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Symbols that Bind, Symbols that Divide

The Semiotics of Peace and Conflict



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Symbols that Bind, Symbols that Divide

The Semiotics of Peace and Conflict

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Preface

This work seeks to explore the use of symbols to divide or unite in various conflict settings around the world. We have taken a fairly broad perspective on what constitutes a “symbol,” to include objects such as flags, signs, and monuments. In addition, we include commemorations and other dynamic events that serve as a means for groups or individuals to connect with past generations, celebrate a heritage, and possibly express religiosity. While these symbols typically reflect heritage to one group, to another group the same symbols might convey hatred and oppression. Our goal is to provide examples of these symbols in a specific conflict setting, providing a historic background and then psychological/anthropological analyses of the current dialogue surrounding the use of the symbols.

This book came about during a series of discussions on the function of symbols. We realized that, although many peace psychologists differ in where they conduct their researches and what theoretical framework they employ, much of our work can boil down to how we are guided towards peace or continued violence through a variety of symbols. More precisely, regardless of the setting, these symbols function to connect us to the past and provide us with a cultural narrative as well as give us emotional attachments and perceptual filters through which we understand our current reality.

We sought a group of authors who were diverse in both their country of interest and the way in which they approached their understanding of the semiotics of conflict and reconciliation. In addition to giving readers a background in the conflict of their respective countries, we wanted the authors to analyze the symbols that have intentionally and unintentionally been utilized by societies after explicit conflict ends. What is the function of the symbols in that society? How do these symbols bring divided group together? How do they continue the conflict if only on an implicit level? Even though this book contains global and diverse perceptives, the emphasis on the divisive and/or reconciling nature of symbols unites the chapters.

For peace psychologists, analyzing these divided symbols can lead to a rich understanding of the history of the conflict, but more importantly can serve as a powerful metaphor for understanding the progression of reconciliation within the

particular cultural conflict. These symbols likely are charged with sociopolitical narratives that help define social identity, in-group/out-group representations, and potentially serve as a current “assessment” of how groups or individuals experience conflict within the specific context. Authors were asked to provide a brief historical overview of the context for the readers, then focus on the particular symbols that are “divided” in the culture with a focus on nuances of the symbols. We have sought authors from around the world who have conducted empirical studies on intergroup relationships or have provided significant academic contributions in the area of symbols and collective memories represented in theoretical publications.

Our aim was to provide readers with a rich tapestry of intellectual analyses from a diverse set of scholars from around the globe. Woven through this framework are narratives that exemplify years of violence and conflict within each society. We recognize that in each chapter, there is a story—a story that by itself is powerful, but viewed collectively these stories complement each other in a way to show how symbols can powerfully divide or unite individuals. In this process, we see the analysis of these symbols as a way to both remember the past and in doing so keep a hopeful eye towards the future of restoration and justice.

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The Function of Symbols that Bind and Divide

Rebekah A. Phillips DeZalia and Scott L. Moeschberger

It is in the intent of this chapter to develop a basic understanding of the function and role of divisive symbols within post-violence or reconciliation settings. Whether these symbols are flags, ethnic labels, commemorations, or other social representations, they serve as a way for members of a society to both communicate heritage and socially connect with other members of a group—both past and present. In analyzing the conflict, understanding these divisive symbols can be of critical importance due to the emotional responses that these symbols elicit. Given this strong response, one can conclude that these symbols are similar to what Volkan (2006) refers to as a “hot place” or a “physical location that individually and collectively induces (or reinduces) immediate and intense feelings among members of an ethnic or other large group” (p. 137). These emotions can lead to some members of the culture being filled with a sense of pride and connection with their social group, while at the same time these symbols can create strong feelings of oppression or even hatred among others.

How these symbols are interpreted often depends on the context in which these symbols appear. Mach (1993) highlights the importance of context in understanding symbols when he notes, “the same object can symbolize two quite different ideas and emotions, and the particular meaning depends on the context within which the symbol is used” (p. 25). The context of the symbol often determines how one group is attributing meaning and identity to the symbol. Often, misunderstanding this context is the source of intergroup tension due to misunderstanding or lack of understanding of the historical significance of the symbol or how the symbol is being perceived by the “out group.”

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


Fig. 1 Functions of symbols (Adapted from Moeschberger, 2011)

For scholars or practitioners working towards building cultures of peace, understanding the deep meaning in symbols can provide a depth of understanding of the conflict that can enhance creative peacebuilding approaches. In a comprehensive analysis of peacebuilding, Schrich (2005) proposes understanding conflict in three dimensions: the material or rational; the social; and the symbolic or cultural. The material dimension consists of conflict related to land or material resources that are in demand. The social dimension is a more complex interaction of communication, relationships, and social interactions. Lastly the symbol dimension “focuses on how people’s worldview shape how they understand and make meaning of the world, and in particular, conflict. It brings attention to the perceptual, emotional, sensual, cultural, and identity-driven aspects of conflict” (Schrich, 2005, p. 32). It is our desire that an increased understanding of this collection of diverse symbols in various settings worldwide can help practitioners better assess and understand conflict settings.

In considering the breadth of rich examples from across the world, a model of understanding the functions of these symbols emerged. While each of the authors goes in detail about how each symbol is utilized in the specific setting, we have developed a conceptual model, guided by existing theories, that can help scholars and practitioners understand symbols in deeper ways. In sum, based on the cases presented in the current volume divisive symbols serve four interrelated functions: (1) connection to past generations, (2) elicit a strong emotional reaction, (3) express and maintain cultural narratives as they contribute to social representations, and (4) a perceptual filter to understand the self in relation to society (Fig. 1).

Connection to Past Generations

The function of a symbol in a given society is largely related to the power of the symbol in preserving the past within the culture. In this way the symbol becomes part of the collective memories that can inform current political discourse and connect current generations to their past (Liu & Hilton, 2010). These collective memories can serve as a powerful way to create a social bond among members of a people group, often to the exclusion of another cultural group. By their very nature, the symbols function as a way for groups to remember and shape their interpretation of history. While this shared history can serve as a potent social bond, it also helps shape the reality that is lived in the current sociopolitical landscape.

To some extent, all the authors in the current volume wrestle with the collective memories that symbols represent in each country. Perhaps the most in-depth example is the analysis of post-socialist monuments by Begic and Mravic in the chapter “Forsaken Monuments and Social Change: The Function of Socialist Monuments in the Post-Yugoslav Space.” In their detailed discussion, the authors adeptly connect the monuments as deposits of collective meaning of past and present. They introduce symbols as not just markers of the past but markers of current territory, noting that these memories can serve as a way to exert power in “symbolic warfare.” Munoz Proto (in Chapter “‘What We Are, Where We Are Headed’: A Peace March Visits an Ex-Torture Center”) also illustrates this connection of the past to the present in her analysis of Villa Grimaldi and the dynamic and complex histories that can be “pushed aside” rather than resolved through remembrance. Several authors noted that the collective memories are a source of continuous trauma, an area that has been the focus of several recent publications (Opotow & Luke, 2013). Santos, in Chapter “Symbols that Speak: Christ and His Word in El Salvador,” shares the personal and societal struggle with the trauma elicited by the Civil War in El Salvador, noting the historic significance of the current image of Christ within the modern day socioreligious memories. And lastly, Andriani, in Chapter “Holocaust Collective Memory in the Context of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: A Multifaceted Symbol,” takes a creative approach in her discussion of the Holocaust as a symbol, rooted in the collective memory of the Israeli culture. In her findings, there is evidence that collective memories certainly influence current perspectives in complex and complicated fashions. In some cases the impact of a symbol on the collective conscious extends beyond the society to a sense of worldwide collective guilt over an event such as the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. These examples both implicitly and explicitly impact present politics and public opinion in multiple nation-states as well as the UN on various foreign policy issues related to whether to intervene in global conflicts as well as the entire spectrum of complex issues found in Israel–Palestine.

Emotional Reactions

One characteristic that divisive symbols elicit that seems to be present within most settings after overt conflict ends is a strong emotional attachment to the symbol. Given that the symbols represents times of conflict or oppression this factor seems obvious—but in some settings the emotional fervor that the symbol elicits certainly points to a powerful marker that shapes current discourse. This aligns with Volkan’s “hot places” notion that emphasizes intensity of feelings.

Two of the strongest emotional reactions can be seen in the current issues regarding flags in both Northern Ireland and the USA. As Stringer and Hunter point out in this volume, the recent rioting in Belfast with the Union Jack flying in the City Hall demonstrates the strong identification with the social meaning that the symbol represents within the unionist community. While the flag policy was in alignment with the rest of the UK, the rioting and protests became violent and ultimately resulted in numerous injuries. In a similar vein, the use of the Confederate battle flag (discussed in Chapter “Heritage or Hatred: The Confederate Battle Flag and Current Race Relations in the USA”) can elicit equally strong reactions. Though protests of the flag flying have not yielded violent protests, the mere introduction of the flag into songs, clothing, or political rallies yields a strong emotional reaction by members of the African American community. Likewise, removal of the flag (such as the statehouse in South Carolina) from public space will elicit fury from pro-flag supports.

In a different way the Christ Symbol in El Salvador also contains a powerful emotional element. Though divided in the various Christian traditions, Santos, in Chapter “Symbols that Speak: Christ and His Word in El Salvador,” highlights how all three traditions relate to the symbol in sensory and affective ways. Though the response may differ based on each narrative context for the Christ symbol, it is very clear that the symbol is alive within the lived experience of individuals interviewed.

Cultural Narratives

The complexity of the symbols within society seems to be a reflection of the complexity of the cultural values as well as the conflict reform which they emerge. These symbols are highly contextualized and impacted by the diverse values of the host culture; in addition they are shaped by the individual values within the culture. These narratives are heavily influenced by cultural variables such as race, religion, sex, and social class and often seem to interact within the current political environment. For example, in Chapter “Holocaust Collective Memory in the Context of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: A Multifaceted Symbol” on Holocaust narratives in Israel found in this volume, Adriani discusses the cultural values of remembrance and survival and how these guide Israelis towards either empathy or anger for their

Palestinian neighbors. To some extent, all of the symbols analyzed in the chapters serve as a feedback loop to shape current cultural narratives, which in turn shape the representation of the symbols. This interaction with culture and values creates a dynamic system in which the meaning of the symbols is constantly shifting based on context and sociopolitical ideology.

Another clear example of the connection between cultural values and symbols can be found in the chapter on Rwanda. As Phillips DeZalia explains in Chapter “Being Rwandan: The Use of Language, History, and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” the government is attempting to promote reconciliation through educational reform that promotes a common Rwandan identity. This has also led to the suppression of former means of identification and their related narratives. The important historical narratives are continually adapting to align with the symbols that are being promoted. In addition, in Chapter “Post-apartheid South Africa: A United or a Divided Nation?” Bornman describes how South Africa has tried to move past the ethnic lines of the past and embrace a national identity. The promotion of the Rainbow Nation, with its accompanying flag, national anthem, and monuments that join multiple groups’ symbols and language, is an attempt at reconciliation—albeit one with limited success. Lastly, in Chapter “Contested Symbols as Social Representations: The Case of Cyprus,” Psaltis, Beydola, Filippou, and Vrachimis found that symbols in Cyprus could communicate feelings of triumphalism or victimization, depending on the perspective.

Perceptual Filter

Symbols can also serve as a cognitive filter and anchor point for individuals to assimilate and interpret new information in relation to culture. These symbols are deeply impacted by a group member’s social identity and can serve as a schema that allows individuals to make sense of their lived experiences. This filter ultimately helps shape cognitive attributions related to group membership and categorization. In this way, symbols serve to both enhance and inform social identities (see section below), strengthening “us/them” and “in-group/out-group” perspectives.

Probably the most developed discussion of this social categorization process is in Stringer and Hunter’s analysis in Chapter “Understanding Symbols of Division in Post-conflict Northern Ireland” of the deeply engrained symbols in Northern Ireland. This analysis reveals the power symbols have in everyday life in Northern Ireland, negatively influencing intergroup contact and cross-community relationships. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Bornman (this volume) highlights the influence of symbols in creating shared identities reflected in the “New South Africa.” An example that shows both directions of categorization would be in Adriani’s chapter on Israel. The “dovish” Israelis saw the Palestinians as part of their in-group because they had both suffered, whereas the “hawkish” Israelis categorized the Palestinians as an enemy group because they were not Holocaust survivors and did not deserve the same treatment.

Social Representation

While many of our authors take a broad look at the role of symbols in their country, another way to view the use of symbols is through a more specific theoretical lens. One of the theories that best clarifies the role of semiotics in reconciliation is Serge Moscovici's Social Representation Theory (SRT). This theory explains how the new ideas have been generated as well as how they have been dispersed throughout the society. As Jahoda (1988) states, "the purpose of social representations is said to be that of making something unfamiliar familiar" (p. 201). Before looking at symbols of peace and conflict through the eyes of SRT, it is important to understand its fundamentals. Specifically, one must look at its main components and the way it is used in violence and reconciliation settings.

Moscovici has been reticent in his research to define some of the fundamental terms of SRT, such as the basic one of social representation. What he has said is that they are "a specific way of understanding, and communicating what we know already" (Moscovici, 2001b, p. 31). Moscovici (1988) describes three possible social natures of representations. There can be a social representation that is the same for all members of the society. An example of this would be the Catholic and Protestant school uniforms described by Stringer and Hunter in Chapter "Understanding Symbols of Division in Post-conflict Northern Ireland" on Northern Ireland. There can be similar versions that peacefully coexist, such as the multiple languages in the national anthem mentioned in Chapter "Post-apartheid South Africa: A United or a Divided Nation?" on South Africa. Or there can be similar versions that cause tension and strife among various communities within the larger society, such as the different historical narratives discussed in the Rwanda section (Chapter "Being Rwandan: The Use of Language, History and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda"). This last version is one which intrigues Moscovici (1990). The tensions that exist between individuals in a society, as seen through their differing representations, is one of the basic subject matters of social psychology on which Moscovici focused his research.

Others have given more details on what characterize representations. Wagner (1994a) lists several necessary features of social representations including a collective nature; an ability to anchor novel events to those previously experienced; a hierarchical structure that entails a core basis with peripheral components; and a semiotic element, which Moscovici (2001b) saw as symbolic and iconic. Valsiner (2003) adds that social representations help individuals cope with the vagueness of the future by connecting it with the more stable past. In addition to connecting the past with the future, social representations also make the ideas of a community relevant, thus regulating the behavior of its members (Moscovici & Vignaux, 2001). At their core, social representations are meant to guide individuals towards particular realities and connect them with their communities. They establish thoughts that come to be the basis of the community belief system, automatic assumptions to which the members can return when confused, which is common in conflict settings.

This focus on the social nature of thought, rather than individual beliefs, continues with Markova (2003) who emphasizes that, while any phenomenon could potentially become a representation, there must be a social element. The phenomenon must be a part of the “public discourse” in order to be a social representation (p. 143). This goes along with Wagner’s (2003) description on the ways in which social representations develop. They can be “thoughts, feelings, action and their justification” and they develop and change, not from an internal process but from “social controversy” (p. 8.2). Moscovici describes this social nature of representations as the consensual universe that “thrives on negotiation and mutual acceptance (Moscovici, 2001a, p. 238), a product of common sense knowledge distinct from the reified universe of scientific knowledge (Markova, 2003; Potter & Edwards, 1999). This is another reason that it is difficult to define social representations. They are not concrete objects but rather “dialogical phenomena” that are only found in relation to other phenomena, never as independent entities. Elements of this are found in the personal narratives found in the chapter on Israel (Chapter “Holocaust Collective Memory in the Context of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: A Multifaceted Symbol”).

The basic preconceptions that are utilized in this dialogue are called *themata* (Markova, 2006; Moscovici & Vignaux, 2001). The basis of *themata* is antinomies (Markova, 2003). Antinomies are basic oppositional dyads that exist, implicitly or explicitly, in every culture. They do not have to be expressly taught to a child in a given culture but are acquired through regular interactions in the culture. They can include such things as freedom–oppression, sun–moon, or joy–sorrow. These antinomies can be dormant if they are not actively recognized or utilized by a society and may never develop into anything more than implicit oppositional taxonomies. During Tito’s rule in Yugoslavia, many of the historical differences between Bosnians and Herzegovinians would have fallen into this category, as described in Chapter “Forsaken Monuments and Social Change: The Function of Socialist Monuments in the Post-Yugoslav Space.”

When the antinomies are put in the active dialogue of a community, they transform into *themata*. Any antinomy has the potential to become a *themata* if it is “brought to the explicit attention of social thinking” (Markova, 2006, p. 444). Almost all antinomies, at some moment in time, will become a *themata* for a particular culture. When antinomies develop into *themata*, they retain their antinomic nature though one side of the opposition tends to take precedence within the culture. These *themata* are the preconceptions at the foundation of common sense thinking. After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the antinomies of freedom–oppression came to the forefront of American culture, with the emphasis being on promoting freedom and eliminating oppression throughout the world. This theme of freedom over oppression developed into very salient social representations such as the importance of spreading *democracy* and the supremacy of Western ideals. While these representations were very salient in 2001, as the time since a terrorist attack increases, the relevance of these *themata* decrease and there may be fewer references to them in the public discourse.

Anchoring and objectifying are two related yet different concepts that help to establish, modify, and maintain social representations. Markova (2006) sees the distinction between anchoring and objectifying as their main function in a society. Anchoring is utilized more for stability and objectifying assists in the process of changing a representation. Anchoring is the process of connecting a new phenomenon with one that has been previously established. Moscovici (2001b) explains anchoring as:

a process which draws something foreign and disturbing that intrigues us into our particular system of categories and compares it to the paradigm of a category which we think to be suitable...In so far as a given object or idea is compared to the paradigm of a category it acquires characteristics of that category and is readjusted to fit within it (p. 42).

When a theme first enters the public discourse it is connected to an already established and understandable concept. This process allows individuals to classify something after a single exposure to it. They can then communicate the new social representation to others, even if that communication first appears vague and ambiguous. An example of anchoring, discussed Moscovici's first work on this subject is the establishment of Freud's Psychoanalytic theory in France. When Freud's theory first came into the mainstream, it had to be anchored to already established representations. The first time someone heard the phrase, "repression," there was no instantaneous common sense understanding of what that meant. It had to be tied to an existing idea of an individual "forgetting" something, a concept that was already a part of everyday narratives. Anchoring the established representation with the new phenomenon does not automatically entail the replacement of the former with the latter (Markova, 2006). At this stage, it is only a connection.

Objectifying occurs after anchoring. In this process, the vague connection between the new phenomenon and the old representation has been established and the new phenomenon develops into a unique social representation, separate from the original. The new phenomenon becomes an *object* separate from all other. Once this process takes place, it allows the social representation to become a part of what the culture deems common sense. As Moscovici (2001b) says:

...what is unfamiliar and unperceived in one generation becomes familiar and obvious in the next. This is not simply due to the passage of time or to habit, though both are probably necessary. This domestication is the result of objectification (p. 49).

The new social representations take precedence over the previous ones, situating themselves into the public discourse. Once they have been objectified, they are able to obtain an iconic status. They become relevant in their own right and can then be used to anchor other new phenomenon to an understandable concept. Going along with the previous example of repression in France, during the objectifying stage, there becomes increasingly less of a need to tie the phenomenon to that of forgetting. Eventually, it gets to the point where an individual can hear of repression and automatically have an image come to mind. There is no need to directly connect it to the process of forgetting. It automatically makes sense in its own right; it has become an object in the common sense dialogue of the culture.

The theory of social representations works well with our model for the use of symbols in peace and conflict. The language that individuals choose to use as they attempt to encourage reconciliation or continue a conflict is based on social representations. We understand our current situation based on the social representations that we use within our society. These are often tied to narratives in our society, such as the Holocaust stories passed down through survivors and historical narratives that are promoted or silenced in post-genocide Rwanda. The words we chose to use or ban—like the national anthem in South Africa—the monuments we choose to erect, dismantle, or transform—like the Turkish and Greek structures in Cyprus—and the ideas we choose to support or silence—such as the meaning of the Christ symbol in El Salvador—are all connected to social representations that are tied to peace or conflict.

Social Identity Theory

Another way to look at symbols in the divide and unite is through the lens of Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), as well as the related Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM; Gaertner et al., 1989) and the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM; Hewstone & Brown, 1986). SIT states that a fundamental part of our self-concept is how we view ourselves as members of social groups (Brown, 2000). We are not independent entities but rather social animals who are continually deciding who is our friend and who is an enemy.

The two main processes that occur in SIT are social categorization and social comparison. In social categorization, we divide “people into ‘us’ and ‘them,’ into in-groups and out-groups” based on certain categories that we find salient (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). It is impossible to view someone as a blank slate. We must compare them to those we have met in the past and assign them to categories based on their similarities or differences with those people. If we feel that they share something in common with us, they will be assigned to our in-group and we will feel a connection to them. However, if we feel that they are more in common with those in our out-group, we will see them as other. Although promoting empathy as an in-group characteristic can make us feel more empathy for the out-group (Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, 2009), we usually do not hold positive views for those we see as separate from ourselves. An example of social categorization is the use of the Christ symbol by Evangelicals in El Salvador (discussed in Chapter “Symbols that Speak: Christ and His Word in El Salvador”). They see their struggle as similar to that of Christ and see him as a member of their in-group and his struggle as similar to their own.

In addition to categorizing those we meet—when we compare groups—we like to view our own as better than comparable out-groups (Tajfel, 1978). This social comparison is so strong that promoting one’s in-group can even take precedence over personal gain (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). No one wants to be a member

of an irrelevant or disappointing group and so we will work hard to view our group as the best. This necessitates viewing other groups, particularly those most similar, as worse than our own. This negative view of the other can be seen in the chapter on Cyprus in this volume. The Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots each view their own right to the land as more valid and their fight to keep it as more honorable and just. And for the chapter on Israel (Chapter “Holocaust Collective Memory in the Context of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: A Multifaceted Symbol”), it is difficult to view the Palestinians fight for recognition as similar to their own because it would involve seeing the negative aspects of their own in-group.

Although our identification with our in-group and dislike of our out-groups are strong, there are a couple of theories that look into ways to promote reconciliation, even with those we categorize as more different than us. In the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al., 1996), one more inclusive superordinate is promoted among members of different subgroups. By having a common superordinate identity, we can view members of our former out-group with “the same kind of positive evaluations and benefits afforded to in-group members” (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000, p. 243). Because we will always view members of our out-groups as inferior to our in-group, the only way to truly bring reconciliation is to bring the enemy into our in-group. For example, in the chapter on Holocaust survivors, those who saw Palestinians as similar to themselves because they were also victims of violence were more able to feel empathy for that group. Another example would be in the promotion of the Rwandan identity, discussed in Chapter “Being Rwandan: The Use of Language, History and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” By eliminating subordinate ethnic identities, the government is hoping to encourage reconciliation among the people.

Another perspective can be found in the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM; Vollhardt, Migacheva, & Tropp, 2008). According to the MIDM, it is important to recognize subgroup identities as part of the superordinate category. Acknowledging the uniqueness of the various groups that come together to form the superordinate category is an essential component of this model. Individuals reject the adaptation of an umbrella grouping that will result in the destruction of their subgroup identity, such as what is found in CIIM. Therefore, attempting to eliminate subgroup identification will hinder the acceptance of the superordinate category. By allowing members to retain their subgroup identity, while recognizing “mutual superiorities and inferiorities” (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, p. 591) of each subordinate group, it is possible to work towards reconciliation without fear of a loss of an important social identity. An example of this can be found in the chapter on South Africa found in this volume. The idea of a Rainbow Nation is a promotion of distinct groups who must work together for the sake of the country.

As with social representations, the use of SIT and the related CIIM and MIDM can be clearly connected to our model of semiotics in peace and conflict. In-groups and out-groups in countries that have experienced conflict are rarely new creations. They are often connected to past generations. Our elders and our leaders teach us who is our friend and who is our enemy. We make automatic assumptions about those we encounter based on these cognitions and act according to those

assumptions. Knowing that the Us versus Them mentality is such an integral part of both conflict and reconciliation, those attempting to bring peace often try to make in-groups more inclusive to expand the number of people with whom we feel a social bond. Some examples of this can be found in Chapter “Contested Symbols as Social Representations: The Case of Cyprus” of this book. Psaltis, Beydola, Filippou, and Vrachimis discuss the peace house that is supposed to unite Cypriotes instead of keeping them divided among Turkish and Greek lines. Springer and Hunter discuss the use of integrated school uniforms to make categorization among Catholic and Protestant lines more difficult in Chapter “Understanding Symbols of Division in Post-conflict Northern Ireland.” And finally, in Chapter “Heritage or Hatred: The Confederate Battle Flag and Current Race Relations in the USA,” Moeschberger gives the example of an African-American college student who displayed a Confederate flag in his dorm room to make it an inclusive symbol of southern pride rather than a symbol of racism and the division that entails.

The end of explicit fighting is never the end of a conflict. That is when the work of reconciliation begins. The semiotics of reconciliation and conflict play an integral, if often hidden, role in this process. In the following chapters, our authors will explore how nations are using symbols to navigate this process, with varying levels of success. By creating symbols that are meant to bind the opposing sides together, these nations are attempting to facilitate peace on multiple levels. If done successfully, these symbols function to change the cultural as well as personal narratives of those who encounter them to create a more unified society.

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Forsaken Monuments and Social Change: The Function of Socialist Monuments in the Post-Yugoslav Space

Sandina Begić and Boriša Mraović

*Away with boundaries, those enemies of horizons! Let genuine
distance appear!*

Oscar-Vladislas de Lubicz-Milosz

L'amoureuse initiation (1910)

Man is an imagining being

Gaston Bachelard

The poetics of reverie (1960)

Monuments play an important symbolic role in people's lives. Each monument is built for a very specific reason and is intended to serve a well-defined purpose. Monuments are erected to remind us of something, some important event or individual. Yet the symbolic value of monuments—built to last eternally—can, and frequently does, change. They can gain or lose on importance depending on the political climate of the time. In Dylan Trigg's (2009) words, "what was once built to testify to a singular and eternal present becomes the symbol and proof of its mutability" (xxviii). Under the right circumstances, a monument built to mark a place or convey a meaning, to designate some commonly shared experience, give form to a socially salient story or event of the past and secure their remembrance in the collective memory of a group of people—thus serving as a symbol that binds—may very well grow into a symbol that divides. A good example is the Georgia's Freedom Charter adopted in 2011 (EASTWEEK, 2011), its primary purpose being the removal of all Soviet-era symbols from the public space, including monuments. This symbolic reinterpretation of monuments almost exclusively takes place in the

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times of social change. Indeed, monuments are virtually always the first to be targeted when regimes are overthrown, and people demand and forge a change in the political order of their country. We have witnessed these types of transformations—toppling of monuments that symbolically represent collapse of the ruling government and a changing political climate—on numerous occasions throughout our modern history. Some recent examples include South Africa, Egypt, Iraq, the former Soviet Union and the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, to name a few. The converse can also be true. A monument erected to symbolize a superior position of one group could be turned into a symbolic representation of a nation striving to be inclusive of all its citizens (for example, see Marschall's (2010) discussion of an attempt to reinterpret the Paul Kruger Monument in Pretoria from a symbol of Afrikanerdom to a signifier of "our [shared] history"). Whatever the nature of the symbolic reinterpretation may be, it appears that no major social transformation is possible without some form of symbolic reinterpretation. This, in turn, raises the fundamental issue of how the past is re-remembered and reinterpreted to fit the needs of the present. Could it indeed be that "history has become our replaceable imagination," as the French historian Pierre Nora (1989) proposed in his seminal paper on memory and history?

The primary purpose of the present chapter is to discuss the symbolism of socialist monuments in the context of the post-Yugoslav space, particularly that of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a former Yugoslav republic. To achieve this, we first discuss the symbolic value of monuments more generally, followed by an analysis of the purpose of socialist monuments in the context of the transitional post-socialist, postwar, post-Yugoslav space. Finally, we examine the current status of socialist monuments as dividing symbols and whether and under which conditions these structures could reveal a potentiality for once again becoming symbols that bind. Although socialist monuments will be discussed in greater detail in the following pages, here we wish to briefly note that socialist monuments exemplify a strange quality of in-betweenness, symbolizing not only socialist past and antifascist struggle but also a past that has been appropriated differently by different people. Some perceive them as symbols of purportedly oppressive past that is to be forgotten and its traces removed, while others experience them as symbols of a time that is remembered as better than the present or simply as a time worth remembering. For the former, these monuments seem to provide a necessary "background" to set against and justify their presently held patriotic—and in some cases, nationalistic—sentiments, whereas for the latter, they appear to function as silent reminders—served cold with a dash of nostalgia—that the wished-for-future that is the present is not what they had expected or desired. Whatever the case may be, the past—epitomized by the monuments—is used as a resource or a reference in making sense of the chaotic perpetually liminal present, marked by lingering uncertainty.

While this chapter deals with a specific type of monuments in a specific context, the struggle—at both the physical and symbolic levels—associated with dealing with memorials that signify an ambiguous past is by no means unique to the post-Yugoslav space. In fact, it can be found in almost every society past and present that has gone through some radical social change. Examples include dealing with the communist monuments in Romania (Salecl, 2000), the legacy of the Soviet Union

in the post-Soviet space (Boym, 2001), the apartheid organizers and Afrikaner nationalist monuments in South Africa (Marschall, 2010), Italy's "divided memory" along the fascist—antifascist transverse (Foot, 2009), the "competing pasts" related to WWII in Germany (Moeller, 1996), and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in the USA as an example of "commemorating a divisive defeat" (Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz, 1991, p. 377), to name a few. Paraphrasing Father Jan Kapica, who in 1906 asked, "What is an Upper Silesian? Is he a German, a Pole, a Prussian, simply an Upper Silesian, or simply a Catholic or, perhaps, even just an abstract human being?" (as cited in Zahra, 2010, p. 99), we ask, "What are these monuments? Are they symbols of socialism, shared life, a period of darkness, a better life, or are they simply sculptures standing in remote landscapes now stripped of their intended symbolism or, perhaps, great architectural accomplishment of an aesthetic value unwilling or unable to assume any nationally relevant symbolic meaning?"

Situating the Discussion in the Wider Symbolic Frame

Because of the pronounced purposefulness with which monuments are build and because they do not exist in a political, social, or symbolic vacuum, situating monuments in a wider symbolic power frame seems warranted for it is the symbolic power that lies at the heart of every political system. Monuments, erected to remind us of the past, to induce and enable reproduction of stories and narratives *embodied* in the stone, invoke predefined meanings that serve as symbolic organizers of social life and the lives of individuals. It is in the *nature* of a monument to always have a "target audience," an addressee imagined as an ideal recipient of its message, who will be called upon, cry, or stand proud before it. This target audience could be the entire globe or a small family. As such, monuments constitute an integral part of the wider *symbolic regime* through which people ascribe individual and collective meanings to the past and present. The term "symbolic regime" is used here to denote the network of dynamically interrelated semantic ensembles and agencies acting upon, within, and across imagined borders of social groups (Bourdieu, 1989). In a stronger sense, we use the same term to denote the social function of any symbolic regime—that is, its domination over means of symbolic reproduction, of which we conceive in terms of Althusser's (1969/2009) Ideological State Apparatuses: educational, religious, legal, political, informational, cultural and other aspects of social life—all the while not losing sight of discursive micro-relationships of power through which a system is maintained.

Any given regime surely exerts symbolic dominance by controlling these and other mechanisms. Thus, the distribution of ensembles, discourses and their material correlates, to a significant degree, demarcates the symbolic field that individuals navigate. This is not to imply that symbolic regimes are some absolutely overpowering structures. Individuals navigating a dominant regime are surely capable of distancing from that regime, opposing it, and even constructing new, hybrid, and idiosyncratic symbolic frames of reference and meaning systems. Indeed, the ongoing

co-construction of individual meanings occurs precisely at this intersection of socially mediated messages and personally held attitudes and beliefs stemming from prior experiences. In other words, even though they always act within the framework of some symbolic regime, individuals are continuously negotiating and renegotiating socially mediated messages to construct new meanings.

Undoubtedly, certain symbols perform more crucial functions of ascription by mediating core ensembles of a particular regime, while others are more peripheral, designating simple elements of the regime. Yet whether crucial or peripheral, it is this facet of monuments that grants them their symbolic value. Moreover, public monuments, generally built to reinforce and be a factor in a dominant or competing societal narrative, principally exemplify the dominance of the power holders over institutional, economic, and sociocultural mechanisms used in the perpetual reproduction of these narratives. Frequently, and particularly during regime shifts and social unrest, various elites compete for social control by claiming their “exclusive” right to build, establish, and maintain narratives, including erecting monuments as integral elements of this process. Naturally, a monument erected for this purpose will *properly* address only those groups or individuals who subscribe to the dominant ideology, and leave others, who are indifferent to this ideology, unaddressed. But there are also those cases when a single statue, a memorial place, or a historical site *properly* addresses only one group while *inappropriately* addressing another, thus calling into memory different—often conflicting—stories and giving rise to feelings of repulsion, detest, and anger. It is precisely these cases that best demonstrate the symbolic power that monuments embody. This function of ascertaining and addressing an audience is the ultimate purpose of any monument, for without addressees, monuments and symbolic regimes as such are stripped of their symbolic efficacy.

The highly complex and dynamic past of the pre-1945 Yugoslav space had given rise to various and often conflicting regimes that, under concrete historical conditions and as a result of concrete material forces, were integrated into a broader—dare we say, less rigid—symbolic regime of post-World War II Yugoslavia. The establishment and historical development of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) in 1945, renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) in 1963, among other things, meant radical symbolic incision into the pre-socialist sociocultural fabric and continued *symbolic work* in and with pre-socialist *materials*. Indeed, the emerging Yugoslav symbolic system aspired to redefine the entire social system from the ground up, including establishing entirely new legal and political systems, with the ultimate aim of creating a society that rested on a previously nonexistent symbolic foundation. Ironically, the process of decline of the “actually existing socialism” was marked by a *rediscovery* of concepts, narratives and symbolism of the past and relentless prosecution of socialism, mainly on the basis of the “horrors it had inflicted upon *our* people.” Parenthetically, it should be noted that a dialogical co-constructivist approach is taken here, meaning that concepts, narratives, and symbols do not exist as such, independent of people and history. They emerge in the process of interactions and everyday practices of individuals immersed in a broader semantic field, assuming their properties only when

imbedded in a symbolic discourse. This means that they cannot be simply discovered but are continually reconstructed, reimagined, and reinterpreted.

Notwithstanding the almost unanimous verdict against it, socialism still stubbornly lingers in the post-Yugoslav space (and what this might mean we will touch upon later). For now, suffice it to state that the material expression of the lingering presence of this fallen system can be found in numerous objects, buildings, sites and monuments that it produced. While socialism is ostensibly a mere matter of the past, its monuments remain material reminders of it and stand like broken instruments of its once enormous symbolic apparatus. However, the truth is not only that their symbolic efficacy, though reduced, is still clearly present, but also that these monuments often act as symbolic—and de facto—targets of dominant regimes of today. Yet before we speculate about the function of these monuments today and whether and under which conditions they might be renegotiated as a new resource for emergence of alternative semantics and symbolism traversing the pronounced imagined and real ethnic boundaries that dominate these lands today, we first must ask what elements underlie and determine this symbolic relationship marked by tension and how and to what extent the symbolic efficacy of these “monuments of the past” still persist into the present. In order to arrive at these two points we first paint the wider panorama of symbolic relations structuring collective life, ultimately aiming at speculating about the symbolic burden and potentiality of these liminal “markers of the past” within the porous boundaries of their “heart shaped frame” (the geographic shape of BiH closely resembles the shape of a heart). It should be noted that because monuments can be treated as an empirical entry point into the symbolic worlds of a collective, we do not confine ourselves to any strict disciplinary approach; instead, we rely on insights from a range of disciplines and approaches attempting to arrive at a wider theoretical frame in which to situate these monuments.

Historicizing Socialist Monuments

The formation of the socialist states in post-WWII Europe was marked by enormous changes, not only in economic and political but also very much in symbolic terms. This process entailed massive efforts at ideologically shaping and reshaping the immediate socialist past and the more distant past of the pre-socialist period. Nothing was to put a stain on *our* great past, *our* revolution, and *our* people. Nothing was to prevent a full realization of *our* socialist goals. The creation of the Eastern Bloc meant the establishment of a wide-ranging symbolic regime dominated by the Soviet Union. The national communist parties in power across this part of Europe were to translate this overarching ideological macro-ensemble into their own “national roads to communism,” establishing more locally suited micro-ensembles and identifying context-appropriate axes of communication with their surviving ensembles from the pre-socialist pasts.

Certainly, the communist elites were well aware that creating a new system demanded careful management of societal resources and vast symbolic work.

Consequently, they introduced massive *story building efforts*, constructing the revolution itself and its vocabulary. In some cases, this was accomplished amid a total absence of popular support, most notably in Hungary and DDR, employing the “discipline and punish” approach to prevent symbolic deviations, while forcefully severing ties with past symbolic regimes that still had some legitimacy for the people of those countries. The infamous case of Enver Hoxha proclaiming Albania the first ever constitutionally atheist state demonstrates the severity of these types of interventions. In the Yugoslav context, this symbolic incursion was probably experienced as most intrusive in Croatia where the idea of an independent state circulating for some time came to be attenuated only through the experience of the NDH (the Independent State of Croatia), essentially a puppet state of the Axis during WWII. Not surprisingly, after Croatia gained its independence in 1991, the Croatian elites resurrected many of the NDH symbols, but remained reluctant to fully assume the ideals of the NDH due to its blemishing role in WWII. Ironically, in 2013, following its accession to the European Union (EU), Croatia was clumsily represented by its old NDH flag in a welcoming message extended to this newest member of the EU on the official EU web portal, leading to a minor but noteworthy diplomatic scandal.

Generally, what this story building effort meant in terms of material expression is evidenced across the Eastern Bloc in the form of hundreds of thousands of monuments, sites, memorials, and buildings erected to actualize the grandeur of the idea guiding it. Analogous to the city-text concept proposed by Emilia Palonen (2008), we could view this material expression as a set of textual inscriptions that function “as a system of representation and an object of political identification” (p. 220).

It neither simply carries the ideologies of the holders of power nor mirrors political discourses. As a set of commemorations, it is a “representation” that aims to establish a world view through the inclusion of certain elements for (an illusion of) internal coherence. Contingent and containing contradictions, it highlights certain aspects and excludes others. (Palonen, 2008, p. 220)

So instead of thinking of these city-texts, including monuments, as mere carriers of political discourses, we ought to think of them as guarantors of the presence and authority of the regime of meanings of which they are a part, patrons of the regime’s coherence in appearance and discourse. Though likely applicable to all regimes but most visible in socialism, the form is to bear witness and to somehow represent the substance of the *text*.

Salecl (2000) provides an excellent analysis of an extreme case, the enormous project of Nicolae Ceausescu—the construction of “a grandiose palace and a broad avenue with neo-baroque fountains surrounded by neoclassic apartment blocks” (p. 7) in the late seventies. This huge construction project was devastatingly destructive. It entailed a radical transformation of the old center of Bucharest and demolition of many historic buildings. Salecl’s analysis also points in another direction, which is of particular interest to us: “What happens after the fall of a regime?” Framing her analysis in psychoanalytic terms, Salecl (2000) arrives at the conclusion that the palace “remains one of the most traumatic remnants of the communist regime.”

Possessing a “sublime quality,” “it is beautiful and horrible at the same time, provoking both admiration and disgust” (p. 7). Without necessarily adopting her terms, we find her discussion relevant for the purposes of framing the discussion of socialist structures, as it reveals their inherent ambiguity. If trauma gives a sense of incision, of certain intrusion but also insistence on the chain of meaning, then monuments and other objects erected during the communist regime could be seen as material points of incision into the semantic and material space of a *community*, their ultimate intention being a complete eradication of “the previous symbolic order, which had been realized not only in the past political system but also in its material remnants—its architecture” (Salecl, 2000, p. 8). Unless they are physically removed—and often persisting long after they had been physically removed—these material objects continue to exist and insist throughout the process of transitioning from one symbolic regime into another, thus affirming their factual and symbolic in-betweenness.

“Ceausescu’s creationism tried to undo the old signifying chain in order to establish a totally new symbolic organization. By razing the historical monuments, Ceausescu aimed to wipe out Romanian national identity, the fantasy structure of the nation that is forged around historic old buildings and churches, and then to establish his own version of this identity.” (Salecl, 2000, p. 8–9)

The process of constructing and maintaining dominance of a symbolic regime is saturated with contradictions and is highly context-dependent. This is nicely exemplified through the public symbolic exchange surrounding the infamous Informbiro Resolution of 1948 (see, for example, Prebilič and Guštin, 2006), as a result of which Stalin, a beloved *drug* (comrade) and epitome of socialist victory was declared an imperialist and deemed unwelcome in Yugoslavia. Although this would lead to many prosecutions of those who failed to denounce Stalin, the crucial point is the ease with which an entire system was fundamentally restructured, simply by changing the position of a single socially salient symbol (for a captivating description of this ambivalence at the heart of the subject, see Lovrenović’s recollection of how he experienced Stalin’s death as a young man living in Yugoslavia in the 1950s (Lovrenović & Jergović, 2010)). Incidentally, a significant consequence of this breakup with Informbiro was “the emancipation of art from the paternalistic Soviet influence” (Potkonjak & Pletenac, 2007, p. 181). Indeed, it was this point that had marked the shift away from the so-called socialist realism and toward a more open—yet in no way free from regime oversight and scrutiny—and less rigid art paradigm which paved the way for experimentation in art forms and expressions in later years (Levi, 2009).

Transformations taking place at the heart of symbolic regimes easily reveal themselves if one traces stylistic architectural revolution of Yugoslav monuments. In her recent paper on monuments built in the post-WWII period, Horvatinčić (2012) provides a comprehensive discussion of the heterogeneity of architectural styles in post-WWII Yugoslavia. Monuments from the socialist era range from those that depict fallen soldiers and other celebrated heroes in the easily recognizable architectural style of social realism thus clearly conveying messages related to the

People's Liberation Struggle (NOB) to those erected on sites of major WWII battles. Monuments of the former architectural style, largely situated in urban centers or regularly frequented areas (e.g., along major roads), reveal the centrality of publically memorializing the WWII experience as a "founding myth." An illustrative example is the "unknown soldier" phenomenon, widely spread throughout Yugoslavia and other socialist countries (see Anderson, 1983/2006). Indeed, instances of institutionalized remembering and memorializing appeared at unexpected nexuses—in football clubs, for example. A large number of Yugoslavia's clubs had some sort of a designated memorial place or monument commemorating club members who gave their lives for the revolution and people's liberation (Mills, 2012). The latter type, on the other hand, was frequently built in a modern architectural style that could be described as abstract, if not outright ambiguous, nowadays even described by some as resembling UFO aesthetics. Indeed, Horvatinčić (2012) reminds us that sculptors active in the former Yugoslav space have created some of the most impressive modern monuments in Europe. If one dwelled on the symbolic meaning of this figurative-to-abstract representational transformation, one could argue that it follows the progression from exhausting symbolic efficacy of the war narrative and toward a more abstract expression of the already established new symbolic regime.

Even in spite of these massive story building efforts and attempts to account for the pre-Yugoslav organization of life by establishing explicit legal and political expressions of its diversity (*narodi* and *narodnosti*, terms that defined the *dominant Slavic peoples* and all other *national minorities*, respectively), Yugoslavia as an idea could not easily fully substitute the preexisting ways of knowing. Indeed, one could argue that numerous provisions created by the Yugoslav government, including the formal constitutional right to self-determination and independence for the constituent elements of the federation, strove to demonstrate that the shared origin of all South Slavs united under the umbrella of Yugoslavia was to serve only as a supplement, not a replacement. Ironically, the currently prevailing ethnic foundations that served as building blocks of another transformative narrative in the post-Yugoslav period seem to resemble the thin foundation on which the idea of Yugoslavia was built. Today's differential footings of these two types of narratives—Yugoslav and ethno-narratives—clearly demonstrate the relative significance of each in the wider symbolic system. Whereas the "South Slav" common origin narrative has seemingly entirely lost its symbolic efficacy, antifascist struggle, revolution, and attempt at achieving an egalitarian society still resonate in the popular imagination of a substrata of the population. Ironically, it is precisely the fact that the idea of Yugoslavia frequently raises less than welcoming reactions that demonstrates its lingering persistence.

Along analogous lines, a contemporary Bosnian thinker, Ugo Vlaisavljević (2006, 2007) establishes two broad theses on symbolic change underlying economic and political deterioration of socialism in Yugoslavia. The first is a proposition that the decline happened when the narratives of the heroic revolutionary past as fundamental building blocks of symbolic legitimization of the public order ceased to properly *address* its imagined addressees. The second is a seemingly incoherent thesis proposing that the system was overly successful at subordinating and dissolving those same competing symbolic regimes (of de-territorializing, to use his term

that he borrows from Deleuze) that will eventually emerge as new dominant regimes. In reality, it appears that the Yugoslav regime was not conceived to absolutely break ties with ethnic imaginaries but rather to give meaning to the revolution by adhering to an alternative ethnic base (Yugoslavs), which would encompass or supplement the existing—often conflicting—narratives. Such conception of a nation inevitably proved to be problematic in terms of constructing and maintaining the Yugoslav symbolic regime's command of the past, for the Yugoslav narratives had very little to say about those periods of the past that played the most important role in the alternative ethnic narratives. In other words, although attempting to construct a very wide ethnic base, one that would accommodate all, when it came to narrating the pre-Yugoslav past it could not compete with the existing narratives reinforced by their doubling with religious discourses. It, thus, had to place its hopes in grounding the narration in the present and the future of the revolution. Kuzio (2002) demonstrates this problem in detail in a different context, that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime, being well aware of this problem, had since the 1930s onwards systematically worked on reconstructing ties with Tsarist Russia as a unifying signifier, thus building its historical legitimacy on “reactionary” grounds.

“Real socialism” in Yugoslavia and elsewhere was an ultimate expression of social constructivism—a revolutionary system almost openly declaring its contingent and constructed nature. No wonder then the size and grandeur of the socialist monuments! The system, revealing itself as openly “under construction” (in permanent revolution), had to ground its symbolic regime literally into the ground, and to make it, if not indestructible, then at least immovable. In contrast, ethnic thinking would destroy its very core, de facto signing its death sentence, by openly declaring itself “under construction.” After all, the possibility to project itself into the past where it reveals itself in its “absolute truth” that stands and shines even today has always been its major advantage. The reemergence of approaches to establishing and maintaining new symbolic regimes that project into the past should not surprise us then. Despite the trans-historical grounding of ethnic regimes, socialist intrusion, still echoing into the present, may have demonstrated the fragility that any symbolic regime faces, thus yielding the same urge for the “novices” to engage in mass-scale construction work that in many ways resembles what was attempted by the socialist regime. In principle, any symbolic and/or material *transition* incorporates two distinct requirements: (1) the establishment and elaboration of a new mode of material correlate, and (2) the elaboration of the mode of relationship towards the preexisting regime and its objects. Though both are parts of the same process—since *identity* of a new symbolic regime always requires a relationship of the aforementioned kind—we distinguished them analytically in order to take a better look at the preexisting regime, which somehow persists into the present.

The war(s) that devastated and eventually led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, conditions that caused them and the enormous consequences they had for economic, political and social relations among ex-Yugoslav nations remain a topic for research. In short, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a process that officially started after the 1990 elections and the secession of the Socialist Republic (SR) of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, has resulted in immeasurable human tragedy, damaged economic, political, and social relations, and a permanent tear in the social fabric of sociocultural life. In

1992, BiH followed suit of Slovenia and Croatia, declaring independence from Yugoslavia. Whereas the declaration of independence has led to a war in both Slovenia and Croatia, these wars were relatively short-lived compared to the long and costly war that materialized in BiH. The extent of human suffering and the damage caused to the social fabric and ties that once existed among people of this region is not surprising given that the SR BiH closely resembled ethnic makeup of Yugoslavia, with its population mixed to such extent that tearing it apart was possible only through massive bloodshed, destruction, and fabrication of fear and distrust. Indeed, what makes BiH unique, at least in the context of former Yugoslavia, is that it was the only Yugoslav republic that did not have a “titular nation” but was instead composed of three dominant groups (Muslims/officially Bosniaks since 1993, ethnic Serbs, and ethnic Croats) in more-or-less proportional shares. Unfortunately, neglecting the lived experience of the people sharing life in this small land, the West quickly adopted the notion of “ancient hatred” as an explanation for the brutalities the war had brought. More detailed observations, however, reveal complex processes of constructing and publicly disseminating nationalist discourses culminating in Milošević’s “anti-bureaucratic,” elite-driven patterns of ethnic mobilization and radicalization of inter-ethnic relationships that transformed once existing and relatively stable cross-cutting social networks into ethnically centered and segmented communities (Biro, 2006; Oberschall, 2000; for an early and rather informative account on the processes leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia, see Rusinow, 1991).

Hence, what differentiates Yugoslavia, and most notably BiH, from the general process associated with any symbolic and/or material *transition* is that the symbolic regimes of post-socialism have inserted, indeed had to insert, themselves not only as post-socialist but also as postwar regimes. This is what Vlasisavljević (2007) thinks when he articulates the constitution of “three nations as three war narrations.” What he maintains as a fundamental characteristic of a symbolic constitution is a war-centered self-constitution of “small peoples” in the Balkans as a century long experience (Vlasisavljevic, 2007). Naturally, whenever we speak about wars we speak about winners and losers, friends and foes, victims and perpetrators. A symbolic regime that establishes itself with these references inevitably has to elaborate on these semantic ensembles. This has been an almost universal experience in the post-WWII period—obviously leading to the formation of clearly opposing representations embodied in the Cold War opposition, but also an enormous variety of alternative elaborations. Interestingly, the symbolic regimes constructed out of the ashes of socialist Yugoslavia in the last decade of the twentieth century, once more emerged as postwar regimes. This, in turn, meant once again entangling and disentangling in the process of elaborating and building “new” symbolic structures through the prism of conflict, on graves and bones, in the most literal sense, thus adding yet another dimension to that state of “in-betweenness” of not only monuments but also the entire symbolic regime of which they are a part.

Socialist regime and its objects, although almost unanimously deemed criminal post factum, in a way withdrew into the shadow where they continue to haunt—if not undermine—the new national regimes, for whatever is assumed to be the principal semantic content of socialism, its alleged criminality seems almost benign in

comparison to the newly emerged national criminalities. On the other hand, deeming the conflicting radical nationalisms the principal wrongdoers of the present almost lifts the weight of socialism's guilt, albeit within the frame of decreasing its efficacy by fortifying divisions and borders, always through a new *agrarian reform*, against the idea of "brotherhood and unity." Indeed, a look into the more recent past and the introduction to the dissolution of Yugoslavia reveals accentuation of social (and symbolic) divisions framed primarily around *national questions*—a *specter* haunting socialism as an idea from its very onset (see, for example, Connor, 1984)—thus setting the stage for a radical national rework of a shared symbolic regime. Most prominent examples of national claims strongly entering the public discourse in the pre-dissolution period are the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) Memorandum and the Slovene Academy of Sciences Declaration of the Serbian and Slovenian national programs, respectively, while still preserving the broader framework of Yugoslavia. Clearly, one of the most conspicuous and widely cited symbolic events marking the national revival and with it the definitive breakup of Yugoslavia was the infamous speech on the Kosovo Battle's 600th anniversary delivered by Slobodan Milošević at Gazimestan in 1989, a site near Priština where the Kosovo Battle, one of the crucial symbols in the Serbian national self-imagination, took place in 1389.

This over-accentuation of cultural difference is not unusual particularly in the process of the (re)birth of a nation. In Eley and Suny's (1996) terms, "Culture is more often not what people share, but what they choose to fight over." Indeed, it is precisely the cultural similarities that are constructed as the most significant differences in the time of a major social change. Illustratively, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where people speak one and the same language (with *regional* dialects), we presently have three official languages that are fully mutually intelligible. The actual linguistic and semantic differences among these three languages are mostly negligible. The essential "difference" among them is in their names—Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian (each to represent a purportedly culturally "distinct" *ethnic* group, which in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina are conflated with religious denominations). Correspondingly, ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs in this country are constructed as culturally distinct from each other and other "ethnic others" who inhabit this country and culturally identical to Croats and Serbs in Croatia and Serbia proper, respectively. Similarly, Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks are constructed as the true guardians of the idea of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who unlike ethnic Croats and Serbs, do not have a "spare country" or matrix. This symbolic fight via cultural means can take any shape and renaming the language and appropriating it as ours, thus strictly distinct from theirs, is but one example. Vlaisavljević (1998) has aptly dubbed this process "reappropriation of cultural ownership." Analogously, marking of territory as ours by the means of erecting monuments that glorify the accomplishments of our people or the suffering of our heroes and symbolically cleansing the territory by removing monuments and other markers that signify the presence of an unwanted other or undesired interpretation of the past—typically occurring simultaneously—are integral parts of this "reappropriation of cultural ownership" process. This line of reasoning coincides with Benedict Anderson's (1983/2006)

theorizing of nations as “imagined communities” that are not based on actual interactions among all members of the community but are instead founded on some preconceived or constructed notion of what the nation to which one belongs is. It seems that precisely because nations are imagined communities, we need symbols—flags, coats of arms, monuments, national heroes, significant dates and ceremonies—to create a sense of confederacy, a bond, in individuals. It is through these symbols that a sense of belongingness to a group is established and maintained. Monuments truly epitomize imagined communities. Indeed, they are frequently erected to construct and maintain a notion of a nation, an imagined community par excellence. It is then not surprising that monuments are the first to be targeted when new communities are imagined or already existing imagined communities are reinterpreted to fit the needs of the present.

Monuments and Collective Remembering

Having historicized and situated socialist monuments in the symbolic power framework, broadly defined, we now wish to move to the discussion of monuments in a different framework, that of memory—or perhaps more appropriately *remembering*. The reader will recall that in this chapter we do not refrain from borrowing from a wide array of theoretical considerations to scaffold our discussion of these monuments, a discussion that is not limited to the use of monuments by the ruling elites to establish and maintain a system, but also extends to what meanings and functions these monuments might have in the post-socialist space.

Over half a century ago, Maurice Halbwachs (1992), one of the most prominent scholars to theorize memory, has made a distinction between “history” and “collective memory,” a distinction that is made on the basis of the applicability of the past to the present. Olick (2008), summarizes Halbwach’s distinction between history and collective memory in the following terms, “History is the remembered past to which we no longer have an “organic” relation—the past that is no longer an important part of our lives—while collective memory is the active past that forms our identities” (p. 7). Although this conceptualization of collective history as “active past that forms our identities” is useful, it does not seem to fully capture what is at work in the process of reinterpreting monuments, and with it reinterpreting the past. The process of reinterpreting the past in the context of the Yugoslav space appears to involve both the more recent past (associated with the socialist system) and the more distant past associated with each ethnic group’s self-imagined “long-standing tradition” that is purportedly made culturally distinct from the alleged “long-standing traditions” of the other ethnic groups. The past, then, is not only continuously under the process of reinterpretation but also undergoing active construction at both the collective and individual level (see Misheva, 2010). Indeed, Čolović (2008), in reading a range of historic accounts of ethnic groups inhabiting the ex-Yugoslav space found in the works of contemporary historians, demonstrates that these imagined groups are frequently represented as having a history that is older than the history itself and constructed as extending into prerecorded times.

In reality, both of these *pasts* could largely be described in terms of “invented traditions,” to borrow from Hobsbawm (1992) that vigorously strive to achieve cultural distinctiveness from the ethnic other who, in reality, is not so culturally dissimilar. Indeed, the smaller the actual cultural differences, the greater the vigor with which the differences are constructed. Here, Barth’s insight about “real” and socially constructed group differences seems particularly poignant. According to Barth (1969/1998), the absence of “real” differences among ethnic groups does not destabilize the “organization of social differences” or diminish the social power of group constructs. Instead, the reduction of differences often means fortification of the “border-maintaining processes” (Barth, 1969/1998, p. 33).

Monuments are closely linked to memory, or more appropriately remembering as a process rather than memory as a compilation of static episodes contained in our minds. Because remembering always occurs in a specific context and is inherently dialogical and textually mediated (Wertsch, 2002), it is not surprising that in the time of major changes entire landscapes are symbolically unmade and remade to influence collective memory and the process of remembering. Indeed, wherever one goes in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, he/she encounters the strong messages mediated through symbols making it virtually impossible to remain uninfluenced by the intensive efforts at unmarking and remarking of the territory. For instance, in Sarajevo one could easily find oneself sipping coffee on the Street of the Bosniak (read Muslim) Brigade, whereas only a few kilometers away one could eat dinner on the Street of the Serbian Defenders, not to mention the numerous monuments erected in the postwar period, commemoration ceremonies, flags, and other markers that have been continuously and forcefully conveying their potent messages for the past two decades. The primary function of these markers seems to be a vigorous effort to create *our* collective memory as opposed to *their* collective memory, thus influencing the process of remembering of both members of *our* and *their* group. Wertsch (2002) describes this as “contested distribution” of collective memory, where different perspectives or ways of remembering function in “a system of opposition and contestation” (p. 24). In Wertsch’s (2002) words,

Competition and conflict characterize this sort of representation of the past. Instead of involving multiple perspectives that overlap or complement one another, the focus is on how these perspectives compete with or contradict one another. Indeed, in some cases, one perspective is designated specifically to rebut another. (p. 24)

This is precisely what seems to be at work in postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the territory markers—monuments, commemoration ceremonies, names of schools, streets, and institutions—from the pre-1990s period have been replaced en masse by new monuments, commemoration ceremonies, names, and collective histories. Interestingly, this was done in such a way that one meta-narrative (of socialist revolution and the historical unification of the South Slav peoples) and almost all markers associated with it were replaced by three mono-ethnic narratives and their symbols. This symbolic cleansing of territory has a dual purpose, to differentiate *us* from *them* and to make the ethnic other feel uncomfortable, unwelcome, and out of place in *our* majority-controlled areas. In that regard, they almost represent a continuation of war through other—symbolic—means aimed at cementing ethnic

cleansing and partition accomplished during the war. Indeed, the defining feature of “elite politics” in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to be its ethno-directionality that strives to push people away from being and remembering as individuals and toward the centrality of ethno-group as the main source of meaning. This “enforcing and reinforcing of symbolic domination” has been primarily accomplished through the mass construction of religious buildings and symbols. There are numerous examples that effectively capture the intensity of this effort. In a symbolically important city of Mostar, that remains perpetually divided along Bosniak-Croat ethnic lines, Croatian dominance finds its material expression in the forms of a cross overlooking the city from a mountain top and an unnaturally tall church tower that through its height wants to compete with the minarets dominating the Bosniak part of the city (for example, see Greiff, 2011). Another example can be found in Foča, a town in Eastern Bosnia that was entirely cleansed of its sizable Bosniak prewar population, where a monument was erected to honor the fallen Serbian fighters. The fact that such monument was erected is not necessarily problematic in its own right; what is problematic is its message that conveys symbolic and de facto domination of one ethnic group, signaling to the expelled that they are not welcomed back. Numerous half built mosques can be found around Sarajevo, on more than one occasion built against the will of the local population, giving material expression to the underlying uncertainty of ever reaching the desired symbolic victory. Even when monuments are erected to communicate a message that is not limited to coquetting with the sentiments of one ethnic group, they nonetheless seem to assume this form. An abstract sculpture erected in 2009 in the Big Park in the center of Sarajevo dedicated to the murdered children of Sarajevo attempts to encapsulate a certain universal moral statement—wrongness of murdering children. The author, Mensud Keco (Postavljen spomenik, 2009, para. 5), explains its symbolism in the following terms,

The monument consists of a bronze ring made of bombshell and bullet brass. The brass were collected in the postwar period, melted and made into a ring. A group of children related to the children killed in the war imprinted their feet into the ring. Two freestanding glass sculptures in the middle represent a mother protecting her child.

A sculpture portraying a mother protecting her child surely aims at a universal message. Still, in the subtext, this object inevitably narrates the suffering caused by the ethnically *other* group—which, of course, is exactly what happened, but what is important is not the actual factum but the way it is interpreted and the way it resonates through the public use—and this is where the semantic of a monument as a symbol becomes contentious. Principally, the question really is, can it be any different when violent deaths are the theme materially represented in the form of a statue.

The Symbolism of Socialist Monuments

Socialist monuments are witnesses of a time passed. Some, mostly situated in the urban centers, are symbolically unambiguous. The message they convey is clearly related to the period in which they were erected—they represent the people’s

liberation struggle through depiction of fallen partisans and other notable individuals celebrated for their acts of heroism and dedication to the antifascist struggle and the “brotherhood and unity” idea. Others are quite ambiguous (Kim & Burghardt, 2012). Placed on the sites of significant battles fought during WWII, these oversized monuments built in a rather abstract architectural style, hardly have any apparent symbolic relation to the time in which they were designed and built. Indeed, these grandiose structures were intentionally abstract and free of any ethnic symbolism for it was through them that the idea of the victorious and revolutionary regime was publicly constructed and represented. By employing the “politics of leaving things unsaid” and promoting the culture of not publically speaking about the atrocities committed during WWII, these unsaid things were pushed under the rug but remained remembered and retold secretly in the *underground*, semi-private and private discourses. Arguably, by leaving things unsaid and actively choosing, banishing, erasing, and manipulating the past and constructing the official narrative about the past—a process termed Yugoslavia’s “policy of memory” by Iliana Bet-El (2002)—the Yugoslav regime provided a symbolic reinforcement for the “national awakening” that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Curiously, the new politics promote the suffering and greatness of *our* people while censoring the socialist past. Indeed, the past always seems to be in the service of the present—it is retailed, reimaged, retold, or sometimes blatantly reconstructed to fit the needs of the present. Incidentally, because of the ambiguous nature and the remoteness of the grandiose socialist monuments that through their abstractness sought to decontextualize the multifaceted and problematic experience of WWII, these monuments are often ignored if not outright forgotten by the current regimes.

So what is the purpose of these monuments? Do they have a purpose? Do they have a future? Could they become tools in the skilled hands of the masters of “heritage industry,” “who deem progress their right” and “seek zealously to convert, heal, and restore the fissures in which dogmatism has yet to flourish” (Trigg, 2009, p. 229)? Trigg (2009) recognizing a danger associated with this trajectory and cautions that the spin-doctors of the present conceive of progress in terms of “keeping an eye on error while eradicating the origins of dissent” (p. 229). Indeed, considering the absence of any unified stance toward the recent past in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina—actually the recent past has been almost entirely dialogically deserted—we can almost speak of a gradient of selectivity of remembering and forgetting (Karačić, 2012) in this society. Among ethnic Croats, the monuments from the previous system have been largely ignored or destroyed. They simply could not be integrated into the new official narrative of independent Croatia and its imaginary correlates among BiH’s Croats—in fact, they seem to stand in direct opposition to the independent Croatia narrative. One recent example shows this clearly. In May 2013, a memorial monument “Tito’s Rose” built in 1985 in Široki Brijeg, a small Croat-dominated town in west Herzegovina was demolished. Its demolition was initiated and carried out by local authorities and justified as an act of redeeming the past since, according to the explanation, although officially commemorating Partisan victims, beneath the structure, lay many victims of that same partisan army. The situation has been somewhat different among ethnic Serbs, as

there appears to be a degree of selectivity in deciding which monuments to neglect and which to integrate into the Serbian narrative. For example, the dominant Serbian post-socialist narrative has been ambiguously marked by attempts at rehabilitating “Chetniks” (see Hoare, 2006) who are in the contemporary Serbian discourse routinely represented as authentic antifascist forces, a representation that stands sharply in contrast to the official socialist narrative. The WWII crimes committed by the Chetnik forces are purposefully left excluded from the Serbian narrative, and, when discussed, strongly defended. Serbia has made yet another step further by legally rehabilitating Chetniks and equating them to the partisan army. On the ground in BiH this reinterpretation of the past is exemplified by the removal of a partisan monument in Bileća, a town in southern Herzegovina, in 2012 and the erection of a monument commemorating Chetniks in the exact same place. An even greater level of selectivity can be found among Bosniaks. Essentially, monuments supporting the thesis of continuity of the Bosnian state, drawing mostly from the medieval period, have been preserved and incorporated into the narrative of Bosnia’s statehood, whereas those that failed to support this thesis (in other words, the vast majority of the socialist monuments), remained largely ignored (Karačić, 2012). This sketch of how contemporary ethnic regimes related to the monuments of the past BiH falls nicely into the Forest and Jonson’s (2002) schema about the Soviet-era monuments in post-socialist Russia. Based on the “relative commemorative vigilance” and the divergent “political usefulness,” Forest and Jonson (2002) identify three categories: (1) co-opted/glorified, (2) contested, and (3) disavowed, each attribute designating the form of the relationship and the degree to which these monuments remain socially efficient.

Thus, monuments that once symbolized one nation are selectively reimagined to fit the newly constructed narratives if they can serve the purpose of propagating and sustaining new ideas of what life should be like in the ethnically parceled post-Yugoslav space. When convenient, the contemporary political elites occasionally use these monument sites to stage commemoration ceremonies that have very little, if anything, to do with the partisan struggle and are instead used as a backdrop for promoting their political—often nationalistically spiced—agendas. Interestingly, realizing the political potential of promoting daily politics on the sites of the partisan antifascist struggle, there has been an emerging enthusiasm for staging commemoration ceremonies in the recent years, only this time with an ethno-nationalist twist (Karačić, 2012). If, however, these monument sites cannot be used for the purposes of propagating political views of any faction, they are deemed functionally useless and thus either destroyed or ejected to the junkyard of history, in the sphere of forgetting.

Is an alternative trajectory possible, one that does not merely reduce these remote monuments to trivial “pastiche,” pale copies of their former selves or, even worse, tools in the skilled hands of masters of “heritage industry”? Allowing them to become ruins presents an attractive proposal, for the “ruin’s memory no longer belongs to anyone. Because of this, memory becomes indeterminate, and thus non-linear. The ruin does not bring us back to a definite temporal point. Instead, it

suggests a limitless potential of temporal points” (Trigg, 2009, p. 239). Could we even conceive of these remote monuments as ruins? Trigg (2009) makes a clear distinction between ruins as structures that are allowed to decay and monuments that present memory as “plastic and contrived” (p. 238). Even so, monuments that are of central interest in this chapter—remote, ambiguous, neglected, and forsaken—seem to have a genuine potentiality of becoming ruins in the true sense of the word precisely because they are remote, ambiguous, neglected, and forsaken. As such, they entail an inherent ability to interfere with the project of micro-nationalizing, thus disrupting a sense of linearity and order while maintaining their status as nationally indifferent.

The potential of ruins is indeed great as “the emergence of the past in ruins, as fragmented and incomplete” overrules the “false arrangements of the past, whereby the surplus remains are discarded, presenting history as an ordered, self-contained, and rationalistic project” (Trigg, 2009, p. 238). Although this trajectory presents an attractive alternative to either destruction or pastichification, a complete metamorphosis from monuments into ruins would require time and absolute neglect, allowing monuments to become entirely divorced from their original symbolic meaning. Might these monuments carry a potentiality that reaches beyond the ruins’ ability to liberate us “from the already formed definitions of history” (Trigg, 2009, p. 238)? Might their ambiguity and their status as neglected and forsaken remnants of a time past become a symbol that binds in the more proximate future?

Monuments Divided

Monuments are inherently dividing. They divide horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, they cut time into two distinct periods—the time before and the time now. In the post-Yugoslav states, these structures represent a time period that is seldom mentioned by political elites; yet though not widely publicly present or discussed in the post-Yugoslav political landscape (and when discussed framed to serve the “daily politics” purposes of this or that political faction), these monuments still represent a shadow narrative—often poorly articulated but present—about an alternative political and social possibility. Vertically, they cut across socially salient ethnic groups thus disrupting the current social and political order, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav successor state that most closely resembled Yugoslavia. In fact, because of its ethnic makeup (none of its three dominant ethnic groups is in the clear majority), BiH was frequently referred to as “mini Yugoslavia.”

Whereas some people (regardless of their ethnicity) remember and embrace this part of history as an integral part of their past and hence their identity, others reject this period and construct it as something that they never wanted, something that was enforced by a powerful and controlling state. These monuments, *de facto*, seem to stand in their way of distancing from the past in the most radical way—by forgetting the past. In fact, thousands of monuments from the post-WWII period have been

demolished, vandalized, or otherwise destroyed since the early 1990s onward. This destruction of monuments was evidently an attempt to eradicate a period that is perceived or experienced as undesirable because monuments, for as long as they stand, remain silent but constant reminders of a time that—if possible—should be expunged from the memories of the nation and its people. Some, in fact, perceive the period between the two wars (WWII and the 1990s wars) as a rupture in an otherwise continuous history of their nation, and monuments as their embodiment. In fact, this treatment or maltreatment of the monuments from this era leads one to believe that the monuments “do not just symbolize an enemy but *are* in themselves the enemy” (Bevan, 2006, p. 21).

This sentiment is perhaps most strongly pronounced in Croatia where these monuments are perceived as a symbol of Serbian dominance in a “union” that was never desired by the Croatian people. A good example of this position is Potkonjak and Pletenac’s (2007) article, in which the authors analyze the depiction of post-WWII monuments in Sisak as symbols of oppression. Ostensibly, once these monuments are removed, a sense of continuity—by mending the rupture of the Yugoslav period through reinterpreting or forgetting—can once again be established. As Jonas Frykman (2003) eloquently states,

What was once the triumph of the Yugoslav state has been redefined as monuments to a dictatorial power. The link between the monuments and the now detested Yugoslav army, JNA, was all too clear. In any parts of the country, memory has caught up with the monuments and made them reveal themselves as demagogic attempts at persuasion. When people in Croatia needed to gain access to their history, they had to remove the monuments that were blocking their path. That is why they stand today as destroyed monuments. Access to history must be gained *through* them—not *around* them. (p. 58)

On the other hand, for those who embrace this period as a part of both their personal and the collective past of their nation that informs the present, these monuments seem to represent a phase of their lives that not only do they not wish to forget but a phase of their lives that also serves as a source of memories that cannot and should not be merely reduced to longing for the lost past. Although the experiences associated with these monuments differ—some weave them into their personal narratives and the narrative of their nation and others either set them in stark opposition to their personal and national narratives or act as if they never happened—these monuments seem to be almost entirely stripped of their initial purpose and symbolism. As such, they could either be deposited to the junkyard of history (literally or symbolically) or they could be perceived as structured void of meaning. In the event of choosing the first route, these monuments will be either destroyed or museumized, thus largely rendered inconsequential, as in the case of Moscow where a mass of “disavowed” monuments once marking the city landscape now sits in the Park of (Totalitarian) Arts (Forest & Jonson, 2002, p. 536–537). If the second route is followed—if these monuments (especially those that are built in abstract architectural style and are geographically remote) are deemed void of meaning—they might become available potential markers of a new symbolic transformation.

Socialist Monuments as Nationally Indifferent?

The notions of “symbolic regimes” and “symbolic power” (Bourdieu, 1989), “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2006), and “contested distribution of collective memory” (Wertsch, 2002) bring us closer to understanding the social and symbolic function of monuments and the underlying rationale for why they are so frequently targeted in a time of political change or social unrest. Still, they leave one important dimension unexamined—what happens at the margins of symbolic regimes, imagined communities, and collective memories? Zahra (2010), in her recent reassessment of the state of her field—history—proposed the use of “national indifference” as a unit of analysis, which she describes as “a response to modern mass politics” (p. 98). She asserts that national indifference as a phenomenon has existed in Europe for a long time (i.e., it has a long history), but, it had not been labeled until recently. Zahra (2010) conceives of this lack of vocabulary to describe populations that are nationally ambivalent as a testimony to the overemphasis of and oversaturation with nationalist-laden terminology in the social sciences. In other words, people are commonly described and their actions analyzed within the frame of nationalist assumptions. Naturally, the nationalist assumptions orientation, frequently adopted by social scientist, can have serious real life consequences. A good example is the “ancient hatred” approach to the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia adopted by President Clinton and his cabinet, an approach that was shaped by Robert Kaplan’s popular book *The Balkan Ghost* (see Bet-El, 2002).

Drawing on examples of the twentieth century Upper Silesians, mid-nineteenth century Dalmatians, and others who chose to “remain on the national sidelines,” Zahra (2010) argues that national indifference is still present in modern societies, though it has become less apparent, especially in supranational states that compulsorily classified its citizens into one of the available categories. This same forcible classification can be found in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, its constitution offering four categories: Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and others. However, in the context of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, not all individuals subscribe to the aforementioned currently available mono-ethnic narratives or the exclusionary categorization along ethnic lines. There are those who are indifferent to them. In fact, how people declare themselves on official forms offers some evidence of the existence of national indifference (among the most popular nationally indifferent “categories” are penguin, Eskimo, and Chuck Norris). Another way of practicing national indifference is by adding names of candidates that are not listed (among the most popular candidates here seem to be superheroes, local celebrities, and curiously Chuck Norris again) or writing comments on the ballots (referring to the politicians as thugs, crooks, and swindlers). Both of these actions are examples of a “double expression” of national indifference, once by making the form or ballot invalid and once by rejecting being placed in one of the preexisting ethnic categories. As Zahra (2010) aptly notes, we should not conclude that national indifference equals political indifference. Quite the contrary; “inaction, evasion, and indifference” could all be analyzed “as potential forms of political agency” (p. 113).

Indeed, taking national indifference as a unit of analysis might shift the paradigm from thinking or theorizing people as “belonging to nations” to taking indifference as a starting point and studying “how and why people allied themselves politically, culturally, and socially from the ground up” (Zahra, 2010, p. 118).

Applying the concept of national indifference to monuments may seem like a stretch, for monuments are not human beings capable of making choices. At the same time, however, monuments are an integral part of every nation’s past and present. Indeed, as Goerges Bataille, a twentieth century French intellectual, has prolifically stated, “if one attacks architecture...one is, as it were, attacking man” (as cited in Hollier, 1992, p. 54). As it has been demonstrated many times throughout our modern history, monuments often meet a dire destiny when nations are unimagined. Many are destroyed in efforts to erase memories attached to architecture and place associated with an undesired past or unwanted others, a process that Bevan (2006) terms “enforced forgetting.” Yet others are pushed to the margins of society, ignored and neglected to the extent of becoming almost invisible. Much like the concept of national indifference can be useful in integrating the voices of those who are on the “margins of elite politics” as demonstrated by Zahra (2010), we believe that this construct could be potentially valuable in studying marginalized monuments and memories. Indeed, the monuments scattered in remote locations across the former Yugoslavia may be seen as embodying the idea of national indifference.

Strictly speaking, monuments erected during socialist times in Yugoslavia were hardly nationally indifferent at the time they were built. Rather, as we explained earlier, they stood as symbols of a different conception of a nation, a nation whose foundations are rooted in the past, but whose substance is to be constructed in the future. This was to be accomplished through a collective action of its people embedded in a setting that crosses rigidly constructed symbolic (national) boundaries. Indeed, the often futuristic architectural style of these monuments additionally underscores this forward-looking orientation. It may be argued that precisely because of its inability to fully assume this future orientation, Yugoslavia’s dissolution was marked by a strong reemergence of ethnic and nationalistic orientations that resulted in ghastly violence and massive destruction. Analogously, nationally indifferent populations or individuals, at least ideally, do not withdraw from politics altogether; instead, they seek to redefine politics. Rather than succumbing to the dominant national reworking of history or completely distancing from the realm of politics, nationally indifferent populations or individuals frequently aim at instigating open and communicative incorporation of historical legacies into current or future communal or societal discourses and visions.

Surely, the monuments of interest here have lost the symbolic power they once had. Nonetheless, they are silently, albeit persistently, demonstrating the possibility for subversion of prevailing mass politics of ethno-nationalism by invoking what has been purposefully left out. For an illustrative example see Todorova’s (2010) narration of her personal experience of an “absent site.” A monument that once marked her personal city map of Sofia, the Mausoleum of Georgy Dimitrov, erected to commemorate a post-WWII state prime minister and a notable communist figure

from Bulgaria's past, though physically removed still ghostly persists and functions as a reference point.

It is impossible—even inappropriate—to predict whether these monuments could ever become symbols that traverse, destabilize, and transform socially and politically salient group boundaries, but due to their great abstractness and remoteness, they surely seem to entail a potentiality for symbolic transformation. Representing the disavowed past on the margins of the unraveling present, they appear as fundamentally open to a new symbolic work of *language games*, reinterpretations, inscriptions, attributions, and story-building efforts. Though this does not necessarily lead to any easily predictable outcome, it is here where their potentiality for reemerging as symbols that bind lies. This may seem as an ambitious proposal, but past events have shown that reinterpretation of monuments or significant figures is not only possible but also probable (e.g., Boym, 2001; Marschall, 2010), for meaning is not entailed in the monuments; rather, monuments are imbued with new meanings generated in the ongoing process of rememorization (Frykman, 2003; Nora, 1989; Potkonjak & Pletenac, 2007). The preserving efficacy of many of the sites and monuments surely further supports this assertion. Certainly, these monuments need not (and indeed hardly can) reassume their intended symbolism invoking the values of antifascist struggle or socialism. Yet divorced from their historical burden, these monuments could reveal a more universal purpose of strivings for liberty, solidarity, community, and thinking in terms of novel ways of democratic self-management. One thing remains certain. Ultimately, the fate of these forsaken structures is in the hands of the people. They may well remain perpetual pariahs; however, they may also find their place in the symbolic systems of the future. Only time will tell whether collective imagination of tomorrow will find a formula for situating these monuments in the collective narrations of the past, if nothing else than as tourist attractions or oddly looking playgrounds.

Conclusion

In an effort to eradicate one epoch and create an illusion of ethnic continuity, socialist monuments—along with religious symbols of ethnic others—became some of the most favorite targets of destruction in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Similarly, the period symbolized by these monuments was frequently dialogically constructed as the “time of darkness.” In the general euphoria of the so-called national awakening, the efforts were placed on removing or rendering inefficient any symbols that served as reminders of shared life. To illustrate, if we conceived of an EKG as a pulse of a nation, then the period between the two wars (WWII and the 1990s wars) would be represented in the shape of a flat line (effectively signifying the state of rest or death) and the continuous waves composed of spikes and dips would represent the exciting pulse of a nation (or in the case of BiH, where there is an absence of a nation in the nation-state sense of the word, we are better positioned

to speak of three distinct pulses, each representing one of the three dominant and constitutionally recognized ethnic groups). These monuments disrupt the wavy flux of markers of ethnic continuity. By their mere presence they constantly remind of the historic fact that a different social order once existed and make palpable the possibility of an alternative social organization. To symbolically erase that past, one would have to either erase or otherwise mute the symbolism that these structures carry. Alternatively, one could incorporate these monuments as markers of a period that has now passed but that still represents a part of one's personal history as well the history of one's nation, however undesirable or unappealing it may seem.

Indeed, in any society past and present it seems possible to talk about two populations, those who have been institutionalized to accept and embody the dominant political and social order and those leaning toward national ambivalence. In the context of contemporary BiH, the former are loyal members of their ethnic group, who routinely perceive these monuments as symbols of a period of darkness that needs to be forgotten. They frequently seek to achieve radical separation from this period by demolishing the monuments, and with them all physical evidence of the "unwanted past." The latter are nationally ambivalent in so far that they disassociate with these monuments, fail to associate them with a malicious historic period or political system, or simply integrate them as markers of a period that constitutes an integral part of both their personal histories and the history of their land, without overly dwelling on them. Indeed, there are also those who seem to experience these monuments (among other triggers of remembering) as representations of the only meaningful alternative to the present perceived as void of any kind of viable sense of being or belonging. While it is possible that this yearning for the lost past may be associated with nostalgia for the time when one did not have to think much as the government was thinking for you, as suggested by Salecl (2000), it could also be that the present is indeed perceived to be so bleak that people are looking to the past to make sense of the present marked by uncertainty. Whatever the case may be, it appears that two parallel *memories*—complicating the dominant neatly organized *ethnic memories*—are at work, the *memories* constructed by the ruling elites and the *memories* as remembered by ordinary people. In spite of the effort to omit the recent past from the national narratives, the past still lingers in the memories of individual persons, who frequently speak of a time before and time after as two distinct periods in both their personal lives and the history of their country. In this sense, the monuments represent dividing symbols that split time into "then" and "now," but at the same time they also could be thought of as symbols that unite, as they are constant reminders of the shared life that—however much denied and however distant from the absolute harmony—indeed existed before the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Although it is hard to tell what the future holds for these once significant monuments, we would like to conclude this chapter on a constructive note. Perhaps, in not so distant future, the time will come when more people will grow tired of keeping up with "the exhausting demands of the nationalist lifestyle" (Zahra, 2010, p. 103) and will "organize around non-nationalist concerns and issues" (Zahra, 2010, p. 103). In fact, it appears that there already is a growing body of individuals who are becoming or have for a while been nationally ambivalent. These individuals

refuse to organize their lives or political allegiances according to the national priorities. They choose to self-marginalize by being nationally, but not necessarily politically, indifferent. It seems that the monuments discussed in this chapter have potentiality for national indifference in a similar vein. Precisely due to their location (geographic remoteness) and the non-nationalist architectural style in which they were built, they seem to—at least—symbolically challenge the nationalist orientation and invoke national ambivalence.

Although it may sound like an ambitious proposal, pairing nationally indifferent populations with nationally ambivalent monuments could lead to a productive process that could potentially move the country toward processes that would go beyond the tension constructed around ethnic division and toward a recognition of genuine distances and differences as a universal condition of being human rather than a source of resentment and acrimony. Yet, in order for this to happen, the initiative must come from the people themselves.

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“What We Are, Where We Are Headed”: A Peace March Visits an Ex-torture Center

Carolina Muñoz Proto

This is what I can tell you about the March: It brings us to that essential reflection about what we are, where we are headed.

Juan Pablo, 39, speaking at Villa Grimaldi.

What is the local meaning of a transnational peace march in a post-dictatorship society? How do divided symbols inform local activists' understandings of such an initiative? And how does a transnational peace march inform or transform their relationship to local symbols of division? This chapter explores these questions in relation to the former Cuartel Terranova (Terranova Station) in Santiago de Chile. The site was one of hundreds of secret detention centers that operated throughout Chile during the 16-year-long military dictatorship that followed the 1973 coup d'état. In 1994, the site became the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park, dedicated to promoting human rights and commemorating the abuses of the dictatorship. Since then, the park has been the stage of numerous human rights and peace education efforts of local and international scope. In 2009 the Park was included in the official route of the World March for Peace and Nonviolence (the March), a transnational campaign that promoted alternatives to war and militarism.

On a warm December afternoon and after almost 90 days of travel, the Pacific and Atlantic legs of the March converged in Santiago de Chile. Local supporters and international travelers marched towards Villa Grimaldi for an event that included a tour of the park, a recital, and speeches by international marchers and local organizers. Among the roughly 500 people in attendance there were international marchers, primarily from Europe and the Americas, as well as local supporters of all ages. For many of these local activists, community organizers, and peace advocates, the

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March's arrival in Santiago created a unique opportunity to visit the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park for the first time. The March also stressed the global relevance of this local symbol of trauma and division. During the event 13 attendees contributed their testimonies to the Memoscopio archive (Muñoz Proto, Devoto Lyon, Villar Castillo, & Battistella, 2013), which was developed through a participatory study of the March in seven countries in the Americas. The Villa Grimaldi testimonies are part of a digital collection of 193 testimonies by March participants from 20 countries.

This chapter offers a close analysis of four Memoscopio testimonies and the ways in which their authors address the complex meanings of the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park through their accounts of the March. Before delving into this analysis, the chapter first offers a brief discussion of the Chilean post-dictatorship context and a framework for thinking about the contemporary meanings and sociocultural functions of Villa Grimaldi. The chapter then describes the March and the Memoscopio archive in more detail and presents the analytical framework used to interpret the Memoscopio testimonies. The chapter ends with a discussion of the functions of Villa Grimaldi as a divided symbol that was briefly recruited into a transnational peace and nonviolence campaign.

A Brief Discussion of Political Memory in Post-dictatorship Chile

Recently Chile observed the fortieth anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état. The coup brought a violent and controversial end to the administration of Salvador Allende, the first socialist government in Latin America to have been formed through open elections (Dávila, 2013; Meade, 2010). In the context of the Cold War and US interventionism, the coup set the stage for a 16-year military dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet (see Esparza, Huttenbach, & Feierstein, 2010). During the dictatorship years the ruling *junta* reversed Allende's socialist policies and turned the country into a laboratory of authoritarian neoliberalism inspired by the Chicago School of Economics (Retamozo & Garrido, 2010). As it happened in other countries of the region, private actors and state agencies persecuted, tortured, killed, and disappeared thousands of communist and socialist supporters, union leaders, workers, and left-leaning community organizers (see Esparza, Huttenbach, & Feierstein, 2010). Between 1973 and the early 1980s a network of over 1,000 clandestine detention, torture, and extermination centers operated in numerous cities and towns in Chile (Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004). There, thousands of Chileans were the targets of systematic state violence while normal life, albeit under a dictatorship, went on outside their walls. These events transformed Chile's psychological, sociocultural, economic, and political landscape in lasting and controversial ways.

For the last 40 years every anniversary of the coup has inspired contentious reflections about the causes, significance, and consequences of the dictatorship and of Chile's return to democracy (Han, 2013; Volk, 2013). The psychological

dimensions of these events have received considerable attention by scholars and practitioners (Lira, 2013). Contemporary scholarship by Chilean psychologists tends to explore the ways in which diverse sectors of society engage in public and private debates about the politics of memory, truth, and reparation (see the special volume introduced by Cumsille, 2013). The profound conflicts these debates activate reveal the continued relevance of the past within the Chilean landscape. During the last two decades the country has developed institutional approaches to commemorate this painful past. Studies of everyday life, however, suggest that a perceived the impossibility of achieving true reconciliation has driven many sectors of society to tolerate irreconcilable differences and take part in depoliticized forms of memory and discourse (Reyes Andreani, 2006; Reyes, Muñoz, & Vázquez, 2013).

As Escobar Nieto and Fernández Droguett (2008) argue, the production and performance of collective memory about the coup rely heavily on the places, events, and public figures that have come to represent deep divisions in Chilean society based on political tradition, class, ethnicity, and role during the coup and dictatorship. Ex-torture centers are among the most complex symbols of past and present conflict. As I will discuss in more detail in the following section, this is in large part due to the irreconcilable meanings these sites carry for communities that have historically been in conflict with each other. Among these groups are victims and perpetrators of violence, right wing and left wing parties, the armed forces and the civilian population, and Chileans of indigenous and European descent, among others.

The Complex Meanings of Villa Grimaldi

According to the records of Corporación Villa Grimaldi (n.d.), the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park was originally an early twentieth century Italian style hacienda house in the outskirts of Santiago. The property served first as a private summer home and later as a restaurant frequented by left-leaning intellectuals, artists, and leaders of Allende's political coalition, the Unidad Popular (Corporación Villa Grimaldi, n.d.; Violi, 2012). Not long after the 1973 military coup the villa became a center of detention, torture, and extermination known as Cuartel Terranova. From its origins Cuartel Terranova has been a symbol of national trauma and division. The site's complex history has caught the attention of numerous intellectuals and artists who have attempted to promote public dialogue about the ethics, aesthetics, and legal aspects of commemoration and remembrance (see Gómez-Barris, 2010; Lyon, 2011; Soto Castillo, 2009; Traverso & Azúa, 2009).

The *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (National Intelligence Headquarters, later renamed *Central Nacional de Informaciones*), which had been created in 1974 to oversee the surveillance and repression of dictatorship detractors, ran Cuartel Terranova during its 5 years of operation. The human rights violations that took place at the site were similar to those that took place in other detention centers across the country (Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004).

Post-dictatorship investigations estimate that nearly 5,000 people—among them men, women, and children—were held at the site (Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004; Corporación Villa Grimaldi, n.d.). Most of these prisoners experienced torture and sexual abuse before being released or exiled, and nearly 230 were killed or disappeared as a result of their captivity. The Park's records show that at least 20 intelligence agents, police officers, and military personnel were involved in these actions.

During the early years of the dictatorship the meaning of detention centers was deeply tied to their role as secret tools of control and repression. For many sectors of Chilean society patriotism has long had a repressive edge that is well captured in the national emblem “By Reason or Force.” This has been coupled with social representations of military strong men as forefathers of Chile's independence. These notions of patriotism operated as an aesthetic and cultural backdrop to the coup and the dictatorship (cf., Errázuriz, 2009). This cultural backdrop helped justify the actions by the military regime and its supporters as means to defend the fatherland against the alleged threat imposed by communism and socialism. The meaning that Cuartel Terranova held for the soldiers and agents who ran the operation was likely infused with these notions. Very much in contrast, this secret detention center was a site of defeat, trauma, resistance, and resilience for many detractors of the dictatorship (Gómez-Barris, 2009).

The Cuartel Terranova operated in secrecy until February of 1978, when it was dismantled and its management was transferred to a second intelligence agency. The site remained abandoned, partially demolished, and unknown to many Chileans until 1987, when demolition plans gave rise to a conflict between those wishing to destroy the site and those wishing to preserve it. After 9 years of abandonment the then director of the *Central Nacional de Informaciones* sold the property to a development company owned by his relatives (Corporación Villa Grimaldi, n.d.; Violi, 2012). Similar to other ex-torture centers in Argentina and Brazil, the ex-Cuartel Terranova quickly became an epicenter of important conflicts over demolition, preservation, and modification of torture centers (Hidalgo, 2012; Schneider, 2012; Violi, 2012). In 1988 the developers leveled the buildings, tower, and cells in preparation for the construction of luxury apartments. But while those directly responsible for the abuses attempted to erase Cuartel Terranova from the map of Santiago and the history of the country, victims' organizations mobilized to publicly demand preservation. Through legal battles, and with the help of private and state organizations, victims and victims' relatives succeeded in transferring the site to the administration of *Corporación Villa Grimaldi* which had been founded to oversee the construction of a future memorial.

Vast sectors of society and the state apparatus were silent bystanders to the legal battles over the fate of Cuartel Terranova. As Gómez-Barris (2010) and others have argued, the desire to “leave the past behind” and seek reconciliation without truth was based on well-founded fears of new military interventions. Many believed that the still weak efforts to restore democracy—threatened by Pinochet supporters in the state, the civilian population, and in the Armed Forces—would not survive truth and reconciliation efforts such as those sought out by the victims of Cuartel

Terranova. Caught between erasure, preservation, and fabricated indifference, the site came to symbolize a larger tension between two paths to reconciliation and democracy: Amnesty and erasure of state brutality versus recognition, prosecution, and reparations (cf., Hite & Collins, 2009).

In 1994, 4 years after the end of the dictatorship, the site became the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park. Today the site is a reconstruction of the various elements of Cuartel Terranova as described in survivors' testimonies. As Violi (2012) and Lyon (2011) argue, Villa Grimaldi is defined by its designers' choice to recreate the original villa's gardens rather than re-present the horror of Cuartel Terranova through a total reconstruction. Contrasting the Park to a high-profile ex-torture center in Cambodia, Violi (2012) explains:

Tuol Sleng is explicitly defined as a 'Museum of Genocide Crimes,' while Villa Grimaldi was renamed as 'Park for Peace'. The different denominations imply a radical shift in the categorization of the place itself, according to a double system of oppositions: 'museum' versus 'park' on the one hand, and 'genocide crimes' versus 'peace' on the other, forcing in this way a completely different reading of the site. (p. 54)

For almost two decades now the site has been devoted to bringing the victims' experiences back from erasure. The Park is a lush garden where visitors find: (1) the water tower where prisoners were kept in isolation before being disappeared; (2) a reconstruction of one of the cells; (3) a model of the center as it was in 1975; (4) a Wall of Names honoring the site's victims; (5) the Rose Garden, honoring the women detained at the site; (6) the Hall of Memory, which profiles several of the disappeared; (7) the Tracks Monument, which honors the disappeared; and (8) the Homage to Militants, which honors the detainees' political parties and groups. In addition, the Park houses an oral history archive, the Memory Site Human Rights Education Program, and a museum that educates school children and the general public about the site's history. The Park's mission to commemorate violence and resistance is similar to that of other memory projects. Psychologist Susan Opatow (2011), for instance, argues that the Jewish Museum of Berlin:

brings evidence, artifacts, and voices of the past back to Berlin to teach people today about moral exclusion and its catastrophic outcomes for those excluded and for the larger society. The museum is not only commemorative but also symbolizes the return of Jewish culture to Berlin. (p. 72)

The Villa Grimaldi Peace Park represents a similar return of the disappeared and the silenced into the political and cultural landscape of post-dictatorship Chile. But while state agencies, private institutions, and community organizations have celebrated this return and commemorated the site's legacy for the last two decades (cf., Hite & Collins, 2009), other sectors have engaged in conflict-avoiding forms of indifference. Reflecting a wider trend (see Reyes et al., 2013), the initial conflict over the preservation or destruction of the site seems to have been replaced by a quieter tension between politicized remembrance and fabricated indifference. For many, the Park is an unwelcomed call to respond morally and politically to the country's painful past, as well as a challenge to narratives that claim a full return to democracy and justice (cf., Kennedy, 2004). Gómez-Barris (2010) argues that the

contemporary meaning of the site is defined not only by the brutal events that took place during the dictatorship but also by the events that have taken place since the country's transition to democracy:

Recent historical events in Chile, including the death of Pinochet, his own and his family's tarnished image, and the election of former political prisoner and torture survivor Michelle Bachelet to the presidency, have helped pave the way for a more truthful rendition of the nation's authoritarian period. Even so, the lasting effects of Pinochet's restructuring of the Amnesty Law, the widespread legacy of fear in the aftermath of the military regime, the culture of impunity, and a massive desire for novelty fueled by neoliberalism continue to constrain Chile's transitional justice and democratic process. What the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park offers is not only an antidote against forgetting, but a meaningful historical and present-day location in which communities politically engage their past, as I soon show. By understanding this memorial's contemporary social use as an organized micro political culture, rather than merely analyzing its symbolic value, we can begin to analyze how the past continues to structure people's exercise of citizenship at such a place. (p. 33)

Building on Gómez-Barris' approach, the rest of this chapter explores the symbolic dimension of the site in relation to the social uses that peace advocates gave to Villa Grimaldi in the context of the World March for Peace and Nonviolence. Within this framework, the focus is on the ways in which these activists' understandings of the March and of Villa Grimaldi informed and transformed each other.

The World March for Peace and Nonviolence

As mentioned earlier, the World March for Peace and Nonviolence (www.theworldmarch.org) arrived at the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park on December 28, 2009 after 3 months of travel around the world. The March was a 2009 transnational campaign that promoted alternatives to war and violence through a 94-day journey around the world. Endorsers included world-renowned public figures ($n > 1,198$); grassroots and not-for-profit organizations ($n = 504$); special interest groups ($n = 125$); governmental, cultural, and media institutions ($n = 149$); educational institutions ($n = 46$); and local municipalities ($n = 183$) in 19 countries. Across identities, languages, geographies, generations, and movements, these diverse supporters found common grounds on a demand for:

(1) nuclear disarmament at a global level; (2) the immediate withdrawal of invading troops from occupied territories; (3) the progressive and proportional reduction of conventional weapons; (4) the signing of non-aggression treaties between countries; and (5) the renunciation by governments of the use of war as a means to resolve conflicts, [as well as the] rejection of all forms of violence. (World Without Wars and Violence, 2009).

The March departed from Wellington, New Zealand, on October 2, 2009. Its start was celebrated with simultaneous activities in 54 countries and 300 cities. During the 3 months of the March, local organizers held press conferences, symposia, concerts, exhibits, recitals, processions, carnivals, parties, and other events in nearly 600 cities around the world. After visiting 60 countries, the March arrived at the

Punta de Vacas Park of Study and Reflection, in the Argentine Andes, where over 4,000 marchers took part in its closing ceremonies. As one of the first transnational peace marches of the twenty-first century, the initiative was a unique window into the psychology of transnational peacebuilding in a digital and globalized world. Because of its scale and diversity, the March was an opportunity to study how a wide range of local activists and organizations from around the world participated in, and experienced, such a large-scale initiative.

Marching across national borders was only possible for a core group of volunteers with access to the right kinds of funding, time, passports, and visas. For this reason, there were thousands of local marchers who joined in as the March passed through their neighborhoods, towns, and countries. (The sample of testimonies presented in this chapter features both local and international marchers.) March events combined the remembrance of past wars, suffering, oppression, and resistance with activities that invited participants to imagine a future culture of peace, justice, and nonviolence. Most March events around the world took place at temples, mountains, and other sacred sites; at city halls, central squares, and other civic centers; and museums, commemoration sites, and other memorials such as the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park. Indeed, many of the sites the March visited could be conceptualized as divided symbols with complex histories and meanings. In addition, the March had a strong social media and digital component that included online collections of videos and images, blogs, and Facebook groups. Hundreds of thousands participated virtually through websites, blogs, and social media. The Memoscopio archive was one among hundreds of digital initiatives inspired by the March.

Memoscopio: A Participatory Study of the March

The Memoscopio archive was created during 2009 and early 2010 at the request of Chilean March organizers. The work was carried out by a diverse team of advocates, activists, and researchers who founded the Memoscopio Project (Muñoz Proto, Devoto Lyon, Villar Castillo, & Battistella, 2013). The project aimed to: (1) document the diversity of individual experiences within the March; (2) generate knowledge about the March's psychosocial significance within and across places; and (3) produce a resource that would be useful to educators, advocates, and researchers. The questions that guided this project focused on the social-psychological meaning of the initiative from the perspective of its participants: What did this 'march around the world' mean to them? What did their participation mean to their advocacy work, their communities, and their contribution to a culture of peace? How did the March deepen or change its participants' understandings of peace, justice, and nonviolence? And how did it inform their ways of remembering the past, experiencing their lives, and imagining the future?

Memoscopio's approach to answering these questions was inspired on what Michelle Fine (2012) calls a psychology for "revolting" times, which favors participatory methods in the study and transformation of conflict and injustice. With roots

in action research (Lewin, 1951) and the pedagogy of the oppressed (Freire, 2000), a Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach emphasizes the applicability, relevance, and shared ownership of research-based knowledge (Brydon-Miller, 1997; McIntyre, 2007; Torre & Fine, 2011). Based on the tradition of community self-surveys and the principles of PAR (Fine, 2006; Torre & Fine, 2011), the Memoscopio team conceived the project as a participatory digital archive of testimonies to be developed in collaboration with March participants. The project put an equal focus on memory and imagination, playfully describing itself as:

Me-mos-co-pio \me-mō -skōpēō- \ noun [from memory + kaleidoscope]: (1) A collective act of memory and creation; (2) An online archive of testimonies about the World March for Peace and Nonviolence.

The use of archiving as a research strategy positions Memoscopio within an increasing number of memory websites, digital archives, and testimony collections that are being created in the context of human rights campaigns and peace activism worldwide (Ashuri, 2012; Fadda-Conrey, 2010; Gregory, 2006; Reid, 1997). The design of the project responded to the fact that the production, circulation, and remote use of information were central to the March (Muñoz Proto, Devoto Lyon, Villar Castillo, & Battistella, 2013; Muñoz Proto & Opotow, 2012). Among other practices sharing and listening to personal testimonies was an important component of participants' experiences during planning meetings, public events, and online participation.

The project builds on a relatively recent but rich array of archives of peace and conflict that house individual testimonies. These antecedents include the archives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) on South African Apartheid (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, n.d.) and the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies (Hartman, 2006). Other institutional archives that inform Memoscopio include the September 11 Digital Archive (Brier & Brown, 2011) and The Commonweal Collection on the Quaker Peace Testimony (Arbor, 2002).

The testimonies in the Memoscopio archive were gathered during March events in the United States, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. The team collected accounts from a diverse sample of marchers during "down times" (i.e., sitting down, resting). The team invited participants to share written, audio, or video accounts on any of the following themes: (1) *The March and I: Its connection to my personal story*; (2) *The March and the world: Its role and significance today*; (3) *The March and the future: Its contribution and projections*; and (4) *Any other topic that seems important*. Memoscopio contributors, who were at least 18-years old, provided their informed consent for the team to publish and study their testimonies (For a detailed description of see Muñoz Proto, Devoto Lyon, Villar Castillo, & Battistella, 2013).

The archive that resulted from this approach (archive.memoscopio.org) houses 36 written and 157 video testimonies ($N=193$) by marchers from 20 countries in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia. The contributors range in age from 18 to 75 and represent a wide range of levels and types of involvement in the March. These contributors are diverse in cultural backgrounds, genders, occupations, and affiliations. They also range in their levels of familiarity with, and commitment to, peace

and nonviolence activism. Memoscopio contributors represent various levels of involvement with the March, including: (1) national and international organizers; (2) international marchers; and (3) local supporters. These various categories of contributors are in themselves diverse, with each person bringing to their testimony their own situated understanding of protest, trauma, violence, in/justice, activism, and peace. These perspectives include those of (1): young Iraq War veterans and conscientious objectors and relatives of 9/11 victims, as well as antiwar and anti-nuclear organizers from the United States; (2) both seasoned and young environmental, health, and pro-democracy activists from Colombia; (3) spiritual and union leaders from indigenous communities from El Alto in Bolivia; (4) youth leaders and educators working in Lima, Peru; (5) political artists from Argentina; (6) and middle-aged professionals who lived through Pinochet's dictatorship, as well as young student activists from Chile, among many others.

The subset of 13 testimonies that inform this chapter was gathered during the March's visit to Villa Grimaldi. The interviews followed the aforementioned protocol and took place: (1) near a central fountain while marchers toured the park; (2) near the stage after the recital; and (3) by the Park's gates as the marchers prepared to leave. In addition, three marchers who spoke during the program gave permission for their speeches to be included in the archive. This approach resulted in a set of ten video testimonies and three written testimonies. The contributors in this subset range in age between 23 and 72 years old and include six women and seven men. Among them are local March organizers ($n=3$), local supporters ($n=6$), and international marchers ($n=4$).

Approach to Analysis

As a method, the analysis of testimonies builds on a tradition of oral histories, and photo-voice methodologies used by social scientists to study individual and collective experiences with exclusion (Luttrell, 2010) and conflict (Lykes, 2010). In their most basic definition, testimonies are accounts of an event or experience that a witness or protagonist shares with an audience, either in person, writing, video, or otherwise. Testimonies are what Mikhail Bakhtin (1982, 1986) calls a distinct genre of discourse, with unique conventions and affordances. Testimonies are tools for powerless people to make public their perspectives and knowledge (Lykes, 2010), thus addressing both allies and enemies. As a genre, testimonies have a growing relevance in cultural, political, and scholarly life. Testimonies have deep roots in Latin American society (Bustos, 2010), Holocaust research (Hartman, 2006), and Truth and Reconciliation processes (Duncan, Stevens, & Sonn, 2012).

Testimonial accounts can be valuable windows into individuals' changing perceptions of divided symbols. In this case, Memoscopio testimonies offer critical information about the ways in which local peace advocates engaged with Villa Grimaldi in the context of the March. The following section presents a content analysis of the subset of 13 testimonies from Villa Grimaldi, which was carried out in tandem with

a larger analysis of the entire archive. The first stage of this analysis involved the creation of an online exhibit in collaboration with the Memoscopio team (<http://archive.memoscopio.org/exhibits/show/moments-of-the-world-march/concert-in-villa-grimaldi/item/1752s>). This approach addressed the need to engage the testimonies as public digital objects whose meaning is situated within specific lives, places, sociopolitical contexts, and moments of the March (cf., Walker, 2010). The second stage involved watching each testimony in the subset multiple times, transcribing, and translating them from Spanish to English. During this process I listened for: (1) descriptions of the March's visit to Villa Grimaldi; (2) articulations of the meaning of Villa Grimaldi in the marchers' own lives and in post-dictatorship Chile; (3) reflections on how Villa Grimaldi informed and/or changed their experience of the March; and (4) reflections on how the March informed and/or changed their understandings of Villa Grimaldi. I carried out the analysis using a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006). In the following section I present the analysis through a close look at four testimonies by March participants from Santiago de Chile.

It is important to mention that the excerpts I present in the following sections do not do full justice to the emotional, gestural, and linguistic richness of the video testimonies, which were intended to be viewed online in the context of the archive. Furthermore, the excerpts lack the sounds, the landscapes, and the weather conditions in which the participants shared their testimonies, thus missing another layer of richness: the testimony as an embodied act that marchers carried out at a given time, place, and in a given psychological state (of excitement, reflection, anticipation, etc.). The aforementioned online exhibit that accompanies this written analysis serves to compensate for these shortcomings and allows the reader to experience the testimonies in their original language, diversity, and intended medium.

Four Testimonies

The testimonies that Alex, Magaly, Danilo, and Sergio shared at Villa Grimaldi communicate an atmosphere of excitement and engagement but are also infused with the pain and conflict of the dictatorship. These testimonies are a sample of the diversity of perspectives and intentions that converged under the March's banner and gave meaning to events such as a visit to the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park. The testimonies suggest that the meaning of the March and its visit to the Villa Grimaldi are rooted in the marchers' life stories as well as in the activities through which they experienced the March. Each testimony contributes a rich and complex description of the March's significance within post-dictatorship Chile and a globalizing world. An important theme that is present throughout the subset of testimonies is the significance of the March as an opportunity to learn about the history of Villa Grimaldi. The marchers describe the Chilean past and present from their unique positions and experiences. These descriptions are often coupled with deepened understandings of

the marchers' relationship to the dictatorship, Villa Grimaldi, and/or post-dictatorship society. The testimonies shared by Alex and Magaly illustrate this theme.

Alex: Reflections on a First Visit

Alex is a therapist who was 49-years old at the time of the March. In his testimony, Alex reflects on the experience of visiting Villa Grimaldi for the first time. Sitting under one of the Park's beautiful trees, Alex spoke into the Memoscopia camera:

I had the misfortune, when I was 11 or 12, to live the start of the dictatorship period in Chile. I am the child of right wing parents. However, the values they themselves transmitted onto me did not allow me to follow their same paths and the same outlook they had. Maybe I took a part of their values and with that I built my own life. And for a long time my eyes were shut... [pauses, chokes up] ...until arriving at places like [Villa Grimaldi] that I did not know existed. One of the things that touches me the most is knowing that there can be people that can make others suffer so much. I work, to the extent possible, to accompany others. And this is a place that is beautiful but [also a place] where the suffering of many people is palpable. And, actually, there must be many others going through the same [suffering] (Excerpt from Memoscopia Testimony 314, translated from Castillan).

Alex makes sense of his first visit to Villa Grimaldi through an origin story that begins with his family and his upbringing as "the child of right wing parents." In the Chilean context, this means he most likely grew up within the sectors of society that supported the dictatorship. In this sense, Alex's experience echoes that of many Chileans who grew up during the dictatorship within right wing or *Pinochetista* families, which made up a large portion of the country. It is possible that a large portion of the local marchers in attendance that day may have never before visited a former torture center, despite their open condemnation of the dictatorship. What is unique and striking about Alex's testimony is the open admission of his ignorance and of his unintentional contribution to the erasure of this painful past. As it is visible in the video, he is moved by the realization that, until then, he had been unaware of the Park's existence ("I did not know [it] existed"). Another interesting element in Alex's testimony is the description of how the very values received from his family allowed him to build a different outlook and, among other things, recognize the significance of international peace and justice initiatives such as the March. This and other mentions of intergenerational relationships in the archive speak of how the dictatorship impacted family relations.

The following portion of the testimony provides clues as to why he may have chosen to speak publicly about his experience. This portion of the testimony also touches on how previous life experiences prepared him to recognize the transformational potential of the March:

I want to share my testimony because I approached the humanist movement [which organized the March] due to personal reasons, due to health reasons. And I found a group of people that would give an unconditional amount of love and care that I have never seen before in other places. And it was strange [is that] I discovered that there was so much to learn and so much to tell, and so much that people don't know. I discovered that it was pos-

sible to give unconditional love and that I could also contribute to this. Of course [a health problem] is a cause of sadness and one feels great pain, but it is the moment to rebuild life and rebuild the outlook towards the world and forward. That seed also forms part of this Park, in its idea, in this participation in the project (Excerpt from Memoscopio Testimony 314, translated from Castillian).

Alex's testimony speaks of the power of community life to turn private, silent health crises into a source of collective strength, and mutual recognition. His accounts suggest that this previous experience prepared him to recognize and value the social function of the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park as a place that helps make public the invisible suffering of those held there during the dictatorship. For Alex, recognition and community are sources of strength for survivors who, despite their sadness and pain, hope "to rebuild life and rebuild the outlook towards the world and forward." While reflecting about himself, Alex also touches on issues that are central to post-dictatorship Chile. Slow transformation towards nonviolence and growing awareness are among these issues:

I believe the World March is a way to warn, to tell, and to say that violence in the world can be stopped but this must be built from within, stopping one's own violence. The contributions [of the March] will be significant for a very long time. I believe it will be one moment, and then another, and then has to come another one until people can come to awareness of what it means to not face reality through violence by working on one's own violence. I believe this is how we can live in peace with one self and with the world (Excerpt from Memoscopio Testimony 314, translated from Castillian).

This last portion of Alex's testimony touches on the meaning of the March and its contribution to building a culture of peace. Speaking at Villa Grimaldi from his newfound position as a Chilean who has moved from fabricated ignorance to the recognition of violence, Alex shares a deepened understanding of the meaning of peace and of the March's contribution to peacebuilding.

Magaly: Returning Home

Alex is not the only Memoscopio contributor who found a new voice through his participation in the March and his visit to Villa Grimaldi. Magaly's brief testimony offers a similar account of transformation. Magaly, a middle-aged activist from Santiago, joined the March's three-week journey through Latin America, marching from Mexico City to Punta de Vacas in Argentina. Magaly makes sense of this experience through a story of return. Speaking from the Villa Grimaldi stage, she describes her growing sense of belonging to a peacebuilding community, both as a Latin American and a Chilean. She also describes a deepened understanding of the healing intentions that inspired the preservation of Villa Grimaldi:

My journey was through Latin America, through our sibling towns, and I must say that everywhere I went I would say... "I want to stay here" because the affection was so strong... And I arrive here [where] I was born, and I also feel the violence that was exerted. But there is a reason why at some point we stood up and said "we are going to build something different because life is beautiful." ...I deeply thank having participated of this team

[of marchers] that has been wonderful and having participated of the March (Excerpt from Memoscopio Testimony 472, translated from Castillian).

Magaly describes how her journey through Latin America and her participation in the March inspired in her new feelings of solidarity with places and communities she had no previous relationship with. In addition to this new sense of community, the March gave her the opportunity to return to her city as a ‘marcher’ whose experience and opinions were worth sharing with others. It is from this position that she publicly acknowledges the painful history of Villa Grimaldi and celebrates the attempt to rebuild Chilean society.

Danilo: On Apolitical Peace and Political Memory

In addition to a deepened understanding of the past and the present, a second theme that runs across this subset of testimonies is the impact of Villa Grimaldi on the marchers’ opinion of the World March for Peace and Nonviolence. The testimonies shared by Danilo and Sergio exemplify some of the ways in which Villa Grimaldi informed their experiences of the March. Danilo is a 27-year-old teacher and political activist who promoted the March and helped organize its activities in Chile. He shared his testimony near the Peace Park’s gates as the marchers left the site:

The significance of the World March for me grew from little to large. At first it was a very weird thing, a thing that did not resonate with me. I felt it [to be] very naive, it is true. But with time I saw that it gained in strength, it gained in shape, and in content. And that filled me much more, resonated much more with me. And even more now that it has arrived to Chile. To be here in Villa Grimaldi. This really does have substance. It is not any March. I has a lot of weight (Excerpt from Memoscopio Testimony 309, translated from Castillian).

Danilo’s testimony speaks to how memory sites such as Villa Grimaldi can give weight and political relevance to peace initiatives such as the March. Speaking as an engaged activist and citizen, Danilo articulates a concern expressed by many contributors to the Memoscopio archive: The tension between crowd-pleasing apolitical peace events and politicized forms of memory that promote greater recognition of local histories. As Danilo, many March participants who are active in local political movements described their rejection of any initiatives that equate peace with the absence of conflict. In the Chilean context, this version of peace is often used as a justification to work for reconciliation and democracy in the absence of memory, truth, and reparations. Such approaches to post-dictatorship peace purposefully avoid dialogues about the most painful aspects of the dictatorship. It is in this context that Danilo understands the site’s political relevance and “weight.” The visit served as proof that other March organizers were committed to a more complex approach to peace that welcomes conflict and politicized memory about the past.

The Memoscopio interview also served as an opportunity for Danilo to infuse the March’s culture of peace discourse with a public reflection on the complex relationship between peace, memory, and justice:

For me the importance of the March for the world is that it is relevant. It is a small grain of sand that this collective is contributing towards the construction of a humanist social revolution, a revolution that is militantly nonviolent... that is the future, to project ourselves in that direction, to connect with old generations and new generations, to create that bridge between Chile, Latin America, the world without excluding any one. And I feel that here we lived a great ceremony full of emotion, on the topic of human rights and the topic of how from memory and from not-forgetting you project yourself to the future with joy, without resentment, but firmly. And that is active nonviolence. That is peace and nonviolence. That is all (Excerpt from Memoscopio Testimony 309, translated from Castillian).

In the above portion of his testimony Danilo offers a theory of change in which events such as the March make small contributions towards a more all-encompassing transformation. This transformation involves three elements that counter local politics of silence and erasure. These include growing solidarity, a transnational understanding of peace and violence, and an intergenerational movement that promotes the transmission of knowledge and memory. For Danilo, events such as the March's visit to Villa Grimaldi serve to open imagination about the future of post-dictatorship societies and to infuse a politics of memory and reconciliation based on the practice of "not-forgetting."

Sergio: Denouncing Silent Forms of Violence

Sergio, a 38-year old painter from Santiago, shared his testimony while standing on the sidewalk next to the tall wall that delimits the Park. While Alex, Magaly, and Danilo begin their testimonies with personal accounts, Sergio jumps directly into political commentary. Speaking as a witness to the Chilean process, he seems to address an international audience that is not familiar with the country's history:

First of all, here in Chile there was a fairly violent period, there was a lot of suffering for a long time, when violence was present on a daily basis. The problem is that despite the arrival of democracy, some aspects have not changed. And our duty now is to struggle against that violence, which is a bit more secret, and [to raise] the consciousness we need so there can be that change within my country, Chile (Excerpt from Memoscopio Testimony 391, translated from Castillian).

The March's visit to Villa Grimaldi provided an opportunity for Sergio to counter official narratives about Chile's transformation. Sergio rejects the notion that Chile's nominal return to democracy means the country has overcome violence or achieved a peaceful society. In his analysis, direct violence and state brutality have been replaced by the "secret violence" of social exclusion, economic exploitation, and other structural forms of violence rooted in neoliberalism and the legacy of the dictatorship. Sergio not only denounces these forms of structural violence but also speaks about complacency and stresses the responsibility that Chileans have to address these problems and help their country reach more profound changes. It is against this context that he offers a positive evaluation of the March's significance. More specifically, he celebrates the March's capacity to bring people together, raise awareness about ongoing problems, and take the first steps towards a less violent culture:

I think is indispensable that people become connected through this idea and generate a whole movement within which we may become energized and have a common objective which is to beat violence in these days. And it has to do with [the March's] contribution and projection. I think this denunciation can be a first step among many that can be taken so that future generations can live in a country and a community of nonviolence or of more controlled violence so that there may not be so much aggression of all kinds, such as the media. In my view it is necessary that all these topics be approached and become subject of conversation, of debate, of change, totally contemporary. I give thanks to be here. I will always participate of these things because they are part of my life and I invite you all to join this (Excerpt from Memoscopio Testimony 391, translated from Castillian).

Similar to Danilo, Sergio ends his testimony with a call to engage critically with the post-dictatorship reality as a “subject of conversation, of debate, [and] of change.” Together, Danilo, Sergio, and other marchers suggest that the March's visit to Villa Grimaldi was significant not only at a personal level but also at a political level.

Agents of Memory, Agents of Imagination

Despite having been transformed into a peace park the ex-Cuartel Terranova continues to be a ‘repository of negative memory in the collective imaginary’ (Meskell, 2002, p.558; cited by Hidalgo, 2012). As a site of national trauma, the Park is defined by an uneasy relationship to silence and indifference (cf., Reyes et al., 2013). It is thus imperative to study how these dynamics may be interrupted in order for the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park to play an even greater role in Chile's peace and justice imagery. The Memoscopio testimonies presented in this chapter offer a window into these interruptions and transformations. The focus of the analysis presented here has been on the reflections that Alex, Magaly, Danilo, and Sergio shared with Memoscopio about the World March for Peace and Nonviolence and its visit to the Peace Park. As a set, these testimonies describe what ‘marching for peace and nonviolence’ meant to local March supporters who visited Villa Grimaldi. Most importantly, they offer a window into how the March informed or transformed these marchers' relationship to the conflicts the site has come to symbolize.

As Alex and Magaly describe, the context of the March helped local March supporters experience the site in new ways. For Alex, this meant making sense of his first visit to Villa Grimaldi through an origin story that connects his upbringing and community life with the country's conflicted relationship to memory. Magaly's testimony, in turn, presents her experience through an account of her journey with the March and her emotion-filled return to Chile and Villa Grimaldi. Both Alex and Magaly describe a deepened capacity to value and support the Peace Park's mission and to connect Chilean experiences with a broader movement for peace. These testimonies exemplify some of the ways in which the March may have deepened other marchers' engagement with the significance of Villa Grimaldi in post-dictatorship Chile. The Memoscopio testimonies also suggest some of the ways in which Villa Grimaldi informed local activists' understandings of the March. As Danilo and Sergio argue, Villa Grimaldi served as a bridge between a global peace discourse

and the local concerns of Chilean activists. The March's inclusion of Villa Grimaldi in its route enabled Danilo to fully commit to the initiative. The March's visit also allowed him to reflect on the importance of remembrance and to offer a public critique of depoliticized peace initiatives that brush over local memories and post-conflict tensions. For Sergio, the March's visit to Villa Grimaldi was a double opportunity to visit the Park in an act of remembrance and to warn the public against narratives that portray violence and injustice as matters of the past.

While the symbolic meaning of the Cuartel Terranova seems 'frozen' in irreconcilable narratives about the causes and consequences of the dictatorship (cf., Reyes et al., 2013), these testimonies suggest that the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park can foster more fluid, dynamic, and generative reflections among Chileans who are willing to support transnational peace initiatives. As a place of activism and community building, the park is a site where real people of diverse backgrounds can meet; where they can rethink their personal and family connections to the dictatorship; and where they may reach new understandings about life in post-dictatorship Chile. The Memoscopio testimonies suggest that the March's visit may have enriched these dynamics in three ways. First, the March shifted the marchers' frame of reference from a local to a transnational one, thus creating 'space' for new kinds of knowledge about the site. Said differently, what may have seemed controversial or taboo to the marchers within the Chilean context may have suddenly become common sense in the context of global peace initiative. Second, the March created an opportunity for new voices to speak about the site as witnesses and protagonists of its ongoing history. Ex-torture centers such as Villa Grimaldi are often and rightfully represented through the testimonies of survivors and, less often, of perpetrators of violence. The March created an opportunity for young people and for activists from various sectors of society to experience an important event at the site. The March also invited them to reflect on their relationship to the violence of the dictatorship and to speak about their peace and nonviolence activism outside local discourses about conflict, human rights, and democracy. Finally, the March created new audiences for these accounts and reflections. The opportunity to address a wide audience of national and international March supporters and detractors may have catalyzed the reflections and realizations found in the Memoscopio archive. The existence of this audience also helped local activists articulate their complex relationships to memory, community, and reconciliation in post-dictatorship Chile.

These new frameworks, experiences, and audiences helped position local March supporters at Villa Grimaldi as advocates of memory and imagination. Alex, Magaly, Danilo, and Sergio would agree that memory sites such as Villa Grimaldi are defined by exclusion, erasure, and amnesia (cf., Greetham, 1999). The context of the March and the Memoscopio interviews were opportunities for local activists to speak publicly against these dynamics and to reflect on the personal and political significance of Villa Grimaldi in post-dictatorship Chile. In this way, the March and Memoscopio positioned local peace advocates as *moral memory agents* (Ashuri, 2012). Both initiatives positioned these March participants as experts whose experiences and testimonies could promote a more engaged and active form of collective memory about the dictatorship.

The March and Memoscopio also invited these activists to act as *agents of imagination*. By this I mean that these initiatives helped the marchers publicly claim Villa Grimaldi as a site where peace, democracy, and justice are learned, documented, and promoted. Acting as agents of imagination, the marchers shared provocative articulations of the meaning of peace advocacy in a post-dictatorship society. Consistent with Reardon and Cabezudo's (2002) view of peace as process, their testimonies sketch an organic theory of change towards a truly peaceful Chile. According to Alex, Magaly, Sergio, and Danilo, post-dictatorship peacebuilding should involve: (1) constructive and nonviolent dialogue about the past even if it produces discomfort (cf., Deutsch, 1983); (2) remembrance, reconciliation, and recognition of violence and suffering through the preservation of, and active engagement with, sites of trauma (cf., Eaton, 2011); (3) the fostering of a political imaginary that rejects quiet forms of violence such as inequality and exclusion (cf., Bradbury, 2012; Fine, 2006); and (4) the fostering international solidarity and dialogue. In these ways, the testimonies describe peace as an ongoing process of healing and transformation that builds on, yet overcomes, past conflict.

In analyzing the Memoscopio testimonies, it is important to consider that individual experience in the archive "stands for collective social and economic experience" (McEwan, 2003, p. 748). For this reason, it is important to understand these accounts as entry points into dynamic experiences rather than as static texts (Eltringham, 2009). It is impossible to know whether the marchers will describe their experiences in similar terms years or decades after the event. Neither is it possible to know the extent to which their new understandings of Villa Grimaldi were enduring. In addition, the small sample of testimonies discussed here offers only a glimpse into the layered and diverse dialogues that were inspired by the March's visit to Villa Grimaldi. March participants tended to be peace advocates and peace movement sympathizers. For this reason, the Memoscopio archive does not include the views of Chileans who actively avoid Villa Grimaldi. Neither does it represent Chileans who would have preferred having the site destroyed rather than preserved. Additional research is needed to understand how such an initiative would be experienced and described by various sectors of Chilean society, such as victims and perpetrators of violence; right wing and left wing parties; the armed forces and the civilian population; and Chileans of indigenous and European descent, to mention a few. For this reason, it is important to consider this analysis in terms of its theoretical generalizability (Fine, 2006) to other moments and contexts of the March, as well as to other societies with a history of conflict. Rather than forcing homogeneity, this perspective brings attention to how and why the meanings of the March and of Villa Grimaldi may be different across lives, times, and settings.

Conclusion

From the case of the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park and the World March for Peace and Nonviolence we learn that the recruitment of local divided symbols into international peace initiatives can fuel generative dialogues and realizations. International

initiatives such as the March can help turn a nation's sites of trauma into stages from where local advocates can articulate visions of peace and justice. This emergent knowledge, in turn, can positively transform participants' experiences of local conflicts by strengthening their capacity to engage in sensitive dialogues.

Ex-torture centers are among the most complex symbols of past and present conflict in Chilean society. This is in large part due to the irreconcilable meanings these sites carry for communities whose historical conflicts were aggravated by the dictatorship. But while the symbolic meaning of Cuartel Terranova may be "frozen" in the past, the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park seems capable of fostering constructive dialogue and transformation in the present. Building on Gómez-Barris' (2010) work on the social functions of Villa Grimaldi, this chapter has explored the uses that peace advocates gave to the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park during the World March for Peace and Nonviolence. Through a close reading of four testimonies in the Memoscopio archive, the chapter explored how the meaning of the March and of Villa Grimaldi informed the experiences of local activists.

The history of Villa Grimaldi and the testimonies of March participants speak of the important yet contentious roles that reclaimed sites of trauma play in post-dictatorship societies. Caught between erasure, preservation, and fabricated indifference, this site came to symbolize a larger tension between two paths to reconciliation and democracy: Amnesty and erasure of state brutality versus recognition, prosecution, and reparations (cf., Hite & Collins, 2009). What is at stake symbolically the role of remembrance and amnesia four decades after the coup (Baxter, 2005; Gómez-Barris, 2010; Hidalgo, 2012; Violi, 2012). For this reason, the inclusion of the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park in the March's route was a momentous occasion for many peace advocates. For the marchers represented in the Memoscopio archive, the presence of the March at Villa Grimaldi was an opportunity to explore the site's significance to their national histories and their personal lives. The Memoscopio project, in turn, created a concrete opportunity for them to publicly share their testimonies. Together, both initiatives invited the marchers to act as agents of memory and imagination whose testimonies enrich collective memory and collective understandings of peacebuilding in post-dictatorship Chile. This was enriched by the ways in which the March and Memoscopio created new frames of reference, new experiences, and new audiences for these local activists.

The present chapter has sought to make four contributions to the study of divided symbols in post-dictatorship societies. First, it highlights the dynamic nature of trauma and memory sites as divided symbols. The case of Villa Grimaldi suggests that divided symbols have dynamic and complex histories, and that the nature, implications, and protagonists of the conflicts they represent can change over time. Acute conflicts over destruction or preservation, for instance, can give way to ongoing tensions between remembrance and indifference that pose important challenges to peace and reconciliation. Second, the chapter brings attention to what happens when local divided symbols are recruited into international peace initiatives. This point is especially relevant to the study of international peace activism and to the development of global cultures of peace that are grounded on local histories and traditions. Third, the chapter brings attention to how the meaning of divided

symbols lies in the interaction between macro-level dimensions (e.g., collective memory) and individual-level phenomena (e.g., testimonies). Attention to these interactions can shed light on the transformation of divided symbols over time and on their potential role as peacebuilding tools. Finally, the chapter exemplifies how the testimony genre of political speech can be a generative site of research about how these transformations take place. The work presented here calls for further theorizing about the conditions under which transnational peace initiatives can engage local divided symbols in ways that are both constructive and generative. In any case, the chapter offers a starting point for more systematic research on the social functions of sites of trauma and on their interactions with translocal peace initiatives.

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Contested Symbols as Social Representations: The Case of Cyprus

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Introduction

Symbols are a means of representation as they stand in the place of something else. From a social psychological perspective, representations have a symbolic function since they use symbols to signify, to make sense of and to establish the real (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Representations are social as they are formed and enacted in social interaction between people in their everyday life in a way that they point to particular social relations in a single community and importantly, for the topic of this volume, relations with members from other communities.

In this sense we can understand the power of representations to construct reality beyond the impoverished perspective of empiricist notions of representation that assume the existence of correspondence with empirical orders as an a priori to the constructive workings of human cognition (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Representations are social in their nature and as such they have subjective, intersubjective and epistemic dimensions. They need to be understood in a holistic way as systems of meaning that encompass values, emotions, beliefs and ideas, as they function within the context of social relations. Such an understanding can shed light to the multiple levels of meaning suggested by the process of symbolization.

This chapter examines symbols as social representations and specifically focuses on the ways that symbolic meanings of cultural artefacts relating to intergroup conflict vary as a function of the quality of social relations between and within the conflicting groups in post-conflict and divided Cyprus. The important role that intergroup contact plays in changing the meaning of symbols within and across the dividing line is highlighted.

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Intergroup Relations and Symbols

Symbols could either bring the two parts of a relationship closer or pull them apart as they represent a particular quality of a relationship in the form of actions, prior events or times, physical objects, special places and cultural artefacts (Baxter, 1987). Artefacts and sensorial perceivable “objects” are not symbolic by definition, but become symbolic when they are interpreted and experienced as such in a particular context.

In the case of conflict and post-conflict societies, conflicting groups use various forms of representation to promote the cause of their collective struggle. As such, one of their primary aims is to communicate something to both the in-group and the out-group. As Verkuyten (1995) argues, symbols can play a key role in conflicts and debates in which the meaning and use of social symbols are a matter of dispute. Symbols also have the power to stir the emotions, moving people to action and reaction. They often become symbols of victimization, oppression, triumphalism, occupation or struggle. In the special case of divided societies, social representations, in each of the societies in conflict, can become largely divided, themselves perpetuating conflict and division.

Such representations are often anchored in official historical narratives and narrative templates (Wertsch, 2007) structuring the past, present and future of members of conflicting societies in a way that they show their intention to become *hegemonic* in society, to use one of Moscovici’s (1988) terms. The term *hegemonic* refers to representations shared by all members of a highly structured group—a party, a city, a nation—without having been produced by the members of the group as their source comes from a central authority. In conflicting societies they are usually hetero-referential (Sen & Wagner, 2005) since they refer to the same events but with exactly the opposite meaning. Still, such official narratives never actually achieve their purpose, as societies are characterized by internal differentiation, multiplicity and complexity in ideological and philosophical currents.

The antagonistic nature of these representations resonates with the kind of representations that Moscovici (1988) called polemical representations of social conflicts. Polemical representations characterize subdivisions of a society, define social identities and are determined by antagonistic relationships between groups often formed and evoked in the context of communication in relation to forms of collective action.

Social Representations and Communication

Social representations are shared in a community and structure the perception, judgment and behaviour of individuals; as such symbols can be said to have implicit, taken-for-granted meanings within a community. Social representations can be said to be the glue that keeps a group together.

Two central processes involved in the formation of social representations in communication are *anchoring* and *objectification*. Anchoring provides familiar classifications and names where the new object of representation is categorized so that it becomes integrated in a pre-existing system of thought. *Objectification* transforms abstract concepts into familiar concrete experiences so that what is perceived replaces what is conceived.

Objectification turns the invisible into perceptible and in that sense the materialization of abstractions is the central process in social symbolism (Verkuyten, 1995). Values, needs, norms and ideals are concretized so that the object or artefact embodies these abstract notions and portrays its symbolic meaning. If we were to use the iceberg metaphor, the visible tip of the iceberg could be the symbol in the form of a cultural artefact but the submerged base would be the emotions, values, ideas, practices and social relations that provide the tip its meaning. In this sense symbols can be misleading because being polyvalent means that the same cultural artefact can be a manifestation of a completely different system of thought. The case of divided societies is particularly germane in making this argument transparent.

Recent developments of the theory of social representations by Duveen (2008), and Psaltis & Zapiti (2014) from the perspective of *genetic social psychology* suggests that different forms of social representations are sustained by different types of social relations. This approach, with its emphasis on the microgenesis of social representations through the study of social relations and social interaction, is uniquely situated to offer an alternative conceptualisation of communities and an understanding of their heterogeneity beyond reified or essentialized notions of culture (Psaltis, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2014; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007).

Forms of Communication and Social Relations and Their Correspondence to Types of Social Representations

Duveen (2008) revisited the second part of the original work of Moscovici (1961, 1976, 2008) on psychoanalysis about the three communicative genres in mass media (diffusion, propagation and propaganda) and issued a call for heterogeneity in social psychology. He argued that we need to recognize that there is an intimate relationship between the values and attitudes of a group and the characteristic communication patterns that sustain it.

In particular, he likened the form of communication originally described by Moscovici as *diffusion* to a type of communication that forms an *affiliative bond of sympathy between members of the in-group* linking independently minded individuals in voluntary association—those who are engaged in a sceptical exchange of ideas in contrast with those holding various forms of dogmas. In this sense the social relations that bind together people in the group could be seen as premised on a common commitment to a view of unconstrained dialogue (Psaltis, 2014).

This is a commitment to a *method* of resolving conflict of perspectives and not a commitment to any particular content or set of beliefs. *Propagation*, another form of communication, is in contrast based on beliefs, and in that sense sets limits to the intellectual curiosity of individuals and is more circumscribed since it is established by a central authority that might be only marginally challenged on the fringes of the group. It thus limits creativity when responding to new problems. The affiliative bonds linking the members of this group of people here is *communion* and the out-group(s) are characterized either by their lack of belief or by their adherence to alternative beliefs (Gillespie, 2008) or political ideologies.

Finally, *propaganda* draws together people who share a specific political commitment, and envisage an appropriate form of political organization where the centre dominates by defining realities and they form affiliative bonds of *solidarity*. The in-group is composed of militants who may be active in various forms of agitation, but who are dependent on the centre for the intellectual content of their representation. The out-group(s) are defined either by their lack of commitment to this ideology or by their commitment to a different ideology (Psaltis, 2014).

This threefold categorization of types of groups is theoretically important in social psychology for two reasons. First, it departs from conceptualizations of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and particularly the later cognitivist elaboration of it by Turner, that groups are structured on the basis of their belongingness in a particular category and it shifts into a definition of groups depending on the way they face novelty and otherness. Second, it enables the exploration of issues of change through processes of microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis of social representations (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990) since the communicative genres contain the conditions for the transformation or non-transformation of representations themselves and in our case the meaning of cultural artefacts and symbols.

These three forms of communicative genres however could be limited as they are based on the original content analysis of newspaper communication back in France in the 1960s. There is the need to expand this kind of analysis to new forms of communication like the internet and social media but also to other forms of symbolic systems like images since according to Duveen (2008) the last years have seen an extraordinary increase in the circulation of images in all the media, the impact of which is still largely unexplored. In the present paper, we adjusted the use of a method proposed by Sen and Wagner (2005) in the study of images as symbols of conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India to the study of pictures of cultural artefacts in the post-conflict context of Cyprus.

Official Histories and the Contested Terrain of Social Re-presentation in Cyprus

Cyprus is a post-conflict society with a yet unresolved political problem where two communities, with a different ethnic, religious and linguistic background have been geographically divided across ethnic lines, for almost half a century as a result of

intercommunal conflict, external interventions by Greece and Turkey, and continuing occupation of the north of Cyprus by Turkey.

The Cyprus problem has often been depicted as a problem of opposing nationalisms (Attalides, 1979). The first intercommunal conflicts started in the 1950s when Cyprus was still part of the British Empire. Greek Cypriots began to seek liberation from the British Empire and union with Greece (*enosis*), which was opposed by the Turkish Cypriot minority, which embarked on a struggle for partition (*taksim*) of the island. In 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was founded as an independent bi-communal state. Violent intercommunal clashes in 1963 and 1964 resulted in the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from the government and of the Turkish Cypriot population into enclaves where they formed their own provisional administration (Patrick, 1976). This resulted in increased ethnic segregation and a radical decrease of the number of mixed villages that were then widespread all around Cyprus (see Lytras & Psaltis, 2011).

In 1974, the Greek military Junta engineered a coup executed by the Greek military contingent stationed in Cyprus and Greek Cypriot EOKA B extremists who were still agitating for *enosis* after the 1960 independence. The coup prompted a military intervention/invasion by Turkey that led to war. The results were major forced population displacements, loss of lives and many missing people that eventually completed the geographical division of the island into two ethnically homogeneous areas. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey in 1983 established a breakaway state, self-styled as “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (henceforth TRNC), which is recognized only by Turkey and is considered by the European Court of Human Rights as a subordinate local administration of Turkey operating in northern Cyprus.¹ In 2003, the Turkish Cypriot administration partially lifted restrictions in movement between the two communities.

In 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU with the *aquis* suspended in the northern part due to the unresolved issue and the failed attempt of the then UN secretary General Kofi Annan to reunite the island in 2004 with a referendum where the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour and a majority of Greek Cypriots voted against. Since then there have been ongoing negotiations to resolve the problem and to reunify Cyprus under a federal arrangement on the basis of bi-zonality and bi-communalism with various dossiers being discussed, the main ones being property, security and governance (see Attalides, 1979; Loizides & Antoniadis, 2009; Lacher & Kaymak, 2005; Papadakis, 2005, 2008 for various aspects of the problem).

The long lasting division of the island meant that different social representations evolved in each community, especially regarding the Cyprus problem and its history since such narratives were for years politically and officially manipulated for the corresponding “national struggles” in each community. Planned and politically driven manipulation of the media and the educational system, particularly the teaching of history, was used as a political weapon in both communities (Makriyianni, 2006; Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Makriyianni, Psaltis, & Latif, 2011; Papadakis, 2008, Psaltis, 2011). According to Papadakis (2008) the central nationalistic

¹ <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58007..>

historical narrative in the Greek Cypriot (henceforth GC) textbooks is one that begins with the arrival of Greeks (fourteenth century BC) in Cyprus that leads to the Hellenization of Cyprus, where the moral centre is Greeks (of Cyprus) and the major enemy is Turks. The plot concerns a struggle for survival by Cypriot Hellenism against foreign conquerors and has a tragic ending with the “Barbaric Turkish Invasion” and occupation of northern Cyprus. The corresponding Turkish Cypriot (henceforth TC) narrative is one that began with the arrival of Turks in Cyprus (in 1571 AD), the moral self is Turks (of Cyprus) and the major enemy are Rums² (Greek Cypriots). The plot concerns a struggle for survival by the Turks of Cyprus against Greek Cypriot domination. The war of 1974 marks a happy ending with the “Happy Peace Operation” by Turkey in Cyprus. Such official narratives clearly promote a particular form of collective remembering of victimization.³

Within each community the power and ideological struggle relates to the formation of diverse interest groups and political parties that create diversified dynamics and ideological tensions (Marková, 2000, 2003) offering varying versions of the past and collective memory (Wertsch, 1997, 2002). These ideological tensions often aim at promoting a particular form of collective action and political agenda that also regulates the quality of the relationships with the other community. The use of cultural artefacts as symbols from the official state or reinforcement or resistance of the narrative by specific groups taking varying positions in relation to the Cyprus issue in each community is thus expected to relate to various meanings and interpretations of the symbols.

Going beyond reified notions of a community and a “culture” (Psaltis, 2012a) the notion of culture can be seen as comprising a system of social representations (Duveen, 2007) that furnish at the societal level of intergroup relations varying positions of identity (Duveen, 2001; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007) and ways of orienting members of the one towards members of the other community

²Rum is actually the Turkish word that was used for the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Greek Orthodox citizens of modern Turkey are also called Rums.

³In 2004 new history books for the history of Cyprus were written by the newly elected leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat in the Turkish Cypriot community that offered an alternative narrative which challenged the separatist and nationalistic one that was in place up to that point (see Papadakis (2008) for an analysis of these short lived books). However, in 2010 with the election of the right wing UBP administration these textbooks were replaced by new ones that reverted to the old nationalist narrative described in the text above. In the Greek Cypriot community there is currently an ongoing educational reform and new curricula have been re-written for all subjects, history included. Initial efforts by the 2008, then newly elected, leadership of leftist AKEL to revise the history textbooks faced reactions by the church and nationalist circles. A compromise solution meant that in the new history curriculum there is still a lot of emphasis on Greek history along with Cypriot history but the new material produced to be used concurrently with books imported from Greece, incorporates a commitment to the promotion of historical thinking skills (see Makriyianni et al., 2011, for a discussion). In 2013 a right wing government was elected in power in the Greek Cypriot community. The new minister of education made statements for the need to promote the national identity of students. He also put the history educational reform on hold pending its evaluation and dissolved the team that was working for the elementary school educational reform and the production of educational material in the Pedagogical Institute.

(Psaltis, 2012a). The question “who is included in the community?” is also a contested question since how far the ethical horizons of inclusion and exclusion of a community extend is a contested issue itself (see Gillespie, Howarth, & Cornish, 2012).

In our recent research with a representative sample from both communities, which attempted to relate intergroup contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus to a social representations perspective (Psaltis, 2011), we identified varying positions within each community that corresponded to varying meanings of the Cyprus problem. The positions could be described by a number of dimensions like the quantity and quality of intergroup contact with members from the other community, varying emotions, feelings of threat, trust and finally anticipated or ideal *futures* or solutions to the Cyprus problem.

A crucial role was also identified for affiliation and the readiness to use national symbols like the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the national anthem of Greece and Turkey currently used in Cyprus by the two communities. In particular, positive attitude towards “motherlands” (Turkey and Greece) and the use of their symbols (flag, national anthem) by the corresponding community is discussed in Cyprus as *Hellenocentrism and Turkocentrism* and expressed, in terms of national identification, in its extreme formulations with the term Greek or Turkish correspondingly. On the contrary, *Cypriocentrism* (Peristianis, 1995a, 1995b) is often described as the wish for the use of Cypriot symbols and feelings of detachment from motherlands that is often expressed at the national identification level with the use of the superordinate term *Cypriot*. At the same time, the majority of the population is using the dual identities of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. However, the strength of identification with these dual identities relates with prejudice to a weaker extent compared to Hellenocentrism and Turkocentrism which suggests that the use of these dual identities is not as symbolically loaded as the feelings of attachment to the “motherlands”.

Importantly, the combination of high or low levels of *Helleno/Turko centrism and Cypriocentrism were defining features of three identity positions that were identified in each community: the Pro-reconciliation, the Communitarian and the Ethno-nationalist positions.*

From the results, it appeared that in both communities, people in the *Pro-reconciliation* clusters showed a very positive orientation towards members of the other community on various variables (trust, contact, forgiveness) and also scored lower on perceived threats and intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). In fact, the Pro-reconciliation clusters in the two communities were almost identical in structure and content expressing peace activists, bi-communal NGOs embarking on a social representations project (see Bauer & Gaskell, 2008) of joint collective action for the solution of the problem. This suggested that such a representation was emancipated from the official narratives of both communities. This position, through its openness to dialogue with members from the other community, indicated that its ethical horizon includes the other community. These participants were probably readers of newspapers and followed media, traditional and new, that were engaged in diffusion of social representations from the perspective of both communities. The stronger Cypriocentric views of this position suggested aspirations for building a

superordinate community of Cypriots as a form of civic identity that includes both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and readiness to use for this purpose Cypriot symbols rather than the “motherland” ones.

The *communitarian* position in each community was characterized by moderate adherence to both the ethno-national symbols (flag, national anthem of “motherlands”) and Cypriot symbols. It was related to high levels of perceived realistic and distinctiveness threats as well as lower levels of trust and contact with the other community (Psaltis, 2011). In the two communities, these positions share structural similarities as they represent a form of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) where the ethical horizon of the concern of participants is constrained to the limits of their own community and fed by the mundane reality of everyday living in two geographically separated communities for years.

From an epistemological perspective, the representations held of the Cyprus issue seem to be largely dominated by the central authority of the official narrative as a set of beliefs difficult to penetrate by dialogue with alternative and critical perspectives. The beliefs are homogeneous, affective, and impermeable to experience or contradiction, fixed on naïve views with a single perspective on the truth in history. This leaves little scope for individual variation and is therefore similar to the “dogma” of religion as described by Moscovici (2000) for representations based on belief. A possible opening for change in these views seems to come from more moderate feelings towards the members of the other community (in the case of Greek Cypriots) and more moderate levels of the quality of intergroup contact (in the case of Turkish Cypriots).

This epistemological approach of the official narrative can also be found in the last of the three positions identified, the *ethno-nationalist* position. This is expressed in the two communities with ideas of Greek and Turkish ethno-nationalism respectively, forming a mirror image of each other where the ethical horizon is a larger ethnic community that includes the mainland nationals but excludes the other community in Cyprus as suggested by low levels of trust and forgiveness and high levels of prejudice and threats. The high adherence to Greek and Turkish symbols of the motherlands and resistance to the idea of using Cypriot symbols for the state is also telling of their lack of orientation to members of the other community. Intergroup contact as expected is also very low to absent in these positions, which in fact shows little to any opening for change. Expression of such positions, albeit in their extreme form, are the practices of militants engaged in propaganda that often reaches the limit of asking for union with their respective motherland and the use of inflammatory speech against the other community and their “motherland”.

The Present Study

The present study aims to extend the previous quantitative analysis that identified the position of national symbols in various forms of representation to a qualitative investigation of three artefacts of a different physical size, purpose and age relating to intergroup relations in Cyprus and the Cyprus issue. Following

a method adjusted from Sen and Wagner (2005) the participants are asked by a researcher of the same ethnic origin to position themselves to the images of the three artefacts. The artefacts were selected on the basis of their relevance to the Cyprus issue and their contested nature in the ideological struggles within and across each community. All three artefacts have been explicitly described as symbols in the public sphere by individuals and groups that were responsible for their construction. With chronological order of their construction, we first discuss a) the flag of “TRNC” and Turkey on the Pentadaktylos (Beşparmak in Turkish) mountain constructed back in 1993, 2) a set of photographs at the Greek Cypriot checkpoint of Ledra Palace in the divided capital of Cyprus placed there after 1996 and 3) an architectural structure of 600 square metres located in the UN Buffer Zone, called the *Home for Co-operation* that was established in 2011 functioning as a centre for intercommunal cooperation, dialogue and research in Cyprus.

The Flag of Turkey and the Flag of the “TRNC”

Pentadaktylos mountains are a range of mountains which run along the northern coast of Cyprus. In 1993, the flag of the “TRNC” was constructed on the southern slope of this mountain range which faces the areas of the island currently inhabited by Greek Cypriots. This flag covers an area larger than 100,000 square metres. The construction of the flag was largely accomplished through the labour of Turkish military occupying forces. The construction also cost the life of a Turkish soldier who lost his life during an accident at the construction site. The Kemalist statement of “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene” (How happy is the one who says I am Turkish) is written next to the flag. Above this statement, there is a crescent and a star forming the flag of Turkey.

The flag was constructed near the village of Vouno, which was renamed to Taşkent by Turkish Cypriots. The flag’s proximity to this village is symbolic since after 1974 the village was settled by former Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of the Tochni village situated in the south of the island. Most of the male inhabitants of this village were executed by Greek Cypriot extremists of EOKA B during the war in August 1974. The widows of the men killed during this event symbolically helped with the construction of the flags by transferring stones for the construction (Fig. 1).

In 2000s, a controversial initiative was to illuminate the flag at night. Lamps were placed along the perimeter of the flag, along the two stripes, the crest and the star in order to illuminate the flag.⁴ The illumination works started in 2003 and were completed in 2006, and since then the flag has been illuminated every night.⁵ The lighting follows a repeating circular pattern. Firstly, the star lights up, then the crescent is added, and then the perimeter of the flag is illuminated so that the lights

⁴<http://www.kktcbayrak.org/proje.htm>.

⁵<http://www.kktcbayrak.org/proje.htm>.



Fig. 1 Flag of Turkey and the flag of the “TRNC”

generate the Turkish flag. Then, the two stripes at the top and bottom are illuminated in addition to the crescent, the star and the perimeter in order to generate the “TRNC” flag.

The illumination of the flag was initiated by a Turkish Cypriot organization entitled “Organization to Illuminate the TRNC Flag on Beşparmak Mountains”. The former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denктаş expressed his support for the illumination of the flag. He argued that the illumination of the flag would demonstrate the determination of Turkish Cypriots during their struggle for existence and freedom.⁶ The organization mentioned above considers the illuminated flag as the honour of Turkish Cypriots and the symbol of the “TRNC” and of the Turkish Cypriots’ struggle for existence.⁷ The artefact is respected and treasured by most right-wing Turkish Cypriots. The flag is painted and cleaned periodically by the “TRNC Civil Defense Organization” and the “Organization to Illuminate the TRNC Flag on Beşparmak Mountains”.⁸ A new renovation was recently announced and took place in September 2013. The president of this organization made a call for donations on the radio and said that the Turkish embassy is also financially supporting the renovation. The flags were recently on the public spotlight again, this time in Turkey on the occasion of a public talk of the Turkish chief negotiator for Turkish EU accession Egemen Bağış who stated that a new Turkish satellite sent back its

⁶<http://www.kktcbayrak.org/mesaj.htm>.

⁷<http://www.kktcbayrak.org/index.htm>.

⁸<http://www.haberkkct.com/haber/sivil-savunmadan-dev-kktc-bayragina-temizlik-62574.html>.

first images, one of which was the flags on the mountain'. He said "The fact that the first images [...] are the Turkish and the TRNC flags is both meaningful and a very clear message." The "common fate between motherland Turkey and the TRNC has now been stamped in every part of the universe like a seal."⁹

The flags nevertheless are not uncontested in the Turkish Cypriot community. Some articles appeared in the Turkish Cypriot press from leftist journalists and academics who referred to the flag as "symbolic violence", recognized its provocative nature from the Greek Cypriot perspective and stated that the flag is an environmental hazard due to the chemicals used to paint it and in addition criticized the overspending on electricity for its lighting at a time when their community is facing electricity cuts due to shortages.

Most Greek Cypriots view the flag negatively as a symbol of triumphalism of Turkey in Cyprus and a symbol of the occupation itself. The reaction seems to come across the ideological spectrum. In 2010, the leftist Greek Cypriot community leader and Republic of Cyprus President Christofias referred to the flag as "monstrous". He stated that seeing the flag creates feelings of sadness and anger in him, specifically since he was displaced from a village situated very close to the flag.¹⁰ In the same public statement, he wished for a reunited and free Cyprus where "our children" will live with no flags on the mountain. In right wing and extreme right wing blogs and web pages, more emotional language is often used for the flags, with the use of animistic metaphors of a human like suffering Pentadaktylos which is trampled, traumatized and bleeding by the violation done to him by the flags and the "boot of the occupier". Some of these blogs announced with joy, on a cold winter day in January 2013, that snow covered Pentadaktylos making the flag disappear. In 2009 a Greek Cypriot member of the European Parliament¹¹ posed a parliamentary question to the European Commission regarding the intentions of the commission about the flag on the mountain on the premise of its provocative nature for Greek Cypriots, the environmental hazards and the electricity waste involved.

The Photographs at Ledra Palace Checkpoint

Two walls with photographs, which were placed on the Greek Cypriot checkpoint at Ledra Palace, depict the acts of the killing of Tasos Isaac and Solomos Solomou in August 1996. The walls are facing south and they are meant to be read by individuals (Greek Cypriots and foreign tourists) who intend to cross the checkpoint to visit the north. These walls have been called "propaganda walls"

⁹ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=22255270>.

¹⁰ <http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/BDE41AE606856EB7C22576A7002E9571?Opendocument&print>.

¹¹ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2009-5053&language=EN>.



Fig. 2 The new photographs at Ledra Palace checkpoint

by the Turkish Cypriot press.¹² For anti-occupation Greek Cypriot organizations and extreme right wing organizations, these pictures have been presented as a symbol of Greek Cypriots' anti-occupation struggle against Turkey and a symbol of Turkish "barbarism" (Fig. 2).

Tassos Isaac (1972–1996) and Solomos Solomou (1970–1996) were Greek Cypriot demonstrators who were killed by Turkish Cypriot and Turkish extremists called Grey Wolves in August 1996. Tassos Isaac was killed on August 11th in the United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus while participating in a motor bikers march against the Turkish occupation army and settlers occupying northern Cyprus with the demand of the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes. The motorcyclist demonstration organized by the Cyprus Motorcycle association was first announced in January 1996, and it was to take the form of a symbolic motorcycle ride, undertaken by Greek Cypriots and persons from other countries,¹³ originating in Berlin and ending in Kyrenia in northern Cyprus on 11 August 1996. Solomos Solomou was killed on August 14th after being shot by Turkish soldiers and officers while trying to climb a flagpole in order to

¹²<http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/56376>.

¹³For a detailed account of the event and organization from a biker's perspective outside of Cyprus see <http://www.warmnsafe.com/the-ride-from-berlin-to-cyprus-1996-to-make-a-point/>.

remove a Turkish flag from its mast near Deryneia, Cyprus. The killing occurred in the aftermath of the funeral of Solomou's relative Tassos Isaac. The photographs were initially placed there by the Pancyprian Anti-occupation Movement (P.A.K)¹⁴ in October 1996¹⁵ a while after Isaac and Solomou's killing, in a campaign intended to prevent tourists from passing to the areas controlled by the "TRNC". The president of PAK, had told Cyprus News Agency at the time that, regrettably, it was estimated that at least 500 people usually visit the occupied areas every weekend in this way strengthening the economy of "TRNC". Members of this movement, relatives of missing persons, refugees and other people tried to deter foreigners from visiting the occupied areas by distributing informational material about the murders of Isaak and Solomou, and the Turkish invasion. The Public information office (PIO) of the Republic of Cyprus also published an 8 page pamphlet¹⁶ with the title "Greek Cypriots killed for saying no to occupation". The title was written in the first page with red letters over a black font. Below the title there was the picture also appearing on the checkpoint wall where a mob of "Grey wolves" along with Turkish Cypriot policemen were beating up Isaac to death.

The murders of Isaak and Solomou stirred international reactions. A few days after the killings of Isaac and Solomou, the then Prime Minister of Greece, Costas Simitis visited Cyprus and together with the then President of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides, visited the homes of the families of the two victims. Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan said that he was deeply saddened by the incidents and added "I condemn those who are responsible for and who encouraged these incidents. I ask them to behave in a right-minded manner."¹⁷ The then Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller, who also visited Cyprus a few days after Isaac and Solomou were killed, said that Turkey would "break the hands" of anyone who reached for the Turkish flag. Responding to Çiller's comments, US State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns stated that "Protection of a flag cannot excuse the horrible events of August 14th 1996. Human life and the sanctity of human life are ultimately more important than protecting a piece of cloth." Burns was criticized by Turkey for calling the Turkish flag "a piece of cloth".¹⁸ Due to the tension created from the events there were demonstrations in Turkey and Greece.¹⁹ Greek protestors attacked Turkish diplomatic missions and Muslim Greek citizens in Greece.²⁰

¹⁴ PAK is a marginal organization with ties to the Greek Orthodox Church not represented in parliament which is against a federal solution of the Cyprus issue. In 2010 it also took part in the organization of an anti-immigration rally in Larnaka along with other extreme right wing and nationalist organizations.

¹⁵ <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/kypegr/1996/96-10-20.kypegr.html>.

¹⁶ P.I.O. Publication 139/1996.

¹⁷ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx?d=en> (August 1996).

¹⁸ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx?d=en> (August 1996).

¹⁹ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx?d=en> (August 1996).

²⁰ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx?d=en> (August 1996).

The Turkish Cypriot press²¹ had reacted to the incidents by mainly accusing the Greek Cypriot side. *Kıbrıs* newspaper mainly blamed Greek Cypriot protestors on its August 12th issue. On August 14th and August 15th, the newspaper again published pieces blaming the Greek Cypriot demonstrators. The titles of the pieces were “They did nastiness again” and “They did not come to their senses”. Similarly, the right-wing newspaper *Halkın Sesi* blamed the Greek Cypriot side. On August 12th the newspaper’s title was “Chauvinism is a winner”. On August 15th, this newspaper wrote: “It has been proven once again what attacks against our borders watered with martyrs’ blood and against our crescent-star flag can result in.” The title of the piece was “They have gone mad”. *Birlik* newspaper, the expressive instrument of the right-wing *National Unity Party* had the headline “The borders of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are inviolable.”

On the other hand, the left-wing *Yenidüzen* newspaper blamed fanatics of both sides under the title “The result of fanaticism”. The newspaper also blamed TC police and the “TC Civil Defense Organization” authorities for allowing members of Grey Wolves to enter the area with guns and other objects on August 12th. On August 14th *Yenidüzen* reported that they had received threats on the phone concerning the newspaper’s reports about the incident. The newspaper wrote the following on August 15th concerning the death of Solomou: “It is as if this person has been sent to death with the purpose of spreading seeds of hate between the two communities. Fanatics achieved what they wanted: he died.” The months that followed saw a few other incidents of murder in the UN buffer zone²² and increased tensions in Cyprus. Ömerge mosque in the south of the divide was set on fire. Some Turkish Cypriots working in the south of the divide were fired by their Greek Cypriot employers.

It is worth noting that the photographs on the Greek Cypriot Ledra Palace checkpoint were restored by Greek Cypriot members of anti-occupation, extreme right wing organizations and relatives of missing persons in 2011.

The Home for Co-operation (Fig. 3)

On May 6th, 2011, a new “third space” was launched between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint opposite the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia in the UN Buffer Zone. This was a dream coming true for the intercommunal Cypriot non-governmental organization, *Association for Historical Dialogue and Research*²³ (AHDR) which is one of the few intercommunal NGO’s in Cyprus working on issues of education. It should be noted that generally the position of NGO’s in public debates in newspapers, radios and TV is rather marginal as they are rarely given voice by the majority of the traditional media. Their positions however are more visible in the internet and specifically the social media. The geographical separation

²¹ http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/kypegr/1996/96-08-12_1.kypegr.html.

²² See UN Secretary General’s report in relation to the incidents here <http://www.un.org/Docs/s199616.htm>.

²³ <http://www.ahdr.info/>.



Fig. 3 The Home for Co-operation from the outside as it is today

between the two communities also keeps intercommunal relations at low levels although relationships have developed after 2003. In a recent research of AHDR about 15 % of Greek Cypriots and 34 % of Turkish Cypriots report that they now have at least one friend from the other community (Psaltis & Lytras, 2012b).

The AHDR in 2008 was awarded a major grant by the EEA and Norway Grants funding to buy and renovate a building in the buffer zone. Other funding agencies, individuals, local authorities and organizations across the divide also supported and contributed to the initiative.²⁴ The *Home for Co-operation* has now become a unique centre in Cyprus providing facilities for hosting conferences and exhibitions, housing a library, a historical archive, and offices for various NGOs doing bi-communal work, and a café (see Till et al., 2013) and in 2014 was awarded the Europa Nostra award for conservation of cultural heritage. European Nostra said the H4C constituted a substantial contribution to the revitalisation of Nicosia’s buffer zone as well as to the wider peacemaking process.

In a symbolic act of good will the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, inaugurated²⁵ the Home for Co-operation (H4C), as the first “infrastructure of peace” cre-

²⁴The project was supported by individuals, organizations, local authorities in Cyprus and abroad, embassies and UNFICYP. The Home for Co-operation also received significant donations by Switzerland, Sweden and UNDP-ACT. Contributions were also made by friends and members of the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, historical and intellectual societies and organizations, academics and civil society in Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA.

²⁵<http://eeagrants.org/News/2011/Home-for-Co-operation-inaugurated>.

ated by Cypriots. This symbolic act got exceptional and extensive coverage from the press in both communities because of the involvement of the two leaders in the inauguration. Most of the newspapers published a photo of the two leaders shaking hands together with the Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice-president of AHDR who made a joint statement that day that the *Home for Co-operation* aimed to give the “dead zone” a new purpose and role, and to transform it from a symbol of separation to a symbol of cooperation. “The Home”, they stressed, “symbolizes both the process and the outcome of cooperation; it is an example of how praxis driven by theory, even in places where barbed wires wound the land, can result in great achievements.” (Makriyianni & Onurkan Samani, 2011). Board members of AHDR (see Till et al., 2013) described the project as an initiative that resulted from the states of exception that constitute Cyprus and the spatial practices of Cypriots who seek to overcome the legacies of a violent and costly “intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005; Kriesberg, 2000). The establishment of H4C offers a model for scholars and activists in other divided contexts in at least three ways: by challenging states of exception, dismantling division through transformative knowledge, and creating safe spaces of encounter. The core of the symbolism of the H4C is the epistemological aspect of the home, as a place that will facilitate free exchange of views by including various communities in the debates over the Cyprus issue as well as various academic disciplines in research (education, history, geography, architecture, politics, *inter alia*) in the quest for the production of transformative knowledge based on the decentering of points of view (Habermas, 1981; Piaget, 1932). A media campaign to make the H4C visible in the public sphere, mainly through the use of social media and the internet was also organized which resulted in the production of various short films.²⁶

The Interviews

For the purposes of complementing the quantitative research of Psaltis (2011) discussed earlier and for the purposes of revealing the tensions behind the representation of the three artefacts, we decided to select a small number of participants that were expected to offer contrasting interpretations of the artefacts. For this reason, 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 6 Greek Cypriot and 4 Turkish Cypriot participants. Gender balance was kept. The participants were selected with the aim of capturing as varied positions as possible on the Cyprus issue since we wanted to include people that identified with the main identity positions on the Cyprus issue in each community: Pro-reconciliation, the Communitarian and the Ethno-nationalist position (see Psaltis, 2011). The mean age of participants was 27 (SD=2.57). The instruments that were used during the interviews were an audio recorder and a laptop and three printed photographs in order to display the artefacts.

²⁶Films can be viewed here http://www.home4cooperation.info/view_page.php?pid=h4c-short-videos-1323274886.

First, demographic information was obtained, including participants' names, age and educational level. Then the first artefact was displayed, showcasing the Turkish and "TRNC" flags on Pentadaktylos mountain. Participants were asked to report whether they recognized what was portrayed in the photograph and describe it. Subsequent questions explored the feelings and emotions that were linked to that specific artefact (if participants had no prior knowledge about it, they were asked to describe the emotions that they experienced when they saw the photo for the first time and give a description of what they thought the artefact was).

Finally, the interviewers explored whether the participants had any personal contacts with members of the other community and whether they believed that this interaction has affected their opinion and feelings towards the artefacts in any way. The same procedure was followed for the second and third artefact.

Production and Consumption of the Artefacts

Each of the actors that produced the certain artefact as a symbol sought to harness a truth about the Cyprus issue and project it into the world through the artefact. The artefact thus becomes an objectification of a social representation expressing a particular configuration of emotions, values, ideas and practices that also relate to contact between the two communities in Cyprus. The present analysis however went further than analyzing the communicative intentions of the actors involved in the construction of these artefacts by posing the question of how such artefacts were consumed, how were they anchored and re-constructed from the perspective of various ideological positions within each community. This analysis brought to light the polyvalence of symbols and the heterogeneity in the meanings and emotions attached to them depending not only on the community of the participants but also depending on the ideological position of the participant within each community (Psaltis, 2011).

The Flags on the Mountain

The nationalist Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş who probably had the initiative to construct the flags in collaboration with the Turkish army wanted to communicate with the artefact on the mountain that the Cyprus issue is now solved since the Turkish Cypriots are free from Greek Cypriot domination and protected by Turkish soldiers in the safe haven of a separate state, and that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots must face the truth that there are now two states in Cyprus, one where Turkish Cypriots live as Turks and another which they call the "Greek Cypriot Administration of South Cyprus". The huge size of the flag and its orientation suggest the intention of its producers to impose this vision on everybody on the island. The hegemonic intention is an extension of the official historical narrative of the Turkish Cypriot community. In this sense it should be read as an objectification of

the same narrative. It is worth noting that none of the participants knew who actually had the initiative to construct the flags beyond a vague feeling of a central authority with political power in the state and links to the military being behind the construction of the flag.

As a communicative act the construction and exhibition of the flag should be read as propaganda, a polemical representation with the intention of becoming hegemonic. This is clearly seen from the way participants from the nationalist and communitarian positions expressed themselves in relation to the flags in the spirit of a zero sum game accompanied by lack of empathy for the perspective of the other. It mostly created pleasant feelings to them and feelings of security, seeing the flag as a symbol of independence and existence of statehood “to communicate to the Greeks that Turkish Cypriots exist” as one participant claimed. It is worth noting that usually participants expressing this kind of feelings did not have any relationship or contact with Greek Cypriots and showed unwillingness to engage the perspective of the other community. As one of these participants said about the flag “It is also seen from the Greek side and I do not know how that makes the Greeks (Rums) feel.” One female participant said: “I do not know if they [those who constructed the flag] had any bad intentions because it is seen very clearly from the Greek side. But, they could have had a good intention of making the people [Turkish Cypriots] feel good about their country.”

The hegemonic intention of the flag is resisted internally by the Turkish Cypriot pro-reconciliation perspective. Resistance appears in various forms. First the flags could be ignored. If recognized, they are usually seen as nationalist symbols that intend to provoke Greek Cypriots and in this sense it becomes a direct form of resistance. Two participants, who have frequent contact with Greek Cypriots, expressed negative thoughts about the flag. A male participant said that the flag is a symbol of the Turkish invasion. Similarly, the female participant mentioned that the authorities are trying to show everyone the Turkish presence on the island with the flag. She added that the artefact was constructed on the southern side of the mountain range so that it would be seen from the south. This participant also mentioned that the artefact is intended to send messages to Turkish Cypriots in addition to Greek Cypriots. She said that the authorities consistently remind Turkish Cypriots about the existence of the “TRNC” via the flag. She further implied that the authorities are trying to impose a more Turkish identity on Turkish Cypriots which she did not like.

It is also interesting to note indirect forms of resistance. One male participant said that it is ironic to see the flag illuminated at night when he cannot turn on the lights at his house due to power cuts and added that this situation creates unpleasant feelings. A female participant also talked about this issue. She said: “We live in a country without proper infrastructure and people experience power cuts frequently. Under these circumstances, it is unnecessary to use electricity in this way on top of the mountain. The state only cares about its own presence and not about the people. I regard it as selfishness.”

The flags, as expected, were also resisted by Greek Cypriots albeit for varying reasons depending on the ideological position of the participant and in various forms. The majority of the participants reported strong negative opinions connected with emotions of anger, sadness, repulsion, indignation and disgust, especially those

from a nationalist and communitarian perspective. One interviewee, however, mentioned that he got used to the sight of them after so many years. He said “*When I first saw the flag I felt disgusted and angry but after so many years it does not affect me anymore.*” A female participant speaking from a position aligned with the official Greek Cypriot narrative said “*You know you are in your country but you see these flags over there and it’s a very bad thing.*” Another participant, taking a more extreme position said that the viewing of that flag makes her feel “hatred for the Turks”. This participant did not differentiate between Turks and Turkish Cypriots which is often the case for extreme right wingers and nationalists. For Greek Cypriot participants who expressed a pro-reconciliation perspective, the flags often went unnoticed. When they were recognized they were described as symbols of nationalism and triumphalism that keep the two communities separated.

The participants were also asked about the intentions behind the placement of the flags. Two participants mentioned that the intention was to intimidate Greek Cypriots, to divide the country and to make a statement to both Turkish and Greek Cypriots that this land is now Turkish. One male participant said that he believed that the flags were constructed by fanatic Turks, the “Grey Wolves” in particular. None of the participants ever visited the site of the artefact and nobody knew of the fact that it was constructed next to the village settled by relatives of the 85 victims of the Tochni massacre, which was expected, since very few Greek Cypriots even know about the Tochni executions in 1974.

Photos on the Pedestrian Crossing

The Greek Cypriot organizations, who placed the photographs at Ledra Palace checkpoint and recently renovated them, wanted to communicate that the Cyprus issue is an international problem of invasion of the independent state of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey, in violation of human rights and international law and that Turkey occupies and fully controls the north of Cyprus. The Green Line is depicted as a ceasefire line that separates the free areas of legitimate and internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus from the occupied areas of the republic. The particular events depicted on the photos prove the brutality and barbarism of the Turks and their sense of “law and order” as written on the walls, premised on violence and imposition against both Greek Cypriots and European citizens. All this is aimed at discouraging tourists and Greek Cypriots from crossing over to the north and supporting politically and financially an internationally illegal state. It is worth noting some of the characteristics of this artefact that differentiate it from the flags. It is meant to be the opposite of triumphalism, that is, a symbol of victimization. The size of the walls is relatively small compared to the flag and the fact that the images are accompanied by considerable text suggests that it is aimed at providing information on the specific event by those crossing from south to north. In this sense the message is not addressed to the other community but to other Greek Cypriots and third parties who intend to cross over. The narration of the events on the wall cites a UN report of the event to strengthen claims to objectivity—making an effort to appear unbiased. The placement of the material on the police checkpoint, however,

and the similarity of the text and images with the pamphlet of the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus leaves little space for doubting that those who placed the material there in the first place were acting with the approval or even encouragement from the state. It also suggests that it is intended to strengthen the part of the official Greek Cypriot historical narrative that describes the events of 1974 as “barbaric” with updated events of “barbaric brutality” by Turks.

Still, at least from the Turkish Cypriot perspective, this effort to appear objective probably failed as it was seen by almost all the Turkish Cypriot participants in our research as propaganda material which they rarely even read. To Turkish Cypriots of the nationalist perspective the photos created discomfort and anger as they were read as provocative, aiming to show that Turkish Cypriots and Turks are barbarians and the ones to blame for the Cyprus issue. The actual act of the killing of the Greek Cypriot demonstrators is either silenced in their accounts or in more extreme cases seen as legitimate, as Isaac and Solomou were seen as violating legitimate borders and trying to desecrate national symbols. From a Turkish Cypriot communitarian perspective, there seems to be more ambivalence on the role of borders and whether they are actually promoting peace or not. The photos on the Greek Cypriot checkpoints create discomfort as they are read as provocative, aiming to show that Turks and Turkish Cypriots are barbarians and the ones to blame for the Cyprus issue.

All Turkish Cypriot participants knew what the artefact was and reported being to the location except for a female participant who reported having minimal contact with Greek Cypriots and expressed a communitarian perspective. This interviewee said that she is not sure whether she has been to the Ledra Palace checkpoint where the photos are situated. After she was told what the artefact depicted, she said that it was built in order to make people have hatred towards the other side. About the incidents she said: “If what the guy [Solomos Solomou] did was wrong, he deserved what happened. The border is a very sensitive situation. You cannot just do whatever you like. The other side has the right to act accordingly.” However, she also said that viewing the photograph of the artefact makes her feel really bad. She further added that she does not like the situation of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots fighting; and that she feels like there needs to be peace.

A second Turkish Cypriot male interviewee, who had minimal contact with the other community, said that viewing the photographs makes him feel angry. He added: “Greeks put those photographs there in order to distort the truth about the history of Cyprus. They want to portray themselves as victims and us as aggressors.” He additionally mentioned that Greek Cypriots want to tell the world that they are the ones who suffered due to the Cyprus problem.

On a different note, a Turkish Cypriot female participant, who reported having frequent contact with Greek Cypriots and expressed a pro-reconciliation position, reported that viewing the photographs creates negative emotions because the artefact shows that Cypriots [implying both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots] have not learnt from their mistakes. She added: “Both sides have made mistakes. It shows that we are not at peace with the past. Some things are constantly brought back from the past. People’s emotions are utilized for politics. I am sad because of this.” This interviewee said that the intention of this artefact is to provoke people and to remind them about these violent incidents when they are passing the border. She also said that

artefact's message to the Greek Cypriots passing the border is: "You are passing to the other side of the island. These people did these things to us. Keep this in mind."

A male Turkish Cypriot interviewee, who has frequent contact with Greek Cypriots, similarly noted that viewing the photograph creates bad feelings. He said neither what was done during the incidents nor the fact that the photographs are there is nice. He noted he does not support any act of violence. He added that the artefact is intended "to remind people crossing the border what had happened and to strengthen their nationalist feelings". He further elaborated: "The walls are intended to communicate to us [Turkish Cypriots] that we did such things to them [Greek Cypriots] and that they will never forget. [...]. Yet, I do not think we will get anywhere by doing such things. We will not achieve anything good."

Moving to the Greek Cypriot representation of the photographs, most Greek Cypriot participants knew about the existence of the photos at Ledra palace checkpoint, either via direct encounter or via images in the Greek Cypriot media. No participant was certain about who installed them there and why. Some participants argued that it was either the parents of the victims or a political act with the intention to remind the visitors who wish to cross to the other side of the atrocities that the Turks performed against the Greek Cypriots and probably to prevent them from crossing. Another participant mentioned that perhaps the intention is to constantly remind people what can happen at any given moment when they cross over, thus instilling fear to any potential visitor.

Although all Greek Cypriot participants expressed very strong negative emotions about the content of the photos, using words such as "sadness", "sorrow", "anger", "rage", "contempt" people who had an actual encounter with the artefact were less expressive. The latter participants argued that the artefact is not as evident as it is often portrayed in the media, and people who cross over rarely actually see it. This assertion about the gradual desensitization to an otherwise negative artefact under the impact of time and the frequency of encounter is consistent with similar arguments raised about the first artefact. A female participant connected the place with her previous experience. As she mentioned she had visited the place when she crossed over for an intercommunal project. She stated that if she had visited the place under other circumstances, her emotions would have been different.

Another interesting point that was raised during the interviews was the attribution of blame for the events that were pictured on the walls. One female participant said that the "Grey Wolves" had killed Tasos Isaak, while another female participant stated that the Turkish Cypriots had killed Solomos Solomou. She also added that Solomou had done the right thing by attempting to lower the Turkish flag and that he did not do anything wrong.

In terms of the communicative genre used the photographs can certainly be seen as propaganda, to the extent that they want to promote the official narrative and cultivate stereotypes about the "barbaric Turks". An element of propagation can also be seen in the more narrowly defined context of the act of crossing. Crossing creates the potential for intergroup contact with the "enemy" and possibility of the reduction of prejudice as we very well know from the classical studies based on contact hypothesis and more recent work (see Tausch et al., 2010). The photos intend not only to discourage crossing by promoting feelings of insecurity and guilt

to the persons who intend to cross but also attempt to make the unfamiliar (the north) familiar as land usurped from Greek Cypriots by barbaric acts, thus cultivating negative attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and Turks but also as importantly towards the new potentialities offered by the act of crossing which is thus moralized and stigmatized as an unethical act (cf. Demetriou, 2007).

Home for Co-operation

One hundred metres to the north of the Greek Cypriot checkpoint and the walls with the photos one can now find opposite the Ledra Palace hotel, a 600 square metre, two storey building with the words “Home for Co-operation” written in Greek, Turkish and English over its main entrance. By building the Home for Co-operation (H4C), in the UN Buffer Zone the intercommunal NGO, *Association for Historical Dialogue and Research* (AHDR), comprised of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot educators, academics and civil society activists, from both the left and liberal right political spectrum wanted to promote contact and cooperation between the two communities and ultimately reunification of Cyprus through challenging the Buffer Zone and turning it from a zone of conflict to a zone of cooperation. AHDR wanted to communicate that the Cyprus problem is a complex political problem that should be approached through multiple perspectives, both internal and external to Cyprus, with hopes of building on the basis of coordinating all possible perspectives on the issue. It is thus illustrating ideas from the social psychological literature on contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) and the social psychology of Piaget (1932, 1977/1995) and his idea of social relations of cooperation, based on mutual respect, as promoting the cognitive and moral development of the person. The communicative genre promoted here is *diffusion* to the extent that the aim is to coordinate various perspectives on the Cyprus issue, in an effort to reach a more informed view of the Cyprus issue and cultivate historical thinking and research skills (Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007). The representations produced as the result of this coordination of various perspectives are emancipated from the official narratives in both sides of the divide. No doubt such views are a minority position in both communities as they challenge the dominance of the official narratives. The novelty of the idea of creating such an infrastructure of peace is also shown from the fact that the only pre-existing symbol of intercommunal cooperation is the commemoration of the murder of Misiaoulis and Kavazoglou²⁷ a symbol of solidarity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots that dates back to 1965, and is commemorated only by leftist parties (see Papadakis, 2008) since the victims were both members of the leftist party AKEL which represents about 1/3 of the Greek Cypriot electorate.

Indicative of the low levels of contact between the two communities is the fact that almost none of the Greek Cypriot participants had a personal encounter and

²⁷The two friends are Dervis Ali Kavazoglou and Kostas Misiaoulis, both members of leftist AKEL party, shot to death on April 11, 1965 when they were ambushed by members of a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organization agitating for taskim (the division of Cyprus).

experience with the H4C, which is situated on the road connecting the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Ledra Palace checkpoints, except for one female participant that had attended some intercommunal events. Half of the Greek Cypriot participants described it as a positive symbol that generates hope for intercommunal cooperation and ultimately the solution of the Cyprus problem. As one female participant said “It provides a shelter for people who want to engage in inter-communal activities and communicate in a safe environment.” Another male participant said “the H4C is something good which contributes to the solution of the Cyprus problem. However, just a house cannot really do much on its own—“One swallow does not bring the spring.”

Other Greek Cypriot participants talking from communitarian and nationalist perspectives were more sceptical about the role of H4C and they implied that there are hidden ulterior motives behind its establishment. As one female participant noted “It is impossible that the Turks loved the Greek Cypriots all of a sudden because they are always looking for their own interest and they don’t want Greek Cypriots.” The same person found it strange that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could actually be together in the same space without fighting.

The two Turkish Cypriot interviewees, who reported having frequent contact with Greek Cypriots, have been to the H4C. Actually, the female interviewee works for an NGO that is based at the H4C. The other two interviewees, who have minimal contact with Greek Cypriots, have not been to the H4C. These participants were given a description by the researcher of what the H4C is and they were asked about their feelings. The male interviewee said that viewing the photograph of H4C does not create any emotions. “It is merely a building” he added. When asked about the intention of the H4C, he answered that he does not know what the intention is. “Usually, these kinds of projects are funded by foreign countries in order to safeguard their interests” he noted. The female interviewee said that the H4C is a nice step towards peace.

The second male interviewee, who has been to the H4C, reported that the photograph of the home creates neutral feelings that are neither good nor bad. On the contrary, the female participant, who works at the H4C, reported that the photograph creates positive feelings such as trust and hope. She reported that the H4C makes her feel hopeful that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can live together. “We work here and we are together. We feel that we are not different from each other” she added.

Symbols and Their Structure and Content in Relation to Historical Narratives

The present findings bring again to the fore the crucial and organizing role of narrative templates functioning as anchors for symbolisation. In line with a previous analysis of oral history accounts of life in mixed villages in Cyprus (Psaltis et al., 2014) the same narratives of attributing blame for the Cyprus issue that were found to regulate remembering are seen here as anchoring symbolisation.

At the nucleus of such narrative forms of social representations of the history of Cyprus, and the Cyprus issue in particular, lies a certain asymmetrical triangular configuration of control (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014) of *self-other-object* that creates the emotional tension which makes particular elements of the representation stick together in a rather predictable structure, embracing feelings of threat, prejudice, lack of forgiveness and distrust in terms of the present state of intergroup relationships (Psaltis, 2011).

In the case of GCs, there is a narrative template of victimization by Turkey, Britain, the USA and NATO where TCs appear as pawns at best and accomplices of Turkey at worse. The loss of *control* is one of losing territory in 1974 which is the beginning of hardships. In the case of TCs, the narrative template is one of victimization by GCs who embarked on a struggle for *enosis* which was opposed by TCs. The events of 1963–1964 are a turning point in losing *control* of political power and international recognition as partners of the newly founded Republic of Cyprus and marginalization and discrimination in internal affairs. The Turkish intervention in 1974 and the declaration of “TRNC” are the salvation from these hardships and the triumph of the nationalist aim of partition.

As most oral history accounts or testimonies will somehow be regulated by these schemata or templates (see Psaltis et al., 2014), the same goes for symbolisation. Either because they tend to conform more or less strategically and consciously to such a structure of victimization or because they actively resist it in a representational project of building a superordinate identity and community that includes both GCs and TCs by emancipating the historical narrative from the two polarizing narratives through the coordination of various points of view.

If such configurations constitute the symbolic function of representations then symbols are bound to reflect these configurations or resistance to them also, but the crucial and more practical question here is how do conflicting societies move from opposition and separation to cooperation and reconciliation? The role of communication types across and within such societies is crucial as these varying forms of representation are supported by varying forms of communication.

Symbols and Communicative Genres

The configurations of victimization or triumphalism as is the case of official narratives are characterized by their partial and ethnocentric nature—functioning as closed systems, being homogeneous, affective, and impermeable to experience or contradiction that leave little scope for individual variation, similar to ecclesiastical “dogma”, a fine example of what Moscovici (Moscovici, 1998/2000, 2000) called social representations based on belief. As such they are based on social relations of unilateral respect. As we have seen in both cases of symbols of victimization and triumphalism a central authority is attempting to dictate the “truth” about the current state of affairs which usually remains unidentified by the individuals. The anxiety of these symbols for control is revealed by an emotionally loaded pursuit of stabilizing the meaning of symbols to a fixed set of beliefs related to the official narratives.

As such they fail to promote true dialogue and reflection (Duveen & Psaltis, 2007; Psaltis, 2012a, 2012b; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007) and claim a hegemonic role in society since they have the intention to influence others but are not open to being influenced themselves. The others can be those in the same community, those in the other community or third parties. For example the audience of the artefacts is not only the in-group and the out-group but also the international community (Flags on the mountain are meant to be seen from travelers overflying Cyprus and even satellites, photos on the checkpoints to be seen from tourists) which reveals the anxiety to enlighten the world about the justice of the cause of the in-group. Their conservative nature and resistance to change comes from their isolation from alternative representations or the way dialogue with alternative representations is undermined by varying semantic barriers (Gillespie, 2008; Moscovici, 1961/1976/2008) that inoculate against change. Such views often attain dominance in post-conflict societies and make their reproduction implicit. The emotive character attached to such symbols and their requirement for homogeneous adherence to the authority of the nation or the community can be easily seen in the incapacity of the two leftist leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet ali Talat that were in favour of reconciliation, and coincided in power for a period of time, not only to open a discussion on the use of symbols but even block the renovation of the flags and the checkpoint photos by extreme right wing nationalist groups.

From such a closed and homogeneous system of belief, any change in the status quo of intergroup relations that makes possible contact between the opposing views of victimization is bound to cause anxiety. The historical development of the opening of the checkpoints on the 23rd of April 2003 by the Turkish Cypriot leadership that ended the almost 30 years of isolation between the two communities was for both communities an unfamiliar event that needed anchoring to become familiar and thus an opportunity for the emergence of a new social representation. As Sen and Wagner (2005) showed emerging social representations flower at the fissures of social life—that is, where an existing symbolic system of interpretation fails in rendering the novel intelligible and in that sense play a role in social change. The traditional GC narratives of victimization framed the opening of the checkpoints as a ploy of Denktaş to lure Greek Cypriots into recognizing his pseudo-state (see Demetriou, 2007; Psaltis, 2011) by showing identity cards and passports to visit their homes in the north. Interestingly, these were the same people that in 1996 were supporting the motorcyclist demonstration demanding freedom of movement to the occupied areas. The paradox can only be resolved with the help of the present analysis. From such a position as long as there is continuing occupation by 40,000 Turkish troops, freedom of movement is only giving the wrong impression that the situation in Cyprus is normalized and that people can now mingle freely with no problems. What goes unrecognized by the nationalist and communitarian position is the potential of joint collective action by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots against the division of Cyprus, by NGOs like AHDR but such a recognition would demand the deconstruction of their representation through dialogue with the opposing narrative and thus a reworking of their own identity (Duveen, 2001) which they find threatening. Instead they prefer to stick to their monoperspective view of things embarking in an

anxious effort to reduce the degrees of freedom between symbolic form and symbolic content.

As argued by Verkuyten (1995) a unity between symbolic form and content is necessary to make an effective social symbol and in that sense there is a constant struggle after meaning of a cultural artefact that a certain group aspires in making it a symbol. Forms of communication like propaganda in their project to promote a unified and hegemonic sense of reality express their anxiety with the polyvalence of symbols once other groups try to reconceptualize artefacts and read such symbols at the pragmatic level of communicative intentions of those who produced them. Communitarian and nationalist perspectives would usually use a series of semantic barriers to annihilate any dialogue with alternative representations of any emerging artefact that promotes intercommunal contact like the H4C, undermining their motive (these are traitors, paid to act like that by foreigners), considering the reading of nationalist symbols and flags as such as taboo (we do not mess with symbols and heroes), and rigid oppositions (we want nothing to do with them) (Gillespie, 2008).

On the contrary, the same historical opening of the checkpoints in 2003 made possible the establishment of intercommunal NGOs and projects such as the H4C that were considered impossible²⁸ in the past. From the perspective of symbolism what distinguishes the H4C from the other symbols is not the effort after stabilizing the symbolic form and content because this is still necessary to make an effective social symbol but the inclusive and not exclusive nature of the communicative process implied in the content of the symbol. Cooperation is by definition a process of communication based on mutual respect and inclusion of all possible perspectives in the spirit of deliberative democracy. The increased levels of contact and cooperation in the field of intercommunal work achieves maybe the more difficult task of overcoming the barriers to communication between the two communities but it does not necessarily guarantee communication with all possible perspectives on the Cyprus issue within each community and with various other communities. Maintaining H4C as a symbol of cooperation and free dialogue is a particular challenge in the face of the unwillingness of communitarian and ethno-nationalist positions to enter dialogue with the pro-reconciliation perspective almost never attending conferences, seminars and debates at the H4C. But it is also a challenge for the H4C to overcome the unwillingness of certain people involved in bi-communal activities to engage in discussion with nationalists or anti-occupation points of view. In other words, there is a constant risk of diffusion degenerating into propagation and an internal dialogue of limited horizons. The challenge for groups engaged in anti-dogmatic work is to keep the dialogue going both across and within each community.

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²⁸ <http://youth-partnership-eu.coe.int/youth-partnership/documents/Publications/Coyote/Coyote17/Invitation.pdf>.

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Symbols that Speak: Christ and His Word in El Salvador

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In 2006–2007, I explored the religious terrain in El Salvador, comparing the experiences of Catholic and Evangelical men and women. Notions of manhood and womanhood change for religious converts, and I sought to understand how and why (Santos, 2012). This required learning religious practice and language, and coming to new understandings of religious symbols. References to Christ, his love, his power, and his very blood became everyday experiences for me. A variety of Christ symbols, with varying and sometimes opposed meanings, caught my attention, particularly since they correlated with distinct social goals. Equally apparent were the lingering causes and effects of the brutal Salvadoran civil war, which ranged from 1979 to 1992. These include crime, poverty, drastic inequality, a high rate of violent crime, and a society-wide sense of anomie.

As part of a Fulbright grant, a number of Central American scholars were taken on a retreat. We visited San Salvador and toured a number of culturally significant sites related to the war. Among these were the National Cathedral, the tomb of the martyred Archbishop Romero, and the University of Central America, where a staff member, her daughter, and six Jesuit priests were brutally assassinated by members of the US-trained Atlacatl Battalion.

A nearby chapel offered some solace from the Salvadoran heat. Growing up Catholic, trained in a Jesuit high-school, the small structure was initially familiar. I looked around- altar, candles, and pews. Then the familiar became unfamiliar. Many chapels and churches carry images of the Stations of the Cross, visual representations which retell the story of Jesus Christ's final hours, his trial and crucifixion. As I looked up at them, my heart quivered before the Salvadoran version of Christ's Passion. Instead of the familiar man and cross, rough black and white drawings of tortured bodies, naked, bound, and bloody, all loomed above. Images depicted massacres and crimes committed by government death squads during the war.

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Bullet holes and bleeding lacerations had replaced scourge wounds and a crown of thorns. In one, three dead bodies lay on top of each other, a man and two women. The man's arms were draped outward in death, a Christ pose where the knees of the dead women served as his crossbeam. The universal images of the God-man had absorbed local idiom, yet continued to carry similar meanings. Suffering and death lead to transformation. Christ, through his life initially, and now through the Salvadoran war, continued to speak to his people.

I hadn't eaten well in some time, suffered from lack of sleep, and was exhausted from fieldwork. I had recently encountered two dead corpses, heard numerous gun-fights, had seen the bruises and cuts on friends who had been beaten, heard of the rape of a close friend's sister, and witnessed a store front blasted to pieces by small machine gun fire. The chapel images affected me deeply. Quite honestly, I saw them and grew weak. I stumbled outside, shaking, and sat down on a rock. I struggled to compose myself, but my distress was obvious. I felt a hand on my shoulder and turned to look up sheepishly. A young woman stood over me, and held out a bottle of water. Behind her, I saw the chapel, its cross, and everything it represented. I felt El Salvador's suffering and heard it clamoring for its namesake (*El Salvador*, literally translates to *The Savior*). I took the offered drink, thanked her, gathered my strength, and walked on.

The Salvadoran Christ Symbol

The anthropologist Clifford Geertz approached religion as a "a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions in such an order of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (Geertz, 1973, p. 90). Note he ignores the Euro-American obsession distinguishing natural from supernatural. No reference to deities or unseen powers, ideas of right and wrong, or truth or falsehoods in religions are found. Rather, Geertz refers to sets of symbols which construct a sense of reality. This reality, in turn, affects humans' sensations (moods) and motivates them toward behavior. Symbols link to emotions, which lead to actions. Religion is a proclivity of the human animal, linked to our ability to manage symbols.

Often regarded as an epiphenomenon, symbols relate to concrete political economic processes. Modern El Salvador suffers structural instability, with high poverty and crime rates, and general anomie. This results from a history of inequality, wherein the majority of the population lived as poor, rural peasants working for a small oligarchy of families. Salvadorans were largely victimized, exploited and coerced, from the colonial period into the modern era. Many regard the Civil War as the logical outcome of this difficult history. Throughout this process, Christ dominates the symbolic landscape.

El Salvador's population can be evaluated as suffering from historical trauma (Brave Heart, Chase, Elkins, & Altschul, 2011; Evans-Campbell, 2008; Olson, 2003;

Sotero, 2006). This concept, recently explored through Native American cultures, refers to “the cumulative emotional and psychological wounding across generations, including the lifespan, which emanates from massive group trauma” (Brave Heart et al., 2011). The trauma is: deliberately, systematically inflicted; linked to multiple events over an extended period of time; reverberates through the population; and derails the population from a more stable historical course (Sotero, 2006). In individuals, symptoms include PTSD, depression, self-destructive behaviors, severe anxiety, guilt, hostility, and chronic bereavement. At the social level, high rates of these may indicate the presence of historical trauma.

Historical trauma interferes with a culture’s adaptations and functions. The ability to cope with distress is often hindered. The Native American case demonstrates how the systematic elimination of tradition, ritual, religion, belief, subsistence practices, and more becomes associated with difficult, culture-wide symptoms. Mourning is disrupted when funerary rituals are outlawed. Parenting is impaired when children are removed from homes and forbidden to communicate with their families in their native language. Responsibilities and adult roles become unclear when life-cycle rituals are removed. Further, if a culture is not permitted to reconstitute these cultural adaptations, the trauma persists and becomes generational. Salvadorans suffer such a legacy of cultural deprivations, with structural limits set by governing forces.

Research demonstrates that Native historical trauma can be ameliorated through renewed religious interest, ritual practice, and the reappropriation of spiritual symbols (Brave Heart, 2003; Brave Heart et al., 2011; Evans-Campbell, 2008; Olson, 2003). Similarly, an examination of Christ’s symbolic significance throughout Salvadoran history can be correlated with the victimization of the Salvadoran people and their religious response as they reconstitute themselves culturally in the face of repeated social crises.

Since the colonial era, Christ imagery has dominated hegemonic discourse in El Salvador. Traditionally, images of Christ as the suffering servant facilitated domination of the majority of the population by an agricultural oligarchy. By the twentieth century the symbols acquired new meanings. Initially through Liberation Theology, and then through the device of another symbol, the Martyr, Christ spoke of the need to reformulate an unjust society by dividing its resources equitably. During and following the Civil War, new believers emerged. Evangelical Christianity eschews physical symbols. Physical images (sculptures, pictures, even images on a candle) are forbidden. Use of Christ images by the Catholic Church is regarded as an abomination. Evangelicals de-legitimize the old symbols, and create narratives to formulate their authentic divinity. Christ now heals society one person at a time, as each converts, tells their story and spreads the word orally. In each of these three cases (traditional Catholic, progressive Catholic, and Evangelical), Christ represents (among other things) a social blueprint. The Christ symbol facilitates action through somatic response. Faith provides hope, motivating believers towards social behaviors that redress their historical trauma. Therefore, a historical overview provides the basis from which to evaluate the shifting meanings of Christ as they come to redress trauma.

Following a Geertzian approach, the term “Christ symbol” is used here to refer to the central referent in a series of symbolic sets, or religious idioms, found in Salvadoran history and present. The Christ symbol itself refers to something divine. Yet other symbols (such as crosses, or human suffering) refer back to the Christ symbol. The Christ symbol is the symbol within which all other symbols are given meaning. The term “Christ symbol” is *not* meant as a term of derision toward believers, or as a referent to Christ himself, or to lay claim that Christ is merely a symbol. The term refers to Christ as signifier, not Christ the signified.

Salvadoran History

Historically, Salvadorans have lived under constant threats to dignity and life, which find origin in concrete political economic forces that created a peasant, almost slave-like caste out of the majority of the population. Salvadoran resistance to structural and physical violence has taken many forms: open rebellion, political activism, religious renewal, and even combinations of these.

This social structure divided the population into poor and elites, the latter holding power over the former whilst coercing them into a pattern of economic dependence and offering little in return. El Salvador’s case is one of a ruling oligarchy bolstered by a military apparatus that has historically allowed them to enforce an agricultural extraction economy over the populace. This unstable process resulted in a history of coups, rebellions, terror tactics, and ultimately, the civil war which raged through the 1980s (Acevedo, 1996; Lungo-Ucles, 1996; Wood, 2003). Causes of historical trauma in El Salvador go back to the colonial encounter. Yet the previous 200 years offer sufficient evidence of its presence.

Nineteenth Century

El Salvador gained independence from Spain, along with the rest of Central America, in 1821. Within 2 years, Salvador found itself invaded first by an army of Guatemalans, and later by Mexican armies on two separate occasions (Lindo-Fuentes, 1990, p. 37–38, 48). From its beginnings, only elites could access education and professional employment. Prior to independence, an 1807 economic report noted that only 5,891 persons in the then province of El Salvador were occupied in non-agricultural occupations. Educated professionals were rare, including only “four lawyers, four physicians, twelve surgeons, and seven druggists” (Lindo-Fuentes, 1990, p. 19). At independence, the young nation was bankrupt, lacking infrastructure and unity.

Traditions developed that remained consistent even into the 1980s. Men and older boys were conscripted by force (Lindo-Fuentes, 1990, p. 50–55). A large sector of

the population went into hiding to avoid war. As their descendants would more than a hundred years later, male Salvadorans avoided markets, festivals, and church to elude conscriptors. By 1842, El Salvador had seen 40 different battles, lost over 2,000 combatants, and had seen a succession of 23 different men holding executive power. Death and instability were the norm.

By 1838 (Schmidt, 1996, p. 9), the Central American Federation had collapsed, and each nation was left to its own devices. The weakness and poverty of the new Salvadoran state led its elites to agree on the need for progress. But how could they convert this agricultural state with a shamefully small number of educated people into a profitable and prosperous nation? The solution was the mega-plantation, or latifundia (Acevedo, 1996, p. 20–21). This required the progressive dissolution of small scale farms, or minifundia, and their absorption into latifundia. It meant the end of communally held lands, the traditional mainstay of the indigenous population. The period between 1879 and 1882 saw this abolition of collective land and the growing prominence of the “fourteen families” that would eventually control Salvador’s politics and economy for the next hundred years (Schmidt, 1996, p. 10). Eventually, 40 % of the nation’s land was devoted to agroexports (Acevedo, 1996, p. 20).

The plantation economy required an enormous labor force. “Vagrancy laws” fined the idle and those without proof of employment. Labor became a punishment for crime, so that one could avoid jail time in exchange for work. An 1852 mandate required 2 days of work for the state from every man (Lindo-Fuentes, 1990, p. 83–85). This oligarchic mindset was “Thomas Hobbes with a vengeance: classical liberalism that assigned to the government the sole responsibility of maintaining order so that the economic elite could pursue laissez-faire economic policies” (Montgomery in Ladutke, 2004, p. 19). Through all this, the state’s focus on capital translated into a dearth of public services, such as schools. In 1888, only one in thirty-two Salvadorans had attended primary school. Workdays were 11 h long and food was considered wages. Workers received two rations a day, consisting of a handful of beans and two tortillas, women receiving smaller tortillas (Lindo-Fuentes, 1990, p. 77–100).

Between 1841 and 1890, the country saw no less than 10 wars and 13 coups d’etat. The economy developed between small intervals of peace. A primary goal protected capital and infrastructure. In 1848, the rural police force was formed, which would eventually become the National Guard in 1911 (Lindo-Fuentes, 1990, p. 62–64). This institution, along with the later *patrullas cantonales* (rural patrols of ex-military campesino conscripts), gave the military control over public security, allowing them to repress any challenge to the status quo. They also served as an intelligence agency, identifying and targeting outspoken campesinos (Ladutke, 2004, p. 19–20). The National Guard would eventually come to be associated with the atrocities it committed in the 1980s.

The Salvadoran postindependence economic system imposed strict cultural restrictions on the population. It eliminated self-sufficiency in cultural and political economic terms. Similarly, no capacity to develop culture outside an oppressive context developed. Political instability likewise translates into cultural instability.

Twentieth Century, Prior to Civil War

The Great Depression aggravated the already precarious Salvadoran economy and resulted in further unrest among agricultural workers (Schmidt, 1996, p. 10). A large scale revolt was planned by the Communist Party in early 1932. Before it occurred, the government conducted a mass slaughter of the lower classes. Indigenous groups in particular were targeted. Some 17,000 Salvadorans died (Ladutke, 2004, p. 20 quotes a death toll of up to 30,000; Wood, 2003, p. 21). Many survivors abandoned their indigenous culture to avoid further persecution as “communists.” This culture loss persists today (Ladutke, 2004, p. 21).

While the 1932 *Matanza* (literally—“the killing”) was by far the most famous rebellion, it was not the only one. Peasant uprisings in coffee regions had occurred in 1872, 1875, 1880, 1885, and 1898 (Acevedo, 1996, p. 20). The severity of the *Matanza*, however, meant such resistance could no longer be expressed without fear of death. Revolution may have never left the minds of the Salvadoran peasant, but its public expression remained quelled for several decades. The *Matanza* uprising, while a strategic failure, served to justify increased militarism and abolishment of freedom by the oligarchy and army, as they banned all political organizations other than the National Party (Ladutke, 2004, p. 21).

Hernandez Martinez, the military General responsible for the slaughter of 1932, became president and remained in office until 1944 (Schmidt, 1996, p. 11). He focused on expanding the authority of the state through a policy of “reactionary despotism” which translated into a totalitarianism focused on preserving the economic dominance of the landowning elite through the power of the armed forces. Coups erupted in 1944, 1948, 1960, 1961, and 1972 (Schmidt, 1996, p. 12). Instability and violence intensified in the 1970s. In 1975, some 37 students were massacred at a protest of government spending on the Miss Universe pageant. In 1977, fraudulent elections transferred power to General Romero, and government forces killed 48 people in ensuing protests (Ladutke, 2004, p. 25).

The Civil War

The Civil War that raged through the 1980s is probably the most significant set of events in all of modern Salvadoran history. A number of revolutionary groups existed before the war, but they finally came together in May of 1980 to form the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), named after the founder of the communist party and leader in the 1932 uprising, Farabundo Marti. They planned their first, and what they believed would be their “final” offensive for January of 1981. In truth, the war would last until 1992. At least 75,000 Salvadorans, approximately 1.5 % of the population of 5 million, would die. The majority were civilians. By 1983, 400,000 Salvadorans were internally displaced and 700,000 had fled the country. Over three dozen journalists were assassinated during the war as part of the government’s strategy against freedom of expression (Ladutke, 2004, p. 29).

In the three decades after World War II, the GDP multiplied by a factor of six. Cotton, sugar, and beef were introduced, diversifying the coffee economy. In the period between 1960 and 1979, industry grew at a rate of better than six percent per year (Schmidt, 1996, p. 13). Rapid economic growth and low inflation did not halt the onset of war (Acevedo, 1996, p. 19). Rather, a look at other economic indicators demonstrates why civil war occurred. “By 1974 the poorest 20 % of the population was receiving only 2.8 % of total income, while the share of the richest 20 % had risen to 66.4” (Acevedo, 1996, p. 27).

El Salvador’s role in the world system of the Cold War also played an essential part. The USA determined that all communist or socialist movements in Central America should fail. The Reagan Administration sent millions of dollars in aid to the Salvadoran military and sharply denied their human rights violations. All the while, US-trained Salvadoran military groups, like the infamous Atlacatl Battalion, committed heinous atrocities. The USA had a direct role in forming and supporting death squads; ignored and tolerated human rights violations; and sent well over 2 billion dollars in military and economic aid to assist the Salvadoran government (Arnesen, 1986; Barry & Preusch, 1987; Diskin, 1996).

Small rural villages, like El Mozote, Morazan, became the sites of massacres. One thousand civilians were murdered there in a single day. Prior to the murders, the Atlacatl Battalion separated a group of young women who were taken to the hillsides and repeatedly raped (Binford, 1996, p. 23). Both the Salvadoran military and the US government would refute the incident until the evidence became undeniable.

The peace accords were signed on January 16, 1992 in Chapultepec Palace in Mexico City (Binford, 1996, p. 79). The FMLN agreed to lay down its arms in exchange for recognition of its legitimacy and is now a political party. The military dissolved the National Guard and the Treasury Police, both notorious for human rights abuses. The army itself was reduced to half its original size (Schmidt, 1996, p. 27–28). Nonetheless, a survey from this period indicates that 73.9 % of Salvadorans were afraid to express themselves in public (Ladutke, 2004, p. 44).

No great socialist revolution resulted. Ultimately, a great deal of the social inequality that led to the war persisted (Diskin, 1996; Walter & Williams, 1993; Wood, 1996). Since the end of the war, difficulties persist (Santos, 2012). The crime rate has escalated dramatically. Most troubling has been the rise of organized criminal gangs, which often serve as social regulators, going as far as imposing taxes on citizens and ruling neighborhoods through terror. Monetary instability led the country to switch to the dollar in the early 2000s.

From History to Trauma

From the period of independence forward, the Salvadoran population has been exposed to historical trauma in five principle ways. First, political and economic instability, such as the constant succession of coups and oscillations in style of

government, remove any sense of constancy and stability. Second, exploitation by the oligarchy, violence under the military, and social inequality lead to a sense of victimization and general fear. Third, without a responsible government or enlightened leaders, Salvadorans historically have had no official system of redress, no one in government to rely on for help or to render justice. This leads, for many, to a sense of fatalism and hopelessness. Fourth, placed at the bottom of a rigid social stratification, the majority of the population remains uneducated, without the possibility of social mobility, yet dependent on the system. This segment of the population has accustomed itself to subjugation. Enculturation under the rigid class structure leads to a lack of self esteem, as most Salvadorans are devalued under the status quo. Fifth, the Salvadoran has historically had limited rights to expression, under penalty of harassment, violence, and death. No independent cultural identity can exist. Cultural formation and social development are thus infringed, as any cultural evolution is repressed.

For most of the population, the ability to develop a stable culture has been impaired by Salvadoran history. These issues have resounded across generations, have been deliberately inflicted, have affected the entire population, and have derailed it from a more stable historical course, constituting a dramatic historical trauma (Brave Heart et al., 2011; Sotero, 2006).

Anomie has historically been the norm in Salvadoran history. Yet, as that very history reveals, it has been punctuated by a large number of attempts at resistance. Further, every culture must reconstitute itself in the face of trauma if it shall survive. As in the Native American case, many Salvadorans have sought this renewal in religious and spiritual terms. The central element for their religious renewal has been the Christ symbol.

The Christ Symbol in Salvadoran History

The same historical inequalities that led so many Salvadorans to arms correlate with shifting meanings of the Christ symbol. The Christ symbol has been used to justify, reject, and redress Salvadoran trauma. The symbol provides cultural adaptations to the Salvadoran context.

Traditional Catholicism

The Catholic Church dominated Latin America for 500 years. It has historically been a powerful political actor and the source of many aspects of Latin American culture, ranging from annual cultural festivals as well as the physical layout of cities around a central cathedral plaza. “The Church’s central role in society resulted in political systems and political cultures that were hierarchical and authoritarian” (Patterson, 2005, p. 14). Catholicism was the one true faith, for both rich and poor.

Social forms were religiously legitimized. “The church provided a rationale for the system and its organization was foundational to society, intertwined with government, education, and even family relations” (Patterson, 2005, p.14).

The Christ symbol that persists from this era can be seen in religious icons found in Salvadoran Catholic churches of the colonial style. Statues, sculptures, carvings, and more, often depict a suffering Christ. Popular Christ symbols are of the passion and crucifixion, beaten and bloodied. Such images are generally placed just out of reach of the faithful and are certainly regarded as off-limits. That is, the symbol is not intended for direct contact, so that the populace may see, but not touch, Christ. Further, the emphasis is on suffering and duty, how Christ willingly accepted hardship in exchange for fulfillment of cosmic destiny. Only through torture and crucifixion could Jesus take his place with God.

Thus, a number of people have argued that, historically, the Catholic Church fostered a form of spiritual fatalism that taught the poor to resign themselves to a life of poverty and misery (Wood, 2003, p.14). Suffering in the human realm would be rewarded postmortem in the heavenly afterlife. The traditional clergy has often been depicted as a willing collaborator with the oligarchy, enforcing an ideology that would make peasants docile, teaching them to fear authority and to shy away from protest.

Anthropological fieldwork (Binford, 2004) in northern Morazan, El Salvador, depicts traditionally minded priests in the 1970s. Father Argueta was the only priest in an area of some 200 mountainous square miles, with some 35,000 inhabitants, some of the poorest peasants in the country:

[He] represented a traditionalist current of Catholicism that emphasized spirituality and subordination before the will of God. His liturgies focused on the self sacrifice of the saints. He interpreted poverty, disease, and infant death as trials mandated by God, for which those who bore them with dignity would be rewarded in the hereafter (Binford, 2004, p. 108).

Like other priests, Argueta held a higher standard of living than that of his flock, some of which can be attributed to their reverence for him. He received payments for conducting baptisms, weddings, funerals, and special masses dedicated to patron saints. Since associating with him was seen as an honor, he was often given presents and free meals. Few dared to approach him directly however, intimidated by his status. He had to be approached through an intermediary, another person of status such as a landowner, judge, or church official. Argueta shamelessly used the pulpit to encourage his congregation to vote for the National Conciliation Party (Binford, 2004, p. 109). He represents the traditional Christ symbol in El Salvador—a pacifier of the poor, a partner to the oligarchy and military, supporting hegemonic power.

This correlates with a focus on adherence to traditions (such as the sacraments), celebration of the mass, a leadership composed of celibate priests, belief in official church doctrines, and the chain of command within the church hierarchy. Ultimately, these stances reflect the persisting view that the Catholic devotee’s relationship to Christ ideally flows through priests and the Church. A new wave of traditionalist evangelism began in the 1990s, and incorporates “a visible role for the laity and an effort to relate theological and pastoral concerns to believers’ life conditions. However... [it] also includes more conservative elements, notably a paternalistic style

of leadership, and insistence on obedience to authority, and an emphasis on moral and personal concerns over political ones” (Williams & Peterson, 1996, p. 882).

The Christ symbol here is distant, far-off, and beyond the reach of the lay person. It lies, roped, off in church corners, above altars that could not be reached without a ladder. It is a Christ symbol seen, not touched. This reflects a social blueprint of consolidated power, restricted access, where a fortunate few have access.

Progressive Catholicism

Yet Catholic study groups often evolved into activist cells and other groups supporting insurgent action. Leading up to the civil war, many joined social movements because they had become convinced that “social justice was God’s will” (Binford, 2004, p. 17–18). The following quotes, from an agricultural cooperative leader and a *campesina* (rural inhabitant) are quite illustrative:

Let’s see why the war emerged. Perhaps... because the Catholic Church gave a certain orientation. Perhaps because the words of the Bible connected with a very deep injustice-[the elites] treated us like animals, it was slavery (Binford, 2004, p. 87).

The organizing began in 1976... It was Biblical study that made people conscious, a process that eventually took another form. By means of the Bible it all began (Binford, 2004, p. 89).

Teachings within some elements of the Catholic Church had shifted. They no longer conspired in the oppression of the masses, but laid a foundation for independent thought. A key catalyst in this transformation of perspective was Liberation Theology. Its early roots can be found in the changes resulting from the Vatican II council in the 1960s. While contentious, Liberation Theology became famous during a meeting of Latin American bishops in Medellin in 1968. Its foundation is the notion of a “preferential option for the poor” (Binford, 2004, p. 90). The Christ symbol roots itself in the poor and their suffering, and persons are morally obligated to alleviate this suffering, including the poor themselves. The power of the Christ symbol does not belong to the few, nor is it out of reach. In many ways, Liberation Theology simply asked “What would Jesus do?” in contexts like El Salvador. The answer was that he would side with the oppressed. Subjugation and tolerance of misery were no longer the will of God. “This very fact, however, would make the church a subversive influence within a social order that was founded upon injustice, exploitation, and oppression exercised against the many by the few” (Martin-Baro, 1985, p. 4).

The Martyr

Religiously motivated zeal and political advocacy met with brutal repression. From 1970 onward, more than two dozen nuns and priests were murdered (Peterson,

1997, p. 103). Much of Salvadoran progressive Catholic thought and action (and even its success) can thus be attributed to the central symbolic role of the martyr (Recinos, 1997). Martyrdom gives death a specific meaning. The deaths of martyrs are not defeats, but proof of the nobility of their cause. “For many, a reinterpretation of martyrdom... helped make political killings more comprehensible by placing them in the light of God’s perceived plan for humankind” (Peterson, 1997, p. 19). In this context, religion was no longer other-worldly, but political, concerned with the realities of the social environment.

El Salvador’s martyrlly Christianity relates belief in a God who sides with the poor and those classified as “social martyrs” in the struggle to end human rights violations, while achieving the democratization of the state, the demilitarization of society, and the achievement of economic justice (Recinos, 1997, p. 97).

The most famous Salvadoran martyrs include the Archbishop Oscar Romero, the Jesuit priests at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), and Rutilio Grande. Father Rutilio Grande was the first of these to die, in 1977. In 1972, he arrived in the town of Aguilares, some 35 km north of the capital of San Salvador, along with three other Jesuits. They conducted a survey to learn the needs of groups within the area, then established 37 Christian Base Communities, CEBs (Montgomery, 1982, p. 105). In the 1970s, Catholic clergy and lay leaders had begun forming such CEBs. Small groups of people would meet weekly to discuss current events and reflect on biblical passages (Wood, 2003, p. 91). The goal oriented believers towards critical thinking skills through social awareness. Eight months after his arrival, workers at a nearby sugar mill organized a strike over a promised wage increase they had not received. He was assassinated in 1977 as he drove to celebrate mass (Montgomery, 1982, p. 109).

Archbishop Oscar Romero is by far the most well known Salvadoran martyr. Romero forged a public link between Catholicism and the liberation of oppressed Salvadorans (Peterson, 1997, p. 99). He eagerly supported the tenets of Medellín, and the need for transformation of structures that marginalized the people. While publicly denouncing the actions of the government and military, he ultimately deplored all violence. Romero did not support armed rebellion, but progressive thought and social justice. Before his death, his Sunday morning sermon was the most popular radio program in the nation, and his weekly interview was third most popular (Peterson, 1997, 111). Romero was assassinated on March 24th, 1980 while saying mass (Montgomery, 1982, p. 115).

Six Jesuits and two women, Elba and Celina Ramos (their cook and her daughter), were assassinated in November of 1989 at the Universidad Centroamericana in San Salvador. While they did not regularly work in parishes, the Jesuits had become well known for their criticism of the war and the government.

They constantly affirmed that Christ is the God of life who cares especially for the poor, they publicly denounced the prevailing political and economic order, they eloquently documented the sufferings of the poor, they systematically taught that the problems of El Salvador demand profound structural transformation that require the participation of the poor majority, they openly challenged the democratic credentials attributed to recent Salvadoran governments, and they insistently advocated a negotiated settlement to the war (Hassett & Lacey, 1991, p. 1).

Through their deaths, Romero, Rutilio Grande, and the Jesuits became part of a Salvadoran social movement that focused on the symbol of martyrs to encourage further determination in the face of the very real threat of death. They proposed an active religious faith that served as social critique, rather than as a religion that justifies the status quo. This represents a clash between Christ symbols, mutually exclusive meanings that divided the very meaning of Catholicism in El Salvador. One Jesuit martyr addressed the dilemma:

One type expresses a vertical, other worldly, and individualistic religion, which is allied with the dominant social sectors and sympathetic to conservative regimes. The other expresses a horizontal, this-worldly, communitarian religion, which is embodied among the oppressed social sectors and sympathetic to progressive regimes. The first will be called law and order religion and the second subversive religion (Martin-Baro, 1991, p. 348).

The progressive Christ symbol was pursued through development of an independent culture of resistance, embodied in the efforts of martyrs. This new culture provided essential infrastructural elements, such as education, solidarity, organization, and esteem. CEBs formed and directly opposed law and order religion in three ways: a historical conception of salvation (that Christ and his Kingdom can be realized in the here and now); a commitment to transform the social order; and a communitarian religious life (Martin-Baro, 1991, p. 363). CEBs were functioning democracies, so that group members came to uphold democracy and pursue it as the ideal for the country as a whole (Peterson, 1997, p. 51–52). They also produced a sense of collective identity, uniting people that may have otherwise hesitated to come together for purely political reasons. CEBs often ventured into community building projects, literacy classes, and the formation of cooperatives. “Later, some members moved to clearly political issues, starting with cost of living and neighborhood problems and sometimes arriving at conflicts over the nation’s economic structure and political system or sympathy with revolutionary political groups” (Peterson, 1997, p. 52). A number of peasant training centers, *centros de formacion campesina*, were formed in rural regions, training some 15,000 leaders between 1970 and 1976 (Binford, 2004, p. 106). A new class of peasant intellectuals took shape.

These changes confronted historical trauma head on. Due to a combination of their treatment by the higher classes and their humble origins, most Salvadoran peasants suffered from a lack of education, a fear of speaking publicly and asserting opinions, a complete deference to authority, and generally a low self image (Binford, 2004, p. 113–115). The training centers focused, therefore, not simply on the dissemination of Liberation Theology, but on giving leaders the proper social tools to effect desired change. They were taught public speaking, were tutored in their reading and writing skills, and debated with their teachers. They also gave workshops on agricultural techniques and agricultural cooperative administration (Binford, 2004, p. 116).

The progressive Catholic perspective allowed a semiotic reorientation. Oppression and poverty became referents to a divine struggle. The religious system of symbols vacated the churches and robes of the clergy and became transferred to everyday structural violence. The Salvadoran’s part in this divine struggle was to strive for a new social order. The key to progressive Catholicism was the

transformation of the symbolic set. Salvadorans needed a conversion, through Christ. The martyred Jesuit Ignacio Martin-Baro offered this conception of conversion:

It is not just a matter of changing values and religious practices; in many cases the convert is led to change his or her “world” significantly, that is, to change categories fundamental to his or her interpretation and evaluation of reality, and is thus led to important changes in attitudes, habits, and forms of action (Martin-Baro, 1991, p. 369).

As exemplified by the deaths of the martyrs, the state responded with a wave of violence directed at Catholics sympathetic to Liberation Theology and social change. Indeed, many came to identify “Catholic” with “subversive.” The result was that being a public, vocal Catholic was potentially dangerous. This linked the martyrs to the Christ symbol irrevocably, as they literally gave their lives in the divine struggle.

Religious Shifts

The persecution of progressive Catholics related to the growth of a number of Evangelical churches during the same period. Unlike progressive Catholics, “evangelical [sic] churches reject secular solutions to the problems afflicting Salvadoran society and focus on assisting individuals in finding personal salvation... Unlike CEBs, most evangelical [sic] churches do not stress social commitment beyond the church community, and many discourage involvement in national politics” (Williams & Peterson, 1996, p. 890). For a number of people, conversion to Evangelicalism thus presented the opportunity to become part of a social group with a stated political neutrality. Indeed, many believe that a number of people within the El Mozote community converted to Evangelicalism in an attempt to publicly aver their own neutrality and perhaps save their lives (Binford, 1996, p. 94). Evangelical churches were also appealing in that they tended to family’s personal needs and problems, such as drug or alcohol addiction, domestic violence, physical illness, and material needs (Williams & Peterson, 1996, p. 890). During the period of war, there was pronounced growth among Evangelical churches. Here was a new response to historical trauma, a new social blueprint that espoused a distinct set of referents to Christ.

Evangelicalism

In El Salvador, Catholic Church data from the period between 1956 and 1970 suggest that 93–95 % of the nation’s population was Catholic, at least in name (Stein, 1999, p. 123). By 1980, the number of Protestants remained at less than 5 %. Though the 1992 census did not include data on religious affiliation, public opinion surveys suggest that up to 23.8 % of the population was Evangelical by 1997 (Stein, 1999, p. 124). By 2000, Peterson Vasquez, and William (2001, p. 6) contend that Evangelicals were between 15 and 20 % of the population.

Many theories have been proposed to explain this rapid, regional shift in religious forms. These explanations are often overlapping, and by no means mutually exclusive. (Gill, 1999; Gomez, 2001; Martin, 1989; Miguez-Bonino, 1997; Moreno, 1999; Patterson, 2005; Peterson et al., 2001; Stoll, 1993; Vasquez, 1999). Some see the spread of Evangelicalism as a form of cultural imperialism. Others maintain that Protestantism has grown in response to a set of socioeconomic and political conditions, or in response to modernization. Conversion to Evangelicalism has also been characterized as the natural outcome of a population in crisis seeking solace in faith. Like Catholic conversion, a spiritual transformation must occur. The difference is that Evangelical conversion implies a rejection of Catholicism.

In the Salvadoran conflict, many focus on Evangelicalism's ability to reconstitute shattered cultural elements (Gomez, 2001; Peterson, 2001; Santos, 2012). The post-war environment compromised social infrastructure, separated families, interrupted childhood development, and normalized violence and death. Evangelicalism focuses greatly on creating networks of support between believers, requiring none of the infrastructure that Catholic churches require (priests, altars, chalices, etc). This fluid model means all that is needed to build community are a few interested believers, who can meet in a house, room, or plaza.

Defining Evangelicalism can be problematic. Millions of people, belonging to dozens of denominations identify as Evangelical. Perhaps the most defining feature of Evangelicalism is its insistence on a literal interpretation of the Bible. It contains the explicit word of God and mere possession of it symbolizes Christian identity. It outlines the guidelines for Christian living, the past and future, and the ultimate end of all things. Conversion to Evangelicalism is also essential.

Once a person converts, behavioral and attitudinal changes should result. Worldview and practice are combined to produce an Evangelical lifestyle that shows great similarity both within and outside Latin America. Essential elements of this worldview include: a close link with Christ, a rejection of the "world" and a resulting elevation of all things Evangelical; an ecstatic form of worship and prayer; belief that the family unit is divinely ordained; and belief in the transformation of self resulting from conversion. As the term is used here, "Evangelical" refers to groups that fit these characteristics.

The Evangelical symbolic set divides all things into two basic categories: the world (*el mundo*), and the body of Christ (the Christian churches and individuals within them; Santos, 2012). For the Evangelical, the world is inherently profane. It is filled with sin. The world is destined for the fires of hell. It is the place of regular people, the unsaved, those who have not accepted Christ. The result is that all negative things are referred to as the "world," or as "worldly." Others distinguish between social realities such as globalization, economic distress, political instability, high crime rates, culture change, social prejudice, and the like. The Evangelical symbolic set subsumes all these in the concept of "the world."

One might mistakenly assume that the Evangelical has a pessimistic view of life. The world is everywhere, and thus the Christian is constantly surrounded by its negative influence, its decadence, and its capacity to harm. It is a very real threat.

However, one's link to Christ is a link with the most powerful force in the universe. This connection provides great comfort and esteem. Christ can never be defeated, so the world cannot win against the Evangelical ethos.

The whole notion of "separation" from the rest of the world is an intrinsic article of faith (Miguez-Bonino, 1997, p. 39). Believers are necessarily a discreet entity formed in opposition to the rest of the world. The Christ symbol divides the universe and social world into two distinct elements, those with Christ and those without him—an inherent comparison of worth between the two distinct elements results. Evangelicals, through conversion, abandon the profane world and link themselves to the sacred, becoming something, not just different, but better. Evangelicals state, assuredly, that they are greater (*somos mas*) than persons still confined to the world (Peterson et al., 2001, p. viii).

Another essential element of the Evangelical worldview and its social project is its obsession with the family. The nuclear family is seen as a divinely inspired unit, and persons are very much defined by their roles within that unit. Evangelicals emphasize the domestic sphere above the public (Brusco, 1993). Family harmony becomes crucial, a way of judging the level of Christian commitment of its members. "Discipline, order, and piety in the family, as in the individual, serve precisely to distinguish believers from... the worldly things, which will pass away" (Peterson et al., 2001, p. 11). Thus, women's submission to men and their completion of household duties simultaneously become a form of worship and evidence of being a good Christian. Submission is easier to accept because it is not simply submission to a husband's whims, but submission to the will of God. Destructive male behavior is interpreted in spiritual terms, as the "powers of darkness and sin" are responsible (Peterson, 2001, p. 36). The appropriate female response, therefore, is not to abandon the family, but to combat the darkness through Christian action, be it through prayer or the execution of her divine duty as wife.

Fatherhood is likewise seen as a divinely commissioned responsibility and authority. The father is to the family what the pastor is to the congregation, what Christ is to the church of believers (Ephesians 5:23). The Evangelical Christ symbol promotes a return to male authority, only provided that such authority is exercised in a loving manner that promotes Evangelical goals. Like women, men do not discharge their fatherly duties just to serve themselves. Rather, they dominate to please God (Peterson, 2001, p. 36). In the context of broken families, "churches often present appealing solutions: a place for each member of the family in an orderly, hierarchical, and stable structure... sharply opposed to the corrupt outside world" (Peterson et al., 2001, p. 11). Participants are encouraged to reform their families, remaking them in the model relationship of Christ and Church. Church members are thus under considerable pressure to convert their family members, seeking to both please God and receive the blessings of happiness and harmony that derive from being part of a Christian family. In fact, recruitment of family members has consistently been one of Evangelicalism's most effective strategies toward growth (Gill, 1999, p. 82).

The Evangelical social model is a domestic-centered one, seeking social change one soul, one conversion at a time. It literally seeks to spread Christ from person to

person. I once spoke with a pastor concerning the high crime and poverty rates in El Salvador. He lamented them, and said, “If only more people would convert, these problems would disappear.” (Personal Communication, 2006)

The Verbal Christ Symbol

Though it too connotes a social project, the Evangelical Christ symbol differs drastically from both the Traditional and Progressive Catholic. First, it cannot be objectified. A literal interpretation of the second commandment (Exodus 20: 4–5) strictly forbids creating any image or worshipping an image. Were a Christ symbol to take physical form, it would violate the referent and reveal itself as an inauthentic symbol. Therefore, the Catholic Christ symbols are false Christs. Icons, statues, paintings—all visual symbols—are Satanic. Yet the Christ symbol is seen, heard, and felt everywhere. The Evangelical Christ symbol simultaneously divides Salvadoran society (believers versus idolators), yet surrounds and comforts the Evangelical. The Christ symbol cannot be engraved nor painted, but can be spoken of endlessly. Christ is thus most often found in narrative form.

In 2006 and 2007, I worked with Evangelical churches in El Salvador and elicited interviews, life histories, surveys, and a network analysis (Santos, 2012). I discovered the Christ symbol “speaks” constantly through certain acts, circumstances, and people, and through what nonbelievers might call coincidence. The Evangelical Christ symbol intervenes and resolves issues and problems. Many converts reported struggling with addiction, relationship problems, psychological and physical difficulties, economics, and more. Christ specifically triggers healing transformations, addressing Salvadoran social maladies through action. He intervenes in believers’ lives, and that intervention is the Evangelical Christ symbol.

I felt, for my part, that I had to receive Christ as my only and sufficient Savior... I heard a voice, a voice that told me, “You must receive Christ.” Then I felt an anguish to move up front and accept Christ. I felt that there was my answer. There was the solution to my problem.

Miguel, 22 years old, after three years of drug use, homelessness, and on the run from gang troubles (Santos, 2012, p. 61).

I spent two years going to church... I would go to church... just thinking- Why? Why? Why?... On June 11th, 1984. It was a Saturday. I told the Lord [begins to weep]- I can’t take it anymore. I told him... I want you to free me.

Emilio, 66 years old, after two years of a crippling stomach illness (Santos, 2012, p. 61).

I remember one time—I’ll never forget this, either. I was drunk, falling asleep. I was trying to get back to my house. I was lying down. And I got up. And I looked and saw myself in a mirror. I looked at myself and saw my eyes all red. And I started thinking to myself—What am I doing with my life, you know? I don’t know. I started thinking like—Why [sic]am I doing this for? Like—What do I gain from this? You know, like... so many things going through my head... I guess it was like, spiritually speaking, it was the Lord already talking to me.”

Martin, 26 years old, a few months prior to conversion, on a binge (Santos, 2012, p. 61).

In the first place, it [converting to Christ] wasn't so that God would get me out of [prison]. And it wasn't out of fear, either. Because I wasn't afraid of anybody. On the inside in those first months, I carried around a knife like that, next to my ribs... There was a need in my heart. I felt alone... I felt alone and desperate... anguished, an anguish, and I felt something like fear. And I said, if these people feel joy here in prison because they are Christians, and I am suffering in my anguish and afflictions, I will try and see if it is true they are happy of heart. And just like I tried drugs out of curiosity, I tried Christ also to see what he was like. And when I tried him... I saw that it was not a passing happiness, but that it was permanent.

Pedro, 24 years old, in answer to why he converted in prison (Santos, 2012, p. 61).

Evangelicals eschew physical symbols. Sensory input, affect, and experience therefore become the Christ symbol for many Evangelicals. Note that suffering itself connotes a symbolic call from God. The Christ symbol lives and speaks in the stories Evangelicals tell each other, as well as non-converts. He clearly acts within their stories. The plot demonstrates how he has saved them. However, he can also work through the telling of the story, to convert the listener. Evangelicals give “testimony” of Christ in their lives. This manifestation of the Christ symbol is intended to convert others.

I fell deeper into drugs. I stopped working. Bit by bit, I took money out of the bank and used it up. My sister would say, “Don't waste that money,” and I'd say “Stop bothering.”

But maybe that was all important, I say, so that I could see that, on my own, I couldn't do anything. I needed to see that there is a savior, and that is Christ, and he is the one who saved me from all that... I came to the gospel when nobody cared about me... Thanks to the mercy of God, he knows very well which ones of us are his. The word says no one will separate us. Those that belong to God, no matter where they are, he will save them. He saved me. He basically raised me from the dust, from the street...

I came to accept through a person that spoke to me of the word. A brother from the church here. Just like I can sit here and tell you Christ loves you, he's the only one who can save you. He was someone I knew from before, a friend... It was a fast change, because God already had chosen me. The word says, “Come to me as you are, weary and burdened and I will make you rest.”

God sent that friend to save me. He told me how he had been worse off than me, but that Christ had changed him. And I saw testimony from other people, people on drugs, stuck in their sin, so I came to understand there is no other path... I accepted July 15 last year... The path of the world, the path without Christ, it yields nothing. If we've come to talk of this it's because I try for you and for friends in the world who don't know the path. Because the truth is there is a hell and there is paradise...

The Church is Christ, his body. It's important to humble yourself before him. If I had not come to the Church, I would not be alive. This is something important I give you, so that you see there is only the path of Christ.

Marco, 42 year old Evangelical male (Santos, 2012, p. 40).

This story is typical of Evangelical narratives. The Christ symbol is declared to be present before the person in the story realizes it. Marco was suffering, unaware of Christ. Now, however, he sees the suffering was a necessary prelude to conversion. Nothing can separate the believer from Christ, even their ignorance of him. Further, the Christ symbol is transferred through human action, or at least uses humans to transfer itself. Marco came to Christ when another Evangelical related their own narrative. The narrative Christ symbol led to Marco's conversion.

Finally, Marco repeated the process by relating the story to me. His life story becomes a referent to the Christ symbol, who now (ideally), enters the listener.

The narrative can therefore act as an invitation to join with the Christ symbol. Because the Christ symbol largely represents a social model (dividing the universe between the world/the body of Christ), its acceptance or rejection is largely a social statement. By accepting Christ, one becomes part of the larger Evangelical social group. In my case, repeated rejections of the invitation led to disappointment among my Evangelical associates. Many lamented my status as depraved and sinful. Out of real concern, they would appeal to me. They suffered to know I was destined for the fires of hell. Since I could not construct a Christ symbol (narrative), the proof of salvation, my soul remained in danger.

The Divided Use of Christ

Because of differences in attitude towards symbolic sets, Evangelicals and Catholics divide Salvadoran society. Some do not take this as representative of a diverse society, but as a moral separation. I fell into this social divide often. Once, I had run from an Evangelical church to a Catholic one. After mass, I identified myself as an anthropologist and asked the priest for an interview. Seeing an Evangelical bible in my hand, he promptly kicked me out of the Church. My explanations that I was neither Catholic nor Evangelical were pointless. The Christ symbol, the printed word, said it all. On a separate occasion, I bade farewell to an Evangelical church at the conclusion of a service. The Pastor, knowing I had worked with Catholics, took the opportunity to inquire about them publicly. Do they not bow before idols? Do they not spend extravagantly on feast days and robes for priests? Do they not act one way in church, then sin as soon as they leave? My very knowledge of the social Other served as a rhetorical device to emphasize the social divide.

Christ means different things to different Salvadorans. Traditional Catholics, Progressive Catholics, and Evangelicals use different sets of meanings to make sense of their Christ symbol. Interestingly, despite their differences, none of these groups rejects the symbol. Rather, they reject the meanings and groups associated with other Christ symbols. To the Progressive Catholic, the sermons telling the oppressed to sit quietly are a false Christ. To the Traditionalist, the agitator and revolutionary mislead the followers of Christ. To the Evangelical, the images of the Catholic Church violate the true Christ.

In all its disparate uses, however, the Salvadoran Christ symbol relates to the social suffering of the population. He represents social blueprints, models for redressing conflict and trauma within Salvadoran society. Historical trauma disrupts social functioning, preventing cultural evolution and causing anomie. El Salvador's history clearly crafted this situation, and the shifting Christ symbol intertwines with this process. The traditionalist Christ accompanied the trauma as a justification. While it provided solace, giving the poor a reason for their suffering, it justified the traumatic social order rather than redress it. Eventually, progressive Catholicism

heard Christ speak different words, espousing resistance and a new social order. Trauma was redressed through an attempt at nation-wide social change beginning with community building at the local level, as found in CEBs. Martyrs embodied this struggle, so that political action and social change, healing the traumas of inequality, became a divine mandate. Death itself, while tragic, symbolized the legitimacy of the struggle. Evangelicalism, too, heals the wounds of cultural disruption. The basic social unit, the family, disintegrates under historical trauma. Evangelicalism glorifies the domestic unit. Establishing family units, playing out proper roles within them, and connecting them through faith are the divine mandate. Further, the Evangelical emphasis on symbols is necessarily narrative. They reject the iconography of Catholicism, leading to a social rejection of other religions. Yet the narrative emphasis allows Christ symbols to intervene directly in the actions of daily life, transforming believers and giving them a device to convert others and save society one person at a time. All three traditions persist in modern El Salvador, dividing the nation through conflicting meanings of *Savior*.

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Holocaust Collective Memory in the Context of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: A Multifaceted Symbol

Cristina Andriani

Beginning with the partition of the land by the United Nations in 1947, Israel has seen seven wars, two *Intifadas*, and numerous military operations and terror attacks (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005). The Israeli–Arab conflict has been a long-term, intergenerational conflict that has claimed many victims on both sides. While Israel has signed peace treaties with Egypt and with Jordan, most of the region remains in an undeclared state of war. These military confrontations and the on-again, off-again peace processes have made for a violent and unstable sociopolitical environment in which Holocaust collective memory has frequently been evoked.

The increase in memorialization of the Holocaust, starting in the 1970s, indicates that it is a process that is becoming more institutionalized and not routinized or forgotten (Burg, 2008; Novick, 1999; Porat, 2004; Segev, 1991). Politicians referenced the Holocaust in their speeches (Zertal, 2005). The Holocaust continues to maintain a prominent place in Israeli discourse through education, in the media, in political speech, in the news, in commemoration practices, and through memorials (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992b; Klar, Schori-Eyeal, & Klar, 2013; Shapira, 1997; Young, 1993).

Holocaust collective memory in Israel is utilized to create a cohesive collective identity; however, its truth is relative “with no clear symbolic order of myths, ideas, hierarchy... there is no preference for the official narrative (the hegemony) of the collective memory over stories competing with it” (Brog, 2003, p.66). Its representations (memorials and commemorations) provide a perceived stability in its meaning, yet are also the *lieux de memoire* in which meaning is redefined by communities in dialogue about the past and present (Braun, 1994). In this chapter, Holocaust collective memory is understood as a fluid and multifaceted symbol that is used by

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different groups *within* the Israeli collective to define collective identities. Specifically, this chapter seeks to elaborate upon how Holocaust collective memory is made meaning of within the context of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. The elaboration aims to demonstrate how Holocaust collective memory can be a divisive symbol within the Israeli culture, as well as how this same symbol can be a source of change towards unity. The chapter will begin by addressing key literature in the field on Holocaust collective memory, how it was introduced in Israel, how it has been taught, and how it is reinforced as a symbol in everyday life. It will then turn to specific symbolization of Holocaust collective memory by using data from 35 in-depth interviews conducted with Jewish-Israelis in November of 2011 in order to depict the different meanings that arise.

Collective Memory

Collective memory is transmitted from one generation to the next through use of the media, commemorative rituals, or grounded symbols (Assman, 2008). Over time, collective memory gradually becomes more homogeneous and institutionalized as the function of transmission shifts from the people bearing witness and the political elite recording these memories to the political elite reporting these now unified recorded memories to future generations (Assman, 2008). Collective memory is thus constructed in the context of the present culture—and not the past—it both *shapes* and *is shaped* by groups.

Collective memory is understood as having two functions: cognitive and conative (Assman, 2008; Poole, 2008). The former function situates memory as a consistent and stable source of information that is utilized as a cognitive map for identity and meaning construction (Eyal, 2004; Poole, 2008). The latter function situates memory within the realm of the uncertain and unstable that must be resolved by future generations (Eyal, 2004). Conative memory is defined by a notion of responsibility that makes future generations accountable for past generations' wrongdoings in order to achieve resolution and reparation (Eyal, 2004). The responsibilities carried by memory involve remembering, *what* is to be remembered, and what it *means* to remember (Eyal, 2004). Conative memory therefore represents the transmission of responsibility, while cognitive memory represents the transmission of information. Collective memories are both cognitive and conative: they record the past and remind us of the commitments that this past implies for present generations (Poole, 2008). The dual function of collective memories establishes connection within groups by making memories significant to each member of the group (Poole, 2008).

We purposefully hold onto collective memory via media, museums, and commemorative ritual. These mediums emphasize the relationship between the personal and political, the individual and the collective, with regards to memory and mourning: “It is not simply a case of whether grieving should be private or national, and *whose*

story should be told, but also a question of how to negotiate the necessary relation between them” (Edkins, 2003, p. 94). Collective memory, much like collective narrative, is filtered and framed to create a sense of homogeneity within a group. It is subjective. It is rooted in both history and myth that brings communities together—collectives are drawn together by a subjective sense of belonging created by a nationalist discourse. It manipulates the past to suit the purpose of the present through inclusion of some facts and exclusion of others in the favor of those whose purpose is being served (Anderson, 1991; Lowenthal, 1996). Collective memory should therefore be understood as conveying symbols that enhance group identity.

Holocaust Collective Memory in Israel

It should be noted that the national narrative of Israel reflects upon a past that includes perpetual persecution by other groups that resulted in the exile of Jews from their land, the Holocaust representing one of many of these instances. Its theme is one of redemption, in which horrific defeats and massacres are turned into stories of heroic death, and survival (Bar-On, 1997; Shapira, 1997; Sheffer, 1997; Toffolo, 1996; Weingrod, 1997). Examples include the death of Yosef Trumpeldor in 1920; the first of these events in which a Jewish commander was turned into a hero, and was quoted as saying when he was dying “it is good to die for our country” (Brenner, 1996, p. 449). The mass suicide of the Jews at Masada is another event that over centuries has turned into the myth of Masada (Ben-Yehuda, 1995, p. 9). The Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943 is an emblematic event that depicts the Jewish-Israeli ideal archetype, the myth tying the Holocaust, Israeli nationalism, and Zionism together (Zertal, 2005). These myths take on a nationalistic and romanticized view of the past (Pappe, 2000, p. 39).

While it is common for all states to create national myths and ideals that reflect political needs, Israel is different in that it has a “perverse debt to the Holocaust,” and in so creating the national narrative, it is “condemned to define itself in opposition to the very event that made it necessary” (Young, 1993, p. 211–212). Israel lives in a culture that is defined by its appropriation of the Holocaust and its millions of dead (Zertal, 2005). This begins with the State of Israel Proclamation of Independence that references the Holocaust and the millions of Jews that it engulfed (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005). It continues with the symbolic bestowal of Israeli citizenship to the six million Jews murdered who were perceived as potential Zionists and their incorporation into the body politic which allowed for the reparations from Germany to Israel (Zertal, 2005). In 1953, the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Law—Yad Vashem—was drafted, thus officially linking the State of Israel and the Holocaust (Zertal, 2005).

Politicians, such as Ben Gurion and Menachem Begin, frequently referenced the Holocaust in their political speeches, describing Israel as the “one fitting tombstone in memory of European Jewry,” claiming Israelis as “the redeemers of the blood of

six million Jews” to describe the Arabs as Nazis whom Israelis must fight in order to not allow another Triblenk (Zertal, 2005). The Eichmann trial was a catalyst to opening the dialogue of the *Jewish* Holocaust, personalizing it for all Israelis (Burg, 2008; Novick, 1999). Holocaust memory was manipulated for the development of a national narrative of redemption through the trial in which the perpetrator was executed, and the innocent victims were empowered through testimony. It shaped Holocaust memory in Israel, which had previously been silenced, affecting the whole nation psychologically through the broadcast of the trial (Segev, 1991; Zertal, 2005).

In Israel, memorials tie past to present, destruction to construction of a new land, death to a new life in a new land, and victimhood to heroization. Yad Vashem and its outdoor memorials built on Mount Herzl reflect the conjoining narratives of heroes and victims of the Holocaust with a focus on resistance and resilience. For example the Warsaw Ghetto Monument is made up of two bronze reliefs, one depicting the deportation of Jews to concentration camps and the other the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, thus encompassing symbols of both heroism and martyrdom. Different memorials and museums at kibbutzim connect both Holocaust commemoration and patriotic national narrative, such as Nathan Rappaport’s monument in Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, where one of the ghetto fighters is portrayed as a young, strong kibbutznik rather than the lean man with glasses that he was. Another example is the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto fighters and Eliezer Gelled and his comrades in Kibbutz Ma’ale Hachamisha which symbolize both heroism and self-sacrifice for the country (Young, 1993). The memorials are a tangible representation of the key symbols of the Holocaust: heroism and martyrdom. Holocaust representation is itself divided into different aspects. The uniting factor is how these symbols are conferred, the rituals by which they are passed on to Jewish-Israelis.

Remembrance Day of the Holocaust and Heroism is itself a dual symbol: it is labeled as a day to remember victims and heroes, and was set to be on the 27th day of Nisan, to fall in a traditionally happy month and within the time of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. The observation of two minutes of silence in Israel as a ritual during this day creates a sense of both common past and common future, uniting all Israelis *regardless of their relationship* to the Holocaust. A siren sounds, and for those two minutes, Israel comes to a full stop: cars will pull over on the highway, the radios and TV stations fall silent, and all stand in silence wherever they are. In addition, all places of entertainment are closed and the media only provides coverage of Holocaust-related programming (Klar et al., 2013). Communities and schools hold ceremonies. The experience is inescapable, yet is a point of contention among Jewish-Israelis, some having different ideas about what ought to be represented and remembered, and how. While Holocaust memorialization in Israel has given voice to survivors and opened a space where the personal has become political, it has simultaneously *shaped* the personal into political. Holocaust museums, memorials, memorial days, and testimonies are sociopolitically “edited” to meet broader political goals. Aspects of the personal experience that challenge the national narrative or that threaten collective identity and cohesiveness are erased.

The Evolution of Holocaust Education in Israel

In 1942, awareness was brought to the Yishuv about the acts of violence that had taken place in Europe, although knowledge was limited and superfluous (Lazar, Chaitin, Gross, & Bar-On, 2004; Yablonka, 2003). Three years later, survivors of the Holocaust composed the majority of the 700,000 new immigrants entering the Yishuv between 1945 and 1947 (Yablonka, 2003). At the time, reactions were mixed: the Jews were both welcomed as a strengthening argument for the need for a State of Israel and shunned as victims who “went like lambs to the slaughter” (Zertal, 2005). Dialogue of the Holocaust atrocities was limited and erratic. It wasn’t until 1951, at the suggestion of Rabbi Mordechai Nurok, both a member of the Knesset and Holocaust survivor, that Yom HaZikaron LaShoah ve LaGevurah (Remembrance Day of the Holocaust and Heroism) was officially instated on April 12 (Ofer, 2009). The Holocaust was now being recognized in the Israeli consciousness as proof of the evil that non-Jews had perpetrated towards Jews. The Eichmann trial, starting in 1961, brought to light the suffering of Holocaust survivors to the Israeli public, but this did not translate into the Israeli education system right away (Porat, 2004).

In Israeli schools, the Holocaust was a marginal topic until the late 1970s, covered by only a quarter of schools and only for a few hours in the entire school year (Ben-Peretz & Shachar, 2012; Porat, 2004). The passing of the Holocaust Memory Bill in 1980 triggered a change in the education system, and by 1982 the Israeli Ministry of Education required 30 hours of Holocaust studies as a part of the history curriculum in high schools (Lazar et al., 2004; Porat, 2004). The Holocaust also became a topic covered in Hebrew literature and Jewish philosophy. In 1988, the Ministry of Education implemented the optional study tours to Poland to visit death camps and other important sites related to the Holocaust (Israel—Holocaust Education Report, 2005; Lazar et al., 2004).

Holocaust Presence in Everyday Life

Starting in 1988, 10,000 Israeli students travel to Poland every year. The Israeli Defense Force also organizes such trips, with one of the goals being to strengthen commitment to the Jewish State (Klar et al., 2013). Since survivors are now less than 3 % of the Israeli population, for most Israelis the Holocaust is not a part of their living memory but rather one acquired through commemoration as described above, text books, the arts, and the media, to name a few (Klar et al., 2013; Ofer, 2009).

Holocaust importance in Jewish-Israeli life is rampant. One study of Israeli college students found that most believed that all Jewish people should consider themselves victims of the Holocaust (Oron, 1993), while another shows that the majority

of Jewish-Israelis view remembering the Holocaust as one of their key life principles (Klar et al., 2013), and yet another finds that three quarters of Israeli school children believe their worldview is affected by the Holocaust (Cohen, in Klar et al., 2013). In an open-ended questionnaire asking Israeli participants the most important events in the last 60 years, the Holocaust was among the top three along with the establishment of the State of Israel and Rabin's murder (Schuman, Vinitzky-Seroussi, & Vinokur, 2003). Klar et al. (2013) further point out that the Holocaust and Palestinian–Israeli conflict are mentioned equally frequently in one of the leading Israeli newspapers, Haaretz. Researchers overall seem to agree that the Holocaust will not soon be forgotten (Klar et al., 2013; Ofer, 2009; Schuman et al., 2003).

Within-Group Differences in Israel

In the field of social psychology, where within-group differences have been studied, limited research has been conducted that suggests there are different ways in which Holocaust collective memory has been construed and utilized within the context of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. For example, research by Salomon (2004), with 309 Israeli high school students participating in the March of Life (March of the Living) to Poland, has suggested that there is a link between universalistic lessons of the Holocaust and dovish orientation, and between particularistic lessons and hawkish orientation. To elaborate further, individuals who perceive the lesson of the Holocaust as particularistic—“it happened to *us* and we should not allow it to happen again to *us*”—will tend to think “we must protect ourselves at all cost” (a hawkish position); those who perceive the lesson of the Holocaust as universalistic—that is, “as a result of what happened, *no one* should suffer this way”—will tend to also empathize with others' suffering in the present and seek more compromise, which falls under a more dovish perspective.

Work by Vollhardt (2009a), Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, and Gundar (2009), and Chaitin and Steinberg (2008) suggests that groups that feel victimized tend to justify violent action against a perceived other, while some, albeit limited, victims who are able to show more empathy for other victim groups—identifying with them on past victimization—are more peace oriented and compromising. These conclusions were drawn, in these specific cases, in the context of Jewish-Israelis reflecting on past victimization (including the Holocaust), and its impact on their attitudes towards the Palestinian other. Jewish-Israelis who had a more exclusive sense of victimhood were more in support of the use of violence in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, while those who were empathic were able to view Palestinians as victims as well and understand how Israeli violence impacted them (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Chaitin & Steinberg, 2008; Vollhardt, 2009a). Therefore, while a group may carry a victim identity, individual differences exist as to how that victimization is utilized and construed.

Further psychological research on perceptions of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict links collective memory to emotions, and emotions to attitudes towards the

Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Wohl and Branscombe (2008), in an experiment with Jewish-Canadians, found that remembering historical victimization decreased collective guilt for current in-group transgressions towards a current adversary. In their study, Jewish-Canadians who were reminded of the Holocaust expressed less guilt about Jewish-Israeli transgressions towards Palestinians. Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992b) found siege mentality beliefs of Jewish-Israelis—that the rest of the world is against them as a consequence of a long history of past victimization—were most prominent in hawks who had an uncompromising ideology towards the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. A broader, but similar study assessing collective and individual fear and hope found that participants were more affected by collective experiences than by personal ones and that collective memory was an important correlate of fear related to collective experiences, showing that “remembering traumatic Jewish experiences that took place in the distant past affects collective fear related to the Israeli-Arab conflict” (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Drori, 2008, p. 251).

What begins to surface among these different studies is that there is a *heterogeneous* response to the Holocaust and its memory. Individuals who identify with the same collective memory may be able to conceive of the same trauma in different ways, some drawing more particularistic, group-based lessons from it, and others more universalistic (Shechter, in Salomon, 2004; Klar et al., 2013). It is these differences that ought to be highlighted and studied further. How do individuals belonging to the same group make meaning of the same collective memory in different ways to lead to different conclusions?

Holocaust Meaning-Making: Examples from Jewish-Israelis

The evolution of Holocaust consciousness in the psyche is reflected in the 35 interviews utilized here to show specific examples of how the Holocaust is symbolized and understood differently among Jewish-Israelis. Those interviewees who were child survivors shared mostly their childhood memories and personal lessons. Second-generation descendants of survivors reported memories of hearing bits and pieces at home, a couple spoke of the Eichmann trial, and of Holocaust Remembrance Day in which the TV streams endless Holocaust-related material. Those interviewees who were in their 20’s and 30’s presented the most cohesive collective experience of learning in school and attending remembrance ceremonies, some taking the trip to Poland with classmates. Additionally, there were instances where second generation interviewees spoke of taking trips to Poland with their children, or helping them with their 7th grade roots project which involves exploring one’s family experiences in the Holocaust. The Holocaust is transmitted through different channels for each generation.

Two aspects of Holocaust symbolism are addressed in the following sections of this chapter: Holocaust legacies and meaning-making through the different lessons drawn from the Holocaust, and how these legacies are interpreted within the context

of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. The interviews will show how Holocaust collective memory can be both inclusive and exclusive, and sometimes simultaneously so within the same individual.

Holocaust Lessons in Israel

Lessons of the Holocaust vary between two extremes of particularism and universalism (Klar et al., 2013; Lazar et al., 2004). In their research, Klar and colleagues identify four voices of “never again”: never again be a passive victim, never forsake your brothers, never be a passive bystander, and never be a perpetrator. The first two voices are particularistic, and the second two more universalistic. The voices/lessons are defined as incompatible with each other “in that protecting another group member, non-group members and enemies may detract from one’s own self-preservation” (Klar et al., 2013, p. 135). The first voice is consistent with perpetual in-group victimhood orientation (PIVO), a strong belief in uniqueness of trauma. The fourth voice in contrast reflects fear of victimization (FOV), the fear that one’s group will lose sight of plight of others (Klar et al., 2013).

Work by Lazar and colleagues (2004), exploring attitudes of Jewish-Israeli adolescents, found that they tended to support Zionist and particularistic lessons, more than universalistic lessons. The youth who were descendants of Holocaust victims connected the former lessons with a sense of national identity, whereas youth who were not related to survivors demonstrated more complex thinking holding a combination of both nationalist and universalistic lessons.

Lessons of the Holocaust: Meaning-Making of Collective Memory

The analysis of themes in the interviews does indeed yield both particularistic and universalistic lessons. However, a series of other nuanced themes arise amid the dichotomy. Below is a model of Holocaust lesson themes, and how these are related (Fig. 1).

The nuance lies in two other emergent themes in addition to particularistic and universalistic lessons: “never again” and “not never again.” Interviewees frequently spoke of variations of “the Holocaust should never happen again” that were based on both awareness and agency. These ideas reflected a desire to see the Holocaust become something that would not re-occur in the future, and the realization that people needed to be aware of and learn to recognize dynamics that led to genocidal thinking, and take action towards the prevention of another genocide (the implication also being one of bystander responsibility). Among the interviews, another voice took equal importance: the belief that the Holocaust *could* happen again.




Fig. 1 Lessons of the Holocaust

Here, statements wrapped around the idea that humans have the ability to be naturally evil, that bystanders have turned their eyes away, and that humans either choose to be ignorant of what is happening or are indifferent to the suffering of others. Universalistic lessons were about respecting and accepting others (with increasing notions of empathy that ranged from caring, to humanization of all people, to the idea of going above and beyond expectations of caring to being leaders and an example for others), while particularistic lessons were branched between connotations of victimhood and nationalism (rather than Zionism). An elaboration of each theme follows.

Universalistic Lessons

The message of the universalistic lesson is “I think that as a result of what happened during the Holocaust, we should care for minorities wherever they are” (Lazar et al., 2004). In the interviews, the concept of caring additionally encompassed: respecting minorities, accepting difference between groups, and being sensitive to the needs of others. The following two quotes provide examples of this theme:

I do think that Israelis should take these refugees [Sudanese refugees currently entering Israel from the Syrian borders] and say yeah we were in that situation we tried to escape and nobody took us so come ok... it's no big deal we can stand that. (Dovish male, 35, from a kibbutz in the Negev)

I think we have to find each other to learn the lessons to respect each other to believe in the positive. I hear the social worker [laughter] but I think it's right in Hebrew now 'Lo Lishpot Et Ha Adom' but only his doings 'Adom' is still 'Adom' a human being if I was a believing Jew everybody is created in God's image yeah? (Dovish male survivor, 70s, Ashkelon)

Further, as can be seen in the second quote, the universalistic lesson expands to the notion of humanism: we should cease to see others as others and accept them as a part of a superordinate group we all belong to. The saying the survivor is referring to is “do not judge man, but only his doings.” Humanism takes on both a utopian tone, “let's drop all the borders and live as one human tribe” (dovish male, 23, kibbutz member) and a religious one: “it's a sentence in the second or third chapter of the Bible that God has shaped man like himself” (dovish male survivor, 82). This was identified as a subtheme of universalistic lessons because the message is a distinctly different one where empathy extends from caring to belonging together as one group.

The third tier of the universalistic lesson is one that suggests that Jews, having the history of the Holocaust, should not only care for minorities but should go above and beyond by setting the example for others, as can be seen in the following quotes:

We should do our best... to set an example for other people in the world how to respect the different people, people who are different from you, and treat them treat them equally, and not to discriminate them just because you're the majority because that's exactly what people did to us and because we suffered it because we know what it can lead to... I would like us to be the most non-racist country in the world but unfortunately I don't think we are. (Dovish male, 25, Jerusalem)

The main is for humanity is that it should never happen again but I think that Jews in Israel should take the torch of making sure it won't happen again. (Dovish male survivor in his 70s, Ashkelon)

Here too, the demand that Jews set the example for others—taking a leadership role in modeling what caring ought to be—surpasses the universalistic message. The subthemes of caring, humanism, and setting the example (above and beyond) are variations of the overall universalistic lessons.

Particularistic Lesson

The particularistic lesson is “from the Holocaust I have learned that Jews should be strong and depend only on themselves” (Lazar et al., 2004). Two subthemes emerged, sometimes distinct from each other, and at times overlapping. The first is nationalism, focusing on the strength and pride of the Jewish people. The second subtheme is victimhood, with an emphasis on Jewish persecution and dehumanization, both past and present. Sometimes both subthemes appear in the same statement, so these are not mutually exclusive.

The nationalistic subtheme extends beyond the need of a Jewish State to a sense of continuity of the Jewish people and culture. The nationalistic lesson draws on the

“we must be strong” aspect of the particularistic lesson. It is about being strong enough as a group to have survived annihilation, being proud, and ensuring that the Jewish State, people, and culture will continue to exist. It should be noted that the nationalistic lesson *encompasses* the Zionist lesson (the main lesson of the Holocaust is that Israel is the only place Jews should live) reported in previous research by Lazar and colleagues (2004) as one of the most prominent lessons drawn by Jewish-Israelis. In this study, the Zionist lesson appeared minimally among interviews and is understood as a specific form of nationalism, among a larger overarching definition. Two examples below illustrate nationalism:

The main lesson I would learn?... Well I think that I made it... I feel like you know the Jews should say that they should embrace their history and their tradition... I think that they [Jewish-Israelis] should stand proud I think that right now a lot of Israelis are embarrassed to be Israelis and they should be very proud to be Israelis. (Hawkish female, 38, religious)

The Israeli mindset is as it says in the Book of Genesis be fruitful and multiply and you know because we've seen the genocide of the Jewish people and especially those kids today who... are turning around and saying yeah let's have more kids. (Hawkish male, 57, religious)

The subtheme of victimhood focuses on Jews as the oppressed minority with regard to both atrocities committed during the Holocaust, but also in relation to past persecution, and in the present through ongoing anti-Semitism worldwide. The Holocaust has left a big scar in the Jewish community, and those that continue to be affected by it carry fear and mistrust of out-groups, thus the message is “we should depend only on ourselves.” Several interviewees reference anti-Semitism in Holland, France, and Iran, while one calls out Romania and Turkey for turning away the survivors who fled the Holocaust in boats only to die at sea. Maybe one of the most poignant messages from a hawkish 67-year-old female survivor is: “we can very good live with you, you don't know how to live with us, you don't want to live with us.”

As stated above, the two subthemes are not mutually exclusive. While some interviewees focus on Israeli nationalism and others on victimhood, many meander in a mix of both: “I don't see that we should be asking anything from the world because we are not going to get it and there's no point we should just keep moving forward and build ourselves instead of feeling bad about what happened.” Frequently, as quoted by this hawkish 26-year-old female, the reference is to past victimhood and present nationalism. This frame seems to reflect the modern concept of the *Sabra*, the new Jew, proud and strong in contrast to the old Jews “who went like victims to the slaughter” identified by Amos Oz (Zertal, 2005).

Never Again

Never again is probably one of the most recognized slogans with regard to the Holocaust, but what does “never again” mean? Klar et al. (2013) identify four variations of never again, ranging from never again will I be a victim, never again will I

forsake my group, never again should this happen to other human beings, and finally, never become a victimizer. The interviews certainly reflected these messages; however the emergent pattern was a different one. Never again was broken down into two subthemes: awareness (never again should this happen, so we should be aware and alert) and agency (never again should anyone let this happen, so we should take action). The first subtheme is about *knowing*, whereas the second is about *doing*. The knowing and doing range from not being a victim, to being an active bystander, to not perpetrating against others, thus shifting between variations of particularistic thinking and universalistic thinking.

Awareness is a call both to remember and to be educated about what happened during the Holocaust. At the particularistic level, the message is to be aware of prejudice, of people like Hitler, of hatred, and anti-Semitism. At the universalistic level, the message is that the Holocaust happened to 13 million people that Jews can fall prey to oppressive thought and should be sufficiently self-aware to recognize internal thought processes of racism and bias. Within the interviews, the distinction of particularistic and universalistic awareness is not clear-cut. Some interviewees are particularistic in their awareness, others universalistic, and yet others a mix of both:

I think Israelis in general could afford to be a little more introspective about how we've been affected by the Holocaust and how it affects our views on the Palestinian Israeli conflict and to be aware that it probably does affect our views on it and... it doesn't mean that we're the bad guys or that we're just being nuts... it just means that we should just try to be more self aware. (Dovish female, 38, Jerusalem)

I think that definitely for the Holocaust one of the conclusions should be that universalistic values should have a stronger role here and it doesn't this is not only regarding the Palestinians this is regarding all over the land religious freedom. (Dovish male, 32, Negev)

This last quote specifically addresses awareness regarding the treatment—or mistreatment—of Palestinians, an aspect that emerges more frequently from the dovish interviewees. Another example of this comes from a dovish female in her late 1950s from Sderot, a city near the Gaza strip that is frequently in the newspapers for the Qassam rocket attacks it receives. She tearfully says in her interview:

We read a text about the Holocaust and I remember one line that I marked in my heart... the line says when you stop seeing others as human beings eventually you stop being human yourself okay can you hear it? And for me this is a warning this is a it's more frightening me than the rockets from Gaza... because I don't want to become indifferent or blind to other people's suffering and to other people despair.

Sometimes *knowing* is associated with *doing*, that is, awareness of injustice and the patterns that lead to its occurrence are also equated with taking action against injustice or human agency. The second subtheme incorporates this notion that humans have the choice as to what actions they take. The emergent understanding of *never again* is one described by participants as choosing to go against the grain. The following quotes highlight different perspectives of agency, from fighting against one's own government, to choosing not to kill another person, to being an active bystander by speaking up or helping to make a difference.

A civil society that is aware that looks outside of itself and that is not afraid to make a stand and possibly push their government to act on behalf of others is really the bottom line I

would expect personally to see Israel doing specifically more of this. (Dovish male, 31, Jerusalem)

If you see something or witness something that does not settle well with you that you feel in your gut that it's wrong and unjust then you need to try to do something to fix it. (Dovish female, 31, Jerusalem)

If there is a lesson it's universal and it's ageless it's not from a certain event it's the fact that you have a choice you don't have to kill your neighbor you don't have to you never have to and when he comes to kill you and you defend yourself so I would say he doesn't have to kill you nobody has to kill anyone. (Dovish male from a kibbutz, 23, Haifa)

The awareness and agency subthemes stand in stark contrast to the indifference and non-agency subthemes discussed next, as a part of the *not never again*. While in this section there has been a sense of hopefulness for mankind and change, the next section takes a more cynical and hopeless tone.

Not Never Again

The literature on lessons of the Holocaust has identified a variety of lessons (particularistic, nationalistic, universalistic) and a set of variations to never again (Klar et al., 2013; Lazar et al., 2004). What has *not* been addressed in research on Holocaust lessons so far is the lesson that nothing can be learned from the Holocaust, or that it will be repeated. These sobering views were rampant among interviewees in this study. As one dovish survivor, age 82, put it, "I have not evaded an answer, I have given you an answer... you can't learn anything... great cynic, huh?" Yet he is not the only one. An unexpected number of interviewees come to a similar conundrum that genocidal behaviors are a part of human nature or part of the structure of societies. In these interviews, reference is made to Rwanda and to Sudan as proof that the Holocaust is being repeated and the world has learned nothing.

Here too, as in the *never again* theme, two subthemes exist that revolve around *not* knowing (indifference) and *not* doing (non-agency/structure). Interviewees perceive indifference from the world at large, a deliberate decision to turn away from or be blind to the atrocities that have occurred since the Holocaust. They also perceive the inability of humans to prevent the recurrence of atrocities, either because it is a part of human nature, thus implying that humans do not have agency, or because it is a part of what societies do, thus implying that the structure of these societies is more powerful than individual agency. Below are examples of both indifference and non-agency/structure:

We said the United States knew about what's going on in Auschwitz how could they? And I really feel that how could they? But how could we stand and see what is going on in Africa and in Ethiopia whatever in all the bad places in the world and not do anything? (Dovish female, 24, Jerusalem)

We still have massive genocides going on in Rwanda and Africa is like the pits of despair... and people are just not aware of it because the media decides to stifle it it's not sexy every day genocide. (Hawkish female, 26, Jerusalem)

History teaches us that it's very easy for people to turn against each other in a very cruel calculated manner it's not the 1st time it happened the 2nd world war it happens as we speak in different parts of the world people do that and it's easy to do probably because it's probably part of our rotten nature. (Hawkish male, 43, Haifa)

The first two quotes specifically point to indifference, that is deliberate, knowing, and choosing to ignore or avoid what is known. This is the stance taken by the passive bystander. The third quote refers to the notion of non-agency, or structure. The human being is compared by one interviewee to the lion that cannot *not* eat meat. The human race cannot *not* kill. This is reminiscent of Hanna Arendt's concept of the banality of evil, that evil is everywhere and not only can it not be prevented by bystanders, but by perpetrators as well.

Holocaust Importance for the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: Positioning and Meaning-Making

In these interviews, the relationship between Holocaust collective memory and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict was explored implicitly through the open-ended questions at the beginning of the narrative interviews, and explicitly through a direct open-ended question to interviewees. The analysis presented here is based on interviewee answers to the explicit question: how, if at all, does the Holocaust have any importance for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict today? Emergent themes yielded insights that were comparable to the research by leading experts in the field of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a, 1992b; Halperin et al., 2008; Klar, Schori, Rinkevich-Pave, & Klar, 2010; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007; Vollhardt, 2009a, 2009b). Only a handful of interviewees find no connection between the Holocaust and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. The majority of them recognize that Holocaust collective memory is very much a part of everyday political discourse (Klar et al., 2010). It is used and abused by “both sides”—sides that are defined as Palestinian and Israeli or left wing and right wing—to justify actions. Some interviewees express views that are consistent with siege mentality and fear, comparative victimhood, and victim beliefs that are oriented towards empathy of the “other” (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a, 1992b; Halperin et al., 2008; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007; Vollhardt, 2009a). Finally, Holocaust collective memory is perceived as having importance for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict in complex ways that are difficult to define. Here is the diagram of themes (Fig. 2).

Self-Focused (Siege Mentality)

Bar-Tal and Antebi define siege mentality as “a mental state in which members of a group hold a central belief that the rest of the world has high negative behavioral intentions towards them” (1992b, p.634). This belief is often accompanied by thoughts of victimhood (one of the subthemes), such as the idea that Jewish-Israelis are alone and misunderstood in the world, they have been persecuted in the past, and will continue to be in the present and future, their existence is threatened, and no one will come to their aid. Siege mentality is perceived as a justification for




Fig. 2 Holocaust importance for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

self-defense: because we are threatened, we should protect ourselves, our nation, and we must be united and strong today unlike in the past. The subtheme of self-defense is frequently juxtaposed with the first such that the message is we were victims in the past, but we will not be victims again.

Siege mentality, in Bar-Tal and Antebi’s research (1992b), was correlated most closely with hawkish orientation. Below are two excerpts, one from an interviewee who identifies as hawkish, and the other from one who identifies as politically middle of the road. Both interviewees have a progression of reasoning in which fear and victimhood are identified, to which strength is a necessary response and means for survival.

Jewish people will never have to explain why they fear. I mean its not that they imagine somebody attacked them. So under this rule of the fear, it should never happen again, and if it should never happen again, you have to be strong, and if you have to be strong, you have to be the majority, and if you want to be the majority, they will suffer... But they [Palestinians] cannot be like us be part of us and all the time complain that they are not equal. They are not equal, that’s right, because we have to be strong. (Hawkish female, 60, Herzliya)

I learned from the Holocaust that you should you have the duty to protect your own people and that’s one thing. Second, it’s undoubtedly true that Israel is in a position that it can defend itself. That’s a good thing, a very good thing because being being the victims like that, it’s indescribable, it’s inhumane, lacking dignity. (Male survivor, 71, identifies as politically middle of the road, Jerusalem)

What was found in the interviews is that siege mentality is *not* exclusive to hawkish individuals. Siege mentality was in fact expressed by two thirds of

interviewees, *half* of which identified as doves. Doves' reflection of sense of siege mentality, unlike that of hawks, was usually couched in some type of caution or moderation.

Well I think it affects the Palestinian Israeli conflict in a way that 1st of all I think the Jewish state, *it doesn't matter how big it is*, but it Jewish state is something *which is kind of controversial*, non-negotiable... I think we needed a Jewish state in order to that the Jews will feel free here to live their lives in whatever way they want. (Dovish male, 25, Jerusalem)

The first would be the matter of practicality I think that as I said one of the most important things that we take from the national values is a matter of survival. I think that if we want to be a Jewish state then *we have to understand our limits and that goes to finding a peaceful solution*. (Dovish male, 32, Netanya)

The emphasis was added to highlight the ways in which interviewees framed the essential need for a Jewish state for the safety and peace of the Jewish people within an acknowledgment that there is another side, or possibly another way. These are not isolated excerpts among doves, but rather a reflection of an ongoing internal struggle that several interviewees identify: the need to protect one's group while acknowledging the other group's rights.

Another subtheme of the self-focused perspective on Holocaust importance for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is that of Palestinian empathy towards Jewish-Israelis. What emerges from some of the interviews is this idea that Palestinians should understand the Jewish plight and past persecution, and they should come to accept the justification for a Jewish State:

The Palestinians should understand that getting a country as a place to escape after being trying to be killed is a place which we won't let other people kill us and its something which the Arabs should understand that we won't let you kill us after we got our nation. (Hawkish male, 20, Kfar Saba)

I think the Palestinians do not understand or they do not want to understand the Jewish feeling of vulnerability. (Hawkish female, 59, from a settlement near Ashdod)

This idea of the Palestinian need to understand the Jewish plight is particular to the more hawkish interviewees. Dovish interviewees address Palestinian understanding only in the context of Jewish-Israeli understanding so that the expression is one of mutual understanding and empathy (discussed next).

Other-Focused (Understanding and Empathy)

The Holocaust has also been viewed by interviewees within the context of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict as a reason to emphasize the humanity of others. In contrast to the first theme, where the focus was on the Jewish-Israeli collective, here the focus is on the “other,” in this case, the Palestinians or Arab-Israelis. The Holocaust is a reason to show empathy and understanding of other's suffering, as well as to build self-criticism in one's behavior towards the “other.” This theme is comparable to the universalistic lesson of the Holocaust, but with a specific application of that lesson to the Palestinian–Israeli context.

In research by Salomon (2004), empathy and understanding of the “other” (more broadly defined as any minority) was correlated with dovish orientation, yet here

too, as with other themes, this correlation is no longer clear-cut. Half of the interviewees spoke of caring and empathy, and half of those who did were hawks. Here are a few excerpts from both hawks and doves:

If we were aware of the mean, of the way that we treat the Palestinians and relate to them as related to the Holocaust, I think we would relate to them a different way. But that doesn't happen and the Palestinians are paying a price because of this never again mentality. (Dovish male, 57, from a kibbutz in the Negev)

The Holocaust should serve as a sort of restraining factor, and again not necessarily on the more peaceful or accepting side, but just to think about what's the best way to end this minimizing cruelty, minimizing long term damage to all sides involved. (Hawkish male, 43, Haifa)

Similar to the *self-focused* theme, the way in which doves and hawks express empathy and understanding differs. Hawks tend to frame empathy and understanding similarly to how doves frame siege mentality, with caution and some reservation. In these cases, hawks speak of minimizing aggression (as seen above), or recognize racist behavior towards minorities without necessarily pushing for change to happen. This caution also arises in interviews with doves, but less so. For example, one dovish male, age 43, from a kibbutz in the Negev, spoke of his experience as a soldier in the IDF (Israeli Defense Force): "I know I did my best to be as respectful as possible with anyone I had interaction with." He engages in a conversation about "blurred" values of what it means to do the right thing, concluding that in the end being a better person also means "taking yourself accountable for the bad things that you've done."

2-D (Oversimplified) and 3-D (Complex) Memory

Holocaust collective memory is central to Israeli discourse of identity and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992b; Klar et al., 2010; Shapira, 1997; Young, 1993). Additionally this discourse is being progressively institutionalized through politicians, the media, and commemoration practices (Burg, 2008; Novick, 1999; Porat, 2004; Segev, 1991; Zertal, 2005). Jewish-Israelis interviewed in this study recognize this pattern and speak of it from two perspectives. On the one hand Holocaust collective memory is being used and abused by different agents to further political agendas; on the other hand, this memory is pertinent yet complex. The two themes that arise from Holocaust discourse in Israel have been labeled 2-D and 3-D memory. Two-dimensional Holocaust memory is memory that is abused for the justification of morally questionable actions by different "sides" (either left wing and right wing Israelis, or Israelis and Palestinians).

It's a good source of the for both sides the leftists can say how can we do that after being the victims? ... and the right wing can say we were victims we can't let that happen again... it's our ticket it's our ticket for being here. (Dovish male, kibbutznik, 23, Haifa)

I went to see it [Waltz with Bashir] with two friends and then when we came out of the movie and we compared notes and all three of us were like said right before we said oh no you are not going to draw the Holocaust card are you? So I think there's it became almost a cliché for a lot of people. (Dovish male, 31, Jerusalem)

People who say that our deeds are Nazis they have no idea what Nazi is. (Dovish male, 82, Herzliya)

The Holocaust is described by interviewees as a cliché, a metaphor, a ticket, an insult or attack, a game piece, or a card. It is distorted to meet agendas. It is overly simplified. Holocaust memory becomes an empty concept with little to no content that is flung around carelessly in the context of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.

Three-dimensional memory on the other hand is complex, bringing about introspection and internal conflict. Complex Holocaust memory, as defined in the interviews, is multifaceted and incomprehensible. It creates tension between the multiple conflicting messages that it carries:

I'm asking a lot of questions to which I have no answer to tell you the truth. The most basic thing on which Israel was based is a historical right. I tried to find in Google what is the definition of historical right and I did not succeed I did not find it I don't know what does it mean? I means if somebody has historical right then other people have historical right too. (Male survivor, middle of the road, 71, Jerusalem)

You can get to certain conclusions and most of them which you hear are wrong... the things which people can't answer very well to leave something, infinite doubt and infinite pain that's what it is what is left yes? (Dovish male survivor, 82, Herzliya)

From both excerpts, Holocaust collective memory, if understood correctly, raises more questions than it answers. Interviewees speak of the dilemmas of bending over backwards versus fighting back, understanding the other's perspective versus the desire for them to understand one's own, and weighing the rights of Palestinians and the rights of Jewish-Israelis. Understanding Holocaust memory, in essence, means to be able to think critically.

Disconnect Between Past and Present

Not all interviewees believed that the Holocaust had any importance for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. A small number of them deemed that the Holocaust and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict should remain separate. This is primarily a rejection of the idea that the Holocaust and the conflict are comparable, that Israelis are treating Palestinians as Jews were treated during the Holocaust, and that the Palestinian refugee camps are like the ghettos in Europe. As one participant (dovish male, 71, from Tel Aviv) sums it up, “it was an invented relationship.” The Holocaust occurred in a different space, at a different time, and for some in the second and third generation, to different people.

Internal Conflict and Dialectics

Across the topic of Holocaust collective memory in the context of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, there is an emergent pattern of internal contradiction. The narrative interviews are rich with data that challenges dichotomous ideology. Interviewees

cannot be placed into clear categories of hawkish and dovish ideology, of peace-seeking and conflict-condoning groups. Rather, each individual falls somewhere within these extremes, experiencing and expressing internal conflict of values whether deliberately or inadvertently.

In the analysis of themes on the importance of Holocaust collective memory in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the distinction between oversimplification of collective memory and the complexity of memory is already made. Oversimplified memory is used as a weapon from one side against the other. Complex memory, on the other hand, follows a dialectic process and opens the gates to the synthesis of thesis and antithesis, one side *and* the other instead of one side *or* the other. “A person might retain basic elements of the two opposing perspectives and believe that both perspectives might contain some truth, even at the risk of tolerating a contradiction” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, p. 741). Individuals process what they’re saying, and in thinking about it, modify their position according to that moment and that specific space they’re in.

This section of the chapter will deal with the dialectic process that interviewees employ to make meaning of the Holocaust, its legacy, and its importance in the context of the conflict. Contradictions and ambiguities are a part of—and essential to—meaning-making of personal experiences within the social world (Madureira, 2009). Here we are no longer looking at *what* answer people give to the questions, but *how* these answers are formulated.

Dialectics proposes a dynamic process of meaning-making, but focuses on the premise that change occurs from the tension incurred by contradictory and coexisting ideas (Galtung, 1984; Kvale, 1976; Markova, 2000; Valsiner, 2012). Reality is a process of meaning-making. The elements that are a part of this process are the self, the “other,” and the context (which includes both social and historical aspects), all simultaneously interacting and changing (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). No single element can be observed without its relationship to other elements being considered as well (Kvale, 1976; Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

The examples of internal contradictions found in the transcripts of the Jewish-Israelis interviewed are countless. These contradictions recognize that for every affirmation of the “self” there is an affirmation of the “other.” As one interviewee pointed out about the term “historical right,” “I don’t know what does it mean? It means if somebody has historical right then other people have historical right too” (Male survivor, 71, middle of the road). Other questions raised in interviews are: how can Jewish-Israelis call for their recognition as a legitimate people without simultaneously recognizing that the Palestinians want legitimization as people? How can Jewish-Israelis care for others without sacrificing so much that they cease to care for themselves? How can Jewish-Israelis claim equality from the rest of the world without awarding it to Palestinians? Excerpts will be utilized to demonstrate the intricate process.

Because of What It's Not

Ilanit (pseudonym) and I met in Jerusalem mid-morning on a weekday. She made *alyiah* 7 years ago when she was in her 20s. Her family, she tells me, wasn't overly Zionist, but she did attend Jewish school when she lived in the United States. She first traveled to Israel after high school for a year to study Torah and decided that she would come back because to her "being Jewish" and "Israel" went hand in hand. While her family has no ties to the Holocaust, she took two trips to Poland. She is invested in her heritage and identity. She identifies as orthodox, Zionist, and dovish which make her torn between several aspects of her identity and within her community. She is conservative, but not as much as her peers who perceive Palestinians as terrorists. She clarifies at the end of the interview that her concept of the conflict is very different—Palestinians have just as much historic right to the land, but they are not a People. We sat over coffee as she shared her story; the interview lasting into lunchtime.

I asked Ilanit about the importance of the Holocaust for the conflict, and she explains that the comparison makes her stomach churn. Yet as her answer develops, she becomes increasingly conflicted and hesitant, drawing parallels while negating them:

You cannot compare. You can't compare like gassing people to what's going on with the Palestinians. But yes there are things that happened that are very questionable activity but the comparison is like sick to my stomach. So the comparison plays an important role but because of what it's not, you know what I mean?... I guess something else that sort of comes to mind is that you know during the Holocaust we the Jews were a minority that were taken advantage of by the powers that be and it made the world recognize that we were deserving of a State. *I could see how that, I could see how, I suppose, that could be used as a parallel to having a sympathetic stance to the Palestinians. But you know simply I could see how that would be a stance, but I don't, it's not the same situation obviously but I think that there is an awareness that if a minority is calling for a state or protection then they should have protection. Like they should be treated, if they're citizens of a country, they should be treated like any other citizen of a country. If they are not treated like citizens of a country then something should be done in order to create a situation where they do have you know full rights and they are able to live their lives like any other citizen of a state and I think the lessons of the Holocaust might play a role in developing that sensitivity amongst the decision-makers but I don't think like obviously like the situation is so unbelievably different. Yeah.* (emphasis added)

Ilanit's thesis and antithesis play out simultaneously in a rapid cycle, each "but" signaling the tension occurring between both drawing and not drawing a comparison between the Holocaust and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. In her answer, some of Ilanit's struggle is about what she hesitates to say and doesn't say. The Holocaust was horrific and unique. Jews were oppressed and killed in magnitude. There is no comparison to what is happening in the conflict today. As she begins to think about the conflict, her sensitivity shifts, and her awareness creates an inner conflict about the parallels that she both draws and shouldn't be drawing: "I could see how, I suppose." Her added "yeah" at the end of her answer appears to be an affirmation of the synthesis of the unity between the different parts of the same whole.

It's What Happens When These Things Happen

Noach (pseudonym) sat across from me at his kitchen table, still dressed in military uniform. At 20, he was the youngest of the interviewees. This was my second visit to his home. Joseph, Noach's father, was one of my interviewees. He offered to help any way he could; his hospitable personality insisted that I stay with his family while I was in Kfar Saba rather than staying at a hotel. I had interviewed Joseph's wife, Adina, in my first visit and Joseph the evening before. That morning, Adina and Joseph introduced me to their son as he arrived home from the army for a week-end break; then they left us in their home while they went to a meeting at the bank.

Noach was born and raised in Israel. He says he grew up in a house "which has all the Holocaust memories of all the reactions." His grandfather was a Holocaust survivor who lived with them and died when Noach was five. Yet Noach carries memories of his grandfather's holocaust-related mannerisms and ideology. "[I] basically grew up understanding that being Jewish is basically our biggest win against Hitler." Noach considers himself extremely hawkish, so much so, he says, that the army has asked him to curtail his desire to kill all the Arabs. He spoke with a thick accent and broken English, sitting across from me at the kitchen table, still in his uniform. When I asked him about lessons of the Holocaust, he replies:

For Jews in Israel is keep studying, keep passing the thing over. But not passing it and say listen once there was the Holocaust, passing it over, studying it and bring pictures and putting a proper story to the people. You're going to tell it for the humanity. It's basically telling them listen there was a whole country in Europe which the air in this country is filled with Jewish blood which was spilled for no good reason at all, and just tell them listen you can't let this thing happen again. Killing people, it does not matter if its Jews Muslims or Christians or Buddhists or whatever, you can't kill people for their beliefs. They are still people. As much as I can say as a Jewish I don't like the Muslims or the Christians, I can say that listen those are people at the end of the day if no one did anything bad to you, you can't decide to kill them. You should have, if you decide to kill someone, you should at least have a reason to do it. You should say listen he tried killing me. He puts in danger, I want to stop this danger. So I can understand that people ask on Ahmadinejad, ok I'm going to say yes, because I want to kill this guy. I want to put his whole country up in fire because his whole country wants to make nuclear bombs in order to kill my country. So yes that's something I can agree with and I can tell humanity stop it, stop the guy who wants to do it even if it means you have to kill him and people in his country which did nothing bad but there are. Its what happens when these things happen.

Noach's narrative starts with the Jewish blood spilled during the Holocaust, from which his thesis is "you can't kill people for *no good reason*." As Noach elaborates on his logic and transitions to the present context, his thesis remains consistent, "*if no one did anything bad to you*, you can't decide to kill them." However, as soon as his context changes to Iran and Ahmadinejad, he finds a valid reason to want to kill ("he tried killing me") and the antithesis comes into being, "even if it means you have to kill him and people in his country *which did nothing bad*." Noach experiences tension between justifying and not justifying the killing of innocent bystanders, which he synthesizes into "it's what happens when these things happen." In sum, one cannot kill the "other," one can kill the "other," and the distinction between the two is whether the "other" poses a perceived threat or not, which may or may not be a "good" reason.

Conclusion

The review of literature in dialectics would suggest that change is most likely to occur within the group of people for whom cognitive dissonance leads to a synthesis of ideas, which become the stepping stone to further change. Thus in answering the question initially posed “how can meaning be made of Holocaust collective memory that is more conducive to peaceful attitudes towards the Palestinian–Israeli conflict?” the focus should be placed on the dialectic pattern of meaning-making because it is the cognitive pattern in which change occurs. But, there is a caveat. Change can occur in different directions, both to more peaceful attitudes towards the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and to attitudes that align with militaristic ideology. Therefore, how does one promote one type of change without promoting the other?

Here I would like to return to research by Shechter and Salomon (2005) and Vollhardt (2009a) on empathy for an adversary. Vollhardt’s review of literature on the psychology of victimhood concludes, among other things, that “victim beliefs that recognize similarities of experience between victim groups may give rise to empathy and prosocial behavior toward outgroups, even toward the other party in the conflict” (2009a, p.135). However, she equally cautions that ongoing threat and conflict interfere with cognitive complexity (such as the ability to sustain conflicting values) and narrow the emphasis to self-focus rather than an ability to be other-focused (Vollhardt, 2009a, p.153).

In a study using 309 high school Israeli students, half of which went on a trip to Auschwitz, Shechter and Salomon found that “[t]he journey increased empathy among participants with initially more positive attitudes towards the Palestinians but it also decreased empathy among those with initially more negative ones” (2005, p.125). Their findings suggest cognitive reinforcement of preconceived notions. Additionally, choices of nationalistic lessons increased pride and group identification, while choices of universalistic lessons increased empathy but equally generated feelings of fear and helplessness (Shechter & Salomon, 2005). Their conclusion is that it is the role of the peace educator to therefore steer meaning-making in “ways that widen, rather than narrow the view of the conflict and of the adversary” (Shechter & Salomon, 2005, p. 137), yet they fail to indicate how.

These findings suggest that the Holocaust is indeed a divided symbol of which each side carries a different meaning and therefore different ramifications. On the one hand, those who understand the Holocaust as a universalistic symbol are more empathic towards the other, but carry more fear and helplessness for themselves. On the other hand, those who understand the Holocaust as a particularistic symbol have less empathy, but increased pride and identification to their group. Further, individuals may shift from one perception of the symbol to another based on the level of threat they experience which will influence whether they are able to think in a complex manner or not.

I would like to suggest that based on findings of the interviews and other researchers, the answer lies in the use of a both/and (complex) approach to teaching lessons of the Holocaust, rather than an either/or approach. This would mean the acknowledgment of the particularistic lesson *as a part of* the universalistic lesson rather than these lessons being construed as separate and mutually exclusive, such that the

message would become, “[a]s a result of the Holocaust, we must learn to care for minorities *and* ourselves.” This lesson encompasses Vollhardt’s (2009a) notion of inclusive victimhood, increasing the likelihood of empathy. The inclusion of one’s own group in the lessons drawn from the Holocaust could also counter the helplessness and fear that Shechter and Salomon (2005) identified in their findings of reactions to purely universalistic lessons.

Research has focused largely on the deterring effects of large scale and long-term trauma of the Holocaust on its survivors, their descendants, and the Jewish community at large. More research should be done in the other direction, assessing resilience and healing patterns. Additionally, research has addressed how past victimization interferes with current conflict and peace-making, and here too further research should focus on how past victimization may have been a source of empathy and understanding towards the “other,” much like the work done by Vollhardt (2009a) on inclusive victimhood, and work by Staub and Vollhardt (2008) on altruism born of suffering.

Several interview participants made statements to the complexity of Holocaust collective memory, and studies above mentioned have aimed to break down the complexity into more manageable cohesive pieces (Klar et al., 2013; Lazar et al., 2004). These findings are useful in understanding the many facets of Holocaust collective memory meaning-making but barely touch on the mechanisms by which these multiple facets are connected. There could be some value in studying the complexity itself, specifically in contradictory messages and lessons and how these can be sustained. Further, if this complexity increases tolerance, can this tolerance not be utilized to promulgate inclusive victimhood and empathy towards the ‘other?’

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Understanding Symbols of Division in Post-conflict Northern Ireland

Maurice Stringer and Jackie Hunter

Introduction

This chapter seeks to explore how group division in Northern Ireland is perpetuated through contrasting narratives and symbols, which support differing views of key historical events. These group based explanations and symbols serve to boost the social identity of group members by making them feel better about their own group at the expense of the out-group. The chapter begins with a description of “the flag protest” which illustrates the key features of a contested symbol within Northern Ireland. We provide the reader with a contextual background which explains some of the main factors which underpin and sustain these group differences in perceptions. The first of these factors is the continuing segregation of the two main religious communities, which remains a key environmental constraint on the development of better intergroup relations. We outline the importance of group membership and group categorization within Northern Ireland. The ability of group members to use a range of learned cues to reliably identify in-group from out-group members is described. Thirdly, we outline how group perceptions are shaped by group attributions, allowing out-group violence to be viewed in different ways than in-group violence and how this process allows groups to construct different group based explanations for historical events. Group biases of this type allow different versions of contested events to be portrayed in ways which support the in-group and disadvantage the out-group. Having suggested how group positions can be supported through intergroup attributions we examine evidence which suggests that parents and groups in Northern Ireland play a central role in transmitting these group attitudes to the next generation. The final section outlines research into

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intergroup contacts and cross group friendships outlining a way in which group based positions can be moderated within a divided society. The authors argue that there is a need to move beyond a focus on old divisive symbols and outline alternative positive symbols which both religious groups can support to help create a more peaceful future.

The Flag Protest

The flying of flags has always been a highly controversial feature of Northern Irish society and there have been many protests and clashes over them. For many Protestants the Union flag represents their allegiance to Britain and underpins their desire to remain a part of the UK, while for many Catholics the Irish flag represents their desire to be part of a United Ireland. Territorial marking through murals and flags has been a marked feature of Northern Ireland and despite attempts like the Re-imagining Communities programme (2006) which began to try to move toward more positive symbols which could boost tourism and promote a more tolerant culture; many symbols still carry a clear group allegiance. The Flags and Emblems Act, passed in 1954 by the Parliament of Northern Ireland, made it an offence to fly a flag, other than the Union Jack, which was likely to cause a breach of the peace. This was perceived by nationalists as a deliberate attempt to undermine their Irish identity, as it made it legal for the police to remove Tricolour flags if they were viewed as a provocation, while the Union flag was exempt from similar action. This act was repealed in (1987) under Direct Rule. The Peace Process and political agreement between the main political parties in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement has been widely welcomed by the vast majority in Northern Ireland, bringing with it the cessation of violence and a broadly based devolved Assembly in which the two main parties share power and other parties are represented. While the majority support these moves within a post-conflict Northern Ireland, individuals whose group identities are based on traditional bipolar political positions feel under increasing threat from the political compromises inherent in the new Assembly.

The Flag protest erupted when Belfast city council voted on the 12th December 2012 to fly the union flag on 18 days per year. This was a compromise between unionists who had traditionally dominated the Council membership and wanted it flown all year round (as it had been since 1906) and nationalists, who did not want the flag to fly at all. The dispute arose because of the shifting balance of power held in the council. In 2011 nationalist parties for the first time held more seats in the council than unionists, with the moderate alliance party, holding the balance of power. Alliance councillors suggested a compromise, namely, that the flag should only fly for 18 designated days, in line with a policy adopted across the rest of the UK for public buildings. This compromise was passed by the council, with the support of nationalist parties and the alliance party despite being strongly opposed by unionist councillors. The unionist parties joined forces to attack the moderate alliance

party for this action and distributed over 40,000 leaflets throughout Belfast calling on people to oppose the removal of the flag. Angry crowds of Protestants, drawn largely from working class areas of Belfast began to march on city hall flying union flags and holding regular protest meetings which brought large parts of Belfast to a standstill. These marches led to violent confrontations with the police who were struggling to keep public order and later spilled over into attacks on and confrontations with nationalists throughout Belfast. Protests quickly spread across the province with protesters blocking roads and rioting in Belfast and other towns. Over 100 police officers were injured trying to control the protests with 200 protesters being arrested by the police. The overall cost of policing the flag protests in Northern Ireland was reported as being 20 million pounds.

The flag protest demonstrates vividly the power that a potent symbol can have in reigniting group conflict in a society that is moving into a post conflict phase. As this chapter was being completed, the G8 Economic forum was being held in Northern Ireland near Enniskillen. This event was heralded as a signal to the rest of the world that Northern Ireland was confidently moving into a post conflict era. However, the ongoing flag protest provided a vivid reminder of how a divisive symbol which evokes group feelings can threaten to reignite intergroup bitterness and conflict. In order to understand this paradox it is useful to examine how the different religious groupings view both the Peace Process and the new power sharing Assembly. Generally, Catholics view the new political agreement as a step forward as it provides both recognition of their future aspiration for a United Ireland, while for the first time giving them a role in the running of Northern Ireland. Successive surveys have outlined the more positive view that Catholics, as opposed to Protestants, have of these political changes (see Life and Times Surveys). While many Protestants welcomed the end of the conflict and a more equal Northern Ireland for all citizens, many working class Protestants feel that the political agreement has done little for them.

This sense of betrayal is also heightened by the economic downturn which has left many poorer families in negative equity or unable to get onto the housing ladder. Both parts of Ireland were particularly badly affected by a house construction boom followed by a collapse in house prices with the economic downturn leaving many families in difficult economic circumstances. Ethno-political reconciliation is much more difficult to achieve in hard economic times than in a period of economic growth. In addition, the feeling of a loss of Protestant political power is particularly felt by Protestants from the working class leaving them uncertain about the value of their group's control over political life in Northern Ireland. This feeling is best conveyed through Lecky's rather stark observation that "The most worthless Protestant, even if he had nothing else to boast of, at least found it pleasing to think that he was a member of a dominant race" (Lecky, in Darby, 1976). In social identity terms, group members even though their individual circumstances are poor, can still achieve feelings of self-worth through belonging to a powerful majority group. This sense of powerlessness with respect to the overall governance of the Province has led many Protestant areas to retreat to their own smaller areas and to mark them out more clearly as belonging to their own religious group. This siege mentality is evident in

the marked increase in territorial marking with flags and other symbols clearly spelling out the group ownership of local areas. As flags are now produced very cheaply and are usually put up quickly during the night the police find it very difficult to remove them without risking even more flags replacing them the next morning.

This group control of local areas has been reinforced as a result of the compromises required to reach political agreement. In effect, former terrorists or freedom fighters depending upon your group perspective on the nationalist side were persuaded to enter government, while Protestant paramilitaries were effectively sidelined. A by-product of the attempt to persuade paramilitary groups on both the Catholic and Protestant side to change their ways has allowed them to use their group structures to increasingly dominate many local communities. Many paramilitaries have changed to the much more profitable domination of crime and drugs within their areas backing up this sense of local group control. The global economic downturn has played a part in this process, as it has encouraged young people to join these established group based networks for criminal rewards which they cannot get due to the absence of normal employment opportunities. In the next two sections we will outline the main contextual issues in Northern Ireland which make intergroup relations more difficult, namely, the religiously segregated nature of the housing environment and the role of group categorization and group socialisation in perpetuating division.

Segregation and Conflict in Northern Ireland

The conflict in Northern Ireland can be most simply described as a struggle between those who wish to see the Province remain part of the UK and those who wish to see Ireland (North and South) reunited. The majority of Protestants are Unionist, and wish to remain within the UK, while the majority of Catholics are Nationalist and desire to see Ireland reunited. The advantage, from a research perspective, is that Northern Irish society divides starkly along religious lines. Individuals and locations are identified readily as either Catholic or Protestant (Cornish & Stringer, 2000; Stringer & Cairns, 1983; Stringer & McLaughlin-Cook, 1985) with very few social categories contravening this basic subdivide. A marked feature of Northern Irish society is the degree of segregation found between the two religious communities (Cairns & Hewstone, 2002; Whyte, 1990). Three types of segregation have been studied: personal and marital, residential and educational (Hewstone et al., 2005). Cairns and Hewstone (2002) in an overview of surveys from 1968 to 1998 found that both Protestants and Catholics consistently report having “all or most” of their friends from their own religious group (Cairns & Hewstone, 2002). Mixed marriages are unusual, accounting for between four to ten per cent of marriages across surveys (Hewstone et al., 2005). However, these relationships do little to alleviate entrenched segregation patterns as it is common for one partner to break all ties with their own group after marriage. Residential segregation in both urban and rural areas is common throughout Northern Ireland. Whyte (1990) estimated that 35–40 % of the population live in completely segregated environments. Despite

the paramilitary ceasefires and lower levels of political violence, recent research suggests that residential segregation is increasing, despite the Peace Process, due to higher levels of local unrest between the communities at residential boundaries (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) in their general review of the obstacles associated with cross group friendships highlight residential segregation as a key factor in preventing the development of cross group friendships.

Educational segregation in primary and secondary education within Northern Ireland is almost complete, with Montgomery, Gallagher, and Smith (2003) estimating that 96 % of children attend single denominational schools and Cairns and Hewstone (2002) reporting that over 90 % of individuals attend denominational schools at both primary and secondary levels. Despite this segregated educational system, an encouraging level of survey support and growing levels of empirical support are found for desegregated schooling (Hayes & McAllister, 2009; Hughes & Carmichael, 1998).

Group Categorization and Group Socialisation

The segregated nature of Northern Irish society and the difficulty that individuals have in moving between groups underpins the process of group categorization (the need to identify in-group and out-group members) which has been well documented in Northern Ireland. Cairns and Duriez (1976) were able to demonstrate that different accents are viewed more or less positively due to their association with a particular group. Stringer and McLaughlin-Cook (1985) demonstrated the ability of individuals within Northern Ireland to confidently identify religious grouping using a combination of surname, Christian name and school attended. Using these contextual cues both Catholic and Protestant participants agreed on the group classification of unknown individuals. Stringer and Lavery (1987) using participants from outside Northern Ireland were able to demonstrate how they acquired this categorization ability over the course of time spent in university in Northern Ireland suggesting that this skill has functional utility in a divided society. These results combined with the lack of a relationship between strength of group identification and categorization ability found by Millar and Stringer (1991) and the fact that both Protestant and Catholic participants use this ability in the same way highlights the functional utility of group categorization in Northern Ireland. Indeed, many individuals within Northern Ireland make these group categorization decisions without being consciously aware that they are making them. Since many of the cues can be accessed unobtrusively when interacting or observing the interactions of others, group classifications can sometimes be made unconsciously. This is a common phenomenon which becomes noticeable when a mistaken identification is highlighted and mirrors results found in other studies where well used categories such as words or faces can activate group information (see for example Hardin & Banaji, 2013). It is important to view this process of group categorization contextually, as an inevitable consequence of living in a divided society, rather than seeing it as indicating prejudiced behaviour. Individuals are not responsible for growing up in a society which places

great importance on group membership; however, if they use this group based information to disadvantage or discriminate against others, it can lead to prejudiced behaviour.

Why is group categorization important in making intergroup contacts work and understanding threats to group based symbols. Hewstone and Brown (1986) have provided extensive evidence for the importance of group categorization during intergroup contact. They argue that it is important to maintain an awareness of intergroup membership during intergroup contacts (through group categorization) to make contact work effectively. They suggest that as long as the contact itself is viewed positively, the individuals need to be recognised as being representative of their respective groups to enable positive feelings brought about through contact to generalise to the wider group (see also Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). While it might seem counterproductive that making group membership salient would improve the outcomes of intergroup contacts, the empirical evidence from many studies supports this viewpoint (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005 for a review). In the Northern Irish context the nature of cross group contact would be difficult to envisage without individuals being made aware of the other person's group background given the variety of cues that are available. Orr, McKeown, Cairns, and Stringer (2012) for example were able to demonstrate how group members in large lecture theatres in a Northern Ireland University adopted segregated seating patterns. These studies suggest that group members' use learned group categorization skills both consciously and unconsciously during intergroup interactions to determine which religious group the individual comes from. Potent group symbols such as the Union flag are particularly provocative for Catholics as they represent a reminder of many years of Protestant political and economic domination. Their reaction to the flying of many flags and the associated marching season which blocks roads and causes inconvenience takes one of two forms. More moderate Catholics simply dislike these tribal displays and would prefer them to be carried out in Protestant areas. Many moderate Protestants have a similar view of the parades to their moderate Catholic counterparts. However, the parades often pass by Catholic areas and this leads to clashes between the two groups. In effect the tribal nature of the flags and marching plays into the hands of more extreme group members on both sides. More extreme Protestants take particular pleasure in the reaction of moderate and more extreme Catholics to their marching, as they are able to categorize the whole out-group as being against them. Similarly more extreme Catholics use parade interfaces with their areas as excuses to confront and fight with other group members.

Group Based Attributions for Violent Events

Following social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) intergroup attributional biases can be interpreted as a reflection of the attempt to achieve and maintain a positive social identity. We will examine how group members in Northern Ireland attribute out-group behaviour to internal causes and in-group behaviour to external

Table 1 Catholic and protestant participants’ explanations for catholic and protestant violence

	Catholic violence		Protestant violence	
	Catholic attributions	Protestant attributions	Catholic attributions	Protestant attributions
Internal	5	15	19	6
External	21	6	5	15

causes when describing violent events. The first published study of intergroup attributions was reported by Taylor and Jaggi (1974) who asked Hindu males to explain four examples of socially desirable and undesirable behaviour by in-group and out-group members. Their results, in what was one of the first illustrations of group attributions, revealed that in-group members positive behaviours were viewed as being attributed to internal causes, while negative behaviours were not. For out-group members this pattern of attributions was reversed with negative behaviours being attributed to internal causes more than positive ones. Pettigrew (1979) in a useful theoretical extension of this pattern of results suggested that in-groups needed to defend themselves from the out-group’s bias toward the positive evaluation of their own group. Hewstone (1990) suggested the term “intergroup attributional bias” for this process which allows group members to view positive and negative behaviours by group members in ways which support their own group.

Stringer, Hunter, and Watson (1991) provided one of the clearest examples of this attributional bias in an examination of violent events in Northern Ireland. They asked 47 Protestant and Catholic participants to look at video clips of violent events in Northern Ireland involving violence by own and out-group members. These clips were rated beforehand by independent German and Spanish judges to ensure that the violence levels were similar. The events showed a Protestant attacking a funeral with hand grenades and an automatic pistol and Catholics attacking a car at another funeral containing two soldiers. These clips were shown along with a series of other clips depicting violent events from the Northern Irish conflict: a civil rights march being broken up by the police; Bloody Sunday; Orange and Republican parades and hunger strikers on a blanket protest. All the video clips were shown to participants with the sound removed, to control for possible effects due to media reporting (Schlesinger, Murdock, & Elliot, 1983) and the order of presentation was changed to help counteract order effects. Participants were asked to explain what they thought was happening in the video clips in their own words and why they thought those involved had acted the way they had. Participants were given 3 min to do this for each video clip.

Participants explanations were coded as either representing internal or external attributions using a methodology employed by Harvey, Turnquist, and Agostinelli (1988). Only two of the 94 statements elicited could not be coded and a reliability check by two independent coders revealed high levels of rater agreement. Table 1 displays the differing pattern of explanations found across Protestant and Catholic participants for in-group and out-group violence.

Comparison of Protestant explanations and Catholic explanations for in-group and out-group behaviour were found to be significantly different $p < 0.01$ and

$p < 0.001$, respectively. These results suggest that both groups attribute own group members violence to external factors while viewing other group members violence as being caused by internal factors (see also Ariyanto, Hornsey, & Gallois, 2009). These group biases also seem to boost individuals' social identity based self-esteem (see Hunter et al., 2000). In-group bias has also been found to increase domain specific self-esteem of group members on those domains which are important to the group (Hunter et al., 2004). Joseph, Weatherall, and Stringer (1997) were able to show this attributional bias also extended to perceptions of unemployment using an attribution for graduate unemployment scale (based on the Attributional Style Questionnaire developed by Peterson et al., 1982) on 209 university students and 294 school children. Participants were asked to respond to scenarios on 15 fictional students who were religiously identifiable through their Christian and surnames. Respondents were asked for each scenario to rate whether the cause of the individuals unemployment due to something about them or something about their circumstances; whether it would persist across time or not and whether the cause of their employment affects all situations in their lives or only this event. The results revealed clear differences in the way in which groups viewed own and other group unemployment. Catholics rated Protestant unemployment as being caused by more internal, stable and global factors than Catholic unemployment. Protestants similarly rated Catholic unemployment as being caused by more internal, stable and global factors than Protestant unemployment.

These graphic illustrations of how the same events can be viewed in very different ways by members of groups has important implications for both the understanding of intergroup conflict and attempts to counteract it. This attribution process enables a shared group account of important historical events to be built up which helps to show the in-group in the best possible light while at the same time attributing the problems in the wider society to the violent actions of the other group. This process in Northern Ireland is largely unchecked by the normal processes of challenge since most individuals only associate with own group members. In addition, communication on divisive issues with other group members is something which is actively discouraged. The segregated nature of Northern Ireland, along with norms that sensitive intergroup issues should not be discussed in the presence of other group members (see Stringer & Vhattum, 1990), make intergroup communication on these issues unusual.

These attributional biases provide a background to help understand how flying the flag and the marching season are viewed as in-group terms. For the minority of Protestants who take part in the annual parades the attempts to limit flag flying and the increasing control over traditional marching routes imposed by the Parades Commission are viewed as a clear sign that Protestant tradition is being undermined. The flags and marching provide a reminder of their groups' once powerful position and the fact that they lead to conflict highlights and strengthens their view that the other group is systematically undermining them. For marching Protestants the violence is caused by Catholics who are objecting to their right to march. By contrast, Catholics view the marching and flags as attempts to turn the clock back to "a Protestant state for a Protestant people". The violence is attributed to

the fact that Protestant marchers are provoking Catholics by insisting on marching past their areas. These very different group accounts of the violence arising from the flags and parades provide a group based explanation which supports the in-group and undermines the other group.

The violent clashes between Protestants and Catholics during the marching season are also a reminder that intergroup contacts can be negative as well as positive. There is a natural tendency in research to look for and report the positive aspects of intergroup contacts. As the field develops there is a need to look more closely at both negative and positive contact experiences and how these shape future cross group encounters. The flag protests provide an example of one situation where group members from one grouping come into conflict with other group members in a negative way which serves to reinforce group stereotypes and acts to strengthen group positions and undermines attempts to foster better intergroup relations.

Group and Parental Socialisation Effects in Northern Ireland

Research into group effects is more easily carried out and interpreted in a Northern Irish setting than in contexts where multi-ethnic groupings make school interventions and evaluation of contact effects more complex. Stringer et al. (2010) in an examination of 700 matched parents and schoolchildren were able to demonstrate the important role that parental attitudes and group attitudes play in group socialisation within Northern Ireland. There are identifiable and highly specific issues on which the two communities in Northern Ireland take diametrically opposed views. The study measured attitudes to five such issues in parents and their children: the Catholic religion, the Protestant religion, parades, the police and the British government. Prior research, using adult samples, had shown these to be areas of group difference (Irwing & Stringer, 2000). Children and parents responded to these items on a seven point scale ranging from strongly agree (7) to strongly disagree (1). The results revealed that parental attitudes accounted for 36.6 % of the variance in children's attitudes with group membership accounting for a further 16.2 %. These findings highlight the powerful role played by both parents and the wider religious grouping in socialising attitudes within a divided society with parental and group socialisation explaining 52.8 % of the overall variance in children's attitudes. They clearly demonstrate the importance within societies in conflict of the process of intergenerational transmission of key social attitudes. These results contrast with the results of studies of parent-child socialisation carried out in non-conflict regions which typically find peers playing a more influential role in attitude transmission than parents. The important contextual point of this research is that it highlights clearly that religious group differences in attitudes are strongly reinforced by both parents and the wider religious group within Northern Ireland and passed on from one generation to the next. Murphy (1978, in Darby, 1976) captures this process of the transmission of group knowledge well: "the average Northern Irish citizen is born either Orange or Green. His whole personality is conditioned by myth and he....will reinforce and protect the myth for

transmission to future generations.” In addition, the findings demonstrate that the two groups hold bipolar positions on a range of central political issues making political agreement or compromise much more difficult to achieve. The negative role of social norms in stopping intergroup contact effects generalising to the wider group is highlighted well by Pettigrew and Tropp (2011, p. 29).

The bipolar nature of group positions also helps explain why group symbols are so problematic as they are clearly identified with particular groups and the history of these groups. To change or challenge a symbol you are in effect challenging the history of a particular group. In this respect group symbols by their very definition, are a group rallying point, providing support for one end of this group based attitude continuum in Northern Ireland. Politicians in Northern Ireland are past masters at stirring up group emotions when confronted with difficult political situations. This emotional arousal activates individuals’ group identity making them to react in groups as opposed to individual terms to social events. Social identity theory captures well this switch from individual to group identity which encourages individuals to set aside cross group friendships and act as a member of their own group.

Intergroup Contacts and Attitude Moderation

Having outlined the deeply divided nature of Northern Irish society and the continuing segregated environment which prevents the development of cross group friendships, it should not be surprising that intergroup contact is seen by many researchers as a means of moderating these group effects (see Stringer et al., 2009, 2010; Turner et al., 2013). Because of the segregated nature of Northern Irish society and the fact that 96 % of school children attend religiously segregated schools there is little opportunity for cross group contacts. Most people in Northern Ireland have friends from within their own religious grouping. Those who go into higher education as adults experience in many cases their first opportunity to mix frequently with members of the other group. Orr et al. (2012) examined the seating patterns of students in university lecture theatres in Northern Ireland and found that even in this mixed environment Catholics and Protestants tended to sit with members of their own religious groups.

Integrated schooling was introduced and supported by Catholic and Protestant parents who were determined that their children should be educated together so that they would be better able to live together and better understand each others backgrounds in Northern Ireland. The Integrated school system has grown quickly and now accounts for about six per cent of school age children. In a post conflict Northern Ireland the sector could expand further given the increasing popularity of these schools. However, the growth of the integrated sector now threatens existing school provision in the segregated sectors. In pragmatic terms Northern Ireland has too many schools and despite continuous demand for the creation of more integrated schools this would inevitably lead to the closure of existing segregated schools. The Assembly faced with this political problem and dominated by parties

Table 2 Intergroup contacts in segregated and integrated schools

Intergroup contact	Segregated schools	Integrated schools
In school	1.6	3.2
Out of school	1.8	2.7

Rating: 1–4 (never, seldom, sometimes, frequently)

dependent upon votes from this larger segregated sector is unwilling to further expand the integrated sector. In practice, new integrated schools are now created through transforming existing schools from the segregated sector into integrated schools. Given the challenges of funding too many existing schools and the increasing pressure to merge existing schools, it is unlikely that many new integrated schools will gain Assembly support. President Obama during his G7 visit reinforced this need to support the integrated education sector by urging (young people) “to take the steps necessary to secure a shared and peaceful society by moving beyond segregated housing and segregated education”.

In the largest scale study yet carried out in Northern Ireland into the effects of schooling on children’s political attitudes, Stringer et al. (2009) were able to examine the impact of integrated schooling on children’s political attitudes. This study was of 1,732 children attending integrated schools, and Protestant and Catholic segregated schools across Northern Ireland. The integrated schools in the study were chosen specifically because they are the longest established of all the post-primary integrated schools in Northern Ireland. The segregated schools were selected to provide the closest match possible to the integrated schools in terms of the size of the school population; the academic performance of the schools based on achievement at GCSE/GNVQ; and the percentage of students taking free school meals, which was used as an indicator of socio-economic status. Participants were tested in class using questionnaires which examined intergroup contact both within and outside school and political attitudes using questions derived from earlier research by Irwing and Stringer (2000) and Stringer and Vhattum (1990). In this account we will report only the key findings for a fuller description of this large scale investigation (see Stringer et al., 2009, 2010).

The study firstly confirmed the lack of opportunity that children in segregated schools have for contacts with other group members both in-school and out-of school compared to their integrated counterparts. From Table 2 it can be seen that while intergroup contacts in integrated schools are reported both in school and out of school, segregated schools pupils report little contact with other group members in school or out of school.

This result is predictable for segregated pupils who have few opportunities in school to meet other group members and a similar low level of cross group contact is found out of school. By contrast, in integrated schools intergroup contacts are reported both in school and outside school suggesting that contacts in school are being taken forward into friendships outside school. This is particularly important since making intergroup contacts in a safe school environment, is very different from maintaining them in more challenging segregated environments outside school.





Fig. 1 Model of the factors influencing children’s attitudes



All Pathways significant : Protestant and (Catholic)

Fig. 2 Attitude moderation in protestant and catholic children in integrated schools

In terms of attitude change pupils attending integrated schools displayed significant moderation in attitudes as a result of reported intergroup contacts. Figure 1 presents the overall Lisrel model of significant effects in this investigation which highlights the important role played by parents in socialisation.

Here, however, we are concerned primarily with the effects of in-school and out of school contact on children’s attitudes which are presented in (Fig. 2) for clarity.

The results suggest that for both Catholic and Protestant children cross group contacts lead to more moderate group attitudes. Cross group contacts in school and out of school were found to have similar effects in moderating children’s group attitudes. Children in both religious groups moved significantly toward the other group’s position following intergroup contacts.

While all effects were significant, it is interesting that cross group contacts appear more successful for Catholics in-school, while for Protestants the most successful effects of cross group contact are achieved out-of school. We believe these results have important implications for helping to resolve intergroup conflict and for the establishment of a more peaceful future in Northern Ireland. The finding that increased intergroup contact can moderate more extreme group positions is particularly exciting, as it suggests that cross group friendships may provide a means of counteracting the entrenched group positions that a historically divided society perpetuates from

generation to generation. It is interesting to speculate how cross group friendships can achieve these moderating effects given the powerful role played by parents and the wider religious group in reinforcing them. In psychological terms, most individuals in Northern Ireland when asked about contacts with other group members claim to have at least one friend from the other religious group. This one friend however poses little challenge to the way in which individuals feel about their own or the other group. In simplistic terms one friend from the other group can be categorised as “different” or “special” from members of the other group and therefore does not challenge group based stereotypes (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). One special friend from the other group does not challenge the natural group tendency to view all in-group members as individuals and all out-group members as being very similar. In a segregated environment with few intergroup contacts, it is easier for these group based effects to operate. However, as the number of other group friends increases, it becomes more difficult for the individual to accept that all members of the other group are the same as experience with a number of different out-group individuals challenges this assumption of out-group invariability. It remains to be seen whether greater intergroup contact can also help counteract group based attributional biases such as those reported earlier by Stringer et al. (1991).

One of the most reassuring aspects from this programme of research occurred when the researchers were trying to understand why certain in-school intergroup contacts appeared to be more effective in forming friendships. Examination of the scales used to measure intergroup contact in school adapted from by Stringer and Vhattum (1990) and their correlations with friendship quality with another group member suggested that the most important location for this friendship interaction was in the school canteen rather than in other classroom based interactions which the scales covered. Interviews with school children quickly revealed that children like to form friendships in situations which are under their own control not under the control or influence of teachers. This finding is important, as it suggests that attempts to alter classroom environments to foster cross-group friendships may be misguided. Children report that the school playground and canteens, where interactions are under their own control, are much more likely to be used for friendship building. It is very challenging for educationalists who have put so much time into developing unique classroom interactions and curriculum interventions to learn that intergroup contacts might be better supported rather than managed (see Stringer et al., 2010).

The importance of symbols is evident when students are on their way home from schools since school uniforms quickly identify school type in Northern Ireland. While individuals are able to identify religious group membership quickly in verbal interactions, it is very difficult to identify religious group visually without some form of clothing or marker which signifies group membership. Interactions between school children in school uniform provides a unique opportunity for members of the public to witness cross group contacts in public settings. The power of extended contact (Wright et al., 1997) makes these situations particularly useful as they can serve as indications of friendship which have been shown to influence the attitudes of those who observe them as well as those who are actually interacting (Pettigrew,

1998). Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, and Voci (2004) have also been able to demonstrate with Northern Irish participants that these extended intergroup contacts appear to reduce anxiety about such encounters.

One of the concerns expressed by parents in Northern Ireland when considering sending their children to integrated schools is that they may lose their group identity. At first reading, the results of our research might be interpreted as supporting this viewpoint, since both Catholic and Protestant children who experience cross group contacts move their attitudes toward those of the other group. However, the important caveat here is that while their attitudes become more moderate, they are still clearly supporting their own group. This more moderate position retains the individual's group identification which is important within Northern Ireland, but their greater familiarity with other group members through increased contacts makes them less likely to accept extreme group positions.

As Northern Ireland moves into a post-conflict environment these group biases have to be addressed if progress towards an integrated society is to be meaningful. Given the bipolar nature of group positions within Northern Ireland and the powerful role played by parents and groups in socialising these group viewpoints, we argue that increased intergroup contact can play a central role in creating a more peaceful society.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have attempted to explain the importance of symbols in the context of Northern Ireland's move from a protracted period of intergroup conflict to what is an uneasy post conflict period. This transitional period requires compromise to support both the power sharing Assembly and attempts to reconcile our troubled past. Two aspects of Northern Irish society were highlighted as being particularly problematic in terms of moves toward a peaceful future, the most important of which is the continuing segregation of the two main religious groups. This segregation has two main effects: firstly, it reinforces a group based perception of Northern Ireland and creates conflict at interfaces between these segregated areas. It also reinforces group categorization and group membership norms which are particularly powerful in Northern Ireland (see also Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). In Northern Ireland, group membership salience can be easily activated by a range of perceptual cues (Millar & Stringer, 1991; Stringer & Cairns, 1983). In situations where group membership is made salient, contact between group members can lead to anxiety and fear (Hewstone, 1996; Wright et al., 1997). There is strong evidence that one of the most important factors influencing intergroup contact is the anxiety that individuals feel when faced with members of the other group (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Paolini et al., 2004; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Stringer & Vhattum, 1990). Paolini et al. (2004) note that high levels of group anxiety ultimately discourage contact by making individuals defensive and even hostile towards other group members, whereas Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) outline the

mediating effect that anxiety reduction can have on prejudice. Segregation and social norms against contact also impacts powerfully on opportunities for inter-group contacts with the vast majority of young people attending segregated schools and having friends only from their own religious group.

Group attributions for events provide a potent means through which violent events by in-group and out-group members can be viewed in very different ways to support the in-group and disadvantage the out-group. We outlined how this works through an examination of participant's accounts of real life violent events and through their different attributions for the unemployment of own and other group members. These group attributional biases provide a means for the two religious groups to view key historical events in different ways. These different versions of the history of Northern Ireland present a real challenge for the Peace Process as they form part of the group socialisation process which parents and the wider religious group pass on to their children. Segregated education plays a role here as well through the subtle attributional group biases of teachers, who as wider group members, provide support for their own grouping.

The economic downturn was also identified as being counterproductive to change, as individuals are more likely to respond to change positively if they see clear economic advances for themselves. For Protestants in working class areas in particular the loss of political power (from a once dominant position) has removed an important reinforcing aspect of group identity making them sensitive to further changes and more protective of their local environment.

In this context, the flag protest provides a clear example of how compromises about the flying of a potent contested symbol led to conflict and interface violence. Flags are currently flying throughout Northern Ireland as we approach the marching season. This highlights both their importance as symbols and the difficulty of charting a way forward which respects these symbols but does not threaten or intimidate others. The authors suggest that greater intergroup contacts provide the most practical way to address the future in Northern Ireland.

In this chapter we have attempted to explain how a society emerging from intergroup conflict remains ill at ease with potent symbols from the past. These group based difficulties cannot we suggest be solved by focusing on difference. The most effective way to deal with the past is not through a concentration on divisive symbols but through looking forward to more positive symbols of hope for the future such as cross group friendships. These friendships across the religious divide are the new symbols of hope, providing reassurance that old group feelings can be overcome; moderating group attitudes and reducing anxiety about the other group. In the past segregated environments provided a physical barrier to cross group friendships, fortunately new technology such as the Internet and mobile phones makes contact at a distance easier. One of the failures of past contact holiday schemes which brought children together in Northern Ireland was lack of contact following the scheme as children returned to their segregated environments. New technology helps overcome this and provides avenues for maintaining contacts and arranging meetings in safe locations.

Stringer, Cornish, and Denver (2000) were able to highlight how perceptions of locations in Northern Ireland had changed with the Peace Process with both

Catholics and Protestants reporting a greater range of locations as being safer for group members than in their earlier study during the intergroup conflict (Stringer & Cornish, 1990). The increasing number of public venues across Northern Ireland which are perceived as being accessible by individuals of both religious groupings without fear of intimidation is in itself a positive symbol of a more normal environment. In terms of cross group contacts this increase in more neutral venues is a welcome development as it allows space for cross group contacts.

Physical symbols of hope are urgently required to counteract Northern Ireland's traditional denominationally dominated landscape. We will briefly mention three of these interschool collaborations, Re-imaging of murals and the London/derry peace bridge. These are important since they have been supported by Assembly funding and importantly help to challenge religious segregation. We highlighted the importance of cross group contacts and friendships in facilitating better group understanding and this new programme of interschool collaborations in which pupils from one school will share facilities and expertise with others in their geographical area. While these programmes are designed pragmatically to save money and make the best use of educational facilities, they offer great potential for cross group contacts between pupils from the largely segregated school systems (see Carlisle & Hughes, 2013 for a review). Assembly funding has also brought changes to wall murals allowing communities to replace intimidating images with more historically neutral images (see Rolston, 2012 for a review). While this re-imaging programme faces challenges, well outlined by Bill in his review, these murals provide both a graphic tourist attraction and a potent visual reminder of Northern Ireland's troubled past. The final symbol of hope is the recent completion of a new peace bridge in London/derry as part of its celebration as the UK city of Culture this year. This new walkway provides a direct link between the largely Protestant East bank of the river Foyle and the largely Catholic West bank in the heart of Londonderry. The new bridge has been welcomed by both communities and is a striking symbol of hope within one of Northern Ireland's most divided cities. It is hoped that future Assembly funding will be targeted on symbols such as these examples which help to break the stranglehold of religious segregation which perpetuates divisions in Northern Ireland.

Another symbol of hope for the future is intergroup trust. Hargie, Dickson, Mallett, and Stringer (2008) examined how intergroup trust mediated encounters between Catholics and Protestants. They were able to show that trust and attraction for the out-group as well as decreased in-group identification were related to positive experiences with out-group members. Of particular significance in this experiment was the finding that intergroup trust was a key variable in terms of willingness to disclose to an out-group member. These results are important since they illustrate that in intergroup encounters there is a need for trust toward the other group member to allow the development of friendships through the disclosure of personal information. These results support those found by Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, and Cairns (2009) who found that out-group trust mediated the relationship between intergroup contact and willingness to engage in intergroup encounters in Northern Ireland. Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) highlight the importance of individual and collective threat in situations where intergroup contact fails, highlighting the importance of

building trust with other group members to help counter the individual and group based threats which can undermine cross group contacts.

We argue that the most potent symbol of improved intergroup relations in Northern Ireland is friendships between different group members. These friendships are hampered by deeply polarised group attitudes which are handed on from generation to generation and reinforced by wider social group influence. Enduring friendships between members of the two religious groups directly challenge the anxiety that many group members feel about making such contacts. They provide exemplars for those who observe them of a very different way of interacting with and thinking about other group members. Group categorization, segregation and group socialisation as we have explained provide powerful mechanisms for sustaining a clear differentiation between in-group and out-group within a historically divided society. This group based view of the social world requires increased intergroup contacts to challenge group norms and role models from the different groups to illustrate the advantages of friendships across groups. The Political Assembly for all its drawbacks forces Protestant and Catholic politicians to work together to work effectively. These examples of cooperation, although undermined at times of political in-fighting, provide highly viable role models for greater cooperation between individual Protestants and Catholics. Examples of this community cooperation can be found in the increasing negotiation between Protestant marchers and Catholic community groups to achieve agreement about routes for marches. These meetings between Catholic and Protestant groups force participants to think about the views of the other group and provide real opportunities for better group understanding. Historically there has been a reluctance for opposing groups to meet, forcing the Parades Commission to adjudicate on march routes which annoys one side or the other. Where genuine group meetings between groups have taken place, in for example London/derry, they have led to decreased violence levels and greater understanding of the feelings of the two groups. One of the lessons here is that group members from both sides when faced with the need to discuss with members of the other group (something which they have little experience of) adopt a more flexible perspective making compromise positions possible. These agreements provide agreement about routes, reassure both sides about the need to keep the peace, and provide a curb on the minority of members from both sides who wish to use these events to attack other group members. Direct communication between representatives of the two groups while difficult to initiate may hold a similar promise to individual cross group contacts in addressing potentially divisive social events.

A final symbol of hope is the emergence of a Northern Irish identity alongside the traditional unionist and nationalist ones. Successive Life and Times surveys which run each year in Northern Ireland has charted the rise in the number of people who are choosing to say they are Northern Irish. This is a very positive sign, as it suggests that many people are uncomfortable with old identities which are associated with Northern Ireland's past. It is welcome that pupils who attend mixed or integrated schooling within the Province while maintaining their group identities are more likely to reject extreme group viewpoints having been exposed to the views of both groups. For many younger Protestants and Catholics the old politics

of confrontation is something which they reject. This desire for a more inclusive and shared Northern Ireland has been helped by the dramatic changes in Southern Ireland where many young people have rejected the traditional authority of the Catholic church following the sexual abuse scandals. The dramatic changes in attitudes in Southern Ireland have helped remove the old fear that many Protestants had of being integrated into a church dominated Ireland. The world economic downturn still impacts strongly on Northern Ireland and most areas of the UK outside of London and the South of England. This has left many regions requiring a subsidy from the rest of the UK to keep functioning. Northern Ireland receives approximately 5 billion pounds per year to function making it the most subsidised area of the UK. The size of this subsidy, and the fact that the area contains only 1.8 million people, makes any status change highly unlikely as the economic consequences would be devastating. The devolved Assembly in Northern Ireland face an economic dilemma as Northern Ireland moves into a post conflict phase with the very real fear that the UK government are likely to reduce this subsidy which was justified by the continuing conflict. The challenge for those seeking a more peaceful Northern Ireland is to increase opportunities for contact between the two religious groups while seeking a more inclusive identity which both groups can support. The increasing popularity of a Northern Irish identity which attracts support from both Catholics and Protestants is one of the most significant symbols of a move toward a more peaceful future.

The challenge of providing new symbols of hope however needs to tread a careful path as recent history has taught us in Northern Ireland. We started this chapter with a description of the flag protest and will end it with an update on its consequences. As another violent flag marked marching season draws to a close, the confrontations and disturbances caused by Loyalist and Nationalist groups determined to celebrate differing versions of the past has brought about new divisions in the our political Assembly. This has lead to the suspension of the new Peace Centre at the Maze which was to be another new symbol of hope as a shared memorial to the past. We remain optimistic that greater group understanding and more moderate group positions, brought about through increased cross group contacts, can provide a more stable environment for new symbols to develop in the future.

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Being Rwandan: The Use of Language, History, and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Rebekah A. Phillips DeZalia

Introduction

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda led to about 800,000 deaths. These were almost exclusively committed by the majority Hutu group against the minority Tutsi group. Since that time, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—the political party in power—has been trying to prevent future violence and make peace a more permanent fixture in the country. Doing this, however, requires reversing generations of historical animosity between Rwanda’s ethnic groups: no simple task for any government. The tensions between Hutu and Tutsi have been around for generations, accelerating during colonialism and reaching their peak during the genocide. To prevent another catastrophe, the RPF has employed peace promotion methods that have brought both sides together in a way that promotes reconciliation and discourages violence. By modifying the accepted historical narrative to emphasize social representations (Moscovici, 1990) that promote unity, the RPF is hoping to build a more peaceful society. However, if the RPF’s attempts only succeed in silencing the former narratives in public settings and do not actually change the people’s personal beliefs, they will prevent short-term violence through the creation of negative peace but may not succeed in their goal of attaining long-term positive peace.

One of the main methods employed has been to focus on the importance of history and its impact on future violence. As Des Forges (1999, p. 31) states, “Rwandans take history seriously. Hutu who killed Tutsi did so for many reasons, but beneath the individual motivations lay a common fear rooted in firmly held but mistaken ideas of the Rwandan past.” The most significant of these ideas is related to the historical narratives regarding the origins of Hutu and Tutsi. Years of regimes that

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focused on the differences between the people rather than stressing their commonality led to conflict and genocide. With the failures of past administrations in mind, the current government is trying to wipe the slate clean by revising history through the elimination of any reference to previous divisions.

The RPF's efforts are further motivated by the central role history plays in the life of the ordinary Rwandan. Since history is subjective, the telling or recording of historical narratives cannot be considered as a simple cataloging of dates and events. Rather it is the telling of personal stories with deep, inherent meaning imbedded in every account. These stories are either created and then passed down through the generations or suppressed with the hope they will be lost to the ages, in a form of collective amnesia. As Buckley-Zistel states, "In Rwanda, aspects of the past seem to be eclipsed from the discourse, creating a form of amnesia, albeit selective, or what I call chosen amnesia" (2009, p. 129).

Individuals in positions of power use these narratives to do several things including regulating social interactions, establishing legitimacy, and maintaining stable relations between individuals in their community and—in the case of genocide—creating conflicts within those communities to eliminate potential rivals for power. These histories "can be used as unifying device[s] for social identity and [they] can be used as divisive lever[s]" (Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999, p. 1022). They can help motivate individuals towards certain actions and, as circumstances change, the historical narratives can also change to reflect these new conditions (Lui & Hilton, 2005). As a tool that can mobilize and motivate large segments of society, it is not surprising that those in power may seek to monopolize the creation and dissemination of history.

The desire to control history in Rwanda is intended to affect identification. The RPF promotes the belief that the former history encourages identification with divisive subgroups, which could lead to future violence between these groups as it has in the past. By changing historical narratives, the RPF is attempting to create and promote one legitimate social identity, that of Rwandan, and eliminate all those with any ethnic connection. The goal of this strategy is to encourage unity and prevent violence because Rwandans will work for the good of the country instead of only thinking of the members of their particular ethnic group.

The theory that I will use to examine the Rwandan government's modification of the history of the country and focus on reconciliation is Serge Moscovici's Social Representation Theory (SRT; Phillips DeZalia, 2011). At the core of any social representation is a thema. These are a part of the dialogue within a society. Every social representation has at least one core thema that is essential to its existence as well as several peripheral themata that help to connect the core to the social world. These representations—or underlying themes—promote certain actions, such as obedience to authority and the elimination of the "enemy." If a representation is going to change, it will be via a change in the peripheral elements rather than the core (Moliner, 1995).

Representations are created through their attachment to established beliefs in a process known as anchoring. They can also be legitimized and become freestanding beliefs that are repeated in communities through the process of objectifying.

By looking at the different themes promoted in traditional and modern historical narratives, it is possible to discover the principles underlying Rwanda's attempt at genocide prevention. In Rwanda, these public narratives are predominantly found in the government approved media, educational material, and government reports. In addition, by looking at the presence or absence of these themes in the personal narratives of the people, it is possible to see if attempts to change history actually do have the potential to prevent mass violence and genocide.

In present-day Rwanda, the leaders are transforming histories to validate their actions and control their communities. The RPF changed historical narratives by emphasizing new social representations and abolishing older representations and their accompanying narratives. A couple of aspects of the historical narrative that they have modified in this attempt are the origin myth—specifically regarding the discussion of tribes and ethnic labels—and clans. They are accomplishing this under the premise that eliminating perceived falsehoods in the narratives of the colonial and postcolonial regimes is a necessary precondition to peace and stability. It is also being done in the name of such themes as *reconciliation* and *unity*. However, “in societies with poor formal education and knowledge transmission, such as Rwanda, collective memory, expressed in day-to-day encounters and oral history, is of greater significance than official history” (Buckley-Zistel, 2009, p. 133). The simple rewriting of history from the top does not erase years of accumulated history in the hearts and minds of individuals and communities. In order for true change to come about, the new version must successfully replace the former in the personal narratives of the people and not simply control public discourse.

In this chapter, I will look at the changing historical narratives in Rwanda, at both the public as well as the personal level, through the lens of the social representations utilized. In order to understand why certain narratives were promoted and others were silenced, it is necessary to understand the representations at their foundation. Analyzing the social representations involved in historical narratives gives insight into why certain stories have begun to be successfully integrated into the personal narratives of Rwandans and why others have yet to be legitimized by the population. Once the narratives are successfully integrated, they can be a part of one's identity. In Rwanda, the RPF is focusing on changes connected to ethnic identity, eliminating a connection to Hutu and Tutsi, and promoting a Rwandan identity. The analysis can be done by examining the mediums in which the new representations are presented including government reports, media outlets such as newspaper and music, and educational materials. It is through these outlets that the current government anchors each new narrative with its accompanying themes that contrast previous versions and establish them as free-standing versions of the past.

Although investigating why new narratives are created and the methods used to bring these about are essential, it is also important to examine the prevalence of these new stories by looking at their utilization in the personal narratives and ordinary conversations of the people. New narratives can only be effective in genocide prevention if their underlying themes become a part of the internal dialogue of the people they were created to affect. If no one believes the new versions or uses them in their lives, then they cannot be used to prevent violence. A significant occurrence

of themes related to former versions of historical narratives would indicate an incomplete acceptance of the narratives promoted by the new regime. If the people are not accepting the current regime's narratives, it is likely that they are also rejecting their underlying themes—not making them a part of their identity—making this change in history ineffective as a tool to prevent genocide.

Changing History

Before analyzing the effect history has had on the lives of Rwandans, it is important to understand the basics of each approach. In the early twentieth century, first the German and then the Belgian colonizers established the official history of Rwanda, even though their accounts were filled with contradictions and conflicting stories (Hintjens, 2001). These historical representations were taught in the schools, discussed in communities and used as justification for what became the Belgian style of rule. After independence from Belgium in 1962, the Hutu elites who ruled in the First and Second Republics undertook the task of controlling the legitimate history of the country. Ben-Amos (1997) discusses this process stating:

It is the memory of a certain group—an elite, who develop the rules that distinguish between what can become history and what should remain “mere” memory, that is, between the official memory of a society and the “unreliable,” disparate, and conflicting visions of its past. (p. 130)

While these Hutu leaders used a similar historical narrative, they changed the interpretation to justify their rule and subjugation of the Tutsi. In 1994, the next major power transition—from Hutu to RPF (Tutsi) rule—led to the first major modifications in the historical representations transmitted and taught in Rwanda, an almost complete reversal of ideas, particularly in relation to the origins of Rwandans.

Colonial Narrative

The historical narrative that the Belgians used to rule Rwanda had its beginnings in the theorizing of John Hanning Speke, a British explorer who came to Rwanda searching for the source of the Nile in the mid-nineteenth century. His encounter with Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (a pygmy group comprising only one percent of the Rwandan population) led him to create the popularization of the Hamitic myth (Prunier, 1995). This myth is based on the post-flood, Biblical account of Noah and his sons found in Genesis 9. In this myth, once the flood has ended and Noah and his family have left the ark, Noah gets drunk and passes out. His son, Ham, sees him in the drunken, naked state, and decides to tell his brothers, Shem and Japheth. These brothers cover their father, without actually looking at him, in order to show him respect. When Noah awakens and discovers that Ham saw him in that state, he curses Ham and banishes him and his family.

Speke believed that all Europeans were descendants of Noah's favored sons, Shem and Japheth, but that Ham moved to the Horn of Africa, in modern day Ethiopia and Somalia, after his father banished him. Although he was the least favored son, Ham was still descended from Noah connecting him by blood to the children of Shem and Japheth. The ensuing hierarchy left Europeans—the sons of Shem and Japheth—at the top above the North African descendants of Ham. Furthermore, in Speke's theory, the Sub-Saharan Bantu—a general label for over 400 ethnic groups in central, eastern and southern Africa—were descendants of the enemies of God's "chosen people" and were, therefore, relegated to the very bottom of the social hierarchy.

In order to identify "superior" people groups, Speke devised a way to distinguish the Hamites from the Bantu by their physical appearance. According to his system, the Hamites were taller and thinner than Bantu and had more "Western" features, proving their distant connection to Europeans. These Hamitic features included: lighter skin; thinner noses and lips; longer heads; and straighter, finer hair. Speke believed that the Tutsi of Rwanda had all the features associated with Hamites. Subsequent researchers attempted to validate Speke's theory. One of these (Louis, 1963) described the differences by writing:

The physical characteristics of the people of Ruanda-Urundi were as striking as the country which they inhabited. The Tutsi were tall, handsome, slender, and well-proportioned, sometimes over seven feet. The Twa, in contrast, were grotesque little creatures whom the Germans referred to as dwarfs. Between the two stood the stocky aboriginal Bantu, the Hutu. (p. 112)

Even though it was their physical appearance that led Speke to classify the Tutsi as Hamites, the classifications penetrated deeper. Tutsi were characterized as smarter, more competent and better leaders than the Hutu or Twa. Europeans soon became "smitten" with this people group "whom they saw as definitely too fine to be 'negroes.'...[The Europeans saw Tutsi as] not only physically different from the Hutu but also socially superior" (Prunier, 1995, p. 7). Armed with the Hamitic myth, colonialists created stories about the migration of the Hutu and the Tutsi to Rwanda. Out of the three relatively distinct groups—Tutsi, Hutu and Twa—only the Twa were believed to be the "original" inhabitants. According to this logic, this meant that there had to have been at least two migrations of people groups into the region. "Thus was born the migration hypothesis, that the ancestors of the Hutu and the Tutsi migrated as different peoples into the region of the African Great Lakes" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 44).

This was the only European theory for the presence of the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. The Twa, the original inhabitants (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995) are pygmy forest dwellers who continue to survive on foraging and hunting to this day. Around the thirteenth century, a group of Bantu from the south-western area of Africa migrated across the plains. Some ended up in Rwanda on their way to the eastern coast. The Bantu—who became known as Hutu—were farmers, possessing a reliable source of food, which gave them an advantage over the foraging Twa. This, combined with their greater height, allowed them to

subjugate the Twa and rule Rwanda. The combination of Hutu and Twa in Rwanda continued until the sixteenth century when the Tutsi migrated into the country.

As stipulated in the Hamitic myth, the Hamites were from northern Africa. Therefore, European colonialists believed that the Tutsi also came from north/northeast Africa and migrated down along the Nile with their cattle. Upon arriving in Rwanda, armed with valuable cattle and possessing “superior” stature, the Tutsi were able to overtake the Hutu and rule the land. As the years passed, Tutsi rule evolved into a feudal system with the king or *Mwami*, as the head. The Mwami’s vassals were comprised of several levels of Tutsi chiefs, with the occasional Hutu appointed as a lower-level chief. The Twa were separated from public life, residing in the forest and rarely permitted into the higher echelons of society.

One of the primary ways that Europeans came to believe in this version of Rwanda’s history was through the accounts of Tutsis. The Tutsi version of their origin was probably derived from two things: (1) the historical narratives that were passed down through Rwandan oral tradition; and (2) the Tutsi’s need to preserve a version of history that situates them on top. Because of their predisposition toward the Hamitic myth, Europeans wanted to see a version of the facts that elevated the Tutsi. “People of both groups learned to think of the Tutsi as the winners and the Hutu as the losers in every great contest in Rwandan history” (Des Forges, 1999, p. 37). This favoritism of the Tutsi continued until the decline of colonialism from 1959 to 1962.

The First and Second Republic

With the end of colonialism in 1962, the power structure in Rwanda changed, altering the established historical narrative. The majority Hutu claimed power with the election of Gregoire Kayibanda, the first postcolonial and Hutu President of Rwanda. Almost immediately the new Hutu elites began persecuting the previous Tutsi rulers. This persecution was justified by a new variation of the Hamitic myth, still in vogue even in the 1950s and 1960s. The new Hutu interpretation of the myth, which Uvin and Mironko (2003) labeled the essentialist version, varied in three significant ways. The first variation related to the connotations placed on the Tutsi migration into Rwanda. These new Hutu elite agreed with the basic premise of the Hamitic myth presenting the Tutsi as Hamites from the north. However, they did not see the Tutsi as superior migrants but as “foreign occupants and oppressors” (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 104). As Malkki states

It is evident that the Tutsi appear in the mythico-history first of all as foreigners—historically recent arrivals ‘from the North,’ ‘from Somalia,’ or ‘from the Nile.’ It was often claimed in this connection that the Tutsi were really ‘Hamites,’ who did not belong in the land of the ‘Bantu’ Hutu. (1995, p. 68)

The second Hutu variation to the Hamitic myth came with a new interpretation of the Hutu social standing within Rwanda. Hutu saw themselves, not as migrants

who preceded the Tutsi, but as indigenous Rwandans. This meant that they had an inborn right to rule Rwanda, just as their ancestors had always done. The final variation was a mixture of the first two. Because the Hutu were indigenous and the Tutsi were foreign, the Hutu believed that the Tutsi were not only a different ethnicity, but a completely different race (Buckley-Zistel, 2006). The Tutsi were Hamites and the Hutu were Bantu. Their perceived status as natives, contrasted with the Tutsi status as a foreign race and combined with the Hutu majority position in the country, gave the Hutu the will and the ability to start a “revolution” to end colonialism and gain power.

In July 1973, Juvenil Habyarimana staged a coup d'état and took control of the Rwandan government. Although there were some Tutsi killings during the coup, the main focus was to overthrow Kayibanda's regime. Habyarimana's time in power became known as the Second Republic. A significant difference between the First and Second Republics was the historical view of Tutsi. They went from being considered a separate and inferior race under the Kayibanda regime to being transformed into an ethnicity under Habyarimana (Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995). As Habyarimana told Philippe Decraene, a reporter from *Le Monde*, “It is not a question of bringing the Tutsi back to power, which would be equivalent to reestablishing the pre-1959 situation; but each ethnic group has its place in the national fold” (1974, as cited in Mamdani, 2001, p. 140) This new Tutsi identification and focus on unity slowly led to reconciliation between the various groups, with more Tutsi in public life and more interactions between the various groups, including increased intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi.

However, there was a significant change that Habyarimana refused to make. Although Habyarimana made conciliatory steps towards the Tutsi in Rwanda, he refused to do the same for Tutsi who had fled Rwanda in 1959. These refugees, who had spent years (if not their entire lives) outside their homeland, wanted the right to return to their country of origin. Habyarimana refused, stating that Rwanda was too small and had too many people already. The refusal on the part of Habyarimana to negotiate with Tutsi residing outside of the country led a group of Tutsi refugees in Uganda to form the original RPF. This militia group invaded Rwanda in October 1990 in an attempt to gain the right to return. However, Hutu in Rwanda saw it as “a foreign invasion” (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 106) reminiscent of what happened when the Tutsi first invaded Rwanda centuries before rather than seeing it as an attempt at negotiation.

RPF Narrative

The Tutsi who were raised outside of Rwanda had a very different version of history, which can be seen in their different version of the origins of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. It varied significantly from the narrative Tutsi supposedly told to the Europeans when they first came to Rwanda. This narrative is often referred to as the social constructivist version, as it argues that the Hutu/Tutsi distinction is a social creation.

It is also referred to as the Pro-Tutsi/RPF version, focusing on the commonalities between the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa, while attempting to erase the supposed differences.

The most noteworthy difference between the Belgian, Hutu and RPF representation of history relates to the Hamitic myth. Belgians saw this as the basis for their favoritism of Tutsi and Hutu saw it as justification for Tutsi persecution. However, the RPF denied its veracity. The RPF believed that there was no racial or ethnic difference between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa and “that all reference to ethnicity was nonsense” (Pottier, 2002, p. 62). Their view was that any distinctions were based on lifestyle and economic standing. There may have been a Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa distinction prior to colonization but it was a triad based on “production” and “basic modes of subsistence” (Taylor, 2004, p. 360), rather than race. They believed that “there may be significant inherited differences in physical appearance between social groups, that do not originate in genetic stock, but in socially inherited difference in wealth, prestige and power” (deSwaan, 1997, p. 111). In this narrative, described in detail by Rodney (1971, as cited in Mamdani, 2001) the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were all original inhabitants of Rwanda. Slowly, there was a differentiation between various Rwandans. Some Rwandans decided that they did not want to cultivate or herd cattle. They survived off of foraging and hunting. This made it difficult to obtain adequate nutrition and they had stunted growth. Their appearance led the Europeans to mistakenly label this group, Twa, as pygmies.

Along those same lines, the RPF narrative states that another group of Rwandans started to focus solely on cattle herding. They lived off of the milk and occasional meat from their cattle. This protein-rich diet led them to grow significantly taller than other Rwandans. The Europeans, upon seeing these cattle herders—the Tutsi—erroneously thought they were an entirely different race from the other Rwandans when, again, it was a simple matter of diet. Rwandans who did not forage or herd cattle survived by cultivating the land. Although their diet was more regular than that of the foragers, allowing them to grow taller than Twa, they did not get the same protein as the cattle herders and so their height stayed somewhere in-between the other groups. This was the group that came to be known as Hutu. The RPF further stated that these economic differences slowly faded before colonialism through intermarriage and in present-day Rwanda it is impossible to tell if someone is a Hutu or Tutsi by their appearance (deSwaan, 1997).

The RPF blamed the colonizers for imposing the Hamitic myth on Rwanda, causing one people group to be divided into three. Chretien et al. (1995) cites an RPF song that discussed the way the colonizers created the conflict in Rwanda. It says:

It is the white man who has caused all that, children of Rwanda. He did it in order to find a secret way to pillage us. When they [the Europeans] arrived, we were living side by side in harmony. They were unhappy that they could not find a way to divide us. They invented different origins for us, children of Rwanda: some were supposed to have come from Chad, others from Ethiopia. We were a fine tree, its parts all in accord, children of Rwanda. Some of us were banished abroad, to never come back. We were separated by this division, children of Rwanda, but we have to overcome the white man's trap...So, children of Rwanda, we are all called to unite our strength to build Rwanda. (p. 359, as cited in Des Forges, 1999, p. 693)

This thinking first started to develop while the Tutsi were exiled in refugee camps outside of their homeland. Because it was their identification as Tutsi that had led to their banishment from their homeland and their continued persecution, “Tutsi refugees in Uganda came to think of themselves as Banyarwanda (Rwandese), and not as Tutsi” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 165). When Tutsi in the diaspora returned to Rwanda, they brought this emphasis on being Rwandan, not Tutsi or Hutu, with them. The Europeans were blamed for the concept of ethnic groups in Rwanda and the conflict that has come from these distinctions. For the RPF, it was the transformation of the terms Tutsi, Hutu and Twa that led to the conflict between the groups. For them, it is only through eradicating the use of these tainted words that Rwandans will be able to again live in harmony.

Social Representations

There are several social representations that have been modified or created since the 1994 Genocide. The RPF has used these to guide Rwandans towards specific actions and thoughts in an attempt to promote peace, solidify power, and prevent future violence. For this chapter, the themes related to these revised representations can be seen in RPF reports and government supported media and education. For the RPF’s modified social representations, the core themes have remained the same while the peripheral elements emphasized in the themata (Moscovici & Vignaux, 2001) have been altered. This process is a form of anchoring and objectifying—connecting the RPF representations with the former beliefs and then transforming them into phenomena independent of the original. As an extension of this, there have been significant changes in the narratives and signs used to promote the representations within Rwanda. The extent to which these new narratives have been integrated into the lives of Genocide survivors can be seen through examples of themes that align with the RPF narratives or the former versions their personal narratives. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore modifications to two specific aspects of the historical narrative; the origin myth and clans.

Origin Myth

One of the most critical Rwanda social representations that the RPF has modified in recent years is that of defining the *origin* of Rwandans. Some of the themata at the base of this representation are:

- division <> unity
- equality <> inequality
- difference <> sameness
- superior <> inferior
- populist <> elitist
- inclusive <> exclusive

This core representation comprised the base of Rwandan society during the colonial period. In deciding the colonial power structure in Rwanda and defining the identity of its inhabitants, the Belgians used their version of this social representation. The importance that the Belgians placed on Rwandan origins—who was native versus who was a foreign invader—justified the way they chose to rule and is one example of the *origin* social representation present in society.

The peripheral elements of the social representation of *origin* are dispersed through the myth stories and historical narratives describing the formation of Rwanda. Formative narratives, including the Hamitic myth, stated that the Twa were the original inhabitants, while the Hutu were the first to immigrate and the Tutsi came much later. Subsequent regimes used these narratives to guide people towards believing that only the Hutu and Twa were the original inhabitants and the Tutsi were foreign invaders who refused to leave. The peripheral element utilized here was that of *differences* between Rwandans. In order to strengthen the importance of *origins*, the Belgians highlighted the *differences* between Rwandans whose ancestors were from that land and those who were originally *foreigners*. This guided the propaganda not only during colonialism but also the First and Second Republics.

Former Narrative

During colonialism, Tutsi were presented as *different, superior foreigners* because their origin put them closer to Europeans than the Hutu. With their elevated status, they were socially separated from the Hutu and given more rights. Because of the emphasis on *elitism*, this superior minority claimed a right to rule over the majority, creating a power structure that was embedded with tension between Hutu and Tutsi.

The First and Second Republic saw the themata of *elitist* <> *populist* and *superior* <> *inferior* reversed while the themata of *division* <> *unity* remained unchanged. Instead of the minority elites having power, the emphasis was placed on the more populist idea of power residing with the majority. Hutus were taught to perceive Tutsi as dangerous, inferior foreigners who did not deserve the rights given to indigenous Rwandans. These views kept the division between the Hutu and Tutsi, basing it instead on negative perceptions of Tutsi rather than the positive ones.

Habyarimana's regime continued to portray Tutsi as inferior and separate to ensure that the majority Hutu retained power. However, there was a distinction made between Tutsi who had been in Rwanda since Independence and those who had fled in 1959, a modification to the theme of *difference*. Those that had remained in the country became a sort of second-class citizenry—not quite the same as the Hutu but less different than those in the Diaspora—and they were given a small role in the social life of country, particularly in the private business sector. Those who had fled never lost their *foreign invader* label and had no legitimate claim on citizenship. The narratives related to this idea of Tutsi as dangerous *foreigner* were particularly reinforced through the school system. Tutsi students were required to identify themselves in class and a strict quota system was enforced that allowed few, if any,

Tutsi students to continue to secondary school and university. The images of Tutsi as different—with their tall, skinny frames and long, thin faces—were also displayed in political cartoons in state-run newspapers which often drew Tutsi as cockroaches or snakes sneaking into Rwanda. This was a warning of impending Tutsi attacks and the dangers of giving Tutsi power.

RPF Narrative

When the RPF came to power, it anchored its representations to those of the former regime but modified the core theme and the themata of the peripheral elements. For the representation of *origin*, the modified core theme promotes the idea that all Rwandans are indigenous, with an emphasis now on *inclusivity* rather than *exclusivity*. Every individual who has ancestors from ancient Rwanda can claim a Rwandan identity regardless of their identification as a Hutu or Tutsi or years spent in the Diaspora. In fact, the RPF has actually forbidden the usage of ethnic labels (Lemarchand, 2009), declaring them to be a part of a genocidal ideology.

In addition to the core modification of *origin*, several of the peripheral elements of the representation have also been altered such as the reversal of the themata of *sameness* < > *difference*. Instead of seeing differences among Rwandans, the RPF promotes the idea that all Rwandans are the same. This particularly emphasizes their similar origins but also the similar social positions and responsibility to Rwanda. The other element that has been reversed is *division* < > *unity*. Rather than focusing on the divisions between people groups, the RPF emphasize the importance of unity among all Rwandans. Because they are so similar, they must unite to improve Rwanda and the lives of its people.

There are two peripheral elements that have been completely removed from the representation of *origins*. These include that of *superior* < > *inferior* and *elitist* < > *populist*. Because of the stress on *sameness* over *difference*, the people of Rwanda are no longer classified along ethnic lines. Because the RPF has banned the division of people into ethnic groups, there is no explicit distinction made between who is superior and who is inferior. This focus on the existence of a privileged group is effectively silenced by the RPF's emphasis on *unity*. According to their reasoning, if there is only one group there can be no favoritism or privilege.

The anchoring of the RPF version of *origin* with the Belgian and Hutu versions is done through the historical narrative of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa distinctions. The Belgian and Hutu renderings of Rwanda's history emphasize that these groups have *different* origins, although the Belgian one presented Tutsi as a *superior, elite* group. The RPF argues that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are the same and, thus, have the same origin. However, the RPF regime has to reconcile the existence of representations along ethnic lines—socially constructed or otherwise—prior to its rule. It has done this by anchoring their new representation on the previous ideas of Tutsi and Hutu identity but altering the meaning—through attempted objectifying—to match its own agenda.

Government

This connection of the new representation with the former version can be seen in materials produced by representatives of the RPF. The 1999 annual report of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) states:

Ethnic groups, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa characterized wealth or poverty; they were not based on blood. One could shift from being a Twa or a Hutu and become a Tutsi if he got rich, if he became poor while he was a Tutsi; he was called a Hutu or a Twa. (p. 19, as cited in Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 110)

This quote anchors the origin myth with the previous version by directly referencing the previous belief that the Hutu and Tutsi labels were ethnic. Because Rwandans know the Hutu and Tutsi labels prior to RPF rule, the RPF utilized these terms in their anchoring of the new representation to the former theme. The previous quote shows the explicit guiding of Rwandans towards the belief that the Tutsi and Hutu divide are examples of the common nature of Rwandans who share the same blood even if they have different economic statuses. This connection continued with a 2007 NURC report, which stated that:

Somebody who could own more than ten cows was said to be Tutsi; someone who had more or less; but lived essentially on agriculture was called Hutu. The one who fed on hunting and fruit was qualified Twa. (Mugabe, 2007, p. 17)

This quote is an example of objectifying. By this point, the anchoring has taken place and Rwandans should not need to be explicitly told that the Hutu and Tutsi labels are not ethnic. They only need to be reminded of the historical social distinction that is now recognized between the groups.

Media

Anchoring is the first process that occurs in the creation of a new social representation. This is followed by objectifying, although at times they can have a slight overlap. As the RPF creates its new representation of *origin* it anchors its social labels to the previous ethnic labels and objectifies the representation as these labels lose their ethnic connotations and only hold a social meaning. Both of these processes can be seen in an article published by a Rwandan English-language newspaper. The journalist wrote:

It is also a matter of socio-cultural and historical logic that, with shared clans, for instance, no Rwandan whatsoever can confidently claim not to have ‘Hutu’ or ‘Tutsi’ blood in him. These terms, as has often been stressed, merely denoted mobile social (and economic) categories in traditional Rwanda that were politicized to disastrous consequences. (“Shame, Disgust and the Fallacy of Difference in Rwanda,” 2005)

This quote demonstrates the transition away from anchoring and the beginning of objectifying. Because it is not possible to completely eliminate these labels from people’s memories, the government has attempted to change the signs associated with this words. This journalist anchored the new theme by acknowledging the

former labels but rooted his argument in the new narrative of social groups over ethnic divisions, showing the beginning of objectifying the new representation through the stress on the new narratives. By emphasizing the social nature of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa divide, the government is silencing the ethnic element. There are also explicit warnings against turning the labels into ethnic or political groups when the social narrative is distributed (via the newspaper) to the general public.

Education

One of the main ways that the RPF has promoted its modifying representations is through education. The teaching of history was banned in the country until new textbooks, with an RPF-approved historical narrative, could be published. In addition to the narratives promoted in the schools, many individuals are required to attend *inganda*. These are reeducation—or solidarity—camps that were originally intended for returning refugees and prisoners but are also required for all students before they transition to university. As one government report put it, “In order to fight against ethnicity and ethnic hatred it is necessary to bet once again on solidarity camps for teachers, pupils of secondary schools of all education sectors of...and the students of the higher education...” (2008, p. 118). Regardless of age or position, the RPF is trying to find a way to reach all Rwandans with its new history.

One example of objectifying can be seen in the way in which the representation of *origin*, which was previously anchored to the concept of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa has now surpassed the need for these labels. In this situation, the RPF has transformed *ethnic groups* into *social groups*. The Tutsi are referred to as cattle herders, the Hutu as farmers and the Twa as potters or hunter-gatherers. An example of this can be seen in the following passage taken from a school textbook.

Social classes or groups in early Rwanda depended on a person’s occupation (the kind of work they did). The system worked like this:

- Most people in Rwanda were farmers who grew crops to feed their families and trade with other groups.
- Others were cattle-keepers.
- Others were hunter-gatherers. (Bamusananire, Byiringiro, Munyakazi, & Ntagaramba, 2006, p. 28)

Starting in sixth level of primary school, Rwandan children are taught to use social groups to distinguish each other rather than ethnic groups. “The goal is to replace ethnicity and other potentially ‘divisive’ sub-state loyalties with an undifferentiating Rwandanness based on shared (reinterpreted) past, culture, and language” (Purdekova, 2008, pp. 503–504). At this point in the textbook the labels of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are not mentioned because there is no longer a need to anchor the concepts of the *unity* and *sameness* of Rwandans to the narrative of Tutsi and Hutu. The origin myths have now been transformed into an independent narrative. When learning about the history of Rwanda, children are only taught to see Rwandans as one people group with various social subcategories, emphasizing their shared origins.

In addition, this does not start until the final year of primary school. Any reference to the origin of Rwandans is silenced in the previous years of education. In addition, there is no explicit reference to the Hamitic myth. That is not an acceptable part of the supported historical narrative.

For those individuals who are too old to learn this narrative in a classroom, they hear a similar version in inganda. The Penal Reform Institute (2004) described a lesson that the mayor of a village called Gikongoro gave during one such lesson. He said:

In the past, everybody got on well with each other, and there were hardly any differences. The only difference was the fact that if you had many cows you were a Tutsi, whereas if you cultivated the land, you were considered to be Hutu. This was a way of expressing wealth, and nothing more. What is more, if someone rich fell ill and lost their cattle, they became Hutu, while a poor person who earned a fortune would become Tutsi. (2004, p. 29)

Personal Narratives

The RPF's revised representation of *origin* is reflected in the personal narratives of Genocide survivors. The *origins* representation combined with the peripheral themes of *unity* and *sameness* and its related narrative of Tutsi and Hutu as social groups are prevalent in the stories of the Genocide orphans with whom I spoke in 2007.

Interview #1

What were called ethnic groups are social classes. Twa were pot makers. Hutu were cultivators (peasants). Tutsi were ill-treating others. A Tutsi could be a Hutu and visa versa according to the number of cows he/she had. Later nose length was considered and conflict arose.

Interview #2

I was also told that since only the Tutsi were known for having many cows, even the Hutu who had many cows in that case ceased to be called Hutu and they were called Tutsi. There were intermarriages among the Hutu and Tutsi.

Interview #3

[Rwanda] was occupied by people all called Rwandans. It was settled by people who came hunting and living on fruits. Others cultivated. Others were cattle keepers.

Interview #4

So, during, in history before, before colonization, Rwanda lived, we lived in a very good condition, OK? There was no race. There was no Hutu. There was no Tutsi. There was no Twa. So, the Hutu and Tutsi, in that period, there were social classes, social classes...So, in the social classes, if I was a Tutsi, I was really a person who was rich. So, who had a lot of... fortune...who had a lot of houses, who had a lot of cows. In that time the Tutsi had a lot of cows, so, that is significant. The cow was wealth. It is like money today. It is like a lot of houses, etc...So, after the Tutsi and the Hutu, the Hutu were the lower class and so, who, the lower that had a lot. So, they farmed...So, the Hutu lived with the Tutsi. It was their work. It was their job to work in that bad situation. And also the Twa is an inferior class.

Interview #5

[When defining a Rwandan] it is not a matter of how tall or how short he is. It is not even the matter of how black or brown he is.

These excerpts show the narrative of Hutu and Tutsi as separate social classes, rather than ethnicities or races—implicitly emphasizing *sameness* over *difference* and *unity* over *division*—although there are variations in the ways these orphans describe the difference. The first and fourth interviews are the most forceful in fighting against the idea of Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic groups, with their narratives containing a negative valence in regards to the concept of Hutu and Tutsi. These are the two that specifically deny the existence of ethnicity in precolonial Rwanda. However, Interview 4 is much more specific in defining the social groups and the orphan in Interview 1 was more specific in his position on the consequences of the division with his reference to the conflict that resulted. Interview 5 is the vaguest in its denial of an ethnic basis to the Hutu/Tutsi divide, a position that was also situated more in denying the former representation and less on promotion of the modified theme. By saying that identity is not related to height or skin color, he is implicitly refuting the Hutu narrative of *origins* as based on the Hamitic myth, where Tutsi characteristics of light skin and tall stature was proof of their different origins. This was also the only one of these five interviewees who lived in a rural area rather than the capital and thus had less formal education. The middle excerpts (Interviews 2 and 3) do not overtly fight the former representation. Interview 3 mentions a divide between cattle herders and cultivators but makes no reference to how this was manipulated during and after the colonial period. Interview 2 leaves room for the former representation through its ambiguous reference to cattle ownership.

While these orphans make reference to social groups, there are a few orphans who appear to utilize the former representation of *origins* with the emphasis on *difference* and *division* through their personal narratives. In the following examples, the Genocide orphans use two methods of referencing the former representation. In three of the excerpts, orphans refer to ethnicity directly, a term that the RPF has tried to silence through the promotion of its new representation. The two ethnographic observations also make direct reference to the difference between groups, although ethnicity was not directly mentioned.

Interview #6

[The history of Rwanda] was composed of things of ethnicity: Hutu; Tutsi; Twa. It was the Hutu and Tutsi that have conflict.

Interview #7

I know that Rwanda had many citizens with three ethnic groups (Hutu, Twa Tutsi).

Interview #2

[I would describe myself as] a Genocide survivor, a Tutsi by ethnicity, a Rwandan...

Observation July 20, 2007

During a discussion on the viability of a pig farm as a means of income for a group of Genocide orphans, one survivor stated: Tutsi will not raise pigs. Other Rwandans will raise pigs but Tutsi think they are dirty and they will only take cows.

Observation July 22, 2002

At a meeting with Genocide orphans in the village of Gasabo, an orphan made reference to Hutu as “descendents of Cain.” The rest of the orphans in the meeting immediately agreed with the statement. Someone explained that this phrase is never used in the presence of Hutu but that the orphans privately use it because the Hutu in their community are mean to them.

The orphans in the sixth and seventh interviews define Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic groups. Interviewee 8 explicitly states that he is ethnically Tutsi. The use of the term *ethnicity* connects this narrative with the former representation and the associated themata. This goes against the narrative of the RPF and follows the narrative of the Belgians and Hutus, aligning with the idea of that Hutu and Tutsi are inherently difference. In both interviews, the orphans make no reference to Tutsi and Hutu as social groups, a denial of the *sameness* theme of the new representation. They completely adhere to the former narrative, something that would be unacceptable to do in a public setting. This aligning with the former representation can also be seen in the four observations, although some do so more directly. The observation involving the discussion of pigs shows the *superiority* of Tutsi over other Rwandans. While other Rwandans are happy to raise pigs and the person from this observation was sure that this was a productive and beneficial activity. He believed that it was an activity below the Tutsi. Regardless of the benefits, Tutsi would not be pig farmers, because they are cattle herders. This connects with the former representation rather than the new version in that their refusal to accept pigs was based on their belief that the practice was below them. Under the RPF narrative, it was easy to switch between being a Hutu or a Tutsi because of the social basis for the labels. In this observation, the claim is that the Tutsi identity was not so easily changed because those who considered themselves Tutsi refused to perform activities that they felt were inferior. This shows the more rigid nature of identity and the inherent implication that there is still *division* rather than *unity* in Rwanda.

The observation that occurred during a meeting of orphans also makes a strong connection with the former representation. By connecting the Hutu with Cain, the orphans are replacing the Hamitic myth, the central narrative used by the Belgians to emphasize the *difference* and *superiority* of the Tutsi over Hutu, with another Biblical account of a cursed figure. Cain was the first man in the Bible to commit murder when he killed his brother. By connecting him to the Hutu, the orphans are connecting this first murder with the murder of their family by their Hutu neighbors.

Clans

Another way in which the modified representation of *origins* is anchored to the former representation and objectified into a different form is through reference to the 18 clans of Rwanda. According to the RPF, clans were traditionally seen in Rwanda as a form of identification that differed from the Tutsi/Hutu distinction. As the RPF eliminated the Hutu/Tutsi divide, it needed to find a social identifier to fill the void created. By encouraging the use of clan membership in the new historical narrative, the RPF could silence discussions of ethnicity and the connected divisive symbols.

Former Narrative

Although clans have always been a part of Rwanda's past, they were a little-mentioned factor in the former narratives and their inter-ethnic nature was not seen as evidence of a common ancestry between Tutsi and Hutu. The blurred origins of the clans have not stopped the RPF from resurrecting this concept and claiming a common ancestor within the clans in its process of objectifying. Under former representations, it was possible to reference clans while still emphasizing the different *origins* of the groups within Rwanda. As Prunier (1995) states, "In fact, the "clans" could hardly be so called, since there was no memory, even legendary, of an eponymous common ancestor" (p. 16). Mamdani (2001) continues this thought stating that, "In Rwanda, however, clan members were definitely unable to trace their relationship to a common ancestor" (p. 54). Since clans were not based on a common ancestor, the scholars who adhere to the concept of separate origins have only a vague notion of where the clans might have originated.

Maquet (1961) asked a Rwandan if Hutu and Tutsi in the same clan had the same origin.

The Tutsi answered that [the existence of clans] did not [prove a common ancestor for Hutu and Tutsi]. They explain it by the relationships which have linked Hutu to Tutsi as clients or servants. After some time the Hutu were identified with the group of their master. Such identification was particularly easy since Tutsi frequently emigrated from one region of Rwanda to another with their Hutu clients and servants. (p. 40, as cited in Mamdani, 2001, p. 55)

In this example, the explanation not only guides individuals towards the continuing idea of difference but also of *superiority* of the Tutsi because the Tutsi forced their clan membership to their Hutu servants. During colonialism and Hutu rule, Rwandans—even Tutsi—believed that the existence of clans was not relevant to the discussion of *origins*. A Hutu was linked to a Tutsi in the same clan, not through blood but through a previous servitude. Maquet (1961) extends this argument by declaring that, "Hutu and Tutsi clansmen did not exhibit any solidarity at all and behaved towards each other as complete strangers" (p. 61, as cited in Mamdani, 2001, p. 55). The clan system was an irrelevant artifact from a previous era.

David Newbury (1980) was another scholar whose research supported the idea of a social rather than ancestral connection between the members of a clan. For him, the development of clans was based on a broader system than a Hutu identifying with his Tutsi rulers family and "seen as linking a political context identified with Rwanda's central court to people formerly outside the system" (Newbury, 1980, p. 399). Although Tutsi dominated the courts and thus their identity affected the change in identification for others, clans formed and were transformed based on the larger political system. These scholars acknowledge that clans existed and that they had members from all ethnic groups. However, they deny that this entailed common *origin* or any sense of *sameness* among Rwandans. There was so little

connection between the clansmen that they were “complete strangers” towards each other. For these scholars, clans were an irrelevant part of the *origin* debate that could be referenced but did not play a part in significantly uniting Tutsi and Hutu in an ancestral way.

RPF Narrative

The RPF usage of clans is paradoxical. In the revised RPF narrative, members of the same clan do share a common ancestor. Whereas the previous narratives only briefly mentioned clans and saw them as based on clientship or political relationships, the RPF narratives put a high importance on one’s clan identity. For them, the clans guide individuals towards the idea of a common *origin* and create a connection between Tutsi and Hutu within clans, emphasizing *unity* and *sameness* over *division* and *difference*. It is, however, ironic that the RPF favors parsing the social landscape according to clans in order to eliminate ethnic identity. Rather than being irrelevant, clan membership is now seen as an integral part of the historical narrative. By anchoring the themes of ancestry to the existing narrative of clans, the RPF is able to objectify the representation, modifying its meaning and the polarity of the themata.

For this new narrative, any migrations into Rwanda were clan based. As these families settled into Rwanda, different members took on different roles in society. Those who chose to farm were called Hutu. Those who chose to raise cattle were identified as Tutsi. Those who chose to forage were labeled as Twa. It is for this reason that more than one social group can be found in the same clan and even if your social category could change due to a change in circumstance or occupation, your clan identity was passed down through the generations.

Education

Clans are also presented in the Social Studies textbook used in Rwandan Primary Schools, which states:

The people of Rwanda were divided into clans. The clans were like large families which gave their members a feeling of belonging. People knew their rights and responsibilities within the clan. Rwandans today can trace their families back to the ancient clans. It is important to remember that there were no tribes in Rwanda. People from every social group belonged to the same clans. They traded with each other. They shared the same religion and culture. They intermarried with each other. They spoke the same language. (Bamusananire et al., 2006, pp. 27–28)

The confusing usage of clans and tribes in this section as two different concepts can be explained if one understands tribes to be code for ethnic groups. The textbook explicitly denies the existence of tribes (ethnic groups) in ancient Rwanda, thus deemphasizing the potential for *difference*. To further eliminate the divisions

within Rwanda, another explicit reference is made to the nonexistence of tribes and the existence of social groups. By stating that every social group could be a part of every clan, the government is anchoring the concept of clans to that of the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa as social tiers. This is important because clans are a lesser known narrative and their promotion is facilitated through this connection. This also allows the clan narratives to be used as a means of guiding one towards *unity* and *same-ness*. Rather than seeing their origins in the tribe (ethnic) system, the students are encouraged to focus on their clan status and social groups contained within.

Government

This discussion of clans extends beyond the school system to other governmental agencies. A NURC report on the causes of the Rwandan conflict states:

At the time the Rwandan identity reference was the clan first. When a person was required to disclose his/her identity, he/she would mention his/her clan without ambiguity. Belonging to the same clan implied that the concerned persons were of the same origin, the same distant ancestor. (Shyaka, 2005, p. 7)

Again, a later report repeats this claim by stating that, “the Rwandan people’s cohesion was also reinforced by the fact that clans were shared by all the Rwandese all together, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and that there didn’t exist specific regions exclusively dwelt by such and such ethnic group” (Mugabe, 2007, p. 16). This connection with clans rather than ethnic groups was promoted by the RPF as a means of endorsing the modified *origins* representation. In the previous example, the explicit separation made between *exclusivity* and clan membership further emphasizes the need for *inclusivity* through the clan narrative. This is a direct reversal of the former representation in which tribal narratives were used to guide individuals towards *exclusive* identities. This utilization of the narrative of clans can also be seen in a proposal for a “Rwandan cultural fund” where it states:

There is also need for sensitization campaigns drawing from Rwandan citizen values in traditions and Rwandan traditional social institutions would also be necessary. One would show for example that Tutsis, Hutus and Twas had a same ... the same... and the same totems that are emblematic symbols like flag and national anthem, same king, same customs, etc. Clans formed the basis for not only individual identification criteria but also social criteria. There is good reason to put out and promote the Rwandan citizen and patriotic values from the Rwandan cultural fund. One would then show the origin and the evolution of the ethnicity that culminated with the 1994 Rwandan genocide. (*The Causes of Violence After the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, 2008, p. 121)

The RPF realizes that it is necessary to focus on “traditional social institutions” such as clans in order to promote their new representations, using these to emphasize the necessity of unity among Rwandans. If the citizens of Rwanda are to act like a united group, they must see themselves as similar. The objectifying of the modified representation of true *origins* as seen through the promotion of clans and cultural traditions combined with the specific rejection of ethnic groups is the means by which the RPF hopes to attain this goal.

Personal Narratives

Even though clans were rarely mentioned in Rwanda prior to 1994, the representation of a common ancestor given through this system has already entered the historical narratives of two Genocide survivors and one observation. However, it is not as solid as the integration of the narrative of social groups.

Interview #2

Earlier, there was Abanyiginye, abashambo and others, up to eighteen [clans].

Interview #4

So, there were no classes. There were no Hutu, so the Hutu and the Tutsi are classes, are social classes. There were others. There were clans, the banyaginga, the bega, the, maybe there were 18, 18 clans.

Observation July 30, 2007

There have always been clans in Rwanda. Long ago, when Tutsi came to Rwanda, they conquered the Hutu. The Hutu became associated with the Tutsi who conquered them and that is how the clans formed. There were 18 Tutsi clans that came and the Hutu joined them.

Of the interviews I conducted, only two made vague references to clans and during times of observation, only one individual brought up clans in a discussion. Because clans have been an insignificant part of Rwanda's history for so long, it has been difficult to utilize this narrative in the anchoring and objectifying of the new representation. When it is mentioned, not many details can be given. No one could name all 18 clans and no one identified themselves with a specific clan. In addition, during the observation, the individual stated that even clans had an ethnic basis through the migration of Tutsi. This is an example of a Genocide survivor connecting to the former representation, showing the difficulty of changing this narrative. This individual is a middle-aged Rwandan who was educated under the Second Republic. Since this regime promoted narratives of the former representation of *origins*, the concept of clans was tied to this and the man has yet to be able to change the association.

Conclusion

The RPF has strictly promoted modified social representations and has silenced dissenting versions. By encouraging themes of reconciliation and peace while reducing those of violence and divisions, the RPF hopes to prevent another genocide. This is not just a campaign to alter social representations and their corresponding historical narratives, but also one to change Rwandans' identities as a means of peace through social control.

The RPF has changed social representations related to unity and division and has employed narratives designed to guide Rwandans towards working together to prevent genocide. Through an emphasis on interconnectedness, the RPF leads people to see themselves not as Tutsi and Hutu but as Rwandans. The RPF hopes that this focus on a more universal identification will facilitate reconciliation and discourage

violence. This can be seen in the *origins* representation and the historical narratives through which it is distributed. The emphasis is on the elimination of the Tutsi and Hutu distinction and promotion of the Rwandan identity. Rwandans are encouraged to see the differences between the two groups as social and irrelevant in the present day. The interviews in this chapter show that Rwandans are slow to change their understanding of the Hutu and Tutsi divide.

This resistance may be due to a significant flaw in the RPF's method of rewriting history (Purdekova, 2008) and silencing the former narrative and associated symbols, including those connected to ethnicity (Lemarchand, 2009). However, acknowledging the uniqueness of the various groups that come together to form the larger symbolic category can be a critical component in the acceptance of a symbol. Individuals reject the adaptation of an umbrella grouping that will result in the destruction of their previous identities. Therefore, attempting to eliminate entire symbolic identities will hinder the acceptance of the larger representation.

Moscovici (1988) described three ways that social representations can work in a society. There can be one unifying representation shared by all. This would be what the RPF is attempting to have with its focus on a revised history and one Rwandan identity. There can also be multiple social representations connected to one phenomenon that either coexist peacefully or cause tension.

In this case, the RPF's refusal to acknowledge Hutu and Tutsi identification could be leading to the ineffective integration of their modified representations into the personal narratives of Rwandans. "Reconciliation, assuming it can ever be achieved, requires that the past be confronted, not obliterated" (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 66). If individuals feel that their identification as Rwandans necessitates the elimination of their identity as Tutsi or Hutu, then they will not willingly accept the new identity with its related representations. The RPF might be better able to increase reconciliation if it stops trying to force the removal of previous symbols and focus more on finding a way for ethnic label and their associated historical narratives to coexist.

However, the RPF is in a difficult situation. If Rwandans are allowed to keep their previous identities of Hutu and Tutsi then the people will be able to openly discuss the prevalence of Tutsi in the government. As it stands today, there are a disproportionate number of Tutsi in positions of power in Rwanda. If the Tutsi and Hutu labels are again placed on the people, the Hutu majority may start to resist the minority rule of the Tutsi. This could lead to an overthrow of the current government, something the RPF feels would cause more violence. In order to prevent violence, the RPF believes it must control people by preventing the use of what it sees as ethnic labels that might lead to a recognition of the disparity in power.

The RPF often prevents the use of the previous representations through intimidation and retribution. Using the symbolic labels of Tutsi and Hutu can lead to charges of genocidal ideology and divisionism (Purdekova, 2008). Although this may be an effective way to prevent public discussion of previous identities in the short-term, it seems unlikely to be a permanent solution to genocide prevention. Eventually, the current government will lose power and the former identities with their corresponding representations and narratives will reemerge into the public sphere, potentially leading to more violence.

There is another complication that seems to be arising from the silencing of the former historical narratives and promoting the new representations. Although only one person I interviewed specifically referenced being of Tutsi ethnicity, the majority referenced “new social groups” (Ingelaere, 2010) that connect to the former representations. For these individuals, they mentioned qualities that allowed them to identify as Tutsi without actually using the word and that were genocide-based (Zorbas, 2004). The most common example of this is the use of the label *survivor*, a “term applied only to Tutsi. This is because the genocide was aimed at only the Tutsi” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 267). Hutu who were in Rwanda in 1994 are called *genocidaires*—if they are known to have participated in the genocide—or *suspected genocidaires* (Hintjens, 2009) or *bystander* if their activities in 1994 could not be verified.

For those who returned to Rwanda after the genocide, there is also a symbolic divide between the Hutu and Tutsi. Tutsi returnees are called *old caseload refugees* or *returnees* because they originally fled the country before 1994. Hutus are called *new caseload refugees* because they left Rwanda during the Genocide. “Despite the new government’s watchword, ‘we are all Rwandans,’ mistrust between the two most polarized groups—the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi—remains a formidable obstacle” (Honeyman et al., 2004, p. 2). Although Rwandans have found a way to avoid the actual labels of Tutsi and Hutu, the use of terms like survivor, genocidaire, bystander, old caseload refugee, returnee, and new caseload refugee allows them to keep the symbolic division alive. Silencing the previous narratives has not eliminated the previous divisions as much as it has moved it underground, ready to appear at a future time to create more conflict.

Reconciliation is a difficult task, and there is no way to guarantee the elimination of future violence. The RPF’s attempt to prevent genocide through changing identity via social representations may prove ineffective. The assumption that only allowing the use of officially sanctioned narratives and their related social representations will eliminate the previous ones from people’s private narratives and memories appears to be misguided. In order to successfully modify divisive identities, it may be essential to openly discuss them in order to diminish their symbolic power.

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Post-apartheid South Africa: A United or a Divided Nation?

Elirea Bornman

Introduction

The 1990s witnessed one of the most startling and dramatic social and political transformations in recent history. These transformations culminated in the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa (Coombes, 2003). On 27 April 1994, the “new” South Africa was born. That day also heralded the formal demise of the apartheid system.

During apartheid, the South African state enforced and reified subgroup identities, racial identities in particular, through rigid processes of spatial, political, social and cultural engineering (Eaton, 2002; Ramsamy, 2007). The power of the White Afrikaner government was consolidated through creating separate territorial, social, cultural and political spaces for Blacks, Coloreds, Indians and Whites. To the most extreme these policies led to the establishment of separate ethnic “homelands”. The fact that groups lived their lives in separate “homelands” and residential areas resulted in limited social and cultural interaction. Furthermore, there was little overlap in the symbolic spaces and historical narratives of the various groups constituting South African society.

The geographic unity of South Africa was reinstated with the reintegration of the former “independent” homelands in 1994 (Ramsamy, 2007). All forms of legal racial segregation were erased from the law books. However, the arduous task of creating a new social, cultural and symbolic infrastructure for the newly created South African nation had just begun (Coombes, 2003). The tensions and discrepancies involved in these processes provided a glimpse on the fault lines of a society, as well as changing conceptualizations of the “nation”, “group” and “community”, during a process of large-scale social and political transformation.

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Nation Building and the State of the Nation

Despite the fact that the territorial unity of South Africa was re-established in 1994 and that racial segregation was abolished, it was widely believed that South Africans lacked a cohesive, commonly accepted and overarching national identity and a sense of nationhood (Eaton, 2002). Heribert Adam commented, “A South African nation has yet to be born. South Africa at present constitutes an economic and political entity, but not an emotional one” (Adam, 1995, p. 46).

Therefore, a process of nation building was regarded by many as the logical step to fill the void left by the apartheid system and to forge a united and harmonious South African nation (Eaton, 2002). Political rhetoric on nation building soon became prevalent and various symbols and events were employed. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) adopted the slogan “Simunye—we are one!” The triumph of the South African rugby team in the 1995 Rugby World Cup was widely proclaimed not only to be a sports victory, but also a victory for nation building. In fact, the picture of former President Nelson Mandela waving to the crowds, dressed in a Springbok rugby jersey, became a symbol of the birth of a “new” South African nation. Similarly, South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Games since 1996, as well as the 2010 FIFA World Cup, was employed to bolster patriotism and nation building. However, nothing surpassed the popularity of the metaphor of the Rainbow Nation, first coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Eaton, 2002). Both in South Africa as well as abroad, it has become an important symbol of the hopes and ideals that a new nation, united in its diversity, has been born on the southern tip of Africa.

However, nation building in South Africa has also been controversial. During the first years of democracy, two strategies were discerned (Ramsamy, 2007). The dominant ethos during these first years was the ideology of non-racialism, based on the idea that a common South African identity should replace various sub-national identities such as racial and ethnic identities. It is epitomized in the words of Nelson Mandela, “We have no Whites; we have no Blacks. We only have South Africans” (cited in Ramsamy, 2007, p. 471).

The embracement of the Rainbow Nation metaphor, in which the colors of the rainbow reflect the various ethnic and racial groupings in South Africa, could be interpreted as a deviation from the staunch stance of non-racialism. According to Ramsamy (2007), the metaphor represents a compromise between the ANC’s commitment to non-racialism and attempts to deal with the continued existence and also politicization of cultural, ethnic and racial identities in post-apartheid South Africa. However, the overall aim of nation building has remained the forging of a united nation and a single overarching national identity (Blaser, 2004).

The advent of the Mbeki-era heralded an important shift, an African shift in the nation-building discourse (Blaser, 2004; Eaton, 2002; Herwitz, 2011). This shift is epitomized in the words of former President Thabo Mbeki (African National Council [ANC], 1997, para 44):

But it is critical that the overarching identity of being South African is promoted among all those who are indeed South African, as part of a process of building an African nation

on the southern tip of the continent. The affirmation of our Africanness as a nation ... is recognition of a geographic reality and the awakening of a consciousness which colonialism suppressed.

The ideology of Africanism is also embodied in terms such as “an African century” and the “African Renaissance” (Herwitz, 2011). Blaser (2004) points out that this shift is not an entirely new phenomenon as an Africanist nationalist current has had a constant presence in all anti-colonial movements in Africa. Rather, it implies a return to an imaginary precolonial past which not only becomes the source of myths about the South African nation but also, eventually, culminates in policies on various levels including in the symbolic realm (Herwitz, 2011). In propagating the ideas of an African Renaissance, Mbeki refers to the great African monuments of the past—at Timbuktu, at Axum, in Zimbabwe and at Aswan—to bolster the idea of a glorious precolonial past. In this distant past, where colonialism and apartheid do not figure, Black and indigenous Africa are proclaimed as a source of virtue and value. In essence, it implies the triumph of pan-Africanism (Blaser, 2004; Labuschagne, 2010). Africanism has become the new ideology for nation building (Herwitz, 2011). However, it has deepened the controversies in the nation-building discourse (Blaser, 2004). The nation is no longer culturally neutral; it is defined in terms of an African culture. The aim of nation building becomes the creation of a single nation with a dominant African identity, which should become the primary identity of all South Africans. Furthermore, it holds that an overarching national identity should include and reflect African culture. As a result, cultural hegemony is exerted in an essentially multicultural and multilingual society (Blaser, 2004).

Nation building in South Africa has been criticized on various fronts. Degenaar (1994) warns that a term such as nation building should not be mentioned in a country such as South Africa. Instead of propagating nation building, diversity should be respected and valued. The greatest opposition to nation building has, however, been reality itself. Although it is undoubtedly true that ethnic, racial and regional identities have been manipulated and reified during apartheid, South African society has remained fractured despite strong nation-building efforts. Various research studies indicate that although a strong South African identity has indeed taken hold among many South Africans, the majority of South Africans identify in some cases equally as strongly and other cases even more strongly, with their respective racial and ethnic or language groups (see Bornman, 2010, 2013).

Coombes (2003) poses the question whether the main fault line in South African society remains the juxtaposition of Black against White. She answers this question herself by denying a simplistic binary opposition between the two largest racial groups. It is indeed the case that the struggle against apartheid has commonly been typified as a struggle between two dominant racial groups (Black and White). However, it is often not taken into account that neither Blacks nor Whites are homogeneous groups. The White society consists of at least two major ethnocultural groups, namely, English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking Whites (also known as Afrikaners). Similar to the ethnic and language differences among Whites, there are also nine Black language groups associated with distinct Black ethnic identities.

As most Black ethnic groups have strong ties with certain regions in South Africa, Black ethnicity also corresponds with regional identities. The province of KwaZulu-Natal is, for example, commonly regarded as the homeland of the Zulu nation. The presence of the group known as Coloreds—a group of mixed racial descent—as well as the largest Indian community outside of India, are often not taken into account. Venter (1999) points out that it is not simply a case of Black against White, but historical processes have also brought two civilizational paradigms in contact in South Africa: the African and Western civilizations.

The conclusion can be drawn that South African society has remained highly and complexly heterogeneous. Furthermore, the unity of the South African nation is still not a given almost two decades after the advent of a new political dispensation and nation building remains controversial and contested. Symbols, monuments and historical narratives play an important role not only in attempts towards nation building and creating national unity, but also in the construction, maintenance and strengthening of sub-national identities.

According to Harrison (1995), all political actions are associated with expressive action in the form of the deployment of symbols. The new South African regime is no exception. Not only has it brought about sociopolitical change in the country, but it has also transformed South Africa symbolically in terms of a new identity, a new set of values reflective of a postcolonial society and a new set of goals for a new nation (Labuschagne, 2010). Overall, the aim of nation building and the creation of an overarching national identity are claimed as the founding principles for changes to the symbolic landscape. In the process, various forms of symbolic politics as identified by Harrison (1995) and Mac Ginty (2001) have been implemented to reconstruct and to transform South Africa symbolically.

New National Symbols for a “New” Nation

The adoption of a set of national symbols has become a common practice among all nations of the world. According to Cerulo (1989), this practice stems from a long history in which ruling houses or groups used to make use of banners, crests and fanfares for purposes of announcement and identification. Thus, national symbols have become modern totems to identify and characterize a particular nation state.

Similar to other newly independent and newly democratic states, the new political elite in South Africa saw the need for a set of new symbols to identify and characterize the new state and the new nation. New national symbols were carefully designed to symbolize the altered nature of the new democratic state and to reinforce the political transition (Mac Ginty, 2001). Once again, nation building, the forging of a united South African nation and an overarching South African identity were forwarded as the most important reasons in the design of new symbols (Bornman, 2006).

The National Anthem

In line with the reconciliatory mood of the transitional period, a proclamation issued on 20 April 1994 by the President Nelson Mandela, stated that South Africa would have two national anthems (“National symbols”, n.d.), namely, *Die Stem van Suid-Afrika* (*The Voice of South Africa*) and *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* (*God Bless Africa*). *Die Stem* was the national anthem during the previous dispensation. It was first written in Afrikaans, but later translated into English. From 1952, it was sung both in Afrikaans and English. At first, the patriotic song had three verses referring to elements of the South African landscape, historical elements such as the Great Trek, as well as commitment to the fatherland. On request of the government, a fourth verse with a religious theme was added later (“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”, n.d.).

Black South Africans generally disliked *Die Stem* and during the early 1990s when the dismantling of apartheid was already on the table, the ANC decided that it would not be sung at sports events. However, an instrumental version was played during a rugby match between South Africa and New Zealand in 1992 and the crowd sang along.

Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika was written and composed by Enoch Sontonga, a Methodist mission school teacher (“National symbols”, n.d.). The first stanza was originally written in Xhosa as a Christian hymn in which God is asked, as the title suggests, to bless the children of Africa. Seven additional verses were later added in Xhosa by the poet Samuel Mqhayi. It soon became popular as a church hymn. The first verse would usually be sung in Xhosa or Zulu followed by the Sesotho version. As no official translations of the song exist, the words vary from place to place and from occasion to occasion.

However, *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* did not remain a religious hymn, but soon became politicized. During apartheid, it became a symbol of defiance against the apartheid government and also a pan-African liberation song (“Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika”, n.d.). The strong pan-African connotations are reflected in the fact that it is currently also the national anthem of Zambia and Tanzania. It furthermore became the official song of the ANC during apartheid and was widely regarded as the non-official anthem of South Africa.

It came as no surprise that *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* was selected as national anthem for the democratic South Africa. Despite its ties with apartheid, *Die Stem* retained official status together with *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* (“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”, n.d.). At the final match of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, *Die Stem* was sung by a Black choir and both songs were sung at the inauguration of Nelson Mandela in 1994.

However, the practicalities involved in singing two national anthems proved to be too cumbersome (“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”, n.d.). In 1997, following the adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996, a new hybrid version was adopted as the official anthem of South Africa. This version combines not only *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* and part of a stanza of *Die Stem*, but also a newly composed last stanza in English based on the melody of *Die Stem*. Five of the languages mostly

spoken in South Africa are combined in the new anthem. The first two lines of the first stanza of *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika* are in Xhosa; the last two lines of the first stanza in Zulu; the second stanza in Sesotho; the third stanza taken from *Die Stem* in Afrikaans; and the fourth in English (“Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika”, n.d.).

The South African Flag

Similar to the selection of a new anthem, the choice of a new flag formed part of the negotiation processes (“Flag of South Africa”, n.d.). The pre-1994 flag reflects the unification of the four former British colonies—the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State—to form the South African Union. The idea of adopting a unique flag for the Union of South Africa was met with great resistance among English-speaking Whites as it was perceived as an attempt to remove British symbols. Therefore, the flag, which was first hoisted on 31 May 1928, represented a compromise between British and Afrikaner interests. It was based on the white, blue and orange Van Riebeeck flag—the so-called *Prinsevlag* (Prince’s flag), which used to be the Dutch flag when Van Riebeeck landed in the Cape in 1652 and was the first flag believed to be hoisted in South Africa. In the centre, on a white band, are the flags of the various colonies that were unified in 1910, namely, the British Union Jack (Cape and Natal) as well as the flags of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Although this flag contained elements of British colonialism, it was closely associated with Afrikaner interests and in later years, it was typified as the “apartheid flag” by opponents of the previous dispensation.

It was consequently decided to invent a completely new flag for the new democratic South Africa. In 1993, a countrywide competition was held in which the public was invited to suggest the design (“Flag of South Africa”, n.d.). Although the then National Symbols Commission received more than 7,000 designs, none of the six finalists received sufficient support. In the end, a design of the State Herald, F. J. Brownell, was selected to be used as interim national flag for the April 1994 elections and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela. Although it was stated in the Interim Constitution that this flag would be used for a probationary period of 5 years after which another round of discussions on the flag would be held, its acceptance was so positive that it was proclaimed as the official national flag in the 1996 Constitution.

The flag has a horizontal red and blue band of equal width at the top and the bottom (see Fig. 1—“Flag of South Africa”, n.d.). In the centre is a horizontal green band which splits into a Y-shape, of which the arms end in the two corners of the hoist side. The top of the Y-shape embraces a black isosceles triangle of which the two sides of equal length are separated from the green stripe by yellow stripes. The red and blue stripes are furthermore separated from the green stripe by narrow white stripes.

A governmental source holds that the individual colors or color combinations could have different meanings for different people and groups and no universal



Fig. 1 The new South African flag

symbolism could be ascribed to any of them (“National symbols”, n.d.). However, the three dominant colors—green, black and yellow—are commonly associated with the ANC. The other three—red, white and blue—are used in the flag of the old Transvaal republic, the flag of the Netherlands and the flag of the United Kingdom. According to F. W. De Klerk (1998) in his autobiography, *The Last Trek: A New Beginning*, chili red is used instead of plain red (which English-speaking Whites would prefer) or orange (which would reflect the Dutch heritage of Afrikaners). The centre Y-design is interpreted as the convergence of diverse elements in South African society heading into the future in unity, a reflection of the former and current motto of the South African coats of arms (see the next section).

Coat of Arms

A new South African coat of arms was also introduced on Freedom Day, 27 April 2000. This replaced the former coat of arms that was in use since unification in 1910. The design process started in 1999 when the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, once more, invited ideas from the public (“Coat of arms of South Africa”, n.d.). Based on the ideas received as well as input from the cabinet, a brief for designers was prepared and Design South Africa (an umbrella company for design companies all over the country) was requested to brief ten of the top South African designers. The design of Iaan Bekker was chosen in the end (see Fig. 2).



Fig. 2 The new coat of arms of South Africa

The design comprises a series of elements organized in a symmetric oval shape. Some of the most important elements are the following:

- The most conspicuous element in the lower part of the oval is the motto—*!ke e:/xarra//ke*—a phrase in the language of the Khoisan language of the Xam people meaning “diverse people unite”.
- In the centre are two Khoisan (or Bushmen) figures which are derived from the Linton stone, one of the most famous examples of Khoisan rock art which is currently housed in the South African Museum in Cape Town. The fact that a depiction of the oldest inhabitants of South Africa and probably in the world has been used is said to be symbolic of belonging to the nation that is extended to larger humanity.
- On top of the shield with the two human figures are depictions of two African traditional weapons, namely, a spear and a knobkierie, serving as symbols of defence and authority.

- The oval shape of ascendance consists of various elements indicative of the South African landscape, namely, the king protea, the secretary bird and the rising sun. The king protea—the South African national flower—is said to signify, among others, the beauty of the flora of the country. The powerful secretary bird is regarded as the equivalent in the air of the lion on earth. It is depicted in flight symbolizing growth and speed and is perceived to be a symbol of the protection of the nation against its enemies as well as the ascendance of the South African nation. It is depicted in gold which signifies its association with the sun and the highest power. The rising sun serves as symbol of brightness, splendor and the supreme source of energy, life and wholeness. Furthermore, it symbolizes the promise of rebirth as well as intellectual faculties such as knowledge, reflection, good judgment and willpower.

According to a governmental source, the combined egg-shaped structure of the coat of arms suggests the rebirth of the spirit of the heroic South African nation (“National coat of arms”, n.d.). The motto of the previous coat of arms—*Ex unitate vires*—was written in Latin, as is commonly the practice in European countries. The meaning of the current motto is not much different. It is however written in one of the oldest indigenous languages spoken on the African continent. Furthermore, the use of African figures is conspicuous and all the other elements are those that typically emphasize Africa, the African landscape and African culture.

Role and Impact of the New National Symbols

Various strategies related to symbolic politics can be discerned in the selection and adoption of new national symbols for South Africa (Harrison, 1995; Mac Ginty, 2001). Firstly, expansionism is reflected in the fact that an almost entirely new set of symbols has replaced the array of symbols associated with the previous dispensation. The majority of the old symbols, apart from a small section of *Die Stem*, have been removed and replaced by the invention of new symbols. In the case of the national anthem, re-ranking has taken place in the sense that the song that strongly reflects pan-Africanism and the liberation struggle, *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika*, has not only been placed alongside the former *Die Stem*, but is also sung before *Die Stem* (commonly associated with Afrikaner interests).

Whereas the symbols of the previous dispensation were predominantly Eurocentric in nature, the newly invented symbols sharply differentiate the current dispensation and government from the previous regime. A predominant tendency towards Africanism characterizes the new symbols, a reflection of pan-Africanism even before an Africanist turn in the nation-building discourse has been identified (Blaser, 2004; Eaton, 2002). The dominant colors of the new national flag are commonly associated with the ANC. The colors associated with Afrikaner and British interests have been removed and replaced by a newly invented color—chili red. The first and dominant stanzas of the national anthem are a song written in Black

languages associated with the liberation struggle and pan-Africanism. Furthermore, prominent in the new coat of arms is the displacement of European elements such as the motto in Latin with almost the same words written in an ancient African language. All the other elements of the coat of arms are reflective of either African culture or the African landscape. The presence and influence of European and Asian cultures are almost completely absent.

Despite the predominant African contents and the fact that only limited recognition is given to other South African cultures, the new symbols were apparently well received by the South African public. According to Heribert Adam (1995), they have been successful in creating reconciliation, unity and new forms of nationalism. The new multicolored flag has been “banalized” by being painted on faces at sport events such as soccer, rugby and cricket and printed and displayed on all kinds of curios and consumer items. Overall, the impression has been created that national pride, as reflected in the new symbols, has surged to levels formerly unknown (Bornman, 2006).

However, research indicates that the new symbols have not been accepted as widely as is often assumed. Bornman (2006) found that Blacks attached significantly more value to the new symbols than did Coloreds, Indians and Whites, who are further removed from the seat of power. The lowest importance ratings were recorded for Afrikaners. In fact, the ratings for this group were so low that they can be interpreted as a lack of identification with or alienation from the current national symbols. The influence of sub-national identities, in contrast to an overarching South African identity, can be discerned in the fact that people who identified more strongly with a community or group distinguished by a distinctive culture, identified significantly less with the new symbols.

Mac Ginty (2001) also notes indicators that the roots of the new South African symbols might be rather shallow, in particular among certain groups. During the transitional years, the acceptance of the new flag was lukewarm among some groups and the old flag was often waved at sport events. These attempts have been publicly denounced as offensive and the previous flag typified as the “apartheid” flag. Even today, debates flame up every now and then on the use of the old flag and the rights of Afrikaners to display this flag. In a recent letter to an Afrikaans newspaper, a reader asks why the English are allowed to freely wave the Union Jack associated with imperialism, while Afrikaners are not allowed to use the old flag (Van der Merwe, 2013). This is but one indication of the close ties between Afrikaner identity, the old flag and the other symbols associated with the previous dispensation.

The Economist (in Mac Ginty, 2001) also notes that none of the members of the national rugby team who visited England in 1994 knew the words of the new national anthem. In recent times, the members of most sport teams have been forced to learn the words of the national anthem. Furthermore, it is often noticed at sport events that Whites remain silent while *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika* is sung and only join in the singing once the words of *Die Stem* start. The fault lines in South African society also became clear in a symbolic clash at a recent public meeting organized by the municipality of Pretoria in order to discuss the proposed name change of the city to Tshwane (Versluis, 2013). The atmosphere between supporters of the name

change (mainly Black) and those opposed to the idea (mainly White) was tense. White attendees demonstrated their opposition by standing on attention and singing the full pre-1994 version of *Die Stem*. Black attendees immediately reacted by singing *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika*. Yearning for the old symbols is furthermore reflected in the fact that Theuns Jordaan, a popular singer representing a new young generation of Afrikaner artists, sings *Die Stem* as a popular song on one of his albums. In a prelude, he announces that this song would always be “dear to our hearts”. Thus, the old symbols have not vanished completely from the minds of the members of the public; it is rather the case that they have remained part of the historical and cultural legacy of groups such as Afrikaners.

Although the new South African national symbols are said to have been invented to promote post-apartheid healing, reconciliation, nation building and unity, indications are that they are meeting with mixed success (Mac Ginty, 2001). In some instances, such as the case of the flag, White people might be associating it with the ANC due to the dominant black, green and gold colors. The strong African elements in all the symbols could also serve to alienate Whites. The absence of strongly recognizable elements rooted in the historical legacies of Whites and other groups (Afrikaners in particular) is probably the reason for a degree of apathy towards the new symbols. People could nevertheless have grown accustomed to the new flag and coat of arms due to their pervasive presence. The new anthem, however, appears to be divisive, especially in situations of heightened intergroup tension. People tend to sing only the parts that they can identify with. However, given the fact that Blacks form an overall majority in South Africa, the predominance of African elements implies that opposition comes from minority groups and is mostly deafened by the majority.

However, the main danger is that the state and its symbols are being manipulated and appropriated by one group and one political party at the expense of others (Harrison, 1995). Mac Ginty (2001) draws the conclusion that the mixed reaction to the new South African national symbols illustrates the difficulty of establishing symbols that are commonly accepted and truly unifying in a divided nation with widely divergent historical and cultural legacies. Moreover, it highlights the pitfalls associated with nation building in a deeply heterogeneous and multicultural society.

The Politics of Memory and Heritage

National symbols are not the only elements in the symbolic inventory of a country or group. Statues, monuments, museums, memorials and other heritage sites represent another integral component. These reflect the human faculty of remembering and memory, our relationship with the past and the way in which the past has shaped our identities and our experiences in the present (Mare, 2007). Political transformation in South Africa has also been characterized by concerted efforts to transform the heritage landscape (Herwitz, 2011; Marschall, 2005; Ross, 2007).

In fact, since 1994, heritage symbolism has become a prominent focus of discourse in the political arena and a site for the renegotiating of issues related to memory, cultural identity and citizenship (Marschall, 2010).

State involvement in the preservation of memory and heritage dates back to the Bushman Relics Protection Act of 1911, which aimed to protect the country's pre-colonial and prehistoric heritage (Delmont, 2004). The 1934 Historical Monuments Commission had the task of protecting the built environment of settlers and colonists, while the National Monuments Act of 1969 was employed to bolster Afrikaner identity and later, the concomitant ideologies of Afrikaner nationalism and separate development. The consequence was that the new political dispensation inherited a highly skewed heritage landscape where 98 % of approximately 4,000 monuments represented colonial and settler history, while the remainder was associated with natural heritage, archaeological, paleontological, geological and rock art sites.

Since the advent of democracy, various initiatives have been launched for the country to come to grips with its tumultuous history, of which the memories have often been smothered, silenced or ignored (Coombes, 2003; Delmont, 2004; Labuschagne, 2012; Ross, 2007). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC; chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu), which had the task of investigating gross human rights violations from 1960 to 1994, inspired these initiatives, in particular. In its final report, entitled *Living with the Issue of Reconciliation*, the TRC states its intent to leave a permanent legacy that will foster reconciliation and peace building and outlines a number of recommendations to concretely reflect and heal the wrongs of the past. One of the recommended strategies is that museums should be erected and maintained to celebrate different aspects of the past, to balance the past, to further justice and to foster reconciliation on various levels.

The necessity of reflecting a more balanced picture of the country's history was taken further by the National Heritage Resources Act of 1999 (Delmont, 2004). The Act proclaims heritage protection to be an important founding stone for the nation-building project. Following the proclamation of the Act, the Department of Arts and Culture identified and initiated a number of the so-called Presidential Legacy Projects in the various provinces. The result has been sweeping changes to the symbolic landscape with the development of numerous new monuments, statues, museums and heritage sites (Bakker & Müller, 2010, p. 48—see also Delmont, 2004; Herwitz, 2011; Mare, 2007; Ross, 2007).

Symbolic imbalance during apartheid has probably been nowhere more conspicuous than in the capital city of Pretoria (Labuschagne, 2010). In 1999 (5 years after the political transition), there were 14 monuments within the boundaries of the city which represented White and Afrikaner interests, with only three commemorating the plight of Blacks who died during World War I and the liberation struggle. It is therefore almost inevitable that Pretoria has become an important focus for symbolic reparation—a process which has served to bring tensions between divergent historical legacies to the forefront. Some of the characteristics of, and changes to, symbolism in Pretoria are discussed in the following sections.

The Voortrekker Monument

The Voortrekker Monument is one of the most well-known landmarks in Pretoria and probably one of the most controversial and scrutinized historical symbols associated with the previous dispensation (Coombes, 2003; Grundlingh, 2001; Moeschberger, 2010; Ross, 2007). The gigantic granite structure is prominently situated on a hill at the southern entrance of Pretoria. The monument commemorates the Great Trek, that is, the migration of Afrikaans-speaking White settlers from the Cape colonies to the interior of South Africa during the second quarter of the nineteenth century (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007). This migration closely resembled American westward expansion and was characterized by a number of violent conflicts with indigenous groups. Important events during the Great Trek are portrayed on 27 large marble friezes on the ground floor of the monument, a display reported to be one of the largest and most impressive of its kind (Grundlingh, 2001).

However, the real inspiration for the building of the Voortrekker Monument comes from a later historical event, the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Herwitz (2011) proclaims that if there were no Anglo-Boer War, there probably would have been no Afrikaner nationalism and no Voortrekker Monument. The Anglo-Boer War between Great Britain and the two independent republics in the interior established by the Voortrekkers, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, featured one of the first instances of concentration camps in world history. The British commander, Lord Kitchener, infuriated by the stubborn resistance of ragtag groups of Boer farmers, burned their farms so that nothing could be produced and placed the women and children in concentration camps where thousands died of disease. The war left the Voortrekker descendants demoralized and impoverished. Their freedom was taken away and they were once more victims of the alien political culture of British imperialism (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 98). As large numbers had to move from devastated farms to the growing cities, they felt the debilitating effects of the 1931 Depression, which had reduced them to the ranks of poor Whites within unfamiliar urban environments.

The centenary of the Great Trek was celebrated in 1938 by a symbolic trek of nine ox-wagons from the Cape to the North (Grundlingh, 2001). The reception of the ox-wagons in cities and towns on the way resulted in unsurpassed cultural and political theatre. Frenetic crowds dressed in traditional Voortrekker clothes welcomed the wagons; couples were married; babies were baptized; memorials were unveiled and streets were named after Voortrekker heroes. Although this second trek was deliberately orchestrated to mobilize Afrikaners, even cultural and political leaders were surprised by the reaction. The reasons for the unsurpassed frenzy can be found in the fact that the trials and tribulations of the Voortrekkers resonated with the problems that Afrikaners, especially those living in cities, experienced at the time. At the root of the enthusiasm were beliefs that only coordinated and unified cultural and political mobilization could lead to a better future. Therefore, the 1938 centenary celebration served as a powerful binding agent for Afrikaner nationalism.

These aspirations were cemented 11 years later by the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument on 16 December 1949 (Grundlingh, 2001). The date of 16 December marks one of the most notorious events during the Great Trek, namely, the Battle of Blood River (Ncome), when the Voortrekkers succeeded in defending themselves successfully against an onslaught of the Zulu army of King Dingane. It is significant that the lower level, which is regarded by many as the most sacred level, contains a burning flame known as the flame of civilization and a cenotaph with the words "We for thee South Africa". At 12:00 on 16 December, the sun shines directly on these words through a small round window in the dome.

The fact that the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument happened only 1 year after Afrikaners come to power in 1948 means that it is irrevocably associated with White Afrikaner political power and domination and also with apartheid (Coombes, 2003; Ross, 2007). Furthermore, it is often assumed that Afrikaners "cannot escape from the 'spell' of the monument"; they "are trapped by racism, by religion, by their myths and by their history" (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 97).

However, Grundlingh (2001) points out that Afrikaner identity and its relationship with the monument have changed since 1949. One of the most important reasons is a demographic revolution among Afrikaners. Under National Party rule, Afrikaners urbanized even faster than before. Protectionist policies gave large numbers access to full-time work opportunities. Many climbed the occupational and economic ladder to achieve middle and upper class status, while they gained a prominent presence in professional occupations. Apart from control over the agricultural sector, their control over private enterprise also grew strongly. By the 1970s, Afrikaner bourgeoisie had established themselves. Economic success has exposed Afrikaners to the lure of a global consumer culture that loosened the ties that bind them to their country, group and culture. Many have emigrated to countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Although 1994 did not represent a deathblow for Afrikaner identity and ethnicity, those who stayed in South Africa have discovered alternative ways of cultural expression such as annual cultural festivals, of which the Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees (KKNK) is one example.

Despite changes to their economic prospects, the Voortrekker Monument has however remained an important symbol for Afrikaners of their identity, role and place in South Africa. Fears for the future of the monument under a Black government led to a decision by a consortium of Afrikaner cultural organizations to form a non-profit company in 2000. The company took ownership of the monument and its extended site. According to the first chairperson of the Voortrekker Monument Company, Christo Kuhn, this was done to preserve Afrikaner heritage and to keep the monument from becoming a political toy. Although it protested, albeit demurely, the ANC nevertheless declared the monument a national heritage site and has continued to support it financially. However, these contributions have declined steadily in recent years (Rademeyer, 2011).

The new management realized the need to change the public image of the monument in order to make it more acceptable within the changed political environment (Grundlingh, 2001; Ross, 2007). The culture of Afrikaners had to be detached from apartheid. In speeches at the monument on the Day of Reconciliation (formerly the

Day of the Covenant), the religious significance of the day—instead of a political connotation—is emphasized. Furthermore, much has been done to emphasize the monument as a cultural facility and a historical resource centre and to make it attractive for local visitors, families and tourists. An exhibition of artefacts depicting life on the Great Trek was moved from the restaurant to the cellar of the monument. The extended terrain contains an amphitheatre for open air concerts, facilities for antique and traditional food markets, the Fort Schanskop Museum (one of the forts built to defend Pretoria against the British in the Anglo-Boer War), walking and bicycle trails as well as a nature reserve containing a number of wildlife species. A historical resource centre and archive for important Afrikaner documents have been recently added.

These attempts have apparently been relatively successful. According to its website, the Voortrekker Monument is currently the most visited heritage site in the province of Gauteng and one of the top ten historical cultural visitor attractions in South Africa (“Voortrekker Monument”, n.d.). The growing tourist industry in South Africa is one of the major reasons that the Voortrekker Monument is not staying all alone on its hill—becoming a sealed off rather than a living past—as many analysts have prophesied (Grundlingh, 2001).

However, an important question is not only how Afrikaners and tourists feel about the Voortrekker Monument, but also how South Africans from other groups perceive it. This is a pertinent question as the friezes in the entrance hall predominantly depict Blacks as savages who ruthlessly attacked the Voortrekkers (Grundlingh, 2001; Ross, 2007). According to Grundlingh, Black responses vary from extreme discomfort to indifference. Some Blacks who took the trouble to visit the monument found the site insensitive and offensive. Others saw it merely as a historical monument depicting a particular epoch in South African history. A Black guide at the monument remarks, “To me the monument tells the history of the Voortrekkers and how they got the land in the interior. Nothing else” (in Grundlingh, 2001, p. 103).

Perhaps the most telling reaction came from the black singer, Abigail Kubeka, when she performed at the monument in April 2000. Kubeka remarked that “... the last inch of the country is now part of the nation” (in Grundlingh, 2001, p. 104). This remark probably says it all: Blacks are currently governing the country as a whole and that means that they also have control over the soil on which the Voortrekker Monument is built. That implies that they can afford to be indifferent or even ignore its significance; they can choose not to take heed of whatever it symbolizes.

The privatization of the Voortrekker Monument has also not stopped speculations on what should be done about and with it after the advent of a new dispensation (Coombes, 2003; Grundlingh, 2001; Ross, 2007). Apart from talks that it should be torn down as a symbol of the destruction of apartheid, there have also been suggestions that it should be painted pink and transformed into a gay nightclub. In a satirical mode, it has been described as a “pop-up toaster”, a “1940 art deco radio”, “an Andy Warhol drawing, a somewhat absurd, even kitsch symbol” (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 101).

Ross (2007) makes some suggestions on how the symbolic significance of the Voortrekker Monument can be transformed in order to promote a more complex narrative of South African history. He suggests that comparisons should be drawn between narratives regarding the struggle of Afrikaners against British imperialism and the struggle of Blacks against apartheid. Therefore, a degree of convergence around metaphors of resistance and liberation can be emphasized. Although Afrikaners have begun to acknowledge the role that slaves and Blacks played in the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, Blacks are portrayed in a predominantly negative way as aggressors and savages on the ground floor friezes. These images are set in stone and cannot be changed. However, Ross feels that some bold steps need to be taken to change the values attached to these images. Therefore, it needs to be acknowledged openly that Blacks attacked the Voortrekkers as they perceived them as conquerors. As many Black tribes were afraid of the military power of Afrikaners (they had guns which the indigenous tribes did not have), so they launched surprise attacks on the Voortrekkers (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007). The one-sided view should therefore be changed to a more multifaceted view of the events. Another possibility, according to Ross (2007), is to convey a strong message to school groups and other visitors of “never again” referring to the country’s racialized past as reflected in some of the friezes of the monument. Although it needs to be taken into account that the Voortrekker Monument depicts Afrikaner historical legacy and does not pretend to be anything else, the embeddedness of Afrikaners within the larger South African nation and relations of coexistence and co-operation with other South African groups can also be emphasized.

When the ANC came to power in 1994, there were talks to appropriate the lower level of the Voortrekker Monument for an exhibition related to the liberation struggle (Labuschagne, 2010). Mare (2007) holds that this would have implied that the ANC appropriated for themselves exactly the thing that they opposed, namely, White domination. It would have meant the coexistence of the spaces of Afrikaner and Black struggles in one symbolic structure, while the hegemony of neither of them would have been resolved. However, these intentions came to naught, probably due to the privatization of the monument. Therefore, despite much speculation, the Voortrekker Monument is still standing on its hill at the entrance to Pretoria. Instead of removing or changing the monument, ANC expansionism has taken the form of the addition of a number of heritage sites as discussed in the next sections.

Freedom Park

One of the most important projects to transform the symbolic landscape of Pretoria has been the erection of Freedom Park. This park, the most ambitious of the Presidential Legacy Projects, was launched on 16 June 2000 (Baines, 2009; Labuschagne, 2010). It has been fully funded by government with an initial budget in excess of R700 million. The official website indicates its erection is a direct response to the call of the TRC for symbolic reparation (“Freedom Park: a heritage

destination”, n.d.). According to the initial mission statement, the park is committed to the nation-building project and aims to:

Provide a pioneering and empowering heritage destination in order to mobilise for reconciliation and nation building in our country; reflect upon our past; improving our present and building our future as a united nation; contribute continentally and internationally to the formation of better human understanding among nations and peoples (Freedom Park Trust 2004–2009 in Baines, 2009, p. 334).

Freedom Park is located on a 52-ha site on Salvo-kop (the name indicates the heavy artillery fire that came from the hill during the Anglo-Boer War), yet another hill at the southern entrance of Pretoria. As such, it is directly facing the Voortrekker Monument. Labuschagne (2010) holds that it was a strategic decision on the part of the ANC-government to build the park on the particular site. Salvo-kop is not of particular historical or religious value for the majority of South Africans and, in particular, not for Blacks. Anthropological evidence suggests that migratory Black tribes stayed for too short a time in the eastern and southern parts of Pretoria to establish permanent sites with significant historic and symbolic meaning. However, there is a site in the northeast of Pretoria, the area surrounding the *Wonderboom* (Wonder Tree—an extraordinarily large wild fig tree), that holds symbolic value as for centuries migrating Blacks used the site to perform religious rituals. This area has a much stronger historical, cultural, anthropological and religious link with pre-colonial history which could underpin the values to which Freedom Park subscribes. However, the choice of Salvo-kop bypassed the heritage and symbolic status of the *Wonderboom* area in favour of a site that has a much stronger link with colonial history—the history of the Transvaal Republic founded by the Voortrekkers and the British occupation of Pretoria.

Therefore, although Freedom Park invites visitors to walk where their ancestors walked, no substantive anthropological or historical links with the past exist at the site. There are no “footprints in the sands of time” which the visitor can follow as proclaimed in an official pamphlet, at least no footprints from precolonial times. The history portrayed by the park is in reality an “invented history” (Labuschagne, 2010, p. 122). The fact of the matter is that the site on Salvo-kop was chosen for political reasons and has no nexus of symbolic links with the ancestors of the majority of South Africans.

Salvo-kop was chosen in order to situate Freedom Park at the centre of a nexus of historical sites associated with Voortrekker history, namely, the Voortrekker Monument and the Fort Schanskop and Fort Klapperkop museums. The latter are two fortifications erected and used to defend Pretoria against the British during the Anglo-Boer War. In doing so, the Black ANC government has, in accordance with the theory of symbolic conflict of Harrison (1995), appropriated a space in the symbolic realm of Pretoria and has put its stamp on the entrance of the city and thus also on the city itself. Another motivation, according to Labuschagne (2010, p. 117) was to perform “a visual amputation of the historical link between the cultural dimension (Voortrekker Monument) and Afrikaner control of political power, practically manifested by its supporters occupying the offices of the Union Buildings”.

At the highest point in Freedom Park, the visitor has a spectacular view of the Voortrekker Monument, the Union Buildings and both forts. However, in the architectural design of Freedom Park, no allowance has been made for a visual link with the other sites in the vicinity. Therefore, the Salvo-kop site does not provide a symbolic centre point and does not establish a historical and symbolic link with the historical legacies of other groups residing within the Pretoria area.

The choice of the particular site created a “bizarre triangle” which elicited conflicting responses from various sides of the political spectrum. Synagues (in Labuschagne, 2010), for example, depicted the new visual and symbolic environment as confrontation between democracy (the Union Buildings), freedom (Freedom Park) and White domination (Voortrekker Monument). Mare (2007) ascribes the placement of the park to the postcolonial ethos that a monument should be in the vicinity of a colonial monument. This was done in a deliberate effort to counterbalance the values and motives represented by the other monuments in the area as well as to share the entrance to the capital city. Ross (2007) also interprets the erection of the park as a counter move to the symbolism of the Voortrekker Monument and an attempt to “correct” the Voortrekker narratives. He does not, however, regard the placement of the park directly facing the Voortrekker Monument as confrontational. In following the strategy of addition, as identified by Harrison (1995), rather than removal or appropriation, Ross feels that a spirit of pluralism is fostered.

In contrast to the gigantic structure of the Voortrekker Monument, Freedom Park does not protrude from the landscape and displays a more modern, open and environmentally friendly architecture. It has been designed to gently blend into the topography of rolling hills of the highveld (“Freedom Park: a heritage destination”, n.d.; Labuschagne, 2010). According to Labuschagne (2010), aerial photography shows a remarkable resemblance with the Great Zimbabwe Ruins near Masvingo. Its network of walls and buildings, as well as the way in which it gently nestles in the slopes of the hill, provides a visual link to the Great Enclosure Complex at the ruins. Most visible from the city of Pretoria is the surrounding stone wall which serves to re-emphasize the visual link with the outer wall of the Zimbabwe Ruins. This link probably serves to emphasize not only precolonial history, but also South Africa’s link to Africa. Along the ridge is a line of poles with blue lights which are said to resemble freedom. However, the lights are not visible during the day and give the park a porcupine appearance which distracts from its simplistic beauty. Furthermore, they do not carry any symbolic substance.

The symbolic space contains several elements, each serving a particular purpose with a symbolic link, which determine its placement (Labuschagne, 2010). One of the most important of these is called the *Isivivane*, the so-called resting place of the spirits of those who died in struggles for humanity and freedom. Another important element, the *S’khumbuto*, represents a memorial for the various conflicts that have shaped South Africa. It contains an eternal flame to remember unknown soldiers, a sanctuary (a serene environment where ceremonies in remembrance of victims can be conducted), an amphitheatre that can seat 2,000 people and the Wall of Remembrance with the names of those who died in eight conflicts in which South Africans was involved (see the next section). Planned future projects entail the *//hlapo* (a live exhibition of cultural and historical subjects that can handled,

discussed and used so that visitors would not only be spectators, but also participants), a facility for the storage of documents on freedom struggles (the Pan-African Archives), and the *Vhuawelo* (a peaceful garden for meditation, healing and spiritual contemplation).

Analysts have been markedly silent on the symbolism of Freedom Park. During a visit to the park in March 2013, the current author was struck by the predominant occupation with elements of death and African ancestry worship such as the honouring of the “spirits of those who died” (“Isivivane”, n.d.). Not only does this emphasis place the park firmly within the realm of Africanism and African religion and culture, but it also creates the aura of seriousness associated with a graveyard rather than a site providing inspiration for the living and the future. The one aspect of the park that should be offering a lived experience, the *//hlapo*, was still absent at that time. The exhibition space contained large banners with pictures of a number of Black African leaders, leader figures of the struggle as well as leaders of other African countries (presumably these assisted Blacks during the liberation struggle). No leaders of other South African groups who also played a prominent role in the liberation struggle were portrayed. Furthermore, it was difficult to see the relevance of a banner with the photo of Che Chuevera for South Africans.

Labuschagne (2010) points out that the emphasis on links with Africanism and Pan-Africanism results in exclusiveness and can serve to alienate non-Black visitors. This is further aggravated by the exclusion of the names of former defence force soldiers who died in the Border War during apartheid (see next section). Therefore, despite the promises on official pamphlets and website, Freedom Park does not really promote reconciliation and nation building and does not provide any clear links with the historical legacies of other groups in order to unite the South African nation. Furthermore, it does not acknowledge and give a voice to the variety of groups and cultures that constitute the Rainbow Nation. Despite the good intentions voiced in the mission statement, official website and advertising material, it is often experienced as an exclusively Black heritage site. The result has been apathy and a lack of enthusiasm and participation from the South African public which is reflected in visitor figures. During June 2010, the period when the FIFA World Cup was held in South Africa, Freedom Park had a mere 3,000 visitors in contrast to the approximately 17,000 people who visited the Voortrekker Monument.

Labuschagne (2010) concludes that although the placement of Freedom Park was done to restore balance in reconstructing the past, its erection was not done in a way that reflects historical sensitivity, good planning, architectural imagination and a sensitivity for the heterogeneity of the Rainbow Nation. Therefore, despite its enormous price tag, the park has failed to fulfil its promises to build bridges between the diverse groups and cultures of South Africa and to unite the South African nation.

Two Walls of Remembrance: Two Historical Legacies

Instead of uniting the Rainbow Nation, the erection of the Wall of Names in Freedom Park has served to ignite tension and contestation between various legacies of

memory, heritage and belonging (Baines, 2009; Labuschagne, 2010). The controversy relates to the “Border War” that was waged by the South African Defence Force on the borders between Angola and Namibia during the last decades of the apartheid regime (Baines, 2009). Soldiers of the South African Defence Force (SADF) fought against Cubans, the armies of the frontline states, and other “terrorist” insurgents. From 1967 to 1992, approximately 600,000 young White males were sent to the border of Namibia. Analysts such as Steenkamp (2007) regard the struggle against apartheid (also known as the liberation struggle) and the Border War as two separate struggles. Baines (2009), on the other hand, believes that the Border War was a mere extension of the low-intensity civil war associated with the anti-apartheid struggle. However, different historical narratives about this war imply that White soldiers believe that they fought against “terrorists” and “communists”, while Blacks believe the participants in this war to have been “freedom fighters”.

During apartheid, a monument—a twice-life-size statue of an infantryman—was erected at Fort Klapperkop to remember those who lost their lives in armed conflicts (Baines, 2009). The site also embodies a series of walls with the names of South African soldiers who died in the Korean and World Wars as well as some of those who died in the Border War. However, the names on these walls are not complete and have not been updated since 1994. The Fort Klapperkop site is also not a well-visited site and has not become a place of mourning and remembrance for the families and friends of those who died in the Border War. Instead, it has become an “overlooked memorial to an undeclared war” (Baines, 2009, p. 334). Since the advent of democracy, this site has been eclipsed by the much more impressive Freedom Park on the nearby Salvo-kop.

As already discussed, in the *S’khumboto* (isiSiswati for “those who have passed on”) in Freedom Park, a Wall of Names was erected to commemorate all those who died during conflicts that shaped present-day South Africa (Baines, 2009). The conflicts identified are precolonial wars, genocide, slavery, wars of resistance, the South African wars (first and second Anglo-Boer War), World War I and II and the liberation struggle. The Freedom Park Trust made an appeal for organizations to nominate names for inclusion on the Wall of Names. However, when veteran organizations submitted the names of SADF soldiers who fell during the Border War, these submissions were rejected, while the names of Cuban soldiers who died on African soil in the same war were included.

The perceived slight elicited an outcry from the public and SADF veterans and the issues were taken up by Afrikaner lobby groups such as Solidariteit and Afriforum on behalf of veteran organizations (Baines, 2009). In 2007, Afriforum made additional submissions to the Freedom Park Trust and not only requested that the names of soldiers who fell in the Border War be included, but also those of civilians and security force members who died in various forms of violence, the so-called “terrorist” violence, during the liberation struggle. Afriforum objected to the inclusion of the names of Cuban soldiers on the basis that they were fighting for communist world domination. The Freedom Park Trust agreed to include the names of victims of “terror”. However, it stood firm that the names of SADF soldiers did not deserve

inclusion. The reasons forwarded were that these soldiers were defending apartheid in order to defeat the liberation struggle.

Some SADF veterans reacted vehemently by erecting an alternative wall at the access to Freedom Park on 16 January 2007 (Baines, 2009). The popular Afrikaans singer, Steve Hofmeyer, played a leading role in the erection of a plaque with the following explanation (poorly translated into English):

This triangular monument's various sides symbolise the fact that history is not one-sided. It is erected to ensure that those who will, as a result of Freedom Park's one sided usage of history, are not being honoured, will get the recognition they deserve. Even though this monument does not cost the R716 million that Freedom Park cost, it is a sincere effort to pay homage to those who died in conflicts. (as cited in Baines, 2009, p. 336)

Various meetings of Afrikaner lobby groups followed. The end of the story is that a more permanent alternative wall, the South African Defence Force Wall of Remembrance, was erected at the Voortrekker Monument to commemorate the SADF soldiers who died in the Namibian/Angolan conflict (Baines, 2009). There are now two walls, each representing different branches of memories and historical legacy, different historical traditions, different groups and identities and perhaps also different civilizations.

The politics of memory consequently became the source of an ideological contest with the Border War as focus (Baines, 2009). On the one hand, Afrikaner groups felt that the Freedom Park Trust had not been consistent in terms of the principle of inclusivity when remembering those who died in past conflicts. They pointed out that soldiers who fought on both sides of the Anglo-Boer War were honoured. However, the same principle was not applied in the case of the liberation struggle and the border war. Therefore, the well-respected Afrikaner historian, Hermann Giliomee (Anonymous, 2007), branded Freedom Park an ANC monument, while Jaap Steyn (Anonymous, 2007), a language rights activist, states that Freedom Park reinforces divisions rather than promoting reconciliation. This oversight has served to fuel perceptions among Afrikaners that they are being victimized in the new dispensation.

Analysts outside the Afrikaner community hold opposing viewpoints. Peter Stiff (in Baines, 2009) agrees that the exclusion of the names of SADF soldiers is indeed inconsistent with the fact that names of soldiers of both sides of other South African conflicts were included. Military correspondent, Willem Steenkamp (2007), on the other hand, feels that SADF soldiers do not deserve to be included as they were conscripted by the apartheid government and were benefiting from apartheid.

However, Baines (2009) believes that if the Freedom Park project is really committed to reconciliation, nation building and the unification of the South African nation, historical consensus is a prerequisite to achieving these goals. It implies that the Freedom Park Trust should go out of its way to accommodate those who feel that the current Wall of Names discriminate against their war heroes. In the end, all sectors of the South African public should feel that they can relate to the names of those included on the Wall of Names. It would indeed be appropriate to include the names of those who died in the liberation struggle alongside the names of SADF soldiers.

Freedom Park is depicted as a “living monument” and the chief executive officer of the Freedom Park Trust, Wally Serote, still believes in processes of consultation about forms of memorialization and their purpose as well as the commemoration of South Africa’s divisive past and the contested meanings attached to particular events. However, Baines (2009) poses the question whether it is really possible to erect an all-encompassing memorial site, as Freedom Park claims to be, in a divided society. It appears to be even more difficult in the case of recent conflicts where the memories are still very raw. There do exist a few examples of war memorials that represent both sides of a conflict. Most war memorials are however sectarian in nature and memory cultures are seldom national in scope. Baines also regards it as debatable whether it is necessary that some kind of national consensus be reached before people can live peacefully alongside one another. Rather, differences of opinion could be seen as a hallmark of a robust democratic culture where differences are not only tolerated, but also cherished.

What is nevertheless at stake is whose interpretation of history will become institutionalized in the end (Baines, 2009). It is usually the case that the winners write the history, while the losers are relegated to the margins of society as the official history propagated by the political elite and cultural brokers become hegemonic. In divided societies, such hegemonic historical narratives are almost always contested. This also applies to the liberation struggle and the border war. Baines holds that it is important that the ANC government should not have the last or only say on how the country’s divisive history is remembered. Furthermore, processes of contestation should not be smothered or hindered. Such contestation should be valued as part and parcel of the practice of democracy, while institutions and structures should be developed to manage conflict.

Conclusions

There can be little doubt that South Africa has undergone an “iconoclastic” revolution since the advent of a new dispensation in 1994 (Bakker & Müller, 2010, p. 48). Not only has a complete set of new symbols been introduced to replace the symbols widely associated with the apartheid state but on the terrain of the politics of memory and heritage, far-reaching changes have also taken place.

Various strategies associated with symbolic politics and competition can be discerned in transforming South Africa’s symbolic landscape (Harrison, 1995; Mac Ginty, 2001). Invention was the dominant strategy in the establishment of a new set of national symbols such as the new flag and coat of arms. In the case of the national anthem, both expansion and re-ranking can be detected as a new song, *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika*, was not only added, but it is also sung first, while the *Stem van Suid-Afrika* (*Voice of South Africa*) has been modified and shortened to make the anthem more compact.

It is indisputable that there also existed a dire need to rectify the heavily skewed heritage landscape inherited from apartheid (Ross, 2007). Expansionism in adding

numerous new sites has been the dominant strategy in addressing discrepancies and giving a voice to suppressed historical narratives (Harrison, 1995; Mac Ginty, 2001; Ross, 2007). Instead of fostering complex narratives between sites representing the historical legacies of diverse groups, a layered approach has been followed in which new layers of suppressed or misrepresented history have been added (Bakker & Müller, 2010). No linkages have been established to integrate the historical narratives of diverse groups, for example, in the Voortrekker Monument and Freedom Park (Labuschagne, 2010). Moreover, alternative narratives have been ignored and suppressed as in the case of the Wall of Names in Freedom Park. The placing of new symbols directly facing or in the close vicinity of existing symbols can be interpreted by some communities as hostile, confrontational and threatening (Labuschagne, 2010; Mare, 2007; Marschall, 2005, 2010). The experience of symbolic threat and the desire to protect valued symbols and the concomitant identities can be discerned in counter expansionary moves such as the privatization of the Voortrekker Monument and the erection of the alternative Wall of Remembrance within the premises of this monument (Harrison, 1995). Furthermore, an expansionist strategy by the current government can be discerned in the fact that a hegemonic African voice, in line with the ideology of pan-Africanism and the African shift in the nation-building ideology, has become dominant and has largely replaced or obscured alternative South African voices (Bakker & Müller, 2010; Harrison, 1995; Labuschagne, 2010, 2012). The predominance of African elements in the new national symbols and the resemblance of Freedom Park to the Zimbabwe ruins not only serve to emphasize links with precolonial Africa, but also proclaim African dominance.

Therefore, although nation building has been proclaimed to be the driving force behind symbolic transformation, the impact has often been divisionary rather than bridging societal divisions. One of the most important reasons is the fact that symbolic reforms do not reflect the diverse and multicultural nature of the South African nation. Thus, the multicolored nature of the South African Rainbow Nation is often obscured by a one-dimensional emphasis on only one color.

The current symbolic politics indicates that South African society has remained divided despite strong nation-building efforts since 1994. It also emphasizes the difficulty, as already discussed, of establishing common symbols in a heterogeneous society and the futility of attempting to dissolve diverse ethnic, cultural and religious legacies within a single overarching national identity (Mac Ginty, 2001). Unity in South Africa can probably best be promoted by acknowledging and valuing diversity. Thus, instead of aiming to establish a single dominant (African) identity, the existence of different groups, cultures, identities and historical legacies—the many colors and flavors of the Rainbow Nation—should be fully recognized, treasured and supported, also in the symbolic realm. A singular hegemonic voice should also not be allowed to drown out diverse historical narratives. The symbols representing the identities and cultures of diverse groups should not be abhorred, but rather acknowledged and accommodated. One step in this direction could be to tolerate group symbols alongside national symbols. Instead of confrontation, robust debate on controversial issues should be fostered. In order to prepare the way for a

common future, complex discourses providing linkages between varied historical narratives should also be promoted. In doing so, intergroup empathy and understanding can be fostered in order to ensure the peaceful coexistence of the many and diverse groups constituting the South African Rainbow Nation.

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Heritage or Hatred: The Confederate Battle Flag and Current Race Relations in the USA

Scott L. Moeschberger

Perhaps one of the most visible and controversial icons present in the USA today is the confederate battle flag. As a symbol, its history parallels the complex and conflicted history of racial relations in the USA. To some, the flag represents an expression of Southern cultural heritage that encompasses a deep connection to longstanding traditions and a “Southern way of life.” It has become an emblem of “Southern rock” and is often seen waving at large-scale events from musical concerts to NASCAR races. Likewise, the flag has also become a symbol of much more exclusionary ideologies, and to many, a symbol of the hatred and oppression of the white supremacy movement. Its use in Klu Klux Klan (KKK) rallies has invariably linked it to both active and passive forms of racism. It has worldwide connections with a “rebel” image and is viewed by some outside the USA as the second “American Flag” (Coski, 2005), despite the irony that it is the symbol of the failed attempt to secede from the USA. With these conflicted meanings, the flag still embodies racial tensions in the USA and links to the specter of slavery that still persists in North American society today.

While the usage of the flag in public settings is still fiercely debated, it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a judgment on the meaning of the flag or the morality of flying the flag. Instead, this thesis posits that the debate about the flag itself could actually be a form of healing and reconciliation in a society that continues to struggle with conversations about the complex issues of race, heritage, civil rights, and slavery. In essence, the debate over the flag is a conversation on who we have been, who we are, and who we want to become.

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Historical Perspectives

Beginnings

In this chapter, there is insufficient space to unpack the complex history of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the anti-desegregation movement. Countless historians and sociologists have written volumes that attempt to unfurl this complex sociopolitical landscape. (For an in-depth analysis of the role of the flag during these events, please refer to Coski's, 2005 work entitled, *The Confederate Battle Flag: America's Most Embattled Emblem*). What follows is a brief overview to provide some context.

Contrary to popular assumptions, the Confederate Battle Flags was not originally used as a national flag of the Confederacy during the American Civil War, a war in which 11 southern states, termed the Confederate States of America (or Confederacy), attempted to secede from the Federal Union of the USA. Though the precise causes of the civil war continue to be debated by scholars, most agree that the atrocity of slavery contributed to the divide between states and eventually became the line of demarcation as eleven "slave states" formed the Confederacy. As the rebelling states began to join together, their first national flag (Fig. 1), termed "bars and stars," represented the newly formed entity (Marcovitz, 2003).

While not originally used as the national flag in the Confederacy, the "Southern cross" eventually becomes embedded (1863) in the second national flag (referred to as the "Stainless Banner"; Fig. 2). Because of the predominate usage of white in the flag, there are concerns that the new flag could be used as a sign of surrender, thus Confederate troops adopt the use of the Southern Cross without the white fixture and the resulting flag becomes referred to as the Confederate Battle Flag (Marcovitz, 2003). This shift to a new flag permanently links the Southern Cross to symbolize the Confederacy. Needless to say as the war continues the flag continues to grow as a symbol of the Confederacy and begins to take a position of greater prominence. While the flag itself is a symbol of the Confederacy, it doesn't truly become linked to Southern heritage and culture until after the war (Coski, 2005). As Thornton (1996) points out in discussing the flag:



Fig. 1 First flag of the Confederate States of America

Fig. 2 Confederate Battle Flag or Southern Cross



Today's Confederate symbols are not artifacts of the Confederacy, but rather artifacts of post-reconstruction Confederate revivals. The new images appeared well after the Civil War, in most cases a generation after, and were parts of the creation of a specific interpretation of what it meant to be "Southern." (p. 237)

While the Confederate flag was used during the Civil War, it did not carry the strong associations that it took on following the war.

Post-War

Though the flying of the battle flag in public during post war reconstruction (the process of the US federal government taking over Southern state governments) is likely subdued, the practice of placing battle flags as a memorial to the Confederate war dead becomes a common occurrence as each "Decoration Day" thousands of battle flags are placed at the graves of Confederate soldiers. This practice is seen in Union soldier cemeteries and eventually becomes one of the origins of the current US national holiday of Memorial Day (Coski, 2005). In addition to honoring soldiers, the battle flag is also a prominent symbol used during significant Confederate commemorative events and monuments starting around 1870 (Thornton, 1996). This resurgence in Confederate nostalgia becomes more formalized as southern states, such as Mississippi (1894, Fig. 3), begin to incorporate parts of the Battle flag into their state flag. Alabama (1895, Fig. 4) follows suit by using the Southern Cross image in their flag, preceded by Georgia (1879, Fig. 5) who adopted a flag associated with the "bars and stars" used as the national flag of the Confederacy—a state flag that is later (1956–2001, Fig. 6) rebranded with the Confederate battle flag. These flags were

Fig. 3 Flag of Mississippi
(Adopted 1894)




Fig. 4 Flag of Alabama
(Adopted 1895)



Fig. 5 Flag of Georgia
(1872–1902)



Fig. 6 Flag of Georgia
(1956–2001)



closely tied to a nostalgic reference to Confederate Southern heritage at first, but began to represent a more sinister symbolism that linked politics, race, and history.

Thornton (1996), in reference to the Alabama flag, notes, “The appearance of a state flag on a Confederate model was a pointed and timely reminder that to be ‘Southern’ was to be white. It was also an implicit hint that to be Southern was to be Democrat” (p. 239). This post-war era (roughly 1870–1846) becomes a time of increased racial segregation in the southern states as Jim Crow laws become a systematic way to create a “separate but equal” approach to public racial integration. These laws create a systemic approach that ensures that the white population has access to superior educational, economic, and social advantages. This period of racial inequality eventually births the Civil Rights movement and a period of significant racial disharmony in the entire USA.

Civil Rights Era

Following World War II, there is little doubt as to what the flag represents to some, as the use of the battle flag becomes a symbol of white dominance and the anti-segregation movement within the USA. While the flag’s representation is still connected with Confederate and Southern identity, the meanings become even more complex as white supremacists link the flag to symbolize radical elements.

Following the Federal Supreme Court ruling that mandated desegregating schools in 1954 (Brown vs. Board of Education, 1954), white Southerners used the flag as a way to fight for the “old order” (Coski, 2005) imbuing the flag with powerful symbolism that became seared into the public memory. Structural racism in the form of Jim Crow laws gives way to active violence and intimidation by those opposed to the new “imposition” by the federal system. Hate groups such as the KKK make use of the battle flag in rallies and convicted murderers of civil rights leaders proudly display the flag on a lapel pin during trial (Thornton, 1996). This gives rise to a new social representation that explicitly links the flag with beliefs that spawn hatred and acts of violence against nonwhites. It is this new meaning that provides the public memory outside of the South with images of lynchings, hate crimes, and white supremacy.

State Flags on Government Buildings

In recent history, the use of the Confederate flag flying on state government buildings and worn by students in schools has once again revived the debate over the history and meaning of the flag. These public disputes have created bitter divisions about the meaning of symbolism that, to many, represents the Southern past. In these debates, the arguments hark back to what the flag represents. Thornton (1996)

quotes from a brochure published by the Northeast Georgians for the Flag and Southern Heritage, describing criticism of the flag as:

...a psychological persecution that would have us renounce our forbears, our heritage and our culture.... The battle of the Confederate flag is merely the opening wedge in a campaign to destroy all vestiges of respect for the traditional South, and our forbears. (p. 234)

In 2003, as the state flag of Georgia was revised to preclude the battle flag, the country renewed public discussion on what the battle flag represents. This national dialogue continued as South Carolina, under boycotts from civil rights organizations, evaluated if the flag should continue to fly atop the state capital building. In 2000 the flag shifted locations on the statehouse property to be flown over a monument to South Carolina's Confederate dead. In arguably the largest social scientific study about attitudes regarding the flag, Cooper and Knotts (2006) found that both geographic and racial demographics impacted beliefs about whether or not the flag should remain atop the statehouse. Examining a nationally representative sample, they found that white Southerners were more likely to support flying the flag than white non-Southerners. In addition, black Southerners were less likely to support the flag flying than black non-Southerners. The authors go on to note that "support for the Confederate flag is not simply about racial attitudes, but a more complex phenomenon where region and race exert important influences" (p. 153). The debate over flying the flag still continues to date with ongoing boycotts of civil rights organizations since 1999. Even the largest collegiate athletic organization (NCAA) banned lucrative university sporting events from being hosted in South Carolina or Mississippi (who still have the flag as part of their state flag).

In a similar vein to the statehouse controversy, the state of Virginia took center stage with the Virginia Governor's recent decree in 2010 that pronounced April 2010 as "Confederate History Month" (Virginia Governor Proclamation, 2010). While the decree makes no mention of the Confederate battle flag, the proclamations serve as a proxy for many of the same issues faced within the USA: How do we remember our past in relation to the Civil War? How do we discuss race within our culture in light of this past history? How can we have these conversations when our cultural past is so integrally linked to our racial past?

Current Discourse

In contemporary media, the image of the flag has received a significant amount of attention, resulting in a spirited public debate. Threaded through these examples are attempts to transform the cultural representations embedded in the symbol of the flag. The forefront of these current conversations centered on 2013 song entitled "Accidental Racist." In the song, Southern country artist Brad Paisley and rapper LL Cool J exchange a dialogue that exemplifies the tensions regarding the flag. In the lyrics, Paisley sings:

To the man that waited on me at the Starbucks down on Main, I hope you understand/When I put on that t-shirt, the only thing I meant to say is I'm a Skynyrd fan/The red flag on my

chest somehow is like the elephant in the corner of the south/And I just walked him right in the room/Just a proud rebel son with an “ol can of worms/Lookin” like I got a lot to learn but from my point of view.

I’m just a white man comin’ to you from the southland/Tryin’ to understand what it’s like not to be I’m proud of where I’m from but not everything we’ve done/And it ain’t like you and me can re-write history/Our generation didn’t start this nation/We’re still pickin’ up the pieces, walkin’ on eggshells, fightin’ over yesterday/And caught between Southern pride and Southern blame.

They called it Reconstruction, fixed the buildings, dried some tears/We’re still siftin’ through the rubble after a hundred-fifty years/I try to put myself in your shoes and that’s a good place to begin/But it ain’t like I can walk a mile in someone else’s skin.

To which LL Cool J responds:

Dear Mr. White Man, I wish you understood/What the world is really like when you’re livin’ in the hood/Just because my pants are saggin’ doesn’t mean I’m up to no good/You should try to get to know me, I really wish you would/Now my chains are gold but I’m still misunderstood/I wasn’t there when Sherman’s March turned the south into firewood/I want you to get paid but be a slave I never could/Feel like a new fangled Django, dodgin’ invisible white hoods/So when I see that white cowboy hat, I’m thinkin’ it’s not all good/I guess we’re both guilty of judgin’ the cover not the book/I’d love to buy you a beer, converse and clear the air/But I see that red flag and I think you wish I wasn’t here.

Not surprisingly, the song elicited mixed reactions. Some suggest that the mere acceptance of the flag is a problematic assumption in the conversation. David Graham (2013) writes in the Atlantic “it’s pretty insane to compare an inoffensive piece of headgear to a flag that represents a treasonous secession movement devoted to maintaining the practice of slavery. It’s even more insane to compare jewelry to, you know, slave shackles.”

While the conversation played out in these lyrics is undoubtedly simplistic and uses stylized comparisons of slave chains to gold chains to illustrate that the differences still exist between the two communities. Though the comparison is faulty at the literal level, it does seem to be a public attempt to bring about conversations that focus on empathetic responses that engage in a productive dialogue. This is the point that Graham misses in criticizing the song because of the diluted manner in which Paisley defends wearing the Confederate flag. Again while this failure may be correct, the true value of the conversation lies in the recognition of each of the cultures represented in the social symbols, in the public act of trying to converse about race, albeit in a clumsy way. As with the broader dialogue on race, if we avoid discussing the topic because it is potentially awkward or uncomfortable, then society will simply remain divided, entrenched within our own cultures and narratives about “what is” and “what has been.” In order to move forward into “what can be” there must be a willingness to move into the zone of disagreement, inhabited by such contested symbols as the Confederate flag.

The complexity of the flag in social conversation is further exemplified in the story of Byron Thomas. As reported by Johnson (2011) in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Thomas, then a first year student at the University of South Carolina-Beaufort, was asked by school officials to take down the Confederate Battle Flag from his dorm room. While the debate over flying the flag in a public space is not unusual in the

media, the fact that Thomas is African-American and flying the flag in support of Southern pride became a curious story. In his interview, Thomas responds:

I wanted to show people that just because I'm black, I don't have to hate something that ignorant people have made into a racist statement. I dearly love the South. So, when I see that symbol, it's Southern pride to me. I was doing a research paper, and then I saw the true meaning of the flag. (Johnson, 2011, p. A23)

Following the same tune of the Paisley and LL Cool J, he goes on to note "because the flag is not going anywhere. To be united our generation needs to see things differently than past generations...I'm fighting for my generation to see things differently."

For some, Thomas' effort to reclaim his "true meaning" of the flag is a difficult transformation to make when so often the use of the flag coincides with the images of hatred and white supremacy represented in the KKK and others who fought against the civil rights movement. However, it illustrates the sort of transformational approach that is necessary to ultimately allow divergent communities to come to terms with a controversial symbol.

One of the more unusual examples of such transformational attempts is found in the incorporation of the Confederate Flag during the 2012 presidential elections. In an attempt to show support to President Obama in his reelection bid, a small group of white Southerners began a movement described as "rednecks for Obama." In this campaign, organizers printed flags that have the Battle Flag juxtaposed with a prominent image of the President and the word "HOPE" fixed under his image.

This transformative approach was also used in 2013 by African-American rapper Kanye West. While dubbed a publicity stunt by some, West marketed several pieces of merchandise in his store that contained the Confederate Flag (McLaughlin, 2013). In addition, images of West wearing a jacket with the flag boldly stitched onto a jacket sleeve appeared in the news. When questioned about using the flag as an African-American, he noted, "The confederate flag represented slavery in a way. That's my abstract take on what I know about it, right? So I wrote the song, "New Slaves." So I do the Confederate flag and made it my flag. It's my flag now. Now what you gonna do?"

The Confederate Flag is a powerful symbol that elicits strong emotional reactions. One of the challenges is that it can and does have different meanings for different people, and the intended meaning can easily be misinterpreted. This is apparent in the widespread debates over flying the flag on government buildings. The examples above show the wide range of meanings intended by the person choosing to fly the flag. Perhaps more significantly they are attempts to shift the meaning of the flag to a place of greater commonality, of a shared Southern heritage for example, or of a part of our history that should be honored in its complexity. For some in the African-American community, its use may illustrate asserting power and control over the terms of use for symbol that was, and sometimes still is, associated with racism.

However, disentangling the flag from racism is no easy task. The state house controversy is not without cause, and universities forbid flying the flag for good reason. Again, the point here is not to argue the merits of these cases, but simply to point out that whatever the intent behind the usage of the symbol, large portions of US society view it as a racist symbol.

In the situations where someone is questioned about why they fly the Confederate flag, it would be unusual to find someone outside white supremacy groups that would equate the flag with racism. However, to those who disagree, it would seem that undoubtedly the person making a choice to fly the flag must know that the flag has racist history and will communicate an unwelcoming message to African-Americans. Despite this, they choose to display the flag to symbolize a part of their identity or ideology, rejecting the conclusion that it is a racist symbol.

While in the South, the flag seems to be a classic example of a divided symbol, with contrasting interpretations claimed by each community, it is a bit more perplexing to understand its usage in the North. For example, I live in Grant County, Indiana, a land of corn, family farms, John Deere and pickup trucks, as well as the location of the last lynching in the USA in (1930) in downtown Marion (Madison, 2000). In this area it is common to see the Confederate flag on the back of pickup trucks, as well as displayed prominently at local festivals, etc. There appears to be two primary explanations for such usage of this symbol. The first is inferred racism. This would seem to be a reasonable conclusion in an area of the country where some of the last remnants of the KKK were active. The second is the association with a “rebel” image. For example, a nearby high school used the Confederate flag and the term “rebels” to describe their athletic image. This is an area that would benefit from increased research to better understand the attributions Northerners make to the symbol of the flag.

An even more rogue usage of the Confederate flag can be found across the Atlantic in County Cork, Ireland. Ireland and the USA are closely linked through a history of immigration that has led to millions of Americans who claim some sort of (at least partial) Irish heritage. Cork is a county in the south of Ireland, and included areas that were wild and impassable to British soldiers during times of rebellion against British authority. During the Irish Civil War, Cork was a bastion of anti-treaty sentiment. Today during national Irish sport matches, one will see the County Cork sporting teams (known as the Rebels) engulfed in full sized Confederate flags draped across their shoulders or images of the flag displayed in other ways.

Not infrequently the use of the Confederate flag seems to be intended as a vague statement of rebellion, particularly rebellion against the control of the federal government. This may hint at an explanation of the phenomena of the flag creeping up at Tea Party events around the country. This linkage, while consistent with the original meaning of valuing states rights, shifts the focus from “Southern heritage” to anti-federalist sentiment.

These examples illustrate how the Confederate flag is a dynamic symbol, shifting in meaning from historic uses to modern interpretations. The interpretations vary, and the usage is fluid-shifting in various contexts. As discussed earlier in the book, Social Representation Theory helps us understand how meaning is attributed to symbols. For example, perhaps in a small, mostly white town in the South, the flag flying communicates something that is shared in common, with certain underlying beliefs, connection to the past, and sense of identity in the present and future. This is very different from attempts to reclaim the flag as a non-racist symbol (such as Kanye West), but both are meant to help provide a sense of identity for a group who share common beliefs and ideologies.

The Confederate Flag as a Social Representation

Undoubtedly, conversations about the flag are an attempt by our US society to engage with our current racial conversations while at the same time attempting to wrestle with our past. As Moscovici (1984) points out “in many respects, the past is more real than the present. The peculiar power and clarity of representations—that is of social representations—derives from the success with which they control the reality of today through that of yesterday” (p. 10). This undoubtedly is the case with the Confederate flag—it serves as a way to anchor to the past but in a way that attempts to make sense of the future.

So how does this powerful symbol relate to issues of peace building and reconciliation within society? Society must continue to engage the contradictory and dynamic meanings that the flag embodies. It is a central part of the American story—of rebellion, Southern pride, and slavery. So to dismiss the song “Accidentally Racist” as being a simplistic discourse about race, while true, is not the correct response. The conversation prompted by the song provides fertile ground for increasing our understanding of race, and we should embrace the dialogue. Could the flag be used as a way to teach history in the schools—to educate students about the painful lessons of the past 300 years? The danger in the image is that we lose sight of its historical significance—for both African Americans and Caucasians. Was the war over federal power fully settled? At the heart of the earliest use of the flag was a symbol of rebellion and resistance to federalism. This issue continues to play out in the political sphere with the rise of Libertarianism and the Tea party within US politics today. The conversation about the flag is as important of a dialogue as the country can have—it is a conversation about race, rebellion, and injustice. It is a story that has not yet been finished, but will hopefully bring about a culture that can accept its history—both past and present.

Race continues to be a troubling conversation in public spheres today. With the recent Travon Martin incident in which an unarmed young black male was shot and killed by a neighborhood watchman George Zimmerman, the nation once again struggled with how to talk about race. With an uptick in racial discussion in the media, US society continued to wrestle with difficult racial conversations. This sentiment is reflected in the New York Times:

With a black president and a culture more accepting of its own diversity than ever before—the full citizenship, which is to say the full acknowledged humanity, of African-Americans remains at the heart of the questions. The only way to sufficiently honor that question is to keep talking, and to listen harder. (Scott, 2013, P. AR1)

What Can Be Done with the Flag?

Attempting to ban or remove the flag from all public spheres would undoubtedly empower and embolden the very ideologies that flag supporters cherish. In addition,

it would remove an important symbol from our US history that, while contested, provides a productive space to understand the complex past that our nation endeavors to move beyond. Coski (2005) wrestles with this dilemma (of what to do with the flag) and ultimately shares a couple ideals. First, he points out that for the flag to truly be a representation of Confederate heritage, it should be reserved solely for this type of setting. Rather than emblazoned on t-shirts and pickup trucks, it should be venerated as a memorial object. Second, he notes that critics of the flags could become more tolerant of its use as a war memorial and historical symbol. He notes, “Americans must learn to accept displays of the flag that merely accept the Confederacy’s existence...displays that remind people of this complex history nourish rather than poison the public dialogue” (p. 303).

While these recommendations seem simple enough, the complexity of contextualizing the flag as a war memorial and historic symbol seems an improbable endeavor. The flag has become iconic and commoditized in culture. As an image it is combined with almost any other iconic symbol—from the simple to the unexplainable. It is not unusual to see images superimposed on the flag such as trucks, fish, Kermit the Frog, LGBT Rainbow flag, eagles, to more menacing images such as guns, swords, and skulls. Though these combinations provide a transformative representation to the flag, they further increase the complexity of social identity that is represented in the image.

The flying of the flag by an African-American University student interjects an interesting transformative approach. Is it possible that some in the African-American community can separate this symbol from the potentially racist connotations and simply view it as display of Southern pride? Or will the view of the Reverend Al Sharpton (2013) prevail, as he recently wrote in 2013:

The Confederate Flag symbolizes dehumanization, injustice, and pain. It is a stark reminder of an era in our history that was defined by the abhorrent practice of slavery. And it is representative of a mentality that looked upon Blacks as inferiors who needed to remain in the shackles of subservience.

Ironically during the writing of this chapter, Sharpton recently announced that his organization National Action Network would boycott Kanye West for his use of the Confederate Flag on clothing.

In summary, the future transformation of the meaning of the Confederate flag will depend on how American society embraces the conversation of race and history. If the USA is to truly become the “Beloved Community” that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. envisioned, then we must become a society that is based on a restoration of who we are and who we have been. It is not about the right to fly the flag or not. It is about how we respond to one another in these actions. It is through this process that we come to appreciate our diversity. As Dr. King points out (as cited by Marsh, 2005):

It is true that as we struggle for freedom in American we will have to boycott at times. But we remember that as we boycott that the boycott is not an end within itself.... [The] end is reconciliation, the end is redemption, the end is the creation of the beloved community. (p. 48)

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