Entangled into Histories or the Narrative Grounds of Multiple Realities

Annette Hilt

The topic *Phenomenology, Social Sciences, and the Arts* – or the ways of constituting, understanding, and interpreting structures of the life-world through works of art – begs the question about the relation between the fictitious, or respectively the imaginary, and the real in constituting our paramount reality: Might this ambiguous difference of paramount realities change realities and might they transcend finite provinces of meaning to a shared reality?

We can look at works of art as documents of social life or as manifestations of particular individual consciousness and try to comprehend how they display reality in contrast to other ways of expressing meaning; or we can analyze them under pragmatic perspectives of aesthetic response and historical perspectives of aesthetic reception. Yet, I want to suggest a further approach beyond the cleavage between fiction and facts or story and history in interrogating the genesis of meaning which fictitious art of memory exercises.

Narration as both pre- and self-reflexive action of a temporal being living in a world is *the important way* not only imagination but also our inter-subjective action space is constituted and enlarged: *There is no comprehensive action without narration*. In narration persons establish a common ground for comprehensive actions in the multiple realities we are confronted with in the every-day; narration mediates between past and future, where understanding of words and deeds is only possible in remembering: in reconstituting history in its biographical course – addressing a present or a future generation. And here, exemplarily literary narration can gain a discursive and comprehensive framework for configuration of memory.

A. Hilt (✉)
Philosophy Department, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany
e-mail: hilt@uni-mainz.de

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In the hermeneutical tradition of Wilhelm Dilthey meaningful context, continuity and unity of human life are configured and constituted as *Lebensgeschichte* – life history.[1] The historicity of biological "raw life" declining from birth to death and crystallizing in different "steps of life" is experienced and ascribed biographically: This comprises not only one's own life as it is apprehended, judged, and comprehended in a meaningful coherency from another person's point of view, but also one's personal experiencing one's own lived life in its temporal horizon – my subjective biography: The latter does not specifically have the form usually termed "autobiography," since such life history or life story may not only be retrospectively told ("*narrated*") as outcome or result of constituting one's own rounded biography from its end with "myself" as both author and subject, but it may also be discovered – struggled with – in living one's life within and towards unsettled possibilities, opportunities, and obstacles; then, this biographical life story is "*narratable*"[2] and prompts an ongoing process of mediating the discontinuous history of oneself with the continuity of time (both "cosmological" time and everyday routines) and ourselves integrating our history in this time.

As such, our biography is both "designed" by life plans and is "happening" to us, it is plot and story of what we experience as our life that manifests itself in words and deeds – as narration. Thus, by historicality – and by the ruptures of time – one's life is biographical since it gains its structure, its relevance, and meaning only in the order of time where singular events and the everyday life form a plot, a story, where somebody undergoing this flux gains identity in the roles explaining the probable and improbable developments.

Biography as lived and living life is shaped in social intercourse within horizons of meaning: Biography as narrated life story unfolds only within a reality I share with others: This reality constitutes structure and prompts structuring of its narration; also, biography refers both to the specification of the *individual* way of leading a personal life in becoming what one is and to the *social* frameworks of constitution and recognition of such biographical life.[3] Narration and the concept of narrative identity try to capture both: the individual and the social reality of life history, comprising the relation between Self and the reality of the world – present,

[1]The concrete and singular expression of life gains coherency and unity in biographical courses of life. Presenting a unity according to selections in the relevance of biographical data, nothing could be added or taken away from a life's history without altering the uniqueness of it, at the same time a singular life mirrors historical universality in its meaning and intentionality: "*Der Sinn des Lebens liegt in der Gestaltung, in der Entwicklung; von hier aus bestimmt sich die Bedeutung der Lebensmomente auf eine eigene Weise; sie ist zugleich erlebter Eigenwert des Momentes und dessen wirkende Kraft. Jedes Leben hat einen eigenen Sinn. Er liegt in einem Bedeutungszusammenhang, in welchem jede erinnerbare Gegenwart einen Eigenwert besitzt, doch zugleich im Zusammenhang der Erinnerung eine Beziehung zu einem Sinn des Ganzen hat. Dieser Sinn des individuellen Daseins ist ganz singulär, dem Erkennen unauflösbar, und er repräsentiert doch in seiner Art, wie eine Monade von Leibniz, das geschichtliche Universum*" (Dilthey 1956, p. 199).

[2]Cf. below, pp. 178.

[3]Cf. Löwith's four implications of understanding life (Löwith 1979).

past and future – therefore also comprising the relation between Self and Time, and the relation between Self and Others by being entangled into history and in their stories. "Narration is the guardian of time," (P. Ricoeur) since the question "*who* one is," can only be answered in telling a story: Narration appresents this "Who" beyond mere properties; in fact, it represents the genesis of how some person became in time from a subjective and also a phenomenological – genetical – point of view.

Hans-Georg Soeffner argues that documents of lived reality express both socially constructed reality and our knowledge about it, yet that such products are merely parts of reality, never reality itself (Soeffner 2004, pp. 92f.). Therefore, these parts of realities have not only to be analyzed but have to be brought in a frame for discourse; a frame where "phenomenological time," the lived life, is not merely evaluated in opposite to objective standards of an all-encompassing cosmological time, but is recognized in its representation of a variety of "methods," "styles," and "ends" by which we interpret our reality together with and in front of others; finally, by experiencing our biographical life in its temporality, we transcend finite provinces of meaning: Constituting the story of lived life means to bring into a structure the different traits and roles by which we experience ourselves and which are ascribed to us by others.

According to Wilhelm Schapp our anthropological entanglement with history and stories expresses a relation which is operative when instrumentally applied rational issues, and life's immanent ends are transcended by an ongoing search for meaning in a horizon of multiple and open possibilities. To understand oneself exposed to multiple realities also means to understand one's own temporal course in its entanglement in the histories of others; it means to relate oneself to other histories by starting a new story of my coming and being into relations: This initiative (re-)structures the multiplicity of perspectives already there and endows new ones.[4] Such self-understanding of a person in its temporal life-world, the ongoing process to integrate the roles she gains and develops into her individuality is not to be captured descriptively alone, but has to be narrated, since only narration is able to reflect and express temporality. Temporality cannot be expressed directly in phenomenological discourse of lived life, but requires the medium of narration (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 389).

To bridge the gap between individual (subjective) and social (shared and manifest) reality in understanding the life-world is one of the main targets of comprehensive sociology; life-world as a meaningful structure has to prove as a unity and as the constitutive ground of these two strains of understanding, the subjective and the social one. Furthermore, life-world becomes the ground for phenomenological reflection in general and of certain practices. Narrative identity

[4]Cf. Schapp (2004, p. 126): "*Anscheinend können wir nur über unsere eigenen Geschichten, über ihre Art und Weise, wie wir sie bestehen, wie wir in ihnen verstrickt sind, wie die Verstrickungen zustande kommen, sich lockern oder unentwirrbar werden, zu uns selbst kommen. Es handelt sich dabei nicht um eine künstliche Selbstbetrachtung oder um das, was die Psychologen unter Selbstbetrachtung verstehen mögen, sondern um eine 'Versenkung' in die eigenen Geschichten in der Weise, daß auf diese Geschichten sich neue aufbauen.*"

draws from this potentiality: *Sinngebung* is its existential attitude which can be analyzed by looking at the everyday action space: Firstly in its words and deeds forming habits of biographical relevance in multiple realities and histories; secondly, it can by investigated theoretically on the transcendental grounds of temporality of self and other; but also such investigation can apply a "third way," (or a "third time"[5]) namely reflecting constitution and genesis of a cosmos where our perspective on stories, their various courses we feel doubtful about in memorizing the past or projecting the future, become entangled in such a way that their multiple realities challenge our relation to Self, shared reality, and to Time.

Here, in life stories struggled with and perpetuated in a somewhat *literary* way, self- and mutually reflected narration does not only throw light on the genetic aspect of biographical constitution of reality but also on a social and ethical claim.[6] In such "fictitious" stories we have to process the unfolding of a story as we learn to know it: Not as a result, but from its own development we have to go through, we have to constitute this story in its relevance and meaning by ourselves. Then, we get confronted with constituting our own existential attitude not only to the story but to the facticity of existential attitude which yields to a horizon of meaning and possibilities not lived before and not yet experienced ourselves; only this constitution we can comprehend and maybe judge. Then, narration can serve as an itinerary and grammar of subjective experience.

Literarily figured life histories as one form of artistic approach to understanding our entanglement in (hi)stories exemplarily disclose the narrative constitution of a Self in an eminent way; in fact, since they are not restricted to a simple form of narration as we often experience this in everyday discourse (or also in interviews heading for the "oral history" of our contemporaries), they refer to the openness of any narrative act to be taken up as a new starting point for dealing with life history: not only in an esthetic way as reader or listener but as someone experiencing her own life story, her own experiences in the light of other stories, as someone becoming involved into comprehending stories. Thus, literarily figured life histories exemplarily point at the phenomenological task about how *Sinngebung* and its horizons are never self-contained (cf. Haker 1999, pp. 228f.), and they point at the ways intentionality – and the givenness of its worldly correlates – is brought about in how we communicate with each other (cf. Iser 1993, p. 430).

The example I want to mirror phenomenological deliberation on narrativity with is Uwe Johnson's novel *Anniversaries. From the Life of Gesine Cresspahl*: *Anniversaries* (*Jahrestage*) was originally published in four volumes between 1970 and 1983, but gains its unity only in the accomplishment of the narration: this by enlarging and enriching itself in the course the narrative dialogue takes.

Uwe Johnson's novel frames time from Weimar Republic around the 1930's to the abatement of the Czech reform movements in 1968. Political events – national socialism, World War II, occupation, displacement, the German partition, the regime

[5]Cf. below pp. 6 and 18.

[6]Cf. below: p. 19.

of East Germany, the reform of socialism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the Vietnam war – are reflected in an exemplary story of a family: narrated or better: refigured by Gesine to her daughter within the year 1968 during 366 days with an entry for each of them; thus, this way of narrating is both history and a story.

The situation of the stranger Gesine in the narrative setting of "Anniversaries" is the following: Gesine was born 3rd of March 1933 in Jerichow in Germany, in a part of the country that later becomes Soviet occupation-zone and afterwards East Germany. She is a single mother who moved to the United States when her daughter was four and who works for a financial institution. Her daughter Marie is a precocious and independent-minded 10-year-old who has readily and completely adopted New York as her home and who only speaks German (sometimes) with her mother.

I will start this coupling of phenomenology and literature under the perspective of narration, memory, and identity with a reading of Schutz and Ricoeur on (1) the problem of how we get access to and shift between finite realities, (2) the constitutive role of narration in social space, and finally (3) the reality history gains in narration as a restitution of memory.

1 What Could We Gain by a Narrative Access to Multiple Realities as Provinces of Meaning? – Mimetic and Symbolic Appresentation and Reference

Narration is always mediated for life-worldly practice and not only displays and states but also (re-)structures, reflects and re-establishes our social knowledge of the life-world in the temporal and perspective flux of reality. But under which conditions do pre-narrative sequences of everyday life become a narration integrating those events not simply taken for granted? Paul Ricoeur sketches out a criteriology of narrativity by his concept of appresentative mimesis of life in its historical ruptures: The everyday lived life as it expresses itself in acting already bears a relation to time which it has to present and represent mimetically; we have to acquit ourselves to time, thus we perform ourselves in time in our everyday action, and then have to restage this in memory, to represent it again which also means to present it anew, conceiving the representation as a potentiality of the narratable: In this process of presentation and representation narrative identity is constituted.

Mimesis as displaying our understanding of the world in our living aims at narrative identity, and it aims at the ways of constituting the self in its ambiguity of inner-, inter- and intra-subjectivity; finally, it structures life's temporal entanglement in histories as we relate ourselves to the multiple perspectives on self, its life-worldly reality with others and within time. Narration is the appropriation of these ambiguous multiple realities the self bears towards the social world and historical time; narrated time bridges the gap between inner, social, and historical time; time as narrated time figures a "third time" gained in relation of history and fiction, in the reception of narration becoming *a* – not the – history (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 397).

Such integrative processes of knowledge and meaning are performed in reflexive and especially in commemorative strategies communicated in narratives in a special way transcending the face-to-face relations of the everyday communications we lead in our world of working; we entangle our contemporaries and their realities with the past and with other persons in past and even future life – stipulating ways they will present and represent this narration within their own lives. Here, the exemplary mode of literature again comes into play: both as a narrated structure of our life-world and a narrative practice of constituting meaning; exemplarily this is, when "objective," everyday structures, their symbols and languages partially fail, and modes of narration have to search for other perspectives, different styles to capture this failure and the loss of structure. This "literary" approach in such broad and existential meaning reflects the habit of narration and the need to somehow invent one's own role as narrator anew.[7] Narration especially becomes relevant in such social structures "in which the meaning of subjective experiences (in memories, attitudes, and explications) is only mediately directed to others or to the results of their acts" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 257).

Thus, narrativity seems to span a large scope: not only of a certain discursive genre or a certain corpus of narrations, but also not a narrative program or praxis designating a course of action as narratives in continuous *narrated* sequences or fixed stories. Such sequential schemes, which are also potencies of performance, are latent narratives that are respectively *narratable*. We are able to narrate such schemes in our habitual, everyday patterns of action. The narratable distinguished from the narrated designates the poles of narrativity: The narratable as latent structure of our action-space, our *Wirkwelt*, mediates temporality in our understanding; and latently it aims at finding a narrated form.

This pre-narrative horizon is the structure of our experience we have in our everyday activity: It refers to a *Vorverständnis*, to a preconception, of the horizon we orient our action space in. Ricoeur terms these everyday habits "*figurating*" time in our everyday working space as "*Mimesis I*." This pre-narrative horizon gains a more complex dimension by memory: It enters a conceptual, a fictional realm where temporality is *configured* by structures of causes, reasons, means, and ends, insofar as the subjective presence of action space and its immediate experience is expressed in a horizon of narrated memory, gaining a distance to its prefigured reality of action space; such configurations bear a mimetic reality ("*Mimesis II*") as it is narrated face to face.[8] Its refiguration in a temporal framework where constitution

[7]I see here a concretization of Schutz's short notion on reconstitution of experience: "Besides, naturally intersubjective thematic relevances can be used again and again in the verification of the congruence of the schemata of experience and explication 'brought into' a We-relation by the partners. This plays an important role, especially in situations where (for one reason or another) language 'breaks down'" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 255).

[8]I hold forth about Ricoeur's analyses about the differences between historiographical and fictional types of mimetic narration: Both of them are similar in their basic structure of expressing reality, since both of them aim at reception of this figurate reality, taking it up and consummating it by relating the story to a realm of praxis in its temporality.

of memory becomes thematized itself and opens to collectively memorized time[9] finds its reality in the praxis of mutual reflection – or commemoration: "*Mimesis III*"' where subjective habits of expressing reality and action and narration gain a metaphorical reference over time and space, a context of interpretation (cf. Ricoeur 1988, p. 9) – a "third time." Here, the finite temporal horizons as they are closed as past reality or as an unalterable sequence of everyday routines of everlasting present, or even as routine anticipation of future events get transcended towards another way to present this past, present or future "Here and Now" in narration. As such a presentation it becomes relevant to our present world of working as a symbolical inclusion of something not present any longer or not yet present.

Thus, the intersubjective and especially the inter-generative life-world are constituted step by step in experience and its refigurations; only then, memory is constituted not only according to relevance but also to a historical horizon where the relevances of paramount reality fall prey to doubt. Only then does it get differentiated into the temporal horizon we situate ourselves in as contemporaries, predecessors, or successors, and it is differentiated into private and collective knowledge. Also, "finite provinces of meaning" differentiate themselves "upon which we bestow the accent of reality"; and only then can "we emphasize that it is the meaning of our experiences, and not the ontological structure of the objects, which constitutes reality" (Schutz 1962, p. 341).

Thus, reality means relation to our emotional (pathic)[10] and active (gnostic) life in our individual and collective habits and styles of living and leading our lives. But how are characteristics of this style linked to our experience? Schutz names a specific tension of consciousness, a specific perspective on time, an individual style of self-experience, and a social framework. There is a subjective and a collective side taking a share in these styles and habits, yet the focus lies on an inter-subjective participation in these finite provinces of meaning. As such we are always referred to a certain style of activity or better practice rooted in factual life-world:

> [I]n all cases in which such an inter-subjective participation in one of these provinces takes place, the existence of 'a material occasion or a material endowment' is presupposed. In other words, communication occurs by objects, facts, or events pertaining to the paramount reality of the senses, of the outer world, which are, however, appresentationally apperceived. This holds good also for symbolic appresentations, in so far as they are communicated or designed to be communicable. (Schutz 1962, pp. 342f.)

Yet, in memory, in differentiating the finite provinces of meaning – not only synchronically as "phantasy" opposed to "theoretical science," but diachronically as deferrals and adjustments in experiencing our lived life in its temporality – we

[9]E.g. the commemorative act where such multiple realities are reflected in their incoherency and finally, in their possible relations.

[10]Cf. E. Straus: The gnostic moment is related to the qualitative side of perceiving objects, or the *what* of meaning being displayed in perception; the pathic moment is related to the *how* of the givenness of our world.

Sympathetic relationship is due to our sensing, prior to the gnostic intentional mode of perceiving. Cf. Straus 1956 esp. pp. 329–350.

also transcend particular finite provinces of meaning: They are no longer separated, but also entangled with the story of our life and in narration with the lives of others. Memory – now as a paramount (not only finite) reality – does not simply encompass the finite provinces of meaning, but means a further attitude towards their multiplicity: an attitude which has to deal with their finitude *and* the possibilities to counter their finitude in interpreting and rearranging them in narration.

Symbolic appresentation especially concerns our experiences in and with the past – or in Schutz's words:

> all appresentational references [. . .] are characterized by a specific transcendence of the appresented object in relation to the actual "Here and Now" of the interpreter. [. . .] The symbolic reference, however, is characterized by the fact that it transcends the finite province of meaning of everyday life so that only the appresenting member of the related pair (the symbol or the story recounted to appresent the past, A.H.) pertains to it, whereas the appresented member (the persons and facts, the past experiences being remembered in the story, A.H.) has its reality in another finite province of meaning. (Schutz 1962, p. 343)

Entering the past by the narrative, entering a narrative world means to enter another province of meaning – but now with the attitude to mark this change, this transcendence, to mark the genesis of rupture and transcendence.

Social collectives – and their stock of knowledge constituting cosmological history – are not within the province of meaning of everyday reality; they have their reality in another province – what William James calls "the subuniverse of ideal relations," or a comprehensive order we only gain in reorienting ourselves or in configuring our reality in a second order mimesis: This forms their symbolical status in apprehension (cf. Schutz 1962. p. 353). For our pre-narrative knowledge of reality (with us lacking our memories in order to reassure this knowledge)[11] does not simply mean translating meaning of everyday reality into somewhat analogous historical relations, but it presses to narratively operate with and communicate our memory.

The paramount reality the past has gained in the action of narrating seems to be "fictitious"; yet, the reality not only of a narrated world, but first of all as a mode of the world of working as long as we remember and narratively communicate it, gains its own right, relevance, and meaning: In engaging with the past, the paramount reality of the "Here and Now" – our working world, we do not put into question – becomes troubled itself. In engaging with the past, entering the "province of narration" we break the demarcation lines of separate finite provinces: Their orders, the relevance-principle of "First things first" lose their coherency, plausibility, and validity, which are necessary to maintain trust in them; but they are also necessary to communicate one's own reality to somebody else.

This appresentation of a past – providing a relevance for the present – is symbolical, substituting something missing – and has to be life-worldly rooted again via a practice by which we share past and future worlds in a narrative approach to provinces of meaning. It is especially the structure of generativity that links narrative

[11]The face-to-face-relations of the past transcends the existence of consociates within the paramount reality.

and universal cosmological time: The line of successors is both a biological fact and an artificial figuration of remembrance. We enlarge memory via the line of memories of our predecessors or even further into the past in imagination; also it is possible to situate my time in the generative calendric time. The historically opened field of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors schematizes the anthropological relation of biological or cosmological time and cultural time of reconstruction of present, past, and future life-world (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 298).

The symbolical aspect of the generational line of succession relies in the appresentations of predecessors and successors, and its appresentations become operative in narration of the past: In representation, which is also a new presentation of a reality for the "Here and Now", it becomes an appresentation of the dead, and their presence is addressing next generations, as predecessors and successors replace the points of views of us contemporaries.[12] But this is achieved only as these generations are appresented in narration and its symbols, since only then, appresentation is inserted in a paramount reality of working, of a perpetuation of (commemorative) communication – configuring and refiguring time as Paul Ricoeur claims this for narrativity. One example we find in Johnson's novel where the place of birth, the house and hometown of Gesine – the narrator and character of this story – becomes a *lieu de memoire* which is narrated and thus alters time and again. These alterations track and incite her narration in order to gain a shared reality for the multiple identities she finds herself divided into within her life-story and not least for her young daughter Marie.

Yet, the demarcation line of the world of my present fellow persons and the world of the past, the temporal indices of proximity and distance become blurred; finitude which usually provides consistency and compatibility of the multiple coexisting provinces of meaning in the world of everyday life becomes troublesome itself. Here, the symbol – or the narrative mode of memory – baffles common structures of experience and their order of time.

Still, in remembering, constitutive structures of experience remain intact in so far as they might provide a ground for inter-subjective participation; remembering manifests narration, and narration on the other hand leads to further manifestations of interpretational and motivating relevances (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 256f.). In narration the mode of addressing attention to the stepwise constitution of provinces of meaning is symbolized itself by certain approaches the narration takes to introduce the past into the presences: In Gesine's case, this happens via a change of language – not only from English into German, but also in her local dialect, indicating her own relocation to the time she was a child living through the story she is telling; her daughter gets attentive to these switches, sometimes even prompts Gesine to take another turn when intuitively feeling that Gesine is not ready to confront herself with remembrance she has not come to terms with herself. An other example for narratively introducing the past into the presence is a

[12]The anthropological archetype of biography is the commemoration of the dead – as fundament for cultural mnemotechniques but also as motivation for individual (autobiographical) memory (cf. Assmann 1992, p. 33).

certain ritual to start another part of the story by taking up photographs, depicting the persons on them, introducing new characters into the story, and step by step embedding them into a broader perspective. Here, symbolizing is not only rooted in "a material occasion or a material endowment" but in the sociality – time, space, and reality – constituted by the attention of a narrator and her listener (the We-relation); by their emotional tension and the way each of these two persons *becomes* involved in past experiences gained in narrating and listening. World and time of the past are *definitely* closed, but they become potent and fecund again for present horizons of meaning: They become relevant again.[13] Narration re-establishes simultaneity with the "world of predecessors, history, and generations" – but what does such kind of fictional province *by means of its entanglement with facts* or at least *by its inner drive to root itself in facts represented anew in narration* mean for a notion of reality transcending the presence of face-to-face in narration?

2 The Narrative Constitution of Social Space

"Under what circumstances do we think things real?" – This is the focal point of Schutz's discussion and of the problem of indefinite multiple realities and finite provinces of meaning. Each of these universes is claimed to have its separate style of existence which nevertheless can be grouped in a hierarchical order: The world of senses or physical "things" as experienced by common sense, which is the paramount reality; going down the order, there are "the world of science; the world of ideal relations; of 'idols of the tribe'; the supernatural worlds, such as the Christian heaven and hell; the numerous worlds of individual opinion; and finally, the worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also infinitely numerous" (Schutz 1964, p. 136).

I have cited these lines Schutz uses in several contexts; here in his essay on "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality", Schutz's application of his phenomenological method on a piece of literature. This particular place where Schutz makes use of his insight on multiple realities is important to me, since here is a possibility to give the role and range of "reality" a further perspective: Schutz continues in outlining his attempt to "analyze the problem of reality in Cervantes' *Don Quixote*": "This is not the place to investigate by what means mind bestows an accent of reality on one of these sub-universes and withdraws it from others; nor how the transition from one realm of reality to the other occurs; nor finally, what features of consciousness characterize the various provinces or sub-universes of reality" (Schutz 1964, p. 136).

[13]Cf.: "The dividing line between the world of my contemporaries and that of my predecessors is not sharp. I can surely view all memories of my own experiences of Others as experience of past social reality. Indeed, as we have just remarked, the constitutive characteristics of these experiences are preserved in such memories. These are experiences in which Others were present in simultaneity with my life" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 88f.).

Schutz's interest is how Cervantes' novelistic structure deals and comes to terms with the experience of multiple realities and their plausibility, since Don Quixote's private reality neither is presented as a solipsistic one nor as unshareable with others. Both Don Quixote's sub-universe of madness and the paramount reality of the senses, in which the other persons of the novel live and act, contain "enclaves of experience transcending the sub-universes taken for granted by either Don Quixote or Sancho Panza and referring to other realms of reality not compatible with either of them" (Schutz 1964, pp. 136f.).

Cervantes presents a tableau of synchronous realities which become confronted with each other; nevertheless these differing realities find mutual structures and practices of co-existence or rather "workable interpretations of the everyday" – yet drawn from rather shallow explanatory patterns of shared knowledge, right at hand for a smooth way of doing away with a disturbing or even a "pathological" experience: Don Quixote's reality and the realities of his fellow persons get translated into each other by a simple immanent function of common knowledge: All irritations are due to the magical enchanters Don Quixote takes for granted, and Sancho Panza grants reality in adopting his master's habit; thus, it is a shared knowledge in their mutual practice travelling together, though the two of them deal with this reality differently. But this is only one pragmatic way to deal with the edges of common sense and to make it work convincingly, since this depends so much on a diligent rhetorical struggle and on the belief that our consociate *vis-à-vis* will react as we anticipate that he will – in Don Quixote's case this means he is stigmatized as a hopeless case of deceived perception and idiosyncratic habit.

The other side of convincing, comprehensive, and interpretive narrative structures is not only to make believe various persons into a shared reality where communication and joint action is possible, but also to provide a common ground on which we can explore this reality together: not only in making everyday action work, but also in sharing our task of narrating this reality and thereby to jointly reflect about what and how we share this narrative working. Only this would mean that both Don Quixote and Sancho Panza would enter the fictitious world as a (possible) paramount reality within their working world and not drop back into private fantasies (as Don Quixote in his delusional state) or into more or less patiently correcting a socially dysfunctional behavior (as Sancho Panza does or also Gesine when realizing her soliloquies in front of others[14]).

For mediating the past world appresented in memory with the present everyday world I am addressing my story to, this also means a struggle to regain a reality where action-space has lost its ground in stable identities of the person acting in it: Identities *seem* to regain *a narrated* plausibility, if the toil of commemorating is undergone. Such narration is a process of realizing the possibilities of existence in past, present and future – in a simultaneity of a life-world to be regained, whereas the respective realities remain in diachronous line as long as they only function as one particular finite province of meaning experienced by one person in her past

[14]Cf. below., footnote 16.

(or her fantasy) and now are represented as one separate part of her biography. Only if they get presented as a paramount reality in communicated narration entangling others and their stories, entangling the action of listening and following the time lines, and finally achieving them as history as a mimesis of the past for the present: Only then they are shared multiple realities transcending their finite[15] meanings and constituting an awareness of the genesis Self, World, and Time in their relevant structures have undergone in this narrative process.

Thus, there is a narrative claim not only to the story-teller but also to the listener or reader: a claim to enter the narrative world and to introduce it into one's own reality, shaping one's own subjective attitude towards the narrative process. Again: It is narration as a process of memory and the collective activity of commemoration establishing the historicality of the world (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 92f.).

Thus, reality is not a final result of a narrative rhetoric, but narration as practice of commemoration is a particular and paramount reality as it becomes a world of working in its own right: We not only prompt an act of fictitious narration, but in narrating we also constitute a world of working, a world which taints our everyday life, which alters our everyday's attitudes and relevances and preoccupations as we go on with other tasks.[16] Gaining its style of existence and of experience measures up to a need, even to an urge to reconstitute not only a common ground for cognition and thinking (remember W. James' question "under what circumstances do we think things real?"); furthermore, it reconstitutes a ground for styles of existence where we are able to start to regain possibilities: possibilities to judge realities in order to act and to live on contentedly with the confrontations between the multiple realities we have to share in our life-world of the everyday.

Fiction does not necessarily find its limits in a closed province of meaning or an imagined compound of reality. Rather, it enables an imaginative power to root narration in and as reality, to entangle it with other perspectives; thus, it transcends finitude, without leaving reality behind. In this sense, the fictitious bears a reality in its interplay with imagination: the fictitious functions as an authority to exemplify the imaginary beyond its pragmatic use – and this without getting torn away by delusion as in dreams or hallucinations (cf. Iser 1993, p. 381). By this entanglement with other stories and its endeavor to manifest its place among and with them, narration is oriented to a Thou, not only mimetically to objects in the world; it is already pre-predicatively (prior to a particular story[17]) and pre-reflexively (prior

[15]Finite insofar as this reality is attached to one intimate personality only or to a time gone by which is sealed within a person's memory.

[16]Sometimes, these different worlds merge into each other within our narrative preoccupation. Again, Gesine gives an example for this, looking for faces of her German past in the streets of Manhattan, arguing with characters of the story she told her daughter the last night, sometimes aloud; whenever she notices this, she ashamedly tries to explain to people present around her.

[17]The everyday life which is lived through pre-predicatively gains a temporal structure and a rough form by the means and ends of our acting. Nevertheless, it is not yet a story with a back- and foreground, against which it stands out as particular and memorable. Only then it would become a *fabula* – ready to be narratable.

to a particular plot[18]) directed to myself being with others: not only as direct communication, but on the grounds of transcending its closed finite province to prove reality for oneself and for others.

Narration – its quest directed to history of "what has been?", its quest directed to the personal life story of "how come that I am here and now and in such a state to place this question," finally its immanent problem to resolve such interrogation of personal identity into a narratable story – displays and enacts a care for life-world as a meaningful action space; narration gains force especially then when the handing down of structures of meaning no longer takes place by fixed symbols and roles; even more: It is a need and a care for trust in the narrated memory we share in commemoration. Here, narration needs composing as base for reflection. Thus, one realizes both in how far history and fiction concretize their intentionality towards a paramount reality in borrowing from each other faithfulness to facticity and trust in multiplicity or even plurality. History needs the narrative mode of fiction and fiction the historical intentionality of veracity (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 295). – What becomes manifest in literature is – following Ricoeur – on the one hand a reflection on pre-narrative reality (past and closed to subjective privacy) and the way we constitute identity in face of history of other lives and their stories; on the other hand, narrative communication has a repercussion on our understanding of life stories and shared life-worlds in general (cf. Haker 1999, p. 212).

3 Narration as a Restitution of Memory and the Multiple Realities of History

Uwe Johnson exemplifies this reflective narrative mode in his literary way to present life stories in performing the problematic act of narration; in fact, his novel narrates life stories as a reflection on how life story becomes narratable. The plot of Johnson's *Anniversaries* has its source in the commemoration of strangers; the place they have arrived at to leave their origins behind is "not a shelter but a field of adventure, not a matter of course but a questionable topic of investigation, not an instrument for disentangling problematic situations but a problematic situation itself and one hard to master" (Schutz 1964, p. 104). That it is hard to master is also due to the loss of regular patterns provided by the past: For Johnson's stranger Gesine, past is a potpourri of traumatic pieces she finds her memory and its recollections shattered into; her life history is full of kaleidoscopic realities she reluctantly tries to recount herself and to her daughter, tries to tell to someone with a lack of such

[18] A plot is a discursive structure when the narratable story becomes narrated, when the simple structure of "inacted time" (b after a) becomes complex – not only due to reasons and effects but to possibilities of what has or might have happened, of what might happen in the future; and of course of what and why might be remembered or forgotten and of what might be narrated now and especially: what might be narrated how.

painful experience. But on the other hand, there is her curiosity in reconstructing these pieces into realities: Realities relevant both to Gesine's former perspectives and to her present day need to restructure the past; finally, these realities are relevant to her daughter, who wants to have a share of Gesine's history for her own – where she comes from, who are her predecessors, her father she has never met and of whom she only bears few souvenirs to attach her remembrance to. For both of them "reality" mirrors the loss of identity so characteristic of a stranger – not only estranged from reality but from the background their own identity had as an integral part of their former biography (cf. Schutz 1964, pp. 96f.). Thus, narration of anniversaries, the stipulation by present occurrences to remember the past, gains a commemorative character – especially with disruptions of social reality due to living in social settings culturally different from a former style of existence, experience, and memory.

Within the year the novel covers, there are not only instituted anniversaries for commemoration of the past, but the novel – or rather, the practices of narration it unfolds and exemplarily manifests – itself becomes an anniversary for our own practice to become aware of the necessity of narration for our comprehensive action.

Gesine's focus on her early childhood is very much on her parents: A father with a peasant's background and a socialist's conviction who had settled in England as a carpenter during the political turmoil of Weimar republic, marrying a wife from a Mecklenburg family of landholders and following her back to Germany when she wanted to give birth to their child there. Gesine's mother killed herself due to psychical instabilities, suffering hard from collective guilt she felt as a German and a personal one not being able to carry out her rigid moral standards when everybody in the small town is arming for the outbreak of war. Gesine was raised and educated in the national-socialist and the communist system; she took one of the last chances to cross the border to West Berlin; took a job in Western Germany; her East German boyfriend was politically murdered before she gave birth to their child, to Marie.

In 1967/68 – the year when the narration is gaining shape – both Gesine and Marie have to come to terms with new circumstances: no longer on the run but not quite at home either. At least Gesine's identity (if not Marie's as well) seems to be torn between multiple realities with respect to history, political convictions and their delusions, and to differing languages and ways of life; this is both the motivation for narration and the outcome of it, yet in the end, these multiple realities come to represent the reality of the historical calamities of the twentieth century's social and political development *and* of a personal life, which Gesine does not simply take for granted but wants to share with her daughter and some of those close to her. This is why Gesine scrutinizes her memory and undergoes ways back to a past that does not want to pass. Yet she passes it on to who pushes her for stories with a child's eagerness but also with an airiness of someone whose memory bears not so many troubles with self-reflective doubt about a past she has never known.

Gesine's on-going account of her past is delivered in various voices – those of her parents, her classmates, official bulletins of the Nazi, and the Communist authorities etc. It is delivered in conversations, in dialogues allowing for interjections and questions by the child: This account is often straightforwardly narrative and

dialogical but occasionally interrupted by what she cannot explain to Marie: Shifting from recounted history in conversation to letters, to inner dialogues of Gesine, to a taped diary for Marie to listen in future time with Marie having another distance to her own past.

Extracting memory, configuring and refiguring time, Gesine tries to give reality to her childhood, her own pre-narrative time; she tries to document her doubts about what was told to her about her family, about people suddenly missing in her childhood world – secretly displaced by Nazi and Communist henchmen; she tries to document the various stories she was told, she tries to give her vague memories and her nightmares a background in narratives which are sound to her audience. Thus, Gesine aims at assuring her identity in time and space, in the framework of *possible*, *not merely fictional* reality. Finally this labor aims at Gesine's conviction to provide Marie with her own roots in the past, as there is nobody except Gesine to give a report about Marie's pre-narrative past. With time passing, Marie herself prompts her mother to narrate and record the seemingly infinite multitude of memorabilia to tell a story of how it has been or how it might have been, to reassure both about a past reality and what it can hold for in the present.[19]

At first, Marie only presses for stories as entertainment: "But what she wants to know is not a past, not even hers. To her it is an exhibition of possibilities, against which she believes to be immune; it is history in another sense" (Johnson 1993, p. 296). – Getting word of other realities – possibilities – does not trouble Marie's own reality and it does not transcend it. Thus, often there is wariness on both sides, about what might be revealed of the sheer weight of memories, about what both Gesine and Marie can stand and understand, but typically both of them are comforted by their agreement: To anchor a narration in the perspective "For when I am dead? – Yes. For when you are dead (and I will live on)." For this reason, Gesine tapes the confession why she might not be able to endure and about her suicidal thoughts, which she deposits for Marie until she has attained full age.

Finally, Marie shapes her own story (and her own symbols as a collection of newspaper-clippings of the present serving as "her present knowledge" of what is taking place around her, but at the same time it serves as images to relate to Gesine's stories) of Gesine's narration which has to stand the test to last as common ground for their investigation. If nothing else, narration gains its relevance in symbolizing the dead and the not bygone past; there are the dead of the past to be commemorated in their no longer speaking, yet nevertheless haunting the present memory: Commemorating them – providing a reality that transcends the past everyday life – might turn out to be more troublesome then the very "Here and Now." The dead and their passed away possibilities of meaningful reality place a demand on our care for this reality relevant for the here and now and for a critical

[19] "*Du wirst von mit sagen können: Meine Mutter war eine ziemlich unordentliche Person. [. . .] Wäre aber gern ordentlich gewesen, unbeeinflußt von Biograpie und Vergangenheit, mit richtigem Leben, in einer richtigen Zeit, mit den richtigen Leuten, zu einem richtigen Zweck. Ich kenne die Vorschriften*" (Johnson 1993 II, p. 889).

approach to the closed province of meaning in the past. Marie has to adjust her view to the logic of narration – no longer being a simple pastime: She has to adjust to what, how, and when Gesine narrates, if she wants to find a way to criticize what she is presented as history; and in taking up the claim Gesine's story puts on her, she becomes a critical interlocutor: The history as "mere" and "raw facts" enriches doubts on what has happened; the stories' different perspectives get confronted with each other. In the end, history will only have its facticity as carefully plotted narration.

Other means of access to the past include photographs, letters, newspapers, and the voices of Gesine's dead family and friends, who live on in her mind. The daily life of New York is registered by such diverse means as the *New York Times*, television, photographs, and dialogues between Gesine and Marie explicitly on today's news and their demands.[20] Here, the present prompts the way of commemorating the past: As a blast in the neighborhood of Gesine and Marie leads to the story of how Gesine's cousins died and burnt in an allied air-raid; as a Manhattan gang slaughter prompts the story of the fist dead person relevant to Gesine's life: a child murdered at "Kristallnacht."

But in this diversity, all of it serves the shared attempt to explain the fact Gesine assures Marie of: "Where I have come from, this place does no longer exist" – since a stable base for commemoration is lacking. It is an attempt not to explain how things have been, but how they might have been; and the multiplicity of narrative and dialogical styles is constitutive for this it is only in narration that this multiplicity can gain meaning for a life with the index of an "every day's reality," which becomes paramount as both of them sit together telling stories and listening to them. Since this is a paramount reality for their times at night after Gesine has come back from work and at weekends of extended narrative settings, since it takes a ritual function for their mutual life, they also can leave it for going to work, going to school, trusting in entering again this past world. Thus, only as a stable reality with its own right, the fictitious gains such a shape to be differentiated into doubtful and trustworthy memories. Only as it gains shape, it can be bridged with daily life, and it can be left and re-entered voluntarily and not by traumatic force of sudden memory.

This narration of Gesine's course of life exceeds a mere autobiographical remembering: Gesine realizes how perspectives and speculations about the past become confronted with others. Her own strand of narrating is supplemented by conversations with her father and her mother she recalls or even invents as they might have been possible if there had been a longer time together with her dead mother and herself starting to talk to each other; finally, her own narration is supplemented with documentary facts she investigates for – and thus, perspectives confronting each other also give shape to the former end- and aimless imaginations. "There is no univocality in the process-related character of narration – and this keeps genesis of a life story between truth and fiction" (Haker 1999, p. 229).

[20]Cf. Riordan (1989, esp. p. 65) for the documentary background.

Narration unfolds in the mode of the possible: It is a "possibility which nobody else than you could you could fathom out. What you think of your past is reality as well" (Johnson 1993, p. 671). – as Marie reassures Gesine. One reason for such merit of memory is the arduousness Gesine takes to link images of memory with her present commemoration of the past when she wants Marie to imagine what has happened; by this, she reconstitutes her own steps back into the past: She *invents* what might have been – not what has been; and thus, her story can be corrected, enlarged, and criticized, but this critique does not devaluate it; rather it reassures the trust in the narratable multiplicity of the fictitious which itself is able to assure reality.

Fiction is invention and imagination under the auspices of forced memory; it is not a question of make-believe, and it is not an aesthetization of imagination for multiplicity's sake. Only if we transcend imagination and the imagined to exemplary imagination as such – as is narration –, only then do we gain knowledge about "possible experience" and "reality"; only when living in experience and from there holding on to imagination, only when contrasting experience with imagination, one can have a concept of fictionality and reality. Such transgression of finite provinces of meaning in positing them as such distinguishes fictionality from delusion:

> Only if we phantasy and pass from the attitude of living in the phantasy [. . .] to the given realities, and if we, thus, transgress the single casual phantasying and its phantasm, taking both as examples for possible phantasying as such and fiction as such, then we obtain on the one hand the concepts fiction (respectively, phantasying) and on the other hand the concepts "possible experience as such" and "reality" [. . .] We cannot say that he who phantasies and lives in the world of phantasms (the "dreamer"), posits fictions *qua* fictions, but he has modified realities, "realities as if" [. . .]. Only he who lives in experiences and reaches from there into the world of phantasms can, provided that the phantasm contrasts with the experienced, have the concepts fiction and reality. (Schutz 1962, p. 238)[21]

Compared to this standard Don Quixote does not leave his finite province of meaning but replaces it with the world of working; he never trespasses the latter – this is his delusion (cf. Schutz 1962, p. 236). Yet, in Gesine's reconstruction, the past in order to explain inconsistencies between its "finite provinces" develops its own interpretative rules for narrating as the dialogue with Marie grows over the year: By this, it becomes their own province of meaning where they can test their doubts and reassure them.[22]

Experience of and not only *in* reality as in a pre-narrative orientation of everyday action leads to a capacity for distinguishing the narratable and the narrated according to a "specific time-perspective (the standard time originating in an intersection between *durée* and cosmic time as the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world)" (Schutz 1962, pp. 230f.). Narration as "third province,"

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[21] The German text has "experience" as a general noun: "*Erst wer in der Erfahrung lebt und von da aus in die Phantasie 'hineinfaßt', wobei das Phantasierte mit dem Erfahrenen kontrastiert, kann die Begriffe Fiktion und Wirklichkeit haben*" (Husserl 1999, Par 74a, S. 360).

[22] Cf. Schutz: "[. . .] in order to explain the inconsistencies between two sub-universes, we have to resort to the interpretational rules constitutive of a third one" (Schutz 1964, p. 155).

and narrative time as "third time," (what Ricoeur also terms "intersection" between the various claims of realities or concretely: the face-to-face-obligation between narrator and listener) constitute a field for intersubjectivity in its temporal and historical genesis. For example, this is the time of Gesine and Marie interrogating each other, being in touch with each other in the presence of constituting a world of the past reaching into past and its relevance for their present life being bound to the here and now. In this time, the narration opens a space for mirroring their affectivity, their involvement with the past. In this pathetic space both of them become sensitive for meanings the narration explicitly – and much more implicitly and latently – holds: meanings which have to become manifested within in this time and space – and beyond.

Exploring the narratable by narration in action and its works, the stories, in an ongoing project of both memory (of one) and commemoration (of at least two, getting entangled with the stories of their contemporaries, successors, and predecessors) is not merely the production of fiction but constitution of a life-world in its temporal and historical style not to be directly objectified – a life-world entangled in (hi)stories. This is a life-world we are bound to as we gain our identity from it to become a Self within the ruptures of time as it becomes historical. On the one hand with this runs that we are also historically *indebted* with an ethical condition of our Self as we gain it in narration. From this debt we gain our social reality not as simply constructed, but as a multiplicity that becomes a claim over and over again to challenge the foundations of our life-history, of its genesis and of the narrative communication by which it is presented: What does this multiplicity – not only what has been, but what might have been – mean to the present act of refiguring this story? How does this multiplicity prompt myself and others to refigure the time? How can this present narration be "guardian of time" in order not to be lost in paramount realities prevailing over this certain past? Passing on narrative frames for the possibility to discover both the temporal and historical dimension of our life-world is not only a duty imposed by a social reality but also by our personal condition to gain our own narrative identities – our life stories. This is the "third time" Ricoeur speaks of, and this is the reality narrativity constitutes as structure for social and individual categories of our biographical articulation.[23]

Such a structure, which Johnson unfolds and reflects on in the setting of his novel – and Gesine reveals in her narration both to herself and to Marie – is contrary to memory understood as mere storage. Such storage renders simply parts which seem to be variably at will and thus incongruent, but it is not invested for reproduction and reconstitution. Such memory might be effective, but will never be complete, coherent, or controllable, since exactly this would mean to expel the

[23]Cf. Schutz on this difference: "The relative-natural world view, viz., the social categories of biographical articulation which are contained in it, are in contrast experienced by the individual as something in the life-world to be overcome, as belonging to the potential zone of operation surrounding his life. The categories of biographical articulation are thus not boundary conditions of the lifeworldly situation, but are possibilities for leading life within this situation" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 94).

past into a sealed mental compartment, where it remains devoid of life and feeling (cf. Riordan 1989, p. 115).

Quite contrarily, it is invention where memory is reconstituted as a long forgotten, even unknown story: Then its personnel, the person's actions, places and times get intrinsically involved with each other. In this case – with fiction coming into interplay with history – life stories exceed mere biographical remembrance and become the "guardian of time," become the guardian of the past with its "subjective meaning" and relevance it had, when itself was in *statu nascendi*; then, narration gains comprehensiveness in a reflexive sense. Now these parameters of a person's actions, places, and time perform in their own right: as they might and ought to have occurred and acted. But this only manifests itself as we feel obliged to these parameters – or better: to our very own personal stakes – in our narration, since the past of the dead become past relevant to our present. We draw on certain general, non-specific aspects of the present, on symbols, if necessary.[24] Those aspects are fictionally transformed. We are rendering them justice and our narration renders trust and a coherent ground to live with, if only narration becomes a mutual process along with a doubt in finite provinces of meaning easily transformed into each other as in Don Quixote' s case.

Motivation for memory is extracted from the present and applied to the re-construction of the past. Narration serves as inter-subjective reflection, covering not only attentiveness on "the same topic," but also on the way we develop such attentiveness and an interpretation (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 255).[25]

The history we gain in such labor of (com-) memoration is never a "mere fact," and facticity is not applicable as demarcation to memory and reality. Also, the biography, the narrative identity, is not an object we try to come close to in the narration, but it is a medium for understanding, since it consists of the processes as a "labor of narration": not only mirroring in a "general fashion" of articulation; no historicity without narration, without the shared activity of narrative interpretation in an inter-subjective situation of interest, critique, and last but not least: trust, ranging from the proximity of a "We" to the distant and anonymous "Them" of the dead commemorated.[26] With the narration unfolding, mother, daughter, and the readers

[24]In *Anniversaries* the photographs displayed in the "New York Times" Gesine and Mary come by each day and discuss for their intention to display atrocities in Vietnam and their justification or abolishment, lead Gesine to choose occurrences of her life 30 years ago: refiguring this time, illustrating what she only has pre-narrative memory of and what also is out of range to experience for Mary herself (a dead body, burning houses after a bomb-attack).

[25]Cf. about the role which "intersubjective thematic relevances play in 'socialization' of the interpretational and motivational relevances": "even if we assume that the latter context, in which a particular theme is first given to partners in a we-relation, is different, not only is the attentional advertence (to the 'same' theme) co-apprehended in the processes of intersubjective mirroring, but so also is the kind of grasping and, at least in rudimentary form, the kind of interpretation on the part of the partner." (ibid.).

[26]Even those Gesine does not know about much but can only speculate about their histories, motives, perspectives in the narration that unfolds between daughter and mother.

not only invent but establish and broaden their own specific situation, their shared finite province of meaning where stories become both trustworthy and criticizable: Trust and critique secure this paramount reality for the possibility of a shared action-space, transcending again the commemorative practice towards other objects, aims, times, and places.

Here, we have "Narrative Transcendences" – from *Mimesis II* to *Mimesis III*, from the pathic endurance of a lived time in memory to reconfiguring new horizons for activity: a passage from the inflicted to the open elements of situation which I can change not only by action (as it might have been possible back in time when past was a working world of presence) alone but by and in all kinds of ways as wishes, hopes, and fears.[27] Narration answers to the problematic situation of the practices how to interpret memory in face of another Self (both myself and the other of myself); interpretation as a phenomenon of narrative practices clarifies the blurred dimensions of my life-world where and by which I encounter the tasks of the everyday. By narration we gain experience, since experience is not only a result of facts but for the most part imagination, reflection, and repetitive commemoration. Narration means to symbolize experience in order to render back a past, admitting one's guilt of the partiality of memory: A narrative redemption does not only soothe a stranger's memory of a shattered past but provides (social) knowledge of both facts and the multiplicity of realities we are confronted with.

Comprehensiveness aimed at by a sociology on phenomenological grounds can find its perspectives in the art of fiction, in the practice of fictionality as it is undertaken in our "living-in-stories." Phenomenology and Social Sciences analyzing how works of arts draw our attention towards the integration of multiple realities through time not only aim at special techniques applied by "*homo symbolicus*", but they aim at the central way our multiple realities constitute themselves temporally, historically, and biographically in narration. This is a way towards an assumed transcendence of finite provinces of meaning, sealed by time, yet also opened by the "third time" of narration.

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[27] Cf.: "Here we are at the transition from the imposed to the 'open' elements of the situation. I can no longer change the previous history of the situation, but within the present situation there are elements which I can influence, which I can change" Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 114).

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