted in the associative network of Ecuadoran migrant women in Madrid. I have focused on assistance for older people that, both in case of care and domestic work, implies personal and material tasks. These types of work differ in terms of working conditions, not job content. Domestic work will refer to jobs performed at the employer's household, including care and cleaning tasks. Care work will be used describe when the employer is a private company, although care and cleaning tasks can be developed in private households or institutions.

My purpose is a modest attempt to illustrate the social factors that keep Ecuadorian migrant women in highly feminized occupations (i.e., care and domestic work), and how the Spanish context affects the processes of re-construction of

[1] These interviews were conducted between 2009 and 2012. The informants were of different ages (between 20 and 65), civil statuses (e.g., single, married, widowed, divorced), family situations (e.g., children in country of origin, children in Spain, no children, grandchildren), social backgrounds, labor trajectories and studies (from no studies at all to postgraduate degrees, along with a highly diverse set of professions and activities). They came from different parts of Ecuador and immigrated to Spain between the late 1990s and 2006. Some highlight dollarization (2000) as their principal motivation, but there were also other factors prompting emigration. At the time of the interviews, they also had different migratory statuses.

P. Moré (✉)
Ortega y Gasset University Research Institute and Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain
e-mail: mmore@ucm.es

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women workers' identity. The Ecuadorian flows to Spain have been highly heterogeneous (Herrera 2005, p. 283), and I do not intend to affirm that all Ecuadorian women in the Spanish labor market work in the care and domestic sectors. Instead, I seek to grasp the social factors that keep a certain proportion of these women confined in to these sectors.

In order to analyze these migrant women's experiences from a gender perspective, it is important to understand the links between migration flows, gender arrangements and care organizations in Spain, where a combination of social, economic and political factors has triggered a 'care crisis'. The most important factors include the massive influx of Spanish women in the labor market and the scarcity of public resources—associated with the familialist welfare state—to solve the lack of childcare and elder care. According to traditional care culture, care arrangements have to be solved within the family, and the gender order assigns this responsibility to the women of the family. Castillo and Agulló (2012, p. 124) show that in labor contexts where work's extension, amplification and intensification prevail over the (male and female) workers' lives, men are generally more absorbed by their jobs and women typically manage the organization and timing of household reproduction. As a result, gender inequality persists. The reason for this persistence is twofold: first, couple arrangements naturalize the mothers' role; second, the mercantilization of cleaning and care work has been transferred from some women (i.e., those now privileged) to socially vulnerable others in worse labor positions (i.e., migrant women) (Candela et al. 2010, p. 137).

This care crisis coincided with a period of expansion in the Spanish economy and the development of immigration flows from the early 1990s to the beginning of the economic crisis in 2007[2]. These two simultaneous processes, Spain's care crisis and its transformation into an immigration country, are deeply interrelated. The highly feminized migration flows that Spain has experienced during this period unite these two processes. The proportion of women in migration flows from Latin American countries was especially high and women were often the pioneers of these migratory chains (Herrera 2011, p. 88). For most of them, domestic work—especially live-in domestic work—was their first contact with the Spanish labor market and society.

This sector has a long history. It was the main occupation of Spanish women in the 1980s (Colectivo Ioé 1990, p. 82), and most were migrants from the countryside to urban areas (Sallé Alonso 1985: 161). However, this labor activity showed a decreasing tendency of full-time workers until the late 1990s (Colectivo Ioé 2001, p. 231). At that time, as a consequence of Spain's transformation into a receiving country for international migration, the tendency was reversed. This process supposed a new injection into labor force for the care industry and private employers of domestic workers. The Spanish government and the Catholic Church actively encouraged this type of female migration, especially from Latin American countries, by establishing domestic worker quotas, maintaining legislation that allowed

[2] From 1996 to 2006, 6.9 million jobs were created in Spain, at a rate higher than in the European Union (EU)—54% for Spain and 13.7% for the EU (Rocha et al. 2008, p. 189).

irregularity in this sector and creating points of contact between migrant women and Spanish families.

The position of migrant women workers must be understood as residing at the intersection of some diverse social processes regarding gender, migration, and care. As Williams and Gavanas stated, the intersection of the care regime[3] and migration system provides the institutional context that shapes the experiences of women, including care workers and their employers (Williams and Gavanas 2008; Williams 2010, p. 290). To build an analytical framework that examines the connections between care and migration processes, Williams suggests observing the intersection of social relations in three domains: family, nation and work. In this perspective, the conditions, organization, and social relations of social production, which include care and intimacy, refer to the family domain; the welfare state and population refer to the nation domain; and the production and accumulation of capital refers to the work domain (Williams 1995, p. 148; Williams and Gavanas 2008, p. 15).

It is necessary to grasp the importance of institutional and macro-economic processes to understand Latina migrant workers' experiences from a critical and analytical perspective and move beyond a simple description of their trajectories and experiences (Herrera 2005, p. 284). The integration of these migrant women in the Spanish labor market has been highly gendered and embedded in the gender culture that assumes women—especially those from supposed traditional countries or cultures—have a set of "natural" care skills. The chapter opens with the essentialization of migrant women's skills, and I will focus on the factors contributing to that essentialization. In my fieldwork, a constant feature becomes evident: most of the Ecuadorian and Latin American women that I have interviewed were never employed in the domestic and care sector before their arrival in Spain. Even if some were nurses or pre-school teachers, they had never developed this work in private households and on the very intimate level required in domestic work and home care assistance. As a result, during my fieldwork, I addressed the following research questions: How did they experience this shift to a feminine profile in their working lives? How have their labor identities been re-constructed because of the essentialization of their working skills?

As Durand states, work identity is a multifaceted concept referring to the very concrete perception that workers have about themselves in their work environments. This identity is constructed through everyday experiences, including their activities, required skills, working conditions, and social relations (Durand 2009, pp. 321–324). This construction of identity is achieved through complex processes that transform personal experiences into identity narratives (Revilla and Tovar 2009, p. 126). These processes are also shaped by people's social positions. Gender, class, and ethnic subordination in the labor market influence these processes for

[3] The care regime denotes the extent to which a country relies on the state, voluntary workers or the private market for care; whether provision is accessed through services or through cash payments or tax benefits; and whether and how policies facilitate maternity, paternity or care leave (Bettio and Plantenga 2004). It also refers to cultures and practices, policy and popular discourses, social relations of power and inequality, and forms of contestation (Williams 2010, p. 390).

Ecuadorian women in Spain. For this reason, I suggest heeding black critical feminists' assessments of race, gender, and class as "distinctive yet interlocking structures of oppression" (Collins 1986, p. 19). Black feminists argue against universal, fixed, and essentialist categories of race, gender, ethnicity, and class and highlight divergences due to social, cultural, and historical conditions (Manalansan 2006, p. 227).

This chapter seeks to define the interrelated processes that contribute to the essentialized careers of Ecuadorian women in Spain. Following the schema that Evetts (2000, pp. 57–67) has developed for analyzing changes in women's careers, this chapter examines three interrelated analytical dimensions—culture, structure, and agency—that are closely woven and operate as a whole. The chapter is thus divided into three sections: the first one is dedicated to the cultural aspects affecting the essentialization processes of Ecuadorian women's labor trajectories; the second section aims to grasp the structural factors framing career boundaries that limit migrant women to feminized and ethnicized jobs; and the third section highlights some elements about strategic capabilities that may impact the perpetuation of feminized careers and trajectories. In these three sections, I aim to link feminized career construction processes in domestic and care work with the complex and relational processes of Ecuadorian migrant women's identity re-construction.

12.2 Cultural Dimensions of the Feminized Influx of Ecuadorian Migrant Women in the Spanish Labor Market

Feminist research has been crucial in understanding the social construction of femininity and masculinity, as well as maternity and family. In this sense, gender has been central in unraveling how those ideas are socially constructed rather than biologically preexistent. Interpretations of woman, man and maternity should be continuously produced and reproduced, changed and challenged. For this reason, these concepts cannot be explained without considering the particularity of social and historical contexts (Glenn 1994, p. 3). Furthermore, cultural beliefs shape the distribution and organization of work, as they affect women's workplace choices, how they decide to conciliate paid and unpaid work, and their identities as partners, wives, mothers and workers (Evetts 2000, p. 59).

Traditional understandings and assumptions about two spheres—production and reproduction—and men's and women's roles according to sexual labor divisions are simultaneously contested and deeply embedded in our society. As a result, domestic work is still culturally assigned to women, and the employment world is built on a masculine model that minimizes the time dedicated to domestic work and family responsibilities (Okin 1989). This gendered work model generally reinforces women's subordinate positions in the labor market (Carrasco and Mayordomo 1999, p. 129) and pushes those in wealthier positions to find "private"

solutions for the care needs that the public sector does not address. Not long ago, wives were exclusively responsible for domestic work, but now families tend to commodify some tasks to a rising care industry, which attracts a large proportion of migrant women from the poorest countries (Hochschild 2008, p. 274). Even if Hochschild's analysis is based on the American case, this remark perfectly fits the Spanish context.

In recent decades, two major transformations in the Spanish labor market—the massive influx of employed women and Spain's transformation into an immigration country—shaped the development of a dynamic and flexible sector offering large quantities of precarious and low-paid jobs. A contradiction emerges from this situation. Although a generation of autochthonous women has chosen to privilege their professional development and break traditional gender rules, this empowerment process is based on the natural transmission of their domestic responsibilities to other women. This transfer of feminine roles shows that the patriarchal cultural belief system that associates women with domestic and private family spheres has not been completely eliminated; instead, it has been crossed by ethnicity, class, and migration axes. The complexity of these cultural changes shows that even though patriarchal ideology and gendered family structures have been challenged, the whole social and economic system in which the family operates remains unaltered (Rivas and Rodríguez 2008, p. 57).

Through a process of gender and ethnic essentialization of their skills, migrant women replaced Spanish women in the household. In the following excerpt, one woman explains how the questions she was asked for her first job in Spain were absolutely oriented to her "CV as a woman", (i.e., her family life and supposed feminine skills). However, in Ecuador and Colombia, she had worked for many years in a factory and a carpenter workshop but never as a care worker. For that reason, she was very worried and expected the employer to ask her to perform specific tasks related to caring for his mother, an older woman with diabetes:

> I was afraid about the first interview because they told me that there would be a test, but then the son of the lady just asked me: "Have you done household work in your own home?" and "Have you cared for your children? So, what's the problem? It is just the same!". (Woman, care worker, Madrid 2012)[4]

For migrant women from Latin American countries, the naturalization of feminine qualities is stronger than for natives because people assume that migrants embody a highly gendered and traditional culture. Moreover, migrant women perpetuate this discourse of their qualification as Latina women. As the following interview excerpts illustrate, this process of differentiation is twofold. First, men generally are not interested in care work:

> Now because of the crisis, they (men) are going to learn to care […] but most of them, I think they don't like it, but it is just they are compelled to […] I guess women, in that sense, are more adapted to care for older people. (Woman, domestic worker, Madrid, 2009)

[4] The interviews were conducted in Spanish, and the author translated all of the text fragments presented here.

> Second, migrant women differ from Spanish women in the labor force:
> Spanish bosses prefer Latin Americans for this reason because we don't raise our voices but keep them in a low tone, like in a smooth one. If you shout at Alzheimer patients, they get more and more agitated, and finally you lose them; that is what happened to many Spanish workers. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2009)

The ethnic essentialisms are central to migrant women's insertion into the domestic and care sectors because ideas about Latin American women's significant "patience" and "affection" frequently shape employers' discourses (Pla et al. 2004, pp. 254–255). According to Pla et al. (2004, p. 286), national stereotypes are reinforced more through networks than based on real personal experiences, but employers use these stereotypes (i.e., "Latinas are more loving") to limit uncertainty before hiring someone and to justify low salaries or bad working conditions. However, these stereotypes are again important in configuring care and domestic workers' identities in opposition to men:

> Because sometimes we women are more loving to grannies—that is, sweeter when we talk to them—and men aren't like that. Men mind their own business. I can't remember having worked in a home with any guy. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2009)

> Their identities are also shaped by how they supposedly differ from Spanish women:
> Many Spanish girls told me that they're harder and stronger than us, not in a physical way but in a way that they don't mind one person or another. We're not like that. I'm myself an example of that, as I get more involved with people I see as weaker, lonelier and more troubled. I get involved with this kind of people, but there is a lot of injustice around. I've had a lot of problems because I don't like injustice. It happens that some are only looked after properly when the family is around or there are visitors. That is when they feed them patiently, but if there are no visitors, they don't want to look after them or do it in a bad way. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2009)

This excerpt shows how migrant women can positively view their ethnicity in opposition to autochthonous women's attitudes and practices at work. Constructing identity is a relational process that is constantly (re)elaborated through interactions and social relations in which people project and receive different images of the self and the other. Furthermore, as labor identity is developed through everyday experience, feeling valued or devalued by employers or clients becomes an important factor in identity construction. Even if, as we saw before, essentialist arguments can be developed to reinforce a positive sense of identity, they are more commonly used to harass and express contempt toward migrant women, as in the following excerpt:

> That man (the employer) would say to me, "Look at those n***** there, those ugly black prostitutes [on TV]. Look, they all come from your country". (Woman, domestic worker, Madrid, 2009)

Although intimate and familiar relationships typically shape domestic work interactions, domesticity, and class distance between employers and employees also influence these interactions. As we can see in the next excerpt, some domestic workers suffer due to their status as domestics. Their status also impacts the construction of their labor identity:

> Almost since the beginning, you could feel she wanted to limit you. She showed that she was the owner and that I was there to do the work. For example, […] when she said, "You have to clean the windowpanes", she was already sitting there to see how you did it. (Woman, domestic worker, Madrid 2012)

Gender, class, and race/ethnicity positions in the social structure shape workers' everyday experiences and impact the construction of their work identities. Many research informants affirmed that they suffered some type of racist, sexist or classist contempt or harassment in their jobs as domestic and care workers. All reported the negative impact of those experiences on their psychological and physical wellbeing. In the domestic and care sectors, migrant women occupy subordinated categories across dimensions, and this particular position might impact the construction of their identities as undervalued workers. Viewing their qualities in a negative way reinforces migrant women's tendencies to continue working in the care sector, where at least some essentialized qualities linked with their gender and ethnic position can be positively reconfigured, as mentioned above.

12.3 Structural Dimensions Limiting Access to The Spanish Labor Market

A career's structural dimensions refer to the family and work patterns that determine the context in which women's career decisions and choices are made; these dimensions also differently affect the occupational destinations and career trajectories of women and men (Evetts 2000, p. 61). This section focuses on a number of structural factors that shape Ecuadorian migrant women's careers.

The intersectional approach (Crenshaw 1989) can help demonstrate how Ecuadorian migrant women's careers in Spain are shaped by "distinctive yet interlocking structures of oppression" (Collins 1993, p. 26). As many scholars show (Oso 1998; Oso and Catarino 2000; Escrivá 2000, 2003; Colectivo Ioé 2001; Marcu 2009), migrant women in the Spanish labor market occupy a subordinated position because this structure is segmented by gender and ethnicity (King and Zontini 2000). Migrant women are at the intersection of the gender and ethnic hierarchies of the labor market and very often also limited by their working class background and their migration status.

As a key element of social structure organization, the sexual division of labor sustains the gender order. The mechanisms of the sexual division of labor—regarded as the social system of labor distribution, through which conflicting social relations lead women to situations of oppression and domination (Hirata and Kergoat 2000, pp. 142–144)—shape the labor market structure and organize the distribution between productive and reproductive labor. Feminist scholars have shown the extent to which women still perform reproductive work in Europe (Torns 1995; Carrasco and Mayordomo 1999; Maruani and Meulders 2005), even when male breadwinner model has been displaced as the dominant adult worker model. Some

features associated with job insecurity (e.g., unemployment, part-time jobs, temporary contracts, salary discrimination, and sexual harassment) affect women more than men and are the most visible signs of their disadvantageous position in the labor market. The gender inequality in the labor market structure has its roots in the historical sexual division of labor within the family and is reinforced by global economic trends, such as the increasing number of unskilled, low-paying jobs in the tertiary sector.

In Spain, young people and women of all ages suffer unemployment more than adult men, and the gender gap grows after marriage, as there are higher unemployment rates for married women than for single or divorced women, while married men have the lowest rate of all (EPA 2011). In addition, there is also a significant proportion of hidden unemployment in figures about women's inactivity rates, which is difficult to pinpoint because surveys rarely include questions about domestic work (Carrasco and Mayordomo 1999). Moreover, the degrees of employment insecurity are also gendered. More often than men, women face atypical employment[5], especially atypical jobs that imply fewer working hours and lower salaries. These part-time jobs can be easily combined with household and family tasks.

This gendered picture is what women from Ecuador and other Latin American countries, which have very high activity rates, find when they enter in the Spanish labor market. These migrant women also suffer the mechanisms of the labor market's ethnic segmentation because they are at the intersection of both axes. During the period of economic expansion in Spain, migrants of both sexes have been primarily employed in unskilled and low-paying jobs in sectors that natives have rejected due to hard working conditions (Cachón 2009, p. 76; Pajares 2009, p. 25). Spanish migration policy has reinforced free market trends in pushing migrants toward precarious and undervalued jobs in the labor market structure. Some mechanisms (e.g., the Catalogue of difficult coverage occupations[6] and the Contingent of workers[7]) aimed to control and organize migrant workers in order to avoid competition with natives. The idea was to link residential permits to job contracts in any occupation not covered by the native population. For instance, the first temporary residence permit prevents workers from shifting to labor sectors beyond the one stipulated in the original contract. These efforts to segregate migrant workers are reinforced by the difficulty in transferring academic degrees from foreign countries. Complicated procedures usually discourage migrants from even attempting to validate their degrees. In other cases, the long processing times keep migrants from practicing their professions:

[5] Atypical employment is any job that differs from the standard of permanent and full-time contract work.

[6] The Catalogue lists occupations for which the Public Employment Services find few candidates to cover job vacancies. The Catalogue is specifically elaborated for each Spanish province and is revisited every three months. http://www.sepe.es/contenido/empleo_formacion/catalogo_ocupaciones_dc/af0401.html [last accessed March 2, 2014].

[7] This national program organizes the migration of foreign workers from their countries of origin to Spain http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Derogadas/r5-rd2393-2004.t5.html [last accessed March 2, 2014].

> It took like a year and a half, nearly two years, to make my university diploma legally valid here, but it came out that in order to achieve legal recognition, I had to take six more exams here. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2009)

Furthermore, the legal status of migrants significantly impacts integration patterns in the Spanish labor market. A combination of restrictive legal entry regulations, the powerful pull factor of labor force demand, difficulties in controlling entrance, and permanence in the territory, and push factors in many countries have created a high proportion of irregular migrants, most of them overstayers (Arango 2004, p. 155). As a consequence, irregular migrant status has caused a systematic pattern of discrimination in the Spanish labor market, pushing migrant workers toward the worst range of jobs.

From a gender perspective, we can see that migrant women's position in the labor market has been even worse than that of migrant men. The National Survey of Immigrants (INE 2007) reveals that migrant women's average salaries were around 70% of men's average salaries—€ 835.45 for women and € 1,218.62 for men (Colectivo Ioé and Fernández 2010, p. 120). According to this survey, around one-third of migrant women in Spain found their first jobs in domestic work. Evidently, this proportion is higher for women coming from countries such as Bolivia (74%), Peru (55%), Ecuador (55%) and Colombia (48%) (Colectivo Ioé and Fernández 2010, p. 110). The informality characteristic of this sector allowed a massive influx of women with irregular migrant statuses. Although the Contingent of Foreign Workers, which was the primary regular access to the Spanish labor market until 2005, included a quota for domestic workers, the figures represented by these quotas were insignificant compared with the flows into the irregular labor market.

The massive incorporation of women in the domestic work sector has often been compared to men's integration in the construction sector, as both are precarious and irregular jobs. However, it should be noted that this comparison is misleading. In fact, while construction sector workers have the potential to earn high salaries and develop different skills that can be used in a wide range of different jobs, domestic and care workers use a skill set that is rarely recognized and lack labor rights and social networks. This situation puts women with irregular migrant status at the bottom of the labor hierarchy.

The juridical framework of domestic work in Spain, recently modified in 2012[8], establishes discriminatory treatment of migrant workers compared with the rest of employees. The legislation in force[9] at the time of the migration boom included archaic measures that imposed abusive working conditions and a narrow set of social benefits for workers, who, for instance, do not have unemployment or sickness benefits.

[8] See the Royal Decree 1620/2011, available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/11/17/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-17975.pdf [last accessed March 2, 2014].

[9] See the Royal Decree 1424/1985, available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1985/08/13/pdfs/A25617-25618.pdf [last accessed March 2, 2014], and the Special Regime of Social Security (1969), available at http://www.ccoo.cat/activitatsdiverses%5Cconvenis%5Cempleadas_del_hogar%5Cdecreto_2346.pdf [last accessed March 2, 2014].

> Working in households, I don't have any benefits; I give all my best, but I don't receive anything. Working for a company—and this is the most important thing—you contribute to the Social Security System, you have your rights, and if you get ill, you are covered. In private households, when you are sick, they don't even give you a free day to visit the doctor. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2009)

In an attempt to put domestic work on the same level as the rest of employment, the Royal Decree 1620/2011 has recently modified this legislation. Although it seems to signal enormous progress, this legislative change also presents some difficulties in its application, and the actual consequences are still unknown because it has only been compulsory since June 2012. However, it is important to note that domestic workers are still not allowed to receive the same social benefits as other workers, especially unemployment benefits.

The intersection of traditional Spanish gender roles with the institutional frameworks of the care and migration regimes—understood as the complete set of care and immigration policies and culture—provided most migrant women limited access to the Spanish labor market: the domestic worker's "backdoor". As a consequence, a self-reinforcing tendency developed, making the domestic "help" for cleaning or caring for family members, children or older people a normal demand for middle class families, who had excessive revenues for public services but could not afford private ones.

12.4 Agency Dimensions in the Construction of Careers and Identity

From an interactionist perspective, we should understand migrant women trajectories as driven not only by cultural and structural forces but also by processes of social interaction and experience. Indeed, cultures and structures are individually experienced in such a way that people's responses and reactions are very different, as well as the meanings, choices and strategies they develop. In this sense, women differently interpret such structures, ranging from adaptation, manipulation, and negotiation to resistance and confrontation (Evetts 2000, p. 63).

However, this emphasis on the rational choice elements for developing strategies should be measured more carefully. The process of developing strategies and possibilities for action are deeply embedded in cultural representations and constraints. In this sense, following Bourdieu's description of *habitus*, migrant women measure their career decisions and strategies according to many cultural schemas and registers, along with a set of structural resources and constraints. In Bourdieu's words, "the conditional and conditioned freedom assured by the habitus is so far from any creation of unpredictable novelty as from the simple and mechanical reproduction of previous conditioning factors" (Bourdieu 1991, p. 96).

As we have seen above, cultural schemes and structural constraints tend to shape migrant experiences. However, migratory projects can be understood as strategies for social mobility, following a wide range of goals (e.g., economic improvement,

independency or social recognition). In her study of Spanish women's experiences in Paris, Oso understands the migration project as a strategy for social mobility, by which migrants link their upward mobility aspirations, shaped by numerous cultural representations, with specific savings and consumption practices (Oso 2004, pp. 211–234).

In the case of Ecuadorian women in Spain, an interpretation of their strategies and aspirations can grasp the ways in which their labor trajectories are oriented. As Evetts highlights, analyzing individual strategies allows us to recognize the diversity and complexity of resources that people use to manage and overcome social constraints (Evetts 2000, p. 63). The aforementioned constraints evidently limit the development of their labor trajectory, but agency or strategy cannot be ignored.

For instance, the following informant strategizes to save the most money possible to achieve her goal of allowing her daughter access to university studies. For that reason, she prefers work as a live-in domestic worker to save as much salary as possible to send back home:

> She wanted to pay me € 300 as live-in domestic worker because I didn't have my work permit yet. I said no to her; I couldn't go for just € 300. […] She tried to insist and I told her: "I'm sorry, madam. I just came here to help my daughter get an education and to earn a bit more here than I would have earned back there. […] So I'm really sorry, madam, but you can find someone else; I can't help you. I've got my daughter to raise. (Woman, domestic worker, Madrid, 2009)

As we can see, she establishes the limits of "bearable" exploitation by heeding the goals of her migration project; in other words, she determines whether the job, despite the exploitation, will allow her to achieve her goals. In this sense, the job she holds as a migrant in Spain is not supposed to be interesting or satisfactory in itself; it is instead conceived as a bridge to achieve goals associated with the homeland. Indeed, in this case, her professional development is not the priority because of her age (she came to Spain when she was over 50) and because her work is viewed as a way to achieve her children's professional development. This last argument, which appears in the following excerpt, recurred among the informants:

> My expectations are not to stay here but to go back (to Ecuador). But first I have to achieve my goals. When I finish what I came here for, to help my kids become professionals, then I will go back. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2009)

The goals of migratory project are frequently related to upward mobility in the country of origin. For this reason, to understand the processes of constructing work-related identity, it is important to be aware of the real overall value that working experiences have for migrants in the host country. Most of the middle-aged Ecuadorian women that I interviewed regarded their feminized careers in Spain as a transitory period in their lives that will afford them better lives back home. This extraordinary stage in their lives represents an important sacrifice to gain some upward mobility in their own societies.

However, even though these women tend to identify more with their country of origin than with their position in Spanish society, they were also extremely interested in improving their incomes and obtaining better working conditions. In this

sense, many women—who began their trajectories working in private households—chose to reinvest skills that they developed caring for older people and joined services companies, providing social services in nursing homes or working as home care assistants.

> Working in a house, you don't get the same advantages you would get working for a company. For example, if you want to quit for some reason, you can do it as you are entitled to unemployment benefits, and you get paid extra if you work on weekends or holidays. On the other hand, I can assure you that, working with older people in a private household, I never got anything. Because of that, as soon as I got my care assistant diploma, I've always wanted to work in nursing homes and not in private households. Even if I had been unemployed, I never have done it again. I've been jobless nearly a year; last year I worked in a nursing home, but my contract finished and I got fired. So then I was looking for a job for nearly a year. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2009)

The strategy of continuing in the care sector fits Bourdieu's habitus definition, which gives a place for election but in a narrow set of possibilities. As the French sociologist said, "the more improbable practices are excluded without any exam, as they are unbelievable, because of this kind of immediate submissiveness to the order that push us to make a virtue of necessity; it is to refuse the refused and to want the inevitable" (Bourdieu 1991, p. 94). The option of changing to another labor sector is often rejected as unattainable, especially when migrant women are of a certain age and do not have a validated degree. The main reason is that they are well aware of their real possibilities in the labor market. Indeed, in the care sector, they can reinvest learned skills from their previous jobs as domestic workers. As many of my informants reported, as domestic workers in Spain, they discovered how to care for older people (a job they had never done before) and realized that the care sector was growing, as Spain is an aging society that always demands a female labor force.

> I'm a care assistant; I care for older people. I will continue to do this job until I retire because you end up growing fond of older people. […] I regret that I didn't come here with my sister much earlier because, in the end, I feel much more useful here than in my own country. […] Working hard to help my kids and build something […], and all that would have been impossible if I had stayed there. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2012)

Working as a homecare assistant, this informant reflects a positive image of herself and her job because it allowed her to improve her social position in Ecuador. Reflecting on her society of origin, she feels proud because she has been able to improve her social status there by sending remittances. At the same time, concerning her job as a care worker in Spain, she feels she has gained some respect and recognition for the work she does. This recognition comes from two main factors: on the one hand, she works for a company that mediates between her and the clients instead of working directly for an employer in a private household; on the other hand, she has had some training in geriatric assistance. These two factors give her more confidence in her everyday work and also allow her to achieve some distance from domestic work.

Although she accomplishes the same tasks that she did when she was a domestic worker, working for a company gives her a different status, and she can profit from social benefits. As a consequence, she feels empowered compared to her previous experiences. Furthermore, the positive image of her job is related to the potential

elimination of the class connotations of domestic work. In this sense, her current labor identity is constructed in opposition to her first experience as domestic worker:

> We go to work knowing the things we have to do but also giving orders because we don't only receive orders here; we are able to give orders. We can raise our voice, and they immediately realize that it is serious; it is not like when they told the maid that she has to duck and she has to do it. […] The domestic workers can never raise their voice; they don't even think about it. On the contrary, we can do it. […] If we are care assistants, we have to earn our respect. (Woman, care worker, Madrid, 2012)

Because work identity is the provisional and interrelated result of the socio-professional trajectory and the immediate relation to the specific job (Durand 2009, p. 38), interactions with colleagues, employers, and clients are very important. In this case, the professionalization process, as a trajectory and an experience of everyday work, gives her more confidence because she feels more valued by her clients and employers—but also by her family. She feels proud of the knowledge that she has acquired through training and believes it adds value to her job. As a result, she thinks that she has gained some recognition as a care assistant that she did not have as a domestic worker.

This feeling of empowerment is crucial in constructing work identity, as the search for recognition is central for workers' individuality (Durand 2009, p. 328; Linhart 2008, p. 12). Even if the shift to care jobs from domestic work promises a set of social benefits, better salaries are very limited, and some care jobs, especially in nursing homes, include a significant intensification in work. I suggest that the material or economic factors are not the only gratification. This transition's value should also be measured in terms of self-esteem and social recognition because it implies the restoration of the work identity and the idea of a career or profession. This search for recognition could be even more important here than in other contexts due to the limited gratifications of these jobs.

12.5 Conclusion

The essentialization of migrant women's careers was a very strong trend in the organization of the migrant labor force in the Spanish labor market. This essentialization is the result of an interconnected set of factors, most of them more related to the culture and social structure of Spanish society than with specific migrant characteristics. Even if the structural and cultural dimensions are strong pushing factors in the orientation of migrant women's careers, there is also a place for agency and strategy. The strategies can be guided by the material improvement of working conditions but also by symbolic, identitarian or transnational aims.

Nevertheless, some of the gendered assumptions related to women's natural care capacities are positively adopted by domestic and care workers to build their work identities. In the same way, migrants also incorporate some ethnicized assumptions about Latinas' natural predispositions to be loving into their own discourses as positive arguments to add further value to their (otherwise unvalued) work.

The search for recognition at work surfaces as an important element in the construction of work identities. In informants' narratives, this recognition is an element that often appears in opposition to other groups or persons, as identity formation is a relational (and oppositional) process: the workers describe themselves in opposition to Spanish colleagues in the nursing homes; to Spanish mothers, who are so absorbed by their work that they do not properly care their children; and to domestic workers when migrants have left this sector to continue their careers as care workers. Each of these identity strategies implies privileging a different axis among the wide range of categories that compose their identity: gender, class, and race/ethnicity. The intersectional approach is thus a useful tool to grasp those divisions. However, a more systematic analysis should be conducted to detail the different possibilities of building multiple, diverse, and transnational identities.

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Chapter 13
Negotiating Identity: How Religion Matters After All for Migrants and Refugees in Luxemburg

Lucie Waltzer

13.1 Introduction: Studying Muslims in Luxemburg

Throughout the last century, the Luxemburgish religious landscape has undergone major changes through secularization and individualization processes, but also due to successive immigration and refugee flows, in particular from the Balkans (Trausch et al. 2003), that have contributed to the pluralization of the Luxemburgish catholic religious landscape. Indeed, Luxemburg is an immigration country with a particularly high proportion of foreign residents[1]. Especially the Muslim community in Luxemburg has grown so much that Islam became the second religion of the country, mainly through the immigration and later the refuge of ex-Yugoslavs (Hausman and Zahlen 2010). However, the number of Muslims in Luxemburg is unknown, since the law of 1979[2] prohibits the collection of data on religious affiliation in the census. Moreover, despite a growth in the size of the Muslim population in Luxemburg over the last 30 years, in absolute terms, the Muslim population is still very small. According to the European Value Study, only 2 % of the national population identify themselves as being affiliated with Islam (Hausman and Zahlen 2010).

The focus on the Luxemburgish Muslim population originating from ex-Yugoslavia is interesting in a comparative perspective, since this group is composed of both migrants who have arrived in the 1970s after the labor agreement between Luxemburg and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as refugees from the 1990s who arrived during and after the Balkan wars. These two categories are different in a number of ways since migrants and refugees have

[1] With more than 43 % foreign residents (Thill-Ditsch 2010), the percentage of foreign residents is among the highest in Europe.

[2] Modified law of March 31, 1979, Loi du 31 mars 1979 réglementant l'utilisation des données nominatives dans les traitements informatiques (Mém. A—69 du 29 août 1979, p. 1386).

L. Waltzer (✉)
University of Luxembourg, Walferdange, Luxembourg
e-mail: luciewaltzer@yahoo.com

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different migration motives[3] and trajectories, they arrived in different historical periods, and have made different experiences in the home country. More importantly, they are subject to a different legal framework in the host country and thus migrants and refugees have different rights and opportunities[4]. A comparative design is promising for tackling variables other than ethno-religious ones and thus for expanding the understanding of identity negotiation in migration processes, by exploring possible reasons for the subjective salience of particular social categories.

This research has only considered Muslims from the Balkan countries and the results can thus not be transferred to other Muslim groups living in Luxembourg. Since any identity construction is context dependent, we can expect very different identity patterns to emerge from research on Muslims from other countries of origin. Nevertheless, I think it is useful to make intra-group comparisons, as they allow for various differentiation and identifications mechanisms to emerge, which enable to distantiate from the taken-for-granted assumption that ethno-cultural differences play a determinant role in everyday praxis of group formation. Moreover, an intra-group analysis allows to distantiate from an essentialist definition of culture, assigning a particular culture to a group, by allowing to show intra-group differences.

The next paragraph will briefly sketch out the context of origin of the research population[5] and address the question of religious affiliation in the Balkan context. This is relevant because the formation of ethnic boundaries and identification patterns begin in the country of origin. The third paragraph will give a brief overview of the theoretical background, followed by some of the findings, conclusions and open questions.

13.2 Is Religion the Main Differentiation Marker in The Balkan Context?

It is acknowledged that the salience of religious identity markers in the Balkans has greatly changed over time. During the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans were ruled by Islamic precepts, and millets[6] were established and regarded as the prime focus of identity by the Ottoman authorities. Non-Muslim citizens had the right to practice

[3] Migrants came mainly for economic reasons and refugees for political and security reasons during the break-up of the Yugoslav federation.

[4] Most of the migrants were received under the law of 1972 (Loi du 28 mars 1972 concernant, l'entrée et le séjour des étrangers, le contrôle médical des étrangers, l´emploi de la main-d'oeuvre étrangère), whereas refugees coming after 1996 were received under the law of 1996 (Règlement grand-ducal du 22 avril 1996 portant application de l'article 3 de la loi du 3 avril 1996 portant création d' une procédure relative à l'examen d´une demande d'asile) and had no access to the employment market as long as they were asylum seekers.

[5] The sample consists of Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Croatia.

[6] The Arabic word *millah*, literally meaning "nation", is the term used for confessional community and refers to protected religious minority groups.

their religion, retain their separate identities and traditional customs, but were subject to diverse measures of discrimination[7] (Bieber 2000). Thus, religion was the salient collective identity giving Muslims an elevated status (Friedman 2000).

The final decline of the Ottoman Empire and the diminution of protection of the interests of Muslims led to a growing consciousness of the necessity to secure their group interests, which fostered the strengthening of religious identities. Between 1919 and 1929 the Empire's successor states were integrated in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and united under the motto of a Union of the South Slavs, but in reality under domination of a Serb dynasty (Poulton 2000, p. 54).

Facing nationalist aspirations, King Alexander I proclaimed a royal dictatorship and renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. His rule remained essentially Serbian-dominated and police applied brutal measures when non-Serb forces endangered the integrity of the state. To combat local nationalist movements, he attempted to impose a Pan-Yugoslav vision, which regarded differences between cultural nations as insignificant and hoped that they would disappear with the increasing industrialization and unification process. The Yugoslav leadership tried to foster a supra-national civic Yugoslav nationality by making the distinction between a unique citizenship and nationalities, that were defined by cultural, linguistic (e.g. Albanian, Romanian) and religious (Serb, Croat, Muslim) criteria (Lutard 1992; Wolczuk and Yemelianova 2008, p. 179). Even though it was normatively uniform, socially and culturally distinct systems co-existed in the republics and provinces (Flere 1991, p. 192). The ruling class never managed to impose the idea of a common Yugoslav identity, transcending particularistic identities and ethnic cleavages.

The establishment of the socialist regime in Yugoslavia had an immediate impact on the Islamic community (Babuna 2004)[8]. The communist state introduced strict separation of church and state and took over civil functions carried out previously by religious hierarchies. The communist ruling class put an end to *sharia* court system, as well as to the obligatory religious tax and religious instruction (Babuna 2004, p. 302). Even though religion was partly relegated to the private sphere during the communist period, the Tito regime played an important role in consolidating the Muslim identity. During the initial communist period, the ethnic identity of the indigenous Serbo-Croatian-speaking Muslims remained undefined. Indeed, the Bosnian Muslim community was not recognized as a nation and remained a national minority that responded with increased political organization. Although the

[7] For example, the Devshirme system consisted of a child levy, compulsory separation of male children from Christian families and educating them as Muslims (Zachary 1984, p. 438; Bieber 2000, p. 15).

[8] After the 2nd World War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia became a Socialist Federal Republic (SFRY), in which six republics were federated under communist rule and the motto of "fraternity and unity". The different ethnic groups were allocated different rights and privileges within the different republics, depending on whether they were recognized as a nation or a nationality. The SFRY can be viewed as a political nation, composed of different apolitical cultural nations (each one having their own republic) and different nationalities (*narodnost*, that had a mother state outside of Yugoslavia).

Muslims were not established as a nation, by the end of the nineteenth century an ethno-national consciousness started to be articulated (Babuna 2004, p. 297).

From the 1960s, the distinctiveness of Muslims[9] was officially accepted and Muslims were recognized as one of the "nations of Yugoslavia" in order to end the competition between Serbs and Croats over the ethnic "ownership" of the Bosnian Muslims (Baskin 1984, p. 124; Friedman 2000, p. 173; Poulton 2000, p. 54; Babuna 2004, p. 304). Again, the distinctiveness of Muslim Slavs who share their language with the respective majority Christian populations rested almost exclusively on their religious adherence.

Considering the low religious observance, identity as "Muslim" lied more on customs and culture than on religious observance (Poulton 2000, p. 54). After 40 years of communist dictatorship, religion is not necessarily a question of devotion, but Islam served as a symbolic boundary between Muslims and the other ethnic groups in Bosnia Herzegovina (Babuna 2004, p. 305).

Even though communism repressed religion and suppressed its visible public manifestations, religion played an important social and cultural role in Balkan societies (Ivekovic 2002, p. 524) and was a central source in the construction of national identity (Detrez 2000; Partos 1997).

The Balkan conflicts also shaped the significance of religious belonging (Heuberger 2001; Moe 2007) and led to a de-secularization of religious identities (Poulton 2000, p. 57; Ivekovic 2002; Hunt 2004). Indeed, participants in this study suggest a shift from an inclusive political identity before the war towards a religious revival as a reaction to being persecuted as Muslims. As such, war and persecution helped strengthen an in-/out-group formation that consolidated the differentiation of the social groups into "us" and "them" (Howard 2000; Seul 1999).

> Extract 1: Suddenly, we all *became religious*, even the communists, we were *all* communists *before*, we didn't believe, we weren't attached to religion. We became quite religious *during the war* (…). It was really a *reaction*. Because the Serbs attacked us, they killed us only for one reason, because we were Muslims. If you hear that, even if you don't believe in God, you say, "me too, I am Muslim". If I think about it now, I see it was a reaction to show we are Muslims (Interview with Sead, refugee from Montenegro, Luxemburg, 11/07/2010) [10].

Even though this paragraph veils the multidimensionality of patterns of belonging by focusing on religious identification and its social significance throughout time, it is important to remember that the Balkans can be considered as a multi-ethnic region, in which multi-layered linguistic[11], religious, regional and political cleavages

[9] Communist authorities preferred to use the term "Muslim", because the alternative "Bosniak" would have implied that Bosnia is their national territory and not the homeland of local Serbs and Croats as well. The term "Bosniak" is now used to denote Slav Muslims in the former Yugoslav republic, now independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[10] The interviews excerpts have been translated by the author. All the original names have been changed.

[11] The different but similar dialects composing Serbo-Croatian were standardized into a unique language during the nineteenth century to demonstrate the 'oneness' of the Yugoslav nation. Yet, they have undergone important transitions since then, especially after the break-up of the Yugoslav

are negotiated (Calic 1995; Lutard 1992, p. 67). Despite this multi-layered character, the South Slav Serbo-Croatian speaking people are mainly divided into three communities on the basis of religious affiliation: Catholics (Croats), Orthodox (Serbs), and Muslims (Bosniaks) (Bringa 1996; Calic 1995, p. 25), as the Slavic population is linked through a common language and (imagined) origin, but it is heterogeneous in terms of religious attachment[12] (Babuna 2004, p. 312; Varro 2005, p. 48).

As suggested by the citation below, in the Balkan context, religious affiliation is audible through names and lexical marking. Indeed, in the Balkans, names immediately divulge religious affiliation.

> Extract 2: In school you can see with the names, you can see immediately. Serb names, they have their roots in the Serb language. And the Muslim names are of Arab origin. So it is easy to recognize, really, if you introduce yourself, people can see immediately who you are (Interview with Sead, refugee from Montenegro, Luxemburg, 11/07/2010).

In a situation of migration, such as the participants in this study have experienced, these markers (names and lexical marking) do not necessarily reveal religious affiliation to members of host society. Religion may become invisible and a personal matter since in Luxemburg there is a greater freedom in communicating or divulging aspects of "Muslimness". For these migrants, religious affiliation is thus not automatically a significant differentiation marker anymore. Indeed, literature suggests for different contexts that migration may contribute to the changing salience of religion (Baumann 2000; Baumann and Luchesi 2003; Cadge 2006; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Connor 2008; Saraiva 2008; Smits et al. 2010; Van Tubergen 2006).

13.3 Identification as the Establishment and Maintenance of Social and Symbolic Boundaries: The Case of Muslim Migrants and Refugees from the Balkans in Luxemburg

This chapter is based on the analysis of semi-directed interviews[13] that were conducted with 26 Muslim migrants and refugees from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

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federation. Nowadays, Serbian and Croatian are officially recognized as different languages. The complex transitions and perceptions related to the union of the Serbo-Croatian language are too complex to be dealt with in this place (Adanir 2002; Babuna 2000, 2004; Friedman 2000; Greenberg 2004).

[12] The situation is different for ethnic Albanian and Turkish Muslims, whose identity is differentiated from Orthodox Christians by language as well as by religion (Babuna 2000, 2004).

[13] The tape-recorded interviews were conducted in French, German, Luxemburgish or English, depending on the language preference of the interviewees. Interviews ranged from one and a half to four hours and usually took place in the homes of the interviewees. The questions were open-ended

The sample was drawn from the IGSS (Institut Général de la Sécurité Sociale), the social security register containing all residents in Luxemburg affiliated to social security. As this register does not contain any information on religion, the sample was established on the basis of nationality. Thus, the participants were randomly chosen from a sample that contained all people born in the former Republic of Yugoslavia or having ex-Yugoslavian citizenship resident in Luxemburg, regardless of their religious affiliation. A trilingual letter was sent randomly to people from this sample, describing my research project and asking them to contact me if they were willing to participate in an interview. The sample included only first generation migrants and refugees. The material is derived from a diverse group in terms of residence status, age, gender and occupation.

The analysis focused on the ways interview participants articulated and negotiated social categories, and attributed meaning to them. Special attention was devoted to the significance of religion as a symbolic boundary. By analyzing the discourses of belonging and non-belonging, and by looking at how particular actors narratively situate themselves in relation to "others", and situationally shift options of belonging, this paper situates itself in a relational and dialectical approach of identity (Anthias 2003; Dahinden et al. 2010; Poutignatmz et al. 1995; Wimmer 2008a). Self-categorization theory (SCT) considers identity as a two dimensional entity, composed of personal identity, defined as self-definition in terms of interpersonal differentiations, and social identity, referring to self-definition in terms of social categories in which an individual claims membership (Deaux 1993). According to SCT, personal and social identity derive from self-categorizations (Simon 2004) that establish boundaries between "us" and "them", i.e. between those who are perceived to belong to the in-group and those who are perceived to belong to the out-group. Individuals can choose different social categories/identity markers as self-descriptive and associate subjective meaning to them (Deaux 1993, p. 6). Certain social categories can be more or less important according to the context and situation of interaction (Stryker and Serpe 1994). Religion and ethnicity, as social categories, can be subjectively appropriated and become important identity markers in the migratory context (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).

The concept of "boundary-work", concerned with the "making" and maintaining of social difference between groups through the establishment of boundaries is very useful to analyze the processes of identity construction (Wimmer 2008a). Lamont and Molnar (2002) distinguish between social and symbolic boundaries, whereby the latter can be considered as "conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize […] people and practices that separate them into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership". When we speak about social boundaries, according to Lamont and Molnar, we are dealing with "objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources and social opportunities" (Lamont and Molnar 2002, p. 168). These boundaries help us to create order. Although the boundaries that distinguish phenomena and people

and covered four general areas: immigration history, trajectory and motives, experiences in host and home country, salience of religion and reconstruction of social networks.

from each other are necessary, how and where these boundaries are drawn, and which criteria are chosen for membership, is context dependent (Barker 2006). It has been suggested in the previous paragraph that in the Balkans religion is the main boundary that establishes distinctions between "us" and "them". The next paragraph will look at how these boundaries are deconstructed and negotiated and which references are mobilized to establish new boundaries.

The approach of "boundary-work" elaborated by Wimmer does not consider ethnicity exclusively as a self-evident *explanans*, but as an *explanandum*, resulting from specific interactional and relational processes, which can be empirically analyzed (Wimmer 2008b).

This paper looks at the negotiation of salient categories for self-identification and looks at how migrants position themselves in relation to ascribed identities or attached stereotypes, and how they contribute to the deconstruction of religious and ethnic identities. The subjective identification and the salience of the group identity are considered as a source of individual difference (Gurin and Hazel 1988; Tajfel and Turner 1979). As such, this paper questions the essentializing nature of religious identity. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss and illustrate different aspects that have emerged from the interview data. I will focus on different types of boundary making and intra-Muslim differentiation, and show how individuals select different "others" in order to define who they are as Muslims. The positioning in relation to the "other" is a very ambiguous process, as I will try to show. As we will see in the following paragraphs, religion remains an important reference in the identity construction, albeit only indirectly.

13.3.1 Intra-Muslim Differentiation

The "boundary-work" approach suggests that individuals classify objects by drawing boundaries along different dimensions leading to the organization of social difference. One important symbolic boundary established by first generation Muslim migrants in their identity narrative is the differentiation from "other" ways of being Muslim and from other groups of Muslims. In a "boundary-work" approach, we can observe a contraction[14], that is the drawing of a narrower boundary in order to disidentify with an ascribed, and often devalued category (Wimmer 2004). This contraction leads to the subdivision into different ways of being Muslim and an abstraction from an often alleged encompassing religious group and the images attached to it. Participants show that their religious affiliation is not determinant. In order to

[14] According to Wimmer, boundary contraction consists of excluding different categories of persons from the in-group and to reduce the number and type of persons included in the group. Contraction happens through "shifting emphasis to lower levels of differentiation or through fission", implying "splitting the existing category into two". To illustrate this notion he gives the example of the encompassing category "Asian", that can be rejected by migrants in favor of finer distinctions such as "Taiwanese" or "Chinese". Boundary contraction is thus about different levels of in- or exclusion that are at the base of categorization of "self" and "other".

deconstruct an imagined encompassing Muslim community, participants use different references, which contribute to the shifting, establishment, and maintenance of different boundaries.

Indeed, religious identification is constructed through a differentiation mechanism from those considered to be (too much) attached to religion. As such, participants include a religious dimension in their identity discourse, but in a negative way. In order to describe who they are as Muslims, they position themselves in relation to an imagined Muslim community that is (homogeneously) imagined as being more attached to religion. By distancing from these imagined Muslims, they construct an image of themselves as being moderate Muslims and express a wish not to be associated with an encompassing categorical "Muslim" pot. As such, religious identity is constructed by distancing themselves from what they are not, and not through a clear statement about what they are, as exemplified by the citation below:

> Extract 3: Eh, like I said, I am not so attached to religion, I am not (…) you see, *I am not a real Muslim*, like, you know with headscarf and all (Interview with Mihreta, female migrant from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Luxemburg, 28/10/2010).

Interestingly, in her discourse Mihreta makes a reference to visible elements such as the headscarf, often used as a symbol in Western societies for (fundamentalist) Muslims, that she associates with being "real Muslims", thereby showing the responsiveness of identity construction to the surrounding environment and to the widely held images that seem to be integrated in her conception of Muslimness. Islam is related to as a familial heritage, and personal Muslimness is constructed through a difference from other Muslims by emphasizing the lack of practice and religious devotion.

Moreover, religion is portrayed as something that should be kept in the private and familiar sphere. The insistence about religion being a private matter could be related to a widely spread idea in Western societies that Islam interferes in all spheres of life, including all domains of social life, and to the fear of being associated with particular prejudices attached to Muslims.

Other kinds of intra-Muslim boundaries are also drawn. Indeed, other national Muslims from the Balkans are excluded from the in-group with reference to notions such as way of life and mentality. As such, regardless of a common religious affiliation, a boundary is drawn as exemplified in citation below.

> Extract 4: The Muslims from Bosnia, they have the same names as we, same origin, same religion, we have a lot in common, *but we are still different* (…). We have a different *accent* and (…) with the Bosniaks, also, (…) eh, they have more liberty in life, *another way of life* (…). We were really *conservative* (…) which is really attached to (…) the Montenegrin culture (…). Montenegrins are really conservative (Interview with Sead, refugee from Montenegro, Luxemburg, 11/07/2010).

This boundary though seems to be very permeable, as there are frequent shifts between more inclusive and exclusive ways of relating to other national groups, depending on whom they position themselves in relation to. For example, in relation to Arab Muslims, participants assign themselves to an imagined inclusive Balkan Muslim community. They contract the symbolic boundary by excluding the non-European and non-modern Muslims from the in-group. Indeed, participants

emphasize the European character of the Balkan Muslims by highlighting the similarities between the ways of life of Balkan Muslims and the non-Muslim Serbs. Interestingly, the orthodox Serbs become the reference group in order to construct the "Europeanness" of the Balkan Muslims. Thus, not only Serbs are associated with "Europeanness", but this trait is also used to establish the symbolic boundary between Balkan Muslims on the one hand, and Arab and non-modern Muslims on the other. Thus, the imagined boundary between Orthodox and Muslim Serbs, can, at least momentarily, be blurred in order to define who they are as a Muslim.

> Extract 5: Our religion, I think we were *modern, European* Muslims. (…). I.e. the clothes, the way of life, it was *almost the same as with the Serbs*, because we lived with the Serbs (Interview with Sarkis, migrant from Serbia, Luxemburg, 03/02/2011).

These data exemplify how different references are used to establish a boundary between the own imagined group—which is not necessarily defined along a religious dimension—and how self-identification is constructed in relation to the "other", who is situationally "re-imagined". These various modes of differentiation can be interpreted as variations of a common scheme of intra-Muslim differentiation, leading to the reconfiguration of groups by a redefinition of the boundaries between them (Wimmer 2008a). It is interesting to note that religion is not simply rejected. Through their identity discourses our participants relate to a certain way of being Muslim, here imagined as European, privatized, secularized. As such, they do not relate to the global Islamic community, the *Umma* to define themselves as Muslims.

13.3.2 The Relationality Issue: About the Difficulty of Certain Markers

The previous paragraph discussed the differentiation from a particular way of being and particular groups of Muslims, which are differentiated with reference to particular markers, attesting the relational character of identity construction. The argument so far is that self-identification is achieved by establishing different kinds of boundaries in relation to different selected others. If we consider identity as a performance (Yuval-Davis 2010) and a dialogical practice, the question about the relationship of self and non-self emerges. Indeed, it has been suggested that "boundary-work", as a two-way process of collective self-identification and external categorization, is necessarily relational (Jenkins 1996).

If the "other" is essential in the construction of "self", the question of how the other is selected and integrated in the construction of self emerges. Belonging and non-belonging to a particular social category is not a straightforward process. Indeed, to construct their self-image, individuals mobilize different in-groups that do not reflect a simple dichotomous division between "them" and "us". Belonging emerges from a complex process of appropriation and subjectivation. As such, the relationship to the other can be very ambiguous. The ambiguousness of the "other" is related to different aspects. In order to self-identify as a member of social group,

one has to be accepted as a member by the group referred to. As such external recognition is a pre-condition for self-definition.

The participant quoted below defines himself using the national and religious dimension, namely as a Montenegrin of Muslim religion. However, this national self-identification seems problematic for him, since "they" (read: other Montenegrins) do not accept his self-identification as such. Because of the occupation of the Ottoman Empire of the Balkans and because of their religious affiliation, Muslim Montenegrins are associated as being Turks by the Christian majority. The fact that this assigned identity has no subjective meaning to this participant becomes clear in his statement "but we never were Turks".

> Extract 6: I would prefer saying I am Montenegrin of the Muslim religion, but the Montenegrins do not accept me as Montenegrin. You see, that is the difference. They think I am not Montenegrin. They think that we are Turks (…), but we never were Turks, we have never been in Turkey, not me, not anyone of my family (Interview with Sead, refugee from Montenegro, Luxemburg, 11/07/2010).

There is thus a dialectic relationship between self-identification and ascription by others. Belonging and non-belonging to a group, and the crossing of symbolic and social boundaries depends on whether those who are on the other side of the boundary accept or reject the minority group. It also depends on the collective memory, which may lead to the rejection of potential in-groups, as shown in the next example. Indeed, Muslims of Serb citizenship express a strong ambiguousness in relation to their citizenship. Although some participants suggest that there is no real cultural differentiation between Muslims and Serbs, subjective identification with this reference is problematic and the boundary between the two groups is maintained.

> Extract 7: We are Serbs, because we lived in Serbia, on our identity card is written Serb, *but you will never find a Muslim from Sandjak, saying I am a Serb* (Interview with Sarkis, migrant from Serbia, Luxemburg, 03/02/2011).

This extract exemplifies the whole ambiguity and problematic relationship to Serbia as an identity marker. On the one hand, the participant considers himself as Serb, but on the other hand, there is a very strong "rejection" of this identity. This rejection may be related to the events of the 1990s and the confusion of Serb ethnic and civic identity. As such, the "other" and the "self" are not clearly defined as constant categories, but situational shifting references. In- and out-groups are not constant and fixed entities, but are negotiated in relation to the way you want to define yourself and the larger interactional context.

13.4 Non-Ethnic and Non-Religious Markers: Rural-Urban Differentiation

Apart from different types of intra-Muslim differentiation, there are other mechanisms that allude to the deconstruction of religious and ethnic identities. Whereas the preceding paragraph focused on the negotiation of religious markers, this paragraph will deal with the salience of non-ethnic and non-religious markers.

A salient differentiation marker in the home country of the participants is the rural-urban divide suggesting that there is no simple dichotomous opposition between the groups in the Balkans, but rather multilayered differentiation patterns exist. Data suggest that ethnic differences can be, at least momentarily, lifted. Indeed, when speaking about cleavages in the home country, ethnic opposition is often overlaid by the opposition between villagers and people from the city, which seems to transcend ethnic and religious differences. Country dwellers are associated with primitivism and conservatism and depicted as the absolute outsiders.

> Extract 8: There were a lot of very conservative and primitive things. *But that was the difference between the village and the city.* There was no difference between Serbs and Albanians. (…) A Serb family and an Albanian family living in *town*, they were *almost* the same, *almost*. An Albanian and a Serbian family living in the *village*, they were *almost* the same (Interview with Makvira, refugee woman from Kosovo, Luxemburg, 05/11/2011).

Even though city people are considered as in-group in opposition to "them"—people from the villages—the citation above shows that the ethnic boundary cannot be completely blurred. Even if there are similarities, Albanians and Serbs are only "almost" the same. The boundary is maintained, although there are no "real" differences. By assigning oneself to the "townspeople", the blurring of the ethnic boundary may be related to the ascribed image to ex-Yugoslavians in the host society and regarded as a try to reconstruct a valued identity as modern and educated.

13.5 Self-Identification Through Moral Differentiation: Performing Morality and Decency

The interviews reveal another criterion for self-identification and differentiation more particularly related to the context of migration. Indeed, the modes of differentiation just mentioned above do not necessarily make sense for the "out-group" in Luxemburg. Participants do not engage in differentiating between rural/regional markers, but use a strong moral discourse, by pointing out to the "truly bad people", from which they intend to distance themselves. Moral boundary is used as an important signifier to define how participants see themselves in relation to other refugees and foreigners in the host society.

Interestingly, participants maintain and even reify the stereotypes attached to refugees and other foreigners by media and Luxemburgish public discourse, by highlighting that they came here to do nothing and that the massive arrival of refugees had harmful effects on their own reputation in the host society. Refugees are portrayed and regarded as people not knowing what to do with their lives, as little thieves. Also refugees maintain these stereotypes, but distantiate themselves from the category "refugee" to which they are assigned to by members of host society. They assign themselves to an imagined symbolic group, imagined and constructed as those wanting to settle down and lead a stable and good life. They draw a boundary between themselves and other refugees or more generally with the category "refugees". (Superior) moral conduct is used as a symbolic boundary between

oneself and the rest of the group one is ascribed to, and personal identification is constructed through reference to a stable way of life, and by highlighting one's own moral superiority.

The stressing and the subjective meaning of these moral qualities could be related to the negative perception ascribed to refugees and migrants from ex-Yugoslavia by members of the host-society. Indeed, many participants suggest, a shift in the perception of Yugoslav people in Luxemburg after the "massive" arrival of refugees happened.

> Extract 9: Really, when I was in Luxemburg during the Tito era, I was a student, I was really proud to tell people that I am from Montenegro. But, now, many years later, when I arrived in Luxemburg, oh my God, I have to hide that I come from Montenegro. Because everything had changed with all the refugees that came (Interview with Refadija, refugee woman, Luxemburg, 04/02/2011).

This performance of morality and decency might also be related to the experience of migration that implies a lot of sacrifices for many of the participants, who may try to redefine their status in relation to majority group. Many of the interviewees experienced migration/refuge as a loss of social status, related to doing socially despised work. In such a context, the wish to recreate a positive image of the "self" is established by highlighting personal decency and moral superiority that is used as a symbolic capital.

The morality narrative revolves around other aspects such as the close-knit family ties, importance of neighborhood relations, spirit of communal way of life, and more elaborated sociability. The discourse about the importance of family closeness and strong connectedness is also used to set themselves apart from "Luxemburgers", that they claim are lacking these values. As such, they subjectively reject being associated with certain categories ascribed to people from their country of origin, by highlighting their personal moral behavior, but also contributing to reposition the value of the home country people, by highlighting the high moral values upheld by these people.

13.6 How Religion Matters After All

The previous paragraph presented the intersectional character of identity, by showing how individuals integrate different non-ethnic and non-religious forms of belonging. As such, even though some ethnic categories are widely agreed upon, we cannot assume ethnic groups as naturally given in-groups. Interestingly, even though we observe religious disidentification, in the process of boundary drawing, the moral component of personal identity brings religion back into the identity patchwork.

In fact, for many of the participants, morality is strongly related to Islam, and more generally to religiosity. Even participants who admit not to have a lot of knowledge about their religion and who claim not to go to mosque or have religious education, relate religion to morality, as suggested by the following extract.

> Extract 10: I didn't learn much about religion, just that you have to be a good person. That is the main thing. For me it is enough if I try to be a good person (Interview with Mihreta, female migrant from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Luxemburg, 28/10/2010).

As this citation suggests, this Bosnian migrant who arrived during the early 1980s, does not have a lot of knowledge about religion, which can be related to her growing up in communist Yugoslavia. Being Muslim is related to being a good person and having a sense of commitment to moral guidelines. Being Muslim is thus not much related to formal religious practices, but to certain (superior) moral behavior. Religion is considered as a moral guideline that helps you to stay by the right side of moral deviance. Religiousness is not structured around the five pillars of Islam, but related to a certain way of behaving and conducting life. By saying "for me, it is enough, I try to be a good person", she suggests that she has no other references in deciding what to be Muslim means, alluding to an individualized form of religiosity.

This exemplifies the selective nature of religious references and the bricolage attitude towards religious heritage. Morality is related to an all-encompassing social identity that underpins the moral character of a person. Religion is therefore indirectly integrated in the identity constellation by relating it to morality, even among those who say religion is not important. What is interesting in a perspective of "boundary-work" is that morality is considered to be the common ground of religions (at least the monotheistic ones). There is an emphasis on the convergence around a core set of religious beliefs and values, with an underlying assumption that religious people of whatever faith are not so different. Participants view religions as moral messages with a common civilizational core, as suggested in the following citation.

> Extract 11: For me, a Muslim, a good Muslim, a good Catholic, a good believer, however you call him, for me, the *religious person* is somebody who doesn't harm anyone. You see? (…) That is religion to me (Interview with Sead, refugee from Montenegro, Luxemburg, 11/07/2010).

Religiousness is equated with being a moral human being (Farkas et al. 2001). Interestingly, to be a good person is related to being religious but not to a particular religious affiliation, as suggested by "however you call him". As such, what matters is not which particular religion you are affiliated to. What counts is to be religious, rather than to hold on to a particular creed. The blurring of religious boundaries is an interesting phenomenon that has to be further explored. Indeed, this blurring of confessional boundaries is in stark contrast to the experience of war, which participants often relate to the instrumentalization of religion by politicians in the war period.

In this context, the blurring of religious boundaries may be seen as an attempt to establish continuity with the prewar period in ex-Yugoslavia. Indeed, participants repeatedly describe the prewar period as a time of harmonious coexistence between religious groups. The blurring of religious boundaries could be interpreted as an attempt to recreate coherence by reconnecting to the Balkan tradition of religious harmony.

Many participants suggest, moreover, that cultural and religious differences are regarded as enriching within the Islamic tradition, which highlighting that God created different religions for us to live together and to get to know each other. In a perspective of "boundary-work", highlighting civilizational commonalities between religions could also be seen as an attempt to blur the boundaries between "Muslims" and the majoritarian Christian host society, and thereby blur the symbolic boundary between the imagined Muslim community and the imagined host society.

Indeed, participants emphasize the similarities between them as Muslims and members of the host society, and stress the commonalities, regardless of the different religious background. This can be understood as a reaction to the image that the participants believe host society holds of Muslims and the scarce social acceptability of being Muslim. By highlighting that Muslims are just like their hosts, they contribute to a normative repositioning of the value of the social category they are associated to.

They do not try to distance themselves from the assigned in-group, but emphasize the similarities between "them" and "us".

> Extract 12: I am Muslim, but I am also a man like you. […] It is really important to say (…), people shouldn't say that we are savages (Interview with Sead, refugee from Montenegro, Luxemburg, 11/07/2010).

On the other side, also in a perspective of "boundary work", we may consider this blurring of confessional boundaries as the emergence of a new symbolic boundary between religious vs. non-religious people. So, despite the declining salience of boundaries between religious groups, the boundary between believers and non-believers seems to remain strong and related to everyday social behavior. In a context of boundary blurring there seems to be a heightened awareness of the external boundary, whereby the non-religious become the symbolic "other". As has been shown in other contexts, the increasing acceptance of religious diversity does not necessarily extend to the non-religious (Edgell et al. 2006).

The emergence of symbolic boundaries is not without social implications. If people perceive the symbolic boundary between religious and non-religious people to be salient, the question about the relationship with those perceived as different emerges, especially in a secularized context.

13.7 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed different processes in the identity construction of Muslim migrants and refugees from the former Republics of Yugoslavia in Luxemburg. The experience of this group in Luxemburg may be different from Muslims in the neighboring countries, with respective Muslim majorities from North-Africa or Turkey.

The interview extracts presented above show not only a distancing from ascribed group belongings, but also that religion and/or ethnicity are not the sole or primary

principles of identification, as is often suggested in the Balkan context (Kaplan 1994). Participants use different intersecting references like the rural-urban divide, differences in mentality, but also personal moral behavior, which overlap and transcend ethnic and religious dichotomies. The data suggest multiple axes of intra-Muslim differentiation that deconstruct an alleged encompassing religious group. Most of the participants distance themselves from an imagined "real" Islam, by considering themselves as not practicing Muslims, and by emphasizing the "Europeanness" of Balkan Islam. They thus use ethnic markers as intra-Muslim differentiation. Interestingly, none of the participants suggests an intra-Muslim confessional differentiation, i.e. between Sunni and Shia Muslims, which seems to be a salient boundary in other national contexts.

Personal goodness is particularly emphasized for self-definition and often related to Islamic concepts of leading a good life. Religion is subjectively re-appropriated to construct personal moral superiority, and thus indirectly integrated in the identity patchwork. Interestingly, religion matters after all for believers and non-believers. Religion is reappropriated and related to an encompassing inclusive social identity, transcending particular religious affiliations.

The data suggest the blurring of boundaries between—at least monotheistic—religions, by showing the moral commonalities of religions, which can be seen as an example of reconfiguring groups by redefining the boundaries between them.

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Part VII
Identity and Symbols: Oppositional Self-Representations

Chapter 14
Veiling and Revealing Identity: The Linguistic Representation of the *Hijab* in the British Press

Ghufran Khir Allah

14.1 Introduction

Several studies have been conducted by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists on the issue of the *hijab* (Islamic veil), particularly focusing on the French ban of religious symbols in public schools (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Scott 2007; Read 2007; Killian 2007; Joppke 2009; Ahmed 2011). The French debate on weather Muslim girls should or not wear the headscarf in public school started in 1989. In 2004, the French government passed a law that banned wearing "conspicuous" religious signs in public schools, such as the Islamic veil, large crosses, and Jewish *kippot*[1]. According to this law, French public schools have the right to expel any female student who wore the headscarf (Read 2007). Finally, in 2010, another ban has been approved, targeting the use of full-length veil in public places within the French territory (Lichfield 2010). On the other hand, various works have discussed metaphor within-culture variation (Kovecses 2006; Shore 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Richard 1936). However, little research has been done to investigate metaphorical variations in representing the *hijab* and its ban in European countries.

The purpose of this study is to investigate this variation within the British mainstream culture and the British Islamic subculture. In order to accomplish this goal properly, the analysis will focus on three main controversial issues—identity, female body, and cultural integration– as they appear in British newspapers, specifically in articles, interviews, and readers' comments. This paper argues that the collected data from the online version of British newspapers show relevant differences between the British mainstream culture and British Islamic subculture.

This chapter intends to answer the following research questions: what does the *hijab* mean for those who wear it? To what extent the British newspapers reflect

[1] The text of the law is available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977&categorieLien=id [last accessed January 5, 2014].

G. Khir Allah (✉)
Department of Linguistics, Autónoma University, Madrid, Spain
e-mail: g.khir.allah@gmail.com

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the mainstream British understanding of the *hijab*? What is the image of the female body reflected in the selected data? Can the variation in metaphorical structures used to represent the *hijab* reveal any features of cultural integration in British society? The chapter argues that the analyzed metaphorical variations are mainly related to the religious differences between the two cultural varieties. More specifically, it examines the ideology that underlines the metaphorical structures by detecting the difference between the metaphorical structures used by British Muslim veiled women and the metaphorical structures used by non-Muslim or non-veiled British Muslim women who oppose the practice of the Islamic veil. In the following paragraphs I offer a brief overview of Islam in Britain, and expand on the contested meaning of the *hijab*. The notion of metaphor in cognitive linguistic is then introduced as a functional step to understand the result of my analysis of within-culture variation of the *hijab* as a conceptual metaphor that appears in the British press.

14.2 Islam in Britain

Although Islam has a long history in European countries, the actual Muslim population in Europe is linked to the waves of Muslim migrants workers attracted to rebuild what World War II destroyed (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Killian 2007). Moreover, post-war rapid economic evolution in manufacturing industry created diverse vacancies for not qualified or semi/trained workers. At that time, the majority of Muslim migration to Britain came from Indian subcontinent, specifically from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. They migrated in search of labor because of the decline of economic situation in their homeland. Most of them were male migrants who left their families behind. They suffered from loneliness and hard work conditions. In addition, they sent more than the half of their income to their families. Most of immigration studies at that time focused on human movements from one part of the world to another, leaving social relations and social integration underresearched (Gilliat-Ray 2010).

The second wave of Muslim migrants to Britain was based on different political and economical forces that produced new categories of migrants, such as refugees, skilled professionals, and international traders, mainly middle class and professional. The majority of them were from Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran. In addition, after the 1970s rise of oil prices, Muslim migrants from the wealthy Arabs countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Gulf States, came to Britain in search for a stable political environment in which they could invest their money (Gilliat-Ray 2010). Those migrants were quite different for their social backgrounds, language, ethnicity, and education from their fellows from South Asia with whom nonetheless they shared the same religious identity. Although after the 1970s European countries introduced limitation for labor migrants, immigration control policies could not stop the flow of undocumented migrants, especially from North Africa.

Today, 50 % of current Muslim population of Europe was born in Europe (Savage 2004). Moreover, since Muslims birth rate is currently more than three times

that of non-Muslims, Muslim community is younger than non-Muslim one. One third of the 1.6 million Muslims are under the ages of 15 (compared to 20 % of the British population as a whole). According to Savage, by 2015 Muslim population will double, while European non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 %.

British government assumed for a long time that those workers would return to their home countries. Muslim migrants, as well, had this dream of going back home. But the successive decline of the political, social, and economic situations in their homeland pushed them not to go back, but bring also their family members to Britain. The settlement of women and children implied a shift toward "Britain identity". The change was gradual and took decades, while, at the same time, it was associated with the effort to maintain religious and ethnic identity among children who had been born in Britain. Children of those migrants, or even their grand children, who were born in European countries are not migrants anymore. They hold the nationality of the European country they were born in, go to its schools and universities, and speak its language as natives do. They are part of the British social structure.

Muslim minorities were expected to abandon their cultural and religious traditions in favor of the European ones. Yet, they turned to be more visible with their religious claims. Since the 80s, British government adopted multiculturalism as a framework, recognizing rights to minority groups within British society (Abbas 2005). Multicultural policies yet imply that they do not belong to "us". Since they are not native white British, they rather belong to the category of "other". For British, despite of the fact that more than three-fifth of Muslims are already citizens, there is no difference between the terms "Islam" and "immigrant", because each one implies the other (Choudhury 2005; Anwar and Bakhsh 2003).

After the Rushdie affair and the controversy about Satanic Verse (Akhtar 1989; Parekh 1990), Muslim in Britain started to refer openly to their Islamic identity in public life. Tariq Modood (2011) defines this identity as something more than an incidental religious dimension or background. For Muslims, their religion is strictly related with their family, community, and commitment to collective political advancement. Yet, the transition from multiculturalism to participation seems to be more challenging than anyone expected. Although Islam is at least the largest second religion in most of European countries, it is not recognized as an official religion in Europe. According to Savage, Europe views the growing Muslim minority as "encroaching" upon European collective identity and public values. The governmental attempts to nationalize Islam were no more than unsuccessful attempts to regulate and control[2]. Savage (2004) describes these efforts as obstacles for the development of a modern European Islamic identity.

Despite the persistent attempts of first generation migrants to maintain the ethnic and cultural identity of their children, the majority of young Muslim generation tends to identify themselves with Islam in first position, the European country

[2] See, for instance, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal that is available in the United Kingdom to Muslims who wish to resolve disputes without recourse to the courts system, http://www.matribunal.com/ [last accessed March 2, 2014].

they live in and their parents' country in second and third positions. This tendency, which is related to the non-hierarchical nature of Islam[3], has two major impacts on young Muslim community. First, the significance of the ethnic identity has gone through a gradual but remarkable decreasing. Second, the desire of constructing an international identity as Muslims is quickly growing and expanding. Indeed, the term "Muslim *Umma*", which refers to the universal Muslim community around the world, is lately often used by young Muslim generation (Gilliat-Ray 2010).

What does push young European Muslims to look for an international identity? As a young Muslim woman living in Europe, I understand this phenomenon from two different perspectives. On the one hand, the "ethnic" identity of the parents is no more convenient for Euro-Muslims because of cultural-religious overlapping in daily practicing. It is very important to mention that the majority of Euro-Muslims learn "pure" Islam away from traditions and conventions, which normally constrain the majority of Muslim countries. This overlapping is hardly noticed by Muslims in their home countries, and is one of the main reasons for the misinterpretation of some Islamic texts, especially those related to women's rights. Accordingly, Euro-Muslims hardly feel identified within those national and cultural contexts. On the other hand, Euro-Muslims, in spite of their willingness of integration, are confronted with the European model of integration, which implies the total immersion in and assimilation to the European style of life. Although Muslims show willingness to respect civic national norms, they refuse to loose their identity as Muslims. As a result, Euro-Muslims (including the third generation) are not seen as fellow citizen, but as immigrants and foreigners because they do not conform to the European values. They are then socially discriminated and isolated. Even converts are considered to be betrayers to their mother culture.

14.3 The *Hijab* Between Misconceptions and Lived Experiences

The practice of Islamic veiling is one of the most challenging phenomena that captures the difficulties of Muslim participation. This challenge has been treated in different ways through out Europe, especially in relation to the issue of wearing the *hijab* in public schools. Britain embraced multiculturalism in state-supported schools. That is, British educational authorities allowed girls to wear the headscarves in accord with the color requirements of the school uniform (Fetzer and Soper 2005). On the other hand, France, under the cover of *laicité*, rejected multiculturalism as

[3] Islam does not admit any role of "priests" or "clergy" as any Muslim may lead a congregation in prayers (Ali and Rahman 2010). Instead, Allah (swt) talks directly to His servants in Quran, and in return, Muslims pray to Him directly. When it comes to the relation with Allah (swt), all Muslims are identically equal. It is to say, Muslims do not have a spiritual figure with political power to follow.

an appropriate educational model in state school and prohibited the use of the hijab at school.

The opinion that *hijab* is an old-fashion and static cultural practice, which has not changed for more than a thousand years, is common in Europe. Moreover, this practice has been associated with stereotypical images of oriental women that are typically depicted as victims of male domination in patriarchal societies. Most scholars (Mernissi 1987; Amara and Zappi 2003; Hawkins 2003; Read 2007) describe the *hijab* as a universal symbol of women oppression within a patriarchal religious culture. Lewis (1993) mentions that western governments assumed that the new social context would have stimulated Muslim migrant women, or their daughters, to stop veiling. Hypothesis such as "living out of the boundaries of home cultures" or living in "liberated" and "developed" countries are assumed over and over even in our days. As a veiled woman living in Europe, I confront the question of "why do you do it?" almost everyday in my social interaction.

Some of these assumptions have been driven from the unconscious cultural-religious blending in Muslim majority countries. The mix between what is religious and what is cultural, and the attribution to cultural practices of false religious connotations mainly affected women's rights because of patriarchal structures of those cultures. In Muslim majority societies, we can list numerous cultural oppressive practices imposed on Muslim women under the name of Islam, such as the imposition of *burqa* (full veil) in Afghanistan, the denial of women's right to equal education in Pakistan, or the ban for women to drive in Saudi Arabia. All of these practices are purely cultural and Islam as a faith has nothing to do with it (Ahmed 1992).

Instead, the origin of the *hijab* is religious. The term comes from the Arabic word *hajaba,* which means "to hide from the view". The religious meaning of the word refers to the headscarf worn by Muslim women in order to cover the hair, neck, and ears. The legitimacy of this practice can be found in the *Quran* in Surah An-nur: 24 [30–31]. According to the Islamic philosophy, this practice empowers women by allowing them to have liberated interaction in social life without being objectified because of their sex, or even being justified by their beauty and physical appearance. Although the majority of Muslim women believe that their religion requires wearing the *hijab*, some women believe that the *niqab* (face veil) is an advanced religious free choice, while others argue that the practice of veiling is not a religious "requirement" while "modesty" is. From their perspective, covering the whole body, but not necessarily the hair, dressing modestly and behaving well is what Islam is all about. The disagreement over the obligatory nature of the *hijab* divides Muslim women into three main groups: Muslim women who believe it is a religious requirement and adopt it, Muslim women who do not believe it is a religious requirement and oppose to it, and Muslim women who have not made their decision yet, but support the free choice and foresee the possibility to wear it in the future. This classification does not imply that those who wear the *hijab* are better believers than those who are not, nor pretends to classify who better represents Islam. This classification just distinguishes among Muslim women on the base of their consideration of the *hijab* as main symbol of their social identity. For those who wear it, the *hijab* turns to be more important than just a piece of cloth. It has deeper meaning and ideological connotation (Thomassen 2011; Bullock 2002).

In European countries, the practice of Islamic veiling carries more connotations than the religious ones. As we mentioned above, first generation migrants put a lot of efforts in to keeping alive the ethnic identity of their countries of origin. The following generation took the difficult task of drawing the line between what is Islamic and what is cultural, and explaining the difference between the two to the society they live in. For young Muslim women who decided to wear the *hijab* like me, the task is more difficult because we display our religious identity through our vestment constantly. As veiled women living in European countries, we are perceived to be oppressed and victims of our family. At school, we are always threatened by the law that bans the headscarf and deprives us from our right to education. As moms, schoolteachers address us as ignorant mothers who need to be shown how to deal with our kids at home. In our career, we are discriminated for not having a proper image in the workplace. Yet, this continuous pressure in every day life makes some practitioners more convinced with their decision. That is to say, under the pressure of losing their identity, many Muslim women in European countries choose to reveal their religious identity and publicly announce their faith by wearing the *hijab* (Ahmed 2011).

On the other part, the *hijab* is interpreted as a sign of rejection of European model of integration, which requires following the mainstream customs and practices. Christian Joppke (2009) argues that the *hijab* stands for the rejection of western materialism, commercialism, and values. In addition, it is understood as a visible statement of difference and refusal of assimilation. Indeed, the conflict between the Islamic and western cultures on the understanding of the value of female body and beauty has a remarkable effect on Muslim women decision of wearing the *hijab*. Scott (2007) states that veiled women think about the *hijab* as a statement of the necessity to restrain the seducing sexuality of women in social life. In contrast, European societies celebrate sex and sexuality as free of social and political risks. Accordingly, women wear the *hijab* as a sign of refusal to be part of unconditioned sexual freedom.

In this regard, it is important to mention that the challenging practice of wearing the *hijab* unifies all veiled Muslim women, including veiled converts, under one single identity, which is the one of "veiled Muslim women". We feel identified with each other. This does not imply, at any degree, our separation from other Muslim practitioner women who do not wear the *hijab*. It is a matter of shared philosophy that can be found among those women who wear the *hijab* out of a free choice.

14.4 Conceptual Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistic

The concept of metaphor in cognitive linguistic is here presented as a functional step to understand the result of my analysis of the use of the metaphors connected with *hijab* in the British press. Cognitive linguistics deals with metaphor from a

conceptual perspective. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) define metaphor as "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 5). The term "conceptual metaphor" is used to refer to the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain is projected onto a second domain as a way to understand the latter in terms of the former (Barcelona 2003, p. 3). That is to say, metaphors are cross-domain mappings that are used to represent "the relationship between two frames with the notion of A is B" (Kovecses 2006, p. 116).

There should be certain kind of similarity between A (target) and B (source) that makes the mapping across the source domain and target domain comprehensible (e.g.: life is journey Johnson 1987). This similarity is embodied in our experience. The embodied experience is claimed to be unconscious most of the time. It makes the understanding of metaphors easier for any language user. It is argued that we can only understand abstract ideas, e.g. love, time and life, by projecting them into the physical world. Linguistic expressions makes conceptual metaphors manifest (Kovecses 2006).

Cultural models and frames are defined as mental representation of the external world constituted by specific cultural standards and ethnic ideologies. These models are unconsciously shared and practiced by individuals pertaining to any culture. From this perspective, the connection between cultural connotations and metaphorical structures is fundamental. That is to say, some conceptual metaphors can be interpreted only within their cultural context. Lakoff and Turner (1989) argue that basic conceptual metaphors are part of the "common conceptual apparatus" that is shared by the members of a certain culture. Kovecses (2005) claims that conceptual metaphors could be tangible processes in our social and cultural practices, and argues that the source domain becomes a social physical reality. According to Kovecses, metaphors largely constitute the cultural understanding of non-physical social, legal or emotional concepts. It has been mentioned that metaphors expose and sometimes constitute human experiences within their cultural context. Correspondingly, metaphorical structures, both conceptual and linguistic ones, are supposed to vary according to these social divisions within the same culture.

As it has been mentioned above, this chapter relies on an innovative theory in cognitive linguistics known as conceptual metaphor within-culture variation. This interdisciplinary field relates with two major disciplines: cognitive science, which includes contemporary cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, and social sciences, in particular anthropology. In recent studies (Brake 1980; Shore 1996; Strauss and Quinn 1997), metaphor has served the goal of social sciences, providing scholars with the ground for interpretative understanding of cultural varieties. Analyzing linguistic metaphorical structures of certain culture or minority helps to grasp the ideology that marks the ethnic identity of each social variety. Accordingly, the study of metaphors has been classified as important analytical tool in the process of acquisition of any cultural knowledge.

Kovecses (2005) clarifies that all the components of conceptual metaphor are involved in within-cultural variation. Firstly, different social varieties use different but congruent source domains at lower level of conceptual organization, whereas at higher levels the source domains are more likely to be sub-culturally shared.

Secondly, target domain could be understood differently within the same culture, and this could produce different metaphors. Thirdly, the relationship between the source and the target has been set into distinct types: one social variety can have a certain target domain that is conventionally associated with a set of source domains. The scope of metaphor is to associate a given source domain with different sets of targets in two or more social varieties. Third, mappings of the same metaphor differ across any social variety. Finally, the linguistic expressions used to indicate the same conceptual metaphor differ as well. Although conceptual metaphors may appear identical in two cultural varieties, each variety uses different mappings or linguistic expressions that reflect different understanding of the target domain.

In order to understand the complex structures of contemporary societies, anthropologists (Fernández 1986; Strauss and Quinn 1997; Alvi 2013) are interested in approaching the variation of metaphors and symbols connotations across cultures and within the same culture. In addition, this topic has been extensively studied by sociolinguists who capitalize the results of anthropologists in order to study and interpret the variation in the use of language within the same community. For instance, when children from migrant parents learn the language of the host country, they use different set of linguistic structures of the native speakers' in order to express their own identity. Even natives citizens who join minority subcultures (i.e. converts) tend to use this different set of linguistic structures. In this sense, Kovecses (2005) argues that if the use of language varies within the same community, metaphorical structures should vary as well. Anthropologists (Tilley 1999; Turner and Boyns 2001) differentiate between cultural dimension, which concentrates on the main style, and the sub-cultural dimension, which involves behavior and lifestyle related to a wider social structure. A subculture is identified by considering those who define themselves in opposition to mainstream culture. Moreover, the self-definition of the subculture involves "the unique metaphorical conceptualizations of important concepts on which the separateness of the subculture is based" (Kovecses 2005, p. 97). According to Kovecses, religion is one of the prominent subcultures in contemporary societies.

So far, most of these studies on metaphor within-culture variations (Quinn 1991; Kovecses 2000, 2005, 2006; Lakoff 1987) have concentrated on the political or social divisions within societies. The main focus of the analysis carried on in this chapter is the religious division within-culture and its effects on shaping the identity of Muslim practitioners as a minority. More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to study the metaphorical variation among the mainstream British culture and the British Islamic subculture when referring to the *hijab*.

14.5 Methodology

For the purpose of this chapter, a total number of 18 articles, 10 interviews, and 34 readers' comments have been collected from the online version of British newspapers, namely: The Guardian, The Independent, Daily Newspaper, BBC on line, This

is London, The Times, The Sun, Daily Express, Daily Mail, and The Telegraph. All selected data have been written by British women, journalist, and readers in order to control gender and cultural background variables. The definition of British identity has been done either by checking the nationalities of the writers of the selected articles on the newspaper website or by their direct declarations of being British citizen through their writings, which includes women born in Britain from migrant parents, who think over UK as their homeland and identify themselves as "British." The French ban of the headscarf at public schools in 2004 and the French ban of the full veil in public places in 2010 have been selected as the general topic. All the selected articles, interviews, and comments are about the British reaction to the French bans between 2004 and 2010. However, some interviewed women talk about the ban of the *hijab* in their own institution or work place in Britain.

The religious variable in its wide term has not been controlled because the selected data shows no significant differences between articles written by non-Muslim women and non-veiled British Muslim women who oppose the practice of the veil. In contrast, differences have been found between articles written by women who declare to be Muslim wearing the *hijab*, on the one side, and British (apparently non-Muslim) women and British Muslim women who declare to oppose the *hijab*, on the other.

Findings have been classified into two groups: (1) the mainstream British culture, which contains the metaphorical structures used by non-Muslim women and non-veiled Muslim women who oppose the practice of Islamic veiling, and (2) the Islamic British subculture, which contains the metaphors used by veiled Muslim women. Following the classification of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphors found in the press have been classified in two groups, ontological and structural metaphors. The obtained results went through a socio-anthropological analysis, which provided the study with adequate interpretative tools to analyze these metaphorical representations. Final results were obtained after comparing the findings in both social varieties[4].

14.6 Same Target Domain, but Different Mappings in the Two Social Varieties

14.6.1 Ontological Metaphors

Following the metaphorical structures explained by Kovecses (2005), this paragraph is divided into two sections. The first section contains ontological metaphors that represent the understanding of abstract concepts in terms of objects and substances.

[4] The obtained results are limited to the selected articles and no generalization could be done. Moreover, research limitations needs to be mentioned. The first one is related to the difficulty in balancing the data. The British Islamic sub-culture makes its voice heard only through the interviews and readers' comments. In the other sources, Muslim veiled women are negatively described by others.

Table 14.1 Identity is an entity/object

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
Anne, a teacher in Hull with 30 years of experience, has found that even hijab makes identification of girls difficult (Childs 2007)	[....] a form of dress that for many Muslim women *forms an integral part of their identity* (Akbar and Taylor 2010)

Ontological metaphors allow the speaker to treat parts of his/her experience as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Although each individual's identity is formed by his/her own believes and values along with the accumulation of experiences, feelings, and ideologies, culture molds all of these components together to produce a shared social identity (Kovecses 2005). Most prominent examples are containers metaphors, personification, and visual fields.

The analysis of data shows five ontological metaphors common to both cultural varieties. In the selected data, both social varieties present a common understanding of what "social identity" means. It was delineated as a substantive "entity" that each social variety designs with its own characteristics according to their different values and ideology. At the same time, both social varieties use the metaphor of "entity" to express the presence of the *hijab* in political and social spheres. Yet, the analysis of these two metaphors shows deep differences in mappings through the two social varieties. According to the mainstream British culture, identity is understood to be stolen by the veil, especially the full veil. In contrast, according to those who wear the *hijab*, social identity is completed by the practice of Islamic veiling (Table 14.1).

The analysis shows that personal identity is considered to be taken away by the practice of the full veil. Women who wear the full veil have been mostly described as identity-less. On the other side, identity is considered to be taken away by the *hijab* too, which is the issue specifically addressed in this chapter. They claim that when women with *hijab* gather, it turns to be difficult to identify those women. It is not only the personal identity, but also the social identity and sense of belonging that have been claimed to be taken away by the *hijab*. It has been previously mentioned that European society celebrates sex and sexuality as free from any political and social risks. According to European feminists, women's liberation is demonstrated by the unconditional performance of their sexual identity in social life. Stasi (2004) declares that the practice of Islamic veiling takes away the freedom to perform women's sexual identity. It also might imply the loss of "western" identity that labels British society, because the *hijab* has never been considered part of the British culture. The choice of wearing the headscarf in Britain is depicted as the insistence on identifying themselves through the culture and country of origin, which deny women vote, equality before the law, and within the marriage. The practice of *hijab* is thus described as a rejection of British culture (Marrin 2000). On the other hand, Muslim veiled women always refer to their Muslim identity as being completed by wearing the *hijab*. Correspondingly, the *hijab* is described as an entity, which is part of their identity. They declare to feel incomplete without it. Scott (2007) indicates that the practice of Islamic veiling represents the religious-spiritual values of their community. Yet, religion is not just a cluster of spiritual believes. Believers

Table 14.2 The veil is an entity/object

Mainstream British Culture	British Islamic Subculture
Sarkozy used Muslim dress as *a nationalistic prop*, seeing it as a threat to France's eternal values (Power 2009)	It's *part of* who I am. It's not just some bit of fabric on my head. It's everything (Jones 2005)
Now two presidents have taken up the veil *framing it* as a topic in radically different ways (Power 2009)	Where people did not know me, the scarf was just a part of who I was (Akbar and Taylor 2010)

Table 14.3 The veil is a tool

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
The veil is *a tool of oppression* used to alienate and control women under the guise of religious freedom (Khan 2009)	I have found it a *tool* of *empowerment* (Akbar and Taylor 2010)

maintain that Islam should manifest in the daily life of any Muslim. The practice of Islamic veiling is a crucial part of their religious-social identity (Table 14.2).

The linguistic expressions used indicate that the image of the *hijab* has been objectified as an entity to be framed, fought over, and used in the mainstream British understanding. Indeed, The *hijab* has been often used in political agendas as a topic to gain public attention. The full veil in public spaces and headscarves in public schools have been controversial issues debated in European political news headlines.

A possible entailment of the metaphor "the veil is an entity/object" is "the veil is a tool". Although both social varieties understand the *hijab* as a "tool", the mainstream British culture considers it as a tool of oppression. On the contrary, the Islamic British subculture understands it as a tool of empowerment (Table 14.3).

According to veiled women, the *hijab* gives them the power of making it impossible for others to judge them according to their physical appearance. They stress the idea that when they wear the *hijab*, their educational abilities and personal values are at stake, instead of their attractive outlook. On the other hand, the understanding of the *hijab* as "oppression" within the mainstream British culture has many different interpretations. It is possibly due to the overlapping of religion and culture in Muslim majority countries on the one hand, and the systematic negative representation of Muslim men in Western media, on the other hand. It could be also due to the contemporary feminist radical movements, which stress on vestment freedom as the first and main right to gain. But while those movements, such as the recently created Femen[5], insist on women's right and freedom of taking cloths off in public sphere, they totally ignore women's right to have cloths on.

The third main ontological understanding of the *hijab* relates to the personification metaphor. The analysis shows three entailments of this metaphor. The first entailment is "the veil is an undesirable person" (Table 14.4).

[5] See www.femen.org [retrieved on February 11, 2014].

Table 14.4 The veil is an undesirable person

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
I can't pretend I do not find them equally *offensive* on my local high-street (Smith 2006)	…
The big headscarf is not *startling* as the enormous burqa or the birdlike Arab masks, but its message is the same (Marrin 2004)	…

Table 14.5 "The veil is a child"

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
…	The reality is that you have a lot of well educated, young women choosing *to adopt* hijab (Akbar and Taylor 2010)
…	I am proud of wearing the scarf (Loat 2006)

The adjectives "offensive" and "startling" have been mainly used by the French government in order to justify the approval of the ban. At the same time, these adjectives appear to be used by British public in the selected data. According to Killian (2007), the rejection of the *hijab* is linked to will of asserting a unified European identity. That is, the European countries feel threatened by globalization, migrants, and converts to Islam. Furthermore, the selected reader's comments reveal the fact that the mainstream British culture does not accept the integration of veiled women in their society because, according to them, they do not share their cultural heritage.

The second entailment of the personification metaphor is "the veil is a child". This metaphor refers to the process of veiling used by Muslim women (Table 14.5).

According to Muslim women, the practice of Islamic veiling is not one of the many choices that depend on the morning mood. Instead, it requires commitment along with certain awareness of its philosophy, since its use in public arena challenges surroundings and implies self-identity transformations. The repetitive use of the verb "to adopt" directly brings the image of a little baby being adopted to be cared of. Adopting a child is a responsible step. It transforms woman's social identity from single, to mom, or family. The child needs special care, and imposes a certain life style on parents, as much as the veil does. Each mother sees her child as dear and precious. In the same way Muslim women view their *hijab*.

The third, and last, entailment of the personification metaphor is: "the veil is a capable person". In this metaphor, mappings significantly differ. It has been previously mentioned that the *hijab* is perceived by Muslim women as enabling them to be what they want, without being judged by their physical appearance. Accordingly, they portrait the *hijab* as a "protector", who defends them in social interaction from being sexually subjected. Consequently, they consider the *hijab* allows equality between sexes. Contrastingly, mainstream British culture portraits the *hijab* as a thief, which "takes away" women's individuality and "restrict" their interactivity (Table 14.6).

The fourth ontological metaphor is "female's body is a precious entity". This metaphor has been detected only in interviews and reader's comments of both social

Table 14.6 "The veil is a im/possibilitator person"

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
Preventer	Protector
It is designed to *take away* women's individuality (Childs 2007)	It *preserves* their modesty and *protects* them from men (Gupta 2009)
It *stops* them achieving their full potential in all areas of their lives, and it *stops* them communicating (Khan 2009)	I feel this dress liberates me and makes me feel special (Osmani 2009)

Table 14.7 "Female body is a precious entity"

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
She was *"selling image"* and needed her staff to *display* their hairstyle to the public (Bentham and Davis 2009)	[…] because a woman is *a jewel*, like *a pearl*. She doesn't need to be *shown off* for the world *to glare at* (Reader's Comment on: Gupta 2009)
We should *celebrate* our beauty (Malik 2006)	So what if I don't want *to display my beauty* and adornment to the world, I can still integrate (Khan 2009)

varieties. However, like the rest of the metaphorical structures in this section, mappings significantly differ in each social variety. For the mainstream culture, female body is a precious entity to be "shown off". They constantly use words such as "display", "sell", and "celebrate" beauty and body. On the other hand, the Islamic British subculture understands the body as a precious entity, which has to be preserved and displayed only to those who have the privilege to see it, such as close family members. Consequently, the following linguistic expressions "jewel", "pearl", or negations such as "I don't display my beauty" are used (Table 14.7).

The Islamic British subculture use of the metaphor female's body is a precious entity" has religious roots. According to Islam, the attractiveness and beauty of the female body is a private issue. In public life, the body is reduced to a "vessel of intelligent mind and a strong spirit" (Scott 2007). On the other hand, the western concept of equality between the sexes lies, according to Scott (2007), in the liberty of exposing the body without any social or religious constrains. Interestingly, Scott argues that while Islam "puts sex out there as a problem for all by conspicuously covering the body", western feminists call for a "conspicuous display of bodies in order to deny the problem" that sex poses (Scott 2007, 167).

Finally, the last ontological metaphor is "public life is a container". The variation within this metaphor tends to appear in mappings the image schema of the *hijab* as in the example below (Table 14.8).

Both social varieties coincide on the use of the image "social life is a container". The mainstream British culture portrays the *hijab* as an obstacle that does not allow women to enter into the public arena. The used linguistic expressions such as "a conditional access" and "barrier" reflect this understanding. That is, it represents the mainstream British culture as a club where people with similar interests join. Only those who promise to follow the club instruction can be part of it. On the

Table 14.8 "Public life is a container"

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
Women have *a conditional access to* the public space, allowed to participate in the world outside the home only if they follow certain rules (Smith 2006)	There is a certain *degree of unity* you feel with other women who wear headscarf, even if you don't know (Akbar and Taylor 2010)
Their clothing is *a barrier* between them and the world and between them and us (Marrin 2004)	Different *does not mean* we are *segregated* from society; different means it's just part of our identity (Akthar 2006)
…	She doesn't want her sexuality *to enter into* the interaction in the slightest degree (Mursaleen 2010)

contrary, the linguistic expressions "unity", "integrate", and "enter into" used by the Islamic subculture show that, for them, the *hijab* facilitates the access into social life and unites them into a community.

14.6.2 Structural Metaphor

The second section contains structural metaphors, which are considered the richest source of metaphorical elaboration. They allow the speaker to use one highly structured and designated concept to construct another concept. Such kind of metaphor is more flexible than the ontological ones because it allows the speaker to understand target A by means of source B through out a conceptual mapping process between the concept A and the concept B. Additionally, they are grounded on the systematic correlations with the speakers' experiences, e.g: argument is war (Kovecses 2010) or difference is war (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Kovecses 2002).

The analysis shows two substantial and overlapping metaphors in this category. These metaphors are "culture integration is war", and "women's cloth is a dangerous weapon", which is an entailment of the first one. The linguistic expressions used by both social varieties indicate the image schema of a severe war existing between the two social varieties. The mainstream British culture refers to British veiled Muslim women as "mute victims". At the same time, wearing the *hijab*, Muslim women "battle us" and "divide the world in two campus". On the other hand, the linguistic expressions used by British veiled Muslim women have the same connotation. Expressions such as "blow up", "you are in for a fight", and their Islamic identity is "threatened" are used. When alluding to the possibility of ending such a conflict, the linguistic expressions "to compromise" and "amicable solution" are used (Table 14.9).

Each social variety feels threatened by the other's way of life. In an attempt to clarify each variety understanding of what culture integration means, mappings between the source domain and the target domain is set as follows (Table 14.10).

By reading each row apart, the contradiction between the two mappings emerges. For the mainstream culture, Muslim women are muted victims of male domination.

Table 14.9 "Culture integration is war"

Mainstream British Culture	Islamic British Subculture
They are all tragically *mute victims* of an especially monstrous patriarchy (Knight 2010)	A scarf throwing (*Benazir Butto* style) over the head could be an *amicable solution* (Reader's Comments on: Wark 2006)
It [*hijab*] presents a serious *challenge* to the West. It *challenges* our ideas of what's most important in our own culture and the points at which we draw the line of tolerance (Marrin 2004)	[…] discussions around the removal of headscarves for women who felt *under threat* (Akbar and Taylor 2010)
What is needed is a bit of *give and take* from *all sides* of the society to make *a compromise* (Reader's Comments on: Wark 2006)	Force me to take off my hijab, and you are in *for a fight* (Reader's comment on: Loat 2006)
This is a benign version of Samuel Huntington's *"clash of civilization"* thesis, which *divide the world into* two campus, Western and Islamic (Smith 2004)	…
There is a lot of *tension* in the Islamic community which feels *targeted* (Jones 2005)	…

Table 14.10 "Culture integration is war"

Generic space	Source domain	Target domain	
	War	Culture integration	
		Mainstream British culture	*Islamic British subculture*
Aims	The liberty of the country	Liberty of Muslims women/ Preserving European identity	Protecting Islamic identity
Parts	Enemies	Male domination, *Offensive* symbol, *regressive* patriarchal culture, *stubborn* veiled women	Western culture domination, *Arrogant Po*liticians, *misled* and *ignorant* society
	Defender	Western culture, Feminists, power of authority	Islamic culture, Muslim veiled women proud of the Islamic identity, power of faith and ideology
	Victims	Veiled Muslim women, Muslim Muted victims, Oppressed women	Western women, Western women, sexually objectified
Equipment	Weapons, canons	Women's cloth, the ban, law (protector)	The headscarf, the *niqab*, consistency, veil (flag of resistance)
Action	Physical fighting	Clash of cultures	Veiling
Results	Compromising, give and take	Wearing the headscarf instead of the full veil or just dress modestly	
Features	Fire, blood, dead body	Divided community	

Table 14.11 "Women's cloth is a dangerous weapon"

British Mainstream Culture	British Islamic Subculture
I entered the classroom […] to be *confronted* by three girls in the back row (Childs 2007)	The veil [...] only *unites* the Muslims, *it makes us stronger* (Reader's Comment on: Loat 2006)
Sarkozy used Muslim dress as a nationalistic prop, seeing it as *a threat to* France's eternal values (Power 2009)	I've found it a *tool of empowerment*. It gave me the freedom to be who I want to be and not worry about what people might think of me physically or whether I'm up to date with the latest fashion trends (Akbar and Taylor 2010)

Victims will be rescued by the ban (saver) approved in Western cultures. While in the Islamic British subculture, the victims are western women who are being sexually objectified, the enemy is the western culture which pushes them toward a total integration that threatens their "authentic" identity. Their only weapon is the practice of Islamic veiling and consistency. Words like "rift" and "spark" are used to describe the consequences of approving the ban in France.

The entailment of this metaphor is "women's cloth is a dangerous weapon". The linguistic expressions, used by the mainstream British culture, such as "confronted", "threaten", and "destroy" clearly denote this metaphor. According to this social variety, the veil is seen as a negative figure that threatens any kind of social interaction. On the contrary, according to the Islamic British subculture, the veil is a flag of the resistance against the total assimilation into European way of life. It gives women confidence in maintaining their identity, which unites all veiled women together (Table 14.11).

14.7 Same Target Domains, Different Source Domains

This paragraph is organized according to the semantic connotation of the findings, which are "the veil is a barrier" and "the veil is a prison". It has been mentioned above that social life is understood as a container. Accordingly, mainstream British culture views the veil as the obstacle that does not allow women to enter into social life. The used linguistic expressions, such as "hidden", "formidable", and "shielded", indicate the purpose of this barrier, which is hiding women from participation in social life (Table 14.12).

The example shows that the mainstream British culture understands the *hijab* as a boundary maker between women and men, or even, between women and public life. However, Muslim veiled women repeatedly reject this metaphor because, for them, the philosophy of Islamic veiling lies on establishing distance between male and female in public life in order to avoid potential gender discrimination rather than to "hide" women. Scott (2007) maintains that although the practice of Islamic veiling deprived women from their sexuality, it creates a neutral environment of communication between men and women. Indeed, British Muslim women understand the veil as a "barrier between (women) and those who want to exploit (them)".

Table 14.12 "The veil is a barrier"

British Mainstream Culture	British Islamic Subculture
It creates *a formidable barrier* to integration (Reader's comment on: Knight 2010)	She doesn't believe it represent a *barrier* between people of different faiths (Patel 2008)

On the other part, the metaphor "the veil is a prison" is explicitly used by the mainstream British culture. Since they think that Muslim women are hold behind a barrier, "the veil is a prison" is a continuation of the barrier metaphor. However, this metaphor has been continuously negated by the Islamic culture. The similarities between the target, the veil, and the source, a prison, can be traced as follow: the restriction and social segregation imposed on Muslim women by the veil coincides with those imposed on prisoners. The linguistic expressions used in conceptualizing this metaphor are many, such as "peering out of the grille", "isolate", "control" and "prisoners".

14.8 Unique Metaphors in Each Social Variety

The analysis of selected data reveals a unique metaphor used by the mainstream British culture, which is the "veiled body is a dead body" (Table 14.13).

Similarities between the target, covered body, and the source, dead body, could be traced as follow: the veil hides the beautifulness of female body in public life in the same way death takes away the life of human body. Accordingly, the veil is the shroud and the veiled body is a dead body. It has been mentioned before that sexual identity has been understood as to be taken away by the *hijab*; besides, sexual identity has an important role in western standards of social communication. As a consequence, in the eyes of mainstream British culture veiled women are "dead" figures roaming around in social life.

The conducted analysis shows a specific image schema reflecting the embodied experience of British Muslim veiled women. It appears repetitively when veiled women talk about their decision of adopting the veil. The used linguistic expressions, such as "path", "meet", and "journey", indicates the metaphor "wearing the veil is journey" (Table 14.14).

Mappings between the target domain, wearing the veil, and the source domain, journey, is explained in the following Table 14.15.

The journey metaphor has been used extensively in the British Islamic subculture. This metaphor tends to emerge from the embodied experience of understanding

Table 14.13 "Veiled body is a dead body"

British Mainstream Culture	Islamic British Subculture
Today I see Muslim girls 10, 20 years younger than me *shrouding* themselves in fabric (Malik 2006)	…

Table 14.14 "Wearing the veil is a journey"

British Mainstream Culture	Islamic British Subculture
…	For others still hijab is *a complicated journey* (Akbar and Taylor 2010)
…	When I have started learning more about Islam, I realised there is *a criteria I have to meet* (Akbar and Taylor 2010)
…	Deciding to wear the veil was very much *spiritual journey* for me […]. It is about my spiritual connection with God (Akbar and Taylor 2010)
…	The reality is that you have a lot of well educated, young women choosing to adopt *hijab* because when *they go down the path of trying to find out their religion and their identity* they choose a form of modesty which may include *hijab* (Akbar and Taylor 2010)

Table 14.15 Wearing the veil is a journey

Generic space	The source domain (Journey)	The target domain (Wearing the veil)
Participants	Travellers	Muslim girls
Process	Leading along the way	Looking for the Islamic spirituality
Destination	Reaching the intended location	Getting closer to God
Criteria	Keeping the environment clean, respecting other travellers	Sustaining modesty
Obstacles	Difficulties along the way (bad weather, complex path)	Maintaining consistency, reaching identity, facing challenges

Islam as an ideology for life. Saida Kada (qtd. in Scott 2007, 143) mentions that the discovery of Islam is "marked by a series of steps" that successively structure the identity of any Muslim. She explains these steps as follow: "one is a Muslim first, one adheres to a certain philosophy in life, in this context, one wants to wear the headscarf".

14.9 Conclusions

The recent debates on the practice of Islamic veiling sum up the clash of identities that European society goes through. The symbol of *hijab* has many negative connotations in Europe. The stereotypical images of Muslim women and patriarchal societies are used in the media over and over to spread these negative understandings. In addition, these symbols are considered to be a sign of the unwillingness to integrate in the European society. On the other hand, Muslims consider this practice as a decisive attempt to protect the Islamic identity they construct in non-Muslim countries.

The innovative theory of conceptual metaphor has proved to be functional in revealing the social variation within the same society. The detected results from the British press shows the important effects of the "religious" dimension in constructing

the images of "identity", "female body", and "social integration" in British society. Both British cultural varieties share considerable metaphorical structures. However, each social variety uses a different set of mappings and linguistic expressions in order to convey each conceptual metaphor. At the same time, each social variety has its own understanding of them, which produces unique linguistic expressions used by people belonging to each variety. The practice of veiling as a religious subcultural dimension, along with its social and political dimensions, has been proved to cause substantial variation in the understanding of social integration and social identity construction in Britain.

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Chapter 15
Narratives of Spanish Muslim Women on the *Hijab* as a Tool to Assert Identity

Salam Adlbi Sibai

15.1 Introduction

This study has been conducted within the framework of a larger qualitative research that analyzes identity and integration of university-educated women, between the ages of 18 and 36 years old. These women belong to the Muslim minority in Spain and are either Spanish-born or have been foreign residents in Spain since childhood or adolescence. In particular, this chapter focuses on the use of the *hijab*[1] to analyze the issue of identity and integration of these women and the daily challenges they confront. The aim of this in-depth study is to analyze the meaning of the *hijab*, taking into account the image portrayed by the mass media, which represent the *hijab* as a symbol of women's oppression (Said 1978; El-Madkouri Maataoui 2009). I aim to explore what these women feel, experience, and think not only about themselves but also about what it is said about them.

I base my study on the theoretical assumption of symbolic interactionism. This approach focuses on recording subjective meanings, as well as perceptions, symbols, and values, which are created and recreated in every social interaction (Ruiz Olabuénaga 2009). Symbolic interactionism is based on the constructivist paradigm that proposes social reality as a human construction that is as changing, situated and multiple as human beings are. It seeks the subjective reconstruction of pre-existing structures by allowing the coexistence of multiple constructions, which are not always consistent with each other. Since symbolic interaccionism aims to record subjective, situated, and changing meanings (Ruiz Olabuénaga 2009), a qualitative methodology has been chosen in order to study in-depth the personal and social realities of these women, without any intention to generalize the results to a wider population (Valles 1999; Van Maanen 1988). Using a constructivist perspective, "I" is used to narrate stories in which people are "self-involved". Still, the narration is

[1] Participants use the term headscarf, veil or *hijab* indistinctly. Nevertheless, for a matter of consistency, in this study I will only use just the term of *hijab*.

S. Adlbi Sibai (✉)
University Complutense of Madrid, Faculty of Education, Madrid, Spain
e-mail: salam_ads@hotmail.com

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not meant as a mere repetition of what is lived and learnt, but rather the participants show their ability of personal initiative to overcome in novel and creative ways their daily challenges (Van Dijk 2000).

This study also draws upon the so-called decolonial framework, which reveals the binary construction of reality brought by an international global system, which arose in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and has been named "coloniality" (Castro-Gómez and Grósfoguel 2007; Quijano 2000a, b). It consists in the establishment and institutionalization of the systematic withdrawal and transfer of material, cultural, spiritual and human resources from the two thirds of the world towards the third part of humanity for the benefit and gain of the latter (Esteva and Prakash 1998). This system is inextricably linked to a specific series of semantic fields, networks of meanings, images, and discourses that create, legitimize, and maintain the unquestionable western superiority. It works with a number of varied and variable, binary and antithetic frameworks—such as identity/alterity, normality/abnormality, modern/traditional, developed/underdeveloped, free/oppressed, democratic/reactionary, progressive/obscurantist, moderate/radical, western/other (Castro-Gómez and Grósfoguel 2007)—that create a set of global hierarchies, which are linguistic, cultural, ethno-racial, gendered, economic, and epistemic. These hierarchies are all interwoven and organized within the global capitalist market by the idea of race and sex-gender system (Adlbi Sibai, Sirin 2012). This framework is used here to challenge and redefine the reality of these women, whilst at the same time to avoid falling into cultural relativism.

15.2 Methodology

The target population of this study is diverse because of their country of origin or the homeland of their parents. The sample consists of participants born in Spain, whose parents were born in Arabic-speaking countries but the majority of whom are now nationalized; participants who are Spanish likewise their parents are, which is especially the case for participants from Ceuta and Melilla; and participants who were born in Arabic-speaking countries and have immigrated to Spain during childhood or adolescence.

Participants also differ because of their ways of enacting their religious identity. Although the majority of the participants identify themselves as Muslims, not all of them are practicing[2] nor use the *hijab*. The sample of participants takes into account

[2] The theological criteria for considering whether a person is practicing or not, is the observance of the three basic pillars of the religion: (1) to believe in one God and in all of his sacred books and prophets, (2) praying five times a day, (3) fasting during the month of *Ramadan*, (4) paying the *zakat*, which is an alms that everyone pays to the poor according to the donor's income, and finally, (5) completing a pilgrimage to the Mecca at least once in life, if possible (Muhammad 2003). Yet, to feel as a Muslim does not necessarily mean that one observes all religious duties. Many participants do not practice all the duties and still tell that they consider themselves as Muslim.

the diversity of Muslim women's realities[3]. However, the participants share three common elements: their university studies, the fact that they were Spanish-born or have been resident in Spain since childhood or adolescence, and finally their religion[4].

The participants reside in the Autonomous Community of Madrid, the Community of Valencia and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The main reason for choosing Madrid and Valencia was the recent activity of Muslim youth associations. It facilitated the task to locate participants with the required characteristics for this study. Moreover, the cultural activities they have undertaken can be considered as an indicator of the desire of young people belonging to a minority religion to participate actively as citizens in their own country. The cities of Ceuta and Melilla, on the other part, were selected for the high proportion of the indigenous Muslim population and their peculiar geographic location. Ceuta and Melilla are both located on the African continent and share borders with Morocco, which is the homeland of the majority of Muslim population living in Spain. Morocco demands, to this day, the sovereignty over both cities.

In order to locate participants, I used a snowball sampling. First, I started from my acquaintances contacting people who fitted the desired profile, and then I asked them to put me in contact with other women who had similar characteristics. I started with a sample of 188 participants (108 in Madrid, 35 in Valencia, and 45 in Ceuta and Melilla), of which 44 were interviewed (15 from Madrid, 14 from Valencia, and 15 from Ceuta and Melilla)[5]. After exploratory interviews, the profile of the interviewees has been deliberately diversified in order to reveal the whole range of perspectives on the *hijab,* taking into account different age, university degree, country of origin and that of their parents, and use of the *hijab*.

I considered that it was not necessary to interview all of them, because when applying qualitative techniques it is not beneficial to increase the number of participants. Higher quantity does not necessarily increase the quality of the information. Since individuals are unique, validity does not arise from generalizability, rather from their particular significance (Callejo 1995). The data collection stage of the research came to an end once enough new information was added to previously

[3] The diversity shown by these participants is just a small part of the wider heterogeneity that exists among women of Muslim faith from different countries throughout the world (given the fact that in this study, there are no women who wear the *hijab* out of obligation, although they are widely represented in the media).

[4] Spain is relatively new to immigration in comparison to other European countries, such as Great Britain or France (Colectivo Ioé 2002). There are no official statistics on the number of Muslims in Spain, even though some research suggests that a million of Muslims citizens live in Spain (Bolado 2002; Pérez-Díaz et al. 2004). This study relies on the report published by UCIDE (Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España) (2010) and the information offered by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, www.ine.es) to produce the following table (Table 15.1 about here).

[5] The interviews were recorded, with prior permission from all participants, and later transcribed using the Olympus DSS Player program. An Olympus DSS file was created for each interview. The average duration was one and a half hour. Anonymity of the participants has been respected at all times. All names that appear here are fictional. All extracts are direct translations of the literal transcriptions. The content has not been altered.

Table 15.1 Muslim population in Spain

	Total population (No. of inhabitants)	Foreign Muslim (No. of inhabitants)	Spanish Muslim (No. of inhabitants)	Muslim total population (No. of inhabitants)
Ceuta	78.674	2.993 (9%)	30.050 (91%)	33.043 (42%)
Melilla	73.460	6.167 (16%)	32.932 (84%)	39.099 (53%)
Madrid	6.386.932	121.752 (75%)	112.326 (25.4%)	234.078 (3.1%)
Valencia	5.094.675	119.632 (52%)	40.817 (48%)	160.449 (3.6%)

gathered data in order to comfortably achieve the study aims (Taylor and Bodgan 1992). Nevertheless, drawing on the argument put forward by Walford (2001), despite not being able to generalize in the statistical sense of the word, it is possible to reach certain level o transferability to other similar contexts, so long as a detailed description of the target population and their context is provided.

Finally, in line with the mentioned methodological decisions, it draws on concepts from the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Straus 1974), contents analysis and discourse analysis techniques to explain and interpret findings from the interviews. This involved the following four levels of analysis: descriptive, quantitative, qualitative and social. Each one was tackled, in turn, both synchronically and diachronically (Van Dijk 2000; Sánchez Martín 2005; Ruiz Olabuénaga 2009).

15.3 What Does Wearing the *Hijab* Mean to Muslim Women? "I Don't Like Anyone to Force Me to Put it on or to Take it Off; i'm Free to Do What I Want"

This study represent participants views on the *hijab*, the reasons they offer for using it or not, and some of the interconnected issues, such as the influence of their families into the decision to use it or not, or the image portrayed by the media, and therefore public opinion (Colectivo Ioé 2005; McCombs 2004).

All participants explain that wearing the *hijab* is a personal decision that must be made freely. According to them, this means that under no circumstances a person should be forced to use it. They define the behavior of someone forcing a woman to use the *hijab* as an "anti-Islamic attitude". There is no reference in Islamic theology which indicates that it is correct to force someone to wear it, nor that a woman who does not wear it should be punished for it. When I asked them whether they use it out of their own personal convictions or whether someone has forced them, they appeared to feel hurt and offended. Their reaction can be explained because this question is based on a stereotype. Asking them about this issue is an indirect and subconscious form of deprecation, as it implies they are unable to make their

own decisions and lead their lives of their own accord. Although I was aware of the precariousness of this question, I still decided to inquire about this point because is the main question that everybody ask them and I wanted to know their reactions, answers, feelings, and explanations.

> I started wearing it when I was fourteen years old, and I wore it because I wanted to, my parents didn't tell me "wear your headscarf or don't go out in the street". I have friends who did experience this situation, but it isn't an Islamic attitude, not at all; because Islam tells you that you have to decide when you put the headscarf on, but always and when you want to and you are committed to what you are doing (Rula, 21 years old, from Madrid, she studies Journalism, her parents are from Morocco, she wears *hijab*).

The participants explained that the *hijab* is an obligation assigned to them by God. The intervention of a man to force a woman to wear it has no theological foundations in Islam. They add that they wear the *hijab* out of faith, love and respect for God, and "not for any man". Even participants who do not use it like Ikram explained that if they will ever decide to start wearing it, they would do it for the same reason: "I would only wear it for God, out of love for God, and not out of love for any man" (Ikram, 21 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Education, she does not wear *hijab*, her parents are from Algeria). She considers veiling as a religious obligation. Whether they fulfill this duty or not should be of no concern to their family or society. Hadia claims that when a woman is forced to wear it, the *hijab* loses its meaning and essence: "It's a duty that is in the Koran, but it has to come from within and you have to be comfortable with it, because wearing it and being uncomfortable in the street makes no sense" (Hadia, 30 years old, from Ceuta, she studied Education, she does not wear *hijab*, her parents are Spanish).

Many of the participants, when talking about the *hijab*, mention the nun's habit: "the nuns wear the veil and they aren't criticized like we are for the *hijab*" (Sayida, 23 years old, from Madrid, she studies Business, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are from Morocco)[6]. In this way, Sayida tried to demonstrate that the *hijab* is not exclusive to their religion, but something common to all monotheistic religions. Yet, in Christian and Jew religious texts the *hijab* maintains its connection with submission to their husbands, while in Islam not.

Wearing the *hijab* is by no means the most important demonstration of their faith. They believe that to behave according to justice is the most appropriate way to express their beliefs. Yet, all participants, both those who use *hijab* and those who do not, consider it one important tool through which they can show their faith. For Amina, the *hijab* also shows that you conduct your life according to the value of modesty:

> For me it means chastity, respect, purity, I love it. I feel so proud of being a Muslim; it is my duty like Muslim (Amina, 25 years old, from Melilla, she studies Education, she wears *hijab,* her mother is Spanish and her father is Moroccan).

[6] On this regard, some of them referred to the video "Because he is Muslim" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJQvRYioWYc&feature=player_embedded#at=11, last accessed October 2, 2009) that denounces how the criteria used to criticize Muslims are praiseworthy qualities in people of other religions.

Showing that you conduct your life according to the value of modesty also makes you gain respect and gives confidence and self-esteem:

> It gave me a massive boost in self-esteem, it changed my personality, I started to be much more open with people, probably because I didn't feel good about myself before (Basma, 23 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Biology, she wears *hijab*, her parents are from Tunisia).

For young Muslim women living in a country like Spain where Islam is not the majority religion, the *hijab* is also something that defines the identity: "The headscarf defines me. It represents everything I am" (Naryes, 21 years old, from Melilla, she studies Medicine, she wears *hijab,* her parents are Spanish). Along the same lines, Kinda asserts powerfully:

> Kinda is the *hijab* and the *hijab* is Kinda. It shapes my personality. The *hijab* gives me a lot of strength (Kinda, 19 years old, from Morocco, she studies Pharmacy, she wears the *hijab*, her parents are from Morocco).

If at the beginning the *hijab* was something separable from, "now it is part of me" (Susana, 21 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Pharmacy, she wears *hijab,* her parents are from Syria). Being identity a continuous process, also the meaning of the *hijab* changes over time.

> At first I wasn't aware of its value, because of my age, but now the headscarf is my personality, it's my flag (Abir, 24 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Mathematics and Computer Engineering, she wears *hijab,* her parents are from Tunisia).

Along the same lines, Susana also tells how the meaning of wearing the *hijab* has altered throughout the course of her life:

> I put it on because I wanted to, but my reasons weren't the same as they are now, now it is part of me and I wear it out of adoration for *Allah*. (Susana, 21 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Pharmacy, she wears *hijab,* her parents are from Syria).

The "true meaning of the *hijab*" becomes apparent once they have been living, growing and maturing with it. Ragda explains that it is not the same now she is an adult woman than when she was 12 years old.

> I'm still learning the meaning of the *hijab*, because when I started wearing it I was naïve, and now, you know it isn't just about modesty because you can be modest in many ways, it is also about believing in *Allah* (praise to God). It's an example we set for ourselves, I believe in *Allah* (praise to God) and He says this is good for me, so I wear it, I don't need any other reasons. It leads to a strengthening of my faith (Ragda, 21 years old, from Melilla, she studies Law, she wears *hijab,* her mother is Moroccan and her father is Spanish).

For all the participants the *hijab* is not simply a piece of cloth (Herrero 2002), "for me is a way of life" (Salwa, 18 years old, from Melilla, she studies Law, she wears *hijab*, her mother is from Morocco and her father is Spanish). It determines the way you dress, behave and act: "it isn't just a headscarf, it's going to determine the way you dress, think and relate to other people, to everyone" (Baana, 20 years old, from Madrid, she studies Education, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are from Morocco). Khadija (23 years old, from Melilla, she studies Medicine, she wears *hijab,* her mother is from Morocco and her father is Spanish), who feels comfortable with

the attire and lifestyle that accompany the *hijab*, also mentions the importance of behavior: "It was what I wanted; it suited my nature, my way of life and things". To wear the *hijab* means adapting own life around it. Along these lines, Ni'mat recalls that she followed these rules before wearing it:

> The truth is that I didn't really notice any change, because my life wasn't that different before I started wearing the headscarf to how it is now that I wear it. I had the same values, what changed was the fact I started wearing the headscarf (Ni'mat, 20 years old, from Madrid, she studies Nutrition and Dietetic, she wears *hijab,* her parents are from Syria).

There are general, common rules, but they can interpret and adapt to them in different and individual ways. The way they wear the *hijab* and their lifestyles are not uniform nor standardized, but rather dynamic, heterogeneous and multiple. This is shown by the answers given by the participants who use it, and also their different dress style, which included a whole array of colors and styles. It is often influenced by the personal taste of each person and also the culture of the parents' homeland. The diversity among the narratives is meant to break the stereotype of the so-called "Muslim woman" and show that it is necessary to speak of "Muslim women" in the plural form.

Another difference between the participants who wear it and those who do not, is that for the former the *hijab* means "being Muslim", whereas for the latter "you can do the same things with it or without it" (Batul, 36 years old, from Ceuta, she studied Biology, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are Spanish). One noteworthy point on this regard is that many participants who wear the *hijab* also maintain that it is possible to be Muslim without wearing the *hijab*. They explain that for them it means being Muslim, but it does not mean that those who do not wear it are less Muslim than they are. They also say that, although it is important, it is pointless if they do not observe the five basic pillars required by their religion. This argument is also shared by Hadia who does not wear it, "there are many things which are more important than the *hijab*, basically, not doing harm to anyone, not drag anyone through the mud" (Hadia, 30 years old, from Ceuta, she studied Education, she does not wear *hijab*, her parents are Spanish).

From another perspective, Lamia explains that her reason for not wearing the *hijab* is that she has not been convinced by the insufficient explanations she has been given.

> I don't wear the headscarf because it's not something I believe in. The explanations they've given me have never convinced me (…) the whole headscarf thing is something I've always questioned and wondered about and I don't see the point of it (Lamia, 21 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Journalism, she does not wear *hijab,* her mother is Spanish and her father is Syrian).

Ikram offers a deeper explanation about this issue and denounce how men do not fulfill their religious duties:

> You're supposed to cover yourself up so you don't attract attention from men, but what if a man attracts my attention, why doesn't he cover himself up too? They've told me that in the Koran, men also have to follow certain steps, but while women observe Islam, men observe it slightly (Ikram, 21 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Education, she does not wear, her parents are from Algeria).

Saida adds that *hijab* should not be the condition to respect a woman, "I think they should respect me with a veil or without it" (Saida, 18 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Medicine, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are from Morocco). On the other hand, in Huda's view, the body is not provocative *per se*. Provocativeness depends on the attitude.

> I think the human body is natural, and it's a symbol of what you want to express. You might think that a woman wearing shorts is provocative, but there are people who wear them naturally, and nothing happens, they don't have this intention, I guess it depends on the outlook of the person (Huda, 18 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies History, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are Moroccan).

Some of the participants insist that it is exclusively a matter of faith and are upset by the argument that refers to wear the *hijab* to limit sexual attraction. Whereas others, although emphasize that the main reason for wearing the *hijab* is faith, add that the argument of reducing sexual attraction is a reasonable one. Some of the participants consider that with *hijab* they avoid that society convert them into sexual objects. They refer, for instance, to social pressure that push women to be always all dressed, neat, wearing make-up, high heels, tight-fitted clothing, whereas men wear loose-fitting clothes, shirts and ties. María claims that equality would be, for example, if female television presenters could wore shirts and simple make-up as their male co-workers:

> Wearing *hijab* means to me that I am independent, self-governing person, I am not a part of a fashion statistics, I am not an element that is used for or against society, but I am the protagonist, the lead, I am the owner of my decisions. I do not accept the social pressure to dress in this way or another. For example, why do the television presenters wear simple make-up and ties and their female co-workers not? (María, 26 years old, from Madrid, she is a researcher on Physics, she wears *hijab,* her parents are Moroccan).

Likewise, according to Kinda the *hijab* is a symbol of equality among women: "there's no difference between tall, short, white, black, pretty, ugly, you don't know what's behind it until they take it off" (Kinda, 19 years old, from Morocco, she studies Pharmacy, she wears the *hijab*, her parents are from Morocco).

15.4 How Stereotypes and Discrimination Affect Their Identity

Many participants say they often find themselves in overwhelming and stressful situations, surrounded by a constant debate about their nature and their lifestyle. People are constantly asking questions, and are curious to know why they do certain things and how they feel. Yet, this continuous questioning is also enriching. Communication with people of the Muslim faith and, more importantly, people of other religions, plays an important role since push them to develop a deeper and more intense spiritual and personal reflection than they thought possible. On the

one hand, they have enhanced both the quantity and the quality of their arguments in order to contest the media debates and public opinion. Secondly, they have more confidence in themselves and their convictions, and they feel stronger to confront the challenges presented by daily life. The *hijab,* an artifact which for many is synonymous of discrimination against women, is the one that allows these women to constantly discover the diverse meanings of freedom and gender equality, "it is the freedom of choice that I had because of my beliefs, and it has made me feel more of a woman, more Muslim, more free, everything" (Maisa', 24 years old, from Madrid, she studied Optometry, she wear *hijab,* her father is Syrian and her mother is Spanish Muslim).

Another aspect mentioned by many participants who use the *hijab* is that it influences the relationships they have with people. When relationships are not characterized by personal contact and dialogue, such as in the street, public transportation and shops, the norms of human communication seem guided by stereotypes (Abdallah-Pretceille 2001; Jordán Sierra 2003, 2007). When people are confronted by something that does not "have a face" they attack it (Soriano Ayala 2001). Difficulties often arise at the first instances of an encounter, but afterwards it depends on the personality of who is wearing it and the open-mindedness of those around them. The majority of them do not consider the rejections they sometimes suffer as manifestations of racism, but rather of ignorance and fear of difference. Besides, they think it would be hurtful to always consider them to be victims of racism.

> I try to lead a normal life as anyone else would do, because taking on all of these pressures wouldn't be easy for me at all, I would always have to be focused on what they are going to think or say and how they are going to say it, and that wouldn't be living (María, 26 years old, from Madrid, she is a researcher on Physics, she wears *hijab,* her parents are Moroccan).

Turning a blind eye, that is, denying a fact along with its meaning and consequences, is a strategy to protect themselves against painful aspects of reality. They play down these experiences of discrimination and insist that "things aren't as bad as they seem". Although these defense mechanisms help them to get on with their daily lives, they run the risk of being "stuck in denial", which leads them to have a distorted view of reality (Pallarés Molíns 2008). When they say it is a matter of ignorance and/or fear, they are trying to contextualize and rationalize these situations, because they do not like to assume the role of victims or show any sign of weakness and/or pity. In short, it helps them to avoid the preconceived ideas about Muslim women: "I have to prove that what everyone else think about me is wrong". They suffer from what it has been called "stereotype vulnerability" (Steele 1997) a response that often appears among individuals who feel that they could be judged or treated in terms of a negative stereotype (Bain 2007).

The use of denial as a defense mechanism might explain why, at times, the participants contradict themselves in their answers. For example, in some occasions they start by saying it does not bother them that people are judging them, yet in the next breath they take a step back and admit that in reality it does hurt them. Once they realize what they have said, they try to go back on their word by adding that "these things happen" and they are "used to it". Some participants incurred in this

type of denial and contradiction more than three times in the same paragraph. They end up alternating between "yes, I recognize the signs of discrimination" and "it doesn't matter to me that it's happening". Yet, it is important to recognize the situations of painful discrimination in order to channel the pain in the best way possible on the one side, and be able to fight against the injustice on the other.

Among the many prejudices that surround Muslim women who wear the *hijab*, two stand out. The first is that people doubt their abilities as professionals, like María said: "they observe me not just out of curiosity, but also to see if I am able to carry out research at the same standard as the rest of my colleagues". The second prejudice is that people assume they are not Spanish:

> They treat you differently in the day-to-day life, for example, when I'm in the street and there's somebody who's lost and wants to ask directions, when they see me, the first thing they ask me is "do you speak Spanish? Can I ask you for directions?" (Ni'mat, 20 years old, from Madrid, she studies Nutrition and Dietetic, she wears *hijab,* her parents are from Syria).

This situation can be explained, not only by the inherent historical factors that shaped the formation of Spain as a nation state (Planet 2004), but also by current media discourses, which have linked Islam, and *hijab* in particular, to immigration. Images that accompany news articles about immigration frequently depict a woman wearing the *hijab*[7].

Along these difficulties, participants explain that people do not understand the meaning of the *hijab.* They think it is a way of discrimination against women, which paradoxically leads them to reject not only the *hijab* itself but also the person wearing it (instead of helping her out). They claim that they do not want to be treated any better or worse, they just ask to be treated the same as everyone else. Finally, they mention that the difficulties they face at work and/or in the street, when for example, their fellow citizens stare at them or insult them, are made bearable by the fact they have freely chosen to wear the *hijab.*

They also add that they think their situation is made more difficult by the oversimplified view of the *hijab* spread by the media. The media only discuss cases where a woman is oppressed and forced to use it. Indeed, they carry out a superficial and biased analysis, and forget that there is another side of the story. That is to say, they think that the media select the cases, without considering any social, cultural, educational, economic, political, and geographical factor, and carry out one-sided critiques. Their reports are often characterized by almost complete ignorance of the complexities of reality (Said 1978; Larrañeta 2010). One of the main issues that the participants highlight about media coverage on the *hijab* is that the different opinions of Muslim women do not appear in the discourse. The media discuss about these women's lives without asking for their input. They speak for them, without leaving them a space to say their word (Adlbi Sibai 2010c). The aim of this chapter is to make their voices heard.

[7] See for instance http://www.republica.com/2012/08/08/rebelion-autonomica-y-rechazo-generalizado-a-la-cuota-sanitaria-para-inmigrantes-irregulares_533179/ [last accessed March 2, 2014].

On the other hand, all of them criticize the cases in which the *hijab* is used to discriminate against women and/or is used for political means. They mention the case of Tunisia where the *hijab* was banned under the rule of ex-dictator Ben Ali or in Iran and Saudi Arabia where women are forced to use it. Moreover, in European countries politicians often intervene publicly to express their opinion for or against it (Yagüe 2010). Ragda says that they find themselves "caught between two stools", as they are victims of discrimination from both sides: the Arab and the European world: "I feel suffocated here" (Ragda, 21 years old, from Melilla, she studies Law, she wears *hijab,* her mother is Moroccan and her father is Spanish).

Their situation is similar to that of colored women, who fall in between different axes of discrimination, specifically race, class and gender (Lorde 1984; Spelman 1988). In the case of the participants in this study, they find themselves at the crossroad of gender, religion, nationality and country of origin. The intersectionality approach, better than the concept of double discrimination, allows to recognize the specificity of their situation, which is not possible to understand through the mere sum of different experiences of discrimination (La Barbera 2012).

Also participants who do not wear the *hijab,* when they describe experiences they have had whilst accompanying friends or family members who wear it, recognize that using it is difficult because of the scrutiny of society. The majority of participants who do not use the *hijab* explain the risk of exclusion, especially in social or work environments, is one main reason that stops them wearing it. They do not feel prepared to confront these difficulties, in particular the idea of putting up with people staring at them continuously in the street. "Everyone would stare at you, I don't think I could wear it if everyone stared at me, the truth is I don't think I could bare it, because people are going to do it and they point at you too" (Fairus, 22 years old, from Madrid, she studies Psychology, she does not wear *hijab,* her mother is Spanish and his father is Moroccan). On the other hand, Nariman says that they did not feel the *hijab* is a personal necessity, "at the moment I don't think I need it" (Nariman, 23 years old, from Madrid, she studies Nursing, she does not wear *hijab,* her mother is Spanish and his father is Syrian). All of the participants, both those who use it and those who do not, believe the *hijab* is a religious duty rather than a part of their culture (Moors and Salih 2009). Yet, when those who do not wear the *hijab* explain their choices, they resort to cultural explanations and admit that it is a matter of will. The reasons they give for not wearing it, such as their family do not wear it or they do not think it is necessary in Spain, would have "neither value nor bearing if they really wanted to wear it" (Safah, 20 years old, from Madrid, she studies Dentistry, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are from Syria).

As for the previous argument, that is, the *hijab* is unnecessary in Spain, Fairus, who does not use the *hijab,* believes that the aim of the *hijab* is to not draw attention to yourself.

> This theory seems a bit daft, but I think to wear the headscarf here, in Spain, might mean you draw more attention to yourself by wearing it, because the headscarf, as I understand it, is meant to stop you attracting attention, or something like that, right? (Fairus, 22 years old, from Madrid, she studies Psychology, she does not wear *hijab,* her mother is Spanish and his father is Moroccan).

Also, Safah thinks that wearing it in Spain has the opposite effect and would make more sense to wear it in Muslim majority countries. “I’m not saying it should depend on the place, it shouldn’t be like that, but sadly it is” (Safah, 20 years old, from Madrid, she studies Dentistry, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are from Syria). On the other side, Suad, who does not wear it, admits, as other participants do, that she does not fully understand its meaning:

> I can’t say what it means because I don’t know, and because I don’t know I can’t say any judgment about it. I don’t understand it and I honestly don’t know what it means (Suad, 18 years old, from Madrid, she studies Biology, she does not wear *hijab,* her mother is Spanish and her father is Sudanese).

One of the most resounding findings is that none of them, regardless of whether they use it or not, view the *hijab* as a symbol of the inferiority of women or a tool for discrimination. Once again, they think the media discourse mix up concepts. Safah explains that the problem is not the *hijab* itself, but guaranteeing that women are able to freely choose whether to use it or not: “I don’t like anyone to force me to put it on or to take it off, I’m free to do what I want” (Safah, 20 years old, from Madrid, she studies Dentistry, she does not wear *hijab,* her parents are from Syria). On the other hand, Amal reports that some members of the Muslim community reproach, either explicitly or implicitly, those who do not veil:

> Wearing it would also have clear advantages, they can identify you more quickly, you belong to a community, Muslims identify you, they accept you more easily, they look at you differently, and they believe you’re a better person. This is what happens among the Muslim people, although it makes no sense. I haven’t experienced this, but that’s the impression I get (Amal, 27 years old, from Madrid, she studied English Philology, she does not wear *hijab,* her mother is Spanish Catholic and her father is Muslim Palestinian).

The final point worth highlighting is the meaning of the *hijab* that only appears in the responses given by participants from Ceuta and Melilla. Participants for Ceuta and Melilla recall that the *hijab* can be related to patriarchy, because wearing the *hijab* is seen as a duty only for married women, if the husbands ask to wear it. Participants, both those who wear the *hijab* and those who do not, reject the patriarchal belief that an important proportion of the Muslim population hold. They think this misunderstanding is due, on the one hand, to the confusion between customs and religion, and on the other hand, and the fact that Muslim themselves have a lack of knowledge about Islam.

The Koran has always been the same, however the place, time and culture of the people who are Muslims are different. These three factors—geography, time and culture—influence, affect and shape how to understand and apply the rules of the sacred texts. As Geertz (1992) pointed, the deepness of the divide between what religion recommends and what people actually do is highly variable depending on the cultures. This is the issue of the interpretation of the sacred texts, i.e. the difference between what Gellner (1981) has called the high culture of Islam, based on the sacred texts, and low culture of Islam, based on their adaptations to the most diverse historical circumstances.

The participants say that an increasing number of women is discovering that the *hijab* is a personal matter between God and themselves, and that it has nothing to

do with their husbands, fathers or brothers. On the other hand, they believe that this patriarchal view of the *hijab,* which is held by some Muslims, is used to inform the biased opinion portrayed by the media.

These findings make clear that in order to understand the issue of identity and integration of the participants is necessary to distinguish Islam from the Arab culture and tradition (Adlbi Sibai 2010a, b). While Muslims in Madrid and Valencia, in search of Euro- Muslim identity (Ramadan 1999), distanced themselves more from the customs and traditions of Arabic-speaking countries, the responses given by participants from Ceuta and Melilla reflect their geographic and socio-demographic characteristics.

Also, some participants believe that problems related to patriarchy are not just limited to the Muslim population in Ceuta:

> In Ceuta, machismo is part of society; it's so big it can be seen throughout the whole society, regardless of the individual's beliefs. I don't think machismo is exclusive to people of the Muslim faith. From what I know about Spain, the laws seem more developed, […] but another problem is the enforcement of laws, one day they do, and the next day we have cases of domestic violence (Fauzia, 31 years old, from Ceuta, she studied Law, she wears *hijab,* her parents mother is Moroccan and her father is Muslim Spanish).

While the participants from Ceuta and Melilla criticize the chauvinist view of the *hijab*, participants in Madrid and Valencia criticize the fact that the *hijab* has become a fashion statement among young Muslim women. They believe that, today, some women wear it more out of custom and tradition than for religious reasons. As a result, they do not develop an individual and spiritual reflection about it, so they cannot say what it means to them.

The participants have reported that the essence and the meaning of the *hijab* is being lost and/or distorted, not only by customs and traditions, but also by political and historical events, the majority of them occurred under dictatorships in a large number of Arabic-speaking countries. For all participants, one of the greatest advantages of being born or raised in a democratic country is the chance to rediscover the original meaning of the *hijab*, despite the rejection they face on a daily basis from the media and society.

The participants also describe their parents' attitudes towards the *hijab.* Their input in this respect is important since one of the arguments used in the media is that families impose the *hijab* upon women through socialization. The participants tell a wide range of experiences. Firstly, in many cases, participants decided to use the *hijab* despite of their parents clearly demonstrated that they would prefer their daughters not to wear it. Not because they did not agree with its religious importance, but because they feared that society would treat them badly and/or they would be unable to continue their education and professional carrier. Guina's parents asked to take *hijab* seriously before wearing it.

> We're not going to tell you yes or no, the only thing we are going to say is that if you put it on, you don't take it off. What we don't want is for you to later say they forced me, if you believe in it, wear it, if not, don't (Guina, 19 years old, from Comunidad Valenciana, she studies Chemical Engineering, she wears *hijab*, her parents are Moroccan).

The *hijab* also entails rebellion. For Susana wearing the *hijab* was an act of disobedience: "my mother told me not to wear it, my father did not say anything. But I love it and I wanted to wear it, even though I was young". But it is also a matter of rebellion against social structures: "I'm sick of you believing that because a woman wears a headscarf she is uneducated or incompetent" (Fauzia, 31 years old, from Ceuta, she studied Law, she wears *hijab,* her parents mother is Moroccan and her father is Muslim Spanish).

An argument frequently used in the media is based on the idea that women who are socialized in their family from a young age to use *hijab* will use it in the future. Yet, this argument would sound untenable if applied to non-Muslim families. Indeed, all human beings are socialized from childhood with the aim to provide them with the tools required to cope in the society they live in (Giddens 2002), and this does not mean they are deprived of their freedom of initiative and choice. People are, above all, autonomous individuals and not slaves to their belongings (Van Dijk 1999). Despite their group membership or their ethnic identity and the powerful influence of social representations, social actors are autonomous individuals and therefore, have extensive control over their formation, and change their views depending on their personal interests, goals and desires (Van Dijk 1999).

15.5 Concluding Remarks

The aim of this chapter was to make the voice of the Spanish Muslim women heard on the issue of their identity and integration through the analysis of their experiences of wearing or not the *hijab*. The first important finding is that in contrast to the view presented by the mass media, participants in this study do not see it as a symbol of discrimination or inferiority of women. There are participants who use it because they want to show their love for God, and/or because it is their way of expressing their freedom. Other participants do not wear it, but hope to be able one day to exercise the right to religious freedom guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution by starting to wear it. Finally, other participants do not wear it simply because they do not believe in it, they do not deem it necessary, or they do not see any sense in it.

The narratives of the participants show that no single or homogenized meaning of the *hijab* exists. There are in fact numerous different meanings and trying to reduce them just to one becomes a pointless task. For each woman, the *hijab* has a different, personal meaning because behind each *hijab* there is a story filled with feelings, experience, and profound reflection. It is not as simplistic as it is portrayed in the media. We should talk about *hijabs*, rather than using the singular form.

For these participants, the cause of discrimination does not lie with the *hijab* itself but with forcing a woman, against her will, to wear it or remove it. Therefore, for them it is equally outrageous to demand to a woman to wear it as well as to force her to remove it. They criticize the fact that this latter idea does not appear in the media. Media only focus on minority cases where a woman is forced to wear it, and

therefore insist that the *hijab* itself is a form of discrimination. Media ignore the fact that the true discrimination is denying these women the right to act upon their freedom, their religious freedom in particular.

The participants reject the idea that anyone could order them to wear or remove the *hijab*. They reject any imposition that comes from the media, people from their community, or society at large, and they reinstate their ability and their right to live their lives how they wish to. That is to say, they refuse that anyone could force them to live a life they have not chosen. Whether the imposition comes from the European world or from the Arab world it does not matter, it is perceived as an insult to their abilities and human dignity.

It became apparent that for these participants the debate does not revolve around the meaning of the *hijab*, because they consider there are multiple meanings, and it is different for each woman. For them, the debate is about the dignity and freedom of women to lead their life as they wish, regardless of whether their decisions please someone else or not.

To analyze Muslim women as objects, rather than subjects is an error made in both the media and academic research (Adlbi Sibai, Sirin 2012). The decolonial framework helps to understand how modernity has introduced and imposed reason upon society as the transcendental norm (Lyon 1994). Using modernist theories to study Muslim women and the heterogeneity of their various situations becomes a futile task. It forces the researcher to alter the analysis in order to understand the participants' narratives through existing prejudices, since modernity is characterized by homogeneity, positivism and pigeonholing criteria (Sen 2006). Instead, the *decolonial* approach gives meaning to the lives of the participants as free and equal women, not only against their male counterparts, but also against other women who do not share their views or lifestyle. Moreover, taking the *decolonial* approach as a starting point allows us to rediscover concepts such as identity, freedom, equality and woman through the participants' narratives. It also shows how the participants are able to unite a variety of contradictory attributes in their own personal way (Santamarina and Marinas 1994).

They refuse to be treated as objects just because they belong to a religion that is currently undervalued internationally. They reinstate their abilities to think and decide independently, as well as their right to lead their lives as they please, including whether or not to wear the *hijab*. For this reason this study aimed at making a room for their voices against western feminists that argue that to free themselves Muslim women should "act like them" (Okin 1999), and against patriarchal structures, which in Muslim majority countries are confused with the Islam itself. The participants strongly criticized some of the beliefs surrounding the *hijab* in Muslim majority countries such as, for instance, the idea that a married woman has to veil if asked to by her husband. They insist that it is necessary to distinguish between religion and tradition because otherwise criticisms of patriarchal traditions can culminate in Islamophobia.

In summary, women of the Muslim faith report that the pressures they experience from the discrimination for being Muslim women have transformed the *hijab* into the best representation of both features of their identity, even in the cases of

participants who do not wear it. Those participants defend the *hijab* more than their counterparts who wear it, because for them this debate is not about the meaning of the *hijab* itself, but about their freedom to choose. In defending the *hijab*, they are defending their rights, and those of all Muslim women, to live (and dress) the way they consider appropriate.

The narratives of participants in this study show that Muslim university-educated women living in Spain view the *hijab* a mean to challenge the patriarchal structures (they say they wear it because they decided so). They criticize women's oppression in Arab culture and tradition as well as in western society, where female body is objectified and commercialized. They also stand against the western feminist movement that pretends to speak for them, silencing and imposing them its way of thinking, living and fighting for their rights. Although they were not aware of it, the discourses of participants in this study echo the claims and criticisms made within some views of some Muslims feminist thinkers[8].

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[8] See http://www.livestream.com/islamicfeminism?t=1294931209000 [last accessed March 2, 2014].

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