

Catching Sports Cheaters: An Example of Successful Police Operations

Irfan Demir and Kutluer Karademir

Abstract Economists examining the ‘rational’ dimension dominate existing explanations for match fixing, yet we need to know more about how match fixing occurs. This chapter examines the actors, vehicles and processes of match fixing by applying the case of match fixing scandal in Turkey to a framework extracted from Hill’s (*The Fix Soccer and Organized Crime*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008) text on the subject. This analysis finds that the actors, vehicles and processes of a match fixing case in Turkey perfectly fit the characteristics identified by Hill.

Introduction

Soccer (interchangeably used with the word “football”) has become a global phenomenon that has significant impacts on social life, politics, economy, fashion and culture (Kuper 1996; Foer 2004). In fact the exorbitant public interest in the game has been converted not only into cash but also social and political benefits. The Fascist regime in Italy, for example, recognized the great public interest in the game and tried to construct a fascist national identity via football (Martin 2004). The first

I. Demir, Ph.D. (✉)

Istanbul Emniyet Mudurlugu, Gokalp Mah. Prof. Dr. M. Aksoy Cad.,
No:1 Kat: 6 (Egitim Sube Md.), Zeytinburnu, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: irfandemir25@yahoo.com

K. Karademir, Ph.D.

Istanbul Emniyet Mudurlugu,
EKKM Sube Mudurlugu A blok Kat 5 Adnan Menderes Bulvarı (Vatan Cad.),
Fatih- Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: kutluerk@hotmail.com

president of Ghana, Kwame Nkumrah, aimed higher in taking advantage of the interest in football to harvest political fruits. Nkumrah struggled to unite the entire African continent by creating an “African Personality,” which stands for a new African generation which can stand on their own feet and independently compete with the rest of the world, using football as the cement (Rosbrook-Thompson and Armstrong 2010). Nevertheless, neither Mussolini nor Nkumrah were able to realize their goals because football invigorates local and regional identities yielding in the long run more separation than unification (Martin 2004; Rosbrook-Thompson and Armstrong 2010).

Observing that most of effort spent by politicians to obtain political outcomes via football could not reach their target, the next question might be: is the turnover created by the ‘football industry’ being distributed, as it should be? The scandals of match fixing that occurred even in the most prestigious tournaments indicate that, it is not easy to answer this question. Match fixing is the purposeful under-performing by players or manipulation by coaches to affect the outcome of individual matches or tournaments in return for incentives (Preston and Szymanski 2003). Shedding some light on how match fixing is put into practice, we examine a recent case of match fixing in Turkey.

The football industry generates revenues from ticket and equipment (i.e., jerseys of popular players) sales, sponsorship agreements, TV broadcasts, gambling, player transfers and stock market speculation. Thanks to these and several other sources of income, the economics of football amount to billions of dollars. The TV broadcasting of soccer matches in popular leagues such as the Premier League of England, Serie A of Italy or La Liga of Spain via satellite and cable generates significant advertising revenues for the broadcasters and these soccer leagues. Additionally, the Internet offers fans both the joy of watching first quality soccer games, while also creating a global betting market which presents great advantages for the criminal syndicates to fix matches (Horrie 2000). As the volume and velocity of money, prestige and interest attached to football grows, this also paves the way for ‘illegal entrepreneurs’ to earn money by taking the uncertainty factor out of the games (McLaren 2008).

Match fixing in sports contests is generally explained by economists within the context of the design of the tournament, which includes the rules for regulating the volume and the distribution regimes of incentives and punishments, fixture and point systems, and the vertical and horizontal movements of teams or players within the hierarchy of leagues or ranking classifications. Economists agree that the design of a tournament is crucial in terms of shaping the perceived value attached to winning among players (Hillman and Riley 1989; Nti 2004; Preston and Szymanski 2003; Caruso 2007). According to Preston and Szymanski (2003), the probability of match fixing is proportional to the imbalance between the perceived gains of the rivals upon winning. A match fixing attempt will be more probable if winning begot great amounts of benefits to one of the contestants (team or individual player) and little or no benefits to the other. Preston and Szymanski (2003) contend that:

Match fixing occurs either because one side 'needs' to win to the extent that it is willing to make side payments to persuade the other side not to make effort or to persuade the referees to make biased decisions, or because players or officials stand to gain financially from gambling on the outcome of a match (p. 617).

Therefore, it can be argued that low-profile players or referees that are paid less are more vulnerable to match fixing (Humphreys 2011).

The theoretical models of economists were supported by empirical studies. Shepotylo (2005) found some empirical evidence that after the introduction of the "3 points for a win" rule, football matches in Ukraine became more corruptible especially in the long-run tournaments. Similarly Caruso (2007) showed the impact of tournament design on the evaluation of the stakes among contestants, using examples from two differently designed tournaments, the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Champions League. Duggan and Levitt (2002) found indirect empirical evidence by examining more than 32,000 Sumo matches in Japan. They found that Sumo wrestling was more likely to be fixed before the match when one of the wrestlers is on the brink of promoting to a higher category, which will provide him with considerable advantages and benefits in terms of money and prestige.

Economics literature provides a solid baseline for the rational calculation process of the probable actors of the game. In sum, the probability of match fixing grows proportional to the imbalance between the amount of expected gains upon winning between the rivals based on the design of the competition, the amount and the distribution of incentives, fixtures and pointing systems, issues such as promotion and relegation, the number of matches etc. Thus recommended solutions to match fixing concentrate on either increasing the amount of punishment for the perpetrators (Preston and Szymanski 2003), which is difficult due to the popularity of sports figures, or lessening the amounts of incentives attached to winning (Caruso 2007), which is apparently unrealistic given the turnover in the football industry.

These explanations of match fixing help us understand the motivations that may yield to match fixing, but we need to know more about how the match fixing process runs, who the more probable actors are, and what types of vehicles are used. This chapter attempts to shed some light on the operationalization of the factors affecting match fixing through examining a case of match fixing in Turkey within the framework of the actors, vehicles and processes as extracted from Hill's study (2008). We begin with laying out the framework that includes actors, vehicles and processes of match fixing based on Hill's study; next, we describe the state of football in Turkey; following this we examine the details of the police operation that elicited a series of match fixing scandals in Turkey using the framework detailed earlier; and conclude with a discussion of our conclusions and recommended policy implications. The case study is built upon a content analysis from daily newspapers, data from official documents and interviews with officers who conducted surveillance and interdiction operations on Turkish match fixing case.

The Framework: Actors, Vehicles and Processes of Match Fixing

Economics literature convincingly elaborates reasons for why match fixing might occur, but more knowledge is necessary on how match fixing is actually practiced. A comprehensive examination of match fixing that answers the above questions was done by Declan Hill (2008). Hill presented striking examples of match fixing in football games in different levels of tournaments ranging from several national leagues to the FIFA World Cup. Extracting components from Hill, a framework of actors, vehicles and processes of match fixing was constructed to allow subsequent application and analysis.

The Actors of Match Fixing

There are two sub-categories of actors associated with match fixing; fixers and targets. Fixers include organized crime groups (the mafia or syndicates) that fix matches to acquire money or power, club directors, and “runners.” The targets category includes referees and players. Hill also mentions “project managers” who can be accepted as a secondary hub between runners and players. Project managers are influential players inside the team who tempt teammates into participating in the match fixing scheme (Hill 2008).

Organized crime groups mostly engage in match fixing to guarantee winning a gambling wager. These are the most dangerous and pervasive actors of match fixing who maintain the ongoing corruption of the sport. These groups perceive sports as a business and are never interested in who wins or loses. The only interest of these actors is to maximize their gains through fixing matches (Hill 2008).

Alternatively, club directors have different motivations for match fixing. They fix matches to win the games and maintain their powerful status in the club. Within this context, they develop long-term relationships with other club directors to create a mutual benefit system. By so doing, especially the directors of big clubs guarantee their victories and satisfy the masses that support them and the directors of smaller clubs earn money by transferring their players to big clubs (Hill 2008).

Runners are the mediators between the fixers and the targets. These are generally ex-players who are recognized by and have direct access to clubs or teams. They maintain connections with the team and mark players in terms of their inclination to match fixing. They also detect the weak sides of players and inform their superiors in the scheme about these. The runner operates between the fixers and the team mostly through secondary hubs called project managers. Project managers are generally influential players in the team. The project manager should beguile at least 2 or 3 players including at least the goalkeeper, one defender and one striker to guarantee the success of the scheme. Referees are generally approached directly by fixers and are offered expensive presents or money in return for making biased decisions during the game. When players are fixed, in comparison to referees, the probability of a successful match fixing attempt is 4 % higher (Hill 2008).

The Vehicles of Match Fixing

The vehicles of match fixing can be categorized into positive and negative. The positive vehicles of match fixing are money, expensive gifts (i.e., watches, cars, holiday trips etc.), women and on some occasions promises to transfer to a more prestigious club. The negative vehicles are threats of violent activities such as blackmail, and threatening physical violence, up to and including threats of death. There is also a psychological dimension that accompanies these factors. That is, the fixers use rhetoric that soothes the feeling of guilt that emerges owing to the corrupt behavior of the target. Hill (2008) notes that fixers are very good at manipulating human psychology and they avoid using offensive words that might make the target feel guilty.

The Processes of Match Fixing

The processes of match fixing refer to a set of activities that are committed to arrange the scheme from beginning to end. These activities involve how the relationship between the actors are established and run; how the targets actually implement match fixing on the pitch; and when and how the positive and negative vehicles are employed.

Hill (2008) notes that the fixing processes are somewhat different in match fixing to win the game and match fixing to win a bet. The former type of match fixing is generally conducted by club directors and is simpler than the latter. The fixer determines the match to be fixed and contacts the runner. The runner connects with the project manager who then tempts selected teammates. If it is the referee to be fixed, they are generally contacted directly by club directors. The first contacts with players are mostly established through runners. The runner then conveys the match fixing offer to the project manager and if the offer is accepted the project manager arranges the process with his teammates (Hill 2008).

Match fixing to win the bet is more complex because the fixers have to control both the players and the bet market simultaneously. Here the fixers have to wait until the last minute before betting to maximize their earnings and not to trigger the FIFA's early warning system. The bet fixers generally target weak teams' players and ask them to lose because doing so raises less doubt. They control the scores of the games by telling the players exactly when to give away the goals. By so doing they are able to invest in more complex betting schemes such as the Asian Handicap and considerably increase their profit. Thus, in this type of scheme the players are given the "instructions" a few minutes before the game starts. At this point certain symbols and gestures are used between the runner and fixed players to communicate. For example, the runner wears a certain color outfit when the team should lose the game and a different color if it should perform well. In return, the players in the scheme put their hands on their chest in the ceremony to indicate that they got the message (Hill 2008).

When it comes to the implementation of the match fixing scheme on the pitch, this is generally done by deliberate negligence and simple mistakes such as wrong moves at the wrong time. Contrary to the general perception, corrupt players refrain from deliberately seeking a red card, causing penalties or scoring own goals because doing so will raise more doubts among observers. Furthermore most of the goals are scored at the earlier phases of games when matches are fixed (Hill 2008).

After the scheme is completed the money or other incentives are given to the project manager and he distributes the prize among his teammates who took part in the scheme. According to Hill, trust is the cement that holds this entire sector of match fixing together. The fixers pay extreme attention in their reputations as trustworthy actors. Therefore payments are done promptly and precisely (Hill 2008).

Turkish Football at a Glance

Turkish professional football leagues were started in 1951 and are currently run in four professional categories (Turkish Super League, League 1, League 2 A and League 2 B) with 124 teams on a promotion and relegation basis. Except for these leagues, The National Cup is also run based on a group and elimination system, which is similar to the UEFA Champions League. According to official website of the Turkish Football Association (TFA) there are 466,500 licensed football players (including amateur players) in the country (“Lisanslı Futbolcu Sayısı” 2010). In the international arena, a few Turkish teams and the Turkish National Team won noteworthy achievements. For example Galatasaray won the UEFA Cup and the UEFA Super Cup in the 1999–2000 season and qualified to quarterfinals in the UEFA Champions League the next season. Fenerbahçe also qualified to quarterfinals in the UEFA Champions League in the 2007–2008 season. The Turkish National Football Team won a 3rd degree in the 2002 FIFA World Cup and another 3rd degree in the 2008 UEFA European Cup.

As in many other countries, there is great local interest in Turkish football. It starts from childhood and playing football in the street. A great majority of Turkish men have keen interest in the sport and talk about their favorite teams and players. Matches take place on the weekends and are the subject of discussion at the work place on Monday mornings, if not the entire week. It is not uncommon to witness quarrels, even fights coming out of football chats. In short, football is a social phenomenon across the entire country. According to the UEFA report (2010) Turkey is ranked sixth in Europe in total stadium attendance with a 3.4 million total attendance and with 11,000 in attendance (on average) per match. In addition, club revenue growth between 2006 and 2010 is 27.6 % in Turkey (UEFA 2010). There are three major daily sports newspapers with a total daily circulation of approximately 450,000 that accounts for almost 10 % of the total daily newspaper circulation in Turkey.

The official bet system was established in 2004 and as of 2012 there were six official betting platforms in the country. According to the official data, 3.5 million people are involved in betting on a weekly basis. About 500,000 online gamblers

participate annually with an estimated turnover of around 2.5 billion dollars (“Futbol Kumar Masasında” 2012).

When it comes to the design of the football leagues, the league system is similar to many others with promotion and relegation in Europe. The distribution of broadcast revenues, which is around \$500,000,000 annually, is conducted through a pool system. Before 2008, the pool system was offering more advantage to more prestigious clubs by distributing 50 % of the broadcast revenues to clubs with earlier championships. After 2008, though, this system was changed. According to the current system 35 % of the broadcast revenues are equally distributed to each team in the league, 44 % is distributed as performance bonus where each win is awarded with 740,000 Turkish Liras (TL) and each draw is awarded with 370,000 TL (approximately \$400,000 and \$200,000 respectively). Fourteen percent of the broadcast revenues are distributed to clubs with early championship titles; and 7 % is distributed based on the end of season achievements. Before the introduction of this system, there were only four clubs with championship titles, but in the 2009–2010 season a fifth club, Bursaspor, won its first championship title.

In sum, there is great interest in football in Turkey. Football players, club managers and directors are popular as celebrities across the country. Since the turnover of betting is considerable it is likely that organized crime groups are interested in manipulating the Turkish gambling market. Also, the amount of broadcast revenues is astronomic (\$500 M per year including taxes) and football clubs have to win more to get larger shares. Within this system, smaller teams are considered successful as long as they are able to stay in the Super League and benefit from this pool. Nevertheless, for big clubs success is measured only by the championship, or to a certain extent winning the second place that will open the door for participating the Champions League, at the end of the season. This is very important for the club directors in order to stay in power because they are seriously criticized and protested against if the team lets down the fans in consecutive seasons. Therefore, from the perspective of the scholars of Economics the value attached to winning is considerably imbalanced between bigger and smaller clubs. In such a domain match fixing attempts can be expected by both organized crime groups and club directors.

Several cases of match fixing were revealed when the police conducted a comprehensive 6 month operation ending on July 3, 2011, with a myriad of arrests including club presidents, star players, player representatives, coaches and many others. Both judicial and administrative investigations were started after the operation. The judicial trial lasted for 1 year and the trial court reached a verdict on the July 2, 2011, finding nearly half those accused guilty. Elaborating on the important details of this operation allows the identification of the actors, vehicles, and processes of this match fixing event. Using content analysis from newspapers, official documents, and court testimony, as well as the reasoned verdict of the court allows the application of Hill’s (2008) framework. Additionally, the following analysis incorporates interviews with officers who conducted the operation. These elements are then compared and contrasted with the framework proposed by Hill (2008) to explore the similarities and differences between theoretical constructs and actual events, shedding light on our understanding of match fixing.

The July 3rd Operation

The Background of the Operation

The July 2011 match fixing scandal in Turkey resulted from a police operation and has become the leading issue of the country for months. According to the indictment, the investigation began in 2009 when a prosecution pursued by German authorities was expanded to include several matches played in the Turkish league. Based on this earlier investigation, the Turkish Football Association (TFA) applied to the Turkish prosecutor to initiate an investigation on those who had been allegedly involved in match fixing and betting schemes.

The indictment mentions that the police focused on the mafia-football nexus and found that due to the potential financial and power benefits, organized crime groups had been increasingly engaging in the football sector since the 1980s. Within this context the president of a second division football club, Giresunspor, applied to the police and made a complaint against his predecessor, Olgun Peker, accusing him of committing several crimes including document forgery, and compelling the players to lose matches in order to force the new club president to resign. Olgun Peker had a criminal record of being the member of an organized crime group headed by Sedat Peker. Sedat Peker used to be a fan-group leader in Fenerbahçe football club, one of the prestigious football clubs of the country with an estimated 25 million fans throughout Turkey. Olgun Peker and Mecnun Odyakmaz were Sedat's closest henchmen. Sedat Peker gained more power over time and became one of the most powerful so-called mafia leaders of the country until being arrested in 2004. Sedat Peker was sentenced to more than 14 years in prison for founding and leading an organized crime group. Olgun Peker and Mecnun Odyakmaz remained engaged in football by running player representative firms. These firms enabled them to undertake the representativeness of hundreds of players at very young ages and control them throughout their careers. By so doing, they were able to earn commissions on the transfers of players and use their influence on players to affect the scores of matches (Indictment 2011).

The investigation on Olgun Peker then expanded to include several important figures of the Turkish football community, such as club presidents and directors, managers, active and retired players, player representatives, referees and federation staff including the ex-president of the TFA. Police collected evidence through technical and physical surveillance throughout the preliminary investigation. Based on this evidence the police conducted an operation on July 3, 2011, arresting more than 40 people. The primary suspects of the investigation were Olgun Peker, Aziz Yıldırım – the president of Fenerbahçe Sports Club – and three other club directors of Fenerbahçe. Although there were several other defendants, Aziz Yıldırım was at the core of the media interest throughout the entire trial process.

As of the 2010–2011 season, Aziz Yıldırım had been the club president for 12 straight years and the football team had won four championship titles under his presidency. In the indictment, Aziz Yıldırım and many of his entourage were

charged with founding a crime group to manipulate the scores of several football matches. Yıldırım had promised to win the championship for the following three consecutive seasons in his 2009 reelection campaign. Interestingly, the team dramatically lost the championship in the last game that very season causing great anguish and disappointment for millions of Fenerbahçe fans in and out of Turkey. Even worse was that Fenerbahçe had a very bad start in the 2010–2011 season. At the end of the first half of the season, they were nine points behind Trabzonspor and they had been eliminated from the Turkish National Cup by a weak second division team. Interestingly enough, they won 16 of the 17 games and one game ended in a draw in the second half of the season. Both Fenerbahçe and Trabzonspor completed the season with 82 points but Fenerbahçe won its 18th title on goal average. In his victory speech, Yıldırım acknowledged the great efforts of some “secret heroes” who worked very hard to get the championship. According to the indictment, after having lost the championship twice in the last four seasons and seeing that the team was falling away from the championship, Yıldırım and his entourage decided to manipulate the scores of the games so that Fenerbahçe would either win or Trabzonspor, their primary rival, lose. Within this frame several players were contacted before matches to fix the games. Many other match fixing attempts by directors, managers and players of miscellaneous teams also took place according to the indictment (2011).

The Post-operation Process

An administrative investigation by the TFA and a judicial trial were started simultaneously after the police operation and both were completed within 1 year. Before getting into the details of these trials, it is important to examine some of the milestones of the period between July 3, 2011, and the beginning of the judicial trial on February 14, 2012, to shed light on the chaos and limbo triggered by the operation.

On July 6th the police department declared that they detected match fixing activities in 19 matches (“19 Maçta Şike” 2011). On July 7th the UEFA made a statement on zero tolerance to match fixing (“UEFA’dan Yeni Açıklama” 2011). The kick-off date of the Turkish football leagues was postponed from August the 8th to September the 14th (“Süper Lig 9 Eylül’de” 2011). On August 22nd UEFA Chief Discipline Inspector Pierre Corno visited the prosecutor and received information on the case (“UEFA El Koydu” 2011). Four days later Fenerbahçe was dismissed from the UEFA Champions League by the TFA (“Fenerbahçe Şampiyonlar Ligi’nden” 2011). Trabzonspor was declared as the Turkish representative in the Champions League instead. Fenerbahçe appealed to CASS against the UEFA demanding €45 million redress for their losses for being banned from the Champions League. They also applied to the TFA and demanded to be relegated, but this demand was rejected by the TFA (“Fenerbahçe, Bank Asya’ya” 2011). Concurrently, tens of thousands of Fenerbahçe fans held protests claiming that the whole process was a plot against their club and the club president (“Taraftarlara Biber Gazlı” 2011).

The match fixing process also occupied the top agenda of politicians. The 6222 Act sets mandatory sentences for match fixing crimes. Many politicians called these sentencing guidelines too strict and on November 22nd all of the political parties represented in Parliament agreed on an amendment to the 6222 Act that reduced the length of sentences for match fixing (“Siddet Yasasinda Beklenen” 2011). Turkey’s President vetoed the bill implementing this amended law. The reason behind the veto decision was declared to be “the strong perception in the public opinion that the amendment was passed specifically to intervene in an ongoing case” (“Şike Yasasına Gulden” 2011). However, the amendment was again sent to the President by parliament without any changes. This time the President had a constitutional obligation to sign the amendment bill into law, which he did on December 14th (“Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, bedelli” 2011). After the amendment, the sentences decreed for match fixing were lowered from 5–12 years in jail to 1–3 years.

Article 58 of the Football Discipline Directive (“TFF Olağanüstü Genel” 2011), decrees *the relegation of a club if its players or directors commit or attempt to commit match fixing*. Fenerbahçe strictly objected to TFA’s attempt to change this rule and declared that they can withdraw the football league if such a change is made (“Açıklama” 2012). The president of TFA asked the clubs for a one-time suspension of Article 58, yet was unanimously refused. Hence the TFA directors’ board resigned (“Mehmet ali Aydınlar’dan” 2012). This resulted in the president of Beşiktaş football club, Yıldırım Demirören, being elected as the new TFA president (“TFF’nin Yeni Başkanı” 2012). Beşiktaş was one of the clubs involved in the match fixing case. The coach and a few directors of Beşiktaş had been arrested during the police operation. After the election of Demirören as the TFA president, new members were appointed to the executive and audit boards.

Highlights on the Police Investigation

The July 3rd investigation was conducted by the Organized Crime Unit of the Istanbul Police Department. Police officers stated during the interviews that, initially, investigators were not looking into match fixing issues, nor were they much interested in football in general, beyond mainstream Turkish fans interest. They were originally investigating organized crime activities within their jurisdiction and they did not expect the issue to expand into match fixing. However, during the course of the investigations, they ended up discovering some of the targets being involved in match fixing along with other criminal activities. As the scope of the investigation expanded, additional suspects were identified. Meanwhile, the police investigations team felt that it would be wise to enhance the team members’ grasp of technical knowledge of football, beyond the level of ordinary football fans. They used every means available to educate themselves, to be able to interpret all activities within the scope of their investigations such as following all matches, keeping up with the media output on football, receiving technical knowledge from relevant sources and studying all the data sources in a structured manner. Some of the team

members attempted to put themselves in the shoes of sports columnists, while others tried to envision themselves as if they were club managers, key players and player representatives. The strategy turned out to be an outstanding means of developing a team concept within the department. After a short while, the team was able to interpret all the activities in the league and moves of the suspects. Whenever needed, they also received some support from other units that do not directly deal with the subject matter (Interview with detectives, August 30, 2012).

Detectives were also subjected to many personal sacrifices, from physical surveillance squads to the technical staff, the entire team worked meticulously, making the effort worthwhile. At one point, a squad started tracking a suspect, who they believed would be heading back to his home, only to end up chasing him across the country as he decided to leave town and meet other associates at a far-away city. The squad had to keep tracking him without being able to notify their own families of their location or potential return date (Interview with detectives, August 30, 2012).

Several similar examples were mentioned during interviews with the investigators. Actual money transfers used to bribe relevant parties involved in match fixing were photographed and a brand new luxury car was videotaped being driven out of the auto dealership with the suspect inside, who actually registered the car under a relative's name. One important point mentioned by the investigation team related to the phone tapping that had to be supported by other supplementary evidence in this case (Interview with detectives, September 7, 2012).

The investigation team identified several significant lessons that could be applied to future investigations of match fixing. First, the need for specific laws against match fixing. The investigators used the comprehensive regulations within their jurisdiction to carry out the investigation and prepare the evidence for presentation to the prosecutor. However, more detailed legal grounds with specific details covering match fixing and other relevant issues could have expedited the process resulting in a more cost-effective effort. It was also reported by detectives that a specialized unit to deal with the specific match fixing cases has to be established. Additionally, an early warning system to signal that the potential match fixing may be occurring should be developed and utilized by the police for earlier intervention. Earlier cooperative efforts with relevant institutions such as the sports federation and prosecutorial authorities would help as well (Interview with detectives, September 7, 2012).

One final and striking point made during interviews with detectives is that football fans themselves offer investigators a valuable tool. Idle fans point out and talk about potential evidence (changes in performance, player injuries, etc.) that can be used in fight against match fixing globally. Should this weapon against match fixing be properly utilized, there could be a significant effect on reduction of cases of sports corruption. This point will be further examined in the discussion section.

The Administrative Investigation

The administrative investigation was pursued by the Professional Football Discipline Board (PFDB) of the TFA within the legal framework of the Football Discipline

Directive. Article 58 of this directive regulates match fixing and decrees relegation of relevant football clubs in the event match fixing is proved. After the police investigation, a copy of the police file was sent to the PFDB by the prosecutor. The PFDB investigated the police evidence and wrote a report on August 15, 2011. This report was never officially shared with the police or prosecutor, but somehow was leaked out to the press (“Mehmet Baransu Şike” 2012) indicating that the club president of Fenerbahçe and some of the club executives had fixed six matches, and attempted to fix another six matches. The report also pointed to article 58 of the discipline directive and suggested the relegation of Fenerbahçe since the actions of the club president and top executives should be considered the actions of the club. The former president of the TFA argued against such action, stating the institutions and individuals should be separated in the investigation. In other words, football clubs should not be punished for the wrong doings of their managers. Thus, as mentioned above, Aydınlar wanted to change article 58 of the directive on a one-time only basis which would be ad hoc to the ongoing match fixing case. After this attempt was refused by the clubs the TFA president and the members of the executive board resigned. All those who resigned were replaced. The disciplinary board examined the file for 8 months and issued a new report on April 22, 2012. In the new report Aziz Yıldırım was acquitted, nevertheless, three of his top executives were found guilty of fixing and attempting to fix a total of six matches. The ex-coach of Beşiktaş was also acquitted in the report. Moreover, the Ethics Board declared that after watching the videos of the suspicious matches despite the fact that there were attempts of match fixing based on the surveillance reports, none of these attempts was successfully implemented on the pitch. The Ethics Board declared that the difference between the reports was normal because the first report was written based solely on the indictment. In the second report the testimony of the defendants was taken into account, videos of matches were watched and new evidence and documents that had been added to the file were examined. After the report was issued Fenerbahçe withdrew the case against the UEFA which was ongoing at the CASS (“Fenerbahçe CAS’tı” 2012).

The report of the Ethics Board was advisory and the final decision would be made by the TFA executive board. After a 1 week retreat, at a hotel in Antalya, to assess the situation the TFA president declared that the report would be sent to the Disciplinary Board for assessment and award of punishment. More importantly, Demirören stated that article 58 of the disciplinary directive had been changed. In the amended form of the article, the commission and attempt to fix matches separated and a new category of action, “gross violation” was included. According to the new article those who commit match fixing are punished with permanent deprivation of rights; if these are the directors of a club, then the club is relegated. For attempting to engage in match fixing individuals can be deprived of rights for 1–3 years and the club gets point reduction punishment up to 12 points only when a gross violation is detected. Demirören declared that the Discipline Board would make their decision in 48 hours based on the amended form of the directive (“Demirören Tarihi Kararları” 2012). No definitive criteria are mentioned as to how to assess the seriousness of the violation in the event of an attempt to match fix.

The Disciplinary Board made their decision on May 7, 2012. No club was punished by the Disciplinary Board. On the other hand, three directors of Fenerbahçe, three football players and four others were punished for attempts related to match fixing (“PFDK Şike Kararlarını” 2012).

The Judicial Trial

The judicial trial process took 1 year and a total of 93 defendants were judged. The top defendant in the case was Olgun Peker who was accused for establishing and leading an armed crime group. The second defendant was Aziz Yıldırım, the president of Fenerbahçe Sports Club. Other defendants were directors, managers, coaches and officials of different clubs, player representatives, and ex-referees. As previously mentioned, interventions in the judicial trial process from the political domain occurred and resulted in the reduction of the sentences decreed for match fixing. At the end of the judicial trial process, court reached a verdict finding 44 of 92 defendants guilty. Contrary to the report of the Ethics Committee, the court found Aziz Yıldırım guilty of inciting others to fix five matches, and also leading a crime group. Yıldırım was sentenced to 6 years and 3 months in prison, but the court released him and other defendants taking into consideration the year they had been imprisoned during the trial. While this chapter was being written in 2013, the case file awaits the outcome of the Court of Appeals decision, and Aziz Yıldırım was still the president of Fenerbahçe Sports Club.

Actors Vehicles Processes

Applying the framework extracted from Hill (2008) to the case specifics as gleaned from the judicial verdict which includes case evidence, media reports, and interviews with the police investigators, it can be concluded that the actors of the match fixing case in Turkey fits the framework. It should be mentioned here that this case fits in only one type of match fixing, which is the “old-fashioned” type of match fixing by club directors, because no incident of a betting scheme was found. Therefore the following analysis pertains to this particular type of match fixing.

The fixers are organized crime groups, club presidents and directors. The targets are players. No attempts for fixing the referees was found in this case, nevertheless, Aziz Yıldırım forced one of several former presidents of the TFA to appoint certain referees to his club’s matches. He then defended himself saying “I did that because those were good referees and there is no other reason beyond that” (Justified verdict 2012). Yıldırım’s henchmen and associates of the club’s top executives played the part of runners. One interesting point is that the fixers conduct match fixing activities with a very limited number of people whom they trust the most. Thus most of the executive board members generally were not aware of what was going on before matches. A second significant finding is that there is a very close relationship between player representatives and the mafia because the legal status of player representativeness is full of gaps allowing for an easy infiltration by organized crime groups.

Organized crime groups started player representative firms to recruit both poor and skilled players at very young age, developing control of them throughout their careers. Ex-players were also used as runners to contact and deceive target players.

The vehicles used in this case of match fixing also matched the framework gleaned from Hill (2008). Both positive and negative vehicles were used. Positive vehicles included cash, expensive gifts (including a Mini Cooper automobile), and promises of transfers to better clubs. The negative vehicles were employed mostly by mafia groups, rather than club directors. Primary negative vehicles were employed to influence the performance of opponent teams rather than threatening players. Cash is the mostly preferred vehicle in the process. Cash is generally delivered to spur the performance of the players who will play against the major rival of the fixer. This type of an action is called incentive pay and it is legally on a par with paying one's own rival to throw the match. In this case both Fenerbahçe and Trabzonspor allegedly attempted to pay incentives to the each other's rivals. The ex-coach of Beşiktaş used transfer promises in an attempt to neutralize the forward of their rival before the final match of the Turkish Cup. A more difficult case was that of Emenike – a Nigerian national playing forward for a modest Anatolian team, Karabükspor. According to the indictment, the match fixing group in Fenerbahçe contacted Emenike and asked him not to play in the upcoming league match between Karabükspor and Fenerbahçe. According to the allegations, the player was not playing for months due to a serious injury, yet had recovered and could have been played in the match. The player was transferred to Fenerbahçe immediately after the end of the season. In the judicial verdict (2012), the court stated that there definitely was an attempt to compensate this player for not playing in the match, but it is not possible to make sure whether the player did not play because of the offer or because he was really not ready for the match.

The processes of match fixing in the Turkish case also fits in Hill's (2008) framework. The fixing process was started by the club president by contacting a few close directors to take action. Directors then contacted runners and ask them to check the atmosphere in the target team for potential collusion in the scheme. When an open door was detected the target was contacted by a player representative, usually by phone, and an offer was made. After the match, the president took action to start the payment cycle. The money or other incentives were then distributed as promised. By definition, incentive payments are normally made prior to the match, however, in this case they were made after the match. Interestingly enough, most of these arrangements are made on the phone, yet the fixers use a ciphered language. For example such terms as "cultivating the farm" or "watering the farm" were used for fixed matches and the term "workers" were used for players (Interview with detectives, September 10, 2012).

Discussion

After examining the Turkish case of match fixing, it is clear that the framework derived from Declan Hill (2008) provides a valid model for analysis. In this case the president of a popular sports club formed and led a narrow circle for the purpose of

manipulating both their own and their major opponent's matches. The primary motivation for match fixing was the desperate need of the president to maintain his status by winning the championship. Within this context, the conspirators offered and paid money and gave expensive gifts to the targets that were mostly key players of rival teams. Also, incentive payments were offered or paid to the rivals' of the opponents by both sides. Drawing attention to the case was the complex relationships among club directors, player representatives and the mafia.

One important policy suggestion after the review of this case is that the players need education regarding the context and dimensions of match fixing. A striking example of this is the wire tape record of a ridiculous conversation between a player and a cleric in which the player informs the cleric that he had been offered €100.000 for underperforming during the match and asked if it would be OK to accept that money (Interview with detectives, September 10, 2012).

Another suggestion for combating match fixing mentioned by police officers during the interviews is that information gathered through both wire taping and physical surveillance had been very effective in providing evidence of match fixing. The officers argued that the extension of legal limits for technical and physical surveillance, to include preventive issues, will render more concrete results.

Additionally, an important finding of this case study was the impact of football on policy-making processes. This was demonstrated by the political interference seen in both administrative and judicial trial processes. The great popularity of football in the country forced the politicians to take action in order to reduce the duration of sentences decreed in the relevant laws and regulations. This is a substantial issue to be explored through further research because the relationship between figures administrating the football sector in a country and the holders of political power might be a variable explaining some crucial aspects of match fixing in other countries as well.

A Comprehensive Approach to Raise Awareness Across Millions

When it comes to policy implications, the authors of this chapter propose reaching out to the millions of soccer fans through the entertainment/movie industry in order to raise awareness and trigger a grassroots uprising against corruption in football. Educating certain identifiable targets such as players, coaches or club managers sounds quite reasonable. Official entities such as FIFA, Interpol, or governmental authorities may well be successful in such efforts. However, educating billions of unidentified targets all over the world, such as fans and supporters, may not be feasible through the conventional means as it applies to the former group. Since we cannot disregard the importance of involving and raising awareness of such a critical mass of the football world, unconventional means of indirect education should be considered to reach out to these target populations and raise their awareness and ensure their involvement and inputs in the fight against match fixing.

Hollywood movie industry has long proven to have a strong ability to convey messages to countless people, regardless of national borders, cultures, and languages.

Football is one of the most common points of interest shared by most nations across the world. Football is also a common denominator that spans cultures and languages. A state of the art movie on football would literally reach billions of people who are fans of the sport. Once the story and other elements of such a movie are secured, any kind of messages can be incorporated into the film and conveyed to people in an effort to raise their awareness, mobilize them, and unite them against match fixing and those who corrupt the sport. Once the movie is released to the worldwide audience, it would influence countless people faster than an official government sponsored effort.

Such a movie should include at least the following concepts:

1. Behind the scene depictions of the discussions in the locker rooms
2. Details of how match fixers approach players and referees
3. Examples of threats against family members and loved ones
4. The cost associated with illegal gambling paid by the innocent fans, and
5. The involvement of politicians to protect their favored teams.

It can be anticipated that the course of future match fixing will deviate from the case examined here. However, after an appropriate movie has been seen by millions, football fans may question any suspicious move through different venues of communication such as social media. Individual gamblers may raise their voices in different ways. Mass media may take a different stance towards match fixing. Those who witness or feel suspicious about any illegal activity may be more aware and willing to report what they know to police or relevant authorities. Such initiatives may pave the way for future investigations, convictions, and legal/administrative sanctions. Fan involvement may serve as a tool for law enforcement and judicial authorities facing problems in conducting investigations and finding evidence to use during judicial processes. Such a movie will, at a minimum, inform those who take part in match fixing to have second thoughts about carrying out their efforts, and for targets to consider accepting bribes and gifts. It would be much more difficult to get away with match fixing when there are millions of eyes looking for evidence of corruption.

Equally important would be to conduct a meticulous cross-section population survey to determine the impacts of any mass media effort to influence potential match fixers, targets, and the fans. This would best be accomplished through utilization of the pretest/posttest methodology of a subsection of the total population exposed to such a mass media effort. Additionally, subsequent long-term studies should be carried out to determine the lasting influence and carry-over of intended lessons to subsequent generations of players, coaches, and fans who may not have seen the original mass media effort.

References

- 19 Maçta Şike ve TeşvikPrimi Var., (2011, July.06). Retrieved from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=18187835&tarih=2011-07-06>.
- Açıklama., (2012, January.14). Retrieved from: <http://www.Fenerbahçe.org/detay.asp?ContentID=27463>.
- Caruso, R., (2007), The Economics of Match-Fixing, MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, <http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3085>.
- Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, Bedelli ve Şike Yasasını Onayladı., (2011, December.14). Retrieved from:http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_cumhurbaskani-gul-bedelli-ve-sike-yasasini-onayladi_1214698.html.
- Demirören Tarihi Kararları Açıkladı., (2012, April.30). Retrieved from:<http://spor.milliyet.com.tr/Demiroren-tarihi-kararlari-acikladi/spor/spordetay/30.04.2012/1534504/default.htm>.
- Duggan M., Levitt S.D., (2002), Winning isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling, *American Economic Review*, vol. 92, n.5, pp. 1594–1605.
- Fenerbahçe CAS'ı Çünkü., (2012, April.27). Retrieved from: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/spor/futbol/20431213.asp>.
- Fenerbahçe Şampiyonlar Ligi'nden Men Edildi., (2011, August.24). Retrieved from:http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2011/08/110824_fb_champions.shtml.
- Fenerbahçe, Bank Asya'ya Düşürülmek İçin TFF'ye Başvurdu., (2011, August.26). Retrieved from: <http://www.turkspor.net/detay.asp?id=65505>.
- Foer, F., (2004), Football vs. Mc World, *Foreign Policy*, No. 140 pp. 32–40.
- Futbol Kumar Masasında., (2012, January.09). Retrieved from: http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/Futbol_kumar_masasinda/222881#.Udu-zKx5evB.
- Hill, D., (2008), *The Fix: Soccer and organized crime*. Toronto: McClelland&Stewart.
- Hillman A.L., Riley J.G., (1989), Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers, *Economics and Politics*, vol. 1, no.1, pp. 17–39.
- Horrie, C. (2000), Football isn't fit for TV, *New Statesman*; Jul 24, 2000; 13, 615; p. R19.
- Humphreys, B. R. (2011), Online Sports Betting and International Relations, *SAIS Review*, No:1, pp. 103–115.
- Indictment., (2011). Retrieved From: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/spor/futbol/19428696.asp>.
- Justified Verdict., (2012). Retrieved From: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/spor/futbol/21200052.asp>.
- Kuper, S., (1996). Football Against the Enemy. UK: Orion.
- Lisanslı Futbolcu Sayısı 466 Bine Ulaştı., (2010), Retrieved from: <http://www.tff.org/default.aspx?pageID=204&ftxtID=10581>
- Martin, S., (2004). Football and Fascism: The National Game Under Mussolini. New York: Berg Publishers.
- McLaren, R.H. (2008) Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play, *Marquette Sports Law Review*, vol 19 no 1 pp. 15-38 Available at: <http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol19/iss1/3>.
- Mehmet ali Aydınlar'dan açıklama., (2012, January.31). Retrieved from: <http://www.tff.org/default.aspx?pageID=285&ftxtID=14402>.
- Mehmet Baransu Şike RaporunuYayınladı., (2012, May.09). Retrieved from:<http://www.habera.com/haber/Mehmet-Baransu-sike-raporunu-yayinladi/147050>.
- Nti K.O., (2004), Maximum Efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations, *European Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 20, pp. 1059–1066.
- PFDK Şike Kararını Açıkladı., (2012, May. 07). Retrieved from:<http://www.ntvspor.net/haber/spor-toto-super-lig/64322/pfdk-sike-kararini-acikladi-video>.
- Preston I., Szymanski S. (2003), Cheating in Contests, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, vol. 19, no.4, pp. 612–624.
- Rosbrook-Thompson, J. & Armstrong, G. (2010). Fields and Visions: The 'African Personality' and Ghanaian Soccer *Du Bois Review*, 7:2 (2010) 293–314.

- Shepotylo, O, Three-Point-For-Win in Soccer: Are There Incentives for Match Fixing? (November 8, 2005). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=755264> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.755264>.
- Siddet Yasasında Beklenen Gelisme., (2011, November.22).Retrieved from: <http://spor.milliyet.com.tr/-siddet-yasasi-nda-beklenen-gelisme-/spor/spordetay/22.11.2011/1466121/default.htm>.
- Şike Yasasına Gulden Veto., (2011, December.02). Retrieved from: <http://spor.milliyet.com.tr/sike-yasasına-gul-den-veto/spor/spordetay/02.12.2011/1470384/default.htm>.
- Süper Lig 9 Eylül'de, Bank Asya ise 10 Eylül'de Başlayacak., (2011, July.07). Retrieved from:<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=18336432&tarih=2011-07-25>.
- Taraftarlara Biber Gazlı Müdahale. (2011, July.11). Retrieved from: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/spor/futbol/18218613.asp?gid=381>.
- TFF Olağanüstü Genel Kurulu 26 Ocak'ta Yapılacak., (2011, December.28). Retrieved from: <http://www.tff.org/default.aspx?pageID=285&ftxtID=14191>.
- TFF'ninYeni BaşkanıYıldırım Demirören. (2012, February.27). Retrieved from: <http://www.tff.org/default.aspx?pageID=285&ftxtID=14590>.
- UEFA (2010), The European Club footballing Landscape, *Club Licensing benchmarking report financial year 2010*. Retrievedfrom:http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/01/74/41/25/1744125_DOWNLOAD.pdf.
- UEFA El Koydu., (2011, August.22). Retrieved from: <http://spor.milliyet.com.tr/uefa-el-koydu/spor/spordetay/22.08.2011/1429717/default.htm>.
- UEFA'dan Yeni Açıklama: Şikeye Sıfır Tolerans., (2011, July.07). Retrieved from: <http://www.dw.de/uefadan-yeni-a-%C3%A7%C4%B1klama-%C5%9Fikeye-s-%C4%B1f%C4%B1r-tolerans/a-15218978-1>.