Contributions To Phenomenology 72

Jeffrey Bloechl
Nicolas de Warren *Editors*

Phenomenology in a New Key: Between Analysis and History

Essays in Honor of Richard Cobb-Stevens

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Editors' Introduction

The close relationship between friendship and elevated conversation is known to us from the ninth book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. With a good friend, one is comfortably oneself, enjoys kinship in love of what is best, and feels called to an improvement of all the virtues.[1] Those who know Richard Cobb-Stevens are likely to think first of his manner of befriending others much in this spirit. Of course, he is a natural story-teller who digs deeply into a delightful wealth of experiences. But the stories never stray far or long from a point in need of a flourish, and so the conversation advances, even if the work of a philosophy department, this or that committee meeting, or even a town assembly require that good friends suspend it until a later date. We sometimes have the impression that this is also Richard's relation to the many great figures of the tradition who are his friends and conversation partners, fellows in the love of what is best. Among them are to be found Aristotle, as we have already noted, as well as Machiavelli, Descartes and Hobbes, but it has been the most recent century that has held his attention most consistently: there is an early and steady interest in William James, a respectful dialogue with some of the Analytic philosophers, and above all, as the present volume testifies, long and important work on Husserl and some of his interpreters. Indeed, we note that this work on Husserl has included not only a profound dialogue with a single great master, but also the promotion of another sort of dialogue between the master's work and the Anglophone work that it sometimes meets in a striking and fruitful manner.

Richard Cobb-Stevens joined the philosophy department at Boston College in 1971. He arrived as a member of the Society of Jesus, and with the rich and varied education for which the Jesuits are well known. After study of Greek, Latin and German he had spent 3 years teaching at the College of the Holy Cross, and

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1169b 5–1170b 20. Richard knows the passage well. His commentary can be found in the second chapter of G. Mansini and J. Hart (eds.), *Ethics and Theological Disclosures: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski* (see the bibliography at the end of this volume).

undertaken summer courses in philosophy first at Georgetown University—where he encountered Husserl for the first time, in lectures by Louis Dupre—and later at Columbia University. From 1962 through 1967, he studied theology in Belgium at the almost legendary College St. Albert, otherwise known simply as "Egenhoven," after the village where it was situated. At Egenhoven, Richard's thesis concentrated on Paul Ricoeur's *Symbolism of Evil*, though he would not meet Ricoeur himself until late 1967. It was Ricoeur who directed Richard's doctoral dissertation on Husserl and James, which he defended at the Sorbonne in 1971, before a jury that also included Suzanne Bachelard, Mikkel Dufrenne, and Emmanuel Levinas.

Richard's career at Boston College spans nearly four decades. His impact on the department of philosophy has been powerful and enduring. In 1975, he was promoted to associate professor after only 4 years on the faculty; in 1988 he became full professor. He was chair of the philosophy department for 9 years of active development and expansion. For 31 years, he also led the department's seminar in college teaching, in the process forming and inspiring many dozens of people on their way to careers in which they in turn taught hundreds of their own students. Richard's own teaching was pursued at every level available to him, and includes supervision of a remarkable 29 doctoral dissertations by students from around the world.

The same warmth, great steadiness and enthusiasm that marked his teaching were also evident in his commitment to a wide range of tasks that many might consider above and beyond the duties of the university educator – though Richard himself never seemed to share that view. His deep commitment to reflection and writing thus never stood in the way of the long hours required for committee work, and for him a personal interest in the more specialized philosophy of the twentieth century was of a single piece with gladly teaching in the university's core curriculum for many years. And in fact, the matter of undergraduate education is a hallmark concern of his career. In 1992, Richard was appointed the first Director of the University Core Curriculum at Boston College, and when he retired 18 years later he was at the time the only person to have held that post. His approach to this kind of work, and to work on many other committees, focus groups and teams, had led many of us to think of him as the very model of true citizenship at the university.

By Richard's own estimation, he has been strongly influenced especially by three people in particular. We have noted that he met Paul Ricoeur as he neared the end of his theological studies in Egenhoven. Ricoeur was at once an early mentor and later a respected friend with a wide range of common interests. The circumstances of Richard's decision to undertake doctoral studies under Ricoeur are well known to his friends and colleagues. Finding Richard somewhat undecided about where to seek the Ph.D., Ricoeur invited him to consider the Sorbonne. After Richard expressed an interest in bringing the thought of Husserl into contact with that of William James, Ricoeur offered him something of a received promissory note of admission, jotted on a napkin pressed into service poste haste. This was the beginning of what became Richard's book on James and Husserl, and more generally his lifelong attempt to build bridges between phenomenology and Anglo-American philosophy. Ricoeur, of course, contributed to this same work,

and over the years mentor and student became friends and colleagues. For over three decades, Ricoeur was a frequent visitor to Boston College, generally at the invitation of Richard, often joined by David Rasmussen and Richard Kearney.

Richard left the Society of Jesus, very amicably, in the early 1970s. In 1979, he married Veda Cobb, whereupon both of them took on the last name Cobb-Stevens. Veda was an accomplished philosopher in her own right, becoming tenured professor at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell, not far from their home in Carlisle. Their time together was short, as Veda succumbed to cancer barely a decade later, but Richard has always spoken of her as important influence on his mind no less than on his heart and soul. Among other things, Veda shared Richard's interest in the philosophy of language, and her intellectual culture was as rich and varied as his own.

In 1989, Jacques Taminiaux became full professor and member of the Boston College department of philosophy (he had visited annually since the late 1960s). By special arrangement, he thenceforth undertook his teaching on blocks of several weeks each year. During those visits, he lived with Richard in Carlisle. In Taminiaux, Richard thus had a houseguest with not only a similar philosophical background and orientation, but also native experience with the European culture that has remained a part of him even after returning home from his long years of study in Belgium and France. Like Richard, Taminaiux is a phenomenologist with a deep understanding of the history of philosophy, a love of art and literature, and a keen sense of the political dimension of intellectual life.

Taminiaux retired from Boston College a few years before Richard, but this hardly left Richard without close friends among his colleagues. But this returns us to the matter with which we began. And perhaps that is a fitting way to underline Richard's legacy at Boston College. The life of the mind and the pursuit of truth and goodness require companionship, a willingness to pause long over profound questions, and a capacity to avoid distraction from the things themselves as they call for proper understanding. It is our pleasure, then, to have assembled essays very much on this spirit, and to have been able to offer them to Richard Cobb-Stevens as a collective expression of the gratitude his friends in the Husserl world feel for him and his work.

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Chapter 1
Vindicating Husserl's Primal I

Dan Zahavi

On Husserl's account, is self prior to the other, is the other prior to self, or are self and other equiprimordial? At first glance, this question might appear somewhat silly. After all, how could anyone doubt what Husserl's answer would be. Even if the standard criticism regarding Husserl's solipsism has long been rebutted, Husserl's declaration in § 41 of *Cartesianische Meditationen,* where he equates phenomenology with the systematic self-explication of the ego (1991a, p. 118), should make the issue foregone. As we will soon see, however, the fact of the matter is somewhat more complex.

Self and Other in Merleau-Ponty

My point of departure will not be Husserl, however, but Merleau-Ponty. I wish to start out by considering the account defended by Merleau-Ponty in *Les relations avec autrui chez l'enfant*. This text is based on a lecture course on child psychology given by Merleau-Ponty at the *Sorbonne*, but contrary to what the title might indicate, Merleau-Ponty isn't primarily interested in various empirical findings pertaining to early forms of social interaction. Rather, he is raising and attempting to answer substantial philosophical questions concerning the relation between self and other. Indeed, his point of departure is precisely the alleged incapacity of classical psychology to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of how we relate to others; an incapacity that according to Merleau-Ponty is due to the fact that classical psychology bases its entire approach on certain unquestioned and unwarranted philosophical prejudices. First and foremost among these is the

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fundamental assumption that experiential life is directly accessible to one person only, namely the individual who owns it (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, p. 114), and that the only access one has to the psyche of another is indirect and mediated by his or her bodily appearance. I can *see* your facial expressions, gestures and actions, and on the basis of that I can *guess* what you think, feel or intend (1964a, pp. 113–114). Classical psychology has routinely explained the move from the visible exteriority to the invisible interiority by way of an argument from analogy, but Merleau-Ponty quickly points to a number of difficulties inherent in this strategy. The objections he raises are very similar to the ones raised by Scheler years earlier in *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie,* but interesting as they are, I don't have time on this occasion to rehearse and assess these arguments (cf. Zahavi 2005, pp. 147–178). Suffice it to say, that Merleau-Ponty concludes his criticism by rejecting the idea that my experiential life is a sequence of internal states that are inaccessible to anyone but me. Rather, on his view, our experiential life is above all a relation to the world, and it is in this comportment toward the world that I will also be able to discover the consciousness of the other. As he writes, "The perspective on the other is opened to me from the moment I define him and myself as conducts at work in the world" (1964a, p. 117). Being a world-directed consciousness myself, I can encounter others who act, and their actions are meaningful to me, because they are also my possible actions. Merleau-Ponty consequently argues that we need to redefine our notion of psyche, as well as revise our understanding of the body. If it is my bodily experience, which can appropriate and understand the conduct of others, the former must be defined, not as a sum of sensations, but as a postural or corporeal schema (1964a, p. 117). Here is what Merleau-Ponty writes:

> since at the same time the other who is to be perceived is himself not a 'psyche' closed in on himself, but rather a conduct, a system of behavior that aims at the world, he offers himself to my motor intentions and to that 'intentional transgression' (Husserl) by which I animate and pervade him. Husserl said that the perception of others is like a 'phenomenon of coupling'. The term is anything but a metaphor. In perceiving the other, my body and his are coupled, resulting in a sort of action which pairs them. This conduct which I am able only to see, I live somehow from a distance. I make it mine; I recover it or comprehend it. Reciprocally I know that the gestures I make myself can be the objects of another's intention. It is this transfer of my intentions to the other's body and of his intentions to my own, my alienation of the other and his alienation of me, that makes possible the perception of others (1964a, p. 118).

There is much that one could dwell on in this passage. It illustrates Merleau-Ponty's substantial agreement with at least part of Husserl's account and one crucial challenge would be to explain why the transference in question is not a form of projection (and by implication why the accounts we find in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty do not fit the mold of simulation theory) (Cf. Zahavi 2010). However, I want to focus on a different issue, namely something Merleau-Ponty writes in direct continuation of the quote just given. He observes that this account will remain unavailable if one presupposes that the ego and the other are in possession of an absolute consciousness of themselves, as if each were absolutely original vis-à-vis the other (1964a, p. 119). This is, of course, an idea that we also

encounter elsewhere in Merleau-Ponty writings, for instance in the famous passage in *Phénoménologie de la perception* where he declares that the "other can be evident to me because I am not transparent for myself, and because my subjectivity draws its body in its wake" (2002, p. 410). However, in the present text, Merleau-Ponty is more interested in the second part of the claim. As he goes on to write, the perception of others becomes comprehensible if one assumes that there is an initial state of undifferentiation, and that the beginning of psychogenesis is precisely a state where the child is unaware of itself and the other as different beings. At this initial stage, we cannot say that there is any genuine communication—communication presupposes a distinction between the one who communicates and the one with whom he communicates. But referring to Scheler, Merleau-Ponty goes on to say that there is a state of pre-communication, where the other's intentions somehow play across my body, while my intentions play across his (1964a, p. 119). In this first phase, there is, on Merleau-Ponty's view, consequently not one individual over against another, but rather an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life (1964a, p. 119). As he would later formulate it in *Signes*,

> The solitude from which we emerge to intersubjective life is not that of the monad. It is only the haze of an anonymous life that separates us from being; and the barrier between us and others is impalpable. If there is a break, it is not between me and the other person; it is between a primordial generality we are intermingled in and the precise system, myself-the others. What 'precedes' intersubjective life cannot be numerically distinguished from it, precisely because at this level there is neither individuation nor numerical distinction (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, p. 174).

In *Les relations avec autrui chez l'enfant* Merleau-Ponty describes how the initial anonymous life gradually becomes differentiated. He describes how the child becomes aware of his own body as distinct from the bodies of others and in particular he highlights the importance of the child's confrontation with his own specular image. Through this mirror-mediated self-objectification the child becomes aware of his own insularity and separation and correlatively aware of that of others (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, p. 119). Merleau-Ponty argues that this view can be defended not only on phenomenological grounds, but that similar insights have been reached by gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis. Merleau-Ponty refers, for instance, to the work of Wallon, who argued that there is an initial confusion between me and the other, and that the differentiation of the two is crucially dependent upon the subsequent objectification of the body (1964a, p. 120).

When saying that the me is initially entirely unaware both of itself and of others, and that consciousness of oneself and of others as unique individuals only comes later, there is an ambiguity in the claim that makes it difficult to assess. Is Merleau-Ponty simply claiming that the child only becomes explicitly aware of the difference between itself and others at a relatively late stage (a late realization that is perfectly compatible with there being a self-other differentiation from the start), or is he defending the more radical claim that the very distinction between self and other is derived and rooted in a common anonymity?

There are passages in both the Sorbonne lectures and in *Signes* that support the latter more radical view.

Husserl on Self and Other

If we now turn to Husserl, and more specifically to *Krisis*, we find Husserl arguing that it holds a priori that "self-consciousness and consciousness of others are inseparable" (1976, p. 256) or as he puts it a bit later in the same text: "Experiencing—in general, living as an ego (thinking, valuing, acting)—I am necessarily an 'I' that has its 'thou,' its 'we,' its 'you'—the 'I' of the personal pronouns" (1976, p. 270). More generally speaking, Husserl ascribes a *relative mode of being* to the personal I (1991b, p. 319). As he puts it on several occasions, if there were no thou, there would also be no I in contrast to it (1973a, p. 6), that is, the I is only constituted in contrast to the thou (Husserl 1973a, p. 247, cf. 1973c, p. 603). Indeed as Husserl wrote in a famous quote, that Merleau-Ponty was later to discuss in detail: "subjectivity is what it is—an ego functioning constitutively—only within intersubjectivity" (Husserl 1976, p. 175).

Husserl consequently holds that the personal I has its origin in social life. Persons have abilities, dispositions, habits, interests, character traits and convictions, but persons do not exist in a social vacuum. To exist as a person is to exist socialized into a communal horizon, where one's bearing to oneself is appropriated from the others. As Husserl writes in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II*,

> *The origin of personality* lies in empathy and in the *social acts* which are rooted in the latter. To acquire a personality it is not enough that the subject becomes aware of itself as the center of its acts: personality is rather constituted only when the subject establishes social relations with others (1973b, p. 175).

My being as a person is consequently not my own achievement; rather for Husserl it is a result of my "communicative intertwinement" with others (1973c, p. 603, cf. 1973c, p. 50). In some of his texts, Husserl calls attention to a special and highly significant form of self-consciousness that comes about by adopting the perspective of the other on oneself. It is only when I apprehend the other as apprehending me and take myself as other to the other that I apprehend myself in the same way that I apprehend them and become aware of the same entity that they are aware of, namely, myself as a person (Husserl 1976, p. 256, 1973b, p. 78). It is no wonder that Husserl often asserts that this type of self-apprehension, where I am reflected through others, is characterized by a complex and indirect intentional structure. But as he also makes clear, it is only then that I am, for the first time and in the proper sense, an I over against an other and thereby in a position to say "we" (1991b, p. 242 & 250).

At first glance, it seems as if there is quite some agreement between Husserl's position and Merleau-Ponty's. It wouldn't be far-fetched to say that on Husserl's account as well, the I and the thou constitute a common system. As Husserl puts it in *Ideen II*:

> According to our presentation, the concepts I and we are relative: the I requires the thou, the we, and the 'other.' And furthermore, the Ego (the Ego as person) requires a relation to a world which engages it. Therefore, I, we and world belong together (1991b, p. 288).

Indeed, rather than saying that the I is prior, or that the I and the thou are simply equiprimordial, on some occasions, Husserl even seems to assign priority to the other. For instance in the following well known quote from *Husserliana 14*, where he says, "The other is the first human being, not I" (1973b, p. 418).

The Primal I

As should be well known, there is a slight catch with the presentation in the preceding section. Husserl operates with several complementary notions of I, and what I have been discussing so far, is not the most fundamental notion. When Husserl writes that the I is transformed into a personal I through the I-thou relation (1973b, p. 171), and when he writes that what distinguish human beings from animals is that although the latter have an I-structure, only human beings have a personal I (1973c, p. 177), he is clearly indicating that the personal I is a founded I. But what then constitutes the deepest and most fundamental dimension of I according to Husserl, and what is the relation between this I and others? The reply (to the first part of the question) is that Husserl's name for the most fundamental dimension of I is *Ur-Ich* or *primal ego*. Let us take a look at a few quotes that address this dimension of I:

> . . .it was wrong, methodically, to jump immediately into transcendental intersubjectivity and to leap over the primal 'I,' the ego of my epoché, which can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability (Husserl 1976, p. 188).
>
> I am not *an* ego, who still has his *you*, his *we*, his total community of cosubjects in natural validity (1976, p. 188).
>
> The 'I' that I attain in the epoché [. . .] is actually called 'I' only by equivocation (1976, p. 188).
>
> The absolute I—which in utterly unbroken constancy is prior to every existent and bears every existent within itself, which in its own 'concretion' is prior to all concretions—this absolute bearing each and every conceivable existent within itself is the first '*ego*' of the reduction—an *ego* that is wrongly so called, since for it an *alter ego* makes no sense (1973c, p. 586).

Two issues are highlighted in these quotes. One is that the I in question differs from our ordinary notion of I. The other is that this I isn't dependent upon or relative to others in the same way as the personal I. Whereas Husserl in regard to the latter writes that if there were no thou, there would be no I either, since the I is only an I in contrast to a thou (1973a, p. 6 & 247), in regard to the former he writes that the absolute I of the reduction is unique in a way that rules out multiplication as meaningless, for which reason it cannot be *an* ego (among many) (1973c, pp. 589–90).

The urgent question we are now faced with concerns what precisely this primal I amounts to. Can the notion be defended, and is Husserl right in insisting upon its uniqueness and indeclinability? Another question to ask is whether this reliance on and reference to a primal I doesn't jeopardize Husserl's phenomenological analysis

of intersubjectivity. Obviously, the answer to the second question will depend on the answer to the first.

To throw some light on these issues, let me revisit a line of argumentation that I originally presented 15 years ago in my doctoral dissertation.[1] This revisit is not only warranted by the fact that my discussion back then was precisely addressing the questions now facing us, it is also motivated by the fact that my contribution has in recent years been subjected to some criticism from younger Husserl scholars.

In my dissertation I suggested that the manuscript B I 14 contains some of the answers we are looking for. In this manuscript, Husserl writes that 'I' does not admit of any plural as long as the word is used in its original sense. Others do experience themselves as I, but I can only experience myself, and not them, as I (Ms. B I 14 127a). Thus, I do not have a second exemplar alongside myself of which I could say, "das bin ich." Accordingly, I cannot speak of *an* I when "I" means precisely *I*. This "I" is absolutely unique and individual (Ms. B I 14 138a). In my dissertation, I went on to argue that when Husserl speaks of the radical singularity of the primal I, and denies that it can be pluralized, he is not at all talking of the substantial or metaphysical uniqueness and indeclinability of the primal I, but rather pointing to its indexical nature. And indeed, in a central passage in the B I 14 manuscript Husserl makes it clear that his focus on the uniqueness of the primal I in no way rules out a multiplicity of similarly unique primal I's. He writes: "The unique I—the transcendental. In its uniqueness it posits 'other' unique transcendental I's—as 'others' who themselves posit others in uniqueness once again" (Ms. B I 14 138b). Finally, I went on to stress that the reference to indexicality wasn't meant to reduce the issue at hand to a contingent linguistic fact, but that it concerned the very problem of individuation.

In his 2006 book, *Das Problem des 'Ur-Ich' bei Edmund Husserl: Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen, Nähe'des Selbst*, Taguchi takes issue with some of these claims. He points out that it remains unsatisfactory to speak of the uniqueness of the I and of a subjectivity that always remains *je-meinig* as long as the very declinability of the I is in question. I don't have time to rehearse Taguchi's very careful and meticulous argumentation, but let me just state that I basically agree with his appraisal. I also agree that the reference to indexicality was misleading. Something that James Hart actually pointed out quite a while ago. As the argument goes, indexicals are defined in relation to each other, and a reference to the indexicality of 'I' is consequently not really appropriate when it comes to explaining what Husserl was getting at when talking of the primal I.

On closer consideration, however, I don't really think there is any substantial difference between Taguchi's view and the one I defended years ago. If one looks in my 1999 book *Self-awareness and alterity* where I again briefly returned to manuscript B I 14, I already then avoided the reference to indexicality and instead formulated Husserl's point in terms of the unique self-givenness of consciousness.

[1] It was while working on this dissertation that in the fall of 1993 I had the pleasure of spending a semester studying under Richard Cobb-Stevens.

As I wrote in attempting to explain Husserl's point, "I can only be self-aware of myself and can never be self-aware of anybody else." Thus, as I understand Husserl, and as I sought to explain it back then, Husserl's emphasis on the primal I is precisely an attempt to point to the intrinsic and "absolute individuation" of consciousness (Husserl 1991b, p. 97); an individuation that the subject does precisely *not* first acquire through a confrontation and interaction with others. As Husserl writes in *Ideen II*, "The pure Ego of any given cogitatio already has absolute individuation, and the cogitatio itself is something absolutely individual in itself. [. . .] The lived experiences in the flux of consciousness have an essence that is absolutely their own; they bear their individuation in themselves" (1991b, p. 299–300, cf. Husserl 2006, p. 386).

According to Husserl, it is quite legitimate to conduct a formal analysis of the relation between selfhood, experiential self-givenness, and the structures of the stream of consciousness without introducing others into the analysis. In fact, as Husserl writes, when it comes to the peculiar mineness (*Meinheit*) characterizing experiential life, this aspect can be understood without any contrasting others (1973c, p. 351).

The advantage of this reading is that it allows us to connect Husserl's late and rather infrequent talk of primal I with his persisting preoccupation with the issue of self-consciousness. Throughout his writings, Husserl argued that self-consciousness, rather than being something that only occurs during exceptional circumstances, namely whenever we pay attention to our conscious life, is a feature characterizing the experiential dimension as such, no matter what worldly entities we might otherwise be intentionally directed at (1965, p. 189 & 412, 1973b, p. 316). Husserl emphasized the ubiquitous presence of self-consciousness in experiential life, and on repeated occasions equated (1) the first-personal mode of givenness, (2) a primitive form of self-consciousness, and (3) a certain basic sense of selfhood. As he wrote in a research manuscript dating from 1922, "The consciousness in which I am conscious of my own is my consciousness, and my consciousness of myself and I myself are concretely considered identical. To be a subject is to be in the mode of being aware of oneself" (1973b, p. 151).

In addition, interpreting the notion of primal I in this way also allows one to establish a link between this notion and Husserl's earlier notion of *Urbewusstsein* or *primal consciousness* (a connection that, as far as I can see, isn't made by Taguchi). The notion of primal consciousness, which Husserl already used in his early lecture course *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie* from 1906 to 1907 doesn't denote a particular intentional experience. Rather, the term designates the pervasive dimension of pre-reflective and non-objectifying self-consciousness that is part and parcel of any occurring experience (Husserl 1985, pp. 245–247). Indeed, but again this would lead too far to rehearse in detail here, I would take Husserl's notion of primal consciousness to point to the same dimension that Husserl sought to analyze in his account of inner consciousness and inner time-consciousness. It surely is no

coincidence that the term primal consciousness occurs at central places in Husserl's lectures on the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness (Husserl 1969, p. 89 & 118–120).[2]

Would Taguchi disagree with this general approach? Given that he himself distances himself from any metaphysical interpretation of the primal I and instead writes that the notion is supposed to designate "the I in its immediate present life-evidence from which I can never distance myself" (Taguchi 2006, p. 115), I see a basic agreement. I would also agree with Taguchi's point that we need to make a clear distinction between Husserl's notion of primal I and his notion of *Vor-Ich* or *pre-ego*. Whereas the latter notion refers to something we can reconstruct, namely the earliest stage in the development of what ultimately becomes a person, the primal I refers to that which I always already am and continues to be independently of any reconstruction.

Given what has been said so far, it should be clear, I hope, why Husserl's emphasis on the primal I doesn't jeopardize his analysis of intersubjectivity. Quite on the contrary, in fact, since we shouldn't forget that Husserl's approach to intersubjectivity is phenomenological. Intersubjectivity is for Husserl not something objectively existing that can be scrutinized from a detached view from nowhere. Intersubjectivity is first and foremost a relation between subjects, or more correctly put, it is first and foremost a relation between me and the other or others. Without a careful and judicious account of the first-person perspective involved, the whole enterprise will fail. As I already argued in my dissertation, this is why Husserl occasionally alludes to the ambiguity of the reduction to transcendental subjectivity (Husserl 1973c, p. 73). The complete reduction leads us both to transcendental subjectivity and to transcendental intersubjectivity. Neither can be thought in isolation: transcendental intersubjectivity is precisely the nexus of transcendental subjects, and when considered as world-constituting transcendental subjectivity is determined a priori by its relation to others (Husserl 1991a, p. 166).

When I in a recent paper entitled "Is the self a social construct?" defend a multi-dimensional account of self, and argue that whereas there are certain aspects of selfhood that are socially constructed, the very for-me-ness of experience isn't constitutively dependent upon others, I not only take myself to be defending a broadly Husserlian outlook. I also think my recent persistent defence of a minimal notion of self, which is directly tied to the subjectivity of our experiential life, can be related to Husserl's notion of primal I. Correctly understood this notion doesn't amount to an obsolete metaphysical doctrine, but is an attempt to do justice to the first-personal character of consciousness. This is what I tried to say already back in my dissertation, though the reference to indexicality might have been inappropriate.

[2] This observation doesn't address the intricate question concerning the role of the I in the process of temporalization. For some reflections on this topic, cf. Zahavi 2011.

And for that very reason, I find it somewhat puzzling to see that Micali in his 2008 book *Überschüsse der Erfahrung* claims that I belong to a group of scholars who in attempting to counteract the traditional reading of Husserl as a solipsist has overemphasized the intersubjective aspects of his phenomenology to such an extent that it represents a distortion of his thinking (2008, p. 101). Thus, on Micali's reading, I am supposed to have denied the primacy of the ego (2008, p. 121), and to have claimed that Husserl in the last phase of his thinking came to consider intersubjectivity as the ultimate foundation of validity (2008, p. 115).

I find it hard to understand how anybody who has read my two books *Husserl und die transzendentale intersubjektivität* and *Self-awareness and Alterity* (and Micali refers to both books) can come to such a conclusion. After all, one of the principal aims of the latter book was to highlight the phenomenological importance of self-manifestation, but already in my dissertation I explicitly argued that Husserl considers the most fundamental constitutive performance of them all, namely the very process of temporalization, to be one that the subject accomplishes on its own independently of others (Zahavi 1996, p. 68). As I also wrote:

> Hence Husserl is in no way defending the thesis that socialization is the source of every type of self-consciousness, subjective identity, and individuation. Quite to the contrary, he would even claim that every concrete relation between subjects presupposes a prior plurality of different (i.e., individual) streams of consciousness (1996, pp. 155–56).
>
> Thus one must not succumb to the abstraction according to which one could speak exclusively of the totality of monads and of generative intersubjectivity, without simultaneously taking into consideration the transcendental primal I as the place where they are unfolded and displayed (1996, p. 81).

In my dissertation I emphasized that the preservation of such an autonomous sphere of subjectivity must be considered a presupposition for any coherent theory of intersubjectivity (1996, p. 68). A line of argumentation I then went on to employ against Habermas and Apel.

Let me return to Husserl himself, however. One important methodological issue that is highlighted in his discussion of the primal I concerns the potentially misleading character of ordinary language when it comes to describing this dimension. As Husserl wrote in the central passage from *Krisis* that I only quoted in part earlier:

> The 'I' that I attain in the epoché [. . .] is actually called 'I' only by equivocation—though it is an essential equivocation since, when I name it in reflection, I can say nothing other than: it is I who practice the epoché (1976, p. 188).

What Husserl is stressing here is that the notion of primal I obviously departs from the ordinary everyday concept of 'I', and that the labeling of the primal I as 'I' can lead to misunderstandings if the usual connotations are retained. At the same time, Husserl also emphasizes that the continuing use of the term 'I' is necessary and unavoidable. Not only do we lack a better term, but Husserl obviously also wishes to retain the experiential meaning of the term. He is pointing to something that all of

us are thoroughly familiar with—namely the fundamental first-personal character of consciousness—although we in ordinary life fail to understand its proper significance. As Husserl remarks apropos the task of phenomenology and this is echoed in similar remarks found in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: "From the beginning the phenomenologist lives in the paradox of having to look upon the obvious as questionable, as enigmatic" (1976, p. 184).

Husserl's reflections regarding the equivocation of the term 'I' when used to designate the basic level of self-experience can a fortiori be transferred to notions such as first-person perspective and mineness (notions I have frequently used in my own books). Not surprisingly, some have objected to the use of the term 'mineness,' since they have claimed that the primary meaning of 'mine' developmentally speaking is 'not yours'. And similarly, it has been argued that it makes little sense to speak of a first-person perspective, unless in contrast to a second- and third-person perspective. Thus, on this line of reasoning, both terms are contrastive terms, terms whose meaning is relative to and dependent upon others. But just like Husserl, I have been using the terms in order to refer to the basic self-presentational character of experience. I can see why the terms might generate confusion, but I don't see any real alternatives.

Before moving on, let me emphasize once again that the use of the notion of primal I rather than denoting a specific entity is an attempt to pinpoint a certain dimension of experience. Furthermore, it must also be stressed that Husserl's emphasis on the autonomy of the primal I, his insistence that it is not co-constituted by others, does not entail that the primal I is somehow worldless and self-sufficient.[3]

Empathy and *Fremderfahrung*

As I have suggested above, I see no conflict between Husserl's highlighting of the uniqueness of the primal I and his accentuation of both the transcendence of the other and more generally of the constitutive importance of intersubjectivity. However, this still leaves the question concerning the role of the primal I in our experience of others unanswered. I am not going to attempt to solve that problem

[3] As a central quote has it: "The constitution of entities on various levels, of worlds, of times, has two primal presuppositions, two primal sources that—temporally speaking (in each of these temporalities)—continually 'lie at the basis of' such constitution: (1) my primordial I as an operatively functioning primal I in its affections and actions, with all its essential structures in the modes pertaining to them; (2) my primordial non-I as a primordial stream of temporalization, and even as the primal form of temporalization, constituting a temporal field—that of primal concrete materiality *[Ur-Sachlichkeit]. But both primal foundations are inseparably one, and thus are abstract if regarded on their own"* (Husserl 2006, p. 199, emphasis added). See also Zahavi 2009.

here, but I just want to point to a certain ambiguity in Husserl's considerations. Needless to say, we have to distinguish a view that takes the primal I to be a necessary condition of possibility for the experience of others from a view that considers the primal I to be a sufficient condition of possibility. The intelligibility of the latter view is questionable. In addition, we also have to distinguish between the view that self-experience is a precondition for other-experience, i.e., the claim that there would be no other-experience without self-experience, and the view that self-experience somehow serves as a model for other-experience, i.e., the claim that interpersonal understanding is basically a question of projecting oneself into the other. My worry about the latter suggestion, which Husserl's occasional reference to a transfer of sense from self to other might seem to support, is that it brings Husserl dangerously close to some version of simulationism, and therefore to a view which de facto denies the possibility of other-experience (cf. Zahavi 2008, 2009). Again, this is not an issue that I can treat adequately in this context, but I just want to call attention to a few places where Husserl clearly expresses his endorsement of the view that we *are* able to experience others.

Already in *Logische Untersuchungen* Husserl wrote that common speech credits us with percepts of other people's inner experiences, we so to speak *see* their anger or pain. As he then went on to say, such talk is to some extent correct. When a hearer perceives a speaker give expression to certain inner experiences, he also perceives these experiences themselves, but as Husserl then adds, the hearer doesn't have an inner but only an outer perception of them (1984, p. 40). So on the one hand, Husserl argues that my experience of others has a quasi-perceptual character in the sense that it grasp the other him- or herself (1973a, p. 24). On the other hand, Husserl also says that although the body of the other is intuitively given to me *in propria persona*, this is not the case with the other's experiences. They can never be given to me in the same original fashion as my own experiences; they are not accessible to me through inner consciousness. Rather they are appresented through a special form of apperception, or to use a different terminology, they are co-intended and characterized by a certain co-presence (Husserl 1973a, p. 27). This does not preclude them from being experientially given, however. As Husserl wrote in *Ideen II:*

> . . .each has lived experiences which are exclusively his own. Only he experiences these in their very self-presence, utterly originarily. In a certain way, I also experience (and there is a self-givenness here) the other's lived experiences; i.e., to the extent that the empathy (*comprehensio*) accomplished as one with the originary experience of the body is indeed a kind of presentification, one that nevertheless serves to ground the character of *co*-existence in the flesh. To that extent, what we have here is thus experience, perception. But this co-existence [. . .] does not, in principle, allow itself to be transformed into immediate originary existence (primal presence) (1991b, p. 198).

> Empathy is not a mediate experience in the sense that the other would be experienced as a psychophysical annex to his corporeal body but is instead an immediate experience of others (1991b, p. 375).

> We 'see' the other and not merely the body of the other; he is there for us not merely as a body, but, instead, his spirit is self-presentified too. He is there 'in person' (1991b, p. 375).

Conclusion

I started out by discussing Merleau-Ponty's position on the self-other relation as it is articulated in one of his Sorbonne lectures. As I pointed out, there is a certain ambiguity in his view. When saying that the me is initially entirely unaware both of itself and of others, and that consciousness of oneself and of others as unique individuals only comes later, is Merleau-Ponty simply claiming that the child only becomes explicitly aware of the difference between himself and others at a relatively late stage, or is he defending the more radical claim that the very distinction between self and other is derived and rooted in a common anonymity? There are certainly passages that can be interpreted in support of the latter view. If this is indeed Merleau-Ponty's position, we are dealing with a noticeable and marked departure from Husserl's view.

However, let me in conclusion briefly consider another central text by Merleau-Ponty, namely the chapter "Other selves and the human world" in *Phénoménologie de la perception*. As Merleau-Ponty writes, the perception of other people is problematic only for adults. The child has no awareness of himself or of others as private subjectivities. As he continues, this infantile experience must remain as an indispensable acquisition even in later life, if something like an intersubjective world is to be possible. Prior to any struggle for recognition, prior to any understanding of the alien presence of the other, there must be a common ground. We must all remain—at some level—mindful of our peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 414). But as Merleau-Ponty then asks, will this model really work. Isn't it basically an attempt to solve the problem of intersubjectivity by doing away with the individuality of perspectives, by doing away with both ego and alter-ego? If the perceiving subject is anonymous, so is the perceived other, and to try to reintroduce a plurality of subjects into this anonymous collectivity is hopeless. Even if I perceive the grief or the anger of the other in his conduct, in his face or hands, even if I understand the other without recourse to any 'inner' experience of suffering or anger, the grief and the anger of the other will never quite have the same significance for me as they have for him. For me these situations are displayed, for him they are lived through (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 415). Merleau-Ponty consequently goes on to talk of an insurmountable solipsism that is rooted in lived experience (2002, p. 417). Although I am outrun on all sides by my own acts, and submerged in generality, the fact remains that I am the one by whom they are experienced. In the end, Merleau-Ponty even refers to the *indeclinable I* (2002, p. 417). This brings Merleau-Ponty's position far closer to Husserl's. It could of course be objected that the Sorbonne lectures are later, and that they might represent Merleau-Ponty's more developed view. But interestingly enough, in those very lectures, we also find passages where Merleau-Ponty claims that Scheler, in order to make the experience of others possible, ended up defending a kind of panpsychism that led to a denial of the individuation of consciousness and thereby also to a destruction of the very distinction between I and other (1988, p. 44). This is a result that Merleau-Ponty finds unacceptable. I happen to

think that Merleau-Ponty is misinterpreting Scheler, though I cannot show that here,[4] but the criticism indicates that Merleau-Ponty even in those later lectures favored the less radical view or at least remained undecided or simply unclear about how far he wanted to go.

Some have claimed that the only way to solve the problem of intersubjectivity and avoid a threatening solipsism is by conceiving of the difference between self and other as a founded and derived difference, a difference arising out of an undifferentiated anonymous life. However, as should have become clear by now, I don't think this solution solves the problem of intersubjectivity, it rather dissolves it. To speak of a fundamental anonymity prior to any distinction between self and other obscures that which has to be clarified, namely intersubjectivity understood as the relation between subjectivities. On the level of this fundamental anonymity there is neither individuation nor selfhood, but nor is there any differentiation, alterity, or transcendence, and there is consequently room for neither subjectivity nor intersubjectivity. To put it differently, the fundamental anonymity thesis threatens not only our concept of a self-given subject. It also threatens our concept of the transcendent and irreducible other. I consequently think that it is more than doubtful whether the notion of a fundamental anonymity can help us understand the possibility of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, it seems to present us with one of those cases where the medicine turns out to be part of the sickness it was supposed to cure and in the end just as deadly. On that background, I think Husserl's proposal remains pertinent. So what is my take home message? I think it is time to vindicate Husserl's notion of primal I.

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[4] Although Scheler does at one point write that we can take the existence of emotional identification (*Einsfühlung*)—a limit case of emotional contagion—as an indication of the metaphysical unity of all organic life (Scheler 2008, pp. 73–74), Merleau-Ponty's criticism is nevertheless unjustified, since Scheler is adamant in insisting that the existence of a unity on the level of organic life in no way rules out the *absolute difference* between individual persons (Scheler 2008, p. 65 & 121). Indeed, one of the central findings of Scheler's analysis of empathy was precisely that the latter presupposes the difference between self and other.

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Chapter 2
Intersections Between Four Phenomenological Approaches to the Work of Art

Jacques Taminiaux

Husserl

At the beginning of my essay, let me recall briefly the teaching of Husserl on the work of art. As a matter of fact the problematic of the founder of the phenomenological movement on the topic is narrowly circumscribed. There is no place within his approach for the questions which in the history of German philosophy had worried thinkers like Schiller, Schelling, Hölderlin, Hegel, and later on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, i.e., issues such as: why do human beings produce works of art?; how does their relation to artworks operate among their activities?; did that relation undergo metamorphoses throughout history? etc. Those questions have no place whatsoever in Husserl's investigation which is focused exclusively on the only basic phenomenon taken by him to deserve examination, i.e., *intentionality*.

Intentionality according to Husserl is a fundamental relationship between two poles whose essence can appear to the phenomenologist: an *intentio* and an *intentum*, or a *noesis* and a *noema*. The Husserlian examination of that relationship claims to avoid explanation and genealogy. Its aim is strictly descriptive, but the description at stake is eidetic for it bears upon essences and not upon facts offered to an empirical observation. In its initial purpose it takes as a primordial axis the *Erkenntnislehre*, the theory of knowledge considered not a psychological investigation but as a *transcendental* one because like Kant's criticism it searches for universal and necessary conditions of possibility.

Precisely because it is concerned with essences instead of facts the phenomenological investigation requires a suspending, the famous *epochè*, of the natural attitude as a whole, which means abstaining from the manifold positing of existence

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carried out by common experience on the basis of everyday perception, or by scientific research whatever its objects and methods. Only such generalized suspending allows what Husserl calls *reduction*, i.e. a return to the phenomenon of intentionality and thus an eidetic survey of all the intentional modalities and of their relations.

That twofold discipline of *epochè* and eidetic reduction is a must in order for transcendental phenomenology to become *pure*. It is in the framework of that theoretical project, but so to speak in its margins, that Husserl wrote a few pages on the artwork and our relation to it: a letter sent in 1907 to the poet von Hofmannstahl and a well-known paragraph of *Ideas I*, a book published in 1913. Let me consider those two texts.

At the time he wrote his letter to the poet, Husserl, then professor at the University of Göttingen, was preparing his famous lessons on *The Idea of Phenomenology*, which were an attempt to characterize the specific features of the phenomenological method which had already been used by him though not yet thematized in the *Logical Investigations*.

We find an allusion to those lessons when Husserl writes to von Hofmannstahl: "Intuiting a *pure* aesthetic artwork implies that the intellect abstains from any existential position; it also excludes any stance by feeling and by will since that stance involves such an existential position. Better: the artwork brings us (almost compells us) to a state of pure aesthetic intuition which excludes those existential stances."

As a result of that exclusion of the existential positions belonging to the natural attitude, the production as well as the reception of the works of art are comparable with phenomenology. In both cases there is access to a *pure* seeing which supposes abstention from all positing of existence and which focuses exclusively on a phenomenon considered *qua* appearing and not *qua* being. The only difference between those two seeings is that the aesthetic one gives rise to a specific enjoyment whereas the phenomenological one gives rise to the discovery of the "meaning" of the phenomena at stake thereby opening the way to "grasping it in concepts".

In the second text, the famous paragraph 111 of *Ideas I*, Husserl describes the contemplation of a particular work of art: Dürer's engraving *The knight, death and the devil*. The title of the chapter in which the paragraph takes place is significant: "Problematic of the noetico-noematic structures" (Husserl 1998, pp. 260–262). The title of the chapter indicates that Husserl deals with the contemplation of artworks in the strict limits of the intentional relationship. Moreover the very title of the paragraph – "The neutrality modification and fantasy" – confirms a continuity with the theme insisted upon in the letter to von Hofmannstahl, i.e., the exclusion of all position of existence. According to Husserl, the intentional *Erlebnis* of which the aesthetic contemplation of Dürer's engraving is a mere instance is an act of consciousness called *Phantasieren*. From an eidetic point of view the act of fantasy is characterized by a neutralisation of all existential position, thereby differing from the perceiving act which posits in a present moment the existence of the perceived and differing as well from the act of remembering which presentifies again but *qua* past what was previously perceived.

To be sure the act called *Phantasieren* is based (*fundiert*) upon perceiving acts such as being aware of the thing "engraving" hanging on the wall, and the perceptual recognition of the shapes of a horse, a horseman, the devil, and so on, but it becomes specifically aesthetic by overcoming the positions involved in those basing acts in such a way that its essence is to focus exclusively upon a fictional scene grouping entities offered "neither as being nor as not-being nor under any other positing modality". Of course it is allowed to claim that the aesthetic act is referred to a world but only with the proviso that it is a "purely fictional world" differing essentially from the world intended by natural attitude in perceiving acts, emotional acts, cognitive acts, shaping acts and so son. Indeed in all those acts the existence of the world is posited whereas the world to which the aesthetic act is related is intended as purely fictional "without granting to it the seal of being or not-being."

In its purism the Husserlian description of the aesthetic act is comparable to Kant's analytic of the judgment of taste in the third *Critique*. Indeed Husserl somehow retrieves phenomenologically the emphasis put by Kant on the play of imagination along with the disinterestedness of the pure judgment of taste. But it should be noticed that Husserl does not seem to retrieve in any way Kant's teaching, in his "deduction of the pure aesthetic judgments" about the *sensus communis* taken as the ability to take into consideration the views of the others. Moreover Husserl doesn't seem to retrieve either the teaching of Kant's "dialectics" about the relation between the Beautiful and the Good.

On the other hand, since Husserl argues in the rigorous framework of an eidetic investigation carried out so to speak *sub specie aeternitatis*, there is no trace in the analysis I have recalled of any attention paid to the research of historians about the links between Dürer and his predecessors or his contemporaries, or about the impact of the famous engraving upon the development of his art.

Heidegger

Against the backdrop of those preliminary remarks I am now in a position to consider advisedly the approach of the work of art by the second founder of the phenomenological movement, Martin Heidegger. His explicit interrogation on the topic emerged only during the thirties, after the publication of his masterpiece *Being and Time*. In that interrogation the notion of *world* plays a decisive role that I would like to elucidate in order to clarify the intersection I am dealing with. But since Heidegger's insistence on that notion in his reflection on art depends on what he had expounded in *Being and Time*, a writing in which *being-in-the-world* is a central theme, I must recall briefly its problematic which claims to be phenomenological, hence to implement in some way the method discovered by Husserl to whom the book was dedicated.

Heidegger himself in a lecture course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* given in Marburg a few months after the publication of the *opus magnum* explains

his own concept of the phenomenological method in the following way: "*For Husserl* the phenomenological reduction which he worked out for the first time expressly in the *Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. *For us* phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed)" (1988, p. 21).

Heidegger's comparison between him and Husserl is fair as far as methodology is concerned but there is a striking difference between the master and the pupil. The Husserlian reduction excludes all position of Being and its primary aim is not ontological but gnoseological, whereas the Heideggerian reduction is focused on the *Seinsfrage* and its aim is a fundamental ontology. As a result the field to be described is no longer *Bewusstsein* but *Dasein,* i.e., the being for whom to be is a question. The metamorphosis entails that the phenomenological problematic does no longer operate *sub specie aeternitatis* in a realm of pure quiddities. It is deliberately historical for several reasons.

Indeed Heidegger insists that the word *Dasein* does not designate an omnitemporal generality but somebody who *hic et nunc* replies to the question *Who?* Moreover the analytic of the individualized way of Being of the Dasein discloses constitutive factors called *existentialia*, such as understanding, discourse, disposition, which operate on two opposite levels: on the one hand, an everyday concern wherein the Dasein pays attention to beings other than itself and publicly available to everybody and nobody in particular, to *das Man*, the They; on the other hand the level of care in which the Dasein discovers itself thrown in Being among other beings, things and persons, and confronted to the task of taking up its own existence as a project which is its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Care is essentially finite, because the end of Dasein, its own death, determines its projective character. It is also essentially temporal, but the temporality involved is not an infinite stream but rather the ek-static openness of a Self to a finite future towards which it projects itself by retrieving its own past. Compared to the radical Selfhood of care, everyday concern is in a position of fall. Care is authentic, concern is inauthentic.

Finally, the historical character of fundamental ontology stands out in the introduction by Heidegger of a new component of the phenomenological method: deconstruction. The point in deconstruction is to reappropriate in the texts of the entire history of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche what corresponds to the understanding of Being by Dasein and to reject by the same token what blocks or covers up that understanding.

Such deconstruction, which repeatedly favours Greek philosophy, was already carried out by Heidegger in his Marburg teaching before the publication of *Being and Time*. As I have tried to demonstrate in several writings since my book on

Heidegger's Project of Fundamental Ontology, that early teaching which dealt primordially with Greek philosophical texts shows that the antithesis between inauthentic concern for an everyday surrounding world and authentic care for a Self-world is rooted first of all in Heidegger's reappropriation with respect to Dasein of Plato's parable of the cave in which a sharp distinction is made between the common views of the *polloi*, the Many, focused on copies or semblances, and the solitary contemplation of truth by the wise man. It is also rooted in an existential reappropriation upon that Platonist backdrop of the distinction made by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between several levels of excellence, and more precisely the distinction between the productive comportment called *poièsis*, enlightened by a peculiar know-how called *technè* and the comportment called *praxis* which is the conduct of one's own life in the light of a discernment called *phronèsis*. Heidegger reappropriated as well with respect to the human Dasein the Aristotelian analysis of the superiority of the solitary *sophia* pursued by the philosopher upon all type of *epistèmè*. What is the link between all of this and the interrogation of the artwork?

There is almost nothing on the issue in *Being and Time* and in the Marburg lecture courses. Theodore Kisiel (1995) does not even mention the word "art" in the Index of subject matter of his careful analysis of *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*. Nevertheless it turns out that it is in the wake of fundamental ontology that Heidegger's reflection on the work of art emerged. On close inspection indeed it is possible to realize that the key notions of that reflection appear for the first time expressly in a lecture course given by Heidegger in Freiburg in 1931–1932 and dealing with *The Essence of Truth* on the basis of a reappropriation of Plato's parable of the cave, hence in continuity with a major topic of the Marburg teaching.

The first key notion to be found in that lecture course is the notion of *origin* which is going to take center stage in the essays on the work of art. According to the lecture course freedom means "understanding Being as such". That freedom obtains *Ursprünglichkeit* thanks to "the *decisiveness* (*Entschiedenheit*) of the tie to beings as they are and to the sight of the Being of those beings as it is, what understands itself only as Dasein, moved back in the isolation and thrownness of its historical provenance and future" (Heidegger 1997, p. 60).

The second key notion is the explicit reformulation in existential terms of the Platonic *philosopher-king*, a reformulation which 2 years later will be at the core of the sadly famous Rectoral Address of 1933 on *The Self-Assertion of the German University* (Heidegger 1985).

The third notion concerns the ontological status of *great art*. Heidegger claims that when art is great, as it was the case in Greece, for example in the "great poetry" of Sophocles, it has the capacity to manifest "the internal power of the human understanding of Being, the sight of light". He warns that in order to grasp this, one has to stop "considering the problem of art as a problem of aesthetics" because neither aesthetic enjoyment nor the scholarship of art historians are adjusted to that ontological power (1997, pp. 63–64).

Those three notions establish the parameters of Heidegger's interrogation on the origin of the work of art which was articulated and developed in the murky context of the triumph of National-socialism and which took advantage of that situation to

transfer to the Dasein of the German people the question Who? previously focused on individuals, thereby granting to that broad Dasein the decisiveness and resoluteness previously limited to the individual potentiality-for-Being.

This is what shines forth right away in the first elaboration of that interrogation where Heidegger writes at the very beginning that for him there is "only one thing which matters": "Namely, in spite of what has been thought and stated for a long time to define the essence of art, to contribute to the preparation of a transformed fundamental position of our Dasein toward art" (1989, p. 5). The possessive adjective used by Heidegger – "our Dasein" – is significant of the broadening of his problematic to the ontological potentiality of a people. But because the decisiveness pervading the text the broadening preserves the antithesis inauthenticity-authenticity which was structuring the existential analytic. That antithesis motivates, for reasons of ontological blindness and fallenness in public and superficial concerns, Heidegger's disdain for aesthetics and for the work of the art historians. The same antithesis explains why he elevates Greek art to the rank of a paradigm by contrast to the arts created afterwards. He insists accordingly on the ontological power of the basic features of the Greek work of art while detecting an ontological deficiency in what he takes to be the main feature of the western artworks after the collapse of Ancient Greece.

According to Heidegger who argues in ontological terms the Greek artwork managed to combine the setting-up (*Aufstellung*) of a world and the setting forth (*Herstellung*) of an earth. By contrast the posthellenic works of art until nowadays are limited to a mere representation (*Darstellung*). Let me consider the contrast without going into details as I did in my book (Taminiaux 2005).

Heidegger claims that the Greek temple around a divine statue was setting up a world as an unfamiliar realm which not only was "more being than any of the tangible present at hand things among which we believe ourselves to be at home in everyday life" but which also had a function of "rejection of the usual presence at hand" (1989, p. 9). That setting up is described by the philosopher, obviously inspired by the chapter on "The Religion of Art" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a "consecration" which "opens up the holy as holy" (Heidegger 1989, p. 9). Thanks to that theophanic power the world gets a verbal status: it is a "guiding escort" which overcomes from above the familiar character of our everyday surroundings.

The second feature of the Greek artwork, the setting forth of an earth, is no less ontological. The word "earth" used by Heidegger does not designate a stock of raw materials waiting for an elaboration in which their crudeness would vanish; instead of designating a matter waiting for a form, it designates "the inexhaustible fullness" of "a ground which because essentially and always self-sealing off, is an abyss" (Heidegger 1989, p. 11).

Since the world opened up by the artwork is an active disclosure whereas the earth simultaneously set forth preserves its secret, great art is the advent of a "contest" (*Streit*) between an opening and a closing. One could be tempted to consider such a contest as an enigma calling for a persistent meditation, but Heidegger makes clear that for him the resolute selfhood of a Dasein prevails

upon attention to an enigma. Indeed he writes: "Towering up in a world and going back into the earth, the temple opens the There (*Da*) in which a people comes to its own – i.e. comes to the ordaining power of its God". And the language he uses evokes a conquest: "In the work the There gets won" (1989, p. 12). The swaggering tonality is confirmed by the introduction in the same context of a call to a "decision" (*Entscheidung*): "With this essential determination of the work-being of the work a position is won which makes a decision possible about the widespread and common view of the artwork as *representation of something*" (Heidegger 1989, p. 12).

The rule of the view of art as representation includes the entire history of art in the western world after Greece. In all the stages of that long history the work of art was meant to be the allegorical exhibition, in visible appearances, of a reality which is not to be found in them, either a supersensible reality in the Christian era, or a natural reality visible elsewhere in the modern age. Heidegger claims that during that long rule of representation the fine arts lost the authentic ontological function they had in Greece. In Greece, he says, "the artwork does not represent anything – and this for the sole and simple reason that it has nothing that it should represent" (1989, p. 13) On the contrary, "it wins for the first time the open, the clearing, in whose light being as such encounters us as on the first day or – if become everyday-like – metamorphosed" When Heidegger claims that the traditional privilege of representation depends on a traditional interpretation of Plato's distinction between the model and the copy it is easy to realize that his criticism of *Darstellung* presupposes his own criticism of the traditional notion of truth as *adaequatio* on behalf of truth as *alètheia*. Indeed what is at stake for him in the contest between world and earth is precisely his own notion of truth as *alètheia*, that is, as a tension between concealment and unconcealment. That tension is meant when he writes that "the essence of art is the setting to work of truth" (1989, p. 16). And in that tension the Dasein is involved.

Three quotes suffice to show that the text I am dealing with is in continuity with the previous analytic of Dasein and its emphasis on the disclosing project by which authenticity is conquered against the fallenness of everydayness.

First quote. Heidegger writes: "If truth first comes to work with the artwork and in it and is not present at hand anywhere beforehand, then it must become.(. . .) Truth is never read off from what is already present at hand. On the contrary, the openness of what is occurs by being projected. . ." (1989, p. 17) In other words there is no truth without project. And of course there is no project without Dasein.

The second quote is focused on the strictly singular historicality of the one who decides to take upon himself to be the "There" of the ontological openness. Heidegger writes the following on the subject: "Who takes upon himself to be this 'There'? Answer: Man (. . .) if he stands towards Being (*Seyn*) as such. This way of being the There we call history. When man is the There, i.e. is historical, he becomes a people". And Heidegger insists that "this There itself is never something universal – rather it is at each time this one and something singular" (1989, pp. 19–20).

The third quote is the very conclusion of the essay: "In the questioning about art what is at stake is this decision: Is art essential to us? Is it an origin (*Ursprung*) and

therefore a jump forward (*Vor-sprung*) in our history? A start or only still a supplement that gets brought along as the 'expression' of something present at hand and pursued further on for ornamentation and amusement, for relaxation and excitement? Are we in the nearness of the essence of art as origin or are we not?(. . .) For clarity over who we are and who we are not is already the decisive jump (*Sprung*) into the nearness of the origin. Such nearness alone guarantees a truly grounded historical Dasein as authentic on this earth" (1989, p. 22).

It is obvious that those three signs of ontological decisionism not only prolong with reference to the singular Dasein of the German people the existential analytic of *Being and Time* but also reject the teaching of Husserl who claimed that the work of art demands a purely aesthetic attitude excluding all ontological position and consequently has nothing to do with the project of making history in the monumental sense of an ontological move. Moreover there is no doubt that the engraving of Dürer relished by Husserl is implicitly included among the targets of Heidegger's polemic against representation.

Arendt

I am now able to consider the approach to the artwork by two thinkers who repeatedly claimed to have their philosophical roots in the legacy of the masters of the phenomenological movement, namely Arendt and Levinas.

I have tried to show in several essays since my book *The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker* that Arendt's analysis of active life and of the life of the mind is to a large extent a reply to the biases and mistakes entailed in the work of Heidegger, her first teacher, by a Platonist celebration of the *bios theorètikos*.

Hannah Arendt did not hesitate to introduce herself as a phenomenologist insofar as the main issue of her analyses was an unprejudiced description of phenomena. She also claimed to practice a sort of deconstruction but a peculiar one which instead of deriving from the perspectives of *contemplative life* was targeting all its prejudices.

I intend to underscore the divergence between her and Heidegger by paying attention to the reflections on the work of art contained in *The Human Condition*, a book on active life about which she wrote to Heidegger in May 1954 that it owed much to his teaching. But of course this acknowledgment of an intellectual debt does not all mean that she considered herself to be a disciple of the German thinker.

Indeed, already in the first chapter of her book Arendt claims that Plato when he decided, after the trial of Socrates, to grant to the solitary pursuit of contemplative life an "enormous superiority (. . .) over action of any kind" (Arendt 1998, p. 14), has founded a tradition which "has blurred the distinctions and articulations within the *vita activa* itself" (Arendt 1998, p. 17) and obliterated the previous excellence of the sharing of words and deeds which pervaded the *bios politikos* of the democratic city.

I have recalled that in Heidegger's fundamental ontology the reappropriation of Plato's celebration of the *bios theorètikos* entailed an antithesis between everydayness and authenticity with the result that the philosopher alone was truly competent in political matters. As I said that antithesis was maintained in the interrogation on the work of art.

There is of course no avail to search for traces of such an antithesis in Arendt's description of active life, and in her reflections on art in the framework of that description. At the very beginning of the text I have commented, Heidegger writes: "To the public the only relation of the artwork is to destroy it. And the greatness of an artwork is measured by this destructive power" (1989, p. 8) By contrast Arendt in her first allusion to the artwork, in the second chapter of her book, underlines its public character. In her terminology the word "public" refers to an "appearing" which is not a semblance but a reality constituted by "being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves". The work of art is public in so far as the artist has the ability to transfigure in a reality perceived by many people a "private" and solitary experience which without that transfiguration would lead a shadowy existence (1998, p. 50).

But the word "public" in her terminology also designates a second phenomenon, namely "the world itself, insofar as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it" (1998, p. 52). The phenomenon of the world so understood obviously escapes the Heideggerian antithesis between inauthentic concern with utensils and authentic care. Indeed Arendt insists that in her view the world "is related to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit it", and consequently that "to live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common as a table is located between those who have it in common". The comparison is highly significant, it means that "the world, like every in-between relates and separates men at the same time" and thus "prevents our falling over each other so to speak" (1998, p. 52).

By claiming that the world is a set of artifacts which relates *and* separates those who live in it, Arendt manifests a clear divergence from the teaching of *Being and Time* which considers the surrounding set of artifacts as the realm of the They wherein human beings fall over each other, and which opposes to the sense of security offered by that dwelling place the *Unheimlichkeit*, the uncanny essence of the authentic being-in-the-world, i.e., of care understood as strictly singular and separated.

It is to be noticed that Arendt argues the way she does because unlike Heidegger her description is not focused on the pursuit of a solitary contemplation but on the articulations of active life. Indeed, by relating and separating at the same time those who live in it, the world as a public and common habitat turns out to be favourable to an activity which is higher than the work necessary for the fabrication of artifacts. That higher activity called "action" by Arendt is what Aristotle called *praxis*, distinguished by him from *poièsis*, fabrication. In Arendt's description of active life there are three levels of activity: the activity of labour which is conditioned by life, the activity of work conditioned by a world, and the activity of action

conditioned by plurality, i.e., in her language, by the fact that human beings are all alike but all different. According to her description action is an ever renewed sharing of words and deeds, interlocution and interaction, between individuals who, because they are all alike, are able to understand one another, but who, because they are all different, must show who they are by taking initiatives in words and deeds.

In the context of plurality any single human being is considered able to reply on his own to the question 'Who?' which is a central question for Arendt as it was for Heidegger, with the basic difference that for her the question is raised by the others whereas for him question and answer occur in the circle of Selfhood since the Dasein confronts authentically who he is in his unique ontological project by replying alone to a call emanating from himself.

The divergence becomes blatant if we compare the two thinkers in their analysis of the relation between artwork and world.

In Heidegger's analysis the relation is ruled by the antithesis inauthentic everydayness and authentic project. The authentic work of art has the ontological character of an origin, a leap forward missing in ordinary artifacts, and thanks to that leap the singular Dasein of a unique people projects itself resolutely towards its future in a contest between Being and Nothingness.

By contrast Arendt underlines a continuity between artifacts and artworks. In her description the products of the activity of labour are doomed to disappear in human consumption whereas the artifacts produced by the activity of work do not vanish in the devouring cycle of biological life; on the contrary they introduce a tangibility and permanence which are essential to the constitution of the world as a habitat. The works of art increase and protect that lasting tangibility. She writes: "The man-made world of things, the human artifice erected by *homo faber*, becomes a home for mortal men, whose stability will endure and outlast the ever-changing movement of their lives and actions, only insomuch as it transcends both the sheer functionalism of things produced for consumption and the sheer utility of objects produced for use (. . .) If the *animal laborans* needs the help of *homo faber* to ease his labor and remove his pain, and if mortals need his help to erect a home on earth, acting and speaking men need the help of *homo faber* in his highest capacity, that is, the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, because without them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, would not survive at all" (Arendt 1998, p. 173).

Needless to insist on the divergence between Arendt and her former teacher. It is significant that Arendt associates the artworks and the narratives written by historiographers whereas Heidegger relegates those narratives in a superficial *Kunstbetrieb*, art-management blind by definition to the ontological process of monumental history. No less significant is the fact that when Arendt deals with poetry in the same context she recalls that the Greeks held remembrance, *Mnèmosynè*, for the mother of the muses (cf. 1998, pp. 169–170) whereas Heidegger the other way round claimed that the real power of poetry is to open ontologically the future of a people.

Moreover when Arendt criticizes contemporary culture she does not argue like Heidegger in ontological terms, and she does not depreciate the contemporary

artists. Her only point is to warn that the stabilizing function of art is endangered if the triumph of *animal laborans* in mass-society reduces art to sheer entertainment.

Levinas

What about the artwork in Levinas's thought? In 1987 he wrote the following in his preface to the German translation of *Totality and Infinity*: "This book which wants and feels itself of phenomenological inspiration proceeds from a long familiarity with Husserl's texts and from a ceaseless attentiveness to *Sein und Zeit*" (Levinas 2002).

Indeed the debate with both Husserl and Heidegger is a constant feature in Levinas's writings. I would like to show how the debate goes on in the few pages where Levinas deals with the work of art. They are to be found in the first book he published after World war II, *From Existence and existants* (1947), and in an article which came out 1 year later in *Les Temps Modernes*: "Reality and its shadow".

In the foreword to the book of 1947 Levinas warns that his essay anticipates further and broader investigations "devoted to the problem of the Good, to Time and to the Relation with the Other as a movement toward the Good" About those further investigations he writes: "The Platonist formula which sets the Good beyond Being is the most general and emptiest indication orienting them" (2001, p. xxvii).

Right away the debate with Heidegger looms up in those words. Indeed Heidegger in the wake of *Being and Time* had also reappropriated Plato's formula (*to agathon epekeina tès ousias*) but without any ethical connotation for he focused its meaning upon the ontological Selfhood of the Dasein, writing in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*: "The essence of the *agathon* lies in the power of oneself as *hou eneka*" (Heidegger 1973, p. 41). In other words Plato's formula in Heidegger's retrieval of it simply means that the Dasein exists for its own sake. There is a deliberate objection to Heidegger when Levinas writes: "the movement which leads an existent toward the Good is not a transcendence by which the existent raises itself up to a higher existence, but a departure from Being and from the categories which describe it: an 'ex-cendence'" (2001, p. xxvii) In other words Levinas claims that ontology cannot be fundamental since it reduces the Good to Being, thereby obliterating the primacy of ethics. He also rejects implicitly by the same token the Heideggerian antithesis between the inauthenticity of everyday concern and the authenticity of care focused upon Dasein's ownmost existence. At any rate it is significant in this regard that when Levinas describes further on in his book our everyday comportment he underscores what he calls its "sincerity". He writes forcefully: "Our existence in the world, with its desires and everyday agitation, is then not an immense fraud, a fall into inauthenticity, an evasion from our deepest destiny" (2001, p. 44).

However, it would be wrong to infer from the words I just quoted that Levinas discards as null and void all interest in ontology. On the one hand, he expresses what he calls a "profound need to leave the climate" (2001, p. 4) of Heidegger's thought, but on the other hand, he insists that he does not want to return to a

"pre-heideggerian" philosophy and he acknowledges his debt when he writes: "At the beginning our reflections are in large measure inspired by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger where we find the concept of ontology and of the relationship which man sustains with Being" (2001, p. 4). By acknowledging that his debt concerns ontology, Levinas suggests that the distinction Being-beings deserves serious consideration. But by expressing his reservation he suggests by the same token that he does not endorse the meaning given to the distinction by Heidegger.

The divergence shines out when Levinas indicates that the purpose of his book is "to approach the idea of Being in general in its impersonality so as to then be able to analyse the notion of the present and of position, in which a being, a subject, an existent, arises in impersonal Being through a hypostasis" (2001, p. 3) All the words of that quote denote a sharp difference.

Whereas Heidegger defines the relationship with Being in terms of ownmost selfhood, Levinas affirms the neutral and impersonal character of Being; whereas the former insists on project, the latter argues in terms of a position; on one side the future prevails, on the other side the emphasis is put on the present; on the one hand the key word is ek-stasis, on the other hand it is hypostasis.

The divergence is confirmed at the outset of the first chapter of the book when Levinas writes, in a clear opposition to Heidegger: "Existence is not synonymous with the relationship with a world; it is antecedent to the world. In the situation of an end of the world the primary relationship which binds us to Being becomes palpable" (2001, p. 8). Given that Being is primarily anonymous and impersonal, given that Being is first of all the sheer fact that "*there is*", the primary relationship with Being occurs beneath intentionality and escapes all decision or "struggle for a future" (2001, p. 10). It is an event we can approach by paying attention to phenomena such as weariness and indolence which obviously are neither lived experiences ruled by an intention of consciousness nor modalities of a projective comportment.

When he deals with those phenomena Levinas shows the limits of both the Husserlian and the Heideggerian descriptions. For instance he obviously points out the flaws of Heidegger's existential analytic when he claims that weariness is a "refusal to exist" (2001, p. 12) and that indolence is felt as "an impossibility of beginning" (2001, p. 13 & 15), a "holding back from the future" (2001, p. 17), a condemnation to the present which indicates that "the future, a virginal instant, is impossible in a solitary subject" (2001, p. 17).

The substitution for the Heideggerian ek-stasis of the notion of *hypostasis* means that for Levinas our primary relation with Being consists in staying under the burden of an anonymous "there is." Such is the background of Levinas's reflections on the work of art.

Those reflections are developed in a chapter whose title is significant of the divergence I am underlining: "Existence without world". The title of the section in which those reflections take place – "exoticism" – is no less significant for exoticism here means that the work of art does not belong to the world. About that artistic exoticism Levinas writes: "We can in our relation with the world tear ourselves away from it. Things refer to an inside, as parts of the given world,

objects of knowledge or objects of use, caught up in the system of practice wherein their alterity hardly emerges. Art makes them stand out from the world, extracts them from this belongingness to a subject" (2001, p. 45).

Given the comparative character of my presentation I could say that the guideline of Levinas's remarks on the exoticism of the work of art is an ontological radicalisation of aesthetics. What does that mean? How does that radicalisation concern Levinas's relation to his two masters in phenomenology, Husserl and Heidegger?

The answer is provided by a precise analysis of the exoticism he attributes to the work of art. The point is this: the work of art subjugates the spectator or listener under a set of impressions whose impact is such that what is seen or heard is an alterity so strong that it escapes the subject-object relationship which pervades our theoretical or practical dealings with the world.

In other words, the disinterestedness underscored by Kant in his analysis of taste is so to speak maximized by Levinas in such a way that our relation to the artwork becomes a state in which all power of a subject upon a specific object disappears. In our dealings with the world the sense impressions we receive are immediately inserted in an objectifying process that is perception: we perceive things which have specific characteristics and persons responding to a name. By contrast, according to Levinas, "the movement of art consists in leaving perception to rehabilitate sensation"; that movement "instead of arriving at the object gets lost in the sensation itself", a sensation "detaching the quality from this object reference" (2001, p. 47). As a result sensation returns to "the impersonality of an *element*" (2001, p. 47).

The Levinassian description of that return to sensation is in no way psychological, it is ontological: indeed the standing out of the impersonal element of sensation is an event, the sheerly factual emergence of the "There is" in its "essential anonymity" (2001, p. 53).

In that context Levinas comes to terms either expressly or implicitly with his two masters in phenomenology. He explicitly regrets that Eugen Fink, in agreement with Husserl about this, considers what is depicted by a painting to be a "neutralised and suspended world" instead of acknowledging that it is something which has lost its world-quality, "a reality without world" (2001, pp. 48–49).

As far as Heidegger is concerned, it is obvious that the Levinassian notion of exoticism is the opposite of the Heideggerian notion of a setting up of a world by the work of art. The same opposition is obvious in the rehabilitation of *aisthèsis* which was treated as a superficial factor in Heidegger's polemic against aesthetics.

The contrast shines forth when, considering the last version of Heidegger's interrogation on *The Origin of the Work of Art*, a version published after World war II, we compare what he was writing about a modern painting – Van Gogh's peasant shoes – with Levinas's remarks on the paintings of his time (abstraction, matierism, surrealism etc.). When Heidegger describes Van Gogh's painting he does not pay any attention whatsoever to colours, lines, rhythm and shapes, his only point is to find in the painting an illustration of what he takes to be a setting of truth into work, namely the disclosure of the essence of a tool, *reliability* defined a reciprocity between world and earth for a peasant woman.

By contrast, what Levinas salutes in modern painting is the effort to introduce by the mere interplay of lines and colours an elementary spectacle in which the coherence of a world disappears and is replaced by the exhibition of the alterity of the "There is".

I conclude by pointing out in the article of 1948 on "Reality and its shadow" (Levinas 1987) a confirmation of the contrast I wanted to underscore.

In an allusion to Greek sculpture Levinas observes that the statue of the pagan God displays the stupidity of an idol and manifests an existence which is a mere shadow of reality for it accomplishes the paradox of a petrified "instant lasting without a future" whereas Heidegger conversely was claiming that the statue was more real than anything else and had the power to open a future.

Moreover, instead of opposing like Heidegger one art, the Greek, to the arts of other cultures in which allegory supposedly prevails, Levinas detects in the statues of the Greek gods, the clearest proof of the allegorical nature of all art. Which means that all work of art whatever its cultural origin manifests that all reality is accompanied by its shadow, the shadow of the "There is" in which it gets petrified unless an ethical opening to the others allows a liberation from that petrification.

Further on in the same article Levinas writes forcefully: "The fact that mankind could give to itself an art reveals in time the uncertainty of its continuation." Since he mentions in that context the teaching of Descartes about the discontinuity of duration, there is no doubt that the quote I just made has to be connected with the conclusion of the article where Levinas claims that without a relation to the others there would be no future, no opening of time. This is of course an anticipation of the ethical developments carried out later in *Totality and Infinity*. But the insistence on the link between time and the other implies a strong objection to Heidegger for whom the opening of time depends exclusively on the Self.

Finally the article of 1948 already suggests that it is the ethical relation to the others, a relation underrated by Heidegger, which introduces above and beyond the mere repetition of petrified instants a diachrony of dialogues, of initiatives, and of responsible choices which justifies the work of the historians of art, disdained by Heidegger, but which forbids to grant to any work a theophanic power.

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Chapter 3
The Curious Image: Husserlian Thoughts on Photography

John B. Brough

Let me begin with a disclaimer. I will look at photography through a phenomenological lens in this essay, but I will take it in a narrow sense, at least by today's standards. I will not be concerned with photographs that have been manipulated, either digitally or by any other means, in ways that radically alter the appearance of their subjects. Photographers have tinkered with their images since the birth of the medium, and the ease with which photographs can be transformed by the computer has made manipulation a common practice today. My focus will be on "straight" photography, which characterizes ordinary snap shots and many photographs that count as works of art, such as those by Alfred Stieglitz, Henri Cartier-Bresson, and Thomas Struth. It was this kind of photography with which Husserl was familiar and that furnished him with examples in his phenomenology of imaging.

Husserl's understanding of photography is informed by the moments he takes to be essential to "image consciousness," the kind of awareness I have when I look at a painting, film, or photograph. Image consciousness is a unique and complex form of intentionality. Unlike ordinary perception, which has a single object, image consciousness has three objects. The first of these, which Husserl often calls the "physical image," plays a foundational role, serving as the material substrate or support of the image I actually see. In the case of a photograph, this would be a piece of paper or some other physical thing covered with lines and shaded areas of black and white or other colors. The physical substrate, since it is part of the world, can fade with time or be damaged in its causal interactions with other physical things, including light and heat. The photograph's support ordinarily does not appear itself. My perceptual awareness of it is suppressed, and it takes a special effort to bring it to presence. The photograph also has an "image object." This is what actually appears when I look at the photograph: a grey, rectangular form, for example, in which I see two men standing on a bridge talking to one another.

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The photograph almost always has a subject as well, which is what it depicts: Jean-Paul Sartre on the Pont des Arts in conversation with architect Jean Pouillon in Henri-Cartier Bresson's image. What we call a photograph necessarily embraces all of these "objects." It is a whole made up of three interdependent moments, each of which of which must be present if there is to be a photograph at all. This tripartite structure belonging to the full object of image consciousness will form the background of what I have to say in this essay.

There is another theme that is fundamental to photography; and if there is anything that particularly distinguishes photographs among the family of images, this would be at its root. What all photographs have in common is that they are mechanically generated. I understand "mechanically" here in an inclusive sense, embracing chemical and electronic means of production. The photographs I will be concerned with also involve the intervention of a human agent, the photographer, but their mechanical origin is essential to their unique and curious nature. A painting can be the image of something that is absent or no longer in existence or completely imaginary, but the photograph, as mechanically produced, is a "tracing of patterns of light reflected from its object" (Friday 2005, p. 343). The patterns caught by the camera become fixed in the photographic image. The photograph in that sense is "a mirror with a memory," as Oliver Wendell Holmes said (1980, p. 74). It enjoys a unique link to causality, and is indexical in a special way, pointing to its cause "iconically, or by picturing the cause" (Friday 2005, p. 343). This has important implications for the photograph's relation to the present, the past, and the real, as we shall see.

Some Preliminary Considerations

Husserl claims that conflict is essential to the sort of image consciousness involved in pictorial depiction. "We have a figment in the case of physical imaging," he writes, "for two reasons:

1. the conflict that comes from being placed into the surroundings of 'reality';
2. *empirical conflict* (there are no human beings in photographic colors)" (1980, p. 148, 2005, p. 175).[1]

Both of these conflicts play a role, not only in the constitution of photographs as images, but in the attraction they exert on us. That the photographic image does not fit into the reality of our perceptual present transforms it into something magical, allowing us to journey elsewhere in space and time and to experience the novel and the inaccessible. The photograph displaces us. We enter into it and are somewhere else, in the presence of something else, of something perceptually absent but visibly present in the form of an image. Let me offer an example of this experience of

[1] Page numbers of the German edition are cited first followed by the page numbers for the English translation for all the Husserl citations in this essay.

displacement. My wife and I walk into a photography gallery in New York. We ask the dealer whether she has another print of an image of Simone de Beauvoir that we had seen an hour earlier at a retrospective of Cartier-Bresson's work at the Museum of Modern Art. She locates the print in the gallery's storage area and brings it out for our inspection. That the photograph can be carried from one place to another in the real world is a property of its physical being. In that respect, the photograph belongs as fully to the "surroundings of 'reality'" as the desk on which the dealer places it. She then removes the protective tissue from the work, and the image is suddenly there before us, whisking us instantaneously from a building in midtown Manhattan in 2010 to a street in Paris in 1947, where we find ourselves looking at the person who wrote *La Force de l'Age*. The contrast between the reality of the gallery in New York in which we are now standing and the figure of the woman in mid-twentieth-century Paris we see in the image is decisive, transforming the object under our gaze from thing to image. We cannot escape entering into the new world it represents, which is radically different from our surroundings in the gallery.

Then there is the second conflict Husserl mentions. The figure of the woman in the photograph not only fails to fit into the space of the gallery, it also conflicts with the subject it represents. The figure appears as small and gray. Simone de Beauvoir's complexion, however, was not grey, and she was not of lilliputian stature. There are no human beings in photographic colors, Husserl remarks, and that is true even of color photographs. The conflict in this case is between image seen and subject meant, and like the external conflict between the image and its environment, it sets the photograph apart and lets its world stand before us.

But then, as we study the photograph more closely, we realize that it is not quite the same image we saw at the Museum of Modern Art. It *is* a photograph of Simone de Beauvoir, taken in the same place and probably within a few seconds of the one on view at the museum, but it shows her face turned in a slightly different direction with the street light behind her somewhat out of focus and cropped at the top. The figures in the background also appear larger, as if they had moved closer to us. In seeing this contrast between the two images, we encounter the phenomenological fact that a photograph is a perspective frozen at a particular moment in time. In ordinary perception I see a subject *through* a perspective, but the perspective itself is not visible; in the photograph, however, it pushes its way forward, even as our attention attempts to cut straight to the subject. I see the slight differences in perspective and the subtle differences in meaning that may attend them.

These initial observations hint at several of the issues that arise for a phenomenology of photography. Prominent among these is the photograph's relation to reality and to time, which I begin to explore in the next section.

Reality, Time, and the Photograph

I perceive photographs. Perception posits its object as *existing here and now*, as present *in person* and *in the world*. The photograph's physical support is certainly such an object, an actual thing in real space and time (Husserl 1980, p. 537, 2005,

p. 646), even if the perception of it is suppressed and its presence in person is, so to speak, muffled.

But what about the photographic image in which something not now, an earlier situation, is presented? Here, Husserl says, "the apprehension contents . . . constitute an image object that appears as present," but which "exhibits what is not present–in this case, what is past" (1980, 166, 2005, p. 201).

Let us stay for a moment with the photographic image before turning to what it represents. The photographic image appears as present. It is there itself, "in person." In that sense, it is perceived. On the other hand, unlike the ordinary object of perception, "the photographic image object (not the *photographed* object) truly does not exist. 'Truly'–that does not signify: existing *outside* my consciousness; on the contrary, it signifies not existing at all, not even in my consciousness" (Husserl 1980, p. 110, 2005, p. 119). The image is a nothing, a nullity (Husserl 1980, p. 46 & 48, 2005, pp. 50–51). All that really exists when I see the photograph is, externally, "a determinate distribution of colors on the paper" and, internally, the act of consciousness "I experience in contemplating the photograph" (Husserl 1980, p. 110, 2005, p. 119). The image, though nothing real, nevertheless has a distinct kind of being appropriate to it as an image: "the depictive image," Husserl writes, ". . . has a 'being' that persists and abides" (1980, p. 536, 2005, p. 645). Image consciousness, therefore, is in part perception: In it I have a suppressed perception of the physical support and a full perception of the image object, which it presents to me as there itself, in person. But it is also in part representation, since the perceived image represents a subject that is not there itself.

Another way of describing the being of the image is to say that it is ideal. As ideal, it "belongs to another time and to another space" (Husserl 1980, p. 537, 2005, p. 646). Husserl makes this claim in the context of a discussion of a statuette of a runner. The image-athlete is not running in actual time, like a jogger passing outside my window, and he is not running in the real space of the room in which the statuette sits. This is also true of a photographic image-person taken purely as an image. Simone de Beauvoir as she appears in Cartier-Bresson's photograph is not standing in the space of the room in which I am now writing this essay. As I will argue later, however, the relation of the subject presented in the photograph to actual time and space, including present time and space, is more complicated than it is in the case of the statuette of the runner. Suffice it to say now that the subject is represented in a depicted space that was and remains part of the same space in which we now find ourselves and in which the photograph presently exists as a physical thing; and it is meant in a depicted time continuous with actual time, however remote it may be from the actual present.

We have seen that the photographic image, like all images, is present to us with the "full force and intensity of perception" (Husserl 1980, p. 57, 2005, p. 62), and that a subject is represented in the image. The image appears in person; the subject, however, does not. It is "meant," but not present. "Not present" in the case of the subject involves two senses of "present": presence in person and temporal presence. Specifically, the subject depicted is not present in person, and it is past. I am aware that it was once bodily present to the camera and to the photographer, and I am also

aware that now it is past. We know, as Husserl puts it, that "human beings as they appear photographically are not to be found anywhere in reality (that is, in the region of possible empirical experience)," and that the photographic image "cannot be arranged in this nexus of the 'real' world as a real thing" (1980, p. 132, 2005, pp. 145–146). But since the image, thanks to these conflicts, is a nullity that nonetheless appears perceptually, it can be hospitable to what does or did exist and can exhibit it, even if what it exhibits is not there in person. It may be the case that the subject depicted in the image is not perceived, but it is also true that the reality of what is depicted, in the sense that it *was* real when the camera caught it, is fundamental to the sense of the photograph. The photograph blends reality and memory.

A perplexing question arises at this point: If a photograph exhibits something that did exist, is my awareness of what it exhibits a "positing" consciousness? Perceptions and memories are positing acts in the sense that they intend their objects, respectively, as actually existing or as having existed. Phantasies, on the other hand, are not positing. Certain instances of image consciousness also clearly seem to be nonpositing. There is no reason to think that a painting by Manet of oysters invites the viewer to posit their existence, either now or in the past. Turner's *The Burning of the Houses of Parliament*, on the other hand, might be said to entail the positing of the event it pictures insofar as it involves, assuming the viewer is informed, the consciousness of something that actually took place. This would seem to be much more obviously the case with photography, thanks to its mechanical nature.

Roland Barthes is helpful in thinking about whether photography can be said to posit its subject. In the case of the kind of photography we are considering, there would be no photograph and no object depicted if a real thing had not been placed before the lens of the camera. Painting may be able to "feign reality without having seen it," Barthes observes, but in photography "I can never deny that *the thing has been there*" (1981, p. 76). Here one might take note of the different ways in which the painter and the photographer are related to the past. The painter can attempt to paint the past, depicting the Parthenon, for example, as he or she imagines it to have appeared in all of its splendor in ancient Athens. The photographer, on the other hand, cannot photograph the Parthenon as it actually was before it fell prey to the depredations of time and human folly. The painter, who was never present to the Parthenon in the fourth century BC, gives us an imagined past, the past as it might have been. The significance of this is that while one can paint the past, one cannot photograph it. The photographer, no matter how creative he or she may be, cannot escape the limits imposed by the camera, and the first limit is that it can capture only what is now in front of it. Photography is like perception rather than memory in that respect: one can perceive, and photograph, only what is actually present. Once the photograph has been taken, however, the past is indelibly represented in the image; and it is an actual, not an imagined past, as it is in the painting.

Although the past cannot be photographed, it nonetheless permeates the photographic image. In looking at the photograph, one sees a past present. Ironically, then, one never sees the actual present in the image, despite the fact

that one can only photograph the present. Indeed, the actual present I photograph becomes past the instant I photograph it. One might even say that the act of photographing it makes it become past: with the click of the camera, the photographed present takes on forever the index of past existence. The photograph is tied to a past present in the double sense of presence mentioned earlier–the object depicted in the photograph was once present to the camera and hence was also temporally present, that is, "now."

Allowing for changes that the photographic medium inevitably introduces, the subject appears in the image in the way in which it appeared to the photographer in the instant in which he or she took the picture. A painted portrait, by contrast, is relatively detached from a particular past moment, and, if the subject of the portrait was invented by the painter, from "presence to" as well. In the photograph, however, there is "a superimposition . . . of reality and the past," as Barthes says. Barthes thinks this connection exists only for photography, and is therefore its "very essence" (1981, p. 76). What the photograph images necessarily carries the mark: "That-has-been" (Barthes 1981, p. 77). The existence of the photograph tells us that its subject has been real and has been "absolutely, irrefutably present . . ." (Barthes 1981, p. 77) in just the way the photograph exhibits it. In that sense, there are no timeless photographs. Furthermore, just as in memory I am aware that what I remember was once perceived, so too in looking at the photograph I am conscious that "someone has seen the referent . . . in flesh and blood, or again in person" (Barthes 1981, p. 79). Perception carries with it the belief that what is perceived exists, and memory the belief that what is remembered did exist. The photograph also includes the belief that its subject once existed and was once perceived as it now appears in the image.

Photography owes this unique link to the past to its mechanical, chemical, or electronic nature. We noted earlier that the photograph is an emanation of its subject. The photo of his mother, which is the center of Barthes's reflections on photography in *Camera Lucida*, is, he writes, "the treasury of rays which emanated from my mother as a child, from her hair, her skin, her dress, her gaze, *on that day*" (1981, p. 82). That photographs are mechanically produced and not, like paintings, created by an artist's unfettered imagination, is an empirical fact, of course, but it is also an essential feature of photography. It founds the defining moment of the subject of the photograph: that it has been. It justifies Barthes's claim that "every photograph is a certificate of presence" (1981, p. 87), attesting to the fact that what we see in it is "at once the past and the real" (1981, p. 82).

Does this help with the question about whether the subject depicted in the photograph is posited? In looking at Cartier-Bresson's image of Sartre, do I posit that Sartre once actually stood on the Pont des Arts? At first glance, Husserl seems to deny that I do: ". . . In the case of depiction," he writes, "we have *quasi*-positing rather than positing" (1980, p. 537, 2005, p. 646). He grants that I can become "visually absorbed and immersed in the photograph or semblance image in such a way that it 'takes on life' and I feel the tendency to shift to positing," but this tendency, he adds, "is immediately 'nullified'" (1980, p. 491, 2005, p. 586). This would certainly be true if the tendency were toward the positing of what appears in the image as present in person. But we have seen that the conflict between what is

represented in the photographic image and the reality surrounding the image ensures that I will not take the subject to be bodily present. Sartre is depicted as standing on a bridge in Paris in Cartier-Bresson's image, but the photograph hangs on a wall in my house, which has no bridge and is far from Paris. The conflict does let us enter another world depictively, but this, Husserl implies, is an ideal world, not a world that involves actual positing. There is, however, the recalcitrant fact that Sartre is depicted as *having once stood* on this particular bridge in Paris. In my consciousness of the photograph, therefore, it seems that I do posit both the absence of the object and also "the fact that this object has indeed existed and that it has been there where I see it" (Barthes 1981, p. 115). Despite his reluctance to say that the experience of the photograph posits its subject, Husserl is certainly aware that in the photographic image an earlier situation, a past, is represented (1980, p. 166, 2005, p. 201). The time that is posited through the photograph and the world to which it transports us is not the present and not the room in which I am now standing. Photographs posit the "there and then," not the "here and now." The fact that the photographic image and what it represents conflict with the here and now does not bar the way to a photographic positing of past existence; in fact, it opens it up. We may venture to say, then, that we *do* posit the being-past of the subject depicted in the photograph. This is neither perceptual nor memorial positing. It is positing in image consciousness, or perhaps we should say in *photo consciousness*, since the photograph seems to be unique among images in summoning up the positing of the past.

That photography posits the subject as past endows it with a degree of evidence and certainty undreamed of in other kinds of imagery. One cannot imagine a painting being brought into a courtroom and introduced as evidence that the event it depicts actually took place. The only thing a painting allows us to say with certainty about existence is that someone produced it at some point in time. The photograph, however, was made simultaneously with the event and by the recording mechanism of the camera. Even though a photographer held the camera and made decisions about when and how to shoot the picture and what to include in it, it still furnishes evidence and, within limits, certainty, that something has been.[2]

Photography and Memory

Oliver Wendell Holmes's idea that a photograph is a mirror with a memory raises the issue of the similarities and differences between memory and photography. Certainly the two are alike in that both displace us into the past and both represent a

[2] It is important to recall that I am not concerned with manipulated photographs in this essay. Photographic evidence can always be challenged on the grounds that the photograph has been doctored, but the challenge makes sense only if we can assume that generally photographs have not been altered in ways that distort their evidential value. Any photograph, of course, will reflect the location and interpretation of the photographer, and will require interpretation by the spectator. As evidence, photographs are self-explanatory only in a minimal sense.

past object as having been perceived. In my memory of a theater, Husserl writes, it becomes evident "that I did perceive the theater" (1969, p. 59, 2008, p. 61). Similarly, when I look at a photograph of a brightly illuminated movie marquee taken by William Klein in Times Square in 1955, I am aware that what I am seeing in the image was once perceived by Klein and also by the pedestrians the image depicts. Both memories and photographs therefore refer back to past perceptions and both represent their objects by reproducing the past perceptions, even if, in photography's case, it is the photographer's perception through a camera and not ours. In a sense, though, we appropriate the photographer's perception, since Klein's photograph places us in Times Square, looking with him through his viewfinder and seeing something of what he saw half a century ago.

But how do photography and memory differ? A key difference is that photography, like painting, sculpture, and film, offers genuine images, while memory does not. Husserl for a time embraced an image theory of memory according to which the direct and immediate object of memorial consciousness was an image in the mind, not the past object itself. Memory, on this account, would be a species of image consciousness. The appeal of the image theory lies in the fact that the past object is precisely past and no longer available to direct apprehension. It seems reasonable to assume that in order to gain access to it, one would have to go through a present intermediary that would serve as a sign or representant of the absent object. By 1910, however, Husserl had broken free from this view and had come to hold, on phenomenological grounds, that memory is a direct, straightforward awareness of the past object or event itself (1969, p. 503, 2008, p. 604), not of an image depicting it. As scandalous as it may sound, Husserl denies that there is any such thing as a memorial image. Memory is not image consciousness; it is a unique form of intentionality that represents its object in the mode of the past. Hence if I remember my mother's face, I am conscious, not of a pseudo-photographic image floating in my mind, but of her face itself as it once appeared to me at a moment in the past. This is not to say, of course, that memory presents its object as there in person. The object is indeed absent, but in its absence I am aware of the object itself in the mode of the past, not of some surrogate. A photograph, on the other hand, is genuinely an image. I perceive it directly, and it represents something else, which is its subject, which I do not perceive. It is the image, not the subject, that is given itself: Image consciousness, Husserl writes, presents an object pictorially, "but not with the consciousness of the thing itself" (1969, p. 183, 2008, p. 189). On the other hand, if a friend has been reading a novel by Sartre and wonders what the author looked like, you could show him Cartier-Bresson's photograph. The photograph would fill the reader's empty intentions about Sartre's appearance. The photograph is still an image, of course, but the subject is recorded in the image through the camera's mechanical action, which, if it does not give the subject itself, at least represents it with the kind of authority that a painting, created through the mediation of an artist's imagination, would lack. Indeed, if one wonders whether a painting furnishes a good likeness, one might well turn to a photograph to check its accuracy. A duality is still there in the case of the photograph, however, since the viewer has Sartre only through the intermediary of the image. One could write

across the bottom of the photograph: "This is not Sartre," and be both right and wrong. The depicted person is not someone other than Sartre–Simone de Beauvoir, for example–but what one sees, in its being, remains a photographic image, not really Sartre himself. Perhaps it would be better to write under the photograph: "I am what I am not, and I am not what I am."

In giving us images, photography enjoys an advantage over memory in a significant respect. Consciousness, so robust in perception, is frail in memory. Memories are often vague, fluctuating, fading, their objects given as if seen "through a sort of thick fog" (Husserl 1980, p. 202, 2005, p. 241). They are also private, accessible only to the individual living through them. They are regularly displaced by forgetfulness, and they can be notoriously untrustworthy. Photographs too can fade and mislead, but they are authentically images and as such have a physical support that guarantees them the stability, permanence, and clarity that memory lacks. Photographs are also public, available for viewing by anyone capable of seeing them. They can even serve as aids to memory and substitutes for it. The representational strength and endurance of the photograph explains why we take snapshots at birthday parties and on vacation, and record weddings in expensive and elaborate photo albums. We know that we cannot entrust everything to memory.

But photographs also have a liability compared to memory. Photographs are episodic and gappy in their recording and presentation of people, things, and events. The evidence of memory may be much more fragile than that of photography, but it is also more supple and elastic. In re-presenting our past perceptual experience, it can range much further in its investigations than a single image or even a group of images. In memory, I recall something in the particular setting and particular time in which I originally perceived it. The perceptions I recall have retentions that reach back to acts preceding them and protentions reaching forward to acts that follow them. Thanks to these intentional moments, consciousness is an interconnected and nearly seamless flow. One memory can thus lead to others intending the original object as it was given in earlier or later experiences. Seeing a photograph can certainly stir up memories or phantasies of what is represented in the image, and one can then move from memory to memory or from phantasy to phantasy. Photographic images, however, do not allow us to slide from image to image in the same way. The subject presented in the image is much "narrower" than what is perceived or remembered. I could, of course, seek out other photographs of the same person or thing, but that would still leave me with episodes, isolated moments of time suspended in individual images. Nicholas Nixon's series of photographs, *The Brown Sisters*, would be a case in point. Nixon has taken a group picture of his wife and her three sisters every summer since 1975. The photographs are fascinating because they manifest the embedded time that aging produces in bodies over a span of many years. Looking at them, however, is quite different from reminiscing, say, about one's children. I may recall one event in my daughter's life and then another that occurred a few months later. There will be a gap between the first and the second event. With memory, I can always attempt to fill the gap through further memories, which would be motivated by the memories with which I began. Photographs, by contrast, inevitably give us disconnected moments of the past.

Even when there are several of them having same subject and arranged chronologically, as in the case of the Brown sisters, they cannot fill in the empty stretches in the way that memory can. On the other hand, the photograph has the advantage that it alone lets us "see" the past in a stable, clear, and public way, albeit in the form of an image. It is because memory's objects are not represented in perceptible images that they seem to appear through a veil or fog. The photograph, on the other hand, as an image that I actually perceive, "*fills the sight by force*" (Barthes 1981, p. 91).

Fiction

The photograph's relation to reality determines its status with respect to fiction. In one sense the photographic image, because it is perceived and yet not a real thing in the world, is, like all images, a "perceptual fiction" (Husserl 1980, p. 519, 2005, p. 620). However, insofar as its subject is something that has existed and has been recorded by the camera, the photograph is not at all fictional. In painting or literature, the artist can create something out of whole cloth, a subject that has never existed and never will exist–a unicorn or satyr, for example. Photographs can attempt to depict fictional characters, but it is reasonable to say that the results are usually not very satisfying. Children's books illustrated with photographs of real people dressed up to look like characters from fairy tales are not as effective as books in which the images are drawn or painted. The photographs are too "real" and too specific. They restrict the imagination or point it in directions away from the story. Furthermore, the person posing in the photograph has a separate identity that can disrupt the presentation of the fictional character and instigate the wrong kind of curiosity. One's reaction to a photograph of Snow White, for example, is likely to be that one is seeing, not Snow White the fictional character, but someone dressed up to look like Snow White, whatever she might look like in her fictional world (we don't have any photographs of Snow White with which to compare the dressed-up figure). On the other hand, it is easy to see Snow White in a drawing or film, particularly an animated film, which tends to overcome the limitations of the photograph, offering images of fairy-tale characters that engage and absorb the viewer without distraction.

There is another reason why photographs of fictional subjects seem to be inadequate to their task. The photographic image provokes a sense of real time and real being, not of "once upon a time," and this threatens to overwhelm the fictional content it was intended to convey. Ultimately, the photograph does not work as make-believe because the viewer knows that a real person had to be there to be photographed. The world of the photograph is the *real* world, not an imaginary world. Hence it is the figure represented in the drawing that one takes to be Snow White, even though the photograph may be more "real" than the drawing. This is also why the photograph of an actor posing in the costume of a stage character makes us see the actor rather than the character. When one attends a play, one sees Hamlet on stage, but in the still photograph one sees Laurence Olivier dressed up to play the role of Hamlet.

Something similar is true in the case of depictions of religious figures. Most religious figures are temporally or ontologically inaccessible to photography, but there are occasional staged photographs of events in the life of Christ, the Virgin, or the saints. These, however, raise the same kinds of questions that photographs of fictional characters raise. This may explain why there are religious paintings and sculptures beyond counting, but few religious photographs, even ones that are staged. Painting leaves a space between the image and its religious subject for the play of imagination, which is an essential ingredient in religious experience. Barthes rightly observes that one might worship a painting or sculpture, but not a photograph (1981, p. 90). The photograph is too firmly tied to a specific moment actually perceived in the past. Film, an art form related to but distinct from still photography, can be more successful in depicting religious subjects, probably because its moving images are able to offer a dramatic narrative. Carl Theodor Dreyer's *The Passion of Joan of Arc* comes to mind.

Photography and Realism

Husserl observes that art moves between two extremes. At one pole is art whose subject is the given world; at the other is art that offers a phantasy world: "Once upon a time, somewhere, in some fable land, etc." (1980, p. 540, 2005, p. 651). Husserl calls art of the first sort "realistic." He does not simply have in mind here convincing figurative art and certainly not trompe-l'oeil imagery. In fact, he focuses on literature when discussing realism, although he notes that painting and sculpture can also be realistic. By realistic art he means art that presents "landscapes, human beings, human communities, destinies, and the interweavings of destinies, in the fullest possible 'characteristic' concreteness, as if we were seeing them, and, within a fixed frame, witnessing everything related to them in the richest possible fullness" (1980, p. 541, 2005, p. 652). Photography is particularly well equipped to achieve the aims of this kind of realism. Although Husserl does not mention photography in the few pages he devotes to realism, it is certainly the case that in many photographs we witness the concrete life of a country or city "as if we were present . . . in the society" (1980, p. 540, 2005, p. 652). Indeed, the vast majority of photographs, from nineteenth-century portraits through Philip-Lorca diCorcia's contemporary pictures of busy urban streets, are realistic in this sense. We see in them the past reality of people and places.

Time Again

We noted earlier that time in the form of "that has been" is essential to photography. There are many other ways in which photographs involve time. A comparison of painting and photography with respect to time helps clarify some of these. For

example, paintings can put us in touch with the past through their material aspects. I can examine a work by Cézanne and suddenly realize that a brush mark I am looking at in the bottom right-hand corner was put there by Cézanne himself over a century ago. Cézanne had to have been there to make the mark. I see the trace of his past physical presence and action, now sealed in the image. The "brushwork" of the photographer, on the other hand, does not lie in the material surface of the photograph but in the image itself. In seeing the photograph, I know that the photographer was once present to what the photograph depicts. The photographer can even include himself in the image as a shadow or reflection in a mirror, telling us directly that he was there.

Paintings can also *exhibit* the temporal. A painting of an old man's face or of a crumbling wall shows time "embedded" in the subject. The painting's material support can also display time. Cracks on its surface are like the lines on the old man's face manifesting the passage of years. Photographs, too, can disclose embedded time, that is, the past of the subject as displaying itself in its present existence, as the images of the Brown sisters do. In that sense, one *can* photograph the past, but only because it is there in the present, etched on the surface of the subject before the camera. The physical support of the photograph can also reflect its age, sometimes matching in its appearance the aged look of what it depicts.

Since photographs are so intimately bound to the past, Roland Barthes claimed that they are retentional but not protentional. This means that for Barthes the photograph is "*without future*," unlike the living experience of the real world, which "is sustained by the presumption" that experience will continue on in the same way (1981, p. 90). There is no reason, however, why a photograph cannot embody in its image all of the temporal dimensions that Husserl finds in a sculpture of Demosthenes that captures the orator at a single instant: "He has just completed his oration, or he is just about to begin his oration, or he is speaking" (1980, p. 536, 2005, p. 645). True, the horizon of this frozen sculptural moment is soaked with ambiguities and empty intentions that the image itself cannot fill, but this does not mean that protention is not just as much an intrinsic moment of the experience of the image as retention is. Photographs also raise temporal questions and open up temporal horizons that they cannot explore beyond the given image. It is precisely because retentions and protentions radiate from the experience of a photographic image of people walking down a sidewalk that we are led to wonder where they have been or where they are they going. Interestingly enough, Barthes himself gives an example that refutes his claim that photography lacks "protensity." He cites a nineteenth-century photograph of a young, would-be assassin who has been sentenced to death: "*he is going to die*. I read at the same time: *This will be* and *this has been*." It is "by giving me the absolute pose of the past," Barthes says, that ". . . the photograph tells me death in the future" (1981, p. 96). This is protentional, though it is true that we need to be told the story if what is protended is to have the specific content Barthes says that it has. In the case of the people walking down the sidewalk, on the other hand, we need no story to know that they were going somewhere, even if we do not know precisely what their destinations might have been. The photographs of the Brown sisters also show that photographs have a

protentional dimension. The first image in the series represents the sisters when they were young. Their very appearance suggests a future not yet fulfilled. The fascinating thing about the *Brown Sisters* series, however, is that we see in the later photographs the fulfillment of the empty future adumbrated in the earlier ones; and with the addition of each new photograph, we see the earlier fulfillments sinking further and further into the past. Because we have a series of images of the same four women taken over a substantial span of time, we see not just youth or middle age, but the process of aging itself.

The Subject and the Photograph

Ordinary perception absorbs us in the world. The perception of the photograph takes us out of the world so that we can see it. In that respect, photography is akin to phenomenological reduction. The spectator of the photograph, of course, does not merely look at a piece of paper covered with lines and shapes. He or she sees an image, and more than that, sees something–the subject–in the image. There are two senses of seeing-in in Husserl, and both come into play in photography. The viewer sees an image, an image-human-figure, for example, in the features of the photograph's physical support (Husserl 1980, p. 487, 2005, p. 582); and then "*in the image* one sees the subject" (Husserl 1980, p. 26, 2005, p. 27). The subject is particularly prominent in photography. "A specific photograph," Roland Barthes writes, "... is not *immediately or generally* distinguished from its referent" (1981, p. 5). The image in photography tends to become transparent, taking us straight to the subject–to Sartre, for example, in Cartier-Bresson's photograph. It may be true that, strictly speaking, it is the image we perceive when we look at a photograph, but it is the subject that usually draws our attention. This transparency is a relative matter–we always see the subject as the image gives it, and to that extent are aware of the image–but it is still something that distinguishes the photograph from other kinds of imagery. This is not to say that the image cannot retreat in the experience of paintings as well, but the tendency is stronger in photography. To generalize, perhaps dangerously, paintings tend to focus our attention not so much on the subject as on the aesthetic qualities of the image in which one sees the subject.

What facilitates this tendency toward invisibility is not some trompe l'oeil character the image might be thought to have. As we shall discuss in the next section, photographs rarely fool the eye in that sense. What appears in the image may certainly resemble the real thing, but ultimately it will conflict with the subject in obvious or subtle ways in color, size, and location, precluding the possibility that it would actually deceive us. This is also the case with "photorealist" paintings, which, in the end, do not quite have the look either of photographs or of reality: they are *too* real, unconvincing because hyperbolic. The realism of the photograph is more subdued, but it still fools no one, even as it brings its subject to the forefront of attention.

There are other senses of "subject" involved in photography. I am the subject who *intends* or is conscious of the photograph, but I can also become an intending subject *in* the picture. "Since the sensuous appearance *eo ipso* presupposes an Ego-standpoint," Husserl says of any pictorial image, "I am somehow *always* in the picture as picture-Ego" (1980, p. 467, note 1, 2005, p. 556, note 3). I become one, we noted earlier, with William Klein as he photographs a movie marquee in Times Square. I stand where he stood, seeing what he saw. There is a dialectic between this Ego in the image and the subject who views the image in a gallery. They are the same and yet not the same. One of them is positioned within the image, the other outside it. The one inside is fixed in place, and is forever conscious of the photograph's subject from the same distance and perspective; the one outside the image is able to move closer or further away from the photograph at will.

What is photographed, of course, is often a human subject. When that is the case, the photograph exhibits and makes intuitable a center of conscious life. The depicted subject will then look at the spectator through the traits of the photographic image. The subject in any image, Husserl says, "looks at us, as it were, through *these* traits" (1980, p. 30, 2005, p. 31). Indeed, the theme of the subject looking-at and being-looked-at permeates the experience of the photograph in multiple ways. Roland Barthes notes four of them: "In front of the lens," he writes, "I am at the same time: the one I think I am; the one I want others to think I am; the one the photographer thinks I am; and the one he makes use of to exhibit his art" (1981, p. 13). Thanks to the photograph, others, whether spectators or the photographer, "turn me, ferociously, into an object, they put me at their mercy, at their disposal, classified in a file. . . ." (Barthes 1981, p. 13). When I am the subject-matter of a photograph, there is always the danger that I will become, in Sartrean terms, an "object," an other to myself, trapped in the gaze of the other. Not all subject-matters of photography are the same in this respect. A landscape, for example, can be the referent of a photograph, but since the landscape is not a free and conscious subject, the photograph cannot turn it into an object in transgression of its authentic being.

The Photograph and Space

The photograph's physical support is an actual thing existing in the same space as the other real objects surrounding it. It is flat, can be of different sizes, and is covered with lines and colored patches. Since it is an object in space, it can be rotated in different ways. Husserl notes that there is "a *normal* position" of the physical support in which the photograph's image shows itself (1980, p. 491, 2005, p. 586). If the position of the support is changed too much, the image object will not appear as the photographer intended, or will not appear at all. If the substrate is properly oriented, the viewer will see the photographic image in the lines and colors spread across the surface of the paper. Space will then appear in the image, but not the actual space to which the support and the viewer belong. The image space conflicts with the actual space: "the one ousts the other from intuition. On the other

hand, the image space is not truly posited in actual space . . .” (Husserl 1980, p. 486, 2005, p. 581). The image-space ends where the image ends; it is framed off from actual space, although, as we shall see, there is a sense in which what is depicted in the image is continuous with actual space.

Ordinarily the space of the support and the space represented in the image are not congruent. Sometimes they are, however, at least in certain respects. A photographic image of a famous person, the president, for example, could be of the same height as the president himself. It could then be printed in lifelike colors and mounted on a cardboard cutout whose contours follow the outline of the president’s body when seen from the front. Here the shape of the physical support and the shape of the image would be partially the same, as they might be in the case of a sculptural bust. Encountering such an image can be surprising and disconcerting, and sometimes even deceiving, on the order of what happens when I see effigies in a wax museum–a favorite Husserlian example–or one of Duane Hanson’s hyperrealist sculptures. Tourists can have themselves photographed with the cardboard cutout, and the resulting image can make it appear that the visitors to Washington were fortunate enough to have run into the president while they walked down Pennsylvania Avenue. Seen in the tourist’s photograph, the image of the president–itself a photographic image–may be indistinguishable from the “look” of the actual president. The flat cutout can pass for “real” in the equally flat photograph. On the other hand, if one encounters the actual cutout on the sidewalk, one can easily dispel whatever initial illusion one might have experienced. “In the case of the photograph,” Husserl writes, “I always find the appearance of a human being, etc., though I perceive a piece of paper insofar as I produce an apprehension by means of the sense of touch [or an apprehension] with respect to my surroundings by means of the sense of sight, and so on” (1980, p. 488, 2005, p. 583). Just as I can touch the apparent skin of a wax figure and discover that it is not a real human being after all, I can touch the cutout’s surface and discover that it is cardboard and not flesh. It is unlikely that I would have to go that far, however. The sheer flatness of the image figure in comparison with the full-bodied, three-dimensional people and things around it would be enough to convince me that it is not real. In the case of the wax figure or Duane Hanson’s sculpture, on the other hand, the shape of the physical support, the image supported by it, and the subject of the image all coincide, which makes it more difficult, assuming that the color of the image is convincing, to avoid at least an initial perceptual illusion. In the case of the photograph, however, “the spatiality . . . is only an approximate, imperfect, analogical spatiality” (Husserl 1980, p. 486, 2005, p. 581).

While photographic space may not be actual space, the photograph can let us see space as we do not see it in lived perception, as in the case of the perspective in the photograph of Simone de Beauvoir discussed at the beginning of the essay. This is one of the many things the photograph exhibits. Lived perception, in contrast, does not so much exhibit the space of the world as come to grips with it. We owe the *exhibiting* of space to our images.

Finally, the space the photograph represents–the depicted space–is bound to time; and because it is a photograph in question, the time is the past. The space

represented by the image, as opposed to the appearing space *of* the image, is real space in the sense that it is the same space as the space in which we now live, only given as past. I can travel to Paris and stand on the Pont des Arts where Sartre once stood smoking his pipe. The stress, however, is on the temporal dimension: the place where Sartre *once* stood. That time-bound space, the space of 1946 holding Sartre and Cartier-Bresson, is irretrievably gone. While what we see in the image is real space, *our* space, that is, space as continuous with the space in which we now live, it is our space as inhabited at another time.

Some Aspects of Photography and Art

Photographs can be many things. They can be sources of information, but also works of art, the objects of aesthetic experience and delight. There are features of the photograph, however, which might seem to militate against its acceptance as art–above all, its apparently anonymous and automatic character. André Bazin observed that the invention of photography meant that "for the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man" (2004, p. 13). No human intermediary seems to stand between the spectator and complete objectivity in photography: The camera, making the image mechanically, gives us the things themselves, not an artist's slant on the things. Bazin, however, for reasons that I will not go into here, was still prepared to say that photography is art. The poet Baudelaire, on the other hand, made no such concession. He thought that photography's mechanical nature reduced it to the slavish recording of the look of things. The most he would grant to the new medium is that it might be of some use to the arts and sciences, and therefore deserved to be called their "very humble handmaid" (1980, p. 88). Beyond that, he was convinced that photography was corrupting and even supplanting art by pandering to the popular belief "that art is, and can only be, the exact reproduction of nature" (1980, p. 86). As a result, "more and more, as each day goes by, art is losing its self-respect, is prostrating itself before external reality, and the painter is becoming more and more inclined to paint, not what he dreams, but what he sees" (1980, pp. 88–89). Baudelaire's concerns, happily, were not realized. A crude realism did not triumph in the arts, and photography did not supplant painting, which, not long after Baudelaire wrote, entered a new and dynamic phase that had little to do with the replication of nature. Photography, for its part, flourished, and has become recognized, particularly in recent decades, as an established and respected artistic medium. This has occurred because critics and much of the general public have come to see that great photographs are created through the mediation of the photographer and not simply by the mechanical device of the camera. The photographer has an eye too, and it is just as indispensable to the photograph as a work of art as the eye of the camera. The recognition that the photographer's role is essential should not be taken to imply that photography as an art has nothing that is uniquely its own to offer. There is indeed something distinctive about photography when it

becomes art, and we do not have to look far to find it. It is precisely the same thing that sets photography apart from other kinds of imaging: the fact that the meaning of the photograph includes the existence of what it depicts.

But this collides with a common view among aestheticians, often expressed by Husserl himself, that aesthetic consciousness takes delight exclusively in appearances and is not concerned with the existence of its subject: "*The positing of actuality falls outside the boundaries of the aesthetic*: What matters within its boundaries is the purely sensuous beauty, the beauty of the appearance" (1980, p. 441, 2005, p. 521). If "the positing of actuality" is essential to photography, if the photographic image depicts its subject as actually having existed, and if aesthetic experience brackets existence, then photography as art and as something worthy of aesthetic consideration would seem to be bracketed too. One way of handling this objection is to claim that when one takes a photograph to be art, one ignores the dimension of existence and focuses on the appearing image. One concentrates, for example, on the image's formal qualities, and pays only marginal attention to its subject and the fact that the subject once existed. Such a narrowly formalist approach to the photographic image, however, will likely fail to do full justice to the image's artistic and aesthetic value. Its limitations may also explain why abstract photography has remained a subordinate endeavor among photographers, although many of them, without producing abstract images, would consider themselves formalists in a broader sense. The reason why a constricted formalism seems inadequate as an account of photography as art is precisely that the photograph's subject and its having existed almost always insist on asserting themselves. It may be true that the manner of appearing alone is aesthetic, but appearance in photography is inclusive; that is, it embraces the subject and its past existence as well as formal qualities. Indeed, Husserl's remarks about realism and his intimations that the subject can figure in aesthetic experience (see, e.g., Husserl 1980, p. 52, 2005, p. 55) suggest that he leaves room for the positing of existence in aesthetic appreciation. It is this that gives the photograph a unique dimension, distinguishing it from painting and the other arts. The inseparability of the photograph, its subject, and the subject's past existence, far from disqualifying the photograph from aesthetic consideration, brings it into the realm of art. Cartier-Bresson's photograph of Sartre is a great image not simply because of its compelling formal qualities, but also because of the way in which it presents Sartre at a particular moment and place and with a particular look, all of which once existed. It captures his essence, not in spite of or in indifference to the existential moment in which he is pictured, but because of it.

A Final Comment: Photography and Essence

Cartier-Bresson's photograph of Sartre exhibits something of a certain kind, a human being. To see a human being in a photograph involves being acquainted with what Husserl calls an "idea" or "look": "Human beings can look very different from one another, but the idea 'human being' prescribes certain possibilities for

perception: a human being is something that has a certain look in perception" (1980, p. 490, 2005, p. 585). If what I see in the surface of the photograph exhibits this "look," then I will see a human being in the photographic image. The image, however, will not merely exhibit a human being in general. I will always see in it a particular person. I will be able to identify the person if it is someone with whom I am acquainted, even if only through other photographs. Should I fail to recognize the person, I will still know that whoever it is, he or she was once actually there, present to the camera. These levels of representation involve truth: the truth that a human being, a *particular* person, did exist at a specific moment in time. The photograph can go further, however, yielding something about the person that transcends both generality and pedestrian particularity: the individual's essence. The idea "human being" may be understood as essence too, of course, but because it is general and embraces a set of possibilities for seeing that applies to many particulars, it can be expressed in a formula. The essence of the individual as an incommensurable being, on the other hand, defies such verbal articulation. It can only be shown, not stated. Barthes describes this as "the *air* (the expression, the look)" (1981, p. 107), which is not the general look of a human being but a "look" in a new sense, making possible something beyond the recognition of a type or even of a particular likeness. The look of the photograph envelops and exhibits the individual's essence. It captures, expresses, and is at one with the air of its subject. It lets the subject emerge in the image, not as one human being among others, but as the free and conscious subject it is. When a photograph misses this air, it may, Barthes says, perpetuate the subject's identity, but not its integrity and value (1981, p. 110). But when the photograph captures it, it "accomplishes the unheard-of identification of reality ('*that has been*') with truth ('*there she is*')" (1981, p. 113). The photograph, like all images, is a perceptual fiction, a figment, but its value lies in its ability, precisely as a figment, to bring the reality and truth of its subject before us in a unique and compelling way, even achieving a kind of earthbound immortality for what it depicts. If art, as Hegel said, is the presentation of the truth in sensuous form, then photography, however curious it may be among the family of images, is a remarkable art, embracing essence and existence, the general and the deeply individual.

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Chapter 4
Hobbes and Husserl

Robert Sokolowski

I have a personal reason to discuss Hobbes and phenomenology in a paper honoring Richard Cobb-Stevens. He once told me about an incident that occurred while he was driving from Boston College to his home in Carlisle, Massachusetts. At one point, a police cruiser flagged him down and the officer came up and went through the usual inquiries. The interview gradually turned into a conversation, and the officer asked Richard what he did. He said he was a professor at Boston College, and the policeman asked, "What do you teach?" On hearing the answer "Philosophy," the officer drew himself up, pointed to his badge, and said, "Do you see this badge?" "Yes." Then, in stentorian tones, "Behind this badge stands the power of The Great Leviathan." This was a striking instance of philosophy flowing back into the *Lebenswelt*.

Husserl does not say much about Hobbes, in contrast with the extensive attention he gives to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but he does mention him in his surveys of the history of philosophy and he makes some insightful, if general, remarks about him as being the source for a number of problems in later British philosophers. In the "Critical History of Ideas" found in *Erste Philosophie*, for example, Husserl says that the psychology being developed by both Descartes and his contemporary Hobbes modeled itself after the new natural sciences of the time. It proceeded as a purely inductive science, which, Husserl says, one might call "a natural science of the soul (*des Seelischen*)" (1965, p. 88). Husserl distinguishes Hobbes from Descartes, however, claiming that while Descartes attributed thoughts to a spiritual substance, Hobbes took cognitional life as "merely subjective appearance," which was to be correlated with material objects; he thereby became "the father of modern materialism and also the new materialistic psychology" (Husserl 1965, p. 94, cf. p. 301 note). He did so by transmitting into modern philosophy a bad inheritance ("ein altes Erbübel") from ancient skepticism and medieval nominalism

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(1965, p. 127). Such random remarks, drawn from Husserl's rather textbook knowledge of Hobbes, stand in vivid contrast with the detail of his discussion of later British Empiricists and their relation to his phenomenology.

This paper proposes to examine Hobbes's own work and to show how some of his doctrines can be illuminated by themes in phenomenology. It will be a retrospective analysis, examining not Hobbes's influence on Husserl but the light that Husserl's philosophy can shed on Hobbes.

Philosophical Method

At the beginning of *Leviathan*, in the introduction, Hobbes, after a long paragraph about the state as an artificial man, says that wisdom is acquired not by reading books but by "reading" men (1996, p. 10).[1] But there are two ways to read men, Hobbes says: one is by knowing the conduct of men in the world and gossiping about them, and the other is by knowing oneself, by looking into ourselves and using this knowledge to understand the ways of other men. Because of the "similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another," anyone who proceeds this way will "read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions." Hobbes claims, therefore, that we best know others indirectly, through self-knowledge. Trying to understand others without this philosophical knowledge of ourselves "is to decipher without a key," like trying to figure out a coded message without the help of the code book. This self-knowledge, however, will itself be clarified by the reading of Hobbes's writings, whose claims will be confirmed by our experience of ourselves. By reflecting on our own experience we will see that what Hobbes says is self-evidently true. Hobbes promises that his book will enable us to learn the formal structures of both human thinking and the various passions. He insists that this knowledge will focus on the passions themselves and not on their objects: "I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, etc.; not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc."

These remarks of Hobbes bear an uncanny resemblance to Husserl's claim that philosophy consists in a reflective analysis of one's own ego. Husserl says that each person must "enter into himself," where the task at hand is to describe the structures of intentionality that are found in our cognitional activities: "The Delphic motto, 'Know thyself!' has gained a new signification. Positive science is lost in the world. I must lose the world by epochē, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination. '*Noli foras ire*,' says Augustine, '*in te redi, in interiore homine*

[1] Hobbes's use of the term "to read" in this context is noteworthy. It will recur in my citations. I will quote from this edition but will modernize the spelling.

habitat veritas'" (Husserl 1977a, p. 157).[2] Husserl spells out this procedure of reflection more explicitly and in greater detail than Hobbes does, and in doing so he offers us a more adequate analysis of what philosophy is. He formulates it in terms of the transcendental reduction, in which we elevate ourselves into a standpoint from which we can contemplate our natural attitude and our natural consciousness (the noetic domain), as well as the objects with which our experience is correlated (the noematic domain). Husserl also says that we must not just think about our individual conscious experiences but must raise them to eidetic generality, that is, we need to perform an eidetic as well as a transcendental reduction. One of the criticisms Husserl makes of Hobbes is that he did not recognize this eidetic dimension but remained an empiricist who worked merely with inductive procedures even in his psychology: Hobbes suffered from "a blindness in regard to ideas and ideal laws" (1965, p. 127). For Husserl, it is through eidetic insight based on our own conscious life that we can come to know what consciousness and truth are for all rational subjects.

Another major difference between Hobbes and Husserl lies in the total absence of any reference to political philosophy in Husserl, in striking contrast with the dominance of the political interest in Hobbes. After sketching the aims of his philosophy in his introduction, Hobbes says that a private person would find this knowledge of men useful only in his dealings with his acquaintances, but "he who is to govern a nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man, but Man-kind" (1996, p. 11). Hobbes is addressing the one who will bear the sovereignty. The philosophical achievement will be put into the service of political dominion. He concedes that this task of reading mankind might seem overwhelming, but he confidently adds that his book will make it easy: "When I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself." All the work will have been done by Hobbes; the sovereign (and his subjects as well, as Hobbes will say later) will need only expose themselves to the methodic exposition of his writing. Husserl is very different from this. His aim is cultural and scientific, not political. He intends to clarify how philosophy is a science, not how it helps in governing. Hobbes, in contrast, wishes to teach both the sovereign and his subjects, whom he shows to be subjects by their own volition; at the close of Part II of *Leviathan* Hobbes expresses the hope that "men will learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey" (1996, p. 254).

There is, furthermore, nothing small-minded in Hobbes's ambition. In the previous chapter he had posed the rhetorical question: "Is it you will undertake to teach the universities?" (1996, p. 237) Will he presume to teach the teachers in the commonwealth? He concedes that this is a "hard question," but he responds, "It is not fit, not needful for me to say either I or No: for any man that sees what I am doing may easily perceive what I think." Husserl would not have been capable of such Machiavellian subtlety.

[2] Hobbes also appeals to the Delphic motto in his introduction to *Leviathan*: "Nosce teipsum, Read thy self" (1996, p. 10).

To conclude this discussion of philosophical method in Hobbes and Husserl, I would like to mention a curious passage at the beginning of *The Elements of Law*, where Hobbes discusses cognition. He writes, "There be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the image thereof, and of all those things which he had before seen and perceived in it" (1994, p. 22). Hobbes uses this thought experiment to show what he means by ideas; he continues, "Every man by his own experience knowing that the absence or destruction of things once imagined, does not cause the absence or destruction of the imagination itself." This passage resembles Husserl's own *Weltvernichtung* as presented in *Ideas I* and *Cartesian Meditations*, except that Hobbes seems to take this possibility rather casually as a step in his argument, while Husserl gives it a more important role. He uses it as one of his "ways to reduction," one of the arguments that establish his philosophical project and to explain the standpoint we need to occupy if we are to carry it out (1977b, p. 103, 1977a, pp. 17–18). Husserl drew this maneuver from Descartes, of course, and he calls it the "Cartesian way" to the epochē and reduction when he later criticizes it in *The Crisis of European Sciences*, but it is interesting to see that Hobbes made use of the same conceptual experiment even if he did not give it a very prominent place in his philosophy (1970, p. 155).

Perception and Imagination

One area in which a superiority of Husserl over Hobbes comes to the fore is in the analysis of perception and imagination, that is, in the analysis of these two basic structures of intentionality. Hobbes's treatment is vastly oversimplified. He discusses perception under the rubric of "sense." He claims that sense occurs when the object works on the eyes, ears, and other parts of the body and "produces diversity of appearances" (1996, p. 13). The effect of the object is essentially tactile; it or its effects "press" the organs of sense and then cause a further motion through nerves and other "strings and membranes" internally "to the brain and heart," where they cause "a resistance or counter-pressure or endeavour of the heart." This endeavour is a motion outward, and because it is outwardly directed, "it seems to be some matter without" (1996, pp. 13–14). Whether inward or outward, however, all we have is motion rolling on in "us," that is, in our bodies. The endeavour, this beginning of an outward motion, is tiny and barely perceptible if at all: "unstudied men" do not acknowledge it because they do not recognize any motion where the thing moved is not visible "or the space it is moved in is (for the shortness of it) insensible" (1996, p. 38). We must, however, admit its existence, because if we recognize larger motions we know there must have been small beginnings for them.[3]

[3] I would like to note the similarity between Hobbes's notion of this small displacement that he calls endeavour and Derrida's notion of différance.

Two points need to be made in response to these Hobbesian claims. The first is that Hobbes begins his analysis of sense by appealing only to bodily motions. They are generated by the object, traverse the space between the thing and the perceiver, enter the sense organs of the perceiver, and finally reach the brain and heart. At that point the bodily motion rebounds and becomes not just motion but a phenomenon: a seeming or a fancy or an appearance. How does this change occur? How does a motion become an appearance? In describing this process, Hobbes shifts from what I would call "body language" to "fancy language," but he does not explain how this transition from physical process to appearance takes place or how the transition from one kind of language to another is justified. He does not explain how we can shift from talking about bodies to talking about appearances. And yet, in a striking passage in the *De Corpore*, he recognizes the strangeness of this difference and seems to admit the dilemma: "Of all the phenomena that exist near us, 'the to be manifest' itself (*id ipsum to phainesthai*) is doubtlessly the most wondrous (*admirabilissimum*); that in natural bodies, some have in themselves 'exemplaria' of practically all things, others of none" (1839, p. 316).[4] This lyrical passage acknowledges the astonishing fact that appearances have suddenly "made their appearance" among simple bodies, but it seems to treat this fact as a mystery rather than as something to be explained. The passage is an expression of premodern, Aristotelian wonder, quite out of keeping with Hobbes's standard way of treating things and reducing them to matter in motion. I would also add, incidentally, that contemporary brain science has not progressed much beyond Hobbes on this issue; it also does not explain how the material processes in the brain and nervous system can also "be" thoughts and images in and through which we experience, name, and articulate things.

Hobbes goes on in this passage in *De Corpore* to make a statement that sounds very much like Husserl's "principle of all principles," the maxim that in our phenomenology we must take intuitive experience as the norm for all knowledge, and we must accept it with all its limitations ("aber auch nur in den Schranken") (Husserl 1977b, p. 51).[5] That is, there are absences as well as presences in intuitive experience. Hobbes's way of saying this is: "So that if phenomena are the principles of knowing everything else, and [if] sensing is the principle of knowing those principles, then it must be said that all science is to be derived from it [from sensing], and for the investigation of the causes of it [sensing], no beginning can be taken from any other phenomenon besides this one itself" (Hobbes 1839,

[4] I am grateful to James Hart for bringing this passage to my attention. See his book, *Who One Is* (Hart 2009, vol. 1, p. 61, n. 8). Part IV is entitled, *Physica, sive de naturae phanomenis, Physics, or on the phenomena of nature*. The passage reads: "Phaenomenōn autem omnium, quae prope nos existunt, id ipsum to phainesthai est admirabilissimum, nimirum, in corporibus naturalibus alia omnium fere rerum, alia nullarum in seipsis exemplaria habere." The translation in the text is my own. The passage is translated in J. C. A. Gaskin's edition of *The Elements of Law: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico* (Hobbes 1994, p. 213). My criticism of Hobbes is analogous to Augustine's critique of Democritus and Lucretius in §31 of his letter to Dioscorus (Letter 118).

[5] The title of §24 is, "Das Prinzip aller Prinzipien."

pp. 316–317).[6] The major difference between Husserl and Hobbes is that Hobbes restricts intuition to sensory perception while Husserl expands it cover categorial and eidetic insight as well.

The second point I wish to make concerning Hobbes's doctrine of perception deals with the spatial location of the appearances that bodies cause in us. Where do such appearances occur? Because a "seeming" or a "fancy" is an effect produced by a bodily motion, the appearance takes its place not in the thing that causes it but in the body that receives it, that is, it occurs in us as perceivers. The appearance is spatially displaced from the thing of which it is an appearance. This dislocation of appearances is vividly brought out in a passage in *The Elements of Law*. Hobbes writes, "Every man hath so much experience as to have seen the sun and other visible objects by reflection in the water and in glasses, and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion: that color and image may be there where the thing seen is not" (1994, pp. 23–24). The appearance is not in the thing but elsewhere, where it is a "thing merely phantastical" (1994, p. 24).[7] Hobbes refers to this shell game that nature plays on us as "the great deception of sense" and he says that it "is by sense to be corrected" (1994, p. 26). In *Leviathan* Hobbes says that if colors and sounds were in the objects, they could not have been severed from them, but we do see that there are situations "where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another" (1996, p. 14). Later on, while discussing the Kingdom of Darkness, he writes, "The phantastical forms, apparitions, or seeming of visible objects . . . are nothing real in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to be" (1996, pp. 447–448).

Hobbes is not saying that appearances might on occasion be separated from the things that appear. He claims that they *never* are to be found in the thing and *cannot* be located there, because they are the outcome of a bodily motion that has departed from the object and has found its residence in us or on some reflecting surface. If from a certain distance the object may "seem invested [clothed] with the fancy that it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy another" (1996, pp. 447–448).[8] Appearances are ontologically and spatially separated from the things of which they are the appearances.

We can use this colorful and interesting doctrine of Hobbes as a point of contrast with Husserl's doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness. For Husserl, the features that we experience as the manifold of sides, aspects, and profiles (*Abschattungen*) in which a thing presents itself to us are all experienced as lodged in the thing itself. They are given in the thing, not separated from it and dislocated

[6] Latin text: "Adeo ut si phaenomena principia sint cognoscendi caetera, sensionem cognoscendi ipsa principia principium esse, scientiamque omnem ab ea derivari dicendum est, et ad causarum eius investigationem ab alio phaenomeno, praeter eam ipsam, initium sumi non posse."

[7] We might note how strongly Hobbes substantializes appearances when he speaks of a "thing merely phantastical."

[8] Hobbes seems to imply that the fancy that occurs in us is like the image that occurs in a mirror.

elsewhere. The thing is the identity given to us in this manifold, not something separable from it. Following his "principle of all principles," Husserl takes our intuitive experience as normative for our philosophical descriptions. Features are experienced intuitively in things and not in us and we need to begin our philosophical analysis with this phenomenon as given.[9] We must not reconstruct it. Instead of appealing to a bodily motion that goes from the object to the perceiver, Husserl describes things as they directly show up to us, and with great subtlety formulates a vocabulary appropriate to such appearances. He also explains how the standpoint we adopt when we carry out such reflective analysis differs from the standpoint we enjoy when we are involved with things in the world. By working out the intricacies of the transcendental reduction, he clarifies the difference between what I have earlier called philosophical "body language" and "fancy language."

One of the strengths Husserl brings to this argument is his extremely refined differentiation of the many kinds of presences, images, and representations that enter into our experience, along with the differentiated intentionalities that are correlated with them. Husserl distinguishes between empty and filled intentions, categorial and sensory perception, imagination and memory, and imagination and after-images. A phenomenologist might go on in this spirit and further distinguish between mirrors and pictures, moving pictures and stills, television and movies, photographs and paintings, and so on. Perception itself takes on many forms, depending on the kind of thing being perceived, each kind having its own style of manifolds. Hobbes fails to make enough distinctions. His vocabulary for imaging is univocal. For Hobbes, "sense" is reduced to one kind of thing because it is reduced to matter in motion, and the appearances that are displaced from things are also flattened out into one kind: Hobbes uses the mirrored reflections in water as being the same kind of "appearance fantastical" as imagination and memory, and he does not adequately discuss pictures.[10] Because a mirrored image can be displaced from the object it mirrors, he concludes that even in perception the look of a thing can be detached from the thing itself, which is counter-intuitive and philosophically illegitimate.

Hobbes's blunt univocity in his philosophical lexicon for appearances accounts in part for his scathing, amusing, but unfair critique of scholastic theories of knowledge. Toward the end of his chapter on imagination in *Leviathan*, for

[9] In a footnote in *Erste Philosophie*, Husserl (1965, p. 151) mentions Hobbes and says that both he and Locke make the mistake of considering the perceived object as a complex of sensory data instead of seeing it as the substrate for its features. In the main text on this page he is discussing Berkeley, who, he says, fails to recognize that *Dingbewusstsein* must be seen as *Einheitsbewusstsein* and that the perceived thing is a synthetic identity in a manifold of presentations. Each of the thing's features, furthermore, such as the color or shape, is itself an identity in a manifold. Husserl observes in the footnote that the philosophical failure to recognize the identity of things seems "ineradicable, *unausrottbar*."

[10] Hobbes claims that statues do not resemble things; rather, they resemble images in the brain of the person who makes them. In discussing statues and idols, he says, "And these are also called images, not for the resemblance of any corporeal thing, but for the resemblance of some phantastical inhabitants of the brain of the maker" (1996, p. 448).

example, he writes, "Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them over to the common-sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood" (1996, p. 19). The scholastic term *species* is like the Greek word *eidos*. It does not name a thing, no more than the English word "look" – as in "the look of a building" – would name a thing. But Hobbes takes it to name a thing. The scholastics, drawing on Greek philosophy, were trying to get a vocabulary appropriate to the philosophical discussion of thinking and appearing, but Hobbes was obviously unsympathetic with their efforts. He did not offer them a charitable interpretation, to say the least, in his linguistic analysis. Each of the first eight chapters of *Leviathan* conclude with an almost ritualistic fling at the scholastics and their "absurd" verbiage, and the attacks continue at intervals later in the work. Husserl, in contrast, is concerned with trying to get the right words to name the way things show up, and to introduce the right stance that will allow us to describe how things can be identified. He also wishes to find the vocabulary to express how we ourselves can become identifiable as speakers and agents of truth. In this regard Husserl's work is more compatible with the ancient philosophy than is that of Hobbes.

Metaphysical, Mathematical, and Political Questions

Chapter One of *Leviathan* deals with sense, which is caused in us by an object that is present. Chapter two deals with imagination, whether simple or compound, which Hobbes defines as decaying sense, the continued "rolling" of the motion within us; such decaying sense occurs when the object that caused the original sense is absent and yet the motion it engendered persists. He also discusses memory (imagination considered as past), experience (many memories), afterimages (imaginations derived from strongly pressed sense), dreams (imaginations during sleep), and understanding (imagination joined to words or other voluntary signs such as nonverbal sounds, hence common to man and beast).[11] The latter five phenomena are essentially reducible to imagination but imagination is not reducible to sense; it is, rather, what happens after sense is finished. There is an irreducible distinction between sense and imagination, even though both are different stages in the continuous motion caused by the object in us. Imagination is that motion as it has rebounded within us, so it is partially generated from within and not, like sense, simply from without.

The relationship between sense and imagination demands further study. Although the two phenomena are just one motion, the motion is differentiated by its direction, first from without and then from within. But in addition there is an

[11] Hobbes's failure to distinguish different kinds of intentionality is especially obvious in regard to afterimages. He considers them a kind of imagination, but they clearly are different.

identity between the two; what we imagine is recognized as the same as what we perceived. Hobbes, however, does not account for such identity. He says, for example, that memory occurs "when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past." He also says that simple imagination occurs "when one imagines a man, or horse, which he has seen before," and he refers to imaginations of "cities we have seen" (1996, p. 16). But why do we not take the image we now have as simply another "sense"? What is it that allows us to recognize the sameness between the present image and the original sense? How is the sense of pastness introduced? If imagination is merely another stage in a bodily motion, why is it not taken as something simply present, as simply another perceptual experience and not "the same thing again"? Once again, the shift from "body language" to "fancy language" is not clarified, and a classical metaphysical issue – that of identity and difference, sameness and otherness, and even the special temporal forms of same and other – are not considered. Husserl, in contrast, with his extensive attention to the theme of identity in manifolds, directly faces such topics and develops a vocabulary to treat them.

I would like to draw attention to a beautiful philosophical formulation in Hobbes. It deals with his treatment of speech. After discussing sense, imagination, and trains of thoughts (imaginations), he moves on, in chapter 4 of *Leviathan*, to speech, the form of expression proper to man. Words, he says, are under our voluntary control, both as reminders to ourselves ("marks") and as instruments of communication ("signs"). We can manipulate them in a way that we cannot manipulate our thoughts. Words enable us to order and guide our ideas in a way that animals cannot, and they also enable us to represent or "personate" ourselves and others and so enter into political life. In leading the reader into this topic (in chapter 2), he mentions and emphasizes a particular feature of words: they exist not as single items, but are woven together in a deliberate manner by a speaker. Hobbes refers to such interweaving as the "sequel and contexture of the names of things" (1996, p. 19).[12] This is a wonderful way of expressing syntax, which Husserl calls categoriality and categorial form. Hobbes's phrase alludes to the temporal sequence of words, the fact that they follow one another in time, and it also signifies their grammatical threading and weaving, their combing and carding. However, Hobbes's ontology of speech, his explanation of how words as physical sounds are related to the meanings and the things that they embody, is far less successful than Husserl's intricate clarification of the metaphysics of verbal meaning in the first two chapters of *Logical Investigations* (2001, pp. 184–215).

Both Hobbes and Husserl were involved in mathematics, and this intellectual formation affected both their doctrines and the way they wrote philosophy. Hobbes thinks of reasoning as computation and he often uses mathematical terms to describe logical operations; adding and subtracting comprise the essential operations in thinking: "When a man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum

[12] Ibid., p. 19. On Hobbes's philosophy of language, see the valuable book: Pettit, P 2008, *Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics*.

total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another" (1996, p. 31). Sums of names are affirmations, sums of affirmations are syllogisms, and sums of syllogisms are demonstrations. He says that "Reason ... is nothing but reckoning," and he compares someone who makes an error in moving from premises to conclusions with arithmeticians who "cast up false" (1996, p. 32).[13] Definitions for Hobbes are sums of ideas, and in particular his many definitions of the passions, in chapter 6, seem to be so many equations made up of a few elementary terms. One might present his definitions formally as follows[14]:

(1) hope = appetite + likelihood of attainment
(2) despair = appetite + unlikelihood of attainment

One might even think of substituting values in such equations. For example, since:

(3) anger = courage + suddenness
and
(4) courage = aversion + hope of avoidance by resistance

we might substitute the definition of courage found in equation (4) for the term "courage" in equation (3) and change the latter into:

$(3)^1$ anger = aversion + hope of avoidance by resistance + suddenness

This procedure is very much like the substitution of terms in physics. If force equals mass times acceleration:

(1) $f = ma$

and acceleration is distance over time squared:

(2) $a = dt^{-2}$

then:

$(1)^1$ $f = mdt^{-2}$

In the way he thinks, Hobbes seems to anticipate Newton. Husserl's first book, of course, was a philosophical study of arithmetic, and his writing always maintained a mathematical tone in its precision of expression.

The most conspicuous difference between our two philosophers is the total lack of any political philosophy in Husserl. In radical contrast with both Plato and Hobbes, Husserl enters philosophy from the world of science, first from mathematics and then from logic as the core of scientific thinking. Even *The Crisis of European Sciences* responds to the cultural problem posed by science, not that

[13] Ibid., ch. 5, p. 32.

[14] For the following definitions, see Hobbes 1996, p. 41. I will discuss only hope, despair, anger, and courage, but one could perform similar operations on many of the definitions Hobbes gives in this chapter.

presented by modern political ideas. He resembles Descartes in this neglect of politics as a setting for philosophy. But although Husserl says practically nothing about political life, what he does can still be of great importance for it. After all, Hobbes begins *Leviathan* by talking about perception, imagination, reasoning, and words. His "epistemology" is a prelude for his treatment of politics. His understanding of human cognition and speech is geared toward the politics of sovereignty. It describes how a sovereign and a subject in a modern, Machiavellian state exercise their reason. Hobbes's anthropology is suited for subjects of the modern sovereign state.[15]

Husserl's metaphysics of knowledge differs from that of Hobbes, and it can be put into the service of a more classical understanding of human beings as citizens. The human person described by Husserl is a responsible agent, someone who does not need to have the definitions of moral terms imposed on him by the sovereign. If he is a virtuous agent, he can discover through his own prudence what is good and noble by nature. He can think for himself and he can converse with others; he is also capable of friendship, for which Hobbes gives no account.[16] He is an agent of truth and a practical agent, and he can politically act for himself as a citizen. He need not be personated by others or concede the whole of political action to the sovereign power. If Hobbes dissociates himself from ancient and medieval thinking, Husserl opens the possibility of regaining philosophy as such, which transcends the differences between ancient, medieval, and modern, and treats human beings as citizens and statesmen, not subjects and sovereigns. He enables us to retain our dignity even before a representative of the great Leviathan.

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[15] On the threat to human freedom in Hobbes's theory, see *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Skinner 2008, pp. 211–216).

[16] Thomas Prufer gives a highly compressed digest of Hobbes's political theory, under the heading, "Hobbes's sovereign teaching." The title is ambiguous; it can refer to both Hobbes's teaching about sovereignty and his teaching as being intellectually sovereign, that is, as ruling over minds. In a note to this section Prufer says that his major point "began to become clear to me through a remark of Francis Slade . . .: 'For Hobbes, friendship is terrible'." See *Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy* (Prufer 1993, p. 25). Without Hobbes's instruction, we are left in a standoff between tyranny and tyrannicide: "Tyranny and tyrannicide are left facing each other unless both sovereign and subject are ruled by Hobbes's teaching. The book *Leviathan* is the mortal god, the knowledge of good and evil" (Prufer 1993, p. 26).

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Chapter 5
From the World to Philosophy, and Back

Alfredo Ferrarin

In his very interesting and compelling *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy* (1990b), Richard Cobb-Stevens argues that what drives phenomenology and analytic philosophy apart is the different interpretation of the connection between predication and perception. While logical analysis since the time of Frege rejects all primacy of the presentational function of perception when it comes to the relation between sense and reference, for Husserl the description of pre-predicative intuition, how we identify particulars through their perceived features, is the indispensable foundation for all articulation in the form of judgment. Since his earliest efforts, Husserl has identified the premise of modern philosophy (the period from British empiricism up to Kant) in the thesis that "mind is a self-enclosed inner space" (Cobb-Stevens 1990b, p. 132). For Husserl, even a statement of perception cannot simply mirror supposedly distinct impressions given in a particular perception and connected—so goes the story for Locke or Hume—by intra-mental processes such as ideas of reflection. Husserl's broadening of the concept of intuition highlights both the surplus of meaning of terms denoting intuitive objects and the universality of formal and categorial dimensions expressed in perceptual statements.

Thus, judgments are not "appraisals of nominalized propositional contents;" our "speech is not guided by a scan of meanings, but rather by anticipated or achieved intuitions of the essential structures of things. (. . .) To know something is simply to possess its form" (Cobb-Stevens 1990b, p. 145). The theory of categorial intuition

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acquires central importance for Cobb-Stevens, who shows its Aristotelian inspiration and anti-modern function in general.[1]

In his transcendental turn, Husserl criticizes Kant on several counts. According to Cobb-Stevens, Kant's theory of knowledge is a response to Hume's skepticism regarding scientific knowledge. "Husserl introduced three significant changes into transcendental method. First, he extended its range by inquiring into the a priori conditions not only of scientific objectivity, but also of pre-scientific and even pre-predicative modes of givenness. Secondly, he contended that transcendental conditions can be intuited. Thirdly, he rejected the distinction between phenomena and noumena, and adopted an interpretation of the relationship between appearing and being that is more reminiscent of Aristotle than of Kant" (1990b, p. 165).

The passages I have isolated do not pretend to do full justice to Cobb-Stevens' rich book. But they are, among many insightful and instructive discussions, the select philosophical points I want to call attention to, probe a little further, and eventually challenge in this paper.

Even a superficial reading of *Ideas I* (where Husserl speaks of vision of essences in terms of *noein* and *eide*, § 19), coupled with the influence that we know Brentano, one of the most notable and important Aristotle scholars of the late nineteenth century, had on his student Husserl, makes it hard to resist the impression that Aristotle has every right to be considered a pivotal figure, and the first phenomenologist, as Heidegger famously suggested. Section "Categorial intuition and Aristotle" tries to verify in what ways this suggestion is plausible.

In section "Husserl and Kant on philosophy," I propose, rather than an exercize in imaginative variation or a meditation on the might-have-beens in the history of philosophy, a reflection on what Husserl could have gained for his own (especially his late) philosophy from a less one-sided reading of Kant's first Critique (the Doctrine of Method in particular). Husserl definitely has many important criticisms of Kant, and I do not intend to smooth out their edge (even though I believe we should not accept them at face value, either). What I want to discuss is the relation between ideas and ends, the world, and especially the teleological character that

[1] "[T]he theory of categorial intuition (.. .) essentially reaffirms Aristotle's description of intuitive discrimination," in "Hobbes and Husserl on Reason and Its Limits," in R. Sokolowski (ed.), *Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition: Essays in Phenomenology*, Catholic University of America: Washington, D.C. (1988, pp. 47–61, the quote is on p. 55). Along the same lines, in *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy* (1990b, p. 5), Cobb-Stevens writes that Husserl's categorial intuition is "a restatement of Aristotle's account of the relation between first and second substance. Like Aristotle, Husserl also describes how thematic discernment of essences requires the development of sophisticated sorting procedures and the imaginative consideration of limit-cases." See also Cobb-Stevens, R, 1990a "Being and Categorial Intuition," *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 43–66. For similar comparisons between, respectively, categorial intuition and Aristotle and eidetic intuition and nous, see Sokolowski, R. 1981, "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition," in *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences: Supplement to Philosophical Topics*, 12, pp. 127–140, and Sokolowski, R., *Introduction to Phenomenology* (2000, p. 180).

philosophy acquires in the last years of Husserl's reflection as it regains its place in a newly conceived historical trajectory.

In section "World and horizon," I discuss more in depth the notion of world in Husserl.

Categorial Intuition and Aristotle

It is beyond doubt that in Aristotle's *De anima* the notion of perception is quite broad. The parallel thesis on the world as an innerly articulated and categorially layered ground is likewise strong. The act of perception is a *krinein*, i.e., an intelligent judgment which discriminates sensibles, recognizes differences (and the differences are a well-defined and organized spectrum proper to material sensible things themselves), is self-conscious and realizes what it does, intuits relations of belonging, grasps simultaneously differences which it nonetheless relates to the same unity, and therefore has as its object a wide range of sensibles, from a color to a complex state of affairs, not simple impressions or sense-data. What is perhaps less obvious is what a presumed intuition amounts to, or what in Aristotle's vocabulary is the purported equivalent for 'intuition' (let alone how tenable an account of cognition that is). A certain continuity stretches from the basic perception of proper sensibles to the intellection of indivisibles. Some aspects are shared by proper sensibles and essences: for example, their grasp is infallible and primary (respectively, we cannot err in the perception of a *quale*, which is the basis for all more complex perception. Either we grasp an essence, prior to and the basis for predication, or we do not, in which case we ignore what we are talking about). Yet, the several acts of what we might tentatively consider intuition are by no means the same: some involve one sense at a time, some more than one (common sensibles), some, finally, require the understanding alone (*nous*).

Among the more interesting instances of a complex perception is what Aristotle calls accidental perception, by which I perceive this white body as the son of Diares, or the bile as simultaneously yellow and bitter. Here perception relates different sensible properties to their substrate. This relation is not due to an act on our part, a synthesis, let alone an intellectual connection we perform. We perceive sensibles alone ("not so far as they are themselves but in so far as they form a unity" (de an. III 2, 425b 1). The job of perception is to relate and ascribe them to their material unity: to recognize, identify, make sense of them. An inversion of the more familiar Aristotelian thesis of the primacy of substance over properties in predication or in metaphysics takes place here: proper sensibles enjoy a primacy and at once direct us to a logic of relations of belonging. When Sokolowski speaks of an introduction of syntax into the world in Husserl's categorial intuition, he almost seems to lend to Aristotle the words he evidently misses to speak again to us. But the true reason why he has ceased making sense to us is, obviously, the quite different one that we come after the reversal of this Aristotelian relation at the hands of Galilei, Descartes and Locke. When in *The Assayer* Galilei speaks about temperature and warmth in

terms of motion of imperceptible particles, he inaugurates a frame of mind that is still ours: senses are deceived by illusory appearances. What is objective is not what we see but what lies behind it; primary qualities, defined in opposition to secondary qualities, are not on a par with them, or strictly sensible to begin with, and precisely for this reason can they now be subjected to precise scrutiny in the new science.

For Aristotle, the soul is openness to the world. It is indeed the world itself in potentiality, the world as form. We become things as we know them, we become the forms we think, so that the soul has no form of its own but is rather the capacity to become each different form in turn. The soul is not removed from, but lives originally by the things of the world. It cannot be understood thanks to an original and reflective relation to itself. There is no I as opposed to the world—or the body—that functions as the pole from which all its several activities irradiate or the center which brings back to itself its various representations and actions. It is no wonder then that when Aristotle describes memory, perception, imagination, thinking, he describes them as objective processes, not as activities stemming from an original I. And knowing means letting things speak for themselves, not forcing nature to answer questions of our own asking—which is why approaching being through knowledge, language, conceptual schemes or such screens is for Aristotle self-defeating. Likewise, the idea that the mind is the indispensable mediation and condition for all discourse, that representations, pictures or methods stand as intermediaries between us and things, or that the mind, the cogito, the I should be investigated prior to and as key to our knowledge of things, is excluded from this view.

Ethics, logic and physics are relative to different and separate realms; they do not rely on, or find a unity or convergence in, a theory of the I, or of knowledge, or a homogeneous method. In fact, this means that all disciplines and sciences must respect the different kind of being and modality of givenness of their object, which in turn dictates the different criteria, aims and methods to be followed in each of them. Things have an inner order and structure which must not await our constitution. This primacy of the object, opposed to the primacy of a unitary method which alone can confer a homogenous treatment, and thereby a scientific dignity, to its objects, is the profound meaning of the ideal of knowledge as contemplation as well as of its affinity with moderation and wisdom.

Aristotle's approach does not exclude from its questions issues traditionally tied to reflection and subjectivity, such as, say, self-knowledge. Only, such phenomena are not to be approached preliminarily through the focus on an I or a soul. To account for self-consciousness (in thought or perception), for my relation to myself in practice (for example, the character, the setting of ends, recognition and empathy in friendship), Aristotle does not have recourse to or take his bearings from an I whose properties such phenomena would have to be considered, but from a soul whose object is being, and only indirectly itself.

It may not surprise us that Brentano saw the notion of intentionality prefigured in such a theory of the soul (perception and consciousness) as somehow all things, or even found in Aristotle a model for his theory of self-knowledge. What we must see is whether or not we are justified in finding in Aristotle a precursor to Husserl's categorial intuition. And here I think that we should start by noticing how for

Husserl the problem at stake is the phenomenological description of the degrees of knowledge, which involves the route from an empty (mostly, but not necessarily only, signitive) intention to a fulfillment through an intuition.[2] Husserl does not begin by setting aside the traditional modern opposition between intuition and thought, or by stressing their continuity as different forms of intending the same thing, but by acknowledging that very opposition, which he however proceeds to rephrase over and against Kant's separation and exclusive ascription of intuition to sensibility and synthesis to the understanding. The dichotomy is now recast as internal to intentionality, in terms of absence and presence, emptiness and fullness. Sensibility and intellection are not simply juxtaposed as heterogeneous. They form the two ends of a spectrum ranging from simple sensible (*schlicht*) intuition to categorial form, and therefore successive layers grounded on one another. Concepts are not simply other than intuitions; they are higher-level acts built on lower acts. We begin by noticing a sensible feature as such and such, say an elementary geometric shape; we then understands a thing as possessing that feature, and thereby make possible statements on it in a categorial form (e.g., 'the table is rectangular'); finally, we experience the coincidence between what is sensibly presented and what is referred to. This table is identified as a substrate of which I predicate the property of rectangularity.

This theory lets us reconstruct the transition from a sensuous awareness of features to a recognition of a relation parts-whole up to the grasp of a state of affairs as the synthesis of identification of such a predication and the manifestation I can point to. Language expresses the articulation of states of affairs. But, syntax is itself built upon categorial states of affairs, not the other way round, as *Experience and Judgment* is specifically devoted to showing. In this view, the sensible level is not continuous with the categorial: we need to break the flow of sensible experience to get to an identifiable, repeatable connection which we can utter and communicate. The inner articulation of an empirical whole is the object of a synthesis that goes beyond the mere noticing of its features. If categorial objects are not the result of subjective connections, nor do they mirror things. As a result, the opposition between sensibility and understanding is clarified, but because it is assumed, confirmed and deepened.

For the phenomenologist knowledge is reached through a description guided and made possible by the preliminary carrying out of the method of reduction, until it attains the fullness of evidence for a pure consciousness; and this final fulfillment is an ideal, a goal we can rarely achieve, but of which we should not lose sight in our cognitive endeavors, the overlap or synthesis of identification between two ways of intending: the empty and the intuitive.

[2] Let us leave aside the differences between the categorial intuition of the Sixth of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, the eidetic intuition or vision of essences in *Ideas I* (§§ 3–5) and in the context of the genesis of judgment out of perceptual experience (Husserl 1975a, §§ 47–50, pp. 197–215). For a comprehensive interpretation of categorial intuition, let me refer the reader to Sokolowski's masterful treatment. See, in addition to the works cited above, also *Husserlian Meditations* (Sokolowski 1974) and "Husserl's Sixth Logical Investigation," in D. Dahlstrom (ed.), *Husserl's Logical Investigations*, Husserl 2003, 109–22.

In sum, Husserl begins by the modern opposition of sensibility and thought; evidence is a goal, and evidence and intuition are the completion of a process we strive after, not a principle as in Aristotle, for whom describing a process as tending to an idea, the goal of an infinite progress, empties it of meaning and undermines its value. Thus, we are tempted to conclude to the distance between Aristotle and Husserl on this theme. But there is something else, more decisive. One of the more interesting and innovative aspects of Husserl's ideation is the role of imagination. It bestows necessity on our cognitions. This does not happen by its own virtue, for its free variation can only result in unquestionable evidence if it is ruled by essential vision. The arbitrary variations in phantasy, that is, do not *produce* an eidos, but are only relevant when they are guided by an eidos; and it is the vision of the eidos that makes us choose which directions of imagination's wavering are meaningful and worth following (how an eidos can be already given and constituted as familiar, as well as authentically grasped, independently and beforehand, so as to guide our variation, is another problem). Still, the importance of this point can hardly be overestimated: to the best of my knowledge, in the history of philosophy this is an unprecendented thesis. As *Ideas I* has it, when we examine an empirical singularity in our free imagination, we treat the individual not as a fact but as the example or instance of a possibility (Husserl 2014, §§ 3–4); the geometrician disregards the given figures because he or she only focuses on ideal possibilities, on an eidetic science (Husserl 2014, § 7). In *Experience and Judgment* (Husserl 1975a, § 97c, p. 374), Husserl will reiterate that a pure a priori has its origin in pure imagination. Imagination helps us establish an invariance to hold fast to, and with it the self-same core of things. When Husserl writes in the *Cartesian Meditations* that every entity is the example of a pure possibility (Husserl 1960, § 34, p. 71), and in the *Crisis* that an index of potential and actual manners of appearing (Husserl 1970, § 48, p. 166), he means that each finite perception opens up a system of predelineated potentialities. To use Hegelian language, I would say that Husserl's essence is unaffected by its alterity, and identity enjoys a higher status than difference. The identity, however, is itself an intended one, an index of possibilities of appearing that transcends all the presentations through which it is given. The identity is not an imagined filling of gaps as in Hume, or a rule or concept I synthesize by connecting the intuitive manifold, as in Kant. But nor is it a given *ousia*, the unchanging core of a substrate undergoing change.[3]

This invites us to recast what *prima facie* appeared as distance into an outright anti-Aristotelian position. In Aristotle imagination is at most a presentification; in the cases in which it is not alternative to perception, it is unreliable and fallible, and its function is not that of granting us access to the actual's possibilities, but of

[3] Husserl writes that for every reality non-alteration is a limit-case of change (Husserl 1975a, § 87, p. 347). As we know, modernity undermines Aristotle's physics by making movement the rule, and rest the limit-case, while for Aristotle everything sublunar tends to rest as to its natural destination, its end and full being.

offering a likely guess.[4] In Aristotle's first philosophy the actual (*energeia*) has priority over the possible in all respects, so that when this thesis is inverted what you get is not a different form of Aristotelianism, but a variation on Leibniz' metaphysics. For ideation and this notion of possibility are embedded in a quite different context, from which they draw a meaning diametrically opposed to Aristotle's. Let me explain.

For Husserl it is only through the modalization of an original, passive belief in the pregivenness of objects in the world that we perform our cognitive acts. In this view the world is an implicit universal ground of belief, the presupposition for all praxis and all judgment, co-present as the encompassing domain within which everything can affect me, stand out and become an object for me (1975a § 7). When we perceive something we always intend more than what is given to our perception. We always transcend the given; and the thing is but a system of profiles I co-intend as I perceive one of its aspects at a time. Sensible data thus are systems of references to similar possibilities: this explains why the present tends to be apprehended as a type, a schema. The world, which in the natural attitude works as this abiding familiar ground of which we are constantly aware as the source of all anticipated confirmation or negation of certainty, must in turn be seen in its being constituted through the reduction, which is the most radical methodical shift we can perform for Husserl. Through the method of reduction, we *conquer* (Husserl 2014, Introduction) the purified terrain of phenomenology. Our gaze must be turned from things back to the acts thanks to which we constitute them. The world, differently stated, is understood through the lens of our certainty of it, and the modalizations of such doxa in our pure consciousness.

To conceive the world as "lying outside the universe of possible consciousness (. . .) is nonsensical" (Husserl 1960, § 41, p. 84). Compared to this, the Aristotelian soul, absorbed in what it intends, simply is not aware that its object is but the intentional correlate of a subjective act. To recall lecture 45 of *Erste Philosophie* (Husserl 1965b, pp. 120–21), every experience and thought through which an object is present for the I is already the result of the I's conscious life, establishing the validity of its objects. This implicit constitution, this hidden functioning thanks to which the world exists for me all at once, as an undivided unity, must finally come to the fore.

If I am right, then it is hard to be surprised by the otherwise shocking (for a student of Brentano's) notion we find in lecture Eight of *Erste Philosophie*: Aristotle's psychology, not having as its clue a proper method, could be no more than a mere sketch—and the sketch is of "a universal science of subjectivity" (Husserl 1965a, p. 52). The shortcoming of Aristotle's psychology is identified in a natural naiveté that cannot represent an adequate tool for countering skepticism. Aristotle could not give a radical foundation of knowledge because he thought of the world as given beforehand (Husserl 1965a, pp. 53–5).

[4] See my *Hegel and Aristotle*, Cambridge 2001, pp. 294–306, and "Aristotle on *phantasia*," in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 21: 2005, pp. 89–123.

This is coherent, I think, with Husserl's characterization of first philosophy as a science of transcendental subjectivity (Husserl 1965b, Lecture 28, p. 4), and with the note on which the *Cartesian Meditations* end: "I must lose the world by epochè in order to regain it by a universal self-examination" (Husserl 1960, p. 157).

It seems to me that the conclusion is inescapable that either we adopt, while naturally transforming, Aristotelian notions (whether or not this means that we unwittingly remain within the Aristotelian tradition is another question), or we look for a radical new beginning for philosophy—a Cartesian or Copernican revolution—; but we can't have both.

My impression is that if the consideration of Aristotle as the first phenomenologist is so pervasive, and persuasive, it is because of Heidegger's repeated suggestions to this effect,[5] rather than of Husserl himself. Paradoxically, we can say that in *this* respect, the importance of Aristotle, Brentano is a greater and more lasting source of inspiration to Heidegger, for whom Brentano's book on being in Aristotle was allegedly a turning point, than to his disciple Husserl.

What is left, then, of Husserl's affinity with Aristotle on intuition? Certainly the picture of perception as a passage from what is passively acquired and familiar to what is known. If we were to add a concrete ontology of essences, with the complex relations between essence and appearance and unity and multiplicity, that would hardly impress Husserl. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (Husserl 1974, pp. 70–1), he writes that a material ontology must be complemented by a formal ontology, of which Aristotle had no clue and which had to wait until Leibniz' *mathesis universalis* to be first conceived.

[5] See *The History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (seminar of 1925, Heidegger 1985, § 6, pp. 47–71), *Logic. The Question of Truth* (1925–26, Heidegger 2010, Part One), and *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1996, § 44, pp. 204–220; original pagination: pp. 213–231). All those pages deal with the concept of truth, testify to Heidegger's seminal "discovery" of Aristotle in some of his most productive years (barely less seminal than his "discovery" of Kant in 1926), and offer many important comments on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Organon*. Heidegger more rarely voices opinions on the *De Anima* (see, however, the seminar of 1923–24 *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*). A striking comment reported by Oskar Becker has Heidegger claim (speaking of *De Anima* II 7, on vision): "Aristotle really in *De Anima* phenomenological (without the explicit reduction)" (Becker 1971, p. 73). See Becker, O 1971, "From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary by W.R. Boyce Gibson", in H Spiegelberg (ed.), *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 2, 58–83. My use of the word 'discovery' is not meant to downplay the originality of this new Aristotle that comes to life through Heidegger, which is entirely due to Heidegger's interpretation. For example, when Ingarden, in his 1918 letter to Husserl on the Sixth *Logical Investigation*, writes that Aristotle would have helped Husserl in distinguishing between logical and objective categories, he clothes Aristotle in the more traditional image of the inventor of logic. See Husserl, E. 1994, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 184–185. On Heidegger's inversion of sensuous and categorial in his interpretation of Husserl's categorial intuition, by which he effaces the relative independence of the sensuous and finds the categorial (and with it the problem of being) already at work in sensibility, see Dahlstrom, 2001, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge (pp. 78–88).

Husserl and Kant on Philosophy

Even if Husserl is bound to find Kant's transcendental philosophy more akin and close to his philosophical approach and interests than Aristotle, he notoriously does not refrain from sharp criticisms of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. His points are subtle, even if he does not base them on a historically careful interpretation of the book. Like many of his contemporaries (in fact, like most readers), Husserl has a very selective, not to say biased, reading of Kant's first *Critique*. What I find problematic is that, as he locates the presumed heart of the work in the Aesthetic and the Analytic, he dismantles the whole and reduces it to one part or section. Even the independent faculties he singles out—and this holds for sensibility and understanding most of all—are not understood as originating in an overarching unitary principle shaping the whole book. Like all similar readings that reduce reason to understanding, and the different forms of comprehension, reflection and thought to a theory of experience, Husserl simplifies matters a great deal as he identifies the exact nature of the problem that Kant is supposedly trying to solve.

A very thin line separates a missed reading—of the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method—from a misreading—of the whole work. But a missed reading is first of all a missed opportunity we have every philosophical reason to regret, not an error or limit we should be quick to denounce. What I would therefore like to discuss in this section is, firstly, on what counts Husserl's criticisms are still important for us, and, secondly, how his working his way to the notions of a teleology of reason in its historical development and of phenomenology as a mission, which permeate his latest pages, could have sparked, and profited from, a fruitful dialogue with Kant's Architectonics.

Husserl on Kant

Arguably, even strict Kantians would grant that the first *Critique* is a tangled web of elusive concepts, phrased in a superficially precise vocabulary actually replete with complicated and perplexing distinctions hiding countless ambiguities, oscillations, and occasional contradictions. The sometimes convoluted prose and the hasty writing of a masterpiece in certain cases put together out of notes from different years during a long decade of gestation do not help; and the often cavalier coexistence in the second edition of important revisions alongside entire chapters that have instead remained unaltered (I refer to the different treatment reserved to the Deduction and the Schematism, among others) help even less. The reader's reaction, that the more you read the book, the more opaque certain distinctions appear, is quite justified. Still, provided we find in it sufficient motivations for further examination, this difficulty should increase a charitable attitude in our exegetical endeavor, not strengthen a prejudiced dismissal. In particular, one effort should be in order: that of not conflating an order of exposition with an order in

things. This holds especially for the stress on the dichotomies intended to highlight the separation of sensibility and understanding, which are relatively independent and can even work unrelated to one another (in pure intuition, or in general logic, for example), but whose heterogeneity is not the final word for Kant, for his problem is how they are united and collaborate in the schematism, the figurative synthesis and the principles of our experience in general.

Having said that, it is undeniable that for Kant intuition can only be sensible, and that things in themselves cannot be easily abolished as post-Kantians thought. Here certain ways out, such as the distinction of respects and the noumenon as a mere limiting concept, are facile shortcuts precluded by other Kantian texts and, more importantly, by other Kantian considerations, such as the noumena's practical reality and causality, and things-in-themselves' affection of our senses. In this sense, Jacobi's famous specter—without the assumption of things in themselves I find no access to Kant's system, with that assumption I must leave it—looms large as the most honest expression of a dilemma still haunting Kantians. Thus, the third of the criticisms on the relation between being and appearing in Kant recalled by Cobb-Stevens in the passage quoted at the beginning is well-taken. So seems to be the second one, on the non-intuitability of transcendental conditions. What about the first one?

For Husserl Kant is not radical enough. He presupposes that outside me lie things exercizing their affection on me, and then proceeds to separate what is contingent about appearances, due entirely to changing affections, from what is universal and necessary, which must then be due to our own faculties (Husserl 1965a, p. 379); thereby he can be said to replace things with our sensibility (Husserl 1970, § 25, p. 94). His vision is marred by the psychology of his age, so that, when he brings all intuitive connections back to the imposition of our forms on to appearances, he shows he is taking his bearings from atomistic sense data, rather than from things with their own organization and articulation (Husserl 1965a, p. 358). Because he does not grant sensibility any independence, and connections for Kant are first set up through our apprehension, his sensibility does not differ markedly from Hume's. Instead of by custom and habit, the several connections are made possible by syntheses guided by other principles, except that these remain no less subjective in nature. The understanding has a double way of functioning with respect to nature: on the one hand, as the source of its laws in explicit self-reflection, on the other, though, as ruling in concealment the intuitively given surrounding world (Husserl 1970, § 28, p. 104 & § 30, pp. 114–15). But Kant does not succeed in making this latter stage comprehensible because he adopts a regressive and not an intuitive method.

A few points are worth singling out. After 1924 (which marked the bicentennary of Kant's birth), Husserl must have devoted renewed attention to Kant's first Critique for the occasion of a celebratory piece ("Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie," Husserl 1965a, pp. 238–87). Since then, he has been laying a more definite value on Kant's genuine attempts than on his failings. Specifically (and I think it is important to note that this happens during Husserl's genetic phenomenology phase), Kant's effort is identified in the attempt at a direct grounding of constitution in the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction, which,

however commendable, fails because of Kant's misunderstanding of the three syntheses as resting on an inadequate faculty psychology (Husserl 1965a, p. 282, and *Crisis*, Husserl 1970, § 28, p. 104).

Lack of radicalism goes hand in hand with an abstract method that does not end up in intuitive evidence. This charge of lack of audacity and rigor in reaching down to roots, literally, amounts also to lack of transcendentalism proper. We can say that Kant's transcendentalism was on the right track in its fight against objectivism: the sense of being of the pregiven life-world is a subjective configuration, the achievement of pre-scientific experience (Husserl 1970, § 14, p. 69). What we now need is to bring this move to its completion in a deeper examination of transcendental subjectivity, which pre-gives the world and then objectifies it. The genetic phenomenologist of the *Crisis* finds in the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition of the Critique a discovery whose greatness demands new work shedding light on the understanding's double functioning: i.e., over and above its explicit laws, its familiar but hidden constitution of the ever developing meaning-configuration that Husserl calls the intuitively given world (Husserl 1970, § 28, p. 104). Let me note, moreover, that among his criticisms, this—that Kant does not dare push his Copernican revolution far enough—is one of the few that would resonate with Heidegger's charge that Kant recoils before the abyss he had discovered in the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition of the Critique for fear of the unknown.

Finally, what Husserl laments belongs, it bears highlighting, in the sphere of Kantian sensibility (inner sense, time, a priori and pure intuition), not of transcendental logic. Kant's understanding is hardly the object of criticism—and this is not surprising if we read that transcendental logic is only possible within transcendental noetics (1965a, p. 281). It is an understanding configuring the sensible world, with all its shortcomings, that matters to Husserl. What Husserl repeats about this is a generic critique that has less to do with Kant's theses on the understanding, the categories, judgment, the I-think, etc., than with Kant's attitude. And the attitude at issue is again a prejudiced one: Kant favors naturalism as he takes for granted, even starts from, the validity of natural sciences, mathematics and physics, in his grounding of experience.

As I said, these criticisms are quite apt in genetic phenomenology's attempt at unveiling the hidden and preliminary constitution of what is experienced as already given configurations of meaning. They cannot be separated, however, from other criticisms we find in Husserl dating back to earlier years. When the later Husserl writes that perceptions have an inner connection whether I actively apprehend them or I am focused on something else, and are therefore established in the sphere of passivity (Husserl 1975a, § 38, p. 165), i.e., not through an active synthesis, he develops criticisms that themselves arise out of a recasting of the notion of a priori. And it is in this context that we should evaluate what Husserl says about Kant's misconceived notion of a priori.

Certain multiplicities, as Husserl showed since the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, come in thematically united groups that involve no synthetic activity whatever. Sensible things have essential or internal properties that prescribe the range of possible connections and variations. We can say that if for Kant no analysis is possible unless as the analysis of a prior synthesis, in Husserl in turn we only unify

or synthesize what is originally given as unitary. The a priori first has to do with the essence of given things, then, and is therefore a material a priori. Colors, sounds etc. come with their own spectrums of possible variations. If all "perception brings with itself a whole perceptual system" (Husserl 1966, p. 11), then associations and connections do not depend on the force of attraction that rules the mental world, as Hume would have it, but on the inner articulation of the world of experience. Receptivity must acquire the philosophical dignity tradition has always denied it.[6] Husserl does not go down the Kantian path and claim that the concept is the rule for Hume's association. The rule is in the things we apprehend.

In the secondary literature this contrast is made much of in order to set up an opposition between Kant and Husserl that I think is overrated. I have in mind two reasons. Firstly, this opposition is reached at the cost of effacing all subjectivity from Husserl's passive synthesis. Even if the connections are established in the sphere of passivity and there is no explicit or voluntary activity on the part of an I, still the passive synthesis does not happen without at the very least the subject's minimal, pre-predicative and lower-level act of taking note of affections, holding fast to them and giving them a temporal duration. Secondly, this opposition makes the I-think's syntheses deliberate and conscious activities (an interpretation there are many reasons to question), and tends to simplify what Kant means by spontaneity. Granted, Kant does not lay an analogous value on receptivity. And yet, Kant could retort that pure intuition is not merely being affected but involves a spontaneity that differs substantially from the spontaneity of the imagination or the understanding, but is nevertheless crucial to order the sensible manifold (1998, KrV B 34), so that bringing Kant's inner sense, as well as all the psychology Kant is supposedly indebted to, back to the empiricist blank slate (Husserl 1970, § 30, pp. 114–15) is quite mistaken.

It would take us too far to discuss Kant's synthesis and spontaneity in this connection. What I want to underline here is that a related, but more serious and basic, misunderstanding on Husserl's part is that of Kant's a priori. As Cobb-Stevens reminded us, for Husserl Kant's theory of knowledge is a response to Hume's skepticism. Interpreting the first Critique in these terms is inextricably and inevitably linked with a prejudiced reading of Kant's a priori. One of the earliest occurrences of the criticism according to which Kant misses the authentic phenomenological concept of a priori is, not surprisingly, the Sixth *Logical Investigation*,

[6] I find it very instructive in this connection that in one of his marginal notes to his copy of Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* Husserl wrote that if we are, unlike God, receptive, this is no reason to make receptivity a deplorable limit of our human condition of finitude. We should not diminish receptivity's essential role, because a cognition that involves no receptivity is an absurdity for us. "All knowledge is intaking (*hinnehmende*), thus not "unfortunately" intaking", is Husserl's objection to Heidegger (1997, p. 444). "Why talk of finitude rather than receptivity?," asks Husserl (1997, p. 443). And then with regard to the idea of an *intuitus originarius* and *intellectus archetypus* he writes that if God needs no explication of intuition or step-by-step getting to know things or fixation in language, "such a God is an absurdity" (Husserl 1997, p. 443). See also *Ideen II* (Husserl 1991, § 18(g), p. 85).

precisely as Husserl clarifies the gap between intuition and thinking (Husserl 1984, § 66, pp. 241–243). The reason for Kant's failure is that he has not achieved the concept of categorial intuition, and cannot recognize the basic difference between intuition and signification. It follows that Kant does not possess a theory of the diverse kinds of concepts, and that his epistemology is metaphysical (in a pejorative sense, meaning dogmatic) because his aim is that of rescuing mathematics, natural science and metaphysics. This critique holds not only on the theoretical, but also on the practical level. For Kant does not see the eidetic a priori lawfulness internal to the sphere of feeling, in its necessary relation to value (Husserl 2004, § 44, p. 215). Back in 1903 Husserl had written that Hume, unlike Kant, has an authentic concept of a priori, as a relation grounded in the universal essence of concepts and intuitable in evidence (Husserl 1965a, p. 354; see also, in 1915–16, the essential necessity in the vision of essences missed by Kant: Husserl 1965a, p. 402). Kant limits himself to introducing principles other than habit to organize experience; but that does not make them less subjective, so that Kant's theory winds up being no less skeptical than Hume's. After all, asks Husserl, do we not find in Hume's idea that the unity of experience conforms itself to thought the Copernican turn that Kant made explicit (Husserl 1965a, p. 354)? Is Kant not a subjectivist and a phenomenalist, then, if he reshuffles all lawfulness to our faculties while claiming things in themselves are forever beyond us?

Husserl, it seems to me, reads the *Critique of Pure Reason* in terms of the *Prolegomena*, where it is easy to be misled about the extent and importance of Kant's pronouncements on the dogmatic slumber interrupted by Hume. And misled, no less importantly, by the regressive or analytic method that, if definitely more abstract than the A Deduction, is itself not a method but an expository strategy meant to ease the difficulty of the first Critique for reluctant readers such as Feder, starting from the givenness of sciences relying on synthetic a priori principles and rising up to their condition. As a result, Husserl does not even seem to be aware of Section 27 of the B Deduction, in which Kant speaks of the epigenesis of reason and denies that he purports to describe what is supposedly implanted in human nature, which is "precisely what the skeptic wishes most" (1998, KrV B 167–8). In any case and regardless of epigenesis, Husserl never seems to doubt the plausibility of his image of Kant. After all, most of his contemporary self-appointed Kant heirs thought and taught the same.

My conjecture, that Husserl is bound to read the a priori as the faculties human beings are naturally equipped with because he understands Kant as a Humean, appears to be strengthened if we consider this point: Husserl rightly identifies the fundamental problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as that of synthetic a priori judgments, but he misunderstands the very meaning of this problem.[7] I find it

[7] See the ms. A I 36 quoted in Kern, I. 1964, *Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus*, The Hague: Nijhoff 1964 (p. 185): the problem of synthetic a priori judgments "*kann nicht den Widersinn bedeuten, wie kann der Mensch oder ich in meiner Immanenz apriorische Urteile (. ..) fällen, die für Gegenstande, die ausserhalb meines Bewusstseins an sich sind, gelten, sondern wie die Sinngebung der erfahrenen und gedachten Natur zu verstehen....*" Cfr. Kern 1964, pp. 179–87.

striking that he repeatedly and with few exceptions calls it the problem of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (Husserl 1986, pp. 4–5; Husserl 1965a, p. 285, 373; Husserl 1976, *Krisis*, § 73, p. 272, and App. XV p. 455 (neither passage is included in David Carr's translation)). The excision of 'pure' is not for the sake of brevity. It seems significant for the same reasons I pointed out earlier: reason is Husserl's name for an intentionality directed towards reality aiming at evidence and intuition, not for the pure principles of all speculative and practical legislation, let alone for reason's striving to the unconditional totality of its concepts.[8] Reason is the reason of experience, not a pure reason independent of it.

Husserl ascribes to Kant the notion that neither analytic nor synthetic a posteriori judgments contain any riddle, whereas in truth these latter present the same problem as synthetic a priori judgments (1965a, p. 380). Kant would object that the problem is quite different, but also deny that analytic judgments should be construed as tautological in Husserl's sense (a good part of his reply to Eberhard focuses on this). And he would also deny that synthetic a posteriori judgments present no problem. Only, he would add, the problem is not relevant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which must only investigate pure, not empirical concepts (in fact, it is in the lectures on logic that Kant offers his elaborate theory concerning *Merkmale* and the formation of empirical concepts).

What Husserl does not see is that the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible is the question of the powers and limits of pure reason. And pure reason enjoys a peculiar autarchy, which it would be wrong, again, to understand as a Humean mind enclosed in its own sphere. For Kant's reason is most essentially a lawgiver, and a judge of its own laws: it uses its powers, and critiques them. In the tribunal it sets up, its gaze is solely on itself; but on itself insofar as it is bound to transcend itself towards the world, to extend itself beyond what it is. Its legislation is directed towards two metaphysical realms, the speculative and the practical orders it constitutes and legislates over.[9]

[8] Examples of this meaning of reason are, among many others, Husserl's reference to his own Fifth and Sixth *Logical Investigations* within the context of his critique of Kant (Husserl 1965a, p. 233); § 23 of the *Cartesian Meditations* (Husserl 1960, § 23, p. 57); the journal entry of 25-9-1906 (quoted in I. Kern, 1964, p. 181). The 1907 lecture-course on thing and space is entitled *Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und der Kritik der Vernunft*. None of that, as is clear, bears an obvious relation to Kant's reason.

[9] I believe that, with respect to some of his theses he would describe as antithetical to Kant, Husserl could have found in Kant instead a kindred spirit. I have two fundamental ones in mind, in particular. If one reads the first Critique as an inquiry into reason's inner articulation, rather than as a response to Hume and as the validation of the sciences of the natural world, then Kant would agree that "the point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it" (Husserl 1970, § 55, p. 189). And, if we think of Kant's notions of transcendental object, and then the affinity of appearances in the A Deduction and the *natura formaliter spectata*, I believe Kant would have subscribed to Husserl's following words in *Experience and Judgment* (Husserl 1975a, § 8, pp. 38–9): "*unfamiliarity* is at the same time always *a mode of familiarity*. What affects us is known in advance at least insofar as it is in general a something with determinations; we are conscious of it in the empty *form of determinability*."

For these reasons I believe that the criticism recalled in Cobb-Stevens' first objection is one-sided. This is too bad, because Kant is always praised by Husserl as the last of the great philosophers who kept alive the ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science, striving to achieve definitive results. And it is all the worse particularly because Kant's reason could have appealed to Husserl for its grounding the interrelation of teleological and historical development, mankind's destination and the mission that philosophy must assume in its fight against irrationalism, positivism and skepticism, and an original unity of theory and practice that presides over even the stark separation of realms that we must affirm anyway.

Philosophy and the World

This interrelation is for Kant a net of mutual implications and references justified by and in the sections of the first Critique most neglected by Husserl, i.e., the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method. It is especially in the Architectonic that these threads are pulled together in their unity under the aegis of cosmic philosophy. Here we read that reason does not borrow a model from the sciences; on the contrary, the sciences can assume a systematic form only when reason provides "the end and the form of the whole" (1998, KrV A 832/B 860). Reason is architectonic and plans its edifice independently of determinate cognitions: it is not instructed by the understanding, but projects the thoroughgoing form of its cognitions and directs the understanding itself in its use. Reason is prior to the understanding and its several cognitions, as it is prior to sciences (if the method is the scientific form of the whole, it would not make any sense for reason to import a method, mathematical or scientific or otherwise, from without). In fact, only reason's system counts as a science, because it is the only systematic ordering of parts. Sciences do not enjoy the comprehensive gaze that philosophy has; if the artisans of reason (*Vernunftkünstler*: mathematician, logician, natural scientist) are compared to cyclopes that must be given back their second eye by philosophy, then scientific cognitions are but the means to reason's self-knowledge.[10]

Reason cannot find rest in its empirical use. Searching for answers, especially to the three questions outlined in the Canon and to the question of mankind's final destination, is the most pressing need and the strongest pull for reason. It demands to go beyond experience, to the condition, the principles that make it possible as a coherent whole; and what it cares about and seeks is the maximum completeness for

[10] Reflexion 903, in Ak 15.1, pp. 394–95, Refl. 2020–3 in Ak 16, 198–9, and the Jaesche logic (Ak 9, p. 45, 1992 p. 554). See my "The Unity of Reason. On Cyclopes, Architects, and the Cosmic Philosopher's Vision," in *Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlichen Absicht/ Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010-Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense/ Proceedings of the Eleventh International Kant Congress*, Five Volumes, ed. by S. Bacin, A. Ferrarin, C. La Rocca, M. Ruffing, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013, vol. 1, 213–28.

all concepts used, because only completeness can satisfy it (Prolegomena, Kant 2010, p. 144, Ak 4, p. 354).

The ideas are the shape in which reason can think the completeness it aims at in a determinate way (Prolegomena, Kant 2010, p. 123–24, Ak 4, p. 332). Ideas are not simply concepts without a corresponding object. Without reason's ideas the understanding's cognitions are incoherent, as an aggregate without unity. If the understanding looks for concepts unifying the manifold, reason seeks to comprehend the given in its ultimate condition, its maximum unity, its non-given and non-givable totality. Ideas are totalizing drives, projections beyond nature directing all induction and research on nature, that unify and direct all use of our faculties. As such, they are at once ends and principles of organization of parts, generative processes aiming at a totality of conditions.

Reason is in this sense an activity of inquiry guided by ends, which are focal points, outlooks we tend to, not givens we must discover. If, through its several ideas, reason generates a world, it is the architectonic idea that organizes an interrelated system of rational cognitions. And it is philosophy that is called upon to follow its lead. In its authentic sense, philosophy is cosmic philosophy, constituted, that is, by a *Weltbegriff* or world concept, the idea of an absolute and unconditional totality, an intelligible order of means and ends (for "philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason," (1998, KrV A 839/B 867)). If, as in an organic system, this whole is immanent in and prior to the parts, no question or rational activity can be pursued in isolation. If artisans of reason are means to reason's essential ends, cognitions should not be pursued for their own sake but instead be used for ends that transcend specialistic-scholastic knowledge. In cosmic philosophy, theory and practice, irreconcilable and divided with respect to their realms of application, are unified; in fact, reason's speculative and practical employments and interests stem from the same original unity in thought.

Cosmic philosophy is thus primarily an attitude with regard to cognitions and an awareness of ends based on a keen sense of reason's interests. It is modest, in that it is the awareness of the insufficiency of our cognitive efforts with respect to our destination, without fostering irrationalism or what Kant dubs misology. And it is in a different respect quite haughty, in that, by keeping in view the highest good at all times, it directs us to a form of quasi-divine wisdom. Cosmic philosophy is a living engagement, and a practice inspired by the idea of the world; and philosophers are not judged for the cognitions they have but for the use they put them to.

I believe there is a definite Socratic streak in this notion. Still, I think that most interpretations of the primacy of practical reason in Kant end up in a non-Kantian abdication of reason to morality. The notion of the highest good is not a practical concept but a symbol of the questions raised in the Canon, or, differently stated, an idea of reason unifying the two separate legislations of pure reason (speculative and practical) and all rational ends in a focal point, the concept of our final destination.

If reason is such a tight unity, its link with history appears substantially weaker. The Doctrine of Method concludes with a 'History of pure Reason' that raises more than one eyebrow. For it does not seem to ground the historicity of reason's

cognitions in ways that we, coming after Hegel, Marx, and historicism, might expect. Upon closer examination, however, it emerges that history is the necessary stage of reason's progressive deployment in the world, and reason must be understood historically. To its retrospective gaze, reason understands its progress as run by a teleology which is its full rule over itself. Turning cosmic philosophy into a cosmopolitan philosophy and helping mankind come out of the tutelage and minority it has put itself into are aspects of the same point: reason demands autonomy in all its fields, and its enlightenment in speculative and practical terms takes place progressively as a conquest to be made in history. Reason is in a position to achieve this result insofar as it refuses to be guided by maxims and principles other than the ones it sets to itself in a thorough and comprehensive systematic way (for, regardless how systematic philosophers consider themselves, reason is essentially systematic; in fact, it is subjectively a system, of inquiry and organization of its cognitions (1998, KrV A 738/B 766). In philosophy, this means that we should not focus on historically determinate results or on doctrinal systems, but on a practice, an activity: we cannot learn philosophy, "we can at best learn to philosophize" (1998, KrV A 837/B 865).

When Husserl approvingly quotes this Kantian dictum in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, however, what counts for him is not Kant's maxim to think for oneself, but the lack up to now of "objectively grounded doctrinal contents" (Husserl 1986, p. 4), and therefore of a scientific system as a definitive foundation admitting no opinions or points of view. Kant thought indeed he had put metaphysics on a scientific path; Husserl clearly disagrees, and calls for a new radical beginning in the more rigorous phenomenology. When, in turn, Eugen Fink recalls this notion of philosophy as an activity of philosophizing in his commemoration of Husserl's death in 1938, he understands it as the withdrawal from all roles in life and the questioning of all fundamental ideas of being and truth we have received (Fink 2004, chap. 3). Fink thinks he is thus being faithful to the spirit of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. Unlike Heidegger, among other Husserl pupils or collaborators, Fink is one of the few who take the phenomenological reduction as crucial to revolutionize our way to see and live through our experience, and even renew our life. Unlike Heidegger, who focuses mostly on the first Critique's Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic—as does Husserl—, and whose notion of world is not the direct result of a dialogue with Kant's Weltbegriff, Fink is also one of the few phenomenologists who take seriously the Transcendental Dialectic. He thinks that Kant's revolution does not consist in the turn from the object to the subject that grounds all objectiv-ity, but from the inner-worldly being to the world itself. Kant has discovered the cosmological difference: the world is not a being, for it cannot be brought to presence, and conversely no being, not even God or the soul, is outside the world as a universal horizon of being, its *Inbegriff* (Fink 1990, p. 117). Despite its external appearance and chapter division, the Transcendental Dialectic does not pursue three different directions of inquiry, i.e., God, the soul and the world, because all questions are internal to the problem of the world. The antinomies arise when reason takes the world as a given totality,

instead of as its own motivation to seek the ultimate condition for all conditioned appearances.[11] The ontology of the Transcendental Analytic eventually comes to clash with the Dialectic, wherein Kant expounds reason's most genuine concept, that of the unconditioned.

Fink expresses these points after Husserl's death. Still, Fink's influence on Husserl's move away from the Cartesian starting point to the theme of the world between 1931 and 1933 can be documented with a certain precision.[12] While the *Cartesian Meditations* grounds phenomenology in a pure ego independent of and over against the world, Fink criticizes this approach and draws Husserl's attention to the problem of man's place in the world, as its transcendental origin. Husserl agrees with Fink and confesses his path was wrongheaded and muddled. The starting point of the *Crisis* is the very different one of the pregivenness of the world.

In the last years of his life, in the face of his growing preoccupations for the crisis of humanity, and of his fears regarding the propagation of irrationalism, skepticism, including the faddish existentialism of his now estranged collaborator Heidegger, and positivism, Husserl offers a diagnosis of the "sickness" of Europe (Husserl 1960, App. 1, p. 270), and a cure: the universalism and idea of mission philosophy has always had and must again endorse. This is not a new discovery proper to the *Crisis*[13]; it only becomes more pressing and urgent during Husserl's last decade, and is voiced in progressively more tormented and alarmed tones before the impending catastrophe. This mission has, in other words, an historical index. When Kant laments that metaphysics, once the queen of sciences, is now in exile and disrepute after the despotic rule of dogmatists and the anarchy of nomads, i.e., skeptics (1998, KrV A viii, Preface), his history is pure reason's history, and does not come clothed in threatening garments. When Husserl identifies the queen of sciences in philosophy (Husserl 2004, § 5, p. 27) and later in metaphysics (Husserl 1970, § 3, p. 9), and calls for a renewed sense of the philosophical ethos, he deplores

[11] Granted, this is a line Fink believes we must probe further, beyond the limitations of Kant's first Critique and of phenomenology itself. For Kant himself ends up transforming this problem into a subjective idea. Nor does Fink spare Husserl and Heidegger his criticisms on their respective concepts of world. I cannot pursue this thread here; let me refer the reader to a thorough essay (in Italian) on this subject: Lazzari, R 2009, *Eugen Fink e le interpretazioni fenomenologiche di Kant*, Franco Angeli: Milan (on Fink's critique of Husserl's concept of world, see, pp. 240–58).

Finally, let me note that Fink's interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic is divorced from all treatment of the Doctrine of Method (Discipline, Canon, and especially the Architectonic and History I have recalled) and the concept of cosmic philosophy. In the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, the Doctrine of method does follow the Doctrine of Elements; its theme, though, is not reason's reconsideration of the form and end responsible for its system as in Kant, but the transcendental world-constitution of the phenomenologizing I as philosophy's most fundamental theme opened up by the reduction (see Fink, E 1995, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation,* pp. 10–2).

[12] See Bruzina's reconstruction in Fink 1995, pp. x–xlv.

[13] See, for example, the articles written for the Japanese journal *Kaizo* in 1922–23 (Husserl 1989, pp. 3–94).

less the weariness and indifference towards truth than the menace of spreading blindness and a sore loss of meaning in his historical situation.

Both Kant and Husserl speak as prophets announcing the advent of a new philosophy. If Kant is a spokesman of the enlightenment in favor of mankind's liberation from darkness through reason's autonomy, Husserl thinks that the philosopher ought to be a functionary of mankind. I believe it would not be too wide of the mark to say that in Kant it is reason's inner necessity that pushes us, after many gropings and impasses, to critical philosophy, whereas in Husserl no renewal is possible without an effort of the will. Reason in Kant is a power, a force, a motivational thrust; in Husserl it needs to be chosen and supported by our decision. This voluntaristic streak may be self-deluded, as his critics point out, but it rests in part, it seems to me, on a more secular consideration of self-reliance, faith and hope. If in Kant reason's ends and mankind's final destination point us to a world in which happiness and morality can coincide, in Husserl there is no reference to a world or life beyond this one.[14] Thus, in Kant reason is dissatisfied with *Vernunftkünstler* (artisans of reason), with the sciences, and with cognition, because it aims at questions that none of them can appease; in Husserl the dissatisfaction is a crisis rooted in reason's own betrayal of its universalistic ideal and authentic calling, and its reduction to objectivism and positivism.

For both Kant and Husserl, insisting that philosophy is a reminder of the whole we tend to forget and underlining the practical destination of philosophy and all theoretical activity are one and the same thing. Still, their positions differ on some significant aspects. If Kant restores, against the use prevalent in modern philosophy, the idea to its original Platonic meaning, except that he deprives it of reality, Husserl recasts Kant's idea in the shape of an infinite striving towards an unattainable goal. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl writes that all sciences are subordinated to the idea of an infinite unfolding of theoretical reason; this infinitely progressing science has for mankind a function that surpasses the theoretical scope (Husserl 1974, § 7, pp. 28–9). Kant blames artisans of reason as well as all philosophy in a scholastic sense for their oblivion of ends. About philosophy's ruling role over sciences, Husserl almost echoes Kant on cyclopes: scientists forgetting the inseparable connection of all sciences, which are like branches of the same tree, wear "methodical blinkers" (Husserl 1974, p. 4). However, unlike Kant, who roots cosmic philosophy in pure reason's highest interest, Husserl bases philosophy's ethical meaning on a personal resolve; and this implies an inversion of universal and individual. In Kant, in other words, reason is an impersonal and universal agency, and I endorse it as I make it mine, as I particularize it in my life. In Husserl, by contrast, I as an individual decide to affirm the

[14] It is not to Kant but, if anyone, to that peculiar Kantian named Fichte, and to his transformation of Kant's imperative into that of realizing historically man's destination, that Husserl comes closest when he speaks of the philosopher's mission and responsibility. See also what he says about the theoretical questioning as decisive and determinant for personal and practical life in "Fichtes Menschheitsideal," in 1986, p. 271.

universalism of an ideal, the ideal of knowledge responsible for itself guiding sciences since Plato (Husserl 1974, p. 3).

Let me note a few more traits in this idea. If there is an ethos of theory opening up for us the perspective on to a new world, it would hardly be possible without the specific and primary virtue of self-responsibility and truth to oneself that Husserl calls *Eigentlichkeit* (and all lapse from it is accordingly caused, I believe we must conclude, by what Aristotle calls *akrasia*).

Unlike in Kant, where sciences miss the comprehensive vision that only philosophy affords, in Husserl sciences are already modelled after the procedure of arts or *technai*, after, that is, a form of making ruled by a project addressed to a practical end.[15]

Also, philosophy is a *Beruf:* at the same time, a profession and a civic vocation, i.e., a response to a calling, the quest for an apodictic science. This means that, if theory and practice are not divided, what is practical is not reason's subordination of all activity to the final destination it aims at, as in Kant, but its theoretical activity itself, its scientific ideal of an ultimate grounding. Phenomenology—the reduction, the decision to establish a radically new science—is the highest practice, even a choice of life, not an abstract intellectualistic enterprise. In *Erste Philosophie* the philosopher's life is described as an absolute vocation and calling (Husserl 1965b, p. 11). Naturally, this choice is possible through an original institution, a selfcreation, an authentic decision (Husserl 1965b, p. 19). The model here is Descartes, the self-made man starting from scratch: a thorough destruction first, a radically new scientific foundation then (Husserl 1960, §§ 1–2, pp. 1–6).

The morality of theory, of relentless self-reflection, further requires that the decision be sustained by constancy, commitment and determination. Philosophy is thus work, *Arbeit*. Kant opposes philosophy as work to fanaticism (*Schwärmerei*) and misology, but takes these as the rush to forsake science in favor of a direct access to wisdom; for him Plato and Epicurus are champions of this attitude. For Husserl instead work is methodical training opposed to "literature" (Husserl 1965a, p. 238); and Plato is the founder of the authentic ideal of knowledge. The risk of a form of work we engage in *per se* is that it may become an end in itself, as Heidegger (and, later, Fink) objects to Husserl. For Husserl only a misunderstanding of the supposed primacy of theory can lead Heidegger to replace the analysis of intentionality by Dasein's ways of care. Heidegger's criticism is therefore as surprising and unjustified as his charge of the transcendental ego as worldless (Husserl 1997, pp. 304–5). In fact, for Husserl Heidegger completely misses the ethics of the phenomenological reduction (see the 1930 Postscript to *Ideas I*): when it brackets the world, it is nothing less than the resolve to start afresh, and even the radical renewal of my life and a conversion, as Husserl writes in the *Crisis* (Husserl 1970, § 35, p. 137).

[15] In *Einleitung in die Ethik* (2004, pp. 3–4), logic and ethics are equally technical disciplines addressing practical needs.

Finally, the world is itself a task, not a given. Its meaning derives from the practices of generations that have shaped it in the form we know. If we inherit the world from our predecessors, we are in turn responsible for how it is handed it over to future generations; but our specific responsibility as philosophers is that of keeping the *telos* of a rational world in view, of helping realize it in history. For what changes from the *Cartesian Meditations* to the *Crisis* is a new understanding of the historicity of reason, and, thereby, also of its teleology. In Kant we saw that teleology has to do with the architectonic relation of means and ends in pure reason's activity; in Husserl the teleology involved in the philosophical vocation comes down to following a guiding idea and thus to realizing historically an entelechy constituting mankind's truest nature since the Greeks. The philosopher works for future generations (Husserl 1965a, pp. 283–87) and for a community of scientists in the deep-seated faith that reason's self-objectification will improve our life (Husserl 1974 p. 5 & 28). On this score faith and rationality, far from being alternative, strengthen one another, because faith (like vocation, calling, destination, hope, conversion, even the community of researchers, which resembles the secularization of a Protestant *Gemeinde*) has lost all religious connotation, and belongs in absolute reason. It is faith in history, which is now seen as reason's development. If in his earlier reflection up to *Erste Philosophie* and the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl's stress was more on phenomenology's breaking free of prejudices inherited from history and on the destruction of tradition necessary to begin anew, in the *Crisis* Husserl sketches a genealogy of modern reason where changes are internal to an underlying historical continuity. For, in contrast to Heidegger (who thinks in terms of epochs, tends to oppose ancients and moderns and finds in Descartes the single-handed originator of modernity), Husserl believes that modern philosophy does owe Descartes its radical spirit, but grows out of the Renaissance's renewal of the ancient Platonic ideal. This ideal is the birth of authentic humanity, which now freely gives itself a rule through philosophy, first in theory and then in practice (Husserl 1970, § 3, p. 8).

Rather than identifying humanity's intrinsic essence, as in the traditional definition of man as the rational animal, reason is the result of a resolve: humanity "is rational in that it wills to be rational" (Husserl 1976, p. 275). But rationality now is "educated by the genuine philosophers of the great past", of which "we as philosophers are heirs" (Husserl 1970, § 7, p. 17). Making comprehensible the historical becoming of philosophy as the unfolding of an original entelechy first established in the Greek beginning is our task as functionaries of mankind (Husserl 1970, § 15, p. 71). If reason is the constant movement of self-clarification ("*die ratio in der ständigen Bewegung der Selbsterhellung*," Husserl 1976, § 73, p. 273, Husserl's italics), philosophy is rationalism through and through. On the one hand, this means that all philosophy relies on the same hidden intention ("*verborgene Intention in aller Philosophie*," Husserl 1976, App. 10, p. 429), humanity's self-understanding, and that the unitary teleological structure underlying the history of philosophy and this entelechy presupposes at the beginning a sort of instinct and a prefigured direction ("*wie ein Instinkt hindurchgehende Ausgerichtetheit*," Husserl 1976, App. 13, p. 442). On the other, this postulates an infinite becoming, which in

turn means that this teleology will never attain its completion, the full humanization of the world. And this implies that the world is not in itself accomplished. If the philosophical epochè saves us from the absolutization of the world, history is the stage of humanity's indefinite realization. Incidentally, this is another quite anti-Aristotelian and decidedly modern idea, for Aristotle's world has, to adapt to my meaning the words Husserl uses about Euclid, a finite and closed a priori (Husserl 1970, § 8, p. 21).

The history of philosophy is run through by an enduring (*verharrende*) identity, which again is not the identity of a given phenomenon but of a task remaining unaltered throughout its changes (Husserl 1976, App. 13, p. 442). In these pages Husserl almost sounds like Hegel as he writes that the historian of philosophy must disregard the external succession of mere historical facts and concentrate instead on reproducing, and thereby making available, the history of philosophy as a supertemporal process from which we can learn (Husserl 1976, App. 13, p. 443–5). And the philosopher needs an historical consideration because to philosophy the past is a motivation for its present: the philosophical present is "the total essence of philosophical coexistence" and a "living present" (Husserl 1976, App. 24, p. 489). Appendix 27 delves deeper into this aspect with the instructive comparison with a work of art (the same holds for handcraft). The work of art is criticized by artists sharing the same surrounding world; but they do not collaborate with the artist, nor has their critique the same active function that the creator's self-criticism may have. The work of art is an end in itself, is not made thanks to or through other works of art, and exists intersubjectively as a common good to be enjoyed by others. In science, by contrast, the realization of scientific projects stands or falls with a shared horizon we hold fast to a priori. An individual scientist is truly scientific when he or she has kept in view the universal horizon of other scientists as actual or potential—past, present and future—collaborators. This horizon is an open infinity, and therefore, if every scientific proposition is an achievement and a result made possible by predecessors, it is at once the material for further scientific work. The correlate of the scientific work, in other words, is the unity of scientists (Husserl 1976, App. 27, pp. 505–7). I find these late Husserlian pages important, even in their lack of particular originality and their distance from the prophetic announcements on phenomenology's revolutionary break from the fetters of the past, as they outline a possible dialogue between phenomenology and the history of philosophy (or of science: think of Koyré or Klein). A striking tension, however, stands out, as the philosopher is both the disinterested reflecting phenomenologist suspending all validities whatever *and* the functionary of mankind, instrumental to its indefinite progress and vitally interested in realizing true humanity. The tension can be lessened if we consider that the phenomenologist and humanity have the same interests and goals: philosophy is the function of humanizing mankind, and apodictic science and humanity's ultimate self-understanding in theoretical reason amount to the same (Husserl 1976, App. 10, p. 429). Still, what I find problematic is not Husserl's voluntarism as he calls for a heroism of reason (Husserl 1970, p. 298), or his faith in philosophical progress despite all the losses he has denounced, or his admittedly perplexing bipolarity (the warning of approaching

tragedy coexisting with an unwarranted optimism about philosophy's help in retrieving meaning in an age of crisis), but the fact that humanity seems to admit of degrees. It can be either authentic or inauthentic; and obviously the latter either does not know its goals or pursues fallacious ones. More than "*Der Traum ist ausgeträumt*" (Husserl 1976, App. 28, p. 508), we could say that this resembles more the Enlightenment dream gone awry and out of hand. For how can the philosopher grasp in a non-arbitrary way what authentic humanity is? How can the philosopher presume to tell authentic from inauthentic, and even teach inauthentic humanity about its goals? Further, how can this be practically implemented? Is the philosopher's history anything other than the circle of reason actualizing itself, which lets in and out of itself what conforms (or fails to) to its preliminary definition of rational?

These questions are so basic they sound elementary and trivial. And yet, Husserl does not seem to raise them. What he does is brilliantly show why positivism decapitates philosophy, and mere sciences of facts produce mere fact-minded people (Husserl 1970, § 2, p. 6; "*Blosse Tatsachenwissenschaften machen blosse Tatsachenmenschen*," Husserl 1976, p. 4). In other words, he shows where things went wrong, why we lost the sense of our infinite task and the *telos* of humanity, and ceased to pursue truth and ask questions. It is not as clear to what extent, though, some Husserlian remarks on Europe, or the West, that have attracted justified criticisms are integral to his position. Indeed, it is the European sciences he writes about, it is European humanity that is living a crisis, and Europe, as a spiritual unity, has an exclusive destiny and teleology. Ricoeur is right when he writes that it is humanity as a whole that has an immanent teleology and sense, which are historically realized in Europe, not the other way round; i.e., it is not because of Husserl's supposed Eurocentrism that he comes up with his theses on Europe's entelechy (Ricoeur 1969, p. 152). But the exclusion of different civilizations (India, China, Eskimoes, Gypsies: see Husserl 1970, p. 273 & 298) from humanity's teleology seems, more than an occasional naiveté, a quite arbitrary prejudice.

World and Horizon

No worldly science can take over the total role that only philosophy has. Philosophy is the science of the whole, which keeps all parts—single sciences, attitudes, styles—from their innate *hybris* of overstepping their role. Philosophy is the science of the all-encompassing world forgotten by sciences. Or so it seems. But is it? Are world and life-world the same?

The life-world in Husserl does not represent an existential category or enjoy the fundamental primacy of a situatedness we have been thrown into. It is transcendental phenomenology's deepened and broadened perspective. Before the *Crisis*, the world is at first the correlate of a belief. Consciousness lives in the certainty of a world as the implicit totality presupposed by all things we experience in it. As such, it would seem that the world must be as little intuitable in Husserl as it is in Kant.

If for Kant the world is an idea, and the result of a leap from experience of nature to its condition (or to the unconditional totality that encompasses it), for Husserl we arrive at the world from our everyday experience by extension; and this, as we will see, complicates matters.

To experience, reasons Husserl, is to confirm an expectation, or to fulfill an anticipated intention, against the non-real, the experience of being otherwise. Reality is a contrastive concept, not an assumed primary datum; every perception must be constantly confirmed, because the possibility of deception or non-being is always open. For whatever act I perform each time, the indefinite possibility of repetition, confirmation, further deepening and verification must be available: every validity implies a connection of potential and habitual validities. All experience then implies a horizon internal to the thing (the possibility, given with the thing, to explore it further) and one external to it (no less given with it, but more mediately, the hidden unthematic horizon to which I can always reawaken my attention). If consciousness of perception is never simple or isolated but implies a consciousness of its horizon, this extends from the horizon of what is present now to an open-ended past and future (cf. lectures 47–48 in Husserl 1965b, Husserl 1970, § 47, p. 162). This is how, in our ever varying perceptions, we are aware of a permanent and unitary world given beforehand. The world arises out of what first presents itself as a passive synthesis of sensible connections, and is made possible by the transition from finite to infinite horizons.

Let me emphasize three points. If all our acts have their goal in objects surrounding us, they "imply an infinite horizon of inactive validities which function with them in flowing mobility" (Husserl 1970, § 40, p. 149).[16] A horizon essentially is a horizon for intentionality. Which means: the concept of horizon is reached by way of a reflection on the flow of consciousness. This in turn implies the concept of wakeful thematization as a break of that flow and a setting into relief against a functioning, anonymous background. This awakening is understood as the ego's voluntary directing itself towards objects, in an alternate movement of reactivation and neglect, during which every validity remains available and can be brought back to life. Differently stated, this alternation of an anonymous subsoil and a thematic attention starting from perception and practices make up "a single indivisible, interrelated complex of life" (Husserl 1970, § 40, p. 149). In sum, the concept of horizon is the correlate of this continuity of consciousness' life. Indeed, it is devised to account for and fulfill this function.

Furthermore, the vision of perceptual consciousness is absorbed in what it faces; the phenomenologist's gaze pushes the limit of that vision farther, but does not differ *in kind* from it: it has the same phenomenon in view, only in its broader context.

Finally, as the life-world acquires central stage for perceptual consciousness, the world progressively recedes into the background; but this means that the world

[16] "The pregiven world is the horizon which includes all our goals, all our ends, whether fleeting or lasting, in a flowing but constant manner, just as an intentional horizon-consciousness implicitly 'encompasses' [everything] in advance" (Husserl 1970, § 38, p. 144).

is more and more explicitly a bounded world, a "sector [*Ausschnitt*] of the world," the world present at any time ("*die jeweils gegenwärtige Welt*," Husserl 1970, § 47, p. 162, Husserl 1976, p. 165).

In *Ideas I* (Husserl 2014, §§ 27–32) the surrounding world for a wakeful consciousness is an indeterminate horizon in which it always finds itself; the world is obscurely known as the background co-present to and co-intended in all its activities. When transcendental consciousness suspends the validity of all sciences and the natural attitude, the world is itself bracketed. Descartes is once more the example of a total neutralization. But if the neutralization is total, the world is not given as apodictic; rather, it is contingent—as well it should be, because it is the all-encompassing totality *for the natural attitude*. The world as indefinite source of coherence, regularity and confirmation is no more than an empirical indubitability; if the non-existence of the world is an ever open possibility, then belief in the world is entirely presumptive. The world is no longer valid as being; only the consciousness that experiences the world is given necessarily.

The life-world of the *Crisis* is neither identical with, nor a substitute for, the world of *Ideas I* or the *Cartesian Meditations*. The continuity is undeniable: here too, as in all phases of Husserl's reflection, the theme of the world is tackled in the form of an introduction to the phenomenological reduction and pure consciousness. What, then, is the difference? To begin with, in contrast to the world, the life-world is a *lived* world. It is the certainty of a ground we rely upon in our everyday practices, i.e., in all goal-oriented activities ("to live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world," Husserl 1970, § 37, p. 142). Differently stated, the life-world is the world permeated by sensible human activities, not just the world of nature.

In the *Crisis* Husserl notes that the Cartesian way to the epochè has one shortcoming: "while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content" (Husserl 1970, § 43, p. 155). The new point of departure is now the pregivenness of the life-world as a rich, concrete and innerly structured world; and what emerges with it is the centrality of the notion of horizon as the complex mutual reference of present and absent, given and possible, seen in its genesis. The passive constitution of the life-world has no beginning in the history of consciousness, for "it takes place at all times" (Held 2003, p. 53).[17] This world is not neutralized by the reduction; it is rather retrieved, as the universal ground to be questioned.

Another difference is that before the *Crisis* the world was the absolute correlate of consciousness: its totality was its uniqueness. In *Ideas I* (Husserl 2014, § 27), it is the world at hand of things, but also of values, goods, practical interests, etc. (this *etcetera* is obviously crucial, because it indicates the indefinite open-endedness of its contents). The life-world instead is at first defined by contrast with modern

[17] See also Bernet, R. 1994, *La vie du sujet*, Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, pp. 93–118; Dodd, J. 2004, *Crisis and Reflection*, Springer: Dordrecht; the essays by P. Kerszberg, M. Barale, D. Dahlstrom, A. Ferrarin, and P. Spinicci in Ferrarin, A. (ed.) 2006, *Passive Synthesis and LifeWorld*, ETS: Pisa; and Kerszberg, P. 2009, "Reconsidering the Subject: Merleau-Ponty and the Life-World", in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal,* vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 87–110.

science. It is reached conceptually by some kind of subtraction. It is one part and not the whole, a *world qua-,* as it were, whereby the different respects appear sometimes as paradoxical, sometimes as enriching one another. The ambiguity of the notion of life-world is exploited by Husserl as he goes back and forth between world and life-world in some of the decisive sections of the *Crisis* (Husserl 1970, pp. 142–148). The use of the notion of life-world as a foil and contrast, and its gradual emergence as in the last (actually, second-last, as we will see presently) analysis the central notion, an independent theme, and a problem in and of itself, are functional to Husserl's account of its essence. But in this movement Husserl, who at first seems preoccupied to remain even-handed, eventually effaces the difference between world and life-world and decides, instead of making the world stand out by contrast, to leave it behind. Let us see how this movement unfolds.

The life-world is at first understood as prescientific, a hidden source of trust and evidence. It is the forgotten *Boden* of sciences, always already there, in which we move with familiarity, the ground of certainties and *doxa* (Husserl 1975a, §§ 7–11, pp. 28–50). As such, it cannot be grounded in an ulterior dimension: it is an original, intuitive world, and the inescapable presupposition for anything whatever. Because of its subjective-relative being, objective sciences presume they must overcome it, except they cannot, because the source of evidence is still at all times functioning for scientists and cannot be reduced to an irrelevant stage we pass through and abandon (Husserl 1970, § 34b, p. 125). The contrast here is between a subjective element and an objective form that is in principle non-intuitable. Accordingly, world and totality mean two different things. For modern science, the world of experience, as a universal configuration of all objects presupposed by science, has an a priori structure and an overall style that has its "habit," a universal and rule-governed causal nexus in which things and events belong together as in an all-encompassing totality (Husserl 1970, § 9b, pp. 28–33). The world is a total form, or, which comes to the same, an infinite idea, making possible inductions, hypotheses, predictions. For the life-world, by contrast, a totality is subject-relative and intuitable; and it can only be intuitable as a universal familiar presence, shared and assumed by all.

The apparent alternative between two worlds, the world of science and the life-world, related but mutually independent, must itself be overcome. Now that the double standard (subjective-relative and objective) of truth has been clarified, the life-world can no longer remain taken for granted as the unquestioned prescientific ground. The life-world must become *the* problem: we can and must question its sense of being. Despite being relative, the life-world turns out to have its own general, non-relative structure. The world does not exist as one being among others, but as the world-horizon within which we become conscious of objects, and as a unique totality.[18] And if the task is reaching a science of the universal how of the

[18] The world "exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it. Every plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon" (Husserl 1970, § 37, p. 143).

pregivenness of the world, this is "the creation of a new science of a peculiar sort" (Husserl 1970, § 38, p. 146).

The suspension of validity of the sciences, however, is not enough to give rise to such a new science, for with this suspension we remain inside the natural attitude. What we need is a total change of the natural attitude, a second, radical and universal epochè. This is where Husserl sounds so extreme. This new reduction is a conversion: not a temporary and fleeting act, but a habitual attitude we resolve to take up once for all, which promises to "change all human existence" (Husserl 1970, § 40, pp. 150–1). This reduction asks us to suspend our very engagement in life, not one thesis or attitude. It is the greatest "liberation" from the most internal bond, the pregivenness of the world. And it results in "the discovery of the universal (. . .) correlation between the world itself and world-consciousness" (Husserl 1970, § 41, p. 151). Humanity now emerges as the self-objectification of transcendental subjectivity in its ever functioning and absolute constitution.

The life-world is seen in its being itself constituted. It is a meaning configuration, an ultimate horizon and the ground for all our practices, the surrounding world now understood as the context of human activities in its historical becoming. This configuration is for transcendental philosophy a subjective formation. Inquiring into the life-world means then to inquire back into subjectivity, as the source of validity and meaning of the world. Thus what is primary in itself is not the unquestioned world, but subjectivity itself as anonymously functioning, as constitutive of the always already developed and always further developing meaning-configuration life-world.

Husserl has finally made his decision and reached a verdict. His subject-matter, he now admits, is not the world, which in the end almost disappears and is, as it were, *forgotten*, "but the world exclusively as it is constantly pregiven to us in the alteration of its manners of givenness" (Husserl 1970, § 43, p. 154). He is interested in the becoming of the world for the natural attitude ignorant of the ever functioning absolute ego. If the life-world is a horizon that the natural attitude cannot transcend, phenomenology's radical quest for origins does not lead us to a world transcending the life-world and the things in it, but to the absolute ego constituting its surroundings, beginning with the spatio-temporal flow of its perceptual life. *Now* can we have the "science of the ultimate grounds" adumbrated in section 38 (Husserl 1970, p. 146)—now, that is, that the world has become a transcendental phenomenon and the correlate of subjective appearances and acts, now that we have proceeded from the world as a unity of meaning back to "its "subjective manners of givenness"" (Husserl 1970, § 53, p. 179).

If so, however, what is discovered as we eventually question the pregiven world is not the universal correlation between world and world-consciousness, as Husserl wants it, but that between consciousness and its surrounding changing horizons. The world can only be the correlate of the natural attitude in the form of life-world. Let me sharpen and illustrate my point by a contrast. Think of this ratio in Kant: the understanding is to nature what reason is to the world. If we now set up an analogous ratio in Husserl, we get within the natural attitude two terms, consciousness and life-world. But once the reduction is performed and the natural attitude

bracketed, we are left with the absolute ego alone constituting its life, without an intrinsic correlation with any world.

In conclusion, I would like to raise two objections regarding the world-horizon. The life-world for Husserl is not a cultural or sociological concept, as in Schütz and Habermas, but the key to a broadened transcendental phenomenology having the absolute ego's passive constitution as its object. Precisely for this reason, though, the world must forever remain *our* constituted life-world: a sense of being-at-home in it, of familiarity and trust, never leaves us. Such a world cannot have any alienness or transcendence. One glaring difference with Kant's world is that Kant, like Husserl, thinks that the world is somehow immanent in our experience of nature—but from its transcendence and as a regulative idea, not as a functioning source of evidence and a horizon. This is why we cannot aspire to make a science of it. Things and world, however related, are separated by a leap. In Husserl instead there is a homogeneity, an internal continuity, and the possibility of a transition (this is what the predelineated potentialities mean), from the ones to the other.

I believe this divergence rests on a very different approach to totality and to open-endedness. In Kant totality exists only as reason's idea: we are bound to miss its reality, but thereby gain its second-order noumenal reality. In Husserl we never reach beyond reality (nor need to), for the actual is enriched with indefinite potential aspects available for discovery. The world as horizon arises from reality and presence, in particular from the presence in perception of solid and finite (material, spatial) external objects given in penetrable media such as air or light; which means that the world is actually derivative, from the relation between ego and things, not original (Fink 2004, chap. 13).

When I said that the phenomenologist's gaze pushes the limit of perceptual consciousness' vision farther but does not differ in kind from it, we can now realize that this is because open-endedness, in turn, is understood in terms of a spatio-temporal continuum in which a further progression is naturally at hand—in which therefore the indefinite extension of experience is inscribed as a possibility, however remote. This highlights one final problem: the choice of the analogy of horizon to refer to the world. The horizon in fact is but a spatial metaphor alluding to the potentiality of experience and at once to an unsurpassable boundary of the field of vision. Husserl wants it to stand for the index of anticipation of indefinite possible intuition, and a unity we cannot transcend. He is right that the horizon helps keep the perspective and relative distance between near and far things in view, even as it shifts with the angle of vision. But a horizon only exists as relative to the observer; no potentiality or progress in experience is prefigured in what is no more than a relative distance. A horizon is as little ready-made or real in itself as the world; and yet, for Husserl it has the reality of an indefinite promise, the potentiality available to experience to refine itself further. What is troubling about this analogy is that a horizon not only cannot be transcended; it is never to be met with or encountered either, and this is the case *in principle*. Not an indefinite potentiality of drawing closer while discovering or reawakening our focus is given with it, but a distance from the observer that remains constant, for the horizon automatically recedes as we presume to approach it. A horizon is in and of itself forever elusive, the very

symbol of what escapes us. It is given, but as inevitably beyond experience: as intuition's internal limit, or its defeat. This is not to deplore the absence in Husserl of Kant's ideas, but to question how the infinite horizon, which is the infinitization of an original, perceptual horizon, can be a world: how you can arrive at totality starting from parts.

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Chapter 6
Sense and Reference, Again

Jocelyn Benoist

Husserl's semantics is basically a *theory of meaning* (*eine Bedeutungslehre*). A preliminary issue it has to cope with is therefore the one of the *delimitation of meaning*: to delineate what is meaningful, and what is meaningless, if such a distinction makes any sense. As in any theory of meaning, Husserl's treatment of the question of meaninglessness must, as such, be revealing of what he takes to be the very nature of meaning.

As a first step into Husserlian semantics, then, I would like to go back over the problem of the theory – or theor*ies* – of 'nonsense' (meaninglessness) that is or are to be found in Husserl, an issue with which I already dealt several times, in my previous studies (cf. Benoist 2002a, pp. 67–172, 2005), but about which I only recently had the impression to reach some definitive clarity.

Expressions

The first thing we must emphasize is the very strict distinction that Husserl makes between what is an expression (*ein Ausdruck*), and, as such, has meaning, and what is not, and does not have any meaning. As it is well known, the *First Logical Investigation* starts with contrasting what is mere index (*Anzeichen*) and what is expression (*Ausdruck*) and *means* (*bedeutet*). The expressions as such, which do not constitute a species (*eine Art*) of the signs in the sense of indices, even if, *de facto*, in the communicative use of discourse, they always happen to function as indices (of the speaker's mental states, in particular those related to communicating) as well, 'have meaning'. In contrast to them, mere indices (indices that do not function as expressions

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simultaneously) have no 'meaning'. The latter just bear a causally grounded relation to what they *designate*, while causality is not enough to ground any meaning proper.

That 'meaningfulness' is absolutely essential to expressions. In a passage of the §15 of the Ist *Logical Investigation* to which we shall return later, Husserl writes:

> *It is part of the notion of an expression to have a meaning: this precisely differentiates an expression from the other signs mentioned above. A meaningless expression is, therefore, properly speaking, no expression at all: it is at best something that claims or seems to be an expression (*ein Irgendetwas, das den Anspruch oder Anschein erweckt, ein Ausdruck zu sein*), though, more closely considered, it is not one at all.* (2001a, p. 201)[1]

Now, if one asks what is required for there be meaning, a first superficial answer might be: some *representational* – or to be assimilated – *format*. Meaning-bearing expressions (i.e. *expressions as such*) are not any mere designations, but *they present something in a certain way*. To put it in Husserl's words, that sound quite Aristotelian, "each expression not merely says something, but says it *of* something" (2001a, p. 197). *To say something of something*: such is the essential structure of an expression – what one calls it to have a 'meaning'.

Sense and Reference (in the Traditional Sense of the Term)

In such a definition, both sides are essential: (1) that, through meaning, *something like* (we're going to discuss that 'likeness') a relation to an object is built (2) that such a relation goes through something that is *said* (the 'meaning' as such). In the case of mere indices, the second side is missing; the relation (or alleged relation, in the case of *things mistaken for indices*)[2] is, in such a case, not grounded in any content that would be expressed ('said').

However, one might have noticed that the emphasis of this two-sidedness is on the so-called relation to an object. In the context of the uprising against psychologism at the end of the nineteenth century, Husserl, following his fellow student Twardowski's reconstruction, and correction of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality (cf. Twardowski 1894), wants to emphasize the insufficiency of 'sense' as such, at least, in some understanding of that 'sense', that takes it to be a mere (mental) 'content': "a mere distinction between physical signs and sense-giving experiences (*sinnverleihende Erlebnisse*) is by no means enough" (Husserl 2001a, p. 188). As it was made clear by Twardowski as to names: "we distinguish, in the case of each name, between what it 'shows forth' [*kundgibt*] (i.e. mental states) and what it

[1] I always quote John N. Findlay's translation of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, in the reprint published by Routledge, London, 2001, sometimes with slight (indicated) corrections.

[2] Indices cannot be, properly speaking, *false*. What might be erroneous is the judgements we make about them – or, more loosely, the *use* we make of them. On the contrary, in Husserl's view – that consists in always interpreting the meaning in the descriptive way, as 'objectifying' – meaning is constitutively true or false – at least at a certain level, we shall see the qualification that is to be made according to the later doctrine.

means. And again between what it means (the sense or 'content' of its naming presentation) and what it names (the object of that presentation)" (*Ibidem*).

What is important here is the fact that the criticism is not only targeted at the 'mentalism' of the traditional 'Lockean' theory of meaning; but even more at the very idea of meaning as a mere 'content' (whether mental or not). That means that *it is not enough* to idealize meaning, making it an ideal (non-mental) content – as we certainly should do – but that, *in addition*, we must recognize, as associated to what is usually called 'meaning', that *aiming at an object* that, for instance, in the case of a name, is the named object.

In fact, for a knower of the Austrian tradition of the nineteenth century, it is obvious that Husserl's target here is Bolzano and his theory of 'objectless presentations', according to which, at the semantic level, there are expressions that do bear meaning, and that, however, do not have any reference.

We cannot, in such a way, stay with meaning. We cannot stop short of reference – meaning by itself does not make sense.

We must elucidate the way in which that claim must be ascribed to Husserl, because it is not that obvious: in fact, we shall be able to affirm that only on the basis of a precise and corrective analysis of how we must exactly take 'reference' in order to conform to Husserl's view.

Because, prima facie*, what Husserl seems to do is just to make a (very strong) distinction between sense and reference*. To make full sense of so to speak the *ordinary* problem of meaning, we have to take into account not only the sense proper but, in addition, the reference as well; but, precisely, we must *distinguish* them – what, apparently, the common sense, or the traditional (ideationist) analysis, does not make.

So, Husserl takes a lot of time and pain to make a distinction, that, as it has been much emphasized, sounds quite Fregean – he even mentions Frege, in a palinode of his early criticism: the distinction between what he calls sense (*Sinn, Bedeutung*) and what he calls object (*Gegenstand*), or 'objectity' (*Gegenständlichkeit*, as an extended – in particular to the categorical level – sense of 'object'). As, in a previous study (cf. Benoist 2002b), I already proposed an analysis of the bearing of Husserl's maintaining the word 'object' for what Frege, disambiguating *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* against the ordinary German use, calls '*Bedeutung*' (which we might, provisionally, translate by 'reference'), I am not going to go back over that now. It will just be enough to draw the attention to the fact that, in Husserl's view, every 'reference' in Frege's sense is a kind or another of 'object' (even if it is therefore necessary to distinguish between diverse categorial kinds of 'objects') – which, of course, in Frege's view, is not the case: concepts as such are legitimate references, although not being 'objects' (it would be, in Frege's view, the worst categorial mistake – and the paradigm of *nonsense* – to call them 'objects').

Anyway, even if that divergence that it would be deeply mistaken to take just as 'terminological', definitely indicates something about Husserl's theory, there remains that, on both sides, there seems to be that very clear-cut, and robust distinction between 'sense', and 'reference', as apparently *two different functions* of expressions.

I am not going to discuss here how far both functions might be interdependent in Frege's perspective. There would be of course a lot to say about that, and, in particular I should observe that it is not clear at all that Evans's very strong

interpretation of that problem (that tends towards the strong interdependence claim), as elucidating as it might be of *some* aspects of the Fregean construction, is the final word. In fact I would have strong reservations about it.

That which is clear at least, and that on which we're going to focus here is that *Husserl* endorses the strong interdependence claim *in some sense* – even if it is precisely in a sense that does not seem at all to be the one in which Frege might endorse the same claim, if and as far he endorses it at all.

The sense both authors would make of the interdependence claim, as far as they endorse it respectively, cannot be the same, because what Husserl places in that interdependence is nothing but the thesis of *intentionality* of meaning as such; a thesis for which no sense is to be found in Frege's construction, even if something like intentionality is not completely unknown to Frege, but in another, completely different sense, i.e. as the intentionality of judgement (or even more of *judging*) exclusively – an intentionality that is no way to be interpreted to the effect of a simple directedness to an *object*, as it is in Husserl.

The fact that the interdependence claim is to be identified in Husserl with the intentionality thesis itself, as applied to meaning – an application that in fact constitutes the first given version of the intentionality thesis in Husserl's thought, and to some extent its paradigm (rivalled, however, by the perceptual intentionality in a complex way[3]) – entails definitely that, if Frege turned out to endorse, even partially, the same claim (which he certainly does), the claim would anyway have very diverse, and maybe quite opposite meanings in both authors. It will become plain once we'll have cracked the nut of the Husserlian understanding of 'reference' and we'll have consequently made the due qualifications to our first use of the terms on which relies the attempted comparison between both authors.

Anyway, as a starting point, we cannot ignore, as obvious as it is, the very strong distinction Husserl makes between what would respectively correspond to Frege's *Sinn* and Frege's *Bedeutung*. As the text of the § 12 of the Ist *Logical Investigation* that we quoted previously goes on, each expression "not only has a meaning, but refers to certain *objects*" (2001a, p. 201). As if it were two different properties, for an expression, to have a meaning, and to refer to an object.

Husserl tries actually to tell both functions apart, contrasting them by disclosing the one as variable where the other remains invariant, in a quite Fregean way. There exist expressions that bear the 'same meaning', and, however, have different references, as there exist ones that, while bearing different meanings, relate in fact to the same reference, as so to speak diverse ways to the same point.

There is therefore undoubtedly some difference: it is definitely not the same to tell the meaning of an expression or to indicate its reference.

That indisputable difference must however not conceal the very strong connection that Husserl maintains between both dimensions. In the first place we must pay attention to the very way in which the philosopher introduces that 'reference'. That

[3] In Husserl's view, the *basic structure* of intentionality is the one of the meaning intentionality; but the *telos*, and fulfilment of intentionality is the perceptual relation to the object, interpreted as an intentionality itself. We shall see the import of that ambiguity.

function of 'reference' corresponds to what Husserl calls "the third sense of 'being expressed'". That "third sense" "concerns the objective correlate meant by a meaning and expressed by its means" (2001a, p. 197): *die in der Bedeutung gemeinte und mittels ihrer ausgedrückte Gegenständlichkeit*. The 'object' of a discourse is definitely not the same as its 'meaning'; but if it is, as such, 'meant' by that discourse, it is 'in the meaning' of that discourse as such, and 'by the means' of that meaning.

So, the reference function and the meaning function are not complete strangers to each other. Where there is 'reference', it is exclusively through meaning. It is the meaning that, so to speak, operates reference.

> *An expression only refers to an objective correlate* because *it means something [*nur dadurch, daß er bedeutet, gewinnt ein Ausdruck auf Gegenständliches Beziehung*], it can be rightly said to signify or name the object* through *[*mittels*] its meaning*. (Husserl 2001a, p. 198)

Sense Without Reference? (Act I)

Now, the question arises obviously whether the dependence is reciprocal, in the sense that, as there is no reference but through, and so to speak (as Husserl himself puts it) *in* a meaning, there is no meaning without such a 'reference'.

In fact, Husserl's whole point, in the first step of his theory of meaning – the step we might entitle 'criticism of the 'folk theory of meaning" – seems to be to reject a possibly natural conception of meaning according to which such a thing might happen: a meaning *without* reference, and 'meaning' and 'reference' might really not only be told apart (as they must be), but also really *separated*.

Husserl's concern is not just to add a compartment to the so-called 'natural' theory of meaning, stressing the fact that there must be a reference *in addition* to the 'content' that the meaning would anyway be. The introduction of the reference as he understands it restructures and redefines the meaning as well, far from leaving it untouched: introducing the reference is, as a matter of fact, a *revision* of the theory of meaning itself.

That point is related to an aspect on which I have especially focused in my early work about Husserl's theory of meaning, although probably not interpreting it correctly at first, that is to say the fact that Husserl endorses an *intentionalist* theory of meaning, a theory according to which meaning is in the first place a kind of intentionality – the one of the *Bedeuten*, which is a *Meinen*. In some sense, as I put it, but maybe excessively, or too unilaterally,[4] that means that meaning can no longer be just a 'content', as such separable and detachable. Or, more exactly, as I

[4] That has always been the core of my interpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning, as an intentionalist one, as it is already to be seen in my first attempt in that field, 1995, "Husserl et le mythe de la signification (Ie *RL*)", *Tijdschrift voor filosofie*, vol. 57, pp. 526–552, reprinted as the chapter I of my book 1997, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie : Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne*, P.U.F.: Paris. Unfortunately, in a first time, I tended to take it to the effect of some *unconditional* referring – in the sense of *being intrinsically relational* – of the meaning intention. A mistake that I subsequently rectified in my book 2001b, *Intentionalité et langage dans les* Recherches logiques *de Husserl*, P.U.F.: Paris, but taking the opposite direction this time too unilaterally as well.

would say now, it might be so only in a way that does not separate it from what it *cannot* be separated from, because what is connected to it in an *essential* way, what stands in some kind of *internal* relation to it; in other words, even the meaning that is idealized as a 'content' (and as such an object, an ideal object), abstracted from the act of meaning (or more exactly from the *real content* of that act, as a part of its), retains something from that act, something that it cannot lose without ceasing to be a 'meaning': that is to say, *its relation* (or, more exactly, as we shall see, its purported relation) *to an object*. "An act of meaning is the determinate manner in which we refer to our object of the moment" (*die bestimmte Weise des den jeweiligen Gegenstand Meinens*) (Husserl 2001a, p. 198). And even the idealized meaning, as an idealization, is the idealization of *an intentionality*. *Meaning is constitutively intentional*.

That means that, in some sense (we shall see which), *it cannot stop short of the object*. There is no meaning independently of that reference to an object, that, so to speak, is the other side of itself – and, finally, not anything else than itself. Husserl makes it clear in his critical remark against Twardowski at the §13: we must be warned

> *against the error of seriously thinking that sense-giving acts have two distinct sides, one which give them their meaning, while the other gives them their determinate direction to objects*. (2001a, p. 199)

So, so to speak, from an intentionalist point of view – a point of view that takes the meaning to be an 'intentional relation' to an object – reference has to some extent to be internalized to meaning itself. In that sense – but how far does that sense go?, we still have to be more specific about that – *there is no sense without reference*, as reference is an internal feature of 'sense'.

An Ostensible Possibility of Nonsense (Sense Without Reference – Act II)

However, now, an obvious difficulty seems to arise, which belongs so to speak to the infantile stage of the theory of meaning: that is to say, the obvious existence of cases where we have to do with a full-blooded expression, that, as such, bears a sense, but to which there is definitely no correspondent object.

On that issue, interpreters of phenomenology diverge. There seems to be a tempting solution that would be to acknowledge something like inexistent objects, treating inexistence as a property. A lot of phenomenologists are probably convinced even today that Husserl positively endorses that kind of Meinongian solution, firmly condemned by Brentano. That is however the case for nothing. Husserl keeps, even after the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, rejecting any kind of ontologization – or even meta-ontologization, to follow Meinong until the end – of inexistence. If there is no 'real object' that corresponds to an expression, that just means that there is *no object (at all)* corresponding to it.

How to reconcile that with both (i) the idea that an expression has a meaning *anyway* (ii) the idea of the constitutive *intentionality* (as referred to an object) of such a meaning?

In fact, we might find a way out of that predicament, if at last we take into account a difference that turns out to be decisive for any understanding of Husserl's theory of meaning, and of the interdependence that that theory acknowledges between meaning and reference – a difference of which some traces are to be found in Frege as well,[5] and that nevertheless is bound to play a completely different role in an *intentionalist* theory of meaning (that *identifies* meaning with some kind of intentionality or with some *abstractum* founded on it) like Husserl's than in Frege's.

Some contemporary scholars in philosophy of language, in particular Michael Dummett, distinguish between *reference* (with the verbal suffix) and *referent* (as an object). One even recently spoke of "reference without referents" (Sainsbury 2005). I think that tool, or a tool of the kind, is indispensable in order to make sense of Husserl's theory of meaning and the kind of internal connection it supposes between meaning and reference – reference, and not (or at least *not always*) referent.

Husserl's theory of meaning, that strives to be phenomenological, that is to say does not intend to put any artificial constraint on meaning, but just to describe that phenomenon as it is given, certainly does not want the meaning to be necessarily directed to something that exists. This theory makes room for the obvious existence of many meaning intentionalities that are just aimed at something that, in some sense, is *nothing*. I can definitely make a speech that has full sense (as it is proven by the fact that it will be correctly understood) about Santa Claus. That does not make Santa Claus any more exist. As the 'Appendix to § 11 and § 20' of the Vth *Logical Investigation*, decisive from that point of view (cf. Benoist 2001b), and often quoted as such, but little understood, makes it clear, in that case:

> *'The object is merely intentional' does not, of course, mean that it exists, but only in an intention, of which it is a real part, or that some shadow of it exists. It means rather that the intention, the reference to an object so qualified [*die Intention, das einen so beschaffenen Gegenstand 'Meinen'*], exists, but* not *the object*. (2001b, p. 127, translation slightly corrected)

This passage is definitely to remind to any commentator or philosopher who would indulge in the idea that Husserl wanted to populate the world of 'shadows' – the kind of shadow that is commonly associated with intentionality, on a certain conception of intentionality. To put it in modern terms, in the case in which the 'referent' does not exist, there is nothing but the intentional act of meaning (the 'intention of meaning', *Bedeutungsintention*), so the *reference* (as Findlay translates perfectly correctly) itself.

[5] As far as Frege happens to be concerned with our *intentions* (*Absichten*, not intentionalities) *to refer*, as he certainly is in the theory of *presupposition* that he introduces to contemporary philosophy.

We must absolutely distinguish between the reference, that is to say, in Husserl's case, the directedness of and through the meaning towards something *as* an object, and the referent, that is to say the *object* itself to which the act is referred, if there is one.

Taking such a distinction into account, we can rephrase our previous claim: according to Husserl, *there is no meaning without reference*, but *there is certainly meaning without referent*.

The Ways of Reference

It would, however, be mistaken to conclude from that apparent independence of the reference, that persists even when there is no referent, that reference, as such, had nothing to do with the referent itself – when there is one – and should necessarily stop short of it. Of course, there is a natural relation between reference and referent when there is a referent: it is by virtue of what is called its reference that an expression that is true, or adequate, has the particular object – that exists – it has as a 'referent'. And reference as such, where there is a referent, gives access to nothing but that referent itself – one might even say that in such a case that Frege already described as a kind of 'success' (you *succeed* in your referring, in such a case), the reference exhausts itself giving access to the referent.

One more time, the appendix to the §§11 and 20 of the Vth *Logical Investigation* is clear:

> *If the intentional object exists, the intention, the reference, does not exist alone, but the thing referred to exists also.* (Husserl 2001b, p. 127)

The best thing to do is to apply that general framework with which the theory (and criticism) of 'intentional objects' made in the Vth *Logical Investigation* provides us to the problem of the being 'relational' or not of the meaning, which constitutes the real core of all the intentionalist theory of meaning that is presented in the Ist *Logical Investigation*. The texts, from that point of view, are fully coherent.

In fact, there are diverse *ways of reference*, and reference is not as homogeneous as it seems. Significantly Husserl starts with the fact that we tend spontaneously to see our way to speak of 'intimation', 'meaning', 'object' as sort of "relational talk" (*beziehende Reden*) (2001a, p. 199). It is however exactly the problem: to know how far this being relational must be taken seriously. *Is meaning a relation or not?*

About that, Husserl's doctrine is perfectly explicit. *There might be a relation*, a real, full-blooded relation. It is exactly what happens when there is a referent, that exists, and even more (let us stay with that case for the time being) that exists in the way the meaning says it to exist (*as* the meaning says it). In that case we are allowed to speak of our words as entertaining a *relation* to an object that is what we have just called the 'referent'. This relation is a relation proper.

However, if there is no referent (if the act of reference remains empty, in a sense we're going to discuss), Husserl does not take any more than his master Brentano

that intentionality (meaning intentionality, as, contrary to Brentano, he recognizes such a *specific* intentionality, instead of making of intentionality some undifferentiated – or at least not differentiated otherwise than hierarchically, but undifferentiated at the level of representations – property of the mental contents in general) should be a relation. Because how to make sense of a relation to something that does not exist (Cf. Benoist 2007, pp. 79–103)? If it is a relation, it is at least not a relation proper.

Certainly, "an expression only refers to an objective correlate because (*gewinnt Beziehung auf Gegenständliches nur dadurch, daß*) it means something" (2001a, already quoted). That means literally (according to the real sense of *Beziehung*: relation) that an expression can as such acquire its *relation* to something like an object only through its meaning. That does not mean, however, that this meaning provides the expression *necessarily* with such a relation, nor that this meaning can do it by itself.

The phenomenological analysis (description) of the §9 already made it clear. Among the acts related to the meaningful use of an expression (in which only it is an *expression*), Husserl counts the acts by which the consciousness endows the expression with meaning, but also the ones that give "intuitive fullness" to the expression. The latter are not at all meaning acts, but perceptual (or analogous to perception) acts. In both kinds of acts "[the] relation [of this expression] to an expressed object is constituted (*die Beziehung auf eine ausgedrückte Gegenständlichkeit konstituiert sich*)" (2001a, p. 192). However, as to that 'relation', the following distinction is to be made. The so-called 'objective' (*Gegenständliche*) in question might precisely be intuitively given (*gegeben*) or not. Where it is given, Husserl says that the relation (to the 'objective') is realized (*realisiert*). In other words, in that case – and only in that case – it becomes *real* as such, there is really a relation.

If it is not the case, Husserl logically says that the relation is unrealized (*unrealisiert*), and, interestingly, comments this way: then, the relation is "confined to a mere meaning-intention", as Findlay translates, or, more exactly, is "merely included in the meaning intention (*in der bloßen Bedeutungsintention beschlossen*)". What a strange relation, that does not go beyond one of its fundaments, is merely "enclosed" in it! It is, in fact, not any relation, but *the suggestion of a relation*.

One must not ignore the fact that, as it is common to that ('post-Brentanian') stage of the history of intentionalism, the standard remains the *name*, and, accordingly, Husserl's conception of 'reference' as such certainly here finds its nurture in a reflection on the reference of that specific kind of words. When do we say exactly that a name really achieves its job of naming – and is no longer, as one says, 'just a name'? Definitely when something is given – in the sense of intuitively, or at least extra-linguistically given – that corresponds to that name; then, the name is said to *name* that thing exactly. In other words, the name finds its real accomplishment in what Husserl will call 'the cognitive function of name', when naming is having a real grip on 'the thing itself'.

The hunch, of which the friends of the object-dependence theory of names will take advantage, is that, to some extent, that makes sense for a name to be (as a

name) only if there is something to be named by it. Husserl, however, does not endorse that claim to the letter, and it is a clue about his real position as far as the question of 'object-dependence', and indexicality in general is concerned (we will have to return to that point). The way Husserl interprets that hunch is that, to make full sense of a name, it must be possible to have something *given* responding to it. So, "the naming becomes an actual, conscious relation between name and object named" (2001a, p. 192). As long as there is not such a given, there is only the "mere meaning-intention (*bloße Bedeutungsintention*)".[6] It is clear that there is something shadowy in such a naming that is not really a relation. However, although Husserl insists on that relational nature of the full-bloodied nominal meaning, one must notice that it is an *epistemic relation* (a relation of access), which does not match the object-dependence theory exactly. It is not the same to say that, where there is a name, there must be an object, and that, where there is a name, an object must be *given*. The latter claim says at the same time, and depending on the interpretations, more or less than the former. More, because the fact that the name I am using is not empty does not mean that I have myself access to the object it names, nor that I even know that this name is not empty. Less, because, after all, we might perhaps conceive of situations in which something is *given* that responds to that name, but, however, that does not exist.[7] So, the logic of intentionality does not coincide necessarily with the logic of object-dependence – a certain intentionality creates a relation between the expression as such and 'something else' (a givenness), but there is no relation *per se* (independently of that intentionality) between that expression and this object.

Now, Husserl holds that that kind of relation to an object (or at least a givenness), in which the expression might stand, is *extrinsic* to the expression as such: "relation to an actually given objective correlate, which fulfils the meaning-intention, is *not* essential (*ist außerwesentlich*) to an expression" (2001a, p. 199). It is perfectly clear: an expression remains the expression it is – therefore (1) still has sense (2) still has the *same* sense – even if there is no corresponding 'intuition' given. That does not mean that, if a corresponding intuition happens to be given, the expression itself, as such, does not stand in a full-blooded relation to the very object that that intuition gives (then, we must definitely say that it is that object as such that is 'expressed'). However, that intuition might be cancelled whereas the expression remains an expression, and without any change in the meaning of that expression. Of course such a claim will raise some difficulty in the case of indexicals, but we shall examine that in another lecture.

[6] Husserl always uses '*bloß*', as Brentano did, in a privative way.

[7] It is, of course, the case of hallucinations, which we're not going to address here. The series of lectures on perception of 1907 *Ding und Raum* makes clear that Husserl, basically, is a conjunctivist, whatever might be said about it. The consequence is that he is really unlikely to endorse the object-dependence thesis thoroughly.

The Unboundedness of Meaning

The result is that there might be *sense without referent* – or more exactly without any epistemic certainty of there being a referent, which allows for real lack of referent as well. It is, in fact, one of the basic claims of Husserl's theory of meaning, that, in that sense, proves a *non-relational* one: meaning *might* be a relation, but is not necessarily one, and we have to distinguish between the two different ways of meaning – when it is a relation, and when it is not.

This is a point Husserl exploits systematically, fighting against a naïve theory of meaning one might call 'referentialism'. This would be the theory according to which for an expression to have a sense would just be to have a referent.

In the §15 of the Ist *Logical Investigation*, Husserl addresses the problem that we take to be revealing about any theory of meaning, that is to say the problem of nonsense. He criticizes the inaccuracy of some common use of the expressions 'meaningfulness' and 'meaninglessness'. He insists on the distinction he made between meaning acts properly speaking and fulfilling (intuitive) acts, and makes clear that fulfilling acts as such cannot be held for constitutive of the 'sense': the sense of an expression (and even more its mere meaningfulness, its having sense) does not depend on them.

One must absolutely distinguish between what is essential to an expression and what is only contingent on it (what happens to supervene additionally upon it).

On the one hand, *sense, as such, is essential*: without sense, an expression is not an expression, but only what Husserl happens to call a *pseudo-expression* (*Scheinausdruck*). On that understanding, there is no 'meaninglessness' proper. To go beyond the bounds of meaning is just to go beyond the bounds of expression.

On the other hand, 'referent' (or, more exactly: intuitive givenness of a referent) *is not essential*. An expression might be perfectly meaningful in the strict sense of the term without there being any adequate intuitive givenness corresponding to it. Even more: without there *possibly* being such a givenness.

We must actually introduce a further distinction, which is quite classical (passed on to Husserl by Bolzano): between *the mere lack of givenness* (the golden mountain that so far I have not succeeded in finding), and *the* a priori *impossibility of such a givenness* – as when there lies some contradiction, or at least incompatibility, in the demand the meaning exerts on intuition.

The second case, as in the example of the 'round circle', may produce a strong effect of oddness, and the consequence is that we might be really tempted to describe it as a piece of 'nonsense', and definitely it is one in a certain ordinary sense of the word 'nonsense'. There is, however, a paradox relative to that kind of 'nonsense' that Husserl emphasizes after his fellow student Marty, from whom he draws his inspiration here: that kind of nonsense, so to speak, *presupposes the sense* (in another sense of the term). It is only as far as an expression bears meaning, and in virtue of its meaning, that it might turn out to be a 'nonsense' in the new sense of the term – that is related to *the impossibility to give a referent intuitively presented*

for it. That nonsense, thus, settles on the ground of meaning, far from constituting a limit, or any kind of externality to it.

In that sense, there is some kind of *unboundedness of the meaning* – which is the result of the 'austere' conception[8] according to which something either is an expression or not: there are no semi-expressions. We cannot make meaning as such dependent on the possibility to have a referent given.

Fulfilling Sense and Sense 'Simpliciter'

There is, however, something more to say about that case of the impossibility of an adequate givenness – and very likely even about the ostensible mere 'lack' of such a givenness, like in the case of objects whose existence we have not experienced so far, but that *might* possibly exist.

In fact, the case is not that clear. Is it to be interpreted to the effect of a mere *lack* of corresponding intuition, as a naïve interpretation of the latter situation (no experience so far) might suggest? It might seem so at first sight – and I must confess I used to interpret it that way. To elucidate that point, and to understand why it is just *not* the case, we need consider a Husserlian distinction to which we have not yet paid attention: the distinction Husserl made before at the §14 of the same Ist *Logical Investigation*, between "fulfilling sense (*erfüllender Sinn*)" and "sense or meaning *simpliciter* (*Sinn oder Bedeutung schlechthin*)".

This distinction is not absolutely clear in its detail, and it is really difficult to make good sense of it – personally, I felt for a long time really uneasy about it: I was not able to overcome the impression that there remained some opacity in that point. I only recently got the feeling that I had reached some clarity about it, and it was at the cost of a substantial revision of my previous (quite common) reading. What is unclear is what the 'fulfilling sense' exactly is.

Husserl defines it this way: "the object's ideal correlate in the act of meaning-fulfilment that constitutes it (*sein ideales Korrelat in dem ihn konstituierenden Akte der Bedeutungserfüllung*)" (2001a, p. 199). One must obviously take notice of the use of the verb 'to constitute' (*konstitutieren*), even in the text of the first edition (1901), which means, in Husserl's mouth: 'to let appear in some way', and pertains to what we might call the 'format' of appearing of the object. So, the so-called 'fulfilling sense' – that Husserl himself introduces with quotation-marks – is something about the (intuitive) acts in which the object that corresponds to the expression endowed with some 'meaning' might be *given*, it is something about the 'givenness' of that object.

There would be much to say about that uncontrolled – or let us say loosely controlled – extension of the sphere of 'sense' so as to include perceptual acts as

[8] In a sense that is not unrelated to the one that is endorsed by Cora Diamond and James Conant in their interpretation of Wittgenstein.

well; something of those acts might be described as a kind of 'sense'. As I have done that elsewhere (cf. Benoist 2001a, pp. 273–280, 2008, pp. 215–235), I am not going to reopen the case.

What seems to be clear is that 'fulfilling sense' (that is, as such, 'fulfilling sense' *for an expression*: it is a relative concept, and there is no fulfilment *per se*) is, in some intuitive acts, *what 'corresponds' to a given expression*.

This supposes some kind of '*fit*'. As 'fulfilling sense' is a relative – and, in fact, a semantic – concept, in some sense, the 'fulfilling sense' for an expression can be determined *a priori*. It seems, so to speak, to be *dictated* by the 'meaning' (*simpliciter*: what we usually call 'meaning') of the expression.

In other words, in some sense, a 'fulfilling sense' seems to correspond, at least ideally, to any meaning-intention as such. To mean something, *it is always to carve out the possibility of some corresponding intuition as well*. It is something about the intentional nature of meaning as such: as it structurally *aims at* something (is directed towards something), it constitutively opens up a possible way for something to be given.

So, *there is no meaning, no '*sense simpliciter*', without a corresponding 'fulfilling sense'* – that pertains to *the way the thing would be given if it was given according to that meaning that intends it* (if it was "given *in the same manner* in which the meaning *means* it (*in welcher ihn die Bedeutung* meint)", Husserl 2001a, p. 199, translation slightly corrected). The end of the paragraph makes that point very clear. In a rather complicated new definition Husserl, then, says the fulfilling sense to be:

> *the identical content which, in perception, pertains to the totality of possible acts of perception (*möglicher Wahrnehmungsakte*) which intend the same object perceptually, and intend it actually as the same object. This content is therefore the ideal correlate of this single object, which may, for the rest, be completely imaginary (*der übrigens ganz wohl ein fiktiver sein kann*)* (2001a, p. 200).

One might perhaps think, at first, that the existence of a 'fulfilling sense' relies on the possibility of real perception (as such a 'sense' would be found in the "possible acts of perception") corresponding to the 'meaning *simpliciter*' of the expression. Or, as Findlay's translation misleadingly suggests, that imaginary representations (a phrase that would exactly translate the notion of representations belonging to that which Husserl calls *Phantasie*) can do the same job in a pinch.

However, as a matter of fact, Husserl does not speak here of 'imagination', but of 'fiction' (*Fiktion*), which, in his conceptual toolbox, is not at all the same. When he says at last that there is a fulfilling sense even if the object is mere 'fiction' (*fiktiv*), in the terminology of the *Logical Investigations*, that means purely and simply that there is a 'fulfilling sense' even if there is *no object at all* (properly speaking) whose appearing is synthesized ('constituted') in it – even, so to speak, if that synthesis is defective.

This raises a real difficulty, because, in a first interpretation of 'fulfilling sense', it might seem, in such cases, that *there is no 'fulfilling sense'* properly speaking: because, where there is no corresponding intuition (either genuinely perceptual or 'imaginary'), there should not be such a sense, that is supposed to be 'the sense of the corresponding intuition'.

The Unboundedness of the Fulfilment

There seemed really to be some entanglement in that hint at 'fulfilling sense' even of fictitious meanings – therefore of meanings it seemed appropriate to interpret as *lacking every possible fulfilment*.

I have however found a way out by paying a closer attention to the details of the difficult §15. If the first interpretation were true, Husserl would make the distinction he's making in terms of *the possibility of a fulfilment*, as opposed to *the impossibility of any fulfilment*. And it is indeed what he *seems* to do. But, at a closer look, it is in fact not what he is doing. There are not on the one side the meanings that allow for a fulfilment, and, on the other side, the meanings that allow for none. In fact, *all* meanings, as such, allow for some fulfilment. But the problem is whether this fulfilment might be *adequate* or not. So, the ostensible independence of meaning *simpliciter* from fulfilment must be retained, but it should be interpreted another way.

We must return to the very terms in which Husserl makes an expression's being meaningful independent from its 'fulfilment.' First, we might observe something that is an obvious result of the point we previously made about 'reference' as distinct from 'referent' or even from corresponding 'givenness', but that we have not, so far, enough emphasized. When we say that meaning ('meaning *simpliciter*'), as such, is essential to expression, and that, in that primary sense, there is no 'meaningless' expression, such a claim might turn out to entail more than the naïve, 'contentual' (non-intentionalist) conception of meaning would suggest. As Husserl makes it clear again in the § 15,

> *In meaning, the relation to an object is constituted (In der Bedeutung* konstituiert sich die Beziehung auf den Gegenstand). *To use an expression significantly (*einen Ausdruck mit Sinn gebrauchen*), and to refer expressively to an object* (sich ausdrückend auf den Gegenstand beziehen*) (to form a presentation of it), are one and the same* (2001a, p. 201).

So, to mean something, and so to speak to represent something (to *refer*) it is quite the same for an expression. The result is obvious: there is definitely no expression without meaning, but, therefore, *there is no expression without reference as well*. The unboundedness of meaning, as far as expressions are concerned, is also *unboundedness of the reference*.

We must, however, notice that, then, we must pay all the attention it deserves to the distinction between *reference* and *referent*. There is no expression without reference (reference is an intrinsic function of expression), but there are certainly a lot of expressions without referents. We might definitely speak of Santa Claus, of the golden mountain, or of the unicorn – or even of the round square –, all that with some 'sense', even if that sense, at least in the latter case, does not comply with what we might call our 'natural standard of sense' (which seems always to presuppose a not too loose connection between the sense and at least the possibility – or *some kind* of possibility – of the referent).

In Husserl's view, this possible lack of referent as such does not matter, as far as the meaningfulness of the expression is concerned. So, every expression is

meaningful, therefore includes a kind of *reference* (*sich beziehen auf*) that is internal to it, "it makes no difference whether the object exists or is fictitious (*fiktiv*) or even impossible" (2001a, p. 201).

Of course, that does not mean so far that that referring (*sich beziehen*) is successful and that there subsists a real *relation* (*eigentliche Beziehung*) between the meaningful expression and an object. This is the case only if the object is given in conformity with the demand the meaning puts on it.

So, there is always a *reference*, but there is not always a givenness that matches it. We must however still make a step further, a step that might seem really difficult, but that is quite decisive: that is to say, to some extent, beyond the unboundedness of the meaning, beyond the unboundedness of the reference, we must at last allow for an *unboundedness of the fulfilment*, as strange as it might seem, that, far away from conflicting with the boundedness of the referent (not all expressions have a referent) we have just emphasized is, in fact, its phenomenological condition.

We have seen before that every expression, according to Husserl, has a 'fulfilling sense', even if it is fictitious – which seems really weird, as it seems that we have to define fulfilment as some kind of 'corresponding intuition', and as 'fiction' in Husserl's sense (in the sense in which he speaks of 'fictitious objects', which are *non-objects*) is supposed to be characterized by the lack of any corresponding intuition.

Considering the problem from the point of view of the so-called 'impossible objects', we have however to reformulate all that. What does Husserl really say about the cases in which meaning cannot find any intuitive counterpart, like the cases of self-contradiction or of any *a priori* incompatibility of determinations? He does not speak, in fact, about such cases, as much of 'impossibility of the fulfilment', as of the impossibility of an *adequate* fulfilment; or he speaks even of an 'impossible fulfilment.' It might seem to play on words, but *an 'impossible fulfilment' and 'the impossibility of any fulfilment', it is not the same at all*.

Authors like Sigwart confused "the true meaninglessness [. . .] with another quite different meaninglessness, i.e. *the* a priori *impossibility of a fulfilling sense*" (2001a, p. 202). In the latter sense, "an expression has meaning only if a *possible* fulfilment (*eine mögliche Erfüllung*), i.e. the possibility of a unified intuitive illustration (*die Möglichkeit einheitlicher Veranschaulichung*), corresponds to its intention". What we should ask is: as contrasted to *what* might a 'fulfilment' be called 'possible'? What would be an 'impossible fulfilment'? And, immediately, the comment Husserl makes suggests an answer: 'possibility', as a determination applied to 'fulfilment' has something to do with *unification*. Is 'possible' every fulfilment that allows for its own unification at the intuitive level.

That seems to leave some room for the opposite case of the 'impossible fulfilment': the one in which it is impossible to operate such a unification, or at least *not thoroughly possible*. And it is so:

> *In the contrary case we apprehend the ideal impossibility of meaning-fulfilment (*die ideale Unmöglichkeit der Bedeutungserfüllung*) through an experience of the incompatibility of the partial meanings in the intended unity of fulfilment* (auf Grund des Erlebnisses der 'Unverträglichkeit' der partialen Bedeutungen in der intendierten Erfüllungseinheit). (Husserl 2001a, p. 202, translation corrected)

It is perfectly clear: in the case of the so-called 'impossibility of fulfilment', there is, in fact, *an experience of that impossibility*, and therefore, to some extent, a 'fulfilment', but, so to speak, a 'negative' fulfilment: the experience of the incompatibility of the partial meanings, and of the impossibility of a smooth unification – which supposes that unification is at least, so to speak, attempted, and *intended* as such.

Husserl will take up that problem again in the chapter IV of the VIth *Logical Investigation*, entitled "Compatibility and Incompatibility" (*Verträglichkeit und Unverträglichkeit*). In fact, such a *negative fulfilment* has a name: *conflict* (*Widerstreit*), and is a genuine form of fulfilment, as a use of intuition that makes intuition 'correspond' to a piece of meaning. However, of course, such a 'correspondence' goes only as far as it is possible, and leads us, as such, to an impossibility, whose experience is its core.

In that chapter of the VIth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl divides the meanings into the *real* (i.e. possible) ones, and the *imaginary*[9] (i.e. 'impossible') ones. 'Real' meanings are those that *might* be fulfilled without conflict (even if they are not necessarily *actually* fulfilled, in the sense that we have not necessarily the corresponding intuition at our disposal); 'imaginary' meanings are that whose fulfilment raises a conflict between different incompatible moments of intuition, and in fact *consists in such a conflict*.

Thus, there is, as strange as it might seem, no meaning without fulfilment, and, finally, there turns out to be some '*unboundedness of the fulfilment*' itself. If we step back to the case of the ostensible mere 'lack of referent' (and not impossibility *a priori* of such a referent), we might risk the following hypothesis: even in that case there is no real 'lack of fulfilment'. The inexistence of the referent (therefore the lack of referent) has so to speak to be '*seen*'. Of course, that raises a difficulty because an absence as such cannot be seen. But that simply means (and it is something that comes out very clearly in the presentation Husserl makes of his logic of truthmaking (*Wahrmachung*) and invalidation (*Falschmachung*) in the VIth *Logical Investigation*), that, in Husserl's view, the falsity of a meaning has always to be identified with some *mistake* (or at least to be intuitively *interpreted* that way): *something is mistaken for something else*. One has something given to oneself *as* what is intended, and however, it is not what is intended, it conflicts in some way with it – that is to say, with the representation one has of it. (This does not mean that Husserl endorses descriptivism necessarily, as we shall see in the lecture about indexicality: we might make sense even of indexical mistakes, grounded in the very indexicality of some representations as such) That means also that, for an inexistence to appear, to be 'given' as far as it might be given, there must be some *positive background* and basis against which and in contrast to which that inexistence might be perceived privatively in the mode of conflict: as if someone's not being there would necessarily *appear* as her being elsewhere, or more exactly in some relation to her positive being elsewhere (as 'incompatible' with it).

[9] In a sense that has much more to do with the 'imaginary numbers' – that are 'impossible' as such – than with imagination.

This doctrine, whose presence in Husserl's early work is not often observed, is not that idiosyncratic. It is one possible doctrine about 'truth- and false- making', the one that David Armstrong precisely lists as 'incompatibilism'(cf. Armstrong 2004, pp. 60–63),[10] or at least some *epistemic* version of such a doctrine.

Whatever, what matters for our purpose here is that, now, we must definitely recognize the impossibility not only of any expression without meaning, not only of any expression without reference (that is to say that does not *claim* to refer, but that is 'reference' as such), but of any expression without any kind of 'fulfilment'. Now we can make full sense of the enigmatic doctrine that was exposed at the §14 of the Ist *Logical Investigation*: definitely, every expression as such defines by itself some 'fulfilling sense', that corresponds to its 'meaning *simpliciter*' (which does not mean that every expression, as such, whether having a possible fulfilment or not, is *actually* 'fulfilled'), a 'fulfilling sense' that is exactly *the way in which such an expression would be fulfilled in some intuitive acts*. So, this way, which belongs to the expression as such (it is, so to speak, the virtual projection of the expression onto a possible intuition), maps a certain configuration of intuition. After that, that configuration might happen to be 'impossible' or 'possible' in the senses we have just defined (that is to say either to include a *conflict* or not). In any case, according to Husserlian intuitionism, there is the possibility to construct a 'corresponding' intuition; but the point is to know whether meaning here makes *incompatible* demands on intuition or not, and, consequently, if such an intuition is 'smooth' or not.

So, the problem is not anymore to know whether there might be a fulfilment or not – there must definitely be one, *it is a part of the 'meaningfulness' of the expression*, contrary to what we might have thought first – but, as the text puts it exactly, whether there is an *adequate* fulfilment or not, thus, whether the intuition can or not be made consistent with the meaning: might the things be given in the way they are meant? The paradox is that, in order to know that, one must in some sense already structure their givenness by the standard of that meaning: it is if and only if they are structured by that meaning that the things will come out as not being the way that meaning represents them. The impossibility of fulfilment (that is to say of adequate fulfilment) arises only *on the ground of fulfilment* and supposes some format already given for the fulfilment: what Husserl calls 'fulfilling sense'.

Once you're on the ground of sense, there is no way to cancel the reference (you might bracket the referent, as the 'transcendental reduction' will do, but there still remains the 'reference') – and even more: *no step beyond intuition. One might not construct any meaning to which it is impossible to have a corresponding intuition*. The only (substantial) price to pay is to make room for 'conflicts' on the ground of intuition – from which results what Husserl calls 'inadequacy' on the part of the meaning. Such is the *intuitionism* that phenomenology endorses as far as theory of meaning is concerned.

[10] Armstrong traces back the *ontological* version – which is not exactly the same, of course – of that kind of solution to Raphael Demos, "A Discussion of Certain Types of Negative Propositions", *Mind*, 26, 1917, pp. 188–196.

Appendix: In Defence of the Common Sense

That 'intuitionism', however, has paradoxical consequences, to the effect that it seems to lead, if we take into account the development of Husserl's thought, to some vindication of the *common sense theory of nonsense*, from which Husserl seemed first to distance himself, according to which an expression like 'round square' for example, to some extent, has *no sense*.

As a matter of fact, if we take a closer look at the fact that to any expression might correspond some 'fulfilment', there might turn out to be some more complicated situations about that fulfilment than the ones we have grossly distinguished, that is to say either 'possibility' or 'impossibility'. In particular, there might come out substantially diverse kinds of 'impossibility' that do not bear at all the same way on the logical and phenomenological status of the expression itself.

As of the Ist *Logical Investigation*, Husserl has made a distinction between two kinds of conflict: real *contradiction* (when one says A and non-A at the same time), *Widerspruch*, and that kind of *incompatibility* (*Unverträglichkeit*) *that is not a contradiction*. In the IVth *Logical Investigation*, he makes clear this distinction:

> *we draw a line between* material (synthetic) absurdity *(*materialer, synthetischer Widersinn*) and formal, analytic absurdity (*formaler oder analytischer Widersinn*). In the former case, concepts with content (first order material kernels of meaning) must be given, as is the case, e.g., in the proposition 'A square is round' and in all false propositions of pure geometry, while the latter covers every purely formal, objective incompatibility, grounded in the pure essence of the semantic categories, without regard to any material content of knowledge.* (Husserl 2001b, p. 72)

We must observe that, then, Husserl takes a proposition like 'A square is round' that entails some kind of (geometrical, therefore *a priori*) incompatibility, to be *false*. This is not obvious at all: a certain common sense will very likely take it to be neither true nor false, but a mere piece of nonsense. However, if we consider more complex examples, that are not as intuitive, like the one Husserl took in the §15 of the Ist *Logical Investigation*, 'a regular decahedron' (2001a, p. 202), maybe it makes better sense: it is a full bloodied (informative) truth, that a decahedron cannot be regular, and, conversely, 'this decahedron is regular' is necessarily *false*.

But, at the paragraph §10 of the IVth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl deals with examples that do not seem as easy. For instance, he gives this example: 'This algebraic number is green'. What is exactly the logical status of that kind of sentence? According to Husserl, first, it is a genuine (well-formed) expression. The proof is that we can form it by substituting 'This tree' by 'This algebraic number' in 'This tree is green', which is a perfectly correct expression. "Any nominal material – in a wide sense of 'nominal material' – can here be inserted" (Husserl 2001b, p. 63). The result is really an expression, to the effect that it definitely has a *meaning*: "In each case we have once more a meaning unified in sense". Of course, such a possibility to save the sense depends on the respect paid to the meaning category (*Bedeutungskategorie*) of the substituted term, that must be

preserved in the substitution if one wants to benefit from the meaningfulness of the original expression so as to build by variation other meaningful expressions.

> *In such free exchange of materials within each category, false, foolish, ridiculous meanings (*falsche, dumme, lächerliche Bedeutungen*) – complete propositions or elements of propositions – may result, but such results will necessarily be unified meanings, or grammatical expressions whose sense can be unitarily accomplished.* (Husserl 2001b, p. 63, translation slightly corrected)

So, the problem is: what is the semantic status of such 'false, foolish, ridiculous meanings'? Are they mere 'pieces of nonsense', as the common sense probably would say?

Husserl firmly resists that idea in the §12 of the same IVth *Logical Investigation*: one must absolutely distinguish between real nonsense (*Unsinn*), which is mere lack of sense (no meaning was given, or some impossibility results from the *grammatical* combination of meanings, due to the 'meaning categories' involved), and 'absurdity' (*Widersinn*). We "exaggerate and call the latter 'senseless' (*sinnlos*), when it is rather a sub-species of the significant (*ein Teilgebiet des Sinnvollen*)" (Husserl 2001b, p. 67). In fact, all those expressions that sound 'ridiculous', as far as they are real expressions, endowed with meaning (but with an *absurd* meaning), must be interpreted in the way the §14 will make explicit: that is to say, as *material absurdities*, that, in virtue of the very meanings they combine, are *false*. So a sentence like 'This algebraic number is green' is just *false*: an object belonging to the ontological category of numbers cannot bear any property belonging to the category of colours. This is an intuitive incompatibility, that can be experienced in a definite fulfilment in the mode of *conflict*: you just cannot make your intuitive number (in the sense of 'categorial intuition', then) bear the givenness of such a property, it is *a priori* impossible – as a result of the ontological and, correlatively, phenomenological (i.e. intuitive) kinds of both concepts.

Such a result would definitely be uneasy for the common sense. We probably do not want to hold such a proposition – if we take it for a proposition at all – for 'false', but for 'absurd.' It is exactly what Husserl's further research on the nature of fulfilment allows to account for. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), Husserl in fact goes over that issue of the logical status of some manifest 'absurdities' again, and qualifies his doctrine noticeably.[11] At the §89 of *FTL*, Husserl deals with this nice piece of ordinary nonsense: "This colour plus one makes three". In such a case, "we say that the sentence '*makes no proper sense*' (*gibt keinen eigentlichen Sinn*)" (1969, p. 216). That means that "it is impossible, in actual thinking, to acquire the judgement as a possible one – not, however, because it contains an analytic or extra-analytic contradiction, but because it is, so to speak, *exalted above harmoniousness and contradiction* in its '*senselessness*' (*ist in seiner 'Sinnlosigkeit' über Einstimmigkeit und Widerspruch erhaben*)."

[11] John Drummond and Vincent Gérard drew my attention to that point. I bought it in "Le primat de la référence" in my book: 2005, *Les limites de l'intentionalité. Recherches phénoménologiques et analytiques*, Vrin: Paris, but still without assessing all its bearing.

So, according to the later Husserl, such an expression, in spite of its grammatical well formedness, *has no meaning* – thus, as such, is not really an expression. The problem, so Husserl, is that *even 'contradiction' presupposes some unity of 'sense'*. The conflict, as we put it before, can only settle on the ground of some positivity that has to be itself interpreted as some kind of (wider) *unity*. What is absolutely not to reconcile does not belong as such even to the sphere of conflict – is not representable as a conflict.

The problem is a problem about *content*. We cannot build a unitary meaning with any contents. There are conditions on those contents, if the meaning, in some paradoxical sense, must 'make sense'. As such, those contents involved in one meaning (by one expression) must belong to some unitary horizon, at least, if not better, the one of 'the world', as the general horizon of the experience. "The ideal existence of the judgement-content depends on the conditions for the unity of possible experience" (Husserl 1977, p. 217).

The idea is very simple: *we cannot fulfil 'anything'*. Fulfilment supposes that we stay within the bounds of what might be either true or false, because what proposes a possible (even if bound to come out as 'impossible' at last) setting for the intuition. There are however things that it does not even make sense to demand on intuition – definitely not to give a round square, which is impossible but whose impossibility it is possible to experience, but, for instance, to give a green algebraic number, in which case it is even impossible to see what one must *try* representing. There are ostensible expressions that do not have any conditions of fulfilment (any 'fulfilling sense'), because they are structurally disconnected from the general conditions of experience, that constitute the universal ground of meaning, due to its intentional – that is to say *orientated towards fulfilment* – nature.

In fact, one might possibly think that a recalcitrant exception to the doctrine held in the *Logical Investigations* has been found here: there are, finally, expressions 'without fulfilment', and we must disconnect meaning from fulfilment. But it is not at all the case: it means just that such 'expressions' must not anymore be held for genuine, full-blooded expressions. Common sense is vindicated, and those purported 'expressions' have to be called, in a new sense (closer to the common sense), real *pieces of nonsense*. There is not only (merely) grammatical nonsense, but also a kind of nonsense that results from *the impossibility* (in the radical way, that time, and not as some *possible* – representable – *impossibility*) *of the fulfilment* – when the fulfilment really *lacks*, and it makes *no sense* to seek it. This case is 'nonsense' as well. Proof, one more time, of the power of the fulfilment and of its bearing on meaning as such.

As such, the possibility of fulfilment (not necessarily of an *adequate* fulfilment and, thus, not necessarily of a 'possible' fulfilment), seems to be a universal condition of meaning, as Husserl, as he went deeper and deeper into the logic of fulfilment, wound up by taking the existing case of meaning intentionality *without fulfilment* – whose *ostensible* meaning (because, in that case, one would definitely not be allowed to speak of more than ostensible meaning) hinders the very possibility of any fulfilment – as *a pathological condition of that intentionality*. Meaning intentionality is the first one, and, to some extent, the paradigm of intentionality

(in general). But it cannot stand by itself. One cannot ignore that it is meant for relation – even if not necessarily relational, as it might essentially fail in its attempt to relate, but, then, even that failure makes sense only again.

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Chapter 7
Transcendental Phenomenology?

Rudolf Bernet

Husserl's characterization of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy has been criticized and rejected from the very beginning. Although the first generation of post-Husserlian phenomenologists, such as the members of the Göttingen School, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, had different reasons for questioning the transcendental character of phenomenology, they all rejected the idea of a transcendental constituting egoic consciousness that is disclosed by means of the phenomenological reduction and questioned the related phenomenological idealism. With some notable exceptions, the next generation of phenomenologists mostly avoided the issue in an effort to defend the significance of Husserl's philosophy. As a consequence, no critical appraisal of the validity of these earlier critiques of Husserl's transcendental philosophy has been developed and there has been little attempt to gauge the relevance of Husserl's phenomenology of transcendental consciousness for future phenomenological thought. This double neglect threatens the continuation of Husserlian phenomenology. One cannot claim to work within the tradition of Husserl's philosophy if one has not engaged with the central ideas of the eidetic reduction, the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, constituting intentional consciousness, the transcendental subject, and the status of a phenomenological eidetic science. However, such an engagement is only critical if one does not presuppose that phenomenology should necessarily commit to being a transcendental philosophy and that a contemporary transcendental philosophy is only possible in the form of phenomenology.

On the one hand, the Marburg Neo-Kantians developed a new, un-phenomenological transcendental philosophy according to which the egoic-subjective accomplishments of knowledge are necessary and *logical* conditions of knowledge, though not phenomena that can be *intuitively* investigated. According to this account, the conditions of experience are the conditions of objects of experience, but these

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conditions themselves are not objects of experience. Consequently, the challenge for a *phenomenological* transcendental philosophy consists in showing that subjective and constituting consciousness is intuitively accessible and can be evidently given. This is the task of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, which turns away from a pure logical determination of transcendental cognitive accomplishments.

On the other hand, a phenomenology without transcendental philosophy first took shape as a pure descriptive phenomenological psychology and also as an existential phenomenology, which replaces the subjectivity of pure constituting consciousness by the facticity of world-experiencing and self-experiencing bodily life. In order to counter these currents in phenomenology, which were already present during Husserl's lifetime, Husserl again appeals to the phenomenological-transcendental reduction. This time, the reduction is meant to prevent transcendental philosophy from sliding into a phenomenological *empiricism*, that is, an "anthropologism" or "naturalism." Whether Husserl correctly estimated the danger of such a phenomenological empiricism and whether the philosophy of the early Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty can be rightfully characterized as phenomenology turning its back on transcendental phenomenology and as phenomenology's fall into empiricism is not discussed here. In any case, as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty already saw, the confrontation between transcendental phenomenology and the so-called philosophy of existence concerns the characterization and necessity of the eidetic and transcendental-phenomenological reductions. As usual, it is important to select carefully the criticisms one addresses. For example, the accentuation of the bodily nature of consciousness and its anonymous passivity or facticity as well as the insistence on the pragmatic character of lived experience would challenge Husserl, the transcendental phenomenologist, far less than the insistence on the necessary world-relatedness of the transcendental-constituting subject or on the constitutive accomplishments of the horizon of the world.

The Phenomena of Phenomenology

What *all* phenomenologists have in common is a certain style of doing philosophy in which the unprejudiced engagement with "the things themselves" or with the intuitive "experience" of the things themselves carries more weight than conceptual constructions and logically consistent argumentation. That is, for phenomenology, the real criterion of truth lies in the proper access to the phenomena, the phenomenological relevance of these phenomena, and their pertinent linguistic expression. This implies a phenomenological intuitionism that succumbs neither to the myth of immediate givenness (cf. Bernet 2003, pp. 153–166), nor to dialectics in its consideration of the historical, linguistic, and social mediation of the access to the phenomena.

What is a phenomenological phenomenon? A first helpful indication can be taken from the observation that there are no natural scientific phenomena and that, strictly speaking, there cannot be any. The objective facts and real states of affairs

that are experimentally observed by the physicist and that serve as the basis on which natural scientific laws are formulated are not phenomena. One can only speak of a true phenomenon when something shows itself as what it is and how it is according to its own way of being. What shows itself as a phenomenon does not only have to show itself from itself, it also has to be given to somebody *hic et nunc* – both belong together. The question of whether we should understand the self-givenness of what appears primarily from the side of the thing rather than from the side of the human conduct that first enables this self-givenness is secondary. There is no original phenomenon without something objective that gives itself and without a dative of this givenness. With Husserl, we can characterize this interrelation as the *subject-relativity* of objective self-givenness without therefore having to commit to a specific notion of this subject. Further, one must also point to the fact that there are phenomena in which something shows itself by means of something else as well as phenomena in which what shows itself shows itself in a disguised manner or differently than how it truly is.

Before phenomenology can take on the task of more precisely characterizing the appearing of the phenomena, the presuppositions of this appearing, and the method of its scientific investigation, it first has to be shown that such phenomena even exist. But why is this necessary? It is because scientific objectivism pervades our way of thinking and our natural life at large. Consequently, the first step towards phenomenology necessarily consists in questioning the universal validity of the ontology of scientific objectivism by means of pointing to the subject-relative phenomena that already surface within the practice of natural science itself. This is the way that Husserl took in *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* and it is this way that today more than ever appears as the only appropriate one for a beginning phenomenology. That is, in the current philosophical context, a phenomenology that starts from the apodictic self-givenness of intentional consciousness and that indicates its transcendental-constitutive accomplishments and the implied idealism is hardly convincing. Thus, even before one ventures into phenomenology, one should already have parted with Cartesianism.

Although phenomenology is only concerned with the subject-relative way things are given, there is no reason to think that only phenomenology can disclose such phenomena. That is, one does not need to be a phenomenologist to discern the subject-relative meaning of the personal pronoun "I," the occasional expressions "here" and "now," or color-predicates and other so-called "secondary qualities." Even if there are no objective phenomena, there are plenty of *pre-phenomenological* phenomena that relate to how things show themselves to us and how they, in their appearance, depend on one's *subjective point of view* (cf. McGinn 1983). Consequently, one can only speak of a phenomenological philosophy when *all* things, states of affairs, and cultural accomplishments or institutions are investigated with respect to their subject-relative way of being given. To contemplate the way that *all* objects we deal with are given to us is an unnatural and reflective undertaking that requires a specific effort or "phenomenological attitude." Thus, truly *phenomenological* phenomena only appear once I decide to investigate each

and every real or possible object in its way of being given to me and other subjects. This is the ultimate meaning of the "phenomenological reduction," without which it does not make sense to speak of phenomenological phenomena or phenomenology.

Before one can say something about phenomenology as a science of phenomenological phenomena, these phenomena must be further described. More particularly, the subject as the dative of givenness, the mode and circumstances of different forms of givenness, and what precedes and follows a certain givenness deserve further clarification. These different issues are so intricately connected that they cannot be treated separately without doing injustice to the essence of the phenomenological phenomena. That is, whether one conceives of the subject or dative of phenomenological givenness as a pure Ego (Husserl), as Dasein (Heidegger), as subjective lived-body (Merleau-Ponty), or as the one who is questioned by and affirms oneself in answering to the event of an alien appeal or overabundant gift (Levinas, Waldenfels, and Marion), depends on how one understands the mode and circumstances of the givenness of the phenomena.

On a pre-transcendental level, none of the later developed accounts of the subject of givenness are incompatible with Husserl's phenomenology. That is, Husserl himself was already well acquainted with the phenomenon of directing oneself to and grasping an anterior or pre-given meaningfulness as well as with the experience of a loss of meaning that one passively undergoes. Further, Husserl was also familiar with the fact that the meaning of a "spiritual" (i.e. cultural) object only discloses itself in an effective and practical handling of it. Furthermore, Husserl explicitly characterizes the referential nexus of these objects as a "spiritual world" with which subjective life is so intricately interwoven that this world is designated as its "life-world." Similarly, Husserl's analyses of the sensuous field of appearance in its relation to a bodily subject of perception with its "here," its bodily capabilities of sensing, and the free kinesthetic capability to move are already developed in the most subtle detail.

Basing oneself on Husserl's manuscripts, one could endlessly enumerate the riches of Husserl's phenomenological descriptions of different subjective forms of conduct and of the different ways that phenomena of various kinds are given without thereby encountering any points of disagreement with the analyses of other phenomenologists. Consequently, if there is disagreement, then it must be attributed to Husserl not having addressed certain more specific phenomenological phenomena or to his method of doing phenomenology and its presuppositions. As will appear in the following, these disagreements are all related to Husserl's characterization of the transcendental egoic subject as both constituting and phenomenologizing subject.

Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology and Its Opponents

How Husserl understands the transcendental subject is primarily and essentially determined by his understanding of transcendental constitution (*and not the other way around*). Consequently, the concept of *constitution* is fundamental for

Husserl's idea of transcendental phenomenology. Most minimally understood, transcendental constitution means that whatever appears to me, appears to me *as* something. This "as" can be further differentiated into a "what" and a "how" or "that" – to speak with Husserl, into the meaning (*Sinn*) and the mode of being (*Seinsweise*) or ontological validity (*Seinsgeltung*) of the intentional object. The *meaning* of something that appears bears witness to a process of sense-formation (*Sinnbildung*); its ontological validity can be presumptive or demonstrated, depending on the way in which the (empty or intuitively fulfilled) process of constitution is accomplished. Sense-formation and the justification of validity are mostly incremental processes, which are preferably realized in the form of a proper and pertinent as well as intuitive and coherent synthetic experience of the "as" determinations of the appearing unitary objectivity.

Thus, a minimal understanding of transcendental constitution emphasizes the interlocking or *correlation* of subjective experience, on the one hand, and the determination of the object's meaning and mode of being, on the other. With regard to both sides of the correlation, the phenomenologist asks how unity is formed on the basis of multiplicities. In this first account of transcendental constitution, all questions concerning the essence of the appearing objectivity, the experiencing subject, or the active and passive course of the synthetic processes of sense-formation and of the justification of its validity are left open. This first and widest understanding of the constitutional process in terms of the *function* of sense-formation and of justification of objective modes of being entails, for any phenomenologist, an inclination towards transcendental phenomenology. In addition, one cannot contest that the phenomenological understanding of this constitutional process directs us, on the one hand, towards a single kind of objectivity and, on the other, to a subject of conduct that either accomplishes or undergoes, that creates, receives, or answers some kind of givenness (regardless of how one further determines this subject).

It seems that in their refutation of the very idea of a transcendental process of constitution, Husserl's successors were all too focused on the question of the nature of the *transcendental subject* and consequently either neglected the other characterizations of constitution or linked the idea of constitution too closely to a certain idea of the subject. In any case, it is certain that most of Husserl's successors either underestimated or simply misunderstood the plasticity and vitality of Husserl's understanding of the subject and the way in which it is taken up in the process of constitution. According to Husserl, the subject is a subject of an experience that can be actively accomplished or passively undergone, that can originally instate meaning or assume the meaning instated by tradition, that is rooted in a bodily motility or captivated by spiritual insights, and that can be aware of itself or live in self-forgetfulness. In all these different modes of experience, a kind of intentional consciousness is operative. This intentional consciousness extends far beyond the act of instating meaning and the act of positing ontological validity. That is, besides the active syntheses, there are also passive and, in a certain sense, "unconscious" syntheses of constitution or sense-formation. Moreover, the active syntheses rest upon various appearances that were not produced by these syntheses themselves and that might even contradict active anticipations and objectives. To state that

Husserl equates transcendental constituting consciousness with the self-affirmation of a self-secure subject and that, consequently, he would not be able to account for the experience of the unforeseeable and the new appears to the reader of Husserl's writings as some kind of biased prejudice rather than a simple misunderstanding.

No phenomenological analysis of sense-formation and of the appearing of objective modes of being can do without some kind of consciousness or experience and without some kind of experiencing subject. Like Husserl's understanding of the experiencing subject is by no means exhausted by the Cartesian idea of the *ego cogito*, the constituted *objectivity* is also not a mere *cogitatum* or object of thought. Without a sensuous support, ideal objectivities can barely be thought; likewise, what appears to the senses captivates the experiencing subject in such a way that what appears rarely stands before one as an object that is merely present at hand (*vorhanden*). For example, when experiencing a value-feeling, the appearing objectivity is suffused with this subjective feeling to such an extent that an all-embracing mood might arise in which the sky is experienced as happy and my state of mind as clouded.

Husserl discerns a similar form of reciprocity in the conscious experience of one's own willing and acting. When the subject willingly issues its "*fiat*" and initiates an action, it does so on the basis of its valuation of the anticipated result of this action and not in a merely arbitrary or impulsive way. Thus, for Husserl, there are all kinds of objects and objective modes of being. Husserl was never concerned with merely "staring at" (*Begaffen*) and trivially describing what is present at hand and detached from its context (Heidegger 1996, p. 57). On the contrary, what appears and how it appears depends on a network of intentional implications that connects what appears in the foreground with what co-appears in the background or remains concealed. Further, what appears and how it appears depends on the behavior of the one to whom it reveals itself in appearing. Just as there are as many kinds of subjectivity as there are kinds of experience, there are, for Husserl, as many kinds of objectivity as there are kinds of objects experienced. Due to their correlation, kinds of experience and kinds of the experienced are tied up with one another in such a way that one cannot have one without the other.

Nevertheless, according to post-Husserlian phenomenologists, there is a threefold limitation to the very idea of *intentional correlation* and the related idea of transcendental constitution. A *first* limitation is that not all phenomena *require* a subjective-constitutive sense-bestowal in order to appear meaningfully. The key example of such an a-subjective meaningfulness is the way in which something that is perceived organizes itself into a meaningful, coherent "*gestalt*." Other phenomenologists, inspired by Heidegger, have pointed to phenomena such as "*events*," which do not require a subjective sense-bestowal and are even *inaccessible* to such a bestowal. In contrast to gestalt-like configurations, events are not experienced objectivities. Moreover, their meaningfulness or lack thereof cannot be traced back to a subjective constitutive accomplishment, not even a passive one. A *second* limitation of Husserl's concept of constitution is that it does not fully capture the *reciprocity* between the constituting and the constituted. As long as one, like Husserl, insists that transcendental consciousness is not of this world and can be without a world, one cannot understand how what is experienced prescribes to this

consciousness the possibility and modes of its experiencing just as much as consciousness does with regard to the experienced. A *third* limitation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is implied in his characterization of the point of view from which the phenomenologist observes the ongoing process of the constitution of the world. In this respect, Husserl is reproached for not having accounted for the phenomenologist being taken up in the factual course of the experience of the world and for the limitation of the phenomenologist's insight into the essence of the phenomenal world.

(A) Husserl's phenomenology is not defenseless against the *first objection*. The insights of Gestalt Psychology that were taken up by Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty are only in conflict with a rather specific egological interpretation of the process of constitution. Only an idealist that confuses appearances for unrelated impressions in which meaning can only arise by means of the application of subjective concepts of the understanding could be thrown off by the insight that perceptual appearances have a meaning and that the constitution of their meaning is co-determined by the empirical relations between shape and background and by the perceptual circumstances determined by illumination, spatial distance, etc. Husserl's concept of intentionality, which leads him to think of what appears and its subjective experience in terms of an original and insoluble unity, already prevents him from being such an idealist.

Of course, there are sense-formations in which the subject gives sense to an incomprehensible givenness. Similarly, there are sense-formations that arise out of a current empirical nexus of appearances and belong to the phenomena themselves. Finally, there are transcendental conditions for the formation of sense that are not subjective and that Cassirer terms "symbolic forms" (cf. Bernet 2010, pp. 41–58). Such symbolic forms of a possible meaningfulness precede each and every subjective conduct and understanding. These forms allow what appears to be meaningful in different ways and to be understood subjectively in different ways. What does not and cannot occur is either a givenness of sense without subjective experience or a subjective sense-formation that can refrain from directing itself towards pre-given phenomena since both would be in conflict with the thought of correlation implied in the transcendental concept of constitution.

In its first formulation, the objection against an exclusively subjective sense-bestowal still refers to the meaningful formation of *objective* phenomena, such as gestalts. In its second formulation, however, the objection calls upon *events* that are no longer objectivities. Even though events are indeed not objects, one should reply to this objection that Husserl's transcendental consideration of the correlation is not concerned with objective entities, but with phenomena; that is, Husserl's analyses are concerned with what is experienced in the way in which it gives itself experientially to the one that experiences. In the case of the experiential givenness of a *meaningful* event, it may indeed often be difficult to differentiate between the meaning created by the event in how it reveals itself, on the one hand, and the meaning that the experiencing subject contributes, on the other. Husserl tries to account for this by distinguishing subjective and intersubjective, passive and active processes of constitution that can be accomplished in the form of original

institutions (*Urstiftung*) and re-institutions (*Nachstiftung*) or that can be motivated by the referential horizon of experience and the horizon of the experienced. Only the extreme and opposite phenomena in which an event, a state of affairs, or a cultural object are either too full of sense or devoid of any sense challenge the correctly understood constitutive accomplishment of sense-bestowal.

Phenomena of the first kind are (religious) revelations, evocative references to unsurveyable contexts, and works of art. In all these phenomena, more meaning appears and is given to the subject than it can grasp, let alone constitute by itself. Phenomena of the second kind are events devoid of sense. In the extreme case, such an experience of a meaningless event can lead to a psychic trauma for the subject. Such traumatic events, in their meaningless givenness, certainly do not refer to an already accomplished subjective sense-bestowal. The meaning that is lacking in such events and that is unavailable to the subject can at best be bestowed after the event. As Freud already pointed out, in the cases in which a bestowal of meaning succeeds, it is hard to distinguish between the contribution of the subsequent association of the traumatic event with other events, on the one hand, and the always limited subjective understanding of the traumatic event, on the other (cf. Bernet 2000, pp. 160–179).

However, such a neat distinction is neither fruitful nor necessary. For Husserl, constitution as sense-formation means that something in its appearing makes sense for an experiencing subject and not that the subject would independently create this sense. For as long as one does not loosen the bond that connects the transcendental concept of constitution with the concept of intentional correlation, every sense-formation is the result of a *reciprocity* between experiential understanding and the organized coherence of what appears. However, this does not imply that all phenomena and events are open for such a reciprocal sense-bestowal. Indeed, there are phenomenological phenomena that withstand such a transcendental constitutive accomplishment. Consequently, there exists a phenomenological access to such phenomena that cannot be integrated into the framework of a transcendental phenomenology. In other words, a phenomenology *before* and *beyond* a transcendental philosophy is possible. Contrary to the phenomenological reduction, the concept of a transcendental constitutional accomplishment cannot claim phenomenological universality. The fact that there are such senseless phenomena or events characterized by a overabundance of sense is, however, not only due to the nature of the transcendental subject, but also due to the phenomena themselves, and most often to both the phenomena and the subject.

(B) According to more recent phenomenologists, a *second limitation* of Husserl's phenomenology becomes apparent when one takes seriously the *reciprocity* that is implied in the concept of a transcendental constitution. Reciprocity would then mean the essential belonging (or dependency) not only of the constituted to the constituting, but also of the constituting to the constituted. Applied to intersubjectivity, for example, this would mean that I am constituted in my subjectivity by the other as much as I constitute the other's meaning-for-me. When one generally designates the realm of the constituted as "world," then the nature of a world-experiencing subject would be determined by the world as much as the sense of the world is determined by the transcendental subject that constitutes this world.

Such a back and forth of the correlative relation of constitution entails that transcendental constituting consciousness has to be understood in terms of the subject's being-in-the-world. However, on the basis of his theory of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, Husserl firmly rejects this possibility and discredits it as a lapse into anthropologism. Husserl's conception of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction seems to rest upon the conviction that the consciousness of the givenness of mundane things cannot itself be a mundane thing. In truth, no phenomenologist would seriously want to make this claim.

Rather, the point that *Heidegger* makes against Husserl is that even though the consciousness of givenness is not a thing, it is nevertheless essentially world-related. Heidegger's objection is made on the basis of the consideration that subjective consciousness, understood as the dative of givenness or subjective point of view, is not different from the things of the objective world because of its wordlessness. Rather, Dasein is characterized by another, non-thingly-objective form of worldliness. Heidegger's consideration is supported by the double insight that, on the one hand, the world is not an objective entity and that, on the other, the point of view for which mundane things and events make sense is not to be located outside the world. It is not a worldless subject, but rather a subject that roams in the world that can acquire a sense for mundane appearances. For a subject that remains beyond the world, mundane concerns must in principle remain unintelligible.

Merleau-Ponty incessantly attempted to retranslate the early Heidegger's insightful consideration of the being-in-the-world of Dasein into the language of Husserl's transcendental philosophy. Of course, this attempt amounts to a *transformation* of phenomenological transcendental philosophy. That is, Merleau-Ponty does much more than refer to the worldliness of constituting consciousness, its bodily behavior, speaking, etc. Merleau-Ponty makes the further claim that the mundane appearances or the "flesh" of the world acquires a sense-constituting function. This claim still amounts to a transformation of *transcendental* phenomenology, however, since Husserl also increasingly became open to the thought that the transcendental subject should understand itself in light of its world-relatedness. Specifically, the given that a bodily consciousness of one's own point of view results from the way in which mundane things present themselves to us (in clarity or occultation, nearness or distance) was already clear to the young Husserl.

Consequently, the second limitation of Husserl's conception of a transcendental sense-bestowal does not have much to do with a supposedly Cartesian understanding of consciousness or a Kantian conception of the subject. Rather, it concerns Husserl's thesis that constituting consciousness is (at least) in principle independent from the world that it constitutes. The second question that Husserl's successors raised against his transcendental philosophy thus ultimately concerns the meaning of the phenomenological reduction, which opens up the (worldly or outerworldly?) point of view from and for which everything turns into a phenomenological phenomenon.

(C) For Husserl, the reduction is "transcendental-phenomenological" because this reduction aims to make the transcendental processes of constitution accessible for phenomenological analysis. Transcendental phenomenology's phenomenon is not just the subject-relative givenness of mundane objectivities. In the end, its

phenomenon is the constitutive process of sense-formation and the revelation of the mode of being of all objectivity as partaking in the correlation between the event of appearance and what appears. Moreover, transcendental phenomenology does not stop at the *description* of this correlative constitutive relation since it investigates this correlation epistemologically as to its *truth value* or *truth making*. Transcendental phenomenology examines how one understands the meaning and the mode of being of an objectivity and, more precisely, whether this understanding accords to the way in which the objectivity gives itself and whether this understanding does justice to its givenness or not. That is, a transcendental phenomenology is careful not to measure the truth of the meaning and being of a phenomenon with a standard that does not comply to the nature of the appearing objectivities in question. So, for example, while transcendental phenomenology strives towards apodictically valid expressions about transcendental constitutional connections, it refrains from making apodictic statements about the existence of perspectivally given mundane things.

However, Husserl still believes that the grounds of merely provisional or inadequate truth claims can be adequately grasped and can be formulated scientifically in an apodictic manner. It is here that we encounter the *third limitation* that divides Husserl from his phenomenological successors. Specifically, Husserl's critics do not only inquire into the (outerwordly or wordly) point of view out of which phenomena make sense, but also into the point of view of the phenomenologist who assesses the nature and justification of their ontological sense. Their critical question amounts to whether the phenomenologist can claim an absolute point of view that enables him to formulate apodictic scientific propositions even about forms of partial and presumptive experience. In other words, Husserl's successors question whether the transcendental phenomenologizing phenomenologist can detach himself from the finitude characteristic of the experiences that he analyses and totally rid himself of the muteness characteristic of the experiences he brings to expression. If the phenomenologist cannot distance himself in this manner and if the very idea of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction is to legitimize such an ability, then, according to the opinion of the more recent phenomenologists, the extent of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction should be limited. This is indeed what Merleau-Ponty has in mind when he claims in *Phenomenology of Perception*: "The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (Merleau-Ponty 2003, p. xv).

The Questioning, Intuiting, and World Acquainted Phenomenologist

In order to give a closer treatment of the third critique of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, we must first eliminate some misunderstandings and ambiguities. One must be cautious since the third limitation concerns the kernel of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology: the nature of a reduction of all phenomena to the

point of view of a subject that no longer experiences the world after having become the phenomenologizing phenomenologist. What is questioned in this third critique is not only Husserl's characterization of the relation between the transcendental subject and the subject of natural life, but also his characterization of the relation between the world-constituting transcendental subject and the phenomenologizing transcendental subject. In addition, this critique inquires more closely into Husserl's characterization of doing phenomenology and the resulting science of the laws of possible appearance, that is, the science of the relation between consciousness and world.

Like any other genuine philosopher, the Husserlian phenomenologist distances himself from natural life by an attitude of systematic *questioning*. The one who questions, necessarily practices a kind of *epoché* with regard to what is questioned. The epoché thus does not simply consist in a general attitude of reservation or abstinence; rather, the epoché must constantly be accomplished anew and this active accomplishment is essential to the deliberate activity of questioning. When performing the *phenomenological* reduction, one asks how and the way in which all kinds of objectivities are given. The radicality of this questioning is measured by the extent to which the one questioning can free himself from prejudices about what these intentional objectivities are beyond how they give themselves. Under the *transcendental*-phenomenological reduction that follows this epoché, one further questions how such phenomenal objectivities can acquire a unitary sense and confirmed mode of being in the interplay between subjective intention and mundane appearing. The one asking in this way asks into the void or without being guided by preconceived logical and ontological categories of objective sense and being. Only in doing so can it be guaranteed that the objects become phenomena and that the world becomes the universal horizon of all phenomena.

However one characterizes life in the natural attitude, like, for example, in its relation to scientific objectivism, it is certain that this life is engaged with mundane things, tied up in mundane situations, and grounded in the belief in the existence of the world. Only the shift to the phenomenological-transcendental attitude makes one attentive to the fact that what is meaningfully and validly pre-given and taken for granted in natural life is essentially co-determined by active and passive modes of subjective behavior. To speak with Heidegger, only the phenomenological reduction opens one to the transcendence and disclosedness of Dasein as the fundament of natural life and concern. This new, phenomenological insight into the hidden fundamental structures of natural life and the insight into the transcendental processes of constitution implicit in this life lead to another insight, namely into the one-sidedness and ungrounded presuppositions of natural life. Phenomenological reflection does not only light up a hidden dimension of experience; it also leads to a critique of the ungrounded prejudices of natural life. However, the question immediately arises whether this means that the new phenomenological life distances itself from natural life to such an extent that it, in a certain sense, turns away from this natural life. Further, the question has to be raised of how the phenomenological investigation of the *essence* of the transcendental correlation of constituting and constituted relates to the actual *enactment* of these constitutional accomplishments.

The clearest answer to these questions is given by Fink and not by Husserl or Heidegger. According to Fink, the task of the phenomenologist consists in reflectively thematizing the transcendental processes of constitution that are implicitly operative in and that govern natural life. The transcendental subject that implicitly reigns over this natural life constitutes the world. As a *world-constituting* subject, this subject is essentially world-related. However, as a *transcendental* constituting subject, it cannot itself be something mundane, that is, something belonging to the constituted world. While the transcendental subject as world-constituting subject is unworldly though still related to the world, for Fink, this is not the case for the phenomenologizing subject. The phenomenologist, as observer of the process of the constitution of the world by the transcendental subject, is only interested in the accomplishments of this subject and in the way in which it constitutes the world. According to Fink, this means that the phenomenologizing subject has lost all interest in the world. Consequently, the phenomenologist as impartial onlooker of the constitution of the world practices a double epoché. On the one hand, the phenomenologist does not partake in the belief in the world that characterizes natural life and, on the other hand, he does not partake in the constitution of the world accomplished by the transcendental subject that he observes (Fink 1995).

While Fink's proposal stands out for its clarity, it lacks the complexity of both Husserl and Heidegger's account. One has the impression that Fink wants to give both Heidegger and Husserl their due and consequently does not do justice to either one of them. On the one hand, Heidegger's fundamental ontology of being-in-the-world is far more than a description of the implicit fundamental structures of natural life. On the other hand, Husserl's phenomenological onlooker is far too involved with the process of world-constitution to be able to give up any interest in the world.

Heidegger's fundamental ontology is, indeed, by no means limited to a phenomenological description of being-in-the-world. On the contrary, his ontology aims to reach the attitude in which the meaning of all being is made phenomenologically accessible out of the experience of the meaning of one's own human Da-sein. Even if it is true that the status of the *phenomenologizing* Dasein received too little attention in *Being and Time*, it is nevertheless clear that, according to Heidegger, the practice of phenomenology is grounded in a specific, world-related and self-related mode of existence of Dasein. According to Heidegger, the phenomenological attitude is different from the attitude of natural life not because of the inhibition of all world-directedness, but because the phenomenologist attempts to disclose phenomenologically and from an extreme point of view the being-in-the-world of Dasein in its totality and fundamental dimensions. The phenomenological insight into the fundamental structure of Dasein as care is arrived at through the phenomenon of temporalization; further, the phenomenological insight into the wholeness of Dasein is arrived at through its being-towards-death.

Thus, according to Heidegger, in determining the being of Dasein, the phenomenologist builds upon *existentiell* experiences, which he does not leave behind when entering into his far-reaching *existential*-ontological investigations. Heidegger's phenomenologist is, of course, more interested in man's authentic way of living his own life than in his concern for mundane things. Nevertheless, this new attitude

or existentially accomplished way of living by no means implies a breaking away from the world or a victory over the finitude and mortality of the phenomenologist. Because of the world-relatedness of the phenomenological insight into the being of Dasein and because of the phenomenologist experiencing his own being-towards-death, for Heidegger, phenomenological knowledge of the being of human life is modeled after Aristotelean *phronesis* rather than *sophia*.

Fink's characterization of the impartial phenomenological onlooker also does not do full justice to *Husserl's* intentions. If one takes a closer look at what a specifically phenomenological observation of the constitution of the world could mean, then both the distanced impartiality of the phenomenologist as well as his mere observing become problematic. That is, phenomenological reflection on the life that constitutes the world is a reflection of a peculiar kind. When performing such reflection, one does not only reflect on consciousness, but also on the various forms of the correlation between consciousness and world. Thus, phenomenological reflection explicates or thematizes transcendental processes of constitution, that is, the processes of sense-bestowal and ontological determination arising out of the interplay between subjective openness and phenomenal givenness. The phenomenologist opens a window that sees out upon the previously hidden processes of constitution as they factually unfold. Of course, the phenomenologist does not constitute a (new) world; nevertheless, the new insight into the hidden processes of the constitution of the world absorbs the phenomenologist to such an extent that he leans far out of his window in order to see the meaningfulness of the world in a new way.

That is, the phenomenological onlooker is not located in an absolute and remote observation post. Rather, he is affected by what he sees, for example, the failure of a process of constitution. His insight into the factually unfolding transcendental processes of constitution is also limited. More precisely, there is even more that escapes the grasp of the phenomenologist than the grasp of the naturally experiencing subject. There is, indeed, much that makes perfect sense within our natural lives for which the phenomenologist cannot provide a clarification. There are several kinds of transcendental constitutional accomplishments or sense-formations that unfold passively and are possibly unconscious. These accomplishments do not allow for a complete thematization and, consequently, they even remain invisible to the attentive phenomenologist. What and to what extent the phenomenological observer manages to see intuitively and make understandable in phenomenological reflection does not only depend on his vigilance and strength of vision, but is also determined by the extent to which the phenomena themselves reveal their nature. The liberation of the phenomenologist from the blindness of natural life does not imply that he would be able to completely and finally see through all the processes of constitution that remain hidden to this natural life. While the shift from the natural to the phenomenological life that the epoché and the phenomenological reduction enable, in a certain sense, occurs in one movement, the elucidation of natural life and its life-world poses an infinite task for the phenomenologist.

With respect to the intuitive character of phenomenological reflection, one should consequently distinguish between the opening up of a new of form of

visibility and that which effectively becomes visible when entering this new dimension. The opening up of a new dimension of phenomenal givenness is unquestionably the accomplishment of the phenomenological reduction. This reduction, however, by no means implies a phenomenological translucency or the possibility of a total phenomenological reflection. Rather, the intuitive character of phenomenological reflection entails that this reflection cannot precede the factual course of transcendental-constituting life and by necessity always trails behind this life. His a priori knowledge about the presuppositions or essential structures of a process of transcendental sense-formation does not prevent the phenomenologist from being surprised by unexpected and even largely unintelligible events of sense. Phenomenological insight into transcendental processes of constitution is itself a factual occurrence that is not to be construed after the fact as a *necessary* consequence of the accomplishment of the phenomenological reduction. It is by keeping this in mind that one can avoid that the lively thematization of the dynamics of constitutional processes solidifies into a distanced and impartial objectivation or fixation of rigid structures.

Phenomenology as an Eidetic Science of Transcendental Consciousness

The seeing of the phenomenologist does not only depend on the factual course of the processes of his world-experience; it also depends on the specificity and potentiality of the mundane objectivities and their horizons of reference. Remaining interested in the complexity of mundane phenomena, the phenomenologist will also always try to influence the world-constituting life and initiate processes of new sense-formation. Even if, according to Husserl, the pure theoretical practice of phenomenology cannot be a constituting being-in-the-world, it is nevertheless still a temporally situated and factual philosophical mode of existence that gives new impulses to the course of natural life. The phenomenologist returning from the philosophical attitude to the natural attitude will, for example, become suspicious of the presuppositions of natural scientific objectivism. Conversely, in his philosophizing, the phenomenologist will take objective scientific facts and theories into account in order to investigate transcendental nexuses of constitution that were thus far overlooked. On the basis of his insight into the constitutional nexuses, the phenomenologist will subsequently subject scientific claims to a critical philosophical scrutiny.

Thus, when Fink denies the phenomenologist any interest in worldly matters, one should disagree. As both Husserl and Heidegger concede, the interest in the transcendental *constitution* of the world is not to be severed from the interest in this *world*. However, Fink was not entirely on the wrong track since a certain ambiguity indeed characterizes the attitude of the Husserlian phenomenologist. This ambiguity does not arise out of the radical difference between the disinterested phenomenological onlooker and the world-constituting transcendental subject. The

ambiguity that one encounters time and again in Husserl's work concerns the characterization of phenomenology as both a science of experience and a science of essence.

As a science of experience, phenomenology applies itself to the reflective elucidation of factual, hidden transcendental processes of constitution. However, as a universal phenomenological science, its interest is exclusively directed at the general essence of these constitutional processes. While the characterization of the phenomenologist as disinterested onlooker goes against the phenomenologist's interest in the world, it accurately applies to the phenomenologist that is only interested in formulating a general theory of the essence of the constitution of the world as such. While the phenomenologist that engages in the factual course of world-constituting life is after the hidden *phronesis* of natural life and the renewal of this *phronesis*, a phenomenological eidetic science dwells in an attitude of pure theoretical contemplation. As a science of principles or first philosophy, phenomenology is a *sophia* concerned with the general determination of its object, with the systematic order of its eidetic insights, and with the question of the truth of its own knowledge-acquisitions.

Nevertheless, the eidetic laws of a phenomenological science of principles are laws concerning the general forms of transcendental correlative connections between intentional subjective experiences and their corresponding objective phenomena. For example, the eidetic law that a spatial thing necessarily appears in adumbrations does not in the first place express an ontological feature of the thing. Rather, this law concerns the phenomenological mode of givenness of an object to an embodied experiencing subject. Conversely, the eidetic law that consciousness is by necessity temporal also says something about the temporality or omnitemporality of the consciously intended objectivities. Phenomenological eidetic laws both concern a priori forms of the appearance of objectivities for a subject and a priori forms of the intentional subjective directedness at objectivities. Specific transcendental phenomenological eidetic laws concern the necessary condition for the constitution of a unitary object in the stream of its appearances as well as the necessary conditions for the unitary coherence of subjective experiences.

It is undeniable that the a priori necessary validity of such formal eidetic laws goes hand in hand with a loss of phenomenal experiential content. Both the empirical facticity of psycho-physical human consciousness and the objective facticity of natural scientific matters of fact that are valid in themselves were already sacrificed in the *phenomenological* reduction. The facticity that an *eidetic* reduction and a phenomenological eidetic science leave behind is the *phenomenological* facticity of factually accomplished experience or factually unfolding processes of constitution. The phenomenologist who is interested in the development of an absolutely valid and universal phenomenological science no longer follows the course of his experiences. Rather, he devotes himself to the study of different forms of experience and their epistemological advantages and disadvantages. He becomes an impartial observer of his own transcendental experiences to such an extent that his factual experience is nothing more than a mode of possible experience for him. In this way, the phenomenologist also becomes the impartial

observer of himself since his own individuality only amounts to an instantiation of the general essence of a phenomenologizing ego. Thus, the phenomenologist as author of scientific affirmations about phenomenological eidetic laws becomes an absolute subject that ascertains the essence of experiences that no longer personally concern him.

Obviously, Husserl is aware that this absolute, transcendental-phenomenological eidetic science and this interchangeable phenomenologist cannot exist in pure form. First, it should be underlined that in addition to an *absolute* phenomenological science there also exists something like a *descriptive* phenomenological science that is also *eidetic*. The essence of transcendental consciousness as such in its relation to the essence of the world as such that an absolute phenomenology targets is not the same as the essential states of affairs that a descriptive phenomenology investigates. Second, even an absolute phenomenology might not possibly succeed in finally determining every relevant state of affairs in the form of apodictically valid eidetic laws. Third, the impartial phenomenological onlooker still has to rely on his own, individual and factual experiences in order to formulate phenomenological eidetic laws. That is, even though an experience of the general is possible, there are no general experiences.

Even as a remote and unattainable ideal, the very idea of an *absolute* phenomenological eidetic science weighs heavily on the conscience of a phenomenological researcher. Of course, he might give credit to the ideal of appropriateness in addition to the ideal of apodicticity like he might allow for objective types and subjective styles of experience in addition to exact essences. He might also be aware that phenomenological eidetic laws are related to the possibility of factual courses of experience and that the impartial onlooker is always still an actual individual subject. Nevertheless, the honest phenomenologist cannot but acknowledge that the aim of formulating apodictically necessary eidetic laws possibly covers up the phenomenological relevance of many unique phenomena and subjects all phenomena to an objectivation that possibly constrains their phenomenality.

Even a *descriptive* phenomenological eidetic science reaches a limit when the meaning of the factual experience it investigates does not allow for a generalization. The best example of this is certainly the phenomenon of history. However, Husserl's tentative statements concerning the philosophy of history are not to be found in his genetic phenomenology. Genetic phenomenology is solely concerned with the history of transcendental consciousness, with the passive motivation of its sense-bestowing accomplishments, with their habitualization by means of the development of a personal style of experiencing, and with a genealogical elucidation of pre-given sense-formations by means of retracing the original sense-bestowal, which allows for the possibility of reiterated sense-bestowals.

While an eidetic analysis of these dynamic processes inevitably goes hand in hand with a loss of material facticity and personal individuality, this genetic analysis by no means breaks the mold of a phenomenological eidetic science. On the contrary, a *genetic eidetic* phenomenology overcomes the logic of a pure static essential characterization of phenomena and opens phenomenological eidetics to the complex structures of, for example, a transcendental person and the processes of

its socialization. Contrary to such a genetic phenomenology that pursues the aims of an eidetic science to its limits, and in this way contributes to its fundamental renewal, a philosophy of history forces the phenomenologist time and again to transcend these limits. Of course, something like an essence of historical phenomena can be discerned. Nevertheless, the philosophical meaning of specific historical facts and of their historical consequences cannot be elucidated by solely relying on the essential lawfulness of a subjective consciousness. Even someone who believes that the history of the world has a meaning – not a contingent meaning, but a necessary one – has to resort to the belief in a teleologically determined *ideal* that cannot be recuperated by any phenomenological eidetics.

The phenomenological science of the essence of pure consciousness and its necessary eidetic laws does not only neglect phenomena *beyond* its domain of competence, but also phenomena that *precede* this domain. More precisely, a phenomenological eidetic science neglects the phenomena that belong to a facticity that is misleadingly called "naturalistic." Specifically, the eidetic phenomenologist neglects the fact that the phenomena he deals with are not merely relative to a subject but also relative to a species. The subjective point of view of the phenomenologist is always a human one and not an animal or ghostlike perspective. A naturalism that attempts to ground the essence of transcendental consciousness in evolutionary events of adaptation and selection, in the nature and functioning of the human brain, or in the psychological laws of an "economy of thought" is by all means misguided. In this respect, Husserl's arguments are still valid. Nevertheless, this need not entail that there are no natural conditions of doing phenomenology or that such conditions are irrelevant for the self-understanding of the phenomenologist.

As is well known, Husserl himself was concerned with the difference between transcendental consciousness and animal consciousness, as well as with the refutation of psycho-physical parallelism. His elaborations on this topic often result in the finding that phenomenological laws concerning the essence of transcendental consciousness can claim absolute validity while the natural scientific laws that apply to dogs and brain-functions can only claim provisional validity. In addition, from the point of view of a transcendental-phenomenological science, one can only say that the dog "co-constitutes" the world of the hunter (Husserl 1973, p. 167) and that the scientific determination of the connection between brain processes and conscious processes is not the task of the phenomenologist, but rather of the natural scientist (Bernet 2009, pp. 80–111).

Husserl is of course correct in presuming that animal consciousness is inaccessible to us and consequently cannot become a phenomenological phenomenon. However, once one widens one's understanding of phenomenological phenomena to include the givenness of a meaningful connection between a goal directed behavior and a certain environmental situation, the expressive behavior of our fellow human beings as well as the expressive behavior of animals acquires the validity of a genuine phenomenon. In this way, the difference between human and animal behavior also becomes phenomenologically accessible and enables insight into certain natural conditions of transcendental consciousness. Nevertheless, Husserl remains correct when he writes: "The lobes of my brain do not appear to

me" (1990, p. 164). However, he does err when he thinks that the natural scientific investigation of human brain-functions would for this reason be phenomenologically irrelevant. The investigation into the difference between the functions of my living organism that can appear to me and the ones that can in principle not appear to me is a legitimate task of phenomenology. It is important to notice that what falls beyond the domain of phenomenological evidence is not therefore necessarily phenomenologically irrelevant. In this way, the question of which phenomena of human conscious are accessible to a neuro-physiological analysis and which are not cannot leave the phenomenologist indifferent. Actually, this question can only be answered by a philosophy that is acquainted with the knowledge acquisitions of empirical research. To merely call upon the a priori necessary validity of phenomenological laws of essence no longer suffices. Conversely, it is also conceivable that the phenomenological investigation of human consciousness and its bodily behavior would give new impulses to neurophysiology and could dissuade it from its atomistic presuppositions. As is well known, in his early work *The Structure of Behavior*, Merleau-Ponty paved the way for such a mutual enrichment (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2006; Bernet 2008).

Thus, we are able to conclude that there can be a phenomenology that does not understand itself as a phenomenology of a transcendental constituting conscious subject. Likewise, there can be a transcendental phenomenology that is not an eidetic science of the apodictically necessary structures of pure consciousness. In other words, within phenomenology there are also limits to sense-formation and limits to the general essential characterization of transcendental consciousness. In both cases, one should respect these limits rather than attempt to transcend them since the ultimate ground of all phenomenology lies in nothing else than the facticity of our experience. This does not, however, mean that the phenomenologist should be constrained by this facticity and be satisfied with simply narrating the history of his own experiences. In the end, the experienced phenomena themselves determine which science of them is possible and to what extent a scientific elaboration of its descriptive findings is congenial to phenomenological research.

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Chapter 8
Neo-Aristotelian Ethics: Naturalistic or Phenomenological

John J. Drummond

The development of contemporary, neo-Aristotelian approaches to ethics have proceeded on two levels. On one level, neo-Aristotelian thinkers beginning with Elizabeth Anscombe (1958) and Philippa Foot (2002a, pp. 189–208, b, pp. 96–147) have developed meta-ethical views regarding questions in moral ontology and epistemology (e.g., the fact/value distinction and realism versus anti-realism), moral psychology (e.g., the role of the emotions in moral experience), and practical reason. On a second level, neo-Aristotelian thinkers beginning with Peter Geach (1977) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), and later Philippa Foot (2003), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999, 2004), and Martha Nussbaum (1988, 1990, 1993) while also attending to the meta-ethical issues, have developed virtue ethics as a normative alternative to consequentialism and deontologism.

Some, no doubt, might find it odd to connect the phenomenological tradition with its focus on describing the transcendental structures of intentional experiences to these developments, but there are profoundly phenomenological moments in Aristotle's thought and in the neo-Aristotelian movement. Conversely, the axiological tradition that arose within phenomenology in the early part of the twentieth century has important things to say about some of the same meta-ethical issues that occupied the attention of the early neo-Aristotelian thinkers. I have in mind the tradition exemplified by thinkers such as Franz Brentano (1969, 1995), Edmund Husserl (1988, 2011), Max Scheler (1973), Dietrich von Hildebrand (1916, 1922), and Nicolai Hartmann (1967). While I am not convinced by the normative positions developed in this axiological approach, I think that the meta-ethical views are important and that there are other bases within the phenomenological tradition for developing a normative viewpoint, one that would resonate to some degree with contemporary neo-Aristotelianism. My title, suggestive of a contrast between the

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naturalistic and phenomenological accounts, is an inclusive disjunction. The contrast between the naturalistic and the phenomenological is not so profound as to render impossible the development of a neo-Aristotelianism that is genuinely phenomenological but compatible with a properly understood naturalism.

For the purposes of this discussion, I understand a neo-Aristotelian ethics to be committed, first, to a teleological, eudaimonistic, and non-consequentialist conception of the good. By a consequentialist understanding of the good, I mean a conception that views the good as a causally produced effect of an action. On this view, the good is external to the action itself, and an action has no moral significance in and of itself apart from its consequences. A non-consequentialist conception of the good, on the other hand, views the good realized by the action as at least partially internal to the action itself. Honesty, for example, is realized in the activity of truth-telling and not as an external consequence of it.

I understand a neo-Aristotelian ethics, second, to be committed to the view that its conception of the good is rooted in a "naturalism" of some kind. While the broadest sense of "naturalism" is opposed to "supernaturalism" and thereby precludes any kind of appeal to the supernatural as the ground for ethical judgments, there are different, more precise meanings available for the term "naturalism" and its cognates "natural," and "naturalistic." I distinguish four:

(1) In its narrowest sense "naturalism" is a reductive physicalism that considers everything exclusively as a spatio-temporal individual enmeshed in a causally mechanistic, purely physical world. Whatever exists, on this view, is either a physical individual subject to causal laws or a merely dependent function of physical variations governed by fixed, mathematically expressible laws. On this sense of naturalism, physical nature exhausts reality and is the correlate of the natural sciences. The scientific viewpoint excludes all that is personal, and thereby relative to a subject, in favor of an impersonal and disenchanted view of nature as it is "in itself." This sense of naturalism is the view held by those who adopt what Husserl calls the "naturalistic" attitude, (1952, pp. 1–3, 179–184, 1989, pp. 3–4, 189–193; cf. McDowell 2002, pp. 156–157) and it excludes the possibility of an ethics rooted in the understanding of nature. The only alternatives for ethics on this view of naturalism are, first, a subjectivism of values entirely divorced from the facts of nature "in itself" or, second, a view of practical reason as external to nature and, as McDowell aptly puts it, "a foreign power, ordering our animal nature about from outside the natural world" (2002, p. 158).

(2) A second sense of naturalism departs from what Michael Thompson calls "natural-historical judgments" and their expression in sentences he calls "Aristotelian categoricals" (2008, pp. 63–73). This naturalism is rooted in a focus on what, with a Wittgensteinian twist, Thompson calls "life-forms." These life-forms manifest not only physical and chemical processes but vital operations. Natural-historical judgments concern these vital operations and typically take the form "The *S* is (or has, or does) *F*" or "*S*s are (or have, or do) *F*," where *S* is a common noun naming a life-form (for example, "mayflies" or "the mayfly") and *F* is a predicative expression naming some vital feature or operation predicable of *S* (for example, "breed(s) shortly before death") (Thompson 2008, pp. 64–65).

These natural-historical judgments have peculiar logical properties. First, they are unquantifiable. They are neither universal nor particular nor singular. For example, "Dogs have four legs" is not falsified by the fact that Fido has only three. Nor can we even think they apply to most instances of a life-form. In the case of mayflies, for example, most die before breeding, although those who live long enough to breed do so shortly before dying. Although singular propositions can have the same form, Aristotelian categoricals are not singular propositions. "The rabbit eats plants" can be understood as a singular proposition if I am pointing at a particular rabbit who happens at the moment to be eating a plant. But even this singular use is comprehensible only in the light of the Aristotelian categorical, for I am identifying the rabbit as having a particular form of life that involves eating plants. Hence, it is clear that the Aristotelian categorical is not a particular proposition either, since it clearly means more than "Some rabbits eat plants," that is, at least one rabbit eats plants, for eating plants is a characteristic behavior of the life-form.

Another logical peculiarity of Aristotelian categoricals is that they do not permit true inferences to particular organisms having the life-form named in the Aristotelian categorical. The failure of this inference can indicate that the particular organism for whom the inference fails is defective (as in the three-legged dog), but it need not (as in the case of the mayfly who dies before reproducing).

Those, such as Foot and Hursthouse, who accept this view of naturalism, require only that there be a significant connection between our moral evaluations and some Aristotelian categoricals. The connection is established by the presence of a teleological significance in the Aristotelian categorical, a significance that is tied to the life-cycle of the organism (Foot 2003, pp. 30–33; Hursthouse 1999, p. 202). Not all Aristotelian categoricals, for example, "Dogs have four legs," have such significance, but others, such as "Male peacocks have brilliantly colored tails" do because male peacocks have brilliantly colored tails *in order to* attract female peacocks during the mating season. It is important to note that teleological Aristotelian categoricals state how a thing *should* be if it is to achieve the goods proper to its life-cycle. To that extent they describe norms rather than statistical normalities (Foot 2003, p. 33). And it is in that light that they serve to underwrite evaluations of organisms in the light of whether or not those organisms can or do achieve the goods proper to their life-cycle. Human actions, then, are evaluated on the basis of whether they contribute to realizing the goods appropriate to the human life-cycle in both its individual and social dimensions.

The logic of Aristotelian categoricals, however, has led to the objection, exemplified by McDowell, that this view of naturalism cannot ground a naturalistic ethics insofar as it cannot provide a basis for ethical inferences about the goods proper to individual instances of the species. Precisely because reason requires that we step back from truths about our nature to determine whether they should govern in our own case means that Aristotelian categoricals do not suffice to provide reasons that guide the choices of individual rational agents. For this reason, the failure of inference, say, in the case where an individual human being chooses not to reproduce, does not allow the judgment that this person is defective or acting unethically. Indeed, in certain contexts, the argument could be made that this

choice, as long as it realizes a good other than reproduction, is both permissible and praiseworthy. If this is true, Aristotelian categoricals, on McDowell's view, cannot ground an account of the virtues (McDowell 2002, pp. 154–155).

In a second line of criticism, Gowans argues against an ethics rooted in teleological Aristotelian categoricals on the grounds that such an ethics "cannot account for the concerns of moral universalism," (2008, p. 29) in particular the view that "each human being has moral worth or standing, and hence deserves serious moral consideration" (Gowans 2008, p. 40). This is not an external, Kantian critique, although it is certainly motivated by a Kantian perspective. Gowans's critique is internal. His point is that neo-Aristotelian virtue-ethicists accept the standard contemporary list of the virtues and understand some of these virtues—despite their apparent partiality to local communities—to incorporate moral universalism. But, Gowans argues, the attempt to reveal "moral evil as 'a kind of natural defect'" (Foot 2003, p. 5) on the basis of Aristotelian categoricals having a teleological significance cannot by itself make sense of the universalism inherent in virtues such as charity or justice. The teleological character of the Aristotelian categoricals regarding the human undetermine these virtues because the sociality of humans these categoricals describe, while a biological fact, is "too blunt an instrument to provide an effective criterion for understanding the [social] virtues" (Gowans 2008, p. 55). This kind of naturalism cannot, therefore, justify the universalist dimension of these virtues even as understood by those who advance this naturalism (Gowans 2008, p. 42).

(3) A third sense of naturalism, also claiming an Aristotelian inheritance, contrasts itself with the disenchanted view of the first sense of naturalism. Scientific, reductive physicalism fails to acknowledge that its own view of nature is itself a human achievement. Nature can never be divorced from the rational achievements of those humans who articulate the world in the way that the physical sciences do. The physicalist view of nature arises from choices made by historical scientists about how they would (and should) investigate the world and the features upon which they would (and should) concentrate. However, as McDowell puts it,

> it is one thing to recognize that the impersonal stance of scientific investigation is a methodological necessity for the achievement of a valuable mode of understanding reality; it is quite another thing to take the dawning grasp of this, in the modern era, for a metaphysical insight into the notion of objectivity as such, so that objective correctness in any mode of thought must be anchored in this kind of access to the real (2002, p. 164).

This third sense of naturalism recognizes that the natural world is contained within the space of the *logos* that apprehends and articulates the world and its significance (McDowell 2002, p. 162). McDowell rejects a transcendental understanding of this human activity. He seeks to bring practical reason back into nature as a "making of meaning" that does not stand over against a world "in itself" but as a making of meaning that needs no external certification (2002, p. 166). Hence, according to McDowell,

> we do not need to conceive practical reason as subject only to formal constraints. What it is for the practical intellect to be as it ought to be, and so equipped to get things right in its proper sphere, is a matter of its having a certain determinate non-formal shape, and a practical intellect's coming to be as it ought to be is the acquisition of a second nature,

> involving the moulding of motivational and evaluative propensities: a process that takes place in nature. The practical intellect does not dictate to one's formed character—one's nature as it has become—from outside. One's formed practical intellect—which is operative in one's character-revealing behaviour—just is an aspect of one's nature as it has become (2002, p. 162).

McDowell's view of nature is enchanted precisely because second nature finds more in the world—more in nature—than what the natural sciences find (2002, p. 174). Since the development of second nature occurs in the natural world, the justification of the virtues is internal to second nature itself (2002, p. 175). This seems, however, to leave McDowell's position open to the line of criticism that Gowans has raised against the second view of naturalism. Because second nature is culturally particular and not formal and universal, its justification is relative to the particular culture in which it is formed and justified. This "internal realism" forecloses an adequate basis for moral universalism. And even if all second natures made space for moral universalism, moral universalism as a universal ethical precept would hold only contingently and could be overridden by particularist considerations.

(4) The fourth sense of naturalism has certain similarities to McDowell's notion of second nature. It points to an enchanted world wherein nature is best understood as the correlate of what is discovered when we adopt what Husserl calls the "personalistic attitude," an attitude in which we attend to how the world reveals itself in the ordinary, everyday experiences of persons. Just as the nature proper to the natural sciences points back to the performances and synthetic achievements of scientists, this fourth sense of nature points back to the performances and synthetic achievements of subjects who experience objects as more than spatio-temporal individuals causally related to other spatio-temporal individuals in the world. The subject experiences objects as having useful functions in relation to human purposes and as having aesthetic and moral worth. The subject encounters other persons with their own purposes and their own sense of the worth of things. The subject places herself in various kinds of relations with these other subjects; she speaks with them, writes to them and about them, reads about them, associates with them, and establishes moral and political relations with them (Husserl 1952, pp. 181–182, 1989, p. 191).

This sense of naturalism turns our attention away from an objective sense of nature to the "natural" experiences of subjects who encounter the world, and it does so more fully than McDowell's sense by virtue of being explicitly transcendental. Nevertheless, this view of nature might not differ too greatly from McDowell's, even with the latter's explicit disavowal of a transcendental dimension. McDowell rejects the transcendentalist view that imposes from without an order on the world; he opposes a constructivist account of the transcendental and of the experience it grounds. The fourth view advanced here, however, in opposition to someone like Korsgaard (1996, 2008, 2009), is not constructivist, but disclosive. The appeal to transcendental structures of experiences identifies the necessary structures involved in our disclosure of the world as it is and as it presents itself to experience. Our natural experiences of the world grasp objects in their significance for us. They grasp the sense of things; they do not impose it upon them.

This sense of naturalism, as it were, pays more explicit attention than the others to the "enchantress" of the world by focusing on the full-bodied and complex experiences of subjects in the world and on how these experiences disclose the world. It is this sense of the natural with its transcendental dimension that underlies what I am calling a phenomenological neo-Aristotelianism in ethics. Central to all these experiences in which we take objects as utensils, tools, sculptures, paintings, literary products, insignias, seals, vestments, icons, sacred spaces, and so forth is the phenomenon of intentionality. A phenomenological neo-Aristotelian ethics grounds itself in the structure, the categoriality, and the teleology of the intentionalities—both passive and active—involved in our moral evaluations and moral choices.

In the remainder of this paper, I shall sketch what such an ethics might look like and identify some of the reasons why I believe that it both incorporates and advances upon a neo-Aristotelianism grounded in the second or third senses of naturalism. Intentional experience comprises both empty intentions—ones that re-present (as in memory) or make present (as in phantasy) or signitively refer in language to an object that is absent—and full intentions—ones that present an object intuitively (i.e., that have a sensory basis) and that thereby apprehend the object in its actual presence (Husserl 1963, p. 93, 1970a, p. 58). Full intentions are called fulfilling intentions when they stand in such a relation to empty intentions that they intuitively present the object as (previously) emptily intended and thereby "satisfy" or "fulfill" the empty intention.

The notion of the fulfillment of an empty intention displays the teleology of intentional experience: empty intentions tend toward a full intention. The experience of fulfillment arises when the intuitively full intention presenting the object as it was previously emptily intended is synthetically unified with the empty intention such that the subject is aware of the "coincidence" or "congruence" (*Deckung*) of the two intentions (Husserl 1970b, p. 685, 1984, p. 556). To experience this synthetic identity is to experience the truthfulness of the intention. Following Husserl, I call this fulfilling experience "evidence" (1963, pp. 92–93, 1970a, p. 57). This is not the evidence of warrants that provide support for a conclusive or probable inference. It is instead the evidence of intuitively grasping the things or situation in a continuous course of experience that is harmonious with our non-evidenced sense of the object. The fulfilling sense is, as it were, laid over the emptily intended sense such that we become aware of their congruence. Such evidential experience provides non-inferential justification of the emptily intended sense. The thing or situation is truthfully disclosed as having the sense ascribed to it in the empty intending, and reason is teleologically ordered to this evidential, truthful disclosure of the world.

We should understand reason as more than the theoretical reason to which the notion of 'truth' seems most properly to apply. There are axiological and practical forms of reason and a form of evidential experience that is proper to each (Husserl 1976, p. 321 ff., 1983 p. 333 ff.). While axiological and practical reason are not rational in just the way that theoretical reason is rational, they are no less rational in their own proper way insofar as they involve this teleological ordering toward

evidence and the truthful disclosure of the good and the right. It follows from this that the evidential experiences toward which reason strives take different forms in cognition and the theoretical sciences, in valuation and the axiological sciences, and in volition and the practical sciences. Nevertheless, the task of reason can be properly summarized as always to ensure in fulfilling experiences the "truthfulness" of our judgments about what is the case, about what is valuable, and about what is right to do. The *telos* of reason—and by extension of the person who exercises reason—is in the broadest sense, then, (1) to apprehend truthfully things and states of affairs, (2) to have appropriate affective and evaluative attitudes toward those things and states of affairs, and (3) to act rightly in response to and on the basis of our truthful cognitions and attitudes.

A person is rational in the full sense, then, when she in an evidential experience knows for herself what is true, or when she in the light of evidence adopts the right attitudes and emotions regarding things, events, actions, and persons, i.e., when she in the light of evidence recognizes what is truly good, and, finally, when she chooses in the light of evidence what is rightly done. The contrasts are, first, with the experiencing agent who merely accepts passively what others claim to be the true, the good, or the right and, second, with the experiencing agent who judges without evidence, who merely supposes that such and such is the case. The rational person in the full sense adopts the evident sense of things as her own conviction and assumes responsibility for this conviction. The person in the fullest sense, then, is the self-responsible, truthful agent. This is the eudaimonistic moment in phenomenology. It defines for us what the human person's flourishing is not merely in biological terms but also in rational terms. The biological is included in the rational insofar as rational agents are also animal organisms. It is on the basis of this eudaimonism that we must understand the notion of the virtuous person.

Crucial to making good on the claim for a phenomenological eudaimonism is to provide for each sphere of reason a sufficiently thick account of evidence, i.e., of the intuitive justification of empty intentions, so as both to specify the notion of *eudaimonia* and to underwrite an account of the virtues. In the cognitive or theoretical sphere, the self-responsible agent grasps the true in a presentation that is a perception, a modification of perception such as memory or imagination, or categorial modification of perception that grasps a state of affairs. Stipulating that "justification" in this context is *prima facie*, non-inferential, and defeasible,

1. p is a justified presentation when
   - 1.1 p discloses the pre-predicative or predicative sense of a thing or situation O and its properties x, y, and z; and
   - 1.2 p is evidenced.

In considering the axiological sphere, we must note that evaluative experiences, according to a widely shared phenomenological view, apprehend the valuable in a moment of feeling or an episodic emotion that is founded on a presentation. This foundational claim is better stated as follows: there are distinguishable layers of sense within the concrete sense of the evaluation such that a presentational layer—the layer

presenting the merely descriptive features of the object—grounds additional, affective layers of sense. Value-attributes, then, are the correlates of intentional feelings or episodic emotions that are the affective response of a subject with a particular experiential history—that is, particular beliefs, emotional states, dispositions, practical interests, cares, commitments, and so forth—to the presented non-axiological properties of a thing or situation. The value-attributes intended are neither separate from nor reducible to the non-axiological properties on which they are founded, and our valuations—precisely insofar as they are grounded on presentations—track these non-axiological properties. Conversely, the non-axiological properties provide reasons for the valuation accomplished in the affective response.

Value-attributes, while disclosed by feelings or episodic emotions, are independent of those feelings and emotions, at least in the sense that a thing's being valuable is not reducible to its being felt valuable. Rather, the valuable is that toward which the valuing feeling or episodic emotion is correct or appropriate. The intentional feeling or episodic emotion experienced by the subject is appropriate when both the apprehension of the underlying non-axiological properties is justified and the intentional feeling or episodic emotion is rationally motivated by those non-axiological properties. The latter criterion necessarily involves an appeal to our shared emotion-concepts and value-concepts. Our sense of the appropriateness of an emotion and the truthfulness of the evaluation it accomplishes is tied, in other words, to our learned and reflectively adjusted conceptions of what affective and axiological attributes are properly motivated by a certain set of non-axiological properties. I learn to evaluate rude behavior, in other words, by learning what features of a person's comportment toward others count as rude. In learning features of the world, I learn which to fear. These emotion and value-concepts, of course, insofar as I have already acquired them, further inform my experience of a situation, enabling me to pick out immediately what is evaluatively salient in the situation. This is why Aristotle, Foot, Hursthouse, and McDowell will all claim, in one form or another, that in some cases only the already virtuous person can properly focus on what is morally salient, make the right sorts of judgments, and perform right actions.

Since the axiological experience involves both a presentation and an intentional feeling or episodic emotion, the experience can go wrong in two ways. First, the underlying presentation can be false, as when I am angry at someone for something I believe they did but that they did not do. My anger, insofar as it is dependent upon that belief, is not truly motivated and therefore inappropriate. If the underlying presentation is corrected through the normal course of continuing experience or upon reflection, then the affective response will be corrected. Second, the affective response and the evaluation it accomplishes might be inappropriate, i.e., not rationally motivated, even when the underlying presentation is true. In such cases (as when someone with a fear of heights fears to go out on a perfectly safe observation deck), reason enters through a critical reflection that invokes and assesses our shared understanding of emotion- and value-concepts and the proper non-axiological conditions for their deployment. The moment of reflective apprehension is necessary; that it be occurrent is not. The reflective work could have been done as part of my responsible appropriation of the concepts. Whether the reflection

is occurrent or not, however, the self-awareness that accompanies my experience will involve a negative self-assessing emotion, such as shame, regret, or remorse. What is crucial here, however, is the fact that the appropriateness or truthfulness of an emotion and our affective self-assessment must always be understood in relation both to our best shared understandings of the different emotions and the conditions under which experiencing them is appropriate and to our self-assessments.

Hence, if

2. *E* is an intentional feeling or episodic emotion whose base *p* is a presentation of an object or situation *O* and its non-axiological properties *x*, *y*, and *z*, then
3. *E* is appropriate to *O* and its non-axiological properties *x*, *y*, and *z* if and only if

   3.1 *p* is justified, and
   3.2 *p* is a reason for (i.e., rationally motivates) *E*, and
   3.3 *F*, a reflectively self-assessing feeling or emotion (such as approbation or pride) positively appraises and justifies *E*, and
   3.4 no relation of justification mentioned is defeated.

Condition 3.1 addresses the truth of the underlying cognitive content, ensuring that *p* is both true and evidenced. Conditions 3.2 and 3.3 jointly address the correctness of the affective response. Condition 3.2 invokes our shared understanding of evaluative concepts and their basis in non-axiological properties, and condition 3.3 brings into play the self-assessing emotions that appraise the affective dimension of the object-directed feeling or emotional episode. To have a self-responsible evaluative experience, a self-responsible and appropriate emotion, is to have this structure of justification.

In the sphere of practical reason, volition denotes the choice of an action as conducive to some valued good or apparent good and as arising from deliberation. Hence, if

4. *V* is a volition that issues in action *A* as conducive to end *G* and whose base is *E*'s evaluation of *G* as a good and choiceworthy end,

we can provisionally characterize justification in the practical sphere as follows:

5. *V* is rationally justified and *A* is right if and only if

   5.1 *E* is appropriate;
   5.2 *E* rationally motivates a desire for *G*;
   5.3 the desire for *G* rationally motivates *V*;
   5.4 *A* conduces to *G* as an internal or external consequence; and
   5.5 no relation of justification entailed is defeated.

Embedded in this account of justification of valuations and volitions is both an ambiguity and a bifurcation in the notion of the good, for it points both to the goods that are pursued as the object of our first-order and contingent desires and to the good of self-responsible, truthful agency that is the fullness of rational personhood. Our being as rational agents is, we have said, inherently ordered toward the good of self-responsible truthfulness in all the spheres of reason, the good of truthfully disclosing what is the case, what is genuinely valuable in the objects of our

first-order, contingent desires, and what is right to do. Reason realizes its proper end—its proper good—just insofar as it achieves evidenced judgments in all the spheres of reason.

The phenomenological characterizations of self-responsible personhood in the various spheres of reason point, then, to an areteic notion of the good and to a set of virtues of both intellect and action. As various judgments, evaluations, and choices are made and confirmed over time, they become convictions of the subject that inform subsequent judgments, valuations, and choices. The convictions of the self-responsible agent of truth, especially when continually confirmed, yield dispositions to experience things or situations as conforming to past experience. These dispositional beliefs and convictions—these "habitualities" (Husserl 1963, pp. 100–101, 1970a, pp. 66–67)—are rooted in the person's perceptions, embodied in their emotional attitudes, articulated in judgments, and expressed in words and actions. Since the underlying experiences can be cognitive, affective, or practical, the person is the person who holds a certain set of beliefs, convictions, affective attitudes, and dispositions to act. They are abiding possessions of the person, and they determine a certain way of encountering the world in the continuing and unfolding course of experience, a certain style of experience, and a certain manner of behaving in the world. They dispose us to expect certain features in certain kinds of situations, to pick out what is evaluatively—and, more specifically, morally—salient in those situations, to have certain kinds of attitudes toward them, and to act in determinate ways. This is just the kind of dispositional state that Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of virtues as states or habits or dispositions to have the right attitudes and to act rightly and from the right reasons.

The virtuous agent, then, is the one who correctly grasps and assesses situations, who has properly appraised ends and has appropriately ordered her preferences among them, who has deliberated well about which actions conduce to what ends, and who acts rightly in the circumstances. The virtuous agent lives self-responsibly—judging, valuing, and deciding for herself in the light of evidence rather than passively accepting received attitudes and opinions. The self-responsible agent, acting virtuously in the pursuit of genuine first-order and contingent goods *for* herself and others, also realizes the second-order goods of thinking well, feeling well, and acting well—what we might call the goods *of* rational agency. The goods *for* an agent and for others who are the co-agents or patients of her actions are the objects of our valuations and volitions and are realized in actions that bring about appropriately desired worldly states of affairs, whereas the goods *of* agency are realized in the synthetic performances and achievements of persons whose first-order cognitive, affective, and volitional experiences both truthfully disclose and fashion the world as morally ordered.

I must emphasize, however, that thinking truly, feeling appropriately, and acting rightly are goods properly realized only in interpersonal contexts when others also realize them. The truthful apprehension of what is the case, the evaluation of goods (including moral goods), decisions about how best to realize those goods, and evaluative judgments about our own actions, the actions of others, and social practices and institutions all arise against the background of a common knowledge

embodied in our collective determinations of empirical, evaluative, and moral concepts, of choiceworthy goods, and of praiseworthy actions. This common knowledge—our notion, for example, of politeness or kindness or generosity—is passed from one generation to the next, and it continues to be worked out, criticized, modified, and reappropriated within successive generations in our encounters with one another, especially with those whose opinions or reasoning might differ from our own. Only in coming to grips with differing opinions and beliefs can we truly be said to come to know ourselves as a person holding certain convictions that have withstood a certain kind of testing and for which we have been forced to achieve the appropriate evidence. In other words, one does not and cannot reason well by oneself. In order to be self-responsible and to realize the goods *of* agency, one must think *for* oneself but not *by* oneself. For this reason, these goods of agency *must* be effectively—even if only implicitly—chosen for others as well as for oneself.

The goods *of* agency are realized in an agent's making sense of the world as she straightforwardly and truthfully seeks to know what is true, what is good *for* herself and others, and what is right to do. They are, in other words, superveniently and necessarily realized in those pursuits when those pursuits are successfully realized. Securing the goods of agency for ourselves and others does not foreclose the pursuit of different first-order, contingent goods. The universality and necessity of the goods of agency is, in other words, consistent with the pluralism of goods pursuable in free societies. However, insofar as the self-responsible pursuit of first-order goods requires that one secure the goods of agency as such, the pursuit of some first-order goods is morally wrong on universalist grounds if that pursuit blocks the realization of the goods of agency for oneself or for other persons. Hence, first-order goods are now apprehended both as necessarily transformed by and as yielding to the second-order goods of agency.

In this light, we can remove the provisional nature of our characterization of self-responsible volition. We now say:

6. *V* is rationally justified and *A* is right if and only if

   6.1 *E* is appropriate;
   6.2 *E* rationally motivates a desire for *G*;
   6.3 the desire for *G* rationally motivates *V*;
   6.4 *A* conduces to *G* as an internal or external consequence;
   6.5 *A* does not frustrate (or frustrates least) the realization of necessarily valued second-order goods of agency; and
   6.6 no relation of justification mentioned or entailed is defeated.

The realization of the end of the action in its performance and ensuring that the action also conduces to necessarily willed goods justify the correctness of the volition and the rightness of the action.

What virtues are appropriate for this notion of *eudaimonia*? The immediate answer, of course, although too simple, is (i) theoretical wisdom, (ii) what I shall baptize "axiological wisdom," and (iii) practical wisdom, i.e., the dispositions to

frame and justify truthful judgments in each sphere of reason. To specify the answer, I need to draw out another feature of this account. The life in which *eudaimonia* is realized is the life of personal autonomy. This is not the autonomy of self-legislation, but the autonomy of self-determination. I determine myself insofar as I am responsible for the convictions—and thereby the dispositions and actions and reactions—that constitute my life. The good of the self-responsible life requires, as we have seen, not only one's own personal autonomy but that of others as well. It is important to stress, however, that it is not merely the case that a person realizes the good for himself or herself in a communal context in which others also realize that good *qua* individuals. Insofar as the testing of one's opinions and convictions necessarily involves an interpersonal dimension, the goods of theoretical, axiological, and practical wisdom are realized in common and concerted efforts, e.g., in conversation or in reading and commenting upon the work of others or in collaboration. Precisely because the good of the autonomous, self-responsible life is realizable only in the joint activities of persons, the value of autonomy is often embodied in political form as constitutionally protected freedoms of thought, speech (including freedoms of the press and expression), and association.

These political freedoms secure the moral space in which personal autonomy can be exercised. That moral space is originally cleared, as I have argued elsewhere, by respect and, in particular, recognition respect in which we respect all persons just insofar as they possess those rational capacities that underlie the possibility of human *eudaimonia*. Respect as a moral feeling, of course, is not yet a virtue, but the disposition to respect the rational capacity and personal autonomy of others is a virtue. The respectful person is the one disposed to have the right feeling—at a minimum, the feeling of recognitional respect—toward others. But respectfulness does not exhaust the virtues required for *eudaimonia* for oneself and others or for the various forms of wisdom. It maintains the moral space in which other virtues associated with and conducive to these forms of wisdom can operate.

Insofar as one's truthful evidencing of things and situations depends on interpersonally shared understandings, we should expect that some of the requisite virtues will have to do with our interpersonal transactions in the sphere of reason. Hence, without having the time to explain them, we can point to virtues such as intellectual charity, intellectual humility, intellectual generosity, open-mindedness—yet firmness of mind as well—and intellectual courage. Someone might object that this account of phenomenological eudaimonism and of the virtuous person is too heavily weighted toward intellectual virtues. So allow me to add four caveats by way of response.

1. For rational agents *eudaimonia* must be realized in rational activities. Anything else would be the *eudaimonia* of a non-rational being. This is not to say that non-rational goods are not choiceworthy or that they do not contribute to human well-being, but these goods are not the goods of rational agents unless they are tied to the rational activities in which their choiceworthiness is self-responsibly evidenced.

2. We must recall that the forms of reason are not merely—and perhaps not even primarily—theoretical. A pure theoretical reason is an abstraction from our straightforward experience of and engagement with the world, and indeed, it is an abstraction that cannot fully leave behind the practical since theorizing is a special kind of *praxis*.
3. More importantly, this account of *eudaimonia* and virtue points to an account of virtue in the sphere of action just as much as it does in the sphere of reason. Having the right attitudes—emotions and desires—and performing the right actions belong just as much to the notion of eudaimonism sketched here as knowing theoretical truths. The intellectual virtues identified here operate in all three spheres of reasons. Indeed, since the most encompassing of the three forms of reason is practical, and since practical reason is concerned not merely with knowing what is right but in *doing* the right in all the spheres of human activity, these intellectual virtues underlie our grasp and exercise of moral virtues as well.
4. Most importantly, the attainment of *eudaimonia* and the development and exercise of the intellectual virtues about which I have so far spoken requires the satisfaction of certain conditions, and the satisfaction of these conditions points to other goods beyond intellectual goods that must be realized in order for *eudaimonia* to be possible at all. Since the human organism that discloses the world is a bodily organism and since the body plays an important role in this disclosure, there are bodily and physical goods that must be realized for *eudaimonia* to be realized. These goods—like the intellectual goods and virtues already mentioned—are valuable both in their own right and as conducive to *eudaimonia*. Chief among these goods are the physical conditions of food, shelter (both clothing and housing), and health as well as the provision of a good education. These goods call forth a doctrine of social and economic rights that can again be embodied in political structures and institutions, e.g., national health care plans and public (and publicly supported private) educational institutions. Once again, however, the political forms do not fully account for the virtue of distributive justice; they simply create the space in which this virtue is exercised, both in the public sphere—e.g., in debates regarding fiscal policy and the redistribution of wealth or in debates about the allocation of health-care resources among a population for whom there are insufficient resources—and in the private sphere—e.g., in decisions about charitable or philanthropic contributions, volunteer activities, and the like. While the notion of distributive justice in both the public and private spheres is central to the view of moral virtue, the virtue of distributive justice does not exhaust the virtues at work in this sphere. The virtuous person transcends what justice requires in acts expressive of (material) generosity or philanthropy, of even-temperedness, mild-manneredness, kindness, friendship, and so forth.

I cannot, of course, recite the full litany of the virtues. I only hope to have shown that in phenomenology there is room for a eudaimonism and a normative account of the virtues that are relevant to debates in contemporary moral philosophy. I also hope to have indicated how this phenomenological neo-Aristotelianism can account

for the internal justification of our first-order moral experience of the sort allied with the second and third senses of naturalism while showing the limits of those views and their need for a broader grounding in a universalistic account of the goods *of* agency.

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Chapter 9
Phenomenal Experience and the Scope of Phenomenology: A Husserlian Response to Some Wittgensteinean Remarks

Andrea Staiti

Introduction

In his groundbreaking work published in 1913, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Husserl affirms that 'phenomenology is, so to speak, the secret nostalgia of all modern philosophy' (1982, p. 142). Although we have to wait until the *First Philosophy* lecture in 1923/24 to find an extensive interpretation of the history of modern philosophy from the point of view of phenomenology, the core insight expressed in this brief statement is clear enough. The kind of thematization and direct investigation of subjectivity as the transcendental source of all meaning and objectivity that phenomenology sets out to accomplish brings to an explicit and mature expression a tendency that is present in the work of the major philosophers of the early modern period up to Kant: "The striving toward phenomenology was present already in the wonderfully profound Cartesian fundamental considerations; then, again, in the psychologism of the Lockean school; Hume almost set foot upon its domain, but with blinded eyes. And then the first to correctly see it was Kant, whose greatest intuitions become wholly understandable to us only when we had obtained by hard work a fully clear awareness of the peculiarity of the province belonging to phenomenology" (Husserl 1982, p. 142).

If we look at the history of philosophy after Kant, however, we see that this 'nostalgia' reaches far beyond the age from Königsberg. In fact, the term 'phenomenology' figures in the work of the most ambitious and original philosophers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In particular, it seems to arise wherever the project of a radically new and encompassing philosophical project is undertaken. Apart from Husserl and all the thinkers directly inspired by him, we

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find sustained claims to 'phenomenology' both before and independently from Husserl. Hegel entitles his breakthrough in absolute idealism *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Charles Sanders Peirce, the father of American pragmatism, starts from the beginning of the twentieth century to enhance his early semiotic account of reality with a discipline that he calls 'phenomenology' or 'phaneroscopy,' which was not just meant to be an appendix or a preliminary stage of his sign-centered pragmatic philosophy but rather a fundamental dimension of inquiry, a set of problems and questions "upon the answers to which, whatever they may be, our final conclusion concerning pragmatism must mainly repose at last" (Peirce 1998, p. 147). And, last but not least, in 1930, we find Wittgenstein responding to Drury, a colleague who was going to attend a conference at the Cambridge Moral Science Club, where he would be asked to comment on Wittgenstein's work: 'You could say of my work that it is phenomenology' (Gier 1990, p. 273).

It goes without saying that the appropriation of the label 'phenomenology' by each of these prominent figures does not prove anything *per se* about the philosophical agenda that they pursued under it. It would be naive at best to argue that, since such different philosophers all employ the term 'phenomenology' to label their work or some decisive portions of it, they must in some respect share a common project, and even less, that they must somehow share Husserl's project. However, the appropriation of the label phenomenology is by no means irrelevant. It does not point at a shared project, but I believe it does point at a shared *demand*. This demand is that philosophical claims may be underpinned *as much as possible* by direct descriptions of our experience. However, and this is where all differences spring from, there is no obvious sense attached to words such as 'experience', let alone 'phenomenological description of experience' or 'phenomenology.' In view of the manifold appeals to experience and phenomenological description in modern philosophy both before and after Husserl a decisive set of questions arises: (1) *how much description of experience is of import in philosophy?* (2) *What is it exactly that we describe when we describe our experience?* (3) *What shall we reasonably hope to achieve, philosophically speaking, from a description of experience?*

The different, more or less explicit answers to such questions identify the different projects envisioned when something like a phenomenology is called for. The broader the import of experience for philosophy is understood to be, the richer the scope and the ambition of the envisioned phenomenology. My plan for this paper is obviously not to provide definitive answers to the above questions, which would require a much more extended treatment than a single paper allows. However, I would like to set a basis for a possible line of research suggested by these questions by way of contrasting two divergent views of 'phenomenal experience' and 'phenomenology': Husserl's and Wittgenstein's. I will show how Husserl's broader understanding of what phenomenology is about bears more fruit—philosophically speaking—than Wittgenstein's. I will address some remarks by the late Wittgenstein in his *Bemerkungen über die Farben* [*Remarks on Colour*] concerning precisely this point, in order to then counter them from a Husserlian point of view. My thesis is that Wittgenstein (at least in the remarks I will consider)

fails to acknowledge the full scope of phenomenology and that Husserl's work concretely shows that there is more to achieve philosophically with phenomenological descriptions of experience than Wittgenstein concedes. This point is particularly timely if we consider that, as I will argue, the renaissance of phenomenological disputes in contemporary philosophy of mind and the references to phenomenal knowledge in epistemology are largely reliant on Wittgenstein's characterization of phenomenology.

The analyses presented in this paper can be considered a late supplement to Richard Cobb-Stevens' seminal book *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy* (Cobb-Stevens 1990). It is Cobb-Steven's merit to have presented a first full-scale comparison of Husserl's phenomenology and the analytic tradition. In this context he also discusses Wittgenstein's philosophy at some length (1990, pp. 32–50.) However, and in accordance with the overall target of the book, he tackles primarily linguistic issues, which characterized the first decades of so called analytic philosophy. However, now that terms such as 'phenomenal knowledge', 'first-person perspective' and 'phenomenology' have gained currency in the analytic debate, it is appropriate to revive the spirit of Cobb-Stevens inquiry and address directly Wittgenstein's conception of phenomenology. In spite of recent conciliatory approaches (cf. e.g. Benoist & Laugier 2004), I hope to show that Wittgenstein and Husserl *do not* agree on the scope of phenomenology. While Wittgenstein endorses a form of phenomenalism according to which phenomenology is exclusively about the qualitative side of experience, Husserl's work broadens the scope of phenomenology and in so doing progressively transforms the philosophical meaning of descriptions of experience. Experience is not simply the realm of the appearance of things but rather the field in which both things and all kinds of connection between things are constituted.

First, I will introduce Wittgenstein's position. In so doing I will not claim to provide any original contribution to the debate concerning the idea of phenomenology in the different phases of Wittgenstein's thought, but simply to report and interpret some statements, which, by virtue of their clarity, can be paradigmatically considered in order to display a possible position on the scope of phenomenology. Second, I will sketch out Husserl's treatment of the problems of logic. *Contra* Wittgenstein, this will prove logic as the first and fundamental field in which phenomenology displays its philosophical import. Third, I will address the relationship between the domain of experience and empirical being from the point of view of transcendental philosophy. Drawing in particular on one insightful manuscript and some other recently published Husserlian materials, I wish to show that the scope of phenomenology also includes empirical being, primarily in its characterization as *being* (and without therefore altering its *meaning* as empirical). As a conclusion I will address the sense of phenomenology as a discipline, arguing that phenomenological problems are not just a bunch of disconnected difficulties but that they systematically lead back to a unitary root underlying all of them–what Husserl called transcendental subjectivity.

Wittgensteinean Temptations

In *Remarks on Colour*, a collection of notes written in 1950 and 1951 shortly before his death, Wittgenstein contends, in spite of what he had stated about his own work 20 years earlier, that "there is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems" (1977, p. 9e). As is usual in his later work, Wittgenstein does not provide us with arguments to sustain his thesis. Nonetheless, this aphoristic remark is more than simply an extemporaneous statement of Wittgenstein's overall anti-systematic and piecemeal approach to philosophy. Rather, it entails a sustained view on the status of phenomenology that clearly comes to light in further notes.[1] In particular, the conviction that "there is no such thing as phenomenology" is a direct consequence of what he considers "phenomenological problems" to be. Let me expand on this point.

As suggested by the title of this collection of notes, Wittgenstein is engaged in an attempt to understand the laws governing our experience of colors. At issue are phenomena such as comparisons between brighter and darker nuances of the same color (why do we speak of the *same* color, being once brighter, once darker?), regularities and irregularities in the combination of primary colors (why do we directly perceive the red element in a shade of orange as a yellow tending to the red, while we do not directly perceive the blue element in a greenish yellow, as a yellow tending to the blue and rather see it as tending to the green?), and the like. These are, according to Wittgenstein, paradigmatic phenomenological problems. In order to be tackled, they essentially imply a reference to our subjective experience of the world. Basically, they are problems pertaining to the *qualitative dimension of experience*. In fact, the qualitative dimension of experience turns out for Wittgenstein to be the *only* dimension where genuinely phenomenological problems arise.

In one further note, Wittgenstein proposes the following description: "Blending in white removes the *colouredness* from the colour; but blending in yellow does not" (1977, p. 15e). However, immediately after he asks, "But what kind of a proposition is that, that blending in white removes the colouredness from the colour? As I mean it, it can't be a proposition of physics. Here the temptation to believe in a phenomenology, *something midway between science and logic*, is very great" (1977, p. 15e, my italics). By locating phenomenology this way (or better, by telling us where he would be tempted to locate it, if there were such a thing) Wittgenstein reveals his unexpressed assumption, which consequently leads him to the rebuttal of the idea of a phenomenology and to a conception of experience as a

[1] Interestingly, the few Wittgenstein scholars, who took this statement into consideration seem not to be really keen on thinking through its implications. Gier finds the statement 'odd', given Wittgenstein's previous commitment to phenomenology (see Gier 1990, p. 278). Brenner, instead, grants us that Wittgenstein actually meant the opposite of what he wrote: 'Wittgenstein's negative comment on phenomenology in *Remarks on Colour* should not be taken as a rejection of everything that has gone under that name. Indeed, he would insist that, properly understood, there is such a thing as phenomenology' (Brenner 1982, p. 298. n. 3).

domain of essentially scattered problems, as I will explain in a moment. Phenomenology, if there were such a thing, would pertain to the qualitative zone that stretches midway between the pure formality of logic and the mere empiricity of the properties of mind-independent, physical objects. In the domain of the qualitative, namely, we have problems and riddles that essentially need to be addressed in phenomenological terms (as is the case with colors). This is not the case when it comes to logic and physics. The manifestation in experience of logical and physical objects is a non-essential feature; they can and must be dealt with by referring to very different criteria than subjective modes of appearance. Thus, the midway-status of phenomenology suggested by Wittgenstein provides us with a relevant point concerning what he conceives phenomenological problems to be and, consequently, how he determines the scope of phenomenology. Experience, in its philosophically relevant sense, is the domain of the qualitative, such as colors. And, this restriction is precisely the reason why there cannot be such a thing as phenomenology for Wittgenstein, i.e., a systematic account of this domain. As he states: "here language-games decide" (1977, p. 3e), and language-games never identify substantive structures allowing for a scientific, systematic account but only changeable, life-related practices: "There is, after all, no *commonly* accepted criterion for what is a colour, unless it is one of our colours" (1977, p. 4e).

Linguistic ascriptions of qualitative properties to experienced things are for Wittgenstein the only kind of orientation we have to chart the terrain of experience (conceived of as the domain of the qualitative) and the regularity of such ascriptions depends upon essentially variable conditions: "Imagine a *tribe* of colour-blind people, and there could easily be one. They would not have the same colour concepts as we do. For even assuming they speak, e.g. English, and thus have all the English colour words, they would still use them differently than we do and would *learn* their use differently" (1977, p. 4e). All regularities we might find in the domain of the qualitative are essentially liable to change and do not form a substantive interconnection suitable to be fixed in scientific terms: "The various colour concepts are certainly closely related to one another, the various "colour words" have a related use, but there are, on the other hand, all kinds of differences" (1977, p. 26e). Given these differences that essentially characterize the domain of the qualitative (the one in whose scope, according to Wittgenstein, phenomenological problems come about) the idea of a "science" pertaining to it is a non-starter. The only philosophical project suitable for the domain of the qualitative is the charting of our intrinsically relative and variable ways to orient ourselves in it, namely, through linguistic ascriptions.

To sum up and highlight the core point, in his *Remarks on Colour,* Wittgenstein tacitly propagates the view that phenomenology becomes philosophically relevant only when it comes to the clarification of the qualitative side of experience. This kind of clarification does not allow for a science but only for piecemeal mappings of disconnected problems. The space of such problems—phenomenological problems—stretches midway between science and logic. When it comes to science and logic, consequently, the problems stop being phenomenological and we reach the limits of the import of experience and its description in philosophy.

Now, it is easy to see that this sketched view is tacitly accepted by many of the participants in the contemporary debate about *qualia* and the so-called phenomenal knowledge. Even philosophers, such as Frank Jackson, Thomas Nagel, John Searle or Sidney Shoemaker, who want to defend the epistemic relevance and irreducibility of our qualitative experience of the world, maintain that experience is fundamental only or at least primarily when it comes to this qualitative side of things. To paraphrase Nagel (1974), phenomenal knowledge pertains to the "what-it-is-like" aspect of things. Or, as in Frank Jackson's famous paper (1986), phenomenal knowledge becomes relevant only when Mary leaves the colorless room in which she grew up and encounters for the first time a colorful world.

To be sure, our qualitative experience of the world does not only pertain to colors. We have qualitative connotations of sensations, such as pain, of perceptions, such as beauty and ugliness, and the like. For all these phenomena, subjective experience indeed has a great import. However, if this were all, then Wittgenstein would be right to argue that there is no phenomenology but only phenomenological problems, namely, piecemeal what-it-is-like problems. But is it true that experience and its phenomenological description primarily or exclusively regard the qualitative side of things? And is it true, accordingly, that phenomenological problems must be located midway between logic and science? I believe that the answer has to be negative. The contrary is true, namely, that the import of experience and its description primarily regard the possibility of a philosophical foundation of logic and the clarification of the status of mind-independent objects in the physical world, precisely the ones treated by the natural sciences. Husserl, I want to argue, provides us with all the necessary theoretical tools to realize this not only in principle, but in great detail and through substantive analyses.

Phenomenality and Logic

The import of phenomenology in logic is strictly related to the unfinished debate between psychologism and logicism. From a psychologistic point of view, the elements and laws of logic are essentially the expression of how the human mind functions. Consequently, logic is to be considered as a branch of psychology. According to this position, the universality and necessity we ascribe to logical constituents leads back to the factual structures of the human mind. For instance, the conjunction of things we refer to when we say "A and B" is an expression of the conjunction of thoughts that diachronically occurs in our mind, namely, the thought of A and the thought of B. The form of conjunction expressed by the word 'and' is founded on the ability of our mind to relate mental states to one another. According to a logicist perspective, on the contrary, logical constituents are not expressions of the structure of the human mind but *objective forms and relations* that the human mind is able to grasp but that possess their validity in themselves. The source of validity of the pure form of conjunction (to stay with our example) lies in the very relation it expresses and its logical properties (such as "A and B" = "B and A"),

which have nothing to do with the diachronic succession of thoughts in an empirical mind. We do not need to refer to mental processes and states in order to account for such validity. Rather, it is the mind itself that operates within the space identified by objective logic validities.

The two theories seemingly call for a clear-cut one-or-the-other kind of decision. And still one feels somehow uncomfortable in having to make a decision. On the one hand, rebutting logicism seems to imply a depreciation of logic as well as absurd consequences; one should, e.g., admit that if our mind were structured differently, then a different form of thought might happen to 'replace' conjunction. But what would a replacement mean in this case? Can we really conceive of a relation 'replacing' conjunction? Rebutting psychologism, on the other hand, seems to imply a kind of logical Platonism that makes it extremely hard to account for the plain fact that, in the end, it is us with our empirical minds that articulate such a discipline as logic and that are capable of grasping and verifying logical relations. Cats and dogs, as far as we know, do not possess this capacity. Thus, logicism seems to imply a depreciation of the peculiar status of the human mind, without which such a thing as logic would be unconceivable. Given this puzzling situation, how are we to make a decision?

The prime merit of Husserl's phenomenological approach to this problem in the *Logical Investigations* is to have clearly highlighted that here, against all appearance, there is no decision to be made. Logicism and psychologism are not contrasting theories on the *same* objects but rather two distinct focuses on two distinct and yet correlated dimensions of logic. But this clearly comes to light only if the phenomenological dimension is addressed, i.e., if we inquire into the way logical elements and relations are given to us within our concrete experience. Logical validities are not experienced directly, in simple acts of consciousness. Rather, they are given to us as the intentional correlates of complex intentional acts through which our empirical minds can relate to them. The structure of such complex intentional acts is a phenomenal structure, i.e., it manifests itself in experience and can be described. Let me briefly expand on this point. The strategy of distinguishing between mental acts and contents of mental acts and charging psychologism with failing to draw such a distinction was developed by defenders of logicism, such as Frege, in order to debunk their psychologistic adversaries.[2] Husserl adopts this distinction and thus rebuts psychologism, but he goes a step further: He argues for the necessity of drawing a second distinction within the very notion of "content," which the logicists want to hold is independent from that of the mental act. The content, in the case of pure logic, is on the one hand the purely ideal validity of the grasped state of affairs, and on the other, the real, immanent, and phenomenal

[2] Cobb-Stevens aptly emphasizes that this distinction and Frege's ensuing anti-psychologism is "the founding document of the analytic tradition." (Cobb-Stevens 1990, p. 2) The difference between Husserl and Frege on this point is that while they are both critics of psychologism, Husserl never endorsed an *anti*-psychologism but on the contrary attempted to reformulate the "reasons" of psychologism so that they would not put in jeopardy the objective validity of logic.

content that makes this grasping possible for us by fulfilling intentions directed towards the ideality of the logical state of affairs. This second dimension is not itself just a mental act performed by an empirical mind, but rather, something indwelling and integral to a mental act, belonging to its internal intentional sense but still not exhausting the "transcendent," objective sense of the validities thereby intended. The title 'phenomenology of logic' does not just mean the being-manifested of logical validities in concrete acts of thought, but rather, it identifies those definite phenomenal elements internal to these acts that put us in connection with logical validities by fulfilling the intentions directed towards these validities. Phenomenology of logic is all about laying out and defining such elements. As Husserl writes: "Phenomenology [. . .] lays bare the "sources" from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of *pure* logic "flow," and back to which they must once more be traced, so as to give them all the "clearness and distinctness" needed for an understanding, and for an epistemological critique, of pure logic" (1975, pp. 249–250).

This becomes especially clear through Husserl's notion of categorial intuition, developed in the Sixth *Logical Investigation*. In this groundbreaking text Husserl shows that all the intentions directed towards logical idealities (elementary concepts such as concept, proposition, truth, etc.; syntactical forms such as disjunction, conjunction, etc.; categories of meaning such as object, state of affairs, etc.) may be intuitively fulfilled, and thus grasped with evidence, through the peculiar syntheses that occur in underlying acts of simple perception when we articulate them cognitively by highlighting some of their characterizing features. To keep our previous example, when we concretely perform the conjunction "A and B," say, "this glass and this pen," we do not have just the sum of two single perceptions, but we also intend, albeit at first only implicitly, the relation of conjunction, of which the glass and the pen are articulated as members. If we study this perception we see that whereas the intention "glass" and the intention "pen" may be fulfilled by sensible materials, which we directly experience (the actual profiles or "adumbrations" of the two objects), the syntactical component of conjunction, "and," may not. There is evidently nothing in our sensuous experience capable of fulfilling the intention "and" in the same way in which the intention "glass" may be fulfilled. And yet the peculiar synthetic link of the two objects that we evidently grasp when we shift from the simple directedness towards them to the consideration of the state of affairs of their being conjoined in an "and-relation", albeit not being a sensible content, is capable of intuitively fulfilling the general intention "conjunction". In so doing, the synthetic link instantiates the pure relation it expresses in the concrete case of "this glass and this pen". When we are simply directed towards "this glass and this pen" we experience this glass *in* conjunction with this pen and not *the* conjunction of this glass and this pen. If we correspondently shift our attention to the conjunction, Husserl argues, we are not simply grasping the same object (this glass in conjunction with this pen) in a different light, rather we re-direct our intention and grasp a higher-order, non-sensible object, namely, the relation of conjunction *as* fulfilled (more or less adequately) by the state of affairs "this glass and this pen".

This grasping, contra psychologism, is not a concealed production. We do not produce the validity of the relation of conjunction by mentally linking the sensibly fulfilled perception of A to the sensibly fulfilled perception of B, but rather we grasp this relation in its pure ideality by correspondently shifting the direction of our intentionality to the state of affairs as such, thereby intending something other than its internal elements. However, and contrary to orthodox logicism, the possibility of being instantiated in mental acts through the intuitive fulfillment provided by the articulating thematization of a state of affairs as such—and thereby being grasped with evidence—*belongs to the very essence of logical validity*. The dimension of phenomenal, describable experience is thus located at the very heart of logical validity. The fact that we can grasp logical validities in their pure ideality and operate with them in the domain of concrete experience is due to the fact that logic is embedded in phenomenal experience, and not just the expression of the empirical structures of our empirical mind. As Robert Sokolowski puts it in his recent book *Phenomenology of the Human Person*: "Logical form or syntactic structure does not have to issue from inborn powers in our brains, nor does it have to come from a priori structures of the mind. It arises through an enhancement of perception, a lifting of perception into thought, by a new way of making things present to us" (2008, p. 57).

Some prominent phenomenologists, notably Merleau-Ponty and Rudolf Bernet, characterized Husserl's position as an intermediate solution between psychologism and logicism. However, by highlighting the import of phenomenal experience in logic, Husserl does not merely mediate between logicism and psychologism, but rather discloses a new and challenging dimension of being and lays the foundation for an entirely new account of logic. Furthermore, the meaning of "phenomenological description of experience" undergoes an important transformation if compared to Wittgenstein's phenomenalism. Describing experience phenomenologically does not merely amount to describing its qualitative side. Rather, a phenomenological description of experience aims at identifying and articulating those structures that render experience intelligible and find their systematic expression in logic.

Phenomenology and Empirical Being

The second half of Wittgenstein's remark implies that phenomenological problems do not directly pertain to the ambit of reality investigated by the natural sciences. According to Wittgenstein, phenomenology, if there were such a thing, would be something midway between logic and science. We have seen how phenomenal experience has a foundational import to logic. In this section I would like to sketch out Husserl's location of phenomenology with respect to the natural sciences. Wittgenstein's position on this point, although he does not make it explicit in the remark we considered, may be easily motivated by the following train of thought: The natural sciences investigate empirical being in its intrinsic properties. Such properties, for the most part, seem to have nothing to do with our immediate

experience of things. Often they even seem to counter our phenomenal experience: The chemical constituents of water, for instance, expressed by the formula H_2O may not be experienced in simple first person perception. Moreover, the fact that water is made of countless clumps of atoms seems to counter our direct experience of a continuous, colorless liquid. Thus, as regards empirical being, a radical distinction seems to be consistently motivated. On the one hand, we have phenomenology (which views water as a continuous, colorless liquid), which pertains to the way empirical being qualitatively appears to us, and on the other hand, we have natural science (teaching us that water is H_2O), which pertains to the way empirical being is in itself. This is patently nothing but the distinction between primary and secondary qualities famously drawn by Galileo Galilei at the very dawn of modern natural science. If such a distinction were the last word on this issue, then phenomenal experience indeed should be understood as a non-essential dimension as regards empirical being. But, Husserl has shown that there is more to be said and that phenomenologically describable experience, on the contrary, has a foundational priority when it comes to empirical being. This can be shown by means of two considerations, (1) genetic and (2) transcendental:

(1) Although it is certainly true that many properties of empirical being discovered by the natural sciences do not manifest themselves directly in the domain of phenomenologically describable experience, it does not follow that such properties have nothing to do with it. When we predicate of water that it is made of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, we specify a property that we ascribe precisely to that colorless and continuous liquid, which we experience phenomenally. The simple perception of water as an empirically existing reality and the set of predicates we can articulate about it in direct experience (colorless, liquid, etc.) are the necessary presupposition for all the further inquiries we can carry out on it and, consequently, for all the conceivable sets of predicates we can articulate through such inquiries. As Husserl puts it in the recently published 1909 lecture *Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*: "The scientific knowledge of nature too, just like the common-sense knowledge already does, works only in this way: it infers from what is immediately experienced, i.e. perceived, to what is not perceived. Non-perceived being is thus largely assumed within physical nature, however, only on the basis of perceived being" (2005, p. 13).[3] The mode of givenness of water in simple perception as an existing reality bearing definite perceptual properties is the source of the motivation that pushes our reason to carry forward our inquiry and to lay bare new properties, which do not manifest themselves immediately. Such an enterprise rests essentially on the describable experience of empirical being, without which the idea of investigating empirical being further in order to discover new, non-immediately given properties would lack its motivational source.

[3] "Wie schon gemeine, so erkennt auch wissenschaftliche Naturerkenntnis nur so, dass sie von unmittelbar Erfahrenem, also Wahrgenommenem, auf nicht Wahrgenommenes schließt. Nichtwahrgenommenes Sein nehmen wir also in der physischen Natur genug an, aber nur aufgrund von wahrgenommenem."

For instance, we are aware of the fact that in spite of the changing light in the room that makes it appear brighter or darker alternatively, water has a particular, "real" perceptual appearance, that we call colorlessness, that stands out more clearly in certain optimal conditions of observation. A transparent glass will reveal more optimally the "real" transparency of water than a blue glass will do. Through a blue glass we will 'see' transparent water through its blue appearance. In this sense, and without having to leave phenomenal experience behind, we already discriminate between what appears "merely" as an appearance and that which appears therein. We know that we can vary the perceptual circumstances in order to transform suboptimal perceptual conditions into optimal conditions and thereby let the real features of empirical objects shine through their momentary appearance most clearly. A consideration of intersubjectivity and normal bodily functioning as opposed to bodily anormality will eventually lead to an appreciation of the relativity of so called secondary qualities to our bodily make-up. Colors and tactual properties are what they are because our human body (in normal conditions) functions in a certain way. This realization sets the basis for a further step of inquiry, geared towards identifying those properties of things that are detachable from the normal functioning of our body, i.e., the merely quantitative and geometrical properties that constitute the object of natural science. Once this path that leads from the world of appearance to the perceptual world to the world of physics is visualized, there is no point in setting up the "world of natural science" against the world of phenomenal experience. As Husserl puts it in the following passage: "All the judgments of the natural sciences presuppose actually the pre-given nature. Let the physicists tell us that, strictly speaking, the things of sensible perception do not exist in the way they appear before our eyes, that physics demonstrates that actually all reality can be reduced to constellations of atoms, ions, energies or whatever. Regardless of how such statements are to be assessed, it is certain that such statements are also referred to the pre-given nature, viz., to the same nature that appears in sensuous perception" (2005, p. 17).[4]

There is thus a genetic continuity in the determinations we articulate on empirical being, a continuity whose point of departure lies in phenomenality. Non-phenomenal determinations may be articulated only by virtue of underlying phenomenal determinations. Therefore, it makes little sense to think that non-phenomenal determinations can ever substitute or "rectify" phenomenal determinations.

Phenomenal experience does not only function as an inescapable presupposition and foundational soil for non-phenomenal determinations of empirical being. There

[4] "Alle naturwissenschaftlichen Urteile setzen in der Tat die vorgegebene Natur voraus, mögen uns die Physiker auch sagen, in strenger Wahrheit existierten die Dinge der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung, nämlich so, wie sie uns da erscheinen, nicht: die Physik bewiese, dass in Wahrheit alle Wirklichkeit sich auf Konstellationen von Atomen, Ionen, Energien und was immer sonst reduziere. Möge es sich mit solchen Aussagen verhalten wie immer: sicher ist, dass auch sie auf vorgegebene Natur sich beziehen, und zwar auf dieselbe, die in der sinnlichen Erfahrung erscheint."

is more to say about its constitutive import for empirical being already at the level of simple perception. Husserl contends that phenomenal experience has a constitutive role for the empirical being precisely *as being*. This is the core-insight of Husserl's *transcendental* phenomenology as he started to develop it after *Logical Investigations*. He understands the relationship between empirical being and consciousness, viz., phenomenal experience, in terms of a constitution accomplished within the latter. Husserl argues that while empirical being always refers back to lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*), in which empirical being manifests itself as such, lived experiences do not refer back in the same way and are thus to be considered as an absolute domain of reality. This line of argumentation, although it definitely breaks with our way of understanding empirical being in the natural, unreflective attitude, proves to be consistent if we try to describe the way in which we concretely experience the world. When we say of water that it is colorless, liquid, drinkable, cold, and the like we articulate such phenomenal properties on something that is given to us in rect experience. This "something" is a being, which thereby functions as a substrate for such predications. If we were asked why we say of water (e.g. a glass of water lying on the table before our eyes) that it is colorless or cold, we would definitely refer to the experiences we have if we look through it or if we dip our finger into it. Now, that 'being' which we call water and articulate as colorless and cold is not something that stands beside or behind such properties and may be grasped independently from them. If someone were to ask why we say of the water lying before our eyes that it is a "being" we could not refer to experiences other than the ones just mentioned. There is no action like dipping our finger or turning our head that makes "being" appear as a property of the object in the same way in which "colorlessness" or "coldness" appear. That is, the sense we attribute to empirical being as a suitable substrate for objective properties is not independent from the lived-experiences of such properties and it rests entirely upon them. Naturally speaking we think that the defining characteristic of empirical being is mind-independency, viz., that it does not need to appear in order to be. Now, it is certainly true that the water in the glass before my eyes does not need me to look at it in order to exist, or in other words, that I do not produce the being of water by means of my seeing it. However, the mind-independency I attribute to water by grasping it as empirical being is entirely motivated by the lived experiences I have of it and is therefore unthinkable independently from them. Water may be grasped as empirical being bearing such and such properties precisely because there are lived experiences in which it shows up as such. Mind-independency is attributed within and by virtue of the dynamics of lived-experience and therefore it rests entirely upon the structures of phenomenal experience. To say that the glass of water on the table before my eyes contains real as opposed to merely imagined water means to affirm implicitly that there is an infinite series of possible experiences of that object that would constantly exhibit the same content "water" and that this water stands in a constant reciprocal relations with the world of likewise "real" objects surrounding it. Unlike merely imagined water, real water heats up when placed in the vicinity of a hot body. It belongs in a network of likewise experienceable or experienced

beings that persistently abide as the correlates of an infinite concatenation of boundlessly variable perceptions.

This is by no means intended to alter the sense of what we experience as empirical being, as if we were to interpret it as an emanation of consciousness or something like it. Rather, it is a radical and plausible account of the fact that the being of empirical objects is unthinkable without reference to an experiencing consciousness, which perceptually grasps phenomenal properties as pertaining to them as identical, abiding substrates for indefinite further determination. In a manuscript from year 1908 (almost 10 years before *Ideas*), partly published in the XXXVI volume of *Husserliana*, Husserl gives an illuminating account of this situation as follows: "Natural being is not absolute being, but rather, being as a correlate of consciousness [...]. Correlate, however, means that it is intentional being, which necessarily refers back to connections of the *intentio*, viz., of a thinking consciousness that on its part is absolute, since it does not refer back in this way. And insofar as it belongs to the immanent essence of such connections of consciousness that within them the object is thought, posited, and then in the end validly determined and known, the objective being "resolves" itself into connections of consciousness, regulated by essential laws" (Husserl 2003, p. 28).[5] A few lines later, Husserl explains that this consideration is not meant to "dissolve" empirical being in a sequence of manifestations but to show the essential rootedness of empirical being in phenomenologically describable experience. All the sense and the possible predications referred to empirical being must not be interpreted as tacit predications about consciousness (as is the case, for instance, in Fichte)[6]: "These considerations do not pertain to the ultimate sense but the ultimate being. Therein lies the fact that "being" in the sense of the objective sciences is not "the ultimate being." Rather, it "resolves" itself into "consciousness." The thing itself does not resolve itself into consciousness. It resolves itself into atoms and molecules. But "a thing is in reality" and "there is a reality" and similar cognitions refer back to

[5] "Das natürliche Sein ist nicht absolutes Sein, sondern Sein als Korrelatum des Bewusstseins (der Erkenntnis). Dieses Korrelatum aber besagt: Es ist intentionales Sein, das notwendig zurückweist auf Zusammenhänge der *intentio*, d. i. eines denkenden Bewusstseins, das seinerseits absolut ist, sofern es nicht wieder in dieser Weise zurückweist'. Und sofern es zum immanenten Wesen solcher Bewusstseinszusammenhänge gehört, dass in ihnen der „Gegenstand' gedacht, gesetzt, schließlich in gültiger Weise bestimmt ist und erkannt, „löst sich' das objektive Sein „auf' in Bewusstseinszusammenhänge, die unter Wesensgesetzen stehen."

[6] See, for instance, Fichte 2000, p. 366: "If one assumes a consciousness [,] one assumes an object of this consciousness as well. This can only be an act of the ego, in fact, all acting of the ego is the only immediately intuitive thing; all the rest is only mediately intuitive; we see everything within ourselves, we only see ourselves [and] ourselves as acting, as we pass through from the determinable to the determinate'. („Wird ein Bewußtsein angenommen [,] so wird auch ein Object deßelben angenommen. Dieß kann nur Handeln des Ich sein, denn alles Handeln des Ich ist nur unmittelbar anschaubar, alles übrige nur mittelbar; wir sehen alles in uns, wir sehen nur uns, nur als handelnd, nur als übergehend vom Bestimmbaren zum bestimmten").

formations of consciousness, and within these formations the being of the thing and the being of all the empirical states of affairs receives its sense" (Husserl 2003, p. 28).[7] We are thus right to ascribe objective (both phenomenal and non-phenomenal) properties to empirical being, and there is no need to philosophically "rectify" such ascriptions by redirecting them to consciousness, in a classic idealistic fashion. The kind of insights Husserl's phenomenology provides us with are neither meant to dispel the evidence of empirical being and its properties, nor call for a mentalistic reinterpretation of it. Husserl wants to argue that the possibility of such ascriptions depends on the manifestation in experience of the empirical being, without which the very sense of the term "being" would be annihilated. Therefore, empirical being rests entirely upon phenomenologically describable experience, in which it manifests itself, i.e., is constituted as such. As Husserl puts it: "To the essence of the transcendent being belongs the appearing, the presenting itself and only through appearances are transcendent beings given, and indeed able to be given" (Husserl 2003, p. 33).[8]

By the end of this line of analysis it is clear that what we refer to when we talk about experience in phenomenology we are dealing with more that just the fleeting subjective outlook of things. Rather, experience is the terrain where empirical being receives the full sense that we always already attribute to it prior to all philosophical scrutiny without being aware of the subjective workings that make this attribution possible.

Conclusion: Phenomenology as a Discipline

Let us recapitulate the steps we have made up to this point in order to provide, as an open conclusion, an answer to Wittgenstein's statement that "there is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems." We first considered Wittgenstein's understanding of phenomenology as something midway between science and logic. We pointed out that this conception of phenomenology rests upon a narrow understanding of phenomenal experience as synonymous with the merely qualitative side of experience. We displayed the insufficiency of this understanding by looking at Husserl's treatment of the matter. His analyses reveal that there is a broader significance attached to our phenomenal experience, which proves to have a constitutive import for both logic and natural science. In particular,

[7] "Es handelt sich nicht um den letzten Sinn, sondern um letztes Sein. Und darin liegt, dass das Sein im Sinn der objektiven Wissenschaften „kein letztes Sein' ist, sondern sich „auflöst' im „Bewusstsein'. Das Ding selbst löst sich nicht im Bewusstseinauf. Es löst sich in Atome und Moleküle auf. Aber „Ein Ding ist in Wirklichkeit' und das „Es gibt eine Wirklichkeit' und dergleichen Erkenntnisse weisen auf Bewusstseinsgestaltungen zurück und in ihnen gewinnt das Sein des Dinges und das Sein aller dinglichen Sachverhalte seinen Sinn."

[8] "Zum Wesen des Transzendenten gehört es zu erscheinen, sich darzustellen und nur durch Erscheinungen gegeben zu sein und gegeben sein zu können."

we saw that the objectivities of logic entertain an essential relation to the phenomenal, albeit non-sensible, fulfillments in which they are instantiated and that empirical being refers back to consciousness. Now, are these explanations enough to characterize phenomenology as a discipline, i.e., as more than a general title for disconnected problems? One could argue that what we have proved up to this point, following Husserl, is only that the import of phenomenal experience reaches far beyond the merely qualitative dimension of things but not that it is a suitable domain for a scientific discipline. We have proved that "phenomenological problems" also pertain to logic and natural science and are not to be located midway between them but not yet that 'there is such a thing as phenomenology'. Husserl provides us with a clue to at least outline an answer to this point. In his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic,* Husserl asks: 'What makes truths belong together in a *single science*, what constitutes their unity of "subject matter"?' (1975, p. 229). His answer runs as follows: "The truths of a science are *essentially* one if their connection rests on what above all makes a science a science. A science is, as we know, grounded knowledge, i.e. explanation or proof [...]. *Essential unity among the truths of a single science is unity of explanation*. [...] Unity of explanation means [...] *homogeneous unity of explanatory principles*" (1975, p. 229). What gives such a unity to the kind of explanations carried out by phenomenology? In other words, what makes experience into a unitary field of inquiry rather than just a scattered set of problems? In doing phenomenology, we do have something like a unity, if not of explanatory principles then at least of descriptive ones. We do not simply invoke "experience" or "first person perspective." Rather we try to delve concretely into their structure and to lay bare their constitutive function for everything that we hold valid. In so doing, we not only refer to the field of experience in its various manifestations but we consider this field as unitary. This is because experience is not only the domain of appearance, but necessarily and at the same time, the domain of appearance *for* an experiencing subject. In other words, the essential characterization of experience is not only the intentional reference to what appears but also the transcendental reference to the subject for whom it appears. While on the side of "what appears" anything can show up (a stone, a logical law, a human being, a square circle, a centaur) and be investigated in its meaning, on the side of "to whom it appears" we cannot find anything but an experiencing subject. This, in a nutshell, is the meaning of Husserl's talk of a "transcendental ego." Phenomenal experience is essentially a centered dimension, the unity of which is given by the reference to an irreducible standpoint, or rather, to an intersubjective consideration – irreducible standpoints in the plural. Such standpoints are not merely empty possibilities; they are nothing but what we are, albeit normally without being aware of it.[9] As Husserl puts it, "*My* life is the first in itself, the originary ground, to which all foundations must be referred back" (1965,

[9] Donn Welton argues on this point: "For Husserl, transcendental subjectivity functions not as a principle from which the multiple modes of experience can be deduced, but as nexus of constitution, having a correlative structure, that illuminates the structures of various regions in their diversity and resemblance" (Welton 2003, p. 274).

p. 396).[10] The kind of reflection carried out by phenomenology leads us to a naturally unthematized dimension of our own life and shows that this life is more than just one worldly manifestation among others, but rather, the condition of possibility for all further appearance and validity. When we refer to phenomenal experience, for Husserl, we are not dealing with a capricious qualitative dimension that can only be made intellectually accessible by reference to linguistic phenomena, as Wittgenstein would have it. Rather, we are dealing with a very well-structured dimension of reality to which all further dimensions of reality refer back. Moreover, phenomenal experience is a dimension of reality which is centered around a unifying principle: the experiencing subject. For this reason, the field of experience and all possible phenomenological problems arising therein is 'held together,' as it were, by the reference to an experiencing ego. The idea of readmitting a robust notion of 'ego' into philosophy would probably meet the skepticism of Wittgenstein and his contemporary aftermath. However, a consideration of this point would open up a fruitful terrain of discussion between Husserlian phenomenologists and current proponents of phenomenological disputes. Be it as it may, with his subtle analyses, which I have tried to reassess in this paper, Husserl shows that the philosophical import of phenomenal experience reaches far beyond the domain of the qualitative and encompasses virtually all dimensions of reality.

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[10] "*Mein* Leben ist das an sich Erste, ist der Urgrund, auf den alle Begründungen zurückbezogen sein müssen."

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Chapter 10
Thinking Fast: Freedom, Expertise, and Solicitation

Daniel O. Dahlstrom

In the past few years, Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell have been engaged in a rousing debate over the proper way to understand human experience. The two thinkers share some common ground; they agree that rationality can be situation-specific and they agree that the mind does not organize our experience. They both see that such a view, a kind of constructivist rendition of Kant's thought, is a non-starter since it leaves the work done by experience completely in the dark. At the same time, neither thinker will countenance the empiricist notion that sensory experience in some unmediated sense provides an independent constraint on human experience.[1]

Nevertheless, the two thinkers differ on whether rationality or mindedness, under some description, plays a role in embodied, human coping. For McDowell its role is pervasive, even when we are "unreflectively immersed" in what we are doing[2]; for Dreyfus, by contrast, embodied coping is mindless or, as he also puts it,

[1] This paper is warmly dedicated to my colleague and friend on the other end of Commonwealth Avenue: Richard Cobb-Stevens. In a meeting of SPEP some years ago, Richard voiced concern publicly about the troubling notion of hyletic data in Husserl's thought. The notion is troubling since, on Husserl's account, they are at once non-intentional yet somehow part of intentionality. In certain pivotal respects, the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell echoes Richard's concern. Indeed, both thinkers attempt to provide explanations of the role of sensory experience by bypassing any reference to hyletic data that enter independently into the constitution of intentionality, by way of insisting on either the unconditional conceptuality of experience (McDowell) or the mindlessness of human coping – a "motor intentionality" – at the base of experience (Dreyfus). I am grateful to Lee Braver, Hubert Dreyfus, and Timothy Nulty for their critical discussion of an earlier version of this paper.

[2] John McDowell, "Response to Dreyfus," *Inquiry*, 50, no. 4 (August 2007): 366.

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"pre-conceptual" in the sense that even situation-specific mindedness is "the result of a specific transformation" of mindless, embodied coping.[3] This difference is obviously quite fundamental, with far-reaching consequences for their philosophical perspectives. For McDowell's brand of Neo-Kantianism, any incoherence in the booming, buzzing world of experience is, at least to a great extent, a product or, better, a by-product of sheer inattention or ignorance, merely waiting for the mind's ever capable conceptual lens to bring it into proper focus. Following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Drefyus contends to the contrary that, at the most basic level, the mind cannot grasp this indeterminacy because it is not the mind but the body that grasps (and grabs), and what it grasps is not an object but "more or less indeterminate solicitations to act."[4]

On one level, I find myself strongly in agreement with Dreyfus. Indeed, I would go further than he does in his indictment of McDowell. With his commitment to the unlimited scope of conceptuality, McDowell can neither escape a version of (conceptual) idealism[5] nor do justice to the full range of our experience of our mental life. Not all mindedness, if I may abuse his term, is even proto-conceptual.[6] Moreover, McDowell remains a victim, willy-nilly, of an epistemological version of what I label "the hylomorphic impasse" of Aristotelian metaphysics. Christian and Islamic philosophers came to a similar impasse in their debates over the status of prime matter; must it not have some determinacy, perhaps merely some level of dimensionality, in order to be formed and is it not incumbent on anyone espousing such a theory of matter to give an account of that determinacy? Kantian invocations of the relation of conceptuality as the form and sensory intuition as the matter of experience reproduce the epistemological version of this impasse. All claims to the contrary notwithstanding, such a hylomorphic approach to cognition continues to evoke the myth of the given, albeit a given that is conceptual. Thus, unless McDowell is willing to collapse experience with conception, he owes us an account of what it is in experience that permits the allegedly unrestricted conceptualization of it. Yet his very theory excludes any such account since our only access to experience or any element of it is conceptual.[7]

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[3] Hubert L. Dreyfus, "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," *Inquiry*, 50, no. 4 (August 2007): 353, 364.

[4] Ibid., 359.

[5] The very etymology of the term 'concept' and, by extension, 'conceptuality' suggests this idealism. 'Concept' (as used in the history of logic) derives from *conceptus* as the past participle of *concipio* and, at least in that sense, literally signifies nothing more and nothing less than 'what has been conceived, i.e., grasped or taken up by the mind.'

[6] John McDowell, "What Myth?" *Inquiry*, 50, no. 4 (August 2007): 346: "On this [McDowell's own] view, our relation to the world, including our perceptual relation to it, is pervasively shaped by our conceptual mindedness."

[7] See my "Gibt es eine eigentliche menschliche Anschauung?" *Jahrbuch für Geschichte und Theorie der Biologie* 8 (2001): 107–121, especially 120: "Auch wenn die Eigentümlichkeit der menschlichen Anschauung darin bestehen soll, daß sie immer schon begriffen ist, bleibt McDowell uns die Bestimmung der Anschaulichkeit der Anschauung (Materie) – im Gegensatz zur Begrifflichkeit (Form) – immer noch schuldig."

To be sure, as Dreyfus notes, McDowell is not committed to a theory of concepts as necessarily universal structures that form an indeterminate field of consciousness (though it would seem that even "situation-specific" concepts entail at least some iterable features or deployments). Moreover, what is given for McDowell supposedly does not include some inchoate, sensory matter or hyletic data, as it ultimately does for Kant or Husserl. Instead McDowell contends that experiential content, whether focused on or not, comes ready-made for conceptuality. It is, in his words, "present in the content of a world-disclosing experience in a form in which it already either actually is, or has the potential to be *simply appropriated* as, the content of a conceptual capacity."[8]

But this hylomorphic account of the given still begs the question; why is this content of the sort that actually is or can be appropriated? Or more pointedly, how do we know or why should we think that the world as we experience it affords itself unqualifiedly to our conceptual capacities? Leibniz, who played this game already and, as Heidegger notes, laid much of the groundwork for Kant and Neo-Kantian thought, at least had an answer: the harmony is pre-established.[9] Not coincidentally perhaps, Leibniz's monadology might be said to fuse the myth of the mental with a prejudice in favor of the objective world, the very myth and prejudice that Dreyfus attributes to McDowell.

Echoing some of Heidegger's most salient insights, Dreyfus emphasizes that we have no phenomenological evidence for the assumption that the way equipment in use "withdraws" from us when we are absorbed in coping is "permeated with conceptuality" or that our coping is potentially self-aware, as McDowell seems to think.[10] The affirmation of the phenomenon of everyday absorbed coping, in contrast to activity that is self-reflective and conceptual, commits one to a methodological rather than a metaphysical foundationalism. In other words, the existential phenomenologist – Dreyfus' name for those who work in the field as he does – is committed to determining how the body is solicited to act against a background of perceptual constants and to regarding this determination as the "ground floor" for understanding higher-level apperceptive and reflective activities – but with no presumption that responses to those solicitations, while self-sufficient, are anything but fallible. As Dreyfus aptly puts it, "the existential phenomenologist

[8] "What Myth?" 348. Form and content are no doubt functionally relative, contextually dependent concepts for McDowell, analyzable much as 'simple' and 'composed' were by Wittgenstein; see Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 21 ff.

[9] Dreyfus makes a similar point when he insists that reflection must introduce some content rather than simply making the same content more explicit; see "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 360; note, however, that McDowell distinguishes his idea of conceptual capacities from an idea that depends upon the difference between being implicit and making explicit; see "What Myth?" 347f and "Response to Dreyfus," 366 f.

[10] Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Response to McDowell," *Inquiry*, 50, no. 4 (August 2007): 372f, 376; see, too, "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 361.

can agree with McDowell in rejecting traditional foundationalisms, and yet affirm and describe the special supporting role of motor intentionality."[11]

Sometimes activities that require considerable mobility and agility on our part are thoughtless. As Dreyfus rightly emphasizes, we just do them and, indeed, mindlessly. We often type, shift gears in our car, converse, play sports, and so on – without giving or even having the slightest thought about the activity itself, including its modalities and conditions. By contrast, when we theorize about these activities, we have to step back from them, we have to disengage ourselves from them. Since we cannot fully disengage ourselves from our own individual lives and existence, theory necessarily comes up short when we try to think theoretically about them. There is a simple, oft-noted analogy here with conditions of seeing, an especially relevant analogy when we consider the Greek root of the word 'theory,' namely, *theasthai* which means to look upon or gaze at something. In order to gaze upon an object, we have to put some distance between ourselves and it; it cannot be too close to us. But our own personal existence is, as Heidegger often reminds, so close to us that it may as well be far away.[12]

But while I agree with the substance of Dreyfus' critique of McDowell, I think that themes in Dreyfus' own account of human experience are beset by serious problems itself, both on its own terms and as a self-styled appropriation of Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world. In the following paper I attempt to articulate these basic problems and suggest strategies for coping with them. The problems that I address cluster around three basic themes at work in his critique of McDowell, namely, the themes of freedom, expertise, and solicitations.

Freedom

One major source of the disagreement between McDowell and Dreyfus is a difference over what is, in Dreyfus' words, "our most pervasive and important kind of freedom."[13] While not merely our capacity to disengage ourselves from and

[11] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 363; Dreyfus probably has in mind McDowell's following remark: "Perception discloses the world only to a subject capable of the 'I think' that expresses apperception" ("What Myth?" 346). Things are more complicated, however, since McDowell insists on distinguishing the 'I think' from the 'I do'; see "Response to Dreyfus," 367.

[12] These theoretical limits are particularly evident if we consider the role that concepts, traditionally construed, play in theory. Concepts – whether they be conceived as mental representations, abilities, abstract objects (Fregean senses) – match up with generic or iterable features of things or experience. Aristotle seems to some interpreters to exclude knowledge of individual existence from theory, setting it aside precisely because it is undefinable and neither predicable of nor present in another. In addition to characterizing concepts as *Regeln* and *Teilvorstellungen*, Kant describes them as 'predicates of possible judgments'; when he does so, he seems to be iterating Aristotle's insight about the limits of theory, since predicates precisely are or can be said of more than one subject.

[13] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 354.

reflect upon what we are doing, freedom for McDowell nonetheless consists in a practical capacity to maintain a certain distance, a kind of *Freiraum* or elbow room, in our orientations toward what the world affords us (where affordances are not merely motivations).[14] For Dreyfus, by contrast, freedom consists precisely in engaging in some activity and form of coping. More importantly, he claims that there is "a truly pervasive human freedom," "a freedom not to exercise our freedom to step back but rather to let ourselves be involved," that is presupposed by the freedom to reflect.[15] Thus, while McDowell associates freedom with our ability to disengage ourselves, Dreyfus emphasizes the freedom inherent in a foregoing engagement.

This talk of freedom introduces two related sets of problems. The first set of problems concerns the meaning of the freedom that Dreyfus is claiming is primordial and its relation to coping. Does this freedom consist in the expertise, i.e., is the expertise itself the exercise of this freedom? Or does this freedom consist in a decision to "let ourselves be involved," as he puts it? (As we shall see below, Dreyfus appears to regard decision as involving forethought, so it would seem that this interpretation of what he might mean by freedom would miss the mark.) It is certainly the case that sometimes I decide to let myself be engaged, to refrain from thinking too much about what I am doing; perhaps, in this sense, human beings are even free, in Dreyfus' gloss of Heidegger, "to open themselves to being bound." But a great deal of our expert coping is unaccompanied by anything like a decision to engage in what I do or even a conscious thought or reflection one way or another; I simply do it. So it is at least unclear what it means in such a case to speak of the freedom to do it. Think of walking on a crowded street, driving in traffic, typing, or even tying your laces – all of which, I take it, can be examples of coping at which many of us might excel. Coping in these and other senses is certainly pervasive but it is difficult to see how freedom, unless it is equated with the coping itself, is equally pervasive. For the most part, I do not let myself be involved or open myself to being bound in the ways required by these forms of coping. One might contend that freedom is a capacity, always already present, to open ourselves up to the possibility of being bound, but phenomenological evidence for this contention is sorely wanting.

But let us for the moment ignore this objection or, better, this plea for clarification and suppose that there is a freedom to open ourselves to being bound in our expert coping and that this freedom is no less pervasive than the coping itself. Let us also concede the obvious, namely, that this freedom would necessarily be a presupposition for choices and chosen actions. Does it follow that this freedom is our "most important kind of freedom"? I wonder what the criterion of importance or

[14] In this respect McDowell borrows Gadamer's view of a "free, distanced orientation" (*freies, distanziertes Verhalten*) to the environment (*Umwelt*), not open to other animals, an orientation that is in each case a linguistic act or achievement (*Vollzug*), one that elevates human beings to the world (*Erhebung zur Welt*); see "What Myth?", 346; "Response to Dreyfus," 369; and Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 3., erweiterte Auflage (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972), 421.

[15] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 355.

value is to which Dreyfus is appealing when he asserts as much, since this freedom is not the freedom to reflect and choose and take responsibility for what we are doing. I return to this point below.

Expertise

In his response to McDowell, Dreyfus stresses the difference between involved and absorbed coping, adding that the latter is "involved coping at its best."[16] He makes a similar point in his APA Presidential Address when he insists that expertise is mindless and deteriorates to competence as soon as reflection (conceptual reflection and self-reflection) enter the scene. To make this latter point, Dreyfus is fond of using the example of Chuck Knoblauch, a second baseman with the Yankees in the 1990s whose particular skill of throwing to first base – a crucial skill for a second baseman – deteriorated in proportion (allegedly) to his habit of reflecting on what he was doing. The example, Dreyfus observes, demonstrates that "the enemy of expertise is thought."[17] He repeatedly and emphatically contrasts this expertise with competence, activity that is indirect, mediated by thought, concepts, rules, and/or reflection. We can monitor what we are doing, but the moment we do so, Dreyfus claims, "it degrades performance to at best competence."[18] Following a coach's advice, "our behavior regresses to mere competence" and, should we no longer need the coaching, our "expert coping returns to being direct and unreflective," which Dreyfus takes to be "the same as being nonconceptual and nonminded."[19] He claims further that "the phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of content which is non-conceptual, non-propositional, [and] non-rational."[20]

Here, again, there is need for considerable clarification. For there are many sorts of activities that experts seem to perform optimally only through reflection, reflection that is, indeed, constant and habitual but reflection nonetheless. Since Dreyfus is fond of the Knoblauch example, let me suggest another obvious counter-example from baseball: the pitcher's deliberations or, often more precisely, the deliberations of the battery (pitcher and catcher) in determining what pitch to throw. These reflections happen in game-time; there is a conventional pause between pitches that allows the pitcher and the catcher time to reflect on the sorts of pitches the pitcher's already thrown, his control of his curve, his fastball, changeup on that day, the history of this batter's strengths and weaknesses, and so on. Clearly, this sort of

[16] "Response to McDowell," 373.

[17] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 354.

[18] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 352.

[19] Ibid., 355. It would be useful to have some account of the difference that Dreyfus envisages between the pre-conceptual and the non-conceptual.

[20] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 360.

expertise is a kind of absorption in coping with the elements, the strike zone, and the tendencies of both the umpire and the particular batter facing the pitcher. But that coping involves constant reflection.[21]

A similar example, equally suitable since it involves no interruption in the flow of a play in the game, is the example of a quarterback in football about to pass, reading the defense in the 3–4 s he typically has to determine possible permutations as they unfold before him, the anticipated positions of various defenders and receivers, and the types of passes he has available to him. Quarterbacks vary drastically in their ability to read defenses and adjust on the fly but the adjustments are matters of thinking, thinking fast, to be sure, but reflections, nonetheless. The more complex the offense that the quarterback is running and the defense he is facing, the more skilled the process of rapid reflection has to be. Reflection does not guarantee success, to be sure, but a quarterback who cannot recognize shifts between zone and man-to-man defense and quickly infer the implications of those shifts for the play being run is not even competent, let alone an expert.[22] In these examples of experts (the pitcher in baseball, the quarterback in football), the thinking may be unusually fast but they can sometimes remember and explain their reasoning, be it successful or mistaken. Of course, some explanations of this sort may be somewhat willful projections or constructions of what probably happened, rather than reconstructions of what did. But given the sort of expertise in question, a sort that requires, in addition to classification (a form of conceptualizing) and reasoning (inferring), a reliable memory of the thought processes involved in the activity (necessary for future plays and game planning), we have reason to be wary of claims that such willful projecting (plausible constructions after the fact) happens as a rule.

These remarks do not undermine the legitimate decision drawn by Dreyfus between expertise and competence. When a basketball player is taught to visualize his shot or a hitter to visualize his swing in the course of shooting or swinging respectively, they can develop competence in this manner but we would hardly say that such players have the respective expertise. Not

[21] In an earlier draft of this paper I next wrote: "Similar considerations apply not only to the batter's deliberation about what pitch to expect between pitches but even as a pitch makes its way to the plate. The batter has to think fast but his expertise to a large extent turns on judging whether it is a fastball, slider, or changeup and adjusting accordingly." I am less sure of this point since such expertise might be a matter of programmed pattern recognition bypassing any conceptual or thinking processes – as Dreyfus insists is the case for the chess Grandmaster playing a game of lightning chess. My guess is that, in the case of batting, it depends on the qualities of the batter; just as not every player closes his eyes or even blinks at the same time, e.g., at the moment of hitting the ball or swinging, so there could be some who actually register (classify) the pitch as a fastball or slider while hitting. We have reason to conjecture that reasoning at some level is at work since most batters are trying to guess what pitch is coming, even if they thoughtlessly respond to a 95 mile an hour fastball, whether they have guessed rightly or not.

[22] This point applies to other positions as well. When asked why his star receiver, Randy Moss, is so good at his position, Tom Brady, the quarterback of the New England Patriot football team, answered: "He makes good inferences."

surprisingly, some of the best shooters in basketball and hitters in baseball fail miserably as coaches capable of teaching their skills. But there are some levels of expertise, as the examples noted above demonstrate, that by their very nature or, better, by the very nature of the position in the sport, demand reflection (and, as noted, a reliable memory of that reflection). The expert quarterback has the ability quickly to size up the situation, i.e., identify or classify (by some accounts, conceptualize) a formation or pattern and to make inferences appropriate to the general aim of the play involved. These examples, it bears adding, hardly seem idiosyncratic. Something similar might be said of players who are experts at other sports (particularly but by no means exclusively competitive sports); think, for example, of those who are expert at soccer, sailing, archery, hunting, fishing – to name only a few. More importantly, what is true of these sports is true of myriad other areas of expertise that require more or less constant attention and reflection, from performing surgery, holding a hearing, adjudicating conflicts, and controlling air-traffic to composing a poem, managing a budget, or being a friend.

Dreyfus acknowledges that the existential phenomenologist, on his account, is left with a serious problem; by underscoring the radical difference between mindless coping and rational, reflective activity and the inaccessibility of the latter to the former, he seems to have painted himself into a phenomenological corner. Even if Husserlian phenomenologists manage to find a way to talk not only with one another but also with scientists and thinkers who have not performed the requisite reductions, they still have to find a way to relate that pure stratosphere of consciousness with the mundane and empirical. Somewhat analogously, on Dreyfus' account, existential phenomenologists have to find a way to mediate between the mindless and the mindful behavior. They owe us an account of how we conceptualize the sensorimotor behavior and how we move from this sensorimotor behavior to theory, though it is hardly obvious how this feat can be managed. But perhaps Dreyfus, precisely by equating all forms of expertise with fully absorbed, mindless coping, hamstrings his account in a way that is phenomenologically narrow, that is to say, in way that fails to do justice to the phenomenological richness and array of human expertise.

Solicitations

Dreyfus sharpens the contrast between his position and McDowell's by distinguishing solicitations from affordances.[23] On Dreyfus' account, our sensorimotor intentionality is largely driven by what the environment solicits from us or, better, from our coping bodies. Our bodies, Dreyfus observes, are "constantly

[23] "Response to McDowell," 375; "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 356–360.

guided by solicitations" and "the world is … the totality of interconnected solicitations that attract and repel us."[24] These solicitations draw on us precisely to act and they cease to be solicitations the moment we make them explicit as the sort of features and data that objects afford a rational and, thus, necessarily detached consideration. Herein lies the difference between a solicitation and an affordance. Affordances are "objective facts about what affords what," e.g., the fact that apples afford eating. But Dreyfus claims that, as he has learned from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, we are directly open, not to affordances as such (which do, indeed, draw on the rationality and conceptuality of the subject) but to the ways such affordances solicit and entice us, e.g., the apple's attractiveness to us when we're hungry.[25] In short, while solicitations draw on us to act, affordances do not; instead, affordances are facts of the matter that serve as the content of a rational consideration of the world.[26]

The distinction that Dreyfus is drawing between solicitations and affordances is crucial. But while I have no quarrel with the distinction, I do have a problem with his characterization of coping as a response to a solicitation. This characterization is misleading and problematic because it suggests a far too streamlined account of the phenomena in question, at least insofar as the sensorimotor activity is construed as a way of being-in-the-world. First, it omits or at least understates the often disposed, emotive character of the interaction with the environment; second, it omits the self-directedness of these interactions or, better, the self-directedness of the sensorimotor activity in its interactions. Since neglect of these aspects of being-in-the-world reflect interpretive tendencies of certain readings of Heidegger's existential analysis, I shall try to elaborate each omission in terms of that analysis. With regard to the first omission, there is a tendency to shortchange the equiprimordiality of the basic existentials, especially the role of the "affectedness" of being-in-the-world (as Dreyfus translates *Befindlichkeit*) in relation to "understanding," another basic existential. If we take understanding in one of its overriding senses for Heidegger as a kind of know-how, expertise, or even coping, we have to remember that there is no understanding (or, equivalently, no projection of possibilities) that is not disposed or affective, emotionally laden, directed, and more or less felt.

This last observation reminds us that we should be wary of construing understanding, in Heidegger's ontic sense of the term, with *mindless* absorbed

[24] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 357, 360.

[25] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 356f: "On McDowell's view, we are directly open to. . .affordances in so far as they are facts like that apples afford eating.....Facts about what affords what, however, are *not* what we are directly open to according to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.... instead of the affordance-facts that on McDowell's view we are directly open to, it is the affordance's *solicitations* – such as the attraction of an apple when I'm hungry – to which I am directly open."

[26] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 358f, 361. The sexual and even criminal senses of 'solicitation' probably make all too patent Dreyfus' point about the difference between solicitation and affordance.

coping. For Heidegger, our affectedness or disposedness discloses our existential dependence upon the world and, on this basis, moods and emotions (*Stimmungen*) tell us where in the world we are or, if a Heideggerian anachronism might be indulged, into what time-space we have been thrown and among what threatening and/or enticing creatures we find ourselves. To be sure, moods are not simply clear but indistinct ideas or necessarily private contents of fleeting mental states. Nevertheless, they disclose the ways that we are affected by what we encounter or, in other words, the ways that what we encounter "gets to us" (*uns angeht*), stirring and moving us. Indeed, Heidegger tells us not only that they are the phenomena long considered by philosophy under the rubric of "emotions and feelings" (*Affekte und Gefühle*) but that Aristotle's interpretation of them shows that they need not be interpreted in the modern sense as "psychic phenomena."[27]

I have been contending that, inasmuch as sensorimotor activity is a mindless response to a solicitation, it would be a mistake to construe an account of it as a gloss on Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world. But, of course, the proper inference from this observation might be: "So much the worse for Heidegger's analysis." But Heidegger's analysis may also be understood as providing the structure of a phenomenon that must be consistent and perhaps even homologous with mindless sensorimotor activity. For in Heidegger's existential analysis, affectedness and its manifestation in moods are always part of the fabric of understanding, indeed, integral to its ecstatic, purposive character. This last remark brings me to the second omission in Dreyfus' account of coping, namely, the absence of any reference to the *Worumwillen*, the for-the-sake-of-which, Heidegger's translations of Aristotle's *hou heneka* form of causation. Rather than mere responses to solicitations or even merely pressing into possibilities, being-in-the-world projects possibilities for itself. In other words, being-in-the-world is self-directed, with or without an ego, and its projection of possibilities is also predisposed and emotionally laden, even if the predisposition and emotion in question register as indifference. Moreover, this self-directedness goes hand-in-hand with the moodiness of being-in-the-world, just as movements of flight and pursuit are suffused with senses of fear and desire. Given the Aristotelian background to Heidegger's thought, particularly his conception of

[27] Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972), 139. To be sure, Heidegger emphasizes how feelings are constitutive of our being-in-the-world precisely by disclosing to us our world, what is within it, and thereby ourselves. That is to say, analysis of our moods cannot remain confined to some purely internal mental content. Yet while not to be confused with conceptual or even proto-conceptual mindedness, our moods and feelings, insofar as they co-constitute our being-in-the-world, are also not to be confused with mindless coping. Dreyfus' emphasis on the mindlessness of coping bodies and their sensorimotor intentionality seems to be a knee-jerk reaction against any account of intentionality that allows for its privacy, as though such accounts inevitably succumb to the shortcomings of a Cartesian model of the mind. Yet while perception may well be fundamentally sensori-motor, it has the character of intentionality, i.e., it transcends the perceiver, putting her in touch with an object, because it is also felt, a part of the fabric of her desires and fears.

the ecstatic-horizonal character of the basic temporality of being-in-the-world, being-in-the-world is never a matter simply of responses to solicitations. Being-in-the-world is ecstatic; like a baby kicking in its mother's womb, it is not simply responding to its environment; indeed, it has a sense of its environment only in kicking. So, too, for Heidegger the ecstatic character of being-in-the-world is not simply a response to solicitations on the horizon; nor is it simply an openness to solicitations. It is far more a self-directed interaction with its horizon.

How do these remarks bear on Dreyfus' critique of McDowell? Dreyfus rightly insists that affordances presuppose solicitations and that a network of solicitations are constantly drawing actions out of the body.[28] But solicitations are not one-directional; there has to be a capacity to be solicited. But even more than a capacity waiting to be solicited, to be in the world is to be moving towards various goals. To be sure, most of our sensorimotor activity is not accompanied or co-constituted by the *pathe* of moods and emotions. But as activities of living organisms, they arguably have a structure that is homologous with the self-directed and even pre-disposed structure of being-in-the-world.[29]

Conclusion

In my foregoing remarks I have tried to articulate problems with certain themes at work in the existential phenomenology that underpins Dreyfus' critique of McDowell, especially insofar as Dreyfus draws on Heidegger's existential analysis. These problems provide reason for challenging aspects of Dreyfus' analysis of human experience in terms of mindless coping and, at the very least, emending the conceptions of freedom, expertise, and solicitations in that analysis. I would like to conclude with a gloss of a phenomenon that illustrates the importance of these problems, taken together. Let us call this phenomenon, borrowing from Dreyfus' nomenclature, the phenomenon of moral coping or coping in an ethical sense, and sketch certain features of it by drawing on an account of such coping given by Aristotle, whose discussion of *phronesis* is a source of inspiration for Dreyfus and McDowell alike.

Aristotle, as Heidegger knew full well, enjoyed some advantages over certain modern thinkers precisely because he was not captivated by any myth of the mental and because he found a way to study phenomena, not least the phenomena of human

[28] "The Return of the Myth of the Mental," 356.

[29] At times Dreyfus notes this reciprocity but for the most part he neglects the self-directedness of much of the activity; perhaps running scared in the face of Cartesianism, he equally understates, as noted, the emotive and at least proto-emotive character of absorbed coping. These shortcomings of his analysis are significant since the forms of disposed self-directedness – mindful but non-conceptual human behavior – may well provide the key to articulating bridges between mindless and conceptually minded coping.

existence, non-dualistically by looking both to their continuity and involvement with one another and to their own distinctive natural processes of movement and development. In short, Aristotle is no stranger to the pervasiveness of both unconscious and pre-conscious sensorimotor activity continuous with and in constant interaction with its environment. For the source of Heidegger's notion of ecstases, horizons, and their interconnectedness, one need look no further than Aristotle's text.

Nevertheless, Aristotle also recognized that these movements are self-directed, that they are teleological (as every flight and pursuit and their emotional counterparts demonstrate), that these movements are not simply a response to solicitations but a function of a constant, purposively-ordered interaction with the environment at hand, and that their respective purposes (*teloi*) are tied to distinctive functions, natural to the entity under consideration. That function in human beings is the process of thinking and reasoning that necessarily accompany choice.[30] Being virtuous is a struggle; we have to cope with inappropriate and considerably powerful desires. In time this coping, if sustained, can weaken the hold of these recalcitrant desires. But this ethical sort of coping is, in any case, the key to human excellence precisely because it entails developing the disposition to make certain kinds of choices and making a choice of any kind requires reasoning and thought. Or, in other words, coping ethically, achieving expertise and not mere competence at being human, is a matter of developing the settled and pleasing disposition to be mindful.

[30] In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* II, Aristotle characterizes human excellence as a *hexis proairetike*, a disposition, induced by practice, to choose in the way that a prudent person, a *phronimos* would (1107a1-5); and choosing, Aristotle further tells us, is accompanied by reasoning and thought (*meta logou kai dianoias*) (1112a16).

Chapter 11
Aristotle and Phenomenology

James Dodd

Often in conversation, and at times in print,[1] Richard Cobb-Stevens is well known for drawing striking parallels between Husserl's phenomenology and Aristotelian philosophy. One characteristic aspect of his remarks that I have especially appreciated over the years is that they have rarely amounted to one of those rather dry scholarly footnotes that academics are fond of exchanging, where we track often faint and all too subtle lines of influence throughout the millennia. So in the case of Husserl and Aristotle, one sometimes comes across parerga and paralipomena of suggestions that Husserl had been influenced by a chance reading of this or that text of his ancient counterpart, or by some dissertation project of a long forgotten student before (or perhaps after) the war that analyzes an equally forgotten bit of flotsam of Aristotelian scholia. Despite their otherwise arcane nature, such scholarly affirmations of the influence of Aristotle, however limited, at least tease us with the promise of significant interest in the world of Husserl studies, since Husserl, though by no means an original interpreter of Aristotle, did arguably engage the legacy of the Philosopher in a significant manner. One need only recall that a discussion of Aristotle's doctrine concerning the meaning of non-assertoric statements frames an important part of the argument in the VI *Logische Untersuchung*.[2] And of course

[1] So for example his "Aristotelian Themes in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*," *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology*. Eds. D. Zahavi and F. Stjernfelt Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002 and also his "Aristotelian *Nous* in Husserl's Philosophy," *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*. Ed. R. Pozzo, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2004.

[2] See §1, 67–70 of Edmund Husserl, *VI. Logische Untersuchungen: Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis*, *Husserliana* 4, ed. U. Panzer, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984 [English: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2 [Investigation VI], trans. Findlay, ed. Moran, London: Routledge 2001], hereafter LU.

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Aristotle, in essential ways, is recognizable as a steady subterranean influence on Husserl throughout his career; for it is arguable that Aristotle's presence can always be felt through the medium of Husserl's almost constant engagement with the formulation of philosophical problems found in the philosophy of Brentano. That being said, and given its due, nothing in Husserl really approaches the level of Brentano's or, perhaps more significantly, Heidegger's attempts to appropriate Aristotelian themes in a systematic and creative manner. Yet Cobb-Stevens' remarks always rise above all mere philological reconstruction; he wants to point more towards illuminating the bond of not so much a common set of positions shared by Husserl and Aristotle, as a shared attitude towards what is satisfying in a philosophical explanation, an attitude that draws these two thinkers together, despite all their differences, which are profound.

Since I was a student, I have been time and again convinced by Cobb-Stevens that Aristotle and Husserl share a fundamental philosophical kinship, and more, I think that what he is so fond of pointing out is of great importance—I would even go as far as to say that what makes Aristotle philosophically compelling today to a great extent also determines what makes Husserl and Heidegger philosophically relevant, and with that the promise of classical phenomenology as a whole.

My intention in this paper is to explore, in the spirit of innumerable remarks of Cobb-Stevens on these matters, what I take to be a key feature of this common bond of philosophical sensibility between Aristotle and phenomenology, namely the systematic elevation of the theme of *seeing* in philosophical discourse. Heidegger will play a critical role below in spelling this out, especially given that his work will allow us to relate the theme of seeing to the actual texts of Aristotle in a systematic fashion, but the philosophical impulse at stake will in the end remain fundamentally Husserlian.

Seeing as a Philosophical Theme

Let me begin by describing in general terms in what sense the theme of seeing plays an important role in classical phenomenological philosophy. There are in fact several dimensions to this, so it is important to try to bring the whole scope of the matter into view, in order to understand the immanent complexity of what might at first seem to be a rather simple and obvious phenomenon.

The first dimension is the most general, and has to do with the aim of phenomenology to provide a perspective within which philosophical *problems* can be approached. A fundamental motivation for both Husserl and Heidegger was a profound dissatisfaction with the way that philosophical problems had been taken up and understood, as problems, in contemporary philosophy during the end of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century. This on one level involves familiar methodological concerns, which are exemplified by Husserl's discussion of

how to approach a clarification of the basic concepts of logic in his 1900/1 *Logische Untersuchungen*, or by Heidegger's reflection on how to approach the rediscovery of the meaning of the question of being in the opening sections of his 1927 *Sein und Zeit*.[3] However, these methodological reflections are not limited to the question of the proper formulation of tasks, but involve taking up the problem of the very sense of what it means to be faced with a task, or what kinds of demands, both methodological and ethical, are implicit in what we might call the *problematicity of tasks*.

This question of problems—or, one might say, the problem with problems—constitutes an important dimension of Heidegger's critique of Husserl that one finds in his Marburg lectures from the 1920s that form an important preparatory phase for the project of *Sein und Zeit*. One of the things that was so dissatisfying about Husserl, from Heidegger's point of view, was the impression that phenomenology, in its attempt to rediscover the motivating force of traditional philosophical problems, nevertheless failed to call the existential grounds of that force as such into question, which threatens to leave untouched a whole gamut of pernicious prejudices that Heidegger considers to be constitutive of modern philosophy since Descartes. Heidegger saw such prejudices embodied in the very manner in which "problems" are represented in contemporary thought, namely in the figure of a *given task*, one that is already pre-conceived from within its trajectory towards an anticipated, well-defined solution, and subsequently assigned to a community of researchers who work together towards its ultimate resolution. Problems, systematically posed and provided to a community as a set of research tasks (one might think here of Hilbert's famous 1900 lecture outlining the top 23 "problems" facing modern mathematicians at the beginning of the last century as exemplary), represent a unique manner in which the posture of questioning, of questionability itself, is absorbed into a figure that from the beginning recognizes the questionable only from out of the given horizon of its elimination in an *answer*. This excludes, in Heidegger's account, precisely the possible being of a question that does not yield to an answer, that remains indifferent to any promise or claim to its own resolution; or put another way, it compromises just what a problem allows us to *see*, by limiting the experience of seeing to a spectacle firmly resolved in the limits of its conclusiveness.[4]

The issue, one might say, turns on what one might call the intentional structure of problems, and this brings us to a second essential dimension of the theme of seeing, namely how in general to understand the role of *intentionality* in phenomenological investigation. This topic is vast; for my purposes, I want above all to

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, ed. F.-W. von Hermann, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977 [English: *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, San Francisco: Harper and Rowe, 1962], hereafter SuZ.

[4] I have in mind here above all §§9-10 of Heidegger's 1923/4 Marburg lectures, *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 17, ed. F.-W. van Hermann, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1994 [English translation: *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, trans. D. Dahlstrom, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005], hereafter IPR (which refers to the English translation).

stress that it is important to always keep in mind that "intentionality" in the classical phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger was never introduced as a *solution* to anything, but rather served as a heading for a specific class of "problems"—that is, problems of how different unities of sense are constituted in subjective life. The central issue of all of the problems pursued under the heading of intentionality is how to understand the role of subjective intentional accomplishments in the foundation of a given access to beings, whether the beings in question are those of the world, of the imagination, or idealities such as mathematical or logical objectivities. This means that the question of the intentional structure of problems has to do with how to describe the unity of sense thanks to which a question is constitutive of an access to the "being" of the questionable, or what is meant or intended in the question as a question. Thus we can rephrase Heidegger's concern about losing the meaning of questions in our embrace of the understanding of all questions as problems aimed at answers: the issue has to do with what questions provide access to, what they make visible, and in what sense such access can be blocked by the modality of sense embodied in problems. That is, we need to ask whether rigorously formulated problems instituted as a set of tasks, those strange offspring of our increasingly comprehensive methodological sophistication, enhance or frustrate what is originally seen in questions.

This notion of intentionality as the heading for the varied problems of access, including those cases in which access takes the form of an essential obfuscation of sense, is fundamental to another "problem" basic to both the thought of Husserl and Heidegger, namely that of the *world*. This is the third dimension of the theme of seeing that will prove to be important for what follows. For both Husserl and Heidegger, the intentional unity of the sense of the world must be grasped in part from a tendency towards its obfuscation, or the tendency for intentional being, intentional access, towards its own immersion, and with that a peculiar loss and dispersion, in the very phenomenality that its own accomplishments have made possible. Husserl's methodological strategies of *epoché* and reduction in his 1913 *Ideen I*,[5] as well as Heidegger's hermeneutical analyses of questioning and inauthenticity throughout *Sein und Zeit*, are all engagements with this fundamental list, as it were, of intentional life towards its own latency, or the tendency in which the potential for the manifestation of intentional life is passed over in favor of its other.

This obfuscation of the world (more the obfuscation that the world *is*, as opposed to an obscuring veil being drawn over an otherwise lucid world-presence), or of intentional being as that which secures access to the world, also lies behind Husserl's and Heidegger's engagement with the critique of modern science, which represents a fourth dimension of the theme of seeing. Science is of importance here not simply because it represents an articulation of things, or a given

[5] See Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, Hua 3, ed. K. Schuhmann, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 [English: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982], §§27–32, 56–62.

picture of how the world is, but more importantly it represents an explicit understanding of what it is to "have" a world, or the nature of the very ground for an encounter with beings. This understanding comprises what one could call the methodological essence of science, that never fully explicit set of assumptions that constitute the *habitus* within which explicit methodological principles and practices are formulated. This is a *habitus* that tends towards self-clarification, and to the extent that science pursues an explicit reflection on how it proceeds in bringing being into view, it does not stand in a simple naive relation to the problem of intentional obfuscation, but always at least partially succeeds in holding the problematic character of access itself in view.

This is, as Husserl argues in the introduction to his 1928 *Formale und transzendentale Logik*,[6] the gesture of *critique* basic to the achievement of science, the original moment of which he traces back to Platonism. As a consequence, science has always already begun to at least implicitly understand the necessity of posing the problems of intentionality, of those fundamental conditions that determine the access to manifestation as such. But at the same time, in the form of a naive naturalism, science also embodies a peculiar modality of the obfuscation of this same question; in this way, science thus embodies the gesture of understanding what it means to make available a unified world of sense, but in such a way that renders this "making available" *unavailable*. Thus for both Husserl and Heidegger, however different their methods, the problem of science can be said to be the problem of bringing into view the life of intentional access that is operative but buried in science; for both, in short, a key philosophical task for phenomenology is the radical critique of the foundations of science, one that takes the form of a fundamental ontological investigation into the accomplishments of the intentional life that makes it possible (and impossible).

A basic gesture of phenomenology as a critique of science is to argue that the problem of science, and by extension the problem with problems, when understood as problems of intentionality, necessitates a reference to something other (if not outside) the unity of sense that constitutes scientific theory as a methodological whole. Here again we have an important factor in the dispute between Husserl and Heidegger—for the one, this "other" was consciousness, understood as that region of being or existence that forms the ultimate field of intentional accomplishment; for the other, this "other" was the comportments of human existence, of a Dasein that is not so much a region of given being as the existential problematicity of being, lived as a world-projection. We will return below to this dispute, since it will prove to be intimately related to the question of the importance of Aristotle for phenomenology. For now I only want to emphasize that, whether the ultimate aim be a *Wissenschaftslehre* or a *Seinsanalyse*, for both Husserl and Heidegger the problem of intentionality ultimately takes the form of the problem of *life*.

[6] Edmund Husserl, *Formale und trasnzendentale Logik*, Hua 17, ed. P. Janssen, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974 [English: *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977].

All of these problems—the problem with problems, the problem of the being of intentional access, the problem of science, and the problem of life—can, I would like to suggest, be understood as permutations of the more fundamental problem of *seeing*. To bring out some of the philosophical consequences of this, in what follows I will begin with some remarks on the manner in which the theme of seeing is developed within Husserl's phenomenology, then I will move on to the manner in which this same theme is articulated by Heidegger on a very different philosophical register, one that is established through an interpretation of Aristotle's remarks on the nature of *meaningful speech*, *perception*, and *falsity*. Throughout, our aim will be to understand the importance of Aristotle not only in reading Heidegger, but also in thinking further about the implications of Husserl's approach to the theme of seeing.

Seeing as Intentional Consciousness (Husserl)

All of this is not to suggest, which would be absurd, that the theme of seeing is unique to phenomenology. What I would like to suggest, however, is that the theme of seeing takes on a very different weight in classical phenomenology than had been the case earlier in the history of philosophy. One way to bring this out is to consider what happens to seeing and its conceptual relatives (insight, intuition, vision, perspective, view, and so on) as a result of the legacy of modern philosophy since Descartes. The Cartesian legacy seeks to progressively cordon off, so to speak, seeing from the functions of judgment and the constructive capacities of the intellect generally. We can discern this legacy in Kant's critical contrast between intuition (*Anschauung*) and understanding (*Verstand*, *Vernunft*); its force is felt even in early German idealism: the plea for a conception of "intellectual intuition" in Fichte and Schelling was never meant to dissolve the Kantian contrast between the immediacy of intuition and the discursivity of concepts, but sought instead to mediate their opposition through the intuitivity of a self-given consciousness. The parameters of a reflection on seeing are thus set in this tradition by the assertion of various kinds of limits, all in response to the perceived need for seeing to be supplemented by other activities or functions of the mind in order to secure structure, order, veracity, and even visibility itself.

Phenomenology can be thought of as an important countermovement to this trend, though in ways falling short of its outright rejection. So in Husserl, the idea of categorial intuition developed in the *Logische Untersuchungen* takes aim at any separation in principle between intuition and concept, weakening their opposition in favor of a notion of a descriptive intuitivity that belongs to conceptuality as such. Husserl goes so far even to emphasize that this intuitivity provides the ground for a unique methodological perspective on those contents of the understanding that the tradition would otherwise consider to be reducible to a set of purely discursive structures, such as propositional contents or states of affairs (what the Stoics called lekta, "sayables"), and eidetic structures both formal and material. The intuitive objectivity of such formations, grasped not in intellectual intuition but in the

intuition of ideal objectivity, becomes emphasized once again in phenomenology, which can be said to break free from the prejudices that animated the medieval battles over nominalism and the *distinctio formalis a parte re*. Husserl sees himself as inaugurating a new descriptive science grounded in what he comes to call eidetic seeing (*Wesenschau*), a seeing that in each case follows the course of the originary evidence of the intuitivity of objects: "The universalization of the correlatively interrelated concepts 'intuition' and 'object' is not an arbitrary conceit but compellingly demanded by the nature of the matters in question."[7]

This story is familiar, and the issue of Aristotle's relation to phenomenology might, one could say, turn precisely on understanding the similarities and differences concerning their respective accounts of conceptuality and perception. Yet there is another dimension to the issue, which can be brought out by considering the development of Husserl's formulation of the problem of transcendence in immanence in the years after the *Logische Untersuchungen*, in lecture courses such as the 1905 *Idee der Phänomenologie* and an important course from 1910 that Husserl gave under the title *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*.[8]

This reflection, which seeks to develop a conception of the immanent structures of consciousness that articulate the sense or meaning of transcendence, or that which is in consciousness but is not of consciousness, arises out of Husserl's dissatisfaction with his account of categorial intuition in the VI *Logische Untersuchung*. There, Husserl had introduced his conception of the categorial perception of for example, a state of affairs as a founded perception, which involves both a continuity and a productive tension between the founding perceptual act and the founded apprehension of the logical object represented by the state of affairs itself.[9] So for example I see that my coffee has grown cold; the perceptual foundation on which this seeing is grounded represents a set of accomplishments of manifestation that are essential to the experiential unity of "seeing that the coffee has grown cold," but which do not include the specific categorial articulations of sense that are ultimately constitutive of the perception of the state of affairs as such (so the "this, that is the case"; the "is" of "is cold," etc. are not elements of sensuous intuition). These categorial structures represent an intuitivity of the whole that is other than but founded upon the perceptual intuitivity of the experience *simpliciter*. Husserl's argument for categorial intuition or categorial perception depends here on a broadening of the traditional senses of both intuition and perception, and he comes to see that this is only possible through (in part) understanding how the progressive complexities of immanent consciousness orient seeing towards ever more complex founded objectivities on the level of categorial articulation.

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[7] *Ideas I*, p. 9.

[8] Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie: Fünf Vorlesungen*, Hua 2, ed. W. Biemel, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973 [English: *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. L. Hardy, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999]; Text Nr. 6: "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie," in: *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Hua 13, ed. I. Kern, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973 [English: *Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Winter Semester 1910–1911*, trans. Farin and Hart, Dordrecht: Springer, 2006].

[9] LU VI, §§40–52.

This was already the point of the analyses of complex intentional acts in the preceding studies of the *Logische Untersuchungen*: the point had been that consciousness is structured in such a way that manifold levels of transcendence, different senses of the "givenness" of the given, can be articulated, from the grounding achievements of sensuous life to the logical syntheses of full blown theoretical consciousness. What changes after the *Logische Untersuchungen*, as can be seen already in works such as *Ideen I* but above all in the posthumously published *Erfahrung und Urteil*,[10] is that Husserl comes to see the founded unities which these different senses comprise to be in turn grounded in an immanence that, so to speak, folds back in on itself in accordance with complex orders of self-encounter. The intentional complexity of founding and founded, so central to the argument of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, is no longer limited to the simple concatenation of a multiplicity of intentional acts, but has its origin in the manner in which conscious life unfolds as the movement of a self-enriching experience. The very sense of "founded" then becomes articulated in a unique way in Husserl's mature philosophy, since what comes into view is not simply an object of a higher order (such as a state of affairs, in contrast to the perceived objects that serve as its intuitive foundation), but the movement of a consciousness that rediscovers in its own established accomplishments those points of departure that allow for intentional complexity and higher order accomplishments. This opens up for Husserl a number of questions that had remained essentially dormant in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, questions having to do above all with the temporality of consciousness, and ultimately its history; likewise the themes of givenness, the being of immanence, and the role of intersubjectivity in the constitution of objectivity both perceptual and ideal.

I would argue that, in Husserl's thought, this attempt to describe the immanent movement of intentional life gradually yields a description of seeing as not only a comportment towards the seen, one that can be understood in terms of an exercise of a faculty of sensibility or the movement of a desire, but also as a comportment that becomes more and more manifest *to itself*. That is, subjective life becomes manifest not so much as a particular species of object, so for example an object of inner intuition or perception, but instead as a subjective dimension of given constitutive life that opens up the possibility of ever more complicated dimensions of seeing. Intentional life becomes, in other words, progressively its own theme, in the wake of the development of a maturation of seeing.

In this way, finding the proper formulation of the question "what does it mean, to become aware of life?" becomes an essential requirement of intentional analysis. What does it mean, for a being who sees to bring the question of its own seeing into view, for its own being, as the intentional access to being, to itself become distinctively accessible? I take the maturity of this thought to be one of the salient differences between the *Logische Untersuchungen* and Husserl's later writings on

[10] Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*, ed. L. Landgrebe, Leipzig: Meiner, 1999 [English: *Experience and Judgement*, trans. J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, London: Routledge, 1973].

logic, above all *Formale und trasnzendentale Logik* and *Erfahrung und Urteil*: for the former, logic was essentially the study of the basic structures that account for the subjective accomplishment of complex meanings; for the latter, logic is the culmination of a self-maturing consciousness that finds in itself the potential to articulate its own rational essence. Each represents a figure of the analysis of access, and each attempts to frame the epistemological problem in terms of a descriptive analysis of the being of life; but it is only in the latter that Husserl breaks free from the lingering strictures of descriptive psychology, and discovers a uniquely powerful expression of the philosophical problem of consciousness.

An important consequence of Husserl's mature approach, I would argue, is that it does not limit the form of the question of how the being of seeing comes into view by assuming it makes sense only if we take up a position outside of seeing, thereby making it an object of a reflection that does not belong to the dynamics of seeing itself. The point is rather that seeing can accomplish its relation to the seen in a modified fashion, one thanks to which the *seeing of the seen* is brought to the level of visibility, but a visibility that is ultimately immanent to its own originally "naive" accomplishment. In this way, the manifestation or phenomenality of seeing is recognized in light of a gathering potentiality, as it were, of the very life of seeing, or of consciousness, and it is in part the maturity of such a potentiality that is a precondition not only for logic, but also for phenomenological investigation as such.

This self-manifestation of comportment, as a developing potentiality that belongs to the fabric of conscious life, is again a theme that only gradually develops in Husserl's thinking, culminating in the genetic phenomenology of the 1920s and 1930s. It does not emerge from an explicit engagement with Aristotle, though Husserl's constant reflection on Brentano's presentations in his Vienna lectures from the 1880s of the problems of time, perception, and imagination, all of which were profoundly influenced by a reflection on Aristotle, form a constant backdrop to its development.[11] It is in Heidegger, however, that we do find an explicit articulation of the theme of seeing from a phenomenological point of view that expressly engages Aristotle's text; and it is Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle in the 1920s that will allow us to understand better the significance of the implicit place for Aristotle in phenomenological thinking.

Seeing as Language (*phunē sēmantikē*)

As evidence for the central importance of seeing for Heidegger's reflections on phenomenology, let us consider two passages from his 1924 Marburg lectures, *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*. These lectures provide both an important perspective on the pre-history to *Sein und Zeit* (in particular, as we will

[11] So for example §§3–4, 45–52 of Text Nr. 1 in Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung*, Hua 23, ed. E. Marbach, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980 [English: *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory (1898–1925)*, trans. J. Brough, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2005].

see, with regard to the concept of care, or *Sorge*), and include one of the most sustained critiques of Husserl to be found in Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (though, as is characteristic, Heidegger's remarks range only over a very limited scope of Husserl's writings). More important for our purposes here, Heidegger in these lectures prefaces his critique of Husserl through an interesting and rich reflection on Aristotle, in which he introduces a number of ideas that are relevant precisely to the questions of world, intentionality, and the being of life that we have begun to articulate above.

The first passage can be found in §16a, where Heidegger explicitly identifies care (*Sorge*) as *seeing*: "Every care is, as such, a seeing."[12] Care, here as in *Sein und Zeit*,[13] is for Heidegger the fundamental structure of Dasein as a being-in-the-world; thus the ontology of Dasein amounts to an ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of care. If every care is a seeing, then seeing belongs to being in the world, not as an contingent supplement but as inherent to its very sense: "A kind of sight is, along with other things, inherent in being in the sense of being in the world."[14]

Seeing is inherent to being in the world to the extent to which it captures the sense in which Dasein is in relation to both itself and to things. Heidegger's reflections here allow us to introduce again, in a more precise way, the question of the world, which we already emphasized above, and precisely in terms of that vacillation between the world as manifestation and obfuscation, or the sense in which the conditions of access also set into place the conditions for a failure to see. Heidegger's first move is to in effect fold the general structure of making manifest, or uncovering, into the basic constitutive order of care or seeing.

We should stress that sight, seeing, is not meant here as one capacity among others; above all it is not limited to theoretical activity, on whatever level or in whatever sense; it is instead a structural feature of Dasein, a constitutive element of Dasein as care. Care is here taken above all as that structure thanks to which Dasein "is" as an unconcealment, or uncoveredness: "This kind of sight has nothing to do with theoretical knowledge but is, instead, a kind of accomplishment of existence's basic constitution, one that ought to be referred to as uncoveredness."[15]

This is the first passage I wanted to stress. In ways that recall Husserl's discussion of evidence in the VI *Logische Untersuchung*, Heidegger is here arguing that seeing and uncovered, manifest being stand in a fundamental existential correlation, forming the same fabric of accomplishment; they are not externally brought together by something else, such as an effort of verification that would have in view a "truthfulness" that is originally alien to both. Yet along with this comes an important broadening of the theme of seeing, one that moves beyond the figure of uncovering and deepens the sense of what is given with the being of uncovering.

[12] IPR, p. 75.

[13] See SuZ, §§39–44.

[14] IPR, p. 75.

[15] Ibid.

Being-in (the world) has the structure of uncoveredness, Heidegger argues, but also of a *having*, a characteristic of the sense of the world we have already alluded to above. In Heidegger's description of ontical human existence, Dasein "has" what it uncovers, and this is a factor that must be included in any reflection on what it means when we say that what it uncovers is *seen*.

Disclosure, having, and world are thus for Heidegger wrapped up in the theme of seeing in a fundamental way, and we need to be thinking of this inner bond of "having" and "uncovering" when considering the second passage from Heidegger's lectures to which I would like to draw our attention:

> What is expressed by the phrase 'in a world' is not that two objects are related in some way to one another but instead that the specific being of what is alive is *grounded* on *having* the world in the manner of taking care of it [or: disclosing it in a comportment in which it discloses itself in its possibilities—JD]. We designate this orientation of an entity insofar as it lives, that is to say, insofar as it is *in* its world, as a kind of sight.[16]

This is important to emphasize, above all to evade the impression that the theme of *Sorge* somehow abandons a more Husserlian emphasis on intuition and givenness, as being in some way suspect as vestiges of a putative intellectualism. The complex of seeing and seen, of the movement of immanence and the unfolding of transcendence, so essential to Husserl's thought, is in fact repeated here, not abandoned. Yet it is not just repeated in a modified form, but in a way that reflects the point of contention between Husserl and Heidegger, cited above, concerning how we are to bring into focus the lived character of intentional life, and thereby understand the inner bond between living and having at the heart of the uncoveredness of seeing.

That an understanding of the bond between a lived having of the world and seeing is at stake here can be seen in Heidegger's discussion of the name "phenomenology," which he pursues through a reflection on the meanings of *phainomenon* and *logos* in Aristotle. Heidegger stresses that *phainomenon* in Aristotle is not simply a self-showing, but a showing made possible by an orientation of encounter: "*phainomenon* is what shows itself of itself as existing; it is encountered by life insofar as life stands towards its world in such a way that it sees the world, perceives it at all in the *aisthēsis*."[17] The emphasis on seeing here thus determines how *logos* and *phainomenon* are to be brought together. Again avoiding a perceived hegemony of "problems," Heidegger does not pursue the question in terms of the traditional gloss of the suffix "-logy," where "phenomenology" would simply amount to a science that seeks to give an account of phenomena as phenomena, *à la* the traditional conception of phenomenology described by thinkers such as Lambert. There is rather a deeper connection between world and seeing that Heidegger is trying to illuminate, and he does this through a consideration of the conception of *language* at play in Aristotle's *De anima* and *De*

[16] IPR, p. 76.

[17] IPR, p. 8.

interpretatione. For in the end, it is language and manifestation that come together in the theme of seeing for Heidegger.

Let us look closer at this, and consider Heidegger's discussion of *logos* in the 1924 Marburg lectures first. Here Heidegger is commenting on *De interpretatione* d, 16b26f (cf. Aristotle 1987, pp. 13–14): "*Logos* is audible being that means something, that is a voice: *logos de esti phunē sēmantikē*." To have a voice, or an audible being that means something, is to be alive; "To have a voice," as Heidegger puts it, "is a distinctive type of being, namely being in the sense of living."[18] Here one might think that Aristotle is, rather characteristically, providing an inventory of the senses in which we can say that someone is alive—to live is to see, but also to speak; or rather, speaking should be considered something alongside seeing as characteristic aspects of a human being. Thus animals (who are, after all, living beings) certainly perceive, and perhaps even make sounds, and maybe even have something like a voice; but such sounds and voices are not saturated with sense or meaning as in the case of humans. This might be so, but we nevertheless need to ask something more general, namely: what is the real difference between the two, namely *seeing* and *speaking*? To answer this, we need to know what meaningful speech (*phunē sēmantikē*) amounts to, or what we are to understand by a sound, made by a living being, that is properly saturated with meaning. But upon reflection we find ourselves led back to the question of what a phenomenon is, or what it is for something to become manifest—for a sound is laden with meaning only to the extent to which something in sound is *manifest as* its meaning or sense. But through what, or thanks to what in speech (*logos*) does something become manifest?

For Aristotle, the answer is: through and thanks to *phantasia* (Heidegger here cites De int. b 8, 420b31f). Again Heidegger: "*Phantasia*—that something shows itself. The sound is a voice (the sound of speech) if, by means of it, something is to be perceived (seen). On the basis of *phantasia* one designates the sound *sēmantikē*."[19]

To be sure, this raises more questions than it answers. The scholarly debate that has been raging for centuries over the role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle shows little sign of resolution, and serves to raise even more questions.[20] But perhaps we can at least assert that, in this case, at the core of Aristotle's position is the idea that in meaningful speech—or sound that has *Phantasia* —something *comes to light* (recalling the meaning of the root *pha-* which, as Heidegger emphasizes, is related to *phōs* light[21]), something shows itself, in a sense that is related to the manner in

[18] Ibid.

[19] IPR, p. 11.

[20] For a more general approach to the question see Malcolm Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination," and Dorothea Frede, "The Cognitive Role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle," both in *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Also see the interesting interpretation in Martha Nussbaum, *Aristotle's de Motu Animalium,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, a reading that has plenty of critics, e.g. Noell Birondo, "Aristotle on Illusory Perception: Phantasia without Phatasmata," in Ancient Philosophy 21 (Spring 2001): 57–71.

[21] IPR, p. 4.

which something appears in an "image," but not necessarily limited to a specifically *graphic* interpretation of *phantasmata*. This emphasis on something *coming to light* in turn yields for us not a specific, but in fact a general conception of seeing: for seeing can be described in general terms as a comportment in which "something comes to light," which in Heidegger, evoking Aristotle, includes an emphasis on the role of meaningful speech. And this is in turn discernible at the core of Heidegger's conception of *care* as an uncoveredness: the originary coming to light of what is in the horizon of the life of Dasein as an event structurally conditioned by language.

But there is more, and this binds Heidegger's discussion with the theme of seeing that we find in Husserl: what comes to light is not simply the manifestation of this or that object of concern, but concernful comportment itself, and that precisely as a *having* of the world. Heidegger: "Insofar as a human being is in the world and *wants* something in that world and wants it with himself, he speaks."[22] This might strike one as an attempt on the part of Heidegger to situate the entire discussion of phenomenality on a practical register, an impression that would, for example, find sustenance if we were to look at Heidegger's discussion of *phronēsis* in the beginning of the lecture course on Plato's *Sophist,* which was given the same academic year as the *Einführung*.[23] However, I would argue that we should leave the theme of the "practical" aside, since the point is not limited to intentional life being aimed at some end or other, which is not even the point in the case of *phronēsis*; rather, the idea Heidegger wants to emphasize is that of an originary investment in things, in a "having" of the world, not simply the manifold ways of being directed to this or that end or *telos*. To *have* means primarily: something is uncovered, where the uncovering *that is oneself* is likewise uncovered.

Let us continue with the passage from Heidegger we have been quoting, where he goes on to develop the theme of bringing something to light in language as specifically an uncovering in the modality of having. It is, again, a having that is also a self-having; the accomplishment of uncovering enriches and cultivates the manifestation of the one who reveals. This is what is means not only to have a voice, in the sense of a sound that comes from a living being, but precisely to *speak*. "[The human being] speaks," Heidegger stresses, "insofar as something like a world is *uncovered* for him as a matter of concern and he is uncovered to himself in this 'for him.'"[24] This formulation allows us to ask the question: what is the *spoken word*, as a fundamental unit of meaningful speech, such that it forms a response to the being-uncovered of world and self, as the basic structure of being-in-the-world? And how is this response of the spoken word, if we can call it that, complicit with the very being of manifestation that is, for Heidegger, at stake in bringing something to light? What does it mean to see with words, or to see in words something that there is to see, or that is *there* to be seen?

[22] IPR, p. 12.

[23] Martin Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, GA 19, ed. I. Schüßler, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992, pp. 48–56.

[24] IPR, p. 12.

Perhaps one might argue that the word simply responds to what is given, or that it responds to what is given to be seen, and with that to be had. Words simply collect together what already is, providing for the ease of arrangement and organization; they thus record what seeing has already seen, and to that extent understood. Yet on Heidegger's account the issue turns not so much on the given registered in language, if by that we understand something that does not need to be further established, but rather what Heidegger calls the facticity (*Faktizität*) of language. That is, the point is not simply to stress the relation of language to the already given, but instead the having-been-*established* of word and speech, thus as itself a given in response to a need *to be* established. In this way Heidegger's interest is drawn more to Aristotle's classification of language, meaningful speech, as belonging among those things that *could have been otherwise*, and which thus need to be explicitly set up in what they are. This is, for example, a key characteristic that ties *technē* together with *phronēsis*, but also, more fundamentally, with language itself.

This can be illustrated by considering a passage in Aristotle from the early chapters of *De interpretatione*, where he stresses the idea that meaningful sound is not meaningful by nature, *phusei*, but *kata sunthēken*, "by convention."[25] It is meaningful, one could say, out of its factical *already having been made* meaningful in the becoming of Dasein as such. Yet in Aristotle language is not for all that an instrument, it is not an instance of a coming together of use and device, even in the form of a bodily organ (*organon*), such as the hand. Heidegger reads the remark at De int. 17a2 (cf. Aristotle 1987, p. 14), where Aristotle asserts that language is not like a tool or *organon*, as amounting to an emphasis of its *Faktizität*: "Language is the being and becoming of the human being himself,"[26] that is, language is the having-been-uncovered of the world and of Dasein in its being towards the seen in care.

A "voice," then, or language as meaningful sound, in which something comes to light (in the manner of *phantasia*), is constitutive of the being and becoming of the human being as such. This is not just the designation of an origin, but rather an indication as to *how* human becoming is the shaping of a view, a seeing of things. The "conventional" character of language represents in this sense a unique modulation of a visibility, a phenomenality, that is determinate as the structure of the being of human existence itself. We can think again here of Heidegger's discussion of *phronēsis* in the *Sophist* lectures, where he emphasizes that *phronēsis*, unlike *technē*, is for Aristotle not something directed outside of itself; the relevant *telos* that is here brought into view is not "outside," *para*, to *phronēsis*, but is the illumination (the coming to light) of the being of *phronimos* as such.[27]

[25] De int. 16a19–29, quoted by Heidegger at IPR pp. 11–12. Cf. Aristotle 1987, p. 12.

[26] IPR, p. 12.

[27] See for example Sophistes, p. 50: "Und doch ist die phronēsis verschieden von der technē; denn bei der technē ist das prakton ein telos, das para ist. Anders steht es mit dem telos der phronēsis. Diese ist: hexis alēthēs meta logou praktikē peri ta anthrōpōi agatha (vgl. 1140b5), 'ein solches Gestelltsein des menschlichen Daseins, daß es über die Durchsichtigkeit seiner selbst verfügt.'" Thus Dasein is itself brought to light in phronēsis, not simply the end points of its actions (praxis) taken as sequential processes.

This same point can in turn be made by reflecting on Heidegger's comment on a rather difficult passage in Aristotle at *De interpretatione* 16b18 (cf. Aristotle 1987, p. 13), which reads: "Verbs themselves, spoken by themselves, are names and signify something (for the one speaking brings his thinking to a halt and the one listening pauses)."[28] The chief difficulty here is to understand what it is about speaking that "brings thinking to a halt" (*histēsi. . . ho legōn tēn dianoian*) and what about listening amounts to coming to a "pause" or rest (*ēremeō*). Heidegger's answer helps us to understand better what is for him significant about the conventional or non-natural essence of language:

> When we naturally go along living, then the world is here. We deal with it, we are preoccupied with it. If a word is then spoken, the process of opining is placed before something; in understanding the word I linger with that thing; in meaning something, I have come to a pause [. . .] What matters for Aristotle, particularly also in contrast to Plato, is the fact that speaking, when it moves within the language, is something that, as far as its genuine being is concerned, grows out of human being's free assessment of things; it is not *phusei* [by nature].[29]

This reading allows Heidegger to in turn articulate the place and importance of apophantics in Aristotle's thought: this lingering with things in words, resting on the heels of the accomplishments of uncovering, allows for ostension, or the possibility of pointing out (*aufzeigen*), of *showing* a being in its being-encountered. Language thus interrupts the flow of a simple, seamless engagement of things in the horizon of care, providing uncoveredness as a space for meaning, which just *is* ostension for Aristotle; "the primordial function of meaning is ostension, to point something out," as Heidegger emphasizes.[30] Both speaking and listening represent breaks in the seams of understanding, breaks that are essential to the specifically cognitive shape of phenomenality; in grasping the meaning of a name, I pause in the broken flow of my understanding, and am thereby in a position to set off the given in order to show (and see) it come to light in its name. Likewise in naming something I contract, or constrict my engagement with the thing and its horizon, in order for language to set apart, set out what it is that is to be shown as named.

Language brings to light by pointing out; but this function of ostension, of meaning, is grounded for Heidegger in the facticity of language itself, which also, and this is very significant for Heidegger's discussion, carries for Aristotle with it the possibility of *falsity*. This point, nurtured by a reflection on Aristotle, is essential to what one might characterize as an important modification on the part of Heidegger of Husserl's phenomenology of perception. Heidegger's approach, the beginnings of which are taking shape in Marburg lectures from the 1920s, effectively amounts to the articulation of the complex of seeing and seen in terms of a renewed problematization of language, one that runs against Husserl's strong tendency to situate the complex of

[28] Quoted by Heidegger in IPR, p. 13: *Auta men kath' heauta legomena ta ērēmata onomata esti kai sēmainei ti (histēsi gar ho legōn tēn dianoian, kai ho akousas ēremēsen)*

[29] IPR, p. 13.

[30] IPR, p. 18.

seeing within what one might call an argument as to the "primacy of perception." And Aristotle, I would argue, is of fundamental relevance to this modification, because his thought has a deep resonance with *both* Husserl's commitment to the primacy of perceptual life *and* Heidegger's turn to language; and by extension, this entire debate forms the very basis for the contrast between Husserl's emphasis on the concept of consciousness and Heidegger's opposing concept of Dasein.

I cannot, of course, pursue all of this at once; for my purposes here, I wish only to indicate how Heidegger's engagement with Aristotle can illuminate for us how the Philosopher's thinking provides important resources for both the argument for the primacy of perception as well as the origin of the problem of obfuscation in the existential interweaving, so to speak, of language and perception.

To clarify what I mean, let us in the remaining sections first turn to Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle on perception, in order then to outline how the issue of falsity and obfuscation is framed. This will in conclusion offer us a way to situate Husserl and Heidegger in a debate over fundamental problems in phenomenology that can, and should be recognizable as essentially determined by Aristotle.

Seeing as *aisthēsis*

Some caution is in order concerning how our discussion is here being framed, and on two counts. First, it is obvious that, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical career, from the I. *Logische Untersuchung* ("Ausdruck und Bedeutung"), or even from the 1890 *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, to the late *Krisis*-related text *Ursprung der Geometrie*,[31] language had been a central theme for Husserl. More, the hallmark of the development of Husserl's philosophy of language could be characterized precisely by a growing sophistication in grasping the implications of its facticity, its specifically *instituted* pregivenness, and with that its being bound up with the problematic of the obscurity of the world. Keeping this in mind, one should perhaps characterize the argument between Husserl and Heidegger as turning on *how* to understand the nature of the pre-givenness of language, its facticity and worldly character; it is not, in other words, a debate about *whether* the facticity of language is philosophically significant.

The second count on which caution is warranted is that Heidegger's own approach in the 1920s in fact appropriates a characteristic Husserlian theme of the folding back of language, and acts of meaning in general, into seeing, into perception. This forms, for example, an important dimension of Husserl's genetic account of intentional unity in his later writings, and is arguably even a prominent

[31] Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, Hua 12, ed. L. Eley, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976; Beilage III in: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, Hua 6, ed. W. Biemel, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970 [English: Appendix VI: "The Origin of Geometry," in: *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr, Northwestern: Northwestern University Press, 1970].

feature in the *Logische Untersuchungen* itself.[32] In Heidegger's Marburg lectures that we have been following, an analogous point is made through a reflection on Aristotle's account of sensuous perception (*aisthēsis*), and serves as an illuminating moment precisely with respect to the relevance of Aristotle for central discussions in classical phenomenology. For the emphasis on language does not, at least not initially, represent a turning away from perception, thus the substitution of one modality of seeing for another; on the contrary, it instead sets the stage for a reflection on the intentional interpenetration of the sensed and the spoken.

Let us consider this point in more detail. There are four aspects of *aisthēsis* in Aristotle that Heidegger emphasizes in his Marburg lectures, all of which are significant for understanding the general structures of lived experience in which language is set, as so to speak the natural basis of animal existence that forms the substratum for the convention of language. The passages in Aristotle that Heidegger employs in this connection are from *De anima* B, 4–5; and G, 2.[33]

The first point of emphasis is that in Aristotle "*aisthēsis* is an *alloiōsis*: a 'becoming-different'."[34] Perceiving as *sensing* is an originary being-other-than itself, and on this basis, that which senses can be described as a relational being (Heidegger here cites De an. 415b24; 416b34). "In perceiving," as Heidegger puts it, "the one perceiving becomes himself someone different insofar as, in perceiving, he now takes up a stance towards his world in a definite manner."[35] Such a being-other, of course, is a recognizable aspect of any description of a properly intentional relation; to evoke intentionality does not amount to ascribing or assigning a relation to elements that only then become two or more *relata*, in this case the perception and the perceived. Rather, the basic idea of intentionality is that relationality can be understood as an immanent structural manner of existence basic to an order of being. *Aisthēsis* in Aristotle approaches a expression of the "intentional" character of a living existence to the extent to which in sensing, the being of the one who senses is moved to be other than itself, thus becoming the sensing-of something.

The second aspect of *aisthēsis* in Aristotle that Heidegger want to emphasize specifies the *manner* of this being-different. Heidegger: "*Aísthēsis* is a *paschein*, a being-affected."[36] In sensing, the sensing is something that *happens to* the perceiver; its relationality is ordered in accordance with a fundamentally passive dimension that circumscribes what Robert Sokolowski and others have described as the "dative of manifestation." Again, this passivity lies at the heart of any phenomenological description of the intentionality of perceptual life; the point, neither in Aristotle nor in phenomenology, was ever to argue for a complete, unsurpassable passivity of perception, but instead to understand how the primacy

[32] See Jay Lampert, *Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl's* Logical Investigations, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995.

[33] IPR, pp. 21–22.

[34] IPR, p. 21.

[35] IPR, p. 22.

[36] IPR, p. 22. Here Heidegger cites *De Anima*, 416b35; 11, 424a1 (cf. Aristotle 1993, pp. 22 & 42).

of the passive, so to speak, determines the manner and function of any activity that roots itself in perceptual life.

This *function* of passivity is in turn specified by a third aspect of Aristotle's conception of perception that Heidegger emphasizes, namely its distinguishing of something from something: "*aisthēsis*," in other words, "is a *krinein*." That is, *aisthēsis* sets off this. . .from. . .; in sensing, the soul distinguishes, discriminates something from something else. Thus sensing, perceiving is not just a passive being other, a moveable affected by the world, but the more complex dynamic of the being-affected of a life by its own being-other that allows for the setting off of something from something else.

Together these three aspects—*aisthēsis* as *alloiōsis*, *paschein*, *krinein*—form for Heidegger an intimate bond between *aisthēsis* and *logos*, to the extent to which the basic accomplishment of any ostension is just the bringing of something to light by the setting-off of something from something else. We can now appreciate better how seeing in the sense of *aisthēsis* shares common ground with speaking, precisely from the perspective of how something is brought to light, and not simply on the basis of a unity of "content," where what has been seen is in turn spoken of. They share a common ground as both belonging to a more fundamental order of intentional life; specifically, *logos* embodies the appropriation of the originary structure of being-other than itself that is basic to the structure of *aisthēsis*. "The *logos*," Heidegger goes on to say, "has the function of pointing out the perceived as such [Heidegger here cites De an. 426b20ff; cf. Aristotle 1993, pp. 50–51-JD]. This fact of the matter, namely, that of being different, is appropriated in the specific manner of speaking."[37] Language, and seeing, thus yield a positioning, a placing of the living subject in care (*Sorge*, which *is* a seeing), whereby it is open to the multitude of whatever it is that can be set apart, or released in a differentiating ostention (*aufzeigen*). This yields for Heidegger a fourth essential aspect of *aisthēsis* in Aristotle, that being in the midst (*mesotēs*) of what is set apart that defines the being of perception; it is in the midst of things qua discriminating, or thanks to the tension opened and exercised by a differentiating looking one way to the other.[38]

Language, despite its conventional character, is nevertheless situated in a being that is primordially a natural sensing-discerning of things; and in this way, comparable to the Husserlian reflection we described above, the functioning of language can be seen as effectively folding back into a complex of life that in turn feeds off a speaking that has deep resonance with primitive forms of a seeing that makes something manifest. Language is to be sure meaningful by convention, but it is a convention that essentially directs nature in a manner that is ultimately in harmony with its end and function as the opening space of phenomenal discernment.

[37] IPR, p. 22.

[38] See De anima b 4, 424a4 (Aristotle 1993, p. 42). Here the example is the discerning situatedness between the sensuous extremes such as those of hot and cold, but also the spectrum of differentiated colors. Heidegger: "*Aisthēsis* must somehow stand in the middle [*mesotēs*], it must not be fixated on one color, it must be able to look at both sides." IPR, 22.

If language in the traditional sense, namely as an artifice or instrument of articulation, has seemed to usurp sensing as being more fundamental, if concepts in other words have become stupid to life, it is precisely because our sense for this originary function of language in directing the movements of unconcealment, thus seeing, has been deadened. And in fact, Heidegger argues, language has become for us something that seems to work against unconcealment, as something that *replaces* seeing, in favor of a claim to truth on the part of an image of things in which things seem to play no immediate role. This, as Heidegger expresses it, renders the very concept of ostension deeply problematic:

> *Aisthēsis* is present in the sort of being that has *language*. Whether or not it is vocalized, it is always in some way speaking. Language speaks not only in the course of the perceiving, but even *guides* it; we see *through* language. Insofar as language is taken up in a traditional and not in a primordial sense, it is precisely what *conceals* things, though it is the same language that precisely has the basic function of ostension.[39]

The Falsity of Seeing

There is much to say about the problem of ostension from the point of view of intentional analysis, but Heidegger's engagement with Aristotle's philosophy of perception is significant in another, related respect that I would like to emphasize. That is, the understanding of life as a primordial seeing that emerges in his reading of Aristotle is not limited to those patterns thanks to which things become visible, or manifest; of equal importance for Heidegger, or Husserl for that matter, is the sense in which things become hidden, or are obscured, not in spite of but *because* of the structure of seeing. Coupled with the project of clarifying the relation of perception and language in the figures of visibility is thus a reflection on the constitutive role of falsehood in our experience of the world.

This expansion of the reflection also allows us to develop the theme of *phenomenon* in phenomenological philosophy, and with that the question of what it means to bring the phenomenality of being into a descriptive focus. The assertion that the phenomenon qua phenomenon poses a unique problem of the access to being is a key gesture of phenomenological philosophy, one that follows in part from a sensitivity to the reticence of phenomenality to emerge as a proper theme for reflection. Heidegger approaches this problem in his 1924 lectures through a reflection on how it was that the term *phainomenon* came to connote *illusion*, or by extension how the semantics of the concept of appearance (*Erscheinung*) came to be more and more limited to that of "mere" appearance, thus undermining the sense in which phenomenality provides a meaningful access to anything at all, even itself.[40]

[39] IPR, p. 22.

[40] IPR, pp. 3–4.

Heidegger's argument is that the restriction of the sense of *phainomenon* to "mere appearance" was not simply a mistake, or even if it was a mistake, it is one that can be traced back to essential motivations. What appears, what shows itself, appears in the world, and with that comes the potential for falsity and illusion; an integral element to the concept of phenomenality has to include an account of the potential of visibility, and with that of seeing, for providing the ground for illusion, for a manifestation that shows something by failing to make it evident (and not just a manifestation that fails to happen).

Aristotle is again of critical importance for Heidegger here, in particular *De anima* B 7, which continues the discussion on perception (*aisthēsis*) that Heidegger sketches in §2c of the *Einführung* that we discussed above. The Aristotelian text provides here an analysis of vision (*opsis*) and the visible (*horaton*). Aristotle argues that the visible, the seen, is either that which has color (*chrōmatos*), or "something which can be described in words but has no name." (418a28) Color, or coloring as what overlies that which itself is visible from out of itself (*touto d'esti to epi tou kath'auto horatou*, 418a29–30), is tied intimately to the *light* (*phōs*), or specifically to the light of daylight, the brightness of daylight (Heidegger here uses the German *im Helle* to render the sense of *en phōti* that allows color to *shine*.[41] Daylight itself, however, is what allows something to be seen through itself, or what Aristotle calls the "transparent" (*diaphanes*)—color just is what produces movement in daylight (418b1–2). However for Aristotle daylight is not a body (this is against Empedocles: light is not a body that moves), but rather a primordial manner in which something is made present; it is through the transparent, in other words, that the actualization of the visible takes place. Specifically, in the case of color, what is made visible in the transparency of daylight is for Aristotle an *idion* (cf. De an. 418a8: Aristotle 1993, p. 27), something sensible in only one way: so sight sees only color, just as hearing perceives only sound. Heidegger here emphasizes the important point that *idion* is contrasted by Aristotle against the *koina* such as change or movement, which belong to all the senses, as well as against the *sumbebekota*, or what is perceived along with or incidentally (this blue orb here as Pierre's eye).

Interpreting the significance of these passages for the theme of seeing, Heidegger argues that "daylight is part of the being of the world itself," that is, when taken in its specifically diaphanous character.[42] This does not mean, however, that the world "is" daylight, or even limited to what is circumscribed by the day; or in other words, if the ostensive functioning of vision is considered, then what can be pointed out is not limited to what stands in the light. For what appears, the *phainomenon*, what shows itself, does not only show itself in the light, but also in *darkness*. Aristotle in fact emphasizes in *De anima* that there are things we see only in the dark, in that peculiar transparency realized as a particular modality that presence assumes within darkness. One might think of the stars in the sky, or sparks rising

[41] IPR, 4.

[42] IPR, 6.

from a campfire, both of which would be hardly visible if at all in the full light of day; instead Aristotle cites, interestingly enough, the "fire like" qualities of funghi and fish scales. The point seems to be that it is only thanks to the support of the surrounding darkness from which such faint illuminations can feed that such things become visible at all. Heidegger's argument is thus that darkness and light together, as two modes of the functioning of that transparency that forms the presencing of the visible, belong to the being of the world.[43]

Yet how do light and darkness relate to each other? Aristotle argues that darkness should not be considered as a kind of light, but rather as the diaphanous that has the potential for light, or better: the diaphanous is darkness qua potential being, and light qua actual being. Thus Aristotle can argue the following: "The same underlying nature (*phusis*) is sometimes darkness (*skotos*) sometimes light (*phōs*)" (418b29f: Aristotle 1993, p. 27). This nature is itself colorless, that is, color produces movement only in the actually transparent, thus only in the diaphanous qua light; but darkness is nevertheless the same visibility qua *dunamei on*, and as the potential presencing of darkness it belongs to seeing just as fundamentally as the play of color in the light. That darkness is in some sense visible to us, as the very presence of visibility in dynamic form, plays a key role in the manner in which the dimly visible or barely visible is perceived. I take it that Aristotle would recognize that the campfire spark is of course a source of light, as is the star; the emphasis here is rather on the pattern of their manifestation, which is in both cases rooted in the being of darkness as potential being, as that into which light retreats in order for the phenomena of the barely or phosphorically visible to be possible. Yet that into which light retreats is, specifically, darkness as *potential daylight*—that is, the potential for the presence of visibility to be drawn to the light.

Aristotle fully recognizes the strangeness of his phrasing; we have no words, as he says in the passage we quoted above, for this "potential" daylight or transparency. That Aristotle lacks appropriate positive expressions for what we might call the fecund obscurity of nascent phenomenality, Heidegger argues, helps us to recognize a limitation basic to the tradition:

> The fact that there is no name for these things indicates, however, that our language (doctrine of categories) is a language of the day. This holds particularly for the Greek language and is connected in their case with the basic starting point of their thinking and their formation of concepts.[44]

Yet this "limitation" is not for Heidegger something that would call for a mere supplement that would round out a full language of being: "One cannot remedy that by somehow constructing a doctrine of categories of the night. Instead we must go

[43] This double character of the visible is, I would argue, the very point of the beginning of *De anima* B 7, something Burnyeat rather vulgarly avoids in his remarks on these passages with his "Let us agree to leave phosphorescence for another day." M.F. Burnyeat, "Remarks on De Anima 2. 7–8," in: Nussbaum and Rorty, eds., *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 425n12.

[44] IPR, p. 8.

back to a point prior to this opposition in order to be able to understand why the day has this priority."[45] This yields a key point we can emphasize with Heidegger: the evidence of the world is the evidence of a being that is not one of pure illumination, but also of darkness, obscurity; this is in turn a fundamental point about the phenomenality of the phenomenon, in that it helps us to understand the importance of marking out a certain reticence to illumination that is constitutive of phenomenal presence. It is also an important point about the accessibility of phenomenality, and with that that of the being of the world: any description of how givenness and manifestation can be approached phenomenologically must include a sense for how the non-given and the darkness of manifestation play a fundamental role in how things are given. For the fact is that, even if our language, at least on the level of categoricity, is a language of the day, we nevertheless, from within the full horizon of intentional life (and with that of seeing), move most of the time *between* the night and the day. This is above all the case on the level of explicit perceptual orientation as a foundation for ostension: we engage the world by illuminating things, articulating them out of their obscurity into definite patterns of "this, not that"; "other than"; "in addition to," and so on, that is, by way of setting things off and apart from one another. The fiery presence of the campfire is set off perceptually from the surrounding darkness; the ocean is set off from the sky and the coast; the phosphoresence of fish scales realizes their movements qua visible through the diaphanous medium of the dark pond as a potent reservoir of potential daylight. This setting off of things from one another is also, as Heidegger stresses, the way for Aristotle in which human beings move about the world (that is, qua *kinēsis kata topon*; here Heidegger is citing 427a18: Aristotle 1993, p. 52); humans roam the worlds as a seeing that, in setting things off from one another, articulates them in their presence.[46]

This figure of *kinēsis kata topon* involves a discrimination limited neither to conceptual thinking nor language; the latter appropriates these distinctions among the visible and gives them a new form, a new structure based on a higher order "taking as." This "as" structure of original setting off belongs to perception itself, to some extent even in the most primitive accomplishments of the sensuous, and in this way it saturates the full being of life as a seeing. The description that emerges from Heidegger's reading of Aristotle is thus quite close to that of intentional life that we find in the mature Husserl, as described above: language, appropriating patterns of discriminating movement from the life of perception, enriches them in turn with its own logical accomplishments of discrimination and synthesis.

Yet in Heidegger's description, not everything that belongs to this *kinēsis kata topon* falls within the strict confines of the transparently manifest; of crucial constitutive importance is also the obscurely manifest, the darkened given. Thus if the question of the consciousness of the world is the question of the relation of the being who experiences to the manner of the givenness of the world, then for Heidegger this involves as much a givenness shot through with obscurity and inaccessibility as it does with a givenness thanks to which things become

[45] Ibid.

[46] IPR, p. 19.

accessible. With accessibility there comes a peculiar threat of inaccessibility to the being of things, to the extent to which their becoming manifest is possible on the ground of that being that is being "in the world."

The role of the threat of the inaccessible is something that both Husserl and Heidegger are acutely sensitive to, I would argue, though in different ways that point us to a fundamental disagreement between them. To bring this out, first let us recall Husserl's approach that we have already begun to describe above. For Husserl, the "given world" is the context of reference for the development of any problem; yet at the same time, world-experience in the form of the natural attitude obscures and frustrates any motivation towards more than a partial thematization of lived experience. Any encounter with beings is always skewed in the natural attitude to the task of fitting the profile of a given existent into the larger context of worldly relations; this tends to obscure the resources of subjectivity specific to pure phenomenality, which thus remains anonymous in its properly transcendental functioning in the constitution of sense. It is against this tendency for the being of seeing to limit its manner of self-manifestation that the Husserlian *epochē* is directed; the *epochē* in this sense is not a world-denial, but rather an attempt to put a distance between philosophical reflection and the natural acceptance of the orientation of reflection to the evidence of the world, thus a suspension of the natural attitude in favor of an attitude that promises to succeed in the illumination of the subjective achievements of world-experience that in the natural attitude are left, necessarily, in the dark.[47] In Husserl what becomes essential in this respect is the contrast between the being of consciousness and the being of the world, and with that the evidence that belongs to both, a contrast that promises to guide a radical reorientation within world-experience for a uniquely illuminating reflection on the sense content and unity of the natural theme of the world itself.

Heidegger understands the task posed by the threat of inaccessibility, or of the tendency for worldly life to obscure itself, in a fundamentally different way. For him, the natural obscurity if lived existence is, one could say, something that has a positive aspect that is systematically undervalued in Husserl, at least from Heidegger's point of view. And here again Heidegger's engagement with Aristotle is decisive, in particular with respect to the latter's reflection on the origin of *falsity* (*pseudos*).

The relevant text of Aristotle in this connection is *Metaphysics* 1024b17–1025a13 (cf. Aristotle 1987, pp. 277–278). Heidegger cites three respects in which Aristotle claims we speak of falsity: (1) a *thing* can be false (*ōs pragma pseudos*); (2) *talk* or *speech* can be false (*logos pseudēs*); and finally (3) there is false in the sense of a *false human being* (*ōs anthrōpos pseudēs*). False (*pragmata* and false *logoi*), Heidegger stresses, always point to the circumstantial character of things that conditions any activity of humans who navigate about the world through the discrimination of things and the higher order articulations of such discrimination.[48] Any speaking that engages the full range of these circumstances engages the

[47] See Ideen I, §32, and Appendix XXXV.

[48] IPR, §2d.

possibility of falsity, of encountering things that are not there; more, the facticity of language itself always places the speaker in the horizon of the possibility of speaking falsely, either in the sense of unintentional erroneous speech or outright lies. To be false in the sense of a false human being is to be one who deliberately fabricates false accounts of things (1025a1f: Aristotle 1987, p. 278)—it means to positively inhabit the shadows, manipulating them in order to affirm an illusory world of specifically *false appearances*.

Heidegger's overarching point in these lectures, and here he is clearly moving beyond Aristotle, is to argue that the distortion that belongs to the being of the world is not something susceptible to a mere reorientation in order to lift the veil, as it were, so as to reveal a unity of sense that is not as such subject to falsity. Accordingly, the task is not to find a manner to suspend the tendencies of our experience towards the self-obfuscation of what is encountered, as it is in Husserl, but rather to find a way to understand, within this movement between night and day, a way to fix just how it is that we are beings who engage in something like a world, which includes falsehood and deception as originary possibilities. This demands above all an appreciation of what Heidegger calls the "elusiveness" of the world, that peculiar character of worldliness in which things are present without being present; for it is precisely in its elusiveness that the world determines for the most part the unfolding patterns of human existence. Immersion in the world and deception are thus existentially bound up with one another. "The more concretely I am in the world," as Heidegger expresses it, "the more genuine the existence of deception."[49]

We can also here recognize an important insight into the essence of seeing. If seeing, and the kind of seeing that is *logos*, includes the possibility of falsehood and deception concerning things that remain elusive even in their being seen, then this implies that seeing itself can function in the form of a kind of failure, a failure to articulate things as they are in favor of things are they are not. More, the potential for human beings to *willfully* inhabit the false, as a *positive* countermovement to the successful illumination of things, indicates a central role for the posture of evasion as a fundamental human possibility.

This discussion of deception and falsity in Aristotle, and its articulation on the fundamental level of seeing taken as a modality of being in the world, is clearly important to the Heidegger of the 1920s, providing an important resource for the contrast between authenticity and inauthenticity (*Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit*) that plays such a central role in *Sein und Zeit*. But it is equally important, I would argue, for engaging Husserl's conception of the "natural" or "naive" character of conscious life; for the absorption in the world, in being among things, is for Husserl not simply an act of focus or attention, but is precisely something that belongs to the tempo of a life that lives more in obscurity than articulated clarity, or rests upon assumptions and the "obvious" more than it does on an explicit articulation of things. Yet for Husserl there is, too, a reticence on the part of this obviousness, if not an elusiveness;

[49] IPR, pp. 27–28.

and in the end I would argue that the difference between the two thinkers does not lie in the recognition by one of an obscurity that belongs to the being of the world that is somehow wholly lacking in the other.

In fact, the real difference lies in a disagreement concerning the validity of a theme that is arguably missing in Aristotle, but which haunts all of his discussions for any modern reader: the very concept of *consciousness*, and of a philosophical analysis oriented around its explication. For in Husserl, the point is not that obscurity, falsity, and error are inessential; rather, the contention is that philosophy can be oriented by a specific form of the suspension of naivete in order to bring into play a perspective that forms a unique *basis from which to see*—the basis of transcendental consciousness. Heidegger's objection should thus be understood in terms of his suspicions that this turn to consciousness fails to illuminate philosophically the constitutive role of obscurity that he sees being evoked in Aristotle's reflections on language, perception, and falsehood.

Conclusion

Heidegger's reading of Aristotle in §§1–2 of his 1924 Marburg lectures is in many ways designed to put into question the meaning of consciousness as a fundamental philosophical theme, which in turn allows him to pursue his explicit critique of Husserl beginning in §3. The critique itself is familiar: the theme of consciousness, in its modern, Cartesian-inspired form, is intimately bound up with a whole set of expectations about the aims of knowledge—of an evidentially secured, certain comprehension of self and world—that covers over from the beginning a genuinely rigorous phenomenological description of human existence. Heidegger's strategy, familiar to us from *Sein und Zeit*, is to evade the trappings of this tradition by bringing its subject into focus qua *Da-sein*, and not *Bewusst-sein*, since the latter is hopelessly encumbered by intellectualist prejudices that insist on securing the known in its knowability. Here the supposed absence of a genuine concept of "consciousness" in the Greeks (above all in Aristotle) helps to lend some credibility to the possibility of reorienting phenomenology around the theme of seeing that is no longer determined from the perspective of a science of consciousness, but of intentional life more fundamentally construed.[50] One might see in this an objection to a very Brentanian practice on the part of Husserl of developing an analysis of structures of intentional existence, already fundamentally articulated in Aristotle, in terms of a conception of consciousness; such an approach is not an advance, but a rehearsal of all the failures of modern philosophy since Descartes.

To fully evaluate Heidegger's critique, we would of course have to engage in more detail Husserl's conception of consciousness, and above all consider the merit of its obvious Cartesian (and with that Brentanian) inspirations, which Heidegger

[50] IPR, §4a.

himself begins to develop in the sections following the ones we have been citing above. There is not the space for that here; nevertheless, it seems to me that we can conclude from our discussion that it would be misleading if the only axis of interpretation of this critique turned on Husserl's relation to Cartesian thought. For Husserl's relation to Descartes turns on understanding the problem of error, of falsity and deception, in its most penetrating form—that of a being seeking to illuminate what is implicit in the accomplishments of manifestation, accomplishments that can come into view only through an insight into the tendency for the theme of subjectivity to obfuscate its own self-presence. And that, I would argue, is where a discussion about Aristotle becomes interesting, for Aristotle, as Heidegger shows us, offers unique resources for thinking through the problem of falsity for the life of seeing, resources that in turn provide us with a potential basis for evaluating the Cartesian perspective on the questions of the being of life, the relation to truth, and ultimately the problem of philosophical method as the culmination of the potential for the self-manifestation of intentional life.

The importance of Aristotle for Heidegger has long been recognized, for Husserl less so. In my view, the philosophical implications of the bonds between phenomenology and Aristotelian thought represent far more than an interesting historical footnote to the early development of phenomenology, which one could say drew its first breath in the almost immediate wake of the birth of modern Aristotle scholarship. These bonds are a still underexplored basis for a genuine, fundamental assessment of the legacy of phenomenology, since they promise to illuminate what is compelling about some of the basic philosophical commitments that characterize classical phenomenological philosophy—just ask Richard Cobb-Stevens.

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