

Contributions to Political Science

Ferenc Gyuris

The Political Discourse of Spatial Disparities

Geographical Inequalities Between
Science and Propaganda

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Geographical Inequalities Between
Science and Propaganda



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The present work is based on the author's PhD thesis, accepted at the University of Heidelberg under the title "The political discourse of spatial disparities. Propagandistic problematization and scientific legitimization in producing knowledge about geographical inequalities."

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Preface

This volume is the result of a two-and-a-half year Ph.D. program in the Institute of Geography at Heidelberg University. My aim with this work is to throw new light on some fundamental aspects of spatial disparity research, which had already become a major field of interest of mine during my bachelor and master studies in geography at the Department of Regional Science at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, Hungary. After several years of intensively studying here the methodology and empirical considerations of spatial inequality analysis, my attention gradually turned towards the underlying conceptual issues. I became especially interested in the motivations and goals of the researchers who had provided valuable contributions to the field of study, and whose works I had regarded for a long time basically as neutral and apolitical, a presumption that became apparently unsustainable as my knowledge of the corresponding literature expanded. I soon realized that a deeper understanding of these aspects was impossible without a comprehensive overview of related concepts originating from different disciplines, which to my best knowledge was missing before the present work. Furthermore, I found it necessary to undertake a reflexive evaluation of these theoretical contributions in order to reveal the complex motivations shaping the research of spatial disparities.

Of course, no scientific work can have the claim of being independent from the context in which it emerged. This book is also a situated product. It certainly mirrors its author's attitude, which has been shaped to a large extent by the personal experience of everyday life during the postcommunist transition in East Central Europe, and by the manifold influence I have gained while staying and travelling abroad, that enabled me to take a look at my "context of origin" from outside (or, better to say, from various "outsides") as well. The main outcome has been a firm personal belief in the desirability of open debates, the competition of ideas, the freedom of thought, and the eclecticism of concepts. Without a doubt, this way of seeing is reflected by my thoughts on tendentiously one-sided interpretations of the world even if these may also contain certain ideas I can share with regard to specific issues. In the meantime, however, an important experience of mine has been the remarkable diversity of views various people can have about the same subject.

This experience is largely incompatible with mechanistic interpretations, which (at least implicitly) can be found in many concepts on spatial inequalities, and which present a world where individuals act purely according to higher interests or faceless regularities, without having their own feelings, passions, and personal (even if not always attractive) views about what is desirable. Such considerations of mine certainly have their imprint on the current volume.

Writing a reflexive essay on a research tradition is never an easy task, but one with many challenges, where the support of those standing close to us is even more important than the material or institutional circumstances in which we are working. For this reason I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Peter Meusbürger, for his valuable suggestions and careful commentaries on earlier versions of the manuscript as well as for the many inspiring and open-minded discussions we have had during my stay in Heidelberg. I also appreciate the patience and support I have received from him all during my graduate program, even in organizational issues, without which I could not have devoted so much time and energy to research. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the help of Johannes Glückler, whose well-grounded and constructive questions as well as pieces of advice concerning the organization of the research process eased my task to conceptualize research interests and find a feasible structure to my work. I have also benefited much from the kind remarks of Ulrike Gerhard and Marcus Nüsser on an earlier version, which have enabled me to make some findings of the essay more explicit.

I would also like to thank my Hungarian professors in the undergraduate programs without whose support I might have never arrived to the issues along which my thesis emerged. I am especially grateful to József Nemes Nagy, who first introduced me to the analysis of spatial disparities and from whom I have learned a lot with regard to the theory, methodology, and empirical aspects of this topic as well as about the functioning of its research practice. I owe a lot to Ferenc Probáld, with whom I have had many fruitful conversations on questions emerging during my research in the last two and a half years. I also appreciate the inspiration I got from Róbert Győri, who was the first to turn my attention to issues of discourse analysis and the political motivations of science.

For the chapters concerning spatial inequalities in “real existing socialist” systems, I am glad for Mária Csanádi and all that I have learned from her during common research projects and academic events in China about the analysis of party states, their functioning, and the structural changes through which they tried to adapt to changing circumstances. I am grateful to those friends and colleagues in China and Russia who have broadened my view of spatial disparities in communist and postcommunist contexts, especially to Qing Li (Beijing) and Elena Guseva (Moscow) for their help in finding some less conventional statistics on China and the Soviet Union for my research. I would also like to thank my friends Zoltán Gyimesi and Márton Czirfusz for the many stimulating conversations we have had on the relationship of politics and the production of knowledge, and Gergely Tóth, who turned my attention to some valuable works in political science on the functioning of political discourses. I would like to acknowledge the many talks with the friends in the Geographical Institute in Heidelberg, which provided me

useful feedback on how my research findings could be formulated in a more clear and straightforward way. I am also grateful to Michael Spaventa for proofreading the manuscript, and to the Springer team for its high quality editing job.

I appreciate the generous support I received from the University of Heidelberg Graduate Academy (Landesgraduiertenförderung scholarship) and the Kurt Hiehle Foundation, which enabled me to finance my research and associated travel costs and conference fees.

Finally, I am most grateful to my parents, without whose permanent support this work as well as my previous studies on the issue of spatial disparities would have been an impossibility.

Budapest, Hungary
April 02, 2013

Ferenc Gyuris

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The analysis of spatial disparities has long constituted one of the most popular issues in human geography, and it has also gained considerable attention from representatives of other social sciences (e.g. economics, political science and sociology). This has at least two reasons. On the one hand, the geographical aspect of social and economic inequalities is an outcome of a great many factors, whose explanation belongs to the domain of various disciplines. Hence, a comprehensive investigation and interpretation of spatial disparities is hardly possible without mobilizing the analytical capacity of different fields of interest. On the other, due to the complexity of the issue, the research of geographical inequalities can provide relevant information for several disciplines, which these can utilize in their research practice even in questions not directly related to the spatial dimension. Despite its multidisciplinary relevance however, spatial disparity research has many aspects that to date have been remarkably neglected, although their investigation would be crucial for a better understanding of the phenomenon.

First, *a general overview of the theories concerning spatial inequalities is still missing*. Most concepts with regard to the issue have never been evaluated along a unitary framework and compared to each other. Without a doubt, one can find a great many publications that present and evaluate at least a few related concepts. Most of these pay attention, however, only to a small fraction of existing theories, which is otherwise no wonder given that these papers usually have empirical analysis as the focus of their interest, and only use theories as “aids” in interpreting results. In fact, some textbooks give an overview of a larger number of concepts about spatial disparities. But these predominantly concentrate on theories that have emerged within the same discipline (or the same approach) and that usually focus on only one of the many aspects of geographical inequalities.¹ Of course, what

¹The largest number of textbooks can be found in the domain of economics and economic geography, with the vast majority of concepts presented in them coming from the former discipline (see, for example, Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Buttler et al. 1977; Knox et al. 2003; Liefner and Schätzl 2012; Maier et al. 2006; Schätzl 2003).

might seem a one-dimensional focus of these textbooks is in fact fully in accordance with their objective, which is not a comprehensive presentation of theories about spatial disparities, but to give an insight into the main concepts in economics and economic geography. This fact also reveals the main reason for the lack of a general overview of theories about spatial disparities. Although the issue is highly relevant for many disciplines, the exchange of knowledge among some of these is unfortunately limited. In other words, the multidisciplinary nature of geographical inequalities itself constitutes a major obstacle for a comprehensive analysis of related concepts. These factors, however, provide only a few reasons for the serious weaknesses of related literature and for the fact that they have not been corrected to this day. They do not alter the fact that *the elimination of these shortcomings would be a crucial prerequisite for a sufficient understanding of both spatial disparities and the scientific concepts about them.*²

Second, the works that provide information at least about some theories (mainly originating from the same approach) mostly present these quasi as things that are just “out there”. It is remarkably neglected why the author raised the questions he/she actually did instead of others that from our point of view might have been likewise relevant. Similarly, virtually no attention is given to considerations as to why the author focused on certain aspects of spatial disparities (e.g. economic output, income, level of education etc.), putting much less or even no emphasis on other factors. Furthermore, the prioritization of certain geographical scale over others in related concepts is usually interpreted simply as a fact, but not as a phenomenon having specific reasons, which are also worth being analyzed. Put simply, *concepts are in most cases not contextualized*; the specific (social, political, economic etc.) milieu within which they have come into being is hardly investigated. Especially striking in retrospective works is an often total negligence of political factors influencing primary concepts, although, as we will present in this essay, most theories on geographical disparities are infiltrated and shaped by firm political notions. The lack of a careful analysis of these is a major shortcoming of review literature due to which concepts easily become prone to oversimplifying or even misleading interpretations. Hence their authors’ point of view and way of seeing are often presented simply as consequences of personal scientific interests or as outcomes of accidental factors. The real (in many cases obviously political) motivations behind the concepts mostly remain hidden. And this not only means that we cannot reveal the context of a given theory. In fact, neither can we understand the intended meaning of the theory itself since we are unable to judge the relevance its main questions had in their day, and what the meaning of its major findings was for contemporaries. Without putting concepts in their contexts it also remains invisible whether a given theory simply echoed the public opinion of the day or offered a radically new approach to a given question. In other words, without paying attention to the context one cannot even say which theories added new ideas

²In line with continental European terminology, in this work we use the term “science” in the broader sense, thus, embracing natural as well as social, behavioral and cultural sciences.

to the discourse of their day and which were those only stressing then widely accepted views.³

Moreover, the negligence of the context can easily lead one to consider theories as if they were *objective, neutral* contributions to a better, “purely scientific” understanding of spatial disparities. The danger is especially high in case of theories that were published before the last 10–15 years, but are still frequently cited, since reference to these is mostly based on information from secondary literature and not on an actual knowledge about the primary sources. Thus, the blindness to the context can make theories with firm political motivations appear as if they were fully apolitical. This dangerous “trap” can only be avoided through a thorough analysis of the context of theories about spatial inequalities, a task that has not been fulfilled in related literature to this day, but which is a major aim of our work.

The issue of context and political considerations is strongly linked to a third question, that of the *intended goal of concepts about spatial disparities*. It is not enough to analyze whether the author of a theory was influenced by various (e.g. political) factors. *One should also investigate whether the author intended to produce analytical knowledge about how disparities work (irrespective of his or her political feelings), or to make normative statements about whether inequalities are “good” or “bad”*. To understand this shortcoming, one should consider the theoretical literature since as early as Scheler (1926) distinguishing what can be called *factual* and *orientation* knowledge.

Factual knowledge, as Mittelstraß (2001) puts it, is “knowledge about reasons, effects and means” (p. 75), and its main goal is “to solve problems” (Meusburger 2005, p. 148). Thus, it is created and applied “to analyze situations as realistically as possible, to set achievable goals, to seek and evaluate alternatives, to utilize resources efficiently, to plan, carry through and control processes, to steer and coordinate large organizations [etc.]” (p. 151). For orientation knowledge, its nature and role are different. In Mittelstraß (2001), it can be regarded as “knowledge about justified aims and ambitions” (p. 76). Its function is also specific, namely “to give order, identity, coherence and *legitimacy* to the system” (our emphasis; Meusburger 2005, p. 152). Thus, “the mediation of orientation knowledge is not about seeking for an objectively (scientifically) verifiable truth, and not about analyzing situations as realistically as possible, but about moral judgments on friends and enemies, about definitions, categorizations and interpretations” (ibid.). For instance, we can well regard as pure forms of factual knowledge that two plus two equals four, that combustion is impossible without oxygen or that if one on Earth drops an apple, this falls due to gravity. Such forms of knowledge seem to have actually no political relevance and overtones. As one could say: “they are just so”. Statements about a claimed moral superiority or inferiority of certain economic systems (e.g. capitalism and communism), political regimes (e.g. liberal democracy, absolutism,

³ Related problems with regard to the lack of contextualization are discussed in more detail in Livingstone (1979).

dictatorship of the proletariat), religions and cultures etc. belong, however, to the domain of orientation knowledge.

It is true, of course, that there are relatively few forms of knowledge free from this ambivalence (“pure science”), especially in social sciences (Meusburger 2005), where actually each “unit of knowledge” has both analytical and political relevance given that its subject is society itself. Moreover, even knowledge produced by natural sciences about things that “are just so”, that are outcomes of natural laws over which human beings have no mastery, might have strong political relevance, and their production might contribute more to political issues than to an understanding of our world. It is only a question of the actual context, where the topic about which knowledge is produced might have definite political relevance. The simple statement that the Earth orbits around the Sun and not the other way round has virtually no political implication when it is made by a teacher in a school class in twenty-first century Europe. In the given context, this is factual knowledge about something that is “just so”, and it is disseminated for pupils simply to teach how our planet and the solar system works. But in the times of Copernicus the heliocentric concept was of enormous political relevance since it seemed radical enough to challenge the dominant Christian orthodoxy and, in consequence, to undermine the legitimacy of the extreme overpower of the Catholic Church. Hence, stating that the Earth orbits around the Sun was at that time not only a form of creating factual knowledge, but also a forceful means to produce orientation knowledge. In other words, *knowledge production often brings into being factual as well as orientation knowledge.*

Still, two issues are necessary to be considered here. First, although factual and orientation knowledge might be intertwined in many cases, there is a rather clear line of distinction between the societal function of those people and institutions expected to produce either factual or orientation knowledge. Each system needs for its efficient functioning architects, weapon designers, analysts etc., whose main task is to produce factual knowledge the regime requires to solve problems. This is what brings planning bureaus, analyst groups etc. into being. The system is also reliant on, for example, priests, ideologists, and propaganda workers, who create legitimacy for the regime and indoctrinate the population with the normative rules regarded by the leadership as desirable. This need might be covered by organs of propaganda, for instance, which are not expected to create analytical knowledge but to give orientation to the people. Hence, although factual and orientation knowledge could be present in a mixed form in each “unit of knowledge”, and each individual as a thinking mind can be the source of both, at a higher scale societal institutions and organizations aimed at the creation of each form of knowledge are in most cases separated and function according to different principles.

Furthermore, for analytical reasons the distinction of factual and orientation knowledge has a firm relevance, even on the individual level, while investigating theoretical works. On the one hand, since these two forms of knowledge can easily be intertwined in social sciences, it is an important question whether the author of a given concept clarified that his or her contribution, even unintentionally, might produce orientation knowledge as well, a fact the reader must be aware of. On the

other hand, the author might have created for himself or herself the image of an “unbiased”, “objective” scientist, while obviously mediating orientation knowledge (even harsh political propaganda) in many of his/her statements. Furthermore, even if the author himself/herself did not play out any of these strategies, his/her successors might have focused only on the analytical, factual parts of the concept, reworking its image, and from a theory with explicit political aims constructing one that seems to be the source of “pure” analytical knowledge. For us, these issues are essential, given that the theories about spatial disparities are predominantly presented in secondary literature as they had produced and had aimed to produce factual knowledge only. This implicit presumption seems, however, highly misleading in the light of the great political relevance the issue of inequality has, and thus points at the necessity of an analysis focusing on the relation of both forms of knowledge in related theories.

For the reasons mentioned above, our study sets three goals, none of which has drawn significant attention in related literature before (not in any disciplines). The first is to give a general overview of and confront to each other theories with regard to spatial disparities, originating from different disciplines, paying attention to various aspects of inequalities, or preferring not the same geographical scale(s). To this, a careful and extensive analysis of the literature, the original texts themselves, is necessary, which goes well beyond a simple “review”, and reveal crucial features of the primary concepts that have been neglected by the successors. Second, we are to investigate the contexts that surrounded the emergence of various concepts. By this we aim to reveal the manifold scientific as well as political considerations that have shaped both theories and the theoretical research of spatial inequalities in general. The third aim is to investigate the relation of factual and orientation knowledge in concepts with regard to spatial disparities, thus, to reveal the political aim of theories basically regarded in the secondary literature as having “purely scientific” goals and not political.

Based on the corresponding results, the main questions which we are intending to answer are as follows:

1. To what extent does the theoretical research of spatial disparities function as a political discourse, aimed at the production and dissemination of orientation knowledge?
2. How and to what extent do political motivations influence or even constrain the creation of factual knowledge about spatial inequalities?
3. Are the positive connotations of producing factual knowledge consciously used to legitimize the political suggestions of these concepts, and if yes, in what way and to what extent?

Hence, the focus of the volume is less on spatial inequalities themselves, but on the theoretical knowledge about them and the process in which this knowledge is created. In this sense it is merely a *meta-analysis*, research about the investigation of and knowledge production about geographical disparities.

For the structure of the book, we first focus on the *social* disparity discourse, which has a much longer tradition and much more explicit political implications

than the analysis of spatial inequalities. Hence, it provides a more feasible example to present how a politically relevant issue, seemingly inherent in all societies, brings into being political discourse, and how such discourse functions. Later on, we focus on how the somewhat more abstract question of *spatial* disparities has emerged as an important topic for various disciplines. In this part of the volume we give an in-depth analysis of related concepts, which have come into being in various disciplines and in different periods. An investigation is performed as to the motivations that brought them into being, whether their intended goals were political, and to what extent and how the image of creating “unbiased” factual knowledge was (mis)used to produce and mediate orientation knowledge. In the conclusion we summarize our findings and give answers to the three questions we raised. Finally, we provide some considerations for a normative interpretation of the spatial disparity discourse, and some suggestions for the future of the analysis of geographical inequalities.

Chapter 2

The Debate Over Social Disparities and the Disparity Discourse

2.1 Terminology and Meaning

The analysis of spatial disparities has quite a long tradition in human geography and other social sciences; it has been among the major research issues of several disciplines for decades. Browsing the works written by geographers, economists, sociologists, or even experts of political sciences, one can find a great many contributions related to what is called spatial “differentiation”, “disparity”, “inequality”, “injustice” or “unevenness”. In the vast body of literature, however, the exact meaning of these terms, certainly all concerning the inhomogeneity of space and the peculiarity of places, remains unclear, especially as such expressions are often considered as synonymous, either explicitly or implicitly (Hinderink and Sterkenburg 1978). For this reason we find it important to have an overview of the various forms of geographical differences, and to introduce clear terminology first, which we can use in our essay to avoid misunderstandings.

In order to do so, the first point we must take into consideration is as follows: although many features of the geographical space can be regarded as related to social processes, not all the heterogeneity that exists in the physical space is socially created. That some regions (e.g. the Rocky Mountains or the Urals) are rich in certain mineral resources while others (e.g. the islands of Japan) are not, is the outcome of the uneven distribution of natural resources, a condition given independent from the spatially varying efforts of societies to use these resources. Neither the fact that Flanders is located on the coastline, while the Pamir Mountains or Tibet have no direct access to the oceans, is rooted in social factors. Thus, these phenomena, at least for their origin, cannot be lumped together with the spatial differences of life expectancy, income, or level of education, which are definitely produced by society. For this trivial reason it makes sense to distinguish between what Ward (2009a) calls “those characteristics over which there is a sense that their production is” at least partly “the result of human agency” (p. 380), and those over which there is not. This is the way Ward defines *spatial inequality* on the one hand, and *spatial differentiation* on the other.

The introduction of such a dual system might seem trivial. Still, the issue is not as simple as it might initially sound. For instance, there is no definite border line to set up between the two categories Ward refers to. Of course, several examples can easily be located either in one group or in the other. For the uneven spatial distribution of crude oil or iron ore, for instance, reasons are exclusively natural. In other cases, social factors play the decisive role. This stands for, let us say, striking disparities in literacy between the federal states of India. Here, *de facto* opportunities for women to enroll in formal education are very unequal in different regions, which is a result of various social (e.g. religious) factors.

Some examples are, however, difficult to explain in a black-or-white manner. In the Sahel, for instance, the progression and regression of the frontline of the desert and the famines they bring about are influenced by spontaneous changes of global climate as well as by the perpetually altering intensity of grazing. In such cases, the dividing line between naturally given and socially created gets blurred. For differences of climate or food-producing potential in this district, the question whether one can speak about spatial differentiation or spatial inequality is not easy to answer.

These uncertainties are fuelled by the fact that the border between the two categories is dynamic; it can vary from time to time, and even from place to place. For example, the access to international waterways is extremely uneven in space. For a long time, this unevenness was only shaped by natural forces. Since the frontline of the Po Delta was moving forward, the once important seaport Ravenna became further removed from the Adriatic Sea and gradually lost its role in commerce. This was a mere result of physical forces. But since then, due to the development of engineering, it has become possible to make access to international waterways for places which had been landlocked all over the former history of humankind. Typical examples for this are the canals in the Great Lakes region as well as on the East European Plain. Similarly, the ability of societies to influence physical forces varies on a broad scale at a given point in time. For instance, in several parts of the Earth (such as in Pharaonic Egypt, in Mesopotamia, in the Indus Valley, or in Ancient China) irrigation systems were established by societies as early as thousands of years ago. At a local level, this improvement could radically reduce the spatial unevenness of potential crop production between river banks and the surrounding areas. Yet, considering locally achievable technologies, similar investments were impossible to initiate in many countries even in the 1940s. Due to a lack of financial resources, technology, organizational methods, etc., such investments still proved to be nothing more than a dream in many African and Asian countries. Thus, whether one should speak here about the spatial differentiation or rather the spatial inequality of transportation and water supply (or, maybe, about both) is unclear. In consequence, the dividing line between spatial differentiation and spatial inequality is a blurred one, it is dynamic, and varies from time to time and from place to place. In other words, whether the unevenness of a given phenomenon belongs to the set of spatial differentiation or to that of spatial inequality, can only be decided in light of the context that we focus on during the research.

As can be seen, the dual categorization of Ward (2009a) is based on a technical distinction according to the existence or non-existence of human agency. This is, however, not the only way to distinguish between various forms of spatial unevenness. Another relevant question here can be whether a given form and level of unevenness is regarded as tolerable and “fair”, or unacceptable and “unfair”. Morrill (2001), for instance, follows this approach to differentiate between *spatial inequality* and what he calls *spatial inequity*. For him, spatial inequality refers to all forms of unevenness in space, whether they are brought into being by natural or social factors. In his words, spatial (in)equality is “without meaning” since “every bit of space is different from every other” (p. 14789). Thus, he argues rather for the analysis of spatial inequity, so forms of unevenness that are considered unfair and unacceptable. This notion seems compatible with many works that use the term *territorial (in)justice* and *spatial (in)justice* with respect to forms of spatial unevenness they consider as morally unacceptable (cf. Bromberg et al. 2007; Davies 1968; Pirie 1983; Reynaud 1981; Smith and Lee 2004; Ward 2009b).

However, if the distinctive line between unevenness resulting mainly from human agency and unevenness caused by the distribution of physical factors is blurred, it is extremely so for its “tolerable” and “unacceptable” forms. These categorizations are based on normative judgments that vary from time to time and from place to place; thus, they are extremely context-dependent. This can be presented well through Morrill’s (2001) example about potholes. In general, potholes in an urban landscape tend to be found more in low-income level districts than in well-off surroundings. As Morrill puts it, “the conviction of poverty area residents [is] that since they pay taxes too, the potholes on their streets should have no lower priority than the potholes on the streets of the rich” (p. 14789). In their eyes, the spatially uneven distribution of potholes, and thus the varying quality of road infrastructure, is obviously “unfair”. But those living in affluent districts might have a different opinion: since they pay more tax than poor residents do, they might find it just to get more back from the city through, for instance, infrastructural developments. Put simply, they might be convinced that their potholes do have higher priority since they have paid more to have all roads in their surroundings kept in good quality. This difference is based on the fact that the “justness” of given disparities can be judged in various ways (as we will explain this briefly in Sects. 2.3 and 2.4). One might prefer the idea of “the same to everybody”, and argue for a spatially equal quality of roads. Others might follow “the same award for the same merit” approach, and since they find individual merits different, they also regard an unequal distribution of awards (good quality roads) as justifiable. The picture is made even more complex by the fact that among those arguing for the same award for the same honor, the interpretation of honor can also be highly different (cf. Sect. 2.4). Besides, although most people would certainly agree that there is a basic level of resources and services each human being has the right to get access to and to use irrespective of his/her place of living (such as basic education and healthcare), potential views about what exactly belongs to this category are dynamic and highly different to each other.


To differentiate between “just” and “unjust” forms of disparities becomes even more complicated if one takes into consideration additional aspects, not only the matter of distribution. Although the vast majority of literature dealing with inequalities solely concentrates on distributive aspects (Schlosberg 2004), the issue of justice goes beyond these. In the words of Young (1990), “distributional issues are crucial to a satisfactory conclusion of justice”, but “it is a mistake to reduce social justice to distribution” (p. 1). As Schlosberg (2004) puts it based on Young (1990) and Fraser (2000), one can only speak about “justice” if those affected by the distribution of a given resource are recognized as being concerned, and if they are allowed to effectively participate in the decision-making about distribution. Thus, there is no universal formula by which “the just” distribution of a given resource could be calculated “from a point of nowhere” (Nagel 1986) for any contexts. Returning to Morrill’s (2001) example, we could say that the spatial distribution of potholes, whether it is equal or not, is to be regarded as “just” only if it is the consensual outcome of a decision-making process, where all people affected are allowed to participate.

Considering these aspects, it is barely reasonable to hypothesize a rigid border between what are considered “fair” and “unfair” sorts of unevenness, and to do the same with “justifiable” forms of spatial inequality and “unacceptable” sorts of spatial inequity. Instead, it seems better to imagine a continuous transition zone between two theoretical extremes: the forms of unevenness that are considered as “acceptable” by the vast majority of society, and the sorts of unevenness that are commonly regarded as “unfair”.

Here the question arises, what kind of relation is to be drawn up between the altogether four categories we already have (*spatial differentiation* vs. *spatial inequality* on the one hand, and *spatial inequality* vs. *spatial inequity* on the other). The Wardian spatial differentiation and spatial inequality might best be presented in their relation to the comprehensive set of spatial unevenness (see Fig. 2.1). Within this set, spatial inequality, which would not have come into being without human agency, can be defined as a subset. The complement of this subset includes spatial differentiation, which is also a kind of unevenness, but one resulting from natural conditions. The border of the subset entitled “spatial inequality” is, however, as it was presented, neither rigid nor static (hence it is depicted by a dashed line).

For the difference between spatial inequality and spatial inequity in Morrill’s view (2001), this idea, at least after some minor changes, can also be integrated in the framework we have sketched up. In Morrill’s concept, spatial inequality refers to every form of unevenness that is not produced by society *and* considered as “intolerable” at the same time. Consequently, this interpretation of spatial inequality embraces socially produced *and* morally “acceptable” forms of unevenness as well as what Ward calls spatial differentiation, which is an outcome of physical conditions. However, in our point the two Wardian categories are also worth being distinguished. Thus, it makes sense to use the term spatial inequality not for all phenomena lumped together by Morrill, but only for those that belong to Ward’s homonymous category. So, integrating Morrill’s concept in that of Ward does not

Fig. 2.1 The relationship of different forms of spatial unevenness. Category names without an *arrow* indicating the limits of their domains belong to (sub)sets that also include all subsets within their boundaries. *Source:* design by author



contradict the structure of sets we have presented in the last paragraph. However, a new subset needs to be added. Within the set of spatial inequality, we have to define a new subset for spatial inequity or spatial injustice. This new subset has no rigid border, but is rather surrounded by a zone of gradual transition starting from what is regarded as “not unjust” forms of spatial inequality (see Fig. 2.1).

At this point, we should also consider a further issue: is spatial injustice really a perfect subset of spatial inequality? Or can it maybe include certain forms of unevenness whose existence is independent from social factors? So, can spatial differentiation, created predominantly by physical conditions, be unjust? Actually, someone might resent suffering from the negative outcome of natural events. If a heavy storm damages crop production in a given area, local farmers will certainly be angry with this. Without a doubt, it will be hard for them to accept the enormous spatial unevenness in yields, and that their income for the given year will be much lower than that of other agricultural workers in other regions. And they might find this situation unfair in a sense that poor production indicators of the year do not mirror the heavy work they have invested in their lands. Still, it is atypical in scientific literature to call spatial unevenness created by physical factors “unjust”. Even in the few articles where such a normative term is used, its strength is remarkably reduced by quotation marks in which the expression is placed (see, for instance, the “‘Unfairness’ of Nature” in Morrill 2001, p. 14790). This typological solution suggests that such a normative statement simply does not go here, since it would imply conscious malignancy.

Actually, to present natural processes as “unjust” is rather incompatible with those ideas that have shaped human societies’ concept of nature over many hundreds of years. For the traditional worldview, nature and all physical processes were considered the creature of transcendent beings (in the Christian tradition, this role is posited for God). And, as these transcendent beings or at least the fact of their authority over humans was automatically judged righteous, natural events and their outcomes were counted *per se* as just. It is a typical example that for many decades

even harmful natural events, such as earthquakes, epidemics, and floods, were regarded as just divine punishments for immorality, ungodly behavior etc.¹

The other concept of nature is a highly materialistic one, which denies the existence of any conscious transcendent creatures conducting natural processes “from above”. Instead, it hypothesizes the existence of impersonal laws and regularities, along which nature “functions”, but which are simply “given”, thus, do not constitute conscious outcomes of anyone’s agency. From this viewpoint, every natural phenomenon (even the uneven spatial distribution of physical circumstances) is produced by nature, which unconsciously obeys the natural laws to which it is subordinated. This approach gained extreme popularity foremost during the Enlightenment, and became a cornerstone of the theoretical building of what is called modern science. Of course, these concepts, the one might be called “Nature *with* God” and the other “Nature *without* God”, are two extremes, between which a great variety of hybrid approaches is possible. For example, one might believe in a type of nature that mirrors a sort of agency and consciousness, but that is not established by “a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of Human beings” (Einstein quoted in Hinshaw 1970, pp. 659–660).

The most important point for us is that both characteristic approaches as well as their hybrids are based on a view of nature that excludes the possibility of consciously “unjust” outcomes. As Morrill (2001, p. 14789) puts it, spatial inequity or injustice means not that “the rules of the game” might produce uneven distribution, but that those human actors powerful enough “manipulate the law itself to get more” than they could expect otherwise. Since such a manipulation is out of the question in the case of natural processes, we can consider the category of spatial inequity as a subset of spatial disparity/inequality.

Of course, as the borders of the sets presented in Fig. 2.1 are dynamic, the uneven spatial distribution of a given phenomenon can migrate from the group of spatial differentiation not only into the subset of spatial disparity, but even to the subset of spatial injustice. Let us have the example of two cities at the opposite coastline sections of a bay. The fact that their potential commercial cooperation was strongly hindered by the body of water functioning as a natural barrier was regarded simply as a “given” some thousands or even hundreds of years ago. San Francisco and Oakland along the San Francisco Bay in California, or the Turkish cities of Istanbul and Üsküdar along the Bosphorus were typical examples for this. But as technology developed, it became possible to build gigantic bridges. The naturally “given” barrier was to be torn down. And thanks to the Golden Gate or the

¹ In fact, this kind of reasoning still exists, even if it has been exiled by now from the domain of science due to changing power geometries in the production of knowledge. After the destructive 2011 earthquake in Japan, Tokyo’s Governor called the disaster a “tembatsu” (divine punishment) for “egoism and populism” tainting Japanese politics and as well as the Japanese people (The Japan Times 2011). US conservative radio host Glenn Beck also interpreted the catastrophe as “a message being sent” by God to follow the Ten Commandments (Hartenstein 2011). Of course it speaks volumes that, unlike would have presumably happened some centuries ago, both persons had to face fierce criticism for their words.

Bosphorus Bridge, the dramatically uneven accessibility of these cities from towns on the same and on the other side was radically reduced. Technology has become a given, realization has become possible. But under these new circumstances, possible normative judgments about a given condition can remarkably change. For instance, maybe a second bridge over the same bay could also be established, but the project fails for political reasons since the government allocates the necessary money in other regions. In this case, all inhabitants still “waiting for the bridge” might think that the problem of uneven accessibility to San Francisco or Istanbul from their own town and from some other towns is not a purely physical issue any more, but rather the result of an unjust political decision. This is how a kind of spatial differentiation (location on this *or* that side of the body of water) can become regarded as a sort of spatial inequality, and even of spatial injustice (construction projects for certain towns to improve their accessibility and no investments in other towns that still remain isolated).

In conclusion, the various terms concerning the uneven spatial distribution of different phenomena can be conceptualized as it is presented at Fig. 2.1. Thus, the exact meaning of the categories can be defined, and will be used in our essay, as follows:

Spatial unevenness: the uneven spatial distribution of any given phenomenon.

Spatial differentiation: the spatially uneven distribution of a phenomenon, if it is predominantly a result of physical factors.²

Spatial inequality, spatial disparity: the uneven spatial distribution of a phenomenon, if it could not have been brought into being without some sort of human agency.

Spatial inequity, spatial injustice: the uneven distribution of a certain phenomenon in space, if it is regarded as “unfair” and “unjust”. This category only includes forms of unevenness created by human agency.

In our study we basically concentrate on the issue of *spatial disparity* since we are mainly interested in the spatial aspects of social disparities, thus, those forms of unevenness in space that can be traced back to human agency. Due to this, spatial differentiation is important for us only to the extent it contributes to the emergence of spatial disparities. And this influence rarely proves decisive for social issues given that physical geography does not determine the social processes emerging at a given place. Instead, as (geographical) possibilism claims, natural conditions only offer *possibilities* for societies. And, although these opportunities might be remarkably different at various places (e.g. in a hot desert or a tropical rainforest), it is not determined but influenced by many factors which possibilities are utilized by

² It is important to underline a terminological issue at this point for the dualistic meaning of “differentiation” in geographical research. Spatial differentiation is interpreted in our essay as *state of unevenness*, in line with the approach of Ward (2009a). In the theoretical literature dealing with *regionalization*, however, spatial differentiation has another meaning. It refers there to the *act* of “dividing up” space, so of differentiating, distinguishing various parts of the world from each other for analytical or administrative reasons. For the latter use of the term see Entrikin (2011).

society and which are not. In consequence, social processes and social disparities, together with their spatial imprints, never constitute direct, mechanistic outcomes of physical conditions (cf. Holt-Jensen 2009, pp. 62–66; Meusburger 2008, pp. 256–259).

Of course, while dealing with spatial disparities, we will in each case clarify whether in the actual context the given form of inequalities was regarded as neutral in moral sense, or as the matter of normative debate, and if the latter was the case, whether they were considered “tolerable” or “unjust”. Thus, we will present whether certain sorts of spatial disparities belonged in their spatial and temporal context to the subset of spatial injustice, a normative category with negative connotations in terms of morality.

Beyond defining various forms of unevenness in space, for our analysis it is also highly important to clarify the relation between *spatial* and *social* disparities. For Osberg (2001), inequality research can be categorized according to “among whom” unevenness is measured. From this viewpoint, social disparities refer to inequalities between societal groups, e.g. men and women, members of various ethnic or religious communities, social strata with different level of education. The analysis of spatial disparities is to be regarded, however, as the branch that concentrates on the spatial dimension of social and economic inequalities,³ hence, differences between people in certain geographical entities. Here the analytical focus is usually put on the different value of given social indicators in various countries, regions, cities etc. which, in fact, is not to be interpreted as disparity between the geographical entities themselves but among the groups of people within these geographical entities. In other words, spatial disparity research is not about inequalities between spatial units, but about disparities between people within different domains of

³ In countries belonging to the former “Western” and “Eastern” Blocs during the Cold War, the meaning of the term “social and economic disparities” is somewhat different. In the former context, social disparities refer to differences in status and privilege, and to an unequal access to resources. On the contrary, economic disparities embrace the unequal distribution of economy in space through the division of labor and functional differentiation. In post-socialist countries, however, whether one speaks about “social”, “social and economic” or “economic” disparities also has a political relevance and might mirror one’s point concerning issues of the politics of science. This is because in the communist period Marxist-Leninist geography entitled “economic” all issues other than physical (Gyuris and Györi 2013). Such an approach was based on the concept that it was conscious work distinguishing human from animals, which led to an overemphasis of production and the subordination of “society” to “economy”. For the same reason, to keep distance from the Communist system, many researchers began after the post-socialist political shift to argue for defining “social geography” as a “higher category” than “economic geography”, where the latter was claimed only to be a subset of the former (Timár 2006). Although in many cases the hybrid term of “social and economic geography” was to follow Marxist-Leninist “economic geography”, the use of this expression is often exposed to criticism by those firmly rejecting Marxism-Leninism. For such a term is either regarded by them as “logically incorrect” (since, for them, “economic” is a part of “social”), or as the proof of a pseudo-Marxist-Leninist stance (where keeping the adjective “economic” at the same level as “social” reflects an opposition to acknowledging “economy” as subordinate to “society”). In the recent work, we refer to “social and economic disparities” in the Western sense, without any implicit political notions.

geographical space. In the light of this, we have good reason to suppose that spatial disparity research inherited much from the social disparity analysis from which it emerged. This inheritance is most obviously manifest in the basic topic, the issue of disparities. Moreover, the way disparities are measured, interpreted, and even the (either explicit or implicit) intention of the whole analytical process is likely to show important similarities, regardless of whether it is about spatial or non-spatial aspects of social disparities. Thus, in a work focusing on the theoretical research of spatial disparities and on the functioning of this process it seems highly relevant and even necessary to have a closer look first at social inequalities, their analysis, and the characteristic features of the latter. For this reason, in this chapter we first concentrate on reasons for the emergence and development of social disparities, and second we present a critical overview of the academic debate with regard to this issue.

2.2 The First Emergence and Development of Social Disparities

Social inequality, which, in a general sense, can be defined as “differences among people in their command over social and economic resources” (Osberg 2001, p. 7371), is coeval with human societies. Dominance, division of labor, the need to co-ordinate complex systems, and differential evaluation exist in each society (Berreman 2001), even if their appearance, level and social function vary on a broad scale. Still, despite the seemingly omnipresent nature of social disparities, two major questions with regard to the issue have remained unanswered for a long time and fuelled fierce debates. The first question is technical, and concerns the origin of inequalities. The second question is moral, and is focused on the normative judgment of disparity: what are its pros and cons, and at what level can it be regarded as tolerable, or maybe even desirable? Both issues are crucial for an understanding of spatial disparities: one cannot come to terms with the phenomenon of spatial inequality if its sources are unknown and its normative relevance is unclear.

To answer these questions, we have to look back in human history over a long time for at least two reasons. First, although the size, complexity and differentiation of human societies have increased dramatically during the last few hundred years (cf. Fassmann and Meusburger 1997; Meusburger 1998a), the basic factors shaping social disparities had already emerged in much earlier phases of human history. Second, even if the number of scientific works in disparity research reached unprecedented levels in the last century, the major normative attitudes towards disparity already appeared thousands of years ago. Moreover, they crystallized not in a few decades, but over dozens of centuries of philosophical and political reasoning. To sum it up, the analysis of spatial disparities necessitates a detailed

investigation of how *social* disparities have been brought into being and which normative approaches have emerged over time.

2.2.1 *The Origin of Social Disparities*

For the origin of social disparities, the initial issue in corresponding debates was the role the emergence of social order played in the development of disparities. Here, two approaches diametrically opposed to one another emerged during the Enlightenment. One interpretation argued that disparities did not emerge as early as the human race did, they were only brought into being by society and social regulations. The other reasoning was that there had always been social inequalities, which, compared to their initial level, have not increased but rather reduced as society and its rules have become increasingly complex. These approaches were actually based on two fundamentally different concepts of human nature. The idea that disparities are nothing but a mere product of society implies that human beings do not “naturally” endeavor to gain mastery over others and create hierarchies. But if society with its regulatory power is considered rather a force to reduce disparities already “out there”, this suggests that humans have a “natural” desire for hierarchies.

In the history of philosophy, both concepts have had numerous supporters, who have often been remarkably firm while forming their opinion. As Thomas Hobbes, for instance, put it in his *De Cive* (The Citizen) in 1642, “the naturall state of men, before they entr’d into Society, was a meer War, and that not simply, but a War of all men, against all men” (*Bellum omnium contra omnes*), fuelled by “the naturall proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their Passions, but chiefly from a vain esteeme of themselves” (Hobbes 1987[1642], p. 49). The same idea, in a shorter form, also appeared in Hobbes’s even more influential work, the *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1929[1651]).

Similar was the opinion of the Darwinian biologist Thomas Huxley, who differentiated between the “non-ethical man”, “the primitive savage”, a “mere member of animal kingdom” on the one hand, and the “ethical man”, “the member of society” on the other. In his view, these two categories constituted two levels of the development of human society. The former referred to the individuals of pre-society humankind, while the latter was considered as brought into being only by well-organized societies and their norms. For the difference between them, in Huxley’s words the “non-ethical man” “fights out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any other animal”. His goal is to survive at the cost of others’ lives; not to reduce disparities between himself and others, but to become winners in the competition, where many necessarily lose. The “ethical man”, however, “devotes his best energies to the object of setting limits to the struggle” (Huxley 1888, p. 204) and “seeks the common weal as much as his own” (p. 205). In other words, for Huxley, the savage world of extreme disparities was followed by human society and its drive for mutuality and evenness.

In the meanwhile, other thinkers vehemently argued for the opposite. For instance, John Locke (1988)[1689] was of the opinion that the state of nature, preceding all governments, was a state of equality, “wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than other” (p. 269). In his words, nothing is “more evident” under such circumstances “than that the Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without Subordination and Subjection” (ibid.). For him, the creation of a controlled, governed society means that the human quits this condition, since it, “however free, is full of fears and continual dangers” (p. 350), as one’s property is exposed to the possible invasion of others. The establishment of a governed society is, thus, a step to protect each human’s individual property, even at the cost of giving up the natural condition of equality. In this sense, governed society is about the institutionalization of an unequal social order that had not existed before.

Similarly, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1754) view, “savage man” was “the friend of all his fellow-creatures” (p. 67), since “nature has ordained [equality] between men” (p. 1). But later on, the emergence of civil society put an end to this. In Rousseau’s view, the very beginning of this new era was when the first human “enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying ‘This is mine’, and found people simple enough to believe him” (p. 40). Due to this event, “equality disappeared, property was introduced” (p. 47). What is more, society and law “irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality” (p. 52). In this interpretation, society with its norms and regulations is but a means of those having broken the “natural law” of equality to establish and stabilize a privileged situation for themselves. In short, it is society being the source of social disparities.

As can be seen from these random examples, various thinkers have had *different views* not only of how social disparities had emerged, but also about the role played by society in the story. Furthermore, their arguments have often been quite radical. They presented the strive for disparities and the notion of equality as if one of them had been a main feature of pre-social human beings, while the other had only been belonging to humans living in a civil society. Contrasting the two approaches, with no doubt, served ideological and political interests for these philosophers. They could be used to legitimize the existing social order or, on the contrary, to criticize it through urging a return to pre-social norms and the establishment of a new order on their basis. The fact, however, that both attitudes towards equality were regarded as “natural” by many, also suggests that, in fact, both are strongly, inherently “human”. This was also the point of Peter Kropotkin, who considered these controversial attitudes typical for all humans and, in a broad sense, for all animals. In his words:

“though there is an immense amount of warfare and extermination going on amidst various species, and especially amidst various classes of animals, there is, at the same time, as much, or perhaps even more, of mutual support, mutual aid, and mutual defence amidst animals to the same species or, at least, to the same society. Sociability is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle.” (Kropotkin 1939[1902], p. 20)

Kropotkin tended to suggest the priority of mutual support over fight, thus, all humans' and animals' strive for bigger equity over their notion to produce disparity. It is a question that is hard (and, maybe empirically impossible) to decide. But his core thought that both sociability and struggle are "natural" phenomena seems to be confirmed by related research in the last decades. Psychologists Weisfeld and Beresford (1982) suggested in concert with their empirical findings that humans have a biological capacity for dominance hierarchization, which is the basis for the notion to compete for social success. Furthermore, anthropologists Tiger and Fox (1971) underlined that it is an inherent biological feature of humans to create hierarchies and accept dominance. These are biologically substantiated mechanisms to produce and reproduce disparities, due to which, as Berreman (2001) puts it, "dominance and differential evaluation exist in every society" (p. 7377).

Meanwhile and similar to all animals that form social groups however, humans try to keep disparities amongst individuals below a certain level to reduce inequalities. This is often regarded an outcome of expectations of the benefits and costs of belonging to the group. Potential benefits can be the assistance of the group in problems that can hardly or not be solved by one. Giving help when one is ill and unable to care for oneself, participating in the nurture of others' children, or providing protection against enemies that otherwise easily defeat an individual, can all be relevant forms of such support. These benefits are, however, not for free: one has to give up a part of one's individual freedom and, usually, accept a kind of dominance while joining the group. Therefore, there is a strong individual expectation that each member of the group can really take others' assistance for granted in certain situations. Thus, a sort of equity at this basic level and the trust that is promoted by the whole group is a necessary precondition for creating and sustaining cohesion within the social group. Consequently, the drive for reducing social and economic disparities is always present in groups, which often create specific social norms to maintain this notion (Csányi 2003). The outcome of these controversial endeavors is that societies are always characterized by *both egalitarian and anti-egalitarian behavior* of their members.

According to these ideas and findings, neither the idea of total equality of human beings before the emergence of society nor the concept of "savage" pre-social humans absolutely lacking any desire for mutuality can be substantiated. Thus, a notion for total equality among individuals is highly unlikely, neither for pre-social circumstances nor for the era after the emergence of society. Social disparities are always present. The level of inequalities and the way they are institutionalized, however, can be remarkably different in various societies. In societies with subsistence economies based on foraging and hunting, individual power disparities are rather moderate. Decisions concerning the life of the group are taken through a process of mutual communication, in which all members are involved, and they are based on common agreement (Boehm 1997). Distribution is based on the principle of "generalized reciprocity": economic pursuits and awards are always shared, even with those who cannot reciprocate right then (since they are ill, too young or too old, or simply as they sometimes return without prey at the end of the day due to

lacking fortune) (Sahlins 1968). The accumulation of personal possessions is strictly sanctioned (Woodburn 1982). In such societies, functional differentiation manifest in occupational roles are rare, and sexual division of labor is complementary with little or no differential evaluation (Berreman 2001). Thus, these societies are referred to in the literature as *egalitarian* (or *unranked*) societies (cf. Berreman 2001; Woodburn 1982). Although early human societal groups cannot be observed, such hunting and gathering societies are still to be found in sparsely populated areas of the globe (from the rainforests of the Amazon to the tundra in Northern Canada), and they are supposed to be rather similar to early human societal systems.

Of course, neither in these cases can one speak about total equity. During the process of common decision-making, for instance, the opinion of elders with large families is usually given greater consideration, as Woodburn (1979) revealed in the case of Hadza people in North Tanzania. No doubt there are no definite leaders in such societies who could impose one-sided control upon others, or who would have access to special means of coercion (Woodburn 1982). Still, a certain kind of hierarchy is to be found here, which ensures that in certain issues more credit is given to the word of some members of the society than to the opinion of others. That is why the views of elderly people, supposedly with more life experience, are given greater consideration. And that is why those that (at least seemingly) own particular forms of knowledge (whether it is technical or magic), such as magicians, have a better position in the hierarchy of decision-making than others (cf. Konrád and Szelényi 1978).

2.2.2 Intensifying Division of Labor and Its Implications on Social Disparities

In other words, total equality among human beings has never been the case, not even in early groups of humans. Yet, as the size and complexity of social systems increase, even the existing mechanisms that promote a kind of egalitarianism among individuals in certain issues get challenged. In consequence, social disparities begin to grow. A crucial point here is the increasing *division of labor*, which can be either *horizontal* or *vertical*.

The horizontal division of labor is usually brought into being by certain hunting and foraging activities, which necessitate rather complex preparations. For instance, some activities of hunting and gathering might need developed tools. Fishing on a lake or on the sea is impossible without suitable boats and weapons. Getting meat becomes much easier if herds of wild animals are corralled, for which fences need to be constructed and maintained. To make adequate tools for these activities, much more knowledge and expertise is needed than individuals had previously. Moreover, these tools can only be created by one who is allowed by the group not to participate in hunting so as to have time to focus on handicraft. That is how a horizontal division of labor becomes unavoidable. This process, however,

rather increases the specialization of work than the level of disparities. As the horizontal division of labor becomes more explicit, the work and life of a hunter and a craftsperson become increasingly different. But no hierarchy emerges among them automatically since both have crucial contributions to the survival of society. The prestige of their work and also the benefit they can realize is likely to remain very similar (Fassmann and Meusburger 1997; Meusburger 1998a).

This is not the case, however, for a *vertical* division of labor. For this, the job is divided in parts which, to be done, necessitate a different level of qualification. Thus, while some members of society are only concerned in the realization of manual tasks (e.g. hunting or gathering fruits), others get involved rather in planning and coordination (Fassmann and Meusburger 1997; Meusburger 1998a). A typical example is when the group shifts to an economic activity that produces benefit with a certain time-delay. As Woodburn (1982) underscores, the members of early hunting and gathering societies have a “direct and immediate return from their labour” (p. 432). They eat the food obtained the same day the hunt takes place, or in the next few days. They do not have to process or store food. Thus, they do not have to select anybody to protect stored food. Moreover, they need not find somebody who has the necessary knowledge as well as reputation to plan and coordinate storage and distribution. This is what Woodburn (1982) calls an *immediate-return system*.

However, this is no longer possible after a certain point in time. As the horizontal division of labor increases, many individuals see their labor resulting in real, material benefit only with a delay of days, weeks or even months. For instance, many “craftsmen” making the tools necessary for the hunt receive their “payment” only after the successful fight or gathering. Furthermore, as specialization increases, the amount of available food also rises. As a result, even hunters can benefit from the prey with a significant time delay since this much food cannot be consumed at once. Thus, in Woodburn’s (1982) words, the *immediate-return system* is replaced by a *delayed-return system*. But this also means that the preservation of products for use during periods of delay as well as delayed-return activities themselves should be coordinated. And to those who have to assume the responsibility of coordination, a certain power should also be given, unless they were incapable of carrying out the task of coordination by requiring others to follow the rules. In a Luhmannian approach, the complexity of society reaches such a level due to diversifying economic activities that contingencies can no longer be dealt with successfully on the basis of spontaneous congruence of individual interests. Thus, *the medium of power should be introduced* to cope with the complex challenges of a more complex society (cf. Luhmann 1984), so to plan and coordinate the manifold tasks complex societies face.⁴

⁴ Although the concept of power itself is also difficult to describe and its definitions in the literature are manifold and highly diverse (for a detailed overview on various notions see Avelino and Rotmans 2009), we use the term here in a broad sense, accepting the definition of Avelino and Rotmans (2009). Their concept is similar to that of Parsons (1963, 1967) to some extent since they define power as the ability of actors to mobilize resources to achieve a certain goal. Differently to

The vertical division of labor also has direct and thorough consequences for disparities in space. Several activities that need low qualification (such as gathering) can be found virtually all over the “ecumene”, the “inhabited world”. Specific activities, however, which necessitate relatively few but highly knowledgeable workers, are to be found only in a small number of geographical locations, namely in the centers of political power and knowledge production (Meusburger 2000).

From the emergence of early delayed-systems on, human societies become more and more complicated in structure, what leads to *increasing social differentiation*. A decisive step here is when someone or a certain group tries to exclude others from the use of given resources, thus, to *transform property relations*. This can happen in hunting and gathering societies as well, if access to resources is scarce. As Lightfoot (1993) puts it, for instance, fishing for salmon plays an important role in the economy of several native tribes along North America’s west coast. The annual runs of salmon, however, last for a short time, and few good fishing sites can be found. In consequence, not all individuals can personally gain access to fish, only a few. Since the few feasible sites can totally be controlled by a few, clans tend to emerge within the society, which, under the control of a charismatic chief, try to establish sole access to these sites while excluding all others. In other words, as soon as it becomes technically possible to appropriate resources that formed common property up to then, certain clans tend to do this. Apparently the norms of the group to enforce egalitarian behavior prove much too weak to prevent the fragmentation of society along different individual interests in case technical conditions to break these norms are given. If a given resource is not ‘unlimited’ anymore, so the impossibility of excluding some from its use is challenged, the thorough egalitarianism characterizing early hunting and foraging societies diminishes.

From the aspect of social disparities, an even more important shift occurs with the beginning of economic activities that necessitate the *permanent settlement* of the group (cf. Meusburger 1998a). The most typical example is raising plants (agriculture) after the invention of domestication. On the one hand, these activities intensify both horizontal and vertical divisions of labor, due to which norms and regulations necessarily become more complex. On the other hand, the geographical range of the group significantly decreases after settling down. The latter phenomenon reduces the potential amount of natural resources to access. For hunting and foraging societies, natural resources can be regarded as unlimited in a sense that the group simply moves if they run out of prey and forage at an exact location. Settled societies, however, cannot do that if they do not want to give up their lands and the buildings they erected. Under such circumstances, members of the group can only rely on resources to be found within a certain radius. Thus, these commonly held resources are scarce, while the number of potential users is large. These conditions

Parsons, however, their understanding of resources is rather broad, not only including material resources, but all sorts of human, mental, monetary, artifactual and natural resources.

easily result in the overuse of resources (Lloyd 1968[1837]; Gordon 1954; Scott 1955).

This problem is known as the “tragedy of commons”, after the article of Hardin (1968), in which he called academic attention to the far-reaching effects of this phenomenon. Hardin presented the fictive case of a pasture open to all with many herdsmen wanting to graze their cattle. In his interpretation, supposing that each herdsman tries to take individual advantage of the situation, they are likely to measure two factors, namely benefits and costs of grazing animals there. If one more animal is added to the herd, on the one hand, the whole benefit is that of the herdsman. On the other hand, increasing the size of the herd also leads to a faster degradation of the pasture, but this negative effect is shared by all the herdsmen. Thus, in sum, adding one more animal to the herd produces more benefit than cost for the individual. In consequence, each herdsman will be motivated to increase the size of their herd, which is to result in a catastrophe. For Hardin, the only solution to avoid a tragedy is to privatize commons or keep them as public property under permanent social control, since these property regimes guarantee unambiguous circumstances regarding the right to entry, and, thus, can *protect resources from overuse*.

Without a doubt, Hardin’s argumentation disregards some important details. First, his concept considers humans as fully rational agents only motivated by profit maximization. This reasoning, based on the rational choice theory (which will be evaluated from a critical point of view in other chapters of this work), is far too simplifying. Furthermore, another important psychological aspect, which, although not mentioned by Hardin, must be at least as important as the factors he refers to. This is the way humans perceive the increase of groups: the number of new items is usually perceived in relation to the size of the whole group. If one has five cattle, adding one more might seem a radical increase as one’s benefit rises by 20 %. Since the number of all animals grazed on the pasture is, however, more than 100, for instance, one additional animal seems to have no significant effect on the resource. Total consumption only increases by 1 %. So, adding one animal to the whole herd “does not matter”. This way of thinking is the major reason for underestimating the negative environmental effects of certain activities, which can easily end in the overuse and degradation of resources. Second, as Feeny et al. (1990) presented, transforming the commons to private or public property is not the only way to control the access to given resources. Shared governance of communal properties can also prove a viable way if the community creates clear access rights and enforces their observance. But from the aspect of social disparities, these necessary additions do not change the main implications of Hardin’s findings. After a while, the tragedy of commons can (and, actually, does) emerge in all societies having common property goods, and it can only be avoided through precisely defined rules on the access to them. This regulation, however, needs an even more explicit division of labor in a vertical sense and a stronger concentration of power in the hands of those responsible for enforcing the rules. And this is the process taking place in societies facing the challenge of scarce resources for the first time, and the process which fuels the growth of social disparities.

In general, the emergence of delayed-return systems and the transformation of property relations exert a decisive influence on social disparities. First, their result is the *intensification, institutionalization and stabilization of inequality structures*. Second, they also *increase the complexity* of social disparities.

2.2.3 Social Disparities and Power Asymmetries in Complex Societies

The rising complexity of social disparities cannot be separated from the increasing need to control the use of resources, which ends up in an *intensification of power asymmetries*. A typical early outcome of this tendency is the emergence of “big man” (or rarely “big woman”) societies. Here someone, through personal charisma and persuasion, achieves a privileged status, due to which they get the right to decide who can use certain resources and to what extent. Somewhat similar are chieftainships, where this privilege is not achieved by but ascribed to someone due to their paramount position in their clan (Berreman 2001).

In “big man/woman” societies, the leader’s privileged position is neither formal nor institutionalized. Thus, the future leader has to fight for his position after the old leader dies. Furthermore, he does not simply inherit the power from his predecessors, but has to achieve it on his own. It is possible, of course, that a leader-to-be is supported by the former “big man/woman”, which can prove decisive in convincing other members of the group and getting their assistance. Thus, the “big man/woman” can influence to some extent whom he or she is followed by. But there is no institutional structure to automatically guarantee the power for someone due to their initial social position (such as for a crown prince in a kingdom). In other words, the system lacks institutional stability. In chieftainships, *power structures are institutionalized*, so the system—usually—does not change in general when the chief dies. His successors will have basically the same power due to their same position. Here, however, the power of the chieftain is limited to kinship, which is based on family relations. This problem is solved only in *kingships*, with an extended power of the ultimate leader (the king). The main innovation of the kingship is a high level of institutionalization combined with a much broader range than that of family relations. The power of kings does not result from kinship, but is ensured from two directions. First, by people whom economic privileges (such as land ownership) were given. In this respect, support and faith are reciprocation of economic benefits (Berreman 2001). Second, kings are legitimized by representatives of knowledge production (e.g. priests), who, in exchange for the political support they receive, create myths, which present the power of the king as in line with the will of transcendent forces and, thus, indisputable for everyday people (Meusbürger 1998a, 2005; Stehr 1994). This sort of legitimization gained in influence particularly with the invention of writing. Due to this innovation, myths as well as regulations substantiating the power of the

king could be widely disseminated, even to a large population scattered over huge area. In a world only based on orally transmitted information permanent face-to-face contacts were crucial, and this sort of communication could only be efficient in societies with less than few hundred inhabitants. With writing, the need for perpetual personal contacts decreased, and the potential size of the system to be ruled and coordinated by one leader radically expanded (Anderson 1968).⁵

These tendencies are very important from the point of view of social disparities since they bring an *institutionalization of social inequalities*, due to which *inequality structures become more and more stable*. Regardless to the level of disparities amidst individuals, in early ranked (e.g. “big man/woman”) societies power relations are very fragile. Even if the overall level of disparities is relatively stable, individual positions compared to those of others can change rapidly. A charismatic leader might totally lose the informally acquired power if his/her supporters do not trust him/her anymore. In the meanwhile, a new leader can rapidly emerge from the social periphery. In more differentiated societies, however, power structures prove much more—even if not totally—stable since they are well institutionalized. The king might make decisions with which many members of the society disagree. The king’s position is still quite stable due to various institutional means, e.g. codified laws, or well-organized institutions indoctrinating people to accept the ruling order. Typical examples for the latter can be institutions of spiritual life (Assmann 2000; Meusburger 2005) and even education (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). Thus, the probability that a social movement deprives the king of his power is very low, if not zero. The same is true for the position of other, subordinated social groups. Neither their inner relations are likely to be radically transformed by the king (or to change spontaneously). This is foremost due to the institutional means which the leader’s power is also based on.

The stabilization of inequality structures also continues in political regimes emerging after kingships. So it is even in plural parliamentary systems, where the main power is placed in the hands of elected persons and institutions (e.g. the parliament and an elected government) instead of those of a king. These changes might reshape power relations and inequality structures within society, but the level of institutionalization does not decrease. It is similarly ensured by the sophisticated legal system as by an ongoing institutionalization of economic interest groups (in companies, various organizations or trade unions, for instance). Education also does not loose its function to legitimize and sustain the ruling order together with its characteristic social disparities (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bourdieu 1998).

⁵ This does not mean that societal systems above a few hundred people cannot come into being at all without a written culture. But the efficiency of communication and, consequently, of coordination here is unavoidably much lower. The number of face-to-face interactions the instructions of the leader need to go through until they can be received by all subordinates dramatically increases, which radically increases the possibility of distortions. (Obviously, the same goes for reactions coming from the subordinates.) Hence, the emergence of a well-organized society and state is not possible without at least a certain fraction of society being literate.

While the emergence of delayed-return systems and the transformation of property relations bring about the institutionalization and stabilization of social disparities, they also result in the *functional differentiation* and, consequently, *increasing complexity* of society. More complex societies, whose economic activity is based on an intensifying division of labor, tend to produce more, create bigger reserves and develop more improved techniques due to which they can raise productivity. Then, these factors induce even faster growth thanks to positive feedback. This process permanently increases the complexity of society. And the broader spectrum the social activities embrace, the bigger is the need to specialize certain parts of society to fulfill certain functions. This leads to a rapidly increasing division of labor, horizontally as well as vertically.⁶ In other words, a deepening functional differentiation within society becomes unavoidable. In Herbert Spencer's sociological approach, this differentiation is the main mechanism of societies to reduce their complexity, and to sustain efficient control over their more and more complicated inner processes (Villányi, Junge and Brock 2009; Vester 2009).

This differentiation ends up in the emergence of social strata,⁷ whose members are linked by being similar in their abilities to mobilize different kinds of resources, whether these are human, mental, monetary, artifactual or natural (cf. Avelino and Rotmans 2009). These abilities can vary from one resource to another, and it is the specific combination of abilities that characterize a given social stratum. One stratum might be influential in mobilizing a certain resource, while its abilities regarding the mobilization of another resource are poor. Some typical examples of this are given by Bourdieu (1998), for instance, in his concept on the spaces of social concepts and lifestyles. This concept draws up a very generalized scheme of the social space. Bourdieu defines social positions as being determined by social capital, which is regarded as a function of economic and cultural capitals. Such an approach must be far too simple since the "capitals" one owes and thus the resources they are able to mobilize can be manifold, as presented by Avelino and Rotmans (2009). Still, Bourdieu's concept shows well how different the combinations of possessing various "capitals" can be. For instance, artists may have much cultural capital, but few economic. Industrialists, however, may be rich in economic capital but poor in cultural. Just as in these cases, most social strata are characterized by different abilities to mobilize different sorts of resources. Of

⁶ It is important to underline that the increase in the division of labor and the complexity of society is barely a balanced process at a permanent pace, but rather a series of rapid shifts with long and relatively "moderate" phases in between. The Neolithic Revolution or the Industrial Revolution, for instance, witnessed a thoroughly rising complexity of society otherwise unprecedented for much longer historical epochs (Meusburger 1998a). Still, although the process is volatile, the continuous increase in the complexity of society is to be regarded as a fact, just as that the amplitude of shifts increases and the duration of moderate periods between these shifts decreases over time.

⁷ In this work we use the term "social strata" instead of "social class", which at least in the continental European context usually has a Marxist connotation.

course, it is not impossible that certain social actors can mobilize a wide variety of resources at the same time. These are the “power elites” in Mills’s (1956) words. Yet, it is rather atypical that certain social strata have similar abilities to mobilize different sorts of resources.

The emergence of social strata is an implication of ongoing functional differentiation, sustained by the continuous intensification of the division of labor (especially vertically). Due to these tendencies, the need to efficiently coordinate society only remains possible through an increasing institutionalization of power relations and inequality structures. In the light of research findings in system theory, although social processes are never teleological (Ziemann 2009), the reorganization of a social system to a lower level of complexity is an “extremely unlikely process” (Luhmann 1997, p. 707). Thus, the probability that social inequality structures becoming more simple is rather low (Luhmann 1997).⁸

The differentiation of society and the institutionalization and stabilization of inequalities do not necessarily mean the polarization of societal power relations. The gap between the “power elites” and the most defenseless strata is not obviously bigger in the highly complex societies of our times than in chieftainships or “big man/woman” systems. It is enough to remember that in the latter, chief leaders are lords of life and death, and their subordinates are often exposed to brutal violence. Social disparities in more differentiated societies, however, also manifest themselves in more complex ways, and the diversity of their forms increases. Consequently, it becomes much more difficult to describe inequalities, to reveal the mechanisms producing and sustaining them, and to understand the reasons and goals of these mechanisms, than it is in more simple societies. Furthermore, inequalities become more visible, even in everyday life, due to their high level of institutionalization. They are mirrored, permanently reproduced and imposed on individuals through such an extremely wide variety of media (from legal acts to advertisements in mass media) that have been unprecedented before. As a result, and in concert with the increasing complexity of society, the topic of social disparities gains in popularity among thinkers and everyday people as well.

⁸ Although it is not absolutely zero. One of the few counterexamples was the *Treckboers* in South Africa. They were descendants of Dutch, German and French Huguenot immigrants, who had been farmers before leaving Europe. In South Africa, however, they were forced by unfavorable climatic conditions in the coastal regions to landlocked areas where their former economic activities were not to sustain any more. Thus, adapting to the aridity of their new land, they shifted to nomadic pastoralism during the eighteenth century (Waibel 1933). In fact, similar changes take place in societies that, after the fall of an empire they belonged to, witness a decline in administration, political uncertainty, and a decreasing complexity of societal structures (e.g. in the former Roman provinces of Britannia and Pannonia after the empire collapsed). Of course, such dramatic changes happen only in exceptional cases under extreme circumstances.

2.3 From Social Disparities to Their Analysis: The Tradition of Social Disparity Research

2.3.1 *Conceptual Questions to an Analysis of the Debate Over Social Disparities*

To reveal how and why the philosophical debate over inequalities emerged, and what the social importance of this question is, it is necessary to make a historical overview of concepts related to equality. At this point one has to consider that, as Livingstone (1979) has demonstrated, such historical overviews are prone to various fallacies and misinterpretations for various reasons.⁹ One has to be aware that any historical overview is necessarily the result of some form of *selection*. Thus, we cannot and should not state that the forthcoming part of this work gives an all-embracing presentation of the history of concepts about equality and inequalities. Neither can it be totally representative and unbiased, since selection, after Weiner (1961), “necessarily involve[s] some interpretative presuppositions” (Livingstone 1979, p. 226). What we can say is that we have a number of authors and their texts on equality and inequality, which seem of sufficient quantity to allow us to establish some findings and draw some conclusions.¹⁰ On the other hand, one has to be very cautious while *interpreting* texts. Here, Livingstone points at seven typical problems. These are expectation, idealization, harmonization, systematization, and (respective to the context) causation, orientation, and whether the given work was reflective or directive. Many (yet not all) are relevant to us here, so they are explained briefly.

Expectation results from the fact that history is always written backwards, so past thoughts are observed from a recent point of view. Here, the historian of ideas usually has some expectations “to bear upon what any writer has said” (Livingstone 1979, p. 227). In consequence, the historian often tends to put certain works and thoughts in a tradition which may have not existed when the idea was born, and in one where the thought might not match. *Idealization* is “the tracing of one idea through different historical epochs”, which involves (either explicitly or implicitly) “an idealized type of the particular doctrine” (ibid.). A typical result is that a

⁹ Livingstone, actually, focuses on problems which emerge easily while the history of *geographical* thought is analyzed. From our point of view, however, many of his remarks have relevance for the history of any sorts of thought.

¹⁰ In this study, the selection of philosophers mainly focuses on those conventionally regarded in political science, philosophy and history as key thinkers regarding equality and inequality. For this, we have found especially useful the works of Bluhm (2007) in Llanque and Münkler (2007), a broadly-used textbook in the university education of political science and political philosophy. A valuable overview of the history of the concept of equality is also given by Dann (1975) in Brunner et al. (1972). The latter series, which was published again in 2004 without modifications, counts as a much-cited scientific work in the disciplines of history, philosophy and political science.

thought (and its author as well) might be judged according to the extent it matches certain idealized concepts. This teleological approach can cover the real motivations of the author, and can suggest connections between ideas and people which simply never existed. Another potential problem is *harmonization*, when the observer from a present-day viewpoint tries to “supply a coherence which the writings appear to lack” (p. 228). This mistake is often linked to systematization, where certain thoughts arbitrarily taken out of their textual contexts are put together to form a seemingly coherent structure, which actually does not exist.

For the interpretation of context, another crucial issue is to consider whether certain authors basically *reflected* the dominant opinion of their era, and whether they were aimed at changing this opinion. It also needs to be determined whether a direct link existed between the ideas of different thinkers and, if these ideas were similar to each other, is it just by accident. Finally, each author had a specific social context, in which the direction of ideas was *oriented*. For instance, certain issues were possible to raise under certain circumstances, others not. Certain formulations were allowed by those in power and understandable for contemporaries, while others barely. Thus, while evaluating the concept of an author, the meaning it had that time should also be considered.

The relevance of these remarks for our analysis is manifold. We should not interpret the “evergreen” debate over equality as a cumulative teleological process, where existing concepts are getting closer and closer to a “perfect”, “ultimate” stance. (Even if certain thinkers maybe thought so while dealing with the issue.) We cannot draw up a coherent tradition in this sense. Neither can we fully reveal the motives of any philosophers. Furthermore, we should keep from systematizing or harmonizing the thoughts of a given author (or maybe of multiple authors) arbitrarily. This endeavor, yet, does not contradict the need to identify certain similarities. What we should prevent ourselves from is creating a mistaken narrative for such resemblance. Causation is also to be avoided, although it is desirable to underline certain causal relations if they really existed. And finally, we should be aware that the opinions of different thinkers were strongly oriented by their social contexts. Thus, we should not focus on the different phenomena various authors might have spoken about to express their approaches to equality, neither on the differences of formulation. Instead, the emphasis should be put on their *main concept of equality*, and on *their normative attitude to this*.

Beyond all these, we have to emphasize one more thing, which is actually linked to the problem of contextualization, but, unlike in his later writings, is not yet explicitly mentioned in this early work of Livingstone (1979). Knowledge is not only embedded in certain social and political conditions, etc., but it is also linked to the place where it is created; knowledge is *geographically situated* (see Barnes 2004; Livingstone 2003a; Meusbürger 2008; Shapin 1998). One implication of this for us is that we have to consider the geographical context of the authors whose concepts of equality we are analyzing. But it might be even more important to note that most European and American works on the history of thought about disparities and equality, be they written by philosophers, lawyers or political scientists, dominantly or exclusively focus on Western (European and North American)

thinkers (see Bluhm 2007; Dann 1975; Dryzek, et al. 2006 [especially Part VI]; Gaus and Kukathas 2004). It is important because the perception of, and, consequently, the approaches to social disparities might be different in Europe, in East and South Asia, or in Africa, for instance. This does not necessarily question the relevance of concentrating on “the West” in this work. From our point of view, such a “Western orientation” of one’s focus is highly disputable if the objective is to give a spatially and historically complete overview of how equality has been defined and interpreted in various societies. However, the decision to concentrate on the contribution of Western thinkers can be justified in the actual work for two reasons. First, our research focuses on political and economic systems rooted in ideas belonging to the Western philosophical tradition (notably capitalism, socialism and communism). Second, although this tradition is not the only one in the world, the analysis of its structure and temporal changes can throw light on how the debate over disparities *functions*. (In other words, on questions such as who makes comments on the issue and why, which motivations and—even implicit—objectives they have while doing so, and which arguments they use to underpin their concepts.) Thus, we have decided to draw our attention to the debate over equality in the Western philosophical thought.

Of course, the question that arises at this point is what would be a feasible time-span for such an historical overview. We have decided to expand our focus to as far back as ancient Greece, the cradle of Western philosophical and political thought. Through this, it becomes possible to present two basic features of the debate over social equality. First, the questions of equality and inequality have emerged in highly different societies over many thousands of years. This fact indicates that the related dilemma has been relevant in virtually all Western forms of society. This indirectly shows that the underlying social phenomena are to emerge in all societal groups above a certain level of complexity. Second, since the factors which have brought the dilemma into being again and again have been remarkably similar in different societies, the characteristic viewpoints and arguments emerging in the debate are also timeless. Thus, to get a better understanding of the importance of equality for society and of how the debate over inequalities functions, we find it useful to analyze various concepts of equality in an historical perspective.

2.3.2 The Roots of Social Disparity Analysis in Ancient Greece

In ancient Greece, the issue of social disparities became popular especially in the Athenian democracy, emerging around 500 BC. Here, the term *equality*—together with freedom—was brought into focus due to its central role in the notions on which the democratic regime was based. Thus, thinkers drew attention to the essence of equality and inequalities, to the factors they were formed and perpetually reshaped by, and to issues concerning the “ideal” level of disparities. Concepts were mostly

motivated by observations on the way existing political systems—merely implicitly—handled the question of equality. Two examples to study were of special importance here, namely the Athenian democracy itself, and the authoritarian political system in Sparta as its counterpart (Bluhm 2007).¹¹

To the issue of equality, particularly valuable contributions were made by Plato, the founder of the Academy in Athens, and his student, Aristotle. Both thinkers believed that great social inequality was a main factor in destabilizing political systems. For Plato, equality was a necessary prerequisite for the stability of state (cf. Pfetsch 2003), and Aristotle also considered disparity as a condition fuelling political tensions and disagreement. As the latter put it in his work *Politics*: “For faction is everywhere due to inequality. . .people generally engage in faction in pursuit of equality” (Aristotle 1998, p. 135).

Their stances on the optimal level and form of disparities showed important differences as well as remarkable similarities. In his work *The Republic (Politeia)*, Plato drew up his concept on a utopian ideal state, while in *The Laws (Nomoi)* the “second best state” (Kuhn 1968), which was regarded not that abstract and unrealistic, was presented (Pfetsch 2003). Both concepts were based on the claimed notion of equality. In *The Laws*, Plato argued for a radically egalitarian, quasi communistic political system. As he described:

“That State and polity come first, and those laws are best, where there is observed. . . throughout the whole State. . .that ‘friends have all things really in common’. As to this condition. . .[in which] all that is called ‘private’ have become in a way ‘communized’ . . .and that all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honour with all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possible, – no one will ever lay down another definition that is truer or better than these conditions in point of super-excellence. In such a State. . .they dwell pleasantly, living such a life as this.” (Plato 1961, p. 363)

In Plato’s concept in *The Laws*, all land of the envisaged city-state (polis) is equally distributed among the slightly more than 5,000 land owners, a number regarded by him as optimal. This kind of equality is considered to guarantee an overall homogenization of society and, thus, to cease social tensions (Pfetsch 2003). Plato’s concept shows obvious, although not absolute, similarities with the then political system of Sparta, where Spartiates, the free males, had equal political rights and equal access to material resources. Here, the individual possession of gold or silver was prohibited, and even females, subordinated to males, were handled as a kind of “commons”: elderly males could deliver their wives over to younger males, and single males were allowed to “borrow” the wives of their

¹¹ In a remarkable way, growing interest in social disparities did not lead to an increasing attention to spatial inequalities. Although social and spatial disparities are coeval, spatial inequality *as a problem* was brought into the focus of thinkers more than 2,000 years later than was the case with social disparities. While the debate over social disparities began in ancient Greece, a similarly significant attention was not paid to spatial inequalities until the nineteenth century. Reasons for this are to be discussed in Chap 3.

friends. Such elements, together with the common nurture of children by the state, were also present in Plato's concept (ibid.).

These very examples, even with their otherwise extremely communistic view, also reveal the severely constrained nature of social equality in the Platonist vision (cf. Strauss 1987). As can be seen, equality only refers here to free males of the higher classes. It is again a similarity with Sparta and its class society, where equality was the privilege of Spartiates. Here, all females were handled as simple "property", while helots, the lower class of Spartan society, were enslaved. In Plato's idealistic views, similar sorts of differentiation are also present (Pfetsch 2003).¹² This fact remarkably indicates a main feature of equality, namely that it is not an objective category but it is socially construed. It is the subjective decision of human beings whether they find a certain distribution of resources equal or unequal. Thus, the debate over social equality has an object that is normative not only in its interpretation, but also in its definition. For Plato, in his *The Laws* he gave a peculiar and controversial definition of equality, which he otherwise presented as desirable. In his view, this "Spartan-like" equality, which he regarded in dual sense, with *material (economic)* and *political equality* going hand in hand, was the key to political stability.

Of course, it should also be emphasized that Plato's concepts presented above refer to an ideal, imaginary situation. Thus, they are not to be seen as "technical guides" for the establishment of a perfect society (Pfetsch 2003). For a real society with real human beings, Plato construed another concept of equality. Here, he distinguished two sorts of equality, "which, though identical in name, are often almost opposites in their practical results" (Plato 1961, p. 413). The one was defined as "even results in the distributions" (ibid.); thus, giving the same to everyone, irrespective of their attributes. The other, "the truest and best form of equality", however, was presented as a *just* distribution, which took into consideration the individually varying honors of persons. As Plato put it: "for it dispenses more to the greater and less to the smaller, giving due measure to each according to nature; and with regard to honours also, by granting the greater to those that are greater in goodness, and the less to those of the opposite character in respect of goodness and education, it assigns *in proportion what is fitting to each*" (our emphasis) (ibid.).

From Plato's point of view, the first form of equality ("even results in the distributions") is also necessary in certain situations to reduce social tensions ("on account of the discontent of the masses") (p. 415). For him, however, the main goal of any state should be to strive for the second form of equality ("in proportion what is fitting to each"). With this, for "real-world conditions" Plato emphasized the importance of what nowadays are called *achieving society* and

¹² Further criticism is levelled at the concept's controversies by Karl Popper (1945), who was convinced that Plato's views would unavoidably lead to tyranny. As Pfetsch (2003) puts it, however, Popper's critique is also one-sided and tendentious, and a detailed evaluation of his stance does not belong to the aims of the recent work. From our aspect, the main point is that in *The Laws* Plato was an explicit advocate of social equality instead of disparity, although (or even if) his concept about an ideal state was still not absolutely egalitarian.

meritocracy. The term achieving society means that those individuals contributing the most to the functioning of society should be paid better than others (Bolte 1979; Meusburger 1998a). Meritocracy rather means the principle that key positions with high responsibility in a social system should be filled by those with the best abilities and qualifications. This idea mainly serves a good functioning of the system and, thus, focuses barely on individuals but on the interests of the whole system (Meusburger 1998a)—for instance, through sustaining political stability. In Plato's concept, both these aspects emerged as foundations of a well-functioning real-world society.

For these reasons, Plato rejected tyranny as well as democracy since he considered both as challenging to the concept of "proportional equality", thus, as being incompatible with "political justice". Instead, he argued for a social order "between a monarchic constitution and a democratic" (p. 411). For him, tyranny produces "unjust" disparities, while democracy challenges the principle of "just" distribution through its drive toward equality. To sum it up, Plato, who outlined a utopian vision of an imaginary state with remarkable (but not exclusive and quite controversial) egalitarian notions, was no more an advocate of equal distribution if "real-world conditions" were taken into consideration.

For Aristotle, his stance on social equality was similar to that of his master for real-world conditions. While discussing the essence of equality, Aristotle introduced two different interpretations: one was based on *arithmetical* proportion, the other on *geometrical* proportion. Equality up to *arithmetical* proportion was based on the concept of regarding and treating all people as equal. Here, the equal distribution of a certain phenomenon among two persons was sharing it equally, giving 50 % to the one and 50 % to the other. The other definition of equality was derived from the idea of *geometrical* proportion. In this approach, equality means that the ratio of the awards distributed among A and B should be proportionate to the ratio of A's and B's merits. In other words, arithmetical equality was based on the concept of all being equal, while geometrical equality meant the distribution of honor based on merit (meritocracy). This differentiation was rather similar to that of Plato, and Aristotle's stance on which sort of equality to prefer also proved similar to that of his master while advocating for geometrical proportion. As Aristotle emphasized it through a judicial example: "[for arithmetical proportion (it)] makes no difference whether it is a good person who has defrauded a bad or a bad person a good, nor whether it is a good or bad person that has committed adultery" (Aristotle 2004, p. 87). This approach, instead, "looks only to the difference made by the injury, and treats the parties as equals" (ibid.), although they, in Aristotle's eyes, are not equal.

Aristotle's position against equal share of resources among individuals was also mirrored by his remarks on differences of property. He did not argue for any sort of economic equality, but handled related disparities as given, which implicitly means their acceptance. In his view, the heterogeneity of society is an unavoidable result of its distribution across various occupational groups (as one would say today, the division of labor). Farmers, craftsmen, traders etc. are all necessary parts of the community to which they contribute in different ways, just as in his interpretation

different organs do in the bodies of animals. But what is even more important is his conviction that different individuals have different merits, due to which not only their social roles, but also their material affluence vary on a broad scale. The major distinction here is between rich and poor, both of whom are considered as necessarily existing. And, Aristotle did not argue for a limitation of these disparities, but rather argued for “just” social circumstances in a sense that they should let everyone benefit from their work up to their merit. Thus, he preferred public property to common property, although with support for the common use of private property to some extent to avoid selfishness:

“For if the citizens happen to be unequal rather than equal in the work they do and the profits they enjoy, accusations will inevitably be made against those who enjoy or take a lot but do little work by those who take less but do more. . . .These, then, and others are the difficulties involved in the common ownership of property. . . .For while property should be in some way communal, in general it should be private. For when care for property is divided up, it leads not to those mutual accusations, but rather to greater care being given, as each will be attending to what is his own. But where use is concerned, virtue will ensure that it is governed by the proverb ‘friends share everything in common’.” (Aristotle 1998, p. 32)

In general, the contribution of Plato and Aristotle to the issue of social equality and inequality included several ideas which later proved fundamental in the analysis of social disparities. Actually, the introduction of the topic into philosophy was a crucial step in itself. But the two thinkers also revealed important aspects of the problem, which have remained at the core of the analysis of social disparities. First, such a point was the distinction between equality as an *equal distribution of resources* on the one hand, and as distribution in concert with individual worth, thus, *equal award for equal merits* on the other hand—where the latter was considered varying from individual to individual, which hypothesizes an *a priori difference* amidst the members of society.¹³ Second, they drew attention to the fact that social equality and inequality have *political as well as economic aspects*; thus, these phenomena cannot be interpreted purely either as jurisdictional or as economic categories.

2.3.3 Additional Concepts to an Understanding of Social Disparities: Ancient Rome

The ideas of Plato and Aristotle concerning social inequalities exerted much influence on philosophical thought in ancient Greece, and, after being transmitted

¹³ In this sense, the master and his student had quite similar attitudes regarding real societies under real-world circumstances. Thus, we agree with those researchers who interpret Aristotle as the person continuing and improving the concepts of Plato with a stronger emphasis on real conditions, instead opposing his master (on the debate over the relation of the notions of Aristotle and Plato, see Wiser 1983; Pfetsch 2003).

there, in Rome as well. They especially fertilized related debates in the Roman Republic, where significant social disparities in terms of rights and property posed a significant threat to political stability. Seemingly, a necessary prerequisite for the latter was to balance differences between the aristocratic upper class, the patricians, and the lower (but still free) class, the plebeians. Thus, the reason for dealing with inequalities was quite similar as it had been in Greece: to avoid political destabilization. The focus of debates was, however, somewhat different, foremost concerning the issue of equality before the law, while less attention was paid to the question of disparities of property. This relative one-sidedness of approaches could be traced back to the specific social circumstances in Rome. After the establishment of the Roman Republic in 509 BC, putting an end to the era of kingdom, the different legal position of the upper class, the aristocratic patricians, and the lower class, the plebeians, was a main source of social tensions. Patricians had many rights which plebeians were excluded from; for instance, they were the only group permitted to hold public office. In order to maintain this strict division, marriage between the two classes was also forbidden. It was a long process of social struggles (the “Conflict of the Orders”) that—finally—gave plebeians the force of law in 287 BC, more than two centuries after the emergence of the republic (Raafflaub 2005). However, because plebeians had many more opportunities to earn a great deal of money in agriculture, handicraft or commerce, and thereby get ahead in the economy, there was much less property-related tension compared to those concerning rights. In consequence, the debate over equality also had a firm focus on legal issues instead of economic ones.

This specific, law-oriented debate over disparities lasted for a long time even after the legal equality of patricians and plebeians had been reached. Here, an especially important stance was taken by the Roman philosopher and statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero in the first century BC. For him, human beings are *by nature equal*:

“There is no similarity, no likeness of one thing to another, so great as the likeness we all share. If distorted habits and false opinions did not twist weak minds and bend them in any direction, no one would be so like himself as all people would be like all others. Thus, whatever definition a human being one adopts is equally valid for all humans.” (Cicero 1999, pp. 115–116.)

Based on this idea, Cicero argued for equality considered as an equal distribution of rights among individuals. The approach of interpreting equality as an equal distribution of a certain phenomenon was, as we have illustrated above, not new: it can also be found in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Still, Cicero’s argument included a remarkable innovation. For Plato and Aristotle, the desirable (or, in the words of Plato, “truest and best”) form of equality under real world circumstances was to dispense the same for equal merit, so, to give more to the “better” and less to the “worse”. This reasoning was obviously based on the implicit conviction that human beings are different from each other with respect to merit. And, as distribution up to individual honors cannot be an equal one if human beings are different in merits, a certain level of social disparities seems an acceptable, or even just condition. Cicero, however, articulated another opinion by introducing the idea of

a priori similarity of human beings into philosophical thought. If individuals are equal by nature in their being human, rights should also be distributed equally among them; it is a *natural law* (Schwarz 2001). In fact, equality regarded as equal distribution was not a profoundly new category in Cicero's time, since it had already been referred to by Plato and Aristotle. But, unlike the latter thinkers, who found this sort of equality not desirable in real societies, Cicero was an advocate of it. Thus, *equality as an equal distribution* between individuals became presented as a relevant and, actually, *requested condition in real, non-imaginary societies*. This approach threw new light on the philosophical debate over disparities, and proved highly influential later on.

This reasoning, of course, cannot be detached from Cicero's personal ambitions and the general political circumstances of his era. Cicero was descended from a family belonging to the *equestrian* order, which counted as a part of aristocracy, but definitely had a lower rank and less privilege than patricians did. As an outcome of this, nobody in Cicero's family had ever had a public position before him (Cicero 1999). With this serious disadvantage, he could only enter public life after a long and hard period of studying and gaining fame as a barrister (Cicero and Sabine 1929). Even after getting involved in politics, Cicero remained an advocate of the equestrian order (Butler 2002). Later on, as a traditional republican politician he also confronted dictatorial attempts to exclude broad strata of Roman society from public life. For this, Cicero was driven to the periphery during Caesar's dictatorship, and he was proscribed and killed during the Second Triumvirate of Augustus, Lepidus and Marcus Antonius, which finally established the imperial order (Cicero 1999). To sum it up, Cicero's public and political career was a fight against the existing tradition and order, where some privileged were to get high positions, while others coming from lower strata (just as Cicero did) had few possibilities. Thus, Cicero's argumentation for a "naturally given" equality of individuals was a highly political project to create a world for the sake of those then underprivileged.

2.3.4 Thinking About Social Disparities Under the Aegis of Christianity

Besides the Greek and Roman traditions, the Jewish-Christian tradition also made significant contributions to the understanding of social disparities. Christianity gained much in popularity all over the Roman Empire during the first to fourth centuries AD, and was proclaimed the official religion of the *imperium* in 380 by Theodosius I. Thus, its teachings on equality began to dominate related thoughts in Europe. The Christian stance on this question was, however, not without controversies. In the Bible, statements for and against equality are also to be found. On the one hand, the lines of the Old Testament say that all human beings are descendants of Adam, who was created by God "in his image", and Noah, who was the only human survivor of the biblical deluge with his family. These ideas suggest that all human beings are brothers and sisters, and they are all similar to

God. This concept, which is frequently referred to in the New Testament as well (for instance when people are all called sons of the Lord, their Father), suggests that all humans have something essential in common, which makes them equal. On the other hand, however, many parts of the Bible seem to legitimize social disparities, even judging them just. A typical example is the words of Jesus on paying taxes to Caesar through which he is justifying social hierarchies and propagating their acceptance by those subordinated: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.” (Mark 12:17). An even more explicit justification of inequalities is to be read in The Parable of the Talents, in the Gospel of Matthew: “For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken away.” (Matthew 25:29).

Yet, the strongest influence on the evaluation of disparities was not exerted by these moral instructions, but by a remarkable shift in the level at which inequalities should be considered. In the words of Paul the Apostle, it is not the level of worldly differences that does matter, but the heavenly equality of all who believe in God and live in concert with his will. As he put it in his First Epistle to the Corinthians:

“Let each man abide in that calling wherein he was called. Wast thou called being a bondservant? Care not for it: nay, even if thou canst become free, use [it] rather. For he that was called in the Lord being a bondservant, is the Lord’s freedman: likewise he that was called being free, is Christ’s bondservant. Ye were bought with a price; become not bondservants of men. Brethren, let each man, wherein he was called, therein abide with God.” (1 Cor 7:20–24)

This stance is in concert with the words of Jesus in The Sermon of the Mount. Here he expressed the perfect uselessness of focusing on material necessities and their accessibility (and, implicitly but logically, their distribution) instead of concentrating on the belief in God:

“Be not therefore anxious, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? For after all these things do the Gentiles seek; for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. But seek ye first his kingdom, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.” (Matthew 6:31–33)

Similarly to Paul the Apostle, a strict distinction of equality in worldly and heavenly senses was also emphasized by the Christian Roman philosopher, Augustine of Hippo. In his book *The City of God (De civitate Dei)*, he explains that perfect justice and freedom are not to imagine in worldly societies, only in heavenly ones, which one can enter after one’s worldly life ends (Bluhm 2007).

Although this approach may help the poor and hopeless to believe in a better life coming (even if after death), and, thus, to better bear the hardness of life, it also questions the relevance of dealing with worldly disparities. As a consequence of this, in the medieval Europe dominated by Christianity and the Christian Church, the issue of “worldly” social inequalities was driven into the periphery of philosophical and political thought, where it remained for a number of centuries. This was absolutely in concert with the political interests of the ruling social strata since the phenomenon of inequality, which was through its very existence the reason for

the emergence of philosophical concepts on equality as early as in the ancient Greece, did not disappear. Although forcefully legitimized by the Catholic Church, the feudal society of medieval Europe was characterized by enormous social disparities. It was so in terms of dominion as well as political participation, since these were strongly intertwined. And these disparities were extremely stable as the differentiation between the nobles and those without legal privileges (and having strongly limited economic possibilities) was based on hereditary grounds (cf. Schreiner 2001). No wonder that those in power had firm interests in diverting people's attention away from inequalities produced by the ruling order. And this interest was shared by the Catholic Church as well since it also took enormous advantage of the existing order. First, since it had vast land properties and a lot of revenue from tithe, the church itself possessed remarkable worldly wealth. Second, the Catholic Church played a decisive role in legitimizing the ruling order and its representatives otherwise not belonging to the religious sphere (kings, nobles etc.) (Konrád and Szelényi 1978). Thus, the church was also strongly interested in maintaining the feudal order and its social disparities.

Still, social inequalities sometimes led not only to serious tensions, but also to social explosion. This was especially likely in times of war, when the burden of rising taxes, which were only to be paid by those not belonging to nobility, fell on the shoulders of the already poor lower strata. Sometimes these problems resulted in peasants' revolts such as the 1358 Jacquerie in France, Wat Tyler's 1381 rebellion in England, the Bohemian Hussite Wars of 1419–1434, György Dózsa's rebellion of 1514 in Hungary and the German Peasants' Revolt of 1524–1526.

Although these events did not re-launch the philosophical debate over the question of disparities in the short-term, certain processes began to point in this direction in the long run. The gradual intensification of international commerce, the increase of literacy, the invention of printing, and the accompanying streams of thought from various cultures led to an "intellectual and social ferment" in many urban centers. That, on the one hand, turned the interest of many of the educated toward some re-invented philosophical concepts from the Ancient Greece and Rome. On the other hand, it also made intellectuals more sensitive to certain social issues to which their ancient predecessors had drawn significant attention, such as inequalities and the lack of freedom (Schwarz 2001). It was especially the case as the Renaissance, in Burckhardt's (1860) words, brought the "emergence of the individual" (cited by Roeck 2001, p. 13155), thus, for instance, an increased interest in injustice lived and suffered by individuals.

These changes were also given impetus by the Reformation, which gradually, but significantly eroded the position of the Catholic Church, indoctrinator of the righteousness of the feudal social order. As Schilling (2001) puts it, relatively widespread criticism of the Catholic Church had already existed in the late Middle Ages. The Reformation, however, went even further since it "completely de-legitimized" the Pope and the Roman church and "unmasked" them as the "Antichrist" (p. 12892). Moreover, the serious loss of legitimacy and moral authority of the Catholic Church concerned virtually all social strata, even the lower ones. This was because the new teachings of the Reformation were disseminated through mass communication—foremost based on the new technology of printing

(Schilling 2001). In consequence, the control of the Catholic Church over what was permitted to be thought and published grew weaker and weaker. This process also undermined the church's long-lasting endeavor to justify the feudal social order and its significant disparities.

This process was even speeded up by the expanding power of secular actors at the cost of reducing the influence of the Roman church. Even before Luther and his famous 95 theses, the emergence and development of early nation states resulted in a "regionalization" of the church. Due to this new initiative, "national" churches within the one universal church were established all over Europe. The Reformation, however, was not aimed at a moderate increase of diversity within the universal church, but put an end to the very era of a universal church, which opened new ways for the secular state to gain in power. As a typical outcome, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed states getting new funds and property assets through secularization. They were also becoming more and more involved in activities crucial to the legitimization of power but that had been dominated by the Roman church up to then (such as education) (Schilling 2001). Furthermore, strengthening nation states were highly interested in the reformation of the feudal political and social order. They wanted to get rid of the system in which secular actors and institutions had needed the permanent legitimization and support of the Catholic Church, a non-secular actor (*ibid.*). These interests, logically, catalyzed the debate over basic issues which had been exiled from mainstream philosophical thought by religious orthodoxy for many centuries. This was also the case for the question of equity, to which a lot of attention was paid by many thinkers of the Enlightenment.

2.3.5 Concepts About Social Disparities in the Age of Enlightenment: The Case of England

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought the emergence of vivid philosophical debates over the issue of equity in many countries.^{14, 15} These concepts had certain specific features due to their different social and political contexts, but

¹⁴ It is worth noting at this point that the United States was a remarkable exception, despite the manifold influence the American philosophical and political tradition exerted on national traditions in Europe concerning the issue of freedom. The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, the cornerstone of the newly emerging US legal order, only stated that "all men are by nature equally free and independent" (which was a statement with limited "range", given that it referred exclusively to *white men* and in the succeeding decades proved in practice compatible with slavery). Equality is otherwise not mentioned in the bill, neither as equality before the law nor as an equal distribution of properties (Dann 1975).

¹⁵ It should be underlined that the philosophical boom in Europe with regard to disparities rather meant the rapid gain of the issue in popularity than the emergence of a brand new topic. Reformation as well as anti-feudal peasants' revolts had already indicated the importance of the problem, and the slogans propagated by the leaders of Medieval anti-feudal revolts planted the seeds of philosophical debates later on.

similarities were also remarkable, at least for the major stances on the desirable form and level of inequalities. The first place to witness the increasing popularity of concepts on disparities was England. In the heart of all related concepts was a firm rejection of the social disparities produced by feudal society, especially the unequal position of different social strata before the law. The manifold privileges guaranteed to nobility allowed them to hold high offices, actively participate in the political life of the country through their right to vote, and possess great material wealth since they did not have to pay tax. Commoners, however, could not even dream about the same. These tensions, which strongly contributed to the English Civil War between 1642 and 1651 and to the deep transformation of the political system, motivated many thinkers to deal with the problem of social disparities and with the notion of equality. Their stances, however, although common to some extent in their criticism of the feudal order, mirrored different concepts of equality.

One characteristic approach suggested that individuals must be equal in their freedom, in their right not to be oppressed by others and, consequently, to be equal before the law and to equally participate in political decision-making. This argumentation was obviously motivated by the endeavor to undermine the political privileges of nobility, and appeared in many thinkers' works. Milton (1915)[1660], for instance, derived his reasoning from the Protestant idea that "the whole Protestant Church allows no supreme judge or rule in matters of religion, but the scriptures, and these to be interpreted by the scriptures themselves" (p. 34). This anti-hierarchical stance "necessarily infers liberty of conscience" (ibid.), a kind of liberty "best pleasing to God" (ibid.) and, thus, given to everybody. Since this freedom, for Milton, "will be more ample and secure to us under a free Commonwealth than under kinship" (ibid), the best is to establish a political order where everyone can openly form their opinion (which implicitly means the universal right to vote). A similar reasoning was that of John Locke, arguing that "all Men by Nature are equal" (Locke 1988[1689], p. 304). This equality was regarded by him "in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another", so, the "equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man" (ibid.).

These statements, however, were not intended to substantiate equality in a universal sense, thus, an equal distribution of everything among individuals. As Milton put it, "the other part of our freedom consists in the civil rights and advancements of every person *according to his merit*" (our emphasis) (Milton 1915[1660], p. 37). Or, in Locke's words: "Though I have said above... That all Men by Nature are equal [in terms of jurisdiction], I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a *just precedency*: Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due" (our emphasis) (Locke 1988[1689], p. 304). Locke also states, as Bluhm (2007) reveals, that even if everybody is equal initially in terms of jurisdiction, the process of acquiring properties through work leads to a strong differentiation of society as its inner

relations become more and more complex. Considering all these, the argumentation of Milton and Locke seems rather close to the reasoning of *equal rewards for equal merits*, which was already presented in relation to debates over inequalities in ancient Greece. To the reasoning of Plato and Aristotle, the concepts of Milton and Locke were also similar in their (now explicitly articulated) conviction that individual merits are different, which unavoidably leads to unequal rewards. Everyone must be equal before the law and, based on their liberty of conscience given by God, they cannot be deprived of their freedom. But other individual attributes beyond this general one vary from one person to another. As a result, people can be rather different in, for instance, the credit given to their words or in the property they manage to acquire.

Some other thinkers, however, went further and argued for equality regarded as (some) equality in the distribution of resources amongst individuals. Proceeding from a radically Protestant, communistic interpretation of the Bible, they tried to argue for improving the situation of the poor and radically reducing or even abolishing social disparities in terms of property. For James Harrington (1656), for instance, freedom and political equality was only to be imagined if disparities of property (especially land ownership) were also equalized. As he wrote, this meant a distribution, by which “no one man or number of men, within the compass of the few or aristocracy, can come to overpower the whole people by their possessions in lands” (ibid.). An even more radical opinion was that of Gerrard Winstanley (1649). He also underlined that, by “the great Creator Reason”, “not one word was spoken in the beginning [of time], That one branch of mankind should rule over another”. But Winstanley went even further since he argued that equal freedom can only be reached through the common use of land, thus, if “the Earth becomes a Common Treasury again, as it must” (Winstanley 1649). For him, this necessitates the appropriation of private property and the introduction of common property (Bluhm 2007). In other words, the interpretation of *equality as equal distribution of resources* also appeared in seventeenth century England.

2.3.6 Enlightenment in France and the Issue of Social Disparities

During the eighteenth century, just like somewhat earlier in England, the issue of social disparities also became the focus of political and philosophical theorists in France. The reason was generally the same as in England: the aim to leave behind the feudal order together with its manifold social disparities. The first important contribution to the topic was made here by Montesquieu, who in his *The Spirit of Laws (De l'esprit des lois)* identified equality as a natural condition of relations between individuals. Moreover, he added that this equality looses as the society creates and institutionalizes certain forms of disparities, which can only be cured by laws (obviously by non-feudal laws). As he put it: “In the state of nature, men are

born in equality, but they cannot remain so. Society makes them lose their equality, and they become equal only through the laws” (Montesquieu 1989[1752], p. 114). With these words, he introduced the idea into the French discourse that all should be equal before the law, but he was not an advocate of equality in all spheres of life. He was for a “regulated” democracy, where “one is equal only as citizen”, unlike in unregulated democracies where “one is also equal as a magistrate, senator, judge, father, husband, or master” (ibid.). Montesquieu’s approach was rather that of “the same award for the same honor”, which is incompatible with the legal disparities maintained by the feudal system, but is also not aimed at a total equalization of individuals.

In many of its main statements, similar was the opinion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is often considered as “the theoretician of a new revolutionary concept of equality” (Dann 1975, p. 1015), which motivated many during the eighteenth and nineteenth century revolutions all over Europe. He also stated that “men. . .are naturally as equal among themselves as were the animals of every species” (Rousseau 2002[1762], p. 82). For him, social disparities are created by the emergence of society, the division of labor and the introduction of property. Thus, inequalities are produced by society, which steadily increases these inequalities for the benefit of those who already have more (Dann 1975). The “system of disparity” (ibid., p. 1015), however, can be ended by the creation of “a moral and lawful equality”, due to which individuals “become equal by convention and legal right” (Rousseau 2002[1762], p. 169).

Yet, Rousseau did not argue for total equality in all senses. He clarified the reason for this through an important theoretical step, an explicit and exact distinction of what he called natural or physical inequality on the one hand, and moral or political inequality on the other. For him, “natural, or physical inequality. . .is established by nature, and consists in the difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind, or of the soul” (p. 87). Moral or political inequality, however, so “different privileges, which some men enjoy, to the prejudice of others, such as that of being richer, more honored, more powerful” “depends on a kind of convention, and is established, or at least authorized by the common consent of mankind” (ibid). Although physical inequalities cannot be abolished since they are given, the moral equality of individuals can be re-established and guaranteed by feasible regulations. In other words, physical inequality and social equality do not contradict each other (Dann 1975).

This argumentation might seem compatible with that of Montesquieu, but it includes a far-reaching innovation. For Rousseau, all disparities that are not directly given by nature are moral inequalities, which an enlightened society can eliminate. As an example, he cited the equality before law, and did not speak about a radical equalization of properties. Still, his stance can also be interpreted as an indirect justification of the latter. And this provided ammunition to those arguing for an extreme transformation of the existing social order. Abbé de Mably, for instance, made the point that social equality can only be reached through an equal distribution of land property (Dann 1975). The Jacobins also followed this reasoning, and projected their egalitarian visions over all spheres of society. For Gracchus Babeuf

(1796), a main Jacobin agitator of the French revolution, equality before the law was only “conditional equality”. Instead of this, he wanted “real equality” including the abolition of differences “between rich and poor, great and small, masters and servants, rulers and ruled”. A crucial and specific point here was “the community of goods”. Babeuf vehemently argued for an equal distribution of virtually everything: “Let there no longer be any difference between people than that of age and sex. . .let. . .then be for them but one education, but one food. They are satisfied with one sun and one air for all: why then would the same portion and the same quality of food not suffice for each of them?” As can be seen, Babeuf and, in general, the Jacobins were for social equality regarded as an equal distribution of all resources. To justify this point, they claimed that all individuals are the same, not only respective to legal and moral, but also to basic material aspects; in Babeuf’s words: “all have the same faculties and the same needs”.

Of course, as the “conditional” equality of those regarding social equality as equality before the law was rejected by supporters of radical changes, the latter’s extreme claims were also criticized by many liberal philosophers. de Condorcet (1796)[1795], for instance, agreed that the principal causes of social disparities are not purely jurisdictional ones, but also concern the material sphere. In his eyes especially important were the “inequality of wealth”, the inequalities in the capability of securing the sources of subsistence to family members (especially descendants),¹⁶ and the “inequality of instruction”, meaning education (p. 259). This is why “there frequently exists a considerable distinction between the rights which the law acknowledges in the citizens of a state, and those which they really enjoy” (ibid.). De Condorcet also agreed that “these. . .kinds of real inequality must continually diminish” (ibid.). Yet, he was firm in rejecting any drive toward borderless equalization. As he put it, these inequalities “have natural and necessary causes, which it would be absurd as well as dangerous to think of destroying; nor can we attempt even to destroy entirely their effects, without opening at the same time more fruitful forces of inequality, and giving to the rights of man a more direct and more fatal blow” (pp. 259–260).

It is important to refer here to the member of the House of Commons in Great Britain, the political philosopher Edmund Burke as well, generally regarded as the “father of conservatism” (Kirk 1953, p. 21; see Lock 2006, p. 585). Although not being a Frenchman, he drew a lot of attention to the French Revolution, and his interpretation was very similar to that of French liberal philosophers. Burke underlined that social disparities are unavoidably produced by society, thus, they cannot be abolished. However, they are necessary for functioning of society, from which all individuals benefit, even those belonging to lower classes. As he put it, social inequalities are established by “the order of civil life. . .as much for the benefit of those whom it must leave in a humble state, as those whom it is able to

¹⁶ Landowners, for example, can leave their lands to their children, but employees cannot do the same with their workplace, which is their main source of income.

exalt to a condition more splendid, but not more happy” (Burke 1910[1790], p. 35). Consequently, he judged any attempts at total abolition of disparities “monstrous fiction”, which, “inspiring false ideas and vain expectations”, “serves only to aggravate and embitter that real inequality, which it never can remove” (ibid.). In his argument, the ignorance of this and the endeavor to eliminate all inequalities would destroy the very foundation of society (Dann 1975).

Another representative of this ideology is the relatively late interpreter of the French Revolution, the classical liberal thinker Alexis de Tocqueville. For him, a radical notion of equality can either result in anarchy or in tyranny. As he put it: “Equality produces. . .two tendencies: one leads men directly to independence and can push them suddenly as far as anarchy; the other leads them by a longer, more secret, but surer road toward servitude” (Tocqueville 2010[1835/1840], p. 1193). In his reasoning, equality as having equal access to all resources can cause an ultimate collapse of society on the one hand. On the other hand, if the power manages to get out of this equalization process, after a while it can crack down on the atomized mass of equal citizens, who become unable “to defend their independence against the aggressions of power” (p. 90). This does not necessarily mean the dominance of a small clique, but even a situation where the equalized majority oppresses those still considered “others” (Bluhm 2007). Thus, a radically interpreted equality as equal distribution of everything amongst individuals unavoidably fails to realize the high goals it sets for itself, namely equality in freedom and well-being.

As can be seen, the social and political processes of eighteenth century France and the French Revolution not only made the issue of social disparities popular. They also resulted in the emergence of two characteristic stances, which, as could be seen, both had their precedents in Western philosophical thought. One argued for a legal framework, which guaranteed that all were equal before the law, but not in terms of property. For the latter, disparities emerging if legal equality is guaranteed were considered “just” and tolerable. This concept was actually based on the notion of “the same reward for the same merit”. Furthermore, it mirrored the sometimes implicit, but often explicit idea that since individual differences are given by nature, individual merits are necessarily different. The other intellectual stream defined equality as equal distribution of resources, whose goal was derived from a conviction that individuals are morally as well as materially common in their being human and in their basic human needs. Incidentally, these two concepts were not just “floating” in that time’s common discourse, but both were strongly linked to certain societal groups and their interests. As Dann (1975) reveals, equality before the law, so the same award for the same honor was a main goal of the bourgeois middle class, standing against feudalism as well as against radical equalization of resources. To interpret equality as an equal distribution, “the same for everybody”, became a popular slogan for lower classes, who were the main supporters of the Jacobin movement.

2.3.7 *Increasing Importance of Disparity Issues in Central and Eastern Europe*

In general, the same tendencies as described in France were to be seen in Germany, where the question of equality was brought into the focus of thinkers (again) by the French Revolution.¹⁷ Many got inspired by fifteenth century anti-feudal rebellions of Thomas Müntzer and Michael Gaismair (cf. Goerz 1989; Macek 1988), while they took the eighteenth century point elaborated by the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant. In this approach, all human beings are common in their autonomous reason, moral dignity and ultimate purpose, even if they are naturally unequal in physical sense. This idea motivated Kant to speak about the “unlimited equality of people” (Kant 1786; cited by Dann 1975, p. 1021), a concept also internalized by many who were touched by Kantian philosophy, such as the poet Friedrich Schiller, or the philosophers Friedrich Schlegel and Jakob Friedrich Fries (Dann 1975). Their understanding of equality, however, only referred to jurisdictional and political issues (to the equal right to express political opinion, foremost through the right to vote). As Schlegel put it, the “maximum [of the equality defined by Kant] would be an absolute equality of civil rights and obligations” (Schlegel 1966[1796], p. 12; cited by Dann 1975, p. 1023).

Meanwhile, however, the radical approaches becoming especially strong in the last phase of the French Revolution also influenced some in German areas. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, for example, followed the Jacobins while he was arguing not only for equal rights, but also for an equalization of property relations. In his view, “everyone as human being has their legal claim on property; this legal claim is equal for all” (Fichte 1806, p. 463). And this equal distribution of property should be guaranteed even if only possible in a state with total and violent control over society (Dann 1975).

Since a significant transformation of the feudal-type German legal order remained a vision before the revolution of 1848, both concepts of equality remained present in the related discourse. Their relation, however, became more and more competitive. Thus, they put a strong emphasis not only on their common rejection of feudalism, but also on their irreconcilable difference to each other. And, similarly as it had happened in France during the revolution, they were caught up by different social strata. As Dann (1975) reveals, the German civic class supported equality before the law, an interpretation of equality as giving the same to the same. Meanwhile, the underprivileged working class, which began to increase in size due

¹⁷ A detailed description of the discourse on equality in Germany from the late eighteenth century on (although with emphases different to those of our paper) is given by Dann (1975). We have to emphasize that neither the democratic idea of political equality nor democratic communities were without predecessors in German speaking territories (for the latter a peculiar example was the *Landsgemeinde*, an early form of direct democracy in Swiss cantons, and, until the Napoleonic Wars, in the Bregenzerwald Region of Austria). In intellectual debates, however, the topic had attracted little attention until the French Revolution.

to a gradual industrialization of many German areas, sympathized with the radically egalitarian notion of giving the same to everyone.

In 1848 and 1849, a revolutionary wave was overrunning almost the whole of Europe. This opened the door for many political endeavors inspired to a great extent by the preceding decades' concepts on equality. The events led to important changes in each society concerned. The revolution swept away serfdom in the last bastions of feudalism in Christian Europe, or catalyzed processes soon resulting in the same (serfdom was abolished in the Habsburg Empire in 1848 and in 1861 in Russia). Furthermore, important steps were taken to establish not only equality before the law, but also political equality. The circle of those having the right to vote gradually increased. In France and Switzerland, universal male suffrage was introduced in 1848. The same was achieved in German territories when the unified German Empire was proclaimed in 1871, and in the US through the 15th Amendment of the Constitution in 1870. In the United Kingdom the process of emancipation was slower, yet, the number of males with voting rights was raised in 1867 as well as in 1884.¹⁸ The goals shared by all opponents of the old feudal order seemed to become reality gradually. This fact turned the attention of thinkers more and more towards the differences between the advocates of legal and political equality on the one hand, and those arguing for material equality on the other. The discourse on equality tended to focus on various attitudes towards material disparities. Here, the duality of the discourse with two competing interpretations of inequalities proved rather stable. Meanwhile, however, the basic arguments upon which intellectuals tried to substantiate their interpretation of equality changed.

2.3.8 *Social Disparities in the Light of (R)Evolutionary Ideas: Darwin and his Reception in the Marxist Approach*

For all competing approaches new inspiration was given by Charles Darwin's (1859) concept of natural selection and the evolution of species. Although the book did not discuss human evolution, its core idea of struggle for life quickly raised the attention of many social thinkers of all political ideologies. A number of supporters of laissez-faire capitalism were made similarly enthusiastic by Darwinian thoughts as many liberals, socialists, or even anarchists. In fact, many of them simply misunderstood, misinterpreted or had not even read Darwin's work (Paul 2009). But, as Paul (2009) puts it, they "found in his [Darwin's] ambiguities legitimation for whatever they favoured" (p. 220). Even as Darwin's next book on social evolution was released (see Darwin 1871), numerous intellectuals simply

¹⁸ A more detailed description of the extension of voting rights in various European countries is to be found in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).

cherry-picked his ideas to substantiate the political concepts they found desirable (Paul 2009).¹⁹

In the post-1848 phase of Western history, some thinkers urged for the equalization of material wealth. For them, only the establishment of an equal distribution of property could guarantee social equality and peace. These already well-known slogans, however, needed new arguments for post-revolutionary times. Here an especially important role was played by Karl Marx, who interpreted human history as a long series of *class struggles* for resources. For the initial condition of society, he hypothesized a so-called primitive communism, a classless society with tribal (actually common) property and without institutionalized social disparities.²⁰ In his eyes, this natural condition was put to an end by those trying to suppress and exploit others to increase their own property and wealth. This became first possible when—following domestication—the division of labor (especially the vertical division of labor) took place. Since using weapons did not remain a necessary prerequisite for production any more (unlike in hunting tribes), certain societal groups could exclude others from having access to weapons, and made it their own privilege. This enabled the privileged group to suppress others and deprive them of owning property and forces of production—except from their physical workforce. After such a social transformation, antique, feudal and capitalist societies all brought about the existence and struggle of two classes. In ancient societies, the free and slaves were fighting against each other. In feudal societies, the dichotomy was based on the opposition of landlords and serfs. Capitalist societies witness class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But finally, according to the theory, the proletariat defeats the bourgeoisie which opens the way for communism and a classless society (see Niedermaier 2009).

As can be seen, Marx's argumentation still strongly mirrored the influence of certain ideas of the Enlightenment. His idea of initial societies was that of an equal one, just as by Locke and Rousseau. And his goal was to re-establish classless relations under the aegis of communism, where social disparities would not be present any more. This objective was similar to already existing radical ideas of equalizing the distribution of resources amongst individuals. Related to this, Marx also internalized a concept that had been fostered by many in the preceding decades. He clearly confronted the notion of legal and political equality to "factual" socio-economic equality. To his eyes, the first was just a bourgeois concept to mask

¹⁹ On the spatially selective reception of Darwin's concept and the relevance of the geographical context for which aspects of the Darwinian concept were emphasized or ignored at given places also see Livingstone (2003b, 2006).

²⁰ This does not necessarily mean an absolute lack of inequalities. In Marxist interpretation, certain disparities can exist even within classless societies. Senior members of tribes, for instance, can have more influence on decision-making over the life of tribe due to the respect they enjoy. However, the forces of production are owned by the community, which, in the Marxist approach, means that nobody can be excluded from their use. In consequence, such deep and stable inequalities cannot emerge as those in class societies (see Niedermaier 2009).

the maintenance of real disparities, thus, something that should be rejected (Dann 1975).

The same stance was presented by Friedrich Engels in his *Anti-Dühring*. Here he stated that the notion of equality “reduced itself to bourgeois equality before the law” (our emphasis) in concepts of the great thinkers of the eighteenth century (Engels 1976[1878], p. 19). In contrast to this narrow interpretation, he argued that “equality must not be merely apparent, must not apply merely to the sphere of the state, but must also be real, must also be extended to the social, economic sphere” (p. 98). For him, this could mean nothing less than “the abolition of classes” (p. 99).

As mirrored by these concepts, Marx and Engels were advocates of equality regarded as an equal distribution of social and economic resources among individuals. With this they firmly distanced themselves from the interpretation of equality as equal reward for equal honor, and not only implicitly. In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx explicitly judged the latter approach absolutely deniable. For him, if the point is, in his words, to give equal right for equal production, “the right of the producers is *proportional* to the labor they supply” (original emphasis) (Marx 2009[1875], p. 9). But “one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time” (p. 10). In consequence, “equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor” (ibid.). And this was the point where Marx revealed why he firmly rejected this principle. His main argument was not to deny that individual contributions were different, thus, to suggest a sort of individual equality respective to abilities. Instead, he criticized the concept as it recognized “unequal individual endowment” as a “natural privilege” (ibid.). Thus, for Marx, the “equal right for equal supply” principle undermines social equality and justifies the maintenance of disparities. It legitimizes all kinds of individual differences through judging them “natural”, while hiding their social reasons. Furthermore, as Marx argued, the “equal right for equal supply” concept of equality did not consider different individual needs. As he put it, according to this principle workers “with an equal performance of labor” (ibid.) would factually get the same. But if we consider that one worker might be married while the other is single, one might have many children while the other has none, their just needs to sustain their families are also different. Thus, to give the same to all workers with the same labor means to give more to some wives and children than to others. For Marx, the solution was simple: “to avoid all these defects, *right*, instead of being equal, *would have to be unequal*” (our emphasis) (ibid.). In these words, Marx explicitly articulated what we have already referred to in this paper. Namely, that the idea of “equal reward for equal honor” is based on the hypothesis of naturally different individual qualities, which are therefore automatically justified. Those arguing for equal distribution, however, do not believe in such a natural determination, thus, they judge unjust any social and economic differences between individuals. Furthermore, they even tolerate the inequality of rights as a prerequisite for an equal distribution. With other words, giving different award for the same merit can gain their acceptance if it results in an equal distribution of resources amidst individuals.

2.3.9 *Social Disparities and “The Struggle for Existence”: Anti-Marxist Interpretations of Darwin*

Darwin’s ideas not only gave inspiration to advocates of a radical equalization of society, but also to their opponents. Their notion to give the same for the same, which in their view would necessarily lead to unequal distribution due to different individual merits, could seemingly be substantiated by certain thoughts of the British naturalist. In his 1871 work on social evolution, Darwin adapted his original concept of natural selection for societal relations. As he put it: “Man, like every other animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high condition through a struggle for existence consequent on his rapid multiplication” (Darwin, 1981 [1871], p. 403). And if human society wants to avoid sinking “into indolence”, “there should be open competition for all men; and the most able should not be prevented by laws or customs for succeeding best and rearing the largest number of offspring” (ibid.). In fact, as Paul (2009) shows, Darwin’s concept of social evolution was not as one-sided as these citations might suggest. He had many comments for as well as against promoting individual competition in human society. That is why he could be interpreted positively by representatives of so many different political views. It is no wonder, of course, that the advocates for individual competition and the unavailability of disparities concentrated on Darwin’s corresponding statements.

As Hofstadter (1944) revealed, referring to Darwin was rather a common habit of laissez-faire conservatives in English-speaking countries. In their opinion, it was only natural that “the best competitors in a competitive situation would win” (pp. 6–7).²¹ This stance was rather compatible with the idea of the same award for the same merit. Furthermore, just as Marx emphasized, it justified social disparities: the very nature of competition assumes that the award should be given to the winner, and equal distribution does not come into question. Such an interpretation of Darwinian ideas was even stronger in Germany, where Darwin’s works enjoyed especially widespread popularity (Paul 2009). As Dann (1975) shows, many German thinkers stated that social equality (urged e.g. by the Marxists) would result in an overall equalization. Reflecting to equalizing notions,

²¹ This is the stance usually described as “social Darwinism” in the literature (Paul 2009). Yet, I do not use this term in the text since this extreme laissez-faire conservatism was basically not rooted in Darwin’s ideas, from which they utilized many slogans. Instead, they could rather be traced back to some concepts of the “neo-Lamarckians” (Paul 2009; cf. Bowler 1990; Hofstadter 1944; Moore 1985). They followed the pre-Darwinian French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck in thinking that organisms acquire new characteristics as the result of a process of active adaptation to their environments (Paul 2009). It was their conviction that, as formulated by the British philosopher Herbert Spencer, “the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such [the “unfit”], to clear the world of them, to make room for better” (Spencer 1970[1851], p. 379; cited by Paul 2009, p. 232). The quick spread of this idea was partly thanks to the skyrocketing popularity of Darwin’s works, which, although not “neo-Lamarckian”, opened the way for other evolutionary concepts as well. That is why many superficial observers identified Darwinism with evolutionism (Paul 2009).

they envisaged a dark future with the authority of masses, where there would be no space left for the “natural aristocracy”, which had emerged during the “struggle for life” (p. 1043) due to its better abilities.

One of the most well-known German philosophers of the late nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche was also influenced by evolutionist and Darwinian ideas, even if he referred to Darwin and Spencer as “worthy but mediocre Englishmen” (Nietzsche 2002[1886], p. 144). Nietzsche interpreted society as a mass of predatory human beings, who are generally irrational, and in a permanent fight with one another (cf. Bluhm 2007). In such a context, he confronted the “herd animal”, the valueless commoner, as compared to the “noble”, who succeeded in emerging from among the “pack” due to superior abilities. For him, social disparity was a necessary result of the differing qualities of individuals. Meanwhile, he regarded all endeavors to eliminate inequalities as attempts to destroy anyone better than the herd animal. For this reason, he harshly criticized the Christian concept of equality before God as well as socialist, communist notions. Nietzsche (2002)[1886] made this opinion explicit while discussing Christianity, “the most disastrous form of arrogance so far” (p. 57). In his words, the whole project of European Christianity was aimed to “stand all valuations *on their head*” (original emphasis) (p. 56). This was considered by him as a violent intervention in the natural process of a kind of social selection:

“... crush the strong, strike down the great hopes, throw suspicion on the delight in beauty, skew everything self-satisfied, manly, conquering, domineering, every instinct that belongs to the *highest and best-turned-out type of ‘human’* [our emphasis], twist them into uncertainty, crisis of conscience, self-destruction” (p. 56).

For Nietzsche, these attempts can directly be blamed for a deprivation of European society:

“people who were not noble enough to see the abysmally different orders of rank and chasms in rank between different people... with their ‘equality before God’ have prevailed over the fate of Europe so far, until a stunted, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something well-meaning, sickly and mediocre has finally been bred: the European of today” (p. 57).

Nietzsche had a very similar approach to his days’ socialist egalitarian concepts—or, in his words, to the aims of “today’s socialist fools and nitwits”. As he put it, the claim to “equal rights and equal claims” was a “brutalizing process of turning humanity into stunted little animals”, or the “degeneration and diminution of humanity into the perfect herd animal” (p. 92). For him, such a goal “could all too easily end up as equal wrongs”, or “in waging a joint war on anything rare, strange, privileged, on the higher man, higher soul, higher duty, higher responsibility, on creative power and mastery” (p. 107). Instead of such, Nietzsche was on the side of “greatness”. For him, “greatness” was equal to “being noble, wanting to be yourself, the ability to be different, standing alone and needing to live by your own fists” (ibid). In other words, “greatness” in his eyes was something that few can reach, and if they reach it, great social disparities unavoidably emerge.

In general, Nietzsche's argumentation was based on an anthropologic-like hypothesis of an irrational, predatory and competing humankind. He had a specific concept of social evolution and selection projected onto a negative idea of humans. Under these circumstances, he regarded few to have "higher" qualities to emerge from the mass of "herd animals", which necessarily produces social disparities. These inequalities were actually justified by Nietzsche, since in his eyes the emergence of the "highest and best-turned-out type of" humans was the only alternative to a "total degeneration of humanity". Furthermore, derived from his negative idea of human, he even questioned the moral right of anyone to urge for equality. His reasoning was cynical but simple: "the non-possessors. . .are no better than the possessors and have no moral prerogative over them, for their own ancestors were at some time or other possessors" (Nietzsche 2007[1878], p. 166). With all these specific features, Nietzsche was a vehement opponent of equal distribution, and a firm adversary of any attempts to get anything away from those with "higher" abilities. Instead, he was for a kind of "equal reward for equal merit" approach, where he regarded individual merits extremely differently.

The late nineteenth century concepts of equality proved very popular and exerted a significant influence on politics in the next century as well. The socialist notion of establishing equality as an equal distribution of resources was internalized and explicitly propagated by key theoreticians of the international labor movement. This interpretation of equality became common among socialist and communist politicians as well, although the actual steps they wanted to take varied on a broad scale. While many (e.g. social democrats) believed in the success of gradual social reforms, others were much more definite (see Lenin 1961[1902]). Lenin, for instance, urged in his works for radical political steps to advance "from formal equality to actual equality" (Lenin 2004[1917], p. 85), thus, to promote material equality instead of equality before the law. And his endeavor, which was based on that of Marx and aimed at the creation of a classless society, gained remarkable political importance soon. After the success of the communist revolution in Russia and the proclamation of the USSR in 1922, communist egalitarian concepts officially became guiding principles of a country the size of a continent.

Meanwhile, the idea of equal reward for equal honor, which actually meant an unequal distribution at the end, also gained many supporters. Advocates of capitalism and liberal democracies were among them as well as leading figures of the newly emerging fascist and national socialist movements in Italy and Germany. Their approaches, of course, were dramatically different. For the former group, they promoted equality before the law, a necessary prerequisite for democratic circumstances. However, the idea of capitalism based on free competition was incompatible with any interpretations of equality as an equal distribution of resources. For extreme rightists, the Darwinian concept of natural selection that was often referred to gained a radical meaning. They emphasized the permanent competition between human beings, where the "stronger" should win and the "weaker" should fall, even in a strict biological sense. In fact, the national socialists rather used the Darwinian language simply to popularize their goals, and barely relied on Darwin's thoughts and notions (Evans 1997; Paul 2009). Yet, the idea of

equal reward for equal honor became for them a propagandistic means of legitimizing their racist aims to enslave or annihilate certain groups of humans.

2.3.10 Concepts About Social Disparities After World War II: Revaluation of the Individual Perspective

Although the extreme racist ideas of Fascism and Nazism ended up on the rubbish heap of history, the issue of equality remained in the forefront of political debates. After 1945, the Cold War also brought an ideological clash between the Western and Eastern blocs. Arguments on both sides could well utilize a number of already existing philosophical concepts to justify their goals. Thus, the number of concepts to make original contributions to the issue of disparities was rather moderate. The few important exceptions showed the influence of new philosophical ideas, which tried to see the world of a faceless mass society from the perspective of individuals, being threatened in their freedom by the increasing power of state bureaucracies (see Bluhm 2007; some characteristic examples are Fromm 1942; Arendt 1961; Marcuse 2007[1964]).

Especially important were the works of the American philosopher John Rawls, who was approaching the issue of equality from a new direction. He initiated the idea of an “original position”, where individuals should agree on the moral principles of a societal order to come. Here, nobody knows what position they can reach in this order. As Rawls (2005)[1971] put it, they have to choose principles “behind a veil of ignorance” (p. 12). And, since nobody knows which principles would favor their own partial interests in their future positions, they will accept “fair” principles which all of them would judge just irrespective of their position-to-be. For Rawls, this “original position” is characterized by “the symmetry of everyone’s relations to each other” (ibid). Consequently, the final principle they will agree on can only be to share resources equally. Only one exception was to be tolerated. If some happen to get less access to resources, it is legitimate to justify an unequal distribution in case it serves the needs of the less well-off and contributes to equalization. As he put it: “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both. . .to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (p. 302). In short, unequal distribution can only be tolerated if it helps to demolish existing disparities. With this stance, the work of Rawls was generally based on a viewpoint that had been a characteristic one for a long time in the debate over equality. He interpreted equality as an equal distribution of resources, which was legitimized by the postulate that all individuals would be equal in an “original position”.

The justness of this stance, however, was challenged by Nozick (1999)[1974], himself also a philosopher. He questioned Rawls’s thesis that individuals would agree on an equal distribution in terms of giving the same to everybody. For him, it would only be possible under circumstances where nobody assumed that individuals could have different abilities. But such a situation is artificial and hardly

can emerge in real life. To illustrate this, Nozick cited the theoretical example of a group of students, whom are offered that they get the grades which they agree on among each other before the exam. Supposing that they are absolutely unaware of their different virtues (e.g. that some of them might be hard-working, others not, some might be clever, others less etc.), they are possible to accept a Rawlsian equal distribution of grades. But in real situations, students have some experience on the unequal capabilities of themselves and the other ones, on that some are prepared well, while others not etc. Thus, at least those with better abilities and more self-confidence would certainly not agree with the Rawlsian principles of distribution. With other words, in Nozick's eyes Rawls' concept presented an example perfectly out of touch with everyday life. For Nozick, it was derived from a much too abstract situation, due to what its principles of distribution were only to have relevance under abstract, imaginary conditions. Nozick, however, argued for another principle, where students would accept previously only a distribution of grades which met the expectations of all of them concerning their real potentials.

Furthermore, Nozick stressed that such a rejection of Rawlsian attempts to equality was not necessarily rooted in an unjust selfishness of individuals. Here he drew up the example of a talented basketball player, who received 25 cents from the price of each ticket of admission in each home game. In his opinion, even if one assumed an initially equal distribution of resources (here money), it is possible that one million persons would attend the games in the season. Thus, each of these one million people would lose 25 cents, while the basketball star would earn an extra sum of \$250,000. This would lead to an unequal distribution, but to a just one in Nozick's eyes. It is the sovereign choice of the one million persons that to see the star is worth 25 cents for them. And it is their autonomous judgment that the basketball player deserves the quarter million dollars. In consequence, Nozick did not argue for an equal distribution, but to one which is accepted by all individuals concerned. In his words:

“From each according to what he chooses to do, to each according to what he makes for himself (perhaps with the contracted aid of others) and what other choose to do for him and choose to give him of what they've been given previously. . .and haven't yet expanded or transferred. . . .From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.” (Nozick 1999[1974], p. 160).

As can be seen, Nozick was for a distribution where everyone received rewards according to their merit, which, due to manifold differences between individuals, cannot be an egalitarian one. It means that the contributions of Rawls and Nozick to the issues of equality and disparities, although being original in their firm focus on individuals, followed the two competing approaches that had existed for thousands of years. The concept of Rawls suggested that equality is to mean an equal distribution of resources among individuals, while Nozick argued for “giving the same reward for the same merit”, even if this ends up in social disparities.

2.3.11 Thinking About Social Disparities: Summary of an Historical Overview

The historical overview of thinking about equality and inequalities lets us summarize some main features of the whole of the debate. As one can observe, the issue of equality has had quite a long tradition in Western philosophical thought, and a number of thinkers have dealt with the question. This remarkable interest has been motivated by the strong political relevance of the problem, namely the virtually omnipresent nature of social disparities and the tensions and struggles caused by them. Furthermore, the relation between philosophical thinking and politics has been mutual. Theoretical concepts have always mirrored their social and political contexts, while they have frequently been caught up by various political movements. Beyond these, related works have interpreted equality in different spheres (e.g. jurisdictional, political and economic).

Still they have had much in common regarding their general stances. For these, two sorts of reasoning have been used frequently, both of which have proved relevant in different contexts and over many epochs. One viewpoint has interpreted equality as an equal distribution of resources, based on the (sometimes only implicit) supposition that all humans are equal. The other approach has emphasized that equality should mean equal reward for equal merit. This concept is (explicitly or implicitly) derived from the assumption that individual abilities and, thus, honors are different. Thus, the notion of an equal distribution as end-state is challenged here, and the argumentation justifies an unequal distribution of resources, if it matches the notion of giving the same for the same. Most thinkers have referred to both approaches in their works, and also clarified their attitudes towards both. These stances were virtually always *for* one concept and *against* the other one. Despite various social, political, economic and geographical contexts, all thinkers have seemed to deal with the issue of equality as if it were a dilemma to decide and where the (only) “right” approach should be found. Their different arguments have been mobilized seemingly to find the answer to a question which had already engaged so many of their predecessors. Thus, the question emerges, which approach to equality and to disparities is “correct” and whose authors have been “right”. In the following section we are focusing on this issue.

2.4 Which Equality? On the Legitimacy of Two Approaches

The philosophical debate over equality and disparities, to which the last section was devoted, might seem purely theoretical and isolated from the everyday problems of the real world. This is, in fact, not so: both approaches we have presented have very definite social and political implications. These are necessary to consider if we are investigating the arguments for and against the two viewpoints. From a practical

point of view, the concept of promoting equality as equal distribution is aimed at the reduction of social disparities, at decreasing the gap between those having more and less. This notion can be interpreted at different levels: in jurisdictional, political, economic etc. senses. In its most general sense, equal distribution refers to all of these. This concept is based on a simple assumption, which was already mentioned in the last section: that we all are human beings, so everybody is equal in their right to a humane life. And a humane life can only be guaranteed through adequate access to basic resources. "Resources" are to be interpreted here broadly. They include material goods and services such as food, clothing, housing, healthcare or education, but political and legal rights as well, including those frequently referred to as basic human rights. Of course, as Schmitt (2008)[1928] puts it, "the substance of equality can vary among...different historical periods" (p. 259). And since equality before the law and the equal right to vote have been achieved in Europe and North America over the last centuries, for several decades the most attention has been paid in the Western context to material or economic disparities. As Nagel (1991) suggests, recently material disparities form a decisive part of "a broader inequality of social status, personal freedom, and self-respect" (p. 5). Thus, the notion of equal distribution is most often manifest in the will to get closer to the state of material equality. For this reason, here we focus on this aspect of equality to present the two main approaches concerning the tolerable or desirable form and level of disparities. Spontaneous social, political and economic processes, however, seem to point to the opposite direction: towards concentration of more resources in the hands of few and, consequently, in the impoverishment of others. This tendency, if being uncontrolled, undermines the universal accessibility of basic goods, and ends up in a situation which is judged "unjust" by advocates of equal distribution. To avoid such an unacceptable ending, a strong state seems necessary which regularly redistributes the wealth produced by society in order to guarantee humane lives for everybody. This redistribution might be unpleasant for those possessing more, but is expected to guarantee a humane life for all individuals.

The rival interpretation of social disparities is basically different. This approach emphasizes that in a 'just' society individual returns from society should correspond to individual efforts to increase the total well-being of society. For several reasons, however, individuals do not contribute to overall social well-being to the same extent. Some might have better abilities, work harder, they are more creative, take more risks etc., and, consequently, create more and, thus, become wealthier. Others might have poorer abilities, work less, lack creativity, avoid risks etc., so they contribute less to society and have fewer resources. According to this social philosophy, such inequalities are not "unjust" since they are logical and natural results of unequal personal efforts. Taking this, any (e.g. state-controlled) redistribution of income and other revenues is "unjust" if it takes resources away from those who have more to give them to those having less. This would be a punishment for those who produce more and deserve being affluent, and an "unjust" support for those who have made less efforts and therefore do not deserve extra funding. Thus, the state should not redistribute resources among its citizens, but its task is to guarantee that everyone gets what they have "worked for" and "deserve". In other

words, equality of human beings should not mean an egalitarian distribution of resources (equality in distribution), but rather a principle of always giving the same reward for the same achievement (equality of judgment).

Of course, these two approaches are just schematized concepts, two extremes of a broad scale with many levels in between. There are certainly very few who would argue for an *absolute* equality of resources among individuals. Neither did the leaders of Soviet-type communist regimes, and not only because they ensured the privileged position of communist party members. In these systems, in accordance with notions of the leadership, wages, for instance, were higher in more productive branches, and individual differences of productivity were also considered to some extent for efficiency reasons (Sawer 1980). Similarly, the vast majority of those opposing the redistribution of resources to reach an equal distribution would certainly not judge “unjust” to help those who are starving, regardless to the reason for their extreme poverty.

The abstractness of these approaches might become even more obvious from another point of view. Both concepts can open the floor to tragic social processes if they are exaggerated and followed too strictly in practice. A system, which is aimed at an ultimate equalization of society, can undermine all individual efforts to improve (material as well as non-material) conditions of living. Furthermore, it would also destroy the regulatory mechanisms without which our society would collapse (see 2.1.). The notion to give the same reward for the same honor can also be abused to justify extreme disparities, and it can end up in callous regimes. The infamous slogan “*Jedem das Seine*” (“to each what they deserve”) above the entrance gate of the Nazi concentration camp Buchenwald clearly indicates this. It is a normative question what is regarded “honor”, and it is a question of power who are allowed to define it. And those in power might agree on a definition of merit which constitutes whole social groups “worthless” (on basis of religion, race, class etc.), and justifies these groups’ annihilation.

As can be seen, life is far too complex to be administered along such simple principles. In consequence, most people are neither totally *for* nor *against* equality. It is not difficult to realize this if one focuses at a micro level instead of on “general issues” of inequality, which are actually alien to real life. In a small pottery business, if one employee makes only one pot a day, while another employee makes ten pots of the same quality, paying more money for the second potter does not seem “unjust”—not even for egalitarians, supposedly. If somebody is badly injured in a serious industrial accident and becomes profoundly unable to work, presumably anti-egalitarian ideologists would also find it “just” that they are helped by the society—even if they themselves might also be responsible for the accident. Furthermore, issues of equality and inequality also emerge in seemingly simple events of everyday life—even in sports, for instance. Let’s have the example of football players on a pitch. For instance, a forward kicks the opposing team’s goalkeeper in the head on purpose. Presumably very few will disagree with sending him/her off, thus, taking away from him/her the opportunity to play. Neither those having egalitarian conviction would be likely to protest. It also seems “just” and “fair” that the cup and the money prize are given to the soccer league’s winning

team instead of rewarding all teams similarly. Meanwhile, however, cups are given to teams, where each member's contribution to the final success is considered the same with this very act. Within the team, the honor of outstanding achievement is split among team members in an egalitarian way. This method certainly strengthens team spirit, but disregards the fact that each team member's effective individual contribution might be very different. Still, honor is equally distributed among the players, and fans do not find it a problem at all—even if many of them are likely to be anti-egalitarians *in general*.

Given these, there is no simple and *universally* valid answer to the question of which concept of equality is “righteous”, for at least two reasons. First, both approaches to the issue of disparities lack universal validity. As presented, a (big large) variety of specific situations is possible where several egalitarian people would disagree with “giving the same to everyone”. Similarly, it is easy to illustrate that anti-egalitarian people, who do not favor equal distribution (and redistribution as its means) in general, are still likely to support them under certain circumstances. In other words, although one can believe in the righteousness of egalitarian or non-egalitarian ideas, most people are likely to find their otherwise highly preferred macro-level general concepts unusable in numerous specific “real life” situations at the micro level. Thus, neither pro-equity nor pro-inequality argumentations are of universal validity. Their validity could only be judged in specific situations, and only respective to these specific situations.

Of course, one can still have a legitimate reason for preferring or rejecting egalitarian views—*not universally, but in general*. One can think that equality is the goal to strive for in *most* cases, apart from special (and relatively rare) examples. It goes without saying that the opposite reasoning is also possible. And, actually, these are the two approaches most people with different political motivations follow. But who is right? Here, another problem emerges, which makes it impossible to come to a decision. Namely that the issue of righteousness is not a matter of “objective” or, so to say, “scientific” analysis, but one of morality. And, from this point of view, neither of these two positions “seems obviously ‘wrong’, yet they are logically incompatible” (Saunders 2010, p. 13). Given that, one could say that both philosophical approaches are right in terms of their own criteria, and neither is right in a universal and exclusive sense. In other words, the question which concept is right is theoretically impossible to definitely decide, it can only be debated. Still, this undecidable issue is very popular, it can permanently raise the attention of many, and it frequently leads to heated debates. To understand this seemingly controversial phenomenon, we should investigate the political importance of the debate over inequalities.

2.5 Political Importance of the Debate Over Social Disparities

2.5.1 *Problematization of Social Disparities for Political Identity-Making*

To understand why the question of social disparities has proved “evergreen” over thousands of years, one should recognize the very central role equality issues play in the field of political ideas and ideologies. As can be seen in Sect. 2.3, from the very beginning the debate over social disparities was highly political in nature. A main goal of virtually all those contributing to the debate was to make political statements about disparities and about the political order that produced them. Besides, these thinkers were aimed at defining the form of equality they found desirable, thus, they automatically—even if sometimes only implicitly—set its realization as a political goal to strive for.

Actually, what most intellectuals contributing to the debate have done is, in a Foucauldian sense, the *problematization* of social disparity. For Foucault, problematization “does not mean the representation of a pre-existent object nor the creation through discourse of an object that did not exist. It is the ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought” (Foucault 1994, p. 670; quoted in Rabinow and Rose 2003, p. xix; also cf. with Castel 1994). More simply, it is “a way in which experience is offered to thought in the form of a problem requiring attention” (Rose and Valverde 1998, p. 545). In other words, many thinkers contributing to the debate over inequalities have argued that social disparity as the opposite of social equality is not a neutral phenomenon, but a problem that is to be cured. No doubt, various authors have problematized the issue in various ways. Some (such as the Jacobins or the Marxists) stated that the existence of any situations differing from an equal distribution of resources among individuals is a problem. Others (e.g. the representatives of bourgeois liberalism) claimed the lack of such an absolute equality not to be a problem, but they problematized the distribution of resources contradicting the “same reward for same merit” principle. As the example of the Catholic Church in the Medieval Europe shows, it was also not unprecedented that certain interest groups tried to de-problematize worldly social disparities.

Of course, this problematization has never been art for art’s sake, but has served political goals. The problematization of all non-egalitarian distributions of resources (under aegis of the slogan “the same for everyone”) has been consciously used by radical egalitarians to undermine the legitimacy of any systems not promoting such a principle of distribution. Those who problematized the lack of the “same award for same honor” principle did so to de-legitimize extreme egalitarian movements as well as ideologies that tried to de-problematize social disparities. Finally, those making attempts to de-problematize disparities had firm

interests in creating or sustaining a system which produced and institutionalized extremely large inequalities. Thus, the debate about equality and inequalities was basically used by each group as a virtual political arena, and statements about various forms of equality and inequality were specific means in a political fight. As Saunders (2010) underlines, “more than any other single issue, economic inequality has for generations functioned like a litmus test of political ideology” (p. 13.).

It is a question, however, how political interest groups can consider that the problematization of a phenomenon such as social disparity can efficiently contribute to the realization of their real-life political goals. The answer is closely linked to the fact that political goals are only to be put in practice if a mass, sufficient both in the number and determination of its members, can be convinced and mobilized to support the concept. And this is impossible without making people enthusiastic about the idea—an issue belonging to the domain of *identity-making*.

Although the term “identity”, its meaning as well as its use are exposed to debates in social sciences and vary significantly with disciplines and approaches, some theoretical views are definitely worth consideration here.²² According to related theories of social psychology, identity can be interpreted as a “social-dynamic product of broad social processes” (von Bogdandy 2003, p. 34). In other words, it does not emerge automatically but must be produced; its production involves various social processes; and once it is produced, it is not static but changes permanently.

As for elements of identity, we can refer here to the thoughts of Henri Tajfel, a main theoretician of social psychology. In his Social Identity Theory (SIT) he distinguished between the *social* and *personal* identity within the individual’s self-concept. In Tajfel’s view, these two categories do not separate from one another in one’s self-concept, their distinction serves analytical goals only (Marxhausen 2010). For us, however, this differentiation is useful since social identity is especially important from the aspect of our current research.²³ For Tajfel, individuals structure their self-perceptions according to certain *categories*, which are socially produced. These categories can refer to various aspects of one’s situation and context, such as gender, age, language, culture, biological features etc. Along these categories, individuals identify themselves as members of certain groups (e.g. the group of those of the same gender, same age, same language, same religion or same social status). Doing this, they construct groups in a cognitive way (Chryssochou 1996; Marxhausen 2010).

Of course, each individual belongs to different groups at the same time. Social identity is the sum of these social self-categorizations. In Tajfel’s words, social identity is “that part of the individuals’ self-concept which derives from their

²² The following five paragraphs are generally based on a more detailed overview in Marxhausen (2010, pp. 40–45).

²³ In contrast to social identity, personal identity is related to “specific attributes of the individual” (Turner 1982, p. 18.). Such attributes can be “competence, bodily attributes, ways of relating to others, psychological characteristics, intellectual concerns, personal tastes” etc. (ibid.).

knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) *together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership*" (emphasis in the original) (Tajfel 1982, p. 2.). The citation's second part is highly important. As Tajfel underlines, social identity is dynamic (it changes in time), situational and context-dependent (Marxhausen 2010). If one is a faithful Roman Catholic and lives in Sweden where this religious group only forms a small minority, his religious identity might be very important. But if he moves to Spain for a 1-year work project, his religious orientation might be less important in a country dominated by Roman Catholics. Thus, his identity might be determined there much stronger by his being Swedish, which can be a curiosity in the new location. And if he remains in Spain because, for instance, he finds his future wife there, this "identity in Spain" can become stable, even pushing the "identity in Sweden" in the background. But if he moves instead to a third country, for example, to China, his identity changes again in the new context. To cite Tajfel (1982, p. 2.) again, "the value and emotional significance attached" to various memberships by him can be remarkably different. Thus, it can be said that certain identifications and memberships are more, other ones are less important for him *in general*.

The main points of this argumentation appear in other related theories as well. John Turner's Self-categorization Theory (Turner 1982), which is based on Tajfel's SIT, presents a very similar point of view concerning identity, social identity and personal identity. However, he adds that the formation of groups also leads to a self-stereotyping of those "within the group" on the one hand, and to a stereotyping of "others" on the other hand (Marxhausen 2010).

An even newer concept, Breakwell's (1986) Identity Process Theory (IPT) uses another categorization to reveal the structure of individual identity. For her, "social identity is seen to become personal identity"; thus, their distinction is "purely a temporal artefact" (Breakwell 2004, p. 28.). Instead, she speaks only about individual identity but differentiates between its *content* and *value dimensions*. The former refer to all characteristics that make one unique, whether they were categorized as parts of "social" or "personal identity" in Tajfel's and Turner's concepts. Value dimensions refer to positive and negative values which are ordered to content dimensions. Although Breakwell's approach differs from older ones at several points, it also defines individual identity as a sort of product, a dynamic phenomenon, and reflects Tajfel and Turner while emphasizing that certain elements of identity have different hierarchical positions within one's identity (Breakwell 2004; Marxhausen 2010). In other words, the differing importance of different elements of identity is articulated in this concept as well.

The concepts and findings above are crucial to understand the political debate over social disparities. The reason is simple, whether we consider the views of Tajfel, Turner or Breakwell: the individual's political self-categorization and attachment to certain political groups can play a significant role in one's identity. Of course, it is only one aspect of identity. And, following Tajfel, the "value and emotional significance" attached to this membership can vary on a broad scale; for some it is important, for others not. Or, in Breakwell's words, political elements of individual identity might have stronger or weaker positions within the hierarchy of

one's elements of identity than other elements do. We have good reason to guess that politically relevant issues play a subordinate role in many people's individual identity. But it is not so in all cases: for politicians (or, more generally, those in power), political ideologists, analysts and all those whose lives are strongly intertwined with politics, political self-categorization or political elements of identity do unquestionably play a serious role in individual identity.

In the light of social psychological concepts, it is obvious that political self-categorization or political elements of identity are not constant: they can and often do change dynamically in the perpetual process of identity production. These changes might be far-reaching: political self-categorization can lose much importance in the individual's identity. Furthermore, if somebody, for instance, supported a certain political movement initially, but has neglected political issues for some years, their political identities are much more likely to change. The chance that they will become more open to alternative approaches grows, while it is also possible that politics-linked elements of their individual identities lose much in significance: one can lose all interest in political issues even if one was an enthusiastic supporter of a certain party in the last election. Similarly, as time goes on, someone might feel that they belong to another political group that they attached to some years ago.

The chance of such serious changes in individual identity cannot be eliminated, but it can be reduced significantly through a conscious control over factors that influence individual identity. And many are strongly motivated in sustaining their own as well as others' political self-categorization without significant changes. They also try to perpetuate an overall social context where as many people as possible find political self-categorization an important part of their individual identities.

First, politicians do this for very simple reasons. In a democracy, they try to gain the most votes in the next election in order to come to power or stay there. If their possible supporters lose interest in politics, they might stay home next time. Or, what is even "worse", after a while it might be the political opponent drawing these people's attention to political issues again, but along his or her own philosophies. Consequently, politicians try to convince people that their attachment to their favorite political group is a crucial part of their individual identities. Furthermore, they try to shape people's political self-categorization in concert with their own political motivations, since it is not enough that people pay attention to political issues; they should do it in a way which assures that they support the given political movement. In fact, politicians' interests in authoritarian systems are rather similar. It is true that their positions are not endangered by elections. Even if such occasions take place, they are absolutely formal and exert no real influence on political power relations. But authoritarian regimes also necessitate a sort of stable social background, so the leadership has to devote energy to sustain and shape people's political identity.

Second, sustaining the perpetual process of political self-categorization is an interest of those who do not belong to the political stratum directly, but actually live from the "politics business". They are non-politicians whose material existence strongly relies on the existence of political parties and of the whole political system.

Usually they are linked to different political groups or to their philosophies and goals, but all of them are common in their dependence on the political arena and on political groups which use it. They are the actors who participate in and benefit from the parties' various activities. This is also important for parties, who, due to this process, can create a supply for their political "products" (ideologies) in order to "sell them" (gain votes and/or legitimacy). This category refers to such actors as political theoreticians, analysts and journalists. If political issues did not owe a privileged position in the life of many, these dependents of politics would easily become unemployed. Consequently, they are profoundly interested in the maintenance of the "politics business" and people's interest in political issues.

Third, the first two groups' activities can (and, to some extent, usually do) result in the emergence of a special social stratum, whose members are highly enthusiastic about supporting a certain political group. They are everyday people, most of whom gain neither political position nor material surplus for their determination. And, in general, it is not their goal, actually. They are those who are touched so strongly by a political party, a charismatic political leader or his/her attractive objectives and initiatives, that they interpret the given political power's success or defeat as a serious personal issue. For such "political fans", political attachment becomes a disproportionately strong, even dominant part of their identities. They believe themselves strong if their party wins, and feel their own identities questioned if their beloved group loses in power. This stratum, which emerges both in democratic and authoritarian regimes, also has strong motivations to sustain politically relevant practices of identity production.

As can be seen, it is a firm interest of several actors to perpetually maintain practices of political self-categorization. These practices are manifold, and any attempt to say what belongs to them is necessarily arbitrary. Here we focus on one highly important practice. This is *participating in a sort of discourse*, in which politically relevant elements of individual identity can permanently be produced and reproduced through a mutual expression of political opinions.

2.5.2 Social Disparity Analysis as Political Discourse

The importance of discourse should not be underestimated in the process of political (or any form of) identity-making. As the representatives of discursive psychology emphasize, social categories, which are necessary prerequisites for producing identity, are constructed in social interaction and communication—or as one could say, in the discourse (Marxhausen 2010). Thus, although identity is produced only in a mental process within the individual, its "raw materials" (the categories, their meanings and values) are socially constructed in a discursive process (ibid.). This statement, of course, can be interpreted in reverse as well. As Taylor (1994) puts it, public discourse is crucial to the dialogic process through which individuals develop their identities. So if the goal is to sustain or strengthen the process of political self-categorization, it is necessary to establish and maintain

a discourse within which the social categories necessary for individual identity production can continuously be created and recreated.

For this, there are some necessary requisites. First, discourse should take place where political stances can be efficiently transferred to as many as possible. This must be about a topic which does not only have clear political relevance (so it is not only of common concern), but which can easily be understood by many people. Furthermore, these people should find the question important, even from their everyday micro-perspective. Of course, it is not easy to decide which issues meet this requirement. Several authors suggest that this is itself a matter of deliberation (Bohman 1996; Conover et al. 2002; Fraser 1992). However, even narrow interpretations such as that of Rawls (1997) argue that political questions of “constitutional essentials” and of basic justice are of common concern. These issues also have the advantage that they are controversial. Especially in debates over justice, it is easy to find relevant arguments for and against any ideas. And, as Lazarsfeld (1939) reveals, debates over openly controversial issues are especially efficient in motivating people. Those who already had an opinion about the question usually get strengthened in their views if they witness controversial debates. And those who were uninterested in political questions are much more likely to get interested by controversial issues, especially if they are easy to understand and form an opinion about. These are direct consequences of what Collins (1988) calls the positive functions of conflicts. For him, conflicts help societal groups to better feel their borders and strengthen them in their identity. Meanwhile, conflicts drive those alone to find allies, so many of them join groups they did not belong to before. From this aspect, political discourses in general (and the disparity discourse in particular) can be considered as discursive conflicts, and the typical patterns of behavior identified by Lazarsfeld (1939) (through which many [become] motivated) are logical results of what is explained by Collins (1988).

Second, the discourse should not only “reach” the masses, but offer them the opportunity to join. Consequently, as many as possible should feel that they are allowed to join the discourse, moreover, that it is important and reasonable to do so. Otherwise they cannot be called by the “politics business”, whose idea of accelerating these people’s political self-categorization fails. To convince people that it is worth “coming in”, the discourse must seem to meet the standards of what political scientists call *democratic deliberation*. This means that the discourse must be (at least seemingly) *public*, *non-tyrannical* and *politically equal* (Conover et al. 2002). Public means that everyone has open access, and that they deliberate in a manner offering public reasons for their preferences (Bohman 1996; Rawls 1997). The discourse is also expected to be non-tyrannical, where the discussion cannot be “coerced illegitimately” (Conover et al. 2002, p. 24; cf. Bohman 1996; Dahl 1989). Thus, everybody is allowed to freely express their opinion. Finally, political equality is assured if all have equal access to arenas of the discourse, and they have equal opportunities to influence the deliberation (Bohman 1996; Knight and Johnson 1997). It should be underlined here that a perfect form of democratic deliberation does not exist in real life. Instead, what one can say is to what extent a given deliberation meets these requirements. In this sense, certain deliberations that

basically fulfill these expectations can be judged democratic. Furthermore, as has already been stressed, to promote people's political self-categorization, the discourse does not have to be democratic. It can be enough if it seems to be, if people believe that the discourse is democratic so their opinion matters. That is what many dictatorial regimes suggest through propaganda about their strongly arbitrary discourses, which they try to make attractive and worth joining for as many as possible, to get them there, under control.

The third point, strongly linked to the notion of political equality, concerns the *easiness of precise political self-positioning* within the discourse. Participating in a discourse can only help political self-categorization if it is clear which statement within the discourse is linked with which political position. If the vocabulary of the discourse is dominated by some simple slogans, whose underlying political meaning is obvious for all participants since they refer to characteristic positions, it is easy even for newcomers to position themselves within the discourse. Thus, they can categorize themselves easily in terms of political orientation. If such slogans and the underlying characteristic standpoints are missing, however, one might be misunderstood by others while trying to express one's opinion. Their words can even lead to a result which is diametrically opposed to what was expected. If these people cannot formulate their opinion properly, they might be assigned to a political category which they do not want and definitely do not belong to. This ability to translate one's views for others is crucial. People without this skill can only exert an insignificant influence in the discourse (Knight and Johnson 1997). Furthermore, as Conover et al. (2002) shows, the main reason for many not joining political debates is the fear of being misunderstood due to improper formulation.

In this sense, newly emerging discourses offer less possibilities for political self-categorization of individuals as such discourses are usually confusing and characterized by a huge number of unique positions. It takes time for some characteristic positions—together with their specific catchwords—to strengthen within the discourse and emerge from the mass of competing stances. From then on, newcomers are likely to choose and internalize one of these prefabricated characteristic positions instead of forming one on their own. Moreover, “veterans” of the discourse often also migrate towards newly emerging characteristic positions. It is so even if this characteristic position somewhat differs from their initial point of view, since joining it offers the opportunity to agree with many other people and get their support. Both behaviors are natural results of a simple psychological phenomenon called *social validation* (Cialdini 2008). In a certain situation people tend to look to how others act or what they have done to decide what to do. Thus, “if many individuals like us have decided for a particular idea, we are more likely to follow, for we find the idea more correct, more valid, than would be the case without their lead” since “if numerous others seem to find merit in something. . . people assume that it must have merit, and they act accordingly” (p. 203). In consequence, a few characteristic positions usually become stronger and stronger through positive feedback, while this process gradually pushes other stances to the periphery of attention or even sweeps them out from the discourse.

Therefore, “old”, “consolidated” discourses can offer more space for easy political self-categorization than “new” ones, still emerging.²⁴

To sum it up, many have the idea of sustaining individuals’ perpetual political self-categorization in order to strengthen the role of political self-categorization in their individual identities. These actors are interested in establishing and maintaining a discourse that is thematically feasible and enables precise self-positioning in an easy way. But to create and maintain such a discourse is just a “minimalist goal”, nothing more. No doubt, even this “minimalist goal” is highly important for those interested in the “politics business” since it is a necessary prerequisite for maintaining people’s interest in political issues. In itself, however, it is just an effort to avoid having potential political supporters turn away from politics or become oriented towards rival political movements. But it is not simply keeping supporters that is important for the actors of “politics business”. Convincing new supporters is similarly meaningful and the never-existing optimal state would be one where everybody would support the given political group. Thus, a politically relevant discourse is not only about the self-representation of political movements, but it is also a sort of battlefield where others’ arguments should be defeated. This is expected to undermine the political rivals’ identity-making capacity, and motivate their former supporters to change their political self-categorizations and align themselves with the winner of the discursive battle. So, the “maximal goal” is not only to introduce and sustain a feasible discourse, but to win it. In Foucault’s related words: “discourse is not simply that which manifests (or hides) desire—it is also the object of desire: . . .discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault 1981, pp. 52–53).

And this is the point where one can understand the enduring nature of debates about equality and social disparities. It is actually a discourse, a very old and highly political one, about a moral issue which is easy to understand even for people having few connections to politics. In this discourse, political positions can be articulated efficiently by using a set of tried and well-tested slogans, which even “newcomers” can acquire without great difficulties. The question of which form and level of inequalities is desirable or tolerable will result in two possible characteristic answers, whose underlying political content is regarded as obvious. On the one hand, one can argue for equality as equal distribution. This position has been

²⁴ The possible evaluation of “consolidated” and “emerging” discourses is thoroughly different if the question is to what extent they enable one to express one’s own opinion without constraints. This is for at least two reasons. First, since “consolidated” discourses offer prefabricated slogans, newcomers are constrained to use these, although maybe none of these slogans is feasible in exactly grasping one’s point of view. Second, in “consolidated” discourses slogans are so strongly and directly linked to characteristic underlying positions that using a slogan automatically pushes one into a characteristic political category. Thus, articulating sophisticated views and avoiding black-and-white thinking is very difficult or even impossible within these “consolidated” discourses.

seen as a proof of socialist political orientation for more than a century. On the other hand, the principle of equal reward for equal honor can also be chosen. For this, unequal distribution and social disparities are regarded not only as unavoidable but also, to some extent, desirable. Articulating the latter opinion has been considered for a long time as taking a conservative-libertarian stance. Thus, the social disparity discourse is an optimal field for actors of the “politics business” to permanently express their political positions and produce and reproduce their political self-categorizations. Due to this, they can raise the attention of possible supporters and enable them to articulate their own political views *within* and to steadily produce and reproduce their political self-categorizations *through* the discourse. Moreover, this process is likely to increase the perceived importance of political self-categorization within the possible political supporters’ individual identities.

2.6 Science as Means of Legitimization in the Disparity Discourse

In the preceding section we have presented that the disparity discourse is a highly political one. Its main goal is to enable political movements and other actors of the “politics business” to show their positions and perpetually produce and reproduce their political self-categorizations. Through these, the floor is open for political self-categorization for all those who participate in the discourse, and who, supposedly, become or remain supporters of a certain political group and its ideology. Thus, the discourse has a number of participants, among whom some politicians and intellectuals are especially influential. But from our point of view, the most important question concerns the *role of science* in the discourse. This issue will be crucial to reveal and accurately interpret the political context and role of the scientific discourse about spatial disparities in forthcoming chapters of this work. For this reason, we find it necessary to present through a case study how the legitimate power of science can be (and actually is) (ab)used in the disparity discourse by representatives of competing interest groups. To reveal typical strategies, we are to focus on the political waves generated by and reactions given to a highly contestable book, which was written by scientists, and concerned an issue extremely sensitive for those within the disparity discourse.

2.6.1 Case Study of a Politically Contested Project by Representatives of Sciences: “*The Spirit Level*” and Its Reception

The work we are concentrating on is *The Spirit Level*, which was written by two epidemiologists, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, and was published in the

United Kingdom on 5th March 2009 (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010a). In the book, the authors begin their research by identifying a remarkable phenomenon of our times: the “contrast between the material success and social failure of many rich countries”. To reveal causes, they conducted a thorough statistical analysis, the empirical heart of which is a considerable series of scatter plots. These are based on official statistics either released by global organizations such as WHO, UNESCO and World Bank or published as survey results of various acknowledged research centers. The majority of data sets focuses on 23 “rich countries” selected by the authors, and on the 50 US states. In most cases, axis X shows the value of “income inequalities”, while axis Y stands for certain sorts of well-being indicators. The latter vary from life expectancy and high school drop-out rates to such sophisticated (and sometimes blurred) categories as “index of women’s status” or “children’s experience of conflict”. In general, issues of health, education, violence and social mobility are especially emphasized. The function of scatter plots is to indicate a strong or weak relationship between selected variables. In order to make such connections more visible, the authors also depict (in their words) “best fit” regression lines.

The main findings of the two epidemiologists is that income inequalities seem negatively correlated with well-being indicators: put simply, “more unequal societies have more problems overall” (p. 25). And it does not only mean that “more unequal societies” have more poor and, thus, a lower average value, but high-income groups are also suggested to suffer from large disparities (as the subtitle of the book’s second edition states, “equality is better for everyone”). In the authors’ interpretation, this phenomenon has specific social and mental-psychological roots. As they underlined: “The problems in rich countries” are caused “by the scale of material differences between people within each society being too big. What matters is where we stand in relation to others in our own society.” (p. 25). This fact is considered to have especially high relevance in unequal societies as “greater inequality seems to heighten people’s social evaluation anxieties by increasing the importance of social status. . . . We come to see social position as a more important feature of a person’s identity” (p. 43). As a result, in more unequal societies everybody is exposed to a kind of permanent and high level of stress, which, as a “chronic mobilization of energy” (p. 86), leads to severe health problems and social dysfunctions. That is how “inequality gets under the skin” (p. 31).

In terms of empirical substantiation, *The Spirit Level* left much space for possible criticism for several reasons, which will be dealt with later in this chapter. The book, however, was obviously aimed at raising interest. First, it is easy to read. The authors tend to avoid complicated and abstract academic language, present simple examples, and use a large variety of cartoon illustrations and witty citations. Second, it is not a monotonous description to read and be “done with”: it sets direct political goals. For Wilkinson and Pickett: “The role of this book is to point out that greater equality is the material foundation on which better social relations are built.” (p. 272). But, “a better society will not happen automatically” (p. 271), and the role of governments as main actors of income distribution (through wages

and taxes, for instance) is crucial at this point. Thus, “the task is now to develop a politics based on recognition of the kind of society we need to create” (p. 271). In other words, irrespective of the scientific quality of its argumentation, the book directly addresses political issues. And this feature makes it very important for us since our main point here is to not merely evaluate the book and verify or deny its findings. The objective is rather to show how *The Spirit Level* and its main statements were perceived and how they were reacted to by representatives of the disparity discourse.

In the light of the work’s topicality and political relevance, it is no wonder that it soon raised the interest of several politicians. On 9th November 2009, David Cameron, then leader of the British Conservative party delivered a lecture at Kings Palace in London on major current political issues. The future Prime Minister of the United Kingdom attempted to draw up a new agenda for his party and, obviously, for a new Conservative-led government to be elected the year after. The task was rather large as the global financial crisis beginning in 2008, without doubt, not only marked the end of a long and characteristic period but also questioned the dominant economic philosophy. Any political forces with serious ambitions had no other choice than to find new and attractive aims for the coming years. In his speech, David Cameron moved to a rather remarkable direction: he referred to *The Spirit Level*. In Cameron’s interpretation, this “research. . .has shown that among the richest countries, it’s the more unequal ones that do worse according to almost every quality of life indicator”. Thus, “per capita GDP is much less significant for a country’s life expectancy, crime levels, literacy and health than the size of the gap between the richest and poorest in the population”. And, for him, this fact does not only mean that improving the conditions of living of the poor increases the national average as well, but, according to the authors, the rich do also have a higher standard of well-being in a society with less disparities and weak social tensions. In the conservative politician’s words, “as long as there is deep poverty living systematically side by side with great riches, we all remain the poorer for it”. Consequently, the task was clear: “we should focus on closing the gap between the bottom and the middle. . .because focusing on those who do not have the chance of a good life is the most important thing to do”. In other words, the main point was defined as to reduce disparities instead of boosting economic growth at any cost.

The opposition leader David Cameron’s statements did not remain without reaction: Ed Miliband, a prominent politician of the Labour Party and then state secretary in Gordon Brown’s left-wing cabinet practically repeated his rival’s words very soon. As he proclaimed, “the gap between rich and poor does matter. . . .And it doesn’t just harm the poor, it harms all of us” (as cited by Devichand 2010). Although issues of equality traditionally belong to popular slogans of left-of-centre political parties, Miliband’s reaction seemed more specific as his second sentence directly referred to a main point of Wilkinson and Pickett in *The Spirit Level*. But the volume’s ‘political career’ did not end at this point: it also influenced Harriett Harman, deputy leader of the Labour Party, in compiling her Equality Bill, which was aimed at changing the discrimination laws in the UK (Moore 2010). David Willetts, conservative Member of Parliament, formerly a young ideologist in

Margaret Thatcher's team and future Minister of State for Universities and Science underlined in one of his newspaper articles that Richard Wilkinson was one of the people whose works "persuaded [him] that inequality matters" (Willetts 2009). *The Spirit Level* not only became popular among British politicians: Sweden's Social Democratic Party leader Mona Sahlin also referenced the book during the election campaign in 2010 (Sanandaji et al. 2010).

The strong influence exerted on political discourse by the work of Wilkinson and Pickett was also mirrored by commentaries in journals. Polly Toynbee, columnist of the left-of-center newspaper *The Guardian* criticized David Cameron in ironic style for his speech at Kings Palace, but not because he had mentioned *The Spirit Level*. Just the opposite: she judged him "clever" to have referred to "the ground-breaking research". Her criticism was pointed at his political agenda, "a complete non-sequitur that contradicts all *The Spirit Level*'s findings". In Toynbee's view, David Cameron's statement to "focus on the gap between the bottom and the middle" means nothing but to "leave the top well alone", which was regarded by her as a typical conservative approach. ("You could not be a Conservative if you thought you should narrow the gap between top and bottom.") (in this section, all citations are from Toynbee 2009). And, for Toynbee, it was just the opposite of everything the "ground-breaking research" was about.

The Spirit Level, however, had provoked a heated—and, actually, politically motivated—debate on the pages of newspapers well before it was referred to by David Cameron and other politicians. This debate was fierce and not free from harsh opinions on any side. Traditional political fault lines became apparent with elementary force. The first articles to speak in high terms of the book appeared just few days after its publication on 5th March, 2009. On the 14th, publicist Lynsey Hanley wrote a detailed review on *The Spirit Level* in the centre-left newspaper *The Guardian*, judging it a book-to-read due to its "inarguably battery of evidence" and "because its conclusion is simple: we do better when we're equal" (Hanley 2009). In her interpretation, Wilkinson and Pickett write about something we already know to some extent ("We know there is something wrong, and this book goes a long way towards explaining what and why."). But they do not only write about it: they also "form a *bank of evidence* against inequality that is *impossible to deny*" (our emphases). And they present (on in) the examples of "more equal" countries (e.g. Japan and Sweden) that "equality is a matter of political will". To sum it up, Hanley emphasized the book's *scientific quality* and the attractiveness of its main idea, but did not try to make use of it for direct ideological and political goals. The latter, however, also happened remarkably soon.

Just one day after Hanley's review, Will Hutton, vice chairman of think tank The Work Foundation and a "left wing campaigner" in BBC's interpretation (BBC News, 2010), highlighted some of the main points of the epidemiologists' work in *The Observer* (Hutton 2009). In Hutton's words, the connection of income disparities and social problems "is spelt out with stark clarity" by Wilkinson and Pickett, who "show beyond any doubt" that inequality "is not just bad for those at the bottom but for everyone". For the book's empirical substantiation, his opinion was definite: "The statistical causation is *unarguable*" (our emphasis). Then he

underlined that: “What is harder is to explain why [the causation exists]. Here Wilkinson and Pickett become more speculative.” The seeming uncertainty on the book’s evidence, however, proved temporary as Hutton finally came to the point: “The cumulative weight of the evidence makes the case hard to refute.” In general, he exerted no criticism on the findings of the book, only on the optimism of its authors: “Just by revealing the wealth of data that shows how we are all damaged by inequality, they think we should be shocked into a transformation of our attitudes. . . .Until the current economic catastrophe, the appeal fell on largely deaf ears. . . .”

In general, Hutton’s opinion on the book was rather positive. A main reason was here the work’s *scientific apparatus*. Besides, political overtones were also important. It speaks volumes that the reviewer embedded his thoughts on *The Spirit Level* in a more general text, which is essentially anti-neoliberal. The review draws up an “indissoluble link” between “Britain’s growing social problems” and the “growth of income inequality”, where the latter one is mainly derived from “the explosive growth of incomes at the top”. Here, Hutton contrasts an “overstretched social worker” with the former Chief Executive of Royal Bank of Scotland, whose £700,000 pension is a symbol of “disproportionate City reward for failure”. He harshly criticizes the payment practice of leading banks, and those financial leaders who still believe in the old system’s righteousness. And *The Spirit Level* proves here a very useful work to reference since it seems to validate the reviewer’s opinion through scientific findings.

The book won high praise from other critics as well. Roy Hattersley, Labour politician and former deputy leader of the party between 1983 and 1992 lauded *The Spirit Level* in the weekly magazine *New Statesman* (Hattersley 2009). In the article he firmly underlines the scientific quality of the work. In his words, the authors made their statements “on the basis of research – not hunch”, and find a correlation between income inequality and social well-being which is “near to absolute”. The benefit in creating a “more equal society” is, therefore, interpreted as a “rational conclusion to be drawn from the mass of evidence” that Wilkinson and Pickett assembled. And this is highly important as “it demonstrates the *scientific truth* of the assertion that social democrats have made for a hundred years – sometimes more out of hope than intellectual certainty” (words in italics are our emphasis). From this point of view, “the importance of *The Spirit Level* is that. . .it provides a vital part of the intellectual manifesto on which the battle for a better society can be fought”. To sum it up, Hattersley speaks in high terms of *The Spirit Level* and presents it as the source of “scientific truth” in order to create scientific legitimacy for the socialist thoughts he supports.

By the way, he did the same as one of *The Observer*’s interviewees in the magazine’s “Books of the year” poll (The Observer 2009). Here he summarized the main points of his opinion in a brief sentence: “[The Spirit Level] confirms, *scientifically*, what social democrats have always hoped was true” (our emphasis). In this poll, Hattersley was also supported by Tristram Hunt, historian and future Member of Parliament in Labour colours: she judged the work “a *statistically clinical* account of the benefits of social democracy for living longer, happier and more fulfilled lives”. Thus, for her, *The Spirit Level* was a “very important book for

the intellectual regeneration of the left". The already tested strategy of presenting a politically attractive work as an indisputable source of scientific—and, consequently, “objective”—“truth” for self-legitimacy was used again by socialist think-tankers in their battle against (neo-)conservatism.

However, while such positive assessments were still appearing in the columns of newspapers, other journalists and analysts began to level serious criticism at the book. One of them was Richard Reeves, future Special Adviser to Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg in David Cameron’s conservative-liberal coalition (Curtis 2010; Reeves 2011). Then, Reeves was already a director of the think tank Demos, an initially left-of-centre institution which he steered closer to right-of-centre political groups by appointing two senior Conservative politicians to the advisory board (Stratton 2009). In his critique on the pages of *The Observer*, he underlined two main weaknesses of *The Spirit Level* as scientific product (Reeves 2009). One was that the statistical findings of the book can be disputed, and sometimes seem rather weak. For him, “drawing a line through a series of data points signals nothing concrete about statistical significance” and, as the authors “do not provide any statistical analyses”, the relationships they emphasize “can’t be verified”. His second point disputed any causal relationship between income inequalities and social problems. In his words, “the authors have simply scoured the data for signs of malignancy in unequal societies. . . . Yet. . . It is not a causal relationship.” Instead, he suggested that, “surely”, it is the political culture that influences redistribution and income disparities on the one hand and general social circumstances on the other hand. Reeves’s negative opinion on the scientific explanatory force of *The Spirit Level* was, therefore, obvious—and so was his attitude towards egalitarian political concepts as well. He made it profoundly clear: “it is a longstanding *psychological weakness* of many on the left to focus on the earnings of a fraction of high earners rather than the stubborn problems of those nearer the bottom” (our emphasis). After exerting harsh criticism on the work of Wilkinson and Pickett and making sarcastic judgments on left-wing political goals, the two points got intertwined in Reeves’s summarizing sentence: “If you are a social democrat looking for some attractively presented evidence for your *prejudices*, *The Spirit Level* fits the bill. But if you want a deeper and more even-handed project to rethink egalitarianism for the current age”, “you’d better to” turn to other publications on the issue (text in italics is our emphasis).

An even harsher article was written on the issue by Charles Moore, former editor of the centre-right newspaper *The Daily Telegraph* (Moore 2010). He exerted strong criticism on the authors of the book: he even refused to declare it a scientific work. According to him, Wilkinson and Pickett “starts with the unargued assumption that inequality is the cause of almost every misery, and then seeks, often interestingly but *certainly not scientifically*, to illustrate its point” (words in italics are our emphasis). Moore, however, did not deal with the quality of data or lacking statistical tests: he focused on the relationship of income disparities and “social illness”. His argumentation was simple: the authors made a mistake when “decided that inequality is not a symptom of other things, but the root of all evil”. In his point of view, this must definitely not be the case as disparities and all social phenomena

can be traced back to other factors, e.g. cultural ones. Thus, the overall findings of *The Spirit Level* must be false and misleading.

In this article, however, it became clear again that the critique was not only addressed to the book's empirical analyses, but to its possible political implications. Moore's criticism was not only attracted by the scientifically disputable interpretation of data sets. His main problem was that the "evidence-decorated" book presents "itself as non-ideological", although it is "a political tract, and. . . a surprisingly traditional socialist one". And, as such, it propagates smaller inequalities, although—for Moore—income disparities are not problems but rather necessary, moreover, "inevitable" temporary results of positive processes. At this point he emphasized that Japan, a country with low inequalities and few social problems according to Wilkinson and Pickett, can be that equal only because it keeps out foreigners. In the United States, however, income disparities are much higher as the US "offers opportunity" to millions of foreigners—among them to many poor people—and lets them immigrate. In Moore's words: "It is inevitable [that] there will be a huge gap in American society between those who have just got across the Mexican border, and those who have already 'made it'. But that need not be a problem so long as the opportunity is real." Nevertheless, Moore agreed with a major point of *The Spirit Level*: "The authors are surely right when they say the general tendency of extreme inequality is to make people fear and mistrust one another more." But in his interpretation, the real problem is not "that some people earn much more than some others". Instead, "worklessness subsidised by welfare" is what really harms as it leads to the emergence of an "underclass. . . which does not maintain economic relations with the rest of society at all".

To sum it up, Charles Moore followed a strategy similar to that of Richard Reeves. He harshly criticized a book whose politically relevant issues were unacceptable for him. The critique was intended to destroy the work's academic image and to show it "unscientific". Thus, its main points lost their scientific legitimacy, and could be attacked and defeated on the discursive battlefield of moral concepts, where they were placed under fire by the heavy artillery of conservative social philosophy.

An even more destructive critique of *The Spirit Level* was given by Christopher Snowdon, public health researcher and co-worker of the think tank Democracy Institute. In his book *The Spirit Level Delusion*, released in May 2010, he drew attention to several major problems, mostly concerning the book's scientific nature (Snowdon 2010). First, similarly to some former critics, Snowdon emphasized that inequality is itself a symptom of certain social problems, not the source of them. Thus, it is deceptive to interpret statistical correlation between income disparities and social "disabilities" as causal. Here, he also referred to a number of academic articles with the same finding. As Deaton (2003), for instance, writes: "there is no robust correlation between life expectancy and income inequality among the rich countries, and the correlation across the states and cities of the United States is almost certainly the result of something that is correlated with income inequality, but that is not income inequality itself" (p. 151). Second, Snowdon—just as Reeves—emphasized the lack of robust statistical tests in the work. But he went

even further: he stated that statistical correlation itself was a consequence of “cherry-picking” countries. He blamed Wilkinson and Pickett for having selected countries that seem to substantiate their hypothesis on positively correlated income inequalities and social problems. And, he also presented new scatter plots, where he depicted more countries than the epidemiologists did. The motivation is clear: these graphs tend to show a sort of—basically negative—correlation between income disparities and social deprivation indicators, which is just the opposite of *The Spirit Level*’s main findings.

Snowdon’s criticism was more general, more detailed and more destructive than any of his forerunners. But it was no exception in the political sense. His book’s political motivations are rather clear and not only due to its ironic subtitle (*Fact-checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything*). For those who need more obvious orientation, it is given in the book’s *Foreword* by Patrick Basham, founder of the Democracy Institute. For him, “personally, Wilkinson and Pickett’s thesis brings back vividly unpleasant memories” of his undergraduate years, when his ““tax cutting equals economic growth equals more employment’ economic model” was criticized as “an ungodly synthesis of the worst Reaganism and Thatcherism” by his “newly-minted Marxist feminist PhD” sociology tutor. About the tutor’s “eighties-style socialist fundamentalism” he had thought at that time that “such thinking has had its day”, but he “was wrong” (Snowdon 2010, p. 6). In his words, since the 2008 global recession “the Wilkinsons and Picketts of this world have enjoyed their intellectually lazy, empirically hazy days of summer”. . . .Hence, the need for an intellectual push-back the likes of which Christopher Snowdon so comprehensively provides in this volume.” (p. 7)

Some months after his book was published, Snowdon’s name appeared again on the headlines of an article in *The Wall Street Journal* (Sanandaji et al. 2010). The essay was written by a group of four, three among them from Sweden. They were Nima Sanandaji and Tino Sanandaji, the president and the chief economist of the Swedish think-tank Captus, and Arvid Malm, chief economist at the Swedish Taxpayers’ Association. All of them were representatives of institutions fostering conservative and liberal economic policy.²⁵ In this article, the main points of Snowdon’s book emerged again. The authors emphasized the lacking scientific quality of the work. They blamed Wilkinson and Pickett for “conflating correlation with causation” and for “data-mining”, where “an apparent correlation is actually the result of excluding inconvenient data”. And, they underlined that according to their own calculations, “the level of income inequality had no impact on levels of life satisfaction”. In this article, possible political overtones of *The Spirit Level* were also strongly emphasized. For the authors, the book (of by) Wilkinson and Pickett “purports to offer strong support for the claim that income redistribution creates social good. Unfortunately, this conclusion doesn’t stand up to our

²⁵ According to its official website, Captus is an “independent. . . free-market think tank that promotes the ideas of liberty such as free enterprise, low taxes and individual liberty” (Captus 2011).

research.” Or, as they wrote later: the work “has an ideological appeal to many among the European left—but if something sounds too good to be true, it usually is”.

At the same time, Peter Saunders, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Sussex University, published a long analysis on *The Spirit Level* (Saunders 2010). The work was released by Policy Exchange, a right-of-centre think tank in London, which is—according to centre-right *The Telegraph*—“also labelled as a ‘neo-con attack dog’” (Helm and Hope 2008) by the centre-left. As for the author’s political attitude, it is obviously no coincidence that his analysis is titled *Beware False Prophets*—a clear reference to Karl Popper’s (1945) work *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, in which Plato, Hegel and Marx as “false prophets” become subjects of harsh criticism as “enemies” of liberal democracy. In other words, Wilkinson and Pickett were represented as “false prophets” by Saunders due to their pro-equality concept.

For *The Spirit Level*’s empirical content, Saunders emphasized the same shortcomings as his predecessors did. These were the lack of robust statistical tests, the arguable way of selecting 23 countries which seemingly prove the authors’ hypothesis, and the misinterpretation of stochastic connections. Similarly to several other critics, Saunders underlined that any seeming correlation between income disparities and social problems is not causal, but “these differences probably reflect a deeper divergence” between cultures (Saunders 2010, p. 7). In his interpretation, altering cultural conditions also undermines Wilkinson’s and Pickett’s suggestion to create a more equal society through strong state redistribution of financial resources. First, because an overall communalist welfare system can only work in a country which is “ethnically and culturally homogeneous” (p. 120), which is actually not the case in such “unequal” societies as the US. Second, it is impossible to identify any certain methods how to organize redistribution since the societies analyzed are not “compatible”. As he wrote, “grafting Sweden’s tax and welfare system onto the USA, Australia or the UK would prove extremely difficult, and if attempted would almost certainly result in socially and economically disastrous outcomes” (pp. 121–122). In general, Saunderson’s work is a detailed review of Wilkinson’s and Pickett’s findings, and as such, it is much more sophisticated and methodologically more substantiated than most critiques on *The Spirit Level* from the political Right. Its main approach is, however, not new, since it bases its criticism on the argumentation that *The Spirit Level*’s quality does not meet scientific standards.

Up to the summer of 2010, right-of-centre critics of *The Spirit Level* apparently have identified all findings of the book that they found disputable. Thus, on 21st July, Matthew Sinclair could already give a summary of the criticism from the Right and its main points (Sinclair 2010). Sinclair, research director of the tax reduction oriented, definitely not pro-equity TaxPayers’ Alliance, seemingly totally agreed with other conservative-libertarian critics. Thus, he came to a brief conclusion with which he was to totally crush *The Spirit Level*’s scientific image: “the book’s claims...are simply untrue” (our emphasis).

As can be seen, *The Spirit Level* attracted great interest from both political sides, although with different results. Among those sympathizing with socialist-egalitarian views, the book soon became very popular as they could present it as a scientific piece of legitimacy of their social philosophy. Conservative and liberal thinkers, however, refuted the work of Wilkinson and Pickett, judged it empirically unsubstantiated and highly disputable in its argumentation and points—in short, unscientific. While these two points of view seemed irreconcilable, very few gave an evaluation which was not obviously influenced by personal political motivations.

One of them was John Kay, economist and advisory board member of the Institute for New Economic Thinking established “with a major donation from George Soros” (Kay 2011). As Kay wrote in his article in the *Financial Times* (Kay 2009), he was “sympathetic to [The Spirit Level’s] basic stance”. Nonetheless, he mentioned virtually all empirical weaknesses of the work which were emphasized in conservative critiques. Providing no “relevant statistical tests”, interpreting simple statistical correlations as causal relationships were only some of these. Kay also drew attention to the limited incommensurability of different countries. For him, the US, Sweden or Japan, whether they are “more” or “less” unequal, are “societies which perform well in terms of their own criteria”. Furthermore, he blamed Wilkinson and Pickett as they gave no evidence for their theory “that not just the poor but the rich are fatter when resources are distributed more evenly”. And he added: “I suspect the claim that equality benefits everyone”, even the rich, “is just not supportable”. Clearly, this statement did not contradict Kay’s “sympathy” for reducing inequalities. He only pointed at the fact that reducing income disparities, even if it might serve interests of the majority, simply cannot be good for everyone. Kay’s review, however, differed from critiques from the Right. Although he identified several weaknesses of the book, he did not write that it would be “unscientific”. Moreover, he underlined that Richard Wilkinson had made important scientific contributions to studies of the social determinants of health. Thus, in his interpretation *The Spirit Level* is a poorly substantiated work, whose empirical findings are hard to agree with. Yet, in his interpretation the book seemed merely an imperfect partial result of a long-lasting and valuable scientific research process than an unscientific political manifesto.

The Spirit Level was also reviewed in *Nature* by developmental biologist Michael Sargent (Sargent 2009). Obviously, the article was not intended to make an ultimate judgment on the book’s main empirical argumentation, nor to focus on its political agenda. Instead, Sargent drew attention to the authors’ “compelling case that the key is neuroendocrinological stress, provoked by a perception that others enjoy a higher status than oneself, undermining self-esteem” (p. 1109). In his words, this idea was presented not because it would be “true” or “false”, but simply as it is “compelling”, worth being discussed. For the suggested link between income inequalities and welfare, Sargent was critical. In his words: “In the past year alone, six academic analyses have been published in peer-reviewed journals, four of which contradict the hypothesis on statistical grounds. Yet Wilkinson and Pickett do not address these criticisms in their book.” (p. 1109). Furthermore, “They might also have explained the occasional notable deviation from their theory, such as the

unexpectedly high murder rates in egalitarian Finland and the unexpectedly low rates in very unequal Singapore.” (p. 1109). Still, Sargent did not write that *The Spirit Level* would unarguably be unsubstantiated, neither that its main suggestions would be. In his words, the idea “has been hotly debated for more than two decades” (p. 1109), and, in a logical way, two of the six academic analyses do not contradict it. Thus, the review in *Nature* showed the book being situated in a hot and still lasting scientific debate. From this point of view, *The Spirit Level* did not turn the scales to the advantage of egalitarians, nor did it do the opposite. It was no solution for the debate, but a “compelling” contribution.

Similarly to Sargent, Oxford sociologist John Goldthorpe (2010) also focused on methodological questions instead of political ones in his analysis. He briefly noted that his point of view on disparities was different to that of Wilkinson and Pickett, but this issue did not appear any more in the article, neither directly nor indirectly. In his words: “The dissenters’ position on social inequality is somewhat closer to my own than is that of [Wilkinson and Pickett] but I do not intend here – and am in any event not competent – to take sides in the continuing, complex debate.” (p. 732). Instead, emphasis was put on two questions: “First, is there good evidence of a contextual effect of social inequality, and more specifically of income inequality, on population health and in other respects? And, second, to the extent that this is the case, is there good evidence that this effect is produced by the ‘psychosocial’ processes that [Wilkinson and Pickett] invoke. . .?” (p. 737).

The first question played a crucial role in most critiques addressed at *the Spirit Level*, as many reviewers underlined that any statistical correlation between these phenomena must be a stochastic but not a causal one. Remarkably, however, Goldthorpe was not dismissive of the epidemiologists’ position. He mentioned that some scientific research seemed to support the arguments by Wilkinson and Pickett (for instance, Marmot 2004). Furthermore, for him, “some evidence of a contextual effect can in fact be found – if not as one of a ‘naturalistic’ universal kind, then as one that operates under certain conditions and in regard to certain aspects of health” (p. 737).

It was the second question which Goldthorpe really found problematic. He referred back to Wilkinson and Pickett, according to whom it is “social status differences” (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010a, p. 43) that lead to well-being problems. Up to this point, Goldthorpe agreed with the two epidemiologists due to his own congruent research findings (c.f. Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). But he also emphasized that Wilkinson and Pickett simply used income inequality indicators to grasp social status differences. And this was a crucial mistake in his eyes as “social stratification is not one-dimensional”, so “status stratification cannot. . . be related to income inequality” (p. 740). As a result of this phenomenon, “the possibility exists that stress associated with status concerns may be intensified by a narrowing as well as by a widening of inequalities of a material kind” (p. 738). Considering this, Goldthorpe judged *The Spirit Level*’s main findings doubtful due to its “serious shortcomings” (p. 732), and argued for a more sophisticated analysis on the relationship between *status* differences and social welfare problems.

In summary, despite his important remarks, Goldthorpe did not level serious criticism at most issues which were otherwise strongly disputed by several dissenters of Wilkinson and Pickett's work. Furthermore, he did not deal with the book's potential political motivations. Instead, he emphasized a methodological problem which remained unrealized by all other critics, and argued for a better consideration of sociological research in other disciplines. Yet, he did not present *The Spirit Level* as unscientific, only underlined a serious weakness in it.

The reviews of Kay and Goldthorpe are remarkable from our point of view since they indicate that the book by Wilkinson and Pickett might be neither the unquestionable source of objective truth nor a pure political manifesto totally lacking scientific relevance. For reviewers having few personal political interests in the disparity discourse, *The Spirit Level* seems a work with important weaknesses but also with "compelling" new ideas worth being thought through. This reveals that material written by scientists (irrespective its scientific quality and substantiation) might not only get a decisive role in the disparity discourse. It also easily becomes a positive or negative subject of quasi-religious belief where it is expected to be worshipped or demolished. Thus, even if statements made by scientists can have a strong influence on the disparity discourse, they have little potential to "defend themselves" from being interpreted one-sidedly for purely political reasons.

2.6.2 Findings of the Case Study: On the Legitimate Authority of Sciences

As has been shown, the *The Spirit Level* quickly became a flash point. Its main argument about a suggested strong negative link between income inequalities and social well-being raised the interest of several columnists, analysts and politicians. Most reviewers wrote about the book in an enthusiastic tone, strongly motivated by their own political views on social disparities. Left-of-centre reviewers tended to present the findings of *The Spirit Level* as "scientific truths", which indisputably prove the righteousness of their ideological position. Right-of-center critics, however, questioned the work's validity, judged it "unscientific" and refuted its social political intentions. As a third group, some researchers criticized the empirical results as well as their interpretation by Wilkinson and Pickett, but did not present the whole work as "unscientific" and resisted joining the purely political debate on the book's political relevance.

Considering these, it becomes possible at this point to understand why *The Spirit Level* raised the interest of so many in the "politics business" and why did it spark a hot debate. With their pro-equity argument, the book's authors entered the social disparity discourse with an opinion necessarily becoming regarded there as a proof of socialist orientation. It is no wonder, therefore, that the position of Wilkinson and Pickett was judged "a surprisingly traditional socialist" "political tract" by the conservative journalist Charles Moore. But that two persons expressed their opinion

within a political discourse would not have resulted in a broad and heated debate. Actually, it was something more: a struggle to win the discourse. With its universalistic statement that equality benefits everyone *The Spirit Level* implied to have found something decisive that could put an end to a long debate. And this attempt seemed serious enough to gain extremely strong support from numerous columnists on the Left and attract withering criticism from journalists on the Right.

In fact, this enormous power of the book was a result of its authors' position. As Foucault underlines, different persons have different opportunities to participate in the discourse. He draws particular attention to what he calls "a rarefaction. . . of the speaking subjects" (Foucault 1981, p. 61). In his words, "none shall enter the order of discourse if he does not satisfy certain requirements or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so" (ibid., pp. 61–62). We should add that once within, different persons have unequal abilities in shaping the discourse: the opinion of some "does matter", that of others maybe barely or not at all. One reason is that one's ability to form an opinion which is regarded as substantiated by the participants of the discourse can vary on a broad scale. If a broadcast corporation performs non-representative polling in the street about inequalities and a requested passer-by argues either for or against equality, this position is usually not paid the same attention to as to that of a leading politician. The opinion of those who are considered to have more knowledge on the issue and more power to change actual conditions is more likely to "matter" in the eyes of many. The second factor is the relation of the speaker's view to their (supposed) own interests. If a Socialist MP argues for equity or a Conservative for inequality, their stances are simply judged "typical" and "obvious" as their fundamental interests are to represent their parties and the alleged voters. It makes a difference, however, when somebody seeming uninterested and "objective" explicitly supports one characteristic opinion within the discourse. And these are the factors making *The Spirit Level* so forceful since it is a contribution to a political debate *by scientists*.

In the last decades many philosophers and researchers have argued that scientific knowledge might be "simply one of a number of equally 'valid' modes of understanding" (Mercer 1984, p. 194, cf. Feyerabend 1993[1975]), thus, it has no supremacy over other modes such as "commonsense" (Mercer 1984, p. 194). In Laudan's words, "it is no longer viable to attempt to distinguish science from non-science by assimilating that distinction to the difference between knowledge and opinion" as "there is no difference between knowledge and opinion" (Laudan 1988, p. 340). Nonetheless, in certain contexts science still has a remarkable reputation (especially in western societies), which elevates it above alternative "modes of understanding". As Haraway puts it, science is often presented as "the real game in town" (Haraway 1988, p. 577). This almost (or sometimes profoundly) religious attitude towards science is the phenomenon of *scientism*, which is described by Stenmark as follows:

"The overwhelming intellectual and practical successes of science have led some people to think that there are no real limits to the competence of science, no limits to what can be achieved in the name of science. There is nothing outside the domain of science, nor is there any area of human life to which science cannot successfully be applied. . . .Or, if there are

limits to the scientific enterprise, the idea is that science, at least, sets the boundaries for what we humans can ever know about reality. This is the view of scientism.” (Stenmark 2008, p. 111)

Scientism is rooted in a presumption that among the various “modes of understanding” it is only science that is disembodied and has a universal scope, and that these aspects rigidly distinguish scientific from non-scientific knowledge (e.g. from folk knowledge, political thought, religion or ideology) (Shapin 1998, p. 5). Thanks to these specific features, science is claimed to have an “uninterested” position, a “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986). Meanwhile, though, it is suggested as being able to reveal all aspects of everything we can find in reality, so its claimed position is “a view from nowhere and from everywhere” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 116). Thus, science is seen as the only mode of understanding to produce “neutral” and “objective” knowledge about the world; the only “agent for revealing. . . infallible knowledge” (Wunder 2008, p. 5). This is especially true for physical or natural sciences, which, as Thompson underlines, are on the top of “a quite explicit prestige hierarchy ranging from the ‘hard’, ‘pure’, ‘tough’, ‘rational’ ‘objective’ disciplines of the physical sciences through to the ‘soft’, ‘emotional’ and ‘undisciplined’ subjects such as sociology, economics, psychology, history and human geography” (Thompson 1981; quoted in Mercer 1984, p. 157).

These normative concepts of scientific knowledge can be traced back to seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Livingstone’s (2009) words, “it was in that era that the term [science] itself began to acquire a definition that linked it to a body of demonstrated truths and observed facts brought into coherence by their adherence to general natural laws” (p. 666). This attitude has been expanding since then, and not only among researchers. The scientific boom of the twentieth century has also not left popular culture unaffected. Popular scientific literature and radio and television programs have brought scientism “right into the living room of ordinary people” (Stenmark 2008, p. 111). Due to this “long-running expansionist policy” (Wunder 2008, p. 7), science is regarded as something supreme by broad strata of society. Therefore, to call something “scientific” is still “the most popular rhetoric for justifying claims of knowledge” (ibid.; cf. Bauer 1992). This fact gives a tremendous *legitimate authority* (Blass 2000) to the representatives of science, especially to those of natural sciences. And, as legitimate authorities “are extremely influential in directing human conduct” (Cialdini 2008, p. 205; cf. Blass 2000), people usually tend to accept scientific “expert’s” guidance, sometimes unthinkingly, even if these instructions contradict their initial views (Cialdini 2008).

This extreme credit given to science made *The Spirit Level* so forceful in the social disparity discourse. Unlike most views expressed within the discourse, this book was intended not to mirror the *opinion* of politicians, journalists or political analysts. Instead, it was aimed at showing the *findings of two scientists*—or, what is even more, of two epidemiologists, *two doctors*. In accordance with this fact, Wilkinson and Pickett claimed not to try to convince readers through mere rhetoric. Instead, they used statistics “from the best sources” (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010b), such as WHO, UN, or World Bank. These were claimed to be processed by

mathematical methods and presented in scatter plots—certainly seeming profoundly scientific to everyday readers. This sort of analysis could be interpreted as an “objective”, “unbiased” contribution to the otherwise politically infiltrated debate on disparities—in other words, the creation of *analytical* knowledge. It was definitely a “view from nowhere and from everywhere” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 116), unlike the obviously politically embedded and biased positions of politicians or political journalists, which belong to the domain of producing *orientation* knowledge. In consequence, since the authors took a stance on one side in the disparity discourse, this was likely to have serious implications on the positions of many since they maybe tended to accept the scientists’ (and therefore *the “scientific”*) view.

No wonder that it was the book’s scientific claim which attracted the most attention from the actors in the “politics business”. Those arguing for equality never forgot to emphasize the scientific nature of *The Spirit Level*. Their methods varied on a broad scale, from referring consistently to the work as “ground-breaking research” (Toynbee 2009) (which is, in other words, “no hunch”) to its explicit presentation as the source of “intellectual certainty” and “scientific truth” (Hattersley 2009). Meanwhile, the book’s critics strongly disputed that the work of Wilkinson and Pickett would have been scientific. They questioned at a minimum the quality of data evaluation every time, arguing that the *method* the authors used did not meet scientific standards—therefore, it was not scientific. A typical reasoning is that of Reeves, for whom “the authors have simply scoured the data for signs of malignancy in unequal societies”, but as the relationships they suggest “can’t be verified”, they “do not provide any statistical analyses” (Reeves 2009). And since *The Spirit Level*’s analyses claimed to be statistical are presented as not-statistical, indirectly—but obviously—the whole work is judged non-scientific. But this kind of criticism was minor: some commentators simply and explicitly regarded *The Spirit Level* an unarguably non-scientific work. For instance, Moore writes that Wilkinson and Pickett argue for equality “certainly not scientifically” (Moore 2010), while, in Sinclair’s view, “the book’s claims...are simply untrue” (Sinclair 2010).

These statements clearly indicate that political journalists on both sides realized *The Spirit Level*’s remarkable potential to reshape power geometries within the social disparity discourse. They also understood that a decisive point is whether the book can be positioned within the circle of “scientific products” or whether its scientific claim can be destroyed. In consequence, reviews from the political Left argued for the scientific quality of the work, while right-of-centre critics judged it non-scientific—and, thus, a sort of manifesto having no supremacy over any other political opinions within the discourse, regardless of its authors’ professional background.

In summary, dealing with social disparities is a way to express political opinions and, thus, to implement political self-categorization. Therefore, the existence and perpetual maintenance of the social disparity discourse is a crucial interest of the actors in the “politics business”, whose political strength and efficiency depends largely on the number and determination of their supporters entering the discourse




Fig. 2.2 The role of science and scientists in political discourses. *Source:* design by author

and contributing to it. However, this discourse is not only a means to sustain the potential voters' political identity. It is also a sort of battlefield where competing interest groups can clash, rivals can be defeated and their identity-making capacity can be annihilated, or at least reduced. In consequence, each party makes serious attempts to find feasible weapons. And the influence their views have on the discourse is merely a function of their legitimate authority. Since science and the analytical knowledge it produces ("scientific facts") still have an outstanding reputation, each statement made by scientists within the discourse (even those in fact belonging to the domain of orientation knowledge) has the very potential to give a new direction to the debate and so it attracts serious attention (Fig. 2.2). No wonder that such statements quickly find themselves (in as) the focal point of harsh opinions. Here, one party emphasizes the scientific nature and "truth" of the statements, while the other tries to segregate them from the field of science in order to undermine their discursive power. In short, science as means of legitimization has a crucial role in the disparity discourse.

2.7 Changing Context and Altering Position of Slogans in the Disparity Discourse

The above sections revealed the highly political nature of the disparity discourse, and presented the crucial role played by science in it. In the light of reactions to *The Spirit Level*, however, one point is still unclear. As it was discussed, certain slogans have a strong political meaning in the disparity discourse. The use of such slogans

automatically puts those using them in certain political categories (e.g. “Socialists” and “Conservatives”). Thus, it seems illogical that any would try to make use of slogans traditionally belonging to the rival’s vocabulary. Still, David Cameron virtually did so when he referred to the book by Wilkinson and Pickett in his 2009 speech. With this, he distanced himself from the typically conservative-libertarian non-equity argument and addressed his positive words to a work which explicitly argued for reducing social disparities, a typical socialist tract. Enthusiastic readers of the book might say that this “turn” was simply a result of its exciting argumentation, and Cameron was but one of those whom the work of Wilkinson and Pickett convinced about the necessity of reducing social disparities. No doubt, a book published “in the right place at the right time” can exert remarkable influence on many people, among them politicians as well. It is still unlikely, however, that—*ceteris paribus*—an interesting reading could lead to mentionable changes in a leading party’s (or a party leader’s) goals under democratic circumstances. Therefore, it seems reasonable to look for other reasons, and to prefer a less “naïve” explanation.

In November 2009, the Conservatives’ chances to win the coming elections seemed very good due to the Labour’s serious trust deficit. Still, overall economic and social circumstances would have made it extremely risky to campaign for increasing economic growth even at the cost of inequalities. This typically neoliberal objective had been very popular among conservative politicians since Reaganist and Thatcherist economic policies. As they emphasized, “growing inequality did not matter” as “a rising tide lifts all boats” (Devichand 2010). However, this reasoning could no longer be maintained for at least two reasons.

First, setting the objective of stable economic growth during a global financial crisis might have proved political suicide in the mid-term. When David Cameron made his speech at Kings Palace, preliminary statistics on the third quarter of 2009 still indicated a more than 5 % decrease of British GDP on an annual basis (ONS 2009). Government deficit as well as debt were skyrocketing, and reached 11.3 % and 68.1 % of GDP by the end of the year after a moderate 4.9 % and 52.1 % in 2008 (ONS 2011). The duration of the recession was impossible to predict, possible engines of a later economic recovery were unclear. No wonder that under such circumstances political leaders did not base their campaign on the slogan of stable economic growth. Its realization would have been uncertain, the risk of failing too big. Therefore, it was more secure to set an objective that can be achieved with less effort, even if it was not a traditionally Conservative one. Reducing disparities might seem feasible in this sense, as the distribution of the pie can be made somewhat more proportionate even if a bigger pie cannot be baked.

Second, politicians were not to ignore the many voices interpreting the financial crisis as the end of an economic epoch, which should be followed by something new. Harsh expressions as the “crisis” or “end” of neoliberalism were used in relation to the global recession rather by neo-Marxist intellectuals (cf. Brand and Sekler 2009; Brie 2009; Badiou 2010; Duménil and Lévy 2011), but not only by them. Joseph Stiglitz, definitely not a Marxist, similarly emphasized that the downturn could put an end to the era of “neo-liberal market fundamentalism”

(Stiglitz 2008). Economic recession, growing unemployment and decreasing incomes also made these views popular for many everyday people. The decline of neoliberalism as an idea became popular among many very quickly. Such tendencies have major relevance in politicians' eyes. If the years of crisis are presented as a shift from one economic (and social) paradigm to another, politicians also have to find new objectives and new slogans to retain their voters' interest and trust. At this point, a logical strategy can be to set a goal which seems to cure the most criticized features of the former policy. In the current case, most criticism was leveled at a dramatic widening of the income gap between various social strata and at the remarkably passive standpoint of the neoliberal state. Given these, some reduction of social inequalities with a certain assistance of the state might have seemed a feasible and attractive aim, even for non-Socialist political groups. No wonder that David Cameron moved in this direction (cf. "We need to use the state to remake society." [Cameron 2009]).

In general, *the structure of discourse has changed due to serious transformations in its social, political and economic context*. Thus, borders between those propagating and rejecting certain slogans have been blurred. The global crisis made many slogans unpopular, which all had been connected to the same political ideology. Consequently, the users of this ideology needed to give up a part of their old vocabulary and add new words to it, or reinterpret certain words to make them acceptable. This does not mean that these actors have also given up their self-identification as a group independent from its rivals. That Cameron used the idea of decreasing social disparities as a slogan to make his party more attractive does not equal their giving up conservatism and becoming socialists. The Conservatives still sustained their image as an independent party, whose solutions to given problems are diametrically opposed to those the Labour Party argues for. For instance, Cameron emphasized in his speech that the reduction of disparities and his party's other goals was not to realize by a "big government", but by a "big society" (Cameron 2009). For him, the role of the state is not to solve the people's problem in itself, but to "help stimulate social action" (ibid). This argument of supporting people to help themselves differs from the traditional socialist aim of a state to "fairly" redistribute resources. The notion of promoting "non-state collective action" instead of "centralized state solutions" also mirrored the conservative philosophy, not the socialist one. Thus, the global crisis, though exerting influence on the rival power groups' vocabularies in the discourse, did not dissolve the barriers between these groups. Inequality became regarded as a vital problem by all leading political movements, but their competition remained.

This finding is highly important from the viewpoint of our analysis. It shows that the disparity discourse (as a political one) can sometimes witness situations where the exclusive slogan of one group becomes a slogan for all competing parties. Such a change is especially likely to occur during great social, political and economic shocks, as will also be seen in Chap. 3 about spatial disparities.

2.8 Social Disparities and the Disparity Discourse: Sub-Conclusion

Social disparities considered as “differences among people in their command over [various sorts of] resources” (Osberg 2001, p. 7371) are present in every society. This is more than a pure result of individually differing biological characteristics. It is caused by a system of dominance and differential evaluation, which is brought into being by many factors as societies become more and more complex in interpersonal relations. In the latter process, an especially important change is marked by the emergence of delayed-return systems instead of archaic immediate-return systems. In these, the horizontal as well as vertical divisions of labor become necessary, which, then, necessitate social control over individuals’ contribution to the labor process. An unavoidable step is that certain members of the group have to control cooperation. And to these members a sort of power has to be given as well, otherwise they cannot coerce everybody to follow the decisions the group has made. Another important event occurs in the history of social disparities when permanent settlements emerge. This shift not only deepens the division of labor, but also reduces the group’s spatial radius. Because reaching scarce resources is the primary challenge, further intensification of social relations is needed to prevent abuse. From then on, over various epochs and different types of society, the intensification, institutionalization and stabilization of inequality structures become dominant tendencies. However, societies not only have sophisticated (and reasonable and necessary, rather than malevolent) practices to produce and reproduce social disparities, they also try to keep these under control. They try to avoid extreme inequalities and the huge tensions they cause since the latter could end up in the collapse of society. In other words, ideas to create and stabilize disparities on the one hand, and to reduce or hold them below a certain level on the other, are both present in every society.

These controversial forces driving social disparities made the issue highly interesting in the eyes of many thinkers as far back as several thousand years ago. From the beginning, many were of the opinion that inequalities above a certain level lead to social tensions which destabilize the state. Meanwhile, many emphasized that equalization also brings about severe problems which threaten the functioning of society. These practically irreconcilable views resulted in two alternative arguments. One stressed the importance of equality as equal distribution. This was based on the (either implicit or explicit) concept that all individuals have something inborn in common, which entitles them to be equal in the end state. The other view argued for equality considered as equal reward for equal merit (achievement principle). This idea was substantiated with the argument of individually differing honors, which should be reflected in rewards to avoid injustice. These two concepts have proved rather stable over time. Although among different social, political and economic circumstances and through different ways of formulation and justification, the dichotomy of these two points has been and remained at the heart of the debate over disparities.

Besides, dealing with social inequalities has always had a strong political relevance. On the one hand, the issue has been highly political since it focuses on power relations. But on the other, in the corresponding debate many ideas have been created which could well be utilized by various political ideologies. And, actually, the debate over disparities has been itself a discursive process that is political. The discourse over social disparities is an easy-to-understand issue of moral and politics, which can raise the attention of a great many. Due to this, it is a feasible means for the actors in the “politics business” (such as politicians, political analysts etc.) to make themselves visible for the masses, thus, to create and perpetually recreate their political identities. Meanwhile, the discourse can be entered virtually by everybody. That is how the actors in the “politics business” can also draw the attention of everyday people to political issues, to convince them about the importance of politics and, if possible, about the truth of the given political approach. Thus, the disparity discourse serves as a battlefield for different political groups. The latter are interested at least in sustaining their self-identity and the people’s interest in politics, and ideally in winning the discursive battle and the support of the masses, while defeating their rivals. The direct relevance of the disparity discourse for political identity-making has been especially important since the emergence of modern mass societies, although it certainly was not insignificant before.

For the disparity discourse, science can have a very significant, even decisive role. As in all discourses, the influence given statements made during the discourse strongly depends on the position of those who made them. And, due to remarkable achievements of science in the last centuries, and especially in the last decades, science (especially “hard sciences”) still has an outstanding reputation and is a force in arguments. In other words, although the often claimed superiority of science amidst various forms of knowledge has already been challenged from many sides, its representatives still have a remarkable legitimate authority. Thus, even a discourse of a moral nature can be strongly shaped by scientists and their statements. The disparity discourse is no exception. Once representatives of scientific life make their remarks concerning inequalities, their views are brought to the forefront of the discourse. There, those who agree with the normative content of the scientists’ statement (or with the normative judgement the scientists’ comment tends to substantiate, even unconsciously) tend to refer to this contribution, stressing its “objective”, “inarguable”, scientific nature. But those who reject the same normative ideas probably reject what scientists say and question the scientific nature of their statements. This has two remarkable consequences.

First, if some scientists aim to shape the political discourse, they are likely to speak in favor of the ideology or movement with which they sympathize, while easily hiding their political stances behind a mask of science). Second, irrespective of the political motivations of its authors (if they have so), comments presented as scientific often invoke extreme and irreconcilable reactions in the discourse. They face destructive attack from those opposing their potential normative meaning, while they are praised by those who can make use of them to substantiate their own political objectives. If the discourse is imbalanced, and dominated by a single

approach, the story is even more simple. Here, the difference between the general acceptance and rejection of a scientific contribution is not a matter of scientific quality (empirical accuracy, methodical correctness etc.), but whether it fits the political objectives of those in power. In other words, the more actors in the discourse they are convenient to, the greater the chance statements by scientists will be embraced and allowed to shape the discourse.

Chapter 3

Social Disparities Meet Space and Concepts Surrounding It

Human society is a heterogeneous aggregate made up by a huge number of individuals, all of whom are different from one another. Thus, it is possible to distinguish a great many of societal groups along various lines of distinction. And one can measure virtually any parameter of the individuals or groups; actual values will always indicate a certain level of disparities. As it was explained in the previous chapter, these inequalities can attract much interest from the side of social research, for analytical as well as for political reasons. Among the many aspects to which one (especially a geographer) may give attention here, one is highly geographical in nature: social disparities can be analyzed in their spatial manifestation. This is the fact on which the whole tradition of spatial disparity research is based, which we will present and analyze in this chapter. Before focusing on the long history, the underlying analytical and political considerations, and the outputs of spatial disparity research, however, we have to briefly discuss the possibility of conceptualizing social inequalities in spatial terms. Although this point might seem to lie outside the domain of analyzing a political discourse, it is of fundamental importance in the actual case. Given the complex relation of space and society, we first have to explain what spatial disparity research indeed means and contributes to a better interpretation of social inequalities. Without making this explicit, we can hardly understand the analytical as well as the political importance of spatial disparity research, which is in fact a necessary prerequisite to reveal the factors that influence and the mechanisms that shape the spatial disparity discourse.

That social inequalities are difficult to conceptualize in spatial terms mainly comes from the fact that the relation of space and society is one of geography's most disputed topics, with many questions still open (for overviews of various approaches see Gregory 2009a; Meusbürger 1999, 2008; Weichhart 2007; Werlen 1993, 1995, 1997, 2007a). Competing approaches¹ are, however, common in that they all enable the analysis of the spatial aspects of social inequalities, even if they do this in different ways. The traditional Newtonian concept of space, which is

¹ A brief but well-structured overview of these approaches is given by Gregory (2009a).

utilized in encyclopedic as well as regional geographies, defines space as a kind of container-like phenomenon. In this interpretation, space is “an empty grid of mutually exclusive points” (Gregory 2009a, p. 708), “an unchanging box’ within which objects exist and events occur”, “a co-ordinate system”, “simply a given universal of existence” (Smith 1984, pp. 67–68). In this *absolute space*, each social (and natural) phenomenon can be localized along a geographical coordinate system. Thus, the configuration of these phenomena in the physical space can be mapped and described, and the difference between various places and regions in regard to certain social attributes can be presented.

In the concept of *relative space*, which is used by the representatives of spatial science, the connection of social and spatial is somewhat different. Here the focus is not on an *a priori* “given” space including social elements (and natural ones as well). Instead, in this approach the space as system or structure is constituted by the objects and events and, particularly, by their spatial relations (Gregory 2009a). This approach, where “physical space [is] superseded by mathematical space” (Smith 1984, pp. 68–73), also enables the conceptualization of social disparities through a spatial analysis of social phenomena. Thus, as Johnston (2009a, p. 711) puts it in line with O’Sullivan and Unwin (2002), it is possible to analyze “the arrangements of points, lines, areas and surfaces on a map, and of their interrelationships”, and to reveal the geometry of the landscape. Social disparities will manifest themselves here as unevenness of social surfaces, and as peaks, slopes and valleys in an abstract, mathematical landscape.

For the advocates of *process-oriented* concepts of space, to describe a sort of abstract spatial form is not enough to reveal the processes running in the background (cf. Olsson 1974). This is because, as Massey (1984) put it, “it is not spatial form in itself... that has effects, but the spatial form of particular and specified social processes and social relationships” (p. 5). Thus, the representatives of the process-oriented approach reject the concepts about space we have presented in previous paragraphs. But coming to terms with the spatial aspects of social disparities is possible in a process-oriented conceptual framework as well. In Gregory’s (2009a, p. 708) words, here one can explore “the process-domains of political economy and social theory, and then [trace] the marks made by these processes and practices on the surface of the Earth”. Thus, the challenge of connecting social phenomena and geographical space is assured.

Even in theories which interpret space as a result of human activity, as a *social product*, it is possible to find the connection between social disparities and geographical space. Lefebvre (1991)[1974], for instance, draws up a theory where three ways to understand space are distinguished. For him, spaces can be differentiated as perceived, conceived, and lived spaces. Perceived places are spatial practices, which are concrete, material, and physical. Conceived spaces are the spaces of mental processes, which Lefebvre refers to as the representation of space. Finally, lived spaces embrace what he calls spaces of representation. These are spaces occupied and used by certain actions, through which they are permanently recoded (Elden 2009). (The same categories are also used by Soja (1989, 1996), who refers to them as Firstspace, Secondspace and Thirdspace [Gregory 2009b].) From this

viewpoint, the link between social disparities and physical spaces can be conceptualized as the different processes of using and recoding space by those people being in different social conditions. Or, approaching from the geographical space, the various coding attached to its different elements (to different places) can mark a point going out from which one can reveal social inequalities in the background.


The analysis of certain social differences by observing the characteristics of geographical space is also possible in an *action-oriented* approach. For Werlen (2007b, p. 586), space is “not to apprehend as an object, but as a representational construct, which, according to the form of everyday action, obtains a peculiar characteristic”. Actually, one can focus on the meaning attributed to physical-material conditions by various actors. By this, one can gain knowledge about social relations (e.g. relations reflecting disparities) from features of the geographical space (cf. Meusburger 2008). A generally similar stance is that of Weichhart (2007, p. 61). In his words, “spatial structures [constitute] a specific form of expression and a medium of social phenomena and systemic interrelations”. Thus, even for him, the analysis of geographical space is a legitimate means to reveal certain aspects of social inequalities.

To sum it up, alternative concepts about space seem to be common in their conviction that social phenomena (even social disparities) have a sort of geographical pattern. Furthermore, their reasoning (at least implicitly) suggests that these geographical imprints might be worthwhile topics of research, which can get us closer to a more profound understanding of society.

We should also underscore, however, that the analysis of such geographical imprints can never give direct information about the individuals themselves. As Meusburger (2008) shows, although space is a medium of human activity, the pattern of activities visible in space is always equivocal and can be interpreted in different ways. In other words, the observation of spatial patterns produced by social acts is barely like reading a well-structured book where each word has a clear meaning. It is instead rather a kind of “tracking” (p. 246). It can reveal important mosaics of information, which, once fit together, might reveal remarkable aspects of certain social issues and bring the researcher closer to their understanding. But it can never enable a comprehensive, unambiguous, “objective” description of “reality” since it does not give a direct insight into the motivations and decisions of individuals who leave these geographical imprints behind themselves. Actually, this problem roots in the very “imprint-being” of each social phenomenon one can register in the geographical space. This is a challenge to emerge at any geographical (hierarchical) level one can focus on, at least above that of human body (Fig. 3.1).²

²We agree with Marston et al. (2005) and Marston et al. (2009) in that the scale in which geographical levels can be defined is just an epistemology, which is “tied to a global-to-local continuum” (p. 666). Thus, Fig. 3.1 is not aimed at presenting all geographical levels one can define, since the number of these is virtually infinite. The objective is rather to give an overview of the geographical levels that are frequently used in geographical research, and to illustrate their relation to the level of human body.

Fig. 3.1 A cascade of hierarchical (geographical) levels. Adapted from Marston et al. (2009), p. 665. Reproduce by permission of John Wiley and Sons



In this sense, this limitation concerns macroscale (global) as well as microscale (local) analyses.³

Yet, geographical imprints can be relevant objects to investigate. Although they are not unequivocal, they still enable (at least to some extent) the reconstruction of certain human activities and social processes, the outcomes of which they are (Meusburger 2008). In some issues imprints might even enable us to glimpse aspects of social issues that otherwise (e.g. in an individual-centered analysis) would remain invisible. For instance, a set of individual interviews would hardly enable one to reveal the striking disparities in income, employment or health indicators between the North and South of Italy, the West and East of Germany (the “old” and “new” federal states), or between Moscow and some mainly rural regions in Southwest Russia. Supposedly, these inequalities on the spatial meso-scale are perceived to some extent by the individuals, so thus they would not be totally absent in interviews. Still, the microscale analysis necessarily based on a relatively small sample, a limited number of entities, could easily point out that rich

³ We should stress here that, according to many researchers, even analyses focused on individuals can fail in their attempt to reveal individual motivations and the process of individual decision-making, since this process is influenced by many factors even individuals themselves do not realize or are simply unaware of (Meusburger 2008; cf. Schluchter 2005). Thus, individual-centered research cannot be postulated as “superior” due to a presumed better explanatory power of social processes. And, consequently, research aimed at higher spatial levels is also not to be regarded as “less capable” to contribute to the understanding of social issues.

and poor people, employed and unemployed, healthy and unhealthy can be found virtually everywhere: in each country, each region and each city. This is of course true from a certain point of view. But it is barely possible in this way to identify the striking regional pattern of disparities, which is much more than a simple outcome of individual differences, and which strongly concerns regional peculiarities in tradition, social structures, or institutional arrangements. The same goes for international analysis, especially that in this regard most individuals have highly constrained or simply no personal experience of actual inequalities in income, employment or health conditions. In such cases, macroanalyses can provide a much more exact and sophisticated description of disparities. This cannot substitute for a deep-drilling, of course, just as the form, the morphology itself does not equal the underlying mechanisms, and statistical correlation is not the same as causal relation. But in such cases macroanalytical methods could reasonably contribute to the description of the phenomenon.

Moreover, geographical imprints of human action can give one insight into the deep strata of social, political, and economic circumstances of the past and their spatial characteristics, the roots of recent phenomena. This is because, as Stinchcombe (1965) emphasizes in his imprinting theory, organizations, and in a broader sense societal structures as well, usually take their features in response to the conditions of their environment at the time they emerge, and due to path-dependence, usually retain these features for a long time.

Thus, in our view the investigation of spatial disparities can be regarded as a legitimate contribution to the research and understanding of social disparities and their causes. This goes to its capacity both to provide useful information on individual acts and to reveal mechanisms behind social inequalities otherwise difficult to come to terms with on an individual level (such as those related to social and institutional structures).

Chapter 4

A Contextual Analysis of the Emergence of Spatial Disparity Research

4.1 Spatial Disparities Without Spatial Disparity Research: The Pre-modern Age

The various categories defined in the last section appeared in scientific thought as topics of research at very different points in time. A firm interest in spatial differentiation was already to be found in the earliest geographical works. As early as in Strabo's (1983) *Geographica* written some 2,000 years ago, to describe of parts of the then known world and to identify differences between them was but a presentation of spatial differentiation. Basically the same was true for chorological works compiled over the next many centuries, including the *Geographia Generalis* of Bernhardus Varenius (1650), and even for the scientific contributions of chorological geography in the early twentieth century hallmarked by names such as Alfred Hettner and Richard Hartshorne (Warf 2010). In all these works, the spatial unevenness of physical geographical factors (such as location, relief, climate, vegetation) was a main factor along which various parts of the earth were distinguished and described.

No doubt, of course, that this chorological tradition also paid attention to certain forms of unevenness produced by social factors. The uneven distribution of population, differences in the efficiency of agricultural production or in the political order are just few topics that are, at least to some extent, imprints of human agency, and which gained attention from all these authors. In their works, however, the outcomes of social processes were usually presented as "given", the human agency standing in their background remained unrevealed. Furthermore, such texts often tended, at least implicitly, to overemphasize the role of physical factors over society. An extreme result of this was environmental determinism, which directly explained social phenomena by physical (mainly climatic) factors. This approach not only appeared in Montesquieu's (1989)[1752] *The Spirit of the Laws*, but it became especially popular at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the *Zeitgeist* infiltrated by evolutionary thoughts (cf. Judkins 2010; for examples see Huntington 1907, 1924; Semple 1911). This tendency was also fuelled by

geopolitical endeavors. Colonial powers could benefit much from presenting the lower technological level of the peoples they conquered as environmentally determined, thus, unavoidable. This was to justify their expansive imperial politics, which could now be interpreted as a civilizing project, not aimed at one-sided exploitation of the colonies but rather “‘bringing faith and civilization’ to the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’” (McEwan 2009, p. 125; cf. Livingstone 1992, 2002).

Meanwhile, the spatial aspect of social disparities only began to attract considerable attention as late as the nineteenth century. This fact is remarkable in light of the fact that spatial disparities are coeval with social inequalities, and, actually, with society itself (see Sect. 2.2). The vertical division of labor separated low-status manual activities from a relatively small number of high-status activities of control and coordination. Through this, it also brought significant spatial disparities into being since high-status activities became concentrated at few locations in the geographical space. These centers of authority were also to be found in the first city-states, where the emperor’s palace and the temple stood in the center, with less prestigious activities located rather on the urban outskirts. This scheme with a contrast between center and periphery was also explicit in the early empires in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China and India. Especially great was the difference between cities and rural settlements, since high-status activities were, virtually without exception, located in urban centers. Thus, spatial disparities had already reached a considerable level before the debate over social inequalities emerged. Still, a discourse about spatial disparities similar to that about social disparities began only more than 2,000 years later.

One important reason for this time delay might be that although spatial disparities had existed for thousands of years, they remained invisible for the vast majority of society. The contrast between urban and rural areas, for instance, was only perceived by merchants and, in the medieval, by traveling journeymen and students. Emperors and kings were also mobile to some extent. Especially before the spread of literacy, the stability of political power and the efficient functioning of the state were strongly attached to the leader’s personal presence. Thus, emperors and kings again and again spent some weeks or months far from their main seat, usually in residences spread over the area over which they reigned, in order to keep control of their subjects. This tradition continued to exist later on as well, even if its importance declined over centuries (Meusburger 1998a, pp. 7–11). Yet, all these “mobile” groups formed no more than a small fraction of society. Others such as the agricultural population in the countryside, strongly linked to the land, or most urban residents enjoying the privilege and defending walls of their city, usually got to know only their closest environment. Thus, spatial disparities attracted virtually no attention from researchers for a long time.

4.2 A Late Beginning for Spatial Inequality Research After the Industrial Revolution

4.2.1 *The Industrial Revolution and the Emergence of Social Physics*

The conditions that had caused the scientific negligence of spatial disparities changed radically during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries due to the Industrial Revolution. In this period, the vertical division of labor increased to formerly unprecedented levels. To a large extent this tendency was the outcome of a rapid technological and organizational shift occurring in a society with a poor level of education and literacy on average. Under such circumstances, a radical division of labor in a vertical sense was necessary to establish productive jobs requiring no specific education, which could suck up the uneducated masses. Then, the efficient functioning of production necessitated a permanent and strong control over and coordination of these manual activities, which gave a further impetus to the vertical division of labor (Fassmann and Meusburger 1997). This process not only increased social and spatial disparities, but also made them visible for the broad masses. Since the vast majority of workplaces came into being in cities, a massive migration began from the countryside to urban centers. In England, for instance, which was the first to witness this tendency, the proportion of urban population rose between 1776 and 1871 from 25.9 % to 65.2 %, and almost half of the surplus (45.7%) resulted from immigration from rural regions (Williamson 1988).¹ With a certain time delay, similar changes began in other Western European countries as well. In this context, the urban–rural divide became highly visible evidence for those flowing from the agricultural countryside into cities, where the industrial sector offered a vast number of workplaces. And it also became visible for urban dwellers, who suddenly witnessed the inflow of those giving an imprint of less favorable rural conditions in their social status as well as in their generally low level of education, and even in their personal appearance. Furthermore, in the cities as social groups of very different status got relatively close to each other in the geographical sense, social disparities became not only easier to see, but their spatial aspect also became highly explicit.

Besides these, improving statistical apparatus played an important role in that spatial disparities gained attention as a research issue. The strongly centralized absolute monarchies of Europe began to systematically collect statistical information about their subjects for administrative and military reasons. And this embraced not only data on the number of population. In France of the early nineteenth century, statistics about literacy and education were also collected, and, with a

¹ Furthermore, a significant part of the other 54.2 % was constituted by the children of first generation immigrants since active and fertile age cohorts were highly overrepresented in the latter group (Williamson 1988).

certain delay, other European states likewise expanded the circle of indicators they registered (Meusburger 1998a, p. 192; pp. 223–224). Hence, the data necessary for quantitative analysis was already accessible. Methods to efficiently process and evaluate statistical information were also provided soon by the newly emerging discipline of social physics. Social physics was brought into being by the idea that society, similarly to nature, follows certain regularities, which can be measured through statistical methods, which were already popular in the natural sciences. A pioneer advocate of this approach was the Belgian astronomer, mathematician, and statistician Adolphe Quetelet. He conducted his first research on long-term demography (e.g. fertility and mortality statistics) from the 1820s onwards, and presented his concept in his main work the decade after (Quetelet 1835). Actually, Quetelet himself was barely interested in the social effects of industrialization (Lesthaeghe 2001), but the tools he used and especially the approach he followed had a significant influence on many social scientists. Similarly valuable was another new method: thematic mapping. Charles Dupin (1826), a French mathematician, published the world's first choropleth map about the rate of illiteracy of France at the level of departments in the very years when Quetelet began his statistical analyses (Friendly 2007). This cartographic method was soon developed further by the Italian geographer Adriano Balbi and the French lawyer André-Michel Guerry (Balbi and Guerry 1829). They depicted different phenomena in their mutual relation (such as the number of crimes in relation to the level of education), which made various indicators easy to compare. Later on, Guerry refined these cartographic methods, and also improved the analysis of social statistics from the level set by Quetelet (Guerry 1833, 1864).

These authors, however, not only invented statistical and cartographic techniques to measure spatial disparities. They also tried to explain the patterns they identified and provide a normative judgment on these. As Meusburger (1998a) points out, several authors, among them Dupin as well, apparently considered geographical inequalities in school attendance and literacy as a problem that should be solved. This problematization was clearly mirrored by their statements, in which they “pleased all friends of French civilization to undertake everything they can in order that 4,441 communes in Northern France and 9,688 in Southern France gain schools. That is the best favor one can do for the motherland” (Dupin; cited in Meusburger 1998a, p. 192). Hence, although the main motivation of early “social physicists” in the Francophone world was to analyze society as if it had been a subject of natural scientific research, in the light of the results they also formed explicit normative opinion, which clearly mirrored the ideals of Enlightenment and nationalism. Thanks to these statements, sciences in general and the French Enlightenment in particular took the first valuable steps to a scientific description and explanation of spatial disparities as well as to the emergence of a political discourse, which had in its core the issue of spatial inequalities.

4.2.2 A New Fashion in the Anglophone World: Spatial Disparity Research From “Moral Statistics” to Charles Booth and to American Social Surveys

Just as in the absolutist France, the statistical analysis of the spatial aspect of social inequalities soon became popular in Britain as well. Although officially gathered data sets were lacking here, private friendly and statistical societies and some affluent individuals began to collect remarkably detailed statistics on various social phenomena. This activity marked the emergence of a new movement in social science, which, just as its counterparts in France, aimed for the scientific analysis of society. Another similarity with then state-of-the-art research in France was the main topics, namely crime, education, and poverty. The firm interest in these “moral statistics” was rooted in the conviction that illiteracy and poor education end up in poor morals, which, finally, lead to poverty. Therefore, the implicit intention of these analyses was to identify spatial “hot spots” of social deprivation, where the level of education should be raised (Meusburger 1998a, pp. 194–196). The underlying presumption, however, soon turned out to be unsubstantiated in the light of empirical results. As Clay (1857) put it, “our present system of popular education is of little or no efficiency in saving the industrial classes from the moral dangers created by those drinking houses” (p. 32). The simple hypothesis about a deterministic relation between education and morality failed.

Still, despite these findings, research concentrating on “moral statistics” were still going on (Meusburger 2008). A main reason was political. During the “Great Depression” after 1873, Britain’s economy faced a significant recession (Musson 1959), which, as Bulmer (2001) underlines, raised social tensions and led to sporadic unrest, and, in 1886 in London, to widespread riots as well (Bales 1999). In a few years, the social research movement reached its peak in Britain with contributions to the issue by the philanthropist Charles Booth. In his remarkably detailed analysis about London, Booth (1902–1903) was the first to identify the problem of social segregation and the isolation of neighborhoods, some highly geographical aspects of social disparities (Meusburger 2008).

Since his unique findings were widely reported all over the world (Bales 1999), Booth’s work gave inspiration to many in other countries, especially Anglophone ones. In the United States, just as in Britain several decades before, wealthy individuals took the first steps. This trend soon opened the way for large-scale analysis backed by charity movements, which largely adopted the Boothian concept to US context (Bateman 2001; Bulmer 2001; Gordon 1973). During the 1910s, the new “fashion” appeared in Canada as well, where similar research was also carried out (Hunt 2002).

The results not only turned the attention of many to social problems, but also clearly indicated the relevance of analyzing social issues from a spatial aspect. In all these works, the spatial disparity of certain social phenomena was no longer presented as the mechanistic outcome of physical factors, and the authors aimed to reveal and understand the background of these inequalities. These were, actually,

the first scientific contributions to what Gilbert (2010, p. 1587) refers to as the main questions of “modern” spatial inequality research: “how to map, measure, and explain variations”? “How did the differences among areas that were being observed affect human life, and insofar as they did, how could the negative aspects be remedied?”

The endeavor of social scientists to reveal the spatiality of social inequalities was, however, not only the beginning of the tradition of spatial disparity research. To the same extent, it was itself a late result of the social disparity discourse, which had already existed for thousands of years, as it was presented in Sect. 2.3. Thus, projects focusing on spatial disparities showed many characteristic features of the whole disparity discourse. First, they emerged for the same reason as the whole disparity discourse had done. They were reactions to increasing social inequalities, which induced social tensions and, thus, had the potential for destabilizing the political system (cf. with the ideas of Plato and Aristotle on the link between social disparity and political stability in Sect. 2.3.2). Thus, these works were products of a context in which the issue of social inequality in general, and its spatial manifestation in particular, became regarded as serious challenges that had to be dealt with.

Second, just as for concepts about social disparity, there was a significant discrepancy between the “scientific” and “objective” statistical and cartographic analytical methods and the political bias of the analysis of spatial inequalities. As Meusburger (2008) underscores, a major explicit motivation of the various social survey movements was to get information about the spatial unevenness of certain factors, which *were a priori considered* as the main roots of social deprivation. The objective was to find out, where illiterate people lived, who, if educated, could make themselves familiar with the teachings of the Bible and other religious texts, so they would become “morally better” (Meusburger 2008). A similar concept was likewise present in the US and Canadian survey movements (Bateman 2001; Hunt 2002). Here these ideas were strongly intertwined with the Protestant tradition of Christianizing. Christian churches as well as private charity movements with many leading participants “explicitly defined in the public eye as Christians” (Bateman 2001, p. 65) were driven by the idea of “increasing well-being” through “moral improvement”. This motivated them to initiate social surveys in the US and Canada, in order to gain data about the—especially urban—poor and about their distribution in space.

Thus, spatial disparity analyses had a significant religious motivation both in Britain and in North America. And this religious bias had far-reaching political consequences, which steered the development of spatial disparity research into a very specific direction.

4.2.3 A Political Discourse in the Making: Problematization of Spatial Inequalities

Due to the above presented ideological driving forces, the social survey movements, armed with the then most up-to-date analytical methods, were actually brought into being by certain political interests, which thoroughly infiltrated them. As Zimbalist (1977, p. 74) shows, if put in its social context, Charles Booth's survey movement can be regarded as a politically conservative, wealthy ship owner's reaction to Marxist social criticism. In 1885, the Marxist Social Democratic Federation in London claimed in a report that one quarter of the working class in London lived in "dire poverty". Booth, however, refused to accept this, as he put it, "incendiary" conclusion. Instead, he "determined to ascertain the facts of working-class life through objective, scientific investigation" (ibid.) to take the wind out of the Social Democrats' sails. Thus, his main motivation in carrying out such an analysis had its roots in his conservatism and religious attitude.

Given this, it does not seem accidental that the whole research concept had the issues of crime, poverty and education as its focal point. This approach, fully in line with that of the first researchers of "moral statistics", obviously fit Booth's political notions. If social deprivation is a consequence of immoral life and the rejection of conservative values, these are the most feasible indicators to reveal this connection. Furthermore, the simple fact of selecting these indicators for a scientific study suggested their "obvious" relevance for the research issue, even before the first empirical results were achieved. In the light of these, it is easy to understand why Booth concentrated on these very data. And it did not constitute any "problem" for him that the supposed direct link between education and crime had already been rejected by the empirical results of "moral analyses" much earlier, as was already presented in this section. In other words, Booth's motivation was strongly political, and his whole research concept was based on principles that certainly met his political expectations, but were actually indefensible in the light of available studies. Still, he emphasized from the beginning that his results would be "objective" and "scientific", using the image of science to make his expected findings unchallengeable by some "incendiary" Marxist claims. Thus, Booth's research promoted a political discourse, in which he was determined to fight against leftist slogans with his methods presented as "objective", but in fact biased by his own political conviction.

The motivation of those initiating similar movements in the US and in Canada was likewise political. The objective was much more than simply to understand certain social phenomena. This is clearly illustrated by the words of Reverend James A. Macdonald, a leading progressive Presbyterian in Canada, a main supporter of social surveys with a focus on cities (Hunt 2002). As he put it: "The city is the strategic point in the warfare against evil, the storm centre is there; there the fiercest battle waged." (quoted in Fraser 1988, p. 80). As Hunt (2002) shows, the main goal of the Presbyterians was to deliver facts about (urban) social problems to the Canadian public and to turn public attention to these issues. Through this

Presbyterians wanted to find supporters for their evangelical policy claims aimed at the cure of “moral problems”. In the light of these it does not seem to be an accident that shortly after the Canadian Presbyterians first social survey on urban areas between 1909 and 1911 a strongly moralistic legislative program was adopted in 1913. In this, the main focus was on the criminalization of certain forms of sexual relations, the use of blasphemous language, and gambling (Hunt 2002), problems being rather typical in urban districts with deprived inhabitants. Furthermore, Hunt also underscores that in common talk in early twentieth century Canada, “the social” and “social problems” explicitly referred not only to the urban poor but to immigrants as well (*ibid.*), mostly concentrated in large cities. Thus, the moral steps urged by the Presbyterians were also obviously aimed at the “Canadianization” of newcomers (*ibid.*).

In the USA, the situation was rather similar. Although there had been two competing streams within the Protestant movement since the Civil War in 1861–1865 (Bateman 2001), both “saw America as the place where the Reformation of the Church was to take its final form, and where the Kingdom of God would ultimately be created on this earth” (pp. 67–68; cf. Niebuhr 1937). Thus, for them, “the political redemption of the nation was inseparable from its Christian redemption” (p. 68). Such as in Canada, those conducting social surveys in the US aimed to release precise statistics, “scientific facts” about “immoral” forms of life and its spatial hotspots. From this they expected that society would understand the significance of the problem and realize the necessity of “returning to God”, thus, adopting Protestant objectives. In Bateman’s (2001, p. 69) words, “what the people had been unwilling to hear from an archangel, they were now hearing, and accepting, from the social surveyors”.

This means that the political goals of the supporters of social surveys in the USA and in Canada differed from those of Booth. Charles Booth was to react to the Social Democrats’ political statements, by which they tried to draw public attention to certain social problems emerging in a mass-industrial society. Social surveyors in North America, however, had their interests not in denying problems, but in “problematization” (cf. Sect. 2.5.1). Those initiating social surveys in the United States and in Canada wanted to present a set of social phenomena as social problem, which should be dealt with, and which could only be cured through intervention. Through this rhetorical process, the supporters of such research created justification for their own policy initiatives. In the light of empirical results, these endeavors could be presented as necessary steps to solve a massive challenge. In other words, the main goal of social surveyors was to set up a political discourse, which enabled movements with evangelical notions to make themselves more visible. Consequently, they could strengthen their own identity, and find a way to the masses to emphasize their own importance and to convince the public about the righteousness of their social goals. And, just as in the case of Booth’s project, this ideologically, politically biased notion was packed in the wrapping paper of the image of objectivity. That is why gathering and processing precise statistical and cartographic data was so important. And, meanwhile, each “objective” result could be used to substantiate the presumption that “lacking morals” was the ultimate reason

for crime and poverty. Thus, no floor was given to other explanations to the problem that would have had arguments different to those of the surveyors.

To sum it up, early works concerning spatial disparities of social phenomena, although they relied on a number of up-to-date and “objective” scientific methods, were brought into being by specific political motivations. This political bias strongly influenced empirical results and their interpretation, even if this distortion might have not even been fully realized by the surveyors themselves. This does not mean, of course, that these research projects had not contributed to an understanding of the topics they concerned. With all their biases, they delivered a huge amount of empirical data. They described the spatial aspect of social disparities rather precisely, even if the background of these inequalities was often interpreted in a questionable way. They also improved the methods to quantify and visualize spatial disparities. Thanks to these it was also not unexampled that the empirical findings convinced the surveyors themselves about the false nature of some of their assumptions. For Booth, he realized that the Social Democrats’ “incendiary” claim, that one-fourth of all inhabitants in London were living in poverty, was not an exaggeration. Booth, actually, found the correct number was closer to one-third (Bateman 2001). This revelation transformed Booth’s attitude towards the social problems of the poor. Although he remained a firm conservative, he became an advocate of universal old age pensions to reduce poverty among the elderly (London School of Economics & Political Science, n.d.).

Altogether, the different movements aimed at analyzing social processes in their spatial manifestation proved the relevance of the spatial scope in disparity research. Furthermore, they contributed much to social sciences in general due to their new methods, approaches and findings. By the latter they gave new impetus foremost to sociology and political science, where this effect proved especially long-lasting. In the US, for instance, surveys remained popular, not only in the 1920s and 1930s, but even after World War II (cf. Bulmer 2001). In most of these new projects, however, the spatial approach was rather subordinate, if present at all. The only remarkable exception was urban sociology in the tradition of Robert Park, which emerged during the 1920s, and which had a firm interest in social disparities in the urban space. As an innovation compared to 19th and early twentieth century social surveyors, urban sociologists not only aimed to describe urban social inequalities, but also to identify the regularities in their background. This endeavor was especially manifest in the works of Park et al. (1925), Hoyt (1939), and Harris and Ullman (1945), which contained model-like representations of disparities in urban space. In these concepts many findings and ideas appeared again that had already been present in Booth’s works. Some examples were the emergence of zones with relatively homogenous social structure, the isolation of poor neighborhoods, and various factors pushing out more affluent social strata from the center towards the urban periphery (Meusbürger 2008).

Except for these valuable concepts, however, the once groundbreaking initiative of “moral” and social surveyors to detect spatial disparities produced by social processes gradually declined. On the one hand, as has already been already mentioned, sociology and political science, which otherwise benefited much from early

spatial disparity research, proved in the long term rather insensitive to the spatial scope. On the other hand, apart from a few exceptions, geography was that time quite uninterested in micro-level social phenomena.² While “moral” surveys were already bringing new and remarkable results in France and in Britain, geography was just in an early phase of institutionalization. Furthermore, it turned its attention mostly to newly explored regions of far-lying continents, which appeared in the mental map of many in Europe as potential targets of spatial expansion, thus, colonization (cf. Livingstone 1992). This also favored a macro-level approach. The main goal was to describe the potential strategic and economic benefits of areas to be colonized. From this point of view, processes at the micro-level seemed quite irrelevant. Thus, geography was rather uninterested in micro-level social phenomena in the cities of core areas of colonial empires. In consequence, the often controversial but still valuable scientific work carried out by many “moral” and social surveyors remained remarkably unconsidered in geography—and, in fact, in other disciplines as well. Meanwhile, however, another tradition emerged from the early twentieth century, which explicitly put spatial disparities in its focal point: the Marxist tradition.

²The few exceptions emerged within the domain of urban geography, where some authors paid great attention to the functional structure of cities (see for example De Geer 1923; Bobek, 1927; James, 1933). These works, however, merely focused on functional differentiation, and not directly on the asymmetrical accessibility of resources for certain social groups and individuals, thus, not on the issues of spatial inequality and spatial injustice (cf. Heineberg 2006, pp. 16–18).

Chapter 5

Spatial Disparity Analysis and Anti-Capitalism: The “Classical” Marxist Tradition

5.1 Marx, Engels, and the Spatial Aspect of Disparities

The Marxist debate over inequalities in space was independent from the social survey movements as well as from the discipline of geography, although several decades later it exerted a significant impact on geographical thought. A Marxist interpretation of spatial disparities began to crystallize around the concept of uneven spatial development. This was actually not to be found in the works of Marx and Engels themselves, although their ideas also concerned the issue of spatial disparities at certain points. As Wissen and Naumann (2008) underscores, one such point was their reasoning in *The Communist Manifesto*:

“All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries. . .that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries, whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes.” (Marx and Engels 1998[1848], pp. 13–14).

Marx and Engels suggested here that the perpetually intensifying division of labor in capitalist societies became manifest in a spatial sense as well. In their eyes this process was to lead to an international homogenization in the structure of production as well as in patterns of consumption. For Marx and Engels, the reasons for these tendencies were twofold (Wissen and Naumann 2008). First, the permanent competition between producers was expected to result in the equalization of conditions and factors of production. Second, Marx thought that the strong competition forced producers to reduce turnover periods. An important part of this endeavor was the rapid development of communication and transport, or, in Marx’s words, “the annihilation of space by time” (Marx 1973[1857–1858], p. 524). For Marx, this not only accelerated turnover, but also decreased traffic times dramatically, which opened the way for a formerly unprecedented spatial mobilization of raw materials and products. This was considered the process making the homogenization of production and consumption technically possible.

In these thoughts Marx suggested the gradual *decline* of certain spatial inequalities. At other places in his works, however, he implied that the same processes were not necessary to result in equalization, but maybe in the maintenance of disparities. He argued, for instance, that the rapid development of communication and transport might not diminish differences between various regions, but only *reorganize* them:

“There is . . . a . . . shift and displacement as a result of the change in the relative situation of production and market places which itself results from the changes in the means of communication. A place of production which possessed a particularly advantageous position through being situated on a main road or canal now finds itself on a single railway branch line that operates only at relatively long intervals, while another point, which previously lay completely off the major traffic routes, now lies at the intersection of several lines. The second place rises, the first declines. The changes in the means of transport therefore bring about local variations in the circulation time of commodities. . . or else they alter the distribution of already existing local variations.” (Marx1978[1885], p. 328).

Furthermore, some remarks of Marx explicitly implied an *increase* in spatial disparities in capitalism due to accelerated turnover. For him, this phenomenon gave “rise to an accelerated concentration of both the centre of production and its market”, therefore, an “accelerated concentration of people and capital at given points” (Marx1978[1885], p. 328).

In regard to other issues Marx also argued that capitalism established asymmetric power relations between different territorial entities, which meant the creation and maintenance of spatial disparities. He grasped this problem at different geographical levels: “The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. . . Just as it has [done so], so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West” (Marx and Engels 1998[1848], p. 14). However, with regard to this issue Marx suggested that capitalism had had some positive impacts as well. For him, as the bourgeoisie “has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural”, it also “rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life” (p. 14). With this he implied that capitalism, while creating urban-rural disparities, opens through it the way for those flowing from the countryside to cities to get rid of certain problems of rural life.

In general, it can be seen that Marx and Engels referred to the issue of spatial disparities at several points. Yet, their findings did not give a coherent overview of the reasons for and temporal changes of inequalities in space. Moreover, it was not clear whether the two authors suggested capitalism to reduce, reproduce, or increase spatial disparities. In this sense, their statements were controversial. This does not mean necessarily, of course, that the related ideas of Marx and Engels expressed in different works were illogical or irreconcilable. One can rather say that their findings were merely philosophical fragments without an explicit spatial focus and independent from each other, and barely parts of a coherent concept with clear spatial interests.

There was only one point where the views of Marx and Engels were definite. They were for the demolition of all spatial disparities, which for them were not reduced, but created, maintained and even increased by capitalism. This was articulated especially clearly in the case of urban-rural disparities. For Marx and Engels, the aim of a Communist revolution should be the “gradual abolition of the distinction between the town and country” (Marx and Engels 1998[1848], p. 37). The same firm notion of spatial equalization appeared in their correspondence elsewhere as well. Nevertheless, the exact level which inequalities could be reduced to through feasible steps remained unclear. In Engels’s words:

“Between one country and another, one province and another and even one locality and another there will always exist a *certain* inequality in the conditions of life, which it will be possible to reduce to a minimum but never entirely remove. Alpine dwellers will always have different conditions of life from those of people living on plains.” (Engels quoted in Smith 1979, p. 9).

As Smith (1994) shows, it is not perfectly clear to what extent Engels found social structures dependent on spatially different physical conditions. Similarly, he gave no detailed explanation about which links he judged crucial between physical and social conditions any why. Thus, he left the reader without assistance in interpreting the exact meaning of “a certain inequality”. Moreover, it can similarly be a matter of debate whether “different conditions of life” referred to disparities that Engels considered “unjust”, or maybe to inequalities he considered as justified. The only stable point is his and Marx’s conviction that capitalism was responsible for spatial disparities, which in general were considered as undesirable.

To sum it up, Marx and Engels concerned the issue of spatial disparities at several points, but they did not create a comprehensive concept on it. Their thoughts on spatial inequalities were, however, embraced and developed by some of their successors.

5.2 Rosa Luxemburg and the Concept of “Uneven Spatial Development”

Among the successors of Marx and Engels, Rosa Luxemburg was the first to contribute to the topic with remarks regarded as important by most radical geographers (cf. Smith 1984; Wissen and Naumann 2008). Luxemburg internalized Marx’s views about the gradual global homogenization of patterns of production and consumption (Wissen and Naumann 2008). Due to this, she interpreted spatial differences in terms of the *mode of production*, not as inequalities of per capita production or income. As Smith (1984) underscores, in her analysis Luxemburg criticized Marx for hypothesizing the universal domination of capitalist production. For her, “the accumulation of capital...depends in every respect upon non-capitalist social strata and forms of social organization” (Luxemburg 2003 [1913], p. 346). Thus, “capitalism in its full maturity also depends in all respects on

non-capitalist strata and social organizations existing side by side” (p. 345). In her interpretation, capitalism can only survive if it exploits, “eats up”, formerly untouched non-capitalist societies. Otherwise it could not create additional markets for its products, which would lead to its doom. This drive for expansion is the main notion of imperialism, considered by Luxemburg as the final stage of capitalism. This endeavor, however, gradually reduces the area for non-capitalist societies. For Luxemburg: “the accumulation of capital is a kind of metabolism between capitalist economy and those pre-capitalist methods of production without which it cannot go on and which. . . it corrodes and assimilates” (p. 397). Hence, from a spatial point of view, Luxemburg treated geographical disparities “less as an internal tendency in capital, more as a legacy from the past which is inexorably destroyed with the forward march of capital” (Smith 1984, p. 95). In her eyes, the outcome of such a controversial development can only be that capitalism exhausts the external sources of its own development. Beyond a certain point, this leads inevitably to the collapse of the capitalist order. In Luxemburg’s words: although capitalism “strives to become universal, and, indeed, on the account of this its tendency, it must break down” (Luxemburg 2003[1913], p. 447).

Actually, Luxemburg’s idea was not profoundly new. As Andersson (2004) shows, Engels had already remarked that “imperial expansion” or colonization had been aimed at finding new consumer markets for industrial overproduction of the European great powers. And, in his short 1894 letter written to the Marxist theoretician Karl Kautsky, Engels had referred to the self-consuming nature of this process. He had interpreted the First Sino-Japanese War within this framework, and had come to the following conclusion: “China is all that is left for capitalist production to conquer, yet the latter, by the very fact of having finally conquered her, will itself be hopelessly compromised in its place of origin” (quoted in Marx and Engels 2004, p. 350). The claim of Engels was, in fact, much more than coming to a “compromise”. To see this, one should have a look at the original text in German, which puts it as follows: “nur China bleibt der kapitalistischen Produktion noch zu erobern, und indem sie es endlich erobert, *macht sie sich selbst in ihrer Heimat unmöglich*” (original emphasis; quoted in Andersson 2004, p. 851). In other words, through conquering China, capitalism “eliminates itself at home”. This is indeed an idea suggesting the same that Rosa Luxemburg explained in her work in details. Still, it is no question that the first thinker to give a comprehensive description (thus, more than half a sentence) of such a concept was Rosa Luxemburg.¹

The concept, which thus can also be linked to Engels though it was thoroughly explained only by Luxemburg, had remarkable political implications. It suggested that spatial disparities had not been created by capitalism, but by former modes of

¹ The idea that capitalist countries are determined to promote expansive politics to establish new markets for their products was also described by some other authors. Typical examples were the British economist John Hobson (1902), a firm critic of imperialism, and the Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding (1910). However, they paid much less attention to geographical aspects than Luxemburg did, and barely contributed to the spatial disparity discourse in this sense.

production. Consequently, the capitalist order could not be criticized in this approach for producing inequalities in space since it actually seemed not to increase disparities, but rather to decrease them. This idea in itself, of course, might seem embarrassing for the Marxist critics of capitalism, who urged the reduction of any forms of disparities. Still, the concept, especially in its form coming from Luxemburg, could serve well in the ideological fight of the labor movement against the ruling capital order. For Luxemburg’s argumentation could be interpreted as a geographical explanation of the necessarily self-consuming nature of capitalism. In his works, Marx presented a basically non-spatial concept about the unavoidable end of the capitalist order and the emergence of socialism. Luxemburg sketched up another thought, which envisaged the same process for the future, but along spatial arguments. With this, a political discourse of inequalities in space was introduced. Here spatial disparity was easy to be presented as a phenomenon that in its temporal changes revealed the unsustainable nature of capitalism and its necessary decline. It was a forceful means of rhetoric to present the “unjust” as well as “inefficient” nature of capitalism. “Unjust” it was, because it could exist only among significant spatial disparities, which were *per se* regarded by Luxemburg and other Marxists as imprints of unfairly asymmetric power relations. And “inefficient” it was as well according to this concept since it seemed a parasitic system, which could not survive when it had eaten up its rivals.

Actually, the political argumentation did not end at this point. Luxemburg not only used her concept to show that capitalism “must break down”. She also aimed to offer a political alternative “unavoidable” to come. As she put it in the very last section of the *Accumulation of Capital*: “at a certain stage of development there will be no other way out than the application of socialist principles” (Luxemburg 2003 [1913], p. 447). For her, capitalism was sentenced to death partly due to its controversial relation to spatial disparities. It needed these inequalities to survive, but also demolished them in the meantime. That is why it had no option but to fall. Socialism, however, could be depicted as a system that is able to permanently exist in spatial equality. For Luxemburg, the reason for this was simple:

“The aim of socialism is not accumulation but the satisfaction of toiling humanity’s wants by developing the productive forces of the entire globe. And so *we find that* socialism is by its very nature an harmonious and universal system of economy.” (emphasis in the original; p. 447)

It is important to stress that these sentences with their strong political meaning seem rather propagandistic than scientific. In fact, Luxemburg’s work contained several economic and political examples that were expected to substantiate her political ideas empirically. But she gave no explanation for what a socialist development of “the productive forces of the entire globe” meant, how it was expected to be possible, and how it was assumed to lead to harmony. In her work, Luxemburg devoted more than 400 pages to the problems and controversies of capitalism. After that, socialism was simply presented as the cure for all social problems of the capitalist order simply because, in Luxemburg’s words, “we find” so. This argument, actually, makes the final political statement highly questionable.

However, in general the work was a remarkable contribution to the spatial disparity discourse, with an obvious Marxist political bias.

5.3 Lenin and the Problematization of “Uneven Spatial Development”

The work of Luxemburg soon provoked reactions from other Marxist thinkers. Many of them criticized the concept at several points, and much of their criticism was addressed directly to the book’s spatial implications.² The Austrian leftist thinker Otto Bauer, for instance, agreed that capitalism was only to survive through exploiting and “eating up” non-capitalist societies. However, he claimed that territorial expansion was not the only possible maneuver of capitalist systems to find new resources, labor force and markets. Instead, he considered the intensifying exploitation of the population in capitalist countries themselves (e.g. through decreasing the wages for workers) as another possible mode of survival (Bauer 1913). This idea had a significant geographical relevance. It implied, although not explicitly, that the expansion of capitalism all over the world still did not necessarily mean that the capitalist order had reached its limits. Thus, an automatic collapse of the capitalist order after it had capitalized all parts of the globe seemed possible to avoid.

In his theory of imperialism, Lenin also argued against the concept of Luxemburg at two points (cf. Wissen and Naumann 2008). First, he had the opinion that the main engine of the territorial expansion of “mature” capitalist powers is less a need to create new markets for their products, but the necessity to find new places to invest capital. His interpretation was instead in line with the original thoughts of Marx and Engels implying that capitalism leads to a strong concentration of capital, even in terms of space. This excessive amount of capital, however, cannot be invested reasonably in the centers, thus, it has to be exported. Hence, capitalism was regarded as striving “to eliminate the unevenness in the distribution of capital among localities and branches of industry resulting from the historical development of individual enterprises” (Lenin 1964a, p. 223.; quoted from Jeidels 1905, p. 271.).

Second, Lenin had a claim that brought a remarkable new idea into the Marxist discourse about spatial disparity. He underlined that uneven development was not only present at the global level, thus, between capitalist powers and the periphery to be capitalized. Instead, uneven development was identified as a natural phenomenon *within* the capitalist world as well. Lenin traced this idea back to the permanent

² Many of Luxemburg’s concepts about economic theory likewise attracted harsh criticism in Germany, even in the Party press. Luxemburg reacted to this in her 1915 *Anti-Critique* (published as Luxemburg 1921). Still, further critiques were coming. The Russian Marxist thinker Nikolai Bukharin (1925), for instance, severely attacked both of her works severely (Yaffe 1972). In our work, however, we focus on the critiques concerning spatial implications in Luxemburg’s concept.

competition among economic actors in capitalism. In his eyes, such an attitude necessarily resulted in perpetually changing power relations. This ruled out a balanced growth in social as well as in spatial sense. As he put it:

“the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, etc., is a calculation of the *strength* of those participating, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the *even* development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, if her capitalist strength is compared with that of the Britain of that time; Japan compared with Russia in the same way. Is it ‘conceivable’ that in ten or twenty years’ time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained *unchanged*? It is out of the question.” (emphases in the original; Lenin 1964a, p. 295).

This concept was compatible with some early and rough ideas of Lenin. As early as 1899 he already argued that the expansion of capital led to increasing industrial specialization, which resulted in the deepening territorial division of labor. For Lenin, the consequence was the differentiation of regions, a widening gap between town and country, increasing unevenness of urban spaces as well (Lenin 1964b).

Lenin’s approach put capitalism and its relation to spatial disparities in a new context. For Luxemburg, inequalities in space had only come into question as the difference between capitalist and non-capitalist parts of the world. In this approach, spatial disparity only referred to the “mode of production”. Inequalities of production, income, the standard of living, etc., came here into question only as indicators to mirror the difference between capitalist and non-capitalist countries. Moreover, as we have already referred to it, Luxemburg assumed that capitalism would automatically eliminate these inequalities. Hence, for her, the capitalist order could be blamed only for one aspect of spatial disparities, namely that it necessitated these inequalities to sustain itself. Lenin’s concept, however, provided much more ammunition for those opposing capitalism. For him, the spatially “uneven” and “unjust” nature of capitalism was not only manifest in the way it tried to annihilate non-capitalist systems and equalize the mode of production globally. Instead, he presented capitalism as a system with a dialectical tension between geographical *differentiation* and *equalization*. Geographical differentiation stood here for the inherent drive of the capitalist system to produce newer and newer forms of spatial disparities *within* the part of the globe it dominated.

For the future development of capitalism, Lenin’s vision at this point was also different to that of Luxemburg. He thought that capitalism would not demolish itself automatically *as soon as* it had established its global rule, as Luxemburg supposed. For Lenin, this situation would instead lead to fierce competition between the colonial powers aimed to redraw lines of colonial boundaries. Thus, he was convinced about the coming of savage wars, which would devour the capitalist order and finally open the way for a socialist revolution. He even calculated with a series of wars instead an only one. But in one issue, concerning the final outcome, his conviction was similar to that of Luxemburg. He was sure that imperial wars could not be maintained permanently, so that the collapse of

capitalism was not to be delayed for a long time. In other words, in this question Lenin definitely rejected the assumptions about the permanent stabilization of the imperialist order in the form of an “imperialist peace”. As he put it: “‘inter-imperialist ‘or’ ultra-imperialist’ alliances, no matter what form they may assume. . .are *inevitably* nothing more than a ‘truce’ in periods between wars” (emphasis in the original text; Lenin 1964a, p. 295).

5.4 Stalin: The “Basic Economic Law of Socialism” and the Claimed Communist Solution to “Uneven Spatial Development”

Lenin’s concept about uneven spatial development was improved upon by Joseph Stalin, who was also Lenin’s successor as the leader of the Soviet Union, proclaimed in 1922. Stalin’s most important theoretical contribution to the issue was written and published, however, well after World War II (Stalin 1972[1952]). Thus, while Lenin formulated his ideas about capitalism in a world where this economic regime had no effective rivals and socialism was no more than an abstract vision, Stalin had to provide a comparison of two existing systems. Under such circumstances the Soviet dictator made attempts to reveal what he considered as the fundamental differences between capitalism and Soviet-type socialism.

An outcome of this endeavor was to define the “basic economic law of capitalism”, which in Stalin’s view “determines the essence of capitalist production, its essential nature” (p. 37). His definition made explicit reference to the spatial aspects of capitalist production:

“The main features and requirements of the basic economic law of modern capitalism [are]. . .the securing of the maximum capitalist profit through the exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the majority of the population of the given country, through the enslavement and systematic robbery of the peoples of other countries, especially backward countries, and, lastly, through wars and militarization of the national economy, which are utilized for the obtaining of the highest profits.” (Stalin 1972[1952], p. 39)

This approach was basically similar to that of Lenin insofar as it claimed the necessary creation of spatial disparities by capitalism. Just as his predecessor, Stalin interpreted the issue at various geographical levels. The spatial inequality between “developed” and “backward” countries³ was stressed by him as well as the disparities within given countries. For the latter, Stalin put special emphasis on

³ It is not the point of our work to present the politically contested nature of the terms “backward”, “underdeveloped” and “developed”, especially as it has already been done in numerous theoretical works in recent decades (a detailed overview of the question is given by McEwan 2009, especially pp. 77–163). Yet, in light of the heated debate concerning the issue we consider the highly disputable nature of these expressions as a fact. For this reason, we use these terms in our work in quotation marks.

the “antithesis” of town and country, which he regarded as a specific outcome of capitalist production. In his words, this sort of disparity was established by “the exploitation of the country by the town”, a consequence of “an antagonism in interests” (p. 25) brought into being by capitalism.

Meanwhile, Stalin’s argumentation had other stresses than that of Lenin, although the two concepts were basically compatible. For Lenin, the main engine of what he called uneven spatial development was the unequal spatial concentration of capital, which had to be relocated to areas lacking capital, where potential turnovers were higher. In Stalin’s view, however, the spatial distribution of capital was only one of the results of the main feature of modern capitalism. In his eyes this main feature was “the necessity of securing the maximum profits” (p. 39). This was the principle that, for Stalin, determined not only the allocation of capital, but virtually everything. If the highest profit was to be achieved through the diffusion of capital, capitalism strove for this. If concentration was necessary for the same objective, the actors in the capitalist economy took steps in this direction. In Stalin’s eyes, just as according to Lenin, it was actually the concentration of capital to serve the interests of capitalism. But Stalin regarded this tendency not as the basic notion of capitalism itself, only as an outcome of the basic notion of the drive for profit. In other words, although he himself did not emphasize this, Stalin identified the main reason for uneven development in much deeper conceptual strata of capitalism than Lenin had done.

Moreover, Stalin did something that had been missing from all of his predecessor’s works. Luxemburg as well as Lenin gave a thorough description of the ways capitalism produced and sustained disparities in society and space. But when shortly referring to socialism as the “desirable” alternative, they did not explain explicitly why this mode of production would be free from the problems of capitalism. Stalin, however, did not remain silent on this issue. As he put it: “the law of balanced development of the national economy can operate to its full scope only if its operation rests on the basic economic law of socialism” (p. 41). The “basic economic law of socialism” was in his words as follows: “the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques” (pp. 40–41).

Through this, Stalin claimed three major differences between capitalism and socialism, which enabled a balanced development (even in spatial terms) only in the latter. First, modern capitalism was in his eyes about the realization of maximum profits. This striving automatically led to competition, and, due to incompatible interests, to the “anarchy of production” (p. 7). In socialism, however, the government “socialized the means of production, made them the property of the whole people, and thereby abolished the exploiting system and created socialist forms of economy” (p. 6). Hence, the demolition of individual differences of property put an end to the “antagonism of interests” (p. 25). As Stalin put it, after the socialist turn the interests of all “lie along one common line, that of strengthening the socialist system and attaining the victory of communism” (ibid.). Thus, from a spatial aspect,

town and country or different regions and countries did not compete any more with each other, but cooperated in a “friendly” manner to realize their common goals.

Second, for Stalin, production in capitalism was “with breaks in continuity from boom to crisis and from crisis to boom” (p. 41). Since the Leninist tradition expected unequal growth levels in different areas during economic booms, sudden crises were also thought to affect different areas to different extents. In consequence, breaks and unrealistic booms seemed to be common in leading to perpetual changes in the level as well as in the geographical pattern of spatial inequalities. This problem, however, was not to emerge in socialism in Stalin’s opinion. There the common interest of the whole society was claimed to preclude any sudden events in the economy, and substantiate an “unbroken expansion of production” (ibid.), free from permanent and hectic changes in the spatial configuration of economic production.

Finally, Stalin argued that capitalist societies tended to hinder the use of new technologies in cases where it did not serve the short-term interest of maximum profit. In contrast to this, socialist societies were to witness “an unbroken process of perfecting production on the basis of higher techniques” (ibid.). To give an example, Stalin referred to the attitude of workers towards using machines. As he put it, workers in socialism, unlike in capitalist countries, used machines “with the greatest eagerness” (p. 44) due to full employment guaranteed by the state, thus, because they did not feel their workplaces threatened by new equipment. For capitalism, Stalin did not elaborate in details his view about the obstacles to mechanization there, but this system was suggested to be the opposite of socialism even in this sense. This argument assumed that workers in capitalism were against working with machines. In Stalin’s approach, they considered machines as rivals, which were installed by capitalists to reduce production costs and to get rid of a more expensive human labor force.⁴ Or, if the costs of human labor were not higher but lower, it was the capitalists themselves who hindered the utilization of machines. Thus, the Soviet leader believed that mechanization in particular and the use of higher technology in general was carried through full-heartedly only in socialist systems. From a spatial point of view, this suggested that “less developed” areas in capitalism had no choice to catch up by using modern technology, while catching up in the same districts was not only possible but inherent in socialist societies.

These views provided a sort of explanation why imbalances and disparities (in the geographical sense as well) unavoidably emerged and increased in capitalist systems, while socialism was expected to bring no such phenomenon into being. Yet, it is still a question how inequalities inherited from a capitalist past were to be eliminated in a socialist country (such as in the USSR) with its “balanced development”. Stalin’s words do not give a clear orientation here. In the geographical

⁴ Such an implicit reasoning was certainly motivated by machine-breaking in England during the Industrial Revolution (for details see Grint and Woolgar 1997), a much-cited phenomenon in Marxist works.

interpretation of his work, however, one can find remarkable suggestions, even if a simple and explicit answer to the problem is not provided here, either. A key idea cited is Stalin's point about the profitableness of production, which in his view is not "annul[ed]" in socialism. Instead, it is "considered not from the stand-point of individual plants or industries, and not over a period of one year, but from the standpoint of the entire national economy and over a period of, say, ten or fifteen years, which is the only correct approach to the question" (p. 23).

Without a doubt, this instruction is still rather blurred, and the Soviet economic geographer Konstantinov, reviewing Stalin's thoughts, underscores that to find the "correct ratio" of investments in economic branches and regions is a major task to be solved by "specialized economic experts" (Konstantinov 1953, p. 496), especially economic geographers. But Konstantinov explains that an outcome of these investigations should be that "we give the necessary people's economic foundation" (p. 497) to the country's economic regions. Given the inherited inequalities in the "development" of such a foundation of the regions, these words implicitly suggest a disproportional spatial allocation of resources in the first period in favor of "less developed" districts. Such a strategy is in line with other parts of the text, where Konstantinov, although speaking about "even development", tendentiously avoids introducing the term "even allocation" of investments and production across the country, and instead refers to a "rational", "planned", "reasonable", and "correct" allocation. In other words, although Stalin did not provide definite solutions to the problem of inherited disparities, his ideas could be and seemingly were interpreted by his contemporaries as opening a way to a planned and active demolition of geographical inequalities until the desired condition of equality was achieved.

5.5 The Marxist Approach to Spatial Disparities: Sub-Summary

Altogether, the analysis of spatial inequalities became an important stream within the Marxist tradition of disparity research. Some ideas concerning the issue were already present in the works of Marx and Engels. These were rather fragmented and did not form a coherent concept, but they exerted, without any doubt, a great influence on later Marxist thinkers dealing with the topic. From then onwards, Marxist theories about spatial disparities had much in common, in spite of some minor differences.

First, the problematization of "uneven spatial development" was an integral part in all of them. Although the exact meaning of the term was not absolutely the same for Luxemburg, Lenin and Stalin, all of them presented this phenomenon as something to create problematic and unjust conditions.

Second, for such disparities all these authors blamed capitalism, at least to some extent. For Luxemburg, uneven spatial development meant the spatial differences

in the mode of production, and she did not argue that these inequalities would have been brought into being by capitalism. Still, she emphasized that capitalism was a system to survive only by taking advantage of these disparities, and with firm (yet controversial) interests in maintaining them as long as possible. In this sense, Luxemburg suggested uneven development to mirror the fundamentally “parasitic” and “unjust” nature of capitalism. Lenin and Stalin were much more critical since they explicitly blamed capitalism for producing and even increasing disparities in space. Furthermore, these disparities meant for them not only differences in the mode of production, but also unevenness in the production and distribution of resources between individuals as well as geographical units. Thus, their criticism towards capitalism was even harsher.

Third, all main Marxist thinkers on spatial disparities presented socialism as the cure for all forms of geographical inequalities produced by capitalism. In their works the socialist order appeared as something free from the controversies and problems of capitalism. It was claimed to be a system to promote balanced development and the demolition of spatial disparities. In other words, the concept of spatial disparities served for Marxist thinkers as a political means. The problematization of uneven development and the way spatial disparities were explicitly and exclusively attributed to capitalism seemed to legitimize all political strives *against* capitalism and *for* socialism. Thus, the socialist concept of uneven spatial development justified the political aims of those who introduced it.

5.6 Science as Means of Justification in the Marxist Interpretation of Spatial Disparities

In order to increase their convincing power, Marxist thinkers rarely failed to present their concepts as “scientific”. This tendency actually had its roots in Engels’s 1880 work *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, in which he distinguished between what he called “utopian” and “scientific” forms of socialism (Engels 1975[1880]). For him, “utopian socialists” perceived certain social problems, and “criticized the existing capitalist mode of production and its consequences”, but “could not explain this mode of production, and...could not get the mastery of it...[they] could only simply reject it as evil” (p. 72). Thus, what they created was an “eclectic, average socialism”, a “mish-mash” (p. 61). Consequently, their visions of a better society “were foredoomed to be Utopias”, so “the more they were worked in detail, the more inevitable they became lost in pure fantasy” (p. 52).

In Engels’s eyes “scientific socialism” was not a socialism of this kind, but one to *explain* social problems. For this reason, he claimed it to be necessarily dialectical since “an exact representation...[of the evolution] of mankind...can...only be obtained by the method of *dialectics*” (our emphasis; pp. 67–68). Thus, a necessary prerequisite for a scientific socialism was to “grasp things and their conceptual images essentially in their interconnection, in their concatenation, their motion,

their coming into and passing out of existence” (p. 67) instead of using a metaphysical approach, which, in his words, investigated objects “fixed”, “isolated” and through constructing “absolutely unmediated antitheses” (p. 65).

Dialectical thinking, however, was only one of the preconditions for making socialism scientific. As Engels put it, it was also necessary

“to present the capitalist mode of production in its historical interconnection and its necessity for a specific historical period, and...also the necessity of its doom; and...to lay bare its essential character, which was still hidden. This was done by the discovery of *surplus-value*.” (emphasis in the original; Engels 1975[1880], pp. 72–73)

For Engels, with these “great discoveries” of Marx, “Socialism became a science” (p. 73). Hence, another prerequisite for a socialist concept to be “scientific” was that it presented the necessary emergence and doom of capitalism during the process of “development”.

Finally, scientific socialism had to be a science with calling, in line with the instructions of Marx in his *Theses on Feuerbach*: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” (Marx and Engels 1969, p. 15). In Engels’s words, the task of scientific socialism was “to grasp the historical conditions of” the solution of capitalist contradictions through proletarian revolution and “to bring the conditions and character of its own action to the consciousness of the [proletarian] class that is destined to act” (Engels 1975 [1880], p. 100). In other words, the third feature of scientific socialism was to set clear, socialist political goals and contribute to their realization by the exploited classes.

From this time onwards, Marxist thinkers frequently stressed that their findings, which seemed to substantiate leftist political goals, were “scientific”, “objective”, and based on “facts”. Meanwhile, they often suggested that the ideas of their political rivals, also with the claim of being objective and scientific, were politically biased and unscientific. Moreover, this argumentation from the side of the Marxists became stronger and stronger as time passed. Luxemburg in her cited work did not go further than underlining the claimed objective nature of Marxist concepts which she needed to underpin her argumentation. She emphasized, for instance, that “Marx’s diagram of enlarged reproduction has *objective* validity” (Luxemburg 2003[1913], p. 103), that it was of “real *scientific* importance” (p. 80), and that it constituted “the *scientific* formulation of the problem” (p. 76; italics added).⁵ Meanwhile, Luxemburg aimed to de-legitimize those who also claimed to be scientists, but whose approach seemed incompatible with the concepts accepted and internalized by her. For instance, she referred to the ideas of the liberal British

⁵ It is important to underline that Luxemburg not absolutely agreed with Marx on every issue. As Walter Stark put it in the introductory note on Rosa Luxemburg in the 2003 edition of her *The Accumulation of Capital*, she was “that rarest of all rare phenomena – a Marxist critical of Karl Marx” (Luxemburg 2003[1913], p. xix). Still, in spite of certain differences in their views, Luxemburg consequently positioned Marx among scientists *without* quotation marks, and his anti-Marxist opponents among scientists *with* quotation marks.

philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill as “‘scientific’ arguments” (p. 352; “scientific” in quotation marks). Through this ironical formulation she clearly drew a boundary line in the scientific field between what one might call “real” science on the one hand (made by socialists) and “claimed-to-be” scientists (“enemies” of socialism) on the other hand.

The same method was also used by Lenin in his works about uneven spatial development. He contrasted “official science” (Lenin 1964a, p. 200) with the Marxist approach. In his interpretation, “official science” produced findings that contradicted empirical evidence, but still aggressively tried to destroy all competing concepts. The Marxist approach was, however, verified by “facts” in his eyes. Thus, Lenin interpreted the scientific field as being configured by the dichotomy between those having political power, and those who are right. He consequently referred to the former as “bourgeois science” or “‘science’” in quotation marks, while about the latter he simply wrote as “science”, without quotation marks. For him, “bourgeois science...strives to obscure the essence of the matter, to hide the forest behind the trees” (p. 216). He considered this by no means as accidental since, as he put it, “bourgeois scholars...are all apologists of imperialism and finance capital” (p. 226). That is why “official science tried, by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx” (p. 200). However, what Marx had written about capitalism and its tendency to end up in monopolies, “has become a fact”, and “facts are stubborn things”, so “they have to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not” (ibid.). It was in the light of these tendencies that Lenin judged the findings of Marx a “precise, scientific analysis” (p. 304).

The notion to stress the scientific nature of Marxist concepts and to deny the relevance of anything else claiming itself to be scientific, however, peaked during the reign of Stalin. In the Soviet Union led by him he actually established an enormous system to incorporate his concepts, even those regarding spatial disparities. This was a real “mind industry” (Enzensberger 1975, p. 72) operating with highly sophisticated solutions to create an image of unambiguousness for Stalinist ideas. For this reason it used several well-tested strategies that had already been utilized by Luxemburg and Lenin, but in many senses Stalin went far beyond his forerunners.

Stalin, just as his predecessors in the Marxist tradition of uneven spatial development, firmly differentiated between “real” and “virtual” sciences. At this point he confronted socialist science or—simply—science with “bourgeois science”. With regard to the latter he referred to his forerunners, for whom “bourgeois science” had served “capitalistic”, “imperialistic”, “reactionary” interests, and for whom the representatives of “bourgeois theoretical science” had been “not genuine theorists but rather mere reactionary apologists” (Engels 1991[1894], p. 92). Meanwhile, socialist science was claimed to be absolutely objective. Remarkably, this was traced back not to a claim of neutrality, but to its Marxist-Leninist foundations. Objectivity, in the Stalinist sense, was not guaranteed by a sort of ideological independence, but by that socialist science “developed on the solid ground of the teachings of Lenin and Stalin” (Forró szeretett... , 1950[1949], p. 8). Through this

definition, all kinds of knowledge not based on Marxist-Leninist, or rather Stalinist, grounds were automatically exiled from the domain of science.⁶

This was, however, only one step in a long march to present the concepts of Stalin as the (only) source of scientific truth. The Soviet leader, of course, similarly to his forerunners in Marxist philosophy, consciously made use of the legitimate authority of science. But his aim was not simply to take advantage of the authority that was already given. Instead, he made serious efforts through his political power to increase this authority to an extreme level. Virtually all “means of production” of the “mind industry”, from official statements of distinguished scientific institutions to mass media, were used to propagate the absolute reliability of science, in this context referring to *socialist science* only (Gyuris and Győri 2013).⁷

Moreover, Stalin also wanted to establish for himself the image of the insider, who was not only a relevant but also the ultimate representative of socialist science. He chose the leading institutions of Soviet socialist science to create this image. Due to his unrestricted political power, the outcome was easy to predict. As Pollock (2006) puts it: “the ‘leader of the chorus’ . . . Stalin stood on the podium while Soviet scientists sang in rhythm to the commanding movements of his baton” (p. 1). In 1939, Stalin was elected an honorary member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and, especially in the post-World War II period, his scientific “genius” was frequently praised by leading members of the scientific hierarchy. For instance, the then President of the Academy, Sergey Vavilov, otherwise an internationally acknowledged physicist, often referred to Stalin as “the genius of science” (Vavilov 1950[1949], p. 11) or “the coryphaeus of science” (Pollock 2006, p. 1). Therefore, Stalin not only upgraded the already existing legitimate authority of science, but also positioned himself as the leading expert and representative of this “mode of knowledge”. The weight of his words about spatial disparities should be considered in the light of these.

While explaining his approach to economic issues in general and to uneven spatial development in particular, Stalin again and again stressed the objective, scientific and unambiguous nature of his statements. Here, he claimed social laws to have the same explanatory power as natural laws. This had two major

⁶In fact, in this milieu the decisive issue in regarding or disregarding someone as a representative of science was the compatibility of his/her point with Stalin’s valid views at that time. A typical example for this is the case of Eugene (Jenő, Yevgeny) Varga, a Hungarian-born Marxist economist and “the USSR’s premier expert on the political economy of capitalism” (Pollock 2006, p. 177). Varga, then heading the Institute of World Economy and Politics in Moscow, tried to come to terms with the survival of capitalism after World War II and the rapid political emergence of the United States. Due to these he argued that the traditional Marxist-Leninist concept about the necessary collapse of capitalism in the short-term due to wars between the capitalist countries was to be confined. He rather had the opinion that the capitalist order could cope with shocks such as World War II was, or at least it was able to postpone an ultimate crisis. For these “heretic” views, Varga soon became exposed to harsh criticism, and his whole institute was closed down in the late 1940s (Spriano 1985; partly based on Reale 1958).

⁷The last two paragraphs are mostly based on a detailed description of the philosophical foundations of socialist science under Stalin by Gyuris and Győri (2013).

consequences. First, taking advantage of the special legitimate authority that natural science had had since the Enlightenment, Stalin projected the same onto social sciences. Second, by this he suggested and also made explicit that social laws were not only as valid as those of nature, but also they lied outside the range of social mastery. As he put it: “the laws of economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the will of man” (Stalin 1972[1952], pp. 3–4).

With this comment Stalin made clear that the processes leading to spatial disparities in capitalism and to balanced development in socialism were profoundly inevitable. Not only did he argue so because for him these were the trends according to the “law”, but because these laws, even those concerning society, could not be changed by human agency. In his eyes balanced growth was impossible under capitalistic circumstances. Even if capitalists wanted to establish balanced development, maybe through planning, they were still regarded as necessary to fail in this attempt. For Stalin:

“Balanced development of the national economy, and hence, economic planning. . . can yield nothing by themselves, if it is not known for what purpose economic development is planned, or if that purpose is not clear. The law of balanced development of the national economy can yield the desired result only if there is a purpose for the sake of which economic development is planned. . . This purpose is inherent in the basic economic law of socialism, in the shape of its requirements. . . Consequently, the law of balanced development of the national economy can operate to its full scope only if its operation rests on the basic economic law of socialism.” (Stalin 1972[1952], p. 41)

Considering these, Stalin left open only one door for those striving for spatial equality instead of spatial inequality. The only chance to enter a phase of balanced development and to get rid of spatial disparities was to shift from the basic economic law of capitalism to that of socialism. Put simply, this meant the establishment of a socialist order and the collectivization of the forces of production.

As can be seen, the issue of spatial disparities soon gained great attention from Marxist thinkers. The topic, at least implicitly, already appeared in the works of Marx and Engels, who referred both to certain tendencies of spatial equalization and to factors increasing spatial unevenness. Although Marx and Engels did not create a coherent concept about unevenness in space, some of their successors tended to give a more thorough analysis of the problem. Especially important were the contributions to the topic by Rosa Luxemburg, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Joseph Stalin. Although their ideas were not compatible with each other at every point, all of them used the spatial disparity issue for the same political purpose. Their concepts were expected to reveal the assumed self-consuming nature of capitalism and the supposedly unavoidable emergence of socialism after the collapse of the capitalist order.

Furthermore, in order to increase the convincing power of their concepts, all these authors made serious efforts to present their ideas as “scientific” and “objective”. Meanwhile, they tried to discredit all other approaches as “unscientific”. This claim was expected to give an extraordinary legitimacy to Marxist concepts.

Furthermore, this legitimacy seemed very difficult to be refuted indisputably since, as is often mentioned in the literature of science studies, science “defies specification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions” (Livingstone 2009, p. 666). Without any doubt, there have been many thinkers who have tried to set the dividing line between science and non-science over the centuries. They have used various criteria, and developed different views about what constitutes science, such as “knowledge based on first-hand observation, claims and procedures warranted by predictive success, the inductive gathering of empirical data, information satisfying the principles of verification or falsification, and so on” (ibid.). But all these ideas have only been various interpretations, and it would be extremely difficult to find anybody claiming himself/herself as scientist whose concepts, also claimed scientific, would match all these potential criteria.

In other words, science itself is an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1955–1956, 1964; cf. Livingstone 2009) in the sense that it is a concept “the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about [its] proper uses on the part of [its] users” (Gallie 1955–1956, p. 169). For these “definitional disputes over contested concepts”, they are “disputes which in their nature cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone” (Gray 1977, p. 344). Instead, it is foremost the medium of power to legitimize certain interpretations and de-legitimize others. In most cases this directly means that the legitimacy of the claimed representatives of science is derived from the support of key leaders of political institutions and movements (Meusburger 1998a, 2005, 2007).

This was also true for the pioneer Marxist theoreticians of spatial unevenness. While publishing her work in 1913, Rosa Luxemburg was already a well-known and prominent activist in the Social Democratic Party of Germany. In 1915, Lenin, although then in exile in Switzerland, was already one of the most influential leftist theoreticians in Europe, having an active revolutionary background. He had been the founder of the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903 and an elected member of the party’s Presidium after 1905 (Read 2005). Furthermore, a few years after writing his work on imperialism he became the leading person in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the first leader of the Soviet Union. For Joseph Stalin, while discussing the “basic economic laws” of capitalism and socialism, he was in power as the ultimate leader of the extremely centralized communist USSR. Moreover, he was one of the two or three then most influential politicians on global scale. Thus, the ideas of these thinkers gained strong legitimacy due to the authors’ political role. This happened first among the supporters of the international labor movement, but later in a much broader circle as well.

Of course it is important to underscore that the “essential contestedness” of science is a general feature of all projects claimed to be scientific, not only Marxist ones. In this sense, the Marxist contributions to the issue of spatial disparities should also not be considered as unique. As we have already presented and will present through several examples, non-Marxist theories about spatial disparities have also tried many times to take advantage of the legitimate authority of science. However, the strategy the presented socialist authors used to legitimize their own

argumentation and to de-legitimize those of others definitely had some peculiarities. First, various claims of being scientific are different in their potential of falsifiability. Most interpretations of what is scientific set certain criteria along which scientific and non-scientific can be distinguished. For those following Engels's views about "scientific socialism", these criteria were the use of a dialectical approach, and the use of the surplus-value concept, through which the capitalistic mode of production can be presented "in its historical interconnection and its necessity for a specific historical period", together with "the necessity of its doom" (Engels 1975[1880], p. 72). This actually means that the advocates of "scientific socialism" defined science, beyond that it had to take a dialectical approach, through its outcome, namely the findings and statements it made.⁸

Hence, for the Marxist concepts about spatial disparities, their scientific quality could only be refuted either if they were non-dialectical (but metaphysical) or if they denied the historical inevitability of capitalism in a certain historical period and its necessary downfall in another one. If these criteria were fulfilled, as it was the case for the works of Luxemburg, Lenin and Stalin, their scientific quality of the concepts was not to be falsified "from inside", along the criteria set by Engels. In the light of this the only point to falsify these concepts would have been to falsify their underlying claim about the "inevitable downfall of capitalism" if the latter would not have happened. But since this event was projected to undefined domains in the future, any criticism that historical evidence seemed not to fulfill the prophecy was possible to be denied through saying that "the time had not come yet".

Thus, Luxemburg, Lenin, and Stalin fulfilled in their works all criteria of "scientific socialism". These criteria, however, might have similarly been fulfilled by many other interpretations, which should not have been compatible with each other necessarily (Just as the approaches of Luxemburg, Lenin and Stalin were also not totally compatible concerning the reason and future dynamics of spatial disparities). In other words, although the approach of "scientific socialism" was not totally unfalsifiable, in the case of the interpretation of spatial disparities this falsifiability only referred to whether a given concept matched some general criteria of "scientific socialism". This fact opened the way for many possible interpretations of spatial disparities, which only needed to be common in their dialectical approach and anti-capitalistic political stance in order to be acknowledged as "scientific". If an interpretation fulfilled these criteria, it fit the bill.

Another remarkable feature of Luxemburg's, Lenin's and Stalin's concepts about spatial disparities was that they were very dogmatic in setting the boundaries

⁸ Thus, we do not agree with the much cited and highly contested opinion of Popper (2002[1963]), for whom "the followers of Marx...rescued the theory from refutation...at the price of adopting a device which made it irrefutable...and by this...they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status" (p. 49). Our point is rather that the concepts of the followers of Marx have a certain potential of falsifiability and refutability. Moreover, we also do not think that the quality of being falsifiable or the level of falsifiability would be the exclusively legitimate measures to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific.

of science. As Garver (1978) formulated, dogmatism is, together with skepticism and eclecticism, one of the characteristic attitudes towards others' approaches that do not match our own. In general, skepticism mirrors the attitude that "all answers are equally true (or false); everyone has a right to his own truth". Eclecticism is rather an imprint of the belief that "each meaning gives a partial view so the more meanings the better". Finally, dogmatism is the conviction that "my answer is right and all others are wrong" (p. 168). The Marxist works on spatial disparities that we have presented in this section were highly dogmatic in sense that they harshly rejected all alternative approaches and exiled them to the domain of "bourgeois" science (thus, non-science). And, since analyses in line with the criteria of "scientific socialism" were *per definitionem* considered as anti-capitalistic, this rejection automatically means the refusal of all works that were not anti-capitalistic.

5.7 Spatial Disparities and Marxism: A Brief Summary

As can be seen, the claims of Luxemburg, Lenin and Stalin concerning spatial disparities showed many important similarities. Otherwise, concepts became more and more radical in their criticism of capitalism as time passed. For Luxemburg, the assumed dependence of capitalism on spatial unevenness was an argument used to forecast the "necessary" collapse of the capitalist order. Lenin went further when he added that capitalism, before it would collapse, unavoidably produced ever increasing spatial unevenness. This idea was expected to indicate the satanic nature of capitalism and its inherent tendency to create unjust conditions, even in terms of space. Finally, Stalin did not only refer to the supposed problems of capitalism identified by Lenin. He also gave an explanation why socialism was expected to eradicate spatial unevenness automatically. In other words, Stalin not only presented socialism as a better alternative against capitalism, but he also aimed to clarify why it was considered as better.

Hence, the issue of spatial unevenness gradually became regarded as a highly important problem in Marxist tradition, which problematized the phenomenon for political reasons. Up to the mid-twentieth century, a whole discursive complex had emerged on the side of the Marxists, with the aim of presenting capitalism as the ultimate source of spatial unevenness and to undermine its moral legitimacy. In an interesting way, however, this argumentation provoked for a long time few reactions from thinkers outside the Marxist project. Their first significant comments arrived not earlier than the post-World War II period, when they indicated a remarkable ideological shift in the newly emerging Western Bloc.

Chapter 6

Non-Marxist Reactions to the Marxist Problematization of Spatial Unevenness

6.1 Antecedents in Practical Life

Even before non-Marxist thinkers first responded to the Marxist problematization of uneven spatial development, the spatial imprint of social inequalities had not remained totally invisible to them. As was presented in Sect. 4.2, the nineteenth century had already brought increasing scientific interest in spatial disparities, especially those emerging within the urban space due to the polarizing effects of the industrial revolution. After this first wave of non-Marxist spatial disparity research, the second era to pay considerable attention to similar issues began in the 1930s. Since the Great Depression hit various regions to differing extents, the negative consequences of the crisis seemed to be concentrated in specific geographical areas. Furthermore, the rapid decrease in real incomes and skyrocketing unemployment also drew attention to the historically rooted problems of certain poor regions. Coming out from an already low pre-crisis standard of living, these areas faced a complex set of social problems during the recession.

In the light of these, the political goal to reduce rapidly increasing disparities in order to cure social tensions became manifest in geographically focused programs. The goal was to close the opening gap between the major “losers” of the crisis and the regions left relatively intact by the depression. Spatial disparity became regarded a problem to be solved. Driven by this notion, from the 1930s onwards several capitalist countries made efforts to reduce spatial disparities (Glasmeyer and Wood 2005). An emblematic example was the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States in 1933. The initiative, called by Scott (1988) “the granddaddy of all regional development projects” (p. 6), was introduced in a region with traditionally poor indicators regarding the overall level of income and education.

Actually, the United States was not the only country to realize the serious challenge posed by regional disparities. In the United Kingdom inequalities caused by the long-lasting depression of industrial areas in the North and in Wales likewise gained attention (Hoover 1969). In 1936 the British Government appointed the

Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, or, in its simple name, the Barlow Commission, to analyze the situation and make suggestions for its solution. The commission emphasized in its 1940 report that “the disadvantages in many, if not in most of the great industrial concentrations . . . constitute . . . dangers to the nation’s life and development”. Thus, they urged that “definite action should be taken by the Government towards remedying them” (quoted in Duxbury 2009, p. 5). In the following years, these words gave impetus to national policies to disperse industry within the United Kingdom for the benefit of regions with structural problems (Gilbert 1976).

Increasing interests in spatial disparities, however, proved temporary in many cases. As the depression was gradually left behind and the economy showed again the signs of recovery, the general attitude towards social disparities also changed. In the United States, for instance, the temporary boom in aid programs ended as soon as the economic circumstances of middle-class households stabilized again. Most people tended to think again that social disparities and poverty in a world after economic recovery were the results of laziness and shiftlessness of the poor, who were themselves blamed for their unfavorable situation. This shift also affected many programs with spatial focus negatively (Glasmeier 2002), even if the TVA remained one of the few counterexamples¹ (cf. Ekbladh 2002). Moreover, it is especially striking from our point of view that the temporarily increasing interest in spatial disparities did not result in the emergence of a massive set of scientific works concerning the theory of unevenness in space. A heyday of theoretical conceptualization of spatial disparities within non-Marxist circles was still not to come.

6.2 Spatial Disparities as the Focus of Scientific Interest: The Cold War Context

The interest of non-Marxist researchers turned to the theory of spatial disparities only beginning in the mid-1950s. But then, the outcomes of this shift were as remarkable as how late the boom began. Within only one decade, a number of groundbreaking theoretical works on spatial disparities were released (especially influential were the publications of Myrdal 1957; Hirschman 1958; Borts and Stein 1964; Williamson 1965; Friedmann 1966). Although with certain differences in their argumentation, these publications were common in considering spatial disparity a problem, and in the notion to explain its causes and identify the potential cures

¹ As Ekbladh (2002) shows, reasons for this exception were manifold, ranging from the agility of the leadership of TVA to the propagandistic value of large-scale investments. These had a crucial role in protecting the TVA and convincing decision-makers as well as everyday people about the desirability of the project in times of economic growth as well. It should be underscored, however, that the main focus of TVA also shifted from more classical attempts of regional industrialization to hydropower production, which gained strategic importance for the federal government during World War II.

for it. Moreover, in the years coming, these were the works to determine the way spatial disparities were conceptualized and interpreted, both in scientific and political thinking. Thus, the issue became a highly important item in the research agenda of various disciplines interested in spatial issues, especially spatial economics.

The reasons for this shift in the scientific interest and for the rapidly increasing popularity of spatial disparity research can be found in the specific geopolitical context of the era. World War II dramatically reshaped the global political arena. While the Axis suffered crushing defeat on all fronts, the economy and military power and, thus, the geopolitical influence of the whole of Europe remarkably decreased. Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as new superpowers, with decisive roles in world politics in the post-war era.

The fragile cooperation, which the two countries had sustained during the war, was gradually replaced by fierce rivalry. As formulated by the high-ranking American diplomat George Kennan, often called “the architect of the Cold War” (BBC 2005, March 18; USA Today 2005, March 18) due to his decisive role in shaping US Cold War policies during the Truman administration: “[the United States] must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect . . . a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power” (X 1947, pp. 580–581).² Under these circumstances the United States was urged to follow “a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” (ibid., p. 581). These ideas soon shifted to the level of national security policy. As a then classified US intelligence report put it in 1950, the Soviet Union sought “to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world” (National Security Council 1950), and in this effort, they regarded “the United States as the only major threat” (ibid.). Thus, the United States, the “principal enemy” of the Soviet bloc, positioned itself as the defender of the whole “free world” and the ethos of “free society” (Dorband 2010).

This new geopolitical role also imposed new responsibilities and tasks on the United States. On the one hand, the capitalist superpower had to represent and protect the whole Western Bloc. Any forms of military, political or institutional intrusion from the Soviet side into the affairs of the “free world” had to be avoided. On the other hand, the communist³ ideology seemed likely to infiltrate into every

² For the political sensitivity of the issue, Kennan’s article was published under the pseudonym “X”. However, some media workers soon brought to light the identity of the author (Paterson 1988).

³ At this point we should refer to some challenges for and political overtones connected to the use of the terms “communist” and “socialist”. In the Western world, the political and economic system in the Eastern Bloc, its underlying ideology, and its advocates are commonly called “communist (s)”. This is how they are distinguished from socialist (social democratic) ideology, socialist politicians and sympathizers, and social democratic systems. In this approach the dividing line between the two terms lies along the boundary between authoritarian and democratic means of agency.

region having been in geopolitical vacuum previously. From the early 1950s on, this became the main fear of US decision makers, since the presumed probability of a direct military attack from the Soviet side significantly decreased (Dorband 2010). Thus, the United States needed to take steps in countries all over the world to convince them to follow the American model instead of the Soviet one.

In fact, the establishment of an international institutional framework to underpin global US endeavors had begun even before World War II ended. That led to the creation of new organizations “to build and sustain international regimes of political and economic order under American leadership” (Dorband 2010, p. 91). Thus, unlike Western colonial powers, the United States wanted its international influence not to be guaranteed by a new colonial empire. As Agnew (1993) points out, US decision-makers rather considered the latter as a “burden” (p. 209). Instead, the presumed post-war world order was to be guaranteed mainly by the United Nations Organization and the Bretton Woods System, “two key organizations to safeguard international peace and security, and to support international economic liberalism” (Dorband 2010, p. 91). The creation of these institutions happened, however, in a still very turbulent international political context, and events in the succeeding years rapidly showed that the United States had to make further attempts to stabilize its international influence. This became especially clear as US-allied former colonial powers proved less and less able to sustain their colonial empires and hold them together under the aegis of Western political goals. In some areas, this problem emerged as early as World War II ended. As the US State Department warned in

In countries once belonging to the Eastern Bloc, however, the current discourse applies the two terms rather in line with their Marxian meaning. Communism in this sense refers to an envisioned condition of a profoundly classless society with a perfect dominance of common property, while socialism embraces only the transitory period from capitalism to communism. In this view, circumstances in the former Eastern Bloc are tendentially called “socialist” since communism in a Marxian sense was not achieved in any of these countries, neither in fact nor according to then official propaganda. Thus, the distinction between communism and socialism comes here from the original works of Marx, and it follows Marxist terminology.

In fact, the latter use has political relevance as well since former supporters of the dictatorial regimes consistently prefer the term “socialism” to “communism” when speaking about the decades before the transition, so thus their former activity can be presented in a somewhat less negative or more tolerable light. (However, the Marxian use of “socialism” and “communism” is in itself no proof of once having been a supporter of the dictatorial regime since this is the usage recently preferred in most contexts, especially in intellectual debates. Yet, it is true that the Western-type application of the two terms, where the former regime together with its ideology and its supporters are called “communist”, appears in the countries of transition generally in right-wing discourses.)

In our work a specific terminology is used to reduce possible misunderstandings to a minimum. In line with the ideas of Marx, we refer to the social, economic and political *conditions* in the former Eastern Bloc as “socialism”, sustaining the term “communism” for envisioned conditions. However, for underlying *ideology*, the *persons* having supported these regimes, and these *states* themselves are called “communist(s)”, expressing that they set as their long-term goal the establishment of communism in the Marxian sense. This use is the same as calling those arguing for monarchy in a republic as well as their underlying ideology “royalist(s)”, even if the actual conditions within the country meet the requirements of a republic and not those of a monarchy.

late 1945: “The British publicly admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without our help” (quoted in Little 2002, p. 120). The United States had to face many similar challenges in the next few years. In 1947, for instance, the United Kingdom got in trouble again, that time in the Mediterranean Europe. The British leadership supported the right-wing government of Greece with financial and military means during the civil war against communist-led forces from 1946 to 1949 (Dorband 2010). In the second year of the conflict, “British officials informed President Truman that they could no longer hold up that commitment due to economic problems at home and urged Washington to step in” (ibid., p. 103; based on Little 2002, p. 119).

In the light of these trends, the colonial empires of Western European powers were likely to weaken and collapse soon, opening the way for the establishment of a number of new independent countries all over the world. These areas were regarded as especially sensitive and important in the global geopolitical struggle. Fears of losing these territories for the benefit of the communist bloc became even stronger during the early 1950s. Considering that the victory of Mao’s communists in China in 1949 had been followed by the Korean War in 1950, the United States was afraid that a communist turn in a given country could induce similar changes in neighboring countries. This was what President Eisenhower called the “falling domino principle” in 1954. As he put it:

“You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.” (Eisenhower 2005 [1954], p. 383)

Under such geopolitical circumstances, spatial disparity became an issue that science and politics in the Western bloc could not neglect anymore, and the problematization of which it had to accept.⁴ And it was not only since the Stalinist argumentation blamed all disparities in society and space on capitalism, a system whose emblematic representative was the United States. An even greater problem was that in several colonial territories the various forms of spatial disparity produced by the policy of colonial powers were everyday reality for most inhabitants. This experience, together with other aspects of colonial repression, was also a potential root of fierce opposition not only to the colonial powers, but to the whole economic and political order which they ran. Thus, the US side neglecting the issue of spatial disparities threatened with a massive turn towards the Soviet Bloc in many colonial territories.

⁴ Cf. Sect. 2.6 about the altering position of slogans in changing contexts in the disparity discourse.

6.3 Geopolitical Struggle and the “Relevant” Forms of Disparity in Space

In the eyes of US government think tanks, two forms of spatial disparity seemed especially dangerous in Cold War competition against the Soviet Union. First, the divide between “wealthy” and “poor nations”, and second, the gap between various regions within given countries. The former issue had already gained a lot of attention from President Harry S. Truman in his 1949 inaugural address. For him, the desirable equality of everyone was derived from the same Christian principles upon which the entire US political tradition was based, namely that “all men are created equal because they are created in the image of God” (quoted in Woolley and Peters, n.d.). Thus, in his view, “the American people . . . are determined to work for peace on earth – a just and lasting peace – based on genuine agreement freely arrived at by equals” (ibid.). This meant that he found necessary “to work for a world in which all nations and all peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit, and to achieve a decent and satisfying life” (ibid.).

In other words, Truman urged for diminishing inequality among various countries and their people in order to establish and enjoy permanent peace, freedom and prosperity. These values, however, were all to be traced back to the same *economic-technical* prerequisite in his eyes. As he put it: “*Greater production* is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.” (our emphasis; ibid.). Thus, the disparity between countries was interpreted by Truman as a result of uneven production, which he considered a function of the different level of scientific and technological improvement.

In consequence, the Cold War competition to win those allies who would otherwise drift into the Soviet sphere of influence was also interpreted in this conceptual framework. As a 1955 analysis of the influential American think tank The Twentieth Century Fund put it: “A country of satisfactory material well-being is rarely, if ever, a voluntary convert to the ranks of Communism. Even if the level of living is painfully low, if there is a reasonable chance of betterment, if the way to economic progress seems to lie open . . . it is unlikely that these cravings will impel a country to sacrifice its independence to a foreign monster” (Buchanan and Ellis 1955, p. 429; quoted in Pounds 1963, p. 376). A similar stance was made in an official 1959 report on US foreign policy, which tried to conceptualize the threat posed by spatial disparities at the international level: “if the non-Communist nations fail to achieve adequate rates of *economic growth*, more and more people will be persuaded by the arguments of the Communists and more and more of the world will fall prey to Communist political systems” (our emphasis; Council on Foreign Relations 1959, p. 17; quoted in Pounds 1963, p. 376). As has already been underscored, these fears were especially immense with regard to former colonies since their drive for “freedom from alleged exploitation and with an accession of wealth” was considered to have failed due to a lack of economic growth after gaining independence. This was put by Pounds (1963) as follows: “*economic*

depression breeds unrest, weakens the fledgling governments of the new states, and creates the openings through which the economic and political influence of the Communist bloc may insinuate itself” (our emphasis; p. 358).

The other critical form of spatial disparities for the US political leadership was the unevenness between regions within a given country. This was regarded as an especially serious problem in many newly-established African countries, where, in the words of Pounds (1963), “the *raisons d’être*” of states often “lie entirely in the fact that that is how the imperial powers of the nineteenth century shaped them” (p. 360). And these political boundaries inherited from the colonial times were often the outcomes of an absolute negligence of local people’s interests from the side of imperial powers. They rather reflected, on the one hand, the power relations of European colonial powers competing for the domination of other continents. On the other hand, inner boundaries in the areas possessed by the same colonial power were usually the outcomes of a well thought out policy of divide and rule. They were simply aimed at “separating friendly tribes and throwing hostile tribes together” (p. 359) to prevent local tribes from cooperating against the colonizers.

In consequence of this historical heritage, most new states were extremely fragile, and the threat of political disintegration was very high. This issue appeared that time in many government requested analyses, scientific works, and in mass media as well. For instance, an official commission, which was appointed by the British government before it surrendered its authority in Nigeria, put it in its 1958 report as follows: “in each of the three Regions of Nigeria . . . we found either a minority or a group of minorities who described fears and grievances which they felt would become more intense when the present restraints were removed and who suggested as a remedy a separate state or states” (Colonial Office 1958; quoted in Pounds 1963, p. 359). Two years later, an article in *The New York Times* described similar challenges in Cameroon:

“Cameroon’s trouble springs from the fact that she has no ethnic, religious, or geographic unity. Her densely populated north is dominated by a powerful Moslem ruling class that threatens the pagan masses as virtual slaves. *The north is fifty years behind the rest of the country in social and educational development.*” (our emphasis; Bigart 1960, January 3, p. 20; quoted in Pounds 1963, p. 359)

Reflecting on these lines, Pounds (1963) underlined in his academic textbook *Political Geography* that “even among the more developed Bamileke peoples of southern Cameroon there are *strong economic and social differences* that have led to violence” (our emphasis; p. 359). Furthermore, he raised attention to similar challenges in Mauritania, Gambia, and Congo as well (cf. Pounds 1963).

In all these cases, ethnic and/or religious issues were regarded as crucial reasons for political tensions, but the importance of economic factors was likewise strongly emphasized. In this context, spatial economic differences were presented as being a catalyst for culturally grounded political tensions. In certain cases, economic unevenness, especially in terms of the accessibility of natural resources, seemed strong enough to cause frictions that otherwise may not emerge. As an example Pounds (1963) referred to Congo, where “the ethnic diversity is matched by the

variety of physical environment” since “the southern province ... known as Katanga, is a plateau region, clothed with savanna and containing rich deposits of copper” (p. 360). For him, this physical divide tended to discourage unity and fuelled a threat from Rhodesia to the Katanga province (*ibid.*). This fear seemed substantiated since the Katanga region witnessed in 1960 the proclamation of the internationally unrecognized State of Katanga, which existed for 3 years before UN intervention put an end to the further escalation of the conflict (Epstein 1965).

Such conflicts fuelled by economic disparities had obvious geopolitical relevance for the superpowers. On the one hand, the cultural and economic disparities within newly established countries were likely to end up in redrawing the boundaries in the political map of former colonial territories. These presumed changes were interpreted as a potential source of geopolitical risk in themselves since the transformation process was likely to open the way for a series of events impossible to predict. Under such circumstances it seemed possible that the rival superpower might prove more efficient in fishing in troubled waters, and could expand its sphere of influence through enticing further countries to itself. On the other hand, serious frictions between various regions of the same country, the secession of a given district, or the conflict of two countries over a disputed area were automatically to result in local conflicts copying the global Cold War scheme. In these cases, rival groups at the local level were very likely to turn to the rival superpowers for support. And this was a problem not only due to its negative implication on geopolitical stability. In fact, if a former colony was torn in two and one of the two local rivals asked for Soviet assistance, it meant that half of the country was lost for the United States as a potential ally. Both examples suggested in a US point of view that the smooth American alignment with all former colonies of Western European powers could easily be challenged if spatial disparities within these former colonies were not reduced significantly. For the same reason, inequalities at lower spatial levels (for instance between or within settlements) seemed barely interesting. These actually did not pose a considerable threat to the geopolitical status quo since a town or a village, if its inhabitants feel discontented with disparities, cannot claim its independence or simply change its national affiliation. In most cases this simply does not happen for geographical reasons (e.g. for a town in the middle of a country). And even where it is possible from a pure “cartographic” sense (border towns, for instance, which could switch to the neighboring country), it is still highly impossible since a town or a village does not have the catchment area to efficiently struggle against either the national or the regional government. For this reason, spatial disparities between countries and regions seemed very interesting from a Cold War point of view, while lower geographical levels raised virtually no attention.

6.4 Spatial Disparity Research: Analytical and Propagandistic Objectives

Since spatial disparities between “rich” and “poor” countries as well as within former colonies were considered as economic in nature to a great extent, the US political establishment became highly interested in two issues. First, it seemed necessary to analyze how economic growth could be stimulated in “poor” countries and regions with colonial background. This notion embraced both the investigation of the theoretical aspects of economic growth and the outlining of feasible practical steps. It was this endeavor to open the way for the project of *developmentalism*, whose initial goals (be they explicit or implicit) and outcomes have been analyzed over the last decades from various points of views in a huge number of scientific works (e.g. Gonçalves 2005; McEwan 2009; Potter et al. 2008; Potter and Conway 2011; Sachs 1992; Ziai 2006).

Meanwhile, however, a second issue likewise gained great attention: it was the relation of economic growth to spatial disparities of economic production and material well-being. Here, the point was on the one hand to see whether, and if so, how the international expansion of capitalism could handle the problem of spatial disparities at an international level (between countries). On the other hand, the ability of capitalist production to diminish spatial disparities *within* given countries was also an issue of high importance. Therefore, a remarkable “boom” began in the market of scientific works concerning the theory of spatial economic disparities as well as the practical means to reduce disparities. And, in accordance with underlying geopolitical interests, these concepts had two common features. First, they dominantly concentrated on the global (international) and regional (intranational) scales. Second, their main interest was in economic issues. Hence, they tended to emphasize (or even overemphasize) the inequalities of production and income among the many aspects of spatial disparities.^{5, 6}

The objective of research both about “development” and spatial disparities was twofold. First, they served analytical goals. Just as has been mentioned, they were aimed at revealing the reasons and cure for what was called “underdevelopment” and a politically dangerous level of spatial disparities. In the meantime, however, they also had important propagandistic goals. Although the latter was rarely made explicit in corresponding academic works, it was no secret that the creation of propagandistic knowledge in general was of elementary political importance here. “Cold War architect” George Kennan put this as follows:

“It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement ... [This] is ... a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally *the impression of a country which knows what it wants,*

⁵ For a concise overview of the shortcomings of such a selective focus see Gerhard (2011).

⁶ This relative one-sidedness, however, certainly seemed less remarkable in that context given the firm economic bias in Marxist concepts about spatial disparities.

which is *coping successfully with the problems* of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and *which has a spiritual vitality* capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy." (our emphases; X 1947, p. 581)

In an epistemological approach this meant that knowledge production, especially with regard to issues of geopolitical relevance, was expected to produce both forms of knowledge, factual as well as orientation knowledge. The latter and its capacity to make "definitions, categorizations and interpretations" and "moral judgments on friends and enemies" in order "to give order, identity, coherence and *legitimacy* to the system" (our emphasis; Meusburger 2005, p. 152) was also extremely important for Cold War US political leadership, thus, significant resources were allocated for the production of orientation knowledge. It was especially important to disseminate American propaganda among foreign intellectuals, for obvious reasons. This social stratum has a crucial role in each society in legitimizing power in the eyes of the masses and also in shaping the view of the political elite⁷ (Meusburger 2005). The extent of US efforts to reach these goals was exemplified well by a major project launched by the American government in 1947. The secret program under the aegis of CIA used culture as a means of mediating orientation knowledge, mainly among the intelligentsia of Western Europe (Saunders 1999). The initiative intended "to inoculate the world against the contagion of Communism, and to ease the passage of American foreign policy interests abroad" (p. 2). To reach these goals, the project was based on "an extensive, highly influential network of intelligence personnel, political strategists, the corporate establishment, and the old school ties of Ivy League universities" (pp. 1–2). In other words, a great deal of politically reliable key persons in the American intelligentsia were mobilized to find out how to convince the intellectuals of foreign countries that "the world needed a *pax Americana*, a new age of enlightenment" (emphasis in original; p. 2).^{8, 9}

⁷The latter capacity made intellectuals especially important for US strategists since they were fully aware of what the Germany-born American political scientist Arnold Wolfers put as follows: "As a rule, the most effective type of aid will be the aid that promises to give the greatest satisfaction to those élite groups who are eager to keep the country out of communist or Soviet control" (Wolfers 1960, p. 386). This obviously included propagandistic aid as well, which could play an important role in getting the support of local elites – not only by financial or military assistance, but also by symbolical gestures.

⁸We should underscore here that Saunders takes in his book a rather critical stance towards the project. This is also emphasized in a review of the essay's US edition by Troy (2002), whose opinion is otherwise similarly unlikely to be politically unbiased since he had worked in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. However, except for a few small mistakes, Troy (2002) confirms the validity of the empirical information to be found in Saunders's book. Thus, for its empirical content, we have regarded this essay as a relevant source of information.

⁹For specific details of the "Cultural Cold War" in Western Europe also see Scott-Smith and Krabbendam (2003).

It was in this context that Western scholarly interests in “development” and spatial disparities began to increase rapidly. Thus, we have every reason to hypothesize that these two analytical streams could also not remain unaffected by the general circumstances of the Cold War. In other words, it can be supposed that these research projects necessarily tended to produce not only factual knowledge, but orientation knowledge as well—either unconsciously, under the influence of *zeitgeist*, or consciously and on purpose. For spatial disparities, it is likely that concepts were not only to reveal why these inequalities emerged and how they were to be cured. They could reasonably contribute to the success of American foreign policy at least in two further points. First, by presenting the United States as a superpower capable of solving these problems; and second, by presenting capitalism as an economic order to cope with such challenges under any circumstances.

Of course, this motivation was similarly present in Stalin’s endeavor to improve existing Marxist concepts about spatial disparities and to claim the uniqueness of socialism to solve the problem. It is certainly no accident that Stalin’s concept also emerged in the early 1950s, at the first peak of Cold War, and that he urged for an international expansion of the theory in a planned “Marxist textbook on political economy” (Stalin 1972[1952], p. 46). In his eyes, such a theoretical work was “particularly needed by Communists and communist sympathizers in all countries”, especially as a “reference book for the revolutionary youth” (ibid.). Furthermore, as Stalin put it: “in view of the inadequate level of Marxist development of the majority of the Communist Parties abroad, such a textbook might also be of great use to communist cadres abroad who are no longer young” (p. 47) (also cf. Pollock 2006). In fact, the creation of this textbook was part of a broader campaign, where Soviet scientists were expected to sustain “the argument that communism was the only viable way to organize society” (Pollock 2006, p. 5) and “to win the hearts and minds of people around the globe” (p. 6). Thus, Soviet leaders and Stalin himself were also aware of the importance of manufacturing and propagating orientation knowledge about potentials of their economic system, where a crucial point was to seem able to eliminate spatial disparities. In Marxist ideology, however, this argument was not new, while American science turned towards the issue for the first time, to give a capitalistic answer to the Marxist problematization of spatial inequalities.

6.5 The Need for Scientific Substantiation and the Rising Star of Spatial Economics

In the Western Bloc’s struggle for mastery over the spatial disparity discourse, the leading role was obviously that of economists. Although the issue of spatial disparities owes a geographical relevance difficult to doubt, at that time Western geographical research showed relatively little interest in spatial inequality and its geopolitical relevance as separate research topics. This did not mean a total lack of

geographical works concerning disparities in the geographical space, but that their main focus was on other issues, such as hierarchies in the urban network and the categorization of urban centers (e.g. following Christaller 1933; cf. Blotevogel 1996; Heineberg 2006, pp. 17–19). Analyses with geopolitical orientation were, however, almost non-existent in postwar geography, mainly due to the highly contested role the infamous German *Geopolitik* played in World War II. Besides, for spatial disparity as a phenomenon and problem, remarkable contributions to the issue from representatives of various social sciences (see Sects. 4.2, 5.1–5.3) were virtually ignored by geographers, and vice versa, since the reputation of the discipline among outsiders was also not especially high. Geography in those years was still dominated by the regionalist paradigm, in Europe as well as the United States, where this was introduced by Richard Hartshorne (Barnes and Farish 2006; Johnston 1978). This approach put at its forefront the analysis of uniqueness of given areas, favoring in Hartshorne's (1939) words (going back to the German Neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelband) an "idiographic" approach instead of taking a "nomothetic" approach and focusing on general similarities. This way of seeing, which did not stimulate the application of mathematical methods in an abstract, geometrical space, proved barely useful in World War II in knowledge production for practical (military and strategic political) ends. Thus, for chief analysts and political leaders, who became key figures in Cold War decision-making, geography did not seem particularly useful. Instead, they needed science (and not only natural, but social science as well) (Barnes 2008) to solve technical problems, and predict future consequences of certain decisions. These abilities increased the presumed potential of a discipline to efficiently aid decision-making, while also having an extreme propagandistic value since statements from such disciplines could easily be presented as the "truth".¹⁰ For these reasons, while top leaders urged an intensive cooperation of science and political decision-making, geography did not seem a science for them, at least not "a science in the way it was becoming defined during the War and early Cold War" (Barnes and Farish 2006, p. 817). A shining example of this was the closure of Harvard University's Department of Geology and Geography in 1948, when expenditures on science and technical development were otherwise boosted (ibid.).

Economics, however, "fit the bill". To a great extent it did since this discipline was the first among social sciences to diverge from its traditional viewpoint and to open to mathematics, quantification and "'predictive' model building"

¹⁰ One can find a perfect example of how great the propagandistic importance of spatial research was for US strategists in the autobiographical essay of André Gunder Frank, later to become a key thinker of neo-Marxist dependency theories (cf. Sect. 8.1.3). Frank points out that in the 1950s as a young researcher he joined the University of Chicago's Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change. Here he worked on a project on the Soviet economy, "whose final client was the US Army Psychological Warfare Division" (Frank 2000, p. 187).

(Mercer 1984, p. 157; also cf. Keeble 1967).¹¹ It also began to exploit the analytical potential of computers much earlier than other social sciences, including human geography. In these disciplines it was merely a few “early birds” who got involved in computing and computer-aided research in the mid and late 1950s (Barnes 2008). In economics, however, the same years witnessed the emergence of whole new theories on the basis of results provided by computer-aided economic analyses in the previous years (Wolf and Enns 1971). Thus, economics seemed more “scientific” than other social sciences and able to give simple, clear suggestions for political decision-makers about what to do.¹² But the discipline was in fact not unitary. Instead, it was characterized by two competing approaches, which were different not only in their reasoning, but even in their fundamental assumptions: these were *neoclassical economics* on the one hand, and *Keynesian economics* on the other. The difference between the two approaches was also manifested in the way they interpreted spatial disparities, which, for them, was identical to spatial disparities of economic production and economic well-being.

6.6 The Stable Equilibrium Model of the Neoclassic: Strengths and Weaknesses

The view of neoclassical economics is that of a highly abstract world consisting of “independently minded individuals making decisions that can be completely rationalized in terms of aims and means, interacting with one another only by means of market competition, and all the while being limited only by the constraints provided by nature” (Boland 2004, p. 685). In this pure world, demand and supply are expected to establish a state of equilibrium in the long term. This means that “all individuals will be satisfied relative to what they can afford” (p. 686).¹³

¹¹ Krugman (2011) writes about this as the decision of mainstream economists “that devising abstract models is an essential part of being a *useful* profession” and that emphasis should be put on “to answer the question about *what to do*” (our emphases; p. 3). Here he specifically refers to John Maynard Keynes as an emblematic pioneer figure of this way of thinking, who, in King’s (2004) words, considered economics “a policy science” and for whom “macroeconomics was worth doing only if it could be used to improve the operation of the economy” (p. 542). As Krugman (2011) underlines, this attitude became dominant in economics during the Great Depression, when politicians needed disciplines “to provide *useful* answers” (our emphasis) instead of emphasizing “the uniqueness of each individual case” (p. 3). This interpretation is also in accordance with international observations that economic and political crises usually result in an increasing prestige of and demand for factual knowledge (Meusburger 1998a, pp. 17–18).

¹² As Storper (2011) puts it about the use of mathematics and modeling in economy, “the clarity of these equations are probably a reason why most countries have some type of high-level Council of Economic Advisors, but few have a high-level Council of Geographical Advisors” (p. 14).

¹³ An especially detailed model to describe how economic growth in the long run creates equilibrium was given by Solow (1956). His analysis actually became a major reference work in neoclassical economics.

Similarly, economic processes in space are also assumed to lead to spatial equilibrium after a sufficient amount of time.¹⁴ This hypothesis is based on the concept that *ceteris paribus* (all other conditions being equal) spatial differences in the price of factors of production tend to diminish due to the spatial migration of factors of production (Harris 1957). Let us say, for instance, that there are two regions in a system, R_1 and R_2 . If labor supply is higher in R_1 than in R_2 , labor costs will also be lower in R_1 compared to R_2 . Under such circumstances, for the same work (in terms of both quantity and quality) a higher wage is paid in R_2 than in R_1 . This difference, however, results in a spatial migration of labor force from R_1 to R_2 , where higher income can be realized. Thus, over the long term, the spatial migration of labor as a factor of production is expected to eliminate inequalities of labor cost in space (for the most detailed presentation of the concept see Borts and Stein 1964; also cf. Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Buttler et al. 1977; Schätzl 2003).¹⁵ This approach suggests that equilibrium is to come automatically if there is no obstacle for the spatial migration of factors of production. Moreover, as Keirstead (1948) suggested, the relocation of production in space to areas with lower production costs is also a means in a free economy to promote spatial equalization. And even if factors of production are not perfectly mobile, but at least free commerce is guaranteed, the spatial mobility of goods and services will end up in a balance of prices of factors of production and in spatial equilibrium (Maier et al. 2006). In consequence, spatial disparity seems here a temporary phenomenon to which no special attention should be paid if spatial mobility or at least free commerce and an unlimited spatial flow of goods and services is guaranteed.

This reasoning has many advantages. First, the concept offers an abstract theoretical framework in which all spatial phenomena can be described with the language of mathematics. Thus, *seemingly*, even the background of spatial disparities can be revealed through some algebraic functions, which are relatively easy to work with, and which can also provide predictions for certain scenarios in the price of productive factors. Second, the idea of automatically diminishing spatial inequalities had a very important implicit political meaning in the Cold War context. Suggesting that an unlimited spatial mobility of factors of production could guarantee, and that it was the only condition to guarantee the enduring elimination of spatial disparities, a possible normative evaluation of the two competing economic systems was as follows. The free-market economy, the model propagated by the United States all over the world, could be presented as the economic order necessarily and unconditionally solving the problem of spatial disparities. But the Soviet-type socialist economy, which was irreconcilable with

¹⁴ This statement is obviously not valid for most simple neoclassical models that totally ignore spatial issues (which are presented and critically evaluated by Buttler, Gerlach and Liepmann 1977; Meusbürger 1998b).

¹⁵ As Cheshire and Malecki (2004) underscores, this concept was a simple adaptation of Solow's (1956) growth model to a regional context, hypothesizing the existence of two regions and two economies instead of only one.

the idea of a free market, was implicitly claimed to end in failure in its attempt to diminish inequalities among countries and regions due to strong state control.

Still, the neoclassical concept of spatial disparities has many weaknesses, which are easy to be challenged. Some of these can be fixed through relatively minor corrections of the concept. For instance, the absolute mobilization of factors of production is rather a theoretical option than a real one, due to many factors. Even if administrative and social obstacles are not considered, there are many reasons why factors of production cannot be totally mobile. A very simple example is land, which is absolutely immobile. If land prices are much higher in Manhattan than in rural Iowa, spatial differences in the supply of land cannot be equalized through transporting some thousands of acres of land from the Prairie to New York. Without any doubt, however, if the migration of forces of production is constrained, trade can still balance regional disparities. In this case, each region specializes in a certain product, which it will produce in larger quantity, and not only for itself, but to cover the demand of other regions as well. Thus, for the neoclassical concept, if free mobility is challenged, free trade should still enable the elimination of spatial disparities. In this view, although the structure of production remains different in various regions, the sum value of production will be the same (cf. Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Maier et al. 2006).

At many other points, however, neoclassical reasoning regarding the development of spatial disparities proves very fragile. Due to its abstract nature, the concept is only valid under specific, and often unrealistic, circumstances. For instance, the whole argumentation is based on the assumption of constant returns to scale, thus, that the change of inputs results in a proportional change of outputs (Buttler et al. 1977). This hypothesis might work well in an abstract one-point economy, pulled out of its temporal and spatial dimensions. But under real circumstances, constant returns to scale almost never exist, maybe with a small stock of very special cases. Otherwise, to calculate with constant returns of scale means that one totally ignores, for example, the changing efficiency of production (respective to the value of product manufactured from inputs of a given value). This equals ignoring qualitative aspects, thus, the concept is unable to consider the temporal improvement of technology, or the spatial differences in the quality of technology used (cf. Bathelt and Glückler 2012).

The concept also hypothesizes diminishing marginal utility of factors of production, which is not necessarily the case under real circumstances (ibid.). Myrdal (1957), for instance, underlines that a certain amount of extra investment might lead to higher growth of industrial production in regions with higher initial value of output. This is because districts with industrial tradition, where not only infrastructure but feasible knowledge is also given, can utilize extra inputs more efficiently than districts lacking this background.

Furthermore, the neoclassical concept of spatial disparities is based on the assumption of perfect competition, which actually does not exist in reality. Furthermore, it is incompatible with the reality of an inherently heterogeneous geographical space, as was already underscored by Palander (1935). He pointed out that if one considers different places (e.g. villages, towns, cities) in a certain area as

different markets, the number of buyers and sellers would be too small and fall far behind the idea of infinite economic actors, a necessary prerequisite for perfect competition. If the whole area is instead regarded as one market, actually existing price differences of the same goods at various places might have two reasons. Either that the goods are not regarded everywhere as the same product, or, if they are, then price differences indicate that the value of the same product is not equal at different places. In fact, both possibilities indicate local market differences, which challenge the idea of homogeneous products as well (that characteristics of given goods do not vary over suppliers), another fundamental prerequisite for perfect competition.

These are, however, not the only factors to challenge the concept of perfect competition. Another serious problem emerges here with regard to the above cited remark of Myrdal about the role of knowledge since a major obstacle for perfect competition is the spatially uneven accessibility of knowledge. As Meusburger (1998a, b, 2008) points out, new knowledge is always linked to certain persons, social systems and loci when it emerges, thus, it is not “omnipresent”. Furthermore, its spread from one person to another and between geographical areas is also limited for many reasons. First, knowledge that others do not have always gives one a certain advantage in economic, political, military etc. competition. Consequently, those possessing new knowledge are usually disinterested in sharing it with “outsiders” and rivals. For this reason, they consciously make serious attempts to keep knowledge exclusive. And even if they aim to mediate knowledge to others, this initiative can be challenged by many factors. The source of knowledge might prove unable to encode new knowledge in a way that it can be received and understood by others. Moreover, once knowledge is received, it is still questionable whether its content is really assessed, accepted and utilized (Meusburger 1998b, 2009). Besides, it is not only the grade (level) or amount of knowledge one has that counts, but rather if one has a certain piece of knowledge before his/her rivals. If a company owns the knowledge to introduce a brand new product or service only few months before its competitors, it can corner the market and make extremely high profit. This is especially so for high-quality technology-intensive products such as IT devices or sports cars. Similarly, receiving and utilizing new knowledge before rivals can give one a huge advantage on a stock exchange. For this reason neither the quantity and quality of knowledge one has nor the timing of this knowledge gained relative to others can be neglected in realistic analyses of social and economic phenomena. Yet, these aspects are overlooked by neoclassical theories.

These serious weaknesses together also pose a further challenge to the neoclassical concept. If constant returns of scale, diminishing marginal utility of factors of production and perfect competition lack, the very basic implicit assumption of the concept that factors of production are paid in proportion to their marginal products collapses (Buttler et al. 1977; Bathelt and Glückler 2012). Besides, as Boland (2004) puts it, there is virtually no room in the concept for social institutions such as churches and governments, and for authorities (or power relations). Thus, institutional barriers that also shape economic processes (e.g. through laws, norms, behavior patterns, and social systems) are excluded (Bathelt and Glückler 2012).

Finally, the idea of humanity itself is highly doubtful in the neoclassical approach as it assumes an absolutely “rational” agency of individuals (Rational Choice Theory—RCT) as well as that this rationality is aimed at the maximization of profits (cf. Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Boland 2004). For the claim of “rationality”, it is extremely problematic in itself since “rationality” is not an absolute category. In other words, whether a certain act is “rational” can only be decided in light of the goals the acting agent set, the information they have, and the means they use (Meusburger 1999; cf. Edwards 1968; Arrow 1974). Irrespective of this issue, however, the concept still remains disputable. On the one hand, RCT implicitly suggests that individuals have no constraints in pursuing their goals. Instead, they are supposed to possess complete information and knowledge, to perpetually assess the changing conditions and to fit their steps to them, to have stable preferences, and to be uninfluenced by emotions while acting (Zey 2001). On the other hand, RCT in neoclassical models is always used with the premise that the goal acting agents pursue is economic in nature, namely the maximization of profit. But human notions, in fact, can be much more diverse. As Werlen (2008) presents, human action can also be aimed at adapting to social norms or at understanding things through efficient participation in communication.

In sum, the clarity of neoclassical concepts and the notion of providing simple, direct answers to the questions of decision-makers (on the output side of model-building) resulted in a very narrow and selective perception and interpretation of society and economic processes on the input side. Of course, most of the problems presented above do not specifically concern the neoclassical concept regarding spatial disparities, but the neoclassical approach itself. Hence, theoretical criticism of neoclassical economics had emerged well before the interest of Cold War researchers turned to spatial inequalities of production.

6.7 The Criticism of Neoclassical Economics and the Concepts of Spatial Polarization

The criticism of neoclassical economics can be traced back to as early as the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Thorstein Veblen, the founder of evolutionary economics, pointed at the fundamentally unrealistic nature of neoclassical concepts (Boland 2004). Furthermore, in the light of the specific economic context created by the Great Depression, the works of John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s gave impetus to an alternative approach in economic thinking, usually called Keynesian economics. Although spatial disparities was not Keynes’ focus, his ideas proved fundamental in this field of research as well. Especially influential was his thought that the economy might face crises that cannot be solved by the market itself through self-correcting mechanisms, but that should be handled through government intervention (King 2004). Although Keynes initially formulated this idea with regard to challenges of employment (cf. Keynes 1936), spatial economists

revealed its relevance soon as the Cold War boom in spatial disparity research began.

The idea that the market is incapable of balancing itself, even in terms of spatial inequalities, raised the attention of many researchers who claimed that spatial disparities were on the increase. Since their observations were diametrically opposed to the spatial convergence that neoclassical equilibrium models forecasted, they came to the point that these models were “of little use in illuminating . . . the real world” (Keeble 1967, pp. 257–258). Hence, they made serious efforts to establish an alternative, non-neoclassical theoretical framework. These works had several common points, but they also had considerable differences, both of which should be analyzed in order to gain a relevant view of the contribution of this approach to spatial disparity research. For this reason, in the forthcoming sections we provide an in-depth analysis of the most influential concepts (Myrdal 1957; Hirschman 1966[1958]; Williamson 1965; Friedmann 1966)¹⁶ coming from the presumption that economic growth in a free market does not lead automatically to spatial equalization without external intervention.

6.7.1 Gunnar Myrdal, the “Vicious Circle” of Polarization, and a Straight Geopolitical Path into the American Sphere of Influence for the “Underdeveloped” World

The first intellectual to give a coherent and in-depth non-neoclassical theoretical explanation of spatial disparities was the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal. In his much-cited (1957) book,¹⁷ Myrdal’s starting point was that “the facts of international economic inequalities in the present world . . . fall into a definite and simple pattern” (p. 3). This pattern, which he revealed on the basis of then up-to-date publications of the United Nations (*ibid.*), and, presumably, on the experience he gained as the inaugural head of the UN Economic Commission in Europe between 1947 and 1957 (Barber 2008), was a remarkable increase in spatial disparities between countries of the world. In Myrdal’s view, this tendency was basically an

¹⁶ The selection is based on major textbooks in economic geography and spatial disparity research (Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Keeble 1967; Knox et al. 2003; Schätzl 2003), which tentatively present these four concepts or at least three of them as the theories with fundamental importance during the 1950s and 1960s. In line with the selection method in these textbooks, we refer to major concepts about economic growth or “development” only briefly, while focusing on works that *directly* concentrate on spatial inequalities.

¹⁷ In the same year, Myrdal’s book was published in the United Kingdom and in the United States under different titles. (The UK edition was entitled *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*, while the US edition was released as *Rich Lands and Poor*.) For the text written by Myrdal, the two editions are identical. Yet, the US edition was published in the multidisciplinary scientific book series *World Perspectives*, and an explanation of the initiative by series editor Ruth Anshen was added to it (Anshen 1957). In our work, page numbers for quotations refer to the US edition.

outcome of a remarkable dichotomy. On the one hand, he identified “a few countries” that “are highly developed economically and have very high levels of average real income per head” (Myrdal 1957, p. 3), and where “all indices point steadily upward” (p. 4). On the other hand, he argued that “in the underdeveloped countries . . . where incomes are so very much lower . . . economic development usually proceeds more slowly” (pp. 4–5), moreover, “many of these countries have during recent decades even moved backward in average income” (p. 5). Thus, in consequence, “in recent decades the economic inequalities between developed and underdeveloped countries have been increasing” (p. 6).

As the main reason for this tendency Myrdal pointed out that market processes are, in contrast to neoclassical expectations, not always moving towards stable equilibrium, which he simply called an “unrealistic assumption” (p. 9), a “false analogy” (p. 13). For him, this was since efficient self-controlling mechanisms in economy are lacking. Thus, he denied the neoclassical point that “a change will regularly call forth a reaction in the system in the form of changes which on the whole go in the contrary direction to the first change” (ibid.). Rather he argued for what he called “circular causation”. This means that “a change . . . call[s] forth . . . supporting changes, which move the system in the same direction as the first change but much further”, thus, “a social process tends . . . to gather speed at an accelerating rate” (ibid.). In consequence, already existing spatial disparities increase further, in form of a “vicious circle” (p. 11), shifting high-income countries to even higher levels of prosperity, while driving already poor countries even deeper into the trench of poverty. In other words, Myrdal drew a rather pessimistic picture concerning spatial disparities, where, just as it can be read in the Gospel of Matthew, “For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath” (quoted in p. 12). This reasoning predicted intensifying troubles in “underdeveloped” countries since the reasons for their “poorness” were considered as self-accelerating. It seemed likely that the words of Nurkse (1953, p. 4) might prove true: “a country is poor because it is poor”, which might also suggest that a country will be poor in the future because it is poor now.

It is important to stress at this point that Myrdal’s theory did not draw a world where everything pointed towards cumulative causation and, thus, towards spatial polarization. He actually argued for the mutual existence of polarizing or “backwash”, and equalizing or “spread” effects. Interestingly, Myrdal referred to as “backwash” effects foremost to the factors that were considered in the neoclassical approach as engines of spatial convergence. This striking difference was due to Myrdal’s firm conviction that the spatial migration of factors of production does not decrease, but rather increases polarization. In his eyes, the free migration of labor was always selective and attracted foremost a young and well-educated workforce, which led to aging and to the overweight of low-skilled labor force in the sending regions. For the free migration of capital, this ended up in Myrdal’s eyes in “siphoning off the savings from the poorer regions to the richer” (p. 28) due to higher returns of capital in economic centers. And, he expected the free flow of goods and services (thus, free trade) to “confer . . . competitive advantages on the

industries . . . in the already established centers of expansion” so that “even the handicrafts and industries existing earlier in other regions are thwarted” (*ibid.*).

Contrasted to these “backwash” effects, Myrdal admitted that “spread” effects likewise exist. For example, he pointed out that the growth in economic centers can stimulate similar processes in peripheral regions that produce raw materials for the centers. Furthermore, he emphasized that both growth in rich regions and the relative decline in poor regions have their limits, which also hinders polarization after a certain point. In economic centers, production and population might become “too concentrated” (p. 35), so public expenditures and private costs of production and living might radically increase. Due to the long lasting economic boom, wages and the costs of factors of production might reach such a high level that the region loses its competitiveness. And, “a country which . . . has for some time enjoyed a quasi-monopolistic position may find that the spirit of enterprise and risk-taking has been damaged” (p. 36). Meanwhile, in “underdeveloped” regions a radical economic decline and the thus intensifying poverty might lead to increasing mortality rates, which also constitute an obstacle for “everlasting” recession. Yet, Myrdal’s general point of view was that “in no circumstances . . . do the spread effects establish the assumptions for an equilibrium analysis”, so that “spread” effects are too weak to counterbalance “backwash” effects. Thus, even if “the two kinds of effects will balance each other” temporarily, “this balance is not a stable equilibrium, for any change in the forces will start a cumulative movement upward or downward” (p. 32).

Myrdal considered these tendencies as not only valid at an international level, but also for regional processes within countries. In his words: “The international inequalities are, of course, not dissimilar from the regional inequalities within a country.” (p. 10). For this reason, he found spatial polarization necessary to take place among regions within a country as well, just as they occur between countries. And such a divergence of the regions was not only a problem in poor countries; as Myrdal put it: “even in a rapidly developing country, many regions will be lagging behind, stagnating or even becoming poorer” (p. 32). No wonder, that even in the United States or Sweden “a closer view reveals great disparities” (*ibid.*).

Still, Myrdal drew attention to an important difference between “rich” and “poor” countries respective to their inner spatial disparities. Based on data from the United Nations (1955) for Western Europe, he emphasized that “disparities of income between one region and another are much wider in the poorer countries than in the richer ones” (p. 33). Moreover, not only the level of regional disparities seemed different in various groups of countries, but even their temporal changes: “while the regional inequalities have been diminishing in the richer countries of Western Europe, the tendency has been the opposite in the poorer ones” (pp. 33–34). The phenomenon was interpreted from the viewpoint of “backwash” and “spread” effects as “backwash” effects are especially strong in “underdeveloped” countries, while “the higher the level of economic development that a country has already attained the stronger spread effects will usually be” (p. 34).

Myrdal traced back this dichotomy to the different roles played by the state in rich and poor countries. For him, “backwash” and “spread” effects brought into being by spontaneous economic processes were similarly strong in each country. In his eyes,

it was state policy making the difference. In Myrdal's view, "in many of the poorer countries the natural drift toward inequalities has been supported and magnified by built-in feudal and other inegalitarian institutions and power structures which aid the rich in exploiting the poor" (p. 40). Meanwhile, in "welfare states" in richer countries of Western Europe, the aims of state regional policy are thoroughly different: they are "directed toward greater regional equality" (pp. 39–40).¹⁸ This was for Myrdal an outcome of political and psychological factors. For the political factor, Myrdal stressed that the most "developed" countries have democratic systems with national parliaments. In his views, under such circumstances "the poor are the many and even the relatively poor the great majority", so "in order to gain power political parties had to sponsor reforms in the interest of greater regional equality" (p. 45). Besides this political need for spatial equalization, Myrdal emphasized the psychological attitude of people towards (spatial) disparities and their reduction: "When people are better off and have greater security they feel freer to give up privileges and let down barriers which keep others out and are more prepared to carry the costs of common burdens." (p. 40).

To sum it up, Myrdal firmly denied the neoclassical concept about automatically diminishing spatial disparities, and developed a remarkably different theory based on the idea of circular causation. For him, economic processes at the international as well as regional level were shaped by parallel "backwash" and "spread" effects, from which "backwash" effects were usually much more powerful. Consequently, a "natural" tendency among countries as well as between regions within a country was polarization. In Myrdal's view, this inherent tendency could only be balanced by state policy, which in his opinion was pro-egalitarian in rich and rather anti-egalitarian in poor countries. Due to this, the level of regional disparities was significantly lower and decreasing in rich countries, as opposed to poor countries, where high regional disparities and divergence were typical.¹⁹

¹⁸ In fact, it is logically problematic to speak about "greater equality" since equality refers in the mathematical sense to the specific condition when two values are absolutely equal. Thus, it might be better in comparative analyses to refer to inequality, which can indeed be "smaller" or "greater" (cf. Goldthorpe 2010).

¹⁹ The role of the state as an actor to control spatial disparities is an important, yet frequently overlooked or misinterpreted point in Myrdal's concept. In secondary literature a typical criticism is that, supposing circular causation, spatial polarization should end up after a while in the extreme disintegration and collapse of both economy and society. Still, this has not happened yet, which is considered to contradict Myrdal's approach and to reveal its serious weaknesses (cf. Maier et al. 2006). This criticism overlooks, however, that Myrdal's claim about "backwash" effects to be tendentially stronger than "spread" effects only referred to conditions where the agency of state was poor or lacked. For him, that "backwash" effects generally overpower "spread" effects was only true for inherent processes of economy. But state measures were expected to follow another scheme. They were believed to strengthen "backwash" effects and increase spatial disparities only in "underdeveloped" economies, but to improve "spread" effects and reduce inequalities as soon as an economy became "developed". Hence, Myrdal's concept barely hypothesized a radical disintegration of economy in the long run but rather the emergence of a national equalizing policy as soon as polarizing tendencies became dangerously strong. Given this, the argument that no economies have polarized themselves in doom until now does not prove the claimed weakness of Myrdal's idea.

Furthermore, Myrdal's argumentation was not only new in breaking with the neoclassical interpretation of spatial disparities. Another remarkable innovation was that he gave an epistemological explanation for the emergence of shortcomings in the neoclassic approach. Here he referred to two aspects, both being well ahead of their time: these were in today's words the geographical situatedness of knowledge production and the implicit political notion of scientific concepts. First, Myrdal emphasized that

"all our economic speculation was for a long time almost exclusively cultivated in the social setting of the then most prosperous country, Great Britain. Thereafter, and until very recently, it was developed further by theorists who, almost without exception, were the nationals of those few countries which were rapidly progressing economically under conditions of expanding mutual trade and large movements of capital and labor. And in these countries all higher culture, including the rise of economic science, was concentrated at the centers of economic expansion. These facts have clearly been of importance in the selection of viewpoints and thereby also in setting the approaches for economic theory." (Myrdal 1957, p. 135)

This had decisive implications for the development of economic thought in general, and of concepts concerning spatial inequalities in particular. As can be seen, conditions under which the genesis of modern economic thought took place have created a remarkable, yet merely implicit, path-dependence. As Myrdal put it:

"Even when we are not aware of our bondage we are all more or less under the influence of certain very general ideas or patterns of thought which we have inherited from long ago. At one time or another they were all solidified into definite doctrines. . . . Our tools of analysis have been molded within the tradition of these doctrines and predilections. We have had them pressed upon our work in the form of a certain approach to problems, a particular manner of looking at things. This determined broadly what questions we ask and how we ask them. It therefore inhibits our imagination and . . . this frustration of originality in turn affects our fact-finding research." (Myrdal 1957, pp. 132–133)²⁰

For Myrdal, the spatial embeddedness of early ideas in modern economic thinking, and the path-dependence necessarily manifest in research practice, together led to an exclusive focus on issues that were relevant at the place where this tradition emerged. Meanwhile, economically important problems of other areas were neglected both in theoretical and in empirical work. Thus, "the problems peculiar to underdeveloped countries tended to fade out in a pale distant haze – until in recent years they were forcefully pressed upon the world by the political and spiritual revolt of the peoples living there" (p. 135).

Myrdal, however, not only argued that the negligence of challenges "underdeveloped" countries faced was the outcome of a sort of (to some extent natural) egoism in Western economic thought. In his view, the fact that the *laissez-faire*

²⁰ This idea can to a great extent be traced back to the much quoted words of Keynes, for whom "practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist" (Keynes 1936, p. 383). In fact, what Myrdal made in these sentences was the extension of the Keynesian remark from "practical men" to theoreticians in economics.

approach, the free trade doctrine, and the equilibrium concept overlooked problems of the “underdeveloped” world also served direct political goals of the “developed” countries. For Myrdal, the political content of these concepts was initially independent of the “underdeveloped” world, and rather mirrored a political struggle between various actors of economic and political life in Britain. In his words, “the laissez-faire bias was programmatic: to them the explanation why the ‘natural order’ of the harmony of individual interests did not materialize in full perfection was mainly the ‘interferences’ of the state and other collective bodies” (p. 141). In other words, the laissez-faire concept, which became virtually inseparably intertwined with the free trade doctrine, had been from the beginning a mind-set with definite political aims. Initially it was to justify the interests of capitalist producers and merchants against an “oppressor state” (p. 141) and its endeavors to control all spheres of life. Thus, the laissez-faire concept had carried “an inextricable antistate and antiorganization bias” (ibid.).

These economic concepts gained relevance for the relation between “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries only somewhat later, through universalistic assumptions of the Enlightenment. The idea that one can think about human beings “in general”, as a homogenous mass having the same interests at a basic level, opened the way for a reasoning that “the concern of economic theory must be the interests . . . of human beings in general all over the globe” (p. 147). As Myrdal put it, the truth of such an approach is “in principle . . . evident and was seen to be evident” (ibid.). This emancipatory universalistic notion, however, had a specific political meaning as well. Hence, the assumption that “free trade would also be in the interest of all other countries as well as of Britain” could easily become “a general proposition” (p. 148). Consequently, the free trade doctrine, for instance, just as the laissez-faire concept and the equilibrium approach, could function “as a means of psychological rationalization” (p. 148) for interests of the British Empire. And there were in Britain many to utilize the remarkable force of this political means. For Myrdal, “when . . . they recommended free trade as a general policy, it was not on the ground that free trade would be for the good of the world but because it would be in the interest of their own country” (ibid.). Following this argumentation, the neoclassical concept of automatic (spatial) equalization in the long run could likewise be interpreted as an attempt to justify the laissez-faire economic policy of the “developed” countries and their notion to impose the same philosophy on the “underdeveloped” world.

In general, Myrdal contributed to the spatial disparity discourse at two major points. First, he rejected the neoclassical concept of automatic spatial equalization, which before had dominated non-Marxist approaches. Instead, he argued that market forces perpetually increased spatial disparities, due to which the intervention of the state would become unavoidable at a certain point to slow down ongoing geographical polarization and to make it controllable. Actually, to refute that equilibrium would be a natural state of the economy towards which spontaneous market processes drive the system was not a profoundly new idea in economics. Joseph Schumpeter (1911), although without a specific focus on spatial issues, had already interpreted economic growth as an unbalanced process, which gained

impetus again and again through the mass emergence of innovative entrepreneurs in a given branch. Several decades later, a somewhat similar concept was developed by François Perroux (1955), who hypothesized that the economy was always mobilized by the boom of given branches, which he called motor units (*unités motrices*).^{21, 22} Still, the concept of necessarily polarized growth had not found a way into the spatial disparity discourse before Myrdal's work. The Swedish economist's other great invention was that he put mainstream theoretical concepts of the day in economics in their epistemological and political contexts. With this, he could not only present the weaknesses the neoclassical concept of spatial equilibrium had, but also explained for which reasons, being political in nature to a large extent, such an unrealistic theory had existed and had been maintained for such a long time.

Myrdal's book, however, also had certain weaknesses and raised far-reaching questions. One disputable point was the empirical substantiation of the work. Since it was published for the first time, Myrdal's concept has become regarded as an important milestone along the road of understanding spatial disparities. With regard to this, it is often stressed that the concepts of polarization theory in general and Myrdal's claims in particular were based on inductive findings. Thus, they are often presented as "the outcomes of detailed empirical analyses, case studies or the researcher's appropriate experience", which "thus, to a certain extent, mirror real circumstances, among which they were obtained" (Maier et al. 2006, p. 78; also cf. Schätzl 2003). Without any doubt, such an interpretation might well suggest the higher validity and, thus, a sort of superiority of Myrdal's concept relative to the very abstract and deductive neoclassical theories about spatial inequalities. A similar but even much stronger *scientific* quality was claimed for the book by Anshen's introductory notes to *World Perspectives*, the series in which the US edition of Myrdal's volume was published. For her, "the purpose of *World Perspectives* is to help quicken 'the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth'"

²¹ There is no sign in Myrdal's book that he would have been familiar with Perroux's concept, but he definitely was with the works of Schumpeter, whom he even referred to (p. 82).

²² Myrdal also added that the concept of disequilibrium and self-accelerating polarization might only be new for neoclassical theoretical economists, not for "the practical men". In his words, "laymen, of course, never believed" in the law of stable equilibrium (p. 22) and "every successful businessman has the principle of the cumulative process as a built-in theory in his approach to practical problems; otherwise he would not be successful" (p. 21). In fact, these statements seem strong exaggerations through which Myrdal tried to underpin his views about the unrealistic nature of neoclassical concepts. In his latter endeavor, however, he also got involved in one-sided formulations. While writing about polarizing and balanced phases of economic growth, he tendentially presented the first as dominant and the second as temporary and only occurring in specific cases. Through this, he emphasized the superiority of polarizing processes over balancing ones in countries without an "intervening state", which might seem similarly one-sided an approach as the neoclassical concept favoring equilibrium as the "natural state of economy" over polarization. In general, both approaches are questionable since both hypothesize that phases of equilibrium and disequilibrium similarly take place in economic growth, while none of them can give exact empirical substantiation for prioritizing either of these tendencies as dominant or "natural".

(original emphasis; Anshen 1957, p. xvi), and the series was an important step to strengthen “the authority of truth and human totality” (p. xiii).

These high words, infiltrated by a firm belief in the existence of universal truth and objective science, well indicate the scientific quality postulated for Myrdal’s work from the date of its publication until recently. It remains tendentiously unconsidered, however, that the concept remarkably vivid in its philosophical argumentation contained very little information derived from empirical findings. For verifying data on strong polarization, which the author constituted as the main scheme of spatial tendencies, he simply named as reference “the latest publications of the United Nations and the Secretariats of the three regional Economic Commissions” (Myrdal 1957, p. 3.), specifying only one of them (United Nations 1955). Hence, it remains unclear which data were exactly used by Myrdal, for it is hardly possible to check his claim that “the facts of international economic inequalities in the present world . . . fall into a definite and simple pattern” (Myrdal 1957, p. 3).²³

The problem of lacking empirical falsifiability emerged at other points as well. Especially the author’s point that the general processes identified in his work were universally valid seemed rather a matter of belief than of empirical evidence. For instance, Myrdal himself also stressed that: “The special characteristics and circumstances of every country, every region and . . . every acting individual . . . will result in elaborate variations on the theme” (pp. 41–42). Still he firmly claimed that “they can, however, all be fitted into this general view of circular causation in a cumulative sequence” (p. 42). Yet, for this, he gave no comprehensive empirical substantiation. The same problem occurred again some pages later: “There would be many individual differences as between the several countries . . . but *I believe* that the main conclusion would nevertheless be that the broad patterns of historical sequence were fundamentally similar as well as the circular causal mechanisms of social, economic and political factors making the process cumulative.” (our emphasis; p. 46). Since the book provided no “tangible” evidence for these statements, their empirical substantiation remained rather doubtful.

The only point in Myrdal’s work to be based unquestionably on empirical data was his argumentation about larger and increasing spatial disparities in poorer and more moderate and rather decreasing disparities in richer countries in Western Europe. Here the resource he used is easy to identify and check (United Nations 1955). Yet, the ambiguities are still challenging. Without any doubt, the cited publication explicitly formulated that “regional income disparities are much wider in the poor countries of Europe than in the richer ones” (p. 138). Furthermore, a paragraph title clearly stressed what had become another main finding of Myrdal: “Growing Regional Disparities in the Poorest Countries of Europe” (p. 139).

²³ It is not impossible, of course, that as director of the UN Economic Commission in Europe Myrdal was aware of certain data that remained unpublished but seemed to substantiate his concept. But even if it were the case, which we actually do not know, Myrdal did not refer this, so thus most of his exact sources remain unidentifiable.

Similarly, Myrdal's claim of a convergent trend among regions in rich countries was also formulated in the same 1955 source—yet, not as evidence but rather as a suggestion: “It *would be tempting to argue* therefore that regional disparities are only a temporary phenomenon in the process of industrialization and *can be expected* to disappear with rising economic levels” (our emphases; p. 144). This hypothesis, however, was converted into a “fact” in Myrdal's essay without providing additional empirical information to underpin its validity.

Still, many challenges remained without reassuring solution. First, it is difficult to estimate to what extent this UN analysis of only 18 countries can be extrapolated in order to make statements with universal claims, just as Myrdal did. Second, it is remarkable that he overlooked an important suggestion of the UN publication, namely that “regional disparities . . . can be expected to disappear with rising economic levels *even in the absence of particular regional policies*” (our emphasis; *ibid.*). This idea of automatic equalization certainly seems less compatible with Myrdal's concept since the latter hypothesized that market forces permanently fuelled spatial polarization, so thus the intervention of the state became necessary after a certain point. In fact, the sentence in the UN publication that Myrdal did not take into consideration was not firm evidence, but an expectation. Yet, much of what he used from the same UN publication to substantiate his concept was also nothing but expectation “tempting to argue”. In other words, Myrdal adopted as “facts” a great deal of UN hypotheses seemingly substantiating his concept, while totally ignoring other suggestions not in accordance with his theory.

Besides the problem of lacking empirical substantiation and the arguable nature of daring extrapolations, Myrdal's reasoning raises an important theoretical question with strong political relevance. This is the dual categorization of countries and regions with “developed” or “rich” areas on the one side and “underdeveloped” or “poor” on the other side. The distinction of these “two classes of nations” (p. 72) suggests decisive dissimilarities in the path of economic growth and polarization they follow, while it similarly makes differences within these groups absolutely blurred. Such a dualistic approach, of course, might be useful since it *a priori* suggests a faster and even accelerating growth of the “rich” and a great and intensifying handicap of the “poor”, which is in accordance with the concept of circular causation and self-accelerating processes. But this interpretation ignores that the countries of the world as well as the regions in most countries do not form two clearly separable groups, not even in terms of per capita production or income. Instead, countries and regions are spread over a broad spectrum with regard to the value of these indicators, and there is no remarkable gap separating two large groups from each other.

Although a strictly dualistic view is a remarkable oversimplification of reality in an analytical sense and a potential reason for misleading interpretations, it well reveals the strong political notions of Myrdal's work. To understand this, the concept should be put in its geopolitical context: a world in which superpowers struggled to make allies among newly established, post-colonial countries, which meanwhile were quite common in their negative attitude towards their former colonizers. In this perspective, the volume is a precisely thought-through work,

despite its theoretical and empirical challenges. The dualistic structure well represents a world where basically two types of countries can be found. The one type is constituted by countries newly becoming independent and looking for supporters (the “underdeveloped” world), while the second group is formed by those powers competing with each other in the Cold War, looking for potential allies and trying to stop the geopolitical expansion of the rival bloc (the “developed” world).²⁴ And Myrdal also stressed that this dual model should be taken very seriously since the difference between the two categories might possibly become a major source of international tensions: “The peoples in the underdeveloped countries are becoming increasingly aware of these huge international inequalities and the danger that they will continue to grow; and these peoples and their spokesmen show an inclination to put part of the blame for their poverty on . . . the countries which are better off” (p. 7).

For the pieces on this “Grand Chessboard” (Brzezinski 1998), Myrdal’s words were most sympathetic towards the “underdeveloped” or “poor” countries, which in his book mostly meant former colonies. For instance, he clearly presented the negative consequences of asymmetrical power relations between colonizers and those colonized. He called this “enforced bilateralism”, which was “often idealized as ‘close cultural and economic ties’ to a mother country”, but which “at the end . . . normally mean a considerable economic disadvantage to the dependent country” (Myrdal 1957, p. 58). As he put it, colonizing powers were interested in “monopolizing so far as possible the dependent country for [their] own business interests” (ibid.), due to which production in the colonies was subordinated to the needs of the imperial center and they were “deprived of effective nationhood” (p. 59). Consequences for spatial disparities were also far-reaching. Since colonies “had no government of [their] own which could feel an urge to take constructive measures to promote the balanced growth of a national economy” (ibid.), they were “laid bare and defenseless to the play of market forces as redirected only by the interests of the foreign metropolitan power” (p. 60). Thus, colonialism resulted in “a strengthening of all the forces in the markets which anyhow were working toward internal and international inequalities” (ibid.). With these words, Myrdal clearly took sides in the debate over colonial heritage, namely in favor of the former colonies, otherwise in accordance with the brief manifesto he formulated in the Preface: “The value premises which determine my viewpoint are the desirability of political democracy and of equality of opportunity.” (p. xix).

²⁴ The sharp distinction of “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries is especially interesting in light of the fact that Myrdal stressed in his work at many points how the contrast of believers and pagans, and later the concept of races as “theological justifications” (p. 115) were used historically to differentiate people and justify the subordination of one group to another (e.g. pp. 115–116). Actually, the latter idea was groundbreaking and invoked questions (such as the social construction of the “Other”) becoming popular in mainstream social science only after Said’s (1978) *Orientalism*. But while drawing attention to these issues, Myrdal virtually overlooked that his own rigid dualistic categorization could also serve a similar notion, namely the struggle of “developed” countries to entice the “underdeveloped” to themselves.

This firm refutation of colonialism, however, did not mean for Myrdal that former colonies should break all their ties with the whole of the “developed” world. First, he pointed out that colonial powers themselves, together with all serious problems and injustice inherent in their policy, also had positive contributions to the life of colonial peoples. Actually, “the colonial governments built roads, ports, railways, etc.” (p. 56), they “established law and order” (ibid.), “conferred also higher education and training for administrative and professional responsibility on some” (p. 57), and colonialism in general “implied contacts with the ideas and ideals of the world and of the advanced countries” (ibid.). These achievements, “even when . . . these enterprises were motivated primarily by the colonial governments’ own interests and those of their settlers and business groups, they represented important advances toward creating the conditions for general economic development” (p. 56). Moreover, in Myrdal’s view “these generally beneficial activities of colonial governments and their business people took on a larger scope in the cases where the political domination was a more complete institutional arrangement and endured for a considerable time” (p. 57), and “the colonies probably had more development than if they had been left to themselves” (ibid.). Yet, these positive words did not justify colonial rule for Myrdal, and not only for moral reasons. He also saw colonial powers failing in stimulating stable economic improvement in their colonies: “during the time of dependence . . . positive accomplishments showed a persistent tendency not to result in much economic development” (ibid.), foremost because of the lack of independent local governments, which would have been interested in stronger and more balanced economic growth.

Thus, what Myrdal actually did here was firmly deny the colonial model, but also emphasized that the one-sided self-isolation of “underdeveloped” countries from the “developed” world could also have negative implications for the former group. In Myrdal’s words, although new, independent governments got a “great asset” through their independence, “this new asset . . . will not be remunerative unless put to use in an intelligent and firm manner” (p. 62). And, since newly independent countries “have not inherited the traditions of rationality and the rule of law which were so important in the earlier history of the now-developed countries” (p. 100), the only advantage “they have is our [the developed countries’] accumulated scientific and technical knowledge” (ibid.). For this reason, Myrdal considered them to have “reasons for learning from all the world” (p. 68). Implicit geopolitical consequences were logical: former colonies had the right to freedom, and they could take advantage of it, but only if they utilized from the knowledge accessible in “developed” countries as much as they reasonably could. This suggested an international framework in which there was no place left for colonial empires, but where new links between “developed” and newly independent “underdeveloped” countries were important to be created.

Myrdal, however, understood “learning from all the world” quite selectively. He was no advocate of copying everything that “poor” countries saw in the “developed” world, because some ideas might be incompatible with “underdeveloped” contexts: “Neither our techniques of politics, administration and social reforms nor

our techniques in production and distribution can with advantage be simply taken over. These techniques have been developed to suit the very different conditions of the advanced countries and are inappropriate to the needs of the underdeveloped countries.” (pp. 100–101). For this reason, “the underdeveloped countries . . . should not accept this theory uncritically but remold it to fit their problems and their interests” (p. 101). Furthermore, Myrdal took an important step at this point. While arguing that the “poor” countries should decide *themselves* what they adapted and utilized from the pile of ideologies in the “developed” world, he still gave quite direct suggestions. And with this, he definitely entered the domain of political propaganda.

Myrdal had already made rather explicit that “underdeveloped” countries should develop new international ties. Now he also named ideologies the former colonies should reject:

“I would wish [the former colonies] to have the courage to throw away large structures of meaningless, irrelevant and sometimes blatantly inadequate doctrines and theoretical approaches and to start their thinking afresh from a study of their own needs and problems. This would then make them far beyond the realm of both outmoded Western liberal economics and Marxism.” (Myrdal 1957, p. 104).

For liberal economics, rejection was an outcome of Myrdal’s highly critical attitude towards neoclassical concepts, which he considered as unrealistic and serving partial political interests (this argumentation was already presented in this section of our essay). Marxism likewise did not fit the bill for Myrdal because it only criticized classical economics without saying what to do instead. In Myrdal’s words, “Marx never worked out a system of organized economic policies to be carried out after the revolution: the notion of ‘economic planning’, now recognized as the true shibboleth of socialism, did not play any important role in his thinking” (p. 142).

Of course, Marxism itself is not to be equaled to the Soviet-type political and economic system. This was also recognized by Myrdal, who stressed at another place that “underdeveloped” countries should not only avoid Marxism, but the Soviet model as well. He used here the argument that the Soviet way of “development” did not principally differ from the capitalist road in an economic sense, but did not provide the (democratic) political conditions necessary for the balanced emergence of “poor” countries. As he put it:

“The underdeveloped country might . . . recall that the one-century delayed industrial revolution which has been taking place in the Soviet Union under very different political and institutional conditions closely followed, in this one respect, the pattern of earlier capitalist development, in that the levels of real income and consumption of the working masses were kept exceedingly low to allow for sustained rapid capital formation. *There is no other road to economic development* than a forceful rise in the share of the national income which is withheld from consumption and devoted to investment.” (our emphasis; Myrdal 1957, p. 84)

This reasoning was actually the Western counterpart of what Stalin had written about the same issue in the early 1950s (see Sect. 5.4). For Stalin, both robust economic growth and spatially balanced “development” (thus, the reduction of

spatial inequalities) were only possible in a communist economic system. His main point was that the Soviet-type economic model could offer solutions to complex problems in capitalism, which the latter could not cure but perpetually reproduced. Myrdal's argumentation, instead, aimed to demystify the Soviet alternative and to show that it was also not free from the challenges occurring in capitalist economies. Furthermore, since the dictatorship in the USSR disabled political negotiations between interest groups, which were common in Western democratic countries, Myrdal argued that communism was predestined to fail in sustaining long-term growth parallel to spatial convergence.

In other words, in the Myrdalian view, "underdeveloped" countries could benefit much from learning from the "developed" world, both in terms of economic growth and spatial equalization. However, former colonial powers of Western Europe with their doctrines of classical economics as well as the Soviet Union with its communist ideology were exiled by Myrdal from the domain of feasible ideals to follow. Hence, only one geopolitical option remained, which the author made explicit in two very propagandistic paragraphs:

"For many reasons anticolonialism and a sympathy for the poorer nations are very much stronger in the United States of America than anywhere else in richer countries, either in Western Europe or in the "white" British dominions. In Europe and still more in the underdeveloped parts of the world I have observed that ordinary people and also politicians have no real appreciation of how important this trait in American culture is and, more particularly, how severely in practice it limits the ability of the United States government to support the old colonial powers in Western Europe who are its political allies.

The average American citizen is apt to suspect the motives of those powers in their dealings with political dependencies or former dependencies. Were it not for all the complicated tactical interests involved in carrying on a cold war by means of a great number of very diverse and often fragile alliances, the United States would even more often, and more bluntly, come out on the side of the poorer countries. In particular it would back the liberation movements in the countries which are still political dependencies." (Myrdal 1957, p. 78)

This rather idealized picture grasped the main geopolitical notion of the book. For "underdeveloped" countries, Myrdal presented the "developed" world as including many countries and various systems which did not, could not, and actually would not solve the problems of "poor" countries. The only remarkable exception was the United States and its people, who appeared in the volume as an unquestionable friend of the former colonies, who was able to help, and who did not do that in its own hidden interest but due to its sober appreciation for those newly liberated peoples. By this, Myrdal drew up in his book a geopolitical map profoundly similar to that which was adopted and presented to the world in Truman's 1949 inaugural address and in US Cold War strategies.

Furthermore, Myrdal did this without providing direct empirical information on the US and USSR systems. For Soviet reality, he was aware that it was a basically different context due to central state planning, the public ownership of the means of production, and state monopoly of international economic relations (p. xix). For this reason, Myrdal already made clear in the preface that he "restrict[ed] [his] range of vision to the non-Soviet world" (p. xx). But in fact, he gave up this restriction as

soon as the aim was to give geopolitical orientation to the “underdeveloped” countries, where it was necessary not to remain silent on the Soviet issue. The outcome was a hybrid argumentation, sometimes excluding the USSR from the focus due to a lack of empirical data, but sometimes still including it despite limited information in order to depict it on the geopolitical world map as an alternative to reject. This mixture of lacking empirical information and theoretical beliefs with political overtones is exemplified by Myrdal’s argumentation: “I *believe* that the principle of circular and cumulative causation would have its application in the Soviet world, too, in explaining development trends as well as in determining policy. And I *would personally be greatly interested* in pursuing my study into the realm of Soviet economy.” (our emphases; p. xix). Another typical example for political statements without empirical substantiation was Myrdal’s already quoted words “there is no other road to economic development”, which is actually impossible either to confirm or to deny, but it was an obvious plea for the US-type capitalist system. And a further example to such “wishful thinking” was Myrdal’s underlying hypothesis for “poor” countries, namely that all of them “crave economic development as well as national independence” (p. 7). Here empirical evidence would have been required to prove that the “underdeveloped” world really “craved” economic development, so that this claim in concert with the economy-oriented geopolitical thinking both in the United States and in the Soviet Union was not simply imposed on the “poor” countries.

Similarly, the highly-worded paragraphs about the United States did not reveal those “many reasons” for which American people and politicians were claimed to be extremely receptive to problems of the “underdeveloped” world. Without any doubt, Myrdal named two reasons, yet not “many”. The first was “anticolonial feelings, and more generally, feelings of sympathy for the underdog”, which were in his view “strongly based in the inherited ethos of Western civilization” (p. 77). The second reason was that the United States, unlike most European countries, had to fight for its freedom, for which it highly appreciated the freedom of other peoples. These aspects, however, do not seem as convincing as Myrdal suggested. The “sympathy for the underdog”, if indeed a part of “the inherited ethos of Western civilization”, had to be as strong in Europe as in the USA.²⁵ The appreciation of freedom and the fight for it was also not absolutely unique to the United States. To fight against foreign occupation or for the unification of a country that foreign interests hindered was a strong and vivid experience in many European countries as well, from Belgium and the Netherlands through Germany and Italy to Greece, even if Myrdal did not devote a single word to these cases.

To sum it up, Myrdal’s concept was a highly innovative theoretical contribution to the spatial disparity discourse. The firm rejection of the doctrine of stable

²⁵ Of course it is itself questionable what “Western civilization” exactly refers to, and even if such a category can be defined, whether it is substantiated to implicitly suggest the “sympathy for the underdog” to be a characteristic feature of “Western civilization”, thus, more explicit there than in “other civilizations”. This issue, however, does not belong to the main focus of our essay.

equilibrium, the introduction of the concept of circular causation and of the parallel existence of “backwash” and “spread” effects brought fresh ideas into the analysis of spatial disparities. Furthermore, putting the neoclassical economic approach in its epistemological and political context was a groundbreaking act by which Myrdal was far ahead of his time, even if these points of his book gained virtually no attention from his successors. But in the meantime the ability of Myrdal’s highly vivid ideas to bring researchers to an empirically more substantiated understanding of spatial disparities is questionable. This is because of the lack of empirical evidence, and some doubtful theoretical and methodological oversimplifications (such as the global extrapolation of Western European statistics and the strictly dualistic interpretation of the world along the axes of “developed” and “underdeveloped”). Yet, Myrdal provided a strong geopolitical guide for the intellectuals in “poor” countries, which gave them clear suggestions whom to deny and whom to ally. With this, the book undoubtedly became a crucial work in the eyes of those shaping global politics, and one providing considerable scientific ammunition for US decision-makers. Thus, Myrdal’s volume began a long scientific career, where the serious gaps in its empirical substantiation and falsifiability were tendentially overlooked, while nobody pointed at the strongly propagandistic nature of its argument. In other words, Myrdal’s work is a remarkable example how Cold War politics influenced the spatial disparity discourse, which actively contributed to the justification of geopolitical struggles, while it paid much less attention to empirical and theoretical issues without which an “unbiased” understanding of social processes is hardly possible.

6.7.2 Hirschman’s Technocratic Polarization Model with Political Overtones

Without any doubt, Myrdal’s 1957 book with its rejection of the stable equilibrium concept and its idea that geographical inequalities are permanently being shaped by contrary forces opened a new phase in spatial disparity research. He was, however, not the only theoretician to move this direction. In the same years, the German-born American economist Hirschman (1966[1958]) published a theory having much in common with that of Myrdal.²⁶ In fact, the circumstances under which Hirschman wrote his book were also somewhat similar. Just as Myrdal worked for many years as an economic analyst for the UN Economic Commission in Europe, Hirschman also spent 4 years in Colombia as an official economic advisor and private consultant (Hirschman 1966[1958], p. vi). During these years he realized two important phenomena, which Myrdal also faced before writing his book. First, Hirschman

²⁶ Although Hirschman’s much-referred-to book was published in 1958, his main ideas concerning the controversial forces that shape spatial disparities had already been released a year before (Hirschman 1957), the same year as Myrdal’s volume was released.

observed that “in the geographical sense, growth is necessarily unbalanced” (p. 184) since “economic progress does not appear everywhere at the same time and . . . once it has appeared powerful forces make for a spatial concentration of economic growth around the initial starting point” (p. 183). Second, he found these tendencies profoundly incompatible with the then dominant neoclassical theories, which he found useless in explaining tendencies in the real world. As he put it, “existing theories had seemed to me to be particularly unhelpful to the decision-maker in underdeveloped countries” (p. v).

Due to these observations, Hirschman, “heartily disagree[ing] with the ‘balanced growth’ doctrine” (p. 50), began working on an alternative theoretical explanation, which, as already mentioned, showed remarkable similarities to that of Myrdal at many points. Just as Myrdal, Hirschman also claimed the existence of two basic sets of economic effects, which were contrary to each other, and shaped spatial disparities dynamically. Hirschman named these “polarization” effects and “trickling-down” effects. Actually, these categories “correspond[ed] exactly” (Hirschman’s own words; p. 187) to Myrdal’s “backwash” and “spread” effects. Similarly to Myrdal, Hirschman also underscored that a possible outcome of free trade was that “growing areas” induced strong competition due to which in “backward areas” even existing production went bankrupt.²⁷ Moreover, he claimed free migration to have similar “unfavorable” outcomes under certain circumstances, since “instead of absorbing the disguised unemployed, Northern progress may denude the South of its key technicians and managers as well as of the more enterprising young men” (p. 188). And, if the lack of tariff walls and borders benefited “growing areas”, “what little capital the South generates is also likely to migrate northward” (p. 189). Hirschman even suggested that “the loss to the South due to the departure of these men may be higher than the gain to the North” (p. 188), so that “polarization” effects might not only increase spatial disparities but also reduce the overall level of economic production in the given system. Still, again in accord with Myrdal’s claims, he argued that the spatial migration of factors of production might also have some positive implications for the “backward” regions. He saw this possible if mobility improved investments in the “poor” regions, or if “the North . . . absorb[ed] some of the disguised unemployed of the South and thereby raise[d] the marginal productivity of labor and per capita consumption levels in the South” (p. 188).

For the outcome of “polarization” and “trickle-down” effects, a further similarity of the two concepts was that Hirschman, just as Myrdal did, found spatial divergence an “inevitable concomitant and condition of growth itself” (p. 184), at least in the initial phase: “an economy, to lift itself to higher income levels, must and will first develop within itself one or several regional centers of economic strength” (p. 183).

²⁷ Besides “growing” and “backward” regions, Hirschman frequently called in his book these categories “the North” and “the South”. This profoundly fit the then conventional terminology to identify the level and dynamics of economic growth with global geographical regions, which is otherwise an oversimplifying and scientifically doubtful, and politically contested approach.

In this argumentation, unlike Myrdal, Hirschman directly referred to Perroux's growth pole concept, and to Boudeville's (1957) work, where the term "growth pole" had already been defined in spatial perspective. Hirschman's views were also similar to those of Myrdal in rejecting that market forces would automatically strengthen "trickle-down" effects and promote spatial convergence in later phases of economic growth. Instead, as he put it, "three possibilities arise" in the long term, at least theoretically (p. 189). For Hirschman, one of these seemed rather compatible with the stable equilibrium doctrine since it hypothesized "the rise in Southern prices", which "would fairly soon prove effective in raising production" (ibid.). Thus, the "South" would catch up, and spatial disparities would decrease. But as Hirschman put it ironically, he saw this version as likely only "in the best of worlds" (ibid.), barely under real circumstances. In his view, the second theoretical option was "the slowing down of Northern progress resulting from rising labor and material costs" (ibid.). Still, Hirschman found this alternative unlikely again "as the North is not entirely dependent on the South" (ibid.), so that the increasing costs of materials from the "backward" regions could be balanced by seeking new sources, and rising labor costs by recruiting additional cheap labor from other poor regions. The latter tendency was actually what Hirschman found the most possible, and which in his eyes efficiently blocked any significant spatial convergence after the enduring phase of divergence. In consequence, if market forces were left alone, "the South could be left in a far worse backwater than before" (ibid.).

To sum it up, Hirschman gave the highest chance under the dominance of market forces to an economic growth process beginning with strong divergence in space, which was later unlikely to convert into convergence automatically. For a reversal in the dynamics of spatial disparities, similarly to Myrdal, Hirschman found the equalizing steps of the state necessary. But for chances that such an intervention occurred, he was obviously more optimistic than Myrdal. Without any doubt, the Swedish economist likewise emphasized that market forces increased spatial disparities, and that polarization could only be reversed by the state. He did not make explicit anywhere, however, that the state would necessarily realize this responsibility and intervene. Instead, Myrdal rather suggested that growing spatial inequalities fuelled increasing political tensions both between and within countries, and that a democratic state was *likely* (but not determined) to intervene as soon as these tensions became politically dangerous. In other words, state intervention to initiate convergence was for Myrdal a possible and politically beneficial decision, but not an unavoidable economic or historical necessity.²⁸

Hirschman had a different opinion: "It is our contention that nonmarket forces are not necessarily less 'automatic' than market forces." (p. 63). He was quite certain that state intervention necessarily would come, especially for two reasons. First, since "all governments regardless of their democratic character desire and need support from all sections of the country" (p. 190), which is a decisive political

²⁸ Myrdal also overlooked that dictatorial regimes might find it as much necessary to reduce spatial inequalities as democratic systems do.

aspect. Second, Hirschman also named a psychological motivation, namely that the notion to reduce disparities itself only emerges after disparity has become an experienced reality. In this sense, “it is the experience of unbalanced growth in the past that produces, at an advanced stage of economic development, the possibility of balanced growth” (p. 93). Considering these two factors as given in countries with significant spatial inequalities, Hirschman was quite optimistic about equalizing efforts from the side of the state. As he put it, “if the market forces that express themselves through the trickling-down and polarization effects result in a temporary victory of the latter, deliberate economic policy will come into play to correct the situation” (p. 190). In this issue, he clearly distanced himself from Myrdal’s “excessively dismal” analysis (p. 187), where “his preoccupation with the mechanism of cumulative causation hides from him the emergence of the strong forces making for a turning point” (ibid.). In fact, Hirschman’s only fear was rather that the government may not choose “the most efficient method of inducing growth in the South” (pp. 194–195), thus, that the pace of spatial equalization might fall behind what real conditions enabled. He considered the root of this problem in the government’s notion to benefit as many regions as possible for political support, which can lead to the low-efficiency method of dispersing funds “among a large number of small projects scattered widely over the national territory” (p. 190). But this was in his eyes merely a peculiar issue, so one not to challenge the main tendency that the state intervenes at a certain point to reduce spatial disparities.

Hirschman’s concept also differed from Myrdal’s theory in a fundamental issue. As has already been presented, Myrdal argued that “The international inequalities are, of course, not dissimilar from the regional inequalities within a country.” (Myrdal 1957, p. 10). At this point Hirschman found certain corrections necessary. For him, the implication of “polarization” and “trickling-down” effects was not the same at international and interregional levels. Instead, he claimed that “the polarization (backwash) effects are much weaker between nations than between regions within the same country” (Hirschman 1966[1958], p. 187). In his view, both “polarization” and “trickling-down” effects were much stronger *within* than *between* countries since regions are not sovereign political units within a country, while countries are sovereign units within the international community. Consequently, on the one hand regions are much more exposed to the outflow of factors of production than sovereign countries defended in this sense by their borders. Similarly, “backward” regions can hardly protect their local industry against more competitive products of “growing” regions, while “backward” countries have certain means of protection through taxes and tariffs on foreign trade. The latter is to great extent enabled by that countries have their own currency and a sovereign monetary policy, while the same lack in the case of regions.²⁹

For these reasons, “poor” regions are much less competitive in their national markets than “poor” countries can be in the world market. In Hirschman’s words,

²⁹ This argument might be challenged nowadays by the European Monetary Union, but in the 1950s Hirschman’s argumentation was absolutely valid.

“countries compete in international markets on the basis of *comparative* advantage, regions within a country on the basis of *absolute* advantage” (our emphasis; p. 196). However, on the other hand, trickling-down was also considered as stronger within countries than between them. As Hirschman stressed, “developed” regions can easily invest in “backward” regions, while the same is much more difficult between countries. Hence, regional specialization can easily deepen between regions, but much less between countries. Moreover, “poor” regions might receive significant support from the national government, which becomes politically interested in reducing spatial inequalities once they have reached a certain level. But, for countries, “international solidarity of this kind is . . . still in its infancy” (p. 198).

Considering these differences, Hirschman emphasized that possible efforts to reduce spatial disparities shall follow different principles at different geographical levels. For stimulating growth in “poor” regions, he argued that the national government should maintain already given interregional “trickling-down” effects while limiting “polarization” effects. The latter might be achieved through providing for “backward” regions some “equivalents of sovereignty” (e.g. “national income tax deductions . . . and some autonomy in bank credit policy”) (p. 199). At an international level, however, the “transmission of growth” (p. 200) might be better achieved if “polarization” effects remained as weak as they are, while similarly weak “trickling-down” effects were strengthened. In Hirschman’s view, this could be guaranteed if an increasing sovereignty of “backward” countries (e.g. in controlling the flows of factors of production or in tariff and monetary policy) was accompanied by a closer integration into the world economy (in sense of attracting foreign investment and exporting local products).

As one can see, the concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman were common in most of the decisive theoretical issues. They both rejected the stable equilibrium concept. They interpreted spatial disparities as an outcome of the play of “backwash” or “polarization” and “spread” or “trickling-down” effects, where market forces were claimed to strengthen polarization rather than equalization. For this reason, both researchers found that a stable decrease in spatial inequalities was only possible if the state intervened. Myrdal and Hirschman were, however, not equally convinced about the unavoidability of this intervention, which was a main difference between their approaches. Furthermore, Myrdal interpreted polarization and equalization in a profoundly similar way in international and interregional contexts, while Hirschman pointed at serious peculiarities between the two geographical levels.

Besides these theoretical aspects, two other considerations are crucial from our point of view. The first goes to the empirical substantiation of Hirschman’s concept, while the second concerns the (even implicit) political notions of the theory, if there were so. For the first issue, the successors’ belief in a firm empirical substantiation of polarization theories (cf. Maier et al. 2006; Schätzl 2003) seems to be challenged by what Hirschman himself wrote in his book. His words in the Preface spoke volumes in this sense: “I have clearly left myself open to the twin charges of *overgeneralization* and *underdocumentation*. . . . I am very conscious that many of my statements must be considered *hypotheses* which remain to be tested.” (our emphases; p. v). A clear consequence of these important shortcomings is that the

book in general and its explanatory part about spatial disparities in particular rather constitute a set of vivid enunciations than a falsifiable concept derived from empirical facts. Thus, the text is full of formulations such as “we may take it for granted” (p. 183), “what appears to happen” (p. 185), “seems to be” (ibid.), “[they] are likely to” (p. 190), “they might be better off” (p. 195), “the points made in the first part of this section lead us to think” (p. 208), etc. Sometimes, the author radiates much more self-confidence despite similarly lacking empirical substantiation while writing that “there can be *little doubt*” (p. 183), “we could *always* show” (p. 184), “it *obviously* sets in motion certain forces” (p. 187), “public investment *clearly* plays here an ‘induced’ role” (all italics are our emphases; p. 193).

Of course, neither a somewhat cautious nor a very definite formulation of thoughts should automatically be considered as problematic. It goes without saying that if empirical findings seem weak, it can be a fully legitimate task of the author to express his or her uncertainty. Solid results of painstaking empirical analyses or prudent philosophical argumentations can, however, reasonably motivate researchers to be firm in their words. This is by no means a problem to be criticized. The problem is rather that the quoted words of Hirschman, whether they mirror certainty or uncertainty, tendentiously remained on their own, and they were not followed by tangible and falsifiable facts. Hence, Hirschman’s reasoning merely had an “it is so because it is so” attitude, which actually made his concept merely speculative. In fact, we do not think that speculations cannot be useful. Neither do we think that a theory cannot be based reasonably “on a limited number of observations” (p. v), even on the analysis of only one country. But it is highly questionable to present a *hypothesis* as substantiated theory, to confuse personal impressions and wishful thinking with empirical evidence. And, if the hypothesis about one country is underpinned by facts, its extrapolation to the whole world (as it actually happened in the book) is yet highly questionable. Even if the author thought that “at this stage the paucity of testable hypotheses has become an even more serious bottleneck in studying economic development than the shortage of data” (pp. v–vi) and that “hypotheses beget data” (p. vi), his 1958 book was still a set of hypotheses which had not managed to “beget data”, not even since its publication. We should underscore once again that releasing speculative ideas is not *per se* negative but can be very useful through fertilizing scientific debates. Such an act is by no means deniable, it is rather to be supported. Yet, it is definitely misleading to write about the outcomes of wishful thinking as if they were “obvious”, “clear” facts, about which “there [could] be little doubt”, as Hirschman did. Such a proceeding ends up in that hypotheses are presented as “facts”, so that they easily become accepted thanks to their suggested scientific image.

In terms of political overtones, Hirschman’s work was in general rather technocratic compared to that of Myrdal. This was due to the “occasional use of technical language” (p. vii), and because Hirschman rarely made statements with direct political relevance. Still, his concept had considerable political implications. The idea that economic growth necessarily increases spatial disparities in an initial phase before efficient attempts of equalization take place had an obvious political

meaning for many countries in Central and South America. The claim that spatial polarization is unavoidable in an early phase of economic growth could reassure and give ammunition to decision-makers in these countries. In the light of Hirschman's words, even if US-propagated development projects in these countries increased and not decreased inequalities in the short and medium term, local politicians could argue that this was neither a sign of conceptual errors nor the shortcomings of realization, just a "necessary" concomitant of growth. This was an important argument given that many such projects actually raised social (Fishlow 1972) as well as spatial disparities in these countries (Haddad et al. 1999). Meanwhile, Hirschman's argumentation also implied that a socialist transformation of economy, a main fear of the US administration for "backward" countries, would not be a good option. First, if economic growth is claimed to result in polarization necessarily in the initial phase, one can suppose that this would also unavoidably happen in a socialist system. Thus, a socialist turn might also not provide an instant cure for the problem of spatial divergence.³⁰ Second, Hirschman's concept also suggested that just because spatial inequalities were on the increase, no governments should be afraid of an escalation of the problem. In this view, after a while even in capitalist systems various state interventions became possible, which could efficiently reverse spatial polarization. This reasoning implied that polarization in the short and medium term was only a necessary prerequisite for long-term spatial equilibrium, and consequently presented the maintenance of capitalism as a rational and desirable political decision in order to achieve long-term spatial equilibrium.

A further claim of Hirschman with firm geopolitical relevance was that a deepening international integration in terms of economy and politics would much benefit the "backward" countries. As he put it, the "development [of backward countries] could of course be greatly accelerated", if "the community of nations disposed of a political mechanism similar to the one that within a nation makes eventually for a redistribution of public investment funds in favor of the South" (p. 200). Hirschman also made explicit how he thought it a pity that there was a lack of such a system while writing that "international solidarity of this kind is *unfortunately* still in its infancy" (our emphasis; p. 198). These ideas were profoundly in concert with firm geopolitical attempts of the United States to create a framework

³⁰ In his work Hirschman made few remarks about socialist systems, but these basically suggested that socialism was "not better" than capitalism. First, it was claimed because certain issues (such as sectoral imbalances) were expected to emerge there similarly as in capitalism (p. 64). Second, some specific features of Soviet economic administration had at least as many negative as positive aspects compared to those in Western countries. Here Hirschman referred to the centralization of decision-making about investments. In his view, this could on the one hand facilitate "the production of entirely new articles not meant as substitutes for any one existing good", while, on the other hand, could make society strongly "biased against innovations whose introduction might cause losses to existing operators" (p. 61). Nonetheless, Hirschman did not give a general overview of how socialism could cope with spatial disparities.

for international cooperation in a post-colonial world along American principles and interests. Here, US administrations expected especially from the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to lay down the foundations of a new, democratic, and capitalistic world order in accordance with American geopolitical objectives (cf. Sect. 6.2). And Hirschman's lines about the desirability of a more integrated world market and stronger international solidarity pointed in this direction.

Besides these, Hirschman's otherwise rather technocratic book gave strong and explicit political support to the United States in its steps to reduce spatial disparities both between and within countries. For him, even if these efforts were not independent from geopolitical interests, they should not be criticized for this but they should definitely be continued. This was justified by Hirschman through the argument that international integration was basically not an outcome of American interests in the Cold War. Instead he claimed that the complicated international situation did not speed up but rather slowed down the processes that could open the way to international as well as interregional equalization. For this reason, Hirschman clearly urged the continuation of US efforts, irrespective of the criticism they attracted. In other words, Hirschman strongly argued for being proud of these decisive attempts instead of apologizing for them. As he put it:

“For the time being, these efforts are largely the incidental results of a struggle for power. Yet it is obvious that they would be intensified rather than abandoned if this struggle were to cease tomorrow. *It seems a pity*, therefore, that we in the United States insist so loudly that the *bold and pioneering* steps we are taking to help the underdeveloped countries are dictated by military necessity or are ‘straightforward business transactions’. Must we thus pave with apologies the road to what can be one of *mankind's highest achievements?*” (our emphases; Hirschman 1966[1958], p. 201.

In general, Hirschman's main concept about the emergence and temporal dynamics of spatial disparities, and about the possible means of equalization, was similar to those of Myrdal. In the analytical part, a significant difference was that Hirschman gave an explanation of how polarizing and equalizing effects functioned differently at international and interregional levels. This minor difference, however, did not concern the main issues of the two concepts. Similarities were in fact much more obvious. Both works were generally based on assumptions and hypotheses, thus, their main findings lacked profound empirical substantiation, so thus they were fundamentally unfalsifiable. Nonetheless, both concepts contained many political suggestions. In Hirschman's book these were usually implicit, but sometimes just as explicit as in Myrdal's essay. Both authors took a stance supporting capitalism as economic system as well as US attempts to handle spatial polarization at international as well as intra-national levels. And, in the meantime, these works both sought to implicitly demystify the Soviet alternative and claimed it provided no better solution to the short and medium term problem of spatial polarization than capitalistic democracies could do.

6.7.3 *Williamson's Inverted U Model: Empirical Background and Political Implications*

The concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman, which rejected the neoclassical doctrine of stable equilibrium, soon gained considerable popularity in the spatial disparity discourse. Their views about the contrary forces of polarization and equalization as factors shaping spatial inequalities exerted much influence on corresponding analyses. Over the next few years all those who wanted to provide a more sophisticated and empirically more substantiated explanation of spatial inequalities relied on these concepts. Here the achievements of the American economist Jeffrey Williamson were especially important since he tried to put the whole theoretical framework on a massive empirical foundation.

In his influential work, Williamson (1965) tried to answer “what *a priori* notions might we have about the behavior of regional income differentials as national development proceeds” (emphasis in original; p. 4). Thus, Williamson’s main notion was similar to that of Myrdal and Hirschman, namely to identify the factors that shape spatial disparities and to reveal the temporal dynamics of the process. For theoretical background, Williamson both referred to neoclassical theories hypothesizing an automatic reduction of spatial inequalities and to the opposing concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman. Following the latter two authors, Williamson also presented why the spatial migration of factors of production as well as central government policy could both increase and decrease spatial inequalities under specific circumstances.³¹ Through these controversial suggestions he presented that “the problem [of spatial inequalities] is hardly that simple” (p. 5), which obviously called for an empirically more detailed analysis of the issue. At this point, Williamson referred to the innovative thoughts of the Russian American economist Simon Kuznets (1955, 1963a) as well, who had already drawn a lot of attention to the temporal dynamics of *social* disparities.

Although uninterested in spatial inequalities, Kuznets had many findings that seemed to have much relevance for the analysis of spatial disparities as well. Right in his 1955 work, Kuznets developed a concept that had remarkable similarities

³¹ We should stress here that some authors refer to Williamson’s concept as a neoclassical one (King and Clark 1978) or at least as a theory following neoclassical logic (Fan and Casetti 1994). This is due to the underlying hypothesis that the usual tendency at a certain point during the process of economic growth is that convergence begins. In our view, however, this interpretation is misleading. In fact, Williamson claimed in his concept that convergence did *not* come necessarily and automatically under free-market circumstances. Instead, he considered state intervention as a major prerequisite for spatial equalization. Without any doubt, Williamson otherwise believed that this interventionist policy always came when a certain level of economic “development” was achieved. In this sense, a new phase of convergence after a period of divergence was the “normal” tendency in his eyes, but not a tendency that automatically emerged. Hence, Williamson was in our view not an advocate of the neoclassical concept of “equalization by free market”, rather a follower of Hirschman, who was convinced about the unavoidability of an equalizing state policy in “developed” countries.

with those published by Myrdal and Hirschman some years later. As Kuznets (1955) underscored, disparities of family incomes significantly decreased in the early decades of the twentieth century in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in Germany (namely Prussia and Saxony) as well.³² This tendency emerged in times of rapidly increasing average family incomes. Such a phenomenon was obviously intriguing since it seemed to be in perfect accord with the neoclassical concept of automatic equalization. In general, Kuznets traced back these processes to the later phases of industrialization. For him, the expansion of industry at the cost of agriculture drove a high number of employees from agriculture to industry, and basically eliminated sectorial dualism. In his eyes, this shift raised the average level of income and reduced its social inequalities as those leaving the primary sector behind to enter the secondary sector witnessed a significant increase in their incomes and got much closer in this respect to those already working in industry.

Kuznets was, however, also convinced that industrialization did certainly not have the same implications in its first phase as later on. Instead, he claimed that the emergence of the first industrial districts, the higher productivity and incomes they could provide their employees compared to those in rural areas, increased income disparities while also raising the average level of income. Kuznets supposed that this first phase might have begun in the United Kingdom at the end of the eighteenth century, and during the nineteenth century in the United States and in Germany. In general, he described the main temporal tendency as “a long swing in the inequality characterizing the secular income structure: widening in the early phases of economic growth when the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and then narrowing in the later phases” (p. 18). Kuznets also found that in low-income countries income inequalities were smaller than in those with average income, which he saw as a further evidence to support his concept. Similar findings were released in Kuznets’ (1963a) later work, which was based on a larger amount of statistical data for more countries than the 1955 analysis.

These analytical results soon attracted the attention of those interested in spatial issues for a simple reason. Kuznets’ concept about rising income disparities in the first phase of economic growth and decreasing inequalities in the later phase suggested a remarkably similar pattern for social disparities as what Hirschman claimed for spatial inequalities. Furthermore, Kuznets’ idea was also similar to those of Myrdal and Hirschman since he traced back the dynamics of inequalities to controversial forces, some of which increased while others decreased disparities. The analogy between this concept and “backwash” and “spread” effects or “polarization” and “trickling-down” effects was obvious.

It is no wonder that Williamson basically adopted the logic of Kuznets while he conducted an empirical analysis of spatial disparities to see whether there was any regularity in its temporal dynamics. His main aim was to focus on the link between

³²This statement was based on social quintiles’ changing share of total income.

economic performance in a country and economic disparities between its regions. Williamson came out from the Hirschmanian assumption that economic interdependence was much stronger between regions in the same country than between countries (p. 5). Thus, he was convinced that the regularities were easier to be identified at a sub-national level. At this point, Williamson's hypothesis obviously mirrored the strong influence of Kuznets' work:

"The initial hypothesis of this study is . . . that the early stages of national development generate increasingly large North-South income differentials.³³ Somewhere during the course of development, some or all of the disequilibrating tendencies diminish, causing a reversal in the pattern of regional inequality. Instead of divergence in interregional levels of development, convergence becomes the rule, with the backward regions closing the development gap between themselves and the already industrialized areas. *The expected result is that a statistic describing regional inequality will trace out an inverted 'U' over the national growth path*" (our emphasis; Williamson 1965, pp. 9–10)

To underpin his presumption, Williamson first carried out a cross-section analysis of data sets from 24 countries, including the classification of countries in seven income groups (following Kuznets 1962), and the analysis of the level of regional income inequalities. The latter was calculated as the weighted standard deviation of the regions according to their income value. The temporal focus was put on the post-war period, with all statistics referring to dates within the time interval of 1949–1960. In order to reveal the link between the two phenomena, Williamson depicted in a cross tabulation all 16 countries about which he had data for at least 2 years (Fig. 6.1). The results seemed to indicate rising regional inequalities in low-income countries, followed by stagnating disparities in middle-income countries, and by decreasing disparities (thus, spatial convergence) in high-income countries. In the light of these findings, Williamson considered his hypothesis as substantiated by empirical information: "it does appear that the pattern of regional inequality is in the form of an inverted 'U', reaching a peak in the middle income class" (p. 15). Furthermore, he judged "the relationship between level of development and degree of regional inequality . . . to be quite significant" (p. 14). To give an even more exact proof to this, he determined the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the regional disparity levels he calculated for each country and the then available estimates for national per capita incomes provided by Chenery (1960). Here, he also took into consideration the countries for which regional data sets were accessible only for 1 year (thus, which had to be ignored in the cross tabulation) insofar their national income levels were depicted in Chenery's list. The calculation on the basis of these 19 countries gave +0.721 as the result, which was in Williamson's eyes a further proof of the validity of his concept.³⁴ He even added

³³ Just as Hirschman, Williamson also used this term "interchangeably with regional income differentials" (Williamson 1965, p. 3).

³⁴ In an interesting way, Williamson did not explain whether he calculated income ranks for the analysis in ascending or descending order. However, as he regarded the positive value of the coefficient to be in concert with his inverted "U" hypothesis, it seems certain that he followed the different orders while creating ranks for income and for regional disparities.

<u>Income class</u>	<u>V_w rising</u>	<u>V_w stable</u>	<u>V_w falling</u>
I		Australia United Kingdom	Canada United States Sweden
II		France	Finland West Germany Netherlands Norway
III			
IV		Italy	Spain Brazil
V	Japan Yugoslavia		
VI			
VII	India		

Fig. 6.1 Williamson’s cross tabulation with 16 countries according to their income class (in descending order from I to VII) and temporal change of regional income disparities (V_w) during the postwar period. Adapted from Williamson, Jeffrey G. (1965). Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Patterns. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 13 (4/II), 3–84, © 1965 The University of Chicago. Reproduced by permission of The University of Chicago Press

that “there is a significant amount of information for the currently underdeveloped nations which this study has not employed (either due to its unreliability or due to its non-quantitative nature)” (p. 17), but appear to be in accordance with the findings of the cross-section analysis.

Williamson also tried to test his hypothesis on datasets for lower level administrative units. For 46 out of the 50 US states he carried out a logically similar calculation to that presented in Fig. 6.1, but here he concentrated on county-level disparities within states in 1950 and 1960. His finding was that only 9 of the 46 states witnessed an increase (and the vast majority a decrease) in spatial inequalities while “all of the U.S. states [were] above the middle income range” (p. 20). This seemed again to substantiate the concept since US statistics indicated declining spatial inequalities in high-income territorial units (the US states). Moreover, Williamson stressed that there was a statistically significant inverse correlation between per capita income of the states and their inner (interregional) disparities (for detailed results see *ibid.*, pp. 19–22).

And, for him, this fact also suggested that the inverted “U” concept could be extrapolated. As states do not have the same sovereignty over counties as the country (the federal government) has over the states, Williamson claimed “inter-county income differentials . . . more likely to be attributable to ‘natural’ forces rather than governmental policy” (p. 18). For this reason, the feasibility of the original hypothesis at the sub-national level implied the existence of “natural” forces that tend to polarize in the early phase of economic growth and to equalize in later periods, and not only at the national level.


In fact, the statistical apparatus utilized by Williamson enabled further observations as well. Besides the cross section analysis, the author also carried out a series of longitudinal research projects based on a time series of spatial disparity values for ten countries. Here the author focused simply on the temporal dynamics of spatial inequalities, not on their connection with the given countries' economic growth. Another difference to the cross-section analysis was the limited amount of information, due to which the temporal investigation had to focus on less geographical entities. Yet, Williamson summarized the results as "with the exception of Germany and perhaps Canada, what slim historical evidence we do have seems to be at least consistent with the results of our cross-section analysis" (p. 31). Furthermore, in the United States, where data sets were available for a remarkably long time interval from 1840 to 1961, in his interpretation the results "trace[d] out a 'classic' pattern of regional inequality" (p. 23).

In the light of all these results, Williamson's main conclusion in concert with his hypothesis was that "rising regional income disparities and increasing North-South dualism is typical of early development stages, while regional convergence and a disappearance of severe North-South problems is typical of the more mature stages of national growth and development" (p. 44). The author also made attempts to reveal the factors fuelling these tendencies, and argued that both the regionally altering levels of labor participation and the sectoral distribution of workforce were likely to play an important role here. In general, however, he rather focused on "describing the patterns", and left reasons to be revealed by his successors. As he put it: "a number of interesting related questions . . . are left unanswered in this study. The most pressing question is . . . why does this pattern of regional inequality persist?" (p. 45). But even if this otherwise highly important question remained open, Williamson's article was a fundamental contribution to the non-neoclassical approach in spatial disparity research due to the huge amount of empirical information it was based on.

Of course, the strong empirical profile of the work gave it a firm scientific image. While the books of Myrdal and Hirschman contained many arguments whose empirical evidence could hardly be checked, Williamson's analysis was based on statistical data and, thus, was falsifiable. Furthermore, it provided a model-like description of how spatial inequalities changed with economic growth that was easy to interpret and present, even graphically (Fig. 6.2).³⁵ With this, Williamson achieved in terms of scientific image a previously unprecedented level in non-neoclassical research of spatial disparities. Without any doubt, the concept of Myrdal and Hirschman also claimed to identify some clearly interpretable general factors driving spatial polarization and equalization. But Williamson went much further since he introduced mathematical modeling in the approach of polarization

³⁵ Although Williamson himself did not release any illustrations in his article, his successors visualized his "inverted U", which, thus, found its way to broad strata in academia (even if such representations could distort the initial concept to some extent since the ways various authors depicted Williamson's "inverted U" were not profoundly similar. Cf. Gyuris 2011).

Fig. 6.2 A graphical representation of Williamson's inverted "U" concept. Adapted from Knox et al. (2003), p. 240. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK



theory, something having been typical before only in the neoclassic. This innovation together with the great deal of empirical data Williamson mobilized unquestionably raised the concept's scientific convincing power, which proved rather long-lasting in the eyes of many. For instance, almost 4 decades after it was published, Cheshire and Malecki (2004) still emphasized in their detailed overview of the history of growth research that Williamson "provided *quite persuasive evidence*" that "the incidence of regional disparities . . . was a function of the level of economic development" (our emphasis; p. 251).

Still, it is worth having a closer look at the "inverted U" concept and its empirical substantiation, especially as many authors have not been as enthusiastic about it as Cheshire and Malecki. Knox et al. (2003), for example, had the opinion that Williamson's "idea of divergence followed by convergence in regional disparities does not meet with strong support" (p. 240). In his detailed critical evaluation of Williamson's work, Krebs (1982) simply categorized the "inverted U" concept as belonging to the group of empirical comparisons that are "virtually worthless" (p. 79). Furthermore, Williamson himself also openly pointed at some weaknesses in his calculations. He saw the main shortcomings as follows (Williamson 1965, pp. 10–11): first, regional units are not "given by nature" but are the outcome of the process of regionalization, thus, they might not constitute an optimal and comparable framework for international analyses. By this, Williamson referred to what later was named the modifiable areal unit problem (*maup*). This is linked to the fact that a certain area can be divided up in regions in remarkably different ways, and the number of possible regionalizations for a given area is actually infinite. For different ways of regionalization, however, statistical analyses can provide radically different results (Johnston 2009b; Openshaw and Taylor 1979), which is a serious challenge in comparative research.

Second, Williamson pointed out that he used nominal income data since regional deflators, thus, regional price indices were not accessible. Yet, he added that in Finland, the only country where he found sufficient regional deflators, results barely changed if regional deflators were considered. Moreover, Williamson suggested that "the divergence between regional price levels is likely to diminish as the nation develops" (Williamson 1965, p. 10). Hence, he suggested that this second point did not constitute a considerable problem. Third, Williamson emphasized that it was

problematic to compare income indicators of agricultural and industrialized regions since in agricultural areas natural products played a significant role in families' well-being, but they were not recorded in income statistics. Fourth, Williamson stressed that "the income accounting concept . . . varies considerably from country to country" (p. 11). In the given case, "Puerto Rican regional development levels are measured by median income per family, Norwegian by assessed income per capita, Canadian by personal income per capita, German by net national product per capita, and so on" (ibid.).

Of course, each of these remarks is intriguing in itself, even if such problems could be handled to some extent. For maup, an opportunity to cope with this challenge is to work with the same regional distribution for the whole time horizon in longitudinal (historical) analyses. Furthermore, one can investigate tendencies at different geographical levels in the same country. This is an efficient method to obtain a more detailed and substantiated understanding of spatial inequalities. The possible bias of regional income analysis without regional price indices can be significantly reduced if one considers other indicators as well, e.g. those reflecting production and consumption. This method can also help much to reveal more precisely the differences between agricultural and non-agricultural regions. Finally, methodological differences in how income statistics are calculated can also be tolerated to some extent, even if an arbitrary comparison of extensively incompatible indicators is doubtful. Thus, the problems identified by Williamson can be solved to some extent in various ways. However, he failed to do this in his work. A typical example is that, as Krebs (1982) underscores, how insensitive Williamson's empirical analysis was for the modifiable areal unit problem. In fact, in his international cross-section analysis the number of regional units taken into consideration per country varied from 6 to 76. In other words, the degree of areal aggregation of the data sets was extremely different in the countries observed. These problematic issues obviously made Williamson's findings very questionable, which he himself also realized. As he put it in the light of these shortcomings: "*It can only be hoped* that none of these limitations is serious enough to negate the striking patterns discovered in the data." (our emphasis; p. 11). In fact, this sentence in itself could be enough to challenge the concept's empirical substantiation.

However, several further aspects of Williamson's "inverted U" shaped model that the author did not point out also raise questions. Among these, one can find issues of measurement. As Krebs (1982) emphasizes, the seven income groups of Kuznets, which Williamson used in his calculations, are very crude and not sufficient for a sophisticated analysis. Furthermore, although the cross tabulation based on this categorization (Fig. 6.1) might seem convincing, the link claimed by Williamson between economic growth and spatial inequalities proves weak in statistical sense since "the inequality index [varies] more within the groups than it differs among the groups" (p. 72). Yet, although Krebs' remark is theoretically legitimate, in the actual case it does not basically influence the validity of Williamson's findings. This can be proved if one uses the historical per capita




Fig. 6.3 The connection of per capita GDP and regional disparities in the 16 countries analyzed by Williamson (including all years that the author took into consideration in his 1965 article). Design by author based on data of Williamson (1965, pp. 25–26; p. 47) (regional disparities) and Maddison (2010) (per capita GDP)

GDP statistics of Maddison (2010) instead of Kuznets’ data.³⁶ If we attribute the former to the regional disparity values calculated by Williamson, and depict the data on a scatterplot, the pattern seems to trace out the descending right side of the inverted U (Fig. 6.3). Moreover, this stochastic connection is significant, even if not completely deterministic, as its R^2 value of 0.3368 indicates.

Krebs, referring to Therkildsen (1978), also stresses that the coefficient of variation as statistical indicator might be problematic “for mathematical reasons” (p. 72). In fact, the coefficient of variation³⁷ is based on the average squared

³⁶ In fact, Maddison’s historical statistics are also highly dubious at several points, even if they are frequently cited in journals with high reputation. This challenge, however, basically refers to comprehensive long term historical statistics (e.g. before the twentieth century), which are usually based on fictive estimations. To the contrary, more recent data about “the better documented economies of Europe and North America” (Clark 2009, p. 1156) are basically reliable, and at least 14 of the 16 countries analyzed by Williamson belong to this category. For this reason, we consider Maddison’s statistics as useful in the given case for the given countries and the given time period. (A detailed review of ambiguities and reliable pieces of information in Maddison’s statistics is given by Clark 2009).

³⁷ Weighted coefficient of variation:

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n f_i (x_i - \bar{x})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n f_i}}, \text{ where } x_i \text{ is the value of indicator } x \text{ in unit } i, \bar{x} \text{ is the weighted average of indicator } x \text{ over the data set, and } f_i \text{ stands for the weight of unit } i.$$

deviation, thus, its value is disproportionately influenced by extreme values (Osberg 2001). This is indeed a feature barely typical for other popular inequality indicators such as the Gini index,³⁸ Theil's regional inequality index,³⁹ or the Hoover concentration index⁴⁰ (cf. Huang and Leung 2009; Rogers and Sweeney 1998). Still, the remark by Krebs and some other authors (e.g. Osberg 2001; Plane and Mulligan 1996) suggesting the coefficient of variation to be doubtful for objective scientific ("mathematical") reasons is also ambiguous.

In fact, what one can make as an objective statement is that the coefficient of variation puts greater emphasis on values extremely deviating from the mean. But whether extreme values or rather those lying close to the mean are more important from the aspect of spatial disparities is actually an *analytical* as well as a *normative* question, but not an objective one to decide in the universal sense, irrespective of the actual research objective. As both Huang and Leung (2009) and Rogers and Sweeney (1998) present, to focus on extreme values as well as to concentrate on the deviation of values close to the mean can be useful analytically. It depends rather on the research question and the statistical population actually analyzed which indicator can give a more exact and interpretable insight into the phenomenon observed. Furthermore, while dealing with spatial inequality as a *problem*, it can be a relevant normative decision *prior* to statistical analysis to focus either on the deviation of extreme cases or on those of units of observation closer to the mean. For instance, let us imagine two countries, both with regions that have very similar values of a certain indicator (e.g. per capita income), and with a dominating metropolitan region with values lying high above those of the periphery. These two countries could be two former colonies on the coastline of Africa, or two highly centralized small countries in Europe or in Asia. In this case study, the coefficient of variation and the Gini index would reveal different aspects of spatial inequalities in the country. The coefficient of variation would rather stress the primacy of the center, thus, the level of center-periphery dichotomy in both countries. The Gini index would merely give an imprint of differences *between* those regions in the periphery,

³⁸ Weighted Gini index:

$$G = \frac{1}{2\bar{x}} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{f_i f_j}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^n f_i \right)^2} |x_i - x_j|, \text{ where } x_i \text{ and } x_j \text{ are values of indicator } x \text{ in units } i \text{ and } j, \bar{x} \text{ is}$$

the weighted average of indicator x over the data set, and f_i and f_j stand for the weight of unit i and j .

³⁹ Theil's inequality index:

$$T = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{y_i}{\bar{y}} \log \left(\frac{y_i}{\bar{y}} \right), \text{ where } y_i \text{ stands for the share of unit } i \text{ of the sum of variable } y \text{ over the data}$$

set, \bar{y} represents the average share of each unit from the sum of variable y , and n stands for the number of units.

⁴⁰ Hoover concentration index:

$$H = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |y_i - z_i|}{2}, \text{ where } y_i \text{ and } z_i \text{ stand for the share of unit } i \text{ of the sum of variables } y \text{ and } z.$$

while less emphasis would be given to the outstanding position of the metropolitan core. As can be seen, both approaches can be relevant, even if their presumable results might be significantly different. But to select one of these two approaches is, as described, an analytical and normative question, not one to be answered in a universal and profoundly neutral way. For both the coefficient of variation and the Gini index have been popular and relevant means in the spatial disparity research (Huang and Leung 2009). Thus, the argument that the coefficient of variation would be methodologically *a priori* “worse” than other indicators of inequality seems problematic, and the critiques of Williamson’s concept based on this suggestion are also less convincing.

Some crucial conceptual points of Williamson’s model are, however, questionable. First, even if the author did not try to deduce universal claims from statistics of a few units, his sampling of sixteen countries was still less representative for the whole world, especially as 13 among them definitely belonged to the so-called “developed nations”. Thus, to interpret these results as if they would mirror a pattern of universal relevance, even in the “underdeveloped” world, might be highly misleading (Gilbert and Goodman 1976). A second point is that a main part of Williamson’s work was the international cross-section analysis, where the author analyzed in various countries the connection between the national level of economic growth and its regional disparities. That was where he judged “the relationship between level of development and degree of regional inequality . . . to be quite significant” (Williamson 1965, p. 14), which he considered as a major proof of the validity of his concept. Such an interpretation of the data suffered, however, from an implicit presumption, namely that the results provided by a *cross-sectional* analysis of a set of countries for one point in time were logically compatible with the findings of a *longitudinal* research within a given country. This was a highly questionable point in Williamson’s concept, which was already “inherited” from Kuznets, whose late critics formulated the problem as follows: “The available cross-sectional scatter might perfectly fit an increasing 45° line while each country is silently moving along a 45° *decreasing* one.” (original emphasis; Gagliani 1987, p. 323). Dots representing countries might seem to draw out a specific pattern in a *cross-sectional* scatter plot, which can also suggest a kind of regularity. But this does not mean that a *longitudinal analysis* must give a similar pattern, and even if it does, there is no proof that the two morphologically similar patterns are *logically* compatible. Thus, to consider cross-section and longitudinal analyses as compatible is “reduce[ing] history to a simple time-dimension” (Krebs 1982, p. 78; based on Hinderink and Sterkenburg 1978). It implies that “underdeveloped countries as latecomers . . . follow the same path of development as the highly industrialized economies” and that “the underlying factors have to be the same” (*ibid.*).

This teleological approach to economic growth was a main feature of developmentalism (cf. Sect. 6.4), which presumed that all countries followed basically the same path of economic growth. In this view, the economic differences between countries were simply regarded as outcomes of a time delay “less developed” countries had relative to the “more developed” ones (Fig. 6.4). A highly sophisticated and much-cited explanation of this idea was presented in the works of




Fig. 6.4 The teleological concept of “progress” in the developmentalist approach. Adapted from Taylor (1993), p. 10. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK

the US economist Walt Whitman Rostow, who interpreted economic growth as embracing five consecutive phases. In his words, these phases were “traditional society”, “preconditions for take-off”, “take-off”, the “drive to maturity” and the “age of high mass-consumption” (Rostow 1960, pp. 4–16). According to this concept, each country had to go through each phase to reach a high level of “development”. Moreover, the order of the phases could not be changed, and none of the phases could be skipped (Gonçalves 2005). In this approach, the process of “national development” was interpreted as climbing up a ladder, where one had to pass each step one by one to finally get to the top. These were actually the main ideas permeating the whole idea of developmentalism.

These suggestions also seemed to have clear consequences for economic planning. Since the concept rejected that alternative ways of growth could exist, “underdeveloped” countries were considered to have only one chance to catch up with the “developed” ones. That was to go through at an accelerated pace the steps the “developed” countries had already taken. This argumentation had a politically important consequence. “Underdeveloped” countries were suggested to follow preferably the “most developed” country, which had the best knowledge and experience on the whole process: the United States (and neither Western Europe nor the Soviet Union).⁴¹

⁴¹ That the implications of Rostow’s concept gave strong support to US geopolitical notions was by no means accidental. This is not only indicated by the obviously anti-Soviet subtitle of the book (*A Non-Communist Manifesto*), but was also made explicit by the author himself, serving as deputy and “regular” national security advisor for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. As he put it: “We must demonstrate that the underdeveloped nations – now the main focus of Communist hopes – can move successfully through the preconditions into a well established take-off within the orbit of the democratic world, resisting the blandishments and temptations of Communism. This is, I believe, the most important single item of the Western agenda.” (Rostow 1960, p. 134).

In fact, Williamson's concept emerged in a scientific and political context strongly permeated by developmentalist thinking. It is no accident that he also wrote in his essay about "early" and "mature" "stages of national development". And it is no wonder that he considered international cross-section and national longitudinal analyses mutually compatible, which by then had become a "well-established practice" in economic research (Moran 2005, p. 225).

Of course, we should not forget that Williamson not only carried out a cross-sectional analysis, but also made attempts to conduct longitudinal analyses for countries where time-series were accessible. Among the 16 countries, it was in ten cases that he had regional data for more than one point in time that embraced at least 2 decades. Here he actually preferred temporal research to longitudinal, analyzing rather the temporal changes of spatial inequalities and not their connection with the level of economic production. His finding was that at least eight of ten countries seemed "to be at least consistent with the results of [the] cross-section analysis", thus, with the inverted U concept (Williamson 1965, p. 31). These results were, however, definitely not as convincing as it might be suggested by Williamson's lines. As we have already pointed out, to consider a temporal analysis as logically equal to a longitudinal evaluation of economic growth is in itself doubtful. This does not mean, of course, that the analysis of temporal dynamics in spatial disparities would be irrelevant. It can be a useful means to reveal, for example, how certain political changes affect the level of spatial inequalities over time. But if one assumes a link between economic growth (or "national development") and regional disparities, the former cannot be replaced in the analysis by a simple time-dimension. This analogy would give the false implication that the pace of economic growth is stable in time, which is obviously not the case.

In the light of this, it is worth analyzing again the ten plus six countries selected by Williamson. The focus is now on the level of regional inequalities these countries had at certain levels of economic production (instead of in certain years). To the calculations we have used the historical statistics of Maddison (2010). Among the eight countries Williamson claimed to fit his concept, we have depicted the United States in a separate scatter-plot to avoid the graph becoming unmanageable. In the light of our results, the inverted U hypothesis seems to be underpinned only by a limited number of units of observation. As Fig. 6.5 shows, it is only three countries that more or less trace out some characteristic sections of an inverted U. Such a pattern appears relatively clearly only in the case of Brazil. Dots for Norway seem to represent the descending right slope of the curve, and for Sweden the "final" section of the ascending section as well as the descending side can be seen well.

Besides, the curve of the United Kingdom tends "to be at least consistent" with Williamson's hypothesis, although the moderate slope indicated by only four dots does not seem very convincing. For France and Italy, the curves run rather accidentally than along a bell-shaped pattern. For the Netherlands, its curve is difficult to be interpreted within the Williamsonian framework since the country did not show permanent economic growth during the whole period. In fact, the deep economic decline caused by the destruction associated with World War II and the left-hand




Fig. 6.5 Connection of per capita GDP and regional disparities in seven of the eight countries considered by Williamson as “at least consistent” with his concept. Design by author based on data from Williamson (1965, pp. 25–26) (regional disparities) and Maddison (2010) (per capita GDP)

direction movement of the curve in the graph is in itself incompatible with the developmentalist concept and its presumption of mutual interchangeability of time and economic growth on the horizontal axis. Concerning the United States, although one cannot see here a “clearly visible” inverted U pattern, the assumption that regional inequalities are higher at a medium level of economic output or “national development” than in phases of low and high output basically seems valid here (Fig. 6.6). To sum it up, from the eight countries considered by Williamson to underpin his concept only four (Brazil, Norway, Sweden and the United States) seem to do so indeed, with a fifth country being “at least consistent” (or, rather, not clearly inconsistent) with the hypothesis.

We have also carried out the same analysis for the countries that were regarded by Williamson to challenge the inverted U concept or to be represented by too few data points for relevant statistical evaluation (Fig. 6.7). At this point, our findings are in concert with those of Williamson. In this statistical population countries either do not trace out any significant path due to the small number of statistical records or their paths do not clearly fit a bell-shaped curve, nor any sections of it.

As one can see, Williamson’s concept can be challenged at many points theoretically as well as empirically. Thus, although it was clearly aimed at an empirically-focused description of the regularities of spatial inequalities, in the light of our results its actual explanatory power does not seem to be significantly higher than that of the purely philosophical (and often highly speculative) concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman. Without doubt, Williamson’s work was unique in a certain sense: since it was based on empirical statistics, it was falsifiable. But this is in itself hardly




Fig. 6.6 Connection of per capita GDP and regional disparities in the United States, the eighth country considered by Williamson as “at least consistent” with his concept. Design by author based on data from Williamson (1965, p. 25) (regional disparities) and Maddison (2010) (per capita GDP) [Williamson used in his analysis a nine-region system defined by the Bureau of Census, namely New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific (Williamson 1965, p. 13). A detailed map of the way states were attributed to each region can be found in US Census Bureau (n.d.)]

a great merit of the concept since it was not only theoretically falsifiable but it can indeed be falsified at several points. Actually, in our view it should not be the point to fully discredit Williamson’s theory. In its context it was an innovative attempt to provide a better understanding of spatial disparities, e.g. through involving a great deal of empirical statistics in theory-making. What we rather aim to emphasize is that the credit it received from mainstream economist experts on spatial disparities (cf. Friedmann 1975) was one-sided and it was accompanied by overlooking some of its serious shortcomings.

Nonetheless, it is clear that Williamson’s concept had great scientific credit in its time (especially due to its mathematical-statistical apparatus). Meanwhile, it could also seem attractive for decision-makers since, similarly to other concepts about spatial inequalities, it had direct political relevance in the Cold War. First, Williamson’s article suggested that spatial polarization could not be avoided in an earlier period of growth. Second, it forecasted a quasi-automatic occurrence of spatial convergence as soon as a certain level of “development” was achieved, thus that the problem would disappear in the long term. This interpretation, just as was explained in Sect. 6.7.2, implicitly suggested that in capitalism spatial inequalities unavoidably increased in the first phase of economic growth, but they necessarily




Fig. 6.7 Connection of per capita GDP and regional disparities in the countries analyzed by Williamson but considered as not “at least consistent” with his concept. Design by author based on data from Williamson (1965, pp. 25–26) (regional disparities) and Maddison (2010) (per capita GDP)

decreased later. Thus, the concept implied spatial polarization to be just a temporary problem.

Furthermore, Williamson had a very controversial attitude to spatial disparities in communist countries. On the one hand, he excluded these countries from his analyses due to a lack of statistics. The only exception was Yugoslavia, which followed a very specific economic path among communist countries, and which actually did not belong to the Soviet Bloc. Anyway, Williamson had the necessary regional statistics for Yugoslavia only for 3 years, which was far less than required for a substantiated analysis. Thus, he had actually no reliable data about communist countries, and argued that “any comparative study involving the East European or Soviet economies would involve questionable indirect evidence and conjecture” (Williamson 1965, p. 31).

Still, Williamson easily overcame his fears of conjecturing. At this point he referred to Dziejowski (1962), who in Williamson’s interpretation suggested that in Poland “the goals of reducing regional dualism have been subordinated to national development goals, and that increasing regional divergence has been the case in the postwar period of early industrialization” (Williamson 1965, p. 31). From a strange mixture of this information and personal beliefs Williamson came to the point that “*it seems highly unlikely* that the Communist nations have sacrificed rapid national growth for the ‘secondary’ Marxian goals of (1) introducing industrialization throughout the country in order to achieve the necessary conditions for socialism

on a nationwide scale and (2) achieving idealistic equalitarianism implied by the socialist society” (our emphasis; *ibid.*).

This otherwise remarkable argumentation remained, however, without tangible substantiation. For Dzierwowski (1962), he really explained that “a large number of industrial plants, originally destined for location in under-developed parts of the country, was finally moved to the largest regional urban centers, generally to already well-industrialized districts” (p. 45). He also really underscored that the development policy of the country in the 1950s and 1960s “somewhat missed its very ambitious aims” (*ibid.*). But he did not argue that all steps would have accelerated polarization. Instead, he stressed that the problem was rather that the policy of spatial equalization *had not been as massive* as it could have been (so thus it decreased disparities not as rapidly as had been possible) and *not* that it had increased disparities. Actually, Dzierwowski was explicit in saying that this policy had “diminished the differences in development levels between various regions” (*ibid.*). Of course, one should not forget that these issues were extremely sensitive for communist leaders, thus, researchers in countries in the Soviet Bloc (such as Dzierwowski) could only refer to concerning problems in an indirect and very cautious way. But it is a fact that Dzierwowski’s article rather suggested a process of spatial convergence, although not at the desirable pace, instead of the stable divergence suggested by Williamson in his interpretation. Thus, Williamson could not provide empirical evidence from Poland to what he “seemed highly unlikely”.⁴²

Besides Poland, Williamson also paid attention to the Soviet Union. His efforts to interpret spatial disparities in that context, however, opened the way again for speculations. Williamson first expressed his uncertainty about the issue with an interrogative sentence: “has [the Soviet Union] undergone any tendency towards convergence in regional development levels and reduction in regional dualism?” (p. 31). On the one hand, he found it “a likely supposition” that the country “did not undergo as sharp a movement in regional divergence as, say, Brazil” (*ibid.*). On the other hand, however, he was rather firm in assuming that such a divergence must have taken place and it must have been significant, even if not reaching a Brazilian level: “*we do know* that the seven Year Plan in 1959 included in it significant regional goals, and also the 1956 movement toward decentralization itself *may imply* a serious attempt to reduce regional inequalities generated by the fabulous growth of three decades” (our emphasis; p. 31). In other words, Williamson derived the suggestion (or even claim) of spatial polarization in the Soviet Union from tendencies of administrative decentralization in the mid- and late-1950s. He did not imply (maybe did not even think) that Khrushchev’s attempts at decentralization were barely aimed at spatial equalization but were mainly aimed at raising

⁴² This does not indicate unambiguously that spatial polarization might have taken place in Poland that time. What we would like to present is that Williamson obviously did not have the data necessary for such a conclusion, and the information he actually possessed seemed rather to challenge than to substantiate his suggestion for communist countries. Yet, he was not afraid of making conjectures, and presenting them as if they would have been in concert with his whatever indirect information.

economic efficiency by giving more responsibility to lower administrative levels in finding potential solutions to the challenges they faced.

As a final example, Williamson referred to Yugoslavia. Here he simply wrote that “in spite of official pronouncements and alleged effort, Yugoslavia underwent increasing regional divergence between 1956 and 1960” (ibid.). However, comments on the dubious significance of a 4-year long period for the general long-term pattern of spatial disparities were absolutely missing.

To sum it up, Williamson’s article was an innovative work, and one which utilized a remarkable statistical apparatus. It was mainly for this reason that it gained great popularity and credit in spatial disparity research. Still, the concept suffered from numerous conceptual as well as methodological and empirical shortcomings, and in many questions ended up in speculations instead of empirically substantiated interpretations. But with all its ambiguities, the concept with its implicit political overtones fit well American geopolitical notions of the era.

6.7.4 Friedmann’s Concept About Spatial Disparities: A Technocratic Textbook Permeated by American Ideology

The works of Myrdal and Hirschman opened a new chapter in spatial disparity research since they provided a non-neoclassical theoretical framework for the field of interest. Through this, they also offered some tools for predicting future tendencies as well as for making practical suggestions for politicians and planners on how to reduce spatial disparities. Yet, since these works were dominated by theoretical ideas (with strong geopolitical relevance), the attention they paid to opportunities of *prediction* and *planning* was relatively limited. This weakness brought into being on the one hand the concept of Williamson, who attempted to provide an empirically substantiated and didactic model of the dynamics of spatial disparities. His inverted U hypothesis was actually the first non-neoclassical contribution to the theory of spatial disparity research with the image of having a strong predictive power. On the other hand, after the otherwise groundbreaking thoughts of Myrdal and Hirschman, a detailed practical handbook of “how to eliminate spatial disparities” was still missing. This gap in research practice was filled soon after Williamson by American planner John Friedmann (1966).

Friedmann, PhD in Planning, Economics, and Geography, a former advisor of regional planning in Brazil and in Venezuela, was basically aimed at providing a book “for students and practitioners in the field of economic development” (Friedmann 1966, p. vii). Nonetheless, from our point of view the crucial importance of his work went back less to its practical suggestions and its implication for “economic development”. Instead, our interest mainly goes to the remarkable contribution it made to the theory of spatial inequalities, the major issue of our essay. In fact, Friedmann gave a brief overview of then accessible theories of spatial

inequalities, although he barely relied on them and merely favored his own experience from South America while forming his views. Just as Myrdal and Hirschman, Friedmann also based his theoretical argumentation on two thoughts. The first was the firm political relevance of spatial disparities due to their potential to induce political tensions. As Friedmann put it, “growing regional inequalities will give rise to political pressures intended to reverse the traditional flow of resources to the center and to help raise per capita incomes on the periphery to a level of approximate equality with the rest of the nation” (p. 13). This was considered as giving a strong justification of spatial disparity research.

The second crucial point was neoclassic inability to explain the dynamics of spatial disparities. Friedmann called this “a major difficulty with the equilibrium model”, which “historical evidence does not support” (p. 14). It was for him an “indisputable fact” that “regional convergence will not automatically occur in the course of a nation’s development history” (ibid.). For this reason, he considered economic growth as unavoidably leading to polarization first, and he strongly argued for state planning to reverse the process at a certain point. Thus, Friedmann belonged to those who claimed that spatial equalization was impossible without state intervention. But, similarly to Hirschman and Williamson, who also believed the free market raised disparities, Friedmann was also optimistic on whether this state intervention took place. This was clearly highlighted by his graphical illustration about the “typical sequence” (p. 35) of “spatial organization” during the process of economic growth (Fig. 6.8). Here he presented the early emergence of a strong center within the country and accompanying spatial polarization as well as the development of sub-centers and a reversal in polarizing trends in later phases as if they were necessary processes, which were always “so”.

Later on, Friedmann also referred to these ideas as “general principles”, which “can be successfully applied to a historical situation” (p. 124). Furthermore, he even argued that “there is a logic underlying the evolution of a space economy that, but for the high risk of failure, may not be violated” (ibid.). With this he implied his model to present a “law-like” and, consequently, the only possible way spatial disparities could follow in the long term. This also suggested that state intervention necessarily took place at a certain point and that spatial disparities would radically diminish in the long run. And, to put an end to the readers’ possible fears for enduring polarization, in the second part of the book Friedmann presented in detail the regional policy of Venezuela as “a system of national planning that quickly gained a high reputation throughout the continent” by inducing regional equalization (p. 123). Thus, while he claimed the existence of “a logic underlying the evolution of a space economy” and that the state was necessary to intervene at a given point, he also provided a case study to convince people that such a state intervention was *indeed* possible, even in “underdeveloped” contexts.


For the work’s scientific basis, it definitely belonged to the group that Maier et al. (2006) calls “the outcomes of detailed empirical analyses, case studies or the researcher’s appropriate experience”, which “thus, to a certain extent, mirror real circumstances, among which they were obtained” (p. 78). Friedmann pointed out as early as in the preface that he had worked as advisor on regional planning both in

Fig. 6.8 Friedmann's schematized concept about the consecutive "sequence of stages in spatial organization". Adapted from Friedmann, John, *Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela*, Figure 2.1, p. 36, © [1966] Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by permission of The MIT Press


1. Independent local centers, no hierarchy




2. A single strong center



3. A single national center, strong peripheral subcenters



4. A functionally interdependent system of cities



Brazil and in Venezuela. In the latter he had been involved in planning the new city of Santo Tomé de Guayana, recently called Ciudad Guayana (Friedmann 1966, p. vii). This fact undoubtedly radiated the impression that the book gave an insider's view, which was not only to emphasize that the author's suggestions for planners and policy-makers were substantiated. Such background information also increased the virtual validity of Friedmann's theoretical findings since these seemed to throw new, empirically substantiated light on the nature of spatial disparities. This image of reliability was also supported by Friedmann's "manifesto" at the end of the book, where he advised regional planners "to assess the total situation with a *keen, objective eye*" (our emphasis; p. 256). These words in an indirect way implied that he himself also followed this principle while conducting his research in Venezuela and summarizing his findings in the book. Besides, Friedmann not only referred to his personal experience, but also suggested the special scientific quality of the project he participated in. As he stressed, the urban development program was actually led by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard (p. vii), which were leading "centers of calculation" (Latour 1987) in the Western world and citadels of American Cold War strategic research (cf. Barnes 2008).

Friedmann did not forget about making the link between this project and his work explicit: as he put it, the 1966 study was “the result” of the field work he conducted in Venezuela under the aegis of these institutions (Friedmann 1966, p. vii).

This information, however, no longer seems that convincing if one gains insight into the work the planners of the Joint Center actually did in the South American country. Here we should refer to another member of the team, urban sociologist Lisa Peattie, who along with her husband were the only ones to address a lot of attention to the controversies and unplanned negative consequences of the highly modernist Ciudad Guayana project. In her book (Peattie 1968) she revealed that she and her husband were the only ones to spend two and a half years on the spot, while all other team members worked more than 500 km away, in the capital city Caracas. Thus, for Friedmann, his “local knowledge” came from colleagues he collaborated with in the capital city. Of course, he might also have had access there to a lot of information inaccessible abroad. Still, this story shows that the insider’s image should not be exaggerated if one speaks about Friedmann’s book. And this is very important from our view since Friedmann explicitly avoided quantitative analyses. In his words: “I must apologize to those who would like to see more quantitative analysis in a study of this type. Unfortunately, many kinds of data were simply not available or were so unreliable that little would have been gained by using them. . . . the use of detailed statistics would have given the reader an impression of specious accuracy” (Friedmann 1966, p. viii). Thus, the claimed convincing power of the book was openly based on the local knowledge of Friedmann (and on the reader’s belief in this), obviously challenged by Peattie’s (1968) lines.

Of course even if one disregards these limitations, the extent to which tendencies in a single country can be extrapolated internationally is a question that remains unanswered. This problem already emerged with regard to Williamson’s article, which made universal claims on the basis of statistics for a relatively small sample of “developed” countries. Friedmann’s book, however, had an even narrower focus: he concentrated on a single case, Venezuela. This might be a disadvantage on the one hand since ideas derived from observations in many countries are usually more likely to be adaptable for further cases. On the other we believe, however, that the investigation of a single case can also help us understand certain relations and gain knowledge that might be relevant in other cases as well. For the latter reason, it is important to analyze Friedmann’s basic argument, even if it is based on the peculiar case of Venezuela.

The most important point for us is why state regional policy to reduce spatial inequalities would, as Friedmann implied, be necessary to emerge at a certain level of economic growth. In fact, the concept became especially fragile at this point. While summarizing the reasons for an efficient regional policy in Venezuela, the author stressed the crucial importance of the following factors:

“Venezuela . . . offers conditions that greatly facilitate the carrying out of a national policy for regional development. The country can boast of an experienced and effective national planning agency (CORDIPLAN). Recognition of the need for a regional policy is widespread. The general level of professional competence is high. And the current government of Venezuela may be regarded as progressive in its political stance and firmly established in power for the period it was elected to serve.” (Friedmann 1966, p. 243.)

Considering the optimism permeating Friedmann's concept with respect to the unavoidability of state intervention to reduce spatial inequalities, the questions arise as to (1) how the above presented beneficial conditions emerged in Venezuela, and (2) why they should necessarily emerge in other contexts. For the first question Friedmann gave a concise answer, throwing light on the importance of political factors. He pointed out that in 1958 the Democratic Action Party (DAP) "with overwhelming public support" (p. 152) put an end to the formerly reigning "brutal dictatorship" (ibid.). Thus, the "conservative coalition" based on the mutual collaboration of the army, the landlords, and some prominent figures of commerce and financial life, mostly settled in and benefitting the capital city Caracas, lost its power. A necessary prerequisite for this was, however, that the DAP "legitimize [d] its leadership through winning a popular national election" (p. 154). And this was the point to exert decisive influence on spatial disparities in Venezuela. In Friedmann's words, as the DAP "was certain of its *de facto* control of cities . . . it was the development of provincial resources rather than further accumulation of wealth and power in Caracas that constituted its chief promise" (original emphasis; ibid.). In other words, the reduction of spatial disparities and the decrease in the capital city's primacy were outcomes of a political transformation, where the new regime aimed to get the support of peripheral regions, which the former conservative dictatorship had neglected. This story gives a deep insight into political mechanisms leading to shifts in the national governments' spatial focuses in "economic development".

Yet, this case study also reveals clearly that state intervention in Venezuela to reduce spatial inequalities was an accidental rather than an unavoidable event. In fact, suggesting that state policies to diminish polarization were necessary to come into being and that their emergence in Venezuela was likewise inevitable implies that underlying mechanisms were also unavoidable. This suggests first that the democratic regime, once in power in the South American country, did not have any other choice but to give up the one-sided support of the capital city. And second, since the change in regional policy had been absolutely unlikely without the political transformation, the inevitability of a turn in regional policy also suggests that the democratic change and the fall of the dictatorship were also necessary. These presumptions are, however, not to be substantiated as mechanistically as Friedmann interpreted the dynamics of spatial inequalities. In the light of historical evidence one could claim at most that every system ends sometime to open way for the next one. But it cannot be grounded that either in a certain phase of history or at a certain level of "economic development" such a (democratic) turn would be inevitable. Not even was it so in South and Central America. Although Venezuela made the democratic turn in 1958, some countries witnessed new, authoritarian regimes to emerge after this date (cf. Fidel Castro's takeover in Cuba, the 1964 military coup d'état in Brazil and Pinochet's 1973 military coup in Chile). Moreover, Friedmann himself attributed the democratization of Venezuela and the authoritarian rule in Brazil to the same phases of "economic development" (cf. p. 7). Thus, to suggest a more or less definite link between a certain level of "economic development" and democratization seems rather to contradict than to be

in line with historical and empirical evidence. But then the implicit logic of Friedmann's concept collapses.

To sum it up, although Friedmann's technocratic work made contributions to the theoretical research of spatial disparities, these in fact lacked firm empirical substantiation. This is even so if the author implied the opposite in many of his remarks. But the essay's scientific image, even if poorly underpinned, could well be used to mediate propagandistic knowledge to the readers. Just as in the case of Hirschman and Williamson, Friedmann's concept suggested that spatial disparities inevitably increased in an early phase of "economic development". This threw new light on spatial polarization: although Friedmann explicitly judged this process "harmful" (p. 99), in "less developed" countries he did not consider it a proof of economic failure but a negative concomitant of something very good: growth. Moreover, his model suggested that spatial disparities decreased after a while thanks to state intervention. Here he presented the latter as inevitable due to the claimed logic of "regional development", and through the example of Venezuela, he also implied indirectly that the prerequisite for spatial equalization was a democratic turn. These lines suggested that although the reduction of spatial inequalities was inevitable to come at a certain point in economic growth, this process only followed the establishment of a democratic system, which was more sensitive to problems of the whole society. This clearly implied that the challenge of spatial inequalities might be better and more quickly handled if authoritarian means are rejected, which also seemed a forceful argument for the American and against the Soviet model. Thus, Friedmann's concept was in accordance with US geopolitical motivations, which it implicitly supported under the aegis of objective science, but in fact with serious empirical and theoretical shortcomings.

6.8 Neoclassical Reactions to Polarization Theory: Arguing Politically to Sell the Product

As can be seen, the widespread criticism of neoclassical ideas in spatial disparity analysis by many researchers resulted in the emergence of a brand new conceptual framework, which opened up new vistas in the interpretation of spatial inequalities. The non-neoclassical theoretical approach seemed more compatible with empirical findings in a world to witness rising polarization. And it had further advantages as well. During the late 1950s and early 1960s this approach developed a theoretical argumentation that was seemingly based on reliable empirical data, while it also provided a rather simple, model-like interpretation of disparities. Hence, those refuting the neoclassical doctrine of stable equilibrium created many theoretical mosaics in the next few years that tended to outline a scientifically substantiated explanation of spatial divergence and convergence, which was also in line with US geopolitical interests. For these reasons, the new approach pushed the old neoclassical views into the periphery of the domain of spatial disparity research. Yet, the

neoclassical approach did not collapse: rather, it tried to gather new momentum and to underpin its claim to be a relevant mindset for explaining the dynamics of spatial inequalities.

This endeavor gained impetus first due to empirical findings that did not obviously undermine the neoclassical concept but even seemed to substantiate it to some extent. Especially important here was the work of Easterlin (1958) published only 1 year after the groundbreaking work of Myrdal and in the same year when Hirschman released his theory. Easterlin analyzed the long-term temporal changes in personal income inequalities for nine geographical regions of the United States.⁴³ In general, Easterlin's results indicated a "general tendency towards convergence" for the period between 1880 and 1950 (Easterlin 1958, p. 324). Yet, he also stressed two issues which for him made it impossible to argue one-sidedly for the validity of the neoclassical stable equilibrium concept. First, Easterlin emphasized that the convergence he presented was "so slow and so limited" (pp. 325–326), although within the selected time interval there "was a situation [in the United States] in which the conditions necessary for the operation of [factors of spatial equalization] were just about ideal" (p. 326). In his words:

"There were practically no artificial barriers to the movement of goods; there were no exclusion acts and immigration quotas to restrict the flow of persons. Rather there was as close an approximation to the conditions of free trade and free mobility *as is likely to be realized in the real world*. And yet after a period of seventy years, substantial differences among regions in the level of income per worker still remained. Why didn't progress go much further?" (our emphasis; p. 325).

Although Easterlin did not manage to give a comprehensive answer to the question he raised about reasons, his findings indicated that the automatic equilibrium through migration of factors of production was not as simple a process in reality as it was in abstract neoclassical models.

As a second point, Easterlin underscored that the slow but stable process of convergence in the United States was no more than a single case. Thus, he emphasized that any results of his analysis could not be automatically extrapolated to other countries. In his words, to decide whether spatial convergence was a general trend in all countries "we must examine the historical experience of other nations" (p. 325). Consequently, he argued that in the light of statistical data from only one country "it is by no means certain that convergence of regional income levels is an inevitable outcome of the process of development" (*ibid.*).

In general, the relevance of Easterlin's results for the neoclassical approach to spatial disparities was somewhat ambiguous. The non-neoclassical Friedmann, for instance, in his 1966 work referred to Easterlin's analysis rather as evidence *against* the stable equilibrium doctrine. In his view, Easterlin's findings proved that free market forces could cause only a slow convergence even in the United States and that forces working for convergence were not determined to get stronger in the

⁴³ These were the same regions as those taken into consideration by Williamson (1965) (see Sect. 6.7.3).

course of economic growth. Based on these, in the light of Easterlin's results Friedmann came to a conclusion even more definite than that of Easterlin. Easterlin only emphasized that spatial convergence was uncertain to take place inevitably at a certain level of economic "development". Friedmann went much further while simply stating that "income convergence is not in any sense a necessary result of the development process" (Friedmann 1966, p. 17) if direct state equalization measures were missing. This sort of interpretation was, however, not without alternatives. Even Williamson (1965) tended to put emphasis merely on the fact that that Easterlin's results "trace[d] out a 'classic' pattern of regional inequality" (p. 23), a term he used as identical with the neoclassical presumption of spatial convergence accompanying economic growth.

The uncertainties in the interpretation of Easterlin's findings indicate that the neoclassical approach was, despite the concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman, still not obviously disqualified by empirical evidence. And the neoclassic actually made attempts to defend the relevance of its interpretation of spatial inequalities. This motivation brought into being the neoclassical work of US economists George Borts and Jerome Stein in 1964. Their task to justify the relevance of the neoclassical approach was not easy to be accomplished 7 years after Myrdal's work had been released. Still, they firmly argued against that free market economic growth would end up in increasing disparities. To substantiate this claim, the authors rejected the universal relevance of Myrdal's concept and referred to the geographically specific nature of the areas he had analyzed. As Borts and Stein (1964) put it: "Myrdal's argument is not general. It does not accord with the U.S. experience." (p. 7). The case of the United States became here decisive since Myrdal had concentrated on international trends and, for regional inequalities within a given country, on Europe. This selection was presented by Borts and Stein as a basic obstacle for understanding spatial inequalities in a free market. In their words: "Myrdal bases his conclusions concerning the effects of free capital movements upon the experiences of the developed and the underdeveloped countries" (p. 4). For them, this comparative analytical framework did not meet the requirements for "a free-market . . . characterized by free trade and free movements of productive services under conditions of full employment" (ibid.). In the view of Borts and Stein, the United States would be a much more feasible, or rather the only adequate, example:

"We believe that the experiences of the component states of the United States of America are more relevant for a test of a theory of growth in a free-market area than are the experiences of countries with *varying degrees of political instability and different restrictions upon private enterprise*. By studying the U.S. experience, we are holding the political factors relatively constant and we can focus our attention upon the market forces." (our emphases; Borts and Stein 1964, p. 4)

And "the land of opportunity", which was selected here by Borts and Stein as the geographical subject of their research, did not let the authors down. As they pointed out, citing the results of Easterlin (1958): "There has been a strong tendency for the convergence of per capita incomes among states within the United States. The evidence, therefore, is not compatible with Myrdal's theory of interregional differences in growth rates among open economies." (ibid.). With reference to

the neoclassical doctrine of stable equilibrium, they also added that “the U.S. interregional . . . growth pattern seems to be tending toward an intertemporal competitive equilibrium” (p. 214).

Thus, Borts and Stein came to a point different to that of Myrdal. Yet, they did not refute that in the countries observed by Myrdal spatial inequalities might change in accordance with his suggestions. Instead, they stressed that these countries constituted no adequate examples of a free economy. Based on this argument, Borts and Stein could pose the United States and its states as the only free market area, thus, the only subject of analysis to bring us further to the understanding of how spatial inequalities were shaped by spontaneous forces in a free market during the process of economic growth. And the United States proved feasible to illustrate the neoclassical assumption that inherent forces of the market *did indeed* promote spatial convergence if all hindrances were removed.

The argumentation of Borts and Stein had an obvious political suggestion since in the “headwind” of polarization theories it seemed to substantiate the neoclassical view, fully in line with US geopolitical interests, that arranging a free market was the only lasting solution to the challenge of spatial disparities. And the concept could also take advantage of its strong scientific image to “sell itself”. As has already been presented, the non-neoclassical concepts of spatial disparities in the 1950s and 1960s often suffered from the lack of a “tangible” substantiation. Williamson was actually the only exception to handle this problem in a sense that he utilized a remarkable statistical apparatus in his 1965 article (although the analysis of these data as well as the interpretation of results had serious shortcomings as was shown in Sect. 6.7.3).⁴⁴ Borts and Stein, however, could rely on various means that had for a long time provided to neoclassical economics the image of an “objective” and “hard” science. Their work included not simply a huge number of tables with statistical data, but also a great deal of sophisticated equations and coordinate systems with curves, representing how certain regularities functioned in an abstract algebraic world (Fig. 6.9).

The importance of such mathematical esthetic or “beauty” should not be underestimated given the post-war scientific context strongly dominated by natural and engineering sciences. In an era whose *zeitgeist* was dominated by a strong belief in the omnipotence of science, many had similar impressions to those of Paul Dirac, Nobel laureate in physics, who expressed his views in 1963 as follows: “It seems to be one of the fundamental features of nature that fundamental physical laws are described in terms of a *mathematical theory of great beauty and power*, needing quite a high standard of mathematics for one to understand it”. Dirac also stressed that in order to understand the world “it is more important to have beauty in one’s equations than to have them fit experiment” (our emphasis; Dirac 1963). This

⁴⁴ In fact, Singer (1961) also made an attempt to formulate Myrdal’s model of cumulative causation mathematically. Singer’s work, however, could only come to terms with some simple ideas of Myrdal, while it barely had anything to say to those many ideas that Myrdal derived from the main presumption of cumulative causation.

To prove that

$$w_y^* = 0 \tag{13}$$

recall the definition of the wage differential:

$$w_x = \gamma w_y$$

$$\gamma = \bar{\gamma}$$

From these we may write

$$w_x^* = \gamma^* + w_y^*$$

$$\gamma^* = 0$$

In addition, $w_x^* = 0$. Consequently, $w_y^* = 0$.

To prove that

$$K_x^* = L_x^* \tag{14}$$

write the capital market equilibrium condition, $\bar{r}\bar{P}_k = \bar{P}_x f_k$. Recall that $f_k^* = 0$. We may write $f_k^* = u_x Q_x^*$, where $Q_x \equiv L_x/K_x$, and u is the elasticity of the marginal productivity of capital. Since $Q_x^* = 0$, $L_x^* - K_x^* = 0$.

To prove that

$$K_y^* = L_y^* \quad P_y^* = 0 \quad Q_y^* = 0 \tag{15}$$

write the labor and capital equilibrium conditions for the domestic sector:

$$\bar{r}\bar{P}_k = P_y h_k$$

$$w_y = P_y h_L$$

Introducing percentage changes, we have

$$0 = P_y^* + h_k^* = P_y^* + u_y Q_y^*$$

where u_y is the elasticity of the marginal productivity of domestic sector capital. In addition,

$$0 = P_y^* + h_L^* = P_y^* + v_y Q_y^*$$

where v_y is the elasticity of the marginal productivity of domestic sector labor. In view of the fact that $u_y \neq v_y$, only zero values of P_y^* and Q_y^* will satisfy the above equations. Since $Q_y^* = 0$, $K_y^* = L_y^*$.

Fig. 6.9 The esthetic of mathematics in neoclassical concepts about spatial inequalities. A section from the proof by Borts and Stein (1964) about the equilibrium growth of economy. Reproduced by kind permission of George H. Borts. All rights reserved by the authors of the work

approach gained strong positions in social sciences as well, despite that an analogy between *physical* laws and *social* processes was far from obvious. And for spatial disparity research, the neoclassical approach had a considerable advantage over concepts of polarization theory in its ability of utilizing sophisticated mathematical apparatus.

No wonder that the book by Borts and Stein made a great hit with many economists, just as the Oxford neoclassical economist Wilfred Beckerman’s review indicated. He contrasted the “*agreed and tested* comprehensive model” (our emphasis) of Borts and Stein to “almost all contributions” to the issue of spatial inequalities, which he judged “theoretically self-contained and isolated” (Beckerman 1965, p. 822). In Beckerman’s eyes, the convincing power of the book was mainly based on the fact that it was “accompanied at every stage by

statistical tests of the assumptions adopted and hypotheses postulated” (our emphasis; *ibid.*). Thus, he called it “a very professional piece of work” to give “great satisfaction to those economists who believe that the job of most, though not all, economists should consist of the *continuous statistical verification of hypotheses* about the way things actually work” (our emphasis; *ibid.*). Furthermore, this scientific image seemed “resistant” to critiques that it was based on the statistics of an only country, the United States. Since Borts and Stein presented the USA as the ultimate example of a free market economy, they gave a theoretical substantiation as to why the regularities of spatial inequalities observed there could be (and only those could be) accepted universally for free market economy without being proved in other countries.

Yet, in the 1960s the neoclassical approach did not manage to get back to a leading position in spatial disparity research. However attractive the concept of Borts and Stein was to neoclassical eyes, it could not explain the dynamics of spatial inequalities in other countries, and its suggestions did not meet the everyday experience of those living in less “developed” areas. For this reason, the theories implying spatial polarization followed by convergence in a later phase dominated the spatial disparity discourse from the late fifties on.

6.9 Spatial Disparity Research in Capitalist Countries During the Cold War: An Epistemological Conclusion

After the end of the social survey movements and the concepts of the Chicago School of Sociology, the analysis of spatial disparities had not attracted great attention in the Western world. Although the issue had been problematized in the Marxist approach as early as before World War I, and it had played an important role in the criticism of capitalism, the capitalist world seemed to neglect the question. This situation only changed with the emergence of Cold War, but then at a remarkable pace.

In the new geopolitical context created by World War II, the emerging Western Bloc had to enter the spatial disparity discourse for various reasons. First, although spatial inequality was not a new phenomenon, the collapse of the colonial empires brought into being many new independent political entities that experienced these disparities as harmful. This was similarly true for the divide between these countries and the “rich” ones, and for inequalities the “poor” countries faced within their boundaries. In fact, both forms of spatial disparities seemed possible to breed unrest and undermine political stability. Thus, the Western Bloc also had firm geopolitical interests in handling the danger posed by them. Moreover, the Soviet Union, trying to establish a transcontinental sphere of influence, utilized the issue of spatial inequalities as a main argument against capitalism in the global rivalry for former colonies. And since the superpowers could barely express their claimed superiority over one another in direct military actions, alternative “battlefields”

gained much in importance. This was especially true in the field of science and culture, and not exclusively with regard to the space race and other spheres of engineering. For both the United States and the Soviet Union it became crucial to radiate the image of a competent power, which was able due to its social, economic and political systems to help other countries in solving their problems better than anybody else could. From this the superpowers expected that the intelligentsia of countries in the geopolitical vacuum would stand on their side. Thus, the spatial disparity discourse soon became a battlefield between the two blocs.

Due to this, even in the Western Bloc spatial disparity research was not only about describing and explaining inequalities in space. Its point was much more than to improve our understanding of the world and to contribute to humankind's common scientific knowledge. Spatial disparity research also gained an important role in expressing the ability of one's "own" system to cope with spatial polarization, now regarded as a problem both in capitalist and communist countries. This objective could be best served in two ways. First, from the view of geopolitical interests, theories were especially useful if they revealed why the "friendly" system was possible, or even determined to solve the problem of spatial disparities, and why the "enemy" system lacked this ability. In other words, a crucial point was to create and radiate a positive image about the self, which could give a firm orientation to the potential reader. This was a process of making the identity of the self ("those who solve spatial disparities") and presenting it to others in order to convince them to adopt the same identity and the same political and economic system. Second, to raise the efficiency of this identity-creating process, theories had to have a strong convincing power. And this was the point for science to enter the field of geopolitical struggles. In fact, the legitimate authority of science was a forceful means to justify the claims and interests of "us" and de-legitimize the claims and interests of "them", the enemy. For this reason, geopolitically feasible concepts about spatial inequalities could best be created by scientists, and in a way that their scientific quality could become clear. It was a direct outcome of this consideration that both neoclassical and non-neoclassical works were written in a way to radiate scientific substantiation.

Still, there was an important difference between neoclassical and non-neoclassical approaches. Although both were strong in radiating scientific image, neoclassical concepts proved obviously weaker in coming to terms with the rapid polarization many "underdeveloped" countries witnessed in those years. Thus, even if the political suggestion of the neoclassical stable equilibrium doctrine was in accordance with political interests of the Western bloc, non-neoclassical concepts seemed much more capable of convincingly presenting US-manufactured orientation knowledge to the former colonies. In the light of this it seems no wonder that polarization theories underwent a rapid boom in the 1950s and 1960s, and that they obviously gained the leading position in the spatial disparity discourse before the neoclassical approach.

Chapter 7

Spatial Disparity Research After the Initial Decades of Cold War: End of the “Golden Age”

In the last few sections we showed that the spatial disparity discourse gained greatly in importance in the post-World War II context, where it became a sort of battlefield between the two superpowers and the political and economic blocks they led. These years witnessed the emergence of new approaches, new concepts, and new empirical results that threw new light on many aspects of spatial disparities, even if they had important shortcomings. This “golden age” seemed to be over, however, after 2 decades. Gradually but tendentially, the political attention paid to the issue began to decline. The debate over theoretical aspects lost especially much in its vividness. The “big science” like investigation of spatial inequalities aimed at a universal explanation of underlying mechanisms and the formulation of “great theories” tended to withdraw to relatively peripheral domains in scientific research. These changes were caused by various political, social, and economic reasons, which are worth being analyzed one by one.

7.1 Reasons for the Decline in the Spatial Disparity Discourse

7.1.1 *Changing Circumstances in Global Geopolitics*

The first reason for a relative decline in the spatial disparity discourse was that the “rush” of superpowers on countries in the geopolitical vacuum gradually cooled down. The first part of the 1960s witnessed a dramatic boom in the number of newly proclaimed independent countries in former colonial areas (Fig. 7.1). Between 1945 and 1959, 19 former colonies with a total area of 13.56 million km² had proclaimed their independence. At the end of 1960, the same values were 37 and 25.47 million km² respectively, increasing to 64 countries and 32.27 million km² by 1968. By the end of the decade, the most intensive part of decolonization was already over. Without a doubt, the number of newly liberated countries increased again in the




Fig. 7.1 Cumulated number and areal extension of liberated non-self-governing territories and trust territories of the United Nations (1945–1990). Design by author based on data from the United Nations (n.d.), with statistics about area from the CIA (n.d.) and Fraga de Azevedo (1958)

second part of the 1970s, but the geopolitical relevance of this “second wave” was rather moderate relative to the boom in the early 1960s. On the one hand, among the 24 countries proclaiming their independence during the 1970s, only seven were larger than 30,000 km², three of which (Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique) became independent after the collapse of Portugal’s colonial empire. Thus, the proclamation of independence in these areas exerted no serious influence on the global status quo. On the other hand, many new countries were not only small in area and population, but their geopolitical orientation was stable. Among the 24 new countries established in the 1970s, ten were islands and archipelagos formerly belonging to the British crown, and remaining within the British sphere of influence under the aegis of the Commonwealth. Consequently, although they became members of international politics due to the “one vote for each country” principle in the United Nations, their still stable orientation towards the United Kingdom precluded a rivalry for them among the superpowers. Due to these factors, the number and political importance of newly proclaimed countries that might have hesitated about which global bloc to join radically decreased from the late 1960s onwards.

Furthermore, the initial period when the superpowers struggled to turn some already independent countries with instable political orientation towards themselves also ended as the fierce rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union gradually became more tolerant and predictable. In the years directly after World War II, the USSR pursued an expansive international policy, while the whole Eastern Bloc prepared for a new world war that Stalin regarded as unavoidable. It was also under such circumstances that President Eisenhower formulated his “falling domino principle”.

After the death of Stalin, however, the succeeding Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev made considerable changes in Soviet foreign policy, and put “peaceful coexistence” at its forefront (Molotov et al. 1998[1957]; quoted in Ivanov 2002, p. 324). This resulted in several important symbolic steps. The 1955 Geneva Summit had been the first such occasion since 1945 where both the Soviet General Secretary and the US President were present. In 1959, then US Vice President Richard Nixon made a visit to the USSR, which Khrushchev replied with a journey to the United States in the same year. In fact, this slow process of cautious opening was temporarily blocked after the U-2 Gary Powers incident over the Soviet Union in 1960, and the erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis. This “hot” phase of the Cold War, however, did not last for long. The political crises could be settled through negotiations, and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ratified in 1963 by both superpowers indicated the beginning of a new phase of “peaceful coexistence”. From these years onwards, US–Soviet relations were indeed characterized by more mutuality and composure than before, even during the late 1960s and 1970s under Brezhnev’s reign.

This tendency was also mirrored by the optimism of a number of newly emerging political and economic theories of convergence between the capitalist and socialist worlds. These works went back to the concept of Tinbergen (1961), which came into being shortly after the first phase of post-Stalinist rapprochement in Western and Eastern Bloc politics. Tinbergen as well as his followers argued in the light of tendencies in global politics that the superpowers necessarily tended to move in similar directions and thus, closer to one another (Kneissel 1974). Of course, each bloc still made serious efforts to prevent any country within its sphere of influence to split with its current political order. This notion was made clear during the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, for instance. The main goal was, however, less to expand, thus, to convince new countries (and their intelligentsia) about the desirability of one system or the other, but rather to sustain the status quo. And under these circumstances theoretical concepts about spatial inequalities no longer had the same propagandistic relevance as they had in the past.

7.1.2 Opening Up in Soviet Sciences: The End of Antagonistic Rivalry in the Scientific Cold War

As was presented in the last section, the need for the dissemination of politically relevant orientation knowledge decreased with changes in international geopolitical relations. Meanwhile, the expectation of Western scholars to present feasible concepts about spatial disparities in order to react to Soviet theories likewise decreased. This was because in the USSR the creation of corresponding theories of their own, purely Marxist-Leninist conceptual basis radically declined after the Stalinist era. This is a remarkable fact since the question of spatial disparities did not lose its relevance for social sciences in the Soviet Union. These issues were still

important for many reasons. Of course, speaking about spatial disparities produced by socialism was a forbidden project since the “proportional development of national economy” (even in terms of space) was regarded as fulfilled in the Eastern Bloc. But in regional planning great emphasis was placed on how to avoid through “conscious planning” the emergence of new inequalities (cf. Lavrov et al. 1979).

Such activity did not contradict Stalinist ideology, which did not argue that socialist economy would have been free from processes that could result in disparities if left uncontrolled. Instead, the general claim was that these processes were not absent and that they could only be regulated and balanced by permanent state control. This was clearly explained by Kozlovsky (1954) in the example of sectoral imbalances. For him, these were to some extent also present in the socialist economy, although he drew a strong dividing line between imbalances in socialist and capitalist countries. In his eyes, the imbalances of capitalism were “antagonistic”, inherent in and inseparable from the capitalist order. Hence, their elimination was only possible through a socialist revolution. Imbalances in socialism, however, were presented as “nonantagonistic”, meaning that they were not inherent in the socialist order. Instead, they were regarded to mirror that planning had still not reached the level of efficiency where unbalancing tendencies were blocked before they could emerge. In Marxist-Leninist interpretation this did not mean that socialism produced disparities. “Nonantagonistic” imbalances were rather considered as signs of the occurrence of challenging tendencies that could still be eliminated by a rapidly reacting planning mechanism before they would have resulted in inequalities.

In other words, Marxist-Leninist theoreticians did not deny that even some tendencies in socialism might lead to disparities if left uncontrolled.¹ What they argued was instead that in socialism conscious planning kept these tendencies under control. But such an argumentation also suggested that the emergence of spatial disparities could only be avoided by a competent system of planning. And a planning process was only efficient if it permanently paid attention to processes that possibly, if left unconsidered, could fuel inequalities. Thus, the issue of disparities could not be neglected in planning. Besides, Soviet theoreticians of spatial planning also had interests in regional policy in Western countries. The main goal here was to identify what could reasonably be adapted to Soviet practice. Hence, several works focused on the achievements and shortcomings of regional policy in capitalist countries (see Lavrov et al. 1979).

For the reasons mentioned above, research on spatial inequalities was crucial in Soviet planners’ eyes to avoid the emergence of disparities within their country. Moreover, they also found the issue important because it constituted a serious problem in many former colonial countries, already belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence. In these cases Soviet experts tried to identify possible solutions for the

¹These tendencies were expected to fully disappear only in communism, the final stage of socialism, where the state itself was also claimed to cease to exist since absolutely losing its function.

problem of extreme spatial inequality inherited from the colonial regime (see Lavrov et al. 1979). This objective, together with its underlying necessity, also guaranteed that spatial disparity as a topic of research could not be exiled from Soviet social sciences.

To sum it up, the problem of spatial inequalities remained of high importance for researchers in the Eastern Bloc. Why is it then that the number of essentially Marxist-Leninist concepts about the issue radically declined, and that accessible Western theories were hardly challenged by new Soviet “rivals”? The answer is that theoreticians in the USSR gradually began to adopt Western concepts instead of creating new ones on a profoundly Marxist-Leninist ideological basis. This phenomenon was an outcome of general changes in science in the USSR.

In fact, Soviet sciences became highly isolated during the late 1940s as Stalin wanted to promote the scientific autarchy of the Soviet Union. In the late years of his reign, as the Cold War began and relations to the former World War II allies got worse, many international links in science were broken “to develop a spirit of Soviet patriotism among Soviet scientists” (Pollock 2006, p. 82). Likewise, it was a goal to protect Soviet science from “alien ideology” (cited in Gerovitch 2001, p. 270) possibly, even if implicitly, transmitting unwanted political views, and to defend the scientific achievements of the USSR from Western espionage (ibid.).² For these reasons, “cosmopolitan”, “bourgeois”, and “reactionary” forms of knowledge were strictly exiled from the domain of Soviet science. Furthermore, the use of schematic models and mathematics, which became essential in virtually all disciplines in the West, including spatial disparity research, was especially unwanted in Stalinist social sciences (Barnes 2008; cf. Gerovitch 2001). This was because model-based and mathematized research was regarded as “formalist”, which is about “never ending investigations of details” and “analysis of small formal questions”. In communist eyes, such “formalism” was aimed to hide “the content and the process behind form”, thus, especially in social sciences to turn attention away from the basic “contradictions of capitalism” and to serve capitalist interests (Markos 1955, p. 362).

The drive to autarchy was, however, soon given up after Stalin’s death, for two major reasons. First, as the old and cruel First Secretary died, scientists in the USSR began to urge for changes in academic life since they saw Soviet science falling behind its US counterpart in many spheres. This was most loudly argued by nuclear physicists, standing on the top of the day’s academic hierarchy in the Soviet Union due to their decisive contribution to the USSR becoming a nuclear power. As they put it as early as 1954, “research in a number of general fields of nuclear physics in the Soviet Union has lagged considerably behind analogous research in foreign countries” (Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences 1954, quoted in Ivanov 2002, p. 322). Since many scientists had similar opinion in various disciplines, they argued for giving up isolation and opening window on Western research (Ivanov

² Although “autarchy” was not apparent since in practice it proved compatible with widespread Soviet espionage in the capitalist countries, especially in nuclear research.

2002). Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership realized that the country was lagging significantly behind the United States in many spheres of technological development. Without a doubt, Khrushchev's trip to the United States was an especially important event in this respect. There he was able to see that, in spite of Soviet achievements in the space program and missile technology, the American superpower still had a considerable advantage in many branches of science and engineering. Thus, the goal in Soviet scientific policy was no longer to break almost all links with the West, but to adopt its useful research findings as soon as possible in order to promote "technological progress" in the USSR. As a remarkable consequence of this ideological change, the Soviet publishing house *Mir* began the translation of foreign scientific books in large quantity. At the same time, the Institute of Scientific-Technological Information (INION) was established to review and abstract international scientific literature (Ivanov 2002). Furthermore, this opening up in scientific life did not end when Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964. His successor, Leonid Brezhnev also argued for a broader application of state-of-art methods in science and technology. This issue gained great emphasis as early as in the first party congress he chaired in 1966 (Saushkin 1971), and at least at the level of propaganda it remained in the forefront of Soviet objectives over the next one-and-a-half decades as well (cf. Brezhnev 1977). In order not to fall seriously behind the United States in terms of military and economy, a sharp increase in productivity was regarded as necessary, which seemed impossible without rapid technical progress (cf. Gerasimov, 1971). Thus, Brezhnev argued for a "scientific-technological revolution" in the USSR. And unlike many other key figures in party leadership, he was convinced that this "revolution" could only be carried through with the adoption of most modern Western technologies and scientific achievements (Hoffmann 1978).

These tendencies opened up new vistas for spatial disparity research as well, although here the adoption of Western concepts necessitated a total ideological turnaround on attitudes toward modeling and the application of mathematical methods. Instead of judging these methods "formalist" and "capitalism-serving", Soviet geographers needed to find out now how to bring mainstream Western concepts and model-building in line with their own philosophy of research and the former political expectations they had had to meet. The task was not easy, but researchers managed to complete it through two strategies. This is well exemplified by changes in Soviet geography, which played a decisive role in spatial planning in the USSR. First, Soviet geographers tended to "de-ideologize" state-of-art Western models, a strategy otherwise present in virtually all disciplines at that time (cf. Gerovitch 2001). This meant that models created by capitalist scientists were presented as having a certain capability of creating *objective* knowledge about the objective world, independently from the political interests of the country in which they emerged. A typical example is that Zaytsev (1971), for instance, wrote about British quantitative geographer Richard Chorley, a pioneer of modeling in the discipline, as to have "worked out a logical model simulating the *objective* world" (our emphasis; Zaytsev 1971, p. 84). Second, many scientists tried to show that modeling and mathematization were actually not contrary to, but in

concert with, instructions of great thinkers of Marxism-Leninism. For example, the prominent Soviet economic geographer Yulian Saushkin (1971) from Moscow State University referred to the nineteenth century French Marxist journalist Paul Lafargue, according to whom “Marx held that science reached its highest level only if it succeeded in making use of mathematics” (quoted in Saushkin 1971, p. 416). Without quoting concrete texts, Saushkin also stressed that “Lenin. . . underscored the role played by mathematics in scientific research” (ibid.).

After this theoretical re-orientation and in accordance with actual directives of the Party leadership, Western spatial models began to infiltrate into Soviet geography.³ In the 1960s several “formalist” theoretical works from capitalist countries were translated into Russian. With a time lag of only few years, fundamental methodological works of Walter Isard (1960), William Bunge (1962), Peter Haggett (1965) and Richard Chorley (Chorley and Haggett 1967) became accessible for Soviet researchers in their native language (cf. Isard 1966; Bunge 1967; Haggett 1968; Chorley and Haggett 1971). Moreover, some German predecessors of post-war Western spatial economics and quantitative geography also found their way to Soviet publishing houses through American intermediation. The locational theory of August Lösch (1940), for example, entered Russian language scientific literature in 1959 (Lösch 1959), only 5 years after its English edition (Lösch 1954) had been released. After initial steps, model-building and the use of mathematical methods rapidly gained importance in Soviet spatial research. During the 1960s Soviet authors discussed and argued for the use of models and mathematical analysis in a number of books and essays (cf. Jensen and Karaska 1969a; Mathieson 1969). As Jensen and Karaska (1969b) pointed out, among more than 500 articles in leading Soviet geographical journals monitored by editors of the US translation journal *Soviet Geography*, mathematical articles were almost non-existent in 1960, but already made up some 15 % of all essays in 1968. In some years, Soviet authors could already conclude that “mathematical modeling appears to have found widest application in economic geography” (Saushkin 1971, p. 425). And this was no longer regarded as “deviance” from Marxist-Leninist fundamentals, but as “a general advance in the development of scientific thought” (Pokshishevkiy et al. 1971, p. 404).

The thorough reorientation in Soviet geographical research and the rising star of modeling and mathematical analysis had serious influence on the international

³ Although Soviet researchers still had to make some compromises while adopting Western concepts, at least in symbolic issues. A typical example is that Peter Haggett’s *Locational Analysis in Human Geography* was published in Russian under a somewhat different title: *Spatial analysis in economic geography*. This was since Marxist-Leninist theoreticians rejected the term “human geography”, which they initially stigmatized as “capitalism-serving pseudoscience”. For this reason, all geographical subdisciplines dealing with non-physical issues were lumped together as “economic geography” in the Soviet Union, and actually in the whole Eastern Bloc (cf. Gyuris and Gyóri 2013). This ideological difference was so decisive in Soviet geographers’ eyes that it could not be given up until the collapse of the communist superpower in 1991. Thus, Western concepts were sometimes renamed while being translated into Russian in order to emphasize their “compatibility” with Soviet scientific approaches and to justify their adoption.

spatial disparity discourse as well. In fact, Western theoretical concepts about spatial inequalities from the 1950s and 1960s were allowed to enter Soviet social sciences and they soon gained reputation there. Soviet researchers concentrated not on the implicit (or sometimes explicit) political suggestions these theories made (and which were presented in Sects. 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8), but on their “objective” (thus, [geo]politically insensitive) findings and suggestions about the link between economic growth and spatial disparities. From the aspect of the spatial disparity discourse these tendencies efficiently reduced the pressure on Soviet theoreticians to create feasible concepts *against* Western ones, which likewise eroded the same motivation for Western scholars. It was no longer necessary to create concepts which explicitly or at least implicitly mediated orientation knowledge to balance countervailing Soviet works since those themselves had become strongly influenced by and (to some extent) receptive to Western ideas.

7.1.3 Changing Economic and Social Attitudes: Devaluation of Spatial Equality as a Desirable Goal

Significant changes in the global geopolitical context as well as the ideological reorientation in Soviet spatial research radically decreased the geopolitical relevance of the spatial disparity discourse, so as the political need for new concepts in the West. Thus, the discourse gradually lost much in political importance from the 1960s onwards. But this was not the only reason for devaluation. Significant changes in prevailing economic and social attitudes also played an important role here. After World War II, spatial inequalities attracted attention foremost for the considerable geopolitical relevance of the issue. Spatial polarization was an obvious challenge in many “poor” countries, which posed a considerable threat to political stability. That was the main reason why the Western Bloc also had to consider spatial disparity a problem to be solved. But besides these geopolitical aspects, due to the intensifying economic competition between the superpowers the link between spatial disparity and overall economic growth also became a topical issue.

For a long time, the main objective had been in capitalist countries to promote economic growth, which had been seen as key to increasing the material well-being of the population. The thought that spatial disparity itself might be an obstacle for growth barely emerged. Instead, especially in the United States, a certain level of economic differences between various regions had rather been judged as desirable due to its claimed implication of fostering competition and, consequently, increasing overall output. After the beginning of Cold War and with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower, however, this approach did not seem as evident as it had before. For Western analysts and decision-makers this was actually the first time to witness the remarkable achievements of an economic system that paid a lot of attention to the issue of spatial disparities. Of course, due to limited information

and the overall secrecy about Soviet reality, capitalist countries could not easily determine whether the communist regime was efficient in decreasing spatial disparities or not. Yet, the vast number of large-scale construction projects (irrigation works, erection of gigantic dams etc.) in remote areas of the Soviet Union suggested that the communist superpower had indeed made remarkable achievements in spatial equalization. And the fact that the USSR managed to become one of the two leading powers of the world in less than 3 decades after its proclamation indicated for many in the West that its economic system might be much more competitive than had been thought before. In fact, then secret background analyses show clearly that the US leadership had quite a realistic awareness of the actual economic advantage its own country had compared to the Soviet Union (cf. NSC 1950). But it was highly questionable in the light of remarkable Soviet achievements in many fields whether the Western world could maintain this advantage. And this uncertainty only increased after the Sputnik crisis in 1957, when the USSR took the lead unexpectedly in a decisive high-tech sector.

Considering all these factors, it did not seem impossible that certain methods in socialist economic organization could work well (even better than their Western counterparts) and that it would be reasonable for capitalist countries to adopt some of them. In consequence, stronger state intervention in the economy, the establishment and operation of an elaborate planning system, or even putting greater emphasis on the objective of “even spatial development” could be judged as having positive implications on economic growth, possibly in capitalist countries as well. It is certainly more than pure coincidence that soon after the Soviet Union’s emergence as a superpower socialist-type philosophy gradually appeared in many issues in Western countries. Spatial disparity research was no exception. In the United States, for instance, the Kennedy administration virtually moved to the direction of regarding spatial inequality as a definite hindrance to overall economic growth (see Friedmann and Alonso 1975; Glasmeier 2002). This philosophical shift gave further impetus to research about spatial inequalities as well as to practical steps in spatial planning. An outcome of this tendency in the United States was the establishment of brand new planning institutions, namely the Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA) in 1961 and the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in 1965 (cf. Glasmeier and Wood 2005). In the same period, regional planning also witnessed a boom in most Western European countries (cf. Keeble 1967).

In sum, from the point of view of spatial disparity research, the achievements of the Soviet Union meant for many in the capitalist countries that an economic model to put great stress on spatial equilibrium might be more efficient in promoting growth in the long term. This presumption was a result of the image of the USSR as a rapidly strengthening rival in the global competition for technological superiority. But for the same reason, the belief that certain peculiar methods of Soviet-type economic management might be competitive and worthwhile to be adopted in the West dissolved as soon as the communist superpower seemed to fail in getting closer to the capitalist world. And that is what happened in the 1970s.

In fact, some economic failures in the Eastern Bloc had already become visible earlier for Western observers. Such an example was when droughts and the consequent fall in agricultural production led to food shortages in the Soviet Union in 1963, which could only be handled by Khrushchev through purchasing a considerable amount of food from the world market. Furthermore, since attempts to increase productivity in Soviet agriculture failed to reach their goal, the country remained a net importer of grain in the succeeding decades (Golubev and Dronin 2004). These problems, however, occurred in a period when the USSR had enormous success in many branches of science and engineering, e.g. in the space and military industry. Therefore, certain challenges in agriculture could rather seem in Western eyes as smaller and maybe temporary difficulties in a country otherwise fully competitive in several highly prestigious high-tech sectors. But this image soon went stale, and not only because the United States finally won the space race by landing on the Moon in 1969.

Besides this issue of enormous symbolic importance, in the 1970s it became clear for Western observers that the Soviet Union and the whole Eastern Bloc had reached the limits of its growth potential. The Communist Bloc simply failed to accumulate sufficient financial resources to cover the costs of future technological development and the further increase in the material standard of living of its population. Reducing the pace of technological development would have, however, rapidly eroded the power of Soviet military force, while a significant and enduring decrease in the standard of living would have catastrophically undermined the power of the system. Hence, the Soviet Bloc had no other opportunity than to get credit from the Western world, which led to a rapidly increasing rate of indebtedness. Within just the first 5 years after 1970, formerly rather moderate medium- and long-term hard currency debt of the Soviet Union to the West multiplied by 3.9 in real terms, and tripled in Soviet satellite countries (Fig. 7.2).

In the light of such serious indebtedness, which was visible for Western decision-makers as well, the Soviet economic model clearly turned out to be uncompetitive with its capitalist counterpart in the long term. The consequence was a fast devaluation of Soviet economic methods in Western eyes, which motivated most mainstream thinkers and decision-makers in the latter to break with adopting and experimenting with socialist-type solutions that had seemed relevant even 1 decade before. This shift also concerned the political discourse of spatial disparities, which was pushed in the background soon in favor of focusing on maximizing growth, even if with disparities in space.

The need for such a reorientation became even greater after the oil crisis in 1973, when Keynesian philosophy operating with strong state measures in the economy seemed to fail in coping with economic decline and re-launching economic growth. In this context the fear of massive stagflation (low growth accompanied by high inflation and unemployment) also contributed to a conceptual shift where the stress on spatial equalization became undervalued relative to the urge to promote growth. It speaks volumes about the implication of these changes how the spatial focus of EDA changed in the United States in the 1970s.

	1970	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
<i>Billion US\$, nominal</i>								
Soviet Union	1.9	5.0	10.0	14.0	16.0	16.5	17.2	17.5
Soviet satellite countries	4.6	13.1	19.1	25.7	31.7	46.9	53.8	61.9
Eastern Bloc (total)	6.5	18.1	29.1	39.7	47.7	63.4	71.0	79.4
<i>Billion US\$, real (in prices of 1980)</i>								
Soviet Union	3.8	8.0	14.7	19.2	20.4	19.8	19.0	17.5
Soviet satellite countries	9.2	21.1	28.2	35.2	40.4	56.3	59.4	61.9
Eastern Bloc (total)	13.0	29.1	42.9	54.4	60.7	76.1	78.4	79.4

Fig. 7.2 Medium- and long-term hard currency gross debt to the West in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Nominal values adapted from Bunce (1985), p. 39. Values in real prices are our calculations based on historical deflators released by the US Office of Management and Budget (2010), p. 210 (Following the method of Glasmeier and Wood (2005), historical deflators are taken from the category “total non-defense composite outlay deflators”)

The organization had initially followed the “worst first” principle, where financial means had been focused on the economically most distressed areas, basically in the rural countryside. With the 1970s, however, the focus shifted towards urban centers, where decision-makers expected from investments stronger positive effects and a more efficient contribution to national growth objectives, even if with less spatial convergence (Glasmeier and Wood 2005).

The normative devaluation of spatial equality as an objective was, however, not only an outcome of “tangible” problems in the Soviet system, and this devaluation not only happened at the level of mainstream political and economic analysts and decision-makers. In fact, normative changes were much more profound and actually concerned the whole society. After having been a major slogan for several decades, the concept of equality (whether in a social or spatial sense) lost much in popularity in the 1970s. The controversies of the preceding decades challenged the desirability of being equal in the eyes of many. For a long time, the term equality had represented the belief in a world where nobody would be excluded from humane life, neither in terms of law nor economic well-being. But after several decades of mass production, increased state control and a high level of bureaucratization, the same term rather seemed to radiate boring uniformity and the fall of the individual. The normative evaluation of the achievements in this era both for material and non-material spheres became disputed. Many tended to consider the legendary words of Henry Ford that “any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is black” (Ford and Crowther 1922, p. 71) as a forced limitation of individual opportunities in material issues, such as in consumption (cf. Harvey 1990; Moulaert and Swyngedouw 1989). Instead of praising the technical development and the mass increase in the efficiency of production, the whole period became gradually reinterpreted to where the profit interests of influential investors and the notion of state bureaucracy to make society easy to control overrode the humane aspects of individuals. This was also mirrored by the term

“Fordism”,⁴ which the Italian Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci (1971) newly introduced with regard to the economic and social circumstances of the preceding decades.

Meanwhile, non-material effects of Fordism also attracted increasing criticism. Many began to regard well-organized bureaucratic apparatuses and main economic producers merely to serve blurred “national interests” even at the cost of severely confronting fundamental individual values. In the Western world, the Vietnam War as a high-tech superpower’s intervention to crush down in another country a political movement backed by the majority of local population especially questioned moral values propagated by the political and economic elite. Instead supporting state attempts to ensure that everyone was fitted into a general paternalistic vision, the right of the individual to one’s own will and own choice came to the forefront in public thinking (cf. Johnston 1978).

For these factors, the attractiveness of the Fordist concept of equality radically decreased, which also catalyzed the relative devaluation of spatial equality as a political problem. Without a doubt, the critics of this interpretation of (spatial) inequality did not form a homogeneous group. Instead, several new competing approaches emerged with regard to the issue, which will be described in the forthcoming section together with their consequences. But these approaches were actually common in refusing most notions having led to the boom of concepts on spatial inequality in the 1950s and 1960s. And this change in the public opinion tended to take the wind out of the sails of the spatial disparity discourse and related theoretical research.

7.1.4 Ambiguities Over the Validity of Scientific Concepts About Spatial Disparities

Besides significant changes in the overall geopolitical, social and economic contexts, theoretical research about spatial disparities in general was also challenged by numerous doubts emerging about the validity of the concepts it had produced. In fact, this does not mean that such concepts had been regarded before by everyone as the source of ultimate “truth” and that they suddenly became exposed to harsh criticism in the 1970s. The process of “disillusioning” was much more gradual and complex, and less one-sided. To understand the underlying mechanisms, it is reasonable to consider some findings in Moran’s (2005) analysis

⁴ When using the terms “Fordism” and, for the succeeding period, “post-Fordism” in this essay, we are not intending to suggest that these would cover two separate eras with profoundly different social and economic regimes. In fact, we agree with those claiming that in our era Fordist and post-Fordist elements of economic and social organization coexist (see Peck and Tickell 1994). Our point is simply to differentiate between the postwar era, which Harvey (1990) called “high Fordism”, and the succeeding period, which two are usually differentiated in geographical literature as the decades of “Fordism” and “post-Fordism” (cf. Faulconbridge 2009a, b).

about the changing reputation of Kuznets' inverted U curve concept regarding the dynamics of social inequalities. Kuznets' model was basically a product of the same context that gave a push to spatial inequality research in the first 2 decades after World War II. Thus, the main factors contributing to its acceptance or denial were generally similar to those shaping the spatial disparity discourse. For this reason, the changing reputation of Kuznets' thoughts can be regarded to a considerable extent as analogous with the afterlife of concepts about spatial inequalities from the 1950s and 1960s.

As Moran underscores, the reception of Kuznets' hypothesis underwent serious changes after the model was first published in 1955. With regard to these changes, one can identify three main periods in the afterlife of the concept. The first phase lasted from the mid-1950s until the late 1970s, and witnessed the reputation of Kuznets' model rapidly increasing. A large number of scientific articles focused on various aspects of the concept and, after providing some "solid empirical support" (Cutright 1967, p. 578) through statistical analysis, confirmed its main suggestions. Thus, Kuznets' hypothesis became a "black box" (Latour and Woolgar 1986), "so widely accepted throughout the social sciences that its existence was seen as a matter of fact, and the processes that created it were considered lawlike" (Moran 2005, p. 214). This evolution could take place in spite of the fact that Kuznets himself regarded his own work in his 1955 article merely as speculative. As he put it: "This paper is perhaps 5 per cent empirical information and 95 *per cent speculation*, some if it possibly tainted by wishful thinking." (our emphasis; Kuznets 1955, p. 26). That the concept still became considered as a "universal fact" was mainly the outcome of its specific social, political and scientific context. As Moran (2005) points out, Kuznets' suggestions were in line with most theories and implicit assumptions in economics of the time, thus, they fit *zeitgeist*. Furthermore, they seemed to give ammunition to decision-makers strongly influenced by developmentalism, who could now refer to the concept as a scientific substantiation to their objectives. In the light of Kuznets' work, the claim that large-scale development projects in poor countries would create in the long term the overall well-being of population seemed scientifically substantiated. In other words, politicians and developmentalist planners saw the concept to justify what they were actually doing. For these reasons, Kuznets' model was "caught up" and enjoyed broad reputation.

The second phase in the afterlife of the concept began with the 1970s and became dominant from the 1980s on. In these years, many new research projects tended to question the universal relevance of Kuznets' inverted U curve. Many authors identified considerable challenges concerning both methodological and conceptual issues, including underlying theoretical presumptions. As a result, the concept lost its image as "a matter of universal fact"; in Moran's words, the "black box" was "opened" (ibid., p. 220). This did not mean a definite rejection of the model. It remained regarded as an important theoretical achievement, but one being valid rather in specific contexts than universally. Severe criticism was first leveled at the model only in the mid-1990s, which in Moran's view opened up the third phase in the concept's afterlife. In fact, Kuznets' findings were not one-sidedly

driven to the periphery within the domain of social sciences. Instead, while there was no longer an obstacle for open criticism and this opportunity was taken by many authors, others remained less adverse or even sympathetic to the concept. Still, Kuznets' model ended being a theoretical construct tendentiously praised by everyone.

The reasons for this "opening of the black box" were, however, rather complex. What is especially important for us now is that this "demystification" cannot be regarded simply as an outcome of scientific ambiguities emerging about the concept. Moran underscores that most academic debates due to which Kuznets' model faced increasing criticism in the 1980s had already been present in the 1970s and even in the 1960s. Thus, the main considerations now getting used to criticize the inverted U model were essentially not new in the 1980s. The only novelty was that Kuznets' work did not remain intact after these critiques. This was again a result of changes in the general context. As Moran points out, the gradual fall of the developmentalist project in the 1970s left its main underlying or justifying concepts exposed to open criticism. The shield of political belief in the righteousness of developmentalism was no longer able to defend Kuznets' hypothesis against critiques already present in academic debates, yet not directly turned towards the inverted U concept before.⁵ In the reception of Kuznets' concept this shift put an end to the era of being a "black box" and introduced the phase of "questionability". Furthermore, it opened the way later for a lively and often critical debate about the concept, with many (yet by far not all) authors definitely arguing against it.

In the case of spatial inequality concepts from the postwar period one can see similar tendencies. For neoclassical models, they were considered as relevant and useful in the initial years since they were the only accessible conceptual framework to explain and interpret spatial disparities in a simple way. In fact, for a long time it had already been clear for many economists (e.g. for Veblen and Keynes), that the whole underlying neoclassical worldview was unrealistic e.g. for its rational choice theory and stable equilibrium doctrine. It was even more obvious for geographers, who had realized that the implicit assumption of the homogeneity of space was erroneous well before similar criticism emerged within the domain of economics. These should have made obvious that the ability of neoclassical concepts to give relevant insight into the nature of spatial disparities was strongly limited. Still, they remained unchallenged until the second part of the 1950s as they were backed by a huge number of acknowledged researchers and by the need of Cold War politics for "hard" explanations in social sciences. Furthermore, they had no rivals since a non-neoclassical interpretation of inequalities in space was missing. In general, this period basically corresponded with the first phase of the afterlife of Kuznets'

⁵ We find it necessary to stress here that in our view the decline of developmentalism was not the ultimate reason for the changing interpretation of Kuznets' hypothesis. Instead this decline itself was also an outcome of other, more general shifts in the general geopolitical, social and economic context, which we present in the current section. This remark, however, does not affect the essence of Moran's argumentation about the complex mechanisms that can place a concept on a pedestal just as they might exile it from the domain of science.

concept in Moran's (2005) view. Then, as the amount of challenging empirical findings increased and the potential of neoclassical concepts to offer feasible solutions to countries facing huge inequalities was questioned, researchers as well as scientists became strongly interested in the creation of new models. This notion brought into being a number of non-neoclassical concepts beginning with the late 1950s, which pushed neoclassical models to the periphery in the domain of social disparity research. But neoclassical interpretations still did not disappear totally as is well mirrored by the reaction of Borts and Stein (1964) to polarization models. Without a doubt, Borts & Stein could not balance the dominance of non-neoclassical concepts which had become by then an obvious fact in spatial disparity research. Yet, the approach they represented remained present, even if far from the mainstream.

The history of non-neoclassical concepts was not dissimilar. In the first years after their publication they were followed by a great many papers that claimed to verify the original concepts. As Keeble (1967) reveals, Myrdal's work with its suggestions about cumulative causation and increasing spatial polarization received strong and explicit support in a number of studies (e.g. Baer 1964; Brandenburg 1964; Cairncross 1959; Lasuén 1962; Pred 1965; Spencer 1960; Wonnacott 1964; or from the side of theory: Kaldor 1970) soon after it had been released. Furthermore, many authors claimed their empirical results to substantiate the thoughts of Myrdal and Hirschman about the reasons for polarization in space. For instance, Baer (1964), Haq (1963), Hay and Smith (1966), Lasuén (1962), Robock (1963) and Williamson (1965) joined the two authors in stating that the free migration of capital led in "underdeveloped" countries to growing polarization since it moved from peripheral regions to central ones, where the assumed turnover was higher. Similarly strong support was given by many to Myrdal and Hirschman in stating that the free migration of labor force was rather to increase spatial disparities (Friedmann 1959; Hughes 1961; Lasuén 1962; Parr 1966; Williamson 1965). Although without a direct reference to Myrdal and Hirschman, the findings of Eckaus (1961), Hathaway (1960) and Randall (1962) suggested the same link. Moreover, similarly without mentioning the name of Myrdal and Hirschman, their claim that the free flow of goods and services also promoted spatial divergence received substantiation from Eckaus (1961), Furtado (1963) and Verburg (1964). In a scientific context where Myrdal's and Hirschman's thoughts dominated the spatial disparity research, the above mentioned supportive findings were certainly perceived by most researchers as additional substantiation of the two concepts, as it is mirrored by the overview of Keeble (1967).

For Williamson's inverted U model the situation was somewhat different since in this case the original work itself included a great deal of statistical analyses. Thus, it differed from the concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman, which were much more theoretical and lacked painstaking empirical substantiation. Williamson's model seemed rather a model that was already "finished" and needed no further verification. Instead, it could have been accepted as well as denied by contemporaries. In fact, Williamson's concept met high recognition as it was mirrored by the works of Keeble (1967), Alonso (1968) and Friedmann (1975).

The same was true for the reception of Friedmann's (1966) model (cf. Friedmann 1975; Schätzl 2003).

Besides these concepts about spatial inequalities, their underlying presumptions as well as their implicit suggestions likewise received considerable support from many authors. A typical example of this was Rostow's (1960) model, which embraced virtually all fundamental implicit suggestions of the developmentalist approach also permeating the works of Myrdal, Hirschman, Williamson, and Friedmann. As Keeble (1967) underscores, Rostow's concept was "accepted with alacrity both by economists concerned with underdeveloped countries and by the intelligent public" (p. 249) (cf. Brandenburg 1964; Dasgupta 1965; Enke 1964; Haq 1963; Meier 1964; Ohlin 1961). Another example is the growth pole concept, which was initially independent from the theories of Myrdal and Hirschman, but was in accord with them for its assumption about sectoral as well as spatial polarization.⁶ As Darwent (1969) presented, Perroux's original sectoral (non-spatial) concept about growth poles met considerable acknowledgment among numerous researchers, especially in the Francophone world (cf. Boudeville 1966; Davin 1962, 1964; Davin et al. 1959; Paelinck 1965; Pottier 1963; Rosenfeld 1962, 1964). The same was true for the spatial interpretation of Perroux's thoughts, which also became popular not only in French (Antoine and Weill 1968; Hautreux 1966; Labasse and Rochefort 1968; Lebret 1961), but in American literature as well (Hirschman 1958; Friedmann 1966).

In sum, concepts about spatial inequalities as well as their main underlying assumptions received basically the same acknowledgment as Kuznets' hypothesis did in the first few decades after being published. Many authors used these theories, referred to them, and tendentially ended up in claiming that their own theoretical ideas or empirical findings provided further verification to the original concept. By this, these fundamental concepts turned into "black boxes" in everyday scientific practice.

This phase, however, did not last forever. After a while, the profound relevance of these concepts became questioned, and they were regarded as useful, innovative and mind-raising, but by no means as universally valid. Remarkably, this "opening of the black box" was also similar to that of the Kuznets hypothesis in a sense that it was not a direct result of newly emerging criticism. In fact, just as in the case of Kuznets' work, both basic concepts about spatial disparities and crucial underlying presumptions had already received some criticism in the first years after their publication. Without a doubt, the number of such critical reviews was moderate compared to those praising the high value of the original concepts. Still these critiques existed as early as in the 1950s and 1960s, but they were either ignored by most contemporaries or their statements were regarded as less relevant. For

⁶In fact, as Darwent (1969) underscored, one can distinguish between non-spatial and spatial concepts of growth poles. The first were derived from the original concept of Perroux, while the latter constituted a geographical interpretation of his work. In the given case, however, our interest is in a common feature of the two categories, namely in their presumption about (self-inducing) spatial polarization, a fundamental idea in non-neoclassical theories about spatial inequalities.

instance, Myrdal's work was questioned by Bauer (1958) at many points. Bauer found dividing the world into "rich" and "poor" countries "arbitrary" (p. 142). For him, such a simple dual structure was justified neither by international income statistics (which he otherwise found highly questionable for various methodological reasons), nor by data on demography, education etc. Thus, he considered the dividing line between "rich" and "poor" as a mere product of Myrdal's mind, which forced several countries of middle-income into one of the two categories, while many countries with profound dissimilarities were simply lumped together under the title of "underdevelopment" or "advancement". Bauer also pointed out that the "vicious circle" of poverty, thus, self-inducing growth and decline, was challenged in the long term both by twentieth century experience in "poor" countries and historical evidence about the "progress" of Western countries before the twentieth century. Here he referred with strong emphasis to "the emergence of the 'advanced' nations, which at some point [had been] exceedingly poor" (p. 143). Besides this criticism, Paauw (1961) also questioned a main idea of Myrdal and Hirschman while calling backwash or polarization effects "hardly a satisfactory explanation" (p. 186) for general conditions in "underdeveloped" countries. The claimed selectivity of interregional migration in favor of "richer" regions, another common point in the works of Myrdal and Hirschman, also attracted criticism. Okun and Richardson (1961) pointed out that this argument was "not so complete or straightforward as Myrdal suggests" (p. 132) and "does not adequately deal with the complexities inherent in the relationship between migration and inequality of per capita income" (ibid.). Furthermore, Lasuén (1962) and Chenery (1962) came to the point in the example of Spain and Italy that spread or trickling-down effects in "developed" countries were not nearly as evident as they seemed to be according to the concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman. Widespread criticism also decreased the acceptance of concepts apparently having better substantiation, and made their supporters less confident in their belief in these models. It speaks volumes how William Alonso, a prominent figure in regional science and himself a father of several models, wrote in 1980 about bell-shaped curves, including the inverted U concept of economic growth and spatial disparities. As he put it after directly naming Williamson, Myrdal and Hirschman as main theoreticians: "The five bell-shaped curves⁷ . . . are not iron laws of history. They are only stylized facts, a useful heuristic which can suggest interesting questions." (Alonso 1980, p. 15).

Underlying developmentalist concepts also did not remain fully without negative reactions, even if challenging voices were not as strong as those of the supporters, and they proved to have little influence on mainstream thinking. This is well mirrored by criticism leveled at Rostow's theory of the stages of economic growth. Besides a great deal of acknowledging reactions, several authors added corrective comments to the concept or pointed out the shortcomings of some of its

⁷For Alonso, the five curves were that of Rostow about the stages of growth, the Kuznets curve, the inverted U concept of regional disparities (first made explicit by Williamson), the curve of geographic concentration, and the model of demographic transition.

details.⁸ Quite a few emphasized, for instance, that in the real world one could hardly identify without serious ambiguities the stages presented by Rostow (cf. Cairncross 1961; Habakkuk 1961; Hagen 1962; Kuznets 1963b). Another point of criticism was that Rostow produced a basically descriptive concept without revealing the mechanisms making the link between the claimed stages of growth (cf. Baran and Hobsbawm 1961; Cairncross 1961; Enke 1964).⁹

But what is much more important from our view, a few authors put in the focus of their criticism issues that reached far beyond the work of Rostow and were of crucial significance for the concepts of spatial disparity as well. Cairncross (1961) pointed out that such complex phenomena as long term economic growth cannot be modeled and “explained in terms of one or two all-embracing variables” (p. 451) such as per capita income. He also suggested what Keeble (1967) made even more explicit, namely that it was impossible to make an all-in-one model with universal relevance. As Keeble put it, “growth patterns vary too greatly between different countries” (p. 252) to be summarized in a general model. For this reason he tended to prefer “the development of more limited models. . .referring to particular groups of countries” (p. 254) instead of the whole world. From our point of view, these authors tried to turn attention to problems serious enough to theoretically undermine the whole Cold War modeling of spatial disparities, where concepts claimed to give a universally valid explanation of the engines of spatial divergence and convergence, often based on the single indicator of per capita income. This was actually a weakness of both neoclassical and non-neoclassical concepts (e.g. those of Myrdal, Hirschman, Williamson and Friedmann).

Furthermore, besides these crucial theoretical problems, Paauw (1961) addressed his words to a similarly important issue: the shortcomings in empirical substantiation. For him: “The dominant problem in our contemporary economic studies of economic development. . .is that hypothesis suggested by *armchair theorizing* or almost *intuitive observation* have tended to outstrip empirical verification.” (our emphases; p. 180). This issue also strongly concerned theories in spatial disparity research. As we have already presented in previous Sects. (6.6, 6.7 and 6.8), poor empirical substantiation was a fundamental shortcoming of the concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman. Moreover, Friedmann’s model as well as Williamson’s work, the latter otherwise including a great deal of statistical analyses, also suffered from many methodological as well as theoretical ambiguities. And, as we have already noted, both Hirschman and Williamson were aware of these shortcomings and referred to them in their works. Still their

⁸ Although the ratio of supporters and critics cannot be calculated exactly, it is interesting to refer to the 1963 conference of the International Economic Association, where Rostow’s concept was at the center of interest. Here, in Rosovsky’s (1965) interpretation, seven papers (excluding that of Rostow) “quite positively approved” the concept, while five of them “[did not] like it” (p. 272). Thus, critical opinions were also present, although they were in the minority and mostly pointed at certain specific aspects of the concept instead of denying it totally. As Rosovsky put it, Rostow’s concept was on balance “‘liked,’ but not ‘well liked’” (ibid.).

⁹ For a more detailed overview of similar critiques see Keeble (1967).

concepts became broadly regarded as well-grounded and were adapted in spatial disparity research.

In the light of these weaknesses and critiques it becomes clear that the fundamental Western Cold War concepts about spatial inequalities did not remain unchallenged until the 1970s. Instead, just as it happened to the Kuznets model, the criticism coming to them attracted relatively little attention and found virtually no way into mainstream thought until significant changes occurred in the general political, social, and economic context. In other words, theoretical and empirical doubts about the validity of inequality concepts were in themselves not enough to induce a change in the theoretical research of spatial disparities, especially as these concepts met the main geopolitical interests of their time. For such a shift the profound changes we have described in the last Sects. (7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3) were necessary, which well indicates the highly *political* nature of the spatial disparity discourse. But when these profound changes took place, already existing critical remarks efficiently catalyzed the devaluation of spatial disparity concepts. The process was similar to the early challenging opinions about Kuznets' inverted U curve that were utilized by those trying to open the concept's "black box" after the decline of Fordism. Likewise the critical comments coming to models about spatial disparity from the 1950s to 1960s accelerated the extrusion of spatial disparity research from the domain of most topical theoretical questions in social sciences over the next few decades. Furthermore, they opened the way for a new era, when the whole issue of spatial disparities was re-evaluated and put in a new theoretical framework, as we will show in the next sections.

7.1.5 Reasons for the End of the Cold War "Golden Age" in Spatial Disparity Discourse: A Summary

In Sect. 7.1 we have presented that the spatial disparity discourse underwent serious changes after the 1960s. An important reason for this turn was the altering global geopolitical context, where concepts about spatial disparities lost much about their function of mediating political, propagandistic knowledge for uncertain countries in the superpowers' global competition. Furthermore, Soviet social sciences could and were actually expected by the post-Stalinist leadership to open to the West to some extent and adopt new scientific achievements emerging there. This further decreased the pressure on Western social sciences to produce theories about spatial inequalities efficiently popularizing US views about a desirable political and economic system. Besides, the Soviet Bloc faced serious economic challenges during the 1970s, which also became very visible to Western eyes. This news rapidly denied suggestions about a decreasing economic lag in the Eastern Bloc compared to its Western counterpart. As a result, the belief in Western countries that certain elements of Soviet-type economic organization were worth adapting was undermined. For this reason, among others the concept of spatially balanced

economic growth lost much in popularity and ideas to focus on faster growth even if accompanied by increasing disparities tended to attract much more attention and to gain more support. In consequence, theories about spatial disparities as possible sources of factual knowledge about how to decrease spatial imbalances also became much less relevant than they had been in the preceding decades. This devaluation due to decreasing factual interests in the reduction of inequalities was also fuelled by criticism leveled at these concepts, especially from the early 1970s onwards. Such critical views questioned that available theories could even contribute to a better understanding of why spatial disparities occurred and how they could be reduced. For these reasons scientific interests in inequalities as well as the belief in existing approaches' ability to give a worthwhile explanation of disparities remarkably decreased. Under such circumstances, the spatial disparity research reached a crossroads, and various approaches had different views about desirable future directions.

7.2 The Spatial Disparity Discourse Re-Evaluated: Neoliberalism, β and σ Convergence, Endogenous Growth Theories, and Krugman's "New Economic Geography"

With the oil crises in the 1970s and the economic challenges they caused, the stable economic growth witnessed by the Western Bloc since the end of World War II could no longer be taken for granted. Thus, although economic growth had already been a major goal both for economic and political decision-makers, its relative importance increased further. In contrast with preceding decades, the main issue was no longer how to distribute the increasing wealth created by growing production, that is, how to divide a larger cake. Instead, the new main goal was to stabilize and boost the economy to avoid the cake becoming smaller. Under such circumstances growth gained an extremely strong priority, where possible side-effects or not obvious positive concomitants seemed less important and relatively easy to tolerate. This in itself reduced the attention paid to spatial inequalities. In years of economic crisis even stable growth accompanied by spatial divergence seemed a much better option than the actual recession, however equalizing.

Some other factors also motivated decision-makers to focus on issues other than spatial disparity. The Keynesian economics that had dominated Western economic thought in the postwar period proved unable to prevent the complex problems posed by the oil crises, and later to solve them. This turned the interests of many towards alternative concepts that seemed to offer better solutions to the challenges than Keynesianism did. Obvious economic problems in the Soviet Bloc also influenced this process since the socialist model of virtually unlimited state control over the economy tended to fall far behind its long term goals. In the light of this revelation it seemed reasonable to change Keynesian economics to one operating with less state

control and giving more room to free market processes. This opened the way for neoliberalism, a formerly peripheral approach¹⁰ that opposed Keynesianism and state intervention, and favored liberalization in the economy, from which it expected to give new impetus to production.

Neoliberalism is, however, rather blind to spatial disparities. This became apparent through the practical outcome of its favored policies aimed at free trade, privatization, deregulation, and welfare state retrenchment (Harvey 2005; Ward and England 2007), which proved “typically... selective and uneven” (Glassman 2009, p. 497). It is rather the neoliberal way of seeing itself that does not consider spatial inequalities a major problem, an unwanted phenomenon. Instead, disparities are regarded here as natural concomitants of economic growth. One can find imprints of this attitude in early neoliberal works well preceding the theoretical shift in the 1970s. Bauer (1958), for instance, in his article for less state control and more freedom in economy stressed the decisive importance of economic “progress”, devoted only half a sentence to accompanying disparities in space. His preference for growth was clearly indicated by his remark that “nations, like individuals, are constantly moving up and down in the scale, and *it is the trend that counts*” (our emphasis; p. 143). Hence, the desirable condition was in his eyes that where each geographical unit could “go upward” in the sense of sustaining economic “progress”. Compared to this, unevenness was hardly a decisive issue for him, so he paid little attention to it and referred to spatial disparities during economic “progress” as something profoundly natural and not deserving special consideration. As he put it: “*Needless to say, this progress has been uneven.*” (our emphasis; p. 143). In other words, a desirable situation for Bauer was where all countries and regions could make progress and reach higher levels of production and consumption. But it was no problem in his view if such an “upward” tendency was uneven in different countries and if it increased disparities. Thus, Bauer did not only subordinate the objective of spatial equalization to that of growth, but also actually exiled it from his view of the world.

In fact, mainstream neoliberal concepts since the 1970s have paid more attention to spatial inequalities than Bauer did in his early essay. This is clearly indicated among others by the vast number of neoliberal methodological works on how convergence and divergence can be measured. Corresponding research gained huge popularity during the 1980s, with related findings crystallizing around two

¹⁰ The theoretical roots of what is nowadays called neoliberalism can be traced back to the interwar period of the Austrian School of economics and personally to Ludwig von Mises and his disciple Friedrich Hayek. The term “neoliberalism” itself, which was first used in the 1930s by the German sociologist and economist Alexander Rüstow, referred however initially to a concept remarkably different to what the term has been considered to mean recently. Rüstow in fact criticized both communism and capitalism and was an advocate for a “third way” in economics, while Hayek was a determined supporter of laissez-faire capitalism and a critic of any form of state planning (for more details see Hartwich 2009). The latter economic paradigm became identified with “neoliberalism” only in the 1980s, when in Latin America leftist critics of anti-statist economic policies (e.g. in Chile during the Pinochet era) began to call these as “neoliberal” (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). In the essay we use the term in the latter meaning.

concepts. One is that of the so-called β convergence, according to which convergence takes place if poor countries or regions tend to grow faster than rich countries or regions do (which can be tested by a simple linear regression analysis). This concept is based on the simple Solow (1956) growth model of orthodox neoclassical economics, which came out from the stable equilibrium doctrine and hypothesized a faster growth in poorer areas. Mathematically, β convergence can easily be tested by a regression model taking per capita income in the initial year as an independent and per capita income growth for the whole period as a dependent variable. In this function, the sign of β regression indicates convergence (negative sign) or divergence (positive sign), and its value shows the speed of convergence or divergence. The other concept is that one can measure convergence through cross-sectional analyses for different points in time. Here the emphasis is on the dispersion (variation) of values (e.g. defined as standard deviation) at a given point in time, and on the temporal change in this dispersion. In this approach if the variation decreases over time, one can speak about σ convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Cheshire and Malecki 2004).

The differentiation of these two concepts is worthwhile because their meaning is actually not absolutely the same. Of course, it can be a logical presumption that if poor areas undergo faster economic growth than rich areas, the difference between them in income level decreases. But this is not necessary to be the case, especially when convergence is investigated for a longer time period. As Sala-i-Martin (1996) underscores, it is not impossible that a poor country growing faster not only reaches but also overtakes another, initially richer one. If the difference in growth rates in favor of the initially poorer country remains, β convergence applies since the country *initially* poorer undergoes higher economic growth during the whole of the period. But one cannot identify σ convergence for the analyzed period since the difference between the two countries might be even larger at the end than it was at the beginning, yet with the country once poor having become rich and the once rich having become poor in comparison to the other country. For this reason β convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for σ convergence.

For research practice, the analysis of both forms of convergence underwent a boom in the second part of the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s. The feasibility of the concepts for describing long-term growth and spatial disparities was discussed and tested in a mushrooming literature (e.g. Barro 1984; Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992; Baumol 1986; Baumol and Wolff 1988; DeLong 1988; Dowrick and Nguyen 1989; Dowrick and Gemmell 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992), where the focus was mostly on the evaluation of long-term international data sets for a large number of countries. The enthusiastic work soon produced, however, many results that undermined the rather orthodox neoclassical conceptual framework. As Martin & Sunley (1998) pointed out, the general conclusion of these analyses was that β convergence could not be verified in an international comparison. It was only richer countries tending to converge toward each other in the long term, while poor countries seemed rather to fall behind more and more hopelessly. Since β convergence is, as written, a necessary prerequisite

for σ convergence, the results automatically denied the overall existence of σ convergence in broad international comparison.

These findings soon led to two conceptual modifications, still within a conventional neoclassical framework. First, many came to the point that only countries similar to each other in fundamental economic and social features converged towards one another. This brought into being the idea of club convergence, assuming that β as well as σ convergence can only be identified *within* relatively homogenous country groups, while these groups do not necessarily get closer to each other in terms of per capita income but might even diverge (see Chatterji 1992; Galor 1996; Quah 1996a, b). Second, several authors pointed out that if missing convergence in international comparison was an outcome of various economic and social conditions in different countries, β convergence analysis might be amended to identify these factors. In practice this means that variables presumed to refer to these specific conditions (such as economic structure, educational level of labor force etc.) are added to the regression model. Then, if there is no convergence, it is investigated which factors are responsible for such a tendency, thus, the difference in which factors leads to higher growth in “rich” and lower growth in “poor” areas. This analysis principally means a “what would be if each country had fundamentally similar conditions” calculation. If β convergence can be identified after this correction, it is called *conditional* β convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). As Martin & Sunley (1998) points out, these corrections opened a new phase in neoliberal convergence research, with many works claiming to have verified the existence of conditional β convergence both in long-term international (e.g. Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Mankiw et al. 1992) and interregional comparisons in given countries (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992; Cashin 1995; Coulombe and Lee 1995; Persson 1997; Shioji 1995). Thus, the analysis of spatial disparities did not disappear from economics after the neoliberal turn. Instead, the number of corresponding works rather increased rapidly since one can easily run the above presented descriptive methods on feasible data sets if those are accessible.

Besides, neoliberal approaches have also not neglected theoretical aspects of spatial inequality in the last some 4 decades. Without a doubt, the conceptual framework within which neoliberal economics in the early twenty-first century tries to explain spatial disparities is fundamentally neoclassical (cf. Capello and Nijkamp 2009). Still, turning back to neoclassical roots, which at one point seemed to be pushed to the periphery by Keynesianism, does not mean that old-school neoclassical concepts about necessary spatial equalization were also adopted automatically. Instead, under the aegis of neoliberal economics new concepts have emerged over the last 3 decades or so. These tried to break with the hypothesis of automatic convergence, which is definitely incompatible with tendencies in the real world, just as it was already recognized by Myrdal and other non-neoclassical theoreticians of spatial disparities in the 1950s and 1960s.

One major stream here is the *endogenous growth theory* mainly associated with Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988). The name itself refers to the main theoretical innovation relative to traditional neoclassical concepts, namely that a

remarkable attempt was made to integrate into the model exogenous effects (mainly technological development) not included by old-style neoclassical theories (hence the adjective *endogenous*; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). In fact, endogenous growth theories are different in how they interpret the emergence of technological development. As Martin & Sunley (1998) points out, one approach (the endogenous broad capital model) argues that investment in capital stock results in “learning by doing” (Arrow 1962) and knowledge spillovers, due to which technology becomes a public good. In this view technological development seems rather a “side effect” (Romer 1994) of investments than the expected result of a decision process. In another interpretation (intentional human capital model) individual agents in the economy intentionally strive for high human capital since they consider this a basic prerequisite for their progress in the hierarchy and for gaining higher earnings. This push leads to intentional measures in order to promote research and education, which finally opens the way for technological development (Lucas 1988). Finally, a third, Schumpeterian point of view is that new technology is mainly an outcome of oligopolistic producers who try to introduce new products for which they can earn monopoly profits until rivals begin to manufacture the same product (Romer 1990). These three concepts, otherwise not fully compatible with each other, are, however, common in making technological development endogenous in growth theory. Without a doubt, that is in itself a considerable innovation compared to orthodox neoclassical theories.

But this is not all the new endogenous growth theories offer. They also reject two highly questionable orthodox presumptions: those of perfect competition and diminishing returns. Instead, they regard competition to be monopolistic, and stress that the returns to investment (e.g. in the case of many sorts of capital goods) might even increase in the long term, mainly due to economies of scale (Bathelt and Glückler 2012). In fact, the latter two presumptions were not profoundly new in the 1980s and 1990s, not even in neoclassical economics. A fundamentally neoclassical interpretation of imperfect competition had already been given by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), while that returns to investment might not diminish in the long run appeared in neoclassical thought as early as the 1940s (Knight 1944). The integration of all these ideas into a unified concept within a fundamentally neoclassical framework, however, only happened in endogenous growth theories.

This step had remarkable implications for spatial disparity research as well since endogenous growth theories suggest that equilibrium is not necessary to come, not even in the long run. The assumptions of imperfect competition and increasing returns in themselves question the neoclassical equilibrium concept, which suggests automatic spatial equalization in a free market on the basis of perfect competition and diminishing returns. Furthermore, the three endogenous approaches to the origin of technological development also imply that even a strong increase in spatial disparities is possible. If one regards technological progress simply as concomitant with investment in capital stock, it can be considered as a self-accelerating process that tends to promote spatial divergence. If one puts emphasis rather on the intention of individuals to raise their human capital, spatial divergence seems realistic again as a workforce with higher human capital can have better

abilities and a stronger willingness to improve its knowledge further. Finally, a Schumpeterian approach concentrating on the oligopolistic competition of firms as the engine of technological development similarly gives much room for spatial divergence. Since returns from technological development as well as technology transfers and spillovers are geographically localized to some extent (Martin & Sunley, 1998), the Schumpeterian approach suggests a considerable path dependence in regional growth and, thus, increasing inequalities in space. Therefore, endogenous growth theories imply that growth in a free market merely tends to result in spatial divergence, although this tendency can be balanced to some extent by state policies (cf. Maier et al. 2006; Martin & Sunley 1998).

Besides endogenous growth theories, another new approach highly relevant from the aspect of spatial disparities is Paul Krugman's (1991a, b) *New Economic Geography* (NEG).¹¹ In his work, Krugman also broke with the assumptions of automatic spatial equilibrium, perfect competition, and decreasing returns, while he integrated the effect of transport costs in his model. To illustrate how economy gets localized in space under such circumstances, he developed a simple two-region model. In this concept only two kinds of production were present: agriculture with constant returns and manufacture with increasing returns. These two forms of production were considered as inherently homogenous. Factors of production in agriculture, namely both land and agricultural workforce, were regarded as immobile in space. For industry, labor force as well as production were defined as mobile. The model also embraced the fixed costs of opening a plant (presumed to be equal in both regions for a given plant) to represent the implication of economies of scale. Spatially important factors also gained place in the concept. Krugman aimed to take into consideration transportation costs of the product being transferred from the plant to the consumers. He presumed the demand for industrial products to be higher in industry than in agriculture, thus, in the region with a stronger industrial sector. He also made his model a bit more complex by assuming that industry was unequally divided among both regions, with one region concentrating all these activities. This meant that industrial demand for industrial products was *a priori* concentrated in space.

After drawing up this framework Krugman attributed exact values to fixed costs, transportation costs, market price per unit produced, and the quantity of demand in both regions. He then raised the question where a new plant would be located under

¹¹ The name of Krugman's concept has attracted much criticism since its publication a bit more than 2 decades ago. The root of this is that what Krugman claims to be the main innovations in his work are new only within the domain of economics, but not for geographers. Thus, Krugman's concept does not add much profoundly "new" to economic geography, and it is fundamentally economic instead of being geographical. Hence, the term "New Economic Geography" seems doubtful. For this reason many geographers follow Martin and Sunley (1996), who tend to speak about "geographical economics" instead of NEG. Although agreeing with the arguments coming from economic geographers to question that Krugman's "economic geography" would be either "new" or "geography", it is not our aim in this essay to get involved in terminological disputes. Hence, for easy and clear identification we take a liberal stance concerning terminology and refer to the concepts under the name they received from their inventors.

these circumstances in order to minimize costs. Here he analyzed three possibilities: that (1) the new plant is opened in the industrialized region; that (2) it is opened in the other region without industry; and that (3) the planned new capacity is split equally between one plant in the industrialized region and one plant in the agricultural region. This is, of course, quite a simple and abstract model, “aggressively unrealistic” as Krugman (2011, p. 4) himself stated later. But through modifying only transportation costs per unit the concept became able to reveal some mechanisms influencing the location of additional production.

In general, an increase in the importance of economies of scale, a decreasing share of industrial activities strongly linked to raw materials, and sinking transportation costs all tended to promote industrial concentration in the region that had been more industrialized initially. Of course, a decreasing importance of economies of scale, a strong reliance of additional industrial production on raw materials, and rising transportation costs had the opposite effect. At this point Krugman did not forget to underscore that many industrial activities were highly centralized in space, which he derived from three factors. The first was that a single location offered a pooled market for employees, which reduced the threat of becoming unemployed and a higher chance for plants to avoid a shortage in workforce. The second point concerned “nontradable specialized inputs”, which could be much better produced at a location where the number of potential consumers was high. Third, Krugman underscored that informational spillovers between firms at the same location were to potentially increase efficiency of all these firms, in contrast to “isolated” companies settled alone at their location.

Without a doubt, this simple concept had serious shortcomings. For instance, its capacity to explain what is located where in the real world economy is extremely limited. In this sense, Krugman needed to refer tendentiously to historically given conditions under the slogan “history matters” (Krugman 1991a, p. 20). And this is only one among the great deal of questions, both theoretical and empirical, that arise with regard to Krugman’s model (cf. Martin and Sunley 1996; Storper 1997; Bathelt and Glückler 2012).

Still, Krugman’s “New Economic Geography” as well as endogenous growth theories has something very important in common. They integrated several (often almost self-evident) critiques of orthodox neoclassical theories that have emerged over the decades since the 1930s. Due to this, they created concepts capable of going beyond the unrealistic assumption of stable equilibrium. Hence, these models interpret spatial disparity not as a simple heritage from the past but as a phenomenon an economy can (although not necessarily does) perpetually produce and reproduce. This is a considerable innovation in economic concepts based on neoclassical fundamentals, and shows that the topic of spatial inequality was not profoundly ignored by neoliberal concepts forging ahead since the 1970s.

To sum it up, mainstream economic concepts of the neoliberal era have not neglected the issue of spatial disparity. Furthermore, although the return to neoclassical roots is apparent, several ideas coming from alternative approaches have been adopted. This has definitely been a great innovation compared to orthodox neoclassical approaches. The coin has two sides, however, since this relative

opening up of the neoclassical mindset has in fact added few economic concepts about spatial disparities to those already existing. The “translation” of non-neoclassical ideas into a neoclassical “language” is of course a valuable project, but underlying ideas themselves have not gained more explanatory power by being changed from simple words into mathematical functions and curves. Leading mainstream concepts in neoliberal economics mostly remain at the level of description, and even the way of this description brings back the tradition of previous eras. For explanatory power, empirics-led β and σ convergence analyses basically reflect the achievements of the 1950s and 1960s despite their modish names.

To make this point clear, it is worth having a closer look at these methods, their logic, their inherent shortcomings, and the controversies of the analytical attitude they mirror (and often promote as well). The simple β convergence analysis stands on the conceptual basis of Solow’s (1956) early neoclassical growth model. The search for σ convergence or in other words the investigation of temporal changes in the variance of regional data sets is actually the same that Williamson (1965) did more than 2 decades earlier. Speaking about club convergence staggeringly resembles Myrdal’s (1957) words about the division of the world into “rich” and “poor” countries with an increasing gap in between. As Cheshire and Malecki (2004) comment in a footnote: “in many ways these models are just restatements in modern terminology and language” of some great predecessors.

Neither does conditional β convergence analysis offer much new in comparison with orthodox neoclassical growth theories. The idea to integrate country-specific social and economic variables in β convergence regression models still reflects a strong willingness to find convergence among countries and regions even if it is not actually there. This is especially clearly exemplified by the many works which do not confirm simple β convergence in the context analyzed, but after adding some special variables triumphantly declare that conditional β convergence exists. Such a statement, in fact, means barely more convergence could be verified if the effect of (even fundamental) peculiarities of each geographical unit were filtered out. In other words, this suggests that an assumption challenged by real world conditions (“convergence exists”) still works if reality is fitted to the abstract world of the hypothesis.

Of course, one might take a seemingly more open-minded stance and claim that if conditional β convergence is an objective, quasi “natural” law, something that is definitely so, conditional β convergence analysis could be helpful in identifying those indicators to mirror “the” fundamental differences between countries and regions. Thus, in this view, conditional β convergence analysis would be useful since it could at least bring us closer to a better understanding of national and regional peculiarities. This belief might be one among the reasons for the popularity of such analyses. Yet, such reasoning is enormously misleading since β convergence (whether conditional or unconditional) is not an objective necessity, but a neoclassical *assumption*, a social construct. Hence, it cannot be used as a point of reference to capture the essence of why a given country or region is specific.

For this reason, the search for factors which, if integrated, let one create a regression model that indicates conditional β convergence can easily end up in cherry-picking conditioning variables due to which the model provides results that meet previous expectations (namely conditional β convergence). This is well indicated by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), for instance, who say in a series of calculations where each step is about adding new variables *to* and deleting old ones *from* the model (just like in a trial-and-error process) that “the estimated β coefficient for the 1920s *still has the wrong sign*” (our emphasis; p. 470). “The wrong sign” refers here to the fact that the actual model still denies the conditional β hypothesis, which the authors are strongly intent on confirming. In this case conditional β convergence analysis apparently becomes a search for additional variables that can make the data-set “fit” the *expected* convergence. In the light of this clear notion to *find* what might not be there, it is no wonder that many studies adopt a “cavalier approach”, so “the choice [of variables] often seems narrow and arbitrary”, as Cheshire and Malecki (2004, p. 256) underscore. Even variables based on highly doubtful measures and totally blurred in their implication for growth and disparities can find their way to analytical models if they seem to “adjust” actual data to expected convergence.¹² In fact, such looseness in itself can undermine the relevance of a calculation given that in β and σ convergence calculations “the effects of initial income are remarkable sensitive to model specification” (ibid.).

A “cavalier approach” is, however, also apparent in how most authors select the time horizon for their calculations and how they interpret temporal changes. A great deal of cross-country and cross-region analyses actually reflect quite a quantitative approach of their authors about which empirical findings can be regarded as “tendency”. The higher number of geographical units and the longer time-period considered are implicitly assumed to automatically constitute the better sample for calculations, based on which statements with general relevance can be formulated. Typical examples of this way of seeing are the works of Barro (1991; 98 countries and 45 years), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991; all US states for 108 years and 75 European regions for 35 years) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004; all US states for 120 years, 90 regions in Europe for 40 years, and 47 Japanese prefectures for 60 years). Here the remarkable size of the sample gives the impression of “scientific painstakingness”, which without a doubt helps to make the authors’ claim about long-term convergence more convincing. But the same calculations also reveal that the volume of both β and σ convergence or divergence can significantly fluctuate within such a long period, and reversals in direction are also possible (so convergence can turn into divergence and vice versa). These findings are,

¹² In the huge body of literature one can find several variables that are used for this reason. Some intriguing examples for this “cavalier approach” might be (quantitatively expressed!) indicators such as “rule of law” (a subjective measure provided by Political Risk Services) (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, pp. 526–527), “democracy” (another subjective measure from Freedom House) (ibid., pp. 528–529) or the “number of assassinations per million population per year” (Barro 1991, p. 439). These indicators are indeed used as specifying variables in conditional β convergence analyses.

however, tendentiously interpreted either not to influence long-term trends significantly or simply as “aggregate shocks” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, p. 471), whose explanation lies beyond the horizon of convergence analysis. For this reason, such “exceptional events” remain unexplained.

Moreover, the question whether one can reasonably interpret the selected period as logically coherent and dominated by the same tendency is rarely considered. If either β or σ convergence seems to have taken place between the initial and final years of the analysis (with maybe more than a decade in between), usually it is simply regarded as “tendency”. For example, in a conditional β convergence analysis for the US states from 1880 to 2000 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find that in the 1980s and 1990s β was positive, thus, per capita regional incomes diverged in these 2 decades. Instead even suggesting, however, that this might indicate a brand new trend compared to previous decades, the authors give the results short shrift by saying that the coefficients are “positive but their size continues to be small” (p. 472). Hence, as the “main conclusion” they come (they manage to come) to the point that between 1880 and 2000 “the U.S. states tend to converge at a speed of about 2 percent per year” (ibid.). In other words, the long but otherwise heterogeneous time period is interpreted as if it were homogenous, so thus the hypothesis of long-term convergence can apparently be verified. For this, simply overlooking “unevenness” (e.g. swings or trend reversals) in temporal data sets or considering them as insignificant is not a high price to pay.

Even more ambiguous is the interpretation of the σ convergence test for regions in five European countries.¹³ The authors present a figure (Fig. 7.3) whose interpretation is very simple in their eyes: as they put it, “The overall pattern shows declines in σ , [dispersion of per capita GDP] over time for each country, although little net change occurs since 1970 for Germany and the United Kingdom.” (p. 482). This is indeed a “cavalier” description of the graph where Germany and the United Kingdom do not show any convergence for half of the time period analyzed, with Italy’s value actually stagnating for some 15 years and France having undergone quite insignificant changes in the last 3 decades. In other words, it is a graph indicating convergence for the 1950s and 1960s and stagnation for the succeeding 2 decades if one really tries to identify the “fundamental tendencies” it shows.

In fact, conditional β convergence analysis suffers from other shortcomings as well. As Cheshire and Malecki (2004) points out, these models usually pay little attention to implications of policy in spite of its significant role in shaping growth perspectives and tendencies in spatial disparities. Another typical problem is that most authors in both β and σ convergence analyses neglect the effects of extreme values in data-sets, although these can significantly influence the results and their potential interpretation. Most authors also overlook that spatial migration can remarkably distort statistical results especially at lower geographical levels. It is

¹³ We find the two examples from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) highly relevant and even typical to the whole approach for two reasons. First, the two authors belong to the few top representatives of β and σ analysts. Second, their 2004 book has been since then the leading textbook on the issue.




Fig. 7.3 Dispersion of per capita GDP within five European countries (1950–1990). A figure interpreted in the original work simply as “the overall pattern shows declines in σ , over time for each country”. Adapted from Barro, Robert J., and Xavier I. Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth, second edition*, figure 11.9, © 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by permission of The MIT Press

especially problematic for commuters whose place of living and place of work differs, since they contribute to production, income, consumption etc. indicators of the places where they work, while they are not taken into consideration in per capita statistical analysis because they do not belong to the local population.¹⁴

Furthermore, it is a fundamental weakness of these calculations, besides their methodological weaknesses, that they do not reveal the *reasons* for the tendencies identified. For simple β and σ convergence analysis, irrespective of whether they indicate convergence or divergence, they are unable to say anything about underlying factors. Even in conditional β convergence analyses, which are aimed at identifying the specifying variables that are the source of missing unconditional convergence, one can only say that numbers indicate a *stochastic* link between certain indicators and the lack of convergence. But stochastic relations are not necessarily causal, a fact tendentially overlooked in these works. Hence, causal links between various social and economic factors on the one hand and growth and inequalities on the other remain undiscovered.¹⁵ For all these reasons it is highly

¹⁴ This effect is, of course, especially strong for administrative units including a single urban core, for instance, whose workplaces attract a great deal of commuters.

¹⁵ We should underscore here that many problems with actual papers about β and σ convergence (such as the “cavalier” approach) are not unavoidable consequences of inherent weaknesses of the concept, even if their occurrence in the literature is remarkably frequent. Some other problems, however, do indeed result from the concepts themselves. An example is the lacking explanatory power of these models, for instance, which results from the implicit assumption in convergence analyses that stochastic and causal relations can be considered as equal, or even if it is not necessarily the case, that revealing some stochastic links and supplementing them with “wishful thinking” *can itself be enough* to identify the reasons for missing convergence.

doubtful whether the β and σ convergence analyses have improved our *understanding* of spatial disparities, and not only the vocabulary used to describe them. This opinion about the convergence literature was also formulated by Cheshire and Malecki (2004):

“Studies in this vein range in quality in our view from the almost totally mechanical and careless to the useful documentation of facts and tendencies, testing of elements of theory and exploration of causal processes. Unfortunately the latter group is very small relative to the former and we are skeptical as to how much will really have been added to our understanding of regional growth processes until the dust has settled and the probably rather few useful findings have been winnowed out from the mass.” (p. 256)

The question whether innovations in mainstream economics during the neoliberal era have contributed to a better understanding of spatial disparities arises with regard to theoretical concepts as well. For Krugman’s “New Economic Geography”, it has definitely turned the attention of many among those using a neoclassical analytical apparatus to take into consideration spatial issues as well instead of relying on aspatial concepts. This is an achievement we find important to admit, but it is still much smaller than the Krugman school claims. In general, the “New Economic Geography” does not offer much new relative to the knowledge that has accumulated in economic geography and regional science over many decades, as has been pointed out by many authors (e.g. Bathelt 2001; Berry 1999; Martin 1999; Martin and Sunley 1996; Neary 2001). Furthermore, some concepts having been present in economic geography for a long time go further in explaining space-related processes than the “New Economic Geography” does (see Storper 2011). Claims about the Krugman school’s lacking novelty are, however, not only true with regard to the body of literature in economic geography and regional science, but also in light of the findings in non-neoclassical economics during the postwar period. This is especially important from the aspect of spatial disparity research, whose boost in the postwar period was propelled and whose domain was later on dominated by non-neoclassical economics. Myrdal (1957), for instance, rejected the concepts of stable equilibrium, perfect competition and diminishing returns more than 3 decades before Krugman’s much-cited work. Another great “novelty” of the “New Economic Geography”, namely that it leaves space for spatial divergence in a free market, was also present in the works of Myrdal (1957), Hirschman (1958), Williamson (1965) and Friedmann (1966), which, in fact, also gave the initial impetus to similar works in economic geography and regional science.

In this sense endogenous growth theories have made larger contributions to spatial disparity research by trying to integrate a crucial factor, technological development, into an essentially neoclassical framework. These achievements seem, however, partial: while technological progress has become endogenous to models, its explanation is impossible without constantly referring to factors still exogenous. As Martin & Sunley (1998) points out, this is especially so for the “social capability” of individuals and firms “to generate, absorb, apply, and learn from innovations” (p. 218), a factor that exerts fundamental influence on technological development. Thus, although endogenous growth theories have definitely brought us closer to a more sophisticated perception of what is called technological

progress, for underlying factors they “clearly raise more questions than they can answer” (ibid.). Hence, whether one considers β and σ convergence analyses, Krugman’s “New Economic Geography”, or endogenous growth theories, these scientific contributions have introduced concepts that are merely “new” only from the view of the neoclassic. Meanwhile, they have taken few steps forward relative to what was already accessible in non-neoclassical approaches and outside the domain of economics, even if not always in the neoclassical language of pure formulas, functions, and curves.

These facts, yet rather indirectly, also reveal some very interesting information about how the importance of theoretical research about spatial disparity changed after the neoliberal turn. We have presented that mainstream economics after the 1970s paid a lot of attention to the issue, especially compared to the orthodox neoclassical approach. Hence, one cannot speak about a dramatic decline in the issue’s topicality. Yet, it indicates a devaluation of the issue that neoliberal economics makes do with the adaptation of some related concepts that had been otherwise present in non-neoclassical approaches or in other disciplines for a long time. Moreover, many findings outside the domain of neoclassical economics have still remained profoundly unnoticed. And the fact that neoliberal economics could get and stay in the forefront of research in social sciences despite this weakness, and that politics still highly appreciates neoliberal thinkers as economic advisors indirectly reflects the decreasing political importance of spatial disparities. While spatial inequality apparently had a considerable political role during the 1950s and 1960s (see Sects. 6.3 and 6.4), it has by now become an issue whose better explanation is not expected from mainstream approaches in economics, even if the issue has not become profoundly neglected.

The relative devaluation of spatial disparity as a political problem is even better reflected by the normative attitude leading neoliberal theoreticians are taking to inequalities. In related works one can find virtually no normative statements or even suggestions about spatial disparities. Spatial concentration and inequalities appear in these texts as purely analytical issues, which one can measure and try to explain, but which are never considered explicitly as negative or as a problem to be solved. Instead, countries and regions converging or diverging are interpreted as “winners” and “losers” (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, pp. 511–515), as participants in the severe economic competition where some necessarily leap forward while others fall behind. This competition-oriented language implies that one can “reasonably” investigate the causes for better and poor achievements, just as it is done in many analyses, but also the acceptance of that “all cannot win” as “normal” and quasi “undisputed”. As Cheshire and Malecki (2004) put it about the nature of “territorial competition”: “equity is not the issue” (p. 261). This reasoning is in fact definitely neoliberal and is in concert with earlier works of this approach, such as with the 1958 article of Bauer. As we have already quoted, for Bauer, development was “necessarily” uneven. He also had the opinion that “nations, like individuals, are constantly moving up and down in the scale, and *it is the trend that counts*” (our emphasis; Bauer 1958, p. 143). These words reflect the same normative way of seeing as those of Barro & Sala-i-Martin and other neoliberal researchers in the last few decades.

One can also find implicit suggestions elsewhere that spatial inequalities are tolerable and do not constitute a problem in themselves. Romer, for instance, who has made especially great contributions to endogenous growth theories, indirectly justified growth accompanied by spatial divergence. As we have already presented, these theories considered technological development and its underlying factors as causing unequal growth in various countries, regions etc., thus, leading to divergence. These theories also underscored that although state policy can take measures to counteract divergence to some extent, if these measures are lacking and the economy is firmly dominated by free market processes, spatial inequalities are likely to increase. Romer, however, apparently did not consider this tendency as a problem while forming a general opinion about market and free trade. In fact, his opinion was that “the traditional answer that we give to students to explain why [markets and free trade]...are good, the one based on perfect competition and Pareto optimality, is becoming untenable” (Romer 1994, p. 19). For him, “something more interesting and more complicated is going on” (ibid.), in the light of which he found necessary to establish endogenous growth theories, throwing new light to economic growth. But Romer remained firm in his conviction that “both markets and free trade are good” (ibid.). By this he implicitly justified spatial inequalities as well, which were even in his eyes direct results of free trade and free market processes. Relative to economic growth, still considered as desirable, spatial divergence did not seem to be a considerable “problem” any more. Such de-problematization of spatial disparities appeared not only in theoretical works, but also in practice in US regional policy. The regional development organ EDA, which in the 1960s had been directed at helping the districts in the worst economic conditions (see Sect. 7.1.3), underwent serious devaluation. As Glasmeier and Wood (2005) points out, the budget of the institute was cut in the 1980s by the Reagan administration, with its expenditures dropping to about one-fourth of previous years’ average in real terms.

To sum it up, the neoliberal turn led in the United States to a thorough reinterpretation of the importance of spatial inequalities. This indicated the beginning of a new era after the early Cold War decades and their solid interests in the issue. The profound changes in the general political, economic and social context presented in Sect. 7.1 not only decreased the credit previously given to related concepts from the 1950s to 1960s. They also undermined the interest in the whole issue of spatial disparity, which was no longer regarded as a significant problem with fundamental relevance.

7.3 An Alternative Path in Europe: A Neoclassical Boom in Spatial Disparity Research to the Extent it is Needed by Policy-Making

In the United States, which had for a long time been the ultimate center of theory-making about spatial inequalities, the shift in the position of spatial disparity research had all the features we have presented in the last section. Unlike in the early hard period of the Cold War, however, when the whole Western world copied the United States even in this sense, certain areas did not follow the US shift in the 1970s and 1980s. In Western Europe, which was a geographical context fundamentally different to that in North America, the direction of the neoliberal turn was quite specific and resulted in a sort of divergence from US theory-making. Without a doubt, this did not mean a profound split with the tendencies in American social sciences. For example, interests in promoting economic growth have increased in both regions, and the use of neoclassical methods in economic research has become dominant in the capitalist countries of Europe as well. Here, however, attitudes towards spatial inequalities have not changed the same way as they did in North America. This was an outcome of some peculiarities of the European context.

Unlike in the United States, decision makers in Europe have considered spatial disparities as a potential threat to a deepening European integration. Since inequalities at international as well as intranational (thus, interregional) level were remarkable, it seemed a realistic scenario that these disparities, if not reduced, could have far reaching outcomes. First, they could hinder economic integration and, consequently, undermine the international economic competitiveness of the European Community. This growth-oriented remark is essentially neoliberal in sense that here the main focus is on economic growth. Still, due to specific circumstances within the European economic area, spatial divergence appears a strong obstacle for growth, thus, it remains regarded as a problem in spite of the neoliberal turn. Second, spatial disparities can not only hinder economic cooperation, but they can also lead to political tensions, which in an extreme situation could pose a threat for the political integrity of the European Community. This aspect is, in fact, essentially similar to US fears in the postwar period about the possible political consequences of spatial disparities in then newly independent states in the so-called “Third World” (see Sect. 6.3). And as certain conflicts from the 1940s onwards verified the relevance of American fears, the actual Greek crisis and economic difficulties in other peripheral member countries of the Eurozone indicate that the concern of European decision-makers has also not been unsubstantiated. For these reasons, the importance of spatial convergence has actually never been denied by prominent politicians in the European Community.¹⁶

¹⁶ We should add that while economic research in the European Union considers spatial inequality an important problem and US neoliberal economics also pays attention to the question (even if barely regards it as a “problem”), economic geography has recently contributed little to spatial disparity research. Although economic geography is very heterogeneous without a “single leading

Moreover, the topic has gained even more attention since the 1980s for various reasons. As Moulaert (1996) underscores, European integration underwent a long period of spatial convergence in the 1960s and 1970s. This tendency ended with the oil crises, however, and in the 1980s international as well as interregional disparities began to increase. The reason was not simply the “Mediterranean enlargement” in 1981 and 1986, when relatively poor countries, namely Greece and 5 years later Spain and Portugal, joined the EEC. In fact, disparities within the pre-enlargement integration also grew during the 1980s (Suarez-Villa and Roura 1993). Divergence was further strengthened by the complete liberalization of the common in market in 1993 (Moulaert 1996), and especially by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, when the European Union merged a total of 12 new member states, mostly from post-socialist Eastern Europe.

This process has also had significant influence on regional policy within the community. Until 1975 regional policy was seen in the EEC as a domestic matter of the member states. In that year, however, the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) was established as a separate international fund to efficiently contribute to closing the gap between more and less affluent countries and regions in the community. After the two steps of the “Mediterranean enlargement”, the European Structural Funds, which played a decisive role in promoting spatial convergence through financial support to economically less well-off member countries, underwent serious reforms in 1988. In 1993, expenditures on regional policy increased again due to a further reform of the structural funds (Cappelen et al. 2003). Eight years later, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam went even further and presented regional convergence as a main goal of the community. As Article 158 put it, “the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas” (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). The “big bang” enlargement in 2004 resulted in additional measures, which explicitly laid down the normative principles of regional development. During the 2005 Luxembourg Presidency of the European Union, “territorial cohesion” appeared as a principle of strategic importance, and soon became a buzzword in the language of EU politics. Here the main reasons for the increasing importance of spatial disparity issues in the European Union, which we have already presented in previous paragraphs, became explicit. On the one hand, it has become an official point of view that spatial convergence is considered as a necessary prerequisite for

approach” (Barnes 2009, p. 180), most state-of-art streams follow a relational approach in research, one of whose main features is a strong micro level focus (see Bathelt and Glückler 2011, pp. 5–7). Hence, the main stress is here on “understanding individual and collective economic action within macro-level contexts” (pp. 6–7). This does not mean at all, of course, that mainstream economic geography has nothing to say that one could utilize well in investigating and understanding spatial disparities. The topic of spatial inequalities *itself*, however, does not belong to the main research issues here, at least at meso and macro levels. For this reason, one can recently find the main contributions to the spatial disparity discourse within the domain of spatial economics and spatial science, with the former at the leading edge of theoretical and methodological innovation.

the EU to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (quote from Lisbon European Council, 2000; for the importance of spatial convergence on the political agenda see Luxembourg Presidency 2005a, b). Hence, spatial disparity appeared as an obstacle for the main neoliberal goal of growth. On the other hand, the decisive influence of spatial disparities on the territorial integration of the European Union also became explicit in these official documents.

These tendencies have also had a strong implication for spatial disparity research in the EU. Instead of de-problematizing the issue in scientific works and breaking with the negative normative judgment about it, spatial inequality continues to be considered a problem in the Union. The general view in this context is that “regional disparities may have significant negative socio-economic cost consequences” (Capello and Nijkamp 2009, p. 1). No wonder that social sciences likewise have great interest in the topic, as was indicated, for instance, by the launch of the interdisciplinary journal *European Urban and Regional Studies* in 1994 (cf. Sadler 1994) and by its rapid development in the succeeding years. Here and at other forums as well a vast literature has emerged on the topic (for a detailed overview of these see Eckey and Türck 2007).

Given the economic, political, and social context presented above, spatial disparity research can have important functions in the eyes of decision-makers and leading political functionaries in the European Union. First, an important task for such scientific activity can obviously be to produce factual knowledge about how spatial inequalities emerge, what their level in the Union is, and especially how they can be reduced. Thus, researchers are apparently expected to contribute through knowledge production to the promotion of convergence, and by this to a stronger economic and political integration with less political tensions and more energy to focus on international competition with other global players.

Second, spatial disparity research can also have a significant role in creating orientation knowledge. This does not mean, of course, the mediation of such strong geopolitical propaganda which the United States and the Soviet Union spread over many continents in the postwar period. In fact, at present the European Union does not have global political and military interests comparable to what the two superpowers had in the Cold War. Even within the EU’s narrowly interpreted sphere of influence, the need for such propagandistic activity is rather moderate relative to what American and Soviet measures aimed for in the 1950s and 1960s. Without a doubt, the European Union indeed has certain geopolitical interests in convincing neighboring non-member countries (e.g. Ukraine and Turkey) to converge to and not diverge from the EU politically. Furthermore, besides its liberal democratic system, the efforts of the Union to reduce spatial disparities can also be attractive in the eyes of those outside. For them, the principle of regional convergence means the accelerated growth of less well-off countries and regions to catch

up with more affluent member countries, at least in the long term.¹⁷ Thus, spatial disparity analysis can have some role in informing non-member countries about the measures within the integration to reduce spatial inequalities and, by this, in making a positive image for the EU.

But spatial disparity research can much more efficiently manufacture orientation knowledge for the citizens of the integration. Since the share of measures for regional convergence has exceeded 30 % of total EU expenditures after the turn of the millennium (cf. De Filippis and Sardone 2010), EU citizens rightly expect the community to explain how this large amount of money serves useful goals and is worth being covered by taxpayers. In this sense, two points might be of special relevance. First, it can be articulated to inhabitants of the community why the objectives of these expenditures are important. Second, if spatial disparity research provides any information suggesting the positive implications of these expenditures, it can be explained why one can regard financial resources spent on spatial convergence as reasonable in the sense that they efficiently contribute to the realization of the intended goal.

Having outlined the overall political, economic, and social context of spatial disparity research in the European Union, it is important to have a closer look at the actual state of the approach. First to become apparent here is that the body of literature contains an enormous amount of descriptive information accumulated over the decades. Among others, they have identified a strong convergence between regions, which slowed down in the 1970s, and which was followed by merely stagnating inequalities (Suarez-Villa and Roura 1993). They have also revealed that differences in per capita income between the member states decreased over the same period, but in the meantime disparities within member countries increased (Puga 2002). Recently these works turned their attention to a new phase of divergence, where EU expenditures in general rather tend to favor more competitive regions and challenge the parallel objective of spatial convergence (Petraikos, Kallioras and Anagnostou 2011).¹⁸ Hence, it is no question that we have a more precise view about the issue of spatial inequalities than we had without these works.

Still, most works do not go beyond description, even if the latter is done under modish names. There is an enormous number of β and σ convergence analyses, many of which are summarized in the comprehensive overview of Eckey and Türck (2007). These works are, however, mostly descriptive, and have serious shortcomings in revealing the real factors behind unequal growth. Although it is

¹⁷ This image has been challenged to some extent by the actual financial crisis, given the serious difficulties member countries have in finding a balance between showing solidarity with other countries and considering the will of their own population. A typical example for possible outcomes of this dilemma is the current attempt of numerous “rich” member countries to cut cohesion funding, whose main aim is otherwise to help less prosperous member countries to catch up (cf. Vogel 2012, April 24).

¹⁸ In fact, each of these findings can be found in a great deal of papers. The articles we refer to are just few examples, which in our view belong to the most explicit and substantiated verifications of these findings.

rarely made explicit, many papers suffer from the problem Neven and Gouyette (1995) admit about their own article while writing that it “describes a pattern of regional evolution”, but “offers little in the way of explaining it” (p. 64). Even in works using sophisticated statistical descriptive methods and giving a thorough explanation of mainstream neoliberal economic theories (mainly Krugman’s “New Economic Geography”), concluding remarks offer very little new behind simple description. A typical example is when, after creating a “regional growth model” (in fact, carrying out a conditional β convergence analysis) where each country has a specific dummy variable to represent “national characteristics” (!), the authors come to the point that “national characteristics of the EU countries...continue to play a significant role in regional growth” (Petraikos et al. 2011, p. 385).

These weaknesses are barely remarkable given the theoretical background. In fact, most works on spatial disparities within the European Union follow Krugman’s “New Economic Geography”. Sometimes they also make direct reference to endogenous growth theories, but in statistical investigation they dominantly rely on Krugman’s approach. Coming from this theoretical foundation, these works unavoidably face the complex problems (for these see Capello 2008) we presented in previous paragraphs with regard to the NEG. As an outcome, they suffer from “the need for more realism” (Capello and Nijkamp 2009, p. 4). For this reason, the capability of such analyses not only to describe spatial inequalities but to reveal their real reasons as well is rather limited. And, due to the same shortcomings, even less can they contribute to an in-depth evaluation of the efficiency of EU attempts to promote convergence. As Monfort (2008) suggests in a working paper of the Union’s Directorate-General for Regional Policy, “even if the analysis of regional disparities is conducted thoroughly, it says little about the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy” (p. 18).

To sum it up, the balance of spatial disparity research in the European Union is rather controversial. On the one hand, the issue clearly gained a lot of attention of political decision-makers, which opened the door for a mushrooming literature infiltrated by negative normative statements about spatial disparities. This is indeed a serious difference to the North American context, where spatial inequality has recently been regarded in mainstream research merely as a necessary concomitant of growth and not as a problem, where most analysts make do with the description instead of revealing the real reasons. On the other hand, however, the European works that put spatial disparity directly in their focus utilize the same theoretical background as US researchers do. In consequence, papers on convergence and divergence in the European Union also do not really go beyond describing patterns in order to reveal (or rather to hypothesize) underlying mechanisms.

To some extent this situation is certainly an outcome of disciplinary power relations. As Friedmann and Alonso underscored in the 1970s, theory-making in regional research was in those decades obviously dominated by US social sciences (see Friedmann and Alonso 1975). In fact, given that in the convergence literature key theoretical works are still from researchers at US universities, the same seems to be true for the recent age as well. This is indeed no wonder after the last 2 decades when leading economies in Europe were so enthusiastic about adapting various

elements of US neoliberal economic ideology and about fitting their own systems to the “Cold War winner” American model.

In our view, however, this notion to adopt US concepts would not be enough in itself to result in favoring concepts in Europe that lack the potential to sophisticatedly explain (and not only to describe) spatial disparities in the European Union. If there were a strong demand for such explanatory works from the side of EU institutions, which provide financial ammunition to a great deal of similar research projects and centers, EU planning documents as well as scientific articles would certainly not make do with a simple description of spatial disparities. This fundamentally descriptive practice in spatial disparity research seems, however, enough to meet the expectations of the Union’s policy-making institutions. On the one hand, a descriptive analysis of spatial inequalities can also provide a sort of factual knowledge for decision-makers by indicating whether previous measures in regional policy have met the expected result. In this sense, spatial disparity research has a feedback function. It has the potential to give a snapshot of the actual state of inequalities, an image that puts a complex phenomenon in a way that is easy to understand (at least apparently). In other words, spatial disparity research, even if it barely goes beyond description, is useful since it enables decision-makers to come to terms with the level and dynamics of spatial inequalities.

On the other hand, spatial disparity research in its current form serves well the maintenance of a discourse in which and by which EU institutions can make a stronger justification for themselves. Even a descriptive approach can efficiently spread orientation knowledge that presents the Union as an advocate of spatial equalization and a supporter of inhabitants living in poor regions of the member states. Furthermore, the vast literature on the topic has a considerable convincing power to suggest that spatial inequality is a crucial question, a problem that is to be solved and that can only be solved by international measures at the level of the whole community. This underpins the claim that the great deal of financial resources spent on regional policy is necessary, and that EU institutions unavoidably need the right to keep control over related decisions instead of letting regional policy be an exclusive competence of national governments.

In sum, describing current trends in spatial disparities can have a worthwhile function through monitoring and providing feedback for planners and politicians as well as through legitimizing policy attempts of supranational institutions of the European Union. This means, however, that spatial disparity research seems to fulfill its expected task if it serves the quite narrowly interpreted practical interests of EU policy-making. From this side there is seemingly little demand for scientific analyses going beyond description in order to reveal the complex mechanisms behind convergence and divergence. For these reasons, the “convergence industry” in the European Union can function well through a symbiosis between descriptive, monitoring-oriented research on the academic side and feedback-demanding decision-making on the policy side. And this indicates again how strongly the spatial disparity research is shaped by expectations and demand from the side of politics. More precisely, one can see how easily important aspects of spatial inequalities can remain outside the focus of scientific research if the demand of

political decision-makers can be covered without devoting more attention to these issues. Consequently, the European example shows how spatial disparity research can gain increasing attention on a neoclassical theoretical basis even in the era of neoliberalism, but only to the extent that it can directly contribute to a narrowly interpreted practical decision-making in politics.

Chapter 8

And Yet Spatial Disparity Is a Problem of Capitalism: Leftist Approaches in a Post-Fordist World

As presented above, the issue of spatial disparity was put at the forefront of mainstream social studies in capitalist countries during the Cold War. In related investigations the United States was at the leading edge of theoretical innovation without a doubt. Due to the manifold changes in the overall political, economic, and social context, however, the topic gradually lost its exclusive position in research agendas from the 1970s onwards. After the neoliberal turn, in the eyes of many, spatial inequality is no longer a “problem” to be “handled”. Meanwhile, the European Union witnessed a different tendency: the attention given to spatial inequalities did not decrease but considerably increased here because of the remarkable economic disparities possibly posing a threat to political stability in the integration. Still, related research in Europe also remained within the theoretical framework offered by state-of-the-art theories of US origin, which mostly did nothing but integrate already accessible concepts to a neoclassical mindset and “language”. Thus, even the most cited and most “visible” researches in Europe dominantly did not go beyond description and left untouched the factors leading to either convergence or divergence.

In the political sense both approaches distanced themselves from their postwar predecessors. The different ability of capitalism and socialism to produce or reduce spatial inequality was as a question exiled from the research agenda. After the neoliberal turn, in mainstream approaches both in North America and in Europe the topic was only investigated for a capitalist framework. These features of the post-Fordist research practice, however, opened a door for leftist ideologies to bring spatial inequality back among their main research issues in order to justify their political objectives. Once re-problematizing spatial disparity from an anti-capitalist point of view, these inequalities could again be presented as proofs of the unjust nature of capitalism and of the necessity to prefer socialist principles in economic management. This was on the one hand suggested by (neo-)Marxist¹ *dependency*

¹ In the literature the term “neo-Marxist” is used in many different meanings. A common point of ideas called “neo-Marxist” is that in a certain view they are all “new” compared to “old”, thus,

theories, which could rely on some ideas from earlier Western concepts that had been critical to the US dominated world order. Works of the latter sort had already been present in the 1950s and 1960s, although they had been located at the periphery of social scientific thought, with virtually no influence on mainstream approaches in the “most developed” Western countries. On the other hand, the re-emerging theory of *uneven geographical development* also opened up new vistas for an anti-capitalist interpretation of spatial inequalities. In the next sections we will focus on these two streams, not only dealing with their actual ideas having mushroomed since the 1970s but also presenting their forerunners, based on which the post-Fordist boom of leftist ideas could take place.

8.1 Global Inequality as a Product of the World Order: The Way to Dependency Theories²

8.1.1 *A Lonely but Hard Marxist Opinion from the West: Paul Baran’s View About Global Inequalities*

In fact, the old Marxist view that spatial inequality can be regarded as an “obvious” imprint of the immorality and unsustainability of capitalism (see Chap. 5) was

traditional Marxist concepts. The nature of this newness can be manifold. First, it can refer to *conceptual* (and methodological) *innovations*. “Neo-Marxism” in this sense means the formulation of new hypotheses and the introduction of new research methods to come to terms with new economic and social phenomena the old “mainstream Marxism” fails to explain or even to perceive. An example for this was the early twentieth century “neo-Marxism”. This tried to conceptualize global capitalism, which mirrored international relations profoundly different at that time than during the life of Marx, bringing into being the theory of imperialism (see Blomström and Hettne 1984, p. 53; also cf. Sweezy 1972). Second, “neo-Marxism” can and in dependency research does stand for approaches being new relative to the “traditionally” Europe-centric Marxism since they mirror a “new”, *non-Europe-centric* point of view. In this sense, “neo-Marxism” differs from “traditional” Marxism in observing processes from the global periphery, redefining a Europe-centric definition of the class to meet real conditions in “underdeveloped” countries, putting stress on the importance of guerrilla warfare instead of organized struggle of labor movements, and paying attention to the “exploitation of nature”, to ecological problems occurring in the global periphery (cf. Blomström and Hettne 1984, pp. 36–38). Third, the prefix “neo” is often attributed to Marxist concepts which have emerged since the late 1960s (mainly since the 1968 student movements), thus, after the postwar decades when Marxism in the Western world had mostly been considered as identical with Soviet communism and was pushed to the periphery of philosophical thought. Here the newness was constituted by a new heyday of Marxist theories, mostly concentrated around the so-called *New Left Marxism* (cf. Fine 2001). To avoid possible misunderstandings and ambiguities, in the text we tendentiously use “neo-Marxism” in the second meaning, where it refers to a non-Europe-centric point of view.

² We agree with Blomström and Hettne (1984) in that the term “dependency theory” in singular is “unsuitable”, since there is no single dependency theory. Instead, “a number of different dependency theorists have received their theoretical impulses from different sources” (p. 77). We also

mainly taken in the postwar period by Soviet theoreticians for apparent geopolitical reasons. Still, the concept had not absolutely been absent in Western thought in the same period. The US Marxist economist Paul Baran based his work *The Political Economy of Growth* (Baran 1957) on the same idea, in which he presented global economic inequalities as a product of the capitalist order. For him, the “underdevelopment” of certain countries was under capitalist circumstances a necessary concomitant of the “development” in others. Thus, he suggested that it was an inherent feature of capitalism to increase global disparities, a tendency which was impossible to end before capitalism would be swept away.

In Baran’s view, the existing world order was that of monopoly capitalism instead of laissez-faire capitalism. For him, the lack of sufficient competition freed capitalists from the stress constituted by the fierce competition with rivals, and for this reason they were not forced to produce as much value-added as it would have been technically possible. In consequence, they invested less than potentially possible for two reasons. Baran claimed on the one hand that beyond a point a capitalist could realize very few or virtually no additional profit through additional investment in the branch already dominated by him/her. Instead, due to the lack of efficient rivals, he/she could actually take advantage of his/her dominating position and realize the same profit without new investment. On the other hand, it made no sense to invest in other branches since these were likewise monopolized by other capitalists, who seemed impossible to compete with efficiently. Hence, in Baran’s eyes, capitalists invested less and, consequently, created less jobs in their native countries than they could, so a situation of “underinvestment” emerged.

There was still a need, however, for creating additional possibilities of investment for two reasons. First, capitalists had a firm interest in not leaving their capital “unused” but to invest it in order to realize more and more profit. Second, the relative shortage of workplaces and the significant unemployment as its result might have led to social unrest, so it seemed politically dangerous. In consequence, capitalists created new possibilities to invest through artificially generated state armament and through “opening up” “underdeveloped” countries formerly untouched by capitalism. The latter was, however, an imbalanced process in Baran’s view. His opinion was that capitalists only invested in “underdeveloped” countries in activities supplying products to be exported to “developed” countries, not to be consumed by local inhabitants. Furthermore, he claimed that all the value-added created in the “underdeveloped” countries was siphoned off and pumped into the “developed” areas. In this interpretation, investment in and exploitation of the “underdeveloped” countries only served the goal for which it was a necessary

resist, however, using “dependency school”, the version the two authors prefer. This formulation may lead to misunderstandings in our view as dependency theorists were not all the members of a singular academic “school”, which is usually based on regular personal contact and a direct master-disciple relationship. In fact, such a link existed between several dependency theorists, but certainly not between all of them. Instead the main similarity was rather in the way all of them tried to interpret the world, and in the mental schemes they used to conceptualize social, economic and political phenomena.

prerequisite: to promote growth in “developed” areas. Thus, the global capitalist order was presented here as a huge zero-sum game, where “underdeveloped” countries unavoidably lost and spatial disparities increased and increased as capitalism developed. In the light of these claims, Baran saw the only option for the “underdeveloped” world to exit the capitalist world order and to convert to socialism. As he put it: “The establishment of a socialist planned economy is an essential, indeed indispensable, condition for the attainment of economic and social progress in underdeveloped countries.” (p. 261).

To sum it up, Baran defined and used the *problem* of global spatial inequalities as a rhetorical means to reveal the claimed nature of capitalism, which for him was inherently unjust and parasitic. He also presented this view as a reasonable point for urging “underdeveloped” countries to break with capitalism and to become socialist, thus, to realize the author’s leftist vision. Baran used here arguments essentially very similar not only to those of Lenin (see Sect. 5.3), but also to those of Stalin (see Sect. 5.4). Furthermore, Baran put great emphasis on presenting not only socialism as an abstract category but existing socialism in the Soviet Bloc as well as something fundamentally positive. Although the fact of waves of political purges and the physical destruction of tens of millions could not be denied, Baran gave an interpretation in which these tragedies were presented either as independent from the socialist notion itself or as tolerable under given circumstances. On the one hand, he argued that such events only resulted from the “cult of personality” and the acting of some “evil personalities” (p. viii) such as Joseph Stalin and Lavrentiy Beria, the head of Soviet state security. Hence, Baran had the opinion that “it is a grievous fallacy to conclude from this that *socialism* is the ‘entire system’ that needs to be repudiated” (emphasis in original; *ibid.*) since “socialism is inherently [not] a system of terror and repression” (*ibid.*). On the other hand, Baran argued that “the ascent of reason has never followed a straight line” and that “errors are . . . unavoidable in all human endeavors” (p. 298). It was for him especially so in a case where it was crucial “to develop at breakneck speed a backward country”, which, moreover, was “threatened by foreign aggression” and “internal resistance” (p. viii). By this, the responsibility for communist terror in the USSR was simply attributed to the aggression of Hitler’s Nazi Reich, the threat from the enemy capitalist world, the historical “backwardness” of the post-revolutionary Russian Empire, and “internal resistance”, but not to inherent features of Soviet-type socialism.

Moreover, Baran did not stop at this point in freeing Soviet communism from the burden of its moral guilt. He even tried to present this system as superior to capitalism. Fully in line with then typical USSR propaganda,³ Baran claimed that socialism only had “errors”, resulting from “an inadequacy of knowledge and insight”, from which “it will progressively free itself” (p. 299). The weaknesses of capitalism were, however, presented as “irrationality”, “*inherent* in the structure of society” (emphasis in original; *ibid.*), and, consequently, not to be cured. In other

³ Cf. the concept of Kozlovskiy (1954) presented in Sect. 7.1.2.

words, Baran used the old and well-tested discursive strategy to “individualize” the shortcomings in the favored (socialist) system (thus, to consider these as but some wrong decisions of some individuals), while “generalizing” the problems in the rival, capitalist community (by claiming them to be inherent to the system) (cf. Meusburger 2005). No wonder that Baran’s work received virtually no acknowledgment in mainstream US theory-making of its day, since it strongly opposed American geopolitical interests in the Cold War and was instead in line with Soviet endeavors. In consequence, it remained “a voice crying in the wilderness” (Harrison 1988, p. 75; quoted in Gonçalves 2005, p. 43).

8.1.2 Leftist Theories to Question the US Dominated World Order by Analyzing Global Disparities: The ECLA Structuralist Approach in Latin America

In the 1950s Baran’s Marxist concept was indeed a curiosity in Western theory-making. This did not mean, however, a total lack of theories questioning the capability and willingness of the United States to handle the challenge posed by global disparities. Some authors actually tended to reject that the US dominated world order would automatically solve the problem, yet they did not argue against the whole capitalist system and found that global inequalities could be reduced through measures compatible with capitalism. The first of them was the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, director of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA; also CEPAL after its Spanish name Comisión Económica para América Latina) after 1948. Prebisch developed a concept (Prebisch 1950) for which “underdevelopment” in peripheral countries was “the result of a specific process that led to underdevelopment in one part of the world and development in another” (Blomström and Hettne 1984, p. 43).

As Gonçalves (2005, pp. 52–53) shows, this presumption was based on the rejection of the neoclassical general equilibrium model of international trade. Prebisch and his team rather thought that international trade was one of disequilibrium, beneficial for some and detrimental for others. Their opinion was that intensifying global trade, if taking place under uncontrolled laissez-faire circumstances, led to more and more imbalanced terms of trade (in other words, more and more unequal exchange) between the “developed” and “underdeveloped” world, thus, to growing global inequalities. The underlying presumption was that increasing productivity in the “developed” countries did not result in shrinking prices of the goods produced in global centers. Instead, producers were expected to try and take advantage of their special situation due to monopolistic competition and maintain price levels despite shrinking production costs in order to realize surplus benefit. In this attempt they were only challenged by labor unions, which were organized well enough to let a considerable part of surplus benefit be re-allocated in order to increase the wages of workers.

Meanwhile, Prebisch thought that increasing production in the center resulted in intensifying competition on the peripheries supplying raw materials for the centers. In his view, since many “underdeveloped” countries strongly depended on revenues from the export of primary goods, they were in a fierce competition with each other to find new consumers for their products. Thus, increasing production in the center ended up in increasing competition in the periphery, due to which prices for primary goods decreased.⁴ And, given a constant price level for manufactured goods and decreasing prices for raw materials, the actual form of the international division of labor seemed to raise global inequalities unavoidably.

Until this point Prebisch’s thoughts were remarkably compatible with the concept of circular causation, an idea developed by Myrdal as director of another Economic Commission of the United Nations, located in Europe. And the similarities did not end here. Just as Myrdal, apparently influenced by Keynesian views, claimed the necessity of state intervention to countervail tendencies of polarization, Prebisch also identified state policy as a possible means to cope with divergence. For him, import substitution industrialization and the protection of local production by tariff barriers was the strategy to put an end to unequal exchange and global polarization.

In fact, the concept of Prebisch was not a Marxist but rather a Keynesian one. Just as Myrdal, he not only rejected *laissez-faire* trade but socialist planning as well. In the words of Blomström and Hettne (1984), Prebisch “did not propose a planned economy. The Russian model was as rigorously rejected as the *laissez-faire* model. The market economy was to remain, but under the ‘surveillance’ of the government” (emphasis in original; p. 44). Still, although Myrdal’s work became a theoretical cornerstone of spatial disparity research, the somewhat earlier concept of Prebisch was kept outside the domain of mainstream theories. This happened in spite of the fact that both authors held high positions in UN institutions with analytical and policy-aiding objectives, which without a doubt gave a strong legitimate authority to their findings and views.

To understand the reason for the different reception of the two concepts, one should take a closer look at their geopolitical implications. As we have already explained in Sect. 6.7.1, Myrdal carefully balanced between two strands. On the one hand, he blamed the colonial past for all international and intranational disparities the poor countries suffered from. On the other, he stressed not the similarities but the differences between the former colonial powers and the United States, while presenting the latter in a positive light with regard to its claimed endeavor to reduce spatial inequalities. Thus, Myrdal’s work efficiently contributed to a positive image of the American superpower. But the same was not true in

⁴The claimed concept about constant prices for manufactured goods produced in global centers and sinking prices for raw materials provided by the global periphery gained support from another UN economist, the American Hans Singer (1950). His calculations were in concert with Prebisch’s suggestion, although there was no direct exchange of ideas between the two researchers (Love 1980). Due to this, the theory we have presented in the text is often called the Singer-Prebisch thesis.

Prebisch's concept. In fact, his opinion about the global role of the United States was rather negative. In the words of Preston (1996): "the ECLA analysis of the situation of the peripheries in relation to the new metropolitan centre of the USA was pessimistic in that the new centre was seen to be both powerful and unsympathetic" (p. 185). For Prebisch, the solution compatible with capitalism to hinder further spatial polarization was not to deepen *laissez-faire* trade with the United States. Instead, he suggested that countries on the periphery (especially in Central and South America) had to reduce such interaction and instead stand on their own feet. This idea obviously did not fit into American geopolitical interests, even if many governments in South America found Prebisch's concept attractive and tried to put it into practice during the late 1950s and early 1960s (for the latter information see Gonçalves 2005, pp. 54–55).

The ideas of Prebisch opened the way for further concepts as well, which "radicalized" (Blomström and Hettne 1984, p. 64) dependency theory. Their central argument was that social changes in peripheral countries were also necessary to get rid of the structures sustaining and permanently intensifying disparities between center and periphery. The Brazilian economist Celso Furtado, also a member of staff in ECLA, underscored the role of social structures inherited from the colonial past in global polarization. In his concept with strong historical grounding, he stressed that the economic growth path of Brazil and the United States began to diverge as early as the first part of the nineteenth century due to cultural factors. In his view, the Portuguese and Spanish colonization imported from the colonial centers to Central and South America a much more centralized and rigid institutional framework than the British model spread over the northern part of the continent. This was for Furtado the main reason for the relative lack of flexibility in nineteenth century Brazil, Argentina etc. to adapt their export structures to changing global demand, a task the United States successfully accomplished. But he did not simply blame the different colonial heritages for disparities within America.

A similarly decisive problem was in Furtado's eyes that "the great disparities in the behavior of the ruling classes" (Furtado 1963, p. 32) and related institutional structures proved highly persistent over time. For him, the strongly centralized state apparatus typical in the countries of Central and South America maintained a system where resources were distributed by the central power for political loyalty. The mechanism mostly benefited an extremely small and heterogeneous fraction of the population basically constituted by landlords and influential merchants. This stratum, "holding the monopoly of power unchallenged" was in fact "composed of various groups of interests", especially in an economic sense, which actually made them "unable to form a plan for national developments" (Furtado 1965, p. 68). Interestingly, Furtado emphasized that these structures were responsible not only for growing disparities between the United States and Brazil, but also for those between the Brazilian regions (see Furtado 1963). Thus, Furtado interpreted vast and increasing inequalities at various geographical levels in a structuralist way.

For a possible solution, Furtado argued for a state-led reorganization of the economy and a remarkable shift in the distribution of income among local

inhabitants to break down the power monopoly of the oligarchs. In his eyes this was the only way out of the vicious circle of “underdevelopment” and increasing spatial inequalities both in international and intranational senses.⁵ In terms of politics, Furtado’s views went beyond those of Prebisch insofar as they urged for social changes in Central and South America. Yet, as Brookfield (1975) underscores, Furtado was neither a pure Marxist nor an advocate of socialist revolution, but rather a person influenced by Marxist as well as liberal concepts (even if he was explicitly leftist—cf. Furtado 1965, p. xiii). As Gonçalves (2005, p. 59) emphasizes, the same was true for Furtado’s Chilean fellow Osvaldo Sunkel, who saw the roots of “underdevelopment” on the American periphery basically in the same factors as Furtado. Still, similarly to Furtado, he did not argue for a socialist revolution, which he otherwise regarded as “a very improbable historical event in the near future in Latin America” (Sunkel 1969, p. 32). Instead, he suggested that the necessary social changes also urged by Furtado could be carried out on the basis of cooperation of the middle and lower classes under the aegis of intensifying nationalism and without sweeping away the existing economic order.

The question to what extent “development” in Central and South American depended on external effects from the global centers was investigated by the Brazilian sociologist Henrique Cardoso and the Chilean historian Enzo Faletto as well. These two authors worked for ILPES (Instituto Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Planificación Económica y Social; Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning), a subordinate institution of ECLA (see Gonçalves 2005, p. 60). Cardoso and Faletto took into consideration both the concepts of Prebisch and those of Furtado and Sunkel about the reasons for “underdevelopment” in Central and South America. But between the ideas blaming either external dependency or inner social structure as the ultimate root of the problem, Cardoso and Faletto (1969, 1979)⁶ tended to prefer an explanation in between.

The two authors explicitly wanted to “avoid the two fallacies frequently found” in related concepts, namely the “belief that the internal or national socio-political situation is mechanically conditioned by external dominance” as well as “the opposite idea that all is due to historical contingency” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 173). In other words, they had the opinion that there were “structural limits to possible action” (ibid.), but a certain room for maneuver still existed so thus “the relation of dependence does not mean that national history in dependent nations will simply reflect changes in the external hegemonic center” (ibid.). For this reason, they argued for a “dependent development” (p. xxii) to exist in countries in the periphery, where “structural links” between “external and internal forces . . . are rooted in coincidences of interests between local dominant classes and

⁵The above mentioned ideas of Furtado appear in many of the books and papers he wrote. For a detailed overview of the related literature and the temporal development of Furtado’s views see Boianovsky (2009).

⁶The two works were generally the same since the 1979 book was the first (otherwise expanded and amended) English edition of the 1969 essay *Dependency and Development in Latin America*.

international ones, and, on the other side, are challenged by local dominated groups and classes” (p. xvi).

To sum it up, Cardoso and Faletto broke with identifying either external dependency or social structure in the dependent countries as an exclusive (or at least dominant) reason for their “underdevelopment”. Instead, they stressed that both factors were important, and that the level of “development” on the periphery was an outcome of the summarized effect of the two factors. By this view the two authors also gave ammunition for leftist political notions aimed at social changes, but not radical ones. They agreed that “external factors” (mostly manifest in the activity of international companies settled in the global periphery) as well as “internal” ones (e.g. social and institutional structures) were responsible to some extent for international inequalities in favor of the global center. Hence, their words (at least implicitly) justified import substitution industrialization as well as attempts to erode the power of the ruling class in dependent countries. In the meantime, however, their concept basically mirrored the willingness to understand phenomena instead of setting clear political goals. Cardoso and Faletto actually analyzed the chances of promoting faster “development” in Latin America, but without saying what to do exactly. Even what can be considered as an implicit suggestion in their concept merely gave justification for already existing political steps (such as import substitution industrialization) instead of calling for radical changes.

To sum it up, representatives of the structuralist approach intensively dealt with global disparities as a major problem for the “underdeveloped” countries in general, and for Central and South America in particular. Their views about the relative importance of external dependence and inner social structures were somewhat different, but the geopolitical meaning of what they said was apparently barely compatible with the foreign political interests of the United States. The limitation of *laissez-faire* trade through tariffs and a decrease in the reliance on industrial imports through industrialization were objectives contrary to American aims. Furthermore, the attempt in dependent countries to reduce the unchallenged power of the ruling class was also questionable to be fully in line with US interests. This was because, as several structuralist authors underscored, local oligarchs in peripheral countries usually tended to have the same economic interests as foreign investors and merchants did. In consequence, to undertake changes in the social structure could have been detrimental in a US view. For these reasons, concepts of the structuralist approach in Latin America received virtually no attention from mainstream US theories about spatial disparities. Yet, these structuralist concepts were free from extreme anti-capitalism. They neither envisaged the necessity of thorough political changes nor did they use the issue of global disparities as a means to take advantage in order to justify radical political goals. These were, however, also done soon by other authors.


8.1.3 Analyzing Global Disparities to Predict or Urge for the End of Capitalism: Neo-Marxist Dependency Theories and the World-System Model of Immanuel Wallerstein

As we have presented in the last section, the representatives of the structuralist approach in Latin America provided concepts from as early as the 1950s onwards that pointed at the link between large and increasing spatial disparities and the political power relations both at the international and local levels. They also suggested (either explicitly or implicitly) certain changes in economy and society in order to hinder further polarization. Still, these concepts did not challenge the fundamental basis of capitalism. After the late 1960s, however, this also happened. Especially in the light of the 1964 military coup d'état in Brazil many came to the conclusion that protectionism and import substitution industrialization, which the ECLA structuralists had argued for, failed in solving the problem of "underdevelopment" in Latin America. This indicated in the eyes of many that steps taken on the global periphery against external exploitation were impossible to reach their objectives without questioning and changing the ultimate foundations of the capitalist order.

The Brazilian sociologist and economist Theotonio dos Santos argued that import substitution necessarily ended in doom since mechanisms responsible for global dependency were intrinsic to capitalism. Hence, for him, policy measures along ECLA suggestions were only to substitute traditional links of dependency with "the New Dependence", where multinational companies headquartered in the global center played a key role in sustaining the exploitation of the periphery (Dos Santos 1970, 1973). Dos Santos had the opinion that asymmetric power structures and resulting international disparities could only be changed by putting an end to capitalism. This meant in his interpretation either the establishment of a nationalistic military regime (as happened in Brazil) or a revolutionary, socialist one (as began in Allende's Chile) (cf. Dos Santos 1969). In this dualistic approach it was of course no question that dos Santos found the second option desirable.

The idea that global dependency and inequality were directly brought into being by capitalism was central to the works of the Brazilian sociologist and economist Ruy Mauro Marini (1965, 1969, 1973) as well. He distinguished between two forms of capitalism. In his view, capitalism in the global center was different to what he called "dependent" or "peripheral capitalism". The latter was aimed at providing cheap exports to the center. For this reason, local wages on the periphery were kept low, and attempts to cover the needs of local inhabitants were neglected due to the low purchase power these had. Marini thought that the whole structure of peripheral capitalism served the exploitation of "underdeveloped" countries by the "developed" ones. This was in his eyes a necessary prerequisite for a high level of well-being in the global center. Thus, Marini also saw the ultimate reason for global

Fig. 8.1 Frank's metropolis-satellite model. Adapted from Blomström and Hettne (1988), p. 69. *M* the world metropolis, *m* metropolis, *s* satellite



disparities in the structures of dependency, which he considered to be unavoidable concomitants of capitalism.⁷

Unquestionably influenced by the Cuban Revolution and the revolutionary wave sweeping through Latin America, some radical authors went even further in presenting growing spatial inequalities as quasi a *casus belli* to justify radical attempts against the capitalist order. A main representative of them was the German-born US economist André Gunder Frank. Frank (1967), working in Latin America from the early 1960s and strongly influenced by Paul Baran (see Gonçalves 2005; p. 63), went back in his concept to the structuralists' idea which he summarized as follows: "economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin" (Frank 1967, p. 9). By this, he pointed out the decisive role of international dependence in the "underdevelopment" of peripheral countries, tracing back the problem of disparities to external causes. In Frank's view, the whole world could be interpreted as a group of "metropolises" and "satellites", forming a hierarchical structure. For him, this structure was much more sophisticated than the dual system presented by Prebisch and his followers. Frank's model was a "chain-like" one, formed by a dense net of links of "the capitalist world and national metropolises to the regional centers . . . and from these to local centers, and so on" (p. 7), to local actors in social and economic life. In this interpretation, each entity between the uppermost and lowest levels was considered as both a metropolis and a satellite: it was a metropolis relative to entities at lower levels, but a satellite for metropolises at higher levels (Fig. 8.1). Ultimate satellites were thought to be found only at the individual level, for instance among landless laborers. Meanwhile, Frank presented the United States as the "absolute" metropolis at the top of the global hierarchy. For Frank, hierarchical links in the model also

⁷The two paragraphs on the scientific works of dos Santos and Marini are mainly based on Blomström and Hettne (1984), pp. 64–66.

represented the links of exploitation, which suggested that disparities between metropolises and satellites were necessary to grow.

In fact, these ideas were not fundamentally new compared to structuralist concepts described in the previous section of our essay. But Frank went even further: he claimed a direct, causal link between capitalism and spatial inequalities, suggesting that the reduction of these disparities was impossible within the actual economic framework. As he put it, “it is capitalism, both world and national, which produced underdevelopment in the past and still generates underdevelopment in the present” (p. vii). Or, in other words: “underdevelopment as we know it today, and economic development as well, are the simultaneous and related products of the development on a world-wide scale and over a history of more than four centuries at least of a single integrated economic system: capitalism” (Frank 1975, p. 43). And Frank indeed considered capitalism to be responsible for spatial inequalities at *all* geographical levels. In the light of the hierarchy he described in his satellite/metropolis model, he was convinced that “the colonialist-imperialist manifestations of capitalism occur not only between countries but equally so within countries” (p. 72). Hence, “at each point, the international, national, and local capitalist system generates economic development for the few and underdevelopment for the many” (Frank 1967, p. 7).

Moreover, Frank firmly believed that these shortcomings of capitalism could not be handled, that the economic order was not be “mended”. For him, the tendency to generate spatial inequalities was a direct outcome of “capitalism’s essential internal contradiction” (Frank 1969, p. 227). This meant that capitalism could not be expected to bring “development” to the periphery in the future and an equalization of spatial disparities. In Frank’s words: “For the system which has produced and continues to produce both development and underdevelopment . . . it is not by its very nature able to produce development only” (Frank 1975, p. 51). It was for this reason that in his eyes “so far, no national, or other sector of the world capitalist system, once underdeveloped, has been able to escape from underdevelopment and still preserve capitalist productive relations” (p. 102). Hence, the reduction of disparities in space and a “real development” in the periphery was considered to be possible only through radical steps. Frank pointed out that since “underdevelopment is the result of exploitation of the colonial and class structure based on ultraexploitation”, development was only achieved “where this structure of underdevelopment was not established because *it was impossible to establish*” (our emphasis; Frank 1972, p. 19). In his view, the “fortunate” areas had been those lacking raw materials valuable for capitalist colonizers since they had not been integrated into the capitalist world economy. Thus, the solution for “underdeveloped” countries was for them to exit the capitalist world order and to introduce a socialist system. There was no other way in between; as Frank made it clear in the title of a 1969 book, the only alternatives were “underdevelopment or revolution” (Frank 1969). By the latter he meant a socialist revolution similar to that in Cuba, which resulted in a split with the United States and a turn towards the Communist Bloc.

As one can see, Frank’s concept about spatial disparities had the firm intention to justify radical political measures and the establishment of a socialist regime. Disparity research turned here into the production and dissemination of a sort of

orientation knowledge, namely political propaganda. And Frank was not the only one to take advantage of such an argumentation. For example, the Egyptian Marxist economist Samir Amin developed a similar concept based on a dual distinction between “center” and “periphery”. In his view, capitalism was manifest in two, essentially different forms in these two contexts.⁸ For him, capitalism in the global center was “autocentric”, thus, “characterized by the balanced internal relationship between the sector producing mass consumer goods and the sector producing capital goods” (Smith 1982, p. 9; with reference to Amin 1980). This was considered to end up in a “normal” growth. Here, producers were on the one hand interested in low labor costs, but on the other they were not advocates for *too* low wages since this would have meant strongly limited purchasing power and little demand for the products manufactured. The outcome was in Amin’s view a rather balanced, “standard capitalism”, with increasing production and increasing purchasing power for the population.

In the periphery, however, Amin saw “distorted” circumstances and “blocked development” (Amin 1976, p. 189). He had the opinion that peripheral areas had been dominated by economies in the global center since the era of colonization, which had managed to maintain this domination over the centuries through sophisticated economic mechanisms. For this reason, the periphery was for him “subject to the logic of accumulation in the centres that dominated them” (Amin 1980, p. 133), and which aimed the “centralization of the surplus on the world scale” (p. 252). Hence, “price structures are distorted” in international trade in order to establish unequal exchange and to “aggravate exploitation in the periphery” (Amin 1978, p. 63). This was also considered to distort the structure of production, consumption, and foreign trade in peripheral economies. Due to artificially low labor costs, the mass consumption regime characterizing the center could not come into being here. Due to this, the production of consumer goods did not begin to increase, and the import of such products also remained at a very low level.

Meanwhile, revenues of the periphery from the export of raw materials mostly landed in foreign companies headquartered in the global center. Only a fraction of this value-added was recycled into the local economy. Moreover, this small part mainly went to the “parasitic” local elite (Amin 1976, p. 193), which were kept in power by foreign supporters in order to sustain the economic, political, and institutional circumstances under which the external exploitation of the periphery faced no threat. In Amin’s view, these narrow but extremely rich elite were the only ones to participate in the revenues. And as the amount of money they could use was much greater than what would have been necessary to cover basic needs, it was spent mainly on luxury goods. In consequence, the rather moderate local human and financial resources that were not needed in exporting branches were sucked up by activities aimed at covering this luxurious demand. Similarly, the limited financial

⁸ As Blomström and Hettne (1984, p. 77) points out, Amin’s dualistic model of two different forms of capitalism was based on the similar ideas of Marini, which we have presented in the current section.

means that one could have possibly spent on the import of capital goods to substantiate future growth also went mainly to the import of luxury goods the local economy could not produce. For this reason Amin was convinced that the “blocked capitalism” brought into being by external forces perpetually “reproduce [d] its own conditions of existence” (Amin 1977, p. 218).

In general, as Smith (1982) underscored, Amin clearly suggested in his works that “peripheral economies have no freedom of manoeuvre in relation to world capitalism” (p. 10). Instead, the fate of the periphery was to serve the global centers of capitalism, which “necessarily” resulted in “the blocking” of its own growth, thus, in “the development of under-development” (Amin 1974, p. 393). In other words, the permanent increase in global disparities was presented as unavoidable in global capitalism. And such a tendency was not only an interest of capitalists in the centers. For Amin, the “subordinated” classes in central economies indirectly also took considerable advantage from the “supra-exploitation” (Amin 1980, p. 163) of the periphery whenever they managed to get additional revenue from their own elite. In the light of these prospects, Amin concluded that “so long as an under-developed country continues to be integrated in the world market, it remains helpless”, since “the possibilities of local accumulation are nil” (Amin 1974, p. 13). Hence, for him, the only and “objectively necessary” chance to get rid of this detrimental situation was a “socialist break” (Amin 1980, p. 131), a revolution.

In the case of Amin, just as for Frank, the analysis of spatial disparity as a problem clearly served the political notion to justify a communist revolution and the sweeping away of capitalism. But besides these radical examples of dependency theories, which were based on a militant language, another concept also emerged that urged political changes with similar, inequality-oriented arguments, yet in a somewhat more moderate tone. This was the world-system model of the US sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein. Influenced by the idea of the French historian Fernand Braudel about the existence of a single world economy, Wallerstein drew up a model of a unitary global capitalist economy, “a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems” (Wallerstein 1979, p. 5). In his view, this unity was brought into being by international trade, which created a direct connection between three subsystems. These were claimed to be the center, the periphery, and the semi-periphery. The latter was an innovation of Wallerstein compared to previous concepts usually defining a simple dual structure of center and periphery.

For the nature of relations between the subsystems, however, Wallerstein’s view was similar to many other leftist authors. He considered the world system to function in an exploitative way, where the center seized power over the periphery and exploited its resources via unequal exchange, driven by the inherent push of capitalism for “production for profit in a market” (Wallerstein 1974, p. 399). Hence, his concept suggested that the “development” of the center necessarily led to the “underdevelopment” of the periphery, and that the global capitalist system unavoidably produced spatial inequalities on a global scale. Yet, he did not claim this process to create a simple core-periphery structure, but rather a system of three components, where the semi-periphery had an important stabilizing function. Wallerstein had the opinion that the semi-periphery, just as the intermediate levels in Frank’s satellite/metropolis concept, was both exploited and exploiter. For this

reason, to some extent it was itself also interested in the maintenance of the current order, and in blocking the periphery's potential attempts to enforce radical changes in the global framework. Thus, as Wallerstein put it, "the world-economy as an economy would function every bit as well without a semi-periphery. But it would be far less *politically* stable, for it would mean a polarized world-system" (emphasis in the original; Wallerstein 1979, p. 23).

As one can see, Wallerstein presented the *problem* of global spatial inequalities as a direct outcome of the capitalist world order. This interpretation, of course, also revealed what the author considered as a probable and desirable solution to the problem: a socialist turn. Unlike Frank and Amin, however, he did not argue that each country had to make attempts to break with capitalism and introduce socialism. In fact, Wallerstein found such an endeavor useless and actually impossible since, for him, it would not change the one capitalistic world system. Instead, he underscored that for a real solution the world economy as such "must be transformed from a capitalist mode to a socialist mode" (Wallerstein 1977, p. 106). In his eyes, this meant "neither a redistributive world-empire nor a capitalist world-economy but a socialist world-government" (Wallerstein 1979, p. 35). Furthermore, he stressed that "socialism does not arrive one fine morning after the seizure of state power" (Wallerstein 1979, p. 106), but only through a "*process* of continuing class struggle" (emphasis in the original; *ibid.*).

To sum it up, Wallerstein's concept was similar to those of Frank and Amin insofar as it used spatial disparity research to point out what its author regarded as an inherent problem of capitalism in order to justify socialist political goals. Without a doubt, the world system model utilized a less militant vocabulary and envisaged rather a gradual, non-violent and maybe utopian political turn relative to the call of Frank and Amin for revolution. In fact, Wallerstein himself made explicit that he did not see his "projection as being in the least utopian" but also did not feel "its institution [to be] imminent" (p. 35). Yet, from our point of view his world system model followed the same logic as the other authors' theories did. He tried to take advantage of spatial disparity research, which he used as a means to substantiate the socialist aims with which he sympathized.

8.1.4 The Relation of Factual Knowledge to Orientation Knowledge in Leftist Dependency Theories

The last sections explained how from the 1950s onwards several leftist concepts emerged outside the Soviet Bloc,⁹ whose authors interpreted global spatial

⁹ In fact, among the theoreticians whose concepts we discussed in the last sections Samir Amin is the only one who could not be regarded without ambiguities as coming from the "Western Bloc". This is because his concepts were strongly based on the experience he gained in Egypt (1957–1960) and Mali (1960–1963), both countries having a socialist and Soviet-friendly

inequality as a problem, namely a problem caused by the actual world order. Besides obvious similarities, these interpretations had remarkable peculiarities as well, e.g. due to the “situatedness of knowledge” since they emerged in geographical contexts with different political, economic, historical etc. features and influences. In some works it was argued that the dependence and “underdevelopment” of the periphery could be demolished and international disparities could be reduced within a capitalist framework. This approach suggested that peripheral countries could (and actually should) take certain efforts (e.g. import substitution industrialization and the reduction of foreign trade) to strengthen themselves and, hence, to solve their problems on their own. Others regarded global disparities as an unavoidable outcome of capitalism, which could only be cured through a socialist revolution. These concepts were obviously different in their political suggestions, but their notion to use spatial disparity analysis as a means to urge for significant political changes (at least on the global periphery) was a common point. In other words, a strong aim of all these theories was to manufacture orientation knowledge. Meanwhile, they also claimed to explain the underlying mechanisms of spatial inequalities, thus, to produce factual knowledge.

At this point the question arises how the relation of these two forms of knowledge production related to each other. Were the results of empirical and theoretical analyses used to derive political suggestions from them, or did the authors follow firm political interests, and carry out “scientific investigations” only to create substantiation for their programmatic political views? To answer the question, we focus on three questions. First, to what extent dependency theorists tried to take advantage of the image of science? Did they claim their concepts to be theoretically more coherent and/or empirically more valid than the views formulated by their rivals, or did they simply present their concepts as intriguing sets of ideas, not necessarily “better” but rather “other”? Second, did their concepts prove well-substantiated, both in the theoretical and empirical sense, providing an adequate basis for the potential claim of scientific quality? Third, how was the relation between the substantiation and validity of these concepts, and the self-confidence of their authors to derive political suggestions from them?

For the first question, in most works of dependency theories one can find numerous examples of the authors’ claim that their concepts were theoretically better rounded and more in accordance with empirical evidence than mainstream views to which they tried to offer an alternative. This attitude was, at least to some extent, already present in the concepts of non-Marxist ECLA structuralists, who mainly substantiated it by underscoring the remarkable shortcomings of then mainstream neoclassical concepts, likewise stressed by many not belonging to the dependence theorists. Furtado (1964) argued against economics interpreted as “a purely abstract science” (p. 2), which “calls for building models or simplified schemes of existing economic systems, models based on stable relationships

orientation in those years. But neither did Amin work in any country actually belonging to the Soviet Bloc, while he did so for a long time in France and for UN institutions (cf. Amin 1992).

between calculable variables *deemed to be* relevant and important” (our emphasis; p. 1). In his view, such an approach had dominated mainstream economics for a long time. Hence, economics had become fully infiltrated by “logical constructions based on fragmentary observations, on simplistic psychological assumptions” (pp. 4–5), e.g. on those of “free competition” and “free exchange”. Yet, “by dint of sheer repetition these formulations became transformed into dogma” (p. 5), into “the ‘great laws’” of economics (p. 4).

In the light of these, Furtado claimed that “economics for a long time lost the features of an *objective science* and became a mere collection of *precepts*” (our emphases; p. 5). At this point he referred to Myrdal’s related ideas on nineteenth century economics, arguing that “economists, *speaking in the name of their science*, have been airing views on what *they considered* to be socially imperative” (our emphases; Myrdal 1953, p. 4). Thus, similar to a considerable part of social scientists outside the domain of Dependency theories, Furtado took a critical stance on the mainstream economics of the day due to its lack of scientific quality. Meanwhile, he argued for the strong consideration of historical aspects and the adaptation of a “structural view” (p. vii) in economic analysis, which he claimed to have done in his essays. Since Furtado had the opinion that “continuing criticism of economic thought by economists themselves is a *prerequisite of the advancement* of this science” (own emphasis; p. 5), he also suggested that his books on the topic were an important contribution to the “advancement of science”. This implied a clear distinction between then conventional works on “underdevelopment” and global disparities, which Furtado suggested to be non-objective and non-scientific, and his own essay, which was presented as more objective and more scientific.

Explicitly neo-Marxist works on dependency also used the discursive method of denying the scientific relevance of other concepts while presenting themselves as theories basically free of similar shortcomings. Frank, for instance, argued that “most social scientists” posited unrealistic assumptions in their theories, which “effectively defines the theoretical limits of their own creativity but does not correspond to the reality of development and underdevelopment” (Frank 1978, p. 1). In his view, “most contemporary theorists are quite unable to explain – and related policy makers are still less able to change – the nature and causes of the poverty and the wealth of nations” (ibid.). Frank, however, claimed to “free ourselves from the *irrelevance* of narrowly limited neoclassical theory” (our emphasis; ibid.). This was for him possible by taking “the global historical vision of Adam Smith and the dialectical historical analysis of Karl Marx”, which together brought into being “a whole world encompassing holistic, real-world historical, socially structural (and . . . theoretically dialectical) theory of development and underdevelopment” (pp. 1–2). To sum it up, Frank also suggested a difference between most other works, which he found to have ambiguous scientific substantiation and relevance, and his own concepts, regarded as free of fundamental weaknesses.

In neo-Marxist dependency theories the claim of scientific quality and the reference to a suggested non-scientific nature of competing approaches was also

strongly present. Baran began his 1957 essay by making his view explicit on this issue. He leveled fierce criticism at classical and neoclassical economics, whose representatives for him had been from the beginning “the intellectual spear-head” of the “rising capitalist order” (p. 2), thus, in Robbins’s (1952, p. 19) words cited by Baran, “the apologists of the dominant class” (Baran 1957, p. 2). Hence, “bourgeois economics”, which started as “advocacy of capitalism” (p. 4), had become “a mere attempt at an explanation and justification of the *status quo*” (emphasis in original; *ibid.*), “a neatly packed kit of *assorted ideological gadgets* required for the functioning and the preservation of the existing social order” (our emphasis; *ibid.*). Baran had a similarly destructive view about Keynesian economics. In his opinion, this approach “found itself face to face with the entire irrationality . . . of the capitalist order” (p. 7), and “under irresistible pressure of incontrovertible *facts*” (our emphasis), namely the Great Depression, it “implicitly repudiated the zealously guarded ‘purity’ of academic economics” (p. 8). Still, Keynesianism was for Baran just an “effort on the part of bourgeois economic thought to discover a way of *saving the capitalist system* in spite of the manifest symptoms of its disintegration and decay” (our emphasis; *ibid.*). In the light of these, Baran claimed that all “bourgeois” approaches in social sciences were to “provide . . . the requisite rationalization for the systematic effort of the ruling class of the advanced capitalist countries to prevent, or at least to retard, the political and economic liberation of the colonial and dependent nations” (p. 15).

Meanwhile, Baran described how “bourgeois” approaches in his view exiled “dangerous” alternative ways of seeing from the domain of “academic science”. For him, the school of economics and social sciences that began to develop on the basis of Marx’s and Engels’s ideas was judged as “heretical” (p. 7), while “bourgeois” social science tried to keep the claim of being “scientific” and “objective” for itself. Baran even wrote about the contrast between “the ‘Holy See’ of conventional economics” and its “heretical”, Marxist counterpart, suggesting a parallel between the Inquisition of the Catholic Church and the struggles within the domain of twentieth century economics and social sciences.¹⁰ After establishing the image of the self as “being suppressed” by “bourgeois” approaches, Baran claimed that the standard of objectivity and scientific quality was only met by Marxist concepts in general and, for spatial disparity research, by his views about global dependency and inequalities. In his words, this was the only approach to communicate “self-evident truths” (p. 11), such as that of “the conflict-laden, irrational nature of the capitalist order” (p. 5), and the only one to be in line with “incontrovertible *facts*” (our emphasis; p. 9). Hence, Baran’s goal was not to question the existence of a universal and “pure” science, thus, to reveal how science in general produced not only factual but orientation knowledge as well. Instead, he kept the idea of an

¹⁰ Baran also evoked the struggles between the “Holy Catholic Church”, and heretics and the godless while recurrently calling the relation of “bourgeois” science and politics to leftist revolutionary thoughts as “a systematic *crusade*” (our emphasis; p. 12).

omnipotent and “objective” science, but attributed this to concepts being in line with his political conviction, and not with the views of other, non-Marxist thinkers.

The legitimate authority provided by science gained an important role in the works of Amin as well. This was not only manifest in his consideration of the social development predicted by Marx’s model as “an *objective* and necessary rule” (our emphases; Amin 1980, p. 4). He also suggested certain kinds of social analysis to be scientific and others as non-scientific. For the explanation of whether the main tendency of capitalism was a homogenization of the forces and modes of production in various geographical contexts, for instance, Amin expressed his view as follows: “The key to a *scientific* analysis of these problems is a *correct* understanding of the question of technology.” (our emphases; p. 32). Thus, the belief in the superiority of science over other “modes of knowledge” and in the existence of objectivity and correctness obviously infiltrated Amin’s concepts.

Moreover, Amin was rather strict about whom to acknowledge as being within the domain of science and whom not. Given his firm Marxist attitude it is maybe no wonder that his critique of complete disciplines being not in accordance with his views was destructive. He stated, for example, that “the work of anthropology generally *has not been scientific*” (our emphasis; p. 36). It is even more striking that he even expressed disapproval of Marxism in the global center. He was convinced about “the hegemony of the social democratic and revisionist ideologies among the working classes at the centre” (Amin 1978, p. 116). This in his view meant that “the trends of that famous ‘Western Marxism’ . . . are all linked with trends in bourgeois, and therefore pre-Marxist philosophy” (p. 124). From this ironic statement Amin derived an even more critical idea about “Western Marxism”: “even when they ask the right questions, they are incapable of answering these questions because their society is not ready for the answers” (p. 125). Thus, Amin claimed “Western Marxism” to express “a bourgeois point of view” (p. 157), to be “distorted” (p. 157), and consequently incorrect and non-scientific.¹¹ In the meantime, he spoke in high terms about Marxism on the global periphery. As he put it: “the revolutionary credential of the intelligentsia, which at the centre is in the service of capital, is here, in the periphery, in the camp of revolution” (p. 124). And, of course, Amin regarded his own works as being authentic examples of such an objective science produced on the periphery. He claimed, for example, to quantify and “to analyse the contradictions”, namely the volume of exploitation, within the capitalist system (Amin 1980, p. 156). Moreover, while Amin leveled strong criticism against

¹¹ This attitude in Amin’s works in fact attracted serious criticism due to its “economic reductionism” (Smith 1982, p. 11). In Smith’s words, “by locating a person’s class position” (e.g. that one belongs to the class located in the global center), “Amin is ‘reading off’ their political and ideological stance” (ibid.). We agree with Smith in that forming an opinion about one’s view only in the light of one’s country of origin is highly erroneous and can result in serious misinterpretations. Still, the oversimplifying attitude of Amin does not influence what we wrote about his claim of being objective and scientific while denying the same for those with whom he did not agree.

the works of Western Marxists, he claimed his own “statistical illustration of the nature of the imperialist problem” as “not arbitrary” (p. 161).

In sum, a strong notion was apparent in most dependency theories to present themselves as objective and scientific, thus, superior to and more valid than alternative views. Related authors did not question the existence of a science with universal relevance, but tried to identify this exclusively with the form of knowledge production that met their political views. In other words, they were determined in taking advantage of the legitimate authority of science to “sell” their concepts. At this point a new question arises: to what extent do the actual theoretical coherence and empirical substantiation of these concepts meet their authors’ claims about scientific quality? To find an answer, we should make an overview of the main points in these concepts that can and actually have attracted criticism from various directions.

A fundamental issue concerning most theories presented in the last sections is their oversimplifying view of the “center” and “periphery”. The majority of works draw a very simple, dualistic structure of the world. The only exceptions are the model of Frank with a chain-like structure, which implies a more sophisticated hierarchy with more levels than those of the “world metropolis” and “ultimate satellites”, and Wallerstein’s world-system theory with an additional third category of “semi-periphery”. The dualistic models suffer from the same shortcoming as, for instance, the concepts of Myrdal and Hirschman on the US “side” in the Cold War spatial disparity discourse, which differentiated between “rich” and “poor” countries. Such a simple interpretation of the world is highly misleading since it ignores the considerable differences *within* the global center as well as within the periphery. As Disney (1977) put it: “Clearly, there is no problem with locating the US or Great Britain within the center, or Haiti or Mauretania within the periphery. But what about countries such as Portugal, Greece, Argentina and Brazil?” (p. 126).¹² Moreover, not even individual countries can be handled as homogenous in this sense since one can find peripheries within the “most developed” countries as well (such as the south of Italy and Appalachia in the United States, which Disney refers to). In addition, we have to emphasize that certain peripheral districts in countries of the global center might face severe social problems that several central areas in the global peripheries are merely free from. Certain districts in Sicilia or Kentucky, for example, suffer much more from unemployment, poverty, and criminality than San José in Costa Rica, or Gaborone in Botswana, which are

¹² In this sense we are even more critical than Disney, because we do not think that either the United States and Great Britain or “Haiti or Mauretania” could be self-evidently located either in the center or in the periphery if the *exact criteria* of categorization are unclear or unrevealed. Without a doubt, one can easily rely on one’s “geographical imagination” (Gregory 1994) to claim that this or that country belongs to the “global center” or to the “periphery”. But in our view this mirrors such a lack of self-reflexivity which is far less than desirable in a “scientific” discourse. Still, we consider Disney’s lines as relevant insofar as he effectively points out why dual categorizations in international issues easily become over-simplified, unrealistic and misleading.

relatively wealthy and safe centers of their countries otherwise often counted to the “global periphery”.

As these examples show, compressing the difficult network of global political, economic and social relations into a simple dualistic scheme is highly questionable and misleading. It has a clear political suggestion, however, since it efficiently suggests an unbridgeable gap between “center” and “periphery”. Here, the responsibility of the center for the problems of the periphery can be exaggerated on the one hand through implying an extreme separation of the two “poles” and a drastic subordination of peripheral countries. On the other hand, precisely the claim of a profound separation between the “center” and “periphery” can make the reader feel the situation so severe, that radical attempts to change this might seem justifiable or even necessary. Moreover, speaking about “the center” and “the periphery” in such concepts not only hides the considerable inner heterogeneity of both categories. It also gives an oversimplified interpretation of the process of “underdevelopment” itself, presenting it as “a unitary process with uniform causes and uniform effects” (Bernstein 1979, p. 74). Thus, the national peculiarities of “development” and “underdevelopment” remain fully unrevealed, just as their underlying mechanisms.

For the models of Frank and Wallerstein, these are not that one-sided, but neither are they really more sophisticated. The fact that Wallerstein defines a “semi-periphery”, actually a “buffer zone” between the countries considered as “exploiters” or “exploited” does not mean a radical change in the concept. In fact, it still suggests a world order dominated by unquestionable “centers” on the one hand and a hopeless “periphery” on the other. In general, the same goes for Frank’s model, which is similarly focused on a monopolized power hierarchy on the global level with the “unlimited” international dominance of the United States.

Another common but questionable point in these concepts is the claim that “underdevelopment” in the periphery is a necessary concomitant of “development” in the center, which suggests “global development” to be a zero-sum game. This assumption is based on weak foundations. A main point of criticism here is that not even the economic boom in the Western world during the era of colonization was a simple outcome of exploiting the resources of the global periphery. As Corbridge (1986) puts it, the authors of these concepts “failed to see that the exploitation of the periphery is only one result of the supposed crisis of profitability in the core. Of equal, or if not greater, importance is a continuous drive to greater productivity and technological change in the metropolis” (p. 42). Furthermore, although it would hardly be possible to deny that the imperial powers took great advantage of the resources they extracted from their colonies, a claim that their growth was only based on this is also highly disputable. For mineral resources, for instance, in 1913 the “developed world” still covered some 96–98 % of its own resource consumption (see Meyers 1987). Besides, just as empirical findings challenge the claim that “development” in the center unavoidably leads to “underdevelopment” in the periphery, it is also not necessary that the “exploitation” of the periphery would automatically end up in increasing “development” in the “exploiter” areas. Instead, as Corbridge (1986) underscores, even European history is full of colonizers who could and others who did not manage to take advantage of their colonies in the long

term. Britain, for instance, emerged as the leading industrial and military power of the world partly due to the high volume of resources provided by its colonies. Spain and Portugal, however, failed to convert the same richness in raw materials to long-lasting economic improvement and military power.

A further point of criticism is that the permanent reference to the dichotomy of “development in the center” and “underdevelopment in the periphery” is difficult to maintain in absolute terms. As Gonçalves (2005, p. 69) emphasizes, the global periphery witnessed in the postwar period not a dramatic decline but a vast increase in industrial investment and production. Thoughts (especially those of Amin) concerning the stagnation in local markets in the periphery also contradict the empirical evidence that the significant growth actually carried out in these countries in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly based on growing local demand instead of a radical increase in exports (cf. Schiffer 1981). Presumptions about an intensifying “underdevelopment” on the periphery become even less substantiated if one chooses a somewhat broader focus including more than per capita production or nominal income. One piece of evidence that is easy to measure is that life expectancy in most of the so-called “underdeveloped periphery” has significantly grown since World War II (cf. Corbridge 1998). The same goes for education and literacy, which has also improved much in this period (cf. Meusburger 1998a, pp. 261–267). Hence, “underdevelopment” could mostly refer to an existing gap between what is called center and periphery. But an absolute “underdevelopment” of the latter (and therefore a decreasing level of material well-being, education, and health indicators, etc.) cannot be substantiated, and if one considers the indicators mentioned above, even the idea of constantly growing global inequalities seems to lack substantiation. In fact, these oversimplifying dual interpretations tend to neglect that the geographical division of labor on a global scale indeed creates certain center-periphery relations, where certain parts of global production are concentrated in other countries. This difference, however, does not automatically mean a strong dichotomy in all social indicators. A rather peripheral position in the global production system does not necessarily equal stagnating or decreasing levels of relative income, education, life expectancies, etc. This does not mean, of course, that international disparities could and would not increase at all. But one can speak about such a tendency only with regard to certain variables, and not in a comprehensive sense as it is commonly suggested in dependency theories by such terms as “development” and “underdevelopment”.¹³

It needs to be noted here that among dependency theories neo-Marxist works explicitly blamed capitalism for the whole problem of “underdevelopment” and global disparities. In the last paragraphs we presented numerous arguments to explain that “underdevelopment” in the periphery can neither be interpreted simply

¹³ It is worth noting here that the implication of absolute “underdevelopment” in the periphery was also strongly criticized by many among the Marxists, who—in line with Marx and Lenin—argued that in “developing” countries capitalism was a progressive force, which brought “development” in a certain historical period (Gonçalves 2005, p. 109).

as the necessary concomitant of “development” in the center, nor “development” is fuelled only by the “exploitation” of the periphery. Such a mechanistic reasoning in its recent form simply falls short of revealing the complex mechanisms that drive the world. This point goes to neo-Marxist views as well, which adopted this oversimplifying interpretation, and expanded it by tracing back such a simple structure of global dependency to what they called inherent failures of capitalism. Hence, if the much too simple explanation for global disparities is challenged (as it was indeed in the last paragraphs), the idea of blaming capitalism for the whole problem also proves unsustainable in its recent form. But even if the link between “development” in the center and “underdevelopment” on the periphery, thus, between capitalist production and global disparities were as simple as these concepts suggested, neo-Marxist dependency theories would still have a major shortcoming, which is pointed out as a critique by some Marxists as well. As Laclau (1971) underscores, if one defines capitalism as “production for profit via exchange”, thus, takes exploitation and capitalism as equal as it is tendentiously done in radical dependency theories, “we could conclude that from the neolithic revolution onwards there has never been anything but capitalism” (p. 25). At this point neo-Marxist dependency theorists simply contradict Marx’s view about the exploitative nature of all modes of production between primitive communism and modern communism. This inconsistency, however, remained hidden in neo-Marxist concepts, while it had a clear propagandistic function. By using the term “capitalism” with reference to virtually all non-socialist modes of production, all problems that emerged in any non-socialist systems could be presented as the failure of capitalism. This was also true for global inequalities.

One can also see that leftist theories failed in identifying the possible ways out of dependence and subordination for the global periphery. The works of Prebisch and his direct followers saw the solution for dependency and increasing global inequalities in the reduction of global trade, protectionism and import substitution industrialization. This suggestion was put in practice by several governments in Latin America during the mid- and late-1950s (Gonçalves 2005, pp. 54–55). After some positive early tendencies, however, the initiative was doomed to end since it rather increased than decreased both dependency and global inequalities. As O’Brien (1975) puts it: “Income distribution seemed to be growing more unequal, and a large segment of the population remained marginal. . . . National policies for industrialization had succumbed to the multinational corporations, and industrialization in Latin America was primarily undertaken by foreign investors.” (p. 11). Due to this, the social problems induced by social and spatial disparities increased, which in many countries led to the collapse of the whole economic system and, instead of a socialist revolution, to political takeover by nationalist, conservative military juntas (ibid.).

The radical imperative of neo-Marxist theoreticians that the periphery should exit the capitalist world market and break capitalism through a socialist revolution proved even less useful in practice. Amin, for instance, presented the takeover of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia as a good example of what to do. As he put it, referring to the leaders of the movement as “better Marxists”, “the lesson in

revolutionary strategy they have given is doubtless the most relevant one for most of the countries in Africa” (Amin 1977, p. 152). Hence, a “successful” realization of what Amin regarded as the optimal solution for global disparities was the total isolation of a small agricultural country from the world economy, accompanied by the profound destruction of industry and commerce and a mass liquidation of one-fifth to one-fourth of the country’s population (cf. Kiernan 2003). Some other countries adopting a policy otherwise in concert with socialist isolationism were China after the split with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s (until the gradual opening in the next decade) and communist Albania between 1978 and 1990. In both cases this policy resulted in a continuous worsening of economic conditions, which, after a while, forced a gradual re-integration into world economy. Meanwhile, other examples revealed that leaping forward from the global “periphery” to the “center” was possible within a capitalist framework. This was especially the case for the “Four Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), which, coming out from the periphery, underwent robust economic growth from the 1960s and have become top centers of global capitalism.

The neo-Marxist idea that center-periphery relations on the international level and global disparities are necessary outcomes of capitalism but would disappear in socialism is also a concept actually impossible to sustain. In a theoretical sense, the implicit underlying assumption of this claim is that “people who are poor, non-Western and super-exploited by imperialism will not exploit each other” (Smith 1982, p. 17). Such a supposition is in itself highly naïve and disputable. But besides theoretical probabilities, empirical evidence also challenges the utopian idea about socialism and the end of all problems it is claimed to bring about. A perfect example is the former Soviet domination in Eastern Europe.¹⁴ As Bunce (1985) points out, in the postwar period the political conglomerate of “friendly” socialist countries was not a system free of dependency but an “ideal empire” (p. 3) from the view of the Soviet top party leadership in Moscow. Stalinization resulted in these countries under strong Soviet dominance no less severe than European colonial suppression in most African or Asian colonies.

For Bunce, the reasons were manifold. After the end of World War II, the whole area and its borders with the capitalist world were controlled by the military machine under Soviet command. On this basis, the local political system in all “satellite” countries was thoroughly transformed in line with the interests of the USSR. Political power was monopolized and put in the hands of small local communist cliques, in fact puppets of the Soviet leadership. The plan of Soviet domination was worked out so painstakingly that the “Stalinist empire” also paid attention to such issues as preferring Muscovite communists in leading positions, while hindering indigenous communists from landing in the top level of the

¹⁴ It is important to underscore here that most neo-Marxist dependency theorists regarded the Soviet system as socialist. Hence, empirical evidence on the latter can be used reasonably to judge the validity of these authors’ claims about socialism. For a more detailed discussion of the relation of socialism as such and “real existing socialism” see Sect. 8.2.2.

political hierarchy. Meanwhile, economies were nationalized, so they became fully subordinated to local communist governments and, actually, to the international communist political machine commanded from Moscow. Soviet dominance was only strengthened by the fact that national communist elites lacked significant political legitimacy since their power only resulted from the firm Soviet assistance they gained. Furthermore, the economic structure in satellite countries as well as their international trade was reshaped so that they became heavily dependent on raw materials provided by the USSR. Since Eastern Europe was in the meantime almost profoundly isolated from the capitalist world economy, economic dependence on the Soviet empire reached extreme levels.

In fact, Bunce (1985) also underscores that the international situation within the Soviet Bloc underwent considerable changes during the next decades. For instance, the maintenance of Soviet military forces in the satellite countries proved a huge burden in the long term, which sucked up crucial resources from the development of the USSR economy. Furthermore, as decreasing economic competitiveness led to deepening structural problems in the bloc, the Soviet Union could not fully focus on its own attempts to raise productivity. It had to give stronger and stronger support to Eastern European countries, where the already weak political legitimacy of national leaderships could have been absolutely undermined if worsening economic conditions would have resulted in a similar decrease in the population's (rather low) standard of living. This led to various indirect attempts from the side of the Soviet Union, such as prices for raw materials exported to the socialist allies gradually falling behind the prices for the same products delivered to capitalist countries. Hence, Eastern Europe gradually became a burden for the USSR in many aspects, or in the words of Bunce, "from a Soviet asset to a Soviet liability" (p. 1). Still the decisive geopolitical importance of the region for the Soviet Union was not a matter of question, so a scenario where these countries could have been allowed to exit the Soviet Bloc remained profoundly impossible until the collapse of the Soviet system. Thus, although the form of dependency in Eastern Europe has changed during the decades, the dependency of the region remained obvious. In consequence, the difference between the claim of Marxist dependency theorists about the end of international subordination and global disparities after socialist revolution and the reality of the Soviet Bloc was irreconcilable.

In sum, there is a great deal of empirical evidence as well as theoretical considerations that challenge the major concepts of dependency theories. This does not mean, of course, that the questions and problems their authors drew attention to would not be relevant. For example, the criticism they levelled to conventional neoclassical theories was highly relevant and was in accordance with the view of many researchers otherwise not belonging to structuralist or Marxist approaches. Neither do we think that the underlying mechanisms dependency theories claimed behind global disparities would all be non-existent and absolutely irrelevant to the topic investigated. Yet, the simple causal relations these authors claimed between such complex phenomena as international trade and "underdevelopment" cannot be sustained in the light of theoretical and empirical

findings. This also means that the easily worded and intriguing (and for many certainly attractive) political statements and slogans that were derived from the oversimplified concepts were also much less unambiguous than they seemed to be in the interpretation of their authors.

From our point of view the discrepancy between the superficial and oversimplifying interpretation of the world these concepts gave and the self-confidence of their authors while deriving political conclusions from this interpretation is of special importance. As one can see, all concepts of dependency claimed that they have identified both the main reasons and the cure for “underdevelopment” in the periphery and for global inequalities in some simple factors. They simply blamed the actual global order (or directly capitalism in the case of radical concepts) for all problems of the periphery. Hence, they also suggested that decreasing international integration or, in its drastic version, an exit from the global capitalist order might solve these difficulties. In other words, the interpretation of the actual situation was as simple as its claimed solution was. And since this simple solution was fully in line with the obvious political motivations of the authors, the underlying analysis was also accepted as reliable in revealing the real reasons behind actual processes, even if they had in fact severe shortcomings.

This means that the authors barely bothered to think through in the light of their analytical results whether their simple interpretations could indeed have enough explanatory power to explain complex issues. Instead, they much too easily shifted to the domain of political propaganda to offer simple solutions to phenomena driven by factors claimed to be similarly simple. This was especially remarkable for neo-Marxist theoreticians, who went well beyond blaming external forces for a given country’s situation and suggesting policy measures, since they urged in the light of their findings not less but to carry through a socialist revolution. In general it is more than remarkable that all authors felt free to derive far-reaching and often radical political conclusions from their remarkably simple interpretations of the world. They never took the other road of considering first whether their theoretical and analytical results could fall short of explaining the complex issues they were focusing on. Since these results seemed to substantiate their political goals, they were accepted. Such a cavalier attitude to analytical results that could be presented as “proofs” for political aims suggests that in these concepts the production of orientation knowledge was superior to the manufacturing of well-grounded factual knowledge. In other words, many dependency theorists, especially neo-Marxist ones, tended to substitute the much criticized factual shortcomings as well as implicit orientation knowledge inherent in other (either neoclassical or Keynesian) concepts by a new (Marxist) form of orientation knowledge. What they did was not “purifying” contested concepts from their weaknesses, but rather offering a new form of propagandistic knowledge instead of the old one. Thus, similar to many other concepts described in this essay, dependency theories also reveal the strong political motivations behind spatial disparity research, and that political considerations easily gain priority over the notion to really *understand* phenomena.

8.2 Another Approach to Blame Capitalism for Spatial Disparities: David Harvey, Neil Smith, and the Uneven Development Concept Rediscovered

8.2.1 *The Marxist Interpretation of Uneven Development as “The Hallmark of the Geography of Capitalism”*

Besides dependency theories, the 1970s gave great impetus to another leftist theoretical stream as well, focusing on what is called *uneven geographical development*. The emphasis here was put on the dialectical tension between geographical differentiation and equalization, an idea that had already emerged in the works of Lenin (see Sect. 5.3). For this view, capitalism has an inherent tendency to equalize all areas respective to the mode of production by homogenizing the geographically different patterns of production and consumption over the whole area it dominates. Meanwhile, however, capitalist competition is claimed to perpetually produce winners, who can overtake their rivals, and losers, who fall behind other competitors. The point is that the latter factor continuously tends to produce spatial disparities, a process that capitalism's other inherent tendency of equalization tries to countervail, but cannot eliminate. Thus, capitalism is considered as a mode of production unavoidably leading to spatial disparities. This concept, which had been first elaborated by Lenin in the early twentieth century, was re-discovered and improved from the 1970s onwards by many researchers, who also internalized the view about a straightforward link between capitalism and what they called uneven spatial development. In fact, this way of leveling criticism at capitalism was likewise a main feature of radical dependency theories we presented in previous sections. The concept of uneven geographical development has, however, two important differences relative to dependency theories. First, the concept of uneven geographical development emerged mainly not as a reflection of problems the “underdeveloped” countries suffered from, but as an approach rather focusing on social challenges in well-off countries, especially their urban districts. Second, unlike dependency theories, the uneven development concept was developed by geographers. In consequence, it opened an academic debate much more sensitive to theoretical issues concerning spatial relations and the space itself than the concepts of economists and sociologists about global dependency.

These were true for the very genesis of the approach in the early 1970s, when David Harvey published his book *Social Justice and the City* (Harvey 1973) to give an explanation for urban problems such as gentrification, the formation of ghettos and urban poverty. Harvey, distancing himself from his earlier positivist works (cf. Harvey 1969), attempted to come to terms with these issues not only in a descriptive sense, but even analytically, revealing the fundamental processes in the background. This notion led him in the succeeding years to pay special attention to the works of Marx (Castree 2004), “to reconstruct [his] theory with space . . . clearly integrated within it as foundational element” (Harvey 1996, p. 9). An important

outcome of this enterprise was the essay *The Limits to Capital* (Harvey 1982), in which Harvey gave a geographer's interpretation of the concept of Marx, creating a sophisticated concept of uneven geographical development.

The starting point of the book was the Marxian claim of capitalism to be a contradictory mode of production. For Marx, the main interest of capitalists was to realize as much profit as possible. In order to achieve this goal, it was believed they attempted to reduce production costs by various means. One of their typical strategies was permanent innovation in terms of technology and organization. In addition, Marx regarded capitalists as constantly trying to decrease labor costs by keeping wages and salaries low, and, if possible, by substituting workers by machines that produced the same value at lower costs. Meanwhile, however, capitalists had a firm interest not only in manufacturing their products as cheaply as possible, but also in selling them as expensively and in as great a quantity as possible. The latter required many potential customers with huge purchasing power. Since the vast majority of potential customers were constituted by the mass of workers, the latter's material well-being was a crucial prerequisite for capitalists to have their products sold. In other words, most individuals had a "double function" in the eyes of capitalists: as earners and spenders. And this was the point where the contradiction emerged. Given this, Marx claimed that capitalism was necessary to cause crises. For him, the attempts of capitalists to reduce production costs (including expenditures on workers) perpetually resulted in decreasing consumption. But since consumption fell back, the spectrum of opportunities where capital could be invested in a profitable way also decreased. Capitalists had, however, a firm interest against carrying out investments that would produce losses. For this reason, in times of scarce opportunities of investment they tended not to invest their capital but rather to accumulate it. In other words, what emerged was "a surplus of capital relative to opportunities to employ that capital" (Harvey 1982, p. 192), and this ended up in overaccumulation.

For Marx, this inherent contradiction made capitalism a "crisis-prone system" (Castree 2008, p. 65). Concerning the outcome of this contradiction, he as well as many of his followers (especially those before the Cold War¹⁵) suggested that crises of overaccumulation would be followed by mass devaluation, finally leading to a socialist revolution, where workers swept away the capitalist order. Harvey underscored, however, that such an event had not happened yet, although capitalism underwent several crises during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The question arose as to how this "survival" had been possible. To give an answer, Harvey went beyond the explanation given by Marx, which he called the "first-cut theory of crisis" (Harvey 2006, p. 190). Harvey's main focus here was on the ability of

¹⁵ As we have shown in Sect. 5.6, the emergence of the United States as a superpower during World War II instead of the ultimate collapse of capitalism undermined in the eyes of many the claim of Marx (and, for instance, Lenin) about the self-destruction of the capitalist order. Voices of criticism against this Marxian idea emerged among theoreticians in the Soviet Bloc as well, although forming such an opinion explicitly was not in accordance with official Stalinist propaganda and thus it was a dangerous act.

capitalism to reveal new opportunities for profitable investment. In his view, if the “primary circuit of capital” (which referred to the production and realization of profit, and its transformation into productive capital through investment) offered no such possibilities any more, the financial system was able to open up a “secondary circuit of capital” (Harvey 1978). This “secondary circuit” referred to a mechanism where financial institutions sucked up surplus capital and channeled it towards activities where profitable investment was possible.

An important example for this in Harvey’s view was the transformation of surplus capital into investments in the *built environment*, which plays a decisive role in the efficient functioning of the capitalist system. As Marx already pointed out in his analysis, a fundamental idea within capitalism is to reduce turnover time in order to speed up the cycle of production (and profit-making). A major prerequisite to reach this goal is to reduce the time required for transport and communication across the market, which has a geographical extension that cannot be neglected. Hence, capitalists have firm interests in the development of transportation and communication (cf. Marx 1976[1867], pp. 505–508), or in Marx’s words, “the annihilation of space by time” (Marx 1973[1857–1858], p. 524). In addition, built environments of production (such as factories), consumption (supermarkets, malls, etc.) and reproduction (e.g. homes) are also crucial for capitalism to function well (cf. Castree 2008). Of course, the construction of the necessary infrastructure has very high costs, and generates profit only in the medium or long term. But in a crisis of overaccumulation, such investments can reasonably absorb a great deal of surplus capital. Thus, they can help capitalists in “buying time through fixed investments” (Jessop 2006, p. 147) and in coping with economic problems. In this story the role of financial markets is that they enable surplus capital to find its way in the form of credit to large projects aimed at the built environment. Furthermore, land markets are also of crucial importance since they mediate investments to the “highest and best” uses of land (Sheppard 2006, p. 125). For Harvey, this mechanism, which he calls the “second circuit of capital” with reference to Lefebvre (2003)[1970], serves as a “temporal fix”. It enables capitalists to invest in structures necessary to the long term growth of production, while freeing them from the serious problem of overaccumulation in the short term.

Another opportunity to absorb surplus capital is offered by financial capital, based on which a “third circuit of capital” is claimed to emerge. According to Harvey, the contribution of financial capital to the solution of a crisis of overaccumulation is manifold. A crucial point here is that “finance markets ease capital flows from less to more profitable areas to the economy” (Sheppard 2006, p. 125), which refers to a set of mechanisms. The financial system enables “the mobilization of money as capital” (p. 262), which is due to its ability to convert capital into money (and, of course, money into capital). Since money is much more mobile and flexible than other forms of capital (e.g. physical capital), the financial system reduces “the cost and time of circulation” (p. 263) as well. This factor can also play a significant role in keeping the rate of profit high, thus, counteracting overaccumulation. Moreover, it is not only the dynamics of circulation that increase, but also the number of potentially profitable investments that surplus capital can reach after

being converted into money. The mediating role of the financial system becomes manifest in further aspects as well. For instance, the credit system functions as “a kind of nervous system for coordinating the divergent activities of individual capitalists” (p. 270). By indicating the rate of interest and its unevenness over various investment opportunities, it serves as a “‘barometer and thermometer’ of capitalism” (ibid.). In other words, it provides up-to-date information to capitalists, who can thus investigate and decide much faster where to invest. Besides, the financial system enables the “centralization of capital” (p. 271), since relatively small amounts of surplus capital possessed by various capitalists can easily be joined up. This opens the way for the realization of large-scale projects too great to be financed by single investors. To sum it up, in Harvey’s view the financial system can on the one hand smooth problems in cases where overaccumulation does not result from the lack of reasonable investment opportunities, but because surplus capital is simply “inflexible” in finding a way to profitable projects. Beyond easing capital flows, the financial system has another important role as well during crises of overaccumulation. If necessary, it can itself also absorb a great deal of surplus money in the form of fictitious capital, such as derivatives. This creates new investment possibilities, which can generate high profits, even if this profit can merely be realized only in the medium or long term.

These two circuits added to the one defined by Marx, however, unavoidably fail in Harvey’s view in giving a permanent solution to overaccumulation. For investments in the built environment, they might delay the devaluation of capital forecasted by Marx, but only temporarily. In fact, they lay down the fundamentals for an even more dynamic and unbalanced growth in the long term than the one having led to the actual overaccumulation. In the light of this, such investments rather seem only to postpone the outbreak of actual problems, with the delay just increasing the potential severity of the crisis. Besides, it was likely for Harvey that “new investments made via the financial system will fail to produce the wealth necessary to pay interest” (Castree 2008, p. 67). This was expected not only due to the very slow temporal turnover of these investments, but also because of the limited time period in which these investments could indeed generate profit. As Harvey underscored, large-scale investments in the built environment only promoted economic growth until they were of a state-of-the-art technological standard. After a while, however, old airports, railways, bridges etc. became obstacles for further growth, especially as their technological upgrading and their replacement would have enormous costs, so thus these were likely to take place much later than desirable. Hence, the profit produced by these investments could be significantly eroded or even outpaced in the long term by the negative consequences of the path dependence these installations caused.

Outcomes of the functioning of financial markets were regarded as similarly questionable. First, they “threaten to extend themselves dangerously beyond a monetary base ultimately rooted in the process of production” (Callinicos 2006, p. 49). This was to end up in severe failures in the economy, or even in the collapse of financial markets. Second, the “third circuit of capital” likewise tended to produce dangerous fluctuations since “fictitious capital, whose value is rooted

solely in investors' confidence, was subject to dramatic speculative booms and busts" (Sheppard 2006, p. 125). These factors were considered to pose extreme threat to the stability of the economy and to lead to serious crises in the foreseeable future. In other words, Harvey regarded both the improvement of built environment and investments in the financial system as only temporary solutions to overaccumulation, which finally led to even more severe crises than those they were initially expected to solve.

At this point, it was geography that offered another opportunity to capitalism to cope with the crisis through what Harvey called the "spatial fix". As he underscored, according to the logic of the English language this term could have two meanings. The first is to secure something in space so thus "it cannot be moved or modified" (Harvey 2001, p. 24). The second meaning relates to the expression "fixing a problem", thus, to "resolv[ing] a difficulty, tak[ing] care of a problem" (ibid.). In Harvey's works "spatial fix" was basically used in the second meaning, referring to "capitalism's insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring" (ibid.).

The potential forms of such a "spatial fix" are manifold (cf. Harvey 1982, pp. 432–438). One possibility is that capitalist producers open up new markets to increase consumption, which makes the outputs of overproduction saleable and offers new possibilities of profitable investment. Due to this, the overall rate of profit does not decline and the crisis of overaccumulation is avoided. A second option is to export capital to regions where a higher rate of profit can be achieved, which creates "a new and international division of labour, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres of modern industry" (Marx cited in Harvey 1982, pp. 434–435). Here countries and regions with a lower level of wages or with unused resources providing a good basis for the creation of new productive forces are of special interest. A third solution is primitive accumulation, which in its basic interpretation results from an increase of the proletariat through the appropriation of the means of production they have control over. In his later works, Harvey has tended to break with the adjective "primitive" and to speak about "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2003, p. 137) instead in order to stress the on-going nature of this process even in our current age. Finally, the most aggressive form of the "spatial fix" is to "export the devaluation" (Harvey 1982, p. 438). This can mean on the one hand "the export of unemployment, of inflation, of idle productive capacity" (ibid.), for instance. On the other hand, however, such a strategy can directly aim at "the physical destruction and forced devaluation of a rival's capital" (ibid.), e.g. through war.

In a historical sense, the four forms of the "spatial fix" could easily be carried out at the cost of non-capitalist societies. These could be forced by capitalist powers to get involved in the capitalist exchange of commodities and money. They constituted perfect targets for capital export from "developed" countries suffering from overproduction. Their inhabitants, or at least a certain part of them, could easily be dispossessed of the properties they had, such as from their land, animals, or the sources of raw materials they controlled. Finally, even non-capitalist countries could be exposed to attempts of the capitalist powers to break down the

production or export of their rivals. All these strategies, however, resulted in the gradual integration of formerly non-capitalist economies into the capitalist world order, so thus their potential to “fix” the crises of overaccumulation has decreased to close to zero by now.

This does not mean, of course, that capitalism has lost its ability to operate with “spatial fixes”. New market capacities can still be created *within* the capitalist world, either through population growth or through “the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army” (p. 443). Moreover, a viable solution to expand markets is “an intensification of the capitalist mode of production” (p. 435) within “peripheral” regions. The same goes for the export of surplus capital, which remains possible as long as regions with lower wage levels and/or with the potential of creating fresh productive forces (e.g. based on unexploited minerals) exist. For Harvey, “accumulation by dispossession” also remains an option in a global capitalist order, even if “pre-capitalist and intermediate social formations” (p. 438) are already exhausted. In his words, under such circumstances capitalism “has to cannibalize itself” (*ibid.*), what basically equals the “proletarianization” of capitalists (*ibid.*). As Harvey put it, “some capitalists . . . become formally subordinate to other capitalists”, while “others are forced into the proletariat directly” (*ibid.*). The fourth form of the “spatial fix”, the “export of devaluation” can also be interpreted within the capitalist world. In fact, the possibility of “the physical destruction and forced evaluation of a rival’s capital through war” (*ibid.*) is highly compatible with Lenin’s views about military clashes between capitalist countries elaborated in his concept of imperialism (cf. p. 442). Hence, for Harvey, the relevance of the four variants of “spatial fix” is not historical, but profoundly contemporary, since they can also function in the recent world dominated by the capitalist mode of production.

Some followers of Harvey have identified further opportunities for capitalism to handle the problem of overaccumulation. There is a growing literature focusing on the “accumulation by dispossession” that takes place by the privatization of public goods. A typical example is that of the commons, e. g. water resources, public places, or even the aesthetic of landscapes: once privatized, a great deal of persons can be excluded from having a control over or taking advantage of them (cf. Jessop 2006; Stahel 1999; Swyngedouw 2005). The privatization of public utilities such as education and health care is another manifestation of the same strategy (cf. Jessop 2006).

Another remarkable point with regard to “temporal” and “spatial fixes” is the strong link between the two categories, which are in fact inseparable. For various sorts of the “temporal fix”, although Harvey defines them as postponing the emergence of overaccumulation to future times, their spatial implication is also obvious. Large-scale investments in the built environment function as “spatial fixes” as well. By “fixing” capital in the geographical space, such investments can in themselves upgrade certain landscapes and promote future growth in production there. Typical examples for this are construction projects on railways, motorways, airports, dams etc., which can exert decisive influence on the perspectives of economic growth in the region where they are located. And this,

just as the strategies explicitly called “spatial fix” by Harvey, has a strong implication on spatial unevenness of “development” since such investments have a certain “territoriality” (Harvey 1982, p. 398). They benefit certain districts and, by this, indirectly change the relative position of others to the worse.

Furthermore, the success of such “temporal fixes” strongly depends on spatial issues, namely on the “spatial configuration” (p. 395) of other elements into which large-scale construction is integrated. The economic efficiency and multiplier effect of such investments is also a function of the volume of productive potentials they can mobilize. The long-term economic impact of an airport, for example, is moderate, if it is located far from large urban agglomerations or if it is difficult to get there from the city due to lacking infrastructure. Similarly, motorways that connect cities whose economic potential is poor cannot generate considerable growth in production. Thus, “temporal fixes” are highly “spatial” in nature.

The same goes for various forms of “spatial fix”, which can similarly be considered as “temporal fixes”. In fact, each category among the four that Harvey presented as forms of the “spatial fix” constitutes an opportunity rather to postpone crises of overaccumulation than to give a permanent solution to them. The stabilizing effect of opening up of new markets is only temporary since these markets get saturated after a while, so thus further markets should be created later on. Similarly, the export of capital to areas where the rate of profit is higher stimulates rapid growth in the new location, which finally leads to overaccumulation there. Furthermore, the emergence of “new productive forces in new regions pose a competitive threat to home-based industry” (p. 435), which in consequence will face even more severe crises in the long term than those capitalists initially tried to postpone in the short term. In Harvey’s view, “accumulation by dispossession” has its limits likewise, because it becomes more and more complicated after a while to find new properties to be expropriated, and this endeavor breeds increasing social and political unrest. Finally, the “export of devaluation” can easily end up in military conflicts that undermine economic production and political stability not only in the “enemy country” but at home as well. As Harvey put it, a possible outcome is a “global war”, “the ultimate form of devaluation” (p. 442).

Given the inseparable nature of “temporal” and “spatial fixes”, which is reflected in these examples, it is worthwhile to handle various “fixes” as “two sides of the same coin” (Castree 2008, p. 66), as all being “spatio-temporal fixes” (Harvey 2003). For the long-term effect of these “spatio-temporal fixes”, the explicit view of Harvey is that without any exception they can only postpone but not prevent the outbreak of crises. In his words, “devaluation is the end result, no matter what” (Harvey 1982, p. 435). Yet, such fixes rearrange the spatial configuration of production and consumption again and again, they upgrade certain landscapes while downgrading others, so they generate “chronic instability in ... spatial configurations” (Jessop 2006, p. 149).

This is rooted mainly in what is considered an “inherent tension between the ‘fixity’ and ‘mobility’ of capital” (ibid., p. 148). The former tends to fuel the emergence of agglomerations, thus, geographical concentration. But in Harvey’s

view “tendencies towards agglomeration obviously encounter both physical and social limits” (Harvey 1982, p. 418) due to capital’s drive for “mobility”. Hence, increasing rents, the shortage of free space, the overuse of infrastructure and related social tensions give momentum to spatial dispersal. This becomes manifest in the flow of capital as well as labor to relatively “unused” areas. “But dispersal also encounters powerful limiting constraints” (ibid.). On the one hand, capital cannot be profoundly mobile since certain forms of it are “tied down” (ibid.) in concrete processes in concrete places. For instance, the relocation of productive capacities might mean that they are grasped out from the set of fixed investments within which they functioned well. If a company closes its plant and opens a new one in another country, related roads, railways and other facilities at the old location cannot be mobilized. Similarly, when a manufacturing plant is resettled, the mines providing raw materials for production necessarily remain at their previous location since this cannot be changed. On the other hand, the spatial dispersal of capital goes against the economies of scale, which plays a crucial role in the increase of production. In consequence, concentration and dispersal are present at the same time. Both might accelerate suddenly, and at any time the one can speed up and outpace the other.

In fact, these findings are not profoundly new in the history of spatial disparity research. Although in another language and under the aegis of another political and economic ideology, they have many suggestions strikingly similar to those of Myrdal and Hirschman in the 1950s (cf. Sects. 6.7.1 and 6.7.2), and even to those of Krugman in the last 2 decades (Sect. 7.2). Much more remarkable is the innovation of Harvey’s uneven development concept relative to previous leftist works, be they early twentieth century ideas or contributions to dependency theories. As Sheppard (2006) underscores, these concepts claimed to explain “how core locations exploit peripheral ones” (p. 129). Their main notion was to suggest a permanent asymmetry in power relations between “central” and “peripheral” areas, which was expected to result in a constant increase in spatial inequalities. Harvey, however, broke with the idea of such a “one way sort” of cumulative polarization. He did not blame capitalism for perpetually opening the gap between “developed” and “underdeveloped” territories, but rather for “the production of geographical difference” (Harvey 2000, p. 79), thus, a permanent instability in spatial configuration. In other words, his criticism went to the claimed inherent notion of capitalism to continuously create spatial disparities, but not necessarily in a cumulative way, by intensifying existing inequalities.

Besides putting the problem of spatial disparities in a new framework of interpretation, contributions to the Marxist concept of uneven geographical development since the 1970s also turned the attention to other crucial aspects of the issue that had attracted relatively little interest before. Of special importance here are the theories concerning the problem of *scales*. As we have presented in previous sections, most approaches to spatial inequalities have concentrated on certain scales at the expense of neglecting others. For example, Western mainstream concepts that came into being during the Cold War had their focus on global and national scales, thus, on disparities between countries and regions (cf. Sect. 6.3). The same went for the concepts of Lenin and Stalin, while most dependency theories dealt

predominantly with global scale. Theories such as that of Frank and Wallerstein, which took basically equal interest in more than two scales, were rare. And even here, the question of scale itself and its theoretical considerations gained little attention.

The concepts of uneven geographical development, however, threw new light on the issue. In the early 1980s, Taylor (1982) presented a three-stage model similar to that of Wallerstein, differentiating between local, national and global scales. This essay contained important innovations. First, its author attempted to theorize the mutual relation of the three scales, a question neglected in concepts about spatial inequalities written by economists and sociologists. Second, he suggested that these scales were not pre-given, but rather socially produced. In fact, the question of spatial hierarchies and scales was also mentioned by Harvey (1982, especially pp. 422–424), although yet not in detail.

These ideas had a significant influence on Smith's (1984) book *Uneven Development*, which put great emphasis on the problem of geographical scales. Smith acquired the concept about the social construction of scales, but rejected that any scale would have a prior rank relative to others. Instead, he regarded the relation of scales as dynamic, while suggesting that the claimed dialectic of equalization and differentiation in capitalism might appear on various scales. For tendencies of the 1970s and early 1980s, his opinion was that equalization mostly took place on the global scale due to deepening political and economic integration, especially under the aegis of US-led international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Meanwhile, Smith considered the urban scale as undergoing remarkable differentiation due to the rapid post-Fordist economic boom in certain agglomerations parallel to the decline of districts of "old industries". This idea opened a new field in spatial disparity research, where the focus is on how inequalities "jump" the scales or how they are shifted from one scale to another in a kind of "scaled politics" or "politics of scale" (Swyngedouw 1997a, b). And it also provided ammunition to the Marxist criticism on the capitalist system since a new sort of disparities (induced by scalar mechanisms) could be described and blamed on capitalism.¹⁶

Altogether, the concept of uneven geographical development has raised many crucial questions since the 1970s, and has thus become an important approach in the spatial disparity discourse. On the one hand, it has turned the attention to many aspects of spatial inequalities that were rather neglected in the decades before. Hence, it has made important contributions to a more sophisticated understanding of the issue. On the other hand, it has had a major political role as well since it has put a new weapon in the hands of the critics of capitalism. Although the idea to blame all existing forms of spatial disparities exclusively on this mode of production is not new, it is a main innovation of the uneven development concept, whose

¹⁶ Although, just as it is not uncommon in the case of new research issues, increased interest in scale led in some cases to an overemphasis of the topic or to "scale fetishism" (cf. Belina 2008).

representatives use arguments that seem highly relevant for the recent age, both for global centers and peripheries.

In an interesting way, however, this approach broke with the strategy otherwise typical for most contributions to the spatial disparity discourse. It does not aim to propagate orientation knowledge by taking advantage of (or misusing) the legitimate authority of “objective” science, but it rather tends to question the existence of the latter. In this sense the key theoreticians of uneven geographical development went back to the ideas of Marx, who “saw ‘knowledge’ as the polite word for competing *ideologies* that serve specific societal interests” (emphasis in original; Castree 2008, p. 63). This view has been internalized by Harvey as well, who stressed that knowledge was “a social product” (Harvey 1982, p. 101), and that “each mode of production evolves a specific kind of science, a ‘knowledge system’ appropriate to its distinctive physical and social needs” (ibid.). For this reason science also lost in this interpretation the claim of “objectivity” and the exclusive status many attributed to it over the last few centuries. It was no longer considered a superior “mode of understanding” (Mercer 1984, p. 194). And this new attitude to science has indeed been taken seriously: the claim of law-like quality of any sort of knowledge is rejected even if this claim were that of Marx. This is well exemplified by Harvey’s words, emphasizing that “we should be chary of attributing absolute and unchecked powers” to “Marx’s ‘law-like’ statements” (Harvey 1982, p. 139).

This firm and consistent attitude, however, does not mean a profound demise of science and the relevance of scientific research. The standards scientific work is expected to meet have changed, however. For most social scientists over the last few centuries, even in the spatial disparity discourse, the main criterion for the claim of scientific quality was (empirical) verification. The representatives of the uneven development concept have given up this expectation and introduced another one, that of moral. For Harvey, for instance, “the issue of validation” in Barnes’s (2006) words is “less one of truth or falsity than finding theoretical knowledge *that changes the world for the better*” (our emphasis; p. 38). Basically the same goes for Neil Smith, whose interpretation distinguishes “science” and a desirable “critical science” along moral aspects. In his eyes “the ideological function of science has generally been to make specific social relations appear natural, even inevitable” (Smith 2008, p. 276), thus, to present the “contradictions” of capitalism as if they were universal laws independent from economic and social circumstances (such as the mode of production). “Critical science”, however, is expected to be free from this “bourgeois” bias.

The idea to give priority to moral suggestions over what Barnes (2006) calls “classical verification” (p. 38) in scientific research implies the clear break with the “cyborg science” (Barnes 2008) of the Cold War period as well as with the “technocratic” science of neoliberalism. And this shift can easily be presented as a hallmark of new leftist approaches in social sciences, and as a specific feature of the uneven development concept among the great deal of theories in the spatial disparity discourse. This argument has a strong political relevance. The decades of Fordism led in the eyes of many to the emergence of “big science” serving “higher interests” instead of those of everyday people. Furthermore, for many this

“tradition” seemed to continue in the neoliberal phase, where these “higher interests” might be less military and more economic, but their relevance for the lived lives of individuals is claimed to be similarly limited. Marxist approaches in general, and the concept of uneven geographical development in particular, however, can create for themselves the image of “changing the world for the better”, thus, of being “just” and “righteous”. In other words, the source of legitimate authority for them is not the quality of being verified or verifiable in “classical” sense, but that their main principle is to fit their research practice to the interest of people.

This apparently attractive endeavor, however, suffers from a serious problem since there are no universal criteria to assess what “changes the world for the *better*” exactly means; that is, what is “better”. This normative judgment has in fact no relevance if one does not define clearly “for whom” and “from which aspect” something is regarded as better. Furthermore, even if these additional issues are taken into consideration, it is doubtful whether there is a “point of nowhere” (Nagel 1986), from where *anybody* could say *what* would be better *for whom* and *from which aspect*. Here we can refer to the remarks of Fraser (2000), Schlosberg (2004), and Young (1990) about “spatial justice” that we cited in Sect. 2.1. For them, one can only speak about “justice” if those affected by the distribution of a given resource are recognized as being concerned, and if they are allowed to effectively participate in the decision-making about distribution. In our view the same goes for deciding what would be “better”: such a judgment about changes can only result from a discursive process where everybody who might be concerned with these changes is involved. Otherwise, normative categories like this have little meaning in themselves. “Changing to the better” only becomes meaningful if it is clear “for whom” and “from which aspect” the issue is interpreted, and the final assessment whether something is “better” or “worse” can only be made in the light of the opinion of those concerned.

As Castree (2004) underscores, this point attracted considerable criticism especially from feminist (and, apparently, postmodern) authors, who stressed that in his book Harvey interprets the world and distinguishes “good” from “bad” as if these were categories with universal meaning. In Deutsche’s (1991) words, Harvey’s reasoning is based on “totalizing visions of society”, on “dreams of unity” (p. 7), or, for Morris (1992), on “a totalizing Marxism” (p. 275), which gives the false suggestion that normative categories can likewise be totalized and interpreted from a single point of view. Hence, although Harvey explicitly argues against “attributing absolute and unchecked powers” to “law-like” relations “big science” just too eagerly produces, his work seems to end up with the same problem. As Deutsche (1991) put it: “Claiming to discover, rather than construct, a reality that forms the absolute foundation of social unity, the subject of Harvey’s discourse generates the illusion that he stands outside, not in, the world” (p. 7). The same issue emerges with regard to Smith’s 1984 book, which in Phillips’s (2008) words “visibly aspired to be ‘grand theory’, and as such can be subjected to criticism for being both *totalizing* and *insensitive to difference*” (our emphasis; p. 78).

Such a “totalizing” conceptualization of the world also means a sort of oversimplification. This stands for these works’ implicit suggestion about the existence of a universally valid approach, which remarkably oversimplifies the great complexity of ways of seeing one can adopt to get an understanding of social phenomena. As Massey (1991) underscored, a satisfactory explanation of social issues cannot be given if one tries to reduce these to a few simple mechanisms. For instance, in her words “it is *inadequate* to try to explain the condition of postmodernity . . . simply as the result of ‘time-space compression’, as Harvey does” (our emphasis; p. 33), or to come to terms with social tensions “by forcing all struggles under ‘the overall frame of . . . class politics’” (p. 55).¹⁷ And the fact that Harvey’s narration was “profoundly reductive in impulse” (Morris 1992; p. 255) led in a strongly-worded interpretation to “the apparent irrelevance of [his] theory to real-world situations” (Dennis 1987, p. 310).

Of course, it is a fundamental question for the whole of social scientific research whether “grand theories”, with the claim of a sort of universal relevance, could be a useful means in scientific research, or instead “theories of the middle range” (Merton 1968) should be preferred, which might lack the same simplicity and universality but have stronger empirical foundations. A similarly crucial issue is to what extent simplifications and generalizations are tolerable in theoretical concepts, which otherwise are necessarily unable to catch every detail of the incredibly complex phenomena they refer to. In our view, however, it is not the task of this essay to provide an in-depth discussion of these questions. What we instead find highly relevant from our point of view is the *political implication* of the generalizations that are made in the concept of uneven geographical development.

In fact, the simplifications in Harvey’s work that Massey leveled criticism at are common in their tendency to suggest the “contradictions” of capitalism cause all of the problems in our current society, especially uneven development. That is how all challenges can be traced back to “contradictions inherent in capitalist production and exchange” (Harvey 1982, p. 193). This has two consequences. On the one hand, this argumentation suggests that uneven geographical development is necessary in capitalism, so that this *problem* cannot be cured in this mode of production. On the other, a claimed solution is also offered. According to Harvey, the capitalist system is “inherently unstable and crisis-prone”, where “though each crisis may be resolved through a radical re-structuring of productive forces and social relations, the underlying source of conflict is never eliminated” (p. 103). For this reason, “the only ultimate resolution to the contradiction lies in the elimination of their source, in the creation of fundamentally new social relationships – those of *socialism*” (our

¹⁷ We should underscore here that Massey’s negative attitude did not only go to Harvey’s concept but to “grand theories” in general. Her works rather mirrored a stance that Cochrane (1987) formulated as “there do not seem to be any *general rules* – or necessary relations – at all” (our emphasis; p. 361). This was a main reason that Massey distanced herself from formerly mainstream concepts in economic geography, usually concentrating on the macro level and seeking universal regularities, and shifted to a relational approach with a micro level focus (cf. Phelps 2008; Bathelt and Glückler 2011, pp. 5–7).

emphasis; *ibid.*). In other words, the problem of uneven geographical development is interpreted as an unavoidable outcome of capitalism, and this idea is used as a strong argument against capitalism. Meanwhile, since socialism is presented as free from the contradictions of capitalism, it is also suggested to promote an even spatial development, a claim that strongly implies a sort of moral superiority of socialism. Hence, it seems a legitimate conclusion that “it is time for capitalism to be gone, to give way to some saner mode of production” (p. 445).

In Smith’s essay, which is similarly “totalizing” in Phillips’s (2008) words, simplifications and generalizations have basically the same role. Just as Harvey, Smith also comes to the point that “the uneven development of capitalism is structural” (Smith 1991, p. xiii) since it is “the systematic geographical expression of the contradictions inherent in the very constitution and structure of capital” (*ibid.*). Furthermore, Smith explicitly claims that “the resulting geographical patterns are thoroughly determinate (as opposed to ‘determinist’) and are thus *unique to capitalism*” (our emphasis; *ibid.*). Thus, uneven development is presented here as “the hallmark of the geography of capitalism” (*ibid.*),¹⁸ which implies that it does not exist in “more developed” modes of production, namely in socialism, which is instead aimed at “the abolition of uneven development” (p. 154).

In fact, these simplistic but straightforward political arguments *for* socialism and *against* capitalism would be impossible without, using the words of Massey, “forcing all struggles under the overall frame of class politics” or explaining the underlying complex phenomena “simply as the result of time-space compression”. This is a point where the key works of the uneven development concept, especially their simplistic political claim, can be prone to criticism. We find it important to underscore, however, that if a concept is based on remarkable simplifications, it does not mean necessarily that its main implication is wrong. In other words, although the concepts of Harvey and Smith might seem to force all phenomena of society into a few typically Marxian categories and schemes, this is not enough in itself, even if it can indeed raise concerns, to firmly state that their findings are necessarily incorrect and misleading. In our view, a decision about whether uneven geographical development is indeed a “hallmark” of capitalism needs further investigation, since there are at least three theoretical opportunities to falsify the concept.

The first direction would be to display that capitalism does not produce spatial disparities. This option is, however, profoundly theoretical since we do not believe that the existence of uneven spatial development under capitalist circumstances could be questioned reasonably. Instead, we find this phenomenon obvious. The second opportunity would be to reveal that spatial disparities in capitalism are produced not in the way Harvey suggests in his ground-breaking work, so that his

¹⁸ Smith uses even more dramatic formulation in other works, speaking about the geographical pattern of uneven development as “the satanic geographies of globalization” (interpreting globalization as a strategy as well as outcome of the neoliberal phase of capitalist development) (Smith 1997).

concept fails to reveal real reasons. Third, one can assess whether the mechanisms presented by Harvey, which are claimed to promote uneven spatial development in capitalism due to its underlying “logic” of profit maximization, would likewise emerge in a socialist, non-profit oriented system and would similarly lead to spatial disparities. In our essay, among the second and third options we first focus on the third question, thus, to the existence of uneven geographical development in socialism. Thereafter we will make a few brief remarks on the second issue concerning the validity of Harvey’s concept for the reason of spatial disparities in capitalist systems.¹⁹

8.2.2 Remarks Regarding Blaming Uneven Development on Capitalism: An Empirical Investigation of “Real Existing Socialist” Countries

For analyzing uneven geographical development in socialist systems and “testing” Harvey’s concept about it, the main challenge is to find utilizable information about the “geography” of socialism. This is a crucial prerequisite to decide whether the mechanisms identified by Harvey or some logically analogous “socialist counterparts” also function in this mode of production and produce spatial disparities there. The task can be completed at least two ways. The first option is basically theoretical. One can rely on accessible concepts about socialism and its spatial patterns, and investigate whether the mechanisms presented there can be compared to those described by Harvey for capitalism. The second strategy has an empirical orientation. Here, the empirical data on economic growth and spatial inequalities in former countries of “real existing socialism” can serve as valuable raw material. Both possibilities raise, however, several questions, about which there is much debate in the literature. For this reason, before choosing among the two options, we have to make an overview of related ambiguities.

With regard to geographically relevant theories about socialism, they are in fact too indefinite to form the basis for sketching up a “geography” of this mode of production. This is well exemplified by the works of Harvey and Smith, which at several points stress the necessity of a socialist turn to put an end to capitalism, but provide very few and sometimes blurred explanations of how the desired socialism would look and function. For Harvey, the main information given about socialism is that Marx’s “plea for the transition” to it is based “upon the need to cure the gross irrationalities that arise out of the burgeoning contradiction between growth in the productive forces and the social relations upon which the capitalist mode of production is based” (Harvey 1982, p. 120). This makes clear that socialism is

¹⁹ According to our knowledge such an investigation of Harvey’s concept has not been provided yet in the literature. For this reason we will give a more detailed analysis here than for most other theories concerned in the thesis, which have been investigated in a great many books and articles.

claimed to be free from all “contradictions” of capitalism. Given that Harvey’s book gives a comprehensive overview of these “contradictions”, one can indirectly identify many features socialism does not have in his view. For instance, its main “engine” is not the capitalists’ need to realize profit, thus, “accumulation for accumulation’s sake” (words cited from Marx; p. 29). It is not based on the capitalist exploitation of certain social classes. And, among others, it does not produce the capitalist form of uneven development. Furthermore, it is also suggested that instead of profit realization the main goal in socialism is the growth of productive forces (thus, economic growth) without the obstacles posed by capitalism. These pieces of information, however, only address the claimed pros of socialism, without revealing how it would function, thus, how these positive outcomes could be achieved. In this sense Harvey’s essay has important similarities with the works of Marx, who elaborated a very sophisticated concept about what he considered as the contradictions and problems of capitalism, but he neither provided “tangible” ideas about the functioning of socialism nor did he give exact instructions how to establish it.²⁰

In general the same goes for Smith’s book. For him, “the struggle to equalize away class relations will lie at the center of socialist history” (Smith 1991, p. 154). This shall also put an end to capitalism’s “blindness to the distinction between use-values and exchange-values” (ibid.), thus, to an era where “value” and “necessity” is defined by the market as profitability. Instead, a new phase shall come, where the capitalist “control of the exchange-value system” (p. 64) is overthrown, as well as its ability to control society. Under these new circumstances, it is for Smith “social control to determine what is and is not necessary . . . what is and is not value” (ibid.). Hence, necessity is judged “according not to the market and its logic but to *human need*, according not to exchange-value and profit, but to use-value” (our emphasis; ibid.). This is claimed to cease the contradictions of capitalism and open up a new era hallmarked by “the abolition of uneven development” (p. 154).

Just as in Harvey’s essay, however, it remains unclear how these circumstances could be created and how socialism would actually function. For example, it is not explained what “social control” would exactly mean, e.g. who would have the right to influence decisions, who would make these decisions *in fact*, and how it would be guaranteed that those having the power fully take into consideration the preferences of others as well. (In other words, how the emergence of a dogmatic and authoritarian vanguard party could be avoided.) Hence, it is also unclear how the “value” of something could be assessed and how “human need” as such can be defined. But these are crucial questions since the meaning of “value” and “human need” is not naturally given but socially constructed, thus, it is not universal. It varies instead from context to context, from person to person and from time to time (just as in the case of “merit” and “award”; cf. Sect. 2.4).

²⁰ This serious shortcoming in Marx’s concepts was also underscored by Lenin in the first years to establish the Soviet Union, as it was pointed out by Popper (1945, vol. 2, p. 79) in his remarkable but otherwise rather one-sided critique of Marx.

Furthermore, even in the same temporal and spatial context the “value” of a good, an act or an idea, for instance, cannot be assessed in general. One should also define from which aspect and compared to what the value is measured. In a poor agricultural country where insufficient food supply is a burning problem, the value of modernist policy measures like the “green revolution” can be very high from the aspect of food security. From the view of environmental protection or cultural diversity, however, the same initiatives have much less value than promoting traditional forms of agriculture, which may achieve lower yields, but which are environmentally and socially more sustainable and, hence, have definite pros in the long term. For this reason, the value of a subsistence economy compared to mechanized large-scale agriculture can only be assessed from various aspects, not in general.

Besides, even if one neglects the role of the context and that value can only be judged from certain aspects, it is still problematic to decide what “human need” and “value” is since different individuals might (and usually do) have different opinions about the issue. Thus, if the goal is a “social control” over judging “necessity” and “value”, a crucial question is to what extent individual views are taken into consideration while “values” are defined, and who has the right and power to exert more or less influence on such debates.

These are all crucial issues which one should come to terms with and regulate before a “social control” over defining “use-values” is introduced. We do not deny, of course, that certain mechanisms can be developed for this sake, which might enable an adequate, though not perfect, “social control” over similar issues. But in fact the theoretical works we presented have no definite suggestions with regard to these questions. This remark goes again not only to the concepts of Harvey and Smith, but to most theoretical works on socialism, whether they are those of Marx and his followers (cf. again Popper 1945, vol. 2, p. 79) or of the anarchist critics of Marx, such as Bakunin (cf. Meusburger 1997). The only exception is constituted by some writings of Lenin and other prominent leaders of “real existing socialism”, e.g. Joseph Stalin, who as active politicians could not neglect such practical questions. This means, however, that beyond the concepts of communist political leaders other theoretical works do not provide an in-depth explanation of the claimed functioning of socialism. Thus, if the works of those personally involved in “real existing socialism”, in fact, communist dictatorships, are not taken into consideration, the idea to “test” Harvey’s concept for theories about socialist systems seems impossible to put into practice.

The second way we suggested seems much more viable: namely, to investigate the actual functioning of “real existing socialist” systems, and to search for mechanisms similar to those that Harvey identified as reasons for spatial inequalities in capitalism. The advantage here is that these systems indeed existed, so there is a considerable amount of information about their inherent mechanisms and spatial practice. Yet, this solution is also prone to criticism since many leftist

theoreticians dispute whether these systems were indeed “socialist”.²¹ As Meusburger (1997) underscores, they tend to stress that “state socialism” in countries of the former Communist Bloc had nothing to do with the ideas of Marx, nor with the “pure” socialism and communism he envisaged. Instead, these are considered to be distorted by Lenin and especially by Stalin.

No doubt, Lenin and Stalin certainly added a great deal of (often controversial) ideas to the original concept of Marx. In this sense it would be highly unsubstantiated to claim the Stalinist Soviet Union, for example, to be either “pure socialism” or a direct and necessary outcome of Marx’s works. Two issues are worth consideration here, however. First, “pure” capitalism has never existed in any country. State regulation in economy, taxes that one pays to the state, investments funded by the state, without a doubt, are present in every capitalist system. The United States under the Reagan administration or Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom were also no exceptions, not to speak of other countries of the European Union, often called in the Marxist literature a gigantic neoliberal project (an overview of similar views is provided by Birch and Mykhnenko 2009). Yet, disparities observed in these countries are tendentially presented as outcomes (what is more, “necessary” outcomes) of neoliberal capitalism, which is in fact present here not in its pure form, but with certain “distortions”. Hence, it seems a justifiable analogy to consider the systems in countries of “real existing socialism” as socialist, even if not “purely socialist”, given the remarkable differences they had in comparison to the capitalist world. Some striking examples are the almost profound collectivization of private property, an absolute lack of competition in many spheres of the command economy (such as in the labor market with its artificial full employment or “unemployment behind the gates”²²), and the price system dominantly shaped by decisions of the communist party instead of market processes.

Second, the works based on the concept of “uneven geographical development” commonly remain silent on “real existing socialism”. Neither do they provide an interpretation suggesting that spatial disparity did not exist in these countries, nor do they explain why these systems, if they were not free from inequality, cannot be regarded as socialist. In the light of this remarkable silence it seems a legitimate project to consider these systems as socialist, and investigate their inequalities as products of a socialist regime. That such an attempt has relevance is also indicated by the fact that even those leftist thinkers condemning Stalinist dictatorship with all its inhumane features tend to approve several “achievements” of this system as “socialist” or “communist”. In other words, their disagreement about claiming systems of “real existing socialism” to be socialist or communist usually ends as

²¹ For a brief overview of various theoretical interpretations of “real existing socialist” systems see Kornai (1992, pp. 9–11) and Csanádi (2006), pp. 3–8.

²² Since Marxist ideology put great emphasis on the individual’s right to work, in “real existing socialist” countries the right to have a workplace was considered as crucial. Hence, these regimes sustained full employment by artificial measures, meaning in fact that many had a workplace, but not reasonable work. This phenomenon was commonly referred to as “hidden unemployment” or “unemployment behind the gates”.

soon as they find in these systems something that seems for them to fit the Marxian concept.

And this is not only the case for some “Eastern” Marxists, who either actively participated in these dictatorial regimes or were forced to praise it, but even for a great many Marxist theoreticians in the “West”, who were obviously never pressed to express such views. We already referred to Baran (1957), for whom it was “a grievous fallacy to conclude from” the Stalinist “cult of personality” and the acting of some “evil personalities” that “*socialism* is the ‘entire system’ that needs to be repudiated” (emphasis in original; p. viii). This formulation also indicates that for Baran it was no question that the Soviet system was a socialist one. Furthermore, he even regarded several dictatorial attempts of Stalin in this “real existing socialism” as tolerable in the light of “foreign aggression” and “internal resistance” (ibid.). The same point was made by Angotti (1988), for instance, who exerted criticism on certain elements of post-war Stalinism, but judged these as “understandable and in a historical sense even ‘necessary’ in the 1930s and during the Second World War” (p. 33), and for whom the Stalinist phase was “not some sort of ‘deviation’ from socialism” (ibid.), but an example for it. We can also refer to those Marxist geographers who have the same view. In Cox’s (2002) words, for example, “*communist experiments*, whether those of the Soviet Union or of China”, although they “proved no match for capitalism’s ability to raise material standards”, “they achieved *considerable success* in terms of equalizing life chances and securing a minimum in housing, healthcare, and nutrition: levels of achievement that have still to be attained in the most prosperous countries in the contemporary world, and a *success* for which they are *given scant credit* by the Western media and politicians” (our emphasis; p. 368).²³ To sum it up, even among theoreticians on the radical left there are many who regard “real existing socialism” as socialism indeed, while the same view among non-socialist thinkers is quite predominant. Given these considerations it seems an analytically legitimate project to have a closer look at the systems that existed for several decades with the self-claim of being socialist, and to see whether the mechanisms identified by Harvey for capitalism had their counterparts there.

While investigating potential similarities and analogies, the first point we have to take into consideration is the claimed inherently controversial nature of capitalism, which in Harvey’s view makes it prone to crises. As we presented earlier, Harvey internalizes the Marxian idea that capitalists are focused on increasing their profits, which they try to achieve by decreasing production costs. This means on the one hand the promotion of continuous technological and institutional innovation, which reduces the relative labor costs of production. On the other hand they try to keep the wages of workers as low as possible. These attempts reduce, however, not only

²³ In our view these interpretations are at least remarkably one-sided and morally hard to accept in the light that these systems physically destroyed tens of millions of human beings in peacetime, who were deprived not only of “a minimum in housing, healthcare, and nutrition”, but even of their personal freedom or of the fundamental right to live (cf. Courtois et al. 1999). (In the forthcoming paragraphs we will pay more attention to these issues.)

production costs but consumption as well, since workers with low income have limited resources to buy goods and services. The outcome of this contradiction is relative overproduction, which results in a decreasing rate of profit. Under such circumstances a certain part of capital is not invested, because it cannot return a sufficient level of profit. But having the capital unused is also not a desirable strategy since, although it does not produce losses, neither does it generate profit. For this reason, capitalists try to find alternative opportunities to keep the rate of profit high, thus, to open up new possibilities of investment to avoid the crisis of overaccumulation. This actually means that they look for strategies enabling the maintenance of and, if possible, increase in consumption.

In the view of Harvey and, in fact, Marx, this problem only concerns capitalism. They claim however that socialism is free from it, because the collectivization of forces of production sweeps away class differences, and production is no longer subordinate to the particular interests of capitalists. Instead, it is regarded as bringing into being a system where the increase in the well-being of the population through growing production is not constrained by such “unjust” factors. As we presented in Sect. 5.4, a very similar argumentation was that of Stalin, for whom the “basic economic law of socialism” was “the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques” (Stalin 1972[1952], pp. 40–41). At this point, however, one can identify a contradiction not less serious than the one Harvey claimed to be inherent to capitalism. If the goal is to achieve a high and “constantly rising” level of social well-being, the system has to increase production, which necessitates growing investments. But focusing resources on investment means in the meantime that the same resources are lost for consumption, which hinders “the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole society”.

If one tries to reveal underlying mechanisms of this contradiction, similar problems can be found as in Harvey’s interpretation of capitalism. For Harvey, capitalists promote technological development and institutional innovation, and keep wages low to reduce production costs. In fact, “real existing socialism” did the same in order to mobilize as many resources as possible and concentrate them on production. It is not by accident that communist leaders were eager to emphasize the importance of “higher techniques” and to present their system as a torchbearer for the technological advance of humanity. From this aspect the Soviet project itself can be interpreted as a gigantic experiment to put in practice the imperative in *The Internationale*, anthem of the international socialist and communist movements: “of the past let us make a clean slate”.²⁴ The experiment attempted to break with all problems of the “old world”, and to build a “new” one. A cornerstone here was the endeavor to introduce revolutionary methods in the organization of economy, and

²⁴ The main features of “real existing socialism”, which we first present through the example of the USSR, were to large extent similar in the Soviet satellite countries in Eastern Europe as well as in the Maoist China, as will be discussed in later parts of this section.

to utilize state-of-art technology on an internationally unprecedented scale. These objectives became explicit in the first years after the socialist revolution. Lenin strove to put Soviet economic production on the basis of central planning, where he considered the German war economy in World War I as the example to follow (Heller and Nekrich 1981, p. 213). This led in 1920 to the establishment of Goelro (*Gosudarstvennaya Komissiya po Elektrifikatsii Rossii*, “The State Commission for the Electrification of Russia”), whose main responsibility was to coordinate the electrification of the country. But in fact this commission also concerned planning in some other branches of mining and heavy industry; thus, it can be regarded as the first industrialization plan of the communist state (Horváth 2008). The institution soon underwent rapid development and in 1922 it was converted into Gosplan (*Gosudarstvenniy Komitet po Planirovaniyu*, “State Planning Committee”), which became the ultimate planning bureau in the USSR, responsible for all economic branches (Cohn 1970, p. 12). In fact, Goelro and the early Gosplan did not produce operational plans, their role was rather to draw up guidelines for general economic policy, thus “indicative planning” (ibid.). Still, they opened a new phase in economic coordination, not only in the Soviet Union but in an international sense as well. Furthermore, operational plans also arrived soon. In 1926, work began on a long-term and in-depth “General Plan” (Moravcik 1961), which was finished as the First Five-Year Plan for the period 1928–1932 (Heller and Nekrich 1981, pp. 213–221). From then onwards, the Soviet economy functioned as a centrally planned system, coordinated through five-year and seven-year plans²⁵ until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Similar planning mechanisms were introduced later on in all countries to join (or to be forced to join) the Communist Bloc, in Eastern Europe as well as in Asia.

Besides putting production under central planning, the Soviet leadership also attempted to adopt state-of-art modernistic principles in economic coordination as well as up-to-date technologies in production. For this reason they launched intensive cooperation with many capitalist countries and some of their leading companies, although such projects often remained invisible for the broad masses. Right after the proclamation of the USSR considerable cooperation began foremost with Germany, which resulted in technology transfer to the communist country through engineers and technicians, and even in the establishment of heavy industry plants (mostly of a military profile). These collaborations enabled Germany to conduct strategic development projects otherwise impossible at home due to the regulations of the Versailles Peace Treaty. But it was beneficial to the USSR as well since precious pieces of knowledge “trickled down” to the Soviet economy and military (Heller and Nekrich 1981, pp. 199–200). Later on, the focus of cooperation shifted to common projects with US companies. By 1929, the number of technical agreements with American firms increased to 40 (Sutton 1968, p. 347). Of course, enterprises from many other capitalist countries were likewise present. Thanks to

²⁵ The only seven-year plan, which was an initiative of the Khrushchev administration, was carried out between 1959 and 1965.

these programs, “at least 95 percent of the industrial structure” in the USSR received foreign technological assistance (p. 348).

And the Soviet leadership not only made great efforts to adopt the technology necessary for production, but also to utilize state-of-art Western knowledge on how production facilities should be constructed and organized. Hence, in 1928 the USSR initiated a gigantic common project with the most acknowledged global company in industrial architecture of the time, Albert Kahn & Co. in Detroit, to draw up the plans for a series of large-scale projects in the Soviet Union, amounting to two billion USD (Fainsod and Bernier 1958, p. 215 cited in Heller and Nekrich 1981, pp. 220–221). Other bureaus in North America and Western Europe were also involved in similar initiatives. These collaborations resulted in plans for and construction assistance in the erection of the first planned Soviet industrial towns, Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, plants in the manufacturing industry (e.g. the car factory in Nizhny Novgorod and the truck plant in Yaroslavl), and hydropower stations (Heller and Nekrich 1981, p. 221).

The motivation behind all these projects was exactly the same as what Harvey presented as a main strategy of capitalists to increase profit, and what was apparently done likewise in “real existing socialist” systems to accelerate production. The Soviet leadership aimed to introduce new, innovative technologies and organizational methods, thus, to carry out a technological shift in order to gain advantage over rival countries. As Sergo Ordzhonikidze, then Commissar of Heavy Industry put it: “Our plants, our mines and our factories are now *equipped with a technology no other land owes* . . . Where did we get that from? We have bought from Americans, Germans, French and English the newest machines, the latest technological achievements, and furnished our enterprises with them. . . . And they still have many plants and mines equipped with machines from the turn of the century” (our emphasis; cited in *ibid.*).

The Soviet project also put great emphasis on the introduction of revolutionary methods in organizing and even training the labor force in order to accelerate economic growth. Since humans were regarded as “the most important force of production” (Abella 1961, p. 123), it was crucial to reshape them in line with communist concepts. Hence, the drive to make the USSR the most efficient system of production resulted in a thorough reorganization of the education system. As Sáska (2005) underscores, the new Soviet leadership banned “bourgeois” principles and methods in education without delay, and put the whole process on a brand new conceptual basis. The new objective was to create the “new socialist type of human”, which would be able to construct the “society of equals”. In fact, actual measures taken to achieve this goal were different in the early years after the revolution and from the 1930s onwards. During the 1920s, emphasis was rather put on the promotion of progressive pedagogy and on the idea of “the necrosis of school” (p. 85), where pupils were expected to learn mainly not from teachers but from their own experience gained while solving practical problems on their own. This concept, which was strongly backed by Lenin and Trotsky, was soon given up after Stalin had come to power. The new approach put in its forefront the education of youth in a strongly hierarchized system along the principles of military-like

discipline, with strong emphasis on the mediation of “socialist” knowledge and on a total refusal of “bourgeois” knowledge. But the main underlying political goal was basically the same: to create “children able to fulfill their vocation in the society of workers” (ibid.), hence, to “free” education from its “bourgeois” heritage and thoroughly transform it in concert with the goals of the Soviet leadership. In other words, Leninist and Stalinist attempts in education, although different at many points, were common in their objective of a radical reorganization of education system to produce a more efficient and politically more “conscious” labor force in order to increase production.

Similar strategies of “controlling the mind” (p. 86) and indoctrinating the population with a mixture of socialist and modernist ideologies were present in cultural attempts as well, namely in the “bolshevization of culture” and the promotion of “proletarian art” (cf. Clark et al. 2007). Architecture was especially important here since its objective was dual. On the one hand, it was expected to radiate the superiority of socialism in its very style, while on the other it was responsible for creating the spaces of work optimized for the increase of production. No wonder that both endeavors became manifest in the way new “socialist industrial towns” and the districts of old cities transformed along socialist principles were planned and constructed.²⁶

For organizational issues aimed at the increase of production, Trotsky and the Bolshevik theoretician Nikolai Bukharin urged right in the early years of the Soviet system for the “militarization of labor” (Heller and Nekrich 1981, p. 216). This was to mean a strong central control over the whole of the labor process and the coordination of the workforce along military principles. Although these ideas did not meet full support, and their promoters were exiled (Trotsky) or executed (Bukharin) before the 1930s ended, ironically, the First Five-Year Plan of 1928–1932 witnessed how they were put into practice. Not only were strikes banned in the Soviet system, but virtually everyone failing to meet the expected (and often unrealistic) level of quantity and quality of work could easily be judged as a “saboteur”, the “agent” of “reaction” and “class enemy”. Punishment for those not doing their “duty” on the “front of labor” was often as severe as those in war. Hence, a worker could soon find himself/herself in prison or in a forced labor camp (pp. 219–220).

Beyond promoting technological development and institutional innovation in order to increase production, the socialist system had another important similarity to Harveyian capitalism. It also tried to keep wages and other forms of workers’ income low since this was a major opportunity to raise the amount of resources that could be invested. Official propaganda, in fact, remained silent about these problems and news tendentiously drew up the image of a country with steadily growing well-being of the population. Western calculations, however, suggested a remarkable and long-lasting decline in wages. The works of Chapman (1954, 1963), which were predominantly based on official Soviet statistics on wages and

²⁶ A detailed overview of these issues is given by Budantseva (2007).

price indices, suggested that during the First and Second Five-Year Plans (thus, between 1928 and 1937) real wages declined by an annual rate of 6.2 % (!). For the late 1930s (1937–1940) a 2.1 % decline was calculated. In consequence, per capita real wages in 1940 only reached 54 % of their 1928 level.²⁷

A characteristic form of keeping wages low was the gradual reduction of the income of those affiliated with non-material activities, which were often considered as “non-productive”. This meant white-collar office personnel as well as teachers, physicians, those working in service industries, and in many cases even engineering and technical personnel. The average earnings of engineering and technical personnel was, for instance, 2.63 times higher in 1932 than the average wage of workers. After a continuous decline, however, this ratio decreased to 1.75 by 1950. For “employees”, who mostly were “white-collar office and accounting personnel”, the same ratio decreased in the same interval from 1.50 to 0.93 (!) (Yanowitch 1963, p. 688). In other words, what Stalin called the “abolition of the antithesis . . . between mental and physical labor” (Stalin 1972[1952], p. 24) meant in practice an intensive inflation of the wages of non-physical workers. In these sectors, of course, there were also exceptions, especially in certain top positions where an unquestionable loyalty to the Party was crucial. Even in the late 1950s, for instance, the director of a steel plant had a salary almost ten times that of a secretary, while the same ratio for a director of scientific research institute and a secretary reached 14.6 (Yanowitch 1963, p. 693).²⁸ But these extreme values were indeed exceptional, and did not balance the overall reduction in real earnings of mental workers, not only in a temporal sense but also compared to workers’ wages.²⁹

Wage constitutes, of course, only one segment of individual revenues, so it can only give a limited insight into the real level of the population’s material standard of living. This point is especially important if one deals with “real existing socialist” systems, where a considerable part of individual revenues was provided in non-fiscal form. Taking this aspect into consideration, however, does not make the situation seem different in the USSR during the 1920s and 1930s. In 1929 a ration system was introduced for bread, and later gradually for most sorts of food and industrial goods as well (Heller and Nekrich 1981, p. 216). Another form of reducing wages was to increase the norm of production per workday for the same payment. This could mean on the one hand that the compulsory norm rose. On the

²⁷ Of course one shall always be cautious about assessing such estimations since their actual reliability is difficult to measure. It is worth noting, however, that Chapman’s cited works were and still have been considered as reliable by most authors on wages in the USSR (cf. Nove 1966; Cohn 1970).

²⁸ Not to mention the many informal benefits those in leading positions could take advantage of, even if only indirectly. For example, factory directors had many additional revenues most workers could not even dream about, from the free use of official car (with chauffeur) to the easiness of spending vacation in the most luxurious hotels for key functionaries, the *nomenklatura*.

²⁹ Agricultural workers also suffered much from a radical reduction in their revenues. These were manifest, however, mostly in non-fiscal form. Hence, this issue is investigated in later parts of this section.

other, “labor competitions” were launched, where official propaganda tried to fuel workers’ enthusiasm to serve the construction of socialism by producing more than expected. This initiative reached its peak during the Stakhanov movement³⁰ beginning in 1935, where workers remarkably exceeding production norms, the “heroes of work”, were presented as models for the whole of society, and where other workers were expected to join the competition and raise their own production as well (cf. Siegelbaum 1988; Davies and Khlevnyuk 2002).

An even more radical form of the reduction of wages was the extensive use of forced labor during the Stalinist period. This was organized within the framework of the Gulag (*Glavnoye upravleniye ispravitelno-trudovikh lagerey i koloniy*; Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies), which was established in 1930 as a group of forced labor camps spread all over the Soviet Union.³¹ The custodial population of the Gulag was according to then classified official registers above 500,000 each year from the early 1930s onwards, and often above 1 million: in 1941 it reached 1.5 million, and in the late years of Stalin’s reign exceeded 1.7 million (Getty et al. 1993). This inhumane system lost momentum only after Stalin’s death, before officially being dissolved by the Khrushchev administration in 1960. Of course, it would be doubtful to claim that the establishment of such forced labor camps followed considerations exclusively economic in nature. Mass arrests in the Stalinist period rather served political goals in the first place, and fit totalitarian concepts about an absolute control of society. Still, the Gulag population had to actively participate in large-scale economic projects (especially in mining industries and the construction of infrastructure), and its temporal changes well followed the most aggressive phases of industrial growth. In addition, special camps (the so-called *sharashkas*) were established, where, based on an excessive usage of highly-skilled prisoners, scientific research and development projects were carried out with military ends (Kerber and Hardesty 1996; also see Solzhenitsyn 2009). These facts mirror the actual role the system of labor camps played in fulfilling the goals set in the five-year plans.³²

Furthermore, the Soviet system developed sophisticated mechanisms to restrain people from spending too much on consumer goods from their usually low incomes, thus the amount of resources potentially secured for investments (and for the promotion of economic growth) increased. For instance, many imported goods

³⁰ The movement was named after Aleksei Stakhanov, a Soviet miner in the Donets Basin, who on a night in 1935 hewed 102 tons of coal, thus, 14 times his quota (Siegelbaum 1988, p. 2).

³¹ Although, as Applebaum (2003) underscores, forced labor camps had gradually been established from 1918 onwards, partly copying the Siberian prisoner camps in the Tsarist period (also cf. Jakobson 1993).

³² It is interesting to note that the Gulag population was not only expected to contribute to economic growth, but its demographic structure also seemed to be in line with this expectation. As Getty, Rittersporn & Zemtsov (1993) stresses, in 1934, 1937 and 1940 age groups between 19 and 40 constituted 74.4–85.3 % of the Gulag population, while for the whole of the USSR this value was only 35.8 % in 1937. Moreover, the proportion of males constantly exceeded 90 %, in contrast to the national value of 47.3 % in 1937 (p. 1025).

were no longer accessible after the revolution, or if so, only for influential members of the *nomenklatura*. A typical example for such a selective accessibility was the establishment of “shops for foreigners”. Certain high-quality products were sold only in these facilities, and only for foreign (“hard”) currency and gold (Heller and Nekrich 1981, p. 217). Hence, the most exclusive goods became inaccessible to the vast majority of the local population, with exception of a few belonging to the *nomenklatura*. Furthermore, since the variety of consumer goods produced in the country also decreased, consumption by individuals became limited for this reason as well. And even the goods that were produced were in many cases difficult to buy. As Kornai (1992, pp. 229–240) underscores, a very simple and in the communist countries quite typical example for this was when customers had to queue even for the most basic consumer goods such as bread, meat or shoes. Of course, this obstacle influenced the consumption of elementary products to a lesser extent. For durable consumer goods, however, the shortage and problems with accessibility in many cases led to forced substitution, where people finally bought lower quality products than desirable if these were easier to buy. Or they had to register themselves on waiting lists, which actually meant that consumption was postponed. And in some cases, shortages simply resulted in the intention of purchase being abandoned.

As can be seen, there is a great deal of evidence indicating that Harvey’s claim about the drive for technological development and institutional innovation, and its endeavor to keep wages (and consumption) low was a characteristic notion not only in capitalism but in the “really existing socialism” of early Soviet times as well. It is true, of course, that socialism in the USSR was not homogeneous over time and that its character underwent serious changes not only before and during, but even after the reign of Stalin. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was only one among the countries that experienced the communist experiment. Hence, the features we presented in the last paragraphs can be attributed to the whole of “really existing socialism” only if their relevance for later decades in Soviet history and for other countries of the Communist Bloc can similarly be verified.

For technological and institutional development aimed at a faster growth of production, this notion not only survived the Stalinist period but became a characteristic feature of Soviet policy until the collapse of the USSR. This was well exemplified by the gradual opening up of science in the Khrushchev era, which we presented in Sect. 7.1.2. These years also witnessed a thorough change in the institutional framework for central planning. Since the 1930s this had been based on a so-called ministerial system. There it was the task of the 20–30 ministries to provide the information necessary for the creation of plans to the State Planning Commission, which as a highly centralized institution was responsible for the whole of the Soviet Union. Besides, if the national plans were compiled by the planning commission and approved by the USSR Council of Ministers, their execution was again the task of the ministries. In 1957, however, a new system was introduced, which was commonly called “territorial”. Here industrial ministries were abolished, and their preparatory as well as executive tasks were given to the newly established regional economic councils (*sovmarkhozy*), each responsible for a given area. Furthermore, the

information provided by these regional councils did not directly flow to the State Planning Commission, but first to the Republican Planning Commissions, which then prepared provisional plans for the State Planning Commission. Finally, when the USSR Council of Ministries approved the plan, its execution was the task of the republican governments and the regional economic councils (a detailed description of both systems is given in Sherman 1969, pp. 134–138).

The drive to technological and institutional development as a means of accelerating economic growth was also clearly present in the Brezhnev era. Without a doubt, the planning system barely mirrored this since the territorial system was given up in 1965 and the ministry system was reintroduced, although with certain—not decisive—modifications.³³ But in the meantime, Brezhnev constantly argued for accelerating the “scientific-technological revolution” in the USSR, thus, the introduction of new technologies and institutional methods. A crucial point here was “the infusion of Western technology and methods of production and management” since he considered these as “essential to Soviet economic and technological development” (Hoffmann 1978, p. 633). For institutional innovation, considerable reforms were undertaken from 1965 onwards, with two main directions. First, the power of factory management to shape its own economic strategies increased at the expense of industrial ministries. Second, the main emphasis in planning was put on “actually marketed production” instead of “gross production”, which tried to underscore the importance of profitability (Davies 1981, pp. 30–31).

For technological development, the transfer of Western knowledge remained permanently on the agenda, and became manifest in a great many industrial cooperation agreements with leading companies in capitalist countries. Such agreements concerned a number of economic branches, from mineral resource development to manufacturing, and even the production of consumer goods, e.g. the introduction of Pepsi in the Soviet Union.³⁴ The main focus was, however, on heavy industries. Besides collaborations in the machine industry (such as the establishment of Togliatti car factory with the assistance of Italian Fiat or the

³³ Although we have to underscore that the reason for this return to the foundations of the ministry system was not only an outcome of the lobby interests of the latter. Independent from such political influences, the territorial system objectively proved unable to fulfill its expected goals. While it failed to promote a more intensive collaboration within the system as the autarchic trends of great ministries were simply substituted by the autarchic trends of regional economic councils, the efficiency of the whole of the system significantly declined since this became much more complicated and fragmented. As Alexei Kosygin, the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1964–1980) and the initiator of the 1965 changes (often called “the Kosygin reforms”) put it: “The divergence from the branch principle has led to poorer efficiency in the management of the branches, to violations of the uniformity of technical policy, to scattering of competent personnel, and given rise to a multi-stage system of management.” (Kosygin cited in Sherman 1969, p. 138). These in fact led to frequent irritations between various councils, which in fact consumed many resources (*ibid.*; also cf. Davies 1981, p. 30).

³⁴ Virtually the only significant “gap” was the development and manufacturing of certain high-tech products with possible military ends (such as in computer and airplane industries) (cf. Fitzpatrick 1974, pp. 58–61).

KAMAZ truck factory with cooperation of US, French and West German firms), special emphasis was put on collaboration in the branches of chemical industries. Here American as well as Western European and Japanese companies were involved, which not only provided technological transfer in certain cases, but also erected a great many plants across the Soviet Union.³⁵

In fact, reforms of the late 1960s failed to stimulate long-lasting and dynamic economic growth in the USSR since the significant corrections they introduced still left the foundations of central planning unchanged (Schroeder 1990). The high level of centralization undermined the efficiency of decision-making due to the unavoidable inability of the central planning mechanism to integrate the “knowledge which all the separate individuals possess” (Hayek 1945, p. 519). This shortcoming, which was analyzed in detail as early as the 1920s by the Austrian school economist Ludwig von Mises (1922) and, later on, by his disciple Friedrich Hayek (1937, 1945), posed an ever growing burden for Soviet society and economy. Cooperation with the capitalist world in technology and production also proved not enough to provide strong momentum to the Soviet economy. These factors together contributed much to the profound changes beginning in the USSR in the mid- and late-1980s under the Gorbachev administration, which can be interpreted perhaps as the greatest attempt in a socialist system for technological and institutional development: the widespread implementation of capitalist methods and, finally, the transition to capitalism. No doubt, the initiatives over the decades of Soviet socialism failed in sum in their attempt to sustainably boost economic growth to a level unprecedented in capitalist countries. This is why the communist experiment ended up in the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Still, all the technological and institutional reforms we presented implied the on-going drive in “real existing socialism” à la USSR for technological and institutional innovation in order to increase production. The existence of this endeavor is not questioned by the fact that related initiatives turned out to be insufficient in practice, just as Harvey’s claim about the similar drive in capitalism is not challenged by the fact that capitalists sometimes also fail to increase the production of profit as fast as optimal (and even possible) from their view.

In addition, another form of “fix”, the notion of keeping wages low in order to secure surplus resources for investment was also characteristic of the whole history of the Soviet system, not only of its Leninist and Stalinist phases. Of course, the actual means have changed over time. The most extreme and inhumane methods of the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s were not maintained later on. The extensive use of forced labor rapidly declined after the death of Stalin, and the Gulag system was cancelled by Khrushchev in 1960. The Stakhanov movement likewise ended after the Stalinist era and, although “labor competitions” constituted an important part of

³⁵ detailed overview of the Western companies concerned in these projects can be found in Fitzpatrick (1974). For chemical industries, which played a distinguished role in international cooperation and in technology transfer from capitalist countries, an in-depth analysis is provided by Sobeslavsky and Beazley (1980).

official propaganda, there was virtually no similar initiative later on since “the organization of an enterprise to increase the productivity of a few selected workers proved to be disruptive to the overall productivity of the plant” (Sherman 1969, p. 165). But the endeavor to increase investments (and, consequently, production) even at the expense of wages and salaries remained obviously present.

The on-going usage of this “fix” as an economic strategy serving the goal of economic growth can be illustrated if average monthly wages as well as investments are presented relative to Net Material Product (NMP), which was the basic indicator of economic growth in “real existing socialist” systems and stood for “the net production value of branches in the sphere of material production” (Staatliches Komitee der UdSSR für Statistik, 1988, p. 13).³⁶ As Fig. 8.2 indicates, average monthly pay for workers and employees increased considerably slower over the period between 1940 and 1987 than per capita NMP (i).

If various historical periods are investigated separately, it becomes clear that the gap between the dynamics of the two indicators gradually decreased, and in the 1980s the increase in payments and per capita NMP was basically equal (ii). This is, however, only 1 decade of the more than seven the Soviet experiment lasted. Furthermore, tendencies in this short final period did not balance the notorious handicap of payments compared to production, which had developed over previous decades. Meanwhile, the dynamics of total investments never fell behind the growth rate of total NMP (iv), and for the whole of the 1940–1987 period investments increased significantly faster than material production (iii).

Beyond the “fix” of keeping wages low in general in order to provide surplus resources for investment, the strategy of decreasing wages and salaries for employees in “non-productive” sectors compared to those involved in material production also remained obvious until the very collapse of the Soviet Union. After the death of Stalin the wage system underwent a major reorganization from 1956 onwards, where this strategy became manifest in two ways. On the one hand, new minimum wages were set, which were different for various activities according to their “material production”. For heavy industry and construction, which as branches gained priority in the Soviet system, minimum wages were raised to 33–35 rubles. The same values in light industry and food processing were 32–33 rubles, and only 27 rubles in “unmechanized work in state agriculture and in certain other ‘non-productive’ occupations”, among them education and health as well (Livshits 1972, p. 230; cited in McAuley 1979, p. 203). On the other hand, 3 years

³⁶ Just as all other macroeconomic indicators, NMP also had its methodological shortcomings and ideological bias. Its main peculiarity from our point of view (and relative to such commonly used indicators as GNP or GDP) was that it mirrored the strong material approach of Marxism and Leninism insofar as it did not take into consideration non-material activities, which mainly covered the sphere of services. Besides, NMP was a *net* indicator, thus, net of depreciation. For these reasons, according to Campbell’s (1985) calculations GNP for the Soviet Union was approximately 23–29 % higher during the 1970s than NMP. Although the “blindness” of NMP to non-material production is a serious weakness, this is still the most comprehensive indicator whose official values are accessible for the Soviet period.

	1940	1960	1970	1980	1985	1987
<i>(i) 1940 = 1.0</i>						
Net Material Product (NMP), per capita	1.0	3.9	6.8	10.1	11.5	12.0
Average monthly pay for workers and employees	1.0	2.2	2.9	4.0	4.5	4.7
<i>(ii) Previous date indicated = 1.0</i>						
Net Material Product (NMP), per capita	n.d.	3.9	1.7	1.5	1.1	1.0
Average monthly pay for workers and employees	n.d.	2.2	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.0
<i>(iii) 1940 = 1.0</i>						
Net Material Product (NMP), total	1.0	4.4	8.7	14.1	16.8	17.9
Investments, total	1.0	6.3	12.3	20.1	24.0	27.2
<i>(iv) Previous date indicated = 1.0</i>						
Net Material Product (NMP), total	n.d.	4.4	2.0	1.6	1.2	1.1
Investments, total	n.d.	6.3	2.0	1.6	1.2	1.1

Fig. 8.2 Temporal changes of monthly payments for workers and employees compared to those of Net Material Product and investments in the Soviet Union (1940–1987). Calculations by author based on data from the Staatliches Komitee der UdSSR für Statistik 1988, p. 22

later (in 1959) it was decided to increase minimum wages to 40–45 rubles, but this increase took place in various branches with a certain time delay. In mining, metallurgy and the chemical and cement industries it was carried out as early as 1959. In the “non-productive” sphere, e.g. in health, education and a great many other services, the same step was taken only in 1964–1965. Hence, those claimed to produce no material value began to receive higher payments only 5 or 6 years later than most workers did (pp. 203–204).

To less extent, wage policy in the succeeding decades still had some similar features. In 1968 a new wage hike was carried through, which increased minimum wages from 40–45 to 60 rubles, but without raising wages above the former minimum level correspondingly. Thus, wage categories were “compressed”, which led to a relative devaluation of the labor of highly educated technical personnel among workers compared to manual workers (p. 206). This problem was basically corrected in the next wage reform some years later, which increased not only minimum wages but benefited more educated workers to a greater extent. Here, however, the shift in wages was again a long process, just as after 1956. Hence, construction, for instance, witnessed the increase in wages as early as 1969, in most industrial activities the same happened in 1971, while in some “non-productive” branches new wages were only introduced in 1976 (p. 210).

These attempts to keep wages low in “non-productive” sectors in order to raise investments and economic production had their imprint on the overall payment structure as well (Fig. 8.3). While the growth of wages steadily remained below that of Net Material Product, relative wages for “non-productive” activities were permanently forced down relative to payments in the sphere of material production. This is indicated on the one hand by the declining difference between workers and engineers (and technicians) in industry. While the gap between these two groups was 107.3 % of the national average, this value decreased by 1986 to 11.6 %. On the other hand, the whole of the period




Fig. 8.3 Changes of average monthly pay in selected sectors of the USSR economy compared to the national average (1940–1986). Design by author, based on data from Pockney’s (1991, pp. 57–58.) collection of official Soviet statistics

witnessed an increase in relative payments for material labor: in 1940, industrial workers earned 103.0 % of the national average, which rose to 110.6 % by 1986. For workers in agriculture, corresponding values (1940: 70.4 %; 1986: 98.2 %) indicate a similar yet even stronger trend. In the meantime, payment in services that need an especially high level of education became more and more underpaid relative to their post-WWII levels. Employees in science earned 39.3 percentage points more in 1940 than industrial workers; after a declining trend, however, from 1974 onwards their payment on average was *lower* than that of industrial workers, and exceeded the national average by only 6.4 % in 1986. Parallel to this, employees in education came out from a basis similar to that of industrial workers (–3.0 percentage points difference), which grew to a considerable lag by 1986 (–31.0 percentage points). Those in healthcare had already been extremely poorly paid in 1940 (77.0 % of the USSR average), but their relative situation became even worse in the succeeding decades (1986: 69.0 %).

Meanwhile, keeping consumption low through strategies that hindered people from using their wages for such ends also remained typical in the post-Stalinist period. Long queues in front of shops did not disappear. Durable consumer goods could only be bought after a considerable time of waiting. For example, the average length of time on a waiting list for housing was in the 1980s some 10–15 years (Kornai 1992, p. 234). Furthermore, many products of higher quality (e.g. many exported goods) were still absolutely inaccessible for most citizens, excluding those belonging to the *nomenklatura*.

To sum it up, the strategy to keep wages (especially for “non-productive” activities) and consumption low remained a main strategy in “real existing

socialism” in the Soviet Union. And, similarly to the drive for technological and institutional innovations, it was not only characteristic of the USSR, but of all socialist countries from Eastern Europe to the Far East. This is of course no accident. After World War II, when the Soviet leadership managed to extend its sphere of influence over a number of new countries and an additional population of hundreds of millions, its Stalinist system was forced upon all satellite countries. Without a doubt, before the profound Sovietization of these countries many local communists stressed that “there is not just one single road to socialism” and that “the construction of a Soviet regime is not the only path leading to socialism”³⁷ (Spriano 1985, p. 276). Moscow, however, tolerated no deviation from its own line so that its new socialist “allies” were profoundly transformed according to the Soviet model, as subordinate units of an “ideal empire” (Bunce 1985, p. 4). Beyond the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship, this resulted in the introduction of central planning, the setting up of planning bureaus and the launching of (usually five-year) plans.³⁸ The principles of economic management underwent serious changes. Especially in industry, mammoth companies (trusts) were brought into being, which were expected to maximize the economies of scale. The militarization of labor and a radical reorientation of education and culture for political goals were carried out actually the same way as in the previous decades in the Soviet Union.³⁹

For issues of technological development as a means of opening up new possibilities for the growth of production, the only major difference between new socialist satellite countries in the post-war period and the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s was that the former did not promote a secret but large-scale technological transfer from the West. Instead, it was the Soviet conquest of these countries itself what opened up new sources of developed technology for the Soviet Bloc, given the high standards many Eastern European firms (especially in Germany and Czechoslovakia, and in certain branches in Hungary and Poland as well) had already achieved in state-of-art industrial activities of the time (e.g. machine, electrical and chemical industries). The transfer of technology from these countries became manifest not only in the adoption of local knowledge and technologies, but in many cases even in the removal of modern devices or even whole factories to the Soviet Union. The plants previously serving the needs of high-tech military

³⁷ These quotations come from the Hungarian communist party leader Mátyás Rákosi and from his Czechoslovakian counterpart Klement Gottwald.

³⁸ The fundamental long-term goal was, of course, to put the coordination of economy on the basis of five-year plans in line with the Soviet example. In the initial period, however, some deviations were tolerated. Central planning began in Hungary with a three-year plan between 1947 and 1949 (Romsics 2010, p. 313), with a two-year plan in the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and 1950 (Weber 2012, p. 25), and with a six-year plan in Poland (1950–1955) (Sherman 1969, p. 330).

³⁹ A brief yet painstaking comparative overview of these changes for Eastern Europe can be found in Bunce (1985), especially pp. 4–8 and pp. 28–32. For a detailed description on some individual countries especially valuable sources are Weber (2012, pp. 28–41) for East Germany and Romsics (2010, pp. 271–384) for Hungary.

Country	1950–1954	1955–1959	1960–1963
Bulgaria	23.7	27.7	41.5
Czechoslovakia	23.5	27.3	27.7
East Germany	14.5	19.4	23.6
Hungary	25.9	24.2	27.2
Poland	21.1	25.1	28.1
<i>Eastern Europe, average</i>	<i>21.7</i>	<i>24.7</i>	<i>29.6</i>
Austria	20.1	23.1	24.1
Belgium	n.d.	17.1	19.1
Denmark	17.2	18.6	22.5
France	18.1	20.3	21.7
West Germany	21.1	24.3	26.4
Greece	15.9	19.2	28.9
Italy	19.7	22.4	25.6
Netherlands	21.5	24.4	24.7
<i>Western Europe, average</i>	<i>19.1</i>	<i>21.2</i>	<i>24.1</i>

Fig. 8.4 Gross fixed investment in Eastern and Western Europe (as percent of GDP, 1950–1963). Adapted from Ernst (1966), p. 890

production for the Nazi Germany (in Eastern Europe) or for imperial Japan (in China and Korea) were of especially great value in the Soviet leaders' eyes, and they were often simply removed to the USSR (for a detailed overview of these forms of technology transfer to the Soviet Union see Sutton 1973).

The manifold Soviet strategies to accelerate investment while keeping wages low were also intensively used in these new socialist countries. A characteristic imprint of this was the high level of investment indicators which, relative to total production, significantly outpaced the corresponding values in Western European countries (Fig. 8.4), although there similarly comprehensive reparations were necessary after the devastations of World War II. This high rate of investment in Eastern Europe also resulted in an increase in output indicators, but wages and salaries remained remarkably low. In Hungary, for instance, 1948 average salaries of employees reached 90 % of the pre-war level in 1938 at constant prices, but only 66 % in 1952 (Romsics 2010, p. 357). In Poland, real wages over the whole period of reconstruction increased only by 13 % relative to an extremely low basis (Sherman 1969, p. 330). In East Germany, similar tendencies were apparent (Weber 2012, pp. 37–38). Although there were certain improvements in social insurance, these in general did not counteract the decline in fiscal payments (cf. Romsics 2010, p. 358; Schmidt 2004, pp. 31–47; for urban China see Cheng and Selden 1994, p. 650). Meanwhile, the militarization of labor, the promotion of “labor competitions” and the Stakhanov movement were forced in these countries just as severely as in the USSR. The introduction of ration cards for certain basic agricultural and industrial products was also a typical policy in the whole

Communist Bloc during the Stalinist period, and in some countries right until the 1980s.⁴⁰ In addition, some other sophisticated means were used as well in order to force people to recycle a part of their payment to state investment projects. A characteristic example was that of the so-called “peace loans” in Stalinist Hungary, where individuals were expected to “voluntarily” lend a part of their income to the state, which could then use it to finance further investments. The volume of this initiative is well reflected by the fact that this strategy extracted some 6.7 % of all wages from the population in 1952 (Cseszka 2007).

The notion to raise the amount of resources focused on investments through reducing the salaries of “non-productive” employees, and to “fix” an economy whose growth opportunities were otherwise constrained this way was also carried out in new socialist countries, sometimes much faster than in the Soviet Union. For example, wage system in Hungary underwent a profound transformation in 1946. As Péter (2011) underscores, wages for workers remained on average equal in the post-war period to the 1938 level. Payment in education, however, dramatically decreased to less than one-fourth of its former standard (p. 7). In consequence, secondary-school teachers in the new system on average earned a bit less than fitters, and physicians received basically the same payment as coal miners (Romsics 2010, p. 358). In addition, the use of forced labor in satellite countries of the Soviet Union was also not unheard of, even if it did not reach the volume of the Gulag system in the USSR.⁴¹

The changes in the Soviet Union after the Stalinist period that we have presented also took place in other countries with “real existing socialist” systems. In fact, the major foundations of the system did not change significantly in most countries until the late 1980s.⁴² The relatively high ratio of investments remained (Fig. 8.5). Various “fixes”, hence, strategies of keeping consumption low did not disappear. In most countries queues in front of shops remained. Many products were not purchased or were only available to the most loyal supporters of the system. Waiting lists did not tend to become shorter.⁴³ Yet, the takeover of Khrushchev

⁴⁰ In the People’s Republic of China, for instance, the ration system concerning a great many of agricultural products was sustained for than 30 years after its introduction in 1955 (Chang and Selden, 1994, p. 657). Additionally, in Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and in such “specific” (not Soviet-type) socialist countries as Cuba and Vietnam, rationing of certain products was still a common practice in the 1980s (Kornai 1992, p. 242).

⁴¹ With the exception of Maoist China where an estimated population of more than ten million was involved in “corrective” forced labor (Wittfogel 1956).

⁴² An important exception within the Soviet Bloc was Hungary, where after the 1956 revolution the reestablished communist leadership tended to promote a more consumption oriented policy in order to avoid similar unrest. For this reason, payments and consumption opportunities were not as reduced as in many other socialist countries. Hence, queues in front of shops gradually disappeared in the 1960s, for example. Waiting periods, however, remained (cf. Kornai 1992, pp. 234–236).

⁴³ For housing, citizens usually had to wait 3–4 years in East Germany and 4–6 years in Hungary for state-owned rented apartments. In other countries of the Communist Bloc corresponding values were much higher (e.g. 15–30 years in Poland). The situation was basically the same for cars. Even in 1989, years had to pass before the car (a socialist country make) was delivered. In some extreme examples, citizens had to wait for 14–17 years on average, as was the case in East Germany (Kornai 1992, pp. 234–236).

Fig. 8.5 Share of investment in GDP in selected socialist and capitalist countries (1980, 1988). Adapted from Kornai (1992), p. 166, after Marer et al. (1992)

Country	1980	1988
<i>Socialist countries</i>		
Bulgaria	28	27
China	24	32
Czechoslovakia	27	26
East Germany	24	27
Hungary	29	21
Poland	25	23
Soviet Union	30	30
<i>Capitalist countries</i>		
France	23	21
West Germany	23	20
Italy	24	22
Netherlands	21	22
Spain	22	24
United States	17	17

and his early measures exerted some influence on political and economic mechanisms in Eastern Europe as well, as it is emphasized in many works (Romsics 2010, pp. 376–384; Schmidt 2004, pp. 63–64; Sherman 1969, pp. 330–333). Furthermore, the more intensive institutional changes in the USSR during the late 1950s and, later on, in the 1960s through the Kosygin reforms opened the way for similar initiatives in most Soviet satellite countries (in 1963 in East Germany, in 1965 in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and, after a preparatory phase from the early 1960s onwards, in 1968 in Hungary) (cf. Sherman 1969, pp. 329–344). Later on, attempts to adopt Western technologies through intensifying collaboration with capitalist firms were also present in Eastern Europe, and not only in the form of technological assistance programs. In fact, the green light was given to joint ventures with capitalist companies as well, in Romania in 1971, in Hungary in 1972, in Poland in 1976, in Bulgaria in 1980, and in Czechoslovakia in 1985 (Boukaouris 1988). And finally, just as in the USSR during the Gorbachev era, satellite countries in Eastern Europe also witnessed the serious changes leading to a profound change in social, political and economic circumstances. Although the date these changes began, like the intensity of reforms, showed great differences over these satellite countries,⁴⁴ the final outcome of measures to raise productivity and increase production was the transition to capitalism and to a pluralistic political system. Even in the People’s Republic of China, which diverged from the Soviet

⁴⁴ An elaborate comparison of the main paths followed by various countries can be found in Csanádi (2006), pp. 240–299.

path after the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, similar economic changes began first after the normalization of international relations between China and the United States in 1972, and especially after the beginning of economic “opening up” in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping’s reign.

To sum it up, while Harvey claims capitalism to be inherently controversial, one can follow a similar logic to identify similarly controversial notions in “real existing socialism”. For Harvey, the root of the problem is that capitalists are intent on increasing profit, but in order to reach this goal they do things that conflict with the ultimate objective: since they develop technology and institutional circumstances, and try to keep wages low, they reduce potential demand for their products and thus, potential profits. Analogous to this mechanism, one can see a similar situation in socialist systems. These on the one hand strive to ensure a high material standard of living for the population through production, while on the other they suck away resources from inhabitants to concentrate them on investment and increase production in this way. And as was presented, this controversy was a characteristic feature of “real existing socialism” in all countries.

It is possible, however, not to stop at this point and continue the adaptation of Harvey’s logic to “real existing socialism”. Just as he claimed capitalist countries seek alternative strategies to come to terms with inherent controversies, thus, to find and take advantage of “spatio-temporal fixes”, “real existing socialism” also had the same tendency. Actually each form of these fixes had its analogy under socialist circumstances, which we will present one by one in the next paragraphs. Here we differentiate between what Harvey called “spatial” and “temporal” fixes in his 1982 work. Although we explained that in his later essays he underscored the interwoven nature of these and introduced the term “spatio-temporal fixes”, we follow the categories he described in detail in his *magnum opus*, in order to make clear how their underlying logic can be adapted to countries of the Communist Bloc.

The first form of “spatial fix” Harvey explained in *The Limits to Capital* was the opening up of external markets in order to find new consumers and thus to increase demand for the products capitalists manufacture. This was aimed at eliminating growing problems of overaccumulation and overproduction. This logic was, however, fundamentally not different in “real existing socialism”. Since stable growth in the population’s standard of well-being was based on increasing production, leaders of socialist systems were interested in accelerating production. The problem here, however, was not overproduction, but rather an *under*production compared to the level of output regarded by these systems as desirable. Given that this underproduction mainly resulted from the shortage of resources to invest, “real existing socialist” systems became strongly interested in finding new external sources of investment, hence, new areas which could be exploited to cover the needs of investment.

This strategy had a strong imprint on international relations between the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, especially right after the end of World War II. The USSR took advantage of the new geopolitical context where it could fully subordinate its new allies to its own interests (a situation Bunce [1985, p. 3] calls “the ideal empire”). Hence, the communist superpower sucked out roughly the same amount of resources in the form of reparations and through

newly established Soviet-East European joint enterprises that Western Europe received from the United States under the Marshall Plan (Marer 1974, 1976). In the Far East, the USSR also extracted some resources mainly through reparations of plants left in Manchuria by the Japanese, but the balance of Soviet revenues from Soviet-Chinese joint companies and expenditures on aid provided to China showed no significant gains (Grow 1974). Later on, this form of “fix” gradually devaluated. In Eastern Europe, the permanent Soviet military presence consumed a great deal of resources of the USSR. In addition, Eastern European communist leaderships realized their bargaining power against the “big brother” interested in geopolitical stability on its Western borders. For these reasons, Eastern Europe gradually went in Bunce’s (1985) words from a “Soviet asset” to a “Soviet liability”. In consequence, the Soviet Union gradually lost the opportunity to squeeze out extra resources from the satellite countries in order to stimulate growth in its own economy.

The second form of “spatial fix” was in Harvey’s explanation the export of capital to regions where its turnover was either faster or higher, thus, where the amount of profit made from a given quantity of capital was higher. A similar logic was likewise present in socialist countries, in the form of concentrating investments in areas where these were expected to promote a greater increase in production. This reasoning had two typical outcomes, which mirrored two approaches, but were not contradictory. On the one hand, a great deal of investments flowed to previously “unused” areas, where dynamic growth seemed possible. On the other, it seemed reasonable to carry out more investments in districts where productivity had already been higher, at least in branches that communist leaders regarded as most important.

The most characteristic example of the first strategy was the strong drive of Soviet leadership to integrate the vast Asian part of the country into the national economic system. In their eyes these areas had previously been quite similar to dependencies of the imperial powers. This view was already present in Lenin’s works before the revolution, who in 1916 referred to 17.4 million square kilometers from a total area of 22.8 million square kilometers of the Russian Empire as “colonies” (Lenin 1964a, p. 258). The 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1921 also emphasized that “each borderland of Russia (foremost Turkestan) was in the position of colonies or semicolonies”, who were forced to supply raw materials for the imperial core where these were processed (Wagener 1972, p. 9). In fact, according to 1908 statistics the so-called “eastern areas”,⁴⁵ which constituted more than three-fourths of Russia’s area, concentrated only 14.4 % of the nation’s population and only 3.5 % of industrial production (*ibid.*, p. 8). Moreover, vast regions were virtually unused both by agriculture and mining.

⁴⁵ These were the Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East in the Russian SFSR, and the Azerbaijan, Georgian, Armenian, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSRs (see Balzak, Vasyutin & Feigin, 1949, p. 206).

For Soviet leadership the “opening up” of these areas seemed to offer an excellent “spatial fix” to find new resources for investment and thus to boost economic growth. Hence, some corresponding plans were created as early as the initial years of the Soviet Union (cf. Hajdú 1999), and certain large-scale industrial projects were indeed launched in the 1930s (such as construction works on the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine) (cf. Holubnychy 1973). These early initiatives were not without achievements. For example, the share of large-scale industry from eastern areas increased between 1913 and 1937 from 15.8 to 18.6 %. This was still however, far from a real breakthrough and, in the Russian SFSR, the total contribution of Asian regions to industrial production was still only 5 % in 1950 (Treivish 2002, p. 10; cited in Horváth 2008, p. 20).

World War II, however, brought a profound change in this situation since more than half of the industrial production in the European USSR was relocated to eastern districts in order to protect them from invading German troops. Furthermore, after the war Stalin launched comprehensive economic development programs in the Asian regions to utilize their unexploited resources and thus to accelerate production. This meant on the one hand large scale agricultural initiatives aimed at irrigation, protection against wind erosion through forestation, and even the introduction of new plants to begin production on lands previously considered as “unfertile” (Hajdú 1999; Holubnychy 1973). On the other, a great many projects were launched to establish new mines, fossil and hydropower plants, and factories where local raw materials were to be processed (Holubnychy 1973). Parallel to this, a net inflow of labor force into “pioneer regions” was maintained. These attempts clearly indicated how the Stalinist regime tried to exploit the growth potential of remote areas as a “spatial fix” in order to achieve a level of increase in national production that would have been impossible otherwise.

These initiatives did not lose momentum even after the death of Stalin. Instead, Khrushchev launched the Virgin Lands Campaign in 1953 to achieve a considerable increase in sown arable land. Moreover, he not only maintained the pace of growth in industrial investments in the Asian regions, but also urged “an *accelerated* development of industries in the eastern parts of the country” (our emphasis; Khrushchev cited in Holubnychy 1973, p. 12). This also included concepts going beyond the improvement of mining and the production of energy and intermediate products, and aimed to establish new centers of manufacturing in the former “frontier” zones. That previous projects were continued and comparable new initiatives were set for the future made clear that the Soviet “spatial fix” of promoting growth through a forced integration of the peripheries in the national economy was not a specialty of the Stalinist system, but was rather inherent in the very nature of Soviet type “real existing socialism”.

In order to carry out this “spatial fix”, “frontier” zones were obviously overpreferred in the allocation of both labor force and investments. Although the system of forced labor as a means of allocating workforce to “pioneer regions” was abolished during the Khrushchev administration, wage compensations for those working in remote parts of the Soviet Union significantly increased from the 1960s

District	Share of area (%)	Share of population (%)					
		1913	1940	1966	1970	1979	1989
European USSR and Transcaucasia	25	85.8	81.8	75.9	75.5	73.7	71.1
Siberia and the Far East	58	6.1	9.4	11.2	10.9	11.0	11.6
Kazakhstan and Central Asia	17	8.1	8.8	12.9	13.6	15.3	17.2

Fig. 8.6 The spatial distribution of population among three great districts of the Soviet Union (1913–1989). The category “Siberia and the Far East” includes the Kurgan Oblast as well in the Urals. Adapted from Probáld (1980), p. 54, with extension by author for 1989 based on official census statistics (Demoscope, n. d.)

onwards (cf. McAuley 1979, pp. 200–201). In consequence, Siberia and the Soviet Far East as well as the non-Russian peripheries of the USSR (especially in Central Asia) had a net migration gain over the post-war decades (Probáld 1980, pp. 57–58).⁴⁶ This was an important factor to increase the relative weight of these areas within the national population (Fig. 8.6). Without a doubt, net migration to these “frontier zones” gradually declined from the 1960s onwards (cf. Rowland 1990), while the contribution of higher rates of natural increase to population growth became more significant (Probáld 1980, p. 56). One should not forget, however, that the relatively large number of births compared to deaths was to a considerable extent the outcome of previous inward migration, due to which a great deal of young population had streamed to these peripheral areas. Hence, the high natural increase in these districts would certainly have not taken place without massive migration gains in the Stalinist and Khrushchevist period, or at least their volume would have been much smaller.

Furthermore, “pioneer regions” were permanently overrepresented in the allocation of investments. This was especially apparent in the case of the Asian part of the Russian SFSR, namely Siberia and the Far East. These altogether never represented more than 11,6 % of the population of the USSR, but their share of total capital investments in the Soviet Union reached 14.4 % in 1950, and fluctuated between 15 and 17 % in the succeeding decades (see Whitehouse and Kamerling 1981, p. 255). Thus, the policy of “drive toward the East” strongly infiltrated both the plans and actual economic decisions of succeeding administrations. In fact, this endeavor remained a cornerstone of Soviet regional economic policy until its very end.⁴⁷

These initiatives resulted in a gradual but remarkable increase in economic importance of the previously “unused” territories. In agriculture, total sown arable land expanded by 48.5 % between 1940 and 1970, and more than three-quarters

⁴⁶ This was despite a strong fluctuation of population, which meant that many flowing to “pioneer regions” returned to the European USSR in some years’ time due to lower costs and a relative easiness of self-sustainment there (Probáld 1980, p. 56). The number of newcomers to Asiatic regions, however, in most periods significantly outpaced that of the “returners” to the European Soviet Union.

⁴⁷ I am grateful for this information to Vladimir Shuvalov, head of Department of Economic and Social Geography of Russia at Lomonosov Moscow State University.

(77.2 %) of growth was produced by the Asian USSR. In consequence, the share of these districts from total arable land in the Soviet Union rose from 27.4 to 43.9 % (cf. Hamilton 1981, p. 204). In fact, the merely extensive nature of cultivation in non-European regions led to relatively low yields: gross revenues relative to agricultural area were in 1970 still 3.5 times higher in the European USSR than in “eastern areas” (cf. Antal 1980, p. 458). Hence, the latter’s contribution to the national total of agricultural production was less impressive. Even for grains, which were the main crops in newly cultivated lands, the contribution by the non-European Soviet Union to national output did not reach one-third (31.3 %) (cf. Hamilton 1981, p. 204). Still, it is without a doubt that the agricultural utilization of resources in these “pioneer regions” significantly increased from a low initial level.

In industry, growth was likewise obvious, especially with regard to the European and Asiatic parts of the Russian SFSR. Although the ratio of these two areas in industrial production was 95:5 in 1950, the corresponding value changed to 80:20 by 1975 (Treivish 2002, p. 10). The Asian frontiers became especially important in extractive branches and in energy production: they provided, for instance, 34.0 % of national coal production, 30.6 % of petroleum, 35.0 % of timber, and 18.2 % of electric power (Whitehouse and Kamerling 1981, p. 249). These achievements clearly indicated the seriousness of efforts made by the Soviet regime to carry out a “spatial fix” aimed at the promotion of national growth through a rapid and forced development in the peripheries.

Beyond the concept of developing the “pioneer regions”, the idea to relocate investments in districts where turnover was expected to be faster or higher opened the way for another strategy as well. The point here was to concentrate investments in areas where productivity was already higher, thus where the installation of new facilities seemed to contribute more to the overall growth of production. Special emphasis was put on urban regions, especially on great industrial agglomerations, which Soviet communists regarded as optimal locations for industrial production due to economies of scale.⁴⁸ In the USSR the accelerated development of towns and cities gained priority from the very beginning. Although during the first all-union census in 1926 only 17.9 % of the population lived in towns and cities, the same value was 32.5 % in 1940 (Fig. 8.7). This shift equaled to an annual growth rate of 6.5 % for urban population, an extreme value in historical comparison: in England between 1776 and 1871, where the urbanization rate increased from 25.9 to 65.2 % over a bit less than 100 years, there was no 5-year period with urban population growth rates exceeding 2.64 % (cf. Williamson 1988, p. 289).

Later on, the dynamics of urbanization gradually slowed down in the Soviet Union, but it still remained unconventionally high in the succeeding decades. Between 1940 and 1959, despite massive USSR casualties in World War II

⁴⁸ A typical way of seeing here was what the Soviet urbanologist Viktor Perevedentsev expressed in a 1969 article: “the productivity of labor in cities with a population of over 1,000,000 is 38 % higher than in cities with a population of from 100,000 to 200,000 and the return on assets is almost twice as high” (cited in Frolic 1976, p. 161).

	1926	1940	1959	1970	1979	1989
Urban population (million persons)	26.3	63.1	100.0	136.0	163.6	188.8
Urbanization rate (% of total population)	17.9	32.5	47.9	56.3	62.3	65.9
Average annual growth of urban population since the last date (million persons)	n. d.	2.6	1.9	3.3	3.1	2.5
Average annual growth of urban population since the last date (%)	n. d.	6.5	2.5	2.8	2.1	1.4

Fig. 8.7 Dynamics of urbanization in the Soviet Union (1926–1989). Design by author based on data from Demoscope (n. d.) (for 1926), Staatliches Komitee der UdSSR für Statistik (1988, p. 168) (for 1940–1979), and Kingkade (1993, pp. 798–799) (for 1989)

accounting for losses of 24–27 million,⁴⁹ annual growth in the number of inhabitants in towns and cities reached 2.5 %. Then in the 1960s Soviet urbanization quickened its pace again to a value unprecedented in England during the Industrial Revolution. In consequence, the USSR, with more than four-fifth of its citizens living in rural areas before the First Five-Year Plan, witnessed in three and a half decades the number of urban inhabitants outpacing those living in the countryside. This was the outcome of policies aimed at “fixing” the economy through the relocation of active population, considered as a decisive factor of production, to regions where additional labor force was expected to induce the highest level of surplus growth.

For sources of this boom, in the periods between 1927–1938 and 1939–1958 the contribution of natural growth in towns and cities to the total increase in urban population was only 18 % and 20 % respectively. More than three-fifths of the increase (63 % and 62 %, respectively) originated from migration from rural areas, and more than one-sixth (19 and 18 %) from the emergence of new cities (either by granting urban status to villages or by founding new towns) (Pokshishevsky, 1972, p. 26). Although the boost in urban population necessarily resulted in an increasing role of natural growth in further urbanization, its contribution to the process was still well below 50 % (41 % and 44 %, respectively) for 1959–1970 and 1970–1979. This was due to the persistent influx of rural inhabitants to urban centers (Kozhurin and Pogodin 1981, p. 58) as part of the Soviet “spatial fix” to accelerate growth through what was expected to be a more efficient geographical distribution of factors of production, even if this rather increased than decreased “uneven development” and spatial inequalities.

In fact, the policy of rapid urbanization not only aimed to produce quantitative changes, namely a stable growth of population in towns and cities. It had qualitative aspects as well since investments were also focused in urban areas. And this did not only go for the construction of gigantic factories, which due to their dimensions needed thousands or even tens of thousands of laborers, thus, could only be settled in great cities for organizational reasons. In fact, much more remarkable was the

⁴⁹ In Russia the officially referred value is 26.6 million after Krivosheev (1997). For some other estimations see Barber and Harrison (2006) and Davies (2007).

Equipment	Cities and towns	Rural settlements
Tap water connection	83	30
Sewage disposal	80	19
Central heating	84	20
Bath tub	75	16
Hot water connection	69	9

Fig. 8.8 The percentage proportion of urban and rural households in the Russian Federation with selected equipment (1993). (It was not common for reliable statistics on similar issues to be released in Soviet publications since they would have clearly indicated the serious shortcomings of public infrastructure and challenge the official propaganda of social and spatial equity. Given the strong path-dependence in the temporal development of infrastructure, however, corresponding data from 2 years after the collapse of the USSR can be used as relevant indicators of conditions during the late 1980s.) Design by author based on Brade and Schulze (1997), p. 47

asymmetrical allocation of resources in urban districts at the expense of the countryside in services where an extreme concentration in space is not a technical necessity. For example, although the urban infrastructure in the Soviet Union was poorly developed in comparison with capitalist countries of similar output standards (cf. Frolic 1976), it was still much more improved than in villages; the urban–rural gap was striking (Fig. 8.8).

Furthermore, the communist leadership made definite attempts not only to prefer urban areas, but to put emphasis foremost on the development of large cities in accordance with the principles of efficiency and economies of scale. On the one hand the point was obviously to steer as much of the workforce as possible from smaller towns to large cities. In consequence, as a share of the whole urban population cities above 500,000 inhabitants permanently increased (Fig. 8.9).^{50, 51} On the other, investments were likewise focused in large urban centers, especially in those whose initial efficiency in economic production was also higher, thus, where a higher increase of production could be expected from a given amount of investment. This became most apparent in spheres whose existence and improvement was a crucial prerequisite for the development of most productive economic branches.

⁵⁰ In fact, similar processes of concentration took place within the network of rural settlements (cf. Brade and Schulze 1997, p. 44 for the Russian SFSR).

⁵¹ The “systemic” nature of urban centralization is well exemplified by the actual outcome of attempts of the Soviet planning mechanism from the 1960s onwards to limit the population growth of cities above 500,000 inhabitants. Since the problems of overconcentration tended to become more and more apparent, town planners in the USSR, in concert with certain party directives, tried to “deliberately limit” the population of cities above half a million souls and decentralize their disproportionately large production basis. These initiatives, however, were unsuccessful as is clearly presented by statistics in Fig. 8.8. As Frolic (1976) underscores, this was an outcome of the system’s drive to growth, due to which the newly emerging objective of creating cities better to live in was rapidly outplayed by the system’s deeply rooted traditional fixation with economic growth.




Fig. 8.9 The structure of urban population in the Soviet Union according to city size (1926–1989). Design by author based on data from Lewis and Rowland (1969), p. 780 (for 1926, 1939 and 1959), Pokshishevsky (1972), p. 25 (for 1970), and Demoscope (n. d.) (for 1979 and 1989)

Higher education, for instance, which is a crucial sector both politically (as the trainer of an intelligentsia loyal to the power) and economically (as provider of a highly-skilled labor force demanded in leading branches of production),⁵² was disproportionately concentrated in the two largest cities, Moscow and Leningrad as indicated by statistics for the Russian SFSR (Fig. 8.10). And this was not simply an historical heritage of the Tsarist period since Moscow's importance in higher education increased between the academic years of 1940/1941–1960/1961 as well (even relative to its share of total population) Without a doubt, this tendency reversed later, and from the 1960s onwards the relative weight of both centers in higher education gradually decreased. In 1990/1991, however, Moscow's share of students was six times higher than of total population of the Russian SFSR; in Leningrad the corresponding ratio was 5.5. These values still mirrored a strong spatial concentration of higher education, which clearly indicated how the notion to accelerate growth and focus investments in cities with the highest efficiency infiltrated the location policy of the Soviet system, even contrary to the propagandistic claim of promoting equity. It also mirrored how the children of the nomenklatura were privileged in the access to higher education.

⁵² For the spatial location of higher education as a strategic branch of knowledge production close to the center of political power see Meusbarger (1998b).

		1940/41	1960/61	1970/71	1980/81	1990/91
Share of students (%)	Moscow	29.8	31.9	23.1	20.7	18.7
	Leningrad	17.8	12.4	10.2	9.2	8.8

		1939	1959	1970	1979	1989
Share of population (%)	Moscow	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1
	Leningrad	1.9	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6

Fig. 8.10 The share of Moscow and Leningrad from university students and total population of the Russian SFSR. Statistics on students refer to academic years, population numbers are official census data. Design by author based on data from TsSU RSFSR (1981), pp. 380–341 (number of students in 1940/1941–1980/1981), Goskomstat RSFSR (1991), pp. 244–246 (number of students in 1990/1991), Staatliches Komitee der UdSSR für Statistik (1988), pp. 174–175 (population in 1939–1979), and Demoscope (n. d.) (population in 1989)

The geographically asymmetrical development of high value-added activities in accordance with the goal of promoting growth was also reflected by statistics on the spatial allocation of labor force with higher education. Despite the slogan of the abolition of “the exploitation of the country by the town” (Stalin 1972[1952], p. 25) and “the antithesis between town and country” (p. 26), Soviet labor policy created and sustained remarkable asymmetries not only between town and country, but also between great cities and mid-size and small towns. As Fig. 8.11 shows, activities where staff with tertiary education is needed were remarkably overrepresented in Moscow and Leningrad. While on average one of ten workers and employees (10.2 %) had absolved higher education in the Russian SFSR, corresponding values were 18.6 % in Leningrad and 21.4 % in Moscow. In consequence, these two cities, which together made up only 4.6 % of total population and 7.2 % of urban population in the Russian SFSR, concentrated almost one-fourth (24.0 %) of high-skilled labor force.

The remarkable difference between a few ultimate centers and other towns and cities (even with more than one million inhabitants) with regard to investments was likewise apparent in developments aimed at promoting the inhabitants’ standard of material well-being. For instance, in 1974 per capita urban living space in the Soviet Union was 7.8 sq. m (Bater 1977, p. 194). For cities with at least one million inhabitants, the median value was exactly the same. In the three largest urban cores of the USSR, however, the situation was much better: corresponding values were 9.0 sq. m in Kiev (1.9 million inhabitants), 8.7 sq. m in Leningrad (4.3 million), and 10.0 sq. m in Moscow (7.6 million) (*ibid.*, p. 195). And these differences could not be blamed on “historical heritage”, but were direct consequences of the Soviet policy of focusing investments in large urban districts. As can be calculated from the data released by Smith (1979, p. 232), the median of per capita living space values for cities in the USSR above one million had been 5.1 sq. m in 1958, and values for the three main centers had not been outstanding. Then, 5.6 sq. m of living space went for one inhabitant in Kiev, 5.9 sq. m in Leningrad, and 5.0 sq. m in Moscow. Hence, considerable differences among “top” cities and others were




Fig. 8.11 The share of labor force with higher education among workers and employees in all branches in the Soviet Union (1980). Administrative divisions grouped by economic districts (names in capital) in descending order according to district-level averages. Design by author based on data from TsSU RSFSR (1981), pp. 224–225 (labor force with higher education) and Goskomstat RSFSR (1991), pp. 111–113 (total labor force)

straightforward consequences of Soviet policy, or in other words, outcomes of a socialist “spatial fix”.

Similar asymmetries, in fact, also became manifest in the uneven development of supply systems covering the basic needs of the population. As Smith (1979) underscored, “the best educational institutions tend[ed] to be in the major cities” (p. 233). Actually the same was true of kindergartens. In Madison’s (1975, p. 256) words: “In large cities, most three-to-seven-year-olds are accommodated at first request, but in smaller cities, the situation is far from satisfactory” (cited in Smith 1979, p. 233). Food supply was likewise unequal as was explained by Kaiser (1977):

“Consumer goods go first to Moscow, then to half a dozen other ‘hero’ cities, so designated for their roles in the Second World War, then down a hierarchical list on which every community is ranked. The State stores in Moscow are always supplied with fresh meat. Novosibirsk, a city of a million souls, sells no meat at all for months on end. Some meat is usually available at Novosibirsk’s farmers’ market, but only at high prices. There are smaller cities and towns that *never* get fresh meat in any form.” (emphasis in original; Kaiser 1977, p. 95; cited in Smith 1979, p. 234)

In summary, the notion to concentrate investments in urban areas, especially large ones, where a higher and faster turnover was expected, constituted as a “spatial fix” a fundamental part of Soviet economic and social policy. This phenomenon at the level of localities, in fact, had a strong impact on regional processes as well. Federal socialist republics of the USSR with a higher rate of urbanization and with relatively developed economic bases (including improved traditions in high value-added branches) gained on average more investments per head from the very beginning.

As presented in Fig. 8.12, relative to its population the Russian SFSR, in fact the leading economic and political engine of the Soviet Union, was apparently over-represented in investments during each administration. Estonia and Latvia, the most productive centers of a great many of high-tech industries based on rich tradition, know-how and highly improved human capital,⁵³ likewise constantly belonged to the main beneficiaries of Soviet investment policy. On the southern peripheries, however, although numerous large projects were carried out in concert with the endeavor to integrate these areas into the national economy, per head investments in most republics considerably fell behind those in Russia or the Baltic republics. With the exception of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, most southern republics received far fewer resources than their economically more developed central and western rivals. Furthermore, the values of Turkmenistan were in the long run also significantly lower than for Estonia and Latvia.

Of course, it is important to emphasize Bahry’s (1983) findings, which indicate that at least until 1970 inequalities in the volume of per head capital investments

⁵³ A statistic that says volumes: in 1965 the number of “specialists” (labor force with tertiary or special medium-level education) per 10,000 persons was 67 in Estonia and 62 in Latvia, but 57 in Russia and only 52 for whole of the USSR (Woroniak 1973, p. 279).

Republic (SFSR)	Rank according to per capita investments				
	1928–1932	1946–1950	1956–1960	1970	1982
Russia	1	3	2	4	1
Estonia	n.d.*	1	3	1	4
Latvia	n.d.*	6	6	3	2
Lithuania	n.d.*	12	5	6	5
Belarus	9	10	13	8	7
Ukraine	3	5	4	9	11
Moldova	12	15	15	10	9
Georgia	5	4	12	13	8
Azerbaijan	2	2	6	14	12
Armenia	8	9	10	7	11
Kazakhstan	6	8	1	2	3
Turkmenistan	8	7	8	5	6
Uzbekistan	10	14	14	11	13
Tajikistan	5	12	10	15	15
Kyrgyzstan	11	12	10	12	14

Fig. 8.12 The republics of the USSR ranked according to per capita investments (1928–1982). Adapted with modifications from Westlund (2000), p. 27. *Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did not belong to the USSR until 1940, when they were occupied by Soviet troops in accordance with the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany

(measured by coefficient of variation) gradually declined (from 0.402 to 0.227), even if far from diminished. What one can say, however, was that the principle of “more investments to more productive areas” became less explicit. This did not challenge the fact that it was still the more productive republics that gained more resources. In other words, the gap between economically more and less efficient republics did not close, only the pace of opening the gap reduced somewhat. This was again an outcome of the socialist “spatial fix” to allocate investments to regions where a higher turnover was expected. No wonder that republics with a more beneficial initial position (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Russia) remained at the top of list of relative production, while most peripheral republics could not step out from their disadvantageous situation (Fig. 8.13). And this disadvantage did not only refer to output indicators; for personal income, housing or public services (e.g. healthcare), differences among the republics were rather similar (Fig. 8.14).

To sum it up, the Soviet system, permanently pressed by the drive to growth, extensively used as a “spatial fix” the asymmetrical allocation of resources into areas where they seemed to stimulate a higher increase in production. This resulted both in the “opening up” of “pioneer regions”, which were foremost subjected to the rapid development of raw material extracting branches, and where growth became manifest mainly in the radical increase of *volume* indicators (e.g. *total* production). Meanwhile, in high value-added sectors as well as in services, the disproportional concentration of resources into urban areas was adopted as the norm, the major outcome of which was a massive rise in *relative* indicators (*per capita* income, *per capita* housing etc.). At the same time, the gap between towns and villages, large and small cities, and even between highly and poorly urbanized (industrialized vs. agricultural) regions and republics persisted, both in volume and relative

Republic	Rank according to produced national income per capita		
	1956	1967	1988
Russia	4	3	1
Estonia	1	1	3
Latvia	2	2	2
Lithuania	8	4	5
Belarus	15	6	4
Ukraine	6	5	6
Moldova	9	8	8
Georgia	12	11	7
Azerbaijan	7	12	11
Armenia	10	15	9
Kazakhstan	5	9	10
Turkmenistan	3	7	12
Uzbekistan	13	13	14
Tajikistan	14	14	15
Kyrgyzstan	11	10	13

Fig. 8.13 The rank of Soviet republics according to per capita production (1956, 1967, and 1988). Design by author based on data from Westlund (2000), p. 27 (for 1956, 1967) and Bond et al. (1990), p. 713 (for 1988)

indicators. Hence, at this point the logic of the Soviet system was again strikingly similar to that of capitalism, where in Harvey's interpretation capitalists were interested in moving capital to where it could efficiently contribute to the maximization of profits. In fact, Soviet leaders tended to do the same in order to keep economic growth as high as possible.

The use of these strategies to "fix" the economy was of course not a Soviet peculiarity. No doubt, the initiative to "open up pioneer regions" was rather possible only in countries with vast geographical expanses and with a great many poorly populated remote districts. For this reason, similar projects as the "drive toward the East" in Soviet Union took place only in China. Their main objective was similar as in the USSR, namely to integrate new resource-rich regions into the Chinese economy. Related attempts were made in several waves during the Maoist period. Right in the first years after the proclamation of the people's republic, during the First Five-Year Plan in 1953–1957, some seven million workers were relocated to great construction projects in inland provinces (Scharping 2006). This process exerted the greatest influence on the northwestern border region with the USSR, where the goal was the establishment of a "Eurasian" industrial axis, lying from South Siberia through Soviet Central Asia to inner China (Dürr 1978, pp. 149–150). Within this framework, the "frontier zones" were expected to supply




Fig. 8.14 Per capita national income, personal income, and urban housing indicators, and the number of doctors per 10,000 population in Soviet republics compared to the USSR average (1970). Republics ranked according to per capital national income. Design by author based on data from Woroniak (1973), p. 269 (national income), McAuley (1979), p. 109 (personal income), Schroeder (1973), p. 184 (urban housing) and p. 185 (doctors per 10,000 population)

the mineral resources (ores and fuels) necessary for a rapid “take-off” in the Chinese economy. These regions were also subjected to programs similar to the Virgin Lands Campaign in the Soviet Union, which resulted in the (in many cases) forced migration of approximately two million persons to the northwestern province of Xinjiang.⁵⁴

Additionally, in order to promote economic growth several projects were launched with the aim of sending workers from urban areas to the rural countryside, which the Chinese leadership believed suffered from chronic shortage in labor force. This initiative impacted more than two million urban inhabitants through the end of the First Five-Year Plan. Moreover, in the 1960s some 30 million persons (among them many rural migrants) were steered to the countryside, and a further 18 million young urban dwellers were likewise repatriated to rural districts, mostly in border regions on the north, west and south. Altogether, approximately 60 million laborers participated (or had to participate) in these inner migration movements, which aimed at the intensive utilization of rural resources and, as was expected, at a historically unprecedented growth in production (Scharping 2006).

In the small countries of Eastern Europe, “empty spaces” were hardly to be found any more in the post-war period, so increasing output by integrating “pioneer

⁵⁴ A detailed overview of this initiative is given by Betke (1998).

regions” was not an option. The other strategy to maximize production, namely the concentration of investments in urban areas, was however a characteristic feature of economic policy both in Eastern European socialist countries and in China. In Hungary, for instance, the new communist leadership launched a firmly pro-urban and anti-countryside policy right after the total takeover of political power in 1948. The capital city Budapest, which was also the ultimate center of Hungarian industry and which already concentrated 11.5 % of the country’s population in 1949, was enlarged in 1950 through the merger with 23 towns and villages in the agglomeration. As a result of the Stalinist leaders’ objective to create “Great Budapest”, the city’s share of national population rose to 17.3 % (calculations by author based on data from KSH 1950, p. 315).

Meanwhile, a great deal of industrial investments were also carried out in the city, due to which the number of workers and employees in industry doubled by 1960 (from 291,000 to 603,000) (Beluszky 1999, p. 226). In addition, construction began on new “socialist towns”, expected to become the major centers of socialist industry. These nine towns were actually small settlements at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, yet, their share of total national investments was unrealistically high: between 1948 and 1953, they received approximately half of all investments (!), while their share of communal and social investments in Hungary changed between 40 and 70 % in these years (Germuska 2002). The pace of growth in these “socialist towns” was, of course, unprecedented relative to other urban centers. Still, many towns with a regional sphere of influence gained new industrial plants in the same period (Bartke 2003, p. 123).

Rural settlements were, however, exposed to harsh attacks. The communist state planning regime judged all localities below 3,000 inhabitants “uneconomical” to maintain (Beluszky 1999, pp. 223–224). The smallest ones, almost half (47.4 %) of all settlements, were considered in a 1950 national plan document as “settlements not to be developed” (Germuska 2002), which actually meant that they were planned to lose their social infrastructure (schools, public administration) and to be gradually demolished in the long term. Here, a 1949 government decree banned the construction of flats as well as public buildings (Hajdú 1990–1991). Some 900,000 persons, then almost 10 % of the country’s population, were planned to be relocated to bigger villages and towns (ibid.).

In fact, the death of Stalin in 1953 and the resulting political competitions within the communist party in Hungary counteracted the realization of these goals. Furthermore, after the brutal suppression of the 1956 revolution by Soviet troops a new, non-Stalinist leadership emerged, which did not adopt all of the objectives of its Stalinist forerunners. Hence, a large-scale physical destruction of settlements was not carried out. Still, a massive influx of the rural population to urban districts began. In Budapest, the number of inhabitants calculated for the area after the 1950 mergers (thus, excluding the effect of this administrative change) increased by 13.5 % between 1949 and 1960 (calculations by author based on data from KSH 1950, p. 315). Several “socialist towns” multiplied their population. In Stalintown (recently Dunaújváros), for instance, which was the number one project aimed at the construction of a new iron and steel plant, the number of inhabitants increased

from 4,000 to 31,000 between 1949 and 1960 (Beluszky 1999, p. 420). In consequence, by 1960 the total urban population rose by 600,000 in a country with less than ten million inhabitants (*ibid.*, p. 231), and the concentration of both industrial production and infrastructure in urban areas strengthened.

From the 1960s onwards, not independently from Khrushchevian and Brezhnevian reforms in the Soviet Union, but in many cases going well beyond them, economic policy and its geographical objectives underwent important changes in Hungary.⁵⁵ At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, it became an official goal to reduce the overconcentration of production and population in Budapest. New industrial plants were not allowed to be built in the capital city and its agglomeration, and many among the companies already located there had to relocate some parts of its production to the countryside. Parallel to this, investments in mid-size towns were put in the forefront (Bartke 2003, pp. 124–125). Meanwhile, the harsh ideas of short-term physical destruction of a great many small settlements and forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of citizens were given up. This shift has some consequences that seemed to reflect a certain trend of spatial equalization in production as well as in the population's material standard of living. For instance, in 1960 still 44.6 % of Hungarian labor force in industry worked in Budapest. This value declined to 34.3 % in 1970 and to 25.7 % in 1980 (*ibid.*, p. 124, p. 129). In several regional centers important developments took place in industry, due to which output indicators significantly increased, especially in districts previously having a poor industrial basis. The disproportional support of the few "socialist towns" decreased, mostly in favor of regional centers. In consequence, differences in the level of production, income and the standard of social services apparently decreased between towns and cities in various regions (Nemes Nagy 2003, pp. 566–569).

These tendencies, however, did not fundamentally eliminate spatial disparities, nor did they challenge the strategy of "real existing socialism" to concentrate investments in areas where a higher multiplier effect was expected. The strong preference of towns and cities at the expense of rural areas remained a common practice in central decision-making. Without a doubt, voluntaristic attempts to relocate hundreds of thousands from the countryside to towns died away after the Stalinist period. Most underlying philosophical considerations, however, persisted. A 1963 official concept study, for instance, still emphasized the need for the "liquidation of inherited disproportionalities of the settlement network" (in fact, the existence of a great many rural settlements), and projected that "villages unable

⁵⁵ In fact the main directions of Hungarian economic reforms were similar to those in the USSR and in other Eastern European countries (which were already presented in previous paragraphs), but their implications were more far-reaching. For example, the 1968 reform package in Hungary entitled New Economic Mechanism was judged by Granick (1973) as "the most radical postwar change, in the economic system of any Comecon country" (p. 414). These peculiarities made up the basis for a more market-oriented form of socialism, usually referred to as "goulash communism". The main foundations of the system remained unchallenged, however, as explained e.g. by Kornai (1992).

to develop” and “peripheral settlements” were to “cease gradually” (Építésügyi Minisztérium, 1963; cited in Hajdú 1993, p. 46). These strongly-worded formulations gradually disappeared by the 1970s and 1980s, but their logic did not. It speaks volumes that in the 1980s, when still some 40 % of the population lived in villages, the share of these areas of national industrial production was only 16–17 % due to the low number of industrial facilities established here (Beluszky 1999, p. 244). Furthermore, industrialization in the villages usually meant the improvement of raw material extraction, not that of high value-added activities (*ibid.*).

For social infrastructure and living conditions, circumstances were not better. In the first part of the 1970s, 90 % of investments in communal services took place in towns and cities, which added approximately half of the country’s population (Illés 1993; cited in Beluszky 1999, p. 235). From national development aid villages received only 7–15 % over the decades of “real existing socialism” (Illés 2003, p. 516). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a strong, centrally led concentration of infrastructure in small settlements. In the first round, many local councils were closed down in villages this size, thus the political bargaining power of local party cells significantly decreased. Instead, in the new system one council located in a larger village was responsible for several other settlements as well, so the latter became subordinated to the former. This opened the way for “the reduction of functions in villages” (Nemes Nagy 1987a, p. 69), thus, a gradual degradation of local infrastructure under the aegis of “rationalization”.

Although small villages already had very limited political power and little room for manoeuvre, the policy of “rationalization” in the 1970s left them almost completely powerless. As Fig. 8.15 shows, in 1960 the vast majority of settlements (94.3 %) had their own council, but in 1980 less than half of them (48.9 %) did, since the number of councils dropped by 50 %. This severely weakened the bargaining force of small settlements. In consequence, although the number of settlements underwent only slight changes between 1960 and 1980, they lost many of their institutions. For instance, in 1960 ten settlements had 13 farmers’ cooperatives on average, which were the backbone of collectivized Hungarian agriculture. Two decades later, the corresponding ratio was 10:4. For state farms, the decrease was similarly radical. This in fact barely meant that the total area of these production units would have decreased. Their management was, however, strongly centralized, and within firms higher value-added activities tended to migrate toward geographical locations closer to the seats of cooperatives, while in peripheral locations (settlements) rather low value-added branches were maintained. Social infrastructure also had serious losses. Rural marketing collectives, which among others were responsible for running local shops, were to be found in two-fifths (41.9 %) of all settlements in 1960, but less than in one-eleventh (8.7 %) in 1980. Parallel to this, the world where virtually each settlement (98.5 % in 1960), even if very small, had at least one elementary school, ended: in 1980 in almost one-third (29.7 %) of all settlements children had to commute to neighboring villages and towns even to use the fundamental service of basic education.




Fig. 8.15 Infrastructural changes in Hungarian settlement network due to “rationalizations” between 1960 and 1980. Design by author based on data from Nemes Nagy (1987a), p. 71, with additional remarks of Nemes Nagy. *data for 1963

Even in those issues where the urban–rural gap seemed not to be that large, actual disparities as outcomes of the “spatial fix” of “real existing socialism” were striking in the background. Although differences between town and country in investments in communal infrastructure virtually decreased from the 1970s onwards, power asymmetries in fact persisted (*ibid.*, pp. 27–33). In Budapest, such investments were dominantly financed by the communal sphere; the contribution of local population (based on their own savings) to these projects reached only 15.5 % between 1976 and 1980. In other towns and cities this value was 34.9 %, and in villages 70.0 %. During the 1980s, these values increased all over the country due to intensifying economic problems, but this barely influenced the disparities between the capital city, other towns and cities, and villages. In the period 1981–1984, corresponding values were 30.0, 51.3 and 77.0 % (Nemes Nagy 1987a, p. 28). In other words, in cases where investments in villages seemed not to fall drastically behind those in urban areas, rural inhabitants were in fact expected to take the leading role in covering costs, while the urban population did not have the same burden. Thus, the logic of the system to concentrate investments (more precisely, its *own* investments) in areas with a higher potential of multiplying economic growth was not challenged.

Beyond preferring urban areas to rural ones, the drive for maximizing the growth induced by a given unit of investment also became manifest in an extreme concentration of high value-added economic activities in Budapest, the dominant urban center in Hungary. On the one hand, the great number of plants, which were established in less industrialized districts after restrictions on industrial

development in the capital city, usually concentrated only some low value-added activities, in which labor force with low education was utilized. More productive activities, however, and the company management mainly remained in Budapest; decision-making in economic firms was not decentralized at all (Beluszky 1999, pp. 241–242). In other words, although the industrial statistics (especially those concerning the sectorial distribution of labor force) of the periphery seemed to improve, this process barely concerned capital intensive branches in industry.

On the other hand, even if at least the low value-added part of industry underwent certain decentralization in terms of geography, this shift left untouched those sectors which were in fact the main engines of national economic growth. In 1980 Budapest, with its share of 23.9 % of all workplaces in Hungary, concentrated 48.5 % of jobs requiring employees with a university education and more than 80 % in key branches of the socialist system (Meusburger 1997, pp. 132–133), for example 84.6 % of employees of leading organs of state power and central administration⁵⁶ (Meusburger 1995, p. 78), and 80 % of top economic managers (Beluszky 1999, p. 369). Meanwhile, villages and towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants, although concentrating 21.4 % of all workplaces in Hungary, provided jobs for only 7.4 % of those having a university degree. Furthermore, this proportion was only 2.0 % in public administration, 1.4 % in law and public order, 0.8 % in banking and finance, and 0.4 % for leading organs of state power and central administration (Meusburger 1997, p. 133; 1998a, pp. 374–375). This extreme concentration of high-quality human capital in one city and the negligence of small villages was in fact much stronger in socialist Hungary than in the neighboring capitalist Austria, where the demographic structure of the population as well as historically inherited asymmetries in the settlement structure (e.g. the primacy of the capital city) were otherwise similar (also cf. Meusburger 1995). On the one hand, the number of jobs held by university graduates was 127 per 10,000 inhabitants in Budapest in 1980, but only 50 in Vienna in 1981. On the other, the same value was only 0.39 for villages with not more than 500 workplaces in Hungary, but 0.68 in Austria. Although not as extreme, the concentration of such jobs in the capital city and some other large regional centers, and their lack in the rural periphery, was mirrored by statistics for small and medium size towns as well (Fig. 8.16).

These imbalances generated permanently increasing economic growth in Budapest and persistent structural problems in the periphery. For example, after some initiatives in Hungary aimed at the introduction of small-scale private enterprises in the early 1980s, Budapest soon concentrated some two-thirds of such companies in the country. In the meantime, its total foreign trade was already larger with the capitalist world than with the Comecon (Beluszky 1999, p. 369). This unique situation would have been impossible without the previous decades when the communist leadership focused disproportional investments in capital and

⁵⁶ This constituted a separate category in then official (although not widely disseminated) labor statistics of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (cf. Meusburger, 1998a, p. 374).




Fig. 8.16 Number of inhabitants per jobs held by university graduates in various city-size classes of place of work at the beginning of the 1980s in Austria (1981) and Hungary (1980). Design by author based on data from Meusburger (1995), p. 73

knowledge-intensive economic activities in the capital city where these were expected to give more stimulus to growth. The periphery, however, hardly had any benefits of these processes, and from the late 1970s onwards the first signs of economic depression in these areas became more and more visible (Nemes Nagy 2003, pp. 568–569).

In other words, despite the much-used slogan of equity in “real existing socialist” systems, these perpetually favored policies allocated disproportional investments to areas that seemed to utilize resources better and contribute more to national output indicators than other districts did. As can be seen, this was not only the case in the Soviet Union, but in communist Hungary as well. In fact, other Eastern European countries also had similar experiences with shrinking disparities between regions (Nemes Nagy 1987b, 2005), but remarkably strong and intensifying inequalities between urban and rural areas as well as large cities and small towns (Illés 2002, pp. 147–149).

It is important to underscore that these strategies or “fixes” were not only apparent in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, but in many cases they were also adopted by the Maoist leadership in China, although in the light of peculiar social and historical conditions and political circumstances their opposite might have seemed a more logical opportunity. During the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party received the strongest support from poor peasants in the countryside. Cities, however, were not only regarded as “counterrevolutionary” and “capitalistic”, but, since most urban cores

along the Eastern coastline belonged to the Japanese occupation zone in World War II, their inhabitants were often exposed to criticism due to their claimed collaboration with Japanese authorities. To sum it up, “cities were associated with capitalism, imperialism and the Kuomintang” (Cheng and Selden 1994, p. 651). Besides, in the initial years Mao did not see much political potential in the working class, which in Western Marxist ideas was regarded as the engine of socialist revolution. This was no wonder given that China had only 12 million industrial workers during the 1950s, but some 600 million peasants (*ibid.*). Furthermore, Mao’s personal conviction was that a balance must be achieved between heavy and light industry and agriculture, and between towns and villages as well (Hunt 1989, pp. 227–238).

These considerations indeed had certain implications for measures of economic policy. During the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) agriculture was not exploited as systematically and dramatically as in the Stalinist USSR. Even later on, industry in most periods did not receive as disproportional support as in its Soviet counterpart. But these peculiarities of “real existing socialism” in China apparently did not overwrite the systemic drive for economic growth, which tendentially led to a concentration of resources into areas where a stronger multiplier effect was expected. The most obvious manifestation of this logic was the fierce artificial differentiation between villages and towns, where the former were exploited in favor of the latter. While as early as the 1950s the state took the responsibility of providing jobs, sufficient food and housing for all urban residents, in villages none of these was guaranteed. Instead, the countryside was left alone to organize and sustain services for itself. Moreover, from the mid-1950s onwards the introduction of the household registration system strongly limited the opportunities for migration from villages to towns, which ended up in an almost profound freeze on voluntary internal flows of population (Cheng and Selden 1994; cf. Wei 1997). This brought into being “two-track” systems even in basic infrastructures, e.g. in healthcare and public education (cf. Lo 1984), with a large gap between urban and rural settlements.

The obvious preference for cities was also mirrored by the regional aspects of investments, at least in four ways. First, the northeastern region of Manchuria, the dominant center of heavy industries in post-war China with a contribution of some 80 % to the national output of the branch (Ye and Ma 1990), all during the Maoist period received per capita investments well above the national average. The difference was especially striking during the phase of post-war reconstruction, when the Northeast gained per capita investments approximately four times the average of the country (Fig. 8.17). Second, the three largest cities, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin were major beneficiaries of the allocation of investments. There was no difference in the era when communist China was isolated in international politics (1960–1972), thus, it was free from Soviet influence and Mao initiated various campaigns with the claim of focusing resources in inland rural regions. Even in these years the three leading urban centers received two to four times as much investment in fixed assets than the national average (Fig. 8.17).




Fig. 8.17 Per capita investment in fixed assets in selected regions of China compared to national average (1952–1976). Design by author based on data from China Data Center (n.d.)

Third, the propagandistic campaigns of industrializing inner regions in many cases, especially in the 1950s, meant the allocation of gigantic new factories to the largest cities of rural provinces, usually to provincial capitals, and barely the construction of decentralized plants in small or mid-size towns (cf. Taubmann 2001; Wu et al. 2010, p. 26). Hence, these projects also intensified the urban–rural gap. Without a doubt, the so-called “Third Front” program in 1965–1971, for strategic reasons aimed at the industrial development of remote areas far away from China’s boundaries, provided a great deal of resources to the construction of military plants far away from large urban centers (cf. Ma and Wei 1997; Taubmann 2001). Still, as Fig. 8.17 presents, the Northeast of China and especially the three metropolitan areas on the east coast gained more attention and investments relative to their population. In other words, programs to spread industry over inland regions merely resulted in a greater emphasis put on remote areas, but in general they did not challenge the primacy of leading industrial centers of national importance.

Fourth, although political objectives in the Mao period underwent serious changes many times, and dramatic reversals also took place at some points, voluntaristic initiatives never endangered the fact that in cities basic needs were covered at least at a tolerable level. As was discussed with regard to Fig. 8.17, initiatives to allocate millions or even tens of millions of urban labor force to rural areas did not undermine the exclusive position of leading industrial centers. The same did not go for rural areas, however. This was well exemplified by the tragic events at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s. In 1958 Mao launched the Great Leap Forward campaign, which was expected through a forced growth both in agriculture

and industry to diminish in a few years the large gap China had compared to the leading industrial countries at the time. Since after the first months output numbers seemed to fall behind projections especially in heavy industry, a dramatic shift in resource allocation in favor of this branch and great urban centers was made. The consequence was a catastrophic shortage of labor force in agriculture and especially in certain rural areas, due to which the otherwise good yield in many cases remained unharvested. Hence, the Great Famine took place, resulting in the death of some 30 million inhabitants and in even more lost or postponed births in villages and small towns, a tragedy not even perceived in main urban centers where sufficient food supply was guaranteed (cf. Lin and Yang 1998; Riskin 1998).

We have to emphasize that these tendencies could not be interpreted simply as outcomes of Soviet pressure, where the Soviet Union, as the only military and economic supporter of the People's Republic of China in the 1950s (cf. Meng 2003, pp. 64–65), imposed its own interests on the Maoist leadership. Without a doubt, asymmetrical power relations with the USSR did indeed exist. Yet, it would be a gross oversimplification and even misinterpretation of the issue to trace back the strong urban bias of Maoist investment policy only to Soviet influence, since the preference toward urban centers did not change fundamentally after the Sino-Soviet split. In fact, the communist China sustained the same practice during its international isolation in the 1960s, and even after official relations with the United States normalized in the early 1970s. Hence, the preference of cities and towns as areas where investments seemed to bring more yield was much more than the result of inevitable Soviet influence; it was indeed a direct outcome of the logic of “real existing socialism”.

As can be seen, the first two of the “spatial fixes” that Harvey identified as typical strategies of capitalists to cope with “inherent contradictions” of capitalism had their analogies in “real existing socialist” systems as well. These were used to find new opportunities for the growth of production, which without these “fixes” would have been much slower. Harvey's third “spatial fix” was likewise present in socialist countries: that was “accumulation by dispossession”, which in fact was a cornerstone of the introduction of socialism in all cases in the form of collectivizations. This was carried through first in industry, which was regarded by communists as the engine of economic growth. In the USSR in 1928, just 6 years after the proclamation of the communist state, 82 % of industrial production was in non-private hands: 69 % belonged to public organizations and 13 % to cooperatives, but only 18 % to private producers. Moreover, the last category absolutely disappeared by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1937. From then onwards, the only change was the gradual shrinking of the role played by cooperatives (to 8 % in 1950 and 3 % in 1960), and the maximization of the share of public organizations (to 92 % and 97 %, respectively) (Sherman 1969, p. 129). Some changes only began with the cautious introduction of some foreign investors into the Soviet economy in the 1970s, which we already referred to in previous paragraphs; furthermore, the emergence of private industrial actors from within the USSR remained an impossibility until the final years before the collapse.

In agriculture, which in the communists' eyes contributed less to growth, collectivization also took place, but at a considerably slower pace. As has been presented, as early as the late twenties the vast majority of industry was out of private ownership. In the year 1926–1927, however, still only 2 % of grain production went to state and collective farms, and 98 % to private farms. Of course, landowners had been totally dispossessed of their lands, and the share of rich peasants (*kulaks* in Russian terminology) decreased from 38 % in the last pre-war year (1913–1914) to 13 % in 1926–1927 (*ibid.*, pp. 65–67). Hence, the role of poor and middle-level peasants significantly rose, but a mass collectivization of agriculture was not on the horizon. Of course, the dominance of private property did not last for long, but in 1940 still more than one-fourth (27 %) of agricultural output was provided by private farms, and this value decreased below 15 % only in the 1960s (Pockney 1991, p. 229).

The strategy of “accumulation by dispossession” was not dissimilar in other countries of the Communist Bloc. In Soviet-occupied Hungary, collectivization began rather early in industry. First, coal mines were taken over by the state in 1946. They were followed by key plants of heavy industry some months later, before the largest banks and companies in any industrial branch were nationalized in 1947. The next year, 1948, witnessed first the collectivization of industrial enterprises with more than 100 workers. Finally, in 1949 the turn came for companies with more than ten (in certain branches five) workers, and for all foreign firms. As a result Hungarian industry, where national companies in 1945 represented only 10 % according to the number of employees, became almost completely non-private within 3 years (Csizmadia 1984, p. 21; cited and explained in Romsics 2010, pp. 310–311).

In agriculture this process was slower, in line with the Soviet example. After 1949, the creation of state farms and cooperatives gained impetus, and initial “achievements” came very fast. The amount of agricultural land in private ownership decreased from 98.0 % in 1949 to 59.7 % in 1953 (Pető and Szakács 1985, p. 188; cited in Romsics 2010, p. 354). This was, however, far from total collectivization, even if private producers suffered from the newly introduced system of agricultural deliveries, where farmers were forced to sell a certain part of their products to the state, often at prices much lower than production costs (Romsics 2010, pp. 350–351). Collectivization in agriculture increased again at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, unlike in industry, some 11–12 % of agriculture (according to land area) remained in the hands of private owners, who, due to intensive methods, altogether provided one-third (32.8 %) of the sector's output even in the 1980s (Csizmadia 1984, p. 71; p. 138; cited in Romsics 2010, p. 445).

These data reveal two important tendencies. First that “accumulation by dispossession” is not a peculiarity of capitalist systems, but also played a decisive role in “real existing socialism”. The main motivations were also remarkably similar. Just as in capitalism, the dispossession of private property in socialism instantly provided additional resources to production (e.g. land, buildings, equipment), which thus would not be developed by the state at a high cost. In addition,

dispossession had an obvious positive effect on production in the long-term as well, given that the goods and services produced with the use of collectivized resources brought revenues (which could be invested again) directly to the state sector, not to private economic actors. The second remarkable point is that in socialist systems dispossession always came first in industry, and there it was carried through very quickly. In agriculture, however, the process ran at a moderate pace, and a complete collectivization of the sector was not achieved, not even in the Soviet Union. In Harveyian terminology, this difference between the sectors can itself be interpreted as a kind of “fix”. In fact, accumulation by dispossession is not without difficulties, since the adaptation, organization and management of newly collectivized properties constitutes a great burden for the state as well. This burden is, of course, usually not comparable with the advantage the state takes by gaining resources for free (on the basis of political power) that others had developed from their own resources. Yet, an immediate and profound overtaking of the economy could be a highly risky project for the state as well, which is otherwise interested in an unbroken acceleration of growth. But the opposite strategy, to let private owners have what they have managed for themselves, was likewise not an option for socialist systems, pushed by the drive for growth. Hence, it was not an illogical option to set the collectivization of the economy as the ultimate long-term goal, but leaving certain resources in private hands. The burden of managing these did not immediately fall on the shoulders of the state, and they were left as a sort of reserve for hard times when the state could run out of resources.

The underlying logic of Harvey’s fourth “spatial fix”, the export of devaluation, was also not alien to “real existing socialism”. For capitalism, Harvey’s claim was that capitalists had firm interests in imposing the crisis of overproduction and overaccumulation on others. This actually meant that if country A, for instance, destroyed the production of country B (e.g. in wars), B had no other option than to buy goods and services from A to cover at least the basic consumption of its own population. Moreover, if A destroyed production capacities in B, this could also make a third party, country C subordinated to A if C had been previously provided with goods and services by B. In other words, the main motivation behind this “spatial fix” is to make others unable to produce in order to create new markets for your products and cure the crisis of overaccumulation.

These considerations were crucial for communist leaders as well, although for them the main challenge was to avoid not overproduction and overaccumulation but *under*production and *under*accumulation (relative to the level considered by these systems as desirable). In consequence, their main goal was to block external attempts to export devaluation inside the Communist Bloc. This included on the one hand that others did not export their goods and services to socialist countries, which in the latter would have challenged the monopoly of local products, decreased sales and reduced resources for investment, which were already scarce. On the other, a crucial point was to avoid having economic actors extract resources, e.g., from local branches of their companies. In fact, both strategies persisted in socialist countries. The first step here was the collectivization of foreign companies, already mentioned as a form of “accumulation by dispossession”, due to which

capital of foreign origin was “fixed” in socialist countries, so that they could no longer be extracted. Similar considerations motivated Stalin’s decision that the countries occupied by Soviet troops had to reject the Marshall Plan, considered as a major capitalist project for the “export of devaluation”.

Later on, the main strategy in the Communist Bloc to hinder external economies in exporting devaluation was the reduction of economic ties with the capitalist world. This led to strong autarchic attempts, especially before the post-war period, when the Soviet Union did not have any allies with the same economic system. As the bloc expanded after 1945, the policy of standing on one’s own feet was mainly promoted with regard to the whole of the socialist world, where the new goal was to establish a “socialist world market”. This idea was put in practice very rapidly. As Fig. 8.18 reveals, most countries in Eastern Europe concentrated 70–80 % of its foreign trade within the Communist Bloc, a remarkable increase relative to previous values. For instance, before World War II the Hungary’s trade with future socialist countries was less than 20 % for imports and only 10 % for exports. In 1948, 3 years after the country was occupied by Soviet troops and in the year when the communist dictatorship was brought into being, orientation toward socialist countries was already stronger, but still not decisive: slightly above 35 % both for exports and imports (Pető and Szakács 1985, p. 94; cited in Romsics 2010, p. 316). The 1958 data of 71.9 % should be interpreted in the light of these historical conditions.

In fact, autarchian efforts dominated international relations not only with the capitalist world, but, despite political attempts to deepen economic integration within the Communist Bloc,⁵⁷ between socialist countries as well. Using the terms of Harvey, this can be interpreted as a peculiar outcome of the chronic drive of socialist economies to avoid that “devaluation” is “exported” from the capitalist world. In order to block such problems, a characteristic manifestation of which was imbalanced trade, the Comecon was organized along the principle of a balanced flow of goods. As Illés (2002, pp. 36–38) points out, this brought into being a system where not only the volume but even the structure of trade had to be balanced among countries at the level of basic groups of commodities (thus, raw material had to be sold for raw material, food for food, machinery for machinery etc.). Consequently, trade was rather rigid, which from the late 1950s onwards resulted in a gradual decrease of foreign trade compared to output indicators. (The only exception was the Soviet Union itself, which could take advantage of its political and military dominance within the bloc and sustain bilateral flows of goods even if those were highly asymmetric and disadvantageous for satellite countries [ibid.])

⁵⁷ The first such initiative was the establishment of the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in 1949, with the task of promoting economic integration within the Communist Bloc. In the 1970s several measures were taken to intensify the activity of the council, although results of these fell behind expectations (Bartke 2003, p. 111).

Country	1958 (exports plus imports)	1963 (exports only)
Bulgaria	86.0	79.8
Czechoslovakia	70.3	70.4
East Germany	79.5	76.1
Hungary	71.9	n.d.
Poland	58.4	60.1
Romania	77.9	67.4
USSR	73.8	63.3

Fig. 8.18 Intra-bloc trade as percent of total trade turnover of the countries of Eastern Europe (1958, 1963). Adapted from Sherman (1969), p. 198

As can be seen, virtually all four sorts of the Harveyian “spatial fix” had their counterparts in “real existing socialism”, where the objective of these was to handle the contradiction between the notion of accelerating growth and a constant increase in the standard of material well-being of the population, mainly through revealing additional resources for investment. Additionally, what Harvey called “temporal fixes” in his 1982 essay also mirrored endeavors similarly inherent not only in capitalist but in socialist systems as well. For Harvey, the first kind of “temporal fix” was investment in built environment, chiefly in construction that was expected to contribute to an even higher rate of profit in the long term as soon as it was finished and installed. Thus, if the condition of overaccumulation hindered a profitable investment of capital in the short term, capitalists oriented towards projects that instantly sucked up otherwise unutilizable resources and, although they could not contribute to the production of profit in the short run, had the potential to bring surplus profit in the long term. This kind of “selling the present to buy the future” logic was profoundly characteristic to socialist systems as well, which were ready to almost fully sacrifice short-term production and consumption for long-term objectives.⁵⁸

One outcome of this consideration was high investment ratio, which we have already discussed in previous paragraphs. But that was not all. For the same reasons, “real existing socialist” systems tried to divert resources from “less productive” and “non-productive” branches (e.g. agriculture, production of consumer goods, services) to activities considered as “most productive” (such as mining and heavy industry). As Fig. 8.19 illustrates, in the USSR as early as the 1920s and 1930s heavy industry was strongly overrepresented in capital investments relative to the industrial production of consumer goods. While the former absorbed more than one-sixth (17.7 %) of all capital investments, the latter

⁵⁸ This readiness was exemplified by the much-cited words of the Hungarian Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi from 1950: “If we do not take a moderate stance, we eat as fried chicken the hen that would lay a golden egg next year, and we would consume in form of branded butter and fried veal the factories, plants and cultural buildings of our five-year plan.” (Rákosi 1951, p. 141).




Fig. 8.19 Capital investments in main sectors of the economy in the Soviet Union (1918–1940 and 1956–1985). Values refer to investment in production items and are compared to the national total. The category “Other” includes construction of trade and communal enterprises, timber and procurement enterprises, and institutions of science, art, education and health. Design by author based on data from Pockney’s (1991, p. 100) collection of official Soviet statistics

received only 3.8 %. The relative negligence of agriculture was likewise striking with its value of 7.0 % in a country where in 1940 still 54 % of the labor force was engaged in this sector (cf. Pockney 1991, p. 67).

This extremely asymmetrical distribution of investments exerted strong influence on growth in individual branches as well (Fig. 8.20). During the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) civil machinery achieved annual average growth rates of 28.2, and 16.0 % during the second plan period. For intermediate products (including metals, fuels and construction materials as well as electricity), corresponding values reached 16.5 and 10.1 %. In the meantime, consumer goods production remained much more moderate (2.1 and 8.5 %), while agriculture first underwent a serious decline (–5.5 %) before entering a phase of stagnation (1.0 %). Although these trends seemed to change temporarily in the last year before World War II, this was rather a proof of decline in *civil* machinery in a period when military expenditures (and the output of machinery for military ends) began to boost. In sum, a disproportional share of investments went either directly to the construction of facilities of production or to the production of raw material and equipment necessary for such construction projects.

For the post-war period, some modifications took place in the distribution of investments under the Khrushchev administration and the early period of Brezhnev’s reign, with the proportion of agriculture gradually increasing from 11.3 % above 15 %, and later on close to 20 % (Fig. 8.19). This shift, enforced

	1928– 1932	1932– 1937	1937– 1940	1950– 1955	1955– 1958	1958– 1961	1961– 1965
Industry	10.6	10.1	1.9	11.7	9.5	8.6	7.3
<i>including:</i>							
intermediate products	16.5	10.1	2.5	10.6	9.5	7.8	7.0
machinery*	28.2	16.0	–6.0	13.6	10.9	12.0	9.4
consumer goods	2.1	8.5	3.3	9.9	7.4	5.7	4.3
Agriculture	–5.5	1.0	–1.4	4.7	7.2	1.7	1.2

Fig. 8.20 Average annual growth rates of output in selected economic branches in the Soviet Union (1928–1965). *Machinery includes only civilian machinery in the pre-WWII period and total machinery for the post-war era. Adapted from Cohn’s (1970, p. 28) collection of official Soviet statistics

by chronic problems in food supply, seems even more important given that in the same period the proportion of labor force engaged in agriculture declined from 54 % in 1940 to 25 % in 1970 and 20 % in 1980 (Pockney 1991, p. 67). Still, the privileged position of heavy industry did not change significantly, and the negligence of consumer goods production became even more striking. In consequence, the pace of growth in agriculture fell far behind that in industry even in the decades after Stalin’s death (Fig. 8.19).

Beyond a high rate of investments and a strong preference for heavy industry, socialist systems had an apparent drive for the establishment of factories, power plants, infrastructure etc. of the largest size. These were considered due to economies of scale to have the greatest implication on growth in the long term. Hence, no wonder that one of Lenin’s first objectives, which brought the whole mechanism of economic planning into being in the Soviet Union—was electrification of the entire country. In line with the corresponding Goelro Plan, a network of 30 new power stations was built, among which ten were gigantic hydropower stations (Neporozhnii 1970; Lapin 2000). This trend continued in the Stalinist period and after the World War II as well. It speaks volumes that during the 7th to 11th five-year plans (between 1961 and 1985) in each plan period 48,000–51,400 MW of new capacity was installed in power plants (roughly equivalent to five Hoover Dams per year), with 7,500–11,800 MW added by hydroelectric stations (Pockney 1991, p. 150). Also typical was the construction of new industrial towns, railway lines (e.g. that of the more than 4,300 km long Baikal Amur Mainline between Siberia and the Soviet Far East), and canal systems.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, for agricultural reasons thousands of kilometers of shelterbelts were planted in order to protect arable land from wind erosion (Brain 2010; Hajdú 1999). Without a doubt, these investments consumed a great deal of resources that were lost for short- and mid-term production

⁵⁹ In 1975, the total length of artificial inland waterway routes in the Soviet Union was 19,000 km (Antal 1980, p. 431), roughly equivalent to the sum of *all* waterways in France, Germany and the United Kingdom at the end of the 2000s (cf. CIA, n.d.).

as well as consumption. But they indicated the regime's endeavor to find additional opportunities for accelerating long-term growth, for instance by giving priority to enormous projects at the expense of investments of a small dimension, which could have stimulated growth faster, but this growth would have been moderate.

Similar motivations and, in consequence, similar "fixes" were apparent in other socialist countries as well. The forced development of heavy industries was on the agenda in Eastern European satellite countries as well, irrespective of natural conditions and whether they were preferable to such branches. Stalinist Hungary, for instance, poor in mineral resources, was supposed to become "the land of iron and steel" (cf. Romsics 2010, pp. 346). In an economic sense, this initiative went back again to a socialist interpretation of increasing production. In fact, immense industrial projects effectively contributed to production only after the phase of construction lasting for several years, and even then they required a mass import of raw materials for production. Yet, due to economies of scale these factories were expected to stimulate extreme growth in the long-term, due to which they were worth in the eyes of communist leaders to be supported. For this reason, the First Five Year-Plan of 1950–1954 allocated half of investments in industry and construction, while services gained a bit more than one-third, and agriculture only 14 % (Bartke 2003, p. 107)—of which a considerable part went to gigantic Soviet modeled projects aimed at large-scale forestation and other attempts to "transform nature" (cf. Gyuris and Győri 2013). These values gradually changed after the 1956 revolution (the share of industry of investments decreased to 42 % in 1958–1960 and to 34 % in the early 1960s) (p. 108), and less raw material resource intensive branches (e.g. machine industry, food industry, textile industry) were put in the forefront. But as reflected by the dynamics of output as well as employment indicators (Fig. 8.21), the role of industry remained privileged in general at least until the late 1970s, when the specific reforms of Hungarian "goulash communism" enabled the service sector to take the lead.

Similar processes emerged in Maoist China. In fact, Mao initially suggested a balanced improvement in heavy industry, light industry and agriculture. Once in power, however, he apparently changed his mind and gave priority to activities where investments seemed to contribute better to robust long-term growth, even if at the expense of short-term consumption. As Ma (1983, p. 24) underscores, during the First Five-Year Plan between 1953 and 1957, 38.7 % of total investments went to heavy industry, and this ratio increased to 52.8 % until 1978. The aspect of economy of scale also played a crucial role here. In the first plan period, for instance, the 156 key projects launched with Soviet assistance mostly concentrated in altogether 8 industrial agglomerations (cf. Wu, Sui and Zheng 2010, p. 26). Even during the "Third Front" initiative in 1965–1971, when a great many plants of strategic importance were established in remote areas of the country, investments were dominated by the creation of large-scale industrial bases and immense infrastructural projects (e.g. railway construction) (cf. Ma and Wei 1997). Meanwhile, the asymmetrically low investments in agriculture were to a great extent also concentrated in large projects, such as those aimed at a radical transformation of nature in northwestern regions (cf. Betke 1998).

Economic sector	1950	1960	1975	1985	1990
Agriculture	51.8	39.0	22.3	20.2	14.9
Industry and construction	22.4	34.1	43.4	38.5	38.4
Other sectors	25.8	26.9	34.3	41.3	46.7

Fig. 8.21 The distribution of labor force among economic sectors in communist Hungary in percentage of the total (1950–1990). Adapted from Bartke (2003), p. 117

Finally, Harvey put emphasis on the important role of the financial system, which is claimed to contribute to the maximization of profits in capitalist systems mainly by enabling capitalists to carry out investments as efficiently as possible. The financial system gives them the opportunity to mobilize capital in form of money, due to which it easily gets access to investment possibilities, reducing both cost and time of circulation. Moreover, it functions as the nervous system of the market, which in a barometer-like way reflects the expectations of the great many actors in economic life, transferring valuable information and helping capitalists to find the best investment opportunities. Last but not least, the financial system, precisely because of its ability to transform all sorts of capital into money, enables the centralization of capital, which is a crucial prerequisite for investments above a certain scale. In other words, the financial system opens the way for projects that in the long term can bring high profits, but that cannot be realized without a sufficiently large amount of resources. In sum, the “temporal fix” function of the financial system originates from the assistance it can provide for capitalists in finding spatial and temporal “fixes”.

Again, the factors that make the financial system so important in capitalism were likewise present in “real existing socialism”, where both the mobilization and centralization of capital was crucial, just as the presence of a system which informed economic decision-makers about the possibilities of stimulating growth. In accordance with these needs, socialist systems also had a mechanism aimed at fulfilling these functions, but instead of a sort of financial system (which served rather as a “bookkeeper of the state” and had no real power in these countries; cf. Meusburger 1995) it was the centralized, authoritarian state bureaucracy. The objective of mobilizing *any forms* of capital was to be achieved by a military-like system, where commands from above had to be obeyed and executed at virtually any cost. For example, the relocation of labor force to the coldest northern periphery or to the hottest deserts in Central Asia could be carried out at a pace unseen in democratic or decentralized systems. In the meantime, migration unwanted by the leadership could be controlled and principally blocked. Of course, the rigor of this control could be different to some extent in various countries and under different leaders, and efficiency often fell behind expectations.⁶⁰ But the system imposed

⁶⁰ This additional idea is necessary since the control of population flows was not always as perfect as the leadership hoped and as foreign observers often thought. As Buckley (1995) underscores, the Soviet internal passport system introduced in 1932 was indeed expected to keep flows totally under control since resident permit (*propiska*) prohibited its owner to reside at another place than

limitations on inland migration that would hardly have been possible in any liberal democracy.

The same was true for the flow of non-human forms of capital as well, such as raw materials. Due to a centrally controlled price system, which was highly independent of demand and supply, the policy of donations enabled the (in fact seemingly) cheap transportation of such goods if it was in the interest of the central decision-making. In the USSR this was especially obvious in railway traffic, which was run at much lower prices than the actual cost price of the service (Trejvis 2008). All these attempts had the same objective as the Harveyian “fixes” in capitalism: to enable resources to migrate to where investment opportunities were considered as better, in order to reduce cost as well as time of circulation and, thus, to contribute to the highest growth possible in a system lacking sufficient resources for investment.

The role of a “nervous system” was also not missing in socialist systems, but given the lack of market mechanisms it was fulfilled by central economic planning. This functioned on the one hand from the point of view of national planning authorities as a “barometer” of economic conditions at lower levels, just as the financial system reflects the changes in preferences and expectations of individual capitalists in market economies. The first step of planning was that enterprises created draft plans, which had to mirror their goals as well as their capabilities, so thus they not only indicated local interests but also had to provide detailed statistical information on actual circumstances. These draft plans were first submitted by enterprises to local authorities, then to branches of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) in Soviet republics, and finally to the all-union headquarter of Gosplan in Moscow, which in consequence gained information from lower levels. But the planning process did not follow a one way path. While draft plans “migrated” upwards within the system, Gosplan received information from above as well, namely the general national goals from the USSR Government. Then, Gosplan created an initial plan, which considered both expectations of the central leadership and local conditions, similarly as individual investors make their decisions in capitalism in the light of information the financial system mediates to them.

This initial plan created by Gosplan roughly clarified the task for lower level authorities as well as enterprises. Hence, the planning mechanism also served as a system giving orientation to lower level units from higher authorities. In this phase, local authorities and enterprises had the opportunity to indicate the supplies they needed for the realization of the goals they were given according to the initial plan.

given in the document. Through bribery and due to inefficiency of state control, however, many managed to migrate without the official permit. Hence, although the system gave state bureaucracy “the illusion of control” (p. 910), managed migration was more “myth” than reality (p. 896). No doubt, the Chinese system was much stricter and more efficient in the period between 1960 and the beginning of post-Mao reforms in 1978 since it brought unwanted migration virtually to a halt. This had been, however, impossible without the widespread use of rations over the whole period (even for most basic goods), which were only valid in one’s official place of residence (Cheng and Selden 1994). Yet, the Maoist example was rather an exception among socialist countries than the norm.

In fact, this was the phase of bargaining. In the light of this feedback, Gosplan informed the government about its resource needs, and tried to establish a balance between bargains from below and expectations and commands from above. In the last phase the government made the final political decisions about the plan,⁶¹ which through Gosplan was mediated to lower authorities and enterprises, who now received detailed specifications, which they principally considered as a set of commands that had to be executed.⁶²

Hence, regional and local administrative units as well as enterprises received the central plan as an information source of vital importance mediating the interests and objectives as well as the capabilities of the national level, thus, the Soviet leadership. Just as capitalist investors try to adapt to changes indicated by the financial system in order to realize higher profits, Soviet enterprises likewise shaped their strategy in line with instructions of the central plan, since this was their best chance to aspire to more state support in the succeeding plan period. In other words, central state planning had basically the same indicative functions in the USSR that the financial system has in market economies, but with a major difference. The mechanism of state planning fulfilled these functions through the maintenance of highly asymmetrical power structures, which thus became inseparable from the very functioning of economy in “real existing socialism”.

The role of financial system in the centralization of capital was necessary for the realization of large projects and, consequently, to an expected acceleration of growth in the long run, not only in capitalist systems, but in socialism as well. This tendency had visible consequences at many levels. For enterprises, production of given goods was concentrated in the hands of great trusts. These were usually not only responsible for a stable growth in investments as well as production, but also for contributing to the social infrastructure at their place of location. It was not untypical, for instance, that the vast majority of production in major industrial centers was added by a single mammoth company, which provided a fundamental contribution to local healthcare, education, cultural and sports life etc. (Horváth 2006). But the notion to centralize capital was reflected by the structure of central administration as well. Executive power was in the hands of supersized ministries attributed to specific branches (such as the Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry, Ministry of Coal Industry, Ministry of Agriculture etc.). Furthermore, the political competence of making decisions about the use of resources was concentrated in just a few. Executive power officially went to the Council of Ministers, an organ with up to 100 members. But this organ was in fact under control of the Secretariat, a committee made up by only 10–15 members, and practically led by the General Secretary Sherman 1969, pp. 7–10. Therefore, decision-making over resources was in

⁶¹ We should stress that the USSR Council of Ministers, composed of 30 to 100 members, was in fact the top organ of the executive branch, but it was in fact subordinated to the top party leadership, namely the Secretariat (cf. Fig. 8.21; Sherman 1969, pp. 7–10). Hence, final decisions about the plan could only be made with the approval of this organ.

⁶² For an in-depth description of the mechanism see Sherman (1969), pp. 138–142 and Bernard (1966), pp. 63–88.

the hands of a few, and finally under control of a single person. This concentration of power was especially remarkable given that commands from above could hardly be rejected (or sabotaged) by lower administrative levels. In other words, “real existing socialism” resulted in a strong centralization of decision-making about investments that was unparalleled in pluralistic democracies with capitalist economies.

As this large number of examples indicates, the strategies that Harvey called “fixes” are not unique to capitalism at all, but they were also present in “real existing socialism”. Moreover, the nature of these “fixes” was also similar in both systems. “Fixes” in socialist countries were no less controversial than their capitalist counterparts, even if in socialism private property was reduced to the minimum. Besides, they led to considerable unevenness in a geographical sense not only in capitalism, but in socialist systems as well. These similarities can easily be presented through some examples.

Controversies became manifest in many ways. The first form of controversy was when a “fix” became an obstacle to its own maintenance. The strategy of syphoning off resources from satellite countries, for instance, was not sustainable forever since it gradually reduced the amount of extractable resources left in the “allies” and, thus, eliminated its sources. Moreover, this process obviously limited the maneuvering room for local communist elites, which was to undermine their power and, consequently, the reliability of transports from these countries to the Soviet Union. No wonder that the policy of syphoning off weakened after Stalin’s death, and, as Bunce (1985) underscores, satellite countries in Eastern Europe rather became “from a Soviet asset to a Soviet liability”. Likewise, the “opening up” of “pioneer regions” and their integration into the national economy worked against itself in the long run. As a new territory began to be exploited, it soon became unavoidable to expand toward new districts. But as the spatial extension of still “unused” areas shrank, prospects for this strategy changed for the worse. Neither was the situation better in regions preferred by investment policy, namely in highly industrialized zones and large cities. Here the extreme high density of investment ended up in overconcentration of economic activities as well as population, which tended to erode productivity. That was a main reason for many planners to urge for a ban on or at least a limitation of industrialization in the largest urban centers, a policy carried out less efficiently in the Soviet Union but more thoroughly in the post-Stalinist communist Hungary (as was presented). “Accumulation by dispossession” was also a self-consuming process given that the pace of collectivization necessarily decreased as the amount of resources in private hands reduced.

In a peculiar way, the temporal “fix” of “selling the present to buy the future” through gigantic projects, which consumed vast resources in the present but were expected to accelerate growth in the long term, was also controversial, exactly for the same reasons Harvey identified in capitalism. In fact, these projects not only needed much time to be carried out, but they were planned to function for decades or even hundreds of years. Moreover, this extremely long “life expectancy” was more than a technical possibility; it was also an economic necessity in sense that a real turnover of these projects seemed possible only in decades’ time. In other words, these projects, while postponing present production and consumption for

what expected to be a much larger output in the future, posed a strong limit to opportunities of future planners. These had to spend a great deal of resources on the maintenance of large buildings, infrastructure etc. planned by their predecessors, so they could not focus as many resources on long-term investments as it had been possible otherwise.

Centralized bureaucracy and planning was also an obstacle for its own efficient functioning. On the one hand, attempts to achieve an extreme mobility of capital (or a strong immobility of it, depending on the actual case) deprived the system of the chance of receiving sufficient feedback in time about possible risks and unwanted consequences of central decisions. Since ordinary citizens had almost no way to express their dissatisfaction, and as experts as well as decision-makers at lower levels could only execute higher commands without criticizing or questioning them, even the most unrealistic initiatives of the top leadership could go through. This could result in serious economic malfunctions, which therefore hindered an efficient mobilization of resources in the future.

Likewise, the logic of running a centralized planning mechanism was at least as strong *against* as *for* promoting efficiency. The expectation was that the highest growth could be achieved if all pieces of information were collected from all over the country, and then was evaluated by the best experts and up to homogenous and high standards. The cross-section of channels mediating information from below to above was necessarily insufficient, however. As we have already underscored, the immense amount of information and knowledge spread over hundreds of millions of people living in a country the size of a continent could not efficiently be transmitted to a few hundred or thousand “wise planners” sitting in their Moscow bureaus. For this reason, much information was simply lost, and the central plans, to which local authorities and enterprises had to adapt, often left actual resources at lower levels unused. In other cases plans from above calculated with the mobilization of resources simply not accessible for local authorities or enterprises in the quantity or quality expected.

Furthermore, local production units and authorities soon realized that their tasks as well as their support from above depended less on their actual situation but on the information they provided to central planning institutions. Hence, they developed various strategies to justify even irrational demands of resources on the one hand, and to convince higher authorities that the plan was achieved, if it was not necessarily the case. For the first issue, local authorities, for example, tended to present remarkably optimistic or even unrealistic forecasts for their own population growth in order to gain surplus resources for investment projects (Bernhardt and Reif 2009). For the second point, it became a common habit of enterprises to fulfill plan indicators as easily as possible without providing the efforts the creators of the plan in fact expected. For instance, if manufacturing of a given product was measured in gross output, enterprises often did as Bernard (1966) explained: “Since the value of gross output includes the price of all raw materials used in manufacture, production targets could sometimes be reached . . . simply by increasing the quantity or the quality of the materials used; this may well be the real reason for the weight of so many Soviet products, which are often noticeably heavier than

comparable foreign articles” (p. 161). Of course, these manifold problems undermined the efficiency of the whole planning mechanism.

In fact, the various forms of “fixes” could not only become obstacles for themselves, but different fixes often counteracted each other. For instance, the drive for autarky (in order to avoid that capitalist countries “exported” their evaluation to the Communist Bloc) was highly incompatible with the notion of technological and organizational innovation. On the one hand, socialist economies sustained a relatively low level of trade with capitalist countries, because they expected this sort of autarky to guarantee that problems of the capitalist world economy could be kept outside. This notion was so strong that even in the 1970s and 1980s the USSR spent some 17–19 % of its GDP on the development and sustenance of a military (Steinberg 1992) whose main task was to deter satellite countries from a definite opening to the West and the capitalist world from trying to enforce the same from outside. In the meantime, especially from the Brezhnev era onwards, the Soviet leadership tried to find alternative ways of transferring technology from the West, which they considered as a crucial prerequisite for the competitiveness of the Communist Bloc. These goals, in fact, were contrary, so thus the amount of resources they consumed was immense relative to their contribution to these countries’ economic performance.

In sum, neither the existence nor the controversial nature of “fixes” was a peculiar feature of capitalism; “real existing socialism” was likewise not free from these. And just as these strategies resulted in an “uneven geographical development” in capitalist countries, so they did in the Communist Bloc as well. At this point we have to consider, of course, that Harvey’s critique had a specific meaning. As already discussed in previous paragraphs, Harvey broke with “classical” leftist concepts about “how core locations exploit peripheral ones” (Sheppard 2006, p. 129). Thus, his main critique was *not* that capitalism would produce a permanently increasing gap between “developed” and “underdeveloped” areas. Instead, he emphasized that capitalism had an inherent notion to “the production of geographical difference” (Harvey 2000, p. 79), thus, a permanent instability in spatial configuration. In other words, Harvey blamed the capitalist system for permanently creating spatial disparities, but without claiming that this process would necessarily mean the intensification of already existing inequalities, thus, a permanent worsening in center–periphery relations. In consequence, if we say that the problem of “uneven geographical development” Harvey blamed on capitalism existed in “real existing socialism” as well, it is not enough to present, for example, the permanent increase in the gap between rural and urban areas, and even between small towns and large cities. We shall likewise present that socialism not only increased disparities in many senses, but also that it failed to sustain a stable spatial configuration of economy and society.

And this is the point at which we have to refer again to the controversial nature of “fixes” in socialism, first because they often became obstacles for themselves after a while, and second since they in many cases aggressively countervailed each other. These paradoxes ended up in permanent changes in the spatial configuration of inequalities. For instance, the “opening” up of “pioneer regions” led to a decrease in

the level of concentration of economic production. Pumping investments in more efficient districts, however, rather pointed in the opposite direction. And since these two forces never achieved an equilibrium, their strength relative to one another permanently fluctuated, so that changes in spatial configuration (and in its inequalities) never ended. Likewise, tendencies at different scales could also contradict each other. Gigantic investments in towns in remote areas could boost absolute as well as per capita indicators of production in these urban centers. Hence, the regional distribution of urban resources became more balanced, regional inequalities decreased. The gap between this urban center and the thousands of villages in the same remote district, however, remarkably increased. To sum it up, “real existing socialism” was no more efficient in promoting an “even geographical development” than capitalism.

8.2.3 Empirical and Theoretical Remarks on the Uneven Development Concept: A Summary

With the closing statement of the last section we have returned to the link between economic systems (or modes of production), “uneven geographical development”, and spatial disparities. Harvey, Smith and many other Marxist theoreticians claimed that uneven development was “the hallmark of the geography of capitalism” (Smith 1991, p. xiii), that “the resulting geographical patterns are thoroughly determinate . . . and are thus unique to capitalism” (ibid.). Furthermore, they argued that “the only ultimate resolution to the contradiction [leading to uneven development] lies in the elimination of their source, in the creation of fundamentally new social relationships – those of socialism” (Harvey 1982, p. 103). As our examples showed, “uneven geographical development” is not an inherently capitalist phenomenon. Its outcomes are definitely *not* unique to capitalism. And “the creation of fundamentally new social relationships” fails to cure the problem, even if these new relationships are based on an almost profound collectivization of resources and on the lack of private property. These findings are of strong political relevance. They reveal that Marxist authors on “uneven geographical development”, although contributing much to a better understanding and theoretical conceptualization of the persistence of inequalities and its roots, attributed exclusively to capitalism phenomena that are present in non-capitalist systems as well. Without a doubt, this act helped much in presenting capitalism as a vicious system, which is indeed the main source of problems in contemporary society, unavoidably “unjust”, and therefore should give way to socialism. But the cost of providing support to socialist political goals and of creating leftist propaganda was high. Namely, a one-sided and enforced interpretation of real phenomena, a remarkable silence about sensitive questions (spatial inequalities in countries of “real existing socialism”) and the hindrance of a better understanding of problems (such as spatial disparities) in

their actual complexity. Hence, Marxist concepts of “uneven geographical development” are similar to so many other theories in the history of spatial disparity discourse. They exemplify how political considerations and the will to create and disseminate orientation knowledge influences (and distorts) the production of factual knowledge about spatial inequalities.

It is, however, not the only questionable feature of related Marxist concepts that they tend to blame all social problems exclusively on capitalism, even if these in fact were present in socialist countries as well. In other words, it is not the only problem that these theories create an extremely contrasted black and white image of the world, with “bad” capitalism on the one side and “good” socialism on the other. Another crucial point is their remarkable oversimplification of the factors driving various systems. Following Marx, Harvey traced back the whole functioning of capitalism to a single rule “that governs the behavior of all capitalists” (Harvey 1982, p. 29), namely to “accumulation for accumulation’s sake, production for production’s sake” (ibid.).⁶³

In fact, Harvey did not argue that individuals would have been so one-sided in their motivations. Hence, it was not his point to suggest that human beings were inherently driven by a single notion, such as *homo economicus* in classical and neoclassical economics. Instead, he claimed the capitalist system itself imposing this one-sidedness on individual capitalists. As he put it: “In so far as individuals adopt the role of capitalist, they are forced to internalize the profit-seeking motive as part of their subjective being. Avarice and greed, and the predilections of the miser, find scope for expression in such a context, but capitalism is not founded on such character traits – competition imposes them willy-nilly on the unfortunate participants” (p. 28). That is why the rule of “accumulation for accumulation’s sake . . . operates *independently of the individual will of the capitalist*” (our emphasis; p. 29). In other words, the Marxist point of view, adopted by Harvey as well, was that of *systemic determinism* or, if one considers systems as modes of (economic) production, of *economic determinism*.

This interpretation raises a crucial question. For Marx (and for Harvey as well) it was competition that led to a fierce rivalry among capitalists, where they virtually had to fight for survival, so thus they had no alternative to internalizing the “rules” of capitalism and adapting themselves to these. For him: “*free competition* brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist” (our emphasis; Marx cited in Harvey 1982, p. 28). This might well be the outcome of an absolutely free or *perfect* competition, where everyone in any situation has to compete, and where, referring

⁶³ The totalization of this single factor does not leave any space for other considerations otherwise very important in all systems. One can briefly refer here to the strategic (military), political or symbolic reasons, which can enable as well as disable certain investments both in capitalist and non-capitalist systems. Even in capitalism, the Statue of Liberty in New York, representative buildings in Washington DC or World War II memorial sites in Normandy have been erected not only (or basically not) for pure economic considerations, as outcomes of “accumulation for accumulation’s sake”.

to Spencer's neo-Lamarckian thoughts in the nineteenth century (cf. Sect. 2.3.9), only the strong survives and the weak necessarily falls. But real life is not so. And if competition is not perfect, hence, individuals have at least some limited opportunities to survive without profoundly internalizing the logic of the system, they will not feel it necessary to adapt totally. Neither are they forced to do so, actually, given that they can definitely survive without fully giving up their individual motivations, thoughts, passions etc. For this reason, the whole Marxian interpretation of capitalism (and Harvey's concept as well) functions only if one assumes perfect competition. In other words, the theory is based on the same unrealistic presumption that constitutes a cornerstone of classical and neoclassical economics (cf. Sect. 6.6).⁶⁴

In an interesting way, Harvey himself also realized the problem of hypothesizing perfect competition, so he tried to explain why this assumption was "tolerable" in Marx's work even if it is otherwise commonly referred to as an apparent shortcoming of neoclassical economics. In his words: "The assumption of perfect competition plays a very different role in Marx's theory to that which it plays in conventional economics. Marx uses it to show how, even when capitalism is operating in a manner considered perfect by the bourgeois political economists, it still entails the exploitation of labor power as the source of profit" (Harvey 1982, p. 28). Thus, Marx was claimed to have this assumption just for rhetorical reasons, to exemplify why capitalism unavoidably produced unjust situations even if it functioned "perfectly", in a "pure" form. This interpretation can be challenged easily, however, given that the whole Marxian concept about the behavior of individuals is based on the implicit assumption of perfect competition. In other words, Marx did not simply use a sort of "pure capitalism" to illustrate controversies of the system, but traced back these controversies to factors only persisting under conditions of perfect competition. The simplistic idea of how the capitalist system enforces through competition all individuals to profoundly subordinate their souls to the rule of "accumulation for accumulation's sake" only works if competition is perfect and omnipresent. Otherwise the systemic or economic determinism infiltrating Marxist theories (even those of Harvey) becomes unsustainable, and the interpretation of capitalism they provide gets challenged, including thoughts about "uneven geographical development" in capitalist systems.

In sum, the Marxist concept of "uneven geographical development" opened a new chapter in the spatial disparity discourse through *re-problematizing* the issue in a context where various other approaches have interests in inequalities, but without paying attention to normative considerations. Compared to Krugman's "New Economic Geography" as well as to endogenous growth theories, the approach developed by Harvey, Smith and other leftist theoreticians has the apparent aim to

⁶⁴ This common feature of Marxism and classical economics may well be understood given that the roots of both went back to the same context, that of nineteenth century Britain, especially its urban industrial districts during the industrial revolution. Yet, an unrealistic assumption does not become realistic just because it is internalized not only by one theoretical approach but by several.

represent voices that find spatial inequalities a *problem* to be solved. Furthermore, given that this stream has mainly been run by geographers, relative to concepts originating from other disciplines it has proven to be much more sensitive to issues concerning the theory of space. For political attitude, the uneven development concept clearly returned to the Marxist tradition blaming spatial inequalities and the instable geographical configuration of economy and society on the capitalist system. Hence, it has a definite leftist orientation. Beyond its innovative attitude to many issues, however, this approach has proved not dissimilar to previous ones in its relation to orientation and factual knowledge. Apparently, the uneven development concept also has strong ideas that provide substantiation to certain political objectives, thus, to produce and mediate orientation knowledge. In this endeavor it has much too easily made or adopted oversimplifications, which in fact hinder a better understanding of the complex issue of spatial inequalities, but which serve well as a means of providing ammunition for those criticizing capitalism. In other words, although the uneven development concept indeed opened a new phase in the spatial disparity discourse, this has remained as much politically influenced and targeted as it was before, from the very beginning (Fig. 9.1).

Chapter 9

Political Functioning of the Spatial Disparity Discourse: A Summary

In Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 we have provided a broad multidisciplinary overview of the theoretical concepts about spatial disparities. This journey through the history of the research tradition has shown that the challenge to explain geographical inequalities has inspired thinkers very differently in terms of personal background, the methods they used, and the way they conceptualized the topic (Fig. 9.1). The first actors came from the domain of natural sciences, and interpreted spatial disparities based on then accessible “moral statistics”. Later on, the tradition became dominated by new approaches. From the late nineteenth century onwards, philanthropists, charity movements, political philosophers, and even active politicians came to the fore. Thus, the discourse moved into the hands of actors actively involved in public issues, but only until the Cold War period, when spatial disparity research became the arena of academics—first economists, later sociologists and human geographers as well. Meanwhile, the original interest in questions such as education and crime, regarded then as decisive in the reduction of poverty, gradually shifted to the economic aspects, which have been dominating the discourse ever since. The attention paid to various geographical scales has also moved broadly.

Despite these remarkable temporal changes, however, the theoretical concepts were common almost without exception in that they problematized spatial disparities, and did so a way that actively (sometimes implicitly, but in many cases explicitly) contributed to the legitimization and de-legitimization of certain political ideologies and systems (the only exception was US theoreticians of the neoliberal age, whose partial de-problematizing of geographical inequalities was in line with the neoliberal view about the “necessity” and in many cases the “desirability” of disparities). The process of legitimization has followed a simple scheme (Fig. 9.2). Spatial disparity as phenomenon has been problematized, and it has been discursively attributed to system “A” (or its main ideology). This creates for system “A” (e.g. capitalism in Marxist concepts) the image of bringing inequalities into being, hence, producing a problem, which is considered to undermine its legitimacy. In the meantime, the opposite of spatial disparity, thus, spatial equality is

Approaches and key thinkers	Date of key works	Background of main theoreticians	What is analyzed?	Geographical scale	Problematisation of spatial inequalities	Ideology or system to be legitimized	Political preference – explicit or implicit?	Science as means of legitimization
“Social physicists” (Quetelet, Dupin, Balbi & Gnerri)	early 19 th century	natural sciences	“moral statistics”	regional	yes	enlightened nationalism	explicit	yes
“Social surveyors” (Booth, social survey movements)	1880s to 1910s	philanthropy, charity movements	“moral statistics”	local (intra-urban, rural-urban gap)	yes	conservative, religious	explicit	yes
“Classical” Marxist tradition	1840s to 1890s	political philosophy & political sphere	economic issues (mode of production, output and distribution)	global, local (rural-urban)	yes	socialist/communist	explicit	yes
Marx, Engels	1910s							
Luxemburg	1900s, 1910s							
Lenin	1900s, 1910s	global, regional, local (rural-urban)						
Stalin	1950s							
Western “Cold War” tradition								
neoclassicals	1940s and 1950s							
Keynesians		economics	economic output and income	global, regional	yes	US modeled free market capitalism and liberal democracy	explicit	yes
Myrdal	1950s and 1960s							
Hirschman								
Williamson								
Friedmann	1960s							
neoclassical reaction (Borts & Stein)								
Western neoliberalism								
US convergence analysis (β and σ)	1980s and 1990s	economics	economic output and income	global, regional	no		dominantly implicit	yes
endogenous growth theories								
New Economic Geography (Krugman)	1990s							
EU spatial analysis	from 1990s onwards				yes	EU integration		

Fig. 9.1 (continued)

Approaches and key thinkers	Date of key works	Background of main theoreticians	What is analyzed?	Geographical scale	Problematisation of spatial inequalities	Ideology or system to be legitimized	Political preference – explicit or implicit?	Science as means of legitimization
Dependency theories (and forerunners)								
Baran	1950s	economics				socialism/communism		
ECLA structural school						capitalism and democracy but without US domination		
Prebisch			economic output and distribution (exchange, consumption)	dominantly global	yes		explicit	yes
Furtado	1950s and 1960s	economics		(Frank: global, regional, and local)				
Sunkel		sociology						
Cardoso	1960s and 1970s	history						
Faletto								
neo-Marxist dependency theories								
Dos Santos	1960s and 1970s	economics (+ sociology)				socialism/communism		
Marini								
Frank								
Amin								
world-system model (Wallerstein)	1970s	sociology	economic output and distribution (exchange, consumption)	global	yes	socialism	explicit	yes
concept of uneven geographical development (e.g. Harvey, Smith)	from 1980s onwards	human geography	economic output and distribution (exchange, consumption)	<i>global, regional, local</i> (emphasis on those in italics) + <i>scales</i>	yes	socialism/communism	explicit	issue of validation: “morally righteous” instead of “scientific”

Fig. 9.1 Overview of the various approaches to spatial disparities. Emphasis is placed on the background of main theoreticians, the analytical focus and scale preference of theories, the political ideologies and systems they were aimed to legitimize through problematization (or de-problematization) of spatial inequalities, and the use of science as source of legitimacy. *Source:* design by author




Fig. 9.2 The scientific legitimization of political systems by problematizing spatial inequalities. *Source:* design by author

presented as the “desirable goal”. In the next step, equality is attributed to system “B” (in Marxist literature socialism), to which the concept provides firm legitimacy.

In fact, the discursive creation of such a strong “black-and-white” dichotomy has always been problematic given the complexity of real societies. For this reason, the main thinkers in the spatial disparity discourse have tended in most cases to make the world seem dichotomic. Here they have relied on a wide variety of strategies, all of which were generally not used in the same concept, but, as we have shown in this work, many of them certainly. These were:

- the conceptualization of spatial disparities (e.g. the selection of indicators and the geographical scale) based on an implicit presumption about the roots of inequalities and their link to certain ideologies and systems (for example Charles Booth’s and the social survey movements’ exclusive focus on “moral statistics”);
- the striking negligence of case studies that could easily provide empirical results undermining the dichotomic interpretation (such as the “blindness” of the concept of “uneven geographical development” to “real existing socialism”);
- the acceptance of hypotheses as explanations in cases they could not be substantiated by the empirical results presented in the concept (e.g. Myrdal’s statement about disparities in Europe);
- taking a “cavalier approach” in explaining empirical results in order to smooth discrepancies between the complex world and simple theories (for instance, a tendentious and oversimplified interpretation of the results of β and σ convergence analysis to indicate a plain tendency actually cannot be identified);

- overemphasizing empirical results that seem to substantiate the concept, while paying remarkably little attention (or diverting attention away from) results not in line with the intended political suggestion of the concept.

The efficiency of these strategies and the authors' willingness to substantiate what they believed in is indicated by the fact that, among the many theoreticians, Charles Booth was actually the only one who let the unexpected results influence himself strongly enough that he made considerable corrections on his *a priori* hypothesis. Yet, despite the political influence on their concepts, all authors actively used the image of science to justify their statements. On the one hand, they emphasized the scientific quality of their works, while often pushing rival interpretations into the domain of non-scientific knowledge, e.g. pseudoscience or political propaganda. On the other hand, they presented their results and findings without making a distinction between analytical and orientational knowledge. Hence, these concepts in whole were presented as "scientific", so thus the outcome of politically motivated and sometimes even unsubstantiated "wishful thinking" was also mediated to the reader as "scientific" knowledge, the "truth". This is how the political discourse of geographical inequalities has managed to use or misuse the scientific image in order to sell orientation knowledge as analytical knowledge, and to justify political endeavors.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

Our study set three issues as its goal. First, it was aimed at giving a detailed overview of the different theories about spatial disparities that have emerged during the last two centuries. Given that these concepts have been created within the domain of various disciplines and most of them have become perceived only in certain branches of social sciences, to our best knowledge their comprehensive analysis has been missing from theoretical works up to now. The second goal was to go beyond a simple description of these theories, and to present them embedded in the specific political, social and economic circumstances under which they have come into being. The third and actually ultimate objective was for us to reveal the relation of the production of factual and orientation knowledge in these theories, and to detect how and to what extent the whole debate over spatial inequalities has been propelled by the latter. In other words, we have investigated how the whole of theoretical contributions to the issue has functioned as a political discourse, which served as a means of legitimizing actual political interests by using (or maybe misusing) the legitimate authority of sciences. This is a main novelty of this work given that the history of spatial disparity research has never been investigated before as a political discourse.

In order to answer our questions, we have focused first on the Western tradition of analyzing social disparities. This was important from the viewpoint of our work for a specific but fundamental reason. Contrary to spatial inequalities, which are relatively abstract and had not even become visible for the vast majority of the population for thousands of years, social disparities have a strong political relevance that is easy to realize and understand even for uneducated people. Hence, the debate over social inequalities, which has existed in the Western tradition since ancient Greece, provides a much more adequate example to illustrate first that thinking about disparities can bring into being a political discourse, which serves as a means of legitimizing certain political interests. This discourse is based on the various interpretations of a given phenomenon, namely social inequalities, which can be problematized (e.g. disparities constitute a “problem” that should be solved) or even de-problematized (disparities are “necessary” or even “desirable” to some extent) in many ways. That is how participants of the discourse, being rivals of each

other, try to create a unique identity for themselves, which can be attractive for many, and thus, which can help participants to find through their self-identification *in* and *by* the discourse new supporters for their political goals. While doing this, a main factor they can take advantage of is the claim of scientific validity: those who can present their political objectives in the discourse as “scientifically substantiated” (and the arguments of their rivals as “unscientific”) can be more efficient in convincing people and finding supporters.

In fact, the debate over spatial disparities, which has a much shorter history, has also been infiltrated by similar motivations. Of course, the manifold concepts that have emerged here have considerable differences with regard to the academic background of their inventors, and, in consequence, in their analytical focus as well (Fig. 9.2). Among main theoreticians contributing to the discourse one can find economists, geographers and sociologists as well as natural scientists, philosophers, politicians, and even philanthropists and members of charity movements. Hence, the theoretical discourse about spatial inequalities has indeed been a multidisciplinary one. Given this it is no wonder that various thinkers have regarded different aspects of spatial disparities as most important. Without a doubt, one’s (academic) background certainly *does not determine but only influences* one’s interests. It is still easy to understand that economists have dominantly focused on the economic aspects of disparities, while for religious charities differences in the way of life and “morals” were much more important.

But beyond these peculiarities, contributions to the spatial disparity discourse have had striking similarities. *Among the key theoreticians of spatial inequalities, the vast majority has had obvious political goals*, which many (yet not all) of them have made explicit in their concepts. Even the few who have tended to de-problematize the issue (US neoliberal thinkers) have done this in accordance with their (either explicit or implicit) political preferences, which have considered spatial inequalities as necessary (and, in this capacity, even desirable) concomitants of something more valuable (in the given case economic growth). In other words, those who have joined the discourse with a de-problematizing stance have also actively shaped it, and they have done so under the influence of apparent (if even implicit) political considerations. This also means *that the spatial disparity discourse has been as political from the very beginning as the social inequality discourse*.

A further similarity of all approaches is that, apparently, they have been influenced and they *have quite easily let themselves be influenced* by their underlying political notions while producing factual knowledge. This means not only that one’s political stance automatically influences the questions one raises, the analytical objective one sets, and even the way one interprets empirical results—thus, to some extent, the findings one *can* or *cannot* make at the end of the analysis. Such a sort of “selective seeing” is, in fact, unavoidable given that each human being has its specific context, which one cannot make oneself profoundly free from. For approaches in the spatial disparity discourse, however, political influence does not come to an end here. As presented in the current volume through a great many detailed examples, it has been true for virtually all key thinkers in the

discourse that they have *tended* to interpret their results in a way being most in concert with political suggestions. They have tendentially put stress on results seeming to underpin their hypotheses and (either explicit or implicit) political stances. Meanwhile, findings less compatible with political expectations have been neglected much too easily. And even if it has not been the case, results have often been exposed to “cavalier interpretations”, which have been rather superficial, controversial or arbitrary, thus, which have not eased but sometimes even hindered a better understanding of spatial inequalities in order to provide seeming substantiation to certain political ideas. Hence, *the relationship between factual and orientation knowledge has often been distorted and made asymmetrical in the spatial disparity discourse, with factual knowledge becoming subordinated to orientation knowledge—in most cases not by accident, but for obvious political reasons.*

The overwhelming majority of theoreticians, however, have tried to intensively utilize the legitimate authority of science, and thus, to suggest that their concepts have been “scientifically substantiated” and “objectively verified”, while denying that rival theories have the same quality. In other words, virtually all main thinkers have played the “science trick”, trying to sell their products by the image of “scientific quality” and “objectivity”, while letting orientation knowledge push factual knowledge in the background. Only a few exceptions, most of whom we can find among the leftist representatives of the concept of “uneven geographical development”, have followed a different strategy. They have explicitly underscored the constructed nature of science, hence, they have not (ab)used the legitimate authority of “objective” science in order to substantiate their concepts. But they have done another trick, in fact, they have clearly distinguished between science “changing the world to the better” and science lacking this capability, where they have clearly attributed the former to themselves. By this, they have simply substituted the contrast of “objective” and “non-objective” science with those of “righteous” and “non-righteous” science, claiming themselves to be representatives of the former and criticizing others as proponents of the later.

These findings about the political functioning of the spatial disparity discourse are extremely important since to our best knowledge our work is the first initiative to analyze this research tradition as a political discourse. Furthermore, the vast majority of the individual concepts we dealt with has not been subjected before to investigations paying attention not only to analytical validity but political constraints and orientational function as well. Our point here, in fact, was much more than to shed light on the politicized nature of the research on geographical inequalities. Our venture reveals that the common practice to deal with related concepts as if they were purely analytical, an attitude dominating secondary literature in the topic, is erroneous and might be highly misleading insofar (even unintentionally) as it lets politically influenced concepts be reborn as “objective” ones. In our view, a theory fit to certain political considerations but sold as scientific is not necessarily useless. Its political situatedness and constraints have to be perceived and evaluated, however. This is a necessary prerequisite for a careful and reflexive application of concepts, which can open the way for an analytically better and more comprehensive understanding of spatial disparities.

Chapter 11

What to Do with the Discourse on Spatial Disparities? A Normative Outlook

Although our findings provide answers to the main questions our study formulated, we cannot let ourselves keep silent about a crucial normative issue. This is how to assess political discourses that are presented by many as if they were “purely” scientific, and those who have taken advantage of the legitimate authority of science while creating and disseminating orientation knowledge. In contemporary literature on the history of science and scientific knowledge one can find many works reflecting stances we regard as exaggerated. On the one hand, there are many researchers who tend to totalize views about the social creation and embeddedness of scientific knowledge. Some of them go even further, and easily present scientific theories as the brainchild of unscrupulous white-collar people sitting in their dark rooms at mysterious locations and, although they mask it as “objective knowledge”, they produce the purest forms of aggressive political propaganda. On the other hand, there are many who try to fully separate what they call the “objective” and “political” assessment of researchers. For them, it is only the factual “validity” of one’s concepts that counts, and criticism of someone for one’s political bias or “service” for political movements is just an “unfair” means to destroy the image one has gained due to his/her “objective” scientific results. Our view is neither that politically influenced concepts should be profoundly rejected and thrown on the rubbish heap of science, nor that theories and theoreticians should be evaluated only in the light of their “objective” (factual) contributions. Instead, we offer an alternative interpretation.

Against the attitude that much too easily discredits thinkers by judging them political “apologists”, we suggest three issues to be considered in general as well as with regard to the spatial disparity discourse. First, in our point *it is problematic to totally question the relevance of any concepts in this discourse*. Without a doubt, it shall be clearly stated that related theories have all been products of tense political contexts, where the rivalry between political forces (e.g. between the Labor Movement and conservative political forces at the turn of the twentieth century, the Western and Communist Blocs, or the US economic and political leadership and the intelligentsia of Latin American countries) has exerted serious influence on concepts in social sciences. Under such circumstances, the strong attention that

had to be paid to general political interests of “one’s own” bloc could hinder scientists in putting more emphasis on painstaking theoretical and in-depth empirical substantiation. Still, their *concepts are worth being taken into consideration and exposed to critical analysis*, which reveals not only political biases and factual shortcomings but even those fragments that should not be thrown out with the bath water of political slogans.

Second, we do not prefer interpretations that easily reject scientific theories as soon as they have turned out to be not absolutely neutral politically. Neither do we think that the relevance of the whole of the spatial disparity discourse should be questioned just because it is a political discourse. The reason for our attitude is simple. *It is not an exceptional phenomenon in this discourse that theoretical concepts had not only factual or analytical but also political or orienting functions.* In fact, as we have already underscored with reference to Meusburger (2005), there are relatively few forms of knowledge free from this ambivalence (“pure science”), and these are generally to be found within the domain of natural sciences. We can well regard as pure forms of factual knowledge that, for instance, two plus two equals four, that combustion is impossible without oxygen or that if one on Earth drops an apple, this falls due to gravity. Such forms of knowledge seem to have actually no political relevance and overtones. As one could say: “they are just so”.

Still, even knowledge about things that “are just so”, that are outcomes of natural laws over which human beings have no mastery, might have strong political relevance, and their production might contribute more to political issues than to an understanding of our world. It is only a question of the actual context, where the topic about which knowledge is produced might have definite political relevance. The simple statement that the Earth orbits around the Sun and not the other way round has virtually no political implication when it is made by a teacher in a school class in twenty-first century Europe. In the given context, this is factual knowledge about something that is “just so”, and it is disseminated for pupils simply to teach how our planet and the solar system works. But in the times of Copernicus the heliocentric concept was of enormous political relevance since it seemed radical enough to challenge the dominant Christian orthodoxy and, in consequence, to undermine the legitimacy of the extreme overpower of the Catholic Church. Hence, stating that the Earth orbits around the Sun was at that time not only a form of creating factual knowledge, but also a forceful means to produce orientation knowledge. In other words, *knowledge production often brings into being factual as well as orientation knowledge.* Moreover, *there are many topics for which this duality is unavoidable*, especially in the domain of social sciences, where actually each “unit of knowledge” has both analytical and political relevance given that its subject is society itself. In the light of this, we argue for less criticism and more tolerance to theories concerning social issues, e.g. spatial disparities, even if they fall relatively far from an abstract (and, thus, in the real world non-existing) category of “pure science”.

Third, we suggest that *the political influence of theories* (e.g. in the case of the concepts we have presented in the book) *should not be interpreted as proof of a one-dimensional claim that these theoreticians have all been simple “apologists”*

and “handmaidens” of political ideologies and systems, who “unscrupulously” misused the image of science to create political propaganda. Without a doubt, these researchers have often created concepts that have been very sophisticated and “feasible” in a political sense while they have paid less attention to factual substantiation. Still, we have reservations about the validity of simplistic interpretations of “Machiavellian” scientists. In fact, one should emphasize at this point again that these researchers have all been children of their times, who have acted in specific contexts and who have been influenced by the dominating discourses of the day. In the reality of Cold War, for instance, thinking about global power relations, the permanent struggle to help “allies” and destabilize (or weaken) the “enemy” were at the very core of everyday discussion. Likewise, interpreting the world as a dual system with the “moral”, “enlightened” or “godly” “we” on the one hand and the “immoral”, “uneducated”, “godless” “others” on the other was an inherent part of everyday thinking in the contexts in which the early “social physicists”, Charles Booth, or the American social surveyors lived and worked. Social scientists have never worked in hermetically sealed containers, but within the very reality of their era. Hence, *it has been merely unavoidable that highly political issues of the day have also found their way to state-of-art scientific theories, even if this had not always been a conscious goal of their authors.* This might have been the case for many “social physicists”, whose interests in social issues was rather analytical, and whose goals were mainly to test what methods of natural scientists could add to a better understanding of society. The same may well go for many technocrats, either during the Cold War or in the decades of neoliberalism (e.g. Williamson or the main thinkers of endogenous growth theories), whose works were not free from certain implicit political influence, although their conscious motivations were supposedly less political but analytical.

It is no doubt, of course, that several thinkers who were otherwise not active politicians (e.g. Myrdal, Hirschman and Friedmann in the Cold War Western context as well as many dependency theorists and contemporary advocates of the uneven development concept) made explicit their enthusiasm for certain political ideologies. In consequence, they belong to another category than the one we described in the last paragraph. But we still find it misleading to consider these researchers as simple “handmaidens” of politics on any side of the political spectrum. Such an approach would neglect the fact that these authors also made significant contributions to a better understanding of spatial disparities. They identified formerly disregarded phenomena, raised new questions, created new theories, and provided new empirical information. *Even if many authors have indeed subordinated empirical findings to political considerations, and thus, factual knowledge to orientation knowledge, the former was not absolutely missing.* The volume of factual knowledge humankind had about spatial disparities was definitely much greater after the publication of these concepts than it had been before. This is an achievement we should not fully controvert.

In fact, *even for those theoreticians who were active politicians as well, it would be an unrealistic hypothesis to claim that in their concepts they aimed to produce 100 % political propaganda.* As Pollock (2006) underscores in the light of once

confidential documents from Russian archives, Stalin himself, one of the most brutal and unscrupulous political leaders in modern history, also had the notion to create not only orientation knowledge. He really *wanted to produce something that was factually valid as well*. In Pollock's words: "His memos and top secret documents are saturated with the same Marxist-Leninist language, categories, and frames for understanding the world that appeared in the public discourse. He did not keep two sets of books, at least on ideological questions." (p. 3). This does not mean, of course, that Stalin's interpretation would have been valid. Likewise, it is no question that Stalin, referring to his works, committed a great many of terrible and profoundly inhumane things that cannot be justified at all. What we instead want to stress is the unrealistic one-sidedness of the approach, which easily judges those whose works are not free from political bias as if their only goal had been to produce propagandistic knowledge. In our view, these persons, just as every human being, had a much more complex set of motivations than simply to create propagandistic knowledge.

Meanwhile, *we are also no advocates of ignoring the discrepancy between the political bias of concepts about spatial disparities and their author's claim of scientific quality*. Without a doubt, this is a problematic question, where two issues are worth being considered in our opinion. First, it is still common in works concerning spatial inequalities that they refer to various theories as if these have been attempts to create "pure" factual knowledge. In non-Marxist works it is actually never mentioned that these concepts might have a political bias, or that their authors might have been influenced by political ideas while creating these theories (cf. again Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Buttler et al. 1977; Knox et al. 2003; Liefner and Schätzl 2012; Maier et al. 2006; Schätzl 2003). These aspects are missing, even (as we have presented) in reviews about theories whose authors themselves made their political stance explicit. Myrdal's *magnum opus*, for instance, devotes dozens of pages to issues about the relationship between politics and the production of scientific knowledge. Still, although Myrdal's book is one of the most-cited works in papers and books about spatial inequalities in economics and economic geography, these aspects remain totally unquoted. If one is familiar with secondary literature on theories about disparities in space, but has not read the original source, one has virtually no chance to become informed about the complex political considerations intertwining Myrdal's concept and influencing its conclusion. (And certainly gets amazed while reading his book for the first time.)

For Marxist works, these usually refer to knowledge as constructed and, thus, prone to political biases. This idea, however, tendentiously ends up in the questioning of all non-Marxist concepts in general, compared to which "one's own" theories can be presented as useful. In other words, this critical attitude in these works usually ends as soon as the debate is over "one's own" theories, and for other concepts, it rather results in a *general* rejection of "capitalistic" or "reactionary" theories without providing an in-depth analysis of them from this aspect. Hence, the large community of researchers dealing with spatial disparities should pay attention to the political aspects of related theories. *In any (even empirical) work where any concerning theory is cited, all analytical steps should be preceded*

by a contextualization of this theory, and by an evaluation of the manifold political influences it reflects. Without this it remains a considerable danger that in these concepts even orientation knowledge is “misinterpreted” and handled as if it were factual knowledge.

The other suggestion with regard to the discrepancy between the creation of propagandistic knowledge and the claim of scientific quality goes to those who will in the future get involved in the theory of spatial disparities. Presumably, these persons will be numerous. The popularity of the issue throughout the twentieth century implies that spatial inequalities have great relevance in all societies above a certain degree of the spatial division of labor. Given this, the question is likely to remain topical even in the long term. Meanwhile, inequalities, whether social or spatial, attract especially great attention in periods when influential politicians or strong civil movements find the issue crucial from their own aspect. This is well indicated by the boom of spatial disparity research in the United States during the Cold War, or even by the expansion of related Marxist concepts from the 1970s onwards. Given the far-reaching consequences of the current global crisis, which is still not over, the topic is likely to remain on the agenda in the coming years. Under these circumstances it would be important in any works aimed at improving our understanding of spatial inequalities to pay attention to four considerations. The first is *to make explicit the author’s personal normative stance about spatial disparities*. The second is *to clearly distinguish between what the author finds to be “factual knowledge” in his/her work, and those ideas whose factual validity is questionable or needs further research, and which have found their way into the concept only due to the author’s positive attitude toward their political suggestions*. Third, beyond these conscious political views, a new concept benefits much from the author’s self-reflexivity if he/she is able *to identify at least the most important political influences that shape his/her views, and clarify these in his/her work for potential readers*. Fourth, it is worth *considering whether certain thoughts that have been explained in the theory for non-political reasons could still easily be interpreted as imprints of political bias*. If the author describes in such cases the origin and underlying motivation of the given idea, he/she eases the readers’ task to correctly interpret the theory as well as its implicit notions. The spatial disparity discourse will remain a political one even if these four issues are considered. Indeed, we do not think that this should be any other way. But these four ideas can help the discourse free itself from many unnecessary blurs, so that it will be able to contribute to a better and more honest understanding of spatial inequalities.

Summary

For many years, the various aspects of spatial disparities have been among the most popular research issues in human geography, and they count as highly relevant topics in several other social sciences as well. To this day, however, remarkably little attention has been paid to the theoretical research on spatial inequalities itself. Therefore, the main motivations of this scientific enterprise as well as the characteristic features of its functioning have remained mostly unrevealed to this day. Our study is aimed at throwing light on these issues. The main questions that we try to answer are as follows: first, to what extent does the theoretical research on spatial disparities function as political discourse, aimed at the production and dissemination of orientation knowledge? Second, how and to what extent do political motivations influence or even constrain the creation of factual knowledge about spatial inequalities? Third, are the positive connotations of producing factual knowledge consciously used to legitimize the political suggestions of these concepts, and if yes, in what way and to what extent?

To answer these questions, the work gives a comprehensive overview of related theories originating from various disciplines. These theories are presented embedded in the context within which they came into being as outcomes of various political, economic and social considerations. Special emphasis is placed on how political motivations have exerted influence on these concepts. We break with the conventional narrative that implicitly tends to interpret the theoretical tradition of spatial disparity research as a series of factual, “objective” contributions to a better understanding of the issue. Instead, we present this tradition as a political discourse, where the propagandistic problematization or de-problematization of geographical inequalities serves the substantiation of political goals as well, while taking advantage of the legitimate authority of science and the image of scientific objectivity. We explain how the discourse functions, and in what way and to what extent political considerations constrain the ability of related concepts to provide “objective”, factual knowledge about the complex phenomenon of spatial inequalities.

Zusammenfassung

Verschiedene Aspekte von räumlichen Disparitäten gehören seit langem zu den wichtigsten Forschungsthemen der Humangeographie und verschiedener anderer Sozialwissenschaften. Die Forschung über theoretische Erklärungsversuche von räumlichen Ungleichheiten sowie die Legitimierung und politische Instrumentalisierung solcher Ungleichheiten haben aber bisher relativ wenig Beachtung gefunden. Deshalb setzt sich die vorliegende Dissertation das Ziel, die wichtigsten Erklärungsversuche einer kritischen Analyse zu unterziehen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf drei Fragen: Inwiefern dient die theoretische Erklärung von räumlichen Ungleichheiten als politischer Diskurs, der das Ziel verfolgt, Orientierungswissen zu schaffen und zu verbreiten? Wie sehr und auf welche Weise beeinflussen oder beschränken politische Motive die Generierung von Fachwissen über räumliche Disparitäten? Wird die Legitimierungskraft von Fachwissen bewusst eingesetzt, um die politische Botschaft dieser Konzepte zu legitimieren, und wenn ja, auf welche Weise und inwiefern?

Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, präsentiert diese Dissertation einen umfassenden Überblick über Konzepte, die sich mit räumlichen Ungleichheiten befassen haben. Dabei wird mit der Tradition gebrochen, solche Disparitäten „wissenschaftlich objektiv“ erklären zu wollen. Vielmehr werden die politischen, ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen untersucht, in welchen verschiedene theoretische Konzepte entstanden sind bzw. in die sie eingebettet waren. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf den politischen Zielen und Hintergründen, welche diese Konzepte geprägt haben. Die Diskussionen um räumliche Disparitäten werden hier also in erster Linie als ein politischer Diskurs angesehen, und es wird erklärt, wie dieser Diskurs funktioniert bzw. auf welche Weise die Problematisierung oder Deproblematisierung von geographischen Disparitäten der propagandistischen Untermauerung von politischen Zielen diene. Es wird auch dargestellt, wie die Wissenschaft häufig eine entscheidende Rolle in diesem Prozess spielte, indem ihre Legitimierungskraft und Reputation dazu verwendet wurden, Orientierungswissen über das komplexe Phänomen von räumlichen Ungleichheiten herzustellen und dieses als „objektives“ Fachwissen auszugeben.

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