Networking the International System

Global Histories of International Organizations

Madeleine Herren *Editor*



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Networking the International System

Global Histories of International Organizations

In Collaboration with Maya Okuda

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Contents

Introduction: Towards a Global History of International Organization 1
Madeleine Herren

Part I Constructing the Memory of International Organizations

From the League of Nations to the United Nations: The Continuing Preservation and Development of the Geneva Archives 15
Sigrun Habermann-Box

Matsuoka Yosuke's Miscalculation at Geneva: A Possible Reconsideration Using JACAR Data 31
Kenichiro Hirano

Part II Eurocentrism and Science Policy

On the Concept of International Organization: Centralization, Hegemonism, and Constitutionalism 43
Toshiki Mogami

Activities and Discourses on International Cultural Relations in Modern Japan: The Making of KBS (Kokusai Bunka Shinko Kai), 1934–1953 53
Atsushi Shibasaki

International Control of Epidemic Diseases from a Historical and Cultural Perspective 73
Naomi Nagata

Part III International Organization as a Forum: Turning Local Concerns Into Global Issues

Sino-Japanese Controversies Over the Textbook Problem and the League of Nations . . . 91
Shin Kawashima

Beyond Empires' Science: Inter-Imperial Pacific Science Networks in the 1920s . . . 107
Tomoko Akami

Networking Through the Y: The Role of YMCA in China's Search for New National Identity and Internationalization . . . 133
Guoqi Xu

Part IV Culture and Standardization: The Multifunctional and Contradictory Use of International Organizations

Global Governance: From Organizations to Networks or Not? . . . 151
Craig N. Murphy

New Capitalism, UNESCO, and the Re-enchantment of Culture . . . 163
Timothy D. Taylor

Popular Culture and International Cooperation in the 1930s . . . 175
Bjarne Rogan

Avenues and Confines of Globalizing the Past: UNESCO's International Commission for a "Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind" (1952–1969) . . . 187
Katja Naumann

Index . . . 201

Introduction: Towards a Global History of International Organization

Madeleine Herren

In November 2010 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced a realignment of its quota shares. The new list of IMF's ten largest shareholders, the world's leading economies, reveals considerable changes: China now ranks third among the most powerful nations economically. Moreover, a number of "dynamic emerging markets and developing countries"[1] have entered the magic list, with India as the prime example. With this decision, an international organization active in the sensitive part of global economy with an impact on the daily life of millions of people draws conclusions from the new situation quicker than the Western nation states probably would. Presenting Asia and Europe in shifting positions, the IMF, together with many other IGOs and NGOs, has shaped the narrative of transition and change for the twenty-first century. Within the thrilling intellectual atmosphere of the Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe in a Global Context" at Heidelberg University[2] a research project has been initiated to develop an understanding of international organizations from both a global and a historical perspective. Taking as a starting point an investigation of missing histories of Asian networks within scholarly research on international organizations, an international workshop has brought together scholars from Asian and Western scientific communities. The result, a collection of contributions aiming to overcome Eurocentric patterns of analysis, will hopefully inspire a continuous debate on the global history of international organizations, a topic that has remained a blind spot in scholarly research until now. Although the contributions come from different disciplines and methodologies, historical development, the building of historicities, and the

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[1] About the IMF http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/govern.htm.

[2] For this project and the publication emerging from the paradigm of transculturality see http://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de/en/. For the project "networking the international system" see http://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de/en/research/a-governance-administration/a3.html.

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invention of tradition build an important explanatory framework for the contributions presented in this volume. Taking the view that internationally organized movements, organizations, and networks matter in almost all fields of political and social life in civil societies and states, this approach avoids going into their different institutional and legal appearances. By contrast, this volume risks understanding international organizations as a self-declared form of interaction across borders that produces footprints and patterns characteristic of the time frame concerned. Their multifunctionality, their power to translate national attitudes into transboundary concepts, and their role as information hubs has not only surfaced in the past continuously but has also shaped post-war situations considerably. Access to today's post-cold-war arrangements on a global scale might lead us therefore to another post-war situation at the end of World War I, when global governance addressed forms of networking and fears of their use in a long-lasting way.

Links to the Past: Ghosts of the 1930s

In the 1930s, even the experts were resigned to approaching the topic of international organizations using well-established definitions. Philip C. Jessup, international law lecturer at Columbia University, found the description for the situation, which then circulated among scholars: the field of international organizations did not lack academic attention, but scholars of the subject faced a "legal and political-scientific wilderness." Referencing Jessup, Pitman B. Potter, one of the most distinguished experts in the field, assumed and enlarged the metaphor in one of his ground-breaking publications. To him, the field of international organizations was "a jungle" (Potter 1935a, p. 213). Facing uncontrolled growth, he abstained from description and decided in favor of classification. The *American Political Science Review* published at length his "Classification of International Organizations" (Potter 1935a, b), where Potter, at that time a member of the Geneva Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, highlighted governmental participation, acceptance by the law of nations, and the structure of a modern state—e.g. separation of powers—as the leading ideas for ordering principles. With reference to his article in the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Potter defined international organizations by their tasks, which were clearly specified so as "to facilitate the communication of national policies and views by one state to another, their reconciliation, synthesis, and adoption as international law and the execution of the latter." (Potter 1935b, p. 416). However, in Geneva the real world looked different, mainly inconsistent and ambivalent, and the tensions between claimed international clarity and the local political situation did not escape those journalists who had established their own international professional organizations, some with explicit links to the League of Nations.[3] In 1938 the well-known British journalist

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[3] International Association of Journalists accredited to the League of Nations (http://www.lonsea.de/pub/org/1030, accessed on 15 July 2013) was listed in the League's Handbook of International Organizations and even included the representative of the Shanghai Central News, L.T. Wang.

George Slocombe excoriated Geneva as the international meeting point and seat of the first truly global IGO, the League of Nations (Slocombe 1938). He termed Geneva "dull" and conservative and the League an accumulation and micro-cosmos of academic expertise rather than as a powerful agency in international politics. Dismissing the idea of a "super-state (. . .) governed by scientists" (Slocombe 1938, p. 324) the author sharpened his pessimistic view. Even more than his political statement, which was common for this time, the structure and metaphors in this book present international organizations as a hybrid world of incongruities: the first socialist director of the ILO, Albert Thomas, was described as the "abbot of a Greek Orthodox monastic order" (Slocombe 1938, p. 312), and despite the uncontested presence of expertise, women specialists were just a small part of the picture. Slocombe's world was still governed by heads of states and charismatic male politicians, although it was closely controlled by journalists and under the observation of Dersen and Kelen, the League's official caricaturists. According to this perspective, Slocombe added his contribution to the academic discourse to the long line of those publishing on international organizations at this time; his contribution therefore exemplifies the contemporary struggle for a decisive shaping of a master narrative. His book encircles the disturbing varieties of international thought no longer related to pacifism, international law, and standardization, and encompasses the newly established academic discipline of International Relations at this time.

Within the tensions between academic classifications and political struggles, international organizations indeed became a tracer of two controversial developments, one enforcing national delimitation and the other following the increasing dynamics of border transgression. Both attained characteristic patterns in different forms of transboundary institutions, both were united under the umbrella term "international organization," which remained soft and imprecise despite Potter's efforts. Beyond the walls of the Palais des Nations, movements, institutions, and groups increased, which did not fit at all into the understanding of international organizations and the ideology of internationalism as established in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the firm belief in international organizations as a European invention and a by-product of Western modernization could not stand in the face of Japanese competition, which also influenced nongovernmental organizations in a way that was clearly visible to contemporaries: In the old city of Geneva, at Rue Calvin, the newly established *Maison internationale* had opened a center where students, the League's international civil servants, scholars, diplomats, and internationalists, organized a Japanese lunch and other gatherings that fit the contemporary 'East meets West'-metaphor; such entanglements between international organizations, movements, and self-declared internationalists characterize the 1930s. However, empirical evidence for a messy ravel of institutions and ideas behind the concept of global governance and international organization questions the established narrative of international politics and points to the irreconcilable differences existing between Japan, the League of Nations, and China at that time.

These references to the ambivalent understanding of international organizations have an undeniably modern sound. Although historians are especially careful in comparing the past with recent developments, the following four elements struggling with reorganizing the newly shaped international relations after the end of the Cold War had already characterized the 1930s.

First, the place of international organizations within academic disciplines is again a contested field, though with some characteristic differences. In 1919, international organizations described the core concerns of International Relations Studies, which was newly introduced in academia at the time. Twenty-first-century scholars are inclined to connect international organizations with newly created umbrella terms such as global governance. Again, international organizations play a crucial role in indicating the discipline's new orientation after the end of the Cold War and the increasing need to compete with postcolonial criticism (Chakrabarty 2008), methodological nationalism (Chernilo 2007), and the still unrealized plans of transdisciplinary research (Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008). The—still underestimated—intellectual history of IO-research reveals an ongoing and dynamic shifting of paradigms that is gaining visibility in the difference found between leading journals in this field: while *International Organization* (IO 1947 ff) is closely related to the (changing) study of international affairs, *Global Governance*, one of the journals newly introduced in the 1990s, "showcases the expertise of leading scholars and practitioners concerned with the processes of international cooperation and multilateralism."[4] Moreover, while international organizations helped to shape a new discipline in the 1920s, they now start to play a crucial role in the global adjustment of social sciences and humanities. To take the field of history as an example, international organizations are discussed as crucial actors in the developing field of global history and give empirical evidence on how border-crossing contacts multiplied in the nineteenth century at a moment when nation states shaped the master narrative. The focus lies on controversial developments with regard to the meaning and importance of border-crossing agencies, as presented in a variety of recently launched journals (e.g. *Journal of Global History, Journal of World History*). Debates on international organizations therefore reveal a methodological sea change that points towards various forms of appearance instead of claiming definitory unambiguity, discussing multilayered activities and agencies instead of institutional structures, and the development of a networking structure parallel to insights into formally established multilateral treaties (Rittberger et al. 2013).

Admitting the presence of wilderness, however, does not impede the mention of blind spots. Astonishingly enough, based on a still dominant and rarely challenged presupposition, analysis of international organizations overlooks a global approach and considers developments beyond Europe and the USA only rarely. Due to an unspoken Eurocentrism, certain fields are still missing, for example, the economic and cultural impact of international organizations, their role in the development of international civil societies, their (mis)use for totalitarian purposes, and their influence on local contexts. Even though the most important of international organizations—the United Nations—is gaining a new historical profile with the concept of the "Third United Nations"(Weiss et al. 2009), tensions between different modes of analysis are obvious, and are at the heart of this volume.

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[4] https://www.rienner.com/title/Global_Governance_A_Review_of_Multilateralism_and_International_Organizations, accessed on 15 July 2013.

Second, in the ongoing process of claiming international organizations as actors of importance in a variety of disciplines, the state (one of the core elements in 1920s International Relations Studies) shifted from an uncontested anchor to an element of negotiable importance. The League of Nations made use of all sorts of international organizations and gave them at least a semi-official position. A virtual "League of Nations family" became visible in the *Handbook of International Organisations*, which was published in several editions by the League of Nations before World War II. This approach changed fundamentally after World War II when the UN system carefully observed the difference between the so-called IGOs and NGOs. In the 1990s, formal and institutional borders again became porous, though in a widely different prospect, so that acting on the brink of national responsibilities gained a spatial dimension as both meeting point and platform. Until now, international civil servants and officials of international organizations had claimed a mode of representation distant from but still comparable to diplomacy. Since the times of Potter and Reinsch, representation had a legitimating value and therefore those scholars of International Relations sharing concerns with international law looked closely at questions of sovereignty of membership and at the extraterritorial rights of IGO (Reinsch 1907; Potter 1935b). As an analogy, organizations like the Interparliamentary Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the International Chamber of Commerce always claimed the privilege of being the more efficient agency with regard to international relations. Although a colorful nomenclature is available for comparing the distance between formal and informal power (e.g. quango for quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations and GONGO for government organized nongovernmental organizations) a spatial and social understanding of international organization is still missing. Supported by debates on cosmopolitanism and the independent existence of epistemic communities (e.g. Delanty 2009), this perspective insists on looking at international organizations as expressions of social coherence beyond the nation state and as platforms and meeting points with their own and specific quality. Demonstrating this new way to understand international organizations Ian Hurd separates two different debates. One considers the ontology of international organizations and differentiates between IO as actors, as tools/resources, and as fora. A second debate focuses on methodologies, including contractualism, regime analysis, and constructivism (Hurd 2011). Although still closely related to disciplinary concepts (international law), the way Hurd handles the transboundary potential of IO is convincing, since the differentiation between ontologies and methodologies opens up the intellectual space needed for transdisciplinary reflections.

Third, presenting international organizations as the result of a constant bargaining over borders that are transforming in a spatial dimension even without formal agreements in multilateral treaties oversteps the range of academic disciplines normally related to international organizations. On the one hand, combining international organizations with cultural studies enriches analytical tools with those based on performativity and soft power. On the other, cultural aspects are increasingly related to international organizations and to UNESCO's idea of global heritage, memories of the world, and the increasing understanding of fields not limited to national actors, such as environmental issues. Moreover, opening up the field of disciplines allows for a testing on both sides and a discussion of new characteristics of international organizations, as well as the way that disciplines handle the increasing importance of overcoming local limitations and essentialist understandings of national, social, and cultural entities. Presenting a world on the move by using international organizations as a magnifying lens will hopefully shed light on blind spots and encourage the investment of more energy in collaborative research and methodological debates within social sciences and the humanities.

Fourth, in the ongoing debate on structures and institutions, bureaucracies are at the core of scholarly interest. Moreover, legal questions on extraterritoriality and supranationality shape the scope of action specified as global governance or networking activities. Astonishingly enough, men and women working for, in, and with international organizations rarely form part of the scholarly debates, even though the newer scholarly literature on international organizations describe the need to include the "Third United Nations" as a broad community of experts and "stake holders" as an expression of a international civil society with increasing importance (Weiss et al 2009). Beyond international organizations, the impact of networking gradually softens formalized approaches. The human factor, at least in subaltern positions, remains almost forgotten, although leading positions became an increasing importance in oral history projects (Weiss 2005).

Challenged by the dynamics of change in the field of research on International Organizations, the choice of topics in this book follows a constructivist approach aimed at testing and fleshing out an understanding of international organizations as networks. According to this approach, border-crossing capacities result from a constant bargaining process that occurs between territorially bounded powers. Following this perspective, surplus values develop only within reach of those who are able and/or forced to cross borders of all kinds (not limited to frontiers of states). Although using a network-related approach creates certain methodological problems (Herren et al. 2012), this way of looking into the history of international organizations opens up a precondition for the main aim of this book: creating an awareness that a *global* history of international organizations is still missing, and that institutional platforms and personal networks created by international organizations produced their own historicity that was separate from being merely a result or a special case of combined national histories.

The focus on history, however, needs further explanation and therefore contributors will discuss the field from different methodological perspectives. Due to the impending upheaval of World War II, today's scholars are uneasy in discussing the twenty-first century's understanding of international organizations within the delicate timeframe of the 1930s. Challenging the connection between peace and international organization is, however, one of the crucial changes in this field.

As mentioned in the introduction to a special issue of Global Governance (Berdal and Caplan 2004), international organizations transform into a tool of international politics that has increasingly had to replace the role of United Nations peacekeeping forces in war-torn countries after the Cold War. Although true for international administration in Kosovo *and* East-Timor, it is not our aim to investigate these specific aspects or their economic implications. But the increasing interest in the political value of apparently non-political and technical interventions indicates future fields of research: Policy-making in international administrations appears to be of increasing importance, and this point of view questions their role during conflicts, wars, and crises in a way that makes the 1930s a field of reference for times of transition beyond the rationale of chronologies.

Times of Transition: Research Design and Findings

This book does not follow a chronological timeline. It combines different methodologies and critically investigates the local impact of international organizations beyond a Western rationale. However, what the contributions have in common is a discussion of international organizations during times of transition, mostly stretching from the 1920s to the controversial understanding of international organizations today. Literally taken, according to networks in the "Age of Extremes" (Hobsbawm 1994/2011), the contributions critically investigate the asserted aims of international organizations by taking into consideration not only the peace building concept of the UN but also the very fact that this organization has a considerable number of soldiers under its command throughout the world.

According to any disciplinary input the topic of international organization may evoke, the first chapter asks the question: Who is producing the memory of international organizations? At first glance one of the more striking common elements throughout the variety of different aims and organizational structures is the promise of transferring information to all members even within a global range. Although it is recorded in almost all treaties and statutes establishing international organizations, this element of information policy does not imply archival accessibility.

Part I discusses the tensions between the ordering principles of the past, established in the nineteenth century along national borders, and the difficulties in preserving the memory of international organizations. Sigrun Habermann-Box addresses the complex history of how the League of Nations organized archival evidence and to what extent the British administrative system shaped the memory of this first global governmental organization. Underestimated in the research until now, this topic enables observation of the power of registry, but also highlights an asymmetrical development in preservation policy: compared to the availability of archival evidence for the UN system and the various NGOs created after World War II (see UNESCO archival portal) the League of Nations observed a rigid policy of records administration. There is still more to say about the interferences between national diplomacy and international organizations for the time period between 1919 and 1946 than about the complex networks within the UN system during the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries. But in only a few cases do the newly available information technologies enable a thorough search of the rich archival sources of the League of Nations with the enormous amount of documents preserved in national archives. Based on JACAR, a digital database making documents on Japan's foreign relations available to non-Japanese speaking scholars in an exemplary way, Kenichiro Hirano provides an example on how future collaborative research may provide access to the complex entanglements of international bargaining and national foreign policy. At the center of this debate is the transcript of a conversation between the Japanese head of delegation, Matsuoka, and the secretary general of the League, Eric Drummond. Indeed, ongoing research projects on the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations[5] underline the paradigmatic character of the League as a global platform for the shaping of multilateral diplomacy.

With the increasing significance of experts participating in international organizations and working as diplomatic advisors new, well-connected actors entered the stage. In Part II foreign science policy dissects the relations between developing epistemic communities and diplomacy, the latter is still the only holder of legitimacy to act on behalf of a state. The very fact that international organizations took all forms, from diplomatic networks to the socialist Internationale, created opportunities to use "soft power" *avant la lettre*. Sometimes newly created epistemic communities and old diplomatic elites converged, sometimes these entanglements resulted in agencies not known before, and sometimes the complexity of agencies enhanced the power of totalitarian structures. While the fact of diversity does not require a methodological sea change, fascism deriving from out of the box of a chaotic variety of international networks needs further investigation that crosses disciplinary and methodological boundaries in a prospective way, that includes contemporary information society. Until now, academic interest in the increasing significance of governmental propaganda remains in the enclosure of the nation state. When addressed to an international civil society and focusing on the gray zones of semi-official agencies, a debate on governmental propaganda entails sidelining the strong tradition of political science in International Relations Studies and implies an increasing consideration of cultural aspects. The main argument in this volume does not suggest shifting from International Relations Studies to an almost exclusive consideration of cultural aspects. Rather, by aiming at a global history of international organizations the political rationale gains an additional level of analysis. Debates within the realm of postcolonial studies and critical discussions about presumed cultural authenticity serve as heuristic tools to circumvent the existing Eurocentric history of international organizations. At least for Japan, center-periphery models and ideas of backwardness or the assumption of an asymmetrical development are not self-evident but are the result of political bargaining processes. Toshiki Mogami critically investigates "IO Occidentalism" and highlights the epistemic role of international organizations. To him, International Organizations indicate the tensions between non-universal functions and the presumed universality of membership, the translation of international organization into an expression of "collective hegemonism" and the telling specification of Western states as "civilized nations." Atsushi Shibasaki explains the vigor of international organizations on the brink of governmental and nongovernmental entanglements. His example, the creation of KBS, the Center for International Cultural Relations, from 1934 to 1953, gives evidence of the political use of West-East rhetoric. Although only a small institution based on a small elite, the KBS enforced the idea that Japan held a unique bargaining position between East and West. Claiming a bargaining position turned therefore into an opportunity to avoid entanglement—a position which then allowed Japan to push claims towards the West. As Naomi Nagata explains, even in the most common forms of internationalized imperialism, the International Sanitary Conferences, Western dominated institutions also impaired the European members. An accelerating world economy provided a good argument for the introduction of a newly shaped and fast working framework of disease control. Although they were still based on old prejudices against the Orient, the new tools resulted in a reduction of sovereignty for Western states and unveiled one of the paradoxes of modern border-crossing networks: While nineteenth-century constitutional law underlined the separation of power as a landmark of modern governance, colonial rules and imperialism had already launched mechanisms that Western powers could not deprive them of.

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[5] See Global Politics on Screen—A Japanese Film on the Lytton Commission in 1932 http://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de/en/news-events/films/portraits/details/m/global-politics-on-screen-a-japanese-film-on-the-lytton-commission-in-1932.html.

Having already discussed state-driven approaches using international organizations as tools in an enlarged version of foreign relations in the previous chapters, Part III sheds light on international organizations as fora and as platforms. Overcoming both institutional history and a concentration on how members define their respective scope of action, this part investigates international organizations as networks whose internal ties create a social coherence not deductible from the sum of the participating members. Following this perspective, international organizations as fora are of interest for those who transform local concerns into global issues or, turning the focus to the other side, for organizations that adapt topics suitable to the organization's importance. Moreover, a third level circumvents the dominant control mechanism and indeed successfully creates a global sphere, sometimes described as "globoscape." Again, the discussion and the example chosen aim to overcome a monocular (subconscious) Western approach, always with the reminder that this volume follows an analytical approach. It does not present a summary of the history of international organizations, but helps to specify examples crucial for a first rapprochement towards a global history of international organizations. One of the most striking examples within the testing grounds of a global history derives from the Sino-Japanese tensions for several reasons: first, they confront opposed ideas about East-West relations within Asia; second, being at the center of attention of world politics, these tensions were always transferred to international fora by both of the parties involved; and third, the reason for the dispute developed its own and very specific momentum. By exploring the Sino-Japanese controversies over textbooks, Shin Kawashima elaborates on one of the most universal ideas the League of Nations had to offer, namely the almost utopian assumption that peaceful humanity results from non-aggressive textbooks. The idea remained steady without consequences, at least as regards a long-lasting peace. Moreover, in the case of Japan and China, Kawashima demonstrates that the textbook controversy had a complex anti-colonial prehistory and always re-emerged on a global platform when bilateral tensions between Japan and China increased. In this case, the global platform had a rather escalating impact—far removed from the rhetoric that peace stakeholders were using in this field. Used as forum for textbook controversies, the League functioned as an international platform for highly political and governmental disputes. At first glance, the Pan-Pacific Science Congress fulfilled a similar task, though it provided a platform for presenting a more local and less global development of networks. However, Tomoko Akami directs scholarly attention to Pacific science networks as a crucial step in making an inter-imperial governance system. This approach travels some distance towards the assumption of viewing international institutions almost exclusively as the consequence of bargaining transboundary topics in the context of existing nation states; and it stresses inter-imperial cooperation as a critical aspect of international organizations at least in Asia and the Pacific, where colonies, not independent nation states, were more common and formal governmental organizations were absent. Against all expectations, however, these Pan-Pacific inter-imperial fora with less diplomatic and more informal profiles had a comparable impact, even similar functions, which generated results even in the same timeframe and in combining fields creating a basis of 'public' infrastructures for regional governance. Addressing the question of Chinese internationalism, Guoqi Xu discusses the role of the Young Men's Christian Association. Within this context, the YMCA reveals this organization's capacity, which spread from introducing China to the Olympic movement to the education of Chinese building the French trenches during World War I.

Part IV turns to the question of how global international organizations invented and introduced new fields of action beyond the established agencies. Again, the governmental use and non-governmental activities present a colorful picture introducing different options. Although not limited to the second part of the twentieth century, this chapter questions a linear development and a close connectivity between the different generations of international organizations. Since the second part of the nineteenth century, the increasing importance of international organizations has become clear and indeed is understood as a characteristic of modern history. On the other hand, some aspects developed differently, and although wars did not destroy transboundary networks, in the post-war situation the texture of networks gained different patterns: After World War I, the presence of non-European agencies increased, after World War II new ordering principles introduced the difference between political and non-political and between governmental and nongovernmental agencies within the system of the United Nations. After the end of the Cold War a tendency toward inclusion and entanglements gave more power to non-governmental arrangements. Within this development, standard setting turned to key elements. While culture provided the chance to handle and organize difference by inventing authenticity, standard setting served the need for common rules, even the establishment of a 'virtual' common language not spoken by human beings but expressed in the forms of the material world like, for example, in the shape of containers, the structure of IP addresses, and the pictograms leading foreigners through airports. Craig Murphy opens up this panorama, taking the development of ISO standards as evidence and referencing contemporary debates about whether or not established concepts of global governance change under the increasing importance of Asia. Within this discussion the references to East and West reveal a methodological approach that is sometimes misunderstood as ideal types. However, there is a remarkable claim for pragmatism and a strong tendency towards "voluntary standard setting" in this field, while debates on culture follow a structure of argumentation almost in the opposite direction. Timothy Taylor found a striking description of UNESCO's impact as a "nonmarketized way of recognizing the local in the name of preservation" under the conditions of a fully developed consumer culture. The assumption of a specific form of creating the history of global culture allows us to understand the ambivalent interplay between inventing, selling, and consuming cultural authenticity. Two approaches selecting different timeframes discuss the ambivalent understanding of culture as a global asset administered properly only by international organizations and as a distinctive expression of authenticity only understandable in its local context. With the international commission of popular arts, Bjarue Rogan discusses the League of Nations' rather reluctant attitude towards folklore, anthropology and ethnology and the suspected lack of neutrality in the League's Committee on Intellectual Cooperation. Challenged by a choice to spread 'high culture' that was acknowledged by the nation states and implemented in their tools of foreign propaganda, the League continued to tread very close to essentializing different national cultures. With the process of decolonization on one hand and asymmetrical development concepts on the other, the concept of culture as global, national, and elitist at once broke apart in the highly controversial results of UNESCO's world history commission. Katja Naumann summarizes the result as a continuous loss of globality with the organization aiming at a non-Western history.

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Part I

Constructing the Memory of International Organizations

From the League of Nations to the United Nations: The Continuing Preservation and Development of the Geneva Archives

Sigrun Habermann-Box

Abbreviations

ARMS	Archives and Records Management Service United Nations, New York
DG	Director-General
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
ECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
IBD	International Bureau for Declarations of Death
IRO	International Refugee Organisation
League	League of Nations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODG	Office of the Director-General United Nations Office at Geneva
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
RRA	Registry Records and Archives Unit, Library of the United Nations Office at Geneva
SG	Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva

Introduction

In 2009 the League of Nations Archives were included in UNESCO's Memory of the World Register. This designation not only reflects the exceptional value of this documentary heritage as the continuous archival documentation of an international

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organization established before 1945, but also recognizes the United Nations' responsibility for its integrity, preservation, and accessibility.

So how was it possible that the archives of a political international organization were kept safe throughout the growing pains of the 1920s, its steady demise in the 1930s, and its almost entire shut-down during the World War II? And how are the archives of the United Nations Office at Geneva managed in order to ensure that they will be available to researchers in the future?

In order to answer these questions this paper will discuss the historical development, policy, and management issues of the archives of the League of Nations (League) and its successor organization, the United Nations (UN), with a focus on the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG).

From the very beginning of the League in 1919, a registry system was put in place to maintain and circulate the official correspondence and records of the League's Secretariat. A description of the registry system and its relevant policies and guidelines provides an understanding of the set up of the archives. It also helps explain how administrative history determined the scope and contents of the archive collections.

Legacy and Foundations

The Registry System of the League of Nations

The League of Nations was conceived in 1919 during the aftermath of the tragedy and suffering caused by World War I. The victorious states established the organization, which was designed "to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security" based on open, just, and honorable relations between nations.[1] The Covenant of the League of Nations, which constitutes the first part of the Treaty of Versailles, established the mandates of the world's first intergovernmental organization dedicated to peace and was approved by the commission on the League of Nations on 28 April 1919.

On 10 January 1920 the League of Nations officially came into being with the entry into force of the peace treaty. The organization consisted of an assembly and a council, both assisted by a permanent Secretariat, which formed the technical organ of the League. Appointed and headed by the secretary-general, the Secretariat was set up in Geneva, first in the Palais Wilson and later in the Palais des Nations.

The permanent Secretariat represented the civil service branch of the League of Nations and was, in practice, the only direct producer of records. These owe their origin to actions taken by the assembly, the council, the various commissions, committees and specialized bodies, as well the work of the Secretariat. The latter was intended to serve these various entities and was also responsible for administering certain matters. The working languages of the Secretariat were English and French.

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[1] League of Nations (1919).

The central registry of the League of Nations was established on 30 June 1919 in London where preparations to set up the organization were underway. The registry's prime function was to maintain the official correspondence and records of the Secretariat, and to regulate their circulation. All incoming communications of a fully official character passed through the registry; and all out-going letters were recorded in the registry and dispatched by it with few exceptions.

With the seat of the League in London and the first secretary-general a British citizen, the registry service was modeled after the systems in place at the British ministries. It was a part of Internal Administration and headed by a registrar-general. The first head of service, Mr. D. A. Leak, was a member of the permanent staff of the British Foreign Office and seconded for service under the League.

In 1921 the registrar-general reported on the work of his service.[2] The system he described remained in place throughout the League's existence and was later adopted by the newly created United Nations.

Legal and Administrative Foundations

League of Nations Registry and Archives Policy

As early as July 1919, the first instructions were issued in the *Procedure with regard to the registration, circulation,* etc.*, of official documents,*[3] concerning correspondence and other papers of the organization. Staff members were asked to adhere "as far as possible" to the outlined procedure to ensure a uniform and consistent practice and thus gain efficiency and convenience in the treatment of official documents. The instructions were approved and circulated in the Secretariat by Secretary-General (SG) Eric Drummond. The following are the main rules that were laid out:

All new papers, duly signed and dated should in the first place be sent to the registry, where they would be classified, entered, and returned to the sender or passed to any person or section indicated by him. Copies of important documents should be sent to the registry. A coherent dossier or file is made up of documents on the same subject and the relevant minutes. The minutes on each individual registered document are placed in chronological sequence. Files rotate among staff based on indications, which the minute writers make on the docket sheet (or jacket). The registry is charged with the copying, signature, and dispatch of outward draft letters that require the SG's approval. The instructions also state: "There need be no hesitation in sending the most confidential documents to the Registry."[4] No document can be removed from the docket sheets and no registered paper should be unnecessarily detained in individual custody. The registry is to be the single legitimate home for all the official archives.

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[2] 29/11929/11929, Summary of Work performed in the Registry of the International Secretariat, 31 March 1921, League of Nations Archives, Geneva. The registry's main tasks concern all activities for the proper filing and circulation of correspondence, as well as replying to information requests, preparation of a daily synopsis, and the general custody of the archives.

[3] 29/520, A.7, 29 July 1919, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

Standing instructions[5] prepared by the registrar-general expand on the SG's instructions from 1919 and include a description of the registry with its three specialized branches for classification, archives, and indexing. It is noteworthy that the Archives Branch, responsible for storing the documents in its facilities, also ensured that the action indicated in the minutes was taken by the relevant executing section of the Secretariat.

The standing instructions also provide details on the rules and procedures for each branch and on the circulation of documents according to subject.

A revision in January 1926 reiterated the main functions and procedures of the registry and lists two new branches: The Transiting Branch, which registered the dates for the document's arrival and exit, and the Safe Branch, which "dealt with the very important documents which are kept in the fire-proof safes."[6]

The instructions of the registry service not only determined its functions and tasks at a given time, they also documented its work. They clearly demonstrate the changes that the service went through in order to adapt to an increased workload. Statistics provided with the registrar-general's report show a rapid increase of registered documents, from a monthly average of 1,062.83 documents in 1919 to 3,188 documents in March 1921. In July 1921, an average of 500 documents a day were processed by the Registry Service.

This enormous increase in volume, which was due to the expanding activities of the League and rising document production, continued steadily and only slowed with the beginning of World War II. It not only put stress on the registry's resources, but also required a constant adaptation of the document classification scheme to new activities and changes in the structure of the organization. Classification sections of the registry never completely coincided with actual organization charts and thus some of these sections later fell into disuse, or documents had to be reclassified. In order to facilitate the classification system the divisions were named, renumbered, and reorganized in 1928 and 1933. As a result, the files and their indexes are today separated into three chronological series from 1919 to 1927, 1928 to 1932, and from 1933 to 1946.

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[4] 29/520, A.7, 29 July 1919, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

[5] 29/11885/11885, Registry. Standing Instructions, 31 March 1921, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

[6] 29/11885/11885, Registry. Standing Instructions, revision January 1926, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

The concerns of the time are captured in a report by the registrar-general in a memorandum[7] dated to 15 February 1923. Following a request by the Library Committee, Mr. Leak provides his opinion that all non-current documents older than 3 years should be transferred to the library for improved research results. Prior to transfer, documents of low importance and utility should be separated and destroyed. A definite decision on this question was, however, deferred by the committee[8] as it did not "feel sufficiently confident on the subject."

This early attempt at reducing the workload for the registry and at establishing an official archives service was therefore unsuccessful and no other subsequent attempts at reorganization have been documented. As Registrar Vallery-Radot's 1939 report demonstrates,[9] the same number of staff treated 52,185 documents in 1923 and more than 90,000 in 1937. The report does not mention any disposal activity carried out by the registry. We can therefore assume that neither the registry files nor the section files transferred to the registry were destroyed.

The League's records and archives were transferred to the UN in 1946 and remained in Geneva. Since 1958 the UNOG Library has been responsible for their management, and rules about access were issued by UN Secretary-General U Thant in 1969. Secretary-General's Bulletin 135[10] determines that consultation of the archives take place in situ from the beginning of the calendar year following the date on which the most recent item in the file concerned has attained 40 years. Exemptions can be made by the UNOG director-general (DG) who can grant exceptions in favor of researchers who are able to prove a legitimate interest in more recent material. A 60-year rule is in place for specific documents from national administrations for files that could injure the reputation, affect the privacy, or endanger the safety of individuals, and for personnel files. Researchers also need to respect national copyright and reproduction rules.

UNOG's DG was charged with the implementation of these rules and work started on the opening of the files. To make them accessible to the public, an inventory, the General Repertory, was finalized in the 1970s and a reading room was set up.

By the end of the 1990s, when most League archives became open to the public, the UNOG Library focused on expanding reference services in the reading room. By that time archivists had acquired extensive knowledge of the collections and research methods. Knowledge transfer among unit staff is actively supported in order to ensure that information is retained and can be tapped in the future.

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[7] 29/26428/20859, Ultimate disposal of the Registered Archives of the Secretariat: memorandum and proposals on this subject, 15 February 1923, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

[8] C.204.M.120.1923, Commission of Experts on the Libraries of the Secretariat and the International Labour Office, 19 March 1923, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

[9] S935/2, Archives (Registry), 1939, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

[10] ST/SGB/135, Access to League of Nations Archives, 26 December 1969.

Records Management Policy at the United Nations Office at Geneva

Even before the transfer of assets from the League to the United Nations, the drafters of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the new organization recognized the importance of its documents and defined their special status in Article II, Section 4: “The archives of the United Nations, and in general all documents belonging to it or held by it, shall be inviolable wherever located.”[11]

To manage the documents and archives, the registry system remained in place and some League files on unsettled issues were transferred to the UN. By 1950 all of these files had been reincorporated into the League Archives in Geneva.

As was the case in the early years of the League, the new UN registry had not yet developed a well-defined filing system. There was, however, some control over correspondence, files, and documents while the organization moved from San Francisco to London to Lake Success in 1947 and into the new permanent headquarters in New York in 1950.

At the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva, the registry, together with the mailing system was initially part of the General Services, Documents, Distribution and Registry Division[12] and later of the Conference and General Services Division. The registry was composed of three units for classification, filing and indexing, and for transit and custody. In 1949 most mail was delivered unopened to the individual divisions. Only once mail had been handled and a reply received, were the documents forwarded to the registry. Only a few divisions retained the system of the League, whereby the registry opened and registered all but personal mail and then forwarded it to the relevant division. Also, the registry no longer verified if action had been taken as indicated in the file.

The file classification system was numerical and broken down into the main subjects dealt with per division. This source-based system was changed in 1973 to a decimal subject-oriented system, when UNOG decided to adapt to the headquarters classification scheme.

The UNOG registry service maintained registered records for their entire lifecycle. Inactive records that were maintained in the divisions and units could be transferred to the Records Retirement Service, which also provided access to these records. Consultation of records was usually based on administrative needs, and external research requests were rare. As was the case at the League, an official archives service responsible for identifying, managing, and preserving records of historical value was never set up.

In 1982 the registry service was transferred to the Division of Administration.[13] In the same decade, the UNOG Central Registry system gradually ceased to function. Many departments stopped sending correspondence to the registry. Some record series are therefore incomplete today and some are no longer in use.

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[11] Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, 13 February 1946.

[12] Internal document 49–14765, Co-ordination of and Co-operation between Registry Services of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies, [1949?], UNOG Archives, Geneva.

[13] ST/SGB/186, Reorganization of the administrative services in the United Nations Office at Geneva, 22 February 1982.

The record series concerning the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) stopped in the early 1980s, when the Commission created its own registry service. After abolishing the registry in the 1990s, the Commission continued transferring inactive records to the UNOG archives for storage, disposal, and consultation.

By the end of the 1990s, only fragments of the registry services for UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Office of the UNOG Director-General (ODG) remained. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is still maintaining a well-functioning registry system and transfers non-registered and inactive registered records to UNOG archives.

In June 2000 a reform of UNOG's registry system was initiated, and responsibility for all archives and records-related functions was transferred to the library.[14] The UNOG Registry, Records and Archives Unit (RRA) was designated to coordinate records management for all UNOG departments and to manage the historical League and UNOG archives. Modern records management principles were introduced and only a registry service for important documents from the Office of the Director-General remained.

Policies and guidelines including **responsibilities and functions** for records and archives at the UN were already issued in 1947. The SGB/63[15] determined the function of the archives and stated that other units had to keep the archivist informed of records, transfer them to the archives, and collaborate with the archivist on records surveys. The Archives Section became the custodian of all non-current and some current records of the UN. The section was responsible for making these records available, advising and informing other UN archivists on records matters, and liaising with archivists from other institutions.

All of the following policy documents confirm and expand the basic responsibilities of the UN Archives Service, the staff members, and the other units.

Disposal and retention policies crucially determined the state of the archives. No records were to be destroyed without the consent of the Archives Section. Revision 1 of SGB/63[16] issued in 1948 clarified the destruction procedure, determining that the Chief of Communications and Records Division could authorize the activity. The responsibility for disposition of records was transferred from the Secretariat Units to the Archives Section.

Policy statements and instructions of 1977,[17] 1984,[18] and 2007[19] confirmed this principle and specified: "With the agreement of the Secretariat unit concerned, the

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[14] IC/Geneva/4612, Reorganization of the archives service in the United Nations Office at Geneva, 13 September 2000.

[15] SGB/63, Functions of UN Archives, 28 March 1947.

[16] SGB/63/Rev.1, Functions of United Nations Archives, 14 July 1948.

[17] ST/AI/252, The United Nations Archives, 28 October 1977.

[18] ST/AI/326, The United Nations Archives, 28 December 1984.

[19] ST/SGB/2007/5, Record-keeping and the management of UN Archives, 2 February 2007.

Archives Section shall dispose of non-current records that have no further administrative, legal, historical or other informational value" thereby introducing modern records management principles.

Even today, the UN Archives Services' retention schedules are still established according to these principles. After checking administrative instructions and guidelines and consulting with legal and audit services, the archivist proposes the retention schedule to the department. Based on mutual agreement, the schedule is then approved by the archivist and implemented with the help of the Archives Service.

Practice at UNOG differed from these guidelines until the year 2000, as disposition was done on a case-by-case basis according to general principles. For example, all files concerning policy and procedure were kept indefinitely and the head of the registry authorized disposal action.

To better understand the rules on consultation of archives, it is important to highlight the development of the policies on **access and confidential information**.

Instruction ST/AI/117 of 1 August 1956[20] was issued to regularize the procedure for the declassification of documents. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General could approve declassification of restricted documents in consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Conference Services, and the substantive department concerned.

Administrative instructions issued in 1984[21] reiterate that restricted records may be declassified at any time by the SG or by his/her authorized representatives. It adds, however, that should no declassification be deemed possible at that point, the records would be automatically declassified after 20 years or be subjected to a review with further declassification reviews at 5-year intervals.

These rather vague guidelines were finally detailed and expanded with ST/SGB/2007/6 of 12 February 2007 on information sensitivity, classification, and handling.

The overall approach to classifying information is based on the understanding that the work of the UN should be open and transparent and that classifications should be used judiciously and only in cases where disclosure of the information could be detrimental to the proper functioning of the UN or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third parties, or violate the organization's legal obligations.

The bulletin lists document types and subjects whose information content is considered sensitive. Different security classification levels and their identification and marking are defined.

Generally speaking, declassification procedures are separated by classification level, whereby confidential documents are automatically declassified after 20 years, and strictly confidential documents require reviews by the SG or his/her representatives. Further details are provided for information received from an outside source.

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[20] ST/AI/117, Procedure for the declassification of documents, 1 August 1956.

[21] ST/AI/326, The United Nations Archives, 28 December 1984.

Access rights to archives for the public have been described in policy documents since 1947.[22] In 1977 Secretary General's Bulletin 158 stated that UN Archives shall promote scholarly research concerning the UN and, to that end, will make available to the public the archival material and non-current records of the organization.[23] As detailed in the administrative instructions of the same year, the public shall have access to archives and non-current records that were originally public at the time of their creation and to those which are more than 20 years old and not subject to restrictions imposed by the SG.[24] In 1984[25] it was added that those less than 20 years old may be accessed if they are free from restrictions and if the originating office consents.

These policies demonstrate the slow but steady evolution of access rights to UN records and archives for the public. Clear guidelines and procedures concerning security classification and declassification and a rigorous application of the organization's transparency rules for newly created documents will make UN archives more widely accessible in the future.

Archival History and the Geneva Collections[26]

League of Nations Archives

Today, the League of Nations Archives proper are made up of the Secretariat Fonds, the records of the Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds), and the External Fonds. These fonds were constituted by different services and are divided accordingly into registry, section or commission files.

Unlike the registered documents of the *Registry Files*, the documents that constitute today's *Section files* had bypassed the official procedure of the central registry and were built up and maintained by the various divisions in the Secretariat. They represent a body of documents whose substance and classification differ for each producing section, as they were produced when some sections (e.g. the Economic and Financial Section) were authorized to function autonomously, or because they kept parallel working files for internal use. Among these section files are, for instance, the "private papers" of heads or even of ordinary members of a section (memoranda, confidential papers, duplicates of correspondence handled by the registry), basic documents of which only a synopsis was registered (material for reports, replies to questionnaires, drafts of mimeographed documents), or chronological series of unclassified correspondence. These papers often complement the registry files.

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[22] SGB/63, Functions of United Nations Archives, 28 March 1947.

[23] ST/SGB/158, The United Nations Archives, 28 July 1977.

[24] ST/AI/252, The United Nations Archives, 28 October 1977.

[25] ST/AI/326, The United Nations Archives, 28 December 1984.

[26] United Nations Library Geneva (1999).

A third class of documents, the *Commission Files*, is defined as files *not* produced by the Secretariat in Geneva, such as the League's External Fonds. These are archive groups constituted by more or less autonomous bodies established by the League of Nations, such as the administrative commissions or units directly responsible to the Secretariat like the branch offices, in order to fulfill administration or arbitrary obligations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.

The Secretariat Fonds (1919–1946, 1,440 Linear Meters)

The permanent Secretariat was the executive organ of the League of Nations in charge of:

- assisting the assembly and the council, as well as their committees, commissions, and conferences in the preparation of their work and the implementation of their decisions, as well as in the participation of surveys on technical subjects;
- carrying out administrative and financial work;
- the registration and publication of the treaties ratified between Member States;
- material and technical work, such as translation of speeches, writing, and reproduction of minutes and reports;
- documentation (statistical collection, information documents, etc.);
- dissemination of information to staff and the outside world.

These tasks were executed in the different departments, divisions, and services of the Secretariat. From 1939 to 1940, the classification system of the registry grouped the different sections and services of the League of Nations Secretariat into three large departments. Department I included the former Political Section, Minorities Section, Mandates Section, Disarmament Section, and Intellectual Cooperation and International Bureaux Section. Department II was composed of the Economic and Financial Section as well as of the Transit Section, and Department III included the former Health, Social Questions and Opium Traffic Sections, Intellectual Cooperation, and International Bureaux Sections.

The Secretariat archive fonds comprises all material produced or received at the headquarters of the League of Nations. As explained in section "The Registry System of the League of Nations", most correspondence and files from the various sections of the Secretariat were handled, established, and kept by a central registry. Many sections additionally created parallel archives, the so-called Section Files, which were managed independently by administrative staff. Loss of files therefore occurred due to unauthorized and uncontrolled destruction, which was effected by section staff whenever it seemed necessary or useful.

Further losses to the fonds were incurred by physical relocations. The archives moved from London to Geneva in 1920 and to the newly built Palais des Nations in 1936. Furthermore, several parts of the fonds were transferred, mostly temporarily, as a result of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations. Another consequence of the wartime situation was the intentional destruction of certain files (e.g. of most section files of the Political Section after 1933) and of the papers of the first secretary-general Sir Eric Drummond (approximately eight archives boxes) in 1940. The papers of SG Joseph Avenol were transferred to the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, located at Quai d'Orsay in Paris, by the executors of his will.

The material that was moved to the USA during or after the war has been almost totally recovered. The registry files of the Health Section of the League of Nations, which were handed over to WHO in 1954, have also been returned.

In spite of the losses, an estimated 90 % of the Secretariat archives fonds has remained in its original state.

Refugees Mixed Archival Group or Nansen Fonds (1919–1947, 85 Linear Meters)

In 1920 Fridtjof Nansen—a Norwegian scientist, Arctic explorer and politician—was appointed League of Nations High Commissioner for Prisoners of War. Within 2 years, Nansen arranged for approximately 450,000 former soldiers to be returned to their homes. In 1921 he was appointed High Commissioner for Russian Refugees and played an instrumental role in organizing emergency relief to famine victims in Russia. Starting in 1922 he also dealt with the problem of refugees from Asia Minor, caused by mass migration. One of his greatest achievements is the introduction of a system of legal protection for refugees, which produced the "Nansen passport."

After his death in 1930, the League created an autonomous Nansen Office for Refugees, which continued the humanitarian relief work until 1938. From 1939 to 1946 the High Commissariat for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations took over the work of the office.

Due to several organizational changes, the corresponding files were registered and maintained by different services, moved to the ILO, and returned to the League. Section files were maintained alongside the registry files, and sometimes parallel registers were kept. The archives of the missions, offices, or correspondents of the High Commissioner for Refugees and later Nansen Office in various countries reflect their own administrative history.

After the official closure of the Nansen Office at the end of 1938, its archives stayed in Geneva and rejoined those of the Secretariat of the League. In 1947 they were supplemented by the archives of the Liquidator of the Nansen Office in Paris. The archives of the High Commissioner for German Refugees in London (1933–1936) were transferred to Geneva in 1936. The main part of the archives of the High Commissariat for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations (1938–1946) and of the League Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees (1939–1947) was allocated to the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and consequently transferred to the National Archives in Paris.

League of Nations External Fonds (1919–1946; 650 Linear Meters)

This archival group includes series of files constituted outside the Secretariat—archives produced by administrative units directly responsible to the Secretariat or by more or less autonomous bodies (e.g. the administrative commissions) connected with the League, its specialized organizations, and their committees, among others.

Among these documents are files from administrative commissions and courts of law, (e.g. the Saar Plebiscite Supreme Court, the Upper Silesia Arbitral Tribunal, the Administrative Commissions for the Financial Reconstruction of Austria or Hungary, the Saar Basin Governing Commission, the Mixed Greco-Bulgarian Emigration Commission, etc.). This material also consists of archives produced by administrative units directly reporting to the Secretariat, such as the branch offices at Berlin or London or offices detached for the duration of the war (e.g. Princeton or Washington Office).

Each sub-fonds has its own history and its own special characteristics depending on the institution that created it and on its geographic location. Some are incomplete or missing for various reasons. Smaller archives groups, for example the records of a mission, have sometimes been incorporated into the Secretariat fonds—like the papers of the Mosul Commission—or into larger sub-fonds of external origin. It was also common practice to divide up these archives among various governments in view of the territorial relevance of some of the material. Some groups were allocated to local or national depositories. As an example, UNESCO in Paris keeps the archives of the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation; and the French National Archives retain some files of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees set up in London in 1939.

Finally, some archives have been lost (e.g. the papers of the High Commissioner in Danzig), or systematically destroyed (e.g. the records of the Tokyo Office, destroyed in 1940).

United Nations Office at Geneva Archives

With the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the dissolution and the liquidation of the League of Nations in 1946, the League of Nations Headquarters in Geneva, the Palais des Nations, became the seat of the United Nations Office at Geneva. UNOG archives concern records created by UN offices operating within the United Nations Office in Geneva.

The following file series were used for the registration of documents during the so-called first period of the UNOG Registry from 1946 to 1973: General (e.g. conferences, relations with governments, missions, and other institutions), General Administration (e.g. Establishment of UNOG, UN Postal Administration), Finance, Property and Equipment Administration, Legal issues (e.g. treaties, privileges, and immunities), Publications and Library, World Health Organization, Information Service, Economic Commission for Europe (statistics, files on the economic reconstruction of Europe, coal, electric power, customs etc.) and Human Rights (the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Human Rights covenants).

The second period of the UNOG Registry, which started in 1974, records 13 file series. In addition to the subjects of the first period, there are series on Technical Assistance, Disarmament, Systems for Information Coordination, and Apartheid. With the decentralization of the Registry Service in 1980, fewer and fewer documents were registered; this continued until 2000 when a records management program replaced the registry system and only the series of the Office of the Director-General was maintained. An estimate as to the extent of the documents lost between 1980 and 2000 has not yet been made and archives transfers are still coming into the UNOG Registry, Records and Archives Unit from divisions and services.

Authorized destruction of registry files was carried out on a case-by-case basis up to 1999. In this way, the files of the first registry period, index category GXVI, Technical Assistance, were disposed of, as records personnel considered them of limited administrative value.

Besides these registry files, archives record groups were established corresponding to deposits of a permanent or semi-active nature. Some examples include the archives of the International Bureau for Declarations of Death (IBD) 1952–1973; the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for World Refugee Year 1955–1960; the transfer of property from the League of Nations to the United Nations; United Nations Headquarters in New York, including papers by the former UN Undersecretary General and Nobel prize winner Ralph Bunche; Human Rights (Projects by country, victims of torture, program for indigenous populations, etc.), Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), UNCTAD and ECE Liaison Office in Germany (1947–1952).

These record groups also consist of the section files maintained by UNOG administrative and other services. Destruction of archives without permanent or historical value takes place in agreement with the originating offices based on disposal agreements and since 2000 also on retention schedules.

Several relocations of divisions or services affected the UNOG archives. When the Division of Narcotic Drugs was moved from New York to Geneva around 1955, its files were transferred to UNOG Archives. These files and those of several other bodies dealing with narcotic drugs were again transferred to Vienna in 1979. Records of the Trusteeship Council, the UN organ for supervising the administration of Trust Territories placed under the International Trusteeship System, which has been suspended since 1994, moved to the UN main seat in New York, and those of the United Nations Environment Program to the United Nations Office at Nairobi. The files of the Division of Human Rights were transferred with the organization from New York to Geneva in 1974 and are still in the custody of UNOG Archives. No known archives losses were incurred through these planned relocations.

Conclusion

The recognized historic role of the League of Nations as the first experiment of an intergovernmental organization dedicated to multilateralism and to peace work is reflected not only in its political activities but also in its administrative structure and rules. As these are the foundations for records and archives management systems, today's collections mirror the successes and difficulties of the League and its successor, the United Nations.

Policies for records management were established from the very beginning, introducing a records registry system following the practice of British ministries. Administrative instructions for staff members and records services followed. League and UN administration sought to regulate records management by defining responsibilities and processes. However, the steadily increasing number of organizational activities and the growing complexity of global issues, coupled with technological changes led to a failure of the registry system. Early on, League and UNOG services developed alternative filing systems within their offices. Additional challenges to the integrity and completeness of the archives were relocations in times of crisis and disaster.

In spite of that, 90 % of the League's Secretariat files remained in their original state and Nansen Office files are considered fairly complete. External fonds suffered more damage, specifically during World War II, but some important file series were recuperated. Concerning UNOG archives, relatively few losses occurred in the registry files. For other records groups, review and description projects are necessary to facilitate or in some cases enable access.

Today the UN records and archives services recognize the threats to their collections. Disaster planning and emergency preparedness, as well as preservation methods and strategies are an integral part of policies. UN Secretariat rules on retention and filing have evolved and are applied in the different duty stations including UNOG. Informing and training staff is a key element of records management programs.

In 2009 the League of Nations Archives were inscribed on UNESCO's Memory of the World Register. This registration underlined the importance of these archives as global heritage and the responsibilities of UNOG as its owner. In concrete terms, it helped to raise awareness and gain support for the need to improve storage conditions at the Palais des Nations[27] as well as widen public access through targeted description, digitization, and online discovery tools.

Digitization not only enables remote access to document content, but also helps preserve the original by replacing it for consultation purposes. The papers of the last secretary-general of the League of Nations, Sean Lester, the papers of the Austrian pacifist, Bertha von Suttner, and the collection of UNOG human rights photos have been digitized and are available through the archives online catalogue.[28] Currently a project for the digitization and online publishing of the official documents of the assembly, the council, and the Secretariat is underway and is scheduled to be finalized by the end of 2013.

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[27] 2009 UNOG Annual Report, 2010: 33–38.

[28] http://biblio-archive.unog.ch/suchinfo.aspx

Taking electronic access one step further, the library's new projects include the design of information discovery tools, such as a comprehensive resource guide to the League of Nations Archives developed in 2011 and made available online.[29]

And last but not least, the UNOG library showcases selected archives in its League of Nations Museum. Open to visitors from all over the world, the multimedia exhibitions provide a visual account of the history of the League of Nations and educate on the progress of UN issues.

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Matsuoka Yosuke's Miscalculation at Geneva: A Possible Reconsideration Using JACAR Data

Kenichiro Hirano

Japan's Withdrawal from the League of Nations

In historical hindsight, it was Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in February 1933 that drove the world to the final phase leading to the outbreak of World War II. Japan wanted the League to recognize Manchukuo, though member states were cognizant that the state was fabricated by Japan. Rejected by the League, Japan moved to confront China on its own and plunged into war with China. Germany, where Hitler came to power in January 1933, withdrew from the League in October the same year. Although it continued to exist until the end of World War II, the League became a weak international organization that was unable to settle international conflicts. Japan's withdrawal triggered a chain of withdrawals from the League, destroying the base of the world's first international organization for peace and security. To escape from the state of being "an orphan in the world," Japan formed a tripartite treaty alliance with Germany and Italy.

Matsuoka Yosuke (1880–1946) played a key role in Japan's withdrawal from the League and in designing his nation's alliance with Nazi Germany. Matsuoka also designed and concluded a neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union, thereby drawing up a world power map on the basis of which Japan soon started the Pacific War. Matsuoka possibly hoped that the framework he had constructed would check the USA from staging a war with Japan, but his design did not succeed.

Matsuoka's dramatic act in Geneva in the winter of 1932–1933 presented him as the key person in Japan's withdrawal from the League. Among the Japanese people at least, the withdrawal instantly made him a hero who had a determined plan and carried it out with confidence. Even today, Japan's withdrawal from the League is so strongly associated with Matsuoka that many Japanese think the withdrawal was Matsuoka's feat. But how did the Japanese government make its decision to

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withdraw from the League? To what extent was the withdrawal the result of Matsuoka's personal bravado? For its part, the League of Nations appeared to have been caught off guard by Matsuoka's walkout from its General Assembly, but how did it really react? Was it ready to accept the repercussions from the first withdrawal of its major member state?

In other words, was it not possible to stem the spread of Japan's outrageous actions, which had started with the Manchurian Incident, before it became too late? Why was the League of Nations unable to prevent Japan from withdrawing? This paper attempts to answer these questions by reading some of the original documents that are provided by the database of the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR).[1] The JACAR database contains a treasure trove of original documents concerning Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. For instance, a keyword search in English of the name "Matsuoka Yosuke" will lead to 179 document files and 1,062 document files in a search in Japanese. Likewise, by inputting "withdrawal from the League of Nations," a search in English will pull up 22 document files versus 87 document files in a search in Japanese. As will be discussed later in this article, the document file titled "Documents relating to withdrawal from the League of Nations by Japanese Government," that is No. 16 in the "withdrawal from League of Nations" group, is the central relevant piece to this inquiry.

The Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo were historical tipping points that led the world to the Pacific War. To avoid taking that course it would have been necessary to somehow contain Japan, and if there was any mechanism that was able to contain Japan it could only have been the League of Nations. In her recent book on the League of Nations, Professor Shinohara Hatsue of Waseda University argues that until it was confronted with Japan's engineering of the Manchurian Incident and subsequent withdrawal, the League—the first universal international organization—had been fairly successful in its novel attempts at collective security measures.

According to Professor Shinohara, the League's novel attempts, which were produced by competition between traditional big power diplomacy and democratic processes among the member states, included long deliberations among smaller states. In particular, the League applied the Lytton Commission of Inquiry and the Committee of Nineteen (States), devices for long deliberation, to deal with the Manchukuo issue. These were really historically fresh attempts, so much so that the League was uncertain about their management or effects. They moved slowly, groping their way along the course, while Japan moved quickly, hastening out one action after another against the international community. The League was sincere in its efforts to solve the conflict, but proved to be ineffective (Shinohara 2010, pp. 195–219). Japan withdrew from the League exactly because the League was such an organization. Thus, it was mainly Japan's policy and diplomacy that decided the course of history. We must take a fresh look at Japan's actions and especially Matsuoka's role in shaping them.

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[1] The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) was established in November 2001 at the initiative of former Japanese prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi. The prime minister proposed it as a means for the Japanese people to face the history of Japan's wars with and colonial domination over its neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific, which victimized many people in the region. JACAR was established as a digital archive that would contribute to historical research and increase the public's historical understanding and thereby contribute to ameliorating the international question of differing recognitions of history. Provided with documents in the period ranging from the early Meiji era to the end of the Pacific War, mainly from the National Archives of Japan, the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Institute of Defense of the Ministry of Defense, JACAR now offers nearly 30 million images of all original government documents online to anyone, at anytime, anywhere, and free of charge. Most of the documents are in the original Japanese but some of them are in other languages, as evidenced by the number of League of Nations' documents quoted in this article in French and English. JACAR's homepage (http://www.jacar.go.jp), document catalogues, and keyword thesaurus can be consulted in English as well.

Generally speaking, Japan was a new force added to the League of Nations, which was often understood as a Western organization, from the outside. Since it was meant to be a universal organization, the League had to include Japan, especially because Japan, lately victorious over China and Russia, was becoming an indomitable power, indeed the only power in Asia. In addition, the League was being used by the British and the United States governments to attempt to gain control over Japan, because it had become increasingly difficult to get hold of Japan through the old arrangements of alliance and agreements. Thus, how Japan was treated in the League tended to have a big impact on the League itself.

Matsuoka's Intention

On 28 April 1933, upon his return from the extraordinary session of the League of Nations, Matsuoka gave the emperor a long report on his mission to Geneva.[2] After offering a long description of the negotiations at the council and the general assembly of the League, Matsuoka explained "it was my understanding that the Japanese government wanted to remain in the League, if that would have brought a practical solution to the Sino-Japanese conflict. As long as practical damages were not caused to the execution of Japan's Manchurian policy, the Japanese government was ready to make certain compromises or even tolerate speeches and actions at the League that were disadvantageous to Japan and stay with the League." (Report to the Throne by Matsuoka, 13) He added that as he considered it regretful that the international community was apt to be suspicious of Japan's sincerity, he was determined to refrain from speeches and actions that might be mistaken as false or frivolous, and he employed no maneuvering from the beginning (Report to the Throne by Matsuoka, 13–14).

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[2] The text of this report, "Report to the Throne by Matsuoka Yosuke (Upon arriving from Extraordinary Session of League of Nations debating on Japan-China problem) April 1933" is available in the JACAR database.

Matsuoka then disclosed to the emperor that there was a chance at reaching a compromise between the Japanese delegation and the League. Matsuoka and the other Japanese delegates were prepared to accept an idea to set up in the League some form of organization to watch over Manchukuo or a forum in Geneva to debate it, and until mid-February 1933, the Secretary-General of the League, the British Foreign Minister, the President of the Extraordinary General Assembly, and others expressed their general agreement with the idea. However, Matsuoka chose to give precedence to following Japan's principles over other practical considerations. He admitted "in retrospect, we completely failed to accomplish the mission to remain in the League. I cannot regret that too much.... However, it can be said that we succeeded in fully attaining our desire not to allow any obstacles to stand in the way of the execution of our Manchurian policy." (Report to the Throne by Matsuoka, 15)

Matsuoka was dispatched to Geneva as a plenipotentiary, joining two Japanese representatives who were already there. He left Tokyo on 21 October 1932, carrying government's instructions for the delegation on Japan's basic position and policies. The instructions, simultaneously sent as top secret telegram No. 103 to Geneva, stated as its first point that "the Imperial government's basic principle on the Manchurian question is already decided in a cabinet decision; the question must be resolved according to the clauses and spirit of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol and the purport of the Imperial government's statement of September 1932. Moreover, this position has already acquired national consensus." (Instructions to Imperial representatives, 980)[3] In other words, the Japanese government was to persist in asserting that Manchukuo was a legitimately independent state and that Japan's special position in Manchuria must be respected. Had Japan's interest been neglected, the Manchurian question could not have been solved.

Yet the Japanese government was at first, to a certain extent, conciliatory toward the League. The instruction declared that Japan was not to reject the League's mediation; rather, the League should be led to understand that only Japan could solve the question. If it was difficult for the League to submit to Japanese persuasion, the delegates were instructed "not to force the League to accept the Japanese position, but try to let the League back down from the question." "If the League should (1) call Japan an aggressor or a Covenant breaker, (2) adopt a resolution with such assumptions, (3) adopt a resolution that would affect the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol or restrict its execution, or (4) try to take practical measures going beyond the abstract resolution by the General Assembly last March to block the execution of Japan's fundamental policies, the delegates must take every effort to fight against them and make the League change the course." In the end, the delegates were instructed to ask for further instructions if those efforts failed (Instructions to Imperial representatives, pp. 981–982). In short, the Japanese government and delegation did not plan to withdraw from the League from the beginning. Shortly before being joined by Matsuoka, the other Japanese delegates, Ambassador to

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[3] The telegram is on 979–982.

France Nagaoka, and Ambassador to Belgium Sato, sent their opinions that withdrawal should be the very last measure for Japan, along with their observation that the leaders of the League did not want to see Japan withdraw either (Usui 1995, pp. 140–141).

Matsuoka did not personally plan Japan's withdrawal from the League from the beginning. To Saionji Kinmochi, the "genro" whom he visited before departing for Geneva, Matsuoka declared that he would not dare withdraw from the League (Inaba et al. 1965, p. 881; Miwa 1971, p. 99). Also, one of his retinues said in recollection, "I do not think Matsuoka went to Geneva intending to spoil the matter from the beginning."[4]

To analyze the options, Matsuoka had three possible choices of course in Geneva. A self-made, ambitious man who had educated himself in Portland, Oregon for 9 years from the age of 11, Matsuoka particularly wanted to excel as a diplomat. He was confident enough to be a tough negotiator, able to speak for Japan in fluent English, and was well informed on the Manchurian question. Indeed, Japan's establishment had selected him exactly because it regarded him as just such a man; he had worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mainly in China service, and after early retirement from the ministry, he had been a vice president of the South Manchurian Railway Company. He wanted to succeed in his next step toward politics (Miwa 1971, pp. 36, 37, 44, 58, 59, 74–77, 90–92). Thus, his first choice was to have the League give Japan its recognition of Manchukuo, and Japan would, of course, stay with the League. He saw that gaining a complete victory for Japan would make him a hero among the Japanese people; but a complete victory was clearly inconceivable. Second, if he could somehow persuade the League to make a compromise short of condemning Japan, Japan would stay with the League. Since it was his initial intention to avoid Japan's withdrawal from the League, if he succeeded in getting the League to even partially approve Japan's Manchurian position, this partial victory would still make him a hero. The third choice, Japan's withdrawal from the League, was not an ideal successful outcome, but he also saw that he might be able to produce a complete victory out of it, depending on how he could dramatize it.

Matsuoka's Maneuvers

Matsuoka and the Japanese delegation started the negotiation with the second possibility as their target. They at first tried to prevent the Lytton Report from being submitted to the council, but soon gave up and tried instead to get an amendment passed. They demanded that unless the League understood and respected Japan's position, in particular its claim for the legitimacy of Manchukuo, it could not solve the question. The delegation questioned the governability of the

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[4] Mr. Yoshizawa Seijiro, personal communication (Uchiyama 1970, p. 181).

Chinese state, asking if China could be a responsible party for conflict resolution, to which the Chinese delegation presented fierce counter-arguments.

At one point, the British delegation showed a rather sympathetic attitude toward the Japanese argument. The classic method of negotiation among big powers initially seemed a hopeful route for Japan, but the League adopted new methods of more universal negotiations with wider participation. In particular, the League proposed to involve the USA and the Soviet Union, both non-member states, in the deliberation on the Manchurian question, reasoning that they had direct interests in Manchuria. Also, it created the Committee of Nineteen to deliberate on the Lytton Report before the final version was submitted to the General Assembly. Placed between the Council and the General Assembly, the Committee was composed not only of European states with experience in diplomatic negotiation but also of new states from non-European regions with less experience. The latter members held high hopes for the League of Nations and tended to engage in idealistic, and thus time-consuming, discussions. From Japan's point of view, their discussions were apt to be anti-Japanese or to lack a realistic understanding of sensitive situations.

Matsuoka and the other Japanese delegates considered these two attempts to be anti-Japanese measures and were determined to prevent them by any means. During the long period of adjournment between the opening General Assembly and the concluding General Assembly, the Japanese delegation was mostly engaged in negotiations with the League's Secretariat and the major delegations on these two measures. Matsuoka maneuvered to obtain concessions favorable to Japan on procedural matters. The Japanese delegation succeeded in blocking the involvement of the USA and Soviet Russia in the negotiations around the League, but did not succeed in bypassing the Committee of Nineteen. However, as time went on, Japan found it to be in its interest that the League took so much time on its deliberation. The documents available in the JACAR database reveal that Matsuoka even enjoyed picking fights on procedural matters, though he claimed that those matters were very critical for Japan. The Japanese delegation and government relied on delay tactics, hoping that the League would lose its interest in the Manchurian question as such. That hope was not realized, and during this interval facts of activities in Manchuria and China piled up and public opinion in Japan became more and more belligerent.

Japan's Fatal Decision

One of the JACAR document files, "Documents relating to withdrawal from the League of Nations by Japanese Government," contains a draft of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' proposal to the cabinet meeting, dated 19 February 1933. The Ministry recalled the cabinet decision of 1 February 1933 that, depending on the substance of an expected League of Nations' General Assembly committee report, Japan would withdraw from the League; it proposed that Japan carry out the plan already fixed since the committee report was sure to contradict the Japanese policy toward Manchuria. The ministry also proposed, with much emphasis, that the Japanese delegate announce Japan's position to the General Assembly, vote against the adoption of the committee report, and leave the assembly hall immediately (Documents relating to withdrawal from the League of Nations by Japanese Government, Picture 2–5). Next to this draft, the record of the cabinet meeting on 20 February can be found. The cabinet adopted the Foreign Ministry's proposal with no modification (Documents relating to withdrawal from the League of Nations by Japanese Government: Picture 5–6). Japan's Saito cabinet reached its final decision to withdraw from the League of Nations on 20 February 1933 and telegraphed the decision to the Japanese delegation in Geneva on the same day. The following day, the League of Nations' General Assembly resumed and 3 days later adopted the committee report that denied the legitimacy of Manchukuo, with only Japan opposing. Matsuoka delivered a long, fatal speech and led the delegation out of the hall.

If Matsuoka reported the true story to the emperor, it must have been in mid-February 1933 when there was a chance, however slight, for a compromise between the Japanese delegation and the League. The Japanese delegates and a few chief League personnel suggested setting up an organization or a forum to deal with the Manchurian question. The Japanese delegates proposed this measure to Tokyo, but the government sternly rejected it. The government had already reached its final decision, while the delegation had relayed its proposal in a half-hearted manner. The JACAR database contains a large group of documents that reveal extensive exchanges between Tokyo and Geneva from around the turn of 1932 to 1933.[5] Telegrams reveal that the Japanese government and diplomats were singularly concerned with how they could prevent the League of Nations from adopting measures and resolutions that would be against Japan's position. No effort was made to avoid Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations by drastically or even partially changing its Manchurian policy.

The Predicament of the League of Nations

Was it possible that the League of Nations might have avoided Japan's withdrawal?

The JACAR database contains another document that is important for this inquiry. The file titled "Secret records of League of Nations, Division 4," is remarkable because it contains eight English "RECORD OF INTERVIEW" typescripts that were left by the League of Nations' Secretary-General Eric Drummond about his interviews with Matsuoka and other Japanese delegates during the critical period of 18 January to 4 February 1933. Matsuoka repeatedly visited Drummond to negotiate for amendments on seemingly procedural matters on which he claimed that Japan's pride and final decision rested. In the "RECORD OF INTERVIEW" from 4 February, Drummond recorded that Matsuoka told him "[as long as the League of Nations' committee adheres to its Manchukuo point,] conciliation was impossible and that Japan would be forced to withdraw from the League which he personally would greatly regret. I (Drummond) replied that I would also regret it, but that I was convinced that the Committee could not meet him on this point..." (Secret records of League of Nations, Division 4, p. 416)

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[5] One example is in the seven document files in "Telegrams addressed to Nagaoka and Matsuoka plenipotentiary representatives and exchange telegrams of League of Nations representatives, …".

It is said that while in Geneva, Matsuoka never pronounced the word "withdrawal," even in his last speech to the General Assembly (Miwa 1971, p. 108). Drummond's record reveals, however, that Matsuoka clearly pronounced that word to the League's secretary-general at least 2 weeks before his walkout. What is more significant, the secretary-general was forced to accept Matsuoka's word, which was almost equal to pronouncing the word himself. Apparently, there was no longer much left for him to do to prevent Japan from withdrawing from the League. He must have felt that little recourse was left to him, first, because he was fully convinced that Japan would not change its position and, second, because the League's structure was such that no quick mediation was possible. It is also quite likely that Drummond thought Matsuoka was bluffing again.

Indeed, Matsuoka was most responsible for creating the situation. His speeches and behavior increasingly stiffened the atmosphere both in Geneva and back home in Japan. His repeated and confident bluffing, a technique he had learned as a student in the USA, backfired—first on procedural matters and then on the crucial matter.[6] Back in Japan, the nation's withdrawal from the League was already demanded in public. Matsuoka tried to dig himself out of the situation. His famous speech to the General Assembly on 8 December 1932, which could be titled "Japan on the Cross," was meant to explain Japan's position to the world; the aim was not only—as sketched out above—to publicize Japan's Manchurian policy but also to leave the door open for Japan to withdraw from the League. Additionally, Matsuoka attempted to achieve this in a way that would benefit his political standing at home. In a telegram in December 1932 Matsuoka declared that he would act at the League of Nations in such manner as to "let the Japanese spirit sweep the world." After all, Matsuoka's negotiations, speeches, and walkout from the assembly at the League of Nations were gestures lacking in sincere diplomacy for peace and made him a temporary hero among Japanese people. Japan had crossed its first point of no return toward the fatal war.

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[6] I am indebted to Professor Miwa for his argument regarding Matsuoka's bent for bluffing. (Miwa 1971, especially Chap. 2 and 58–59).

A Lesson from History

The League of Nations could not prevent Japan's withdrawal, which opened the road to World War II, despite it being the first universal organization designed to prevent such wars from reoccurring. But it is important to note that the League, and the world as a whole for that matter, was not accustomed to international organizations for world peace and security. No one knew for certain how to manage such an organization. No one knew what the repercussions of the first withdrawal of a major member state from the League would be. Japan and the Japanese people had little prospect for what their actions would invite and could not abstain from recklessly pursuing the course to which their insistence on self-interest and pride led them.

The League of Nations was the first universal organization for international peace and security in world history, but it could not prevent a self-centered national state like Japan from pursuing its policies of expansion with little regard for international peace. Since the institution was the first of its kind, the outcome was perhaps inevitable. Humanity had a poor understanding of global diplomacy through world organizations. Today we have learned much in the aftermath and have something of a second chance. Although the League of Nations may have failed, we hope that future historians will look back upon today and tomorrow's efforts with the United Nations, deeming our use of it—to ensure a more equitable future—as a triumph for humanity.

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Part II
Eurocentrism and Science Policy

On the Concept of International Organization: Centralization, Hegemonism, and Constitutionalism

Toshiki Mogami

The Propensity for Centralization

International Organization, that is, the act of organizing the international community,[1] may be *prima facie* a highly self-explanatory term. It presupposes that there exist discrete entities that await organization into monarchies, absolute kingdoms, or sovereign nation states. A historical process is set in motion as long as these entities are mutually distinct and discrete and, therefore, capable of being antagonistic to each other or, on the other hand, of entering in to mutually cooperative relations.[2]

If such discreteness is the precondition of International Organization, its history can date back to the Peace of Westphalia, when the individual "modern" nation states are said to have begun. But no actual organization was created at that juncture of history, and humankind had to wait for the advent of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century to see the germs of modern international organizations. Most books on the history of International Organization (or international organizations) begin their narratives with this juncture, precisely because the true proliferation of modern nation states began in this century rather than in the seventeenth century, thus encouraging the formation of a system of coordinating and regulating the relationships among those Vattelian "absolute" sovereign states.

The Concert of Europe is generally deemed as a precursor of modern international organizations, particularly as a prototype of elitism-based organs like the UN

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[1] The author distinguishes 'International Organization' beginning with capital letters from 'international organization.' The former refers, as explained in the text, to the conceptualized phenomena of utilizing international organizations and/or multilateralism for international order, while the latter refers to the actual international organizations that exist.

[2] For this in Japanese, see Mogami (2006).

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Security Council.[3] It may be so, and the Concert represented the needs of the age to integrate the rapidly growing new nation-state system that might tend to be disorderly; and like the Security Council, it was an act of organizing the discrete entities not on the basis of sovereign equality but on the discriminating dichotomy of the ruler and the ruled among states. But equally important is the fact that other organizations, which are not necessarily predicated on the ruler-ruled division, burgeoned in this era too. It was the Public International Unions that were brought about on the functional basis of enabling states to cooperate with each other in the socio-economic fields in order to correspond to the needs of the post-industrial revolution age.[4]

Thus, nineteenth-century Europe saw the birth of the two origins of International Organization: the need to overcome or regulate or control inter-state conflicts, albeit, by the great power entente of the age, on the other hand and the need to facilitate inter-state cooperation beyond the division imposed by national borders, on the other. These are the origins that have continued to manifest themselves throughout the history of International Organization up to the present day.

It can be said from the above that International Organization is, essentially, an anti-thesis to a state system that may be prone to anarchy. The extreme case of this antithetical reaction would be the federalist centralization of the world. Yet this centralization does not easily take place, so the median solution would be to form an association of states without the surrender of state sovereignty to the organization in question. This is how most international organizations have existed since the nineteenth century and continue to exist today.

The Centrality of the Occident

Modern international organizations were created in Europe in order to address the problems of the day. They were projections with which to tame and mold (some might say ‘civilize’) the state system. In this sense this phenomenon was undoubtedly a positive contribution to the world. On the other hand, this geographically protruding development has left its hallmark on the global system as well: the Euro-centricity of international organizations, both in the geographic allocation of the actual organizations and in the dominant power of the Occident in some (even many) of the key international organizations.

The persistent Occidentalism is represented, for example, by the near concentration of UN organizations/organs in either Europe or America: Geneva, Vienna, The Hague, and other European cities, or New York, Chicago, and other American cities. Out of approximately 70 UN organizations or organs only 6 are located outside these "centers": UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in Gaza, UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) in Nairobi, UN University (UNU) in Tokyo, International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) in Santo Domingo. The number may increase a little if we include several treaty bodies related to the UN, such as the Secretariat for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in Nairobi or the International Seabed Authority in Kingston, but the overall picture remains basically the same. Thus, the Occident-centric structure, or *IO Occidentalism*, is all too evident. Admittedly, it may be efficient to concentrate them in cities where the infrastructure is well prepared and transportation is easy, but this does not entirely explain IO Occidentalism.

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[3] Hans Morgenthau calls the Security Council “the Holy Alliance of our time” (Morgenthau 1971, p. 461).

[4] See, for example, Reinalda (2009, Part IV).

The study of International Organization itself has been essentially Occidentalistic, focusing largely on the organizing of states in Europe, partly for the plausible reason that international organizational phenomena began in Europe and existed only there until a certain point in time. Take, for example, Gerard Mangone's book *A Short History of International Organization*, which is almost exclusively the description of the European setups or Occident-created organizations.[5] This was understandable to some extent, for by the year of the book's publication (1954) few international organizations had existed outside Europe because the age of regional organizations had not yet arrived. But the non-Occidental countries remained unable to influence even the founding and operational principles of more universal organizations such as the UN, and thus the working methods, organizational structures, or modes of decision-making in those organizations inherited much from the Occidental tradition. The shadow of Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the International Court of Justice Statute, which refers to "the general principles of law recognized by *civilized* nations" (emphasis added), still looms over the world of international organizations today.

Academically problematic is that the tone and structure of Mangone's book seem to have remained as the representative paradigm in the discipline of International Organization. Even regarding the UN, where we have witnessed the self-assertions of the Third World countries since the 1960s, the working methods and principles largely originate from the Occident, and few researchers seriously question the validity and legitimacy of those aspects. Likewise, when we look at regional organizations, many of us unconsciously tend to compare non-European organizations with European organizations, as though we are evaluating the degree of modernity or organizational maturity of the ASEAN with that of the EU. The term "ASEAN way" is a quiet protest against such a tendency.

This Occidentalist tradition has to be clearly relativized in our discipline since the world is much more diverse and multicultural. Yet at the same time we have to keep pursuing the universal: common norms, principles, methods, or objectives that would promote unity in this divided world. Here we are pulled back to the UN as the focus of research despite the heavy Occidental influence it initially received and still retains. We also know that it has equally received all the aspirations of different kind of states, absorbed all the problems of the world, and embodied all the contradictions of the world. Thus we can take this organization as a model case for the study of the relationship between international organization and universality on the ground of, first, its apparent universality in membership and, second, its non-universality as the *modus operandi* to organize and integrate, if not centralize, today's world.

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[5] See Mangone (1954).

Functionalism Versus Collective Hegemonism

The UN began as a great power-centric organization with the omnipotent Security Council at its core, which modified the organization's pure Occidentalism by including China. It was organized according to *collective hegemonism*, in the sense that it can manifest itself when, and only when, the five outstanding powers can decide to act in concert, rather than according to one single big power's unilateral hegemonism. It was also what the present author calls a *weighted sovereignty* system, which attributes more power of decision-making than others, deviating from the principle of sovereign equality (Mogami 2006, esp. 73).

On the other hand, while this deviatory principle remained dormant during the Cold War, two trends came to the surface in opposition to it. One is the embodiment of a qualitatively different kind of hegemony inside the UN, that is, the increase in the number of developing, Third World countries, which has turned the power structure inside the UN General Assembly on its head, albeit *only* inside the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This is what the author calls *in-organizational hegemony* (Mogami 2006, pp. 282–285),[6] which is exemplified by the adoption of numerous General Assembly resolutions detestable to the big powers. The other, which has to do with the transfiguration above, is the inclination of the UN system as a whole toward functionalism as concerns its field of activities and the organizations that have proliferated accordingly, including UNEP, UNDP, UNHCR, UN-HABITAT, and many others in addition to the specialized agencies.

Thus, although the UN was created as a big power-centric, "constitutional" organization ("constitutional" in the sense only of forming a global power center), it developed during the Cold War more as a smaller power-oriented and functional organizational system. It is interesting to note that by pursuing these unplanned paths, the UN system has come to incarnate two sorts of "governance" or government without the power to enforce as was defined by James Rosenau (1992, p. 4): *normative governance* and *operational governance*.

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[6] Cfr. The terminology of Marjo Hoefnagels, "hegemony within IGOs" may overlap with the present author's term to some extent (Hoefnagels 1981, p. 22).

Normative governance refers to the accumulation of international norms or quasi-norms through treaties as well as the resolutions of the UNGA and other similar organs. Many, if not all, of these hard and soft international law reflected the aspirations or assertions of the developing countries, particularly the resolutions of the UNGA, such as the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order of 1974. The Cold War period in the UN, a frozen period, was also one of active norm-creation and standard setting, redefining the normative meaning of the international order with or under the UN, hence the "normative governance."

Operational governance means fulfilling the needs of the underprivileged population of the world. This may include the provision of shelter, alimentation, water, and hygiene as well as all other basic human needs, which may go beyond material needs and cover basic human rights as well. These operational activities in principally socio-economic fields are, so to speak, meant to be acts that fill the vacuum in the societal needs that governments are normally called on to provide. As far as this act of infilling is concerned, the UN organs are functionally replacing the governments of the recipient states, without formally taking away their sovereignty. In other words, operational governance performs sovereign duties without restraining sovereignty.

In contrast to the historical origin of International Organization, no centralization is observed in this schema; yet a certain kind of constitutionalization can be observed if the notion is defined as the establishment and sustenance of "order." Evidently it is not an inter-state order, or an order maintained by police force, but order in the sense of preventing the collapse of several societies that may conceptually and eventually lead to the global order. Thus we are witnessing an age where *constitutionalization without centralization* is becoming possible. Since centralization of the world by the abolition of states and state sovereignty is neither imminently feasible nor destined to be indispensable for the ordering of the world, this new prospect of constitutionalization without centralization should not be belittled in our perspective of International Organization.

The same could be said about the role of international law. Although its effectiveness may vary depending on cases and/or countries, it nonetheless provides a similar framework of ordering to the international community—that is, a considerable degree of normativity without centralized power of enforcement. It is what Andreas Paulus calls "the international legal system as a constitution,"[7] which in the same vein disregards the element of centralization in terms of the abolition of state sovereignty. It is the essence of what has come to be known as multilateralism.

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[7] See Paulus (2009, pp. 69–109).

Unilateralism qua Centralization Versus Constitutionalization

As stated above, the UN system contains an element of weighted sovereignty in its principal organ that is in contradiction with the principle of sovereign equality; and this organ, the Security Council, cannot be easily controlled by the other, ordinary member states because of its privileged status. Normative value judgment aside, this lopsided structure is of a nature to undermine the overall operation of the UN system *per se*. It is because the privileged permanent members of the Security Council are exempted *de jure* from the legal and political scrutiny of their legally dubious acts, they might *de facto* stay out of the UN system as the normative framework of the world; they do not have to be bound by the legal control of the UN. It is what the term unilateralism means, which is facilitated, rather than being forestalled, by the working mechanism of the Security Council defined and endorsed by Articles 25, 27 and Chap. 7 of the Charter.

Unilateralism is normally defined as the arbitrary, self-centered, and often violent action of superpowers, which is basically correct. At the same time it signifies a fundamental challenge to multilateralism that is premised on joint decision-making and joint action by the members of a given community. But a unilateralist state may also exploit a multilateral setting when it is in its own interest (like the case of the Gulf Crisis in 1990) but ignores and leaves it behind and acts on its own (like the start of the War against Iraq in 2003). If multilateralism is equated with the concept of International Organization, this would be an indirect (straightforward in essence) negation of the concept of International Organization, a solipsism that is incompatible with this latter notion, at least the egalitarian, twenty-first century version of it. This is precisely why some international lawyers have criticized unilateral actions, particularly in 2003, not in order to condemn a particular state but to defend multilateralism in distress.

It is also in this context that the notion of constitutionalism emerged with people like Jürgen Habermas at its center. Here constitutionalism manifests itself as a protest concept against unilateralist arbitrariness and lawlessness rather than as a formative concept for establishing a centralized international power. It may believe in the universality of some of the international norms, particularly *jus cogens*, yet it does not frontally attack the sovereign state system nor does it envisage the enactment of a global constitution anew. Habermas, for example, unequivocally states that no such original enactment is necessary; it is enough for states to abide by the already existing rules, such as the UN Charter and other fundamental rules of international law (Habermas 2004, pp. 157–165). Here constitutionalism (or constitutionalization) refers to molding state behavior according to universal norms, not establishing a centralized government or a unified *Grundnorm*.

New Enemy, New Legitimacy, New Constitutionalism

The mainstreaming of the "war against terrorism" has turned another page and given birth to a new sort of legitimacy in the world of international organizations. Although it is not evident that the war against terrorism has acquired uncontested legitimacy everywhere, it has gained some, especially in the Security Council politics. It had already started before rampant unilateralism came to the fore; it was in 1999 that the Security Council adopted resolution 1267 condemning the Taliban regime and imposing sanctions on it, establishing the Resolution 1267 Committee, which marked the comprehensive sanctions regime against the Taliban, Al Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, as well as the organizations and people related to them. To the extent that the Security Council resolutions that construct this sanctions regime are legally binding (Art. 25 of the Charter), possibly with their effect to transcend other treaty obligations (Art. 103 of the Charter), this sanctions regime is endowed with certain legitimacy, which may also lead to the enhancement of the legitimacy of the Security Council-centric organizational design of the UN system. It in turn revives the momentum for centralization, positing the SC at the apex of the constitutionalization of the world. On the other hand, it is all too evident that this type of constitutionalization stands in sharp contrast to the other mode of constitutionalization born out of the criticism against unilateralism.

In addition to this collision of two types of constitutionalism, we are also faced with another type of constitutionalism, that of the European Union. It has been made salient when the Security Council-imposed targeted (or smart) sanctions were pitted against the human rights protection regime inside the EU or, for that matter, the Council of Europe. There have been a number of court cases in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), with some domestic courts of their member states. Of special attention was the Kadi/Al Barakaat judgment of the ECJ in 2008, which overturned the ruling of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of 2005, and gave priority to the protection of human rights over the implementation of the SC-imposed targeted sanctions.[8]

One bone of contention about these judicial decisions is that there existed the conflict of two constitutionalisms, that is, between that of the Security Council and that of the European Union. Some might paraphrase it as a conflict between global constitutionalism and regional constitutionalism, the former applying universal norms throughout the world, and the latter constructing their own constitutional order.[9]

The present author is not fully persuaded by the reasonableness of this characterization. First, the legitimacy of the first 'global' constitutionalism does not seem to be uncontested, but rather has been challenged and criticized repeatedly; for one thing, even the definition of "terrorism" has not been consolidated; for another, the states that are the leaders of this sanctions regime are often the targets of Habermasian constitutionalist criticism for their disturbance of the global constitutional order. Second, the European regional order does not necessarily have to be labeled as regional constitutionalism, which contravenes the universal standard in matters like human rights, just because they are "regional," for the standards that this regionalism applies to human rights protection may be clearly global in normative contents. The regional can be universal, and the ostensibly universal may in reality be parochial.

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[8] For the overall review of these and similar cases, see, among others, Eveno (2006, 110/4: pp. 827–860). This article also provides an insightful inquiry into the questions of constitutionalism and its relations with the Security Council as expressed in the title.

[9] See, for example, Ličkova (2008, 19/3: pp. 463–490).

Inherent in these arguments is the question of how we should interpret the concept of International Organization. It is not fixed, but has changed over the course of time. There was originally the notion of centralization attached to it; integrating the discrete states was pursued, sometimes even by force of great powers, like the Concert of Europe or the Security Council-centric schema of the UN. It is, in other words, centralization without (democratic) constitutionalization. And now a new dimension has been added, which is constitutionalism made up of a set of fundamental norms restraining arbitrary exercise of state sovereignty, including the prohibition of discretionary use of force and other norms of *jus cogens*. Also included in this set are norms addressed to human beings, such as human rights protection. On this new dimension, whether states are formally integrated into one unit or not does not matter; instead what does matter is whether the values of human existence are protected or not. The integration, or even abolition, of states may be approvable if it is the result of the realization of human values, but not definitely a precondition for it. Thus, the state-centric notion of International Organization and/or constitutionalism has been influenced by the inflow of other philosophies like human rights.

The Form May Change, But the Need Continues

Despite the drive with which some countries in the Security Council have promoted the war against terrorism and targeted sanctions, its constitutional legitimacy and stability seems to be ephemeral, and is not likely to become a stable model of International Organization for this century. True, global peace and security is of primary importance, but the defect of the current regime is that the prerogatives to centralize are monopolized by only a handful of states. Equally problematic is that this type of centralization is based on the selectiveness of the centralizer and the centralized, a disequilibrium that keeps the resulting centralization only partially legitimate and thus unstable. This selectiveness is applied also to allegedly "terrorist" individuals who are listed on the terrorist list compiled by the Committee 1267: some alleged "terrorists" are (unknowingly) listed and others are not. All this means that under this anti-terrorist centralization schema, some states and some people are involved in a system of international law application without any shield to protect them, except in cases like Kadi, where the targeted people were fortuitously able to turn to the regional judicial system for human rights protection.

Centralizing states globally by means of universal international organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations has not proved to be a realistic option, but instead has demonstrated its limits and deficiencies in that it lacked in impartiality toward states, although a similar enterprise could be successful on a regional basis as exemplified by the EU. This defect is exactly what Immanuel Kant warned of in *To Perpetual Peace* against the idea of a world state, saying that it would end up in a great power swallowing up other smaller states (Kant 1977, p. 225). As long as this recognition is concerned, a global centralization of states may no longer be an agendum about the concept of International Organization, at least for some time to come.

At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact that the integration of the international community is still going on in other forms or on other dimensions. Integration in a mild sense persists in the UN system through normative governance and operational governance, and the indispensability of the UN itself is proof that International Organization, conceptualized not as a global centralized government but as a functional association of states, predicated and reinforced by the increasing number of international norms, has remained valid. International Organization in this sense and at this juncture of history means the institutionalization of this recognition as well as the fact that no country (with one or two extreme exceptions) can exist alone, and that no country (with one or two extreme exceptions) can be free-wheeling in its behavior on the international stage, and that association with others pays off.

Another agendum that remains is the concept of non-state organizations or NGOs. Although the term “non-governmental organizations” has somehow taken root, many of them on the international plane are apparently non-state, and would be better grasped cognitively if their non-stateness was clearly expressed. The essence of NGOs is that their activities are ideated and performed in disregard of the division of the world by states. Only “problems” exist, such as hunger, famine, disease, discrimination, and other human rights violations, etc., whose existence cannot be factually divided by state borders but are often divided by them legally. The only solution of this global (qua human) problematic was that those who come to their rescue dissipate the artificial and obstructive barriers. Human suffering knows of no state borders.

NGOs over the course of time have gained more recognition and expanded not only their fields but also dimensions of their activities. Not only are they engaged in the operational activities on the field (where they overlap with the activities of organizations like the UN, a fundamentally state-organ), but also in the normative activities of the international community, such as treaty making. There NGOs are not simply “promoters” of the treaties, such as Anti-personnel Landmines Convention or Cluster Munitions Convention, but also often the “designers” and “instillers” or “injectors” of the innovative international norms. In addition, some NGOs are now invited to the conferences of the Contracting Parties (which NGOs are not) or the review conferences as observers side by side with the state parties. It does not mean that those NGOs are formally on a par with the state parties since they are still barred from signing and ratifying treaties, which remains monopolized by sovereign states.

Despite this ultimate limitation, what counts more is the fact that norm creation on the international plane is no longer monopolized *in substance* by state actors. If they are meeting the needs of the world in a non-state way, they are doubtless forming an essential part of the world of International Organization that will shift the intellectual interest from the formal integration of sovereign states to the functional integration of the globe, with a variety of actors both state and non-state.[10]

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[10] Since the completion of this short essay the author has further developed his studies of international (global) constitutionalism. Readers may refer, among others, to his article (Mogami 2012, 55: pp. 371–402). For a general and excellent account of global constitutionalism, see Peters (2009, pp. 153–262).

Activities and Discourses on International Cultural Relations in Modern Japan: The Making of KBS (Kokusai Bunka Shinko Kai), 1934–1953

Atsushi Shibasaki

Introduction

KBS (*Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai*, the Center for International Cultural Relations) was the first national institution for international cultural policy in modern Japan.[1] It was established in 1934 and concluded its function in 1972 when the Japan Foundation (*Kokusai Koryu Kikin*, 1972 to the present), its new successor, absorbed most of its activities.

Though its scale had been relatively small when compared to ‘big’ organizations such as L’Alliance Française or the British Council (coincidentally it started in the same year, 1934), its importance is not negligible when considering why the people concerned tried to create it and the aims they tried so hard to pursue by managing KBS.

It’s not the policy impact of KBS that is significant, but the perspective or ‘dream’ the people concerned had relating to the activity and possibility of such an institution. When assessing its impact, it is clear that the KBS could do almost nothing to prevent Japan from going down the tragic path of war. As we shall see in section III, the military and nationalistic bureaucrats readily overwhelmed KBS as the war deepened, consequently they had no choice but to obey them and help them by unwillingly doing their propaganda work during the Asia-Pacific War (1941–1945). Though the budget continued to increase, they couldn’t pursue their initial goals or purposes at all, especially during the 1940s.

However, even after the war, KBS didn’t abandon its ideals or dreams about its mission. These ideals and dreams reflected its members’ thoughts and ideas on international culture and on Japan’s role and identity in international cultural

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[1] This chapter is mainly based on Shibasaki (1999a) with some refinements. See also Shibasaki (1997, 1999b).

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relations. The study on KBS clearly reveals these thoughts, which might still hold some space in the hearts and minds of the Japanese people in terms of their own national cultural identity.

This paper consists of four parts. Part I is a ground-clearing section. Its aim is to explain why KBS was established in the 1930s, which was a period traditionally considered to be the end of amiable internationalism with mutual respect between nations due to the Manchurian Incident (1931). Part II explores three fundamental ideas on conducting international cultural relations shared by Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, scholars, and officials. In part III we shall have a brief look at the history of KBS from 1934 to 1945, by dividing it into three phases and by trying to depict its changing nature. Part IV confirms the meaning of the end of war for KBS.

The Meaning of the 1930s in the History of International Cultural Relations of Modern Japan

Most scholars interested in international cultural relations in Japan have come to the conclusion that cultural exchange programs and activities before the war had their heyday in the 1920s, not the 1930s. For these scholars, the 1930s marked the end of the "cultural internationalism," designated by mutual respect and glorious international cooperation (Iriye 2000, pp. 51–52). The Manchurian Incident in 1931 and Japan's opting out of the League of Nations in 1933 marked the end of internationalism or international cooperation, including in cultural aspects.

However, based on this understanding we cannot explain why KBS was founded in 1934, well after the events of 1931. In addition, we can observe the implementation of many other international cultural activities during the 1930s. The Ministry of Railways set up the Bureau of International Tourism (1930), International Tourist Committee (1931), and The Association of International Tourists (1931). The Japan English Speaking Students Association was organized in 1933 and subsequently hosted the Japan–America Student Conference (1934 to the present) and the Japan–Philippine Student Conference (1937–1940).[2] And the Japan Pen Club and International Student Society (*Kokusai Gakuyu Kai*) were initiated in 1935. At least the first half of the 1930s was an era of institutionalization of international cultural relations and didn't designate the decay of such activities.[3]

Figure 1 helps us to understand why these institutions, including KBS, were devised in the early 1930s (Shibasaki 1999a, p. 20). This figure shows that the early 1930s didn't mark the era of shrinking international exchange but rather its expansion. This expansion owed partly to the tightening of Sino-Japanese economical and social relations because of the war, and was partly due to technological innovation and development that included increasing the number of sea routes and ships,

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[2] On the foundation of the Japan-America Student Conference, see Shibasaki (1999d).

[3] Further information can be found in the Lonsea database (www.lonsea.de).



Fig. 1 Movement of people, goods, money, and information in 1930s (Shibasaki 1999a, p. 20)

opening new international telephone lines, establishing a quicker international mailing service, and so on. This upward trend now appears tentative from our viewpoint, but the people at the time couldn't foresee the consequences. For example, the number of foreign tourists increased from 50,159 (1930) to 154,086 (1937) (Nippon Kotsu Kosha 1982, p. 59). In 1936 the amount of money these foreign visitors spent in Japan reached 107.68 million yen, which ranked the fourth largest source of earning foreign currency (Nippon Kotsu Kosha 1982, p. 48). One official of the tourist bureau described that until 1937 it was the 'Golden Era' (Nippon Kotsu Kosha 1982, p. 6). We can see similar phenomena and perceptions from the reflection of airline companies and shipping lines.

In short, the increase of international exchange in terms of the movement of people, goods, money, and information and the creeping danger of isolation from the international community in terms of politics and diplomacy occurred at the same time during the first half of the 1930s. Promoting international cultural relations was seen as a way of getting out of this situation.

Three Key Ideas in Understanding International Cultural Policy

There were three strands of thought embedded deeply in KBS and in the forerunners of KBS. These are the Japan Association of the League of Nations (*Kokusai Renmei Kyokai, 1921–1943*), the Japan Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (*Gakugei Kyoryoku Kokunai Iinkai, 1926–1933*), and the Cultural Policy Towards China (*Tai Shi Bunka Jigyo, 1922–1945*). These ideas are key to understanding the historical character of the relationship between nationalism and internationalism/ transnationalism in Japan and, furthermore, to understanding Japanese cultural identity in the world community.

Kokumin Gaiko *(National Diplomacy) as* 'Diplomatie Nationale,' *Not as People's Diplomacy*

The first idea is *Kokumin Gaiko* (lit. National Diplomacy). As Jyunpei Shinobu,[4] a famous scholar of international law at that time, pointed out, this concept was introduced by the Wilsonian discourse on the democratization of international relations (Shinobu 1926, p. 24). According to Shinobu, the expression *Kokumin Gaiko* has two meanings in Japanese. One is 'People's Diplomacy,' which means that the government must heed the will of its people and conduct their diplomacy as openly and democratically as possible. The other is 'Diplomatie Nationale (National Diplomacy),' which means that the people must take action by crossing borders to exchange opinions and communicate to people in other countries directly, without the direction of politicians or diplomats, for the sake of defending their national interest. People's diplomacy was apparently derived from Woodrow Wilson's "open diplomacy." 'Diplomatie Nationale' is close to transnational activity by civil society at present in the transboundary and voluntary nature; however, in 'Diplomatie Nationale' the aim is strictly limited to promoting national interest and protecting national prestige unilaterally and compulsory towards abroad.

Although he introduced the two meanings of *Kokumin Gaiko*, Shinobu's main focus was apparently on 'Diplomatie Nationale' rather than on 'People's Diplomacy.' In Japan, *Kokumin Gaiko* was understood in a way that each Japanese citizen had to act as a civil diplomat to make foreign people understand Japan's standing point or Japan itself. It was not about constraining governments through democratic pressure. The purpose of *Kokumin Gaiko* was not merely to forge goodwill relationships but to offer strong support from the private sector in order to protect and realize the national interest, which went along with close cooperation with the government and bureaucracy.

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[4] Shinobu (1871–1962) was a professor at Waseda University. He had been a diplomat for 20 years before becoming a lecturer at the university. He wrote many articles in newspapers as well as publishing textbooks on international law, diplomatic history, and international politics.

This *Kokumin Gaiko* incentive explains the reason for the foundation of the Japan Association of the League of Nations. It was established in 1920 and one of its motives was to participate in a meeting with the same kind of national association as the League of Nations and to defend its national interest against other committees. This meeting functioned as an arena for informal diplomacy in which many issues were discussed, including the conflict between Japan and China. China already had its own national committee and insisted on discussing Japan's unjust actions towards their country at the meetings (Unno 1972, p. 31). Without its own association, Japan would have been left behind in this unofficial diplomatic channel. As a result diplomats, politicians, and businessmen agreed to found an association, and their aim was to "keep world peace and [to] contribute [to the] welfare of human being as well as to keep our national interest" (Soeta 1920, p. 12).

Similar ideas can easily be found at the inception of the *Japan Committee of Intellectual Cooperation* in 1926. Saburo Yamada, chairman of the committee and eminent scholar of international law, described that this committee was the organization that represented Japan by cooperating with the public and private sectors in order to eliminate "misunderstandings" regarding Japan and Japanese culture (Yamada 1926, p. 11).

The implication of this *Kokumin Gaiko* concept, at the core of most international or transnational activities, was that 'cultural internationalism' is indispensable in achieving its nationalistic aim, the pursuit and protection of national interests, and to eliminating misunderstandings about Japan through activities by international or transnational non-state actors.

After Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, most staff, officials, and scholars involved in League related activities participated in KBS or offered some help to KBS. Although they were essentially both nationalists and internationalists, they were generally moderate and were regarded as liberal in contrast to the military or radical right-wing politicians and officials who shaped the government, especially after the Manchurian Incident (1931). In addition, they were well versed in Western culture and civilization. They knew the importance of international cultural relations and had many connections and friends in Western countries from their long experience of the work involved.

*Fusion of Oriental (Eastern) and Occidental (Western) Cultures (*Tozai Bunka No Yugo*)*

The ultimate aim of these *Kokumin Gaiko* activities was the fusion of Oriental and Occidental cultures *through the mediation of Japan*. Japan was seen as the only country that could attain that.

From this point of view, Japan was the only country that could survive Western impact. Although it had to sign the unequal treaties, which resulted in the abandonment of tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality to Western countries, Japan had succeeded in establishing its status as an independent nation state. In addition, Japan was the only country that could achieve rapid modernization and thus became—at least in the East Asia region—a strong power. On the cultural side of things, Japan had also succeeded in accepting Western cultures and values without losing the essential part of its traditional culture. In this respect, Japan was the only country (or Japan is the only nation) that was able to amalgamate Oriental and Occidental cultures in harmony.

This type of thought spread after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), which was the first victory of a non-white nation over a white empire (Matsumoto 1960, p. 100). Of course, in retrospect, there is a considerable amount of doubt about what the fusion between East and West itself was and the extent to which Japan really could accomplish this fusion. The important point is that there was a strong feeling of self-esteem among Japanese people who saw themselves as citizens of a superior nation and the only one that could achieve this fusion.

The concept of fusion can be easily found in many documents. One of the most striking proofs of how this idea of fusion between Orient and Occident was created can be found in the official diplomatic documents and journal articles on the cultural policy toward China (1918–1941) (Abe 2004, pp. 271–272; Teow 1999, pp. 1–11). Among the influential officials concerned, Nagakage Okabe[5] is one example that will help us to understand what they were thinking.

Nagakage Okabe argued that world culture would not be regarded as truly global (in the sense that it covers all cultures on the earth) until Oriental culture was accepted on an equal level with the West (Okabe 1924, p. 9; Okabe 1925, pp. 55–60). In order to achieve equality, according to Okabe, Oriental culture had to be properly introduced to the West by an Oriental nation. Following this line of argumentation, Japan was the only country that could even come under consideration because of the success it had enjoyed since the Meiji Restoration. Japan claimed a special status in world culture and was therefore able to play the special role of facilitating fusion. As for Oriental culture, Okabe claimed for Japan the sole capability of representing it to the world. The cultural policy toward China in this context was straightforward: China was merely the subject in achieving Japan's special role. For Okabe and almost all of his colleagues, although China once had a great culture to which Japanese culture owed much, the incapacity of the Qing Dynasty had made the decline of China as a state apparent and unavoidable. It seemed clear that China had lost the capacity and authority to represent Oriental culture, and the time had come for Japan to take the lead. Japan's exclusive right to represent Oriental culture to the world was attributed to its success in escaping colonization and to its becoming the regional power. This egocentric view of its cultural mission prevailed among the officials who were interested in international cultural relations. Later, Okabe was deeply committed to the KBS and after the war he even became its president.

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[5] Okabe (1884–1970) was born of a noble family and started his career as a talented bureaucrat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later he turned to politics, and in 1930 he became a member of the House of Peers. During the war he served as minister of education. After World War II, he became a director of the National Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo (MOMAT) and a president of KBS.

Attaining Mutual Understanding by Transmitting More Japanese Culture to the Western World Through Cultural Activities

This section specifies the political actions taken in order to achieve the fusion described above.

In this respect, intellectuals, government officials, and politicians shared almost the same view, which was that Western people did not understand Japan and/or Japanese culture at all. From this point of view, the import of Western culture and civilization (as much as was needed and as fast as possible) did not contribute to mutual understanding. This feeling of misperception had a significant negative impact on the status of Japan as a nation state and has affected its isolation. Based on a lack of understanding of the Japanese culture, Japan believed itself to be exposed to baseless abuse and critiques from outside. In order to redress this disparity, contemporary society agreed to 'export' and disseminate Japanese culture as a first step to attaining the desired fusion.

This approach shaped the Japanese League of Nations' policy and its China-oriented activity. There are plenty of examples of this in the writings of Okabe, Yamada, and in the documents of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others.[6]

This perception or misperception influenced Japan's diplomatic relations with other countries in many respects. The rejection of the racial equality proposal submitted to the League of Nation by the Japanese government in 1919 deeply influenced Japanese impressions. Moreover, the feeling of Japanese isolation increased after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. At that time, mutual understanding was realized not by increasing understanding of Western culture in Japan but by introducing Japanese culture into the West. Japanese society at this time had a strong subjective feeling of frustration, caused by not being understood or accepted or misperceived and misunderstood by Western powers.

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[6] When referring to this 'misperception,' they often cited the famous poem by Rudyard Kipling: "Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgment Seat." They regarded it as their mission to conquer this misperception by promoting mutual understanding through cultural activities.

The Activities of KBS and Discourses on Its Activities, 1934–1945

Basic Feature of KBS

KBS was founded on 11 April 1934; however, due to fiscal constraint, the budget allowed encompassed only 10 % (0.2 million yen) of the amount originally intended. The resources were too limited to fulfill the dreams and hopes connected to KBS and its enterprise. Furthermore, the possibility of war and increased militarization of the state were around the corner and heavily overshadowed the development of the organization's activity.

The KBS chairman was Fumimaro Konoe, a famous politician who was appointed as prime minister three times. He committed suicide at the end of the war. The vice chairmen were Seinosuke Go (President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, one of the most influential figures in the business world) and Yorisada Tokugawa (from a noble family, famous for his contributions to international cultural exchange). The president was Prince Takamatsu, a younger brother of the Showa Emperor Hirohito. The chief director was Aisuke Kabayama, who was the son of a famous navy general and politician. He had studied at Amherst College and had many friends (including Franklin D. Roosevelt) and connections in the USA and Europe. Kabayama was the central figure of the KBS from the start.

Under Kabayama there were several directors. Among them was Kiyoshi Kuroda, the son of a war hero in the Russo-Japanese war. In addition, Ino Dan, the son of the head of Mitsui zaibatsu played one of the most important roles in KBS. He cooperated with the manager Setsuichi Aoki, who had been working at the Association of the League of Nations. However, we have to keep in mind that Okabe Nagakage (see Part II) was also in the list of directors. At the start, both were relatively liberal internationalists who put moderate emphasis on mutual understanding, and relatively state-centric nationalists who regarded one-sided transmission to be of utmost importance.

Phase I: 1934–1937 International Cultural Activity (Kokusai Bunka Jigyo)

Trial and Error for Establishing the Mission

In phase I, KBS representatives talked loudly but achieved very little. The budget was not ample (See Fig. 2) and they did not know exactly what was expected of KBS by other countries. They wanted to project Japan and Japanese culture all over the world, but they still had not found the proper means to do this. They started researching the needs and expectations for KBS and actually initiated some



	1934	1935	1936	1937
From Government	200,000	300,000	300,000	325,000
From donation	135,000	123,500	80,000	77,000
Other	70,910	68,281	121,740	120,661
Total	405,910	491,781	501,740	522,661

currency = ¥

Fig. 2 Budget of KBS, 1934–37. Source: Shibasaki 1999a, p.92

projects. Of course, they also supervised some interesting programs, such as offering Japanese traditional pottery and artifacts to the International Exhibition of Art and Beauty held in Johannesburg in 1934. In addition, they published a collection of photographs of Japanese culture taken by two famous photographers at that time, Ihei Kimura and Yosho Watanabe. In addition, a grant was given to Nippon Kobo, led by another famous photographer, Yo'nosuke Natori, in order to publish the unique photo magazine, *NIPPON*.

One of the big projects in phase I was the making of a movie on kabuki dance. This plan started in June 1934, right after the foundation of KBS. The famous dance called Kagami-jishi by Kikugoro Onoe 6th was chosen. KBS officials entrusted the film to Yasujiro Ozu, who was one of the most famous Japanese film directors of all time (*Tokyo Story* (1954), *Late Spring* (1949), *I Was Born But. . .*(1932) etc.). The cost mounted to 15,000 yen, which claimed 3.8 % of the budget provided for 1934.

New Cultural Movement

Around the time of its foundation, some arguments about the possibilities for KBS arose. The famous journalist Kiyoshi Kiyosawa strongly criticized KBS because Japanese culture was not effectively introduced worldwide as KBS had imagined it would be (Kiyosawa 1935, pp. 291–297). Others claimed that KBS stuffs were too pedantic and that high culture was favored over Japan's popular culture (Kada 1934, pp. 52–28). Kan Kikuchi, another famous writer, keenly argued that even most Japanese didn't know much about their cultural heritage. In his view, what was needed instead of KBS was an "internal cultural association" that would help Japanese people understand Japanese traditional cultures (Kikuchi 1934, p. 116).

Diplomats, who played an important role in setting up KBS, deplored the organization's small size and insisted on the expansion of its organization and budget as soon as possible. Ken Yanagisawa, one of the most important diplomats in international cultural relations, as well as a poet and essayist, who devoted his work to KBS and related activities for years, compared KBS with huge American foundations like Rockefeller and Carnegie. By citing many concrete examples, he tried to prove the need for KBS to introduce Japanese culture to many other countries. He argued that they couldn't respond to all of these requests because the allocated budget was far from what was expected (Yanagisawa 1934, pp. 71–92). Kabayama, the first director, also confirmed the expectation that KBS would disseminate Japanese culture in many countries, based on hearings in the USA and other European countries during his visit. He wrote that this "New Cultural Movement" was overwhelmingly welcomed abroad and that he received many offers of assistance for KBS (Kabayama 1935, n.p.).

One of the unique arguments about international culture was raised by Kotaro Tanaka, a scholar of commercial law at Tokyo Imperial University and the author of *Sekaiho No Riron (Theory of World Law)*, published in 1932–1934. He was deeply involved in cultural exchange programs in the 1930s and praised the establishment of KBS and its ideals in general. He elaborated his ideas on international culture and international cultural exchange, and his theoretically well-structured approach still holds relevance for our thinking on international culture today.

His schema of international culture differentiates *particular* and *universal* aspects of culture. In the particular aspects we can recognize and respect distinctiveness in each other and develop such distinctiveness through division of labor. In the universal aspects we can deepen the commonality and develop world culture through cooperation. He used the metaphors of a "flower garden" or "orchestra" to describe this formation:

> On this earth, there is a flower garden, with cultures of each nation as the fruit of each nation's history are gathered and co-exist in harmony. Or there is an orchestra who played one same symphony by each nation's culture playing different melodies by different musical instruments. This perspective is not a fictional ideal but a living reality (Tanaka 1935, pp. 19–21).

Ironically, as we have seen, KBS was not managed according to the ideas Tanaka envisioned. Although Kabayama, Kuroda, and Yanagisawa were partly on Tanaka's side, their internationalism was more nationally oriented and based on the three ideas analyzed in Part II. Furthermore, nationalistic officials like Okabe and other figures influenced KBS. Ultimately, KBS would take a direction quite opposite to the one Tanaka had hoped for.

Phase II: 1937–1940 Foreign Cultural Policy (Taigai Bunka Seisaku)

Sino-Japanese War as the Second 'Manchurian Incident'

The staff of KBS regarded the Sino-Japanese War, which began in July 1937, to be a 'second Manchurian Incident,' which meant that, as had happened after the Manchurian Incident (1931), Japan was going to become once again isolated and misunderstood; consequently, the time had come for KBS to tackle this isolation



	1938	1939	1940	1941
From Government	340,000	500,000	700,000	700,000
From donation	61,000	30,000	102,650	10,000
Other	98,100	63,530	84,659	87,341
Total	499,100	593,530	887,309	797,341

currency = ¥

Fig. 3 Budget of KBS, 1938–41. Source: Shibasaki 1999a, p.126

and these misunderstandings by promoting cultural activities with the aim to reach 'mutual' understanding.

However, things did not turn out as they wished. KBS experienced significant changes as an organization. First, in 1939 Chief Director Kabayama and Vice-Chairman Go resigned from their positions. Matsuzo Nagai, a former diplomat, was appointed chief director and Nagakage Okabe was selected vice-chairman. In 1940, Aoki, who had been devoted to KBS, was harassed by the military because of his experience in international cultural relations and his internationalist motives. His removal increased KBS' nationalistic activities as well as a belief in the one-sided coercion of Japanese culture and its assumed supremacy.

Moreover, during the war KBS underwent a substantial change with regard to its location and its bureaucratic system. Initially, the Branch of Cultural Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) supervised KBS. Diplomats like Ken Yanagisawa or Hikotaro Ichikawa were involved; both were highly educated and culturally refined intellectuals. Under the supervision of MOFA, KBS pursued its ideals at its own discretion regardless of pressure from factions with a more nationalistic profile. However, in 1940 the Branch of Cultural Affairs was dissolved, and the result was that KBS was cut off from MOFA and transferred to the Bureau of Information related to the Cabinet. KBS was now under the supervision of the Foreign Cultural Policy section of Cultural Propaganda. It lost its function as an organization of International Cultural Activities and was incorporated into the machine of Foreign Cultural Policy as a tool of cultural propaganda.

During this period, budget appropriation continued and activities increased (Figs. 3 and 4). In 1938 the Japan Institute Inc. (*Nippon Bunka Kaikan*) was established in the Rockefeller Center in New York. This institute served as an important information link overseas.[7] However, this didn't necessarily mean that the status of KBS had become the center of Japan's foreign cultural policy. The shift from International Cultural Activity to Foreign Cultural Policy meant that the Japanese government needed less reciprocal (even though this 'mutuality' entailed

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[7] Tamon Maeda was president of this institute and later became the minister of education. Among the visitor list we can find the names of Edwin O. Reischauer, John K. Fairbank, and Arturo Toscanini.



Fig. 4 The number of materials sent abroad (Shibasaki 1999a, p. 147)

the frustrated feeling of misunderstandings discussed above) cultural exchange and more coercive propaganda. In this new context KBS was far from being the core organization. Government officials as well as military officials no longer needed international or internationalistic activities.

Shrinking the Space for Conducting 'International' Cultural Activities

It is unfair to insinuate that the KBS staff was not aware of this change. However, in order to survive, KBS was eager to adjust to this contextual shift. Right after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, in July 1937 KBS hosted meetings with business people, intellectuals, and politicians for the purposes of discovering how to conduct global 'Foreign Cultural Operations.' The meeting was held ten times and KBS asked attendees how it would be possible to propagate Japanese culture in different areas including the UK, the USA, Germany, Italy, China, some Oriental Countries, Latin American Countries, British Colonies, France and the rest of Europe. However, many of the participants disliked the idea of enforcing one-sided propaganda, fearing the deterrence or destruction of business relations. One businessperson even suggested that before exporting Japanese culture to 'civilized' countries, the Japanese society ought to understand its own culture first. Cynically, another businessman asked KBS not to get involved in such propaganda, and instead to aim for short-term success while keeping a moderate, long-term cultural exchange program (KBS 1940, n.p.).

Another problem arose after the beginning of World War II. By definition, KBS activities were based on 'international' relations, and KBS thus had to conduct cultural programs between nation states. However, when World War II began, and the tensions between the Japan-Germany-Italy axis and its opponents increased, it was almost impossible for KBS to find a counterpart for its programs except in countries like Wang Zhaoming's puppet government in China, Manchuria, Thailand, or in French Occupied Indochina.

Saburo Minowa, a diplomat to the Information Bureau and therefore one of the supervisors of KBS in this period, wrote a few articles on how to conduct foreign cultural policy or diplomacy. In one of his lectures, he followed the Fusion Thesis, but he proceeded to make Japan's cultural supremacy more explicit (Minowa 1940, pp. 250–254). As a bureaucrat he tried to prove the importance of foreign cultural policy, but there was no room for activities based on a horizontal relationship between nation states. Consequently there was almost no chance for KBS to play an important role.

Phase III: 1941–1945 Greater East Asia Cultural Policy (Daitoa Bunka Seisaku)

Serving the Propaganda Operations

The presence of KBS only weakened after the beginning of the Asia-Pacific War. As pointed out in the previous section, KBS was made for horizontal international cultural relations. However, as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—the slogan prevailing at that time—implies, the Japanese government and military



	1942	1943	1944	1945
From Government	775,000	775,000	775,000	750,000
From donation	79,422	80,000	70,000	100,000
Other	85,673	180,176	325,104	201,528
Total	940,095	1,035,176	1,170,104	1,051,528

currency = ¥

Fig. 5 Budget of KBS, 1942–1945. Source: Shibasaki 1999a, p.161

designed a hierarchical political order in Japan and the occupied area. KBS was almost useless in this perspective.

Nevertheless, KBS survived the war. One reason for this was that there were still existing bilateral relationships within the ‘Sphere’ namely between Japan and Thailand and between Japan and French Occupied Indochina. Japan and Thailand signed a cultural cooperation treaty in 1942, and a Japan Institute (Japan-Thailand Cultural Institute) was established in the same year with Ken Yanagisawa as its president. The same kind of institute was also established in French Occupied Indochina in 1943.

Another reason for KBS’ survival was that the military and government found the materials KBS had been accumulating useful for propaganda and education. Many pamphlets, pictures, films, especially Japanese language learning kits, and so on were translated into several languages and were sent to the occupied zone. The budget continued to expand (Fig. 5), but KBS was playing the role of a small subcontractor that served the outsourcing order from the military and government.

Desperate Effort for Self-justification in the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’

During this period there were significant arguments and debates on international relations. Matsuzo Nagai, the chairman, tried to explain how the KBS shifted from International Cultural Activity to the “Greater East Asia Cultural Policy.” Following the new approach, the spirit of Japan was now at the heart of a “New Great East Asia Order” and thus the aim was to let ‘them’ understand the essence of Japanese culture and Japan’s ‘true’ intensions (Nagai 1942, p. 2). Saburo Minowa also argued that cultural activity aimed at the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had three goals: (1) sweeping the ‘false’ culture of the USA and England away from all nations of the ‘Sphere’; (2) protecting and developing their own particular cultures; and (3) leading them with the Japanese culture in order to make the area prosper (Minowa 1942, pp. 46–48). It seemed that the aim was to try to substantiate the importance of KBS by submitting proof that they themselves did not truly believe in.

The need for cultural policy had been boosted during wartime, but there was no room for KBS. They had to deal with this period by outsourcing work, since there were only a few ‘bilateral’ or ‘horizontal’ relations left in the hierarchical or ‘vertical’ order.

Beyond the Defeat: What Has Changed and What Has Not, 1945–1953

After the Asia-Pacific War, KBS tried to rebuild its activities and sought a new direction. However, its central aim remained the same as in 1934: the fusion of Oriental and Occidental cultures (KBS 1946a, n.p.). At first, they decided to approach this goal by improving the cultural maturity of the Japanese people. During the war they had realized how little the Japanese people—especially the military and right-wing politicians and officials who were responsible for the war—knew of Japanese culture and how narrow-minded they were.

At a first glance, this seems to represent a significant paradigm shift, but in truth it was far from it; this was in fact a ‘one-step-back’ strategy. According to the Fusion Thesis, the Japanese people had to claim the Oriental (including Japanese) and the Occidental culture as their own in order to make fusion happen. What seemed especially problematic in achieving this was the self-righteousness and ignorance of the Japanese culture. Only if they could overcome their own ignorance could they follow this scheme towards the longed for fusion. In this sense, what they had internalized was that they had deviated from their initial purpose because of pressure from the wartime regime and therefore that the fault was not their own but that of the fanatic nationalists who had dominated the wartime period.

Thus, in some sense although they reviewed the past, they did not reflect on what needed to be fundamentally addressed. Post-war KBS blamed the military and the war for its failures but did not notice that the initial ideals needed to be re-examined as well. Indeed, when confronted with the occupied forces in the post-war era they continued to cling to a perception that Japanese culture was woefully misunderstood. One famous writer said in the hearings held by KBS in 1946 that “Foreigners can never understand *Noh* (one of the most famous classical Japanese stage performance)” and Ino Dan complained “I wonder if American people understand Japanese culture, they paint beautiful Japanese wooden desk white”[8] (KBS 1946b, n.p.). During the Occupation Era (1945–1952) activity slowed down considerably mainly because all financial assistance from the government stopped; however, in 1953 KBS enjoyed a resurgence. After regaining independence in 1952, financial support from the government started again in the same year.

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[8] What Dan refers to here is that although most Japanese people, including Dan, preferred the natural feel and color of wood, some Americans did not understand this sense of beauty and ruined Japanese artifacts with ‘improvements.’

Conclusion

This paper has approached the nature and the essence of KBS by discussing its three fundamental ideals and its activities according to three phases. As a cultural institution, KBS was one of the *Kokumin Gaiko* (National Diplomacy) institutes. In order to realize the East-West fusion in the long run and to correct 'misperception' and 'misunderstanding' about Japan, KBS promoted 'mutual' understanding, which actually implied a spread of 'superior' Japanese culture overseas. Figure 6 represent the one-sided, self-complacent nature of KBS, which stemmed from the frustration of not being understood in a way that seemed adequate to Japanese nationalism.

Ironically, KBS did not achieve the status of a big and powerful cultural institute. Chance prevailed in expanding its activities, but the more the war extended and the more the budget increased, the more its significance as the main actor decreased. After the war ended, KBS denounced its wartime experiences, especially from 1941 to 1945, while the three ideals established in 1934 remained unexamined.

We can think of many reasons why KBS held on to ambitions or 'dreams' like the Fusion of East and West and the idea of Japanese cultural supremacy. One of the most important factors in this was their notion or attitude concerning the exchange of cultures between nations. In the prewar period most of the people concerned imagined that when one national culture (for example, Japanese culture) contacts another (for example, German culture) and cultural 'exchange' is conducted, these two cultures must not change in character. In their minds, all that was possible was to promote mutual understanding without implementing a new culture or new Japanese/German culture after the meeting of the two. As Kenichiro Hirano repeatedly argued, and as Kotaro Tanaka had already pointed out in the 1930s, an encounter between two different cultures always brings with it some kind of change to both (Hirano 2000; Tanaka 1937, pp. 20–23). However, in the pre-war period, international cultural activity was carried out not with an intention to change national culture, but to defend it and even to enforce its superiority over others.

One of the lessons learned from the study of KBS is that international cultural activity must be conducted based on the theoretical attitude of cultural contacts. However, there is always a danger of being too defensive toward one's own culture and too offensive toward others. Thus, the history of KBS reveals some important lessons as to how to conceive, conduct, and manage international cultural relations.


国際文化振興会
KBS
文化ノ昂揚
文化ノ流入
inflow of culture
積極的助成
(国際文化事業)
activity
図書ノ交換又ハ輸入仲介
教授学者名士ノ招請文化
使節団来朝斡旋外国事情
ノ内地ヘ紹介
文化ノ自然流入
natural inflow of culture
対外行動
foreign action
連絡及協力
内
地
外務省、内閣情報局其他関係官庁放送局、同盟通信社
外国文又ハ外字入印刷物又ハ情報ヲ発行スル新聞社、雑誌社出版社
鉄道省観光局、対外関係諸団体
外
国
国際文化振興会ノ在外機関
在外事務所
連絡員
通信員
在外日本機関
在外公館
在外諸機関代表
在外諸団体代表
在外日本人有志
外国人側
外国官庁及諸機関、大学、諸学校、研究所、図書館、博物館、諸団体、寺院、教会、新聞社、雑誌及通報社、学者、記者、日本研究者、映画館、劇場等
宣伝上ノ作戦
文化宣伝ノミ独立シテ行フ場合
文化宣伝、政治宣伝、経済宣伝、ノ相互利用
文化宣伝ノ開拓セル畑ニテ政治又ハ経済宣伝ヲ行フ
政治又ハ経済宣伝ノ畑ニテ文化宣伝ヲ行フ
政治又ハ経済宣伝ノ為メニ文化宣伝ヲ行フ
文化宣伝ヲ有効ナラシム為メニ政治又ハ経済宣伝ヲ行フ
対外行動ノ内容
資料ノ供給、配布、仲介、交換
日本文化資料ノ配布又ハ供給
図書ノ国際交換及仲介
外国ニテ発行ノ新聞雑誌著書ニ対スル応援
経費援助、記事内容ノ指導、寄稿
人的要素ニ関スル努力
外人（在日並ニ在外国）ノ日本文化研究援助
教授、学生、名士等の交換又ハ招請
講師、芸術家、専門家等の派遣
会合ノ関係
講演会、懇談会
映画会、映画講演会
幻燈講演会、音楽会
資料ノ陳列
展覧会、博覧会、見本市
（主催）
（協力）
（促進）
懸賞論文募集其他

Fig. 6 (continued)


文化ノ流出
outflow of culture
対外文化宣伝
(国際文化事業)
activity
文化ノ自然流出
natural outflow
of culture
方法 means
目的 purpose
世界ノ文化ヲ昂揚セシム
外国人の対日認識ヲ正確ニシ之ヲ強化ス
対外政治宣伝並ニ経済宣伝ノ内容ヲ充実シ之ニ便宜ヲ与フ
対内行動 domestic action
準備 preparation
対外的準備
基礎的準備
連絡及協力
人的準備
資料ノ準備
文化宣伝ノ企画
連絡及協力
日本文化ノ研究
外務省其他官庁
放送協会、鉄道省観光局
通信社、新聞社、出版社
諸研究機関及専門家
対外関係諸団体
映画其他諸興業会社
対外用講師ノ養成
対外文化宣伝人ノ養成
日本研究外人トノ連絡
日本文化資料ノ製作
日本文化資料ノ整理
日本文化資料ノ蒐集
品物
映画、幻燈、写真
印刷物
民情紹介品
美術品日用品
展覧会用品
蓄音器竈板
其他
一般国情民情
地理、歴史、風土
政治、経済、外交
科学、美術、文学
音楽、芸術、其他
日本文化資料ノ国内的蒐集
外国人ノ論説及著書蒐集
国策並ニ対外関係ト調和
相手国及時期ニ応ズル内容
対外行動ノ方法ノ検討
文部省其他官庁及諸機関
大学、公私研究機関及学者
博物館、図書館及個人
諸団体、諸施設、芸術家、興業界
商工業界、出版社
日本文化ヲ顕明シ之ヲ把握ス
日本文化ノ特質ヲ認識ス
文化ノ定義ニ関スル研究
外国ニ紹介スベキ日本文化ノ範囲
日本文化資料ノ蒐集
既成ノ研究ノ結果ノ利用

Fig. 6 ‘Mind map’ of the activity of KBS (Shibasaki 1999a, pp. 214–215)

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Note: Most of the KBS documents, including some publications, are compiled in the MOFA archives (The Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/record/index.html) and in the Japan Foundation Library (JFIC, Japan Foundation Information Center http://www.jpf.go.jp/e/about/jfic/lib/index.html). An incomplete list of the documents is contained in Shibasaki (1999a). The author has made catalogs and a tiny database of all the documents and publications of KBS in JFIC in 1996–98; this is still available. Further information can be obtained by contacting JFIC (Lib@jpf.go.jp).

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International Control of Epidemic Diseases from a Historical and Cultural Perspective

Naomi Nagata

Introduction

In the globalized world the transnational movement of people has increased, with the consequence that people have become more exposed to threats from various epidemic diseases.[1] Not only have cholera, plague, and yellow fever reappeared but also Ebola, HIV, BSE, SARS, and recently avian flu have newly emerged in the world. Now swine flu too has become a threat to life.

In order to deal with these threats, the World Health Organization revised the existing International Health Regulations in 2005. The WHO first adopted the International Sanitary Regulations in 1952 and subsequently amended them as International Health Regulations in 1968. The regulations adopted in 1951 derived from the International Sanitary Conventions, which were the outcome of fourteen International Sanitary Conferences held between 1851 and 1938. Even with subsequent revisions, the regulations maintain the basic principles of the conventions, and there seems to be a solid basis here for an international consensus on global health security–perhaps even something along the lines of a global culture.

Looking back today on the International Sanitary Conferences is valuable for three reasons: first, it is indicative of some useful international strategies against global epidemic diseases as a means to greater human security; second, as a case study in international regimes, it will shed light on the development of international society and its mechanisms; third, it will help to provide insights into colonialism and imperialism from the point of view of cultural changes.

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[1] This paper is based on a book written by the author: *Ryukobyo no Kokusaitekikontororu Kokusaieiseikaigi no kenkyu The International Control of Epidemic Diseases, A Study of The International Sanitary Conferences 1851–1938,* Tokyo: Kokusaishoin, 2010.

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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate from the respective frameworks of human security, international regimes, and acculturation, that an international sanitary system was formed at the conferences. Firstly, it investigates the principles that were adopted at the conferences. Secondly, it studies how the various actors behaved in order to arrive at these principles. Thirdly, it explores how the principles have influenced the policies of the major countries in the world. Finally, it points to the meaning of the international sanitary system today and suggests the possibility of the formation of a global culture.[2]

Principles of the International Sanitary System

What were the principles that took shape at the conferences? Human development is a process of protecting freedom of choice to display capabilities derived from human diversity. Freedom of choice is vulnerable to various threats to human life. Human security is the idea of promoting international cooperation to protect people from those threats. The characteristics are that (1) all people in the world, whether rich or poor, can be involved in the threats, that (2) a threat in one area can probably spread over other areas, and that (3) by not ignoring threats in one area but dealing with the roots of them earlier, we can settle them in an economical and humanitarian way (UNDP 1994).

Preventing epidemic diseases is a good example of human security. Cholera, pest, and yellow fever are indiscriminately infectious until people develop an immunity to them. Cholera was endemic in India, and in the nineteenth century the increase in the movement of people brought it to European countries. And in the process of the sanitary conferences, international preventive measures were developed so as to control outbreaks of cholera in one area through the collaboration with individuals, states, and international organizations.

International Preventive Strategy Based on One Principle

The nature of infectious diseases and the means of controlling them were controversial issues. Essentially there were two approaches to the problem: One was quarantine, which was based on the doctrine of contagion. This was a measure that detained persons or ships coming from an infected area for the incubation period before allowing them to enter the country. Most of the continental powers adopted this approach because building a sanitary barrier was consistent with the mood of the people. But the measure was implemented in an arbitrary way, causing inconvenience to travel and trade. The second approach was sanitation. This was based on the doctrine of miasma or infected air and was a measure that removed filthy and decaying things so as to make the country clean. Great Britain adopted this approach to improve sanitary conditions, which had worsened during the Industrial Revolution. But it took a long time to implement this since it required scientific proofs, a large amount of money, and a commitment to the education of people.

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[2] There are not many other books or papers on the international sanitary conferences, these include O.P. Schepin and W.V. Yermakov, eds. 1991. *International Quarantine,* (Madison: International University Press) and S. Carvalho and M. Zacher. 2001. “The International Health Regulations in Historical Perspective,” in *Plagues and Politics Infectious Disease and International Policy,* ed. A.T. Price-Smith (New York: Palgrave).

Whether cholera was transmissible or not established, the first and second sanitary conferences (1851, 1859) only regulated national preventive measures (both quarantine and sanitation) in a uniform way.

Faced with the fourth pandemic of cholera (1862–1875), the third conference (1866) established that cholera was transmissible and adopted strict national quarantine measures. The principle applied was that of *the focus of cholera: namely, the strengthening of quarantine in a place in direct proportion to its proximity to a focus of cholera* (Nagata 2010, p. 38; La Conférence sanitaire internationale 1866, No.7, pp. 6–7). The conference also established that cholera invades Europe from India, its endemic source, and adopted the Orient Special Measure. The measure put sanitary barriers on the routes of cholera (in India, at the entrance and coasts of the Red Sea, in the Persian Gulf, and in Egypt). The principle was *the regional quarantine for Europe*. Under this strategy a ship coming from an infected area had to submit to quarantine procedures, regardless of whether it had cholera or not.

As the extending web of railways made the quarantine more burdensome and less effective in Europe, the fourth conference (1874) decided on two types of measures that differed according to regions: the strict quarantine for the Orient, a less strict quarantine or medical inspection for Europe. The principle applied to the two quarantines was *the focus of cholera* and *the regional quarantine for Europe*. In southern Europe, quarantine was still necessary but the measure could be relaxed because of the strict quarantine in Orient. The principle for the medical inspection was *a combination of sanitation and quarantine: the relaxation of quarantine measures in proportion to sanitary measures taken throughout the countries* (Nagata 2010, p. 45: La Conférence sanitaire internationale 1874, pp. 440–444). Northern Europe, especially Britain and Germany, had good sanitation so that the outbreaks of cholera in their countries could be easily controlled. Therefore, medical inspection was considered sufficient at their ports and frontiers. In this case, a ship coming from an infected area was given free passage if it had no cholera and even if it did have cholera, the passengers in good health were not to be detained.

The occupation of Egypt by Great Britain (1882) frequently allowed British ships to escape the strict quarantine at the Suez Canal performed by Egyptian government. And this quarantine might have prevented the outbreak of cholera in Egypt. The sixth conference (1885) had to coordinate medical inspection in northern Europe with strict quarantine for the Orient, and it adopted a strict medical inspection based on uniform principle. The principle was *a combination of* *sanitation and quarantine: the relaxation of quarantine measures in proportion to sanitary measures being limited to ships at the time of departure and traverse* (Nagata 2010, p. 48; La Conférence sanitaire internationale 1885, pp. 145–150). The propagation of disinfection techniques did enable most countries to implement sanitary measures of this limited nature. According to this principle, the strict quarantine in the Orient was relaxed because of the sanitation on ships, and the medical inspection in northern Europe was intensified because sanitary measures limited to ships were not sufficient. Therefore, ships coming from India were given free passage in the Red Sea if medical inspection certified that the ship had taken the necessary measures and that it had no cholera. In northern Europe even healthy passengers were to be detained if the ship had cholera.

The Adoption of a General and Objective Criterion and the Internationalization of the Sanitary Councils of Egypt and Ottoman Empire

The adoption of this uniform principle did not lead to the sanitary convention being finally concluded. For those maritime powers whose domestic levels of sanitation had already reached a sufficiently high standard, measures based on the principle were still burdensome. Moreover, the principle itself, as an international measure, remained inadequate. The sanitary measures involved taking various actions and included concrete and subjective criteria. Therefore it was often difficult for captains or ship doctors to prove that the measures had been carried out and the sanitary authorities in the ports often judged arbitrarily.

Recognizing that merchant ships were a lesser risk than pilgrim ships, the seventh conference (1892) adopted a new principle for the Suez Canal. The basic idea of the principle derived from *the combination of sanitation and quarantine,* but the principle itself was *the relaxation of the quarantine in proportion to the sanitary condition on board the ship* (Nagata 2010, pp. 56–58; La Conférence sanitaire internationale 1892, pp. 22–27). The sanitary condition was a general and objective criterion because it was judged from the existence of diseases and the passing of the incubation period. According to this criterion, ships coming from infected areas were divided into three categories and the strict quarantine in the Suez Canal was greatly relaxed. Clean ships, that is, ships having no cholera at the time of departure, traverse, or arrival, were given free passage. Infected ships, that is, ships having cholera and not having passed the incubation period, were to submit to strict measures (isolation of the sick, disinfection of articles, observation of the passengers and the crews). Suspect ships, that is, ships having cholera but having passed the incubation period, were to submit to less strict measures (disinfection). With these agreements having been reached, for the first time the sanitary convention was concluded.

The eighth, ninth, and tenth conferences (1893, 1894, 1897) widely applied the principle to other area (Europe), group (pilgrim) and disease (pest), taking into consideration their different circumstances, and they all resulted in sanitary conventions. The principle became known as the Venice-Dresden Principle—an appellation derived from the venues of the seventh and the eighth conferences (Nagata 2010, p. 68).

In principle, European states could administer sanitary services within their own territories autonomously. That was not true for the Ottoman Empire and for Egypt. These states could not impose preventive measures on Europeans and their ships because of extraterritoriality. They overcame this by establishing the Sanitary Councils,[3] in which the consuls of the European powers[4] became participating members. However, their delegates substantially outnumbered the foreign delegates so the councils were virtually territorial institutions.

But as the Orient measure based on *the regional quarantine principle* was adopted, it became more convenient to internationalize these councils in order to implement the measure more faithfully. European powers did it in an indirect way through international control of the sanitary fees by the establishment of a financial commission with only two Ottoman delegates in the council (1868).

Moreover as the Egyptian Council was put under British pressure (1882) and the sultan of the Ottoman Empire often intervened in the deliberations of the Ottoman Council,[5] it became necessary to internationalize the councils more directly in order to execute the conventions. Thus, at the seventh conference the number of Egyptian delegates in the Egyptian Council was reduced from nine to three. At the ninth conference, although attempts to reduce the number of Turkish delegates in the Ottoman Council met with failure, it was decided that an executive committee with only two Ottoman delegates would be established in the council.

The Coordination of National Strategies by International Organizations on the Three Amended Principles

The reform of the Egyptian Councils was successful but that of the Ottoman Council was not and the Ottoman Empire unilaterally abolished it soon after the outbreak of World War I.[6] On the other hand, new international organizations emerged in the world. The Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) was established in 1905, the Office international d'hygiène publique (OIHP) was founded in 1907, and the Health Organization of the League of Nations was established after World War I. At first, they were competitive with or indifferent to each other.

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[3] The formal name of the council of the Ottoman Empire was the Supreme Sanitary Council of Constantinople, and that of Egypt was the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt.

[4] The USA was also a member of the Sanitary Council of the Ottoman Empire.

[5] For example, cholera broke out in northern Egypt in 1902. The Ottoman Council decided that a ship coming from an infected area would submit to quarantine procedures for seven days. But the sultan, from fear of the disease, ordered a quarantine for twelve to fourteen days.

[6] Egypt took over the powers of the Egyptian Council in 1938.

The Venice-Dresden Principle was no longer in harmony with scientific knowledge. The criterion of the principle was whether a person had contracted a disease and whether the period of incubation had passed. But it no longer became objective and general as the role of vectors (rats in pest, stegomya in yellow fever, infected but healthy people in cholera) was taken into consideration. Nor was the principle suitable for all: the measures derived from it were too strict for those states already having a sufficient level of sanitation but were too relaxed for states lacking this.

Thus, at the thirteenth conference (1926), a new sanitary system finally came into being: the coordination of national measures by international organizations on the three amended principles.

The principles were amended to be complementary to each other. The Venice-Dresden Principle was generally applied as standards. The criteria of the principle were decided according to the particular disease.

The measures on *the focus of diseases and regional quarantine* were often too stringent. Therefore, the application of the principle was limited to particularly high-risk persons or regions, or alternatively to implementation under the coordination of the international organization (the Egyptian Council).

The *combination of sanitation and quarantine* attracted more attention. States improving their sanitation were increasing in number. This trend was accelerated by the League of Nations and its health organization, which encouraged preventive measures in peace so as to control infectious diseases that were often threatening to world peace. The point was that the criterion of the principle was neither objective nor general. Therefore the OIHP came to guarantee that sanitary measures in question were taken. In the case of a ship arriving from a port registered in the OIHP as a healthy port, the sanitary authority of the port of arrival had to relax the measure as much as possible in proportion to the measures taken at the port of departure.

The main coordinator in the convention of 1926 was the OIHP, and other international organizations gradually became cooperative. The coordination of national strategies depended on the exchange of information, the settlement of the conflicts on quarantine procedures, and each state's capacity to implement the conventions. Since governments were reluctant to give notification of disease outbreaks out of fear of stringent measures being taken against their ships and people, a system for international epidemiological intelligence was established. The OIHP, cooperating with the Geneva Office and the Singapore Office in the Health Organization of the League of Nations, the PASB, and Egyptian Council, undertook to collect and disseminate all epidemiological information. At the fourteenth conference (1938) the OIHP was made the technical consultative agency on the interpretation and application of the convention and the arbitrator of disputes over it. As for the development of the capacities of states, the Health Organization of the League of Nations took an active role.

Behaviors of Actors in the International Sanitary System

I will turn now to the question of how the various actors behaved in order to arrive at a consensus on the principles. International regime theory has two disciplines: one argues that actors reinterpret their own interests in light of their information, knowledge, and circumstances. The other argues that actors make their interests connect together under international laws or ethics, or with sympathy as a member of their communities (Hurrell 1993, pp. 58–73).

The sanitary conferences give evidence of three methods of arriving at consensus: (1) acting together so as to develop solidarity among participants, (2) collecting information so as to widen mutual understanding among them, and (3) accepting the predominance of common interests so as to restrain unilateralist leanings. Three types of actors are related to these methods: experts, diplomats, and international organizations.

Experts: A Framework of Negotiation

The first five conferences (excluding the second) were characterized by the participation of expert delegates, mainly physicians, and they had no plenipotentiary powers. Expert delegates tended to stick to their own theories. At the first conference (1851), physician and consul delegates unified national preventive measures from their experiences, but they did not pay much attention to the different circumstances of each country.

At the third conference (1866), physician delegates eventually provided sound scientific knowledge regarding cholera and a common interest—that is, the protection of Europe. On the basis of these, they agreed to strict national quarantines and to the Orient special measure. Most of them, however, still did not take into consideration whether the measures were effective and possible.

It was not until the fourth conference (1874) that physician delegates discussed the measures above from a practical point of view. A strict quarantine in the Orient was effective and possible because cholera's endemic sources (India) and its two entrances to Europe (the Red Sea and the Caspian Sea) were located in this area. Owing to the development of railways and sanitations, medical inspection established a European regime though it was unacceptable in southern Europe. The risk of disease exceeded the loss of trade, so the less strict quarantine was necessary. Thus, the delegates avoided some hasty uniformity, gave the parties concerned the chance to compare each other's measures, and anticipated being able to achieve a uniform measure in the future.

This anticipation was realized at the expert commission of the sixth conference (1885),[7] where they adopted measures based on a uniform principle, *the*

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[7] This conference was attended by physicians and diplomats and the diplomats had plenipotentiary powers. But after the deliberations of the expert commission were finished, the conference was adjourned and never reopened.

combination of sanitation and quarantine. In achieving consensus, physician delegates offered a framework of negotiation for sharing responsibility for the international measures. This was because Britain intensified the medical inspection in the face of the outbreak of cholera in Egypt, and the continental powers relaxed the quarantine because of the development of improved disinfection techniques. The consequence was that the difference between the medical inspection and the quarantine decreased. In this framework, both of these measures consisted of several procedures (isolation, disinfection, inspection, observation). Negotiation among the parties concerned allotted these procedures to sanitary authorities and to the ships of each country from departure to arrival. In this way a uniform international system arose. Thus, the question of which measure should be chosen transformed into the question of to what extent procedures taken at the time of departure and during traverse could reduce the procedures required on arrival. It was this framework that made the dynamic bargaining to harmonize individual interests with the common interest possible.

Diplomats: Obligations to Limit Sovereignty

At the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth conferences (1892, 1893, 1894, 1897), the participation of diplomat delegates, who had plenipotentiary powers, prevailed. Diplomat delegates tended to pursue their national interests in the name of sovereignty, which, as in the second conference (1859), they had considered an absolute right.

Owing to the precedent conferences, however, in the seventh conference they came to grasp their national interests in terms of the common interest and to accept obligations to limiting sovereignty. As for the Suez Canal, the British delegates argued that even infected ships could pass through the canal without submitting quarantine procedures before entering the canal. The delegates from France and other continental powers objected that this would involve a risk of contacting the coasts of the canal and propagating cholera in Europe. British delegates finally had to accept controls performed by the Egyptian government at the entrance of the canal.

Moreover, at the eighth conference diplomat delegates also came to think that obligations should be those that all powers involved could accomplish. In the case of Europe, German and Austrian-Hungarian delegates insisted that the government in the infected country should only have to notify the focus of cholera and information about measures taken in the county. The majority had argued that not all states had a sufficient level of sanitation and mutual trust among them that such notification presupposes. German and Austrian-Hungarian delegates could not but accept control at the port of arrival even in Europe, where sanitation was relatively improved.

Diplomat delegates participating in the ninth conference (1894), however, could not use obligations as a justification for the right to intervene in other states. They admitted that states had the obligation to protect their Islamic pilgrims going to sacred places (Mecca, Medina). The Italian delegate went so far as to claim the right to intervene if the Ottoman Empire neglected the protection of pilgrims. In this case, he proposed the acceptance of international measures and the internationalization of the Sanitary Council by the Empire. Other European delegates did not support the claim from fear of political difficulties. As expected, the Ottoman delegate refused to participate in the discussion.

In determining the contents of the obligations, the diplomat delegates utilized the framework of negotiation offered by the medical experts, besides referring to their treaties, customs, and precedents in the past. Thus, cooperation between diplomats and physicians came into being. The framework made it possible for them to coordinate national interests with common interests in detail. In the seventh, eighth, and ninth conferences, the delegates, adopting the Venice-Dresden Principle, took the special situations of the Suez Canal, of Europe, and of pilgrimages into consideration. They thought that ships in Europe were less dangerous than those entering the Suez Canal if the canal was strictly under the control of the Sanitary Council of Egypt. And they also thought that merchant ships were less dangerous than pilgrim ships, which were dirty and crowded. At the tenth conference, most of the provisions of the three conventions (1892, 1893, 1894) were maintained, but the delegates still utilized the framework to respond to new questions, namely, the issue of plague and the development of sanitation.

International Organizations: Normative, Informative, and Field Activities

The conferences from the eleventh to the fourteenth included international organizations as actors. International organizations were not only scenes of power struggles but also took more active roles.

Since the reformation according to the convention of 1892, the Sanitary Council of Egypt became a regional organization that executed the sanitary conventions in territorial states. The council no longer represented territorial or European interests one-sidedly. The long experience in acting together in the council brought some solidarity among member states, and the council represented the regional interests of merchants, ship-owners, medical experts, and people concerned with this area. All members of the council consented to *a revision of the Venice-Dresden Principle* and campaigned for holding another conference to amend the convention of the tenth conference (1897) (Nagata 2010, pp. 163–164; Memorandum by Dr. Ruffer, March 11, 1901 FO542/3, PRO; Memorandum, Alexandrie, le 7 Mai, 1903, FO542/5, PRO).[8]

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[8] The same was true of the Ottoman Council, though the reform of it was not successful.

The aim of the OIHP was to collect general information about diseases and sanitary laws from the participating countries and to accelerate conclusion and adoption of conventions among them. The organization, however, was not universal because most of the members were European countries. This organization made a guideline for the twelfth conference (1911), which promoted *the combination of sanitation and quarantine* considering the improvements of sanitation in Europe (Nagata 2010, p. 172; Session Extraordinaire De Mars 1911 du Comité Permanent de l'Office International d'Hygiène Publique, 82, pp. 84–91; Session Extraordinaire D'avril 1910 du Comité Permanent de l'Office International d'Hygiéne Publique, 7–8, pp. 51–52). After World War I, however, the number of its members was increased and the OIHP became less European. The sphere of its activity also expanded so that the OIHP came to undertake a part of activities at the sanitary conferences. Thus the OIHP was able to make the draft convention for the thirteenth conference (1926).

The League of Nations, established in 1920, offered a new common interest—world peace. Its health organization had to realize this interest in terms of health so as to control epidemic diseases, which often led to conflicts and wars. The activities of the Health Organization were different from the normative activities of the OIHP. They were as follows: responding to the needs of individual countries by surveying the situations that caused problems and by giving appropriate advice for them (field activity); facilitating solidarity among nations through study tours and the exchange of medical officers and through producing models of special agreements between neighboring nations (informative activity).

In the process of making the draft convention of the OIHP above, the Health Organization played a complementary role. The organization made sure that regional or individual interests were reflected in the draft. It dispatched commissions to the Near East and the Far East to suggest measures applicable in these areas (Nagata 2010, pp. 180–181; Health Committee, Minutes of the Fourth Session held at Geneva, April 20th–25th, 1925, pp. 49–52). It also recommended the revision of the OIHP's decision on requisites for a bill of health and a periodical extermination of rats, as these requisites were burdensome to ship owners. As the result of cooperation between the two organizations, most of the draft convention was adopted in the conference.

Nevertheless, there was no guarantee that the convention would be ratified and executed exactly by the member states. Neither the members of the OIHP nor of the conference had experience in acting together to bring about a sense of solidarity in the way that the Sanitary Councils and Health Organization did. Moreover, the increasing number of members made it difficult to take all the national interests into consideration in the convention. Thus, in the thirteenth conference it was determined that the OIHP would have the task of linking national interests with the general convention by encouraging common activities. This was based on the experience of the informative activity of the Health Organization of the League of Nations.

After the conference, the OIHP developed its informative activities rapidly as far as the sanitary convention of 1926 was concerned. In epidemiological intelligence, without disadvantaging the states offering information, the OIHP made the merits of rational measures based on the daily exchange of epidemiological information well known so as to promote the observance of the convention. In quarantine services, continuing its activities other than its sessions and communicating with states closely, the OIHP coordinated the divergent opinions on the qualifications required for ship's doctors by continuing the deliberations. And it encouraged states to arrive at an informal yet actual consensus on the abolition of the bill of health on ships first by mail. This later became the basis of a formal and legal consensus. Furthermore, in order to implement the convention it also offered uniform models for the certification of extermination of rats, which were vectors of pest.

Influence of the International Sanitary System on the Countries

How did the principles influence the policies of major countries in the world? Cultures are designs for living, so sanitary policies can be considered a kind of culture and the international sanitary system influenced processes of cultural change. Acculturation explains processes of cultural changes from the point of view of the acculturated. According to this theory there are seven patterns of cultural changes, some of which are: (1) foreign cultural elements act on existing cultural elements to integrate them, (2) existing cultural elements act on foreign cultural elements to integrate them, (3) both cultural elements interact to become new cultural elements, and (4) both cultural elements coexist without interacting (Hirano 2000, p. 116).

Here we shall take Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire as the key to the formation of the international sanitary system in order to point out that core national values have an important role in cultural changes between nation states and to show the four patterns of cultural changes: (1) some of the existing cultural elements were close to core national values and the foreign cultural elements were completely refused, (2) the foreign elements were accepted as long as the core values were preserved, (3) new elements were produced by combining existing elements with the foreign elements, (4) the foreign elements were accepted when such values were changed.

Great Britain

Great Britain was the greatest maritime power in the world. The British government took an approach to disease that was based on miasma and sanitation, since this was connected with one of their important values—that is, freedom of navigation or more generally, individual freedoms. The government thus opposed all measures that were burdensome to navigation, whether quarantine or sanitation in the first and second conferences respectively (1851, 1859) (Nagata 2010, pp. 197–199; Sir Emerson Tennent to Lord Wodehouse, January 28, 1853, FO881/406, PRO.).

Nor did the British government accept the strict quarantine and the Orient Special Measure in the third conference (1866). In the conference, however, the government did not deny the transmissibility of cholera, especially through water, because most British medical experts became supporters of the contagion theory. The government encouraged the improvement of sanitation to secure clean drinking water in the cities and medical inspection at the port of arrival. Medical inspection was adopted at the fourth conference (1874).

Moreover, admitting that procedures of quarantine and sanitary measures became virtually similar as mentioned above, the British government accepted the framework of negotiation established in the sixth conference (1885), although they did not adopt the strict measure drawn from the negotiation. Since then, utilizing this framework, Britain came to make concessions with the continental powers. From the seventh to the tenth conferences (1892, 1893, 1894, 1897), the government actively negotiated within the framework and gained the less strict measures derived from the Venice-Dresden Principle.

Thus, the international strategy was diversified at least among European powers without much infringement on Britain's freedom of navigation. And once the British government obtained results that were satisfactory to their interests, they were reluctant to participate in subsequent conferences.

On the other hand, the British government also thought it dangerous to settle international affairs by means of international organizations. This was because those organizations might infringe on their freedom of action, which was among their most important values. Thus, the government took a negative attitude to the internationalization of the Sanitary Councils and to the establishment of the OIHP.

World War I, however, made Britain change their values dramatically. To them they added the responsibility of great powers to maintain world peace and, in the field of sanitation, to prevent and control infectious diseases, which were potential causes of conflicts and wars (Nagata 2010, pp. 206; International Health Conference 1920, pp. 20). The British government utilized international organizations and conferences as a means of materializing this value. The government took the initiative of setting up a health organization under the League of Nations and incorporating the OIHP into it, and after the plans ended in failure it was energetically engaged in managing both the OIHP and the Health Organization. The government also presented to the OIHP a memorandum that became the basis of the draft of the convention (1926). It admitted the progress of scientific knowledge, the revision of the Venice-Dresden Principle, and the reintroduction of the focus of diseases and regional quarantine. Thus Britain contributed to the diversification of the international system.

The Ottoman Empire

The Middle East was not only an area where plague was endemic but also the entrance point for cholera into Europe. The Ottoman Empire took the position of contagion and quarantine, which was linked with one of their important values, national security. The Ottoman government was in favor of the measures derived from *the focus of cholera and regional quarantine* in the third conference (1966). The measures corresponded with the traditional Oriental method in which the strict regulations were laid down and then relaxed by the administration according to the circumstances.

On the other hand, the government resisted the measures derived from *the combination of sanitation and quarantine* in the sixth conference (1885) because they never believed sanitary measures to be effective. The government also resisted the Venice-Dresden Principle in the eighth and ninth conferences (1893, 1894) because the principle admitted no discretionary powers (Nagata 2010, pp. 233–234; Note Verbale, Sublime Porte, le 18 Mars, 1899, MH19/241, PRO). The government refused to sign the convention, even under pressure from European powers.

But both the Ottoman Empire and the European powers gradually came to make concessions, utilizing the framework of negotiation. At the tenth conference, the Ottoman government demanded a continuation of the existing measure until it was able to improve sanitation. On the other hand, some European countries could not keep the Venice-Dresden Principle rigidly on the grounds that the measures derived from it were insufficient for their security. Moreover, as international trade and travel increased, the Ottoman government admitted *the combination of sanitation and quarantine,* and accepted the Venice-Dresden Principle, recognizing the importance of an objective and general criterion. Finally, it joined in the convention of the eleventh conference (1903) with a reservation taking her insufficient sanitation into consideration. European powers accepted this under the advice of their delegates at the council, who understood the situation of the Ottoman Empire. At the thirteenth conference (1926), the reservation was adopted as the revival of *the focus of diseases and regional quarantine* and became a general provision of the convention.

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire consistently resisted the internationalization of the Ottoman Council, as this threatened to infringe on their freedom. In the ninth conference (1894), an executive commission in which the number of Ottoman delegates was greatly decreased was to be established in the council. But the government refused definitively and the sultan's interventions, in spite of having no rational grounds, became more and more frequent. As the Young Turkish Revolution (1908) brought about a constitutional monarchy, the Ottoman Empire claimed a position as a modern state and, instead of simply opposing European control of the council, began to oppose the very existence of the council itself. Ultimately, it was unilaterally abolished during World War I.

Conclusion: The Meaning for Today of the International Sanitary System and the Possibility of a Global Culture

Since the last sanitary conference, the basic principles of the international sanitary system have been maintained to this day. They have only been intensified or relaxed according to circumstances such as the threat of infectious diseases during World War II, the progress of scientific knowledge, and the increase in the international movement of people. Therefore it is appropriate to point out some of the significance that the international sanitary system has for today.

The international sanitary system can be seen as indicative of global strategies for human security. In order to protect one area earlier for the sake of all the others, the experience of the international sanitary system shows, firstly, that it was epoch-making to adopt the measures on one principle because one area had to be linked with other areas; secondly, that it was remarkable to make the criterion of the principle general and objective, for any area had to be equally treated when it was attacked; thirdly, that other principles were also necessary as a supplement to the main principle or a substitute for it in the future as situations in each area were different and changing; fourthly, that international organizations are indispensable as coordinators because conflicts among areas concerned had to be settled and information on diseases around the world was necessary as soon as possible. Thus, an international sanitary system that was mobile and flexible came into existence.

The international sanitary system shows various patterns of behaviors and many devices for international regimes. Not just common knowledge but also a practical way of thinking is necessary. In spite of scientific knowledge, experts waited for two types of measures to be similar, with result that experts formed a framework for negotiation. The idea of common interests and a framework of negotiation are very effective. Diplomats came to consider that sovereignty was not an absolute right but came with the obligation to utilize the framework to coordinate national interests with common interests specifically. Acting together makes people feel sympathy and solidarity with each other. The role of international organizations was full of creativity in this sense: executing international measures, representing particular interests, developing international regulations, providing information, and satisfying people's needs. Thus, a new sphere called international health has opened up in which the dynamics are quite different from those of power politics.

The international sanitary system reveals new facts about imperialism and colonialism from the point of view of acculturation. Great powers could not dominate lesser powers without effecting their own cultural change. In spite of being against quarantines, Great Britain accepted transmissibility of cholera and utilized the framework for negotiation so that they made the less strict quarantines accepted. The power also hated the idea of international control, but after a disastrous world war they actively participate in the OIHP and the Health Organization. On the other hand, lesser powers could not accept the influences of great powers as they were. Although the Ottoman Empire was against the Venice-Dresden Principle, the power understood the utility of the principle and utilized the framework for negotiations so as to admit the principle with reservations. Not being welcome to the internationalization of the Sanitary Council, the empire turned into a modern state and succeeded in abolishing the Council itself. There are more complicated relationships between great and lesser powers in the terms of acculturation.

The acculturation that accompanied the international sanitary system gave this system a diversity of culture, and this demonstrates the possibility of the emergence of a global culture. It is said that in globalization of culture, part of cultural elements become common and that as common cultural elements increase, a global cultural will possibly appear. However, it is impossible that all cultural elements become totally common in the light of acculturation the cultural changes of which acts on diversity as well as on uniformity. In my opinion, a global culture is the situation in which, though cultural elements become diverse, the diverse cultures coexist with each other, linking together loosely. For this situation, it is necessary that a global culture should produce a totality able to encompass all the cultures and tolerance to be able to accept other cultures. This symptom can be seen in the International Sanitary System. For example, the three amended principles dealing with various countries were adopted. A framework for coordinating national interests with common interests was formed. The solidarity and sympathy among nations were encouraged by international organizations. The great powers accepted the universal values and worked to achieve them.

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Part III

International Organization as a Forum: Turning Local Concerns Into Global Issues

Sino-Japanese Controversies Over the Textbook Problem and the League of Nations

Shin Kawashima

Introduction

Since the pre-World War II period there have been disputes in the world, including East Asia, over textbooks. Textbooks became a source of diplomatic contention when the League of Nations started a debate over the textbook in 1925 and the Committee on International Cooperation worked on a resolution. The textbook problem between Japan and China emerged in the 1910s, and after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 it was taken up in the League of Nations. In this paper I will introduce the historical background of the "textbook problem" and the diplomatic controversies and negotiations that resulted from it. I will also examine the debates that occurred in the League of Nations over textbooks and the circumstances of the wartime period.

In terms of the previous historiography, China's Xu Bing wrote the pioneering historical study on controversies related to Sino-Japanese textbooks (Xu 2000, 2001, 2003; Wu 2008). Japan's Sunayama Yukio then re-examined the genealogy of anti-Japanese textbooks by introducing new historical documents (Sunayama 2005; Ōsato 2005). In addition, China's Wu Keda has used Chinese materials to draw attention to new facts about the textbook controversies of the 1910s. However, these studies not only lack sufficient historical proof, they have also barely touched the textbook problems of the 1930s when this debate, bilateral until now, came on the agenda of the League of Nations and transformed into an issue of world politics. Thus, in this paper I would like to introduce new archival material to add to the existing literature on the 1910s–1920s, as well as to further examine the 1930s.

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Anti-Japanese Movements and the Problem of Sino-Japanese Textbooks: The 1910s–1920s

Controversies over textbooks between Japan and China first broke out in the 1910s. With the establishment of a modern educational school system modeled on Japan in the late-Qing period (1644–1911), Chinese textbooks were compiled under an "official approval." While on the one hand Chinese textbooks were strongly influenced by Japanese textbooks, textbooks for subjects like national (Chinese) history were compiled with the goal of cultivating the consciousness of a nation. Thus even during the period of strengthened Sino-Japanese economic and political relations, the textbooks of each country, which were the basis of national identity, became a symbol of contention between the two. (Kawashima 2006).

Research by Xu Bing, Sunayama Yukio, and Wu Keda has clarified the details of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic disputes over textbooks in the 1910s. As previous studies have pointed out, the Sino-Japanese textbook controversy is thought to have begun on 13 September 1914 with an article published in the *Tokyo Daily* and *Osaka Daily*, titled, "We Sternly Tell the Chinese Government—We Hope that the Chinese Textbooks Filled with Anti-Japanese Phrases will be Abolished."(Tokyo nichinichi shinbun 1914; Osaka mainichi shinbun 1914.) However, the Japanese consul in Shanghai informed the Japanese envoy to China about a debate that had already started in August 1914 in Dalian, the south Manchurian hotspot. In a letter from 4 November 1914 Consul Ariyoshi Akira wrote to minister Hioki Eki stating: "The above-mentioned 'Article on Advanced Elementary Schools' listed the anti-Japanese phrases that can be found in Chinese elementary school textbooks. This article, which was published this year in mid-August in Dalian's *Liaodong Xinbao*, also listed other Chinese books published in Shanghai." (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku 1.1.2 12-1-1, 13 September 1914). Dalian (Dairen) was the released territory controlled by Japan after 1905, and became the Japanese base in northern China. The Japanese community there was used as a frontier to collect intelligence and launch propaganda toward China. Although we cannot confirm the content of the *Liaodong Xinbao*, there is a strong possibility that reports published in Japan were based on Dalian's Japanese-language newspaper reports. In other words, Japanese-language newspapers in China had already reported on the textbook problem in August 1914; in turn, the Japanese consul in Shanghai who saw this report conducted an investigation on the Chinese textbook. Thus, the textbook controversy had begun before the 13 September article was published, and the controversy developed on a global stage from its very beginning. By the end, Japanese authorities concluded in 1914 that what they had initially believed to be textbooks were not approved by the Ministry of Education, and therefore did not qualify as textbooks but rather as "sub-readers." On 23 September 1914, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued orders that the Japanese legation in China solve this problem, and on 26 September the Japanese Minister in China, Hioki Eki, sent a "private letter" to the minister of education in the Republic of China, Tang Hualong. Tang subsequently replied on 23 September and 26 September (ibid., 23 September 1914 and 26 September 1914; Jiaoyu Zazhi 1914, pp. 72–73). In these letters, Hioki made clear that he did not believe the Chinese texts were officially authorized textbooks. Tang responded to Hioki by stating that indeed these texts had not received official approval. Moreover, he alluded to freedom of speech guaranteed under the ROC's constitution, which made intervention difficult. In addition, he mentioned the very existence of books published in Japan that were antagonistic toward China. However, on 2 October Yuan Shi-kai, the official president of the Chinese Republic since 1913, issued a presidential order demanding the revision of Chinese books based on the principle of "friendly neighborly relations"(Zhengfu Gongbao 1914; Jiaoyu Zazhi 1914, p. 69). As Sunayama has pointed out, Yuan Shi-kai's policy of Sino-Japanese friendship created an opportunity to resolve the Sino-Japanese textbook problem. However, Yuan's presidential order did not state clearly which parts of the books should be revised nor what form these revisions should take. Thus it left open the possibility that these books would continue to be published without any revisions.

After 1914, as previous studies have pointed out, the next controversy over textbooks broke out in 1919. In fact, between 1914 and 1917 a constant stream of so-called anti-Japanese statements surfaced in Chinese public and private forums that were well known to diplomats at this time. One example in China's diplomatic archives is a telegram sent in June 1915 from the Chinese minister to Japan, Lu Zongyu, to the Chinese foreign minister and president, Yuan Shikai. Lu reported on the Japanese government and people's astonishment when newspapers announced President Yuan's authorization to include "Japan's Humiliation of China" (*Zhong Ri guo chi*, or Japan's "21 Demands" in 1915) in textbooks—though the final decision depended upon the approval of the council. To the Beijing government, Minister Lu recommended a prudent attendance of this matter (Zhong hua min guo wai jiao bu dang'an 03-33-095-01-007; The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.1985, p. 400). While the tendency to commemorate 7 May or 9 May as a day of "China's national humiliation" began to spread in education spheres from the 1910s to 1920s, it was in June 1915 that the details of the 21 Demands were first reported in China.

The 1919 controversy focused on the Chinese article "New Textbooks and Japan," published in *Zhongguo Jiaoyujie* in July 1919. However, this problem did not happen in 1919 but several years before. *Zhongguo Jiaoyujie* pointed out a previous problem that revolved around two textbooks, *Guomin Xuexiao yong Xinshi Guowen Jiaokeshu* (*New National School Chinese Language Textbooks*) and *Gaodeng Xiaoxuexiao yong Xinshi Xiushen Jiaokeshu (New Advanced Elementary School Ethics Textbooks).* Both were published by the Chinese publisher *Zhong hua shu ju earlier and were re-printed many times.* These were school textbooks officially approved by the Chinese ministry of education.

Some scholars have pointed out that the problem broke out in 1917; however, new materials reveal that it actually happened in late 1916 (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku 1.1.2 12–1, 27 December 1916). Upon receiving a report on anti-Japanese textbooks, Japan's minister of foreign affairs, Motono Ichirō, sent a dispatch to the general consul of Shanghai, Harada Manji. Motono told Harada that since the content of these textbooks “had a detrimental effect on Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations,” Harada should find “a suitable method” to get the Zhonghua Shuju to eliminate such content (ibid., 5 February 1917). In addition, a report from the Fuzhou consulate prompted a protest by the Japanese Minister, Hayashi Gonsuke. He addressed the Chinese Foreign Ministry demanding not only a revision of the content, but also a cessation in the sale of these textbooks (ibid., 31 January 1917).

The Chinese indeed drew back. The representative of the Communication Office (Jiaoshe Shu) in Shanghai, Yang Sheng, and his successor, Zhu Zhaozai, stated in their answer to Consul Harada on 12 March 1917, that the representatives of the Communication Office had given strict orders to the Chinese Publisher’s manager to revise its textbooks in accordance with Japan’s demands. In addition, at the request of Beijing’s MOFA, the Minister of Education, Fan Yuanlian, also directed the Chinese Publisher to consider Japan’s demands in subsequent revisions of its textbooks (ibid., 12 March 1917). After the local authorities solved the problem, the central government sent a letter to the Chinese Publisher in Shanghai. This letter represented the end of the problem rather than the beginning. According to an article published in the *Jiaoyu Gongbao* (*Education Bulletin)*, titled “Letter to the Chinese Publisher Asking to Re-consider the Parts in Elementary School Textbooks that the Japanese View as Anti-Japanese,” the Chinese MOE sent this request to the Chinese Publisher on 24 April 1917 (Jiao yu gong bao 24 April 1917 4/6, pp. 40–41).[1]

In 1919 the debate was revitalized when an edition of the journal *Zhonghua Jiaoyujie*, published a series of articles on the 1917 case mentioned above. That *Zhonghua Jiaoyujie* took up this case again after 2 years was undoubtedly related to growing anti-Japanese sentiment in the May 4th Movement. With such an atmosphere surrounding the movement, the Chinese Publisher also published an article that once again “objected” to the measures that had been taken against the company in 1917. Wu Keda has pointed out that the reason the Chinese Publisher in Shanghai re-introduced this problem after 1919 is not only due to anti-Japanese sentiment, which was escalated by the Shandong Problem and 21 demands, but also its opposition to the Chinese Commercial Press (*Shangwuyin shu guan*), which had close ties with Japan.[2]

In the 1920s, the Japanese authorities resumed investigations on anti-Japanese textbooks. Such textbooks were believed to be supported by the Chinese government in order to sustain anti-Japanese ideology. In the late-1920s, Foreign Minster Uchida Kōsai ordered Minister Obata and other consuls to further investigate the textbooks (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku 1.1.2 12-1-1, 28 December 1920). The Japanese consuls’ reports pointed out that although there were anti-Japanese events held during the “national humiliation” anniversary of May 9th, their observations of Chinese textbooks differed from those of the 1910s.

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[1] I would like to express my thanks to Dai Dongyang (Institute of Modern History, China’s Academy of Social Sciences) for her help in acquiring use of this material, which cannot be found in Japan.

[2] In the first half of the 1910s, the Commercial Press and Chinese Press had engaged in a so-called textbook debate in the Shanghai newspaper, *Shen bao*. Subsequent research has made clear that in January 1914 the Chinese Commercial Press accepted Japanese funds. See (Tarumoto 2004).

Interestingly, these consular reports concluded that the textbooks published in the 1920s were not very problematic. The reports repeatedly pointed out that although Chinese readers and history textbooks from Shanghai and other places did indeed display anti-Japanese characteristics, they also followed an anti-European and anti-American direction. Moreover, Japanese diplomats concluded that anti-foreign tendencies could also be found in Japan. Such reports came in from Fengtian [Shenyang] Consul Akatsuka Shōsuke, Jinan Consul Mori Yasusaburō, and from other consuls in Hankou, Jiujiang, Changsha, and Canton, where anti-Japanese sentiments were more widespread than in other places. Some reports even re-examined textbooks that had been problematized as “anti-Japanese” in the 1910s and concluded that they did not in fact have any anti-Japanese tendencies.[3]

As shown above, although textbooks by the Chinese Publisher were problematized, Japanese consular reports rarely criticized the textbooks—or at least allowed multiple interpretations in the early 1920s. Thus, we can conclude that compared to the Japanese Diet and Japanese army, which were quite sensitive about the textbook problem,[4] Japanese consuls in China held more sympathetic views towards China’s textbooks. The estimation of Chinese textbooks by Japanese diplomats in China was seemingly decided by the atmosphere of the current state of Sino-Japanese relations rather than by the contents of the books. As a result, when the Chinese feeling toward Japan became friendlier, their impression of textbooks also changed. However, because some politicians and military services in Japan couldn’t feel the change of atmosphere in China, they remained suspicious of anti-Japanese sentiment in Chinese textbooks.

The next round of debates on anti-Japanese textbooks started in 1927 under the guidance of the minister of foreign affairs, Tanaka Giichi. At this time, anti-Japanese movements had become prevalent once again. The KMT launched propaganda activities aiming at a revision of China’s unequal treaties, while the Japanese government initiated a new hardline foreign policy towards China. Nevertheless, during this period only a few Japanese consuls reported on intense anti-Japanese activity (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku I.4.0 2–2, 21 October 1927). However, from 1929 onward the situation became tense. Consuls now reported that “the Chinese had begun to use a variety of media—posters, plays, and music—to carry out anti-Japanese education, linking the movement to abolish the unequal treaties with the anti-Japanese movement through the. . .” Three People’s Principles

On 4 May 1929, Foreign Minister Tanaka called the main diplomatic offices in China and ordered investigations (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku H.7.1.0 8, 4 May 1929). An increasing number of Japanese consular reports now criticized the

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[3] Some reports from the consuls, (e.g.. Niuzhuang and Chengdu) pointed out this anti-Japanese tendency as early as the 1910s (ibid., 27 January 1921; ibid., 16 February 1921).

[4] For the General Staff Office’s summary report, see (“Shina kyōkasho ni okeru haigai kiji,” *Mitsudai Nikki*, 1923, vol. 5).

KMT's advocacy of anti-Japanese ideology (ibid., 13 May 1929). While in 1927 Suzhou Consul Iwasaki had sent reports that were sympathetic to Chinese discourse, his tone completely changed in 1929. According to his 1929 report, the Chinese military and KMT viewed Japan as a hypothetical enemy; moreover, schools were taught using anti-Japanese lecturing material (ibid., 12 May 1929).

The Outbreak of the 1931 Manchurian Incident and the Textbook Problem

During the 1930s the Japanese consuls in Manchuria began to report on the intensification of anti-Japanese education in China (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku I.4.0 2–2.). In the international arena, relations between the League of Nations and the Republic of China grew ever closer. In 1931 the League of Nations' Education Inspection Team paid a visit to China. Unrelated to the Lytton Commission investigating the Manchurian incident in 1932, the Inspection Team was part of education aid in the ongoing efforts by the League of Nations to cooperate with China.[5]

After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on 18 September 1931, the situation was aggravated and Japanese consulates in Liaoyang reported in late-October: "Based on the policy of expurgating anti-Japanese phrases from textbooks above the elementary school level, as ordered by the Fengtian [Shenyang] Kwantung Army Police Commander, we have recently been collecting and censoring various textbooks" (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku A.1.1 0 21-5-1, 30 October 1931). There are also consular reports from February 1932 that stated: "In censoring all books in schools, libraries, and bookstores, we have confiscated or burned every anti-Japanese article. Thus at present there is absolutely no trace of any anti-Japanese textbooks or books" (ibid., 9 February 1932). In Manchukuo schools the Japanese used textbooks approved by the KMT government that were censored with black ink; these were then gradually replaced by textbooks officially approved by the Manchukuo government.

The Manchurian Incident also had a huge impact on the Chinese authorities. According to reports by the Japanese consul in Nanjing, the MOE in Nanjing commanded the office of education of the provincial government to "carefully collect" books related to the Chinese perseverance during the Manchurian Incident, publications discussing problems in Northeast China, and Chinese research on Japan. Chinese students should "carefully read" and study these books (ibid., 30 December 1931).

After the Manchurian Incident, the Nationalist Government raised the issue of education within the League of Nations. While the Lytton Committee investigated the Manchurian incident, the Japanese authorities continued to conduct research on

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[5] On the cooperation between the ROC and LN, see (Ogata and Hanzawa 2007).

Chinese anti-Japanese education in an attempt to legitimate their actions in Manchuria as "unavoidable." The outbreak of the Shanghai Incident on 28 January 1932 increased the importance of textbooks within Sino-Japanese relations. The Shanghai Commercial Publisher—known then as an anti-Japanese base—was attacked.[6] As part of their efforts to justify the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese both at home and abroad proclaimed that the main cause of the Japanese invasion lay in China's anti-Japanese movements (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku H.7.1.0 8, 14 November 1931, 15 December 1931).

Moreover, Akamatsu Yūji, the director of the Japanese League of Nations' Association, started to pay particular attention to anti-Japanese education. He required the chief of Asia Bureau, MOFA to collect evidence related to this issue (ibid., 22 January 1932). Thus on 29 January 1932, MOFA once again requested that various Japanese diplomatic offices in China conduct investigations on anti-Japanese education *(*ibid., 29 January 1932). With the exception of those in northeast China, most of the reports sent by the diplomatic offices were based on textbooks compiled by the Chinese Publisher and World Publisher (*Shijie shuju*). In the 1930s diplomatic reports, such as one from the Fuzhou consul, read as follows: "Although in the past there had been some cases of severe anti-Japanese education, the Nationalist Government had never been actively involved. However, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident the Nationalist Government and local authorities have propagated policies that cultivate clear-cut anti-Japanese ideology." After a series of investigations, it was reported that over a hundred "anti-Japanese textbooks" were sent to the Japanese representative at the League of Nations.[7]

During this time, the Chinese authorities also adopted countermeasures. Drafted by the Chinese MOE on 21 March 1932, "Items of Education Regarding Relations with Japan" gave an account of China's policy.[8] Since the 1910s the Chinese had pointed out that Japanese Publisher contained elements that were xenophobic and critical of China. The 1932 "Items of Education" can be viewed as a countermeasure to Japan's critique of China's "anti-foreign education" in the League of Nations. In the following section, I will introduce relevant documents not yet mentioned in the previous historiography.

According to "A Proposal for Our Response to the Japanese Request to 'Cease Anti-Japanese Education,'" the Chinese proposition was as follows: (1) To make clear that "because education in China belongs to China's domestic affairs and is completely under Chinese sovereignty, so education in China will not be interfered with by any other country." Moreover, "the Japanese should cease educating Japanese children and youth in ways that encourage insults toward, and the invasion of, China." (2) To state that China does not exclude Japan or any other nation, since

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[6] On the Chinese casualties, see (Riben di guo zhu yi Zhongguo qin lüe zi liao ji 1988, p. 641).

[7] During this process there were books published on anti-Japanese textbooks in China. For example, see Hobo (1931).

[8] Zhong yang yan jiu yuan jin dai shi yan jiu suo dang an guan suo cang, Guo min zheng fu wai jiao bu dang an. No document number. "Guan yu suo wei pai wai jiao yu wen ti."

"the aim of the ROC's education is to develop a world utopia (datong) based on the principles of national independence, universal democracy, and the advancing of people's livelihood." (3) To make evident that the Japanese assertion of China's so-called "anti-Japanese education" had no legitimate basis. (4) To show that in terms of descriptions of international society and other countries of the world, China's textbooks were more valid and discreet than Japan's textbooks. While Japan's accusations of China's textbooks as "anti-foreign" were not based on facts, Japan's textbooks in fact constantly presented a xenophobic attitude toward Russia, England, Germany, France, and the United States; in addition, they contained critiques of international society and the LN. (5) To demand the deletion of parts in Japanese textbooks encouraging children to belittle China and foster Japanese invasion of China.

With regards to the Japanese accusation of anti-Japanese education in China, the Chinese responded that such statements were limited to the views of certain individuals. Moreover, according to the Chinese statement, the evidence raised by the Japanese was based on books that had not been officially authorized as textbooks, or mentioned texts that simply did not exist. Next, the Chinese argued that the historical facts of foreign policy in textbooks were aimed at cultivating consciousness of Chinese national identity among students. For example, the descriptions of the "21 Demands" and "Jinan Incident" fell under this category. As mentioned by the Chinese statement, these types of narratives could be found in every country; indeed, even Japan's textbooks contained examples such as the Jinan Incident or the signing of unequal treaties (Sanseidō, *Chūgaku Rekishi Kyōkasho* [Middle School History Textbook], Chap. 34).

The second part of the document prepared by the Chinese authorities, "Proposal of Our Requests of Japan," went one step further and listed the following three points. First, the Chinese sought the elimination of anti-Chinese content in Japanese textbooks that were aimed at promoting the humiliation and invasion of China. Second, since Japan's occupation of Manchuria the Japanese "have revised local elementary school textbooks and eliminated all patriotic materials as well as texts related to diplomatic history." The Japanese should thus take full responsibility for "having destroyed our country's educational administration and having anesthetized our teenagers." Third, with regard to the destruction of China's education and cultural organizations in places like Manchuria and Shanghai by the Japanese army, the Japanese government should restitute whatever it had plundered and pay proper compensation for damages to the *Emperor's Si ku quan shu*, to the Shanghai Commercial Press, among others. With regard to the second and third items, the proposal noted that further investigations were necessary in order to gather evidence.

In the attachment appendix of this document by Chinese authorities, titled "Middle and Elementary School Texts Edited by Japan's Education Ministry that Promote the Invasion of China," the Chinese authorities recorded the names of relevant textbooks and the parts on invading China. Here I would like to introduce the parts that the Chinese MOE found most problematic. Chapter 46 of *Middle School Asian History Textbook*, edited by Sanseidō, depicted the first Ming emperor, Taizu (1368–1398), as a "beggar" with the "barbarians, bandits, and beggars" who merely followed along during the revolution. The chapter also stated: "Since China will soon collapse… Japan should consider the way to expand its power in China, in the process of Chinese collapse," in order to catch up with other power's actions in China. The supplement also raised the example of Chap. 20 in Sanseidō's *Middle School Asian History Textbook for Female Students*, which described Japan's military expedition to Shandong as "a violent clash caused by China's Southern Army."

In response to Japan's criticisms of Chinese education, the Chinese MOE prepared the following documents in English: "Japanese Aggressive Politics and Anti-Chinese Teachings in Japanese Text-books" (10 April 1932) and "Remarks on a Japanese Propaganda Pamphlet Published under the Title of Anti-Foreign Teachings in New Text-books in China" (13 March 1932). It is not clear whether these documents were submitted to the League of Nations or not; however, we can see what the Chinese attitude towards this problem was at the time.

With Japanese and Chinese authorities having investigated each other's "anti-foreign education" (or more specifically anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese education), the League of Nations began to discuss the matter. After the Lytton Commission's investigation in Manchuria in March–June of 1932, the ROC representative, Gu Weijun, referred to anti-Japanese education in the League of Nations' Investigation Committee on 25 June 1932. The educational problem, including textbooks, was part of the agenda for the Lytton Commission's investigation into East Asia, because both Japan and China pointed out that education cultivated strong anti-foreign sentiments toward each other. In response to Japanese accusations of China's anti-Japanese education, Gu stated as follows: (1) The incorporation of such content in Chinese textbooks should be seen as part of China's strategy for recovering national sovereignty; (2) Because such extreme content is found in textbooks, there is a necessity for China to take a more amicable standpoint and add revisions to the text; (3) However, China requests that the Japanese also simultaneously make revisions in their textbooks. Moreover, Gu objected to some of the materials that Japan had labeled as "anti-Japanese textbooks." He argued that most of the material the Japanese had submitted as evidence of anti-Japanese education had not in fact been approved by Chinese authorities; such texts were "teaching materials" but not official textbooks. According to Gu, much of the material submitted by the Japanese, contained mistakes and mistranslations. At the same time, he listed several examples in Japanese textbooks that were humiliating to China (Kokusai renmei jimukyoku Tokyo shikyoku 1933). During a discussion, probably at the general assembly of the Lytton report in the LN in October 1932 (the material didn't make clear the place) Gu stated: "Although China's nationalism is rapidly developing, at its root there is no anti-foreign ideology" (ibid., 34). Japan's foreign affairs minister, Matsuoka Yōsuke, responded: "Anti-foreign ideology is in full force in China… As stated in the Lytton Report, China has implemented anti-foreign education for several years—what will be its after-effects?" Gu countered: "While Mr. Matsuoka has contentiously described his reasons for why he fears our nationalist movement's anti-foreign education, as I stated above he has no grounds for supporting those fears" (ibid., 40). Although the discussion ultimately proved fruitless, the main issue revolved around whether or not Japan was correct about China's "anti-foreign" education or whether it was part of China's efforts to recover its sovereignty.

The Chinese views in discussions at the League of Nations were as follows.

> If you compare China's movement to recover national sovereignty with that of Japan's in the past, it is a fact that ours is relatively restrained and moderate. The unequal treaties signed by the Tokugawa bakufu in the mid-nineteenth century resulted in various disasters. Negotiations over abolishing extraterritoriality gave birth to Japanese anger, and foreigners in Japan became the object of violent attacks. Ōkuma Shigenobu even lost one of his legs in the people's anger over his unsatisfying negotiations with Western countries about this issue. Textbooks used in Japanese schools also include many passages whose aim was to constantly remind boys of Japan's painful history of foreign relations. Good examples of this can be seen in *Elementary School Japanese History*, Volume Two, Lesson Two; *Elementary School National History*, Lesson 47; and *Middle School History*, Chapters 32 and 34 (all published by Sanseidō).[9] It is correct that the Lytton Commission reports that "modern China's nationalism is a normal phenomenon that befits the period of political transition that China is undergoing today. Such nationalist feelings and demands can be commonly observed in any country under similar political conditions." What is extremely strange is that despite Japan's similar experience, it does not sympathize with China. Instead, Japan has misunderstood the Chinese people's true wishes and is the number one country opposing the realization of such wishes (Kokusai renmei jimukyoku Tokyo shikyoku, 68. Translation by the author).

After the Lytton Report was officially issued in October 1932, the League of Nations began to discuss the report in the assembly of the Lytton Report. Chapter Seven of the report examined Chinese boycotts in relation to Japan's economic interests. The Lytton Report, however, did not necessarily make clear the connection between anti-Japanese education—specifically, anti-Japanese textbooks—and Chinese boycotts. This was also pointed out in the other Japanese documents, including "The Japanese Government's Opinion on the Report by the League of Nations' China Investigation Committee" (League of Nations Association, November 1932).

On 6 December 1932, Gu Weijun submitted comments to the council of the League of Nations in response to Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke's criticism presented above (League of Nations.1932; Nihon Gaimusho hozon kiroku, A.1.1.0 21-12-1-5). Gu replied:

> In the past, Japan has always adopted a policy of obstructing China's unification; threatening the peace of the Far East has been Japan's traditional continental policy. The Tanaka Memorial written by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi in 1927] is the most representative

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[9] The textbooks above were apparently not included in the investigation materials prepared by China's MOE as evidence of Japan's "anti-foreign" education. However, the textbooks and passages cited here are nearly identical to those raised in the article, "Evidence of Japan's Invasion of China and Anti-Foreign Education," published in Shanghai's Chinese-language magazine, the *International* (Guoji). This article, which dates from May 1933, was collected by the Cultural Department of Japan's Foreign Affairs Bureau. Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku, A.1.1.0 21-5-1, Tokyo.

> expression of this.[10] Minister Matsuoka insists that this memorial is a forgery. But even if we were to suppose that the Tanaka Memorial did not in fact exist, if you look at Japan's actions toward China then the document certainly still holds enormous meaning.

On top of these criticisms, Gu stated: "Japan's accusations that China is anti-foreign are absolutely groundless; anti-Japanese sentiment is merely a reaction to Japan's invasion of China." Gu added that, "Even in Japan, anti-foreign textbooks are by no means rare."[11]

As is well known, the debate over the Lytton Report ended with Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933. In the end, Japan and China's mutual criticisms of each other's education policy remained unsolved within the League of Nations. However, with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, anti-Japanese education did not just increase, changing textbooks served as a token in conflict solving. According to reports by Japanese diplomatic offices, in the aftermath of the "Chengdu Incident" on 24 August 1936, Chiang Kai-shek tried to negotiate for peace with Japan. After the declaration of a "good-neighbor" policy on 29 August, newspapers reported that the Chinese Education Ministry would erase anti-Japanese passages in textbooks in accordance with the decision to end anti-Japanese movements (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku/Matsumoto kiroku, A.1.1.0 9–10, 25 November 1936). However, peace negotiations between Japan and China ran into difficulties due to the "Xi'an Incident" of December 1936. Thus, it was no longer necessary to remove anti-Japanese phrases from Chinese textbooks.

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Mitsukoshi department stores throughout Japan established exhibitions dedicated to the July 1937 "Sino-Japanese Incident" that marked the start of the war. These exhibitions displayed anti-Japanese posters and textbooks, which were used as tools to justify Japan's actions in the war. Japan adopted a fundamental policy not only in Manchukuo but also in all occupied areas to try to purge textbooks of any anti-Japanese sentiment and any Western influence on its developments.

When the Wang Jingei Nationalist Government was established in Nanjing in 1940, it initially attempted to use an inspection system for its elementary and middle school textbooks, similar to the Reform and Provisional governments. The new government designated that the textbooks were to be re-compiled, "because the Reform Government era's textbooks were imperfect." But in the end, the Japanese authorities conceded that the process went no further than partially revising the

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[10] The Tanaka Memorial was a typical false document; however some Chinese nationalistic organizations based their propaganda on this document. Although Chinese governments knew of its falseness at first, their criticism of Japan was based on this document at League of Nations on Lytton Report. About the Tanaka Memorial, Hattori, Ryuji made the process of its changing to become the symbol of Japanese invasion of China clear (Hattori 2010).

[11] Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku A.1.1.0 21-12-1-5, 6 December 1932. 3160. Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of Enquiry set up in virtue of the Resolution adopted by the Council on December 10th 1931(continuation)"*League of Nations Official Journal*, December 1932, 1877–1890.

Reform Government's textbooks (Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo shozō, 30 July 1938). The head of the Education Ministry, Zhao Zhengping, told a Japanese envoy that during the editing process the Japanese had requested "close cooperation" with Central China's Liaison office (Kachu Renrakubu) and had tried not to depend solely on the Japanese-funded Central China Printing Office (Nihon gaimushō hozon kiroku I.1.4.0 2–2, 15 June 1940). Ultimately, probably because the Japanese side paid attention to the autonomy of the local government superficially, the Education Ministry inherited the same methods of the Reform Government in allowing the Central China Printing Press to print the textbooks and then in entrusting Three Communications Press to distribute them free of charge (ibid., 31 July 1940). In this way, as the Sino-Japanese War progressed, Chinese-language textbooks edited by the Japanese were used in areas under Japanese rule, while textbooks viewed by the Japanese as "anti-Japanese" were used in areas controlled by the Nationalist Party.

Conclusion

In this paper I have examined cases of Sino-Japanese controversy over textbooks, in particular focusing on how they were dealt with in diplomatic sites. In addition, I have tried to supplement earlier historiography on the 1910s and 1920s with new information.

In the pre-war period, textbooks not only cultivated nationalism but also involved criticism of neighboring countries. Thus, textbooks were viewed as supporting anti-foreign ideologies and spoiling friendly neighbor relations. However, textbooks were not singled out as the only problem but were treated as one of many diverse media used for nationalistic purposes, which included books, billboards, and posters. In the diplomatic arena, the textbook controversy began with Japanese protests against China's anti-Japanese textbooks. While the Chinese tried to avoid turning the issue into a diplomatic problem by emphasizing friendly neighborly relations, the Chinese simultaneously countered with their own criticisms of Japanese publications. By the 1930s the Chinese also began to clearly criticize Japanese textbooks, and during the Sino-Japanese War textbooks became an indicator of conflict for both sides. If we look at the entire process as a whole, however, it is clear that at least from the early- to mid-1920s, Japanese consuls in China did not particularly emphasize the anti-Japanese nature of Chinese textbooks. While it is unclear whether this stance was related to the liberal foreign policy (Shidehara Diplomacy) of the 1920s, after the establishment of the Nationalist Government in 1927 the consuls began to criticize the anti-Japanese nature of Chinese textbooks. Nevertheless, during the Sino-Japanese negotiations for peace in 1936, there were key moments where the Chinese appeared to accept Japan's request to revise their textbooks. In other words, in terms of diplomatic negotiations over textbooks Sino-Japanese relations did not necessarily become increasingly worse. In fact, there were attempts made by both sides to improve relations. This problem will need to be further examined in the future.

In the post-war period, Japanese textbooks were revised to criticize militarism, to end people's worshipping of the emperor, and to emphasize democracy. While is it not yet clear to what degree the Republic of China participated in the occupation of Japan, with the exception of censoring "Shina" from Japanese official documents and publications, the Republic of China was not able to eliminate Japan's "anti-Chinese characteristics" as it wished. And while there were variations between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, post-war China basically inherited the historical views and perceptions of Japan that were strengthened during the process of Sino-Japanese antagonism up through the Sino-Japanese War. Thus the controversies that surrounded the textbooks were not resolved by the war.

Afterwards, Japan re-established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and took responsibility for the war by performing acts of gratitude that "used good to requite evil." Supported by theories that advocated the "Division between the Military and Civilians" and "Sino-Japanese friendship," in 1972 Japan established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China as politics were used to solve the problems of the past. However, this old—and yet simultaneously new—problem of textbooks flared up again in the 1980s, this time as a problem involving Japan's domestic politics.

Sino-Japanese historical controversy has some significant implications for global issues. First of all, contemporary historical and emotional nationalistic issues sometimes have a long-distance history so that the process of reconciliation is rendered extremely complex and sensitive. Second, inadequate coping with this issue can cause long-term problems. When countries associate strong nationalism with their development, such historical frustration naturally disturbs most ordinal exchanges among them. Third, this article illustrates that the means used to cope with historical issues under the Cold War were certainly diverse, and that the situation in East Asia was very different from that in Europe. Global governance and the path to reconciliation probably share common ground to some extent; however, they have to hold on to their flexibility and diversity in order to solve issues with specific backgrounds in each region.

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————————, H.7.1.0 8, Shina ni okeru hai-Nichi chōsa kankei zakken, Vol.2. 14 November 1931. Shina no hai-Nichi kyōiku ni kansuru ken.

————————, H.7.1.0 8, Shina ni okeru hai-Nichi chōsa kankei zakken, Vol.2. 15 December 1931. Shina no hai-Nichi kyōiku to Manshū Jihen.

————————,H.7.1.0 8. 22 January 1932. Kokusai Renmei Kyōkai shuji Akamatsu Sukeyuki yori Ajia kyokuchō Hase Masayuki ate "Chuka Minkoku no hai-Nichi kyōiku ni kansuru ken."

————————,H.7.1.0 8, Hai-Nichi kyōiku chōsa ni kansuru ken. 29 January 1932. Yoshizawa daijin yori zai-Shi kaku kōkan.

————————,H.7.1.0 8. 20 April 1932. Zai-Fukushū Tamura Teijirō sōryōji yori gaimu daijin Yoshizawa Kenkichi ate "Hai-Nichi kyōiku chōsa ni kansuru ken."

————————,H.7.2.0 4–6, Sankō shiryō kankei zakken, zatsu oyobi Kokusai Renmei kankei. 7 September 1931. Shidehara daijin yori zai-Jufu Sawada kyokuchō "Kyōiku mondai ni kansuru Renmeitai shienjo Teikoku sanka no ken."

————————,I.4.0 2–2, Gaikoku ni okeru kyōiku seido oyobi jyōkyō kankei zakken, Chūgoku no bu, Vol.1, Haigai kyōiku kankei. 21 October 1927. Zai-Soshū ryōji Iwazaki Eizō yori gaimu daijin Tanaka Giichi ate "Shina shōgaku jidō no haigai kanka ni kanshi hōkoku no ken."

———————————————,I.4.0 2–2, Haigaku kyōiku kankei, Chūgoku no bu, Vol.2(13). June 1939. Kakkoku ni okeru kyōiku seido oyobi jyōkyō kankei zakken.

———————————————,I.1.4.0 2–2. May 1939. Zai Nankin Hanawa Gikei sōryūji yori Matsuoka Yōsuke gaimu daijin ate, "Kokumin seifu kyōikubu no genjō ni kansuru ken."

———————————————,I.1.4.0 2–2. July 1939. Ishin kyōiku no genjō.

———————————————,I.1.4.0 2–2. 15 June 1940. Zai-Nankin Abe Nobuyuki daishi yori Arita Hachirō gaimu daijin ate,

———————————————I.1.4.0 2–2. 31 July 1940. Zai-Nankin Abe Nobuyuki daishi yori Matsuoka Yōsuke gaimu daijin ate, "Shina-gawa shōgakkō kyōkasho ni kansuru ken."

Zhonghua minguo wai jiao bu dang an, 03-33-095-01-007, Wai jiao bu shou, zhu Ri lu zong xing gong shi dian. 11 June 1915, the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.

Beyond Empires' Science: Inter-Imperial Pacific Science Networks in the 1920s

Tomoko Akami

> *Science knows no international boundaries.*
>
> Victor C. Vaughan, Chairperson, Division of Medical Sciences, U.S. National Research Council,
> at the opening of the Third Pan-Pacific Science Congress
> 30 October 1926, the Great Hall of the Tokyo Imperial University (Vaughan 1927, p. 75)

As Madeleine Herren argues in the Introduction of this book, Asia and the Pacific region is largely missing in the recently growing field of history of international organizations; thus, the history falls short of being global. Reasons for this omission have been discussed in other chapters. They include Eurocentrism in scholarship and the Sino-Japanese conflict that discredited the collective security system proposed by the League of Nations. This did not mean, however, that these international organizations were not trying to be global. Indeed, the League, the first comprehensive governmental international organization, worked hard to become involved in regions beyond Europe, including Asia and the Pacific region, and the cooperation of Japan, the Asian Empire, was crucial for the League's claim to be global.

One simple fact explains why Asia and the Pacific region have thus far largely escaped scholarly attention in the history of international organizations: only a handful of independent or semi-independent nations (such as the British Dominions) existed in the region between the late nineteenth century and the end of World War II, the period when international organizations flourished. Most of these organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, recognized only

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"independent" nations as their members. As a result, there was little basis for international organizations to be formed in the regions filled with colonies (Akami and Okamoto 2013). These "independent" nations, which international law of the time described as "civilized" nations, were empires that governed not only their own "nations" but also their formal colonies and territories, and their imperial administrations represented these colonies and territories at international organizations. This dual nature of the nation state as the national and imperial governing polity in this period, presented a messy problem of sovereignty for international law experts (Akami 2013).

As part of this volume's effort to make the history of international organizations global, this chapter examines what Herren has described as an informal fora of an epistemic community of experts in Asia and the Pacific. It argues that in the absence of proper governmental IOs in the region during the inter-war period, these conference-based "organizations" played a significant role in creating an inter-imperial cooperative framework for experts. It suggests that this cooperation then produced a kind of regional governance system, complementing the global initiative of the League of Nations. Akami and Okamoto argue that this type of conference-based organization with less established bureaucracies became the dominant character of international organizations in the region after 1945 (Akami and Okamoto 2013).

This chapter focuses on scientists and the international conferences of the Pacific Science Congress (PSC), held mainly in the 1920s.[1] Before the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, the PSC held conferences in 1920 (Honolulu), 1923 (Melbourne and Sydney), 1926 (Tokyo), 1929 (Java), 1933 (Victoria and Vancouver), and 1939 (Berkeley and San Francisco).[2] The PSC provided the site for the biggest and most comprehensive gathering of scientists in the region during this period. Below I will refer to what we now call Asia and the Pacific region (or the Asia-Pacific region) as the Pacific region, which is what contemporaries called it in the examined period (Akami 2002, pp. 35–37).[3]

When it is relevant, I will make a comparison between the network of scientists at the PSC and that of social scientists at the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). In the inter-war years, the IPR was regarded as one of the 37 most active and influential international non-governmental organizations, and among them it was the only one that was headquartered within the Pacific (White 1933, pp. 13–15). Established in Honolulu in 1925, it held international conferences in the region at 2–3-year intervals and addressed the political, economic, and social problems of the

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[1] The first conference was called the Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference, the second and the third, the Pan-Pacific Science Congress, and the fourth to the sixth, the Pacific Science Congress. I use PSC as the abbreviation for all of these conferences.

[2] The Japanese government still sent a group of scientists to the conference in 1939. The PSC was resumed in 1949 and has been held every 4 years up to the present day. See http://www.pacificscience.org/congresses.html (accessed on 23 September 2010)

[3] On the problem of the terminology of the region, such as the Pacific and the more recent Asia-Pacific, see Dirlik (1992) and Jolly (2007).

Pacific. Those who attended the IPR conferences were prominent public intellectuals, many of whom used newly developing social scientific methods to analyze contemporary regional affairs (Akami 2002). While the PSC and the IPR could be understood as a part of the Pan Pacific movements of the time (Akami 2002), there were a few significant differences between these two networks other than their fields of expertise. The PSC was more interested in the inside of the Pacific, while the IPR was mainly focused on Pacific-rim countries. The PSC was governmental and the IPR was not (Akami 2002, pp. 57, 107–109). How did these differences affect the operations of these networks?

This chapter suggests that the PSC's focus on the inside of the Pacific, not on the Pacific rim, made it more imperial. While PSC scientists argued that they were working for the welfare of the people in the region, their main concern was metropolitan imperial/national interests. It stresses, however, that these scientists pursued not only their own empires' interests, but also promoted inter-imperial cooperative frameworks in diverse scientific fields. The PSC network also intended to influence governmental actions. Until the Great Depression hit the world, PSC's Pan Pacific network promoted inter-imperial scientific cooperation. This cooperation led to the making of these inter-imperial infrastructures, which were then to become the basis of regional "public" infrastructures, and an important part of the global governance mechanism initiated by the League in the same period.

Shaping the Pacific Science Inter-Imperial Network

Examining scientists' networks in the Pacific in the mid-nineteenth century, MacLeod and Rehbok characterized "Pacific Science" as empires' science. Distinguished from "Atlantic Science," it was "the cognitive space" Europeans had produced, and the Pacific was "viewed as an essential library and museum for imperial interests of Britain, France, and Germany" (MacLeod and Rehbock 1994, pp. 4, 5).[4] In other words, "Pacific Science" was an empires' science that served empires' interests.

However, the boundary between Atlantic "metropolitan" Science, and Pacific "periphery" Science was not clear-cut. Intra-imperial scientific interactions were extensive, and colonial needs and findings enhanced scientific developments at metropolitan centers, and vice versa. Pacific Science of the nineteenth century was empires' science not only because its main objective was to serve empires' interests, but also because it was a constitutive part of metropolitan empires' science. Furthermore, scientists from various empires often formed intellectual and collaborative networks.

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[4] The main interest of MacLeod and Rehbock is in intra-British imperial and Anglo-American networks with a specific focus on Darwin and Darwinism. They characterized "Pacific Science" as "observational, outdoors, and difficult to measure to exact measurement," while Atlantic Science was "epitomized by the experimental, 'indoor' laboratory, a space devoted to the exact sciences."

Such networks have often been understood as "inter-national" rather than "inter-imperial." The International Research Council (IRC; established in July 1919) was, therefore, described as an international organization that coordinated scientific activities among the "nation-states" rather than "empires" (Greenaway 1996, pp. 18, 23).[5] In the beginning, as Greenaway points out, scientists' networks developed in the mid-late nineteenth century not through unified national academic associations but through the independent associations of major cities in Central Europe, especially in Germany. The national unit structure became more prominent after World War I (Greenaway 1996, pp. 7–23). In 1926, still fresh in his memory, Sakurai Jōji, President of the third PSC and emeritus professor of Tokyo Imperial University, noted that the formation of the IRC was "an almost complete reconstruction of international scientific organizations." Most organizations in diverse fields of science were then affiliated with the IRC (Sakurai 1927a, pp. 70–71).[6] They were now consolidated into "national" units, which became the bases of the IRC.

The IRC was also a creation of war. Although its function remained the coordination of international scientific collaboration (Sakurai 1927a, pp. 70–71), its main objective was "inter-Allies" wartime collaboration. The USA and Canada, respectively, first formed their own National Research Councils (NRC) as a part of wartime mobilization in 1916 (the USA was to join the war in April 1917). France and Britain began to discuss the need for the collaboration during in 1917 (Greenaway 1996, p. 16), while the American NRC initiated the Allied forces' collaboration in order to develop a submarine detection system. They discussed the formation of the IRC and its membership during the last 2 years of the war, which first included only Allied countries and then some neutral countries and dominions of the British Empire as separate and independent members. The IRC was formed finally after the Armistice (Greenaway 1996, pp. 23–25).[7] Its initial objectives were therefore not peace or order but war efforts, and it excluded former enemy countries.

When the PSC was created in the 1920s, in some countries the NRCs, which were the "national" units of the IRC (Australia, Japan, and Italy),[8] became the "national" units also of the PSC. In other countries, where there were already established "national" scientific associations, such as the Royal Society (established in 1660) in Britain, they became the national unit for the IRC and the PSC. Another stream of scientific organization, the Associations for the Advancement of Science (AAS), also provided a cooperative organizational base in the British Commonwealth and the USA. They were the British AAS (BAAS, founded in 1831), the American AAS (founded in 1848), and the Australasia AAS (founded in 1888). The

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[5] The decision to form the IRC was made in December 1918.

[6] Towards the end of the war, a few conferences of Allied countries' scientific organizations discussed the formation of the IRC. The International Metric Commission was one of the very few that were not affiliated with the IRC.

[7] On the NRC, see also http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history.html (accessed on 20 June 2011).

[8] Japan's NRC was founded soon after the Armistice, Australia's NRC was founded in 1919, and Italy's NRC was formed in 1923.

BAAS was both a national, intra-imperial, and inter-imperial organization in the sense that its participants came from its "nation" as well as its colonies/dominions and the USA. The Australasia AAS branched out from this British AAS.[9] The NRC of Australia represented the AAS as well as other discipline-based scientific organizations internationally.

In the inter-war period, most international organizations, including the IRC, were formed in the model of what Hedley Bull termed the "International Society" (Bull 2002, p. 32). This society was an imagined political community whose members were the sovereignty states bound by shared common interests and values (Bull 2002, p. 13). The idea is distinguished from the cosmopolitan notion of what Ian Clark called "World Society," which consisted of the world public (Clark 2007, pp. 1–9). As White examined in 1933, even among non-governmental organizations the cosmopolitan model (their members were not national units, but borderless individuals) was rare in the inter-war period (White 1933, pp. 31, 34–36). Instead, most non-governmental international organizations were based on national/imperial units (Delanty 2009, p. 48).[10] As a result, the PSC, as well as the IRC and the IPR, enhanced the "national" consolidation of scientific organizations in member countries (White 1933, pp. 35–36; Akami 2002, p. 108). Therefore, individual member scientists first had to belong to a national organization in their scientific field that was affiliated to the NRC or to its equivalent. The NRC or its equivalent would then select national representatives to attend international scientific meetings.

Although the IPR and the PSC were both "inter-national" not cosmopolitan organizations and based in the Pacific region, the IPR defined itself as "non-governmental." Because its conference participants were not official representatives, it argued, the participants could discuss issues without being confined by their own states' policies (Akami 2002, pp. 56–57).[11] In contrast, the PSC was "governmental": It accepted governmental endorsements, it was funded by official subsidies, its invitations were sent to the governments through diplomatic channels, and its participants were "official delegates," formally representing their own states (PSA 1930, p. 49). PSC members only began to criticize this official status in the late 1930s, when the governments (especially the USA) stopped giving subsidies (PSA 1934, p. 128).

Despite this "inter-national" model, just as the member states of what Bull called the International Society were mainly empires (Akami 2013),[12] the states which the PSC represented were often not only the national states but also the metropolitan imperial states that governed their colonies and territories. In the Pacific region, even in what has been often assumed as the age of self-determination, the Japanese, US, and European empires continued to maintain their colonies and territories (Iriye 1965, p. 4).

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[9] The AAAS was founded in 1888 and developed as a more independent organization for Australia and New Zealand (the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science) by 1938.

[10] Examining cosmopolitanism, Delanty also pointed out that the League of Nations and its related organizations were based on the sovereignty of nation states in the inter-war period.

[11] This was partly due to the US State Department's unwillingness to endorse the IPR conference.

[12] The International Society's member states need to be defined as nation state/empires (Akami 2013).

Although the main members of the IPR and the PSC were the empires in the Pacific region, or the empires that had colonies or interests in the region, a few new factors did emerge in the 1920s. First, British dominions and India were formally recognized as independent members of many international organizations, including the League of Nations. Not just British dominions but also the American territory (Hawai‘i) and its colony (the Philippines) sent separate groups throughout the 1920s to the IPR. At the PSC, scientific organizations from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada played major roles.

Australian members especially led the formation of the PSC. At the British AAS conference that was held in Australia during the war (1914), American and Australian participants agreed that they needed to know the Pacific better. They worked on a joint venture of Pacific exploration throughout the war. In 1919 plans for this joint exploration venture were put forward to the American AAS. In 1920 “the Committee on Pacific Exploration, originally appointed by the [American] National Academy [of Science], was transferred to the [American] National Research Council.” The committee became the organizing body of the first PSC of 1920 in Honolulu (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921, iii–iv). Here American-Australian joint leadership was crucial, and the two streams of scientific organizations (AAS and NRC) converged at the PSC.

Second, because the League of Nations had to encompass members beyond the North Atlantic, especially in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, Japan was an important non-European member at the League in the 1920s. Similarly, as at the IPR, the Japanese NRC tried to take the lead at the PSC and hosted the third conference in Tokyo in 1926. Third, China and the Soviet Union joined the PSC in 1926, although they were not active.

The PSC as Inter-Imperial Science Network: Participants and Organization

Four PSC conferences were held in the 1920s: the first in 1920 (Honolulu), the second in 1923 (Melbourne and Sydney), the third in 1926 (Tokyo), and the fourth in 1929 (Java); all were largely funded by the host country’s government (including state governments) (Lightfoot 1924a, b).[13] In 1920, reflecting the initial focus on the Pacific expedition, the PSC covered relevant fields of anthropology, biology (marine biology and land fauna), geography, geology, meteorology, oceanology, and volcanology (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921, pp. 35–43, 50–53, 153). It added agriculture and hygiene, and covered 12 fields in

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[13] This practice became a norm after the second conference.

1923 and 14 fields in 1926 (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 3; The NRCJ 1927a, pp. 3–7).[14] In 1929 hygiene was dropped and all the fields were divided into physical sciences, biological sciences, and agriculture (PSA 1930, pp. 53, 85, 117).

Scientists from the USA were dominant at the PSC. This strength reflected the United States government's regional leadership in the 1920s, which manifested in the Washington Conference of 1921–2. The conference produced a treaty framework that defined the United States-led regional order of naval arms control and economic cooperation. It inspired the notion of the "Pacific Community" among certain public intellectuals in the Pacific-rim countries (Akami 2002, pp. 39–40). At the first PSC conference in the United States territory of Hawai'i in 1920, among 104 participants who represented their scientific associations as well as their own governments, 45 attendants came from Hawai'i and 36 came from mainland USA (see Appendix). Others were from Australia, the Philippines, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, and Britain. Unlike the first IPR conference of 1925, no participants came from China or Korea (PSA 1930, p. 49). In 1923 (held in Australia), the USA (and Hawai'i) was still the biggest foreign group (23) (see Appendix). In 1926 (held in Tokyo), despite a huge number of Japanese participants (417), American scientists chaired eight discipline groups (physical sciences in general, radio wave, meteorology, seismology, architecture, geology and geography, agriculture, medicine and hygiene) among the 16 (including physical sciences in general and biological sciences in general) (The NRCJ 1927a, pp. 3–7).[15]

While the IPR was interested in Pacific-rim countries, the PSC was more concerned with the nature and peoples inside the Pacific. Because of this the PSC had strong European imperial/colonial representation, especially after the second conference of 1923 (see Appendix). In contrast, non-Asian participants at IPR conferences in the 1920s and 1930s came only from English-speaking countries mainly on the Pacific rim. The criteria of participation for PSC conferences was vague enough to include almost any country: it could be "dominions, colonies, territories or dependencies lying within or bordering the Pacific Ocean, the countries having dominions, colonies, territories or dependencies in the Pacific region," or the countries which shared "the same objectives" with these countries (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 98). This trend of a strong European metropolitan/colonial presence at the PSC increased in 1926 and in 1929 (See Appendix).

The Australian group elevated the status of non-metropolitan state members at the PSC in 1923, when it was the conference organizing secretariat (Fig. 1).

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[14] The fields in 1923 were: Agriculture, Anthropology and Ethnology, Botany, Entomology, Forestry, Geodesy and Geophysics, Geography and Oceanography, Geology, Hygiene, Radio Telegraphy, Veterinary Science, and Zoology. In 1926 it covered: Agriculture, Anthropology and Ethnology, Architecture, Astronomy, Botany, Geology, Geography, Geology and Geography, Medicine and Hygiene, Meteorology, Radio Waves, Seismology, Zoology and Fishery.

[15] The other group leaders of the PSC in 1926 came from Britain (2, physical and biological sciences, astronomy), from Russia (2, botany, and zoology and fishery), and one each from Australia (geology), Canada (geography), the Netherlands (biological sciences in general), and the Netherlands East Indies (anthropology).

Fig. 1 PSC in 1923 (Lightfoot 1924a, n.p.)

Australian scientists played a leading role at the PSC, which was not the case with the IPR. From the time of the interception of the PSC during World War I, as seen above, the Australian group was central. It hosted the PSC (conference) in 1923, while IPR conferences were never held in Australia. In this 1923 conference, the Australian group promoted the status of colonial/territorial members.

However, this action reinforced, rather than diminished, the imperial nature of the PSC. In 1923 David Orme Masson, President of the PSC and the Australian NRC, noted that "Australia … [had] more to learn from the older and greater nations—from the Mother Country, from America, from Japan, from Holland." After complying with this imperial/colonial discourse, he then stressed Australia's "new responsibilities" to develop its own mandate in the Pacific (Lightfoot 1924a, pp. 17, 18, 24, 25). Here Masson asserted Australia's status not as a nation state equal to other nation states, but as a power equal to other imperial states, because the League of Nations had given Australia an administrative responsibility over the mandates in the Pacific. Furthermore, colonial (and territory) groups, the status of which the Australian NRC tried to promote in 1923, were represented by metropolitan imperial agents. When they did not have separate representation, an empire and its colonies were categorized as one imperial group (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 28).[16]

In 1923, PSC leaders implemented this imperial framework into a temporary governing committee of the PSC. The committee consisted of five imperial states (the USA, France, Britain, Japan, and the Netherlands), four dominions/territories (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Hawai'i), and two colonial administrations (Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines) (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 49). Hawai'i had a status similar to a British dominion.

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[16] These groups included Japan and Formosa, and the Netherlands and Dutch East India.

Pacific Science Conferences as a Stage for Japan's Public Diplomacy: Inter-Imperial Cooperation and the Legitimization of Its Colonial Rule

As was the case in the IPR, the Japanese group assumed a leading role in the Pacific Science network in the 1920s. However, this new "Asian" factor also furthered the imperial character of the PSC. At the third PSC in Tokyo in 1926, Sakurai,[17] President of the PSC of 1926, reinforced the principle of treating colonial units as "equal" to imperial states, which the Australian group had initiated in 1923. He noted, "no discrimination [was] made between a country and its colonies, territories or dependencies, as to representation at the Congress, so long as there [was] sufficient scientific activity in any of them." Sakurai argued that this "equal footing" promoted the efficiency of cooperation and cordial relations. American scientist, Victor C. Vaughan (Chairperson, Division of Medical Sciences of the third PSC of 1926), also stressed that scientists needed "good fellowship and hearty cooperation," and even noted that scientists listened "to no boasting of race superiority" (Sakurai 1927a, pp. 73–74; Addresses by Overseas Delegates 1927a, pp. 75–76).

Although the Japanese group led the formalization of this principle of giving an "equal" status to "colonial and territorial" states in 1926 (as in 1923), imperial/colonial officials, who were appointed and sent by the imperial metropolitan states, represented the colonies and territories. In 1926 the PSC established the Pacific Science Council (PS Council) as its executive body. Its 11 original member countries were the metropolitan imperial states (the USA, France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Japan), the British dominions (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), and Hawai'i with equivalent status, and the colonial administrations represented by the metropolitan/colonial officials (the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines). By the end of the 1920s, the council had added China, the Soviet Union, and then French Indochina. Each "national" (and imperial/colonial) organization appointed its representative at the PS Council (The NRCJ 1927a, pp. 51, 86–87, 98–99).[18] The Pacific Science Association (PSA) was also founded as an administrative body for the PS Council in 1926 (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 98), and it also consisted of these "national" units.

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[17] See Sakurai also in http://www.lonsea.de/pub/search_person, accessed on 20 June 2011.

[18] The NRCs were the 'national' units for the USA, Australia, Canada, and Japan. In China, which was still internally divided, "the Science Society of China" became the national unit. The Academy of Sciences, Leningrad, represented the U.S.S.R. (or Russia). The PSC could not agree on whether or not they should use the term, Russia or the U.S.S.R. The national units of the PAS were: the Royal Society (Britain), the Academy of Science (France), the Royal Academy of Science (the Netherlands), New Zealand Institute, Bishop Museum (Hawai'I); Netherlands East Indies Pacific Committee, and the Bureau of Science (the Philippines). From China, the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation participated.

Despite the official backing, the PSC did not have a permanent international secretariat, which the IPR did maintain. Although the PS Council (and its secretariat, the PSA) should have directed PSC (conferences), in reality such administration was rotated among the "national" units that were scheduled to host the next conference, and which would be funded by the government of the host country. It is worth pointing out that a non-governmental organization, the IPR, had a permanent international secretariat (the International Secretariat of the IPR), while the officially recognized PSC did not develop one. This was due mainly to the fact that the IPR had its own independent funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. As a result, the IPR had a budget for the international secretariat, which funded personnel and research grants and directed IPR conferences and joint research projects. In contrast, although the PSA was meant to be a permanent secretariat, it was active mainly in organizing and conducting conferences, and the PS Council met only at the time of the conferences. When the host of the next conference was undecided, therefore, the PSA had no administrative base. This occurred after the Great Depression hit in 1929.

Japan's enthusiastic participation in the PSC reflected the Japanese government's foreign policy in the 1920s: cooperative diplomacy towards the other empires. Japan became a council member of the League of Nations in 1920. It also positively responded to the call of the United States government for the United States-led regional order, which materialized as the Washington Treaties of 1922. When United States public intellectuals advocated the idea of the Pacific Community at the IPR, Japanese counterparts welcomed it and argued that Japan should be a partner in building this regional order (Akami 2002, p. 66).

Such enthusiasm for a new regional leadership was also evident among the Japanese group at the PSC. In 1923 it proposed hosting the next PSC in Tokyo. Despite the great earthquake of 1923,[19] the Japanese government and Japan's NRC did not withdraw their proposal and held the third PSC in Tokyo in October–November 1926. Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō (1866–1949)[20] spoke at the opening session in the newly built great hall of Tokyo Imperial University. The fact that they could hold the conference after the major disaster, Wakatsuki argued, proved that Japan was a first-rate nation in science and technology. The hall was packed with PSC participants, Diet members, and other dignitaries (Fig. 2).

Wakatsuki reinforced his government's basic stance on peace and "international cooperation" (inter-imperial) (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 67). Sakurai Jōji was the president of the PSC, and took it one step further. He stressed that the personal bonds that the PSC had been developing since 1920 would create a sense of "brotherhood" among participating scientists. This would, he argued, lead to a

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[19] Soon after this proposal was made, the great earthquake hit the Tokyo and Yokohama area, killing almost 90,000 people and destroying houses and infrastructure in the greater Tokyo area.

[20] The first Katō Takaaki Cabinet (June 1924–August 1925) passed a universal male franchise bill in 1925. Wakatsuki formed the cabinet in January 1926 (and this lasted until April 1927).


Third Pan-Pacific Science Congress, Tokyo, 1926.
A Group Photograph.

Fig. 2 PSC in 1926 (NRCJ 1927a, n.p.)

"Cultural Alliance" that would contribute to "permanent and absolute peace" (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 74).

The advocacy for peace, promoted by the brotherhood of scientists in the Pacific region, was not new at the PSC. In Australia in 1923, Masson, then president of the PSC, emphasized peace as "an underlying motive of all such international conferences as ours" (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 356). Herbert Gregory, the head of the Bishop Museum in Honolulu and one of the leading figures of the PSC, was especially concerned that anti-Asian immigration movements in the USA would cause a major conflict in the Pacific region. In 1923 he argued that scientific research would "serve to eliminate the ignorance of the Pacific," which he regarded as "the root of the suspicions in the Pacific" (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 29). Sakurai agreed with Gregory in 1923: "the strong bond of brotherly feeling between the men of science from different nations could not fail to exercise its beneficial influence in all directions, dispelling misunderstandings" (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 27).

In 1926 Wakatsuki and Sakurai further defined peace as the aim of the PSC and included it in the PSC's constitution. It noted that the PSA would "strengthen the bonds of peace among Pacific peoples by promoting a feeling of brotherhood among the scientists of all the Pacific countries" (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 98).

The PSA in the 1920s avoided the topic of military conflict. There was no reference to Japan's military intervention in China (May 1928)[21] in the proceedings of the PSC of 1929. Instead, the leader of the Japanese group, Dr. Hatai Shinkichi from Tohoku Imperial University, made an opening speech as a government representative: "the Japanese government . . . [was] sincere in its desire to cooperate with all the other nations of the Pacific for furthering the same common cause, that [was] everlasting peace and happiness of the peoples in this part of the globe" (PSA 1930, p. 89). The Japanese delegate, therefore, used the conference to propagate the pacifist nature of Japan's policy and its inter-imperial cooperative stance.

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[21] The Tanaka Giichi Cabinet, which took over from the Wakatsuki Cabinet in April 1927, sent the military to China to intervene in Nationalist China's unification process; this ended with a major military conflict at Jinan in May 1928.

For the Japanese government, however, the PSC was not only a site for public relations activity; it was also a significant forum for achieving international scientific collaboration. As the Kantō earthquake case demonstrated, Japan needed more research and regional collaboration for the prediction of earthquakes. It was also interested in the development and protection of diverse resources (food, farming animals, fish, and mineral). Participating scientists dealt with plant and animal diseases that affected the crops and stocks in mainland Japan and its colonies (Taiwan and Korea). Japanese scientists led in the areas of hygiene, which was a significant area for domestic health and trans-national epidemic prevention.[22]

Pacific Science: Utilitarianism, Problem Solving, and Applied Science

Social scientists at the IPR were mostly concerned with the problem of the relationship among independent/dominion states on the Pacific rim. In contrast, the PSC's main concern was the problems within the Pacific Ocean: they were interested in the oceans, the bottom of the oceans, islands, soils, people, animals, insects, and vegetation of the Pacific, a large part of which were under colonial rule. The very origin of the PSC, as we saw earlier, was a joint venture of Pacific exploration in order to know more about the Pacific Ocean, its islands, and peoples, especially Polynesians. As a result, the Committee of Pacific Exploration and the Bishop Museum (Honolulu) were central in organizing the first PSC. There was a genuine scientific curiosity about the geological history and evolution of the Pacific Ocean (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, pp. 41, 43).

Although this genuine scientific desire to explore the unknown was evident, and peace was a significant objective of the PSC, PSC leaders largely characterized the PSC's Pacific Science not by its idealism but by its utilitarian nature. They saw it as one of the duties of human beings to utilize nature for the public good, and scientists provided a vital service in this area. Masson, president of the PSC of 1923, noted in the opening address of the PSC in Melbourne in 1923:

> A nation, . . . needing sciences, must make liberal provision for the highest training in all its branches, and must, moreover, see it that the resulting skill and knowledge are fully utilized for the public good. (Masson 1924a, p. 19)

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[22] The second PSC appointed the Japanese as the leaders of "botany" and "veterinary science."

Herbert Gregory also argued in 1923 that scientific research "would serve as a basis for the development of the resources of the Pacific, which [would] be needed as the world increases in its population" (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 29). Similarly, Victor C. Vaughan, the leader of the American delegates in 1926, noted:

> The chief function of science is to understand the phenomena and force of nature, and to utilize this knowledge in the service of man and for the betterment of the conditions of life. (Address by Overseas Delegates 1927a, p. 75)

Such utilitarian concern led the PSC to focus on applied science (The NRCJ 1927a, pp. 99–100; Lightfoot 1924a, p. 356).[23] Sakurai understood in 1926 that the PSC was largely unconcerned with pure science because its main aim was not the advancement of the general knowledge of nature. The PSC dealt with real and specific problems in the region. Therefore, it needed to focus on applied science and, unlike many other scientific associations, it had to be multidisciplinary (Sakurai 1927a, p. 72).[24]

The utilitarianism of the PSC reflected the way experts, either scientists or social scientists, approached their inquiries in this period. The PSCs and the IPR conferences were formulated in a very similar manner. These experts regarded the Pacific region as a distinct entity. They identified the region's problems as "Pacific problems" or "Pacific scientific problems," and sought a collaborative approach to solve them. The first PSC conference proceedings of 1920 noted that the PSC would "outline scientific problems of the Pacific Ocean region and to suggest methods for their solution." The first step was to make an "inventory of existing knowledge" and "to devise plans for future studies." It would then "formulate . . . a program of research which [would] serve as a guide for cooperative work for individuals, institutions and government agencies" (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, v). PSC leaders were convinced that conferences were the best means of achieving these goals (1921a, p. 27).

The PSC identified a decrease in the population of the Polynesians—"vanishing races"—as one of the most urgent scientific problems of the Pacific. The conference identified a few factors that contributed to this population decrease: epidemics, "the large and complex problem of race relations in the Pacific," and the "problem of race mixture." This was why the first PSC included anthropology (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, pp. 50, 51, 53).[25] This multidisciplinary approach was maintained to tackle specific Pacific scientific problems in the following PSCs. Masson noted in 1923: "our task … [was] to discuss those scientific problems which [were] special interests in the Pacific area, to call attention to them and lay plans for future research" (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 356). The problem-solving approach also brought attention to public health, and the Australian group and the Japanese group were the main advocates for including this area in the PSC.

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[23] Pure science was, however, not totally neglected. Masson noted that applied science was based on pure science. Whether or not to include more pure science at PSC conferences was undecided in 1923. Japanese scientists were also strong in pure science in 1920, 1923, and 1926. The third PSC in Tokyo still could not decide whether pure science should be included or not.

[24] In Sakurai's view, the British AAS and its counterparts in other countries pursued this goal to advance the general knowledge of nature.

[25] This inclusion of anthropology into more orthodox science fields (marine biology and land fauna, geography, oceanology, meteorology, geology, and vulcanology) was a distinct feature of the first PSC.

Priorities of the Inter-Imperial Network, and the Welfare of the Peoples in the Pacific

Did the PSC's imperial membership and its utilitarianism make the PSC's scientist network serve mainly empires' interests in the 1920s? Or did the PSC pursue a broad humanitarian goal? The answer was not clear-cut. On one hand, the PSC's imperial agenda was clear in its main attention to the development of the resources in the Pacific. At the same time, the PSC stated in 1920 that it would conduct scientific investigation and cooperation for "the welfare of Pacific people," and to "develop a unity of interest and to make harmonious coordination practicable" (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, p. 27). This was further confirmed in the PSC's Constitution in 1926. The PSC would "initiate and promote co-operation in the study of scientific problems relating to the Pacific region." The PSA would also direct the PSC to prioritize cooperation in the area, which would affect "the prosperity and wellbeing of Pacific peoples" (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 98). The following examination suggests that almost every topic PSC pursued had elements of imperial exploitation and broader humanitarian benefit as well as regional public infrastructure making.

From the very beginning of the PSC in 1920, empires' agenda to exploit local material and human resources for metropolitan gains were intricately combined with the agenda and rhetoric of the development and welfare of the peoples within the Pacific. When they discussed "protection of human race against many diseases and crops against pests" (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, p. 153), for example, they were discussing labor for colonial industries as well as the public health. This kind of mixture was also evident in the sessions on geography and geology in 1920. At one geography session it was argued that there was an "almost total lack of topographic maps" of the Pacific region. These maps, the session pointed out, would be needed for "mining, railroad and highway extension … and the utilization of water in power development, irrigation, and transportation." It argued that "[t]he natural resources of the world cannot be discovered and utilized efficiently without such maps" (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, pp. 35, 40). The creation of these maps could serve the interests of metropolitan/colonial states and industries, and/or it could contribute to the local public infrastructure.

Other sessions at the PSC in 1920 likewise reflected a mixture of empires' pursuits of strategic and commercial interests and the development of a regional public infrastructure. A session recommended "the use of wireless telegraphy for the improvement of determination of the longitude of the islands in the Pacific" (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, p. 36). The issue of physical oceanography was also important for "navigators in disclosing dangers to vessels sailing the ocean" and was "of economic value in enabling vessels to save time and fuel in their navigation" (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, p. 37). A meteorological study also had commercial and public benefits (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, p. 38).

These topics continued to be discussed in the following PSC conference. In 1923 participants argued for "[t]he speedy erection of wireless stations in all countries bordering the Pacific capable of communicating directly with each other," a wireless meteorology service, and regional map-making in general. They also discussed geology in the context of resources development (Lightfoot 1924a, pp. 45, 47).

A similar combination of imperial agenda and broader welfare goals was evident in the debates over race, hygiene, and public health. At the second PSC of 1923, the Australian group stressed race and hygiene issues. Sessions like "the preservation, progress and welfare of the native population of Oceania" continued to address the issue of the decline of "native races" (Lightfoot 1924a, pp. 40–41). While the first PSC focused on the Polynesians, the second PSC extended its scope to Australian Aboriginals. This strong interest in "race" reflected that of Australasian scientists in this period (Powles 1988, p. 295; Bashford 2004, pp. 7–9),[26] and anthropologists and ethnologists featured strongly in the second PSC. PSC research interests went beyond "native races," and papers discussed the races of the Australians and the Japanese as well (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 48; 1924b, v–vi).

This "race" concern led the second PSC to emphasize the area of public health and hygiene, in which a multidisciplinary approach (medicine and anthropology) was taken. One session discussed "the preservation of the health and life of the native races by the application of the principles of the sciences of preventive medicine and anthropology." Furthermore, public health issues prompted an international collaboration. A session on veterinary sciences in 1923 argued for the establishment of an international bureau of animal health, which could send "a monthly notice of all outbreaks of contagious and infectious diseases of animals" to member countries. The Australian government also proposed a survey of tropical diseases of animals in its new mandates in 1923 (Lightfoot 1924a, pp. 48–49).[27]

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[26] Powless suggests the AAAS's two distinct characteristics were the "national physical morality" and public health. Alison Bashford also stresses the centrality of the management of public health in colonial governance in Australia.

[27] The issue may have been inspired by the discussion of the establishment of an epidemic intelligence bureau in Asia at the League of Nations' Health Organization. See, Tomoko Akami, "Public Health Experts at the League of Nations: Agents of Health for a Nation, Empire, Colony, and/or the Globe," paper presented for "Lives beyond the borders: Towards a social history of

The League of Nations paid great attention to this public health management in the mandates in the Pacific, and it was a crucial area for the mandate powers, such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, to prove the legitimacy of their rule (Condliffe 1928, pp. 516–530).

Like the Australian group, the Japanese group was strong on public health and was keen to promote this field. At the third PSC, it organized sessions that addressed the hygiene of "natives," the Japanese, European Australians, and New Zealanders (The NRCJ 1927a, xiv–xv). In the section of "medicine and hygiene," the third PSC included the topics of "infectious and deficiency diseases," "parasitology," "sanitary and food problems," and "veterinary medicine."[28] As in 1923, a multidisciplinary approach was taken, and anthropological knowledge of "natives" was "utilized for meeting their needs" (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 93).

These concerns with the health and hygiene of the people and animals in the region were combined with empires' interests. The measures to improve public health would contribute to the welfare of the people in their colonies/mandates/territories. At the same time, these people were also laborers and their healthy bodies were a key factor in the economic development of these areas. Furthermore, by stressing the ability to manage public health in its mandate, the Australian government was demonstrating its "concern and competency" as a new mandate power in the Pacific. Similarly, Japanese papers stressed Japan's efficient colonial management of resources and people.[29]

Inter-Imperial Cooperation for Conservation and Earth Science, and the Making of Regional Governance Infrastructures

Although primarily imperial, the Pacific scientists' network at the PSC nonetheless served interests beyond those of the empires. This was evident in the earthquake-related sciences of seismology and vulcanology. Located on an archipelago that was earthquake-prone, the Japanese government had a vested interest in seismology, and was keen to share information and set up collaborative mechanisms for earthquake alerts in the region. Meanwhile, by the mid-1920s Japanese seismologists had been actively engaging with their Euro-American counterparts in shaping seismological knowledge (Clancy 2006, pp. 5, 6).[30]

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cosmopolitans and globalization, 1880–1960", the Cluster of Asia and Europe, University of Heidelberg, 12 February 2010.

[28] This proceeding, vol. 2, was devoted to the papers on Medicine, Hygiene and Veterinary Medicine.

[29] The Japanese papers at the fourth PSC included papers on Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, and created an impression that these resources belonged to Japan and that Japan was competently managing them. See the contents of PSA 1930.

[30] On the international interaction by Japanese physicists, see Traweek (1992).

Other countries agreed on the need to establish an inter-imperial/colonial system for predicting earthquakes. Such an institution was to benefit all the people in the region regardless of which country they belonged to. Participants emphasized "the urgent need for mutual information, regularly supplied by each observer to his distant colleagues," and noted that the PSC was making the first attempt at "more localized and more continuous observation of regional phenomena." In 1923 a session resolved that volcano observatories in the region should be established. The PSC also recommended constructing safeguards to protect the public from earthquakes (*Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference* 1921a, pp. 43–44). In 1926 the NRC of Japan further argued for a regional collaborative system for earthquake disaster prevention, and urged radio companies in the region to speedily exchange scientific information on volcanoes and earthquakes. The PSC also supported the creation of Japan's geophysical and astronomical observatory on one of the Japanese mandate islands in the Pacific, as it saw that the institution would contribute to the welfare of the people in the region as a whole (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 91).

Conservation was another area above empires' politics. As Heys argued, the USA had well-established conservation movements by the time the PSC was established (Hays 1959). The PSC inherited this strong commitment from its very first conference. In 1923 it supported the establishment of "faunal sanctuaries," the preservation of "interesting and valuable animals in danger of extinction" and marine mammals (Lightfoot 1924a, p. 49), and maintained this agenda throughout the 1920s (The NRCJ 1927a, pp. 91–92; PSA 1930, p. 122).

The PSC also encouraged the use of the navy for scientific research on the Pacific Ocean. In 1926 the PSC reported how the Dutch National Navy's submarines were used for gravity determination in the Pacific Ocean, and the Netherlands group recommended that other navies do the same (The NRCJ 1927a, p. 90). Standing inter-imperial/national research committees were also founded in the fields of "Oceanography of the Pacific and the Coral Reefs of the Pacific Ocean," "Volcanic Rocks of the Central Islands of the Pacific," and "Pacific Anthropology" (The NRCJ 1927a, pp. 93–94).[31]

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[31] The committee on Oceanography was chaired by Thomas Wayland Vaughan, Director of Scripps Institution of Oceanography. The committee on Volcanic Rocks was chaired by Alfred Lacroiz, permanent secretary of the Academy of Science, Paris, and that on Pacific Anthropology was chaired by B.J.O. Schrieke, Professor of Sociology, Faculty of Law, Batavia.

The Peak of Inter-Imperial Network: 1929 Java on the Eve of the Economic Crisis

The PSC scientist network so far had been an inter-imperial network. It served largely empires' or inter-imperial interests, although projects were framed to demonstrate that they would provide welfare for the local people, and there were significant areas that stood beyond individual empires' interests. The fourth PSC conference of 1929 was held at Bandong in May–June 1929 under the auspices of the Netherlands Indies Science Council and was supported by the Netherlands Indies Government. It was the last conference before the outbreak of the worldwide economic depression and Japan's military aggression in northeast China.

In an opening speech, Professor Dr. O. De Vries, general president of the PSC of 1929, stressed the importance of the personal bonds that the PSCs had been creating. While his predecessors had made this point before, Vries further argued that scientists could cooperate more easily in the Pacific than in Europe because they were away from the major political conflicts at Geneva. Scientists might disagree, he noted, but these disputes were "scarcely of such social or political importance that the world in general would feel relieved to see us meet and know that these volcanic centres will blow off before they erupt." Because of the political insignificance of the Pacific region, therefore, the PSC had better opportunities for rigorous discussion and cooperation (PSA 1930, pp. 72, 76).

This fourth PSC was the most imperial of all: It was held in a Dutch colony and hosted by the colonial government; furthermore, all the patrons and the honorary positions were held by officials of the metropolitan and colonial institutions. Professor Dr. F.A.F.C. Went,[32] President of the Royal Academy of Science of the Netherlands, led the Netherlands group. He stated that the Netherlands' involvement in the PSC was driven by colonial concerns. The Academy of Science in Amsterdam had formed a committee for Pacific exploration, he noted, and it was this committee that had secured participation in the PSC in 1923. The Royal Colonial Institute at Amsterdam, in which "practical study and science [went] hand in hand," provided the funds. The institute's objective was to solve "problems relating to the colonial economic atmosphere of the present day" (PSA 1930, pp. 77–78, 79).

While Siam's first participation was noted in 1929, the majority of participants were either from imperial metropolitan institutions or imperial agencies in their colonies. Although Japan sent the biggest group (39), followed by the USA (34), and the Netherlands (32), and almost 100 scientists and observers from the Dutch East Indies attended the conference (See Appendix), the conference photo shows predominantly European faces (Fig. 3).

Conference papers reflected the interests of colonial industries (rubber, banks, mining, sugar, and oil) more than at the previous conferences (PSA 1930, pp. 2–4). A greater attention to colonial plantations at this fourth PSC most likely prompted

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[32] See Went also in http://www.lonsea.de/pub/search_person, accessed on 20 June 2011.



The Delegates to the Fourth Pacific Science Congress; Final General Meeting.

Fig. 3 PSC in 1929 (PSA 1930, n.p.)

the addition of agriculture as the third major independent division to the existing two divisions (physical science and biological science).

The Netherlands group's imperial interest was clearly stated in an opening address by H. E. Mr. A.C.D. De Graeff, governor-general of the Netherlands Indies. While he shared the philosophy of contemporary scientists in identifying and solving a problem, and even described his metropolitan government not as an empire but as "little Holland" (PSA 1930, pp. 69, 70), he noted that European empires were distinguished not for their exploitation of the Orient, but for their "unselfish" and "impartial" service to it by introducing modern science. He argued:

> [A]s far as the Western activity in the Orient is concerned with full conviction to subscribe the statement once made on a similar occasion by the former Governor of the Strait Settlements that the most exacting criticism of the part which Europe has played and still plays in the history of the Orient, [we] must recognize that the purest and perhaps the greatest of all flights which the West has carried East of Suez is the devoted unselfish and impartial labour of modern [s]cience. (PSA 1930, p. 71)

Meanwhile, the topics of public health and hygiene, which the Australian and Japanese groups had enthusiastically promoted, were dropped in 1929. The main reason, as the conference organizer explained, was an overlap with the conference of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, which was held at almost the same period as the fourth PSC (PSA 1930, p. 53).[33] The Australian group representative, E.C. Andrews, opposed the move and argued that the PSC should establish “a section for Medical Science for Hygiene and Sanitation.” This would enable the PSC, he continued, to tackle the various diseases (tropical and general diseases, including malaria, filaria, plague, tuberculosis, hookworm, venereal diseases, yaws) (PSA 1930, p. 83). Andrews’ main concern was nonetheless white settlers, especially in the tropics and in tropical Australia. The PS Council acknowledged his appeal, but replied that the proposal was “received too late.” No medical subjects were presented to the conference of 1929, and whether it would be included at the next PSC or not was left “to organizers of future Congresses” (PSA 1930, p. 117).

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[33] The association was founded in Manila in 1908. In the 1920s it held the fifth conference in Singapore in 1923, and then it held following conferences in 1925 (Tokyo) and in 1927 (Calcutta). See "Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine," *The British Medical Journal* (1 Dec 1923), 2 (3238): 1059–60, cited in http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2317466/?page=1 (accessed on 20 June 2011).

Another colonial group, the French Indochina group, became active at the PSC in 1929, further enhancing the imperial/colonial nature of the PSC. The group requested membership to the PS Council, which was granted. To demonstrate its quest for greater influence, in 1929 this group argued that French should be a conference language “on the same footing as English” (PSA 1930, p. 57). This was a protest against the statement by Sakurai in 1926 that the conference language should be English in order to assure the unity of the PSC (Sakurai 1927a, p. 74). The French colonial proposal was not taken up, although conference summaries should be, it was agreed, distributed in European languages other than English (PSA 1930, p. 97). In 1929 the French Indochina group as well as the Canadian group proposed hosting the next conference. The subsequent economic depression, however, demolished their capacity to carry out the organization of a major international conference, and both withdrew the invitation.

In 1929 the largely imperial PSC nonetheless continued to invite China and the Soviet Union. When the Nationalist Government of China achieved national unification in 1928, the national unit of the PSC was changed to the National Research Institute at Nanjing (PSA 1930, p. 113). As the Netherlands government did not have formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the invitation went through a non-official channel. Although the Soviet Union did not send delegates in 1929, it remained in the PSA (PSA 1930, p. 57). The PS Council continued contact with the Soviet Union group (PSA 1930, p. 121).[34] However, both China and the Soviet Union remained minor actors.

Although the imperial aspects of the PSC were more articulated in 1929, the PSC maintained existing priority research areas, which included the conservation of nature, “race,” and “rare and remarkable animals” in the Pacific (PSA 1930, pp. 76, 122). The standing committees, which had been set up by the Tokyo PSC of 1926, also remained active.[35] The PSC continued to argue for the use of the navy for scientific research, which, it stressed, would benefit all scientists at the PSC (PSA 1930, pp. 97, 121).[36] In the discussion of meteorology, some thought it better to discuss regional issues in a broad global context, while W.T. Vaughan argued for the need to confine the conference's focus to the region (PSA 1930, pp. 98–99). The PS Council also discussed the IPR's research director's suggestion of joint research possibilities (PSA 1930, pp. 110–112).

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[34] The PS Council, in particular, was interested in “the plan for oceanographic research in the Northwest by the Section of Oceanography of the Pacific Committee of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.”

[35] The committee on the Oceanography of the Pacific was most active, and attached its first report of more than 100 pages to the proceedings of 1929.

Conclusion

The examination of the PSC and the IPR contributes to our efforts of making the history of international organizations more global. This chapter showed that in the 1920s the PSC as well as the IPR developed fora for inter-imperial cooperation, not bureaucratic institutions. Imperial officials and scientists attended its conferences from metropolitan centers and colonies/territories/mandates. Although the USA, which also had colony and territory in the Pacific, dominated both the IPR and the PSC, the PSC's focus on the inside of the Pacific prompted more continental European metropolitan and colonial states' participation in the PSC. While new powers like Australia and Japan were the leading groups at the PSC in the 1920s, they did not challenge but instead reinforced the imperial agenda. They were concerned with the development and protection of human and material resources in their mandates/colonies, and they were eager to demonstrate their managing ability and the legitimacy of their rule at the PSC conferences. The Japanese participants also used the PSC fora to propagate Japan's "pacifist" foreign policy.

While the Pacific region of the inter-war period lacked formal governmental international organizations, PSC's inter-imperial scientific network played a significant role. These scientists stressed the importance of applied science to utilize natural resources for human benefits. Its agenda was framed in a way that the public good of the people in the region could be achieved. While this was rhetoric in the age of the League of Nations, the PSC proposed projects that would not only serve shared imperial interests, but also could contribute to the "public" interests of the people in the region. Whether the people actually benefited from these projects needs to be carefully examined. We may say, nonetheless, that the imperial science network of the PSC prompted a collaborative effort in areas that could benefit the people in the region beyond the interests of specific empires. This included the development of a joint system for detecting earthquakes and for conservation. In this sense, the network was contributing to the making of regional governing mechanisms out of this inter-imperial cooperation, and the move complemented that of the making of the global governance mechanism initiated by the League in Geneva.

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[36] In 1926 the Dutch Navy was deployed for this purpose. In 1929 the proceedings noted that the Japanese Navy and the German Navy respectively conducted research on the ocean floor with echo soundings, and their results were made available to scientists in other countries. The PS Council decided to ask the navies of various countries to assist in their similar research activities.

In Java in early summer 1929, participants believed that their inter-imperial paternalistic approach and their belief in science would solve the Pacific problems and that the natural and human resources of the region would be fully utilized for their needs. Their imperial world of the PSC was about to collapse as the economic crisis overtook the Pacific region. Yet the inter-imperial projects initiated by the Pan Pacific scientists' network continued to be carried through, mainly in the USA, even during the war.

Appendix: Participants of the Pan-Pacific Science Congress Conferences

The First PSC, Honolulu, 2–20 August 1920

Imperial administration: mainland USA (36); Japan (4); Britain (1);
Dominion and Territory administration: Hawai'i (45); Australia (8); NZ (2); Canada (1)
Colonial administration: The Philippines (4)
Unknown (3)
Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference, August 2–20, 1920, Honolulu, parts 1, 2, 3 (Honolulu: Star-Bulletin, Ltd. 1921), Bernice P. Bishop Museum Special Publication.

The Second PSC, Melbourne, 13–22 August 1923, and Sydney, 23 August–3 September 1923

Imperial administration: the USA (17); Britain (12)
Dominion and Territory administration: Australia (21); NZ (13); Canada (3); Hawai'i (6)
Imperial and colonial administration: Japan and Formosa (10); the Netherlands and Dutch East India (5).
Colonial administration: the Philippines (5); British Malaya (2); India (1); Tahiti (1); Papua (1); New Guinea (1); Fiji (1); Hong Kong (1)

- Fourteen more Australians represented Euro-American organizations (the included MIT, Cambridge, Edinburgh, and the Rockefeller Foundation).

- French Consul-General represented "the French Government and the interests of the nations which live under the French flag in Indo-China, in New Caledonia and the islands of French Oceans."
- Dutch scientists represented the Netherlands government, scientific associations, the Colonial Institution, the Netherlands-India government.
- Consuls or Consul-Generals also represented Guatemala, Chile, and Peru states

Gerald Lightfoot ed., *Proceedings of the Pan-Pacific Science Congress, Australia, 1923,* vols 1, 2 (Melbourne, H.J. Green, Government Printer, [1924a, b]).

The Third PSC Conference, Tokyo, 30 October–11 November 1926

Imperial administration: Japan (417); the USA (36)[37]; the U.S.S.R. (10); France (6)[38]; Britain (3)[39]; Netherlands (3)
Independent administration: China (17); Sweden (1); Chile (1); and Peru (1).
Dominion and Territory administration: Australia (15); New Zealand (6); Canada (5); Hawai'i (8)
Colonial administration: the Philippines (10); The Netherlands East Indies (9); Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States (3); New Caledonia (1); Tahiti (1); Hong Kong (1)[40]; Indo-China (1)[41]; Macao (1).

- Siam and South American countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rika, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Salvador) were invited, but did not attend.

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[37] Four Japanese scientists and officials also represented American institutions. They were: Kashima Kōzō, from Military Scientific Laboratory of the Ministry of Army, representing the American Chemical Society; Kōzu Shukusuke and Watanabe Manjirō, from Tohoku Imperial University, representing the Mineralogical Society of America; and Kuwata Inokichi, from the Yokohama Plant Quarantine Station, representing the American Association of Economic Entomologist.

[38] This included four French diplomats in Tokyo.

[39] This included John Batchellor, who was the British missionary leader based in Sapporo. He presented a paper on Ainu Philology.

[40] An academic from the University of British Columbia noted that he would represent the Government of Hong Kong.

[41] A French official and scientist, Alfred Lacroix from the National Museum of Natural History Paris, represented the government of Indochina.

- Sakurai Jōji, the leader of the Japanese group, noted that the Japanese delegation to the second PSC was the biggest scientists delegation to an international conference.

The National Research Council of Japan ed., *Proceedings of the Third Pan-Pacific Science Congress, Tokyo, October 30th–November 11th, 1926*, vols 1, 2 ([Tokyo: the NRCJ 1927a, b]).

The Fourth PSC, Java, May–June 1929

Imperial administration: Japan (39); the USA (34); the Netherlands (32); Britain (3); France (2); Italy (1).
Independent administration: Germany (8); Denmark (2)[42]; Austria (1); Czech-Slovakia (1); Sweden (1); Switzerland (1); China (18); Siam (16)
Dominions and Territory administration: Australia (18); Hawai‘i (5); New Zealand (3); Canada (2).
Colonial administration: the Netherlands Indies (23); the Philippines (10); Indo-China (9); Hong Kong (2); Ceylon (1); Macao (1). This was also the case for the representatives of the host ‘country’.

- Another 100 scientists and observers from the colony attended the conference.
- The Japanese group was the biggest at the fourth PSC.
- Almost a third of papers on physical sciences were presented by Japanese delegates (43 papers among 154 papers). Their strong areas were those related to earthquakes and geology.
- Many of these Japanese papers were on Japan’s formal and informal colonies. As well as papers on Taiwan (on geology, coals, tectonics, rocks, submarine relief of the strait, and the aborigines), Japanese delegates also presented papers on other formal and informal colonial areas of Manchuria and Korea (gravity measurements), North and South Sakhalin (cretaceous deposits), and Shantung (rocks).
- Among these Japanese papers, oceanographic works were also strong. A recent survey carried on by the Hydrographic Department of the Imperial Japanese Navy was reported.
- Other Japanese papers included those on current, sea level, geodetic leveling, and longitude.
- Japanese delegate presented 12 biological papers out of 75, and 11 out of 65 agricultural papers.

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[42] One was a Danish diplomat based in Beijing.

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Networking Through the Y: The Role of YMCA in China's Search for New National Identity and Internationalization

Guoqi Xu

For the Chinese the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was a milestone in their country's history. The Games meant international recognition and the emergence of a strong China. China's participation in World War I was another crucial event in modern Chinese history. The May 4th Movement and the founding of the Chinese Communist Party were, to a great extent, directly linked to the aftermath of the Great War. Surprisingly, the Young Men's Christian Association (the Y) played an important role in both events. By examining the Y's involvement in both cases, I will attempt to provide a fresh look at China's century-long obsession with internationalization and a new national identity. By internationalization I mean the ways in which the Chinese actively engage in and are engaged by the international system, by organizations, ideas, forces, and trends; it was a process that compelled China to associate with the outside world and the international system. As I have argued elsewhere, "Internationalization was driven by shifts in the flow of social, intellectual, economic, ideological, and cultural resources between China and the wider world, as well as by new Chinese interest in foreign affairs and their position in the world." (Xu 2011b, p. 19)

To a large extent Chinese political and intellectual culture in the period from 1895 to the present has been shaped by a dual process—namely, intensive internationalization and internalization. Two kinds of internationalization—a passive process and a progressive one—were and are at play. The first responded to intensified foreign invasion and encroachment on Chinese territory and to strong foreign influence on Chinese port cities, the Chinese economy, finances, markets, and overall development. Progressive internationalization involved actions initiated by the Chinese themselves and included the embrace of Western education, political theories, and foreign political models, as well as actively promoting Chinese interests in the world arena. Internalization here refers to the process and conditions whereby China renewed itself and prepared for internationalization and the process

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by which China adopted and modified external impulses to make them its own. Internationalization, then, bridged China's domestic reforms and agendas as well as its foreign policy. Internationalization and internalization would eventually turn China upside down and transform it in many unprecedented ways, both in its internal politics and in foreign relations.

The Y and China's Century-Long Olympic Dream

The year 1895 was a turning point in both Chinese and world history. The major European powers were moving closer to the first incidence of total war. While in Asia, the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) was for the Chinese a rude shock and a wake-up call to a new reality that they had to come to terms with. As a result of that defeat, most Chinese elites became convinced that only by giving up the country's traditional imperial and Confucian identity and becoming a modern nation state could China successfully ride the world tide and survive. More importantly, it was believed that China's only hope for survival and the possible recovery of its past glory was by joining the emerging world order dominated by Western powers.[1] In other words, China was finally ready to learn from the West and to negotiate a new national identity based on Western ideas and practices. Ideas like social Darwinism and survival of the fittest, introduced at this juncture, prepared the Chinese mentally for their embrace of Western sports.

To be sure, the Boxer Rebellion (1898–1900) was one of the few exceptions in which a machismo subculture within larger society used its physical skill in a way that greatly affected cultural developments in China. The name "boxers" was coined by foreigners; the Boxers called themselves "Fists United in Righteousness" (*Yihequan*) and almost all their members were poor young farmers from northern China who had suffered enormously from foreign incursions (later there were even female members called Red Lanterns). The Boxers had several interesting characteristics, including the fact that they practiced a combination of spirit possession and martial arts. They also demonstrated a strong anti-foreign attitude, especially in their attacks on both Chinese and foreign Christians and missionaries. When the Qing court transformed the Boxers into an officially sponsored militia and encouraged them to target foreigners, the rebellion eventually triggered an international military expedition that led to the further humiliation of Qing China when its military forces and the Boxers were easily crushed. The Boxer Rebellion left a long-lasting impact on Chinese politics and foreign relations. The uprising reinforced negative European perceptions about China and its people—hostility to Christianity, resistance to modern technology, and xenophobia. The defeat and humiliation suffered at the hands of the international expeditionary forces soon led to the Qing's final fall in 1912.[2] Through their role in the downfall of the Qing, the Boxers in a sense precipitated developments that led to much broader changes, although this was not their intention. The Boxer Rebellion was the last powerful cry for political change in the old fashion by the advocates of traditional martial arts and religion. The Boxers, unlike many elites, realized that their martial arts skills could be used to resist the predations of foreigners, even though their efforts in this case ended in tragedy.

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[1] For details on the impact of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95 on the Chinese mindset, see Xu (2011b, pp. 1–49).

The Boxers, despite their good intentions and patriotic thinking, ended up doing a great deal of damage to the nation; still, one might argue that the Boxer Rebellion marked a new trend that increasingly linked physical education with the national fate and identity. This trend seems to have emerged clearly after 1895. One thing that may be fairly said about the Chinese prior to 1895 is that, even if we acknowledge that some Chinese did believe in the value of physical exercise, their interest was only in personal enrichment. Only after 1895 did a revolutionary shift in the Chinese attitude towards sport occur; in short, the Chinese began to associate physical training and the health of the public body with the fate of the nation. To understand this change, we have to first understand the world in which China was finding its way and what happened to China at the turn of the twentieth century.

Just as Chinese elites began to realize that Western sports might help cure the "Sick man of Asia" and took the first steps toward transforming their country, world sport entered a new phase with the revival of the Olympic movement in the 1890s. The founding and hosting of the first modern Olympic Games coincided with China's full awakening to the new international and national reality. On 6 April 1896, the first modern Olympic Games were held in Athens. Pierre de Coubertin, a founder of the modern Olympic Movement, noted, "The important thing in the Olympic Games is not winning but taking part" (Young 1996, p. 112). For Chinese elites, who were looking for direction for their nation, modern sports and the Olympics with their mix of nationalism and internationalization seemed a possible solution to their problems. The Olympic call to be "faster, higher, stronger" and for nations to participate in the world as equals, matched the ideals that were motivating the Chinese at this time. After all—theoretically—the new Olympics provided the proverbial level playing field where every nation, large or small, could take part and be judged by the same rules and standards. Modern physical education in China, an import from the West, was thus fundamentally different from the old tradition of *tiyu*.

Nothing is further from the truth than the claim that in pre-modern times the Chinese paid little attention to physical training. Still, it is true that until late 1890s the phrase *tiyu* (sport or physical education in modern Mandarin) did not exist in China; it was a term imported from Japan.[3] In 1902, when Liang Qichao

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[2] For recent studies on the Boxer Rebellion, see Preston (2000), Esherick (1987), Cohen (1997), Elliot (2002), and Xiang (2003).

[3] For instance, even a recent book published in China still claims in all certainty that the phrase *tiyu* was not used in China until the nineteenth century when it was imported from abroad. See Liu (2003, pp. 1–3).

(1873–1929) and other influential Chinese first used *tiyu*, their discussions focused more on militarizing the spirit and on militarized physical training (*shangwu*) (Xu 1996, p. 12). The phrase *tiyu* consists of two Chinese characters: *ti* meaning body, and *yu* meaning cultivation. When the Chinese began to embrace modern Western sports, *tiyu* carried significant new meaning: it emphasized the possibility and mission of nation strengthening. The appearance of these new possibilities coincided with Chinese ambitions to forge a new national identity and to assume a role in the international scene at the turn of the twentieth century. Throughout this article, I use "physical culture" and "sports" interchangeably with the Chinese expression for several reasons. First, these represent a very close translation of the Chinese. Second, by using physical culture or sports here, I mean to convey a different sense, something more than physical training. In the Chinese context, *tiyu* also involves culture, especially public culture, a forum where, as Thomas Bender claims, "power in its various forms is elaborated and made authoritative" (Bender 1986, p. 126).

For many Chinese, who started to embrace *tiyu* at the turn of the twentieth century, this turn to physical culture reflected or responded to a national cry for renewal, equality among the nations of world, and a desire to be recognized as a respected power. As the Chinese adopted Western sports, they also began to give them new meanings. Sports, for Chinese people, were one *avenue* to national renewal and equality among the nations of the world, and they represented a means to achieve their desire to be recognized as a respected power. For the Chinese, *tiyu* not only conveyed a distinct sense of sports but also the idea that through the forum of sports as public culture, they could articulate Chinese nationalism, the national identity, and even the meaning of being Chinese. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, it was the Y not the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that was responsible for bringing the Chinese into the world of sports in the first place.

The Y set up its first branch in China in 1895. From the late nineteenth century on, the Y had devoted enormous attention to China. According to its own assessment in 1918, "The Association work is probably better developed in China than in any foreign country. There are eighty-two foreign secretaries, and also 300 hundred native secretaries. The administrative work of the Association is largely in the hands of able Chinese."[4] The official Y history indicates "It was to China that the YMCAs of the United States and Canada directed more continuous effort than to any other one country or area." Because of the "importance of China in the world scene, and because the Chinese were accepting Western education and social forms," the Y wanted to help shape the future of a great people who were entering upon what was seen as a gigantic and sweeping revolution (Latourette 1957, pp. 245, 252). The Y's entry into China coincided closely with China's pursuit of a new national identity and early efforts to join the world community as an equal member. It was fitting that when the Y set up its first branch in Tianjin in 1895 it soon introduced the modern Olympic movement and inspired China's century-long dream to host the Olympic Games in Beijing.[5]

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[4] Halford, Elijah W., "A World Brotherhood," *Association Men*, 43, No. 6 (February, 1918), 427.

The Y could not have chosen a better time, since in that year China had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese and had begun to wrestle with the issue of nation building and adapting to the new international situation. The Chinese of the 1890s, like the Americans of the same period, seem to have suffered from what Richard Hofstadter called a "psychic crisis," though the backgrounds to their respective crises were fundamentally different.[6] The prominent Chinese linkage of *tiyu* and *shangwu* (warlike spirit) with national self-strengthening was clearly fostered in this climate through the efforts of the Y in major cities around the country. After 1895 the Y began to promote modern sports in China in a coherent and collective effort.[7] In 1899 a Shanghai branch was set up, and by 1922 40 branches operated across China. Perhaps it is right to claim that the Y played a pivotal role in China's modern sports development. The organization successfully promoted modern sports by sponsoring games, journals, and lectures. It was under the Y's leadership that the first Chinese national games took place in 1910. The idea of the games came from an American, M. J. Exner, a Y official sent to China to provide physical education leadership in 1908. Major officials and referees for the 1910 games were foreigners and the official language of the games was English. In 1923, when the Far Eastern Games took place in Japan, the leader of China's team was the American J. H. Gray, who delivered a speech to the Games on behalf of China. Nothing could have provided a better vehicle for China's international recognition than the modern Olympic Games. As a matter of fact, it was under the sponsorship of the Y that the China National Amateur Athletic Federation was established in 1921 and was subsequently recognized by the IOC as the Chinese Olympic committee in 1922. That year Wang Zhengting became the first Chinese member of the IOC, and his election symbolized the beginning of China's official link with the IOC. Wang was the second IOC member from Asia. Although some Chinese claim that China had a long history of sports and that soccer and golf originated in China, the introduction of modern sports obviously came from the West. Basketball was introduced in 1895 by an American, and volleyball was introduced about 10 years later. Ping-pong, another obvious import, eventually became one of the most popular sports in China and has even been treated as a national sport due to China's use of ping pong to promote its international prestige and to conduct international politics, as well as to represent its national honor.

Since the late 1950s, the Chinese have become a dominant force in the world table tennis championships. In the 1970s the Chinese even brilliantly practiced so-called ping-pong diplomacy to improve USA-China relations. Since the late 1960s, both Mao Zedong and then US-president, Richard Nixon, realized that China and the USA needed each other. However, as Henry Kissinger pointed out,

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[5] For details, see Xu (2008, pp. 25–34).

[6] For details on this point, see Hofstadter (1965).

[7] For details, see Wu (1956, pp. 71–72).

"both parties had to tread warily, feeling their way toward each other with significant but tenuous messages and gestures, which could be disavowed if rejected" (Kissinger 1979, p. 685). After over 20 years of mutual hatred and misunderstanding it is not surprising that relations could be not be lightly or easily established. Only something extraordinary could provide both Beijing and Washington with a clear signal to go forward, and that proved to be a sports event. Mao's decision to invite the American ping-pong team in April 1971 to visit Beijing took the whole world by surprise. Nixon admitted "I was as surprised as I was pleased by this news. I had never expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a ping-pong team. We immediately approved the acceptance of the invitation" (Nixon 1978, p. 548). China's ping-pong diplomacy was one of the critical developments of the late twentieth century. As Chinese premier Zhou Enlai has pointed out, "Our great leader Chairman Mao set the ping-pong ball in motion and moved the world. This small ball has thus spun around the globe and shaken the world" (Wu 1999, p. 243). Due to this ping-pong diplomacy and its snowball effects, the ping-pong diplomacy of 1971–1972 was seen as a pivotal development in Chinese diplomacy and internationalization. It would provide a model for future diplomatic maneuvers. In 1984, for instance, China and South Korea pursued a policy of so-called tennis diplomacy, which symbolized rapprochement between the two nations.

Foreigners, especially the YMCA officials and Chinese returning from abroad, were the two most common channels for bringing these sports to China. Americans were especially key in this regard. Under Y sponsorship, many future leaders of Chinese sports had an opportunity to study abroad, including Wang Zhengting, Zhang Boling (1876–1951), Dong Shouyi (1895–1978), Hao Gengsheng, and Ma Yuehan (1882–1966), among many others. All these men later served as leaders of modern sports in China. In fact, until the 1920s foreigners, especially Americans, remained the driving force behind the Chinese interest in sports. Only in the late 1920s, as China struggled to recover its national sovereignty, did the influence of the YMCA begin to decline.

Not surprisingly, it was through the Y that the Chinese learned of and understood the new Olympic Games. As early as 1907, Y officials systematically introduced the modern Olympic movement and the coming London Olympic Games to Chinese audiences. According to the Y journal *Tiantsin Young Men*, Zhang Boling, a Y man and future president of Nankai University, gave a stirring speech at a gathering organized by the Y on 24 October 1907 about the Olympics and China. He briefly mentioned the history of the Olympic Games in the West and asked when China would get involved. To prepare for entry, he suggested that China should first hire Olympic winners from the USA to serve as coaches. Zhang expressed the hope that China could send teams to the Olympic Games someday; he was perhaps the first Chinese national to talk seriously about the Games and to articulate the Chinese ambition to take part in them. Another article published in *Tiantsin Young Men* in May 1908, included similar sentiments. It declared that although nobody knew how long it would take for China to take part in the Olympic Games, the day would soon come. Furthermore, it was the duty of the Chinese people to make China ready for the moment when China could not only take part in the Olympic Games but also could host the Games in China. A lecture organized by the Tianjin YMCA in 1908 also fueled these interests. It focused on three questions: (1) When would China be able to send a winning athlete to Olympic contests? (2) When would China be able to send a winning team to Olympic contests? (3) And when would China be able to invite the world to come to Beijing for an International Olympic contest? According to a YMCA document, "This campaign grips in a remarkable way the heart and imagination of Chinese officials, educators, and students" (Xu 2008, p. 29). But China's Olympic dream would be deferred for a long time; China had to wait until 2008 to host the Olympics. However, when Beijing finally celebrated its Olympic Games and realized its so-called century long dream, few in China gave deserved credit to the Y and to its role in helping China's networking with the world through the Games. It is time to restore the hidden stories behind China's internationalization and the role of the Y when we think about a pivotal sporting event like the Beijing Games.

The Y Men and Chinese Laborers

Like the long-forgotten role of the Y in China's Olympic dream, few in the world have paid attention to the role of World War I in making modern China, and even fewer realize that the Y was involved in China's participation in the war. The Great War coincided with a period of tremendous changes in China, which was in the middle of a period of major transformation and renewal. At a time when both the existing world order and China's Confucian political system were collapsing, China wanted to join the world as an equal member and take part in the creation of a new world order. The Chinese saw the coming of the Great War as a crisis in a Chinese definition: the term *weiji* or crisis combines two Chinese characters—danger (*wei*) and opportunity (*ji*). As Europe's "generation of 1914," too young and innocent to suspect what bloody rites of passage awaited them, went gladly to war in August 1914, the new generation in China experienced a sense of *weiji* at the challenge of dealing with new developments in the international system.[8] China recognized the dangers of becoming involved in the war involuntarily, since the belligerents controlled spheres of interest in Chinese territory. Moreover, with the collapse of the old international system, China could easily be bullied by Japan, and its development could be thwarted. If China saw the war as both danger and opportunity, Japan approached the European war as the opportunity of a millennium, and would take full advantage of it.[9] In fact, the Japanese government openly declared that “Japan must take the chance of a millennium” to “establish its rights and interests in Asia.”[10] As a matter of fact, when World War I broke out, Japanese policymakers universally greeted it as an opportunity to renew Japan’s quest for national glory in China. Elder statesman Marquis Inoue Kaoru welcomed the war as “divine aid of the new Taisho era for the development of the destiny of Japan.” Another influential Japanese called it absolutely the most opportune moment to advance Japan’s future standing in China (Dickinson 1999, pp. 35–36); This was the moment that Japan seemed to have been waiting for since 1895. As Baron Kato, the Japanese foreign minister, explained to one American journalist in 1915,

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[8] For the best book on the generation of 1914, see Wohl (1979).

[9] J. Ingram Bryan, "The Shotgun of Modern Japan," *New York Evening Post*, August 3, 1916. The whole article was reprinted in *The Peking Gazette*, October 12, 1916; for a detailed analysis of the Japanese government's policy on the war, see Takeuchi (1967, Chap. 14).

> Germany is an aggressive European Power that had secured a foothold on one corner of the province of Shan-tung. This is a great menace to Japan. Furthermore, Germany had forced Japan to return the peninsula of Liao-tung under the plausible pretense of friendly advice. Because of the pressure brought to bear on us, Japan had to part with the legitimate fruits of war, bought with the blood of our fellow countrymen. Revenge is not justifiable, either in the case of an individual or a nation; but when, by coincidence, one can attend to this duty and at the same time pay an old debt the opportunity certainly should be seized.[11]

It is clear that Japan was determined to take full advantage of the European war at China’s expense and to take revenge for the German action in 1895. On 23 August, Japan, citing its 1902 treaty with England, declared war on Germany and brought the war directly into China.[12] Qingdao fell into Japanese hands on 7 November 1914.[13] On 18 January 1915, after it had already taken control of Shandong from Germany, Japan, without any regard for diplomatic norms, directly presented Chinese president Yuan Shikai with the 21 Demands through its minister to China.[14] The 21 Demands fully exposed Japanese ambitions in China and helped China to focus on the direction in which the country should head. If Japan provided China with a crisis of national identity by defeating it in 1895, the demands it presented in 1915 not only aroused Chinese national consciousness, but also helped China identify its first specific goal in responding to World War I: attending the postwar peace conference. Although China had earlier expressed its intention to join the war, it was only after the 21 Demands that sufficient momentum had gathered for the government to act on its now almost irresistible desire to attend the post-war peace conference.

Just as consideration of Qingdao compelled the Chinese to try to join the war in 1914, and the Japanese 21 Demands made China determined in 1915 to win a place at the post-war peace conference, the prospect of joining the international system also provided important motivation to ongoing Chinese efforts to be an active party in the war. Japan, China's most threatening and determined enemy, had diplomatically aligned itself with the Allies, Britain, and France. Why then did China choose to enter the war on the same side as Japan? The reason for this was a strategic one—China had to be part of the winning team in order to attend the post-war peace conference on the best possible footing to represent its interests. Obsession with its international status is the key to understanding China's seemingly contradictory move.

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[10] Ikuhiko Hata, “Continental Expansion, 1905–1941,” in Hall (1988, p. 6: 279).

[11] Samuel G. Blythe, “Banzai—and Then What?,” *The Saturday Evening Post* 187, no. 47 (1915): 54.

[12] For a detailed analysis, see Tyau (1918, p. 145).

[13] For details on fall of Qingdao, see Hoyt (1975) and Burdick (1976).

[14] For a detailed study on Sino–Japanese negotiation regarding the 21 Demands see Lee (1966). For the most recent work, see Zhitian Luo, “National Humiliation and National Assertion: the Chinese Response to the Twenty-one Demands,” *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 2 (1993): 297–319.

Once the decision to join the war and link its fate with the Allied side had been taken, the Chinese government, with the support of its foreign policy public, was both determined and creative in pursuing its goal.[15] Sending laborers as soldiers was an ingenious move in this direction, and the crises that Great Britain and France faced at the front meant the maneuver would eventually succeed. As early as 1915, China worked out a "laborers as soldiers" scheme designed to link it with the Allied cause when its official entry into the war was uncertain. To establish a strong link with the Allied side and strengthen its case for claiming a role in the war, this new strategy was launched in 1915, and it was the Chinese rather than the Allies who initiated it. The idea of sending laborers to help the Allies was the brainchild of Liang Shiyi (1869–1933), who called it the *yigong daibing* (literally, laborers in the place of soldiers) strategy.[16] This unprecedented move was a product of the young Republican China's forward-looking policies. Many political elites and public intellectuals directly linked the "laborers as soldiers" plan to their vision of China's future development and the goal of assuming equal status in the family of nations.[17]

About 140,000 Chinese, most of them illiterate peasants, went to Europe during World War I. These laborers were recruited by the governments of France and Britain to help both countries in their Great War against the Germans; later, when the United States joined the war, the Americans took advantage of their labor as well. Although they might never have realized it, these laborers were an important part of China's historic search for a new national identity and were involved in the first large-scale encounter of Eastern and Western civilizations in the early twentieth century. They contributed both to the Allied victory and to new ways of thinking about China and the world among Chinese elites. By studying the Chinese laborers in Europe and their stories, we not only recover a neglected chapter in world history, but we also improve our understanding of how this seemingly obscure episode affected Chinese and Western societies as well as the modern world order. To a large extent, the laborers' journey to the West actually charted China's journey to becoming a key player in a new international political system. Once again, the Y was involved in this important episode of both Chinese and world history. As soon as the Great War started, the Y made itself available to serve the Allied countries' war efforts by directing the sports activities and other welfare programs at the fronts. When Chinese laborers arrived in France, the Y also took a hand in shaping and influencing their lives and thus, at least indirectly, in affecting Chinese history once more.

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[15] Foreign policy public here means the groups of Chinese who paid more than average attention to foreign policy and foreign affairs.

[16] See Feng et al. (1978, p. 1: 310).

[17] For details on Chinese workers and the Great War, see Xu (2011a).

The Y's work with the Chinese focused on three areas: recreation, education, and moral and religious uplift.[18] Its key task was to defuse any misunderstandings between the laborers and the commanding officers to improve morale among the laborers, to promote Western civilization, and to spread God's word to the Chinese. The Y conducted its work from the modest centers it established in the Chinese labor camps (Hopkins 1951, p. 491). A model program for the Y's work week was roughly approximated at each center: Sunday, Bible classes and services; Monday, Western motion pictures—Chinese laborers had opportunities to watch movies and soon they came to recognize and look for Charlie Chaplin, just as they did for the "Tommies" and "Yanks"; Tuesday, letter writing; Wednesday, indoor games; Thursday, gramophone entertainment; Friday, amateur theatricals (Chinese); Saturday, voluntarily directed amusements and lantern (slide) lectures. All these activities, except those on Sunday, were usually confined to the hours between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m., between work and bedtime.[19] Besides sports activities, the Y secretaries encouraged the Chinese to use their talents in other ways as well. Probably the most influential and popular activities were drama associations or theatrical groups. The Chinese enjoyed traditional music and opera, and many of the companies had regular theatrical groups organized by the laborers with support of the local Y secretaries. The Y set up stages so they could put on amateur theatricals. The laborers were passionately fond of these activities, and many men got involved in their preparation; thus, the excitement generated around these efforts effectively offset gambling and other types of temptation.

The Y was instrumental as well in promoting education for the laborers. One confidential report notes, "It is significant that the secretaries, almost without exception, gained conviction regarding the need of mass education in China."[20] The education programs included classes on subjects like English, French, history, mathematics, Chinese, and geography, among other subjects. The Y secretaries explained the war and Western civilization to the workers as best they could. The Y, sometimes in cooperation with the military authorities, also arranged for experts to give lectures to the laborers. For instance, Harvard Medical School trained Dr. William Wesley Peter was sent to France as a Y man to present a series of lectures to the Chinese laborers. Over the course of his several-month stay, Peter was able to deliver health lectures in Chinese.[21] The Chinese obviously enjoyed and benefited from the Y programs and services; they were "all very grateful for whatever little courtesies were accorded them. Whenever a secretary did some favor for the men they would come back with presents for him as a token of their appreciation."[22]

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[18] G. H. Cole to Rev. W. E. Soothill, October 1918, YMCA Archives (University of Minnesota), folder: China Correspondence and Reports, September 1917 to October 1918.

[19] Faris, Paul P. "Consternation in China Camp," *World Outlook*, 5, No. 3 (1919).

[20] "General Statement Regarding the YMCA Work for the Chinese in France," March 1919, YMCA Archives (University of Minnesota), box 204, folder: Chinese laborers in France reports, 1918–1919.

[21] W. W. Peter to R. C. Beebe, December 6, 1918, information concerning Dr. W. W. Peter. YMCA Archives, Chinese labor battalions, Chinese Correspondence and Reports, November 1918 to October 1919, box 153, folder: China Correspondence and Reports, November to December 1918.

The Y, of course, was not only interested in helping the Chinese and in receiving such tokens of appreciation. It also had its own interests to further. From its official perspective, by making the Chinese happy, the association was more effectively helping to save Western civilization and helping the Allies to win the Great War. More importantly, its efforts helped to spread Christian values to the laborers and hence to China.[23] To effectively carry out its goals, the Y established an important bridge to link the Chinese elites with the laborers in France. Thanks to the Y's work, China's best, brightest, and absolutely elite members were in personal contact with these laborers. The success of the Y work with Chinese laborers largely depended on these Chinese elite members. Shi Yixuan, a Chinese student from Harvard University, was the first Chinese to answer the Y's call to work with the laborers in France. Besides Shi Yixuan, Chinese Y workers included Yan Yangchu (James Yen), Jiang Tingfu, Lin Yutang, Chen Liting, Wang Zhengxu, Quan Shaowu, Gui Zhiting, Lu Shiyin, and many others.[24] At one point, the 160 staffers supported by the International Committee included 92 Chinese. Of these, 27 came directly from China, 54 from colleges in America, 5 from Great Britain, and 3 from among the Chinese students in France.

In addition to the Chinese who went directly from China to France to help their countrymen, in 1918 38 Chinese students and 17 American missionaries from America and China went at the invitation of and with support of the International Committee of the YMCA of North America (including both the USA and Canada). At the beginning of 1919, their numbers further increased. The Chinese students who studied in France, Britain, and especially in the USA were recruited by the International Committee. In response to the call to patriotic as well as Christian service in France, these students gave up their familiar surroundings to work for their fellow countrymen.

Under normal circumstances, the life trajectories of Chinese elites would have not crossed those of the laborers. In normal times, there would have been no occasion, no reason, for members of the highest echelons of Chinese society to interact with laborers on a personal basis. But this was not a normal time, and Chinese elites and workers did meet in the West and shared experiences in France during the Great War. Their work with the laborers furnished them with a laboratory in which they had ample opportunity for initiative and development of leadership. The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) took a leading role in providing educational, social, and entertainment programs for the Allied fighting forces and for the Chinese laborers as well. The national Y organizations in Great Britain, in the United States, and, in particular, the Chinese National YMCA made the experience of the Chinese workers in Europe less miserable and more fruitful. The Y groups took the initiative in setting up effective programs to help and counsel the laborers (over some resistance from the British command), provided key personnel to run the programs, and the Chinese National YMCA provided the bulk of the expenses from subscriptions from Chinese back in China. In the larger picture, the Y initiative (especially that of the Chinese National YMCA, an independent organization allied with the world movement) was symbolic of the emerging Chinese nation's push to join global liberal forces in what became known as the "Wilsonian moment."[25]

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[22] Shi, I.H., "Upon their return to China," *Association Men*, 62, No. 12 (August 1922), 538.

[23] Young Men's Christian Association International Committee, *For the Millions of Men Now under Arms*, no. 13, 4–7.

[24] YMCA, "Zhu fa huagong dui qing nian hui shi ye lu shui," YMCA Archives, box 204, folder: Chinese laborers in France.

The Chinese laborers were obviously more responsive to the lectures given by Chinese elite members. For instance, L. T. Chen, a graduate of Yale University and a Chinese Y man, gave a number of speeches on the subject of "the relation of the Chinese to the war in Europe." For many laborers, it was the first time they had listened to lectures by their own country's elites; for some, it was the first time they had ever listened to a public address. And the men listened to and watched the speakers intently. One of the most effective programs from these Chinese Y secretaries was the reading program since large majority of the laborers were illiterate. The great success of the literacy classes can be credited to a single person: Yan Yangchu. He invented a revolutionary new teaching method with a selection of foundation characters that would prove to be the foundation of widespread literacy programs in China (Hopkins 1951, p. 491). For those who were illiterate and too old to study regularly, the new phonetic system could be mastered in a few weeks. This enabled them to read and write within a short time. For those who could read and write a little, a select vocabulary of 600 characters, also easily mastered within a few weeks, enabled the men to read newspapers and other simple literature. For those who were already fairly well educated and really motivated to study, classes in English, French, geography, history, mathematics, and the Chinese classics were offered in many camps. General mass education lectures, accompanied by demonstration apparatus or illustrated by motion pictures and stereopticon slides, tackled questions such as sanitation, forestry, road building, national consciousness, the Great War, citizenship, and so on.

Many laborers reported that the Y's classes helped them become better citizens and broadened their intellectual horizons. They developed skills for self-governance and independence that they could use on their return to China.[26] The education programs were so popular that an average of 120 men from companies of 500 regularly attended classes in the 25 companies of one area. They were so popular that the classes ran out of material. Another very effective tool used by the Chinese Y secretaries was a journal called *Chinese Laborers Weekly*, which was founded in January 1919 by the Y. The idea for the journal came from Yan Yangchu who served as its first editor. The journal used colloquial Chinese, which helped the laborers to read and understand both world and Chinese affairs. *Chinese Laborers Weekly* was very popular: "Everywhere the Chinese coolies are eager to possess themselves of copies of this paper, which thus becomes an educational agency."[27]

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[25] For the best study on this topic, see Manela (2007).

[26] "Zai fa huagong zhi hao yin," *Hua Duo Bao* 1, no. 9 (October 14, 1918).

The aim of the *Chinese Laborers Weekly* was to promote knowledge, help the men gain moral values and establish good bonds among themselves and with Westerners. It focused on enhancing and broadening their intellectual horizons, enforcing their understanding of nation state, nationalism, and patriotism. It usually included editorials, news from China, news from the world, and so on. Where it discussed national sovereignty, it urged laborers to defend the national interest.[28] Yan and his friends worked hard to help the laborers develop self-esteem and patriotism. He asked them to work hard and "win glory for the motherland." Yan asked the laborers to always put the interests of their futures, their families, and China first; he urged them to always try to learn more, to behave well, and to learn thrift and discipline by putting aside bad habits and behavior. He reminded them that their behavior in France was directly linked to foreign perceptions of the Chinese and China. They were "representatives of all Chinese," and in the interests of China and all Chinese they should think carefully before doing anything.[29] In many of his writings, Yan asked the laborers to love China and to help establish a better China. The journal also printed important articles from home. For instance, it carried several articles by Ye Shengtao on women's issues.[30] To get laborers' input and active participation, the journal often encouraged the men to submit pieces on topics such as "Chinese laborers in France and their relation to China," "What is the Republic of China?" "Why is China weak?" and "How to improve education in China."

Yan's experience with the laborers in France taught him that they were intelligent, good-hearted, and eager to learn. The only thing they lacked was education (Yan 2005, p. 45). Yan decided to devote his life to easing their suffering and unleashing their power (ibid., p. 59). He realized he had not understood the Chinese working class and life in China before he came to France.[31] It was the laborers who taught him about the real and true China. Through his work with the Chinese labor corps in France, Yan found a solution for China's problems and identity crisis; more importantly, he also determined his career for life: mass education. He realized that only through education at the village level and reform from the bottom up, would

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[27] Conference of Workers Reports, Report of Conference of Workers Held at Peronne on July 23–24, 1919, YMCA Archives.

[28] "Zhong guo de zhu quan," *Huagong Zhoubao* (February 12, 1919): 1.

[29] "Gong he xin nian, san xi san si," *Huagong Zhoubao* (January 19, 1919): 1.

[30] Ye, Shengtao, "Nu zi de ren ge wen ti (1)," *Huagong Zhoubao,* no. 17 (June 11, 1919): 4; Ye Shengtao, "nu zi de ren ge wen ti (2)," *Huagong Zhoubao,* no. 18 (June 18, 1919): 3; Ye, Shengtao, "nu zi de ren ge wen ti (3)," *Huagong Zhoubao,* no. 19 (June 25, 1919): 3.

[31] See Buck (1945, pp. 8–9); Song, Enrong, *Yan Yangchu quan ji,* 1:526; Yan, Hongguo, *Yan Yangchu Zhuan Lue,* 59.

China be able to re-create itself and qualify as an equal member of the world community. Yan's initial Mass Education Movement grew out of his literacy work with the Y in France (Hopkins 1951, p. 491). In one of its official publications, Yan's work in the 1920s was credited as "perhaps the most remarkable single YMCA-inspired event among many in public health, education, and athletics" (ibid., p. 695). He later became a world leader in rural education and his rural reconstruction movement in China deeply influenced China's modern development.

Conclusion

From 1895 to 1915 and into the twenty-first century, China has experienced many twists and turns. It went from being a terribly poor and weak nation to today's rising power. Many factors have been involved in China's great transformation and process of networking with the world. Among the many agents in this networking process was the Y. To understand modern China and its position in the world, it is the Y's role in China's national development (due to its international background and its focus on popular cultures such as sports) that can perhaps provide us with the most penetrating perspective. By studying the two above-mentioned cases, this paper has attempted not only to reveal a lost chapter in both Chinese and global history, but more importantly, to demonstrate that non-political and international institutions such as the Y may serve as a more rewarding and revealing window through which to understand China. The two cases under discussion for this paper clearly inform us of the crucial links between China and the world, between international institutions such as the Y and Olympic movement and China's internationalization, between Chinese elite members and its marginalized groups, and between the Great War and China's great transformation.

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Part IV

Culture and Standardization: The Multifunctional and Contradictory Use of International Organizations

Global Governance: From Organizations to Networks or Not?

Craig N. Murphy

Introduction

During the second half of the nineteenth century, activists concerned with the expansionist tendencies of industrial capitalism planted the first seeds of what we now call "global governance" by convincing national governments to hold conferences that led to an ever-expanding universe of international organizations. Around the same time, scientists and engineers invented the processes of "voluntary consensus standard setting" (VCSS) that have long been used to set industrial standards and, more recently, to establish standards for social and environmental integrity that are monitored by another constellation of new organizations. Both parts of this system were built on Western models. Today, when many of the most vital centers of industrial growth are in Asia, some observers believe that this "Western" focus on rules and formal organizations should be supplemented or replaced by an "Asian" system of less-formal networks that will produce and monitor pragmatic, ad hoc agreements (see the summary of scholarly, policy-maker, and activist views in Mahbubani and Chesterman 2010).

This paper argues that the outcome will be more complex. Asians have become enthusiastic participants in "Western" global intergovernmental organizations and international standard setting. At the same time, many Westerners in the leading sectors of the new global economy have developed a fundamentally network-centered vision of the next generation of global governance, a world "beyond bureaucracy," to use the words of Oracle standards guru, Trond Arne Undheim (2008, p. 1). These shifts have as much to do with the industrial specializations (and related sources of power) in different regions of the world than with fundamentally different cultural assumptions about governance.

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The (Largely) Western Origins of Global Governance

Global governance consists of two roughly equal parts. One is the system of agreements administered by intergovernmental organizations. The UN, including the specialized agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, lies at the center of this part, but does not encompass it, even though the major organizations that are not part of the UN system, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Criminal Court, are deeply entwined with the UN (Weiss and Thakur 2010). The second part, private global governance, is made up of regulatory standards agreed upon by combinations of firms, governments, professional associations, unions, and other advocacy-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While the number of standards created by such ad hoc coalitions has exploded since the 1980s (Abbott and Snidal 2009), most private global standards have been set by a single process ("voluntary consensus") within a nested structure of standard setting organizations that has existed for over a century. Since 1946 the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has been the peak association within this structure and, since the 1990s, ISO has become deeply involved in setting international environmental and social responsibility standards alongside the ad hoc coalitions. Meanwhile, some of the most prominent of the new private standard setters have adopted ISO's VCSS practices (Murphy and Yates 2011).

The early histories of both the UN system and the VCSS standard setting bodies are largely European. They go back to institutions created during the era of the "New Imperialism" and the "Second Industrial Revolution." The oldest of the UN's specialized agencies began as part of the "Public International Unions" that were designed both to facilitate the Second Industrial Revolution and to moderate the social harms that it caused (Murphy 1994, pp. 119–52). The non-governmental international standard setting bodies grew out of late nineteenth-century conferences of scientists and engineers connected with the lead industries of the day, especially electrical engineering (Yates and Murphy 2006).

Nevertheless, the original institutions of global governance were never strictly "Western." The conferences that created the *private* institutions of global governance included representatives of all the nations with firms in the new leading sectors. Thus, Japanese engineers took part in all of the early meetings on electrical standards as well as in the organizations that were ISO's predecessors (Yates and Murphy 2008, p. 17). South Asian engineers took part in international industrial standard setting from the 1920s onward (Verman 1973) and in ISO's early years, India took on a role that was a little bit less prominent than Sweden's, but more prominent than Italy's (Murphy and Yates 2009, p. 31). Similarly, in the *public,* intergovernmental realm, Asians have long been involved. From the UN's beginning, its Secretariat and the military forces it has placed in the field have included disproportionately large numbers from Asia.

Even so, the UN's Asian staff has largely come from the British Commonwealth, the legacy of a system of hiring designed by a British civil servant and student of

Keynes who favored people who shared his managerial and social/ideological preferences (Toye and Toye 2004, p. 61). For similar reasons, UN ranks, accounting procedures, professional codes, and procedures for identifying and punishing bureaucratic lapses all reflect governmental practice in the West and, officially, UN system Secretariats understand themselves to be impartial, rule-driven, and meritocratic models of Weberian rationalization.

Nevertheless, many of the outsiders who know the United Nations system best argue that, while UN staffers may *wish* to act in accord with these "Western" ideals, that rarely happens. The capstone volume of the recent UN Intellectual History Project calls these bemused outsiders the "Third" United Nations (Jolly et al. 2009, p. 7) as distinct from the club of state members (the "First" UN) and the UN Secretariat (the "Second" UN). The volume, whose authors admit to being part of this Third UN, argue that it is impossible to understand the work of the UN system unless one takes into account this informal network of the NGOs, independent commissions, external experts, scholars, consultants, private benefactors, and other individuals who work with the First and Second UNs. The Third UN and the similar penumbra of people connected to the UN's predecessors have been essential simply because members of the UN, the League of Nations, and the Public International Unions have never provided the organizations' staffs with the funding and independence that they need to do their jobs. The organizations have always had to rely on the voluntary efforts of others—from the sponsorship of key international conferences provided by nineteenth-century European aristocrats to the critical independent judgment offered by scholars like those involved with the UN Intellectual History Project. Looked at from the point of view of those involved in the Third UN, neither the club of member governments nor the secretariat that it oversees are particularly rational or rule-driven, let alone impartial or willing to judge arguments on their merits. In fact, the ultimate lesson of the History Project's Richard Jolly and Thomas Weiss is that the intergovernmental part of contemporary global governance is really just part of a larger transnational network of individuals and organizations linked not by rational self-interest or devotion to their professions, but by an attachment to the ideals that the UN represents: peace, social justice, development, and the like.

Similarly, a prominent historian of industrial standard setting, Winton Higgins, reminds us that the founders of today's VCSS organizations were "evangelical engineers" who, "in a spirit of internationalism (...) generated enormous enthusiasm around the project of optimising the application of mass-production principles, not least standardisation, to civilian industries" (Higgins 2005, p. 39). The centerpiece of the "private" side of contemporary global governance has always been much more a social movement than a rationalized bureaucracy (Murphy and Yates 2011).

Changes in Global Governance with the Rise of the East?

Nonetheless, even if the reality of global governance has always fallen short of the Weberian ideal, that ideal has been the goal of its proponents. As Higgins notes, the standards movement has always "evangelized for rationalization" and VCSS standard-setters often judge their success by the (surprising) degree to which their "voluntary" standards become mandatory (Olshan 1993, p. 319). Similarly, until quite recently, for most of the advocates of the UN and its predecessors, the *real* goal was to create a world government—limited, yes, but rational and modern, like the best of the welfare states (Weiss 2009).

Some observers believe that, with the rise of Asia, this will change. Asians, argue Simon Chesterman and Kishore Mahbubani, value pragmatism and "constantly adapt and change." The Asian approach to global governance involves "respect for diversity and an emphasis on consensus-building over conflict, practical solutions over lofty principles, and gradualism over abrupt change" (Chesterman and Mahbubani 2010, p. 1). The modal form of such governance is a network of powerful individuals, states, and organizations linked by common goals but with mutual respect for, and deference to, any disagreements within the group.

Not surprisingly, some advocates of the older "Western" ideal of global governance worry about the narrowness of the set of goals that all the world's powerful political and economic leaders might share. Perhaps all of them value economic growth and the liberal international economic institutions that foster it, but that, the critics say, is not the major problem of global governance today. The current problem is the need to find ways to "re-embed" the global economic order that liberal economic institutions have helped create in a broader set of social and environmental values, not only because those values are desirable in themselves, but also because, without that, the global economy will not survive (Bernstein and Pauly 2007; Ruggie 2008), something that some Westerners fear that key Asian leaders do not recognize. Some analysts even fear that China is attempting to create "a world without the West," to the detriment of the liberty and welfare of all (Barma et al. 2009).

At the very least, the conflict between "Asian" and "Western" values may have provided some Asian governments with a justification for limiting their contribution to international governance. Chesterman and Mahbubani (2010) report that Chinese and Indian leaders are convinced that just "by taking care of more than two billion people" they make a sufficient "contribution to global stability and order." Deng's admonition, "Tao Guang Yang Hui" ("Do not overreach") justifies this free riding. In the early 1990s, Deng used the phrase to explain why China should not be expected to provide aid to the least developed countries, "China couldn't and never could take this leadership. We are not capable" (quoted in Wang 2010, p. 17). Similar claims have been made about China's long refusal to boost the global economy by floating its currency and about both India's and China's reluctance to move forward with global climate negotiations.

Nevertheless, the political scientist James C. Hsiung (2010) believes that an effective system of global governance will develop despite current conflicts over "Western" and "Asian" political values (Yu et al. 2010, ix–xii). Hsiung argues that Confucian values played an important role in twentieth-century East Asia by authorizing and buttressing economically interventionist states that successfully overcame the legacies of foreign rule and domination. It was less that Western liberal ideals were rejected than that they "did not answer postcolonial Asia's immediate needs and concerns" (Hsiung 2010, p. 200). That does not mean, Hsiung argues, that Asian governments will fail to learn how to provide global governance effectively even if that requires taking on new global responsibilities that some neo-Confucians once seemed to reject. After all, China's current policies in Africa seem to be fostering growth and industrialization more successful than the ones pursued by Western donors for the last 50 years (Brautigam 2010) and, in that way, China may be doing more than any other power to embed the world economy in an *effective* global consensus that absolute poverty is unacceptable. Moreover, even if China has undercut democratic governments in order to pursue its potentially poverty-reducing economic policies, undermining democracy is not China's fundamental purpose on the continent (Carmody and Taylor 2009). Similarly, an early Western critic of Ban Ki-Moon's deferential, gradualist, ad hoc approach to running the UN (in contrast to Kofi Annan's aggressive, legalistic, rationalistic reform agenda) now praises Ban and his network of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese partners for their commitment to reducing global warming and "successful incorporation of the needs of the developing world into the [recent] global stimulus" (Williams 2009).

There is also evidence that China and the other new industrial powers of East Asia have become increasingly comfortable with the older, "Western" forms of global governance, although their comfort level differs by issue area. Jing Gu, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner do see a difference between the institutions of global governance that create and manage global markets and those, such as the global development system, that are concerned with the social embedding of the new, truly global economy that is growing within them. In terms of market creation: "The WTO arena is accepted by Western countries and China as the institutional context to deal with conflictive trade interests (. . .). In this field, institutionalist optimism—that cooperation and common institution building between new and old global powers is possible—seems to be justified. (Gu et al. 2008, p. 288). But China rejects the development assistance norms promulgated by the exclusivist OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), and is obviously going its own way in creating new norms that govern its assistance relations with Africa (ibid.).

Both Hsiung and Gu suggest that China's reluctance to operate within the traditional Western system of global governance vis-à-vis the developing world may have less to do with a preference for "Asian" forms of governance than it has to do with an aversion to the hypocrisy of the most powerful Western states whose actions toward the developing world have been anything but rule-governed. The newly powerful industrial states of Asia, they remind us, still identify with the postcolonial and neo-colonized governments who look to the universal, legalistic, and unanimity-oriented UN as the only legitimate source of global governance. Perhaps, if the major Western aid donors were willing to accept the UN's coordination mechanisms (the UN Development Group and its country teams) as the institutions governing the global development system, China and other new major aid donors (India, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States) might be much more willing to embrace Western models of global governance in this market-embedding arena.

The East in the World of Western Standard Setting

There is certainly evidence from the world of *private* global governance that Asian involvement with Western market-creating institutions (in this case, industrial standard setting) has led, over time, to greater Asian involvement with Western market-embedding institutions (environmental and social standard-setting).

Recall that, despite the Western-bias of the early international industrial standard-setting bodies, engineers from Asian countries with significant industrial sectors were involved from the beginning. Nevertheless, some Asian countries took a much less active role than others did. For example, despite Japan's industrial prowess, its companies and engineering associations were less involved in international standard setting than India's were until the late 1980s. Japan had no need to be. For decades, Japanese firms had organized themselves to produce to the different standards required by all of the national markets to which they sold their products, a strategy that few other Asian societies were able to emulate (Sturén 1981).

Ironically, Japanese firms only became deeply interested in international standard setting after ISO set a quality management standard, ISO 9000, that many of them considered inadequate. They already were leaders in the "customer orientation" and "continuous improvement" that ISO 9000 was supposed to encourage; following the ISO standard, alone, would leave them with a less effective quality management system than the one they already had. Yet customers in other parts of the world began demanding that suppliers be "ISO 9000 certified" and this new cost of doing business led Japanese firms, going forward, to become active in ISO's work in order "to formulate world standards that start from Japan" (Stortz 2007, p. 37).

China and South Korea also became much more actively involved in international industrial standard setting from the mid-1990s, quickly moving from being "standards takers" to "standards makers" in information technology (IT) (Dai and Kshetri 2008; Lee and Oh 2008). Both learned from Japan; from the beginning, Chinese and South Korean IT firms used standard-setting strategically, trying to gain advantage for themselves by assuring that their own standards became the global ones, a strategy that can be successful for countries with a large domestic market—that is, for China (Garud et al. 2002). Also beginning in the 1990s, exporters throughout Asia faced the same pressure that Japan did to adopt ISO

9000. That experience led them to seek an active part in the negotiations that created environmental standards (the ISO 14000 series), labor standards (the private SA 8000), and social responsibility standards (ISO 26000 and many NGO-sponsored standards of the ISEAL Alliance) based on the ISO 9000 model.

Certainly, many Asian firms—like firms elsewhere—involved themselves in those negotiations simply to weaken the result (Balzarova and Castka 2010). Nevertheless, familiarity with ISO 9000 was key to bringing Asian firms and national standard-setting bodies into the private processes that aim to re-embed global markets in a larger set of social norms. ISO 9000 is widely adopted throughout Asia and there is strong evidence that firms adopting that standard are much more likely to adopt environmental management standards and other social responsibility standards (see references in Murphy and Yates 2009, pp. 77–82). Surveys of Chinese firms suggest two mechanisms by which this happens. On the one hand, firms that are already using the ISO 9000 standard, find ISO 14000 and similar standards understandable and easy to implement, so they choose that route if they come under pressure from purchasers to do something about their environmental impact or other externalities (Cordeiro et al. 2010). On the other hand, the orientation toward customers and clients that ISO demands often leads to a broader stakeholder orientation and more active communication between suppliers and buyers, which encourages the transfer of social norms down supply chains (Song et al. 2010).

There are other reasons to believe that the ISO standard-setting process, in particular, might become central to the creation of effective global minimum standards for labor, the environment, and human rights. Among the groups attempting to set new global standards, ISO is the most widely legitimate because more Third World stakeholders are involved (Castka and Balzarova 2008). In addition, people familiar with ISO standards play important roles in high-tech firms throughout the world as directors of quality management or standard-setting (Murphy and Yates 2011). Finally, in high-tech firms at least, the engineers who head the standard setting divisions are often activists in global social and environment movements (ibid.) There is nothing new in this. Since the nineteenth century, the standards movement has been dominated by socially progressive engineers in the high technology fields of the day (Yates and Murphy 2008.) In fact, the process of industrial standard setting may always have encouraged private firms in the new industrial powers of the day to join in the development the social norms that made capitalism sustainable.

Finally, in many parts of Asia, including the Middle East, Vietnam, and China, the private institutions of global governance work hand in hand with a UN system that is trying to convince governments to embrace stricter environmental regulation, enforce higher labor standards, and provide greater social security (Murphy 2006, pp. 177–94). In a 2009 interview, the UN chief in China said that the role of the UN was to promote, “global norms and standards (. . .) help China become a full and active, concerned, global citizen, (. . .) [and] test out sensitive ideas – land reform for farmers (. . .) growth of civil society” and other policies to promote a sustainable economy (Malik 2009).

In sum, the current system of global governance may be working to assure that, despite the system's Western origins, it will continue in a more Asia-centered world.

The Western Embrace of Network Thinking

Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that global governance will shift toward the "Asian" model simply because parts of the current system have become obsolete. Oracle's Trond Arne Undheim (2009, p. 1) looks forward to a day in the near future when, "ISO is either revitalized or disbanded (. . .) smaller, leaner, and not under the UN [idea of national representation] anymore. Industry has an equal seat, and there is ample funding for SMEs [small and medium enterprises], especially from the third world, who want to participate." Undheim is typical of the many IT engineers who believe that the traditional "evangelical engineers" goal of creating technologies that can be as widely used and as widely interconnected as possible might best be achieved by companies making their standards freely and publicly available (Weber 2004, p. 238). Members of the new generation of engineers are likely to see themselves as part of the "Open Source" movement more than as "standard-setters," even if their jobs require attention to both. As David Clark, a leading Internet architect, famously put it, "We reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code" (quoted in Russell 2006, p. 104). According to telecommunications historian Andrew L. Russell, "This phrase (. . .) represents a jab at the competing set of standards for internetworking created by (. . .) ISO [whose] process lacked experimental value and flexibility" (ibid.).

Social standard setter Alice Tepper Marlin (2009), the developer of the SA 8000 labor standard, believes that this problem of ISO adhering to outdated rules and procedures, despite their perverse impact on the organization's larger goals, has been evident throughout the recent (2004–2010) negotiations over the ISO 26000 social responsibility standard. Instead of learning from social entrepreneurs who had actually created similar standards using an updated VCSS process, ISO followed its outdated rules. One requires that each national standards body develop an internal consensus among different stakeholders (firms, unions, human rights organizations, environmentalists) before it takes a position. This is the "UN" character of ISO that seems so anachronistic to Undheim. Not all national bodies enforce that rule, but in the ISO 26000 negotiations the USA body did. That was particularly unfortunate because ISO's rules required that many of the existing transnational social standard setting bodies (like Tepper Marlin's) be represented through the USA body simply because their headquarters are in the global financial capital, New York. Therefore, many of the people with the greatest practical knowledge of how to negotiate social responsibility standards were prevented from speaking in ISO 26000 meetings because their views did not correspond to the lowest-common-denominator consensus that could be forged within the USA group.

Many in ISO's traditional movement constituency, the "evangelical engineers" in the leading technological sectors of the day, understood Tepper Marlin's problem. Pekka Isosomppi, a Nokia standard setter who is now in also in charge of his company's corporate social responsibility efforts, hopes that ISO 26000 will lead to the wide use of auditable social responsibility standards created by some of the social-movement oriented national standards bodies like the one in Brazil, which is linked to the World Social Forum, the annual global NGO conference that aims to a more just and democratic world. Yet, he worries that the ISO standard will become the basis for disparate systems of lowest-common-denominator national regulation (Isosomppi 2009, p. 13).

Isosomppi agrees with Tepper Marlin (2009) that ISEAL Alliance of NGO standard setters combines the strengths of both innovatory "Open Source" and traditional ISO approaches to social standard setting: It fosters coalitions of businesses and NGOs that want to set new, higher standards in different social and environmental fields. At the same time, it promotes the consolidation of standards through its own voluntary consensus process among its members.

At least one of the engineers who embraces a marriage of VCSS and Open Source thinking as the key global governance, Oracle's Undheim, explicitly links this new way of thinking to "Asian" models in his *Leadership from below*, a book that promises to bring "Asian and Scandinavian influences together with the true logic of the workplace Internet into a pragmatic leadership framework" (Undheim 2008, jacket). Despite his questionable claim of having a uniquely fresh "Gen-Y" insight in *Leadership from below*, Undheim is on to something. Alfred D. Chandler (1962) famously argued that the structure of the great bureaucratic firms of the late nineteenth-century's Second Industrial Revolution coevolved with the corporate strategies that most successfully responded to the mix of technologies and the scope of the markets available at the time. S. E. Finer (1997) saw the evolution of the massive modern state as a response to the same technologies and the political battles among the social forces newly empowered by the industrial system. Hsiung says that in the colonized and neo-colonized worlds of East Asia similar models did not evolve due to the additional environmental constraint of Western power. Therefore, it is not surprising that a different model came to be seen as the norm in many countries. After all, this "Confucian" or "Chinese" model allowed countries under Western pressure to thrive. The model, Hsuing argues, continued to be respected even when, as is the case in some parts of Asia, the actions of Chinese capitalists, which were often supported by the Chinese states, were widely considered a form of sub-imperialism. (The brilliant Indonesian novelist, Pramodeya Ananta Toer [1960/2007] has written some of most insightful and sympathetic analyses of the origin and role of the hated yet respected "Confucian" networks in his own country.) Clearly, today, the technological, geopolitical, and market constraints faced by states and firms are very different than they were a century ago. We should expect the governance models that prove most successful to be very different as well.

Scholars of global governance need to be conscious of how tentative and unformed the systems regulating today's global economy really are. We especially need to be careful about adopting concepts that could blind us to changes that may be taking place.

I am, for example, attracted by the conceptual clarification proposed by Steven Bernstein (2010), one of the scholars who has done the most to document and clarify the distinction between the market-creating global governance that is already in place from the market-embedding work that has yet to be done. Bernstein would have us focus on governance that really governs, on authoritative norms that are enforced by monitoring and sanctions, on what, some might argue, is a very "Western" version of global governance, but, importantly, a version of the concept that lets us distinguish between "private global governance initiatives" that are nothing more than the branding strategies of companies trying to appeal to a particular group of elite consumers and those nongovernmental initiatives that truly aim for universal compliance.

In contrast, another recent attempt at conceptual clarification, this one by a scholar who has long-focused on the global information economy, J. P. Singh (2009), emphasizes the ways in which "global governance" is a *process*. The process orientation attunes Singh to the *learning* that scholars focused on sources of authority of fixed institutions might overlook: He is particularly concerned with the conditions under which international actors learn to pursue solidaristic goals, especially solidarity with and among those who are less advantaged. Like Undheim, who shares a similarly "Asian" model of governance, Singh is able to uncover a range of successful "strategies from below" that have transformed social practices, even if they have not led to the complete embedding of the global market in a solidaristic compact that both he and Bernstein hope for.

We need both concepts, both lenses, both models in order to understand the kind of global governance that is actually developing and to pursue the kind that we would prefer to see. If the "Western" versus "Asian" distinction is used only as a shorthand to point to these different emphases (they are not, I think, different ideal types) of global governance, then it may be a distinction worth maintaining even if it has little to do with what has actually happened to or in global governance, either recently or over the last century and a half.

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New Capitalism, UNESCO, and the Re-enchantment of Culture

Timothy D. Taylor

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It is by now commonplace to make references to the high level of interconnectedness most people in the developed world enjoy (or decry). Some of the most prominent ways that contemporary scholars describe the present moment focus on the network, whether it's Manuel Castells's "network society" (Castells 1996–1999) or Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello's "connexionist world" (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). For these and other scholars, today's networked world exists because of capitalist processes, though studies of capitalism in the last couple of decades seem to have taken a back seat to studies of what are thought to be its effects, whether one calls them network society or globalization or something else altogether. Yet capitalism, as I have written elsewhere (Taylor 2013), ought to be the transcendent category of analysis, as it was for so many classic social theorists beginning, of course, with Marx.

What I mean by the "new capitalism" (a term adopted from Sennett 1998 and 2006) is a familiar enough capitalism, for it is also known as late capitalism (Mandel 1978), neoliberal capitalism (Duménil and Lévy 2004; Harvey 2005), and others. It is a capitalism marked by global interconnectedness through new digital technologies; deregulation; dependence on a defense economy based on permanent war; the decline of the influence of the labor movement; the growth of debt; new forms of colonialism; the global growth of monopolistic and oligopolistic

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pursuit of massive profits; increasingly polarized wealth; heightened consumption; an international division of labor; and more. Socially and culturally, this new capitalism has rendered culture ever more important (as I will detail below), that is, the production of culture is more important to capitalism than in the past.

For musicians in the West, one result of the increased interconnectivity of the world is that more and more musics from outside of the West have found their way to the West, and with increasing speed. Musics, almost from the beginning of the phonograph in the late nineteenth century, had traveled from Western metropoles to many places around the world, but it wasn't until the 1980s when musics from the West's 'elsewheres' began to travel to Western metropoles, resulting in the rise of what has come to be known as "world music" as a generic category (see Taylor 1997). Now, through the Internet and cellular phones, recorded music can travel around the world almost instantaneously.

These new digital technologies that have resulted in dramatic shifts in the production, dissemination, and production of music, occurred at a historical moment when the concept of culture has become increasingly popular, increasingly organizing peoples' experience in their own lives and their relationships with others: if one has greater and faster access to other people's cultural forms, this frequently makes one seek to characterize and often differentiate one's own culture from another's. The global success of the anthropological concept of culture has given people around the world a way to conceptualize practices and beliefs that were formerly, to them, just the way things were. But capitalist globalization and the travel of people, media, and information have done much to relativize the world. "Culture" has become a way to seek stability and, as such, has become a resource; in George Yúdice's words, culture "is increasingly wielded as a resource for both socio-political and economic amelioration, that is, for increased political participation in an era of waning political involvement, conflicts over citizenship, and the rise of . . .'cultural capitalism'" (Yúdice 2003, 9). Or, in the words of the great Senegalese musician Youssou N'Dour, which were emblazoned on a promotional T-shirt in the 1990s: "The most important thing we own is our culture. [D]on't trade away your culture for anything in the world." The idea of "owning" culture in this sense—as opposed to owning a particular object from another culture, or under colonialism "owning" countries or regions—is a very recent development, an ideology not found before the advent of the new capitalism.

"Culture" has become closely linked to conceptions of identity, and this is another concept that has emerged in the last couple of decades that plays a profound role in shaping peoples' self-conceptions and social relations. I have written elsewhere of the rise of the concept of identity as we in the USA currently understand the term, a kind of project in the Sartrean sense of self-fashioning that is socially based, frequently ethnically or racially inflected, and reliant on practices of consumption (Taylor 2007). And Castells notes the seeming contradiction between, on the one hand, global interconnectedness through new informational technologies and, on the other, the trend in the 1990s and beyond toward constructing identities based on history and geography, sometimes in a search for meaning that can be spiritualized (Castells 1996, 22). For Castells, identity has become an important, perhaps dominant, source of meaning in today's network society (Castells 1996, 3).

1. Intangible Cultural Heritage and UNESCO

There has long been an impulse among many in the West to seek to preserve traditional cultural forms and practices that are perceived as being in danger of disappearing through processes of modernization, or Westernization, or now, globalization. Musicians' practices, and the nearly global reach of the increasingly monopolistic music industry—preceded by earlier processes of globalization, marketization, and Westernization that began after World War II—resulted in many countries beginning to become concerned about cultural imperialism, or the replacement of local cultural forms by those from elsewhere. Some countries have established laws that mandate that radio broadcasts must contain a certain percentage of musicians from that particular country as a way to preserve and encourage musicians with that country's borders (see Taylor 2012).

In Japan, in particular, there was a growing awareness of the importance of preserving cultural forms that were being threatened by the importation of popular cultural forms from Europe and the USA, resulting in a "Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties" in 1950 (Japan—Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties, n.d.). South Korea followed in 1962, followed by countries like Taiwan in 1982. These countries were influential with UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), which passed several declarations early in the new millennium on intangible cultural heritage, including devising a new designation of "masterpieces of the intangible heritage of humanity." UNESCO believed that "Traditional knowledge and practices lie at the heart of a community's culture and identity but are under serious threat from globalization" (UNESCO, "Intangible Cultural Heritage Domains," n.d., 12). Earlier forms of protection had been of "tangible" things like buildings and monuments; as a result, countries with oral traditions were greatly affected. These declarations had a massive impact in Asia, parts of Latin America, parts of Europe, and much of Africa (Rees 2010a).[1]

The rise of the UNESCO conceptions of intangible cultural heritage is evidence of the increased importance of culture in today's globalized capitalism. In order to conceptualize "intangible cultural heritage," participants in UNESCO's various conferences that lead up to these conventions had numerous discussions of culture. In 1982, the World Conference on Cultural Policies convened in Mexico City, and "redefined" culture to include not just arts and letters but also "modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs" (UNESCO, "Working towards a Convention," n.d., 6). This "redefinition" "stated that heritage now also covered all the values of culture as expressed in everyday life, and growing importance was being attached to activities calculated to sustain the ways of life and forms of expression by which such values were conveyed. . ..”

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[1] I am indebted to Rees 2010a and Rees 2010b for this capsule history.

The conference also approved a new definition of “cultural heritage,”

> which included both tangible and intangible works through which the creativity of people finds expression: languages, rites, beliefs, historic places and monuments, literature, works of art, archives and libraries. . .. [E]very culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each people’s traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means of demonstrating its presence in the world. In this sense. . .cultural identity and cultural diversity are inseparable. . . (UNESCO, “Working towards a Convention” n.d., 6–7).

Since music is considered to be in the domain of intangible cultural heritage, UNESCO and the International Council for Traditional Music—the only international non-governmental organization (NGO) devoted to the study of music—have developed formal consultative relations. The ICTM received a high ranking from UNESCO, so it is now the first stop when UNESCO needs to make a formal consultation about musical matters (Seeger 2010; see also Seeger 2009). But, since there are people and networks around each piece of intangible cultural heritage, and since people move, the ICTM’s view of music doesn’t always articulate well with the more nation-focused model of UNESCO (Seeger 2010).

Since UNESCO is a prestigious organization, the effect of the intangible cultural heritage conventions, and in particular the designation of a particular cultural practice as a masterpiece, can have profound consequences. The ethnomusicologist Helen Rees told me that in China, constructions/representations of traditional musics as being backward and unscientific suddenly reversed and a new term was invented: “original ecology folk song.” Old, folklorized performances of music were jettisoned for peasant music, but not the earthiest of peasants, so these newer performances are somewhat sanitized. Instead, folklorized music survives in conservatories, whose denizens were never interested in traditional music before (Rees 2010a).

UNESCO was well aware of the risks inherent in declaring something to be intangible cultural heritage worthy of recognition and protection. These risks include “political conjuring” that could turn complex cultural forms into “simplified messages about cultural identity.” This could lead to, among other things, “an increasingly artificial demand for dramatizations and ritual enactments of cultural traditions, which are often celebrated out of context in the form of dress, music, dance and handicrafts” (UNESCO, “Working towards a Convention,” n.d., 9). There were also worries during the meetings about the convention that cultural forms such as music and dance that are transmitted orally and visually, and thus change over time and from place to place, could become institutionalized and fixed. And UNESCO now has to be aware of nominations for masterpiece status to make sure they aren’t simply motivated by a government’s desire to increase tourism (Seeger 2010).[2]

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[2] For a study of UNESCO, intangible cultural heritage, and tourism, see (Di Giovine 2009).

UNESCO was also concerned with financial repercussions, such as commodification of works, which "will have a disruptive impact on folk-culture itself" (UNESCO, "Working towards a Convention," n.d., 9). This concern was well founded. The impetus behind Japan and other countries' desire to attempt to protect their indigenous cultural forms was based on an older notion of identity, rooted in unitary conceptions of nation and culture. Today's identity is much more individualized. The UNESCO masterpiece designation is rooted in this older conception of identity, but at the same time cannot avoid being part of this increasingly networked, marketized world, which is much more marked by importance and rapid changes than what has gone before. Castells writes of the new ephemerality of social movements, often based on a single issue, sometimes "flaring up for just an instant around a media symbol" (Castells 1996, 3)—or, one could add, a masterpiece designation.

For example, Helen Rees told me that the designation of the *qin* (a kind of Chinese zither) as a masterpiece of the intangible heritage of humanity in 2003 has markedly changed the role of the instrument in China. When Rees first went to China in 1987, she wanted to learn the *qin* and really had to press her host to allow her to do so. Cities and regions that had little or no tradition of *qin* music now host several *qin* studios. Rees bought a good, modern *qin* for about $60 in the 1980s, and it is now worth $30,000-50,000; she also told me of a Hong Kong-based musician who bought a Ming dynasty *qin* in the late 1970s for $10 that is now worth about $250,000 (Rees 2010a).[3]

2. "Culture," "Identity," "Creativity"

Now let me attempt to historicize and deconstruct some of the ideologies that frequently appear in UNESCO's official documents, which are rife with terms like "culture" and "identity" and "creativity" used in the most glowing fashion. These documents reveal an enchanted view of many of the world's cultures. This sentence, for example, appears on the back of all of UNESCO's publications on intangible cultural heritage: "Intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity." (UNESCO, "What Is Intangible Cultural Heritage?" n.d., n.p.).

But the question of "identity" is extremely complex, as I have written elsewhere (Taylor and Gillespie 2009; Taylor 2007). There are national identities, cultural identities, group identities, individual identities, and more. Each type of identity has its own history, and each type has many, many local forms and variations that are unique to a particular place and time. Not every nation in the world, for example, has had a stable conception of itself throughout its history, and not every country in the world came into being at the same moment. In particular, individual identity, frequently today simply unqualified as "identity," is a very recent development rooted in postwar US culture, though the concept has traveled remarkably quickly (Taylor 2007).

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[3] For more on intangible cultural heritage and the *qin*, see (Rees 2010b; Yung 2009).

Questions of "identity" in UNESCO's sense are complicated by the simple fact that people and cultural forms move in an uncoordinated fashion. As a longtime student of Irish traditional music, I studied the flute with a septuagenarian Irishman who emigrated to the USA in 1947. Irish traditional music was clearly a large part of his sense of Irishness, but, at the same time, there was a long period in his life when he hardly played the music at all. What of his identity then? Was he somehow "less" Irish? Such situations are not unusual; on the contrary, they are the norm. Peoples' relationships to cultural forms produced in their own culture are more complicated than simply validating a monolithic and rigid conception of an identity that is indexed to a particular cultural form or practice. UNESCO's conception of identity seems to be something of a set of nesting dolls, the largest being "national identity," next, "cultural identity," followed by "individual identity."

But all sorts of factors come into play, such as (beginning with the Irish example), political divides and religious conflicts and also including gender, and geography, as well as generation, a particularly important complicating factor, perhaps especially among diasporic peoples, as children born in one place attempt to identify with the birthplace of their parents. For example, a dynamic that has emerged in the USA among diasporic South Asians is that immigrant parents, whose main stance toward US culture was to assimilate, are providing ways for their children to juggle more complicated reactions to and against America, and India. In voicing these reactions, South Asian American youth rely on their parents' knowledge and experience of India in order to make musics and identities that resonate both with the USA and with their ancestral homes. This reliance on the parents' knowledge and experiences is illustrated in this scene with Queens, New York-based DJ Lil' Jay and his mother, who occasionally brings him Hindi film music tapes to sample for his remixes:

> "Who is that, Ma?" Jay says looking up from his tape deck. It's a melodramatic Hindi ballad jammed into a middle of a boisterous 11-minute house mix, one of nine tracks on Lil Jay's coming album.
>
> She holds up her right index finger, squints up at the ceiling. "Disco Dancer, na?" she guesses. "Must be Amit Kumar or Kishore. Yes, Kishore. 1982." She hands her husband his milky tea (Sengupta 1996: §13, p. 11).[4]

"Identity," therefore, far from serving the stable, grounding, function that UNESCO seems to ascribe to it, is a constantly shifting, endlessly inflected mode of self-conception and self-fashioning. A particular cultural form doesn't simply register a social group's or individual's identity, it is, in part, how identity is made, unmade, negotiated, represented, performed, understood, and more.

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[4] See also (Maira 2002).

On to "culture." In order for culture to be mobilized as a resource in Yúdice's sense, it has to be understood in the essentialized and reified way mentioned earlier. UNESCO's documents reveal understandings of culture in this sense. And, indeed, UNESCO's language in the many documents it has produced about intangible cultural heritage is full of terms that assume an enchanted, unspoiled culture, particularly in its usages of "culture," "identity," and "creativity." Yet the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, signed in Paris on 17 October 2003, states, quite simply,

> The 'intangible cultural heritage' means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity (UNESCO, "The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage" n.d., 4).

This idealized and romanticized conception—which could apply to the Hindi remix music discussed above, and which even mentions peoples' relation to nature, as though their cultural production was "natural" as well—reveals fairly old-fashioned, pre-network society notions of the production of culture.

One of UNESCO's documents, which chronicles the road to the 2003 convention, describes several international seminars that debated questions surrounding the question of intangible cultural heritage. A language of "culture" and "identity" seemed to suffuse these meetings. A UNESCO report on a meeting in Bogotá in 1978, writes that this meeting stipulated that

> cultural authenticity is based on recognition of the components of cultural identity, whatever their geographic origin and however they have mingled, and that every people or group of peoples has both the right and the duty to determine independently its own cultural identity, based on its historical antecedents, its individual values and aspirations, and its sovereign will (UNESCO, "Working towards a Convention" n.d., 6).

"Creativity" has a similarly complicated ideological history in European and North American thought, emerging in a period when the patronage system was declining in the late eighteenth century, forcing composers to become freelance musicians instead of employees of a church or aristocrat. "Creativity" (and "art," for that matter) are ideological complexes that emerged in this moment in European history when cultural production associated with social elites was becoming increasingly marketized and drawn into the capitalist system ("The artist was born at the same time his work went on sale," writes Jacques Attali in a favorite quotation [Attali 1985, 47]). And Christine Battersby, in a book that remains exceptionally useful, describes how the concept of genius by the end of the eighteenth century became closely linked to creativity, that it was creativity that made men (not women, as she makes clear) superior to others, even godlike (Battersby 1989, 2).[5]

This was a historical moment in the history of capitalism in which knowledge was stored and transmitted mainly through print and in vernacular languages—print capitalism (Anderson 1991). Networks of publishers, distributors, retailers, and consumers were instrumental in spreading the notion of creativity and genius that we employ today—ideologies that became closely linked by the end of the eighteenth century (Williams 1976)—for it wasn't until this network existed that it was possible for Europeans to learn of musicians or other artists in far-off places through published reports, and to play and hear their published music.

UNESCO uses the concept of "creativity" in precisely this late eighteenth/early nineteenth-century way. Its definition of "masterpiece" is:

> Based on the fact that any culture may hold masterpieces and without restriction by any specific historical and cultural reference, a masterpiece (in the field of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity) is understood as a cultural manifestation of exceptional value, defying any formal rules and not measurable by any external yardstick, which conveys the freedom of expression and creative genius of a people" (UNESCO, "Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral Intangible Heritage of Humanity," 2001, 12).

This is a serviceable definition of masterpiece in the realm of artistic field.

3. The Re-Enchantment of Culture

Terry Flew has written of the three main ways to coordinate behavior among social actors: hierarchies, markets, and networks (Flew 2009). Markets occasionally recognize local cultural forms and lift them up into the view of a broader public, as in the case of, say, Irish step dancing thanks to the success of *Riverdance*; or Paul Simon's popularizing of South African *isicathamiya* music on his *Graceland* album of 1986. The UNESCO halo effect is similar in a sense, acting as a kind, non-marketized way of recognizing the local in the name of preservation. Yet, as I have shown, the ideologies that drove UNESCO's adoption of the idea of intangible cultural heritage and masterpieces all emanate from capitalist processes.

I employ the term "enchantment" in the classic Weberian sense here, a term that Weber used to describe magical thoughts and practices thought to be common in the premodern world that were slowly being eliminated through the rise of rationalization and bureaucratization; in his words: "One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service" (Weber 1946, 139).

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[5] And Battersby notes, women were increasingly excluded from the category of genius and creativity, even as male creators were praised for their "feminine" qualities, (Battersby 1989, 3). "Creativity," Battersby writes, was "displaced *male* procreativity: male sexuality made sublime" (Battresby 1989, 3).

In designating something as intangible cultural heritage, or, especially, naming something a "masterpiece of the intangible heritage of humanity," UNESCO is actually conferring upon a particular cultural form or practice a kind of re-enchantment that gives it privileged status in today's commodity culture, however ephemeral that status may be; it is taking someone's cultural practice and placing a halo over it. Colin Campbell (1989) George Ritzer (1999), and others, have discussed a re-enchantment provided by modern consumer culture in which consumers exist in a kind of fantasy world, a dreamlike state in which desire for commodities constitutes a large part of peoples' lives. In many Western countries, particularly in the USA, stores are increasingly temples of consumption; advertising seems to impart all sorts of special properties to commodities that they don't actually possess, as many scholars of advertising have noted (see, for example one example, Jhally 1990).

By agreeing with Campbell and Ritzer, I am not departing from Weber here, for I believe he was quite right about the corrosive effects of rationality. I am conceptualizing enchantment here as akin to a structure of feeling, to invoke Raymond Williams (1977), that rationality didn't destroy. Rather, it emptied it out, and this structure was refilled with new modes of enchantment provided by the consumer culture that emerged in the eighteenth century (Campbell 1989).

But I am speaking here of a kind of re-enchantment provided by consumption in a capitalist, marketized, globally networked world. I think that re-enchantment can occur not only through the workings of markets, but also networks like those with UNESCO as the key node. UNESCO, through its identification of intangible cultural heritage and designation of some practices, musical instruments, languages, and other cultural forms as "masterpieces of the intangible heritage of humanity," is valorizing those practices and forms according to nineteenth-century ideas of creativity, genius, and more recent conceptions of culture and identity. That is, to come full circle, nineteenth-century print capitalism produced certain ideologies that are still with us, but our own globalized, networked capitalism has produced others, and has found new ways to (re)use some of these older ideas. All now coexist, though in ways that are quite complex.

If UNESCO's way of protecting "intangible cultural heritage" is fraught with so many problems, is there a better way? I don't believe so. There is no longer any way to be "outside" capitalism, only the ongoing necessity of devising ways of taming its more virulent tendencies. This, I am sure, is what UNESCO is attempting. As much as the designation of intangible cultural heritage owes to the workings of Euro-American capitalism and the ideologies it has engendered since at least the end of the eighteenth century, it may be that the only way to attempt—attempt—to preserve certain cultural forms and practices from what now seems to be the inexorable march of capitalism around the globe is to insulate them from capitalist processes of commodification. While UNESCO is currently the most prestigious node in a network that recognizes intangible heritage, there are also a growing number of small and not-so-small private foundations that fund and promote traditional arts. These operate locally and regionally, as well as nationally.

For example, here in southern California, the Durfee Foundation promotes the maintenance and furtherance of traditional musics by funding, quite generously, a teacher and a student to foster the transmission of traditional musical skills (see http://www.durfee.org/programs/music/overview.html). Programs like this can plant seeds and foster marginal musicians. In this way, some musics and musicians can attempt to go relatively unnoticed, perhaps escaping the catapult into today's networked, globalized capitalism that UNESCO recognition seems to produce.

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Popular Culture and International Cooperation in the 1930s

CIAP and the League of Nations

Bjarne Rogan

Abbreviations

CIAP	la Commission Internationale des Arts (et Traditions) Populaires
CICI	la Commission Internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle
CIFL	le Congrès International de Folklore
IAEEF	The International Association of European Ethnology and Folklore
IBL	International Bureau of Labour
ICAES	International Council of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences
ICHS	International Committee of Historical Sciences
ICOM	International Council of Museums
IICI	l'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle
ILO	International Labour Organization
OIM	Organisation Internationale des Musées
SIEF	la Société Internationale d'Ethnologie et de Folklore

The subject of this text is international cooperation within popular culture research during the inter-war years. The empirical basis for this is the oldest general international scholarly organization for ethnology and folklore in continuous operation. It was conceived at a congress organized by the League of Nations in Prague in 1928 as *la Commission Internationale des Arts (et Traditions) Populaires* (CIAP). Since then it has been remodelled several times and in 1964 it changed to its present name SIEF—*la Société Internationale d'Ethnologie et de Folklore*. As a general society for European ethnology it covers all aspects of the study of popular culture, from folklore, folk art, and folk-life studies to anthropology.

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This paper will briefly trace the changing motivations for international networking, and it will focus on the relationship, at times precarious, between scholarly societies and supporting international organizations like the League of Nations, as well as on the difficult balance between research and its applications. From the 1920s and through the 1930s the League's sub-organization for culture (CICI, see below) regarded culture as a medium for mutual sympathy between ethnic groups and populations, as well as a means for controlling the unintended consequences of the modernisation of society. But culture might also be (mis)used by political fractions and even by states.

Why International Cooperation in the Field of Popular Culture?

It has often been observed that by its very nature, the study of popular culture requires an international breadth of vision. At least since the late nineteenth century it was clear to scholars that the materials of folklore—be it fairy tales and ballads, dances and rituals, ploughs and fishing gear—"transcend all barriers of language and culture, traversing continents and spanning oceans in vast leaps and drifting across borders in easy stages" (Dorson 1961, p. 287). The great paradox, however, is that the study of popular culture has developed most energetically along national lines, its main institutions being national and local museums and folklore archives. With the exception of German-speaking Europe and the Nordic countries, its position in the universities has been weak or non-existent, or came about at a later stage (Rogan 2012).

With a predilection for local, regional, or national studies and a focus on describing and charting popular culture, folklore and ethnology have strived hard since the early twentieth century to become a comparative, academic discipline. In order to overcome problems related to a diversity of methods and rather weak theoretical foundations, as well as the isolation caused by geographical and political borders, international cooperation was thought to be of paramount importance by its foremost scholars. However, the motivation has changed over time from a concern with comparison to a vision of a common theoretical platform.

In an early phase, the arguments for transnational cooperation derived from the materials themselves. During the first part of the twentieth century, the comparative method was the folkloristic method *par excellence*. There was a deeply felt need to make the national materials available for comparison, through easy access to central (or preferably international) archives and to have translations of texts from the vernacular to a world language. In the next phase there was a growing need for an infrastructure for transnational research projects, especially regarding cartography and culture atlases, bibliography, and terminology. In 1953 CIAP established a cartography commission to discuss techniques and standardization of the national atlases. A few years later, the idea of a pan-European atlas, from the

Atlantic to the Urals, was taken up by scholars on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A project of such proportions required a supranational structure.

But some scholars entertained even higher ambitions: To bridge the gap between the many local ethnologies in Europe, to define what they had in common and how they related to general ethnology (or anthropology). General ethnology was supposed to be the glue that would keep the European tribe of regional ethnographies together. The wish to combine the descriptive basis of European ethnographies with an analytical and theoretical approach became a central, though controversial, concern for post-war international cooperation.

The League of Nations and Its Ambivalent Attitude to Popular Culture

Inter-war CIAP owed its existence to the League of Nations, through its Geneva-based sub-organization CICI (*la Commission Internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle*), a consulting organ in the field of art, museums, and culture that was established in 1922. In 1926 France inaugurated in Paris the *Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (IICI), which became the executive organ of CICI.[1] The Prague congress, mentioned below, and later the organization and the running of CIAP, was one of the tasks of IICI, which soon came to be regarded as a French tool for cultural hegemony. Also, the mutual post-World War I distrust between German and French scholars contributed to a difficult climate.[2] Diplomatic manoeuvres and political distrust thus constitute the backdrop to CIAP.

CICI hesitated for a long time to engage in popular culture before finally deciding to organize a congress on *les arts populaires*—folk art. The event took place in Prague in October 1928, and its aims were twofold: "... to serve at the same time scholarship and the ideal of reconciliation of peoples."[3] The objective was to highlight what the different nations had in common, to study the manifestations of folk art, and to make an inventory of surviving traditions and, not least, to study the means by which to keep alive what could still be found of folk art. Or, as underlined in the program, "[...] the aim is not only scholarly, but also practical."

The concept of *arts populaires*, used in the congress title, was not arbitrarily chosen. As revealed by Arnold van Gennep, the League of Nations "did not want to see used officially" designations like *ethnographie*, *ethnologie,* or *folklore*. The program covered material culture as well as folk music, songs, dance, theatre, and dramatic performances. But it did not include what the scholar van Gennep considered to be folklore in a broader sense; that is, popular religion, legends and fairy tales, incantations, and so forth.[4] The Belgian participant Albert Marinus gives a fuller explanation (*Actes* [. . .] 1956, p. 18):

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[1] I use the French terms, following (Renoliet 1999).

[2] See (Renoliet 1999) for a detailed discussion. See also (Erdmann 2005).

[3] UNESCO archives, Paris. *Commission Internationale* ... Paris 1928. This and all other translations of quotations into English by BR.

> You have perhaps observed that the word "folklore" was used neither for the congress nor for the commission [CIAP] that came out of it. The simple reason is that to the former *League of Nations*, the word "folklore" was banished, just as was the word "ethnography." Actually, they believed that the word "folklore" would give stuff to political claims, and that the populations would not resist claims, with reference to similarities in costume, songs, etc. Such attitudes were to be feared, especially for disputed regions between neighbouring countries.

We may so far conclude that the backdrop to the congress and to the creation of CIAP was partly a fear of what the discipline of folklore might offer by way of ammunition to belligerent parties on the European inter-war scene. The latter fear emerges clearly from personal notes, memos, and correspondence between the ICII officials and some participants.[5]

"[Folk] Art Will Increasingly Become the Flower of Peace"

Before the conference in Prague, the Belgian journal *Neptune* (1 May 1927) promoted the twofold aim that was both scholarly and practical; it would be a congress "in the service of peace and coexistence":

> It is highly possible that this congress will be an effective tool for universal peace [. . . Folk] art will increasingly become the flower of peace [. . .]
>
> The aim [. . .] is both aesthetic and social, and we would suggest: political. By studying the expressions of folk art in different regions [. . .] one will be able to establish the deeper reasons for the analogies of form and the identity of patterns, between peoples of different races, and consequently the relations which have existed between peoples who are today strangers, even sometimes enemies. The demonstrations of these old relations [. . .] will serve as an element of reconciliation, the awakening, in some way or other, of a source of friendship, stronger than any diplomatic approach [. . .].

The Prague congress was attended by participants from 31 countries, including government delegates from 19 of these. Most of the participants came from European countries, some from South America (Ecuador), and a few from Asia (Japan). The proceedings of the congress, *Art populaire* I-II (Paris 1931), contain 180 of the circa 300 papers presented.

During the congress a battle was fought about how to follow up in the future. There was a deep split between the scholars, who wanted to establish a scholarly organization, and those (mostly bureaucrats and official representatives from European states) who wanted an organization with more practical aims. The delegates of the League of Nations preferred no organization at all, but they found that an organization controlled by IICI would be the lesser evil.

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[4] Archives MNATP. Carton 804. M. Cuisenier. Memo of October 15, 1945.

[5] See f. ex. UNESCO archives, Paris, IICI Correspondance, F.IX.8.

A proposal for a permanent commission of nine scholars and a scholarly program was rejected. The compromise was a permanent *Commission Internationale des Arts Populaires* composed of the leaders of the national delegations.

Correspondence and notes disclose several details in this tug of war and reveal how IICI officials in the following months tried to reduce the damage caused by the election of a permanent commission is various ways: by rewriting or 'doctoring' the text of the resolution in order to tie CIAP closer to IICI; by offering to serve as the secretariat of CIAP; by convening an immediate reunion of the CIAP Board in Paris under the auspices of IICI; by proposing a set of statutes giving IICI control over CIAP; by proposing to appoint and pay a scholarly secretary for CIAP; by trying to prevent CIAP reunions in other places than Paris, and so forth.[6]

Other motions and actions were approved unanimously by the congress. Only two of these are of interest for our discussion: the Congress accepted a mandate to work for the maintenance and propagation of popular manifestations—in cooperation with the international movement for better leisure habits for workers (ILO through its executive organ IBL) (see below), and it was decided that *national* committees for folk art would be created in the member countries.

CIAP: The Liberty-Loving Bird That Was Forced Into Its Cage

The League of Nations and its sub-organs did not welcome a permanent CIAP. IICI had wanted to use folk art to promote its own political aims. But the IICI officials feared that scholarly results might be used for other political purposes like identity politics and territorial claims. Their preoccupation, as expressed openly in IICI's report to Geneva, was "to reconcile the independence of the scholars of CIAP with an administrative organization where the Institute should have control. These two interests oppose each other and it is necessary to define the limits strictly."[7]

IICI ordered the CIAP Board to convene very soon after Prague in Paris in January 1929. On the issue of controlling the scholarly program, the CIAP Board refused the proposal of a scientific secretary appointed by IICI. However, IICI had its way on other issues. Richard Dupierreux, an IICI official, was appointed secretary of CIAP, and §1 of the statutes stated the close contact between CIAP,

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[6] UNESCO archives. See especially F.IX.57 Le Congrès International des Arts Populaires, Prague 1928. Organisation générale, and F.IX.69 Commission Internationale des Arts Populaires. Bureau de la CIAP. 1ère réunion Paris 18.1.1929.

[7] UNESCO archives, Paris. CIAP 1–13/1928–1931 (Box 450). Société des Nations. Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle. Rapport de l'Institut sur le Congrès international des arts populaires de Prague, p. 4 (summer 1930).

CICI (in Geneva), and IICI (in Paris). Apparently—but only apparently—IICI had regained control over CIAP during spring 1929.

A CIAP general assembly was planned in Barcelona in September 1929 but cancelled. It was unexpectedly moved to Rome in late October, against the wishes of the French ICII director, Jules Luchaire. Luchaire wanted full control of meetings with a scholarly agenda.[8] However, the general assembly of CIAP in Rome included a scholarly agenda: "Folk music, singing and dancing in their relation to social life." Luchaire reproached his subordinate Dupierreux for his lack of vigilance.

But things turned out even worse, in the eyes of CICI. The scholars who had drawn the shortest straw in Prague concerning the establishment of a *scholarly* organization, encouraged the Italians to prepare a full congress. Instead of the 24 members of the commission (by then 27) as many as 350 persons convened. A new Board was elected and new statutes were approved, stating that CIAP was only *temporarily* attached to ICII, and it was decided that CIAP's 2nd congress should take place in the Netherlands the following year.

This was a declaration of war to CICI. CIAP was once more out of their control and repercussions soon followed. At the following (12th) session of CICI in Geneva in July 1930, its president Jules Destrée presented the case in the following way: The Prague congress had ventured to elect a commission (CIAP) by itself; however, this was "without the intervention nor the consent of CICI, a fact that had been given a rather cool reception in Geneva."[9] The meeting in Rome had been an even greater success; whereas CICI over the years and with much effort could muster only 35 national committees, CIAP had managed to raise 27 in only a few months. Destrée informed CICI that serious talks had taken place and that "now, however, the escaped bird is ready once again to enter its cage." Negotiations were to take place immediately, as it was "indispensable that the situation be brought under control."

The conditions imposed by CICI were hard: CIAP would have two presidents, one elected and one appointed by CICI. Furthermore, CIAP would have one secretary appointed by its board and another by CICI. Finally, the general assemblies of CIAP would be arranged *by* (and not only *with the assistance of*) IICI.

With no funding or administrative resources, CIAP had a rather weak hand in the negotiations. Still "the escaped bird" did not quite accept its cage, at least not yet. CICI had to withdraw the proposal for two presidents, and a later proposal to have CIAP fused with OIM (later ICOM—the *International Council of Museums*) was also withdrawn. The negotiations ended in January 1931 with CIAP in a position directly under CICI and with one board member appointed by CICI and a secretary by IICI—but nonetheless with a secretariat and a (modest) budget. By the beginning of 1931, the League of Nations had once again secured control over CIAP and its rebellious scholars.

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[8] See UNESCO archives, Paris, F.IX.68 and F.IX.73.

[9] Archives MNATP, Box 804 (Jean Cuisenier), dossier: CIAP 1929–1932(37). CICI/12e Session. Procès-Verbal 11.

CIAP at Work: Folk Art and the Workers' Leisure Time

The topic for the CIAP general assembly, planned for Oslo in 1932, was folk art and workers' leisure time. However, the assembly was cancelled due to lack of interest from the delegates.

This assembly was intended as an important stage in a project initiated by Geneva. As early as 1927, the *International Labour Organization* (ILO), through its executive organ the *International Bureau of Labou*r (IBL), had taken a keen interest in the planning of the Prague congress. There was some disagreement between IBL and IICI on whether folk art (*l'art populaire*) meant "art *for* the people" or "art *by* the people." After some correspondence, IICI and IBL agreed that the two meanings might sometimes merge, but that *by* [Fr. *par*] was the important issue; that is, the safeguarding, practice, and adaptation of traditional techniques which might lead the workers to an active, better, and more intelligent (and moral) use of their leisure time.[10] However, the distinction would remain a headache and a contradiction for the scholars.

IBL made a proposal in March 1931 to launch an investigation on "folk art as a means to develop workers' culture in general, through a better use of their leisure hours." ILO's objective was stressed: The workers should not only be taught to appreciate folk art, for their distraction and for the embellishment of their homes, the goal was to make the workers participate and become creators of folk art and organisers of artistic events.[11] In other words, the emphasis was on activities and not passive consumption.

The background for the 'leisure time problem' was twofold. First, a general reduction of working hours had taken place in many countries as a result of the adoption of the Washington conventions in 1919. Second, the economic depression had led to unemployment on a large scale in the 1930s. ILO's folk art program was a policy both for employment and for a better use of the recently acquired spare hours.

The investigation was organised by IICI, who sent questionnaires to the 27 national CIAP committees. IICI also edited and published the report, entitled *Art Populaire et Loisirs Ouvriers* (1934). The introduction and the analytical part of this 300-page book (but without CIAP's critical assessment) was also published in the League of Nations' bulletin *Coopération Intellectuelle* (vol. 22–23:1213–44), under the heading *L'Art par le peuple*.[12]

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[10] UNESCO archives, Paris, IICI Correspondance, F.IX.57, 58.

[11] *Art populaire et loisirs ouvriers*, 7.

[12] The references to page numbers between 1213 and 1244 refer to the bulletin *Coopération Intellectuelle*. Page numbers below 300 refer to the book *Art populaire et loisirs ouvriers*.

The report moves between a realistic understanding of labor in modern society—characterized by industrialization and urbanisation—and a romantic view of the decay of folk art in contemporary society as well as paternalistic ideas of how to educate and ennoble the new generation of workers. The question posed was whether it was possible to make the workers fill their newly won spare time with folk art. Through arguments about the psychology and the soul of the people, this question was answered in the affirmative. But care had to be taken to prevent the worker from feeling that he had been deluded into engaging in something that was contrary to modernity. Paternalism lurked around the corner here: Tact and discretion would be required from the educator, if the worker was to feel that practising folk art was a natural and agreeable pastime in an industrial or urbanized setting. However, the report presents very few concrete actions.

"... Free from Every Sort of Scholarly Obstructions"

The IICI was not satisfied with the degree of commitment among the scholars. The report contains a clear message to the academic circles in general, and not least to CIAP, which is addressed directly several times, sometimes with an invitation for cooperation, but more often in the form of implicit or overt criticism (Coopération Intellectuelle*,* p. 1230):

> [...] it is necessary that also the scientific milieus accept to include in their research programmes new aspirations, of a more social kind, like those that inspire the International Bureau of Labour [...] It is necessary that the research milieus, which up to now have taken an interest in folk art as source material for agreeable historical or aesthetic presentations, now begin to realize the social aspect of the problem that preoccupies us, by offering their assistance in an efficient way.

The report admitted that museums might be an important pedagogical tool, but its assessment of the contemporary museums was far from positive (1239):

> The present collections [... are] organised according to the most rigorous scholarly principles, with the objects normally exhibited behind glass, arranged in chronological or topographical order. It must be admitted that the working classes and the peasants do not find the desired remuneration for visiting this type of museums [...] The scholarly apparatus of these museums [...] even their distance from rural centres and workers' quarters in towns, create difficulties of access for the popular classes. The scholarly platform that workers and peasants are met with in these institutions does not always suit the simple and primitive spirit of these people [...]

The type of museum advocated by the report was to be the sheer opposite of these scholarly institutions. They should be small, cover only a district or a region, and be situated close to rural and workers' centres. The collections and exhibitions should be organised not with "excessive scholarly rigour" (1240), but with simplicity and clarity, in an agreeable and picturesque way. And as a last kick to CIAP and the researchers in general: The campaigns for promoting folk art should be based on small pamphlets “free from every sort of scholarly obstructions” (1241).

As might be expected, the report did not receive a hearty welcome from CIAP. CIAP’s assessment (omitted in the League’s bulletin) expressed sympathy with the overall political aims but dismissed the project in its present form: The specialists consulted had widely different conceptions of the term folk art, the actual position of folk art varied enormously from country to country, and few if any practical solutions had been proposed.

CIAP’s main argument went to the core of the concept of folk art, which encompassed tradition *and* spontaneity. Folk art was a process that could not be steered as it would be modified, changed, or frozen in an artificial way the moment one tried to teach its practice. Trying to create or force spontaneity would be contrary to its very essence; it would mean “leaving the field of ‘Art *by* the people’ and instead fall[ing] back on the sterile idea of ‘Art *for* the people’” (84). CIAP repeatedly underscored the report’s narrow understanding of the question. And their final words were clear enough: “The Board of CIAP [. . .] once more emphasizes its decision not to give support to an action that might alter the traditional or spontaneous character of folk art” (88).

The Rise and Fall of an Organization

CIAP and the League’s two sub-organizations differed markedly in their views on applied folklore. IICI and IBL criticized the researchers for their introverted academic attitudes, whereas CIAP claimed that IICI’s and ILO’s ideas of practicing the object of their discipline were based on a fatal misconception of the real character of folk art.

A recurrent issue was the League’s strong wish to use the results for political purposes. But at the same time it feared a possible misuse. This fear led to an underestimation, even contempt, for research on cultural issues. The refusal in 1934 to collaborate on an ILO/IICI-project that they found scientifically unsound was the last protest from the CIAP scholars against a political regime that was detrimental to the organization *as a scholarly forum*. The rest of CIAP’s pre-war history may be summed up in one single word: decline.

When this debate took place, CIAP was not only an “encaged bird.” Its wings were as clipped as any bird—or any organization—could be. In the following years, CIAP became increasingly less creative in its scientific activities, meetings were cancelled, and no congresses held.

Rival scholarly organizations for ethnology and folklore—all independent of the League of Nations—appeared on the international scene in the mid-30s, arranging their own congresses and launching scientific journals. Two of these, IAEEF (*The International Association of European Ethnology and Folklore,* 1936–) and CIFL (*le Congrès International de Folklore*, 1937) fought a silent battle for hegemony on the European scene, whereas the third one, ICAES (*International Council of*

Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, 1934–), had nothing to fear from the others, having the world—not just Europe—as its playing-ground. They all neglected the moribund CIAP until World War II put a decisive end to all these activities (Rogan 2008a, b).

Some Concluding Remarks

The role of the League and its sub-organizations invites some questions. The first is why there was such a strict regime on behalf of the League?

I have presented ethnology/folklore's traditional anchoring in the local and the regional. Drawing on people's own wealth of knowledge and practices, these disciplines have especially great propagandistic value, a fact that has been demonstrated all too often, not only within Nazi and communist contexts (Rogan 2012). Furthermore, international cooperation in the 1930s primarily meant comparison and charting of (historical) cultural areas. These aims were clearly delicate issues in the wake of the newly drawn map of Europe after World War I. Furthermore, the Central Powers of World War I, especially Germany, were among the leading countries of *Volkskunde*. Even if the post-war exclusion clauses of these countries in research cooperation were no longer observed, suspicion and distrust remounted from the beginning of the 1930s. The French-dominated CICI (with its inherited suspicion towards Germany) was particularly vigilant. Folklore was too explosive an issue to be left to the researchers alone.

There are hardly any organizations that can serve as a comparison. The anthropological ICAES (1934–) was not organized by or under the League. This was also the case for the more powerful *International Committee of Historical Sciences* (ICHS 1924–), whose main function in the inter-war years was to overcome nationalism and to bridge the gaps between scholars who had fought each other during World War I (Erdmann 2005). Few if any scholarly organizations have faced more conspicuous clashes between different ideologies on the inter-war scene. But ICHS was independent economically, receiving substantial funding from the USA (Nas and de Groot 2009).

The second question is whether the decline of CIAP was due only to the League's regime. The answer is most likely, no. As pointed out, folklore has generally developed along national lines. Dorson has expressed its national aspects in this way (1961, p. 287):

> [. . . The] galvanic force behind concerted, subsidized, and firmly organized folklore studies is the force of nationalism. Folklore has served national interests of various sorts: the anxious pride of the small country seeking its cultural identity; the *hubris* of the racist state, glorying in the solidarity of the *Herrenvolk*; the aspirations of an emergent nation, hoping to crystallize its myths; the ideology of the socialist state, extolling the creative powers of the anonymous masses. [. . .] Today the well-equipped political state possesses its accredited historical records, its approved and national literature, and its classified folklore archives.

It is a sad fact that this introverted perspective, sometimes approaching myopia, has been a real obstacle to international engagement and cooperation.

What is uncomfortable to a present-day observer is the condescending, even contemptuous attitude of ILB and CICI to basic research. ILO and IICI had planned a political action within the cultural sphere that must have appeared fully legitimate at the time. But their criticism hit CIAP hard. CIAP strived to become an academic discipline and to overcome the many deficiencies associated with the regional and national ethnographies of Europe. It defined itself as a *scholarly* organization. But since its inception in Prague in 1928, it had been torn between its own ambitions and the claims of its master, the League of Nations, who wanted CIAP to be an organization for cultural action. The controversy over folk art offers a conspicuous example of the clash between scholarly discourse and a somewhat blunt political will to steer research.

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Avenues and Confines of Globalizing the Past: UNESCO's International Commission for a "Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind" (1952–1969)

Katja Naumann

> "Everyone gets his share, but universalism has become antiquarianism and idealism has been understood as obscuring the actual significance of history." (Steensgaard 1973, 77)

In 1973 Niels Steensgaard reviewed the volumes of a world history composed under the UNESCO auspices beginning in 1952; it was a thoroughly new way of globalizing the past. The conceptual renewal that is identified by Steensgaard was to be asserted in the years to come but it took shape during the two decades before. The International Commission for a *Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind* is an illuminating example of both the intellectual dynamics and the constraints of writing worldwide connections and entanglements back into history through collaboration in the setting of an international organization. I would like to describe both aspects in the following article.

As an agency that would "contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science and culture" UNESCO obviously turned its attention towards history curricula and textbooks, aiming to outdo national, and thus contradictory interpretations. One of its predecessor organizations, the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (1925–1946), promoted a collective revision of what is taught about the past at schools, and the drive for historicizing the 'global condition' (Geyer and Bright 1995, p. 1044)[1] of its time and for centering education on it corresponds to the boom of universalism in the middle of the twentieth century.

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[1] With this term Geyer and Bright describe the emergence of a specific epoch of global integration (in the middle of the nineteenth century) in which the continuous meshing of trajectories has irreversibly dissolved autonomous entities (societies, cultures, or civilizations). It involves permanent struggles over identity, sovereignty, and autonomy leading neither to homogenization nor to a separation between the 'global' versus 'local'. On the contrary it is characterized by a

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As in the decades between 1840 and 1860 or around 1900—each a period of worldwide transformation in which interactions over large distances had accelerated and world orders had changed resulting into an interest in tracing back contemporary global developments—so too did the 1940s bring renewed attention to transnationality as well as to interdependencies on a global scale (Mann 2008; Middell 2005). Numerous people in many places articulated visions of how the world could be made and kept peaceful that were quite comparable to the hopes for global governance after the end of the Cold War (Maurel 2010). Among them were the founders of UNESCO who envisaged the organization as a center of a genuine culture of peace—"educate so that the minds of the people shall be attuned to peace"[2]—and a driving force in strengthening the "intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" based on a firm belief in a "unity of the human family, and the interconnectedness of progress and development in all areas of the globe." (Stenou and Keitner 2003) And, as before, this universalist outlook provided the impetus for world historical reflections.

Only a few months after the agreement that resulted in the establishment of UNESCO, Julian S. Huxley, head of the Preparatory Commission, stated that "the chief task before the Humanities today would seem to be to help in constructing a history of the development of the human mind." (Huxley 1946, p. 42) Others shared his conviction, and he immediately found followers who supported his suggestion of compiling such a history.

Hence, in early May of 1949, Lucien Febvre, the well-known French historian and founder of the Annales School,[3] was asked to draft an outline for a new history of mankind that would essentially contrast the traditional universal histories. Febvre envisioned a "non-political world history" that would reach beyond the separation of humanity's history into national ones and would offer a thoroughly non-Eurocentric perspective. He suggested an account of the "great stages of interchange of borrowing," to follow transcultural exchanges and processes of transfer across time, and to outline their continuity. Such a history should reconstruct forms and formats of encounters and encompass "everything that circulated from one group to the other." Only then could it be made clear that humanity, in the past as well as in the present, was "constantly shifting about in an endless series of transcontinental migrations," and that any "partitioning of the world is nothing but a fiction."[4] The sine qua non for this endeavor, as Febvre saw it, was that it could not be assigned to a single author, or just two or three, but that the largest possible number of scholars and scholarly organizations from around the world had to

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constantly refreshing integrative dynamic that simultaneously "fragment[s] the world even as it [becomes] one" and renews differences.

[2] These are the words of Clement Attlee, the British prime minister (Laves and Thomson 1968, p. 221).

[3] On Febvre and the Annales see: Middell and Sammler 1994; Huppert 1997; Muller 2003.

[4] Report of Lucien Febvre, May 1949, in: Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind Papers, Box 4, Fd. 2.111, UNESCO Archives, Paris, Petitjean (2006, p. 86). The archival materials quoted in the following all derive from this inventory.

collaborate in order to accumulate the knowledge needed for such an historical exploration.

In summer 1951, the 5th General UNESCO Conference authorized the writing and edition of a *Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind* (SCHM). It hereby confirmed a resolution in 1947 that had also called for an internationally authored new interpretation of world history. In addition, the General Assembly followed Lucien Febvre's conceptual ideas by approving a nine-page table of contents that had been worked out in response to his draft. Shortly thereafter, on 1 January 1952, an International Commission was constituted, contracted to, and financed by UNESCO, and assigned to edit the six volumes. These volumes were intended to address the wider public, and were intended for use in the training of teachers and for history education in schools and colleges around the world; they were less designed to be a traditional scholarly study.[5] Originally planned for 5 years, the work lasted over two decades, with the last volume published in 1975, 6 years after the formal dissolution of the commission.

Much of what they sought to accomplish proved difficult to realize (Duedahl 2011). However, by the time the work was finished about 300 scholars, educational experts, and politicians from more than 50 countries had been involved; in this respect, Febvre's original prerequisite of wide collaboration had been entirely met.[6] With that the SCHM stands as one of the first international collaborations in the area of world history writing and is thus an interesting case in itself, particularly in light of previous failed efforts to compose international groups of authors.[7] There are two further reasons why it is worthwhile to have a closer look:

Firstly, it reveals a fascinating social history of conceptual change within globally orientated historical accounts. The dynamics of the institutionalized debate between agents from all regions of the world shattered consolidated narratives and epistemological certainties. Eurocentric views were explicitly and persistently challenged, not by single voices but by a collective. Diverging interpretations encountered and clashed with each other, and the efforts aiming for mediation and reconciliation initiated learning processes that made quite a few of those involved understand that the universalist notion of world history, of one interpretation for all regardless where they live, was not to be realized. With every comment received on the chapters for the volumes, each over 1,000 pages long (in the end 411 comments from all over the world are mentioned and partly reprinted in the introductions and footnotes) it became clear that representing each culture equally was a hopeless enterprise. The idea of an unbiased interpretation, free from any political and cultural baggage, was a myth, and a highly problematic one at that. Secondly, the SCHM demonstrates the severe restrictions of an international collaboration based on political representation (all the members of UNESCO had the right to participate in the project, were invited to, and many did so[8]). Individual interests and political logics stood firmly against a joint historical narrative. This lesson is still relevant, since the hopes for a comprehensive historical account by or on behalf of an international organization endure to this day. In fact, only few years ago a complete third revision of this UNESCO history was published.[9]

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[5] Statutes of the International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind, Annex 1, Annual Report, 15, September 1952, Box 5, Fd. 2.114.

[6] The Commission started out with eight members but was gradually enlarged. At its dissolution in 1969 its bureau consisted of 22 members and its corresponding members amounted to ninety-three scholars from 42 countries. Added to that, 130 more people from almost fifty countries were involved. Three or four author-editors wrote each of the six volumes. Most of them had additional collaborators at their disposal and they could draw on the contributions in the *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*—a complementary journal edited by Febvre since its foundation in 1953.

[7] For example, Walter Goetz' efforts to engage Johan Huizinga, Henri Pirenne, Alphonse Aulard, and George Peabody Gooch for his Propyläen-Weltgeschichte (Middell 2005, p. 637).

Most of the research on the SCHM, scarce as it is, describes it as a failure, deploring it as having spoiled initial hopes by being highly Eurocentric, imbalanced, fragmented, and thus akin to the traditional universal histories.[10] This reading, incidentally, adopts and perpetuates the criticism that led UNESCO to issue a second edition in 1978.[11] Without a doubt these criticisms have a point, but I think the history of this project warrants a more significant insight: the existing global imbalances in power and the resulting tensions, which were reproduced in the institutional framework of the SCHM, could not but conflict with the historiographical aim of globalizing the past. The transfer of certain mechanisms of structuring international relations, above all the principle of nation-state representation, into the sphere of scholarly production had to be counterproductive. The idea of composing a world history in which each contributor is responsible for the representation of the own culture or country unavoidably created an atmosphere of bargaining over the scope, space, and visibility each nation was granted, and provoked competition over whose history was presented more favorably. After all, during the twentieth century, involvement in international organizations had become an indicator for international recognition, and they were thus reckoned as arenas in which nation states battled for global political status and importance, and were pitted necessarily against each other. Many countries used them in that sense, not the least by imposing their agendas on the politics of the past (Geyer and Paulmann 2001; Herren 2009). Thus the representation of a markedly hierarchical world of nation states in the organizational structure of the SCHM turned it into a body where (geo-)political stakes and interests were negotiated in the wrapping of Geschichtspolitik, which contradicted the original intellectual aims. It did so, however, in a productive way. Both points I would like to spell out. The less optimistic part will come first, but we shall end on a more positive note.

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[8] Fifty-two countries had become members of UNESCO between 1946 and 1956, another 24 newly created countries joined in 1961/1962 (Hüfner and Reuther 1996, p. 39). The SCHM was affected by this growing membership, which turned into a serious challenge. It shifted the balance of power within the Commission, diversified the expectations concerning the content, and the changes in topical and regional emphases that flowed from this caused severe practical problems. In view of the 300 participants from all over the world the disputes, conflicts, and sometimes despair that went along with the work can be easily imagined.

[9] *History of Humanity*, seven volumes, Paris (2003–2008). A revised second edition was approved by a resolution of the 20th General UNESCO Conference in 1978. On its concept see (Herrmann 1991).

[10] Twice has the SCHM received a more favorable appraisal. For Ernst Schulin it was the first effort at a truly global history (Schulin 1979, pp. 170–72), while more recently Poul Duehldahl has argued that "it was the first trial of overcoming Euro-centrism after World War II" (Duedahl 2011, p. 25).

[11] Immediately after the Commission was dissolved in 1969, voices were raised that the history should be rewritten on the grounds that the authors had composed an unduly unbalanced image of the civilizations of the world—in fact, a "Eurocentric vision of the history of humanity," in which "several regions of the world are inadequately or superficially represented" while Europe's share is preponderant. Furthermore, it was charged that non-Western cultures had been treated from a perspective that presupposed the superiority of the "West," and that even European history had been unduly reduced since its East- (Central) parts had hardly been mentioned; see: (UNESCO, Preparation of a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, Paris 1985).

National Concerns and Global Power Relations Within the SCHM

After the declarations of independence in Asia during the 1950s, and later on in Africa, the countries in these regions began to play an essential part in international politics. Membership in UN organizations increased and the balance of power changed, especially after 1960. Within UNESCO the new members brought about a more global orientation. The period was all about development and modernization policies, not least since the UN had declared it a decade of development, and both hegemonic powers mobilized technical, military and ideational resources in order to secure influence over the decolonizing countries. This could not but leave its mark on the work of the SCHM.

The topical and regional focus of the project increasingly turned towards non-Western pasts in their linkages to contemporary processes of decolonization. The fifth and sixth volumes dealing with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries particularly mirror the rising interest in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. All of these regions are dealt with repeatedly and in detail, with India, China, and Japan receiving the greatest attention (they are treated more than 150 times in various contexts). This is anything but surprising, though, considering that historiography brings to mind those aspects of the past that communities consider to be relevant to the present. UNESCO, like many other international actors, was involved in multiple ways in shaping negotiations and processes in these regions of the world. Thus the challenges which were presented to British and French colonial claims by national liberation movements, and the consequences of the emergence of a new world order, formed the contemporary background; it stands to reason that this was reflected within the debates on the SCHM. To put it bluntly: Lucien Febvre's 1949 plea for overcoming Eurocentric historical perspectives in traditional universal histories was, in the following years, confined to the historical dimensions of the contemporary transformation processes in the so-called Third World.

For instance, immediately after shipping the first chapters of volume VI to the commentators in autumn 1959, the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, Moscow strongly protested against the manuscripts and a conflict broke out and rapidly escalated between North American and Soviet scholars regarding the interpretation of the social and political changes in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.[12] Months of fierce debate and an author's meeting with Soviet historians in Moscow—which was necessary to make any progress at all—led to the US-American perspective being represented in the main text and the powerfully eloquent opposite view in the footnotes. Take, for instance, the assessment of the 14-point program by Woodrow Wilson with regard to the national liberation movements in Asia: The text presents Wilson's speech as the foundation of the two processes which, in the understanding of the authors (Caroline F. Ware, North Hampshire; J. M. Romein, Amsterdam; and K. M. Panikkar, Indian ambassador in Peking, Cairo and Paris), characterize the twentieth century—namely, the striving for self-determination and the regulation of worldwide relations by international organizations. The respective footnote expresses the Soviet view that it was essentially the October Revolution that resulted in the challenge to colonial power.[13]

Significantly, both sides constantly used the charge of Eurocentrism to justify their viewpoints. They could do so because this criticism had become the central topos in the interventions from non-European scholars.[14] Through all stages of planning the project, right up to the final editorial comments, scholars from non-European regions engaged themselves intensively in preventing another world history that was written from a European perspective and would leave out large parts of the world's past. The letters and comments reflecting this aim are too numerous to count. One example of this questioning and rejection of Eurocentric viewpoints will suffice to illustrate my point.

In August 1958 the eminent historian Ramesh Chandra Majumdar[15] used harsh words to object against the presentation of Indian history in the manuscript for volume V. According to Majumdar it was "absolutely hopeless, and it must be altogether rejected." He called for it to be rewritten by someone who was familiar with the history of the country: "Since it is highly offensive and sure to sound the susceptibilities of all Indians I am sure it will create a storm of indignation all over India."[16] It was not just the scant treatment of Indian history that was resented in that volume, Constantine K. Zyrayk (Zureiq), a Syrian historian,[17] also objected to the passages on Islamic countries.[18] It was at this time, in the sixth year of the project, that Majumdar further articulated severe doubts about the general framework of the history, asserting that the "scheme of universal history undertaken by the Commission has been a failure, so far," and suggesting as a consequence that the project "confine [itself to] the history of Europe and America, and leave out the Orient, at least for the present."[19] Although in the end this drastic step was not taken, this objection indicates that, even early on, there were doubts about the possibility of avoiding an unduly "Western-centered" perspective within the traditional interpretative schemes.

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[12] K. V. Ostrovitianov to Carneiro, 26 September 1959, p. 2, Box 12, Fd. 2.51 (6).

[13] Volume 1, p. 39 and 53.

[14] That occurred after 1955 when Soviet and Eastern European scholars became involved and much of the discussion and conflict centered on the ideological issues of 'Capitalism' versus 'Socialism,' the question of how non-European history can be represented adequately remained an ongoing concern and issue.

[15] Majumdar (1888–1980) was a well-known historian in India/Bangladesh, taking part in the professionalization of the historiography of his homeland, and acting, among others, as president of the Indian Historical Congress, the professional association of historians. After receiving his PhD from the University of Calcutta he taught for the later part of his career at Dacca University (Bangladesh). Majumdar established his name with studies in ancient history, but he soon embraced Indian history up to the present. His synthetic works, one on Bengal and one on India, were widely read and discussed, see (Sreedharan 2000; Weickgenennt Thiara 2009).

The resentment was not at all confined to internal discussions. The proponents sought publicity wherever they could to fortify their criticisms. In October 1959 the *London Times* published an article about the first international conference on Turkish Art in Ankara. It reported on the opening speech of the rector of Ankara University in which he sharply attacked Louis Gottschalk, one of the authors of volume IV, for making apparently disparaging remarks about Turkish artistic achievements. He referred specifically to a sentence in which all Turkish mosques are said to be simply copies of St. Sophia.[20] Also, just months before the dissolution of the commission a highly politicized conflict arose out of the fact that in the freshly published volume VI, a map of Asia was included that showed Kashmir as part of India. Pakistani protest was so vehement that it entered the agenda of the 15th General Conference of UNESCO in 1968 after the Pakistani National Commission had threatened that it would effect a prohibition of the book. It took over a year to settle the issue, during which Guy S. Métraux, General Secretary of the SCHM, barely managed to rescue the situation.[21]

These examples indicate that the pleas for a more balanced treatment of non-European history were often linked to the striving for an accentuated representation of the respective nation's perspective, and had markedly nationalistic intentions. A whole range of agents from 'smaller countries'—that is, from nation-states that did not belong to the club of ‘global players’—conceived of the SCHM as a podium from which they could articulate their interpretations of the world’s past to an international audience. They used their (often recently gained) political sovereignty and membership in UNESCO to demand a strong representation of their national history.[22] Serious and ongoing challenges regarding Eurocentric perspectives, together with the institutionally anchored obligation to watch over the description of their own country’s history, opened a gateway through which national concerns and interests could enter. The UNESCO history of mankind was as much an arena “of gaining access to international politics through the back door of internationalism” (Herren 2001, p. 129) as other institutionalized international collaborations were. National history figured often more prominently in the discussions about the volumes than transnational processes and world historical developments. Parallel (geo-)political considerations were at stake, being fought out not least in regard to who would participate and represent their country, and these overshadowed the intellectual concern of globalizing the account of the world’s past.

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[16] Majumdar to Carneiro, 17 August 1958, Box 21, Fd. 2.629.2.

[17] Zyrayk (1909–2000) was born in Damascus and received his PhD from Oxford and Princeton University before becoming professor at the American University of Beirut. Politically engaged in the liberation of Syria he acted as counselor to the Syrian Legation of the United States in 1945, and as delegate to the UN Security Council and to the UN General Assembly in 1946. As a scholar both in history and philosophy he became known for his works on modern Arab thought and identity, see (Atiyeh and Oweiss 1988).

[18] Editorial Report, 22 April 1959, Box 20, Fd. 2.627 (2).

[19] Majumdar to Carneiro, 17 August 1958, Box 21, Fd. 2.629.2.

[20] Gottschalk to Métraux, 4 November 1959, Box 32, Fd. 2.83 (14).

[21] Correspondence, Box 21, Fd. 2.629.6.

Transnational Bargaining and the Challenge of Historiographical Universalisms

As time went by, however, the arguments over Eurocentric and other diverging interpretations brought about a process of bargaining that led to a thorough questioning of the conceptual framework and theoretical assumptions of the SCHM.

The first of its dimensions concerned how to avoid the pitfalls of traditional universal histories with regard to a “non-Western” standpoint. In 1955 the chairman of the committee of author-editors raised the problem of how to deal with the fact that various terms are highly normative: for example, would the term ‘Indian Mutiny’ (the Indian Rebellion against the British in 1857) be less acceptable in India than in England or the USA?[23] The idea of a list of ‘politically correct’ terms was rejected, instead the issue was left to the author with the request that he/she indicate other notations in the text and why they had been chosen. The authors of volume 6, for example, decided to address this issue directly, stating in the preface that:

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[22] This is well illustrated in a comment from Korea in reaction to one the manuscripts of volume VI in 1959: “Although Korea has not been in the past very well-known to the outside world, it is lamentable that the History . . . seems to have been influenced by the age-long evil of China/India/Japan-centered Oriental history. . . it is by no means just that a UNESCO-sponsored work should fall victim to the mannerism of mediocre historians.” Comment by Korea, 26 October 1959, p. 1 and 69, Box 41, Fd. 2.84 (20).

[23] Gottschalk to Carneiro, 30 March 1955, Box 28, Fd. 2.823.

> In writing contemporary history, the historian has to make use of terms that are interpreted differently and carry a different emotional weight in different countries and situations—terms such as 'West,' 'East,' 'underdeveloped,' 'totalitarian,' 'democratic,' 'capitalist,' 'communist,' 'socialist,' and even neutral words like 'bureaucracy.' Since it is impossible to avoid such words or to put a note every time misunderstanding might arise from their use, we must rely on the collaboration of the reader to understand them in the context in which they appear, and to do the same with such imprecise designations of geographical areas as Near East, Middle East, Tropical Africa, Oceania.[24]

Furthermore, the continuous and contentious clashing of viewpoints resulted in the recognition that changing the traditional composition of world histories to avoid Eurocentrism could not be done simply by adding some information on neglected world regions or by small changes in phrasing. Instead, the integration of scholars from non-European countries and original research on or knowledge from these regions was increasingly seen as an indispensible prerequisite. Illustrative here is the writing of volume IV by Louis Gottschalk, professor at the University of Chicago, and his co-editors. Soon after Gottschalk had presented a plan for his book in 1952—which was to describe the developments of almost 500 years, tracing them from the Mediterranean region to the Baltic, further to the Middle East and Asia, and continuing by way of Africa and Latin America back to Europe[25]—he realized that this undertaking would require historical knowledge about world regions that he, as a historian on the French Revolution, was neither familiar with, nor likely to become familiar with in the near future. In drafting the first manuscript in 1953 and 1954 he repeatedly requested that articles be published in the *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, which would help him obtain the needed information, and he noted down those topics for which he asked Guy S. Métraux, the secretary-general, to find area studies specialists.[26] The more he received and read the more he understood that he was confronted with a rather fundamental problem: namely, that much of the small enough literature on non-European world regions was written from a European or American point of view. To counter-balance this bias he involved doctoral students or younger scholars at his university in original research, acting not just as sources of information but also as authors.[27] Added to this, Gottschalk seriously sought to incorporate criticisms received on the description of the non-European pasts—for example, Silvio Zavala's[28] comment in early 1954 that the melding of people of Indian and European origin in Latin America (mestizaje) and the close contacts among the natives was such that they influenced the whole pattern of the emerging culture.[29] Being immersed in the work, Gottschalk saw clearly that taking a non-Eurocentric approach implied more than adding information here and there, but required a conceptual shift that could hardly be undertaken by himself alone. He therefore engaged himself in the discussion, initiated by Zavala, of how pre-Columbian history could be periodized, how the history of indigenous America could enter world history more appropriately, and above all how the influence of that world region on others could be integrated.[30] He immediately agreed to the proposals by Padro Armillas and Juan Coma, who offered the conclusions from a seminar of Mexican historians (held October 26–29, 1954, in Mexico City[31]) on how the development of indigenous America should be interpreted, and thus allocated space for them in volumes III and IV.[32]

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[24] Author-Editors' Preface, in: Caroline F. Ware, J. M. Romein, K. M. Panikkar (eds.), The Twentieth Century (= SCHM, vol. VI), Paris 1966, p. xiv.

[25] Plan SCHM, in: Annual Report, 15 September 1952, p. 16 f. and p. 20 ff., Box 5, Fd. 2.114.

[26] Gottschalk to Métraux, 20 Mai 1953, Métraux to Gottschalk, 29 May 1953, and Gottschalk to Métraux, 12 March 1954, Box 32, Fd. 2.83 (13); Métraux to Hu-Shi, 2 June 1953, Box 21, Fd. 2.629.4.

[27] Large parts of the sections on Islamic history were written by Marshall Hodgson. Those on Indian history were penned by Earl H. Pritchard and later by J. A. B. van Buitenen, see: Gottschalk to Métraux, 2 July 1954 and Gottschalk to Métraux, 18 January 1956, Box 32, Fd. 2.83 (13); see also "Notes on the Preparation and Editorial Treatment of Volume IV", in *The Foundation of the Modern World*, eds. L. Gottschalk, L. C. MacKinney, E. H. Pritchard (= SCHM, vol. VI), pp. xv–xix.

The second conceptual shift was that with the passing of time the hope for a unified account of the world's different pasts and a balanced historical narrative convincing to all dissipated, as did the aim that diverging perspectives could be finally and completely integrated and thus dissolved. Three mechanisms were developed by the Bureau of the international commission to create space and to debate contrasting opinions openly: The *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, founded originally to offer the authors easy access to special topics and problems, turned increasingly into a discussion forum. The footnotes of the manuscripts became a central element for making opposite readings, which for whatever reason were not to be incorporated into the main text, accessible to the reader. And at the beginning of all the volumes a list was provided of the names of the commentators, and the most severe objections, which were usually related to the adequate treatment of non-European history, were discussed.

These passages are a mirror not only of the search for a proper placement of the Asian, Latin American, African, and Middle Eastern pasts in a world historical account, but also for how to deal with necessarily varying historical perspectives and narratives. They prove that, as it progressed, the SCHM was increasingly conceived not as the final layout of the world's history, but as one step in a transnational debate about it that was necessarily linked to its time and was to be continued in the future. Most of the author-editors and the intensively engaged members of the International Commission would have agreed with what for Charles Morazé was the main achievement of the project:

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[28] Zavala (1909–) is considered one of the most influential Mexican thinkers in the twentieth century. After studying law at the National University of Mexico and the University of Madrid he turned to history, not only in his writings. He supported and fostered historical studies in his country by founding the Centro de Estudios Historicos at the Colegio de Mexico (the national academy), see (Pietschmann 2009).

[29] Silvio Zavala, Comments on the Introduction to vol. IV, 26 January 1954, Box 32, Fd. 2.83 (13).

[30] Zavala to the International Commission, 20 October 1954, and Memo Métraux and Gottschalk, 16 November 1954, Box 20, Fd. 2.628 (1).

[31] Métraux to IC, 9 November 1954, Box 20, Fd. 2.628 (1).

[32] Métraux to IC, 18 November 1954 and Turner to Métraux, 6. December 1954, Box 20, Fd. 2.628 (1). The next draft received very positive comments by Zavala who stated that Latin America was captured well, while now the passages on Asia and Africa should be revised, Métraux to Gottschalk, 24 June 1955, Box 32, Fd. Gottschalk.

> it was this very awakening of discussion, these torments of research, and this ambiguity of the state of historical knowledge which gave full meaning to an undertaking which proves, not that mankind is in agreement about its history, but that it takes a keen interest in it and seeks its unity through the medium of its observation. The present publication does not close the discussion, and that is just as well; it is a matter of progress in research. . . . it is not a question of rendering a final judgment, but merely of publishing a first report.[33]

The third conceptual revision was that the more the representation of the varying viewpoints and memories became the central concern for the work, the more the universalist idea of one history for all was shattered. This surely did not hold for everyone involved, but several statements reveal that process and shift. In 1962 Paulo E. Berrêdo Carneiro, director of the SCHM, wrote that the project was "to describe, from a universal standpoint, the contribution of each age, each region, each people to the scientific and cultural ascent of humanity."[34] He held on to the idea of a universalist account and comprehensiveness.

In the same year René Maheu, then acting general director of UNESCO, stated on the one hand that: "The ambition to write a universal history is a very old one. . . . The present work belongs to that noble line of great syntheses . . . It has the same twofold ambition, to embrace the past in its entirety and to sum up all that we know about the past." On the other hand, he emphasized that one needs to draw from the various bodies of knowledge in contemporary societies and include underlying conceptions even when they diverge. Furthermore, he remarked that "universality springs not from a unique abstract nature but is being gradually evolved, on the basis of a freely acknowledged diversity, through actual contact and a continuous effort at understanding and cooperation."[35] Thus in Maheu's reading the 'universal' is still there, but it is contextualized, historicized, and seen as resulting from cross-cultural exchanges between different bodies of knowledge and interpretations.

Caroline Ward, co-author of volume VI, went much further in giving up the old universalist illusion: "we are writing in a world full of tensions and of proud and sensitive peoples. And truth and accuracy are not enough because truth does not always improve relations among peoples. . . . There is no consensus to the fullest possible degree on the facts about historical relations of nations and peoples."[36]

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[33] "Authors' Preface" in *The Nineteenth Century 1775–1905*, ed. C. Morazé (= SCHM vol. V, Paris 1976), p. xiv.

[34] Preface by Paulo E. De Berrêdo Carneiro, ibid., p. xiv.

[35] Foreword by René Maheu, ibid., pp. xv, xii, xv.

[36] C. Ward, "The History of the Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind. Some Problems of Interpretation," *Cahier d'Histoire Mondiale* 5 (1959) 1: 270–292.

Similarly, Louis Gottschalk who wrote: “conflicts of interpretation can not be resolved by communication among their conflicting authors, the proper way to proceed, I think, would be to let the conflict stand unresolved. To give the impression that all historical interpretation can be reconciled at the present stage of the world’s culture would be, in my judgment, unhistorical.”[37]

Without a doubt these insights were gained through a process of reflection engendered by painstaking and unsuccessful efforts to accomplish a world history in the style of former universalism, albeit freed from Eurocentric interpretations. On the way, however, a disappointment emerged which raised general questions. It was precisely the ‘failure’ in living up to the original hopes that caused skepticism concerning both the possibility and desirability of universalism, and brought about an awareness that other conceptual approaches, as well as other methodological instruments, might be more appropriate. The supplement to volume VI states this in no uncertain terms: “The question has been raised whether this is feasible, i.e. whether UNESCO’s objective of bringing to the history of mankind a perspective which the world can share is attainable.” Formulated in response to a criticism by Raymond Aron, which is also printed in the publication, the supplement continued: “The authors have wished above all for it to be descriptive, neutral, objective, acceptable to everybody. . . . Perhaps, within the outlook of UNESCO, the authors had to conceive of their task as they have done. But in this case it is UNESCO’s own conception, applied to the twentieth century, that must be called into question.”[38]

Such an understanding did not remain within the SCHM but was introduced in other historiographical contexts, for example in discussions at the International Congress of Historical Sciences in 1965 and in the work of the Committee on Historical Analysis of the Social Science Research Council, the umbrella organization of the social sciences in the United States.[39] And it was also openly articulated in the reception of the final product, as the remarks of Niels Steensgaard with which this article began reveal.

This development makes the first UNESCO-world history appear less as a failure and more as a moment in the process of debate, negotiation, and learning. One could argue that the SCMH marks a decisive moment in the process, extending from the eighteenth and nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, through which universal history changed into global history or into the world history of today. The conceptual ambitions espoused at the beginning of the work, especially as penned by Lucien Febvre, with the emphasis on cross-cultural interactions and worldwide borrowing as the driving forces of the development of humankind, can be seen as the beginning of the kind of world history that gained momentum in the years to come. These ambitions were partially lost in the process of the work because national historical arguments and political considerations entered into the process. But still, crises, dead-end-streets, and failures contain the seeds for new beginnings, and to my understanding this also holds true for the SCHM. In that sense, the resolution to revise the first edition, agreed upon by the 20th General Conference of UNESCO in 1978, has a recognition of the insights gained in the previous work at its heart and is a belated compliment to it.

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[37] Gottschalk to Carneiro, 28. Juli 1964, Box 32, Fd. 2.83 (15).

[38] “Supplement to Author-Editor’s Preface,” in *The Twentieth Century*, eds. C. F. Ware et al., 10, footnote 39.

[39] At the XIIth CISH Congress in 1965 in Vienna a session was held under the title “Projects and Concepts of World History in the Twentieth Century, where Louis Gottschalk reported on the work of and the experiences gained in the SCHM, which was followed by a long and intensive discussion about different conceptual approaches, see: Rapports, Section Methodologie et Histoire Contemporaine (= Vol. V), pp. 5–19, Actes (= Vol. 5), pp. 525–539, Vienna. Louis Gottschalk was the chairman of this Committee of the SSRC. For its report see (Gottschalk 1963).

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Index

A
AAS. *See* Association for the Advancement of Science (AAS)
Acculturation, 74, 83, 86, 87
Annales School, 188
Anti-foreign education, 97, 100
Anti-Japanese statements, 93
Asia, 1, 8–11, 25, 33, 58, 65, 66, 97–99, 107, 108, 113, 115, 135, 137, 140, 151, 154–157, 159, 165, 178, 191–196
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAS)
  American AAS, 110, 112
  Australasia AAS, 110, 111
  British AAS, 110–112, 119

B
Beijing, 137, 138
Beijing Olympic games, 133
Bender, Thomas, 136
Bishop Museum, Honolulu, 118
Boxer Rebellion, 134, 135
Britain (Great), 75, 80, 83, 84, 86, 109, 110, 113–115, 128–130, 141, 143, 144
Budget of KBS, 61, 63, 66

C
Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale, 189, 195–197
Canada, 110, 112–115, 128–130, 136, 143
Capitalism, 157, 163–172
Centralization, 43–52
Chaplin, Charlie, 142
Chengdu incident, 101
Chen, Liting, 143
Chen, L.T., 144
China, 1, 3, 10, 31, 33, 35, 36, 46, 57, 58, 65, 91–103, 112, 113, 115, 117, 126, 129, 130, 133–146, 154–157, 166, 167, 191
Chinese Communist Party, 103, 133
Chinese Laborers Weekly, 144, 145
Chinese MOE, 94, 97–99
Cholera, 73–80, 84, 86
Christianity, 134
CIAP. *See* Commission Internationale des Arts et Traditions Populaires (CIAP)
CICI. *See* Commission Internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle (CICI)
Close cooperation, 57, 102
Cold War, 4, 7, 11, 46, 103, 188
Commission Internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle (CICI), 176, 177, 180, 184, 185
Commission Internationale des Arts et Traditions Populaires (CIAP), 175–185
Committee on International Cooperation, 91
Common interests, 79, 81, 87, 111
Concert of Europe, 43, 50
Confucian, 134, 139, 155, 159
Constitutionalism, 43–52
Constitutionalization, 47–50
Consumer culture, 11, 171
Coubertin, Pierre de, 135
Creativity, 86, 166, 167, 169–171
Cultural changes, 73, 83, 87
Culture, 151–160, 163–172, 175–185, 187–199

D
Decolonialization/decolonize/decolonizing, 11, 191
21 Demands, 93, 94, 98, 140
Development, 190, 191, 195–199

M. Herren (ed.), *Networking the International System*, Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-04211-4, © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

De Vries, O., 124
Dong, Shouyi, 138
Drummond, E., 8, 17, 25, 37, 38

E
East-West relations, 9
ECJ. *See* European Court of Justice (ECJ)
ECtHR. *See* European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
Egypt, 75–77, 80, 81
Enchantment, 163–172
Epidemic diseases, 73–87
Epistemic community, 108
Eurocentrism/euro-centric(ity), 1, 4, 8, 107, 188–192, 194–196, 198
Europe, 1, 4, 27, 44, 45, 60, 65, 75, 76, 79–82, 85, 103, 107, 124, 125, 139, 141, 144, 165, 177, 184, 185, 193, 195
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 49
European Court of Justice (ECJ), 49
European ethnology, 175, 177, 183

F
Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, 125
First Sino-Japanese War, 134
Folk art, 175, 177–179, 181–183, 185
Folklore, 11, 175–178, 183, 185
Foreign cultural policy, 63, 65
Framework, 31, 47, 48, 74, 79–81, 84–87, 108, 109, 114, 159, 190, 194
France, 65, 80, 98, 109, 110, 114, 115, 129, 130, 141–143, 145, 146, 177
French Revolution, 195
Friendly neighborly relations, 93, 102
Fusion of Oriental and Occidental Culture (Fusion of East and West), 57–59, 67, 68

G
Geneva, 2, 3, 16, 19, 24, 25, 27, 31–39, 44, 82, 124, 128, 177, 179–181
Global culture, 11, 73, 74, 86, 87
Global governance, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 103, 109, 128, 151–160, 188
Governance
  normative, 46, 47, 51
  operational, 46, 47, 51
Greater East Asia Cultural Policy, 65–68
Great War, 133, 139, 141, 143, 144, 146
Gregory, Herbert, 117, 119
Gui, Zhiting, 143

H
Hao, Gengsheng, 138
Harvard Medical School, 142
Health Organization of the League of Nations, 78, 82
Hegemonism, 43–52
Hirano, Kenichiro, 68
History
  global history, 1–11, 198
  non-European, 192, 193, 196
  universal history, 188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198
  world history, 39, 134, 141, 187–190, 192, 194–196, 198, 199
Hofstadter, Richard, 137
Human security, 73, 74, 86

I
Identity, 53, 54, 164, 165, 167–169, 171, 178, 179, 187
IGOs, 1, 5
IICI. *See* Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle/International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (IICI)
ILO. *See* International Labour Organization (ILO)
Inadequate coping, 103
India, 1, 74–76, 79, 112, 128, 152, 156, 168, 191–194
Inoue, Kaoru, 140
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), 108, 109, 111–116, 118, 119, 127
Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle/International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (IICI), 26, 175, 177, 179–183, 185, 187
Intangible cultural heritage, 165–167, 169–171
Internalization, 133, 134
International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind, 187–199
International Court of Justice, 45
International Criminal Court, 152
International cultural activity, 54, 60–63, 65, 66, 68
International cultural relations, 9, 53–68
International health, 86
Internationalization, 76, 84, 87, 133, 134, 139, 146

International Labour Organization (ILO), 3, 25, 179, 181, 183, 185
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1, 152
International Olympic Committee (IOC), 136, 137
International organization, 43–52, 91–103, 107–128, 133–146
International organization for peace and security, 31, 39
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 11, 152, 156–159
International regimes, 73, 74, 86
International Relations Studies, 5, 8
International Research Council (IRC), 110, 111
International Sanitary Conferences, 9, 73
International sanitary system, 74, 79, 83, 86, 87
IOC. *See* International Olympic Committee (IOC)
IPR. *See* Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)
IRC. *See* International Research Council (IRC)
ISEAL Alliance, 157, 159
ISO. *See* International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
ISO 9000, 156, 157
ISO 26000, 157–159
ISO standards, 11, 157

J
JACAR. *See* Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR)
Japan, 3, 8–10, 31–39, 53–68, 91–103, 107, 110, 112–118, 122–124, 127–129, 135, 137, 139–141, 156, 165, 167, 178, 191
Japan-America Student Conference, 54
Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), 8, 32, 36
  database, 32, 36, 37
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 59, 92
Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, 34
Japan's Humiliation of China, 93
Jiang, Tingfu, 143
Jiaoyu Gongbao, 94
Jus cogens, 48, 50

K
Kabayama, Aisuke, 60, 62, 63, 72
KBS. *See* Kokusai Bunka Shinko Kai (KBS)
Kimura, I'hei, 61
Kissinger, Henry, 137
KMT's advocacy, 96
Kokumin Gaiko (National Diplomacy), 56–57, 68
Kokusai Bunka Shinko Kai (KBS), 9, 53–68
Konoe, Fumimaro, 60
Kuroda, Kiyoshi, 60–62

L
League of Nations, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 31–33, 36–39, 51, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 78, 82, 91–103, 107, 108, 112, 114, 116, 122, 127, 153, 175–185
Leisure time (worker's), 181–182
Liang, Qichao, 135
Liang, Shiyi, 141
Lin, Yutang, 143
Lu, Shiyin, 143
Lytton Report, 35, 99–101

M
Manchukuo, 31–35, 37, 38, 96, 101
Manchurian incident, 32, 54, 57, 59, 62–64, 91, 96–102
Mao, Zedong, 137, 138
Masson, David Orme, 114, 118
Matsuoka, Yosuke, 31–38
May 4th Movement, 94, 133
Ma, Yuehan, 138
Middle East, 85, 112, 157, 195, 196
Middle School Asian History Textbook, 99
Ministry of Education, 92
Minowa, Saburo, 65, 66
Modernization, 165, 191
Multilateralism, 4, 28, 43, 47, 48
Music, 95, 164–172
Mutual understanding, 59, 60, 63, 68, 79

N
Nankai University, 138
National identity, 92, 98, 133–146, 167
National interests, 57, 80–82, 86, 87, 109, 184
National Research Council (NRC)
  American NRC, 110, 112
  NRC of Japan (NRCJ), 113–117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 130
Nazi Germany, 31
Network thinking, 158–160
NGOs. *See* Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Nixon, Richard, 137, 138

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 1, 5, 7, 51, 52, 108, 111, 152, 153, 159
NRC. *See* National Research Council (NRC)

O
Occidentalism, 9, 44–46
October Revolution, 192
Office International d'Hygiène Publique (OIHP), 78, 82–84, 86
Okabe, Nagakage, 58–60, 62, 63
Olympic dream, 134, 139
Olympic games, 135, 137–139
Olympic movement, 10, 135, 137, 138, 146
Osaka Daily, 92
Ottoman Empire, 76, 77, 81, 83, 85, 86
Ozu, Yasujiro, 61

P
Pacific Community, 113
Pacific exploration, 112, 118, 124
Pacific Science Association (PSA), 111, 113, 115–117, 120, 122–127
Pacific Science Congress (PSC). *See also* Pan Pacific Science Congress
  conservation agenda in, 120, 127
  inter-imperial cooperation at, 115–118, 127
  utilitarianism of, 118–120
Pacific Science Council (PS Council), 115, 116, 126, 127
Pan Pacific Science Congress, 10, 108, 112, 118–121, 123, 128–130
Peter, William Wesley, 142
Pilgrimages, 81
Ping-pong, 137, 138
Ping-pong diplomacy, 137, 138
Plague, 73, 81, 85, 126
Popular arts, 11
Popular culture, 61, 146, 175–185
Power politics, 86
Private, 152, 153, 156, 157, 160
PSC. *See* Pacific Science Congress (PSC)

Q
Qingdao, 140
Qing period, 92
Quan, Shaowu, 143
Quarantine, 74–80, 83–86

R
Records
  disposal, 21
  policy, 17, 20–23
  retention, 21
Red Sea, 75, 76, 79
Regional governance, 108, 122–123

S
Saionji, Kinmochi, 35
Sakurai, Joji, 110, 115–117, 119, 126, 130
Sanitary Councils, 76, 82, 84
Sanitation, 75, 76, 78–85, 144
Security Council, 44, 48–50
Shanghai incident, 97
Shangwu, 136, 137
Shi, Yixuan, 143
Sick man of Asia, 135
Sino-Japanese controversies
  league of nations, 91–103
  textbook problem, 91–103
Sino-Japanese War, 62, 65, 101–103
South Manchurian Railway Company, 35
Sovereignty, 5, 9, 80, 86, 97, 99, 100, 108, 111, 138, 145, 194
  state, 44, 47, 50
  weighted, 46, 48
Standard setting, 11, 47, 151–153, 156–159
Suez Canal, 75, 76, 80, 81

T
Tanaka, Kotaro, 62, 63, 68
Terrorism/terrorist, 49, 50
Textbooks, 10, 91–103, 187
Third World, 45, 46, 157, 158
Tianjin, 136
Tiantsin Young Men, 138
Tiyu, 135–137
Tokyo Daily, 92

U
UNESCO. *See* United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
United Nations (UN), 5, 7, 15–29, 39, 51, 152–158
  records, 20
  records management policy, 20–23

United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 6, 11, 15, 26, 28, 163–172, 187–199
United Nations Office at Geneva archives, 26–27
United States (USA), 4, 25, 31, 33, 36, 38, 60, 62, 65, 66, 98, 110, 111, 113–117, 123, 124, 127–130, 136–138, 141, 143, 144, 158, 163, 165, 171, 184, 194, 198
Universalism/universalist, 189–191, 196–201
Universality, 9, 46, 48, 197

V
Vaughan, Victor C., 107, 115, 119
Voluntary consensus standard setting (VCSS), 151–154, 158, 159

W
Wang, Zhengting, 137, 138
Wang, Zhengxu, 143
Washington Conference, 1921–2, 113
Weber, Max, 170, 171
Weiji, 141–143
Western civilization, 142
Westphalia, 43
Wilsonian moment, 144
World Bank, 152
World Health Organization (WHO), 25, 27, 73
World Trade Organization (WTO), 152, 155
World War I, 2, 10, 16, 77, 82, 84, 85, 110, 114, 139–141, 177, 184
World War II, 5, 6, 10, 16, 18, 24, 28, 31, 39, 65, 91, 165, 184
WTO. *See* World Trade Organization (WTO)

X
Xu, Bing, 91

Y
Y, 133–146
Yale University, 144
Yanagisawa, Ken, 61–63, 66
Yan, Yangchu, 143–145
Ye, Shengtao, 145
Yigong daibing, 141
Yihequan, 134
YMCAs. *See* Young Men's Christian Associations (YMCAs)
Young Men's Christian Associations (YMCAs), 10, 133–146
Yuan, Shikai, 93, 140

Z
Zhang, Boling, 138
Zhonghua Jiaoyujie, 94
Zhou, Enlai, 138