Graziano Battistella *Editor*

Global and Asian Perspectives on International Migration

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Acknowledgments

Many ideas come to mind, float in the air, bounce back and forth in conversations with colleagues and friends and then go nowhere. Some ideas keep returning and beg for implementation. A conference pairing scholars from Asia with colleagues from the west was one such idea that did not go away. And a conference was planned and came to fruition in April 2013 with the support of individuals and institutions, who I am pleased to acknowledge.

From inception to implementation there is a crucial phase which consists in finding the right cooperation. First of all, it is important to secure the cooperation of authors willing to put their mind into the task of writing and discussing theoretical perspectives on migration. For this reason, my first acknowledgement goes to the authors who have participated in the conference and then revised their contributions in view of a publication.

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Chapter 1
Migration in Asia: In Search of a Theoretical Framework

Graziano Battistella

Research on migration has increased with the rise in international migration since the early 1960s, highlighting new migration patterns and their impacts. However, the expanding stock of migration research has not made it easier to govern migration or solve the problems of migrants. Instead, more complex migration relationships have outpaced the capacity of research to offer suggestions on how best to manage new flows of people over national borders. This chapter tackles the fundamental question of what is known about migration; in particular, it examines the characteristics of migration in Asia and the issues generated by migration flows in a continent with 60 % of the world's people and some of the most complex migration relationships. It will then introduce the contributions in this volume, which were presented at an international dialogue on some aspects of migration and conclude with questions for further research.

1.1 A Synthetic Overview

The formulation of a theoretical approach to migration began a long time ago. Ravenstein's laws on migration appeared in 1885, at the time of the great migration from Europe to the Americas, although the laws were formulated to explain internal migration in the United Kingdom (Ravenstein 1985). The application of Ravenstein's laws to international migration (Ravenstein 1889) inspired theorizing about migration, and neoclassical economics were developed in the 1950s (Lewis 1954) and refined in the 1970s by Harris and Todaro (1970). The push-pull model advanced by Lee (1966) came to dominate the explanation of the origin and development of migration for many years.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, scholars reviewed various migration theories in response to social and economic changes that led to new forms and

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trends of migration. A cursory overview was provided in 1981 by De Jong and Fawcett, as a premise to the analysis of a micro-level decision making process. Massey and colleagues reviewed the extant theories (Massey et al. 1993) and evaluated them against the North American context (Massey et al. 1994) and the global context (Massey et al. 1998). Further reviews were undertaken by Portes and Böröcz (1996), Arango (2004), Cooke and Bélanger (2006), Bijak (2006), Fussell (2012), King (2012) and Piguet (2013). In 1996 Cohen edited a selection of articles on migration theories, from the classic to the more recent ones. Hammar et al. (1997) looked at theories within the development and interdisciplinary perspective, and Brettell and Hollifield (2000) focused on the interdisciplinary approach to the study of migration. In 2010 an issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (vol. 36, issue 10) was devoted to migration theories and social change. The reviews had different objectives but ultimately agreed that each theory is limited and yet has something to offer for the understanding of migration.

Following Massey, the first part of this chapter intends to provide a general understanding of migration processes from origin to end by making use of the insights offered by the various theories. The purpose of this synthesis is to suggest that in spite of the limitations in the various theories some knowledge on how migration originates, develops and ends has been accumulated through the years. It also intends to suggest that additional questions arise and theoretical developments are necessary when the specificities of a migration system, like that of Asia, are examined.

Some caveats should be mentioned before proceeding: the synthesis is limited to labor migration; not all migration questions are addressed; and the theories will be utilized for what they can contribute, although such contribution is not without limitations or criticisms. There are two assumptions: migration theories are complementary, not antithetical, in the sense that one theory does not necessarily invalidate another, rather it brings light to a different aspect of the migration process (Massey et al. 1993; Portes 1999); and each theory has something to contribute to the knowledge of migration. Needless to say, the synthetic overview fully supports what many have said about the impossibility and probably the undesirability to come up with a unified theory on migration. In the words of Robin Cohen (1996, p. xvi): "There is no definitive theory in migration although there is a clear sense in which some agreed positions are emerging." Portes (1999) agrees with this and adds that "the different areas that compose this field are so disparate that they can be unified only at a highly abstract and probably vacuous level" (p. 27). The synthesis will draw knowledge from various disciplines, in response to the demand that a proper understanding of migration requires an interdisciplinary approach (Hammar et al. 1997). Brettell and Hollifield (2000, p. vii) put it eloquently when they said that "Migration is a subject that cries out for an interdisciplinary approach." It remains a modest synthetic overview, with no ambition to fill observed gaps, such as the limited anchoring of the analysis of human mobility in the theoretical development of the social sciences (Castles 2009, p. 454), or to indicate new theoretical or methodological directions. It simply says that to understand the migration process we must know the background context, the structural factors, the personal motivations, the role of intermediaries, the incorporation of migration, and the reasons why migration continues and at some point ends.

1.1.1   The Background Context for the Migration Process

International labor migration involves people moving over national borders for a certain period of time in search of better opportunities, so the reasons for unequal development must be understood to comprehend migration. Prebisch (1950) envisaged a world organized into two types of states: those at the center import raw materials and export finished products, and states on the periphery export raw materials and import finished products. Such an unequal trading relationship keeps developing nations in a peripheral condition, prompting Prebisch to suggest import substitution so that developing countries can develop their manufacturing sectors.

The center-periphery concept was adopted by dependency theory (Franch 1969; Cardoso and Faletto 1979), which posited that the center-periphery relation was an integral component of the capitalist model of development. The world systems theory (Wallerstein 1975) introduced a third type, the semi-periphery, to describe countries that depend on the center but also have some control over countries at the periphery. These broad theories contribute to the understanding of the origins of migration by illustrating the ways that capitalist nations penetrate the markets of the countries at the periphery, displacing workers and turning some into migrants who move to the more developed countries. The linkages established by political and economic dependency tend to favor migration flows. More specifically, Sassen (1988) argued that migration to the US was a byproduct of the internationalization of production, as the outflow of capital generates an inflow of labor.

In addition to the economic, the demographic, political and social contexts lay the premise for possible migration movements. The linkage with the demographic factor was best theorized by Zelinsky (1971) who argued that migration develops according to regularities which are modeled on the modernization process and are structured in correlation with the demographic transition. The weaknesses of that correlation, particularly when applied to a specific region like Asia, were underscored by Skeldon (1992). Nevertheless, the importance of the demographic differentials among countries as a premise to labor movements remains patent. The political and social factors were emphasized particularly by historians who observed that political ties functioned as facilitators of migration movements. The European colonialism stands out as the macroscopic example of such ties, with people moving first toward the colonial states, workers being transferred to the colonies and among colonies as indentured labor and migrants moving toward the colonizing countries during and after the colonial period (Emmer 1986).

1.1.2   Structural Economic Factors at the Origin and the Destination

After understanding the broad causes of migration with the help of the dependency theory and world systems theory, the structural economic factors at the origin and the destination must be clarified. Neoclassical economists emphasized macro-level variables such as differences in endowments of capital and labor that encourage

workers to move from labor-abundant to capital-abundant countries with higher wages. Capital moves in the opposite direction, and migration of labor and capital falls as wage and interest rate differences decrease. Harris and Todaro (1970) emphasized that both wage differences and the probability of finding a job affect the expected return to migration, and that noneconomic costs can also factor into calculations of whether to stay or move.

Neoclassical economics relies heavily on the assumption that people make rational decisions to maximize their economic well-being. Simon (1955, p. 104) had already warned that there is no evidence that persons facing complex decisions might perform all the calculations required by rational choice. He spoke of "approximate" rationality (1955, p. 114) or bounded rationality, in which persons, because of the limited information and limited capacity and time to analyze such information, look for satisfactory choices, rather than the optimal choices. With the idea of bounded rationality, maximizing wages cannot be the exclusive factor motivating a decision to migrate.

Instead of focusing on the differences among countries, Piore (1979) looked at the labor market in the country of destination and concluded that migration is generated by the demand for migrant labor in that country. Also, the labor market will necessarily become segmented, as people tend to move from occupations with low wages and social prestige to occupations with higher wages and prestige. The secondary labor market remains in need of workers willing to accept 3-D (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs. Since the segmentation of the labor market is structural, there will always be a demand for new migrants to replace those who return or move up the job ladder, so the dual market theory argues that the supply of local workers changes faster than demand, creating a structural demand for migrants.

If Piore focused on the structural aspects of the country of destination, Stark (1984; 1991) examined the structural elements in the country of origin that offer few protections against various risks, including insurance against crop failures, unemployment subsidies, and access to credit. Migration is thus a response to such inadequate protection. A crop failure, for example, can trigger a decision to migrate abroad. Moreover, households rather than individuals are the key unit of analysis, as they allocate members to maximize income and minimize risk. It is the household rather than the individual which decides to send a son from rural Mexico to the US and a daughter to a factory in Mexico.

The new economics of labor migration (NELM) explores other reasons to migrate as well. The return of successful migrants can motivate others to go abroad so that they do not suffer relative deprivation. The NELM emphasizes factors other than income maximization as reasons for migration.

1.1.3   Personal Factors

Understanding the background context and the structural factors at the origin and the destination illustrates the propensity to migrate but is not sufficient to explain why people migrate. In fact, although factors are similar for a specific population,

those who decide to migrate are a minority within the population. Globally, they constitute about three percent of the world's population (UN-DESA 2013). In some countries of origin this proportion is higher, but still a minority. Therefore, in addition to structural and family factors influencing the decision to migrate, personal factors must also be considered.

At the personal level, it is always observed that migrant workers are mostly young adults, persons in the prime of their productive life. In this regard, the propensity to migrate was considered at different stages of a person's and family's life: young single adults are more mobile than married persons and married persons are more mobile before children go to school, etc. (De Jong and Gardner, 1981). While criticized for its limitation to the nuclear type of family, the idea remains that demographic characteristics of migrants have a role in the decision to migrate.

In looking at the micro-level motivational approach to the decision to migrate, De Jong and Fawcett (1981) found the previous theories incapable of explaining most of all why some people do not migrate. In that regard, in contrast with the excessive role given to economic reasons, they emphasized that migration should be considered as the result of many motives. They proposed to apply to migration the value-expectancy model, which consists in viewing migration as the result of a cost-benefit analysis between values and expectancies (1981, p. 47). Values can be classified in seven categories: wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, autonomy, affiliation, morality, while expectancy refers to the belief that a particular behavior will attain a certain value. On the basis of the value-expectancy model, some hypotheses can be made concerning the probability of mobility by specific groups of people. A further study analyzing migration from the Philippines examined the discrepancies between the intention to migrate and the actual implementation. The study explained the discrepancies "in terms of unanticipated constraints and facilitators, as well as changes in the conditions that precipitated the migration intention in the first place" (Gardner et al. 1986, p. 63).

1.1.4   The Role of Intermediaries

The final component for the initiation and continuation (*see* later) of migration is characterized by the role of intermediaries (labor recruiters, brokers, transport agencies, etc.). Direct hiring—a process in which employers hire migrants without the intermediation of recruitment and placement agencies—or hiring through government-to-government agreements apply only to a minority of workers. For the majority, employers utilize the service of intermediaries and migrants secure a visa and employment abroad through labor recruiters. Intermediaries charge employers for their services, but in many countries, they also earn by exacting a fee from the migrants, although this practice is barred by the ILO Private Employment Agency Convention, 1997 (No. 181). The profitable activity of labor recruitment has generated a proliferation of agencies, compelling governments to regulate it. Goss and Lindquist (1995) emphasized the importance of intermediaries in what they called the migrant institution, suggesting the application of the

structuration theory to migration as the best way to unify the knowledge of the migration process. Others have focused on the role of intermediaries as merchants of labor (Martin 2005) who tend to prolong migration beyond its necessity because of its profitability; they also contribute to the commodification of labor migration. Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen (2013) have further elaborated on the role of intermediaries by adding to their facilitating role (performed by labor recruiters) the control role (performed by private security agencies which act on behalf of governments) and the rescue role (performed by non-government organizations or NGOs, migrant associations and civil society groups). Regardless of the different angles, and barring a major overhaul of the migration systems, it is clear that for the majority of workers migration cannot occur without the intervention of intermediaries.

1.1.5   The Incorporation of Migrants

Migration implies that migrants live and work in a country where they were not born or different from their usual country of residence. How migrants can successfully incorporate in the society of destination has long interested sociologists, particularly in countries of permanent migration. The Chicago School, which specialized in the social analysis of life in an urban context, formulated the assimilation theory. Robert Park (1924) theorized the race relations cycle, which goes from contact to competition to accommodation and finally, assimilation, in a sequence considered normative and irreversible. A less normative approach was taken by W.I. Thomas, who recommended a wise policy of assimilation that does not destroy the memories of migrants, but builds on them. The assimilation theory dominated the debate until the early 1960s, when it was comprehensively formulated by Milton Gordon (1964). In theorizing the nature of assimilation he distinguished the various types or stages of assimilation: from the initial stage of cultural or behavioral assimilation to the final one of civic assimilation (1964, p. 71). Of the three major theories of the assimilationist process, he considered Anglo-conformity as the most successful. The competitive theory of the melting pot did not see a practical implementation, as in fact, many melting pots were created within the American society (*see* also Glazer and Moynihan 1963). As for cultural pluralism, he considered it a minor key for the understanding of ethnic America, while his preference was for structural pluralism.

Ironically, the ultimate theorization of assimilation came at the time of its demise due to the emergence of a strong movement for the discovery of ethnic origins. Instead of assimilation, integration was considered the most appropriate term. Its main characteristic is that while assimilation is considered a unidirectional process, integration is considered a bidirectional one, in the sense that migrants have something to contribute to the local society and that successful incorporation requires for the receiving society to provide the opportunities for it. However, integration was never formulated in a coherent theoretical model (Favell 2001) and assimilationism did not die. In studying the more recent generations of migrants to the US, Portes

and Zhou (1994) spoke of segmented assimilation, as some of the new migrants assimilate to the lower echelons of society. Alba and Nee (2003) supported a return to assimilationism, but devoid of ethnocentrism and determinism and in which the process of assimilation as boundary crossing is substituted with that of boundary blurring.

While integration was formally defined by the Commission of the European Union (C2003/336), multiculturalism was debated as a different form of organizing societies with migrants. Philosophically, the debate was polarized around the communitarian and liberal positions. Charles Taylor's sharp criticism of the false neutrality of liberalism on values—i.e., hiding the intent to impose the hegemony of western culture—and the emphasis on equality which is only procedural equality, led him to advocate for a public recognition of the collective rights of minority cultures (Taylor 1992). Habermas (1993) thinks that autonomy requires participation (civic autonomy) to be real autonomy, therefore, democracy must be deliberative, a process in which all participate, including migrants. Migrants should not be required to attain cultural integration, but political integration, the adhesion to the constitutional values (constitutional patriotism). Diversities must be respected, but rights remain individual in nature. Kymlicka (1995) takes a middle position when he rejects the procedural neutrality of liberals as discriminating and the uncritical recognition of the collective rights of minorities. He makes a distinction between internal and external restrictions that minority cultures impose. He considers external restrictions acceptable, while internal restrictions are against liberal principles. "Liberals should seek to ensure that there is equality between groups, and freedom and equality within groups" (Kymlicka 1995, p. 194). Recently, Murray (2012) has taken some distance from the misconception that, in multicultural policies, anything goes, but also from attributing an excessive role to multicultural policies, which "represent only one small part of the legislative toolkit available to decision-makers engaged in the business of maintaining unity and social solidarity in conditions of diversity" (p. 150). He advocated for civic multiculturalism, where both majority and minorities respect differences and contribute to social cohesion.

Politically, multiculturalism has remained publicly recognized in Canada and Australia, while it underwent some crisis in Europe. However, the discussion on the plurality of cultures and the need for social cohesion within societies continues. The issue was the object of the Human Development Report in 2004 (UNDP 2004), with emphasis on cultural freedom. In some circles, to overcome the major deficiency of multiculturalism, which is the lack of dialogue among the various cultures which potentially leads to cultural ghettos and an erosion of social cohesion, it is important to go beyond multiculturalism in favor of intercultural dialogue. The UNESCO report of 2009 emphasized that there must be an educational effort to acquire the competencies in intercultural dialogue, which include listening, understanding and wonder (UNESCO 2009, p. 46).

The realization that migrants in traditional countries of settlement were not availing of the possibility to acquire citizenship and the irruption of the globalization discourse demanded new perspectives on the belonging of migrants. Some authors advanced the notion of transnationalism as a condition in which migrants belong

and interact with different spaces at the same time (Basch et al. 1994). Although it is acknowledged that the transnational condition might apply only to a minority of migrants (Portes 2003), the concept has challenged the static approach to migration as a one-time, definitive movement, so typical, and yet also so partially true, of the nineteenth century migration to the Americas.

1.1.6   The Continuation of Migration

Migration in general, as well as labor migration in particular, has increased in the past decades. Oft quoted figures produced by the UN Population Commission say that migrants were about 154 million in 1990 and are estimated to be 232 million in 2013 (UN-DESA 2013). The growth of migration is attributed to the same factors that originate it, in addition to other factors that have been observed for quite some time.

Chain migration is an expression that was already used during the great migration from Europe to the Americas. The distinctive feature of chain migration is that it differs from impersonally organized migration, because the arrangements for the migrants are made "*by means of primary social relationship with previous migrants*" (Macdonald and Macdonald 1964, p. 82, italics in the original text). The concept of chain migration, which during the years of the great migration was symbolized by entire villages that moved from Europe to the Americas, was reformulated in the more comprehensive notion of migration networks. These networks are characterized primarily by interpersonal connections that link migrants, former migrants and non-migrants through family, friendship and acquaintance ties. As the scarcity of information is one of the biggest challenges that migrants face, obtaining information from personal and social networks facilitates the migration process and increases the probability to migrate. In broad terms, the linkages that one can find within a migration network constitute social capital, the value of which is proportional to its possibility to be converted into real capital (Massey et al. 1987). The role of migration networks, particularly in decreasing the cost of migration, also explains why migration movements tend to last longer than the structural factors would require. To further explain the tendency of migration to expand and continue, Massey et al. (1998, pp. 45–50) also borrowed the notion of cumulative causation from Gunnar Myrdal (1957), to indicate that, since an act of migration modifies the context in which it takes place, successive migration acts become easier and more probable for others. Cumulative causation will ultimately limit itself because of the process of saturation, when decreasing migration costs are no longer significant in the decision to migrate.

1.1.7   The End of Migration

If migration is initiated by certain structural differences between the origin and the destination, the closing of those differences is expected to end migration. At the macro level, while the demand for migrant labor might continue in the country of

destination, the availability of workers willing to migrate from a specific country of origin which has experienced economic and social growth will decrease and migrants will be sourced from a different developing country. Since World War II, countries that were destinations of migrant labor have continued to receive foreign workers, while some previous countries of origin (like Italy and Spain in Southern Europe, or South Korea in Asia) have become new destinations of migrants. The insights of various theoretical perspectives concur in understanding the end of migration, i.e., the moment in which a country arrives at zero net migration. The additional theoretical challenge consists in predicting when a country would undergo the so-called migration transition and from a country of origin become a country of destination. Studies conducted on some Asian countries (APMJ 1994) concluded that the prediction cannot respond solely to abstract econometric models since national social and political factors lead to different results.

In the understanding of the development of migration in connection with economic growth, Martin (1993) has observed that the situation will be different for low skilled and highly skilled migrants. While low skilled migration will grow initially and decrease after some years in response to economic growth generated by freer trade and investment (the so-called migration hump), the migration of highly skilled workers will continue as it is compatible with decreased wage differentials between the origin and the destination.

The end of migration also has a micro dimension, which consists in the decision of migrants to return to the country of origin. Return can be structurally embedded in the migration process, as in the case of contract labor migration to the Gulf countries or other destination countries in Asia, or it can be the result of adverse circumstances in the case of migrants with permanent or long-term status in the countries of destination. Initial studies of return migration focused on presenting typologies on the possibilities for the decision to return (Rogers 1984) or the impact of return migration on the place of origin (Cerase 1974). The articulation of return within the various migration theories was put forward by Cassarino (2004) although no unified model was constructed. Battistella (2004) has suggested a matrix of four types of return, which can be addressed by four types of policies (*see* IOM 2013, p. 135). In general, it is observed that return might occur even if conventional theories on migration would suggest that it is more profitable for the migrant to remain abroad. Stark (2003), while emphasizing that migration can occur even in conditions of no wage differentials, also suggested that return might occur even if salary differentials remain high, because the migrant might want to utilize the higher purchasing power of his or her savings in the rural area. Studies tend to conclude that while economic factors might have been preponderant (although not exclusive) in the decision to migrate, non-economic factors, of which family relations are the most important, are salient in the decision to return.

1.1.8   Some Missing Components

In this synthesis, migration has been considered in its various aspects as a process which begins, continues and ends because of structural and personal factors. The

various theories have contributed to the understanding of the remote causes (the background context); the proximate determinants (the structural factors at the origin and the destination); the role of intermediaries; the personal motivations for leaving, for staying abroad and for returning; and the different ways in which a society with migrants can respect differences while attaining social cohesion.

Various aspects of the migration process were not considered. Among them: the impact of migration on the countries of origin, the countries of destination and the migrants themselves; the social consequences of migration; the nexus between migration and development; and the gender perspective on migration. Most of all, the synthesis did not address the fact that the movement of workers across borders does not take place freely. It is heavily regulated by each state, sometimes in the exiting process, to ensure protection to nationals going abroad, and always in the admission process, because every state considers the policy on admission of migrants as an expression of its sovereignty. Zolberg (1999) advocated the need to "bring the state back in" as an essential component for the understanding of migration. In this regard, the interpretative and predictive power of theories has to contend with political decisions, which do not cohere with theoretical formulations. It is not possible to expand on each of the aforementioned missing components in this chapter. However, in regard to the policy aspects it is worthwhile to observe that research on migration policies has established some regularities, which include:

- absolute control of migration is not possible or not desired;
- excessively restrictive migration policies generate irregular migration;
- admission policies are more open during times of economic growth and more restricted in time of economic recession;
- migration policies tend to be more in favor of migrants than the prevailing public opinion;
- the inefficiency of migration policies depends often on the lack of coherence with policies in other sectors;
- sectors that might be at the opposite side in other issues, can find themselves on the same side when it comes to migration (the "strange bedfellows" of Zolberg (1999)).

Trying to represent the whole synthesis in an abstract formulation might remain difficult because of too many components. The most comprehensive formulation was proposed by the systemic approach. Mabogunje (1970) attempted it in regard to rural-urban migration in Nigeria and Kritz et al. (1992) applied it to international migration. While the systemic approach helps us understand that it is not possible to look at migration simply as a movement from country A to country B while ignoring all the other relevant dimensions, it does not sufficiently address all the elements of the synthesis and it remains difficult to validate through research.

In spite of the missing components, the synthetic overview has helped us understand that many questions have been addressed in migration research and have received partial explanations. Most of the questions and the research looking for answers have been elaborated in North America and Western Europe, with the permanent, long-term or guest workers migration models as the object of analysis.

Asia has come more recently into the picture, as labor migration within the region took off only in the early 1970s. International migration in the Asian context merits the question whether it might challenge some aspects of the general theoretical formulation. In migration within Asia the role of the state is preponderant and leads to a migration system which is much more rigid than in other regions of the world. This has resulted in some out-of-the-box patterns, such as the development of labor migration to the Gulf countries from countries with which they did not have previous political or social ties, or Japan's insistence not to import less skilled migrant workers despite the decades-long demand for such workers, or the by-passing of intermediaries with South Korea's government-to-government arrangements with selected countries of origin. Irregular migration, which is widespread in the region, does not appear to be an anomaly but a component embedded in the system. The incorporation of migrants into society is unforeseen, to the point that in some places, like the Gulf countries, migrants are maintained separately from the local population. One could say that those points do not invalidate theory, as they pertain to the governance of migration. If it is true that the governance of migration cannot be effective when it clashes with fundamental dynamics illustrated by theories, then it remains difficult to explain why the migration system in Asia has persisted for over four decades. Regardless of the stance on this matter, this chapter argues that the specificities of migration in Asia should be examined to verify the theoretical questions they raise.

1.2   Migration in Asia[1]

Asia is the origin of large flows of migrants toward countries of traditional settlement in North America and Oceania and of long-term migration in Europe. In 2012, 41 % of immigrants receiving permanent status in the US were from Asia (in particular China, India and the Philippines) (US DHS 2012); the top three source countries of permanent residence in Canada were again China, the Philippines and India, which account for 36 % of the total (Government of Canada 2012); the same three countries were among the top four countries of origin for Australia in 2012–2013. In particular, the Indian sub-continent contributed 29 % to Australia's total migration program and North Asia, 23 % (Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2013).[2] Our focus, however, is on labor migration, of which we provide a very cursory overview of flows and characteristics.

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[1] This brief overview will not include Central Asia. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and/or Middle East countries are also referred to as West Asia.

[2] Asia is also a region of vast internal migration. Perhaps the most renowned internal movement concerns migrants from the rural to the coastal provinces of China, involving 221 million people (AMO 2012 (2013)).

1.2.1   Flows and Trends[3]

All regions in the Asian continent are both origin and destination of migrants. However, the Middle East and East Asia are prevalently destination of flows originating mainly from South and Southeast Asia. Migrants from the Indian subcontinent are almost exclusively absorbed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The percentage is particularly high (over 90 %) for Indians and Pakistanis. Of the Indians, however, the count is limited to those migrants who need the exit clearance (Exit Check Required), which applies only to workers in less-skilled occupations and working in 17 specific countries. They reached 747,041 in 2012 and worked mostly in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman (Government of India, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs 2013). The same Gulf countries were the main destinations of Pakistani workers, 456,893 in 2011. Migrants from Bangladesh numbered over half a million in 2011, after a decline in 2010 because of the 2008–2009 recession, and reached 607,798 in 2012, but declined again to 409,253 in 2013.[4] Large numbers of Bangladeshis also migrate to India, although in a mostly irregular way. Nepal has become more prominent as a country of origin (354,716 in 2011) and in addition to the Gulf countries, it deploys many migrants to Malaysia. The flow from Sri Lanka has been stable for some years (262,960 in 2011), of which over 90 % were directed to the Gulf countries. Apart from South Asia, migrants in the Gulf countries originate from the Philippines and Indonesia. The Gulf countries are distinctive in terms of the overwhelming percentage of foreign labor force (from 21 % in Saudi Arabia to 88 % in the UAE), which is a cause for concern across the region. All GCC countries have embarked on specific programs to reduce dependence on foreign workers and provide more jobs for their nationals. Aside from the Gulf countries, Jordan and Lebanon are also destinations of migrant labor, particularly from the Philippines, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Jordan has become a country of temporary resettlement for a large number of asylees from Syria since the civil war erupted in 2011.

In East Asia, the main destinations for migrant labor are Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The number of foreigners registered in Japan, which does not admit unskilled foreigners as workers, has been declining because of the global crisis, but surpassed two million, mainly from China, South Korea, Brazil, the Philippines, Peru and the US. Foreign workers in South Korea (which has a country-to-country admission scheme) numbered 595,098 in Dec 2011, 529,690 in Dec 2012, and 547,590 in Dec 2013. Of them, 203,473, about 37.2 % in Dec. 2013, were ethnic Koreans from China according to the Korea Immigration Service statistics.[5] Migrants in Taiwan were 489,134 at the end of 2013, mostly from Indonesia, Vietnam,

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[3] Unless otherwise specified, figures in this section are taken from the Asian Migration Outlook 2012 (AMO 2012 (2013)).

[4] http://www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=18. Accessed 21 Mar 2014.

[5] I am grateful to Ki-seon Chung, senior researcher at Migration Research and Training Center of the International Organization for Migration (IOM MRTC) in Korea for this information.

the Philippines and Thailand (ROC (Taiwan), Ministry of Labor 2014). In addition to migrant labor, all three countries have a considerable number of foreigners—mostly women—married to their nationals. This has ignited a great deal of attention in South Korea, which has instituted a multicultural program to provide foreign spouses with the necessary acculturation to adapt in Korean society.

In addition to being the main sources of migrant labor for the Middle East and East Asia, South and Southeast Asia are also destinations of migrants, mainly from countries within their respective regions. In South Asia, India is the main destination of migrants from Nepal and Bangladesh. While Nepalese can freely enter India because of the open border agreement, Bangladeshis cross the border and enter the state of Assam mostly without authorization. In Southeast Asia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are destinations of labor flows from within and outside the region. Statistics on the origin of foreigners in Singapore are not known, but the share of the foreign population to the total population reached 37 % in 2011. The foreign workforce was approximately 1.2 million, mostly unskilled migrants, particularly domestic workers and construction workers. In Malaysia, registered foreign workers were 1.8 million in 2011, over 50 % of whom came from Indonesia. The legalization program in 2011–2012 registered 2.5 million foreigners, of whom 1.3 million were in an irregular situation. Thailand is the destination of migrants from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. The actual number of foreign workers is not known, as the registered ones (1.3 million in 2011) represent only a portion of the total foreign workforce. Annual registrations yield different results, making it difficult to trace the trend of the foreign population in the country.

Among the countries of origin in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Myanmar are the countries that deploy the largest number of migrants within the region: Indonesia to Malaysia and Myanmar to Thailand. Both corridors are largely unauthorized. The Philippines is the most important country of origin in terms of worker deployment and policies designed to facilitate and protect overseas labor. In 2012, a total of 1,802,031 Filipino workers went abroad, of whom 458,575 left as new hires, 976,591 as re-hires and 366,865 as seafarers (POEA 2013). Among the various countries of origin, only the Philippines includes seafarers in its count of overseas workers, also because it is the highest deploying country in that sector. While largely going to the Gulf countries, the Philippines deploys workers in many other destinations, but particularly to Hong Kong, Singapore and East Asian countries.

1.2.2   Characteristics

The annual flow of migrants within Asia approaches four million people. The dominant model of employment is largely temporary labor migration with the following characteristics:

- *Temporary low-skill employment*. In general, migrants are hired with a short-term contract (mostly two years), which is not renewable onsite. Migrants must return to their country of origin and can be rehired, and those who do, cannot

accumulate social benefits because of the limited length of employment. The system is designed to minimize the social costs for the country of employment and to avoid the establishment of ethnic minorities with residence rights. Consequently, migrants are provided lodging in dormitories or labor camps, have minimal interaction with the local society and family reunification is not allowed. Those social rights are limited to highly skilled workers or for specific categories of foreigners, such as the *Nikkeijin* (migrants of Japanese origin) in Japan. The length of employment is longer in South Korea, where the Employment Permit System (EPS) allows for 5–9 years of work, or in Taiwan, where contracts can be renewed up to 12 years.

Migrants are employed mostly in semi-skilled or low-skilled occupations. India and the Philippines have a considerable number of highly skilled migrants, particularly in the health sector, but the majority of workers from the other countries are considered unskilled. The profile of workers from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Indonesia are rather similar: three-quarters of the workers are in low-skilled occupations. Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines provide most of the domestic workers to Hong Kong, Singapore and the Middle East. Workers from Vietnam to the Middle East are mostly low skilled, while the flow to Taiwan is more balanced. Most Indonesians in Taiwan are women working as caregivers. The profile of migrants from the Philippines is not based on skills but on categories: 45 % are production workers and 41 % service workers, of which the largest numbers are domestic workers (IOM 2011).

- *Private intermediation*. The vast majority of migrants in Asia are hired and deployed through the intermediation of the private recruitment industry. The industry has a component in the countries of destination, where recruiters are contracted by employers to provide them foreign workers, and a component in the country of origin, where recruiters are contacted by migrants looking to work abroad. The intermediation is organized in the Middle East as a system which maintains the workers under the control of the recruiter or sponsor (called *kafeel*), who holds the visa for the worker and must grant the exit clearance for the worker to leave the country. In other countries, the recruiter only functions as a placement agency. The competition among recruiters in countries of origin has increased the cost of migration, as they charge recruitment fees to the migrants.[6] The cost of migration is a major area of rights violations, as practices are poorly monitored. In many cases, migrants who cannot afford to pay the fees upfront are allowed to migrate and fees are deducted monthly from their salary. Changes are occurring in the sector, particularly in Saudi Arabia, with the establishment of the Mega Recruitment Agencies or MRAs (Royal Decree no. 51 of 2013) which should phase out the small recruiters (*kafeels*). Many questions surround this change, as the MRAs can function both as recruiters and employers and workers hired by MRAs may be transferred from employer to employer. The only exception to private intermediation is the Employment Permit System in South Korea,

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[6] In the Philippines it is equivalent to one month salary. However, domestic workers should not be charged any fee.

which relies on country-to-country agreements for the employment of foreign workers.

- *Female migration*. Because of the high demand for migrants in jobs traditionally attributed to women (nurses, domestic workers, caregivers, workers in hotels and restaurants, sales, assembly of electronic components) the number of women hired to work abroad has increased. This is particularly evident in some countries, like the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. For various reasons, including values and policies concerning women, migrants from other countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, are almost exclusively male (for details, *see* Oishi (2005)).

- *Irregular migration*. All areas of destination in Asia include a number of irregular migrants. In East Asian countries, irregular migrants are mostly overstayers, i.e., migrants who entered the country with proper documentation but remained longer than their visa or contract allows. In South and Southeast Asia, irregular migration occurs mostly in the form of border crossing. This is happening because countries of origin and destination share long land borders which are difficult to police (such as those between Myanmar and Thailand or Bangladesh and India) or sometimes long-established ethnic and economic links tend to ignore more recently drawn political boundaries (such as between the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippines and Sabah in Malaysia). In the case of the Gulf countries, irregular migration is the result of unscrupulous hiring practices or, in the case of Saudi Arabia, one major form of irregular migration is overstaying in the country following the traditional pilgrimage to Mecca. Irregular migration is mostly dealt with through registrations or amnesty programs, which allow for a temporary stay before repatriation. But the problem seems intractable.

- *International cooperation*. Migration policies in the region are set by countries of destination and countries of origin try to adapt to them, seeking to maximize the opportunities offered by the different destinations. Increasingly, however, countries of origin have become assertive and countries of destination have engaged in dialogues and agreements to improve the conditions of migrant workers. The clearest example of intergovernmental cooperation is the EPS in South Korea, which is based on intergovernmental agreements. However, bilateral agreements have increasingly been signed by countries of origin and the Gulf countries. Often such agreements intend to facilitate labor deployment and are short of conditions for protection (Battistella 2012). The willingness to engage in such a process, which was shunned years ago, is indicative of a changing trend. In addition to the bilateral approach, the multilateral dialogue has been pursued through consultation processes, such as the Colombo Process and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. More binding cooperation through the ratification of international instruments on the rights of migrants is still limited.

1.3   Theoretical Questions on Migration in Asia

The theoretical propositions advanced by migration theories formulated in countries with mature migration flows also apply to labor migration in Asia.[7] Between regions of origin and destination there are noticeable differences in economic development and specifically in expected salaries. On the other hand, the demographics of the continent are also vastly different, with regions of origin including some of the most populated countries in the world, where the propensity to migrate is well established by years of experience and an organized recruiting industry to facilitate the transfer of the labor force. Even countries that are less involved in migration fall within the theoretical framework, such as Mongolia, which is sparsely populated, or the Lao People's Democratic Republic whose per capita income is below that of the typical countries of origin (between US$ 1500 and 8000, according to Olsen (2002)), or China, which has a huge internal labor market to absorb its own labor force (although some immigration is already happening also toward China in recent years).

At the same time, migration in Asia presents specificities which demand further theoretical introspection. The first aspect concerns the fact that some unskilled migration is taking place without much difference in the salaries earned abroad compared to salaries available at home. This is particularly the case with migration to the Middle East, where salaries had declined over the years, to the point that the Philippines decided to demand a minimum salary of US$ 400 for domestic workers, causing a temporary decrease of deployment for a couple of years (2007–2008). Theory already considered the possibility of migration without salary differentials (Stark 2003). However, specific research is needed to determine the motivating factors in case of movement without economic gains: is it because of unemployment, or the desire for adventure, or in general, the result of the so-called migration culture?

As had been mentioned, migration in Asia is largely mediated by the private sector. The role of institutions, both public and private, in facilitating and furthering migration has been documented (Abella 1997, 2004). Nevertheless, the actual impact of the recruiting industry has not been properly studied in existing theoretical frameworks. Hugo (1998) considers the recruiting industry as a form of social capital. Since they are providing a paid service, it is difficult to consider intermediary agents as capital. For many migrants, dealing with recruitment industry is less of a social capital than a liability since migrants can be saddled with debts, which tie them to the migration project.

An aspect which is not much studied in migration theory is the tendency of many migrants to be involved in repeat migration or re-migration. Countries of destination seem to occupy a place in a hierarchy, which migrants aspire to move to after an initial migration. How that hierarchy is established, how it differs from country to country, and which migrants are likely to engage in repeat migration are some questions which have not received adequate attention.

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[7] Hugo (1998) had arrived at the same conclusion in his overview of the applicability of theories to Asian migration.

In regard to the migration process, there seems to be a disconnect between the migration project and its implementation. Most migrants become migrants with some objectives to be achieved but end up remaining migrants for much longer than initially planned. Theoretical studies have looked into the optimal time migrants should stay abroad (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002), but adequate research is needed to explore the factors that prolong the time abroad and measure the gaps between the planned, the optimal and the actual time in migration.

A peculiar factor of migration in Asia consists in the disproportionate and growing number of women involved in domestic work from particular countries, including the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but not from other countries. Similarly, some countries employ large numbers of domestic workers (like Hong Kong, Singapore and the Gulf countries), while others do not (e.g., Japan and South Korea). In addition to economic factors, what other factors determine the involvement of countries in domestic work migration and the hiring of domestic workers?

The resilience of migrants in time of crisis is well documented. The general wisdom is that migrants tend to maintain their jobs or to remain abroad even in times of crisis, because the alternative (returning home) is less advantageous and because of obligations already incurred at the destination (Battistella 1999). Nevertheless, the actual behavior of migrants during crisis requires better theoretical understanding.

Irregular migration is present all over the world. At the same time, irregular migration is widespread in Asia; in some countries (like Malaysia and Thailand), the scale of irregular migration is beyond the proportions found elsewhere. Some easy answers could be provided, but the feeling is that not enough is known in this regard; in particular, irregular migration has been relegated as an anomalous aspect when in fact, it can be under the purview of theoretical considerations.

Since the 1990s, remittances have grown considerably in all countries, but particularly in Asian countries that figure at the top of the list. Such growth cannot be explained solely by the increase in the number of migrants or by the increase in salaries. Of course, remittances were underreported before and much of the increase can be explained by better methods of reporting and better use of official channels. Still, some gray areas remain and the growth of remittances in times of crisis requires better explanations to be uncovered by future research.

The whole labor migration system in Asia is constructed around the temporariness of contracts and stay. Castles (2009 and elsewhere) argued that temporary migration will inevitably lead to the formation of minority communities. Although some elements of it can be traced in some countries (Asis and Battistella 2013), it is difficult to generalize. In many respects, the temporary system in Asia seems to hold (Seol and Skrentny 2009). Additional research is needed to understand whether temporary migration can function properly without introducing the possibility for migrants to settle in Asian countries.

Finally, Asia has been the site of the expansion of skilled migration. This type of migration is needed by developed economies and it is pursued by developing countries, which appreciate its higher returns and less problematic situations. The different treatment of skilled and unskilled migrants is creating a class divide, with various repercussions. Migration, ultimately, is the attempt by individuals to over-

come disparities vis-à-vis those in other countries. When differential treatment is simply replicated in the international scenario, the benefits of migration are severely dampened. Will the skilled-unskilled divide go unchallenged or will the preferred treatment of skilled migrants ultimately benefit also unskilled workers? Moreover, how will migrants be provided with more agency, increasing their participation in the negotiation of their protection standards?

1.4 The International Dialogue

As Hugo (1998, p. 170) has already observed, in Asia, "much of the literature on international migration is predominantly descriptive and atheoretical." The focus of many studies has been on policies and consequences of migration programs, less on the theoretical explanations for the various dynamics that drive migration. The international attention to the nexus between migration and development has further directed research on the impact of migration on development, less on theoretical concerns (Asis et al. 2010). Even when theoretical frameworks were presented, it was observed that they were developed mostly in the fields of economics, sociology, geography, and demography, much less in other disciplines; that the micro level analysis was less common; and that some phases of the migration cycle, like return, had received little attention compared to the rest.

The international dialogue which took place in Manila in April 2013 intended to solicit a deeper theoretical understanding of some aspects of migration in Asia by juxtaposing them with an analysis of similar aspects in a more international setting, particularly North America and Europe. Considering the interrelations of the global society at all levels, the divide is somehow artificial or arbitrary. The intent was to begin a conversation on possible theoretical developments that can continue in different settings and circumstances.

1.4.1 Temporary Migration or Circular Migration?

As noted earlier, labor migration in Asia is characterized by short duration of work and stay in countries of destination. In this respect, it reproduces the guestworker migration system in Europe, without family reunification. Temporary migration has been the most common term to refer to such short-term flows in the region, including the Middle East. Because workers normally engage in many departures and returns, other expressions were used, such as revolving door migration. Recently, the term circular migration has gained currency, both with descriptive as well as normative implications. The issue is discussed by Stephen Castles and Derya Ozkul on the North American/European side, and Piyasiri Wickramasekara on the Asian side. They agree that the term does not have sufficient theoretical and empirical background to be applied to a specific form of migration which should yield triple win results (i.e., resulting in benefits to the country of origin, country of destina-

tion, and to the migrant). In particular, it cannot be applied to the large majority of migrant workers in Asia, who do not have the freedom of movement connected with the concept of circular migration. On the other hand, the migration of highly skilled workers and professionals toward the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries also might not result in circular mobility, as both workers and employers look for stable working relations.

1.4.2 What Multiculturalism?

Because of the strict temporary nature of migration in Asia, it is commonly believed that migrants will not establish ethnic minorities within countries of destination. At the same time, some forms of migration, in particular marriage migration, are establishing communities of foreigners with permanent or long-term residence rights, prompting some Asian countries to describe this new reality as multiculturalism. Christian Joppke, reflecting on the disappointment of European countries with the experience of multiculturalism, advocates for the return to the concept of integration and the importance that institutions, such as schools, play in facilitating integration. He also makes the case for the relevance of the majority culture and migrant selection and the importance of policies that strike at discriminatory practices. In-Jin Yoon, on the other hand, presents the case of multiculturalism in South Korea, where the concept and the policy are rather recent, and explains the various facets embraced by the term multiculturalism in the Korean context. In particular, it is a program directed at a small portion of the foreign population, i.e., the foreign spouses (overwhelmingly women) of Korean citizens, and it is a program of acculturation, if not outright assimilation. In that respect, multiculturalism is a misnomer. On the other hand, because of its relevance in western societies, the term can have political relevance, as it can be utilized to enhance the quality of migration policies.

1.4.3 Gender, a Perspective of Growing Relevance

The conversation between Eleonore Kofman and Brenda S.A. Yeoh on the gender perspective of migration was thoughtful since both scholars on both sides of the globe have been dialoguing for some time in raising the relevance of women in migration flows, their role in the productive and reproductive sectors, the impact of migration on gender roles within family and society, and the broader implications of female migration for societies in the destination and the origin. Concepts like the global care chain is one of the contributions of feminist and gender scholars which has contributed to understanding the division of reproductive labor between countries at various stages of development. Building on transnational theory, some gender dimensions are posited in the specific way men and women shape or are shaped by their transnational experience. In addition, the Asian experience of growing female migration has invited more scrutiny on the nature of the family while

growing marriage migration has raised questions on gender specificities in the access to citizenship. Both authors advocate for additional research to deepen the gender perspective in the understanding of migration.

1.4.4   Return: The End of Migration or the Beginning of a New Understanding?

As return is embedded in the labor migration system prevalent in Asia, the typical concern is when return will be final and how migrants will reintegrate in their home countries. The analysis of the western experience, where migration policies are encouraging return, has brought Jean-Pierre Cassarino to emphasize the importance of return preparedness. On the other hand, Biao Xiang, reflecting on the various experiences of return in Asia, takes the conversation to a different level, where return is considered for its hermeneutic valence if migration is not understood as the behavior of some people but an event co-constituted by many participants. In that respect, return contributes to the understanding of the complex elements in the notions of nationality and transnationality and Asia becomes not just a site for a different experience of return migration but an anticipation of social transformation for the rest of the world.

1.4.5   Regional Integration: The Most Promising Context for the Governance of Migration?

Until recently, the governance of migration was dominated by the national approach, with each country formulating its own migration policy. However, the need for cooperation was long understood and regional agreements have been established in many parts of the world, mostly with the objective to facilitate the circulation of workers within the region, while maintaining control over migrants from other regions. The integration of the movement of migrants has been gradual and commensurate to the political and economic integration of the countries participating in the agreement. Reflecting on the European Union, the most advanced experiment with freedom of circulation for migrants within a region, Rinus Penninx concludes that the regional governance of migration is possible if the economic conditions and the political will for it converge. Examining the scenario of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community, to be established in 2015, Fernando Aldaba concludes that at this moment, neither the economic conditions nor the political will of the states are converging for the free circulation of migrants within the region. Demographic and economic conditions are still too great to expect such freedom. Thus, as an initial step, such freedom will be limited to seven professional categories. However, the process has started and it is expected that, sometime in the future, migrants will move freely within the ASEAN.

1.4.6   Migration Transition: The Result of Virtuous Cycles

Policymakers, scholars, and civil society leaders in countries of origin in Asia are asking how long it will take before workers are no longer forced to look for jobs abroad. Philip Martin has concluded that it is difficult to predict the turning points in the migration transition because they depend on whether migration sets in motion virtuous or vicious cycles. The three determining factors are recruitment, remittances and return. Manolo Abella and Geoffrey Ducanes have taken a different approach. In their view, turning points occur when economic welfare has reached a sustainable level. Economic factors only explain a small portion of what happens in the migration reality. In fact, full employment and migration can coexist. Moving away from the use of GDP growth as a predictor of migration flows, they have utilized the Human Development Index (HDI) elaborated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a more comprehensive measure of social and economic change within a country. Among their conclusions are the following: a rise in the HDI of countries of medium development will lead to an increase of emigration; with the rise of HDI, a lower number of college graduates migrate; a transition point occurs when the per capita income of a country goes beyond US$ 8000. In that respect, many countries will still include people with a propensity to migrate, as they are below that threshold.

1.5   Conclusion

There is a general consensus that research on migration needs to be based on better theoretical frameworks and be grounded on multi-method analysis. The intent of the international dialogue was to strengthen a conversation among scholars on specific aspects of the migration process which have particular relevance for migration in Asia and to suggest that the Asian experience might have some peculiarities which can contribute to migration theories.

Many themes were discussed in the dialogue, raising questions for further research, including:

- To what extent is the temporary migration system prevalent in Asia sustainable? Will minorities develop within Asian societies as a result of migration, and how will countries address them?
- The cultural aspect has played an important role in forging migration policies in Asian countries. Some forms of migration, particularly marriage migration, call for a reconsideration of cultural homogeneity. How can societies that have traditionally considered themselves to be culturally homogeneous deal with cultural diversity? As multicultural policies did not encounter the same support in countries of North America, Oceania and Europe, can Asian societies learn from previous experiences or will they repeat the same journey from assimilation to integration? Or will they tread an intercultural pathway?

- Should the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) expand the free movement of professionals? Will professionals support circularity within AEC or will they expect the right to settle?
- How can the rights-gap between less skilled and more skilled migrant workers be closed?
- In working towards making migration as a choice rather than a necessity, how can virtuous cycles be implemented in the countries of origin of the continent? In what ways can regional and international dialogues contribute to it?
- How does irregular migration fall within a migration theory? Is it simply a deviant behavior from defective policies or is it an integral component of the migration process? What is the threshold of irregularity that can be considered tolerable by countries?

There is a long road ahead and arriving at sound theoretical propositions can be elusive. In reviewing migration theories, Arango observed that "most would still not qualify as a theory… Existing migration theories are mainly useful for providing explanations ex-post" (Arango 2004, p. 32). In that respect, it might be wiser to speak of regularities as Zelinsky (1971, pp. 221–222) had suggested. Establishing the regularities of migration in Asia is an initial contribution to the theorization of migration that can draw migration scholars from Asia and beyond.

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Chapter 2
Circular Migration: Triple Win, or a New Label for Temporary Migration?

Stephen Castles and Derya Ozkul

2.1 Introduction

The term 'circular migration' has become fashionable in migration policy circles. The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2005 concluded that 'the old paradigm of permanent migrant settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration' (GCIM 2005, p. 31). In the same year, the International Organization for Migration argued in its World Migration Report that circular migration would bring benefits to developing countries (IOM 2005). The debate was further stimulated through the European Commission's 2007 Communication on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships (European Commission 2007) and debates at the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development (*see* various chapters of Betts (2011)).

It is very hard to define circular migration (*see* below for more discussion), but it is generally taken to mean 'repeated migration experiences involving more than one emigration and return' (Wickramasekara 2011, p. 9). In other words, it denotes a situation in which migrants are able to move between an origin country and one or more destination countries repeatedly, for stays of varying duration. Circular migration is frequently characterized in policy documents as a 'triple win':

> It offers destination countries a steady supply of needed workers in both skilled and unskilled occupations, without the requirements of long-term integration. Countries of origin can benefit from the inflow of remittances while migrants are abroad and skills upon return. The migrants are also thought to gain much, as the expansion of circular migration programs increases the opportunities for safer, legal migration from the developing world (Agunias and Newland 2007, p. 1).

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Agunias and Newland (2007, pp. 1–2) also argue that circular migration is appealing because many migrants do want to return to their countries of origin after a period of working abroad.

Critics of current policies on circular migration, on the other hand, argue that the supposed benefits to origin countries and migrants are often not achieved. Such critics see circular migration as attractive to destination country governments, because it allows them to overcome public hostility against the recruitment of migrant labor through the claim that migrants will not settle and that they will not bring about social and cultural changes. In other words, it reflects the desire of destination countries to 'bring in labour but not people' (Wickramasekara 2011, pp. 85–86), similar to the intentions of past 'guestworker policies' (Castles 2006). If this is the case, then circular migration might be seen simply as a new label for temporary migration, especially for lower-skilled workers. This can be a way of recruiting labor to meet employer demands, while restricting worker rights and entitlements, and thus reducing both the social and political costs of migration.

In this article, we will discuss the various understandings and policy models of circular migration, particularly with regard to different skill categories. We will provide brief case studies of some national approaches, and discuss the extent to which worker and human rights are affected by circular migration policies. We will come back to the question of 'triple win or new label for temporary migration?' by discussing evidence on the development impacts of circular migration and the effects for workers, their families and communities, as well as examining which groups might benefit in destination countries. We will argue that migration policies are bound to fail if they do not consider the social dynamics and the human side of migration.

2.2 Conceptualizing Circular Migration

There is no generally agreed definition of circular migration. Governments, international organizations, academics, NGOs and trade unions focus on different aspects of circular migration, and therefore use different definitions. For example, Vertovec (2007, p. 2) argues that the shift to circular migration has come through 'a rather sudden realisation that remittances, the transnational flows of money earned by migrants abroad, have become a major global economic resource.' Hence, he claims that international organizations and governments look for ways to help migrants to invest in hometown associations and to 'tap' diasporas for various purposes (mainly through philanthropy, entrepreneurship or political lobbying)' (Vertovec 2007, p. 3).

This official approach is based on a neoclassical understanding of migration theory, which considers migrants as financial assets rather than as social beings. Neoclassical macroeconomic approaches, developed initially by Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961) and Harris and Todaro (1970), suggest that migration occurs because of differentials between areas in economic needs and wages. Microeconomic, neoclassical theories, developed by Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969) and Borjas (1989) assume that migrants take their decisions rationally by calculating the costs

and benefits of moving between two countries. Similarly, present advocates of circular migration assume that origin and destination countries would develop such programs because of their economic needs and that individuals would participate based on their rational calculations.

On the other hand, Skeldon (2012, pp. 44–45) points out that there has been considerable research going back many years on circular internal migration, that is, regular, short-term movement back and forth between villages and towns. He goes on to argue that the extension of such internal migration models to international migration is linked to newer ideas on transnationalism and the importance of social networks for shaping patterns of movement and residence. Examples of such circular international migration can be found in the long-standing 'sojourner behaviour' associated with Chinese migration, as well as more recently in the 'shuttle migration' from Eastern Europe to the West following the collapse of communism (Skeldon 2012, p. 46). Such movements mostly take place in areas where free movement across international borders is allowed. Examples include the European Union's Schengen zone and the Trans-Tasman agreement, which allows free movement between Australia and New Zealand (Skeldon 2012, p. 47).

The key point here is that such forms of circular migration are based on the freedom of individuals and groups to decide about their own cross-border movements. Many current models of migration management are precisely about constraining such freedom through limitations on who may migrate, restrictions on length of stay, denial of such labor rights as medical insurance or choice of employers and occupations, and enforced return to the origin country after a certain period. Skeldon states that 'It is a contradiction in terms to speak of managing circular migration, as the very fact of managing the process will turn circular migration into temporary programs of migration' (Skeldon 2012, p. 53). Cassarino (2013) labels this as 'securitised temporariness':

> Circular migration programmes do not only build upon past practices designed to regulate the movement of international migrants; they also react against such inherited practices in a subtle manner by linking the adoption of temporary and circular migration programmes with new security-driven safeguards. (Cassarino 2013, p. 23)

Most present models are based on the neoclassical model and involve movements of migrant workers to immigration countries for limited periods of time. Migrant workers may include low-skilled workers, trainees and people with middle-level trade skills or highly skilled professionals. Usually, such workers get residence and work permits that only allow them to stay for a certain period, sometimes with the possibility of renewal. Such arrangements can include seasonal work permits limited to a certain number of months, as well as longer-term permits for a certain number of years. The GCIM stated that 'each year, for example, some two million Asian workers leave their own countries to work under short-term employment contracts, both within and outside the region' (GCIM 2005). Clearly, in such models circular and temporary migration programs are seen as more or less identical.

The European Commission (EC) defines circular migration 'as a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries' (European Commission 2007, p. 10). The two most relevant

forms of circular migration for the EU are seen as those concerning migration of third-country nationals settled in the EU (i.e., not citizens of an EU member state) and circular migration of persons residing in a third country. The former can be seen as a way of facilitating the temporary return of diaspora members (often highly-skilled persons) for business, professional and voluntary work or other activities. The latter category is about providing opportunities for people to come to the EU temporarily for work, study, training or a combination of these on the condition that they return home after a certain period. 'Ensuring effective return' is a key aspect of the EC Communication and circular migration is closely linked with 'mobility part-nerships,' which are designed to 'better manage migration flows, and in particular to fight illegal migration' (European Commission 2007, p. 4).

Typically, official migration policies in general and circular migration policies in particular differentiate between workers according to their 'human capital,' in other words, their education and skill levels. Nearly all destination states—not just the older industrial states of the West, but also newer industrial countries in Asia and elsewhere—have set up schemes to encourage the entry of the highly-skilled, such as IT professionals, managers and medical practitioners. It is generally easy for such persons to get residence permits (both temporary and permanent), which are often linked to preferential treatment with regard to family entry and other privileges. This category of workers is the one most likely to take on the characteristics of circular migrants, moving frequently between origin and multiple destination coun-tries—yet paradoxically, destination country governments often want to encourage the highly-skilled to remain permanently.

Lower-skilled workers, by contrast, generally experience highly restrictive con-ditions, with limitations on duration of stay and the right to change jobs, as well as a frequent prohibition on bringing in dependents. Circular migration schemes are often of a seasonal nature, or are restricted to certain industries with labor short-ages, such as hospitality, construction and agriculture. Such schemes often contain enforcement provisions to ensure timely departure, such as bonds or forced savings repayable only in the country of origin, or even deportation in the event of overstay-ing the limited duration of entry permit. Clearly supply and demand are crucial fac-tors in these differential schemes: there are shortages of highly-skilled workers so they get favorable conditions, while lower-skilled workers are seen as plentiful and are therefore easily replaceable. Some governments may decide to forbid lower-skilled migration altogether, while turning a blind eye to irregular migration. This brings advantages for politicians, who can chime into populist anti-immigration discourses, as well as for more marginal employers, who may prefer irregular work-ers because they lack rights and can readily be exploited (Castles et al. 2012). Such a perspective based on purely economic benefits ignores the universal human rights of migrants.

In response to the neoclassical theory, the 'new economics of labour migration' (NELM) (Stark 1991; Taylor 1999) has stressed that wage differentials between two countries are not the only factor in migrants' decisions. Researchers using the NELM approach have also shown that many migration decisions are made not by individuals but by families, who see work in a city or another country as a way of

diversifying resources and minimizing risk. The majority of present circular migration programs do not take into account this social and human dimension of migration. Indeed, migration is not only an economic process, but also a social one affecting both migrants and their family members at various levels. Present programs often presume that individuals take their decisions alone and only for economic benefits. However, ignoring the fact that migrants are tied to their families and their surroundings may result in the false understanding that led to the failure of past 'guestworker' programs.

2.3 Overview of Temporary and Circular Migration Schemes

Between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s, all the fast-growing industrial economies of Western Europe imported labor, especially for lower-skilled jobs in manufacturing, construction and the services. In some cases (UK, Netherlands, France), many of the workers were from former colonies and were entitled to settle permanently. Other migrants entered spontaneously and were regularized once they had jobs. For instance, in France, over 80 % of migrants entered in this way in the late 1960s (Castles and Kosack 1973, p. 34). But in addition to these unmanaged flows, all the Western European countries at one time or another experimented with the systematic recruitment of temporary migrant workers. The UK, France, Switzerland and Belgium pioneered labor recruitment in Southern Europe as early as the 1940s, while Germany, Austria and the Netherlands followed. One of the strategies used was seasonal recruitment, especially for agriculture, construction and catering.

For example, Switzerland had 149,000 seasonal workers in 1969. These had permits to enter for less than 1 year, but with an option to re-apply in subsequent years. Later, a rule was introduced that allowed seasonal workers to convert to Annual Permits after 5 years. Those on Annual Permits (the largest category of foreign workers) were also allowed to bring in dependents after 3 years and to change to long-term permits after 10 years (Castles and Kosack 1973, pp. 36–39). These concessions—introduced due to competition for scarce labor in the late 1960s and early 1970s—inadvertently led to permanent settlement later on. This experience demonstrates how circular migration (in this case, repeated seasonal employment) can lead to temporary migration (annual permits) and then on to settlement. The German example (*see* Box 2.1) reinforces this lesson.

> **Box 2.1: Germany**
> As a latecomer, the German Federal Republic was able to learn from experiences elsewhere. Its system for recruiting guestworkers was based on a high

degree of state involvement, as well as bilateral agreements with countries of origin. The idea was to provide a 'mobile labor potential' (as German employers put it), by recruiting workers for a limited period, restricting their labor market and residence rights and minimizing family reunion. The approach was known as 'rotation': the labor reserves of Southern Europe, Turkey and Northern Africa could provide a constant flow of workers, but few would settle permanently, so there would be no significant social or cultural consequences for the receiving country. Moreover, temporary workers were expected to accept relatively poor wages and conditions, to make few demands on social infrastructure and to avoid getting involved in labor struggles. Germany was trying to import labor but not people (Castles and Kosack 1973, pp. 39–43).

The German guestworker scheme, like others, failed to achieve its aims. Most migrant workers came with the intention of staying only a few years. Indeed, many did return home after a period, but others stayed on longer and were able to bring in dependents or to start new families. In addition, they gained longer-term residence rights, as well as entitlements under Germany's work-based welfare systems. Certain workplaces were labeled as 'guestworker jobs', and German employers became dependent on foreign labor. When German authorities decided to suspend recruitment at the time of the 1973 'oil crisis', they found that many migrant workers stayed on, and that processes of family reunion, settlement and formation of ethnic minorities had become unstoppable.

Yet in the 1990s, Germany once again introduced temporary migrant worker programs. A combination of demographic ageing and high demand for labor in certain sectors made the import of workers essential, albeit on a smaller scale and under even stricter conditions than before. By the late 1990s, a range of programs were leading to the temporary employment of around 350,000 foreigners a year (Martin 2004, p. 239). The largest was the seasonal worker program set up in 1991, which provided for bilateral agreements with Central and Eastern European countries to admit workers for up to 3 months in agriculture, building or catering. Another program was for foreign 'contract workers', employed by firms in their home country, who came to work in Germany for up to 2 years on specific projects, usually in the building sector. The workers remained employees of the foreign firms and were often paid far less than German wage rates. Other smaller programs covered cross-border commuters from the Czech Republic and Poland, and short-term recruitment of nurses from former Yugoslavia and Asian countries (Castles 2006). Irregular employment of Polish builders or domestic workers, for example, became widespread.

Temporary programs declined in significance after the accession of many Central and Eastern European countries to the EU in 2004 and 2007, while many irregular workers were legalized. Germany, like most other EU states (except the UK, Ireland and Sweden) introduced an initial delay in free move-

ment from these countries, but this period has now passed. In any case, the global economic crisis (GEC) from 2008 led to an increase in migrant unemployment, but also (and unexpectedly) to an increase in migrant employment concentrated in sectors mainly providing jobs for women, such as aged care, domestic service and cleaning (OECD 2012, pp. 61–68). German policies now focus mainly on attracting highly-skilled workers, such as engineers and doctors, and on implementing the EU's Blue Card Directive to attract highly-qualified persons from outside the European Economic Area (OECD 2012, p. 232).

Like present circular migration schemes, the guestworker system was based on the 'rotation principle,' whereby workers were to work for a limited time, and then return to their countries. This system, however, did not work due to several reasons. First, employers were frustrated that the workers they trained had to leave after a certain period of time and argued for the need to retain them. A second reason was connected with migrants' life cycle. Migrants were generally fairly young when they first arrived and initially intended to return home after a period. But once they built social networks, established their families and had children who went to destination-country schools, it became much harder to leave. Third, the situation in sending countries—especially less-developed ones like Turkey and Morocco at that time—offered few opportunities for returning migrants. Lastly, it was very difficult for liberal, democratic countries to deport migrants who had not committed any offence. Like many other migration policies (Castles 2004), the guestworker system failed and created unintended consequences such as ethnic concentrations and the need for high expenditure on infrastructure and integration.

The guestworker era of the 1960s and early 1970s gave way to new 'zero immigration policies' on the part of many European governments. However, by the 1990s, these were proving hard to sustain, in view of demographic factors (decline in fertility rates and increasing numbers of people over working age), social factors (improving education for young nationals and their reluctance to take on low-skilled jobs) and economic factors (strong demand for skilled workers in some sectors, growth of service industry jobs, and demand for female migrant workers in areas such as domestic work, aged care work and cleaning). In Southern European countries, the main approach was to tacitly permit irregular migration from Eastern Europe, North Africa and Asia, with periodic amnesties or legalization campaigns. Northwestern European countries like the UK, Germany and France also experienced increased irregular migration, but generally preferred regular migration. In both Southern and Northwestern Europe, a series of temporary migration schemes were introduced. However, it is often hard to differentiate between temporary and circular migration schemes—especially as the term 'circular migration' has only come into widespread official use since 2007, most importantly through the EC's 2007 Communication on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships (European Commission 2007).

Box 2.2: Spain

Prior to the major recession that started in 2008, Spain recruited large numbers of foreign workers. Spanish legislation favored circulation of migrants. Departed temporary workers had to register with the Spanish consulates or embassies within 1 month after their return to origin countries. After this, they were permitted to participate in the temporary program again without going through the original selection process (Newland et al. 2008). Those who had participated in seasonal programs for 2 years (4 years before the Organic Law 2/2009), had obeyed the rules and returned to their countries after each program, could also acquire easier access to permanent residency (European Migration Network 2010, p. 33).

Seasonal workers entered Spain under the general program for foreign workers, *Contingente de Trabajadores Extranjeros*, which allowed them to stay up to 9 months in a year. Temporary migrant workers did not have the right to free circulation within the European Union. The establishment of national quotas (*contingentes*) was a multi-level process in Spain including employers, trade unions and regional authorities (Carrera and Faure-Atger 2010). Each year, the *contingentes* were decided according to provincial and sectoral needs, and were approved by the national government at the last stage.

Spain signed bilateral partnerships with Morocco, Colombia and Romania. The Integrated Management Programme for Seasonal Immigration between Morocco and the Province of Huelva aimed at attracting workers from Morocco to work in strawberry and citrus fruit cultivation in Cartaya, Spain. The program was highly criticized by human rights organizations due its worker selection process. Initially, migrants' rates of return to their origin countries were very low: in 2005 only five percent of the 1200 participants returned home. The selection process was then changed: only women aged less than 40 who had children were accepted. Workers were not allowed to bring their children or other family members. In 2007, 85 % of the 4563 workers returned voluntarily (Newland et al. 2008, p. 8). The program established employment centers in Casablanca, Kenitra and Nador to provide information to workers about the application process, work and life conditions in Spain, as well as courses in the Spanish language.

The Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) plan between Spain and Colombia was implemented with the support of the IOM. Information distributed by the Program emphasized the dangers of irregular migration and the advantages of return. The plan was based on initiatives by the Spanish trade union, *Unión de Pagesos* (UP) and its foundation, the *Fundación Agricultores Solidarios* (FAS), to attract workers for harvesting fruit in Catalonia. This was an important example for provincial level decision-making. It was

the *Unión de Pagesos* rather than the Spanish Government that signed the agreement with the Colombian Government. The FAS also identified labor needs in agriculture in Catalonia and worked with the Ministry of Labor to find workers from Colombia, Morocco and Romania. The foundation helped workers to find accommodation and to facilitate their integration. In the Catalan region, they manage 5250 housing units.

A major trade union in Spain, the *Union General de Trabajadores* (UGT), called for the establishment of a forum to discuss issues concerning migrant workers' rights and integration into the labor market. The UGT opened an information center in Ecuador and was in contact with the trade unions in Morocco. In Spain, temporary workers do not have to contribute to pension funds. After they return to their countries, this puts them at risk in the future. On the other hand they are entitled to healthcare. However, temporary migrants participating in such programs are not allowed to have sick leave. Therefore, migrant workers generally do not go to doctors unless they have serious accidents at their workplace. If they do go to doctors, they are not paid for that day, and therefore in practice, they are reluctant to go (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2012).

By 2008, as a result of the deepening recession and rising unemployment, Spain suspended most recruitments of migrant labor. However, seasonal employment for agriculture has continued, as this sector remains highly dependent on foreign seasonal workers. There has been a shift from managed migration from Morocco to spontaneous entries from Ukraine and from the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.

Mobility Partnerships (MPs) are the key instruments of the EU's migration policy. Cassarino (2013, p. 31) argues that these are selective as 'they are addressed to those third countries once certain conditions are met, such as cooperation on unauthorized migration and the existence of "effective mechanisms for readmission"'. The EU signed mobility partnership agreements with Moldova and Cape Verde in 2008, Georgia in 2009 and Armenia in 2011. An agreement was also attempted with Senegal, but could not be achieved. At the time of writing (May 2013), negotiations with Ghana were still ongoing. Recently, the so-called Arab Spring brought about new flows of migration. Since then, the EU has called for immediate action to start negotiations with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, with a view to establishing MPs. Similarly, negotiations are also planned with Libya 'as soon as the political situation permits' (European Commission 2011, p. 2). MPs include enhancement of circular migration programs (Maroukis and Triandafyllidou 2013).

Emphasizing flexibility, the EU's Global Approach to Migration, which was adopted in 2005, had evolved into Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) by 2011. 'Mobility' here refers to short-term visitors, tourists, students, academics, businesspeople and family visitors. Another major difference from past schemes is that current temporary schemes do not derive from a comprehensive

migration policy, but are composed of small and separate programs. These may include programs specifically designed for seasonal workers, working holidaymakers, sector-based workers, and overseas students in receiving countries. The public may be unaware of these because such programs are specific and are not connected with each other.

The desire for flexible temporary or circular migration schemes is, of course, not limited to Europe. In recent years, the US Government has expanded temporary work-related visa schemes, which now bring in far more skilled workers than the Green Cards (that allow permanent residence). In 2010, 1.7 million temporary workers were admitted—mainly highly-skilled personnel. The intake of seasonal agricultural workers (H2A visas) also increased from 28,000 in 2000 to 139,000 in 2010. The main countries of origin for temporary workers were Canada, Mexico and India (UN DESA 2009). This is a temporary rather than a circular scheme, even though workers may be allowed to re-apply after returning home. By contrast, New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme is based on managed circularity. It allows agricultural and horticultural employers to recruit seasonal workers under agreements with the governments of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Workers are only allowed to stay for a limited period of under 1 year, but can return in subsequent years (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment 2013). Boxes 2.3 and 2.4 give details of temporary or circular migration concerning Canada and Australia, while Box 2.5 deals with the Republic of Korea.

Box 2.3: Canada

Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) favors circular migration to meet labor needs in agriculture, particularly in Ontario's tomato industry. The SAWP has been running for more than 40 years since the Canadian Government signed bilateral agreements with Caribbean countries in the late 1960s and with Mexico in 1974. Around 20,000 migrant workers, mostly from Mexico (60%), participate in the program (Newland et al. 2008, p. 6). Migrants can work between 6 weeks and 8 months, and may return in the following year, provided that their employers still want to employ them. The employer is supposed to pay migrant workers the same wages as Canadian workers, as well as provide health insurance, accommodation, meals or cooking facilities. Employers are also responsible for paying part of the transportation costs from and to the origin country. Employers prefer workers who have at least basic literacy skills. SAWP migrants are not allowed to apply for permanent residency, nor can they bring their family members (Wickramasekara 2011, p. 47). SAWP is regarded by many as a 'model' for temporary migration programs due to its high degree of circularity; yet, critics point to excessive employer control and workers' restricted mobility and social and political rights (Basok 2007; Preibisch 2010).

Canada has also started a pilot project for workers with lower levels of formal training (LSPP). The project issues work permits of up to 2 years for workers at skill level C (those who have completed secondary school and some job-related training, or who have completed courses directly related to work) and for workers at skill level D (those who have completed some secondary school and on-the-job training). Workers have been employed for 'crop production, animal production, support activities for agriculture, food and beverage manufacturing' (Preibisch 2010, p. 410). Workers may extend their stays for 6 months more, provided that their employer approves it. After that, they have to leave Canada for at least 4 months. Workers under the LSPP are not allowed to bring in family members, or to apply for permanent residency. In both types of low-skilled temporary programs, cases of discrimination and exploitation have been reported (Preibisch 2010). While recruitment used to be limited to married men, recently, some women have been recruited as well.

Canada has had a Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP) since 1992. Workers have to have taken at least 6 months of training or to have had at least 1 year of full-time paid work as a caregiver in the past 3 years prior to application to the program. After approximately 2 years of employment, caregivers may be eligible to apply for permanent residency in Canada.

Provincial governments may initiate and sign bilateral agreements directly with origin countries: the government of British Columbia has signed an agreement with the Philippines to receive 30,000 temporary workers (Newland et al. 2008, p. 14). Another agreement was signed between the province of Québec's Foundation of Recruiting Enterprises of Foreign Agricultural Labour (FERME) and the government of Guatemala. The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Project Guatemala-Canada was established in 2003 under the management of the IOM. The number of workers participating in the project has grown from a few hundred to approximately 4000 in 2010. To guarantee their return, the project typically selects married men and women with children.

Box 2.4: Australia

Like Canada, Australia has been a major destination for permanent migration regardless of migrants' racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds. However, in recent years, temporary migration has increased rapidly. Currently, Australia hosts around 650,000 temporary migrants. This includes New Zealanders, who have freedom of movement under the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement: although no figures exist, it is believed that many enter temporarily or move back and forth. The others are skilled temporary migrant workers entering

under the 457 Temporary Business Visa program and international students. Annual intakes of 457 Visa holders have grown rapidly and now are nearly equal to entries of permanent skilled migrants. Many temporary migrants work in the fast-growing resources sector as mineworkers, trades-people and technicians, while others are in manufacturing and service industries. Many are managers, often taking part in intra-company transfers in multinational corporations. International students are allowed to work for 20 hours a week while studying. Most have to enter the labor market, due to the high student fees and cost of living; they form an important labor source for the retail and catering industries.

Another source of temporary migrant labor, especially for agriculture and tourism, is Working Holiday Makers. Students and other young people, mainly from British Commonwealth countries and North America, are allowed to work temporarily while visiting Australia. Working Holiday Makers are a crucial source of labor for seasonal harvesting of fruit and vegetables and for the hospitality sector. Their number has steadily increased, reaching 162,475 by the end of 2012 (DIAC 2012, p. 7). In 2008, the Australian Government introduced the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme to admit Pacific Islanders to work in horticulture. Recently, East Timorese workers have also been admitted under this scheme to work in tourism. As of September 2012, only 1623 seasonal workers had arrived under the Pilot Scheme. The low take up is mainly because employers prefer Working Holiday Makers, since the regulations concerning accommodation and other conditions are less onerous.

Australia does not apply any specific circular migration programs, yet Graeme Hugo's research on Chinese and Indian migrants in Australia shows that circular migration already occurs without government intervention. Hugo (2008) shows that those who have returned to China visit Australia regularly, while those remaining in Australia visit China frequently. Hugo (2009, p. 17) concludes that there exists 'a considerable extent of bilocality with many Chinese and South Korean origin Australians maintaining work, family and housing in both countries and circulating between them.'

Temporary migrants are not entitled to medical care or welfare benefits in Australia. Moreover, it remains unclear how existing principles of settlement, multiculturalism and citizenship will be affected by the increase in temporary flows. This represents a significant shift in Australia's historical immigration model: people who enter with a temporary perspective are likely to have different ideas about settlement and citizenship, compared with those who arrive with a more permanent perspective. For a traditional country of immigration, understanding these transformations is crucial.

Box 2.5: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

South Korea's foreign resident population has risen rapidly since the early 1990s, reaching one million (or two percent of the population) in 2010 (OECD 2012, Table A5). Since the late 1980s, South Korea has had labor shortages due to low fertility, increased length of education and reluctance to do manual work (Hur and Lee 2008). When the South Korean Government eased regulations on foreigners' entry in 1988 to attract tourists to the Seoul Olympic Games, inflows of irregular migrants began to increase rapidly (Seol 2001).

In 1994, the government introduced the 'Industrial Trainee System', which sought to replace irregular migrant workers with 'industrial trainees'. They were, in fact, contract workers in low-skilled jobs who were allowed to stay for a maximum of 3 years but without entitlement to basic labor rights. 'Industrial trainees' were paid less than existing irregular migrants and were not allowed to change their workplace. However, many employers (especially in marginal sectors) welcomed migrant workers. 'Industrial trainees' became irregular by leaving their designated jobs or by overstaying (Hur and Lee 2008; Seol 2001). Since most migrant workers were heavily in debt to pay broker fees, becoming irregular was widespread. The number of irregular migrants peaked at 308,000 in 2002, and the Korean Government abolished the 'Industrial Trainee System' in 2006.

In 2005, the government introduced a new 'Employment Permit System' (EPS), which recognized the labor rights of migrant workers and provided the same minimum wages as national workers. The recruitment and placement process is now handled by government agencies of South Korea and the sending countries. EPS migrants are allowed to stay for 3 years under the initial permit and to renew their permit once for 1 year and 10 months. This gives a total period in Korea of 4 years and 10 months—designed to prevent migrant workers ever reaching the threshold of 5 years, after which they could apply for citizenship.

In 2002, the government also introduced another scheme exclusively for members of the Korean diaspora in China and other countries in the region (the 'Visit Management System', later replaced by the 'Visit and Employment System') (Lee 2010).

Many employers want to retain workers who have learned the job and performed well. In 2010, the contracts of the first EPS migrants (including renewal) ended. It has been reported that up to 40 % of these workers stayed on with an irregular status (Kyung 2013). Therefore, in 2012, the government introduced the 'Faithful Foreign Worker Program' to allow workers to apply for a new permit, after spending at least 3 months in their origin countries. These workers have to work for the previous employer, at least initially. Like the original permit, the new one does not lead to entitlement to permanent residence or family reunion. Job-changing rules also remain highly restrictive.

The South Korean government sets an annual ceiling for incoming migrant workers. However, high salaries and the strong influence of Korean culture throughout Asia have increased aspirations to migrate to South Korea. The recruitment process under the EPS is still costly and highly competitive. The EPS also restricts the industrial sectors for foreign employment to manufacturing, construction, agriculture and fishery (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2010), where employers often prefer male employees. Service sectors such as catering, cleaning, domestic work and care-giving are exclusively permitted to members of Korean diaspora under the 'Visit and Employment System'.

Left with few opportunities, women who wish to go to South Korea may have to seek other options such as marriage migration (Kim et al. 2007; Lee 2008). Marriage migrants cannot apply for visa renewal or for citizenship without the endorsement of their spouses. Currently, one in four new marriages is an international marriage, and the number of marriage migrants increased from 25,000 in 2001 to 142,000 in 2011 (Korean Immigration Service 2002, 2012). Many of the brides are ethnic Koreans from China, but others come from Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines.

Note: This box is based on research by Chulhyo Kim, University of Sydney.

2.4 Transnationalism and Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century

Circular migration appears to be the optimum solution for the conflicting demands of the market and the state: it provides businesses with the flexible labor they demand, while supporting politicians in their claim of supporting the sovereignty and the tightly controlled borders of the nation-state. However, the implications of such schemes seem to be the very sources of their failure. The emerging 'flexibilization' (Harvey 1989) threatens basic principles both for individuals and for nation-states. At the individual level, it creates mobile people (referred to as 'vagabonds' by some authors) tied to business and state interests. Although there have always been mobile people in history, imposing circular schemes on their movements forces them to develop transnational identities—which contradicts a core principle of traditional nation-states. Zygmunt Bauman (1995) argues that 'vagabonds' become 'strangers' wherever they are. Through constant movements, everywhere they go becomes their place, but eventually nowhere becomes their real place (Bauman 1995, p. 94).

On the state level, a new configuration of citizenship rights and obligations emerges in the long run (Ong 1999). A strictly managed (and therefore, 'forced') circular migration has the potential to create forced transnational identities, which may transform traditional loyalties to nation-states. Circular migration schemes emerge from both political and economic perspectives, but also from a new set of configurations of time and space in the contemporary world and have the potential

to create new unexpected configurations. Just as the old temporary guest-worker schemes proved that temporary migration was not a temporary issue, such circular migration schemes can illustrate that migrants in the present world cannot be forcibly circulated, without creating new allegiances and new sub/supra national identities that could eventually transform the very foundation of nation-states.

James Hollifield (2004) has drawn attention to the 'liberal paradox': international economic forces push states towards greater openness, but powerful domestic political forces push for greater closure. The liberal paradox also applies in ethical terms. On the one hand, liberal Western democracies support individual human rights as universal rights. On the other hand, they deny such human rights to non-citizens who cross their borders. Whether they are defined as irregular or seen as regular, but are restricted to a limited period of time or to a specific employer, migrants cannot enjoy their universal rights and often become exposed to exploitation. As Seyla Benhabib puts it:

> The modern state system is caught between sovereignty and hospitality, between the prerogative to choose to be a party to cosmopolitan norms and human rights treaties, and the obligation to extend recognition of these human rights to all (Benhabib et al. 2006, p. 31).

Circular and temporary schemes tie migrant workers to certain sectors and employers for pre-defined periods of time. These spatially and temporally confined workers risk becoming part of a new model of indentured servitude (De Genova 2009). While circulating between countries, migrants have to lead dual lives. Migrants have strong ties to their family members back home, and this is a way for receiving countries to make sure that they return. The circular migration project between Spain and Morocco provides an example (*see* Box 2.2 above).

The median age of non-member immigrants to EU countries is 27.5 (EUROSTAT 2011, p. 47). If we assume that circular migrants have similar age patterns, it seems probable that their marriages (or partnerships) would be either delayed or ruptured, and if they do have any children, these might be left alone and at risk. In destination countries, migrant workers' compulsory ties to their employers increase their vulnerability, while in origin countries, their dependents are at risk through the absence of spouses or parents. Hence, the liberal paradox in ethical terms is that 'transnational migrations bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies: between sovereign self-determination claims, on the one hand, and adherence to universal human rights principles, on the other' (Benhabib 2004, p. 2).

Stuart Rosewarne (2010, p. 106) argues that for labor-sending countries, the opportunity to export labor requires the proletarianization of labor power, with the constitution of the new global worker, and is premised on the country being incorporated more fully into the international circuit of capital as labor becomes organized as a commodity, through the sale of labor power, as capital, and as migrant workers remit earnings as capital in a money form.

Labor-receiving Western states, on the other hand, are democratic and claim to respect human rights both in their national legislation and in their adherence to international human rights treaties. Therefore, no politician can state such economic imperatives explicitly. Hence, the tacit acceptance of irregular labor migration in

some cases (such as the USA, with its 11 million irregular residents) and the drive for circular migration, as a way of justifying the denial of rights for non-citizen workers in other cases.

It is important to highlight the paradoxes of circularity. Such schemes renegotiate and render the sites of authority for nation-states more fluid than ever. If circular migrants are deprived of their right to have one single residence, they tend to create transnational spaces. Paradoxically, it is in such transnational spaces that the sites of authority for nation-states are re-defined and unraveled.

This leaves us with the question, 'how can human rights approaches work in a world based on mobility and transnational identities?' New configurations are already emerging under international and supranational law. The EU is a unique example, where citizens of a member state can vote in the local elections of another member state. However, the EU is also an example of geographical restrictiveness: rights only apply to people who are citizens of specific states within clearly defined boundaries.

It is not ethically or politically acceptable to trade off human and worker rights for the opportunity to migrate as a worker, as has been suggested by some economists (Ruhs and Martin 2008). We believe human rights should be applied to each individual and group to the same extent, whether they are part of a national or regional community or not. Migrant workers should be entitled to bring their family members with them, and to have access to trade unions and social benefits. For example, one of the 'classical countries of immigration', Australia, does not provide medical care and social benefits to its temporary residents. This is against the transcendent and equal dignity of all persons - the basis of Western liberal thought.

2.5   Conclusion: The Triple Win—Who Gains and Who Loses?

The use of the term 'circular migration', especially in policy documents, is often imprecise and vague. Even if we do choose to not rigidly follow Ronald Skeldon's precept that circularity and management are incompatible concepts (*see* above), it should be acknowledged that most official circular migration schemes are really temporary migration programs under a nicer-sounding name. Sometimes, they have elements of circularity, such as improved conditions for applying for a second period as a seasonal or temporary worker. In other cases—especially in the Gulf oil states and much of East Asia—they are temporary programs pure and simple. Indeed, many employers and governments do not differentiate between the two. In this chapter, we have taken an eclectic approach that reflects this conceptual confusion, and discussed a range of migration schemes that show at best limited aspects of circularity.

Proponents of circular migration claim that it provides a 'triple win situation,' bringing benefits to destination countries, origin countries and the migrant workers themselves. In this final section we briefly discuss these claims and the evidence

available to assess them (for a much more detailed account with many references, *see* Wickramasekara (2011)).

2.5.1 Claimed Benefits for Destination Countries

Circular migration is promoted as offering destination countries a supply of both highly-skilled and lower-skilled workers, without the costs of long-term integration measures. It is clear that many employers—especially in low-productivity sectors—welcome the availability of workers on circular or temporary schemes, both because such workers fill labor force gaps and because they are easily exploitable, since they are often not allowed to change jobs or look for better conditions. This corresponds to the fact that demographic factors are limiting the number of young nationals entering the labor market, and that such young nationals are in any case often not prepared to accept poorly-paid or unpleasant jobs. However, even in low-skilled sectors, it is far from certain that circular or temporary schemes provide sustainable solutions: where labor needs are long-term, recruitment on short-term 'rotation' schemes will not help in the long term. For example, one of the fastest growing areas is domestic and care work, where labor demand tends to be long term, and where employers do not favor frequent changes in personnel.

As for highly-skilled workers, there is considerable evidence that migrants prefer opportunities for long-term residence and family reunion—even if they plan to leave in the long run. Attempts to attract highly-skilled personnel on a temporary basis—like the German Government's scheme to recruit Indian IT workers—have not been very successful, as the highly-skilled can choose from a range of competitive offers.

The belief that circular migration will lower integration costs is not new—it was a key rationale for the guestworker programs of the 1960s and 1970s, and this contributed to serious problems faced by immigration countries later on when settlement did take place. Circular migration programs are sometimes based on the claim that integration measures are not needed for short-term migrants. Furthermore, the fact that migrants are not allowed to bring their family members reduces the costs involved for destination countries. However, even temporary migrants need integration services, such as information with regard to their rights, but also about practical measures, like finding housing and managing daily life in a foreign society.

In Australia, government-funded Migration Resource Centers are instructed not to provide any services for temporary migrants. In reality, it is hard for Migrant Resources Center personnel to turn away temporary migrants in search of help. Moreover, non-governmental welfare organizations sometimes have to provide services for temporary workers (as well as for asylum seekers) without government funding. In Spain, the farmers' solidarity foundation (*Fundación Agricultores Solidarios*) facilitates temporary migrant workers' integration. In the UK, the East Riding Migrant Engagement project aims to provide housing, health, information and education-related services to migrants, including seasonal agricultural workers. In any case, denying medical care and welfare benefits to workers on circular migration

schemes is a violation of human rights and can also lead to negative consequences for public health and social cohesion.

Moreover, the very idea of completely preventing settlement reflects an inability to understand that migration is a dynamic social process: most migrants do indeed believe when they first arrive that they will return home, but as their stay in the new country extends, they get older, form relationships and have children, and thus, their life-goals often change. Virtually every temporary movement leads to some settlement. Democratic states are rarely willing or able to adopt the draconian measures needed to prevent this, while more authoritarian states often lack the capacity to enforce departure and to prevent a shift into irregular status—particularly when employers are eager to retain experienced workers, as the South Korean case shows. Few circular or temporary programs provide opportunities for transition to permanent status (Australia is a positive exception in this respect, as many 457 Visa holders and students do become permanent settlers), yet, the transition takes place nonetheless, and often, under very difficult circumstances.

Yet, Western governments seem to believe that circular migration will reduce irregular migration. This is a key objective of the EU's mobility partnerships and circular migration schemes as well as its more general migration policies (European Commission 2011).

Circular migration programs are designed to channel migrants into regular forms of migration, by offering opportunities of legal movement to those who undertake the often complex application processes and wait for permission to migrate. Such programs are invariably linked to pressure on origin countries to adopt measures to regulate emigration and eliminate irregular movements. However, there is little evidence that circular migration programs actually do reduce irregular movements. Since destination countries favor highly-skilled migrants and ignore the actual employer demand for lower-skilled workers, the very workers who might benefit most from regular migration are often excluded. Since jobs exist for the lower-skilled, irregular employment remains a frequent option—actually encouraged at time of high labor demand by some governments (such as Italy and Spain), although not today due to the recession. The tightening of border control by the USA is a prime example of the unintended consequences of government policies: along with a rise in deaths at the border, the result in many cases has been that former irregular circular migrants have turned into permanent settlers (Cornelius 2001; Jimenez 2009).

2.5.2 *Claimed Benefits for Origin Countries*

The second 'win' lies in the claim that circular migration will contribute to the development of origin countries. International organizations, like the IOM (2010, 2011), argue that circular migration can benefit origin countries through remittances and the transfer of skills. Important policy institutes such as the European Policy Centre (McLoughlin and Münz 2011) and the Washington, DC-based Migration Policy Institute (Newland et al. 2008) also support this view, albeit at least in the

latter case with the reservation that major changes are needed in many current circular migration schemes (Agunias and Newland 2007). As temporary workers, circular migrants are believed to bring their savings back with them when they return to their home countries. Because highly-skilled participants in circular migration schemes are also obliged to return, such programs are also claimed to prevent a 'brain drain' of needed development skills from origin countries. Indeed, it is also claimed that highly-skilled circular migrants actually gain training and experience while away, thus benefitting origin countries even more.

Yet, there is little evidence to support any of these claims. Since temporary migrants tend to get poorly-paid jobs while abroad—and this is actually supported by such restrictions as prohibitions on job changing—they rarely accumulate significant savings that could be invested to support economic development. High rates of unemployment of returnees have been reported in India and the Philippines (Agunias and Newland 2007, p. 7); nor do most such migrants gain skills. Destination-country employers are looking for cheap and flexible labor and are generally unwilling to invest in education or training. As for the highly-skilled, the phenomenon of 'brain waste' is widespread: where people considered highly-skilled in origin countries can only get less-qualified jobs in destination countries, they are unlikely to gain useful skills. Even in the rare cases in which migrants do gain education and training, this may not be particularly relevant to the labor-market needs they encounter upon return.

It seems, therefore, that migrants are more likely to be able to contribute to the development of their origin countries if they are able to gain secure, permanent positions in destination countries, rather than the temporary and often exploitative jobs typical of circular and temporary migration programs. Indeed, programs to encourage members of diasporas to invest in their home countries, or to return on a temporary basis to make their skills available (also seen as part of circular migration) may be more useful than circular migration from origin to destination countries.

In any case, analysis of a range of cases of successful and less-successful attempts to link migration and development leads to the conclusion that migration itself cannot make a significant contribution, unless other conditions conducive to development are present: an investment-friendly climate; reduction of bureaucracy and red tape; provision of infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications and electricity; and reduction of corruption (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). Advocating circular migration as a panacea for development follows the naïve recent trend of 'celebrating migration as self-help development "from below"' (de Haas 2010, p. 227).

2.5.3 Claimed Benefits for Migrants

Finally, do the migrants themselves gain from circular migration programs? It is true, as proponents of circularity claim, that, at the time of initial migration, many migrants only want to work abroad for a limited time, in order to save to improve

their living and working situation upon return. The chance to migrate legally must be seen as a benefit for those able to access it, as it reduces the risks and costs of migration.

But there are many caveats to this conclusion. First, since receiving country governments prefer the highly-skilled, lower-skilled migrants often still have to cross borders or to take up employment in an irregular way. Highly-skilled workers may indeed gain from the easier mobility facilitated by circular migration schemes—and yet, paradoxically, it is this category of workers who are most likely to be offered permanent residence. The lower-skilled are less likely to be able to access circular schemes—much circular migration is in fact irregular. In some countries (e.g., Spain and Italy), workers may be regularized later on; in others (such as the USA, Malaysia and Japan), they often remain in permanent insecurity as irregular workers. As we saw above, EU mobility partnerships and circular migration schemes emphasize the objective of cutting irregular migration, but there is little evidence that they achieve this.

Second, even where the lower-skilled can move through circular migration programs, they may not be able to achieve their economic objectives: assigned to '3D jobs' in low-productivity sectors, they are unable to save much, and have to repeatedly postpone their definitive return to the country of origin. Employers often have no interest in training or promotion for circular workers—it is their low cost that is attractive to employers in the first place, and any investment in training may be lost if the worker has to return home.

Third, with increasing length of stay, migrant workers' objectives may change, particularly through incorporation into social relationships and family formation. Every circular or temporary scheme, despite the intentions of its authors, involves some degree of permanent settlement. The few schemes that provide a legal possibility for this allow settlement with security and dignity; the majority lead to irregularity, insecurity and conflict.

Failure to recognize the nature of migration as a social process was at the root of the failure of past European guestworker systems. This blindness has now been globalized into the new crop of circular and temporary schemes. The governments of Asia's industrial countries find such schemes just as attractive as do their counterparts in Europe, North America and Australia; but there is little evidence that such schemes will achieve their declared objectives.

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Chapter 3
Circular Migration in Asia: Approaches and Practices

Piyasiri Wickramasekara

3.1 Introduction

Circular migration is nothing new as it has long been rooted in internal migration and cross-border migration flows. What is new is the current emphasis on managed circular migration as a triple win bringing benefits to all three parties involved—migrant workers, destination countries and origin countries. Several comprehensive up-to-date reviews are available on broader issues of circular migration and its relevance particularly in the European context (McLoughlin and Münz 2011; EMN 2011; Wickramasekara 2011). In line with the theme of this volume, the objective of this chapter is to survey the theoretical discussions of temporary and circular migration in Asia.

First, the chapter reviews definitional issues and evidence on temporary and circular migration in Asia briefly. The next section reviews some past studies in so far as they try to explain the theoretical basis of such movements. In the final sections, the weaknesses and strengths of existing literature will be identified together with areas for further research.

3.2 Definitions and Notes on Methodology

3.2.1 Definitions and Evidence of Circular Migration

There are varying definitions of circular migration in the literature ranging from promotional definitions to generic ones (Wickramasekara 2011). The author maintains that a generic definition offers the best approach for understanding circular migration. "Simply defined, circular migration refers to temporary movements of a

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repetitive character, either formally or informally across borders, usually for work, involving the same migrants" (Wickramasekara 2011, p. 1). By definition, all circular migration is temporary. It is different from permanent migration for settlement and return migration involving one-trip migration and return.

To the extent that migration is defined in terms of permanency of move, the coverage omits "a great variety of movements, usually short term, repetitive or cyclical in character, but all having in common the lack of any declared intention of a permanent or longstanding change of residence" (Zelinsky 1971, pp. 225–226).

It is also necessary to distinguish between different types of circular migration:

- Spontaneous (voluntary) circular migration and managed circular migration;
- Circular migration of persons from developing countries and circular movement of persons from the diaspora to their home countries.

In discussing theoretical issues, spontaneous or voluntary circular migration offers more scope than managed ones. In the Asian context, there are no formal or managed circular migration programs except the seasonal worker programs of New Zealand (Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme) and Australia with the Pacific Islands. The Korean Employment Permit System (EPS) is not technically a circular migration scheme, but the introduction of the 'Faithful Foreign Worker Program,' whereby some workers can apply for a new permit subject to spending at least 3 months in their origin countries, makes it a managed circular migration (Castles and Ozkul 2013). The long-standing Gulf migration system is primarily a temporary migration program, which has elements of circularity to the extent that some workers may repeatedly go back for work there (Wickramasekara 2011).

On the one hand, all circular migration is in essence temporary migration because migrants have to eventually return to the home country in the absence of any right to permanency in the country of destination. On the other hand, all temporary migration forms do not lead to circular migration—most may involve a single migration cycle while some programs may lead to permanent settlement in destination countries like what transpired under previous guest worker programs in Europe. In this sense, circular migration is a subset of temporary migration.

3.2.2 Data and Measurement Issues and Evidence on Circular Migration

Given the inherent difficulties in measuring normal migration flows, it should be naturally more difficult to estimate circular migration. In national and international data systems on international migration, the term circular migration hardly appears. For instance, there is no single reference to either circular migration or circular migrant workers in the ILO manual on migration statistics (Bilsborrow et al. 1997) or the UN Recommendations on International Migration Statistics (United Nations 1998).

Hugo's field work in Indonesian villages (Hugo 1982) highlighted that census and other statistical data collections bypass these movements. Lucas also confirms:

> Yet circular migration is normally difficult to quantify, given the nature of census data; recording a person's current location and place of birth reveals no migration, despite any intervening, circular movement. As a result, only specialized surveys really permit systematic analysis of circular migration. (Lucas 2003, p. 15)

Chapman and Prothero also argued as follows:

> To comprehend its complex nature more fully, circulation must be investigated and analyzed at several scales: the micro (individual, family), the meso (community, settlement system, region) and the macro (country, continent, world). Consequently, the measurements and techniques to be employed are of critical importance and the data must be both longitudinal and cross-sectional. Far greater attention must be focused upon social, economic and political structures which bound and influence reciprocal flows and these must be examined from a range of assumptions. (Chapman and Prothero 1983–1984, p. 622)

The ILO manual and UN Recommendations recognize the categories of 'seasonal workers' and 'temporary migrant workers.' At the national level, one hardly finds any information on circular migration patterns involving overseas migration. Circular migrants are difficult to measure because they may not go through the registration systems in subsequent moves given their familiarity with the migration system. The lack of formal exit control measures in many countries also is another reason for missing information on such movements. Even recent surveys have omitted this category. For example, various reports of the periodic Kerala migration surveys which involve about 15,000 households in the State of Kerala have not made any reference to circular migration.

When migrants are part of a specific circular migration program based on an agreement between two countries, there is better scope for generation of movement data. This is true of the Employment Permit Scheme of the Republic of Korea.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) provides separate information on a category of 'rehires' which could reflect repeat movements. The Philippines regulations distinguish between two categories of migrant workers returning to the same employer ("*Balik-manggagawa"*):

> a) Worker-on-Leave—a worker who is on vacation or on leave from employment under a valid and existing employment contract and who is returning to the same employer, regardless of any change in jobsite, to finish the remaining unexpired portion of the contract.
> b) Rehire—a worker who was rehired by the same employer after finishing his/her contract and who is returning to the same employer, regardless of a change in jobsite. (Department of Justice 2012, p. 3)

The first category is not strictly a form of circular migration because the movement is part of the initial migration episode. "Rehires," as defined in the Philippines context, refers to a specific type of circular migration. The term 'rehires' underestimates the true extent of circular migration because it includes only those going back to the same employer. A circular migrant can join another employer in the same country or move to a different country for employment after the first migration experience because the basic criterion of circularity is that the same migrant is involved in repeated migrations, irrespective of the destination country. The share of rehires in

Table 3.1 Australia: permanent migration in and out, 1993–1994 to 2007–2008. (Source: Hugo 2009b, p. 22)	Asia-born moving to Australia	560,111
	Asia-born moving from Australia to Asia	97,552
	Australia-born moving from Australia to Asia	72,773
	Net migration	389,786

total land-based outmigration in the Philippines has been in the range of 60–65 % of total migrant workers between 2008 to 2011 (POEA 2012). This could mean that total circular migration would be more than two-thirds of the total.

A study in Jordan found that only 10 % were first time migrants, while 46 % were there for the second time and the balance, 44 % more than twice. An ILO survey in the UAE and Kuwait however, revealed that only a quarter of those who moved were repeat migrants, but the sample was purposive and not representative of the general situation (Wickramasekara 2011).

A migrant re-integration survey carried out in Sri Lanka reported that only 40 % of migrant workers sampled had gone for foreign employment for a second time. Close to 20 % were third time migrants, and less than 10 % were fourth time migrants (SPARC 2013).

Contrary to popular view that permanent migration represents a one-way flow, Hugo has pointed out that permanent skilled migration movement from Asia to Australia is a two-way flow based on analysis of migration flows between 1993 and 2008 (Table 3.1).

In this sense, permanent migration streams also involve circular mobility elements.

3.2.3 Framework of the Study

A theory of circular migration has to address the following tasks:

a. conceptualize the difference between circular migration and other forms of mobility, specially temporary migration;
b. explain the factors that lead to the initiation of circular/temporary migration or circular mobility;
c. highlight the reasons for continuation or perpetuation of circular migration;
d. predict the impact and consequences of circular migration on parties involved: migrants themselves, host and origin societies.

This chapter recognizes the close links and parallels between internal and international migration (Standing 1984a; Skeldon 2006). As Skeldon remarked: "Internal and international migrations are integrated and it is necessary to consider them as a unified system rather than in isolation" (Skeldon 2006, p. 15). As shown in Sect. 3.3, early theories of circular migration in Asia were primarily based on analysis of internal migration.

3.3 Theoretical Research on Circular Migration in Asia

According to Massey et al. (1998b): "much of the literature on international migration is predominantly descriptive and theoretical, providing little opportunity for hypothesis testing or theoretical generalization" (p. 170). They cite several reasons for relative absence of theoretical studies on circular migration and mobility in the Asia-Pacific context (Massey et al. 1998c): relative recency of immigration in most countries, poor quality of data on international migration and high incidence of irregular and informal movements. While immigration in Asia may have been relatively new in the 1990s when they conducted the study, it is no longer the case.

Most work on Asian temporary migration across borders have been empirical since the large-scale movements that took place from the Gulf boom of the early 1970s. Concerns with feminization of migration and trafficking and smuggling of migrants became major preoccupations of international agencies which funded part of this research.

In the Asian context, rampant problems of abuse and exploitation of migrant workers, both in the Gulf and within Asian countries, have absorbed a lot of attention from researchers (Wickramasekara 2002, 2005). Asis et al. (2009) have shown that research funding by many agencies in Asia "seems to focus, almost exclusively, on particular issues such as trafficking, to the exclusion of other concerns" (Asis et al. 2009, p. 82).

More recently the issue of migration and development also has featured high on the research agendas (Asis et al. 2009). As Asis et al. (2009) point out: "In general, migration research has been preoccupied with capturing bits and pieces of the phenomenon as it unfolds, a task that has limited most research to descriptive analyses" (p. 98).

3.3.1 Early Theories of Circular Migration Processes Involving Internal Migration

Since the 1960s, there has been rich literature on circular migration and mobility concerned with internal population movements (Bedford 1973a, b; Hugo 1975, 1982, 1984; Goldstein 1978; Standing 1984b).

Bedford's Pioneering Analysis of the Transition in Circular Mobility, New Hebrides (Bedford 1973a, b)

Bedford carried out a survey on the movements of people of New Hebrides from 1800 to 1970, in arriving at his views on circular mobility. In his view, circulation was more common than migration in traditional tribal and peasant societies (Bedford 1973a, b). He distinguished between oscillation, which involves routine movements of less than 1 month, and circulation. He explains the rationale of circular migration as follows:

> Plural societies and dual economies exist in various forms in most colonial or formerly
> colonial countries, offering a contrast in ways of life that can be particularly stark. A com-
> promise often adopted by members of the indigenous population is circular migration.
> Wishing to retain the security of their traditional institutions, generally associated with
> residence in rural communities, while obtaining some of the benefits of involvement in
> non-indigenous economic activities, they circulate between village or hamlet and the cen-
> tres of wage employment-plantations, mining settlements, towns. (Bedford 1973b, p. 189)

It is also important to note that the mobility of New Hebrides people went beyond
national borders to other islands as well as to Queensland, Australia. The main mo-
tivation was the demand for non-indigenous material goods. Later migration to cash
cropping areas and movement to towns within the New Hebrides became common.
Bedford adds:

> This brief survey of the evidence of over 150 years does not reveal a transition leading
> yet to permanent redistribution: it does however, reveal a transitional sequence within a
> particular class of movement behaviour-circulation. Throughout the post-contact period,
> a basic and traditional pattern of inter-island mobility has persisted in which permanent
> change in place of residence is exceptional. (Bedford 1973b, p. 207)

This is because for most islanders, the rural communities remain as their permanent
homes, "as bases from which to participate in a variety of economic activities: sub-
sistence gardening, cash cropping, local business ventures and wage employment"
(Bedford 1973b, p. 226).

Hugo's Analysis of Circular Migration in Indonesia and West Java

Hugo's analysis of Indonesia is the most comprehensive assessment of circulation
undertaken in Southeast Asia. "The work of Graeme Hugo (1975) on population
mobility in West Java constitutes a milestone in research on the topic, both be-
cause of its innovative character for the region and because of the many insights it
provides on the role of circulation and commuting in total population movement"
(Goldstein 1978, p. 39).

Hugo has summarized these arguments in two research articles (Hugo 1982,
1984).

> Circular migrants usually maintain some village based employment, and the frequency,
> with which they migrate is determined by the distance involved and the costs of traversing
> it, their earnings at the destination, and the availability of work in the home village. (Hugo
> 1982, p. 61)

What is interesting are the discussions of what explains circular or non-permanent
migration. Hugo considers three theories: (a) sociocultural explanations; (b) eco-
nomic explanations; and, (c) uneven development or uneven impact of capitalism.

The first view argues that circular migration has become institutionalized within
certain ethnic groups in Java, but Hugo saw that there were a number of complex
sets of interacting forces, among which economic considerations are also important.
As regards economic explanations, he advances the hypothesis of maximizing fam-
ily income and utility from consumption.

> [M]ost of the non-permanent migrant households could not earn sufficient incomes in either the city or the village to support themselves and their dependents. Thus, circular migration or commuting provides a means for families to maximize their incomes by encouraging some members of the household to work in the village at times of peak labor demand and to seek work in the city or elsewhere at slower times while other members of the household remain to cope with limited village-based labor demands. …. Thus, by earning in the city but spending in the village, the migrant maximizes the utility gained from consumption. (Hugo 1982, p. 70)

The other plausible reason is risk aversion or minimization since a "circulation strategy keeps the mover's options in the village completely open so that the risk of not being able to earn subsistence is reduced by spreading it between village and city income opportunities" (Hugo 1982, p. 70). Village-based support systems can be mobilized in times of economic or emotional need, and lack of resources does not allow them to take the risks involved in permanent migration to the city.

The third explanation argues that mobility resulting from the uneven impact of capitalism generates substantial inequalities across sectors, classes, and space. Hugo cites Frobes who stated that this type of circular migration delays the formation of a proletariat, preventing the emergence of "two social groups: an urban-based non-landowning proletariat and a small farming class." Instead the outcome is an "undifferentiated group involving themselves in both the capitalist and peasant modes of production."

Hugo (1982) argues that all three explanations are complementary. The first two economic explanations represent a micro-level situation whereas the third theory—uneven development—implies that macro-structural forces in society are important to explain the migration phenomenon.

Hugo also analyzed the impact and consequences of the moves which have a close parallel in current research on migration and development. For instance, he highlighted the role of remittances—again a major benefit of the triple win argument currently being advanced (Wickramasekara 2011). The study found that 60% of the income of commuter households were derived from remittances, while remittances from circular migrants amounted to almost half of their households' total income.

Hugo also posed the question on whether the observed high level of non-permanent mobility was simply a transitional phase followed by permanent relocation of many migrants to urban areas. While he rightly pointed out the need for integrating the known causes of this circular mobility into a coherent theoretical framework, the study did not attempt to do it.

Circular Migration in Southeast Asia: Some Theoretical Explanations (Fan and Stretton 1984)

The above study also deals with the issue of rural-urban labor migration. It offers two models to provide theoretical explanations of circular migration.

First, it is the decision of the family to maximize income as well as utility from consumption referring to spatial allocation of family resources. Second, is the hypotheses of income maximization-cum-risk aversion options for the family The

study advanced the hypothesis that "a risk-averse decision-maker prefers circular migration to permanent migration even if the latter promises higher expected income" (Fan and Stretton 1984, p. 339).

Hugo (1982) had also used these two models to explain circular migration from villages of Indonesia as shown above. As he highlighted, the models are complementary rather than competitive.

The analysis draws upon village studies reviewed by Goldstein (1978) and urban occupation studies done by different researchers in Southeast Asia. It is based on migrants in the urban informal sector in Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila who have adopted a circular migration pattern. The strong network of contacts is an integral part of the circular migration process because it is through these contacts that a potential migrant can secure a job in the urban sector. It was observed that circular migrants from the same rural area and same job tended to live together in the city, which ensured social support and lower living costs. Thus, the family would distribute its labor resources between the village and the urban center to maximize family earnings, usually by sending the main income earner to the city while the rest of the family remains in the village. Fan and Stretton (1984) argue that a sufficient set of conditions must be present for a circular migration pattern to emerge. Among the conditions are: "the rate of return in the urban sector is relatively higher than in the village (at least for a large part of the year) and either living costs are higher in the city than the village … or the family has a rural-biased consumption preference, or a combination of both" (Fan and Stretton 1984, p. 346).

The second model of risk aversion indeed complements the income-utility maximization model by showing that if one aims at maximizing income and is risk-averse, then circular migration would be preferable than other options.

> Risk aversion provides an additional reason for keeping a home base in the village. If plans fail to materialize, the family can always fall back on its existing mode of livelihood. By keeping his contacts, the circular migrant goes to the city only when work is available, thus eliminating to a great extent the uncertainties of job-hunting.

Fan and Stretton (1984) therefore, conclude that circular migration is a rational choice of risk-averters, and that remittances and the repetition of the circular pattern act as important mechanisms to strengthen the linkages between the rural and urban sectors.

3.3.2   Asian Migration Systems

The Asian labor migration system is largely a temporary labor migration system which has seen several waves of migration. The initial trigger was the Gulf oil boom of the early 1970s which enabled the Gulf countries to embark on ambitious modernization programs calling for massive labor inflows, particularly from Asia. The rapid development of Malaysia and Thailand also led to large inflows of labor from neighboring countries, initially on irregular basis. Apart from Hong Kong SAR, other East Asian countries had no formal labor admission schemes for low- skilled

workers despite the demonstrated demand (Wickramasekara 2002). The Taiwan Province of China in the early 1990s and the Republic of Korea more than a decade later (in 2004) liberalized the admission of low-skilled workers while Japan has still not relaxed its policy of denial. At the same time, Asian skilled workers, particularly from China and India, have migrated to major European countries, and to Australia and New Zealand within the region, mostly on a permanent basis. More recently, New Zealand, followed by Australia on a smaller scale, launched schemes for the admission of workers from Pacific countries on a seasonal basis for work mainly in agriculture. The Recognised Employer Scheme of New Zealand is a good example. Current types of migration flows include the following.

a. Migration to the Middle East and the Gulf region: mainly from South Asia although the Philippines and Indonesia also account for part of the flows to these destinations.
b. Intra-Asian flows: mostly to Malaysia, Hong Kong SAR and the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan (China). These flows are dominated by migrants from Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand) and China and Mongolia to some extent. There is a substantial volume of irregular cross border migration flows. South Asian countries also send workers to Malaysia and Singapore and to the Republic of Korea under its Employment Permit System (EPS). Within South Asia, there are cross border flows from Afghanistan to Pakistan, Bangladesh to India and Pakistan (largely undocumented) and from Nepal to India (within a free movement regime).
c. Documented flows to developed country destinations within Asia and outside Asia, mostly of skilled persons. Australia and New Zealand are the major destinations in the Asia and Pacific region, while destinations outside Asia include Canada, the United States, the UK, and other European countries. The flows consist of both permanent settlers and temporary workers, and the youth may account for a substantial share.
d. Irregular flows to developed Asian destinations, Australia and New Zealand and to Western countries from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia (China and Mongolia).
e. Seasonal workers from the Pacific island countries and other Asian countries brought to New Zealand under the Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme (RSE) are bound by strict regulations on duration of stay. This is the closest to circular migration as defined above.
f. Working Holiday Maker scheme: a few Asian countries (Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) are entitled to send workers to Australia under this program but not the bulk of poorer Asian countries. This is a temporary scheme which does not formally provide for repeat migration.

Most of these flows are not circular migration per se, but there are elements of circularity in the temporary migration schemes. For instance, the Gulf migration forms part of circular migration when the same people undertake repeat migration. In a

broader and loose sense, the system can be described as circular migration because previous groups of temporary migrants are being replaced by subsequent waves of temporary migrants and only some may be new migrants. In other words, there is migrant circulation though it may not involve the same migrants. But in this Chapter, I shall use the narrow definition of circular migration, i.e., repeat movements by the same workers.

The only attempt at an extended discussion of the theory underlying Asian migration is the monograph by Massey et al. (1998c). The monograph discussed Asian migration in terms of two systems: the Gulf migration system (Massey et al. 1998a) and the Asia-Pacific system (Massey et al. 1998b). These are discussed in the next section.

The Gulf Migration System

Migration of workers to the Gulf countries was a major development that sustained temporary labor migration regimes following the virtual termination of European guest worker programs. The oil bonanza of the early 1970s enabled Gulf countries to modernize their economies resulting in large demands mainly for low-skilled workers. Over time, most of the expatriate work force have been drawn from Southeast and South Asia. It is a classic temporary labor migration system based on fixed-term contracts valid mostly from 1 to 3 years. It is also a strictly rotational system with some circular migration occurring when migrant workers re-migrate with new contracts. Competition has driven down wages, and working conditions are proverbially poor. Intermediaries play a major role at both ends which further erodes the benefits of labor migration for workers and source countries. Abuse and exploitation of migrant workers and denial of their basic human and labor rights are very common, with private sector employers acting with virtual impunity (Wickramasekara 2005; Verité 2005). Standing's (1984a) characterization of international circular migrants applies equally well to the Gulf situation:

> Being vulnerable as aliens and ignorant of their rights as citizens, if they have had any, they have represented a highly exploitable labor supply, workers who could be used to depress wages (through a resignation to accept lower wages and through exerting pressure on average wage rates); they have facilitated an increase in the detailed and social division of labor and helped perpetuate and accentuate a stratified labor force in very much the same ways as with internal labor circulation. (Standing 1984a, p. 34)

While this temporary labor migration system with elements of circularity has continued for about four decades, it cannot by any means serve as a model to be replicated in liberal democratic societies.

There have been few attempts to discuss the Gulf system in terms of circular migration. There is hardly any information on the extent of circular migration in the Gulf system except, to some extent, for the Philippines.

The neoclassical argument of persons migrating for higher wages still applies given existing wage differentials between origin and destination countries. Yet, the difference has been narrowing over the years, especially for low-skilled workers. There is also wage discrimination by nationality (Wickramasekara 2011).

Massey et al. (1998a) maintain that two theoretical models are more relevant than other theories in understanding levels and trends in Gulf migration: segmented labor market theory and social capital theory.

As regards segmented labor market theory, Gulf migration has been demand driven from the beginning. There is clear segmentation of the labor market between a highly pampered public sector, mostly reserved for native workers, co-existing with another sector consisting of small and medium enterprises largely reliant on cheap immigrant labor. Unlike in Piore's (1979) theory, this segmentation is not because of rapid industrial transformation in Gulf countries, but because of the vast infrastructure and other investments made possible by the oil bonanza. The immigrant sector makes up a large share of the economy, with migrant workers accounting for 60–90 % of the total workforce in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. Over the years, there has been the Asianization of the workforce "whose migrants can be more effectively exploited through policies of deliberate discrimination" (Massey et al. 1998a, p. 159) unlike Arab workers.

Massey et al. (1998a) also emphasize the role of social capital—institutions and networks—in explaining the perpetuation of Gulf migration even in the presence of "rather draconian labor market and immigration policies" (p. 159). Undoubtedly the Gulf region presents a quite difficult environment with no pathways to permanent settlement and lack of family unification provisions for the low skilled who comprise the bulk of the migrants. Settled communities of migrants had emerged initially, especially among migrants from the Arab countries. The Gulf War and its aftermath served as a convenient trigger to engage in mass deportation of established communities of Jordanians, Palestinians, and Yemenis except Egyptians with the marked shift to Asian workers. There has been growing social networks over time among Indian and Pakistani workers in the Gulf region who can provide useful information and contacts for their friends and relatives to migrate to the region.

At the same time, a major recruitment industry has been built up in both origin and destination countries which promote and perpetuate migration. These consist of large networks of recruitment agencies especially in origin counties, subagents, the sponsors of migrants or *kafalas* in destination countries, government bureaucracies, travel agents and other service companies, and former migrants themselves acting as agents. They have a vested interest in promoting continuous migration given the large rentier incomes involved.

Massey et al. (1998a) did not find any evidence, however, that the forces outlined by the world systems theory were relevant to the initiation or perpetuation of international migration to the oil-rich nations of the Gulf (Table 3.2).

Asia and Pacific System

Massey et al. (1998b) reviewed the Asia and Pacific system, treating it as a separate migration system from the Gulf one. Their analysis probably reflects the mid-1990s situation when the intra-Asian system had not matured fully, and Thailand had not become a major destination.

They conclude that the neoclassical economics proposition that migration flows are driven by wage differentials between origin and destination countries is supported by empirical evidence.

> Whereas neoclassical economics predicts a one-time move to a region of higher wages, the new economics posits successive periods of temporary foreign labor to achieve specific goals such as risk minimization or capital accumulation. Circularity, of course, reinforces social obligations embedded in Asian kinship structures and ensures continued family control over migrant behaviour, and more significantly, over migrant income. (Massey et al. 1998b, p. 177)

Segmented labor market theory advanced by Piore (1979) may apply better to some Asian destinations, such as Taiwan (China), the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, since these countries had achieved structural transformation of the economies. According to Massey et al. (1998b) the segmentation mostly occurred along the lines predicted by Piore (1979) "with a bifurcation of employment into primary and secondary sectors" (Massey et al. 1998b, p. 182). The jobs which do not appeal to native workers are mostly in agriculture, construction, domestic service and small and medium enterprises.

Massey et al. (1998b) also favor social capital theory in that migrant networks explain 'perpetuation of international migration.' According to them, "the existence of a stock of migrants in a potential destination is the most important predictor of whether a particular community will send migrants to that area in the future" (Massey et al. 1998b, p. 186). However, they noted the absence of studies to formally support this hypothesis either for migration to the Gulf or within Asia.

3.4   More Recent Research: Illustrative Cases

There has been a large gap in the literature on circular migration between the 1980s and the late 2000s when the renewed interest in circular migration came up in the context of migration and development. The Global Commission on International Migration highlighted the potential of circular migration which was later picked up by the European Commission, Global Forum on International Migration and Development, and the International Organization for Migration, among others.

This section reviews a few studies dealing with the theoretical aspects of circular migration in the context of some Asian countries.

3.4.1   Circular Migration Patterns to Japan

In the case of Japan, two types of circular migration can be observed. One is the admission of entertainers who get 3- to 6-month visas. The other group consists of migrants of Japanese descent described as Nikkei. There are only a few studies which attempt to explain the rationale of these pattern of mobility.

Table 3.2 Relevance of theories for Gulf and Asian migration systems based on Massey et al. (1998b)

Theory	Gulf migration system	Asia-Pacific migration system
Neoclassical	Initially wide wage differentials between origin and destinations; Trends for wages of low skilled workers to decline over the years; Wage discrimination by nationality	"The accumulated weight of empirical evidence generally supports neoclassical theory's fundamental proposition that movement into and out of countries of the Asia Pacific system is tied to wage differentials" (Massey et al. 1998b, p. 175)
New economics of migration	Not much evidence to support; but remittances are important income supplement for migrant families	Evidence supports migration household decision—not individual decision, esp. for women; not fully tested; risk diversification strategy common; supports repetitive migration pattern for risk minimization and capital accumulation
Segmented labor market theory (Piore 1979)	Demand driven immigration; dual labor market and labor market segmentation are evident between public sector and large private enterprises and other sector reliant on immigrant low wage labor; Wage discrimination; Immigrant sector much larger share of economy; Asianization of workforce to undermine bargaining power of migrants, and as a result of the 1990 Gulf war	Demand-driven with structural change in Asian tiger economies and Japan, and later by Malaysia and Thailand; 3D jobs, Korea SMEs, agriculture, construction and domestic work dependent on migrant labor; "clear pattern of labour market segmentation within the Asia Pacific migration system." Immigration demand-led and supported by formal contract recruitment mechanisms; (Massey et al. 1998b, p. 182)
World system theory	Not much support	Not much evidence to support the theory; Japan's relocation to sources of labor in mid-80 s; International division of labor
Social capital: migrant networks	More difficult environment given no pathways to permanency and family unification for low skilled; networks of migrants and recruitment industry have emerged to sustain continuing migration flows; Asianization of the workforce to prevent Arab networks	Migrant communities promote continuing links, and also foster irregular migration; migration chains; marriage migration
Social capital theory: migrant institutions	Large networks of recruitment agencies and the *kafala* system with their own dynamics: govt bureaucracy, private companies and rec agencies; Migrant networks more important for Arabs but their role very low	Similar patterns; major role of the recruitment industry, govt. bureaucracy, private companies; informal migrant networks inducing more inflows
Cumulative causation	Immigrant recruitment not related to productivity or structural change in Gulf countries	Culture of migration (Philippines); promotion of migration at expense of protection; dependency syndrome

Table 3.3 Number of
back-and-forth movements
between Brazil and Japan.
(Source: Compiled from
Takenoshita 2007)

No. of moves	No. of movers	Percent of total sample ($N=439$)
One	150	34.2
Two	110	25.1
Three	104	23.7
Four	42	9.6
Five	23	5.2
Six	6	1.4
Seven	4	0.9
Total movers	439	100.0

Transnationalism Among Japanese Brazilian Migrants

The revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law in 1990 provided for immigrants of Japanese descent to migrate for employment in Japan with renewable working visas and a basis to conduct 'any activities' in Japan. The greatest number came from Brazil. They have been incorporated into the labor market in Japan as low-skilled but documented foreign workers. One distinguishing characteristic of this migration is the prevalence of back and forth movements, particularly between Brazil and Japan (Takenoshita 2007). Table 3.3 shows that two-thirds of those sampled had moved more than once to Japan, and almost one-quarter had moved three times.

The objective of Takanoshita's study was to establish whether back-and-forth movement between the origin and destination countries can enhance socioeconomic positions of *Nikkei* migrants. The findings did not support the hypothesis of transnationalism that circular migration helped Brazilian migrants in Japan to upgrade their socioeconomic status and to adapt well into Japanese society. These migrants could not engage in transnational practices to improve their situation given the adverse impacts of the labor market structures and lack of support for integration in the host country. This finding is similar to that of the study of entertainers below.

The author explains this outcome in terms of the dual labor market hypothesis or segmented labor market theory as advanced by Piore (1979). Brazilian migrants were mostly employed in the secondary labor markets and informal activities characterized by poor wages and working conditions and lack of employment security.

A recent analysis by Sasaki (2013) confirms the fragility of the labor market status of Brazilian migrants who are treated as flexible and disposable workers in the aftermath of the crisis.

> The economic crisis in late 2008, however, resulted in a drastic change in the existing pattern of migration. In response to massive joblessness in the Japanese manufacturing industry, hundreds of thousands of Brazilians repatriated to Brazil, leading to a widespread breakdown of the transnational system of migration. (Sasaki 2013, p. 1)

Their vulnerability arose from their high concentration in the manufacturing industry in Japan and their dependence on the temporary work agencies which meant

they could not compete with native workers in the job market. The lack of any integration support on the part of Japanese authorities contributed to the outcome.

These studies of *Nikkei* workers support the segmented labor market hypothesis.

Japan and Entertainers

The study of Filipino entertainers by Parreñas (2010) takes up the issue that their experience of settlement does not always fit the dominant perspective of transnational migration. She argues that circular migrants hold 'feelings of greater affinity for the home society.' Her field study highlighted limited integration in the host society, with few prospects for settlement as they are generally segregated in time and space. The short period of migration means that Filipina entertainers have to plan for their departure immediately on arrival. The study questions the assumption in the literature that circular migrants will eventually become permanent residents. She calls for 'the formulation of new theoretical frameworks that better capture the qualitatively distinct experiences of circular migrants' (Parreñas 2010, p. 301).

As Parreñas (2010) observes: "In this highly competitive industry, it is rare for entertainers to complete more than two or three labor contracts before they permanently retire in the Philippines, because not only does the supply of entertainers far exceed the demand, but the greater preference for younger women also reduces the likelihood of return migration. In this industry, youth is more valuable than experience" (p. 321).

She distinguishes between circular migration from 'transnational migration' which she believes to be based on the experiences of permanent migrants. Yet, transnational migration could simply mean cross-border migration irrespective of the duration of stay. While transnational communities coincide to a large extent with the settled diaspora communities, 'transnational' would not necessarily mean long-term migrants. In her view, "Short-term migrants tend to be target earners. In the case of Filipina entertainers, they 'earn money in Japan and spend it in the Philippines.' They hold feelings of greater loyalty for the Philippines" (Parreñas 2010, p. 303). It would be difficult to establish the last point based on the evidence of the study. Being on short visas and the exclusionary measures and 'the barriers that impede their feelings of membership in the host society' (p. 306) as stressed by the author, they of course, have no option but to return to the Philippines.

She rightly recognizes the combination of factors that determine the likelihood of long-term (transnational) and circular migration: migrant agency, state policies (whether liberal or authoritarian), geographical proximity, skill profile (whether high skilled or low skilled) of the migrant, and flexible visa regimes which allow the migrant to return freely to the host country. Low skilled migrants are more likely to be circular and temporary migrants as the Asian and Gulf experience has shown who are subject to various exclusionary practices: "Poor wages, ineligibility for family reunification, restricted durations of migration, and limited political rights" (p. 307).

Her conclusion that " … accounting for short-term migration requires a paradigmatic shift from our models of settlement based on long-term migration" (Parreñas 2010, p. 320) is hardly new. She suggests that a "more suitable analytic framework for documenting the settlement of temporary migrants would be to look not at the extent of their integration but instead at their segregation in the host society" (p. 307) on which considerable work has been done in the context of Gulf migration.

3.4.2   Circular Mobility in China

China's internal migration presents a classic example of circular migration where millions migrate to the cities every year and return to their homes before undertaking repeat migration. This type of circulation has now been going on for almost three decades. The rapid growth of coastal cities and the demand for low skilled workers, and widening rural- urban income disparities led to the large movements involving more than 125 million workers. Most migrants maintain close links with home areas, which act as a safety net, especially because migrants retain access to land and housing in their places of origin.

It is important to note that China, in common with socialist economies, has imposed many restrictions on rural to urban migration, including the household registration or *hukou* system of China which guarantees access to urban entitlements. While these have been relaxed in varying degrees in recent years, many barriers still remain. Moreover, rural movers also face serious rights violations especially in the workplace, and experience discrimination in cities although they are citizens of the same country.

The literature survey (of material in English) did not highlight much theoretical explanations of this phenomenon unlike in the case of Indonesia. Fan (2011) argues that circular migration and split households have become long-term practices among rural Chinese, although conventional assumption has been that these are temporary phenomena. Based on a survey of migrants conducted in 2008, her research showed that the majority of rural migrants had no intention to settle down in cities.

Fan (2011) almost echoes the findings of Hugo's for Indonesia.

> By straddling the city and the countryside, migrants can earn urban wages as long as they have jobs, support the rest of the family at a rural and lower cost of living, and return to the home village or rural town if migrant jobs dwindle. In this light, circulation, rather than permanent migration, allows the migrants to obtain the best of both worlds. To them, therefore, settling down in the city is not inevitable and may not be the best choice. (Fan 2011, pp. 13–14)

According to the study, the main factors which promote repeat migration are the state migration control system, lack of access to the household registration system, which denies many benefits including health benefits for the family, and schooling for children, and access to family support in the home areas.

Hu et al. (2011) find that more educated and more experienced migrants tend to be permanent urban residents, while those with more children and land at home are likely to be circular migrants. Although rural people have been allowed to move freely between cities and their homes, most of them are still denied permanent urban residency rights and associated social benefits defined by the *hukou* system.

> Our results show that compared with their circular counterparts, permanent migrants tend to stay within the home provinces and are more likely to have stable jobs and earn high incomes and thus are more adapted to urban lives. We also find that more educated and more experienced migrants tend to be permanent urban residents, while the relationship of age and the probability of permanent migration is inverse U-shaped. Due to the restrictions of the current *hukou* system and the lack of rural land rental market, those people with more children and more land at home are more likely to migrate circularly rather than permanently. (Hu et al. 2011, p. 64)

Access to *hukou* of large cities is still tightly controlled, with less than 20% of those with formal urban *hukou* having got them at the prefecture-level or provincial capital cities. Rural migrants cannot bring their children to cities and afford them education due to *hukou* restrictions. The lack of a rural land rental market also has a negative impact on migrants' decision to stay in cities permanently.

3.4.3   Afghanistan: Transnational Ties and Circular Migration Patterns

Contrary to popular impressions of movements motivated by seeking asylum and refugee status, there is increasing evidence that the bulk of recent movements of Afghan persons are for temporary, seasonal, and circular migration. Research also highlights that circular migration, in the sense of repetitive migrations of a short or temporary nature, are common. Most of this earlier research did not use the term "circular migration," but instead used terms such as "back and forth movements" or "transnational mobility," which seem to capture the essence of the process (Monsutti 2006). There is general consensus that migration and the formation of transnational networks are key livelihood strategies for the people of Afghanistan.

Monsutti (2006, 2008) highlights the complexity of motivations behind migration and argues that it is too simple to describe it as an outflow of refugees. In his view, neither the definition of "refugee" in official international texts nor the various typologies of migration offer an adequate analytical framework to understand the migratory strategies of the Afghan population. While most movements took place due to the direct effect of war, their movements have occurred within the context of a longstanding tradition of migration and the pre-existence of transnational connections. Monsutti explains as follows:

> Afghans have continued to make constant journeys back and forth as part of what is a dynamic process that leads to complex social adjustments. It is a cultural model, not a simple act of flight followed by integration or assimilation in the host country, or return to the country of origin. In fact, repatriation in the Afghan context does not imply the end of migratory movements, especially in more recent years. The probability of further

departures, at least of some household members, is high due to the use of migration as a strategy to secure livelihoods. Factors which induce asylum-seeking are not necessarily the same as those which perpetuate migration and discourage return to Afghanistan. Migrants have woven networks of contacts that make it easier to move between different countries. Addressing the original causes of flight does not constitute a guarantee to bring current migratory movements to an end, as the factors sustaining transnational movements of Afghans have come to form more or less stable systems. (Monsutti 2006, p. 1)

This forms the basis of circular migration movements in Afghanistan whether as voluntary returnees or as deportees because repatriation in the Afghan context does not imply the end of migratory movements, especially in more recent years. The returnees are mostly from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, where there is increasing pressure by the authorities to send Afghan migrant workers back. As Monsutti (2006) rightly pointed out "The probability of further departures, at least of some household members, is high due to the use of migration as a strategy to secure livelihoods" (p. 1). Yet, the fact remains that most of these movements are informal and irregular in nature, although those migrating may not consider them as such.

3.4.4   Thai Repeat Migrants and Remittances

The study by Lee et al. (2011) is not about the initiation or perpetuation of circular migration. The question posed was "whether repeat migrants are different from first time migrants in terms of their remittances behaviour" (Lee et al. 2011, p. 144). Stark (1978) suggested that an individual remittance is initially low, but increases with time as migrants adjust to their new environment, settle in their new destinations and are relieved of the initial costs associated with moving. However, he also stated that individual remittances will decline as altruism wanes over time. This is because migrants' commitment and attachment to their families and home areas may weaken over time. It may apply to those permanently migrating

The authors hypothesized that repeat migrants are also less likely to remit to their home country, compared with the first-time migrants. They have based their analysis on a survey of Thai workers abroad, conducted by the Asian Research Centre for Migration (ARCM). Of the 379 workers in the selected sample, 64 % were first-time migrants, 27 % were second-time migrants and only nine percent had migrated three times or more. Some 22 % also had stated that they would migrate again.

The authors conclude: "Repeat migrants are less likely to send remittances, but are more likely to save, compared with first-time migrants. This finding suggests that first-time migrant workers remit most of their earned income to Thailand, while those who repeat migration prefer to keep their money and are less likely to remit it" (Hu et al. 2011, p. 149). They explain this behavior in terms of initial debts incurred in the process of migration which have to be paid off immediately. The results also support the 'remittance decay hypothesis' of New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM).

3.5 Skilled Migration, Brain Circulation and Diaspora Circulation

Issues of brain drain have been a concern since the 1960s with the high outflow of skilled workers from developing countries to developed destinations. It was mostly seen as a one-way flow leading to permanent settlement in countries of destination. Later, this view has given way to more optimistic approaches, such as brain circulation and brain gain, recognizing the role of return migration, remittances, transnational practices, and diaspora knowledge networks and skills transfers, among others (Biao 2005; Wickramasekara 2003). Yet, there has been a lag in development of theoretical perspectives on skilled migration. For instance, Iredale has pointed out.

> In the current situation, highly skilled migration represents an increasingly large component of global migration streams. The current state of theory in relation to highly skilled migration is far from adequate in terms of explaining what is occurring at the high skill end of the migration spectrum. (Iredale 2001, p. 7)

Biao (2005) also remarked: "The transnational approach was more a result of the recognition by government and international agencies of the new economic and technology reality than led by theories" (p. 2).

There is considerable interest in the role of the diaspora and its circulation mainly due to the recent emphasis on the migration and development nexus. In view of the overriding importance of China and India in benefitting from diaspora linkages, Asia has emerged as an important locus for deliberations on the migration–development nexus with a number of actors playing a key role. Asis et al. (2009, p. 92) conclude that "there is, on the whole, a theoretical lag between migration and development literatures globally, including in Asia".

3.5.1 Global Dynamics and Migration of Highly Skilled Asian Workers

In an analysis in the early nineties, Ong et al. (1992) attempted to explain the migration of the highly educated Asians in terms of global dynamics. They distinguished between unskilled labor, skilled manual labor and the highly educated. They argue that unlike unskilled and skilled manual workers, highly educated workers are highly dependent on advanced economies to practice their trade. Unskilled labor is not tied to any particular nation because technology is embedded in the machinery that workers use. Skilled manual labor operates with a technology that is already fully dispersed to the developing countries, eliminating any special linkage to advanced countries. Usually the nature of on-the-job training bestows upon these workers the benefits of being in a sheltered segment of the labor market, thus providing an incentive to remain.

Globalization and global inequality generate the economic incentives for the highly educated to migrate for better living standards abroad. They argue that the migration of highly-educated Asians have some unique features compared to gen-

eral migratory movements for three reasons: first, most of the training received is in industrial nations; second, unequal development on a global scale contributes to mobility; and, third, the reverse flow of returning students or visiting scholars to developing countries benefits home countries. Ong et al. add:

> While the global articulation of higher education and the formation of an international class of labor are preconditions in the movement of the highly educated, it is global inequality that generates the economic incentives for individuals to leave a less developed country for a developed country. Differences in the standard of living between developed and developing countries are in some ultimate sense the underlying cause of migration, when it is not motivated by flight from repression or political disorder. (Ong et al. 1992, p. 556)

They identify a major difference between earlier labor migration and the post-1965 migration of professionals in terms of circulation and return of professionals. Unlike earlier departures, many of them return to their native countries for a period of time and engage in knowledge transfer before again returning to their host countries. The authors also highlight the circulation of the highly skilled between origin and host countries although on a small scale playing a crucial role in the transfer of technology.

Their argument that highly educated labor from Asia is only fully empowered for production in advanced economies is no longer true because a number of Asian countries have also transformed into advanced economies.

3.5.2   Migration of Knowledge Workers

One of the first analysis of the transnational approach and positive aspects of skilled migration in Asia (with focus on India) was conducted by Khadria (1999). He reviewed the issue from the broader notion of human capital and the impact of the growth of a diaspora. Based on the analysis regarding knowledge workers from India to the USA over three decades, he concludes that the first generation effects of remittances and skills and technology transfer through returns have been limited. He therefore, focuses on the 'second-generation effects' of brain drain which have the potential for broad-based impacts through contributions of the diaspora to education and the health sector and increase the productiveness of the people—the human resource base in India. His pioneering analysis provided a framework which has been used widely in discussing diaspora contributions, particularly in the case of India.

An interesting feature is his argument that physical return is not important since skilled persons can make these contributions while abroad. The policy implication is that governments and international agencies should not focus so much on return home since the conditions that led to their initial emigration have not changed. Therefore, attention should be on measures to maximize the benefits which could flow to origin countries from engaging positively with knowledge worker emigration. This will come from 'second generation' effects flowing from the assets generated by knowledge workers who stay abroad and who have gained the maximum possible returns from their involvement in a foreign labor market.

While Khadria's analytical framework about transnational linkages and mechanisms has not been well-developed, the idea of circulation of skills and the contributions while abroad have influenced further analysis on the issue.

3.5.3 Iredale's Analysis of Migration of Professionals

Iredale (2001) reviewed theories and typologies of migration of professionals citing examples from Asia. According to her, increasing globalization of firms and internationalization of education are major forces which have promoted the migration of professionals. Although the paper did not deal specifically with circular mobility, she noted an increasing tendency for temporary mobility of professionals creating a category of 'skilled transients.' While existing theory is inadequate in explaining high skilled migration, she highlights that it is important to focus on transnationalization or internationalization of professional labor markets in fields such as information technology and nursing.

She categorizes skilled migration in terms of six typologies according to motivation, nature of source and destination, channel or mechanism, length of stay (permanent, circulatory/temporary, mode of incorporation in host country labor markets, and national/international profession or the nature of the profession). She argues that the last factor is very important in explaining skilled migration flows.

While Iredale (2001) has drawn attention to the tendency of governments to admit skilled workers on temporary schemes on the grounds that labor shortages are immediate and short-term in nature. But her analysis does not deal with mobility patterns of such workers as circular migrants or otherwise.

3.5.4 Circulation of Transnational Entrepreneurs

Saxenian's (2000) research has emphasized the importance of circulation of highly skilled entrepreneurs, particularly from Asian countries.

The emergence of parallel Silicon valleys in cities, such as Bangalore, Bombay, Beijing, Shanghai, and Taipei, has been primarily facilitated by expatriate scientists in the US Silicon Valley.

> As the "brain drain" increasingly gives way to a process of "brain circulation," networks of scientists and engineers are transferring technology, skill, and know-how between distant regional economies faster and more flexibly than most corporations. (Saxenian 2002, p. 183)

Instead of draining their native economies of human skills and resources, these "circulating" immigrants have brought back valuable experience and knowhow to local economies. It is different from brain exchange in that the same skilled persons are commuting back and forth between source and destination countries. A survey of Silicon Valley emigrant professionals found that 80–90 % of Chinese and Indians having business relations in their home countries travel more than five times a year to their countries (Saxenian 2000).

Saxenian (2011) described transnational entrepreneurs as the 'new Argonauts'.

> This globalisation of entrepreneurial networks reflects dramatic changes in global labor markets. Falling transport and communication costs allow high-skilled workers to work in several countries at once, while digital technologies make it possible to exchange vast amounts of information across long distances cheaply and instantly. International migration, traditionally a one-way process, has become a reversible choice, particularly for those with scarce technical skills, while people can now collaborate in real time, even on complex tasks, with counterparts far away. (Saxenian 2011, p. 2)

Saxenian's analysis has contributed to better conceptualization of circular mobility of high tech entrepreneurs between the USA and Asia.

3.5.5 Australian Permanent Migration and Circular Movements

Hugo has analyzed circular mobility patterns in Asian high skilled migration to Australia based on migration flows over more than a decade. In his view, "Circularity, reciprocity and complexity are structured features of Asian migration to Australia, not a peripheral or ephemeral feature" (Hugo 2009b, p. 30). In an analysis of migration flows between Australia and China and India, "the migration relationship is best depicted as a complex migration system involving flows in directions and circularity, reciprocity, and remigration."

Hugo developed a conceptual scheme to identify the main components of the migration system, and showed that many migrants transited between the different elements in the system. The inference is that the traditional conceptualization of the migration relationship between India and China, on the one hand, and high income countries, on the other hand, as being 'South-North' in nature was hardly appropriate. He discussed the implications of reconceptualizing mobility in this manner for understanding the migration process and for the development of migration policy in China, India and Australia (Hugo 2008). He defines circular migration in the context of Australian movements as follows: "This involves long-term but temporary migration of Asians to Australia and Australians to Asia. The main groups are students and long-term temporary business migrants. These are people who will spend more than a year at the destination but always with the intention to return. They take out temporary residency at the destination" (Hugo 2008, p. 269).

He highlights "a new type of 'hyperconnectivity' between migrants and their home communities" made possible by declining costs in telecommunication, travel and financial transfers.

> It has been demonstrated here that mobility and frequent movement between origin and destination is an important part of the hyperconnectivity established by Indians and Chinese migration to Australia. Permanent and return migration are only the tip of the iceberg of a much larger amount of mobility. (Hugo 2008, p. 286)

According to Hugo, Australian Government thinking in migration policy is "still largely based on the centrality of permanent migration," with poor understanding of the complexity of population movements with Asia and the Pacific.

3.6 Summary and Conclusions

Several issues have emerged from this brief survey of available theoretical literature of circular migration in Asia.

There is limited focus on theoretical approaches partly due to policy driven research and funding structures favoring empirical work. As Castles (2003) pointed out: "Because social scientists often allowed their research agendas to be driven by policy needs and funding, they often asked the wrong questions, relied on short-term empirical approaches without looking at historical and comparative dimensions, and failed to develop adequate theoretical frameworks. They gave narrow, short-term answers to policy-makers, which led to misinformed policies" (p. 26).

Initially, there was considerable research on analysis of internal population movements mostly covering rural to urban migration as a manifestation of circular mobility for Indonesia and the Pacific, among others. The phenomenon was studied mostly by geographers based on field research (Bedford 1973a, b; Hugo 1982, 1984; Goldstein 1978). The Chinese internal migration has been studied, but less from a theoretical perspective (Biao 2005).

While policymakers regarded rural-urban migration in negative terms as leading to slums and overburdening urban infrastructure, most circular migration discussions highlighted the benefits to households from this strategy. For instance, Hugo (2009a) has identified the crucial role of remittances.The early literature did not discuss links to international migration. Bedford (1973a, b) however, looked at movement of Hebrideans to other islands and also Queensland and back. Standing (1984a) also discussed links with international migration.

Most of the research has been in origin countries of Asia except perhaps, for Australia. The literature on intra-Asian migration and Gulf migration has been mostly empirical or highlighting working conditions, trafficking in persons and rights issues, especially relating to female domestic workers. Apart from Massey et al. (1998c), there has been no serious effort at discussing the theoretical issues relating to temporary migration across borders in Asia.

Only a few studies have drawn a conceptual distinction between circular migration and temporary migration. The case of Brazilian migration to Japan and that of Filipino entertainers to Japan exhibit clear patterns of circulation. The studies, especially relating to Brazilian migrants, support theories of social capital and segmented labor market theories which were claimed to be the best explanations of Gulf and intra-Asian migration as well.

The literature on the circulation of the diaspora and transnational networks has not advanced beyond empirical analysis of patterns and empirical documentation of trends.

Security of migration status in destination countries seems to play a major role in promoting circular migration since migrants enjoy the right of return.

In moving forward on theoretical analysis of circular migration, the following issues need to be addressed:

- What is the rationale for repeat migrations, especially across borders? What theoretical approaches can explain the behavior of circular migrants? How does success or failure in previous migrations affect the probability of further migratory movements?
- What theoretical frameworks can explain the difference, if any, between low skilled and skilled workers in regard to circular migration?
- What are the gender implications of circular migration—are women more likely to be circular migrants?
- What are the interfaces between internal and international circular migration?
- What implications does circular migration have on the rights of those who move?

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Chapter 4
European Immigrant Integration After Multiculturalism

Christian Joppke

4.1 Europe's Rhetorical Good-Bye to Multiculturalism

However clichéd it may appear, a reflection on "multiculturalism" in Europe to-day should still start with the well-known "good-bye" to it by the political leaders of Europe's three most powerful nations, which in the past had been considered paragons of sharply distinct "national models" or even "philosophies" on immigrant integration and membership at large: "multicultural" Britain, "assimilationist" France, and "segregationist" Germany.[1] Most scholars have taken these statements as what, of course, they were: "rhetoric," because two of the involved countries had not previously been known to pursue multicultural policies. Accordingly, the semblance of convergence in contemporary political thinking on immigrant integration was immediately rejected in favor of reasserting the old "national model" mode of thinking. "(T)hey do not seem to be talking about exactly the same thing," commented Ruud Koopmans (2013, p. 2); and John Bowen critiqued the politicians' wrongheaded claim that "normative ideas of multiculturalism shape the social fact of cultural and religious diversity," while in reality there was "continuation of long-standing, nation-specific ways of recognizing and managing diversity" (2011, p. 2).

But it is still apposite to identify common themes underlying these almost si-multaneous abdications of multiculturalism, as they stand out against the inevitably nationally distinct contexts in which they were expressed. These common themes point to a convergent critique of "multiculturalism," however "maddeningly spongy and imprecise" this concept may be (Stuart Hall, as quoted in Koopmans 2013, p. 3); they also point to a convergent policy response that appears to be more noteworthy than persistent national differences in the handling of immigrant diversity. One could even argue that Europe's good-bye to multiculturalism reflects

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[1] The two most sophisticated statements of "national model" reasoning on immigrant integration are Favell (1998) and Koopmans et al. (2005). All of course are in different ways inspired by Brubaker's (1992) classic France-Germany comparison.

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a distinctly European immigration problematique, marked by predominantly non-selected family migration from Muslim majority countries, which sets Europe apart from other parts of the developed world, most notably the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Indeed, the first thing to notice is that German Chancellor Merkel's, British Prime Minister Cameron's, and French President Sarkozy's critical statements on multi-culturalism are all interventions in these countries' protracted debates surrounding Muslims and Islam, which is arguably Europe's main—if not the only—integration issue surrounding immigrants and the progenitor of most of its multiculturalism struggles. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the helm of a conservative party, was forced to respond to the immense popularity of an admirably frank (if also alarmist and in part, dubiously arguing) critique of an Islamic "parallel society" with no contact to the mainstream, whose more fortunate demographics would lead to the "abolishment" of Germany (Sarrazin 2010).[2] Because an explicit multicultur-alism policy never was in Germany, what the German state leader really attacked was a previous laissez-faire or non-policy toward immigrants on the part of the fed-eral government, along with the reigning political etiquette not to address the sensi-tive issue of an immigrant group that stands visibly and willfully apart, although perhaps more under the "Turkish" than the "Muslim" flag.[3] In the past, Merkel said, "too little" had been asked of immigrants; now it was right to ask them to learn Ger-man because otherwise, they could not succeed in the labor market; furthermore, "forced marriages" were "not acceptable," and Muslim girls should "not stay away from school outings."[4] One sees how misleading it is to call the German policy approach "segregationist;" this would make the chancellor's intervention incom-prehensible, which was at heart integrationist. Note that in the same statement in which Merkel declared Multikulti (Germany's slang word for "multiculturalism") as "utterly failed," she also supported the German President's statement that "Islam is a part of Germany," which was incontrovertibly true but strangely had stirred controversy among the conservative spectrum; and it coincided with the announce-ment of an ambitious federal scheme of establishing Islam faculties at German state universities, analogous to already existing faculties of Catholic and Protestant the-ology, which would educate and train German imams at public expense.

Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that multiculturalism was a "failure" because under its reign, "all our democracies have become pre-occupied with the identity of those who arrive and not enough with the identity

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[2] The dubious part in Sarrazin (2010) are (brief) eugenic-type statements about the "low" intel-ligence level of Muslim immigrants and its dismal implications for Germany's demography, which led to a wholesale condemnation of the book. This is regrettable because the book contains an astute and largely correct analysis of immigrants' high unemployment and disproportionate de-pendence on welfare, and of the perverse incentive structure provided by the German welfare state (even in its recently thinned-down version).

[3] In a speech given to Turkish immigrants in Germany in February 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan called upon his compatriots not to be "assimilated" because "assimilation is a crime against humanity" (Spiegel Online, 10 February 2008).

[4] "Merkel: 'Multikulti ist absolut gescheitert,'" Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 October 2010.

of the country that accepts immigrants."[5] While certainly correct about what "multiculturalism" boils down to—a preoccupation with the identity of the "others"—it was not (and, of course, not meant to be) a good description of France, with its two decades of incessant regulating, lately even legislating against Islamic dress in the name of *laïcité* and Republican values. Indeed, the French state had never been as laissez-faire and hands-off as the German state with respect to newcomers' (read: Muslims') cultural practices. However, what the recent law prohibiting the extreme veil (*burqa*) in public spaces (2010) particularly rails against is a very similar, quiet yet thorough accommodation of Islam in the legal systems of both countries (*see* Joppke and Torpey 2013, Chap. 2 and 3), which had seemingly gone too far in bypassing the court of public opinion. The difference to Germany, which accounts for the uniquely persistent, ever nastier politicization of Islam in France, is the presence of a strong populist right-wing party, the Front National, which is particularly dangerous for a conservative party in power and has helped to steadily turn the latter toward the right end of the political spectrum in the past decade. Note that Sarkozy's multiculturalism critique occurred shortly after Marine Le Pen, the new leader of the National Front, had polemically compared Muslims' street prayers in some French cities (because of insufficient mosque space) to the Nazi occupation in the 1940s. However, as in Germany, Sarkozy's admonition to move from an "Islam in France" to an "Islam of France" and the very similar critique of "communities coexisting side-by-side," while more aggressive but also more positively integrated by a Republican idea of national unity, betrays an overall integrationist propensity of the French state. Elements of this are the state-supported creation of a national umbrella organization of Muslims in France, the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM); indirect yet "compensatory" state support for the building of mosques; and state-subsidized French imam education, at the Institut Catholique in Paris. So the reality of the French approach is as integrationist as the German one. Certainly, the French variant is accompanied by a more insistent affirmation of majority society values than would be thinkable in Germany, which may be explained by a mixture of national legacy and political arithmetic. But even the drastic anti-*burqa* law is unlikely to cut deep into the lives of ordinary French Muslims, the great majority of whom are secular and rarely enter a mosque (*see* Godard and Taussig 2007, p. 31 f.).

The only one of the three countries where a good-bye to multiculturalism might make sense from a traditional, "national model" point of view is Britain. Had not here, to quote Prime Minister David Cameron, "the doctrine of state multiculturalism"[6] been once in place, that is, been an explicit state policy and not just a (however imagined) laissez-faire? However, in reality there has never been an official multiculturalism policy in Britain, at least not as one knows it in Canada or Australia. Instead, the stronghold of British multiculturalism had always been the municipal level, especially in jurisdictions of high immigrant density and ethnic

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[5] "Le multiculturalisme est 'un échec,' affirme Nicolas Sarkozy," Le Point.fr, 10 February 2011.

[6] David Cameron, Speech to the Munich Security Conference, 5 February 2011 (downloaded from www.number10.gov.uk).

diversity. Beyond that, British multiculturalism was more of another word for the traditional British liberalism of toleration, colored perhaps by a higher level of "political correctness" and speech regulation than one finds elsewhere in Europe.[7] What Cameron concretely attacked in his widely noted abdication of multiculturalism (issued, of all places, in Munich—site of Allied appeasement to Hitler) was lavish state funding for certain Muslim organizations in the context of the government's anti-terrorism campaign. This policy, dubbed "Prevent," which had been launched after the 2005 domestic Islamists' bombing of the London Subway, had tried to win over the moderate part of British organized Islam and to insulate and weed out the extremists. So this was certainly not a "politics of recognition" out of the books of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1992), who had influentially conceived of multiculturalism as an identity-affirming correction to past injustice. Instead, it was a pragmatic politics of more effectively rooting out the sources of terrorism. "Prevent" erred on many fronts, especially the questionable fusing of the anti-terrorism and Muslim integration agendas. Before it was aborted in 2011, it made much state money (up to US$ 135 M per year)[8] flow into the pockets of Muslim organizations with little, if any, liberal democratic credentials or intentions. This was inevitable given the radical and largely unapologetic features of even the mainstream of British Islam (*see* Leiken 2012, chapters on Britain).

The British Prime Minister's Munich statement on integration policy is interesting in three regards: first, much like in Germany and France, it displays a formulaic, imprecise reference to a "multiculturalism" that never adequately described what the state actually had been doing with respect to immigrant integration; secondly, also like the French and German variants, the British good-bye to multiculturalism cannot be decoupled from one specific immigrant group that is driving the rejection of "multiculturalism" everywhere today, which is Muslims and their perceived integration deficits. And, thirdly, Cameron signals an alternative, which he calls "muscular liberalism." This is just another word for the "civic integration" policies that have taken the place of the demonized—and most often imagined—multiculturalism of the past and thus warrant further scrutiny.

The remainder of this chapter addresses the centrality of Islam in Europe's goodbye to multiculturalism (II), and the "muscular liberalism" or "civic integration" policies that have appeared in lieu of a discarded multiculturalism (III). The final part presents some "critical issues" that will shape European immigrant integration after multiculturalism (IV).

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[7] In Bruce Bawer's list of acts of "surrender" by European liberals to strident Islamic claims-making, among the most curious speech regulations are British ones, such as in a counterterrorism phrasebook that blacklists "Islamic extremism" to "avoid any implication that there is an explicit link between Islam and terrorism" (2010, p. 267). In Carol and Koopmans' (2013) impeccable comparison of "Islamic religious rights" in Western Europe, one learns of British police guidelines requiring police dogs to wear boots when searching the houses of Muslim suspects, and of a British consultancy agency advising the National Health Service to forbid staff eating in their offices during Ramadan to avoid upsetting Muslims (p. 181).

[8] 'Counter-terrorism and multiculturalism', The Economist, 11 June 2011, p. 34.

4.2   Religion and "Islam" in Europe's Good-Bye to Multiculturalism

In a cross-national review of multicultural policies for immigrants, Ruud Koopmans (2013) made two interesting observations. First, multiculturalism in Canada, the United States, and Australia is more entrenched there because of the high proportion of (naturalized) immigrants in these countries' national electorates, which naturally bears immigrant-friendly "policies and discourses" (Koopmans 2013 p. 5). Secondly, "public controversies about multiculturalism are mostly not about ethnic folklore or language, but about the incorporation of controversial religion claims" (Koopmans 2013 p. 37). Europe's multiculturalism debate is even tantamount to controversy over Islam, partially because a great part of Europe's classic guestworker and postcolonial immigrants after WWII happened to originate in Muslim countries, like Turkey, North Africa, and South-East Asia. But this cannot be all, as other immigrant religions, like Hinduism or Buddhism are unnoticeable in this respect—in inter-religious comparison there is a "unique salience of Muslim claims for religious rights" (Koopmans 2013, p. 7; *see also* Koopmans et al. 2005, Chap. 4).

In general, "language" and "religion" are the two critical multiculturalism issues surrounding immigrants—what Koopmans calls "ethnic folklore" in the above listing of multiculturalism issues is really nil if not at heart a language or religion issue, or rather, apart from the latter two, "ethnic folklore" is about as controversial as food or music. Language and religion have in common to be, like ethnicity and nationhood, "principles of vision and division of the social world" (Bourdieu, cited in Brubaker 2013), sorting people into "communities" and providing them with "forms of identification" (Brubaker 2013). They are thus potential hurdles to and competitive allegiances in immigrants' integration into host societies, which likewise appear and self-identify as "communities" precisely in demarcation from the immigrant others.

However, more important than their communalities as group-builders are underlying differences between language and religion, both in their regional distribution as conflict issues and in their own terms. With respect to their regional distribution, Zolberg and LittWoon (1999) observed that both issues are differently critical on both sides of the Atlantic, "Islam" in Europe being "like Spanish" in the United States, that is, the respective society's key cultural integration issue.

However, language and religion also differ in their own terms, with important policy implications. Language is not exclusive: when asked to acquire another language (as every school child is), one is not forced to give up one's previous language (brilliantly observed by Zolberg and LittWoon 1999). On the contrary, adopting a second language is capacity-enhancing. It does not deprive the person of anything, least of all, her "identity." At the same time, states cannot but operate in a specific (and not any) language; sheer facticity and resource-scarcity tilt toward an "assimilationist" state response with respect to language (Zolberg and LittWoon 1999). However, this is exactly reciprocated on the part of second-generation immigrants,

Hispanics included, who show overwhelmingly high rates of English-language acquisition (*see* Alba and Nee 2004). For succeeding and partaking in the American Dream, there is simply no alternative. At the same time, there are institutional incentives for market actors and vote-catching politicians to counterbalance the assimilationist state tilt with a modicum of pluralism by, say, advertising or campaigning in Spanish, which has long been common practice in the United States. No further state policy is required to regulate this process, a functionally differentiated society does all the necessary.

The situation is more difficult with respect to religion. Religion is exclusive: at least in its monotheist variants, one cannot adhere to more than one religion at any one time.[9] In addition, at least in the monotheist variant, religion comes with a moral script that bears no compromise (*see* Stark 2001). Just because religion is so tightly connected with morality and ethical views of the "good" life, it is strongly protected in terms of individual liberty rights in liberal state constitutions. Georg Jellinek (1904) even famously argued that religious freedom is the historically first human right. Accordingly, with respect to religion, there is no alternative for the state but a pluralist, de facto multicultural state response. However, this is not so much a response in terms of a "policy," because constitutional law requires respecting individuals' right to believe and exercise their religion freely (whereas the notion of "policy" conveys the possibility of other "policies," that is, choice).

Building on Zolberg and LittWoon (1999), Rogers Brubaker (2013) has further mapped out the different implications of language and religion as generators for multiculturalism conflicts. The first thing to observe is that "linguistic settlements" with endogenous language minorities are "not expandable" to immigrants, while "religious settlements" always "are expandable." This reflects the deeper ethical reach of religion compared with language, which cannot be settled with factual reference to "this is how we do things here." At the same time, religious diversity is "more robust" and "deeper and more divisive" than linguistic heterogeneity. Religious diversity is more "robust," because it can be easily transmitted within the family, while language reproduction requires "exo-socialization" that only the state can provide. Witness that there is nothing like the language shifts in the 2nd and 3rd immigrant generations in the area of religion, where later-generation "immigrants" are often more fiercely religious (in culturally purified ways, as described by Roy 2004) than their parent or grandparental generations. In addition, religious diversity is "deep diversity" (Brubaker 2013) because religion, unlike language as merely a "medium of communication," is a "structure of authority" with "intrinsic normative content," often competing with the state's claim to provide the norms for regulating public life. This feature of religion is particularly visible in the case of Islam, which Brubaker characterizes as stridently "public" religion, more than the "Christian Jewish, Hindu and Buddhist traditions" (Brubaker 2013). Obviously Islam in mind, Brubaker concludes that "religion has tended to displace language as the cutting edge of contestation over the political accommodation of cultural heterogeneity."

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[9] The situation is different for East Asian religions, which are not exclusive so that one can practice several simultaneously (*see* Riesebrodt 2007, p. 143).

In light of these considerations, it both surprises and does not surprise that Islam is considered Europe's main cultural integration problem. It surprises because the legal-constitutional means are in principle at hand to resolve the issue, with no need to resort to special multiculturalism policies. And it does not surprise, given the stated "deep diversity" (Brubaker 2013) generated by religion in general, and Islam in particular. Especially, American observers attribute the salience of Islam as domestic conflict issue in Europe to an inherent Christian bias of European societies, from which America is luckily free (Zolberg and LittWoon 1999; Nussbaum 2012). However, locating the problem in an insufficient accommodation of Islam qua religion obscures the elasticity of liberal institutions and the strong protection of religious freedoms in Europe also (*see* Joppke and Torpey 2013).

Instead, what one can observe is that "Islam" figures as a protest ideology of the socioeconomically marginalized Muslim populations of Europe (*see* Roy 2004). Posed as a counterfactual, without the high unemployment and school drop-out rates, the low income levels and residential segregation that mark (or mar) the lives of European Muslims, particularly in the second or even third immigrant generation, there would be much less of an Islam problem in Europe, perhaps as little as there is one in North America. In fact, the happier demography of American Muslims, who are generally better educated and higher earning than average Americans, helps explain why Islam in America is "the dog that did not bark" (Joppke and Torpey 2013, Chap. 4). To tackle the European Islam problem as one of deficient "cultural integration," to be countered by culture-focused integration policies (such as "multiculturalism" policies), would ignore the socioeconomic underpinnings of the problem (*see* Hansen 2010).

Of course, this is not all. Islam can figure as a domestic protest idiom only because it is one at the international plane, in terms of a globally operating Islamic movement that sees itself, for good or bad, as world-wide opponent to Western hegemony and "imperialism." Note that Buddhism, Sikhism, Hinduism, etc. are not visible as domestic protest idiom, even though marginalized immigrants under these colors certainly exist in Europe (*see* Koopmans et al. 2005, Chap. 4). This may have intrinsic religious reasons (*see* below). However, at the international plane, there simply isn`t anything akin to "Israel" or "Iraq" that would allow aligning these religions into an opposition to the "West." By implication, more effective than even the best "cultural integration policy" would be an alternative foreign policy that takes the winds out of global Islamism. This has long been the demand of British Muslims, whose radicalization, sadly involving terrorism, took a quantum leap after the Blair government's support of the American invasion of Iraq, which was perceived, however wrongly, as a war against Islam. However, to have foreign policy dictated by a small minority, and one that sees its main loyalty and affinities outside the British national community at that, is also a tall and questionable order—not to mention that even the most Islam-friendly foreign policy is unlikely to make "Israel" disappear as a target of global Islamic wrath.

To these socioeconomic and geopolitical factors must be added an intrinsic creedal openness of Islam to function as an oppositional identity. Islamic doctrinaires, even those considered reform-minded, like Yusuf Qaradawi or Tariq Ramadan, conceive

of European Muslims as a people apart, a quasi-nation that can be integrated only by an extreme program of multicultural recognition—exactly the (however imagined) position that the European state leaders, quoted at the beginning, are busily moving away from. Islam, in this akin to Orthodox Judaism, stipulates a tight package of religious rules to cover all aspects of life, including those commonly considered secular or political, which prevents its practitioners from blending more easily with their respective environs. Especially Ramadan, dubbed by *Time Magazine* as one of the 100 most important figures of the twenty-first century, insists that an uncompromising, unreconstructed Islam can (and must) be practised in Western societies, and that, in this respect, Muslims may feel "at home" in the West (Ramadan 2002).

The basis for Ramadan's optimism is "political liberalism" (Rawls 1993), which Islamic reformists have readily embraced (above all, An-Naim 2008, who of course is much more reform-minded than Ramadan; also Fadel 2008; for an academic matchmaking, *see* March 2009). Political liberalism argues that consensus or the ties that bind in a liberal society can only be procedural, in terms of an agreement on rules of coexisting peacefully; there can never be agreement on "comprehensive doctrines," ethical views of the good life that forever divide individuals and groups in a pluralistic society. If there could be agreement, we would live in an age of nationalism. Short of it, or beyond it, all one can hope for is an "overlapping consensus," the reaching of a common platform of political rules from within one's "comprehensive doctrine"—provided certain limits are respected, most importantly the "reasonableness" of the latter.

In an intriguing ethnography of on-the-ground Islam accommodation in the French *banlieues*, American anthropologist John Bowen has identified the workings of political liberalism in terms of "social pragmatism": it allows flesh-and-blood Muslims to acknowledge even a strictly secularist host society like France by always staying within their religion. It works like this: as long as a non-religious rule, like civil marriage (to which there is no religious alternative in laicist France), bears "positive social consequences" for Muslims, these positive consequences figure as the civic rule or institution's "Islamic justification" (Bowen 2010, p. 168). Tariq Ramadan provides an example: "A civil marriage already is a Muslim marriage, I think, because it is a contract, and that is what a Muslim marriage is" (Bowen 2010). The Islam-internal mechanism for this is *maqasid*, the interpretation of a scriptural obligation in terms of the general "purpose" it was meant to fulfill, which is the *via regia* of Islamic reform today. Surely, Bowen-Ramadan's example for "social pragmatism" is drawn from family law, which is intrinsically closer to one's ethical or even religious views than polity and politics. But it exposes the weak spot of political liberalism, which is to invite an only pragmatic or instrumental attitude to host society rules and institutions. In turn, these rules and institutions are likely to be skirted whenever they conflict with one's religious precepts. Political liberalism, as Andrew March (2007, p. 249) concedes, "cannot require, as part of a minimal doctrine of citizenship, any robust or emotional attachment to one's community of citizenship." This being the case, if a choice has to be made, the outcome is unambiguous: "If for being a good Frenchman you have to be a bad Muslim, then I say no," says Tariq Ramadan (in Fourest 2004, p. 224). The astonishing thing here

is the language of peoplehood applied equally to state and religious membership, one excluding the other, which gives a flavor for the particular difficulties of Islam integration.

4.3 "Civic Integration": Complementing or Replacing Multiculturalism?

Against this backdrop, one understands why British Prime Minister Cameron now rejects the idea of a "passively tolerant society," which is what the dismissed multiculturalism of old boiled down to, and that he wants to move on to "muscular liberalism."[10] This essentially means that liberal host society values and institutions are to be intrinsically and unconditionally accepted for what they are, whatever one's religion prescribes, and not just for their usefulness for pursuing some other project. Muscular liberalism, which wishes to "thicken" liberalism from anodyne procedure into identity, expresses uneasiness about the laissez-fair regime of the past with respect to the cultural integration of immigrants. It is part of a general trend toward civic integration policies for immigrants, which has long become the dominant approach to immigrant integration in Europe and thus warrants a closer look (one of the earliest statements is by Joppke 2007; most recently, *see* Goodman-Wallace 2012).

The standard European account is one of civic integration replacing or stepping in for multiculturalism in retreat (especially Joppke 2004, 2007). A Canadian looking at the European scene, Keith Banting (2011) puts this into question. It is indeed naïve to assume that policies change by a new policy simply "replacing" an old one that is thereby discarded. On the one hand, this gives a wrong picture of immigrant integration policy as being coherent and purpose-made. Against such a view, Gary Freeman had pointed out that "no state possesses a truly coherent incorporation regime" (2004, p. 946), and, moreover, that "immigrants are mostly managed via institutions created for other purposes" (2004, p. 948). Civic integration is in most places the first immigrant integration policy where previously there was none; what it "replaces" is not an old policy but a non-policy, a de facto multiculturalism that consisted of non-intervention in the integration process on the part of the state. On the other hand, policies rarely change by a dramatic rupture but more often in evolutionary, incremental ways, by way of "drift," "conversion" of old policies for new purposes, or "layering," whereby new policies are added on to existing ones. In the case of European immigrant integration, Banting argues, a "new emphasis on civic integration is being layered on top of pre-existing multiculturalism policies, resulting, in some cases, in a regime that has important similarities with multicultural integration Canadian-style" (Banting 2011, p. 13). In Canada, indeed, an official multiculturalism policy had always proceeded by way of civic integration, so that there would never be a contradiction or opposition between the two: Canadian mul-

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10 *See* footnote no. 6.

ticulturalism has from the start been "integrationist" (p. 5); its constitutional centerpiece, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), is robustly focused on the "protection of liberal democratic principles" (p. 9), thus making Canadian multiculturalism inherently "liberal multiculturalism"; and language acquisition and civic knowledge of history and institutions, the dual pillars of European civic integration, is "a long-established tradition in Canada" (p. 11). Banting thus concludes that "multiculturalism and civic integration are not inherently incompatible approaches to diversity" (p. 3). He provides empirical evidence for this with the help of a "Multiculturalism Policy Index" (MPI). It records a "modest strengthening" of multicultural policies in most European countries between 1980 and 2010 (even in "segregationist" Germany and Austria), despite some negative outliers (like the Netherlands or Denmark, whose multiculturalism scores went down between 2000 and 2010, the decade of "backlash" against multiculturalism).[11]

It must be acknowledged that not only in Canada, where "multicultural integration" (Banting 2011, p. 5) is firmly in place, but in all English-speaking New World societies, multiculturalism shows few signs of crisis or retreat. For Australia, Gwenda Tavern found that even under a conservative Liberal Party government, multiculturalism was more out in name than in reality, simply because of the "absence of a viable policy and doctrinal alternative" and "practical considerations of migrant integration" (2012, p. 19). And it even rhetorically bounced back under a new Labor government with its Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, extolling the "genius of Australian multiculturalism" (Tavern 2012, p. 11). Indeed, part of its "genius" is respect for "traditional Australian values" and "citizenship," and the minister even deems the European distinction between "muscular liberalism" and multiculturalism void: "When David Cameron really said he supports a 'muscular liberalism,' he was—I argue—also advocating a more Australian version of multiculturalism" (quoted in Koopmans 2013, pp. 2–3). Finally, while the United States never had a Canadian or Australian-style official multiculturalism policy, Desmond King (2005) finds there a combination of "group-calibrated nation and strong state" (p. 125), that is, "a wide acknowledgment of group distinctions combined with a state struggle to ensure that government policies do not accentuate hierarchical divisions between groups based on race, ethnicity and national background" (p. 122). He calls this constellation "post-multicultural," but the "post" in it is not visible to the untrained eye. Like in Canada and Australia, however, a distinct feature of the United States seems to be that "accept(ance) (of) the reality of multiculturalism" on the part of its "current generation of nation-builders" (p. 123) goes hand in hand with immigrants' willingness to "assimilate," a term completely shunned in Europe but of unbroken vitality in the New World: "Almost all immigrants want

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[11] Banting and Kymlicka's Multiculturalism Policy Index is a composite of eight policies: constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism (at any vertical state level); multicultural curricula; ethnic representation in public media; exemptions from dress-codes; allowing dual citizenship; funding ethnic organizations; bilingual education; and "affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups" (Banting 2011, p. 13 f.). At least two of these measures: dual citizenship and affirmative action, in my view, are not necessarily multiculturalism policies (for affirmative action as a form of antidiscrimination, see below).

their children to learn English quickly and to assimilate in ways which are entirely historically familiar," King concludes (p. 127 f.).

Accordingly, Banting's (2011) puzzled look at Europe expresses not only a Canadian but a New World sentiment at large, according to which there need not be a conflict between multiculturalism and a robust commitment to assimilation. However, he concedes that "some versions of civic integration undoubtedly are inconsistent with (a) multicultural approach," particularly to the degree that the former move toward the "illiberal" pole (p. 3). The standard bearer in this respect, of course, is the Netherlands, which invented the entire genre of "civic integration" in Europe some 15 years ago. It is thus apposite to briefly look at this original case of European civic integration, and to assess the degree to which the policies that go under this name vary cross-nationally.

Under the label of *inburgering* (the English neologism would be "citizenization"), the Netherlands first introduced civic integration courses in the late 1990s as a remedy to disproportionate unemployment, school drop-out, and residential segregation especially among the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant populations.[12] Importantly, this malaise had occurred in the shadow of a multiculturalism (or "ethnic minorities") policy that gave a premium on institutional separation. Such separation has a long legacy in the Netherlands in terms of its nation-building through "pillarization" (*verzuiling*), the division of society into Protestant, Catholic and Social-Democratic sectors. Only the elites of these sectors would communicate with one another within a regime of "consociational democracy" (Lijphart 1967)—a regime that, ironically, had almost disappeared when it came to be reinvented for the purposes of immigrant integration in the 1980s. This regime never worked for immigrants, not least because two of its central elements: elite communication and equal-level socioeconomic integration of the rank-and-file had never been in place. Accordingly, the new *démarche* of inburgering was to bind immigrants into host society institutions, above all the labor market, and to make them learn Dutch. However, due to swelling populism and domestic turmoil surrounding Muslims and Islam, an initially utilitarian policy of making immigrants "self-sufficient" (and thus no longer dependent on welfare) mutated into a culture-focused policy of making them adapt to, or at least be cognizant of, "Dutch norms and values." This went along with an increasingly punitive and control-minded approach, making permanent residence permits contingent upon passing a civic integration exam, eventually even handing out temporary visas for (mostly Turkish and Moroccan) family migrants only after they could demonstrate basic civic knowledge and Dutch language competence before arrival (so-called "integration from abroad").

A contested question in the literature is whether civic integration policies, which were immediately emulated elsewhere in Europe (including Germany, France, Britain, Austria, and Denmark), are convergent on essential parameters, such as

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[12] The literature on Dutch civic integration has grown into a small industry, much of it highly repetitive. It suffices to read Entzinger (2002), and—most recently—Goodman Wallace (2013, Chap. 7), which finds more "liberal" elements even in the latest version of this policy than most other commentators would condone

their illiberal features and notional move beyond multiculturalism; or whether their shared features are outweighed by persistent national distinctiveness and "national models" of membership and immigrant integration.

In earlier writings, I argued that civic integration obliterates the old assumption that European states were following different "national models" or "philosophies" of membership and immigrant integration, and that if one seeks to identify variation in managing (immigrant-related) cultural diversity in Europe, it is within the dominant mode of civic integration and fostering "liberal identity" (Joppke 2007, 2008, 2010a). This was not to deny that variation continued to exist, particularly with respect to the harshness of the policy. Unlike its Dutch inspiration, the French *Contrats d'acceuil et d'integration* are not punitive but service-oriented, the civics part lasting just one day, while some newcomers are obliged to take (state-paid) French language lessons—interestingly, not more than a small minority among predominantly francophone immigrants. The German *Integrationskurse* focus on language-acquisition, which is a much bigger problem in Germany, as most immigrants do not speak German on arrival. In the case of defaulting, one may lose social benefits, but not one's residence permit. In the context of nationality law, initially heavily culture-, even morality-focused citizenship tests (piloted by some Länder) were replaced by a federal test that focuses on civic-political knowledge and is easy to pass. In Britain, civic integration originated in the context of nationality law, and it was only subsequently extended to the regulation of entry and residence. Given the status of English as global lingua franca, language acquisition is no problem in Britain. Instead, civic integration *à l'anglaise*, has an applied-culture inflection, expecting immigrants to know how to pay bills, behave in pubs, and stand in line patiently, in all seriousness. One observer found that in its civic integration and naturalization requirements, at least England (as against Wales or Scotland) "subscribes to a 'postnational' multicultural concept of citizenship—advocacy of a 'multicultural Britishness'" (Kiwan 2011, p. 276), which sounds very Canadian indeed (for a critical view of persistent cultural elements in Europe's civic integration requirements, which he finds reprehensible from a political liberal point of view, *see* Orgad 2010).

According to this analysis, the general thrust of civic integration is to narrow (rather than widen or stabilize, as "multiculturalism" is suspected of) the cultural distance between immigrants and host society, and to make them understand its norms, principles, institutions. However, tested knowledge of these norms is one thing; their proven adoption as guidepost for one's own behavior is quite another (*see* Bauböck and Joppke 2010). Cameron's notion of muscular liberalism clearly aims at the latter—that is the whole point of injecting "muscles." While behavioral and moral change cannot but be the goal of policy (already qua policy, short of any "muscles"), it does not necessarily have the tools or the powers to bring it about—because civic integration wishes to be liberal policy. This self-limitation becomes apparent if one looks at outliers that have come under fire precisely for wanting to go further. The notorious example is the "Muslim Test" introduced in 2005 in the German Land of Baden-Württemberg, which seeks to sniff out, by way of morally inquisitional trick questions, whether applicants for citizenship really accepted the principles of the Basic Law (that they had to swear allegiance to in a ritual oath),

or whether they only pretended in order to grab a German passport. Exactly to set a counterpoint to this heavily criticized "morality test" (*Gesinnungstest*), the German federal citizenship test introduced in 2008 abstains from morality questions and limits itself to civic-political knowledge questions. A second "morality" outlier comes from the other side of the Rhine, where a female Muslim was denied French citizenship in 2008 because of her wearing of a *burqa*—this was found "incompatible with the essential values of the French community, especially equality of the sexes."[13] Before this *Conseil d'Etat* decision (which is now routine administrative practice), the "assimilation" required for naturalization under French law had been taken in a thinly linguistic sense. In a context of intensified conflict surrounding Islam, the meaning of assimilation has obviously thickened.

Overall, these are illiberal exceptions that have become known exactly for that. In most other instances, civic integration is limiting itself to instilling and testing cognitive knowledge, while abstaining from intervening in the inner sphere of morality (*see* Michalowski 2011 for an empirical confirmation). Even the "Dutch norms and values" that are to be respected in what is (together with the Danish variant) the harshest civic integration variant in Europe, share this self-limitation: when Muslim immigrants are confronted with sexual libertinism in the notorious Dutch information video for newcomers, the gist is not that Muslims also undress at chilly Dutch beaches but that they are aware that this is common practice in this "liberal" country (astutely observed by Hansen 2010).

Against the view that the arrival of civic integration in Europe signals policy convergence on immigrant integration and the abandonment of "national models," Sara Goodman Wallace (2013) has recently argued, in the so far most detailed and systematic comparative account, that the new policies "do not signal departures from national approaches to citizenship, but rather fortify them" (2013, p. 18). Indeed, civic integration requirements differ in "scope": some (restrictive) countries focusing more on the status of legal permanent residence as an alternative to (and as a shield for) impermeable, traditional citizenship, while in other (liberal) countries there is continuity between both statuses, fulfilled residence requirements easing the path to citizenship; they differ in "sequencing," that is, which legal status (residence or citizenship) is targeted first; they differ in "density," that is, their degree of difficulty. But, above all, the "purpose" of the new policies varies, from liberal to restrictive, depending on existing citizenship legacies and political conflict surrounding them. In this respect, Goodman Wallace distinguishes between four constellations: "restrictive continuity" in Austria and Denmark, where states "make permanent residence a significant second barrier of admission," thus "insulating citizenship from liberalizing change" (2013, p. 140, Chap. 4); "liberal continuity" in Britain, thus confirming Banting's (2011) view that multiculturalism and civic integration may go happily together; "restrictive moderation" in Germany, where a conservative campaign for new requirements for legal permanent residence has helped to "offset" or "counterbalance" liberalizing citizenship reforms; and, finally, "liberal moderation" in France and the Netherlands, where civic integration

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[13] *Conseil d'Etat*, decision on Mme Faiza M., req. no. 286798, 27 June 2008.

amounts to putting some restrictive spikes on traditionally liberal and (over-)inclusive citizenship regimes.

Goodman Wallace's important insight is that, depending on institutional and political context, civic integration may take on different meanings, from Canadian-style "liberal multicultural" to more restrictive, if not illiberal. Her conceptually important move that allows her to do this is to distinguish, more clearly than previous accounts had done, between legal permanent residence and citizenship proper as two alternative statuses and foci of integration for immigrants, which are differently targeted and differently brought together or separated in European states' contemporary civic integration policies.

But there is still an underlying communality even in her analysis, which is all about mapping and explaining policy variation: she describes it as "reassert(ing) the community-defining competence of the modern nation-state" (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 317). If integration was once "inferred" from residence time and left to the individual to fill with meaning, it is now "assessed" through explicit and objective criteria that allow no second-guessing (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 199). Moreover, civic integration is the "defining (of) new parameters of belonging under the banner of liberalism" (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 308). While liberal states "cannot mandate the practice" of immigrants' identifying with and feeling loyal to their new society, which is the whole point of civic integration measures, their unquestionable joint import is "bringing the state closer to the individual," which naturally bears "illiberal possibilities" (Goodman Wallace 2013, p. 321 f.). But these conclusions are not far from those in previous accounts (e.g., Joppke 2007), so that a commendable stress on policy variation is not incompatible with convergence on essential parameters.

What conclusions can we draw from this review of European multiculturalism debates and related policy trends on immigrant integration? There is little space of maneuver for a liberal state in the vexed terrain of culture and identity, and variation is limited by the following shared parameters:

- "Multiculturalism," notionally the beast to beat by the new civic integration policies, never really was by way of explicit state policy—instead, it is a cover for the laissez-faire that previously reigned in most European countries. Amnon Rubinstein has got it right: "Indeed, the new concept of multiculturalism has manifested itself in Europe more by the absence of demands for integration than by granting specific collective rights" (2007, p. 772).
- Religion, the key cultural integration issue in Europe, has mostly been processed not in terms of explicit multiculturalism policies but by autonomous legal systems, and constitutional liberty clauses (rather than "policies") have functioned as main vehicles of accommodation.
- The one "policy" that there is today, "civic integration," despite significant variations across European states, has only occasionally gone beyond a legitimate emphasis on civic-political knowledge and language acquisition—the "muscles" in "muscular liberalism," which obviously bear illiberal possibilities, have mostly been in word only.

4.4   Critical Issues

In the final part of this chapter, I wish to flag, in a normative, forward-looking mode, five critical issues that states have to reckon with when crafting immigrant integration policies after multiculturalism. These are all issues of context and "relationship": (1) the strange coincidence of multiculturalism-in-decline and antidiscrimination-on-the-rise, which suggests to keep both apart; (2) the need to recognize majority culture; (3) the importance of robust debate and democracy; (4) the anticipatory tying of immigrant integration to immigrant selection; and (5) finally, acknowledging the role of non-immigrant-specific policies and institutions in the process of integration.

4.4.1   Multiculturalism vs. Antidiscrimination

Interestingly, the fight against discrimination, which since 2000 has become a requirement under European Community law, has shifted to high gear in the very moment that multiculturalism has been called into question. This suggests that, notoriously fused and confused, the multiculturalism and antidiscrimination agendas have to be kept strictly apart. In a nutshell, multiculturalism seeks to perpetuate difference, while antidiscrimination seeks to abolish it (*see* Joppke 2010b). Another way to put it is that multiculturalism measures are permanent, while those of antidiscrimination are temporary only, triggered by and remedying acts and facts of discrimination. The lodestar of antidiscrimination is the "de-racialization" of society, as Ronald Dworkin (1985, Chap. 14) called the purpose of US affirmative action. It aims at a situation where skin color (much like any other ascriptive marker) is not "seen" when seeing a person—much like small children cannot "see" black until they learn that it carries (negative) social significance. To get there—this is the impetus behind affirmative action in the US and behind what in Europe is called, more cautiously, positive discrimination—it is necessary that people of all ascriptive endowments, black and white, Muslim and Christian, be found in every social station, top and bottom, in complete randomness. Short of it, when race or religion signals social status, which cannot but be a result of injustice or unearned privilege, it is legitimate and demonstrably effective, at least so argue the proponents of affirmative action or positive discrimination, to preferentially recruit minority individuals into coveted social positions.

The legal basis for this is the recognition of "indirect discrimination," which proceeds by comparing the demographic availability of minority individuals with their actual (under)representation in key societal sectors, like employment, education, or public office. The problem is that this opens up a group-recognizing, de facto multiculturalist wedge within a notionally individualistic and universalistic policy, because without a preconceived idea of who is a "minority" one could not observe the existence of "indirect discrimination." This is why the antidiscrimination and multiculturalism agendas and forces closely overlap in the real world, even appear

to be one, although philosophically they are apart, even opposite from one another. The bottom line is that to favor antidiscrimination is not necessarily to support multiculturalism—otherwise one could not explain why the former is uncontested in Europe, while the latter is in crisis.

4.4.2 Reassertion of Majority Culture

Under the umbrella of multiculturalism, the culture deemed in need of protection was only that of the minorities. "But what about the majority's right to preserve its own culture?" asks Amnon Rubinstein, only to provide the answer himself: "The hidden assumption is that the majority has the means and will find ways to preserve its status" (2007, p. 789). In a way, the view of radical feminists and Marxists that the Dominant are culturally invisible, hyping up their particulars as the (falsely) universal, carried the day—no need to have mercy on them and to recognize "their" culture, which is but an instrument of power. And it is true that the nation-state is the most potent instrument of reproducing majority culture—what more could the majority want? In Will Kymlicka's (1995) influential theory of liberal multicultur-alism, even when being notionally inactive, states cannot but prioritize majority culture when fixing holidays or an official language—which is all right for him, because cultures provide a "context of choice" that is necessary for free and mean-ingful choices; only justice commands that minority cultures get the same deal in turn. That no deliberate state action is necessary to protect majority culture seems to be the implicit background reason why measures like the 1994 French *Loi Toubon* (ridiculed even in France as "Loi Allgood") have raised eyebrows, which mandated to keep the French language free of English words, like "hairdresser" or "week-end" or "computer."

However, the snubbing of majority culture, through an alliance of market forces, intellectuals, and a rights-focused legal system, was wind in the wings of right-wing populism that has become epidemic in Europe. A case in point is the curious repres-sion of the fact that European societies are Christian societies, although Christianity has been the single most important European culture- and civilization-maker since the early Middle Age. The high-point of this repression was perhaps the denial of a reference to God and Christianity in the preamble of the drafted (but never realized) EU Constitution (*see* the critique of Weiler 2004).

In an important counterpoint to this trend, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its Lautsi v. Italy decision of March 2011,[14] allowed the Italian state to display Christian crosses in its public schools, overruling its own lower cham-ber decision of November 2009. The ECtHR's Grand Chamber thus also reached the exact opposite verdict as the German Constitutional Court had in its notorious 1995 Crucifix Decision, in which to "learn under the Christian Cross" was deemed

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[14] ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Lautsi and Others v. Italy, decision of 18 March 2011. *See* the discus-sion in Joppke (2013).

a violation of a school child's negative religious right (not to be bothered by the religion of others if its atheist parents so wished). As the ECtHR argued instead, the Christian cross at the school wall was above all a cultural, not religious sign that symbolized the Christian formation of Italian society. Moreover, as a passive symbol, the Cross did not amount to active indoctrination of a creed that a secular state, of course, was never allowed to engage in. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Cross on the school wall was legitimized in reference to pluralism, as the Italian schools also allowed Islamic headscarves on the part of students, offered optional Islam instruction, and were considerate of the religious calendar of Islam. A Maltese judge on the Strasbourg court had called "historical Alzheimer's" and "cultural vandalism" the lower chamber's earlier prohibition of the Cross, in its Lautsi I decision in 2009. Indeed, it seemed unreasonable, even politically dangerous to allow a militant atheist from Finland to wipe out a century-old tradition in Italy for the sake of her sacrosanct (negative) "religious freedom"—the irony also being that a religious right gunned down what in the end, of course, is "religion." A better path to take, this is the message of the Strasbourg court's Lautsi II decision, is a gentle pluralism, in which the minority accommodation that is constitutionally required does not happen at the cost of the "majority," whatever that is in a diverse society.

Interestingly, the more entrenched multiculturalisms of Canada and Australia have all undergone a turning-point to stress that this was not only a thing for minorities but for the majority too. The successful grounding of multiculturalism in Canadian and Australian national identity seems to be a reason for multiculturalism's greater resilience there than in Europe, where multiculturalism never lost the sense to be for minorities only. By the same token, multiculturalism is a much less plausible identity option in the ethnic nation-states of Europe, which are not primarily the product of immigration or colonial settlement.

4.4.3 The Role of Public Debate and Democracy

Much of Islam accommodation in Europe proceeded quietly and unnoticed in the non-public settings of courtroom and state bureaucracy (*see* Dassetto et al. 2007; Joppke and Torpey 2013). This guaranteed liberal outcomes, but it also invited political backlash. Especially, the cultural implications of immigration, which touch on the identity of the host society, cannot bypass the court of public opinion. Despite the generic risk of populism, democracy is an indispensable medium of immigrant integration. The current turmoil surrounding visible Islam, the *burqa* and the minarets, signals that the democratic stage of integration has finally arrived. Precisely in these countries where political etiquette had once sealed debate, as in the once "liberal" Netherlands and Denmark, the politicization of Islam is all the more virulent today. In Germany, a best-selling book (Sarrazin 2010) that dared to call "integration above all a task of immigrants" (which in the United States is legally enshrined in its century-old "deeming" provision) and that found the difficulties of Muslim integration not unconnected to "Islam" (thus questioning the

reigning firewall between political extremism and religion), led to the ostracizing of its author, who was forced to resign from his post at the German Federal Bank and from his membership in the Social Democratic Party. But, judged by the experience of Denmark or the Netherlands, the stifling of debate only feeds extremism.

On the opposite end, direct democracy is not the most suitable venue to process sensitive minority issues either. The true shock of the successful Swiss Minaret Referendum is not its outcome—in other European countries, even larger majorities would have rejected visible Islam.[15] Instead, the problem is to leave such sensitive issues for mass publics to decide, which are known to be inimical to immigrants and Muslims in all Western countries. Representative democracy, whereby "public views" are passed "through the medium of a chosen body of citizens" (Madison 1982), is much better suited for dealing with delicate minority issues. In fact, political leadership is particularly asked for in this domain. Unfortunately, leadership is exactly the resource in short supply in contemporary "audience democracy" (*see* Manin 1997), where public opinion, and not the best or just solution, is the benchmark of political success. There is no "golden rule" in the vexed terrain of minority integration, but the opposite extremes of extreme democracy and no democracy are equally insufficient.

4.4.4   *The Neglected Factor of Immigrant Selection*

Canadian officials, aware that they manage the immigration function better than most other countries, tend to argue that the "integration" of immigrants starts with their "selection." Similarly, Canadian academics are often surprised about the European view that "civic integration" and "multiculturalism are antithetical, the first replacing the second (e.g., Banting 2011). Instead, they point to a happy equilibrium of "multicultural integration" achieved in Canada that is as "muscular" as it is accommodating (Banting 2011). Indeed, Canada is blessed with a virtuous circle of integration and selection. But it is premised on a rigorously and robustly high-skill-oriented immigrant selection, within its famous points system, which also happens to admit no more than a trickle of Muslim immigrants. Even Will Kymlicka (2005), reflecting on multiculturalism's "retreat" in Europe, concedes that in the hypothetical case of an overwhelmingly low-skilled Muslim intake, Canada might undergo a European-style questioning of its multiculturalism. Conversely, fathom two US political scientists (Citrin and Wright 2011, p. 3), if the "'visible minorities' in the Netherlands would be well-educated, English-speaking and economically skilled migrants from Hong Kong and India," as they happen to be in Canada, "a good bet is that…we would not be talking about the rise and fall of multiculturalism in the Netherlands." Note that around 2010, 46% of the foreign born in Canada had a college or even higher university degree, while only 17% of the foreign born

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[15] This is the result of a French poll conducted in the immediate wake of the Swiss minaret referendum. *See* Le Figaro, 3 December 2009, p. 11.

in Germany had equivalent degrees; conversely, only 22 % of the foreign born in Canada had less than a high school diploma, which applied to 48 % of the foreign born in France (these are OECD-based data reported in Koopmans 2013, p. 22). A similar transatlantic divergence applies within ethnic groups also: 14 % of Turkish foreign born in the United States have less than high school education, while 82 % of those in Austria do (Koopmans 2013, p. 23).

The European conundrum of ever more repressive "integration" policies, epitomized by "integration from abroad," which is not an integration policy but a control policy under different name, cannot be decoupled from the fact that most of its legal immigrants, some 80 % in France or the Netherlands, are not "selected" but un-chosen and low-skilled "as of right" immigrants, arriving in the context of family formation and asylum-seeking. Moreover, the large majority are Muslim immigrants, often from North Africa and the Middle East where Islam is chronically politicized, thus further fuelling the *querelles islamiques* within Europe.

As ethnic selectivity has become anathema in liberal societies (*see* Joppke 2005), an obvious way out of this conundrum is the turn to rigorously skill-based immigrant selection, on the assumption that only the combination with poverty and exclusion fuels the politicization of cultural (more precisely: religious) difference. At the same time, the *demand*, given out by French President Sarkozy, to move from "suffered" to "chosen" immigration is highly misleading, because a modicum of "suffered" immigration has to be accepted for legal-constitutional reasons. Not to mention the ethical problems of creaming-off the best and fending-off the rest, robbing underdeveloped societies of their precious human capital. But from a realist point of view, the Canadian lesson is that there is no alternative to an unsentimental selection policy that "selects" and does not just "accept."

4.4.5 Limits of Integration Policy

From an American point of view, the European search for the right "integration policy" must be puzzling, because America has accomplished much more with much less (if any) policy engagement, leaving "integration" entirely to society, especially a famously absorptive labor market and an assimilatory mass culture. The best defense of multiculturalism against its critics is to point to the miniscule share of the related policies within the total state budget, even compared to other measures on integration (which is in a proportion of 1:50 in Canada!), so that everything bad on the integration front can hardly be the fault of multiculturalism policy alone (*see* Banting 2011, p. 7).In a comprehensive review of studies on the effects of multiculturalism policies across Western countries, Koopmans (2013, p. 1) summarized these studies as showing "no effect" on socio-economic integration, "some positive effects" on political integration, but "negative impacts" on socio-cultural integration—a "mixed picture," certainly, but also no reason to be alarmed about multiculturalism policies. Koopmans' own "Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants" (ICRI) index showed a cross-European "consolidation at moderate

levels of multicultural policies," but also that the "expansion of multicultural policies has halted in the early twenty-first century" (Koopmans 2013, p. 13)—findings that are similar to those of the Banting-Kymlicka index (Banting 2011). Interestingly, with respect to "religious rights for Muslims," by far the most accommodating country in 2008 was the Netherlands, some 10 years into its multiculturalism backlash, being well ahead of Britain, Canada, and Australia in this respect (Banting 2011, p. 17). This suggests the immunity of legally-provided religious rights from the ebb and flow of multiculturalism policies, considering that the Netherlands is also one of the four countries on the ICRI index where "multicultural policies" had declined in the past decade, next to Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (Banting 2011, p. 12). Moreover, Koopmans argues, "where effects of immigrant integration policies do occur, they mostly point towards the importance of individual rights and equal opportunity," such as rules of access to citizenship, and not the group-rights measures favored by multiculturalism (Banting 2011, p. 34).

But even more important than any explicit integration policy, groupist or not, seems to be immigrant-unspecific labor market structures and educational systems. In a widely noted paper, Koopmans (2010) found that in Europe, the three countries that notoriously score lowest on all multiculturalism and integration indexes: Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, also had the "highest" rates of non-EU immigrant labor market participation, while three other countries that are commonly found on top of these indexes: Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium, showed the "lowest" rates of immigrant labor market participation. Rather than dwelling on the good showing of the Germanic countries, which should point to fortuitous labor market and company structures (with strong labor unions that cater to foreign workers), Koopmans attributes the bad showing of the integrationist countries to their combination of strong welfare states with pronounced multiculturalism policies, which minimize incentives to acquire linguistic skills and interethnic contacts.

With respect to educational systems, a study comparing second-generation Turkish immigrants in six major European cities found that second-generation Turks in Paris were eight times more likely to reach higher education than those in Berlin (Crul and Mollenkopf 2012, Chap. 10; based on data for 2007/8). Further, 30 % of second-generation Turks held a professional job in Paris, thus making a leap up the social ladder compared to their unskilled worker parents, while only 13,5 % of second-generation Turks in Berlin were in professional jobs. The authors attribute the good results for France, but also for Sweden (over 31 % of second-generation Turks in Stockholm held a professional job), to these countries' comprehensive school systems, which do not separate native (elite) children from immigrant (and working-class) children at an early point. By contrast, the stratified school systems of Germany and Austria are particularly bad in this respect (second-generation Turks in Berlin/Germany and Vienna/Austria did equally bad with respect to schooling). To the factor of comprehensive schooling must be added the positive effect of extended childcare facilities and long school days in France and Sweden, which move immigrant children from early on and for long portions of their day into majority-society contexts. Conversely, the scarcity of public Kindergärten and

schools closing at midday in Germany and Austria leave immigrant children in the vitiating ambit of their parents.

The message is that immigrant-unspecific institutions are more important for integrating immigrants than even the best "integration policy." The European debate suffers from an over-attention to policy and neglect of the role of institutions.[16]

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[16] For instance, with respect to political participation, Turkish immigrants in France and the Netherlands were found to show higher levels of identification with and participation in host societies than their compatriots in Germany—the explanation being easier access to citizenship in the former two countries (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010).

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Chapter 5
From a Migrant Integration of Distinction to a Multiculturalism of Inclusion

In-Jin Yoon

5.1 Multiculturalism in Northeast Asia

Multiculturalism emerged as a discourse and policy of managing ethnic and cultural diversity in the 1970s. It was regarded as a more liberal and democratic alternative to the assimilation model in race and ethnic relations (Kymlicka 2010). It met, however, a backlash in the mid-1990s as Western Europeans tend to believe that multiculturalism separated rather than integrated immigrants and ethnic minorities into a mainstream society and prevented them from having a sense of identity and responsibility as members of society (Joppke 2010). The fear that accommodation of diversity has gone too far and is threatening the majority group's way of life gave rise to nativist rightwing political movements in the Netherlands, France, and the UK (Back et al. 2002; Entzinger 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005). Political leaders of France, Germany, and Britain continuously declared the failure or the end of multiculturalism in their own countries.

While multiculturalism lost popular support in Europe, it gained public interest and policy attention in Northeast Asia, particularly in South Korea since the 1990s. The rapid increase of immigrants and the urgent need for accommodating new members of society and helping them integrate into mainstream society were the main reasons for the sudden interest in multiculturalism. Although structural changes that brought about racial and ethnic diversity in a society and the urgency of policy intervention to solve immigration-related problems are similar in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the three countries have shown different paces, breadths, and directions of policy reforms. If Korea has taken proactive and broad-spectrum measures to respond to the rise of a multicultural society, Japan has basically maintained the status quo while making only minor reforms and engaging in local grassroots movements.

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In terms of scale of societal responsiveness, Taiwan seems to be closer to Korea than to Japan. Also, because of unique historical legacies, ethnic composition, political leadership structures, and relationships between the state and civil society, each country has developed distinct features of multiculturalism discourse and policy.

Japan has long been a multi-ethnic society because it has had distinct ethnic minority groups for a long period of time (Lie 2001; Weiner 1997). Multiculturalism has not been discussed in the past, however, and began to arise as a political ideology only after the mid-1990s when there was a felt need to respond to the growing visibility of migrants in Japanese society (Burgess 1997; Yamanaka 2010). Japan began to admit foreign migrant workers in the 1980s and other types of immigrants such as marriage migrants and foreign students joined the wave of immigration. As of 2010, the number of registered immigrants was 2,212,639, accounting for 1.8 % of the total population. Among the foreigners are Brazilians and Peruvians of Japanese descent called *Nikkeijins* invited to work in Japan and tens of thousands of Vietnamese refugees. There are also significant numbers of foreign businessmen and their families, English teachers, and foreign students (Hays 2013). The largest group of foreigners is the Chinese, who surpassed the Koreans for the Number 1 spot in 2007 and accounted for 32.2 % of the foreign population. The next largest minority groups are the Koreans (26.5 %) and the Brazilians (10.5 %). Migrant workers totaled 650,000 in 2010, constituting 1.0 % of the total labor force. The cumulative number of female marriage migrants was estimated at 195,994 in 2005 and international marriages account for about 5–6 % of all marriages in Japan.

The Japanese government responded to immigration-related problems by adopting a 'multicultural coexistence' policy in 2005 (Kim et al. 2008, p. 166). In the following year, it announced the implementation plan for multicultural coexistence, which provided guidelines for supporting foreign residents at the local municipal level (Lee 2010). One noteworthy characteristic of the multicultural coexistence policy is that it is led by local governments where foreigners are concentrated and the central government's involvement is weak and limited. Most programs at the local level aim at assisting foreigners to adapt to Japanese society and culture. However, the central government has not shown strong leadership to reform immigration policy and educate the general public to change their nationalistic ideas and attitudes (Akaha 2010; Yamanaka 2010).

Because of the long presence of indigenous people and four major ethnic groups in Taiwan, multiculturalism discourse and policy have taken off earlier in Taiwan than Japan and Korea. The four major ethnic groups include Taiwanese aborigines, the mainlanders, the Hakkas and the Fulos whose ancestors emigrated from Fujian province in the south-eastern part of China (Wang 2003). When the Kuomintang (KMT) ruled Taiwan in an authoritarian manner and Chinese nationalism dominated national identity and culture, multiculturalism was not a topic of public discourse and policy. From the 1970s to the 1980s, however, 'Taiwanese consciousness' began to challenge Chinese culture and to look for unique Taiwanese culture and identity (Wang 2003). From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the aborigines began movements to recover land and the Hakka joined movements to regain language and name. To recognize and compensate for historical discrimination against ethnic minorities, the Taiwanese government issued a series of multiculturalism policies:

"Community Renaissance," "Multicultural Taiwan," and "Cultural Citizenship" (Wang 2007 as cited in Kim and Oh 2012). Also, in 1997, it revised the Taiwanese Constitution to redefine the identity of Taiwan as a multicultural nation and granted civic, linguistic, and cultural rights to aboriginals (Kim and Oh 2012). The government also legislated a series of laws including the Aboriginal Education Act, the Aboriginal Development Act, the Draft of the Aboriginal Self-Government Act, and the establishment of the Committee for Aboriginal Affairs (Wang 2007). Moreover, the Taiwanese policy of Cultural Citizenship is recognized as the first one in East Asia that aims to instill democratic multiculturalism through the acknowledgment and expansion of cultural rights (Kim and Oh 2012). However, this policy is criticized for emphasizing cultural unity while ignoring the cultures of ethnic minority groups such as the Hakka and aborigines.

Taiwan's multiculturalism policy met a new challenge in the 1990s onward when the immigration of migrant workers, foreign brides, and Chinese brides increased ethnic diversity and complicated social membership. Taiwan began to admit foreign migrant workers and marriage migrants in the 1980s. There were 417,385 migrant workers and 404,142 marriage migrants in 2008. Migrant workers accounted for about 3.0 % of the Taiwan's labor force and marriage migrants constituted 25 % of all marriages in 2008. In that sense, the impact of international migration on the economy and society should be greater in Taiwan than Korea. Like its Korean counterparts, migrant workers in Taiwan are reported to suffer serious violations of human and labor rights, such as expensive referral fees, deduction of security deposit from salary, no or limited days off, ban on change of business or workplace, and sexual harassment, in the case of domestic or care workers (Cheng 2003). Female marriage migrants, especially from Asia's developing countries and mainland China, are subject to prejudice and stereotypes and children of these women have disadvantages at schools and in society (Tseng 2008). Like other East Asian counterparts, Taiwan still restricts citizenship to its nationals and is unwilling to grant multicultural rights and citizenship to immigrants like migrant workers.

Korea accepted multiculturalism discourse and policy with great enthusiasm. Given a small number of immigrants, especially a smaller number of permanent residents, the enthusiasm for multiculturalism that Korean people have shown so far is quite surprising and unusual. The drive behind the multiculturalism fad was possible because it was thought to be politically correct and was regarded as synonym for globalization and advancement, a step toward joining the ranks of advanced nations (Seol 2009).

Many actors allied with each other to convince the general public that a multicultural society is inevitable and ethnic and cultural diversity is an asset of creativity that would enhance national vitality and competitiveness (Yoon 2010). Korean scholars introduced theories and discourses of multiculturalism developed in Western societies to examine current situations and problems of various types of migrants. Civic organizations advocated the rights of migrant workers and marriage migrants and supported their adjustment in Korea. Mass media transformed migrants' problems into a social issue and raised public awareness of the difficulties faced by migrants. The Korean government took proactive measures to accommodate the

needs of foreigners and migrants. Although it acted rather too quickly and hastily, the central government and its affiliated organizations have made some remarkable accomplishments in immigration and multiculturalism policies. These include (1) the establishment of the Employment Permit System and Healthy Family Support Centers, (2) legislation of the Foreigners Treatment Act and the Multicultural Family Support Act, and (3) establishment of legal and institutional infrastructures like the Korea Immigration Service. Also, according to many surveys on Koreans' perceptions of migrant workers and multicultural society, Koreans seem to have much more open-minded and positive viewpoints toward migrant workers, marriage migrants, and a multicultural society than ever before, and their perspectives are slowly but gradually changing more positively (Yoon et al. 2010; Yoon and Song 2011).

The Korean approach to multiculturalism has several distinctive characteristics. First, multiculturalism and migrant integration are not clearly distinguished, and terms such as multicultural policy, multiculturalism policy, foreign policy, and immigration policy are often used almost synonymously and interchangeably. Although multiculturalism policy and migrant integration policy have some overlaps, the former is distinguished from the latter in its emphasis on the recognition of a minority group's rights to maintain cultural and religious practices (Wright and Bloemraad 2012, p. 78). When we examine closely the Korean government's policies and programs regarding immigrants, most of them are about assisting immigrants to adapt to Korean society with little attention to cultural rights (Kim 2010). Nonetheless, such types of policies and programs are often regarded as multiculturalism policy, and this confusion prompted some critical Korean researchers to call the Korean government's policy as "multiculturalism in appearance only" (Kim 2007). There is no official multiculturalism policy explicitly stated by the Korean government and currently, the official names of similar policies are foreigner policy and immigration policy. However, many ministries of the central government and local governments as well as civic organizations carry out a variety of migrant integration programs in the name of multiculturalism, because this policy is largely viewed in Korean society as popular and politically correct.

Second, the main targets or beneficiaries of the government's migrant integration policy are people in international marriages and their children. Koreans coined a new term for these people, the multicultural family, to avoid negative connotations associated with international marriages between American military servicemen and Korean women and children of international marriages (e.g., mixed-blood people). Migrant workers, who account for a larger share of immigrants in Korea, are not considered a major clientele of migrant integration programs. Ethnic Chinese, who have lived in Korean soil for many generations, are not even considered as a relevant target group that the government needs to take care of.

Third, most migrant integration policies and programs aim at assimilating immigrants to Korean culture and society rather than accepting cultures and identities of immigrant groups. Korean language education, Korean culture learning, counseling, and vocational training are the backbone of migrant integration programs. Some civic organizations, like the Women Migrants Human Rights Center, run a

Vietnamese language program for the Korean husbands of Vietnamese female marriage migrants, but such cultural program is very rare. Also, although multiculturalism is officially adopted as a goal of Korean public education and more efforts are put in to enhance multicultural acceptance among the general public, multicultural education is still interpreted as helping immigrant children adapt to the Korean school environment.

Fourth, the Korean people and society as a whole are pretty sympathetic toward immigrants, especially toward female marriage migrants and their children. Because of the general public's positive and benevolent attitudes toward immigrants, the Korean government allocated a generous budget for migrant integration programs. This phenomenon, called "paternalist policy" and "tolerance paradigm" (Shim 2007), is largely due to a small number of immigrants and their weak influence on Korean society and culture. Thus, immigrants do not pose any threat or challenge to the dominant group's status quo and way of life, making the Korean people tolerant of them. In addition, as mentioned earlier, Koreans recognize their historical wrongdoings toward ethnic minorities, especially the ethnic Chinese and children of international marriages, and thus view multiculturalism as a liberal democratic way of coexistence in the global era.

The last point relates to what I want to elaborate on in the next section. Because immigrants and ethnic minorities are not numerous, are non-threatening and had arrived in Korea at different time periods, the Korean society responded to each group in a separate manner. While their number was still small and the economic burden was negligible, such a piecemeal approach was not a problem. However, as their number increases and their presence starts to feel burdensome, a new approach needs to be designed to restore fairness and efficiency.

5.2 A Migrant Integration of Distinction

As a result of the sudden rise in immigration since the late 1980s, Korea now has a number of multicultural minority groups. In this context, a multicultural minority group is defined as a group of people whose race, ethnicity, nationality, or culture are more salient markers than sex, age, sexual orientation, or region when defining him or her as a minority. At present, migrant workers, marriage migrants, children of international marriages, overseas Chinese (華僑), overseas Koreans living in Korea, and North Korean migrants are the most representative multicultural minority groups in the country. Koreans have different perceptions and grant different statuses and privileges to each of these groups according to their nationality, compatriot status, and legal status (Yoon 2010). Figure 5.1 shows the position of multicultural minority groups arranged along the dimensions of nationality, compatriot status, and legal status. North Korean defectors belong to the right upper part, where Korean nationality and compatriot status fit in together, and therefore they get special treatment for they are Korean in blood and expected to play important roles in the process of unification. In the right lower part, where non-Korean

Figure 5.1 Koreans' cognitive schema of immigrants

nationality and compatriot status fit in together, ethnic Koreans in China, Russia, and other overseas Koreans are located. Here, though they are not Korean nationals, they are given extra care and attention often based on brotherly or fraternal love. At the left upper part, where Korean nationality and non-compatriot status overlap, are the naturalized-marriage migrants. They have acquired Korean nationality through marriage and are expected to continue family lineage by giving birth to the next generation. These marriage migrants and their Korean husbands form multicultural families, and their children—who are full citizens—also receive special attention and support, especially in education. Last but not least, at the left lower part, where non-Korean nationality and non-compatriot status overlap, are the ethnic Chinese in Korea and the migrant workers. Although the ethnic Chinese have been permanent residents in Korea for several generations, they are treated as 'half-citizens' (Kim 2006). Since foreign migrant workers are non-citizens, non-Koreans by blood and are only temporary residents in Korea, they receive much less attention, and this is further divided based on their legal status. Legal migrant workers are protected through the Foreign Workers Employment Law and Foreigners Treatment Act, while illegal (or undocumented) migrant workers are excluded from any form of legal protection, and are therefore put in a difficult situation.

The Korean government is no different from the Korean people in its relationship to each multicultural minority group. In response to a sudden rise in immigrants and diverse immigration-related problems since the late 1980s, the Korean government offered a number of countermeasures. In each instance, it tried to establish ministry-centered migrant integration policies for each specific case. Its case-by-case pattern of response is quite visible in its policies for protecting the human rights and supporting the social adaptation of multicultural minority groups. For example, the government enacted the North Korean Defectors Welfare and Resettlement Act in

1997, the Overseas Koreans Immigration and Legal Status Law in 1999, the Foreigners Treatment Act in 2007, and Multicultural Family Support Act in 2008 to address one by one the problems of domestic adaptation and social integration of each migrant group. However, these laws distinguished foreigners and migrants from ordinary citizens and approached each migrant group separately by enacting special laws for each group. On the other hand, it failed to take a comprehensive approach, such as the legislation of the Anti-Discrimination Act, to extend equal treatment to all minority groups.

Another effect of enacting policies according to individual ministries was the awkward advent of a classification phase wherein each multicultural minority group was differentiated from the others. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family specified female marriage migrants and their children as the beneficiaries of that ministry's policies. Likewise, the Ministry of Unification identified North Korean defectors, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade earmarks overseas Koreans as the targets of their respective ministries' policies. As a result, rather than simultaneously enacting support measures for identical recipients, each policy was deliberated across agencies, leading to the recurring problem of redundantly investing material and human resources into similar programs and policies, each under a separate support regimen.

Moreover, lines were not only drawn by government ministries, but also by migrants themselves. Each separate migrant group highlighted their special qualities, distinguished themselves from other groups, and demanded special treatment and privileges from the Korean government and society. Chinese Koreans tried to highlight their shared ethnicity with Korean citizens and their special identities as the descendants of independence movement activists during the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula. To this end, they dislike being regarded on equal terms as foreign migrant workers and female marriage migrants. North Korean defectors also share an obvious kinship with South Koreans and claim special treatment on the grounds that they are forerunners of future North-South Unification. They argue that their successful adaptation in South Korea is a litmus test of South Korea's ability to achieve social integration after unification. In particular, civic organizations and the Ministry of Unification, the agency responsible for North Korean defector policy, seem to oppose viewing North Korean defectors from the perspective of multiculturalism. Female marriage migrants become the wives, daughters-in-law, and mothers of Korean citizens, roles recognized as essential for the reproduction of families. Proactive government support is provided to these individuals in order to aid their rapid assimilation as Koreans. Meanwhile, foreign migrant workers are given only the most basic considerations for human rights protection and are otherwise excluded from social integration policies because they are only perceived as being temporary migrants. Moreover, legal foreigners receive governmental protection and the guarantee of equal rights as Korean citizens under the Foreigners Treatment Act legislated in 2006; however, undocumented foreigners and their children are situated in a blind spot in terms of human rights. Accordingly, rather than recognizing multicultural minority groups in Korea as a unified minority, their distinctions are highlighted, and they are unable to unite and respond collectively to the social discrimination and exclusionary structures that constrain them.

The government's policy of migrant integration does not integrate migrants into prior administrative and welfare systems but supports them by providing separate laws, programs, budgets, human resources, and facilities thereby giving rise to wasteful, overlapping investments. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family claims to provide services to female marriage migrants that are customized to their life cycle. The question is, once an immigrant acquires citizenship, until what point should the government support them. Similarly, it is also necessary to consider up to what point the government ought to protect and support North Korean defectors. Regarding the overlapping investments of budgets and facilities, the Ministry of Unification operates 31 settlement support centers for North Korean defectors (called Hana Centers, meaning "We are One" Centers) and the Ministry of Gender Equality operates 200 multicultural family support centers nationwide. In metropolitan areas across the country, institutions under various names, such as foreigner human resource centers, foreign worker support centers, and foreign laborer support centers, are all supporting foreign migrant workers. Korea's approach to migrants is quite different from that of Japan where autonomous local governments operate multicultural coexistence programs, and they do not distinguish between foreigners and locals. Instead, they recognize all participants as local residents and provide equal services (Moon 2012, pp. 23–24; Table 5.1).

Migrant integration policy of distinction has not only created fissures among migrants, but has also amplified prejudices and stereotypes, even antagonism and conflict among migrants and locals. Cries of reverse discrimination against locals grow daily as government support for migrant groups is deemed excessive compared to the support provided to marginal groups among ordinary citizens such as the low-income class, single-parent families, and the disabled. Backlash of this type is increasingly prevalent in "contact zones," such as tenement housing areas, where migrants and locals live in rather dense proximity to one another.

In the past, the problem of reverse discrimination of locals was raised primarily by anti-multicultural movement actors, but now, the issue has received so much criticism from civil activists concerned about the cost-free childcare for the children of multicultural families that the problem can no longer be ignored.

Given all of the issues raised above, it is clear that at this point, it will be difficult to obtain the consent of ordinary citizens and to continue operating special group-specific policies. Thus, in the future, government support ought to be provided to people equally, not according to their particular background and identity, but according to their needs as determined by universal standards such as social class and risk factors (familial dissolution, sickness, and unemployment). If universal standards are applied, then support will be available not only to those minority groups with a migrant background, such as North Korean defectors and multicultural families, but also to local citizens such as low-income households, single-parent families, the disabled, and so on. This will have the effect of alleviating reverse discrimination and controversies over fairness. When citizens believe that they, too, can receive government support when they fall upon hard times, they will be less stingy about providing support to migrants who are in the initial stages of resettlement. Naturally, with the expansion of policy beneficiaries comes the problem of securing a budget.

Table 5.1 General content of Korea's migrant integration policy by ministry.(Source: Lee (2012))

Ministry	Policy targets	Policy domain	Main points of policy
Ministry of Justice	Immigrants	Immigration, citizenship	Coordinate foreigner policies
			Social integration of migrants, social order of foreign residents
			Refugee policies, overseas Koreans policies, permanent resident and naturalization policies
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commerce	Overseas Koreans, etc	Support of overseas Koreans	Issue visas, overseas Koreans policies
Ministry of Labor	Foreign migrant workers	Employment	Permission to employ foreign workers
			Employment support for foreign workers
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family	Multicultural families	Multicultural family and gender equality; women's civil rights	Advance civil rights and welfare of migrant women
			Support social adjustment of female marriage immigrants and multicultural families
Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism	Ordinary citizens	Culture, sports, arts, tourism	Promote social awareness about multiculturalism
			Support cultural and linguistic adjustment of migrants
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy	Foreign investors	Investments	Support foreign investors
Ministry of Security and Public Administration	Foreign Residents (marriage migrants, foreign workers, international students, etc)	Local administration and Resident management	Support for the local resettlement and participation of migrants
			Build implementing system of multiculturalism policy at the local government level

Table 5.1 (continued)

Ministry	Policy targets	Policy domain	Main points of policy
Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology	Children of multi-cultural family, immigrant children, native students, teachers, etc	Development of educational human resources	Support education for children of multi-cultural families Lifelong education programs for marginalized classes (including multicultural families)
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs	Female migrants residing in rural areas	Educational training for female migrant farmers	Provide customized agribusiness education for female migrant farmers

However, as policy targets are universalized according to the inclusive principle of social integration and the actual number of support recipients gradually expand, this will also reduce reverse discrimination and disputes over fairness.

5.3   Toward a Multiculturalism of Inclusion

As seen in the experiences of the West and Korea, which have specific government policies targeting a specific immigrant and minority groups, it is difficult to garner the general public's support and to bring out sustainable policies because of controversies over fairness. Therefore, government support must be provided in accordance with universal standards like social class, not by special statuses. If the general public is able to receive the government's support when facing difficulties, it would not be as opposed to supporting immigrants in the early settlement stage. Expanding the policy targets in this way would definitely cause a budget problem, yet the problem of reverse discrimination can be resolved if such policy targets are universalized theoretically and supporting targets are augmented gradually.

  Legislating separate laws for specific multicultural minority groups is not only complicated and ineffective but also creates conflict and division among different minority groups, on one hand, and migrants and natives, on the other. From the experience of advanced countries that practice multiculturalism, it is evident that the minimum and most basic condition of multiculturalism is to abolish all kinds of discrimination and social exclusion. Unfortunately, Korea does not have a comprehensive anti-discrimination law yet. It has a series of separate anti-discrimination laws for people with disabilities, women, and the elderly, but it has failed to achieve general consensus on the issue of prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and sexual orientation. Legislating a comprehensive and universal anti-discrimination law is a first step towards a multiculturalism of inclusion.

Korean ministries have created and managed separate systems and facilities for multicultural minority groups. This practice has created problems of overlapping support for certain groups and sparked accusations of reverse discrimination against lower-classes of native Koreans. Although separate systems and facilities might be essential at an early settlement stage, integrating them into the existing welfare administration system after a certain period is a more efficient use of budget and labor force. It can also remove concerns of excessive support for certain migrant groups and reverse discrimination against locals.

Finally, we need to develop a new principle of social solidarity and integration suitable for a multicultural society. As explained earlier, relationships between Koreans and multicultural minority groups are determined largely by whether they are Korean nationals or not, compatriots or not, and foreigners with legal status or not. Naturalized international marriage migrants and their children are regarded as Korean nationals; Overseas Koreans are regarded as compatriots; while regard for foreigners and migrant workers differs according to the legality of their stay in Korea. Naturalized marriage migrants and their children become the target of inclusion and assimilation. Overseas Koreans receive preferential treatment over non-Korean foreigners. Foreigners staying in Korea legally are protected from discrimination and receive support for social adjustment and economic activities while illegal or undocumented ones are excluded from social support and protection.

These group-specific principles are inconsistent and are often viewed as discriminatory and thus not appropriate to become the principle of coexistence among peoples of different cultural backgrounds in a multicultural society. Thus, there is a need for a more universal and inclusive principle of social integration that can be applied to all actual members of a multicultural society.

Ethnicity and ethnic nationalism used to be the principle of social solidarity and the driving force that united Koreans in times of national crises. It is no longer valid in recent times, however, when territory, ethnicity, culture, and nationality do not coincide (Befu 2001). Nationality (or citizenship) and civic nationalism are more effective than ethnicity and ethnic nationalism to incorporate naturalized foreigners, such as marriage migrants and their children, into South Korean society. They are not, however, applicable to overseas Chinese who are permanent members of Korean society and other sojourning foreigners. Moreover, undocumented foreigners who constitute a sizable portion of the foreign population, do not receive basic protection of their human rights because Korean laws, like the Foreigners Treatment Act and the Ordinance to Support Resident Aliens, protect only foreigners with legal status in the country.

In order to acknowledge all actual members of a multicultural society and to provide them with minimum protection of human rights, I propose the adoption of the principle of residence and cohabitation as the principle of multicultural coexistence. By the principle of residence and cohabitation, foreigners and migrants are acknowledged as residents and people living in local communities and are entitled to basic human rights regardless of legal status. All multicultural minority group members are cohabitants with local Koreans, sharing residence in the same communities and having interdependent relationships. The concept of cohabitation is

similar to the concept of denizenship proposed by Soysal (1994). Soysal argues that the restructure of citizenship from particularistic national to universalistic postnational citizenship has its roots in the post-WWII period when a new legal arrangement, also called denizenship, came into being for labor migrants and guestworkers. Guestworkers in Germany and France, who have resided in countries for years, have obtained civil and social rights, regardless of their nationality. It is true that denizenship does not allow political participation, and therefore represents a legal status to be located between being alien and being a citizen (Joppke 2010, p. 33). However, it can still provide long-term aliens with social rights and opportunities to participate as productive members of the host society and to work, as a rational transitional procedure of normalizing the status of long-term aliens by naturalization. In that sense, cohabitation and denizenship can work as middle-range principles of multicultural coexistence before Koreans, still imbued with strong nationalism, adopt universalistic postnational citizenship.

5.4   Theoretical Discussions

The examination of Korea's situation of multiculturalism provides several topics for theoretical discussion. One is whether multiculturalism is valid for Korea or not. The second is the relationship between civic integration and multiculturalism. The third is the position or status of the dominant group in multiculturalism discourse and policy.

Regarding the first issue, as already mentioned, the proportions of immigrants in Korea (likewise Japan and Taiwan), including the short-term and permanent residents, do not exceed three percent of the total population. The proportion of permanent resident foreigners is below one percent. Integration is not an important element of the policy because most foreigners are short-stay, low-skilled workers expected to return to their homeland once the contract period is over. If multiculturalism is limited to the social and cultural rights of immigrants and ethnic minorities with guaranteed citizenship, it may be irrelevant and invalid for countries like Korea with a small number and a low percentage of foreign permanent residents and indigenous peoples. Moreover, it may be counterproductive to implement social integration programs in countries like Korea where ethnic and cultural homogeneity used to contribute to national solidarity and mobilization. Europeans may find it difficult to understand why the Korean government and Koreans have interest in multiculturalism when it is regarded as a failed social policy in many European countries.

We have to note, however, the fact that Korea was ethnically and culturally homogenous in the past but is quickly transforming into a multiethnic, multicultural society due to the increase of international migration since the 1980s. The number of foreigners in 2012 reached 1,445,103, about 1.9 times higher compared to the 2000 figure of 491,324, and it is projected that the proportion of foreigners will increase to 9.2 % of the population by 2050. As society is becoming more pluralistic

and complicated, we need a new principle of social solidarity and cohesion by which diverse ethnic and cultural communities can coexist. Also, we need to develop a social policy to aid immigrants and ethnic minorities to integrate into mainstream society more effectively so that they can become full and productive members of society. In this context, multiculturalism can function as one of the principles in which diverse cultural communities can coexist.

Parekh (2006) described multiculturalism as a perspective of human life different from a political doctrine accompanied by a specific program and a philosophical theory about humanity and the world. He also said the theory of multiculturalism is not about the minorities, but about an appropriate relationship among multicultural communities. This interpretation of multiculturalism is a comprehensive viewpoint in which multiculturalism is not confined to particular minorities, specific countries, or the Western context, but can be universally applied. Pursuing culture-oriented multiculturalism could relieve tension resulting from the historical context of residents and immigrants. Regardless of the historical and numerical proportions, 'those' possessing different culture from our own are our counterparts for 'mutual communication,' who enable us to have a new understanding of our customs and traditions, to look back, and to transcend them. In this case, multiculturalism is a discourse about the proper relationship between entities pursuing mutual communication based on respective cultures.

Originally, multiculturalism did not simply refer to cultural diversity based only on racial and ethnic differences, but became overly racial or ethnic in Western Europe and Korea. In particular, multiculturalism in Korea exhibited a labeling effect that often restricts the discussion to female marriage migrants and their children. This kind of interpretation seriously distorts the meaning of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is a set of principles and practices to acknowledge and value cultural diversity arising from differences in various dimensions encompassing religion, region, gender, age, and gender identity as well as race and ethnicity. Korean society is expected to transform into a hyper-pluralistic society in which conflict and opposition between social groups are intensified by the traditional dimensions such as classes, regions, genders, generations, and ideologies, as well as race, ethnicity, age and religion. It is the Korean society's important mission to investigate the aspect of fracture and conflict between social groups in a pluralistic society and to develop the principles of coexistence and cohesion as well as action plans for diversity management.

Another reason why multiculturalism is valid as well as useful for Korea is because it can foster democracy and help democratic values and behaviors to be practiced in everyday life. As we know, East Asian countries including Korea have been strongly influenced by Confucianism that emphasizes hierarchy and conformity. The freedom of ordinary people has been severely suppressed and basic human rights of diverse minority groups and disadvantaged classes of people have been violated. Nationalism, communism, authoritarianism, and other kinds of ideology that demand conformity to group norms make it difficult for democracy to flourish. Recognition of and respect for diversity is one of pre-conditions of equality, and democracy is possible and can mature when people relate to each other as equal

beings. As Kymlicka (2010) points out, multiculturalism is about developing new models of democratic citizenship to replace uncivil and undemocratic relations of hierarchy and exclusion. Then, multiculturalism is more needed in less democratic societies than in already democratized societies to expedite the consolidation of democracy after the phase of transition to democracy.

The final reason why multiculturalism is needed in Korea is that it can enhance cultural diversity and creativity that would provide a new engine for national development in the age of knowledge economy and creativity economy. Korea is well-known for high levels of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The belief in sameness and the tradition of centralized authoritarian rule gave birth to a phenomenon of strong group conformity. Koreans fear of being different from others and do not allow others to be different. Individual freedom, privacy, and creativity have been choked by pressure for group conformity. In order for Korea to flourish in the knowledge and creativity economy, Koreans need to develop more multicultural ability to appreciate cultural diversity and hybridity and utilize them for creativity and innovation.

Regarding the relationship between civic integration and multiculturalism, viewing multiculturalism solely as civic integration, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibition of discrimination, may overlook the importance of culture, which is a core of multiculturalism. In Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Bhikhu Parekh (2006) describes 'cultural diversity' as the essence of multiculturalism and develops an in-depth discussion on this matter. Culture has led to an insight that mutual dialogue between cultures is not normatively ideal but 'inevitable,' since it is a mechanism that enriches the culture itself from its nature, in which it is originally fluid and has uncertain boundaries that change over time. Consequently, it insists that not only the assimilation and conformity of minorities to the norms and values of the mainstream culture have to be bolstered, but it also endeavors to promote a consensus through mutual dialogue between minorities and majorities, and to develop a democratic and rational relationship that has to be adopted beforehand.

In addition to these philosophical arguments of Parekh, culture is psychologically a foundation of self and identity, and affection for one's own culture and pride is natural. Even if civic rights are ensured and opportunities for a better social status are provided equally, it cannot be said that true freedom and happiness are being appreciated if one cannot use the native language and enjoy native culture. Hence, multicultural receptivity, which keeps the tradition of minorities intact, assures the right to enjoy and acknowledge each other's culture separately from civic integration, and is a multicultural society's basic requirement that can never be set aside.

The final topic of discussion, the position or status of the dominant group in multiculturalism discourse and policy, is what appears to separate interculturalism from multiculturalism. In his comparison of interculturalism and multiculturalism, Bouchard (2011) claims that multiculturalism operates in a 'diversity' paradigm where individuals and groups have equal status under the same law and there is "no recognition of a majority culture." By contrast, interculturalism operates in a 'duality' paradigm where "diversity is conceived and managed as a relationship

between immigrant minorities and a cultural majority that could be described as foundational" (Bouchard 2011, pp. 441–442).

I do not intend to join the debate between the two philosophies, but I just want to point out that even multiculturalism in many liberal democracies, like Canada and Australia, acknowledge the privileges of the dominant groups or foundational pillars of society. The 1968 Official Languages Act of Canada, for example, gives English and French preferred status over all other languages. Similarly, the 1989 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia acknowledges the importance of "our British heritage" in helping "to define us as Australian" (Levey 2012). Thus, as long as multiculturalism is sponsored and implemented by the state, it is taken for granted that the dominant culture is the core around which ethnic minority cultures are added, to increase diversity but not to alter the foundation. In this sense, the line between the two ideas of diversity management is overlapping.

If ethnic hierarchy is a sociological fact that we cannot ignore, acknowledging the prominent status of the dominant group and its culture is unavoidable. This does not mean, however, that the dominant group should have privileges over minority groups in power and other forms of scarce resources. All members of society should be treated equal before the law, regardless of their racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Nonetheless, we need to recognize that the dominant group's history, culture, and identity happen to form the basis of a nation's culture and identity. If immigrants volunteer to join that nation, it is fair to say that they have already at least implicitly agreed to adopt the host society's culture and identity. They can maintain their unique culture and identity in private realms, but as members of one common society, they need to share the common national identity and to fulfill civic duties and responsibilities. The status of the dominant group is particularly relevant in countries like Korea and Japan where ethnic minorities are so few and not influential. In such countries, claiming that every group and culture is equal is simply pretension and rhetoric. What is more constructive is to recognize that a given society was formed by the history and culture of the dominant group and that is the basis of social order. And then, we need to discern what is particularly ethnic and group-specific, and what is more civic and universal, and gradually build the basis of social membership and rights and privileges on more inclusive, universal, and democratic criteria. Such a gradual recognition and revision will make the transition to a multicultural society a robust and sustainable project.

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Chapter 6
Reviewing Theories of Gender and Migration: Perspectives from Europe and North America

Eleonore Kofman

The review of theories of gender and migration in the West will focus on the past two decades of writing in Europe and North America (Canada and the US) with some reference to Australasia. The intellectual circulation of ideas and the focus on gendered migration from the global South, often from Asian countries, to the North mean that the division between Europe, North America and Asia cannot be seen as representing bounded regions or addressing totally distinct themes. The global has become the scale at which labor migrations, especially domestic work and care, have been conceptualized (Lutz 2011; Mahon and Robinson 2011; Zimmerman et al. 2006), although local and regional variants need to be recognized (Raghuram 2012).

For the period from the 1990s which I shall primarily be discussing, much of the literature has focused on labor and family migrations and the experiences of settlement within transnational and global contexts. While there is a substantial literature on gender and refugees, it has increasingly tended to be studied by specialist scholars. In the 1990s, following the breakup of nation-states and as a result of conflicts in neighboring regions, asylum seekers and refugees constituted a large group of migrants in Europe and were included in an overall analysis of migration, for example as in Lydia Morris' (2002) concept of civic stratification, analyzed in terms of stratified rights of entry, residence, access to the labor market and welfare.[1] So too in the various chapters of *New Perspectives on Gender and Migration* (Piper 2008) did the examination of different livelihoods and stratified entitlements that cover all categories of migrants. The nature of gender persecution, women as a social group and the asylum determination process are some of the current lively debates in relation to asylum and refugees (Bhabha 1996; Crawley 2001, 2006; Freedman 2003). Of course, many of the refugee communities from the 1980s and 1990s,

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[1] Our project (Kofman, Lloyd and Sales) Civic Stratification, Exclusion and Migratory Trajectories in Three European States (1999–2001) covered two broad groups (former Yugoslavs and Turkish speakers) who had to varying degrees been formed through asylum flows.

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whether from Central America in North America, or Turkey, the Middle East and Africa in Europe, have become ordinary migrant communities and absorbed into the literature on incorporation and integration as well as transnationalism. And during the past two decades, labor flows, irregular and official, have grown, while family migration, the largest contributor to permanent migration and a heavily female flow, has been problematized by states.

Even without including asylum and refugee aspects, the field of gender and migration is extensive. In this paper, my focus will be on how theorizing gender in migration has engaged with two perspectives framing contemporary migrations, that of transnationalism and globalization. Each of them emerged in a particular disciplinary, regional and socio-political context. Transnationalism emerged initially in the United States from anthropological research which critiqued an assimilationist paradigm and the nation-state as a taken for granted unit of analysis. Hence, it sought to reformulate the way one saw society by highlighting attachments between places of destination and origin and border crossings (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Subsequently other variants were adopted. The field of studies was broadened to include a range of different types of connections between places (Transnational Community Programme at Oxford University). Transnational families (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002), particularly strong in European research, developed, especially in relation to caring functions of the elderly (Baldasser and Baldock 2000; Baldassar 2007) and children left behind. Another focus has been on transnational social spaces (Faist 2010) through kinship groups, transnational circuits and transnational communities whose solidarity is based on their shared identity. These approaches, however, omit more circulatory movements based on *savoir-circuler* (knowledge of how to circulate) which is not premised on settlement in another country but where individuals migrate so as to stay at home (Morokvasic 2004). As King (2012) puts it, the transnational perspective has teased out the "transnational tensions" of "stability within movement." In addition, some have adopted a more critical transnationalism seeking to place it within a 'systematically divided and historically produced global world' (Espiritu 2005) and thereby connecting with the critical analysis of globalization.

Globalization, as a connected world of flows of communication, capital, goods and services and people, and with profound transformations upon places and groups, has gone through a number of phases and interpretations of historical antecedents, spatialities and its privileged and marginalized subjects. In the 1990s, neo-liberal and hyper versions of globalization of disembodied flows, deterritorialization, loss of state sovereignty and global elites were prominent, e.g. Castells (1996). Since then, a more sophisticated understanding of the complex interplay of de- and re-nationalization has replaced the simple loss of state power (Sassen 2006) as well as making visible its gendered counter geographies (Sassen 2000). Its disciplinary associations are primarily with geography, sociology and international relations, especially political economy approaches. Though slightly prior to the burgeoning studies of globalization, Cynthia Enloe (1989) in *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, tracked the implications of diverse circulations of women and men arising from international politics, such as sex tourism, prostitution in areas around military bases,

diplomatic wives, and nannies, au pairs and domestic workers. In the latter case, many of them are recent immigrants hired by middle class women who have entered the labor force. As she rightly noted, the employment of domestic workers was not limited to the First World. Later writing theorized how gender can be incorporated into thinking about global processes and inequalities and the concrete sites of global transformations, such as the state, cities and households, and the strategies and responses to global restructurings (Marchand and Sisson Runyan 2000). It took however a few years for gender, migration and globalization to be brought together.

In the next section, I will first trace briefly the emergence of research on women and then gender and migration. This will be followed by exploring how gender has engaged with transnationalism and globalization and with feminist concepts of gender order and intersectionality, and concluding with how gender and migration studies have contributed to these perspectives. The scope of the paper is on research conducted in Europe and North America. However, within these broad regions, there are notable differences. For example, much Canadian research is strongly influenced by political economy and global approaches while research in the USA is more focused on the socio-cultural and transnational.

6.1   From Women to Gender and Theoretical Engagements

Until the late 1970s, women had consistently been ignored and, when mentioned, were most frequently associated with family migration and family life; they were not seen as economic actors (Zlotnik 1995) or relevant to important issues of employment, housing and discrimination (Morokvasic 1975). In some instances, they were mentioned briefly, only to be subsequently omitted from the analysis which their inclusion complicated (Berger and Mohr 1975; Portes and Bach 1985). By the 1980s, women had become an object of enquiry in studies of migration in a number of European countries, Canada and the United States.

Thus, the early 1980s resulted in a series of overviews of women and migration, largely dominated by labor migration and a political economy perspective (Morokvasic 1984; Phizacklea 1983). In the following years, other forms of migration, such as that involving refugees, came to be included (Simon and Brettell 1986) as well as an attempt to understand how personal and family networks mediated and operated to facilitate and sustain migration (Boyd 1989). Castles and Miller's (1993, pp. 8–9) *The Age of Migration* was the first text to incorporate women in its fourth tendency consisting of the feminization of migration which was traced back to the growing role of women in labor migration in Europe, the Middle East and Japan. For them, it "raises new issues both for policymakers and for those who study the migratory process." In many of the periodizations of the gender and migration literature, the 1990s represented a shift toward a focus on gender relations and a heightened awareness of the interlocking character between social characteristics and the fluidity of gender relations (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003; Lutz 2010). For Lutz

(2010, p. 1549), it meant the "social construction of masculinity and femininity, the differential meaning of private and public as a workplace, the gender-specific evaluation and the differential consequences of migration experiences for male and female migrants in the context of being couples, parents and families." Yet, although a number of leading American scholars of gender and migration have castigated others[2] for maintaining a focus on women, many studies still focus on women without constantly comparing them with men. Migrant men and masculinities remain a relatively limited object of enquiry (but *see* Datta et al. 2008; Donaldson et al. 2009; Kilkey 2010; Scrinzi 2010).

The years from the end of the 1990s to 2003 constituted a watershed. On the one hand, a series of books reviewed, presented a state of the art and summed up our understanding of gender and migration globally (Willis and Yeoh 2000) and regionally, for Europe (Kofman et al. 2000) and the United States (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003). Feminist scholars had also sought to engender mainstream theories such as transnationalism and globalization. On the other hand, several articles and books set out analyses which have dominated or set the framework for concerns about gender and migration for the following decade. In particular, the first was the concept of global chains of care formulated by Arlie Hochschild (2000) and based on the fieldwork of Parrenas (2001, 2009) who had named the transfer of domestic and care labor from the Global South to the Global North as the international division of reproductive labor. The second, on transnational families[3] (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002) built on the existing literature on transnationalism and applied it specifically to translocal or multi-sited families. They defined them as 'families that live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely "familyhood" even across national borders' (p. 3). At the time of my review of family migration literature in Europe, this perspective was only beginning to take off in Europe unlike the situation in the Asia Pacific (Kofman 2004b).

At the end of the 1990s, Katie Willis and Brenda Yeoh (2000, p. xi) commented that analysis had become more engaged with theoretical constructs and the diversity of categories among women and men such that gender cuts across class, ethnicity, sexuality and age. Others (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003; Kofman 1999) felt, however, that while there had been an accumulation of empirical studies, there had been little real shift in mainstream social science research on migration in taking heed of gender identities and relations. Mahler and Pessar (2006, p. 28) concur and suggest that this happens in part due to the undervaluation of the qualitative data that largely inform gender analyses.

Increasingly, analyses of gender and migration sought to engage with integrative theories connecting places and processes (Kofman 2004a), such as transnationalism

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[2] Rhacel Parrenas (2009) has questioned the insistence of some of the leading feminists to only discuss gender, maintaining that it is possible to study gender through a focus on women if we wish to.

[3] Baldassar and Baldock (2000) had earlier sought to bring together studies of the family and migration through care of parents.

(Hondganeu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Mahler 2003) and globalization through its alternative circuits (Sassen 2000) and social reproduction (Truong 1996). These authors argued that the theory they were engaging with was short on gender but useful in advancing our understanding of gender and migration.

Transnationalism has had considerable appeal (Truong and Gasper 2008) for those wishing to transcend the dichotomies imposed by the constraints of the nation-state and embrace the breadth of material and symbolic goods, practices and mobile subjects within social fields of migrant circulation, i.e., their communities and the connections between them which are influenced by multiple sets of laws and institutions (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). This perspective brings out the diversity and complexity of migratory movements in an historical context, the gender transformations and new identities as well as legal systems. Yet at the outset, gender relations were marginalized, hence some feminist scholars (Mahler and Pessar 2001; Pessar 2003; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Mahler and Pessar 2006) directed their efforts to engendering it. Their interest lay in whether gender relations were reproduced or transformed in the context of transnationalism.

In engendering transnationalism, Mahler and Pessar (2001) and Pessar and Mahler (2003) developed a framework they called 'gendered geographies of power' which consisted of three elements: (1) Geographical scales where gender operates across multiple scales from the body, the family, the state, and in which it is embedded and re-enacted between these different scales. What happens when one crosses borders, i.e., does this reinforce gender ideologies or allow them to change? (2) Social location refers to how individuals are located in multiple and intersecting hierarchies of gender, race, class, and sexuality.[4] These locations may be fluid in that one can occupy a high location in one place while occupying a lower one elsewhere, that is positioned in contradictory locations (Anthias 2013). Migrant women encounter downward social mobility through deskilling in the country of immigration but this may be experienced differently according to their previous situation or social location—downward mobility being higher for an educated person. Quite a few studies have commented on men wanting to return to their home country where they have a higher social location and their domination of home town associations (Goldring 2001). (3) The agency people have over their social location. This refers to the notion that some people are able to initiate movement and partake in mobility and was derived from Doreen Massey (1993). However, while Massey's analysis is firmly placed within global spaces of inequality, the economic aspect is often pushed into the background in transnational perspectives. Indeed, Bürkner (2012, p. 190) contends that social inequality, mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and political regulations have not received adequate analytical attention.

For Truong and Gasper (2008), embedding gender in migration studies enables the intersection between (1) gender as a reality that permeates social lives, (2) labor

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[4] There is a vast literature on intersectionality, a term that has become a buzzword in the past decade (Nash 2008) though the idea of interlocking and interacting social divisions has a longer history based on the triad of gender, race and class. The gendered transnational literature, though referring to fluid and multiple identities, has not really theorized it.

as a human creativity mediated and affected by technological changes, and (3) migration as a gendered history of human connections, often set in family and kinship systems, social identities and production relations. The analysis of multi-local livelihoods allows for a better understanding of the dynamics of migration, the roles of social networks and actors, intra-household level interaction and the role of remittances. They caution against the insufficiency of purely economic perspectives while arguing that migration studies need to return to a more culturally aware political economy but also reflecting the value of transnational perspectives. I will return subsequently to Truong's (1996) earlier path breaking work on gender, international migration and social reproduction.

Annie Phizacklea (2000) too embraced trans-nationalism as a way forward beyond the old dichotomy of the individual versus the structural. She considered that this concept could more successfully articulate the connections between levels using the theory of structuration to introduce the institutional meso level based on a framework put forward by Goss and Lindquist (1995). They had argued that the highly organized labor migration from the Philippines could only be understood through the operation of national and international institutions linking employers and individuals across time and space, while households and social networks are chaotic and imprecisely used concepts, and are therefore inadequate as the sole elements of meso-level analysis. For Phizacklea (1983), while households are crucial, they only form one piece of the jigsaw puzzle. So too should one question the ability of networks to articulate structure and agency. Hence, we need to think in terms of an institutional complex encompassing knowledgeable individuals, the agents of organizations (migrant associations and multinational corporations), kinship networks and the state. Where migratory flows are less institutionalized, Phizacklea suggests turning to Massey et al. (1993), who argue that as countries have become more restrictive, a lucrative niche opens up for entrepreneurs who facilitate the crossing of borders.[5] The role of employers and recruitment agencies and those who facilitated the movement of migrants (smuggling and trafficking) were highly relevant in advancing our understanding of gendered European migrations (Kofman et al. 2000).

However, for both households and networks, it was felt that more sophisticated research was needed on the diversity of households and how they are changed through migration in both sending and receiving societies. Others (Truong and Gasper 2008) highlighted the centrality of networks and affiliations and suggested that they play different roles in different stages of migration as well as for different categories of migrants, for example, the skilled and less skilled. Equally, there has been considerable reflection on networks and how they contribute to the formation of social capital (Erel 2010; Ryan et al. 2008).

Despite the popularity of a transnational perspective, we should not downplay the significance of global inequalities in providing a focus for an understanding of gendered migrations. Phizacklea had rejected globalization as a theoretical framework on the grounds that it tended to highlight the workings of transnational companies,

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[5] Entrepreneurs are also important in institutionalized migrations.

transportation systems and information and communications technologies in altering the space-time dimension of our lives but had underplayed the continuing significance of national identities and belonging. Hence, the hyphen in trans-national-ism. While this was common in many theories of globalization in the 1990s, global inequalities needed to be addressed and with much of the gender and globalization highlighted. Sassen-Koob (1984), Sassen (2000, 2002), for example, focused on growing inequalities in the global economy and the feminization of survival. She had started by making connections between de-industrialization in the US and internal migration in Third World countries as the US shifted its low level manufacturing there. This led to analyses of the strategic sites of globalization, namely global cities, which acted as magnets for low paid labor to serve the growing number of high paid elites. She argued that we are witnessing the return of the servant classes, largely composed of migrant women and men in both shadow and formal activities (domestic work, industrial cleaning, fast foods). In countries of origin, women have become crucial in the circuits of counter geographies (domestic work, sex work, nursing), and through their remittances ensure the survival of their families and national economies. Rather than being a burden, such low income individuals have become significant sources for profit and government revenue enhancement.

Truong (1996) drew attention to the close relationship between production and reproduction or its intimate 'Other' through the globalized transfer of labor. A global rather than a national perspective was necessary to understand the transfer of labor from one class, ethnic group or nation. It was explained by three elements: (1) Structural gaps in the reproduction of labor which affected different classes and economies; (2) the processes by which the transfer occurred; and (3) the implications of this for states, capital, communities and reproductive workers themselves. The current gaps arose from the withdrawal of the state from supporting children and the elderly; the increased participation in paid work by women and the inflexibility of the sexual division of work in the household, and the expansion of hospitality and tourist industries giving rise to associated sex industries. These were the same reasons offered by Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) in their book Global Woman for the care crisis in the developed world.

6.2   Continuities, Discontinuities and New Directions

Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) had commented that 'the migration of women from the 'Third World' to do women's work in affluent countries had so far received little scholarly or media attention'. Parreñas (2001) extended Truong's notion of reproductive labor with the concept of the 'international division of reproductive labor' but it was Hochschild (2000), using Parreñas fieldwork of Filipina women in Italy and the US to describe the global connections and transfers of labor, who coined the term 'global chains of care.' Global chains of care were defined as 'a series of personal links between people across the globe, based on the paid or un-paid work of caring'. The chain serves to abstract labor (physical and emotional)

upwards. These chains in turn cascade downwards and incorporate labor that at each stage is remunerated to a lesser extent, as does the commodity chain. Women's migration reconstitutes the division of labor among women themselves with other female kin absorbing some of the caring activities.

The concept rapidly became very influential as a theorization of transfers of care globally but, as a number of critiques have commented, it is premised on a very narrow range of relationships, institutional arrangements and care regimes (Kofman 2010; Manalansan 2006; Yeates 2009). Firstly, the chain was embodied in transnational motherhood of women who had left their children behind. "The global care chain concept suffers from its lack of embeddedness in a critical international political economy perspective and from its narrow application to just one group of migrant care workers" (Yeates 2004, p. 370). For Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997), who had drawn attention to this group in their study of Latin American women in Southern California, the category of transnational mothers leaving their children behind was not the dominant one, tending unsurprisingly to be most common among live-in-domestic workers. Among live-out housekeepers and carers and weekly cleaners, this category constituted the minority. Indeed, Parreñas' sample of 222 women in Rome comprised about half single women as well as 79 men. In this general representation, the transfer of care labor becomes totally identified with transnational motherhood and a care deficit for children left behind. Another study of domestic workers in Italy revealed that 41.6 % were married but 69.6 % had migrated alone (Chaloff 2005). Although Parreñas' sample was not a small one, many studies of domestic work and care are based on small samples, often capturing only a subset of the migrant labor force (Williams 2011), whether it be in terms of marital status, dependents, nationality or immigration status.

Manalansan (2006, p. 239) suggests that we complicate the analysis by firstly examining the presence of men which he argues would highlight the continuities and discontinuities of domestic work (Scrinzi 2010). Indeed, migrant men are much more likely to undertake care work than non-migrant men and are particularly prominent in care for the elderly. He has also critiqued the heteronormative assumptions and failure to see women and men as sexual and gendered agents. Lastly, family dynamics and migration are more extensive than child care, transnational motherhood and children left behind implied in the care chains literature.

Older people, both as care receivers and care-givers, also have their place. Although it is difficult for older migrants—generally those over 50 years—to migrate independently, they may be able to do so through family reunification, especially in countries such as Australia, Canada and the USA (Thang et al. 2012). For Latin Americans in Spain, of whom an increasing number have residence rights or citizenship, this has meant that they are able to bring in parents, who may enable the daughter to continue working, often as a carer herself. Grandmothers also constitute a resource. In certain instances, 'swallow grandmothers' move from their country of origin to the country of their daughters' settlement. These transnational daughters are not necessarily transnational mothers (Escriva 2005). Ecsrivà takes into account immigration policy (see below) in shaping family dynamics and formation. The ability and right to bring in family members, even for those who are legally resident,

are not necessarily available to recent migrants in all European countries, especially for those working in the domestic and other less skilled sectors. Even where formal family migration policies exist, the right to bring in parents is discretionary.

As with the new economics of labor migration approach, one of the strengths of the care chains approach is that it has highlighted the role of the household in the global economy but it has treated the transfer of labor as if it flowed directly between households or at best, with the aid of networks. Instead, the household is one of the nodes of what has been called the care or welfare diamond (Jenson 2003; Kofman and Raghuram 2010; Razavi 2007), connecting different institutions and sites in the provision of care. In addition to the household, the other points are the state (national, regional and local), markets and communities (non- profit and voluntary). The strength of each of the points and the relationship between them vary according to welfare regimes (Lyon and Glucksmann 2008). Indeed, it has been the ultra-liberal regimes such as the United States and familial welfare regimes (Lutz 2008), where public care services are poorly provided, upon which the research for the care chains has been based. In many European states, despite increasing marketization of care, it is provided through a combination of the state, the market and the voluntary sector, and in each of these nodes, migrants contribute to the labor force. Many migrants also work in residential homes for the elderly, which are largely run by the private sector (Cangiano et al. 2009). Shortages in care labor have increasingly been filled in many states by EU migrants who have the right to work and access to welfare services and benefits. Indeed in the UK, the care work force is highly varied in terms of immigration status. Among the foreign born in 2007–2008, UK citizens comprised 28 % EU nationals 20 % those with permanent residence 14 % with work permits 19 % students nine percent, spouses seven percent and other visa categories two percent (Cangiano et al. 2009, p. 67).

More recently, a framework based on a transnational political economy of care has been developed. Fiona Williams (2011) proposes five dimensions—the transnational movement of care labor, transnational dynamics of care commitments, transnational movement of care capital, transnational influence of care discourses and policies, and the development of transnational social movements, NGOs and grassroots organizations. Let me focus on the first two which directly impact on migration, although the other dimensions also shape the global care landscape. In the first dimension, Williams recognizes not only the diversity of contracts and working conditions among home care workers but also that in some states, such as the UK, formal care and health workers are numerically far more important than home-based ones. Secondly, in relation to the second dimension, migrants leave behind commitments but they also activate further migration for care.

There are four ways of thinking about the relationship between care and migration but in practice, a mix of all four may occur in any context (Kofman and Raghuram, 2010):

1. people who migrate as care providers
2. people who migrate and leave some care responsibilities behind
3. people who migrate and bring some care responsibilities with them

4. people who migrate and have either daily or emergency care requirements, particularly as they get older.

Most current analysis has focused on the first two categories (Lutz 2010). The first type of mobility, i.e., of those who move to care, is increasing, as we have shown. The second type, of the issue of the care of the left-behind, has a long history. It involves both children and elderly (Diaz Gorfinkel and Escrivà 2012). In relation to those who bring care responsibilities with them, our third category, normative notions of family mean that migrants are sometimes allowed to bring younger dependent children with them but rarely are elderly relatives, such as parents allowed, except as visitors (Kofman and Meetoo 2008). The care needs of migrants, especially as migrants age, are the least well considered of our four categories.

The transnational political economy framework developed by Willams (2011) sets migration within a broader context and recognizes the diversity of flows, conditions of employment and the fact that care also yields profits for small and big business through its provision of labor for and beyond the household. What appears to be missing is the role of the state and its entry and settlement regulations. Its role in producing supply and demand for caring labor must be taken into account rather than assuming that it is the market that transfers labor between transnationally distant households. States such as the Philippines, produce professions that can be exported, such as nurses, and encourage emigration (Magalit Rodriguez 2010). Others may prevent certain categories, such as less skilled women and especially those with young children, from legally emigrating.

Immigration regulations structure labor supply through selective policies (Harzig 2003; Kofman 2012b). This generates a complex system of stratification of class, gender and race based on the interaction of skills, mode of entry and nationality, in which the global competition for the skilled has made them increasingly welcome as migrants who have the possibility of acquiring citizenship. Care work generally does not qualify as skilled work. In Canada, the Live-In Caregiver scheme, with a predominance of Filipino women, was designed as a temporary worker route tying migrants to employers and deskilling them for the first two years (Stasilius and Bakan 2003; Pratt 2012), though it has effectively become an immigration route. In Europe, most states, except Italy and Spain, do not recognize domestic labor as a valuable form of work which warrants a work permit. The way in which different states in the EU opened up to migrants from Eastern Europe also shaped the status of migrants who might have right of residence but not the right to work unless self-employed or placed by an agency in the country of origin. This was the situation of Polish workers in Germany during the transitionary period from 2004 until the country opened up fully in 2011 (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck 2012). In some European states, for example in Denmark and Norway (Stenum 2010), the absence of a channel for domestic workers has been circumvented by the use of au pairs increasingly drawn worldwide.

Capturing the range of activities that constitute the international division of reproductive labor (Parreñas 2012) has led to a return to the earlier concept of social reproduction (Bakker and Silvey 2008; Kofman 2012a) linked to a renewed interest

in gendered political economy, especially in its interest in how everyday actions transform the global economy (Hobson and Seabrooke 2008; Piper 2011). Social reproduction may be defined as all those activities that are undertaken to maintain and sustain individuals, families and communities in their everyday lives. It enables one to connect both relational or face-to-face activities, such as physical care with the non-relational, such as cleaning (industrial and home) or food preparation (Duffy 2005) which also employ large numbers of migrant workers. It also encompasses a variety of institutional settings and skill levels which are assigned to different categories of workers (Bakker and Silvey 2008). Furthermore, the migrants who contribute to reproductive labor are not necessarily entering through labor routes. Those with hybrid identities, such as student-workers, as well as the large number of family migrants employed in paid (and unpaid) domestic work and care (Kofman 2012a), also contribute to reproductive labor.

At the same time, the focus of much research on migrant women continues to leave largely invisible those who do not work in the domestic and care sectors (Morokvasic 2012; Kofman 2013). Migrants also work in many countries in the more skilled sectors of nursing and social work, that is, the caring professions (Gabriel 2011; Widding Isaksen 2010; Kingma 2006; Yeates 2009). Yet reviews of gender and migration often omit this category altogether (Lutz 2010), although the gender brain drain, especially of health workers, has become a major policy concern in migration and development (Piper 2011). My article (Kofman 2000) examined the reasons for the invisibility of skilled female migrants in studies of skilled migration in Europe but the topic continues to attract relatively little attention (but *see* Ackers 2004; Boucher 2007, 2009; Iredale 2005; Jungwirth 2011; Kofman 2012b; Kofman and Raghuram 2005; 2006; Meares 2010; Riano 2011),[6] leaving the literature on skilled migration male-dominated and focused on the workplace and its economic dimension.

There seems to be a paradigmatic separation (Kofman and Raghuram 2005) between the skilled and the unskilled such that globalization for migrant women has been driven by the circulation of those undertaking less skilled work (Sassen 2000) in order to ensure the survival of households and states. In contrast, much of the literature on skilled migration pays attention to the contribution of migrants in the knowledge economy, and in particular the science, information technology, financial and managerial sectors, which are seen to be the driving forces behind global wealth creation. These occupations are the most valued in monetary terms and are consequently often also designated as highly skilled, rather than just ordinarily skilled, such as teaching, and therefore increasingly privileged in immigration policies in many European states.

Skilled migration tends to be treated as purely economic in which social considerations do not impact. As Helma Lutz (2010, p. 1659) concluded, "a closer look at economic theories of migration from a gendered perspective promises to show a

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[6] Much of the literature is concerned with deskilling of skilled women, especially those entering through family migration routes. Here we find the application of Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital to transnational migrations useful (Erel 2010).

multiplicity of motives other than purely economic ones for pursuing or refraining from migration projects." Filipina nurses, for example, cited both economic and social reasons of desiring greater independence from prevailing gender norms and a wish to see the world, compared to men whose reasons were more concerned with economic power (Espiritu 2005). Furthermore, skilled female migrants tend to be concentrated in female-dominated occupations, such as education, health and social work. Much of the research in these areas tends to be undertaken by disciplines such as human resources (Hussein et al. 2011) or industrial relations (Bach 2010) where issues concerning the workplace are paramount and treated separately from the familial and social dimensions.

Another concern in the past few years, both in the US and in Europe, has been the extent of social change, especially in relation to the emancipation and empowerment of women and changes in gender ideologies and relations as women, and in few instances men (Donaldson et al. 2009), move to a new society.[7] Morokvasic (2007) counseled against accepting uncritically the idea that the move from a traditional to a modern society results in emancipation or that participation in the labor market translates into changing and more egalitarian gender relations in the home and the community. She notes that many studies point to the contrary that is, the reproduction of gender inequalities, intensified traditional roles, dependency and increased work load. However, she also nuances the negative outcomes in arguing that the gender order, though not challenged and overturned, may be used to one's advantage, for example, using marriage to be able to migrate or obtain residence in a country. And in relation to a group of health professionals, unlike the less skilled who are usually the subject of discussion, Espiritu (2005) highlights the fact that gender asymmetries may persist even if certain gender inequalities are altered. The reasons men and women have for migrating also differed; for men, it was for economic improvement and to be desirable sexual partners, for women, in addition to economic considerations, it was also to liberate themselves from sexual constraints and make more independent choices about marriage partners. Many of the men had migrated as dependents of their wives and had experienced downward social mobility while women had done well in the labor market. A gain in gender equality may be uneven for professionals so that while men may do more childcare, women still do most of the household tasks. Thus, the change in social location is not just an overall change in gender relations but one which should be evaluated in relation to different domains, such as the work and home, as well as in terms of social divisions such as class, ethnicity and gender (Anthias 2008) in both the receiving and sending country (Lutz 2010).[8]

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[7] There is an assumption that the flow is primarily from South to North yet evidence shows other directions are also significant. So while South-North is the largest with about 40 % of flows, South-South nonetheless accounts for at least a third of migratory flows. Given the significance of informal movements, the percentage may be even higher (IOM 2013, pp. 55–56).

[8] There is a growing literature on gender and remittances and the meaning of social remittances, a term coined by Peggy Levitt (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011), which I shall not discuss in this paper.

The concept of gender order, used by German feminist scholars (Jungwirth 2011; Lenz et al. 2007), and based on Connell (1987), can be useful in developing a more systematic and comparative framework for the analysis of migration from one society to another. Gender order refers to an inventory of historical patterns of power relations between men and women and definitions of femininity and masculinity. It encompasses different institutions, such as work, family, education and the state, and I would add, the immigration system. Each of these institutional sites has its own gender regime. Globally, gender orders have become unbound (Lenz et al. 2007) as women have taken up employment in the formal sector and the male breadwinner model has declined, yet men are still reluctant to undertake household tasks. Though more flexible and varied, and affected by neo-liberalism and a market philosophy, gender orders are still embedded in national and regional institutions and structures, and also differ between women and between men by class, nationality, age, religion and sexuality.

We should not assume, however, any linear movement between supposedly less wealthy and higher income societies in relation to the gender order experienced by women. Female migrants from post-socialist societies have encountered in Germany a society in which science and technology is a profoundly male domain, unlike in their countries of origin, and if employed, they are therefore channeled into lower paying female occupations. Conservative welfare regimes in Europe, such as Austria, Germany and Switzerland, are still largely based on a male breadwinner model. In cases where they have entered as family migrants, and therefore assumed to be divorced from the world of work, the normative gender order, both in the workplace and through immigration regulations (restricting access to the labor market), forces women into profoundly traditional roles (*see* Riano 2011 for Switzerland) which are often ascribed to the 'traditional cultures' of their countries of origin.

The gender order may have become more flexible for national women and men but it has usually been retained in all its traditional trappings for migrants. We see this most clearly in the necessity for migrants to marry to enter as spouses rather than cohabit, a common form of relationship in the states under discussion in this paper. Although transnational families have now been on the agenda for a decade (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Zontini 2010), family and marriage migrations have in recent years received increasing attention as many European states have problematized the integration of family members and as a result, imposed integration at the border through more restrictive admissions criteria (Kofman et al. 2013; Kraler et al. 2011; Olwig 2011).

6.3 Conclusion

Engendering transnationalism, globalization and migration has added new dimensions and ways of perceiving how these concepts can further our understanding of everyday lives, social practices and complex inequalities resulting from migratory movements of women and men. While there is a growing interest in social change

and transformation, the role of shifting gender orders has not been adequately recognized by mainstream scholars. These changes in gender orders are varied and complex between societies. As we have noted, there are diverse migratory pathways not only between the most commonly studied South and North but also between North-North and South-South.

Furthermore, moving between societies and states embraces many types of temporalities and social locations across different sites of work, family and community. There has been a tendency to construct dichotomies and separations but as I have argued in this chapter, it would be helpful to articulate the categories and sites. For example, labor and family migrations are connected and influence each other.

So too should we consider how the two approaches of transnationalism and globalization, and developments within each, increasingly engage with each other. More and more, the two are being combined theoretically and methodologically. Within transnational perspectives, the institutional has been taken more seriously; for globalization, the relationship between everyday lives and sites of social reproduction and global processes has come to the fore. And between the everyday and the global, we should not forget the state as an institution which has increasingly intervened, not just in the management of migration and designating ever more complex systems of stratification, but also in the management of integration and transnational movements, especially in relation to families who are often deemed not to be sufficiently modern. These interventions all have an impact on gendered migrations.

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Chapter 7
Engendering International Migration: Perspectives from within Asia

Brenda S. A. Yeoh

7.1 Introduction

Although one of the first migration theorists, Ravenstein (1885), identified differences in migration behavior between women and men, for much of its history, the study of migration has tended to ignore gender as a variable. Migrants were often either assumed to be non-gendered beings, or all migrants, regardless of gender, supposedly experienced migration in the same way. Gender and migration research dates largely from the 1970s and 1980s and was initially concerned with 'adding women' to existing migration research (Mahler and Pessar 2006). A recognition of the importance of gender led to a large number of studies focusing on women's migration flows and experiences, as previous research had been so male-dominated. By the 1990s, this focus on women led to an expansion in the areas of research interest, moving away from structural approaches based on labor markets and the economic sphere, to micro-scale studies, often concerned with gender norms in source communities and gender relations within sending households (*see* for example Chant 1992; Buijs 1993; Bjerén 1997). There has also been growing awareness of the diversity within the categories of 'women,' and recent research has highlighted the ways in which gender is cross-cut by class, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, age and other social variables.

In the past 25 years, Asia has experienced dramatic economic growth as well as a widening of differences among countries with regard to standards of living and the supply and demand for labor (UNESCAP 2008). In turn, there has been a rapid rise in migration not only from the region but also within the region. In 2005, some 50 million of the world's estimated 190 million migrants were in the Asia-Pacific region (UNESCAP 2008, p. 21); in 2010, Asia's total migrant population is estimated to reach 61 million (out of a total 214 million),

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the largest concentration of migrants outside Europe (UNDESA 2009). Migration within Asia has also become more feminized, irregular, and commercialized (ILO 2006), and as such, poses particular challenges for the protection of migrants' rights and welfare. Women, who are the majority of migrants globally, comprise about 45 % of migrants from Asia as a whole (UNDESA 2009), and between 62–75 % of legal migrants from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka (Asis 2005). Significantly, women also dominate irregular migration channels in Asia (Asis 2005).

The feminization of Asian migration is largely a response to increasing gender segmentation in labor markets accompanying changing production and reproduction processes worldwide (Lim and Oishi 1996). Production activities relocated from core economies to the periphery to take advantage of cheaper input costs, have drawn on pre-existing gender relations and attracted young, rural women into factory employment, creating a pool of migrant "factory daughters" within developing Asian nations (Wolf 1992; Ong 1987; Salaff 1995). The other, numerically more important form of female labor migration is linked to reproductive activities, such as domestic work, care work and the sex industry (Constable 1997; Huang et al. 2005). There has also been an increase in the demand for women's paid domestic and care work on an international scale due to: (i) the decline in state support for childcare and care for the elderly and infirm; (ii) an increase in women's labor force participation, meaning that they are unable to fulfil their domestic responsibilities; and (iii) an expansion of hospitality and sexual services as male executives become more mobile. Migrants, therefore, are filling a gap in reproductive labor in which local women do not want to engage. Another significant category in terms of migratory flows in the region is constituted by the growing numbers of female marriage migrants from developing countries who have become an increasingly notable presence in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia (Piper and Roces 2003).

Recent trends in the feminization of migration experiences in Asia provide grist to the mill in developing critical migration theory beyond that grounded in western modes of migration historically or, more recently, immigration and settlement of Asian migrants in Europe and North America. In this chapter, I attempt to draw on these recent Asian trends in migration to provide a selective mapping of some important contemporary developments in research on gender and international migration in the region, focusing primarily on key highlights which have made significant differences to our understanding of women and men on the move in Asia, as well as potential areas of interest which warrant further study. I make no attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of the migration and gender literature, as this has already attracted numerous excellent reviews (*see* for example, Curran and Saguy 2001; Mahler and Pessar 2006; Piper 2006; Silvey 2006; Kofman 2012). Instead, the approach here is to look at the specificities of Asian migration in order to decipher potentially productive apertures for more theoretically informed interventions which may not move the field in broad shifts but lead to smaller, more incremental elaborations that help to mesh theory with the Asian context.

7.2 Migration, Households, Transnational Families

The inclusion of a gender element in migration studies in Asia led to the recognition of the importance of looking at social relations both in the 'source area' and the 'destination,' beyond considering individuals' characteristics and motivations. By the 1990s, with the advent of the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM), the social unit which rose to prominence in such studies was the household (Massey et al. 1993). Attention is trained on how migration decisions are often made on a household basis, and the way the household acts as the social unit through which gender norms are mediated between individuals and wider society (Lawson 1998). The household is also the site for most reproductive activities, which are usually regarded as 'women's work.' In what Chant (1998, p. 9) calls the 'household strategies approach to gendered migration,' the focus on social relations within households helps us problematize the division of labor and power within households, therefore providing insights as to the 'propensity and freedom of different individuals, according to gender, age and their relationships to other household members, to engage in migration.'

More specifically, gender and migration research has highlighted the importance of the household and reproductive activities in four main ways: firstly, migration decisions although made at a household level, represent inequalities in intra-household power relations and reflect local-level gender relations. Secondly, the household, or as Zlotnik (1995) terms it, 'the family' needs to be considered, as reunification or marriage is an important determinant of migration, particularly to countries of 'permanent immigration.' Thirdly, while most individuals' decisions to migrate for work purposes are linked to improving the economic status of their households, women's labor migration may be constrained by domestic responsibilities, particularly the care of children or the elderly. Finally, access to reproductive services, rather than employment, may prompt household migration. While women and children may remain permanently in the cities with greater access to shelter, services and kinship support, adult men often seasonally migrate outside the cities for agricultural work (Chant 1998).

As we move into the new millennium, recent rounds of globalization have further facilitated the easy access to travel and led to the quickened pace of movement across national borders. Distinctively, gender differentiated migration flows of unprecedented volume and complexity within and out of the Asian region have become one of the main drivers of contemporary social change in Asia, and taken-for-granted objects of study such as the "family" and the "household" have to be rethought in terms of new spatialities and temporalities as borders are transgressed, rigidified or redrawn in the face of multiple, hyper- and transnational mobilities. In this context, the geographically dispersed "transnational family" that has been stretched and remolded by migration as a "new" form of living arrangement in which familial relations may reside and develop is becoming more common across a wide spectrum of society. From the more "elite" Asian astronaut families (where the wife remains with the children in the host country (such as Canada and New Zealand) while the "astronaut" husband commutes between host and home countries (such as

Hong Kong and Taiwan)) to those of overseas contract workers, transnational informal "networks," remittance "flows" and "circuits" of care and affection—often facilitated by easier communications—have emerged to connect dispersed members. In a world of constant motion, migrants and their families increasingly live at "the intersections of different spaces … different times and different speeds" (Abbas 1997, p. 41) and this has opened up new interstices for examining gender relations. This is signaled in the emerging gender and migration literature of the new millennium, where we are increasingly confronted with making sense of a wide range of terminology related to "family" (and also "marriage"), including "sending family," "left-behind family," "family with absentee parent(s)," "host family," "surrogate family," "frequent flyer family," "international marriage," "cross-cultural marriage," "fake marriage," "long-distance marriage" (e.g., *chong bac vo nam*, Vietnamese for "husband in the north and wife in the south"), "first wives" and "second wives," mistresses (e.g., *queridas* (Filipino term), *er nai* (Chinese term)) and "situational singles" (Shen's (2005) term for married Taiwanese men who indulge in the social freedom of extramarital affairs while living in a foreign land away from the social policing they encounter at home).

In short, migration studies has contributed to the opening up of the Asian "family" as a material and ideological construct to academic scrutiny, and in the process paved the way for a more critical understanding of gender identities and relations. Such a vein of work in opening up the black box of the family/household by giving attention to power geometries and household politics grew in depth and complexity, as researchers went beyond the assumption that household decisions regarding migration were guided by "principles of consensus and altruism" to take on the notion that they may "equally be informed by hierarchies of power along gender and generational lines" (Mahler and Pessar 2006, p. 33). This is a significant step forward given the taken-for-granted nature of the Asian family. As Ong (1999, p. 71) observes, the family is "the primary unit of regulation and the vehicle of state power." In many countries in Asia, state constructions of the "family" are often based on a "nostalgic vision of femininity" where decision-making is expected to be hierarchical (read "patriarchal"), and where individual desires are usurped by the "greater good" of the family (Stivens 1998, p. 17). For example, Silvey's (2006) work discusses the Indonesian state's constructions of the family as the bulwark against the social costs of modernity, and of women as the lynchpin responsible for the fate of the family. In this context, transnational migrant women who leave their families to work abroad are simultaneously exalted as "heroes of foreign exchange" while seen as in need of "protection" to preserve their sexual and moral purity for the sake of their families. At the same time, the continued overseas labor migration of low-income women is seen as necessary and inevitable in sustaining visions of the newly emerging bourgeois consumerist family.

The corresponding focus on the migrant's gendered agencies and experiences in negotiating familial ties that bind has also generated a growing vein of work on women's subjectivities as participants, collaborators, leaders and resistors. For example, the use of 'flight' from one's natal family to 'fight' constricting gender norms and identities is a central thread in Suzuki's (2002) account of Filipino wom-

en who sever affective ties to the family and resort to marriage or labor migration to escape gendered surveillance and sexual violence. Trapped in a masculinist regime with double standards—women's sexual purity and chastity is tightly controlled while men's overstepping of sexual boundaries through extramarital affairs and rape is often overlooked—these women decide to 'gamble' with the risks involved in unmooring themselves from 'home' to 'navigate a potentially "suicidal voyage" on the unfamiliar sea of migration.' While marriage to Japanese men or working as 'entertainers' in Japan may not always offer the emancipation that the women seek (and in fact brings with it a whole new set of gender negotiations), Suzuki (2002) shows that they find empowerment through breaking 'hegemonic constructions of the unwed daughter as virginal and dutiful' and finding 'alternative moralities' to counter patriarchal control and remake their agency in striving for 'new life chances in an otherwise unkind world.' To take a different example of the pursuit of alternative realities, Williams (2005) shows how migrant women originating from East Nusa Tenggara draw on their "spatial entanglements" in less familiar places to creatively develop more "mobile subjectivities" to reposition themselves vis-à-vis their families and kin and in the process, loosen the control that male kin have on their bodies and sexuality. Ironically, for migrant women who seek employment as domestic workers in foreign homes, it is by "knowing one's place" and through careful presentation of the self at the place of sojourn that they succeed in crafting a space of widening subject positions in order to distance themselves from the expectations of feminine docility and obedience at home. Understanding the experiences of migrant domestic workers in the context of the 'family' takes on a double reading because they move in and out of at least two families/households—one anchored in the 'homeland' from which they are spatially removed, and the other belonging to their host-employer in which they are physically located (Yeoh and Huang 2010, 2012). Indeed, for many migrant women, transnational migration creates an ideological terrain on which the "uneven and shifting mixtures of family loyalty and responsibility on the one hand, and autonomy and agency, on the other hand" (Ryan 2004, p. 367) are continuously traced and retraced.

Three observations conclude this section. First, it should also be noted that much of the work in this vein recognizes the need to examine multiple intersecting subject positions when exploring migrant women's everyday lives; as Elmhirst (2002, p. 83) puts it, 'lived experience generally exceeds class, gender or "ethnic" categories as the meaning of these and the experiences and goals of women are variously shaped by ideologies of religion, development and nationhood in particular ways at particular times and places.' This does not mean that gender is unimportant as a mobilizing center for identities; instead, what it does suggest is that gendered subjectivities are inextricably bound up with wider cultural struggles over resources and representations.

Second, of note is the fact that while much of this work grew out of examining migrant women's lives in the multiple contexts of changing families and households, it has gone beyond the limits of the household scale to address how migrant women transform their lives, and are transformed, as they become threaded into the intersecting spaces between globalizing time-space compression on the one hand,

and the particularities of localisms on the other (as well as the multiple liminal spaces 'betwixt and between') (Yeoh et al. 2002, p. 1).

Third, in recent years, attention has also broadened beyond exploring the impact of migration on women's agencies and subjectivities to asking questions as to whether the rise of transnationally stretched families compels us to rethink gender notions in the social provisioning of everyday and generational care. The feminization of transnational labor migration in Southeast Asia in the last 2 decades is an increasingly significant driver of contemporary social transformation of the 'family/household' in sending communities, as clearly seen in its impact on changing arrangements and relationships of care around which millions of left-behind children are growing up for part or all of their young lives in the absence of a migrant father, a migrant mother, or both, and under the care of a 'single' parent or other surrogate caregivers. While there has hitherto been limited research on how care deficits are dealt with in families and communities with migrant members in sending countries at the Southernmost end of the global care chain, recent migration studies using Southeast Asian cases point to the durability of the woman–carer model. First, current research on migrant mothers emphasizes the resilience of gender ideals surrounding motherhood even under migration in the transnational context. While mothering at a distance reconstitutes "good mothering" to incorporate breadwinning, it also continues maternal responsibility of nurturing by employing (tele)communications regularly to demonstrate transnational 'circuits of affection' (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997, p. 550). Asis (2002) and Graham et al. (2012) observed that most migrant mothers actively worked to ensure a sense of connection across transnational spaces with their children through modern communication technologies, while Sobritchea (2007, p. 183) argued that 'long-distance mothering' is an intensive emotional labor that involves activities of 'multiple burden and sacrifice,' spending 'quality time' during brief home visits, and reaffirming the 'other influence and presence' through surrogate figures and regular communication with children. Second, the research thus far suggests that the care vacuum resulting from the absence of migrant mothers is often filled by female relatives such as grandmothers and aunts (Gamburd 2000; ECMI/AOS-Manila et al. 2004; Parreñas 2005a; Save the Children 2006). The continued pressure to conform to gender norms with respect to caring and nurturing practices explains men's resistance to, and sometimes complete abdication of, parenting responsibilities involving physical care in their wives' absence. These studies conclude that the "delegation of the mother's nurturing and caring tasks to other women family members, and not the father, upholds normative gender behaviors in the domestic sphere and thereby keep the conventional gendered division of labor intact" (Parreñas 2005, p. 99). More in-depth studies combining quantitative and qualitative analyses, however, have begun to reveal a more complex picture of more flexible gender practices of care in sending countries. Even in the context of Vietnam with its strong patriarchal traditions, Hoang and Yeoh (2011, p. 734), for example, "calls into question the commonly held view of the delinquent left-behind husband who is resistant to adjust his family duties in the woman's absence." Instead, they argue that Vietnamese men struggle to live up to highly moralistic masculine ideals of being both 'good fathers' and 'independent

breadwinners' when their wives are working abroad, by taking on at least some care functions that signified parental love and authority while holding on to paid work (even if monetary returns are low) for a semblance of economic autonomy (Hoang and Yeoh 2012; *see* also Yeoh and Lam (forthcoming) for similar findings on Indonesia and the Philippines).

7.3   Migration, Nation, and Citizenship

Beyond the scale of the family/household, another important research arena stems from considering 'nation' and 'migration' as countering yet interlocking 'stories' through which to explore the way gendered discourses and relations are interwoven into the matrix. Peter van der Veer (1995, p. 15) has observed that transnational migration generates nationalisms, because 'nationalism needs this story of migration, the diaspora of others, to establish the rootedness of the nation.' In other words, in coming to grips with the relationship between transnational communities (such as ethnic 'minorities' and 'guest'-workers) and their 'host,' 'mainstream' societies, 'the presence of the migrant 'other' is used… in the nationalist discourse of the established' (van der Veer 1995, p. 7). In exploring the 'transgressive fact of migration' (van der Veer 1995, p. 2) to the project of nation-building, feminist scholars have raised crucial issues of nation, state and citizenship and in relation to this argued that gendering and racializing of such migrant flows have further complicated definitions of citizenship and the constitution of civil society. Precisely because the e/immigrant other is a gendered subject and precisely because the state articulates nationalism by employing 'generic' modes (offering men and women specific positions as 'mothers of the nation' and 'defenders of the nation' and making specific appeals to women and men as gendered subjects, *see* Radcliffe (1990); Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989); Westwood (1995)), the potentially disruptive absence/presence of female e/immigrant others needs to be carefully managed by the state through the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Deconstructing state migration policies and rhetoric relating to the import and export of labor to reveal their ethnicized, classed and gendered connotations continues to form an important research arena in understanding the relationship between 'gender' and 'migration.'

Some of the early work in this vein in the context of Asia has focused on the place of low-skilled workers as the transgressive other in the more developed nation-states in the region. Of key importance is the fact that migration (and citizenship) regimes in Asian countries—such as the bifurcated labor migration system, with the low-skilled regulated by a 'use-and discard' contract labor system which encourages transience, while the highly skilled are encouraged to put down roots through more liberal immigration and permanent residency systems—are fundamentally different from the western modes of immigration and settlement. Increasing social diversity in Asia must be understood within the context of already plural societies, including those which have experienced extreme struggles and conflict within and between ethnic groups during the colonial era (Collins et al. 2012) and

this again renders models of integration developed in the west less meaningful. Yeoh and Huang (1999, p. 1164), for example, have argued that 'by virtue of being a woman, a foreigner, a domestic, and a menial, not only is the 'maid' [in Singapore] significantly excluded from the material spaces in the public sphere but also her physical invisibility signals the lack of a foothold on the metaphorical spaces in the public spaces opened up in recent public discourse on potentially more inclusive notions of citizenship and civil society.' In the case of Japan, Mackie and Taylor (1994) note that while male migrant workers in construction and manufacturing are often discussed in terms of labor policy, immigrant women (mainly from the Philippines) who work in the entertainment industry are more often than not discussed in terms of morality and policing. Thus, while male immigrant workers engaged in productive labor are given space in discussions about policy matters, immigrant women workers, both in Singapore and Japan, remain beyond the pale where citizenship discourses are concerned. In other words, while it has been argued that transnational migration is potentially a transgressive force challenging notions of citizenship, conceptual moves drawing on the experiences of women as labor migrants in the region seem to be stillborn. There is little evidence (at least in Asia) to support Soysal's (1994) argument that national citizenship has given way to postnational citizenship, where immigrant groups without formal citizenship status are able to mobilize around claims for particularistic identities by appealing to universalistic principles of human rights and connecting themselves to the wider public sphere. Such interpretations ignore the rigidity and resilience of state-imposed disciplinary migration categories and their continuing effects in structuring social and political life.

It is to the growing phenomenon of international marriage migration in Asia that scholars have found new potential for rethinking the relationship between migrants, gender and citizenship. Scholars working towards a fuller explication of the relationship between citizenship, marriage and family in transnational contexts have observed that there "does not appear to be [an existing] legal framework that is fashioned to deal with international marriage and the offspring of such unions" (Turner 2008, p. 47). In this light, marriage migration in Asia has becomes a productive arena for examining citizenship "as a set of processes" which is both inclusionary (involving reallocation of resources) and exclusionary (involving building of identities on the basis of an imagined common solidarity) (Turner 2008, p. 48).

In this vein, focusing their work on the incorporation of marriage immigrants in Taiwan, Wang and Belanger (2008, p. 92) draw on Aihwa Ong's concept of 'partial citizenship' to show "how the operation of differential legal and social citizenship justifies the perpetuation of a hierarchy of immigrants and serves to prop up the notion of a superior national Taiwanese identity." While the immigrant wives are theoretically folded into the nation-state as "new citizens," they are "set in relationships with the state, family and community, which together constitute their identities, and at the same time produce and reproduce a racialized and genderized society in Taiwan." (pp. 92–93). For example, cast in the role of 'a good daughter-in-law, a good wife and a good mother' (Wang 2007, p. 23), female marriage immigrants are expected to be only interested in integration courses that tie them to their families and

which help them improve their roles as carers of "their husbands (cooking, hairstyling), children (parenthood, health care, women and children safety) and the elderly (medical care training). There are no choices like political participation, Southeast Asian language media offering, local community facilities information, and so on" (Wang and Belanger 2008, p. 98). The links between marriage migration and citizenship are thus not only based on but constrained by notions of the patriarchal family, and of women as domestic caregivers and biological and social reproducers.

In this light, Yeoh et al. (2013) argue that strategies of simultaneity (often harnessed to transnational family linkages) that marriage migrants exhibit signify an act of resilience in the face of weak and partial incorporation into host nation-states. As Glick-Schiller et al. (2004) have argued, understanding the pathways to incorporation of transnational migrants into nation-states must also take into account the 'patterns' and 'politics' of 'simultaneity' involving these migrants, where their everyday practices often reflect 'the complex interplay of being part of different local and social settings in different political and geographical locations.' While 'concepts of pathways to incorporation and simultaneity' (Glick-Schiller et al. 2004, p. 15) would apply in one way or another to transnational migrants of different stripes, we argue that using these conceptions in the case of marriage migrants poses interesting challenges as 'incorporation and simultaneity' need to be understood in terms of the nexus between two scales: while they are often 'strongly' linked to and folded into the 'family,' they are often only weakly incorporated into the 'nation-state.' In this light, an understanding of the negotiation of citizenship rights among marriage migrants must engage the nation-state framework and also take into account the uneven contours of the transnational stage, precisely because these rights, as well as the strategies to access these rights, are inextricably bound not only to the marriage migrant's 'weak' positioning in both sending and receiving nation-states, but their negotiated placing in both natal and marital families.

Turning to the potential of collective activism, Hsia (2009) draws on her work on emerging social movements among marriage immigrants in Taiwan to think through how citizenship notions may be reformulated to transcend its close association with the nation-state. More specifically, she illustrates how "multicultural citizenship" can be used as a "narrative strategy to render exclusionary models of citizenship more inclusive," and to pave the way towards "the ideal of a more inclusive multiple citizenship [that allows for overlapping membership across several nation-states]" (Hsia 2009, p. 17). While the model of multicultural citizenship is a double-edged sword—as Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999) point out, the rhetoric of multiculturalism can be co-opted without changing the substantive rights or even formal rights of citizenship for the immigrants—Hsia (2009) shows that activist groups among immigrant wives have been successful in radicalizing politically correct conceptions of multiculturalism. Despite the exclusionary and patriarchal model of incorporation underlying Taiwan's 'multicultural' immigration policy (which only allow wives and children of Taiwan citizens to be naturalized), Southeast Asian marriage immigrants have capitalized on the multicultural ideal (that the nation-state contains a degree of plurality that opens up space for migrants to retain their cultural identity provided they adhere to the state's political norms) to challenge the long tradition

of citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. By drawing on their status as mothers of Taiwanese citizens, they also have a base from which to fight for various rights (such as the right to teach their children "mother-tongues"). Hsia (2009, p. 41) concludes that "compared to migrant workers, marriage migrants are in a more advantaged position to challenge Taiwan's exclusionary model of citizenship because the nature of transnational marriages involves citizens from different nation-states and their children are the direct result of cross-border migration." Echoing this same sense of optimism about women's collective agency, Suzuki (2000, p. 434) reports that non-Japanese Asian wives of Japanese men "negotiate and assert their rights" and are "active in organizing public events" (Suzuki 2000, p. 436). These actions have "triggered civic engagement, if not activism, among concerned Japanese citizens" and advanced "demands for citizenship and the improvement of immigration procedures…albeit in a piecemeal way" (Piper 2003, p. 465).

7.4   Future Mappings

To take stock, it is clear that there has been a massive increase in gender-sensitive migration research in the context of Asia since the 1980s, and I have tried to outline some of this work in relation to two potentially innovative lines of research that emerge out of regional concerns, the first around fundamental notions of the 'household' and/or 'family,' and the second, around questions of 'nation' and 'citizenship.' While many of the findings emergent in this scholarship stem from the specificities of Asia's prevailing migration regime, it is not the intention here to claim Asian exceptionalism. Instead, as proponents of the 'Asia as method' analytical strategy have advocated (Chen 2010), by developing new perspectives based on migration experiences in Asia, we break from western-centric discourses that have prioritized certain fundamental issues such as individual rights and formal citizenship, and take a step towards developing 'multipolar, decentered ways of knowledge production' (Xiang 2013, p. 6).

In concluding, I would also like to point to three areas that deserve further attention among scholars of gender and migration in Asia:

First, notwithstanding the observed feminization of labor migration in Asia, there is a need for a much more explicit recognition of men's migration experiences and the social construction of masculinities. Our preoccupations thus far have often been with examining women's experiences as 'different' but somehow still assuming that men's must be the norm or the foil against which women's experiences are measured. Gender and migration research needs to move beyond simply comparing differences between male and female migrants to understanding them as systematically interrelated.

Second, there is a need to continue to develop and interrogate frameworks which allow for gendered understandings of migration not as single or singular act but as multiple interconnected chains of movement of different degrees of permanence. Much has been said about mobility and travel being the quintessential idioms of our times. Rapport (1998, p. 77), for example, observes,

> The universal way in which human beings conceive of their lives [is] in terms of a moving-between—between identities, relations, people, things, groups, societies, cultures, environments…. It is in and through the continuity of movement that human beings continue to make themselves at home…. They recount their lives to themselves and others as movement: they continually see themselves in stories, and continually tell the stories of their lives.

Transnational migration needs to be conceived as a chain of multiple 'sites of hope and new beginnings' (to borrow Brah's (1996, p. 193) phrase), where each destination can be the last, or potentially just a 'transit lounge' on the course of a longer journey. Instead of starting off with a binary where the 'global' is presumed to be that which moves, while the 'local' is that which is fixed, we need to focus instead on the complex space between the global and the local where relations of (im)mobility are forged and reworked, and over time, productive of particular cultures of (im)mobility. As Cresswell (2006, p. 2) observes, 'mobility' and 'immobility' are not just ontological opposites but bound through 'relational politics' and 'given meanings within contexts of social and cultural power.' And if 'mobility' can no longer be thought of in distinct categories, we need frameworks which allow us to comprehend how it challenges the way men and women live out their lives in a world where, while mobility has in general increased in all sorts of ways, it has not increased uniformly or seamlessly for different men and women in different subject positions. Work on the transnational politics of im/mobility needs to engage not only the negotiation of periods of mobility but also immobility as migrants traverse boundaries across spatial hierarchies of uneven development. Transnational journeys do not guarantee a seamless transition in one's life trajectories or a coherent sense of self as migrants move from one place to another. The dislocating effect of border-crossing emerges not only through travel, but more importantly through a process of painstaking re-adjustments on learning different ways of self-conduct, becoming productive citizens, and renegotiating a sense of being that is all at once nationalized, ethnicized, gendered and classed.

Finally, drawing from the two realms of work in the field of gender and Asian migration research—at one end, lowly paid, 'low skilled' domestic workers and at the other end, highly paid, 'high skilled' professional and managerial workers—I am constantly struck by the fact that the issues and discourses which surround each of these streams of migration are often thought of as separate and unconnected. I would contend that, at least in the context of the global space of flows, these migratory journeys do cross-cut in interesting ways and are crucial to the reproduction of the global city and the sustenance of globalizing visions. As Weyland (1997) argues, the global (highly paid) corporate and managerial labor force, which sustains the "public" multinational business space epitomizing globalism, is itself reproduced by the presence of a female "privatized" global space, often shored up by both (unpaid) corporate wives as well as (lowly paid) foreign domestic workers. There is a need to explore ways in which different transnational flows intersect in generating a politics of difference (along class, race or nationality lines) among women, and in so doing, enrich our understanding of migrants as gendered subjects.

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Chapter 8
A Case for Return Preparedness

Jean-Pierre Cassarino

8.1 Introduction

"Return to the country of origin must be on the basis of free choice by the individuals concerned," concluded the Council of Europe (1987) during a conference on migration affairs organized in 1987 in Oporto, Portugal.

   More than two decades later, members of the same Council (Council of Europe 2008) adopted a motion for a recommendation dated 7 January 2008. They expressed concerns regarding the implementation of "Assisted Voluntary Return" (AVR) programs, calling for an assessment of their human rights implications. Two years later, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted Resolution n. 1742 (Council of Europe 2010), inviting Member States to:

> Ensure that assisted voluntary programmes are indeed voluntary, that [returnees'] consent is not obtained under pressure or blackmail and that returnees have access to independent and impartial actors in the return process to make free and informed decisions [Point 10.1]. Ensure that assisted voluntary return should never put in jeopardy the right of an asylum seeker to claim asylum and protection [Point 10.4].

These statements correspond to two different political moments in the treatment of migration issues. The first one was characterized by the resilience of the mid-1980s' economic downturn, linked with the growing politicization of domestic concerns, such as the "integration of immigrants," citizenship and identity, and with the rise of anti-immigrant political parties in European countries. New restrictive laws on immigration and family reunification were adopted. The right to stay became subordinate to migrant workers having a job contract. These restrictions were accompanied by reinforced implementation of state-led "return" programs aimed at inducing migrant workers to leave their destination countries.

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The second statement refers to conditions and contingencies that are markedly different. More specifically, it results from the drive for operability and securitized temporariness,[1] which today characterizes the rationale for current labour migrant schemes in Europe and elsewhere. This vision of temporariness applies not only to current (temporary) labor migration schemes and so-called circular migration programs. It also applies to the fate of asylum-seekers and refugees in European democracies. The abovementioned 2010 PACE Resolution reflected such policy developments which, over the last decades or so, have raised serious concerns from migrant-aid associations and the UNHCR regarding their implications for the fate and safety of foreigners (whether these are migrant workers, refugees, asylum-seekers and unauthorized migrants). Gradually, "the notion of return has shifted from being [viewed as a] decision made by individuals to a policy option which is exercised by governments."

The first part of this article (Blitz et al. 2005) is aimed at briefly examining this shift. It is important to realize that this shift would never have made sense without the global acceptance of a migratory regime able to enlist an array of contradictory points of view and contrasting national interests under the same umbrella: the International Agenda for Migration Management. This agenda has in turn been contingent on the production and reproduction of a hegemonic lexicon. Policy treatment and understanding of "return" have not been immune to this lexicon.

The second part considers these policy developments from the flip side of the coin. It sets out to question the exclusive policy focus on the so-called "voluntariness" of return. Then, it seeks to demonstrate that *return preparedness* constitutes an adequate prism through which the rights, choices and aspirations of return migrants should be addressed both analytically and in political terms.

8.2   Return in Policy Priorities

Like many other migration terms used by governmental and intergovernmental institutions, return has gradually acquired a different meaning. Today, in most migration countries, its understanding is all too often associated with the end of the migration cycle. It is even mixed with expulsion or removal. This understanding has become so hegemonic, if not predominant, that the reference to return would imply a form of pressure or coercion exerted by the state and its law-enforcement agencies.

"Return" stands high in the hierarchy of priorities that have been identified in the current top-down management of international migration. However, this is not because return is viewed as a stage in the migration cycle. It is because return has been narrowly defined in the current lexicon of governmental and intergovernmental agencies as the fact of leaving the territory of a destination country.

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[1] I addressed elsewhere this notion, *see* Cassarino, J.-P. (2013).

In the European Union (EU), this vision of return has been presented as an "integral part" of the instruments aimed at dealing with unauthorized migration and at protecting the integrity of immigration and asylum systems in most destination countries (European Commission 2005, p. 2). Since the early 2000s, return policies of the EU and its Member States have been predominantly, if not exclusively, viewed as instruments aimed at combating unauthorized migration, while defining return as "the process of going back to one's country of origin, transit or another third country" (European Council 2002, p. 29).

This understanding of return is of course reflective of the normative construct that the migration management agenda has consolidated, for it not only reinforces the centrality of the state but also rationalizes its security-oriented methods and means of implementation. In the parlance of the EU, return merely refers to the act of removing unauthorized migrants and rejected asylum-seekers from the European territory. Moreover, it does not take into account migrants' post-return conditions, let alone their human and financial potential as participants in development.

It is astonishing to observe the hegemony that this approach to return has achieved over the last decades and how it is now weaving into various policy areas at national and international levels. At a national level, an array of measures, laws and infrastructures have been established to serve this design. Detention centers, fingerprint identification systems, yearly expulsion quotas, laws on preventative custody are just a few examples. At an international level, cooperation with neighboring countries (on so-called enforced return) has been justified in official rhetoric as a necessary evil regardless of whether the country of readmission already possesses the capacity to fully respect the fundamental rights and to protect the dignity of readmitted persons. Today, at the level of the 27 EU Member States, more than 300 bilateral and multilateral agreements have been concluded to facilitate the swift removal of unauthorized aliens.[2]

These initiatives have been presented as a bitter remedy or a necessary evil, turning cooperation on readmission and reinforcement of border controls into a rational solution to fight effectively against unauthorized migration. There is no question that this cause-and-effect relationship gives rationality and sense to official discourse and means of action. They also discard any alternative interpretation regarding the actual problem by monopolizing the legitimacy of specific solutions.

To understand this, we need to question why this is so and whether it could be otherwise. Why is the issue of reintegration so marginal, if not non-existent, in the mechanisms that have been implemented so far by state agencies? Various elements account for the short-sightedness of current "return" policies.

One major implication of these developments lies in having built a hierarchy of priorities aimed at best achieving the objectives set out in the migration management agenda. A hierarchy of priorities could be defined as a set of policy pri-

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[2] The inventory of these agreements is accessible here: http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research/analyses/ra/.

orities whose main function is to delineate the contours of the issues that should be tackled first and foremost, while hiding or dismissing others. The drive for operability (in dealing with border controls and the swift and "cost-effective" removal of undesirable migrants and denied asylum-seekers) added to the drive for flexibility (in brokering flexible deals or arrangements with non-EU countries with a view to containing unauthorized migration) have been established at the top of this hierarchy of priorities. Concomitantly, such top concerns have cohabited with other priorities such as the oft-cited "nexus" between migration and development, migrants' skills acquisition and portability, and migrants' human rights. However, their criticality and relevance have hardly been considered by policymakers owing to their low position in the hierarchy. This does not mean that these other priorities have not been dealt with at all. It means that they have been viewed as *dismissible priorities,*[3] even if they have been presented as priorities *tout court*.

Admittedly, the reference to a hierarchy of priorities may carry to many minds a sense of discomfort. The most immediate reaction would be to identify the architect who skilfully structured this hierarchy. There is no question that its gradual acceptance results from exceptional epistemic conditions[4] that consolidated through the sharing and repetition of plausible truths and unquestioned apodictic statements shaping the perceptions, attitudes and policy options towards migrants and asylum-seekers of all actors involved, whether these were from countries of destination, or from countries of transit and origin.

More problematically, those who received and assimilated the lexicon have been dispossessed of their own contingencies and realities through a process of strategic alignment. I am not only referring to the initiatives of the European Commission which, faced with overt criticisms[5] from some EU Member States and their spin doctors, have been gradually regimented by the latter's demands. I am also referring to non-EU countries of transit and of origin, located in the direct neighborhood of the EU, which were given a powerful mental picture of the challenges that needed to be tackled first and foremost in the abovementioned hierarchy of priorities.

Any scholar having worked on return migration would soon notice that this policy approach was not part of the open and recurrent debates about return migra-

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[3] Of course, the reference to dismissible priorities is oxymoronic. I use it in order to address the gap between intentions and contingencies.

[4] By epistemic conditions, I refer to the role of power in knowledge construction as applied to migration and asylum, from a Foucauldian standpoint.

[5] Very succinctly, such overt criticisms became more explicit following the 1993 entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EU intended to play a major role by turning migration into an issue of "common interest" and by prompting Member States to better cooperate on (and harmonize their national) migration policies. Member States have expressed their concern in numerous ways regarding the capacity of the EU institutions to deal "effectively" with "migration management." Such developments reflected the resilient contention on competence on migration affairs between the EU, on the one hand, and its Member States, on the other.

tion during the 1970s and 1980s. I addressed in detail these past debates elsewhere (Cassarino 2004). Suffice it to say that return was not mixed with expulsion, let alone with readmission, and migrants' motivations to return home, on a temporary or permanent basis, as well as their manifold patterns of reintegration, constituted at that time the main measures to be tackled as well as the research interests of scholars across various disciplines. Since the 1990s, the growing politicization of international migration movements, the ensuing adoption of restrictive laws regarding the conditions of entry and residence of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, reinforced border controls, the heightened debates on national sovereignty and identity, constitute the main ingredients that have gradually been conducive to different perceptions of migration in general, and to return in particular. Such new taxonomies as "voluntary return" and "forced return" started to shape more intensive public discourse and action by governmental and intergovernmental institutions.

The gradual pervasiveness of this dichotomy (voluntary versus forced return) in public discourse and policies on migration and return appears today unquestionable. However, the extent to which it reflects the composite nature of return flows and returnees' experiences remains highly debatable. There are two interrelated reasons supporting this argument. The first one lies in the fact that the dichotomous approach to return, as it stands now in current political rhetoric, is shaped by a receiving-country bias. The second reason is that neither conditions in countries of origin after "return" nor reintegration are properly considered.

Additionally, despite the seemingly impeccable reference to voluntariness, the frontier between "voluntary" and forced return could only turn out to be blurred, given the purposes it serves.

This blurry frontier has been evidenced over the last few years by academic institutions and research centers which carried out field surveys based on interviews with persons who were "returned" through AVR programs. The common objective of these surveys was to provide empirical evidence of the socio-economic and psychological conditions of these persons. Moreover, they set out to assess the impact of both readmission and AVR programs on the patterns of reintegration of foreigners in their countries of return. In other words, they tried to fill in a knowledge gap which has characterized so far the implementation of policies aimed at removing, either coercively or on a so-called voluntary basis, aliens who are subjected to a removal order by the authorities of a Member State.

For instance, June de Bree observed in the framework of a field survey carried out in Afghanistan with "AVR returnees" that interviewees are faced with poor employment and housing conditions back home. Her field survey showed that 93% of the sample declared that "they are restricted in their mobility within Afghanistan, either because they or their family had personal issues with the Taliban or Mujahedeen, or because of a general feeling of insecurity due to violence, crime and (terrorist) attacks" (de Bree 2008, p. 16). Insecurity, added to economic and social instability in Afghanistan, are the most frequent factors that her interviewees mentioned regarding intentions to leave again, as 89% of them expressed the desire to return to

the West.[6] In a similar vein, in a comparative study based on a large number of interviews carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Togo, Marieke van Houte and Mireille de Koning showed that social and political tensions in the country of return added to the lack of safety, accounting for the interviewees' desire to re-emigrate, even when obstacles to do so exist (van Houte and de Koning 2008, p. 34). These factors strongly jeopardize the interviewees' possibility of reintegrating socially and professionally in the country of return. Needless to say, such investigations are important in understanding how the voluntary dimension and the "sustainability of return," which constitute key elements supporting the adoption and implementation of AVR programs, have been addressed in concrete terms in the above case studies.

Arguably, it is the aforementioned drive for operability that has supported this shift, just like, as noted by Jon Sward (2009), it has so far exempted AVR programs from any comprehensive and independent assessment of their impact on the conditions of persons in their countries of return.

Furthermore, the dichotomous approach to return would not have been predominant without the production of knowledge reifying the managerial centrality of the state, as mentioned before, and turning the state and its administration into the legitimate producers of this form of knowledge. The selective allocation of public funds to research projects viewed by civil servants and the state bureaucracy as being "concretely useful" to their "actions" is a direct offshoot of the desire to produce and to legitimize a form of top-down knowledge about migration, in general, and return, in particular.

Never before has the production of knowledge about migration issues become crucial in political terms. By obstructing any alternative interpretation of a given problem ("we cannot do otherwise"), the production of top-down knowledge does not only pave the way for dealing with a given problem, it also strays from the causes of the problem and subtly justifies a unique technical solution as the necessary evil.

Admittedly, the identification of priority actions and their unquestioned "necessary" solutions has consolidated so far a migratory regime aimed at dealing with consequences more than causes, and overlooking the actual conditions shaping migrants' patterns of reintegration after return. In a similar vein, these developments have had a certain bearing on the vision of migrants often represented as having little if no agency at all.

However, beyond the strength of any paradigms, there are inescapable facts and characteristics that cannot be dismissed when it comes to dealing with the return of migrants. The next section sets out to address them while highlighting their policy implications.

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[6] An evaluation report directed by Arne Strand, based on interviews with Afghan "voluntary returnees," confirms their desire to re-emigrate for abroad owing to harsh insecure conditions and poor economic prospects in Afghanistan. *See* Strand et al. (2008, pp. 46–47).

8.3   The Ethos of Return Preparedness

Return migration occurs all the time. We know that return migrants constitute a highly heterogeneous group of actors in terms of migration experiences, length of stay abroad, patterns of resource mobilization, legal status, motivations and projects. Over half a century, an array of studies across various disciplines has explained the manifold factors shaping migrants' patterns of reintegration in their country of origin (*see* Cassarino 2004). They all share the basic assumption that migrants' patterns of reintegration are shaped by three interrelated elements: (1) context in home countries (the most obvious factor); (2) the duration and type of migration experience lived abroad; (3) the factors or conditions (whether favorable or not) in the host and home countries which motivated return, i.e., the pre- and post-return conditions.

Taking into account these three interrelated elements (place, time as well as pre- and post-return conditions) is indeed critical in showing that different variables combine in shaping migrants' patterns of reintegration in their country of origin. There exists, however, a basic and too often overlooked condition that intimately connects any person who returns home from abroad, regardless of the place of origin, social background, motivations, prospects, skills and occupational status and that is, return preparedness.

Return preparedness is not a vague notion. It refers to a process which, by definition, takes place in a person's life, through time, and is shaped by changing circumstances (i.e., personal experiences, contextual factors in sending and receiving countries) in their broadest sense. It is not only about preparing for return. It is about having the ability, though not always the opportunity, to gather the tangible and intangible resources needed to secure one's own return.

Additionally, return preparedness calls for a twofold question. Why do some migrants have a stronger degree of preparedness than others? How is the issue of return preparedness dealt with or taken into consideration in the framework of contemporary migration management policies?

Willingness and readiness. Willingness and readiness to return are the two fundamental elements that compose return migrants' preparedness. Willingness pertains to the act of deciding or choosing, on one's own initiative, to return and without any pressure whatsoever. It refers to the subjective power to choose to return at a certain time, because it is part of a person's migration cycle. Admittedly, that person will necessarily have to weigh the pros and cons as well as the costs and benefits of the decision to return. However, what matters is the subjective feeling that the decision to return was neither dictated by others nor by external circumstances, regardless of whether it is justified in absolute terms or not. Willingness refers to whether it is the time, and whether it is right, to choose to return or not.

Clearly, given the heterogeneity of return migrants' experiences and profiles, the notion of willingness is far from being a constant, for it might not happen all the time in the return process. Sometimes, unexpected events or obstacles may disrupt the migration cycle and compel migrants to return home at shorter notice than ex-

Fig. 8.1 Preparedness to return. (Source: Cassarino 2004, p. 271)

pected. In this case, return is not chosen having potential implications for the post-return conditions of the migrant.

Readiness to return reflects the extent to which migrants have been in a position to mobilize the adequate tangible (i.e., financial capital) and intangible resources (i.e., contacts, relationships, skills, networks) needed to secure their return, whether it is temporary or permanent. This notion allows the manifold resources mobilized by migrants to be analyzed. It also stresses the need to view return as an ongoing process which requires time. As mentioned above, migrants have different capacities for readiness. Some may be optimal, others may be insufficient. Time, resources, experience, and conditions in the host and home countries constitute the main factors which, combined together, shape their readiness to return.

Willingness and readiness to return reflect the ability of a person to decide how, when and why it is time to go back home. This ability is not a given, for the conditions of return may vary substantially, leading to various degrees of preparedness. In other words, not all migrants choose to return on their own initiative, nor do they have the readiness to do so. Such various degrees impact on their propensity to reintegrate back home.

Preparedness pertains not only to individual choice, but also to the readiness to return. In other words, to be optimally prepared, return is an issue of individual capacity to decide to return and to mobilize the tangible (i.e., financial capital) and intangible (i.e., contacts, relationships, skills, acquaintances) resources needed to secure return (i.e., readiness). At the same time, readiness to return varies with the types of experience of migration and with migrants' context of return. This is illustrated in the graph below (Fig. 8.1).

The emphasis on the willingness and the readiness of the migrant to return (i.e., the returnee's preparedness) yields various analytical benefits:

It argues that return is not only a voluntary act. Return also pertains to a process of resource mobilization that requires time. Moreover, migrants may manifest their wish to return without necessarily being ready to do so;

With regard to the link between return migration and reintegration, it shows that, irrespective of their legal status in host countries, returnees differ from one another in terms of levels of preparedness and patterns of resource mobilization;

It regards various types of migrants ranging from labor migrants to refugees. In other words, returnees differ from one another not only in terms of motivations, but also in terms of levels of preparedness and patterns of resource mobilization;

It shows that returnees' preparedness is not only dependent on the migrants' experience abroad, but also on the perception that significant institutional, economic and political changes have occurred at home. Of course, these circumstances have a bearing on how resources are mobilized and used after return;

It highlights the fact that returnees' preparedness is shaped by circumstances in host and home countries, i.e., by pre- and post-return conditions;

It takes into account migrants' preparedness to return while arguing that the returnees' impact on development at home is also dependent upon his/her level of preparedness.

In previous works (Cassarino 2004), I tried to identify different degrees of return preparedness, regardless of the diversity inherent in the experiences of migration and return conditions. Table 8.1 illustrates these three degrees.

Table 8.1 schematically illustrates three different conditions as well as three degrees of return preparedness which differ from one another in terms of resource mobilization, as pre- and post-return conditions, length of stay abroad, willingness and readiness. All impact on returnees' patterns of reintegration back home.

This analytical framework includes three levels of preparedness which are consequential on how resources, if any, may be mobilized before and also after return.

The first category refers to returnees whose high level of preparedness allowed them to organize their own return autonomously while mobilizing the resources needed to secure their return. This category pertains to migrants whose migration cycle was complete. They feel they gathered enough tangible and intangible resources to carry out their projects in their home countries. They have also developed valuable contacts, and acquired skills and knowledge that can constitute a significant adjunct to their initiatives. They had time to evaluate the costs and benefits of return, while considering the changes that occurred in their countries of origin, at institutional, economic and political levels. Some of them may maintain their residential status in their host countries with a view to securing their cross-border mobility. Their high level of preparedness influences their participation in cross-border social and economic networks; these convey informational and financial resources that can foster resource mobilization not only before return but also after return. Some migrants' projects at home may be responsive to public programs, promoted by the governments of their countries of origin. Although the impact of such return-friendly state-sponsored programs remains to be better estimated, their implementation may be viewed as a positive change by returnees.[7]

The second category includes returnees having a low level of preparedness. This category pertains to migrants whose migration cycle was incomplete. The length of stay abroad was too short to allow tangible and intangible resources to be mobilized, owing to major events which interrupted their migration cycle, e.g., unex-

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[7] This is what Robyn Iredale and Fei Guo (2001, p. 14) observed during a survey related to Chinese returnees from Australia. The authors argue, "Although the Chinese government's incentive programs don't appear to have had a direct impact on people's decision-making processes in Australia, they have provided a positive signal from the government that the social environment and policies in China are improving."

Table 8.1 Returnees' degrees of preparedness. (Source: Cassarino 2004, p. 273)

Types of returnees	Pre-return Conditions				Post-return Conditions	
	Status	Motivations	Resources mobilised		Reintegration process	Resources mobilised
High degree of preparedness . Labour migrants; . Refugees; . Highly-skilled migrants; . Students.	May obtain resident status in host country. May own property in host country. Temporary	Migration objectives are reached. Migration cycle is complete. Perceived positive changes in job market or in the government at home. Perceived political and/or economic improvements at home generate new opportunities. Strong incentives in origin country induce return.	Savings. Acquaintances (address book). Contacts. Knowledge, skills, expertise. Higher education.	Return Migration	Re-discovery of the real characteristics of the origin country. Adaptation and negotiation. Distinctiveness	Resources mobilised before return are invested and re-adapted to local context. Exchange of "valued items". Additional cross-border network resources may be mobilised in order to gather other resources and information.
Low degree of preparedness . Labour migrants; . Short-term refugees; . Highly-skilled migrants; . Students; - Refugees	Temporary	Migration objectives could not be reached as planned. The migration cycle is incomplete: disappointment. Unexpected family events in home country prompted return back home.	Few savings.		The household and relatives provide moral and financial support. Limited resources can be invested as a result of the migration experience.	Limited resources are mobilised at a local level, after return, with a view to facing the re-integration process.
No preparedness . Rejected asylum-seekers; . irregular migrants.	None	Interruption of the migration cycle. Removal,. Rejected visa extension	Non-existent		Difficult conditions at home. Shame. Re-emigration may be envisaged.	Non-existent

pected family events, ostracism, no real opportunities for social and professional advancement in host countries. These migrants consider that the costs of remaining are higher than returning home, even if few resources were mobilized before their return. Hence, resource mobilization in receiving countries remains extremely limited and the returnee will tend to rely on resources available at home in order to reintegrate.

The third category pertains to returnees whose level of preparedness is non-existent. Their migration cycle was abruptly interrupted. Actually, they neither contemplated return nor did they provide for the preparation of return. Circumstances in host countries prompted them to leave, for instance, as a result of their rejected application for asylum or following their removal from the territory of the destination country (Table 8.2).

Admittedly, the abovementioned three levels of return preparedness roughly plot a plurality of conditions faced by return migrants. At the same time, however, the identification of various levels of return preparedness lies precisely in emphasizing that, regardless of the heterogeneity characterizing return migrants' experiences and profiles, willingness and readiness to return constitute key elements in understanding why patterns of reintegration vary so much.

Clearly, there exists an interrelationship between the completeness of the migration cycle and the level of return preparedness which, as shown in the foregoing, is contingent on the willingness and readiness to return (both being shaped, in turn, by

Table 8.2 Levels of preparedness and migration cycles

Level of return preparedness	Migration cycle	Return motivations
High	Complete	Decided owing to favorable conditions
Low	Incomplete	Decided owing to adverse circumstances
None	Interrupted	Compelled/forced

different patterns of resource mobilization and by circumstances in host and home countries). These considerations have concrete and practical implications when it comes to defining policy measures aimed at offsetting the incompleteness of the migration cycle and migrants' low level of return preparedness. Particularly, in the current context marked by the resilient economic crisis, many migrants have opted to return to their home countries to escape unemployment in destination countries. This option results from adverse economic circumstances that negatively impact on their readiness to return to their countries of origin. This individual option also results from a pondered evaluation of such circumstances. Public authorities in countries of origin will necessarily have to respond to the social and professional reintegration needs of their returning nationals, as is the case with Filipino returnees hit by the crisis in Western countries.

Likewise, these considerations are of paramount importance to understand that the abrupt interruption of the migration cycle (e.g., as a result of removals or the so-called "voluntary return" of unauthorized migrants and rejected asylum applicants) has consequences on the reintegration of migrants that are too severe and disruptive to be dealt with credibly through state-sponsored assistance programmes.

8.4   Conclusion

Again, return refers to a *process* that can be optimally prepared if it is reflective, among others, of the aspirations of individual migrants and of their readiness.

Emphasis on three different levels of preparedness has clear policy implications. Any state administration in the world wishing to sustain the social and professional reintegration of return migrants, regardless of their skills, will necessarily have to factor in its policy measures the issue of return preparedness.

Against this backdrop, one is entitled to wonder how the drive for temporariness, which is part and parcel of current circular migration programs, can optimally ensure temporary migrants' high levels of return preparedness, and under which conditions.

For it is precisely the drive for temporariness, not the repeated to and fro movements of migrants, that has configured the rationale for circular migration programs in Europe. If it were the opposite, the issues of return and reintegration would have been dealt with more substantially by policymakers in both countries of destination and of origin[8]. Admittedly, return has often been referred to as a key component

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[8] For a comprehensive analysis of circular migration schemes, *see* Piyasiri Wickramasekara (2011).

of circular migration programs. However, return has not been dealt with as a stage in the migration cycle; rather as the end of the temporary stay of migrants. Unsurprisingly, and given the receiving-country bias mentioned in the first part of this chapter, reintegration—i.e., the process through which migrants take part in the social economic, cultural and political life of their countries of origin—continues to be glaringly overlooked. Moreover, since the early 2000s, the 'return' policies of migration countries have been predominantly, if not exclusively, viewed as instruments aimed at fighting against unauthorized migration. This limited approach has been detrimental to the exploration of the link between return, reintegration and development. This may also explain the reluctance of many countries of origin to adopt and implement mechanisms aimed at sustaining the temporary or permanent reintegration of their nationals.

Making a case for return preparedness is crucial in realizing that current migration policies have disregarded so far the implications of various levels of return preparedness. It could even be argued that, having focused exclusively on the securitization of temporary labor migration, many migration countries find themselves with inadequate instruments aimed at supporting the permanent and temporary return of migrants, let alone their reintegration needs.

Finally, making a case for return preparedness is also, if not above all, an attempt to raise awareness of the evidence that, beyond established paradigms, a lot remains to be done in order to respond concretely to migrants' rights, including their aspirations for stability and advancement in their lives.

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Chapter 9
The Return of Return: Migration, Asia and Theory

Biao Xiang

Does it still make sense to talk about "return" at a time when population movements become multi-directional, identity is replaced by hybridity, the local community is entangled with transnational space, and "home" and "away" are both destabilized and the division between are blurred? The notion of "return," once a deeply desired, life-changing event for many migrants, may inevitably give way to transnational mobility and circular exchange (Baubock and Faist 2010, p. 13; Brubaker 2005, p. 2).

Yet, precisely at the same time as return seems to become meaningless, return migration of different types are on the rise in Asia and beyond, ranging from returning forced and trafficked migrants to temporary labor migrants and the highly skilled. According to a survey by Hong Kong Baptist University in 2002, three percent of Hong Kong residents chose the category of "returnee" as their cultural identity (Hong Kong Transition Project 2002, p. 13).[1] These types of return migration take place both within Asia and from outside the region.

Return has, to a great extent, become a defining and patterning factor of transnational migration. Circular migration—whereby migrants are expected to return home by the time their visa expires in order to be allowed to return to the host

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Parts of this paper draw on discussions in my chapter, Xiang, B. (2013). Return and the Reordering of Transnational Mobility in Asia. In B. Xiang, B. Yeoh and M. Toyota (Eds.), Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia (pp. 1–20). Duke University Press.

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[1] When Washington-based Migration Policy Institute (MPI) asked a number of leading migration experts what surprised them most in 2006, Howard Duncan, executive head of the International Metropolis Project identified the return migration of professionals to Asia as the most striking. "Although return migration is a common phenomenon, the number of returnees, especially to Hong Kong, is significantly higher than one would expect," he commented. (*See* Migration Information Source. Migration Experts Size Up 2006. December 2006. Available at www.migrationinformation.org. accessed on 10 October 2009.) At least 120,000 returned in 1999 alone (Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong SAR 2000:48; *see also* Ley and Kobayashi 2005, p. 116).

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countries to work again—is not only the main channel for non-EU citizens to enter western Europe, but also "functions as the rhetorical lynchpin and the conceptual glue that holds together the EU's larger migration management system" (Feldman 2012, p. 24). In Asia, such return-oriented circular migration has dominated labor migration since the 1970s. Regarding the highly skilled, the Asian tigers and, more recently China, shifted their policy priority from stopping outmigration to encouraging return. Refugees are also returning and have returned. The refugee agency, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), identified voluntary repatriation as the optimal durable solution for refugee problems and designated the 1990s as the "decade of repatriation" worldwide (Koser and Black 1999).[2]

The "return" of return migration poses new challenges to researchers. The movements covered by the rubric of "return" are extremely heterogeneous, and the meaning of return becomes very ambiguous indeed. If return migration was previously neglected (Koser 2000, pp. 56–60), it seems to have become an impossible subject to study. One response to this is for the researcher to maintain a sharp distinction between the "emic" and the "etic" perspectives, and to focus solely on the "real" return as defined by pre-set criteria. Such a distinction is provisionally useful for organizing basic information, and a normative differentiation between voluntary and coerced returns is also important in some policy discussions. However, the distinction may also obscure as much as it reveals. Migration and particularly return migration today are characterized by deep entanglements between emic and etic perspectives. For instance, by "return," we conventionally mean the movement from overseas to one's nation of origin, and probably very few returnees truly return to their place of birth (*see* Unger 1986; de Haas 2006; Labrianidis and Kazazi 2006). Why do we privilege the *nation* over the village, the dialect region, or religious community? No matter how technically neutral we strive to be, even the most basic definition of return tends to reinforce the established world system of nation-states. The word *return* itself has become a vocabulary of the nation. There are no such things as purely neutral terms that a social researcher can use.

In other cases in which the "emic" and the "etic" can be easily distinguished, such divide may not be theoretically productive either. Since Marcos' "Operation Homecoming" (Espiritu 2003, pp. 81–82) in the 1970s, the presidential ceremony held at the Manila airport to welcome returning overseas workers has become a firm political tradition in the Philippines. However, the migrants are encouraged to go overseas again once the holiday season is over. We would be missing the point by fixating on whether the return should be seen as real return; what matters is the fact that both the government and the migrants invest an enormous amount of energy in making the journey a kind of return. The more pertinent questions may be: why is this fictive return regarded as necessary, appealing, and productive? Why has the notion of return become politically significant in this particular historical period?

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[2] Parreñas (2001) documents how return became a major theme of Filipino migrants' literature in Hong Kong, and the preparation for return dominated the life of Filipino entertainers in Japan beginning with their arrival.

Difficulties with conventional theorization urge us to seek new ways of conceptualization. This chapter explores how the heterogeneity of the experiences of return and the ambiguity of its meaning can be turned into sources of theoretical innovation. To do this, we will first need to move away from epistemological behavioralism. Borrowing from political science in the US, I use the term behavioralism to describe a common approach in migration studies that sees migration as a distinct individual behavior that has its own characteristics and regularities. Epistemological behavioralism assumes that we can, or have to, understand migration by examining migrants' activities (e.g., when and how individuals move or return), based on which, we can develop general theories about migration behavior.[3] I instead advocate an approach that regards migrations as phenomena co-constituted by different actors including not only the migrants, but also the receiving and sending states, the NGOs, the public media and international organizations. The co-constitution processes are fundamentally context-specific and may not be generalizable. Return is an action, as well as a discourse, a policy concern, a point of political contention and a strategic moment when the intersections between bounded state power and transnationally mobile subjects are particularly visible. By examining how the intensification of return movements in Asia since the 1990s is deeply tied to other larger socio-political changes, this chapter theorizes return as a mode of order-making in the world that formally consists of nation-states but also faces ever-escalating transnational movements. Asia is significant here not because it is different from the "West" or the "rest," but on the contrary, the region typifies some aspects of the relation between return migration and social transformations that are potentially global.

9.1 What is Migration Theory For?

Return migration is a norm rather than an exception.[4] It was historically commonplace that migrants moved back and forth before the erection of national borders.[5] This is widely recognized in the literature, though not systematically examined.

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[3] Behavioralism differs from behaviorism. The latter is a school of psychology of learning that suggests that human behavior is socially acquired and thus socially malleable, while the former was largely a positivist movement in political science, particularly in the US, since the 1930s. For the differences between the two, *see* Berndtson 1997.

[4] The three ports of Xiamen, Shantou, and Hong Kong in South China, for example, recorded 14.7 million departures between 1869 and 1939, and 11.6 million returns between 1873 and 1939 (*see* Sugihara 2005). On the other side of the world, one-fourth to one-third of transatlantic migrants returned from North America to Europe between 1870 and 1940, amounting to ten million (King 2000, p. 29). For a careful research on the high level of return migration from the United States to Europe at the turn of the twentieth century, *see* Wyman (1996). For a recent review of return as a historical phenomenon, *see* Ley and Kobayashi (2005, p. 112).

[5] For a revealing case study of how Indian seafarers had moved back and forth without the intention of settling in the UK for a long period of time, *see* Balachandran (2012).

Ernest Ravenstein's (1885) "laws of migration," for instance, stipulated that every migration stream is accompanied by a counter flow, and that the migration-system theory of the 1970s identified return as an integral part of all migration systems (Mabogunje 1970; *see also* Nijkamp and Voskuilen 1996). However, apparent historical similarities should not blind us from discontinuities. Contemporary returns are no longer a "natural" demographic phenomenon as Ravenstein had argued. Returns are inextricably tied to the politics of nation-states. As Wang Gungwu (1981) has clearly established, overseas Chinese had been either unmarked or thought of as traitors until the Qing court in the late nineteenth century officially named them *huaqiao* (Chinese sojourners)—temporary migrants who waited to return. The overseas Chinese acquired this name not because they suddenly became inclined to return but because the Qing government began to perceive China as a nation instead of a civilizational empire potentially covering the entire world, and the government therefore felt compelled to define its relation with its overseas population in explicit terms as a way of defining its relation to the world. The nationalization of the notion of return can thus be seen as a discursive strategy with which the state laid claim to mobile subjects.

To appreciate historical specificities and to theorize return in relation to larger social changes, we first need to deconstruct what I call "epistemological behavioralism" that has dominated migration studies. Epistemological behavioralism sees migration as a distinct behavior, that is, a particular class of intended human actions taken in response to external stimuli and constraints. The behavior is predictable and susceptible to interventions. Questions as to the who, why and how of return are regarded as the main concerns (Gmelch 1980, *see also* Cassarino 2004 and 2013, which provide an excellent summary on how mainstream migration theories have conceptualized return). Underlying epistemological behavioralism are two fundamental yet largely implicit assumptions: first, migration results from individual behavior although it almost invariably becomes a concern as an aggregate issue (thus, it is different from other typical behavior, such as alcoholism or stealing). A free, capable and rational individual is the primary unit of inquiry and the standard figure in theoretical reasoning. Sharp divides between free and unfree subjects and between voluntary and forced actions are not only foundational for moral judgment, but are also a methodological necessity. The constructed nature of both free will and coercion tends to be neglected. Secondly, epistemological behavioralism lumps disparate human flows into a singular subject that can be analytically isolated, including the uncovering of externally discernable patterns and the internal, stable essence. The mobility of students, pilgrims, diplomats, soldiers, wondering intellectuals, beggars, which were historically treated as *qualitatively* different,[6] are now imagined into a single subject ("migration"). The first movement can be called individualization, and the second, totalization. It is only through individualization

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[6] Prominent historian Wang Gungwu has expressed similar views on different occasions. He pointed out that, until recent time, the English word "migration" referred to the mobility of manual labor only. The wideningin scope of the term "migration" to include other groups was a result of the generalization and bureaucratization of migration control.

that totalization is possible. For instance, it is only by perceiving sleeping as an individual human behavior, regardless of how different people sleep differently in different time and space, that biologists can study all human's sleep as a total whole. For epistemological behavioralism, we should discover enough laws and rules in order to measure migration the same way biologists measure sleeping, eating and drinking.

Both individualization and totalization are epistemological movements that are probably specific to the twentieth century. The trend of individualization may have been caused by (1) the liberal ideology that foregrounds individuals as the main social actors and its associated assumption that effective policy interventions must enhance individual interest (migration cannot be simply stopped as a collective phenomenon, it instead must be managed by affecting individual desires and calculations); (2) modern positivist scienticism, which is largely methodologically individualistic; (3) nation-states, which are supposed to be responsible for all individual citizens directly (as opposed to being mediated by nobles, gentries, or manors), and therefore policies should address individual needs. As Adam McKeown (2008) has brilliantly demonstrated in his work on the history of Chinese migration, US authorities had perceived migrations as social processes and journeys, and it was only at the turn of the twentieth century that the question of "who the migrant is" superseded the question of "how a migrant got where he/she is." Migration has been thought of for a long time without constructing individual migrants as the central subject of analysis.

The trend of totalization may be attributed to the following: (1) The development of welfare states and democracy in receiving countries in modern times rendered it necessary to turn migration from amorphous, constantly changing, unstable flows into a measurable and transparent statistical artefact in order to calculate costs and benefits and to make policies accountable to the public; (2) The entrenchment of citizenship and nationalism made immigration a favorite topic of national debates, which by definition presents migration as an aggregate phenomenon; (3) The establishment of a specialized state apparatus for migration management brings about a conceptual boundary that marks out migration as a distinct subject for regulation. Demography and development studies, possibly the two most influential and rapidly growing sub-disciplines after WWII, both have significant influence on migration studies and both tend to reify migration as a generic phenomenon in itself.

Simultaneous individualization and totalization creates a range of contradictions. For instance, voluntary migration is viewed as a spontaneous behavior driven by individual will; on the other hand, the government management of migration has become so sophisticated and deeply penetrating into migrants' lives that "spontaneous migratory behavior" hardly exists. At one moment, we may be talking about migration as an individual behavior, and the next moment as a collective phenomenon.

This does not mean that we have to become nihilists when trying to understand migration and return. An analogy can be drawn between diaspora and return. "The universalization of diaspora," as Brubaker remarks (2005, p. 3), "means the disappearance of diaspora." But instead of jettisoning the concept of diaspora altogether, Brubaker suggests that scholars use diaspora not as a "category of analysis," but as a

"category of praxis," namely "an idiom, stance and claim" that the subjects of study attribute to themselves (2005, p. 12; *see also* Cohen 2008). Rather than speak of a "diaspora" as an entity, a bounded group and ethno demographic or ethno cultural fact, we should speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices and so on (Brubaker 2005, pp. 12–13). In my view, the "return" of return is inviting similar theorization strategies.

Taking return as an action, an idea or a claim does not mean that we will take what the actors say and what they do at face value. Different actors have different actions and claims surrounding return, and interactions between the multiple actors should be our focus. These interactions can be messy, but this is how social relations evolve and how history is made. The contradictions, ironies, incoherence and inconsistency in what people say do not mean that they are wrong and need to be corrected by scientific terminologies and methodologies. The contradictions are what real life is about. As Anna Tsing (1995) reminds us, a wheel would simply spin in the air and go nowhere without encountering the rough surface of the ground. Friction and contradiction produce movement, action and effect. Researchers cannot position themselves outside messy interactions. As mentioned earlier, we may have to be methodologically nationalistic when discussing return. This is certainly problematic, but it is conditioned by basic problematics in real life. Researchers cannot erase these problematics, but need to be critically aware of them. Methodical pursuits of neutrality and technical clarity without such awareness may well create more confusion.

Such theorization may not produce neat schemas or typologies; it aims to bring to light specific dynamics of history in the making. It does not predict what happens tomorrow, it seeks to engage with the changing reality now.

One of the biggest problems with positivism lies with its pretension that the researcher can stand outside of history. Epistemological pretention is crucial for imperialism, especially in its late, more sophisticated stage that we are going through now. Imperialism pretends provisional as the universal, projecting some of the European emic view as the universal etic. As feminist scholars pointed out a long time ago, all knowledge is knowledge from somewhere and all knowledge is situated knowledge. Theorization is, in a way, about articulating the situatedness. As such, the question of positionality became central for theorization. Asia provides a critical epistemological position from where we study the world.

9.2   What is "Asia"?

Asia is not only what I study; it is where I stand. In his seminal work, "China as Method," Mizoguchi Yuzo (1989) urged us to reverse the conventional approach in China studies that took the "world" as the method (reference point) to measure China as the subject. Since there is no such thing as a truly global standard, the "world" often means particular European experiences in practice. In contrast, "China as Method" examines specific historical developments in China as part of global

history, and thereby rethinks the world as the subject matter from the perspective of Chinese experiences. In this framework, China and the world become dynamic, entangled processes instead of static entities in isolation. However, what Yuzo argued for is obviously not specific to China studies. Recently, Chen Kuan-Hsing (2010) extended the proposition into an advocacy for "Asia as method." "Asia as method" encourages scholars in Asian countries to take each other as reference points, and by doing so, develop a scholarship that is free from Western colonialism and imperialism, and one that is both locally rooted and generalizable (Chen 2010).

Asia as a method certainly does not assume that the rest of the world is becoming like Asia or that societies worldwide are adopting "Asian methods" of development. Rather, it is an analytical strategy. By developing new perspectives based on experiences in Asia, we hope to discern problematics in the world that are otherwise less obvious or dismissed as aberrations. Modern social research is, to a great extent, a product of the practice of using Europe as *the* method. Mainstream scholarship on international migration, for instance, has long been overshadowed by the European experiences of refugees, especially the Holocaust, and this explains why certain concerns and concepts (e.g., individual rights and formal citizenship) are prioritized while others are marginalized (e.g., collective orders). It will not take us very far to simply critique this scholarship for being biased; we may instead appreciate its value as well as limiting it more by explicating its relation to the specific historical context. Rather than jettisoning established theories for being Eurocentric, it may be more productive to develop multipolar, decentered ways of knowledge production. Asia as a method aims at exactly that not because it is special or superior, but because it enables an extrication of migration research from Western concerns and, at the same time, provides a solid ground for developing substantive theories.

Asia is a method instead of a case of global studies because the relation of Asia to the world is not that of a part to the whole. Asia is actively interacting with the world rather than simply reflecting it. When we take Asia as a method in theorizing return, we need to take into account two levels of co-constitutive relations. First, return movements and other developments constitute each other in Asia. Second, Asia is itself an outcome of co-constitution between practices in the region and forces beyond.

9.3 The Return of Return and The Return of Asia

The rise—or the "return"—of Asia is a defining feature of the changing global order today (Mahbubani 2008). The rise of Asia not only denotes a geopolitical shift in economic gravity and political power, but also represents new institutional architectures and modes of governance. Central to the Asian institutional configuration is a particular articulation between state interventions and the free market, and between national regulation and transnational flows. Most Asian countries strive to globalize their economies, but at the same time, these countries jealously guard their national sovereignty and state power. The combination of strong and often au-

thoritarian states with free-market economies was a crucial condition under which the so-called East Asian economic miracle could take place in the 1970s and 1980s (Evans 1995). Postdevelopmental states that emerged in the 1990s are even more entrepreneurial and market-oriented, but they remain uncompromisingly nationalistic (Ong 2006. The so-called Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) way of regionalization is driven by two objectives of pursuing region-wide economic integration and safeguarding member states' political autonomy and sovereignty. ASEAN member states encourage international migration, and it is precisely for this purpose that they make it an explicit rule that each member must consider others' concerns on sovereignty when determining its own policies.[7] Thus, there is no surprise that return migration is commonly encouraged and effectively enforced in the region.

From this view, the intensification of return migration indicates a sociopolitical order that is emerging from transnational mobility: constant in-and-out circulatory flows order and fit movements into the framework of nation-states. Return thus nationalizes transnational mobility. Following Georg Simmel's celebration of the "miracle of road" for its "freezing movement in a solid structure" (Simmel 1997, p. 171), we may liken return programs to roundabouts. Roundabouts do not directly control the movement of each vehicle, but they channel the traffic into certain patterns that can be monitored and regulated from a distance. Movements on the ground do acquire their own momentum, and drivers do break rules from time to time; but the movements are shaped into flows that are governable by nation-states. "Nation-state" here stands for particular operational frameworks and organizational principles, not for closed territorial containers. Nationalization is a way of ordering transnational mobility instead of a means of territorial fixing. In contrast to the common proposition that transnational migrations challenge state sovereignty (e.g., Sassen 1996, pp. 67–74) and defy national policies (e.g., Castles 2004), transnational circulation in Asia serves as a (national) method of migration regulation.

The intensification of return migration is not uniquely Asian. On the contrary, experiences in Asia are analytically important precisely because they cast in high-relief some general developments across the world. The return of trafficking victims and refugees has been a common concern in Europe and other parts of the world. In terms of labor mobility, the EU has promoted "circular migration" between Europe and non-EU countries since the late 2000s. Return is a defining feature or even a precondition of migration (*see* Castles 2006; Commission of European Communities 2007; Martin et al. 2006). Economist Paul Krugman (2006) dubbed the proposal for permanent guest-worker programs in the United States as "the road to Dubai." National sovereignty in the twenty-first century is no longer solely based on territory, but also via the management of mobility.

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[7] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers." (Available at http://www.aseansec.org/19264.htm, accessed on 14 April 2012.) Battistella and Asis (2003, p. 10) conclude that the ASEAN "regional approach [to migration management] remains at the consultative level, with minimal impact on policy process and decision-making in the individual countries."

9.4 Return and the Underlying Turns

Return migrations in contemporary Asia are driven by, and are in turn constitutive of, at least five sociopolitical turns. These five shifts are depoliticization, the formal informalization of labor relations, the formalization of mobility, the ascendance of outward-looking nationalism, and finally an integrative turn in the governance of mobility that brings sending and receiving states, state and non-state actors, and government policies and public perception into loose alliances.

Depoliticization indicates a shift in which, by the end of the Cold War, international affairs were no longer primarily framed by ideological divide and political antagonism, and meanwhile, supposedly neutral principles, particularly that of national sovereignty and human rights became the new hegemony. Depoliticization was responsible for the first large return flows after the Cold War, specifically the return of refugees. As refugee issues during the Cold War were deeply politicized and were attributed to Communist authoritarian regimes, the decisive victory of capitalist liberal democracy was supposed to have reduced the number of refugees dramatically. In Asia, the return of five million refugees from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009 was "the single largest return program" in the history of the UNHCR (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2009). If the provision of protection for refugees during the Cold War was based on apparently universalistic, but deeply politicized, humanitarianism, the return of refugees was predicated on the belief that the nation-state, now supposedly free of ideological struggles, was the natural and neutral institution that every person should belong to.

The depoliticized perception about the world order also underpins the return of victims of human trafficking. The four Rs—rescue, return, rehabilitation, and reintegration—are recommended by international organizations as well as national governments as the optimal solution to human trafficking. The "Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration," signed by nineteen governments in Pacific Asia in 1999, recommended that: "(t)imely return of those without right to enter and remain is an important strategy to reduce the attractiveness of trafficking." Return is perceived as such a desired outcome that international organization staff are sometimes reluctant to identify a person as a victim who may not have a place to return to, because where there is no point of return, there is no solution (Lindquist 2013).

9.4.1 The Formal Informalization of Labor Relations

The liberal market model that has dominated the Asian economy not only made short-term contract employments prevalent, but also created a structural condition in which capital and labor were decoupled from each other and employment relations became fundamentally destabilized in the processes of subcontracting and outsourcing (Xiang 2012). Labor relation is informalized, and temporary workers became an economic necessity. The overwhelming majority of the 15 million workers who migrate from one Asian country to another are on strictly temporary terms

and have to return home once their contracts are due (Martin 2008). This can mean that about three million migrants are returning to various Asian countries from the Gulf alone every year. In some sectors such as entertainment, the rotation of foreign workers is built into the nature of the business to the extent that the migrants perceive their migration as a journey leading to return (Parreñas 2001; 2010).

Informalization is, however, implemented and sustained by formal state policies about return. Compulsory return is central to the control of unskilled labor mobility in East Asia. Migrant-receiving countries across the region commonly adopt a "no return, no entry" policy. That is, they determine the number of new arrivals from a particular country according to the returns to that country. Compulsory return effectively renders the relations between migrants and the host state as nothing more than a labor contract. A number of countries identify pregnant women and sick migrants as primary subjects of repatriation precisely because these "problematic" bodies bear the danger of developing social relations beyond economic contracts with the host nation. Compulsory return is also central to the simultaneous informalization of labor relations and the formalization of migration control.

9.4.2 The Formalization of Mobility

Despite the public outcry that irregular migration is running out of control, a formalization of migration has stood out as a clear trend in Asia since the late 1990s. Migration channels became more clearly defined, migration control strengthened and irregular migration decreased in proportion. Deportation, in which irregular migrants are forced to return to their country of citizenship, often from one Asian country to another, has been taken up as a main step towards formalization. This became particularly evident after the financial crisis in 1997. When the crisis broke out from June 1997 and continued until January 1998, Malaysia sent back more than 10,000 Bangladeshi and Pakistani workers, while South Korea expelled between 150,000 and 300,000 migrants and Thailand repatriated 6,000 Burmese migrants (Varona 1998). Initially an emergency measure, forced return was soon turned into a routine. Malaysia has deported tens, or even hundreds of thousands of migrants in each of the half-dozen crackdowns since the end of the 1990s. Japan expelled an average of 54,000 migrants a year in the 1990s and early 2000s (Ministry of Justice, Japan 2005). The scope and density of forced return in Asia are striking when compared to other parts of the world: in the 2000s, Australia removed and deported about 10,000 a year, the United Kingdom more than 60,000, and the United States nearly 400,000 (double the level 10 years ago).[8] In fact, Malaysian Home Affairs Minister Azmi Khalid called the Ops Tegas (Operation Tough) campaign in March

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[8] For Australia, *see* the Department of Immigration and Citizenship Annual Report for the 2000s. For the UK, *see* UK Home Office. (2009). Control of Immigration: Statistics, United Kingdom 2008. August 2009. Available athttp://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb1409.pdf. For the United States, *see* US Department of Homeland Security (2011). 2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (p. 94). Available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.

2005, which expelled 600,000–800,000 irregular migrants,[9] as "one of the biggest transmigration programs in the world" (Holst 2009). Commenting on the campaign, then deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Najib Razak, warned that no category of irregular migrants would be spared including those with documents issued by the UNHCR (The Star, 4 March 2005). Forced return is now regarded as an effective means to reduce irregular migration and the number of unsuccessful asylum seekers worldwide (*see* Ghosh 1998; Koser 2000, pp. 69–70; Lakzco 2000).

9.4.3 Outward-Looking Nationalism

The highly skilled are perhaps the most visible returnees in Asia. Starting with the flows to Taiwan and South Korea in the 1980s, the return of the skilled became phenomenal in the late 2000s, partly driven by the decline in the economy in Europe and the US. For instance, a reported 186,200 Chinese students returned home in 2011 after the completion of higher education overseas, primarily in the US, Europe and Japan, an increase of more than 38 % compared to 135,000 student returnees in 2010 (People's Daily, 16 March 2012). The return of West-based professionals and entrepreneurs is perceived as a "return to the future"—in the rush ahead of global business and technology curves. Return is a project driven by enterprise rather than by nostalgia.

The return of the highly skilled is also celebrated because it re-energizes nationalism. Although portrayed as a manifestation of global market forces, flows are, to a great extent, facilitated and incentivized by states. China, for example, has invested tremendous amounts of financial resources to encourage return, and has turned return events into political rituals (Xiang 2011). In a world where imagined communities reach far beyond the national border (*see* Appadurai 1996), returnees from overseas are probably more capable than the supposedly quintessential, deep-rooted peasants or tribesmen of energizing nationalism. If the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is one of most arresting emblems of nationalism, as Benedict Anderson (1991, pp. 50–51) pointed out so aptly, in the time of globalization, the returnee is a powerful embodiment of nationalism. If the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier combines the senses of the sacred and the profane essential to modern nationalism, the returnee reconciles territoriality and extraterritoriality, which is crucial for nationalism in the globalizing age. This is, however, a new type of nationalism that bases national pride on the nation's position in the global market instead of on independence and self-sufficiency, defines national belonging in cultural terms, and considers economic redistribution and political participation less important. It is outward looking, culturalist, and often elitist (*see* Upadhya 2013).

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[9] The campaign mobilized up to 500,000 officials and volunteers, and sent 600,000–800,000 migrants home, including 400,000 who left voluntarily for fear of harsh punishment and 200,000 to 400,000 who were deported. *See* Daily Express 2005. *See also* Chin 2008.

9.4.4 The Integrative Turn

There is discernible coalescence between sending and receiving states on return migration. The highly skilled are desirable for the country they return to partly because they are desirable in the country of residence. Unskilled or irregular migrants are unattractive to both the receiving and the sending countries; nevertheless, the countries agree that return is a migrant's right that cannot be denied and an obligation that cannot be easily waived. Compulsory return has been a basis for intergovernmental agreements on labor migration in East Asia since the end of the 1970s (Xiang 2013). As for victims of human trafficking, it is now an obligation for legitimate sovereignties to repatriate the victims and to admit the returned. Since the late 1990s, multilateral governmental agreements such as the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), have created the infrastructure as well as pressure for national governments to enforce the return of victims of human trafficking. Sending states are willing to collaborate with receiving states because this enables them to establish closer relations with their overseas citizens and to tap into outmigration for national development. Receiving states share some authority in regulating immigration with the sending states (for instance, by delegating power to government and private agencies in the sending countries for selecting and screening would-be migrants. *See* Xiang 2013) because, given that immigration control is being tightened across the world, "the labor-sending state is perhaps the institution most able to effectively resolve the contradictory forces of labor demand and immigration restriction" (Rodriguez 2010 p. xxiii). Malaysia and Indonesia have developed relatively effective transnational operational systems to enforce return (Lindquist 2013). Instead of resisting the pressure from Malaysia to receive deportees, Indonesia as the country of origin in fact has used this momentum to tighten its regulations of outmigration.

Such interstate institutional coalescence means that return programs enable nation-states to enhance their sovereign power transnationally and mutually. Both sending and receiving states become more powerful in relation to migrants. This may shift the central tension in international migration from those between migrants and the receiving society and those between the sending and receiving states to that between migrants and alliances of states. An unskilled migrant worker violates regulations of both the sending and receiving countries if he or she fails to return as required, which can be punishable by both countries. In contrast, a highly skilled or a successful entrepreneur can become more valuable to multiple countries by moving back and forth between them. It is important to note that such institutional coalescence between states is largely an intra-Asia phenomenon. The repatriation of migrants from Europe and North America to many Asian countries remains cumbersome and is subject to ad hoc bilateral negotiations due to the lack of general consensus.

There is also an ideational coalescence regarding return migration. The fact that the notion of "return" is used to refer to migration journeys of vastly different natures should not be seen as a problem of misnomer. It instead indicates the construction of a hegemonic framework, a good common sense, that gives migration

particular meanings. Return discourses deployed by governments, NGOs, and public media on different types of migrants echo each other and collectively naturalize return and home. Since everyone is supposed to love home and is protected at home, return is assumed to be unproblematic for all migrants. What is wrong with asking someone to go back to where he or she "really" belongs?

The naturalizing effect of return is of course nothing natural in itself. The natural appearance of return is constituted by particular international agreements, and by the participation of NGOs, public media, business associations, and private agencies that specialize in recruitment and transport. It is these institutional arrangements that underpin the dialectics between differentiation and coalescence, between the national and the transnational, and thereby contribute to the ordering of mobility without hindering it. What it shows is that a hegemonic order is being constituted.

As Gregory Feldman (2011, p. 17) recently pointed out, one of the main challenges for migration studies as well as for global studies in general, is: "how to conceptualize global configurations of institutionalized power that absorb disparate policy domains, policy actors, and policy targets without central control or even a conspicuous desire to control in the maniacal sense of the term." Return migrations can provide a concrete point of entry for exploring how an overarching order emerges from seemingly decentralized, disorganized and disparate practices and discourses. The diversity and complexity in return migration become a productive source instead of obstacles to overcome.

9.5   Conclusion

The question of "how we can theorize migration" should be secondary to questions of "why we theorize" and "what theorization is." The "how" question cannot be addressed productively without the "why" and "what" questions being thought through. The answers to the "why" and "what" questions are always historically specific and politically informed. This chapter argues that the epistemological behavioralism as the currently predominant way of theorization is specific to the twentieth century. Its limitations are increasingly apparent when migration flows become more intensified and complex. We may never be able to capture the dynamics of migrations and their multifaceted social consequences if we treat migration as a behavior that can be described and predicted according to objective quasi-natural laws out there.

Influenced by feminist and socialist thinking, this article advocates that theorization should and can serve as a means of engaging with concrete reality and participating in the history. As concrete reality is always changing, theories should not look for stable patterns and certain futures only, but should fully embrace contradictions and messiness. Looking from this angle, return migration as a predictable *type* of migratory behavior has indeed disappeared, but the diverse return flows as co-constituted by multiple actors cast sharp light on an emergent socio-political order. The figure of the returnee not only reconciles territoriality and extraterritoriality, but is

compellingly rendered as a trope that energizes and rearticulates nationalism in an era of increasingly fluid and indeterminate national sovereignty. Adopting the seminal ideas developed by Yuzo and others, the article suggests that Asia, a co-constituted and constantly changing region, provides a special position to theorize migration. Where we stand determines what we see. How we are aware of where we stand conditions how we see things. In sum, this chapter suggests that we should take return as a lens and Asia as a method for studying global changes. In doing so, we will hopefully bridge migration studies and Asia studies with broader concerns and therefore contribute to building a genuinely robust global scholarship.

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Chapter 10
Regional Economic Integration and Migration: Lessons from the Case of Europe

Rinus Penninx

10.1 Introduction

Europe is a continent with a very high density of states. Each of these states claims the sovereign right to decide who (of all its non-citizens) may enter, reside and work on its territory. Furthermore, after admission, that same state allocates a certain (legal) position to newcomers different from nationals, and in case an immigrant settles, the state decides on (the conditions for) becoming a citizen of the state. These nation-state principles make international migration exceptional by definition.

In practice, however, Europe has developed from a continent of emigration (since the nineteenth century until and including the 1950s) to a continent of immigration and the exception has become more and more the rule. This change in direction and size of migration across national borders has gone hand in hand with a growing economic (and by necessity, also political) cooperation between states, resulting in the European Union (EU) which consists of 28 member countries. Within the common territory of these 28 states—having half a billion inhabitants together—new rules, regulations and institutions have been established for (the free movement of) capital, goods and labor in such a way that their economies have become part of an internal EU market that functions as a national one. Mobility between member states has (nearly) all of the characteristics of internal migration instead of international migration.

In light of migration literature, this is a remarkable result that asks for a more detailed, analytic description to understand how this has happened and could happen. This result is furthermore remarkable if the political climate relating to international migration in Europe is taken into account: governments have declared their countries non-immigration countries, and anti-immigrant sentiments and movements have grown. The issue of migration has been and still is a hot political topic in Europe.

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I will make this analytic description in a few steps. In the first section, I will draw an outline of key facts concerning the migration of people across borders of European states since roughly 1950, how factual immigrations have been perceived and labelled and how these perceptions have influenced admission and integration policies of states. A second section outlines how regional economic and political institutions and policies have developed in Europe since 1951 and how these have handled migration (of workers and persons) across borders of Member States. In the final section, I will draw empirical conclusions on the mechanisms at work in the European case, make some observations as to the nature of national and regional policies, and on theoretical notions and assumptions of migration theories.

10.2   International Migration in Europe Since 1950: Reactions and Policies

While Europe used to be predominantly an emigration continent until the 1950s, it has become an immigration continent since then. The number of foreign-born residents rose from an estimated 23 million in 1985 (UN 1998, p. 1) to more than 56 million, or 7.7 % of the total European population in 2000. When we look specifically at the European Union (of the present 28 members), these figures are higher: according to the Statistical Office of the European Union, in 2011, nearly 49 million of the total of 504 million inhabitants of the EU (some 10 %) are born outside the country where they presently live (Eurostat 2012, p. 1). These figures only cover legally residing foreign-born persons.

Historically, immigration started in the Northwest-European countries. Other countries that used to be emigration countries until the 1980s, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Finland, started to experience significant immigration in the 1990s and 2000s. Still other countries, among them most of the new EU-Member States that accessed in 2004 or after, have been experiencing emigration, transit migration and immigration at the same time. Europe has become an immigration continent.

The pattern of origin of migrants in Europe changed in the course of time. Up to the 1980s, immigrants could conveniently be grouped under three headings: (a) migration with a colonial background that connected certain European countries to their former colonies; (b) labor migration that connected a number of 'recruiting countries' to a limited number of 'sending countries,' and (c) refugee migration that was strongly dominated by the movement of refugees from East to West Europe. In terms of the origins of immigrants, this led to a geographical pattern of migration that embraced Europe and the Mediterranean countries, plus a limited number of (former) colonies. That picture changed completely since the 1980s: the new geography of migration (King 2002; Bonifazi et al. 2008) shows immigrants coming to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers: expatriates working for multinational companies and international organizations, skilled workers from all over the world, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum

seekers from African, Near Eastern and Asian countries, from the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries, students from China, undocumented workers from African countries—just to single out some of the major immigrant categories.

The new migration to Europe is not only much more diverse in origin, but the types of mobility have changed significantly: increased short term stays like those for seasonal work in agriculture or tourism, for study, sunbelt migration of pensioners, as well as longer stays of employees of international organizations, multinational enterprises and highly skilled people in general. One could bring these migrants together under the category of wanted travelers and movers. Their mobility is facilitated, if not promoted. However, there are also others who decide without invitation to look for an economically better and/or politically safer new destination. Paradoxically, for this category of migrants, national borders and the sovereign right of states to decide on admission of non-nationals have gained importance. For the non-invited migrants, new and increasing barriers have been erected.

10.2.1   Unwilling Immigration Countries: National Reactions to Immigration

A predominant characteristic of European states is that they have consistently defined themselves as non-immigration countries, exactly in the period that Europe has factually become a continent of immigration. A rhetoric of being a 'nation of immigrants,' as is usual in classic immigration countries like Canada, Australia and the United States, has been completely absent in Europe. On the contrary, consistent and explicit anti-immigration rhetoric (Doomernik and Jandl 2008) has been a constant factor in Europe, despite the fact that quite a few European countries in recent decades have had higher immigration rates than, for example, the United States.[1]

This particular framing has had pervasive consequences, first of all, for how factual immigration was perceived and labelled. Many newcomers received special labels that legitimized their arrival, but they were not called immigrants. In the Netherlands, for example, a sizable group of immigrants from the former Dutch Indies (after the 1949 independence of Indonesia) entered the country under the label of 'repatriates,' while workers from the Mediterranean were defined as 'guest workers' to express the intended temporary nature of their stay, and migrants from Surinam (Dutch Guyana) and the Dutch Antillean Islands in the West were (until 1975) called Overzeese *Rijksgenoten* (fellow overseas citizens, part of the Dutch Kingdom). In Germany, inflows from the East in the decades after WWII were received under the labels of *Übersiedler* (from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany) or *Aussiedler* (in principle, refers to Germans who had settled elsewhere in the past), 'coming home,' or refugees; and there was

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[1] In 2011, eight of the 27 EU-countries had a higher percentage of foreign-born residents than the USA had in 2010. *See* Eurostat (2012) for statistics on foreign and foreign-born populations in the EU- and EFTA-countries. The latest percentage of the foreign-born population in the USA, based on the 2010 Census, amounted to 12.9 % (US Census Bureau 2012).

the significant category of *Gastarbeiter*, a label that indicated expectations of temporary stay.

A consequence of defining oneself as a non-immigration country was that after the first oil crisis of 1973, increasingly restrictive admission policies were introduced, which in the beginning was meant mainly for 'economic migrants' (i.e., the guest workers). Initially, this was justified by the decrease in demand for migrants, particularly lower skilled ones. But the factual closure for new migrant workers also caused an increase in supply-driven migration. Supply-driven migration presented itself first (in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s) in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and France, particularly under the policy category of 'family reunion' (and 'family formation') of temporary workers. Their supposedly temporary stay was gaining the characteristics of more permanent settlement. Return to their home country was not an attractive option, notwithstanding the sticks and carrots that were offered, particularly in Germany during the Return Promotion Programs in the late 1970s and the 1980s.

From the mid-1980s onwards, a new supply-driven migration announced itself in West-European countries in the form of asylum seekers. This increasing inflow of unsolicited newcomers culminated in the early 1990s during the 'asylum crisis'[2] and provoked new measures of restriction and control of entrance and admission. These restrictions in turn led to a spiraling rise in 'innovative' new forms of entrance, like smuggling and trafficking, which in turn, generated new control-oriented requirements and procedures (for asylum and family migration). New dynamics thus developed, and new actors were brought into play (Van Liempt 2007). Immigration was increasingly criminalized, as the tougher regulations led by definition to more illegality and irregularity. International political terrorism, furthermore, brought migrants into focus from a security perspective.[3] Migration thus became associated first and foremost with problems and threats and as such, rose to the top of the political agenda in many EU-countries in recent times.

The ideology of not being an immigration country also had consequences for settlement and integration policies. North-West-European countries 'solved' the contradiction—of not being countries of immigration, while receiving significant inflows at the same time—by defining these migrants either as a priori members of society, as in the case of the 'repatriates' in the Netherlands and *Übersiedler* or *Aussiedler* in Germany, or defining them as 'temporary guests.' In the former case, full citizenship was offered (in the Dutch case, it was even a condition for admission) and a full-fledged reception program aiming at a speedy assimilation was put in place. In the latter case of the guest workers, however, it meant limited facilities for accommodation in anticipation of their eventual return. For this sizeable group of 'guests,' time created increasingly a contradiction of expectations: in the course of time, many guest workers factually stayed for good and formed communities that

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[2] In the 4 years of 1990 to 1993, the number of new asylum applications surpassed the annual level of 400,000 in the European Community (of 12 members then).

[3] For an analysis of parliamentary debates on increasing controls concerning immigration in the UK and the FRG, *see* Bastian Vollmer (2010).

grew by using their right to bring their families and spouses. Most governments in Europe that had recruited guest workers, however, maintained the illusion of return until the turn of the century and confined themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures, leaving the integration responsibility in practice to parties in civil society, such as trade unions, churches and welfare organizations (Penninx 2005).

The picture of migration and related policies that I have outlined here is strongly based on developments in the Western European countries. South European states have a much more recent experience in immigration and integration. For most of the thirteen new members of the European Union that accessed in 2004 or later, the topic of migration and integration is relatively new and takes multiple forms: emigration, immigration and transit migration co-exist in most of these countries (*see*, e.g., Black et al. 2010; Okolski 2012).[4]

10.3   Economic and Political Integration and Migration in Europe

The preceding general description of the development of migration and migration policies in Europe was based on (nation-) states as basic units of analysis. What has been and is the significance of supra-national forces for migration? Here, post-war Europe has a specific story to tell.

Regional economic cooperation started in Europe as early as 1951, when the Treaty of Paris instituted the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an economic cooperation between six West-European states: The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The treaty presented 'guidelines' for the free movement of (at that moment only skilled) workers in the sectors of coal and steel production.[5] Although the principle was worked out over time, it actually did not have a great impact on migration flows during the period and until 1968.

The 1968-Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community (EEC) of the same six countries not only stipulated that economic cooperation would cover all domains of economic activity, but it also confirmed that in that common market, there was not only free circulation of capital and goods, but also of labor. Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome formulated the principles, inserted under the political pressure of Italy, which was still a labor exporting country at that time. Regulation 1812/68 formulated concretely that any national of a Member

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[4] Interestingly, such a situation has also developed in so-called 'sending states' like Morocco and Turkey. For Turkey, *see* İçduygu and Kirişci (2009).

[5] Goedings (2005) made a detailed historical analysis of the origins of the free circulation of workers in the early period of economic cooperation in Europe from the 1951-Treaty of Paris until the 1968-Treaty of Rome. She shows that it has particularly been Italy that has consistently pressured negotiations to include the free circulation of workers.

State was eligible for employment vacancies in the territory of another Member State with the same priority as nationals of that State (Böhning 1972).

So, the principle of free circulation of labor was already introduced in 1968; the continuous growth of the EEC made it applicable in an ever-growing area. The EEC grew from the initial six members in 1968 to nine in 1973, when the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined. Free movement of labor applied to these three countries from the date of accession, although fears about and protests against it had been significant. In 1981, Greece joined the EEC while Spain and Portugal followed in 1986. With Greece, a 'transition period' until 1 January 1988 was negotiated. For Spain and Portugal, the date of 1 January 1993 was chosen as the beginning of free circulation of labor. In all of these cases, there have been predictions and fears of significant new migrations after more members joined, but new migrations that took place after accession were actually insignificant. It did have consequences for the position of those who had migrated before: migrants from these new joining countries already resident in established EEC-member states gained a stronger legal and residence status than other Third Country Foreigners (Penninx and Muus 1989).

The Single European Act of 1985 re-launched the idea of an internal market and introduced the next step: free movement of workers was broadened to cover all citizens of Member States. The European Community (EC) should become "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured." The Single European Act foresaw removing all physical, technical and fiscal barriers to be implemented by 31 December 1992. Such an opening up of internal borders, however, meant that the Community would share henceforth one common external border. In turn, that meant visa policies, admission of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) and asylum policy should be coordinated between Member States. The decision to have internal freedom of movement necessitated such common policies. Member States were torn between not wanting to give up their sovereignty in this domain, and the upcoming "asylum crisis" as well as the general pressures of supply-driven migration that pushed states towards common (restrictive) policies.[6]

In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU) as the successor of the EC. The EU created a European citizenship and granted full freedom of movement to all citizens of Member States. It completed the earlier developments in the sense that all obstacles for such movements were taken away and migrants' equal access to facilities was guaranteed. Movement between Member States within the borders of the EU, which used to be defined as international migration, had actually become internal migration for citizens of Member States. Under this new regime, the EU expanded further to 15 states in 1995 through the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

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[6] Five countries (France, the FRG and the Benelux-countries) were moving quickly towards open borders and in July 1985, they signed the Schengen Treaty which envisaged a system of international border controls and checks, a common asylum procedure and information exchanges on asylum and unwanted migrants, to be implemented by 1 January 1990. The Schengen-model later became the standard for the EU.

However, complete freedom of movement and the factual abolition of borders within the EU had also increased the need to coordinate Member States' policies relating to the admission of Third Country Nationals. So, it was also decided to make migration and asylum the subject of common EU-policies. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 concretely stipulated that 5 years after its ratification (i.e., by May 2004), asylum and migration should have become subject to communitarian policymaking (being thus moved from the third pillar of intergovernmental collaboration to the first pillar of communitarian EU-governance) and that existing policies and practices would have been harmonized. This goal was reaffirmed at the Tampere Summit of 1999. That summit also formulated the next step, namely that Third Country Nationals who are long-term residents in Member States should be granted rights that come as closely as possible to those of EU-citizens.

Indeed, by May 2004, agreement had been reached on two sets of issues (Van Selm and Tsolakis 2004). The first relates to the synchronization of policies aimed to combat illegal migration and keeping at bay potential asylum seekers, and to the harmonization of asylum policies. The Schengen Agreement and Dublin Convention at that stage were made part of Community Law. These new policies focus on the perceived problematic nature of (unsolicited) immigration of Third Country Nationals. A clear tendency existed to develop restrictive immigration policies at the lowest common denominator of Member States and proposals of the European Commission to adopt common rules for admission (i.e., for legal migration) were not accepted.[7] The second set of issues—and a much smaller set of EU directives—related to the integration of legal immigrants from Third Countries and served to improve their position. They include a directive on the immigrants' right to family reunification[8] and on the free movement between Member States (after 5 years of legal residence).[9] Observers have remarked that, on balance, the interests of the Member States have been served much better in the harmonization process than those of the immigrant EU-residents (Van Selm and Tsolakis 2004; Groenendijk and Minderhoud 2004).

In the next five-year period (2004–2009), when the Tampere program was followed by The Hague program, the reluctance of Member States to build a common broader migration policy remained. On the one hand, there was consensus towards restrictiveness, which included a comprehensive package to secure the European Union's borders with the aid of information technology (EUROSUR) and to strengthen border surveillance by FRONTEX. On the other hand, the European Commission's proposals for general alternative approaches to migration policies, such as in the Communication of 2005, were not accepted—member states have preferred "to follow a selective and sectoral approach, adopting directives defining rules regarding the entry and residence of students, researchers, and highly-skilled

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[7] Such as the proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence for the purpose of paid employment and self-employment activities, COM (2001) 386 final, 11.07.2001.

[8] Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003.

[9] Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003.

migrants," to be followed by directives on intra-corporate transferees and on seasonal workers (Pascouau 2013, pp. 1–2).

The Lisbon Treaty, in force since 2009, forms the last significant change in the institutional context of migration policymaking at the EU-level (Carrera and Guild 2012). In the preceding 10 years, EU-migration had been formally communitarian but factually intergovernmental since all decisions were dependent on consensus of Member States, as described above. The European Council—representing the Member States—and the European Commission, entrusted to implement the Council's decisions, had been the main actors. But the Treaty of Lisbon changed this context significantly. First of all, for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), under which migration policies fall, the 'Community Method of Cooperation' became applicable. In practice, this means that the European Parliament has become co-legislator and that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU is also applicable to laws and actions of AFSJ. This implies that the role of the Council[10] as representative of Member States will diminish and the role of the European Commission will change.[11]

In summary, the European Community and later the European Union have become significant political and policy entities which have created a new context for international mobility and migration in Europe since the 1990s. On the one hand, the early (Western European) EU members have transposed their national policies into common restrictive admission policies in relation to potential immigrants (economic migrants, family migrants and asylum seekers) from non-EU countries. Furthermore, they have made these policies the 'standard' for new members of the Union: the *acquis* requires the new members to build legislation and institutions in conformity with established EU policies in this domain. This strand of EU policies has been characterized by critics as the 'Fortress Europe policies.'

On the other hand, the EU created a fundamental right to move and settle within the EU area for EU citizens and for long-term Third Country residents of its Member States. This regime was largely in place when the EU expanded from its 15 members since 1995 to 25 members in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia acceded), to 27 in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania acceded) and to 28 in 2013 when Croatia joined the EU. Although many old Member States delayed free access to the labor market of citizens of these new members for some years, the total area of free circulation in the EU of 28 counts, in the end, a population of more than 500 million.

The effect of the accessions of 2004 and 2007 was twofold: one, a substantial (partly irregular) migration that had taken place from East to West since the fall of

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[10] According to Carrera and Guild (2012, pp. 14–15) these institutional changes make it questionable whether the multi-annual programs of the Council, such as the Tampere, The Hague and the present Stockholm (2009–2014) ones, are the driving force of policy making and implementation now and in the future.

[11] Within the European Commission, there has furthermore been a split of the previous Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS) into two separate DGs: one for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, led by Commissioner Viviane Reding, and one for Home Affairs, led by Cecilia Malmström.

the iron curtain in 1989 was redefined as internal or legalized under the new regime. Second, it reinforced migration from some new Member States, particularly Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, to Member States in the Western part of the EU whose labor markets attracted workers. So, migrant populations of these three countries grew significantly across all of the 15 old Member States until the financial and economic crisis of 2009 and the following years. In 2011, the total foreign-born population in the EU-27 amounted to 9.7 %: 3.3 % were citizens from another EU-country, 6.4 % were Third Country Nationals (Bundesministerium des Innern/Bundesamt 2013, p. 146).

Meanwhile, we see that in the last decade, immigration of Third Country Nationals in the EU decreased and immigration of citizens of Member States increased (Eurostat 2011, pp. 16–18; Urso and Schuster 2011).[12] The financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s has reinforced the dominance of intra-EU migration. Germany is a strong case in this respect (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration 2013, p. 54 ff.): while in 2004, the number of new immigrants in the FRG was approximately 50/50 % coming from the 26 EU-partners and TCNs, this percentage shifted gradually to 63.4 from EU-countries and 36.6 % TCNs in 2011. Recent immigration figures of other Member States also indicate such a trend towards stronger internal EU-migration. The strongly increased unemployment in the Southern EU-countries and Ireland may further contribute to this in the near future.

10.4   Lessons from the European Case

10.4.1   Political Processes at Work in the European Case

One of the remarkable features of the European case as described above is that (the free circulation of) labor has been included in the evolving and expanding economic cooperation from the beginning. Italy—which in the first decades was the only labor exporting country of the cooperating countries—has brought in the subject consistently in negotiations within the ECSC and EEC (without using it very much in practice; labor migration was already regulated in the early decades through Italy's bilateral agreements with cooperating partners).

Although labor was thus included in the gradual creation of an internal market (along with capital, goods and services), migration and mobility between partner countries at the same time met continuously with fear, resistance and suspicion. These have particularly been expressed vividly around the accessions of new mem-

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[12] Urso and Schuster 2011, p. 17: "Another trend (.) is the increasing percentage of EU nationals among migrants. In absolute terms, they have registered the highest increase, namely 470.000 (+3.8 %, which is in line with the continuous growth in previous years (=13.3 % from 2008 to 2011)." Eurostat 2011, p. 17: "The number of EU-27 citizens migrating to a Member State other than their own country of citizenship increased, on average, by 12 % per year during the period 2002–2008."

bers, starting with the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. From the 1980s onwards, these uncertainties translated in waiting periods for new accessing states before free movement of their citizens was allowed. One can see these delays as balancing protection of national labor markets, on the one hand, and the principle of free movement, on the other. But they are temporary transition measures: the principle survives in the end.

The more the internal market was successful, the more comprehensive the freedom of movement became, both in terms of who could profit from it (not only workers, but all Member State citizens, eventually including long resident Third Country Nationals) and in terms of the rights and equal access to services it involved. Obviously, there is a forceful logic in the functioning of economically open spaces that may supersede strong nationalistic political tendencies to protect the national economic interests in general and labor markets in particular. It has done so in the European case, at least. Nationalistic political sentiments can strategically be neutralized by presenting free movement within the EU as equal to internal mobility (to the profit of national labor markets). At the same time, these sentiments may be directed to strong protection (build a fortress) against the outsiders (Third Country Nationals).

So what has happened in terms of migration regulation is not the absence of control and regulation, but a shift: a new regime is created within the EU that is actually not new, but is equal to internal mobility within nation states. Migration is 'international' in the old sense only when the outer borders of the EU are crossed. It also means that what has started in the beginning as an economic phenomenon—workers moving within a certain sector (coal and steel) potentially across political borders—has ended up being a political phenomenon that touches the heart—i.e., sovereignty—of nation-states. Member States have sacrificed part of their sovereign right to decide who may enter, reside and work on its territory in exchange for economic gains and the rights of its citizens elsewhere in the European Union. This has been a difficult and long process, as I have shown, and it is still not complete. But, it is also a process that is difficult to reverse, as is shown presently, when the EU is not only confronted with strong economic and financial problems, but also with strong nationalistic and anti-European sentiments in Member States.

This analysis has thus mainly looked at the political process around the economic integration in Europe. It did not look at specific factors, such as demographic developments or specific economic or labor market developments that might have influenced the emergence of the European Union and its predecessors. Since we studied only one case, it is difficult to draw hard conclusions on the possible influence of these factors, but nevertheless, it is worthwhile to make some observations on these factors.

As for the influence of economic and labor market developments, it may be observed that these might have influenced the speed of the process to a certain extent at some points in time, but they have not been decisive in the long run. The process of creating a real freedom of movement was a slow and long one, developing through periods of economic growth and of stagnation. It started in the post-war decades of growth and labor market shortages (but was actually not used very much

then), but clearly developed further in a period of economic restructuring and difficult labor markets in the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. During this economically more difficult period, the actual abolition of internal borders was prepared and realized. The prosperous period of the mid-1990s until 2007 that may have facilitated the growth of the EU-area (and of a significant increase of people that could profit from the internal freedom of movement), was followed by serious financial and economic problems within the EU. These serious problems do translate to nationalistic and anti-European sentiments recently, and to policies that consolidate the present situation rather than to develop towards more integration (Collett 2013; Pascouau 2013), but they are not able to reverse the process.

As for demographic developments, we have to observe first of all, that these have entered the (political) debate rather late: it was only after the turn of the century that the UN-publication "Replacement Migration" (United Nations 2000) brought this argument into the political debate on any scale. Furthermore, the argument is used selectively afterwards. In the political process on migration policies, it has not played a major role. The influence of demographics is indirect and often not remarked. It refers to a different level of analysis, that of the 'root causes' of migration.

10.4.2   Relevance for Migration Theory

Political sciences entered migration studies relatively late, but since Aristide Zolberg (1981, 1989) made his plea to introduce political aspects in migration theory in 1981, political aspects have gained importance in explaining international migration. The basic assumption in this approach is that—besides demographic, economic and social factors—the existence of (nation-) states as political units exert a great influence on the emergence, size and direction of migration movements across state borders. The direct means for the state are essentially the manipulation of exit and admission of citizens/residents.

Western European states developed admission systems, but for a long time under restrained conditions of temporariness. This illustrates that there are many other indirect means to steer migration across political borders: an important one is defining membership of the state. A state is supposed to protect its territory and its citizens and their interests; a nation-state is a state that defines furthermore a specifically defined group as its ideal members and guards access to both membership and territory. That makes international migration fundamentally different from internal migration and mobility.

Viewed from these premises of international migration, the creation of a fundamental right or freedom for citizens and even non-national residents to cross national borders and work and settle in another country is an anomaly: it seems to make the fundamental distinction between internal and international migration undone. Nevertheless, this is what actually has happened in the EU. In that sense, the European experience is surprising and unexpected. Yes, the process has been a difficult,

gradual and long lasting one with many obstacles and adversaries: it took some 60 years. Nevertheless, the European case has shown that such a process is possible and eventually, even on quite a large scale.

In the theoretical sense, the European case tells us that we have to review the premises of our theories on the political aspects of international migration and extend them with assumptions on the question under what circumstances and through what kind of political processes 'international migration between nation-states' can be transformed to (the freedom of) 'internal mobility' within larger blocs of countries that cooperate economically and politically. In the practical sense, knowledge about the political processes behind the European case can be used in comparable situations, such as the ASEAN or, for that matter, NAFTA.

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Chapter 11
Migration Governance in the ASEAN Economic Community

Fernando T. Aldaba

> *ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, as well as a community conscious of its history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity.*
>
> ASEANVision 2020

11.1 Introduction

11.1.1 Deepening Integration and Migration in ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is currently embarking on a deeper regional economic integration through its blueprint for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which hopes to establish a free flow of goods and services, free mobility of business persons, skilled professionals and investments by 2015. The AEC can be characterized by (a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly competitive economic region, (c) a region of equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy (ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2008).

Even before it launched this process of regional economic integration, the deep development divide plus geographical, cultural and historical factors have driven migration across ASEAN member countries. While the region itself has experienced dynamic growth in the last few years, income per capita spread is still relatively wide among member countries. As of 2010, Singapore had a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US\$ 43,929 as against Myanmar's US\$ 715 (*see* Table 11.1

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Table 11.1 Population, territory and economy, 2010. (Sources: ASEAN Finance and Macroeconomic Surveillance Database and IMF-World Economic Outlook, April 2011)

Country	Total land area (sq km)	Total population (thousand)	Gross domestic product			
			At current prices		Per capita	
			(US$ Mn)	(PPP$ Mn)[a]	(US$)	(PPP$)
Brunei Darussalam	5,765	415	12,402	19,406	29,915	46,811
Cambodia	181,035	15,269	11,168	29,985	731	1,898
Indonesia	1,860,360	234,181	708,032	1,030,998	3,023	4,403
Lao PDR	236,800	6,230	6,508	16,105	1,045	2,585
Malaysia	330,252	28,909	238,849	415,157	8,262	14,361
Myanmar[b]	676,577	60,163	43,025	76,601	715	1,273
Philippines	300,000	94,013	189,326	351,686	2,014	3,741
Singapore	710	5,077	223,015	291,934	43,929	57,505
Thailand	513,120	67,312	318,709	585,698	4,735	8,701
Vietnam	331,051	86,930	107,650	291,260	1,236	3,351
ASEAN	4,435,670	598,498	1,858,683	3,107,829	3,106	5,193
CLMV[c]	1,425,463	168,592	168,351	412,951	999	2,449
ASEAN-6[d]	3,010,207	429,907	1,690,332	2,694,878	3,932	6,239

[a] Myanmar: US$-Kyat exchange rate is based on the parallel rate as used in IMF-WEO April 2011
[b] GDP per capita in PPP$ is GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates; hence PPP $1 in a country, say Cambodia, has the same purchasing power, showing the purchasing power of US$ 1 in a country compared to US$ 1 in the benchmark country (USA)
[c] CLMV includes Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam
[d] ASEAN-6 includes Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand

Table 11.2 Comparative poverty incidence in ASEAN. (Sources: PPP $2—taken from World Bank data bank at http://databank.worldbank.org)

Country	PPP $ 1	PPP $ 2
Brunei Darussalam	NA	NA
Cambodia	28.3	56.5
Indonesia	18.7	50.6
Lao PDR	33.9	66.0
Malaysia	0.0	2.27
Myanmar	–	–
Philippines	2.7	45.0
Singapore	NA	NA
Thailand	17.2	26.5
Vietnam	13.1	38.5

PPP $ 2—Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified (2006–2010)
PPP $ 1—Philippines and Thailand from country submission; other countries from World Bank
'–' no data available, *NA* not applicable

for a complete listing of GDP per capita of member countries from the ASEAN Community in Figures-ACIF 2012).

Poverty rates (US$PPP 2 per day threshold) remain high even in the original member countries like the Philippines and Indonesia. Three countries—Cambodia, Indonesia and Lao PDR—have poverty rates over 50 % (*see* Table 11.2, ACIF 2012).

Impoverishment has been one of the major push factors for the migration of un-skilled workers in the region.

Intra-ASEAN migration has been increasing over the years. Currently, the share of intra-ASEAN migration to total migration to the entire world is 32.39 % (out-ward) and 38.73 % (inward), respectively (*see* Table 11.3). Malaysia's outward migration to ASEAN destinations, mostly to Singapore, is at 80.72 % while Myan-mar's 62.39 % is mostly to Thailand and Indonesia's 60.64 % is mostly to Malaysia. With deepening regional integration, what can we expect in terms of labor mobility and migration in the region?

11.1.2   Objectives and Rationale of the Study

As ASEAN further progresses towards economic integration in the region where movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor are fully liberalized, what will happen to migration especially that of semi-skilled and unskilled workers? What approach is recommended to transcend the limitations of the national ap-proach? Can regionalism be an intermediate step in the governance of migration? Can economic integration proceed without liberalizing the movement of labor? Finally, what migration governance approaches are emerging in the ASEAN Eco-nomic Community? These are the main questions this chapter aims to address.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.2 examines the current migration situation in ASEAN. Section 11.3 looks at the possible impact of deepening integration on migration in the region especially for the unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This will be done using current theories and studies on regional integration and migration. Section 11.4 examines the progress of economic integration in ASEAN. Section 11.5 discusses the current migration governance in the region, while Sect. 11.6 discusses the "ASEAN way" and the possibilities of multi-level governance using the global public goods framework of Betts (2011). This section also elaborates on the various forms and levels of migration governance occurring in the region. Section 11.7 con-cludes and gives recommendations for policy convergence in multi-level migration governance as an emerging approach in the ASEAN Economic Community.

11.2   Current Migration in ASEAN: Characteristics and Statistics

Migrant workers from ASEAN have increased rapidly in number to an estimated 12.9 million in 2010, equivalent to around six percent of the global total. These mi-grant workers sent US$ 44.13 billion in remittances for the whole region, around nine percent of the total worldwide (*see* Table 11.4). Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and Singa-pore are the major host countries; the Philippines, Indonesia and CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) are the sending countries. This is clearly seen in the net migration rates of the ASEAN members in Table 11.5, where Singapore's rate was

Table 11.3 Intra-ASEAN migration and share to total migration. (Source: Pasadilla (2011) based on migration data from http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0. Accessed 23 February 2011)

	Intra-ASEAN			Total migration			Share of intra-ASEAN to total migration (%)	
	Outward migration	Inward migration	Ratio of outbound/ inbound	Outward migration	Inward migration	Ratio of outbound/ inbound	Outward migration	Inward migration
Brunei D.	9,313	120,578	0.08	24,343	148,123	0.16	38.26	81.40
Cambodia	53,722	320,573	0.17	350,485	335,829	1.04	15.33	95.46
Indonesia	1,518,687	158,485	9.58	2,504,297	397,124	6.31	60.64	39.91
Lao PDR	82,788	10,134	8.17	366,663	18,916	19.38	22.58	53.58
Malaysia	1,195,566	1,882,987	0.63	1,481,202	2,357,603	0.63	80.72	79.87
Myanmar*	321,100	814	394.47	514,667	98,008	5.25	62.39	0.83
Philippines	335,407	9,096	36.87	4,275,612	435,423	9.82	7.84	2.09
Singapore	122,254	1,162,960	0.11	297,234	1,966,865	0.15	41.13	59.13
Thailand	262,721	448,218	0.59	811,123	1,157,263	0.70	32.29	38.73
Vietnam	221,956	21,511	10.32	2,226,401	69,307	32.12	9.97	31.04
TOTAL	4,123,515	4,135,357	1.00	12,852,027	6,984,461	1.84	32.08	59.21

* means that the data were based on earlier estimates by the World Bank, i.e., 2007, while the rest are from the 2010 released data

Brunei D. Brunei Darussalam

Table 11.4 Migrant stock and remittances. (Source: World Bank 2010 estimates)

Country	Migrant stock (2010)	Percent	Remit $ mil (2011)	Percent
Brunei Darussalam	24,343	0.19	–	
Cambodia	350,485	2.73	245	0.56
Indonesia	2,504,297	19.49	6,924	15.69
Lao PDR	366,663	2.85	110	0.25
Malaysia	1,481,202	11.53	1,198	2.71
Myanmar	514,667	4.00	–	
Philippines	4,275,612	33.27	23,065	52.26
Singapore	297,234	2.31	–	
Thailand	811,123	6.31	3,994	9.05
Vietnam	2,226,401	17.32	8,600	19.49
Total ASEAN	12,852,027	100.00	44,136	100.00
Total world	215,763,573		507,600	
Percent ASEAN of total	5.96		8.70	

Table 11.5 Net migration rates in ASEAN (per 1000). (Source: ADBI and OECD (2013) citing UNDESA data Population Division 2011)

Country	1980–1985	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010
Brunei Darussalam	3.57	2.2	3.1	3.53	2.04	1.84
Cambodia	0	3.44	3.01	1.58	−1.83	−3.71
Indonesia	−0.1	−0.3	−0.75	−0.75	−1.08	−1.11
Lao PDR	−2.04	0.01	−1.34	−3.46	−4.16	−2.51
Malaysia	2.4	5.43	3.31	3.82	3.2	0.62
Myanmar	−0.32	−0.73	−0.62	0.02	−4.38	−2.12
Philippines	−0.7	−1.03	−2.13	−2.12	−2.77	−2.76
Singapore	12.08	8.48	14.26	13.72	11.36	30.87
Thailand	1.37	1.85	−3.8	1.94	3.4	1.45
Vietnam	−1.14	−1.04	−0.9	−0.75	−1.07	−1.01

high at 30.87% from 2005–2010. The Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia receive hefty sums of remittances from their overseas workers. The movement of labor in the region is further characterized mostly by a relatively low-wage and unskilled work-force for domestic service, construction, agriculture, fishing and forestry (PIDS 2012).

This current ASEAN migration counts a large portion coming from illegal re-cruitment facilitated through informal networks and brokers. The legal ones are in accordance with bilateral agreements between sending and host countries or are done through officially registered private agencies in the sending country with partner firms in the receiving country.

11.2.1   The Three Migration Subsystems

Researchers have identified three migration subsystems in the region. Asis (2012) clas-sifies them as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines—East Asia Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) and "Maritime Southeast Asia."

Table 11.6 ASEAN emigrants to OECD countries. (Source: ADBI and OECD 2013)

Stock	Emigrants 15+ ('000)	% male	Low educated (%)	High educated (%)	15–24 (%)	65+ (%)
Philippines	2,502.3	38.6	13.7	51.9	9.5	12.2
Vietnam	1,757.7	48.6	33.5	27.7	8.4	9.9
Thailand	346.9	32.6	30.6	33.4	20.8	3.3
Indonesia	336.0	45.4	17.9	41.9	10.9	24.6
Lao PDR	256.1	49.4	41.1	19.7	3.5	9.1
Cambodia	254.5	46.9	45.4	19.7	6.2	10
Malaysia	245.9	44.3	11.6	58.4	17.5	7.6
Singapore	119.3	45.7	16.3	52.7	17.1	6.5
Myanmar	78.4	48.2	25.3	44.3	9.8	18
Brunei	9.8	47.6	17.8	51.2	23.6	2.7

Battistella (2002) has a similar typology (GMS and BIMP-EAGA) but for the last subsystem, he identified a more general area, the "Malay Peninsula," which consists mostly of Malaysia and Singapore, two of the most dynamic economies in the region. Both countries have sustained their economic growth for several decades already.

The GMS subsystem meanwhile has Thailand as the locus of the movement of labor. Prior to becoming a labor-importing country, it was a country of asylum for refugees from Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Between 1975 and 1997, it assisted nearly 1.92 million refugees (Battistella 2002). But when Thailand experienced sustained growth in the 80 s and into the 90 s, economic factors pulled migrants, mostly irregular ones, from the three relatively less developed countries.

BIMP-EAGA was established in 1994 to be developed jointly by the member countries as a "growth triangle" in ASEAN. This sub-region includes Brunei and regions in Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak, and Labuan), the Philippines (Mindanao and Palawan) and Indonesia (islands of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Irian Jaya). An important hub of migration in BIMP-EAGA is Sabah where population movements from Western Mindanao in the Philippines and from Kalimantan in Indonesia began even in pre-colonial times, when state boundaries established by colonial powers had limited impact (Battistella 2002). It is an area linked by historical and cultural ties. Irregular migration from the Philippines has been dominant in the area which was exacerbated during the height of the armed conflict in its southern region, Mindanao, during the last three decades. More recently, Sabah has been in the headlines as a group of armed men from the Sultanate of Sulu in Mindanao arrived to reaffirm a "centuries-old claim" of the area.

11.2.2   Migration Outside ASEAN

Outmigration from ASEAN can also be seen in the region, especially to developed economies in the OECD countries and to the United States. The Philippines, which has the lowest percentage of its citizens migrating to other ASEAN countries at only 7.84 % (*see* Table 11.1), sends the most migrants to the OECD and the United States. Vietnam and Thailand follow closely (*see* Table 11.6).

Batalova (2011) finds that in 2009, South Eastern Asians made up the largest proportion of the Asian-born population in the United States, followed by those from Eastern, South Central, and Western Asia. South Eastern Asians numbered 3,667,000, accounting for 34.4 % of the overall Asian-born population in 2009. The main countries of origin from this region were the Philippines (1,726,000), Vietnam (1,152,000) and Thailand (203,000).

11.3   The Impact of Deepening Economic Integration on Migration

11.3.1   What Economic Theories Say

Mainstream economic theories and models at first suggested that trade liberalization will reduce migration in a source country. Schiff (2006), for example, notes that Nobel Prize winner and trade economist Robert Mundell uses the Heckscher-Ohlin framework to show that international trade and factor movement are substitutes. He explains that "…this result makes such intuitive sense. Host countries opening up to trade will raise production of export goods, employment and wages in the source country, and will therefore reduce migration. Second, since labor services can be exported either by exporting goods in which labor services are embedded or by exporting labor directly, reducing the export of labor services through one channel (trade) will result in an increase in their exports through the other channel (migration)" (Schiff 2006, p. 4).

However, Schiff (2006) further highlights a study from another economist, Markusen (1983), who claimed that when assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model are modified, complementarity between trade and factor movement is obtained. Other studies, as cited by Schiff (1996), claim that migration and trade may be complements in the short run and substitutes in the long run. These studies assert that there is a migration 'hump,' with complementarity occurring as trade is first liberalized, and substitution as liberalization continues. Eventually, Schiff (2006) notes that trade liberalization might result in an increase or decrease in migration flows, depending on various factors—level of tariffs, the coverage of trade liberalization, the technology gap between countries, the elasticity of relative wages with respect to tariffs and migration costs.

Other studies show that economic integration is an important factor for growth in the region through more competition in the product market, consequently leading to price convergence. Greater trade integration should also increase the total amount of trade, generating a final positive effect on the aggregated demand and in firm labor demand, eventually inducing migration in the short run (Martinoia 2009). Countries of emigration whose comparative advantage may rest in natural resources or abundant labor expect that deepening integration will expand their share in international trade although reducing emigration will not be their priority as this contributes to their economic growth through remittances (Alba et al. 1998).

Martin (2008) sums it up in that "trade, investment and aid can accelerate economic growth in ways that narrow the demographic and economic differences promoting international migration by speeding up economic development. However, the economic development path in migrant-sending countries is often narrow and winding rather than wide and straight, suggesting frequent roadblocks on the way to development. Even if sending and receiving countries reach free trade and investment agreements that can reduce migration in the long term, these same policies can produce a migration hump in the short run." Alba et al. (1998) add that migration is likely to continue until in the medium term when there will be more marked convergence among the diverse member countries in terms of development.

11.3.2   What States Actually Do

In the real world, what happens is that receiving member states of an economically integrating region unilaterally restrict labor mobility, selecting which type of labor is needed to further economic growth. Sending countries, meanwhile, either officially or unofficially accept migration as an important component of its development strategy of catching up with the rest in the region. But migration scholars and experts doubt the capabilities of governments to actually control migration. They argue that fluctuations in migration primarily respond to the more important structural demand factors that are, in turn, determined by human development, economic cycles, and changes in the structure of labor markets factors which policy makers have very little influence (de Haas 2011, citing Castles & Miller 2009 and Thielemann 2006).

De Haas (2011) notes that indeed, migration policies can have some effect on migration, but he also gives a caveat to distinguish the effect of migration policies with regard to the following: the volume of migration, the spatial orientation of migration, the composition (legal channel and migrant characteristics) of migration, the timing of migration, and reverse (return) migration. His recent reviews of immigration (Czaika and de Haas 2011a) and emigration policies (de Haas and Vezzoli 2011) show that such policies are more effective in controlling the selection and composition of migration rather than the general volume and long-term momentum of migration.

11.3.3   The Benefits of Migration Liberalization

As shown above, economic integration allows only limited mobility of labor and this usually pertains only to skilled workers, professionals and business investors. Economic theory suggests that when productivity between countries varies, constraints to the movement of labor can lead to differences in wages and the marginal product of labor, inducing workers to move from low to high productivity

Table 11.7 Efficiency gain from partial elimination of barriers to labor mobility (percent of world GDP) (Source: Clemens 2011)

	Removal of barriers	Net emigration rate % origin-region pop.	Efficiency gain % world GDP
Moses and Letnes (2004, 2005)	Complete	73.6	96.5
	Partial	29.3	54.8
	Partial	10.3	22.0
Irequi (2005)	Complete	53	67
	Partial	24	31
Klein and Ventura (2007)	Complete	>99	122
	Partial	14.8	20
	Partial	7.3	10
Walmsley and Winters (2005)	Partial	0.8	0.6
	Partial	1.6	1.2
Van der Mensbrugghe and Roland-Holst (2009)	Partial	0.8	0.9
	Partial	2.0	2.3

The Moses and Letnes figures on emigration rates from Moses and Letnes (2005) Table 9.3; figures on efficiency gains are from Moses and Letnes (2004) Table 11.9, scaled to assume equal inherent labor productivity across countries (e.g., 10 % elimination of wage gap gives US$ 774 billion gain in Table 11.9, multiplied by ratio 96.5/9.6 in Table 11.5 to equalize inherent labor productivity, and divided by world GDP gives 22 % . Irequi (2005) figures are from Tables 10.3, 10.6, 10.8, and 10.9. Klein and Ventura (2007) figures are from Tables 11.2 and 11.7 (emigration rates calculated from population allocations given 80 % initial population to poor region). Walmsley and Winters (2005) figures from Tables 11.4 and 11.11, assuming 80 % of world population starts out in (net) migrant-sending countries. Van der Mensbrugghe and Roland-Holst (2009) figures come from Tables 11.6 and 11.7, and likewise assume 80 % of world population starts out in (net) migrant-sending countries. 2001 world GDP assumed US$ 32 trillion, doubling (in 2001 dollars) to US$ 64 trillion by 2025

areas. Thus, liberalization of barriers to migration could create benefits for a region and even for the whole world. And this is also why despite the legal barriers setup, workers from a poorer country take the risk of migrating to a richer country.

Clemens (2011) highlights these efficiency gains from partial to complete elimination of barriers to labor mobility based on various studies he reviewed. From Table 11.7 below, complete liberalization may bring about efficiency gains from 67 to 122 % of the world's GDP. Partial removal of barriers could result to a low of 0.6 % to a high of 54.8 % depending on the various assumptions of the models used for estimation.

He adds that "the emigration of less than five percent of the population of poor regions would bring global gains exceeding the gains from total elimination of all policy barriers to merchandise trade and all barriers to capital flows." Calculating from the back of a metaphorical envelope and assuming an average gain of migrants of US$ 7,500 a year, he comes up with a gain of US$ 23 trillion—which is already 38 % of the global GDP. Unfortunately, despite these glowing gains in migration liberalization, states continue to restrict labor mobility.

11.3.4 Most of the Gains are from the Movement of the Unskilled

Stephenson and Hufbauer (2011) cite the estimates of Iregui (1999), emphasizing that the potential gains from the migration of skilled labor are much less: three to 11 % of world GDP as compared to the 13 to 59 % for all the skills. They also mention a study by Walmsley and Winters (2002) which estimates that the potential gain from the movement of these unskilled workers could go as high as US$ 110 billion, or 70 % of the total. Stephenson and Hufbauer (2011) claim that the benefits to migrants (through remittances), less the national income losses of the sending countries, will still result into a significant gain for developing countries—the equivalent of 1.8 % of their GDP. It is worth highlighting that the dominant type of migration in ASEAN is that of unskilled workers.

11.4 The ASEAN Economic Community and Migration

11.4.1 The ASEAN Economic Community and Migration

The vision of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020 launched in the Bali Summit of October 2003 was to be fast-tracked to 2015. This was declared by the ASEAN leaders in their 12th Summit held in Cebu City, Philippines in 2007. The ASEAN Economic Blueprint was adopted during the same year in the following 13th Summit. The Blueprint is a coherent master plan for the establishment of the AEC. It describes the vision of the AEC, which is the realization of the end goal of economic integration characterized by four pillars—a single market and production base in which there is a free flow of goods, services and investments; a freer flow of capital; equitable economic development; and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities. Each characteristic consists of several core elements with objectives, action plans and strategic schedules. A four-phased strategy is set in each of the core elements.

To evaluate the progress of the members and the region itself in achieving the goals of the AEC, a Scorecard was developed similar to the EU Internal Market Scoreboard. The Scorecard identifies the specific action to be undertaken collectively by ASEAN and its member countries to establish the AEC. It is a compliance tool to track the implementation of measures and achievements of milestones/quantitative indicators in the AEC Strategic schedule, but it is not an instrument for impact assessment. ASEAN has made considerable progress in implementing the AEC. As of end-December 2011, it has completed 187 measures (67.5 % out of 277 measures due for the two phases under review (2008–2011). The following tables from the official AEC Scorecard show progress for each pillar (Table 11.8).

For Pillar I, ASEAN has implemented 65.9 % of measures, with significant achievements in free flow of skilled labor and capital, and integration of priority sectors (ASEAN Secretariat 2012a).

Table 11.8 Pillar I: Single production and market base

Key Areas	Phase 1 (2008–2009)		Phase II (2010–2011)		Total Measures	
	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented
Free flow of goods	9	0	23	24	32	24
Free flow of services	10	3	13	17	23	20
Free flow of investment	5	1	5	8	10	9
Free flow of capital	1	0	5	0	6	0
Free flow of skilled labor	–	–	1	0	1	0
Priority integration sectors	28	0	1	0	29	0
Food, agriculture and forestry	8	0	5	6	13	6
Total number of measures	61	4	53	55	114	59
Implementation rate*	93.8%		49.1%		65.9%	

*Implementation rate is calculated as the ratio of measures that are fully implemented to total number of measures targeted

(–) Indicates no measures targeted for this phase

Around 67.9% of measures under Pillar II were implemented as of end-December 2011, with notable progress in the areas of competition policy, intellectual property rights (IPR), and regional cooperation in minerals and information and communication technology (ICT) (ASEAN Secretariat 2012a) (Table 11.10).

Pillar III has so far achieved 66.7% of targeted measures, as the implementation of various activities in small and medium enterprise (SME) development and Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) remained generally on track (ASEAN Secretariat 2012a).

Towards integration into the global economy, ASEAN has achieved 85.7% of identified measures, including the ratification of various Free Trade Agreements with China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India (ASEAN Secretariat 2012a).

Some measures due for execution have not been fully implemented. Some of these gaps mainly result from the delays in the ratification of signed ASEAN-wide agreements and their alignment into national domestic laws as well as delays in implementation of specific initiatives (ASEAN Secretariat 2012a). ASEAN is still confronted by many intra-regional challenges related to non-tariff barriers, sticky labor laws, lack of infrastructure and a development gap among members and it has to overcome the reasons why several measures were delayed (Das 2012).

ASEAN prides itself with its "open regionalism," which is actually the ultimate goal of Pillar IV. However, given the diversity of free trade agreements it has entered into, plus the fact that ASEAN Member Nations (AMNs) are also free to negotiate their own bilateral free trade agreements with other developed economies, a "spaghetti or noodle bowl effect" has contributed to the problems of implementing and deepening regional integration. This, in effect, has further complicated the execution of the measures agreed upon by the member nations.

Despite the delays and imperfections in the road to economic integration, ASEAN seems to be making progress in building one economic community which may be realized some years after its target of 2015.

Table 11.9 Pillar II: competitive economic region

Key areas	Phase 1 (2008–2009)		Phase II (2010–2011)		Total measures	
	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented
Competition policy	2	0	2	0	4	0
Consumer protection	2	0	5	4	7	4
Intellectual property Rights	–	–	4	1	4	1
Transport	15	10	6	8	21	18
Energy	0	0	2	1	2	1
Mineral	1	0	7	0	8	0
ICT	2	0	4	0	6	0
Taxation	–	–	0	1	0	1
E-commerce	–	–	1	0	1	0
Total number of measures	22	10	31	15	53	25
Implementation rate*	68.7%		67.4%		67.9%	

*implementation rate is calculated as the ratio of measures that are fully implemented to total number of measures targeted
(–) Indicates no measures targeted for this phase

Table 11.10 Pillar III equitable economic development

Key areas	Phase 1 (2008–2009)		Phase II (2010–2011)		Total Measures	
	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented
SME development	1	0	4	3	5	3
Initiative for ASEAN integration (IAI)	2	0	1	1	3	1
Total number of measures	3	0	5	4	8	4
Implementation rate*	100%		55.5%		66.7%	

*Implementation rate is calculated as the ratio of measures that are fully implemented to total number of measures targeted

11.4.2 *The Potential Benefits of ASEAN Regional Integration*

Itakura (2013), using a dynamic GTAP model shows that the welfare impact for all countries in ASEAN will be positive in the process of integration especially when both goods and services are liberalized. However, the welfare impact will not be even

Table 11.11 Pillar IV: Integration into the global economy

Key areas	Phase 1 (2008–2009)		Phase II (2010–2011)		Total measures	
	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented	Fully implemented	Not fully implemented
External economic relations	5	0	7	2	12	2
Total number of measures	5	0	7	2	12	2
Implementation rate*	100%		77.8%		85.7%	

*Implementation rate is calculated as the ratio of measures that are fully implemented to total number of measures targeted

with Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia enjoying a higher level of welfare effects than the other member countries. In terms of GDP impact, again it is all positive for the ASEAN member states (AMS) with Cambodia and Vietnam gaining most in terms of percentage points. Itakura (2013) also estimated the welfare impact if ASEAN engages in more free trade agreements with other countries, i.e., its open regionalism. He finds that among the Free Trade Area (FTA) policy scenarios, the ASEAN+6 FTA leads to the highest positive impact on real GDP for many of the AMS.

Another Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model estimation by Lee and Plummer (2011) shows that trade liberalization, with reductions in administrative and technical barriers and decreasing the trade and transport margins under the assumption of endogenously determined productivity, will generate estimated welfare gains for AEC 2015 ranging from 1.1% in Indonesia to 9.4% in Thailand. Thus, they recommend the streamlining of customs procedures, decrease in administrative and technical barriers, as well as increased competition and improvements in infrastructure to maximize the benefits of the AEC. Petri et al (2010) also show that the AEC could generate benefits comparable to those of the European Union, valued at around 5.3% of the region's GDP and more than twice if the formation of the AEC will further result in free trade agreements with key external partners.

Thus, the pursuit of liberalization and greater integration will redound to various benefits for the AMS. However, the extent or the level of benefits actually gained will depend on a variety of factors, e.g., the prompt implementation of measures, the required institutional changes at the regional and national level, the awareness and response of key sectors in the economy of the member countries themselves. And in the short and medium term, the development divide may still persist. As beneficial impact may vary across countries, it may also vary across economic sectors across and within nations. Thus, while the net effect may be positive for the entire region, there will still be winners and losers when it comes to specific sectors of the economy in the ten member countries in ASEAN.

Table 11.12 GDP growth rates 2008–2014. (Source: ADB 2013 Outlook)

Country	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Forecast 2013	Forecast 2014
Brunei Darus-salam	−1.9	−1.8	2.6	2.2	1.0	1.8	2.0
Cambodia	6.7	0.1	6.1	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.2
Indonesia	6.0	4.6	6.2	6.5	6.2	6.4	6.6
Lao PDR	7.2	7.7	8.1	8.0	7.9	7.7	7.7
Malaysia	4.8	−1.5	7.2	5.1	5.6	5.3	5.5
Myanmar	3.6	5.1	5.3	5.5	6.3	6.5	6.7
Philippines	4.2	1.1	7.6	3.9	6.6	6.0	5.9
Singapore	1.7	−1.0	14.8	4.9	1.3	2.6	3.7
Thailand	2.5	−2.3	7.8	0.1	6.4	4.9	5.0
Vietnam	6.3	5.3	6.8	5.9	5.0	5.2	5.6
ASEAN	4.4	1.4	7.9	4.6	5.5	5.4	5.7

11.4.3 Actual Growth of the Region: 2009-present

Despite the global financial crisis which started in 2008, the region has managed to grow moderately in the past 4 years like the rest of Asia. Reeling from the global meltdown in 2008, Southeast Asia expanded 1.4 % in 2009 but rebounded in 2010 at 7.9 % From 2011 until the present, economic growth in the region has been respectable at 5.0–5.7 % (*see* Table below) despite the continued uncertainties brought about by problems in Europe and the slow recovery in the United States.

In a certain sense, the process of deepening integration has helped the region weather the crisis. Trade within the region has increased to almost 40 % by 2010 from only around 25 % in 2000 (ASEAN Secretariat 2012b).With the economies of North America and Europe slowing down in the last few years, the region has relied on trading within ASEAN and other Asian countries like China, Japan, South Korea and India. Remittances from migrant workers have also helped some AMS to be resilient during the crisis, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. Remittances, coupled with national government spending, form part of a "rebalancing strategy" for some countries in Asia. The economies of CLMV countries have been growing robustly in the last few years (Table 11.12).

11.4.4 Potential Effects on Migration

From the current literature, there seems to be no empirical estimates on the migration that will be induced by the process towards the AEC. However, intuitively, we may give the following expectations:

- Given this trend towards liberalization of goods and services, there will be an increase in total migration of skilled workers (because of efforts toward services liberalization, i.e., ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, where Mode 4

specifies the movement of natural persons) in the whole of ASEAN, with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand as primary destinations.

- There will also be a faster increase in the total migration of unskilled workers in ASEAN in the short and medium run (in the three ASEAN migration subsystems) because of the following reasons:

  a. with improvements in connectivity, access to labor market information is increased and transport costs are reduced;
  b. increased incomes in sending countries due to trade liberalization complemented by remittances from already existing networks (of relatives and friends) reduce migration costs;
  c. increasing wages (in differential) in receiving countries will continue to be an important pull factor despite similar increasing wages in the sending countries;
  d. workers in the losing sectors will be "pushed" to migrate;
  e. travel facilitation due to no-visa requirementsvia tourism liberalization;
  f. however, specific country migration effects (either on skilled or unskilled) may depend on a variety of factors that Schiff (2006) and other studies have enumerated, e.g., level and state of education of the labor force, structure of the economy (formal and informal sectors), number of winning and losing sectors, etc.

- It will be expected that unskilled workers may enter illegally into receiving countries. Only those facilitated through bilateral or bipartite agreements may be able to enter legally; thus, it is likely that irregular migration may also increase.

If we use the eclectic "aspirations-capabilities" framework of de Haas (2011) and Czaika and Vothknecht (2012), we can surmise that in both the aspirations and capabilities aspect, the momentum towards the formation of the AEC will induce further migration of both skilled and unskilled workers. In terms of "aspirations," workers and professionals will have more information about the possibilities and opportunities in the region aided even further by the advances in mass media and telecommunications. From the "capabilities" perspective, with increased incomes in the receiving countries, reduced travel costs and with further enhancement of the capacities of migrant networks in receiving countries (to help relatives and friends in sending countries), labor mobility will be greatly facilitated.

11.5   Migration Governance in ASEAN

11.5.1   The ASEAN Way of Governance

The 'ASEAN Way' of governance follows strict consensus among members coupled with the principle of "non-interference" in the issues confronting another country. This has made cooperative and region-wide resolutions on various issues complex and difficult. To facilitate decision-making, ASEAN has established alternative mechanisms to reach consensus:

1. ASEAN-X formula is a mechanism where members not ready for consent can let other members move on towards cooperation, thus going beyond simple bilateralism. This can also be used at the sub-regional level, e.g., Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Programme and the Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia– Philippines East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA).
2. ASEAN+X mode of expansion, where the Association cooperates with external (non-ASEAN) partners. This is sometimes used in conjunction with the first formula, signaling that ASEAN members need not necessarily agree to join the initiative as a bloc.

Supplementary to the official meetings described above which are altogether officially called Track 1 are assemblies of non-state actors called Track 2, involving academics and public intellectuals tasked to provide expert advice and inputs to the former before concrete projects or policy recommendations are adopted. The recognized Track 2 actors include the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO), the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), and the ASEAN University Network. Track 2 is usually used in deliberations on political and security issues.

ASEAN more recently acknowledged another type of Track 2 process—the establishment of the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC), a group that is critical in moving the regional economy forward. A third form is a people's track (Track 3) where ASEAN recognizes accredited non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The ASEAN People's Assembly (APA), a Track 2–Track 3 interface was arranged by ASEAN-ISIS but its NGO reach was limited. A purely Track 3 initiative which continues until today is the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC), which started in Malaysia during the 11th ASEAN Summit (2005). This year, the annual conference described as the "most prominent civil society forum in the region" will be held in Brunei Darussalam from 6–8 April 2013.

Various ministerial meetings, senior officials meetings, committees, experts groups, and task forces give technical and policy support to the decision-making in ASEAN Track 1. Track 2 and Track 3 mechanisms are parallel and complementary processes that provide input right up to the Ministerial Meeting level. Other technical inputs are received officially at the committee, task force and expert group level or through the national delegations. These diverse modes, along with advocacies at the country level, provide avenues for the discussion and adoption of regional social policies including migrant and labor concerns.

With the process of deepening economic integration, the involvement of non-state actors in both Track 2 and Track 3 processes will probably intensify as issues and concerns affecting them emanate in the path towards the ASEAN Economic Community.

11.5.2 Current Migration Governance in ASEAN

At the country level, ASEAN Member States (AMS) have established institutions and policies to manage migration, whether inward or outward and whether the AMS

is a sending or receiving country. Some sending AMS have negotiated bilateral agreements with host countries to protect and manage their migrant workers (*see* below for a more detailed discussion). However, at the regional level, irregular migration issues and other related problems remain to be solved especially from the perspective of the basic rights of migrant workers.

However, ASEAN has already initiated several moves to manage migration at the regional level. On 29 December 2004 in Vientiane, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Children. The declaration was expected to generate concerted action against the trafficking of women and children. It promoted networking, information sharing, human rights of victims and coercive actions against individuals and syndicates engaged in human trafficking. On 13 January 2007 in Cebu, Heads of Government during the 12th ASEAN Summit adopted the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. The document hoped to promote and safeguard the welfare of ASEAN migrant workers for fair and equitable employment opportunities, adequate payment of wages, and access to decent working and living conditions.

Standards for the protection of migrant workers are reflected in the ASEAN Charter as well as in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint. In the Charter, ASEAN needs "to respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and trans-boundary challenges." The ASCC Blueprint provides for fair and comprehensive migration policies and adequate protection for all migrant workers. The ASEAN Senior Labour Officials Meeting Working Group (SLOM-WG) on Progressive Labour Practices to Enhance the Competitiveness of ASEAN is also committed to implement the Declaration effectively. ASEAN also created the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ACMW) that was tasked to focus on three main thrusts:

First, the stepping up of protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers against exploitation, with activities like the policy repository of best practices in migrant worker management policies and information services to educate migrant workers on their rights;

Second, enhancing labor migration governance in ASEAN Member States, with activities like workshops on Best Practices in Protecting Migrant Workers and improving Overseas Employment Administration and the holding of the regular sessions of the ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour;

Thirdly, promoting regional cooperation to fight human trafficking in ASEAN in partnership with the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, a gathering of key officials in the region;

As an additional track, a team under the ACMW has been set to draft the instrument and has met three times since April 2009 and has been deliberating mutual bases and the key principles to be included in the instrument. Unfortunately, until the present time there is still no instrument adopted.

Aside from these official activities, some AMS are active participants in regional consultative processes usually organized by the International Organization of Migration (IOM). Another important initiative is the sub-regional cooperation on migration issues. Key examples are the joint training programs for migration

management implemented by the Mekong Institute or joint advocacy activities of the Mekong Migration Network in the Greater Mekong Subregion.

A large number of activities occur between two countries through bilateral agreements especially in managing low-skilled labor migration. Bilateral agreements are formal, legally binding treaties relating to cooperation in various aspects related to labor migration and can take the form of bilateral labor agreements (BLAs), bilateral maritime agreements (BMAs), bilateral social security agreements (SSAs), or anti-trafficking agreements (ATAs) (Go 2007). Other forms of bilateral agreements include those related to health, human resource development and joint action on the protection of the rights of migrant workers.

Examples in ASEAN include a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Thailand and sending countries like Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos to reduce irregular migration (Battistella and Khadria 2011). Another is a bilateral agreement between the Philippines and Indonesia to consolidate the efforts of other labor sending countries in the region towards promoting the welfare of migrant workers and protecting their rights (Go 2007). Another MOU on domestic workers was also signed in 2011 between Malaysia and Indonesia. The Philippines has also signed seafarer agreements with Brunei and Singapore—Recognition of Certificates under Regulation I/10 of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as Amended in 1995 (List of Existing Bilateral Agreements of the Philippines, Department of Labor and Employment).

11.6   A Multi-level Approach to Migration Governance

11.6.1   What is Multi-level Governance?

Given the possibilities of increasing migration trend and the current governance systems within ASEAN, a multi-level type of migration governance is evolving. This is probably because it is not expected that a working regional mechanism will be established soon to encompass all migration issues. Take for example the formulation of the Declaration instrument which until now is still pending. Because of the development divide and the long road to economic convergence among member countries, migration will continue and should increase in the short and medium run. At the same time, we also know that there is a continuing divergence in the level of awareness and action among member countries and across national sectors when it comes to migration issues. Thus, in order to attain a certain level of consensus and convergence on various policy areas, all possible sources (in terms of levels, venues, mechanisms) of awareness raising, discussion, debate and problem solving should be explored and initiated. Thus, the current system of multi-level governance approaches seems to be the direction ASEAN, consciously or unconsciously, is taking.

At the national level, it pays for the Philippines to have a multi-level approach as Battistella (2012, p. 419) highlights:

> …. The objectives of the migration policy consist in facilitating the employment of Filipino workers abroad and the consequent economic benefits, while ensuring safe and decent conditions for the workers…These objectives are reached through the national migration policy. However, the national policy has inherent limitations, both in terms of design, implementation and reach, as the outreach of the Philippine government while migrants are abroad is limited to diplomatic and other services. For this reason, the Philippines has engaged both in bilateral and multilateral cooperation……all three levels must be pursued, with some preference for the bilateral approach within a multilateral framework.

The Philippine migration management is touted as a global model given its long experience in sending its workers abroad since the early 1970s. Should ASEAN then as a regional organization also practice and officially adopt multi-level governance approaches?

What is multi-level governance (MLG)? –The essence of the MLG framework is the assertion that in the diversity of policy arenas, no single stakeholder has full capacity and experience to resolve important issues. Decision making is decentralized among a host of stakeholders at different territorial and geographical levels, rather than solely dominated by national governments (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Conzelmann (2008, p. 7), citing Schmitter (2003) defines multi-level governance as:

> … an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent actors—private and public—at different levels of territorial aggregation in more or less continuous negotiation/deliberation/implementation, but does not assign exclusive policy competence to any of these levels or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority

The current dynamics of migration governance in ASEAN as discussed above already suggest this kind of multi-level type of governance. The important aspect that should be highlighted is whether such types of governance eventually lead to policy convergence or policy cohesion as discussed in studies and cases in the European Union.

11.6.2   Global Public Goods Theory and Multi-Level Governance

Multi-level governance of migration is rationalized by Bett's framework of global public goods (Betts 2010). According to Betts, a global public good is "one for which i) the benefits or costs are non-excludable between states (i.e., all states benefit equally irrespective of who contributes) and ii) the benefits are non-rival between actors (i.e., one state's consumption does not diminish another state's enjoyment of the benefits).

Some global public goods, such as climate change mitigation, may require states to work towards formal multilateral cooperation. However, not all areas of migration governance are global public goods. Instead, Betts (2010, p. 3) argue that "some forms of migration governance vary in the qualities of 'excludability' and 'rivalry' that define a global pubic good." As such, different and alternative forms of cooperation such as bilateral, regional or sub-regional cooperation may occur. To illustrate, he focuses on three types of migration issues and their corresponding governance mechanisms (Betts 2010, p. 3):

i) The governance of refugee protection represents a global public good. The benefits—in terms of security and human rights—accrue to all states…and the enjoyment of those benefits by one state is largely undiminished by another state's enjoyment. One would therefore expect a multilateral regime.

ii) The governance of low-skilled labour and irregular migration represents a 'club good' in the sense that while regulating irregular movement has benefits that are 'non-rival,' the benefits are partly…being geographically confined within a particular regional context. One would expect cooperation within 'clubs'—regional, interregional or trans-regional.

iii) The governance of high-skilled labour migration is a private good. Its costs and benefits are highly excludable, accruing almost exclusively to the sending state, the receiving state and the migrant. However, the benefits…are 'rival' because there is a finite supply of skilled labour. The dominant form of cooperation is therefore likely to be through unilateral liberalization or bilateralism. In such areas, the role of multilateral forums and organizations is likely to be limited to facilitation.

But why are non-state actors also involved in the various migration governance levels? One possible reason is the continuing under-provision of such public goods at various levels. Theory suggests that the first best option is market allocation but because public goods are classified as a type of market failure and that a free rider problem exists, then the state should provide them. However, at the regional and sub-regional levels, supranational institutions are supposed to provide such goods but more often than not, these goods are underprovided because of coordination problems, resource deficiencies or institutional constraints and capacities. Thus, third sectors like civil society organizations come in to partially provide such goods, or state institutions at various levels forge partnerships with them to deliver the good or the service. On the other hand, some non-state organizations advocate and demand governments and supranational institutions to provide the service. Thus, in migration governance, we see the active involvement of migrant groups, non-government organizations, trade unions, research institutions, among others.

11.6.3 The Emerging Multi-level and Multi-stakeholder Governance in ASEAN

Accordingly, the ASEAN multi-level migration governance can be characterized by various levels of state governance, participation and influence of non-state actors in policy areas, and partnerships across and between sectors. The latter characteristic should be highlighted. At the various levels of governance, non-state stakeholders have been actively involved in searching for possible resolutions and actions on migration issues and have partnered with government institutions and other civil society groups. The table below specifies the various levels and actors in the emergent migration governance in ASEAN (Table 11.13).

Important in such multi-level and multi-polar migration governance are the following:

First, these multi-level migration approaches should be promoted and recognized officially by ASEAN so that awareness-raising on migration and development will be greatly enhanced at various levels (a "let a hundred flowers bloom" strategy). A

Table 11.13 Levels of migration governance in ASEAN

Level of governance	Migration policy and program area	Actors/institutions	Key activities	Examples
Global	Migration and Development	Multilateral and bilateral institutions, governments, civil society, private sector	Biannual conference; panels on good practices, key migration issues	Global forum on migration and development
Regional	Migrant workers' rights	Governments	Framework agreement, information sharing	ASEAN framework agreement on the protection of migrant workers rights (2007); repository Matrix of legislations and policies on migrant workers in AMS (2012)
Regional	Child trafficking	ASEAN Secretariat, governments, civil society	Regional framework and declaration, implementation mechanism, networking among NGOs	2004 ASEAN declaration against trafficking in persons particularly women and children; 2007 ASEAN practitioner guidelines on effective criminal justice responses to trafficking in persons, establishment of ASEAN convention on trafficking in persons (ACTIP)
Regional	Various migration and development issues	Multilateral and bilateral institutions, governments, civil society, private sector	Consultative conferences—sharing of possible resolutions, good practices	Regional consultative processes organized by IOM
Regional	Migrant workers' rights	Multilateral and bilateral institutions, governments, civil society	Conferences	ASEAN forum on migrant labour
Regional	Various migration and development issues	Civil society	Networking and advocacy	ASEAN task force on migrant workers
Sub-regional	Child trafficking	Government	Formulating regional strategies and high-level policy dialogue and by linking regional response through individual national plans of action.	Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against trafficking (COMMIT)
Sub-regional	Capacity Building	Governments	Seminars and workshops	Mekong institute

Table 11.13 (continued)

Level of governance	Migration policy and program area	Actors/institutions	Key activities	Examples
Sub-regional	Various migration and development issues	Civil society sector—NGOs, academe, FBOs, etc.	Policy research advocacy	Mekong migration network
Bilateral	Migration management	Governments	Negotiations and Implementation mechanisms	Bilateral agreements on migrant protection, employment terms, social security, etc
National/local	Migration management	Government	Regulations, policies	Philippine and Indonesian agencies (POEA, BKPM) Singapore (MOM)
	Various migration and development issues	Civil society—NGOs, academe, migrant organizations	Policy research and advocacy, financial literacy, etc.	

multi-level approach may also enhance the principles of equity, partnership, participation and transparency in governance.

Second, its effectiveness will depend on how these multi-centric and multi-actor approaches will be linked to each other. All these should lead to policy convergence (or policy cohesion) either at the regional or sub-regional level. Various convergence or coordination mechanisms and initiatives must be established to achieve this goal. For example, a core of leading key migration institutions (a state agency, a regional non-government organization) should be able to jointly organize an official venue or mechanism for updating and sharing information on what is happening at the various levels and centers (e.g., an ASEAN Multi-stakeholder Summit on Migration). A common annual theme or action campaign at various levels may also be advanced for a certain time period to be able to focus. In the end, all these inputs must be considered in the deliberations of the official policymaking processes.

Third, the ASEAN Track 1 process through its secretariat involved in migration issues should always be at the very least aware of what is happening at various levels and at most, must be linked to these diverse initiatives. The ASEAN secretariat and the established committees (e.g., the ACMW) are key coordinators in this regard. Effective networking will also be strategic.

Fourth, given the advantages of the Internet and social media, an active web portal for information on migration issues, databases, events, links and related research may be jointly established by key regional institutions supported by development partners. Various stakeholders must be able upload updated information regularly.

11.6.4   The Level Which Would Immediately Benefit the Migrant Workers

Which level (or levels of governance) is most useful and beneficial for migrant workers themselves? This may depend on the issue or policy area. However, for the welfare of unskilled workers and for their actual work terms and the legalization of status, bilateral agreements between states (Battistella and Khadria 2011; Go 2007) and bipartite agreements between the private sectors of receiving and sending countries (Orbeta 2013) may play key roles, as various studies have shown. Successful bilateral agreements are based on the recognition that migration of such workers will redound to the benefits of the negotiating countries.

Unilateral policies related to the management of the migration process, which includes regulations on the recruitment industry, training programs for departing workers, oversight on the terms and conditions in the labor contract, and grievance systems, will be critical for migrant workers. Various unilateral strategies are also used when sending states find it difficult to negotiate bilateral agreements. Examples include laws specifying joint liabilities of foreign and local recruiters, deployment bans to selected countries, formulation of standard and model employment contracts (Go 2007).

A regional level framework for standards and rights should also be helpful only if all member countries ratify and if effective implementation and monitoring mechanisms are established. The Declaration was a good starting point for a regional framework but since then, everyone has been waiting for an instrument to be finally adopted by the member countries.

11.7 Conclusions and Further Recommendations

The paper has discussed the progress of ASEAN towards building an Economic Community and its possible impact on labor migration. The process of deepening regional integration in ASEAN will undoubtedly create more economic growth, but development will still be diverse. While complete liberalization of labor mobility will not be foreseen in the short and medium term, skilled and unskilled migration will definitely increase as the benefits from trade liberalization of goods and services are reaped by member countries. These benefits plus developments emanating from integration like better infrastructure and connectivity, visa facilitation and region-wide supply chains will help induce further migration of all types in the region. Thus, various issues and concerns will continue to hound ASEAN as multi-level approaches to the governance of migration emerge. Multi-level and multistakeholder governance initiatives will hopefully translate into policy convergences in the resolution of key migration issues at various levels. The following are some possible recommendations to help reach convergence:

11.7.1 Promoting Multi-level Migration Governance in a Deepening Regional Integration

As mentioned above, migration of both skilled and unskilled workers will continue whether official or irregular. Issues concerning the rights of migrant workers will continue to confront ASEAN and it is but proper for key stakeholders, both state and non-state, in the region to respond. As long as the various actors agree that good migration governance at all levels will be key to ASEAN's development as a caring community, multi-level approaches should eventually lead to convergence in some policy and program areas in the near future. Thus, it is imperative to increase awareness in ASEAN that migration will positively contribute to the development of the whole region and its people, and that multi-level action and response should encouraged.

11.7.2 Phasing of Labor Mobility Liberalization

The AEC's ultimate goal is development convergence among member countries and economic integration is definitely one key strategy. While liberalization of labor

started only with skilled professionals, during the process of integration, select un-skilled or semi-skilled workers may also be needed by labor shortage member countries. Bilateral or sub-regional agreements may be able to respond to this situation. Thus, as economic integration deepens, member countries must evolve sub-regional and bilateral agreements on the movement of skilled and semi-skilled labor, being conscious of the fact that benefits are win-win. Eventually with economic development convergence in the long run, a complete free flow of labor maybe realized. The phasing of labor mobility liberalization in the integration process must emanate from the acceptance that productive labor across member countries is an important component in the process of building the ASEAN community.

11.7.3 Promoting Models of Bilateral Agreements

There is a need for documentation and sharing of information on good practices in negotiating different types of bilateral agreements especially on social security and protection. Model agreements and even model contracts can also be made available in a web portal on ASEAN migration for both sending and receiving countries to help them craft their own.

11.7.4 Strengthening Sub-regional Migration Governance Mechanisms Especially in BIMP-EAGA

Many migration issues and problems in ASEAN occur at the three migration sub-systems. Thus, it is at this level where solutions and possible agreements must also be made. It is important to note that in the Greater Mekong Sub-region, there are already various active modes of governance with state and non-state actors. However, in BIMP-EAGA, issues of migration have been predominant in the last few years but institutional responses have been few or almost non-existent. Thus, there might be a need to initiate new mechanisms or strengthen existing institutions addressing migration in this sub-region.

11.7.5 Finishing and Adopting the Instrument for the Declaration on Migrant Workers' Rights

So many years after the Declaration on Migrant Workers' Rights, there is a need to finalize the corresponding instrument for its implementation. Civil society groups in the region have coordinated among themselves through the ASEAN Task Force on Migrant Workers to draft a comprehensive instrument as input to the official process. The governments of the Philippines and Indonesia have also drafted their own version. More inputs from different actors emanating from various venues may help in forging consensus for the Instrument.

11.7.6   Strengthening the Network of Civil Society and Private Sector Groups and Their Link to the ASEAN Secretariat and Governments of AMS

Finally, an important characteristic of multi-level governance is the active participation of non-state actors. ASEAN must continually recognize the important role of civil society and the private sector in managing migration issues at various levels. It is also important that these sectors have access or channels to officials and state institutions (at various levels) involved in migration issues. For civil society, there are already many institutions and avenues existing for tackling migration issues, e.g., the ASEAN Task Force on Migrant Workers' Rights and the ASEAN Civil Society Conference; and for the private sector, the ASEAN Business Advisory Council and ASEAN SME Advisory Council. The former groups have already been very active in championing the cause of migrant workers while the latter groups will have to engage in region-wide supply chains in a deepening integration scenario. These supply chains will be employing migrant workers from all over ASEAN and will probably partner with foreign investors and investing multinational corporations due to the dynamism of the regional economy.

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Chapter 12
The Determinants of Migration: In Search of Turning Points

Philip L. Martin

12.1 Introduction

The number of international migrants, persons outside their country of birth a year or more, doubled between 1980 and 2010, from 103 to 214 million (UN DESA 2011). However, the share of the world's people who are international migrants has remained at about three percent over the past half century despite factors that might have been expected to increase migration, including persisting demographic and economic inequalities between countries at a time when globalization is making it easier for people to learn about opportunities abroad and cheaper to travel and take advantage of them.

International migration is the exception, not the rule. The number one form of migration control is inertia—most people do not want to move away from family and friends. Second, governments have significant capacity to regulate migration, and they do, with passports, visas, and border and interior controls. One item considered by many established governments when deciding whether to recognize a new entity that declares itself a nation-state is whether it is able to regulate who crosses and remains within its borders.

The number of international migrants is likely to increase for reasons that range from persisting demographic and economic inequalities to revolutions in communications and transportation that increase mobility. There are also more borders to cross. There were 193 generally recognized nation-states in 2000, four times more than the 43 in 1900 (Lemert 2005, p. 176).[1] Each nation-state distinguishes citizens and foreigners, has border controls to inspect those seeking entry, and determines what foreigners can do while inside the country, whether they are tourists, students, guest workers, or immigrants.

The first step to make migration a manageable challenge is to understand how globalization in a world of persisting differences encourages more migration. The

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[1] Lemert (2005, p. 176) says there were fewer than 50 generally recognized nation states in 1900.

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challenge is to manage international labor migration in ways that reduce the differences that encourage people to cross borders over time.

12.2 Labor Migration and Economic Development

There are millions of workers in developing countries who would like to move to higher-wage countries to earn in 1 h what they earn in a day or a week at home. Should higher-wage countries open their doors wider to workers from lower-wage countries? Would the result of more international migration be a so-called triple win: migrants would get higher wages, receiving country employers and societies would get jobs filled at lower wages than the alternatives, and sending countries would benefit from the spending of remittances and the return of workers with skills and motivations acquired abroad?

The World Bank and many economists who want to promote economic development answer these questions with a resounding yes, arguing that migration can reduce poverty and speed up development in migrant-sending countries (Pritchett 2006; World Bank 2006; UNDP 2009). These organizations and authors believe that more migration from lower to higher income countries is inevitable for many reasons, ranging from globalization to shrinking populations in richer countries while poorer countries have huge cohorts of youth seeking jobs. They call for speeding up the onset of the third wave of globalization—migration, to accompany the free movement of goods (trade) and money (finance), and believe that migration and remittances will act like a rising tide that lifts all boats.

There is no international organization devoted to promoting more migration. One UN organization, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), aims to minimize the number of refugees who need protection from persecution in their countries of citizenship, while another, the International Labor Organization (ILO), seeks to protect migrant and other workers by promoting decent work and labor standards. The absence of an international organization analogous to the World Trade Organization has been lamented by those who wish there were a World Migration Organization to promote more labor migration, since they believe that there will be "too little" migration if it remains the purview of national governments (Ghosh 2000). Some groups of nations, notably the European Union, have added free-movement of labor to free flows of goods and capital within the now 28-nation group and 500 million + residents, but EU member states continue to determine how many and which non-EU foreigners can enter and stay.

There are many advocates of more international migration. Pritchett (2006) argues that more migration would increase global economic output in the same way that freer trade creates more wealth, viz, by allowing countries to specialize in what they can produce relatively cheaper than other countries. Pritchett begins with five forces that promise more international migration, including persisting economic and demographic inequalities, uneven globalization, and the existence of hard-to-trade services such as care of children and the elderly. With globalization reducing

barriers to the movement of goods and services, and revolutions in communications and transportation lowering the cost of information and travel, Pritchett sees liberalizing labor migration as the last frontier in globalization.

It is widely agreed that an ideal world would have few barriers to international migration, and very little unwanted migration. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that there will be very little unwanted migration that allows countries to remove barriers to migration, as within the EU. This is why managing international migration in ways that protect migrants and contribute to development in both countries of origin and destination is an increasingly important global challenge (Abella et al. 2004). If employers recruit workers in another country who would otherwise be unemployed, if these guest workers send home remittances, and if returning migrants use skills learned abroad to raise productivity at home, migration can speed up development. However, if recruitment takes needed workers out of the country, if remittances are few or are spent in ways that generate few new jobs, and if migrants settle abroad or return only to rest and retire, migration may increase over time.

The fact that there is no automatic link between migration and development makes "turning points" in migration a subject of empirical study. A special issue of the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* in 1994 examined migration turning points generally and in particular countries. Fields (1994) attributed the relatively quick transition from sending workers abroad to importing labor in Korea and Taiwan to a combination of export-led growth policies and well-integrated labor markets. Local and foreign investments created manufacturing jobs that paid wages slightly higher than wages in agriculture, attracting rural-urban migrants to factories, and this rural-urban migration transmitted the benefits of export-led growth to those who remained in farming, where wages rose as the farm workforce shrank.

Starting points matter. Fields emphasized that in Asian Tiger economies, non-farm wages were only 20% higher than in farming, not the 100% or more in some African and Latin American countries with dual or segmented labor markets. Eng Fong (1994) used a migration hump approach to show labor migration first increasing with development and later decreasing as population growth slowed. Country studies emphasized unique features, but all highlighted the importance of export-led growth to create factory jobs that attracted rural workers.

If migration opens a window of opportunity for the poorer countries that send migrants abroad, why does international migration seem to speed economic development in some countries but not in others? Governments have since 2006 debated this question at the Global Forum on Migration and Development, but have done more to clarify the questions rather than provide answers (Martin and Abella 2009).

The 3 Rs summarize the impacts that migrants can have on the development of their countries of origin:

- Recruitment deals with who migrates. Are migrants persons who would have been unemployed or underemployed at home, or key employees of business and government whose departure leads to layoffs, reduced services, and more emigration pressures?
- Remittances to developing countries exceeded US$ 1 billion a day in 2012. Can the volume of remittances be increased if more migrants cross borders? How can the cost of transferring small sums between countries be reduced, so that more

money is received in migrant-sending countries? Once remittances arrive, are they spent to improve the education and health of children in migrant families or do they fuel competition for fixed assets, as when land or dowry prices rise?

- Returns refer to migrants who come back to their countries of origin. Do returning migrants bring back new technologies and ideas and stay? Do they circulate between home and abroad, or do they return to rest and retire?

The effects of the 3 Rs on the economic differences between countries that prompt economically motivated migration are not uniform, one reason why the link between migration and development is often described as uncertain or unsettled (Skeldon 1997, 2008; Papademetriou and Martin 1991). Economically motivated migration can set in motion virtuous circles that reduce migration in the future, as when young workers who would have been unemployed at home find jobs that pay higher-than-average wages abroad, send home remittances that reduce poverty and are invested to accelerate economic and job growth, and return with new skills and technologies that lead to new industries and jobs. The result is a convergence in economic conditions between sending and receiving areas as predicted by the factor-price equalization theorem, which holds that trade in goods or migration of workers can reduce economic differences between countries.[2]

The alternative vicious circle between more migration and slower or stalled development, and thus ever more emigration pressure, can unfold if employed nurses, teachers or engineers are recruited for overseas jobs, so that the quality and accessibility of health care and schooling declines in migrant-sending areas or factories lay off workers for lack of key managers. In the vicious circle, migrants abroad do not send home significant remittances, or send home remittances that have adverse effects such as pushing up the value of the currency and choking off exports or fuelling inflation rather than creating new jobs. Migrants abroad do not return, or return only to rest and retire, so that there is only a limited transfer of new ideas, energies, and entrepreneurial abilities from richer to poorer countries. In the vicious circle, more migration can slow development and increase emigration pressure.

12.3 Recruitment

Migration is not random: young people are most likely to move over borders because they have "invested" the least in jobs and careers at home and have the longest period to recoup their "investment in migration" abroad. However, even among young people, exactly who migrates is heavily shaped by the recruitment efforts

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[2] The factor-price equalization theorem assumes that there are two countries, C1 and C2, with two goods, G1 and G2, produced by two inputs, capital and labor (Mundell 1957). If G1 is capital intensive and G2 is labor intensive, and the price of capital relative to labor, R/W, is lower in C1 than in C2, C1 is the capital–intensive country and C-2 is the labor-intensive country. Countries export primarily commodities that require intensive use of the relatively cheaper factor, so that C1 should export mostly G1 to C2, while C2 exports G2 to C1, narrowing the costs of capital and labor in the two trading countries. With wage differences narrowing, there is less economic incentive to migrate from the lower to the higher-wage country, that is, trade is a substitute for migration

of foreign employers and recruiting agents and governments in sending areas or networks that link migrants settled abroad with friends or relatives at home. For example, if foreign employers are hiring IT professionals and nurses, institutions may evolve to train computer specialists and nurses to the specifications of foreign employers and help them to move abroad to fill jobs. Alternatively, if foreign employers recruit domestic helpers and farm workers, institutions will evolve to move low-skilled migrants over borders.

The recruitment of migrants has been concentrated at the top and bottom of the education ladder, that is, as employers sought workers with college degrees and low-skilled migrants. The recruitment of well-educated professional workers is generally done openly, as employers and their agents recruit nurses, IT specialists, and teachers.

Indian IT is an example of a virtuous circle migration and development circle. India had only 7000 IT specialists in the mid-1980s, according to the Indian software association, NASSCOM (www.nasscom.in), but multinationals recognized their skills and recruited more for their operations outside India. Institutions developed to train more Indians for IT work, and brokers to find them foreign jobs. Some Indians who had been abroad returned with contracts to provide computer services to the firms that had employed them abroad. The Indian government supported the nascent IT-outsourcing industry by reducing barriers to imports of computers, upgraded the communications infrastructure, and allowed the state-supported Indian Institutes of Technologies to set quality benchmarks for IT education in India.

Employing Indians in India to do computer work for clients abroad had important spillover effects in India. The expanding outsourcing industry pressured the government to improve India's electricity and telecommunications infrastructure, promoted the use of merit-based selection systems in higher education and employment, and hastened the improvement of IT services in India, since Indian firms that served clients abroad could offer the same world-class services at home. The virtuous circle was completed with a sharp jump in enrollment in science and engineering schools, making India a leading provider of IT specialists and services (Heeks 1996).

By contrast, the recruitment of African doctors and nurses by hospitals in former colonial powers may have set in motion a vicious circle of poorer health care that slows development in migrant-sending countries. Many African countries retain colonial-era education systems, so that doctors and nurses are trained to colonial-power standards. Financially strained health care systems often find it hard to lure doctors and nurses to poorer rural areas, and some require medical graduates who received government support for their education to serve a year or two in underserved rural areas before receiving their medical licenses. The result may be a bad experience that prompts many newly licensed health care professionals to leave Africa.

Health care is a peculiar sector. Governments strongly influence the demand for health care professionals via the building of hospitals and setting charges for patients and drugs, and influence the supply of health care workers by subsiding the training of medical professionals, regulating the issuance of credentials, and setting or influencing the salaries and working conditions of health care workers.

Many health care workers trained in African countries leave for higher wages and more opportunities elsewhere. For example, half or more of the doctors and nurses who were trained in Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique were abroad in 2005 (Clemons and Pettersson 2008).

How should governments respond to the exit of health care workers that can set in motion vicious circles between migration and development? Governmental efforts to limit the emigration of health care professionals may not be the proper response to an inadequate wage and lack of decent work in underserved rural areas, since barriers to out-migration interfere with personal rights and may be evaded. They may also aim at the wrong target, since the number of trained nurses in the country but not employed in nursing exceeds estimates of nursing shortages in many African countries (Clemons and Pettersson 2008).

One response is ethical recruitment codes. The World Health Organization, which estimated a shortage of 4.3 million health care workers in 40 sub-Saharan African countries in 2008, developed a best-practice code to regulate the recruitment of African health care professionals by health care institutions in richer countries that calls for recruitment MOUs between the governments of countries sending and receiving health care workers. These MOUs encourage richer-country governments to subsidize training of more health care workers in emigration countries (Connell 2010).

Demanding compensation is another response. Jamaica has one of the world's highest rates of outmigration among professionals, including health care professionals. Three-fourths of Jamaican university graduates have emigrated, and "migration fever" is reportedly common among university students who assume that they will earn higher wages and have better working conditions abroad.[3] Minister of Foreign Trade Anthony Hylton called for "bilateral and multilateral arrangements with countries like England and the United States, so that they pay at least a part of the training cost to the government for recruiting people that we have trained and will not necessarily benefit from their service,"[4] but has not won compensation from the countries in which Jamaicans work.

On the other hand, some governments encourage their professionals to emigrate, as when the Filipino government opens new markets for its health care workers abroad. There are several key differences between the Philippines and countries seeking compensation for their professionals employed abroad, including the fact that nursing education in the Philippines is often financed privately, so that individuals rather than governments invest in education for foreign employment. Some 6500–7000 nurses a year graduate from Filipino nursing schools, and many plan to go abroad for better pay, more professional opportunities, and to be near relatives.[5]

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[3] Jamaica has replaced some of its emigrant health care workers with Cubans.

[4] Quoted in Migration News (2001). Latin America. 8(10), October. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2468_0_2_0.

[5] The Philippines Nurses Association Inc. (PNA) estimated in 2002 that 150,885 Filipino nurses were abroad, and noted that experienced nurses with specialty training were most in demand overseas.

Pay for Filipino nurses abroad was reported to be US$ 3000–4000 a month in 2003, versus US$ 170 a month in urban areas and US$ 75–95 a month in rural areas of the Philippines,[6] prompting private recruiters to compete to match Filipino nurses with foreign jobs.[7] The government professes little concern. Then-Labor Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas in 2002 said that nurses are "the new growth area for overseas employment," and that Filipinos have a comparative advantage in health care because of their care-giving skills and English. She said: "we won't lose nurses. The older ones, those in their mid-40 s, are not likely to leave. Besides, the student population reacts to markets quickly. Enrollment is high. We won't lack nurses."[8]

Instead of heath care professionals emigrating to provide services, some countries are attracting foreign patients to hospitals that provide high-quality care at lower-than-home-country prices. Health tourism, what the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) deems Mode 2 provision of services,[9] brings patients to health care workers rather than moving health care workers over borders to patients, putting the emphasis on decent work in what could otherwise be migrant-sending countries. India, in January 2004, created a task force to "assess the opportunities for promoting India as a health destination,"[10] while the Malaysian government called "health tourism" a growth industry and supports its expansion.[11]

IT and health care migrants raise issues at the top of the job ladder, while domestic workers, laborers, and most other migrant workers are nearer the bottom of the job ladder. Most lower-skilled workers find foreign jobs with the help of for-profit recruiters who often charge workers for their job-matching services (Martin 2012). Migrants, employers, and governments want low recruitment costs and good worker-job matches so that migrant workers are in the "right" jobs abroad, satisfying employers and achieving savings targets without overstaying or taking second jobs. However, recruiters may not have the same low-recruitment costs and good worker-job matching incentives.

ILO conventions call for employers to pay all of the recruitment costs of the migrant workers they hire and for governments to operate no-fee labor exchanges. C181 (1997) on private employment agencies allows governments to create

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[6] Since it is easiest to go abroad as a nurse, some Filipino doctors, who earn US$ 300–800 a month, are reportedly retraining as nurses so they can emigrate.

[7] For example, one agency promises Filipino nurses that their US hospital employers will sponsor them for immigrant visas (www.nursestousa.com/).

[8] Quoted in Migration News (2002). Southeast Asia. 9 (6), June. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2650_0_3_0.

[9] Trade in services, which are often produced and consumed simultaneously, as with haircuts, and sometimes change the consumer, totaled US$ 4.1 trillion in 2011. There are four major modes or ways to provide services across national borders: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, foreign direct investment (FDI) or commercial presence, and Mode 4 migration, which the GATS refers to as the temporary movement of "natural persons." Mode 4 remittances are about US$ 200 billion a year, less than six percent of total trade in services.

[10] "Govt Sets Up Task Force On Health Tourism," Financial Express, 11 January 2004.

[11] About 60 % of foreigners who seek treatment in Malaysia are from Indonesia. In October 2003, the Health Ministry set fees for three packages priced between RM450 and RM1,150, and recommended floor and ceiling prices for 18 procedures. ("Robust growth in revenue for health tourism sector," Business Times (Malaysia), 4 February 2004.)

exceptions to Article 7's statement that "Private employment agencies shall not charge directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs to workers." Some governments set maximum recruitment charges that are a fraction of foreign earnings, such as setting maximum recruitment charges at a month's foreign earnings, which is 4.2 % of earnings under a two-year contract and 2.8 % under a three-year contract.

Many migrants report paying far more in recruitment costs, up to a third of what they will earn abroad, or \$ 2000 for a three-year contract paying US\$ 200 a month or US\$ 7200 while abroad. However, layers of agents and intermediaries between official recruiters and migrant workers make it hard to measure recruitment costs accurately, including financial costs for passports, visas, and health checks. There are also opportunity costs when migrants must travel to capital cities to complete exit procedures or participate in pre-departure orientation and training, since workers cannot earn wages while preparing to go abroad. Measuring migration or recruitment costs accurately is the first step to reduce them.

12.4 Remittances

Remittances to developing countries were US\$ 406 billion in 2012. Remittances are projected to increase by US\$ 40 billion a year to reach US\$ 534 billion by 2014. Remittances to developing countries have risen with the number of migrants, and surpassed official development assistance in the mid-1990s. Unlike foreign direct investment and private capital flows, remittances were stable during the 2008–2009 recession, while FDI and private capital flows to developing countries fell sharply (Sirkeci et al. 2012).

Remittances have two major components: workers' remittances, the wages and salaries that are sent home by migrants abroad 12 months or more, and compensation of employees (called labor income until 1995), the wages and benefits of migrants abroad less than 12 months.[12] Many countries do not know how long the migrants who remit funds have been abroad, so most analyses combine workers remittances and compensation of employees. For example, Mexico reports most money inflows under worker remittances, while the Philippines reports most under compensation of employees. The volume of remittances depends on the number of migrants, their earnings abroad, and their willingness to send money home.

A handful of developing countries receive most remittances (World Bank 2012). India received an estimated US\$ 69 billion in 2012, China US\$ 60 billion, the Philippines US\$ 24 billion, Mexico US\$ 23 billion, and Nigeria and Egypt, US\$ 21 billion each. Bangladesh and Pakistan received US\$ 14 billion each, followed by Vietnam with US\$ 10 billion and Lebanon with US\$ 7 billion. Remittances are the

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[12] A third item not generally included in discussions of remittances are migrants' transfers, the net worth of migrants who move from one country to another.For example, if a person with stock migrates from one country to another, the value of the stock owned moves from one country to another in international accounts.

largest share of the economy in a diverse group of countries, including ex-USSR countries whose Soviet industries collapsed, such as Tajikistan (remittances equivalent to 47 % of GDP) and Moldova (23 % ; island countries such as Tonga and Samoa; and Central American countries with large diasporas in the United States, including Honduras and El Salvador.

Studies agree that the best way to maximize the volume of remittances is to have an appropriate exchange rate and economic policies that promise growth. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorism attacks, many governments have tried to shift remittances from informal to formal channels, that is, to encourage migrants to remit via regulated financial institutions such as banks. Migrants have demonstrated a willingness to transfer money via formal channels, especially if it is easy and cheap to do so, but this usually requires banking outlets in migrant communities at home and abroad and competition to lower transfer costs.

The cost of sending small sums over borders can be 10 % of the amount transferred, or US$ 20 to send US$ 200. The G8 and G20 countries pledged to promote cooperation between migrant-sending and –receiving countries to reduce remittance costs, and the 5×5 program aims to reduce remittance costs by five percentage points within 5 years. However, remittance costs are still considered too high, averaging 7.5 % in 2012 in the 20 largest bilateral remittance corridors (World Bank 2012).

The US-Mexico remittance market is unregulated, in the sense that Mexicans in the US decide how much to remit. Several Asian countries, by contrast, tried to specify both the amount of remittances and how migrants remitted. For example, many Korean migrants in the Middle East in the late 1970s were considered employees of their Korean construction company for which they worked in Korea and abroad. Most of their wages were paid in Korean currency to their families in Korea, while the migrants received only a small stipend in local currency.

Korea no longer sends workers abroad, but some of the Chinese and Vietnamese who work abroad remain employees of Chinese and Vietnamese firms at home. Their wages are paid in the same way that Korean migrants were paid, viz, most go to the migrant's family or bank account in the home currency. The Philippines attempted to specify how much should be remitted in the 1980s, but abandoned this forced-remittance policy for most migrants after protests. However, seafarers must remit 80 % of their earnings via the employment or manning agencies that place them on board ships.

Forced-remittance programs are unpopular with migrants. Migrants from Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Lucia and Dominica have worked on US farms since 1943 under the auspices of the British West Indies Central Labor Organization (BWICLO), which charged migrants 5 % of what they earned for liaison and other services. BWICLO also required departing migrants to sign contracts that required US employers to deposit 20 % of each worker's earnings in a Jamaican savings bank. Returned migrants complained of difficulty accessing these forced savings, and initially received them with no interest, although protests prompted the Jamaican bank to begin paying interest.

Between 1942 and 1946, Mexican Braceros had 10 % of their earnings sent by US employers directly to the Bank of Mexico. Many of the war-time Braceros say they never received these forced savings after returning to Mexico, and the Mexican

government says it has no records of what happened to the money. Suits filed in the US against Wells Fargo Bank, the US bank that transmitted the funds to Mexico, and the Mexican government led to the creation in 2005 of a fund to pay former Braceros and relatives of late Braceros living in Mexico up to US$ 3500 each.[13]

Governments sometimes use the volume of remittances as a short-hand indicator of migration's effects on development. Remittances can improve the lives of migrants and their families, and their spending can speed growth and job creation, even for non-migrants. Most remittances are used for consumption, helping to explain their stability[14] even as exchange rates and investment outlooks change.

The governments of many migrant-sending countries, including Mexico and the Philippines, acknowledge the important contributions that remittances make to their country's financial stability and development. Mexico has a much touted 3×1 program, with federal, state, and local governments matching each dollar donated by migrants abroad to improve infrastructure in migrant areas of origin (Orozco and Rouse 2007). However, there may be conflicts between migrants abroad who want churches or plazas improved for weddings and celebrations when they return and stay-behind residents who put higher priority on running water or paved streets.

The spending of remittances can generate jobs. Most studies suggest that each US$ 1 in remittances generates a US$ 2–3 increase in economic output as recipients buy locally produced goods or invest in housing, education, or health care, improving the lives of non-migrants via the multiplier effects of remittance spending (Taylor and Martin 2001). The exit of men and women in the prime of their working lives initially reduces output in migrant-sending agricultural areas, but the arrival of remittances can lead to adjustments that maintain or even increase the output of local farms and other businesses. For example, families who lose workers to migration can shift from growing crops to raising less labor-intensive livestock and rent their crop land to other farmers, who may be able to achieve economies of scale on larger production units.

In addition to remittances, migrants can steer FDI to their countries of origin and persuade their foreign employers to buy products from their countries of origin. Having migrants abroad increases travel and tourism between countries, as well as trade in ethnic foods and other home-country items. Migrants abroad may undertake many other activities, including organizing themselves to provide funds for political parties and candidates. Many of these activities are informally organized, making it difficult to ascertain their volume and impacts.

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[13] The Mexican government, without admitting it lost the 10% of Bracero wages withheld by employers and sent via banks to Mexico, agreed in 2005 to pay US$ 3,500 in compensation to Braceros living in Mexico. However, only 49,000 of the 212,000 Mexican applicants could provide the required documentation to receive payments. Rural Migration News (2009). H-2 A Re-Engineering, Braceros. Volume 15 Number 1 January. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=1408_0_4_0.

[14] Automatic stabilizers in developed countries, such as unemployment insurance, help to stabilize the flow of remittances to developing countries that have the same economic cycles as the countries in which their migrants work.

12.5   Returns

The third R in the migration and development equation is returns. There is no auto-matic relationship to ensure that more migration generates faster development. In vir-tuous circles, returning migrants provide the energy, ideas, and entrepreneurial vigor to start or expand businesses at home. Alternatively, returned migrants can work at home, using the skills and discipline acquired abroad to raise productivity in sending country factories and businesses. Migrants are generally drawn from the ranks of the risk takers at home, and if their new capital is combined with risk-taking behavior upon their return, the result can be a new impetus for economic development.

On the other hand, if migrants settle abroad and cut ties to their countries of origin, remittances may decline and migrant human capital may be "lost" to the country of origin. Migrants may return only to rest and retire, which could limit the effect of returned migrants on development. The third possibility is for migrants to circulate between sending and receiving areas. Under some circumstances, back-and-forth movement can increase trade and other links between countries and con-tribute to economic growth in both.

It is often hard to isolate the effect of migration in a country that switches from being a labor sender to a labor-receiver. Taiwan provides an example. The govern-ment invested most of its educational resources in primary and secondary educa-tion in the 1970s, so Taiwanese seeking higher education often went abroad for advanced study, and over 90% of those who earned PhDs remained overseas de-spite rapid economic growth in Taiwan.[15] During the 1980s, even before the end of martial law, some of these Taiwanese PhDs abroad began to return, while others maintained "homes" in North America and spent so much time commuting to Tai-wan that they were called "astronauts."

The government provided incentives to attract Taiwanese scientists and engi-neers abroad, including subsidized Western-style housing. For example, the Hin-schu Science-based Industrial Park was created in 1980 to develop a Taiwanese rival to Silicon Valley. Hinschu was soon a major success, employing over 100,000 workers in 300 companies with sales of US$ 28 billion by 2000 (Luo and Wang 2002), when 40% of Hinschu's companies were headed by returned overseas mi-grants. The targeting of PhD holders was also successful: 10% of the 4,100 returned migrants employed in the park had PhD degrees.

Taiwan's experience suggests that investing heavily in the type of education ap-propriate to the stage of economic development, and tapping the "brain reserve over-seas" when the country's economy demands more brainpower, can be a successful development strategy. Then-Chinese leader Premier Zhao Ziyang called Chinese abroad "stored brainpower overseas," and encouraged Chinese cities to offer finan-cial subsidies to encourage them to return home. Many cities responded with "Re-turning Student Entrepreneur Buildings"[16] to attract Chinese professionals home.

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[15] These students were highly motivated to pursue advanced studies.Before they could go abroad, they had to complete two years of military service and obtain private or overseas financing.

[16] Shanghai reportedly has 30,000 returned professionals, 90% with MS or PhD degrees earned abroad, who are employed or starting businesses (Kaufman, Jonathan, "China Reforms Bring

The poorest countries pose the largest challenge to encouraging returns. Several international organizations, including the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Development Program, operate return-of-talent programs that subsidize the transportation and living costs of professionals abroad who agree to return and work in government or academic institutions. Many of the professionals involved in these return-of-talent programs have an immigrant or long-term secure status abroad and remain in their country of origin only a year or two. Sussex University's Richard Black called subsidized return-of-talent programs "expensive failures" because they do not result in the "investment that [return] should bring."[17] However, in later analyses, Black has softened this conclusion to "there is much uncertainty about the impacts of migration and return on development (Ammassari and Black 2001, p. 40). It is clear that the subsidized return of professionals can help to spur inclusive development, but the evidence is mixed.

Even if migrants do not return, they could contribute to development in their countries of origin. Many analysts point to the potential of "circular migration" to speed development, or hope that migrants settled abroad can initiate or speed diaspora-led development at home by promoting trade links with and investments in their countries of origin. Migrant-sending governments can foster what Bhagwati (2003) called a diaspora model of development by forging links to their citizens abroad via dual nationality or dual citizenship to "integrate past and present citizens into a web of rights and obligations in the extended community defined with the home country as the center." Bhagwati is well-known for urging migrant-receiving countries to share some of the taxes paid by migrants with migrant countries of origin.

Migrants abroad can also send home "political" remittances, such as ideas that help to speed up development by breaking down gender and other stereotypes that limit the education of girls or restrict women in the workplace (Levitt 1998). Migration exposes people to new opportunities as well as new ideas. Levitt and other researchers focus on how migrants moving from poorer to richer countries transmit ideas that increase the emphasis in their countries on the importance of hard work, education, and savings and investment.

There are also limitations of diaspora-led development. There are many proposals but few concrete examples of migrants and diasporas formally advising or serving in the governments of their countries of origin. For example, some of the Mexicans who migrated to the US were later elected to office in Mexico, but their plans to speed up development were not always well received.[18] Similarly, diasporas may

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Back Executives Schooled in US,"Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2003; Tempest, Rone, "China Tries to Woo Its Tech Talent Back Home," Los Angeles Times, 25 November 2002).

[17] Quoted in Beattie, Alan, "Seeking Consensus on the Benefits of Immigration," Financial Times, 22 July 2002, p. 9.

[18] Andres Bermudez, California's so-called Tomato King, was elected mayor of his 60,000 resident hometown, Jerez, in the state of Zacatecas. He first won the election in 2001, but that victory was set aside because he had not lived in the town for 12 months. The residency requirement was reduced to six months and he was hailed as a binational symbol when he was elected mayor in 2004. He served as mayor for two years before making a failed bid for Mexico's federal congress.

support and fund one side in civil wars and conflicts, as in Sri Lanka, prolonging conflicts that slow development (Orjuela 2008). Governments' fears that the diaspora could favor one side in an internal dispute or conflict is one reason why some governments are reluctant to engage their diasporas.

12.6 Development and Migration: The Migration Hump

Economic theory normally assumes that trade and migration are substitutes, so that freer trade between countries with different wage levels should reduce economic incentives for migration over time as wages in the trading countries converge. As wage differences narrow, low-wage workers have especially fewer incentives to migrate from poorer to richer trading partners. However, trade and the migration of professionals can be complements, meaning that the temporary movement of professionals often increases with more trade and investment. There are several reasons for this, including trade in complex goods and the spread of multinationals that move managers and technical experts to the countries in which they invest and trade.

This distinction between low- and high-skilled workers suggests that freer trade and investment can be a long-run substitute for the migration of low-skilled workers, albeit with a short-run migration hump under some circumstances, while freer trade and investment can be complementary for highly skilled workers. Economic theory and experience thus suggest different policies toward low- and high-skilled migration linked to free-trade agreements, being wary of a migration hump for the low-skilled while facilitating the movement of temporary professionals.

Converging wages or factor-price equalization embodies a number of assumptions that may not hold in particular trading relationships, explaining why "factor-price equalization is a real-world rarity" between low- and high-wage trading partners.[19] A quick look at several of these assumptions in the context of trade and migration between Mexico and the US after NAFTA went into effect in 1994 demonstrates that there can be a migration hump with freer trade (Martin 1993). Canada and the US entered into a free-trade agreement in 1989, so the addition of Mexico with NAFTA in 1994 primarily reduced trade and investment barriers between Mexico and the US at a time when Mexican wages were about an eighth of US wages.

One critical assumption of the standard trade-as-a-substitute-for-migration model is that countries freeing up trade share the same production functions or technologies. However, if the basis for trade is a difference in technologies between countries instead of each country's endowment of capital and labor, migration and

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(Quinones, Sam,"Andres Bermudez Dies at 58; 'Tomato King' and Mexican Officeholder," Los Angeles Times, 8 February 2009)

[19] The Economist, 17 November 2012. www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21566629-liberalising-migration-could-deliver-huge-boost-global-output-border-follies.

trade may be complements, as with the increased Mexico-US migration that accompanied freer trade in corn over the past 2 decades. If tractors plow corn fields in the United States and oxen pull plows in Mexico, traditional trade theory assumes that the reason for this difference is that Mexico has more labor and lower wages, not that tractor technology is unavailable in Mexico. US farmers have higher capital-labor ratios than Mexican farmers in this scenario because capital is cheaper in the US, not because Mexico's rural poor lack access to tractors.

When NAFTA went into effect in 1994, about 30 % of Mexicans were employed in agriculture, and corn was the major crop of over half of Mexico's farmers. Iowa, the leading US corn-producing state, produced twice as much corn as Mexico at about half the price. The Mexican government had tried to reduce rural poverty by offering a higher-than-world price for corn, but this subsidized corn policy benefited primarily larger farmers who produced a surplus to sell, not the small corn farmers who dominated the ranks of Mexico's rural poor.

NAFTA's free-trade provisions required Mexico to reduce protections for its labor-intensive corn-farming sector. Free-trade in corn opened new export markets for capital-intensive US corn farmers, but hastened the demise of labor-intensive Mexican corn farmers, some of whom had migration links to the US at a time when US unemployment was low. One result was the so-called Mexico-US migration hump in the late 1990s, during which trade with Mexico and the migration of low-skilled Mexicans to the US increased together (Martin 1993; Migration News 1995).[20]

As a result of the economic restructuring in especially rural Mexico induced by NAFTA, Fig. 12.1 shows that more Mexicans migrated to the US. This additional migration due to freer trade is shown as the area A, the extra migration due to freer trade that would not have occurred in the absence of NAFTA. However, freer trade and more investment also spur economic growth throughout Mexico, and many of the children of displaced farmers who received more education than their parents found jobs in the factories and businesses that were created due to freer trade and investment. The additional Mexico-US migration associated with freer trade begins to fill after about 15 years, and then falls even further, so that freer trade spurs economic growth in migrant-sending areas and results in less (unauthorized) migration over time.

The migration hump was used as an argument for and against approval of NAFTA. The unions opposing NAFTA pointed to the prospect of more unauthorized migration as a reason to vote against NAFTA, while trade specialists and President Clinton argued that freer trade and investment was the only policy that would stimulate the economic growth needed to reduce unwanted Mexico-US migration over time.

There are about 12 million Mexican-born US residents in 2012, including eight million Mexican-born workers in the US labor force, but net Mexico-US migration fell to zero between 2005 and 2010, as the number of Mexicans returning to Mexico matched new Mexican entries to the US, according to the Mexican census. These data suggest that Mexico-US migration has reached point B in the figure, and at roughly the 15-year mark projected by Martin (1993).

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[20] A million Mexicans lost jobs in 1995, and two-thirds of the Mexican farmers questioned in one survey reported that their incomes had been reduced by a NAFTA-induced influx of corn, processed meat and milk products that lowered the prices they received for farm products in Mexico. An estimated 800,000 Mexicans entered the US, mostly illegally, in 1995.

Fig. 12.1 Mexico-US migration hump under NAFTA

A second reason why trade may not be a substitute for migration between low- and high-wage countries is because the differences in factor productivity that lie at the core of comparative advantage may arise from infrastructure and other public goods rather than factor endowments. In an extreme case, a labor-intensive country such as Mexico may not have a comparative advantage in producing some labor-intensive goods despite low wages because a lagging infrastructure makes it too expensive to get inputs to available workers and finished products out of the country.

In such cases, it can be more efficient for US producers of labor-intensive goods to import low-wage Mexican workers and take advantage of the superior US infrastructure, so that migration increases alongside trade. This happened in the 1980s, when Mexican shoe workers moved to Los Angeles, US shoe production increased, and Mexican shoe exports fell despite a peso devaluation that should have increased Mexican exports. Migration turned into a continuing complement to freer trade in this case because of economies of scale, as increased shoe production in Los Angeles lowered costs of production and encouraged expansion.

Increasing the productivity of workers in lower wage countries by moving them into higher-wage countries to take advantage of more private capital and better public infrastructure is the basis of estimates that removing barriers to migration would raise world GDP significantly (Winters et al. 2002; Klein and Ventura 2007). For example, one estimate concluded that moving more of the 2.7 billion workers in developing countries to industrial countries, which currently have 600 million workers, would raise the average wage of migrants by US$ 7000 and increase global GDP by 30 % or US$ 21 trillion.[21]

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[21] Estimate of Sharon Mutant of the University of Warwick noted in The Economist, 17 November 2012. www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21566629-liberalising-migration-could-deliver-huge-boost-global-output-border-follies.

There are several other reasons why low-skilled migration and trade can be complements, including non-instantaneous adjustments, imperfect markets, and migration networks. Trade models normally assume that adjustments to the dislocations that can accompany freer trade are instantaneous and costless. In the case of NAFTA, the displacement of corn farmers associated with freer trade occurred in western and southern Mexico, while freer trade with the US created jobs in northern Mexican factories that often imported components, assembled finished goods, and re-exported them. The Mexican farmers displaced by freer trade in agricultural commodities were older men with little education, while the border-area maquiladora factories that expanded in the wake of NAFTA hired mostly young Mexican women who had just completed secondary school. Displaced farmers who could not easily find jobs in these expanding Mexican factories contributed to rising Mexico-US migration during the past 2 decades.

Standard trade models also assume that there are complete markets with perfect information and no transactions costs. Rural areas in Mexico and other low-wage countries often lack well-functioning banking and insurance markets, making it hard for farmers wanting to take advantage of new opportunities that are opened by freer trade to obtain capital to expand or experiment with new crops that may become more profitable with the opening of new markets. In such cases, migration to a higher-wage country may provide the fastest way to obtain additional capital or to cope with natural and other disasters. Surveys of Mexican migrants in the US typically find that a significant share of young men migrated north in order to earn the money needed to repay loans that were incurred by their families to deal with health and similar emergencies.

Trade and migration can be complements for other reasons as well, including transactions costs. Transactions costs include information and transportation costs, which can fall faster if increased trade and migration lowers them faster at a faster pace. For example, closer economic integration can lower the cost of communication between two countries by increasing the density of communication networks and number of translators and bilingual residents. More trade and investment can also add transport links that lower transportation costs for ever larger flows of goods and people.

The so-called new economics of labor migration has developed other reasons why migration may increase alongside more trade and rising incomes in the poorer country (Taylor and Martin 2001). One such reason is relative deprivation, as occurs when a successful migrant returns from work abroad and uses savings to buy a television or household appliances, encouraging other families to encourage household youth to go abroad and send home remittances so that they too can afford these items.

The literature on freer trade and low-skilled trade imagines workers moving from one country to another and settling, potentially raising the cost of providing social safety net services in receiving countries. US studies conclude that immigrants with less than a high-school education upon arrival have a negative present value when computing the value of the taxes they and their children and grandchildren pay

compared to the cost of the tax-supported benefits they are likely to receive over their lifetimes, even assuming that the children and grandchildren of immigrants have the same earnings and benefit behavior as other US-born children (Smith and Edmonston 1997).[22]

There is a positive correlation between the volume of trade with a country and the number of business-related admissions to the United States, especially of foreigners arriving with the E, H, L, or TN visas that are often held by professionals. For example, in 2004, Canada and Mexico, the top two trading partners of the United States that together accounted for 31 % of US trade worth US$ 2.3 trillion in 2004, also together accounted for 22 % of the 1.2 million entries of foreigners with E, H, L, or TN visas in 2004 (Wasem 2007, Table 12.1). Note that a visa holder admitted several times within 1 year generates multiple entries or admissions in these admissions data.[23]

There are three major reasons why freer trade and investment are associated with more high-skilled professionals: complex goods, movements linked to multinational corporations, and foreign investment. First, increased trade in complex goods, those that require specialized and customized inputs and are often tailored to the needs of particular buyers, usually require the seller to educate the buyer before the sale and to provide services after the sale. Complex goods are often in service for years or decades, and the manufacturer often has an ongoing relationship with the buyer to monitor the complex good. Sales of complex goods are often accompanied by professional migrants who educate buyers and service the good after sale, making trade in complex goods and the migration of professionals complements.

The second reason that trade and professional migration can increase together is the spread of multinational corporations, which by definition operate in more than one country. Most multinationals want to move managers and skilled professionals to their subsidiaries abroad so that the techniques that ensured success in one country can be transferred to another. Introducing home-country management and production techniques in foreign subsidiaries, such as just-in-time inventories in manufacturing, usually requires the movement of managers who have experience with the technique in their home market. Over time, foreign professionals may be replaced by locally trained managers, but some multinationals continue to rotate managers and professionals between their operations in various countries in order to ensure productivity and continuity and to provide future leaders with experience in all of the firm's operations.

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[22] The present value of an average immigrant was US$ 89,000 in 1996, but was US$ 197,000 for immigrants with a high-school diploma or more and -US$ 13,000 for an immigrant with less than a high-school diploma.

[23] Total trade between Korea and the US was US$ 72 billion in 2004, the US ran a US$ 20 billion trade deficit, there were 28,900 Korean E, H, L, or TN admissions, and 829,000 total Korean admissions. Total trade with Australia was US$ 22 billion in 2004, the US ran a trade surplus of US$ 6.7 billion, there were 23,400 Australian E, H, L, or TN admissions, and 645,000 total Australian admissions. (Wasem 2007, Appendix A, CRS-22).

Table 12.1 Migration humps: Trade and low-skill migration as complements. (Source: *See* text)

Theoretical rationale	Complementarity between trade and migration in the short run	Substitutability between trade and migration in the long run	Reason for larger migration hump
Technologies differ	Labor-intensive production in South cannot compete with capital-intensive production in North	Production of goods in which South has a comparative advantage generates jobs	Poor infrastructure and public services may retard new job creation
Factor productivity differences	Wage differences are insufficient to create comparative advantage in labor-intensive production in South	Public investment in education and infrastructure closes the productivity gap	Failure of public policies to close productivity gap over time
Economies of scale	Industries using migrant labor in the North expand, lowering costs of production and South cannot compete	Public investment in education and infrastructure in South closes the productivity gap	Failure of public policies to counteract scale economies in Northern migrant-intensive industries
Adjustment lags and costs	Lags between economic integration and job creation Factor specificity: displaced corn farmers not hired as factory workers, so loss of subsidies prompts emigration	Economic integration create jobs in South, especially for better educated younger workers most prone to migrate	Poor public services, discourage investment, extend the investment-employment lag and fail to overcome factor specificity problems
Market Failures	New jobs in South provide the funds to undertake risky migration	New jobs and factor market development offer alternatives for migration	Limited employment expansion to provide attractive alternatives to migration, due to above
Migration networks	By minimizing migration costs and risks, networks increase the likelihood that short-run deterioration of employment and wages in the South become manifested as new migration. Given a short-run increase in migration, networks accelerate migration effects	Diminishing returns to migration networks, combined with increasing opportunities from trade reform in the migrant-sending country	Absence of diminishing returns to networks and/or slow employment and income growth in sending country
Relative deprivation	Short-run increases in income disparities caused by trade reforms stimulate migration as a means to reduce relative deprivation	Broadened access to market opportunities and/or migration eventually reduces relative deprivation and associated migration pressures	Persistence of unequal access to income opportunities in migrant-sending country

The third reason that freer trade and the migration of professionals can be complementary involves investors, who normally want to play a role in managing especially new investments abroad. Investors may want to go to the country in which they are investing or send professionals to begin the operation abroad, making an easy-entry visa a key part of an investor's decisions about whether and how much to invest. Not all investors have an operation in their own country, which is why some countries have investor visas that issue probationary and eventually settler visas to foreigners who invest at least a certain amount and create or preserve a certain number of jobs.

12.7   Conclusions

About 3 % of the world's seven billion people are international migrants, persons outside their country of birth for a year or more. Most people become international migrants for economic reasons, seeking opportunities and higher earnings abroad. Persisting demographic and economic inequalities, just as globalization is making it easier to learn about opportunities abroad and cheaper to travel and take advantage of them, promise more international migration. Indeed, many people in richer countries that attract migrants fear being "overrun" by migrants.

Fears of "too much" migration may be exaggerated, since migration can speed up development in migrant countries of origin so that they turn from emigration countries to destinations for immigrants in a decade or two. If migration is self-stopping, then there is no reason to fear that migration from any particular country will increase over time.

The major links between international labor migration and development flow via the 3 Rs of recruitment, remittances, and returns, or who leaves, how much money do they send home, and what are the economic impacts of returned migrants? However, there is no economic law to assure that these 3 Rs operate in ways that promote stay-at-home development. Instead, international migration opens a window of opportunity for faster development, and walking through the window to ensure that migration in fact speeds development requires good economic policies at home. Good economic policies make it less likely that local workers cannot find jobs and that key managers or health care workers whose absence slows development stay at home. Good economic policies are also likely to increase remittances and the share of foreign earnings invested by migrants who return from foreign jobs.

What if migrants leave areas with poor economic policies and little hope? Under these circumstances, there is more likely to be too little or inappropriate training so that migrants who go abroad are employed at low wages or fill jobs that do not utilize their skills. Recruitment systems can permit local agents to collect some of the wage gap or wedge that motivates migration, and workers can go into debt to pay migration costs, making them more vulnerable abroad. Once abroad, poorly paid workers and those working below their qualifications earn and remit less and, when they return, are more likely to rest and retire rather than apply new-found skills and entrepreneurial vigor in their home economies.

The fact that the link between migration and development is not fixed means that policy can make a difference. However, many international debates focus on symptoms rather than underlying fundamental issues, as when they promote ethical recruitment or campaigns against trafficking rather than providing workers with local alternatives. The best protection for workers who may be abused by recruiters or traffickers is the power to say no, which requires having decent work options at home. Similarly, appropriate exchange rates and prospects for growth may do more for migration- and diaspora-led development than remittance-matching programs.

The chicken-and-egg question is how to get economic policies correct in a country that is already sending workers abroad and being transformed by migration. In some cases, emigration acts as a safety valve that can maintain the status quo, allowing flawed policies and politics to continue because those who might have protested at home go abroad. In other cases, emigration acts as an additional spark for sustainable development, providing the skills and capital needed for faster growth. The seemingly endless plans for poverty reduction and economic development highlight the difficulty of getting economic policies correct, but without the right fundamentals, migration is as likely to set in motion vicious circles between migration and development as virtuous.

An ideal world would be one with few barriers to migration. This ideal will be reached sooner if migration always speeds development in migrant-sending areas, so that the push factors that contribute to fears of unwanted migration diminish. For both migrant-sending and -receiving countries, migration is a process to be managed, not a problem to solve, so that constant attention to the workers, employers, and institutions is required to protect migrants and ensure that labor migration that speeds development.

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Chapter 13
Migration Transition in Asia: Revisiting Theories in the Light of Recent Evidence

Manolo I. Abella and Geoffrey Ducanes

It is now exactly 20 years since the Conference on "Turning Points in Labour Migration" was organized by the ILO in Seoul in cooperation with the Korea Labor Institute and the UN University. The conference aimed to contribute insights into the complex relationship between migration and development, and in particular how improvements in general standards of living in successfully industrializing economies in East Asia have led to a transition in migration. A year later the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (APMJ) published the eight papers commissioned for the conference in a special issue. This paper revisits some of the ideas and conclusions that emerged out of that conference and offers some reflections in the light of what has actually taken place with migration in the region over the recent past. To confirm the general validity of some of our conclusions, we then look further afield at the experience of a larger number of countries. Fortunately, more studies and a larger data base on emigration and immigration have since emerged, thanks to the data collection activities of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of the United Nations, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank.

We start with the general proposition that, everything remaining the same, most people would prefer to live and work in the countries where they were born and raised. Migration then occurs because those who move see better prospects for improving their material or spiritual conditions outside their own communities or countries, otherwise they would have stayed. Once similar conditions start to avail at home, the assumption is that the propensity of people to migrate declines until net emigration approaches zero. This by itself does not of course signal that a turning point in migration has been reached and that a transition is already about to take place. We interpret the turning point to be reached only when the improvements

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in material welfare and other conditions are sustainable, anchored on a shift to a higher level of productivity and accompanied by corresponding changes in political and social institutions which give people confidence and security. Thus, a few years of zero net emigration, or even a few years of net immigration, may not mean very much unless they signal the start of a more permanent condition. While there may be temporary setbacks such as, for example, an economic recession that forces young people to look for jobs outside the country (i.e., such as what is happening now in Greece or Spain) these do not constitute a reverse transition where the country still possesses the technological capacity and the economic, political, and social institutions necessary for delivering a high standard of living.

Of the various conditions that shape people's confidence and sense of security, the easiest to observe and measure are material ones such as employment and wages, or more generally incomes, although clearly not the only ones that count nor even always the most important. This practical limitation has constrained investigations into the determinants of transition. Unfortunately, the more holistic measures of development and human welfare, such as UNDP's Human Development Index, were not yet available at the time the studies for the Seoul conference were undertaken. Later in this paper we shall make use of these indices, which have since become available, to shed light on the issue of migration transition.

It is notable that none of the studies pursued the line now gaining some currency that there is some internal logic linking migration to development, particularly though remittances. In simplest terms, the argument is that with appropriate policies, countries of origin can accelerate economic development because migrants' remittances relax foreign exchange constraints and increase savings and investments, while the migrants themselves often bring back useful knowledge and know-how. If "migration-led" development can be sustained, it may therefore lead to its own demise in the form of a migration transition.

13.1   Early Views on Turning Points in Asian Migration

What was observed years ago was that in the successfully industrializing countries of East Asia the decline in the absolute as well as relative levels of net emigration was followed by positive net immigration. While migration transition has been widely observed in other parts of the world and is in principle predictable when the reasons for wishing to migrate diminish (i.e., as incomes converge) there seem to be wide differences among countries in when and how long a transition takes place. Such differences may be accounted for by a country's openness to trade, the path a country chooses to meet labor shortages, how quickly economic growth translates into higher wages, differences in geography, external factors such as shifts in immigration policies of destination countries, or even by differences in attitudes to ethnic heterogeneity. If the experience of these countries can shed light on how these factors have made a difference to the timing and speed of transition, then it may be possible to predict what is likely to happen to the other developing countries in the

region. Case studies on Japan, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Thailand looked at the processes of change taking place before the countries reached their respective turning points. What explains the decline in emigration pressures and were these broadly similar among the countries? The experiences of these countries were juxtaposed against more theoretical models on how migration transition can best be explained, especially by economic theories on labor market adjustments in the course of structural change and rapid development.

We revisit these earlier views on migration transition starting with the theoretical explorations.

Pang (1994) distinguished three turning points in migration, each one determined not only by economic but also by institutional and political variables. At early stages of development, when labor is abundant but per capita income is low, net outflows of labor rise as a percentage of the labor force. As development proceeds, net outflows are likely to accelerate because families can mobilize more resources to send more members abroad while the cost of information and uncertainty declines due to social networks established by earlier migrants. As economic growth continues, the rate of increase in net outflows is likely to then decline as net attractions to stay at home increase until the first turning point in Pang's model is reached. He associates this with the early stages of industrialization, when more people, previously discouraged by poor job prospects, begin to enter the labor force. As industrialization gains further strength, more people find employment—especially women. The greater employment of women sets in train a decline in fertility rates. Depending on the size of the population, a surplus of labor may persist for some time but the net outflow of labor eventually starts to increase at a slower pace than the growth of the labor force. The second turning point is reached when a country succeeds in expanding trade and investments, motivating workers abroad to return. Skilled foreign workers may also be admitted. Pang notes that although full employment may not yet be reached at this stage, one will be likely to already see changes in "…people's values and attitudes towards work—changes that lead to sectoral labor shortages. There is greater reluctance among locals to take up dirty, dangerous and difficult or 3D jobs…" (Pang 1994, p 87). The third turning point is reached when the economy starts to become a net importer of foreign workers, particularly the unskilled. This transition happened very swiftly in the case of Malaysia, which shifted almost immediately from being a country of net emigration to a country of net immigration, but not in Japan or Korea which instead opted to send capital overseas and establish offshore labor-intensive production.

Another theoretical formulation of migration transition was offered by Nayyar (1994) who focused on how intensively labor is used as economies pass through different stages of the structural transformation. At the early stages of development, surplus labor from the rural sector is absorbed outside agriculture into manufacturing at existing levels of wages and productivity. Manufacturing may increase its share of output and employment but the changes are more significant in the composition of employment than of output. He described this stage as the "extensive margin" of labor absorption. Net outflows of labor, which may have started earlier, will tend to come to an end when this stage of structural transformation is completed.

The second stage is reached when labor is transferred from low to high productivity occupations and real wages rise in both sectors. Manufacturing becomes more capital-intensive and significantly expands its share in output, while the share of agriculture shrinks. He describes this process as the "intensive" margin of labor use. Not all economies, however, are able to make a transition from being labor exporters to becoming labor importers. In his paradigm, reaching the intensive margin of labor use or full employment is an essential condition for the country to become a net importer of labor.

In his analysis of the migration transition experienced by the so-called NIEs of East Asia (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), Fields (1994) attributed much of the credit to two factors: one is the labor-intensive character of their export-led growth, and second is the highly-integrated nature of their labor markets. Their development strategies paid off quickly as employment opportunities expanded and the improvements in the labor market were transmitted to all sectors. Rising employment and wages, in turn, slowed down emigration pressures while firms sought to mitigate wage increases by shifting to labor-saving and labor-augmenting technologies, and by importing labor to the extent that immigration policies allowed. The fact that these economies were characterized by absence of institutional restrictions in the labor market enabled very flexible responses to the growth in demand which eased wage pressures in the early stages of industrialization but which were felt economy-wide and later brought about a migration transition.

The classical argument that the movement of goods is a substitute for the movement of the factors of production was the starting point of Alburo's (1994) contribution. He sought to confirm this "trade-off" between trade and migration by looking at the actual experiences of eight Asian countries and found that they all had increasing emigration with increasing exports. Interestingly, the peaks of migration outflows seemed to have clustered around periods of stagnant levels of exports. The relationship did not hold consistently for all the years however, nor for every country; but where the net outflow of workers diminishes on a sustained basis, it is the speed of trade expansion that seems to determine the turning point. Positing this observation as a testable hypothesis, he proceeded with an econometric analysis and found strong evidence that increasing exports is indeed associated with increased worker outflows, but accelerated exports reduced emigration. An alternative way of interpreting these results, as Alburo suggests, is that there is a social opportunity cost to migration.

The case studies undertaken in four countries however provided more nuanced explanations for each of the cases of migration transition than just purely economic. According to Watanabe (1994), what actually transpired in Japan with worker outflows and inflows cannot be explained by economic theory. Much of what happened with Japanese migration was the consequence of politics (i.e., admissions and later restrictions on Asian migration to US and Canada) and of Japan's defeat in the Second World War. Strong emigration pressures already felt during the Great Depression persisted well into the 1960s but actual emigration fluctuated widely on account of policies of destination countries. What played a bigger role in Japan's reaching its Lewisian turning point (exhaustion of surplus labor and rising real wages) was the intensification of labor use in its industrialization, especially the absorption of labor in small cottage industries.

In his case study, Skeldon (1994) argues that Hong Kong's experience does not fit neatly into models of migration transition. Geopolitical factors have played a key role in patterns of migration which included multiple turning points. Starting with the flood of refugees from the mainland after the Second World War, Hong Kong had large labor surpluses throughout most of the 1950s when processes of industrialization began. However, there was little emigration of any significance not because of absence of emigration pressures but because there were few doors open to the entry of unskilled Chinese migrants. Industrial employment grew rapidly during the 1950s and Hong Kong entered a period of low unemployment by about the beginning of the 1960s. Unemployment did rise in the mid-1970s due to the global recession and again in the early 1980s, but these trends were brief. In the case of Hong Kong, Skeldon argues that the turning points were from immigration to emigration, but these were due not to economic changes or labor market conditions but to Hong Kong's specific geopolitical circumstances. The spurts of emigration, especially in the late 1980s to early 1990s, coincided with periods of record low unemployment and the opening of immigration doors to some countries. These included flows to Canada, Taiwan, Australia, and the US, comprised largely of professionals and highly qualified people as well as students.

In Korea's case an abundant supply of labor enabled the country to achieve very rapid economic growth in the initial stages of its industrialization (Park 1994). Trade played a large role as Korean exports of light industry manufactures grew rapidly throughout the 1970s. Manufacturing absorbed labor from the rural areas by the millions and the process was hastened by the removal of price supports for rice and other crops which shifted the terms of trade against agriculture. Park claims that by about the middle of the 1970s, the Lewisian turning point had already been reached in Korea. From then on, the manufacturing sector became increasingly dominated by heavy industries. In the early years, Korea's development strategy included an active programme to export labor but this soon faded into insignificance. By the early 1990s, Korean small industries were already facing severe labor shortages, forcing the government to relax existing immigration restrictions to low-skill labor, and eventually to adopt a formal temporary guest worker scheme. This was the second turning point when Korea became a net importer of labor.

Thailand also went through similar phases of structural change as Korea, according to Pracha Vasuprasat (1994), although these started a decade or so later. A labor export program was in place by the mid-1970s, which continues to this day. Given its abundant supply of labor, a strong agricultural economy and stable economic policies, Thailand easily attracted large inflows of foreign direct investments which fueled its export-led industrialization. Initially exporting mainly processed agricultural products and raw materials, Thailand's exports eventually became dominated by light manufactures. The manufacturing and services sectors easily absorbed the millions of Thai workers leaving agriculture. The difference with Korea lies in its having porous land borders with much poorer neighbouring countries, insuring continued supplies of foreign workers willing to take the place of Thais in so-called 3-D jobs in agriculture, construction, and low skill services. Real wages remained fairly stable until well into the beginning of the 1990s, when unemployment reached record lows. This explains why significant numbers of Thai workers continued to seek

employment in Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and the Middle East despite full employment conditions at home. However the numbers of Thais leaving for work abroad have gone down and for many years have been much smaller than the numbers of foreign workers coming to Thailand from across the border; hence the country must have transitioned very early from being a net exporter to a net recipient of labor.

From these case studies of Asian countries, we may draw a few general conclusions:

- Rising employment and per capita incomes clearly impact on propensities to emigrate but since actual levels of emigration also depend on exogenous factors (i.e., policies of destination states) the former constitute at best necessary but not sufficient conditions for migration transition to take place.
- For the same reasons as above, the turning point need not be a unique event; even countries which have attained full employment may still experience net outflows of labor.
- Exporting goods and exporting labor may be complements at early stages of industrialization, both contributing to accelerating a country's economic development. However, with faster exports growth (thus accelerating income growth) they tend to become substitutes—meaning that accelerating exports can lead to return migration.

13.2   Searching for Global Evidence of Migration Transition

Data on migration flows (number of immigrants arriving and number of emigrants departing) are hard to come by but the United Nations Population Division has managed to make estimates of net migration (difference between number of immigrants and number of emigrants) for all countries with at least 150,000 inhabitants in 2000 for each 5-year period between 1950 and 2000. The data cover long enough intervals to even out temporary fluctuations and can serve as a good basis for determining if net migration has changed, from positive to negative or vice versa, during the 50-year period (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs 2004).

Since very small countries are highly susceptible to experiencing net outflows for a variety of reasons, we look at the 109 countries with five million or more inhabitants in 2000. We reproduce in Annex A Table II.5 of the UN's World Economic and Social Survey of 2004 which shows which countries had positive, zero, or negative net migration in each of the 5-year periods between 1950 and 2000. Comparison of their data shows that most countries have experienced a shift in net migration over the 50-year period. Only 16 countries had experienced consistently negative net migration (more emigrants than immigrants) during each 5-year period between 1950 and 2000, and only seven had consistently positive net migration (more immigrants than emigrants). Among the other 86 countries, according to the UN report, net migration had changed sign or been zero at least once since 1950. The report reached the conclusion that "…international migration is a volatile phenomenon

whose direction can and often does change, implying that, for most countries, it is not possible to postulate that a lengthy period of sustained negative net migration will necessarily be followed by a period of sustained positive net migration" (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs 2004, p 33).

In Europe, the countries that used to be countries of emigration but have experienced a transition and have become receiving countries in recent years were Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain, which used to be the main sources of migrant workers for the rest of Europe in the 1950s and 1960s but have become destination countries in the 1980s; Finland, which used to supply labor to Sweden, has since been a net receiver of workers from the former USSR; the United Kingdom, where immigration of workers from the rest of EU, especially from the new member states, has overtaken the numbers of UK nationals emigrating to other parts of the world; the Russian Federation, which has emerged as the destination country for many of the former Soviet republics; the Czech Republic and Hungary.

In Asia, Japan has become a destination country especially for descendants of Japanese immigrants in Latin America, as well as from China, Korea, and other parts of Asia; Malaysia, which supplied Singapore with many workers, has herself become a receiving country of workers, many from East and South Asia.

On the other hand, there were also countries which transitioned from being net receivers to being net senders of migrants. They include Georgia, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

Some countries passed through migration turning points more than once, notably Belgium, Switzerland, Jordan, Libya and Venezuela, which all experienced shifts from being net receivers to net senders and then back again to being net receivers.

Table 13.1 below provides a summary of the data shown in Annex A and highlights the trends observed for many Asia/Pacific countries. Of the 16 countries found to have remained net senders of migrants throughout the 50-year period, four were Asian countries (Nepal, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and India). Only Australia remained a net receiving country throughout the period. The Republic of Korea was a receiving country from 1950 to 1955, but became a net sender ever since despite the spectacular growth of her economy and rise in living standards over the past 2 decades. Equally surprising is the case of Thailand, which the UN data show as a net sender from 1980 to 2000, a period during which she was known to employ large numbers of Burmese, Cambodian, and Laotian workers. Both Sri Lanka and the Philippines had zero net migration in the early years, but have become net senders since the 1960s (consistent with outflow trends for the two countries coming from other sources).

13.3   Economic Downturns and Migration Flows

How have net migration flows been affected by changes in economic conditions in the Asia/Pacific region? The growth of the region's economies were set back by two significant disturbances in the recent past, the first on account of the Asian financial crisis of 1998 which started in Thailand but subsequently had severe contagion effects on the rest of the region in particular Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Hong

Table 13.1 Countries or areas with five million inhabitants or more in 2000 distributed according to number of 5-year periods of positive or negative net migration, 1950–2000. (Source: Table II.5 of UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004)

Number of 5-year periods with negative (−) net migration	Number of 5-year periods with positive (+) net migration	Total number of countries	Of which Asia/Pacific countries are (+) years of net immigration (0) means inflows = outflows
10	0	16	Nepal, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India (+) none
9	0	1	
	1	12	Rep of Korea (+)1950–1955, China (+)1965–1970
8	0	3	Sri Lanka (0) 1950–1960
	2	4	
7	0	2	Philippines (0) 1950–1965
	1	1	Papua New Guinea (+) 1965–1970, (0) 1990–2000
	3	11	Cambodia (+) 1985–2000, Pakistan (+) 1975–1990
6	3	1	
	4	10	Japan (+) 1980–2000
5	0	2	Vietnam (0) 1950–1975
	3	3	
	4	1	
	5	5	Lao PDR (+) 1955–1975, 1985–1990
4	1	2	Afghanistan (0) 1950–1975, (+)1990–1995
	2	1	Thailand (0) 1950–1970, (+)1970–1980
	3	1	
	4	1	
	6	3	Malaysia (+) 1950–1965,1975–1980, 1990–2000
3	1	1	Myanmar (0) 1950–1980, (+)1995–2000
	2	1	
	4	1	
	7	1	
2	0	1	
	5	1	
	6	1	
	7	1	
	8	7	
1	0	1	DP Korea (0) 1955–2000
	9	6	Hong Kong (+) for all periods except 1965–1970)
0	10	7	Australia (+) all periods

Table 13.2 Selected indicators of net migration 2000–2010. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2009)

	Emigration rate[a]	Stock of immigrants[b] in 000s		Net international migration rate[c]
	2000–2002	2005	2010	2005–2010
Japan	0.7	1999	2176	0.0
R. of Korea	3.1	551	535	0.4
Singapore	6.3	1949	1967	0.3
Malaysia	3.1	2029	2358	0.1
Hong Kong	9.5	2721	2742	0.2
Thailand	1.3	982	1157	0.0

[a] Emigration rate is the stock of emigrants from a country at a particular point in time expressed as a percentage of the sum of the resident population in the country of origin and the emigrant population

[b] Immigrants are individuals residing in a given host country (country of destination) that is not their country of origin (or birth)

[c] Net international migration rate is the total number of immigrants to a country minus the number of emigrants over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of the receiving country over that period. It is expressed as net number of migrants per 1000 population, or as a percentage

Kong (China), and Japan; and the second, the 2009 banking crisis in the US which also caused a recession in the East Asian region, affecting particularly hard Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore.

The net migration data, on which Table 13.1 above is based, only cover the period from 1950 to 2000 and thus can only reflect what happened after the Asian financial crisis. The net flows did not appear to change for most countries until 2000. Australia, Japan, Malaysia and Hong Kong remained net receivers of migrants, while the Republic of Korea and Thailand, along with other developing countries of the region, remained as net senders of migrants. More recent data made available from other sources indicate that the Republic of Korea may have reached a turning point during the middle of that decade. The decline in fertility rate has already made an impact on the labor force which grew anemically at only around 1% for most years. Unemployment rate did not go beyond 3.7%. A net sender of migrants over the previous decades, Korea had 7.3 million Koreans estimated to be overseas as of 2011, of whom about 40% maintain Korean nationality, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Oh et al. 2012). Korea registered for the first time in 2006 a net immigration of 47,600. From then on net inflows were registered rising to 82,000 in 2011 (Table 13.2).

Singapore experienced an increase in emigration rate early in the decade but remained a net recipient of migrants throughout the last decade. Other sources suggest a rise in emigration throughout the decade since net inflows declined from 2004 to 2011 even if immigration rose. Malaysia also remained a net recipient of migrants over the last half of the previous decade but only marginally so. Hong Kong experienced a very high rate of emigration early in the decade which may not have been sustained since the net international migration rate remained low over the last half of the decade. The UN data base did not include Taiwan, but other sources suggest

that net migration flows were slightly negative throughout the decade, except for 2007 when a positive inflow was registered. In the case of Thailand, the net flows are almost impossible to determine since they are dominated by clandestine movements.

13.4 Shifting to More Holistic Measures of Welfare

At the beginning of this paper, we laid down our basic assumption that given a choice, most people would prefer to live and work in the country they were born and raised. The phenomenon of migration is therefore taken as an indication that those who move see better prospects elsewhere for improving their material or spiritual welfare, otherwise they would stay. We also recognized that using simple indicators like income as a proxy for well-being is unsatisfactory. People after all are motivated to move by many other dimensions of welfare. Countries that attract immigrants are typically those that offer a safe and healthy environment, where standards of education are high (which is often also an indicator of developed democratic institutions and a rich cultural life), and where human beings can achieve higher levels of productivity through the application of their labor.

Since 1990, the UNDP has been developing its Human Development Index (HDI), a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. Because of this index, it is now possible to compare countries and the advances they have made over time based on a more comprehensive measure of welfare than simple indicators like GNP per capita. The specific components of HDI for the 2007 estimates were:

- Life expectancy at birth
- Adult literacy rate
- Combined gross enrollment ratio
- GDP per capita
- Life expectancy index
- Education index

The UNDP calls countries that have achieved an HDI of 0.9 or higher, developed, and those that have not, as developing. UNDP then grouped countries based on HDI values: 0–0.499 for low HDI; 0.500–0.799 for medium HDI; 0.800–0.899 for high HDI; and greater than 0.900 for very high HDI.

Annex Table B shows the countries that have made the most gains in terms of their HDI ranking. We use their HDI values, and changes therein, for testing a few hypotheses that may shed some light on how they influence migration.

13.5   Testing Some Hypotheses

13.5.1   Do Countries Which Achieve Significant Gains in Human Development, As Indicated by the HDI, Attract More Immigrants?

We postulate the following relationship: the change in the stock of immigrants from 1990 to 2005 is some function of the change in HDI from 1990 to 2005, the initial population in 1990, and the initial HDI level in 1990.

$\Delta M_{90-05} = f(\Delta HDI_{90-05}, P_{90}, HDI_{90})$ where M is the stock of immigrants, ΔHDI_{90-05} is the change in HDI from 1990 to 2005, and P is the population in 1990.

We postulate this relationship on the grounds that countries which make significant gains in welfare, as indicated by HDI, will attract more immigrants. The 1990 population is included as a variable since the data on stock of immigrants are expressed in absolute terms, not as a percentage of the population. Assuming that a bigger country has a bigger capacity to absorb more immigrants than a small one, we needed a way of isolating this effect on immigration from that of HDI values.

The results of the statistical regression are shown below:

Number of obs. = 112
F (3, 108)   = 2.84
Prob > F   = 0.0412
R-squared   = 0.0764

ch_stk_≈9005	Coef	Robust std. err	t	P>[t]	95% Conf. interval	
ch_hdi_9005	−2520.212	3392.725	−0.74	0.459	−9245.181	4204.757
pop_1990	1.32866	2.156487	0.62	0.539	−2.945871	5.603191
hdi_1990	2187.528	900.0551	2.43	0.017	403.4626	3971.594
_cons	−1060.483	427.3559	−2.48	0.015	−1907.676	−213.3893

The results of the regressions based on values for 112 countries show no significant relationship between the change in HDI over the 15-year period and the change in the stock of immigrants. This becomes understandable when one notes that many of the countries that registered large gains in HDI are developing countries which did not have policies for admitting immigrants.

However, the countries that in 1990 (initial year) had a high level of HDI tended to have a large increase in the stock of immigrants from 1990 to 2005. These countries were already developed ones in 1990. The results are consistent with the fact that in recent decades the growth in migration was higher in the South–North, than the South–South direction.

13.5.2   Are the Effects of Gains in Human Development Better Reflected in "Net International Migration" Than in Changes in Stock of Immigrants?

In the above regression, we sought to find a correlation between changes in stock of immigrants with changes in HDI. In the following, we replace the changes in stock with the data on "net international migration rate," which the UNDP defined as the "total number of immigrants to a country minus the number of emigrants over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of the receiving country over that period. It is expressed as net number of migrants per 1000 population or as a percentage." We postulate the following relationship:

$NM^i_t = f(\Delta HDI^i_t, HDI^i_t)$ where NM is net migration rate for country i. We look first at the net migration rate for 1990–1995 and relate it to HDI gains for the immediately preceding period, 1980–1990.

Number of obs. = 81
F (2, 78)   = 5.91
Prob > F   = 0.0041
R-squared   = 0.3332
Root MSE   = 0.87701

n_mig_r-9095	Coef.	Robust, Std. Err.	t	P>[t]	95 % Conf. interval	
Hdi_gr_8090b	0.7716273	0.3599032	2.14	0.035	0.0551151	1.48814
hdi_1980	2.966112	0.9868895	3.01	0.004	1.001366	4.930858
_cons	−2.43363	0.9255655	−2.63	0.010	−4.276289	−0.5909707

For the second period, we use the net migration rate for the period 2005–2010 and relate it to HDI gains for the preceding period, 1990–2007.

Number of obs = 115
F (2, 112)   = 6.21
Prob > F   = 0.0028
R-squared   = 0.0989
Root MSE   = 0.45831

n_mig_r-0510	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P > [t]	95 % Conf. interval	
Hdi_gr_9007b	0.2264966	0.101186	2.24	0.027	0.0260096	0.4269836
hdi_1990	1.1496	0.3287123	3.50	0.001	0.4982889	1.800902
_cons	−0.897534	0.2778862	−3.23	0.002	−1.44813	−0.3469381

The above regressions show a highly significant relationship between net international migration rate and the HDI growth in the immediately preceding period, as well as with the initial period. Countries that initially scored high HDI values also have higher net international migration rates, on average. More significantly, countries

which made rapid gains in HDI also registered high net migration rates. The relationship to estimation periods was robust, meaning that it was found for data pertaining to net migration rate from the first half of the 1990s, as well as data for the first half of 2000s.

13.5.3 At What Level of Income do Propensities to Emigrate Weaken?

The UNDP statistics on migration include estimates of emigration rates for each country for 2000–2002 and thus allow us to relate emigration propensities to income in the origin countries. Unfortunately, it is only possible to do a cross-section analysis of the question when it would have been more instructive to have a time series showing how the propensity changes for the same country as it undergoes development changes. Nevertheless, the cross-section comparison is interesting and yields a few interesting insights.

We postulate the following simple relationship:

$Ei = f(Y^i_{00}, Y^{i2}_{00})$ where Ei is the emigration rate for country i for the period 2000–2002, Y^i_{00} is GDP per capita for the year 2000 in purchasing power parity dollar (base 2005), and Y^{i2}_{00} is its square (in natural logarithm).

Number of obs = 181
F (2, 178)   = 10.94
Prob > F   = 0.0000
R-squared   = 0.0807
Root MSE   = 9.1536

Em_rate_20-2	Coef.	Robust, Std. Err.	t	P > [t]	95 % Conf. interval	
lrgdpch	18.63681	4.996586	3.73	0.000	8.776638	28.49697
lrgdpch2	−1.034394	0.2943477	−3.51	0.001	−1.615254	−0.453534
_cons	−72.9012	20.45579	−3.56	0.000	−113.2683	−32.53413

The results show that emigration rates are on average higher for countries with higher incomes. However, at very high levels of per capita income they begin to decline and at some stage, a turning point is reached. From the results, one can also estimate that the turning point occurs at per capita GDP around $ 8172 in PPP (base 2005). Note that this jibes with Olesen (2002), which posited that migration occurs from countries with income between $ 1500 and $ 8000 in PPP terms (base 1985).

These findings are consistent with the common observation that, since emigrating is costly, emigration will be low at low levels of income, but rises as incomes rise. Emigration rises at a decreasing rate with respect to income, however, and eventually falls.

13.5.4   Are Those with College Education more Likely to Emigrate? Is this Observable at All Levels of Income?

$ET^i_{00} = f(Y^i_{00})$ in natural logarithm. where ET^i_{00} is the emigration rate of the tertiary educated for country i for the period 2000-2002 and Yi is GDP per capita for the year 2000 in purchasing power parity dollar (base 2005) in natural logarithm.

We hypothesize a similar relationship between emigration rates and per capita incomes, but this time relate to incomes the data on emigration rates of the tertiary educated which are also available from the UNDP statistics.

Number of obs = 101
F (1, 99)   = 6.44
Prob > F   = 0.0127
R-squared   = 0.0557
Root MSE   = 16.46

t_em_ra-2000	Coef.	Robust ,Std. Err.	t	P > [t]	95 % Conf. interval	
lrgdpch	−2.73237	1.076961	−2.54	0.013	−4.869295	−0.595446
_cons	37.60904	9.735164	3.86	0.000	18.29237	56.92572

The above results show that the higher the incomes per capita of the origin countries the lower on average the emigration rates among those with tertiary education. A virtuous cycle is discernible, with the emigration of the better educated declining as incomes rise.

13.5.5   Do Emigration Rates Rise With the Level of Urbanization of Origin Countries? To What Extent is the Relationship Affected by the Country's Level of Human Development?

Cities serve as hubs of communications and transport linking countries to the outside world; thus it is taken for granted that higher emigration rates will be positively associated with levels of urbanization. Is this supported by the statistics now available from UNDP on emigration rates? To find out, we relate emigration rates with urbanization rates. Furthermore, we test if the relationship depends on level of development by breaking up the countries according to their classification by the UNDP into those at high, medium and low levels of human development.

The following relationship is then postulated:

Ei00-02 = f (U90, HDI) where E is the emigration rate for country i estimated by UNDP for 2000–2002; U90 is the level of urbanization in 1990. HDI serves as the dummy variable for level of development.

a. *Very High Human Development*

Number of obs = 38
F (1, 36)   = 1.55
Prob > F   = 0.2216
R-squared   = 0.0702
Root MSE   = 6.3885

em_rate-20-2	Coef.	Robust, Std. Err.	t	P > [t]	95% Conf. interval	
Urb_pop_1990	−0.0961647	0.0773071	−1.24	0.222	−0.2529507	−0.0606212
_cons	15.19256	6.110617	2.49	0.018	2.799656	27.58547

The regressions for countries at high level of development do not show statistically significant relationship between emigration rates and urbanization (note that the R-squared is very low and the probability value, p, is high).

b. *High Human Development*

Number of obs = 44
F (1, 42)   = 14.33
Prob > F   = 0.0005
R-squared   = 0.3232
Root MSE   = 9.6181

em_rate-20-2	Coef.	Robust, Std. Err.	t	P > [t]	95% Conf. interval	
Urb_pop_1990	−0.3684356	0.0973243	−3.79	0.000	−0.5648439	−0.1720273
_cons	34.55495	6.673341	5.18	0.000	21.08761	48.0223

The results show that for countries classified at high level of human development, a higher level of urbanization is associated with lower emigration rates. The correlation is strong as indicated by the very low "p" values and the relatively high R squared.

c. *Medium Human Development*

Number of obs = 75
F (1, 73)   = 6.69
Prob > F   = 0.0117
R-squared   = 0.0839
Root MSE   = 9.3086

em_rate-20-2	Coef.	Robust, Std. Err.	t	P > [t]	95% Conf. interval	
Urb_pop_1990	0.1662984	0.0643163	2.59	0.012	0.0381161	0.2944806
_cons	2.076478	2.61407	0.79	0.430	−3.133355	7.286312

The results show that for countries at medium level of human development, a higher level of urbanization is associated with higher emigration rate.

d. *Low Human Development*

Number of obs = 24
F (1, 22)   = 1.38
Prob > F   = 0.2526
R-squared   = 0.0433
Root MSE   = 3.6014

em_rate-20-2	Coef.	Robust, Std. Err.	t	P > [t]	95% Conf. interval	
Urb_ pop_1990	−0.0653779	0.0556481	−1.17	0.253	−0.180785	0.0500291
_cons	6.452508	1.907368	03.38	0.003	2.496869	10.40815

Note that for countries at both extremes—at very high level and at low level of human development—there is no statistically significant relationship between urbanization and emigration rate.

13.5.6 *Are Propensities to Emigrate Higher in Societies that have Greater Inequality than in Those that are More Equal?*

Among the "push factors" driving emigration is often people's dissatisfaction with inequalities they see in their society. These inequalities are often due to maldistribution of productive assets (a few owning huge tracks of the most fertile lands) or lack of opportunities to earn a decent income despite hard work. It is therefore legitimate to ask if reducing social inequality through appropriate policies help bring about a turning point in migration. We are able to investigate this issue with the same statistics available from the UNDP. For countries at the same level of human development, is lower inequality associated with lower emigration rates?

We postulate the following relationship:

$E^i_{00} = f(Rto^i_{10}, HDI^i)$ where Rto^i is the ratio of the income of the top 10% to the income of the bottom 10% in country i.

Number of obs = 117
F (2, 114)   = 4.88
Prob > F   = 0.0092
R-squared   = 0.0440
Root MSE   = 5.7171

em_rate_20-2	Coef.	Robust, Std. Err.	t	P>[t]	95% Conf. interval	
Rto_t10tob-c	−0.0363306	0.0177785	−2.04	0.043	−0.0715497	−0.0011114
hdi_2000	5.480209	2.166037	2.53	0.013	1.189307	9.771111
_cons	3.200981	1.49716	2.14	0.035	0.2351183	6.166843

Contrary to our expectation, the regression results show that, controlling for HDI level, countries with higher inequality as measured by the ratio of the top 10% to the bottom 10% tended to have lower emigration rates. For countries with the same inequality, those at higher HDI levels tended to have higher emigration rates.

Using Gini coefficient as the measure of inequality yields no significant relationship between inequality and emigration rate.

13.6 Fitting Theory to Reality

We tried to see how our notions of migration determinants and transition fitted the experience of countries using the most comprehensive data base available from the United Nations on immigration and emigration, urbanization, and its indices of human development (HDI) for large number of countries. The availability of the HDI indices has, in particular, enabled us to take into account more factors than just income changes in measuring improvements attained by countries in improving the human condition, presumably a key consideration for people's decision to leave or stay in their countries of birth. Moreover, the data sets cover a long period of time, offering us a more reliable indicator of sustainable changes than data for just a few years which would have been subject to temporary fluctuations. There are of course limitations since migration movements are inherently difficult to track using periodic surveys. Censuses only catch the situation at discrete points in time. Another caveat is that many of our hypotheses focus on economically-motivated movements while the data available of migrant stocks do not differentiate one form of movement from another.

Our statistical analysis of the link between migration and HDI suggests that our theorizing is still far from satisfactory since HDI only explains a part, albeit a small part, of the whole story. The following general conclusions, however, seem warranted even at this stage of our exploration:

1. Countries which show improving human development are likely to experience more emigration than before. This probably reflects the fact that rising incomes enable more people to become mobile not only within their own countries but also outside, and because people with better education and health can venture out and seek to have more satisfying lives within or outside their own countries. However, those in countries at the highest levels of development are likely to be more content to stay at home.
2. For countries already at high levels of human development, it does not seem to matter how much of the population is urbanized. Urbanization seems to be related to greater tendencies to migrate when countries are still at medium level of development.

Table 13.3 Countries that have developed most rapidly in terms of increase of HDI (Top 20)

	Country	HDI growth from 1980 to 2007	Country	HDI growth from 1990 to 2007	Country	HDI growth from 2000 to 2007
1	Nepal	2.16	Mozambique	2.28	Niger	3.92
2	Bangladesh	1.86	Mali	2.23	Ethiopia	3.13
3	Burkina Faso	1.67	Rwanda	2.04	Burkina Faso	2.85
4	Guinea-Bissau	1.62	Bangladesh	1.96	Mali	2.30
5	Mali	1.53	Burkina Faso	1.82	Tanzania (United Republic of)	2.09
6	Burundi	1.43	Liberia	1.81	Cambodia	2.01
7	China	1.37	Nepal	1.81	Mozambique	1.97
8	Mozambique	1.34	Uganda	1.59	Rwanda	1.90
9	India	1.33	Benin	1.46	Tunisia	1.79
10	Egypt	1.30	Togo	1.44	Congo	1.65
11	Pakistan	1.30	Pakistan	1.42	Morocco	1.63
12	Indonesia	1.26	China	1.40	Chad	1.61
13	Benin	1.25	Guatemala	1.40	Uganda	1.57
14	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	1.23	Malawi	1.38	Zambia	1.57
15	Morocco	1.20	Morocco	1.37	Jordan	1.55
16	Malawi	1.20	India	1.32	Nepal	1.46
17	Viet Nam	1.16	Papua New Guinea	1.32	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	1.41
18	Tunisia	1.09	Guinea-Bissau	1.25	Bangladesh	1.39
19	Guatemala	1.05	Tunisia	1.20	Burundi	1.38
20	El Salvador	0.99	Nicaragua	1.17	Benin	1.37

3. Education seems to matter but not in the way usually assumed, namely that the more educated tend to leave. This seems to depend on whether countries are experiencing improvements in human conditions. Our study suggests that the tendency for those with college education to emigrate declines with increasing HDI levels of their countries, hence we said it may be a sign of a virtuous cycle taking hold.

4. Our data suggest that the turning point when countries stopped being net senders to being net receivers has tended to occur when per capita incomes (at purchasing parity terms) reached about US$ 8100. The estimate is significant, not because it is likely to be generally valid, but only because it suggests that many developing countries are still quite far from reaching such threshold.

5. The effect of social inequality on people's motivation to emigrate is one of the issues explored by the study. Contrary to our expectations, the data show that the tendency to emigrate does not rise with higher inequality, but in fact it declines with higher inequality (Table 13.3 and 13.4).

Table 13.4 Countries that have developed most rapidly in terms of HDI ranking (top 20)

	Country	Change in HDI Rank from 1980 to 2007	Country	Change in HDI Rank from 1990 to 2007	Country	Change in HDI Rank from 2000 to 2007
1	Ireland	16.0	China	18.0	Tunisia	16.0
2	Korea (Rep. of)	15.0	Korea (Rep. of)	17.5	Jordan	10.0
3	China	12.0	Ireland	15.0	Ireland	9.5
4	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	10.0	Bangladesh	11.0	Indonesia	9.0
5	Australia	9.5	Australia	10.0	Equatorial Guinea	9.0
6	United Arab Emirates	9.0	Tunisia	10.0	China	8.5
7	Nepal	9.0	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	9.0	Tanzania (United Republic of)	8.0
8	Turkey	8.0	Dominican Republic	9.0	Korea (Republic of)	8.0
9	Singapore	7.0	Turkey	8.5	Armenia	7.5
10	Indonesia	7.0	Guatemala	8.0	Estonia	7.0
11	Bangladesh	7.0	Chile	7.5	Latvia	7.0
12	Chile	5.0	Brazil	7.0	Iceland	6.5
13	Malaysia	5.0	Nepal	7.0	Ethiopia	6.0
14	Spain	5.0	Honduras	6.5	Kazakhstan	5.5
15	Pakistan	4.5	Saudi Arabia	6.5	Bangladesh	5.5
16	Bahrain	4.0	Cape Verde	6.0	Romania	5.5
17	India	4.0	Jordan	6.0	Cambodia	5.0
18	Egypt	4.0	Viet Nam	6.0	United Arab Emirates	4.5
19	Iceland	4.0	Mexico	5.5	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	4.5
20	Finland	3.5	Indonesia	5.0	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	4.0

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