

Chapter 4

European Immigrant Integration After Multiculturalism

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4.1 Europe's Rhetorical Good-Bye to Multiculturalism

However clichéd it may appear, a reflection on “multiculturalism” in Europe today should still start with the well-known “good-bye” to it by the political leaders of Europe’s three most powerful nations, which in the past had been considered paragons of sharply distinct “national models” or even “philosophies” on immigrant integration and membership at large: “multicultural” Britain, “assimilationist” France, and “segregationist” Germany.¹ Most scholars have taken these statements as what, of course, they were: “rhetoric,” because two of the involved countries had not previously been known to pursue multicultural policies. Accordingly, the semblance of convergence in contemporary political thinking on immigrant integration was immediately rejected in favor of reasserting the old “national model” mode of thinking. “(T)hey do not seem to be talking about exactly the same thing,” commented Ruud Koopmans (2013, p. 2); and John Bowen critiqued the politicians’ wrongheaded claim that “normative ideas of multiculturalism shape the social fact of cultural and religious diversity,” while in reality there was “continuation of long-standing, nation-specific ways of recognizing and managing diversity” (2011, p. 2).

But it is still apposite to identify common themes underlying these almost simultaneous abdications of multiculturalism, as they stand out against the inevitably nationally distinct contexts in which they were expressed. These common themes point to a convergent critique of “multiculturalism,” however “maddeningly spongy and imprecise” this concept may be (Stuart Hall, as quoted in Koopmans 2013, p. 3); they also point to a convergent policy response that appears to be more noteworthy than persistent national differences in the handling of immigrant diversity. One could even argue that Europe’s good-bye to multiculturalism reflects

¹ The two most sophisticated statements of “national model” reasoning on immigrant integration are Favell (1998) and Koopmans et al. (2005). All of course are in different ways inspired by Brubaker’s (1992) classic France-Germany comparison.

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a distinctly European immigration problematique, marked by predominantly non-selected family migration from Muslim majority countries, which sets Europe apart from other parts of the developed world, most notably the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Indeed, the first thing to notice is that German Chancellor Merkel's, British Prime Minister Cameron's, and French President Sarkozy's critical statements on multiculturalism are all interventions in these countries' protracted debates surrounding Muslims and Islam, which is arguably Europe's main—if not the only—integration issue surrounding immigrants and the progenitor of most of its multiculturalism struggles. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the helm of a conservative party, was forced to respond to the immense popularity of an admirably frank (if also alarmist and in part, dubiously arguing) critique of an Islamic “parallel society” with no contact to the mainstream, whose more fortunate demographics would lead to the “abolishment” of Germany (Sarrazin 2010).² Because an explicit multiculturalism policy never was in Germany, what the German state leader really attacked was a previous *laissez-faire* or non-policy toward immigrants on the part of the federal government, along with the reigning political etiquette not to address the sensitive issue of an immigrant group that stands visibly and willfully apart, although perhaps more under the “Turkish” than the “Muslim” flag.³ In the past, Merkel said, “too little” had been asked of immigrants; now it was right to ask them to learn German because otherwise, they could not succeed in the labor market; furthermore, “forced marriages” were “not acceptable,” and Muslim girls should “not stay away from school outings.”⁴ One sees how misleading it is to call the German policy approach “segregationist;” this would make the chancellor's intervention incomprehensible, which was at heart integrationist. Note that in the same statement in which Merkel declared *Multikulti* (Germany's slang word for “multiculturalism”) as “utterly failed,” she also supported the German President's statement that “Islam is a part of Germany,” which was incontrovertibly true but strangely had stirred controversy among the conservative spectrum; and it coincided with the announcement of an ambitious federal scheme of establishing Islam faculties at German state universities, analogous to already existing faculties of Catholic and Protestant theology, which would educate and train German imams at public expense.

Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that multiculturalism was a “failure” because under its reign, “all our democracies have become pre-occupied with the identity of those who arrive and not enough with the identity

² The dubious part in Sarrazin (2010) are (brief) eugenic-type statements about the “low” intelligence level of Muslim immigrants and its dismal implications for Germany's demography, which led to a wholesale condemnation of the book. This is regrettable because the book contains an astute and largely correct analysis of immigrants' high unemployment and disproportionate dependence on welfare, and of the perverse incentive structure provided by the German welfare state (even in its recently thinned-down version).

³ In a speech given to Turkish immigrants in Germany in February 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan called upon his compatriots not to be “assimilated” because “assimilation is a crime against humanity” (Spiegel Online, 10 February 2008).

⁴ “Merkel: ‘Multikulti ist absolut gescheitert,’” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 October 2010.

of the country that accepts immigrants.”⁵ While certainly correct about what “multiculturalism” boils down to—a preoccupation with the identity of the “others”—it was not (and, of course, not meant to be) a good description of France, with its two decades of incessant regulating, lately even legislating against Islamic dress in the name of *laïcité* and Republican values. Indeed, the French state had never been as laissez-faire and hands-off as the German state with respect to newcomers’ (read: Muslims’) cultural practices. However, what the recent law prohibiting the extreme veil (*burqa*) in public spaces (2010) particularly rails against is a very similar, quiet yet thorough accommodation of Islam in the legal systems of both countries (see Joppke and Torpey 2013, Chap. 2 and 3), which had seemingly gone too far in bypassing the court of public opinion. The difference to Germany, which accounts for the uniquely persistent, ever nastier politicization of Islam in France, is the presence of a strong populist right-wing party, the Front National, which is particularly dangerous for a conservative party in power and has helped to steadily turn the latter toward the right end of the political spectrum in the past decade. Note that Sarkozy’s multiculturalism critique occurred shortly after Marine Le Pen, the new leader of the National Front, had polemically compared Muslims’ street prayers in some French cities (because of insufficient mosque space) to the Nazi occupation in the 1940s. However, as in Germany, Sarkozy’s admonition to move from an “Islam in France” to an “Islam of France” and the very similar critique of “communities coexisting side-by-side,” while more aggressive but also more positively integrated by a Republican idea of national unity, betrays an overall integrationist propensity of the French state. Elements of this are the state-supported creation of a national umbrella organization of Muslims in France, the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM); indirect yet “compensatory” state support for the building of mosques; and state-subsidized French imam education, at the Institut Catholique in Paris. So the reality of the French approach is as integrationist as the German one. Certainly, the French variant is accompanied by a more insistent affirmation of majority society values than would be thinkable in Germany, which may be explained by a mixture of national legacy and political arithmetic. But even the drastic anti-*burqa* law is unlikely to cut deep into the lives of ordinary French Muslims, the great majority of whom are secular and rarely enter a mosque (see Godard and Taussig 2007, p. 31 f.).

The only one of the three countries where a good-bye to multiculturalism might make sense from a traditional, “national model” point of view is Britain. Had not here, to quote Prime Minister David Cameron, “the doctrine of state multiculturalism”⁶ been once in place, that is, been an explicit state policy and not just a (however imagined) laissez-faire? However, in reality there has never been an official multiculturalism policy in Britain, at least not as one knows it in Canada or Australia. Instead, the stronghold of British multiculturalism had always been the municipal level, especially in jurisdictions of high immigrant density and ethnic

⁵ “Le multiculturalisme est ‘un échec,’ affirme Nicolas Sarkozy,” *Le Point.fr*, 10 February 2011.

⁶ David Cameron, Speech to the Munich Security Conference, 5 February 2011 (downloaded from www.number10.gov.uk).

diversity. Beyond that, British multiculturalism was more of another word for the traditional British liberalism of toleration, colored perhaps by a higher level of “political correctness” and speech regulation than one finds elsewhere in Europe.⁷ What Cameron concretely attacked in his widely noted abdication of multiculturalism (issued, of all places, in Munich—site of Allied appeasement to Hitler) was lavish state funding for certain Muslim organizations in the context of the government’s anti-terrorism campaign. This policy, dubbed “Prevent,” which had been launched after the 2005 domestic Islamists’ bombing of the London Subway, had tried to win over the moderate part of British organized Islam and to insulate and weed out the extremists. So this was certainly not a “politics of recognition” out of the books of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1992), who had influentially conceived of multiculturalism as an identity-affirming correction to past injustice. Instead, it was a pragmatic politics of more effectively rooting out the sources of terrorism. “Prevent” erred on many fronts, especially the questionable fusing of the anti-terrorism and Muslim integration agendas. Before it was aborted in 2011, it made much state money (up to US\$ 135 M per year)⁸ flow into the pockets of Muslim organizations with little, if any, liberal democratic credentials or intentions. This was inevitable given the radical and largely unapologetic features of even the mainstream of British Islam (*see* Leiken 2012, chapters on Britain).

The British Prime Minister’s Munich statement on integration policy is interesting in three regards: first, much like in Germany and France, it displays a formulaic, imprecise reference to a “multiculturalism” that never adequately described what the state actually had been doing with respect to immigrant integration; secondly, also like the French and German variants, the British good-bye to multiculturalism cannot be decoupled from one specific immigrant group that is driving the rejection of “multiculturalism” everywhere today, which is Muslims and their perceived integration deficits. And, thirdly, Cameron signals an alternative, which he calls “muscular liberalism.” This is just another word for the “civic integration” policies that have taken the place of the demonized—and most often imagined—multiculturalism of the past and thus warrant further scrutiny.

The remainder of this chapter addresses the centrality of Islam in Europe’s good-bye to multiculturalism (II), and the “muscular liberalism” or “civic integration” policies that have appeared in lieu of a discarded multiculturalism (III). The final part presents some “critical issues” that will shape European immigrant integration after multiculturalism (IV).

⁷ In Bruce Bawer’s list of acts of “surrender” by European liberals to strident Islamic claim-making, among the most curious speech regulations are British ones, such as in a counterterrorism phrasebook that blacklists “Islamic extremism” to “avoid any implication that there is an explicit link between Islam and terrorism” (2010, p. 267). In Carol and Koopmans’ (2013) impeccable comparison of “Islamic religious rights” in Western Europe, one learns of British police guidelines requiring police dogs to wear boots when searching the houses of Muslim suspects, and of a British consultancy agency advising the National Health Service to forbid staff eating in their offices during Ramadan to avoid upsetting Muslims (p. 181).

⁸ ‘Counter-terrorism and multiculturalism’, *The Economist*, 11 June 2011, p. 34.

4.2 Religion and “Islam” in Europe’s Good-Bye to Multiculturalism

In a cross-national review of multicultural policies for immigrants, Ruud Koopmans (2013) made two interesting observations. First, multiculturalism in Canada, the United States, and Australia is more entrenched there because of the high proportion of (naturalized) immigrants in these countries’ national electorates, which naturally bears immigrant-friendly “policies and discourses” (Koopmans 2013 p. 5). Secondly, “public controversies about multiculturalism are mostly not about ethnic folklore or language, but about the incorporation of controversial religion claims” (Koopmans 2013 p. 37). Europe’s multiculturalism debate is even tantamount to controversy over Islam, partially because a great part of Europe’s classic guestworker and postcolonial immigrants after WWII happened to originate in Muslim countries, like Turkey, North Africa, and South-East Asia. But this cannot be all, as other immigrant religions, like Hinduism or Buddhism are unnoticeable in this respect—in inter-religious comparison there is a “unique salience of Muslim claims for religious rights” (Koopmans 2013, p. 7; *see also* Koopmans et al. 2005, Chap. 4).

In general, “language” and “religion” are the two critical multiculturalism issues surrounding immigrants—what Koopmans calls “ethnic folklore” in the above listing of multiculturalism issues is really nil if not at heart a language or religion issue, or rather, apart from the latter two, “ethnic folklore” is about as controversial as food or music. Language and religion have in common to be, like ethnicity and nationhood, “principles of vision and division of the social world” (Bourdieu, cited in Brubaker 2013), sorting people into “communities” and providing them with “forms of identification” (Brubaker 2013). They are thus potential hurdles to and competitive allegiances in immigrants’ integration into host societies, which likewise appear and self-identify as “communities” precisely in demarcation from the immigrant others.

However, more important than their communalities as group-builders are underlying differences between language and religion, both in their regional distribution as conflict issues and in their own terms. With respect to their regional distribution, Zolberg and LittWoon (1999) observed that both issues are differently critical on both sides of the Atlantic, “Islam” in Europe being “like Spanish” in the United States, that is, the respective society’s key cultural integration issue.

However, language and religion also differ in their own terms, with important policy implications. Language is not exclusive: when asked to acquire another language (as every school child is), one is not forced to give up one’s previous language (brilliantly observed by Zolberg and LittWoon 1999). On the contrary, adopting a second language is capacity-enhancing. It does not deprive the person of anything, least of all, her “identity.” At the same time, states cannot but operate in a specific (and not any) language; sheer facticity and resource-scarcity tilt toward an “assimilationist” state response with respect to language (Zolberg and LittWoon 1999). However, this is exactly reciprocated on the part of second-generation immigrants,

Hispanics included, who show overwhelmingly high rates of English-language acquisition (*see* Alba and Nee 2004). For succeeding and partaking in the American Dream, there is simply no alternative. At the same time, there are institutional incentives for market actors and vote-catching politicians to counterbalance the assimilationist state tilt with a modicum of pluralism by, say, advertising or campaigning in Spanish, which has long been common practice in the United States. No further state policy is required to regulate this process, a functionally differentiated society does all the necessary.

The situation is more difficult with respect to religion. Religion is exclusive: at least in its monotheist variants, one cannot adhere to more than one religion at any one time.⁹ In addition, at least in the monotheist variant, religion comes with a moral script that bears no compromise (*see* Stark 2001). Just because religion is so tightly connected with morality and ethical views of the “good” life, it is strongly protected in terms of individual liberty rights in liberal state constitutions. Georg Jellinek (1904) even famously argued that religious freedom is the historically first human right. Accordingly, with respect to religion, there is no alternative for the state but a pluralist, *de facto* multicultural state response. However, this is not so much a response in terms of a “policy,” because constitutional law requires respecting individuals’ right to believe and exercise their religion freely (whereas the notion of “policy” conveys the possibility of other “policies,” that is, choice).

Building on Zolberg and LittWoon (1999), Rogers Brubaker (2013) has further mapped out the different implications of language and religion as generators for multiculturalism conflicts. The first thing to observe is that “linguistic settlements” with endogenous language minorities are “not expandable” to immigrants, while “religious settlements” always “are expandable.” This reflects the deeper ethical reach of religion compared with language, which cannot be settled with factual reference to “this is how we do things here.” At the same time, religious diversity is “more robust” and “deeper and more divisive” than linguistic heterogeneity. Religious diversity is more “robust,” because it can be easily transmitted within the family, while language reproduction requires “exo-socialization” that only the state can provide. Witness that there is nothing like the language shifts in the 2nd and 3rd immigrant generations in the area of religion, where later-generation “immigrants” are often more fiercely religious (in culturally purified ways, as described by Roy 2004) than their parent or grandparental generations. In addition, religious diversity is “deep diversity” (Brubaker 2013) because religion, unlike language as merely a “medium of communication,” is a “structure of authority” with “intrinsic normative content,” often competing with the state’s claim to provide the norms for regulating public life. This feature of religion is particularly visible in the case of Islam, which Brubaker characterizes as stridently “public” religion, more than the “Christian Jewish, Hindu and Buddhist traditions” (Brubaker 2013). Obviously Islam in mind, Brubaker concludes that “religion has tended to displace language as the cutting edge of contestation over the political accommodation of cultural heterogeneity.”

⁹ The situation is different for East Asian religions, which are not exclusive so that one can practice several simultaneously (*see* Riesebrodt 2007, p. 143).

In light of these considerations, it both surprises and does not surprise that Islam is considered Europe's main cultural integration problem. It surprises because the legal-constitutional means are in principle at hand to resolve the issue, with no need to resort to special multiculturalism policies. And it does not surprise, given the stated "deep diversity" (Brubaker 2013) generated by religion in general, and Islam in particular. Especially, American observers attribute the salience of Islam as domestic conflict issue in Europe to an inherent Christian bias of European societies, from which America is luckily free (Zolberg and LittWoon 1999; Nussbaum 2012). However, locating the problem in an insufficient accommodation of Islam qua religion obscures the elasticity of liberal institutions and the strong protection of religious freedoms in Europe also (*see* Joppke and Torpey 2013).

Instead, what one can observe is that "Islam" figures as a protest ideology of the socioeconomically marginalized Muslim populations of Europe (*see* Roy 2004). Posed as a counterfactual, without the high unemployment and school drop-out rates, the low income levels and residential segregation that mark (or mar) the lives of European Muslims, particularly in the second or even third immigrant generation, there would be much less of an Islam problem in Europe, perhaps as little as there is one in North America. In fact, the happier demography of American Muslims, who are generally better educated and higher earning than average Americans, helps explain why Islam in America is "the dog that did not bark" (Joppke and Torpey 2013, Chap. 4). To tackle the European Islam problem as one of deficient "cultural integration," to be countered by culture-focused integration policies (such as "multiculturalism" policies), would ignore the socioeconomic underpinnings of the problem (*see* Hansen 2010).

Of course, this is not all. Islam can figure as a domestic protest idiom only because it is one at the international plane, in terms of a globally operating Islamic movement that sees itself, for good or bad, as world-wide opponent to Western hegemony and "imperialism." Note that Buddhism, Sikhism, Hinduism, etc. are not visible as domestic protest idiom, even though marginalized immigrants under these colors certainly exist in Europe (*see* Koopmans et al. 2005, Chap. 4). This may have intrinsic religious reasons (*see* below). However, at the international plane, there simply isn't anything akin to "Israel" or "Iraq" that would allow aligning these religions into an opposition to the "West." By implication, more effective than even the best "cultural integration policy" would be an alternative foreign policy that takes the winds out of global Islamism. This has long been the demand of British Muslims, whose radicalization, sadly involving terrorism, took a quantum leap after the Blair government's support of the American invasion of Iraq, which was perceived, however wrongly, as a war against Islam. However, to have foreign policy dictated by a small minority, and one that sees its main loyalty and affinities outside the British national community at that, is also a tall and questionable order—not to mention that even the most Islam-friendly foreign policy is unlikely to make "Israel" disappear as a target of global Islamic wrath.

To these socioeconomic and geopolitical factors must be added an intrinsic creedal openness of Islam to function as an oppositional identity. Islamic doctrinaires, even those considered reform-minded, like Yusuf Qaradawi or Tariq Ramadan, conceive

of European Muslims as a people apart, a quasi-nation that can be integrated only by an extreme program of multicultural recognition—exactly the (however imagined) position that the European state leaders, quoted at the beginning, are busily moving away from. Islam, in this akin to Orthodox Judaism, stipulates a tight package of religious rules to cover all aspects of life, including those commonly considered secular or political, which prevents its practitioners from blending more easily with their respective environs. Especially Ramadan, dubbed by *Time Magazine* as one of the 100 most important figures of the twenty-first century, insists that an uncompromising, unreconstructed Islam can (and must) be practised in Western societies, and that, in this respect, Muslims may feel “at home” in the West (Ramadan 2002).

The basis for Ramadan’s optimism is “political liberalism” (Rawls 1993), which Islamic reformists have readily embraced (above all, An-Naim 2008, who of course is much more reform-minded than Ramadan; also Fadel 2008; for an academic matchmaking, see March 2009). Political liberalism argues that consensus or the ties that bind in a liberal society can only be procedural, in terms of an agreement on rules of coexisting peacefully; there can never be agreement on “comprehensive doctrines,” ethical views of the good life that forever divide individuals and groups in a pluralistic society. If there could be agreement, we would live in an age of nationalism. Short of it, or beyond it, all one can hope for is an “overlapping consensus,” the reaching of a common platform of political rules from within one’s “comprehensive doctrine”—provided certain limits are respected, most importantly the “reasonableness” of the latter.

In an intriguing ethnography of on-the-ground Islam accommodation in the French *banlieues*, American anthropologist John Bowen has identified the workings of political liberalism in terms of “social pragmatism”: it allows flesh-and-blood Muslims to acknowledge even a strictly secularist host society like France by always staying within their religion. It works like this: as long as a non-religious rule, like civil marriage (to which there is no religious alternative in laicist France), bears “positive social consequences” for Muslims, these positive consequences figure as the civic rule or institution’s “Islamic justification” (Bowen 2010, p. 168). Tariq Ramadan provides an example: “A civil marriage already is a Muslim marriage, I think, because it is a contract, and that is what a Muslim marriage is” (Bowen 2010). The Islam-internal mechanism for this is *maqasid*, the interpretation of a scriptural obligation in terms of the general “purpose” it was meant to fulfill, which is the *via regia* of Islamic reform today. Surely, Bowen-Ramadan’s example for “social pragmatism” is drawn from family law, which is intrinsically closer to one’s ethical or even religious views than polity and politics. But it exposes the weak spot of political liberalism, which is to invite an only pragmatic or instrumental attitude to host society rules and institutions. In turn, these rules and institutions are likely to be skirted whenever they conflict with one’s religious precepts. Political liberalism, as Andrew March (2007, p. 249) concedes, “cannot require, as part of a minimal doctrine of citizenship, any robust or emotional attachment to one’s community of citizenship.” This being the case, if a choice has to be made, the outcome is unambiguous: “If for being a good Frenchman you have to be a bad Muslim, then I say no,” says Tariq Ramadan (in Fourest 2004, p. 224). The astonishing thing here

is the language of peoplehood applied equally to state and religious membership, one excluding the other, which gives a flavor for the particular difficulties of Islam integration.

4.3 “Civic Integration”: Complementing or Replacing Multiculturalism?

Against this backdrop, one understands why British Prime Minister Cameron now rejects the idea of a “passively tolerant society,” which is what the dismissed multiculturalism of old boiled down to, and that he wants to move on to “muscular liberalism.”¹⁰ This essentially means that liberal host society values and institutions are to be intrinsically and unconditionally accepted for what they are, whatever one’s religion prescribes, and not just for their usefulness for pursuing some other project. Muscular liberalism, which wishes to “thicken” liberalism from *andyné* procedure into identity, expresses uneasiness about the *laissez-fair* regime of the past with respect to the cultural integration of immigrants. It is part of a general trend toward civic integration policies for immigrants, which has long become the dominant approach to immigrant integration in Europe and thus warrants a closer look (one of the earliest statements is by Joppke 2007; most recently, *see* Goodman-Wallace 2012).

The standard European account is one of civic integration replacing or stepping in for multiculturalism in retreat (especially Joppke 2004, 2007). A Canadian looking at the European scene, Keith Banting (2011) puts this into question. It is indeed naïve to assume that policies change by a new policy simply “replacing” an old one that is thereby discarded. On the one hand, this gives a wrong picture of immigrant integration policy as being coherent and purpose-made. Against such a view, Gary Freeman had pointed out that “no state possesses a truly coherent incorporation regime” (2004, p. 946), and, moreover, that “immigrants are mostly managed via institutions created for other purposes” (2004, p. 948). Civic integration is in most places the first immigrant integration policy where previously there was none; what it “replaces” is not an old policy but a non-policy, a *de facto* multiculturalism that consisted of non-intervention in the integration process on the part of the state. On the other hand, policies rarely change by a dramatic rupture but more often in evolutionary, incremental ways, by way of “drift,” “conversion” of old policies for new purposes, or “layering,” whereby new policies are added on to existing ones. In the case of European immigrant integration, Banting argues, a “new emphasis on civic integration is being layered on top of pre-existing multiculturalism policies, resulting, in some cases, in a regime that has important similarities with multicultural integration Canadian-style” (Banting 2011, p. 13). In Canada, indeed, an official multiculturalism policy had always proceeded by way of civic integration, so that there would never be a contradiction or opposition between the two: Canadian mul-

¹⁰ *See* footnote no. 6.

ticulturalism has from the start been “integrationist” (p. 5); its constitutional centerpiece, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), is robustly focused on the “protection of liberal democratic principles” (p. 9), thus making Canadian multiculturalism inherently “liberal multiculturalism”; and language acquisition and civic knowledge of history and institutions, the dual pillars of European civic integration, is “a long-established tradition in Canada” (p. 11). Banting thus concludes that “multiculturalism and civic integration are not inherently incompatible approaches to diversity” (p. 3). He provides empirical evidence for this with the help of a “Multiculturalism Policy Index” (MPI). It records a “modest strengthening” of multicultural policies in most European countries between 1980 and 2010 (even in “segregationist” Germany and Austria), despite some negative outliers (like the Netherlands or Denmark, whose multiculturalism scores went down between 2000 and 2010, the decade of “backlash” against multiculturalism).¹¹

It must be acknowledged that not only in Canada, where “multicultural integration” (Banting 2011, p. 5) is firmly in place, but in all English-speaking New World societies, multiculturalism shows few signs of crisis or retreat. For Australia, Gwenda Tavern found that even under a conservative Liberal Party government, multiculturalism was more out in name than in reality, simply because of the “absence of a viable policy and doctrinal alternative” and “practical considerations of migrant integration” (2012, p. 19). And it even rhetorically bounced back under a new Labor government with its Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, extolling the “genius of Australian multiculturalism” (Tavern 2012, p. 11). Indeed, part of its “genius” is respect for “traditional Australian values” and “citizenship,” and the minister even deems the European distinction between “muscular liberalism” and multiculturalism void: “When David Cameron really said he supports a ‘muscular liberalism,’ he was—I argue—also advocating a more Australian version of multiculturalism” (quoted in Koopmans 2013, pp. 2–3). Finally, while the United States never had a Canadian or Australian-style official multiculturalism policy, Desmond King (2005) finds there a combination of “group-calibrated nation and strong state” (p. 125), that is, “a wide acknowledgment of group distinctions combined with a state struggle to ensure that government policies do not accentuate hierarchical divisions between groups based on race, ethnicity and national background” (p. 122). He calls this constellation “post-multicultural,” but the “post” in it is not visible to the untrained eye. Like in Canada and Australia, however, a distinct feature of the United States seems to be that “accept(ance) (of) the reality of multiculturalism” on the part of its “current generation of nation-builders” (p. 123) goes hand in hand with immigrants’ willingness to “assimilate,” a term completely shunned in Europe but of unbroken vitality in the New World: “Almost all immigrants want

¹¹ Banting and Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism Policy Index is a composite of eight policies: constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism (at any vertical state level); multicultural curricula; ethnic representation in public media; exemptions from dress-codes; allowing dual citizenship; funding ethnic organizations; bilingual education; and “affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups” (Banting 2011, p. 13 f.). At least two of these measures: dual citizenship and affirmative action, in my view, are not necessarily multiculturalism policies (for affirmative action as a form of antidiscrimination, see below).

their children to learn English quickly and to assimilate in ways which are entirely historically familiar,” King concludes (p. 127 f.).

Accordingly, Banting’s (2011) puzzled look at Europe expresses not only a Canadian but a New World sentiment at large, according to which there need not be a conflict between multiculturalism and a robust commitment to assimilation. However, he concedes that “some versions of civic integration undoubtedly are inconsistent with (a) multicultural approach,” particularly to the degree that the former move toward the “illiberal” pole (p. 3). The standard bearer in this respect, of course, is the Netherlands, which invented the entire genre of “civic integration” in Europe some 15 years ago. It is thus apposite to briefly look at this original case of European civic integration, and to assess the degree to which the policies that go under this name vary cross-nationally.

Under the label of *inburgering* (the English neologism would be “citizenization”), the Netherlands first introduced civic integration courses in the late 1990s as a remedy to disproportionate unemployment, school drop-out, and residential segregation especially among the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant populations.¹² Importantly, this malaise had occurred in the shadow of a multiculturalism (or “ethnic minorities”) policy that gave a premium on institutional separation. Such separation has a long legacy in the Netherlands in terms of its nation-building through “pillarization” (*verzuijing*), the division of society into Protestant, Catholic and Social-Democratic sectors. Only the elites of these sectors would communicate with one another within a regime of “consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1967)—a regime that, ironically, had almost disappeared when it came to be reinvented for the purposes of immigrant integration in the 1980s. This regime never worked for immigrants, not least because two of its central elements: elite communication and equal-level socioeconomic integration of the rank-and-file had never been in place. Accordingly, the new *démarche* of *inburgering* was to bind immigrants into host society institutions, above all the labor market, and to make them learn Dutch. However, due to swelling populism and domestic turmoil surrounding Muslims and Islam, an initially utilitarian policy of making immigrants “self-sufficient” (and thus no longer dependent on welfare) mutated into a culture-focused policy of making them adapt to, or at least be cognizant of, “Dutch norms and values.” This went along with an increasingly punitive and control-minded approach, making permanent residence permits contingent upon passing a civic integration exam, eventually even handing out temporary visas for (mostly Turkish and Moroccan) family migrants only after they could demonstrate basic civic knowledge and Dutch language competence before arrival (so-called “integration from abroad”).

A contested question in the literature is whether civic integration policies, which were immediately emulated elsewhere in Europe (including Germany, France, Britain, Austria, and Denmark), are convergent on essential parameters, such as

¹² The literature on Dutch civic integration has grown into a small industry, much of it highly repetitive. It suffices to read Entzinger (2002), and—most recently—Goodman Wallace (2013, Chap. 7), which finds more “liberal” elements even in the latest version of this policy than most other commentators would condone

their illiberal features and notional move beyond multiculturalism; or whether their shared features are outweighed by persistent national distinctiveness and “national models” of membership and immigrant integration.

In earlier writings, I argued that civic integration obliterates the old assumption that European states were following different “national models” or “philosophies” of membership and immigrant integration, and that if one seeks to identify variation in managing (immigrant-related) cultural diversity in Europe, it is within the dominant mode of civic integration and fostering “liberal identity” (Joppke 2007, 2008, 2010a). This was not to deny that variation continued to exist, particularly with respect to the harshness of the policy. Unlike its Dutch inspiration, the French *Contrats d'accueil et d'intégration* are not punitive but service-oriented, the civics part lasting just one day, while some newcomers are obliged to take (state-paid) French language lessons—interestingly, not more than a small minority among predominantly francophone immigrants. The German *Integrationskurse* focus on language-acquisition, which is a much bigger problem in Germany, as most immigrants do not speak German on arrival. In the case of defaulting, one may lose social benefits, but not one’s residence permit. In the context of nationality law, initially heavily culture-, even morality-focused citizenship tests (piloted by some Länder) were replaced by a federal test that focuses on civic-political knowledge and is easy to pass. In Britain, civic integration originated in the context of nationality law, and it was only subsequently extended to the regulation of entry and residence. Given the status of English as global lingua franca, language acquisition is no problem in Britain. Instead, civic integration *à l'anglaise*, has an applied-culture inflection, expecting immigrants to know how to pay bills, behave in pubs, and stand in line patiently, in all seriousness. One observer found that in its civic integration and naturalization requirements, at least England (as against Wales or Scotland) “subscribes to a ‘postnational’ multicultural concept of citizenship—advocacy of a ‘multicultural Britishness’” (Kiwan 2011, p. 276), which sounds very Canadian indeed (for a critical view of persistent cultural elements in Europe’s civic integration requirements, which he finds reprehensible from a political liberal point of view, see Orgad 2010).

According to this analysis, the general thrust of civic integration is to narrow (rather than widen or stabilize, as “multiculturalism” is suspected of) the cultural distance between immigrants and host society, and to make them understand its norms, principles, institutions. However, tested knowledge of these norms is one thing; their proven adoption as guidepost for one’s own behavior is quite another (see Bauböck and Joppke 2010). Cameron’s notion of muscular liberalism clearly aims at the latter—that is the whole point of injecting “muscles.” While behavioral and moral change cannot but be the goal of policy (already qua policy, short of any “muscles”), it does not necessarily have the tools or the powers to bring it about—because civic integration wishes to be liberal policy. This self-limitation becomes apparent if one looks at outliers that have come under fire precisely for wanting to go further. The notorious example is the “Muslim Test” introduced in 2005 in the German Land of Baden-Württemberg, which seeks to sniff out, by way of morally inquisitorial trick questions, whether applicants for citizenship really accepted the principles of the Basic Law (that they had to swear allegiance to in a ritual oath),

or whether they only pretended in order to grab a German passport. Exactly to set a counterpoint to this heavily criticized “morality test” (*Gesinnungstest*), the German federal citizenship test introduced in 2008 abstains from morality questions and limits itself to civic-political knowledge questions. A second “morality” outlier comes from the other side of the Rhine, where a female Muslim was denied French citizenship in 2008 because of her wearing of a *burqa*—this was found “incompatible with the essential values of the French community, especially equality of the sexes.”¹³ Before this *Conseil d’Etat* decision (which is now routine administrative practice), the “assimilation” required for naturalization under French law had been taken in a thinly linguistic sense. In a context of intensified conflict surrounding Islam, the meaning of assimilation has obviously thickened.

Overall, these are illiberal exceptions that have become known exactly for that. In most other instances, civic integration is limiting itself to instilling and testing cognitive knowledge, while abstaining from intervening in the inner sphere of morality (see Michalowski 2011 for an empirical confirmation). Even the “Dutch norms and values” that are to be respected in what is (together with the Danish variant) the harshest civic integration variant in Europe, share this self-limitation: when Muslim immigrants are confronted with sexual libertinism in the notorious Dutch information video for newcomers, the gist is not that Muslims also undress at chilly Dutch beaches but that they are aware that this is common practice in this “liberal” country (astutely observed by Hansen 2010).

Against the view that the arrival of civic integration in Europe signals policy convergence on immigrant integration and the abandonment of “national models,” Sara Goodman Wallace (2013) has recently argued, in the so far most detailed and systematic comparative account, that the new policies “do not signal departures from national approaches to citizenship, but rather fortify them” (2013, p. 18). Indeed, civic integration requirements differ in “scope”: some (restrictive) countries focusing more on the status of legal permanent residence as an alternative to (and as a shield for) impermeable, traditional citizenship, while in other (liberal) countries there is continuity between both statuses, fulfilled residence requirements easing the path to citizenship; they differ in “sequencing,” that is, which legal status (residence or citizenship) is targeted first; they differ in “density,” that is, their degree of difficulty. But, above all, the “purpose” of the new policies varies, from liberal to restrictive, depending on existing citizenship legacies and political conflict surrounding them. In this respect, Goodman Wallace distinguishes between four constellations: “restrictive continuity” in Austria and Denmark, where states “make permanent residence a significant second barrier of admission,” thus “insulating citizenship from liberalizing change” (2013, p. 140, Chap. 4); “liberal continuity” in Britain, thus confirming Banting’s (2011) view that multiculturalism and civic integration may go happily together; “restrictive moderation” in Germany, where a conservative campaign for new requirements for legal permanent residence has helped to “offset” or “counterbalance” liberalizing citizenship reforms; and, finally, “liberal moderation” in France and the Netherlands, where civic integration

¹³ *Conseil d’Etat*, decision on Mme Faiza M., req. no. 286798, 27 June 2008.

amounts to putting some restrictive spikes on traditionally liberal and (over-)inclusive citizenship regimes.

Goodman Wallace's important insight is that, depending on institutional and political context, civic integration may take on different meanings, from Canadian-style "liberal multicultural" to more restrictive, if not illiberal. Her conceptually important move that allows her to do this is to distinguish, more clearly than previous accounts had done, between legal permanent residence and citizenship proper as two alternative statuses and foci of integration for immigrants, which are differently targeted and differently brought together or separated in European states' contemporary civic integration policies.

But there is still an underlying communality even in her analysis, which is all about mapping and explaining policy variation: she describes it as "reassert(ing) the community-defining competence of the modern nation-state" (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 317). If integration was once "inferred" from residence time and left to the individual to fill with meaning, it is now "assessed" through explicit and objective criteria that allow no second-guessing (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 199). Moreover, civic integration is the "defining (of) new parameters of belonging under the banner of liberalism" (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 308). While liberal states "cannot mandate the practice" of immigrants' identifying with and feeling loyal to their new society, which is the whole point of civic integration measures, their unquestionable joint import is "bringing the state closer to the individual," which naturally bears "illiberal possibilities" (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 321 f.). But these conclusions are not far from those in previous accounts (e.g., Joppke 2007), so that a commendable stress on policy variation is not incompatible with convergence on essential parameters.

What conclusions can we draw from this review of European multiculturalism debates and related policy trends on immigrant integration? There is little space of maneuver for a liberal state in the vexed terrain of culture and identity, and variation is limited by the following shared parameters:

- "Multiculturalism," notionally the beast to beat by the new civic integration policies, never really was by way of explicit state policy—instead, it is a cover for the *laissez-faire* that previously reigned in most European countries. Amnon Rubinstein has got it right: "Indeed, the new concept of multiculturalism has manifested itself in Europe more by the absence of demands for integration than by granting specific collective rights" (2007, p. 772).
- Religion, the key cultural integration issue in Europe, has mostly been processed not in terms of explicit multiculturalism policies but by autonomous legal systems, and constitutional liberty clauses (rather than "policies") have functioned as main vehicles of accommodation.
- The one "policy" that there is today, "civic integration," despite significant variations across European states, has only occasionally gone beyond a legitimate emphasis on civic-political knowledge and language acquisition—the "muscles" in "muscular liberalism," which obviously bear illiberal possibilities, have mostly been in word only.

4.4 Critical Issues

In the final part of this chapter, I wish to flag, in a normative, forward-looking mode, five critical issues that states have to reckon with when crafting immigrant integration policies after multiculturalism. These are all issues of context and “relationship”: (1) the strange coincidence of multiculturalism-in-decline and antidiscrimination-on-the-rise, which suggests to keep both apart; (2) the need to recognize majority culture; (3) the importance of robust debate and democracy; (4) the anticipatory tying of immigrant integration to immigrant selection; and (5) finally, acknowledging the role of non-immigrant-specific policies and institutions in the process of integration.

4.4.1 *Multiculturalism vs. Antidiscrimination*

Interestingly, the fight against discrimination, which since 2000 has become a requirement under European Community law, has shifted to high gear in the very moment that multiculturalism has been called into question. This suggests that, notoriously fused and confused, the multiculturalism and antidiscrimination agendas have to be kept strictly apart. In a nutshell, multiculturalism seeks to perpetuate difference, while antidiscrimination seeks to abolish it (*see* Joppke 2010b). Another way to put it is that multiculturalism measures are permanent, while those of antidiscrimination are temporary only, triggered by and remedying acts and facts of discrimination. The lodestar of antidiscrimination is the “de-racialization” of society, as Ronald Dworkin (1985, Chap. 14) called the purpose of US affirmative action. It aims at a situation where skin color (much like any other ascriptive marker) is not “seen” when seeing a person—much like small children cannot “see” black until they learn that it carries (negative) social significance. To get there—this is the impetus behind affirmative action in the US and behind what in Europe is called, more cautiously, positive discrimination—it is necessary that people of all ascriptive endowments, black and white, Muslim and Christian, be found in every social station, top and bottom, in complete randomness. Short of it, when race or religion signals social status, which cannot but be a result of injustice or unearned privilege, it is legitimate and demonstrably effective, at least so argue the proponents of affirmative action or positive discrimination, to preferentially recruit minority individuals into coveted social positions.

The legal basis for this is the recognition of “indirect discrimination,” which proceeds by comparing the demographic availability of minority individuals with their actual (under)representation in key societal sectors, like employment, education, or public office. The problem is that this opens up a group-recognizing, *de facto* multiculturalist wedge within a notionally individualistic and universalistic policy, because without a preconceived idea of who is a “minority” one could not observe the existence of “indirect discrimination.” This is why the antidiscrimination and multiculturalism agendas and forces closely overlap in the real world, even appear

to be one, although philosophically they are apart, even opposite from one another. The bottom line is that to favor antidiscrimination is not necessarily to support multiculturalism—otherwise one could not explain why the former is uncontested in Europe, while the latter is in crisis.

4.4.2 *Reassertion of Majority Culture*

Under the umbrella of multiculturalism, the culture deemed in need of protection was only that of the minorities. “But what about the majority’s right to preserve its own culture?” asks Amnon Rubinstein, only to provide the answer himself: “The hidden assumption is that the majority has the means and will find ways to preserve its status” (2007, p. 789). In a way, the view of radical feminists and Marxists that the Dominant are culturally invisible, hyping up their particulars as the (falsely) universal, carried the day—no need to have mercy on them and to recognize “their” culture, which is but an instrument of power. And it is true that the nation-state is the most potent instrument of reproducing majority culture—what more could the majority want? In Will Kymlicka’s (1995) influential theory of liberal multiculturalism, even when being notionally inactive, states cannot but prioritize majority culture when fixing holidays or an official language—which is all right for him, because cultures provide a “context of choice” that is necessary for free and meaningful choices; only justice commands that minority cultures get the same deal in turn. That no deliberate state action is necessary to protect majority culture seems to be the implicit background reason why measures like the 1994 French *Loi Toubon* (ridiculed even in France as “Loi Allgood”) have raised eyebrows, which mandated to keep the French language free of English words, like “hairdresser” or “weekend” or “computer.”

However, the snubbing of majority culture, through an alliance of market forces, intellectuals, and a rights-focused legal system, was wind in the wings of right-wing populism that has become epidemic in Europe. A case in point is the curious repression of the fact that European societies are Christian societies, although Christianity has been the single most important European culture- and civilization-maker since the early Middle Age. The high-point of this repression was perhaps the denial of a reference to God and Christianity in the preamble of the drafted (but never realized) EU Constitution (*see* the critique of Weiler 2004).

In an important counterpoint to this trend, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its *Lautsi v. Italy* decision of March 2011,¹⁴ allowed the Italian state to display Christian crosses in its public schools, overruling its own lower chamber decision of November 2009. The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber thus also reached the exact opposite verdict as the German Constitutional Court had in its notorious 1995 Crucifix Decision, in which to “learn under the Christian Cross” was deemed

¹⁴ ECtHR (Grand Chamber), *Lautsi and Others v. Italy*, decision of 18 March 2011. *See* the discussion in Joppke (2013).

a violation of a school child's negative religious right (not to be bothered by the religion of others if its atheist parents so wished). As the ECtHR argued instead, the Christian cross at the school wall was above all a cultural, not religious sign that symbolized the Christian formation of Italian society. Moreover, as a passive symbol, the Cross did not amount to active indoctrination of a creed that a secular state, of course, was never allowed to engage in. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Cross on the school wall was legitimized in reference to pluralism, as the Italian schools also allowed Islamic headscarves on the part of students, offered optional Islam instruction, and were considerate of the religious calendar of Islam. A Maltese judge on the Strasbourg court had called "historical Alzheimer's" and "cultural vandalism" the lower chamber's earlier prohibition of the Cross, in its *Lautsi I* decision in 2009. Indeed, it seemed unreasonable, even politically dangerous to allow a militant atheist from Finland to wipe out a century-old tradition in Italy for the sake of her sacrosanct (negative) "religious freedom"—the irony also being that a religious right gunned down what in the end, of course, is "religion." A better path to take, this is the message of the Strasbourg court's *Lautsi II* decision, is a gentle pluralism, in which the minority accommodation that is constitutionally required does not happen at the cost of the "majority," whatever that is in a diverse society.

Interestingly, the more entrenched multiculturalisms of Canada and Australia have all undergone a turning-point to stress that this was not only a thing for minorities but for the majority too. The successful grounding of multiculturalism in Canadian and Australian national identity seems to be a reason for multiculturalism's greater resilience there than in Europe, where multiculturalism never lost the sense to be for minorities only. By the same token, multiculturalism is a much less plausible identity option in the ethnic nation-states of Europe, which are not primarily the product of immigration or colonial settlement.

4.4.3 The Role of Public Debate and Democracy

Much of Islam accommodation in Europe proceeded quietly and unnoticed in the non-public settings of courtroom and state bureaucracy (*see Dassetto et al. 2007; Joppke and Torpey 2013*). This guaranteed liberal outcomes, but it also invited political backlash. Especially, the cultural implications of immigration, which touch on the identity of the host society, cannot bypass the court of public opinion. Despite the generic risk of populism, democracy is an indispensable medium of immigrant integration. The current turmoil surrounding visible Islam, the *burqa* and the minarets, signals that the democratic stage of integration has finally arrived. Precisely in these countries where political etiquette had once sealed debate, as in the once "liberal" Netherlands and Denmark, the politicization of Islam is all the more virulent today. In Germany, a best-selling book (Sarrazin 2010) that dared to call "integration above all a task of immigrants" (which in the United States is legally enshrined in its century-old "deeming" provision) and that found the difficulties of Muslim integration not unconnected to "Islam" (thus questioning the

reigning firewall between political extremism and religion), led to the ostracizing of its author, who was forced to resign from his post at the German Federal Bank and from his membership in the Social Democratic Party. But, judged by the experience of Denmark or the Netherlands, the stifling of debate only feeds extremism.

On the opposite end, direct democracy is not the most suitable venue to process sensitive minority issues either. The true shock of the successful Swiss Minaret Referendum is not its outcome—in other European countries, even larger majorities would have rejected visible Islam.¹⁵ Instead, the problem is to leave such sensitive issues for mass publics to decide, which are known to be inimical to immigrants and Muslims in all Western countries. Representative democracy, whereby “public views” are passed “through the medium of a chosen body of citizens” (Madison 1982), is much better suited for dealing with delicate minority issues. In fact, political leadership is particularly asked for in this domain. Unfortunately, leadership is exactly the resource in short supply in contemporary “audience democracy” (see Manin 1997), where public opinion, and not the best or just solution, is the benchmark of political success. There is no “golden rule” in the vexed terrain of minority integration, but the opposite extremes of extreme democracy and no democracy are equally insufficient.

4.4.4 *The Neglected Factor of Immigrant Selection*

Canadian officials, aware that they manage the immigration function better than most other countries, tend to argue that the “integration” of immigrants starts with their “selection.” Similarly, Canadian academics are often surprised about the European view that “civic integration” and “multiculturalism are antithetical, the first replacing the second (e.g., Banting 2011). Instead, they point to a happy equilibrium of “multicultural integration” achieved in Canada that is as “muscular” as it is accommodating (Banting 2011). Indeed, Canada is blessed with a virtuous circle of integration and selection. But it is premised on a rigorously and robustly high-skill-oriented immigrant selection, within its famous points system, which also happens to admit no more than a trickle of Muslim immigrants. Even Will Kymlicka (2005), reflecting on multiculturalism’s “retreat” in Europe, concedes that in the hypothetical case of an overwhelmingly low-skilled Muslim intake, Canada might undergo a European-style questioning of its multiculturalism. Conversely, fathom two US political scientists (Citrin and Wright 2011, p. 3), if the “‘visible minorities’ in the Netherlands would be well-educated, English-speaking and economically skilled migrants from Hong Kong and India,” as they happen to be in Canada, “a good bet is that...we would not be talking about the rise and fall of multiculturalism in the Netherlands.” Note that around 2010, 46% of the foreign born in Canada had a college or even higher university degree, while only 17% of the foreign born

¹⁵ This is the result of a French poll conducted in the immediate wake of the Swiss minaret referendum. See Le Figaro, 3 December 2009, p. 11.

in Germany had equivalent degrees; conversely, only 22% of the foreign born in Canada had less than a high school diploma, which applied to 48% of the foreign born in France (these are OECD-based data reported in Koopmans 2013, p. 22). A similar transatlantic divergence applies within ethnic groups also: 14% of Turkish foreign born in the United States have less than high school education, while 82% of those in Austria do (Koopmans 2013, p. 23).

The European conundrum of ever more repressive “integration” policies, epitomized by “integration from abroad,” which is not an integration policy but a control policy under different name, cannot be decoupled from the fact that most of its legal immigrants, some 80% in France or the Netherlands, are not “selected” but un-chosen and low-skilled “as of right” immigrants, arriving in the context of family formation and asylum-seeking. Moreover, the large majority are Muslim immigrants, often from North Africa and the Middle East where Islam is chronically politicized, thus further fuelling the *querelles islamiques* within Europe.

As ethnic selectivity has become anathema in liberal societies (see Joppke 2005), an obvious way out of this conundrum is the turn to rigorously skill-based immigrant selection, on the assumption that only the combination with poverty and exclusion fuels the politicization of cultural (more precisely: religious) difference. At the same time, the *demand*, given out by French President Sarkozy, to move from “suffered” to “chosen” immigration is highly misleading, because a modicum of “suffered” immigration has to be accepted for legal-constitutional reasons. Not to mention the ethical problems of creaming-off the best and fending-off the rest, robbing underdeveloped societies of their precious human capital. But from a realist point of view, the Canadian lesson is that there is no alternative to an unsentimental selection policy that “selects” and does not just “accept.”

4.4.5 *Limits of Integration Policy*

From an American point of view, the European search for the right “integration policy” must be puzzling, because America has accomplished much more with much less (if any) policy engagement, leaving “integration” entirely to society, especially a famously absorptive labor market and an assimilatory mass culture. The best defense of multiculturalism against its critics is to point to the miniscule share of the related policies within the total state budget, even compared to other measures on integration (which is in a proportion of 1:50 in Canada!), so that everything bad on the integration front can hardly be the fault of multiculturalism policy alone (see Banting 2011, p. 7). In a comprehensive review of studies on the effects of multiculturalism policies across Western countries, Koopmans (2013, p. 1) summarized these studies as showing “no effect” on socio-economic integration, “some positive effects” on political integration, but “negative impacts” on socio-cultural integration—a “mixed picture,” certainly, but also no reason to be alarmed about multiculturalism policies. Koopmans’ own “Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants” (ICRI) index showed a cross-European “consolidation at moderate

levels of multicultural policies,” but also that the “expansion of multicultural policies has halted in the early twenty-first century” (Koopmans 2013, p. 13)—findings that are similar to those of the Banting-Kymlicka index (Banting 2011). Interestingly, with respect to “religious rights for Muslims,” by far the most accommodating country in 2008 was the Netherlands, some 10 years into its multiculturalism backlash, being well ahead of Britain, Canada, and Australia in this respect (Banting 2011, p. 17). This suggests the immunity of legally-provided religious rights from the ebb and flow of multiculturalism policies, considering that the Netherlands is also one of the four countries on the ICRI index where “multicultural policies” had declined in the past decade, next to Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (Banting 2011, p. 12). Moreover, Koopmans argues, “where effects of immigrant integration policies do occur, they mostly point towards the importance of individual rights and equal opportunity,” such as rules of access to citizenship, and not the group-rights measures favored by multiculturalism (Banting 2011, p. 34).

But even more important than any explicit integration policy, groupist or not, seems to be immigrant-unspecific labor market structures and educational systems. In a widely noted paper, Koopmans (2010) found that in Europe, the three countries that notoriously score lowest on all multiculturalism and integration indexes: Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, also had the “highest” rates of non-EU immigrant labor market participation, while three other countries that are commonly found on top of these indexes: Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium, showed the “lowest” rates of immigrant labor market participation. Rather than dwelling on the good showing of the Germanic countries, which should point to fortuitous labor market and company structures (with strong labor unions that cater to foreign workers), Koopmans attributes the bad showing of the integrationist countries to their combination of strong welfare states with pronounced multiculturalism policies, which minimize incentives to acquire linguistic skills and interethnic contacts.

With respect to educational systems, a study comparing second-generation Turkish immigrants in six major European cities found that second-generation Turks in Paris were eight times more likely to reach higher education than those in Berlin (Crul and Mollenkopf 2012, Chap. 10; based on data for 2007/8). Further, 30% of second-generation Turks held a professional job in Paris, thus making a leap up the social ladder compared to their unskilled worker parents, while only 13,5% of second-generation Turks in Berlin were in professional jobs. The authors attribute the good results for France, but also for Sweden (over 31% of second-generation Turks in Stockholm held a professional job), to these countries’ comprehensive school systems, which do not separate native (elite) children from immigrant (and working-class) children at an early point. By contrast, the stratified school systems of Germany and Austria are particularly bad in this respect (second-generation Turks in Berlin/Germany and Vienna/Austria did equally bad with respect to schooling). To the factor of comprehensive schooling must be added the positive effect of extended childcare facilities and long school days in France and Sweden, which move immigrant children from early on and for long portions of their day into majority-society contexts. Conversely, the scarcity of public Kindergärten and

schools closing at midday in Germany and Austria leave immigrant children in the vitiating ambit of their parents.

The message is that immigrant-unspecific institutions are more important for integrating immigrants than even the best “integration policy.” The European debate suffers from an over-attention to policy and neglect of the role of institutions.¹⁶

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¹⁶ For instance, with respect to political participation, Turkish immigrants in France and the Netherlands were found to show higher levels of identification with and participation in host societies than their compatriots in Germany—the explanation being easier access to citizenship in the former two countries (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010).

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