Paul Gibbs · Ronald Barnett *Editors*

Thinking about Higher Education

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Simon Marginson has been a Professor of Higher Education in the Centre for the Study of Higher Education at the University of Melbourne since 2006. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences Australia, and the Society for Research into Higher Education in the UK. Simon's research is focused on higher education, science and international education in the global setting. He has held continuous Australian Research Council basic research grants since 1995, and published 12 books and more than 200 chapters and journal papers. He is a Joint Editor-in-Chief of the world journal *Higher Education* (with Jussi Valimaa from Finland). Simon serves on the Editorial Board of the *Times Higher Education*, and on the Advisory Committee of the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities. He was a member of the American Council on Education's Blue Ribbon Panel on Global Engagement in 2010–2011. Recent co-edited books include *Higher Education in the Asia-Pacific* (with Sarjit Kaur and Sawir 2011), and *The Handbook on Higher Education and Globalization* (with Roger King and Rajani Naidoo 2011). In March 2013, his journal article 'Higher education in East Asia and Singapore: Rise of the

Confucian model', published in *Higher Education*, 61(5), was named best journal paper of the year on comparative and international higher education, by the Comparative and International Education Society at its New Orleans meeting.

Marianna Papastephanou has studied and taught at the University of Cardiff, UK. She has also studied and researched in Berlin, Germany. She is currently teaching Philosophy of Education in the Department of Education at the University of Cyprus. Her research interests include political philosophy, the 'modern versus postmodern' divide, utopia, the Frankfurt School and epistemological, linguistic and ethical issues in education. She has written articles on the above topics, she is the Editor of K.-O. Apel: From a Transcendental-Semiotic Point of View (Manchester: MUP 1997), and the Author of Educated Fear and Educated Hope (Rotterdam, Sense Publishers 2009); and Eccentric Cosmopolitanism and a Globalized World (Boulder, Paradigm 2012).

Brian Pusser is an Associate Professor in the Center for the Study of Higher Education at the Curry School of Education of the University of Virginia. His research focuses on political theories of higher education and the organization and governance of postsecondary institutions in comparative perspective. Most recently, he is a co-editor of *Universities and the Public Sphere: Knowledge Creation and State Building in the Era of Globalization*. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis (2011) and is a co-editor of *Critical Approaches to the Study of Higher Education* (forthcoming) Johns Hopkins University Press.

Suellen Shay is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Higher Education Development (CHED) at the University of Cape Town. She is also currently Deputy Dean of CHED. Her career in CHED since 1989 has spanned a range of types of development work, including language development, curriculum development, and staff and institutional development. Her research attempts to bring the theoretical frameworks of sociology of education to an understanding of higher education as social practice, specifically focusing on assessment and more recently knowledge and curriculum. She has published in British Journal of Sociology of Education, Teaching in Higher Education, Studies in Higher Education, British Journal of Educational Research and Harvard Educational Review. She serves on the Executive Editorial Board for Teaching in Higher Education.

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Introduction

Paul Gibbs and Ronald Barnett

This book's purpose is simple, to offer a space for thinkers about higher education to tell us about what they think and to encourage the reader to think about higher education themselves. Things are never that straightforward! When released from the institutional constrains of higher education from within universities we open the possibilities of creative engagement with what might be, as well as, what is and has been. In inviting contributors to this book, we were of the view that the contemporary debate exhibits a particular kind of shortcoming. The shortcoming that we saw lay in the lack of a positive and purposeful thinking as to what higher education might be. Accordingly, these chapters offer and reach out towards a re-conceptualisation and an emergent way of describing how higher education might service the goal of to enabling the flourishing of individual and society.

Certainly the issues faced as a background to this book the economic functions of higher education in the global economy have never been so evident. The notion of higher education is being redefined in termed out efficiency and the through the assumed surplus values inherent in the fetishism of accreditation to increasing social as well as economic capital. Indeed lack of thinking about higher education might be one reason why the economic discourse which seemingly pervades all aspect of human endeavour has taken such a strong hold on how we experience higher education in established institutions. This need not be the way we all to often think about higher education. This book intends to provide fresh perspectives and advocates, in Barnett's terms, 'feasible utopias' where imaginative thinking of what higher education might become is explored. The chapters in this books flow easily within this horizon of the imagination.

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The book is structured as 11 independent chapters from thinkers working across the world (Australia, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, United States and South Africa). Each chapter is independently written yet they are also woven together with a number of themes skilfully outlined in the opening chapter by Barnett. Here he address the problematic that out thinking has become inconspicuous and argues for us to find the time and the space to think, to be delighted by what might be. This thinking is necessarily temporal in nature confirming and universalising the past in a present of actionable reliability, not of certainty, but of adequacy that allows action and prevents paralysis. Such thinking is political, social and moral. It concern those present and those yet to come, it concerns the use of resources and the value we ascribe to the use these resource are put. It is to do with what should be taken a worthy, good and for what purpose or none at all. The aesthetic and poetic intrinsic value defy a cost benefit analysis but are essential to our distinctiveness need a place in out thinking as much as the expedient. Such approaches are compatible with the idea again introduced in this volume by Barnett of an 'imaginative critical realism' which offers but a plausibility and fallibility to our endeavours.

What does this Book Offer to Think About?

The contributions here could have been presented in various ways, criss-crossing as they do the numerous themes. These included: conceptualisation and realisation; identify of, and trust in, complex social institution; globalisation and the raise of entrepreneurism; public good or private investment; personal development and community engagement and, what might be called the invisible hand of the State gloved in the form of supranational agencies which function to hold higher education institutions accountable.

There are three sections to this book. The firsts explore and imagines how the university might bring joy and flourishing to individuals and societies. The second considers the global, regional and national conceptions of the university as a creator of public goods and what that role might be in the future. It illustrates this specifically in how the university might develop through community engagement. The third considers the role of the university in terms of it knowledge creation and transformation, its curriculum and it role in personal development through an investigate into the student voice, and how higher education might itself be stylise through the language used to describe it.

Section one is opened by a chapter by Barnett where he avocates that we might think imaginatively. In a wide ranging and adroit discussion, which rest for a while on the idea of an ecological university, Barnett takes us to the heart of question sing, thinking and imagination. This compelling chapter is followed by Papastephanou discussion and development of what Barnett calls feasible utopia. In her contribution Papastephanou see the university as being able to nurture a utopian reality, she accepts this is not an uncontested task and one is conflict with the managerial prevalent today, but one that with an ethical imagination can be used to

re-conceptualise higher education in the current milieu. These two chapters light a beckon to guide positive thinking about the future of the higher which shines through the rest of the book. Accompanying these chapter in this section is a chapter by Gibbs which deliberately locates its discussion in a distant future and reflect on the past. It looks at how higher education determined by the adoption of a happiness imperative might have developed and what might be the consequences for higher education then in a place where institutions do not determine the delivery of higher education. It is education without institutions but more surprisingly education without a soul.

Section two provides one of the most dynamic and thought provoking small collection of papers on the subject of public good. In turn Marginson, Pusser and Kehm develop, critique and develop the idea of neo-liberalism and public good in Global, Regional and national contexts the accompany chapter by Fenwick shows how some the idea previously discussed, especially by Pusser, might be actioned in civil society. Marginson's introduction to this section presents a rationale and compiling argument for the imaginative thinking of a global higher education as a complex combination of flows of ideas knowledges and finances which ebb and flow, where national systems provide breakers in which the pillars of individual institution excellence shape the waves of higher education. In such a complex environment the national system will tend to dominant and although the potential for global public good is high and critical there are policy dimensions that may prevent the liberation of such potential. In a call to action Marginson seeks empirical ways in which barriers to the development of global public goods might be breached. Many of the concern identified by Marginson have resonance in Kehm's European perspective and in Pusser's discussion of the United States.

Kehm's lays out the terrain of the European Higher Arena and suggests that the overt retrenchment of State in the provision of higher education in the wake of the marketisation agenda has left the sector needing to find it own robust identity and in so doing try and recoup its loss of public trust. In doing so she raises important questions as to how universities can contribute not to a national, nor regional, but to a global public good. Pusser then brings clarity to the public private debate in a discussion of the university and civil society mainly within the context of the United States. In his analysis Pusser argues that understanding the layered relationship between the State, civil society and the market will be essential in determining the future shape of the university. Predicting a declining role for private investment in higher education provision Pusser's argument offers a counter view to that of the World Bank's avocation of market as the prime source of funding for the higher education. It just maybe, in Pusser analysis, that the university, in conversation with civic society will strengthen its public remit.

Fenwick chapter presents a set of exchanges between the community that host a university and the university itself focusing on university community initiatives. Difference, uncertainty and responsibility coame into view, with Fenwich offering a s*ociometrial* approach to exploring this engagement. This chapter has strong links with the idea developed in next section on how higher education can facilitate personal development and selfhood.

In the third section are contribution from Wheelahan, Shay, Bachelor and Bengtsen. The section considers the university as a producer and, indeed, transformer of knowledge both in research and in pedagogy and the importance topics of fair access and personal development and growth are also examined. Wheelahan opens the section by considering the structure of knowledge creation in the discipline bound university. Her social realist analysis sees the university as communities of knowledge which produces, with specific expertise and with shared norms and conventions, knowledge which have practical social and ethical dimensions.

Shay contribution addresses the important question of what higher education is for and how boundaries are built and can be can dismantled to allow fair access. She does this from the perspective of the curriculum. Shay main concern is the access to knowledge offered in the context of South African higher education. In developing a concern with the question: just what is valuable and legitimate (in a society such as South Africa)?

Bachelor invites us to understand and think about the how the process higher education is understood in the meaning and identity making for the students. She expertly helps as see the and hear how students challenge themselves and formulate how they might settle on what it is that they want themselves to be. Voice is used as a device for defining and refining selfhood within higher education, while—it is suggested—listening to that voice in how it is used by student can offer support to this process. Finally, the section is closed by Bengtsen concern for the student body and their personal development. In a chapter that challenges the nature of what we might take as higher education through the lens of the linguist style used to describe it. Bengtsen's resolution is a language of abundance.

Thinking About Higher Education

This book has brought leading thinkers on higher education together in order to facilitate the open up a space in which others might join them in thinking about higher education. The contributors offer us their thinking and in that the gift of our own thought. As editors we were drawn to Heidegger in our own thinking of their contributions in specifically to the relationship he identified between thinking and gratitude when he asks the question; "[T]he supreme thanks then would be thinking? And the profoundest thanklessness, thoughtlessness. Real thanks, then, never consists in that we ourselves come bearinggifts, and merely repay gift with gift. Pure thanks are rather what we simply think—think what is really and solely given, what is there to be thought" (Heidegger 1968, p. 143). According to Heidegger, the real gift is the gift of the unthought-of; the stimulus for the research practice of creative questioning of what is as yet concealed. Our authors provide the impetus for us all to seek that unconcealment as they have done.

Their endeavours have resulted in this book we believe has a number of achievements. First, the contributors offer the reader a wide choice of perspectives framed in an internationally context which allows their imagination, judgements

and knowledge to shine through in these pages. Second, by the distinctiveness of their approaches they illustrate how multidisciplinary or transdisciplinary approaches can illuminate ways of advancing solutions to messy problems in uncertain times. Thirdly, through their contributions we believe they offer to other reasons to think hard and creatively about the world of higher education.

The authors of these chapter, whose short biographies are available in the book, also propose, above all else, hope; hope for a future in which higher education has an important part to play is term of justice emancipation and morally responsible teaching and knowledge production. In the fluidity in which we all find ourselves they point to ways in which higher education, both those who participate in it and those who can provide it which can assist, enrich and uplift humanity. As editors we are grateful to them for allowing us to have been part of their creative endeavour.

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Part I
Positive Imagination

Thinking about Higher Education

Ronald Barnett

Introduction

The very idea of 'thinking about higher education' implies two things. Firstly, that it is worthwhile to think seriously and hard about higher education and secondly that higher education opens itself to complexities and options. We do not often, after all, think seriously and hard about toothpaste or cabbages; typically, they do not warrant hard and serious thinking; and nor do they much open themselves to manifold complexities and options. Higher education, on the other hand, seems to possess features of complexity, worthwhileness, elusivity and options.

But what then is it to think seriously about higher education? To what end? And what form should such thinking take? What forms, indeed, has thinking about higher education taken? How, for instance, might the thinking embedded in the chapters in this book be characterised? Just what are the options? And why might thinking now about higher education be especially timely?

This essay, accordingly, offers a kind of meta-thinking about higher education. It will offer some reflections about the state of play in such thinking. In tackling this chapter in this way, I want to suggest both that thinking about higher education is important and that some species of thinking about higher education may be in rather short supply and deserve to be developed. In particular, imaginative and even utopian thinking is—I shall suggest—rather thin on the ground and unless it is more in evidence, higher education as a social institution is liable to be somewhat rudderless, and will be subject to the buffeting of large global forces.

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An Emptying of Thought

What might it be really to think about higher education as intently, say, as a poet thinks about her or his topic; really to focus on higher education with that kind of almost forensic vision? Might we just see higher education anew, as a poet might see, say, a leaf or a view of a landscape or a set of clothing anew. Could there be a chance that the familiar will come alive, being presented to us differently from its customary apperception?

Suppose that such a viewpoint, such a clear-sighted and fresh vision was possible in relation to higher education, would we want to engage in such work? Would not such thinking cut us off from the contemporary debates about higher education? Perhaps any such insight or picture would be so adrift from contemporary thinking that it would have no purchase; it might be met—as perhaps the works of Picasso or Schoenberg were met—with bewilderment.

And yet is that effort not worthwhile at the present time? Doesn't the present time present us with a set of stock phrases and terms that hardly any longer convey serious meaning? And doesn't that set of terms betray a poverty of thinking about higher education? 'Globalisation', 'the knowledge economy', 'the knowledge society', 'entrepreneurial', 'skills', personal 'benefit', and 'knowledge transfer' are surely characteristic terms of the public debate. In response to this linguistic tsunami, and struggling to make itself heard, is a counter vocabulary that includes terms such as social engagement, public benefits, public goods, gender, rights and citizenship: the central idea here perhaps is that the student is a player in society with its sets of mutual obligations. A connected but somewhat separate counter vocabulary in part offers a view of the student as a centre of thought in her/his own right. Enlisted here—from time to time—are to be found terms such as authencity, mind, person, voice and personal development.

It will be observed that many of the chapters in this volume invoke the latter more expansive and even—as we perceive it—more oppositional vocabularies; and several of them attempt to essay the extent to which the dominant vocabulary—that places higher education in an economic market—can be reconciled with a more human and socially-oriented vocabulary. And so the structure of this volume is shaped very much with the human (especially the student) and social angles, through which higher education might be discerned.

But the matter can and surely should be pressed further. When we speak of higher education having social or human aspects, just what might be understood by 'higher education'? The term 'higher education' hadn't come into play when Newman wrote his essays on The Idea of the University (and that linguistic history is of interest in itself here) but he sketched out a very large view of higher education nevertheless. For Newman, the educative process in question was to offer an 'ascent', a 'philosophical' outlook. Is it not of the moment here that Newman employed the metaphor of going up, of 'ascent', when today we speak of a 'higher' education? What is this height?

Some will doubtless say that, today, an enquiry of this kind is a cul-de-sac; and on two grounds. The critics will point out that Newman's metaphor of going upwards—in that idea of 'ascent'—is an evocation of what we might term the metaphysical university. It was a carry-over, it could be said, from the earlier formations of the university, from the mediaeval university onwards, in which the university was seen as forming an association variously between education and God, or Spirit or Truth, embodied in a critical dialogue (vividly encapsulated in mediaeval disputations). The essential idea here was that higher education offered a transcendence, a leap out of conventional thinking and perceptions of the world and of humanity's place in the universe. Connected here is the allegory of Plato's cave, as an opening into the light, which in turn has evident pedagogical implications.

Such metaphysical ideas are now outré, so the critic will suggest. Whether on grounds of the world now having passed into a post-metaphysical age or into a post-modern age (or even now, as some say, a post–post-modern age), any such intimations of education opening up imaginative new worlds, and worlds connected with large and bold ideas are now, we are told, without substance. Such meta-narratives are no longer seriously available. The whole language of an ascent into a different world and of education opening a philosophical outlook has to be ditched.

A second critique is more down-to-earth. It starts with the observation, as intimated, that we now are faced with mass higher education. Consequently, that there can be much conceptual content to the idea of higher education can only be sustained at the price of incredulity. The scepticism here takes two forms, a weaker and a stronger form. The weaker form takes the line that no concept of higher education of any substance can hold across millions of students and thousands of higher education institutions. Even the UK alone boasts two million students and around one hundred and fifty institutions. The idea that there can—or even should—be a holding onto a unitary conception, or even an essence, of higher education is implausible.

In its stronger form, the sceptical critique would allege a close relationship to the idea of a 'higher' education and an education for an elite. A higher education, as originally conceived, looked to the development of forms of understanding, outlook and even character that were coincident with the upper socio-economic strata; and, indeed, there was much compelling evidence to back up that case. The adjective 'higher' had a not so subtle association with a social hierarchy in which a higher education came to be tacitly promoted as the education appropriate for the upper classes. On the empirical level, sociological ideas of cultural and social capital served to endorse this association.

In the face of such sentiments, some have argued that the idea of higher education has been hollowed out. And, indeed, that suggestion could be pressed further for, amid the marketisation of higher education in which students are encouraged to be customers of their educational experience, higher education comes to be precisely that which the students-as-customers desire. It is no accident that—in the UK at least—a national student satisfaction survey has come to be

highly influential in shaping institutions' internal policies and provision. Higher education is now oriented precisely at and towards the student's 'satisfaction'. Accordingly, any attempt to think about higher education in itself can be seen to be an exercise in dilettantism, being both inappropriate and having no purchase on the real world. Thinking about higher education is, at best, a problematic venture. It may even be emptying.

Glimpsing Possibilities

Is there no place for serious thinking about higher education then? This volume, at least, is testimony to the value of scu thinking but we are then faced with the question: what kinds of thinking about higher education are possible, and what value might be accorded to each of them?

We may begin with what I hope is a fairly uncontroversial observation. Thinking about higher education may be situated in a context of time. Thoughts may be directed to higher education as it has been in the past, is now at the present time, and may become in the future. But this simple observation plunges us into difficulties straightaway. It may be thought that thought about the past and the present is, in a way, straightforward. For in both temporal situations, one has evidence on which to build the thoughts. In thinking about the future, on the other hand, no comparable evidence is to hand. The imagination can come into play and be given free rein.

However, this contrast between thinking about higher education in the past and the present on the one hand and in the future on the other hand is far from watertight. It is by no means the case that the imagination comes into play only in relation to the future, in thinking about higher education. For example, to pick out the market as a defining feature of higher education at the present time, or to pick out, say, enculturation as the meaning of higher education in the first half of the nineteenth century, calls for acts of the imagination. In each case, what may seem a self-evident empirical fact of the world requires a reading of the world; it requires an imaginative act to identify higher education alternatively with markets or with disciplinary forms of understanding. In each case, there is an entreaty to enter into an imaginative reading of the world (to associate it alternatively with markets or general education): readers or listeners are being invited to see higher education in such-and-such a way, rather than in another way.

The imagination, therefore, is present in any reading of higher education, in any depiction of higher education. That being so, questions arise as to the kind of imagination that might be called upon. Is it an optimistic or a pessimistic imagination? Is it a rather conservative and endorsing imagination, or is rather critical and even radical, seeking to bring about a new kind of higher education? (Barnett 2013).

A critical voice may already have raised itself. In that critique, it may be urged that a key distinction needs to be made, one not yet fully apparent. It is that between concept and institution, between seeing higher education as a social

institution and seeing it as an idea. This is a crucial distinction, and it allows for various argumentative ploys. In a way, all concepts—at least, those that are concerned with social processes and institutions—are critical concepts. Once they have attained any clarity and depth, we can then interrogate the institution in question as to whether it really does live up to the hopes in the concept. With a concept of health established, we can inquire into the extent to which a so-called 'health service' really does live up to its billing (of improving the levels of health in society). Correspondingly, with higher education: we can inquire into whether an institution of higher education—a university, say—really is providing a genuine 'higher education'. The issue would be whether that institution was meeting the conditions felt to be inherent in the concept of higher education. Thought about higher education can become a powerful weapon in the reform and improvement of institutions claiming to offer higher education (including, obviously, private providers of higher education).

This distinction—between concept and institution—should itself be seen as different from another key distinction. This is a distinction between what might be termed internalist and externalist conceptions of higher education. The *internalist* concepts of higher education call attention to the connections between higher education and the development of the mind, of an individual's understanding, and of the student's entry into a form of reasoning. There are a number of different, although related concepts here, in which attention focuses separately on concepts of mind, reason and understanding. Not far away are other concepts such as those of truth, knowledge, initiation (into worthwhile forms of understanding), and epistemic virtues (which, it is argued, are part of a disciplined initiation into disciplines).

In contrast to such internalist concepts of higher education are *externalist* concepts. Such concepts look to the actual and potential carry-over into the wider world. Again, there are multiple concepts of higher education, focusing variously on the economic, social and cultural value of higher education.

Fashion can be seen in the weight that characteristically attaches to these different concepts. The modern age has surely seen as a slide, in which externalist conceptions of higher education are being preferred to internalist conceptions; and this is surely the case, not only in the wider political and public spheres but in the academic literature as well. Today, attention focuses on the wider benefits of higher education. But here, too, preferences are evident. A fork has opened. As higher education comes to be interpreted in terms of its wider context, the economic and social spheres beckon. It is, however, the economic sphere that is winning the palm at the moment. Social and cultural benefits of higher education are, consequently, downplayed if not downright neglected.

There is a hybrid conception of higher education that has been struggling to gain its voice for at least 65 years and arguably for 200 years. This is the idea of higher education that is concerned with the human qualities that it is sometimes said that are imparted by higher education, at least in its better incarnations. Residing here lies an interest in the 'epistemic virtues' that are claimed to accompany higher education, such as truth-telling, persistence, courage, sincerity,

appropriateness, care, criticality, vigilance, and otherness (in listening to and yielding to the world). It is further claimed that these epistemic virtues have some carry-over into the graduate's life-world. Through higher education, the student comes to take on worthwhile qualities and dispositions. His and her character is formed.

This is at once both an internal and an external conception of higher education, which make it doubly powerful. It builds from the demands that flow from an initiation into worthwhile forms of thought (an internalist conception) and moves outwards to the societal advantages that such an education bestows on the individual (an externalist conception). The graduate becomes the embodiment of the rational life, promoting society as a space of reason (Bakhurst 2011). So possibilities may be glimpsed, possibilities that are at once conceptual *and* institutional.

Conceptual Fragility

As implied, conceptions of higher education are far from static. The term 'fashion' was used earlier but it can profitably be used only with some care. Over the last half a century or more, across the world, we have seen a slide from internalist conceptions of higher education to externalist conceptions. At the moment, too, economic conceptions dominate. To put it formally, they have come to constitute a discursive regime (Foucault 1974).

'Fashion' is a rather too flimsy a term here. This slide in conceptions of higher education, from internalist (epistemic and individual growth) conceptions of higher education to externalist (especially economic) conceptions of higher education can be understood as the outcome of the changes that higher education as a social institution has undergone. As a matter of public policy, it has grown—across very many countries in the world—from a small activity on the fringes of society bestowing social and cultural capital on elites to a massive institution, consuming large resources and involving upwards of 40 % of young adults. (The figures vary but there are now between 150 and 200 million students worldwide.) This expansion has been encouraged against a background of the emergence of the knowledge society, a global knowledge economy and 'cognitive capitalism' (Boutang 2011), a context in which higher education has been repositioned much closer to the heart of society. From a medieval process barely in society to a major institution *of* society: this has been the trajectory of higher education over the past half century across the world.

Both at the personal and at the societal and political levels, higher education has come consequently to be seen in economic terms, a conceptual shift encouraged by a state-sponsored marketisation of higher education. It follows that the conceptual shift that we have witnessed over the past 50 years or so has been prompted by changes in the deep structures of higher education.

In the sociological literature, there is much debate—not to say angst—over the so-called 'structure-agency' issue. Is human agency a function of deep-seated

societal structures or are those structures susceptible to human intervention? (Archer 2000) Less remarked upon is what might be termed the structure-concept issue. To what degree is a concept—a concept of higher education, for example—a function of the forms that higher education is assuming, and to what extent might higher education be influenced by newly formed concepts? For example, the idea of openness has been influencing higher education for at least half a century. Over time, across the world, open universities have been established showing an evolution of 'openness' (in terms of accessibility, of reach, of technological capacity and of communicative interactions) (Peters et al. 2012). Concept and form—of openness—have been intertwined.

There opens the possibility despite the societal and global structures at work—which are themselves dynamic—that concepts can help to influence the shaping of our institutions of higher education and of our curricula and pedagogical practices. If that is so, it is all the more remarkable that the contemporary world surely reveals a contraction in the range of concepts that inform the public understanding of higher education. The terms that dominate the public understanding of higher education have, as implied, come to focus on its economic value, both personal and societal. In government documents, in the material of the think tanks and in the public discourse, the terms that are called up to depict higher education are those of work, employability, salary, knowledge economy, skills and fees.

Not far away are debates about the relative value of 'public' and 'private' institutions; although it is increasingly noted that even so-called 'public' institutions are becoming entrepreneurial and self-sustaining, relying on the public purse only to a very limited degree. The academic literature fares not much better, with a dominant strain being critical of the form now assumed by higher education, and drawing on concepts such as neoliberalism, performativity, commodification, cognitive capitalism, students-as-customers and new public management. This academic pessimism harbours its own rather limited conceptualisation of higher education.

In short, the contemporary conceptual canvas offers two depictions of higher education: largely an endorsement of changes underway in the light of shifts in the direction of global cognitive capitalism and a pessimistic critique of that position. This is a gross simplification, of course. Struggling to make itself heard are more optimistic voices, evoking conceptions of higher education that are at once critical and yet positive. Here, we find a cluster of ideas, all intent on discerning in higher education elements or outcomes that have a public character. In this camp can be found, for example, Maxwell's (2012) idea of the university of wisdom, Michael Peters' idea of socialist knowledge (Peters et al. 2012), Parker's (2005) idea of the theatrical university, Standaert's (2012) idea of the world university, and Stearns' (2009) idea of the student as a global citizen. All of these ideas lend themselves to—or explicitly identify—social and public goods that flow from higher education.

Serving as a canvas here is the theorisation of the very idea of 'public', in which perhaps the most significant theorist is Simon Marginson. Marginson (2007) has forcefully made the point that, in contradistinction to goods in a market

place, knowledge does not lose its value either in its free circulation or in being held by increasing numbers of people. It is a 'non-rivalrous' good. Indeed, the value of knowledge in those circumstances—its being distributed widely across society—may actually grow. This observation has two profound implications: firstly, that higher education should be as widely dispersed across a people as possible; and secondly, that higher education, in its curricula and pedagogical processes, should be turned outwards, such that that the wider world can itself gain as much benefit from higher education as possible.

It follows from these reflections on the relationships between concepts and society in relation to higher education that characteristically they stand in a limiting relationship to each other: society tends tacitly to set boundaries—albeit weak boundaries—to the range and orientation of concepts of higher education in play. In turn, the power of concepts of higher education to change matters—institutions of higher education and their practices—is limited but yet possibilities can be glimpsed. Prima facie, it makes sense to go on thinking about higher education.

Feasible Utopias

Internalist/externalist; public/private; individual/collectivist; pessimistic/optimistic; superficial/deep (sensitive to the deep structures of the university): these, then, are just some of the fault lines on which conceptions of higher education are built. And fault lines are notoriously prone to instability. Securing any stable and sure basis for thinking about higher education seems fraught with difficulty. The Descartes problem of higher education emerges (as it might be termed): can ideas of higher education be discerned that have *any* sureness to them?

Sureness, of course, is a loaded term: sureness in pointing to its inescapability—certainly not; sureness in its reasonableness—possibly yes (both in its empirical basis and its actual reasoning). Opening here is a further incisive question: *Is it possible to derive conceptions of higher education that are non-ideological, not prone to undue pessimism, are duly sensitive to the deep structures underlying universities (the rise of the global knowledge economy and cognitive capitalism), are properly critical of contemporary forms of higher education, open themselves to the realisation of new forms of higher education, and are appropriate to the twenty-first century (and even beyond)?*

Surely, such a question point us to towards a quest for utopian thinking. Utopian thinking, after all, tends to be optimistic, gains its traction from its setting up desirable alternatives to conventional forms, and proffers visions of new possibilities. It may, however, be objected that they fall at the remaining hurdle: being detached from the here-and-now, they can hardly be sensitive to the deep structures of the university. Consequently, utopias are destined to remain just that: never realised and never realisable. It follows that, if utopian thinking is to be of substantial help, conditions have to be placed on it. Its conceptions of higher education would need—in the first place—to demonstrate that they were both attuned

to the deep structures of the university and opened themselves to some degree of feasibility.

All this amounts to a call for—as it might be termed—*feasible utopias*. Feasible utopias are utopias that just might be realised. They are utopian in that they are nowhere to be found, at least in their fully realised form. They are feasible in that there are good reasons for believing that they *could* be realised. They are not castles-in-the-air but have a degree of feasibility about them, even if—given the weight and power of the contemporary forces besieging the university—they are unlikely to be realised. That they could just be realised imparts hope and energy in the possibly daunting project of bringing them about.

But feasibility, while necessary, is not a sufficient test of the worthwhile-ness and robustness of a feasible utopia of the university. Other criteria should surely come into view. These might include (i) range (does it have application on the personal, societal and global levels?); (ii) its capacities for emergence (does it open itself to evolving in the light of changing circumstances?); (iii) wellbeing (does it offer a hope of improving the world in some way?); and (iv) time (does it have a due sense of time, of building on the past but of moving purposefully into the future?). Together, with the feasibility criterion, these five conditions amount to five criteria of adequacy: they offer tests by which putative feasible utopias might be assessed.

Prospects

What are the prospects for such imaginative thinking? The question requires an answer at two levels. At the first level, the stratospheric level, there is the issue as to the conditions that permit, encourage or discourage imaginative thinking. Here, we have to acknowledge the global situation of higher education: higher education is a global phenomenon. It is not just that student mobility is global in nature, with universities competing in an international student market, but it is also that universities are global in their reach and are subject to massive forces of global cognitive capitalism and internet communication. Speed, in particular, as Virilio has repeatedly insisted is power—'the greater the speed, the greater the control' (Virilio 2005/1984, p. 65); and the universities, despite a general perception of their inertia, have come to understand this new situation very well.

This is a world that is never quiescent, and is characterised by speed of information flows, dynamic knowledge formations, transnational education, orchestrated global networks, internationalisation strategies and now 'massive on-line open courses' (again global in their reach) on the part of universities. Under such conditions—of global neo-liberalism and cognitive capitalism—it might be felt that universities simply have to become forms of 'the entrepreneurial university' or 'the virtual university' or 'the corporate university' or 'the digital university'. Imaginative thinking has no place in the contemporary university; or so it may seem.

Another level of response, however, is available. At this level, we move back to the level of the individual institution. What is striking here is that around the world many universities are reviewing their higher education offer. Old and newer, research-led and teaching-led, liberal and vocationally-oriented: we see evidence of higher education being reconsidered. The disciplines and their inter-relationships, the possibility of some form of general education (perhaps in a new cross-university foundation programme), the identification of intended graduate qualities and new forms of pedagogical relationship (derived through forms of open learning), and large educational ideas such as the student as a global citizen: all these and many other projects are coming into view. In short, at the institutional level and at the disciplinary level, we see much innovation going on around the world. We can surmise, accordingly, that the imagination is being well-stretched, in the evolution of higher education.

Pessimism or optimism, then: which disposition should fairly colour our imaginations about higher education? Is higher education now bound in by massive global forces that severely constrain individual institutions or are there still significant spaces in which the imagination can work, to conjure quite new images of higher education? My view, paradoxical as it may seem, is that both situations are present: universities are caught amid swirling global currents—of student flows, of neoliberalism, of the internet age, and of cognitive capitalism—but it is still the case that, by and large, universities have considerable room for manoueuvre. The imagination can and should be brought into play.

As stated, however, the play of the imagination is no guarantor of worthwhile new conceptions of higher education emerging. We need not just more ideas of higher education but *better* ideas. Our imaginative ideas need to be able to prove their worth in the real world, as utopian as they may be. They have to constitute feasible utopias, able to measure up to the five criteria of adequacy that we identified earlier.

The prospects, then, as to imaginative thinking about higher education coming more into play turn on the *possibility of possibilities*. It is at least possible—empirically and conceptually—that new possibilities may be imagined, that can be seen to hold water. This may not seem very much; but it is a large observation. In the possibility of possibilities, the possibility arises ultimately of new practices being sighted and even realised.

The Coming of the Ecological University

Where, then, have we reached? I have suggested that characteristically, as a matter of fact, our thinking about higher education is unduly limited. Higher education is framed within a narrow band of concepts; and those concepts have been tilting in the direction of externalist conceptions of higher education, typically associated with the economy (‘marketability’, ‘skills’, ‘employability’, ‘personal financial gain’). The conceptual playing field is far from even, a fact explicable in

terms of the power of the underlying empirical forces in the world. Matters seem weighted against imaginative thinking but yet some room for conceptual manoeuvre may be discerned. And indeed, many universities—both at university level and at programme level—are being adventurous in conceptualising higher education in a wider way. Ideas of 'general education', 'wisdom', 'citizenship', 'lifewide learning' and 'service' are being heard and promoted and are being realised.

A shorthand commentary here is to observe that more public conceptions of higher education are being opened alongside the dominant economic conceptions. As yet, this is but a front that is opening: the economic conceptions surely still hold the high ground. But it may be that that economic strain in thinking about higher education is far from being unassailable. It may be that we are not far from a world—of global and national instability and incomprehension—in which more social and more public conceptions of higher education will be called for and may even come to occupy the dominant position.

In these shifting conceptual sands, another feature is pertinent here. This is the emergence over the past 50 years or so—in the English language at least—of the very term 'higher education'. Still a loose concept, the term is now in widespread usage and is frequently used as a synonym for and interchangeably with 'university'. This terminological move is explicable in the development of mass higher education: in spite of the rise of research as the high status activity of universities (on which the world leagues tables are mainly based), still teaching constitutes the main activity of almost every university around the world. And alongside universities have emerged a plethora of largely teaching-based institutions of higher education. So the conceptual distinction between higher education as an educational process (of a particular kind) and the university as an institution which offers programmes of higher education has become blurred. 'University' and 'higher education' at least have come significantly to overlap each other, even if they are not quite yet identical.

Against this socio-conceptual backcloth, the ground may be becoming propitious for the coming of *the ecological university* (Barnett 2013) . The ecological university, we may say, would be a university that was not just aware of the many ecologies in which it has its being, and was not just wanting to sustain those ecologies, but was intent on enhancing their wellbeing. By 'ecology' is meant here all the networks in which a university is characteristically situated, networks of reasoning, of inquiry, of knowledge, of personal development, of social institutions, of culture, of economy and of communication. All these are ecologies, being webs of interconnected points and processes, in which the university is implicated. And these networks spread out regionally, nationally and globally (with individual universities being placed differentially in those networks).

The idea of 'ecology' is, in Bernard Williams' terminology, a 'thick concept' (Williams 2008/1985): it is fact and value combined. To put 'ecology' and 'university' together is both to point to the embeddedness of the university—and higher education, thereby—in ecologies and to point to the responsibility that the university has to sustaining those ecologies. A related concept here, in ecological debates, tends to be that of sustainability: questions arise as to whether an ecology can be sustained

and what has to be achieved to bring that end about. Here, however, as implied, a stronger idea can properly be entertained: we can ask not only as to what a university might do in order to sustain its various ecologies—of knowledge, of learning, of communication, of understanding, and so on—but also what it might do to enhance those ecologies. So we can ask, for instance, in what ways might a university work to enhance ecologies of understanding, reasoning, and communication, and of culture and economy across society, and even across the world.

An Ecological Higher Education

The ecological university, therefore, does not have a narrow sense of higher education and nor does it act only in its own interests. It has societal and global horizons and it seeks to enhance the wellbeing of the multiple ecologies in which it is embedded. And such a conception of higher education can be played out in very concrete ways in the provision made available to its students. The promotion of students' service learning, the encouragement to students to engage in their own 'lifewide learning', the instantiation into curricula of the idea of the student as a 'global citizen', the stretching of curricula to include social dimensions of a discipline, the inclusion of student projects oriented towards community matters, the challenge of value conflicts: these are only a sample of the possibilities that reach out towards an ecological curriculum.

Such an ecological higher education stretches out in different directions. It stretches beyond the campus, as the student is encouraged to venture outwards, both in forms of understanding and in action off-campus. For instance, students will be encouraged to engage with other cultures, both physically (with some overseas experience) and virtually (through virtual travel, for example, to students on a comparable course in another country). But it also stretches back into the campus. Firstly, it has pedagogical implications: curricula innovations of the kind identified here prompt a pedagogical relationship in which the student is given both space and responsibility to take up far-reaching options (perhaps involving action in community either in students' home country or in other countries), and challenged to develop their reasoning, communicative and action-oriented capacities. Secondly, it has institutional implications, in which the university is understood as an environment that can work in encouraging forward the ecological student. Opportunities to bring students together (on multicultural campuses) so that they can learn about each other's cultures will be seized. Students will be treated as adults and as co-directors of their total experience.

This ecological higher education opens up both time and space: time horizons are opened, both into the future and backwards into the past (for the present cannot be understood in the absence of its history); and space is opened, as the student is encouraged into a global space, not only geographically but also epistemologically. The student comes to understand herself and himself amid multi-cultures. Boundaries of time and space are weakened.

An ecological higher education also presents with continuing possibilities. In pointing towards spacious curricula, it points also to spacious pedagogies, in which the student is afforded space to come into new kinds of strangeness in their own way. Emergence is not only a meta-concept, working at metaphysical, global and system levels but it is a practical concept that speaks to the student finding his or her own possibilities in a networked world. The student not merely teaches herself in profound ways but also comes into herself. Heidegger's idea of 'being-possible' (Heidegger 1998/1962, pp. 183–185) is concretely realised in an ecological higher education.

Conclusion

Thinking about higher education is characteristically hedged in. It is somewhat unthinking, unreflectively content to work within conventional boundaries. Of course, conceptions of higher education are more or less restricted, and are more or less open. The presence of a concept of higher education, however, does not entail thinking about higher education. Conceptions of higher education are prompted by the large and even global currents to which institutions of higher education are subject. In the world of higher education, concepts tend to follow form and influence them only marginally. But still, much may happen in the margins. Ultimately, the conversation in the margins may even come to constitute the main text.

Can thinking about higher education leap out of its own traditions? Can it reach over its own shapings? Two kinds of question arise: Are there directions in which any such attempt to free up thinking *should* go? And, are there *conditions* that should attach to any such thinking afresh? Surely, in answer to the first question, such thinking should be oriented towards deriving concepts that extend higher education towards the fullest realisation of its possibilities. Such a consideration itself implies conditions in response to the second question. For thinking about higher education, if it is to work in favour of a full realisation of its possibilities, has to take account of the deep structures within which higher education is placed. Thinking can open the possibility of possibilities.

In short, thinking about higher education has to become a kind of social philosophy, a reflective exploration of the possibilities before higher education. And here, the 'possibilities before higher education' have to be both conceptual and practical. 'Higher education' is both a concept and a complex social institution, containing manifold practices. Opening up here is an even larger and more challenging task, for thinking about higher education now is charged with becoming what might be termed an *imaginative and practical critical realism*. This thinking about higher education strives to be as imaginative as possible but yet has its eye on the considerable social and economic embeddedness of higher education. 'Head in the clouds and feet on the ground': this could be said to be the motto of this kind of thinking. Such thinking is extremely demanding. Little wonder that its presence is in short supply today; but such thinking about higher education *can* be discerned. It is a feasible possibility.

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Higher Education and Ethical Imagination

Marianna Papastephanou

Introduction

The advent of the new millennium found university discourse in a peculiar, perhaps unprecedented position: a plurality of intersecting influences induced academics to see the time as important 'for higher education institutions critically to reflect on why they exist' (Gibbs 2001, p. 86). What is unprecedented is not quite the exhortation 'critically to reflect' but rather the object of such a critical reflection, that is, the existence, the very **being** of higher education. This ontological challenge was prepared by shifts in extra-mural social priorities and realities and presaged by J.-F. Lyotard's (1984) *The Postmodern Condition* in mid-eighties. The cataclysmic impact of those shifts had, as early as mid-nineties, been captured by the bold ontological metaphor of the university being and dwelling in ruins (Readings 1995). The global character of the impact had been described from a comparative-educational point of view by Cowen (1996) as the coming into being of the 'attenuated university' (p. 256). An all-embracing attenuation, financial, pedagogical, qualitative, and so on, has made 'the university's existence' much less dependent on political support and protection (p. 257) and much more susceptible to the vagaries of the global market.

This chapter considers the above with an eye to the various kinds of utopianism underlying: the thought about higher education[1]; the attempted and/or effected marketization; the theoretical renunciation of marketization and the gloomy depiction of academic reality; and the desire for critical and imaginative redirection, i.e.,

[1] The terms 'higher education', 'academia' and 'university' will be used in this chapter at times interchangeably. This does not obscure the differences of the terms and does not favour a conflation of them. But it aims solely to avoid needless intricacy and also to stress the points on which all of them face similar realities and challenges.

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ultimately, the desire for a new academic ontology. Thus, the first step requires conceptual clarifications and associations of utopianism with higher education and its current state. Then, after a brief overview of the current situation in the context of commercialization, the essay explores the possibility of responding to the ontological challenge through the kind of utopianist vocabulary that makes ethical imagination relevant to a more desirable academic future. Given that we still live in anti-utopian times, and with the benefit of the hindsight that sheds light on the bankruptcy of modernist utopia, the plea for a university as feasible utopia (Barnett 2011, p. 110) invites some thoughts on the possibility of making a stretched ethical imagination a pre-condition for higher education reforms.

The University and (its) Utopianism

Let us begin with clarifications of the conceptions involved in the plea for a more imaginative education. The plea itself may invite the charge of utopianism precisely because imagination is a key issue in any utopianizing endeavour. But, to treat utopianism as a charge already presupposes that one defines utopianism negatively, i.e. as a bad thing. The employment of utopianism as a charge derives from what is termed an 'anti-utopian' position. Anti-utopian objections to a strikingly imaginative education again presuppose a relation to imagination, but, in this case, the relation is one of setting limits to imaginative endeavours. Therefore, it is necessary to untangle conceptual knots of this kind. Primarily, the meaning of utopianism must first be explained in a value-neutral sense, i.e., as either a good topos (utopia) or a bad topos (dystopia). And, then, utopianism must be seen through the anti-utopian lens, i.e. as a discourse within which imagination leads thought astray. Once the terms of the challenges facing a more imaginative education are clear, we may proceed with the aims of this chapter.

Utopianism may minimally be understood as the discourse about the no-place, i.e., the *topos* that exists only in imagination and facilitates imaginary operations that further and heighten thought. For instance, thought experiments about how life in academia would be in a less competitive world presuppose the alternative topology of a reality in stark contrast with ours. Therefore, 'utopia' can be taken to concern life and reality as it might or should be, based on a particular conception of the good. To M. Buber, utopia is the unfolding of the possibilities that lie hidden within the communal life of humanity regarding the just order of things (Buber 1985, p. 30). Thought experiments about a futurist world of happiness, for instance, the one of Paul Gibbs' chapter in this volume, utilize the operations and textual force of utopia as the kind of unfolding of possibilities that Buber describes, regardless of the authorial purposes (e.g. literal or ironic, etc.) served by the thought experiment as such.

But nothing compels us to imagine a no-*topos* (u-topianism) as a necessarily good *topos* (u-topia *qua* eu-topia). Utopianist imagination can also be about the bad *topos* (dys-topia) that lurks in risky experimentations with reality or the bad *topos* that we

are about to effect by failing to mend our ways or by failing to experiment enough. 'Dystopia' conceptualizes the kind of utopianism that recruits the blackest representation of an existing or possible reality (where most qualities of life are absent or threatened) in order to issue an early (or timely) warning. Thus, **utopianism** as the signification of no-*topos* incorporates:**utopia** as the invocation of a good world; and **dystopia** as the revocation of a bad world. As we shall see, **anti-utopianism** attacks utopianism wholesale, and, to do so more effectively, it often plays dystopia off against utopia, e.g. it declares the proposed utopian world a bad rather than a good one and satirically depicts it as a dystopia. Anti-utopianism treats utopias as pernicious ideas and defends the reproduction (material, symbolic) of society or, at most, the modest, minimal betterment of life conditions.

Much against the general lack of theorization of the university along utopianist lines (in educational theory and in other educational disciplines, as stated in R. Barnett's essay in this volume), the university has implicitly involved utopianist elements all along. From the ancient *Scholae* of pre-Socratics such as the Pythagoreans (Dawson 1992) where the experimentation with 'koinovion' (shared life) introduced to society a 'city' of students within the city of *demos*, down to our times, the community of teachers and learners always forms a heterotopia of a kind. Despite their reality, heterotopias are a type of utopia; for they are something like counter-sites, i.e., 'a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted' (Foucault 2008, p. 3). As such heterotopias, *Scholae* and, later, universities had set amongst their objectives the contemplation on the ideal city and the preparation of the younger generation for its realization. As Barnett puts it, 'the idea of the university traditionally stood for the highest realisation of human being' (Barnett 2011, p. 154). The universality involved in the hope for human fulfilment, i.e. that this hope was not just related to a class of people or specific individuals but to human being as such, inspired early modern feminist utopias of inclusion of women in some form of higher education.

Let us illustrate this with concrete examples. Mary Astell wrote *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of their True and Greatest Interest* [1694] (Astell 1970) to turn her utopian vision of women's higher education into a concrete proposal. She imagined an educational institution where women would experience intellectual ventures and 'disinterested friendships'. Astell's design of a feminine educational institution may be described as an educational heterotopia in the seventeenth century. Likewise, Margaret Cavendish imagined an advanced educational institution for women. Her *Female Academy* [1662] is a utopian play 'where "academical ladies" gather "to speak wittily and rationally"' (cf. Bonin 2000, p. 340). I suppose too few contemporary anti-utopians would feel comfortable in charging retrospectively those feminist utopias with unrealistic dreaming or in accusing them of pursuing a dystopia by being so inclusive in their vision of academia!

In fact, from its early constitution in medieval times the university 'was expected to serve universal interests of truth-seeking, of knowledge-gathering, of learning and critical reason' (Barnett 2005, p. 786). The epistemic universality of principles related to concepts such as truth, knowledge, learning and critical reason constitutes

a cognitive or scientific utopia that has, as an imaginary projection to the sphere of human potentiality, guided and regulated the early university's vision and operations. Regardless of the fact that the guiding principles of the medieval university anteceded by some centuries the first north-western thematization of utopia by Thomas Moore, or the utopias of Bacon, Comenius and Leibniz (Fischer 1993, p. 14)[2] those principles can be seen as emblematic of a much more general utopian direction implicit in academic self-understanding until recently. And it is no accident that the debunking of the above epistemic universal principles that we have witnessed of late coincides with a general anti-utopianism. The attack on the epistemic vision guiding the older university that condemns it as unrealistic dreaming and/or harbouring elitist tendencies echoes the more general anti-utopianist attack on any grandiose, universalist vision. As affirmation of the present or of the social currents that are left unobstructed to change the present, anti-utopianism gives in to the kind of contempt for the old university that eases the passage to its neo-liberal transformation.

However, apart from its implicitly political (i.e. ideal city, feminist inclusion), universalist, cognitivist and scientific utopianism, the university has explicitly experienced utopian times. May 1968 exemplifies the explicitly utopian days of the university; students' movements emerged as the utopian collectivities expected to set on course the radical transformation of society. It is extremely interesting (though it remains sadly under- or non-theorized) that the most explicit utopianization of the university coincided with those restless times when utopianism was at its political culmination and, paradoxically, simultaneously in theoretical decline. In such a climate, J. Lacan's anti-utopian comment to students that they just seek another Master[3] becomes highly significant for understanding the temporal interplay of utopian peak and anti-utopian challenge. Perhaps this ambivalence can no better be conveyed than by reference to J. Lacan's response to the events of 1968 through his *L'envers de la psychanalyse*, Seminar XVII (1969–1970) (Žižek 2003). Lacan's interest focused on the passage from the discourse of the Master to the discourse of the University as the hegemonic discourse in society. As S. Žižek puts it, 'no wonder that the revolt was located at the universities: as such, it merely signaled the shift to the new forms of domination in which the scientific discourse serves and legitimizes the relations of domination' (Žižek 2003). When higher education reached its highest relevance to social intervention, it also confronted its own, inherent anti-utopian despondency about the possibility of fulfilling a truly utopian purpose. To a great extent justifiably so, for its modernist utopianist

[2] In the early modern Christian world, the effort to find a pedagogic mediation between religion and science which 'would flourish in an educative utopia' was the sole concern that united utopian authors/thinkers such as Bacon, Andreae and Comenius (Shklar 1981, p. 282). The significance of all this for the universities of the times is easy to infer.

[3] Here is Lacan's famous retort to the student revolutionaries: 'As hysterics, you demand a new master. You will get it!' According to Žižek, this passage 'can also be conceived in more general terms, as the passage from the prerevolutionary *ancien regime* to the postrevolutionary new Master who does not want to admit that he is one, but proposes himself as a mere "servant" of the People' (Žižek, ibid).

premises were indeed flawed. Among such flaws were the longing for perfection in every detail of life (known in the relevant literature as 'plenitude') and the desire for a closed society in no further need for change (known in the relevant literature as 'end-state').[4] Those premises tarnished the vision and brought it too close to the disguised Master discourse that Lacan chastised. But does this mean that higher education can or should dismiss all possibilities of utopianism? Can, for instance, the university's redemptive potential and agency be discarded as outdated with no detrimental effects for the world of which universities are a significant part? Can university discourse dispense with utopian vocabulary, or, conversely, is anti-utopianist university discourse divorced from utopianism?

The latter question is crucial for looking more deeply into the multi-faceted and inescapable relation of the university (as an instance of higher education) with utopianism. Anti-utopianism attacks any high-minded aspirations of higher education to think of itself in utopian terms and to re-think its ontology along such lines. Anti-utopianism nourishes fear of drastic transformation and chastises all such efforts. In my opinion, the main reason why, as Barnett remarks in this book, utopian thinking about higher education is in such short supply concerns the theoretical sway of anti-utopianism, especially in the Anglophone academic imaginary. And, such anti-utopianism paved the path for, or became a secret accomplice of, the global marketization of the university and of the proclamation of the entrepreneurial (or the corporate) university the end point of higher education development. Now, as we have asked above, is this anti-utopianism itself truly divested of utopianism of a kind?

Let us answer this complex question first by considering the relation of the anti-utopian, neo-liberal spirit with the existing reality. Anti-utopianism tends to appropriate all kinds of nightmarish depictions of fantastic worlds in order to show that our world is the best possible and that any play with un-worldly (u-topian) possibilities is doomed from the start. Thus, it resorts to utopianism to draw from it dystopias—yet only to use them as imaginary constructions of how horrible the world would be if some utopias were realized. Anti-utopianism does so in order to discourage demands for radical change—in our case in point, the demands for re-thinking the university or for the meta-thinking of it along utopian lines. But, in so doing, anti-utopianism treats the existent (or the imminent that awaits us when existing social forces are left unobstructed to shape the near future) as the best possible world. In other words, anti-utopianism treats the existent as an accomplished or imminent utopia (ideal world). Ironically, anti-utopianist managerialism also goes utopian when it utopianizes the performative university and maintains even a corresponding utopian subject, its 'redemptive' class: the footloose managerial elite, the administrators who synchronize global educational standards and are expected to bring the whole world into the developmental pace of north-western countries. Thus, if thought through, the only way by which neoliberal managerialism sustains its anti-utopianism (its hostility to other utopias) is by **maintaining its self-understanding as the principal agent** for preserving

[4] For a fuller discussion of such issues, see Papastephanou (2013).

or finalizing the best possible world. Being already accomplished or just around the corner, the vision of a managerialist university neutralizes any vision of further utopia. Academic reality is, for its managerial designers and visionaries, an accomplished utopia, a further change of which, other than minor refinements, would be only for the worse. Thus, the fact that, as Barnett argues, utopian thinking about higher education is rather thin on the ground indirectly proves, in my view, the extent of the 'repressed utopianism' or 'crypto-utopianism' [both terms borrowed from Olssen (2003) and Milojevic (2003) respectively to signify unacknowledged though operative utopianism] that works underneath neo-liberal and managerial anti-utopianism.

But anti-utopianist managerialism in academia has been crypto-utopianist also in the role it has played and the tactics it has used for the justification of the new situation. To condemn the old ideas of the university, the performative-managerial vision recruited dystopian images of the priorities or realities that it turned into ruins and came to supplant. In simpler words, it presented the then established order to which it was hostile as an existing dystopian world, a thoroughly bad world with which a new academia should radically break. When dystopia is employed to show the current or future dangers of an established order so as to strengthen the desire for redirection, it is part and parcel of utopianism. The worldview proposed as 'the' solution finds its ultimate self-justification and legitimacy in the blackest description of the existent. Thus, the marketization of higher education surreptitiously or unwittingly went utopianist in its dystopian account of the then existent. Cowen registers this development most helpfully by reference to the university: 'The university will and does change but it needs to be attacked and criticized publicly' (Cowen 1996, p. 246); such attacks and public criticisms often depict academic reality in the gloomiest of ways. Cowen identifies three relevant processes: 'the ideological case for change needs to be publicly constructed, the university's role has to be respecified and supervisory procedures have to be created to ensure that its working practices change' (Cowen 1996). Cowen offers damning proof of the neo-liberal crypto-utopianism inherent in such processes and of its dangerous proximity to totalitarian utopianisms that inspired much neo-liberal anti-utopian flurry in the first place. 'All three processes in extreme form were developed by Nazi Germany, Stalin's Russia and in the cultural revolution period in China' and 'all three processes in less extreme form can be seen currently [1996 – M. P.], for example in Australia, the UK and the USA' (Cowen 1996). The unspoken utopianism of neo-liberalism becomes manifest in: the dystopian image of the existent that prepares the ground for change [in Cowen's words, 'the critiques have been generated']; the unimaginative and univocal 'solution' ['the role redefined'], the only one on offer; and the 'end-state' panoptical mechanism ['new techniques of surveillance, which lack the crudity of the Soviet and Chinese practices' but have nevertheless 'a considerable impact on university cultures' (Cowen's words)].

Hence, in its proximity to its undesirable doubles, the repressed utopianism of neo-liberal anti-utopianism is not only noticeable beneath the anti-utopian surface gloss; it is also what is typically theorized in utopian studies as 'bad utopianism'. It is equally so because the vision it maintains proves more and more to be a

detrimental one for academia and the extra-mural world. Now that much of what had been then promoted as neo-liberally authorized change (one presented as the best possible world) has taken place, now that the neo-liberal 'utopia' has been put into practice, neo-liberal discourse spearheads again an anti-utopianism, this time against anything that may challenge the newly effected 'best possible world'. However, instead of consistent anti-utopians, the defenders of the neo-liberal trend appear, in John Stuart Mill′s words, as 'cacotopians' ('cacos' in Greek means 'bad'), that is, as coming from, or favouring, a bad place. [5]Mill's accusation is pertinent to contemporary anti-utopian adherents to 'our best possible world' ideal when they assume that 'what is commonly called Utopian is something too good to be practicable, but what they appear to favour is too bad to be practicable' (Mill, cf. Sargent 2006, p. 15).

As stated above, the dystopia that belongs to utopianism is the critical 'probing of human society at its most bleak' that can open up a space 'where preventive action can take place, and positive possibilities can be explored' (Geoghegan 2003, p. 151). Dystopia thus understood can help generate utopia as much as it can help anti-utopianism or repressed utopianism, and the decisive issue from a critical point of view should be the content of the proposed vision, the pluralism it allows, its sensitivity to context, and the appropriate distance it should take from 'end state' ideality and practices.

If we take the example of the university as indicative of a broader situation that affects all other forms of higher education, we notice that dystopia becomes an important conceptual tool of opponents of neo-liberal higher education vision. Like the crypto-utopian proponents of 'university performativity' sloganeering, the opponents of neo-liberal academic commercialization also employ dystopian imagery in order to criticize what they consider pernicious and undesirable. The 'university in ruins' is the best-known trope that critics of managerialism employ in order to account for the ontological challenge that academia has confronted. The image of a construction which is now ruined is a dystopian image. From being presented as the ideal city, to its presentation as a demolished city, the university is now close to being felt as an infernal city, a site where dwelling has become too difficult, perhaps impossible.

Yet, 'the city is where we dwell. The ruins are continuously inhabited' (Readings 1995, p. 19); the university as such a city is built of materials constantly reshuffled. Therefore, in the ineluctable interplay of dystopian revocation and utopian invocation, the image of the university in ruins may also become a site of promise inviting imaginative reconstruction and experimentation with new materials. Being institutions of public life universities have an important role 'as locations of emancipatory imagining. But this emancipatory imagining is often at odds with the banality of their institutional social practice' (Joseph 1995, p. 95).

[5] It is remarkable that the earliest refutation of anti-utopian liberal arguments can be found in the earliest liberal use of utopia alongside with dystopia. John Stuart Mill used the term dystopian in a public speech in the House of Commons along with the term 'cacotopian' taken from Bentham (Sargent 2006, p. 15).

The Banality of the Current

But, to what banality is the current drawing us? It has become a matter of survival for researchers and lecturers at the university 'to act and think in an entrepreneurial way' (Simons and Masschelein 2009, p. 7). In order to get along, or to hold a position, academics preoccupy themselves with measuring their own human capital, making the most of their competencies, calculating strategically and setting goals based on their 'reading of the competitive environment'. Ultimately, they evaluate and manage [their] life in view of these strategic goals' (ibid). In terms of research, such strategicality is accompanied with contempt for thought, especially, for the 'use-less' thought that cannot be measured in practical logistics of gains and losses. It is indicative of the whole problem that when educators employ philosophy, even when it comes to issues that are downright philosophical, their tone becomes apologetic. In fact, they make some extra effort to justify their going 'abstract' and becoming 'philosophical' and to supply their account with empirical evidence and direct associations with practical applicability.

The conception of the student is likewise affected: in outcome-driven education 'process is incidental and the outcome sought is not an educated person in the classical sense, but an accredited person able to use their educational outcomes (or competencies) to further their economic desires' (Gibbs 2001, p. 87). Profit- and opportunity-seeking acquires now a binding role in academic life. For, the collapse of communal ideals and bonds does not eliminate the need for bonding; it displaces, rather, its fulfillment by sacralizing the new purpose shared in common. Academic 'professionalism emerges as a quasi-religion, our only way, apparently, of holding ourselves together after the disintegration of religious myths and pre-industrial traditions' (Wilshire 1990, p. 277). The badly buried, older sense of community spectrally accompanies the newly effected academic *modus vivendi*.

The spectrality of community chimes with the conception of ethics that reigns in academia. Those market performance indicators that 'turn students into consumers, and educators into service providers' promote liberal accounts of individual rights that support 'the concept of a personal good life *in isolation* from the "important role that communities play in the development of meaning and morality"' (Gibbs 2001, p. 87, emph mine). Morality becomes a matter of introspection accompanied with a privatized happiness, and all this finds expression in the glorification of 'personal well-being', as if a person could truly be happy just through personal success even if everything around her is on the verge of destruction. Anything even remotely related to collective good or happiness seems irrelevant in the moral landscape of the most pervasively anti-utopian privatization of hope. Such privatization ousts the ultimate utopian feature, i.e. the universalism of a collective ethical vision (despite modernist exclusions, misconceptions and failures). Beyond the oxymoronic narrowness of modern universalism, a truly universal collective vision is the one that considers the good of the universe, i.e., the good of all worlds, the natural, the social/global and the intellectual, aesthetic and

experiential world of individual existence (Papastephanou 2012). For, to deserve the name, a utopian vision should address all and exclude nobody from its aspirations to happiness.

No wonder, then, that despite the 25 years since Steven Cahn's *Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia* (new edition, Cahn 2011), the ethical challenges discussed there have not been met. On the contrary, the well-documented academic shift toward productivity-related and managerial priorities has created new ethical stakes and exacerbated older ethical deficits in the university world. As critics argue, 'the reconfiguration of universities as engines of economic growth has dealt critical blows to ethical principles and conduct in institutions now driven by corporate interest, competitive individualism and the intensification of audit and surveillance regimes' (Sutherland-Smith and Saltmarsh 2011, p. 213). By now it is acknowledged that academic ethics is a systemic issue that is broader than (though inclusive of) individual ethical failures and in need of urgent response (Bertram Gallant and Goodchild 2011, p. 7). Yet, this systemic issue is typically dealt with in a moralist manner that overlooks a broader ethical framework of the good life. An ethical framework makes more radical demands on the self and society, and should be presupposed if genuine morality is not to slide into vacuous moralism. But such a framework, which constitutes the conceptual ground of utopianism *par excellence*, has to be re-thought: in a broadly anti-utopian global climate and in the years' hindsight (e.g. since the times when the university or its students figured to many as the new redemptive force), the association of the university (and of higher education more broadly) with ethical imagery requires caution.

Thinking About Higher Education and Ethical Imagination

In the current context, the plea to think about academia presupposes a rehabilitation of thinking as such. The question posed to the university in particular seems now to be 'how to think in an institution whose development tends to make thought more and more difficult, less and less necessary' (Readings 1995, p. 23). The ontological challenge that the university confronts is also an ethical challenge to reclaim the space, intensity and pause for thought in the frenzy of academic competitiveness. Without losing their distinctiveness, ontology, epistemology and ethics find a unity as parts of an inextricable whole whose synergy is indispensable to re-thinking academia. As Bruce Wilshire wrote in his (Wilshire 1990) book *The Moral Collapse of the University*, 'if we would restore the university to its educational and moral course we must rethink what it means to be a human being' (Wilshire 1990, p. 24). We may unpack the equation as follows. 'Knowing has ethical properties' (Barnett 2009, p. 433) and because of 'the relationship between knowing and being' (ibid), the conclusion that 'there is an ethical space in which universities have their being, whether they acknowledge this or not' (Barnett 2011, p. 4) can safely be reached. Thus, the rest of this chapter explores the possibility of a desirable, *ethical* image of higher education for a utopian re-thinking of higher education.

To meet the ontological challenge, according to Barnett (2011), the university should turn to the kind of critique that unleashes utopian energies and hidden possibilities. The very concept of higher education involves the kind of critique that invigorates thought. Higher education is 'a *critical* concept that provides standards such that educational processes in universities […] can be assessed as to the extent to which they fulfill the criteria implied in the idea of higher education. We may judge that institutions of higher education, including universities, do not always provide a "higher education" to their students' (Barnett 2011, p. 3). To remedy this 'we desperately need more imagination to be brought to bear in identifying new ideas for the development of the university' (Barnett 2011, p. 5). But, when anti-utopianism affirms the present for fear of more imaginative explorations of a possible future, new ideas cannot emerge. New ideas presuppose a discontent with the present, a degree of revolt and, therefore, an overcoming of the anti-utopian stumbling block. Thinking about higher education in fresh terms requires a stretch of the intellect and of the imaginative reach of feasible, ethical transformation (Barnett 2011).

However, regrettably, socio-historical and, consequently, educational contexts favour practical-technological, instead of ethical, aspirations to perfectibility (Wimmer 2003, p. 167). This limits ethical academic contemplation to one-sided, and hence pernicious, attention to mainly negative academic moral duties and obligations. We typically consider what academics should avoid doing or how to protect academia from external threat. Without underestimating the importance of all this, we should be aware, nevertheless, of the fact that any vision of ethical transformation, no matter how vigilant as to feasibility, requires a general conception of the good life and positive accounts of the public good. The ethical is not identical, then, with what typically passes as moral. Usually associated with liberalism, moral theory focuses on individual morality, duties and rights. It distances itself from the ethical construed as a discourse about a communitarian ethos and an inclusive universalism when promoting the common good, a good for the benefit of all and approved by all affected by it.

A conception of the ethical that cannot be reduced to the moral plane underpins, for instance, attacks on the kind of definition of the market that associates it exclusively with private greed. Against such a definition, Gibbs pertinently argues for another sense of the market, one that has at its core a notion of public good (Gibbs 2001, p. 87). The latter operates within the province of ethics rather than of individualized morality and is compatible with the utopian emphasis on collective ideals of the good life away from individualist moralism. A re-direction of market and academic priorities toward a notion of public good is in tune with Barnett's more general plea for suffusing higher education with more critical imagination.

Then again, notions of the good life are precisely the main target of anti-utopian polemics. Critics of communitarianism and utopianism point out, justifiably, to an important degree, that conceptions of the good life may be dogmatic projections of one's (e.g. the academic's) ideal into society. Thus, the question now is: can we maintain a commitment to a sense of ethics that is more thoughtful than liberal moralism, one that deepens critical imagination, while also avoiding the charges that condemned older utopianism to disrepute?

Academics 'must work without alibis' 'neither razing the old to build a rational city on a grid, nor believing that we can make the old city live again, by returning to the lost origin' (Readings 1995, p. 19). The plea for a new notion of public good is not necessarily nostalgic of older conceptions of ideal life. Nothing compels us to construe it thus. Thinking about higher education does not arrest time even when it moves to concrete suggestions of direction. When concrete suggestions are vigilant of their own risks they leave space for their own openness to imaginative challenge and become more responsive to self-critique. Academic and disciplinary structures must be ready to 'imagine what kinds of thinking they make possible, and what kinds of thinking they exclude' (Readings 1995, p. 24). For this reason, the idea of the university has continuously to be revisited and re-imagined (Barnett 2011, p. 2). Utopianist higher education should be universalist in the sense of assuming no privileged subject of effecting change, no single law-giver and no specific redemptive collectiveness (e.g. managerial or academic elites). The utopianism of the university should in no way be that of a self-appointed and exclusivist redemptive agency.

If the rehabilitation of the idea of the common good is to avoid the authoritarianism of the academic as a self-appointed prophet, it must first avoid the temptation to over-determine a possible common good. But if ethical thought in academic contexts is also to avoid anti-utopian restrictions of critical imagination, it has to determine somehow the set of questions and answers about the good life that the current situation neglects. For instance, shying away from ethically more demanding standards loses its ideological justification when anti-utopian reservations are questioned: in such cases, one can no longer recruit as an alibi the despondent view that 'living in a world which has been and will always be imperfect, we should have modest expectations from surrounding realities, so, let us not make a big fuss when injustice occurs, say, in tenure academic procedures, in selection of post-graduates, etc'.

Then again, a major challenge is to keep an equal distance from two dangerous extremes that concern the appropriate degree of determining what should count as a desirable future. On the one hand, an ethical image runs the risk of becoming too detailed, thus leaving too little to actual dialogue (in this case, the academic visionary becomes a self-appointed prophet). On the other hand, a picture of the good life that is too vague runs the risk of becoming un-inspiring and inoperative (in this case, the academic fails to take any position when ethical suggestions are at stake). Let us examine the equidistance from over-determinate and in-determinate imagery as a pre-condition of ethical imagination. As mentioned above, the word 'ethical' has societal connotations of a communitarian origin and scope, and points to specific conceptions of the Good regarding which secular liberalism has hypocritically been prohibitive. More recent and mediating versions of liberalism in education, David Blacker's liberal contextualism, for instance, are more reconciled with the ethical and more willing to accommodate it in public discourse. On the contextualist view, 'the good society is best understood as a pluralistic one, where different social spheres are allowed as much free play as possible within democratic boundary constraints that are themselves based on relatively thin universal norms of social equality' (Blacker 2007, p. 81). Yet, on this view, any

evaluation of the possible contents of the good is still undesirable. 'A contextualist picture of schooling and social justice resists the reduction of educational value to any single good'. Instead, it relies on a eudaemonist, value pluralism, arguing that 'there is no One Best Way to live a worthwhile human life' (Blacker 2007, p. 102). This consideration directs us to avoid over-determinate images of the good because those tend to favour dogmatically one existential choice over all others.

However, we must also consider the limits that such a view should confront. True, there is no One Best Way to live a worthwhile human life. Likewise, 'there is no general model, no *the* University of the Future, merely a series of specific local circumstances' (Readings 1995, p. 26), and those plans for re-building the university that will fail to acknowledge this will 'smack of bad utopianism' (ibid). However, there are Too Few Ways (material such as redistribution of wealth, symbolic and cultural such as the overcoming of competitiveness or profit-seeking obsessions, and the commitment to enriching existential choice) that make people capable of approaching what seems to them worthwhile. This consideration now directs us to avoid the indeterminacy of the ethical image that fails to work out at least a set of questions and answers about the good life. In the same vein, there is no One Best Way to re-think the university, but there are, interestingly, Too Few Ways (perhaps next to none) to defend the perpetuation of the current situation. Yet, this escapes the attention of anti-utopian neo-liberalism even when going contextual.

Overall, thinking about higher education may also include explorations of an ethical imagination that, by relying on the interplay of utopian determinacy and indeterminacy, it becomes immune to anti-utopian attacks—not only regarding the feasibility of utopian conclusions but also regarding their desirability and appropriateness. The danger of end-state educational utopias may be kept at bay by acknowledging that, instead of being a demerit of the ideal vision, indeterminacy is, in fact, an important cautionary element of a reconsidered academic utopianism. Faithful to such indeterminacy, this chapter will be confined to its meta-theoretical character and will avoid to air concrete suggestions. Imagination may be precisely the answer to the question about how determinate a vision should be. Unlike dry, flat and detailed normativity, imaginative ideality directs us to an ideal city that looks hazy in the distance. The pictorial aspect is necessary at the motivational level for a vivid ethical approximation of the good society. Utopian thinking is to be plausibly thought as 'the ability to conjure up vivid ethical pictures of a "good society" that would be possible only if certain hostile social conditions were transformed' (Cooke 2004, p. 419). Dystopia depicts the ugliness of the current, the un-aesthetic effects of too much familiarization with the existent. Such familiarization brings us to the point of not being able to see the ruins around us. The suggestive and evocative qualities of dystopian and utopian textuality can serve the indeterminacy that is necessary for the avoidance of blueprints better than a detailed philosophical argumentation could ever do. Literary and visual poetics of the good life (as well as of the *inferno* that we live in and we have accepted) may be conducive to the kind of invigoration of thought that is so necessary when higher education tries fumblingly to find its way to an unknown and indeterminate future (Papastephanou 2010).

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the conceptual ground and preconditions underlying the idea that the 'possible energy' of the university as institution (Barnett 2011, p. 153) might be an ethical energy. This may sound as abstract as any other theoretical suggestion whose immediate connection with 'the daily experience of what it is to live and survive in universities with all their concrete messiness' (Barnett 2005, p. 794) is not easy to spell out. But, an ethical vision, even if too difficult to approximate, let alone realize, has, nevertheless, ontological and existential effects. For it helps those involved to see the possibility of a beautiful existence (in Foucault's terms) in its contrast to the actuality that blocks it. The dystopian depiction of contemporary higher education in ruins simultaneously invites the re-thinking of the university beyond anti-utopian despondency; for, fearless contemplation of utter hopelessness 'can be the first step in the recovery of hope' (Geoghegan 2003, p. 151).

When endorsing the plea for critical and imaginative rethinking of academia along more inclusive and collective (less self-centered) axes, it must be clear that we search for the kind of ethical vision that avoids dogmatic accounts of the Good-as-One-Way-of-Defining-Eudaemonist-Ethics (Blacker 2007, p. 102). Indeed, in modernity, utopia 'was to be the fortress of certainty and stability; a kingdom of tranquillity' (Bauman 2003, p. 16). Yet, the modern utopia which is often associated with an ethics of control and the avoidance of societal risk is just one kind of utopia, in no way exhaustive of utopianism. Hence, the aspirations of this chapter have been purposely modest. It has not attempted to give practical directives or to prescribe how the university should be re-thought—even less to determine the outcome of such a thought (which should always be the outcome of collective effort).

But, at the same time, the chapter emphasized an equal vigilance regarding an inoperative and relativist indeterminacy. Overall, it has elaborated on the constellation: higher education, critique, feasible utopia, ethics and imagination, by applying utopianist vocabulary. It has done so in order to argue that utopian thinking about higher education and the university in particular may reclaim the vision of an ideal city, minus the 'fortress' modern connotations or the aloof distance of too much indeterminacy regarding what counts as collective good. The university thought as a possible, ideal city should be neither a citadel, nor an ivory tower.

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Happiness not Salaries: The Decline of Universities and the Emergence of Higher Education

Paul Gibbs

> *THE end of Education is to render the individual, as much as possible, an instrument of happiness, first to himself, and next to other beings.*
>
> James Mill 1825

It is 2167, the three-hundredth anniversary of John Stuart Mill's *Inaugural Address* to the University of St Andrews, and we celebrate a world as a happy place. In every city, tributes are laid at the omnipresent status of John Stuart Mill ('J.S.', to the educational elite) and those contributing to the fundamental changes during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This includes Noddings and the Boks, whose work helped us change our views on how higher education might contribute to happiness rather than personal income. A 100 years of happiness pervades all social, cultural and individual activities; there are no longer food and water shortages; efficiency is achieved with mandatory rainbow-belted commissioners who ensure that sigma variances in all things are squeezed into vertical lines; and the popular press struggle to find something unhappy to report in their news. All is well.

Of course, some of the past centuries' institutions have had to change, or fail, in order to secure such a state of contentment. To release individuals from the anxiety of exercising their democratic duties, a group of Representative Citizens (13 global citizens, nominated by the 13 remaining Keiretsu global corporate companies that now rule the world and currently, as always, all men) make the main decisions on global resource allocation, money, and law and enforcement. This means the ancient Zenon's stoic idealism has come to pass. Loneliness and alienation have been replaced by nourishing fellowship through allocation to each of us of three or four friends of equal intellectual footing. Moreover, one of the main causes of unhappiness—those unhealthy temples of crass

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entrepreneurship and greed, the universities—have mostly been dissolved, along with the need for academic credentials. Some of these institutions were sacked and pillaged for their out-of-date computers and furniture, but most now have alternative utility as coffee houses, discussion forums and hedonist centres of the new enlightenment. The mistakes of the past are no longer in danger of being repeated, as the past no longer exists: happiness is realised in the moment and futural hope. This has meant that the temporal trinity has been replaced by the temporal duality of the present and the future. The past is held under the security of appointed guardians who have had their hippocampus chemically castrated, so as not to resent the happiness of others.

This paper is written on behalf of one of these 'guardians' to construct a new justification for why higher education flourishes because of the decline of the university. It is written in the style of the then accepted forms of academic discourse to give added historical authenticity. No-one now quotes the past, for all that was is now known.

Happiness

Two of the greatest essays on happiness were written by the stoic Seneca and the early Christian theologian, Augustine of Hippo (386/2010). They share a focus on the distinctive human attributes of rationality and desire, that this distinguishing feature should be used to the full, and that only in so doing would we be happy. Seneca was to explore and exhort that happiness is the life of the virtuous person where sensual pleasure—which is not a goal in itself, but a pleasurable by-product, like pretty flowers in a in a field of wheat—to the existential reality of a virtuous life. This life is uncorrupted by externally induced desires, and where people stand firm on their own stances as to their own being. Indeed, in Seneca's *On the Happy Life* (54–62/2008), much foreshadows the Christian notion of happiness in knowing God and Mill's doctrine of happiness through the obligation of exercising the higher faculties of human beings.

For Augustine, his deductive dialectic logic is present to us through a conversation within his family, Here he reveal that it is only through knowing God can one be happy. *The Happy Life* (386/2010) is a document of Cartesian importance, for it first establishes a difference between body and soul and then investigates that true happiness does not come from the pleasure of the flesh, but from those designed to improve the soul. As Augustine's mother is quoted as saying, "I believe that the soul is nourished by nothing other than the intellectual grasp and knowledge of things" (ibid, p. 33). Augustine again foreshadows Mill's position that intellectual striving maketh man, when he responds, "thus we are correct in saying that the minds of those who are trained in no area of learning and have absorbed nothing of the fine arts are human and starved" (ibid). Those who seek happiness seek to find the good that one can be and, by extension, this can only be found in the seeking and finding of God. Although Seneca also makes reference to God as our

liberty from desire, he advocates (rather ironically) that securing happiness may be easier by reducing the number and intensity of our desires and having and expecting less. This position leads Seneca to argue what makes the happy life in Section "Beginning the Reforms: Measurements" of his essay, *On the Happy Life*. Specifically, this life is one in harmony with and respectful of nature and is achieved in three ways: through a sound mind; a brave, flexible and critical approach to how one conducts oneself in own environment; and taking care of oneself and the advantage life and one's efforts can bring, without be seduced by them—"without becoming their slave" (54–62/2008, p. 87). He then indulges in an elaborate discussion on a happy life, defending his own lifestyle![1] He argues "the wise man regards wealth as a slave, the fool as a master" (54–62/2008, p.108) and, "if anyone steals his wealth, he [the wise man] will still leave to him all that he truly possesses; for he lives happy in the present and untroubled by what the future holds(ibid, p. 109).

More recent political debates, but still from nearly 400 years ago, considered whether happiness should be a goal of public policy. These reached their post-enlightenment surmount in the eighteenth century with a series of perspectives including those of the Italian, Baccaria, the French philosopher, Helvetuis, and the Scot, Hutcheson. Following these thinkers were those we might hold responsible for the 'British Happiness Enlightenment', led by Bentham and our hero, Mill. They forged the link between education and happiness and our resurrection, albeit prematurely, began to take shape. The recognition of the link was made by Bentham, but a more sustainable rationale was left to Mill to provide. He did so through a more subtle approach to Bentham's proposed homogeneity of pleasure. This, he achieved through his concept of higher and lower pleasures that reflected an Aristotelian prejudge for intellectual superiority in human endeavour.

One hundred and fifty years later, this linkage was lost as it merged into the agreement that education was no more than an instrumental factor in the realisation of happiness, which was mainly the result of increased income and prosperity. As salvation passed from gods in the next world to comfort in this, the education system regularly presented data. This was fashioned to support arguments that increased levels of accredited institutionalised education equated to increased prosperity. So compelling became these self-defeating arguments that the World Bank recommended privatised higher education to developing countries, which infused into the core of higher education the business capitalist notion of being, where extrinsic value overrode intrinsic values.

This lead to increased concerns over happiness among economists after the paper by Easterlin (1974) suggested that happiness, rather than economic growth, income or consumption, should be a policy priority. In fact, he showed that average self-reported happiness appeared to be the same across rich and poor countries and that economic growth does not raise well-being. Castriota (2006) proposed

[1] This has resonance in neo-Confucian writers, as well such as Wang Yang-Ming's *Instructions for a Practical Life.*

that the positive effects of education on happiness result from a variety of intermediary processes and, as a consequence:

> the quantity of material goods a person can buy becomes less important. It is reasonable to believe that a low education level reduces the chances of achieving a high level of job satisfaction and the probability to have a stimulating cultural life, and makes the purchase of material goods a more important determinant of the life-satisfaction (2006, p. 3).

This echoes Seneca, retorting to his detractors in *On a Happy Life* by justifying his riches as enabling him to enact his virtues, and defending such a life by his claim that "I own my riches, you own you" (2008, p. 157). This is a nuanced rendering by Seneca of stoicism principlesthat valuethe simple life, reducing one's needs in order that one might be fulfilled and achieve happiness. It was subsequently tested after his breakage with Nero. Of course, whilst educational institutions could support the desirability of education for economic, ideological and spiritual reasons, the questioning of the institutional structure—let alone the desirability of what they packaged—assumed a certain worth. As Dearden pointed out, "education may be broadly defined as the process of learning through which we come to an understanding and appreciation of what is valuable or worth pursuing in life, and happiness is no more than one among several final ends worthy of pursuit" (1968, p. 27).

The problem seems to have emerged when the idea of higher education and the university as institution conflated. Dominance was given to the institutionalisation of education and control of accreditation that then could have value—surplus value, it was claimed. Indeed, this happened at a time when human capital theory had its most disruptive effect on how people perceived each other. The notion that education as being desirable for happiness becomes lost in institutionalised education. The goals of our being in an Aristotelian sense of *eudaimonia* were lost, and *techne* rather than *praxis* predominated. The institutions killed edification for profit, and what was taken to be an educated person became an accredited person, a person of technological being. This ruptured the link between happiness and this human condition. But before unpacking what has taken the place of institutionalised higher education, perhaps we should linger a little longer on the work of our hero, Mill, resting on three of his works that describe the purpose of education: *On Liberty* (1859/2008), the *Inaugural Address* (1867/2000), plus the nature of pleasure in his *Utilitarianism* (1861/2008).

J. S. Mill

The distinguishing feature of Mill's notion of happiness, manifest as pleasures, is revealed in Chapter "Thinking about Higher Education" of his work, *Utilitarianism*. Like most dispositions, happiness is neither wholly intense nor without disruptions. For Mill, happiness has moments of ecstatic pleasure and moments where iti s derived from lack of pain, from base pleasure and of the realisation of the authenticity of self's higher stance in revealing one's being. This realisation is in the being of

one amongst others, through the necessary human condition of virtuous co-existence through mutual respect and restraint. This stance does not need to be articulated in a life plan, as Rawls may have maintained in his *Theory of Justice*. There is little doubt that such autobiographical plans can facilitate happiness but, as Bok (2010a) proposed, it can be rather restrictive. He discussed higher and lower level pleasures, the difference between quantity and quality of these pleasures, and how the selection may be judged. The purpose of this judgement in what is alternatively termed 'utility', or the "Greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" (2010b, p. 128). Moreover, given that our purpose, our being, is to fulfil the contingencies of the human condition, we should search the specific pleasures and grant them status above those shared with other species: these are the higher pleasures for the intellectual.

It is Mill's doctrine of higher and lower pleasures that distinguishes them from Bentham's homogeneity, clustering incommensurable entities together such as public house, ball games and poetry. In calculating sums of happiness, Mill implicitly recognises that, for man, there are more desirable pleasures than mere sensation and that abundance of sensual pleasure is qualitatively different from those more difficult to obtain and retain. Thus, pleasures are not homogenously valued but separated into higher and lower pleasures. As Mill writes:

> It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone (2008, pp. 138–139).

This is to say that certain actions are not always higher than others but might be intrinsically preferable, that we live in an environment beyond our control, and we are born into a particular set of circumstances. As Gibbs (1986) comments, "Mill declares, that persons who are familiar with the pleasures of the higher faculties—the intellect, the feelings and imagination, the moral sentiments—prefer these pleasures markedly to the lower purely physical pleasures". Furthermore, they would not be willing to relinquish these higher pleasures for any amount of the lower, even though they know the higher pleasures to be "attended with a greater amount of discontent" (1986, p. 31). So, there is a price attached to these high-quality pleasures and the happiness they may bring. Price is existential; angst cannot be measured by the wisdom of other, but through the dispositions of the person. The greater the natural gifts, the greater one's capacity for both happiness and unhappiness and, if practiced, is enhanced by learning. At this point all seems reasonable, but Mill has more to warn us about: institutionalised education, and I turn to *On Liberty,* Chapter "Higher Education and Public Good", and to the *Inaugural Address* to consider this further.

Mill's delivered his *Inaugural Address* to the University of St Andrews on being installed Lord Rector in February 1867. It was nothing if not controversial, not least because he himself had not attended university, even though, according to Garthforth (1980), he had an inheritance to provide him with a place at the University of Cambridge. In ways similar to chastisement of the system in the

early twentieth century, he questioned the England's educational system and compared it unfavourably with Scotland's schooling and higher education practice. He maintained his distaste for the standards of Oxford and Cambridge and, seemingly with some goodwill, recognised the slow improvement in academic endeavour at these English establishments. Having contextualised his argument, he set out his rationale for a liberal university education that does not waste time on educational attainment, which should have been sufficiently obtained in schooling prior to the university. There was a lack of encouragement for critical thinking in both literature and science; Mills saw this division as an absurdity. Mill's *Inaugural Address* and Newman's *Idea of a University* portray ideals of individual attainment that are hard to imagine would be irrelevant at any stage of human civilisation.

In his *Inaugural Address,* Mill's insistence for general education is evident in how he understood higher education. He described the function of a university: "not a place of professional education. Universities are not intended to teach the knowledge required to fit men for some special mode of gaining their livelihood" (1867/2000, p. 5). He accepted that professionals need training, but not that this was a function of the university. He claimed that:

> The proper business of an University is different: not to tell us from authority what we ought to believe, and make us accept the belief as a duty, but to give us information and training, and help us to form our own belief in a manner worthy of intelligent beings, who seek for truth at all hazards, and demand to know all the difficulties, in order that they may be better qualified to find, or recognise, the most satisfactory mode of resolving them (ibid, p. 81).

Mill argued compellingly, I think, that "professional men should carry away with them from an University, not professional knowledge, but that which should direct the use of their professional knowledge, and bring the light of generalculture to illuminate the technicalities of a special pursuit" (ibid, p. 7). This argument concerns the quality of the rounded person who understands their cultural and moral responsibilities prior to undertaking the skill of employment, leading to more conscientious and wise use. Indeed, he saw no place for the university directly to teach the professions (although he allowed for associated schools). In his ideal of higher education, it could be argued that Mill set out that those trained in skills without the interest to contextualise them in culture are not furthering their higher faculties, and hence happiness.

It is not surprising, at least in *On Liberty,* that Mill suggests that all examination in the higher "branches of knowledge should be voluntary" (2008/1859, p. 119), that it should not be government's place to confer the acceptability of any award to enter a profession, and that those who gain qualifications should have no advantage over those who do not, excepting in the reputation that the examining entity confers on the holder of their award. This openness to entry into the crafts and the profession, away from institutionalised learning, was taken up in the debates on competence in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, but did not get far under the hegemony of business and the survival inclinations of the universities.

Mill's work cannot go uncontested, nor without consideration of its ambiguities as well as recognition of its merits. Its originality has distinctive overtones of

Plato's tripartite soul (*Republic*, 580d–583a), Aristotle's *eudemonia* (*Nicomachean Ethics*; 1177a10–17, and the *Politics*, where he argues that the happiness of the individual is the same, regardless of its form, as the happiness of the state; 134a6–21). However, its originality is less problematic than the inherent constrictions and lack of worldliness of how Mill's notion applies to the real world. His self-reflection might be the core of higher level happiness and, taken with situational context, helps his proposal to gain creditability. But this again has problems. Although Mill's appeal is to competent judges, his appeal to experience externalises the judgement of quality. This seems strange, given that the justification for his pleasure principle was based on the Epicurean comparison that:

> The life of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification: Is he not discounting those very faculties that distinguish us and collectivism them?

In this, Mill was mirroring the defence of Epicurus made by Seneca in his essay on happiness.

Furthermore, as Gibbs points out, "Mill does not consider the situation of pleasures and choice is impeded by; weariness, over-indulgence over-familiarity and distracting appetites" (1986, p. 50). And when Mill states that "the mode of existence that is best in itself is the mode which would be most congenial to the best-endowed, highest developed, morally and intellectually most advanced human beings" (ibid, p. 56), his intellectual egoism and elitism become all too clear; few of us fall into this highly defined category and it is unrealistic for us to assume that such a mode of existence is available to anyone who, in some stoic way, is able to grasp it. Indeed, in *On Liberty* (Chapter III), Mill proposes, "Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way" (2008, p. 64), and "If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode" (ibid, p. 75). Surely, what Mill identified in himself is the appropriate realisation of how to use one's capabilities in specified circumstances; the action of a practically wise man.

Beginning the Reforms: Measurements

The early twenty-first century frenzy of activity by economically rich countries spawned instrumental attempts to measure the homogeneity of happiness, so as to declare satisfaction in citizens politically and to find ways to facilitate a flow of a politically distinct form of happiness. The idea that happiness has unitary value can be traced to Epictetus, who maintained that happiness was a ratio between satisfied and unsatisfied desires; to Kant, as a resolution of the conflict between duty

and desire; and to Bentham, as a net sum game of pleasure over pain. Mill, accepting the main premises, developed a more nuanced approach that seems to have been lost in this instrumentation of happiness generation. To do this, measurements were needed and that was most easily achieved by deconstructing happiness into key attributes to be measured, improved (scores, not existential experiences), and reconstructed into shining happiness.

The political significance of this happiness was presented and summarised in a persuasive manner by Bok. Bok reflects on more contemporary places of happiness in governmental governance—the now-iconic Bhutanese example—and he draws important political and hence economic conclusion from a society whose goals are constituted to increase the general happiness of it citizens; a goal at the heart of the thesis of both Bentham and Mill. His argument was extended to most of the socio-economic functions where politics can direct communities. In a wide-ranging discussion of educational institutions, he resolved that the evidence that education *per se* enhances happiness is hardly convincing, especially given the monetary effect that prolonged education has on consumption. Indeed, little of the social restructuring and wealth-generating intra-activities of society bore increasing happiness and, for sure, the dominance of a financial credo as the basis of higher education seemed to have diverted the edifying premise of education in terms of enhancing citizenship and the existential of taking a personal and satisfying stance on the becoming of oneself. Indeed, he went so far as to suggest, 'Educators and policyholders alike need to place more weight on purposes other than acquiring vocational skills. There is much more to education than becoming a productive member of the work force, and more to schools and universities than producing "human capital'" (2010b, p. 178). Even the UK's own National Statistical Office, when arguing to support the slightly higher life satisfaction scores of those with higher qualifications, cautioned that it "must be remembered that there are also other variables which may affect these results, such as age, income, type of employment, employment status and the individual's health." (2012, p. 32). Its warning did not prevent the perfusion of indices for happiness and well-being shown in Table 1.

The very attempt to capture, entrap technologically through measuring something, then control happiness affirmed the premise of 'power to feed' economic growth. Although these attempts may have offered some evidence that happiness was linked to institutionalised formal education, none of the evidence proved to be clear and tended to reflect that societies' social structure was so deeply entrenched that traditional education forms were unable to break through. A few studies were published concerning happiness and education. An analysis of the majority of social studies contended that education is positively correlated with indicators or variables of happiness or well-being subjects. The development of instrumentalism and a marketing culture in universities across the world and a growing disinterest in the democratic human condition lost the universities their sophistic justification. As jobs ceased to be readily available for graduates, graduate unemployment rose, salaries dropped and, with continuous unexplainable hikes in fees, student numbers dropped. The neglected trades began to flourish and the 'smoke and mirrors' economy led by financial services was revealed in its fully undressed state.

Table 1 A selection of happiness indices

Gross national happiness index	http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Short-GNH-Index-final1.pdf
Happy planet index	http://www.happyplanetindex.org/about/
Oxford happiness index	http://www.happyplanetindex.org/about/
World database of happiness	http://www1.eur.nl/fsw/happiness/
Child well-being in rich countries	http://www.unicef.org.uk/Images/Campaigns/FINAL_RC11-ENG-LORES-fnl2.pdf

The warnings had been there, from the likes of Fromm and the commonly accepted view of happiness consisting of "the pleasure of unrestricted consumption, push-button power and laziness" (1990, p. 324) came to fruition.

The Realisation

The relationship between education and work become transparent, not as a route to any form of happiness but to a new serfdom contingent on the hegemony of the employers, whose profits grew negatively with general happiness. Something had to happen. That happening, that moment of vision, was the backfiring of the instrumentalisation of happiness and the realisation that education was a contingency not of happiness but of wealth; and unfairly disturbed wealth, at that. The result a was a reaction to the lack of moral authority that individualistic capitalism offered and a turning back to Mill and his higher level pleasures, away from measurement of the disembodied features of an artificially constructed contentment: a contentment passively not to encourage citizens to take a stance on their own being. As in the Reformation and the destruction of the churches, in this Enlightenment the universities fell from grace. As they failed to secure employment, recruitment dropped. Massive overseas programmes ground to a haltand investment returns fell. At the same time, a gap widened between the owners of the means of education credential reproduction and those who taught as a passion, which saw standards drop. This all fitted well into the development model of higher education presented by Vincent-Lancrin, way back in 2004 when he mapped a six-stage eclosion of higher education. The first four stages of this process are:

1. Tradition (state-dominated provision);
2. Entrepreneurial (the inclusion of with-profit universities);
3. Free market (with a private tertiary sector regulated by private companies, as far as quality assurance and accreditation are concerned, and mostly funded through market mechanisms); and
4. Lifelong learning and open education.

At the fourth stage, universities were characterised by universal access for all ages and much less research. As Vincent-Lancrin states, "higher education becomes a source for recurrent professional development financed by companies, individuals

seeking recognised skill upgrading, and states. In an ageing society, more elderly people enrol for non-professional reasons. Universities become more learner- and demand-oriented, more teaching-oriented, with short courses, more distance learning, and more e-learning" (2004, p. 260).

The fifth stage was global networks, where:

> strong polarisation in academic status, with academic superstars and developers of 'learning tools' winning high status whereas the average teaching staff become less qualified and achieve lower status. Programmes and courses matter more than institutions. Intellectual property rights for substance as well as for teaching methods give high returns to their owners (ibid).

This was first seen in the on-line networks based around Stanford and Harvard universities.

The sixth stage, which has led to many clear linkages of happiness with education, is the basis of our current form of the provision of higher education: diversity of recognised learning—disappearance of universities. As Vincent-Lancrin predicted,

> People learn throughout their life, at work, at home, for personal and professional motivations, more and more by themselves and by sharing their expertise with other people interested in the same field. Professional education requiring hands-on practice, like surgery etc., is transmitted within businesses through an apprenticeship system or thanks to new sophisticated electronic devices (e.g. online). Technology is an enabler for the diffusion of information and knowledge. People learn as much and possibly more than today but in a different way: learning takes the model of 'open course' education, mostly free and non-commercial, involving many partnerships between individuals and institutions of all sorts (ibid).

Lee concludes that his process would indicate that the "value of traditional education will decrease and the value of educational credentials will decline. Inequality gaps will be removed and social cohesiveness between or amongst social strategy will improve" '(2011, p. 76) and so it happened. The university is dead. Long live higher education!

The Path to Happiness

As previously commented upon, the historic catalyst was the experimental online open-access programme from MIT and Harvard in the second decade of the twenty-first century. No longer was there merit is getting hugely into debt, undertaking courses riddled with employment skills and waiting upon no-show academic stars. Information was available everywhere and, in most cases, free. Employers declared they did not want certificates but able, free-thinking and cheap labour. Professional bodies reclaimed their moral rather than remunerative leadership, setting their own criteria of practice competence open to all and re-establishing a reputation lost when they outsourcing to universities. With political interference legally restructured and directed by the UNESCO to the provision of hygiene, power and food, people in general began to wonder and hope for what might be, again.

This wonderment was the beginning of the move in the turn of higher education, away from universities to a more expansive place for higher education, where people

thought more independently, questioned more deeply and acted more sincerely. This new higher level enlightenment gave meaning back to the nature of humanity. This revelation of what we might be was able to lift the cloak of consumer-inspired indifference and we saw individuals, groups and communities look toward themselves, recognising the transformative power of knowledge. In such a context, we were awoken to the fraudulent reputation of universities as contributors to the common good, revealed as a mechanism for the repetition of socio-economic stagnation. Self-help groups remerged. These were distinct from what institutional educators had become. These institutionalised academics were knowledge technicians (as Derrida refers to them, 2004, p. 96), or entrepreneurs, dogmatically harnessed to politico-economic ideologies, determined by and perpetuating a creed-based consumer society. These self-help groups would become known as transdisciplinary, under the old ideal of education divisions, and provided a pragmatic approach that concentrated on the most pressing and practical problems faced by society.

These new self-help groups had much in common with the initiatives of the old, early twentieth-century system of tutorial classes delivered by peripatetic academics, reaching into worker communities to deliver higher education (Turner 2009). In those days they were organised by the Workers' Educational Associations (WEAs) and exemplified through the work of Tawney (Tawney 1914). These changed the higher education sector to allow for pragmatic associations along the lines proposed by and based on his experience of the WEAs' Tutorial Classes, as the "nucleus of a university established in a place where no university exists" (1914, p. 77), a university in the community, not in the building of existing institutions. In the spirit of the WEA, like these real outreach programmes it was constantly in transition. In this important sense, what the community workers' university provided is distinct to its host community. In this it was a university of hope (see Halpin 2003), for it was a place for those who had been deprived of discourse by their failure to conform to a particular ruling paradigm.

What was proposed was a global reappraisal of what a university might be. Rather than locating knowledge outside the community, to be taken into it without even porous barriers, what was proposed was a flourishing learning space with blurred boundaries between theory and practice, in ways directed as social action and self-fulfilment. The *praxis* so created had benefit and hope as its goal, not personal interest and money. For sure, such institutions were risky to support because they might have actually made a difference to the chances ofthose excluded from the existing system. People might have perceived that, to address societal and community issues, they might need to change the nature of the problem itself.

Higher Education Without the University

The community of higher education support groupsprovided the space to be creative and were deeply rooted in its local community. They took their inspiration from Tawney but, rather than following his notion of the content of higher

education, they developed a more radical pragmatic notion of knowledge and truth. They envisaged a place, not where external taught degrees were delivered, but where problems of wellbeing are solved, opportunities created and assessments made of achievement rather than the individual. This is not a corporate or with-profit university, where techniques and skills are taught for an extrinsic purpose with the intent of replication but a place of creative engagement with pressing social problems. It is a practical approach where the infrastructure can exist within many educational buildings and is made available at all levels for communities. These, plus the technological and assessment changes, provide flexible delivery. It is edifying process, well underpinned by formal education up to age 18. This education finds ways for all, too, learning languages of the current social systems. It does not have truck with the nationalist past of nations and the negativity of culturally specific knowledge. It concentrates on how we can become better citizens, do our duty to others and fulfil our potential. Employment starts for all at 18, guaranteed by the multinationals that control the distribution of work through an assessment of potential. Promotions are evaluated on how that potential is realised. In doing so, happiness is enhanced by taking a strong stance on what one might be and working through ones' own being to achieve this. There is no benchmarking; no norm referencing. Just you, seeking to be the best you can.

Beyond the age of 18 comes the support of lifelong learning and professional development training. The purpose of lifelong learning at all levels of attainment is twofold; to encourage a new space to reveal one's profound boredom with the world as it is every day, and to provide the moral and intellectual competences that make sense of this newness and happiness. Heidegger suggests as much by claiming that education is the "very foundation of our being as human" (2007, p. 167) and that "real education lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entity by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it" (2007, p. 167). Thus, post-school education is ontological and requires one to examine and question what one has come to know as true in the shaping of one's being. In Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's cave (Plato's Doctrine of Truth), the movement that Heidegger describes is the move to understanding and changing the way one comports to the concealed, in a progressive unconcealing, in search of truth and understanding of being.

For Heidegger, education is understanding the essential being of the world of which we are a part. Thompson explains this as Heidegger's offering "ways of restoring meaning to the increasingly formal and empty ideals guiding contemporary education" (2005, p. 143). Such a restoration, however, is not something that can be packaged for consumption. It is ontological and is more like the education suggested by Rorty as edifying. This ontological approach has not the linearity of production, but the grasping of meaning in terms of temporality. The difference is that, instead of the being as the objective presence, it is being that can project its own possibility.

This is the edifying process for education that Rorty spoke of. As he puts it, "edifyingdiscourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings" (1979, p. 360). This is not to discount objective inquiry, but to place it as one among many ways

of knowing oneself. Again, I want to suggest that edification is a revealed learning from, and reacting to, the rupture of the moment of vision that shows our everyday profound boredom.

The result is a pedagogy that blends what we take as known, but stops short of claiming that it should be the determinant of our identity. As such, it is unlike the mass production model of accredited courses in formal educational settings, or the accelerated apprenticeships currently on offer, although the former does have a role to play. It requires us to allow the knowledge of being authentically in the world to be made manifest by the learner, using skills and judgement to turn upon the acculturated education that provides these very skills in the first place. Rorty takes this point seriously both in the *Philosophy* and *The Mirror of Nature* (1979), but more publically in his essay *Education as Socialization and as Individualization* (1999), where he makes clear that the role of compulsory education is to acculturate for the development of *das Man*, to provide the education that one is given by society and the role of higher education is criticallyto question those practices as ironists. He accepts the difficulties of implementation, but bases his argument on need, a prerequisite of formal early education, for tools and language sufficient to question one's being.

And hence the basis of our higher education without universities was developed and through it we have achieved happiness by diverting our energies and resource to developing potential and accepting less competitive economic progress for well-being, humanist and happiness even at the price of democracy.

Postscript[2]

There were of course problems. For this to work, all stakeholders to an edifying process needed to be engaged. This was a radical and profound change in our way of being and confronted many of the taken-for-granted norms of our then society. However, having taken the step toward happiness in the early twenty-first century, not to pursue it would have meant that the glimpse of a more authentic future would have been lost and we would have rapidly lost our self-identity to the anomie of an extended past

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[2] This paper is part of a series of papers that includes: *How the Economic of Greed Lead to the 13 Representatives*, *The Loss of Nationhood and the Growth of Global Citizenship*, and *Why it is More Important that Everyone has Food and Drink before Cars and Holidays.*

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Part II
Finding the Public Good

Higher Education and Public Good

Simon Marginson

Introduction

What is the basis of sociability, or 'public goods'? How do we maintain and reproduce the collective human environment that is essential to our existence? The neoliberal hegemony in policy, which models erstwhile public activities in terms of economic markets and business logics; and also the ubiquitous cultural emphases on autarkic individual self-realization and competitiveness; have created new questions about the sustainability of social relations. We are constantly aware of the conditions of society, on a daily basis; yet we know very little about public goods, or 'the public good', in terms that can be recognised by social science.

Although it is evident that higher education does not function in the manner of a capitalist market, and arguably can never so function (Marginson 2012c), methodological individualism, business models and market ideology have together blocked recognition of the public good or goods in higher education. How can we grasp the public good comprehensively? How do we move beyond a solely economic understanding of public goods, without setting aside production? How do we measure public goods while satisfying both inclusion and rigour? How common are public goods between social sites and across national borders? How can we enhance the incidence and value of public goods? Which institutions contribute to public goods and how? How does higher education contribute? Under what conditions? Arguably, research and conceptual development concerning the public functions of higher education institutions (HEIs) is important both in its own right and as a way into the larger problem of public goods.

HEIs are among the main social and economic institutions of advanced societies. They educate people in social skills and attributes on a large scale. They

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reproduce occupations, they provide structured opportunity and social mobility, they create and distribute codified knowledge, and they carry a heavy and growing traffic in cross-border relations. While there is no general theory of HEIs it is clear many of their goods are not captured as benefits for individual students or companies but are consumed jointly. These benefits are collective in nature. HEIs contribute to government, innovation capacity, and the formation and reproduction of both knowledge and relational human society. The public outcomes of higher education include these collective outcomes. The public outcomes also include certain individual goods associated with public collective benefits, such as the formation, in individual students, of social and intellectual capabilities basic to social literacy, scientific literacy, effective citizenship and economic competence. These individual capabilities are not associated with measured private benefits. Higher education has a special and multiple importance as a producer of public goods. HEIs also produce private goods for students and industry; that is, rivalrous and excludable benefits distributed on a zero-sum basis, such as the social status of graduates, earnings attributable to higher education, and income generated by intellectual property originating from university research. This does not negate their role in producing public goods. Yet higher education is some under pressure to focus primarily or exclusively on individualisable economic benefits. What happens to sociability when the pendulum swings more towards private goods? We need to better understand the collective costs entailed in this reduction.

To break open the problem of the public contribution of HEIs and systems, it is necessary to investigate relations between the state, society and university. The nation-building role is central to the evolution of the modern university (Scott 2011). However, state/society/university relations vary across the world, as do conceptions and practices of public goods. Arguably any of the differing national/cultural traditions have the potential to contribute to the common pool of ideas about, and practices of, the social and collective aspects of human existence—including the public dimension of higher education, and strategies for augmenting it. Meanings of 'higher education', 'society', 'state', 'government', 'public' and 'private' are not uniform or fixed but are nationally and culturally nested (Enders and Jongbloed 2007). Within these broad scale variations there are differences within national systems in the activities of individual HEIs. Public goods in higher education and research have a national dimension, in some locations a regional dimension, and also a global dimension whereby 'global public goods' (Kaul et al. 1999) are produced and distributed. Nations and HEIs vary in the extent to which they are globally active. Yet there are also growing elements in common between HEIs, especially research-intensive universities, amid global and regional convergence in knowledge, HEIs and state practices. Given the centrality of HEIs, and the importance of questions of 'public' across the world, by identifying the shared 'public' elements in higher education we can better understand what nations, and human societies, have in common. This suggests an inquiry into higher education and public good can be usefully pursued on a comparative basis, in order to identify generic dynamics of the collective in higher education.

Nevertheless, inquiry into public goods presents significant methodological challenges because of the nature of those goods: complex, difficult to measure,

globally variant. Collective benefits are a frontier problem in social research. We lack firm, consistent definitions, modes of observation, and pathways to measuring, public goods in higher education. No single disciplinary framework has been adequate to the task. The applied policy economics that is the principle discipline of government has been unable to adequately capture those goods. Many existing concepts of public goods are solely normative. Evidence-based methods and means of measurement are under-developed. In short, we need stronger concepts and analytical tools.

Higher Education as a Social Sector

Higher education institutions, especially large research universities, are major concentrations of political, social, economic, intellectual and communicative resources. They reach freely across populations and cultures and connect 'thickly' to government, professions, industry and the arts. Their functions centre on the creation, codification and transmission of knowledge, and certification of graduates. The potential of higher education is larger than suggested by the model of university as self-serving firm current in policy discourse in the English-speaking countries. The social meanings of HEIs derive from their many connections with other social sectors and their continuing direct and indirect effects in many people's lives.

More global forms of higher education are now gathering momentum: a fast growing informal sub-sector on the Internet led by Mass Online Open Courseware (MOOC) programs produced by the leading American universities; formal cross-border distance learning; and university branches outside the parent country. But higher education still largely takes the form of institutions physically located in, and closely engaged in, nations (and regions) and cities. HEIs are also visible and connected to each other in the global environment, and subject to continuous comparison and rank-ordering. University ranking has normalizing effects (Hazelkorn 2011) generating convergence on the Americanized model of 'Global Research University' (Ma 2008) inherent in ranking systems. HEIs also operate in an open information setting, with multiple potentials for collaboration, in which national borders are routinely crossed, and identities are continually made and self-made in encounters with diverse others. We can imagine higher education as a single world-wide arrangement: not a unitary global system but a complex combination of (i) global flows of words, ideas, knowledge, finance, and inter-HEI dealings; with (ii) national higher education systems led by governments and shaped by history, law, policy and funding; and (iii) single HEIs operating locally, nationally and globally. This world-wide arrangement is imperfectly integrated. There are uneven and changing patterns of engagement and communication, zones of autonomy and separation, stable and unstable hierarchies. Relations are structured by both cooperation and competition. There are fecund mutual influences, doggedly persistent differences, and surprising similarities of approach across borders. This bounded, complex, hierarchical, fragmented, contested, product-making,

subject-forming, continually transforming world-wide setting; with its rules, discourses and exchanges; recalls Bourdieu's (1993) notion of a 'field of power'.

Despite their globalised character (King et al. 2011) and various traditions of autonomy and academic freedom, mainstream HEIs are above all creatures of society-building and nation-building by states (Scott 2011), and in Europe of the Europeanization project. This is true in relation to all public HEIs, many private HEIs—in most nations they are closely regulated, with the exception of online institutions—and also in relation to HEIs' global activities. Through higher education, states provide comprehensive social opportunity and vocational training, reaching well over half the school leavers in some countries, and sustain basic research and research training. HEIs are often central to development in subnational regions (OECD 2007). 'Global competition states' (Cerny 2007) model the nation-building role of HEIs in terms of national economy and prosperity. HEIs are expected to advance the global competitiveness of the nation by preparing and attracting knowledge-intensive labour, and fostering innovation.

State management of HEIs is not always made explicit. Increasingly contemporary states achieve policy objectives not through direct provision by through the arms-length steering of actors in semi-government instrumentalities, universities, NGOs and the private sphere, using codes, financial incentives and prohibitions (Rose 1999). Further, the policy frameworks used by governments often model HEIs as economic units in a competitive market, and students as consumers (Marginson 1997). New Public Management reform enhances the scope of HEI executives. In many nations the government share of HEIs' income is falling (OECD 2012), a trend exacerbated in the post-2008 recession. Nevertheless, in the neo-liberal era states have not reduced their hold on higher education; nor has the broader public withdrawn. State interest in the sector has been enhanced by globalisation, the economics of innovation, and the growth of student participation. In all countries higher education is politicised and the object of societal and economic expectations. In many countries it is subject to extensive public debate. It is not the exclusive province of student consumers and employers as the market model implies.

Higher education departs from orthodox economic markets in another respect (Marginson 1997, 2012c). Universities produce status goods (Hirsch 1976; Frank and Cook 1995), student places and certificates that are subject to absolute scarcity. Elite universities are not driven by profit maximization or market share. They do not expand to meet all demand. The hierarchy of elite HEIs is stable over long periods, unlike producer hierarchies in other industries. Leading HEIs are more like core institutions of government, such as the legal system, than firms. Commercial training and mass education HEIs are more demand dependent and less stable.

In sum, research universities in all countries are best understood as semi-independent institutions tied to the state. The relationship with the state varies by type of HEI. The strongest research HEIs have the most organisational agency and most scope for global engagement and partial disembedding in relation to the nation-state. The relationship with the state also varies by country and culture. In East Asia, Russia and Latin America the leading universities are publicly positioned as

autonomous arms of government. Nevertheless, even in the USA, where higher education has long been defined as a market, federal programs and regulation crucially shape that 'market', e.g. in relation to student loans, research funding, intellectual property, for-profits (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004); and universities' global strategies coincide with state policy.

While higher education everywhere is implicated in the projects of states, these projects, and the state-HEI relation, also vary significantly. As noted, relations between state/society/HEIs, including ideas and practices of the 'public' mission, are shaped by long-term national and cultural traditions and also by differing hybridisations between those traditions and global modernization. It is known that across the world there is marked variation in private/public funding balances in higher education (OECD 2012). Variations in notions of public good are less well understood. Within the global setting we can identify distinctive *meta-national regional* approaches to higher education, deriving from differing ideas of the social character of HEIs, the scope and responsibilities of government and family, and relations between family, state, professions, employers and HEIs. These regional variations are shaped by differences in the role of the state, and in political and educational cultures (Marginson 2012a). In English-speaking countries there are North American and Westminster systems. The role of national government is felt more directly in the UK, Australia and New Zealand than in the United States and Canada. Europe has sub-regional traditions like Nordic (Valimaa 2011), Germanic and Francophone. There is Russian higher education (Smolentseva 2003), Latin American (Marginson 2012b), the Post-Confucian systems in East Asia and Singapore (Marginson 2011), South Asia, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

Contrast the English-speaking systems and Post-Confucian systems. In the Anglo-American world and where the British colonial legacy is strong, Adam Smith's limited liberal state prevails, with separations between government-market and government-civil society. Normative individualism problematizes 'collective' and 'public'. State agendas are pursued in the language of deregulation; though at the same time, state subsidies are often used to buy the participation of poor families in tertiary education. Tensions on the state/non-state border dominate politics, the correspondingly question of university autonomy dominates the politics of higher education. In the Sinic East Asia, in both single-party and multi-party polities, a more comprehensive state prevails. This form of state is in direct lineage from the Qin and Han dynasties in China in the third century BC. In the Sinic world government and politics are typically dominant in relation to economy and civil society (Gernet 1996). The state's role in ordering society is less often questioned than it is in the West (Tu Wei-Ming 1999, p. 2). Notions of social responsibility are more holistic than in English-speaking systems (Zha 2011a), and notions of the individual are inclusive, taking in the social other. Nonetheless the endemic debate in Western universities, between higher education for instrumental economic purposes and higher education for moral formation and social enrichment, plays out also in East Asia (Bai 2010; Xiong 2011).

Sinic universities are openly part of the state, albeit with scope behind closed university doors for independent scholarship, debate and criticism of state practices.

Confucian educational cultivation at home, and 'one-chance' examinations that allocate social status via entry to high status universities, underpin near universal desires for education that extend even to very poor families. The state does not need to incentivize poor families to participate in tertiary education. The post-Confucian desire for education is universal. Post-Confucian takeoff in higher education and science (Marginson 2012a) is created not only through performance-focused state policy, state-financed infrastructure and international benchmarking, but by symbiosis between state and family. Yet while in East Asia comprehensive states are joined to high household funding and stratified systems, in Nordic countries the state provides equitable access to universal high quality public services, though the Nordic model is now under pressure (Valimaa 2005). Compared to East Asia, and notwithstanding recent funding cuts, higher education in most English-speaking nations and all of Western Europe is more state dependent in the economic sense, while more autonomous from direct state ordering in the political sense.

The way to a generic analysis of higher education and public goods lies through nuanced exploration of national practices and regional cultural variations, enabling the identification not only differences but of commonalities of approach. This requires an interdisciplinary approach. A political economy framework tends to flatten out those qualitative differences that are nested in cultural practices. But with political economies converging globally, cultural traditions and practices are the medium in which political economic practices and global trends are articulated in varied ways. This does not mean a relativist cultural analysis replaces a generic political economy analysis. Arguably, both are needed. Together their analytical power is maximized.

Conceptual Frameworks for Identifying Public Goods in HEIs

The politicised nature of public outcomes in higher education, together with the difficulty of identifying public goods, especially on a comprehensive basis, tends to favour *a priori* and normative approaches. Many statements by HEIs, HEI organizations and governments address the issue with rhetorical claims about productivity, knowledge, literacy, culture, local economies, social equality, graduate training in leadership, democracy, tolerance and global understanding; even universals like 'civilization' and 'the future of humanity'. Such claims are rarely tested empirically. But notions of 'public' with no grounding in empirically observable practices tell us nothing. The other problem is narrow approaches. As noted, economics is the main discipline used for empirical investigation of public goods. But neo-classical policy economics employs analytical frameworks that privilege market transactions and use an a priori idea of 'public' that excludes much of what HEIs do, especially the collective goods.

There are three disciplinary approaches to the public outcomes of higher education, grounded in economics, political theory, and communications theory respectively. The public goods are modeled as a production, as a polity or part of

a polity, and as a communicative network. No single approach on its own can provide a comprehensive theorization. Arguably, however, all have something to contribute to the understanding of sociability.

In economics Samuelson (1954) provides an influential schema for distinguishing public and private goods. Public goods are defined not by ownership (state or non state) but by social character. Public goods are one or both of non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Goods are non-rivalrous when consumed by any number of people without being depleted, for example knowledge of a mathematical theorem, which everywhere sustains its use value indefinitely on the basis of free access. Goods are non-excludable when the benefits cannot be confined to individual buyers and are consumed collectively, such as national defence. Private goods are neither non-rivalrous nor non-excludable. Private goods can be produced and distributed as individualized commodities in economic markets. Public goods and part-public goods are unproduced or under-produced in markets. Ostrom (2010, p. 642) notes this approach is consistent with the idea of an 'institutional world' divided between 'private property exchanges in a market setting and government-owned property organized by a public hierarchy'. Samuelson's schema, while couched in generic terms, embodies the norms of one kind of society and polity. It applies best in Anglo-American nations in which the role of government is limited, private/public tend to be practised as zero-sum, and ideally, all production occurs in markets unless there is market failure. But the world is not as neatly divided as Samuelson suggests, and subsequent work in economics has rendered his public/private distinction rather more complex.

After Buchanan's 'club goods' (1965), Ostrom (2010) adds 'toll goods' exclusive to part populations but non-rivalrous in the group, as in collegial relations in universities. Stiglitz (1999) reflects on the public good nature of knowledge, which affects both research and teaching. At first new knowledge is confined to its creator, and can provide exclusive first mover advantage as a private good. Once communicated knowledge is a classical public good that retains its value no matter how often it is used. Across the world, regardless of public/private financing in other respects, basic research is subject to market failure and funded by states or philanthropy. Despite this, devices like journal pay-walls artificially prolong the excludability of texts or artefacts embodying particular knowledge. Those who seek free access to university research assert the natural form. The OECD (2008) notes the potential for creativity in innovation, especially collaborative creativity, is maximized when knowledge flows freely and quickly. Other economists emphasize that intellectual property barriers provide incentives to creators. Economics produces one or another summation of public goods, depending on the political and technical assumptions in which the analysis is nested. In the economics of education, neo-liberals downplay the problem of market failure and the scope for collective goods, favouring markets and high tuition (e.g. Friedman 1962); endogenous growth theorists tend to talk up the roles of public goods and public investment (e.g. Romer 1990).

One strand of political theory models the 'public good' as comprehensive or universal, akin to an all-inclusive polity. A more precise concept, though difficult

to operate empirically, is the 'commons', a shared resource utilized by all not subject to scarcity (Mansbridge 1998). Universal education systems may take this form but the stratification of HEIs on the basis of status or resources qualifies the notion. Another strand in political theory models HEIs as a semi-independent adjunct to the state with a distinctive role as source of criticism and new ideas and options for strategy. Calhoun (1992) and Pusser (2006) apply Habermas's (1989) notion of the 'public sphere' to the broad political role of higher education.

Habermas describes the public sphere in eighteenth-century London as the field of discussion, debate and opinion in salons, coffee shops, counting houses and semi-government agencies where people met and opinions were formed and communicated on the matters of the day. Organizationally separate from the state but focused on it, the public sphere provided it with critical reflexivity. Likewise, in American research universities, expert information and education help the public to reach considered opinions (Calhoun 1992). Pusser (2006) models the university as zone of reasoned argument and contending values. American higher education has been medium for successive political and socio-cultural transformations, such as 1960s civil rights. In China, leading national universities, especially Peking University, perform an analogous role inside the party-state, as a space of criticism that is continually connected to power within the framework of Sinic practices of constructive intellectual authority and responsibility (Yang 2009; Hayhoe 2011; Zha 2011a). Because of its advanced capacity to form self-altering agents (Castoriadis 1987, p. 372) and engender critical intellectual reflexivities, and ease of movement across boundaries, at times, in East and West, higher education incubates advanced democratic formations. This suggests that one test of the 'public' university is the extent that it provides space for criticism, challenge and new kinds of public space.

Habermas's public sphere also highlights the role of communication in constituting 'public'. Some theorists define 'public' as the network of organizations, public and private, constituting the common communicative space (for contrasting but potentially compatible ideas about the communicative public space see Castells 2000; Cunningham 2012; Drache 2010). Here research universities are quintessentially 'public' in their capacity. Early adopters of the Internet all over the world, they are intensively engaged in global, regional and local/national networks.

However defined, the public outcomes of higher education have three spatial dimensions. The national dimension encompasses sub-national regions like states/provinces, and cities. Knowledge about public goods in higher education mostly imagines HEIs as solely in a national system and defines their outcomes in national political terms. But HEIs also operate regionally and globally. The notion of global public goods, which emerged from the work of the United Nations Development Program on ecological sustainability and cross-border refugees, provides another conceptual framework, combining economic theory with an inclusive polity. Global public goods are 'goods that have a significant element of non-rivalry and/or non-excludability and are made broadly available across populations on a global scale. They affect more than one group of countries' (Kaul et al. 1999, pp. 2–3). Such goods are increasingly important in higher education, with its thick cross-border flows of knowledge and people, especially in research.

The Empirical Terrain

On the empirical terrain many practices can be identified as 'public' in whole or part. In almost all national higher education systems, regardless of political culture, the growth of student participation, and enhancement of social equity in participation, are seen as public goals (OECD 2008)—though around the world, there is much variation in notions of 'equity' and programs designed to achieve it. Social equity is a keystone public good that conditions other public (and private) goods. Goods like social literacy and collective citizenship are maximized when there is universal access to good quality education. Three other public goods common to most systems, albeit difficult to monitor, are industry innovation via research; the 'engagement' of HEIs (Gibbons 1998) in servicing local populations, cities and sub-national-regions; and internationalization via student and academic mobility and cross-border HEI collaboration (Knight 2004). Despite much research on these and other outputs, no study is comprehensive.

McMahon (2009), in the economics of education, integrates other studies to summarise the private and public goods in terms of individualised benefits to students. The limitations of this method are that it downplays the collective benefits; it limits scrutiny to outcomes assigned prices or shadow prices, and reflects the conventions of North American higher education. McMahon finds the non-market benefits of higher education exceed the market-derived benefits. Private non-market benefits for individuals, like health and longevity for graduate and children, and better savings patterns, average USD $38,020 per graduate per year, 22 % more than the extra earnings benefits per graduate per year ($31,174). The social (collective) benefits of higher education include its contribution to stable, cohesive and secure environments, more efficient labour markets, faster and wider diffusion of new knowledge, higher economic growth, viable social networks and civic institutions, cultural tolerance, and enhanced democracy. These direct non-market social benefits of higher education—externalities received by persons other than graduates, including future generations—average $27,726 per graduate per year. McMahon notes the full externalities of HEIs also include indirect social benefits, the contribution of the direct social benefits to value generated in private earnings and private non-market benefits. Once this indirect element is included, externalities total 52 % of all benefits of higher education. McMahon argues that because externalities are subject to market failure, more than half the costs of higher education should be financed by persons other than the student (p. 2).

Yet tuition regimes are not primarily based on calculations of the value of externalities. The public/private balance of costs can vary sharply in higher education systems similar in other respects. In two-thirds of the OECD countries state-dependent institutions charge domestic students under USD $1,500 per year. In the five Nordic countries, the Czech Republic and Turkey, public students pay no fees. Tuition fees in English-speaking systems are relatively high: in the UK the norm is 9,000 pounds per year. In Japan and Korea private outweighs public funding by three to one (OECD 2012) and China may be heading towards this level. In Russia

free student places sit alongside low fee and high fee places. These variations reflect historical, cultural and political factors like citizen entitlements. There appears to be little fit between the public/private balance of costs and the public/private balance of benefits. In high fee education, some public goods are financed by private tuition (e.g. formation of citizenship). In free systems governments fund the production of private goods (e.g. scarce places in sought after universities and programs). This does not negate the potential for market failure in public goods, but suggests it is not linearly related to financing, and is likely to be socially and culturally nested.

Perhaps the dimension of public goods in higher education that is most neglected is that of global public goods, which were first discussed by the present author (Marginson 2007; Marginson and van der Wende 2009). The concept has since entered policy discourse in several nations, including Singapore, South Korea and the US (Sharma 2011). Globalisation has enlarged the space for free 'public' exchange (Peters et al. 2009). The considerable potential for global public goods is mostly under-recognised. Global public goods range from capacity building in developing nations to the inadvertent fostering of global cosmopolitanism in education export markets. Public research goods include not only inter-university collaboration on common problems like epidemic disease but all scholarly knowledge that crosses borders.

Policy Problems

The absence of an agreed nomenclature for classifying public outcomes, the lack of tools for monitoring and measurement in most areas, and the normatively-charged nature of the discussion, have generated policy lacunae in relation to the difficult problem of higher education and public goods. As noted, policy-makers take an approach that is either too broad and vague, so that the extant notions of public goods are meaningless; or an approach that is too narrow, using *a priori* economic methods solely focused on readily measured benefits. Both approaches disable policy: either way, public goods cannot be effectively identified and regulated.

The narrow economic approach mostly understands the HEI outcomes as private earnings and rates of return. This policy bias is dominant in English-speaking countries. Over time it weakens the rationale for public planning and public funding except in basic research, emptying out awareness of the public outcomes of teaching, except in social equity and engagement. Successive reductions in public subsidies are justified by pointing to measured private earnings (Dawkins 1988; Browne 2010; Norton 2012). Anglo-American policy enjoys global influence in a wide range of other jurisdictions. Yet, arguably, the Anglo-American discussion of public goals in higher education is particularly unhelpful. Concepts and policy mechanisms have become largely frozen, reducing state purchase on the higher education sector. So long as private/public are treated as zero-sum and public goods seen as marginalised or diffuse, there appears little prospect of a forward move in conception, practice or measurement of public goods. There has

been little effort to explore the measurement of public goods, except in relation to social inclusion and balance in student participation. Without conceptual and practical clarity on public goods in higher education, governments around the world have found it relatively easy to make large-scale cuts to higher education budgets in recession (Eggins and West 2010; Douglass 2010; UNESCO Bangkok 2012); and also to introduce large scale marketization reforms as in the UK, where public subsidies for non-STEM teaching are now zero, without regard for the short-term or long-term effects on collective benefits.

Likewise, there is little awareness or clarification of global public goods in higher education. This is partly explained by the absence of a global state or regulatory framework. Because global public goods are under-recognised they are under-funded and probably under-produced. No one nation takes responsibility for them. No global protocols regulate equity in distribution. Yet global public goods raise issues of regulation and financing that should be considered. For example, when research in one nation generates benefits elsewhere, should the cost of research be shared between producer and consumer? What governance mechanisms could identify, regulate and finance global public goods in education and knowledge? (Kaul et al. 2003). Inversely, negative global externalities ('global public bads') such as brain drain raise questions about cross-border compensation for countries losing their 'brains'.

Recognition of global public goods also suggests the question of *whose* public goods. Each nation (and institution) has its own global projects and distinctive ideas of global good. Thus there are multiple—partly overlapping—global public goods. However the dominant ideas of global public goods are skewed towards the strong higher education nations (Naidoo 2010). For example the use of English as a global language and the standardization of science as a single system constitute global public goods to the extent that all institutions communicate and share a common system; but diversity of knowledge is another, often contrary, global public good. In nations with academic cultures in, say, Spanish, English-language dominated globalization can generate both public goods *and* 'public bads'. The 'bads' are minimized when there are broad two-way flows between national and global domains (Marginson and Ordorika 2011). The key is to identify, monitor and broaden the common global ground. The problem of 'whose public goods', and the contested nature of the global, highlight the value of comparative research.

Conclusion: One Possible Way Forward

How can we investigate higher education and public good(s) so as to advance concepts, empirical understanding and policy wisdom? In contrast to the normative and *a priori* conceptions that have hitherto dominated ideas about public goods in higher education, two moves are essential. First, it would seem best to adopt an empirical and cross-disciplinary inclusive method (here normative practices of 'public' in higher education are among the objects of study rather than the horizon of inquiry). Second, this kind of work requires an adaptive theory approach

(Layder 1998). Using this method the starting notion of public goods is left partly open, to maximize inclusions from the higher education systems under study. Thus the notion of 'public goods' is used to frame the project; it functions as an object of study during empirical research; and then, having been developed during the processes of research and data synthesis, a revised form of that starting notion—all going well a newly coherent generic definition of public goods in higher education—becomes the outcome of the inquiry.

Starting Notion of Public Good

What follows is more tentative than the preceding analysis and requires empirical test. Rather than starting from a notion of public goods in higher education that is drawn from one discipline it would seem best to begin with a combination of economics and sociology. This could draw on Samuelson's (1954) distinction between public and private goods, his notion of rivalry and excludability as determinants, and the idea of public goods, including collective goods, as goods subject to market failure and dependent on governments or philanthropy. Whether such public goods are consumed individually (e.g. productivity spillovers at work) or jointly, they require a policy, administrative or donor process. However, it would be unwise to adopt Samuelson's assumption that relations between public and private goods are zero-sum. Observation suggests that in higher education, as in other social sectors, public goods and private goods may be advanced at the same time, rather than the one necessarily excluding the other. Indeed, one may function as condition of the other; for example the education of students in elite HEIs may advance citizenship, or internationalization. These potentials are open-ended. For these reasons, the public/private balance of funding cannot be determined by the public/private balance of goods created, though the reverse causation partly applies: funding is one (but only one) factor that determines whether the goods are public or private. High tuition enhances private goods.

Samuelson's assumption that public goods are exhaustively defined by their natural or intrinsic characteristics also seems mistaken. Whether an activity is 'public' or 'private' is shaped not by whether markets are intrinsically possible—that would privileges markets as the norm of social organisation—but by social arrangements. The category of 'public' can extend beyond residual goods subject to market failure. if there is no hierarchy between HEIs and student places are universally accessible, the 'public' element is enhanced. Hence both teaching and research can be more or less rivalrous and/or excludable in character. Research, when first created and when subject to property arrangements, can be exclusive. Otherwise it is public. The knowledge contents of teaching are mostly non-excludable and non-rivalrous. MIT, Harvard and Stanford provide free access to MOOC units on the Internet, without impairing the private value of their face-to-face Ivy League degrees. Degree programs entail more than knowledge. Places in MIT or Stanford provide scarce valuable private goods, constituting zero-sum social

positions and access to elite networks. This enables high fees. Teaching programs are mixed, variable and ambiguous, embodying a wide range of combinations of public and private goods.

Measurability

One key question is the measurability of public goods in higher education. To conduct empirical research it is necessary to make provisional decisions on this; yet conclusive decisions about measurability require research. In the face of this circularity the issue must be kept partly open.

Keynes notes in his *Treatise on Probability* (1921) that qualities apprehended by social science can be divided into three categories: those open to measurement and computation, those to which a precise number cannot be assigned but are capable of rank ordering (more/less, better/worse), and those that can be apprehended only in the exercise of expert judgment. All three categories are relevant. Quantification provides states and HEIs with more direct purchase on the problem, but given the overlapping and multiple nature of these public goods, and the fact only some can be measured, all computations are partial in reach.

Globalised Comparative Methods

The transformative (and problematic) impact of global HEI rankings (Hazelkorn 2011) shows the growing weight of the global dimension. But orthodox comparative education cannot simultaneously comprehend both global and national elements. The orthodox method compares bounded national systems using templates grounded in the home country, most often the United States. This tends to downplay global elements and systems such as policy borrowing, people mobility and cross-border science, though these elements have a strong presence in both public and private goods. The part-global integration of higher education and knowledge, and the emergence of a more plural higher education world, in which the European Higher Education Area and the East Asian systems have larger roles, reducing Anglo-American dominance, highlights the limits of this approach (Marginson and Mollis 2001). This suggests we need an alternate *relational* method (Marginson 2008; 2010a) that (a) envisages worldwide higher education as a unified field of heterogeneous organizations, national systems and cross-border agencies, including all relations inside, between or across nations; (b) combines the global, national and local dimensions of action (Marginson and Rhoades 2002) while acknowledging pan-national regions (Dale and Robertson 2009) and scales of subject-relations; and (c) engages concepts, values and practices from higher education traditions other than the Anglo-American, like the French, German, Nordic, Latin American, Japanese, and Chinese.

Here the guiding meta-assumption is that the route to common understanding lies through national case studies that foreground diversity. Using this method the generic language about public goods, devised after empirical investigation in contrasting sites, will be site-sensitive and inclusive of the major systems and traditions, not grounded in only one (Zha 2011b).

In a 2008–2011 study of Asia Pacific universities for the Australian Research Council, the author distinguished global and national effects, focused on relations between them, and separated elements common to the universities in the study from context specific elements. This approach can be extended to identify definitions and practices of national public goods in higher education, through case studies that investigate contrasting national systems; distinguish that which is common to national public goods across the different systems from that which is nation-context bound; interpret observed public goods in the context of differing national/regional political cultures, state practices and education cultures; and devise generic terms and indicators that integrate notions of public goods from the range of national/regional traditions.

The above argument suggests that in order to situate public goods effectively within each national system and cultural tradition, empirical data should be interrogated in terms of:

1. *The state and political culture*: Ideas and practices of the roles, responsibility and scope of government, state relations with economic markets and civil society, prevailing ideas of 'society' and 'public'.
2. *Relations between government and HEIs*: HEIs and state/society building, autonomy, regulation, funding, discursive/other practices of the social and economic roles of HEIs.
3. *Social-educational culture*: Social and economic expectations of higher education, family educational practices, examinations/social selection, social mobility, school-university relations.
4. *System organization in higher education*: Institutional stratification, competition and cooperation between HEIs, and the diversification of public and private goods.
5. *The private sector and public goods*: State/society/HEI relations in that sector.
6. *The global perspectives and activities of HEIs*: Global imaginings, global position and positioning, cross-border linkages and mobility, global policy borrowing and commonalities.
7. *Public goods in higher education:* Specific programs and practices of HEIs and systems, including measurement of the relevant activities, that contribute to public goods (broadly defined) in the national system concerned; the funding of those activities, and the relation between funding and activity.

Finally, the inquiry should incorporate global public goods in cross-border flows and systems, identifying both nationally-specific elements and globally common elements. Global public goods can be identified from the viewpoints of several national/regional traditions, enabling both triangulation between perspectives and also the isolation of common elements.

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Forces in Tension: The State, Civil Society and Market in the Future of the University

Brian Pusser

> *Although it is one of our oldest social institutions, the university today finds itself in a quite novel position in society. It faces its new role with few precedents to fall back on, with little but platitudes to mask the nakedness of the change. Instead of platitudes and nostalgic glances backward to what it once was, the university needs a rigorous look at the reality of the world it occupies today—Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University 1963.*

The year 2013 marks the fiftieth anniversary of Clark Kerr's Godkin Lectures at Harvard University, published in the first edition of his influential work, *The Uses of the University* (Kerr 1963). Then president of the University of California system, Kerr set out a remarkably thorough and prescient vision of the research university, its challenges and its potentials. While in subsequent editions Kerr offered new perspectives on a number of functions and adjusted some of his priorities, he remained convinced of the need for a better understanding of the political life of the university, and the ways in which it would be shaped by powerful internal and external forces. In delivering the original lectures in 1963, Kerr noted, "Beyond the formal structure of power, as lodged in students, faculty, administration or 'public' instrumentalities, lie the sources of informal influence. The American system is particularly sensitive to its many particular publics" (2001, p. 20). In a 2001 addendum, he added urgency to his claim: "The most critical pressures will be on those who handle the flow of transactions between universities and the external society's power centers. Will they know enough, care enough, be vested with sufficient high-level, long-term judgment to manage the flow effectively?" (Kerr 2001, p. 225).

In his first Godkin Lecture, Kerr also noted the lack of scholarship on the university. In many respects, that challenge has been redressed. Scholarship on post-secondary policy formation and implementation, organization and governance, research, access, student success and finance is far more prevalent than a half century ago. That work generally draws on economics, sociology, organizations studies, and, to a lesser degree, political science, and has long been dominated, though not

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exclusively driven, by rational choice and pluralist approaches (Pusser 2008; Pusser and Marginson 2012) . However, half a century later, relatively little has changed in the amount of research in the United States on the role of Kerr's "external society's power centers" in shaping the research university. The university remains a dynamic terrain of social, political, economic, discursive and symbolic contest, yet research and scholarship relying on critical perspectives or applying the fundamental theories of the state and political economic contest are too rare.

In contemporary scholarship, as in Kerr's day, a missing element for understanding the future of the university is a conceptual model of the relationship of the university to three essential spheres of contest that exist in tension with one another: the state, the civil society and market forces. Such a framework calls for a contextualization of these contests within a broadly defined political arena, in which power and interests loom large and acknowledgement that universities themselves have agency and some authority to make, or resist, alliances with actors, interests and associations in each sphere (Pusser 2008, 2011; Rhoades 1992). The aim of this chapter is to sketch the boundaries of a critical theoretical model of the university centered on the role of the state, civil society and market relations, as a guide to some ways in which new understandings of the university may be realized.

The State and Higher Education

The state has not been a frequent unit of analysis in the study of universities, or in the scholarship of the broader arena of higher education in the United States [1] (Barrow 1990; Loss 2012; Ordorika 2003; Parsons 1997; Pusser 2008; Rhoades 1992; Slaughter 1990). The traditionally decentralized approach to providing education in the U.S., which has vested considerable authority and responsibility for resource allocation to each of the country's fifty individual states, has obscured the importance and utility of state theoretical approaches to understanding universities and the national higher education system. However, the most useful question for understanding the future of the university in the U.S. is the same as in the rest of the world: what is the fundamental role of higher education in the state project? The answer provides a pathway to understanding the missions, institutional forms, regulations, patterns of subsidy and patterns of student access that shape higher education in unique contexts.

The role of the state in education is fluid, shifting at various points in the history and evolution of the national project. Scholars argue for some universal understandings, including that the state is an arena of contest over the essential purpose

[1] Throughout this chapter I distinguish between colleges, which may be either 2-year or 4-year and primarily serve undergraduates, universities, which include Master's level graduate training, research, and perhaps professional schools, and research universities, which incorporate undergraduate education, graduate and professional schools, doctoral programs, and high levels of research. When referring to the arena of higher education, or the higher education system, I include all of these institutions as providers of postsecondary education.

of education, and that the role of education in the state is determined by demands from the civil society, market forces, and the state itself (Carnoy and Levin 1985). Those competing demands reflect distinct visions of the role of education in the state that vary according to history, context and power, where the state is seen as both enhancing economic development and redressing historical and contemporary inequalities emerging from market activity (Carnoy 1984). Contest over the role of education in the state takes place in a variety of ways and venues, including the political arena, social movements, and through the efforts of the state and its institutions. Sheila Slaughter, in her own work (1990) and in collaboration with others (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004), has defined the essential role of higher education in the contemporary state as "academic capitalism," where higher education is an extension of the fundamental orientation of the broader political economy to the creation and preservation of capital. Labaree (1997) has set out three fundamentals goals for education in the U.S.: the preparation of democratic citizens (democratic equality), the preparation of skilled laborers and professionals as part of a broader commitment to economic development (social efficiency), and to be a source of opportunity for individual economic advancement (social mobility). While Labaree does not address higher education specifically, his conclusion that the social efficiency and social mobility goals are dominant in the elementary-secondary realm is similar to Slaughter's findings for the postsecondary arena.

From a critical-theoretical perspective, public universities can be conceptualized as political institutions of the state (Ordorika 2003; Pusser 2008). Given the key role of the state in chartering, regulating and providing subsidies for private colleges and universities, many of the same conditions of contest and control apply to those institutions. Under state charter, colleges and universities generate significant public costs and allocate scarce benefits, in a process made possible by public authority and subsidies. The processes by which they garner legitimacy and resources, and by which they allocate costs and benefits, are adjudicated through political, social and economic contest. At the same time that it serves as a site of contest over the role of education in the state project, the university plays a relatively unique role as an instrument in broader political contests (Ordorika 2003; Pusser 2004). The symbolic importance and visibility of universities assures that major national and international struggles over equity, resource allocation, opportunity and social justice are played out in debates over policies and practices at colleges and universities, on occasion before they emerge in the wider political economy (Cohen 2002).

The state charters or licenses nearly every type of postsecondary education in the United States. It shapes the university through three fundamental functions that vary in degree and kind depending on context and the demands of the broader society: provision, subsidy and regulation. The state may provide higher education directly through public, nonprofit institutions. It may provide subsidies to public, private, nonprofit or for-profit institutions, and it has the power to regulate the activities of every type of postsecondary institution. In many cases, the state relies on some combination of these three functions to shape the missions, provide financial support and ensure compliance with the social, political and

economic demands placed on universities. The state, in concert with the judicial branches of government, holds authority over universities in the United States, yet it is the political arena that shapes demands from various interests into the policies that guide the activities and outcomes of universities of all types. While all of the forces discussed here shape the contemporary university, in the neoliberal moment the market has become the dominant force (Pusser et al. 2011).

State-Centered and Civil Society Institutional Alignments

Moving to a more precise understanding of the university and the state calls for revisiting the dominant typology for understanding the institutional array. Scholars and policy makers in the United States have long relied on a basic distinction between "public" and "private" postsecondary institutions, in which oversight of the former is controlled by state-level legislative bodies and political actors, and the latter by their own trustees. A key federal site for postsecondary data collection, the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (Department of Education 2012) makes the distinction this way: "Institutional Control: A classification of whether an institution is operated by publicly elected or appointed officials (public control) or by privately elected or appointed officials and derives its major source of funds from private sources (private control)." [2] More recently, scholars have noted increasing commonality in governance (King 2007) and finance (Geiger 2007), along with a growing convergence of purposes in each sector (Enders and Jongbloed 2007; Marginson 2007).

The traditional public–private institutional typology is intuitive, but conceptually limiting. It obscures the sources of resources and legitimacy the sectors share, and the ways in which they are similarly shaped by political contest. By one estimate, 15 publicly-traded for-profit education companies in the United States received over 85 % of their revenue from federal dollars (United States Senate, Health Education, Labor and Pensions Committee 2012). It is also the case that many private, nonprofit universities receive millions of dollars annually in federal research grants. Institutional lobbying to secure federal funding is common to both public and private nonprofits (Savage 1999), as are commercial activities, university-industry research partnerships, and the pursuit of support from private foundations (Cook 1998; Geiger 2004; Weisbrod et al. 2008).

A more nuanced way to think about postsecondary institutions in political-theoretical terms is to categorize them by their orientation to the state, civil society or market. From this perspective, public universities in the U.S. can be thought of as state-centered institutions, created by the state to provide higher education in the public interest. As state-centered institutions, public universities maintain

[2] IPEDS further divides institutions under "private control" into three smaller categories, Private Not For-Profit, Private Not For-Profit—Religious Affiliation, and Private For-Profit (IPEDS Glossary, 2012–2013).

linkages to the civil society through social, professional, and community organizations, and they also maintain powerful alliances to the market sector. Private nonprofit colleges, in contrast, emerged from, and remain more closely aligned with, the civil society, although they are generally chartered, regulated and subsidized by the state and also maintain close ties to various market activities. Private, proprietary institutions operate on market principles, with essential subsidies from the state, and produce education from which they can make a profit. At the same time, all three institutional types influence one another through competition for students and resources, legitimacy within the broader state project, and for positions in postsecondary prestige hierarchies.

The State-Building University

Scholars focused on emerging higher education systems have also pointed to an interdependent relationship in the contributions of universities to the capacity and legitimacy of the state itself. These "state-building universities" are charged with credentialing the professional classes, establishing intellectual centers for the development of law and policy, and providing research in the public interest (Ordorika and Pusser 2007). In doing so, they prioritize some state goals over others. The privileging of the research function, with its outsize impact on global prestige rankings (Pusser and Marginson 2012), is an increasingly prominent strategy. Given the variation in contexts and the array of unique demands in each national setting, the widespread aspiration to prioritize high levels of basic, applied and revenue-generating research is a subject of some debate (Altbach 2007; Baatjes et al. 2011; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

The Market and Higher Education

For a twenty-first century scholar of higher education, one of the most remarkable aspects of Kerr's Godkin Lectures is that in the nearly 100 published pages there is virtually no mention of the market. Kerr was one of the more experienced and thoughtful leaders in American higher education, as he described the postsecondary landscape past, present and future. The state looms large in the work, and the civil society—particularly the obligation of postsecondary institutions to engage with society—is invoked in some detail. While Kerr does note the increasing competition between institutions and the influence of student demand, there is little indication of tension between the market and higher education.

What a difference 50 years can make. Few topics have generated more controversy over the past few decades in research and practice in higher education than the concept of a market in higher education. Studies of the market and the university can be divided into two broad categories: research on the degree to which higher

education is appropriately understood as a market arena (Marginson 1997; Weisbrod 1998) and a much larger body of research on such topics as the impact of emerging competition (Kirp 2003), the changing nature of financial support for higher education (Ehrenberg 2000; Zumeta et al. 2012), faculty labor (Rhoades 1998), commercialization (Bok 2003), the monetization of university research (Geiger 2004), and the impact of competition on university mission (Weisbrod et al. 2008). Despite considerable work on the civil society throughout the social sciences, the characterization of contest in the broader political economy of the United States over the role of public institutions in general, and universities in particular, has become increasingly binary: state versus market. Nor has the tension between the two forces been presented in a particularly nuanced fashion. Morrow suggests that in many instances the discourse has been reduced to "the simplistic thesis that everything to do with the state is *bad* (inefficient, paternalistic, undemocratic, oppressive, etc.) and everything to do with unregulated markets is *good* (efficient, empowering, democratic, liberating, etc.)," (Morrow 2006, p. xxix).

The narrowing of the space for critical discussion of markets is so pronounced (Sen 2000) that it serves as an example of Lukes's third dimension of power, in which the terms and conditions of a concept become so thoroughly instantiated that individuals and institutions rarely imagine another set of possibilities (Lukes 2005). Similarly, Alexander suggests that conflating market and civil society is conceptually problematic: "The identification of capitalism with civil society, in other words, is just one example of the reductive and circumscribing conflation of civil society with a particular kind of non-civil realm" (Alexander 2006, p. 35). In the scholarship and practice of higher education, the market sphere has effectively subsumed the civil society, an arena which must be analytically restored to the center of conceptual models of post-secondary education, in order to understand the future of the university.

The Civil Society

Given the lack of attention to the state in research on universities in the United States, it is no surprise that the alliances between universities and associations in the civil society have also not been studied in detail. There is a great deal of work on developing civic responsibility through higher education (Geary Schneider 2000; Sax 2000), on university students and civic engagement (Ehrlich 2000), and considerable work on social capital, yet there is little attention to the role of formal associations, political contest or the state in that work. Scholars of international and comparative education have turned attention to education and civil society in national and global contexts, work that is largely focused on elementary secondary education (Mundy and Murphy 2001).

Simply put, the concept of the civil society and the university has been overshadowed by the focus on the market and the university. In terms of policy enactment and public discourse, this is not a new development. The creation of the land grant colleges entailed a variety of competing forces that included elements of the

state, market and civil society (Rudolph 1962). Barrow (1990) notes a shift generated by the industrial revolution in the early twentieth century, which generated a stronger bond between the state and economic interests in the governance of higher education. By the 1970s, models of the political economy of higher education were focused on the interactions of politics, markets, and institutional interests (Berdahl 1971; Clark 1983), while more recently, much attention has been turned to the dynamic between markets and institutions (Weisbrod et al. 2008).

The shifting relationship between the state, market and civil society in social thought extends well beyond higher education (Edwards and Foley 2001). Jeffrey Alexander (2006) divided the history of the civil society into two phases. In what he termed "Civil Society I", civil society was "a rather diffuse, umbrella-like concept referring to a plethora of institutions outside the state" (2006, p. 24). The nascent conception of civil society was understood to encompass capitalist markets, as well as voluntary religion, social organizations and associations, and "virtually every form of co-operative social relationship that created bonds of trust—for example, currents of public opinion, legal norms and institutions and political parties" (2006, p. 24). Initially, the elements of the civil society, including market activities, were understood as an essential counterbalance to state authority. By the mid-nineteenth century, a new conception of civil society emerged. Alexander defined that period as "Civil Society II." In response to the excesses and inequalities of economic markets at the time, the relationship between civil society and the market, as delineated in social theories and related political philosophies, was radically altered. According to Alexander, "Shorn of its cooperative, democratic and associative ties, in this second version (CSII), civil society came to be pejoratively associated with market capitalism alone" (2006, p. 26).

In the aftermath of the Great Depression, and the implementation of the New Deal, the relationship between the state, civil society and the market in the United States was reshaped again (Sunstein 2006). Through the New Deal, the state exercised considerably greater regulatory control over a failing market sector and demands from the civil society helped to expand protections for individuals and organizations in a range of social locations. Through the GI Bill and the Higher Education Act of 1965, civil society organizations in concert with political leaders and state agencies increased access and affordability in higher education. During the social movements of the 1960s, elements of the civil society, including labor unions, churches, and community-based organizations, played significant roles in the transformation of the relationship between the state and society. In each of these instances, universities served as sites of contest and spheres of influence.

Academic Civil Society

One of the most influential intellectual innovations in the study of universities in the United States over the past two decades has been the development of models of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

While this work has been remarkably useful in pointing to the ways in which market forces have reshaped university activities to privilege economic development, it also opens space for thinking about the changing relationship of the academy to the civil society. Research universities in the U.S have been lauded in the political arena for enhancing economic development, a process generally seen as generating both public and private benefits (Geiger 2004). They have gained considerably less attention for other efforts in the public interest, including contributions to the development of civil society, although student access, civic engagement, and student success remain central points of political and policy discussions (Pusser2008; Sax 2000) . Not only do postsecondary efforts to facilitate economic development dominate the discourse of university contributions to society and foster institutional connections to commercial enterprises, they often place universities in partnerships with those civil society organizations that fundamentally address economic interests (Slaughter 1990). In doing so, the institutions may distance themselves from those elements of the civil society essential for political legitimacy, but not distinctly related to market activity, such as associations that support basic medical research, community engagement and public health initiatives. Given the relative decline in legislative funding for public institutions, and the struggle to preserve federal support for student aid over recent decades, it appears that the university ties that are central to academic capitalism have not been so effective in building and preserving political-economic support for other university purposes.

The Institutional Role

Scholars of higher education have also long been challenged to model the interests of the institutions themselves in social and political contests. Early work based in the study of public administration placed the institutions and their leaders as articulators of competing demands (Baldridge 1971), with considerable work on the importance of institutional autonomy (Berdahl 1971). Political scientists later turned attention to the structural politics of education and pluralist interest group competition (Chubb and Moe 1990; Moe 1996), frameworks increasingly adopted in postsecondary research (Doyle 2012; Parsons 1997). Burton Clark brought elements of organizational sociology to his triangle of coordination (1983) in which he posed the state, markets and an institutional oligarchy in tension, with efforts to seek greater autonomy, control of knowledge production, resources and professional norms as key drivers of the institutional interest. More recently, scholarship has focused on the degree to which institutional interests exist alongside, or in tension with, demands from the broader political economy (Bok 2003; Kirp 2003; Pusser 2008) .

State-centered institutions and those that originated in the civil society have increasingly divergent missions, and different roles in the political economy of higher education. This has become quite apparent in the rankings of universities.

U.S. News and World Report began ranking colleges in the United States in 1983. As recently as 1987 there were eight public universities ranked in the top 25 institutions (Van Der Werf 2007). In U.S. News and World Report's 2012 National University Rankings, there were no public institutions in the top 20, with three in the top 25. The disparity in ranking is understandable in light of the great concentration of financial resources for research, scholarship, and student support in the country's most elite private institutions. There is little to suggest that public, state-centered institutions will gain comparative advantage any time soon; more likely they will continue to lose position in the rankings. Whether or not such institutions should be ranked on the same basis as private universities that originated in the civil society remains an important question that calls for a reconsideration of the relevance of such comparisons, in light of the unique histories, missions, and obligations of universities (Pusser and Marginson 2012).

Understanding the evolving relationship between universities, the state, civil society, and the market will be essential for determining the shape of the university moving forward. There are important elements of each of the key spheres that will likely explain what unfolds, with the civil society taking on increasing importance.

The Future of Higher Education and the State

Despite four decades of neoliberal policy proposals designed to reduce the size and influence of the state (Feigenbaum et al. 1999; Harvey 2005), public institutions in the United States currently enroll more than two-thirds of all postsecondary students, and are of central importance in the political economy of higher education (Zumeta et al. 2012). Given demands for research and training in the national interest (White House 2009), a commitment to increasing the percentage of the population holding postsecondary certificates and degrees in general, and in STEM fields in particular, state-centered institutions will play a vital role going forward (Demos 2012).

The Neoliberal Moment

It is also virtually certain that contest over the role of state-centered institutions will continue, as long as neoliberal ideologies and policies remain potent forces on the postsecondary landscape. Despite the global financial collapse in the first decade of the century, a robust political movement in the United States continues to push for policies that reduce tax support for public institutions, while further privileging markets and private sector provision of essential services. This approach was central to recent national political struggles over health care and has long been linked to arguments that state provision is inefficient. In this climate, state subsidies for teaching and service in state-centered institutions will be hard won

(Ehrenberg 2000; Rizzo 2006). A key aspect of this policy struggle is the question of whether or not higher education should be considered a public or private good (Marginson 2007; Labaree 2000). Advocates of the private good model (Friedman and Friedman 1980) have argued that those who directly benefit should pay the cost of attendance, and that state contributions to most forms of student aid should be reduced. While considerable effort has been recently devoted to developing student subsidies at the state and federal level as part of efforts to increase college completion, they have fallen short of increases in tuition, and the future of state subsidies for students and institutions remains uncertain.

Redistribution

Another emerging shift in the approach to financial support for universities is the increase in policy proposals and legislation designed to limit the degree to which public postsecondary institutions may redistribute tuition revenue to students in need of financial aid (Kiley 2012). The allocation and redistribution of costs and benefits in various forms have long been core elements of the finance of higher education in the United States. Such practices as setting ratios for in-state and out-of-state admissions, selectively building cohorts from large applicant pools, discounting tuition, and using a portion of tuition revenue to provide financial aid for those with higher financial need, all differentially allocate costs and benefits in higher education. The allocation of need-based aid has taken on increasing importance, as the student cohorts at the nation's most selective universities have become increasingly economically stratified (Astin and Oseguera 2004). At the same time, the state fundamentally redistributes revenue for higher education through the collection and allocation of tax dollars for the support of postsecondary institutions and students. This process affects all institutional types, as state-centered universities, those based in the civil society, and proprietary institutions benefit from student financial aid provided through the state. It is not overstating the case to suggest that fundamental aspects of higher education in the United States will be determined going forward by the contest over the appropriate state role in the generation and redistribution of financial support to students and institutions.

The Future of Higher Education and the Market

The U.S. has long been characterized as one of the most market-driven higher education systems in the world (Clark 1983; Geiger 2004). There is a rare degree of consensus in the scholarly community on the power of market ideology in shaping the contemporary politics and practice of higher education (de Sousa Santos 2006; Marginson 1997; Pusser 2011; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). The future of

market approaches to higher education will depend on social, economic and political contests that will determine the degree to which market competition is seen as a legitimate model for providing postsecondary education, the nature and force of regulations governing proprietary institutions, the utility of market mechanisms as a driver of organizational practices in state-centered institutions, and the effect of the market as a force shaping equality and success for individuals and communities. A key aspect of the rise of market-driven policies and practices in higher education has embodied a process described by Bachrach and Baratz, following Schattschneider (1960), as the "mobilization of bias" (1970, p. 8). This concept is one that Steven Lukes referenced in his analysis of the second dimension of power (Lukes 1974, 2005), which suggests that the creation and instantiation of discourse, symbols, rituals and beliefs around a particular ideology over time lead to a hegemonic positioning of the ideology that becomes difficult to dislodge through pluralist contest. While the last few decades have been shaped by the construction of the inevitability of markets and competitive behaviors in universities, the nature of postsecondary education in years to come may well be determined by the emergence of new discourses that challenge the discourse and policies privileging markets in higher education.

There are a number of reasons to predict that the long and accelerating instantiation of neoliberal policies in the global political economy will slow over the coming decades (Harvey 2010). First, the financial collapse of 2008 and subsequent economic austerity have caused many individuals and organizations to rethink the limits of de-regulation and privatization, and to endorse a larger regulatory role for the state going forward (Galbraith 2008). Second, as the neoliberal project has matured, and the impact of increased competition, the shift of costs from the state to individuals, and the effect of commercialization and privatization on postsecondary institutions becomes more clear, a number of scholars and policy makers have begun to question the efficacy of such practices in higher education (Baatjes et al. 2011; Rhoads and Torres 2006; Rodriguez et al. 2011; Valimaa 2011). At the same time, students, civil society organizations and political interest groups have organized to resist tuition increases and to support increases in state funding for higher education. Despite a significant state deficit and recessionary challenges in 2012, voters in the state of California approved a tax increase that could provide as much as $30 billion for higher education over the next decade (Kiley and Fain 2012).

Another challenge to understandings of market provision in higher education came in 2012, with the release of a comprehensive report prepared by the majority committee staff of the United States Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee. The report addressed activity in the for-profit higher education sector, the fastest growing and most market-driven arena in higher education in the United States. The document included the majority committee staff report and additional accompanying minority committee staff views. While the report presented achievements and challenges in the proprietary sector, its title reflected many of its findings: "For Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Safeguard Student Success" (United States Senate, Health

Education, Labor and Pensions Committee 2012). The majority staff report noted high levels of student drop-out in some institutions and problematic levels of student loan debt in portions of the sector. It called for higher levels of federal oversight and additional regulation, predicting, "In the absence of significant reforms, that align the incentives of for-profit colleges to ensure colleges succeed financially only when the students also succeed, and ensure that taxpayer dollars are used to further the educational mission of the colleges, the sector will continue to turn out hundreds of thousands of students with debt but no degree, and taxpayers will see little return on their investment" (United States Senate, Health Education, Labor and Pensions Committee 2012, p. 2). While the Senate committee report also included a more positive view of the sector held by some members of the committee, and the majority staff findings generated rebuttals from the for-profit industry, the release of the report is likely a harbinger of additional regulation and some reconsideration of the state role in subsidizing for-profit provision in higher education.

The Future of Higher Education and the Civil Society

The ability of universities to forge stronger, mutually supportive bonds with associations and movements within the civil society will depend on new partnerships within higher education institutions, and beyond their borders. As he envisioned a new conceptual approach, one that envisions civil society as a "solidary sphere," Alexander argued "to the degree that this solidary community exists, it is exhibited and sustained by public opinion, deep cultural codes, distinctive organizations–legal, journalistic, and associational–and such historically specific interactional practices as civility, criticism, and mutual respect" (2006, p. 31). It can be argued that one of the "distinctive organizations" in which those elements come together is the university. Looking ahead, universities' abilities to maintain connections to the civil society through community engagement, research in the public interest and alliances with a variety of associations and interests will be imperative for building stronger coalitions in support of higher education.

Various aspects of Alexander's solidary sphere also constitute aspects of contemporary models of the university as a public sphere (Ambrozas 1998; Marginson 2011; Pusser 2011; Smith 2010), the vision of the university as a site for knowledge creation and critique that maintains a high degree of autonomy from the state, the market, the civil society and the political arena. Such a public sphere through higher education is not an end in itself; it also may serve as a common space for learning and community building at a time when a number of scholars see the civil society in the United States in need of renewal (Putnam 2003; Skocpol 2003). To achieve a public sphere through higher education, universities will need to balance their own efforts to fulfill state missions and contribute to economic development, with a clearer and more concerted outreach to elements of the civil society, including community-based organizations, labor associations,

professional societies, civic associations, and a wide range of advocacy groups. Through broader coalitions, universities have the potential to both build support in the civil society and, increase their salience in the political arena. Focusing university research, scholarship and teaching on such fundamental elements that shape relations in the civil society as public opinion, service and engagement will be essential to building an academic-civil society alliance as robust as that embodied by academic capitalism.

The Future of the Institutional Role

The future of higher education as a sphere of influence cannot be separated from the future of universities themselves. Here too, the impact of neoliberal and market ideologies looms large, in demands for increased efficiency, accountability, assessment, and private streams of revenue. Much of the contemporary conversation on institutional transformation in the scholarly and policy communities revolves around how best to respond to competitive pressures to introduce new forms of course delivery, branding strategies and commercial activities within nonprofit institutions (Clotfelter 2011; Engell and Dangerfield 2005). Despite the attention to emerging technologies, new organizational missions and managerial practices (Reed 2002), it is more likely that contest in the political arena between state, civil society and market interests will have the most influence in determining appropriate functions in the higher education arena going forward. This has often been the case in the history of higher education, and again points to the need for the university to strike a balance between key constituents and interests in the wider society. Seeking balanced alignments throughout the political economy of higher education has been easier said than done, as universities have struggled to increase revenue. As state-centered universities have suffered losses in funding, some have endeavored to gain additional autonomy from the state, with modest degrees of success (Pusser 2008). At the same time, they have sought to garner additional revenue through higher tuition, private philanthropy, and various forms of academic capitalism, a set of responses that has found mixed support in the political arena and the civil society. As state-centered universities and those located in the civil society have moved closer to the market, they have further challenged their own ability to expand engagement and create additional alliances with a broad range of civil society associations, individuals and social movements (Cohen and Arato 2003; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

In a heightened competition for resources and legitimacy, universities will also need to prioritize and attend to specific missions and purposes. This is not the first time that strategy has been suggested. There is an established literature on the importance of distinctive missions (Clark 1970). Yet with regard to state-centered research universities, there may be reason now to reconsider the further pursuit of prestige and legitimacy through high levels of funded research and increasingly selective admissions. While research, teaching, and the universities' historic roles in leadership development need to be acknowledged and supported, attempting to rise

in prestige hierarchies as presently constituted isn't a project that is likely to prove successful for very many institutions. At the same time, it may compromise other elements of these universities' fundamental missions, particularly those traditionally associated with public benefits (Pusser and Marginson 2012). While the declining position of state-centered institutions in prestige rankings may come as a disappointment to many key constituents, it also offers an opportunity to more deeply commit institutional contributions to the public good, research in the public interest, high-quality teaching, student access, affordability, community service and engagement. These qualities may ultimately prove to generate more legitimacy and resources than does moving up in prestige rankings or creating further market alliances.

Conclusion: A Question of Balance

The future of the university in the United States will be determined through a new process of institutional evolution. The challenge is clear: create and disseminate new knowledge, increase student diversity, access and success, reduce economic stratification and increase social mobility, and perhaps most important for the preservation of the institution itself, build a public sphere through higher education where critique and creation can flourish beyond the control of the state, civil society or market. To accomplish this, higher education institutions will need to build more equitable and balanced alliances with each of those essential spheres. There are precedents for such a transformation: the land grant movement of the 19th century, the expansion and diversification of the student body after World War II, and the vast restructuring of norms of financing access to higher education that accompanied the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1965. In each of these cases, the state, associations in the civil society, market interests and post-secondary institutions collaborated in complex, meaningful social and institutional change processes. The implementation of these initiatives fundamentally altered both the landscape and the national sense of the potential of higher education. As Fredrick Rudolph noted with regard to one effect of the land grant movement, "Vocational and technical education had become a legitimate function of American higher education, and everywhere the idea of going to college was being liberated from the class-bound, classical-bound traditions which for so long had defined the American collegiate experience" (1962, p. 263).

Public universities in the U.S emerged to provide functions that would not necessarily be produced by institutions emerging from the civil society, or the proprietary sector. The longevity and effectiveness of the fundamentally nonprofit, non-market, and increasingly state-centered higher education system in the U.S. over the past two and a half centuries needs to be recognized and celebrated by the institutions themselves and their constituents. The essence of the neoliberal argument in higher education has been that the market can produce a full range of positive outcomes in higher education more effectively than can the state (Friedman and Friedman 1980). In a contest for resources and legitimacy that has been

increasingly zero sum, it isn't clear how effectively those two visions can co-exist. The interests of a broad array of constituents in the civil society, in the political arena, those who see a legitimate state role and those who believe a successful future depends on market provision of higher education, along with those who are not aligned with any of these spheres need to be heeded, as part of a comprehensive debate over the role of higher education in the national project, how to pay for it, and how to sustain its essential purposes.

Just as universities have served a role as state-building institutions and as partners in academic capitalism, so too can they become central to a renewed civil society. This will require alliances with associations and social movements in the wider society, and increased consideration of the role of the university in the production and transmission of social capital. Contemporary universities have proven adept at creating alliances with commercial interests, leaders in the political arena, state actors, and civil society associations devoted to economic development. An intentional strategy linking future research, scholarship, teaching and outreach in pursuit of benefits for a broader set of constituents within the civil society is called for. It will require alliances with associations and individuals working in such areas as public health, community restoration, environmental sustainability, global education, and human rights, to build on work already being done in postsecondary institutions and to expand into new areas. Mindful of its role as a key site for the creation of social capital, the university will need to continue to work to broaden access and diversify the postsecondary student population. Taken together, the benefits of such strategies will go beyond the university's increased contribution to civil society and the public interest. The university's ability to carry out its core missions depends to no small degree on its legitimacy in the political arena. A strengthened relationship between universities and the civil society, and the increased civic participation that would generate, will also better position postsecondary institutions, both state-centered and those with origins in the civil society itself, for greater success in the political arena going forward.

The university of the future will need to bring together its constituents to more directly engage in an informed conversation on the nature of the state, the civil society and the market, and by doing so, serve as a public sphere through higher education, a site where each of these central forces can be contested, debated and strengthened. And it should more deeply contemplate its own purposes and performance, in order to better understand the brilliance of the institution at its best and the deep disappointments attending its limitations. At the conclusion of his remarks in the Godkin Lectures, Clark Kerr posed this question: "We have been speaking of the City of Intellect as a university city with its satellite suburbs. The City of Intellect may be viewed in a broader context, encompassing all the intellectual resources of a society, and the even broader perspective of the force of intellect as the central force of a society—its soul. Will it be the salvation of our society?" (2001, p. 92). A half-century later, the question is every bit as relevant as it was in 1963. The future of higher education remains linked to the future of society, the vitality of the university a key source of strength, its contests reflecting society's struggle, its potential no less than society's collective aspirations.

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Beyond Neo-Liberalism: Higher Education in Europe and the Global Public Good

Barbara M. Kehm

Introduction

In Europe, "the University" is considered to be one of altogether two societal institutions (the other one being the church) that have survived the centuries. This long-term survival could not have happened without change. Despite the fact that universities have often been characterised by an unwillingness to reform, they have continuously adapted to new circumstances and societal change. And we know that the University of the twenty-first century is different from the one of the Medieval Ages. Both the formerly elite institution with its powerful academic guild and the ivory tower in pursuit of disinterested truth have transformed into a mass institution with close relationships to society and economy.

The importance of universities in and for the knowledge society has been emphasized again and again, and universities have become more important than ever before. However in recent years, university reforms, especially the introduction of new managerial forms of governance, have aimed at turning universities into actors on markets and making them more entrepreneurial while at the same time the State is withdrawing from detailed regulation and from funding them. Accordingly, getting a higher education degree is increasingly considered to be a private investment rather than a public good. In addition, universities are expected to play a greater role for the economic well-being of the society and to contribute to the national competitiveness in globalised knowledge economies. The neo-liberal logic of markets has entered the realm of (higher) education. However, these ideas about the role of universities—and more general of higher education institutions—in contemporary societies are not uncontested. Many academics feel that being subjected to a market logic hampers their creativity, many potential students

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hesitate to be burdened by high debts after getting their degree and the mission and vision of many universities is still largely influenced by ideas to contribute to the public good rather than being actors on markets. This does not mean that universities are not active players in their societies and don't want to interact with society and economy. In fact, they do this all the time. However, what is lacking is a common and shared 'idea' of the University and its role in society. What is lacking as well is (normative) trust in what they are doing.

In rankings universities are pitched against each other on the basis of problematic criteria and metrics in the framework of which a deficit model is constructed, i.e. as long as you are not at the top you are lacking something. The accountability agenda is displacing the quality improvement agenda and academic careers are not made on the basis of teaching excellence. In fact providing good or even excellent teaching is required everywhere when recruitment into the academic profession takes place but it is considerably less honoured and rewarded if compared to research and publications. Whichever way we look at it, universities are always criticised for not being good enough at teaching, or at research, or at outreach and one starts to wonder who defines what is 'good enough'. Therefore, the following two sections of this contribution will discuss the new relationships between higher education, the State and society. Much of the common criticism is related to the fact that (a) normative forms of societal trust in higher education have been replaced by cognitive or instrumental forms (cf. Stensaker and Gornitzka 2009) and (b) there is no longer any shared idea of the University. In the last part of this contribution some proposals will be made how (normative) trust can be regained by establishing more clearly the various contributions of higher education institutions to the common public good.

Relationships Between Higher Education, the State and Society

In most continental European countries, a shift from state control to state supervision or "steering from a distance" (Goedegebuure 1993) could be observed from the early 1990s which granted higher education institutions more autonomy while reducing the role of the state to that of a facilitator and focusing less on input control than on output control.

However, this increase in institutional autonomy (over budgets, staff, facilities, etc.) was not granted without conditions. Increased autonomy of higher education institutions was closely linked to three expectations:

- a more hierarchical as well as a more professionalized institutional management;
- an increase in organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and
- a higher degree of accountability to the public.

This does not imply that the state no longer steers. Public authorities continue to have the responsibility "… to set national goals, define the rules of the game and

the regulatory framework within which the different actors in the system can perform most effectively" (Santiago et al. 2008, p. 71). However, the inclusion of a variety of actors in the coordination of higher education systems and in the strategic decision-making of higher education institutions in addition to the State has been characterised as multi-level governance. In Europe, some of the responsibilities that public authorities previously had for higher education have been shifted to supra-national bodies or organisations, other have been given to the institutions themselves, and finally a third group of responsibilities—among them, in particular, accreditation, quality assessment, and evaluation—have been given over to more or less independent agencies. Finally, through a decrease in state funding in most European higher education systems the higher education institutions were forced to diversify their funding base. This has triggered competition for fee paying students in a number of countries but also led to a discussion whether higher education is a public or a private good.

Higher Education: A Public Good or a Private Commodity?

According to one of the most cited economists Paul E. Samuelson (1954), in order for a good to be classified as public, two main pre-requisites must be met: It has to be non-excludable and non-rival. The former entails that everyone can use the good or get access to it without exception, while the latter means that the use of the good by one individual does not decrease its availability to other users. Additionally, these goods ought to be funded by the state without relying on alternative funding sources. An example of goods with such absolute nature is hard to find in the real world, but there are those that come reasonably close to the definition in order to be called public or quasi-public. Traditionally, higher education has been considered to be one of them, not only by fulfilling the two conditions but also because of its nature to be beneficial to individuals and society in general (cf. Tilak 2009).

The scepticism whether higher education still represents a public good has increased in the last two to three decades under the influx of neo-liberal policies in public sector reforms. In the field of higher education, this has been enhanced by a process of privatization and the introduction of markets forces, in form of competition for talent, reputation, and funding. With that, the nature of higher education has moved closer to that of a private commodity which can be subjected to trade as envisaged, for example, in the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) administered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

In that sense, we can observe two different conceptualizations of higher education in which one represents a more traditional, state-regulated, and nationally oriented concept in the framework of which the creation and transfer of knowledge are key functions versus a concept of a modern, dynamic, market-driven, and globally oriented higher education with an added economic value.

These points, however, paint a somewhat one-sided picture. Namely, the higher education reform or modernization process and the process of privatization of

higher education—despite existing cultural, political, and historical differences (cf. Neave 2004)—have given rise to quasi-markets (Braun and Merrien 1999; de Boer et al. 2010) in which

- access to higher education is restricted through selectivity;
- there is an increased competition for reputation, funding, students, and staff between higher education institutions on the national and international level;
- public expenditure for higher education per student has declined (cf. World Bank 2010) and higher education institutions have been urged to seek alternative funding (introduction of tuition fees, more third-party funding for research, public–private partnerships, etc.).

Thus we can observe a move away from its public good character towards an individual value requiring an investment first which then is calculated through rates of return as worthwhile (or not). There are, however, potential risks to this trend of privatization. Altbach (2001) has projected an increasing disassociation of higher education and public interest leading to an acceleration of the privatization process of higher education.

The Evaluative State

The observed shift from statecontrol to state supervision which grants higher education institutions more autonomy while reducing the role of the state has had the purpose of making universities more efficient, effective, accountable, and responsive to their environment. It also widened the scope of the functions that universities have to fulfil, for example, the extension of the third mission, outreach activities, an increase in public–private partnerships, recruitment and admissions policies to reflect societal diversity, or expectations to contribute to economic and social well-being. However, in exchange for this autonomy a higher degree of accountability was introduced which was no longer more or less exclusively addressed to the state but to the wider public. Being accountable means now "to provide proof of efficient and effective use of public money" (Kehm 2007, p. 142).

In this context, Neave (1988, 1998) has developed the notion of the 'rise of the evaluative state'. He argued that the concept of the evaluative state was initially designed to act in response to the financial difficulties that higher education faced.

In earlier times, evaluation was part of a relatively standard practice of "routine verification and maintenance" (Neave 1998, p. 267) by which the government, through a number of prescribed instruments and strict legislation, controlled the appointment of senior academic staff, provided guidance for the curricular content of study programmes and made sure that allocated public money was spent appropriately (Neave 2004).

The 'evaluative state' arose out of new types of evaluation labelled 'strategic' and 'exploratory' (Neave 1988, 1998) and their results, instead of providing indications what and how to improve, are increasingly used to reduce budgets of low

performing units and institutions or even close them down and to reward the high performing units and institutions. The main changes thus entail a shift from input and process control to output control. The state then mainly makes decisions about budget allocations based on the results of such control. Together with the inclusion of external stakeholders in the institutional governance structures and the decision-making powers assigned to them, the question is whether, at the end of the day, the universities have gained more autonomy or simply have been subjected to more complex arrangements of control characterised by multiple groups of actors.

Paradeise et al. (2009) have discussed whether the described developments mean a tighter or a looser coupling between higher education and the State and whether universities with more autonomy and a professionalised management are becoming more entrepreneurial or more bureaucratic. A widely shared view among experts in the field of higher education studies is that state policies for higher education have shifted to new arenas and that despite the fact that there are differences in state policies among the European countries in terms of a tighter or looser coupling (e.g. tighter in the UK, looser in Austria), the changes cannot be appropriately defined and analysed in the framework of these categories. The same holds true for the question or more entrepreneurialism or more bureaucracy in higher education institutions. These notions tend to be characterised by a certain amount of path dependency as well as being dependent on the issues at stake. Accountability, evaluation, or accreditation have certainly led to more bureaucracy while the necessity to diversify the funding base or activities geared towards profiling and branding make higher education institutions more entrepreneurial. Leadership styles too can either be more entrepreneurial or more bureaucratic.

Accountability Between Trust and Stakeholder Control

Referring to Hirsch (1997), Stensaker and Gornitzka (2009) distinguish between normative/cognitive and rational/instrumental forms of trust in European higher education. They argue that over the last 10 years or a bit longer the normative/cognitive forms of trust have been replaced by rational/instrumental forms. The reasons for this development are identified to be a growing international and even global interaction of higher education institutions which is mostly no longer based on the (normative) forms of trust which develop over time and through longstanding knowledge of the actors involved. Furthermore, expansion of higher education systems as well as increased international cooperation have contributed to a growing number of institutional actors and detailed information is not always available for normative trust to develop.

Within national systems of higher education, expansion has led governments to expect from their higher education institutions to do more with less funding. Starting in the 1980s, the funding crisis evolved into a legitimation crisis and a growing distrust of governments and stakeholders in the quality and efficiency of higher education institutions could be observed. Instruments to monitor and

control efficient spending of public money and the quality of activities and services have been developed in order to re-establish trust. However, the new forms of trust that developed were less normative, i.e. a result of interaction over time and growing familiarity, but rather instrumental, i.e. a result of information gathered. Increasingly, higher education institutions had to negotiate with the responsible public authorities for their funding and the more or less implicit social contracts existing previously were replaced by pacts (cf. Olsen 2007), i.e. negotiated and written agreements between higher education institutions and the responsible public authorities concerning expected performance on the side of the higher education institutions and funding levels on the side of public authorities. Thus universities were made accountable for their performance and increasingly benchmarked against each other. On the one hand more autonomy was granted to the institutions to allocate their budgets, recruit staff, select their students, decide about the number of programmes and departments but on the other hand results were monitored on the basis of externally set standards. In this way the traditional, normative trust relationships between higher education institutions and public authorities have been reshaped by basing them on rational/instrumental forms of trust. In addition, external stakeholders have become legitimate actors in the "trust-creating business" (Stensaker and Gornitzka 2009, p. 132) and external agencies have become involved in the setting of standards, procedures and guidelines for quality assurance. Trust in its rational/instrumental form is thus established through accountability and stakeholder control and has become a multi-actor and multi-dimensional issue in the governance of higher education.

The Rise of Supra-National Actors

Ever since the beginning of the 1990s, international or supra-national organisations have become more influential in higher education policy making, not only in Europe but elsewhere as well. Examples are the role of the European Commission in the creation of a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and a European Research Area (ERA), World Bank lending for higher education in developing countries, the OECD comparative statistics which are increasingly used by national governments for benchmarking (from PISA to AHELO), or UNESCO's involvement in the development of lifelong learning policies and quality assurance systems.

A commonly shared interpretation (see for example Héritier 2002; March and Olsen 1998; Martens et al. 2007) is that national governments were no longer able to deal alone with emerging problems and that solutions had to be found in cooperation with other governments. Martens et al. (2007) argue that basically two problems—the increasing inability of national governments to finance a vastly expanded sector of public higher education and increasing doubts about the labour market relevance of higher education qualifications in the face of emerging knowledge economies—gave rise to the internationalisation of higher education policy

in which supra-national actors began to coordinate the search for solutions to common problems that national governments could no longer solve by themselves.

In addition, the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) supported the growing liberalisation and marketization of higher education with four notable effects:

- an increasing privatisation of higher education,
- demand and supply following market rules,
- competition for best talent,
- and growing cross-border supply of higher education for profit.

Thus, as Martens et al. (2007) conclude, educational policy making has increasingly become an international arena in which agenda setting, developments of standards and guidelines, the setting of goals, and comparison and benchmarking are taking place.

What do these developments imply for national governments? Higher education governance and policy making on the systems level no longer tend to be the exclusive responsibility of national governments. Some responsibilities have "moved up" to the supra-national level, others have "moved down" to the institutional level through deregulation and steering from a distance, and again others have "moved to the side" to independent or semi-independent agencies. This has led to a multiplication of arenas in which higher education policy making is taking place. But does this imply an increasingly global governance of higher education by international and supra-national organisations and markets, i.e. a post-national governance regime (Martens et al. 2007, 219f.)? Certainly the shifts and developments sketched here have led to the creation of new spaces for additional and often private actors. However, in the face of soft strategies like the European Commission's open method of coordination Martens et al. (2007, p. 237) prefer to speak of "shared governance" in the higher education space rather than global governance which is not without conflicts and tensions as could be seen in the framework of the Bologna Process but can be characterised by multi-level and multi-actor forms of governance. In order to determine the respective power of these actors and to trace the shifts in the new arenas of higher education policy making, new conceptualisations of higher education governance and the role of public authorities will have to be developed.

The Increasing Power of Agencies

Little research has been done so far about the increasing power of independent or semi-independent agencies which are active, in particular, in the field of quality assurance. Stensaker and Gornitzka (2009) have pointed out the growing "agencification" of quality assurance in higher education. Although quality assurance had been delegated by the public authorities to agencies in some European countries before the onset of the Bologna reforms, their growth in number and their increase in power all over Europe can be traced back to one of the goals of the Bologna Declaration of 1999, namely the improvement of European cooperation in quality

assurance. In many continental European countries, national or state governments traditionally had a responsibility to approve new study programmes. With the introduction of the two-tiered structure of degrees and the resulting massive curricular changes triggered by the Bologna Process reforms, most governments shifted the responsibility of quality assurance and curriculum approval to newly established accreditation agencies.

However, there is some variety in Europe. In some countries (e.g. most of the Nordic countries) quality assurance agencies monitor the higher education institutions and assess them with respect to the question whether they have a functioning quality management system in place. In other countries (e.g. Germany) accreditation agencies assess every newly established study programme whether it conforms to externally established criteria of quality. If that is the case, accreditation is granted for a determined period of time (e.g. 5 years in Germany) and then has to be carried out again. In some of the Central and Eastern European countries, quality assurance agencies together with a leading university develop templates for curricula which then have to be implemented in all other universities.

Despite these variations, most European agencies involved in accreditation and quality assurance have started to cooperate on the European level in order to arrive at common standards and procedures for quality assessment. A European Network of Quality Assurance Agencies has been formed and a European Register of Quality Assurance Agencies has been established into which only those Agencies are accepted that conform to the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in higher education. These Guidelines determine how to carry out quality assurance (procedures) while the Standards indicate criteria for the determination of quality and external as well as internal quality assurance activities.

Quality assurance thus has gone through several shifts: first it was delegated by the public authorities to agencies ("moving to the side") which established procedures for external quality assessment and criteria for determining whether quality was present at the institutional or at the programme level. At the same time higher education institutions were required to establish procedures for internal quality management ("moving down") conforming to the criteria and standards established by the agencies. When the agencies themselves started to cooperate on the European level ("moving up"), standards and guidelines for quality assurance were developed jointly and applied in a growing number of European higher education systems. In an analysis which tried to answer the question whether the European quality assurance agencies themselves conform to the European Standards and Guidelines and the impact this has on institutional quality assurance practices, Stensaker et al. (2010) came to the conclusion that the "success of the European Standards and Guidelines as a supra-national governing tool" lies in its creation of instrumental trust and transparency on the macro level but that it is also becoming an increasingly bureaucratic tool "not providing real value for money for the society in general" (ibid., p. 585). They argue that the European Standards and Guidelines prioritise "assurance over quality", thus becoming "an example of how 'governance' indeed can be possible without any 'government' supporting it" (ibid., p. 585). This begs, of course, the question whether a re-appropriation of

quality and quality assurance in higher education either by public authorities or by the academics themselves should be put on the agenda in the future.

Actorhood of Higher Education Institutions

Traditional steering theories have not accorded actorhood to universities. They rather followed the principal-agent theory in which a strong state was the actor (principal) and the universities the objects of steering (agents) . However, due to the changing nature of higher education governance in the last decade or two, "universities are being addressed as actors which they are supposed to become" (Meier 2009, p. 245). This implies that the shift from being an institution to becoming an organisation and thus acquiring actorhood has frequently not or not yet been completed. Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson (2000) have proposed the notion of universities as "incomplete organisations" to characterise the ongoing shifts. The managerial model of governance is pushing higher education institutions towards becoming actors, be it in national or supra-national policy arenas, be it on markets, or be it in their immediate (regional) environment. By acquiring actorhood higher education institutions are expected to adapt more quickly to external changes and become more flexible in meeting external demands. An important factor in this development is typically seen in the professionalisation and managerial orientation of university leadership. Rectors, presidents, or vice-chancellors are no longer seen as "primus inter pares" (first among equals) with relatively weak decision-making powers but as strong willed managers of corporate entities.

What then would make higher education institutions more complete and what is preventing them to become complete? Brunsson and Sahlin-Anderssohn (2000) argue that three factors, namely identity, hierarchy, and rationality, are important for the acquisition of actorhood. Identity means a distinctive profile and a tighter coupling of the organisational units, hierarchy means clear-cut lines of power and control, and rationality refers to the efficiency and effectiveness of internal decision-making processes. These can only be achieved if higher education institutions are granted a considerable extent of autonomy. However, Musselin (2007) in referring to Weick (1976) has argued that universities are "specific" organisations which must be distinguished from other corporate entities, e.g. companies of the private sector, in at least two respects. The first one is their character as loosely coupled systems; the second one is their unclear technology. The loose coupling indicates the independence of the basic units (e.g. faculties, departments, institutes) from each other which prevents completeness and identity. Unclear technologies refer to the fact that the core business of higher education institutions, i.e. teaching and research, can not be standardised and is intrinsically motivated in its nature. This prevents rational decision-making to some extent. Finally, there is no doubt that there are hierarchies within higher education institutions but they have often been characterised as expert organisations, i.e. organisations with highly specialised and highly qualified members who are notoriously difficult to manage and will need and insist on a high degree of autonomy themselves to do their work.

Some national higher education systems in Europe have progressed already more on this path towards making universities complete organisation and enabling them to become actors.

If we attempt to tie together what has been discussed so far, it is possible to say that higher education institutions nowadays are expected to be good at what they are doing, to be accountable for it, to be entrepreneurial, and to be actors on markets in order to earn (instrumental) trust. They don't all have to do the same because vastly expanded higher education systems require differentiation and mission diversification. However, what has been rewarded the most in recent years is the successful, research-intensive university. This has not only triggered a considerable movement towards isomorphism, i.e. imitation of the most successful institutions by other higher education institutions, but also to an inflationary use of exaggerated and superlativist adjectives in profiling and branding. But let us have a look now what kinds of ideas are floating around for the University of the twenty-first century. Not all of these are brand new, some have been around for a while, but the three examples which have been chosen here are currently the most popular and provide some guidance as to the role and function of higher education institutions in and for society. They are not mutually exclusive but emphasize different aspects of what a university can or should be.

Ideas for the University of the Twenty-first Century

As has been stated above, there is currently no unifying "idea of the university" any more and this might turn out to be a problem. In 1977, the American sociologist, Joseph Ben-David, offered the view that the German university, i.e. the Humboldtian idea of it, with its emphasis on the individual scholar and scientist was the best model for the nineteenth century and that the American university, i.e. the American idea of the research university, with its emphasis on the institution, was the best for the twentieth century. This, of course, begs the question which "idea" of the university might be the best or most appropriate for the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the argument in this contribution is, that a shared 'idea' of the university is a prerequisite for normative forms of trust to develop again.

The Multi-Versity

Derek Bok and Clark Kerr both having been presidents of American universities (Bok was President of Harvard University from 1971 to 1991 and Kerr first Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley from 1952 to 1958 and then 12th President of the University of California System from 1958 to 1967) have written extensively about the idea of the multi-versity (Kerr 1963/2001; Bok 1982). The regular prefix 'uni-' in university indicates that a uni-versity is the one

and unified location where all subjects and disciplines, all knowledge if you want, can be found. The prefix 'multi-' refers to phenomena like universities without a fixed location or with various locations and to the large variety of activities inside and outside the institution, e.g. student housing, research and development, community outreach, employment counselling, teaching hospitals, alumni services, student recruitment, enrolment and orientation, international student affairs, placement testing, and so on. Kerr in his book outlines the historical development of the American higher education system taking over more and more responsibilities and tasks, thus diverting from the idea of a unified space for science and scholarship. Bok refers to Kerr but embeds the concept of the multi-versity in a more societal context and in terms of how the university should function.

The concept of the multiversity originally referred to the big American research university which tends to be a massive conglomerate "riding off in all directions and still staying in the same place" (Kerr 2001, p. 14). This of course makes it all the more difficult to manage. Kerr jokingly described it as follows: "A university can aim no higher than to be as British as possible for the sake of the undergraduates, as German as possible for the sake of the research personnel, as American as possible for the sake of the public at large—and as confused as possible for the sake of the preservation of the whole uneasy balance" (Kerr 2001, p. 14). And due to the increasing challenges and demands from society at large with which European universities are confronted as well and which have led to mission overload in many cases, the phenomenon of the multiversity can be observed in Europe as well by now. But while Kerr still thought that with creativity and flexibility of deans, administrators and staff the multiversity could be governed by leaders willing to mediate for a "workable compromise" (Kerr 2001, 27f.), Bok presented a less optimistic view.

According to Bok the multiversity tends to do too much too fast and to have its hands in too many cookie jars. Students are suffering because the campus is too "cluttered" (Bok 1982, p. 68) with so many services, activities and research projects that professors are not doing enough teaching and students are not doing enough learning. University management turns into a "huge insensitive bureaucracy" (ibid., p. 65) and impedes the basic mission which is to educate students. Given the fact that due to reduced funding universities today are forced even more to do more with less and look for funding elsewhere adding outreach, continuing education, consulting and collaboration with industry, the phenomenon of a multiversity tends to result in more entrepreneurialism. Consequently the concept of the multiversity lost its popularity in the 1990s and was replaced by the concept of the entrepreneurial university.

The Entrepreneurial University

The concept of the "entrepreneurial university" was developed by Burton Clark (1998) who saw it as a response to increasing demands from an increasing number of stakeholders. These demands could no longer be satisfied by the "traditional university infrastructure" (Clark 1998, p. 131) and the "demand overload" (ibid.)

to meet the needs of society led to an "entrepreneurial response" (ibid., p. 137). Clark developed five common elements of the entrepreneurial university by carefully selecting five institutions in different European countries and analysing their response to the demand overload. These common elements are:

- a strengthened steering core
- an expanded developmental periphery
- a diversified funding base
- a stimulated academic heartland
- and an integrated entrepreneurial culture.

Unlike U.S. American universities, "traditional European universities have long exhibited a notoriously weak capacity to steer themselves" (Clark 1998, p. 5). Strong state control and the power of the academic oligarchy in intra-institutional decision-making plus the lack of market mechanisms led to weak institutional leadership and no involvement of stakeholders. With the advent of new public management in many European countries this situation has been reversed: less state control, a weakening of collegial academic decision-making plus the introduction of competition increased market mechanisms, requiring a more professional management and the involvement of stakeholders in strategic decision-making. A *strengthened steering core* is the result of these developments. In quite a number of European countries, the vice-chancellors are no longer elected from among the group of professors but are appointed, often from outside and often by a Board of Governors. A number of European organisations have established training courses for newly appointed members of institutional leadership (down to the level of deans) to provide them with skills and competences necessary for professional management.

Some elements of a diversified funding base are represented in outreach activities which promise to generate institutional income. This might eventually lead to an *expanded developmental periphery*. This can be applied research in cooperation with industry or the establishment of science and technology parks to provide opportunities for spin-offs and start-ups but also a heightened emphasis on continuing education provisions and cooperation with schools. Newly established transfer offices have paid increasing attention to opportunities for commercialisation of research results in form of patents and licenses or royalty income. These activities may start on a small scale, for example through contract research, but are then supported to develop further by locating new sources of funding, becoming larger scale collaborative research and eventually leading to major long-term returns (Clark 1998, p. 71).

The lack of state funding which many European higher education systems have experienced in the course of expansion from elite to mass higher education systems has led to the development of new ideas to generate institutional income and acquiring a *diversified funding base*. Not all European countries have followed a policy to introduce or increase tuition fees (e.g. Austria, Germany, the Scandinavian countries), but the American practice of fostering alumni relationships in order to acquire private donations and endowments has taken hold.

Furthermore collaboration with industry in research has contributed to additional research income. But also professors were asked to attract more third party funding for their research and become more active in competitive bidding. Frequently large-scale interdisciplinary research centres have been established outside the traditional department or faculty structure. In addition, many European countries have introduced full cost calculation for external research funds. That means that third party research funding has to include all relevant overheads which the university used to cover itself when sufficient state funding was still the rule.

The fourth element of an entrepreneurial university is a *stimulated academic heartland*. Clark defines this as the departments and teaching units in which traditional academic values are rooted (Clark 1998, p. 7). Here the greatest level of resistance to the introduction of an entrepreneurial culture might be encountered. However, budgetary autonomy of the basic units achieved through decentralised lump-sum allocations can enable forms of self-regulation which lead to distinctly entrepreneurial directions. Through budgetary and investment management the basic units can pursue the acquisition of research grants and other forms of income from a variety of funding organisations and through a variety of activities.

The final element, an *integrated entrepreneurial culture*, implies that an entrepreneurial spirit and a sense of forging ahead are pervading the whole institution. Clark's example is the University of Warwick in the 1980s. An entrepreneurial culture implies a reorganization of departmental and administrative activities, creating new units in cooperation with business and industry and expanding the developmental periphery.

However, Clark takes care to stress that "entrepreneurialism in universities is not synonymous with commercialization" (2004, p. 502). Entrepreneurial universities are flexible and creative regarding sources of funding. Any one of the five crucial elements may become a catalyst and require further reorganization before any progress can be made. The important issue is that entrepreneurial universities are in a state of continuous change in order to adapt effectively to changes in society (Clark 2004, p. 501). But a functioning entrepreneurial university also requires the ideas, cooperation and efficacy of the people involved at all levels in order to maintain its entrepreneurial momentum.

The concept of the entrepreneurial university has been criticised for its tendency to focus on market-like behaviour and on relationships with industry and business. Subotzky (1998), reminding us of the idea of education as a public good, proposes to focus more strongly on community partnership programmes and universities being a public good should do something in return for the public good.

The Network University

The concept of the network university implies that the idea of the university "as a single concept has diminished in the face of multiple missions and visions of higher education and research" (Enders et al. 2005, p. 75). In particular, in the

face of growing competition universities are seeking for strategic partnerships and alliances, research is being carried out increasingly in larger and more interdisciplinary groups, and exchange of students is organised among carefully selected partners. Both internationalisation and globalization have contributed to a growing sense of interconnectedness and networks have become a mode of coordination of multiple actors in multi-level governance arrangements. Activities do no longer take place within the individual institution but are shared among and part of larger networks of partners cooperating with each other, including public–private partnerships.

Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani (2008) have analysed network governance in public sector institutions as one of the "grand narratives" (Lyotard) supposed to help modernise higher education institutions so that they can develop organisational actorhood.

According to Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani (2008, 336f.), network governance has developed as a reaction to two problems: the high transaction costs of new public management approaches and the inability of these approaches to deal with the complexity of the ongoing processes of transformation. Network governance includes a larger number of actors, it emphasizes lateral instead of vertical forms of management, and it requires a decentralisation of power from the top to the bottom. Networks develop the ability for self-organisation and self-steering through interdependence and interaction of the network partners and can produce complex goods, e.g. knowledge or education. Finally, networks are instruments for the coordination of collaborations, consortia, and strategic alliances. European examples are the "League of European Research Universities" (LERU), "Universitas 21" or the "Coimbra Group". However, there are also individual universities promoting an image of being a network university. New York University has launched its image of being a "Global Network University" and the Free University of Berlin became one of the winners of the German Excellence Initiative with its concept of becoming an "international network university". Both these examples are based on the belief that ideas have no boundaries and that the world is increasingly integrated. There are also examples of research and practice trying to work with the concept of the network university. A European project is based at the University of Amsterdam with partners in Athens, London, and the Netherlands. The goal is to transform the unidirectional flow of knowledge in a traditional university setting into a connected web of collaborative learning (cf. www.netuni.nl). Furthermore, a group of researchers from the Madrid region has studied the network university as it actually develops. They argue that research and observation have generally established that financial support for research and development initiatives is tending towards "large interdisciplinary and inter-organizational groups" (Olmeda-Gomez et al. 2008, p. 2). The authors were looking at university-industry-government cooperation, i.e. the "triple helix model", and tried to visualize how such networks are formed, how the partners within them interact, and what positions the various actors have within the network. The study revealed a high degree of co-authorship and information sharing among the network partners. Olmeda-Gomez et al.

(2008, p. 17) came to the conclusion that universities play a "pivotal and crucial role in the establishment of cooperative networks". Combined with the growth of networks that could be observed in recent years this indicates a development towards the network university.

However, the concept of the network university has also not remained without criticism. One of the main issues is how national state control can be exercised over state institutions being increasingly involved in transnational network collaborations. Should universities as dominantly state funded public sector institutions be given free reign? Can they still guarantee then that they are working for the common public good?

Conclusions: The Role of Universities in Emerging Knowledge Societies

I agree with Martens et al. (2007) that the European level has established itself as a new higher education policy arena in which important impulses are generated to influence national policy making in higher education. The Bologna Process has been a creative and dynamic process with multiple effects (although not all of them intended) but it has not yet been able to fully realise its creative potential and keep its political momentum. I would argue that one way to achieve this is to re-define the "social contract" between higher education and society and to regain more normative forms of trust. How can this be done?

I'd like to refer to Simon Marginson (2009) who has argued that the Bologna reform process enhances the potential for European contributions to the global public good. However, this has to be a conscious policy choice. In an economic perspective nation is 'public' and global is a market. Thus, Blass (2012, p. 1069) doubts the sustainability of the European Higher Education Area because the Bologna Declaration intended to extend the concept of 'national' to Europe and thus also extend the concept of public good while at the same time being contextualised by or embedded into a global market. Marginson (ibid., 315f.) issues a similar warning. If the project of the Bologna process to create a European Higher Education Area remains too regional and inward looking it might run the risk to overlook "the endogenous dynamics of Asian and American higher education" and produce inadequate global engagement. Therefore, Marginson proposes to use the potential of the European project to contribute "to the global public good beyond Europe" (ibid., p. 316). He reinforces the idea to invest in selected higher education institutions placed preferably in "global cities" in order to build "global critical mass" and connectivity on the base of city/university synergy. The goal would not be—as stated in the presidential conclusions of the Lisbon summit in 2000—to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge driven economy of the world but to "become the most creative, most innovative and most globally engaged higher education region (and) create many public and private benefits" (Marginson 2009, p. 318).

Can there be a balance between these two driving forces or a middle ground? Blass argues that "in the future, universities will need to contribute to the global public good in order to justify their position on the world stage, while contributing to the local private good in order to sustain their existence financially. By achieving the former they will attract students to achieve the latter" (Blass 2012, p. 1069). And even though Germany is a country without tuition fees and this author shares the notion of education (including higher education) being a public rather than a private good, Blass' argument can be regarded as the beginnings of a new social contract. This has increasingly and more urgently been defined in recent years as higher education producing both public and private goods, high quality and societal relevance in teaching, learning, and research. The employability debate in the framework of the Bologna reform agenda is the transfer of the notion of societal relevance from research into the teaching and learning dimension. Thus, the new social contract of higher education is one that has to be guided by the question how European higher education institutions can contribute to the global public good under conditions of market competition in the emerging knowledge societies and economies. It just may be that the notion of a university involved and engaged in global networks coupled with entrepreneurial activities at local, regional and international level might best be suited to bring this about.

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Futures for Community Engagement: A Sociomaterial Perspective

Tara Fenwick

Introduction

Community engagement with higher education's teaching as well as in research is fast becoming a key strategy for universities to enhance their societal relevance. This strategy is only likely to continue in importance globally, judging from the emphasis among research funding councils on community engagement and impact, the Carnegie Institute's classification of community engagement (Driscoll 2008), or legislation for university outreach and service to community (Akpan et al. 2012).

However perhaps inevitably given its categorical bagginess, there is still considerable conflict over just how universities can and should enable spaces for meaningful engagement of higher education with communities. Referred to variously as civic engagement, community partnerships, social responsiveness, and service learning, HE-community initiatives have been launched with diverse purposes and varying quality and success (Stewart and Webster 2008). Critics have highlighted conceptual and practical confusion, contested objectives, lack of coordination, lack of institutional commitment, and lack of clarity about the nature of community and of engagement (Akpan et al. 2012).

Amidst these analyses, three themes of disquiet appear to lurk in these community initiatives. One is *difference*. This is not just difference in logics of knowledge production, as others have argued (Gibbons et al. 1994), but fundamentally different material textures of knowing, values, practice and participation among universities and their communities ranging from labour markets to virtual worlds. A second is *uncertainty*, as these fast-changing societal communities dare higher education as a system and as a tight cluster of interests to surrender its controls

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in authorizing particular forms of knowledge and being. A third is *responsibility*. As higher education embraces an ungoverned, perhaps even a-critical condition of uncertainty, what happens to its primary responsibility to bring about learning for cherished purposes such as critical thinking and active citizenship?

This chapter explores these three problematics of uncertainty, difference and responsibility in university-community engagements. Rather than focusing on their challenges, it argues for new ways to conceptualise these problematics drawing from what some are calling 'sociomaterial' approaches (Fenwick et al. 2011). Here, knowing is taken to emerge and be performed within the entanglements of materials with the social and personal: bodies, objects, technologies and places (Gherardi 2009; Mol 2002). Section 1 explores uncertainty through a notion of 'emergence' derived from complexity perspectives of education (e.g. Osberg and Biesta 2007; Davis and Sumara 2006). Section 2 explores difference through sociomaterial studies of different worlds or 'multiple ontologies' (Mol 2002). Section 3 examines responsibility through Jean-Luc Nancy's (2000) sociomaterial conception of 'touching' for understanding individuals' relations with community. The purpose here is not to present a single theoretical model, but to invite together diverse lines of thought that intersect but also interrupt one another. These theoretical voices, illustrated through examples of community engagement, may help point to new entry points and practices for engaging uncertainty, difference and responsibility with communities. The conclusion explores implications of these ideas toward futures in higher education.

Uncertainty and Possibility in Community Engagement: 'Emergence'

Uncertainty has proven to be a difficult dynamic for higher education in its struggles to establish workable models for community engagement (Shannon and Wang 2010). The internal diversities constituting whatever is to be considered 'community' are highly heterogeneous, difficult to map, and respond to initiatives in unpredictable ways. Conventional methods of project planning, based on pre-determined objectives and actions intending to produce particular impacts and outcomes, often prove to be unworkable. A more resilient, less rationalistic approach may be afforded through complexity science, a domain of sociomaterial thought that has been recently circulating in higher education research and social sciences more broadly (Byrne 1998; Haggis 2004). For purposes of this discussion, complexity may be represented as a radically holistic analysis that does not separate person from context, but shows how all things (individuals, tools, technologies, ideas, environments) are continually brought forth in dynamic systems or 'assemblages' of 'vital materiality' (Bennett 2010). These systems emerge in unpredictable ways through non-linear dynamics of mutual interaction and influence, producing a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Complexity in these terms offers useful approaches for reconsidering what it means to engage in community, and how we might understand knowing in community engagement.

For educators interested in learning, a central understanding in complexity is *emergence*. Phenomena, events, actors and knowledge are viewed as mutually dependent and mutually constitutive; they emerge together in dynamic structures (Davis and Sumara 2006; Osberg and Biesta 2007). That is, the nature of any complex adaptive system (a university, a neighbourhood, a human mind, a political event, a particular professional practice, a spreading virus, etc.) as well its elements and their relationships—both human and non-human—emerge through the continuous rich and recursive interactions among these elements. Humans are viewed as fully interconnected with other material and immaterial elements of the systems that are constantly acting upon each other. No clear lines of human intention can be traced from these interactions to their outcomes. Out of these continuous and non-linear interactions emerge dynamic wholes that exceed their parts. Osberg (2008) calls this 'strong emergence': conditions where the knowledge and capability that emerges is more than the sum of its parts, and therefore not predictable from the ground from which it emerges. For higher education, Haggis (2004) argues that emergence helps move beyond preoccupations with teaching activities and student outcomes, to understand how activity, knowing, intentionality, biology and location together produce emergent effects such as student learning across a range of mutually implicated systems.

The possibility of emergence in education depends upon internal diversity (Davis and Sumara 2006): diverse responses from the parts of a system, diverse elements elaborating small variations, diverse interactions generating novel information or energy, and so forth. But diversity alone is not sufficient, as Prigogine demonstrated: there must be interaction. With masses of interaction, the smaller parts of the system become energised and sensitive to even minor fluctuations. Emergence occurs, according to Prigogine (1997), as choices are continually made from among alternatives presented to a complex system amidst these all these interactions. These alternatives emerge from within the system and seem to be chosen totally by chance; no possible calculation can demonstrate the system's preference for one or another. As each choice is adopted, the system changes and a new range of choices opens. The result is a complex system's continuous state of *uncertainty* and surprise. Chance is always operating in the unfolding configurations, and these keep opening a multiplicity of possibilities. Osberg (2008, p. 150) shows how Prigogine's conceptions are particularly valuable for education, because in complex systems, 'what is already present is reordered or renewed in a way that opens incalculable (and wider) possibilities. In this sense, the non-deterministic "logic" of emergence can be thought of as a logic of renewal'.

This is not to say that the system organises in complete chaos, with no limitations or direction other than random pursuit of possibilities. There are always disordering dynamics held in tension with ordering patterns. Multiple feedback loops influence the ways a system evolves and transforms, often unpredictably, and usually irreversibly. Feedback amplifies perturbations in the system, potentially creating a momentum and distribution of small events that give rise to large system effects.

Many communities that higher education initiatives seek to engage will resemble complex adaptive systems in their unpredictable patterns and adaptations. But

one problem here is that higher education with its audits and regulations usually functions more as a controlling bureaucracy than as a complex system. How can this sort of system engage with communities in ways that encourage productive emergence rather than stifling it? A second problem is that complexity theory is a-political. Emergence is not necessarily benign, and important questions for higher education are often invisible in complexity analyses. How does power flow within a community to enact particular entities, positions and rewards? What knowledge and activities produced among the processes occurring within a complex system become most powerful or most excluded? How can complexity promote socially desirable possibilities?

Let us turn to an actual HE initiative that incorporates a complexity sensibility to see how such troubling issues might be addressed. The University of Guelph in Canada has, over time, developed a strong tradition of students being placed in community service learning. This has evolved to a university-wide commitment to students learning in community, rooted in principles of building mutual linkages and deeper engagement between university and communities for community benefit. The overriding purpose is driven by social responsibility:

> respectful, collaborative interactions among higher education institutions and groups or individuals and communities (or groups within communities) for the greater benefit of the community … [that] provide participants with a view to their role in the larger world and their responsibilities as both citizens and professionals (University of Guelph 2012).

Working from these beginnings, Guelph has undertaken to reimagine the entire role of the university, produced through a series of dialogues with its stakeholders. This initiative is the *School for a Civil Society*, which is now in the process of spearheading projects on a variety of fronts to engage global and local civil society organizations and individuals as well as students, administrators and faculty in new pathways for teaching, learning, research and service (University of Guelph 2012). This overall initiative offers an interesting example of emergence in action. It began with a series of perturbations, various structured conversations with community organizations, presenting provocative visions for the university in terms of civic engagement, global citizenship, 'anti-complacency' etc. Multiple possibilities emerged and began to interact. A 'catalyst' team amplified the conversations, convening and highlighting and communicating the results, via further in-person and online gatherings, to enable continuing interactions. Test pilots with stakeholders were conducted on particular ideas, with an emphasis on 'rapid prototyping' to concretize ideas and experiment with possibilities. Various feedback loops monitor the entire process: the catalyst team convenes conversations to 'connect the parts to the whole' (structures, limitations etc.), and to enable students and community members to critically reflect together on the directions that are emerging in terms of the overall aim. The University's process draws explicitly on complexity-derived concepts developed for social innovation by Scharmer (2009). These begin with 'co-initiating' (establishing common ground with community stakeholders), infused with a process of 'co-sensing' and attuning critically to emerging dynamics.

Some of these 'co-created' possibilities have become concrete projects. Guelph's Learning Opportunities Trust provides a wide range of awards to enable students to pursue extended community engagement placements: 88 % of undergraduates now complete such a placement. A new Certificate in Civic Engagement and Global Citizenship is scheduled for launch in 2013. An Institute for Community Engaged Scholarship develops interdisciplinary research in partnership with communities on problems they identify, on issues ranging from agricultural to environmental design. The projects involve postgraduate as well as undergraduate students who are taught community-based research methodsthen supervised on cluster projects by faculty and senior postgraduate students (CSAHS 2012).

In considering higher education's community engagement, a complexitysensibility draws attention to the fine-grained relations among learners and the community environments in which they become enmeshed. Learning becomes defined as expanded possibilities for action, or becoming 'capable of more sophisticated, more flexible, more creative action' (Davis and Sumara 2006). Engagement is not about treating the community as an object to be simply analysed or linked with or learned from. Community engagement initiatives such as the University of Guelph project focus on enabling conditions for complexity and emergence: involving students in as much diversity as possible, creating opportunities for and encouraging multiple interactions, amplifying perturbations in directions to be encouraged, ensuring multiple feedback loops to connect various activities and units, and injecting different forms of information. The point is to hold open the spaces of uncertainty, and to do whatever is possible to sustain co-sensing and presencing of all participants around core principles. In such complexity can emerge radical new possibilities for knowing and being together.

Engaging Difference in Community: Multiple Worlds

A second problematic in community engagement, foreshadowed in the preceding discussion, is the fundamental difference at play among systems of knowledge and practice. Higher education in its delivery through most universities emphasizes disciplinary bodies of knowledge, definable standards of achievement, competitive structures, timetables and measurable outcomes. This embeds logics and assumptions about what constitutes productive engagement, legitimate knowledge-making activity, and partnership that are often at odds with non-university communities. Mol (2002) among others has shown how these differences are not simply a matter of different *worldviews* but actually represent different *worlds* of being—what she refers to as 'multiple ontologies'. Sorting these out involves practices of what she calls ontological politics.

Mol's (2002) studies in health care, for example, show how a disease can be performed into existence completely differently in different communities. In her detailed study of lower-limb atherosclerosis, she followed its enactment in

physicians' discussions with the patient, radiology's focus on comparing images, laboratory examinations of artery fragments, and surgical procedures. Mol (2002) concluded that this apparently single object of atherosclerosis actually materialised as a very different thing in these worlds. Each world constitutes a unique sociomaterial assemblage of routines, methods, language and instruments. Mol argues that in effect, these worlds of community health clinic, radiology, laboratory, surgical theatre, etc. function as different ontologies. Many of these worlds or ontologies co-exist—they become patched together so that the patient can proceed through diagnoses and treatment. However, the actual objects of atherosclerosis enacted in these different worlds bear little similarity.

These different worlds need to create passages among them, and to somehow communicate across these ontologies. This communication is a critical problem. To try to collapse these objects into one and suggest that they are simply different worldviews is to assume that there is one world, one ontology: that of whomever is speaking. Everyone and everything else is appropriated into this one world. Others' worlds of framing, touching, analysis and reality are relegated to being merely a different 'view' of this world. Henare et al. (2006) show how classical anthropology often fell into this trap. For example, an ethnographer meets Cuban diviners who try to show him that aché, a substance used in their séances, constitutes divinatory power. The researcher may understand this as their (naïve) worldview of what is really just white powder. But for the Cuban diviners, the powder *is* magic, it *is* power. In their reality, this object is fundamentally different to the white powder that exists for the researcher. Henare et al. argue that this is an important distinction—to appreciate that the question is not just of different worldviews, but of different ontological worlds. But is it possible to break sufficiently from one's own world of categories and constructs to truly engage in the 'method assemblages' of utterly different ontologies?

One example of higher education in community engagement that attempted to cross different worlds is movingly presented by Somerville (2013). The project involved art and storytelling to link students and academic researchers with Aboriginal communities and other non-university groups. Here, higher education functioned as a community-oriented public pedagogy, rather than as a student-oriented curriculum. The focus was the Murray-Darling basin river system in Australia. The MDB covers 14 % of Australia's landmass and accounts for 70 % of its irrigation, but its rapidly dropping water levels, increasing salinity and acidifying soils are a prominent example of the global crisis in water shortage. Perspectives among government, local towns, businesses, environmental groups, and the many Aboriginal peoples affected by the MDB are sharply divided. Somerville (2012) points out, for instance, that while different regulatory allocations and blockages are imposed by the various Australian states touched by the MDB, the 46 Aboriginal peoples of the region share common cultural stories carrying sacred knowledge of the water, its links with plants and animals, and its harvesting and sustainable management. Somerville and her colleagues, including Aboriginal researchers, an archeologist and ethnohistorian, partnered with Aboriginal communities and artists to share knowledge and collectively learn new approaches to respond to the MDB

crisis. Using an arts-based research approach that Somerville refers to as 'enabling place pedagogies', the initiative seeks to both bridge these knowledges and to mobilize new knowledge. Paintings and other art pieces were produced to represent Aboriginal knowledge, and presented to groups along with accompanying oral stories that helped to open access to the clusters of meanings embedded in the art. The art and stories were generated through the team's research work as a collective, including their discussions with diverse communities. Each year the artworks and stories were presented around particular project themes emerging for the team, and public audiences invited to engage with them in a learning process facilitated by the team. In both artworks and stories, meanings are complex, layered, and remain elusive. They refuse the closure of the already-known, and invite new discoveries. Somerville (2012) describes the overall approach as pedagogical, working in spaces between different worlds of Indigenous and non-Indigenous knowings to explore how knowledge can travel between them.

By way of a more concrete specific example of this work, here is one glimpse from the third public art exhibition. The exhibition was launched with a 'Welcome to Country' ceremony modelled upon a tradition of welcoming visitors from outside the Aboriginal tribal bounds. The welcome was led by a Wiradjuri Elder wearing the traditional possom skin cloak, marked on one side with designs signifying a person's tribal and country connections, as well as being an important protector and source of warmth, a wrap at birth and a shroud at death. The academics explained the project purpose and underpinning ideas of place, people and pedagogy. Then stories were offered speaking of the people's different connections to water, and showing the artworks as an opening for different ways of thinking about water. One story explained the teller's deep attachment to the threatened Narran lake, and how much she feared it turning into 'a body after an autopsy'. Another artist told of a possom cloak that she made to wrap a baby close to death—the baby, a granddaughter of one of the academic researchers, lived.

> Imagine the river without a map
> having it in your head
> that's how people found their way
> if they got lost.
> The little ones would start with a small cloak,
> as they got older they would come along with it on
> just throw it down, talk with the mob
> This is my country, where I come from
> you could use it as a cloak and a map together.
> (Treahna, from Somerville 2012, p. 93).

The baby's cloak is held out to other community participants to reveal the story of country and river identity inscribed on it, then is placed in the centre of the room and the audience invited to touch it. As Somerville (2012, p. 93) explains, 'When the many people feel the cloak with their hands they are participating in a ritual of place, touching identity, and touching country. Through the cloak as a sensory object they are offered a bridge into a different way of knowing.' The cloak is a transitional object: an artwork mapping the river, a deeply personal story of body,

a symbol of people's bonds with country, a material link between artists, audience and academics, and a connection to energies of birth, renewal and creation. Later, the audience were invited to share questions, and new stories emerged of people's attachments to the land and memories of the water. Through the responses of the artists and academics, Somerville (2012) explains, 'the conversation flowed from the space of the exhibition with its artworks and stories, to larger questions of caring for the environment, to climate change, to the fate of the earth, and to the relationship of all this to global indigenous knowledges of place. The final conversation was about the importance of cultural flows.'

Events of the project such as this exhibition's 'Welcome to country' launch were analysed ethnographically by the researchers to understand local processes of knowledge exchange. What they found was that, drawing on the metaphors of the river system itself, flows of knowledge can be enabled across vastly different worlds brought together by shared issues. In this particular project, the first step was opening a deep recognition of the ways Indigenous water knowledge is circulated through art: song, possom cloak maps, body painting, etc. The second was in enabling non-Indigenous engagement with these artistic representations—particularly in ways that, Somerville (2012, p. 97) explains, create connecting 'flows of knowledge between places, between peoples, and between people and places'.

This example suggests that higher education in community engagement may begin by acknowledging elemental difference not just in worldviews, but also in material worlds that co-habit. Communicating across these in ways that do not appropriate or dismiss the other's world of being poses fundamental challenge that is not simply a question of translation or listening more closely or even of respect. For Mol (2002) in her examination of healthcare communities, the challenge requires practices of ontological politics such as patching together different knowledge systems in a juxtaposition that may feel incoherent. For Somerville (2013), the challenge was to find pedagogies that enabled water knowledge to be shared across university and non-university communities, working through one another's forms of representation: science, art, song. For both, difference is taken seriously as a difficult and deeply material encounter. Difference is not to be resolved, in these crossings, but to be honoured on its own terms as a profound experience that cannot be known prior to engagement.

Responsibility in Community Engagement: 'Touching'

Yet these encounters of difference invoke troubling questions about responsibility, power and ethics. Particularly in considering approaches for engaging with diverse communities, higher education must confront concerns about its educational purposes of fostering criticality. How do students and staff avoid becoming enmeshed in problematic dynamics of community without distance and critical structures to analyse them? How can community engagement ensure that it will proceed in productive and possibly transformative directions of mutual benefit, rather than to

reproduce what may be existing oppressions, corruptions, or vacuums of responsibility perpetrated in either higher education or particular communities? But this problem depends on a particular framing, whereby the beings involved are conceived as separate and distinct.

One writer who has developed a provocative sociomaterial conception of emergence that directly resists this conception is Jean-Luc Nancy (2000). For Nancy, human beings and community exist in 'singular plurality', such that individuals are fundamentally part of one another, mutually implicated in each other's constitution, yet continually made distinct through encounters of what he calls 'touching'. Nancy's ideas have been employed particularly in challenges to assumptions of political community and the responsibility to act politically. In this section, they will be described briefly in terms of the insights afforded for considering HE-community engagement.

Nancy's central notion of being-in-common and being singular-plural rests on a doubling of singularity and plurality that co-exist in dynamics of mutual implication and mutual exposure. Basically, Nancy proposes a world of material bodies, not just human, that emerge into being in a shared becoming of sense and what he calls shared finitude. Nancy's world shares, with the complexity writers mentioned earlier, an ontology of radical contingency. However it could be argued that Nancy's ideas go further than these conceptions. For the language of complexity cannot in itself address issues of responsibility and ethics, which lie at the heart of the educative call. Nancy, on the other hand, insists on ethical responsibility with respect to different others. Yet he does so in a conception that avoids the problem of prescribing a particular ethics of reciprocity, or a particular vision of the common good for a community.

Turning to his notion of 'being singular-plural', Nancy (2000) writes about being as what he calls 'being-with', an irreducible togetherness. For Nancy, we are mutually implicated in one another. Human beings live among each other, ultimately, not as separate individuals, but as 'being-in-common'. As James (2006) explains, we are not other to one another, in that we do not encounter each other in the 'face-to-face' in a relation where the other is otherwise than (my) being. Our being-in-common rests on two existential truths. First, we share finitude: we share the same relation to death. We confront this 'finitude', and the fact of our sharing it, through our exposure to the communit(ies) in which we live. Second, we share the quality of being unique. While we are fundamentally joined with each other, we are each equally singular. Each is just as singular as every other. Thus, all have in common their singularity, while all are unique. Together we exist as one singularity, which is simultaneously a plurality.

The focus for Nancy is how this singularity is revealed, and how it is enacted. A critical dynamic for him is encounter among singularities, encounters in which their singularity is exposed, to themselves and to others. The concept of 'touching', the dynamic through which this 'exposure' occurs, is central. Nancy talks of encounters as touching, being touched and being in touch with, as a way to expose singularities: 'the being of community *is* the exposure of singularities' (Nancy 1991, p. 30).

Thus, being depends on being-with. But this is not a communal togetherness. Instead, community is a juxtaposition of singularities that share a space while remaining distinct. They share through a reciprocal exposure of their singularities,

their uniqueness. Nancy's singular plurality is a mutuality of being-in-common, 'the mutual exposure of bodies and incommensurability-in-common' (Watkin 2007, p. 61). Being-in-common does not depend on what participants share, but *that* they are exposed to each other. In this exposure, this touching, singularities come into presence—as intimately joined but separate. Thus, community can never be a common being, but 'the mutuality of being-in-common at a distance'.

Being, then, is a continuous coming into presence. It is coming into presence as distinct from others, but also sharing with others the quality of being equally unique. Being-in-common is a sharing that is at once intimate and distant. Responsibility is not about imposing values or a particular vision of community benefit, but about the deepest engagement of being-with:

> The ethics of mutuality is a potent solidarity, where the suffering of any one, of each one, is a suffering which I share and, concretely, for which I have responsibility. Why? Because I am not *in* relation; I *am* singular plural relation… participants have nothing in common; they *are* in common. (Watkin, pp. 61-62)

Nancy (1991) describes these encounters in community as enacting both 'combat and love', which for him are part of the same dynamic. In what he calls the 'melee' which is community, the passion of encounters among these singularities, this web of singular plurality, this being-with, is what creates the life of community.

In considering university-community engagement, Nancy's ideas provide a powerful testimony to what is it stake in the encounters. His proposal of 'being singular-plural' is difficult to grasp but calls attention to the tiny grains of experience and complex lines of intensity that are embedded in these. The focus on 'touching' helps to make visible the deeply intimate yet mundane, everyday experience of encounters that bring forth our own and others' uniqueness, our singular presence, and our mutuality.

Let us try reading this sensibility against yet another example of community engagement through higher education. This is known as the 'Learning Exchange' of the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, a site for UBC students to engage in community service learning. The Learning Exchange is located in a neighborhood known as the Downtown Lower Eastside (DtLE) which has become well known for its concentration of highly visible social issues such as poverty, unemployment, drug use, sex trade, homelessness and violence. Inaugurated in 1999, after much consultation with community representatives about what sort of UBC presence would be most useful, the Learning Exchange opened to match 30 student volunteers in community projects with eight non profit organisations. By 2010, 2,000 students were placed in service learning projects such as tutoring children or coaching sports activities in schools, building compost systems for community gardens, designing nutrition education materials for low-income single mothers, or providing English language teaching and interpretation. Before being matched with projects, students are first expected to spend time meeting people living in DtLE. Students are often first sent off to work alongside residents in their everyday occupations such as 'binning', collecting metal cans and glass bottles from garbage containers which then get reclaimed in local recycling facilities. Project ideas are developed through conversations with students and residents, facilitated by the Learning Exchange staff, that build upon the community's

stronger networks to address shared problems—not just social, but also environmental and economic (UBC 2012).

As the students work through these projects collaboratively with the community, they share their own knowledge while coming to appreciate the unique knowledge of community members. Together, students and community members learn practical skills whether building things, making spaces like a rooftop garden or playground, creating artwork, or engaging in advocacy such as lobbying city hall about a community issue. Back at the UBC Learning Exchange, students are engaged in dialogues to think critically about their own reactions to what they see happening in the community, the webs of influence at work, and the effects of their own presence in these webs.

The emphasis is not on students helping individuals or solving community problems such as substance addiction. Instead the emphasis is on students working alongside DTES residents, not necessarily connecting or building relationships, but in sharing space and material activity over time - touching and being touched by them. Students learn to understand the DTES not as a singular place of blight, but as multiple communities and networks. They also learn to see and promote the neighbourhood's strengths, such as its diversity and complexity.

In terms of complexity and emergentist notions of learning, we might focus on the connections being continually formed as well as the perturbations in the system, and trace the new knowledge and social patterns that emerge unpredictably. A complexity analyses, like Nancy's, emphasizes distinction, such that singularities maintain and recognize their mutual uniqueness, as well as their implication in the other's uniqueness. Complexity shows that new configurations and knowing cannot emerge without difference in the first instance, and encounter and engagement among diverse elements in the second. However in terms provided by Nancy, the primary dynamic is of touch, not connections. For Nancy, the world(s) of any community, or encounter between communities such as a university teaching system and a low-income inner city community, are non-representable. The action and micro-interactions that occur in their coming-together is an infinite happening of coming into presence. That is, what is important is a contingent and continually emerging relation of thinking and the real, where identity, knowledge, action and environment emerge together. Being touched or touching is coming into presence, imminent, prior to signification, in ways that cannot be codified, represented, modelled and prescribed.

Implications for Higher Education Futures

This chapter has argued that a fundamental challenge for higher education seeking to collaborate with communities beyond its borders is to engage—deeply and openly—with the uncertainty, difference, and responsibility in these possibilities of becoming. But what do these conceptions suggest in terms of future directions and practices for HE?

The conception of 'emergence', as the large initiative undertaken at Canada's University of Guelph had begun to explore, suggests at least three main approaches for HE in engaging the uncertainty of community. One is to create conditions of complexity: diversity, interaction, perturbation, feedback loops and decentralized organisation. Guelph's example set out to actively attract as much diversity as possible, to provoke multiple dialogues, and to provide decentralized scaffolds to encourage, gather and amplify all the interaction and feedback. A second role, often promoted by educational writers using complexity (Davis and Sumara 2006), is to adopt a pedagogy of complexity. This is about actively encouraging participants—beginning with students and involving community members, university staff and administration—to attune to dynamics of emergence in an initiative. It is a pedagogy to slow down the action, to notice how one is inter-penetrated by complex assemblings of relationships, and to attune to the imminent, to radical choices and novel patterns that are continually emerging in surprising ways. A third and related role is to support student's and others' anxiety in this uncertainty. Rather than supplying fixed models and plans and evidence-based knowledge, a complexity pedagogy focuses on thriving in undecidability of knowing, education and practice (Osberg and Biesta 2007). This is about learning resilience in radical contingency, but also learning to experiment and improvise, finding the possibilities that are continually emerging—the logic of renewal in Osberg's terms (2008)—in everyday practice.

In terms of difference, Mol's (2002) conception of multiple ontologies challenges HE to consider the elemental problem of communicating with collectives outside itself that inhabit a different world of being, not just a different worldview. Somerville's (2012) example showed the complexities of encounters across these worlds, as students, educators, academic scientists, and artists worked with Aboriginal communities to share knowledge about water in an initiative to address the Murray Darling Water Basin crisis. To take difference seriously, students can be encouraged to give up attempting to know others prior to encountering them. They can learn to attune to the moment where they confront and experience difference. They are taught that difference cannot be treated simply as another worldview, a curiosity that can be folded into one's own settled ontology. Students, and other participants in community initiatives, can learn that they come into presence themselves as unique beings when they meet difference on its own terms, as a unique and different sociomaterial world to their own.

This is where Nancy's (2000) conception of touching offers further insight in the learning afforded through university engagements with community. Responsibility inheres not in what educators do, but in their fostering of students' immersion in new relations. The *I* apprehends the presence of the other and responds: not by appropriating the other, rehabilitating, socialising, or any of the other positions commonly adapted in pedagogical relations—but simply touching. This is echoed in a complexity-inspired conception of responsibility in the relational universe: a subject does not *have* relationships, as though it existed as an unchanging entity, possessing various connections. Instead, students learn that 'We *are* our relationships. We are nothing other than our relationships—with each other, with the world' (Bai 2001, p. 23).

For higher education's relationships with multifarious communities, these and other sociomaterial approaches show openings for entry, opportunities for interruption, and strategies for productive coalitions. Higher education's enmeshment with materials is too often dismissed or overlooked. Yet its common purposes for engaging with communities in the first place—e.g. to promote students' global citizenship, employability, social and environmental responsibility, etc.—cannot be pursued without appreciating the materials As Bennett (2010) argues, it is not only human voices that can disrupt societal inequities in resource distribution and knowledge recognition: disruption always involves assemblages of human *and* non-human forces. Within these human-nonhuman assemblages, the creative dynamics of emergence depend upon interventions that enable conditions of diversity, decentralised organisation, attunement, multiple interactions and feedback. Through community initiatives, universities can take responsibility for opening and sustaining these conditions. In the words of Karen Barad (2003, p. 827):

> Particular possibilities for acting exist at every moment, and these changing possibilities entail a responsibility to intervene in the world's becoming, to contest and rework what matters and what is excluded from mattering.

Conclusion

'Community engagement' of higher education can become a woolly and platitudinous excursion or a highly rationalized, outcomes-measured implementation. Both approaches can miss a deeper engagement with uncertainty, difference and responsibility. The departure point of this chapter is to step outside the structured rationality of HE interests and models to seek fresh perspectives about what is at stake in community engagement. The chapter has drawn from what some have called sociomaterial approaches to understanding communities and knowing, where knowing is taken to emerge and be performed within the entanglements of materials with the social and personal: bodies, objects, technologies and places. In this relational universe, conceptions of 'emergence' (Osberg and Biesta 2007), 'multiple ontologies' (Mol 2002), and 'touching' (Nancy 2000) suggest a rather different way of engaging with others. These conceptions highlight the details of everyday mundane encounters, conflicts and connections in HE-community engagements, drawing attention to the ways difference of all kinds collides in these everyday negotiations, and raising new questions about how knowing circulates and what radical possibilities for change are continually emerging.

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Part III
Which Knowledge and Who Can Have It

Babies and Bathwater: Revaluing the Role of the Academy in Knowledge

Leesa Wheelahan

Introduction

Higher education is being changed in two ways. First, it is becoming more utilitarian and specifically vocational as a consequence of the dominance of economic values in contemporary society and policy which subordinates higher education and its institutions as instruments of micro-economic policy. Second, the rhetoric of 'the knowledge society' seems to undermine the distinctiveness of 'higher' education and its institutions. Both processes contribute to undermining the academic disciplines and their location within institutions of higher education. The irony is that prosperous, socially inclusive, knowledge rich societies rely on the store of knowledge developed, codified, curated and transmitted by higher education institutions. More fundamentally, they rely on an understanding of the nature of knowledge and of the means of its generation—research—which are undermined by utilitarianism and by the genericism posited by the knowledge society.

There is a creative tension between academic disciplines on the one hand, and inter-disciplinary research that focuses on a particular problem on the other that requires insights from many different disciplines. Interdisciplinary research requires the disciplines as a condition of its existence, but the disciplines on their own cannot 'solve' complex problems that are the result of many different interacting causal factors. A discipline cannot claim to explain the *whole* world, just an aspect of the world and quite imperfectly at that. Problems arise in the academic disciplines in attempts to unproblematically translate findings from the 'pure' academic disciplines to real, messy, complexities—processes of translation and integration by more applied disciplines are required (Collier 1997; Bhaskar 2010). However while this is so, in undermining the academic disciplines, proponents of 'useful' knowledge are undermining the conditions for the development of knowledge.

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The chapter focuses on the arguments for transdisciplinarity made famous by Gibbons and his colleagues (Gibbons 2004b, 2005; Nowotny et al. 2001) who argue that disciplinary structures are a constraint on the development of knowledge. They distinguish between Mode 1 knowledge which is largely disciplinary based, and Mode 2 knowledge which (they argue) transgresses disciplines and is contextual, problem oriented research that occurs at the site of application. Gibbons (2008, p. 2) distinguishes between transdisciplinary knowledge on the one hand and interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary knowledge on the other, because unlike the latter, the former is "not necessarily derived from pre-existing disciplines". Rather, he argues that transdisciplinary knowledge is constructed through the 'boundary object'—the common object or purpose that brings researchers and other 'key stakeholders' together.

First, the chapter draws on the philosophy of critical realism to establish the ontological basis for understanding how knowledge is produced and the role of the academic disciplines. This is followed by an analysis of Gibbons' and his colleagues' arguments for Mode 1 and 2 knowledge. The final section uses critical realism and the sociology of Basil Bernstein to consider the implications for higher education, universities, curriculum and students and for education for the professions.

A Critical Realist Argument

Critical realism distinguishes between the world and our knowledge of it. It argues that the world does not depend on what we think about it or know about it. Critical realists argue that the natural world exists independently of our conceptions of it, although our actions may change aspects of the natural world as exemplified through the consequences of human activity resulting in global warming. In contrast, the social world is *relatively* independent of our conceptions; our purposeful activities may change aspects of the social world, but we operate within parameters that have been shaped by previous agential actions (Archer 2000). However, our knowledge of the natural and social worlds is fallible and provisional because our experience of the world is always theory-laden (though not theory determined) (Sayer 2000).

Critical realism is a relational theory of ontology that argues that the (natural and social) world is complex and stratified and characterised by emergence and complexity (Bhaskar 1998a, b). It distinguishes between 'causal mechanisms' (such as gravity in the natural world and social class in the social world) which interact in open systems so that their propensities to act in particular ways may be realised, changed or impeded. This is the level of the real, the level of causal mechanisms. The next is the level of the actual, where events actually happen. We may or may not be able to perceive these events, but that doesn't mean they have not occurred (such as a tree falling in the forest). The third level is the level of the empirical—what we actually experience (we may have been in the forest and seen and/or heard tree fall). Collier (1998, pp. 261–262) provides a lovely example of how the different levels interact and the different insights that are needed when he illustrates the

contrasting insights the gods in Valhalla bring to understanding why a strike is on at a particular factory. He explains that Thor provides the physical description of why things have stopped in the factory but he needs Woden to analyse the social realities and to tell him there is a strike on, whereas Fey, the god of biology and Loki, the god of unconscious are needed to explain that "the boss's daughter is going to elope with the chief shop steward, the boss is going to die of apoplexy, and the daughter [will] inherit the firm and turn it into a workers' co-operative".

A critique that critical realism makes of 'conventional science' is that it depends on counting how many times things happen (or the constant conjunction of events) as a key criterion for identifying causal laws and mechanisms. In contrast, critical realists seek to identify causal mechanisms and how they interact in open systems and this shows that things *could* happen but don't always happen. For example, Sayer (1992, p. 110) says that we don't need to explode neutron bombs to know their causal liabilities. Sayer (2000, p. 11) explains that "Realists therefore seek to identify both necessity and possibility or potential in the world—what things must go together, and would could happen, given the nature of the objects".

The Nature of Knowledge and the Disciplines

Critical realists regard knowledge as a social product that emerges through our practice in the world. They distinguish between the intransitive dimension which refers to the existence of the natural and social worlds and the transitive dimension which refers to our knowledge of these worlds. While objects and our knowledge of objects are causally related, there isn't a direct correspondence between the two and each can change independently of the other. Our knowledge is always mediated by pre-existing concepts and knowledge and by the social conditions of our access. There is no direct correspondence between the two because knowledge is socially produced and mediated, and has its own conditions for its existence and causal properties. It requires communities of knowledge producers (such as in the disciplines) with criteria for and consensus about how knowledge is produced (at least in some measure) which includes judging the validity of knowledge claims.

Collier (1997, p. 22) argues that 'abstract' academic disciplines provide insights into *aspects* of the world by identifying causal mechanisms in isolation of their operation in open systems. These disciplines are abstract sciences (as in the case of physics, chemistry and biology) because they abstract particular structures and causal mechanisms to demonstrate their actions, "*other things being equal*" (Collier 1997, p. 22). He says they can't predict how things happen in the real world because all other things never are equal. Bhaskar (2010, pp. 11–12) explains that "intermediate and concrete sciences sit between the abstract sciences and the reconstructed concepts of concrete objects." Concrete sciences use as their organising framework the object of study, whereas intermediate sciences study the confluence of different interacting factors or causal mechanisms. Both focus on the emergent outcome of many causal mechanisms operating at different levels in open

systems (Collier 1997, 1998). Collier makes a further distinction between concrete sciences (in which he includes the human sciences and some natural sciences) and *practices* which are individuated "by the aims that they pursue and the means they use." He gives agriculture, health care and war as examples of practice.

Collier (1997, p. 26) argues that concrete sciences should draw on abstract sciences (as well as their research on their own intransitive objects), while practices should draw on concrete sciences. He contrasts his preferred sequence "*abstract sciences—concrete science—practice"* to "the abridged sequence *abstract science—practice"* (Collier 1997, p. 26 emphasis in original). This is because abstract sciences are often used directly to inform practice, but the abstract sciences are based on abstracting causal mechanisms and identifying their propensities to act in particular ways, all other things being equal. But, as explained above, all other things never are equal. He gives as an example a discovery in the abstract sciences that may result in cheaper and quicker production of commodities, but at the expense of environmental devastation, or impairment of workers' health and well-being. He argues postmodern criticisms of the misuse of abstract sciences "lies not with abstract science but with the tendency of its commercial and military users to apply science in its abstract state, rather than treating abstract sciences as contributory disciplines whose results must flow together into the sea of concrete science before they are in a fit state to be applied practically" (Collier 1997, p. 26).

Collier's argument carefully distinguishes between different types of academic disciplines and explains the relationships between them. It shows that the 'pure' abstract disciplines are fundamental to our understanding of the world, but for *aspects* of the world. Concrete sciences or disciplines are needed to understand complex realities, and even here, concrete sciences often need to work together with each other and with the pure disciplines. Each is essential. Each requires institutional structures and cultures to support, develop, codify, curate and transmit knowledge. This role has traditionally been played by universities, although not exclusively. The development of the 'knowledge society' has seen the proliferation of sites of knowledge production outside the academy (Bernstein 2000), but this does not diminish the role of universities as society's method for institutionalising the development and structuring of knowledge. However, if the focus is on producing 'useful' knowledge for direct application, whilst at the same time attacking the pure disciplines for lack of relevance, a key enabling resource for 'useful' knowledge is being undermined.

Mode 1 and 2 Knowledge and Society

Gibbons (2004a, 2005, 2008) and Nowotny et al. (2001, 2003) define Mode 1 knowledge as disciplinary based, often 'pure' research, conducted in universities by disciplinary specialists within a hierarchical framework that specifies the rules for knowledge creation, what counts as knowledge and who can contribute to it. They contrast this with Mode 2 knowledge which is categorised by "a distinct set of cognitive and social practices" suitable for cross-disciplinary, problem oriented, applied

and less hierarchical research that occurs at the site of application, and which is, as a consequence, "more socially accountable and reflexive" than is Mode 1 knowledge (Gibbons 1997, p. 3). Mode 2 knowledge is created in many sites, and not just the university. It does not privilege the university as the sole site of knowledge creation.

Gibbons (2005) says the old social contract between society and science has changed. The old social contract depended on a distinction between the two and a division of labour between universities and society. Under the terms of the old contract, science was seen as the means for growth, control and predictability and was characteristic of "high modernity with its unshakeable belief in planning (in society) and predictability (in science)" (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 5). Gibbons (2005, p. 6) explains that the role of science was to produce knowledge and communicate it to society. Under the old social contract, the communication was one-way, with science speaking to society.

Gibbons and Nowotny et al. argue that the success of this model altered the relationship between society and society and led to a new social contract. The success of science meant that it was increasingly brought into new domains and asked to solve new problems, many of which were not able to be addressed through existing disciplinary structures (Gibbons 2005). Science no longer has a one way dialogue with society—society now speaks back to science, by setting priorities, questions and problems to be solved, and by changing the social and institutional context in which science is practiced. They argue that as a consequence, both society and science have changed and there is a new relationship between them. Further, the discrete domains of politics, culture, the market, science and society under modernity "have become transgressive arenas, co-mingling and subject to the same co-evolutionary trends" (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 4).

They argue that the economic and social changes which have transformed the relationship between science and society include the pervasive introduction of market policies, globalisation and consequent limits to the state. Knowledge production is now shaped by "the strategic policies of both industry, government and the research councils, [which] have been increasingly driven by a variety of socio-economic demands, involve a more diverse range of research competences, and exhibit many more cross-institutional links" (Gibbons 2005, p. 7). Moreover, these broad social, economic and political changes were also expressed through changes to intellectual cultures through challenging social conditions of equilibrium, normative stability and the scientific order.

Nowotny et al., argue that the *context* of application now provides the conditions for the development of robust science, not the traditional *methods* of science. Moreover, because contexts are now transgressive as a consequence of the previous boundaries between domains in society becoming permeable, overlapping and mutually constitutive, the previous disciplinary distinctions provide a constraint on the development of new knowledge. Robust science must respond to these new conditions, which have been brought about by the growth of complexity. They argue that a dynamic of co-evolution links society and science and changes each in the process, resulting in similarities between the two "in the operation of underlying forces" (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 33).

These 'underlying forces' may be best understood as clusters of "perceptions, attitudes, outlooks, assumptions and rationalities" that "coalesce with altered social practices and institutional constraints" which are linked through a self-organising mode and not through simple cause and effect relationships (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 33). Society is now characterised and shaped by: uncertainties in science and society; science as a driving force of economic competitiveness; economic rationality as the filter for priorities; a temporal dimension with the 'future as extended present'; the flexibilisation of distance as a consequence of information and communication technologies and globalisation which has contributed to both centralisation and decentralisation, and altered identities (see also Giddens 2000; Castells 2000); and, the self-organising capacity of science and society founded on reflexivity.

On the face of it, this seems to be an impeccable critical realist analysis of stratification and emergence. However, they flinch from following their analysis through to its logical conclusion and argue that "it would be wrong to aspire to identify common patterns of causality" (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 30). They don't explain *why* it would be wrong, and nor do they explicitly spell out a theory of ontology even though their arguments about epistemology rest upon implicit assumptions about the nature of the real.

Reflexivity and Audit

Nowotny et al. identify the self-organising capacity of science and society as the most important characteristic of Mode 2 society. This is founded on a reflexivity which permeates all aspects of life. Reflexivity results in increasingly complex internal systemic differentiation that consequently increases the capacity of systems to engage with an increasingly complex environment in iterative and fluid ways at different levels, including the local. They argue that there is a second sense in which reflexivity constitutes a mutually iterative and constitutive process between science and society, and that is the emergence of the 'audit society' as the means of managing risk in the context of inherent uncertainty. This new mode of organisation is effective (they argue) because it internalises forms of behaviour in a context where old methods of social control are increasingly ineffective. It preserves relative autonomy for the scientific community while ensuring it is responsive to society's needs.

> In the absence of the active participation of those who are to be audited, and without an internalized institutional self-discipline, social control is ineffective. It can even be argued that, in the shift towards an audit and accountability culture (which can be regarded as forms of institutional reflexivity), an element of authenticity enters. The self, or the organization, is expected to conspire in its own surveillance. Social control is internalized and so transformed into self-control. At the same time it also becomes possible to shift from process to outcome. (Nowotny et al. 2001, pp. 45–46)

This extraordinary analysis sets the scene for an argument that the collective and collegiate forms of social organisation founded in the disciplines is a constraint (on trade?), that the methods of the sciences (or the epistemological core) no

longer result in 'robust' science, that new social forms are needed to bring society and science together (the market), and that this will result in responsive research. Science must now be relevant. How is relevance determined? Through the mechanism of supply and demand in the market place of knowledge. While it may be a 'metaphorical' market, it nonetheless elicits "the individualized and individualizing beliefs, values and norms upon which the functioning of any market is premised" (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 107).

This leads to an argument in which Western individualism is now the new mediator between science and society. Communitarian philosophies result (they argue) in strong in/out group relations, tight and shared norms and less internal differentiation, and segregation between different disciplines. In contrast, individualism results in more integration because people are not constrained by tight in/out group relations or shared norms and approaches and they are more likely to engage (through the market) with others, and are also more likely to be responsive to the needs of others. Unlike traditional models, this creates 'spaces' for individuals, groups and organisations that were previously excluded. This is, they argue, a desirable outcome.

Bernstein (2000) presents as a dystopia a world in which 'inner commitments' to a field of knowledge is severed, and the use-value of knowledge eclipsed by its exchange value as a consequence of the commodification of knowledge through its subordination to the market. For Nowotny et al., it seems to be the reverse, through an almost Hegelian unfolding of the rational spirit towards self-realisation (Heywood 1999), except it is the market and not the state that expresses this self-realisation.

TINA: There is no Alternative

Because Nowotny et al. do not have a theory of ontology they present an historicist and teleological account of the development of science and knowledge, reducible only to social relations. Consequently, they run the teleological TINA argument—there is no alternative—which leads them to argue that the driving force of science and innovation is markets and individual competitiveness. They do not find the basis of science in the nature of the objects of science, but in the *cultural practices* of science, which leads them to argue that epistemological core at the heart of science is empty:

> or, more accurately, that the epistemological core is crowded with many different norms and practices which cannot readily be reduced to generic methodologies or, more broadly, privileged cultures of scientific inquiry. (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 199)

They achieve this through presenting a straw person in the form of positivist science, and counterpose their model of 'robust' science. For example, Gibbons (2005, pp. 8–9) cites research into deep vein thrombosis to illustrate his argument. He says that research on DVT conducted in laboratories on fit young people found no correlation between DVT and air travel when tested at 6,000 ft for relatively short times. He contrasts this to research on actual populations with

diverse medical histories who fly in cramped spaces at 35,000 ft for up to 15 h. The former produced reliable but not robust research. However, the former model also describes atomistic, positivist science, which reduces causation to constant conjunctions of events. The latter approach identifies causal mechanisms operating in open systems. This is not an argument for individualism and competitiveness in science, but an argument against positivism. Similarly, Nowotny et al. find the basis of objectivity in the *methods* of science and not in the relationship between knowledge and its object. This leads them to argue for science that is more subjective and epistemologically eclectic.

There are many problems with the approach that Nowotny et al. outline. First, because they lack a theory of ontology, they reduce knowledge to knowers and their cultural practices, rather than the product of practical engagement in a stratified and complex world. This leads them to substitute the culturally and historically specific forms of social organisation expressed through markets (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) as the normative ideal and the inexorable reality (TINA). Second, as they concede, given that economic rationality and individualism pervades Mode-2 society, there are "acute issues of social justice, economic equality and the further democratization of knowledge" (Nowotny et al. 2001, p. 252). Third, in presenting market relations as the integrative force, the danger is that the market will be seen as the only arena for identifying research problems, and this excludes or makes more difficult public investment in public issues such as global warming. In essence, they have used a pluralist view of politics in which the diffusion of political, social and economic power through interest group competition is the normative ideal (Schwarzmantel 1987). This approach is not able to account for socially differentiated capacities to identify and constitute concerns and interests, nor for the way in which power is exercised (Lukes 1974). Fourth, in rejecting positivist science and in not articulating a non-relativist epistemology based on a materialist ontology they are left with pragmatism or instrumentalism, in which 'what works' is the guiding criterion. This does not necessarily provide insights into the nature of the causal mechanisms that contribute to the outcome, because it is possible to get the right answers for the wrong reasons. Finally, while Nowotny et al. concede that Mode-1 science (that is, the disciplines) continues to have a role, they present a sustained argument against it in the academy as well as in research, and so run the risk of undermining the conditions that make knowledge creatio possible. Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge creation need to be held in creative tension, and the latter rests upon negotiation with the former.

Implications for Universities, Higher Education, Students and Curriculum

Universities have historically been sites of knowledge creation for applied as well as pure disciplines. Identifying universities just with the pure disciplines is too narrow a conception of their role. The University of Bologna (founded c 1088)

was established as a law school, while Oxford (c 1167) and Cambridge (c 1209) were established as theology schools to train graduates for the church (Grendler 2002; Leader 1988). For example, Verger (1992, p. 42) explains:

> But the fact remains that no recognized medieval university was ever restricted to arts schools. Although the latter were, in various forms, fairly plentiful in the medieval West (above all, from the fourteenth century on), they were only granted university status when they were associated with, at the very least, a faculty of theology, law, or medicine.

The pure and applied disciplines have struggled for ascendency at different times over the last 800 years, and the debate on Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge may be understood as another expression of this debate. Both forms of knowledge are required, and both require institutional forms and structures to support, develop, codify, curate and transmit knowledge. The pure disciplines rely almost exclusively on universities or other public research institutes. The applied disciplines are more varied. The 'old' (and elite) applied disciplines such as theology, medicine and law have had strong links with the academy and institutions and professional associations in their field of practice. These links are more tenuous in many of the newer applied disciplines (such as management and hospitality) which either have not been in the academy for very long, and/or have very weak institutions or professional associations (Bernstein 2000). Leaving the development of new forms of knowledge to the vicissitudes of the market will not necessarily result in robust forms knowledge. For example, hospitality has been in the market at least since Mary tried to find an inin which she could give birth to Christ, but it is only now emerging as a field of practice underpinned by an emergent disciplinary form of knowledge in the academy. Arguably, the development of hospitality as an applied discipline that can inform the field of practice relies on its further development in the academy, but also and inescapably, on developing institutional and professional forms of support within the field of practice.

The pure and applied disciplines have proliferated over the last 200 years as a result of the increasingly complexity of society and division of labour (Bernstein 2000). Proponents of the negation of the disciplines have a model of disciplines that is rigid and based on impermeable boundaries. But the boundaries are more permeable than this and the disciplines change in response to further engagement with their objects and with each other and society more broadly. New challenges do arise because of the pace of change and growth in complexity in society, and this poses challenges for interdisciplinary work in particular. However, rather than negating the importance of disciplinary boundaries, interdisciplinary work occurs through explicit negotiation of the boundaries. Bhaskar (2010, p. 5) argues that successful interdisciplinary work will require members of interdisciplinary teams who can work together effectively "in *cross-disciplinary* understanding". And, this "will necessitate a form of education and continuing socialization of the interdisciplinary research worker" (Bhaskar 2010, p. 5). However, while this may be so, arguably this cannot be at the expense of the creation of disciplinary experts. It is an argument for a more complex and nuanced division of labour and the creation of new roles.

Higher Education, Students and Curriculum

Higher education is broader than universities. While universities have an institutionalised role in creating and codifying knowledge, higher education is offered in institutions other than universities, and these institutions have a responsibility to ensure that students have access to abstract theoretical knowledge for two reasons. First, as Bernstein (2000) argues, society uses abstract disciplinary knowledge to construct its conversation about what it should be like. Abstract theoretical knowledge enables society to connect the present with the past and the future. It is the means society uses to imagine alternative futures through thinking the unthinkable and the not-yet-thought. It thus provides students with social access to this conversation and this is why access to abstract theoretical knowledge is fundamentally about distributional justice.

However, a precondition of social access is that students must have epistemic access—they must be able to enter the system of meaning so they can understand debates and controversies within it. So the second reason that students need access to disciplinary knowledge is because they provide epistemic access to the aspect of the natural and social world they study. This is not an argument for presenting the disciplines in curriculum as 'the truth' even though seeking the truth should be a normative goal for curriculum. Access to disciplinary knowledge provides students with access to criteria they need to judge and critique knowledge claims, and this is essential if they are to participate in debates and controversies in society more broadly and in their field of practice in particular. Access to the methods that the disciplines use to produce knowledge also helps students understand the provisional nature of knowledge as they gain new insights into their objects of study. This will assist students in becoming critics of knowledge and critical producers of knowledge.

Ironically, access to disciplinary systems of meaning will provide students with better access to the contextual. Unless students have access to knowledge which gives them insight into the causal mechanisms that interact at different levels in constructing the contextual, they will not be able to distinguish between features of the contextual that are necessary and intrinsic to it, and those that are contingent and accidental. Bhaskar's (1998b, p. 146) argument that "no moment ever contains its own truth, or act its own criteria of intelligibility" has important implications for pedagogy and curriculum. By focusing on the contextual students are denied access to the conditions of knowledge needed to understand the contextual. This is because the complexity contributing to the structuring of the contextual is denied, as is the means to access to the contextual by using the general to understand the particular. This has implications in particular for education for the professions, as discussed in the next section.

Implications for Professional Education

Privileging Mode 2 knowledge has potentially negative consequences for education for the professions. Instead of *counterposing* Mode 1 and Mode 2 forms of knowledge, it is more productive to examine the relations of relative autonomy and interdependence between the pure and applied disciplines. The applied

disciplines constitute the theoretical 'tool-box' that underpins practice and the applied disciplines provide the basis for education for the professions (Barnett 2006). The applied disciplines have emerged from processes recontextualisation from their disciplinary origins for the purposes application in fields of practice (Young 2006). However, the applied disciplines have developed relative autonomy from the pure disciplines. There is an iterative relationship between the development of the 'pure' and 'applied' academic disciplinary knowledge as each develops through their own insights and insights provided by the other. However, each has different concerns: the focus of the pure disciplines is to extend disciplinary knowledge and understanding, whereas the focus of the applied disciplines is to extend the knowledge base of practice (Young 2006).

This has important implications for education for the professions. While curriculum must have as its focus the field of practice students are being prepared to enter, the condition for their *epistemic* access is through understanding the boundaries that distinguish the pure disciplines relevant to their field, their objects of study, and the way in they are 'assembled' and translated through the applied disciplines. This provides students with access to the complexity that structures their field and the emergent relations that result from the operation of causal mechanisms in open systems. While problem-based learning models of curriculum may have a role, exclusively basing education for the professions on experiential and/or problem-based models of learning that have as their object a feature of the world and not the structures of the knowledge, may well deny students the access they need to understand their field.

Bernstein (2000, p. 52) referred the pure academic disciplines as 'singulars' because they refer to knowledge structures that are defined, insulated and named as a single field, with its own discourse, rules, texts and speakers. In contrast, he refers to preparation for the professions as the 'regionalisation' of knowledge, and their location within the academy as 'regions'. He says that:

> Regions are constructed by recontextualising singulars into larger units which operate both in the intellectual field of disciplines and in the field of external practice. Regions are the interface between disciplines (singulars) and the technologies they make possible. (Bernstein 2000, p. 52).

Consequently, the task of curriculum in higher education for the professions is to *face both ways* to the field of practice and the field of knowledge. In many ways, constructing curriculum for professions is more complex than it is in constructing curriculum for pure academic disciplines, where the orientation is just one way, towards the structures of knowledge (Barnett 2006).

Conclusion

The academic disciplines play an irreducible role in creating knowledge in society. They identify causal mechanisms of aspects of the natural and social worlds. Knowledge is always contested because there isn't a direct correspondence between knowledge and the objects of knowledge as each has its own conditions

of existence. The production of knowledge requires communities of knowledge producers with specialised practices and shared norms and conventions that they use to produce knowledge, while the objects that they study are not dependent on these knowledge producers for their existence. Gravity does not depend on scientists for its existence and nor does social class depend on sociologists for its existence. The norms and conventions of the disciplines are not given truths, but evolve through experience and debate. The disciplines don't represent 'the truth', but they do represent our best efforts so far in getting closer to the truth.

The academic disciplines represent only one part of our investigations in the world. They cannot tell the whole picture because they are focused only on an aspect of the world. Interdisciplinary work is necessary because without it one cannot identify, let alone explore, mechanisms of co-determination in open systems (Collier 1998). While the development of pure disciplines is undertaken by universities and other specialist institutions, the development of applied disciplines requires synergistic relationships between the academy and social institutions within the field of practice. Knowledge creation in pure and applied disciplines and interdisciplinary work that focuses on particular problems or objects in the world all require institutional forms of support, and each enriches the other. Dichotomies where disciplinary knowledge is cast as bad and contextualised knowledge as good undermine knowledge. This is the irony in utilitarian arguments for useful knowledge that will support markets and is to be elicited by markets—these arguments undermine the conditions for the knowledge society.

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Curriculum in Higher Education: Beyond False Choices

Suellen Shay

Introduction

This chapter is an invitation to "think about higher education" from the rich and contested site of curriculum. Much of the contestation around curriculum occurs against the backdrop of global concerns about a general failure of higher education evidenced in poor articulation between the school and university, poor completion rates, the performance gap between privileged and under-privileged, underemployed graduates, and the general failure of higher education to meet the needs of the knowledge society. Scott (2009) describes this crisis in South Africa as a systemic failure: higher education in South Africa is failing the majority of its young people.

In response to this crisis, curriculum debates are often framed through a discourse of polarities, or 'false choices' about the purposes of higher education. These include, for example, choices between curricula for employability versus 'educating the mind', vocational versus academic, knowing versus being, problem versus discipline-based, depth versus breadth, Mode 1 versus Mode 2. I propose that underlying these debates and the false choices they construct are contestations about knowledge. In order to make any headway as policy makers, educational development specialists, teachers and researchers in higher education we need to move beyond these false choices. This will require a better understanding of the field of contestation which gives rise to this polarized discourse.

Amid these contestations sociologists of education rooted in social realism have made a compelling case for knowledge itself (Muller 2000; Young 2008; Moore 2007; Maton 2000; Wheelahan 2010). They have argued that: knowledge matters in education, there are different kinds of knowledge, not all forms of knowledge

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are equal and these differentiations have significant implications for curriculum. The crucial implication is that if learners are to have access to powerful knowledge (Young 2008), then all curricula, including vocational, must include theoretical knowledge. More specifically, all curricula must include epistemic access to theoretical knowledge. As Wheelahan (2010) argues, "Social access without epistemic access is merely to reproduce social inequality" (p. 1).

Much of the focus of the knowledge and curriculum debate and critique has focused on the schooling sector. There is however a growing body of scholarship exploring the relationship between knowledge and curriculum in higher education (Luckett 2012; Muller 2009; Vorster 2011, Wolff and Luckett 2013). This chapter is contribution to theorizing this relationship and proceeds in four parts: First, I clarify the notion 'epistemic access'. Second, I argue that higher education curriculum is experiencing a contextual turn. Third, drawing on key theorists in the sociology of education—Basil Bernstein, Pierre Bourdieu and Karl Maton—I offer a conceptual framework. The framework enables us to map contestations in the field of knowledge production and to explain what might be happening in higher education curriculum. Finally, I use the framework to explore specifically what happens to knowledge when curricula 'face outwards'. One plausible explanation for the crisis currently being experienced in higher education is a widening gap between the needs of a knowledge society and the kinds of curricula which higher education has to offer.

Epistemic Access: What is it and Why?

The notion of 'epistemic access' was coined by the late Morrow (2009[1])—a South African scholar and activist—who argued that if one of the key purposes of higher education is to produce knowledgeable citizens then it follows that one of its core functions has to be to give students access to knowledge, access to what Morrow (2009) calls 'epistemic values'—that is, the forms of inquiry of the disciplines. This is more than disciplinary content, it is the "grammar of inquiry" (p. 37). Morrow elaborates on this, "In this way of talking, any *established* and *disciplined* practice, such as civil engineering, teaching, mathematics, legal practice, biochemistry, history or primary healthcare, can be said to be constituted by a particular (but not necessarily exclusive) grammar… Higher knowledge of the practice in question would consist in understanding the constitutive grammar of the practice, the grammar that makes the practice what it is" (p. 120). He is clear that this is not knowledge for knowledge's sake, "What I have claimed is that a modern society does not so much value knowledge per se, but rather that kind of knowledge that is a potential, and potent, catalyst for innovation and growth" (p. 121).

[1] Morrow (2009) is compilation of his essays spanning a period from the late 1980s to the early 2000s.

While higher education is no longer the only knowledge producer, it still has a unique mission of producing the knowledge producers, ensuring a new generation of knowledgeable citizens and professionals who can contribute to all spheres of society. Higher education's role in this endeavor is not simply an extension of schooling; it is not the same as post-secondary. It is called *higher* education for a reason. Morrow (2009) quoting Muller, "It (higher education) involves a capacity to manipulate information and knowledge to produce new configurations (this is really what 'new knowledge' means in the 'steady state' knowledge society)… It involves, in other words, the ability to distinguish between representations and objects… and to be able to manipulate the representations to generate new connections" (p. 119).

What was Morrow's point? What were his particular concerns for higher education at the dawn of South Africa's new democracy? To foreground epistemic access—that is, access to specialized discourses—as one of the key functions of higher education, would not have been popular argument in the early days of post-apartheid. It smacked of elitism. Morrow is writing at a time when higher education in South Africa was experiencing rapid expansion of enrolments, and a promising increase in the number of students who historically had been denied access. By 2000 the number of black students[2] enrolled in higher education had nearly doubled; they comprised nearly 60 % of the overall enrolments (Scott et al. 2007). However, as Muller (2012) argues, "Morrow was one of the first to sound a warning that, if we were serious about 'opening the doors to learning' as the then fashionable slogan had it, *formal access* was one thing, *epistemological access* another" (p. 3).

Indeed Morrow's concerns were well-founded. The 'open doors of learning' have become for the vast majority a revolving door. The great achievement of post-apartheid's increased enrolment upon great scrutiny reveals only a marginal increase in overall participation rate of 15 % in 2001 to 16 % to date. A disaggregation of this cohort by race exposes a 60 % participation rate for white students and only 12 % for black students. In terms of completion rates, national cohort studies show that only 30 % of the students have completed their 3-year degree in 5 years (Scott et al. 2007). The completion rate for black students is about half that of white students for many programmes. This is the quantitative picture of the 'systemic failure' Scott refers to, noted above. This trend of poor and racially differentiated completion rates is not unique to South Africa (Altbach et al. 2009).

It can be taken as given that not only is this a blow for social justice but it is a profound blow to the future sustainability of South Africa's economic development given the relationship between knowledge production and economic development especially in developing countries (Naidoo 2007; Fisher and Scott 2011). Morrow's (2009) call for epistemic access spotlights the huge challenge to steer a conceptual path between the twin goals of equity (the imperatives of redress)

[2] The term 'black' is used here inclusively and constitutes those students who under apartheid would have been classified African, Coloured and Indian.

and development (the need for highly skilled knowledge producers). This is the permanent tension of a developing country in a competitive globalized world. It is another one of those false choices especially in the context of developing countries such as South Africa where the majority have been disenfranchised. Without redress, there will be no development. These goals have to be held in tension and compromises will need to be made on each side. The process of transformation is likely to be slower and difficult political choices have to be made.

So the argument for epistemic access is now being made at a time when the need for knowledgeable citizens has never been greater, when higher education is currently systemically failing to deliver against this purpose, and when there is conceptual confusion about what 'knowledge' means in a knowledge society. The opportunities for higher education curriculum reform—curricula for epistemic access—have never been greater. Morrow sounded a keynote—the term 'epistemic access' has become ubiquitous in educational development in South Africa and beyond (Muller 2012; Young 2008; Wheelahan 2010)—but more conceptual work is needed. The stakes are perhaps greater than even he imagined.

Curriculum in Higher Education: A Contextual Turn

The global pressures currently being exerted on higher education are well-documented—multiple accountabilities giving rise to the stakeholder university, contestations about the purposes of higher education, internationalization, the imperatives of a knowledge economy, new trends in knowledge production, the ICT revolution, and a shrinking financial resource base to name a few (Altbach et al. 2009). It is risky to generalize the effects of these pressures on curriculum reform given the complex interplay between global, national and institutional imperatives (Adam 2009). However there is no doubt that higher education curricula must now serve a wide range of diverse interests. I propose that the collective effect of these pressures on higher education curriculum has resulted in what Bernstein (2000) would describe as a weakening in classification, that is, a weakening of the traditional disciplinary boundaries which have constituted curriculum formations. This weakening of boundaries opens up new spaces and results in a contextual 'turn' or 'pull' on curriculum, a pressure on curriculum to 'face outwards'.

While this turn is often characterized as 'utilitarian', 'instrumental' or 'market-driven', in fact the picture is more complicated and more interesting as some current curriculum reform initiatives at leading universities reveals. For example, the central question of Stanford University's recent review of its undergraduate curriculum (SUES 2012) is "how do we best prepare Stanford students for local, national and global citizenship?". There is also the well-known 'Melbourne Model'—a radical curriculum shift towards inter-disciplinarity. These processes all reveal that reform is much more complex than it would appear and that it is crucial to pay attention to what is happening to knowledge.

Evidence of this contextual turn on South African higher education curriculum reform can be found in the range of competing discourses vying for attention in early days of post-apartheid higher education policy debates. There are the discourses of 'skills' for economic development, of 'transparency' and 'transformation' for equity, of 'relevance' and 'responsiveness' for new modes of knowledge production to name a few (Adam 2009; Kraak 2000; Ensor 2004). As these policies have gained traction there have been persistent critical voices raising questions about the implications of these contextual pulls for knowledge.

One of the most heated debates was generated in response to the Mode1/Mode 2 thesis (Gibbons et al. 1994)—that is, that the production of knowledge and the process of research are being "radically transformed" (Nowotny et al. 2003, p. 179). These trends have resulted, they argue, in a "new discourse" of science (Nowotny et al. 2003, p. 181). The argument attracted a great deal of attention by policy makers in South Africa who found it a convenient and compelling driver for the transformation of higher education. It also came under some sharp attack from some quarters of the academic community, in particular the interpretation that Gibbons was arguing for a replacement thesis—that Mode 2 was replacing Mode 1 (Kraak 2000; Muller 2000). Muller (2000) critiqued the way in which advocacy for Mode 2 was problematically taken up by curriculum policy in South Africa—providing a platform for curricula to replace foundational knowledge with problem-based curriculum as happened in many medical schools. Or the way in which generic, transferable skills were foregrounded over disciplinary knowledge. Muller (2000) asks, "What knowledge is of most worth for the millennial citizen?" (p. 41). For him the answer was unequivocally Mode 1. From the point of view of the developing world, he argued, we cannot afford to replace Mode 1 with Mode 2.

It is interesting to note that for Bernstein neither the strengthening or weakening of classification is inherently a good or bad thing. The crucial question he argues is, in whose interests is this strengthening or weakening? (Bernstein 2000, p. 11). He notes that in particular we need to pay attention to what happens to knowledge. Following on Bernstein then I ask, what are the implications of this contextual turn for curricula? More specifically, what are the implications for epistemic access?

To attempt an answer to these questions, I offer a framework which enables the conceptualization of these curriculum contestations. This framework attempts to move beyond 'either/or's' to a way of thinking which asks, what are the underlying principles which constitute this contestation. It looks to the field of power in which Mode 1 and Mode 2 are different kinds of capital vying for resources, and even deeper it looks to the underlying principles which position these forms of capital. I will show how Legitimation Code Theory draws together both the field theory of Bourdieu and the code theory of Bernstein to get underneath these polarizing discourses. What the framework aspires to offer is a new language or a new way of thinking about curriculum—rooted in notions of epistemic access.

The conceptual framework has a number of key requirements—it needs to say something about the ontological status of knowledge, the nature of the field or fields which constitute the knowledge practices, and the underlying principles

which constitute the bases of legitimation. Against this conceptual map or framework of contestation I will discuss some of the key trends in curriculum change—and finally come back to the issue of epistemic access.

The Conceptual Framework

A conceptualization of epistemic access necessitates a brief detour to establish some ontological assumptions. To view knowledge as a social field exposes both its 'structured and structuring' properties (Maton 2014). Various educational traditions have tended to emphasize one property over the other. Sociologist of education located in a critical or social realist paradigm have re-asserted ontological realism—that is, that our (albeit fallible) knowledge is of/about an ontologically real world. As Maton (2014) captures it, knowledge claims are always both about *something* and by *someone*. The first assertion is that the world is real and thus a knowledge claim is always about something other than itself. It cannot simply be reduced to who is making the claim. This is the epistemic relation—the relation between the (real) object and the knowledge claim. The second assertion is that we can only ever know through our socially constituted ways of knowing. This is the social relation—the relation between the subject and the knowledge claim. Social realism thus asserts both the objectivity and sociality of knowledge. All knowledge claims have both an epistemic and a social relation—the issue of interest is which is more important as the basis of legitimation in a particular field.

All this has important implications for how disciplines are understood—what Trowler (2012), drawing on Bernstein (2000) defines as the "*reservoirs* of knowledge resources" which disciplinary practitioners draw on for their "localized *repertoire*" (p. 9). Against overly relativized notions of disciplines, the 'reservoir' speaks to the "regularized sets of discourses, ways of thinking, procedures", "the common background knowledge"—the epistemic anchoring. Against overly reified and objectified notions of disciplines, the localized 'repertoires' speak to the social construction or the social relations—the localized selection, interpretation and reinterpretation for specific interests. This understanding of disciplines is consistent with a social realist take on knowledge. Curricula provide epistemic entry to disciplinary communities that legitimate certain methods of inquiry, which hold entrants and members of the community accountable to a certain set of epistemic values. These values set the boundaries of what constitutes the community in the first place (the rules of the game) but at the same time set out the stakes, the struggle, the contestation.

Having established both the objectivity and sociality of knowledge, I turn to elaborate the field or fields that structure these knowledge practices. For this I turn to Bernstein's pedagogic device (2000). The pedagogic device models the relationship between the field of production (where knowledge is produced), the field of recontextualization (where knowledge is translated into curriculum) and the field of reproduction (where knowledge is transmitted through pedagogy). Each of

these fields has different rules that constitute what is acceptable. There are strong resonances of Bourdieu in Bernstein's notion of field. In Bourdieu's terms it is always a 'field of power' (1996, p. 264). It is the relationship between the field, its forms of capital (in this case knowledge) and the positioning of agents that explains the logic of social practices or its basis of legitimation.

Bernstein's interest is in the relay or the transformation of knowledge as it circulates across the different fields from, for example, from research into curriculum into pedagogy (2000, p. 25). For Bernstein the fields are hierarchically related—the rules of the field of recontextualization are derived from the field of production, the rules of the field of reproduction are derived from the field of recontextualization. In this model curricula inherit their bases of legitimation from the field of knowledge production. However Bernstein notes that in the process of "de-locating" from one discourse to another—from disciplinary knowledge to pedagogical knowledge—a gap is created. "As a discourse moves from its original site to its new positioning … a transformation takes place. … the transformation takes place because every time a discourse moves from one place to another, there is a space in which ideology[3] can play" (2000, p. 32). Thus while these knowledges are related they are not the same. Their basis of legitimacy—what makes them special—is not the same. The research produced in the scientific laboratory is not the same as the educational knowledge of the science textbook. There are all manner of selections and translations that occur.

In conceptualizing curricula that enable epistemic access, this 'gap' becomes a key focus of interest. What is the nature of the gap between the field where knowledge is being produced in increasingly rapid, demand-driven, problem-oriented, competitive, market-driven ways on the one hand and the field of recontextualization where higher education curricula are produced? What transformations are taking place? Does the hierarchical relationship of Bernstein's fields hold for higher education? If so, this would suggest that higher education curriculum inherit their basis of legitimation—their epistemic code—from the field of knowledge production. Is this the case? The trends discussed above would suggest that there is a range of competing forces shaping curriculum production which may or may not be serving the interests of curricula for epistemic access. As noted earlier Bernstein's caution, when classification is weakened whose interests are being served?

Having establish the fields and problematized the relationship between them, the conceptual task is to expose the underlying principles which constitute the basis of legitimation in this field—what Bourdieu would refer to as forms of capital, what Bernstein would refer to as underlying principles or 'codes' which constitute different 'orders of meaning'. Even if there is agreement that epistemic access is crucial, there are fundamental disagreements about what kind of knowledge is needed, what kind of knowledge students need access to. As the social realist put it, there

[3] By 'ideology' Bernstein means power or powerful ideas.

are more or less powerful forms of knowledge. These are contestations about legitimacy and one hears resonances of these contestations in the discourses of polarity cited above. I propose that in order to avoid a slide into these either/or ways of thinking, it is necessary to map out the broader field of contestation and to attempt to expose some of the underlying principles which are at stake. This then yields a picture of differentiation—different forms of knowledge.

It is important to note the long history and tradition of knowledge typologies. Aristotle distinguishes between episteme, techne and phronesis (Flyvbjerg 2001). Muller (2012), drawing on Winch (2013), contrasts knowing-that, knowing-how, knowing-why. Bernstein (2000), drawing on Durkheim's distinctions between sacred and profane knowledge, uses the spacial metaphors of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' to distinguish between 'systematic' and 'everyday' knowledge. There is Becher and Trowler (2001) classic characterization, drawing on Biglan and Kolb, of hard/applied, hard/pure, soft/applied, soft/pure. In previous work (Shay et al. 2011) I extend Muller (2008) and Gamble's (2004, 2006) work to distinguish between practical and theoretical knowledge and their principled and proceduralized variants. These typologies are helpful for characterizing differentiation. The approach taken here is however is different. It follows from Legitimation Code Theory that underlying every typology is a topology of principles. The full framework offers a number of principles or codes as a toolkit for analysis. (see www.legitimationcodetheory.com). I draw on the semantic codes. Other codes would expose other distinctions and thus this analysis in no way claims to be exhaustive in its description of knowledge practices.

The purpose of the semantic codes—semantic gravity and semantic density—is to enable us to say something about the 'orders of meaning'—what is legitimated:

Semantic gravity (SG) is defined as "the degree to which meaning relates to its context, whether that is social or symbolic. Semantic gravity may be relatively stronger (+) or weaker (−) along a continuum of strengths" (Maton 2014, p. 129).

Since all meaning is context-dependent, it is important to specify what is meant by 'context'. For the purpose of this conceptual framework semantic gravity refers to the extent to which meaning is strongly or loosely embedded in the context of application or performance. Thus knowledge practices with strong semantic gravity would mean those both constituted for and by a site of practice, a situation or a problem. Ones with weak semantic gravity would mean those knowledge practices which are context-independent. The contextual turn of curriculum noted above could thus be characterized as a trend in the strengthening of semantic gravity—where the logic or coherence of the curriculum is shaped by its context of application, what it is for, its external purposes, its relevance to society (Fig. 1).

Semantic density (SD) is defined as "the degree of condensation of meaning within symbols (terms, concepts, phrases, expressions, gestures, clothing, etc.). Semantic density may be relatively stronger (+) or weaker (−) along a continuum of strengths. (Maton 2014, p. 129).

For the purposes of the conceptual framework I operationalize semantic density to refer to the extent to which the knowledge practice is conceptually dense or conceptually light. Concepts with strong semantic density 'package up' meaning through, for example, abstraction as one sees in science or by 'compounding or



Fig. 1 The semantic plane (Maton 2014 , p. 131, Fig. 7.1)

layering' meaning as one sees in design (Shay and Steyn in press). Concepts with weak semantic density are less abstract, less layered, have a closer relationship to their empirical phenomenon.

These two underlying principles—or bases of legitimation—enable us to distinguish knowledge practices by signaling something about the nature of the context and the nature of the concept. These continua as axes create a topology for mapping both knowledge differentiation in field of knowledge production and curriculum differentiation in the field of recontextualization. (A more detailed discussion of this conceptual framework can be found in Shay 2013).

Field of Knowledge Production: Differentiated Knowledge

We can now use these codes to analyze the differentiated forms of knowledge in the field of knowledge production. This is graphically illustrated in Fig. 2 by the outer ring.

In the bottom left quadrant (see Fig. 2) knowledge practices can be characterized as having strong semantic gravity and weak semantic density (SG+/SD−), what Bernstein refers to as horizontal discourse or everyday knowledge. This is "oral, local, context dependent and specific" (Bernstein 2000, p. 157) or what Freidson (2001) calls practical knowledge: "knowledge largely free of formal concepts and theories, learned by experience, and instrumental for performing concrete tasks in concrete settings" (p. 31). Its organizing logic is the function, the purpose, the problem at hand. Its basis of legitimation is experience.

In the top right quadrant (see Fig. 2) knowledge practices can be characterized as having weak semantic gravity and strong semantic density (SG−/SD+), what



Fig. 2 Semantic field of recontextualized knowledge

Bernstein refers to as 'vertical discourse' or systematic knowledge. The basis of legitimation is thus not experience but the capacity to integrate experiences "to create very general propositions and theories, which integrate knowledge at lower levels" (p. 161). Freidson (2001) calls this "formal knowledge… abstract and general in character… and cannot be applied directly to the problems of work" (p. 29). Vertical discourse is the stock of what we know as disciplines that Bernstein (2000) refers to as 'singulars' which are "on the whole oriented towards their own development, protected by strong boundaries and hierarchies" (p. 52).

In his work on knowledge structures Bernstein only offers horizontal and vertical discourses since his interest was to differentiate everyday knowledge from systematic knowledge and within the latter to distinguish how knowledge develops in the social sciences in contrast to the natural sciences. But the topology set up by the semantic codes enables us to go further. In the bottom right quadrant (see Fig. 2) we have knowledge discourses which are both strong in semantic gravity and strong in semantic density (SG+/SD+). Though Bernstein's knowledge discourses do not account for this quadrant he coins the term 'regions' to describe the recontextualization of singulars. Regions—for example Medicine, Engineering, Architecture—operate at the interface of the field of knowledge production and any field of practice (2000, p. 9). Regions recruit vertical discourses for the solving of problems. Thus they have dual accountability: they face both ways, inwards towards disciplines as well as outwards towards fields of practice (p. 55). I call this

regionalized knowledge or regions. There are strong resonances with the descriptions of Mode 2 where knowledge is generated within the context of application (Nowotny 2003).

In his discussion of singulars and regions, Bernstein (2000) adds an additional 'performance mode' which he calls 'generic' which he notes is a more recent construction historically. He argues that generic modes are produced "by a functional analysis of what is taken to be the underlying features necessary to the performance of a skill, task, practice or even area of work (p. 53). This is the top left quadrant (see Fig. 2). The logic of 'generic' is that it can transcend specific contexts, be transferable. Thus it is weak in semantic gravity. It also tends to repudiate content or concepts in favour of processes or outcomes (Whitty 2010). It is thus weak in semantic density.

Thus by mapping Bernstein's different knowledge discourses onto the semantic field we expose different epistemic codes—different bases of legitimation. We can now reinterpret the Mode 1/Mode 2 debate as a contestation over the basis of legitimation—an epistemic code battle.

Field of Recontextualization: Differentiated Knowledge

What happens when these different kinds of knowledge in the field of production are recontextualized into curriculum? This is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the inside ring. In this final section I turn to look more closely at what happens when the boundaries of disciplines are weakened in the interest of some external purpose. In other words, what happens to knowledge when curricula 'face outwards'?

Bernstein (1975, 2000) offers the beginnings of a model for thinking about this recontextualization of different kinds of knowledge into different kinds of curriculum. He distinguishes between 'collection code' and 'integrated code' curricula. A collection code curriculum is one where the contents "stand in a closed relation to each other", they are bounded, strongly classified (1975, p. 80), for example, a Bachelor of Social Science degree where students might major in Psychology, Sociology and Politics. The boundaries of the disciplines are by and large maintained. The logic of the curriculum is the conceptual spine of its respective disciplines.

The integrated curriculum code is where the contents "stand in open relation to each other" (1975, p. 80). The boundaries of the disciplines are weakened as in inter- or multi-disciplinarity curriculum. This is different logic. The disciplines become subordinate to some external problem in the 'real world' of practice (e.g. climate change, HIV/Aids, poverty, development). Interestingly Bernstein does not suggest that the knowledge base of the integrated code is weakened. He simply notes that in any recontextualization process the classification of knowledge will change—there will be a shift in epistemic coding. The crucial question, he argues, is 'in whose interest is the apartness of things, and in whose interest is the new togetherness, the new integration?' (2000, p. 55).

Drawing on the conceptual model offered earlier I would like to now propose that there are three possibilities for curriculum when there is a contextual shift. Each of these shifts represent changes in the classification of knowledge or changes in the epistemic code.

The first possibility is a shift towards generic mode of curricula. (see Fig. 2). Here the alleged strengthening of semantic gravity is in fact at the cost of both semantic gravity and semantic density—in other words, in an attempt to make a contextual shift, both contextual and conceptual logic are weakened. These would be curricula where specialist knowledge is backgrounded and what is foregrounded is high level, context and content independent dispositions, qualities, or attributes. This could be a curriculum where the primary logic is, for example, graduate attributes (e.g. global citizens, critical thinkers, etc.…). This is a curriculum which privileges what Maton refers to as the 'knower code' over the 'knowledge code'—where who you are is more important than what or how you know (Maton 2014). This has been one of the critiques of learning-outcomes based education in South Africa, what Young and Muller (2010) refer to as a "swing from content-based to skills-based" (p. 18). And we have seen this worldwide.

The second possibility is a shift towards what I call proceduralized mode of curricula (see Fig. 2). Here semantic gravity is strengthened at the cost of semantic density. What becomes privileged is context-specific skills which can be wielded in practice. In 2009–2010 I was part of a research and development team tasked to conceptualize curriculum differentiation in a comprehensive university in South Africa—comprehensives are a new category of university which are the result of a merger of traditional universities and universities of technology (Shay et al. 2011). The analysis revealed that some of the formative Bachelors degrees of the collection type had experienced a contextual shift, a pull to become more 'relevant', to produce graduates who are 'work-ready'. For example, in some of these degrees, courses that would have been considered as foundational knowledge were replaced with a growing suite of more 'practical' subjects. Thus in these cases the contextual shift resulted in more theoretical knowledge being replaced by more procedural knowledge.

Sociologists of education have been critical of this contextual shift. Young and Muller (2010) in their 'future scenarios' for curriculum critique the 'end of boundaries' scenario arguing that the need for specialist disciplinary knowledge will not go away, it will only be available to those privileged enough to access elite and private sector institutions. Stavrou (2009) in her study of the regionalization of social scientific knowledge in French universities is critical of how disciplinary knowledge (in this case Sociology) is de-contextualized and re-contextualized for problem-solving so that sociology students are confronted with how to solve a social problem instead of being given the theoretical and methodologically tools necessary to transform the problem into a sociological problem.

This resonates with critiques of problem-based learning (PBL). Larsen's (2012) work-in-progress study examines a 'contextual shift' in higher education curricula in Denmark in response to Bologna. He shows in his analysis how when disciplinary boundaries are 'blurred' this gives rise to the need for pedagogical interventions



Fig. 3 Progression of levels of design cognition

such as PBL–PBL, he argues, is brought into 'redeem the lost disciplines'. He argues that in this process the knower (attributes, dispositions) is foregrounded and knowledge is fragmented and weakened.

Does the weakening of disciplinary boundaries inevitably lead to the fragmentation of knowledge—a slide towards genericism, a slide towards procedural knowledge? Can we produce curricula which maintain both their semantic density and gravity? These questions lie at the heart of a growing body of scholarship in South Africa noted earlier, much of it motivated by a desire to understand the epistemic barriers which talented but underprepared students face as they enter into higher education. These studies point to a third possibility.

The third possibility is that as semantic gravity strengthens so too does the semantic density what I refer to as a regionalized mode of curriculum (see Fig. 2). Time will only allow a brief illustration from a design foundation course at local South African university of technology. This Design course has as its purpose to give students who have been identified as artistically talented but have had no prior formal training. The course is designed to give epistemic access to the general field of design as well as to a range of specific design disciplines. What the analysis of the curriculum briefs reveals is that designer 'ways of knowing' develop through the engagement with increasingly more context-dependent design problems which require increasingly abstract design concepts (see Fig. 3). In this epistemic code the engagement with the particularity of the problem enables, indeed *advances*, the capacity for abstraction (Shay and Steyn in press). Clarke and Winch (2004, p. 511) refer to this as "the confident embedding of theoretically informed action in practice". This is not simply the *application* of theory to practice—this is a specific form of knowledge with its own epistemic code.

The analysis also reveals how different disciplinary design problems will require and develop different kinds of designer identities. The relationship between these epistemic codes and the identities which they constitute is a fascinating area for future research. Bernstein (2000) notes that knowledge always specializes consciousness and Maton (2014) develops this by arguing that every knowledge structure has a knower structure. But more empirical work is needed to understand different identities within the different epistemic codes. The Stanford University review (2012) gives us a glimpse of what this might mean: "students begin to understand the stakes not merely of studying physics or philosophy but of understanding and engaging the world as physicists or philosophers do. They become fully vested in the knowledge they have gathered, which ceases to be something external and becomes a part of who they are".

The point of the design example is not to argue that all curriculum which enable epistemic access must manifest a regionalized curriculum mode (SG+/SD+). Rather it illustrates how strong semantic gravity need not be at the cost of semantic density, that engagement with the particularity of specific design problems can enable, indeed *advance*, the capacity for abstraction. The illustration also gives insight into curriculum design principles for not only epistemic access but epistemic progression. In this case progression to expertise requires the selection and integration across different forms of conceptual knowledge according to the demands of context-specific problems. This progression requires intentional sequencing—as the design case illustrates, sequence matters.

Conclusion: A Curriculum for Epistemic Access

In closing I need to be clear about what I am saying and what I am not saying.

I have argued that one of the effects of the many global pressures on higher education has led to a contextual shift on curriculum. The conceptual framework that I have offered shows how this contextual shift is a battle over the epistemic code—what kinds of knowledge will be legitimated. It posits that there are a number of possible outcomes of this contextual shift. While it is the case that much curriculum reform has been dominated by utilitarian and instrumental discourses leading to generic and procedural modes of curricula, my argument has been that this need not be the case. The weakening of the boundaries around the disciplines—a breaking down of their isolation—can result in a strengthening of the interface between disciplinary knowledge and the great challenges of our time. Harvard Provost Hyman, commenting on the tension between the autonomy of disciplines and the needs of a rapidly changing world remarks, "there's no reason why the problems of the twenty-first century should happily conform to the academic divisions… concretized… by the end of the nineteenth century…" (Gazette, 20 May 2011).

What I am not arguing is that there is no place for generic capacities, qualities and dispositions in the twenty-first century. Barnett and Coate's (2005) foregrounding of

'being' in the curriculum is a crucial corrective in conceptualizations of curriculum. Neither am I arguing there is no place for deep context-embedded procedural skills. The point is simply that these 'ways of being' and 'ways of doing' must have an epistemic anchoring in disciplinary and inter-disciplinary forms of knowledge. This is what makes higher education, *higher* education.

If Higher Education's primary purpose is to produce the next generation of knowledge producers, the challenge is to re-commit ourselves as policy makers, educators, researchers to ensure curricula for epistemic access. Not only is this a matter of social justice—to give those young people who have traditionally been marginalized from their role as knowledge producers—but as these youth increasingly constitute a majority of the global population, it is a matter of the future economic sustainability of our world.

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Finding a Voice as a Student

Denise Batchelor

Introduction

The idea of finding a voice as a student is open to alternative interpretations. Finding a voice could refer not only to a student developing an individual voice of his/her own, but also to students developing a collaborative voice, whether pedagogically, in relation to their university, or in relation to the broader higher education system or wider society. These different interpretations are interrelated rather than oppositional. The student might find his/her individual voice through collaborating with others, and students might find a collaborative voice through the interaction and combination of each of their individual voices. The focus of this chapter is on the voice of the student as a person in her/himself rather than on students developing a collective voice. The reason for this individualistic approach is not to deny the validity of finding a voice in the other sense just noted, but rather to develop a particular trajectory for the formation and evolution of a student's individual voice.

What, then, could it mean for a student to find a voice? Some initial responses might be that, intellectually, voice could be found through an initiation into the processes of reasoning; personally, through striving for a state of well-being consonant with that student's idea of the good life; and professionally, either through identifying a future career direction, or deepening and developing understanding of the profession in which the student is already a practitioner through further study. Each of these preliminary formulations of what it could mean to find a voice is inextricably linked to particular understandings of the nature of the self who might find his/her voice. The matter of student voice is important precisely because of the extent to which ideas of voice relate to and express understandings

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of selfhood, personhood and identity—intellectually, personally, and professionally. The development and evolution of these understandings are at the heart of students' experiences in higher education, both pedagogically and personally.

Given the extensive conceptual hinterland of terms such as 'voice', 'self', 'person' and 'identity' in different academic disciplines and across different cultures, the range of references for this chapter has been limited for reasons of space and coherence. The chapter draws chiefly on the philosophical part of that background of ideas, whilst fully recognizing the potential and power of alternative explications of selfhood, identity, being a person and finding a voice of one's own. These would include sociological and cultural accounts of voice in relation to social and cultural capital (Bourdieu et al. 1999; Sennett 1998), and psychological accounts of voice (Rogers 1967).

In what follows, the project of deciding on a student's personal, academic and professional aims, and then beginning to realize those aims, is linked with the process of finding a voice of one's own. A concept of identity is developed which communicates the idea of the progressive expression of selfhood for students as a process of becoming oneself through, first, immersion in, and then, separation from, the voices of others. Finding a voice is delineated as a project involving four stages:

1. breaking free through separation;
2. coming together through integration;
3. moving towards self-fulfilment; and
4. identifying and clarifying values and ideals.

These distinctions are inevitably crude: the suggested stages are as likely to overlap as to follow sequentially, and their proportions and interrelationships will differ for each student. They offer a framework only.

The chapter title is not intended to imply that students have no voice when they enter the university, rather that this voice is likely to form and re-form, be problematized and made more complex through their experience of higher education. Alteration and complication may occur through their existing voices being challenged or reinforced, weakened or strengthened, rejected or reimagined. Voice is not fixed but fluid.

Structure

In the "Introduction", finding a voice was delineated as a project involving four stages:

1. breaking free through separation;
2. coming together through integration;
3. moving towards self-fulfilment; and
4. identifying and clarifying values and ideals.

These four stages embody the structure of the chapter. The scene is set by looking at different understandings of selfhood, and the relationship between voice and selfhood. The meaning of the formation and evolution of the student voice, and the ways students might engage in the process of finding a voice, is then clarified from two different perspectives. The first is drawn from literature, and reflects the stage in finding a voice of breaking free through separation. The second is drawn from philosophy, and reflects the stage in finding a voice of coming together through integration. Each perspective is to do with the notion of a catalytic moment when things come together for a person, albeit temporarily, and s/he comes into his/her own voice.

The chapter next examines how students might engage in the process of finding a voice through formulating what would constitute self-fulfilment for them, and through identifying their values and ideals. These aspects reflect the stages in finding a voice of moving towards self-fulfilment, and identifying and clarifying values and ideals. The *Conclusion* looks ahead to possible strategies for enabling students to find a voice that are related to the four stages elaborated during the chapter.

Different Understandings of Selfhood

Organ (1987) and Taylor (1989) indicate the wide range of diverse interpretations of selfhood extant in Eastern and Western philosophical traditions. The scope and possibilities of these alternative theories are likely to be reflected in the self-understandings of the international student body. Given the boundaries set by one chapter, I will concentrate on two particular interpretations of self hood and explications of personhood from the Western philosophical tradition. These are taken from the work of John Locke and Joseph Butler .

Maslin (2001, p. 261) observes: 'John Locke was the originator of the theory that personal identity consists in psychological continuity.' In *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Locke (1975, p. 90) writes:

> To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places…

Locke's account of personal identity as diachronic identity favours the inner awareness each individual has of itself as a conscious being enduring through time. Maslin (2001, p. 262) continues:

> The essence of the Lockean approach is this: personal identity consists…in a certain kind of continuity and connectedness between a series of experiences.

Similarly, Butler (1896, in Cottingham 1996, pp. 195–196) alludes to the existence of a natural subject with inherent characteristics and potential when he refers to:

> …that certain conviction which necessarily and every moment arises within us when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon what is to come.

Locke's and Butler's views were not always in accord, but certain aspects of their thinking helped me to formulate what I mean by finding a voice. Firstly, Locke's allusion to a continuing core of identity that is reflectively self-aware, and Butler's reference to a continuous and inescapable experience of self-recognition as persons consider their past and imagine their future, opened up a particular and person-centric understanding of the progressive formation and evolution of an individual voice over time.

Secondly, Locke's and Butler's theories of selfhood resonated with my own practical experiences of working with undergraduates and postgraduates, both as a teacher and personal tutor (in its sense of a pastoral tutor) in a post 1992 United Kingdom university over many years. Their words encoded the challenges, constraints and difficulties for students as they worked at repeatedly striking a balance between their past, present and future perceptions of personal identity, or struggled to change the weightings of that balance as they thought about who they had been, who they were now, and who and what they might become. Students' changing ideas of what they could expect from their lives in the present and future, and reflections not only on what their expectations had actually been in the past but also on what they might have been, could equally generate either positive emotions of hope and anticipation or negative feelings of regret and wasted life. Locke's and Butler's expressions of the unavoidability of self-awareness encapsulate the tensions which such an acute awareness carries with it.

Voice and Selfhood

The sound of someone's voice is distinctive and special. It forms an intimate part of who they are, and is one of the ways in which we think of and remember them. Rée (2000, p. 16) draws a parallel between voices and faces in that they share a particular quality of uniqueness:

> …individual voices have a rather special significance in human life. We respond to them as we do to faces: as immediate embodiments of personal character and sensitive indicators of fluctuating mood.

Hegel (1978, p. 181) similarly suggests that a person's voice is the main discloser of his/her inner self:

> It is primarily through his voice that a person makes known his inwardness, for he puts into it what he is.

These two quotations suggest that a person's voice both reveals and communicates his/her authentic personhood. It gives a genuine and trustworthy insight into who s/he really is. Rée's allusion to 'personal character' and 'fluctuating mood' hints at the individuality, complexity and mobility of someone's voice. Hegel's reference to 'inwardness' and 'what he is' suggests that a person's fundamental values are made evident through his voice.

But, it could be argued, how far can voice be synonymous with self or identity if either that voice is distorted, or the self it seeks to express is incomplete or impaired? If the voice is itself distorted, this means that the self or identity is hidden or lost by the very voice that endeavours to express it. If the self is incomplete or impaired, this means that the voice expressing that self will be fractured or fragmented.

The objection of a possible misalliance between voice and selfhood is based on the fallacy that the process of being and becoming a person, and the voice that continuously expresses that process, is somehow finite and static. From this perspective, voice is judged to be authentic only if it expresses the ideal and complete person that the individual seeks to become. But becoming the person one aspires to be can entail wrong turnings, false starts, mistakes and failures as well as moments of breakthrough, integration and success. In what follows, I suggest that voice is no less genuine if it clearly mirrors this erratic progress: the sometimes halting, sometimes rapid steps on the way towards self-realization. Qualities of vulnerability and fallibility make voice more, not less, authentic in *that* they reflect the essence of the demanding and extended project of finding a voice.

Finding a Voice Stage One: Breaking Free Through Separation

The first perspective on the formation and evolution of the student voice builds on an idea expressed by the poet and novelist Al Alvarez in his exploration of the ways that a writer might come into a voice of his own. Alvarez (2005, p. 20) observes:

> …to find his voice he must first have mastered style, and style, in this basic sense, is a discipline that you acquire by hard work…Voice is altogether different…Voice…is the vehicle by which a writer expresses his aliveness…

Alvarez's distinction between mastering style and finding a voice of one's own in writing can illuminate certain aspects of the formation and evolution of students' voices in higher education, even when 'voice' is defined in a wider sense than the written voice alone. Just as a writer moves closer to finding his own voice through an arduous process of experimenting with, imitating, adopting and discarding the styles of other writers, so students in higher education have a range of ready made and already formed voices offered to them and identities constructed for them which they are invited to be inspired by, engage with and respond to as they work at defining and expressing themselves. These proffered voices and identities are to do with students' present and future selves, encompassing disciplinary voices, professional voices, and the voices of future successful employees. Students are thus encouraged to try out and adopt various styles of studying and being. But voice emerges as students find their own place and make their own unique sound amidst the plethora of voices and influences proffered to them.

Finding one's own voice is therefore an emancipatory process, but a process that is initially grounded in the voices of others. The idea of finding a voice has associations of branching out and breaking free of the influence of others, but these influences are the necessary premise for movement towards emancipation. For Alvarez's apprentice writer, the journey towards self-definition takes place against a background of intensive immersion in the work of other writers. Similarly, the student in higher education will be finding his/her own epistemological voice from within a context of being steeped in the vocabulary and epistemic contours and paradigms of his/her chosen field. This immersion is a necessary prelude to developing a voice of one's own.

But there is also a converse position: having a voice, far from branching out and breaking free of the influence of others, is in fact equated with being perfectly immersed in others' voices. This immersion, far from being a means of suppression of voice, is the means for its fullest and most fluent expression, the way it communicates itself best. Faithful imitation of others' voices, rather than breaking free of them, then becomes an alternative way of finding a voice of one's own (Hye-Kyung Kim 2003).

For each of these reasons—whether voice is found through immersion in followed by separation from others' voices, or through an ever deeper immersion into others' voices—it is a fallacy to imagine that the emancipatory process of finding a voice of one's own can ever be a leap clean free of other influences. This is hardly possible. The very context in which persons find themselves will influence the way they go about finding voices of their own. Appiah (2005, p. 156) expresses the impossibility of remaining completely independent of external influences when he observes:

> …it is the state and society that provides us with the tools and the contexts of our authorship; we may shape our selves, but others shape our shaping.

Finding a Voice Stage Two: Coming Together Through Integration

The second perspective on the formation and evolution of the student voice is based on the concept of Bildung. According to Gadamer (2004, p. 8):

> The *concept of self-formation, education, or cultivation* (Bildung), which became supremely important at the time, was perhaps the greatest idea of the eighteenth century…

Thompson (2005, p. 523) refers to the traditional interpretation of *Bildung* as '… the intentional act of truly becoming oneself'. It describes '…the open and free development that leads one to become truly more and more oneself' (ibid., p. 522).

She suggests that one feature which characterizes *Bildung* is a process of integration and relation, a coming together and achievement of coherence and cohesion both in an individual's personal identity and in his/her relationship with the wider society. This dual aspect of connectedness is the point of departure here,

linking into the ideas of self-fulfilment and becoming the best one can be that will be explored later.

Thompson (2005, p. 519) writes:

> *Bildung* is concerned with the moment of change, in our relationship to ourselves and to the world. It is about the connection of who we were, who we are and who we can become in the future.

Achieving a connection between one's past, present and future selves suggests reaching a point of balance and equilibrium, even if this can only ever be a temporary reconciliation. It recalls Locke's interpretation of personal identity as a certain kind of psychological continuity and connectedness between a series of experiences, and Butler's reference to a continuous experience of self-recognition as persons consider their past from the standpoint of the present, and imagine their future.

The first part of Thompson's identification of integration as a key feature of Bildung is to do with personal integration, the state of being connected to oneself. As with Alvarez's apprentice writer, one aspect of the act of truly becoming oneself, and achieving coherence and cohesion in one's personal identity, is to transmute the external influences one has absorbed in such a way that they become a part of oneself. But this goes beyond a process of mere assimilation alone. Gadamer (2004, p. 10) uses the image of a grammar book to clarify the difference between assimilating outside influences for self-improvement, as opposed to transforming them into something original and new:

> Thus the educational content of a grammar book is simply a means and not itself an end. Assimilating it simply improves one's linguistic ability. In Bildung, by contrast, that by which and through which one is formed becomes completely one's own. To some extent everything that is received is absorbed, but in Bildung what is absorbed is not like a means that has lost its function. Rather, in acquired Bildung nothing disappears, but everything is preserved.

Gadamer's image of the grammar book in which one immerses oneself to become more fluent echoes Alvarez's idea of immersion into the work of other writers as a way of finding one's own voice. Like the apprentice writer who finds his own unique voice, Bildung is about fashioning out of that store of accumulated influences something that is uniquely new and one's own. Ideas of formation and reformation of voice carry within them an implicit possibility for transformation. Both Alvarez's image of coming into one's own voice as the expression of one's aliveness, and Gadamer's understanding of Bildung as being concerned with a moment of change, of breakthrough in one's self-understanding, can be interpreted as moments of transformation.

The second part of Thompson's identification of integration as a key feature of Bildung is to do with social integration, the state of being connected to others. In addition to the aspect of self- connectedness that relates to an individual's personal integration of their past, present and future selves, there is a further aspect of connectedness that is equally relevant to the idea of finding a voice for a student. This is the connection between that student and the wider society, what Thompson

(ibid.) terms '…relationship to ourselves and to the world' and what Winch and Gingell (2008) in their three point definition of Bildung, identify as preparation for economic participation in society (note 1).

Consciousness of the wider world, particularly its economic contours, is difficult for contemporary students to ignore. The parameters of the context in which they are engaging in the project of finding a voice are partly defined by the debate as to whether the university should fulfil a liberal or utilitarian educational purpose. The dilemmas of institutional direction arising from this debate are likely to be mirrored in microcosm in the choices and experiences of each student within the university. Certainly, in the challenging and competitive global economic climate of the twenty-first century it is impossible for most students to remain unaware of the utilitarian argument, one aspect of which is that higher education courses should be closely related to the needs of their national economy in order to remain viable: the safest option for potential entrants to higher education is to study a vocational course clearly linked to the possibility of future employment.

But the hegemony of the utilitarian argument does not necessarily mean that the argument for universities to fulfil a liberal educational purpose has lost all its force. Løvlie and Standish (2002, p. 324) stress the centrality of the element of freedom when they define liberal education in an emancipatory sense:

> …a liberal education is unlike any education geared solely to extrinsic ends. It is at odds…with any conception of education that is not centrally concerned with the good of the learner, the notion of the good here being tied especially to conceptions of *freedom.* It is in virtue of this that it is liberal.

Some students will be torn between these two interpretations of what higher education is for. The idea of personal freedom is powerful. At some level the decision to enter university is likely to be to do with hope, a personal dream of who and what one might become, as well as with the maximization of secure employment prospects. A significant aspect of the evolution of voice is to do with students' changing perceptions of how much they can expect from their lives. Ideas of self-definition and self-fulfilment come into play here—ideas which bear a spectrum of different meanings transculturally.

As s/he enters higher education therefore, alternative senses of the term 'vocational' may be present in a student's choice of course. As well as being vocational in the sense of being directly related to future employment in a specific field, her choice of course may also be vocational in its meaning of being called through attraction to pursue a particular subject that is not obviously linked to specific employment.

Then, while s/he is in higher education, the balance of the student's priorities as to the most meaningful interpretation of 'vocational' for her may change, sometimes more than once. At different times each sense may carry equal weight, one may be dominant, or one may not be present at all. Each of these fluctuations in understanding the meanings of 'vocational' will be given expression through the formation, re-formation and development of different kinds of voices, not only internally within students themselves but also externally by others, through the

voices of peers, teachers, family members, politicians, employers or the media. At times, these voices are likely to clash, confuse and contradict each other. They may be transitional, conflicting and oppositional voices.

Where then does this leave the possibility for a harmonious reconciliation between Bildung interpreted as the development of one's inner authenticity, and Bildung interpreted as making an economic contribution to society? In some cases, achieving this harmony may be straightforward. The student may be passionate about the subject s/he studies, and it also leads directly to a career to which that subject is central. But in other cases there is a disconnect between the subject one is passionate about, and through which one finds one's voice personally, and the perhaps unrelated career one follows in which one finds one's voice in terms of making an economic contribution to the wider society. In this second instance, the experience of finding a voice is a conflictual process characterized by struggle, tension and dissonance for the student. The phrase 'finding a voice' initially has reassuring overtones of arriving at a destination, resolving difficulties and achieving an harmonious resting-point. I suggest that finding a voice is a much more restless and uncertain process. Moments of arrival, resolution and rest do occur, but they are only temporary, and lead to further motion.

Finding a Voice Stage Three: Moving Towards Self-Fulfilment

The third perspective on the formation and evolution of the student voice is to do with ideas of self-fulfilment. A significant dimension of finding a voice for a student is to identify a path that might lead to self-fulfilment, and then to begin working towards that goal. I suggest that finding a voice in this sense of pursuing self-fulfilment is seeking to become the best that one can be. But exactly what constitutes self-fulfilment for a student, and the best way to become the best s/he can be, is likely to be a contested issue. As well as the student's own ideas, which may change and develop over time, parents, relatives and friends may also hold strong views. Within the university itself, academics in pastoral roles may offer students advice individually on the best path to pursue. In addition, academics' opinions on the most fulfilling way of studying their discipline will be reflected in the way they design their curricula, their choices about what it is worthwhile to learn, and how they teach and research their subjects. Through the theories they espouse and the practices they adopt, they are continuously communicating to students messages about what they consider to be the best ways of studying a subject, and developing a satisfying intellectual identity within it.

The process of experimenting with other people's voices, like Alvarez's apprentice writer, was considered above as having both positive and negative potential: the experience could equally either help or hinder a student in finding a voice of his/her own. It was suggested that the already formed and 'prêt-a-porter' voices

and identities offered to students have the negative potential to suppress students' own voices as well as the positive potential to inspire them to find distinctive sounds of their own. Similarly, when trying to achieve self-fulfilment by becoming the best that one can be, other people's ideas of what is best *for* the student may sometimes impede or delay the process of realizing what is best *in* the student. The various voices expressing opinions about what is best *for* and best *in* the student may be in harmony or disharmony at different stages of the student's time before entering the university, the time s/he is there, and the time after s/he leaves. The challenge for the student is to find his/her own voice for self-fulfilment amongst all these other voices.

Gewirth (1998, pp. 59–60) aligns the process of self-fulfilment with that of self-discovery. Through the process of fulfilling one's capacities one grows in self-knowledge:

> …to seek after one's best can be not only challenging but also rewarding and exhilarating. It can help one to find out who one truly is, where this involves fulfilling those of one's capacities that can make one's life as worthwhile to oneself as possible…So to fulfill yourself is to find yourself…

Gewirth proposes (1998, p. 13) that there are two modes of self-fulfilment: aspiration fulfilment and capacity fulfilment. *Aspiration fulfilmen*t refers to the fulfilment of one's deepest desires; *capacity fulfilment* signifies the fulfilment of one's potentialities:

> The self is fulfilled when its deepest desires or its best capacities are brought to fruition.

One dimension of finding a voice as a student is working at defining a realistic interpretation of both of these aspects of fulfilment for oneself, aspiration fulfilment and capacity fulfilment, and achieving a sustainable balance between the two. Helping students to find this balance is one aspect of supporting student voice.

Identifying a path that could lead to self-fulfilment, and beginning to work towards that goal, takes courage and entails elements of risk. Gewirth (1998, p. 20) suggests that

> …in having aspirations the self strives toward being what it is presently not.

As already indicated, Locke's and Butler's theories of the self propose a continuing relationship over time and also conterminously between a person's past, present and future selves. But this is not necessarily an unproblematic or smooth relationship. Developing from the person one is in the present into the person one aspires to be in the future is not always easy. Gewirth (ibid., p. 20) particularly flags:

> …the question of whether the present self has the resources to become the future self it aspires to be. But since it is the present self that copes with this question, a certain extrapolation –which is often risky- is required from present to future.

This passage expresses a problem that is immediate and present when working with students on defining their aims and ambitions in undergraduate and postgraduate personal development modules. The process makes challenging demands on

students as they re-align their aspirations with their actual capacities and abilities. Usually this entails change, whether in terms of aiming higher, raising their sights as to what they are capable of achieving, or deciding to pursue a different direction, altering their aspirations as a result of testing their capacities. Locke's and Butler's theories of selfhood capture this challenge of repeatedly working at striking a balance between past, present and future perceptions of personal identity as students think about who they have been, who they are now and who and what they might become (Batchelor 2006).

As well as the tension of realizing that one does not have the capacities to fulfil one's cherished aspirations, and the re-adjustment needed to compromise one's understanding of what constitutes self-fulfilment, there is an opposite but similarly disturbing form of tension in striving for self-fulfilment. A student's understanding of what constitutes self-fulfilment for her may change through her experience of higher education, and part of the process of finding a voice may involve coming to the realization that the path one previously thought would lead to self-fulfilment does not in fact achieve this end. In his autobiography John Stuart Mill (1989, p. 112) recalls the time when he hypothesized just such a moment of self-awareness, and describes its disorienting and debilitating consequences for him as a person:

> …it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself, 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?' And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!' At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down.

Another aspect of supporting students in finding a voice is to help them think through the difficult and practically awkward implications of realizing that they are on the wrong course.

As well as courage and the will to take risks, aspiring to be what one presently is not requires imagination. Rorty (1995) identifies imagination as a pivotal and fundamental driver in the process of self-development. When asked in an interview whether there are any private virtues other than imagination, Rorty replied:

> No. That's just because I'm extending the term 'imaginative' to mean every project of self-creation, every sense of duty to oneself.

A further aspect of supporting students in finding a voice is to foster such imagination, and create spaces where it can be voiced.

Finding a Voice Stage Four: Identifying and Clarifying Values and Ideals

Imaginings and conceptions of self-fulfilment emanate from the values a person adheres to, and the ideals those values engender. Therefore another integral aspect of finding a voice for students is the identification and clarification of personal

values and ideals: any notion of 'best' in becoming the best that one can be will be influenced and informed by them.

Ideals have a deeply personal component. De Ruyter (2003) suggests that ideals define the essential nature of persons. They have a conative power, and are connected with the core of a person's identity. Gewirth (1998, p. 23) links someone's aspirations to their most cherished values and deepest desires. Without ideals people have no identity, and there is nothing they can 'be said essentially to be'.

De Ruyter (2003, p. 474) draws a distinction between ideals and values. She suggests that the relationship between ideals and values is that ideals are '*not-yet-realized values*' (my italics). When an ideal is realized, it is still a value but no longer an ideal. She argues that ideals are a sub-class of values, and educational ideals are a sub-class of educational aims. Ideals express inspirational and aspirational values, and possess a visionary quality.

De Ruyter (ibid.) also subdivides ideals into two categories, ultimate and normal. *Ultimate ideals* are powerful but distant beacons, beckoning people on towards states of excellence that might be unattainable. They represent images of excellence that are flawless, unqualifiedly perfect, unattainable and unrealizable. *Normal ideals* are more within reach, representing images of excellence that are as perfect as we can realistically expect to find, attainable, realizable, and aware of the possible imperfections of an imagined excellence.

In the preceding section on moving towards self-fulfilment, it was suggested that one dimension of finding a voice as a student was working at defining a realistic interpretation of both aspects of fulfilment for oneself, aspiration fulfilment and capacity fulfilment, and achieving a sustainable balance between the two. Similarly, another dimension of finding a voice as a student is working at defining a realistic interpretation of both ultimate and normal ideals for oneself, and achieving a sustainable balance between the two. Ways in which students can be supported in both of these endeavours will now be examined.

Supporting Student Voice

In the "Introduction", the question was posed: what could it mean for a student to find a voice? In attempting some answers, Locke's and Butler's theories of selfhood were drawn on to define persons as having a continuing core of identity through time, an irresistible awareness of their own identity despite the changes they experience, and the capacity to look back at the past from the present as they contemplate the future. The process of finding a voice was then examined both from Alvarez's perspective, and through the lens of the concept of *Bildung*. Two related aspects of finding a voice were considered: the quest for self-fulfilment, and the clarification of a student's values and ideals.

Each of these interpretations of what it means to find a voice involves the student in hard thinking and reflection as s/he tries to make connections between past, present and future identities, and to recognize his/her own voice as being distinct

from either immersion in or imitation of others' voices. Whilst at best these activities will culminate in positive outcomes of self-awareness, self-fulfilment and integration of the student's past, present and future selves, they might equally have more negative results.

Finding a voice is a process beset with pitfalls and possibilities for failure and discouragement. For example, Alvarez identifies the moment when a writer finds his own voice as the point at which he breaks free of the influences of other writers, following a period of productive immersion in and learning from their various styles. But what if this process of immersion is counterproductive in that it produces the reverse outcome, that is, that the writer's own voice is overwhelmed or even silenced by the voices of others? Similarly, self-fulfilment is identified by Gewirth as the most constructive combination of a person's aspirations and capacities in order to enable him/her to become the best that s/he can be. But if a student does not accept that his/her capacities and aspirations are out of kilter, or recognize the need to work at a more realistic alignment, self-defeat, frustration and giving up rather than self-fulfilment, flourishing and making progress are the more likely outcomes.

A further question is now posed: in what ways might students be supported as they engage in the demanding process of finding a voice—as they work to distinguish their own voices from others' voices, to integrate their past, present and future selves, to strive for self-fulfilment in order to become the best that they can be, and to clarify and articulate their ideals and values? If finding a voice is a process beset by possibilities for failure and discouragement, then students are likely sometimes to face experiences of things going wrong. Hart (2011) asks what lessons can be learned from these negative experiences, and identifies two kinds of lessons: the kind that, once applied, leaves the person unchanged, and the kind that reconstitutes the self. Supporting students when things are going wrong for them entails preserving a balance between over-and under- protection, so that students are enabled to learn the second kind of Hart's lessons.

Listening

The student voice described so far has been characterized by qualities of elusiveness, mobility and difficulty of definition. Its complex nature calls for a parallel complexity in defining the activity of supporting such a voice. At various points in this chapter, brief allusions have been made to possible ways students might be supported through the four suggested stages of the process of finding a voice. These allusions will now be gathered together and developed in greater detail.

The references to possible means of support have included:

- finding a way of presenting others' voices that inspires and encourages rather than silences the student's own voice;
- helping students to work at defining a realistic interpretation of self-fulfilment, discriminate between their aspirations and capacities, and achieve a workable balance between the two;

- encouraging students to work at defining a realistic interpretation of and differentiation between ultimate and normal ideals for themselves, and achieve a sustainable balance between the two;
- fostering students' imagination as they find a voice.

The common denominator of these strategies of support is listening. The strength and sustainability of the student voice stems partly from how it is heard. Empathetic listening is at the heart of ways of supporting students in finding their voice. Accurate active listening to him/herself by a student through hard thinking and reflection is part of the process, as well as being listened *to* in a careful and discriminating way. Both are significant factors in supporting the student in finding his/her voice.

This kind of listening can make uncomfortable demands on listeners, challenging them to reassess their own settled convictions. Finding a voice of one's own as a student may even be discouraged because of its perceived disruptive potential to the status quo for academics. For example, Hodgson and Standish (2006) examine how the voice of the student is formed within a discipline: is it developed to question and challenge an established field, or is the student's voice groomed to reinforce that field's 'domestication' (ibid., p. 564) by speaking in the accepted vocabulary and paying homage to the established scholars in the field? They analyze to what extent the student's voice can be understood as being genuinely his/her own voice in a process of formation that is heavily controlled.

In addition to academic practices, the culture of pastoral student support within the university, and especially the way effective and successful support is defined, will influence the formation and evolution of the student voice at difficult junctures as well as when things are going smoothly. For example, the concept of building personal self-esteem plays a considerable role in ideas of helping and supporting students, but how best to achieve that end is open to contesting interpretations, especially within different cultural contexts.

On the one hand, the preferred dominant strategy may be to protect and shelter students, encouraging and praising them through positive feedback in order to boost their morale. This approach is vulnerable to the criticism that some students will lack resilience as a result of being over-protected and sheltered. They may be unprepared to manage experiences of failure or rejection, not only while they are in higher education but also afterwards, such as persevering despite multiple rejected job applications, or failing to secure employment consonant with their qualifications. Cigman (2004) is writing about the school sector, but her ideas are equally relevant to higher education. She identifies the dangers of ignoring or glossing over students' experiences of failure in a misguided bid to boost their self-esteem, arguing that ultimately such self-esteem is unrealistic, temporary and built on fragile foundations.

On the other hand, the preferred dominant strategy in helping and supporting students may be to challenge and confront them, focusing on their weaknesses and limitations in order to strengthen and improve their performance. This approach in turn is vulnerable to the criticism that some students' confidence may be damaged by it, and they could feel threatened and undermined as a result.

A student whose voice forms and evolves through processes of flux, experimentation and self-challenge is likely often to experience periods of uncertainty, self-doubt and failure, whether actual or anticipated. At these points the interpretation of student support as being primarily about boosting students' self-esteem through protection and praise, or primarily about challenging and confronting students in order to generate a more realistic self-esteem, becomes influential. Supporting students in finding their voice means not denying or minimizing experiences of disorientation, and their potential for disrupting the student's previous aims and priorities. For example, as already indicated, an aspect of supporting students in finding a voice may be helping them think through the difficult and practically awkward implications of realizing that they are on the wrong course.

Rather than dilute or deny the difficulties of finding a voice of one's own, genuine support is about listening accurately to the oppositions and antitheses inherent in the process itself, and seeing engagement in that process by the student as a sign of successful rather than failing voice. Support is about listening to complexity.

This requires qualities of openness in listeners regarding their own idea of a student, and their customary definitions of success and failure.

Conclusion

In a higher education climate where academics are under increasing pressure to be successful researchers, teachers and administrators (Fanghanel 2012) and many students are experiencing financial and economic hardship as well as the challenge of competing in a globalized employment market (Barnett 2007), finding time and space to listen risks sounding like an expendable indulgence. However, listening is not a separate, extra activity that has somehow to be fitted into an already packed curriculum, perhaps at the expense of other interests. Rather, listening is a *disposition* that potentially permeates every activity in higher education: a disposition to listen to oneself, to listen to others, to be listened to by others, and also to listen to a subject, responding to the possibilities it offers for development of voice and expansion of the self. The formation of this disposition is shaped by a person's values and ideals about learning, teaching and researching.

Each of the four suggested stages of finding a voice,

1. breaking free through separation;
2. coming together through integration;
3. moving towards self-fulfilment; and
4. identifying and clarifying values and ideals

entails a particular mode of listening which involves a moment of r*ecognition*. For Alvarez's apprentice writer, finding a voice means listening to the voices of other writers before *recognizing* the point at which one's own distinctive voice emerges. A central feature of the concept of *Bildung* is listening to the voices of one's past, present and anticipated future selves in order to *recognize* moments

of integration, of things coming together, moments of connectedness not only within oneself, but also with others in the wider society. Making progress towards self-fulfilment entails listening with discrimination to one's aspirations and capacities in order to *recognize* the points at which these can be realistically and sustainably aligned. Similarly, identifying and clarifying one's values, and the ideals those values engender, entails working at defining a realistic interpretation of both ultimate and normal ideals, and *recognizing* the points at which a sustainable personal balance between the two can be achieved.

A conceptual analysis of the term 'recognition' will reveal different constituent elements of its meaning (Schmidt am Busch and Zurn 2010). These component parts have the potential to 'thicken' our understanding of what it means to listen to students. Setting out this analysis, and mapping and evaluating its insights against the pedagogic and pastoral activities where students are listened to, offers a way to build further on the ideas in this chapter, and move forward in considering how students find a voice in higher education.

Notes

1. Winch and Gingell (2008, p. 23) define Bildung as follows:
   'Humboldt's conception of Bildung attempts to encompass the following:

   1. Preparation for economic participation in society at a level appropriate to one's ability and social rank. This requires knowledge and skill for vocational purposes.
   2. Sufficient skills, knowledge and virtues to participate in adult life and to continue one's learning.
   3. The development of the uniqueness of one's personality through significant life experiences (Erlebnisse), such that it is, in a sense, a continuing work in progress (allgemeine Menschenbildung).'

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Into the Heart of Things: Defrosting Educational Theory

Søren S. E. Bengtsen

Introduction

What is the meaning and purpose of education? Why do we educate ourselves? The nature of Bildung and educational development is traditionally linked to understandings of personal, social and cultural maturation and growth. The purpose of education is closely connected to a learning process which takes the individual or society to a more complete state of autonomy and authenticity. However, a language which deals with ideals and end points rarely succeeds in capturing the essence of specific learning situations and personal experiences of educational development. I argue that a more sensitive language must be called for in order to make visible the forms of abundance and multiplicity which characterizes specific and concrete learning situations in our everyday lives as teachers and students at the university.

In the German tradition of "Bildung" initiated in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century by Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm van Humboldt the meaning of education was described as a maturation of spirit and character of the particular individual as well as society as a whole. Through education the ennoblement of the individual person's character would benefit society and culture in order to collectively fend off barbarism and degeneration in the public sphere (Kristensen 2007; Kjærgaard and Kristensen 2003; Bruford 2010). A similar understanding of the relation between education and Bildung is found in the acclaimed twentieth century German educationalist Wolfgang Klafki who views the purpose of education as a realization of a rare and valuable human potential which is latent in the

The title "Into the Heart of Things" is a phrase borrowed from the German Poet Rainer Maria Rilke as quoted in van Manen (2007).

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particular person, society or culture—depending on the didactical point of view (Klafki 1983, 45ff., 2005, 113ff.). Through education the particular person or society matures and develops his or its true autonomous potential and gains a privileged understanding of the world, often referred to as wisdom (ibid.).

During the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century a particular form of "existential Bildung"[1] (my term) has emerged in Britain particularly in the work of Barnett (2007, 2010), Batchelor (2006, 2008), Bonnett (1994, 2009) and Parker (2005, 2007). In this tradition the purpose of education is linked more closely to the existential development and formation of the individual person than is seen in German and Scandinavian traditions. The development of autonomy, understood as a maturation of character, is fused with creativity, risk and choice. Here, Bildung means finding your own voice in a sea of collective and cultural accepted norms and values. To develop one's own voice in higher education is for teachers to fuse one's personal visions, imaginations and dreamscapes into specific teaching situations, and for students to merge this imaginative space with the learning experience.

Both in the German and British traditions the purpose of education is to obtain privileged insight into the character of the world. However, the language available to describe this relation between education and world is held in abstract concepts and generalizations. This is partly due to the nature of concepts which is to find common ground in collective and shared abstract meanings that enable people to communicate across different cultures and social environments. On the other hand in such language the embodied world seems to fall away and recede into a shadowy and hazy background. The language of educational theory does not connect to individual persons, specific things and concrete situations and events. Particular individuals, concrete experiences and specific things "exist" merely as examples or variants of more general and collective meanings. There is a haunting paradox in the intension of penetrating ever more deeply into the world of persons, things and events *and* at the same time lacking a language and vocabulary in educational theory which succeeds to enliven, evoke and conjure that world containing *these* persons, *those* things and events.

The chapter strives to make explicit that paradox which is implicit in the language of educational theory and to point out the unfortunate implications such a paradox may result in. Drawing on educational philosophers from the seventeenth century till today the chapter endeavors to point out a new direction for educational theory in which the feature of linguistic style may ease bridging the gap

[1] In this chapter I use the word "Bildung" in a broad sense to be able to compare aspects of educational theory in Germany and Scandinavia to a more international (and English speaking) context. As Gundem and Hopmann (2002) have pointed out the relation between so called continental and Anglo-Saxon terminology is complex and sensitive. In this chapter I try to read across this complexity and gather such different terms as "Didaktik", "education", "development" and "growth" in the collective term "Bildung". Aware of the many difficulties in reading across this semantic complexity the primary ambition of this chapter is to focus on the similarities, and not differences, between the German word "Bildung" and the English word "education".

between concept and educational practice which has emerged unintentionally in educational theory. In this chapter I understand linguistic style in a broad sense; not merely bound by the framework of linguistics (grammar, syntax, semantics, pragmatics), but as an exploratory and adventurous use of language for in, as we shall see later on, in branches of contemporary phenomenology which have a more literary and aesthetic bend.

A Complementary View on Bildung—and a Lack of Words

In line with enlightenment philosophers like Kant and Humboldt Wolfgang Klafki carries on the understanding of education as a developmental process with the purpose of ensuring spiritual and cultural growth. Bildung is understood in opposition to personal and cultural decay and degeneration, and the education of each individual is necessary in order to refine the social and collective development. Core values of good education are in Klafki related to democracy on the social level and personal autonomy on the individual level (Klafki 2005, 73ff.). Klafki understands the ideal educational process as the particular person's obtaining of fundamental values and knowledge valid in the particular society and culture. The purpose of education is to enable the individual person to act on behalf of the core values and ideals of the culture the person is a member of (Klafki 1983, p. 63, 2005, p. 166). Even though the Bildung, or education, of the individual person is formed out of general and collective values and norms of the particular culture and society, Bildung always manifests itself in different ways in different situations and in lives of different people. The real task of the educator in higher education is therefore to anchor the fundamental cultural values in the education of the particular student.

The correlation between collective values and individuality is in Klafki defined as "categorical Bildung" (Klafki 1983, p. 62, 2005, p. 166). Categorical Bildung means that the student through different learning situations, each containing a specific subject matter or theoretical problem, over time obtains insights of a fundamental and general character due to the maturing consciousness and focus (Klafki 2005, p. 170). The specific learning situation, and with this the individual person who takes part in it, and the specific subject matter in hand are seen as vehicles to acquire and promote collective and paradigmatic cultural "key issues" which are fundamental to the particular cultural mindset and identity (Klafki 2005, p. 176). The understanding of Bildung can be established on an abstract conceptual level as a didactical *reflection*. Thus Bildung, or education, is by Klafki defined as dependent on specific learning situations even though these are treated in a general way with a collective cultural focus.

Where the purpose of education as a developmental process in Klafki is connected to a social and collective horizon, the purpose of education is described differently in contemporary British research into the nature of Bildung. In this tradition Bildung (the authors referred to use the term "education") is not linked to a strong bastion of core values but to fragile, unpredictable and vulnerable situations which

bare the mark of existential choice and risk. With inspiration from philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, Barnett (2007) and Batchelor (2006) accentuate the close relationship between personal development and existential crisis. Educational development is seen from the individual person's point of view, and in the process of learning the world may, to the individual, seem strange, unreal and deform "as the student wrestles with contrasting accounts of the world—whether in the form of inconsistent data or conflicting sets of ideas" (Barnett 2007, p. 122). The process of Bildung is described as a transformation of the student or teacher through experiences of educational development as he cannot go back to his former self but must persist in his studies in order to master his new identity. The student may feel caught up in a web of existential discomfort through which he can glimpse the gateways to new worlds and vistas beyond his imagination. At the same time the student is unsure of herself and lured on by the promise of authenticity and wisdom, and the student is "impelled forward. She can barely help herself, (…) the student is 'hooked'" (ibid.).

Education as existential Bildung draws on a "raw dream of what higher education might mean for them [the students] as individuals" (Batchelor 2008, p. 52). Educational development is realized through creative and imaginative strain, but creativity can be hard to balance in an academic context in which the individual student "is required to be demonstrably productive rather than speculative, matured and developed rather than maturing and developing" (Batchelor 2008, p. 54). As there is no immediate rest or safe haven in shared cultural norms and values Batchelor points out that educational development can be experienced as "exploratory, uncertain, not always in control, and suffers periods of obscurity in thought that seem like failure. It can be an apparently unproductive voice without an immediate clear result (…)" (ibid.). However uncertain and confusing the educational process may be, the purpose of education is finally for the individual person to be able to endure and finally overcome this uncertainty and to mature into a more authentic self (Batchelor 2008, p. 52; Barnett 2007, 40ff.; Bonnett 1994, p. 111).

Notwithstanding the differences in focus in German (collective, cultural) and British (individual, existential) educational theories they overlap with regard to the shared preoccupation with Bildung as a process of maturing, development and transformation toward an autonomous and reflected form of being. Viewed not as opposing but complementary understandings of Bildung and higher education these traditions enable a more wholesome understanding of educational development than if seen isolated and in opposition to each other.

Despite of the shared interest in Bildung as a developmental process which manifests the relation between specific learning situations and fundamental cultural and existential categories, the language available in both traditions is somewhat cloaked in abstract terms and general concepts. Terms like "categorical Bildung" (Klafki), "key issues" (Klafki), "authenticity" (Barnett, Bonnett and Batchelor) and "ontological discomfort" (Barnett) signify different aspects of educational development on a conceptual level, but the question is how powerful these concepts are in order to orient us not only toward inner states of our personal or cultural selves but to the world around us, the specific things and particular events

of our everyday lives. Barnett calls for a new vocabulary when reflecting the future of higher education, stating that new thoughts on higher education must be realized through new words, phrases and linguistic imagery.

However, in the language of both the German and British traditions we do not hear the voice of specific persons, particular things and concrete social events. Instead a conceptual layer of meaning is added with the aim of closing in on general aspects of things as such, people as such and social events as they appear from a general point of view. The question is if the voices of specific persons are muffled, the character of particular things is ignored and the complexity of social events is unintentionally overlooked and downplayed in a conceptual language building on general meanings. The question I wish to reflect upon in the rest of the chapter is in what ways another language for Bildung in higher education might present itself, and to discuss if a language which orients itself toward specific people and events can be seen to further complement the educational theories already presented so far.

Maps, Globes, Instruments and Machines

With the seventeenth-century Czech educational theorist John Amos Comenius, often referred to as the father of modern didactics, the character of the school as a physical place with specific material objects and spaces is accentuated. To the student (pupil) the place of education must itself be a wondrous and a "pleasant place" full of luring and enchanting *things* (Comenius 2010, p. 131). Where the educational theories above underline the fascination and wonder of education on a conceptual level, Comenius links this wonder and fascination to specific things and places. According to Comenius good educational development must take place in a school which is experienced as a "fair" where the students may "feast their eyes" (ibid.) on various things which mark out the *place* of the school as an educational *space*. The school room should contain objects and instruments to take hold on the mind and imagination of the particular student. Comenius mentions the importance of objects like "optical or geometrical instruments, astronomical globes, and such like things that are calculated to excite their admiration" (Comenius 2010, pp. 130–131) together with "portraits of celebrated men, geographical maps, historical plans, or other ornaments." (Comenius 2010, p. 131). The purpose of mentioning these specific objects is to make his point clear that the meaning of education is to "root" the student to the world around him and let him be "absorbed" into this world not through concepts and categories alone but also through a fascination with concrete things and specific learning environments (Comenius 2010, 145ff.). Also Comenius thought of his didactical method as a way of obtaining general and universal knowledge, and he called his educational theory a "Pansophia" (Comenius 2010, p. 149). However, what is interesting in this context is Comenius' use of another vocabulary which supplements the conceptual level of meaning with a linguistic orientation towards specific objects,

places and things. I argue that this linguistic style in some ways gives his educational theory a different range and scope compared to the use of abstract concepts and forms of reflection seen in the more structural focus of the contemporary educational theories mentioned above.

The seventeenth-century German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz shared with Comenius an interest in education through the fascination with particular things and events. In an often overlooked paper[2] titled *An Odd Thought Concerning a New Sort of Exhibition* (*or rather, an Academy of Sciences; September, 1675*) (Wiener 1940) Leibniz reflects on a way of educatingthe masses—or in Leibniz's own terms "everybody would be aroused and, so to speak, awakened" (Wiener 1940, p. 239)—by means of a vast entertainment park containing all sorts of strange and wondrous instruments, machines, automatons and more or less bizarre objects:

> The exhibitions would include Magic Lanterns (…), flights, artificial meteors, all sorts of optical wonders; a representation of the heavens and stars and of comets; a globe like that of Gottorp at Jena; fire-works, water fountains, strangely shaped boats; Mandragoras and other rare plants. Unusual and rare animals. (…) Royal Machine with races between artificial horses. (…) Naval combats in miniature on a canal. Extraordinary Concerts. Rare instruments of Music. (…) Extraordinary rope-dancer. Perilous leap. Show how a child can raise a heavy weight with a thread. (…) We will bring the man from England who eats fire, etc., if he is still alive. Through a Telescopelia we could show the moon at night along with other heavenly bodies. We could send for the water drinker (Wiener 1940, pp. 235–236).

In a similar way as Comenius Leibniz explicitly relates education to the fascination with and exploration of specific things and events. And more interestingly his language has a cinematographic character in the way he uses a particular linguistic style to conjure up the experiments and machines which for the most part never came into physical existence in Leibniz's own lifetime. With inspiration from Comenius and Leibniz my point is that not only the school should become a fair, but language itself must become a fair as well in order to realize a corridor between abstract concepts and the specific things and events which often draw us in in the first place. Leibniz's idea should not only be seen as a way of pleasing and entertaining the public, but also a way of "awakening" them from their idle slumber. If this is read as an ambition of public Bildung by means of the emerging natural sciences in the seventeenth-century the meaning of Bildung is drawn into a more plastic, material and sensual linguistic realm than is the case in the educational theories described above. Furthermore an aesthetic note can be detected in the language of Bildung found in Comenius and Leibniz in which the ambition of education through fascination is made manifest in the very language used to channel meaning, imagery and plasticity to the reader.

The point I wish to make is that the force of educational practices, so vividly described by Comenius and Leibniz, must be met with a theoretical language

[2] I have learnt of this paper in Graham Harman's writings in which Harman makes a similar point about the relation between Leibniz and education (Harman 2005, p. 145 and 253ff.).

flexible and sensitive enough to mediate between lived and embodied educational events and the analytical framework we use to understand and interpret these events. This is not only valid with regard to seventeenth-century entertainment parks, but contemporary schools and universities as well. As the Danish educational philosopher Thomas A. Rømer points out in his intriguing paper titled *The Educational Thing* (Rømer 2011) "education should be conceived of as a thing in itself." (Rømer 2011, p. 499). Rømer points out that educational practice is like a "swarm" (Rømer 2010, p. 33, 2011, p. 504), and cannot be reduced to the concept "education" or "Bildung" without losing the essence of pedagogy itself. Rømer describes the school or university (the educational *place* much doted on by Comenius and Leibniz) as swarming with activities (lunch breaks, math, school yard fights, daydreams, love letters, exams, parent-teacher conversations, idle talk, chemistry experiments), people (best friends, fierce rivals, favorite teachers, angry janitors) and *things* (erasers, old school books, smart boards, toilets, long hallways, dark chambers, chalk, IPads, chewing gum). In a similar way we are reminded by Masschelein (2011) that school time is *lived* time and embodied time; time that stretches into infinity and time that flashes past us as we play football or discover the pleasure of reading a good story.

Many educational theories have drawn attention to the importance of educational practice, but few manage to transfer the energy, vitality and force of such practices to the language of educational theory itself. I wish to question if our theoretical understanding of the essence of education and Bildung is varied, nuanced and sensitive enough to capture the experience of long afternoons doing homework while your friends play football in the sun outside your house, the selfish (but very real and true) joy of discovering that biology class has been cancelled due to your teacher's illness, or the mixed feeling of fear and wonder when confronted with strange instruments and wires which your physics teacher tells you is part of a scientific experiment. The point is that education and Bildung are extraordinary rich and varied phenomena which are very hard to capture in abstract terms and categories, even if we call them by such sympathetic names as "experience", "situational learning", and "reflective practice". Despite the instrumental value of these concepts on an abstract level, they immediately become meek and frail when compared to the force of specific learning and teaching *places* and *times*.

Mosquito Bites, Shadows, Rivers and Gods

Paul Feyerabend asks in his posthumously published book *Conquest of Abundance. A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being* (1999) why the language of contemporary science and philosophy is so stale and meek compared to the abundance of human and nonhuman phenomena in the world. In philosophy most of the phenomena we experience are described as "things", "persons" or "social events"; we usually pour the richness of everyday lives and events into one of these three categories. This means that we do not have a nuanced language in philosophy to

distinguish between "trees, dreams, sunrises, (…) thunderstorms, shadows, rivers, (…) wars, flea bites, love affairs [and] (…) Gods." (Feyerabend 1999, p. 3). Bending Feyerabend in the direction of higher education I argue that the language we use to describe the purpose of educational development and maturation of character does not properly grasp the abundance of the world which is the purpose of education to become adjusted to. This "ontological delicacy" (Feyerabend 1999, p. 13), as Feyerabend puts it, can be said not to be mirrored in a correspondingly linguistic delicacy in educational theory. I argue that such a lack of linguistic delicacy might risk, putting it dramatically, to empty the language of educational theory of the direct semantic link or corridor to the specific things and events which truly bear the force of wonder and motivation for learning.

In line with Feyerabend the Canadian educational philosophers David W. Jardine, Sharon Friesen and Patricia Clifford point out that the element of abundance not only characterizes the world in a general way but also can be applied to the curriculum in schools and at universities. Thus, the "topics entrusted to schools *are* abundant, (…) and abundance define the ways things *are*, and therefore, the great array of the ways of traversing a place that students bring to the classroom *is precisely what living things require if they are to be 'adequately' understood in their abundance*." (Jardine et al. 2006, p. 88). As a consequence of this we should change our linguistic vocabulary when describing the developmental process in higher education. According to Jardine et al. educational development must be seen as a way of bringing forward the character of specific things and finding a language which at the same time can treat things as specific things *and* point to their relevance on a general conceptual level (Jardine et al. 2006, 17ff.). This mirrors Feyerabend's argument that we need a more profound stylistic link to capture the connection between the force of specific things and events and the general concepts of Bildung and educational development normally brought forth in debates concerning the purpose of higher education and the essence of university practice today. Higher education research needs to bring the world into the language of educational theory instead of the other way around.

The Danish educational philosopher Hansen (2008, 2010) argues that it is the undying task of educational theory to catalyze this double focus on specific and general aspects of learning situations by the use of style in language. To be able to fully grasp what potential Bildung holds in higher education, the educator must, according to Hansen, "defrost" the lived experience caught hold on on a conceptual level in order to "become familiar with the lived experience, lived life or fundamental force of life." (Hansen 2008, p. 77, my translation). Hansen points out that Bildung in higher education in essence can be defined as such a linguistic transformative action which is inspired by the encounter with other people, perspectives and ideas (Hansen 2010, pp. 163–164). Theories on Bildung must according to Hansen carry with them in tone and style the "creative force" of the world itself (Hansen 2010, p. 170). The things themselves must reverberate in the language of educational theory, and as educators we must be able to make our language resonate with the concrete experiences of the lives, things and actions we study or describe.

But what does it mean to give voice to the things themselves? What words would be proper to use to give voice to the experience of the sound of the creaking

floorboard outside the professor's office, which threaten to give in while you are waiting for him to finish his meeting so you can receive comments on your overdue paper? And how can theory absorb, or project, the creative buzz and spontaneity of a work shop held in the name of ancient Greek philosophy or German grammar? What is it that thing or aspect which is abundant? Is it to do with noises, faces, characters, choices, questions or assignments manifest in embodied *places* of learning and teaching? Are such questions merely due to romantic or nostalgic memories of past liminal experiences—or do they rise out of a need for a more nuanced, rich and sensitive language in educational theory on behalf of the persons, things and events who and which constitute the educational practice themselves, but are seldom given a direct and individual voice in educational theory? To me these are questions about the imperative nature of specific educational practices. The imperatives we act upon in our daily meetings with students and colleagues; the force of education which we feel obligated to act upon, or which nature of importance we suddenly, and often unexpected, catch a glimpse of, but rarely have time to pursue in depths in practice, and maybe even less time to reflect upon by use of theory. These educational imperatives need a theoretical language to be shaped and molded by, a language for theory which in itself is spacious and abundant.

Linguistic and Educational Shamanism

How can this sought for link between educational theory and stylistic cinematography be realized then? In contemporary American phenomenology, Lingis (1996, 1998) and Harman (2002, 2005) place emphasis on the relation between linguistic style and conceptual understanding. Both underline that every situation which can be described as development or Bildung[3] always points back to a specific situation, a special encounter, a particular experience or reflection. According to Lingis the persons we meet and the social events which shape our lives always happen as specific phenomena which require a language that recognizes and respects the concreteness of the situations we find ourselves in and the individuality of the persons we encounter:

> The world is not a framework, an order, or an arrangement, but a nexus of levels. The levels are not dimensions we can survey from above; we find them not by moving toward them but by moving with them. A level is determinate not as an extension we can survey or a periodicity we can diagram, but as a style we catch on to by moving with it (Lingis 1996, pp. 33–34).

[3] As is the case with the other British and American authors mentioned in this chapter Lingis and Harman do not use the word "Bildung". Furthermore they rarely use the word education either as their ambition is to develop a more general philosophical theory which does not deal in particular with educational theory and practice. Therefore when the words "Bildung" and "education" are linked to Lingis and Harman it should be seen as my own interpretation of their more general concepts.

To follow Lingis' line of thought it could be argued that Bildung is not a phenomenon which can properly be grasped from a distance. To obtain a deeper understanding of Bildung we have to "move with it" in the specific situations which can be said to be of importance to the particular individual's experience of educational development. The language we use to lay hold on phenomena of Bildung has to be equally flexible, nuanced and creative to be able to absorb the nature of Bildung into the conceptual language of educational theory. In Lingis' writings one finds a wide array of specific actors, things and events. The experience of things is not kept in abstract and theoretical language but channeled through a linguistically varied and plastic treatment of as different phenomena as grapefruits, orphans, glass, poverty and rain forests (Lingis 1998). The style of our linguistic expression mirrors the character of the phenomena experienced, and "When we speak, we speak for others. We answer another in her words. Our thoughts are shaped in the vocabulary, grammar, and rhetoric of our interlocutor" (Lingis 1998, p. 136). I argue that in order to grasp the nerve and essence of Bildung in higher education we need to expand the language used to describe and reflect such phenomena as part of educational development. As a supplement to the traditional conceptual language we need a language which shimmers and moves on different stylistic levels.

This way the language used in educational theory can build portals and gateways to specific and individual experiences of Bildung which both the German and British traditions deem essential to the nature of Bildung. This claim calls for a language which move on the inside or the interior of specific events and situations—a language for educational theory which does not sever the cord between the language used *in* practice and the language used for thinking *about* practice. To repeat the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, we must "imagine the importance of a language (…) whose function [is] not to tell us about things but to present them to us in the act of executing themselves" (Ortega 1975, p. 138). This gives a new meaning to the term "student voice" as evoked by Barnett and Batchelor earlier on in the chapter. The idea is to not only use the term "student voice" as a vehicle for the semantic construction in order to convey conceptual meaning across different practices—but also to use the term much more literally; in order to infatuate educational theory with the voices of specific students, teachers, administrators and other professionals whose specific voices carry their own meaning and their own individual form of importance.

Harman strikes a similar note when he argues that the language in which we form our understanding of the nature of learning must be seen as a "trapdoor or spiral staircase" (Harman 2005, p. 254) through which we move between the different levels of the world (ibid.). It is important to link our conceptual language with the actual learning situations we find ourselves taken in by, and to linguistically revive the specific encounters we have with our colleagues or fellow students—encounters which have been of chief importance to our continued motivation which propel us further and further into the heart of the particular things and events that are the objects of our study and research. A general and abstract language to articulate these experiences and phenomena in is not less true or less real, but it is not enough in itself as it lacks the force of creativity and the nerve

of motivated learning processes. In order to orient our concepts and theories in a more sensitive way to specific learning situations and experiences of personal and professional change, we need a language which is able to close in on the particular force and charm as Harman calls it, which reveals the essence of the particular phenomenon (Harman 2005, 134ff.). Like Leibniz Harman seeks to let specific things and events speak for themselves through a language which carries an aesthetic force by means of stylistic attention, sensitivity and humility (Harman 2005, p. 255). The nerve and force of these specific things and encounters is by Harman defined as "charm":

> I can think of no better technical term than *charm*. This word should be heard with overtones of witchcraft rather than those of social skills. What is at issue is not some sort of people-pleasing faculty in things, but a sort of magic charm or elixir that we sense in each thing, as when warriors devour tiger hearts or druids cautiously approach forbidden trees. The charm of objects is their innocent absorption in being just what they are, which in each case is something that we ourselves can never be. Packed full with deeply sincere agents, the world resembles the hideout of a sorceress, with its numerous medicines, poisons, vegetables, mushrooms, weapons, jewels, scents, tamed animals, gifts, toys, uniforms, and omens. In our most memorable moments, the world is certainly no less interesting than such a witch's hut would be (Harman 2005, p. 137).

This ambition is in Harman's own writings realized by a constant mixing of short narratives, linguistic imagery and abstract philosophical concepts. In Harman's phenomenology we not only meet terms like "subject", "object", "intentionality", "consciousness" and "epoché" which are part of the traditional phenomenological terminology. In Harman's universe a thing is not just a "thing"—it is brought forth in ever new forms of being and character as for example a "grasshopper", "moonbeam", "plastic dinosaur", "clown", "dust ball", "raspberry", "sailboat", "flash fire" and "grapefruit" just to mention a small selection of words taken from his books listed here. Harman argues that in order to capture the essence of particular things and events like "cities, or bags of Christmas candy, (…) a handshake or a fleeting kiss." (Harman 2005, p. 95 and 171), we need a concreteness in our linguistic style which recognizes and supports the individual character which defines the specific aspect of the world.

The languages of Harman and Lingis have a repetitive and chanting character, and they use specific words and phrases to evoke, even summon, a corporeal and aesthetic force within their conceptual frameworks. Through Lingis' and Harman's particular use of linguistic style concrete phenomena attain a plastic, animated and embodied character. We are reminded of the specific learning experiences and developmental processes and choices which really matter to us, and we are ourselves on a mental level summoned to partake in the dramas and narratives these words and phrases evoke within our recollection and understanding. This "linguistic shamanism" (my term) could thereby be seen as an educational shamanism—a way of making manifest a more embodied and animated meaning of the term Bildung.

A key term here, as in the title of the chapter, is "heart". What does it mean for theory to reach the heart of the matter? In fear of sounding too romantic I argue

that there is a risk for educational theory to lose hold of the heart of the matter, unintentionally I am sure. I argue that the primary goal of educational theory is to bear witness of the varied and embodied character of educational practice. Not only with good intensions soon to be abandoned and substituted for a journey into the logic of abstract categories of the human mind—but with the ambition of continuing to bear witness throughout theory itself, and to promote theories with *educational* heart. In this endeavor language is of seminal importance. Not merely to listen to, but through theory to understand and reflect the voice and challenges of specific students and teachers. There is a reason why specific learning and teaching situations are imprinted on our memory for years and years; we were struck with the force of educational heart. I suggest that such force should also be felt through the impact of educational theory itself.

This does not mean that I argue that educational theory should be turned into literature or poetry, and likewise I do not argue for turning analytical rigor into artistic experiments. The points made above are meant to draw out complementary aspects of the language and concepts we use to cast our understandings of the nature of Bildung and educational development in. If the purpose of education is to make us more familiar with and thoughtful of the natural and social world in which we partake as individuals, the language we use to discuss the nature of education should reflect the nature of the world we inhabit and the forces which pull our attention and reflection toward specific things, particular events and concrete encounters with other people. As educational practice is experienced as a myriad of different voices, faces, agendas, subject matter, greetings and arguments, I wonder if educational theory could, or should, match this form of variation by being able to make change of pace, rhythm, tone, voice and style in order to, as Lingis argues, move *with* the specific phenomenon itself, and the pulse of the heart of the matter, and the heart of things.

Bildung as a Marriage Between Word and World

This last section argues for a deeper understanding of Bildung, as higher education may benefit from a closer bond between word and world. It is imperative for future understanding of Bildung that our linguistic style adapts to the mongrel and speckled nature of university practice in our everyday lives. Of course we must take care that a strengthening of focus on style should not default to sentimental or romantic infatuation. If linguistic style becomes an end in itself it often strikes a trivial note without making any deeper contact with the phenomenon in hand. Therefore linguistic style, as I promote in this context, should be understood as a trapdoor or spiral staircase as mentioned above; a means to travel between abstract and concrete personal and social levels of meaning and being of specific "Bildung-phenomena".

A critical question could be directed against this chapter's own conceptual and abstract language; whether it is equally distanced and removed from specific

learning situations? A deeper question arises whether it is at all possible to conceptually frame a specific learning situation. It could be argued that it is much more logically coherent if we could keep a watershed between conceptual and embodied levels of meaning in order to carry out the most precise and homogenous analyses of the nature of Bildung. I do not agree, and I find it fruitful to view linguistic style as a link and platform of contact between practical situations and conceptual understanding—which through language and style enable thought and understanding to move *with* the phenomenon *as* it transforms itself from a specific to a general, or from an embodied to an abstract, phenomenon—and back again.

To give form to this closer bond between word and world when discussing educational development we need a new form of "educational phenomenology" which does not only speak *of* the specific learning situations but *from* such situations.[4] Such a marriage between word and world makes possible a phenomenology of education, even a *phenomenology of Bildung* maybe, in which language is used to bring forth specific and individual forms of educational development as it emerges and is experienced by particular people in concrete situations. In my own work with the relation between personality and professionalism in supervisory dialogues at the university (Bengtsen 2011, 2012) I argue that dialogical style can be seen as such a portal or corridor connecting conceptual and embodied levels of educational practice. In educational research we must be able to linguistically link to the style of the phenomenon we study, in other words we must steep our own cognitive categories into the heart of the specific teaching or learning event in order to let our understanding of educational development be saturated with the particularity of the situation itself.

When reflecting on learning and teaching situations which have made an important difference in our understanding of academic practice and identity, we are reminded that a conceptual and semantically coherent understanding of Bildung is only half the story. We recognize that Bildung is also something we feel, something we touch or which touches us; an inspired dialogue with a colleague or a student on a rainy morning in an empty auditorium, a flash of new insight obtained after weeks of unproductive toil, a difficult email response to a student which explains why she failed her last exam which leads to further correspondence never completely settled. Bildung or educational development does not always show itself as a long and well reflected process but may appear as a sudden and unexpected vision. To use a phrase from Harman, "we may sacrifice years to thankless study in order to hunt down some golden unicorn glimpsed one day in the library, even though it may never enter our grasp and no one else may even believe that we ever saw it" (Harman 2005, p. 141). Besides finding its way into German idealism and beautiful crafted philosophical concepts of autonomy and personal maturation Bildung also very much exists in the everyday lives of students and teachers; as skills acquired but not necessarily perfected, as analytical abilities tested and evaluated but maybe not completely understood and recognized by your peers.

[4] This point is inspired by Hansen (2010).

The British educational theorist Janet Parker describes how educational development may be highly individual and idiosyncratic (Parker 2005). Parker's understanding of idiosyncrasy could be described as knowledge or learning which does not follow suit with conventional forms and approaches and could be described as "paradigmatically deform" (my term). However, being experienced as strange and weird does not mean that such experiences cannot be described as real Bildung-phenomena or true cases of educational development. Parker uses the term "troublesome knowledge" to describe insights and reflections of such a character (Parker 2005, p. 158). The term "troublesome knowledge" is used to point out what happens when individual learning experiences do not match the expected learning outcome:

> [S]tudents, not yet having attained the requisite disciplinary framework of understanding, make their own, producing an idiosyncratic and extra-disciplinary account of the phenomena. Of course such an account can be seen as simply wrong, but a less judgemental and open reading might see that what is being produced is 'troublesome knowledge'; the sort of meanings that the discipline cannot comprehend. (Parker 2005, p. 158)

Often such "rookie mistakes" or "unschooled mishaps" are seen as errors on behalf of the student. As flaws in the correct process of Bildung. However, for Parker such educational misfits are valued as rare Bildung potential as it shows how Bildung cannot merely be viewed as something matured or completed, but as experiences out of focus and sometimes without a visible center. I argue that language of educational theory must be able to linguistically match the broader spectrum of the nature of university practice. Style seems like a promising way to walk in order to linguistically and conceptually *move* with the nature of Bildung as it presents itself in situ and to bring forth its individual faces, vibrating voices and particular insights and shades of wisdom—sometimes acquired by chance or luck, good or bad.

Most students have a vision and a belief of what makes higher education worthwhile for them. Obtaining a degree at the university often takes years, sometimes several years if you have to work full time and support a family as well. Sometimes being a student at the university changes the way you are, the way you view other people, and how other people view you. Why do we do this, and how is it at all possible? When does this transformation take place, and does it happen suddenly with a flash, or does it happen slowly, by degrees? A change that is not fully a change, or only half a change can be hard to capture in an abstract concept or category. Categorically speaking either you are changed, or you are not. But Bildung cannot be reduced to a categorical feature, or a conceptual meaning, Bildung *is* this change itself; the days without time to attend to your studies because of work, or because your baby son is ill with a fever and will not stop crying during the night. And the days where something suddenly happens, a new insight shows itself in a sudden flash of new meaning and new understanding. But how do you describe it to your peers, how do you make it fit into the often rigid genre of academic writing? You struggle with the words, but somehow your new found understanding just will not fit into university semantics.

This argument discloses a new understanding of Bildung which defines Bildung as an educational *process* and not an ideal or end point. I suggest that Bildung must

be seen as an educational *practice*, which does not necessarily contain a happy end or a matured self. Denise Batchelor has indeed hit the mark with her focus on educational processes over products, but we need a more subtle and sensitive theoretical language which does not freeze these processes in terms such as authenticity or autonomy. To be able to see into the heart of educational practices we need to defrost the language of educational theory itself. A language for processes includes a language for educational mishaps, disappointments, failures as well as unforeseen breakthroughs, triumphs and luck. To understand the purpose of higher education we need to understand the purpose of the specific learning or teaching situation, and the purpose of each choice, each vision and each struggle which anchor students and teachers to the sphere of the university each day, every day. And maybe we need to try to understand education as a process without purpose, or at least without a clear purpose. Few students, and their teachers, can know where higher education will take them, or if it will take them to a new place at all.

Conclusion

The argument of this chapter consists of two main points. Firstly, I argue that an understanding of Bildung may benefit from not only the traditional historical and conceptual view founded ultimately in German idealism and enlightenment thinking and its modern counterparts. On the contrary Bildung must be seen as a highly complex, tangled and situational phenomenon which is always grounded in specific learning contexts and personal experiences. Secondly, I argue that such a concrete and specific nature of Bildung needs a more diverse and flexible language in order to match and correspond more precisely to the character of embodied "Bildung-phenomena" (my term). This does not mean that we should not mind traditional conceptual understandings and descriptions of Bildung and educational development—on the contrary I argue for a complementary understanding of Bildung which includes different modes and levels of understanding at the same time. In this way I call for new ways of describing and closer examining the phenomenon which we call Bildung or educational development in ways more attuned to the concrete practical events and experiences, both in theory and method.

Hopefully a renewed focus on the linguistic style in which we cast our educational theories may sharpen our focus on Bildung as a multimodal and in some ways contradictory phenomenon; in our everyday lives Bildung is not necessarily experienced as maturation or the reaching of autonomy and authenticity. On the contrary to *be* a student or teacher may be experienced as a form of stasis or quicksand from which you strongly feel the temptation to simply give up and back away—but somehow you do not give up but carry on. Why? Because Bildung can also be described as an inspiration to hold on to something important you may just merely have had a glimpse of but never actually caught hold on. This creates a mixed experience of doubt *and* conviction, wisdom *and* folly, which is often very hard to contain in the same homogenous categories and definitions. To show that

Bildung is a phenomenon of abundance we need a language which helps disclosing this *educational* abundance.

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Coda: Reaching for Higher Education

Ronald Barnett

Introduction

It has emerged here, surely, that we can always go on reaching for higher education. Possibilities—for reaching for higher education—continue to emerge, whether, for example, in connecting higher education with the public sphere, in widening the forms of knowledge with which it is connected, in firming its ethical character, and in widening the development of students. All manner of directions in reaching for higher education continue to open.

These possibilities—again, as we have seen in this volume—are of two kinds. Possibilities are *real*: they really do exist in the world, as new forms of knowledge form, as new opportunities emerge for universities to engage with the world and as students' own lives become more complex and their hopes of higher education widen. Possibilities are also *imaginary*. This does not imply a measure of fantasy and non-realism. Imaginary possibilities are those that may be imagined and such possibilities may well be feasible.

Both real and imaginary possibilities are widening. As higher education becomes evermore immersed in the wider society, in both the world of work and the life (the 'lifeworld') of students, possibilities for higher education go on opening up. This is a widening in the way matters stand—in the real world—for higher education. Its connections with society go on opening. But the imaginative space for higher education also continues to open further. More and more ideas are being offered as to how higher education might be thought about and taken forward. The contributions here, therefore, may be understood in this dual light—as an opening both of the spaces that actually already exist in an interconnected world (in which

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higher education has become highly important across the world) and of the imaginative spaces through which we might just glimpse possibilities not yet immediately present but yet which could yet come to be realised.

Such reflections on thinking about higher education—as an opening of spaces—has a possibly perplexing implication. For such thinking is a reaching for higher education that can never stop. There is always more work to do. This thinking opens up new challenges, new possibilities and new conundrums that call for new thinking. Higher education is never, then, quite fulfilled.

Our opening proposition—that we can always go on reaching for higher education—could, therefore, be expressed somewhat differently. Higher education is always *beyond reach*. For some, this will be a depressing realisation, that higher education should always be beyond reach. For others, however, it will be a matter of some excitement, that developments in higher education are always to be striven for and that it makes sense to do so.

For others still, it has to be admitted, that observation will be met with a shrug of the shoulders. 'So what?' After all, it may be said, this is a long-familiar situation. Whether seen against a horizon of, say, the time since the Second World War, or of the last 150 years or even of the last 800 years (since the birth of the European university), higher education has been striven for. People have had to reach out for it, whether in donating money to found medieval colleges, or to establish—on the part of the state—universities over past centuries, or to respond to the new forms of knowledge and new technologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or to open opportunities afforded in the modern era by digital technologies and e-learning. At each moment in its history, higher education has witnessed conceptual and practical challenges *and* imaginary visions as to how it might go forward, and in turn investments of effort and resources to found new kinds of arrangements. So the suggestion that higher education has to be always reached for, and is—in that sense—always beyond reach offers us nothing new.

But that conclusion seriously underplays the novel character of the situation in front of higher education today and in both of the two senses in play here. As a matter of fact, new opportunities are opening in increasing directions: today, higher education has options in front of it, economically, socially, politically, and personally (in its offerings to students and their possible individual formation). Multiplicities abound. But, imaginatively too, higher education is confronted with a welter of ideas as to how it might go forward, ideas that are often work in progress, as debates are engaged across the world (as to the privatisation/public tension; as to the research/teaching relationship; and as to the responsibilities of the university towards the student).

But then we are led back to our double suggestion, that we can and are always reaching for higher education *and* that higher education is always beyond reach. Higher education is always before us; there are always more ways by which it might be realised. Its work is never done. Spaces keep opening, challenges continue to abound, ideas and imaginings are never still but always are in play, unfolding and opening new vistas. There are always new possibilities in front of higher education.

Thinking about higher education, therefore, is far from being aimless or even just an 'academic' enterprise. It is rather an activity—as is portrayed here by the contributors to this volume—that is intent on realising more fully and more profoundly the possibilities that lie ahead of higher education. This thinking becomes a reaching out for higher education and towards higher education. It is a *necessary*, indeed crucial, activity if higher education is not to be frozen but is going to go on reaching towards the fulfilment of its possibilities.

This thinking about higher education is also much needed at the present time—one is tempted to say desperately needed—since there are massive forces and ideologies at work that threaten to close options for higher education, both practical and visionary. Marketisation and neoliberalism in particular threaten to twist higher education into the service of economic reason. There may yet be positive gains from these forces but in their being taken up unthinkingly the risk is run of the horizons of higher education drawing in, as students are encouraged to see themselves just as economic appendages, bringing skills to the labour market (itself barely functioning, especially for young people). In turn, the dominant discourse of higher education itself contracts, being largely confined to working out systems and procedures—in curricula and pedagogies—that serve the labour market (even if now highly questionable). That these closings, of thought and practices and policies, are only tendencies and are not yet universal does not diminish their significance. Continual vigilance, exercised in significant part through thinking, is needed to open new windows and vistas for higher education.

But this thinking and this reaching for higher education is far from being a matter of resistance to contemporary movements, for it has in any event much more positive attributes. This thinking—of the kind exemplified in this volume—is always a species of *imagining*, sometimes more practical and sometimes more visionary. Thinking about higher education has its ultimate value in extending the horizons against which higher education is understood and provided. This is why higher education is always beyond reach; there are always possibilities that can be gleaned, and that can give it new impetus. There are always tensions and indeed conflicts to be worked through. There are always utopias that can be espied and even turned into feasible utopias.

Higher education is then always beyond reach, and thinking about it can propel its horizons further away. But thinking can also help to realize higher education, so as to help fulfil its possibilities, even if they must necessarily fall short of the ideals for which higher education stands. Thinking about higher education is a necessary aspect of its realization, even if that very act of thinking continues to push back its attendant horizons. Thinking about higher education and reaching for higher education can never be exhausted; they will and should continue to open new ground for each other.

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