Siegfried O. Wolf · Jivanta Schöttli
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Politics in South Asia

Culture, Rationality and Conceptual Flow

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Foreword

After receiving his initial academic training in India, Subrata Mitra's career included numerous positions in Europe and the United States and reached a culmination point during the 20 years of tremendous intellectual activity at Heidelberg's South Asia Institute (SAI). Although the Political Science of South Asia as a separate discipline had been taught at the SAI since its founding in 1962, the arrival of Mitra as Professor and head of the department turned the subject into a driving force at the institute. Mitra taught courses across the full range of comparative politics and political analysis, from political theory to method, to institutions, state and society, political economy and international politics pertaining to South Asia. These attracted an ever-rising number of students and the publications that emerged in the context of his chair at the SAI were unprecedented in terms of number and the breadth of topics. Within a short time it became obvious that Mitra's arrival in Heidelberg would fundamentally challenge and eventually change the way post-colonial India and the neighbouring states within South Asia would be studied in political science.

The intellectual and intercultural setting of the SAI was much appreciated by Mitra who, in his own words, "arrived as an Indian only to become a South Asian". It comes as little surprise then that this book includes authors from several countries within South Asia and with whom Mitra worked closely during his career in Heidelberg. The publication offers an insight into the themes and topics that Subrata Mitra followed over the past decades. It is not—and cannot be—comprehensive but renders well the key issues for which he had developed a keen interest. As will be explored in greater detail in the following introduction, among the major themes in Mitra's writing and research were the subjects of democracy, security, citizenship and governance in South Asia.

While being a whole-hearted scholar and academic teacher, Mitra also valued and encouraged applied political science. In the late 1990s he and close collaborators in his department contributed significantly to the curriculum of the Cross-Cultural Leadership Forum (CLF) that was founded by the Klaus Tschira Foundation in Heidelberg. In seminars and workshops designed for the corporate world as

well as political decision takers—among them members of the German parliament in Berlin—Mitra contributed elaborated case studies that enabled participants to make use of academic knowledge for (more) appropriate action in their professional lives. In recent years, Mitra supported the foundation of the Brussels-based think tank, the South Asia Democratic Forum, cooperating with and encouraging members of his department to apply their knowledge to the European Parliament.

This volume marks the retirement of Professor Subrata Mitra as head of department for Political Science at the SAI. It has been conceptualized and compiled by his close collaborators and assistants at the department who have already started to follow in his footsteps, taking up his work and ideas to develop them further. However, knowing Subrata Mitra, a respected professor and personal friend, for 17 years, I have all reasons to believe that despite stepping down from his position, we can expect him to be ever more present, freed from the day-to-day administrative duties of running a department. It seems safe to predict that Subrata will continue to further enhance and provide invaluable support to the academic community of South Asian studies in Heidelberg and beyond. This is likely to generate an even richer output and a further advanced research agenda than that which we have already happily and proudly witnessed over the last decades.

Heidelberg, Germany   Martin Gieselmann
June 2014

Martin Gieselmann is Executive Secretary of the South Asia Institute (SAI), Heidelberg University. He received his M.A. in Modern Chinese Studies at Heidelberg University and holds a doctorate *summa cum laude* in Chinese Studies from Vienna University. He has published widely on the cultural issues of contemporary China, predominately literature, drama and cinema. As scientific administrator he has served at several research projects run by major foundations such as Mercator Foundation, Klaus Tschira Foundation and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Contact: gieselmann@sai.uni-heidelberg.de

Introduction

This book has been compiled to celebrate the work of Professor Subrata K. Mitra whose scholarship includes a wide spectrum of research topics, writings and teaching on South Asian politics. Following his early years at Ravenshaw College in Cuttack, Orissa (now Odisha), where he completed B.A. (honours) in Political Science (1969), he subsequently did his MA in Political Science from Delhi University (1971). Mitra was amongst the first candidates to acquire an M.Phil. from Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (1972). Growing up in the extraordinarily dynamic environment of post-independence India, where processes of state and nation-building were palpable, had a deep impact on his academic outlook and interests. This was a period when the foundations of modern Indian politics were being both strengthened and contested, laying the basis for a functional political and administrative system, and a deepening, multiparty democracy.

In his own words, "I studied politics in order to understand how society changes and what the individual can do as an agent of that process, working within the framework of the structures within which one is placed. In this process I discovered that human agency and structure can collaborate in creating new structures and this applied to post-colonial states, ensconced in traditional societies, and both negotiating change on the lines of the political vision of the founding fathers who oversaw the Transfer of Power from British colonial rule. This is the insight I took with me from Orissa to Delhi, and beyond Delhi to the United States where I learned to analyse the process of social change through the theory of games, coalitions and rational choice"[1].

It was during this stay in the United States, as a doctoral student at Rochester University, that Subrata Mitra's particular understanding of Indian politics took shape, blending theories of measurement, spatial modelling and their operationalization through empirical puzzles drawn from the Indian context. Two of his mentors from the United States, G. Bingham Powell and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,

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[1] Subrata K. Mitra in conversation with the editors.

are contributors to this volume. Following the Ph.D., an international career began to take shape, with a stint back in India at the *Centre for the Study of Developing Societies*—CSDS. His next port of call was France where, as part of the Indo-French cultural exchange programme, Subrata Mitra was based at the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* in Paris. Subsequently, he left for Germany as a postdoctoral fellow of the *Alexander von Humboldt Foundation*. At the completion of his project on paradigm shifts in theories of development, Subrata Mitra went back to Paris and joined the French Institute of Public Opinion (*Institut Français d'Opinion Publique)* in Paris as the head of the department of multivariate analysis. He left Paris in 1985 to move to the University of Hull as the New Blood Lecturer in Indian Politics. Mitra joined the University of California, Berkeley, in 1993 as the Indo-American Community Chair and moved to Heidelberg University in 1994. During his two decades in Heidelberg as Professor and Head of Department of Political Science at the *South Asia Institute*, Mitra has held visiting professorships in Nottingham University and Tsinghua University of Beijing, China, the Radhakrishnan Chair in the Central University of Hyderabad, India, and *Directeur d'Etudes Associé* at the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales* in Paris.

Heidelberg had always held an attraction for Subrata Mitra. Even as a young student in India, Mitra had been deeply influenced by two thinkers, both of who had worked in Heidelberg. One was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the other, Max Weber. As a result, Mitra's "hope was to understand the global sweeping theories of Hegel through the instrumentality of human choice, which is where Max Weber is so very useful because of his concepts of the legal, the traditional/rational and the charismatic authority and the twin concepts of instrumental and value rationality"[2]. Mitra's work has therefore been an application of the rationality of human choice and the importance of values and tradition, drawing upon his education and political observation, both abroad and at home. Thus, *Culture and Rationality* which was the first book published after coming to Heidelberg in 1999[3] laid the groundwork for a framework that he has implemented ever since, that of the "Critical Traditionalist" which in the words of the author, "does not plead for a return to tradition, nor does it recommend to the European student of Indian politics to go native. The political scientist needs to explain the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, but not shy away from the challenge of unfamiliar questions. What they cannot explain using general political science, they should use to stretch the conceptual boundaries of political science."(Mitra 1999:33).

According to Mitra, Indian society cannot be understood exclusively in terms of Western categories. In Western societies, after the Renaissance, man becomes the centre of the universe. All natural resources including other societies were to be put

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[2] From an interview in the *South Asia Democratic Forum* (SADF) Bulletin. See SADF Bulletin No. 5, Brussels, Belgium, 19. December 2012, pp. 10-14 (Part I); and SADF Bulletin No. 6, Brussels, Belgium, 15 February 2013, pp. 28-31 (Part II). Both available at: www.sadf.eu.

[3] Mitra, Subrata K. Culture and Rationality. The Politics of Social Change in Post-colonial India. Sage Publication: New Delhi, 1999.

at the disposal of man, to be used for his welfare. However, such a radical rupture between the natural and the supernatural did not take place in Indian thinking. That is at the basis of the intellectual dilemma of Hegel and Weber. How can one think theoretically about societies where the gods are not dead, animals are worshiped and plants are considered holy? The solution of Hegel and Weber to this problem was to subsume non-Western life in terms of Western categories. The political implications of this categorical supremacy of the West resulted in them later being used as an intellectual justification for Western colonial rule and Western obligations to modernize non-Western societies.

New research, however, reveals that the potential for an endogenous modernity existed already in the intellectual debates of Kautilya and his *Arthashastra* (4th Century B.C., "The Science of Material Gain" or "Science of Polity") and other classic Indian texts like the *Manusmriti* (laws of Manu). A challenge for the political science of South Asia is therefore to discover the political and moral resources of a pre-modern/pre-colonial South Asia and to understand the South Asian state as a hybridization of the endogenous and the exogenous values derived from the Western experience of the Renaissance. With this in mind, Mitra states that there is a need "to understand how one can think of modernity not only as an input that turns tradition into a clone of modernity. The modernity, which Europe made up for itself from the Renaissance, is a modernity which is empowered by methodological individualism. I have discovered that one can arrive at an endogenous modernity by marrying the values of European modernity to one's own tradition and indigenous values. This hybridization of the modern institutions can become the basis of civility and orderly rule in a non-Western society".[4] An example of how to tackle the above challenge is Mitra's analysis of sub-national movements in India[5]. Here he showcases research on sub-national movements that goes beyond categories of the modern state, taking up the entanglement of the endogenous and exogenous a step further, by looking for deep-seated roots to modern politics in regionally embedded values and social networks. Most recently, this approach was applied to a study of the Telengana movement[6] in which Mitra analyses the emergence and "banalization" of social movements in a regional, sub-national context based on a model that highlights the *rational* politics of cultural nationalism. In this context, one finds another remarkable feature of Mitra's approach to political analysis—the appreciation for a comparative approach to the study of politics. Most of his works in this respective field are based on an intra-

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[4] See SADF Bulletin No. 5, Brussels, Belgium, 19. December 2012, pp. 10.

[5] Mitra, Subrata K. and Alison Lewis (eds.), Subnational Movements in South Asia. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996; Subrata K. Mitra, "The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, 1995, pp. 55-77.

[6] Subrata K. Mitra, "Sub-National Movements, Cultural Flow, the Modern State and the Malleability of Political Space: From Rational Choice to Transcultural Perspective and Back Again", Transcultural Studies, No.2, 2012, pp. 8-47.

country comparison rather. In short, Mitra sees "India itself as a comparative arena" and "relies on a dense web of determinants to make his case."[7].

As a political scientist with an area specialization in the non-Western world, Mitra's scholarship seeks to abstract and generalize whilst cultivating and drawing on the cultural and historical context of the region. In his recently published South Asia Edition of *Politics in India*,[8] he states, "My approach is to analyse politics from below and above, in terms of what those involved are aiming to achieve, the consequence of the aggregation of those goals, and the creation of rules with which the state seeks to run the political process in an orderly way". (Mitra 2014:xiii). In this way, Subrata Mitra has developed an approach that draws upon historical evolution, but not cultural determinism or an over-reliance on contingency, and the use of rational choice, but not rationalization, to understand and explain Indian politics. While he stayed true to his formal political science education, Subrata Mitra never stopped studying and exploring new ways of thinking. In his 20 years as a Professor in Heidelberg, he has pursued new paths of political investigation and theory with avid interest and persistently supported scholars far outside his own fields of research.

India's democracy is the empirical focus in the vast majority of Mitra's publications, offering a rich and varied tapestry of theory-driven puzzles, analysis and new research questions. Bearing this in mind, Mitra has pursued a second lifelong interest, the topic of governance, which has "remained something of a fixed Pole Star" (Mitra 2006:xvii). However, his work on India's democracy always gives rise to insights and questions that either probe deeper into India's own historical evolution or wider, to the neighbourhood of South Asia and beyond. Thus for instance *Democracy and Social Change in India*, published in 1999,[9] ends with a questioning of linear views of modernization in general (Mitra/Singh, 1999: 265). Thus, he asks why caste, after more than four decades of social legislation, education and liberal democratic politics, continues to play an important role in Indian political and public life. Mitra's answer is that primordial identities have become part and parcel of competitive politics. He makes the counter-intuitive claim that in fact "caste consciousness (...) destroys precisely those attributes of the caste system, such as traditional social obligations, hierarchy and dominance, which the essentialist view presented as necessarily fixed in time and space" (Mitra/Singh, 1999: 270). This view draws deeply upon the legacy of Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, who were pioneers in the study of Indian politics in the United States and had a great personal influence on Mitra. An article of theirs, which was presented during a visit to Heidelberg's South Asia Institute in 2002 and was published

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[7] See also Rudolph, Susanna Hoeber, "Foreword", in Mitra, Subrata K. The Puzzle of India's Governance. Culture, Context and comparative theory. Routlegde: London and New York, 2006, pp. xiii-xv.

[8] Mitra, Subrata K. Politics in India: Structure, Process, and Policy, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 2014.

[9] Mitra, Subrata K. and V.B. Singh, Democracy and Social Change in India. A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the National Electorate: SAGE Publications: New Delhi, 1999.

initially in the *Heidelberg Papers on South Asian and Comparative Politics* (initiated by Subrata Mitra in 2000), is included in this volume.

In a move to further explore new avenues and directions, located at the interface between political science and area studies, Subrata Mitra joined the newly founded *Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe in a Global Context"* at Heidelberg University in 2008, as its first spokesperson for Research Area A, "Governance and Administration". A large academic institution funded by the German Federal and State governments, the Cluster comprises of four broad research areas under which a range of individual research projects are brought together from various disciplines. Centred on the intellectual trope of "cultural flow", the main aim of this unique endeavour is to engage the humanities and the social sciences in a fruitful dialogue on the various historical, cultural and socio-political exchange processes between Europe and Asia. In the Heidelberg Cluster of Excellence, Subrata Mitra led a project titled, "Citizenship as Conceptual Flow: Asia in a Comparative Perspective". Together with a team of researchers at Heidelberg University, the United Kingdom, India, France and South Korea, he traced the conceptual development of citizenship from its European origins and its adaptations to the local requirements in India after 1947. The output of the project, which has inter alia been published in the volume *Citizenship as Cultural Flow: Structure, Agency and Power* (Springer; 2013), shows citizenship as a two-dimensional concept, comprising of a legal right to the soil and a moral affiliation to it. Mitra denotes it a "liminal category", connecting the past to the present and the exogenous to the endogenous through cultural and conceptual flow. The novelty of this research lies not only in its innovative definition of the concept beyond its legalistic connotation, but also in its approach to measure citizenship using a multi-method approach. True to his academic background, Mitra's study of citizenship combined quantitative approaches in the form of statistical analysis drawn from a cross-sectional, India-wide opinion survey with qualitative interpretative measures to develop a holistic understanding of citizenship as concept and practice in India. The project on "Citizenship as Conceptual Flow: Asia in a Comparative Perspective" came to its conclusion in 2012 but Subrata Mitra continued to be active in the *Heidelberg Cluster of Excellence* and maintained his highly interdisciplinary research agenda. His publications on the hybrid nature of Indian politics[10], and on political iconography in Europe and India[11], testify to a continued desire to link the analysis of political action with questions of culture, identity and history. An innovative

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[10] See Subrata K. Mitra. 2011. 'From Comparative Politics to Cultural Flow: The *Hybrid* State, and Resilience of the Political System in India', in Phillip Stockhammer (ed.) *Conceptualizing Cultural Hybridization: A Transdisciplinary Approach* (Heidelberg: Springer), 107-132.

[11] See Subrata K. Mitra and Lion König. 2012. 'Icons, Nations and Re-use: Marianne, France and Bharat Mata, India' in: Julia Hegewald and Subrata K. Mitra (eds.) *Re-use: The Art and Politics of Integration and Anxiety* (New Delhi: Sage), 288-313. Subrata K. Mitra and Lion König. 2013. 'Icon-ising National Identity: France and India in Comparative Perspective' in: *National Identities*, 15 (4), December, 357-377.

collaboration with art history and religious studies led to the edited volume *Re-use: the Art and Politics of Integration and Anxiety*.

The authors included in this volume are eminent scholars from across the world who have known, taught or worked together with Subrata Mitra. The book is divided into four sections: (1) Democracy in a Comparative Perspective, (2) The Post-Colonial State in South Asia, (3) State and Foreign Policy in South Asia and (4) The Art of Politics. Following is a brief summary of the articles in each section.

Part I: Democracy in a Comparative Perspective

The three chapters included in this section examine various facets of democracy and democratic politics. Harihar Bhattacharyya examines the *Communist Party of India (Marxist)* and the paradox of its resilience within the democratic framework of Indian politics. Bingham Powell draws attention to Western Europe and through his analysis of ideology and party polarization, demonstrates that Western models of democracy need to deal more explicitly with the challenge of explaining change. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith conduct an empirical investigation into mechanisms of mobilization in the case of Tanzania. Reading the chapters, one is reminded of the importance of comparative politics for the cross-fertilization of case studies drawn from very different cultural contexts and historical backgrounds for insights into a variety of important political phenomena.

Political Parties and Democracy in South Asia: The CPI-M and the Problematic of India's Liberal Democracy

Do conventional approaches to party system analysis work in a non-Western context? Harihar Bhattacharyya's contribution challenges the conventional and emphasizes the need for a critical and at once well-balanced application of theoretical assumptions that largely emanate from a Western historical background. In doing so, Bhattacharyya engages with a problem that has also been a focus of Mitra's work on party politics in which he introduced the concept of *indigenization* emphasizing that we need to understand "the ways and means with which political parties acquire local roots while retaining their canonical form" (Mitra 2004)[12]

Bhattacharyya's account, in this volume, of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) and its dilemmas and paradoxes vis-à-vis Indian liberal democracy takes into consideration the specific conditions within which Indian parties

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[12] Mitra, Subrata K./Enskat, Mike/Spieß,Clemens (eds.), Political Parties in South Asia. Praeger: Westport, Conn., 2004, p. 5.

emerge, operate and continuously re-create their party political environment. His analysis critically examines the empirical data to grasp and illustrate the notion of democracy as understood by the CPI (M), and the effects these have produced for liberal democratic institutions. Scrutinizing the CPI-M's discourse on democracy, Bhattacharyya traces evidence to document the anti-democratic and anti-institutional implications of the CPI-M's ideational constructs and actual record of democratic governance. To give a broader context, he introduces the reader to some of the theoretical problems of Marxism and puts these into a historical perspective. Finally, given the tendency to examine parties largely as structural variables, Bhattacharyya argues for an approach that incorporates the role of agency.

Ideological Trends and Changing Party System Polarization in Western Democracies

Following the theme of political parties and the historical evolution of party systems, G. Bingham Powell's piece turns the focus back to Europe and addresses change over time by analysing ideological trends and political polarization. This provides a link to one of Mitra's earliest works titled *Governmental Instability* in Indian States[13] that was published in 1978 and was based upon his Ph.D. thesis at Rochester in New York State. In his dissertation, Mitra had used party manifestos to systematically analyse legislative and government party configurations, an approach that was much ahead of its time and laid the foundation for future studies. Nonetheless, as Powell points out, work still needs to be done since there continues to be little knowledge about what causes party system polarization. The chapter embarks on this by exploring the relative influence and relationships between international ideological trends, election rules, domestic voter diversity and party system left–right polarization in Western democracies.

Applying a cross-decade analysis, five hypotheses are generated from general theories and tested on the basis of various data sources such as citizen self-perception data from the *Eurobarometer*, the *World Value Survey* and the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES) studies, and party position data from the *Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)* and CSES. Powell demonstrates that evidence can be drawn from various statistical models that party system polarization does have major effects on ideological congruence, government stability and short-term policy shifts, as well as on various forms of individual behaviour in general. However, other theoretical assumptions turn out to not be supported by the data. Having taken up one of the most complex puzzles in the field of party system analysis, Powell provides insights into the origins of stable and changing party system polarization.

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[13] Mitra, Subrata K., *Governmental instability in Indian states*, Ajanta Publication: Delhi, 1978.

Tanzania's Economic and Political Performance:
A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory

Moving away from Europe to Africa, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith make a highly interesting application of selectorate theory to the case of Tanzania. Their article argues that by applying the framework of selectorate theory to all political systems, one can identify two groups that are core to the selection and retention of political leaders: the selectorate and the winning coalition. The selectorate are all the people who have a say in selecting a leader, e.g. all voters in a democracy whereas the winning coalition in a democracy means all those voters who provide a majority for the leader.

Provided that the leader wants to stay in power, he or she has to ensure the support of the winning coalition through the provision of private goods (such as material or financial benefits for individuals) and/or public goods (such as better health-care access or greater income equality). A central hypothesis of the selectorate theory is that the larger the winning coalition—like in a democracy with millions of votes needed for getting into and staying in power—the more *public* goods provision (rather than *private* goods provision) is utilized to secure support.

In the context of Tanzania's democratic system, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith scrutinize this hypothesis by analysing the effect of coalition size at the district level on the provision of private vis-a-vis public goods. Controlling for potential alternative explanations such as the levels of poverty, productivity and population, the authors show that larger winning coalitions in districts favour public goods, whereas smaller winning coalitions count on private goods for securing support. This highly useful insight allows the authors to "illuminate (. . .) some of the problems that may hinder improved living conditions in Tanzania" and to provide concrete policy advice.

Part II: The Post-Colonial State in South Asia

In this section, Dietmar Rothermund explores the political transformation of the post-colonial state in South Asia. S.T. Hettige gives insights into the Sri Lankan experience of nation- and state-building while Jim Manor examines the interconnection between politics and development in South Asia. Further exploring the broader horizon of South Asia, David Jacobson's analysis of violence, citizenship and civility, across time and space, draws attention to differences in meaning in western as well as non-western perspectives.

India's Social Challenges

In his chapter on "India's Social Challenges", historian Dietmar Rothermund takes stock of the Indian Republic's achievements in the social sector and analyses the challenges ahead. He illustrates how some notable achievements also generated new hurdles, thus for instance the Green Revolution, paving the way to India's self-sufficiency in food, also led to a dramatic increase in population. While this is today labelled the "Demographic Dividend", a quickly growing, young and hopeful Indian population also poses challenges in terms of urgent needs of health care and education, the need to combat environmental degradation and water scarcity, alleviate poverty and to address the concerns of Indian women. These are some of the major issues that the state must address in the twenty-first century.

Rothermund makes the further point that the legitimacy of any government depends on its ability to meet such social challenges. Since he sees neither the Centre nor the State governments in a position to provide solutions in a meaningful and lasting way, the argument is made for further decentralization and empowerment of local government structures to tackle issues of employment, health care, education and poverty alleviation. Therefore, entrusting the *panchayat* with further responsibilities, like financial authority, appears as the most promising way forward for Rothermund.

Neo-Liberal Reforms, the Ethnic Conflict and the Decline of Liberal Democracy in Sri Lanka

In his contribution to the volume, the sociologist Siri T. Hettige explores the (post)-civil war political scenario in Sri Lanka, which has been marked by verbal and physical attacks on moderates, tightened state control over the media and political control over public institutions. These developments are analysed by taking into account three key factors: post-colonial social, economic and political developments, more recent economic reforms under the influence of neo-liberalism and the long-standing ethnic conflict that led to the steady militarization of Sri Lankan society. Hettige argues that post-independence economic and social policies did not help create a harmonious society, but hampered the growth of the private sector and increased the dependence of the wider population on the state for public resources such as credit, land, subsidized services and employment.

With the "open economic policy" of the newly elected pro-market regime, which came to power in 1977, arrived neo-liberal policies. However, Hettige states that, even after 1994, despite several significant state interventions to mitigate the corrosive impact of liberal economic reforms, the general thrust towards greater market liberalisation continued unabated, along with which came a heightened sense of social insecurity. The militarization of society is a consequence of the decade-long ethnic conflict that has torn the island apart. The process includes religious and private, as well as, state-owned media, thus testifying to the all-pervasive impact of

the military conflict. In sum, all these factors, Hettige argues, contributed to the emergence of illiberal trends in governance in the country causing a persisting sense of instability and insecurity across society, which if they continue to be unaddressed, will entail a further deterioration of the socio-political situation in the country.

Key Issues in the Study of State Politics in India

James Manor's chapter provides a highly useful and systematic entrée into some of the core questions that one needs to pose when analysing Indian politics at the state level. The author elaborates how since 1989 power was decentralized—away from the national level—and at the same time centralized within numerous federal states. Manor categorizes the Indian states by their concentration of power and pinpoints the "increase in abuses of power" by various Chief Ministers.

With a Machiavellian focus on how politicians try to boost their power and popularity, Manor tackles questions such as: do Chief Ministers rather use "clientelism", populism, or what the author calls "post-clientelism", or a combination of the two? Manor argues that—given the obvious long-term disadvantages of clientelism and populism—the increase in state revenues since 2003 led to a proliferation of "post-clientelist" programmes. Furthermore, Manor explores whether Chief Ministers choose to nurture, distract (by opportunities to enrich themselves), marginalize or occasionally cut down some of their subordinates? How and to what extent do Chief Ministers indulge in corruption (be it for themselves, their parties or in turning a blind eye to their corrupt subordinates)? How do Chief Ministers "manage" national leaders? Which social bases for their power do they try to appeal to—does this lead to divisions among or a uniting of social groups within their state? Drawing upon his deep first-hand knowledge of politics in the numerous Indian states with their diverse (political) cultures, Manor sheds light on the "dark arts which politicians sometimes use, and to the nitty gritty of what Ashis Nandy has described as the pigsty of Indian politics".

Citizenship and Violence: The Past and Future of Civility

In the section's final article, David Jacobson explores the linkages between violence and citizenship. Drawing a conceptual difference between the academic consideration of violence and civility in the West and in the post-colonial world, as well as the decline in violence in Western, as opposed to non-Western, states, Jacobson argues that a civil society is best attained where there is a "culture match" between state and society. Following Stephen Cornell, this "cultural match" is described as "the match between governing institutions and the prevailing ideas in the community about how authority should be organized and exercised". Statistically, societies associated with particular social phenomena are likely to be more prone to violence

in the contemporary world. These factors include, notably, low women's status, a high degree of fractionalization, communities with high levels of grievance and high levels of corruption. This is to say that tribal or clan-based societies, especially when deeply patriarchal, can be associated with relatively high levels of violence.

After discussing liberal and communitarian arguments for the decline in violence, Jacobson turns to the empirical contexts of the Middle East and Africa to illustrate his argument, before referring to India and the work of Subrata Mitra on citizenship as a policy model, "providing as it does guidance to bring a modicum of peace, with freedoms, to other post-colonial societies".

Part III: State, Security and Stability in South Asia

Covering traditional as well as human security, the chapters in this section identify a number of South Asia's most pressing security challenges. The role of the state remains crucial to the study of South Asia (see Rothermund & Mitra: *The Post-Colonial State in Asia)* and each of the three chapters included in this section addresses this point. Stability is a central concern for all South Asian states, both internally and in terms of bilateral relations. Each of the chapters highlights key regional challenges with Partha Ghosh examining the impact and dimensions of migration and integration, Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah who explores the future of Afghanistan following the withdrawal of international troops and the implications of the US pivot to Asia as analysed by Jean-Luc Racine.

South Asia's Response to Its Refugee Questions

Partha S. Ghosh examines in his contribution, the challenges of formulating a refugee convention for the whole region. The fact that South Asia hosts the largest number of refugees, migrants, displaced and stateless persons in the world indicates its significance for security and stability in South Asia's domestic and international politics. A major obstacle in solving South Asia's refugee conundrum is that very little has been achieved at the regional level, most importantly within the ambit of the *South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation* (SAARC). Ghosh points out that there is also a lack of domestic legislation and enthusiasm among authorities to deal with massive inter- and intra-state migration. Nevertheless, the chapter makes clear that some progress has been achieved regarding the provision of shelter and relief. Furthermore, some of the migrants have managed to acquire legal documents, which will enable them to obtain citizenship in their respective host states in due course.

To answer the question of how greater integration in terms of policy could be achieved, Ghosh's conceptual point of departure is to elaborate on the different situations and respective implications of Mandate and Non-Mandate Refugees.

This helps to contextualize and illustrate the options for domestic refugee-centric legislation as well as any notions of a regional approach. In order to do so, the chapter examines both individual countries as well as bilateral relations. However, in tackling the puzzle of how to develop a regional convention for refugees, it seems that corruption, indifference and/or ethnic and communal sympathies still seem to be the bases on which citizenship is either granted or withheld.

The Withdrawal of the Foreign Troops from Afghanistan in 2014, Peace Negotiations and the Role of Pakistan

In his chapter Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah outlines the potential scenarios that could unfold after the withdrawal of US and NATO troops and the ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014. Without doubt, the pull out of foreign combat troops represents one of the most significant events for security and stability in the extended region of South Asia and beyond. In order to analyse the implications of this on-going process, Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah draws attention to the dynamics of peace negotiations and the potential role that Pakistan can play. To do so, he evaluates the performance, strategies and perceptions of the US in conducting "meaningful talks". In addition to that, the chapter deals with the efforts of Washington to achieve a certain level of reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

To determine the extent to which the Afghans are prepared for the post-withdrawal scenario, the chapter not only elaborates on the significance of the Doha Talks for the future positioning of the Taliban but also outlines the interests and actions of other major actors in Afghanistan, most notably the Afghan government under the leadership of President Hamid Karzai, the *Afghan High Peace Council*, and the "Northern Alliance". In this context, Shah pays special attention to the most crucial question: are the Taliban prepared for a comeback to political power and how would their traditional rivals react to this? In this context, Shah depicts the mixed reactions over the main trajectories from an agent-based as well as structural perspective.

From the Great Game 3.0 to the U.S. Asia Pivot: The New Geometry of South Asia's Geopolitics

Jean-Luc Racine's chapter locates India within the contemporary world of evolving geopolitics. He focuses on the pressures, opportunities and challenges that face India both towards the East and West. In both regions, the United States looms large as a major player and shaper of geopolitical dynamics. Providing an analysis and overview of the events that have moulded international politics in India's immediate neighbourhood as well as the broader Asian context, Racine also addresses the role

and motivations that have driven the actor, in this case India. By examining examples of Indian foreign policy and considering the views of Indian analysts and strategists, Racine draws attention to the multiple levels, often conflicting goals and dilemmas that characterize policymaking. Two central geopolitical dramas are given particular attention in the chapter—the *Great Game 3.0* referring to a post-9/11 world where Afghanistan is key and the *US Asia Pivot* where China is central. Eschewing a purely structural perspective, Racine asks whether India is moving towards a position of greater bargaining power and leverage. To answer this question, he considers the point that India cannot afford to be hemmed in by regional dynamics but must define and frame a global perspective.

Part IV: The Art of Politics

The chapters in this final section represent the perspective of three scholars who look at politics not simply through procedural dimensions but also in terms of the substantive value created through the conflictual, contested and divisive business of politics. Thus, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph focus on civil society, Frank Pfetsch on the challenges of negotiation and Klaus von Beyme on politics and art in the time of accelerated globalisation.

The Coffee House and the Ashram: Gandhi, Civil Society and Public Spheres

Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph examine the associational forms created by Mahatma Gandhi and discuss the light that these shed on the debates about civil society and the public sphere in political and social theory. As John Keane once remarked, "reflexive, self-organizing non-governmental organizations that some call civil society can and do live by other names in other linguistic and cultural milieus" (Keane 1998: 55). As a first step, the chapter draws upon Habermas and Putnam to identify the attributes that have been used to define civil society associations. They then move on to explore Indian "variants" of public sphere and civil society, including a number of nineteenth century examples of voluntary associations that arose out of the experiences of colonial British India.

Examining the case of India, Rudolph and Rudolph discuss the methodological and empirical challenges that the scholar encounters in trying to establish equivalence across time and space via concepts and institutions. Justifying their choice on ontological grounds, they decide to focus on Mahatma Gandhi and his creation of the Gandhian *ashram*. The chapter studies how this "Indian" variant compares with the practice and concept of civil society and public sphere as they have evolved in European history, thought and practice.

What Makes a Negotiated Solution Durable?

Frank Pfetsch in his contribution explores a specific way by which political conflict can be solved without the use of force. In particular, he elaborates on aspects that have to be taken into consideration by political actors to make such solutions lasting. The method of achieving a non-violent solution to political conflict is to mediate a *compromise*, a feat that Pfetsch singles out. While a well-balanced solution appears to be a straightforward panacea at first sight, theoretically many facets have to be taken into consideration to make it a durable solution. Organized in two consecutive sections, the chapter first establishes the theoretical tools, like defining and distinguishing a compromise from other solutions that might be likewise benign but elusive when it comes to the question of the resilience of such solutions. Further, criteria are established that allow for a distinction to be drawn between a "true" and "false" compromise, an aspect that is of utmost importance for a profound and imperturbable conflict-scenario analysis.

Having established a well equipped theoretical toolbox, in the consecutive section, Pfetsch tests the tools by applying them to historical cases as diverse as the Munich Diktat of 1938, the Cuban missile Crisis or the Treaty of Lisbon that was crucial for the development of the EU, to name only a few. Against this rich background, Pfetsch concludes by emphasizing the overarching importance of compromise for political negotiations, whether or not those compromises fulfil all conditions for a durable solution.

From Exoticism to Postcolonial Art: Theorizing und Politicizing Art in the Age of Globalisation

The final chapter in this volume deviates from previous ones by breaking with the classical themes of political science. Klaus von Beyme illustrates his profound knowledge of the arts and art history by transcending disciplinary boundaries under the umbrella of the postcolonial discourse. He demonstrates the relevance of political debates and beliefs for the creation and interpretation of art. Von Beyme illustrates the problems that arise when "Eastern" areas meet "Western" theories and it appears that the discourse around this collision of worlds is much further developed in disciplines like art history, linguistics or postcolonial studies then it is in political science. Thus, von Beyme's chapter on the transformation from exoticism to postcolonial art might also be understood as an appeal for a similar transformation within the field of comparative politics. This entails rejecting a view of non-Western political systems as exotic and different, especially those that do not copy the institutional structures and political processes of the European and North Atlantic variants, and moving towards a more liberal and open-minded interpretation of these non-Western and postcolonial contexts.

Conclusion

The chapters of this book, diverse as they are, show one thing clearly: political science is a truly global science, which draws rich lessons from its application in diverse geographical settings. The book is also an embodiment of Subrata Mitra's way of life. Having studied, observed and researched politics all over the world, from his undergraduate education in Orissa via his days in Rochester, Paris and Hull to his career in Heidelberg, Mitra exemplifies the global scholar like few others do. This book, which honours the Indian specialist Subrata Mitra, attracted contributions from so many different scholars' writing on such diverse topics and is proof of the global reach and resonance of Subrata Mitra's work and personal friendship. But he has also remained true to his origins, both geographical and scientific, and concentrated his research on India and in pursuit of answers to the persistent question, "How does the state work?" Beyond a deep-seated empiricism, the other leading question in his academic life has always been to ask, what the story of India—or for that matter, of South Asia—is the story of? Relating what one knows to what one sees in order to derive generalizable insights from specific case studies has been Subrata Mitra's guiding credo and his research and teaching are reflective of this principle.

At this point, the editors would like to take the opportunity to gratefully acknowledge the efforts made by all current and former colleagues—secretaries, lecturers, researchers, student assistants—as well as the tremendous number of eminent international scholars from all over the world—who, over the last decades helped, not only to support and contribute to Subrata Mitra's research and teaching but also to build a vibrant department of political science dedicated to the politics of South Asia. By taking theory and context equally seriously as well as being open-minded to themes and approaches, Mitra tirelessly pushed his own work and his students towards a constant dialogue across Continents. His never-ending energy, drive and endurance to bring together well-established scholars with young promising researchers are exemplified in this present volume. Thank you, Subrata! May your mission "to understand India in terms of the world, and the world in terms of India" from your happy abode in Heidelberg, in the company of your peers and students—past, present and future—continue its intellectual journey with customary vigour.

Heidelberg, Germany
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Siegfried O. Wolf
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Part I
Democracy in a Comparative Perspective

Chapter 1
Political Parties and Democracy in South Asia: The CPI-M in India's Liberal Democracy

Harihar Bhattacharyya

The Problem

Political parties and their relation to democracy with particular reference to South Asia has remained a central research interest of Subrata K Mitra (Mitra 1999; Mitra et al. 2004). Mitra's understanding of the subject has been informed by newer theoretical concerns, and questioned the conventional approaches, mostly derived from the Western paradigms, that have privileged a certain context (Western) to the neglect of the specific context obtaining in South Asia. Mitra's context-specific agency/actor oriented approach has sought to break the theoretical impasse in party scholarship. At the same time, Mitra has cautioned us about the pitfalls in taking the context-specificity too far through his critical reflections on the notion of 'indigenisation' of party systems (Mitra et al. 2004). He has, therefore, advocated for adopting a more comprehensive approach that takes into account indigenisation, agency and institutional arrangements (Mitra et al. 2004: 4–5).

This chapter seeks to pursue some of the above concerns of Mitra in exploring the dilemmatic position of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) vis-à-vis *Indian* liberal democracy, which has got a limited operational space in conditions of a post-colonial state marked by high level of authoritarianism and centralism, and a social and cultural ambience whose age-old traditions of hierarchy, customs and practices still hold considerable sway over the people. When looked at theoretically, relation of political parties with democracy has remained somewhat uncertain despite the fact that they have got intermingled. The uncertainty has been rooted in the absence of democracy inside the political parties which have made themselves nonetheless indispensable for the operation of democracy. In the most recent theoretical literature on the subject (Diamond and Gunther 2001) the overall decline of popular trust in political parties has been noted which raises serious question of the

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sustainability of democracy the world over. In the South Asian context, not particularly known for a good record of democracy, and a healthy party system, newer challenges in the form of spontaneous upsurge of the people against the institutions of the state and originating from outside the fold of political parties (e.g. in India and Bangladesh) and the formation of new form of parties (Palshikar 2013: 10–13) throw fresh questions about the efficacy of political parties for democracy in South Asia.

Our inquiry is pursued with reference to the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) which remains the most powerful communist party in India, and governed until 2011 three states of the Indian federation—West Bengal for over 34 years since 1977 (uninterruptedly); Kerala intermittently since 1957; and Tripura (India's North-East) since 1978 except during 1988–1993. Tripura remains the only state where the CPI-M led left coalition has been returned in 2013. To be sure, India's communist movements have remained regionally based. Much has been written on the regional communist movements in India and the Communist parties.[1] There is perhaps little to add to the understanding of the historical growth, organisation and ideological shifts, and the communist parties-run State level administration from 1957 (Kerala); 1977–2011 in West Bengal; and 1977–1993; 1993-onwards in Tripura. Our point of departure here will be democracy, that is, the party's position on democracy, and the effects that have been produced in respect of the liberal democratic institutions.

Let us make two important caveats here. First, despite the fact that the European Enlightenment thinkers, generally, had disdained factions, parties, groups and so on, as the latter were thought to provoke disharmony in society (Baker 2001: 84–105; Przeworski 2010: 16–62; Ball 1989: 155–77), political parties, or party systems (Diamond and Gunther 2001; Ware 1996; Sartori 1976; Duverger 1955) developed, took shape and came to be closely associated with the growth of representative governing institutions, and 'democracy', as a political conduit of Western modernity, and an indispensable part of our 'democracies' the world over.[2] Ironically, politically parties themselves are hardly based on democratic principle as far their internal mechanisms of organisation and operation are concerned, although in many cases general masses, or a section of them, have been able make their way into the membership, and in some cases, leadership of political parties, as a result of several factors such as universal adult suffrage, expansion of the principle and practices of democracy in society and polity and so on. Second, I would like to remind ourselves what W. H. Morris-Jones, one of the first scientific observers of Indian politics post-independence (1947), cautioned us while studying India's political institutions. Morris-Jones said that 'institutions with familiar names' may not necessarily 'perform familiar functions' (Morris-Jones 1954: 2). Morris-Jones said of course the above with regard to his in-depth study of Indian

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[1] See for detailed references, Bhattacharyya (2004).

[2] See Ball 1989 'Party' pp. 155–76 for an introduction to the conceptual genealogy of political parties down the ages.

Parliament, a very formal political institution par excellence, unlike the political parties, which necessarily indulge in a great deal of informality in their practices. In the non-Western contexts, the same texts as used to describe political institutions in the West may not be adequate enough to do the same (Manor 1991) so that political institutions in such contexts tend to acquire somewhat a hybrid character (Chatterjee 2012).

Existing Knowledge

To be sure, the CPI-M is part of the Indian party systems, and hence it is necessary to locate its importance within the latter in order not to overestimate its role in Indian politics generally. Since the 1990s the landscape of India's political parties has received some serious academic attention (Mitra et al eds. 2004; Manor 1995; de Souza and Sridharan eds. 2006; Suri 2008; Hasan ed. 2004). Scholars have noted the significant changes in the party systems in India, transformation of the single party dominant system ('Congress System') to multi-party systems, party fragmentation; the rise in importance of regional parties, the mode of functioning of political parties from 'consensual' to 'coalitional'; decreasing vote share of 'national' parties and hence their failure to obtain majority in Parliament since the late 1980s; the importance of identity politics for political parties; the parties' role in India vis-à-vis what Manor calls, 'democracy and decay', decline of ideology and the rise in 'pragmatism', and so on. This is not the place for a separate and more critical inquiry which could be undertaken in general on the actual changes that have taken place and the outcome of such changes for the polity and the citizens. But what can be said here is that while the above labels are not so new and do not describe the changes adequately enough, because the Indian political parties have exhibited such features as 'fragmentation', 'coalition'(at the State level), multiparty systemic traits, at least, at the State level, regionalization[3] the most significant changes to have occurred are in respect of the ideological positions of the parties, and their approach to governance, development and democracy in the age of reforms in India. Therefore, the term 'pragmatism' may capture some essence of the changes at the expense of a rigid ideological position. Also, organisationally speaking, the old political parties have not changed at all; the regional parties are under the near total control of one or two regional leaders, most often referred to as 'party supremo' in the daily media, and understood that way as such. However, the issue of democracy has evaded the attention of party scholars of India.

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[3] This is quite an old trait in the very organisation of the Congress Party evident immediately after its formation, but in the growth of non-Congress parties since the mid-1960s, and their control of State level governments post-1967.

CPI-M

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) is the post-split (1964) communist party in India[4] from the parent body called Communist Party of India (CPI), and largest and most powerful of the left parties.[5] Its membership figures are 1,044,833 (CPI-M 2012: 173), which show some noticeable increase, in fact, over 2007 (CPI-M 2012: 173). It is to be noted that it is not true that its membership is regionally concentrated in its strongholds such as West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, the State where the party has been the leading element in left coalition governments for decades. Organisationally, the party's presence could be seen in all States except Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh. Beyond the party membership, of course, the party's mass fronts (workers, peasants, students, women, youths) also count a lot, and in which membership figures, though dwindled in some cases somewhat over the last 3 years or so (students, youth and women), appear to be quite stable, and in some cases show increases (CPI-M 2012: 174–81). Until 2011, the CPI-M led Left Front (a coalition government of many left parties) ruled the state of West Bengal uninterruptedly since 1977 in West Bengal, Left and Democratic Front (a coalition of left and democratic parties) ruled the state of Kerala intermittently since 1957, and Left Front (a coalition of left parties) has still been ruling the state of Tripura in India's North-East nearly uninterruptedly since 1978 (except an interlude of 5 years (1988–1993). Although it lost power in 2011 at the State level, it still continues to govern in sub-state level local government bodies such as municipalities and panchayats in West Bengal and Kerala. In the above two states where it lost it still retains a considerable following. In West Bengal, for example, the Left Front received more than 41 % of popular votes! In Kerala, the LDF retained about 42 % of the popular votes despite conceding defeat to the UDF led by the Congress party (INC). Beyond the above three states, where the left parties, more particularly the CPI-M, retains strong organisational support bases too, the CPI-M has organisational presence in other states as well although it must be admitted that the party has not been able to penetrate well beyond its traditional regional concentration. In the party's own estimate, since 1978[6] the membership of

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[4] I have discussed and updated on the developments in regard to the party elsewhere in some greater detail. Bhattacharyya, H. 1994, 76–103. For regional level studies of the CPI-M and the Left Front, see Bhattacharyya 1998, 1999. For the CPI-M in relation to running the representative institutions in West Bengal, see Bhattacharyya 2001, 2002, 2004; 2005; 2012a, b.

[5] The other left parties in India include: Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), All-India Forward Bloc (FB), Revolutionary Communist Party of India (RCPI), Bolshevik Party, Communist Party of India (Maoist), Socialist Unity Centre of India (SUC) and others. Various studies on radical left politics in India including it regional bases contain more detailed data on them. See, for instance, Overstreet and Windmiller (1959); Franda (1972); Nossiter (1980, 1988); Kohli (1991); Banerjee (1984); Ruud (2003); and Suri (2008).

[6] In the Salkia (Howrah in West Bengal) Plenum when the historic decision to transform the party from a cell-based into a mass party was taken, the latent objective seemed to be to obtain greater electoral support.

the party and its mass fronts registered only about 4 % increase in the Hindi speaking areas of India until 2011 (CPI-M 2012: 181). Also, while the party's organisational strength increased in the States where it has been a governing party such as Tripura and West Bengal, the party failed to extend its reach in Tripura's neighbourhood; the same is the case with respect to West Bengal vis-à-vis its neighbours like Bihar and Jharkhand (CPI-M 2012: 173). The fact that in West Bengal the party registered some decline in membership since 2011 raises the question about the likely impact of what T. J. Nossiter (1988: 177–99) called a long time back, the 'movement-ministry dialectic', or the 'the cart and the horses problem'.

Thus, when seen from the perspective of all-India politics, the party is a significant but not determining force. When looked at from the perspective of electoral performance, the CPI-M since 1967 (when it took part in the Lok Sabha elections after its rise in 1964), its popular vote share at the national level ranged between 4.4 % (1967) and 5.33 % (2008) with highest peaks being 6.15 % (1980); 6.14 % (1989& 1991); and 6.12 % (1996) (Suri 2008). Although the party incurred a substantial loss of seats in the Lok Sabha between 2004 and 2008 (from 43 to 16), its share of loss of votes polled during the same period was only 0.33 %. As a measure of its strength when combined though with that of the other left partners, the left values of votes for the Presidential elections (August 2012) were nearly the same as that of the Trina Mul Congress (TMC), a regional party par excellence, which has replaced the Left Front in West Bengal as the party of government in 2011. Nonetheless, such parties assume particular significance in Indian politics, often quite determining, in a highly fragmented and regionalized party systems, and when obtaining a single party majority in Lok Sabha (popular chamber of Indian Parliament) appears to be the thing of the past since the late 1980s. For example, the support to the UPA-l (2004–2009) from outside extended by the most important left parties was crucial for the survival of the Union government. The left parties had also played a somewhat determining role in the past during the 1977–1980 Janata Party experiment and subsequently in the late 1980s and early 1990s when a United Front government was installed at the Union.

CPI-M and Democracy

I intend to indicate here that despite the major changes that have taken place worldwide since the time of Karl Marx and Lenin, or even Mao Zedong, and the very different context obtaining in India, the CPI-M and other communist and left parties are yet to re-consider their fundamental categories adopted in the bygone era! As we shall see below, the CPI-M as well as other communist parties and left groups in India do not have a theory of running the representative institutions although they have been participating in electoral politics, including leading state and sub-state level governments for about half-a century. Also, until recently, the CPI-M did not believe in taking power at the national level through elections

although the same did not apply to state and sub-state level administrations in India's federal polity. But we would like to highlight one theoretical point here, which is also deeply rooted in a specific historical situation and a specific reading of the same by the founders of Marxism. Except the very short-lived experiment of the Paris Commune (1870–1871) of a different nature, and small in scale, Marx and Engels, the founders of Marxism, did not witness the possibility that the communist parties could achieve governmental power within the liberal democratic system, and run the administration. Neither was such an opportunity available to Lenin.[7]

Democratic Dilemma

Are political parties compatible with democracy? Are the communist parties compatible with democracy? Paradoxically, political parties themselves are often not based on democracy, internally speaking although they have been found to be indispensable for democracy. The communist parties are also not based on democracy in their internal organisation, and in fact are based on inequality within the party organisation, hierarchically organised as they are, in terms of power and control. Added to this is the communist parties' condescending attitude to institutions and practices of democracy, theoretically speaking.

The great dilemma of the CPI-M in this respect is that although the party is fully immersed albeit formally in India's liberal parliamentary democratic system at different levels, from the national to the local, its approach to democracy is negative and theoretically dismissive. However, the party has its own understanding of democracy which needs to be brought out and examined.

Before we do that, a brief theoretical discussion is in order for putting the question of democracy, particularly its limits and possibilities, in general, and the classical Marxist understanding of democracy to which the CPI-M appears to be committed, in particular, in perspective. To take the latter issue first, the CPI-M is a 'classical Marxist' party (Anderson 1976) which means among others the following: First, it is based on the assumption that the working classes are the agent of fundamental social, economic and political transformations. Second, the communist party being their representative is the vanguard in bringing about those transformations and a revolution to be ushered in a classless society in future. Third, the liberal democratic states and other types of state in all capitalist societies are but the instruments of domination, which act on behalf of and also at the behest of the capitalists against the working masses, and hence liberal democracy is a state form and sham, to be toppled, and eventually destroyed. Finally, a distinction is made

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[7] Lenin, in fact, was responsible, under some historic compulsions though (War Communism), to render the Soviets that were created in the wake of the Russian revolutionary process, defunct, temporarily. However, what was temporary for Lenin was to become permanent under his 'successor'!

between 'bourgeois democracy' and 'socialist democracy', and a trenchant critique is made of the former in favour of the latter. Sudipta Kaviraj (2011: 5–9) has drawn our attention to this aspect and argued that the above distinction is but a misreading of the historical contexts in which Marx wrote and the contingent character of Marx's distinction. Kaviraj said that Marx's "critique was right for the historical period to which it pertained: the form of property-based liberal constitutionalism (of the kind Locke defended)" (ibid.). But what we describe as democracy today is not liberal in the Lockean sense: the meaning of liberalism has been transformed in the age of universal suffrage and there have been significant modifications to the capitalist system that Marx experienced' (Kaviraj 2011: 6).[8] Kaviraj has also pointed our attention to Marx's cynicism about democracy in respect of the following: First, Marx was aware of the limits imposed on the emancipatory possibilities of democracy in his times. Second, he was equally cynical of the capacity of the 'masses' to rise above their 'false consciousness' (Kaviraj 2011: 7).[9]

CPI-M's Discourse of Democracy

The party has seldom undertaken any serious exercise in fully stating its theoretical position on democracy and democratic institutions except indicating in its programmatic statements that the party would take an instrumentalist position on them as part of its strategy of 'People's Democratic Revolution, an idea rooted in the Comintern debates in the 1920s. When understood in the Indian context, it meant that the party was to take part in the constitutional democratic process including elections at all levels of the polity, and even forming governments at State levels within Indian federation (under article 112 of the old Constitution of the Party; dropped since 2000!). The rationale of such an exercise, according to the party's understanding, was to make use of all available space within the constitutional democracy of India, and thus, to complete the incomplete 'bourgeois revolution' in India. It was thought that as a result of forming such governments at the state level, the working classes would be inspired, and made conscious of the need for a fundamental transformation (Bhattacharyya 1999: 234–235). Since the party termed the existing state in India 'bourgeois-landlord', the party's special paradox was the question of primacy between the party and the government or

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[8] Perry Anderson (1983) has pointed out the 'legacy of institutional thought within classical Marxism was thus always very weak, with the dire consequences for the actual process of institutionalization in [Bolshevik]Boshevik Russia itself' (p. 98) although he himself continued to maintain the old Marxist distinction between 'bourgeois' and 'socialist democracy (p. 99). (For further details, his *In the Tracts of Historical Materialism* (London: Verso).

[9] This particular aspect takes him, ironically, closer to the elite perspective, particularly Robert Michels' hypothesis of the 'iron law of oligarchy' in which despite Michels' belief in democracy as the best form of government possible, a similar argument about the incapacity of the masses for a variety of reasons was highlighted. (See for further details, Michels 1915.)

administration, which Nossiter called 'the cart and the horses problem'.[10] What is being argued here is that those ministry-movement dialectics is but the symptom of the deeply-rooted theoretical problem of not having any creative approach to democratic and representative institutions.

We now turn our attention for a while to a book titled "Marxism and Democracy' (1993) edited by two CPI-M leaders which is but a collection of articles penned by higher level party leaders including late Jyoti Basu, and E. M. S Nambudripad plus appendices on excerpts from the writings on democracy by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on democracy. This collection can be accepted to be an authoritative text of the CPI-M's discourse on democracy. In the very *Foreword* to the book, late Sailen Das Gupta (then Secretary of the West Bengal State Committee of the CPI-M, and later Chairman of the Left Front) stated the obvious that the conventional Marxists have been stating over the last one century and a half:

> Democracy is not a new invention of the bourgeoisie. From the early days of the Greek city states to the present age, democracy has meant different things to different people. But none of the theoretical postulate or practices has been devoid of class content (Biswas and Bera 1993: 1).

In the very introductory chapter titled 'Democracy and Marxism', the conventional and somewhat mechanical Marxist position is stated in greater detail with suitable quotes from the founders, and Lenin and Stalin. The fundamental contribution of Karl Marx to the concept of democracy, it is believed, consisted in

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[10] The so-called 'cart and the horses problem' have differentially stood in the way of smooth functioning of the Marxist-led State governments in India, and in many cases served to produce effects to cripple the party and the movement. To cite one example from the case of Tripura, only surviving Marxist led State level government in India: 'In this state, the Communist Party organization is not the determinant of the Ministry. The Ministry, on the other hand, is the determinant of policy, government and party. The result is excessive dependence on the administrative-bureaucratic-police apparatus, and the reduction of the importance of the party'. (One political commentator of Tripura) (Quoted in Bhattacharyya 1999: 235). The State Party's understanding in its 12th Party Congress in 1985 corroborated the above observation. The inner party source wrote: 'We must keep in mind that not dependence on government but its *use* as an important instrument of struggle of the people is the correct policy.' (Bhattacharyya 1999: 235) Interestingly enough, to make the ministry more effective in the second term, 7 out of 8 State Secretariat members were made ministers in Tripura. The party's explanation was that although it had strained the organizational resources, 'but this step was required to instill confidence in the people about the government'. (Bhattacharyya 1999:. 235) Rather than halting the process, it had continued unabated. In the 1988 State Assembly elections, "practically the entire leadership" were "fighting the election as candidates", and as I have argued (Bhattacharyya: 245), as a result, the state level leadership failed to provide guidance and co-ordination during the critical time after the deployment of the Army and the Congress (l) offensive. This was one major instance of the debilitating effect of the 'Marxist ministry' on the movement, and also the consequence of the communist movement had to suffer in the wake of its near total immersion in electoral politics. (Bhattacharyya 1999: 235). My 'Micro-Foundations of Bengal Communism' (1998) contains micro level empirical and organizational data to prove the same point more poignantly of the so-called 'the cart and the horse problem'. But we will discuss it later in the article. The Kerala experiment is which T. J. Nossiter (1982) has discussed at length did not show any different picture.

pointing out the class content, or essence of democracy. Retaining the old dogmatic label 'bourgeois democracy', it was asserted.

> Most features of bourgeois democracy—constitutionalism, universal suffrage, parliament, jury, the system of local self-government bodies, the official personal freedom—are resulted from the struggle of the masses (Biswas and Bera 1993: 3).

That democracy was a form of the state; that 'bourgeois democracy' was organically linked with the rise and fall of capitalism, from its progressive to reactionary forms; that the capitalists endangered their own democracy; and that 'democracy can only be guaranteed in a socialist state with the dictatorship of the proletariat' (ibid.), are restated without an inch of any critical faculty exercised about the historical specificity of the phenomenon of democracy in a country like India, as perhaps elsewhere, as Kaviraj (2011: 1–14) has well argued. Further on, Biswas and Bera (1993: 3) felt tempted to quote from Stalin ('Concerning Questions of Leninism') in order to make the party's, or the Marxists' 'theoretical' position on democracy clearer:

(a) 'Although the party carried out the dictatorship of the proletariat and in this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, the dictatorship of the party, this does not mean that the dictatorship of the party (its leading role) is identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat.
(b) Not a single important decision is arrived at by the mass organizations of the proletariat without guiding directives from the party.
(c) The party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. The party is the direct governing vanguard of the proletariat. . ..In this sense, the party takes power, that the party governs the country'[11]

The readers perhaps cannot take anything more along the lines depicted regarding the party's understanding of democracy. Shorn of all shibboleths, it was hard, if not impossible, to digest, the ideas that 'dictatorship' (whether of the angles or of the devils) could be democracy, and second, a party (in this case the Communist Party of course) is nearly equal to the state form, and governs the whole country etc. The cynicism and criticality that the founders of Marxism reserved for democracy and the highly context-bound nature of their many concepts including 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (which was hardly ever made equal to the party dictatorship by Marx and Engels, and much less theorized by them as such).[12]

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[11] The excerpts, appended to the book 'Marxism and Democracy' referred to above edited by Biswas and Bera (1993), especially those of Marx, Engels and Lenin, are a testimony to the party's reading of the issue of democracy in India, or West Bengal, in the light of what has happened in Europe, and what the founders said about them. One wonders if the elected members of local self-governing bodies, or today's 'Marxist' Members of Legislative Assembly, would be able to read his or her understanding of democracy that way, and also whether that would be the right thing to do today. (For further details, see Biswas and Bera 1993: 8.).

[12] Interestingly enough, even Lenin in his famous *The State and Revolution* (1917) did indeed try to visualize the rule by the proletariat after the revolution as a makeshift arrangement far removed from the one the former USSR experienced subsequently at its great peril though. Also, in Marx's conceptualization of the dictatorship of the proletariat first in his letter to his friend Joseph

The Party's Discourse on Running the Representative Institutions and its Effects

Given the above understanding of the party about democracy and representative institutions, it would not perhaps be difficult at all to understand the operative discourse of the party in running the elected governing bodies within the so-called 'bourgeois' democratic edifice in India, and their anti-democratic effects. I will pay attention in particular to rural and urban grassroots representative institutions known in India as panchayats and municipalities, etc. In running such institutions, the CPI-M developed its own inner party mechanisms: *Party Directives* (on a regular basis), *Party Letters*; and above all, parallel *Party Sub-Committees* to that of the institutions they were and are still in charge, electorally speaking. In one such West Bengal State Committee level 'Directive', the party's 'political objective' was explained at some length:

This does not mean acting at will. It means activation of panchayats in accordance with the principles and ideals of the party. The basic issue involved here is giving party leadership to panchayats. This leadership consists of (a) political leadership, and (b) organizational leadership. The political leadership of the party is established only when people in their own experience accept the political perspective of the party as their own Party directive. 'The party has a definite aim. Panchayat activities should be conducted in such a way that they conform to the basic goals of the party' (Bhattacharyya 1998: 230).

Accordingly, the three-tier panchayats are to be run like this:

Since there is Panchayat Sub-Committees at each level, 'all elected party members of Panchayat Samiti, and Zilla Parishad will act under the respective committees. Generally, the Local and Zonal committees of the party will look after the Gram Panchayats and Samities respectively. The final decision at each level will be taken by *Parichalan* ('Guide' in literal rendering) Committee (read Sub-Committee) of the party although the elected members may offer recommendations.' (ibid.).

Now, let us look at how the above State level 'directives' could be taken down the distinct level. To give some evidences from inner party sources from one district (Bardhaman/Burdwan):

(a) 'The party has clear directives about the way a revolutionary party should *use and utilize* these panchayats. [emphasis is added]
(b) 'We have absolute control over the three-tier panchayats in this district. The District Committee has definite directions. They have been sent to all zonal and local committees. The District Panchayat Sub-Committee regular meets to direct the panchayats. *It is the District Committee and the Secretariat which take all the important decisions regarding the panchayats*. On the whole, the District, Zonal and Local Committees have control and vigilance over panchayats.' (emphasis added)
(c) '*In running the Gram panchayats, the decisions of the Sub-Committee are final*. (emphasis added) As a result, the ordinary members of the Panchayats do not feel

Wedemeyer (dated London March 5, 1852) did not mention even for once the party, let alone its all pervasive role (*Marx-Engels Selected Correspondence* 1975: 64).

encouraged to attend meetings. They lose all interest in attending any meeting. Their voice is not heard and reflected in the panchayats. Many think it is the duty of the *Prodhan* (Sarpanch) to involve the people with the panchayats. These create difficulties.

(d) *'That the activities of the Panchayats will be performed by elected members of panchayats alone is the outlook which is opposed to the long-term political objective of the party.* (emphasis added) In order to transform panchayats into weapons of struggle against vested interests, and to utilize them in further developing class struggle, what is necessary is *strong party control over panchayats,* (emphasis added) collective discussion and leadership, and regular check-up of Panchayat activities in party committee meetings.' (ibid.: 231).

Such inner party documentary sources could be mentioned ad infinitum. In other writings of mine on the panchayats, I have given some further evidences (Bhattacharyya 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2013). Kaviraj (2011) said that such 'primitive control' over such democratic bodies by the party should be read not as 'socialist', even 'modernist but of a pre-modern variety' (ibid.: 22), an effect once again of having no theory of democracy today as far as the party, or conventional Marxism in India, is concerned. Ironically, the party's inner party sources show that the above 'directives' of the party have not worked the way they were intended, and the party itself was self-critical of many blemishes.

Reading through the inner party sources carefully one will notice that panchayats activities, as well as activities of other such bodies at higher and lower levels, have been discussed and examined, and some self-criticisms have also been undertaken. Consider the following:

(a) 'We must involve the people irrespective of all classes and creed in the activities of the panchayats. The people of the area must be made aware that it is their money and work. They will decide upon the priority of expenditure and implementation of development work.

(b) 'If everything is concentrated in the hands of a few and people are kept in the dark, then even honest operation will also arouse suspicion in the eyes of the people.

(c) 'We cannot expect those who do take part in decisions to carry out decisions. The process of decisions must start from the people.' (Bhattacharyya 1998: 111).

The following passage from another state committee level inner party sources titled 'Panchayat parichalanona samparkei parjyalochona' (in Bengali/translation mine) is even more candid:

There is even indifference in involving in decision-taking and Panchayat activities those elected on CPI-M party ticket, let alone the common people of the area. Decisions are at best kept at the level of merely information. Regarding women, no progress has been noticed in their participation at all. There are complaints regarding the following: opposition members are not taken into consideration in matters of purchase committee or beneficiary committee; maintaining contractorship in fictitious names; lack of transparency; and even corruption by the party or a group within it![...][13]

The similar anti-democratic and anti-institutional effects of the above controlling mechanisms have also been found in empirical probing of *Gram Sansad* (Village Parliament), an institutional innovation of the CPI-M, below the level of

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[13] CPI-M State Committee ed. Party Chithi Sankalan, 1998: 229 (unpublished and confidential).

Gram panchayats, as an assembly of voters of constituencies of Gram Panchayats, to decide in an open meeting twice a year the accounts, expenditure, budgets and other activities of the Gram Panchayats, so much so that the common villagers have developed, by and large, an attitude of indifference and apathy in respect of participating in the meetings. As a result, obtaining a quorum of only 10 % members present has been found to be difficult and often to ensure a quorum the children of the villages offer their signatures for some inducements.[14]

Conclusion: Democratic Failure

Enough evidence is given to prove that the CPI-M's discourse of democracy and democratic governance has turned out to be anti-democratic and anti-institutional in implications. The above also serve to explain why the Left Front regime failed West Bengal in 2011. This may seem puzzling because the party and its various mass fronts have stood for the protection of the democratic rights, civil rights, ethnic rights and so on in different parts of India in different times. The puzzle is added by the fact the party was elected for more than three decades to run a state level administration in India (in West Bengal, for instance) and also the levels below with good margins of popular votes. Even in the last State Assembly elections in West Bengal in 2011 the party and its left partners retain about 42 % popular vote while conceding defeat to the TMC-Congress alliance. And yet, under the Left in West Bengal, neither democracy nor the representative bodies developed and flourished in the sense that the people developed any real stakes in them, and also in the sense that such bodies enjoyed institutional autonomy and the appropriate manner of functioning. The party's over-bearing 'theoretical' perspective saw to it that they remained subjugated to the omnipotence of party control. While a full-length examination of this complex issue cannot be taken up here[15] it is possible within the space available to indicate and highlight some of the deep-seated theoretical problems of Marxism in respect of democracy and institutions. For Kaviraj (2011), the problem is historical in the sense that democracy has different trajectories, and developed unevenly across different historical settings (Kaviraj 2011: 8). He argues that democracy in India has evolved and become successful in 'unrecognized forms' (ibid.: 22). In other words, democracy in India has become successful, he argues, as a peculiar case, which means not something unique, because all cases of successes of democracy are peculiar (ibid.: 13–22). So, the theoretical point that can be made here, following Kaviraj (2011), is that the CPI-M has remained blind to its misreading of Marx's cynicism of democracy, on the one hand, and on the other, to the success of democracy in India in

(continued)

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[14] For further details, Bhattacharyya 2005; Bandopadhyay 2012 (Unpub. Ph. D, Univ. of Burdwan)

[15] That is an ongoing book project of mine.

'unrecognized forms'. Consider the following statement of Chatterjee in this regard:

> Yet when economic liberalisation came in the early 1990s, it did not have to be imposed by authoritarian means. Something has clearly changed in Indian politics. Greater and greater sections of the people were developing a stake in the governmental regime and becoming aware of the institutions of electoral democracy as a means to influence that regime (Chatterjee 2012: 45).

What the Marxists have since Marx's times failed to understand is the power of democracy, and its consequences. Democracy in our times (Anthony Giddens calls 'reflexive society') is far removed from Karl Marx's or Lenin's times. Finally, even though Antonio Gramsci (1971) sought to rescue and revise classical Marxist position on democracy and institutions, to some extent, by highlighting, in some original way, the importance of consent in civil society, and the feelings and common sense of the masses, something to which the party-centred and statist Marxism so far had hardly paid any attention (ibid.: 198–199), today's world has moved farther on. Drawing on the notion of 'peculiarities' that Kaviraj has emphasized in his critical and original reflections on democracy worldwide, and in particular on India, it may be argued that such peculiarities are not to be taken as the sign of weakness of democracy. Democracy rethinking in the twenty-first century and beyond needs to look for the innovations that such 'peculiarities' have brought before us (Kaviraj 2011: 22). Ruefully, the CPI-M, claimed as a party of the working people, is yet to take full cognisance of this evolving reality, and has preferred to remain stuck to the age-old distinction between 'bourgeois democracy' and 'socialist democracy'.

Finally, following Mitra's cautions in explaining and understanding the political parties in the non-Western contexts, it is concluded here that an ill-defined and defective self-definition of the agency (in this case the CPI-M) vis-à-vis democracy in India has over-worked to the neglect of the context as much as that a creative contribution of the Indian Left to India's liberal democracy, institutionally speaking, remains a far cry.

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Chapter 2
Ideological Trends and Changing Party System Polarization in Western Democracies

G. Bingham Powell Jr

Party System Polarization

I was one of Subrata Mitra's teachers in the mid-1970s when he was earning his Ph.D. degree from the University of Rochester. He was wonderful to have as a student, brilliant and enthusiastic, eager to learn all that we had to teach and to apply it creatively to his interest in Indian politics. He wrote a marvellous dissertation, on which I served as an advisor, applying both theory and empirical hypotheses from the study of Western parliamentary democracies to explain cabinet instability in four Indian states. He made systematic use of the party manifestos, a tool that emerged much later as a major source of data on parties in national democracies in the West, to analyse legislative and government party configurations. This very successful work was later published as *Government Instability in Indian States* (1978). It has been a privilege to keep in touch with Subrata over the years and indeed, to recruit him to write a fine chapter on India for the introductory comparative politics textbook produced by Gabriel Almond and me (of which the 11th edition is now in print.) The current chapter, although stimulated by my own more recent work on ideological congruence between voters and governments, also draws on party manifestos and uses them to characterize party systems, particularly the party system polarization, which is the major dependent variable here being explained. The polarization of the party system, that is, the degree to which major political parties are dispersed across the left-right spectrum or concentrated towards the centre, has a variety of important implications. At the individual level, party system polarization affects citizen voting choices. For example, greater party system polarization seems to encourage voters to use ideology in making electoral choices and to mobilize citizens into politics (Dalton 2008). At the system level party system polarization shapes the ideological congruence between the median

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voter and legislative and government representatives (Kim et al. 2010, Powell 2013). When the large parties are close to the median voter, many outcomes create congruent governments. When they diverge, governments are usually much further away. Party system polarization is also linked to less durable parliamentary governments (e.g. Warwick 1994). Moreover, when party systems are polarized the immediate election outcome has more striking policy impact (Dalton et al. 2011, 179).

Despite its importance, we know relatively little about the sources of party system polarization. Presumably, it is bound up with the patterns of party competition. Theoretical work assuming a uni-dimensional space, such as that of Downs (1957), Sartori (1976) and Cox (1997), argues that such competition is shaped by the number of political parties and the configurations of citizens' preferences. Competition in a multi-dimensional space is less predictable. We might expect that prominent additional dimensions not reduced to the single left-right space would create cross-cutting patterns of citizen support, constraining party system polarization. Moreover, political parties have their own ideological traditions, which shape the language and context of their competitive offerings, and which can link families of parties to the space of competition in stable or changing ways. (Also see the brief review in Volkens and Klingemann 2002). The intent of this chapter is to explore empirically these proposed sources of party system polarization and their relationships in the political systems of Western democracies.

Theory and Hypotheses

The first task is to convert the general theorizing about party system polarization into specific hypotheses about the levels of party system polarization in the Western democracies. We shall then turn to some issues of measurement, before trying to test the hypotheses. The context is the Western democracies in the era since WW II. A large tradition in party system scholarship in Western Europe, building particularly from the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) has emphasized the historic social cleavages of religion and class that shaped these party systems from the initial extensions of the franchise. Although the declines in church attendance and trade union membership, as well as demographic changes and the rise of new issues and new parties, have eroded these cleavages, their legacy continues to influence the configuration of political parties that confront the electorate. As Lipset and Rokkan suggested, these configurations were traditionally more similar on the political left, with substantial Social Democratic parties appealing to the working class voter an important presence in most countries. Although the left of the political spectrum is complicated today by the presence of Green parties and various left splinters, including remnants of Communist parties, the Social Democratic presence remains important. The centre and right of the political spectrum, on the other hand, are more complex. Conservative parties generally offer some kind of rightist choices, but are not found in every country, or share the right space with

various competitors, such as Liberal parties or extreme right parties. As we shall see below, just how far "left" and "right" these major contenders locate themselves has an important impact on party system polarization.

Another element, however, is the large presence of Christian Democratic parties in a number of countries, especially those with substantial Catholic populations. The Christian Democratic parties have traditionally offered a combination of traditional social appeals with support for more extensive social welfare programs, cutting across the general left-right spectrum. While the specific package of appeals varies across times and countries, the presence of substantial Christian Democratic parties might be expected in general to diminish the polarization of the party system. We can see initial evidence of this by comparing the average left-right manifesto packages offered by Social Democratic, Conservative, and Christian Democratic parties across the 20 Western parliamentary democracies over the 50 + years between the late 1940s and 2003:

Party family	Average right-left position of manifesto (0–100 scale)	N
Social democratic	71	305
Conservative	38	160
Christian democratic	48	155

As we can see, the average Social Democratic party places itself solidly on the left, with a net (left minus right) of over 70 % of its ideological manifesto statements devoted to leftist appeals, while the average Conservative party places itself solidly on the right, with a net percentage of 38 % of its relevant manifesto statements taking leftist positions. But the average Christian Democratic party manifesto straddles the left-right spectrum almost perfectly, with a net of 48 % leftist appeals, just slightly to the right of centre. As Christian Democratic parties gather substantial support, they should depolarize the party system.

Hypothesis 1: The more voting support for Christian democratic parties, the lower the level of party system ideological polarization.

Of course, the most general and best known theories of polarization focus on party competition and the number of competing political parties. At one extreme we have Anthony Downs's (1957) theory of two-party competition, which predicts convergence towards the median voter. If there are more than two or three parties, Cox (1990, 1997) finds the most likely outcome of multiparty competition to be parties distributing themselves with relatively equal niches of voters between them. More parties, then, will create opportunities for voters towards the extremes to express their more polarized attitudes, sorting their party support in a more polarized fashion. At the other predictive extreme, we have Giovani Sartori's (1976) theory of polarized pluralism, which predicts that systems with over five parties will behave in a "centrifugal" manner, in which parties on both left and right flee the centre. In general we should expect more effective parties to be associated with more polarized party systems.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the effective number of parties competing, the greater the level of party system ideological polarization.

The election rules shape the conversion of votes into legislative representation. Single-member District (SMD) rules advantage the larger parties, often creating absolute legislative majorities, and penalize the smaller ones unless they enjoy geographically concentrated support (Duverger 1954; Rae 1971; Lijphart 1994). Most famously, Duverger's Law expects SMD plurality election rules to be associated with two-party systems, because of a combination of mechanical aggregation and strategic voting and entry. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, depending on the effective thresholds, limit these concentrating effects. We do, indeed, find effectively fewer parties competing in the party systems under SMD (3.2) than PR (4.3) in our sample. (Effective number of parties uses the method introduced by Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The combination of these effects and Hypothesis 2 leads us to expect greater party system polarization under PR election rules than under SMD election rules, effects which will be diminished controlling for the effective number of parties.

Hypothesis 3: Party system ideological polarization will be greater under PR election rules than under SMD election rules.

As already suggested, Cox 1990, 1997 has proposed that the diversity of citizens' ideological distribution should shape the polarization of the party system. In a multiparty context that means, the more voters place themselves towards the extremes, the greater the incentives for parties to appeal to them. On the other hand, if most of the voters locate themselves toward the centre that is where the parties will seek and find support (see also Ezrow 2007, 183–184, for a change-oriented version of this same hypothesis, and Merrill and Adams 2002). Ezrow 2007 adds to the basic citizen diversity hypothesis an "electoral laws" hypothesis that argues that because vote seeking incentives are greater under systems with disproportional representation (here the SMD systems, primarily), the responsiveness of party system polarization to citizen diversity will be greater under these systems. He also suggests that the incentives to join government coalitions, rather than seeking vote pluralities, may encourage more centrist position-taking, rather than responsiveness to voter diversity, under PR (Ezrow 2007, 184–185).

Hypothesis 4: The more dispersed the citizens in their self-placement on the left-right scale, the greater the party system ideological polarization. 4a. Responsiveness of party system polarization to voter dispersion will be greater in SMD system.

In the great majority of our countries parties of the Social Democratic family have strong voter support. In about half of them, including all the SMD countries, parties of the Conservative party family also have strong support. We have seen that on average the Social Democratic parties offer manifesto appeals predominantly on the left of the ideological continuum, while the average Conservative party manifesto is predominantly on the right. These averages, however, conceal a great deal of variation across both countries and times. Naturally, we expect that the ideological positions of the Social Democratic and Conservative parties in a given election

will greatly shape the polarization of the party system. It is the party positions **relative to** the party system mean (and each other) that are all-important. For example, if both large parties swing to the left, following (and affecting) the changing centre of the discourse, polarization will be maintained at the same level.

> Hypothesis 5: The relative ideological positions of Social Democratic and Conservative parties shape the polarization of party systems.

We have some well- known longitudinal expectations about international ideological trends that we can add to our hypotheses. These may help explain longitudinal trends in polarization, both in absolute terms and in terms of the relative relationships to the election rules. On one hand, the Social Democratic parties are expected generally to have become somewhat more centrist in their orientations, partially because they have to some extent achieved their redistributive and welfare goals, partially because of the strategic broadening of their constituencies.[1] On the other hand, the Conservative party positions have varied in several directions. The late 1950s and 1960's saw many Conservative parties accepting major elements of the welfare state; the 1980s saw the Thatcherite anti-welfare state backlash, at least in Britain and other SMD countries. For a more detailed, but roughly consistent, description of the movements of parties and party families in Western Europe from the 1940s to the 1990s, based on a slightly different approach to the manifesto data, see Volkens and Klingemann (2002).

> Hypothesis 5a: Over the post-war period, the positioning of Social Democratic parties has gradually become more centrist, in both absolute and relative terms, which should reduce polarization of party systems. 5b. The positioning of Conservative parties has varied significantly, in both absolute and relative terms, with a more "social democratic" emphasis in the late 1950's and 1960s, and a more conservative emphasis in the 1980s.

Data: Measuring Polarization and Its Sources

Measuring party system ideological polarization depends on measuring the position of the individual political parties on a left-right ideological scale. In this chapter I have relied primarily on the Comparative Manifesto Program for identifying the parties' positions in elections in the Western parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 2003 (Budge, et al. 2001; Klingemann, et al. 2006). Laver and Budge (1992) combined "a priori theoretical coherence" and "a series of exploratory factor analyses" (26) to develop an operational definition of a common left-right scale expressed in the party manifestos (statements of party promises issued during the election campaign) for 11 European countries. This left-right scale has been widely used. It includes such elements as "state intervention," "peace and co-operation,"

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[1] For a discussion of this general "drift towards moderation" of the social democratic parties and the strategic, economic and social conditions that shaped it, see Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2005, 234–235, as well as Kitschelt 1989, 1994. However, on the independence of Social Democratic party ideological positions to shifts in public opinion, see Adams, et al. 2009.

capitalist economics" and "social conservatism," each built from a number of more specific code categories. (The version of the Manifesto left-right party placements used in this chapter is a variant proposed by Kim and Fording (1998), which uses the number of left statements minus right statements as a percentage of left and right statements combined).

At several points the Manifesto-based results are compared with results from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project (CSES.) Although only beginning in 1997, and thus covering a shorter time frame than the Manifesto project, the survey-based CSES studies have the advantage of using a very different means of estimating the left-right positions of political parties: the perception of the citizens, who have been asked to place each party on an 11 point 0–10 scale. Thus, while the Manifesto studies use a more substantively equivalent scale, the CSES studies use a scale attuned to the perceptions of the citizens in a given country. Each of these approaches to estimating party ideological positions has its strengths and weaknesses (Powell 2009). Using the two approaches provides a robustness check in analyses where we would expect the two scales to generate similar results.

In both data sets the estimates of the left-right positions of the individual parties are combined to compute a single polarization number. Conceptually, we are trying to estimate the stretch of the political party system—its configuration at the time of the election in terms of being concentrated towards the centre or spread out towards the extremes. We want to take account of the size of the different parties, so that systems with large parties in the centre are less polarized, even if they have small parties towards their extremes. In this computation I have relied on a widely used statistical property: the standard deviation of the distribution. To capture the party size element, the party positions are weighted by the votes received by the party in the election.[2]

In the tests below I have also relied on the Manifesto data set to classify political parties by their party family, particularly the Social Democratic, Conservative, and Christian Democratic families. To estimate the dispersion of citizens on the left-right scale I have used three sources of public opinion surveys: the Euro-barometers, the World Value Studies, and the CSES studies. In each case I use the standard deviation of the citizen distribution on the left-right scale as the measure of citizen dispersion. The Euro-barometer data average the two surveys done in the year of the election.[3] The World Value studies are used if they took place within a year of the election. The CSES data are multiplied by 0.91, to convert to the ten point scale, before being added to the citizen dispersion estimates. In elections where we have multiple data sources, these are averaged. As the oldest of these surveys, the Euro-barometers, only began in the 1970s, fewer cases are available for analysis with the citizen dispersion measures and they cannot be used to explore the fluctuations in polarization in earlier decades.

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[2] For similar approaches to party system polarization, see Warwick 1994; Ezrow 2007; Dalton 2008; Kim et al 2010.

[3] Thanks to Lawrence Ezrow for providing the Eurobarometer data from 1976 onwards.

Testing the Hypotheses

Our first three hypotheses concern the degree of support for Christian Democratic parties, the number of parties and the election rules. Moreover, as the three variables potentially interact with each other, we need to examine them with mutual controls. This is done in Table 2.1. The left column shows the independent variables in various models. The dependent variable throughout is party system polarization, defined as the (weighted) standard deviation of the party positions on a 100 point scale, based on the party manifestos. The successive columns show models adding the independent variables to the OLS equations.

The first data column shows the effect of **support for parties of the Christian Democratic family**, which is expected to pull the party system towards the centre. This hypothesis is supported, as the coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level, even in the model with no other variables in the equation. However, the effects are substantively small, with a ten point increase in Christian Democratic support translating into reducing polarization by only about one unit (average polarization is 17.5, with a standard deviation of about seven units.) In short, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data, but does not explain a great deal of the variation in party system polarization (as can also be seen by the small R-squared in the equations).

The second data column shows the effect of the **effective number of political parties**. By itself and in combination with Christian democratic vote (Model 3), the effective number of parties has a significant effect (at the 0.05 level) increasing polarization, just as expected from theories of party competition. There is no sign of a particular cutting point as predicted by Sartori 1976; moreover, as noted, we do not really have any cases of pure two-party competition of the Downsian sort. The weak, linear pattern seems more consistent with a "sorting" model, and works

Table 2.1 Regression analyses of cleavages, parties and election rules: dependent variable is party system polarization based on party manifesto data

Independent variables	Regression coefficients				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Constant	**18.62****	**14.78**	**16.14****	**20.03****	**21.39****
	(0.50)	(1.20)	(1.25)	(1.59)	(1.05)
Vote for Christian democratic parties	**−0.08****	–	**−0.14****	**−0.14****	**−0.14****
	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Effective number of parties	–	**0.68** *	**0.61***	**0.09**	**−0.21**
		(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.32)
SMD election rules	–	–	–	**−4.38****	**−5.33****
				(1.10)	(1.15)
France dummy	–	–	–	–	**5.53***
					(2.05)
R-square	**4 %**	**2 %**	**5 %**	**10 %**	**12 %**
Number of cases	329	329	329	327	327

Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses
* = significant at 0.05; ** = significant at 0.01

similarly for the absolute as well as effective number of parties. Substantively, the effects are not large, as adding one effective party increases polarization less than one unit.

However, the real surprise comes in Models 4 and 5, when the election rules are added to the model. Far from enhancing the impact of the effective number of parties on polarization, taking account of the election rules greatly reduces the coefficient, which becomes totally insignificant. This is doubly surprising. On one hand, there is a good deal of theory that leads us to expect that more effective parties will increase polarization; the hypotheses emergent from those theories are **not** supported in the data (see Ezrow 2010, Chap. 3 for similar conclusions). On the other hand, we expected SMD election rules to be associated with less party system polarization, which is true, but we expected the causal mechanism to be the greater number of parties associated with PR, which turns out not to be true either. France has exceptionally high polarization, but controlling for it by adding a dummy variable, as is done in Model 5, does not alter the other inferences. France, of course, has an SMD majority system, rather than a plurality system, as well as traditions of support for parties on the far left, such as the Communists, and on the far right, exemplified in this period by the National Front (Brechon and Mitra 1992; Mitra 1988).

I replicated the equations with effective number of parties and election laws with the CSES data, which covers a shorter time period, but uses average citizens' perceptions to place the political parties on the left-right scale. The findings were nearly identical. Despite the plausibility of the expectations about number of parties, and the weakly positive simple correlation, the effect is completely washed out when we control for the election laws.

The **election law effect** is also robust to the examination with the CSES data, with SMD election rules associated with about 0.6 of a point less polarization on the ten-point CSES left-right perception scale, equivalent to 6 points on the 100 point Manifesto version, which is slightly greater than what we see in Table 2.1. Both differences are statistically significant.

Polarization levels vary over time in both SMD and PR systems, but in different ways. In the PR systems polarization is highest in the first post-war decade, declining gradually thereafter, with the largest drop roughly between 1975 and 1985. In the SMD systems an initially high level of polarization declines sharply in the 1955–1965 decade, then rises gradually to its relatively highest point in 1985–1995, before dropping sharply again in the most recent period. These two different trends lead to average polarization actually being higher in the SMD elections than in PR elections in 1975–1995 decades, although otherwise (and cumulatively) higher in PR elections. Interestingly enough, these two significant, but different, cross-decade patterns remain after we take account of support for Christian Democratic parties and of the effective number of parties.

Hypothesis 4 proposed that one source of party system polarization would be the **dispersion of the citizens** on the left-right scale. It is possible that the greater party system polarization in the PR systems and the (different) cross-decade patterns in both SMD and PR systems might originate in the dispersion of the citizens

themselves. Hypothesis 4 in general and the role of citizen dispersion in election law and time differences are difficult to investigate because of the limited numbers of cases for which we have appropriate citizen self-placement data. The largest single citizen data source is the Euro-barometer data, which only commences in the mid 1970s and, of course, only covers countries that are members of the European Union at the time of the election. Even adding to these the CSES-covered elections and a few elections which roughly coincided with World Values studies, only catches 109 cases of the 329 Manifesto data elections, a mere 15 of which take place in SMD settings. (There are also potentially difficult questions about the causal direction of the relationship).

Across our full time period of 1976–2003, support for Hypothesis 4 about citizen dispersion is weak and insignificant in the PR systems, despite our expectations derived from the formal analysis. In the SMD systems, on the other hand, citizen dispersion has a notable impact. As Ezrow (2007) reported, these effects are much greater than in the PR systems. Although the coefficient does not reach statistical significance by the usual standard, (significance is about 0.14), it is respectable given the small number of cases (15.) It is reasonable to say that general support for Hypothesis 4 is doubtful, although Hypothesis 4a stands; and the issues of the time and election law patterns are not resolved by taking account of citizen dispersion. The decade effects are relatively unaffected when we add citizen dispersion to models containing decade dummies.

Because of the importance of the citizen dispersion hypotheses, and their founding in our theoretical expectations, I analysed them using directly the data from both CSES-based studies and the Manifesto data. The CSES-based results are shown in an interactive model with election rules in the right-hand column of Table 2.2. (For comparison purposes, only CSES studies in the "old" democracies are included here.) Interestingly, in the time period that CSES is available (1996

Table 2.2 Regression analyses citizen dispersion in most recent decade by data type: dependent variable is party system polarization

Independent variables	Regression coefficients	
	Manifesto-based polarization (1996–2003)	CSES-based polarization (old democracies, 1996 on)
Constant	**−7.96** (12.04)	**−20.32**** (8.23)
Citizen dispersion	**12.45*** (6.00)	**18.66**** (3.70)
Citizen dispersion * SMD	**1.80** (13.41)	**−5.24** (6.57)
SMD election rules	**−7.30** (26.35)	**6.79** (14.51)
R-square	**20 %**	**67 %**
Number of cases	37	26

Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses
* = significant at 0.05; ** = significant at 0.01

and after) increased citizen dispersion in the PR systems has a positive impact on polarization, significant at 0.01 level; but the SMD difference is weak and negative. (The effect of citizen dispersion under SMD is estimated by adding the two coefficients, so it is still robustly positive).

The left-hand column of Table 2.2 shows the interactive model with election rules using the Manifesto-based data, but only for the 1996–2003 period, which corresponds to the CSES data. These results are very similar to the CSES results, with the un-multiplied coefficient, showing the effect in the PR countries, now significant (at 0.05), and the additional impact in SMD countries tiny and insignificant. It seems to be the time period, not the measurement approach that is responsible for the different results in the PR systems. Adding vote for Christian Democratic parties does not fundamentally alter these results, nor does adding ideological position or distance from the centre of the discourse of the Social Democratic parties (see below and Table 2.3.) In these analyses in the most recent time period, Hypothesis 4 is supported, whereas 4a is not. We have no explanation for the time period differences.

Table 2.3 Regression analyses of decades and party ideology, by election rules: dependent variable is party system polarization based on party manifesto data

Independent variables	Regression coefficients					
	PR elections			SMD elections		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant (1945–1955)	20.85** (1.12)	**10.92** (2.54)	**9.84** (1.15)	18.02** (1.56)	0.31 (4.14)	7.46** (2.05)
Decade 1956–1965	**−0.53** (1.63)	**−1.32** (1.58)	**−0.26** (1.20)	**−4.63*** (2.21)	**−3.85*** (1.97)	**−2.11** (1.24)
Decade 1966–1975	**−1.86** (1.64)	**−2.38** (1.59)	**1.52** (1.24)	**−2.19** (2.09)	**−1.21** (1.88)	**−0.73** (1.17)
Decade 1976–1985	**−4.26**** (1.59)	**−4.03**** (1.53)	**−0.53** (1.20)	**−0.57** (2.25)	**2.43** (2.11)	**−1.19** (1.35)
Decade 1986–1995	**−4.27**** (1.59)	**−3.71*** (1.54)	**−0.09** (1.21)	**−0.09** (2.40)	**−2.74** (2.22)	**−0.06** (1.40)
Decade 1996–2003	**−4.39*** (1.80)	**−3.84*** (1.74)	**0.12** (1.36)	**−6.74**** (2.56)	**−1.33** (2.57)	**−1.31** (1.60)
Social democratic family ideology	–	14.98** (3.24)	–	–	22.00** (4.84)	32.92** (3.17)
Social democratic family distance to party mean	–	–	47.51** (3.46)	–	–	–
Conservative family ideology	–	–	–	–	–	−34.83** (3.16)
R-square	**6 %**	**14 %**	**49 %**	**14 %**	**32 %**	**74 %**
Number of cases	229	229	229	83	83	83

Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses
* = significant at 0.05; ** = significant at 0.01

The **positions taken by the main political parties** seem to shape party system polarization surprisingly independently of the number of parties and the dispersion of citizen preferences (see also Adams et al. 2009, who find similar independence of Social Democratic party positions). Moreover, it is the international trends in the movements of these parties that seem to account for the cross-decade changes in polarization. Our data show the expected drift towards the centre by the parties of the Social Democratic family: on the 100 point scale the average Social Democratic party scores at about 75 in the decades until the mid-70s, then moves right until reaching about 64 in the most recent period. As expected, the Conservative parties show a varying pattern, and also one somewhat different in the SMD and PR systems.

We can see the effect of the movements of the major party families in the regression equations in Table 2.3. As the decade trends are somewhat different in PR and SMD systems, Table 2.3 shows those separately. The three models for PR elections are on the left of the table and the three models for SMD elections are on the right. Model 1 of each analysis shows only dummy variables for the different decades, with the omitted decade (1945–1954) captured in the constant term.

Considering first the SMD elections on the right-hand side of the table, which involve simpler and more consistent party configurations, as well as a more distinctive pattern of cross-decade changes, we see in Model 1 the substantial polarization in the constant term, followed by substantial depolarization in the 56–65 decade, an increase in the next 30 years, and another decrease (even sharper) in the 1996–2003 period. Model 2 introduces the left-right position of the party of the Social Democratic family. As the ideological variable is coded 0–100 with 100 on the far left, we expect that the higher the Social Democratic family value, the more polarizing. Introducing the Social Democrats ideological position greatly and significantly increases the R-square and largely accounts for the depolarization of 1996–2003, (in which the Social Democrats have moved very substantially to the centre). Adding the position of the Conservative party, we see a significantly negative coefficient for it, which reduces most of the remaining decade effects, especially that for 1956–1965. (This is consistent with the "social democratic consensus" often discussed in the literature, which later founders on the challenge of Thatcherite neo-conservatism in most of the SMD countries). Moreover, with the ideological positions of the two parties in the equation the R-square is increased to 74 %, emphasizing the degree to which these two parties' strategies of competition shape the polarization of the SMD elections. Either a rightist move by the Social Democratic Party of 15 points, or a leftist move by the Conservative Party of 15 points, would decrease polarization by 5 units.

The PR elections are shown on the left side of Table 2.3. Model 1 shows the decade dummies. The first three decades show only slightly declining polarization, whereas the second three decades have significantly less polarization, at roughly a constant level. As with the SMD elections, we first introduce the ideological position of the Social Democrats. In these more complex party systems the effect of this single party is less than in the SMD systems, although the coefficient is highly significant and in the expected direction (more leftist SD parties are

associated with greater polarization). The SD ideological position alone, moreover, does not greatly reduce the decade effects. However, if we introduce a variable for the distance of the Social Democrats from the ideological mean of the parties—which thus captures the net movement of the other parties as well as the Social Democrats—we see a much larger impact. Not only is the coefficient much larger, (a fifteen point move towards the centre reduces polarization by seven units, which is a standard deviation), but the reduced distance between the Social Democrats and the ideological mean accounts for all of the decade effects (in the simpler SMD party systems it was not necessary to take this additional step). Introducing the distance of only the Conservative parties in the PR systems (not shown) is not so helpful, as only a third of the PR countries have Conservative parties in the legislature; in the Catholic countries, their place is often taken by parties of the Liberal family or other specialized parties.

Although for simplicity Table 2.3's PR equations show only the decade dummies and the Social Democratic party positions (absolute and relative), some additional analysis is also informative. First, as usual, adding the effective number of parties has no effect and the coefficient remains small and insignificant. Second, adding vote for Christian Democratic parties to Model 3 in the PR systems increases the R-squared to 60 % and the coefficient is negative and significant, at about the same size as in Table 2.1. Third, although adding a variable for the dispersion of the citizens greatly reduces the number of cases, it is notable that the coefficient is tiny and insignificant (however, if we add the variable for the dispersion of citizen to either Model 2 or Model 3 in the SMD elections, it is large and strongly significant, even with only 15 cases). Fourth, the addition of country dummies increases the R-squares greatly, of course, but does not much alter the size or significance of the Social Democratic ideological variables, or the decade dummies. However, adding the country dummies does reduce the effect of the Christian Democratic vote to insignificance, suggesting that its effect is largely cross-national, not dynamic.

The results of our hypotheses about the levels of party system ideological polarization in different conditions can be summarized fairly easily. As expected from Hypothesis 1, the expression of a cross-cutting cleavage, in the form of Christian Democratic party support, reduces polarization. Hypothesis 2, that greater effective number of parties would increase polarization, is **not** supported; substantively weak zero-order effects vanish when we control for the election laws. Hypothesis 3 is supported: PR election rules are associated with greater polarization, although the effect varies greatly across decades. However, contrary to theory, this effect is not shaped by the number of competing parties.

Hypotheses 4 and 4a are supported only inconsistently. In the pre-1996 decades and in aggregate: in the SMD systems citizen dispersion is related to greater polarization, but in the PR systems there is little consistent relationship. In the 1996–2003 period citizen dispersion is significantly associated with polarization in both types of electoral systems. The smaller number of cases and shorter time frame for which the citizen dispersion data are available limits our confidence in its role, even aside from the potential problem of causal direction. Finally, Hypotheses

5 and 5a, b are generally supported: the changing right-left positions of Social Democratic and Conservative parties are the main drivers of changing party system polarization. Moreover, the international trends in the relative ideological positions of parties in these families account for the changes in average cross-decade polarization levels.

Concluding Comments

Party system polarization has major effects on ideological congruence, government stability, and short-term policy shifts, as well as on various forms of individual behaviour. But the origins of stable and changing party system polarization itself are not well understood.

This exploration of party system polarization in the Western democracies reveals several cross-decade trends, especially the very recent decline in polarization in the SMD countries, amidst many country-specific fluctuations. The cross-national trends seem to be the consequence of international ideological movements, especially the moderation of relative leftist ideology on the part of the Social Democratic parties, and the varying ideological stances of Conservative parties in the SMD countries. They do not seem to be generally shaped by the declining Christian Democratic support or by trends in the effective number of parties or by citizen dispersion. Indeed, the effective number of parties, contrary to theoretical expectations, has remarkably little effect on party system polarization. Citizen dispersion effects do seem to help shape party system polarization, somewhat inconsistently, but don't seem to contribute to the large cross-decade trends.

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Chapter 3
Tanzania's Economic and Political Performance: A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith

Introduction

This study, inspired by my more than four decades of discussion and interaction with Subrata Mitra—my former Ph.D. student, my dear friend, and often my inspiring teacher—is an effort to build on his earlier work and the lessons I have drawn from it. Country-specific studies that look at local-level variation in a rigorous way, such as pioneering studies by Subrata Mitra (1978, 1991, 2001, 2003), show that governance differs markedly across provinces and electoral districts. Such variation may crucially influence quality of life for citizens. With that in mind, we build on Mitra's insights into coalition politics in India and elsewhere (1980), as well as selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), in an effort to understand how governance influences quality of life within Tanzania. Tanzania, like India, provides a fruitful setting for testing governance hypotheses. It is a multiparty democracy with substantial district variation in support for the dominant national party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (the CCM). Tanzania's elections are generally free and fair but a single party has controlled the presidency since independence. Tanzania provides a further benefit as an analytic focus because the structure of its political system affords an opportunity to investigate selectorate theory claims with data on winning coalition size that closely matches the theoretical concept.

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We begin with a brief, informal explanation of selectorate theory,[1] after which we discuss Tanzania's political system and how it relates to the theory. Then we specify hypotheses and the data used to test them. Based on the statistical evidence, we close by discussing steps to improve Tanzania's performance.

Selectorate Theory

According to selectorate theory, all political systems have two institutional characteristics that describe how they retain and select leaders. The *selectorate* (S) are those people who have some say in choosing a leader. The *winning coalition* (W) is the subset of selectors whose support the leader must retain to remain in office. As distinct from the winning coalition, the *support coalition* reflects the commonly held idea that parties try to maximize their vote share (Downs 1957; Powell 2000) to gain a mandate for their policies. The support coalition coincides with the total vote for the winning party. The size of a party's winning coalition may differ markedly from the total votes it receives both because a party cannot control voter decisions to support it and because a party only needs to reward the subset of voters whose support is essential for victory (Riker 1962). The winning coalition represents the smallest number of votes *needed* to assure electoral victory.

In selectorate theory, leader turnover occurs if the incumbent fails to allocate resources in a manner that ensures that winning coalition members remain loyal. To stay in office, the incumbent must reward coalition members so that they are at least as well off as they can expect to be by defecting from the incumbent's coalition and giving their support to a rival. Fortunately for incumbents, they have an advantage challenger's lack. The incumbent has already had time to work out which supporters can be kept loyal most cheaply. This means that once past a transition period, the incumbent's winning coalition members know with high probability that they will continue to receive a flow of benefits. The challenger, in contrast, will want to sort out her winning coalition members after coming to power. To overthrow the incumbent she will take support from anyone but once in office she will want to keep those whose loyalty can be retained most cheaply. This turns out to mean that anyone defecting from the incumbent's coalition to help the challenger rise to office only has a chance of long-term benefits equal to the ratio of the size of the coalition to the size of the selectorate from which it is drawn (W/S), a probability that is lower than the odds of being retained by the incumbent. Hence the incumbent can retain the loyalty of coalition members even while rewarding them less than the challenger promises to do since the incumbent's payments can be counted on and the challenger's promise cannot be (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). The challenge for incumbents is not only to retain the loyal support of their

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[1] For the formal development of selectorate theory, see Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009a).

coalition, thereby sustaining themselves in power, but also to maintain discretionary control over as much of the government's revenue as possible.

Selectorate theory recasts discussions of regime structures away from traditional categories such as democracy or autocracy. These conventional labels are broadly associated with the size of a government's winning coalition and selectorate, but these conventional labels lead to ambiguity and unproductive debate over whether this or that regime is "truly" a democracy. The selectorate perspective makes precise and continuous predictions about anticipated differences in government performance as a function of even small variations in the size of W, and for some factors not examined here, W relative to S. Selectorate and coalition size are conceptually continuous variables. Leaders maintain their coalition's loyalty by producing *public and private goods* with government revenue. Public goods benefit everyone in society. Some public benefits, such as the extent of personal freedom or national security, do not vary greatly across districts within states but policies such as health care access, residential electrification, equal opportunity, and other quality of life indicators are likely to vary substantially across districts within a country. Private benefits, such as grants of monopolies, access to scarce hard currency, and direct payments such as the selective use of vouchers or foreign aid, can be targeted at the leader's essential supporters (W) and, of course, this can be done differentially in different political constituencies.

All polities produce both public and private goods; it is the mix of the two that varies with selection institutions. Selectorate theory shows that as the size of W increases, leaders shift that mix away from private benefits and toward public goods. A larger winning coalition means more supporters to please, spreading out private benefits, making public goods a more efficient way to retain the backing of a winning coalition. Additionally, as W/S increases, incumbents must spend more of the government's revenue on satisfying coalition demands. This means that the leadership has less discretion over spending and, therefore, fewer opportunities for personal enrichment or for trying out pet policy projects. Hence, leaders prefer to govern with a small coalition drawn from a large selectorate. Ordinary citizens always benefit most when their leaders are accountable to a large coalition.[2] The larger the coalition the more public goods the incumbent must provide to stay in office although as the coalition gets to be very large the marginal improvement in public goods is asymptotic. Coalition members benefit most when the ratio of W/S is large. Circumstances dictate whether they are better off when both W and S are absolutely large or when both are small (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009a).

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[2] Furthermore, past a critical cut-point, once the coalition is sufficiently large even members of the winning coalition cannot be made better off by reducing its size. That means that beyond a key threshold (and absent a massive exogenous shock) the winning coalition's size can make a polity immune from both revolutions and coup d'etat (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009a).

Tanzania's Coalition and Selectorate Structure

In parliamentary systems such as Tanzania's, the size of an incumbent's winning coalition derives from the aggregation of voter support on a constituency by constituency basis. Parliamentary districts can be differentially rewarded to attract support. Where a large coalition is required, greater local public benefits are to be expected. In constituencies that can be won with a small bloc of votes, private rewards are likely to work better as the means to keep the small bloc loyal (Smith et al 2013). As we explore Tanzania's governance structure, bear in mind that rational, power-seeking leaders are interested in engineering political institutions to create coalition loyalty (Mitra 1980, 2005). That means reducing W as much as possible and, if they can, making W/S small too.

Tanzania became a multiparty, competitive democracy in 1995. Yet there are issues with Tanzania's democracy. Despite its first-past-the-post, plurality voting rules in a single-member district system, Tanzania's parliamentary elections typically involve ten or more parties competing for office in each constituency. This number contradicts Duverger's law (Duverger 1972; Riker 1982). The large number of parties per district is encouraged by the government and, as we will see, shrinks the size of the voter coalition needed to win a majority in parliament. Not only do Tanzania's elections reduce the size of the vote needed to win, but in addition 91 of the Bunge's—Tanzania's parliament—323 seats are filled by *indirect* election or by outright appointments by the president. Understanding the selection process that fills these seats helps explain what determines the size of W, and therefore, the allocation of benefits in each district. Therefore, we examine the Bunge's composition and how that relates to electoral coalitions.

The Bunge and Selectorate Politics

Of the 91 indirectly elected or appointed members of the Bunge in 2005, 75 were indirectly elected women. Those seats were allocated to parties based on the proportion of directly elected seats they won. Additionally, five members are designated by the Zanzibar assembly, ten cabinet ministers are appointed to parliament by the President, and the Attorney General serves as an ex officio member. Each directly elected Member of Parliament (MP) wins by getting a plurality of their constituency's vote. Votes beyond a plurality add nothing to the party's representation. To form a government, a party simply needs a majority of the 323 seats.

Let us now consider the allocation of all parliamentary seats and what their number implies about how many *elected* members are required to secure a parliamentary majority. A simple majority requires 162 MPs. Of those 162 MPs, the president is assured of between the 11 appointed from his cabinet and 16, including the 5 from Zanzibar as those 5 normally are worked out in a negotiation with the

president. These members, like those elected from his party, are likely to be loyal (as has historically been the case) as long as they are rewarded well. Now let X equal the number of directly elected members of parliament that assures the president's party a majority in parliament. For X to translate into a majority we need to recognize how the rules work and work out what their implementation implies. We see in the formula below that a majority of the total parliament is achieved by electing X directly, appointing X/232 of the 75 women to be designated by the party of the president under Tanzania's indirect-election rules plus the opportunity to appoint 16 members based on 11 from the cabinet and 5 from Zanzibar:

X + (75Women) (X/232) + 16 = 162 Seats, meaning X = 111. Thus, a majority of parliament (162 seats) is won if the largest party (the party of the president) succeeds in directly electing only 111 members.

As we see, if the party of the president can win 111 elected seats, he assures himself control over parliament. If all contests had only two parties, then the president's party would achieve control with as little as 17.2 % of the vote.[3] But Tanzania's 2005 parliamentary elections averaged 10 parties per constituency. With so many parties competing in each parliamentary district, the vote share required to win was much smaller. Because victory goes to the party with a plurality of votes in 111 parliamentary districts, the size of the district-level winning coalition is clearly defined. The smallest winning coalition needed on a district basis is determined by one more vote than the vote for the second largest party in each district. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of CCM district-level minimal winning coalitions as a percentage of the district total vote (W/S) for the 2005 presidential election across Tanzania's 119 districts (comprising 323 electoral constituencies).[4] Smaller values are associated with a stronger norm of loyalty to the incumbent (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Since the selectorate in each district is the adult population, the relative magnitude of the norm of loyalty varies as a function of W; that is, the vote share for the second largest party in each district (with the CCM having the largest vote share for the president in each district) and the population of the district. As the Figure shows, nearly 25 % of all constituencies have a ratio of W/S that is less than 5 %. About 50 % of the districts have a ratio of W/S less than 10 %. Only about 15 % of the districts show relatively weak party loyalty, with W/S greater than 25 % (the size of W in a Duvergerian Westminster system) in these cases. That is, a majority of seats were winnable with vote shares of 10 % or less, making W rather small for a democracy.

In accordance with selectorate theory, we hypothesize that Tanzania's national government's provision of district-level public goods rises with the size of W in

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[3] 111/323 seats won, each with 50 % of the vote being all that is needed per 2-candidate constituency. This equals 17.2 % of the vote.

[4] Unfortunately, we have not been able to secure data strictly at the level of the parliamentary constituency because the Tanzanian government does not report information on resource allocations in that way.

Fig. 3.1 Tanzania's district level W/S: presidential election

each district; that is, with the vote total of the second largest party in the presidential elections. Private goods provision falls as the size of that vote increases. Selectorate theory is agnostic regarding the allocation of public and private goods in each district as a function of the winning party's *total* vote; that is, its support coalition. The empirical tests examine these hypothesized relations between the district-level size of the winning coalition and public and private goods allocations. We also test the alternative possibility that the larger the CCM's vote share, the more public goods it provides and the fewer private rewards.

Data

We evaluate the size of the district-level winning coalition as the logarithm of the vote total for the second largest party cast in each district (log(W)). We also test the effect of the CCM's vote, measured as the logarithm of its vote total in each district (log(CCM)), and we construct models that look separately and then simultaneously at the effect of the size of the required minimal winning coalition and the size of the support coalition; that is the CCM's vote.

Private Goods

Maize is Tanzania's main crop. The government selectively provides vouchers to subsidize maize seed purchases. The value of vouchers varies across districts, providing two opportunities to observe private rewards. Selectorate logic implies that who gets vouchers and how much the vouchers are worth is driven by the size of the winning coalition in each district. As vouchers are private goods transfer payments, large coalition districts should be unlikely to receive vouchers and if they receive any they should be worth less than those given to smaller coalition districts.

We also evaluate the budgetary expenditure on road construction as an indicator of private goods. Road construction, like all large construction projects, provides opportunities for graft and corruption. Of course, roads also provide an important public good as they facilitate labour mobility and the ease with which people can coordinate opposition to government policies if so inclined. Still, choices over how much funding to provide for road construction on a district basis inherently includes a significant private goods component which should be evident when we analyse district level patterns in relation to the size of the winning coalition.

Public Goods

The district level data also permit us to investigate the extent to which the winning coalition's size shapes public goods provision. We investigate the following quality of life indicators: access to health care (measured as the number of health care facilities per square kilometre), the district-level infant mortality rate, spending on education as a percentage of the district budget, the proportion of electrified housing, and the district-level Gini index.[5] We view greater income equality (a smaller Gini index) as a public good, just as we view more efforts on behalf of residential electrification (Brown and Mobarak 2009), health care access, education and low infant mortality as public goods.

Control Variables

We control for plausible alternative explanations for the allocation of resources to public and private benefits in each district. Controls include measures of

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[5] The Gini index measures the degree to which income is distributed equally or unequally. Technically, it computes the area under a curve that compares the cumulative distribution of income in actuality, from poorest to wealthiest, relative to what that cumulative distribution would look like if income were equally divided among everyone in society. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient for a useful summary of how the Gini Index is computed.

productivity, poverty, and the value of vouchers when appropriate. Productivity is measured, in keeping with the practice in Tanzania, as maize production averaged across the long and short rainy season (District Analysis from the World Bank, 2008). Maize production is an important focus in understanding Tanzania's economic performance because it is the country's main cash crop, the preferred food staple and an important source of income for about 85 % of Tanzania's population.[6] Poverty is measured as the percentage of the district population identified by the World Bank as below the poverty line. Vouchers can reasonably be viewed as the central government's opportunity to provide aid transfers to the districts and, as such, might be used to improve economic conditions rather than to advance the government's political agenda. Hence, when examining allocations other than to vouchers, we control for the value of vouchers (log(Vouchers + 1)) to see whether the government uses them to improve district-level living conditions. Additionally, we control for the log of the district population or population density (population per square kilometre), depending on which is more appropriate for the dependent variable. Here the objective is to correct for any scale or proximity/crowding effects that might have a confounding effect on the size of the CCM or winning coalition vote as explanations for policy choices between public and private goods. Other than variables measured as percentages, control variables are calibrated as the logarithm of their raw value (+1 to retain values of 0). This means that regression coefficients are readily interpreted as the percentage change in the dependent variable for a one percent change in any independent variable.

The analysis proceeds as follows. For each dependent variable, we report three regression results including control variables and the independent variables of theoretical interest. We estimate the impact of coalition size on public and private goods provision. We separately estimate the impact of the total vote for the CCM on the same dependent variables and finally we examine the effects of each when both are included in the analysis.

Findings

The results must be interpreted cautiously as we only have data for resource allocations following the 2005 election. Therefore, we cannot control for prior accumulated values of private and public goods in the districts. Still, the data are extensive enough that we can perform careful tests that sort out the relative impact of coalition size as distinct from general support for the CCM.

The district level gives Tanzania's central government its best opportunity to influence economic and social circumstances. It can make decisions purely on a needs basis, as is estimated by controlling for district-level poverty and

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[6] See "Mitigating the Impact of Drought in Tanzania: the WEMA Intervention," November 2010, text available at http://www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/WEMA-TZ-policy-brief1.pdf

Table 3.1 Summary statistics

Variable	Observation	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Voucher (Dummy: 1 = Yes, 0 = No)	119	0.328	0.471	0	1
Log(Voucher)	119	3.395	4.905	0	12.006
Log(Roads)	113	0.014	0.008	0.002	0.44
Log(Infant Mortality)	118	4.490	0.310	3.434	4.997
Log(Health Care Access Per Capita)	117	8.795	0.471	7.040	10.179
Log(Electrified Households)	119	0.996	1.581	−2.780	3.841
Log(Gini Index)	119	3.452	0.082	3.268	3.769
Log(Poverty)	119	3.460	0.386	2.404	4.215
Log(Productivity)	119	5.107	1.127	0	6.958
Log(Population)	119	12.392	0.587	10.616	13.901
Log(Population/Km^2)	119	4.193	1.443	0.697	8.637
Log(W)	119	10.133	0.927	7.340	12.362
Log(CCM)	119	11.073	0.571	9.261	12.565

productivity, or it can make decisions to dole out resources on a political basis. If the political path is chosen, then we expect private benefits like vouchers and road construction to be concentrated in districts in which W is small and for health, electrification, and income equality benefits to go to the districts in which the CCM needed a larger winning coalition. If selectorate-style politics is not central, then the size of the required winning coalition in each district should have no bearing on resource allocations. The CCM's vote total might still be relevant. It might reflect satisfaction with the party's previous performance on behalf of the people in the district. As we will see, there is substantial support for the idea that selectorate-style politics is a central consideration in Tanzanian constituencies and little support for the notion that the support coalition reflects positive feedback for the CCM's accomplishments.

Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the variables while Table 3.2 shows the bivariate correlations among the independent variables. Note that the correlation between Log(W) and Log(CCM)—the two independent variables of greatest interest—is only 0.36, indicating that the size of the second largest party's district vote total (W) is not strongly associated with the CCM's total district vote.

Table 3.3 tests the impact of log(W) and the control variables across the dependent variables. Table 3.4 replicates the tests in Table 3.3, but substituting the size of the support coalition (log(CCM)) for log(W) in each district. Table 3.5 repeats the tests, examining the simultaneous impact of the winning coalition and support coalition sizes, as well as the control variables, on the dependent variables.

The first column in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 evaluates the likelihood of receiving vouchers (a dummy variable coded 1 in the districts that received vouchers and 0 otherwise) as a function of coalition size and CCM support. The impact of coalition size is substantial. Doubling the size of a district's winning coalition

reduces the prospect of receiving vouchers by about 69 %. The CCM's presidential vote, by contrast, is not significantly associated with the likelihood of receiving vouchers. When we consider the size of W and the CCM vote simultaneously, the CCM vote is insignificant while each percentage increase in W is associated with an equal percentage decrease in the odds of getting vouchers.

The value of vouchers is even more dramatically responsive to coalition size than is the likelihood of receiving vouchers. The second column of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 shows the results when predicting the value of vouchers across all districts while column 3 takes a more nuanced and realistic look at the same question, this time focusing only on those districts actually selected to receive vouchers.

As is seen in column 2 of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, a 10 % increase in the size of the required winning coalition translates into a 15 % decline in the value of vouchers received. The vote for the CCM is insignificantly related to the value of vouchers, although taking the size of W and the CCM vote into account simultaneously, both reduce the value of vouchers, with the effect of W being statistically more significant than the effect of the CCM vote. In column 3 we see that a doubling of W (remembering that the districts receiving vouchers are selected, as we have seen, on the basis of having a small coalition to begin with), produces about a 1/3 reduction in the value of vouchers. The size of the CCM vote, in contrast, is not significantly associated with the value of vouchers in those districts that actually received this private benefit. It seems that even among the small coalition districts—those most likely to receive vouchers—the central government sharply discriminated between those that value private goods the most (the smallest of the small coalition districts) and those that value such goods the least (the relatively larger small coalition districts).

Among the control variables, productivity and population size are associated with getting vouchers and with their value. Contrary to the stated purpose of Tanzania's voucher program, need—as measured by the proportion of the district's population below the poverty line—has no consequential impact on the use of vouchers to help stimulate the agricultural economy. Spending on road construction as a percentage of the district budget reinforces the selectorate evidence for a private-goods orientation in small coalition districts. The vote for the CCM also is negatively associated with spending on road construction. When the required winning coalition is small and the support coalition also is small, more is spent on roads than when either or both are large. Less productive, wealthier, less densely populated districts generally experience greater spending on road construction. It seems road construction is not being used to alleviate poverty, but is being used to reinforce coalition loyalty in small coalition districts. The allocation of resources devoted to private benefits that can easily be targeted to loyal supporters seems to follow the expectations derived from the selectorate theory. The results are uneven with regard to the role that the size of a support coalition (that is, the vote for the CCM) plays in party decisions to dole out rewards. Finally, these results do not encourage the conclusion that the allocation of resources for vouchers and road construction is being used to alleviate poverty and improve general living conditions.

Table 3.2 Bivariate correlation: independent variables

N = 119	Log (W)	Log (CCM)	Log (Poverty)	Log (Productivity)	Log (Vouchers)	Log (Population)	Log (Population/Km²)
Log (W)	1.00						
Log (CCM)	0.36	1.00					
Log (Poverty)	0.059	−0.00	1.00				
Log (Productivity)	−0.18	0.19	0.03	1.00			
Log (Vouchers)	−0.29	−0.03	−0.09	0.33	1.00		
Log (Population	0.52	0.93	0.07	0.18	−0.01	1.00	
Log (Population/Km²	0.28	0.18	−0.44	−0.25	−0.16	0.13	1.00

Table 3.3 Tests of model 1: the role of winning coalition size on district resource allocations

Model 1: size of winning coalition	Vouchers?	Voucher value, all districts	Voucher value, districts getting vouchers	Road budget	GINI	Home electric	Ed. budget	Health care access	Infant mortality
Log(W)	−0.686 2.36*	−1.532 2.74#	−0.330 2.74#	−0.003 4.42#	−0.025 2.41*	0.408 2.50*	0.800 1.42	0.192 4.23#	−0.078 2.10*
Log Poverty	−0.469 0.83	−1.105 1.02	0.165 1.62	−0.004 2.33*	−0.029 1.50	−2.259 7.34#	−1.141 1.07	0.402 3.57#	0.244 3.50#
Log Productivity	0.779 2.63#	1.138 2.85#	0.513 1.65	−0.002 3.64#	−0.010 1.37	0.003 0.02	0.158 0.36	0.041 1.11	−0.055 2.07*
Log Voucher				0.000 0.32	0.000 0.11	−0.018 0.69	−0.003 0.04	−0.004 0.50	−0.007 1.12
Log Population	0.299 0.63	0.852 0.96	1.038 4.23#		0.030 1.88	−0.772 3.07#	0.605 0.70		0.071 1.24
Log Pop/km²				−0.002 3.37#				0.010 0.30	
Constant	−0.043 0.01	6.375 0.68	−1.929 0.73	0.078 7.76#	3.586 20.90#	14.294 5.40#	8.232 0.91	5.227 8.28#	3.862 6.43#
Observations	119	119	39	113	119	119	118	117	118
R-squared		0.18	0.50	0.33	0.08	0.38	0.06	0.27	0.16

Absolute value of z- or t-statistics is displayed in second row of each cell (z for Voucher: Yes or No and t- statistic for all others).
*Significant at 5 %
#Significant at 1 %

Table 3.4 Tests of model 2: the role of support coalition size on district resource allocations

Model 2: size of support coalition	Vouchers?	Voucher value, all districts	Voucher value, districts getting vouchers	Road budget	GINI	Home electric	Ed. budget	Health care access	Infant mortality
Log(CCM)	-1.125	-2.373	0.199	-0.007	0.035	0.325	-1.973	0.401	0.176
	1.10	1.13	0.49	6.84#	0.94	0.55	0.99	6.10#	1.32
Log Poverty	-0.549	-1.443	0.374	-0.004	-0.026	-2.219	-1.366	0.416	0.262
	0.97	1.27	1.10	2.52*	1.27	6.88#	1.25	0.399#	3.64#
Log Productivity	0.949	1.526	0.224	-0.001	-0.006	-0.075	0.037	-0.023	-0.045
	3.30#	3.94#	2.03*	1.54	0.88	0.064	0.09	0.65	1.71
Log Voucher				0.000	0.001	-0.033	-0.044	-0.008	-0.003
				0.98	0.82	1.26	0.50	1.05	0.48
Log Population	0.690	1.609	0.554		-0.024	-0.703	3.100		-0.157
	0.70	0.79	1.43		0.66	2.92#	1.61		1.22
Log Pop/km^2				-0.002				0.001	
				3.56#				0.03	
Constant	0.053	6.928	-1.221	0.114	3.476	14.292	8.802	3.054	3.818
	0.01	0.72	0.41	9.75#	20.39#	5.26#	0.97	3.94#	6.37#
Observations	119	119	39	113	119	119	118	117	118
R-Squared		0.13	0.39	0.45	0.04	0.35	0.05	0.37	0.14

Absolute value of z- or t-statistics is displayed in second row of each cell (z for Voucher: Yes or No and t- statistic for all others).
*Significant at 5 %
#Significant at 1 %

Table 3.5 Tests of model 1: the role of winning coalition and support coalition size on district resource allocations

Model 3: size of winning coalition and support coalition	Vouchers?	Voucher value, all districts	Voucher value, districts getting vouchers	Road budget	GINI	Home electric	Ed. budget	Health care access	Infant mortality
Log(W)	−1.010	−2.179	−0.347	−0.002	−0.026	0.570	0.688	0.115	−0.070
	3.00#	3.63#	2.69*	2.48*	2.21*	3.13#	1.09	2.61*	1.66*
Log(CCM)	−2.820	−5.670	−0.156	−0.006	−0.007	1.251	−0.870	0.338	0.063
	2.08*	2.59*	0.40	5.51#	0.17	1.94*	0.39	4.94#	0.42
Log Poverty	−0.711	−1.653	0.503	−0.004	−0.030	−2.125	−1.233	0.378	0.251
	1.21	1.53	1.59	2.27*	1.50	6.81#	1.12	3.68#	3.49#
Log Productivity	0.758	1.054	0.168	−0.001	−0.010	0.007	0.156	−0.011	−0.055
	2.47*	2.70#	1.63	2.04*	1.37	0.06	0.35	0.31	2.05*
Log Voucher				0.000	0.000	−0.006	−0.012	−0.004	−0.006
				0.46	0.07	0.22	0.13	0.55	0.98
Log Population	3.089	6.571	1.175		0.037	−2.044	1.488		0.006
	2.14*	2.77#	2.76#		0.82	2.92#	0.61		0.04
Log Pop/km²				−0.001				−0.014	
				3.03#				0.48	
Constant	0.820	7.168	−1.715	0.119	3.488	14.040	8.400	2.707	3.849
	0.15	0.79	0.63	10.26#	20.79#	5.36#	0.92	3.52#	6.37#
Observations	119	119	39	113	119	119	118	117	118
R-Squared		0.22	0.50	0.48	0.08	0.40	0.06	0.40	0.16

Absolute value of z- or t-statistics is displayed in second row of each cell (z for Voucher: Yes or No and t- statistic for all others).
*Significant at 5 %
#Significant at 1 %

We now look at the relationship between winning coalition and support coalition sizes and public goods at the district level. We begin with income inequality. As expected, the coefficient for log(W) is consistently negative and statistically significant. Districts with larger coalitions also have more equal income distributions than districts that rely on smaller coalitions. The magnitude of CCM support is unrelated to income distribution. The control variables likewise have no consequential effect on income inequality.

Residential electrification is a significant factor in improving the quality of life in a largely rural, agricultural country like Tanzania. Brown and Mobarak (2009) show that as African countries move from small to large coalition environments at the national level they improve the affordability of residential electricity at the expense of industrial subsidies. We cannot quite replicate their tests, but we can come close by evaluating the percentage of electrified homes in each Tanzanian district as a function of coalition size. The results indicate that districts that require a larger winning coalition provide greater residential electrification than districts that depend on a small coalition. Indeed, a doubling of the winning coalition's size is associated with a 57 % increase in the percentage of electrified homes. The CCM's vote, in contrast, is unrelated to residential electrification except at the margin after calculating the impact of log(W). As expected, poverty and a large population act against home electrification. Vouchers do nothing to influence electrification and neither does district productivity.

Next we assess the relationship between coalition size, CCM support, and the percentage of the district's budget spent on education. Here we find that neither the size of W nor the size of the support coalition significantly influences education spending. Neither do any of the control variables. Whatever drives education spending in Tanzania's districts, it is not captured in the models tested here. Health care access, however, is strongly linked to winning coalition size. Doubling W translates into a 20 % improvement in the number of health care facilities per capita. CCM's presidential vote also strongly improves health care access but still, even when controlling for the CCM's vote, the size of W remains a significant contributor to improved health care. Happily, more impoverished districts also enjoy much more health care access, a major consideration in improving the prospects for future productivity. A 10 % increase in poverty in a district converts to about a 4 % increase in health care facilities per capita. This indicates a significant needs-based component to health care access. The poor, of course, are most vulnerable to illness and disease and the government seems to be responsive to this problem.

A final assessment of coalition size effects on health care is seen by looking at district infant mortality rates. Winning coalition size is consistently associated with reduced infant mortality rates. Support for the CCM is not. Even worse, when support for the CCM borders on being statistically significant with regard to infant mortality (as in Table 3.4), then we find that increases in support for the CCM are associated with an increase, not a decrease, in infant mortality. Doubling the minimum winning coalition's size is associated with a decrease of nearly 8 infant deaths per thousand, a substantively important improvement. Poverty, of course,

Table 3.6 Scorecard: significant or insignificant in the predicted direction

	Table 3.3 Log(W)	Table 3.4 Log(CCM)	Table 3.5 Log(W)	Table 3.5 Log(CCM)
Voucher Dummy	Significant	Not Significant	**Significant**	**Significant**
Log(Vouchers)|District Received Vouchers	**Significant**	Not Significant	**Significant**	Not Significant
Log(Road Construction Spending)	**Significant**	**Significant**	**Significant**	**Significant**
Log(GINI)	**Significant**	Not Significant	**Significant**	Not Significant
Log(Residential Electrification)	**Significant**	Not Significant	**Significant**	**Significant**
Log(Education Spending)	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant
Log(Health Care Access)	**Significant**	**Significant**	**Significant**	**Significant**
Log(Infant Mortality)	**Significant**	Not Significant	**Significant**	Not Significant
Total	7/8	2/8	7/8	4/8

contributes to a sharply higher infant mortality rate and productive economic activity helps reduce infant mortality.

Conclusion

What have we learned? Table 3.6 provides a scorecard. It shows that the required size of the winning coalition is consistent with selectorate hypotheses in 88 % of the tests. The size of the support coalition—the CCM vote—significantly influences choices on the dependent variables only 38 % of the time. Thus, the analysis illuminates some of the problems that may hinder improved living conditions in Tanzania. Important structural pathologies distort efforts to improve quality of life in Tanzania. These structural pathologies are consistent with the incentive-based rational-choice arguments promoted both by Mitra (2011, 2005) and by selectorate theory. This means that incentive-based rational-actor logic might be used to infer changes that are likely to improve welfare in Tanzania or wherever else similar patterns exist. Although what needs to be fixed is clear and so are some of the policy changes required to fix things, we should not underestimate the tenacity of entrenched interests whose influence, inevitably, will be diminished by moving Tanzania from its current equilibrium to a new equilibrium. Identifying what might be changed is not the same as implementing the changes. As to the question of what needs to be done, our hope is that those in a position to do so will heed

studies like this and look for incentive compatible means to convince entrenched leaders to alter how they use domestic and foreign-aid-based resources so that these resources improve the quality of life of impoverished people regardless of how they vote.

The international aid community is in a position to use economic assistance as a lever to encourage better resource allocation decisions. Aid funds could be concentrated on constituencies that rely on a large coalition. Such aid funds might be distributed directly to the local governments rather than through the national government, although this might merely shift politicised practices from the centre to the districts. If the international aid donor community makes funding conditional on coalition-increasing electoral and political reform, then it is likely that Tanzania can be moved toward greater growth, more equal opportunities, and greatly improved quality of life. In the absence of such pressures—and other selectorate studies suggest that aid donors are not interested primarily in improving economic outcomes in recipient countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009a, b)—the small coalition framework is likely to become more entrenched, retarding progress even as it enriches a few at the top of the political order.

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Part II
The Post-Colonial State in South Asia

Chapter 4
India's Social Challenges

Dietmar Rothermund

Introduction: Social Welfare and the Nation State

The legitimacy of government depends to a large extent on its ability to overcome the social challenges faced by the nation which it governs (Mitra and Singh 1999, 2009). In many parts of the world the nation state had to yield many parts of its sovereignty, but social welfare has remained its exclusive prerogative nevertheless. India with its huge dimensions and its millions of poor people is not in a position to attain the standards of a welfare state. However, the Republic of India led by Jawaharlal Nehru had staked a claim to provide for the welfare of its citizens as far as possible. As Sudipta Kaviraj has pointed out, the very success of the Nehruvian state created its difficulties (Kaviraj 1995). The ambitious state raised the expectation of its citizens and ran the risk of being judged in terms of its aims of guaranteeing social justice.

The challenges faced by India were enormous. Feeding the Indian millions was a major task. This was achieved with the help of the Green Revolution and its increase in the yields of major crops. But the growth of more food and the elimination of epidemic diseases also led to an increase of population. A rapid fall of the death rate rather than a high birthrate caused this increase. Whereas elsewhere the decline in the death rate had been paralleled by a decline in the birthrate, this did not happen in India for several decades. It is only in recent years that the Indian birthrate has declined. a phenomenon which will be discussed in detail later on.

The Indian peasantry follows a law of inheritance which demands that the landholding of the father will be distributed equally among his sons. With population increase this inevitably leads to a continuous subdivision of holdings. As uneconomic holdings predominate, the productivity of agriculture declines and

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the reserve army of landless laborers swells, only to be exploited by those who still own sufficient land. For a long time, Indian agriculture absorbed surplus labour like a huge sponge, saving the cities from being swamped by migrants. Whereas more than two thirds of the Indian people still live and work in the rural areas, the primary sector only contributes about one sixth to the Gross Domestic Product. Even now, India is under urbanised by world standards, but its megacities expand at an alarming rate. India is facing many challenges at present. Here, we shall discuss only six major challenges: (1) The utilisation of the 'Demographic Dividend' which accrues to India due to the recent decline of the birth rate, (2) the need for more intensive healthcare, (3) the demand for education, (4) the degradation of the environment and water scarcity (5) the alleviation of poverty, (6) the problem of the neglect of Indian women.

The economic reforms of 1991 have led to a relative reduction of state expenditure on social services although the improvement of human capital is of great importance for India's further development. But the reformers felt that 'the market' will take care of this. The technocratic bias of the reforms has also led to a neglect of the protection of the environment. Poverty alleviation is considered to be an important task of the state, but it has often been approached as if it were a matter of charity rather than of nation building. Finally, the neglect of women is a problem, which cuts across all fields of social policy mentioned above.

The Demographic Dividend

For many years India seemed to experience a 'population explosion'. The demographic transition, which was experienced by so many other countries, where a decline in the death rate was soon followed by a decline in the birth rate, seemed to elude India. Only in recent years a rather sudden decline in the Indian birthrate raised the hope that India would soon benefit from a 'demographic dividend', which accrues to countries whose adult population no longer has to take care of too many dependents. This population can then increase its savings, provided it is in gainful employment. This transition has come as a surprise for the Indian government, which had sponsored 'family planning' for a long time with limited success. China's 'One Child' rule could not be implemented in India. China actually forced the onset of its 'demographic dividend' in this way and has exhausted it by now. It accrues to a nation only in a period of about 30 years. After that, the window of opportunity is closed and the nation concerned has to rely on the benefits, which it has derived from this period. Indira Gandhi tried hard to implement an effective policy of family planning by even introducing campaigns of mass sterilisation. This contributed to her defeat in the elections of 1977 and when she returned to power in 1980 she did not revive her old policies. Even the term 'family planning' was abandoned and replaced with 'family welfare', which sounded more benign. Indira Gandhi died before she could witness the fall in the birthrate, which she had hoped to bring about. It may sound cynical, but the fall of the birthrate which then set in

the 1990s may have been caused by the neglect of social services, which accompanied the economic reforms. Poor and illiterate women were in the vanguard of a new wave of birth control. The usual theory of demographers that increasing income and the education of women lead to a reduction of the birthrate was falsified in India (Visaria 2004). It seems that a feeling spread among poor women that 'the future is no longer what it used to be'. A parallel for this can be seen in the sudden drop in the birthrate in East Germany after re-unification in 1989 (Witte and Wagner 1995). Young women who used to expect help in childcare from the state under the old regime of East Germany postponed having babies as they were not sure what they could expect from the market-oriented new regime. South India was far ahead of North India in the reduction of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). In most South Indian states the TRF was already below the standard reproduction rate of 2.1 while in Northern India it was still above 3. The window of opportunity provided by the demographic dividend will, of course only be of benefit to the nation, if there is adequate employment. Thus, the greatest social challenge for India in the immediate future is to create jobs for those willing and able to work. The workforce also has to be healthy and educated and this leads us to further challenges, which have to be met. As has been pointed out earlier, the reforms have led to cuts in expenditure on social services and this has greatly affected healthcare and education.

Healthcare

The health of the Indian people is not taken care of as well as it should be. The number of undernourished children below 5 years of age is alarming: 42 %. Public expenditure on health services amounts to only 1 % of GDP. There are estimates that about 5 % of GDP are actually spent on healthcare, which means that a large share of it is private expenditure. Health insurance is so far only marginal; the majority of the poor are not insured. If poor persons fall ill, this often means their permanent ruin. Nowadays there are private hospitals in India, which are of world standard and attract 'medical tourists' from abroad who can get operations done in India at about 10 % of the cost which they would have to bear at home. But state supported healthcare is of low quality. Only in some states such as Tamil Nadu it is up to the mark. In 2005 the central government inaugurated a National Rural Health Mission (NRHM). Under this scheme Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) are recruited in villages.[1] These ASHAs are appointed by the village councils. The central government provides them with a modest remuneration and a health kit which contains generic medicines including Ayurvedic ones. Ayurveda has been looked down upon by professional physicians, but its virtues have been rediscovered. India has an impressive pharmaceutical industry. There is no dearth

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[1] Asha means hope and is a popular name for girls.

of affordable medicines. But there is a shortage of medical personnel. The number of fully qualified physicians has risen from 62,000 in 1951 to 760,000 at present. They are aided by 1.5 million trained nurses. But for a nation of 1.2 billion this is not enough. The number of hospitals is also insufficient, there are about 15,000 in the whole of India, but two thirds of them are located in cities. There is less than one hospital bed for 1,000 people in India. Schemes such as the NRHM are to be welcomed, but they attract corruption. In some cases politicians have squirreled away large amounts of the money allocated for healthcare centres. While corruption is a matter of undue political influence at the top, absenteeism of staff members of healthcare centres affects the system at the level of public service. Studies have shown that about 40 % of the health staff shirk their duty in this way.

Education

The Indian education system has also suffered from a reduction of public expenditure after the reforms. The government has frequently asserted that 6 % of GDP should be spent on education. Since GDP has grown during the last decade the amounts allocated for education have increased, but these allocations have remained below 3 % of GDP. Special attention has been devoted to elementary education. The enrolment of pupils has increased to about 90 % of the respective age group. But enrolment is not enough, regular school attendance is what really matters. The provision of midday meals in schools has helped to increase attendance. This scheme has been financed by the central government since 2004. At present about 130 million children get these meals. The Government of Tamil Nadu had started such a scheme in the 1960s and in 2001 the Supreme Court had made it mandatory for all State governments to participate in providing such meals. While school attendance has been improved in this way, the quality of instruction still leaves much to be desired. The Right to Education Act passed in 2009 which makes this right a fundamental one to be guaranteed by the state has not changed the quality of instruction. A government report of 2010 shows that 50 % of the pupils of the fifth standard do not attain the skills of reading and writing expected from those of the second standard. School education should enable the young people to be successful in the labour market. But for this, qualified teachers are required and they are in short supply. Moreover, the teachers often show a lack of discipline. They are paid by the State government which fails to supervise them properly. About 25 % of the teachers are usually not taking their classes. If they were paid and supervised by the village councils, they would not be able to shirk their duty in this way. But the teachers have powerful unions which fight against such a change in their terms of service. There are about 2.5 million primary school teachers in India. Supervising them effectively is impossible, unless supervision is decentralized and entrusted to the village authorities. High schools and universities are not covered by the Right to Education Act. They offer a higher education to about 10 % of the age group from 17 to 23 years. This is far below the world average of 23 %. India's quest for a

"knowledge economy" is not fostered by this meagre provision of higher education. Moreover, the quality of the teachers in this field is also not the best except for those teaching in elite institutions like the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs). The IITs are also exceptional in terms of the discipline of their teachers. Absenteeism does not exist at this level. This is not due to close supervision but to the attitude of the teachers. They care for the respect of their peers and they can earn this only by maintaining high standards in teaching and research.

India has the third highest number of students after the USA and China, but the grades they acquire are not corresponding to international standards. Indian professors receive a fairly decent pay, but in all subjects which are also in demand in the private sector, there is a dearth of good university teachers. Moreover, Indian universities concentrate on teaching and do not encourage research. Therefore students are rarely taught by professors who can inspire them with the devotion to their own research. The University Grants Commission (UGC) which should set standards of excellence in this field can hardly cope with this task. Universities have been well financed in recent years, but professors complain that their students are lacking a good school education and are hardly equipped for their studies at the university. Thus a fundamental reform of the education system is required so as to enable India to face the social challenge of progressing towards a 'knowledge economy'.

The Degradation of the Environment, Water Scarcity and Climate Change

The phenomena of economic growth unfortunately also give rise to an increasing degradation of the environment. This manifests itself in many ways: deforestation is progressing at a rapid rate, air and water are polluted, garbage dumps—often containing toxic waste—are proliferating, and the level of groundwater keeps sinking. In the megacities with their sprawling slums these problems are particularly obvious. Slum dwellers are not necessarily poor. Most slums are active locations of marketable production. But the slum dwellers cannot afford paying rents for urban housing and are thus condemned to stay in their slums. Environmental problems do not only affect the cities but also the countryside. The lavish use of fertilizers and pesticides leads to a deterioration of the soil and also penetrates to lower levels where it pollutes the aquifers carrying groundwater. Rivers can cope with pollution in short periods whereas aquifers take thousands of years to regain their purity. The drilling of deep tube wells has often contributed to a sucking up of poisonous substances such as arsenic which are embedded in layers not touched earlier. Peasants who invest in tube wells must spend at least 3,000 US-Dollars for a well. If that well runs dry, they are ruined. Neighbours digging deeper wells may contribute to their ruin by pre-empting the flow of groundwater. There are authorities that are supposed to regulate the access to

groundwater, but they are often unable even to maintain a register of the wells drilled day by day. The mobile drilling rigs operated by enterprising companies cost about 300,000 US-Dollars each and they must be put to use continuously in order to justify this investment. Social control is of utmost importance in this field but it is difficult to impose. Water Users Associations have implemented collective control in many parts of India. Peasants are also able to make joint efforts for harvesting water. Rainwater often flows unutilized into the rivers. Earlier joint water harvesting was part of traditional agrarian practices, such as maintaining tanks which had to be desilted regularly. The drilling of wells enabled individual peasants to opt out of such joint endeavours. Reviving these practices would reduce the dependence on tube wells. India's hunger for energy has led to the intensive exploitation of the huge deposits of coal. Most of these are located in forests inhabited by tribal people. Many forests have been cut without paying attention to the livelihood of these people. The Minister of Environment had declared some of these forests as 'no go'-area. But he faced resistance to this from business interests. He was then shifted to another ministry. Degradation of the environment and the neglect of weak groups of the population combine so as to create the conditions for violent resistance. The Maoists who challenge the state authorities in many parts of Eastern India with the force of arms thrive under these circumstances. India wants to have a forest cover of one third of its territory. According to official data only one fifth does have such a cover, but satellite photographs indicate that only one tenth is still covered. A forest is only recognized as such if the canopies of its trees touch each other. This criterion is rarely applicable in India, where 'forests' often consist of isolated trees and shrubs. Reforestation is an urgent task, but it is hampered by the fact that is considered to be the duty of the state. The local population is not at all involved in it. 'Social forestry' has been acclaimed as a solution to this problem. It is entrusted to the village communities and some positive results have been reported. But it has not been pursued with vigour. This is unfortunate because the Chipko movement had shown long ago that local people, particularly women, are taking an active interest in their forests. The forest authorities are geared to the protection of the forest by defending it against the people rather than with the people. Moreover, foresters are often corrupt and permit the depredation of the forest by ruthless contractors. The spread of social forestry is therefore an urgent task in India.

India belongs to the group of countries which affect the world climate with their emissions. Of course, India can always point out that its per capita emissions are negligible compared to the industrialised countries of the West. But in absolute terms India's emissions are considerable. Putting the blame on others does not help India when the monsoon is affected by climate change, endangering the very survival of the country. About 16 % of India's territory is drought prone; if this increases and droughts become more frequent, famines may occur. Thus both the prevention of environmental degradation and of climate change pose serious challenges to India.

Poverty Alleviation

In 1972 Indira Gandhi stated at the first United Nations summit on the protection of the environment that poverty is the greatest pollution. One year earlier she had adopted the election slogan 'Garibi hatao' (Beat poverty) and had won the elections. Nevertheless poverty could not be overcome in India and has remained a permanent social challenge. There were frequent debates on how to define the poverty line. As early as 1962, an official commission had defined this line in terms of the daily intake of food. Some other marginal needs were also taken into consideration, but not healthcare and education as it was assumed that the state would take care of these needs. This was an illusion, nevertheless another commission appointed in 1979 again restricted its deliberations to food requirements and held that 2,400 kcal per day in rural areas and 2,100 in the cities should be sufficient. Whoever got less was below the poverty line. The findings of 1979 were then projected further based on current food prices. In the euphoria following the reforms of 1991 the Planning Commission announced that by now only 19 % of the Indian people were below the poverty line. Experts raised a vigorous protest against this announcement. The Planning Commission then lapsed into silence for a while. The Economic Survey for 2005–2006 refrained from making a statement on this contentious issue and pointed to the continuing debates. The Planning Commission soon issued a revised estimate: 27.8 % of the Indian people are below the poverty line. The absolute figure of the poor was about 300 million. All this was based on the old nutritional norms. International studies which define the poverty line at a daily income of 1.25 US-Dollars (at Purchasing Power Parity) estimate that 41.6 % of the Indian people are below the poverty line. This would amount to an absolute figure of 500 million, which seems to be a realistic estimate. The data of the Global Hunger Index reflect this assessment (International Food Policy Research Institute 2009). The index places India at rank 66 of 88 countries. It is based on three indicators: general malnutrition, underweight of children below 5, mortality of children below 5. The publication also lists data for India's federal states. Most of them have ranks comparable to those of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.

For a long time Indian poverty was regarded as a rural problem. If poverty was noticed in the cities it was regarded as a spillover of rural poverty which forced people to migrate to the cities. It is only in recent years that urban poverty has been recognized as a problem sui generis. The general approach to poverty alleviation had been to help the rural poor by food for work programmes or transfer payments. The most recent programme of this type is the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme under an act passed in 2005. It takes note of the fact that the rural poor are generally landless labourers who are unemployed when neither ploughing nor harvesting create a demand for their labour. In earlier times, landowners fed their labour force throughout the year so as to be sure of their help in the busy seasons. By now there is a huge reserve army of landless labourers on which the landowners can rely. But they pay these labourers only during busy periods which

means, that on the average these labourers are unemployed during 100 days per year. For this period they can then apply for employment under the Guarantee Scheme. The authorities must find work for them and if they cannot do so they must nevertheless pay the applicants. This means a giant transfer payment which has had some success as far as poverty alleviation is concerned, but it does not necessarily enhance rural productivity. Due to its climate India could actually become the hothouse of the world, exporting a great variety of agricultural produce. But this requires an adequate infrastructure. It is said that about one third of India's agricultural produce goes waste before it reaches the consumer. The economic activity of the informal sector provides some income to the urban poor. There are estimates that the total production of Dharavi, Mumbai's slum which houses about a million people, amounts to one million US-Dollars per day. Only 10 % of the people of Dharavi are unemployed, the rest manages to alleviate their own poverty quite successfully. Urban poverty cannot be eradicated by means of transfer payments. Rural as well as urban productivity must be enhanced.

The Neglect of Indian Women

The neglect of Indian women is a problem which constitutes one of the greatest social challenges. Press reports on the rape and death of a young woman in New Delhi have attracted global attention. There have been public demonstrations in India which have indicated that violence against women is a widespread phenomenon. Due to the very nature of this problem it is usually hidden behind a wall of silence. Actually the respect for Indian women is ingrained in the national culture. There is a great deal of evidence for this in ancient literature and the many goddesses of the Hindu pantheon also testify to this phenomenon. On the other hand the norms of a patriarchal society determine that the position of a woman in the family is secure only after she has become the mother of a son. Northern India is a stronghold of this patriarchal tradition. This is reflected by the regional distribution of the female deficit which is one of the striking features of Indian society. From 1901 to 2001 the number of women per 1,000 men has decreased from 972 to 933. In recent times the new methods of prenatal diagnosis of the sex of unborn children has encouraged the abortion of females. The application of these methods has been prohibited by law, but this can be easily circumvented. This is also true of the prohibition of early marriages. Census data show that particularly in rural Northern India married women in their early teens are to be found very frequently. Young daughters-in-law can be easily replaced and no money is wasted on their healthcare. Parents will often argue that daughters are a burden because of the demand for dowry by the prospective husbands. The demand of dowry is also prohibited by law, but this does not prevent the future husbands from asking for 'presents'. Where old matriarchal traditions are still alive, as in Kerala, there is even a surplus of women, whereas the Punjab has a female deficit which surpasses the national average. States with a high female deficit will in due course face the

problem of missing brides. In China this problem is already well known and the men who cannot find brides are called 'barren branches'. In India, Northern men looking for brides may have to go to Southern India, but the men there would certainly not welcome such migrants.

The neglect of women is also reflected by their rate of illiteracy. At present the rate of illiteracy for men is 24 % and for women 46 %. The illiteracy rate in India has decreased since the attainment of independence, but the gap between male and female rates of illiteracy has remained more or less the same. The share of women in local government was also very limited until a law made it mandatory that one third of the members of village councils must be women. There should also be a concerted drive to recruit more women for the police. At present only about 13 % of the police staff are women, this should also be enhanced to 33 %. There are frequent complaints of the rape of women in police custody. Women therefore avoid contact with the police. This would change if there were more women serving in the police. The image of the poor illiterate and neglected Indian woman contrasts with that of the active woman of the Indian middle class who even attains positions earlier held only by men. One should not forget, of course, that these successful women are so to speak standing on the shoulders of the poor women who serve them as cooks and maids, as sweepers and nannies and enable them to pursue careers in business and politics. However, middle class women often are in the vanguard of those who fight for women's rights including those of poor women. The recent demonstrations which have been mentioned above have shown this very clearly.

A wonderful example of a middle class woman standing up for the rights of poor women is Ela Bhatt, the founder of SEWA (Self-employed Women's Association). As a young lawyer she joined the legal division of the Textile Labour Association of Ahmadabad. In this position she came to know the wives of textile labourers who earned some extra money with their handicrafts. This was Ela Bhatt's introduction to the 'informal sector' of the Indian economy. She organized SEWA as a trade union in 1972. This was no easy task, because being self-employed, these women did not have an employer—and where there is no employer there cannot be a trade union. But Ela Bhatt managed to overcome this obstacle. SEWA was recognized as a union and soon had many members who got an adequate pay for their work. Ela Bhatt became know internationally. She has shown how her service helped to fight poverty. If more women take initiatives like this, India can master the social challenges which it is facing at present.

Conclusion: Empowering Local Government

In the introduction it was stated that the legitimacy of government depends on its ability to meet the challenges faced by the nation. The survey of some major social challenges has shown that the Indian central government and the governments of federal states are hardly in a position to master this task.

Decentralization in terms of an empowerment of local government is urgently required. The demographic dividend will accrue to India only if all those willing and able to work also find jobs. Since two thirds of the Indian people are still living in rural areas, the majority of the jobs have to be created there, and this means first and foremost an increase in the productivity of agriculture. Infrastructure, the transport of marketable crops, extension services etc. should be improved, and the village councils ought to be empowered to deal with such matters. The 'white revolution' of enhanced milk supply has demonstrated that in properly organized special fields the rural people can do very well. The spread of healthcare to every village is another important task. The ASHA programme is a step in the right direction. It should be backed up with a public healthcare centre in every village supervised by the village council. This would prevent absenteeism of the staff. Similarly, primary schools and their teachers should be under the supervision of the village council. Social forestry and the social control of water use, as well as the organization of water harvesting should also be managed by the village council. Poverty alleviation which is so far a top-down affair run like a huge charity should be turned into a campaign for the mobilisation of productive work locally. People should be empowered to alleviate their poverty themselves. The neglect of women could be stopped by starting with their empowerment at the local level. The provision that one third of the members of the village councils have to be women is a step in the right direction, but these women will only be able to become effective if the powers of the village councils are enhanced. In legal terms many steps have been taken to secure the position of these councils, but this has not been followed up by giving them sufficient powers of control and financial authority. There has been much talk about 'capacity building' in India, but this can only be done by entrusting those whose capacities should be built with responsibility.

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Chapter 5
Neo-Liberal Reforms, the Ethnic Conflict and the Decline of Liberal Democracy in Sri Lanka

Siri Hettige

Introduction

This essay was written as a contribution to the edited volume to be published to felicitate Professor Subrata Mitra who is a long standing friend and colleague of mine. It is his abiding interest in South Asian politics that gave us the opportunity to interact closely with each other in the late 1990s when we shared a deep interest in youth and politics in South Asia. We continue to enjoy our friendship and collaboration to this day.

Political developments following the end of the ethnic war in Sri Lanka in mid 2009 clearly point to an erosion of the liberal democratic system of governance in the country. The period of conflict in particular its most decisive last stage spanning for several years, was the most polarized and contentious in terms of both ideological and physical violence. Emotions were running high on both sides of the ethnic divide. Intolerance of conciliatory views became clearly evident. Given the determination of the two conflicting parties to fight an all out war to a finish, any moderate voices that attempted to intervene and bring about a peaceful settlement became the target of vicious attacks, both verbal and physical. Media institutions, journalists and civil society organizations that were critical of the government campaigned for basic human rights like freedom of expression and peaceful settlement of conflict and faced threats and at times violent attacks. State controlled media became virtual government propaganda machines and denied journalists working in such institutions any freedom. Political control over public institutions undermined professionalism in such organizations to a considerable extent, making it difficult for the officials to function independently in keeping with rules and regulations. The most recent incident of political interference was the removal of

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the Chief Justice of the country following a controversial impeachment motion passed by parliament.

The above developments need to be analyzed taking into consideration three key factors, namely (a) post-colonial social, economic and political developments, (b) more recent economic reforms under the influence of neo-liberalism and (c) the long standing ethnic conflict that led to a steady militarization of Sri Lankan society. This chapter is intended to examine these three factors. It is argued that the erosion of liberal democratic system of government is the result of a combination of circumstances, some of which are recent developments while others can be traced back to the first few decades since independence.

Post Independence Social Change

Sri Lanka's independence in 1948 was a peaceful transition from the British colonial rule to self-rule through an orderly constitutional process. Yet, the social and cultural divisions and the structure of the colonial economy contained the seeds of discontent and division that came to the surface following independence. While the ethnic divide between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority became the most contentious political issue, the gap became wider due to some of the public policies pursued after independence. A predominantly agrarian economy that emerged during the colonial period could not generate a large enough surplus to accommodate a steadily expanding, younger population with aspirations for upward social mobility. Though an import substitution industrialization policy was followed since the mid 1950s, industrialization process was slow and did not lead to rapid employment generation at a time when population growth and the expansion of the education system gave rise to a larger, restless population looking for opportunities to escape rural poverty and underemployment. The country's younger people despite their almost uniform, livelihood aspirations became increasingly divided on ethno-linguistic lines. Persisting cultural divisions and the increasing alienation of the youth from the wider politico-economic structures and processes prepared an environment conducive for the rise of youth militancy. While a significant section of the young population, both in the south as well as in the north was attracted to violent, anti-systematic youth politics, the state also became increasingly repressive towards violent youth movements. Many youths were killed in the process.

Post-Independence economic and social policies did not help create a harmonious society. A vibrant leftist movement, spearheaded by two Marxist political parties, namely the Communist Party (CP) and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) with the backing of a vibrant trade union movement affiliated to these parties, persuaded successive post-independence regimes at least since the mid 1950s to adopt socialist economic policies. These included labour legislation to provide greater protection to workers, nationalization of foreign and locally owned private enterprises and establishment of many state enterprises including import

Table 5.1 Population growth in Sri Lanka ('000)

Decade	Decade average	Rate of natural increase
1879–1879	2,552	0.5
1880–1889	2,820	0.5
1890–1899	3,197	0.7
1990–1909	3,777	0.9
1910–1919	4,336	0.8
1920–1929	4,811	1.3
1930–1939	5,566	1.3
1940–1949	6,631	2.0
1950–1959	8,827	2.7
1963	10,582	2.63
1971	12,689	2.2
1981	14,846	1.67
1996	18,300	1.2

Source: Snodgrass (1968): 307 Census and Statistics Department Various reports

Table 5.2 Employment by sector in Sri Lanka (No. of persons)

Year	Government	Semi government	Private
1977	422,647	617,033	283,437
1978	446,085	652,472	321,951
1979	470,118	747,034	315,972
1982	484,802	784,370	345,679
1987	513,300	752,700	N.A.
1989	588,500	749,700	425,784
1991	652,959	654,000	687,086
1992	653,959	637,271	N.A.
1993	676,403	618,793	N.A.

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Review of the Economy, Various Years

substitution industries. These policies on the one hand hampered the growth of the private sector and on the other, increased the dependence of the wider population on the state for public resources such as credit, land, subsidized services and employment. A slow rate of economic growth in the context of a steadily expanding population made it virtually impossible for the state to satisfy the growing aspirations of a mostly rural population, in particular, the aspirations of upwardly mobile younger generations' exposed to modern education. The result was growing restlessness among youth. Many educated rural youth in southern Sri Lanka rallied round the People's Liberation Front (JVP), a militant leftist party that staged the first armed uprising in 1971 against a progressive, left of centre regime elected less than a year earlier. The uprising was put down by the use of force and the leaders of the movement were jailed for varying periods of time (Tables 5.1 and 5.2).

Two important aspects of the post-colonial social transformation from the early 1950s onwards have been the increasing importance of ethno-nationalism in politics and the rise of the socialist, central planning model in economic management. While the post-colonial state in general became increasingly interventionist in economic and social planning following independence, the tendency became

more pronounced since the mid 1950s. For instance, the broadly Sinhala-nationalist regime that came to power in 1956 adopted an increasingly state-led development model. Economic and social policies adopted were inspired by socialist ideas and an increasingly politically conscious population became more and more dependent on the state for their material and social needs.

The demographic, social, economic and political changes since the mid 1950s came together to produce some highly significant shifts in the politico-economic landscape of the country. While the rate of population growth remained quite high in the 1960s and 1970s, the demand for material resources increased steadily exerting unprecedented pressure on such resources as land and employment. This naturally resulted in great competition among the population groups for such resources. The fact that the state had by now become the most significant conduit for channelling scarce resources had significant political implications. This was particularly so because the Sri Lankan state had already become clearly associated with the county's majority Sinhala Buddhist community. As is well documented by social scientists, the coming into power of the 1956 regime was greatly aided by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist groups, in particular politically active Buddhist priests. Some of the measures taken by the new regime addressed the grievances of the Sinhala- Buddhist nationalists. These measures included the adoption of Sinhala as the official language in place of English and the conversion of two traditional Buddhist educational institutions in to universities. This latter step was largely in recognition of the political contribution made by a number of scholarly Buddhists monks affiliated to these two traditional monasteries.

The persisting political influence of the Sinhala nationalist groups on the state tended to alienate the minorities in the political sphere. The small yet influential English educated burger community left the country looking for better opportunities elsewhere. Most of them ended up in Australia where they have been socially and economically well integrated. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan Tamil minority though agitated and aggrieved by some of the state policies since independence continued to campaign for their collective rights. Their political aspirations eventually gave rise to a violent separatist campaign that ended in the defeat of the LTTE in 2009.

The period from the mid 1950s to late 1970s has been characterized by the dominant role played by the state in the management of the country's economy, both nationally and internationally. The rate of economic growth did not keep up with population growth leading to a persisting or even widening gap between rising expectations of the general population and the available opportunities. This is particularly so in the case of the younger population increasingly exposed to modern education. Since urban industrialization was insignificant during the period, increasing population had to be mostly accommodated in the rural areas. Increasing population pressure on land led to landlessness, land fragmentation, poverty and unemployment (see Table 5.3). The state took various measures to relieve population pressure on land such as the establishment of new settlements and import substitution industries, but the situation did not improve rapidly. Population groups

Table 5.3 Land and population in the peasant sector

Year	Cultivated peasant land	Peasant population	Peasant population per acre
1871	954	1,831	1.9
1901	1,370	2,541	1.9
1931	1,809	3,921	2.2
1959	2,351	7,297	3.1

Source: Snodgrass (1966)

that competed with each other for resources, particularly ethnic groups, perceived the competition as a zero sum game. This situation reinforced tension among ethnic groups, in particular between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils both of which traditionally have been peasant population.

Liberal Economic Reforms

The conditions mentioned above prepared the ground for a major public debate on development. While the socialists argued for further socialization of the economy, liberally minded politicians proposed radical economic reforms to allow the market both, local and global, to play a dominant role in the economy. The voters already exposed to widespread unemployment, economic hardships and shortage of consumer goods voted overwhelmingly in favour of liberal economic reforms at the 1977 general election. The newly elected pro-market regime in 1977 introduced policies that encouraged foreign investments, reduced state control over much of the economy, and facilitated private economic initiatives. While social sector expenditure was reduced, infrastructure projects were financed using both external and domestic funds.

The outcomes of liberal economic reforms have been complex. They have also been shaped by the ethnic war that had significant economic and social implications. The impact of economic reforms implemented since 1977 would have been quite different, if not for the devastating war that absorbed enormous material and human resources. Yet, it is not easy to practically disentangle the economy from the war and visualize how the economy would have behaved under liberal economic reforms in the absence of war. What is significant however is that despite the on-going ethnic war, the economic reforms program introduced in 1977 has been carried forward by successive governments since then without any significant reversals, though there had been considerable debate, controversy and ideological contestation on the matter between different political parties and groups. Given the fact that the liberal reforms had already resulted in a closer integration of the local economy with the global economy, even the regimes that displayed some reservations about radical market reforms could do little to alter the path along which the economy was already moving. The coming into power of a left of centre regime led by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumarathunga in 1994, after a lapse of 17 years of

UNP rule, signified the popular disenchantment with what has been popularly referred to as the open economic policy. Despite several significant state interventions to mitigate the corrosive impact of liberal economic reforms, the general thrust towards greater market liberalisation continued unabated. But more significant was the escalation of the war leading to a heightened sense of insecurity in almost all parts of the country due to intermittent yet devastating LTTE bomb attacks targeting both military and civilian targets. An effort made by the regime led by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumarathunga (CBK) to find a peaceful, negotiated political settlement failed, largely due to the lack of political consensus among political parties. Though she was re-elected as president in 1999, the government led by her was defeated at the parliamentary elections held in 2002. The UNP led by Ranil Wickramasinghe won a majority of seats in parliament and formed a government under his prime ministership. A significant step taken by this short-lived regime led by him was the signing of a Norwegian brokered agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. Though hostilities ceased temporarily, frequent allegations by both sides of ceasefire violations made the agreement increasingly unsustainable and unpopular, encouraging its critiques to demand its abolition. While ethnic tensions steadily increased, the ideological gap between the two main ethno-nationalist groups widened. Civil society initiatives to support a negotiated political settlement to the conflict came under severe criticism by Sinhala-nationalist groups. We will return to this theme in a subsequent section of the chapter.

As mentioned earlier, the regime led by CBK, despite her coalition's critique of the open economic policy could do little to change the policy or to mitigate its impact. When Ranil Wickramasinghe became Prime Minister his regime made an effort to push the economic reforms agenda forward. His attempt to cut back government expenditure, freeze recruitment to the state sector and discourage unprofitable smallholder agriculture adversely affected the vast rural population, for long dependent on state patronage. His government was defeated at the parliamentary elections held in 2004, just 2 years after his election to power in 2002. He contested the presidential election held in 2005 but was narrowly defeated by Mahinda Rajapaksha, the pro-Sinhala-nationalist candidate who promised to annul the Norwegian-brokered peace agreement if he was elected. This was to virtually signal a return to all-out war with the LTTE in the aftermath of the 2005 presidential elections.

The Ethnic Conflict and Militarization of Society

A great deal has been written about the ethnic war in Sri Lanka from diverse angels. No attempt is made in this chapter to provide a detailed account of the conflict. Among many significant outcomes of the conflict was the steady militarization of society. Faced with the threat of being caught in the cross fire, civilians became deeply conscious of the deteriorating security situation. This was the case across the

ethnic divide. In spite of the grave risks the combatants faced on the battlefield, many youth were attracted to the battle, particularly from the south. In order to mobilize human resources for the war, the Sri Lankan government, planning for a decisive battle with the LTTE after the presidential elections in 2005, offered various incentives to Sinhalese youth to join the military. Given the strong preference of Sri Lankan youth to join government service with retirement benefits, despite the risks involved, many youth came forward to fight on the side of the government security forces. The government propaganda aided by Sinhala nationalist groups, sought to impress upon the Sinhalese community, in particular its underprivileged rural social strata that it is worth making sacrifices to save the country and the nation from the grave threat posed by the "enemies". Buddhists, in particular the clergy were encouraged to organize various religious rituals to bestow divine blessings on the "heroic, patriotic soldiers". Even private media institutions joined government controlled media to valorise heroic acts of the forces, driving the enemy towards their imminent defeat and salvaging the country and nation from LTTE terrorism.

The unprecedented commitment on the part of the government to lead an all-out war against the LTTE, mobilization of popular support for the war, intense government propaganda for the war effort to marginalize dissenting voices and the recruitment of thousands of youth for the military, helped bring the military to the centre stage. The country was placed on a war footing, making it virtually impossible for civil society groups and opposition political parties to take up other issues of public importance for discussion and debate. The last stage of the war launched after the presidential elections in 2005 lasted for over three years and ended with the decisive defeat of the LTTE in 2009. This was an important juncture in post-independence Sri Lanka as it marked a steady erosion of democratic values. Even though the military became a significant force in society with the commencement of the war in the early 1980s, the rise of the military during the last stage of the war was unprecedented. Given the increasing sense of insecurity, support for the forces surged, even among radical Sinhalese political groups that had suffered at the hand of the same security forces several years earlier.

Another important aspect of the militarization of society is the increased significance of employment opportunities in the security forces. Employment in the security forces increased to over 300,000 persons around 2008. Given the persistent high rate of youth unemployment and under-employment, particularly among secondary school leavers, employment in the security forces with the prospect of retirement with an attractive pension after a minimum period of service was highly attractive to many youths from disadvantaged rural families. A regular monthly income became a significant addition to the meagre incomes of lower class families. The creation of home guard units in Sinhala and Muslim villages in the north and east that faced LTTE threats also provided employment opportunities to unemployed and under-employed youth there. Employment as home guards paid by the government gave a regular income to otherwise economically vulnerable families in the villages concerned. Even though the war posed a grave threat to the lives of

armed combatants and even home guards, their regular salaries created a semblance of income security to their families.

Occasional but almost random bomb attacks by the LTTE in many parts of the country made it virtually impossible for the security forces to provide protection to civilians everywhere. This necessitated the mobilization of civilians for civil security work. The establishment of civil security committees (CSC'S) in almost every village outside the conflict zone was the result. A number of villagers representing different segments of the community were enlisted in to these committees that worked closely with the police and the security forces to ensure the protection of civilians and civil installations like schools, places of worship and government buildings. These committees had regular meetings to discuss civil security matters and carried out surveillance work to prevent any unexpected incidents. Security check points maintained by the police and the military were established in almost all the parts of the country to prevent the movement of weapons and LTTE combatants also became quite common across the country. The developments outlined above helped elevate national security to a priority concern of the civilian population, relegating all other issues of well-being to a secondary level. Security concerns tended to override almost everything and the security forces had a significant impact on the daily lives of the people. Most people took this state of affairs for granted.

Given the heightened sense of insecurity created by the war and related developments, any attempt to provide a sense of security was welcomed by the general population. On the other hand the regulation of civilian life by the security forces could not be resisted even when such regulation resulted in the erosion of civil liberties such as freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly. In other words, militarization was accompanied by a simultaneous rise of ethno-nationalism and a decline of liberal democratic form of governance. Since the threat of the LTTE was easily equated with a threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity posed by Tamil nationalism, the true triumph of the Sri Lankan security forces over the LTTE was widely perceived as the triumph of Sinhala nationalism. So, any criticism of the military and the war effort was considered unpatriotic and treacherous and invited outright condemnation and even violence from the "defenders of the nation".

State-Society Relations and the Prospects for Development and Good Governance

So far in the present chapter, an attempt had been made to provide an overview of social, economic and political developments in post-independence Sri Lanka. This was done under three themes, named, (a) Post independence social, economic and political developments, (b) more recent liberal economic reforms and (c) the ethnic conflict and the militarization of society. While post-war political developments

Table 5.4 FDI entering Sri Lanka by sector (2006)

Sector	No. of projects	FDI (US$ mn)
Food, beverages and tobacco	28	34.1
Textile, wearing apparel and leather prod.	64	103.5
Wood and wood products	5	4.4
Paper, paper, products, printing and publishing	4	0.8
Chemical, coal, petroleum, coal, plastic	32	43.4
Non-metallic mineral products	8	5.3
Fabricated metal, machinery and transport eq.	20	14.1
Other manufactured products	46	29.5
Agriculture	6	0.7
Services and infrastructure	162	368.2
Total	375	603.7

Source: IPS (2008)

clearly display an illiberal tendency, as is evident from recent constitutional amendments, interference in the judiciary, and the curtailment of civil liberties, the challenge is to find a causal explanation of the illiberal turn. In the remaining pages of the present chapter, an attempt is made to propose such an explanation.

Post-liberalisation socio-economic developments coupled with the escalation of the war were not conducive for long-term private investments. The free trade zones established after 1977 to attract FDI only attracted labour intensive industries. Intensification of the conflict no doubt discouraged many potential investors and persuaded many people to leave the country. Those who left the country included many highly skilled persons as well. The persisting conflict coupled with the continuing exodus of skilled human resources prevented the diversification of the economy away from the low-skilled based industries and short term investments in such sectors as construction, tourism, trade and communication (see Table 5.4).

Inadequate diversification of the economy contributed to the trade gap that has been increasingly bridged by private remittances sent by workers employed abroad and commercial borrowings. Rising cost of labour and intermediate goods resulted in higher costs of production making export industries less profitable and viable. It has been cheaper and more profitable for companies to import industrial products from other countries rather than to produce them in Sri Lanka. But, the same has contributed to the widening trade gap and the lack of creation of lucrative employment opportunities in the country, encouraging more and more people to find overseas employment. The number of people leaving the country for overseas employments has increased steadily over the last several decades. The current annual average of departures for foreign employment is over 250,000, persons, almost twice as many as the annual addition to the country's labor force (SLBFE 2012). They are mostly engaged in unskilled and semi-skilled employment that gives them a relatively low income from an international point of view though often they cannot earn as much in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, their savings are generally low and do not provide adequate protection from poverty in old age.

Table 5.5 Labour force participation and composition of employment in Sri Lanka

	2000	2002	2004	2006	2007
Labour force, '000	6,827	7,145	8,061	7,599	7,489
Labour force participation rate (%)	50.3	50.3	48.6	51.2	49.8
Male	67.2	67.9	66.7	68.1	67.8
Female	33.9	33.6	31.5	35.7	33.4
Employment status (%)					
Public sector	13.4	13.4	13.0	13.4	13.8
Private sector	42.9	44.5	46.4	42.1	42.7
Employers	2.3	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.8
Self-employed	28.4	28.6	28.3	30.8	30.4
Unpaid family workers	13.0	10.7	9.4	10.5	10.3
Composition by economic activity					
Agriculture (% of total)	36.0	34.5	33.5	32.2	31.3
Industry (% of total)	23.6	20.9	22.8	26.6	26.6
Services (% of total)	40.3	44.7	43.7	41.2	42.1
Unemployment rate (5 of labour force)	7.6	8.8	8.3	6.5	6.0
Male	5.8	6.6	6.0	4.7	4.3
Female	11.1	12.9	12.8	9.7	9.0

Source: IPS (2008)

In countries like China and India where there have been unprecedented diversification of the domestic economies under neo-liberal reforms, a significant development has been the rise of a new middle class with considerable personal incomes, professional development and autonomy. The lack of industrial diversification and the exodus of highly skilled persons due to circumstances outlined above hampered the growth of the new middle class. The continuing creation of relatively low paid, state sector employment and the growth of the informal sector have contributed to the expansion of an inward looking, nationally oriented, lower middle class that has traditionally depended on state patronage for their survival and well-being. Though state sector employment declined during the initial period of economic liberalisation, such employment expanded again in the recent past, largely reflecting the growing demand for employment from the educated unemployed. Private sector employment has remained stagnant over time as a proportion of the total employed in the country (see Table 5.5).

Most people in the country rely on the poorly resourced, ethno-linguistically segregated public education system to secure educational qualifications. With the exception of a few privileged urban schools within the state education system, public schools provide a poor quality education that is grossly inadequate for school leavers to secure more lucrative and challenging livelihoods in the highly competitive private corporate sector. As discussed elsewhere (Little and Hettige 2013: 179–98), ethno-linguistically segregated schools in all parts of the country reinforce pre-existing primordial, ethno-religious identities, making the products of the state education system by and large receptive to messages emanating from ethno-

nationalist movements. Youths who secure educational qualifications from the public education system overwhelmingly prefer government jobs as these are more secure, pensionable and relatively more prestigious than private and informal sector jobs. On the other hand, many of these jobs are often allocated on the basis of political patronage.

The state sector, despite radical economic reforms, continues to be highly significant for the vast majority of lower and lower middle class families for their present well being and future prospects. This is true for all ethno-linguistic communities, though access to public resources such as government jobs is largely mediated by political factors. Given the fact that the state has become closely identified with the majority Sinhalese community in post-independence Sri Lanka, particularly during and after the conflict, the nexus between the Sri Lankan state and the Sinhalese, rural lower middle class has become stronger, influencing state society relations in a significant manner. This has in turn contributed to increasing ethnic tensions in the country, even after the end of a long drawn out ethnic war. The result is a persisting sense of instability and insecurity felt across society, a situation highly conducive for the exodus of people, in particular youth with professional qualifications who are in demand in the developed world. The result is the continued depletion of a liberal-minded and globally oriented middle class, leaving behind an amorphous, ethno-linguistically oriented lower middle class dependent on state patronage.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of social, economic and political developments in post independence Sri Lanka with a view to identifying the key factors than have contributed to the emergence of the present illiberal trend in governance in the country. The ethnic war has led to the rise of an assertive and pervasive defence establishment and liberal economic reforms failed to create conditions conducive for the rise of an independent, liberal minded and globally oriented middle class. Furthermore, the emergence of a populist state that thrives on the support of a dependent, ethno-linguistically oriented lower middle class have been the three main factors contributing to the present illiberal trend in governance in the country.

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Chapter 6
Key Issues in the Study of State Politics in India

James Manor

Introduction

Subrata Mitra's work has ranged widely over many topics, but much of it is bound up with two core concerns. He is strongly preoccupied with 'politics': the inter-action of actors, ideas and forces in the pursuit and use of power. That much is well understood by most of his readers, but the second theme may need some explaining. He often focuses on the state level in India's federal political system. Why? It is because he understands that it is at the state level and below that most of the actual governing has always happened in India. He also knows that each linguistic region in India has its own distinctive caste system which differs somewhat or even radically from systems in other regions—and apart from the Hindi belt, the bound-aries of most Indian states conform to linguistic regions. It is thus at the state level and below that state and society mainly engage one another. For those reasons, anyone—like Mitra—who is interested in how politics and society interact, and how democracy connects to development, must focus less on New Delhi and more on India's states. Some of topics that are examined in this chapter, especially in Part II, may seem less edifying than the themes which Mitra has stressed. His analyses have tended to focus on issues like citizenship, and the links between politics and development. At times, the discussion below deals with matters such as corruption, the use of illegally obtained funds, the manipulation of destructive divisions within society, and the use or threat of violence. But it will be clear from a careful reading of Mitra's writings that his deep understanding of state-level processes is based in part upon a subtle grasp of these less salubrious realities. Thus, the (at times) rather overt assessments of them in this chapter are intended not as a dissent from Mitra's sophisticated analyses, but rather as a tribute to them.

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With Mitra's grasp of state-level politics in mind, this writer (who shares those preoccupations) presents here a set of questions that analysts need to ask about senior politicians' struggles to govern at the state level in India. Those questions appear in Part II below, but it is necessary to precede it in Part I with a discussion of a fundamentally important change that has occurred over the last quarter-century—a massive redistribution of power away from the national level, from the apex of the political system. Much of that power has flowed to the state level—which adds a further and potent justification to Mitra's interest in India's states.

The Redistribution of Power Since 1989, and Its Implications

Since 1989 when it became impossible for any single party to win a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha (the dominant lower house in Parliament), India has been governed by minority governments or by coalition governments that have included large numbers of parties, most of them state-based. That has made it impossible (until 2014) for the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to exercise dominance at and from the national level, as it did during most of the period between 1971 and 1989. Power has flowed, very substantially, away from that office to other institutions at the national level and to governments, parties and forces at the state level.[1] This has enabled many institutions at the national level—and the federal system which bridges national and state levels—to be regenerated after they had atrophied or suffered assaults during the era of PMO dominance (Manor 1994). Abuses of power by actors at the apex of the system, which were common when the PMO dominated, have largely ceased to occur because other regenerated institutions have checked them.

As a result, India has witnessed far fewer abuses of power by Prime Ministers since 1989 than the United Kingdom witnessed under either Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair. Margaret Thatcher, for example, abolished an entire tier of elected municipal councils—mainly because the opposition Labour Party consistently won control of nearly all of them. James Prior, who had served as one of her senior cabinet ministers, stated publicly that such a radical rupture in the structures of the democratic order amounted to a constitutional change that should have had cross-party consensus—of the sort seen in India in 1993 when the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments (creating, not destroying elected councils at lower levels) were passed. But Thatcher ignored such views and took that action on her own. Since Britain has no written constitution—which is to say that it is uncertain whether it has a constitution at all—it has never been possible to determine whether her action was or was not 'constitutional'. That lack of clarity facilitates abuses of power in Britain. This again became apparent when Tony Blair led the country into

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[1] In a small minority of states, significant powers have also flowed further downward to *panchayati raj* institutions (especially at district and local levels), but most state governments have been rather ungenerous to *panchayats*. For more detail see Manor 2010.

the war in Iraq on a false prospectus. He asked his Attorney General for a confidential view on the legality of going to war without an enabling resolution from the United Nations Security Council. When the Attorney General replied that the legality of such an action was open to serious doubt, Blair pressed for a more favourable opinion—which the malleable Attorney General delivered. These legal opinions were not shared with Parliament, or even with many members of Blair's own cabinet, and Britain went to war. Blair's Labour government also undermined numerous ancient rights. It sustained a change made by a previous Conservative government abolishing the right to silence by persons under questioning by the police—which undermined the time-honoured presumption of innocence. His government then went further and eroded the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, the right to a jury trial, and habeus corpus. The absence of a written (or perhaps any) constitution made it impossible to determine whether such actions—taken, once again, without the consensus that James Prior had appealed for under Thatcher—were 'constitutional'.

Ironically, however, while power has been dispersed or decentralised since 1989 at the national level, and within the federal system as a whole, it has in the same period become more concentrated and centralised within many individual states in the federal system. In numerous states, this has triggered not a regeneration of institutions but degeneration—something akin to the deinstitutionalisation that occurred at the national level during the years of PMO dominance (1971–1989). And in an era in which abuses of power by Prime Ministers in New Delhi have markedly diminished, the centralisation of power in many states has led to an increase in abuses of power there by some Chief Ministers (who are the Prime Minister's counterparts at the state level). A small number of Indian states—extreme cases—have begun to resemble 'authoritarian enclaves', although the Constitution prevents fully-blown autocracies from developing. (A major opportunity awaits researchers who seek to explain those preventive processes.)

The crude Table 6.1 sorts most of India's larger states into three categories: (A) in which one leader dominates state politics, (B) in which a leader exercises near-dominance, and (C) in which no leader dominates. (States in the table followed by question marks arguably belong in different categories.) At this writing in mid-2014, 40 % of Indians live in Category A states, and nearly 20 % more live in Category B states—so that most Indians currently live in states where power is rather (or very) highly centralised.

Two comments on this table should be noted. First, over time, several state governments have moved from one to another of these categories—in different directions. For example, between 1995[2] and the untimely death of Chief Minister Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy in September 2009, Andhra Pradesh was located in

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[2] It was in 1995 that Chandrababu Naidu seized power in a palace coup from his father-in-law, Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao. It is arguable that Rama Rao had personally dominated the state government before his ouster, but Naidu proceeded far more systematically and effectively in radically centralising power. When he was defeated by the Congress Party at a state election in May 2004, the new Congress Chief Minister (Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy) sought to exercise personal dominance over the state government in much the same way that Naidu had done. That was more

Table 6.1 Concentrations of power within state governments

A. Dominance by one leader (total population, 448.7 million = 40.6 % of the Indian total)
West Bengal (population, 91.3 million)
Gujarat (60.4 million)
Tamil Nadu (72.1 million)
Odisha (41.9 million)
Uttar Pradesh? (199.5 million)
Haryana? (25.4 million)
B. Near-dominance by one leader (total population, 218.7 million = 18.1 % of the Indian total)
Bihar (103.8 million)
Madhya Pradesh (72.6 million)
Chhattisgarh (25.5 million)
Delhi (16.8 million)
C. No leader dominates (total population, 387.9 million. = 34.7 % of the Indian total)
Maharashtra (112.4 million)
Rajasthan (68.6 million)
Punjab (27.7 million)
Jharhand (33.0 million)
Uttarakhand (10.1 million)
Andhra Pradesh (84.7 million)
Karnataka (61.1 million)
Kerala (33.4 million)

Category A, but since then it belongs in Category C. By contrast, West Bengal was a Category C state until the election of May 2011, but since then, it should be placed in Category A.

Second and more crucially, there are important variations among the state governments that are grouped in each of the three categories listed above. These are the products of several variations across states, including: traditions of state-society relations and modes of governing; the configurations of powerful interests within any given state; the condition of the bureaucracy (relatively undamaged and thus reasonably effective in some states, but crippled by abusive mistreatment from politicians in others); the government's revenue base; levels of development; natural and human resources, etc.

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difficult to achieve from atop the Congress Party, but Reddy succeeded to a considerable degree. The two Chief Ministers who succeeded Reddy have been unable to maintain centralised control.

Key Questions for Analyses of State Politics in India

Scholars who study state governments and the politicians who head them must tackle a number of important questions. A great many of these (there are others) are set out below, in what amounts to a research agenda for those who wish to analyse state politics. The thrust of this discussion is unashamedly Machiavellian. That is appropriate since is reflects the main preoccupation of almost all powerful politicians: the need to enhance their popularity and power. This approach, and powerful leaders more generally, have received far too little attention from most political analysts who study India. These questions focus mainly on Chief Ministers, especially on those who have centralised power, although they can also be applied to others who have not done so. Many questions below can also be usefully applied to the leaders of opposition parties at the state level:

1. What devices or approaches do Chief Ministers use to maintain and enhance their popularity—and to govern? The main device used by many in the past has been the distribution of patronage (goods, services, funds and favours) to key interest groups. Political scientists call this 'clientelism'. That continues to happen, but in recent times, other approaches have gained in relative importance. The first of them is well known: populism, initiatives that are meant to be widely popular—not least, subsidies on food, fuel, agricultural inputs, transport, etc.

   However, many Chief Ministers have become increasingly disappointed with both of these approaches. Voters tend, after a little time passes, to take subsidies for granted and to forget that they are there. They become invisible, so that they do not continue to sustain a government's popularity. Subsidies also drain the state exchequer of funds. Patronage distribution often degenerates as a Chief Minister's subordinates increasingly fail to allocate benefits effectively, enrich themselves by stealing funds intended for distribution, or sell patronage at high prices which alienates people from whom political support is needed.

   Many Chief Ministers have therefore turned increasingly to a different approach which this writer calls 'post-clientelist' initiatives. They mount development programmes to deliver goods and services to voters through the bureaucracy. These programmes are largely or entirely protected from the bosses of patronage networks who wish to divert resources for their own use. In many states in recent years, 'post-clientelist' initiatives have gained importance in relative terms—compared to patronage distribution and populism. A surge in state and central government revenues since 2003 has provided Chief Ministers with abundant resources for such programmes. This is a fundamentally important change, since patronage was for decades the very life's blood of the political process. Those who still describe India as a 'patronage state' are

badly out of date. ('Post-clientelist' approaches are discussed in greater detail in two other studies by this writer.[3])

Whatever devices a Chief Minister chooses—patronage distribution, populism, 'post-clientelist' initiatives (and more than one of these can be used at the same time)—how intensely partisan is their approach? Do they manage 'post-clientelist' programmes in manner that conforms to Weberian norms, leaving their rather or very weak party organisations to one side? Or do they (like Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, 1995–2004) forge close links between state administrative agencies and their party, so that party activists ensure that services go disproportionately to party loyalists. Do they (again, like Naidu) seek to turn low-level government employees and government-sponsored associations—such as *anganwadi w*orkers and 'Self Help Groups'—into agents of the party?

2. How do Chief Ministers deal with subordinates in their party organisation—which may, but usually does not, have some institutional substance? Do they (for example) placate and cultivate them; offer them distractions such as opportunities to enrich themselves so that they seldom challenge the Chief Minister's dominance of policy making (a tactic employed by Digvijay Singh, Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister, 1993–2003; for more details, see Chap. 3 of Melo et al. 2012.); marginalise them and limit their opportunities to achieve prominence; periodically cut some of them down in order to intimidate the others (a device frequently used by Naveeen Patnaik, Odisha Chief Minister since 2000). Chief Ministers may of course do more than one of these things at the same time.

3. How and how much do Chief Ministers take advantage of 'fund-raising' opportunities by soliciting massive kickbacks paid directly to them by moneyed interests for the award of government contracts/permits, or for agreements to look the other way while those interests engage in illegal and/or destructive activities? Such opportunities have become far more important in recent years, as a result of the surge in potential profits from (a) illegal land deals, and (b) agreements with industrialists—not least with those involved in extractive industries in an era of soaring prices for raw materials.

4. What is their approach to 'fund raising' opportunities for senior subordinates and for legislators? Former Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra Pradesh once told a meeting of legislators that they could "eat" one-third of the funds from various government programmes, but that if they exceeded that limit, they would be punished.[4] Meanwhile, he raised massive sums behind closed doors in the form of massive kickbacks from industrialists. His

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[3] These will appear soon in two forthcoming volumes. The first is *Democratization in the Global South: The Importance of Transformative Politics*, edited by Olle Tornquist and Kristian Stokke. The second will be edited by K.C. Suri and Hans Lofgren. The latter paper also supplements the overall analysis of state politics set out here.

[4] Interviews with two civil servants who were present at that meeting, Hyderabad, 19 and 20 August 2001.

successor, Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy, placed no limit on profiteering by legis-
lators, but like Naidu he amassed far greater amounts from kickbacks. Others,
including Naveen Patnaik in Odisha, severely curtail subordinates' oppor-
tunities. In an effort to centralise power in his own hands Shivraj Singh
Chauhan (Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh since 2005) told colleagues in
the ruling BJP and legislators that they would no longer be permitted to
recommend the transfers of civil servants.[5] This action had ambiguous impli-
cations. On the one hand, it curbed corruption at lower levels by depriving
legislators of opportunities to obtain payments from bureaucrats who wished to
obtain or to avoid transfers. It also facilitated the implementation—through
those bureaucrats, and potentially along Weberian lines—of government
programmes, some of which were/are 'post-clientelist' in character. On the
other hand, it made it far more difficult for legislators—democratically elected
representatives—to exercise influence over civil servants to ensure that their
constituents' needs and interests were served.

5. How do Chief Ministers use the funds that they raise? Do they channel some
   resources into patronage networks and/or into populist giveaways?
   (M. Karunanidhi, when he was Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu between 2006
   and 2011, distributed colour television sets to ordinary folk.) Do they deploy
   funds to intimidate or to buy off subordinates or opposition actors—to increase
   the Chief Ministers' room for manoeuvre, perhaps to pursue 'post-clientelist'
   initiatives?

6. How and how much do Chief Ministers pursue personal dominance by
   projecting themselves more than their parties or their governments as the
   source of largesse? Karunanidhi is not an isolated example of this tendency,
   but some leaders restrain themselves somewhat. This is especially true of most
   (but not all) of those who are members of the two national parties. BJP leaders
   usually do so because they are aware that the party's organisation, unlike most,
   has significant institutional substance—although Chief Minister Narendra
   Modi in Gujarat is an exception. Congress leaders do so because they know
   that it is unwise to divert attention from the party's first family—although the
   late Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy in Andhra Pradesh was something of an
   exception.

7. If they are members of a party with a powerful national leadership, how do
   Chief Ministers seek to manage those leaders? The shrewd answer to this
   question usually entails a degree of deference to those at the apex of the
   party, and generous flows of ill-gotten funds to them.

8. If (in contrast to item 7 just above) they lead state-based parties that are part of
   a ruling alliance in New Delhi, do they seek 'wet' posts in the national
   cabinet—posts that can be squeezed for illicit 'fund-raising'—for their nomi-
   nees, so that the profits can be transferred back to their parties at the state level?
   The party which has done this most effectively in recent times is the Dravida

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[5] *Free Press Bhopal Journal,* 29 October 2010.

Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu. Its 'achievement' owes much to its ability to gain inclusion in ruling alliances led by the BJP before 2004 and by the Congress between 2004 and 2014. But its assiduous looting of central government ministries was finally exposed in 2010 when a scandal broke over the award of telecommunications licenses. Two very senior figures, one of them the DMK leader's daughter, were jailed while awaiting trial on corruption charges. Where do ill-gotten funds go: to the state party's high command or to a diversity of actors within the party?

9. How do Chief Ministers manage 'wet' ministries within their own states? Do they retain those portfolios, or place trusted subordinates in charge of such ministries, to milk them for funds? And once again, where does that money go? One independent legislator in Madhya Pradesh has stated that when the BJP is in power, such funds mainly flow to the state-level party leadership, but a Congress government will permit a free-for-all on the understanding that "we all loot".[6]

10. How have Chief Ministers managed the far more abundant funds which have flowed to their governments as a result of the surge in state and central government revenues since 2003? Are they inclined, and sufficiently adroit, to control most of those new resources? To what uses do they put those funds?

11. How do Chief Ministers who head coalition governments deal with other parties in the ruling alliance? One key issue here is the distribution of 'wet' ministries. When the BJP and the Shiv Sena jointly governed Maharashtra between 1995 and 1999, the former party seized control of most such ministries before the inexperienced Shiv Sena recognised what had happened. That partly explains why the latter indulged in systematic extortion, to compensate for their losses.[7]

12. Whether or not they are in coalitions, do Chief Ministers curtail 'fund-raising' from certain 'wet' ministries in order to ensure the effective delivery of services and positive develop outcomes (like public works that last because they are not built with inferior materials) since those things make their governments popular?

13. To what social bases do Chief Ministers and ruling parties seek to appeal? Do they cultivate support from a rather narrow set of social groups (as in Uttar Pradesh much of the time since the early 1990s) or from a broad diversity of groups (as in Karnataka for most of the period between 1983 and 2005)? The answers to this question will explain much about the character and intensity of political and social conflict within any given state. In states like Uttar Pradesh, senior politicians foment animosity between the groups that support them and others. In states like Karnataka, they have tended (until 2005) to foster amity between social groups. To what extent do they seek to cultivate support from

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[6] Interview, Bhopal, 4 December 2003.

[7] Interview with a senior civil servant, Mumbai, 5 February 1999.

prosperous groups (which implies a regressive impact) or from disadvantaged groups (which implies a progressive impact)?

14. We can ask the question posed in item 13 just above in a slightly different way. To what extent, and precisely how, do Chief Ministers engage in 'dividing and uniting', and seek to pursue what the Indian media rather loosely describe as 'social engineering'? We have seen that in Uttar Pradesh 'dividing' has been emphasised, while in Karnataka, 'uniting' has usually been stressed. But all leaders pursue both of these strategies at the same time—so that the important thing to note is the emphasis given to one or the other.

   In recent years, several Chief Ministers—most notably Nitish Kumar in Bihar—have refined this approach in subtle ways. They have sought to appeal to certain sections of broad social categories which have received fewer benefits from governments than have other sections of the same categories. Nitish Kumar increased his popular support by reaching out to deprived groups of Muslims and Dalits (Scheduled Castes). Politicians in all states watch their counterparts elsewhere and when they see promising new approaches, they often adapt them to their own contexts—so that for example, at the Karnataka election of 2013, H.D. Deve Gowda pursued a strategy similar to that of Nitish Kumar.

15. How deeply have Chief Ministers' party organisations sunk roots into society? It is important to note here that, with a tiny number of exceptions,[8] political parties in India lack the organisational strength to make their influence penetrate much, downward below the district level, or outward beyond urban centres into rural areas where most voters reside. This is true even of the BJP. Despite much media hype to the contrary, its organisation—which is strong in certain respects—lacks that penetrative capacity (Manor 2005). The weakness of party organisations provides much of the explanation for the recent trend towards 'post-clientelist' initiatives (discussed above). Such initiatives are largely implemented through administrative structures which almost always penetrate more effectively than party organisations.

   For an extreme case of shallow roots, consider Odisha where a tiny set of hyper-elite caste groups have long dominated the state's two main parties and thus its politics. As a result, Odisha has not yet reached the stage which nearly all other states reached by the mid-1950s, when landed groups that dominated village life came to dominate state-level politics as well. (Most of those states have moved on to wider power-sharing since then.)

   To understand this theme, we need to ask three key questions about any Chief Minister. First, how interested is s/he in sinking roots into society? Some are disinclined to attempt this because to do so would empower party

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[8] The main exception is the Communist Party of India-Marxist. The DMK in Tamil Nadu once had a penetrative organisation, but in recent years it has degenerated into a family enterprise. Chandrababu Naidu had some success while he was Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister (1995–2004) in making his Telugu Desam Party organisation penetrate into rural arenas. But once he left office, it lost its capacity to do so effectively.

institutions and subordinates, and thus undermine the personal dominance of the leader. Second, if a Chief Minister actually wishes to sink roots, what devices does s/he use to achieve this: populism, patronage distribution, or 'post-clientelist' initiatives? Finally, are they helped or hindered by the capacity or incapacity of their party organisations?

16. Do Chief Ministers who centralise power damage institutions within their states, or seek (as some do) to regenerate them? One example of the latter is Nitish Kumar in Bihar. He reminds us that centralisation need not entail institutional atrophy—although that has usually been the result in and beyond India. The problems that he has encountered also indicate how challenging regeneration can be in states where institutions have degenerated severely. He "runs his government as a one-man show" (Kapoor 2010), and yet he has worked to achieve institutional regeneration. But the severe institutional weakness which he inherited has made that task extremely difficult.

    For example, he and extremely able civil servants carefully selected by him have tried to make the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) work well. That makes sense since there is a great need in Bihar for that programme which provides poor rural households with up to 100 days employment per year on work projects at a reasonable wage. But they have been seriously impeded by the fact that when he assumed office, roughly one-half of the administrative posts at the sub-district level stood vacant. His predecessors had, for several years, not bothered to fill them. The MGNREGA can only operate effectively if bureaucrats at the sub-district level—who are dominant there because in every Indian state, elected councils (*panchayats*) *a*t that level are quite weak—are present in strength. They may also cause the programme to malfunction,[9] but in their absence, something close to paralysis ensues. Because so many posts were vacant, Nitish Kumar's government has had to leave a substantial proportion of MGNREGA funds unspent. Efforts have been made to recruit sub-district-level officials, but it is a slow process because Bihar's hiring procedures are unusually cumbersome and thus slow.[10]

17. How do Chief Ministers seek to attract inward investment and to achieve economic growth? How do their states' natural and human resources help or impede such efforts?

18. How do Chief Ministers regard and deal with alternative power centres? These include centres outside government (for example, the media and civil society organisations), but also centres within the state apparatus but outside the executive agencies (*panchayati raj* institutions, the courts, state assemblies, etc.). Do they seek to weaken, marginalise, intimidate or coopt them?

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[9] This is an important theme in a forthcoming book on the MNREGA by Rob Jenkins and this writer.

[10] These comments are based on an interview in New Delhi with a civil servant who played a key role in managing the MGNREGA in Bihar, and with a leading policy maker at the national level, 5 April 2012.

19. What use do they make of the coercive agencies of state? At least during her first term in power (1991–1996), Chief Minister Jayalalithaa in Tamil Nadu tended to communicate with the rest of her government through senior police officers. So on occasion did another film star, former Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh. Some chief ministers use the police, and sometimes special forces, as more than just gatekeepers: sowing fear, seeking to intimidate potential opponents, harassing civil society organisations and journalists—and worse.[11]

20. To what extent have senior politicians reached beyond coercive state agencies to groups of supporters who are capable of mounting campaigns of violence? We have seen examples of this from the Congress Party in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, from the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, and from the BJP in Gujarat.

    Since this discussion focuses on the state level, it does not address the riots in 1984 after the murder of Indira Gandhi, when Congress Party leaders fomented killings of Sikhs (see Mitra and Phoolka 2007).

    But at the state level, we find that in late 1991, Congress Chief Minister S. Bangarappa in Karnataka made comments about a dispute with neighbouring Tamil Nadu over Cauvery river waters which were widely seen to inflame sentiments against the Tamil minority in his state. When anti-Tamil riots began in southern Karnataka, Bangarappa was slow to respond—refusing even to interrupt his daily badminton game when an official brought him news of the outbreak of violence. Delayed action by security forces over the first two days of rioting led to lethal mayhem in Bangalore and Gundlupet.[12] Congress Chief Minister M. Chenna Reddy of Andhra Pradesh, who was removed from office by national leaders of his party after communal riots occurred in late 1990, claimed that dissident politicians in his own party had fomented the violence in order to force his ouster. His views were shared by several senior bureaucrats, social scientists and journalists.[13] Shiv Sena activists played a leading role in attacks on the Muslim minority during the Bombay/Mumbai riots of 1993 (see Sardesai 1993: 198–201 and Human Rights Watch 1995: 24–26). When anti-Muslim riots broke out in Gujarat in 2002, the BJP state government—at a minimum—demonstrated that it was disinclined to intervene to stop the violence, which then spread to numerous urban centres (Wilkinson 2004: 61). A senior BJP leader, Maya Kodnani, was convicted in 2012 for her part in the murders of 97 people during those riots. Despite the accusations against her,

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[11] Raman Singh's Chhattisgarh government (since 2003) has detained large numbers of *adivasi's* who have plainly not been involved in political activity as part of its anti-Naxalite campaign. Andhra Pradesh witnessed very high numbers of deaths in police custody and extremely severe repression of Naxalites under both Chandrababu Naidu and Rajashekhar Reddy.

[12] These comments are based on interviews by this writer with Congress politicians, a key civil servant, and analytical journalists in Bangalore in late January 1992.

[13] Interviews with Chenna Reddy and others, Hyderabad, April 1991.

she had in 2007 been appointed minister of women and child welfare in the state by Chief Minister Narendra Modi.

21. How do Chief Ministers who seek improvements in law and order proceed? One of Nitish Kumar's initiatives should be noted because it reminds us of the ambiguities that sometimes arise. When he took power, dire law and order problems afflicted Bihar. A great many people made their living from criminal acts: murder, kidnapping, extortion, etc. The Chief Minister dealt with this problem by ordering the police to tackle criminals aggressively. But he also sought to persuade many criminals to "make a career change" by offering them opportunities to win government contracts for construction projects. In their new role as contractors, these people skimmed off some of the funds from the projects, but minor roads, electricity sub-stations, etc., still got built—after a fashion and to a disappointing standard.[14] As a result, serious crime has declined, which has helped to regenerate the democratic process—and to attract some investors to Bihar who were earlier reluctant to risk kidnapping and racketeering. But it has not necessarily regenerated administrative institutions/processes, since unsavoury elements have been given roles within them—although to be fair, corrupt elements had been present in strength within them before. This theme has certain echoes elsewhere. In the Rayalaseema region of Andhra Pradesh, which has been plagued by severe and often lethal violence between gangs for decades, gang leaders have recently sought increasingly to win government contracts since they offer more abundant profits than do battles for control of rural turf.[15]

22. We must also ask not just how adroit a Chief Minister is—a question that emerges repeatedly in the discussion above—but also how realistic or naïve s/he is. In a small number of cases, naivete and a lack of realism have become debilitating problems. It tends strongly to emerge when a Chief Minister is acutely narcissistic, excessively preoccupied with self rather than with the political process more generally. Not all narcissistic Chief Ministers are naïve or maladroit, but consider two who were.

In his final months in power in 1995, N.T. Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh appears to have become delusional. On one occasion, he arrived for an interview with a senior journalist dressed in his customary saffron clothes, and he then struck a dramatic pose in the throne-like chair at his residence.[16]

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[14] This comes from Jug Suraiya who usually writes to amuse readers, but on this occasion he showed in the Times of India (30 November 2010) that he can also produce political analyses.

[15] Interviews with a leading analytical journalist and a senior police officer formerly posted in Rayalaseema, Hyderabad, 2 and 3 December 2012.

[16] This writer interviewed Rama Rao, who was dressed similarly and seated in the same chair, in 1984.

The journalist sought to break the ice by saying that, at that moment, the Chief Minister looked like Swami Vivekananda. After a theatrical pause, Rama Rao replied, "I am Vivekananda".[17] Within weeks, Rama Rao was deposed in a palace coup by his son-in-law and key party manager, Chandrababu Naidu—partly because the latter was concerned about the old thespian's bizarre, narcissistic, self-destructive behaviour.[18]

Chief Minister B.S. Yeddyurappa of the BJP in Karnataka (2008–2011) exhibited dangerous naivete in other ways, which eventually proved his undoing. He tended to hatch wildly unrealistic plans and to announce them before consulting advisors. When civil servants explained that they were impossible, he told them to "do it anyway" (see also (Manor 2011). When this proved infeasible, he suffered public embarrassment and raged openly about traitors in his midst. (Betrayal was a central theme in his state election campaigns in 2008 and 2013. It worked well the first time, but not the second time.) His naiveté reached breath-taking levels when he accepted cheques from people who provided huge kickbacks in exchange for favours. Yeddyurappa, who is rather unintelligent, had been advised that this was all right by an aide who later turned out to be working for a bitter rival within his party (on that occasion, betrayal actually occurred). Most of those offering bribes were too canny to write cheques, but a few did, and the resulting paper trail enabled investigators to bring multiple criminal charges against Yeddyurappa. Before he was forced to leave office, a senior BJP leader railed at him: "Don't you have a lawyer? Don't you have an accountant?" In other words, why had he failed to cover his tracks? It is unusual to find the kind of extreme naiveté displayed by Rama Rao and Yeddyurappa, but it is sometimes a factor on a smaller scale, so analysts need to consider this theme.

The list above is long but not exhaustive. It may, however, help analysts of state politics to get started with their enquiries. The rise of state-based parties may eventually be checked, but while it lasts, state governments and leaders of ruling parties at the state level will remain immensely powerful. They will continue to demand our attention. Readers who are familiar with the writings of Subrata Mitra may find some of the topics discussed above more unseemly than the themes that loom large in his work. It is certainly true that the details of 'wet' and 'dry' ministries, of how illicit 'fund raising' occurs, and of how the money thus raised is used in dubious ways by state-level politicians are unedifying. So are some of the other cynical actions of political leaders which are discussed in this chapter—not least the manipulation of narrow identities, sometimes to encourage destructive divisions within society and even violence. Mitra's formidable analyses tend to focus on more uplifting topics such as citizenship, and the link between politics and development. But it will be clear from a close reading of his writings that he is not a

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[17] I am grateful to Cho Ramaswamy for this information.

[18] Interview with a close aide to Naidu, Hyderabad, 7 August 1996.

naïve stranger to the dark arts which politicians sometimes use, and to the nitty gritty of what Ashis Nandy has described as the pigsty of Indian politics. So while this chapter may at times appear to lower the level of analysis of state-level actors, it should be read as a tribute to Mitra's deep understanding of that topic—an understanding which certainly encompasses these less uplifting aspects of the political (and yes, of the democratic) process, even if his assessments address them less blatantly that this chapter does.

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Chapter 7
Citizenship and Violence: The Past and Future of Civility

David Jacobson

Introduction

In the debates over citizenship and civil society and its different models—say British multiculturalism versus French republicanism—the main division has been primarily characterized by give-and-take between liberals and communitarians over what makes for "the good society." I wish to examine a key, additional element that has been largely forgotten in the contemporary discussion on citizenship in Europe or North America—namely, violence. What are the limits in the shaping of civil society, before we tip over into growing levels of violence?[1] After all, the role of civility is in the very etymological roots of "civil society." The reason Western scholars have been able to largely ignore this issue of violence, except for considering occasional upheaval as in the periodic discontent in immigrant neighborhoods in Europe, is that violence in these societies has dropped, and dropped dramatically. Yet in many parts of the post-colonial world levels of violence -from crime to political violence- are very high. The objective of creating a civil society has largely failed, at least for the immediate future. So here the discussion of citizenship and civil society is not just of academic interest, but is a critical policy issue.

Inspired conceptually by Subrata Mitra's work, I will make the following arguments. First, the attainment of a civil society is best attained where there is a 'culture match' between state and society. In Mitra's words, "citizenship emerges as the convergence of the individual's self-perception, rights and capacities as well as loyalties, values and sentiments. . .The citizen considers himself the agent of his political destiny, and that of the political collectivity of which he is a part."

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[1] This chapter draws significantly from Jacobson (2013), with the permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.

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(Mitra 2010, 46 & 52). Many post-colonial societies struggle in this regard because at their very conceptualization, the boundaries of society were determined in ad hoc, artificial ways, ways which generally suited the exigencies of colonial powers rather than the indigenous peoples who were serendipitously (in any organic sense) ordered into new nation-states.

Second, statistically, societies associated with particular social phenomena are *likely* (but not necessarily) to be more prone to violence in the contemporary world. These factors include, notably, low women's status, a high degree of fractionalization, communities with high levels of grievance, and high levels of corruption. Clearly, there is often an association of "culture mismatch" together with these social phenomena. Or, to put it another way, tribal or clan-based societies, which are often characterized by these qualities, especially where deeply patriarchal, can be associated with relatively high levels of violence.

I first talk about the decline of violence—the emergence of a civic society truly does lead on the whole to a decline of violence of all kinds, not only on an international level, but also on with regard to the personal sphere, leading to fewer cases of murder, spousal abuse and even cruelty to animals. The decline over time has been dramatic. I then turn to liberal and communitarian arguments regarding civil models, and the arguments for why these models are respectively most propitious for a *civil* society. I indicate, in broad terms, the predicates of a relatively peaceful civil society. Finally, I will turn to India, more in the form of a question: Is India an exceptional case to the arguments made here? I note the essential role Subrata Mitra's work will play for citizenship research and policy in this area in the future.

The Decline of Violence

Following Steven Pinker's recent book, *The Better Angels of Our Natures: Why Violence Has Declined,* the documentation of violence and its decline has been engaged well beyond academic specialists (Pinker 2011) However, the argument was made much earlier (as Pinker acknowledges), notably by the sociologist Norbert Elias in *The Civilizing Process*, first published in German (ironically) in 1939, but gains much wider readership from the 1970s, following the English translation:

> Violence trends drop, in the aggregate, world wide, but the trends are most evident, early on, in Europe. Levels of violence dropped precipitously in Western Europe, beginning unequivocally in the seventeenth century. That decline begins most noticeably in the Netherlands as well as in England, and gradually spreads to the rest of Western Europe. In the late Middle Ages homicide is typically estimated at between 20 and 40 killings per 100,000 population. By the mid-twentieth century the European rate is 0.5-1 homicides per 100,000 population. In the seventeenth century moral concern regarding cruelty and violence was growing. Infanticide became a severely punishable crime, public executions declined and torture was gradually discontinued.[2]

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[2] On violence, the seventeenth century timing, the Dutch and English beginnings and the long term trends are discussed in Eisner (2001).

One explanation for this changing rate of homicide, and the changing attitudes to violence that came with it, is what Norbert Elias referred to as the "civilizing process," which involved a growing emphasis on self-restraint, and containing one's emotional impulses, combined with the increasing salience of a centralized state demanding a monopoly on the means of violence (This of course begs the question what precipitated the emphasis on self-restraint.) Elias introduced a more subtle argument than the long dominant view of Hobbes, or at least he provided a new stage in the decline of violence by noting the cultural and social psychological issue of self-restraint:

> For Hobbes the only way to escape a state of anarchy, of a nasty and brutish life, was the installation of the Leviathan, a monarchy or other government authority that can impose penalties on aggressors. But brute coercive power is not enough—clear in Elias' argument and many others who followed. The Leviathan, goes the argument, can civilize a society only when the citizens view laws, law enforcement and other social and political institutions as legitimate, "so that they don't fall back on their worst impulses as soon as the Leviathan's back is turned." (Pinker 2011)

Steven Pinker suggests that even in the colonial period violence, in the aggregate and after initial periods of heightened violence, can decline. In a controversial argument he suggests that decolonization actually precipitates increased violence. He writes:

> The thickening of the civil war wedge in the 1960s had an obvious trigger: decolonization. European governments may have brutalized the natives when conquering a colony and putting down revolts, but they generally had a well-functioning police, judiciary and public-service infrastructure. And while they often had their preferred ethnic groups, their main concern was controlling the colony as a whole, so they enforced law and order fairly broadly and in general did not let one group brutalize another without too much impunity. When the colonial governments departed, they took competent government with them. Many of the governments of the newly independent colonies were run by strongmen, kleptocrats and the occasional psychotic. They left large parts of their countries in anarchy, inviting the predation and gang warfare…They siphoned tax revenues to themselves and their clans, and their autocracies left the frozen out groups no hope for change except by coup or insurrection.

He further notes:

> The reduction of homicide by government control is so obvious to anthropologists that they seldom document it with numbers. The various "paxes" that one reads about in history books – the pax Romana, Islamica, Mongolia, Hispanica, Ottomana, Sinica, Britannica etc. refer to the reduction in raiding, feuding, and warfare in the territories brought under control of an effective government. Though Imperial conquest and rule can themselves be brutal, they do reduce endemic violence against the conquered. The effect is also noticeable to people themselves. As an Anyana man living in New Guinea under the pax Australiana put it, "life was better since the government came" because a "man could now eat without looking over his shoulder and could leave his house in the morning to urinate without fear of being shot"…One of the tragic ironies of the second half of the C. 20th is that when colonies in the developing world freed themselves from European rule, they often slid back into warfare, this time intensified by modern weaponry, organized militias and freedom of young men to defy tribal elders. (all quotes Pinker 2011: 35, 79, 306 and 57).

I emphasize the colonial dimension as the colonies illustrate the dynamics of civil violence. Pinker is statistically correct, in the aggregate. The colonial powers did play (with important exceptions like the Belgians in the Congo and the Germans in Southwest Africa) a role in reducing violence. And violence does in many cases tick up after the period of decolonization. The problem was however, the precarious sociological, political and constitutional position that colonial masters left the bulk of colonies.

Liberal Arguments for the Decline of Violence

The historian Albert Hirschman in his essay, *The Passions and the Interests,* observes how the philosophers rehabilitated what was a dangerous vice—the pursuit of gain—by recasting it as an "interest" (Hirschmann 1977; see also Smith 1827). While passions are unpredictable and dangerous, they suggested, interests are transparent, constant and predictable. From this basis arose a science of economics. Self-interest motivates us to do what we do: Farmers have an interest in growing the wheat, and the bakers in baking the bread. The market in principle works without any regulation from above—such was Adam Smith's insight about the "Invisible Hand," the accumulated self-interest that propels the market. And as the term "interest" entered the lexicon, so the stigma of the pursuit of money began to evaporate. The restraint inherent in "interest" in turn demanded an element, as Hirschman put it, of "calculating efficiency, as well as prudence, into human behavior…" (Hirschmann 1977: 40) Interest in this regard is a distinct calculus from, notably, the ethic of honor: one calculating and instrumental; the other passionate and expressive. Interest, when initially broached by the moral philosophers, concerned not just economics but a range of interests—"Interest of conscience, Interest of honor, Interest of health, Interest of wealth…" wrote one French thinker of the time (Hirschmann 1977: 39). But interest in the narrower, calculating sense came to define economic behavior. Many came to view rational self-interest as the core basis of human personality.

It is in this notion of self-restraint that a *civil* society could arise, where different individuals could mingle in the public arena, protected by an elaborate etiquette. Manners and advice books on etiquette began to flourish in the seventeenth century. Restraint in this context is highly textured, an elaborate delineation of behavior and of acceptable conduct. In fact, such civility, restraint and etiquette were (and are) critical for any society of self-governing individuals to exist at all. Restraint was also essential for social "respectability."[3] And so much of the West and in time other parts of the world came to see capitalism, with some constraints, as rational, considered, and essential to human happiness. And yet, in the rest of the world capitalism remained a demeaning expression of selfishness, greed, a mercenary

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[3] On manners and etiquette, see Elias (2000).

mindset; and in the selling of one's labour on the marketplace, morally equivalent to prostitution. For the fundamentalists—in the most extreme form among Islamists—when it comes to women's unfettered participation in the market, the merging of capitalism and prostitution is literal, not simply metaphoric: the portrayal of women, the buying of fashionable clothes, conspicuous consumption, or independent work reflect, in this vision, a form of prostitution.

Communitarian Arguments for the Decline of Violence

Philosophically, it is, according to John Locke, the concrete individual, rather than the state, that is endowed with rights and freedom of conscience; but for Rousseau, individual liberties can only be achieved through the state. The anthropologist John Bowen writes:

> Here Rousseau stands against Locke, freedom through the state against freedom from the state, society as a 'coming together' and 'living together' against society as isolated rights-bearing individuals or (worse) as isolated communities defined by religion, race or ethnicity. In the Anglo-[American] mirror image of France, agents of the state display their separateness in their turbans or their headscarves, and the people follow suit. (Bowen 2007: 15).

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, enacted in 1958, defined France as an "indivisible, secular, democratic, and social republic," where the state *protects* individuals from the claims of religion. French citizenship is not only protected from religion, but is seen in contrast to it. French secularism means the separation of "church and state through the state's protection of individuals from the claims of religion." In contrast, in the United States, secularism "connotes the protection of religions from interference by the state." Remember, in the French Revolution—and in historical memory—the forces of autocracy are the twinned repressions of the monarchy and the Catholic Church. Religion was (and in much of France's public mind is) the enemy of freedom. In America, Protestant dissenters, intensely religious, were the backbone of the Revolution of 1776. In France, the picture is more ambiguous: French national self-understanding is of a nation based on individuality, indivisibility, and universalism, and assimilation to a singular culture. Religion accommodates itself to the state and the secular nation, not vice-versa. Belief, in the French tradition, should be highly privatized, in mind and in geography.

So why is this communitarian approach purportedly propitious for the decline of violence? We take it for granted, but the nation-state has been bestowed with a corporeal character and a "personality." So indeed, in certain ways this was a revolutionary response to the king's body spiritual in the early establishment of nation-states. This personality is expressed in the language of national self-determination, right of self-defense and other similar terms. Personality is also implied in reportage, along the lines of, "Paris announced that it regrets Washington did not adopt a more multilateralist position." The body natural in the

nation-state is the citizen herself. The nation-state's two bodies are mutually constitutive (as are the king's two bodies). Historically, the emergence of more central states and individual rights grew in tandem. Central governments had an interest in breaking down the power of feudal and other authorities. Guilds, the aristocracy, tribes, and locally autonomous authorities limited state power. Centering the rights of individuals in the state itself benefited both states and the favored individuals.

From the modern emergence of citizenship—for example in the American and French revolutions—this relationship was fully institutionalized. The idea of the "citizen" embodies not just the individual, but that individual's association with the state. He (and it was he, to start) is the source of the state's authority. The state is the source of his authority, in his right to vote and, over time, his expanding civic rights. Similarly, democracy inheres in this relationship epitomized by the citizen. The citizen's control over his own body—his self-determination—is inherently a part of national self-determination of the state. And so, it came to be understood, the reverse is equally true (see Boli 1981). In the French approach, if we break apart this relationship of the body natural and the body spiritual that is bundled into *le citoyen*, we put individual and republican liberties at risk. It is revealing indeed that Marianne is the symbol of France. She is always presented as a woman of beauty. A different "model" is chosen periodically as the official Marianne for the year—not just beautiful but frequently radiating certain sexuality, as in the celebrated choice of Brigitte Bardot.

Why, in the French context, does rupturing this relationship of the body natural and the body spiritual (or, more explicitly, the body politic) threaten liberties? Take the hadith that the Ummah is likened to the human body: If one part is in pain, the whole body suffers. In other words, if one part of the Muslim community, of the Ummah, is in distress, the whole Ummah should feel its concern. Now, it is critical to emphasize this is generally a social concept—that is, it can be an empathy that does not necessarily take on political import. In fact, this sense of a communal body is shared broadly. Thus when Haitian Americans respond to a devastating earthquake in Haiti, for example, no one questions that sense of obligation. Nor is it viewed as having political implications within the United States. But among most if not all Islamists, the Ummah as the body spiritual does take on a political connotation.

The sense of the body personal elides almost seamlessly into the body spiritual. And, in certain circumstances, the body spiritual is the body politic. What are those circumstances? Sometimes this is clear, as in the nation-state or for a monarch in medieval Europe. Sometimes there is a constructive—or destructive—ambiguity. France—the public and the government—concluded, in banning the public display of the burqa and the niqab, that dress is political. That is, the government sees the hijab (equivocally) and the niqab and burqa (unequivocally) as representing an approach to the body politic, both of the French nation-state and of the Ummah. For France, in the most palpable sense, this dress represents oppression of women. As such, it represents a negation of the citizen and the promotion of an alternative cultural authority. Even if some women voluntarily dress themselves in these ways, all they are doing is veiling—metaphorically—the cultural oppressors. In this way,

the sartorial can be perceived as a tangible threat to the future of democracy and republicanism.

In the French perspective multiculturalism—to the extent that it generates different bodies spiritual and politic among large populations—cannot stand.

The Leviathan, the Economist and the Sociologist

There is also an analog in the development of Economics and Sociology in these debates. Economics, which develops first as a discipline claiming the scientific mantle in the eighteenth century, suggests that the "Invisible Hand," rooted in rational self-interest, is the mechanism that ensures an orderly society. In this regard, the classical economists made an advance on the blunt instrument of the state as the principal nexus of peace, as in the Hobbesian Leviathan.

Sociology, again as a discipline claiming to be a new science, emerges roughly a hundred years later. The dominant figures—notably, Marx, Durkheim and Weber—contest the confidence of Economics as a promise of peace. Rather, they talk of the corrosive effects of a society built on little more than the mechanisms of the market. They point to statistics showing increasing pathologies as capitalism bloomed. Suicide rates go up, marriage buckles increasingly, alcoholism grows as a blight on the social body and furthermore social violence is more prevalent in the forms of, for example, crime, the oppression of the state and class conflict. Marx talks of *alienation*, Durkheim points to *anomie* and Weber describes the quiet desperation of a subtle, constant institutionalized coercion in the *iron cage*.

Where does this leave us? I think what is revealed in these debates is a tension between "peace" and "freedom," or what today is termed the debate between "security and "liberties." Clearly the implication is a Hobbesian opposition—namely, that between peace and freedom we have a zero sum game. The Economists (and liberals in the classical laissez-faire) argue that peace and freedom are a positive sum game. The Sociologists by implication suggest the Economists' argument actually generates a zero sum game—more such "freedom" generates greater violence. Rather, for freedom to be realized, a republican state is essential and from one can extrapolate that in their model freedom and peace once again are interdependent. Note here also that violence takes on different nuances: For Hobbes freedom was constrained when an external agency interferes with the *body* such that the individual is physically unable to act as he wishes. Physical force is of the essence here. But for Hobbes your freedom is not implicated if your *will* is coerced. John Locke suggested that, on the contrary, that freedom of will is essential to liberty. Note that this brings up the distinction between physical and moral repression. Thus, for example, if moral pressure is imposed and a student, say, feels uneasy about expressing an opinion that goes against the opinion of her professor and fellow students, for Locke this is a problem (but not necessarily for Hobbes). This is explicit in the thought of John Stuart Mill. The yoke of laws has become lighter, he suggested, but the yoke of opinion has become heavier. Relatively recent theorists, starting with Marx, suggest that so-called consumer freedom is to yoke

oneself to bourgeois customs. We become tethered to our possessions, turn into tools of management and are, consequently, alienated and in a state of "false consciousness" regarding our supposed freedom. (As we shall see, there is an Islamist echo of this position.) The contemporary theorist Charles Taylor suggested that freedom is not about "opportunity" but about the *exercise* of self-realization. In Hannah Arendt's terms, freedom is realized through civic politics. Quentin Skinner seeks to close the circle: the slave lives solely at the mercy of someone else. He self-censors. He seeks to avoid the rage of the master. Freedom, for Skinner, is the absence of dependence on arbitrary power.[4]

A More Nuanced Argument on What Makes for a *Civil* Civic Society

If we cast our eye across post-colonial nations, in many of them the level of violence is striking—not necessarily political violence but violence in general, be it criminal, vigilante, vengeance and the like. This is the case despite having an array of political systems in their histories—socialist, democratic, capitalist and the like. At the same time, there are relative success stories (like Botswana, democratic from its independence) and countries that have managed to pull themselves out of authoritarianism and show a modicum of stability and good governance (for example, Ghana). Others were stable under the thumb of authoritarian regimes (though the underlying violence was high), but eventually spin into extreme levels of violence (for example Syria).

Clearly no one political model is a panacea to violence, or provides a promise, *sui generis,* of civic order. Whether we derive the political model from a "liberal" or "communitarian" basis, they do not as such provide a stable foundation. Furthermore, the extent of violence across the post-colonial world, since the waves of independence suggest that something systemic is at work, that is, the violence cannot be attributed to each society individually. The laws of probability make this highly unlikely.

Rather, as I noted, the problem was the precarious sociological, political and constitutional position colonial masters left the bulk of colonies. That is, the nations created by colonial powers were frequently created as if *deus ex machina,* responding not to the sociological realities on the ground but rather to great power politics and other political and economic concerns of the colonialists. However we do need to recognize conditions on the ground also contributed to high levels of violence, notably tribalized and sectarian divisions in these societies, which also contributed corruption, grievances and the like. These propensities tended to be exacerbated, or ameliorated, depending on the political structures and boundaries (including borders) that were put in place in the colonial period.

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[4] For an overview see Skinner (1996).

In cases, it should be stressed, colonial powers—say the British in Nigeria—put in good faith efforts to create stable societies, and sought to end egregious practices like slavery. Other times the colonial powers left the emerging countries with indifference or much worse—such as the Belgians in the Congo. Really what was key was the extent "culture match" was in place (generally accidently, as in Botswana), or nurtured over time. Stephen Cornell and his colleagues describe "culture match" this way:

> Cultural "match" refers to the match between governing institutions and the prevailing ideas in the community about how authority should be organized and exercised. Such prevailing notions are part of the culture of a tribe or of any cohesive society. Governing institutions "match" a society's culture when governing authority is exercised when, where, and by whom the society's norms—often unspoken and informal— regard as legitimate. Where cultural match is high, the institutions of governance tend to have a high degree of support in the community, commanding allegiance and respect. Where cultural match is low, legitimacy is low, and governing institutions are more likely to be toothless, ignored, disrespected, and/or turned into vehicles for personal enrichment. (Cornell and Kalt 2003).

Cornell examined American Indian reservations, which differed greatly in terms of governance stability and economic development. American Indian reservations provide something of a propitious case for sociological study. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) which provided a model for reservation government: "power is centralized in the tribal government, chief executive officers exercise extensive power, there is no independent judiciary, and there is executive oversight of business operations." About two thirds of Indian reservations adopted the IRA. Thus we can compare outcomes across reservations, and across tribes with distinct "cultures." Cornell examined especially closely the White Mountain Apache in Arizona, a very successful reservation politically and economically, with the Oglala Sioux of the Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota, a deservation beset by poor governance and social ills. Both had adopted classic IRA systems of governance. Cornell et al note:

> Our research strongly suggests that a central part of the difference has to do with the institutions of governance. Those institutions are essentially the same in structure. But in the Apache case, there is a much closer match with Apache traditions. In the Sioux case there is no match at all. A comparison of Apache and Sioux systems of governance prior to the mid-nineteenth century, before either tribe had come under the effective control of the United States, shows substantial differences between them...Traditional Apache government was centralized. It put enormous power in the hands of a single, charismatic leader. That leader selected the legislature or council, which was looked to for advice, but over which the executive had the last word. There was no independent judiciary; the chief executive resolved major disputes as chief judge and jury. He made the major economic decisions as well...This traditional Apache system looks very much like the contemporary IRA government. By chance, when they adopted their IRA constitution, which was written by the federal government, the Apaches got a governing system that in many ways resembled the system they had developed over centuries on their own. As a result, the people tended to believe in that government, and still do so. The institutions of governance at Fort Apache have community support because they fit Apache conceptions of the appropriate organization and exercise of political authority. They have cultural match...The situation is very different at Pine Ridge. Traditional Lakota government looked radically different from the contemporary IRA version. It placed little power in the hands of single individuals. A legislative council exercised the largest degree of power. (ibid).

Cornell et al. do not address the issue of violence directly but it is clearly implicit in this approach.

Pinker and others have noted the extreme levels of violence across human societies historically. So it is not sufficient to attribute the problem solely to the colonial and post-colonial experience. There are precipitating factors that post-colonial settlements reinforced, if out of indifference, divide-by-rule policies or simple ignorance. It is important to stress these factors as they in turn need to be addressed in nurturing civil society in postcolonial circumstances (It is extraordinary how colonial mistakes, to put it mildly, keep getting repeated: for example, trying to develop centralized governments in highly tribalized societies like Afghanistan.)

Societies that have low women's status, high levels of fractionalization, extensive corruption and are characterized by extensive grievances (dimensions which also characterize patriarchal tribal societies) also *tend* to display high levels of violence, as established through statistical and qualitative analysis (Jacobson and Deckard 2012). Except for women's status, one can see how colonial settlements reinforced these dimensions. And in the greater Middle East, patriarchal practices remained very much in play.

A New Opening

This story of citizenship and postcolonial societies is what makes the India example so interesting, a de novo state after the partition, with no particular "culture match." It is in this light, among other reasons, that Subrata Mitra's work on citizenship is so important and, indeed, seminal. Less noticed, perhaps, is the importance of his work for policy, providing as it does guidance to bring a modicum of peace, with freedoms, to other post-colonial societies. India is very well covered in this volume, and how India has addressed this problem is addressed with granular detail in the writings of Mitra, but let me note the following observation of his:

> The Indian record of successfully turning subjects into citizens has cross-national significance because, rather than being a unique attribute of Indian culture, it is based on an institutional arrangement[s]...India's relative success on the issue of citizenship can be attributed to the fact that these tools of citizen-making are used with unusual vigour and imagination by the political decision-makers in India... India makes stakeholders out of rebels by adroitly combining reform, repression and selective recruitment of disaffected people into the privileged circle of new elite (Mitra 2010).

He further notes the mechanisms:

> India's relative success compared to most post-colonial states in turning subjects into citizens can be attributed to five factors: (a) India's institutional arrangement (the Constitution), (b) laws linked to India's social visions, (c) the double role of the state – as neutral enforcer, and as a partisan, supporting vulnerable social groups – in producing a level playing field, (d) meticulous bar-gaining among interests affected by legislation within the frame-work of vigorous political participation, and (e) "judicialisation" – evidence of the courts at work in turning subjects into citizens. (ibid.).

Subrata Mitra has provided a map for analyzing a key issue across much of the world; indeed he has provided a path for policy mavens and peacemakers as well. We scholars have an unprecedented opportunity as a result, to not just enlighten the world intellectually but to make it a better place, thanks to his work.

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Part III
State, Security and Stability in South Asia

Chapter 8
South Asia's Response to Its Refugee Questions

Partha S. Ghosh

Introduction

As per SAARC membership (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) South Asia is constituted of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.[1] As a region it has witnessed massive inter-state migrations and refugee movements as no other region of the world has. Ever since India's Partition in 1947 it has witnessed the movement of about 50 million people across the international borders either in search of security or for economic and social reasons. Besides, the region has also hosted refugees from beyond though their numbers are not large. How has the region dealt with these challenges since barring the lone exception of Afghanistan no other state has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol? There are no domestic legislations on refugees either. In spite of these legal handicaps, however, South Asia has shown humanitarian grit in no small measure to provide relief and shelter to most of these refugees/migrants. Even if when the states have not been able to do much they have not at least come in the way of refugees managing their lives by taking advantage of these hugely populous countries where laws are not strictly enforced against illegal residence or employment. This chapter tries to see how the respective states have handled their refugee issue both politically and administratively.

The chapter is divided in five parts. In the first part we have taken stock of the Mandate refugees in the region. The second part has been devoted to the study of relief and rehabilitation that India and Pakistan organized to deal the Partition refugees. In the third part we have discussed other bilateral refugee questions,

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[1] There is no other way of defining South Asia. For a critical explanation of this point, see Gosh (2013).

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namely, India-Bangladesh, India-Sri Lanka, Nepal-Bhutan and Bangladesh-Myanmar. In the fourth part we have addressed the issue from a regional respective. Given the absence of refugee-centric domestic legislations is it possible to have a regional refugee regime? The fifth part would contain some general remarks in way of making some concluding points.

The Mandate Refugees

There are two kinds of refugees in South Asia: Mandate Refugees and Non-Mandate Refugees. Mandate refugees are those who are recognised as refugees by the UNHCR acting under the authority of its Statute and relevant UN General Assembly resolutions. Mandate status is especially significant in countries which have not signed the 1951 UN Convention or its 1967 Protocol. In South Asian context that means all SAARC states except Afghanistan. In India the refugees from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Somalia and Sudan are Mandate Refugees. In 2010, there were about 9,000 such Afghan refugees of which more than 2,000 had applied for asylum. The remaining countries accounted for about 1,000 (Zutshi et al. 2011: 55–58). The Afghan refugees primarily suffer from two problems, one, their children's education, and two, lack of employment opportunity for them. Without some knowledge of English they cannot get jobs outside India if and when they would get a chance to repatriate. English medium schools in India are expensive because they are privately run which the refugees cannot afford. Government schools impart education only in Hindi and the madrassas in Urdu, neither of which is really of much help to them as in any case they have to work outside of India (Hans 2003: 373–76).

The Myanmarese/Burmese refugee phenomenon in India is almost three decades old. By the end of the 1980s a democracy movement had started in Burma under the leadership of Aung Sang Suu Kyi, daughter of Burma's independence hero Marshal Aung Sang. The state repression that followed resulted in either the formation of rebel armies like the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) or in escapes to India and Thailand. Several thousands of such activists arrived in India seeking refuge. The government of Myanmar claimed that not only India was supporting these 'rebels' and Aung Sang Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) it was even funding the government-in-exile called the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). According to UNHCR and Indian government reports, between 1988 and 2001, about 6,000 Burmese refugees had entered India of which about 1,000 had been granted the Mandate refugee status. However, towards the end of 1990s India's support for the pro-democracy movement started to decline. There were of two reasons, one, China's growing proximity with the Burmese military rulers, and two, Burma's providing shelters to several anti-India insurgent groups operating in India's north-east (Bhaumik 2003: 196–204). As of 2010 there were almost 9,000 Burmese political refugees a half of which had sought asylum (Zutshi et al. 2011: 55–58).

In Pakistan there has been a massive number of Afghan Mandate Refugees. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 had resulted in a huge inflow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. Although many Afghans had arrived in Pakistan as refugees even prior to the event the intervention boosted the flow massively reaching almost 10,000–15,000 figure every month. By the time the Geneva Accords were signed in 1988, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan had crossed 3,500,000, of which 67 % were in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—KPK), 28 % in Baluchistan, and the remaining scattered all over the country. In the 1990s there was a tendency among them to return home and by 1997 about 2,600,000 had actually returned. The UNHCR provided repatriation assistance to about 1,900,000 of them. Another 1,300,000 returned from Iran, taking the total number of Afghan refugees who went home to around 3,900,000—the largest repatriation of a single refugee group since UNHCR came into existence in 1949 (Malha 1997: 9). The situation, however, changed after 9/11 which resulted in the collapse of the Taliban regime. Once again an exodus was unleashed because the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan which was never enforceable became even more porous leading to uninterrupted cross-border movements. The US-led bombing campaign that started in October 2001 not only resulted in thousands of Afghans taking refuge in Pakistan in a fresh wave but also affected the process of UNHCR-sponsored repatriation drive. For several ethnic and political reasons the Pathan, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara refugees sheltered in Pakistan and Iran camps refused to go back. Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century it was a difficult task for both the UNHCR and the Pakistan government to manage the Afghan refugee problem. Many of them went back to Afghanistan only to come back again as the situation there was not conducive for peaceful resettlement as well as to take advantage of the financial incentive that the UNHCR provided for their return (Ghufran 2011: 948–53).

In Nepal and Bangladesh the UNHCR is engaged in facilitating the repatriation of ethnic Nepali refugees from Bhutan and the Bengali Muslim Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, in the first case to third countries and in the second case to their original homes in Myanmar's Rakhine province. Since 2007 there has been a policy in place to repatriate the ethnic Nepali refugees from Bhutan to some Western countries which have agreed to accept them. By April 2013 about 80,000 such refugees had been resettled in eight countries and another 20,000 were in the process of repatriation (http://www.unhcr.org/517a77df9.html, accessed on 9 January 2014). In Bangladesh the process of repatriation of Rohingyas has not been successful in spite of the UNHCR efforts partly because of the non-cooperation of Myanmar government and party because of the refusal of many Rohingya refugees to return as they find Bangladesh to be more conducive for their permanent settlement for ethno-political reasons.

Partition Refugees: The Broad Concerns

Immediately after independence both India and Pakistan had to deal with millions of refugees. Since the challenge of dealing with this massive flow was identical for both the states they were expected to coordinate their policies. The models available to them were the Custodian of Enemy Property and the War Damage Commissions of Europe. There were three major concerns, namely, the property rights of those who migrated, the question of abducted persons, and the rights of those minorities who did not migrate. Between December 1947 and June 1949 several India-Pakistan meetings were held to deal with the problem of evacuee properties. It had already been agreed that no illegal requisition of property would be recognized and action would be taken to protect and restore such properties to their lawful owners. In September–October 1947 Pakistan and India appointed officers to serve as custodians of evacuee properties in both the Punjabs. Later, on the Indian side the exercise was extended to Delhi, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and some princely states. In 1948, the case of Bengal was dealt with separately through the Evacuee Property Act. Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Cooch-Behar were excluded from the jurisdiction of the act. Notwithstanding these legal regimes, enforcement of the law had to confront many problems, such as, how to define an evacuee property, how to define a movable property, how to decide the time frame for the beneficiary to take advantage of the act, and, the jurisdiction of the law (for example, was it to cover Jammu and Kashmir and other disputed territories). Some solution to these vexed problems was found in the policy of the Evacuee Property Organisation in both countries by (a) accepting the statements of the refugees at their face value in respect of their losses as it was not expected of them to possess any valid legal documents, and (b) by both governments exchanging their land records and title deeds (Menon 2003: 158–59).

Still, whatever success was there it was confined to the Punjab region. So far as Bengal was concerned nothing really worked. The reason was that in the former there was virtually full exchange of population and assets but in Bengal because of its different circumstance it was not possible. The Nehru-Liaquat pact of April 1950[2] envisaged policies to secure the return of the displaced minorities and to protect and return their abandoned properties. In pursuance of these policies, Minorities' Boards and Evacuee Property Management Boards were established

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[2] Officially called the Delhi Pact, it was signed between Indian and Pakistani prime ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, respectively, on April 8, 1950, following the escalation of tension between India and Pakistan in East Pakistan after economic relations between the two countries had been severed in December 1949. The idea was that let the refugees be allowed to return unmolested to dispose of their property, allow abducted women and looted properties to be returned, to derecognize forced conversions, and to reconfirm minority rights. Minority commissions were established to implement these terms, and confidence was in fact restored for a time; however, in the months following the pact, more than a million additional refugees migrated to West Bengal. The continuing struggle over Kashmir also strained relations between the two countries.

in both East and West Bengal. Notably the Hindu refugees in Bengal were not to be designated as refugees by the West Bengal government but only as 'displaced persons'. The West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 was meant to acquire land wherever possible for 'public purposes' to settle the immigrants. Such acquisitions were largely to be governed by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1891. But the problem was of finding enough suitable paddy land which was ready for cultivation. The only possible way was to convert waste lands into arable tracts which the government tried to do through the passage of The Waste Lands (Requisition and Utilization) Act, 1952. The real problem, however, was how to implement these laws. In most cases the day to day care of the refugees became the responsibility of the district administrations which continued till July 1958 when it was decided to wind up all the relief camps in the state (Sen 2000: 49–56).

Limited Efficacy of the 1950 Pact

One of the major ideas behind the Nehru-Liaquat pact was to restore confidence among the minorities in both Bengals, Muslims in West Bengal and Hindus in East Bengal. Though millions of Hindus and Muslims had fled their homes still millions had not. They had now become minorities in the new countries. But while the pact served the Muslim minority of West Bengal well it did not come to the rescue of Hindus of East Bengal. Both Syama Prasad Mookerjee and K. C. Niyogee, ministers from West Bengal in the Union Cabinet, were of the view that had the central government not intervened through the expedience of the Nehru-Liaquat pact the exchange of populations and properties would have taken place automatically. Already, the statement of the Union Minister for Refugees Rehabilitation, Mohan Lal Saxena, on 2 March 1950, in a meeting at the Writers' Building (the seat of West Bengal government) had irked many West Bengal politicians. Saxena's proposal was to distinguish between the pre- and post-1950 refugees. The pre-1950 refugees were entitled to both relief and rehabilitation but the post-1950 refugees to relief only, not rehabilitation. Saxena's argument was that once the communal hostilities would subside the refugees would return to their places of origin. The ground realities, however, were so different that such hopes were not entertained by anyone in West Bengal. Against this background the pious commitments contained in the Nehru-Liaquat pact of safeguarding the lives and properties of the respective minorities in India and Pakistan looked hollow. While the Bengali Muslim evacuees from West Bengal returned to their native places, there was hardly any reverse migration of Hindu refugees in West Bengal to their homes in East Bengal (Basu Ray Chaudhury and Dey 2009: 9). Moreover, the Muslims in India could repose their faith in the provisions of the Indian Constitution promulgated on 26 January 1950 but there were no corresponding guarantees in the Pakistan's Objectives Resolution passed on 12 March 1949. The relevant provisions in the latter were at best vague and contradictory.

Syama Prasad Mookerjee, who was a member of Jawaharlal Nehru's Interim Cabinet and who had resigned from the cabinet on 6 April 1950 to register his protest against the Nehru-Liaquat Pact, unequivocally condemned it on the floor of the parliament on 19 April 1950 in the following words:

> First, we had two such agreements since Partition for solving the Bengal problem and they were violated by Pakistan without any remedy open to us. Any agreement which has no sanction will not offer any solution. Second, the crux of the problem is Pakistan's concept of an Islamic State and the ultra-communal administration based on it. The agreement sidetracks this cardinal issue and we are today exactly where we were previous to the agreement. Third, India and Pakistan are made to appear equally guilty, while Pakistan was clearly the aggressor. The agreement provides that no propaganda will be permitted against the territorial integrity of the two countries and there will be no incitement to war between them. This almost sounds farcical so long as Pakistan troops occupy a portion of our territory of Kashmir and warlike preparations on its part are in active operation. Fourth, events have proved that Hindus cannot live in East Bengal on the assurances of security given by Pakistan. We should accept this as a basic proposition. The present agreement on the other hand calls upon minorities to look upon the Pakistan government for their safety and honour which is adding insult to injury and is contrary to assurances given by us previously. Fifth, there is neither proposal to compensate those who have suffered nor will the guilty be ever punished, because no one will dare give evidence before a Pakistan Court. This is in accordance with bitter experience in the past. Sixth, Hindus will continue to come away in large numbers and those who have come will not be prepared to go back. On the other hand Muslims who had gone away will now return and in our determination to implement the agreement Muslims will not leave India. Our economy will thus be shattered and possible conflict within our country will be greater (quoted from the *Parliament Debates* by Mandal 2011: 164).

It was one of the constant refrains of West Bengal that in dealing with the refugee issue the central government was behaving like a step mother compared to what it did in Punjab. Many of these criticisms were not unfounded as we would see later in this chapter.

The Case of Abducted Women

In respect of abducted women the policy that was worked out by India and Pakistan in 1948 was to recover such women and return them to their families. In pursuance of the policy, the Constituent Assembly of India promulgated on 15 December 1949 the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act which was renewed every year till 1957, 2 years post-1955 Citizenship Act, after which it lapsed. This exercise too met with many hurdles partly because of differences between India and Pakistan as well as gender prejudice of the society in many cases (Menon 2003: 159, Roy 2010: 42–55). Here is an illustration:

> The Hindu and Sikh women who were recovered from Pakistan to be restored to the 'nation' and to their 'homes' were differently positioned from Muslim women who, as 'recovered abducted women', were 'taken into custody' and placed in detention camps in India under what may be called a 'state of exception' till the time their own government claimed them. For the purpose of the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act,

'Muslim abducted persons' constituted a distinct class, and the Act extended only to some states—United Provinces, Provinces of East Punjab and Delhi, Patiala and East Punjab States Union, and the United States of Rajasthan. It was through what constituted an exception—the *suspension* of the writ of habeas corpus—in these detention camps, as Pratibha Baxi has put it, that notions of 'national honour' were instituted through law: 'Muslim women who had been "recovered" and sent to camps were constituted as *impure* body populations who had no clams to Indian citizenship, and no man or his family could claim that these women had been unlawfully detained in the camps, unlike routine law' (Roy 2010: 42–43).

India's Relief Strategy

In India the two regions that mattered the most in this regard were, one, Delhi and the adjacent states, and two, Calcutta and the adjacent districts. A study of these two experiences shows how the two respective state responses differed and why. In the case of Delhi, the Central Government was clear about its mission but in the case of the West Bengal government its mission was not clear. The primary reason for this difference was that while the migrants from West Pakistan had come to India for good, without any doubt in their minds that they would not return, but in the case of West Bengal the migrants were not sure about that. It was true for the Muslim migrants as well who had left for East Pakistan. Both Nehru and the West Bengal government used to think that the phenomena were temporary and as the situation normalized the refugees would return to their respective homes. The ground realties tended to suggest that they were not completely off the mark. In early 1950 the Bengali refugee flow peaked at 3.5 million but following the Nehru-Liaquat Pact on minorities 1.2 million Hindu refugees returned to East Pakistan. Before long, however, a large number of refugees migrated back to India once again. By any measure it was a fluid situation and no one was sure about the exact numbers. For example, while the West Bengal government said that by 1954 2.7 million refugees had arrived, the central government put the figure at 2.8 million by 1951, and then at four million by 1956 (Bandyopadhayay 2000: 32). Besides, while in the case of Punjabi refugees in Delhi the Central Government was directly involved because Delhi was a Union Territory for West Bengal it was the state government which was the nodal agency which lacked resources compared to Delhi. Only in the cases of the rehabilitation schemes in Dandakaranya in Madhya Pradesh (MP) and in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands where some Bengali refugees were transferred to ease the pressure on West Bengal the Central Government was also involved, more so in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which was a Union Territory (both these schemes are discussed later).

Rehabilitation of Refugees: The Indian Experience

Like any refugee situation anywhere the question that arose was: How to deal with the challenge both humanly and administratively. There were two kinds of refugees from West Pakistan. Though most of them were Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab there were other refugees too who were from Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP—now called Khyber Paktunkhwa/KPK). The government decided that the refugees from Pakistani Punjab should be resettled in Indian Punjab only, and their migration to other parts like Delhi or U.P. should be discouraged. Thus, the refugees from the canal colony districts of West Punjab were resettled in their original places from where they had migrated a few decades ago. Similarly, the refugees from the Lahore tehsil[3] were resettled in Ajnala tehsil, those from Sialkot in Gurdaspur, and those from Rawalpindi in Ambala. The Sikhs were generally resettled in the riverine areas of Ferozepur, Fazilka and other places. It was the general policy of both the Indian and Pakistani governments to consider the community factor in resettlement so that in future they could be safeguarded against the devastating effects of breakdown of support systems such as family, tribe and community.

So far as the East Bengali refugees were concerned, besides doing whatever could be done within West Bengal, efforts were made to shift a portion of the refugees outside the state as there was no land available in the state to accommodate them any further. It was argued that the central government must treat the East Bengali refugee problem as a national problem and not merely as West Bengal's concern. Sucheta Kripalani, a Member of the Indian Parliament, said: 'It was not on West Bengal's decision that this country was partitioned. This country was partitioned by a decision of India…. Therefore, it is a national problem and all the states should pull their weight in rehabilitating them' (*Lok Sabha Debates*, 31 March, 1956: 3888). It was against this background that two locations were chosen for the purpose of rehabilitating a section of East Bengali refugees, one in the Raipur district of Madhya Pradesh known as the Dandakaranya rehabilitation scheme and the other in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands known as the Andaman rehabilitation scheme. The two schemes yielded different results. While the Dandakaranya experiment failed the one in Andaman succeeded.

The Dandakaranya Rehabilitation Scheme

The reason that the Dandakaranya project failed was because the area was not suitable for East Bengali refugees who were mostly farmers adept in rice cultivation in the wet lands. In contrast Dandakaranya was dry and arid, particularly unsuitable

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[3] A tehsil (also known as tahsil, tahasil, taluka, taluk, or taluq) is a unit of government in Pakistan (also in India). It usually consists of a town and the villages around the town.

for wet rice cultivation. Besides, only a fraction of the real grant for development had reached the refugees in whose name the grants were sanctioned. According to one refugee, who spent years in the Dandakaranya camp and who later became a writer, it was in the name of refugee rehabilitation that massive funds were released that led to road and bridge constructions but from them the refugees gained hardly anything. The whole project area was bigger in size than the state of West Bengal. As such the real gainer was the state of Madhya Pradesh and not the refugees. Moreover, the refugee settlements were scattered at long distances making it impossible for them to maintain their cultural and social life. Existential tension with the local tribal communities was yet another problem (Biswas 2011: 205–7, Ghosh 2000: 122).

The Andaman Rehabilitation Scheme

Compared to the Dandakaranya project the Andaman rehabilitation scheme worked well. Unlike the Dandakaranya project which failed for three reasons the Andaman project succeeded for three reasons. First, the deforested tracts that were made available to the refugees were highly suitable for rice cultivation, second, the refugees who were brought to the island were real farmers, young and well bodied prepared to convert forest lands into arable lands, and third, being far away from West Bengal the left-oriented politics of the state did not hamper the administrative activities on the island. The lands were particularly fertile for paddy cultivation because there was plenty of rainfall and being the jungle tracts for millennia the soil was rich in nitrogen content and hence highly fertile. No wonder that the refugee Bengali community now is a well to do people with representatives in several middle class professions. This success story, however, had its political repercussions. The West Bengal government dreamed of incorporating the islands into the state on the ground that the state was overcrowded and needed more breathing spaces. The government of India eventually turned down the request partly under pressure from the already settled people of the islands who were mostly from South India, and also for security reasons. The argument, indeed reasonable, was that the strategic location of the islands required close watch from Delhi for which a state government was not capable (Chakrabarty 2012: 47–55).

Rehabilitation of Refugees: The Pakistan Experience

After Partition the state of Pakistan that was created had two wings—the East and the West. The refugee problem was felt in both the wings. It was, however, in West Pakistan that the challenge was most critical, as of all the refugees that came to Pakistan 81 % landed in West Pakistan (73 % in Punjab alone) while only 9 % landed in East Pakistan. It may be noted that the refugees who came from the Indian

part of Punjab to the Pakistani part came largely en-masse and within a short span of time. But those from other parts of India came in relatively smaller numbers but the process continued for years. The latter category settled mostly in the Sind province, particularly Karachi. As a result, while the refugees in Punjab spoke the same Punjabi tongue which the locals also did, those settling in Sind did not speak Sindhi. This led to two different kinds of responses from the Punjab and the Sind governments to their respective refugees. The government of Punjab was more sympathetic to the refugees compared to the Sind government. The Central and the Punjab governments jointly established the Pakistan Punjab Refugee Council for the purpose of refugee rehabilitation. The Punjab government was allocated a grant of Rs. 12,500,000 and a development loan of Rs. 80,000,000. Besides, 42 satellite towns were built to accommodate 80,000 families. A Rehabilitation Tax was instituted and credit agencies were created to fund new businesses. At the village level a *guzara* (this Urdu word means to somehow manage one's financial requirements) scheme was introduced for temporary allotments of agricultural lands. In spite of delays and other controversies by and large the schemes worked. For example, by the end of January 1959, of the total of 1,390,362 pending cases 1,315,544 had been settled (Waseem 1994: 109–10).

There was also more cooperation between India and Pakistan in respect of settlement of evacuee properties insofar as Punjab was concerned. No wonder that within a short time 6.6 million hectares of evacuee land was allotted to incoming refugees in the Punjab province (Waseem 1994: 107). In contrast, in Sind land was allotted on a temporary basis and, that too, on a smaller scale. Unlike Punjab, the process of refugee rehabilitation in Sind remained grossly dissatisfactory. Even in 1954, 7 years after Partition there were as many as 240,000 refugees out of a total of 750,000 who were yet to be rehabilitated. Since the process of refugee flow continued the problem remained. In Punjab, by 1948 the immigration had stopped (see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Patterns of refugee rehabilitation in Pakistan

Punjab situation	Sind situation
Settlement: smooth and quick (90 % by July 1948)	Settlement: problematic and delayed (30 % unsettled by 1954)
No returnees	Refugees returning to India
Refugees spread over Punjab	Refugees concentrated in Karachi
Permanent allotment	Temporary allotment

Source: Waseem (1999)

Bilateral Dynamics

Intra-regional refugee issues in South Asia are essentially bilateral in nature. In this section, first we would discuss India's response to the Tibetan refugees who fled Tibet after the Chinese occupation of the latter in early 1950s and more so after the arrival of Dalai Lama in India in 1959 seeking political asylum and later the East Pakistani refugee arrivals during the Bangladesh liberation war, and then secondly, we would try to see how a set of two countries with a common refugee issue has coped with the problem. In this latter part we would take up three case studies, namely, India-Sri Lanka, Nepal-Bhutan and Bangladesh-Myanmar.

The Tibetan Refugees

In the 1950s India faced the challenge of hosting about 100,000 Tibetan refugees which had serious humanitarian and foreign policy implications. Initially these refugees were put in camps in Assam and West Bengal. Later other camps were also organized in states like Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Dehradun (then in UP, now in Uttarakhand), Arunachal Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Delhi. Later, to make their stay as comfortable as possible they were sheltered in Dharmashala (Himachal Pradesh) which was climatically suitable for them. Dharmashala also became the seat of Tibetan government in exile. Considering the fact that there was little possibility of return for these refugees soon the government of India wanted to facilitate their finding gainful employment in sectors conducive to their capabilities. Thus besides providing them agricultural lands wherever possible they were employed in road building works, carpet weaving industries, agro-based industries and in the handicrafts sector (Kharat 2003: 287–93). These days one finds that the Tibetans are doing good restaurant business in many metropolitan towns.

East Pakistani Refugees, 1970–1971

During the 1970–1971 liberation movement of Bangladesh which invited large-scale repression by the Pakistani military junta about 10,000,000 East Pakistani refugees arrived in India. Their relief on a day-to-day basis was a one-sided affair on behalf of India as it was not to be expected that the Bangladesh government in exile in Calcutta would be able to do anything worthwhile in this regard. Not only refugee camps had to be set up in all the neighbouring Indian states, namely, West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya, even in other states such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh also some refugee camps were established. India did two things quickly: one, it sanctioned a grant of INR 2,000,000,000 for relief, and two, it

set up a special Branch Secretariat in Calcutta under the leadership of P.N. Luthra, an Additional Secretary in the Department of Labour and Rehabilitation. Reserve food stocks were created and makeshift shelters were put up overnight. Foreign assistance at this stage was non-existent which started coming only later. Till August 1971 it was about $147 million against the total cost of $576 million. This was 25 %, which later rose to 40 %. Visiting foreign officials were impressed by India's efforts. Dr. S. Komar, an ambassador from Yugoslavia, wondered 'how it was possible to have taken care of such an unprecedented influx in such a short time' (Bandyopadhayay 2000: 42). The UNHCR also played some role in relief and repatriation though there was a controversy when India alleged that the organization had failed to maintain its non-political role as its High Commissioner Sadruddin Aga Khan who happened to be a Pakistani traveled extensively in East Pakistan in June 1971 on the invitation of President General Yahya Khan. India's charge against the High Commissioner was that when the refugee flow was still in full swing (3,000,000 refugees arrived after June 1971) he was talking about their repatriation which gave the impression that he was trying to help the Pakistan government by overlooking the on-going gross violations of Human Rights in East Pakistan (Saha 2003: 240–42).

India-Sri Lanka

Two types of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka India has to cope with, first, to arrange for the repatriation and rehabilitation of a section of Indian Tamils in accordance with the Shastri-Sirimavo pact of 1964,[4] and second, to meet the challenge of a continuous flow of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees starting with the unprecedented anti-Tamil riots of 1983. The issue of Indian Tamils has been festering for half a century with no complete solution to the problem though so far as Sri Lanka is concerned it has done its part of responsibility enshrined in the Shastri-Sirimavo pact. On 9 November 1988 the Sri Lankan parliament unanimously passed the bill entitled 'Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons (Special Provisions) Act', which conferred Sri Lankan citizenship on all stateless persons lawfully residing in the country and those who had not applied for Indian citizenship (Sabaratnam 1990: 205). But the Indian component could not be implemented. By 31 January 1989,

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[4] The pact was signed between the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranayake on 30 October 1964. According to the pact it was decided that of the 1953 estimate of 975,000 stateless persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, 300,000 (together with the natural increase in that number) would be granted Sri Lankan citizenship while 525,000 (together with the natural increase in that number) would be granted Indian citizenship. The status and future of the remaining 150,000 people (together with the natural increase in that number) would be decided later by a separate agreement. In 1974, through another agreement between the two countries it was decided that both the governments would grant citizenship to 150,000 persons left undecided by the 1964 pact according to a 50:50 ratio.

1,16,000 families had been repatriated to India, but neither the problem of their statelessness nor that of their rehabilitation had been resolved (Vedavalli 1994: 38–39, 46–49, 154–55). S. Thondaman, the Sri Lankan Minister for Animal Husbandry and Rural Industries, and the president of the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), in a press conference in April 1997 alleged that while, through his efforts, Sri Lanka had granted citizenship in 1988 to all stateless Indian Tamils who had opted for Sri Lanka, India had not done its bit. According to him many repatriates to India had been denied citizenship rights. He further informed that of about 200,000 Indian Tamils who had applied for Indian citizenship most had since died but their children still remained stateless. Due to the discontinuation of the ferry service between Sri Lanka and India on account of the war in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, the process had come to a standstill so far as repatriation to India is concerned. Nor are Indian Tamils keen to return to India. According to a rough estimate there were 250,000 such stateless people in Sri Lanka in early 1990s. In any case, there was little enthusiasm among the Indian Tamils to return to India. According to a contemporary sample survey the majority had to opt for Indian citizenship because they had no other option (Vedavalli 1994: 46–47, 154–55). It is estimated that of the total number of Tamil refugees in India 30 % are Indian Tamils. The problem is that often these Indian Tamils are taken for Sri Lankan Tamils as a result of which they have to suffer both in Sri Lanka and India (Suryanarayan 2003: 343–45).

The Sri Lanka Tamil refugee phenomenon dates back to 1983. The anti-Tamil riots that rocked Colombo in July 1983 forced about 30,000 Sri Lanka Tamils to take refuge in neighbouring Tamil Nadu in India. The flow continued with varying degrees of intensity and by May 1985 the figure touched 100,000. Many of these refugees settled permanently in India. According to one estimate, in 1990 approximately 120,000 Sri Lanka Tamils were living in refugee camps while about 80,000 were living outside the camps (Bastiampillai 1996: 195). It has been the global experience that wherever the refugees have a choice to avoid the state-sponsored refugee benefits they do so by using their social contacts because freedom of movement and freedom to select jobs of their choice is important which the camp life restricts (Hovil 2007: 599–620).

Following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 the Sri Lanka Tamils in India became suspect in the eyes of the Government of India. The AIADMK Government in Tamil Nadu responded favourably to the Centre by withdrawing all facilities of higher education for them and by monitoring the movements of the internees of the refugee camps more stringently. Even the non-camp refugees were asked to register themselves with the police immediately. By July 1991, more than 26,000 such persons had been registered. Soon afterwards police began to apprehend those who had not registered resulting in 1800 arrests under the Foreigners' Act (Suryanarayan 1996: 221–22). The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, J. Jayalalitha demanded immediate action: 'I appeal, rather demand, that the Centre should take immediate action so that all Sri Lankan Tamils could be sent back.... It should take place immediately' (Suryanarayan 2003: 328). Soon a plan of repatriation was drawn and between 21 January 1992 and 20 March 1995 arrangements were made to repatriate 54,188 people. To counter the criticism that the government was

forcing the Sri Lanka Tamils to leave, the UNHCR was permitted to have a token presence in Tamil Nadu to oversee the repatriation. Following the defeat of the LTTE in Jaffna and Killinochchi in November 1995, the repatriation was halted, which once again resulted in refugee influx into India. Between 31 July 1996 and 10 October 1996, about 13,000 Sri Lanka Tamil refugees reportedly arrived in Rameswaram, on the coast of Tamil Nadu (*The Hindu*, 6 October 1996). In 1997 there were 1,64,000 Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in India. Besides India, there were several destinations, particularly in the West, for the Tamil refugees, namely, Canada (1,25,000), USA (15,000), UK (35,000), Holland (15,000), Germany (60,000), France (40,000), Switzerland (36,000), Australia (8,000), Denmark (8,000), Norway and Sweden (6,000), New Zealand (1,000), Belgium (1,000), Austria (3,000), Finland (200), Russia (5,000), Botswana (2,000), Indonesia (3,000), Ukraine (1,000), Thailand (5,000), Vietnam (1,000), Rumania (750), Mexico (300), Peru (300), Chile (200), Bulgaria (800), and Cambodia (500). The pain of the scattered existence of the Tamil refugees was poignantly expressed in the following poem of V.I.S. Jayapalan, a Sri Lanka Tamil expatriate poet (quoted by Suryanarayan 2003: 321–22):

My son is in Jaffna
Wife in Colombo
Father in the Wanni
Mother, old and sick in Tamil Nadu,
Relatives in Frankfurt
A sister in France
And I,
Like a camel that has strayed in Alaska
Am stuck in Oslo
And our families
Cotton pillows
To be
Torn and scattered by the
Monkey fate?

There are four categories of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu—(1) Refugees in the camps, (2) Recognized refugees outside the camps, (3) Sri Lankan nationals, and (4) Tamil militants detained in special camps. In 2002, the 111 refugee camps in Tamil Nadu sheltered 63,941 refugees belonging to 16,955 families. Of the total 39 % belonged to the first category, 12 % to the second category, 48 % to the third category and 1 % to the fourth category (Suryanarayan 2003: 332–351). It is not clear how many Sri Lanka Tamils have arrived in India as refugees after the defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan armed forces in May 2009. Recent reports only suggest that there are 113 camps that shelter 80,000 Tamil refugees (Priyamvatha 2013: 20). There are, however, some reports which indicate that there is a racket going on in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu to smuggle Sri Lanka Tamils out of their country to such destinations as Australia and Canada via India. Many agencies are in the business to do the job by extorting handsome price for the

execution of these risky operations which often fail to the further impoverishment of the prospective migrants (Natararajan 2012).

Nepal-Bhutan

In the 1990s about 100,000 refugees from Bhutan of Nepali ethnic origin arrived in Nepal to avoid repression of the Bhutanese monarchy. The introduction of nationality laws and nationality-centric cultural markers were discriminatory for Nepali minority in the kingdom which the latter had resisted. In spite of several meetings between the two governments for the return of the refugees nothing happened and the refugees continue to be in Nepal. According to the Brussels based *Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT)* of 7 March 2008 in June 2007 there were about 110,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal sheltered in seven camps. The most important reason for Bhutan not to take the issue seriously is India's indifference to the question, or, more logically, India's benevolent neutrality in the case so far as Bhutan was concerned. It may be underlined that Bhutan's borders do not touch those of Nepal. They touch those of India, that too those areas of India's north-eastern region which host large number of ethnic Nepalis. It would be logical to surmise that India saw to it that these Nepali refugees did not take shelter in India which would have complicated India-Bhutan relations. According to a report of the New Delhi-based Human Rights Law Network (HRLN):

> The Indian government has neither acknowledged presence, provided relief nor extended any assistance to Bhutanese refugees. They are mostly staying in the north-eastern states and in West Bengal. Reports indicate that the local people provide shelter to these refugees. They earn a living through self-employment in animal husbandry and find work in agriculture and the informal sector. The Indian government has not yet formulated any policy statement regarding the Nepali Bhutanese (Zutshi *et al* 2011: 65).

India's policy has suited the Bhutanese interest well. For Bhutan, dealing with Nepal on the subject was relatively easy compared to dealing with India, which was a bigger power bordering Bhutan. Many rounds of failed talks between Bhutan and Nepal on the refugee issue have shown the far sight of Bhutan and Indian leaderships. So far, Bhutan has not taken back a single refugee. The issue is virtually a dead one now in spite of all kinds of UN and NGO interventions. The offer of several Western countries to grant immigrant visas to many of these refugees has further watered down the problem to Bhutan's satisfaction (see the section 'The Mandate Refugees' above).

Bangladesh-Myanmar

While India faced the problem of political refugees from Myanmar Bangladesh has faced a much greater challenge in respect of ethnic Rohingyas from Myanmar seeking refuge there. For these Bengali-speaking Muslim Rohingyas who belong to the adjacent Rakhine province (previously known as Arakan) of Myanmar Bangladesh is their natural refuge whenever in trouble. In the 1970s certain ethnic policies of Myanmar led to large-scale migrations of Rohingyas to Bangladesh. Starting from 1977, about 260,000 such refugees arrived in Bangladesh. By June 1996, 200,000 of them had been repatriated. They were followed by another 15,000 while the remaining 45,000 were awaiting repatriation in five camps in Bandarban and Cox's Bazar districts. According to a 2009 statement of the Bangladesh government there were still between 200,000 and 400,000 Rohingyas who were waiting to be repatriated (Rahman 2010: 235).

The ethno-religious dimension of the problem has come in the way of any agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar to find a lasting solution to the problem. It is alleged both by the secular forces in Bangladesh as well as the government of Myanmar that these refugee camps contribute to Islamist militancy in Bangladesh to the detriment of liberal and democratic politics in Bangladesh and that of national security of Myanmar. Latter claims that the Rohingyas are Bangladeshis who have illegally settled on their land and as such they have been evicted. This irks the Bangladeshis, particularly in the camps' neighbourhood areas, who insist that they should be sent back even if force will have to be used. This may have been also caused by the fact that there is a growing militancy amongst a section of the refugees under the leadership of Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), which has close links with such terrorist groups as Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (Huji). Because of this militancy variable neither the Bangladeshi government is sympathetic to the plight of the Rohingya refugees nor is the Myanmar government in any mood to take them back. In 2008 when the Bihari Muslims were allowed to become Bangladesh nationals many had thought that it might as well mean that the government was willing to consider similar policy for the Rohingyas but nothing of that sort happened for it would have been an unpopular move especially in view of their terrorist links (Murshid 2012: 105–8).

Towards a Regional Response

Considering the fact that refugees, migrants, displaced and stateless people cause considerable strain on regional politics and security it would be instructive to find out how concerned South Asian states have tried to deal with the challenge. Little has been achieved at the SAARC level notwithstanding regular meetings of the organization and its various standing committees. Since there is a perceptional

hiatus between India and its regional neighbours on matters of regional security, SAARC's political agenda is limited. India finds it easier to deal with its neighbours bilaterally as several of India's neighbours would like to dilute India's preeminence to the extent possible through multilateral understandings (Ghosh 2013). There has been some talk of sub-regionalism under the umbrella of the so-called Gujral doctrine but insofar as the refugee issue is concerned, it is not on the agenda at all. The subject has received attention only indirectly. The lack of official enthusiasm, however, has been compensated to some extent by non-official attempts to prepare a blueprint of a regional convention.

Search for a Regional Refugee Regime

Over the years many concerned individuals in South Asia have highlighted the human dimensions of the refugee problem to plead for a law based approach to the question. They argue that South Asia's reluctance to join the international community in signing the 1951 Convention or its 1967 protocol cannot be dissociated from the anthropological discourse over human rights. At the core of the debate is the conflict between the concept of universality of human rights and the cultural relativity of the same. While the former is generally grounded in the Western notion of human rights, the latter is imbedded in the approaches of the decolonized countries after the end of the Second World War. Though the gap is increasingly narrowing, differences between the two approaches persist. These differences are not always inter-state or inter-cultural sometimes they can as well be intra-state or intra-cultural (Subba 2004: 468–71). Given these complexities it is not unlikely that individual states have different notions of human rights and thereby different approaches to refugee protection. Although seven out of eight South Asian countries have not signed the international refugee covenants yet none of them can be branded as ruthless in dealing with the refugees on their soil. Partly because of their constitutions and partly because of their overall societal makeup, they do not show outright hostility to the refugees and, in spite of their resource shortages they are generally willing to recognize and address the plight of refugees.

By September 2008, there were nine international human rights treaties. Monitored by the human rights treaty bodies they created legal obligations for participating states to promote and protect human rights. When a state accepts a human rights treaty through ratification or accession, it becomes a state party to that treaty and assumes the legal obligations to implement the rights set out in it. The treaties provide for the creation of international committees of independent experts to monitor the implementation of their provisions in those countries that have ratified or acceded to them. The United Nations treaty body system plays a pivotal role in strengthening the protection of human rights nationally. The primary mandate, common to all human rights treaty bodies, is to monitor the implementation of the relevant treaty by reviewing the reports submitted periodically by the states. The most relevant among the nine human rights treaty bodies so far as refugee rights are

concerned is the 1990 Committee on Migrant Workers. It monitors the implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

To think of a South Asian refugee regime the first step should be the enactment of national laws dealing with refugee rights. Let us take the example of India. Has it fared well in dealing with its refugees without a refugee law? India has three kinds of refugees, namely, (a) Refugees who receive full protection according to standards set by the Government of India—Tibetan refugees, Sri Lanka Tamil refugees and Jumma (CHT) refugees from Bangladesh, (b) Refugees whose presence in Indian territory is acknowledged only by UNHCR and protected under the principle of non-refoulement (Mandate Refugees)—Afghan, Iranian, Somali, Sudanese and Myanmarese, and (c) Refugees who have entered India and have assimilated into the local communities; their presence is neither acknowledged by the Indian government nor UNHCR—Chins, Rakhain refugees (in Mizoram) and Naga refugees (in Nagaland), all from Myanmar, and ethnic Nepalis from Bhutan (in Sikkim and in the Dargeeling, Jalpaiguri and Karseong districts of West Bengal). In the absence of national laws court cases have in many instances gone in favour of the asylum seekers on humanitarian grounds. As Justice Markandeya Katju, the former Chief Justice of India, said: 'While the Executive branch of the Indian state does not recognize refugees and refugee law, the judicial wing of our state does recognize refugees and refugee law to a certain extent. … It is not subordinate to our government, and it often censures the government. … In particular, *the Indian judiciary has introduced refugee law into our legal system through the back door*' (Katju 2001, emphasis added). The Supreme Court of India has gone to the extent of applying Article 14 (Right to Equality) and Article 21 (Right to Life and Dignity) to all, including migrants and refugees living in India, as well as conferred to the refugees the basic human rights as defined by the United Nations (Nair 2007: 5).

It is, however, argued that the humanitarian and judicial approach though helpful for the refugees, and which must be appreciated, is not enough. It should be buttressed by legal commitments aimed at specifically recognizing and protecting the rights of the refugees. In the Indian context it has been argued:

> [T]he call for humane treatment of refugees does not mean that the special existential or security concerns of the Indian people have to be ignored. The case for a humane and rights-based treatment of refugees will sit well with a democratic and responsible order. A rights-based approach means that these concerns are given weight within a framework that recognises *the distinctive essence of humanitarian problems* and gives legal recognition to the fact that every person, alien or national, is of equal moral worth, and worthy of treatment that does not violate his or her dignity (Chimni 2003: 466–67, emphasis in the original).

Simultaneously, while pleading for national refugee laws, activists across the region have also been advocating for a regional refugee regime given that most of the refugees in the region are *intra*-regional. This is considered particularly important because it has been seen that although many countries have signed the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol there is a lack of coordination between these instruments on the one hand and the respective national laws on the other. In South

Asia a number of seminars and conferences have been organized under the auspices of SAARCLAW[5] and ICHLR (Indian Centre for Humanitarian Law and Research) to discuss the subject. By 1994 efforts were underway to draft a legal framework for the protection of refugees in South Asia. An Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was established on the initiative of Sadako Ogata, a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The India EPG led by Justice P.N. Bhagwati, former Chief Justice of India, presented a draft model national law in 2000 which was shared with all the relevant ministries of the Government of India. According to this model draft a refugee was:

> Any person who is outside his/her Country of Origin and is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, sex, ethnic identity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion . . . owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, serious violation of human rights or events seriously disrupting public order in either part or whole of his/her country (Nair 2007: 2).

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) discussed the draft and proposed several amendments. In January and October 2009, the Indian NGO PILSARC (Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre) presented another model draft on refugee protection to a group of concerned individuals for consideration. But not much progress has been registered in actual terms. The reasons are, one, the political class is indifferent to the demand as it feels that India's track record in refugee protection is satisfactory which does not warrant any drastic change, and two, there is fear from the security establishment that in the name of refugees all sorts of unwanted elements would enter India making its already difficult task more complex. In late 2009 when the Ministry of Home Affairs was preparing the draft of the Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Protection) Bill there was strong misgivings expressed by the security agencies. Interestingly the 46-page draft did not mention anything about the illegal Bangladeshi settlers in India. The security set up was apprehensive that in the absence of citizenship cards in India, unlike Europe and America, coupled with the fact that India has vast and porous borders with poorer nations the refugee entries would be unmanageable. In any case the draft was careful not to accept all the recommendations contained in the Model Code prepared by Bhagwati. For example, it dropped the refugee and/or asylum seekers' right to choose the place of residence and move freely within India, right to adequate housing facilities, right to employment, right to health care, right to free primary education, and right to move courts for enforcement of rights conferred

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[5] Established in Colombo on 24 October 1991, and now registered with the SAARC Secretariat at Kathmandu, SAARCLAW, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation in Law, is an association of legal communities of SAARC countries comprising judges, lawyers, academicians, law teachers, public officers and a host of other law-related persons. It disseminates information about the developmental concerns of the region. It has affiliate Country Chapters in Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and activities of the Organisation have also taken place in the Republic of Maldives.

under the Indian constitution (Home Ministry's Refugee Bill worries Security Agencies 2009).

Conclusion

In South Asia both legality and illegality co-exist. In the case of refugees it is not any different. In a situation where it is difficult to distinguish between a refugee, an illegal immigrant, and an unauthorized settler, any discussion on a legal regime of refugees is merely an academic exercise. The only way an unauthorized foreigner in any of the South Asian country can become a citizen of the country of his residence is by naturalization which is a complex legal procedure and any unsuccessful application would warrant eviction which they want to avoid. This is not typically a South Asian phenomenon. In many developed and developing countries such procedures are either circumvented by illegal means or the states just fail to identify them for eviction. Even in the United States in spite of its highly sophisticated surveillance system there are about 11,000,000 unauthorized settlers the majority of whom are Mexican. Even there are hundreds of thousands of undocumented Indian residents. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that there are about 240,000 such Indians living in America now who arrive in the country in a variety of ways: overstaying the tourist visas, aging out of dependent visas, and illegally crossing the Mexican border (Subramanian 2014).

In South Asia a large number of Bangladeshis in India and Pakistan, and, similarly, many Afghans in Pakistan, have managed to acquire legal documents which facilitate their obtaining citizenship in due course. What has made this possible is corruption and indifference at the administrative levels besides ethnic and communal sympathy at the local level. The fact that these illegal immigrants provide cheap labour serves as yet another facilitating factor. The neigbourhood middle class residents would often cry hoarse against these illegal immigrants but would seldom mind employing them as domestic helps or using their rickshaws for local commutes. In any case, though massive in number, the issue of illegal immigrants is a fact of life in South Asia and no matter how the states want to respond to the problem it persists and there is no popular opposition to these refugees either.

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Chapter 9
The Withdrawal of the Foreign Troops from Afghanistan in 2014, Peace Negotiations and the Role of Pakistan

Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah

Introduction

The entire South Asian region is currently buzzing with excitement at the news of the US-Taliban breakthrough for negotiations in Doha, the capital of the tiny oil-rich Gulf State of Qatar, promising a political solution for ending 12 years of war. The intended talks, according to a senior US official started in June 2013. Before further evaluating the implications of the new wave of US-Taliban talks, it is imperative to analyse the current volatile situation in the region in the complex scenario of direct US involvement in Afghanistan, the presence of more than one hundred thousand foreign troops in the war ravaged country and the beginning withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2014.

Why the US, NATO and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops came to Afghanistan is a known fact and needs no further explanation. Despite the more than decade long presence of international troops, it is still unclear whether the years of military engagement were a fruitless effort or if they succeeded in routing out terrorism which not only threatened the USA but also global peace and stability. Since Operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF mission, Afghanistan has remained a battleground and despite all tall claims by the US and its allies, bringing peace and tranquillity to the country still seems to be a far cry. A daily increase in casualty numbers forced the US administration to change its strategy in Afghanistan. Some of its old allies, including France have opted for an early withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. Internal pressure on the US government to pull out its forces from an un-ending un-winnable war compelled the present US government to get out of the Afghan imbroglio; but only after giving an impression that they have fulfilled their mission in Afghanistan. Although the administration of US President Barack Obama tried to use its triumphant card by citing the major

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gains i.e. elimination of Osama bin Laden and other members of al Qaida's top brass, many in the US believe that instead of eradicating terrorism it increased the abhorrence against the Americans.

Under these circumstances President Obama announced that by the end of 2014 the US war in Afghanistan would be over. Although this decision was lauded by many in the USA, ambiguities and many unanswerable questions in the minds of scholars working on the subject remained. What are the implications for the region? Are the Afghans prepared for a withdrawal or not? What roles will Afghanistan's neighbours play in the future set up of the Hindu Kush state? It is still unclear whether the pull-out will bring stability or be followed by an anarchical situation as witnessed in the past. What about the role of the Taliban in the future set up of Afghanistan? Are they prepared for a comeback as a ruling group? Are they willing to accept the present Afghan Constitution and ensure that their policies regarding women rights and civil society have been changed drastically? If they are successful in regaining power in Kabul, how would their traditional rivals i.e. the so called 'Northern Alliance' reacts? The Taliban who previously vehemently opposed direct negotiations with President Hamid Karzai's regime, calling it a puppet regime, have recently softened their stance and indicated that they are willing to enter into direct negotiations with the present Kabul administration. Whether it would improve the current law and order situation or further aggravate the situation by escalating the militancy, thus contributing more to the violence and chaos in the volatile region, remains to be seen.

These and many similar questions, pertinent to the present debate on the foreign troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan are analysed in this chapter. This is part of my effort to bestow some words in this volume in honour of Professor Subrata Mitra, whom I affectionately call Mitra Dada and who will retire in 2014, which is also a very crucial year for the region.

In his State of the Union Address in 2013, President Obama announced that American troops were 'coming home'. Lauding their services he said that "Tonight, we stand united in saluting the troops and civilians who sacrifice every day to protect us. Because of them, we can say with confidence that America will complete its mission in Afghanistan, and achieve our objective of defeating the core of al Qaeda". He further added that "by the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over" (Obama's 2013 State of the Union Address 2013).

The withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan remains a hot topic. At the time of Obama's announcement thirty three thousand troops had already returned. Another thirty four thousand troops were scheduled to go back home by the end of 2013 (ibid.). This partial withdrawal created mixed reactions. While President Obama was in favour of a speedy return, this kind of accelerated withdrawal was opposed by the military commanders, who were in favour of keeping the bulk of the American troops in Afghanistan until the end of 2014, when their mission in Afghanistan is supposed to end. Their opposition left Obama in a dilemma: he revised his strategy and, to avoid the stigma of defeat, tried to paint a picture of success for NATO and its allies in Afghanistan, pointing out that "it's important for us to make sure that we get out in a responsible way, so that we don't end up having

to go back in" (Lieven 2012). One of the major issues faced by the US administration was whether to leave a sizeable number of US troops in Afghanistan or to simply trust the Afghan security forces, trained by the US and its allies, and give them the whole responsibility of taking care of Afghanistan. They would be confronted with huge challenges i.e. maintaining peace and order as well as safeguarding Afghan interests. The officials of the Obama administration have voiced their feelings clearly. In one of the interviews, Benjamin J. Rhodes, one of the prominent senior national security advisers of Obama remarked that "the trajectory we've set here is one of transition and Afghan sovereignty'. He further added that 'we have a goal here of having the Afghans more into the lead and having us steadily pulling back" (ibid.). According to some sources, the new strategy of the US and the NATO partners was to get in touch with the Afghans and to dispel the impression that while the US and NATO troops will be leaving Afghanistan, the West will not abandon the country (ibid.). Leon Panetta, then US Defence Secretary was unclear about the number of troops the US intended to leave behind after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Although he did not mention the specific number of army personnel to stay back in Afghanistan, he said that the US would keep its troops in Afghanistan even after the combat mission ended in 2014 because al Qaida still posed a substantial threat to the country and if left un-routed they would strengthen themselves, regain their influence and regroup (US Senate backs quicker withdrawal from Afghanistan 2012).

President Obama and his counterpart President Karzai reached an understanding on many key agreements including the foreign troops' withdrawal and their replacement by Afghan Security Forces. Obama told Karzai perspicuously during a meeting at the White House that after the planned withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, relatively few troops would be left in Afghanistan who would be performing the dual duties of advising and training the Afghan troops and hunting down the remnants of al Qaida. "That is a very limited mission, and it is not one that would require the same kind of footprint, obviously, that we've had over the last 10 years in Afghanistan", President Obama said. Karzai was not concerned over the residual US troop levels and had no allusion saying "numbers are not going to make a difference to the situation in Afghanistan. It's the broader relationship that will make a difference to Afghanistan and beyond the region" (Landler et al. 2013). On several occasions the American President made it clear that the US and NATO troops would give up a combat role and revert to an advisory and support role. The responsibility to restore peace in Afghanistan would be bestowed upon the Afghan National Army. The future relations with the Taliban were also discussed. Despite having some reservations against the Taliban in the future set up of Afghanistan, Obama favoured a 'political settlement' with the Taliban and keeping in view the planned peace talks in Qatar, he made it clear that in the reconciliation process, the Afghans should be given a leading role. "The United States has been very clear that any peace process, any reconciliation process, must be Afghan-led. It is not for the United States to determine what the terms of this peace will be" (ibid.).

US-Taliban Talks in Doha

The Afghan Taliban, who earlier refused to enter into direct negotiations with the Karzai government terming it a puppet regime following the policies of the US and its allies in Afghanistan, showed their willingness to hold talks with the Afghan government and the US officials to find a negotiated settlement of the conflict. It was reported that a twelve-member delegation, representing various militant factions of the Taliban had already arrived in Doha for meetings with Afghan officials. The Taliban delegation was led by Tayyab Agha, brother-in-law and spokesman for Taliban leader Mulla Mohammad Omar. Maulvi Shahabuddin Dilawar, a former envoy of the Taliban regime in Saudi Arabia was another prominent member of the delegation (Taliban open Qatar office; US announces direct talks 2013). Similar efforts had not been successful in the past due to various reasons. Among many other demands, the Taliban wanted the release of their five prominent leaders, kept in Guantanamo Bay since 2002. They were Mulla Fazaldad Akhund, Noorullah Noori, Abdul Haq Waseeq, Khairullah Khairkhwa and Mohammad Nabi for the exchange of a US soldier Bowe Bergdahl,[1] taken hostage since June 2009 and reportedly with Commander Sirajuddin Haqqnai.[2] The Taliban demanded the inclusion of Pakistan in the talks, which was opposed by the Afghan government. The Pakistan Foreign Office welcomed the idea of direct talks between the Taliban and the US officials in Doha and reiterated its stance that "Pakistan is ready to continue to facilitate the process to achieve lasting peace in Afghanistan in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people" (Pakistan welcomes opening of Taliban office in Doha 2013).

In the third week of June 2013, the Taliban opened their office in Doha with the aim of 'opening dialogue with the international community and Afghan groups'. The US and Pakistan both responded positively and welcomed the decision. President Obama described the opening of the Taliban political office as an "important first step towards reconciliation" between the warring groups and the Afghan Government. British PM David Cameron called the opening of the Taliban office "the right thing to do". Pakistan also welcomed the announcement regarding the opening of the Taliban office in Doha. The Foreign Office officials, recalling

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[1] Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, captured in 2009, is the only American soldier the militants held. The Taliban wanted an exchange of five high-profile Taliban prisoners in Guantanamo Bay but till date the talks are not successful. According to some informed sources, Sangin Zadran, a commander of the Haqqani network, killed in a drone attack on 6 September 2013 in Miranshah (North Waziristan), was holding the US soldier. He was set free in May 2014.

[2] Mullah Fazal Ahmad belongs to Kakar tribe from Uruzgan and was the Taliban army chief when was captured. Mullah Fazal was in Northern Afghanistan when was captured by the Uzbek war lord Rasheed Dostum, who after taking huge amount from the US handed him over to them. Noorullah Nori, who belongs to Ghazni, was the governor of Balkh province, when captured. Khairullah Khairkhwa was the Interior Minister of the Taliban and belongs to Spin Boldak near Kandahar. Abdul Haq Waseeq was the Deputy Intelligence chief under the Taliban and belongs to Paktia. Mohammad Nabi was also an important Taliban military commander.

Pakistan's role in the establishment of the office, issued a statement that Pakistan had long called for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Afghan conflict. Pakistan, it said, "has repeatedly urged an early end to the war in order to re-establish peace and security in the region". It also eulogised the "constructive and positive role" of Pakistan and regarded it as an "important milestone in support of a peaceful process for Afghanistan" (ibid.). Pakistan's role in persuading the Taliban to enter into negotiations with the US and the Afghan authorities for the sake of peace was also confirmed by Mr. Scott Smith, a former UN official who worked in Afghanistan. According to his observations, it appeared that Pakistan forced the Taliban leadership to accept the talk offer. He linked it with the recent changes in Pakistan including the formation of a new Government, the worsening of law and order, the domestic economic crisis and the growing militancy. According to him, after acknowledging the importance of these issues, the newly-installed government of the Muslim League was forced to 'rein' their protégé to come to the negotiation table. "Maybe they've made a calculation it's getting too dicey", according to Mr. Smith to allow the situation to go on in this manner (Experts: Pakistan pushed Afghan insurgents to the table 2013). While Pakistan was expected to play the role of a 'broker' for the Taliban, the US was given the same role to play for the Karzai administration, which had expressed its reservation about the Doha talks. He insisted from the very beginning that the discussion be held in Afghanistan and under the auspices of the Afghan High Peace Council, a body nominated by the Afghani government.

The host government was also in favour of negotiations between the warring factions. Mr. Ali bin Fahd al Hajri, the assistant to the Foreign Minister regarded the negotiations as the "only way for peace in Afghanistan" (US-Taliban breakthrough: Talks to begin in Doha tomorrow 2013). According to some reports, Obama was personally involved in working with Karzai to enable the opening of the Taliban office in Doha (ibid.). However, before any major breakthrough on the main issue could be reached, a row developed due to the fact that the Taliban hoisted their flag on the newly-opened office. The Taliban in their pre-talk press conference called themselves the representatives of the 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan', the formal name of its 1996–2001 government and hoisted their white flag in the background behind them thus giving an impression of being the representatives of the state in exile. This infuriated the Afghan government, which immediately boycotted the talks and described it as unacceptable. They criticised the US role in the opening of the office and made it absolutely clear that the talks should be Afghan-led. "The latest developments", according to a statement issued by the Afghan authorities, "show that foreign hands are behind the Taliban's Qatar office, and unless they are purely Afghan led, the High Peace Council[3] will not participate in the talks" (Karzai suspends US talks, sets new conditions for Taliban negotiations 2013). It further

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[3] The High Peace Council was constituted by the Afghan Government for intra-Afghan dialogue. Its present head is Salahuddin Rabbani, who succeeded his father Burhanuddin Rabbani who was assassinated on 20 September 2011.

stated that the "opening of the Taliban office in Qatar, the way it was opened and messages it contained, contradicts the guarantees given by the US to Afghanistan"(ibid.). The US also showed its indignation on the adoption of the said name, i.e. 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan', and the State Department's spokeswoman Jen Psaki insisted that "we do not recognise the name Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" and added that "the government of Qatar has taken steps today to ensure that the political office is in compliance with the conditions established by the Government of Qatar for its operations". She further said that the "office must not be treated as or represent itself as an embassy or other office representing the Afghan Taliban as an emirate government or sovereign" (Karzai suspends US talks, sets new conditions for Taliban negotiations 2013).

The Afghan government seemed unsatisfied with the excuses put forward by the US. While showing their determination for bringing back peace and normalcy to Afghanistan, Janan Moosazai, the Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman said that 'we still need a full explanation about what happened and why the office was established in clear contradiction to the written assurances given to the Afghan government by the US'. He further told the reporters that the aforementioned office can only be used for peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government and could not be used for fund raising or other similar purposes. He further informed that according to some reliable reports the disputed flag, flagpole and signs had been removed from the Taliban's office in Doha (Taliban deny accord with US over Qatar office opening 2013).

Interestingly, after the failure of the proposed talks in Doha once again all eyes were fixed upon Pakistan to play its crucial role in bringing back the warring factions to the table. Previously, the importance of Pakistan for such talks was already highlighted by the NATO Secretary-General. In Brussels, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen before his formal meeting with the NATO Foreign Ministers commented on the role of Pakistan and said 'if we are to ensure long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan we also need a positive engagement of Afghanistan's neighbours, including Pakistan' (Kayani meets Karzai, Kerry for Afghan peace talks 2013). In this particular connection, to remove the stalemate in the Doha talks, Mr. James Dobbins, the US Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan immediately called on Mian Nawaz Sharif, the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. He arrived in Islamabad on 25th June and called on him to discuss the latest development regarding peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Karzai regime. Nawaz Sharif highlighted the role of Pakistan in the proposed talks in Doha and stated that durable peace in the region is in the interest of both countries. He linked the peace and normalcy of one country to peace and stability of the other country. He reiterated his full support for the Doha talks, which, if successful, would bring peace, and tranquillity to the region. Moreover, he assured the American representative of Pakistan's full support and commitment to the Afghan-led and Afghan owned peace process (Afghanistan, US reaffirm support for Taliban peace deal 2013). The efforts of Pakistan were not only confined to merely giving statements, but the Pakistani authorities tried to convince the Taliban leadership of its full support in this regard. They tried to remain engaged with the

Taliban to put the Doha peace process back on track after the said controversy. To show their commitment and sincerity vis-a-vis a durable peace, they even expressed their willingness to release some of the imprisoned Taliban leaders, lingering in various prisons in Pakistan. Mr. Aizaz Chaudhry, Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman made it clear that it is in the interest of everyone that the peace process should continue and remain alive. "We have affirmed our commitment", he said, "to consider all possible measures that we believe could contribute to the reconciliation process in the larger interest of peace in Afghanistan" (Syed 2013a, b, c). He further stated that the "Doha process was facilitated by convincing all stakeholders of the need to hold dialogue to reconcile their positions in the interest of bringing lasting peace to Afghanistan" (ibid.). For confidence building measures, the Pakistani Prime Minister called President Karzai and informed him of the talks taking place between Pakistan and the US Special Representative focusing on bringing back durable peace to Afghanistan. Karzai appreciated the good will gesture of Nawaz Sharif and thanked him for his support for the peace process in Afghanistan (Regional peace impossible if Pakistan ignored: Nawaz 2013).

To show his special interest in the peace process and to dispel the impression that Pakistan is desirous of destabilising Afghanistan, Nawaz Sharif sent Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign affairs, as his special envoy to deliver personally his invitation to Karzai to visit Pakistan (Syed 2013a, b, c).

Political pundits eagerly waited for the response of Afghanistan's President who until recently accused Pakistan of harbouring militants and was particularly disturbed over Pakistan's alleged secret links with the Haqqani network, which was directly involved in many anti-state activities in Kabul, including the suicide attack on security installations, foreign missions and the Presidential Palace. However, to the utter surprise of many Karzai did not repeat the allegations this time and it appeared that a 'better sense' prevailed. "There was a sense", according to a source quoted by the *News*, "that Karzai himself had realised that he was ill advised to put forth conditions for a visit, his relations with western capitals is at an all-time low, and he appeared surprised that after all that hateful rhetoric against Pakistan, reaction was quite cool from Islamabad. Of course, Aziz's visit is also a face saver for Karzai and his ego must be massaged that here is bigger country at the receiving end, yet taking an initiative to break the ice" (Baabar 2013). During his meeting with the Afghan president, Sartaj Aziz reiterated Pakistan's efforts for the Afghan peace process and reminded Karzai of Pakistan's positive role in helping organise the Doha talks, which according to Sartaj Aziz unfortunately did not work. He further told Karzai that Pakistan would definitely extend its full support for holding the peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan authorities but made it absolutely clear that the Afghans should understand that though there are contacts between Pakistan and the Taliban, Islamabad "does not control them". He further stated "In the future, if to this extent we are requested we can play the same role but at the appropriate time and in consultation with other interested parties" (ibid.). Karzai assured Sartaj Aziz that he would visit Pakistan in the last week of August (Dawn 18 August 2013d).

Karzai's planned visit to Pakistan was seen as a step to 'reduce tensions' between the neighbouring states. However, some political analysts saw it differently. They were a bit sceptical about Karzai's role in the future Afghan set up. To them Karzai had lost the ground because in early 2014 presidential elections were to be held in Afghanistan. The Afghan Constitution debars Karzai to contest the elections for a third term. According to some reports, Karzai wanted to put his weight behind Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a former Afghan Mujahideen leader. But Sayyaf would definitely face stiff resistance from the 'Northern Alliance' who are better organised and are hopeful of getting this prestigious position through the ballot. They accused Karzai of scuttling the Doha peace negotiations with the Taliban who refused to recognise the Karzai regime as the Afghan people's representatives. The US on its part is interested in the safe pull-out of its troops and equipment from Afghanistan. They simply need a kind of understanding with the Afghan Taliban during the withdrawal of the troops. They are more concerned with the safe exit of their troops from Afghanistan. If they find Karzai an 'impediment to a deal the US wants with the Taliban, he will be quickly side-lined' (Dawn 18 August 2013g). In his overall assessment of the Afghan situation, Munir Akram, a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN, highlighted the role of Pakistan in peace negotiations, withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014 and the future set up in Afghanistan. He remarked that 'Due to its old links with the three principal Afghan insurgent groups—Mullah Omar, the Haqqanis and Hekmatyar—Pakistan is well placed to assist in facilitating an understanding with the Taliban to ease the US-NATO withdrawal and, perhaps even promote a more durable political solution in Afghanistan. It is in Pakistan's interest to do so' (Dawn 18 August 2013d). He further added that Pakistan would be obviously doing this for its own sake. Pakistan's priority, according to him, is a friendly Afghanistan in the post-troop withdrawal scenario and a government that is not too close to India, thus posing a double threat to Pakistan from both eastern and western borders. He argued for opening an 'informal dialogue' with the Northern Alliance to secure their support in this particular connection. According to him 'securing peace in Afghanistan and on Pakistan's western frontier remains a daunting task. With so many "moving parts" there are no neat or clear solutions or strategies that can be prescribed and pursued. Success will require all involved parties to adopt flexible positions and imaginative solutions responsive to the interests of all'. He suggested further that Pakistan 'cannot afford to be a passive player in this "Great Game". It should take the lead in promoting positive and viable outcomes to the various components of this political puzzle'.

Karzai's Islamabad Visit (26 August 2013) and Its Impact

Karzai visited Islamabad on 26 August 2013. The main purpose of the visit appeared to be seeking Pakistan's cooperation and support in getting the Afghan peace negotiations back on track, which faced stalemate from the stubbornness and

non-flexible attitude from both sides i.e. the Taliban and the Afghan authorities. In addition, the release of the Taliban prisoners was also on the agenda. The Afghan government believed that these prisoners, detained by Pakistan, could play an important role in convincing the Taliban leadership of the resumption of the peace dialogue between the warring parties. Although there were not very high expectations from the visit at least it was interpreted by many as a positive step in connection with the peace process for the future of Afghanistan. Previously many attempts to reach an understanding of the real type i.e. to help one another to get rid of insurgency and cross-border infiltration from both sides failed. Moreover, the longstanding mistrust between the neighbours was because of Kabul's tirade against Islamabad for maintaining close ties with the Taliban, particularly with the Haqqani network, and the accusations of Pakistan of seeking Kabul's coming closer to India, was seen as the major impediment in confidence building measures. The main focus of agenda was the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Karzai said that he was in Pakistan 'with the expectation that the government of Pakistan will facilitate and help in manners it can promote the peace process in Afghanistan and in providing opportunities or a platform for talks between the Afghan High Peace Council and the Taliban movement'. 'We hope that with this, on the top of our agenda, we can move forward in bringing peace and stability to both countries', he added (Karzai concludes Pakistan visit with invitation to Sharif 2013). Pakistani authorities affirmed their help and full support and showed their readiness to work together with Afghanistan 'for the furtherance of shared objectives of peace, stability and prosperity in the region and beyond' (ibid.).

Although, the original visit was initially planned only for one day, Karzai was asked to extend his visit for another day by the Pakistan Prime Minister to discuss further steps to be taken to help facilitate talks with the Taliban. He immediately accepted the invitation, which was termed by many as a positive step. Karzai also took this as a golden opportunity and requested the Pakistani authorities to release Mullah Baradar, the number two in the former Taliban hierarchy, who would persuade the Taliban leadership to talk to the Afghan High Peace Council inside Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities showed their readiness for the release of Mullah Baradar and other prominent leaders of the Taliban who can play a leading role in the peace process thus bringing stability and peace to the region. On Tuesday 27th August, both leaders met at Murree, the hill resort near Islamabad. They discussed the matter again, but according to Baqir Sajjad Syed 'could not come up with anything concrete about the revival of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan except for reiterating that Pakistan remained committed to helping the Afghans in restoring peace to their country' (Syed 2013a, b, c). After his return to Kabul, Karzai asked Islamabad to fulfil the promises made during the 2 days talks. In a reference to Pakistan, according to the same source, Karzai said acrimoniously that the Taliban backers wanted to keep Afghanistan 'impoverished and underdeveloped forever' (ibid.). The US appreciated Pakistan's role in initiating the talks with Karzai government and offered to help Afghanistan in facilitating talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Mr. James Dobbins, Washington's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, praised Nawaz Sharif for seeking 'more

meaningful dialogue' with the Karzai regime and supporting the peace process in Afghanistan. 'This seems to be genuine desire. I think it's somewhat accelerated since the new government came into office', Dobbins said (Dawn 13 September 2013b). He further commented that 'Pakistan has also, particularly over the last 6 months or so, become active in supporting an Afghan reconciliation process and urging the Afghan Taliban to participate in that process' (Dawn 18 September 2013c).

However, the ground reality was different. As a gesture of good will and after sharing the names and other information with Afghanistan, Pakistan released 33 Taliban prisoners from various jails. The idea behind the release of these people was that they would definitely encourage and convince their comrades to come to the negotiating table to resolve the issues. However, some Afghan officials showed their strong reservations regarding the manner in which Pakistan released the Taliban prisoners without handing them over to the Afghan officials. 'When they decide to free Taliban, they only inform the Afghan government a few hours before', complained Ismail Qasimyar, a senior member of the High Peace Council (Dawn 14 September 2013a). Some Afghan officials disclosed that in many cases the released Taliban have gone back to the battlefield against the US and its allies.

Either convinced by the Pakistani authorities or being themselves desirous of bringing back peace and tranquillity to the region, Mullah Muhammad Hassan Rehmani, a former Governor of Kandahar and a close associate of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban leader, recently reminded the US to fulfil its promises made to the Taliban. In a recorded interview with some Pakistani television channels and newspapers at Helmand Province, Mullah Rehmani stated that the US should honour its promises and that they would resume negotiations with the US authorities in Qatar. He further said that the Taliban and the US representatives would then exchange their demands during the talks. He also claimed that the Taliban now wanted to build relations with countries other than the US (The News 16 September 2013). To give a further boost to the Afghan peace process, the Government of Pakistan decided to release Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on 22 September 2013 to 'further facilitate the Afghan reconciliation process' (Dawn 22 September 2013e). He was the 34th Taliban detainee released since November 2012 when the process was initiated. Considered to be the 'most senior' and 'apparently the most influential leader' to have been freed by Pakistan, the Afghan government appreciated the decision and hoped that this would have a positive impact on the peace process. They hoped that Baradar would play an important role in the peace process (ibid.). At the same time they made it clear that if Baradar is unable to play his significant role in the peace process, his release would be meaningless. Syed Farukh Faryabi Jenab, Secretary of the *Meshrano Jirga* (Upper House/ Afghan Senate) during his visit to Pakistan tried to address the apprehensions of Pakistan that after the NATO and US forces pull out from Afghanistan in 2014, the forces opposed to Pakistan would be using the Afghan soil for their anti-Pakistan activities. As a sovereign country, he said, Afghanistan has the right to develop relations with the countries of its own choice, keeping in view the Afghan national interest as supreme. However, 'the principle remains that the Afghan soil would not be used against any other

country'. He made it clear that prolonging the stay of some US troops would in no way harm the interest of Pakistan. Also Afghanistan's relations with India, according to him, should not worry Pakistan because it is not build for this specific purpose (Dawn 26 September 2013f).

Conclusion

In the third week of June 2013, breaking news spread around the globe that the peace negotiations between the Taliban and the US started. The venue of the proposed talks was in Doha. These talks received special interest, because it was a serious effort to end the more than one decade long war in Afghanistan and to bring back peace and normalcy to the war ravaged country. Moreover, Obama's announcement regarding the withdrawal of the US and the NATO troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, inculcated a new spirit in the peace negotiations. Initially the start was not that bad: there was consensus on the venue of the negotiations, the contending parties were to be facilitated in Doha. However, despite both parties claiming complacency, the talks did not start in a smooth manner as expected. The Taliban's hoisting of their white flag on the newly opened office, and calling themselves 'the representatives of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan', of course, with the concurrence of the Qatari authorities, as claimed by the Taliban became the bone of contention. The Afghan government showed its indignation, ridiculed the talks, labelling them as unacceptable to the government and the people of Afghanistan. They also castigated the 'behind the curtain' role of Pakistan, which was accused of taking sides with the Taliban, inciting them against the present Afghan government which was not included in the talks. They demanded that these talks should be held inside Afghanistan and between the Taliban and the purely Afghan-led High Peace Council of Afghanistan, formed for the specific purpose of entering into negotiations with the Taliban and other militants, fighting against the US and its allies in Afghanistan.

However, soon both parties realised the importance of Pakistan, despite the fact that Afghan authorities had certain reservations against Pakistan, which they described as a 'sponsor' of the Taliban, particularly of the Haqqani network . Pakistan's new government, although well aware of the predicament of the whole Afghan scenario, showed its acumen and took some practical steps in this regard. Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan's Prime Minister, sent his special envoy to deliver his personal invitation to Karzai to visit Pakistan and support him in confidence building measures to be taken by both sides to curb the menace of terrorism in the region and also to help in dispelling the impression that Pakistan has no interest in peace in the region. Despite his abhorrence against Pakistan, Karzai accepted the invitation and visited Pakistan to end the stalemate in the peace talks and also to request Pakistan to release the Taliban prisoners, which can be used as a valuable tool in the

(continued)

future peace negotiations. In their adulation of the Pakistan's PM efforts, the Americans also showed their satisfaction that the peace talks would this time be successful and described them as 'meaningful talks'. Some sources claimed that the leaders of both Afghanistan and Pakistan failed in a major break-through of the Afghan crisis in these meetings. However, the release of more than thirty prominent Taliban was seen as a very positive step and once again hopes were raised that this would definitely contribute to the peace process and bring back normalcy and stability to the whole region. The recent release of Mullah Bradar, the number two in the Taliban hierarchy, has been considered as a great progress in the right direction. Although nothing can be said with certainty, there are high expectations from the release of Mullah Bradar as he has been given the task to serve as a bridge between the warring factions. The exuberant Mullah Baradar, on his release, welcomed the peace process and assured the authorities in Pakistan that he would be using all his efforts to convince the Taliban leadership to resume the broken contacts and start negotiations for a durable peace in the region. Some circles showed their reservations regarding the importance of Bradar and say that he is not the same trusted comrade of Mullah Omar as he used to be previously. They doubt the tall claims of Bradar that he still enjoys the confidence of the Taliban supreme leader. However, according to some reports Bradar has proceeded towards North Waziristan where he would be meeting with the leaders of the Haqqani network to discuss the new peace initiatives and will be seeking their cooperation in this regard. As mentioned earlier, the US and its allies are interested in a safe scheduled pull out from Afghanistan by the end of 2014; Karzai's regime wants a peaceful transition after the recent presidential elections in the spring 2014 and Pakistan's major interest lies in the restoration of peace within the country, hit by extremism and terrorism, and also in seeking good friendly relations with Afghanistan after the foreign troops' withdrawal. Are these peace negotiations going to succeed? What would be the response of the various pressure groups in Afghanistan to the domination of the Taliban if the talks are successful? These and other related questions are yet to be answered. With so many 'if's and 'but's, after the foreign troops withdrawal by the end of 2014 what would be the future of this region? Keeping in view the past experiences and the previous occurrences in the region, 'Whither Afghanistan' is still daunting the minds of many. With lots of altruism in mind and ambivalence around us we cannot remain indifferent to the Afghan imbroglio, or leave it to the forces of retrogression to dictate their terms but should inculcate the precepts of refurbishing ideas to recuperate from the civil war like situation and help restoration of peace and tranquillity in the region. In this particular connection, talks in Doha are very important because it will open an avenue for further talks and other similar steps in the right direction i.e. bringing stability and peace to the region.

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Chapter 10
From the Great Game 3.0 to the U.S. Asia Pivot: The New Geometry of South Asia's Geopolitics

Jean-Luc Racine

Introduction

While Subrata Mitra is well known for his publications on Indian politics and political sociology, he has also worked on Indian foreign policy and on South Asia geopolitics. It might hence be appropriate to pay homage to him in this Festschrift by addressing some of the issues he has worked on in this field. In doing so, I shall keep in mind not only some of his publications on the matter, but also some issues which were discussed in a conference he invited me to attend in Heidelberg in 2011, on 'Trilateralism and Triangular Dynamics in International Relations'.[1] At the risk of oversimplification, South Asia appears since more than a decade as a region torn into two contradictory trajectories. On the one hand, the emergence of India has helped to reconnect, not only metaphorically, the country to the Asia Pacific: in a way, India has reintegrated Asia, after having been left aside by the dynamics of the Asian Tigers, of the Newly Industrialised Countries, and of course of post-Mao China.[2] On the other hand, at the west of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been engulfed more than ever after 9/11 in a spiral of crises nurtured by war, terrorism, and insurgencies. Looking at a map of Asia, the India-Pakistan

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[1] 'Trilateralism & Triangular Dynamics in International Relations: Implications for International Relations Theory' International Conference organized by the South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg and the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Centre for Contemporary India Research and Studies, Heidelberg, July 8 and 9, 2011.

[2] Asian Tigers was a term used for defining four Asian countries having quickly developed during the three decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, a British colony then a dependent territory before being retroceded to China in 1997, under a special status. Amongst countries classified as 'newly industrialised' during the 1970s and 1980s were Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines, not labelled as fully developed.

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border connects (or delimitates) the 'arc of freedom and prosperity' referred to by Japanese Prime Ministers eager to extend it to New Delhi and the 'crescent of crisis'[3] encompassing what has been labelled as the Greater Middle East under George W. Bush: an area where tensions have been exacerbated with the recent developments of the so-called Arab Spring, the Syria conundrum and the Shia-Sunni confrontation in post-Saddam Iraq, not to forget the Iranian nuclear issue and the security challenge increasing in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This broad dichotomy is fundamental, but sketchy when presented in a simple binary opposition, not only because India, or for that matter Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have their own internal security challenges to address, but more deeply because neither India nor Pakistan can be confined to a single sub-regional paradigm. This chapter will precisely try to analyse how complex geometries are making sense of South Asia geopolitics today.

From the Partition Syndrome to the Great Game 3.0: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan

The India Pakistan Conundrum

Sixty-seven years after the independence of India and Pakistan, the partition of the British Raj remains the structural axis of the South Asian divide, a divide that the creation in 1985 of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its enlargement to Afghanistan in 2007 have not been able to obliterate. The crux of the matter is not just 'the core issue of Kashmir'.[4] More deeply, Pakistan has constructed itself against the idea of India that prevailed in the Congress Party before 1947, and which has been incarnated in post-colonial times under Jawaharlal Nehru's stewardship. The frustration over Kashmir, aggravated by the secession of Bangladesh supported by the Indian Army in 1971, has been deliberately cultivated by the Pakistan military, generally seconded by the political class on this issue. Islam is supposed to be the cement of Pakistan, but when the Pakistan nation cracks—be it due to divides within Islam, ethno-linguistic identities or ideological divergences—the animosity against India provides a glue supposed to unite the nation. Textbooks, military manuals, political discourses, national celebrations

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[3] On the "Arc of freedom and prosperity", see for instance 'Confluence of the Two Seas', speech by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, August 22, 2007. On the 'Crescent of crisis': (Daalder et al. 2006).

[4] The expression 'the core issue of Kashmir' suggests that solving the Kashmir problem is an imperative prerequisite for the normalisation of the relationship between Pakistan and India, and that Kashmir cannot be 'put on the backburner' (another Pakistani standard formula) when discussing other issues such as trade. For long a key concept of Pakistani military or civilian leaders, 'the core issue of Kashmir' is also used by a section of the Kashmiris separatists accusing both India and Pakistan to neglect the rights of the Kashmiris.

have time and again played this anti-India card. Four wars against India between 1948 and 1999 and New Delhi's mismanagement of Kashmir before and after the local insurgency developed in the Vale of Srinagar from 1989–90 onwards, have only fed a sense of insecurity systematically cultivated by the Pakistan military 'for the sake of the nation', but also to the Army's benefit. All attempts at 'normalisation', or at least sustained dialogue have unfortunately failed, from the 1950s till today, for lack of common ground, certainly, but also because external factors have repeatedly obliterated attempts to work towards a better mutual understanding. The terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 is the most prominent testimony to this spoiler strategy. The killing of five Indian soldiers along the Line of Control in August 2013, just when New Delhi was preparing the reset of the dialogue with the new Nawaz Sharif's Government after another incident in January is the latest example of the difficulty to dialogue, not even to negotiate.[5]

When the USSR sent its troops to Kabul in 1979, the Great Game started afresh. Afghanistan was still its central ground. Moscow was still a player, but in these final Cold War years between the USA and the USSR, Washington. took the lead from the British of Kipling's time, when the British Empire competed with Tsarist Russia for the control of Central Asia, Afghanistan and India's neighbourhood. During the 1980s, India was involved in this Great Game 2.0, albeit relatively marginally. It supported Commandant Masood's Tadjiks while Islamabad was all behind the Pashtuns. It bore the brunt when U.S. strategists and Saudi money helped Zia ul Haq's Pakistan to become a 'frontline state' against the Soviets. The Deobandi leanings of Zia stimulated his support to Afghan mujahideen, depicted less as nationalists fighting against foreign troops than as holy warriors conducting jihad against kafirs—the infidels. The rest is History. The year the Soviets left Afghanistan, Kashmir, South of the Line of Control, erupted against India's rule. By 1992–93, when the repression led by New Delhi started to weaken the Kashmiris' insurgency, Islamabad infiltrated inside Kashmir jihadis from Pakistan, some of them trained on the Afghan field against the 'Red Army'. One year later, under Benazir Bhutto, Islamabad sent beyond the Durand Line, symmetrically, new fighters who were able to stop the civil war between divided mujahideen, before taking over Kandahar, then Kabul in 1996: the Afghan Taliban.

In between, in 1991 the USSR collapsed. The Cold war was over, leaving a clear winner, the U.S., whose hubris soon developed in a 'hyperpower'[6] dominating the world on all accounts: military, economic, diplomatic, cultural and in the medias.

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[5] The Indus Water Treaty brokered by the World Bank and signed in 1960—but now criticised in Pakistan and in Jammu and Kashmir—and the annual declaration on nuclear facilities on January 1st are rather exceptions than the rule. On the opposite, the question the boundary at Sir Creek, supposed to be relatively easy to solve, is not progressing. Trade negotiations are also progressing very slowly, and political decisions are not always promptly implemented, as shows the grant of 'Most Favoured Nation' status to India decided by the Pakistan Government in 2011 by not yet acted (India gave this status to Pakistan in 1995).

[6] The concept of 'U.S. hyperpower' has been developed by former French Foreign Affairs minister Hubert Védrine, who finds it no more pertinent in the present global configurations.

The same year, the financial crisis afflicting India decided the new Congress Government led by then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to embark on economic reforms. It took a decade for getting the fruits of this shift, in term of growth rates or geopolitical recognition. It is not by chance than in 2005–2006, when its GDP reached 9.5 %, India was co-opted as one of the founding members of the new East Asia Summit and made its mark at Davos with the slogan '*India everywhere*'. In 1998 the arrival to power of the 'Hindu nationalists' did not change significantly the economic policy redefined by the Congress, but 3 months after taking over, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) decided to cross the Rubicon, and conducted five nuclear tests, officially recognised as military (the lone test conducted under Indira Gandhi in 1974 was supposed to be 'a peaceful nuclear explosion'). Shifting the economic policy towards liberalisation was very much in tune with the dominant global pattern. On the opposite, crossing the nuclear threshold went against the grain of the international community which had renewed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. In both cases India remained outside the pale of these treaties and so did Pakistan, for the same reason. Neither India nor Pakistan had joined the NPT when it was adopted in 1968, in order to keep open the option to conduct nuclear tests. In 1998, 2 weeks after India, Pakistan did test six nuclear weapons, for good measure.

The India Pakistan U.S. Triangle

At this point of time, the geopolitics of India and Pakistan entered in a new phase of great complexity, as goalposts began to shift on the triangular field delimited by Delhi, Islamabad and Washington. The then U.S. President Bill Clinton had, by law, imposed sanctions upon India and Pakistan after their tests. He did so, but launched in the meantime two parallel dialogues with New Delhi and Islamabad. The U.S. negotiator Strobe Talbot understood quickly that he would not get any rollback of the nuclear policy conducted by the two South Asian countries, but the dialogue did not failed, far from it. As per 'the law of unattended consequences'—to quote Talbott (2004: 5)—the dialogue with India led to a better mutual understanding: 2 years after the tests he had strictly condemned, Bill Clinton conducted in India in 2000 a very successful State visit which ended by a Joint Declaration celebrating common values and shared economic interests in a "Vision for the 21st century" (Government of India 2000). After 5 days in India, Clinton spent 6 h in Islamabad, enough for delivering a speech on Pakistan television stating that the new century "does not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood" (Pakistan TV 2000), a clear reference to the 'war of Kargil'[7] the General Pervez Musharraf, his host, had engaged the year before, killing in the egg the

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[7] Indians refer to 'the war of Kargil'. Pakistani leaders (and some commentators) prefer the understatement of 'the Kargil incident'.

rapprochement negotiated in Lahore by Atal Bahari Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, with his counterpart Nawaz Sharif, sacked by a bloodless coup instigated by Musharraf a few months after Kargil.

The year 1998 has not been just marked by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May. Less noted at the time, but in retrospect announcing the future, the U.S. Navy had launched over Pakistan (with the approval of Sharif) a strike on Afghanistan: missiles were a retaliation against four camps of the group said being behind the deadly attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania a few weeks before: al Qaeda, enjoying the hospitality of the Taliban, whose regime was then recognised by just three countries: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. For long, the U.S. Administration had hyphenated India and Pakistan. Entangled in their Kashmir dispute, the policies vis-a-vis the two countries were seen as webbed in a zero-sum-game: any decision seen as positive by one was seen as negative by the other. Furthermore, the diplomatic relationship was complex. Pakistan was an ally of the West since the 1950s, when it joined the Bagdad Pact, but once the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, Washington imposed sanctions upon Islamabad, suspected of conducting a clandestine nuclear programme—a fact pushed under the carpet for a decade, after Pakistan became the frontline state against the Red Army. Besides the blunder made in abandoning Afghanistan to its civil war and to Pakistan's doctrine of 'strategic depth' aiming at controlling as far as possible what was happening in their Western neighbour, the U.S. policy conducted under the Pressler Amendment convinced many Pakistanis than, decidedly, the U.S. could not be trusted.[8]

The case of India was different, almost the opposite. Washington had neither appreciated its non-alignment policy, even when it was balanced. Under Indira Gandhi, it started to tilt in favour of Moscow: India had signed a Friendship Treaty with the USSR in 1971 and had kept rather quiet after the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979. The times, however, were changing. India had the bomb, yes, but also a fair record in non-proliferation. That was not the case of Pakistan, suspected to disseminate a nuclear knowledge to U.S. listed 'rogue states', amongst them North Korea, Iran and Libya (a point confirmed in 2004 when the A.Q. Khan affair made the headlines.[9] With North Korea the process went both ways, as the Pakistan Ghauri I missiles were said to be copies of the North Korean Nodong II). The adventurism of Pakistan Army launching its operation across the Line of Control near Kargil in 1999, at the risk of war between two nuclearized countries, went much beyond the well-established support to jihadis sent to Kashmir. While Pakistan was engaged in a dangerous regional game across its borders, India was implementing a new economic policy aiming at more rapid growth. All these

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[8] Passed in 1985 by the U.S. Congress, the Pressler Amendment required the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan has not acceded to nuclear weapons, and can therefore receive U.S. aid. In 1990, the year following the retreat of the USSR from Afghanistan, Washington, no more in need of Islamabad cooperation, decided to impose sanctions upon Pakistan as required by the Pressler Amendment.

[9] See for instance: Broad (2004).

factors explain why, by the end of the Nineties, a number of think tanks in Washington were pleading for 'a decoupling of India and Pakistan in U.S. calculations', particularly when came the time to give advice to the 'next President' ahead of the elections of 2000, then to the President-elect.[10]

Post 9/11: Great Game 3.0

9/11 redefined the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. General Musharraf understood immediately what was at stake and in a talk to the nation explained why, "in its national interest", Pakistan had to join 'the war against terror' after having given their chance to the Taliban regime to cut its links with al Qaeda. Once again, Pakistan became a frontline state for another U.S. war in Afghanistan, this time with U.S. and NATO troops on the ground. So prone to 'promote democracy' in the Greater Middle East, the 'Neoconservatives' in Washington had no problem with a military regime (they even granted Pakistan the coveted status of 'Major non-NATO Ally' in 2004) as long as Musharraf played the game. He did so in its own way, pragmatically adjusting the unchanged Pakistani strategic paradigm to the changing circumstances (Racine 2010). The rationale was to walk on the rope, balancing as far as possible between conflicting imperatives. A difficult task, which contributed to the insecurity Pakistan is today facing.

On the India front, when jihadists attacked the Legislative Assembly in Srinagar in October 2001 and the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December, Musharraf condemned these actions as terrorism. When India, in retaliation, moved its troops to the Pakistan border, the two countries were again on the brink of war, but nuclear deterrence, international pressure and the limited potential of Indian commandos to attack targets across the Line of Control in Kashmir avoided an open conflict. Better, in a major speech delivered on January 2002 on what "the true spirit of Islam" is, Musharraf, while reaffirming to Pakistanis that "Kashmir runs in our blood" made a clear point: "no organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir". "The extremist minority should realize that Pakistan is not responsible for waging armed Jihad in the world". . . "we have to check extremism, militancy, violence and fundamentalism" adding that "there is no need to interfere in other countries" (The President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation 2002). After having banned in 2000 two sectarians outfits, he banned on that day two other ones and also, more importantly for New Delhi, the Jaish-e Mohammad and the Lashkar-e Taiba, the two main jihadi groups operating against India in Kashmir and beyond. Musharraf invited India to dialogue on Kashmir in a new spirit, as suggested by A.B. Vajpayee himself. He invited as well the U.S. to put pressure on India and address the issue of human rights violations in Kashmir.

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[10] See Carlucci and Hunter (2000: 5). For an evaluation of this policy, see Tellis (2008: 21–42).

After the tense stand-off of 2002, India and Pakistan effectively entered a backstage dialogue, with promising results. In 2003 a ceasefire protocol was promoted on the Line of Control, and in January 2004 an official and very structured *composite dialogue* started, addressing all types of issues, including Kashmir.[11] The infiltrations from the Pakistani side of the Line of control went down, as went down the number of incidents in the State of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control. The story, however, does not end here. If Musharraf had banned the criminal sectarian outfits involved in Sunnis/Shias confrontations, and the jihadi groups operating against India, he let them re-emerge under new names, and did not dismantle them. While Musharraf's Foreign Minister Khursid Kasuri states that in 2007 India and Pakistan had come close to an agreement on Kashmir, the well planned terrorist attack conducted by Pakistani militants in Mumbai in November 2008 reached its goal: the dialogue was suspended. Five years later no court has tried the masterminds of the operation, and the founder of the Lashkar-e Taiba, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, listed as head of a terrorist organisation by the U.S. and the UN is a public figure still allowed to speak in large meetings across Pakistan.

On the Afghan front, Musharraf followed the same ambiguous policy. Pakistan police arrested key al Qaeda militants (including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the best known inmate of Guantanamo), but not Osama bin Laden or his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri, presently the chief of the organisation. The Afghan Taliban continued to enjoy support from Pakistan—not just the Quetta shura said to be led by Mollah Omar, but also groups such as the Haqqani network suspected to have received ISI support for its operations against the Indian Embassy in Kabul. However, walking on the rope has a price. From 2003 onward, after the first attacks against Musharraf himself, a section of the militants instrumentalised by the State power for long, turned against Musharraf's regime, accused of toeing the U.S. line in Afghanistan and compromising with India on Kashmir. Musharraf's call for 'enlightened moderation' (Musharraf 2004) did not make the difference, and after the attack against the radicals running the Red Mosque in Islamabad, in 2007, the extremists accentuated their action in two ways. In the tribal agencies close to the Afghan border, a number of insurgent groups coalesced under the name of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), for establishing a radical Islamic regime in Pakistan. In the rest of the country, a nexus of Pakistani Taliban, sectarian groups and al Qaeda operatives launched terrorist attacks against various targets. Pakistan had now to face extremism and terrorism born in its midst. The Army finally acted, but selectively. It crushed the Taliban-linked Maulana Fazlulla's militants in Swat in 2009; it fights for years now against the TTP in the tribal agencies, but not against the groups faithful to the State and operating against NATO in Afghanistan..

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[11] The dialogue was addressing, at different levels (top bureaucrats, foreign secretaries, ministers) the following issues: peace and security; Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen glacier; Wullar barrage/ Tulbul navigation project; Sir Creek contested border; economic and commercial cooperation; terrorism and drug trafficking; people to people relations. The origin of the composite dialogue dates back to 1997, but it assumed special significance from 2004 till 2008. See Paddler (2012).

Today, while the U.S. is withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Great Game starts afresh. In this Great Game 3.0, India hopes to get the benefit of the good relations established with Afghan President Hamid Karzai: Afghanistan has received close to US$2 billion aid from India during the last decade, and a 'strategic partnership agreement' has been signed between the two countries in 2011. During his visit to New Delhi in May 2013 (the fourth in 2 years), Karzai has requested India to supply military weapons and to send instructors to Afghanistan. All this is obviously anathema to Pakistan, whose goal has been, since Independence, to avoid to be squeezed between India and a pro-India regime in Kabul. Whatever be the status of dehyphenation and the lack of trust between Washington and Pakistan as exemplified by the commando killing Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad in 2011, the U.S. cannot afford to let Pakistan down for the time being: it will be difficult to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban while keeping Pakistan aside, as Pakistan will be one of the most important countries for the future of Afghanistan.

Finally, two different rationales are at play in Washington's diplomacy. Emerging India is seen as a partner (although sometimes disappointing) if not as a full-fledged ally. The future of Asia will unravel on the shores of the Pacific, but India cannot be forgotten for a number of reasons, including strategic ones. Pakistan, on the other hand, is more important for the problems it faces and for the challenges it raises than for a prospect of a shining future. It remains to be seen if the Asian pivot strategy announced by the U.S. in 2010 and officialised by the Pentagon in January 2012 will really imply a disengagement from the Greater Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan included. For India, in any case, the imperative is twofold. It should pay attention to its immediate neighbourhood—its top priority, confirmed India's new Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh when taking over on August 1st 2013. It should as well locate itself on the chessboard supposed to be the crux of the competition global between the U.S. and China. China, which is, for India, both a neighbour and an emerging global power.

The China Parameter

The Bilateral Border Dispute

India's relationship with China is particularly intricate. The border dispute, still unresolved despite 16 rounds of talks since 2003, is crucial for a number of reasons. It is on this border, legated by the British Raj to India and discarded by Communist China as a colonial injustice, than the expectation of fraternity between the two Asian giants collapsed after the short *Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai* episode of the 1950s. The humiliating short war of 1962 fought on the Mac Mahon Line in the Eastern Himalayas was one of the greatest failures of Nehru's foreign policy and left an indelible mark on the Indian psyche. It took 17 years for an Indian Foreign Affairs Minister—A.B. Vajpayee—to visit Beijing after the war and 34 years for a Prime

Minister —Rajiv Gandhi—to do the same after Nehru's visit in 1954. Along with the border, Tibet also became a bone of contention, when India accepted to accommodate, in 1959, the young Dalai Lama and his monks fleeing Lhasa after the take over by the People's Liberation Army.

The Line of Actual Control in what is today Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet by the Chinese) was not the only border contested. On the West side, India discovered in 1957 that the trans-Himalayan desert plateau of Aksai Chin, seen by New Delhi as belonging to Kashmir, and hence to India, had been in fact occupied by the Chinese: a strategic location for them, linking Tibet to Xinjiang, two very sensitive 'autonomous regions' agitated by separatists elements. So China is, willingly or not, a part of the Kashmir equation, on four accounts. First: Aksai Chin. The Line of Actual Control here can always be used as a titillating factor in the bilateral relations with India, as demonstrated the camp established in April 2013 by Chinese troops in a contested area just before the first visit to India of the new Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Second: the trans-Himalaya Shaksgam Valley exchanged with Pakistan in 1963 against minor territorial adjustments. The agreement signed then between Beijing and Islamabad, 1 year after the Sino-Indian war, states that "after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will re-open negotiations" with China on this issue (Bilateral agreement signed in Beijing on March 2, 1963).

Third, the continuous support provided by China to Pakistan, who are not only 'friends' but 'brothers' in official statements, has constantly reinforced the Pakistani military, including in its nuclear dimension and therefore has an impact on its Kashmir policy. True, in the Nineties Beijing has adopted apparently a more neutral stand on Kashmir. President Jang Zemin, in Islamabad, preached in 1996 for moderation and dialogue ("properly handling existing disputes in the spirit of seeking common ground while setting aside differences" Speech by the President Jiang Zemin at the Senate of Pakistan 1996), and after Kargil, Beijing decided not to support General Musharraf's adventurism: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had to go to Washington for finding a way out of the crisis with the help of President Clinton. However, and this is the fourth point, Beijing seems to have of late refocused on Kashmir, not so much on the crux of the dispute between India and Pakistan than on the geostrategic interest of the northern territories of Gilgit Baltistan, the link between Xinjiang and the Indus Valley and the Gwadar port slowly developed in Balochistan and managed by a Chinese company on the West coast of Pakistan. The 'Trade, energy, transport and industrial corridor' project proposed by Musharraf in 2007 and confirmed by Nawaz Sharif in Beijing in July 2013, is obviously suffering from the insecurity prevailing in Pakistan, but it remains a great goal. Already, Chinese economic presence in Gilgit Baltistan is well documented, but Beijing has denied reports mentioning that China has thousands of troops in the region. India is concerned by these developments, the more so than a hardening of China on Kashmir has been evident when Beijing started in 2010 to issue stapled visas for Kashmiris from the Indian side, and even rejected the visa demand of the Indian general commanding in Kashmir. Two observations might be in order here. First, even if India and China were ready to solve their

boundary dispute on the East (an uncertain hypothesis, as the Chinese would stuck to getting the Tawang Buddhist monastery in Arunachal Pradesh), it would be almost impossible to delink the China border issue from the Kashmir issue, as the two interfere in Aksai Chin. Second, simple realpolitik would suggest that it would be in China's interest to pressure Islamabad to accept a settlement of the Kashmir issue along the Line of Control, as it would comfort their presence in Gilgit Baltistan, and secure the Karakorum Highway, a part of the proposed economic corridor. The recognition of the Line of Control as a de facto border (for 15 years) was in fact part of the progress made in secret talks between India and Pakistan under Musharraf, but the following Pakistani Government reneged on this crucial point, as did the Military. Either Beijing's influence on Islamabad is limited or China's diplomacy plays rather convoluted cards as far as India (and not just India) is concerned.

India, China and the Indian Ocean

The India-China-Pakistan triangle is not the sole geometry governing India China relationship beyond its strict bilateral dimension. If we set aside the global competition between the two countries for access to resources such as energy or for export markets (whatever be the difference in favour of China) and focus on the geopolitical realm, another triangle takes shape: India-China-US. The so-called *string of pearls* that China is building along the rim of the Indian Ocean is not (yet?) strategic in the military sense of the word, but certainly Beijing is carefully expanding the Chinese presence between the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden, investing in ports it helps to build: Sittwe in Myanmar where China is far ahead India in the competition for energy resources, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka; Gwadar in Pakistan, not to forget the Maldives, where China has opened an embassy in 2011, nor the Seychelles and Mauritius where Beijing has signed transport infrastructure agreements. Add the Chinese Navy involved—as the Indian Navy—in anti-piracy operations off the Somalia coast: New Delhi is concerned by what is seen as an encirclement policy, while Beijing pleads good faith, business and cooperation.

India considers that for the time being its Navy is stronger than China's one, but a competition is clearly engaged, although China's primary strategic interest is more focussed on the Pacific than on the Indian Ocean. However, the Indian Ocean is vital to China for three reasons: first, the oil and gas of the Middle East transits through it; second, the sea lanes of communication with the European markets cross also the Indian Ocean; third, China growing interest for Africa gives the Indian Ocean a special value. Furthermore, if trade and transport corridors can be established through Myanmar and Pakistan—two maritime neighbours of India—China would save greatly on transport for developing its South Western and Far Western regions, one of its national priorities. The question of Taiwan and the competing claims between China and its neighbours about islands in the South

China Sea explain why Beijing is developing its Navy: its first aircraft carrier, bought from Ukraine, has been put into service in September 2012. In the meantime, India has launched, in August 2013, its first indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which will operate in 2018 (India has already one carrier and a second one has arrived from Russia in January 2014), and will soon conduct sea trials of its first nuclear submarine, INS Arihant. More broadly, India has become during the last few years the first arms importer in the world. In this context, the announcement of the Pentagon's Asian pivot in 2012—the U.S. talks today of 'rebalancing' rather than 'pivot'—raises for India a major issue: how to locate itself in the coming strategic reconfiguration prepared by the U.S., between the Greater Middle East and Asia? The answer—or the dilemma—lies in what is at the core of New Delhi's foreign policy: the quest for autonomy. A hard question, when both China and the U.S. are much more powerful than India.

India and the U.S. Rebalancing Towards Asia: The Indo-Pacific Concept

In June 2012, at the Shangri La Conference organised in Singapore, the U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta came to this major annual event on defence and security issues in Asia, "to explain a new defence strategy that the United States has put in place and why the United States will play a deeper and more enduring partnership role in advancing the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, and how the United States military supports that goal by rebalancing towards this region" (Speech by the Secretary of Defence Leon E. Panetta 2012). India was mentioned in Panetta's speech briefly, amongst the 'key partners' such as Indonesia and Singapore, a level below the 'key treaty alliances' linking the U.S. with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines and Thailand. But Panetta made a point to visit New Delhi after Singapore. In a speech delivered at a think tank close to the Defence Ministry, it did quote President Obama's statement to the Indian Parliament in 2010: "the United States and India will be one of the defining partnership in the 21st century" (Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India 2010) and repeated what means, geographically, the rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific Region: "We will expand our military partnership and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia". He added that "defence cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy" (Panetta 2012).

The Indo-Pacific

The extension of Asia Pacific to the Indian Ocean and to South Asia gave rise in India to a new concept introduced at the Australian National University in 2012: the *Indo-Pacific* (Medcalf 2012). The concept got official recognition when Nirupama Rao, the Indian Ambassador to the U.S., mobilised it in a public comment on America's Asian pivot. Quoting Rowry Medcalf and other observers, she asserted: "Indo-Pacific Asia, or the Indo-Pacific for short, is a 'more credible and contemporary name' than the Asia-Pacific. They see it as an emerging Asian strategic system that encompasses both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, defined in part by the reach of China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of the United States in both (these oceans)" (Rao 2013).

The concept of Indo-Pacific makes sense for India's decision makers as it offers the country an opportunity to being associated to the U.S. rebalancing towards Asia. More deeply—and this is a point Rao underlined—it echoes both what has been the long history of India's relationship with South-East Asia and China (post-Meiji Japan could be added as well) in the fields of trade, culture and ideas on the one hand, and the impact of the 'Look East policy' launched by New Delhi in 1992 on the other hand, not to forget, in between, the 'Panscheel doctrine'—the five principles of peaceful coexistence—defined with China in 1954.

A selective list of significant initiatives taken during the past two decades helps to understand what India brings today to the Indo-Pacific concept: the ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, which targets US$100 billion trade for 2015; large infrastructure projects, such as the Mekong India Corridor (MIEC) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway to be expanded to Cambodia and Laos; India's membership to the East Asian Summit since its inception in 2005; the ASEAN Regional Forum dedicated to security issues and the ASEAN Defence Minister +8 process joined by India in 1996 and 2010 respectively. Add to these regional structures bilateral defence cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, and it is quite clear that India has decided to seriously implement its 'Look East' policy. This dynamics fits U.S.'s interests. Has not Hillary Clinton said, in a visit to India in 2011 as Secretary of State: "We encourage India not just to look East, but to engage East and to act East as well" (Clinton 2011). Furthermore, the U.S. is the country with which India has conducted the largest number of naval exercises since a decade (Operations Malabar) including sometime other countries, such as Japan, Australia and Singapore. The 13-nation Milan exercise (a biennial event) hosted by India in 2010 testified clearly to New Delhi's willingness—even before the U.S. pivot strategy was articulated—to engage in a joint task force with Asia Pacific countries beyond the U.S. including Australia, New Zealand, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore. Does this imply that, between the 'competing concepts of regional architecture in Asia', India and the U.S. should bet first on ASEAN, in order to build an 'Arc of Advantage', as a 2013 report suggests (Singh and Pulipaka 2013)?

Here again, this triangle is in fact one of the tools that Indian diplomacy might use and strengthen, but it cannot be exclusive. Japan, for instance, is also very much in the picture, and New Delhi is happy with Shinzo Abe's return to power. Abe has always be in favour of upgrading India's status in Asia, and endorsed "India's role in keeping Asia's sea lanes stable" (Jha 2012). Japan's critique of India's nuclear tests of 1998 is over, and in 2006 the two countries signed a joint statement 'Towards India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership' which has expanded later on. A Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation followed in 2008. Furthermore, trilateral consultations between India, Japan and the US are now established.

The Balance of Interests

Whatever could be the irritants between India and the U.S. (on the major combat aircraft deal allotted to the French; on India' sluggishness to implement the civil nuclear deal; on U.S. restrictions on Indian professional visas, not to mention questions raised by the U.S. policy in AfPak) there are enough common interests for New Delhi using the Asian Pivot as a tool for its own geopolitical goals and the recognition of its growing status. There is however a red line, known to all, which is valid as well for South East Asian countries (Japan is perhaps in a different situation since tension grew with Beijing on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012 and the return to power of Abe in 2013). India is ready to participate to the U.S. rebalancing to Asia as long as it does not amount to the containment of China. Despite the suspicion about the so-called 'peaceful rise' of China and the border dispute with Beijing, India has now too much to share with China for tying its own hands to a policy defined in Washington. China is today the second trade partner of India after the European Union, far ahead of ASEAN and the US[12] and in 2005 the two countries agreed to establish an 'India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity'. Ups and downs in the relationship might suspend topical dialogues but not decisively (the annual defence dialogue restarted in 2011 after a 2-year gap, and the strategic dialogue has restarted in 2013 after a 3 year gap) and top-level visits are regularly conducted, besides meeting aside multilateral conferences and regional summits, not forgetting BRICS and Russia India China summits. Significantly, in April 2013, India and China hold in Beijing their first dialogues on Central Asia and on Afghanistan.

Indian analysts and strategists may have different views on what the country foreign policy should be. Some may prone the rejuvenation of non-alignment (Khilani 2012). Others may plead for a stronger rapprochement with the U.S. or

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[12] Bilateral trade of India on 2010–2011: with EU: US$118 billion; with China (without Hong Kong): 96 (Hong Kong included: 125); with ASEAN: 57; with U.S.A: 45. Aggregated oil producing countries from the Middle East came first that year, slightly above EU. Source: Government of India (2013).

take a hard line against China. But none believe in a real alliance with Washington, where India would be a junior partner. Regarding the U.S., it is still about 'reinventing partnership' (Schaffer 2009), a partnership expanding, but within limits (see Gupta 2011 and Chari 2012). Regarding Asia, the game on the chessboard is shifting, and an additional player should received attention too: Russia, which has a long and good relationship with India, particularly in the defence field. Moscow's growing interest for the Pacific (Russia has invested a lot in Vladivostok for welcoming the APEC Summit in 2012) is necessarily linked to Russia relation with China, which is not without question marks about the future of Russia's Far East. Russia, in a way, is also pivoting towards Asia (Trenin 2012). In response, an Indian analyst submits that: "while many South China Sea littoral countries would be willing to balance China, a Russo-Chinese axis would in all likelihood encourage more bandwagoning than balancing", and concludes that "Russia must be prevented from ganging up with China" (Iyer-Mitra 2012).

Conclusion

The game today is however not as simple that this geometry seems to suggest. It is not only a question of Barack Obama's capacity to implement forcefully the U.S. rebalancing towards Asia. The real issue lies in the intricacies of economic parameters, which, at the age of globalisation, weave a network of interdependencies between the key players. Certainly, the hard realpolitik is still at play, as we see with Vladimir Putin's support to Bachar al Assad in Syria. Certainly the BRICS countries, democratic or authoritarian, share the same aversion against all Western initiatives which appear as weakening the principle of national sovereignty under the principle of the 'responsibility to protect'. But we are no more fully ruled by Westphalian principles. When China owns more than 1.2 trillion value of U.S. government debt, it becomes a part of the U.S. financial system. In other words, the dialectics between competition and cooperation shapes much of the confrontation potential between key players, whatever their investment in defence could be. This is valid as well for the India and China relationship, beyond the soft statements released during official visits: the goal remains to avoid military confrontation (including by nuclear deterrence) but, in a way, to be ready for conventional clashes, if need be, along the Himalayas or at sea.

More deeply, this economic interdependence calls for moderating the discourse on the shift of power from the West to the East, particularly as far as India is concerned. In 2009, one of the best Indian analysts, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, wondered if the crisis afflicting the U.S. and Europe was not offering to India (and to other emerging countries as well) a strategic opportunity for asserting themselves (Saran 2009). It is clear today that these emerging powers—China less than the other ones—have in fact suffered from the contraction of the Western economies. India, on this regard,

is doing better with a GDP growth rate of 5 % in 2012 than Russia (3.4 %) or Brazil (0.9 %). However, beyond the GDP, the spectre of a financial turmoil is accentuated by the announcement that the U.S. Federal Reserve will restrict the flow of liquidities it chose to expand for stimulating the U.S. economic recovery. In clear, foreign investors will accelerate their withdrawals from India and other emerging countries for reinvesting in the West. Beyond the grand strategy scenarios, the hard reality of economics defines for a large part India's capacity to implement an ambitious foreign policy. The uncertainties in this regard comfort those who think in term of 'concert of powers'.

Some Indian strategists believe that the dynamics of emerging Asia in the context of the U.S.'s pivot would 'churn the oceans', intensify the growing rivalry between India and China and deepen the security dilemmas in the *Indo-Pacific* (Mohan 2012). This is not the official view in New Delhi, if we believe Ambassador Rao when she says: "We speak of Asian stability demanding cooperation, even if it is laced with competition, and not confrontation, between India and China, thus creating what is termed 'an arc of advantage and shared economic prosperity' across Asia." (Rao 2013). The present Indian President, Pranab Mukherjee, had theorised this position in perhaps a less idealistic discourse when he, as Minister for External Affairs, said: "What the world needs is not [the] old style balance of power but a well-crafted system to promote a 'balance of interests' among the major powers. No structure of international security will endure if it does not take into account the interests of all the major powers. That is also true of regional security arrangements." (Mukherjee 2007). Back we are here to where we had started: the India-Pakistan relationship, which cannot be dissociated from the US's rebalancing to Asia.

For India, therefore, the U.S.'s pivot—which in fact solemnised a trend already engaged for years with the withdrawal from Iraq and the announcement of withdrawal from Afghanistan—encompasses a large track of what South Block pundits call its 'extended neighbourhood', from the Middle East to the Pacific. The divide between the moving East Asia and the crisis-ridden West Asia is deepening. For New Delhi, the balance is to be found between the need to manage the difficult relationship with Pakistan and address the challenge raised by the future of Afghanistan, without being stuck in the AfPak web of problems, in order to fully engage the East and in fact the rest of the world.

For the time being, it seems clear that New Delhi has succeeded reasonably well in this endeavour. In a piece written with Jivanta Schöttli in 2007, Subrata Mitra underlined 'the uncertainty of India's foreign policy', "a sense of vagueness and incoherence about India's intention on, and likely reactions to, issues affecting her vital interests". He deplored the lack of 'deep stateness, or residual reserve of basic national consensus' about the core

interest of the country (Mitra and Schöttli 2007: 19–20). Indeed vagueness may be noted, and for quite a number of U.S. Representatives and analysts, India's disappointing policy regarding the expectations raised by the nuclear deal, and the unwillingness of New Delhi to adhere to some defence cooperation proposals formulated by Washington, have been puzzling, and a debate has been opened in the U.S. about the worth of partnership with India, with quite opposing views between those believing that expectations from India "have not been and will not be fulfilled" and those considering that we are entering "an Indo-American century" (see debate in: Is the U.S.-India Relationship Oversold? 2012 and Twining 2011). A noted Afghan analyst thinks as well that despite the strategic partnership signed with Kabul, Hamid Karzai's demand for more security involvement post 2014 have seen "Delhi back in its hesitant corner", and drew a "cold response to Kabul", adding: "Delhi's recurring hesitancy and self-doubt has emboldened an overconfident Rawalpindi and revives Kabul's memories of Delhi's past inability to protects its interests and allies" (Moradian 2013).

On the whole, however, India's status has improved during the last two decades, and one may ask if 'vagueness' is not a Janus-like posture: partly negative, partly deliberate, as a way to keep options open. This is perhaps less due to a lack of 'basic national consensus' than to a willingness to take time and move smoothly. There is no reason for New Delhi to accept all U.S. initiatives, nor to bet too much on the future of Hamid Karzai's line. A position which does not prevent India to conduct at the same time trilateral talks with China and Russia on the future of Afghanistan. One many issues, beyond the unavoidable politicking posture of Opposition parties, there is quite a large consensus between the Congress and the BJP on the way to deal with the U.S. or with China (this is different with the Communist parties) and even, to an extent, on Pakistan.[13] What are at stake is therefore not just the domestic political debates ('the democratic 'noises'', would say Subrata Mitra) impacting on India's foreign policy, or the limitations of India's economic might or technology capacities for asserting itself.

There is also at play the personality of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh which might partly accounts for a way to move with pragmatism, which takes into account the compulsions of the long transition that both India and the world are engaged in, in a time of multiple realignments generated by the emergence of new players, all of them not yet global powers (Racine 2008) which redefine the dialectics between multipolarity and multilateralism. That is why a recent American study on China and India considers that, in the in

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[13] Should the BJP win the general elections in 2014 and Narendra Modi become Prime Minister, a tougher foreign policy regarding China and Pakistan may be (or may not be) implemented.

the future, both the countries, and not just China, will raise challenges to the U.S. (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012). In between, the India Government, not boasting as some magazine covers or media-sponsored books do (see Bhandare 2007), about India as a next superpower, simply tries to give India its "rightful place in the comity of nations" (The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Independence Day Speech 2008). Those who regret India's diplomatic status at the peak of Nehru's power have to accept that today India is silent or discreet on a number of international issues, from Egypt to Syria.

The idealism attributed to Nehru's foreign policy is less visible today in a nation, say Mitra and Schöttli, "that is ambiguous and moralistic while all the same promoting low self-interest" (Mitra and Schöttli 2007: 32). Contrarily to what India hawks say, India is not really a soft State. What remains to be seen is how the country will adjust with its ambitions, the day its global status, at the U.N. Security Council for instance, will improve. The scope, here, will not be regional challenges as with the Great Game 3.0 or India's location on the shifting Indo-Pacific chessboard. Those will remain decisive to India's interests, but, as Mitra says, accepting the burden of globalisation will imply also "to engage with situations that do not have any apparent links to national interests" (ibid.). The answer given to this challenge, today and tomorrow, are and will also be answers to 'the tryst with destiny' India, in Nehru's words, embarked upon on August 15th, 1947.

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Part IV
The Art of Politics

Chapter 11
The Coffee House and the Ashram: Gandhi, Civil Society and Public Spheres

Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph

Introduction

The discourse and practice of civil society have had a lively career in the 1990s, passing through numerous incarnations and representations that range from revolutionary—as in Eastern Europe—to collaborative.[1] Civil society, Charles Taylor tells us, refers to a space that exists "over against the state, in partial independence from it. It includes those dimensions of social life which cannot be confounded with or swallowed up in the state." (Taylor 1990: 95). Taylor stresses the obstreperous, challenging aspect of civil society, the aspect that showed its face in the Narmada movement in India, in the WTO protests in the US, the contest over electoral corruption in Korea, the non-violent protests of the Chipko movement. But there are other ways to read it. The Oxford English dictionary sounds a more gentle tone, stressing mutuality and douceur as aspects of civic society: "having a proper social order," keeping "a certayn civile iustice and friendly love to one another", or "reformed, civill, full of good" (Shakespeare 1591, in Two Gentlemen of Verona).[2] The Oxford Dictionary sounds rather like a text for Robert Putnam's or James Coleman's idea of social capital—the capacity to trust and habits of collaboration.[3] It is a vision which expresses itself in Rotary clubs, soccer clubs, Parent Teacher

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[1] This chapter was first published in *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, Working Paper No. 15, June 2003, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, Heidelberg University, URL: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/3723/1/hpsacp15.pdf

[2] The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[3] See Putnam et al. (1993) and Coleman (1990).

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Associations, Lok Sevak Sanghs, associations of and for the homeless, and other friendly associations.

Civil society has also become a vehicle for discussing transitions to democracy in authoritarian states of the South. The question arises whether these countries have a social sphere autonomous of the state, an associational life that aggregates persons as citizens acting jointly for political purposes, and which serves as the platform for articulating democratic demands. The discussion of how Gandhi's program bears on Indian civil society is relevant to this latter question. Transplanting concepts such as civil society and public sphere, born and used in Anglo-American liberal contexts, requires re-calibrating the concept for use in the context of other histories and social structures. When talking about India, we have the excuse that so much of the liberal tradition was transplanted in the course of nineteenth century nationalist discourse and practice, as also in the constitution of 1950, that the concept of civil society can claim a comfortable home. But definitions of political categories are often captive to their point of first use in a European historical context.[4] As the concept of civil society travels out of its quintessential eighteenth century European origin point to new temporal locations in the twentieth century and to new cultural locations outside the West, it expresses itself through different cultural forms and takes on different meanings. Indeed it was one of Gandhi's unique talents to give new shape to institutional forms and meanings associated with liberal and democratic spheres.

Jürgen Habermas' Public Sphere is part of the same theoretical family as civil society. The version of civil society as expressed in his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Habermas 1989) will serve me as the theoretical backboard off which to bounce a consideration of Gandhi's associational inventions. The coffee-house stands as a heuristic marker for Habermas, the Ashram as a marker for Gandhi. Strukturwandel established Habermas' position as a defender of the enlightenment project of modernity against the critics of the modern, among whom Gandhi is one. Habermas created categories and representations that highlight the contrast between the Gandhian and European variants of civil society.[5] When Habermas examined England, France and Germany he found that the public sphere came into being in Europe in the eighteenth century, creating the ground for

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[4] See for example my defence of treating transnational religious movements as an aspect of transnational civil society, in Rudolph (1997).

[5] The "original" 1962 Habermas has a more restrictive vision of civil society, focussing on narrowly political associations with a strong rationalist and speech-act oriented dimension. The Habermas who appeared at a panel on his work in 1989 had expanded his horizons to include associations with mainly social ends.

The institutional core of 'civil society' is constituted by voluntary unions outside the realm of the state and the economy and ranging [...] from churches, cultural associations, and academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concerned citizens, and grass-roots petitioning drives all the way to occupational associations, political parties, labor unions, and 'alternative' institutions (Calhoun 1992: 253).

democratic participation.[6] It was embodied in coffee houses, political clubs and literary journals.

> There sprang from the midst of the private sphere [he writes] a relatively dense network of public communication. The growing number of readers [...] was complemented by a considerable expansion in the production of books, journal and papers [...] The societies for enlightenment, cultural associations, secret freemasonry lodges and orders of illuminati were associations constituted by the free, that is, private decisions of their founding members, based on voluntary membership and characterized internally by egalitarian practices of sociability, free discussion, decision by majority etc. (Habermas in Calhoun 1992: 422).

In these locations persons who previously led separate lives in private spaces come together and become a public, transcending their private preoccupations and addressing common purposes. The communicative process directed at common questions creates a unified public. Communicating with each other, social actors learn to share ideas. Their communication is marked by certain features, by rationality, by disinterestedness, by the irrelevance of inherited identities to their deliberation, and by a rigorous separation of the private and public spheres.

First, rationality: Habermas' discourse implies the public interest can only be arrived at through acts of reasoning that conform to formal notions of rationality and rules of deductive logic. He imagines public intellectuals in engagement with each other. As Eley (1992: 293) suggests: "The faculty of publicness begins with reading, thought, and discussion, with reasonable exchange among equals, and it is this ideal which really focuses Habermas' interest". Habermas' faith in the power of communicative action makes him a denizen of that German tradition, leading back to Hegel, which imagined that the philosopher could, by speech acts and reason, break out of the objectification wrought by social forces such as capitalism and mass culture. The deliberations that take place in the Public Sphere are not based on the common sense of ordinary people. Habermas explicitly brackets what he calls "mere opinion" as not the same as "public opinion". Public opinion is the outcome of the deliberated, reflective consideration of bourgeois educated persons, while "mere opinion" consists of "things taken for granted, normative convictions," and "collective prejudices" (Seidman 1989: 232). His exclusions remind of the exclusions common in the eighteenth century British political arena where the coffee house began. In that arena, what was called "opinion out of doors", that is, opinion outside the deliberative circle of parliament was regarded not only as inferior but as illegitimate. Habermas' volume traces a downward historical trajectory, following the degeneration of the Public Sphere from its peak moment in the eighteenth century. He articulates a pessimism common in the 1960s among conservative American sociologists and among critical Frankfurt Schoolers. Both expected to be overwhelmed by the deluge of mass culture, commodity fetishism, and vulgar

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[6] For an account and analysis of the emergence of opinion and the rise of parties see Lloyd. I. Rudolph, "The Origin of Party: From the Politics of Status to the Politics of Opinion in Eighteenth Century England and America," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1956.

interests. Associations marked by "convivial social intercourse and by a relatively high standard of education" engage in rational consideration of public issues only for a brief, transitional historical moment.

> [. . .] they developed only in a specific phase of bourgeois society, and only by virtue of a specific constellation of interests could they be incorporated in the order of the bourgeois constitutional state (Seidman 1989: 232).

Then begins the decline. The public sphere is superseded when the bourgeoisie loses its short-lived monopoly of opinion and begins to be pressed by a widening democratization of the public. The forces that obliterate communicative action are mass culture, consumerism, capitalism, the proliferation of private interest. Coffee houses and political clubs are overrun by the competitive and presumably non-rational processes of "pressure of the streets" and cruder forms of interest confrontation. Habermas' pessimistic framing of this move toward democratization is governed by his privileging of the "rational" over the democratic. The rationality of a proper "public sphere" will be crowded out by the irrationalities of democratic mobilization. Real deliberation on the common good will be overrun by the narrow interests of organized pressure groups. Public spheres and their rational focus on a common interest are hazarded by democratization and mass politics.[7] The disinterested, rationalist nature of the deliberation in the coffee house is grounded in Habermas' severe dichotomization of the private and the public. Interest is a product of the private sphere, disruptive of public wealth.[8] In this, Habermas stands in line with the dominant tendency in European political and social theory. For Aristotle, the family was private and pre-political; the polis is public and political. Politics lives in a compartmentalized arena where rationality is uncontaminated by the preoccupations of the private person.

To summarize, the civil society associations instanced in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit have a number of attributes which will anchor our discussion of Gandhi's variants of civil society and public sphere. They are voluntary, not coerced; they are located in public spaces—the "coffeehouse"—that are explicitly separated from the (private) sphere of house and home; they are marked by an opposition between private and public that impugns the private as the realm of personal interests, disruptive to the public interest; they are skewed toward the

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[7] Habermas speaks of a "weakening of the public sphere"; of the public sphere becoming "a field for competition among interests in the cruder form of forcible confrontations"; "Laws that have obviously originated under the 'pressure of the streets' can scarcely continue to be understood in terms of a consensus achieved by private persons in public discussion". Deploring the "refeudalization" of the public sphere he notes that "today [publicness] has [. . .] been enlisted in the aid of the secret policies of interest groups" (Seidman 1989: 236). Much of this is reminiscent of the impatience with political bargaining that lies behind Max Weber's distaste for democratic politics.

[8] There is a deviant lineage in the western tradition which argues otherwise. See Althusius (1995: 32). His pluralist view of the polity as constituted by a graduated set of socio-political units encompasses the family as a basic unit: "By politics alone arises the wisdom for governing and administering the family".

intelligentsia, not plebeians, presuming literate if not literary skills; they are grounded in rationalist forms of deliberation which implicitly exclude the force of residual inherited identities—ethnicity, religion—which are seen to live in the arena of private interest.

The Ashram transgresses almost all of these desiderata. It complies with the first condition—the ashram like the coffee house is voluntary. But there the overlap ends. The Ashram encompasses illiterate plebeians as well as literate public intellectuals, assumes the relevance of inherited identities—such as ethnicity and religion—not only in private but in public space; and it merges the home and the political arena, the private and the public.

Indian Variants of Public Sphere and Civil Society

How does the theory of public sphere travel in the Indian and in the Gandhian environment? In India, Partha Chatterjee would like to restrict the concept to "those institutions of modern associational life set up by nationalist elites in the era of colonial modernity, [. . .] often as part of the colonial struggle".[9] He would limit it to Indian cousins of the Habermasian coffee house. And indeed, the nineteenth century specimens of voluntary associations, the Deccan Educational Society, the Brahmo Samaj, the Indian Association, the Prarthana Samaj, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha fit rather well with the eighteenth century rationalist, voluntary, bourgeois, public sphere imagery that Habermas offers. The trouble with these distinctly liberal nationalist organizations is that they were restricted to a tiny, English speaking urban elite. It was only when the nationalist movement was transformed into a popular agitation, first with mass resistance to the partition of Bengal in 1905 and then in the Gandhian period, that it began to reach significant publics. It began spawning collective action not easily contained within the sober, rationalist descriptors of the public sphere. Liberals like Ranade and Gokhale were one thing,

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[9] 'Beyond the Nation? or Within?', Economic and Political Weekly, January 4–11, 1997, pp. 30–34, 32. Chatterjee's article recognizes the distinction between the traditional definition of civil society and public sphere and the Gandhian variant of this definition which we are about to elaborate. But he would prefer, apparently in the interest of heuristic sharpness, to "retain the term civil society [for] those characteristic institutions of modern associational life originating in western societies that are based on equality, autonomy, freedom of entry and exit, contract, deliberative procedures of decision-making, recognized rights and duties of members [. . .]" even though non-western countries provide "numerous examples of the emergence of what could well be called civil-social institutions which nevertheless do not always conform to these principles." It is a position that denies (on historical grounds? on normative grounds?) the fluidity and adaptability of institutions. This is a different theoretical road than the one which we adopted in an earlier work in which we argued that "caste associations" represent a hybrid form of civil society which transgresses the dichotomy between ascribed and voluntary groups. See our The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Reprint, 1996).

religiously and plebeian toned reformers such J.G. Phule, Shri Narayana Guru and Gandhi himself another. Social movements were deeply infiltrated by the symbolism, relationships, and practices of a society that was rural, religious, collectively organized, and predominantly illiterate. Bayly, in an argument that provides a historical space for civil society in eighteenth century India suggests that such activity was carried on in the arena of religious discourses, the dominant site for ethical reflection and normative practice (Bayly 1999: 180–211). Indian associational life in the nationalist era reflected the society into which it was introduced, where realms of life, private/public, religious/secular, chosen/inherited had not been sharply differentiated. Civil society looked different.

One problem in asking the civil society/public sphere question in India is that one is moved, by the eighteenth century European genealogies of civil society, to look to urban contexts. The rural as an arena does not appear on the horizon, or only marginally. A coffee house in a wheat field? Marx spoke for a general theoretical perspective among modernists when he supposed that peasants did not enter "into manifold relations with one another." They were homologous units; like so many potatoes in a sack, they made nothing more cohesive than a sackful of potatoes.[10] They had no civil society.

The Ashram as Public Sphere?

Wherever Gandhi's mass politics project travelled, in South Africa or in India, his first step was to create a centre, an ashram—although he did not call it that until he came to India. He created seven in all, two in South Africa, five in India. Here the vanguard participants of his movement could live together, the dedicated and trained resistance professionals who were key for his mass mobilization projects, the Delhi Satyagraha, the South African political marches, the Dandi salt march. Ashrams are retreats for those who wish to join a community of dedication, usually to a normative or spiritual life, in Gandhi's case also to wider political interests and to social service—projects Gandhi regarded as paired.[11] Gandhi initiated these arenas to reach into rural India, beyond the literary elites to a non-literate mass public. Is deliberation in the public sphere conditioned on literacy? What happens to systems of communication, essential to the formation of civil society, when the potential citizens can neither read or write and before oral/visual mass communication provide another means of communication? When Gandhi attempted to create a public sphere, in 1900 in South Africa, in the 1920s in India, most villagers and

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[10] See Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon', Selected Works (New York, n.d.), II, p. 415.

[11] India saw a proliferation of ashrams in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, institutions which mixed classical models with more recent institutional forms and spiritual needs. The forms also traveled across denominational lines, to Christians and New Agers. For an introduction to the forms and review of historical instances see Taylor (1986).

towns people were not only illiterate but had neither radio nor television. I mentioned before that the Habermasian coffeehouse does not function with public opinion defined as common sense but opinion as the fruit of a highly cultivated rationalism. Gandhi, in building a mass public, defines public opinion as common sense and assumes that common sense is widely distributed. Gandhi did not assume a public sphere was conditional on literacy. He was aware that public deliberations and cultural performance reach high levels of complexity under conditions of low literacy. In India, Drama (traveling theatre)[12] domestic oral compositions (grandmother's tales)[13] and public oratory (the juridical deliberations of caste and village panchayats) regularly engage ordinary non-literate people in complex and sophisticated cultural production and communication.[14] To create a "public" focused on matters of public concern under conditions of non-literacy requires forms of organization different from the coffee house and the literary journal, forms in which exemplification and performance play a visible role. Satyagrahas were elaborately choreographed, though of simple materials. The Gandhian ashram expanded the concept of a public sphere from emphasis on the discursive exchanges of educated men to exemplary performances whose enactment would provide political education and trigger mass discussions. Satyagrahas were not just large scale assertions of non-violent resistance. They were political theatre, pedagogic drama for launching dramatic actions designed to politicize millions of people, including uneducated rural and urban folk, alerting them to issues, engaging them in public debate.

The Private as Public and Political

A crucial feature guaranteeing the disinterested rationality of Habermas' public sphere is the insulation of the public from the private, the private which is seen as the realm of private interest, of "Normative opinions" and "collective prejudices". Gandhi's strategy of reaching wider constituencies and his moral conviction about the unity between the public and the private self-conspired to have him transgress this dichotomy. That transgression has to be read against the complex meanings of public/private harboured by Indian society—meanings to which conventional European usage is a poor guide. The meaning of privacy is modified by the structure of the family and the pattern of housing and rural settlement. In multi-generational ("joint") families with strong collective norms, privacy has little meaning;

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[12] See Susan Seizer, [Dissertation on traveling village drama troupe] (Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Spring 1997).

[13] See Ramanujan (1991: Introduction).

[14] For a remarkable display of juridical village rhetoric see the documentary, "Courts and Councils", made by the University of Wisconsin and available from its Center of South Asian Studies.

surveillance of the most trivial or intimate acts was/is common.[15] The borders of what constitutes privacy become problematic when the family reaches beyond the nuclear unit and constitutes a small community, an incipient public. Again, in villages and hamlets, most quotidian activity is accomplished on verandas or in courtyards, within sight of the neighbours, in "public." Privacy is more an urban than a rural phenomenon, and a luxury of the walled-in middle class rather than the open-air poor. Many nominally private practices in India display in public and for the sake of public certification personal acts that begin in and belong to the private sphere: the pulling of the headcloth over the face designating a woman's modesty; the tying of the dhoti designating caste status; the choice of or mix of desi and angrezi dress forms; the participation in a public meal; the marriage of two incompatibly ranked social actors display in public for the sake of approbation or defiance personal acts that begin in and belong to the private sphere. A narrow view of politics would relegate these to the private.

Yet the most fundamental social transformations that Indian reformers have sought to accomplish in the last hundred years have been as much embedded in private as in public spheres. Major public figures engaged in the search for just and meaningful social practices among the conflicting claims that the colonial situation generated often affected the public sphere most profoundly by performing some act of private deviation—marrying a widow; crossing the ocean; ignoring the family's conventional commensal rules. As the feminists say, the personal is political. When these individual transgressions proliferated, and reformers sought social legislation to modify oppressive private practices—The Age of Consent Act; the Widow Remarriage Act—the claim of privacy, that intimate spheres are beyond the reach of public scrutiny, or at least beyond the scrutiny of the colonial state, was invoked.[16] What Gandhi did was to assert the opposite, that all private matters— or most—were on the table.

The Tolstoy farm in South Africa was constructed as a model of the imagined India, a diverse India, and its private negotiation of those differences were displayed in public through Gandhi's prolific publications. Public Opinion was one (Gandhi 1928: 134).[17] Navajivan and Young India reached a circulation of 40,000. The accounts are full of the quotidian details of negotiating the integration of private difference into a public space. How to arrange feeding? By allowing every family to work their own kitchen, as religious, caste, and culture based differences might dictate? The Ashram dwellers came from a society in which

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[15] For an extended discussion of the cross-cultural meaning of "Privacy" see Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph (2000); Introduction to Part V, "Private Lives in Patriarchal Space".

[16] M.G. Ranade (1842–1901), who favoured social reform as an appropriate issue for the Indian National Congress, was forced to back off when it became apparent social reform, as against political freedom, would deeply divide the Congress.

[17] For the massive repercussions in India of the violence committed against the South African strikers in 1913, including Viceroy Lord Harding's surprising condemnation of the South African authorities, and G.K. Gokhale's amplification to India of the news he received from South Africa, see Gandhi (1928: 286).

inter-dining was forbidden by ideas of caste purity and pollution. If they were to eat in a common kitchen, an act of social transgression, how to mediate between meat-eaters and vegetarians? The conundrum appears to have been settled by Gandhi's usual negotiated voluntarism, not unsurprisingly on the side of vegetarianism. Dish washing arrangements were partly designed to override residual reservations about purity and pollution: no one was exempted from the cleaning of common dishes.[18]

The Ashram as vehicle of displaying the private in public became a species of road show, moving its performances around India and recreating its forms of life at each of the major reform and resistance sites—in Champaran in 1917, in Kheda in 1918, on the salt march in 1930. Part of the road show was the visible practice of simplicity: performing menial work, wearing plain clothes, living in unfurnished environments, doing for yourself, working with comrades of diverse religion and ethnicity. It was a multi-valenced practice, signifying the asceticism of the religious seeker, an abjuring of private self-indulgence in favour of the public interest, identification with the least, and a strike at the hierarchical and exclusivist features of Indian civilization.

Many of the middle class professionals who came to the nationalist cause came with Habermasian assumptions about the division between public and private spheres. They would gladly have collaborated in the public realm, shielding the more difficult and precious private arena of sectarian, class and caste practices behind the claim of private space. Dismantling the public/private boundary enabled the unabashed invasion of the private practices that drew the boundaries constituting caste and religious difference.

The exemplary performances of simplicity at Champaran, in Bihar, during Gandhi's work on behalf of the indigo labour force in 1918 offer a famous example. The volunteers whom Gandhi had recruited for this campaign were prosperous upper caste advocates, who helped bring court cases to challenge labour-hostile laws and help take witness from the labourers. They assumed serving the movement was compatible with upper caste life styles. Gandhi teased them into shame, and coaxed them into adopting the egalitarian practices of the Ashram.

Writes Gandhi:

> The curious ways of living of my companions in the early days were a constant theme of raillery at their expense. Each of the vakils had a servant and a cook, and therefore a separate kitchen, and they often had their dinner as late as midnight. Though they paid their own expenses, the irregularity worried me, but as we had become close friends [...] they received my ridicule in good part. Ultimately it was agreed that the servants should be dispensed with, that all the kitchens should be amalgamated, and that regular hours should be observed [...] it was also felt necessary to insist on simple meals (Gandhi 1957: 417).[19]

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[18] "There was to be one single kitchen, and all were to dine in a single row. Everyone was to see to the cleaning of his own dish and other things. The common pots were to be cleaned by different parties in turn" (Gandhi 1928: 216).

[19] It is not our objective in this paper to analyse Gandhi's rhetoric, but it is worth pointing out that Gandhi's accounts of the Ashram's negotiated voluntarism report no agents: "It was agreed", "it was decided upon". The various decisions to create a common vegetarian kitchen, at Tolstoy Farm, at Champaran, appear to happen without the active intervention of any advocate or persuader, but

Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who became India's first president, was one of the advocates. He wryly recalls his experiments with simplicity, trying to figure out how to lower a clay pot by rope into the village well, to the immense amusement of the locals.[20]

These practices demanded a sharing of common social premises: simplicity and abstinence from servants, saving money, dignifying labour, enacting respect for tasks performed by the humble. The lawyers, who signed up with Gandhi, hadn't counted on cleaning their own chamber pots. This public sphere made greater demands than the coffee house, excavating the political meaning of private lifeways, buttresses of the deepest inequalities and oppressions of Indian society. The enactment in the ashram of multi-ethnicity, encompassing several Indian regional-linguistic subcultures; of ecumenism, grounded not in a privatization of religion but in a deliberate ethic of mutual respect for publicly practiced religiosity; and of cross-caste neighbourliness, made the ashram as theatre, the model and exemplar of an imagined society.

The Coffee House and the Ashram: Contrasts, Congruences

Among the features that distinguish the ashram from the eighteenth century political club is the religious grammar in which the ashram is embedded as against the enlightenment rationalism of the club. Yet we ought not draw too sharp a distinction: the Gandhian ashram is about civic virtue, service to a general interest, and the creation of a just society. Gandhi would align with Habermas' understanding of a decline in the public sphere due to the proliferation and institutionalization of private "interest". The ashram's idea of service which builds on models of religious obligation as well as self-abnegating asceticism sits somewhat awkwardly with rationalism. Yet it points in a similar direction as the civic virtue face of the public sphere. Voluntarism, free entry and exit, are features in which associations operating in a public sphere overlap with the ashram. Ashrams, writes Richard Taylor, "may be the only traditional kind of Indian association (perhaps along with some bhakti groups) that are outside the [. . .] conditions of ascriptive membership—at least in theory, if not always in practice" (Taylor 1986: 20). Volunteers "applied" to the ashrams, alerted by the fame of Gandhi's projects. Some arrived in the spirit of novices entering a religious order, some in the spirit of peace corps volunteers. Neither ethnicity nor caste nor religion nor nationality qualified or disqualified. Those, for whom it was too much or too little, left. Entry by merit, exit by choice.

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rather appear as the fortuitous and appropriate result of a spontaneous consensual expression of ashram souls.

[20] See Prasad (1956).

The ashram's projects were/are based on a more holistic vision than that of the coffee house, of how to improve the human condition. In the world of the coffee-house, the political is separable from other spheres, from personal vocation, religion, ethnic and other "primal" solidarities. The Public Sphere focuses on politics. The ashram embodies the belief, more native to the religious than the political adept that social change comes about through the ethical and moral transformation of selves rather than through public and political institutions. Gandhi formed his first ashram in the grip of a "spell" cast by Ruskin's espousal of such a holistic vision.[21] After reading Unto This Last, the four political economy essays that constituted Ruskin's slashing attack on market capitalism and modern society,[22] he made himself a promise that reaches well beyond political agendas: "I determined to change my life in accordance with the ideals of the book" (Gandhi 1957: 298). The ashram was established in part to enable its indwellers to practice a community of virtue: dedicated to the collective good; to the belief that all work is equally worthy; to the conviction that the life of tillers and craftsmen is worth living (Gandhi 1957: 299).

In Gandhi's view the state is too frail, even impotent, to be the arena of a public good. The locus of true power being the civil society on which the state is ultimately dependent, civil society becomes the proper arena for change. Deliberations in the public sphere are predicated on the assumption of a state that will execute the general interest that evolves. But for the Gandhian ashram, it is the transformation of inner selves, of the will and intent of human actors, that is the path to social change. Thus the world views and behaviours that constitute the practice of injustice, such as beliefs in untouchability or extortionate dowry practices are not affected by the weak hand of legislation, but by persuasion and the enactment of justice, routinized in committed associations. Change is more than a political act— for which the coffee house and the political club are sufficient, influencing legislation, public policy and public sanctions. Change for Gandhi is a societal act engaging subjectivities as well as political structures. Such a political process requires bearers other than the limited and rationalist forms of the eighteenth century coffee house, pub and literary society.

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[21] "One of the great prophetic books of the nineteenth century", which "pierces through the smoke-screen of classical economics, and reveals true human realities". Clark (1982: 265).

[22] See Clive Wilmer's review of six books on Ruskin that herald the "return" of this alternately celebrated and shunned figure, "Go to Nature," Times Literary Supplement, April 7, 2000, pp. 3–4.

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Chapter 12
What Makes a Negotiated Solution Durable?

Frank R. Pfetsch

Introduction

Negotiated results are the most common practice in democratic societies. Compromise is the non-violent method of achieving solutions to political conflict. My contribution is theoretical as well as empirical. The first part deals with the theoretical aspect and concerns questions such as what is a compromise, how can one achieve a compromise given the range of potential solutions to a particular negotiation? What does a "true" compromise consist of in relation to a "false" one? What are the criteria for sustainable solutions? Five conditions for sustainability will be identified. The second part explores the subject in terms of the historical context of diplomacy by referring to examples of concrete events in recent times. Questions to be considered include: how do politicians act in conflicts, what kind of insights can be drawn from official and semi-official texts? The empirical experience provides the material to test the theoretical ascertainment. I will then provide historical examples for each of the five conditions for a durable compromise.

Compromise from a Theoretical Point of View

The word compromise stems from the Latin *compromissum* meaning that the parties involved, promise each other (*com-promittunt*) to accept a decision taken by a third person acting as a referee. The party that does not accept the decision/the arbitration later on, loses the money guarantee. Nowadays, a compromise is not necessarily agreed on in the presence of a third person or party. From an etymological point of view, the word compromise is composed of two words: *mittere*

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(to do) and *pro* (to do together). Today a compromise is considered an arrangement through which two or more parties commit themselves to mutual concessions aimed at collaborating or reaching an agreement. This is the result of a negotiation between the parties where everyone makes concessions in order to end up with a solution acceptable to all. This can be a full or partial compromise into which the parties have negotiated contentious issues that they wish to deal with. Conflict lies at the root of any kind of negotiation for without conflict there would be no need to negotiate and to find a compromise. A compromise can be precise or ambiguous. In the latter case everything depends on the interpretation and how this is put into practise. The best compromise is worthless without its proper execution. A compromise can be the lowest denominator at which the parties find agreement. Often, a compromise is a framework for future relationships. In common language, the compromise has a rather pejorative connotation, as it somehow implies a loss, even a waiver. In the political or business environments it is not necessarily considered to be negative as it provides a solution to divergent interests. There are cases where a compromise can be a *win-win* situation if the two parties reach a consensus on issues that compensate not very high evaluated issues by one party with those highly estimated of the other party. So that is an arrangement to the benefit of the negotiating parties.

Typical Questions Regarding Negotiations

- What kind of concessions do parties have to make in order to satisfy their interests?
- What difference does it make to distinguish between objectively and subjectively defined issues?
- Is it easier to find solutions for negotiated issues based on objective criteria as it refers to material issues that can be measured quantitatively?
- Are the subjective estimations/evaluations of the concessions made decisive whether or not the result can be regarded as satisfactory for the parties involved?
- What role do actual circumstances play at the moment the decision has to be made?
- At which point is equilibrium of interests reached, which is to say that the two (or more) parties estimate to have received the equivalent of what they have conceded? Are the negotiating parties happy with what they have received?
- What role does symmetry or asymmetry play in the relationships of two (or more) parties?
- Should a good compromise be Pareto-improving and make the parties better off than under the status quo?
- What is a "true" compromise compared to a "false" compromise?

The issue to be negotiated often consists of different elements, whether they can be differentiated or that they must be treated as one entity. In the latter case, it is

difficult to find a compromise—especially when the issue is charged with emotional values-; in the former case the issue can be divided and differentiated allowing room for a package deal or other kinds of negotiation instruments where every stakeholder can be accommodated. Once parties have agreed to negotiate and a compromise is concluded, what makes it acceptable and sustainable?

An Ideal Sustainable Compromise/Solution Consist of Five Elements

1. It is required that all stakeholders in the conflict are included in the negotiations. If one stakeholder involved in the conflict is not included, the result of the negotiations will not be respected.
2. It is required that all the matters/issues to be negotiated are integrated into the negotiation process. Disputed issues must be put on the table. Should some elements be excluded, there can be only a partial compromise.
3. The result has to reflect reciprocal interests and be accepted voluntarily and without any reservation by the parties. The interests of all parties have to be taken into consideration. In case of any reservations towards the realisation of the compromise, the compromise is false and cannot be considered sincere. Thus consensus is necessary for it is therefore important that no party loses face.
4. The outcome has to correspond with the power structure that exists between the negotiators. If power relations amongst negotiators are not respected, reaching a consensus is highly improbable. The concession both parties have to make depends on the relationships existing between the parties. If the relationships are symmetric the concessions of each party are somewhat equal, in the middle of the road; in asymmetric relationships the weaker has to make more concessions than the stronger. Since concessions have to be made the result may reflect a Pareto-minus situation for each party but makes the parties on the whole better off than under the status quo.
5. The result must reflect existing circumstances, foremost the (local) political or social environment. A compromise—the result of negotiations—should be considered in its relevant historical context. A change of context can prompt a change in the content of compromise.

One can say that if these five conditions are not respected, a sustainable compromise will not be reached. On the contrary, should the criteria be duly respected, there are good chances that the compromise reached will have a longer duration (of up to 10 years used as a general benchmark). I will now highlight some

historic cases in chronological order that illustrate the theoretical considerations. Very frequently and especially in the western democratic world, compromise is a common and popular means especially in the European Union. In the case that a compromise cannot be agreed upon, a majority vote will decide in the representative bodies and the minority will have to accept the result of the vote and thus submit to the majority. In a situation where the parliamentary game does not lead to a satisfactory result, a referendum can lead to a solution that is more broadly legitimised. However, this solution is not available to all of European countries, e.g. as is the case in Germany.

Examples of Historical and Diplomatic Compromise

The Case of the Munich Diktat of 1938

The Munich dictate between the four "Grand Powers", Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom on the one side, and Czechoslovakia, on the other side, is clearly a result that did not include all of the parties involved in the issue at stake (element No.1 of the conditions of a true solution was not taken into consideration), with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union having been excluded. The strategy of the *entente* between the democratic powers France and United Kingdom was not to be involved in the crisis and save the peace. Hitler had free rein to attach the Sudetes to the Reich and, later on, divide Czechoslovakia and integrate it into the Reich. The outbreak of war and later the defeat of Germany restored the false agreement (Element No. 5 was confirmed with the end of World War II and the end of the East-West confrontation).

The Case of the Cuban Crisis of 1962

The "*Cuba missiles Crisis*" is another case that shows a solution through compromise is possible by respecting the interests of the most important relevant stakeholders; Cuba that had the rockets on its soil was left out. More than 50 years ago, on the 22th of October 1962, President Kennedy revealed to the world (in the Security Council of the UN) the existence of ballistic missiles installed on Cuban soil. It was an existential threat for the United States. With a small group of advisers mainly six possible reactions were discussed and various responses considered including: no reaction at all, diplomatic pressure, secret talks with the Castro regime, indirect military action (blockade, control of the air, chirurgical strike against the rocket basis and finally, invasion of Cuba. Kennedy decided to opt for politics of restriction by ordering a sea blockade. He calculated that the USSR would withdraw its rockets and decided to keep Cuba in quarantine. Four days later,

on the 26th of October, following discrete consultations, Khrushchev ceded. He ordered his combat boats that had driven to the limit of the blockage zone to make a U-turn. He hoped to benefit from the acceptance of American conditions against the promise that the United States would not invade Cuba and would deconstruct the Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil, which had already decided upon before the crisis and was not part of the agreement. Kennedy went for a solution that would avoid Khrushchev losing face (elements No. 3 and 1 for a sustainable solution). The two superpowers thus settled the crisis, coming to terms with a compromise without worrying about the protests by the Cuban government, which wanted to put forward its own conditions. With the removal of Khrushchev from office and the end of the Cold War the issue disappeared from the world stage.

The Case of German Ostpolitik

The treaties concluding the German Ostpolitik (1970–74) were not an ideal but a partial solution to the issue of German unification. Under asymmetrical conditions, the USSR, still a superpower and therefore the more powerful of the parties and the weaker party being Germany which before its reunification was empowered by the other Superpower, the United States. Negotiations were pursued between unequal parties. The aim of German reunification could not be reached by the social-liberal German government but by accepting the "existing situation", in particular in territorial terms, at least an amelioration of living together between East and the West of Germany was achieved. In exchange, the Soviet Union received what it wanted; this is to say the confirmation of its territorial acquisitions during the war. The German government accepted the preponderance of the Soviet Union over the satellite countries. Consequently, that is a compromise that respected the power structures in existence at the time of the cold war (elements No. 4 and 5 for a sustainable solution were taken into consideration). Germany could improve its bargaining position by leaving out its maximum position of unification that was not an issue put on the negotiation table and convincing—initially in the face of huge resistance—its allies in the West to accept the negotiations and to find arrangements with the countries of the East (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the government of East Germany) that were acceptable and in line with their respective interests. The strategy of the negotiations was to establish priorities by starting negotiations with the most powerful player (the USSR), followed by the "satellite" countries of the East. That is a strategy opposed to the one used before by the conservative German government that aimed at distancing and liberating the satellite countries from the domination of the superpower, USSR by negotiating directly with Warsaw and Prague in order to establish Consular representations (element No. 5 of a sustainable solution not being respected); and by negotiating with East Berlin to establish a diplomatic representation (*Ständige Vertretung*).

Later on with the social-liberal coalition government the "New Ostpolitik" respected all of the established elements but did not take into account all of the elements (element No. 2, this is to say the German unification was not discussed).

The Case of the Camp David Agreement of 1979

The 1979 "peace treaty" signed between Egypt and Israel is certainly a partial compromise, but a stable one (element No. 1 of the conditions for a sustainable solution was not taken into consideration). It is a treaty between two countries that had not taken into consideration the interests of the Palestinians (the organisation of the Palestinians, PLO, had not yet been recognised as legitimate) and the question of the status of Jerusalem. Only the interests of the two countries in terms of territory were addressed. The treaty is not a compromise in the strict sense of the word as it deals with giving back one part of the territory that was conquered during the "Six Days War" in 1967. Later, in 1973, the war broke out again ("Yom Kippur"); the Egyptians and the Syrians could reconquer a large part of the Golan and the Sinai. It took 5 more years of intense diplomatic effort and negotiations between Sadat and Begin to arrive at an agreement that referred only to the Sinai and excluded Jerusalem and the other territories and furthermore, did not touch the questions of the Palestinians. Therewith, the compromise consists of omitting those questions that are difficult to resolve and to concentrate on those questions that are most easy to solve. It is a partial compromise of high risk (Sadat had to pay it with his life). The treaty has remained valid until the present day.

The Case of Negotiations on Ex-Yugoslavia During the 1990s

In Yugoslavia, the slow melting process of the communist system after the death of Tito in 1980 was accompanied by resurgence in nationalism. Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence. Slobodan Milosevič, the Serbian President, rejected these declarations and ordered the Yugoslavian army, mainly in Serbian hands, to hinder the secessions, aiming instead to reunite in the form of a "Grand Serbia" all Serbs living in Yugoslavia. Civil war broke out and the international community acted through the bodies of the United Nations and the European Community (EC). Both presented plans to resolve the crisis. It is important to mention that Milosevič signed a ceasefire document, which was purposefully disrespected (some researchers count more than 30 times that the agreement was broken). His strategy was clearly to gain time in order to use the re-established army later on. He signed knowing that he would not respect the agreement. That is clearly an example of a false compromise, a fictive compromise (mentioned as element No. 3 of a sustainable solution). NATO subsequently bombed the Serbian capital in

order to stop further bloodshed. With the removal of Milosevič from office and his condemnation before the International Court of Justice this chapter was closed.

As to the European Union, there are three concrete cases that I would like to deal with The Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Lisbon, and the Fiscal Pact.

The Treaty of Maastricht

The Maastricht treaty (1992) became a ground-breaking compromise in the history of the European Union and above all in the history of Franco-German relations. It consisted of an exchange of the Deutschmark against the Euro on the one hand—a concession agreed upon by Chancellor Kohl—and the acceptance of the reunification of Germany by President Mitterand and other European countries on the other hand. It was a compromise already put forward by Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, to establish a common currency under the condition of the German philosophy of '*Stabilität*'. Though his trade-off—a question of *Do-ut-des*—has been consistently denied by Mr Kohl in his autobiography, it has become a historical reality. Germany's neighbours, and the German government and people themselves, wanted Germany to remain in the European institutions as an integrated part of Europe and the western world. One can say that this arrangement covers all five criteria for a sustainable solution.

The Treaty of Lisbon

Another case in the history of the European Union is the *Treaty of Nice* (leading ultimately to the Treaty of Lisbon) that had been provisionally concluded in 2001. To reform the European constitution, a covenant was established in 2004 to prepare a constitution. It preconized, amongst others, a President and a Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as some changes to make the decision-making process more effective, alongside with a more precise demarcation of the different European Union bodies' competencies. In 2005, the proposition of the covenant was neither accepted by the French nor by the Dutch, but became accepted by other countries. Therefore, a so-called reform treaty had to be worked out. In 2007, Germany, as the then-current chair of the European Union, and its Chancellor Merkel had to negotiate a new treaty in order to find a compromise between those countries that wanted to keep a constitutional touch, such as Germany, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, or Spain and those countries that preferred a more minimalistic treaty, namely the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic. It was all about preserving as much as possible of the constitutional text—18 out of 27 countries had already ratified the constitutional treaty—and yet at the same time, to change the text in a way that others could approve of the treaty. The compromise consisted of avoiding the word "constitution", conceding exceptions to Eurosceptic countries by not

integrating the Charter of Human Rights (*opting out*), and by making other concessions such as to the qualified majority vote at the Council. As soon as the preamble was formulated in a way that avoided symbolisms (such as religious values) and Poland received its Commissioner in the Commission, the interests of the three countries were saved. No constitution was concluded, but a treaty that later came to be known as the Treaty of Lisbon.

The compromise therefore consisted of bringing in changes that catered to the interests of some member states and to encourage consent to a treaty between the 27 member states of the European Union. In several of the bi- and multilateral forums, both personal and formal negotiations have been conducted. Various instruments were used including the formation of coalitions, conceding exceptions (e.g. *opting out*), changing the text, playing with the timing (a solution had to be found before the European parliamentary elections in 2009), or the exertion of pressure on opponents by, for example threatening to ratify the treaty without the Poles. Mrs. Merkel, as President of the conference, had to sacrifice national interests such as keeping the constitutional treaty in order to save the conference. On the one hand, there were sacrifices on the part of those parties that wanted to keep the constitution and, on the other hand, on the gains of the other part—those that wanted a minimalistic treaty. The fact that in the end, after disputed and difficult negotiations, all countries accepted the treaty shows that they were somehow satisfied with the result or at least could consent to the treaty. Not all national interests could be integrated into the treaty. One can say that all five criteria were taken into consideration in order to realise a sustainable compromise that may last for a certain amount of time.

The Case of the Fiscal Pact in the European Union

To end the crisis in the Euro area (2009–2012), largely a debt crisis of the public authorities, two strategies were proposed. One insisted on the realisation of agreements for the fiscal compact, this is to say a budgetary equilibrium above all of those countries with a budget deficit (put forward by Germany in particular). The other strategy demanded economic growth which, in the future, was assumed to facilitate establishing the budgetary balance and to ameliorate the social situation in those countries hit by the financial crisis (put forward by France and the IMF in particular). Both proposals mutually exclude each other only partially for one can pursue both at the same time by adding a growth compact to the fiscal compact. The compromise would therefore consist of combining the two interests in a way that both parties receive a fair share. As with all compromises, the two parties have to make sacrifices and abandon parts of their proposal: Germany has to smooth its rigorous insistence on a balanced budget and France has to attach conditions to the economic growth compact. In exchange, both countries keep parts of their interests. That is a compromise by exchange that reflects the reciprocal interests following element No. 3 of the conditions for a sustainable (conflict) resolution.

Later on, with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the change in power structures, German reunification became possible. The reunification negotiations of Germany then respected all the conditions for a sustainable solution (all of five criteria of a sustainable solution are realised).

Conclusion

The empirical cases illustrate, the conditions needed for durable solutions and indeed lead to an evaluation of how important compromise is for negotiation results. At the same, time they give hints for compromising processes should they lead to durable solutions. I mentioned historical cases for all of the five elements that characterize a durable solution of compromise. Cases that fulfil all the conditions are the treaties of the European Union, the treaties on German unification, the case of the Cuban crisis. The other historical examples that do not fulfil all of the five elements are the Serbian case, and the Munich Dictate.

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Chapter 13
From Exoticism to Postcolonial Art: Theorizing and Politicizing Art in the Age of Globalisation

Klaus von Beyme

Throughout the modern era, theories of art have made political claims and aimed at societal change. It is only with the advent of post-colonialism that political philosophy has dominated the process of verbalisation of the fine arts.

Phases of Fascination for the Exoticism of Foreign Cultures

The fascination with the exotic has a long tradition and developed out of an extremely hierarchical understanding of 'the other' on foreign continents towards a conception of equality that went as far as the 'hybridization' or 'creolization' of culture. According to the language regime of postcolonial studies, the term 'exoticism' was first used in 1599. It was internalized to such extent that even school children in the Caribbean or Queensland rather described their own vegetation as 'exotic' instead of the European oak (Ashcroft 1998: 94f.). Exoticism and orientalism has always had two connotations:

– A positive one, expressing fascination, understanding and sympathy with the foreign,
– And a negative one, marked by prejudice, euro-centrism, imperialism, racism and sexism. Even apolitical artists amongst the orientalists were accused of imperialist complicity, only because of the propaganda-effect of their works. In many cases, sexism became a driving motive with apolitical artists, who, at first glance, were neither imperialists nor racists, but lived out their twofold phantasies of power through their images: power over foreign cultures and over their women.

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Exoticism developed in distinct historical phases that can roughly be divided into four:

1. In *pre-modern times* it was characterized by the ambivalence between a fascination of the exotic and an inadequate reception through European prejudices (with few exceptions like Dürer, Veláquez or Rembrandt).
2. In the *imperialist era*, most artists' fascination with the exotic was clouded by power-centered aspirations of elites interested in building national empires. The colonial politics of France were aimed at assimilating indigenous elites, thus creating a paradox: on the one hand, exoticism was used for imperialist propaganda, and on the other, the policy of assimilation let to a considerably faster extinction of the exotic than in other places.
3. In the *classical modern era* of the first half of the twentieth century, the fascination for the exotic was marked by the critical adoption of the 'foreign'. However, the intention was only rarely (e.g. for Nolde or Pechstein) to understand non-European cultures. It was rather a quest of searching for oneself, paired with a European archaism, which used exotic forms in a discrete way.
4. In *post-modern times*, since the 1960s, post-colonialism was taken increasingly seriously. There emerged a hybridized global culture, in which other countries apart from the north-Atlantic region were able to raise their voices, thus heralding the end of exoticism.

In all these phases of the development of exoticism one can find different degrees of ambivalence within the conscience of artists oriented towards the exotic. The orientalism in the arts and literature was characterized by profound historical changes within the four periods:

– In the rococo period, a *courtly, lascivious foil of comparison* to Europe was created. The fascination with the exotic remained mostly arabesque. Chinoiserie had largely disappeared when classicism emerged, making Greece and Rome the indigenous model for tradition.
– Napoleon's invasion of Egypt produced a rather *less idyllic, martial and rebellious picture of the orient*, as depicted in the works of Gros and Girodet.
– During romanticism (since Delacroix), *orientalism was aesthetically and literally romanticized* and placed in contrast to European decadence.

Influenced by *Foucault's* philosophy, modern art history has internalized the thought that *Europe subdued all that was foreign to its own discourse of power*, which did not always happen ostensibly and imperialistically. Parts of orientalist art had nothing to do with the political interests of dominating the Orient, but were an expression of individual erotic—and at times even sadistic—phantasies of European artists. The complete availability of female bodies with no concern for life and death became even clearer in *Gérôme's* 'Slave Market' (early 1860s). Even *Manet's* painting 'Masked Ball at the Opera' with its "Gesten kaum verhehlter Gier der werbenden Männer, der abwehrend sich anbietenden Frauen, wägende Blicke, tastende Hände, brutale Winke, alles typische Gebärden dieses in jeder Nuance großstädtischen Treibens, werden zu dem Gekräusel eines Stils", which Julius

Meier-Graefe (1912: 216f) described as "Fleischbörse". At worst, orientalism is the demonstration of *power of men over women and power of white men over allegedly inferior colored races*. At best it creates some form of moral voyeurism (Nochlin 1989: 42, 44f). *Gérôme's* painting was accepted for the salon in 1867, while *Manet's* was rejected that same year. Linda Nochlin suspects that the 'meat market's' proximity to the center of one's own society might be the reason for this difference in treatment. Gérôme's painting on the other hand could morally be assigned to a different culture that only indirectly affected the observer.

In the iconography, Erwin Panofsky (1962: 11) accentuated the Australian bushman, who, lacking knowledge of the European cultural context, could only recognize an 'excited dinner party' in a scene of the Last Supper. Through exoticism, Europeans were confronted with becoming these bushmen themselves, marveling at and acquiring forms whose contexts they did not understand.

The End of Exoticism: Postcolonial Art and the "Creolization" of Cultures

The postcolonial era was seeking a synthesis through a universalism of tolerance that no longer knew 'exoticism' and was driven by a 'political correctness' which developed a sympathy for everything cultural that deviated from the European norm. 'The end of art history' was proclaimed, because artists were now able to adopt any kind of historical form of art, from ancient cave paintings to Chinese landscapes (Danto 2000: 253). 'Anything goes' became the slogan.

The End of Exoticism in the International Exhibition Circus

The goal of overcoming eurocentrism was a theme taken up by a significant number of exhibitions since the 1990s: in Paris ("*Magiciens*", 1989), in Cologne and Graz ("*Inklusion*", 1996), in Cologne ("*Kunstwelten*", 2000), or at the *Biennale zeitgenössischer Kunst* in Lyon (2000).

1. A first pioneering step in the German language area was the exhibition "*Weltkulturen und Moderne Kunst*" during the Olympics in Munich, in which the encounters of modernity with Oriental cultures were documented (Wichmann 1972: 43). In all these exhibitions the aim was no longer only to disseminate knowledge and understanding for the third world, but also to equally represent artists of foreign regions.
2. For the exhibition "*Magiciens de la terre*" at the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the selection criteria were still objects with an 'aura' despite the fact that 'aura' was already proclaimed a thing of the past. Each artist was visited at his studio to sort out possible charlatans. The organizers were not looking for mere accidental

discoveries of objects with a practical use, but rather for works that were based on ideas and metaphysical values. Apparently, this goal was best achieved by artists from the African provincial backwaters, e.g. *Dossou Amidou* from Coué in Benin, whose work "Masque" was selected. The artist, working on the traditional production of masks, admitted "I only work, I cannot define what you call art" (Magiciens 1989: 81). Given the combination of traditional ritualism and an almost mannered superstructure, the question has to be allowed whether the artist's naivety was feigned or not? If it was real, the question arises whether his object "Masque" was similar to what 'north-Atlantic' artists were doing when they adopted individual exotic motifs into *Pop Art*. Whether the diverse exhibition in Paris eventually lived up to its strict criteria appears to be less interesting than the fact that subsequent postcolonial exhibitions no longer demanded such strict criteria.

3. At the "*Biennale der zeitgenössischen Kunst*" in Lyon (2000), the equality of cultures was coined into the slogan "Each the exotic of the other". "Exotica" was the name of an installation by *Anne and Patrick Poirier*: in the semi-darkness of a berth, a city panorama is being depicted. Built from industrial waste, decayed houses, abandoned train stations, or decommissioned gas boilers are shown. The earth has become an inhabitable waste heap (Schlocker 2000: 2) and the distance to other cultures was transformed into a radical criticism of our own civilization in an archeology of decay.

4. In the exhibition "*Blut. Kunst, Macht, Politik, Pathologie*" (2002: 205), action and performance artists went one step further to integrate the cathartic function of actions into art and to finally put into practice the old slogan of lifting the borders between art and life. They referred to *Duchamp, Yves Klein and Piero Manzoni* as archetypes, but radically pushed the limits further by crossing the boundaries of shame and disgust. Compared to this, the grease-pieces in Beuys' installations could easily be described as appetizing! Blood was used in elucidating metaphoric acts against bondage and violence. Female artists went as far as inflicting injuries upon themselves in order to surpass the mere display of blood-scenes, which even *Francis Bacon* did not achieve. In a world in which teenagers self-inflict wounds through tattoos and piercings, one can expect more tolerance for this form of postmodern art. An aggressive Benetton commercial used bloody symbols without any commentary to let the pictures talk for themselves. Commercialization has lowered the boundaries of shame and disgust for many post-modern people. Whether these plentiful blood-scenes have an elucidating effect or rather contribute to a dulling of public conscience is contended. The verbalization of the fine arts, which steadily increased from romanticism to the classical modern period, increasingly demonstrated its underbelly: the polished language of comments in catalogues and feuilletons stood in growing contrast to an often weak technical implementation of montage and installations.

5. The *Documenta 11* (2002), which for the first time featured a curator from outside Europe, tried to surpass the Eurocentric perspective and boundaries of art through five platforms in different parts of the world. With the pathos of a

'spectacular differentness', the conventional logic of exhibitions was turned upside down: the exhibitions was no longer the primary concern and its conceptions found formulation in the jargon of postmodern systems theory: "Eine Ausstellung lässt sich auch als eine Art Metasprache der Mediatisierung betrachten, die ein tautologisches System konstruiert, in dem das Kunstwerk durch die Beziehungen zwischen Medien, Objekten und Systemen gewissermaßen auf seine eigene Selbstreferentialität verpflichtet wird" (Enwezor 2002: 42). Social, political and cultural networks were meant to trace the horizon of the global discourse. Endeavors to develop a narrative relationship to come to a unifying perspective were to be a thing of the past. The postcolonial consequences of globalisation were to reveal a '*shocking proximity of distance*', which seeks to abolish the global logic and tries to incorporate it into a single sphere of *de-territorialized rule*. Classical avant-gardists perceived a changing order, while postcolonial post-avant-gardists seek impermanence and a-territoriality.

In his comprehensive analysis, Enwezor (2002: 49) benefitted from the fact that he had studied political science. Thus, platform 1 was dedicated to democracy as an unfinished process. Already during the 10th Documenta (Politics – Poetics 1997: 24f, 803), *context* as a key-term led to the re-discovery of the political context in order to leave behind the notion of 'post-modern convenience-aesthetics'. Earlier, in 1997, 'post-democracy' came into focus—a form of pseudo-democracy, meant to do without subjects and reducing democracy to 'consensus'. Incorporating conflict within the cultural hegemony of consensus, *Antonio Gramsci* was evoked and the 'self' was deconstructed with *Foucault*. However, time and again the auto-poetic self-referencing of systems was infused with actionist language. Art should not only criticize the system, contextual-art became the new form with which art should actively participate in the social construction of reality: "Die KünstlerInnen werden zu autonomen Agenten sozialer Prozesse, zu Partisanen des Realen" (Weibel 1994: 57).

During the 11th Documenta, criticism of democracy became more manifest. It was deplored that democracy had become an export good after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, without actually creating full-fledged democracy in all cases. Defective democracy evolved as a major research area within democratization studies. The term did not claim that there were perfect democracies; it rather demonstrated that defects could be found not only in young democracies, but also in already consolidated ones. Platform 1 was not meant to produce a new theory of democracy, but to critically question existing concepts of democracy with regard to the creation of national and cultural identity. Enwezor's (2002: 50) social science approach was timely and commendable, because it was not limited to the ritual of democratization through elections. It became apparent that the consolidation of democracy was also dependent on the rule of law. In young democracies, the rule of law is frequently deficient nationally and imperfect internationally, though the 'truth commissions' in post-authoritarian states and the onsets of

international jurisdiction are promising. However, through their selective and over-politicized production, their value continues to be greatly reduced.

In Platform 3, the debate about the adaptation of the innate and the foreign was invigorated. "The praise of creolization", sung by three theorists from Martinique (Bernabé 1993: 75), was applied to art. While creolization initially was the product of imperialism and power-generating homogenization, it now created an antipole: fragmentation and intermixture became the dominating life experience, far beyond the Caribbean region of origin. While the concept of creolization was not new, like many other post-modern innovations, it was widely discussed amongst publicists. Missing from this debate was the fact that the surrealists *André Breton* and *André Masson* had already led a 'creolized dialogue', in which they refuted claims of exoticism and postulated that the whole world was theirs (Masson 1976: 228). A mild form of criticism of disparity without concept was cunningly directed against Enwezor's claim to be some form of "general secretary of global, critical networks with a world-spanning cultural responsibility" (Gregor, NZZ 31.8./1.9.2002). Since the curator neglected the legal basis of the UN system as well as the remaining sovereign powers of nation states (which were especially stressed by countries of the 'third world'), his position remained oddly apolitical.

Although the carnival-like approach of publicists was overshadowed by the deadly terrorism of the early twenty-first century, the consequences of globalisation, trash heaps and wastelands, were drastically named through the cynical pursuit of truth by 'metaphysics of crap'. It was attempted to overcome the post-modern arbitrariness. The experience with the opposing art of Dadaism and a number of post-war classical avant-garde movements showed that the system was able to absorb criticism as long as key terms were merely being reversed, but the central code of the system remained the same. A promising figure with a morale and diverting from the social codex was discovered in "*Trickster*". A *Trickster* is a liar, a sex-maniac, humorist, quick-change artist, 'bricoleur' and 'agent provocateur', who manipulates language and operates in the 'interstice of alterity'. All cultures have such prominent examples such as Hermes in ancient Greece, the coyote in North America, the king of apes in China, Ganesh in India, Loki in Scandinavia or Pulcinella in Italy. Liberating laughter is recommended to "pass over to the regenerating time of differentness" as opposed to the usually completed artwork or propaganda message (Jean Fisher in: Documenta 11, 2002: 63, 67f).

Postcolonial literature sometimes regrets the fact that the great Mexican moralists like Orozco, Rivera and Siqueiros are not appreciated enough. Orozco, in his hybrid synthesis of first and third world, displayed the Aztec mistress of the conquistador highly palpably in the painting, "Cortés and Malinche" (1922–26), or, for that matter, praised the world's complementarity in his painting "North America–Latin America" (1932), although he was deeply entrenched in Mexican mythology. At the same time, Orozco (1981: 288f)—like Siqueiros—detested this form of touristy indigenousness: "Ich persönlich hasse es, in meinen Arbeiten den unerträglichen und degenerierten Typ aus dem Volk darzustellen, der im Allgemeinen für 'pittoresk' gehalten wird, um damit Touristen zu umgarnen". He never marketed the Indio-Myth like *Frida Kahlo* who was an incarnation of the

hybrid with a German father and a Mexican mother. In his social analysis, Orozco was already more progressive than Enwezor, because he was skeptical of the terminology of 'third world-ism' and realized that, what ideologues described as 'folk' or 'proletariat', was really more a 'Lumpenproletariat' and that uncritical indigenization and artificial exoticism hindered the progress and development of a nation. More and more themes of deviant behavior were discovered, e.g. vegans, abnormal minorities like left- or right-wing radicals, bisexuals or gender reassignment as presented at the *Prinzhornsammlung* in its 2013 exhibition Ovartaci, the jutlandic name roughly translating as imbecile.

Conclusion

Globalisation was meant to break-up the dichotomy of center and periphery, but merely relocated the centers, rarely benefitting the peripheries. The curators' quandary, despite their best postcolonial intentions, was revealed by the fact that the Northern Atlantic media scarcely reported on the Documenta platforms in India and Nigeria in 2002. Exposing western orientalism and globalism, *Edward Said* (1997: 44) hinted towards a new dilemma: since Eurocentric culture 'cherry picked' from all over the world, it has become even more interesting for everyone else. Said appeared to have been tamed and to have internalised post-colonialism and the new 'empire' without centers of power. Increasingly, Northern Atlantic culture threatens to set and define the standards for those hybrid forms of culture that were *en vogue*. The proportional representation of the world's regions and countries, like it is applied in many exhibitions, is not enough, because third-world artists simply do not dispose of the resources (media, publishers, exhibition sites) of northern metropolises. In light of heightened expectations, produced by the postcolonial debate, disappointment is to be expected. Even the most elucidated concept of multi-cultural representation of artists is not able to change the global art market. Patrons keen to support African art were disappointed when their customers preferred second-rate 'limers' (Olu Oguibe in: Weibel 1997: 96). This phenomenon has been dubbed '*glomanticism*', a disastrous combination of globalism and romanticism (Marchart 2004: 99). During the Documenta 12, the African Denis Ekpo (Documenta Magazine 2007: 151, 132ff) appealed for looking beyond the evils of euro-centrism and complaining about the, in Rasheed Araeen's words, "stranglehold of the West", and instead search for an African complicity. The former leftist theory of the West, as represented by Hardt and Negri (2002: 48), has not helped to develop an artistic self-consciousness of the third world. It has become self-referential and the 'imperial machine' no longer allows for an external point of view. Communicative production and imperial legitimation can no longer be separated from each other. Comfort can only be found in Foucault's hypothesis that power always entails

countervailing power. However, art remains in danger of neither producing 'exoticism' nor 'global art', but 'exotic parodies'.

Western art on the other hand has to remain aware of the inconsistencies in its civilizing process in order to realize the continuity of the exotic and barbaric within itself in accordance with the principle of the "*Ungleich-zeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigen*" (Ette 2006: 380). Nothing of this is new for artists since Picasso and Kandinsky and art historians from Worringer to Gombrich have long realized what the Documenta 12 discovered as an outrageous novelty in 2007: "not only people, but also objects migrate from one cultural context to another". The only progress is that the sought after exoticism of the classical modernism is replaced by a vague form of 'random correspondences' (Knöfel 2007b: 177).

From this it should follow that for grand exhibition events art should be allowed to be art again. It has to gain some distance from the hype generated by the market although that leaves even the well-meaning curators with the dilemma that they are dependent on media attention in order to finance their exhibitions. After the linkages between art and politics resulted in ever bolder theories, it is now time for an exhibition that no longer tries to be the "parade-ground" for the latest postcolonial theories.

It appears that this future began with the Documenta 12 in 2007, in which the political and social context of the works was no longer disguised (cp. Wagner 2007: 41). Buergel, the curator of the 12th Documenta, promised to cut back on theory so that visitors would not need a degree in sociology in order to understand the art (Knöfel 2007a: 166). However, it was not completely void of theory. Again, there were concerns about democracy. This time however, there was also criticism for those critics from the left who attacked democracy as a Western 'model standard', for they, having lost revolutionary hopes, had sunk into a nostalgia where democracy was repudiated. *Jacques Rancière* was allowed to repeat his hypotheses about the hate against democracy (2005), according to which a negative coalition made up of Muslim fanatics, financial oligarchs and African dictators all conspired together to advance their anti-democratic motives (Documenta Magazine 2007: 450f). The curator wanted to act beyond the market but the growing critics of contemporary art did not damage the market. To the contrary, modern art auctions produced exorbitant prices. The press coverage in 2007 was a lot more negative than during the previous two exhibitions in Kassel, though unjustified. The urge for postcolonial equality was interpreted as 'arbitrariness' and the fight for a global perspective was already thought as having been won. While the 'migration of forms' through epochs and continents had been appreciated since classical modernism, the originality in this area was once again rather a lack of knowledge. Variations on the postcolonial theme for the third time in a row produced weariness and

malicious comments. The 'global village' promoted by the curators appeared to be a single large "Waldorf-Kindergarten" (Ackermann 2007: 82). Pieces that were only aiming at producing the viewer's dismay, fear and disgust and tried to indoctrinate them politically ended up as being some form of negative knick-knack (Rautenberg 2007: 49). The migration idea became a retro attitude, a desire for a form of art that overcomes time and borders and "persische Teppiche, Stoffhund und ausgestopfte Giraffen aus dem Gaza-Streifen zusammen bringen könne" (Voss and Maak 2007: 25). A 'productive failure' was expected and the thunderstorm that brought down Ai Weiwei's 'building-junk cathedral' was perceived to be a 'present of the gods'—not so much as the municipal sanitation department's removal of a piece of art—because it stressed the 'deformation of the liberated form' (Maak 2007: 33). Buergel (2007: 182), the curator of the 12th Documenta, had to face contradictory allegations by critics. Some complained about a lack of concept, while others perceived the exhibition as being too curated. Buergel himself interpreted this criticism as the fear of globalisation. "Seltsame Weltecken" unsettle people and the canon they are fond of and fought for. Eventually, the curator's self-comforting ended in verbal scare-mongering, claiming that these "seltsame Weltecken" (Latin America, East Asia and South Africa) were sooner or later going to draw level economically and technically through the power of globalisation.

The conclusion for the confused observer aims at advice to the curators of exhibitions on postcolonial global art that they realize their mental devotion for auto-poetic systems theory and take it seriously. They should stop to think of the sub-systems, politics, society and art, as being that easily interlinkable. Rancière clearly stated this in the debates surrounding the 12th Documenta: "Das Paradoxe im ästhetischen Regime der Kunst liegt darin, dass die Kunst eine politische Wirkung genau aufgrund der Abgekoppeltheit der ästhetischen Sphäre entfaltet" (Documenta Magazine 2007: 464). The analysis of art and society in post-modern times can no longer be grounded in simple causal relations and overcome alienation of artists by reification of "power" interpreted in the context of pictures. However, difference, the postcolonial debate's main concept, should not be essentialized to a degree that comparative cultural analysis is no longer allowed to find similarities. Since John Stuart Mill's "A System of Logic" (1843, 1959: 253) there has been a tension between a method that looks for differences and one that uncovers similarities though comparison. During the rationalism of classical modernism it was necessary to apply the method of difference against a rash mental appropriation. Today, one has to use the method of agreement with regard to the generally human and human rights, which transcend all differences, and revitalize it in a complementary way.

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