Michael Barber
Jochen Dreher   *Editors*

The Interrelation of Phenomenology, Social Sciences and the Arts

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The Interrelation of Phenomenology, Social Sciences and the Arts

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Introduction

Michael Barber and Jochen Dreher

The papers in this volume were presented at the international and interdisciplinary conference "Phenomenology, Social Sciences, and the Arts," and they focus on the specific interrelationship of a philosophical, epistemological position and a particular social scientific perspective with distinct analytical potential to investigate art phenomena. The phenomenological perspective allows reflection on the subjective point of view of artists and interpreters because of its reflections on the eidetic features of consciousness and on such objective structures as the field of aesthetics, communication, meaning, finite provinces of meaning, music, and literature, because all of these structures lend themselves to the kind of eidetic, or essential-philosophical analysis for which phenomenology is known. The social science perspective by contrast examines the empirical, socio-historic preconditions of the triad: artist and interpreter, and the objectified work of art. The theory of the life-world developed in the interface of phenomenology and social sciences, via an eidetic phenomenological analysis, allows an interpretation of diverse reality spheres involved in the work of art, thus describing the symbolically established meaning structure which is responsible for the function of the art work as such.

The most significant social scientist and philosopher dedicated to the analysis of interrelations between phenomenology and social science was Alfred Schutz, the fiftieth anniversary of whose death was commemorated at this conference. As part of his work he used phenomenology to describe the epistemological foundations of social science, in particular Max Weber's concept of social action, which he took to be the nucleus of social science. Furthermore, Schutz developed a theory of the life-world, as well as a theory of sign and symbol, and an account of multiple

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realities – all of which especially serve the interpretation of art phenomena; in relation to this, Schutz's work on literature and music, in particular, became most crucial. Especially well-known among researchers in phenomenology and social science are his analyses of multiple reality spheres within Don Quixote, as well as his interpretation of Mozart's operas. One central thesis supported by the theoretical framework of the conference and in this book is that the analysis of production, as well as the perception and interpretation of art work, needs to take into consideration the subjective viewpoint of the artist, in addition to that of the interpreter.

Also relying on the eidetically depicted life-world that includes the subjectively centered viewpoints of individuals inhabiting various provinces of meaning, phenomenology analyzes the essential, philosophical features of literature, literary arts forms and their relationships to social sciences, art as communication, creative action, imagination, the aesthetic sphere, narrative, symbol systems, metaphor, finite provinces of meaning, intersubjective relationships, artisitic value, the visual arts, music, and the practicing of music. The perspective of social science, by contrast, discloses the empirical, socio-historical conditions at play in the creation and reception of the art work. Weberian social science, though, examines such conditions as they appear in the meaning which actors give to their acts as opposed to the meaning that an observer might give to such acts and thereby converges with a phenomenological focus on consciousness. The specific theoretical focus which combines both the disciplines of phenomenology and social science offers an innovative framework for the analysis of art phenomena, and makes possible a creative interpretation of a variety of distinct art forms and works, in addition to the realization of theoretical reflections on the interdependence of arts, phenomenology, and social science.

The conference was unique in that junior scholars presented papers on which senior scholars commented. This volume begins with several papers focusing on general questions of the nature of aesthetics and the relationship between phenomenology, the social sciences, and the arts. A second section presents various papers on literature, a third section treats music, and a fourth film and photography.

Several authors discuss the character of aesthetics and its relationship to social science and phenomenology. Masato Kimura authors the essay "Irrelevant Spheres and Vacancies of Artworks" which reviews the aesthetical theories of W. Conrad and R. Ingarden, both of whom battled psychologistic approaches to art. Their views, which recognize the "blanks" in works of art, open the door to the Konstanz reception theory of literature that involves an interplay, fitting for a phenomenological approach, between object and subject, between art work and interpreter, whose relevance-system, as Schutz described it, plays a crucial role in interpretation. In his essay, "Cultural Science in Literary Light," Lester Embree develops a *Wissenschaftslehre* by showing how the three literary art-forms that Schutz treats in his outline "Sociological Aspects of Literature," namely, poetry, drama, and the novel can be correlated with and can illuminate the cultural sciences of psychology, social science, and history. Hubert Knoblauch's "Projection, Imagination, and Novelty: Toward a Theory of Creative Action Based in Schutz," develops Schutz's theory of action by showing how it might be of use to explain

creativity. Such a theory of novelty will have to involve subjective features of action and cannot be fully dependent on the external events happening independently of the actor. Schutz's own stress on the cognitive and typificatory aspects of experience ends up marginalizing imagination, which is confined to a finite province of meaning. Knoblauch recovers aspects of imagination found in Schutz's own account of everyday life and expands Schutz's own theory by comparing it with Hans Joas' idea of situated creativity which involves coping with the everyday situations that confront us. Hisashi Nasu sets out, in his essay "Imagination and the Social Sciences," to undo the polarization between the arts and the social sciences, often construed as an opposition between imagination and reason – a bifurcation deriving from what Husserl called Galilean science. Nasu describes imagination as an act of consciousness and sees it as an ingredient in perception. He also contrasts imagination with perception and memory, and he then discusses how a kind of authorial construction of types characterizes both the social sciences and literature. However, social scientific types are more circumscribed (given their need to comply with the postulates that Schutz has spelled out). Hans-Georg Soeffner explores the significance of the entire aesthetic sphere in his essay "Functional Purposelessness: The 'Practical Meaning' of Aesthetics." Soeffner shows how perceptual experience contains the potential of constituting aesthetic objects and how the synaesthetic cooperation of the senses produces a unity within experience. This meaning endowing – a hallmark of phenomenological theory – also extends to the cultural constitution of symbols and symbol-systems that enable human beings to face the insecurities of existence. However, in contrast to the way that everyday knowledge provides security through routines, imagination produces an open rather than closed mode of reality: the aesthetic relationship to oneself. Aesthetics is related to science in its openness, but it does not follow science in its rational rules of construction. Ilja Srubar's "Art as a Paradoxical Form of Communication" highlights the paradoxes of communication through art, its physical givenness and yet its reference to a non-everyday reality, its meaning-structure as not susceptible to pragmatic intervention by beholders and yet dependent on pragmatically constituted meaning elements. As Srubar puts, one can phantasy oneself blowing through a steel door, but still there is resistance there to be overcome. At the lowest level there is the intersubjective context of action and the meaning-establishing acts of the body. Even semiotic literary works contain a non-semiotic level of meaning insofar as one must have bodily experiences of grief or fear to understand the semiotic significance referring to such experiences in a literary work. Non-semiotic elements are needed to activate the presence of the work of art. Finally, Anna Lisa Tota in "When Sociology Meets the Work of Art: Analytical Frameworks to Study Artistic Production and Reception" addresses the origin of artistic value, especially in the light of the recognition of such value, which is not stable but varies across contexts. Tota provides a sociological theory of such value as opposed to those who would attribute value to an artwork on the basis of its intrinsic features. In entertaining the question of who produces art, she challenges authorial accounts (e.g., romantic theories of genius) and reception accounts (Iser) since they overlook the social contextual and institutional elements involved in the formation and reception of

art. Schutz himself often discussed such elements in terms of in-groups and out-groups. The social factors affecting art consumption are to be considered also. Tota concludes using the example of Boticelli, whose art was not of value until it received an advocate in the nineteenth century critic Aby Warburg.

Literature is one of the areas that Alfred Schutz examined in its relationship to phenomenology and the social sciences, and several of the authors in the conference addressed this intersection of themes. Gerd Sebald discusses the metaphorizing, or understanding one thing in terms of another, in his essay "Crossing the Finite Provinces of Meaning: Experience and Metaphorizing of Literature and Arts." Such metaphorizing occurs when one understands one event in terms of another, as Schutz understood his meeting with Edmund Husserl in terms of Goethe's Wilhelm Meister novels. This boundary crossing between provinces of meaning occurs in more mundane moments, as when the present awakens a past experience that explicates the present or when written signs passively evoke meanings. Amalia Barboza in her essay "Sancho Panza and Don Quixote: The Documentary and the Phenomenological Method of Analyzing Art Works" contrasts the methods of Alfred Schutz and Karl Mannheim, utilizing Don Quixote as a test case. Whereas Schutz attends to art as a close province of meaning, Mannheim reads the text as a "document of the time" and the historical and social conditions, including the *Weltanschauung* from which it emerges. Barboza's essay achieves the synthesis of the viewpoints of sociology and phenomenology, in line with the purposes of the conference. Michael Barber, in "Literature as Societal Therapy: Appresentation, *Epoché*, and *Beloved*," analyzes the levels of transcendencies overcome through appresentation in novels. Narratives, usually from the narrator's perspective, overcome the spatio-temporal gaps and the gaps between persons, and the entire novel, with its fictional life-world, appresents a more profound meaning. Hence Toni Morrison's novel *Beloved* appresents the cruel and horrifying trauma of slavery, whose reliving through the novel is the first step toward societal healing. Martin Endress' essay "*The Man without Qualities* and the Problem of Multiple Realities – Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil Revisited" challenges the classical interpretation by Peter Berger of Musil's novel in terms of multiple realities. Endress inquires whether Musil's "other condition," which seems to transcend the entire world of everyday life (that includes all multiple realities) can really be understood in terms of "multiple realities" at all. Instead, Endress suggests that the concept of "multiple realities" can be extended to include more and more abstract levels of reflexivity. Annette Hilt, author of "Entangled into Histories or the Narrative Grounds of Multiple Realities," examines, with the help of Uwe Johnson's novel *Anniversaries* and its main characters Gesine and Marie, how biographical narration in particular constitutes personal identity and intersubjective action. Narratives appresent the past symbolically, disclose our entanglements in histories, confront various perspectives in the past with each other, and constitute an intersubjective world of working. In "The Universe that Others Call the Library: Redconstructing the Symbolic Mystifications of the World of Everyday Life," Jochen Dreher discusses how the logic of the poetic event, which differs from the logic of everyday life and rational truth, applies to Jorge Luis Borges' short story

"The Library of Babel." Following Schutz's views that symbols within the world of everyday life-world appresent the transcendent ideas belonging to other spheres of reality and relying on Schutz's idea of contextual or interpretational schemes, Dreher detects competing meanings for the comprehensive library of libraries in Borges' story. The library can appresent the idea of a strong authority (like that of the European totalitarian systems) or the idea of chaos insofar as one cannot find the book one needs and insofar as within this library one regularly becomes lost in a labyrinth.

Schutz, himself a pianist, repeatedly reflected on music, phenomenology, and social relationships, and hence several of the authors in the volume have taken up and developed his own thought in this area. First there is the essay "The Tuning-in Relationship: from a Social Theory of Music towards a Philosophical Understanding of Intersubjectivity," in which Carlos Belvedere begins with the tuning-in relationship experienced in music and then takes up Richard Zaner's criticisms of Schutz's account of intersubjectivity. According to Zaner, the application of the concept "appresentation," appropriate for perception of things, when applied to persons ends up making simultaneity between persons incomprehensible. Belvedere responds to Zaner's criticism by pointing to the inevitability of subjective perception, the metaphorical character of "appresensation," and the passive-synthetic character of intersubjectivity as a datum of the life-world. Chung-Chi Yu's paper, "Mutual Tuning-In Relationship and Phenomenological Psychology," shows the centrality of phenomenological psychology in Schutz's project to found the social sciences philosophically – a project that differs from Husserl's treatment of phenomenological psychology. Yu argues that the mutual tuning-in relationship of music explains the various relationships involved in musical composition and performance and clarifies the "we-relationship" at the core of phenomenological psychology. Andreas Göttlich, in "Music, Meaning, and Sociality," attempts to demarcate the boundary between phenomenology and sociology in music. Music, as possessing symbolic meaning and referring beyond the world of working to the reality sphere of art, depends on social relationships between listeners, musicians, and composer. The composer, though, in laboring "to get it right," to exercise the kind of creative expressiveness that Helmut Plessner described, proceeds in a manner more accessible to phenomenology and its focus on the subjective viewpoint of the composer than to social analysis. Andreas Georg Stascheit, in his essay "The Problem of 'I Can': Methodological Reflections on Creative Practice," distinguishes creative practice as extending the horizon of the Husserlian "I can" from "training" which seeks achievement. Creative practice effects a transformation of the practicing subject. The subject transforms itself through such practice through reiteration, variation, a dialogue with the environment and listening to itself, continual transformation of the object practiced, the conversion of the practicing subject into both a spectator and actor at the same time, and the transposition of itself into a state of permanent becoming. Mototaka Mori begins with Schutz's criticism of Maurice Halbwachs' identification of musical language with musical notation in his essay "Musical Foundation of Interaction." Mori, on the basis of Schutz's analyses of opera and

the polythetic feature of music, discoverable in phenomenologically illuminated conscious experience, argues that music fulfills the role of intermediary between persons in much the way that the body and language do.

Although Schutz himself did not comment on film or photography as a work of art, several authors saw this area, too, as one in which Schutz's insights could be applied. George Psathas begins the section of the book dealing with film and photography with his essay "Interpreting Film: The Case of Casablanca," in which he suggests the different approaches that sociology and philosophy might take in interpreting film. He points to the cultural presuppositions implicit within a film that can be social, political, military, historical in nature and that can include such elements as membership categorization, national purposes, and gender relations. After illustrating such presuppositions as they surface in the film "Casablanca," Psathas goes on to discuss the sociology of practical reason by showing how the order to "round up the suspects" at the end of "Casablanca" involves an utterance, a social action, open to multiple meanings, depending on the social groups issuing and receiving the order. In the essay "A Phenomenological Inquiry of *Rashomon*," Ken'ichi Kawano examines the great Japanese film directed by Akira Kurosawa. The story, on the death of a samurai, is narrated through different subjective perspectives in such a way that one wonders if there would be any way to determine objectively what happened. However, the constant invalidation of one perspective after another by the reader indicates that one supposes there is some objective account. The movie, Kawano concludes, reveals the importance of ambiguity, the influence of varied stocks of knowledge, and the need for continual inquiry. The final essay in the volume, Thomas Eberle's "The Art of Making Photos: Some Phenomenological Reflections," analyzes the activity of photograph-taking as valuable in its own right, even if photos are never developed. Eberle describes photography as a matter of a certain attention *à la vie*, of adopting an always varying, contextualized "photographic gaze." Eberle describes the features of this gaze, the tension of consciousness of a distant, solitary observer, who sees things in frames; chooses a foreground and background; takes account of the dimensions of space, time, and social relationships; engages in a kind of free variation; and masters the technical skills necessary to take full use of cameras. Eberle's essay, like Stascheit's, represents an account of art from the viewpoint of an artist.

One finds in this book a panoply of references to concepts that those familiar with Schutz's and Husserl's work will recognize and that play a key role at the intersection between the social sciences and the arts: the opposition to psychologism; the subjective point of view of the actor and the interpreter; finite provinces of meaning and the relationships in particular between the world of working, arts, social science, and phenomenology; *Wissenschaftslehre* (interrelating the sciences to each other); the theory of action and creativity; the role of imagination; type construction; meaning-endowment; the pre-semiotic engagement with the world; the role of in-groups and out-groups in the appreciation and valuing of art; symbol theory; appresentation; the overcoming of levels of transcendencies; identity and intersubjectivity; schemes of interpretation; the tuning-in relationship; passive synthesis; phenomenological psychology; the "I can" of Husserlian habitualities;

the role of the body; the critical examination of presuppositions; perspectival interpretation; the attention *à la vie*; and the role of space, time, and social relations in activity. This book shows the vitality of the phenomenological perspective of Alfred Schutz, that it is highly relevant to a rich understanding of aesthetics, social science, phenomenology and their intersection and to the specific areas of literature, music, and the visual arts. It is also significant, as this volume shows, that both junior and senior scholars from many disciplines and from many national origins were able to find the Schutzian framework fruitful for the analysis of art. In fact, this is the most comprehensive book ever produced on the relevance of Schutz's phenomenological and social scientific framework for the arts. Finally, the vitality of the framework is proven in that the authors creatively take Schutz's work beyond itself, investigating new applications and extensions of his approach.

Part I
Aesthetics and the Social Sciences

Irrelevant Spheres and Vacancies of Artworks: Phenomenological Aesthetics Revisited

Masato Kimura

1 Phenomenological Aesthetics Against Psychologism

Around the turn of the nineteenth century, Gustav Fechner's experimental aesthetics had become influential, which advocated "aesthetics from below" against the idealist speculative aesthetics arguing about the ideas of aesthetic beauty "from above."[1] Experimental aesthetics introduced the inductive method to define aesthetic values, for instance, collecting data of people's reactions to geometrical figures or proportions such as the golden ratio. Theodor Lipps and Johannes Volkelt, critically inheriting Fechner's methodology, systematized the aesthetics of empathy (*Einfühlung*). They understood aesthetics as an applied psychology, and the beauty of artworks as effects of beholder's empathy regarding it. Accordingly, the object of the aesthetics should be the psychological principle of our aesthetic impressions in this perspective. Moritz Geiger as a phenomenologist also admitted that Lipps' view was "the common basis for many aestheticians" around that time (Geiger 1915, p. 68).

Hence, also in the field of aesthetics, the first requirement to the Husserlian phenomenology was to overcome psychologism. And it were, amongst all, Lipps' former students in München University such as Johannes Daubert, M. Geiger, Alois

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[1]Ingarden reports the situation of the literary study at the time: "What with the tendencies to psychologism in aesthetics which were still active at the beginning of the century (especially in Germany, for instance in the works of Theodor Lipps and Johannes Volkelt) and the aftereffects of psychology and historicism of Dilthey, literary study was constantly diverted into other fields of investigation, primarily into a historically colored individual psychology of the poets. Husserl's antipsychologism and the attempts to reorient aesthetics took effect very slowly in the field of literary study" (Ingarden 1968/1973, pp. 3f.).

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Fischer, and Theodor Conrad, as well as Husserl's students in Göttingen represented by Waldemar Conrad and later Roman Ingarden, who undertook this task.[2]

W. Conrad (1878–1915) was the first to apply phenomenological method to aesthetics in his paper on the structure of aesthetic objects (Conrad 1908/1909). This paper appeared in the journal, *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunst-wissenschaft*, which was the journal edited by Max Dessoir, an aesthetic theorist who played an important role in promoting the general science of art, trying to reintegrate art and beauty dissociated since Konrad Fiedler's science of art (Dessoir 1923).

Against the psychologistic notion of aesthetic effects (*Wirkung*), Conrad claimed the peculiar ideal being of artworks. "The essential thing for Conrad is to distinguish the aesthetic object from the performances to which it gives rise, and, above all, from the perceptions which we have of it. Since the aesthetic object is distinct from its epiphanies, it is an ideal object" (Duffrene (1953) 1973, p. 217). Although he acknowledged that our value judgments regarding artworks could be seen as the effects of the aesthetic objects, he rather insisted on the importance of inquiring into the "intentional relationship" to the object, which value judgments drew upon.

> When we evaluate an artwork, this is beautiful, or that is not beautiful, then these (actual) judgments are surely "effects" of the artwork in some sense, but it is at any rate more than that. We say, "the judgment means something," or "the judgment is related to an object and evaluates this object." Or as far as we speak of actual judgments, we say, for instance, "We mean something in this judgment," and we are oriented to an object and evaluate it. And looked at closely, this "relation to an object" is found also in the "acts" of observation, the grasping, and enjoying of artworks, upon which the judgments are founded. (Conrad 1908/1909, p. 73 –My translation)

Conradean strategy to approach artworks is based on his characterizing our appreciation of arts by its difference from our perception of natural objects as "real" things. For instance, Ludwig Beethoven's fifth symphony as an aesthetic object must be distinguished from both its musical score and each performance, which we can really perceive here and now. Real things are rather contraposed to ideal objects, and the phenomenological descriptive method is required by Conrad to grasp the latter. According to him, it is the feature of natural science to grasp object in the sphere of real things, and psychologism has erroneously reduced aesthetic realities to such empirical-naturalistic realities.

In the view of evading psychologism, and also for the reason that we cannot escape possible false senses in the naive attitude, Conrad requires that phenomenological intuition identify this philosophical attitude with the "adequate" aesthetic attitude or *Kunstgenuß*.[3]

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[2]See the details of Husserl's first contacts with Münchener students in Spiegelberg 1982. The influences of the great mentor and the students were bi-directional. Scaramuzza and Schumann (1990) discusses that Husserl's notes on aesthetics (Hua. XXIII Beilage VI, VII, LX) are based on the lessons from Fischer's *Habilitationsschrift* entitled *Untersuchungen über den ästhetischen Wert* (unfortunately not published).

[3]As his methodological basis, Conrad refers to Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* and his lecture on "*Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft*" (Husserl, 1973). This lecture

2   W. Conrad: Irrelevant Spheres of Artworks

In the concrete analysis of aesthetic objects in the case of music, Conrad concentrates on the issue how an ideal musical object (artwork) can be constituted. He argues that the structure of musical object can be articulated in two ways, i.e., musical "sides" (*Seiten*) and "pieces" (*Stücke*). The "sides" consists of four further essential qualities of sound (*Ton*) as "the simplest musical type," namely, pitch (*Tonhöhe*), duration, intensity, and tonal color (*Klangfarbe*). "Pieces" consist of rhythm units and meaning units, which are respectively structured into further different levels into single tones. The two kinds of units are independent from each other. According to Conrad, these articulations are "essentially" attributed to the aesthetic object, namely independent from the listener's arbitrary experience (Conrad 1908/1909, p. 89).

Pitch, duration, intensity, and tonal color are the qualities of sound behind which we cannot go, and "when natural scientific-mathematically expressed, sound as such is to be seen as the function of these four variables, within which value setting the sound can be defined" (Conrad 1908/1909, p. 81). Among four qualities, the incomparable property is the duration of sound, which is fulfilled by the other three, not vice versa. And pitch is a "substantive" quality contrary to the other two, because we can speak of the "same sounds" only by identifying the pitch, even with different intensity and tonal color (Conrad 1908/1909, pp. 83f.).

Different sounds are united by characteristic patterns of these four sides, which form "an acoustic core" of the melody and the musical piece as a whole. The most decisive for melody is "sound line form" (*Tonlinienform*) determined in the coordinates of pitch and duration, which he equates with the contour of a painting (Conrad 1908/1909, pp. 91, 101f.).

According to Conrad, intensity and tonal color are in the background of a listener's interests, while their "expression character" (*Ausdruckscharakter*) and "sound atmosphere" (*Stimmungston*) come to the fore. These two psychological factors depend not only on the combination of sound sides, but also on the meaning units, and the effects and resonance brought by each of them reflect upon each other. Conrad seems to understand these as noetic/noematic spheres of psychological impacts inherent to the sounds.

While the musical arts are characterized as temporal art forms (Conrad counts also poetry among such art forms) to be analyzed temporarily along the rhythm and meaning units, which are based upon the duration of sound, the articulation of sound qualities and their fringes enables us to see further the thematic relevance structure of music, which is conceived spatially or better horizontally.[4]

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is known nowadays under the title "*Ding und Raum*" published in *Hussaliana XVI*. By Conrad's manner of applying phenomenology to music, poetry, and the spatial artworks, Husserl was "impressed greatly" (Spiegelberg 1982, p. 167).

[4]Mazzoni (1998) investigates possible developments of Conrad's analysis of temporal melodic structure of music.

Conrad maintains that the acoustic core and its psychological fringes constitute "the most important sphere within the object field" of music, which is, however, surrounded furthermore by the sphere of "*Mitgemeinten*," that is, the horizon of intentional meanings (Conrad 1908/1909, p. 91). And this is what is interesting to us, in view of situating Alfred Schutz's concept of the social sciences in relationship to phenomenological aesthetics.

The sphere of *Mitgemeinten* is articulated by Conrad into two components: those implicit and those explicit. The former includes possible division, complexion, and relationship of acoustic core, and the latter consists of the further four components: (i) the non-acoustic milieu such as the "fringe" of reverberation which poses as a preparation of the succeeding sounds and which evokes the claps and cheers of the audience (this fringe named by Conrad "temporal environment" of the acoustic core); (ii) personalities of composer, players, or singers; (iii) those associated by the listeners to the music such as their memories of the past; and (iv) those depicted by the musical theme in the horizon of acoustic core.

In this context, Conrad expounds his suggestive notions of "spheres of irrelevance," and "the allocation of interest" (*lnteresseverteilung*) distinguished from the field of subjective attentions.

> Taking the allocation of interest into account: an aspect falls in the "foreground" of interest, and others in the "background," and so on. Namely the question is not about what subjective attentions or interests accidentally turn to (*Zuwendung*) in the above mentioned field of attention. Rather our interests are required by the object . . . . (Conrad 1908/1909, p. 91. My translation)
>
> We distinguish the acoustic core and the adherent psychological characters in the case of musical object. Both can vary within a certain boundary without any loss of the identity of the meant object. For the moment there is always a *sphere of irrelevance* in the aesthetic domain in contrast to the mathematic. The absolute pitch (the pitch position of the melody) and also the tempo and intensity (clearly in changes brought by distantiation) and so forth can vary within a certain, more or less small sphere without the completeness of performance in danger. (Conrad 1908/1909, p. 105. Translated and italicized by MK)

Conrad's idea of the sphere of irrelevance is inspired by the Husserlian notion of *Ideation*, i.e., free imaginative variation to reach an eidetic from an arbitrary instance (Husserl 1954, sec. 87–93). Irrelevant spheres explain why we can identify an aesthetic object in spite of each performance in greater or less degrees of expertness and in a different instrumental setting. If a performance violates the relevance sphere of the musical identity, then it is recognized as an erroneous incomplete performance or the one of another different piece (Conrad 1908/1909, p. 105). Conrad considers the above mentioned "sound line form" especially vital for the preservation of the melodic identity. Since intensity and tonal color play little role in (i.e., they are irrelevant to) the constitution of the sound line, the irrelevance spheres of these two are broader when considered from the viewpoint of melodic identity. And if I might put forward an amendment, what is relevant to the melody is not the "absolute" pitch and duration of the sound, but relative distance and interval between each tone, (in the case of jazz or karaoke, we often play the sound with a different key and tempo) although the rhythm units have to remain of a hearable size.

Also noteworthy is that Conrad understands the allocation of interest not to be a subjective psychological matter, but rather it belongs to the objective side, or better within the intentional relationship of beholders to aesthetic objects. Schutz's notion of relevance is sometimes interpreted as an indication of his alleged "subjectivism," but he uses this term instead of "interest" exactly to keep away from the subjectivist connotation of the latter. It is not certain whether he had ever read Conrad's paper (at least, no reference is found in Schutz's published works), but I see here in Conradean object aesthetics a precursor of Schutz's ingenious relevance theory. Schutz himself also adduces instances of actual and marginal topics of music (*Haupt-* und *Nebenthema*) in his earlier fragmental manuscript on relevance Schütz 2004 [1929] as a better metaphor of the "counterpointal structure" of mind than that of personality split. So it is surely affirmed that his relevance theory derives an important inspiration from the structure of music. And Conrad's analysis suggests the potentiality for us to read Schutz's relevance theory as a theory of interpretation of artworks, too.

Generally speaking, Conrad's endeavor has not been thus far influential in comparison to the other phenomenologist such as Geiger or Ingarden. But it leaves no room for doubt that he laid the first foundation of the phenomenological aesthetics in terms of his investigation on the peculiar mode of being and the stratified structure of aesthetic objects. His insights further anticipate Ingarden's ontologist theory of aesthetics in essential points, as I will show in the following section.[5]

3   R. Ingarden: Multiple Layers and Vacancy of Artworks

Conradean object aesthetics was developed further critically by Roman Ingarden, a Polish phenomenologist, who also belonged to the Göttingen circle. Born in Cracow under the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in 1893, he studied under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), a student of Brentano in Vienna from 1885 to 1889,[6] and thereafter became a student of Husserl at Göttingen (1912–1915) and also in Freiburg (1916–1918).

Ingarden published his major works in aesthetics, *The Literary Work of Art* (1931), *Ontology of the Work of Art* (1962), and *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* (1968) which cover literature, music, picture, architecture, and film. After the Soviet annexation of Poland, he was forbidden to teach from 1949 until

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[5]Conrad's object aesthetics also anticipates the New Criticism flourishing in the Anglo-Saxon world in the "autonomous" mode of being (*Seinsweise*) of the artworks, which they call "texts". They also maintain that the literary criticism can be understood as an individual science by dispelling the so-called "intentional and affective fallacies" with which we identify the meaning of texts with either author's intention or reader's affection (Cf. Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946).

[6]See Rollinger (1990) for the relation between Twardowski and Husserl (pp. 139ff.).

1956 because he pursued an alleged idealist direction against Marxism. According to Spiegelberg, it was after the late 1950s when Ingarden's prominence mainly developed on the international scene (Spiegelberg 1982, p. 224), and after the 1960s his works on aesthetics have been increasingly reevaluated, given the success of the Konstanz school of reception aesthetics.

Ingarden's aesthetics departs from his recognition of the specific mode of being of artworks as in Conrad, and he shared Conrad's views that a musical work should be identified with neither its performances, score, nor listeners' mental experiences of it. At the same time, however, he takes a censorious attitude toward Conrad, who identifies aesthetic works with ideal objects.

Ingarden distinguishes artworks not only from mental experiences and physical reproductions, but also from ideal objects like mathematic objects, because an artwork is something existing in time, having its date of birth and changing in the history. And he defines the mode of being of an artwork as that of a "purely intentional" object, because every object must be intended to be objectivated. The objectivity of purely intentional objects cannot be reduced to either an idealist or realist notion of existence. Ingarden admits that Conrad also detects a difference between an artwork and a mathematical objectivity, but "Conrad is here too much under the influence of Husserl's position in the *Logical Investigations* to grasp the peculiar mode of existence of the literary work," and "his arguments regarding this question are still quite primitive," due to the lack of "existential-ontological investigations."[7]

However, Ingarden also concedes Conrad's "correctness in principle" and the kinship with himself in his finding of the stratified structure of artworks. Similar to Conrad's recognition of different "sides" of the artwork as an object, Ingarden also sees the different "strata" of artworks. Independent from any interpretations, the artwork (especially literary work) has an objective structure of four strata of sound, meaning-units, represented objectivities, and schematized aspects (schematic means that absolute qualities are in a sense already idealized and formatted to be recognizable).[8] And different layers, in turn, invited manifold interpretations due to their multiplicity which surfaces differently in terms of the interpreter's diverse interests and knowledge.

Noteworthy here is that the third and fourth layers are conceptualized by Ingarden as something including "indeterminate spots." (*Unbestimmtheitsstellen*)

For example, if the story of a novel "takes place" on a given street in Tokyo, and a reader does not know the place from his own experience, the reader has to imaginatively concretize and actualize these spots of indeterminacy of the description, while he actualizes also the predetermined aspects of the given street (Ingarden

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[7]Ingarden 1931, pp. 27f. = 1973, p. 32. Krenzlin summarizes the difference between Conrad, Geiger, and Ingarden in terms of their treatments of *Seinsweise* of artworks (Krenzlin 1998, pp. 50f.).

[8]However, Ingarden recognizes only one stratum of sound formations in a work of music, and two strata of objectivities and aspects in the case of painting.

1931/1972, §42). Represented objectivity cannot be unequivocally determined, but can be only a schematic skeleton with indeterminate spots. Adumbration as unlimited diversity (*unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit*) is, *ex vi termini*, indeterminate in different perspectives. Ingarden introduces the notion of "concretization" in this context, which means filling vacant spots and completing the artwork in the beholders' perspective.

Unlike the classical aesthetics, Ingarden's insight into indeterminate spots and concretization tolerates the beholder's active participation in the art creation. Here, I would like to point out that we can think of these spots of indeterminacy as kinds of "variables" contained in the text, which Conrad rightly analyzed in his theory of irrelevance. The variables in artworks give rooms for the reader's or spectator's "free" interpretation,[9] without, however, violating the identity of such artworks.

Gaps and vacancies are not a deficiency, but essential components of the artwork, as they make artistic expressions pregnant with implications. This idea very much inspires Konstanz school, especially Wolfgang Iser (1970), to which Schutz's analysis of thematic relevance made a significant contribution.

4   Theory of Vacancies and Structure of *Nichtwissen*

The theory of the vacancy is a systematic plan of a book sketched by Schutz in his draft on relevance (Schutz 1970, pp. 159ff.), and this later evolved into his original published work of sign and symbol (Schutz 1955).[10] According to the Schutzian theory of symbol, each province of meaning such as the world of science, dream, fantasy, etc., is a finite holistic universe of meaning. But every given world has its open horizons of space and time which transcend the actual here and now, and human-beings come to terms with these sorts of transcendences, using the signs and symbols immanent within the world in question.

Transcendences to be fulfilled by signs and symbols are called "vacancies" (*Leerstelle*) by Schutz in his above-mentioned manuscript, and in order to clarify the ambiguity of the term "unknown," (*Nichtwissen*) Schutz planned to dissect them into three types of "unknowns":

> A. What has never been known and has to be known;
> B. What was formerly known and has been lost;
> C. The "hidden" (covert = *verdeckte*) knowledge.
> (Schutz 1970, p. 162)

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[9]Although an interpretation is not indefinitely "free" since they it involves communicative processes within author's mind and text itself. Ingarden requires "polyphonic harmony" of different strata for an "adequate" interpretation. Iser was skeptical of this normative assumption, as I will argue soon after.

[10]Luckmann also embodied the theory of *Nichtwissen*, opaqueness of our knowledge, in *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* (Schütz and Luckman 1979).

In the succeeding sentences, it is further suggested that (A) the typically expected knowledge be referred to as a "blank," and (B) lost knowledge be an issue of inner and outer horizon in the Husserlian sense, respectively whether it is elements or contexts which are lost. (C) Hidden knowledge indicates the issues of different modalities as well as negation.

We should remember that, Schutz distinguishes in his paper on symbol (i) "marks," which correspond to the vacancies lost but within restorable reach; (ii) "indications," which means the appresentational relationships between certain things typically known as interrelated; (iii) "signs" manifesting others cogitations; (iv) "symbols," which arrange sorts of vacancies belonging to one province of meaning enclosed by another (And this kind of vacancy is called "enclaves").

In any case, vacancies of inner horizon are exactly what Ingarden called "indeterminate spots" found in the basal layers of literary artworks. Critically accepting Ingarden, Wolfgang Iser refines and extends the notion of indeterminate vacancies from his view of reading as communication between text and reader. Here, I cannot argue details of Iser's reception aesthetics within the remaining space,[11] but apparently Schutz's reflections made a significant contribution to this contemporary development of phenomenological aesthetics.

Toker (1994/95) examines Iser's somewhat vague usage of the term and sees the notion of vacancy as including three possible subclasses: "blank," "vacancy," and "gaps." (i) "Blank" refers to the "suspended connectability" of different segments of the text; (ii) "vacancy" in the narrower refers to "non-thematic segments"; and finally, (iii) "gaps" refer to the felt absence of instructions by the author, such as breaks in a serial novel.[12] By breaking the coherency of the text, vacancies rather facilitate and spur reader's imagination.

Interestingly, Iser's notion of blank, contrary to Ingarden, focuses on the above mentioned vacancies of outer horizon, which indicates a knowledge lacking context.[13] From the viewpoint of the reception aesthetics, readers are required to participate in reading as an action, namely, the process of selection and decision, and also to fill in blanks in order to secure coherency despite thematic alternations of different segments. And in this context of thematic-horizontal relationship of text segments, Iser cites Schutz's notion of thematic relevance.[14]

> Indem sie die notwendige Beziehbarkeit zweier Segmente anzeigt, konstituiert sich der Leserblickpunkt als ein Feld, wodurch sich die Segmente wechselseitig bestimmen . . .
>
>   Folglich wird der Blickpunkt des Lesers zwischen den jeweils gruppierten Segmenten hin- und herpendeln. Was er in den Blick nimmt, wird für ihn thematisch. Wenn eine Position zum Thema wird, so kann die andere nicht ebenfalls thematisch sein. Das aber heißt nicht, daß sie verschwindet; sie verliert nur ihre thematische Relevanz und bildet im Blick auf die zum Thema erhobenen Position eine Leerstelle. (Iser 1976, pp. 305f)

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[11] See also Prof. Barber's reflection in this volume.

[12] Iser 1976: Chap. 4. Cf. Toker 1994/95, p. 156.

[13] And he also investigates the issue of negation as the other basic structure of indeterminacy in the text (Iser 1976, pp. 327ff.).

[14] Iser also refers to Gurwitsch's theory of field of consciousness at the same place (Iser 1976, p. 305).

Speaking of Schutz's notion of sign as intersubjective appresentation, Iser develops his theory of vacancies, analogizing them with impossibility of "pure" experience of others we interact with. He calls this sort of opacity between persons "no-thing," referring to R. D. Laing's communication theory, and argues that every interpersonal relationship is inevitably based upon this "no-thing" (Iser 1976, pp. 259f.). "For we react so, as if we knew how the partner experience us, and thereby we form a steadfast belief in it and act as if this assumption is real. That is, interpersonal relationship draws upon this sort of compensation of primary blanks of our experiences" (Iser 1976, p. 260). In common-sense thinking, we "idealize" reciprocity of perspectives in Schutz's terminology. Taking for granted until counterevidence, we behave ourselves as if our standpoints are interchangeable, and our differences in perspectives are irrelevant for the purpose at hand, although others always leave unpredictable and uncertain elements.

Iser also refers to the difference between our real interpersonal communication and the aesthetic relationship of the reader with the artworks: "Text-reader relationship lacks any face-to-face relationships, from which every form of social interaction originates" (Iser 1976, p. 262). In the case of social interactions, one can fulfill or reformulate vacancies found in conversations by directly questioning to his/her partners. But the text as such will never "tune in" to readers as a partner of conversations does. And yet, the text, as the sign of author's intentions, is also suspended as in the case of a serial novel. Hence, readers can never know whether his interpretation is "adequate" or not. In this respect, Iser is opposed to Ingarden's metaphysical assumption of the inherent polyphonic harmony between different strata (Iser 1976, pp. 267ff.).[15] Artworks are open to reader's interpretation, and in turn, interpretations create artworks.

Texts do not have the dynamism of expressive others in the face-to-face relationship. Iser, however, maintains that despite this difference of condition, interactions between text and reader share an important point with the social interactions, for the asymmetry of text and reader rather gives impetus and momentum to his/her aesthetic reception of the text. Thus, the thinker of reception aesthetics underscores beholder's active role to "create" artworks by taking notice of the bidirectional interaction between readers and text full of vacancies.

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[15] See also Brinker (1980) who argues that Iser "misinterpret" Ingarden in this respect.

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Cultural Science in Literary Light

Lester Embree

1 Introduction

For those who have not heard it before, let me begin with the story of how I came over 10 years ago to produce the "construction" in *Alfred Schutz's Sociological Aspect of Literature.* I had been invited to contribute to the Festschrift for Maurice Natanson, who had a major interest in literature, and I remembered a one-page manuscript in the Schutz Nachlaß. My thought was then to transcribe that Manuscript, add some commentary, and thus produce a flower for the bouquet presented to that leader of American phenomenology. But when I began to skim Schutz's publications for passages referring to literature, not only did I astonishingly find some 70 pages of pertinent passages, but they marvelously fit the 3×9 grid below and thus the 27-cells in that one-page manuscript. So I decided to assemble the construction and to organize a conference and volume around it and submitted instead for Mauri's *Festschrift* an essay in ecological phenomenology, which then preoccupied me.

In my Editor's Introduction to my construction I wrote that,

> Given the fact that the main text here was not "constructed" previously, i.e., not written out by Schutz himself, the present effort is not a "re-construction." Rather, the present text is like a new building built by fitting together copies of clearly relevant pieces of an architect's other buildings into a design for which he left only a sketch.

Accordingly, my construction has the 27 parts in the grid reproduced below and they are filled with quotations from Schutz's publications plus some commentary. The quotations are often relevant to his theory of the cultural sciences, which I consider the core of his thought, but I abstracted from that use in order to reverse

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THE GRID

	Poetry	Drama	Novel
[1] language	[1-A]	[1-B]	[1-C]
[2] author-listener	[2-A]	[2-B]	[2-C]
[3] situation	[3-A]	[3-B]	[3-C]
[4] relevance	[4-A]	[4-B]	[4-C]
[5] reality	[5-A]	[5-B]	[5-C]
[6] motive	[6-A]	[6-B]	[6-C]
[7] time dimension	[7-A]	[7-B]	[7-C]
[8] relation poet to work	[8-A]	[8-B]	[8-C]
[9] relation poem to listener	[9-A]	[9-B]	[9-C]

Fig. 1 The Grid

the references from use of literature to clarify cultural science and then to fit his remarks about literature into the grid. Schutz refers to three types of literature, namely: poetry, drama, and the novel, and I proceeded in my construction to present the nine cross-cutting themes in those three respects, e.g., for language I presented pure expression, communication, and description in sequence, and then I proceeded this way level by level down the grid because three items are easier to compare together in some respect or other than nine are. (But it is not clear how Schutz proceeded).

In the present essay I shall instead proceed differently in two ways. In the first place, I will now respect Schutz's original intention and show some ways in which literature can help clarify aspects of the three sorts of cultural science arguably recognized by him. His references to literature thus contribute to his *Wissenschaftslehre* of the cultural sciences.

> I fear that in this country the terms methodology and epistemology are used in a more restricted sense than their equivalents in German and I accepted these terms only because I could not find any better translation for 'Wissenschaftslehre' which includes both logical problems of a scientific theory and methodology in the restricted sense. (Schutz and Parsons 1978, p. 101)

As I began to show long ago, such a theory of science or science theory, also called methodology in the broad signification, can be cultivated about their own disciplines by cultural scientists, e.g., Max Weber, or about species and genera of science by philosophers, e.g., the social and cultural sciences by Schutz, and interaction is possible within it concerning the basic concepts, distinctive methods, and disciplinary definitions of the kinds, sorts, and particulars of the sciences in question. (Embree 1980, pp. 367–373)

The scattered allusions to aspects of literature are concentrated in the construction and most useful for understanding the theories of the three species of science mentioned. In the second place then, my exposition will go down the columns rather than across the levels of the above grid and thus have three parts, one each devoted to psychology, social science, and history. Reference simply to the levels in each of my column-based parts should suffice for readers interested in more detail in the construction than I will render here. Finally, it deserves mention that I have worked from the published oeuvre of Schutz and that there may be more that is of relevance in the Nachlaß.

2   The Phenomenological Psychology of Poetry

While poetry can of course be sung before audiences, it originally and essentially is pure expression, which is to say that for Schutz it has no need of others hearing it and is thus fundamentally without communicative intent, difficult as this may be for many to comprehend, much less accept. Here I recall a film on television of Yevgeny Aleksandrovich Yevtushenko (Евгéний Алексáндрович Евтушéнко) striding about on a central stage like a fight ring – it might have been Madison Square Garden – surrounded by thousands of Americans, declaiming in Russian, unaffected by their acclaim during the process, and only afterwards seeming to notice them. If this was an act, it was a curious one which Schutz seems to describe the root of with his notion of pure expression.

While not an addressee, a beholding listener can thus nevertheless observe the poet's self-expression and even feel personally addressed and also provide an objective meaning context even if such is not required for the poem to be a poem. Like music, poetry is a solitary art. The poet is face to face only with language, although with respect to her own work she is also a listener/reader and hence, in a way, the audience for it as well as the speaker/writer. But how can music and poetry that are fundamentally without communicative intent be scientifically investigated?

The listener can witness the poem while it is being expressed. In doing so, she encounters the poet's body as a field of expression with tones, inflection, gesture, etc. as well as the conceptual contents they accompany. Even if the language is not understood, there is still rhythm and rhyme, and the mood of the poet is thereby appresented in the now, rather than in retrospect as Schutz believes is necessary when one grasps the meanings of one's own actions. There can also be objects that are fictive as well as serious and there can be semantic as well as syntactic systems in the poem even if they are stretched by the poet with such things as paradoxes.

When I pondered this description, I first thought of the egological reduction and Schutz's 30 year correspondence with Dorion Cairns about it that I had recently studied (Embree 2009). This reduction, which he thought Husserl combined with the transcendental reduction, involves how we initially recognize ourselves as subjects alongside, as it were, all other subjects in the world vs. an egoism, as one may call it, in which all others are only considered in relation to a subject, usually

oneself. Thus viewing of things as "for me" replaces "for us." This reduction is implicitly practiced on the poet and the listener as just described and indeed often in Schutz's reflections, and if one considers the investigation of individuals in relation to others to be social psychology in contrast with sociology, which investigates intersubjectivities or groups to begin with *à la* Talcott Parsons, then one might consider his perspective social-psychological insofar as it is about a beholding self in the audience and an expressive other, who is the poet.

But then I thought of Part II of the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, which is curiously about the self taken isolatedly, i.e., without others besides herself considered, which Schutz says is made possible by the phenomenological reduction, which I believe he misunderstood because Husserl would call this more specifically the reduction to the primordial sphere and that is different from the result of the egological *epochē*, reduction, and purification.

If reference to others by the individual person specifies psychology as social psychological, suspension of that reference leaves psychology *tout court*. *Aufbau,* Part II, is then psychological, as is *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, and various shorter stretches in Schutz's expositions.

What we have is how the poet who is "listened" to is actually observed non-verbally as well as verbally even though she has no communicative intent. In music there can also be communicative intent or not for Schutz, but in a quite non-linguistic way, as we know from "Making Music Together," and thus the non-verbal accompaniments of poetic words do not need to be intended to communicate either. This can clearly occur when the poet is witnessed singing a finished poem or even struggling aloud to find the best wording.

Here I remember in comparison a film of Pablo Picasso painting a picture; in it one could see him add or change colors, add or change parts, etc., and thus I believe painting can also be done without communicative intent. I even think of Cézanne allegedly leaving his paintings in the fields after he finished them. (His wife, the story goes, collected and sold them.) Whether important non-verbal aspects can be grasped in reading handwritten drafts of a poem I am not so sure, although of course Schutz took graphology quite seriously.

In any case, the emphasis on language, ideal types, and constructs in Schutz's thought often peripheralizes such non-verbal phenomena, but where science theory is concerned, they deserve full recognition for their role in participant observation and the interviewing of informants to be understood. If psychology, about which actually Schutz says very little, is about individuals rather than groups, then what he says about poetry as well as music pertains to the approach of psychology, social psychology especially (Embree 2008, pp. 141–150; Embree 2009).

The next level down this column of the grid, i.e., Level 3, concerns the situation of the expression. Schutz's focus here is on what the beholder of literature observes. For poetry, the beholder is detached, somewhat like a theoretician, while the poet is engaged in her situation and what is emphasized is how the poet originally refers to singulars that can only become plurals through language, e.g., from this tree standing strong before me to trees in general and their strength.

Level 4 concerns relevance. We have Jamesian "knowledge about" and "knowledge of acquaintance" as well as blind belief and ignorance where things as interesting to a self are concerned. The perspective has all things with a meaningful relation to the inner life of the poet and symbols, but not so much symbols of things beyond the poem as symbols of other parts within it, something T.S. Eliot is quoted as referring to as "associations."

Level 5 involves what Schutz analyzed under the heading of "multiple realities," which is highly familiar to Schutz scholars and hence needs little space devoted to it here. The poet suffers and acts in a reality, but this reality is less the reality of everyday life than that of dream or phantasy. Like the theoretical attitude, the poetic attitude is not the attitude in which influence on the course of events in the world is sought, even in the way of being deliberately left uninterfered with.

Level 6 concerns motives, which are of course in general of the "because" and the "in order to" sorts for Schutz, i.e., causes and purposes, and it happens that Schutz is willing in a broad intersubjective perspective to approach the literary style of an entire epoch or generation in such terms. Poetry, however, is said to be "motiveless." There is much variation, including shifts from positive to negative feelings, within the poet who is observed expressing herself, but they seem at least difficult for her to relate to her motives; rather, the changes just appear to occur for her. This contrasts with those parts of our lives in which we plan and perform and then retrospectively judge not only into how well we have served our purposes, but also why we did as we did in the first place.

Time is the focus of the seventh level, and in Schutz this includes past and future as well as present and inner as well as outer time and successors and predecessors as well as contemporaries in the broad signification. And time involves the body as well as society and space. "Literary time," as it might be called, is not tied to the structure of outer time and its contents are unlike so-called real things with respect to identity, but irreversibility still holds. In specification of time for poetry, Schutz merely wrote "inner duration" in his architectural sketch.

For the everyday and psychological observer of poetizing, the general thesis of the alter ego's existence is followed and the inner life of the poet thereby taken to have the same structure as one's own life and thus only to be observable from without in its vivid present, while the beholder can reflectively-retrospectively observe only her own remembered past and expected future, which phases are inaccessible for the poet. Perhaps, however, while the poet has no access to her own motives, the listener/reader can speculate about what these are in her. Such speculating about the motives in the past and future of others in factual if not essential ignorance is not uncommon in everyday life.

[8-A] Next is the relation of the poetic author to her artwork and chiefly concerns the pertinent rules of craftsmanship covering the original positing of meaning by the author and the interpretation of it by the beholder. For poetry Schutz says that it and the inner life of the poetical activity form not an identity but a unity each part of which is explorable by the other. Related to this is how a symbol must be as meaningful as that which it symbolizes. "[T]he laws of unity in poetry mean nothing

else than the postulate of identity of the poetic object with the original experience of our inner world which, in turn, becomes the foundation of poetic creation." (Embree 1998, p. 64)

The last level in this column is about the relation of the expression to the beholder, who tunes in on it, and where, as mentioned, there are the poet's facial expressions, gait, posture, rhyme, rhythm, etc., even without communicative intent. The emphasis on this level is on the art form, i.e., poetry, rather than the art work, i.e., a poem, for Schutz. The listener to poetry, addressed or not, reproduces in herself what transpires in the poet's *durée*. This involves changes in feeling according to John Keats, whom Schutz quotes, and the meaning of a poem is to be grasped not in a summary but through reading or reciting it from beginning to end, possibly in memory.

As for the overall significance of these descriptive remarks about poetry for the cultural science of psychology, it seems chiefly contrastive with respect to what is usual in Schutz. Yes, there is poetry, but most of life is very different from poetry. Nevertheless, the pure expression and the beholding of it is open to investigation in phenomenological psychology, even if Schutz's science theory is more focused on the historical as well as chiefly on the social sciences.

3 Drama and Social Science

While "expression" is the key concept for poetry, "communication" is the key for drama. Here, there does seem concern with influencing the course of events in the world and doing so non-verbally as well as through language, although the latter is emphasized in the theory of literature. The players not only seek to communicate with each other on stage but also with the audience. Although it is different, this is already closer than poetry to what happens in everyday life.

Where the author-listener relationship is concerned, i.e., the second level in the grid, many passages occur in Schutz's publications. The communications among the players – monologues excepted – are designed by the author not only to be interpreted by them but especially by the beholding audience in the theater, who know so much more about what is happening than the characters that Schutz attributes to the audience "omniscience." His account of everyday reliance on the vernacular and schemes of interpretation applies here. The words (and gestures) determined by the dramatist depend for their meaning on how the audience as well as the players other than a speaker interpret them, while novels often tell us what to make of what happened. As in social science, not only objective meaning, i.e., outsider interpretation, but its ultimate focus on subjective meaning or insider interpretation is involved: What is Hamlet really trying to do?

The actors acting are symbols of the heros, e.g., Richard Burton of the Danish prince. Monologue has the figure speaking to herself rather than to others in the situation, which is like poetry, but of course the intent of the dramatist is that the audience thereby advances its understanding of the action. Speaking is a type of

influencing (*Wirken*), but all who are involved are actually in a world of imagination different from the world of working. The goal of the playwright, which it seems for Schutz that only Mozart attained and did so in opera, is to show the different meanings that the same situation has to each of the characters involved in it. The playwright makes us understand that to each of them the presence and behavior of the others are elements of her own situation; and he reveals to us the specific springs of action by which each character acts within and reacts to the situation (Embree 1998, p. 32).

[3-B] The situation in drama is the face-to-face situation not only for the players on the stage but *also* with the audience, so that there is at least a triple definition of the situation. Time and place are shared and all are directly aware of one another simultaneously, so that all are consociates; I have ventured a small terminological advance for Schutzian investigations by suggesting that there are "consocial situations" (Embree 2004a, pp. 119–133) and this is one. But for the characters portrayed, this situation does not include the audience, but for the audience it includes the actors.

Next relevance [4-B] is determined by the playwright. Here the image of the puppeteer and her puppets and script that is used by Schutz to clarify model building in cultural science has direct reference, and the element of spontaneity is emphasized in relation to what is scripted as relevant for an actor. And "actor" and "action" can refer of course to theatrical as well as everyday matters. Was it Shakespeare who wrote that "all the world's a stage . . . "?

As for the reality [5-B] of the play, the setting, the characters, and what is represented in words and gesture, these are real only insofar as the players and audience imagine and believe what and that they are. Scenery is symbolic and only taken for real. This contrasts with our everyday life, where curtains do not rise and fall, events are all explainable, and time is different. Unlike observers in everyday life, audience members are not free to become participants in the action, yet in discussing the play amongst themselves, they refer to a world beyond the world of working. Sociologists speaking of social roles borrow terminology from the theatre.

Motivation [6-B] in drama is chiefly of the in-order-to variety. The actor chooses among projects of action before our eyes, and she is seen as responsible for her actions before herself if not also before the others in the play. Certainly, however, there must also be some because motives sometimes referred to in some plays.

Time in theatre is presence, which does not refer to what actually happens on the stage, but refers to what is represented as now happening in the world of the play. And there is an artificial continuity between meaningful phases jumped to without intermediaries in this imaginary time. The curtain can go down at the end of one day and rise on another day years later.

As for the relation of the author to the work, the playwright is invisible, which contrasts with the poet, for whom it is the work of art that disappears behind the personality. But it may be added that only the playwright can know the future and grasp the whole play as a unity from beginning to end, which the players as players and the typical audience cannot, unless of course the play has been seen before or the script read beforehand.

Finally where drama is concerned, the play relates to the beholder in the audience such that its imaginary present is coordinated with the present in her inner time. The same story could be the plot of a novel or poem, but they would lack this feature.

As for the significance of drama for science, it seems clear enough that it not only draws on basic patterns of action, roles, relationships, and interactions in everyday life but also attempts to refer to them with carefully selected words and gestures by the players and this not only parallels in method and terminology what social scientists do in their building of models populated with puppets, but also in most of everyday common-sense thinking where idealized constructs are operated with in usually less conscious ways. Because of the emphasis on what is contemporary, even if in part imaginary, drama would seem the type of art from which specifically social scientists have the most to learn and this contrasts with poetry and psychology. The actors on the stage are consociates, but the heroes, heroines, relationships, interactions, influences, and motivations that they symbolize would seem very like the world of contemporaries thematized in the models constructed in economics, linguistics, political science, sociology, and so on.[1]

4   Historical Science and the Novel

If poetry correlates with psychology as investigation of the separate self and drama with social science in the strict signification (but emphasizing consociates rather than contemporaries), the novel correlates with the historical sciences, at least as referring to already occurred events even though not necessarily from predecessors, but usually more like so-called "contemporary history."

It is better to speak of "cultural science" rather than "social science" insofar as it includes the historical sciences rather than merely the social sciences strictly speaking. In addition to the crucial §41 of the *Sinnhafte Aufbau,* which addresses the transition from the world of contemporaries to that of predecessors as well as their similarities and differences, Schutz actually says quite a bit about the historical sciences, mentioning at least as many of such disciplines as he mentions social sciences. Even though he does not dwell on them, unfortunately he did not recognize what is now called contemporary history (Embree 2004b, pp. 281–306).

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[1]My late colleague and friend, Stanford Lyman, saw Schutz as anticipating Kenneth Burke and Erving Goffman's revival of dramatism in social science: "The dramatistic perspective . . . begins with asserting the literal truth of Shakespeare's passage in *As You Like It* that 'All the world's a stage . . . ' It goes on to point out that each culture provides a 'treatment' for the 'script' of life, the 'scenes' and 'acts' of which are 'written' and/or 'performed' by individual or collective social 'actors,' who are also 'direct' or 'directed' in their performances, 'criticized' by themselves and by their 'audiences,' and choose or are commanded either to replay their 'part' again and again, to perform their 'role' only occasionally, or to 'close' the drama and begin a new one." (Lyman 1998, p. 209)

Schutz characterizes drama as "description," but also mentions "representation." The novelist and often her characters have communicative intent. The beholder is the reader and only has access to the reported events through the intermediary of the writer. Like the audience in theatre, the novelist is omniscient, but it is as though she has already attended the play and reports afterwards what transpired, including what the witnesses saw. Of all art forms, the novel leaves the least to the imagination of the beholder. As with history, the narration is entirely under the author's control, she dictates an objective meaning context to the reader, and thus her writing is unlike communication in everyday life where both sides continually interpret one another.

What the novel depicts is as if it is part of the real world of everyday life, even if it is sometimes a Kafkaesque "enclave" within it. The reader's stock of knowledge about this world is relied on. The subuniverses of madness and common-sense of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza refer to one another within a set of multiple realities (and here one can also think of science fiction).

[4-C] Relevance is defined by the novelist and it is that of the reported events. [5-C] These events are parts of the past reality seen through the reporter's eyes, which are inalterable, but nevertheless reinterpretable. What did cause the French Revolution? The reported events can also be taken as symbols, e.g., *Moby Dick*, for the human condition. And a reader can leave off following the narrator's guidance, do something else, and then pick up again where she left off, which regularly happens in the reading (and the writing) of history books, but hardly ever in reference to poems or plays.

While poetry is motiveless and while the in-order-to motive predominates in theatre, it is the because motive that predominates in the novel and in historiography. In other words, the concern is not with what the characters are trying to do so much as with why they did what they did. And as intimated, the time dimension is the past tense. Of course, the book in the reader's hands is in the now and can be set aside, but the events represented through it are in a past and uninfluenceable, and this even if the verbs in the narration are in the present tense and events can seem to occur as one reads about them, but in this respect it is as if the reader is taken back to the time of the past events.

While what is reported in the novel is over and done with, which can be made definite with expressions such as "he said" and "she replied," the novelist can digress and add comments just as the historian can. Interestingly, the readers addressed by the novelist, who is usually invisible behind the narration, are not specific according to Schutz, although so-called "Chick Lit" is directly chiefly to women readers and there are other subgenres directed to specific readerships. Even so, the writer decides the theme and contents of the story told.

As for the relation of the novelist to the reader, strict chronology does not need to be respected, so that out-of-sequence representations of episodes that occurred at different times are admissible, the reader being expected to understand what came before what and with or without what influence on what. And this too can be done in history writing.

As for the relevance of the novel to the historical sciences, Schutz is explicit about the conceptual as well as verbal relation of the expressions "story" and "history,"

how the one fictively and the other seriously refer, as seen above, to past events and their causes that have already happened and cannot be influenced but can be interpreted and reinterpreted. And while the addressees of history as well as the novel are Schutzian contemporaries, there is reference to the life-worldly consocial situation in this passage about historical research, to which one can readily also add a comparison with reading a novel.

> The procedure of historical research is the same as interpreting the words of someone who is speaking to me. In the latter case I gain through communication an indirect experience of what the speaker has experienced directly. In the same way, when I am reading a historical document, I can imagine myself face to face with its author and learning from him about his contemporaries. (Embree 1998, p. 62)

5   Conclusion

In summary, the three types of literature analyzed by Schutz in his talk before the Alumni Association of the Graduate Faculty of the New School in 1955 can be reinterpreted to shed light on the three types of cultural science addressed implicitly and explicitly in his *Wissenschaftslehre.* There is more to this in my construction than I have space here to render and there may be more to this effect in the Schutz Nachlaß, but the deeper lesson is that there is no doubt more to be leaned for science theory beyond his letter but in his spirit from further reflection on those types of literature themselves.

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Projection, Imagination, and Novelty: Towards a Theory of Creative Action Based on Schutz

Hubert Knoblauch

> *And I first taught them what dreams needs must prove True vision. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, pp. 527f.*

1 Introduction

Within the last decades Schutz has become a classical author in sociology as well as in the broader range of the social sciences. As part of his analysis of the life-world (which has been elaborated by Schutz and Luckmann 1973), he devised a theory of action that has moved into the centre of attention. Action is indeed not only a major category for economy – a field in which Schutz can claim some expertise – but particularly for sociology. In fact, in his *opus magnum*, the *Phenomenology of the Social World* (*Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, Vienna 1932), he specifically addresses action as a basic issue in sociology. Here, he explicitly refers to Weber's classical approach to define sociology as the science of social action. It is widely known that Weber (1922, 2003) defined social action as a form of action meaningfully oriented towards others, the category of action being defined as conduct guided by meaning. It is, as Schutz contended, the *definiens*, "meaning," that lacks clarity in the definition by Weber. To Schutz, phenomenology seemed particularly well equipped to clarify the terminus meaning. In drawing mainly on Husserl's phenomenology (and altering this approach later in his *The Structures of the Life-World*), he developed a notion of action defined by intentionality and the time structure of human experience as the basis for its meaning.

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Since his theory of action is established in sociology as one basic analytical frame, I want to ask if and how it can provide the basis for addressing a specific question in action theory: How can something new enter into action? Or, to formulate it in different ways, how can action be creative? Although Schutz himself did not address this specific question, I want to suggest that his theoretical frame provides a useful starting point for the analysis of the question of creative action, i.e., how actors can be conceived of creating something new.

The creation of something new has been tackled in various disciplines. Thus, arts and the sciences concerned with the arts are definitely addressing the question of creative action. Although Schutz tackled aesthetic problems throughout his life, his theory of social action is oriented to solve problems posed and left over by economy. In economy as well as much of sociology and the social sciences the problem of creation is often treated as part of the phenomenon of "innovation." Innovation as the process of the creation of something new is, indeed, a quite crucial aspect of modern capitalist society. Famously, it was the economist Schumpeter who drew attention to the importance of innovation in societies of all types (Schumpeter 1912). "Capitalist innovation means creation of new combinations of methods and machines and at the same time radical devaluation of all produced values, including well-functioning machines, effective production methods, and highly qualified workforce." (Rammert 2000, p. 3)[1] In modern society, innovation gains in importance. According to Schumpeter, it is particularly the task of one group of actors, entrepreneurs, to realize innovation: The process of innovation, however, is defined, so to say, *ex negativo*." It consists essentially in the "creative destruction" of the old. In addition to this negative notion of the new, Schumpeter's theory and the social scientific analysis of innovation focus mainly on the innovation on a societal level, i.e., how innovations are produced and acknowledged as a social fact. Because it rather focuses on types of innovative actors, organization and diffusions of innovations,[2] the question, how the new is created in action, is hardly ever addressed. Therefore, I want to ask how the new can be part of an action. That is to say that we take the subjective point of the actor bracketing the question if and how the "new" conceived of by one actor must necessarily be acknowledged as new by others. Indeed, innovation studies demonstrate widely that the active creation of the new depends on labelling processes of what is socially considered as the new, and it may well be that the idea that the creation of the new as a solitary process is only a "legitimatory" myth in the social construction of innovations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yet even if we allow for the possibility that the individual action plays a negligible role in the social process of innovation, one cannot ignore that also from the subjective point of view the creation of the new can figure as a motive of our subjective action: We can decide to create something new, and act accordingly ("new" meaning here not something which we forgot).

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[1]As opposed to Marx, capitalism survives and succeeds because and as if it is permanently producing innovations.

[2]A process studied by Rogers (1962) in much detail.

In contradistinction to what is meant by the social process innovation, I would refer to this subjective accomplishment of projecting something new in action as *creative action*, for (a) the newness of what we do is necessarily subjective (but not necessarily reduced to subjectivity), (b) it must not be part of social actions, interactions, and institutions (as in cooperative role games in which the imaginary is produced interactively as analysed, for example, by Herbrik (2011)), but rather operates as a subjective feature of action; (c) it is not dependent on external events happening in the world "independent" of the actor (for these presuppose again that their meaning is constituted as different from what is already known).[3]

Since subjectivity is at the core of any theory of action and, consequently, of creative action, I should start by clarifying this point: If we talk and write about the "new," we must necessarily ask: New with respect to what? What may be "new" to a baby, could be quite familiar to the mother; what may be new to tribe "x" may be quite common in tribe "y"; and what may be new in one scientific discipline, technological field, or special market branch may be already out of fashion somewhere else. Whatever any objective criterion for the novelty of something ever may be, it relates to the previous knowledge of those who define it as new. At this point one could take a relativist, radical constructionist stance that reduces novelty to a matter of arbitrary definition which depends on subjective knowledge, social points of views, or discourses independent of and accidental for whatever may be "really" new. Yet, even if whatever is subjective may be dependent on the social availability of meaning (in terms of the sociology of knowledge: i.e. knowledge – and I am not declined to follow this view, see Knoblauch 2005), any social science would need to explain how differences between knowledge of the subjects, how novel meanings and, thence, creative action, can arise.[4] We would need to explain how new interpretations are possible – that may again fall back on the interpreters. On these grounds, it may be quite helpful to look at the actor's *subjective point of view*. It is exactly this point of view Schutz takes as the bases of any science of the social, i.e., of social action, and it is Schutz who most radically addresses action (and the interpretation of action) from the subjective perspective.

As mentioned, Schutz himself did not develop an explicit theory of creative action. However, he quite explicitly addresses the future aspects of action in his theory crucial to any notion of creativity. Therefore the question will be raised how useful these aspects are to a theory of creative action. My argument will be, first, that, because of his stress on the cognitive and typificatory aspects of action, his theory seems not to allow to address anything creative at all. Second, I argue that his theory allows us to address the new if one realizes one of its inconsistencies.

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[3]The wrong methodological assumption that "events" phenomenologically outside of the brackets, the *epoché*, may serve as an explanation for what is inside the brackets leads in my eyes to the somehow quasi religious substantialism in some recent phenomenological conceptions. Cf. Henry (1987); Marion (1989).

[4]I have elaborated this problem of the methodological grounds of subjectivity in more detail in Knoblauch (2008).

For although Schutz acknowledges the role of fantasy and imagination as activities of consciousness, he dismisses the role of imagination in action in favour of a more rational concept. In doing so, he cuts off an important part of his theory and gets into contradictions: On the one hand, imagination and fantasy form part of action, on the other hand, they are cut off from action in a distinct "province of meaning." I want to solve this problem by suggesting to include imagination into action and projection and creativity, in order to, then, show which aspects of imagination contribute to creative action. In order to clarify this notion, I shall draw comparisons to Joas' theory of creative action (Joas 1996). In the conclusion I shall address the societal dimensions which provide the social background for the transformation in the concept of action analysed theoretically. It will be argued the increasing importance of creativity and imagination is due to general changes in contemporary society. In this context, creativity is not any longer limited to the arts but extends into the fields of science, technology, and economy. From this point of view, the theory of creative action has to be considered as a part of a theory of action that is open to societal changes, including the transgression of art and creativity.

The argument I want to put forward is essentially based on the thinking of Alfred Schutz. Instead, however, of relating to Schutz in a exegetical manner only, I will try to build on Schutz in a constructivist manner (as Merton in his *On the Shoulders of Giants* (1965) suggested): The theoretical problem that is identified in Schutz's thinking will not be understood as refuting Schutz's theory but it will be taken as resulting from prevailing viewpoints pertinent to the society of Schutz's time (Barber 2004). Therefore, the argument should be understood as building on, refining, and reformulating the theory of Alfred Schutz which, to my mind, forms one lasting basis for the practice of doing sociology.

2   Everyday Prophets or: Action as Anticipated Future

If whatever is new may be difficult to assess "objectively," i.e., in a way to be verified intersubjectively, from the perspective of the actor it can be simply conceived of as opposed to the *old*, i.e., something that is already known. Therefore it seems promising to start the inquiry about the creative action by looking at those aspects in Schutz's theory of action which are related to the *future*. Indeed, in his famous essay on Teiresias, Schutz (1964) posed the question explicitly: If and how we can have knowledge about the future. Teiresias was the seer in Greek mythology who was able to see the future but unable to interfere in events. In order to answer the question, Schutz takes an explicit mundane attitude: He is neither interested in the transcendental presuppositions of action, nor interested in the transcendent experience in itself that is linked to the "seer" as a religious figure. His main intention is neither to reconstruct the charismatic state of consciousness of the seer as an extraordinary individual nor to take account of the tragic inability to act with respect to his anticipation of the future. Instead Schutz takes the mythic figure as an extraordinary case that allows him to address the ordinary, common-sense thinking

of an ordinary human actor who lives among fellowmen and women and anticipates what may happen when acting. On the basis of the extraordinary example Schutz wants "to prepare the ground for the description of certain features of the manner in which the common-sense thinking of ordinary men, leading their everyday life among their fellow-men, anticipates things to come." (Schutz 1964, p. 281)

The possibility to conceive of (or imagine) future actions is based on the notion of the future as it is given to our experience. Among the experiences that are oriented towards the future, action plays an exceptionally important role. Most other experiences are defined by their relation to prior experiences. Indeed, this temporal relation is constitutive of what Schutz calls experiences: Activities of consciousness bring previously acquired typifications to bear on present experience. Action, as a special kind of experience, differs from these kinds of activities significantly. This difference, he argues, is particularly due to its time structure – to be more exact: to its relation to the future. For in Schutz's view, every action is defined by the state projected into the future, i.e., "*modo futuro exacti*." To say it in Schutz's words, "I have to place myself in my fantasy at a future time when this action will already have been accomplished, when the resulting act will already have been materialized." (Schutz 1964, p. 290) Note that Schutz here already refers to the central role of "fantasy." For it is by means of fantasy that the project is placed in the future.

But what, then, is considered as the project by Schutz? In answering this question, one must, first, repeat that the project is defined in the particular temporal structure of the "past future," i.e., "*modo futuro exacti*." In English this corresponds grammatically to saying that the action is imagined as "having been performed."[5] Since action depends on the capacity to imagine something that has been finished in time, it necessarily builds on past action. This view results also in what I would call a "*historicist*" view on action.[6] To say it in the words of Schutz (1964, p. 290): "I base my projecting of the forth-coming act in the future perfect tense on my experiences of previously performed acts typically similar to the projected one." Therefore one could say that, according to Schutz, actions are guided by the past, for "man in everyday life interprets his past, present, and future in terms of the pre-organised stock of knowledge he has at hand at any moment." However, Schutz goes much further than only arguing that the past plays a role amongst others in conceiving the future. The historicist tendency is due to the consequence that future

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[5] Although this is very basic to Schutz's understanding of the difference between act ("*Handeln*") and action ("*Handlung*") and suggests a universal capacity of humans, there is, as far as I can see, so far no comparative analysis if this quite difficult grammatical form is to be constructed in all languages. As opposed to relativist arguments that stress the differences of languages in structuring time (Whorf 1956), there are strong arguments to assume that even those languages that do not dispose of similar grammatical structures are capable of producing similar meanings. Cf. Malotki (1983).

[6] Quite frequently, Schutz adds that certain rules must apply for such actions: Very often he mentions the "*ceteris paribus*" rule by which we assume that in general the same conditions are assumed that held for our projected actions, and the *cum grano salis* rule, by which we assume that certain restrictions to the prior typification may apply.

is built on the past: "… in common-sense thinking our knowledge of future events consists in subjective anticipations that are founded in our experiences of past events as organized in our stock of knowledge at hand." (Schutz 1964, p. 292) The future, Schutz claims, is not only guided by the past; it is like a transposal of what has passed in the stream of consciousness into another time mode.

The *future as anticipated past* – this seems to be the formula of Schutz's notion of action: Action draws on prior knowledge that "according to my present knowledge the projected action, at least to its type, would have been feasible, its means and ends, at least as to their types, would have been available if the action had occurred in the past." (Schutz 1962b, p. 73) For Schutz's theory of action, this formula appeared quite productive since it allowed first to link action to knowledge in terms of typified experiences (and thus to the sociology of knowledge because they can be "handed on"). On these grounds, knowledge provides the basic background for action. Knowledge in this sense always includes what is called "memory" in diverse cultural approaches of "collective memory" yet it cannot be reduced to memory. Albeit in this view all actions may depend on the past, only those are guided by historical knowledge which explicitly reflect the past as past (Tota 2005).

As strong as the historicist argument may be, for a theory of creative action, however, it is quite disappointing. If actions are essentially anticipations of the past, there seems to be no chance for the new and unexpected arising from action itself. Action, it seems, transfers or transposes what has been learned in the past into the future. Similarly to Schumpeter, it would be only the sheer destruction of the old which would allow for the new.

3   Imagination and the Problem of the Provinces of Meaning

Admittedly, this reconstruction of Schutz's theory of action conceals a decisive detail. In fact, Schutz himself gives two indications as to how the new may enter into action. On the one hand, he makes a hint at where the new may come in; and on the other, he elaborates on one possible resource of the new, that is, fantasy, without, however, allowing for this option. Let us first have a closer look at the latter option since it is a prerequisite for a theory of creative action. We will turn to the former when we sketch the outline of such a theory.

As already mentioned, action is a spontaneous activity oriented towards the future.[7] Future, in turn, is addressed by the capacity of projecting prior experiences. These prior experiences depend, first, on the possibility to typify, for it is typified experiences that are transposed into the future. There is, however, a second resource of the future that is involved: projections. Schutz conceives of projecting as

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[7]"*Handeln ist zunächst einmal jede auf Zukünftiges gerichtete spontane Aktivität*" (Schutz 1974, p. 75).

fantasying action, i.e., "the fantasy of spontaneous activity itself."[8] Fantasy (or imagination, as he also calls it) seems to be the mechanism or the medium by which what has been typified is being transposed into the future tense *modo futuri exact*i. In this sense, fantasy and imagination are essential to any action.[9] Let us, therefore, consider how Schutz conceives of fantasy or imagination.

Fantasy or imagination is, in the first place, not always and not essentially linked to action. To the contrary, Schutz considers fantasy or imagination to be what he calls a "province of meaning."[10] To be more exact, to Schutz, imagination is the title for "various worlds of phantasms."[11] These include "fancies or imageries" (Schutz 1962a, p. 234) as well as "innumerable provinces of meaning," such as "the realms of day-dreams, of play, of fiction, of fairy-tales, of myths, of jokes."

The notion of province of meaning is adapted from William James' notion of "subuniverse." According to James (1981, pp. 921ff), the reality to which we posit ourselves in action is divided into disparate spheres, such as the reality of science or the world of mythology and religion. Schutz (1971, p. 392) relates to this concept, yet he prefers the notion of province of meaning in order to stress that it is not the ontological structure of the outer reality but the meaning of experience that draws the lines between these "provinces" (or "universes"). Provinces of meaning are constituted subjectively. The concept resembles also the notion of forms of world-making (such as art, science, and everyday life) coined by Nelson Goodman (1978, 1984). As opposed, however, to Goodman (who considers all worlds made by the various forms as equivalent), Schutz assumes that there is one "paramount" reality that dominates in consciousness. He shares this view of a "paramount reality" with William James, which differs however with respect to the reasons for the dominance of certain realities. Whereas James considers sensual perception as the major reason for the domination of one world, Schutz adds action and "pragma" and sociality to this "primacy of perception" (Schutz and Gurwitsch 1985, p. 364): The paramount reality is the "reality of everyday life." This world of everyday life is characterized by perception and the sociality of perception (as intersubjectivity), by action and the sociality of action (as social action), and, as one may add, by communication via bodies, an aspect highlighted by Schutz but often overlooked in Schutz's reception (cf. Knoblauch et al. 2003).

Although the reality of everyday life is, thus, defined as an intersubjective reality, it depends also, as all meaning (and their provinces) on a kind of subjective

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[8]„*Jedes Entwerfen ist vielmehr ein Phantasieren von Handeln, d.h. ein Phantasieren von spontaner Aktivität, nicht aber die spontane Aktivität selbst*" (Schutz 1974/1932, p. 77).

[9]One should underline the particularity of this insight. In the French tradition there is long record on "*l'imaginaire*," the imaginary may be sometimes linked to institutions, yet hardly ever to action. Cf. the systematic and historical overview in Legros et al. (2006).

[10]Still in his "notebooks" for *The Structures of the Life-World* (Schutz and Luckmann 1984) Schutz uses "province of meaning" synonymously with "sub-universes," "meaning fields," ("*Sinnbereiche*") and "meaning areas" ("*Sinngebiete*").

[11]Originally Schutz had planned to use "imageries" as a title but then he favoured "fantasy." Cf. Schutz (1996 [1945]).

"attitude," i.e., a "cognitive style." Provinces are separated from other areas in that they are constituted by experiences of a similar kind that are consonant with one another (and form a system) to such a degree that leaving a province of meaning is experienced like a shock (as when waking up). Schutz identified five aspects of the cognitive style of any province or meaning, such as (a) the specific tension of consciousness; (b) the distinctive *epoché*; (c) the prevailing form of spontaneity; (d) the form of self-experience, (e) the form of sociality and (f) the time-perspective. Thus, the cognitive style of everyday life is characterised by wide awakeness (a), the natural attitude (b), action and working (c), identity (d), intersubjectivity (e), and the "specious present" between subjective time and world time (f).

In his analyses of the structures of the life-world, Schutz focuses very much on the "paramount reality" of everyday life. In addition, he also analyses dreams, theoretical thinking, and religious experiences as provinces of meaning. Finally, he also addresses imagination and fantasy: Imageries and imaginations constitute, to him, a province of meaning on its own: "The compatibilities which belong to the world of working in everyday life do not subsist within the realm of imagery; however, the logical structure of consistency (. . .) remains valid." (Schutz 1962a, p. 238) The distinctness of this province of meaning is due to the fact that " . . . the imagining self can, in his phantasies, eliminate all the features of standard time except its irreversibility." (Schutz 1962a, p. 239)[12] Furthermore, Schutz applies all the criteria for a cognitive style and finds that imagination or fantasy should be considered one distinct province of meaning.

As lucid as his analysis is, it is the distinctness of the province of meaning to which I want to draw attention, for it concerns our question as to how we account for the possibility of creative action. Schutz's thesis that imagination is a province of meaning in its own right establishes a categorical distance to the world of everyday life as well as to action. My argument is that this distance causes problems within Schutz's own theory. In fact, Schutz suggests "to distinguish sharply between imagining as a manifestation of our spontaneous life and the imageries imagined." (Schutz 1962a, p. 235)[13] However, imagination, then, is not defined by the images or

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[12]For the sake of clarification, Schutz refers to Husserl's distinction between predicates of reality and predicates of existence in "Experience and Judgement": "With the natural attitude there is at the outset (before reflection) no predicate 'real' and no category 'reality'. Only if we fantasise and pass from the attitude of living in the fantasy (that is the attitude of quasi-experiencing in all its forms) to the given realities, and if we, this, transgress the single casual fantasying and its phantasm, taking both as examples for possible fantasying as such and fiction as such, then we obtain on the one hand the concepts of fiction (respectively fantasying) and on the other hand the concepts 'possible experience as such' and 'reality . . . we cannot say that he who fantasies and lives in the world of phantasms (the 'dreamer'), posits fictions qua fictions, but he has modified realities, 'realities as if' . . . Only he who lives in experiences and reaches from there into the world of phantasms can, provided that the phantasm contrasts with the experienced, have the concepts fiction and reality." (Schutz 1962a, p. 238)

[13]One should add at this point, that the description of imagination as a province of meaning causes another problem for Schutz. For even with respect to imagination, he observes that it must not be performed in isolation but can be subject to communication for it is "social and then take[s]

the activities of imagination but rather by its difference from the world of everyday life, i.e., the distinction to action. Imagining is a world in "quotation marks," that is, those actions imagined remain merely as actions and performances. In imagination, we are "free from the pragmatic motive" and must not be preoccupied with the common environment and its reality.[14] The particular feature is that "imagining as such always lacks the intention of realizing the phantasm": "the imagining self neither works nor performs." (ibid)

Schutz separates imagination as a province of meaning not only from the pragma of everyday life (Srubar 1988), but also from other provinces of meaning, such as the sciences, the arts, and religion. This separation often leads to substantialist interpretation of the provinces of meaning as being "essentially" different from one another.[15] And the separation results also in a logical problem. For if the world of fantasy and imagination are so clearly separated from action, how, then, can it be explained that fantasy and imagination have to be considered constitutive of any action? We are obviously faced with a blatant contradiction.

Schutz seems to have been aware of this problem, and he offers two solutions. On the one hand, he gives an essentialist answer: In between the world of imagination and the world of everyday life, he claims, there are intermediary provinces that compare to "enclaves": "this is, of regions belonging to one province of meaning, enclosed by another, a problem which, important as it is, cannot be handled within the frame of the present paper." (Schutz 1962a, 233 n. 19.) The example he gives in this footnote is exactly the one that concerns us: "Any projecting within the world of working is itself, as we have seen, a fantasying, and involves in addition

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place in We-relation as well as in all of its derivations and modifications." (Schutz 1962a, p. 240) If however, communication presupposes that we act in everyday life, as Schutz stresses frequently (Knoblauch et al. 2003), how could the communication on imagination be cut off this everyday life?

[14]For Husserl, the "fantasizing consciousness" is also "neutral," i.e., it lacks a certain positionality of acting (Husserl 1989, §§109–115). Even if the imagination would be an action, it would remain an action "in inverted commata." (Husserl 1989)

[15]In drawing this sharp distinction, he can be understood as following a substantialist notion of experience (cf. Knoblauch 2011). That is to say that it assumes clear-cut boundaries of the "faculties" of the mind as if they were given by nature. Although some might consider this substantialist interpretation of Schutz as exaggerated, it is no accident that, for example, Peter Berger built his explicit "substantialist" sociology of religion on Schutz's theory of provinces of meaning. Berger (1974) argues that Schutz´s different provinces are separate because there are substantial differences between them, so that religion e.g. is seen to be found on experiences that essentially differ from those of e.g. imagination or arts. However, this only holds if one agrees with the assumption that imagination is a separate province of meaning. One should note that this assumption is substantialist in essence. In a more constructivist sense, however, it may be argued that the differences between provinces of meaning are themselves subject to social constructions (Luckmann 1988). That is to assume that the types of realities and their boundaries may vary within as well as across cultures—an assumption Schutz himself cherished at certain points, for example, in his idea that the dominance of the "paramount reality of everyday life" is itself a result from the "secularization" of consciousness and rationalization of the *attention à la vie*" (Schutz 2003, p. 71).

a kind of theoretical contemplation, although not necessarily that of scientific attitude." (Schutz 1962a)[16] The solution of "enclaves" is not really satisfying since it would exclude imagination from any sphere of action and interaction, as e.g., from playful elements within everyday action.[17] It would mean that we need to implant a continuous "enclave" into the world of everyday life – which would question the very distinction between these two spheres.[18] Even if Schutz's historicist argument would be true, this solution would not be convincing. For in this case, imagination would not be necessary with respect to what is being projected since all projects are built on prior typifications: "What we preconceive in the projection of our action is an anticipated state of affairs that we imagine as having been materialized in the past." (Schutz 1962a, p. 292) Thus, ideally the whole action is imagined as having occurred. In this case, imagination would only be necessary as a capacity that transposes from the past mode into a mode different from the past. That is, imagination would be identical with a transposition from what has been experienced to something that has not been experienced but is an experience *in potentia*. One may ask if and how this mode in potential can take on the "future" form, as Schutz suggests when he even assumes that "I have to place myself in my fantasy at a future time when this action will have been accomplished, when the resulting act will already have been materialized." (Schutz 1962a, p. 290) Leaving aside the problem if a projection has by definition a future aspect,[19] the solution is unsatisfying for imagination cannot just be an enclave to projection. It cannot categorically be separated from action.

Therefore Schutz offers another solution to the problem of the distinction between imagination and the pragmatic sphere of everyday action. This solution may be called *gradual*. Instead of keeping the boundaries of both provinces, he identifies grades between action and imagination. The most open grade is similar to the grammatical form of the "*optative*." Here, options are only considered as pure possibilities without any desire and will for realisation. This form he contrasts to the projections "*in potentialis*," that is, if the possibilities between which I choose lie "in my actual and potential reach." (Schutz 1962a, p. 261) Thus the accessibility of options is differentiated when he distinguishes the fantasy "*in potentialis*" from its "optative" form: "This potentiality," he stresses,

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[16]See Schutz 1962, footnote 19.

[17]With respect to the world of fiction and play, this critique had been formulated by Goffman (1986) who suggests instead that various "frames" be distinguished by means of conventional signs and rituals.

[18]As Michael Barber suggests here rightly, Schutz indeed discusses the fact that we are moving between provinces of meaning; the observation, however, already presupposes a "bounded unit" and indicates simultaneously the problems of this presupposition.

[19]Phenomenologically, the future itself is not available in experience directly; it is only by way of protentions and of memories of future events that had been expected in the past that future is accessible to consciousness. The assumption that the transposition is identical with the future aspect becomes even more problematic if we consider that imagination does not have a time index (according to Husserl) and is not clearly related to the standard time of action according to Schutz.

this possibility of executing the project requires, for instance, that only ends and means believed by me to be within my actual or potential reach may be taken into account by my projecting in fancy; that I am not allowed to vary fictitiously in my fantasizing those elements of the situation which are beyond my control; that all chances and risks have to be weighed in accordance with my present knowledge of possible occurrences of this kind . . . . (Schutz 1962b, pp. 67–98, 73)

In another text he specifies the ways how the options are reduced with a notion from Roman law. The "*conditio potestativa*" designates those circumstances that are controlled by the party that decides if they be realised or not (Schutz 1962b). For whatever one may understand by "control," it refers to something that is known and typified. Action, then, is only realised on the basis of what is known.

The graduation of fantasizing in action into two modes, "*optative*" and "*potentialis*" highlights three features that were not explicit in the "historicist" argument: Projections of actions have to be (a) realistic in that I have to know the ends and means in my reach; (b) they must be rational in that I can weigh the options. It is necessary to stress a third aspect which has been overlooked so far: (c) that the fictitious variation and fantasizing of elements "be not allowed" and only those elements permitted which are in my control (of course the control only is exerted on those aspects subjectively accessible to the actors). At this point Schutz includes a normative element that is essentially linked to the structure of society: For what is under my control not only depends on the knowledge that I have of the situation – and that the knowledge may be sufficiently clear, distinct, familiar, and at in reach. He also has to assume that there is a clear cut division of labour. In this sense they build on a certain social structure, division of labour, and social distribution of knowledge (Schutz and Parsons 1977, p. 45). Before we want to consider the importance of social structure to the theory of action, I want to indicate how Schutz can be understood as laying the grounds for a theory of action.

4 Creative Imagination and Situated Creativity

In the introduction I have mentioned Schutz's hint at a notion of creativity. This hint is found in his discussion of the sophistic distinction between the *téchne poietiké* (τέχνη ποιητική) and *téchne ktetiké* (τέχνη κτητική), where the former refers to the art of creating something and the latter the art of acquisition (or mimicking, as Plato suggested). Since Schutz relates this distinction to aspects of his theory of action, we can hope for some inferences on the notion of creativity. In his "Choosing among Projects of Action" the distinction between the former, creative aspect of action, and the latter, mimetic aspect of action, is paralleled by his distinction between the "optative" and the "*potentialis*" mode of action. Whereas mimicking builds on pre-constituted options of actions, the creative aspect of action is due to the fact that the actors can "probe" the problematic options in their own fantasy, so that these options are embedded in and distinguished by the subjective flow of time. Although Schutz does not elaborate the "creativity" of action any further, the

reference to the role of fantasy in action by Schutz may be considered as a basis to infer how and what other aspects of fantasy play into action.

(a) As already mentioned, the very capacity to transpose a past project of action into another mode (that may be understood as future) is definitely one accomplishment of imagination. Schutz has to presuppose this, for without it projection of something past could not be possible. One may, of course, doubt that this already involves imagination.

(b) Imagination is definitely involved in the case of visualising one's action. Indeed, Schutz does explicitly refer to this case.[20] Visualisation is by no way restricted to the charismatic capacities of the seer (as "Teiresias"). Rather, also as an actor in everyday life, "I have to visualize the state of affairs to be brought about by my future action before I can draft the single steps of my future acting from which the state of affairs will result" (Schutz 1964, p. 289). Although the sentence reads as if visualization was necessary for any projected action, the fact that this is one of the few references to visualisation may cast some doubt at this generalization.

(c) Imagination is not only involved in visualisation. One may dare to say that some kind of imagination is already required in the capacity of typification. If typification consists in the selection of certain aspects on the basis of relevance, one may assume that the constitution of types by means of these aspects be an act of imagination, even more so in the case of action. For although Schutz seems to suggest that actions projected build on past actions, he cannot really be claiming that actions projected are the very same. Everyday experience leads rather to assume that the elements of which future actions are built depend on prior actions but that we may combine them in new forms. Thus, if I plan to climb on a certain mountain (that is known to me only under dry conditions) while it is raining, I would possibly need to combine the journey with other situations at other places where it was raining.

(d) Although Schutz's historicist argument does not mention this case of imagination, also the combination of elements of typified past experiences into a new action requires imagination. (We will come back to this case in the next paragraph).

As combination in general is a form of variation, variation may be considered to be one of the most important imaginary techniques. Husserl gives an example of what is meant by variation: "Imagine an individual house that is painted yellow at the moment. We can easily imagine it to be blue or its roof to be made of slate instead of tile, and also its shape may be different" (Husserl 1972, p. 416). This example is telling since it (1) shows that the provinces must not be distinguished (it may be a real house); moreover, (2) fantasy is varying features of the house, and finally, (3) this variation must not remain in the frame of the *eidos*, i.e., we may leave the typifications which Schutz anchored in the past. In addition

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[20]In this respect, Sartre's analysis of "*l'image mentale*" may be of some use (1986, Chap. 8).

to visualisation, combination (variation), also idealisation and generalisation are accomplishments of imagination that contribute to action projection. This point has been stressed by Gurwitsch (1974, p. 63). In looking for the phenomenological fundaments of scientific practice, Gurwitsch argues that our basic assumptions on bodily behaviour are based on idealisations and generalisations. "Reflecting on his de facto mobility, the perceiving subject can readily imagine being endowed with a greater freedom of movement than he actually enjoys." (1974, p. 63) The generalisation from "accessibility in fact" to "accessibility in principle" is an "operation of the imagination" by which mobility is generated. Generalizations extrapolate individual experiences into something that is not given itself but only imagined by induction.[21]

One could certainly add more forms of activities of imagination contributing to action. Here it should suffice to indicate that there are a number of such imaginary activities involved or implied in the phenomenological analysis of action. This is not to say that any form of fantasy or imagination is already part of action. But instead of considering imagination a province of meaning distinct of action, it would be obviously much more plausible to consider the "pure form" of fantasy and imagination as an idealisation of the imaginary elements of action: Because we imagine something that is not (yet) present in action, we can also imagine something that is not present in action at all.[22] By linking action and imagination, we do not only avoid the contradictions Schutz has to cope with, we would also have one way to explain how the new gets into action. To say it in the words of Gurwitsch (1974, p. 106): "Imagination proves to be the necessary condition of every attempt to bring about changes in the real world."

Imagination is a first element we need for a theory of creative action so that we could argue that creative action is a form of action that exploits the potentials of imagination. This is, however, only half the story, for it requires that imagination be related to projects of action. Whereas Schutz tried to solve this relatedness to action with the sharp and utterly problematic distinction between imagination and action, he gives another indication exactly at one of the few points where he addresses the creation of the new in action. In "Choosing among Projects of Actions" (Schutz 1962b) he explicitly refers to the ways in which "new" projects may be made. He underlines the assumption that prior actions are being projected according to their type. It is not necessary, he writes, that the same projected action be known in its "individual singularity," with its "singular ends" and "singular means" and corresponds to the singular situation of action (Schutz 1962b, p. 84). Schutz does not elaborate on this idea, so we have to make inferences as to what this could mean.

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[21] In this sense one would even be able to consider abduction as one of the basic imaginary techniques to create the new, as Reichertz (2003, p. 60) stresses, for by way of abduction we may infer from one known element to two unknown.

[22] This idea is also to be found in Husserl's Ideas (§74a) where he stresses the move from the "single fantasy and the content of the fantasy" to the fiction, i.e., the reality "as if."

Quite obviously, he underlines the singularity of subjective knowledge on the one hand and of the situation of action on the other. Singularity here means that the very moment and the specificity of the action and the situation differ from the way how we anticipate it typically. This singularity is a strange argument for Schutz since he seems to assume that we always grasp the world by means of typifications and that the subjects act on the basis of typifications. Indeed, one may argue that phenomenology aims at what has been called "generalised subjectivity," i.e., at the search for the generalizable feature of subjectivity (cf. Knoblauch 2008). So even if he can argue that the singularity adds something, one has to admit, first, that this would be the case in any kind of action, including "non-creative" ones, and, second, that the singularity evades any analysis that focuses on typifications. Thus, singularity does not explain the possibility of the new.

Given the singularity argument, there are two other options for Schutz. One source of the new lies in the subjectivity of knowledge and motives. As should have become clear above, it is imagination that can be identified as the subjective source for changing knowledge and motives. The second option, the situation, has not yet been analysed systematically by Schutz himself. Although he does not use situation as a key term in his theory of action (it is rather derived from Parsons), it may be used as a link to one of the few theories that explicitly focuses on creative action by Hans Joas (1996). Joas defines creativity as the "ability to cope with situations." Situations he takes to be any relation people have to other humans and objects of which these persons are aware and to which they orient in their action. Situations pose problems to actors that are being solved by a procedure Joas calls situated creativity: Situations are not only guided by our goals and projects but also by our perception of situations and thus by our habitualized dispositions and by our bodily ability to act (again we can compare them to typification and knowledge). These forms of perception of the situation enter into our action plans and realisations and lead to transformations and adaptions that can be defined as situated creativity. Creativity, thence, consists of solving problems and adapting to situations. This way, the actions are no longer defined by projects and goals but by the ways how these goals are adapted to reality.

This notion of situated creativity by Joas does not differ strongly from a phenomenon Schutz has been describing. Indeed, in order to adapt to situations, we do not only draw on elements of actions that we have acquired before but we may also need to recombine these elements by way of imagination. Whereas the recombination is based on imagination, it is "triggered" by what Joas calls the situation. Situation, however, is not understood in a realistic sense of something "objectively" given (as was assumed by Parsons). Rather (and much more in accordance with a constructivist approach), it is the subjective perception of the situation that "causes" actors to readapt the elements of their inventory. At this point one could now introduce again the "singularity" of the situation and put forward the argument that every situation is different. Yet there is also a possibility within Schutz's analytical scheme in order to explain this "adaptation" to the situation. For Schutz frequently draws on Leibniz's gradation of knowledge: Typifications may vary in clarity, distinctness, familiarity, and consistency (cf. Schutz and Luckmann

1973). This is to say that we may project actions on the basis of vague, unclear, unfamiliar, and inconsistent knowledge. The situation in which we act must not only be regarded as contingent. Rather, it is also typified while acting, i.e., in situ. Adaptation to the situation then means that the typifications given to prior experiences are clarified by, assimilated to, or substituted by typifications *made* in situ. Creativity in this sense consists in the continuous deviation from projected courses of action – as vague or as clear these courses may have been projected.

5   Outlook

The situatedness of creativity highlighted by Joas has also been addressed by Suchman (1987). She identifies it as a situational flexibility of actors in "situated action," i.e., the adaption of actions to the situation. Thus, situative adaption, she argues, is an omnipresent feature of "primitive" non-Western forms of action, e.g., in Melanesian navigation methods. Moreover, situated action of situated creativity can also be found in contemporary Western society. Wagner-Pacifici (1998), for example, supports the idea that actors today are open for contingencies in their action that is also caught in the interest in improvisation (an aspect also hinted at by Schutz's analysis of music playing). And Rosa (2005, p. 454) stresses that to the degree that the pace of society is accelerating, the importance of situatedness is increased. As a result, actors cannot rely any more on the stability of their past experience in order to project their actions.

The increased importance of situations, therefore, increases the need for creativity. This has been empirically demonstrated, for example, with respect to work in high technology settings. On the basis of empirical analysis of the work in complex organizations, Heath et al. (2000) argue that the work with information and communication technology necessarily demands actors to adapt to the indexicality of each situation and, thus, to be "creative." This necessity for "creativity" has also been identified as an essential requirement to highly qualified work also in other sectors of modern society. Bröckling (2007), for example, argues that the need for creativity is one of the most important resources that neoliberal economy demands of the new kind of "knowledge workers."[23] Fantasy and imagination have become instruments of a modern heuristics of action, and this is explicitly so, be it in the psychology of creativity, in the human potential movement, or in management by vision. Indeed, the "creative industry" has been acknowledged as one of the rising industrial sectors promising continuous wealth to the most advanced regions of late capitalist societies (Florida 2004). Quite obviously, we cannot talk about creativity without accounting for its role in society.

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[23]Bröckling (2007, pp. 157f) distinguishes between six semantic aspects of creativity: artistic action (expressivity); production; problem-solving action; revolution (similar to Schumpeter's entrepreneur); life; and game.

Of course, the role of society is also acknowledged by Schutz who, in his foundation of the sociology of knowledge, stressed that most knowledge guiding actors in real life is, as he calls it, "derived" from the social stock of knowledge. Linguistic typifications as well as other forms of objectivations transmitted socially provide individuals with pre-fabricated typifications. As such they enter into the subjective stock as knowledge by which actions are guided.[24] On these grounds one must not only concede that large parts of subjective knowledge depend on the social distribution of knowledge within a society; one should, rather, recall that this is the reason why Schutz considered his analysis as contributing to the sociology of knowledge as its major area. For the analysis of creative action, this means also that the question as to what is considered as "new" has to be seen as depending on the current state of knowledge and the social distribution of knowledge. Not only can the "new" vary according to different social groups, types of actors, and traditions of actions, as the rising role of the "creative class" shows, but also the very motive to orient towards the new may be differentiated in a society.

In addition to the "knowledge of" and "orientation towards" the new, the functional differentiation and institutional specialisation of knowledge also affects action particularly in the sense of Schutz. One must recall at this point how important it is for Schutz's notion of action that the actor be in "control" of one's means and ends of action – and that this is one of the reasons for the distinction between the "fantasy" part of projections from the realistic part. Under conditions of a complex division of labour as it prevails in contemporary society, however, the "control" over one's means and ends of action is difficult to maintain – even if Schutz only means the subjective disposal of the meanings of things on fantasy. Remember that the loss of control had been already been complained about by Marx, and Weber as well as Durkheim confirmed that this is a feature of modern society: Modern actors have to act in situations that depend with respect to their ends as well as their means on other actors as well as technologies and media which are, at best, controlled by organisations (which again depend on actors who observe them). On these grounds, it seems utterly unrealistic to assume that the control of the means and ends remains a basic condition for action, and innovation studies show, that this also holds for Schumpeter's entrepreneur who is bound into bureaucratic and "systemic" regulations.

However, the situation does not leave us in the "iron cage" of modern bureaucracy, as Weber (2003, p. 356) feared. On the basis of Schutz's theory of action, we cannot only understand that the loss of control of action opens the way to include imagination as an essential resource for action. One may dare to claim that this is exactly one of the major societal changes affecting action: That the boundaries to imagination became permeable, that the "reality theory" has changed and everyday life opened its gates towards imaginary concepts and theories that are open to various symbolisms (from the symbolism of dream interpretation to the multitude of

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[24]At this point, the role of communication enters into phenomenological theory. Cf. Knoblauch 1985.

self-fantasies that have been labelled identities), symbolisms that, rather than being social utopias, remain bound to the individual actor and her imagination.

Admittedly, the role of imagination has been acknowledged quite often. Thus, Murphy et al. (2010) celebrate the necessity of imagination for the modern knowledge economy, and, with respect to general sociological theory, imagination has been an important topic since the times of Sartre and Castoriadis which diverted from France to the Anglo-Saxon discussion. Yet the use of the same words does not mean that they have the same meaning. "Imagination" in the French tradition (Legros et al. 2006) overlaps with the "idealistic" aspects of what in the German of Husserl, Weber, and Schutz would be called "meaning." Imagination, in the sense of Schutz, however, refers to a specific faculty of human consciousness, i.e., to activities by the subject. And it seems that it is exactly this kind of subjectivity to which modern societies, and, consequently, contemporary social theories seem to respond when they look for one of the major resources for "innovation" in society. It is not any more the individual entrepreneur but the subject and the difference of its meaning from socialized knowledge which is the resource for novelty. With respect to general sociological theory this means that Schutz (and in his tradition particularly Berger and Luckmann) joins in the post-structuralist thesis that most parts of subjective (typified) experiences are "derived from" society and thus are social in origin. The phenomenological approach at the same time shows that we cannot reduce the subject to something that is totally constructed by society. Even if the contents of imagination are an "imaginaire collective," (Legros et al. 2006) or, to use Schutz terms, even if the typifications used in imaginations are "derived" from the social stock of knowledge, the analysis of creativity does not get around the essential subjectivity of imagination – as basic as this subjectivity may ever be (cf. Knoblauch 2008).

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Imagination and the Social Sciences

Hisashi Nasu

1 Introduction: Toward Imagination and Construction

Two human mental activities, "*imagination*" and "*reasoning*," are ordinarily conceived as contrastive or oppositional. It is often said that if one would like to understand and explain the objects, events, and occurrences through *reasoning*, one should refrain from looking at them in *imagination*. These two mental activities are customarily allotted to different fields, with "*reasoning*" as a constitutive factor of the *social sciences*, but *not* a necessary condition for the *arts*, and in contrast, "*imagination*" as a constitutive factor of the *arts*, but *not* a necessary condition for the *social sciences*. Moreover, imagination is often thought to be an obstacle to the rigidness of methodology of the social sciences, because imagination is assumed to refer not to "reality" but to "fiction" and with no referent in "reality."

Such a view of reasoning and imagination and of the social sciences and arts can be found typically in the positivistic social sciences. This approach has various components, but for purposes of exposition, I shall define it very generally here: It is based on an assumption that the object of the social sciences is a *self-subsistent* world of *self-subsistent* social facts structured in a *law-like manner*, following the "Copernican-Galilean-Newtonian view of the world." (Luckmann 1973, p. 158) The social sciences, therefore, should attempt to develop rigid scientific methods which

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enable the social scientists to observe and describe *all* aspects or phases of the
social world *objectively* and *precisely*, to collect empirical data *correctly*, and to
draw *objective* and *scientific* insights from such data through deductive reasoning.

For the positivistic social sciences, imagination is nothing more than an obstacle
which impedes the "objectivity" and "preciseness" of their research, since imag-
ination is a "false perception" founded heavily on emotions and it can be grasped
neither objectively nor precisely by "scientific" methods. What is most important for
the positivistic social sciences is, therefore, to develop rigid methods and techniques
for eliminating imagination from the objects of their research as well as their own
scientific activities (cf., Nasu 1997).

An alternative to the positivistic social sciences, however, has appeared, which
recognizes implicitly or explicitly the important role of imagination in the social
sciences. Although there are several important differences identified among scholars
who follow such an alternative (cf., Endress 2003), they are founded on a crucial
idea:

> Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the
> outset selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore,
> always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial
> abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry along
> their interpretational inner and outer horizon (Schutz 1953, p. 5).

And they share a basic tenet: "reality is socially constructed." (Berger and
Luckmann 1966, p. 1) I shall call such a social scientific perspective "social
constructionism" in the broadest sense.

Social constructionism in the broadest sense[1] is, generally speaking, inclined to
conceive of society or social facts not as already established entities but as ongoing
processes which are continuously being realized and achieved. Such a conception
can be reached by directing attention to the role of imagination in the everyday
experience of actors and as well in the scientific experience of social scientists.
Social constructionism is actually founded on the idea that the objects, events, and
occurrences that serve as topics in common-sense and social scientific thinking are
"thought objects," that is, "constructs of a higher complicated nature," and therefore
the "*imagination* of hypothetical sense presentations" is indispensable for complet-
ing them (cf., Schutz 1953, p. 3). It might be said furthermore that "the real locus
of society is in people's imagination," and that "the object of the social sciences is
primarily an imaginative idea or group of ideas in the mind." (Baumann 1975, p. 60)

The detailed explication of social constructionism can be found in A. Schutz's
sociological and phenomenological work, and more directly in P. L. Berger and
T. Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (Berger and Luckmann 1966).
According to this perspective, imagination is, in contrast to the ordinary view and
the view of the positivistic social sciences, indispensable for social scientists in the
sense that the objects of their research and their scientific activities depend on their
own imagination.

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[1]Hereafter, the term "social constructionism" is used in this broader sense.

Previous to these theorists, there were few resources in the social sciences to explore the notion of imagination with several exceptions, one of which is C. W. Mills. His *Sociological Imagination* (Mills 1959) is so influential that it has taken the second place in a ranking of sociological works, according to a survey of "The Most Influential Sociological Work in the 20th Century" carried out by the International Sociological Association in 1998 (cf., Ina and Nakamura 2007, p. 25). Mills' book has been referred to as in the same framework as "social constructionism," since it criticizes the so-called "grand theory," "scienticism," and "positivism."

Mills explained the sociological imagination in various ways. It is, for example, "the capacity to shift from one perspective to another"; "a quality of mind that seems most dramatically to promise an understanding of the intimate realities of ourselves in connection with larger social realities"; "by its use men … often come to feel as if suddenly awakened in a house with which they had only supposed themselves to be familiar"; and it enables the social scientists to "understand the human variety in an orderly way." (cf., Mills 1959, pp. 13–14, 22, 148)

These statements about the sociological imagination are worth attending to. First, some of Mills' statements look more like features of a manifesto than founded and warranted claims. Second, the sociological imagination is treated as a capacity which can be possessed only as a result of training. Third, in spite of his important insights, his proposal becomes finally banal and curious. He proposed to "understand the human variety in an orderly way," for example, and "this orderly way" means for him to "connect with the 'social structure'" and especially with the "nation-state" as the "most inclusive unit of social structure." (cf., ibid., pp. 148–150, and *passim*)

This apparent superficiality might result from his failure, in my opinion, to discuss which direction should be taken after "awakening" by using the sociological imagination or what kind of "larger social realities" the "intimate realities" should be connected with. In sum, he explained "sociological imagination" only from the point of view of a sociologist and in terms of its expected role or function in sociological research, and did not provide any qualification for the conception of "sociological imagination" as to why it is required for sociological research.

Mills' *Sociological Imagination* has no direct connection with social constructionism. There is, however, a kind of parallelism found between the directions of Mills' arguments and the directions followed by some scholars who profess themselves to be social constructionists.

Social constructionism depends on a background assumption that society is not as stable as it appears, and it is inclined in speaking of society to focus on its plausible, fragile, and flexible aspects, leading to a basic tenet that "reality is socially constructed," and the observation that "common-sense 'knowledge' rather than 'ideas' must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge." (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 15) This perspective has many supporters and followers throughout the world. Some self-confessed social constructionists, accepting and following these assumptions and ideas as a kind of slogan or manifesto without taking into account the philosophical arguments on which they are founded, try to develop a "sociology of everyday life" as a practice by "returning to the everyday

life-world," which deals with everyday events *uncritically* and *naively*. Others
see society as a kind of "virtual reality" and talk about "society as fiction."[2]
In such popularizing processes, social constructionism has been criticized for
"nominalism," "subjectivism," "trivialism," or "sensationalism."

Such criticisms are, in my opinion, due in part to an implication contained in
the notion of imagination: "one can imagine whatever it is at one's own will," and
in part to a style of inquiry which would like to leave inquiries on imagination up
to philosophers, and worse still, neglect to take philosophical work into account.
If "the real locus of society is in people's imagination," (Baumann 1975 p. 60) it
might follow that any social facts or reality could be created, in principle, at one's
own will, since one can imagine whatever it is freely and arbitrarily. Such a view
neglects obviously the "obdurate character" of society (Blumer 1969, p. 23), and
cannot help but distort social constructionism, thus inviting the kind of criticisms
just mentioned.

If one would like to forestall such criticisms of social constructionism and render
it more effective and useful for the social sciences, the notion of "imagination"
should not be left to philosophers but explored more seriously in terms of the social
sciences.

2   Imagination as an Intentional Act of Human Consciousness

Actors in everyday life do not live only according to their roles as provided by the
social structure. They can keep a "distance" from their roles through *imagination*
and actually engage in such role-distant behaviors in their everyday life (cf.,
Goffman 1961). Then, What is imagination then?

Imagination is a mode of consciousness or a mode of intentionality and can be
conceived of as the ability to suppose or bring to mind what is *not present*. It is one
of modes of representation. Imagination can be characterized, therefore, in contrast
to perception and other forms of representation.

Perception is, firstly, a consciousness of the apprehension of the object in its
living, so to speak, present. Second, the intentional objects of perception are given as
really existing, and they are intended as having their "absolute positions in objective
time," "as determined by their absolute position in objective time." (Husserl 1939,
pp. 70–71, 86–87, 205–206 [67, 82, 176]) Perception shares the second feature
with recollection but not with imagination. This is the feature of "positional lived
experience."

Owing to these two features, "if, e.g., while I perceive my material environments,
a flash of memory comes to me and I devote myself entirely to it, this world of

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[2]Both Berger and Luckmann seem to be dissatisfied with the recent directions of social construc-
tionsim since the publication of their seminal work (cf., Berger 1992; Luckmann 1992), and this
might be, at least partially, due to such circumstances mentioned here.

perception does not then disappear; no matter how much this world may lose its 'actuality,' may 'withdraw from me,' perceptively it is always there, perceived, in the broader sense of the term." (ibid., pp. 205–206 [175–176])

These distinctions lead to the third and fourth features of perception and the objects of perception. All perceptions with regard to the objects intended in them are joined together in a unity and have reference to the unity of single world. Furthermore, perception can identify objects as individuals. Individuation and identification of the individual is possible only on the basis of an absolute position in objective time (cf., ibid., pp. 195, 202–203 [168, 173–174]).

These four features of perception and the objects of perception hold true for recollection with the exception of the first feature. They, however, do not hold true for imagination. The objects of imagination lack their absolute positions in objective time, and they cannot have a temporal unity among them, a unique temporal order like the objects of perception and recollection. The objects of imagination are given in the mode of "as-if," that is, as quasi-objects (ibid., p. 70 [67]). Although among all perceived and remembered individual objects of positional lived experiences there is a unity on the basis of their absolute temporal position in the objective world, this possibility of connection disappears for the objects of imagination. The imaginings of one ego separate from one another have no necessary connection *a priori*, and, as a rule, have none in our actual experience, that is, they have no connection in their objective relations, neither among themselves nor with perceptions. The objects of imagination do not join together into the unity of a world. This means that the experience of imagination in general provides no *individual* objects in the true sense (cf., ibid., pp. 195–196, 198, 203 [168, 170, 174]).

It would follow from the description thus far that perception has no clear advantages over imagination in social research. Perception has its referents in the actual world, and the "objects of perception are certainly 'given originally' to us in perception." (ibid., p. 437 [360]) Perception, therefore, has its perfect clearness in respect of all objective phases which reach their mode of givenness really within it and on primordial lines. Furthermore, perception is always available and producible at pleasure with the help of convenient experimental apparatus (cf., Husserl 1976, p. 146 [198–199]). In contrast, imagination does not refer to the actual and draws a world inconsistent with the real world. Imagination might be accused of "weakened sense" and "false perception," as in the saying that "there is nothing so dangerous as imagination." It follows that perception is useful for a firm base of reasoning, because it *looks like* it makes reasoning "verifiable" or "falsifiable" and guarantees reasoning's validity. For this reason perception is said to have advantages over imagination in social research. "In order to penetrate to the evidence of our first experience of the pregiven primordial world of our life (the *Lebenswelt*), we have to go back to the perceptual field given to us at any moment." (Schutz 1950, p. 278)

The intentional objects of imagination of one ego are certainly disconnected not only from the objects of perception but also from each other. However, all the lived experiences of an ego are constituted in the absolute flow of inner time-consciousness and in it have their absolute temporal position and uniqueness. This means that they have their temporal unity. This is true for the lived experiences of

imagination which appear in this flow. Imaginings are, as lived experiences, ordered in the unity of the ego (cf., Husserl 1939, pp. 195–196, 205–206 [168, 175–176]). Furthermore, on the basis of being constituted together in the flux of *one* time-consciousness, there is the *possibility of the establishment of an intuitive connection,* depending on associative awakening and linkage*, among all objects constituted in it* (cf., ibid., pp. 206–207, 210–212 [176, 179–180]), and therefore among the objects of perception, recollection, and imagination. It follows that the imaginings of one ego have a connection, not only among themselves but also with the perception of this ego, *as lived experiences*, and the intentional objects of imagination have their absolute position within *inner* time-consciousness. The unity of imagination is possible (cf., ibid., pp. 195, 200 [168, 171]).

The unity of imagination is, however, different from the unity of perception and of recollection. The latter are founded on their absolute position in objective time, which imagination lacks. In contrast, the experience of imagination in general provides no individual objects in the true sense. Nonetheless, "each act of imagination, being divorced from all temporal connection, has its own *imagination-time*." (ibid., p. 198 [170]) Thus, insofar as in all imaginings there is constituted a single quasi-world, namely an imaginary world, imagination can "provide quasi-individual objects and a quasi-identity, namely within the fixed unity of this imaginary world." (ibid., p. 203 [174]) The objects of imagination are objects imagined from and on the basis of one's own previous experience as an object of imaginary experience. Husserl has pointed out clearly that "the 'unity of an imagination' is manifestly nothing other than *the unity of a possible experience or the modification of neutrality of a unity of experience.*" (ibid., p. 200 [171])

It is important to pay attention here to his statement following the sentence just extracted above. He wrote that the unity of an imagination "affords precisely the ground for the essence: unity of experience." (ibid.) Why?

One critical point should be made here: Objects of perception are given, in principle, only imperfectly. It is absolutely true that perception refers to the limited and denumerable extension of actual particulars, from which empirical generalities have been originally acquired (cf., ibid., p. 409 [339]), and objects of perception are certainly "given originally" to us. This is the most important reason why social scientists would like to rely exclusively on data obtained from so-called "empirical research."

What we obtain in perception is, however, something self-given imperfectly because, first, it can be seen only from "one side," and second, what comes to self-possession as a thing is surrounded by a presumptive inner and outer horizon, that is, a determinable margin not yet determinate (cf., ibid., pp. 360–361 [437]; also Husserl 1976, p. 197 [145]). As Schutz pointed out, the life-world carries along with it its inner and outer horizons of determinable indeterminacy, and in this sense, is essentially *opaque* (cf., Schutz 1970, pp. 61, 136, 148).

For actors in everyday life, however, there is no problem with this kind of imperfectness of perception and essential opacity of our life-world. Insofar as actors do not face unexpected troubles, that is, everything proceeds smoothly in a taken-for-granted way, they do not turn toward the imperfectness and opacity as such, since

they always pre-predicatively suppose other sides appresentatively, unfold horizons, and fill in the opacity at least to the extent normally required, by socially derived and approved "typifications" which entail imagination.[3] The given (well known, taken for granted as beyond question) moments always and already pre-delineate the "vacancies" which remain undefined to the extent required (cf., ibid., p. 159).

Normally, perception always and already refers back to another side hidden by one side and also to a horizon which presumptively exhibits a broader experience of particulars (Husserl 1939, p. 339 [409]). Thus, imagination, in this sense, always and already operates even in the normal and ordinary perception. Otherwise, for example, Goldstein's patients with brain injuries would turn out to be the normal, since his patients were overwhelmed by the actuality of factual experience and were unable to conceive of possibilities, that is, incapable of imaginational operations, processes, and transformations (cf., Schutz 1950, p. 277). Even concrete objects before us cannot be recognized sufficiently only through what is within actual reach. They must be *constructed* through imagination. In order for experience to be unified, imagination must be activated. "If it were possible to conceive for a moment a consciousness which does not imagine, it would have to be conceived as completely engulfed in existence and without the possibility of grasping anything but existence. But it is exactly that which cannot be nor could be: all existence soon as it is posited is surpassed by itself." (Sartre 1950, p. 210)

When actors face unexpected trouble with perception, they may turn toward the imperfectness of their perception and try to go behind and look at the objects from another side and "observe" the "actual" more closely in different aspects. But as for the "horizons" which are accompanied to experience, "we cannot freely institute an actual experience going to infinity of everything that this object in truth is (*if* it is)." (Husserl 1939, p. 437 [360]) Another side hidden by the front side can certainly be seen by going behind, but horizons cannot be unfolded fully simply by pursuing one line of the possible harmonious experiences and their content of appearance and by depending on the initial perception with the objective sense established in it, because

> there is in all experience of the individual a wholly determined *commitment*. ... Everything which we further experience must be brought into a context of unanimity [*Einstimmigkeit*] if it is to count as an object for us. Unanimity must prevail on the ground of a unity of experience, a ground already prescribed for each individual object of experience. ... ... Every *experience in the pregnant sense* ... thus signifies "*taking a stand on the ground of experience*." (ibid., p. 415 [344])

The same issue holds for imagination insofar as we imagine within a context such that the individual imaginings are to be linked together in a unity of one act of imagination. We have a quasi-world as a unified world of imagination. It is the "ground" on which we can take our stand in the course of a unified act of imagination. But the difference between the worlds of perception and of imagination absolutely remains. In imagination, "it is left to our free choice to decide how far

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[3]As for the relation between typification and "phantasia," see Butnaru's excellent essay (Butnaru 2009).

we will allow this unity to extend; we can enlarge such a world at our pleasure, whereas fixed boundaries are set to the unity of an actual world by what was given previously." (ibid., pp. 415–416 [344])

"Imperfectness" or "vacancy" derived from "horizons" is an essential feature of human experience and cannot be resolved fully, at least, by depending on the actual. A broader experience of particulars presumptively exhibited by a horizon, as Husserl wrote, can be acquired in imagination "by opening up this presumptive horizon of being." (cf., ibid., p. 409 [339]) The essence of imagination consists in "negation" of the actual and therefore in "freedom" from the actual. It is only this "freedom" that opens up "an entry into the spacious realms of essential possibility with their infinite horizons of essential knowledge." (Husserl 1976, p. 147 [200]) For precisely this reason, Husserl rightly said that the unity of an imagination affords precisely the ground for the essence: unity of experience. It can be said now on a firm foundation that imagination has advantages over perception even in the social sciences, provided that attention is directed to the human ability to *construct* reality.

3   Imagination for the Social Sciences

Perception can grasp the object *passively,* at a *pre-predicative level*, as a unity, only by appresenting its hidden sides and unfolding horizons to the extent required with the help of typifications and the imagination belonging to typification. Imagination is, in this sense, not "an empirical and superadded power of consciousness," but "the whole of consciousness as it realizes its freedom." (cf., Sartre 1950, p. 209) To affirm this point, in the following, imagination at the *predicative level* will be considered, in which a single quasi-world of imagination is established and quasi-individual objects are provided actively.

Not only the objects of imagination but also the world of imagination "is," and is such and such by grace of the imagination which has imagined it. In order to activate imagination, consciousness must be free from and negate all specific concrete reality (cf., ibid., p. 208). Imagination consists of "negation" and the "freedom" founded on it and has no referent directly in the actual. It is precisely these features of imagination that lead not only to its disadvantages but also to its advantages in comparison with perception.

If only these features of imagination are literally taken into account, however, to say that imagination is indispensable for the social sciences seems to lead to the idea that social scientists are free to describe any society at their own will. If this were the case, it follows that imagination would be an obstacle for the social sciences, and then, a serious criticism of social constructionism (see, Sect. 1) would be invited.

Attention should be paid here to Sartre's pregnant statement: "the freedom of consciousness must not be confused with the arbitrary." (ibid., p. 207) There is still, in the essence of the connection which constitutes the "unity" of imagination, an abundance of essential limitations on imagination (Husserl 1939, p. 203 [173]).

First, since all the lived experiences of an ego are constituted in the absolute flow of inner time-consciousness, and the unity of an imagination as a lived experience is nothing other than the unity of a *possible* experience or the *modification of neutrality* of a unity of experience, essential limitations on imagination can find "their expression in this: that in the continuation, although free and open, of the unity of a complex of imaginings, it is the unity of a 'possible world' which is constituted with the encompassing form of the time of imagination pertaining to it." (ibid.)

"What can be varied … in the arbitrariness of imagination … bears in itself a necessary structure, an *eidos*, and therewith *necessary laws* which determine what must necessarily belong to an object in order that it can be an object of this kind." (ibid., p. 426 [352]) Therefore "the logical structure of consistency," or in Husserl's terms, "the predications of existence and nonexistence" should remain valid in imagination. I can imagine giants, winged horses, and centaurs, but not a regular decahedron, unless I stop at the blind juxtaposition of empty terms (cf., Schutz 1945a, p. 238). Imagination can and should be free from the factual, but not from logical incompatibility.

Second, although all existence as soon as it is posited is certainly surpassed by itself, it must retreat *toward something*. The object of imagination is in every case something individual (more precisely quasi-individual) toward which the existent is surpassed. In other words, the object of imagination is not purely and simply the world-negated. It is always the world negated from a certain point of view, namely, the one that permits the imagining of the absent or the non-existence of the object as the *individual* object of imagination. The freedom founded on negation must be able to define itself by a "being-in-the-world" which is at once the *negation* and the *construction* of the world (cf., Sartre 1950, pp. 207–208).

Therefore, in order for imagination to provide the (quasi-) *individual* object as an intentional object of imagination, as mentioned above, the unity of a single quasi-world of imagination should be or should have already been constructed. In addition, in order for the centaur to emerge as *unreal*, the world must be grasped or *constructed* as a world-where-the-centaur-is-*not* (ibid., p. 207). In the sixteenth-century, "dogs with fish heads" appeared not in a fantasy book, but in a book devoted to zoology. These dogs belonged not to the imaginary world but to the actual world (cf., Jacob 1989, p. 353). Thus, as Sartre indicated (cf., Sartre 1950, p. 206), there is another requisite if consciousness is to imagine the individually unified object as absent: It must not only be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality but also be able to posit the imagined object as being out of reach of this synthetic totality.

The limitations of imagination mentioned thus far derive from the necessary conditions that imagination must be unified and the world and objects of imagination must be unified and individualized in the mode of the "quasi-." These limitations can certainly provide the object of imagination a guarantee to be unified and individualized as absent or non-existent but cannot secure their *possibility, regardless of actual or potential, to be experienced* in the actual world. A centaur can be imagined as an animal which can *not* be experienced in the *actual* world.

If it is only these limitations which are imposed on imagination, such imagination can be useful in *literature* but not in the social sciences. Although the social sciences certainly share imagination with literature, and it can be acceptable to say that the essence of the social sciences is much the same as that of literature (cf., Baumann 1975, p. 6), centaurs can appear in the social-scientific work only as a metaphor or an analogy or something similar. In order for imagination to operate in the social sciences adequately, it must not only permit the objects of imagination to be unified and individualized but also provide them the possibility, probability, or likeliness to be actually or potentially experienced in the actual world. Thus, additional limitations of imagination in the social sciences, in comparison with imagination in literature, should be inquired into.

For literature, which consists wholly in imagination, "there is no reality which functions as a limitation to possibility." (Iser 1991, p. 404) The authors of literature can describe freely any kind of object. The objects of imagination in literature, that is, the characters in literature, can exist as a whole, "only by the authors' grace." (cf., Schutz 1945a, p. 239) They can be persons living "in everyday life" or in "the world of chivalry" or even "horses with wings" or "centaurs." If they are "persons in everyday life," they may be described as "persons" in the natural attitude who are directed by pragmatic motives. If such a person is the famous Don Quixote living in the world of chivalry, he is described as a person who does not acknowledge his delusion, even when he must recognize that the attacked objects are not imagined giants but actual windmills, but interprets the windmills *reasonably* by the "theory" that his arch-enemy, the magician, must have transmogrified at the last moment the formerly but no less real giants into windmills. Windmills are described as not realities but mere appearances for him (cf., ibid., pp. 236–237).

The authors of literature can also imagine and describe a device for transporting human beings from Tokyo to Zurich in a moment, because the object of imagination in literature is not subject to objective time, and in addition, it is not in the *potential* mode but in the *optative* mode, and therefore is not conditioned by real practicability (cf., Schutz 1951, pp. 72–73).

The authors can have themselves appear in their own literature. They can also ascribe any roles to imagined "themselves" in the literature. They can also describe "themselves" as committing a murder. If this is the case, the authors are, in principle, not actually arrested for a "murder," since "working" in the literature is a "projected covert action" (cf., ibid., pp. 67–68) and cannot actually change the outer world by gearing into it. The author's imagination is "ineffective" in this sense, and the author, at least as an imagining self, does not transform the actual outer world (cf., Schutz 1945a, p. 236). Imagining *as such* always lacks the intention of realizing that which is imagined. "It lacks the specific positionality of the thetic consciousness." (ibid., p. 235)

In a word, authors are "omniscient" in their literature (Schutz 1955, p. 4). The situation in literature is totally determined by the authors. The relevance system on which action of the characters in literature is founded is also totally determined by the authors. Their imagination, however, has several limitations, which derive from generic features of imagination and are almost corollaries of the limitations

of imagination in general. First, since imagination is also an activity of our mind, the imagining self can, in imagination, "eliminate all the features of objective time except its irreversibility." (Schutz 1945a, p. 239) Even when the authors imagine, they are in the *durée*, that is, continuing to grow old, and the irreversibility of occurrences originates within the *durée* which is constitutive for all activities of our mind, and therefore for their imagination. As already mentioned above, the constitutive *lived experiences* including imagination, as *lived experiences* in inner time-consciousness, have *their absolute temporal position relative to one another*, their before and after (cf., Husserl 1939 p. 206 [176]), and the unity of imagination and the objects of imagination derive essentially from this inner time-consciousness.

There is a second limitation on imagination in literature. Even in literature, since the objects of imagination are imagined within "a whole world," (cf., Sartre 1950, pp. 76, 257) that is, a single quasi-world of imagination, the "logical structure of consistency" remains valid. Even in literature, a "regular decahedron" does not appear unless the author stops at the blind juxtaposition of empty terms (cf. Schutz 1945a, p. 238).

The third limitation on imagination in literature derives from the fact that the objects of imagination can exist, as a whole, only by the grace of authors. This fact, in turn, means that they have no fixed positions in the order of objective time, and they are individualized only in the mode of the "quasi-." The category of sameness is not applicable to them. It makes no sense to compare the characters appearing in different literature as to their sameness or likeness unless the authors intend originally to compare them in their own different works. "It is meaningless to ask whether the witch of one fairy tale is the same as the witch of another." (ibid., p. 239) Imaginings separate from one another have no necessary connection *a priori* (cf., Husserl 1939, p. 198 [170]). Imagination in literature is, in principle, self-completed. It follows that there is, in principle, a freedom left completely to the readers to interpret and appreciate the novels.

Now let us turn to the social sciences. The scientific process does not consist only in observing objects, collecting data, and deducing a theory from them. One can observe the objects seriously, in detail, and for years without producing any insights of scientific interest. First, scientific activities that involve observing the objects and collecting data always and already fall within a cognitive framework which exists by the grace of *imagination*. Second, scientific insights cannot be drawn from the data without interpretation of them, and the data, in turn, can be interpreted not by observing the literalized data strictly and precisely as "figures of ink on the sheet," not by scrutinizing them as "letters or numerals written," but by considering them through *imagination* as something *transcending* themselves and referring to other terms.

The social sciences actually share with literature the act of imagination as a constitutive factor. Like the act of imagination in literature, scientific theorizing does not gear into the outer world. It can be cancelled without creating any change in the outer world. Since "its aim is not to master the world but to observe and possibly understand it," (Schutz 1945a, p. 245) imagination in scientific theory is free from pragmatic motives, as in literature.

Social scientists, like the authors of literature, can select the objects of their inquiry and posit the problems at hand freely. By this positing of the problem, the system of relevance emerges, which, in turn, determines the "level" of the research, that is, "the demarcation line between all that does and does not pertain to the problem under consideration." (ibid., p. 249)

Nonetheless, attention should be paid to two differences between imagination in literature and in the social sciences. First, the freedom of social scientists to select and posit the problem at hand is more constrained than the freedom of the authors of literature. As Schutz pointed out (cf., ibid., p. 250), any problems in the social scientific field have to partake of the universal style of this field and have to be compatible with the pre-constituted scientific problems and their solution by either accepting or refuting them. Imagination in scientific works should not be self-completed in the same sense as literature. The social scientist, unlike the author of literature, is not omniscient. Schutz even said that "the latitude for the discretion of the scientist in stating the problem is in fact a very small one." (ibid.)

Second, the intentional objects of the social sciences, "insofar as they are not 'ideal objects of a higher order,' have their well defined place within the order of objective time; and insofar as they are 'ideal objects of a higher order' they are founded upon objects having such a place in objective time." (ibid., p. 252) Imagination in the social sciences, unlike in literature, cannot go beyond this limitation.

If this is the case, imagination in the social sciences might appear to be self-contradictory, since imagination consists of "negation" of and "freedom" from all specific concrete reality, and intentional objects of imagination are non-existent or absent in the actual world. According to this definition, imagination has no referent in the actual world. But this is only a seeming contradiction. Imagination includes an ability to bring to mind what is non-existent or absent via the present or an ability to conceive of the present as non-existent or absent. Imagination is *at once negation* of the objects in the actual world and *construction* of the quasi-objects and the quasi-world.

This second difference undoubtedly leads to another limitation on imagination in the social sciences. The objects of imagination in the social sciences cannot be such and such only by the grace of the imagination of social scientists, as they are in literature. The social scientist, unlike the authors of literature, is not omniscient in this sense, too.

This second limitation should not be reduced to the first one, because the first remains as a whole within the world of social sciences. If it is only the first limitation which is imposed on imagination in the social sciences, then social scientists can select and posit the problems *freely* and *arbitrarily*, and can construct their thought objects *freely* and *arbitrarily*, only provided that they are compatible with pre-constituted *scientific* problems. If this is the case, there is no need for "actual" actors and actions with common-sense thinking to appear in the social sciences.

The second limitation derives from the peculiarity of the observational field of the social sciences. The social sciences must focus primarily on the social world, and this world is not in its essence structureless but

has a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. They have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought objects which determine their behavior, define the goal of their action, the means available for attaining them. ... The thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life among his fellow-men (Schutz 1953, p. 6).

Thus, social scientific constructs should be designed to *at once refer to* and *supersede, that is, be free from* the constructs of common-sense thought. These circumstances must extend through imagination in the social sciences, since imagination is already and always involved in human beings' living, thinking, and acting in the social world, and therefore, in the constructs of common-sense thought.

Schutz's methodology of the social sciences, especially his postulates for the social sciences, can be placed in this context. His discussion of the methodology of the social sciences is founded on his insight that "his [observer's] system of relevances differs from that of the interested parties and permits him to see at the same time *more or less* than what is seen by them," (ibid., p. 26, *italic* added) and proceeds along three related questions; What makes everyday experience or a unity of everyday experience possible? What distinctive features does experience have in the world of the social sciences? How can social scientists talk about everyday experience adequately? (cf., Nasu 2010) Schutz's arguments in this field introduce various topics, one of which leads to the formulation of methodological postulates.

Schutz formulated several methodological postulates in his essays, and there are some differences in his arguments among these essays, but there is no need to detail them here (for such detail, see Nasu 2005, 2010). Just four postulates will be briefly treated here for their significance to this essay: the postulate of subjective interpretation, the postulate of logical consistency in a narrow sense,[4] the postulate of relevance, and the postulate of adequacy.

These four postulates are formulated to provide guarantees that social scientific "constructs are by no means arbitrary." (Schutz 1954, p. 64) They are, however, different from each other in their way of achieving this guarantee. The postulate of subjective interpretation requires social scientists to "refer to the subjective meaning of actions of human beings from which social reality originates," (ibid., p. 62) and therefore attempts to provide such guarantee by founding scientific constructs on common-sense constructs. The postulate of logical consistency in a narrow sense, which is said to be applicable only to the theoretical sciences, is intended to provide a guarantee by requiring the system of social scientific constructs to be "in full compatibility with the principles of formal logic." (Schutz and Parsons 1978, p. 60) The postulate of relevance, which requires the formation of social

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[4]The postulate of logical consistency is formulated in two ways. This postulate in a broad sense is equivalent to the postulate of rationality and contains the postulates of relevance and of compatibility as well as the postulate of logical consistency in a narrow sense, which requires the system of ideal type to be in full compatibility only with the principles of formal logic in a narrow sense (cf., Nasu 2005, pp. 125–127).

scientific constructs to comply with the "principle of relevance," (cf., Schutz 1943a, pp. 83–84) aims at offering a guarantee by establishing the "unification of the social scientific field" (cf., Schutz 1945b, pp. 583–585) through bracketing the natural attitude and positing the level of investigation solely on the basis of the scientific problems which the social scientists themselves have established as compatible with the whole of their scientific knowledge (cf., Schutz and Parsons 1978, p. 60). The postulate of adequacy, which was borrowed from Max Weber with some revisions, seems to fulfill a guarantee by leaving the judgment of the adequacy of social scientific constructs not only to the social scientists who construct and use the "second level construction," but also to the actors and their partners who construct and use the "first level constructs" on the scene of social reality (cf., Schutz 1953, pp. 4, 44).

Briefly, Schutz's methodological postulates, formulated *together*, attempt to guarantee social scientific constructs to be "by no means arbitrary" by ensuring the open and creative relation between common-sense thinking and social scientific thinking and thereby overcoming the seeming *paradoxical requirements* that social scientific constructs should not only refer to and be founded on, but also supersede, i.e., be free from and negate, the constructs of common-sense thought (cf., Nasu 2005, 2010). Thus it can be concluded that Schutz's postulates are formulated for dealing with two additional limitations on imagination in the social sciences mentioned above in order to let social scientific imagination act fully and adequately, and also not arbitrarily.

4 Some Concluding Remarks

The object of perception is given originally to us in perception, and clear perception is always at our disposal if it is needed. So the social sciences, which would like to focus on the social world and persons perceiving, recollecting, thinking, imagining, judging, and also acting in it, should go back, among other things, to the perceptual field given to us at any moment, in order to penetrate to the evidence of our first experience of the pre-given primordial world of our life-world (cf., Schutz 1950, p. 278).

Experience in the perceptual field, however, has *of necessity* "vacancies," that is, other sides hidden by the front side and inner and outer horizons. The "actual" in this field cannot be made only of percepts in the strict sense. The object of perception is *essentially* given imperfectly and with *vacancies*, and in order to grasp it as unified, these vacancies need to be filled in *supposedly* by appresentation and representation *to the extent* required. Even the concrete object of perception before us needs to be constructed as a unified object in a world, which should be, in turn, constructed as a coherent world.

This construction is normally performed in a taken-for-granted way, and for the actors in the everyday life-world, there is no problem with the imperfectness in this sense. They do not turn toward this imperfectness of their daily experience insofar as everything proceeds smoothly.

Such a description of perception and imagination in the everyday life-world leads to several insights which are important to the social sciences. First of all, it can be confidently said with Sartre that imagination is not a superadded power of consciousness but the whole of consciousness. It is absolutely impossible to conceive of consciousness which is not accompanied by imagination. Imagination is indispensable for social life. This is one reason why the social constructionist perspective is required if the social sciences are to focus on the everyday life-world and its essential opacity derived from the essential nature of human experience. If social scientists are to treat *honestly* the social world and the actors' experience in their everyday life, they must pay attention to imagination and the construction process in the actors. When they try to elaborate a theory of action, for example, their analysis needs to focus on the process by which an actor determines future conduct after having considered several possible ways of action, that is, a process of dramatic rehearsal in *imagination* of various competing possible lines of action (cf., Schutz 1951, pp. 67–68).

The second point is drawn from the fact that the vacancies of human daily experience are normally fulfilled with no problem and in *taken-for-granted ways*. Actors are used to filling in vacancies and constructing the objects and the world of perception as a unity without having self-recognition of their own act of construction. Fulfillment in such a way leads to disregarding the outer and inner horizons of the object and also to encompassing the imaginational process of construction with a socially approved and established typification. Thus, "imperfectness" will be taken to be "perfectness," and there will be no possibility left to look at the objects, events, and occurrence from another perspective. The so-called "status quo bias" remains untouched.

And thus there is another reason why a social constructionist perspective should be required in the social sciences. If social scientists are indifferent to these circumstances, background assumptions prevailing in everyday life will be smuggled into their scientific activities and insights uncritically and unconsciously. Alternatively, if social scientists turn to actors' imagination and construction process, they will be able to make prevailing and taken-for-granted assumptions a *topic* of their inquiry, secure the possibility of disclosing inner and outer horizons, and free their social scientific reasoning from such assumptions by activating their imagination.

This is, however, only half of the story. Imagination is indispensable not only for activities in the everyday life-world but also for scientific activities. Social scientists actually depend on imagination in the whole process of their scientific activities. In addition, to activate the imagination is one thing; to reflect on imagination is another. If social scientists are indifferent to the circumstances that the data collected through their "scientific" methods is already and always "theory-laden," (Hanson 1958) and use their own imagination in a taken-for-granted way, as the actors in everyday life do, such scientific activities will lead social scientists to reduce the nature of their objects to what their scientific criteria will allow, and the "status quo bias" will also remain untouched here.

If this is the case, imagination might certainly be a serious obstacle to the adequacy of scientific activities. If social scientists, however, turn toward the

important and indispensable role of imagination for human activities including daily as well as scientific activities, they will not only refer to and take the actors' imaginational process of construction as a *topic* of their inquiry, but also turn toward and reflect on their own scientific activities and imagination involved in them. In this case, imagination is not an obstacle at all to the adequacy of the social sciences but rather an enhancement. It needs not lead a reduction of "the intimate realities" to the "social structure" as in Mills' "sociological imagination." It does not create an illusion to observe and describe "all aspects" of the social world, since its horizons are primarily open, and it is impossible to think of "all aspects" of the social world to be explored.[5] Rather, imagination ensures "determinable indeterminacy" and frees scientific reasoning from its self-restriction to scientific methods as well as to an empirically verifiable or falsifiable field.

If social scientists rely on a social constructionist perspective, founded on the thesis that the life-world is essentially opaque, and according to Schutz's methodological postulates, refer to and thematize the actors' imagination and construction process, and in addition, turn toward, reflect on, and then free themselves from their own imagination operating in a taken-for-granted way through re-activating it sufficiently and adequately, imagination will lead social scientists to relativize the actors' taken-for-granted assumptions and disclose horizons of their experience via their social scientific viewpoints, and at the same time, they will relativize their own taken-for-granted assumptions and disclose horizons of their experience through the actors' viewpoint. Such a perspective will ensure the open and creative circular relationship between the world of everyday life and the world of social scientific theory, and "prevent theorizing from [freezing into] a strange solipsism" (Schutz 1943b, p. 50) as well as dogmatism or scientism. This will be a first step, in my opinion, to "Positivism" in the sense of "the absolute unbiased grounding of all science." (Husserl 1976, p. 45 [86])

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[5]Therefore, with regard to a "theory of objects," social constructionism depends not on the "correspondence theory," but on the "congruence theory." (cf., Garfinkel 1953)

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Functional Purposelessness: The "Practical Meaning" of Aesthetics

Hans-Georg Soeffner

Preliminary Remarks The title of this essay has two parts, each containing a deliberate paradox: (1) aesthetic purposelessness assumes a function and (2) the relatively – as opposed to the practice-oriented conceptual sensory area of everyday mind and everyday activity – "finite provinces of meaning" (Schütz 1971, p. 407) of aesthetics assumes a practical meaning. This must and will be substantiated below. Here, I will not – or only marginally – follow the traditional lines of a philosophy of aesthetics represented from the eighteenth century by Baumgarten, Kant, or Hegel to the present, by e.g., Martin Seel. Instead, I will attempt, as much as this is possible in a short lecture, to characterise on the basis of phenomenological-protosociological and anthropological thought the structural relationships between common-sense thinking, aesthetics, and science.

The term "*Beziehungsgefüge*," structure of relationships, already indicates a decisive assumption: No matter how much socially constructed systems and world views, especially in modern and increasingly differentiated societies, may be separated into seemingly self-contained individual segments and dissociated into a variety of perspectives – socially experienced reality is always relational, involving a structure *and* process of "interdependencies." (Simmel)

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1 Taste Instead of Conservation of Values: Aesthetic Configuration of Aesthetics

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber described the "*Ästhetentum intellektualistischer Zeitalter*" (Weber 1976, pp. 365f) as the result of a development whereby aesthetics and especially art disengage as "pure art" from a "religious will to salvation" and lay claim to worldly salvation, thereby creating an animosity between, on the one hand, ethical religiousness and the "rational lifestyle systematisation" that emanated from it and, on the other hand, aesthetic-cultural self-interpretation. However, if art and thus social order are nothing but a "*vom Standpunkt des Menschen aus mit Sinn und Bedeutung bedachter endlicher Ausschnitt aus der sinnlosen Unendlichkeit des Weltgeschehens*," (Weber 1973, p. 180) it not only creates a tension between after-life religion and worldly salvation scenarios, but also a worldly oriented necessity for justification of here-and-now ethics.

And norm setting through practical reason becomes its advocate – in the name of human intellectuality. As a human form of expression in its respective current novel historic disguise, this rational activity becomes permanently suspicious of relativism – especially in intellectualized times. When such relativistic intellectualism joins and embraces an aesthetic-cultural attitude which considers itself destined for freedom to design possibility horizons of self-interpretation, the affinity to also assume a position replicated from the aesthetic attitude increases when faced with ethical norm setting: to deny responsibility for an ethical judgment on behalf of seemingly arbitrary possibility horizons of interpretation and value systems.

What in the Cologne vernacular is articulated as practical wisdom, namely the statement: "*Jeder Jeck ist anders*," (Each fool is different) may in intellectualistic times ultimately result in proclaiming the prevailing life style as a matter of taste: "*Die Ablehnung der Verantwortung für ein ethisches Urteil und die Scheu vor dem Schein beschränkter Traditionsgebundenheit, wie sie intellektualistische Zeitalter hervorbringen, veranlasst dazu, ethisch gemeinte in ästhetisch ausgedeutete Urteile umzuformen (in typischer Form: 'geschmacklos' statt 'verwerflich')*. (Weber 1976, 366)." From a viewpoint of religious ethics, such subjectivist "*Kultus des Ästhetentums*," (Weber 1976, p. 366) whereby everything becomes a matter of taste and seriously arguing about taste is not desired, may – according to Weber – "*sehr wohl als eine tiefste Form von spezifischer Lieblosigkeit, verbunden mit Feigheit, angesehen werden*" (Weber 1976, p. 366). In short, consequent "*Brüderlichkeitsethik*" (ibid.) and intellectualistically gilded aesthetics cannot meet: The ethics of fraternalism has fused the spectrum of possibility horizons into manageable rules and regulations. Thus, aestheticism satisfies neither intellect nor aesthetics. It offends the intellect, as it allows it to dissolve into arbitrariness and it offends aesthetics because it aesthetisises something that cannot be aesthetisised: the human purpose of being an aesthetic being – in a wholly existential meaning.

Hence, Weber's descriptions of the intellectualistic era and its embedded cult of aestheticism refer to a historically specific form and exaggeration of ways of

life. These are ways of life that dissolve the critically cognitive faculty of the intellect into intellectualistic attitudes and which attempt to either outperform man's significant approach to the world and to himself, characterized by aesthetics as well as aestheticism, with an egocentric and ultimately empty virtuoso-ness and self-aesthetisation, or to let it dissolve into airiness. Simmel characterised the latter as constant overstimulation of the nervous system of, e.g., city dwellers continuously exposed to and continuously looking for new stimuli until eventually the stimuli lose their attraction. Accordingly, Simmel defines airiness as "*Abstumpfung gegen die Unterschiede der Dinge*" (Simmel 2008, p. 324). The replacement of value systems with the arbitrariness of taste judgments is the mark of the blasé aestheticism.

Therefore, the outperforming as well as the ennui attitude of such ways of life must be distinguished from a fundamental human world – just as self-reference characterised by aesthetics and aestheticism – totally independent of whether we are still or once again living in an intellectualistic era. Yet Max Weber would surely have considered the postmodern era, if such an era indeed existed, an intellectualistic one.

2   What Problems Can Aesthetics Answer?

In 1925, three years before he developed in "*Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch*" (Plessner 1975 [1928]) his theory of man's "eccentric positionality," Helmuth Plessner, in a short essay, analysed the potential of aesthetics (Plessner 1982 [1925], pp. 51–57). Here, he obviously is not concerned about the potential of art but the perception – resulting from the interplay of human senses – of an "aesthetic object," (Plessner 1982 [1925], p. 54) a perception characterised by prereflective understanding. According to Plessner, "*das Ästhetische [bleibt] nicht im Wahrnehmen eines Gegenstandes beschlossen,*" but "*mit der Wahrnehmung [muss] ein Sinn verknüpft sein [. . .] und zwar ein atheoretischer Sinn, der einer unmittelbaren Intuition gegeben ist.*" This results in a "*ursprüngliches Erlebnis eines Kontrastes [. . .] zwischen dem schlichten Akt der Empfindung sinnlich-stofflicher Daten und dem Akt eines in gewisser Weise unstofflichen Verstehens*" (ibid.).

Since this first thesis on the relationship of sensory perception and aesthetics, the "*Anthropologie der Sinne*" (Plessner 1970) has remained an unresolved leitmotif of Plessner's thinking. His treatise of the same title, published in 1970, comprises essays from 1936 to 1968. In the following, I will refer to some of Plessner's ideas, but will take the liberty to "transmute" them – the ideas – into my own sociology of knowledge approach.

The starting point is Plessner's struggle with a phenomenologically-based insight that does not completely agree with the second fundamental anthropological law, the law of "*vermittelter Unmittelbarkeit*" (Plessner 1975 [1928], pp. 321ff). It is the discovery that apparently there exists something like an "*ursprüngliche Begegnung des Menschen mit der Welt, die nicht zuvor verabredet ist*" (Plessner 1975 [1928], p. 336). In this phrasing, Plessner affords – as on other occasions – a grammatical

ambiguity: The state of being not arranged may relate to the original encounter as well as the world. Taking both together, the not arranged encounter of man with the world simultaneously results in a world which may also be new and different from the one previously perceived and appointed. Subtly, this ambiguity appears intended as in this "original encounter," in which an "*Einheit von Vorgriff und Anpassung*" (Ibid.) is meant to take place.

Evidently, this characterisation of the phenomenon of experienced, multidimensional immediacy and the previously described "original experience" of perception of an aesthetic object can be paralleled to the labelling of what I term "aesthetic kairós" (Soeffner 2005): on the one hand, the prereflexive, timely condensed fusion of sensory perception activities, and, on the other hand, the aesthetic objects constituted within it. Similarly evident is the fact that for Plessner, this type of immediate experience does not primarily refer to artistic acts, the perception of objects of art, or even the "art of society" (Luhmann) as a differentiated social subsystem, but that it precedes all of these *as the condition of the potential of the constitution of aesthetic objects in experience and perception* and that it is generally created in the "eccentric positionality" of man as a significant characteristic of the human condition. In other words: In this specific sensory experience – and perception activity, *everything* that is perceived is potentially transformable into aesthetic objects.

Just as for Max Weber all human activity and production – i.e., economic, political, manual, private, religious activity, and its relevant social institutions – may be accorded "cultural meaning" in a specific approach of the *sinnverstehend*/(cognitive) social subject, from Plessner's point of view, they may, on the basis of aesthetic perception and experience, also be provided with an aesthetic emphasis – however, only within this experience and perception horizon – in which a characteristically "aesthetic object" already exists. Only within *this* horizon can Bazon Brock and any one else, Duchamp's ready-mades, John Cages' minimal music (cf. "4′33″"), Andy Warhol's "Brillo Boxes," and other "work experiments" become aesthetic objects.

Accordingly, "aesthetic" or the "non-aesthetic" is primarily not an attribute or characteristic already intended in specific types of activity and organisation and which thus can be awarded or denied, but it emanates – to use terms by Alfred Schütz – from a specific "tension of awareness" which shapes the "sensory area" (Schütz 1971, pp. 407ff) of aesthetics and its constituting forms of perception, experience, and activity. In this respect, contrasting of "aesthetic" and "non-aesthetic" *on the object level* is prohibitive, regardless of the form of human expression.

According to Plessner, the "*offensichtliche Versagen [der] traditionellen Ästhetik gegenüber der künstlerischen Produktion der Gegenwart*" (Plessner 1970, p. 190) results from exactly this object-centred point of view. Once again, this phrasing contains a conspicuous grammatical ambiguity: The failure of traditional aesthetics may refer to (1) an artistic production which was created in the (then) present or (2) the artistic producing in the present – on the aesthetic *kairós* – itself.

Presumably, the "subjective meaning," (Max Weber) as intended by Plessner, aims for the first interpretation option. The second interpretation is also "objectively," i.e., linguistically and grammatically, possible. It follows "subcutaneously" yet coherently Plessner's theoretical approach as outlined so far – however, only if I may be permitted here – as elsewhere – to understand Plessner better than he does himself, something Fichte already claimed for his interpretation of Kant.

It is a concept which, in the course of Plessner's thinking, concentrates more and more on sensory performance and the interplay of senses: more on constitution performance of the senses than the "objects" constituted by them. For my own approach and its associated thesis of the "practical meaning of aesthetics," the *structural multioptionality of human perception as intended in synaesthesia* must now be identified with the help of Plessner's analyses to arrive at a protosociological determination of aesthetics: To demonstrate in the double meaning of the genitive construction *how/as what* aesthetics may be determined and *what* it is meant *for*.

Just as with Plessner, who was prompted by the "obvious failure of traditional aesthetics" (see above) regarding modern art to search for a new gateway to the basic premises of anthropologically based aesthetics, my approach also aims to look for general comprehensive information, however, in dependency on time. This is not only so because it should be seen as a development of Plessner's thinking, but also because it must prove itself on the empirical level regarding new forms of artistic production as well as a new media environment, which requires additional efforts (in adaptation) from human perception and its basis, the senses. Overall, it can be stated that the development of aesthetic theories runs in parallel not only to the development of artistic production and its increasing "autonomisation," but also to the invention of new technical instruments and equipment which human sensory perception must adapt to – new acoustic and optical instruments, physical imaging methods, and new media as well as accelerated spatial movement through new means of transport (Soeffner and Raab 2004). Time and again, new interplay of the human "sensory equipment" and sensory training develops. In basic ("functionalistical") terms: Our senses are innate so that we may train them and have them trained by our environments.

In his search for the "*Sinn der Sinne*" (Plessner 1970, p. 199; Cf. Strauss 1935) (Erwin Straus) Plessner concluded that "*jeder Sinn seinen Grund [hat] in dem, was er und nur er herausbringt*," whereas all senses "together" bring on "diversity in the whole": "*Soviel Seiten, soviel Sinne. Aber auch: soviel Sinne, soviel Seiten*" (Plessner 1970, p. 232). However, this variety is not arbitrary. As "sources of perception," the senses correspond to the activity they control. The outcome of this is their "*Aktionsrelativität*" (Plessner 1970, p. 238). As for the animal kingdom, it also holds true for man that sensory perception does not exist "by itself" but "for/towards something": for orientation, coordination of activity, and mutual ("social") control of individuals of a species, and aesthetic appreciation (see Schiller).

Here, Kant's insight that senses (just as "pure reason") cannot err is confirmed biologically as well as ethno-ethologically. Errors and wrong conclusions are,

according to Kant, not "owed"[1] (Cf. Kant 1968 [1790–1799] Bd.8, §57ff) to the senses, but to the *translation* of sensory perception into intelligent and reasonable terms, i.e., the linguistic procurement (and distortion) of the sensory immediate which later on becomes the subject for radical language criticism for Nietzsche[2] (Cf. Nietzsche 1980b).

Accordingly, with the animal kingdom we structurally share the interplay of sensory equipment and synaesthesia. However, unlike our animal precursors and cousins – according to Plessner – man does not rest "*bei dem puren Faktum seiner sinnlichen Organisation, er sieht etwas darin, einen Sinn – und wenn er ihn nicht findet, gibt er ihm einen und macht etwas daraus*" (Plessner 1970, p. 199). This applies for the sensory organisation as a whole as well as for each individual sense: We find meaning even in their existence and make something of it, e.g., in Goethe's "meaningful" phrase: "*Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, die Sonne könnt' es nicht erblicken*," but also by specialising individual senses – in the past as hunters, gatherers, and craftspeople – or by accentuating individual sensory perceptions and increasingly supporting them with "organ extensions" such as spectacles, microscope, telescope or microphone, loudspeaker, sounding body, etc.

The arts in particular are turning into experimental grounds for perception – for the specialisation of senses as in painting, photography, and music – as well as for conscious training of synaesthesia in works of sensory compositions comprised of images, music, movement, incense, voice, etc., such as Holy Mass, but also in theatre, opera, or media compilations at contemporary mass events. At first glance, two seemingly opposing tendencies are perceived in these aesthetic experimental grounds: on the one hand the specialisation of sense, and on the other hand, the aggregation of sensory perception.

However, upon careful inspection it becomes apparent that both movements relate to each other, in fact, must aim at each other to prevent the concerted specialisation of the senses turning into a discrepancy of sensory perception. The "cooperation of senses," in our relatively natural contact with ourselves and our environment, has always been seen as synaesthetical processing into an overall picture; it is, in fact, broken apart in these aesthetic experimental grounds and uncovered just as sense perception, which is structurally given in a hidden manner, is capable of being broken into divergent components also. Thus, in the anthropology of the senses as well as in aesthetic practice, it becomes apparent that we are our senses' primary medium, which we must make accessible and to which we owe our sensory and worldly perception.

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[1]The same applies to the "*Sinnestäuschungen*": They result from the conclusions drawn on the basis of perceptions on the perceived.

[2]In connection with the question of the "*richtige Perzeption*" (Nietzsche 1980b, p. 317) Nietzsche writes: "*Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen und geschmückt wurden und die nach langem Gebrauch einem Volke fest, kanonisch und verbindlich dünken: Die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind . . .*" (ibid., p. 314).

However, if it is true that all senses together "bring about" variety and divergence, ("*soviele Seiten, soviele Sinne. Aber auch: soviele Sinne, soviele Seiten*," see above), the unity of the senses is not self-evidently given, but the *generation of unity* is *the problem* which must be solved in the process of aesthetisation. It is a process which, on the one hand, aims for simultaneous experience of divergence and on the other hand, fusion of sensory perception. This process must be achieved by someone committed to the fundamental anthropological laws of the "*natürliche Künstlichkeit*" and the "*vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit*," (Cf. Plessner 1975 [1928], pp. 390ff) someone who not only perceives something, but also perceives *that* and *how* he perceives something (Cf. Simmel 1992, p. 49) which is not a unity in itself but something which relates to itself and ultimately knows that we are all "*Fragmente [. . .], nicht nur des allgemeinen Menschen, sondern auch unserer selbst*" (Plessner 1970, p. 247).

The aesthetisation of the perceived and of perception at the same time is the human response to this problem. And the "*künstlerische Verschmelzung*" based on aesthetisation to its "*modalen Qualitäten unüberbrückbaren Divergenzen*" is – according to Plessner – "*ein[. . .] dem Menschen offen stehende[r] Weg, aus sinnlicher Diskrepanz der sensorischen Komponenten ein Konzept zu machen; eine Einheit*" (Cf. Imdahl 1996; See also Raab 2008, pp. 159ff). Here, Max Imdahl's differentiation and simultaneous conflation of "*wiedererkennendem Sehen*" and "*sehendem Sehen*" (Cf. Imdahl 1996; See also Raab 2008, pp. 159ff) in picture hermeneutics finds its anthropologic basis.

At the same time, it becomes apparent that the aesthetisation of human life, in addition to its many other effects, results in a specific means of expression which simultaneously represents and illustrates the unity of the contradiction, the limitation and the crossing of the line, the immediacy of effect, and the emblematic procurement: the symbol (Cf. Soeffner 2000).

Significantly, range, use, and the effect of the symbol encompass common efforts at aesthetisation and representation, as well as religious, artistic, political, and also economical efforts. Thus, aesthetisation and the "*Selbststeigerungstendenz des menschlichen Lebens*" (Cf. Plessner 1975 [1928], p. 320) expressed in it are answers to a fundamental crisis: the constitutive lack of balance of the eccentric positionality (Cf. Plessner 1975 [1928], p. 316). They represent the attempt to create by artistic means a base which time and again can only offer temporary as well as unstable support: *culture* (Cf. Plessner 1975 [1928], pp. 311ff) *as inner worldly basis of human existence* and not as a playing field for cults and virtuosi of aestheticism.

The aesthetisation attempts of humankind and its products – culture in its manifold historic manifestations – first and foremost refer to the task imposed on us, to face the fundamental insecurity and crisis tendency of our existence: to bring meaning to the diverging world of the senses and to create social order since we are continuously threatened by a mysterious inkling of the coincidence of our respective individual existence and the "world affairs" as a whole. At the same time, the arts – as intrinsic, cosmopolitan, and potential practical aesthetisation of life – as well as anthropologically-based, historic aesthetics demonstrate the freedom and man-made

meaning potential which can be realised in reply to the crisis scenarios that must be overcome time and again.

Therefore, while the inheritance of evolution enforces on us the imbalance of the eccentric positionality, this inheritance frees us to gain a distance from ourselves and our environment and to achieve thereby a degree of "cosmopolitanism." Paradoxically put: The ability and the potential of the aesthetisation of our life and our environment are expressions of an evolutionarily enforced, crisis ridden freedom, the basis of the instability and at the same time the opportunities for an insecure and improbable life style.

3   Opening and Closure

In "*Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch*," Plessner compares the closed "centric positionality" of animals to the "eccentric positionality" of man. Previously, Darwin (Cf. Darwin 1872; Lorenz 1977; Gehlen 1978 [1940]) – one of his teachers – as well as later on Konrad Lorenz also alluded to the stress ratio, which is still found in man, between, on the one hand, closed organisational forms, shaped by instincts and innate behaviour patterns and, on the other hand, "inferior instinct features" (Gehlen) and the resulting cosmopolitanism. From the perspective of human activity, this stress ratio between openness and closeness results in a continuous antagonism between the processes of opening and closure, which in turn is manifest in specific means of expression.

If we agree with Nietzsche's thought experiment from "*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*" and consider man from the viewpoint of animals, which we in fact are, i.e., from the perspective of programmed and programmatic closeness, this creature appears as an animal "*das in höchst gefährlicher Weise den gesunden Tierverstand verloren hat, – als das wahnsinnige Tier, als das lachende Tier, als das weinende Tier, als das unglückselige Tier*" (Nietzsche 1980a, p. 152).

This thought experiment clarifies that healthy animal sense and the so called healthy common-sense have one thing in common: the search for a stable anchor to be accomplished through purposeful limitation of the too open-minded – horizons of a precarious cosmopolitanism.

This exclusion of risks and implausibilities does not really involve a dispute with a risk-free multioptionality as expressed in the "anything goes" attitude since this illusion of the existence and preservation of a balance of random activity options does not pose a serious threat to the healthy common-sense of practical every day actions: It knows that one must and will always act – and that every decision and action launch subsequent actions which quickly finish off the pretentious arbitrariness of constantly open options.

Rather, healthy common-sense reacts to an existential crisis, a threat, which can always be removed only temporarily: namely the fact that we are "insecure

beings" and that it is due to our cosmopolitanism that we act as "*Spezialisten des Nichtspezialisiertseins*," (Lorenz 1963) that is, ultimately we do not know what we will do "*sondern es erst durch die Geschichte erfahren*" (Plessner 1975 [1928], p. 341) – through a future we, in attempting to anticipate adaptation, must design beforehand only to be time and again surprised by the future turned into a concrete present (Cf. Soeffner 2001). Metaphorically speaking: The healthy human common sense suspects that despite all security measures of closure we are always threatened by the potential "breakdown of the mundane" (Alfred Schütz) and the disintegration of the security of the living world. However, it refuses – especially for this reason – to register that these supposedly security-producing closure processes are in fact increasing the risk potential instead of reducing it.

Therefore, Karl Popper also turned against the "*Erkenntnistheorie des Alltagsverstandes*," while nevertheless quite accepting its suitability for daily use. Just as the largely closed learning model of the "centric positionality" of animals, common-sense also tends to retain successful patterns of problem-solving and to transform these into routines: What has stood the test is considered good and will be hallowed as tradition provided it is met with collective approval. The everyday world finds its order through exclusion of the treacherous. Experimentation with the interdependence between trial and error is replaced by the intellectual attempt to not even allow error: to eliminate the error before we could learn something new from the possibilities of dealing with it. Accordingly, Popper's "critical rationalism" distinguishes between "everyday theories" and scientific theory formation. The former want to verify what they consider safe. The latter methodically aims for falsification, confronting the seemingly secured "fact" with that which is possible and has been excluded from "everyday theories," replacing the transformation of that which is probable into certainty with a blueprint of the improbable as a testing ground and "site" for human cognitive faculty and perceptivity: a blueprint of alternative realities instead of closed reality constructs that recoil from "errors."

According to Popper, this dealing with errors that closes itself off early on distinguishes Einstein from the amoeba: Both apply "*die Methode von Versuch und Irrtumsbeseitigung [. . .], aber die Amöbe [irrt] nicht gerne, während Einstein gerade davon angezogen wird: Er sucht bewusst nach seinen Fehlern, um aus ihrer Entdeckung und Beseitigung etwas zu lernen*" (Popper 1974 [1972], pp. 84f.) In other words, Einstein as well as the common amoeba construct order from and for reality. In both cases, it is not about a reality "per se," but constructions of order which are designed from different perspectives and approaches. None of these constructions claim to be "more real" than the other, just as in *this* combination, the distinction between "real" and "fictitious" seems to be generally absurd. Rather, it is about different approaches to our relationship with the world and ourselves and – in dependence of it – about different *modes* of reality.

The everyday mind with a "wide awake" (Alfred Schütz) attitude that is concentrated on practical (interactive) activity aims for an effective, i.e., preferably smooth activity process. The socially supported everyday life world it has designed

is based on reliable routines and recipe knowledge. The mode of reality established by the everyday mind wants not only to avoid errors but also to minimise irritations – such as the discrepancies created in the divergence of the senses.

However, the aesthetic relationship to oneself and the world which is created by just this divergence and possible discrepancy of the human senses is exemplified by the "categorical subjunctive": an attitude which Plessner described in his "*Versuch über die Leidenschaft*" (Plessner 1983). I will take up this narrative, sharpen it purposefully, and turn the "categorical subjunctive" into the central idea of my concept of aesthetics and aesthetisation as it best illustrates the *open mode of reality* which characterises the aesthetic relationship to oneself and the world.

Plessner himself makes the following – preliminary – distinction between indicative and subjunctive: "*Während der Indikativ zu Feststellung des Wirklichen und des Möglichen dient, schafft der Konjunktiv einen Spielraum innerhalb des Möglichen. Das Unmögliche prägt sich wieder indikativisch aus*"[3] (Plessner 1983, p. 347). Ostensibly, this margin within the possible is reminiscent of Karl Valentin's "*Können habe ich schon wollen, nur wollen habe ich nicht können* (While I wanted to be able to, I wasn't able to want to be able to)." However, neither Valentin's concise theory of non-action nor "*Es ginge schon, aber es geht nicht* (It could work but it cannot work)" or "*Es müsste gehen, weil es gehen könnte* (It should work because it could work)" is meant here, but rather "*Es könnte gehen, weil es gehen können müsste* (It could work because it should be able to work)."

The central aim of the categorical subjunctive is the initiation of a specific mode of reality which grants even the improbable an emphasis of reality. This mode of reality comprises not only imagination of the improbable (as still possible), but also recognition of the *reality of the imagination*. This is a reality of the imagination in a twofold sense: on the one hand, the design of the improbable *as real in the mode of imagination* and on the other hand, the reality of the work of imagination in human self- and world-reference.

One has, in reference to reality as a product of social construction (Cf. Berger and Luckmann 1969), become accustomed to conceive reality as "relative," i.e., depending on the conditions of its social constructs. The fact that, regardless of how relative and construed it may be, it confronts us as a hard factuality which we must master, and has been stressed time and again by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Cf. Berger and Luckmann 1969, p. 20), who hardly fit the label of "constructivism" as measured vis-a-vis the "radical constructivism" of Varelas, Maturanas, and Luhmann's system theory. In contrast, when I speak about different reality modes, my emphasis – also stressed by Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann – is different. This emphasis is due to the respective specific tension of awareness (see above), by which the different "sensory provinces" or "sensory areas" (everyday world, ecstasy, science, dream, art, etc.) are constituted and through which they delineate themselves from each other. All these separate sensory areas are real inasmuch as they must actually be experienced and lived: *in their respective own* mode of reality.

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[3]On the lack of subjunctive in some languages such as Hebrew cf. also p. 347, footnote 3.

The fact that the world of work and the world of interaction of everyday activity, the world of lived and experienced "interdependencies," (Simmel) may be termed "paramount reality" and that it is awarded the "sharpest" emphasis on reality since a "wide awake awareness" lives, acts and experiences in it, cannot be interpreted – as it often happens – as if the other sensory areas were less "real" or as if their "reality content" was decreasing. Rather, these are granted a respective reality emphasis in each specific tension of awareness and its dependant mode of reality.

The open mode of reality of the aesthetic relationship to oneself and the world as characterised by the categorical subjunctive on the one hand distinguishes itself – as I have shown above – from the "closing" practice oriented mode of reality of the everyday mind, while on the other hand, due to its open and subjunctive character it sympathises with the sensory area of scientific possibility and reality blueprints – however, without corresponding with it. It is evident that the open mode of reality of the aesthetic relationship to oneself and the world shares the (positive) utopian location with Popper's understanding of science characterised by the dictate of falsification and "error construction," and in the same way it can be shown that without an "aesthetic tension of awareness and its offspring fantasy and imagination," productive science is impossible. However, it is equally apparent that the categorical subjunctive of the aesthetic relationship to the world and oneself prefers imagination over science's rational rules of construction: The aesthetic relationship to the world characterised by the categorical subjunctive expresses itself in the call on the power of imagination, to newly contextualise the order of everyday life, its "agreed" perceptions of environments and objects, in short, to relocate them to the mode of reality of imagination: An "as if" is attached to the "it is," and the "so-sein" shows itself as it "can become." Precisely in the blueprint of this *lived* and *experienced* – on this side of the rules of rationality – possibility horizon does the practical meaning of aesthetics exist.

In his early work, Plessner already compared contradictory answers of man to the question of eccentric positionality: on the one hand, the search for security and "homeland" in religion and on the other hand, the blueprint of dreams of freedom. From a "utopian location," "a standing nowhere," the latter wants to be realised within the instable security of an artificially created second homeland, namely culture (Cf. Plessner 1975 [1928], p. 341). According to Plessner, an "absolute animosity" (Plessner 1975 [1928], p. 342) exists between the search for "definite" security and homeland, as promised by religion, on the one hand, and culture, on the other, the uncertain form and structural insecurity of human interpretation.

It is also true that – in less pathetic terms – there is a constant conflict between, on the one hand, the opening tendencies of an aesthetic-based relationship to the world and, on the other hand, the closing attempts of the human aspiration for security. What Plessner terms animosity between religion and culture is also found in the relationship between "serving" that is religiously or politically motivated and "pure" art (Hegel), or the relationship between normative universality claims of (religious) ethics and uncertain worldviews of the aesthetic self- and world-reference. Within science itself, which as a construction of errors and improbabilities also owes its existence to the aesthetic relationship to the world – without, however,

being absorbed by it due to its commitment to rationality – new enmities are continuously formed between closing and opening tendencies. Thus, there is more than an argument in fundamental theory hidden behind the epistological opposites between system theoretical explanatory models or homo oeconomics and hermeneutic/ phenomenological sociology of knowledge: namely, the conflict between the categorical indicative of the closing verification and the categorical subjunctive of an open scientific relationship to oneself and the world, between a scientific strategy based on security politics and an uncertain, utopian answer to the crisis of eccentric positionality. Such an answer, however, is sustainable – all the more so because its proof lies in the future.

However, cosmopolitanism, i.e., life in future and possibility horizons can quite simply be distinguished from the last closing process of human life: "*Auch im Maul des Hais lässt sich noch über Zukunft reden, aus der Dose nicht mehr* (Rühmkorf 2004)."

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Art as a Paradoxical Form of Communication

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I. The Schutzian Paradox

When we thematize the arts from the point of view of Alfred Schutz, we are confronted with a paradox: On the one hand, he considers music, the literary forms, etc. as forms of communication where the author, the work itself, and the beholder are related to each other (Schutz 1982a, b; Srubar 1998). On the other hand, however, the arts belong to finite provinces of meaning that transcend the reality of everyday life at the same time that communication is a form of practice that characterizes the paramount reality of the daily life *par excellence* (Schutz 1962a, pp. 234ff).

In this paper I explore how to deal with this paradox not only in the Schutzian theory itself but also from the point of view of a general theory of the constitution of social reality and in view of the anthropological fact that art is one of the basic forms of the life-world as cultural.

At first glance the paradox stated above seems not to constitute a special problem in the context of the Schutzian approach. According to him, the relations between the everyday province of meaning and meaning structures transcending the daily world are represented by symbolic appresentative systems (Schutz 1962b, pp. 340ff). These systems bridge the gap between the everyday world of working and the non-everyday realities by using everyday objects, relations, or signs as significants for transcendently meaningful contents, making them communicable within the practice of everyday actors. But symbolic communication as realized in the art forms differs from everyday communication in some important respects that I would like to sketch.

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To start with, let us consider Schutz's concept of communication in general. He conceives of communication as an interactive relation in the daily world of working (*Wirkensbeziehung*) where the meaning of the communicative act performed by the ego consists ultimately in the reaction of the alter ego. In this process the actors orient each other on the course of material action, their streams of consciousness become synchronized, and their actions become related in a reciprocal context of because- and in-order-to – motives (Schutz 2004, §§24–26, 32).

The everyday form and the artistic form of communication in general, however, differ in a significant way. The daily communicative working relations presuppose the reciprocity of perspectives that characterize the everyday attitude toward the other in general. Language, action, and even writing as media that we are supposed to understand are primarily conceived as marks for intentions of my interaction partners. The need for mutual understanding as well as the need to grasp what is going on in the situation I am involved in constitutes imposed pragmatic relevances that come to the fore. In this process language as the medium of meaning is used but not particularly thematized. The relevances imposed here aim at the coordination of the inner and external action. The social reality constructed in this process is a common one and marks a common ground for further interaction. Thus, it is not the medium of communication itself but the course of mutual understanding that everyday communication focuses on. The presence of communicative acts is established here by the material course of action and not by the attention given to the communication medium itself in its property as an artefact.

This changes radically when we consider communication in the forms of art. This kind of communication, too, is based on coordination of streams of consciousness by a constructed social reality, namely by the reality of the artwork itself. This process involves at least two levels of meaning constitution: First, there are acts constituting this reality as valid in its self-givenness in general. But beyond that, art as form of communication necessarily presupposes another mode of meaning constitution where the non-everyday character of the reality presented in the artwork becomes visible. The meaning structure of the artwork as perceived by the beholder has to synthesize and to contrast both levels as well. In this necessity the paradoxical character of art as form of communication is manifest. To grasp the specific character of that communication we have to observe some distinct points.

The artwork has to present itself as a non-everyday context of meaning. In this consists its autonomy with regard to its author and to its beholder. In contrast to the daily communication in the natural attitude the medium of the communication – the work itself – becomes relevant here in its material as well as in its meaningful particularity. The temporal and spatial relations between the author and the beholder dissolve themselves therewith, as does the chain of mutual motivations that links the communication in the world of working. In communication within the arts the whole pragmatic context disappears and with it drops away also the immediate reciprocity of perspectives on which the presence of communication in daily life is based.

With respect to this fact Schutz stresses, that the beholder of – literary and musical – artworks abandons the pragmatic relevances and motives in his attitude toward the works and surrenders to the relevances imposed on him by the autonomous

meaning structure immanent in the artwork itself. Due to that change of attitude, the reciprocity of perspectives on which the presence of the communicative situation is based changes its character as well. The interacting partners are not involved in a course of physical interaction. Rather, the interaction is interrupted by the autonomy of artwork. The artwork itself acts now in the interaction somewhat like a *sui generis* partner. Its autonomy is marked now by its non-everyday attributes and first of all by the fact that it is not possible to affect its meaning structure by any pragmatic interventions. This meaning structure, of course, can be interpreted in different ways, but it cannot be changed as such in contrast to the frames of reference provided in the working relationship of daily communication.

Thus, in order to distinguish its autonomous, artificial character the artwork has to retract itself from the daily communication. This result Schutz shares with his predecessors (for example with Kant 1996, §5), contemporaries (Ingarden 1965, §7) as well as with successors (Wiesing 2009, pp. 195ff). The question is now whether this result is profound enough to make clear how the artwork as form of communication does communicate its presence at all, or, in other words, by what mechanism can the reality of the artwork be effective in the sense of its intersubjective comprehensibility? The search for an answer – when we follow Schutz – leads us into the realm of phantasies, i.e., to the constitution of those finite provinces of meaning where the reinterpretation of everyday structures of relevance takes place, a reinterpretation which is also constitutive for the meaning structure of the arts since the world of phantasy is characterized by the absence of pragmatic motives as well. "Living in one of the many worlds of phantasy we have no longer to master the outer world and to overcome the resistance of its objects. We are free from the pragmatic motive that governs the natural attitude toward the world of daily life, free from bondage of intersubjective space and intersubjective standard time" (Schutz 1962a, pp. 234f).

When the relevances imposed by pragmatic motives do not have an orienting function within the realm of imagined reality, the question arises again: What kind of relevances must be inherent in the artwork so that the meaning structure that it imposes on the beholder provides an intersubjective reality accessible to others? Schutz argues that even the constitution of reality in phantasy is restricted by structural rules as this constitution is also anchored in the meaning structure of life-world. The phantasizing individual can fill in his empty expectation by arbitrary contents; he is free to vary events, their succession and their repeatability, at will. But he cannot leave the constitutive structure of expectation itself. Thus, even phantasy is restricted to limits.

In his study "On Multiple Realities" Schutz (1962a) reduces this limiting formal structure to temporality, i.e., to the irreversibility of the stream of consciousness – the *durée* – that represents the elementary level where the objects of consciousness are constituted. In addition to these basic limits of phantasy that even a solely imagining ego cannot disregard, further structural restrictions of reality construction occur when the phantasy is to be presented in an intersubjective way as an artwork. In that case the limits given by constitutive acts of the inner consciousness of time are not sufficient to establish the artwork's presence. The relevances imposed by

the meaning structure of the artwork have to establish a framework for expectations that ought to be more complex in order to provide intersubjective accessibility for the contents represented.

Schutz deals with this problem in his studies on the structure of literary works (Schutz 1982a). There he reveals that the unity of action, time, and space as required by Aristotelian aesthetics does not represent only an aesthetic principle but also provides means to shape expectations that are constitutive for the construction of the artwork's reality. In this way the artwork can carry on its play with socially typified expectations and provide for their transformation in non-everyday contexts.

Thus, Schutz's studies indicate that the irreducible framework of the artwork's meaning structure needs more extensive foundation than pure phantasy. While the irreducible structure of expectations in the realm of pure phantasy was related to the *durée,* i.e., to the acts of consciousness, in the synthesis of time, space, and action that is constitutive for the meaning context of literary work we recognize dimensions of the manipulatory area that emerge primarily for the acting ego. It is exactly the relation between the elements based in acts of consciousness and in the pragmatic acts of working that Schutz uses to distinguish types of meaning structures in literary genres. Poetry is characterized by its closeness to the world of phantasy, and drama adopts the temporal and spatial structures of action that are modified and alienated in novel. Thus, even if the artwork as communication form is characterized by the lack of pragmatic attitude, we still can determine traces of pragmatically constituted meaning elements in the expectations that the meaning structure of the artwork imposes on us.

But what about the events itself that due to phantasy fill up the formal expectation structures set by the artwork? Husserl (1999, §74), on whom Schutz relies here, explains that neither the lived experience of the world in the natural attitude nor that in phantasy needs a particular predication as real since lived experiences always are perceived in their self-giveness as "here." To distinguish lived experiences in the natural attitude from those in phantasy presupposes that a preceeding difference between reality and fiction has already been established. The difference itself then does not consist in the degree of validity of the experience but in its perception "as if," i.e., in the cognitive style that Schutz characterizes as "free form pragmatic motive" (Schutz 1962a, p. 234). Thus, abandoning the pragmatic relevances changes the way in which the lived experiences are thematized, but it does not eliminate imposed relevances inherent in the lived experiences, generated in the pragmatic constitution of objects and others in interaction and communication. The resistance of a steel door can be broken in my phantasy by my mere breath, but still there is a resistance to be overcome.

Thus, the structure of events, phantasy, and artworks deal with in a non-pragmatic way is also marked by pragmatically generated expectations that remain visible within the meaning structure imposed by the artwork. My assumption is now that these pragmatic traces have to be present in order that that meaning structure be accessible in an intersubjective way, since they ensure that subjective as well as social typifications and their non-pragmatic alienation by the artwork remain mutual translatable, at least on a rudimentary level.

II. The Body as a Medium of Non-Semiotic Communication

The assumption made above is essential to answer the question how the presence of the artwork is constructed. As a result of our previous examination we can state that such a presence is an artificial one – to borrow an expression from Lambert Wiesing (2005) – insofar as the meaning structure of the artwork has to realize its non-everyday as well as non-pragmatic character. But as far as presence is understood as the immediate givenness of something as something, the artificial presence also involves moments of self-givenness inherent in the natural attitude and co-generated pragmatically as we have seen above. Beyond that we also have seen that the presence of the artwork results from its meaning structure. This structure imposes relevances and expectations on the beholder, involves him into the "story" of the artwork, and communicates its presence in this way.

Now, we could made our task less difficult and reconstruct this communication process simply in terms of "encoding" and "decoding." That would also fit our assumption that the pragmatic traces within the meaning structure of the artwork ensure its translatability into the meaning structures of the beholder. In that case the pragmatic moments would function as the common code within the encoding-decoding-process. In spite of the fact that this procedure would fit into the Schutzian concept of artwork as symbolic communication, I am hesitant to consider this as a general constitutive mechanism of artificial presence. If we accept this concept, it would imply that all kinds of artwork are to be considered as translations, i.e., as representations of something else. As a consequence of this, artworks in general would be defined as systems of signs and their presence always would be a presence of something absent, i.e., a representation. But that conclusion is in no way stringent when we consider the vehement discussions in the field of iconographic research where the followers of sign theory and the perceptionists (among whom the phenomenologists traditionally belong) oppose each other (cf. Wiesing 2005). And considering Schutz's own remarks concerning the "tuning in" in "Making Music Together," (Schutz 1964) we can state that not even he took the representative character of artwork for granted generally.

The crucial point seems to be whether we will be able to find a level of the meaning structure of the artwork where its presence imposes and communicates itself to the beholder unrelated and prior to the question of its immediacy or representation. When we follow the pragmatic traces within the meaning structure of the artwork, we are led to the strata of embodiment and corporeality on which the pragmatic approach to the world is based. Already in his early studies relying on Bergson and later on Husserl Schutz recognizes (Schutz 1982c, 2003) that the place where the meaning-establishing acts of consciousness are intertwined with the meaning-establishing acts of working can be found in the body. As a result of this, the life-world cannot be conceived just as a structure of consciousness but also as an intersubjective context of action. In the same manner as the meaning-establishing acts of the inner temporality provide the synthesis of time objects within the stream of consciousness, the meaning-establishing acts of the body provide the presence

of the outer world within that stream of lived experiences. Without body, no action, without action, no world – that way one could define the principle of the pragmatic constitution of meaningful reality in a very simplified manner.

This result is certainly not reserved to Alfred Schutz. It was also Merleau-Ponty who worked it out in a way that is interesting in our context. Merleau-Ponty's concept of body-subject and its body scheme[1] aims at the meaning structures established by the acting body and including everything related to the body by its action (Merleau-Ponty 1966, pp. 98ff). A gesture may appear in the external perspective as a sign but in the context of my body scheme it is experienced without any reflection neither as an idea nor as a sign, but "without any intervening thought," (Merleau-Ponty 1966, p. 111) as a meaningful course of action to which an alter ego reacts. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes concrete as well as "abstract" actions. The first consists in a real course of action while the second elicits a lived experience of that course of action due to an action that is just imagined. Thus, the lived experience of the body – concrete or abstract – constitutes the body-subject in the unity of its acts as well as the unity of all related objects and embodied alter egos. The meaning establishing acts of the body scheme make it possible to experience imagination as an immediate, effective presence that is given and comprehensive also in a non-semiotic manner. In this sense linguistic understanding is also founded in the body scheme, since language represents a mechanism of imagination. Without embodied contents, linguistic symbols would be empty. According to Merleau-Ponty, the body provides a "general symbolism" that is previous to language. It bestows meaning on words as linguistic artefacts, making them present in lived experience (Merleau-Ponty 1966, pp. 235ff). Communication is conceived in that sense as a "communion" of body-subjects, i.e., the intersubjectivity is based on an intercorporeity (Merleau-Ponty 1966, p. 320). Thus, in spite of the criticism Schutz exercises on Merleau-Ponty, we can see that they share a common pragmatic approach, where embodiment as an access to the world plays an essential role.

III. Semiotic and Non-Semiotic Presence of Artworks

We recognize now that the presence of an artwork in the sense of its intersubjective accessibility does not consist only in the dimensions of the manipulatory area inherent to its meaning structure but, beyond that, also in meaning-establishing acts of the body that enable us to perceive imagined contents as lived experiences in a non-semiotic manner. At this point precise differentiation is needed. The character of non-semiotic moments in the presence of artworks should obviously vary in the case of literary works, which represent forms of semiotic communication par excellence, from that of visual arts, particularly in painting. The basic difference consists probably in the fact that the presence-establishing mechanisms in literary

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[1]The English translation I am referring to uses for "body scheme" the expression "body image."

works serve as background for the translation from the daily relevances into their alienated forms on which the autonomous meaning structure of the artwork is based.

As a matter of fact, literary works as forms of communication can be conceived as long chains of translations. The particular steps of that translation process can be located on several levels: The author uses the stock of language and forms it into performative expressions; the context of these expressions constitutes the meaning structure of the work that is imposed on the beholder and his comprehension. The structure of systems of appresentation that, as revealed by Schutz, governs the use of signs, works within that process in many ways. In literary works signs are permanently present even though they are not permanently visible. Ingarden (1965, pp. 22 ff, 54ff) points out that there are at least two ways of reading in which we can approach a literary artwork. We can read the particular sentences as judgements related to the reality outside of the work. In doing so, we ignore the inner reality of the work and analyze the single phrases in respect of their conceptual validity. The other approach – that is appropriate to read literature – concentrates on the inner reality of the work. It keeps its attention within the context of the work and is comprehensive with respect to the presented contents and relations.

The first approach conceives the text as a system of signs and considers its contents as significants that denominate something outside of the work. What disappears in this perspective is the inner reality of the work itself. The second style of reading that concentrates on the inner meaning structure of the work makes – on the contrary – the signs invisible, and it quasi-skips them and remains confined within the contents of the work. And here we get a hint at the way in which the literary work can be perceived in lived experience as present. The meaning structure of the literary text is generated by a complex interplay of semiotic relations. But when the literary work is to display its immanent effects, its semiotic construction has to retreat. What remains effective is the lived presence of the contents based on the meaning-establishing acts of the imagined body. First due to these acts we become involved in the work, we can sense sadness, pain, or happiness, and we cry or laugh. i.e., we live with the work and understand its protagonists. In other words: The meaning which language of the literary work is comprised of must become sensual if the presence of its structure is to be effective. This sensual constitution of meaning involves imagination where the visualisation of literary contents plays an important role.

The assumption that the visuality of language indicates proximity to its roots in the meaning structures generated by the body is not restricted to phenomenological considerations. Piaget (1972), who claims for his results experimental evidence, also discerns succeeding phases of visual and conceptual linguistic representation in the ontogeny of children. The visual phase represents the first stage of linguistic development where the cognitive patterns generated by the non-semiotic sensorimotor interaction of body become transformed into the semiotic system of language. According to this, the visual linguistic phase is characterized by a proximity to the pragmatic cognitive patterns constituted in the bodily interaction with objects and others. Thus, Piaget's results indicate, too, that the comprehensibility of linguistic expressions is based on the meaning structures established by the lived experience

of body-subjects. His findings seem to be supported by Johnson's and Lakoff's (1980) studies on the metaphoric construction of language. In their well known book *Metaphors We Live By*, they argue that the imaginative function of language is founded in metaphoric patterns generated from lived bodily experience. Expressions like "down" or "high" depict not only body related dimensions of the manipulatory area but also emotional and social as well as material conditions. According to these authors even expressions in scientific language that aim at measurable relations are based therein.

When we assume that the presence of literary work is linked to the visuality of its language, the question comes up, however, of how presence in visual art is constructed at all. But before we approach that topic, let me recall three substantial points characterizing the presence of literary work.

1. On the one hand, that presence is constituted in the sequential reading where an automatised decoding of signs takes place, while, on the other hand, this semiotic construction recedes into the background and makes way for the relevances imposed by the pragmatic dimensions of the manipulatory area as well as by the meaning establishing acts of the body scheme.
2. These acts possess – according to Merleau-Ponty – a non-semiotic character, i.e., they are neither reflective nor are they signs, rather they belong to the immediate lived experience of the body-subject.
3. Despite the fact that the construction of literary works is a result of semiotic processes and representations, the presence of these representations is obviously based on non-semiotic moments that enable us to perceive the contents of the work in a "material" way as lived experiences of our body, while the materiality of the semiotic system itself is not thematized.

Following Ingarden (1962, pp. 162, 163ff) the third point applies also to visual art, particularly to painting. Here, too, we can distinguish the materiality of "painting," i.e., of the material colors and their artistic use, from the "picture" as a meaning structure that offers – as the result of painting – the framework within which the "pure and simple presence" of the picture is realized. In other words: The interaction of the material elements of the painting provides the meaningful material presence of the picture itself. The crucial question now is how that interaction is to be understood. Shall we understand it as a semiotic process? Shall we conceive that what is represented in a picture as an icon according to Peirce (2000, pp. 135f), i.e., as a sign of itself?

Even though the discussion of this point within the iconography seems to be quite polarising, I would like to advocate a less one-sided point of view. We have seen that even the literary works that are constructed in a semiotic way do contain a non-semiotic level of meaning that co-establishes their presence. Obviously, the semiotic and non-semiotic elements in the meaning structure of an artwork do not exclude each other. The presence of a picture, however, seems not to be a result of a sequential decoding by the beholder that would have to become invisible

itself if the content of the artwork should become present. Husserl demonstrates, as we have seen, that even fictitious imaginative objects are primarily perceived in their self-givenness as taken for granted. In contrast to the successive polythetic constitution of the meaning structure of the literary work, the constitution of the meaning structure of the picture happens in the simultaneity of synthesizing acts where the content of the picture is present in its unity at once. If we would look at the literary work in that synthesising manner, it would turn into an object and we would perceive the materiality of its medium, for example a book. The opposite applies to the picture: If we would try to read a picture, i.e., for example to decode its symbolism, it would be modified into a text and lose its particular presence.

As a result, we can conclude that the presence of pictures is neither based on their semiotic character nor on translations of encoding and decoding. In that sense we can also follow Wiesing (2005), who argues that for this reason pictures cannot be considered signs and rather possess a particular non-semiotic presence. How is this presence constituted? I would like to assume that the presence of a picture in the sense of the intersubjective accessibility of its meaning structure is constituted by the same elements that we have discerned already in the literary work. The non-everyday meaning structure of pictures, too, is marked by the impossibility of our intervening in their meaning structure by any pragmatic action. Neither can the beholder interact within the situation presented in picture nor can he use the presented objects and constitute their meaningful materiality in a pragmatic way by working. The relevances imposed on the beholder by the meaning structure of pictures, rather, are effective within the framework of the imagined body scheme and within the structures of manipulatory area given in that imagination. Due to that, the picture becomes immediately present in the lived experience.

Once again we can detect here the paradoxical character of arts as forms of communication: The exclusion of pragmatic moments creating the non-everyday character of the artwork calls at the same time for an inclusion of meaning elements related to action and to body in order to make the artwork's presence effective. This paradox becomes more manifest when we consider abstract art. Here the beholder has no possibility of "reading" the picture, i.e., to decipher its symbolism, unless he knows the theory hidden behind the picture and indicating its intentions as painting. At this point we can see that social discourses, too, can affect the constitution of an artwork's presence. This can happen by the social incorporation of visual and reading attitudes as Bourdieu has shown, but also by the efforts of artists and their interpreters to gain defining power concerning the "legitimate" way of painting, i.e., to produce "true" theories that also can be adopted and applied by the beholders. Of course, the theoretical competence to interpret abstract pictures cannot be expected in general. Thus, the abstract artwork can provide its presence only by imposing of relevances that draw its effects from body scheme. What is left is the emotional and corporeal lived experience of the "aura" of the picture causing the beholder's "immersion" into the artwork as we experience while viewing large monochrome paintings.

IV. Art as Paradoxical Communication

Let me now consider art as a paradoxical form of communication in the wider framework of a general constitution theory of life-world. When we suppose with Schutz that there is a constitutive context establishing a meaningful structure of life-world, we can see that the meaning structure of the artwork is also generated in that context at all its levels. It is constituted equally in the temporal and corporeal acts of the subject; it needs pragmatic elements based on interactive relations to the objects and to others; it is formed by the material character of the art media as well as by signs; and it is finally embedded in discourses of power that affect the habitualization of visual and reading patterns and form knowledge of legitimized artistic practices. Beyond that, the meaning structure of the artwork possesses a particular character that arises from the paradoxical composition of its constituting levels named above. The first paradoxical moment consists in the fact that the artwork has to manifest its non-pragmatic, non-everyday autonomy, on one hand, and at the same time it has to include pragmatically generated elements of meaning in order to activate its presence. In other words: Its presence emerges as an oscillation between the pragmatic and the imaginative mode of meaning constitution. Here its particular character becomes clear: While those of its imposed relevances that enable its intersubjective accessibility rely on pragmatically and bodily-generated elements of meaning, the non-pragmatic autonomy of the artwork imposes at the same time an inhibition of pragmatic motives on the beholder. As a result of that, he realizes the presence of the artwork only as a lived experience of imagined but not of real action, while all those pragmatic contexts that allow for an "authentic" immersion into the artwork remain thematized. The communicative effect, i.e., the intersubjective accessibility of the imagined relevances involved here, is cofounded by their bodily, non-semiotic character. Here the second paradoxical moment of the artificial presence of the artwork appears: When the presence of the artwork provides its accessibility to beholders, i.e., when it performs its communicative function, it has to rely on non-semiotic meaning elements. This applies, as we have seen, to literary works as well as to visual art. Thus, the paradoxical character of the arts as communication forms consists also in the fact that these forms are also non-semiotic.

Thus, Schutz's concept of symbolic communication presents a good example of such a paradoxical communicative structure where pragmatic and non-pragmatic as well as semiotic and non-semiotic moments are intertwined within the constitutive process of the mundane life-world.

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When Sociology Meets the Work of Art: Analytical Frameworks to Study Artistic Production and Reception

Anna Lisa Tota

1 Introduction

Within the last decades the sociology of the arts has grown to become an important field of analysis both in the USA and in Europe. The aim of this paper is to explore the implications of the sociological perspectives for investigating the work of art, both in relation to its production and reception and to its capacity to inscribe events in the public discourse of a national or international context. In the first perspective – the social construction of the arts – the relationship of the arts with other disciplines, such as semiotics and structuralism, is analysed and discussed. In the second perspective – the artistic construction of the meanings of public events – artwork is viewed as a code able to shape, for example, the content of public memories. This essay will explore especially some implications of the first perspective. A specific focus will be devoted to the analysis of the cases of non-recognition, defined as those cases, where the artistic value is not recognized as stable but is a shifting value during different periods and epochs. It will be argued that the sociological perspective implies a different explanation of those cases.

As Schmidt (1979b, p. 31) argues: "It is impossible to produce works of art, only something already produced can be considered a work of art." Artistic value is thus, according to Schmidt, a quality that depends not on the intentions of the subject that produces (the artist), but rather on the evaluation dynamics of the subject that observes (the person that enjoys it). Schmidt's approach, like that of textual linguistics in general, redefined, in the second half of the 1970s and in a radical and

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innovative way, the question of how artistic value is established. The present essay proposes to single out some of the most important analytical co-ordinates and to use them to outline a sociological theory of artistic value. The intention is to underline the eminently social nature of the process by which artistic value is formed, on the one hand questioning those conceptions (both scientific and common-sense) according to which artistic value is normally attributed to a work of art on the basis of its intrinsic qualities or exclusively on the basis of the author's talent and on the other underlining the existence of a series of social factors that play a decisive role in establishing the claim that an object belongs to the "art system" (Schmidt 1979a).

This paper will involve questioning the romantic conception of a work of art, emphasizing the inability of this notion to explain, on a sociological level, the processes of artistic production and artistic reception. The genesis of a work of art can, in fact, be explained: (1) in a metaphysical perspective by divine inspiration; (2) in a romantic perspective by referring to the extraordinary character of genius (or, in its psychoanalytical variant, through recourse to intra-psychical dynamics); (3) in a sociological perspective by posing the question of social dynamics that concur in producing artistic value, as underlined through a variety of approaches, by studies like those of Bourdieu (1980, 1993); Becker (1982); Zolberg (1990); and Wolff (1993).

2   Different Conceptions of a Work of Art

We can classify different conceptions of a work of art according to the way in which they solve the problem of genesis, that is, how they respond to the question: "Who produces a work of art?" In brief, even among the variety of perspectives, we can identify at least three different types of reply:

1. According to authorial theories, the genesis of a work of art is due entirely to the artist who produces it. They consider artistic production as a process occurring completely inside subjects. Included in this category are the psychoanalytical theory and its subsequent revisions (Klein 1948; Chassaguet-Smirgel 1971), the romantic conception of genius, and cognitive theories of the creative process (Wertheimer 1935; Guilford 1967).
2. Reception theories underline the role of the consumer process, which becomes a constituent part of the artistic event. These theories conceive the work of art as a product of the intersection of the vector of meanings inscribed in the work itself by the author, and the effective reception experience of a social actor who singles out which of the possible meanings to construct. They point out, therefore, the "not-concluded" nature of a work. Included in this perspective is the contribution of Czech structuralism (Mukarovsky 1936), the *Rezeptionsaesthetik* studies of the Constance School (Iser 1972; Jauss 1972), textual linguistic studies (van Dijk 1977; Schmidt 1979b), the vein of semiotic studies begun by (Eco 1979), the

phenomenological perspective (Ingarden 1965), and the contribution of reader-response criticism (Fish 1980; Tompkins 1980; De Man 1983; Freund 1987).

3. Finally, contextual theories examine more closely some of the theoretical implications of reception theories by studying empirically how and to what extent the receptive work of the spectator is oriented not only by textual information but also by contextual information, in order to document how both affect the social processes of formation and attribution of artistic values. This article sets out to document how a work of art is also created by the local contexts in which it is produced and, above all, by those in which it is enjoyed.

We can relate to the three different approaches to the genesis problem both the different definitions of artistic value and the different interpretations of cases of forgeries, imitations, and the opposing cases of "lack of recognition." This brings us to the problem of the recognition criteria of forgeries or, more correctly, those of authenticity certification. In particular, as we shall see, the focal point of this essay will be cases of "lack of recognition," in which a "true" work of art is not recognized, for example because it has been placed outside its own traditional reception context.

2.1 Authorial Theories

According to authorial theories, a work of art is a product belonging completely to the artist. This perspective refers to a widespread romantic conception, which maintains that the subject is the exclusive creator of the work, which is the result of ability and extra-ordinary talent. The artistic value of a product is, according to this approach, independent of the existence of a public that consumes it culturally, that recognizes it as art.

If, on the one hand, this conception removes the author from the body of social and institutional relations in which he or she is placed (the artist is considered an abstract individual, freed from family and social context who, thanks to the extraordinary talent with which he or she is endowed, generates a work of art),[1] on the other, it removes the work from its reception context portraying it as a gift of God. Artistic quality is considered a characteristic selectively present in certain subjects, processes or products, like an objective quality generated by the author's talent.

The image of the artist to which these theories refer is that of a solitary genius performing his extraordinary feats in an ivory tower. As Murray (1989) underlines, the concept of genius is a relatively recent historical product, born in the eighteenth century. The poetics of the romantic movement has associated it with a series of characteristics.

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[1]See for example Elias' (1991) analysis of Mozart's biographers.

(a) In the first place, the myth of separateness. The rhetoric of the romantic conception extols the figure of a solitary, poor artist unknown to his or her contemporaries. The extraordinary character of his or her talent expresses itself in isolation and separateness. The artistic experience takes on an almost mystical connotation; it seems like a subspecies of sacredness that swoops down on the profane. This ideology of separateness has profound implications for the overall conception of the artist, insofar as it implies a scission of the artist from his or her context: Because genius is removed from the body of the social relations in which it is placed, one reaches the paradox of abstracting the artist from the rest of his or her personality. Referring to Mozart's biographers, Elias underlines the ideological nature of this conception: "At times one is inclined to treat the artist Mozart as a sort of superman and the man Mozart with concealed contempt. It is a type of evaluation ... that is based on the idea ... that his musical talent was a natural gift without any kind of relationship with the rest of his personality" (Elias 1991, p. 59). More correctly, the myth of the genius' separateness seems to imply two categories of abstraction: (1) the first "inter-individual" between the artist and the rest of the world; (2) the second, already indicated by Elias, of an "interpsychic" nature between the artist and the rest of his or her personality.

(b) The myth of celebrity after death. The romantic images of the artist refer to a conception of a work of art which denies the constitutive character of the dynamics of recognition: The work of the bohemian is artistic, despite the fact that the artist is not recognized by the contemporary public, but only by a hypothetical future public. In this perspective, the question arising from the frequent contrast between the talent of an artist and the Jack of recognition by contemporaries – more than an "unsolved mystery," as Elias maintains (1991, p. 50), appears as the logical consequence of the ideological scission between the individual and the context that romantic conceptions have helped to produce.

(c) Art as an illness. A further distinctive feature is the link between psychic suffering and artistic quality: pain as the source of the sublime. Contrary to the previous case, what is established here is a close connection between existential anguish on the part of the subject and the artistic value of the created product: the artist, in the romantic imagination, is someone who has failed in life. This romantic conception of the maieutic, creative value of suffering has profoundly influenced the psychoanalytical theory of art, to the point where psychoanalysis itself may be interpreted as a creation of Romanticism:

> The idea that the origin of art can be discerned in illness, in physical insufficiency or nervous excitability is of romantic origin ... Certainly, there have always been neurotic artists but their chances of success in the different epochs of history, were very different. For the most part, they were considered oddities, and before romanticism, they never played a decisive role ... Psychoanalysis itself is a creation of romanticism; without the spiritual heritage of romanticism and independent of the romantic sense of life it is unthinkable. (Hauser 1958, pp. 58–60)

In this regard, Poe's "The Oval Portrait" appears emblematic, in that it is inspired by the very same constructive conception of pain or by the same destructive

interpretation of art. The story tells of a portrait of great value that the artist paints of his wife, at the cost however of her life. In fact, as the brush strokes add colour to the picture, the colour drains from the cheeks of the loved one. In this case, the connection between art and suffering is evoked explicitly: The portrait generates a process of material destruction (culminating in the death of the subject who has inspired it) and moral destruction (through the sense of guilt and pain of the artist who has painted it).

2.2 Reception Theories

These theories consider the artistic event to result from the integration of two distinct phases: that of production and that of reception. Usually a cultural product is already destined to become an object of aesthetic reception when it is produced. But the artistic value of the work is completed by the spectators' reception activities. This takes place more precisely through the meaning-conferring activity which, though partly guided by the work itself, is always carried out by the spectator.

This interpretation of artistic production has its theoretical foundations in at least four distinct veins of research: (1) Mukarovsky's contribution and Czech structuralism; (2) the *Konstanz Schule* and the *Rezeptionsaesthetik*; (3) textual linguistics; (4) the semiotic vein of studies begun in the 1970s by Eco. To these must be added the "death of the author" theories (Barthes 1968; Foucault 1979), which we could place midway between reception and contextual theories, and the tradition of reader-response criticism (Fish 1980; Culler 1982; Freund 1987). Some of the studies mentioned take the literary text as their object; others have been subsequently extended to other kinds of text as well, such as the spectacular text.

These contributions have in common the centrality of the reception process which, taking a diversity of perspectives, refers to a common artistic-production concept definable as co-operative realization. The theories pertaining to this perspective move the definition of artistic value from a purely semantic level to a pragmatic one; the attribute "artistic" does not designate different objects according to their content, but objects that belong to a system of action (art, literature, the theatre) regulated by specific conventions. In this way, conventions in the aesthetic communication processes take on a fundamental role, making the communication itself possible.

If we define the dominion of art with reference to pragmatic criteria, terms like "artistic," "literary," "poetic" lose their traditional object referents. According to Schmidt, literariness does not exist as an objective value; it is a relational attribute which is constructed in such a way as to satisfy the social conventions regulating that specific "linguistic game" (Wittgenstein 1953).

In his theory, Schmidt has taken over the notion of linguistic game by elaborating the concept of "communicative action effect in which the text is situated." To study the concept, the author proposes the distinction between "communicated" and

"communicative base,"[2] which re-introduces the structuralist distinction between "material object" and "aesthetic object" (Mukarovsky 1936). Underlining explicitly how the notion of the value of a work was essentially a sociological matter, Mukarovsky supported the idea of the variability of all the values:

> The work of art itself is not in any way a constant greatness: every movement of time, space or social environment changes the current artistic tradition through whose prism the work is perceived; the effect of these movements also changes the aesthetic object, which in the consciousness of the members of a given community corresponds to the material product, to the object created by the artist. Even when a work is evaluated positively in two different and distant epochs, the object of the evaluation is an aesthetic object different every time, thus in some ways a different work. (Mukarovsky 1936, p. 96)

Prague structuralism poses the problem of aesthetic value precisely in reference to the distinction between the material object and the aesthetic one. The variability of aesthetic value does not, in fact, depend, in this perspective, on the imperfection of human perceptive capacity, but is intrinsic to the very nature of this value "which is a process and not a state" (Mukarovsky 1936, p. 99). Or to put it another way, if a different artistic value is attributed to an object by changing the observer, or passing from one epoch to the subsequent one, it is unnecessary to resort to the cognitive scheme of error (either the observer at time t1 or the viewer at time t2 must necessarily be mistaken, in that the object observed is the same), but rather it is necessary to reflect on the processual, relational nature of each value.

The assertion of the variability of values raises, however, the question of their objectivity: Mukarovsky, who in the end does not seem to want to resign himself to anything but a somewhat bland form of historic relativism, is seeking a generally valid legitimacy that would characterize the relationship between a work of art as an aesthetic value and any type of community. The objective aesthetic value (that is, independent and stable) must be sought, according to the author, in the material artefact, insofar as only this lasts, while the aesthetic object is variable.[3] This contrasts with the traditional practice in the aesthetic field according to which, as Mukarovsky points out, the object of aesthetic evaluation is not the material artefact but the aesthetic object, its reflection and correlation in the consciousness of the person who enjoys it.

It should be noted that, once the distinction between aesthetic object and material object has been introduced, the crucial question becomes how the material object (or product) participates in the genesis of the aesthetic object.

> The independent value of the material artefact will be all the higher according to how conspicuous the body of extra-aesthetic values that the product succeeds in linking to itself

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[2]While "communicated" corresponds to what is assigned to the test by the participants, the text or "communicative base" is the mere physical support.

[3]As Mukarovsky observes, even in the case of works that last for centuries, such as Homeric poetry, we are not faced by an invariable or eternal value, because even in these cases there are strong oscillations; the material object itself is associated in time with different aesthetic objects, according to the epoch in which it is received.

is ... Thus the independent aesthetic value consists in all its aspects of a tension which it is the task of the spectator to surmount ... (The fundamental task of art is) to guide and renew the relationship between man and reality as the object of human behaviour. (Mukarovsky 1936, pp. 126–129)

The author ultimately roots the objectivity of aesthetic values in their relationship to extra-aesthetic values which seem "deposited in a sort of collective consciousness" (Mukarovsky 1936, p. 159). The work, according to Mukarovsky, thus suggests to the beholder the way to construct a personal relationship with reality. This anticipates some features both of Adorno's aesthetic theory (1970), according to which the artistic value resides in the capacity the work has to affect the spectator's *Weltanschauung*, independently of the aesthetic pleasure it is able to arouse, and of Jauss' theory (1972), according to which artistic value depends on the aesthetic distance between *Erwartungshorizont* and *Horizontwandel*, that is, on that effect of subversion of the spectator's expectations which takes place during the reception process.

In point of fact, Mukarovsky's aesthetic theory anticipates some of the fundamental lines of all the subsequent aesthetic reflection. The introduction of the distinction between material support and aesthetic object has radically changed the very nature of the definition of artistic value.

However, it has to be noted that the distinction between "material object" and "mental artefact" is analytical, not empirical: What the spectator sees is already at least partly endowed with meaning. That is, we see only aesthetic objects or, in the definition adopted here, mental artefacts. To speak of material objects means performing a deconstruction of the meaning whose main purpose is to draw attention to the plurality of possible perception processes before the same object which, however, is a pre-object.

From this approach, the focus of the analysis moves on to the manner in which the author succeeds in influencing the mental artefacts constructed by beholders (concerning this, see the two fundamental notions of model reader (Eco 1979) and implicit reader (Iser 1972)), and then on to the degrees of freedom that the spectators possess with respect to the operating instructions. The notion of the model reader was thoroughly worked out by Eco in 1979, but already in *Opera aperta* (1962) the author deals with the pragmatics of the text:"(...) a text postulates its own receiver as an indispensable condition not only of its own, concrete communicative ability, but also of its own potential for meaning. A text is a product, the interpretative fate of which belongs, in part, to its own generating mechanism" (Eco 1979, pp. 52–54). A notion similar to Eco's is elaborated by the Konstanz Schule: Iser defines implicit reader *(Implizite Leser)* as "the character of topicality of reading already traced in the text" pointing out that this is not the equivalent of the "typology of a possible reader" (Iser 1972, p. 9). A central criticism addressed to Iser's notion of the implicit reader regards this very last point: the empirical nature of the reader. Can the latter become the object of a concrete study (Gentili 1985)? Iser's position, with regard to this, is explicit: The reception aesthetic deals with the implicit reader, not the empirical one. Thus the author does not study the empirical reception processes of readers as, for example, they take place in a library, but studies texts to gather

the textual strategies inscribed in them. It was the studies of van Dijk and Kintsch (1975) that, some years later, supplied that empirical documentation lacking in Iser's approach.

A very interesting declination of the model reader concept is owed to De Marinis (1982), who analyses the case of the theatrical performance: The author proposes, for the analysis of the "performance as text," the notion of the model spectator, who is an implicit, ideal subject. The author singles out two perspectives for the study of text reception: (1) the intra-textual level of the implicit receiver and (2) the extratextual level of the real receiver. While the intra-textual level has been amply investigated (Iser 1972; Eco 1979; De Marinis 1982), the same has not been done for the extra-textual level. For many years empirical studies on reception have been few and far between, thus creating a partial levelling of analysis at the intra-textual level which, though decisive, does not exhaust all the relevant aspects of the phenomenon. In fact, if we accept a relational definition of the meanings and values inherent in the artistic event, we cannot then, in the empirical study, reduce the analysis to one of the poles, that is, to the author (even if, with regard to the latter, we deepen the level of analysis to the point of including the model spectators, that is, the representations the author has of his or her own public).

The risk implicit in such a reduction is evident in De Marinis' studies in the early 1980s, in which he transforms the model spectator from "textual strategy, an interpretative course variously inscribed in the text" into "theoretical meaning able to make clear the regularities and the invariants implicit in the real spectator's hermeneutic activities, categorizing them adequately" (De Marinis 1982, pp. 188–190). In this type of approach, one witnesses a sort of logical omission: The imaginary reader of whom the author of the literary text is thinking while writing, that ideal spectator at whose side the producer sits during the preparation of the theatrical performance, becomes a sort of average of all empirical spectators, in other words, a theoretical model able to categorize the effective reception experiences of the real spectators, as opposed to the ideal projection born in the mind of the author and the producer. This assumption, unless it is translated into a mere research hypothesis, is misleading. From this might be deduced the uselessness of empirical research in aesthetic reception processes: The model spectator, in fact, would already supply an a priori categorization of the effective reception experiences. From a methodological standpoint, this would be the equivalent of deciding to study the transmitters in order to find out what the receivers are doing, which appears at least open to question.

This type of theoretical approach has had a certain impact on the development of research on these themes; as has been said with respect to reception activities, most of the studies deal with the shape such activities take in the reasoning of the authors rather than focusing on the real experiences of the receivers. From the first half of the 1980s onwards, however, we have witnessed an inversion of this trend: In the last few years, in fact, research on consumer behaviour with regard to artistic products has undergone a certain development, though within very different perspectives.

2.3 Contextual Theories

This perspective focuses on the relationship between a work of art and production and reception contexts as a fundamental issue: The artistic product is defined as resulting from the intersection of individual talent and reference contexts, and not as a process occurring entirely inside subjects, as the romantic conception of art would have it.

According to how they define the relationship between artistic production and context, we can further distinguish within these theories a number of distinct veins; while some approaches underline the dynamics pertinent to the more general social and cultural contexts in which the work is placed (Bourdieu 1993; Wolff 1993; Tanner 2003), others try to reconstruct the social dynamics that have made it possible for genius to assert itself (Kermode 1985; Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Gardner 1988; Elias 1991; De Nora 1995) by focusing the analysis on the social practices of recognition. Still others underline the local relationship between artistic production and contexts both in its production and in its reception (Goldfarb 1976; Becker 1982; Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991; Zolberg 1990). Melucci (1994) underlines the importance of recognition processes, focusing on the dualistic relation between the social actor and the context in which the actor is placed. In his research:"Creativity is analysed, besides referring to theories and current models, considering the subjects it has been attributed to . . . the discourses characterising it . . . and the contexts which make it possible" (Melucci 1994, p. 8).

The second type of approach concentrates on recognition contexts: These are studies of the so-called politics of talent. They reconstruct the social dynamics that permitted a great genius of the past to achieve success. Emblematic, with regard to this approach, is the analysis of the material suppositions in Raphael's works, carried out by Max Scheler (1926). Included in this perspective is Csikszentmihalyi's study (1988) on the cases of Botticelli and Mendel: The former, held to be a mediocre painter up to the middle of the nineteenth century, becomes a talented artist only thanks to the reappraisal of his works by Ruskin (Csikszentmihalyi 1988) and above all, as Kermode (1985) underlines, due to the studies of Herbert Horne and Aby Warburg. And Mendel owes the fortune of his theory of natural selection to the rediscovery made by the evolutionists some 40 years after its original formulation. Following Inghilleri (1990), we can therefore ask ourselves where Botticelli's creativeness lies: in his mind, in his work, or in the use future cultural consumers will make of it (like Ruskin and Warburg)? To the vein of so called theories of genius also belong Gardner's study (1988) on the construction of Freud's fame, that of De Nora on the social bases and social consequences of Beethoven's success (De Nora 1995) and that of Elias (1991) on Mozart's genius. In De Nora's study Beethoven's talent does not appear self-evident: the author analyses the ways in which Beethoven's superiority has been elaborated and sustained by his contemporaries (by means of public relations, mobilizing other meanings able to produce evidence, etc.). The analysis emphasizes the role of the

power relations between the artist and his public or the artist and his patrons in making his talent possible. In this respect, the relationship between Beethoven and Prince Lichnowsky, his closest patron, is exemplary:

> Lichnowsky underwrote the success of Beethoven's first publication in at least one way . . . he subscribed to 20 copies and, if we count the additional subscriptions by members of his family, between them the Lichnowskys and the Thuns (his wife's family) accounted for 21 percent (53) of the 249 copies . . . Underwriting of the publication costs was a way Beethoven could be made to look like an already successful published composer . . . Once again, we see how the dramatisation of Beethoven as corresponding to a preconceived imagery of success – in this case the achievement of a highly successful first publication – was part of the frame within which Beethoven could be constructed as worthy. (De Nora 1995, pp. 139–140)

Reflecting in general on the concept of genius, De Nora (1989) writes: "If we ask how Mozart was able to compose music of such purity and perfection we can only answer, 'because he was a genius, which is tantamount to saying that we do not know'" (De Nora 1989, p. 1). If the term "genius" appears to be an empty word, a label used to define the residual; it corresponds in fact to that which is not explained. However, according to De Nora, the implicit assumption that genius is unexplainable cannot be endorsed by sociology: To speak of genius as an unfathomable characteristic of the person means neglecting crucial aspects of this phenomenon. What remains, after having eliminated in Mozart's work the product of technique, of years of study and engagement that he shared with all the other musicians of his time, is just what we want to investigate (De Nora 1995).

Elias, on the contrary, has studied the assertion of Mozart's genius, which he defines significantly as "genius lived before the age of geniuses" (Elias 1991, p. 18). This study documents how Mozart, after being an *enfant prodige* of the European courts where he played during the *tournée* organized by his father Leopold, was appreciated much less than his contemporaries in the Vienna of the final stages of the eighteenth century. In fact when, counting on the support of the Viennese public, he decided to give up his post with the Archbishop of Salzburg, as he wanted to control his own music and become a "free artist," he was no longer appreciated, to the point where he was unable to earn enough even to live on. At the beginning of his stay in Vienna, the artist gave piano lessons in the morning and almost every evening played in the houses of the nobility, but as time went by the situation underwent a radical change:

> The 12th July 1789 . . . [Mozart] reminds the merchant Michael Puchlierg of the failure of the new subscription for a concert, as there was only one subscriber, Herr van Swieten, a close acquaintance of his. Viennese society had turned its back on him, the emperor taking the lead . . . he depended, all things considered, on a limited circle of local subscribers somewhat closed in upon itself and tightly integrated. If the word spread that the emperor did not think particularly highly of a musician, fashionable society simply abandoned him. (Elias 1991, p. 29)

Mozart, who had pinned all his hopes on the Viennese public, suffered greatly from the humiliations inflicted on him by the nobility. The situation of abandonment

that was created was such that Elias was induced to say that Mozart suffered to the point of dying from it. Elias' study rescues Mozart from the rapid isolation of the genius by linking indissolubly the affairs of Mozart the artist with those of Mozart the man. This contribution, on a level with De Nora's, by investigating the social dynamics that sustain and make possible the assertion of genius, addresses the relationship between the work and the politics of talent.

The third type of approach studies the context at a micro-level. The focus of the analysis is on the institutionalized components of artistic production and reception: In particular De Nora, in an article published in 1986, deals with the question of the meaning of music, assuming that this meaning is not located in the music itself (as the referential theory of language would have us believe) but in the listening practices of the receivers. Goldfarb (1976) in a study on "Student Theatre in Poland," analyses theatrical reception and focuses on the relationship between theatre and the articulation of public discourse in Polish society. Tota (1994, 1998) analyses the cognitive and cultural bonds of the theatrical spectator for the purpose of documenting how a spectacular event like the theatrical one is constructed. Macdonald (1995) studies the reception conditions of an exhibition in a museum, elaborating a typology of use models.

3 The Politics of Authenticity

Kunstsein ist etwas ganz anderes als Kunstwert. (Utitz 1920, p. 5)

Already in 1920, Utitz affirms that the belonging of a product to the art system, that is, its designation in terms of "artistic product," was a concept semantically distinct from that of "artistic value." In fact, this distinction poses a series of anything but marginal questions. If the quality of being an art work (that is, its designation in terms of belonging to the art system) is excluded from the value we attribute to it, what criteria do we choose to value a work with regard to the art context and not, for example, with regard to that of everyday life? According to Schmidt, it is a matter of pragmatic criteria: The object must satisfy a series of conventions pertinent to a given system, that is, to art.

In a sociological perspective, this shifts the focus of the analysis to the social practices of attribution, recognition, or construction of the authenticity of a work; a thorough analysis of these practices could most likely document how the categories of true/false are connected to those of artistic value or, at least, show how problematic it is to keep totally distinct the identity of a work (that is, its belonging to the art system) and its value.

Eco (1990) underlines the complexity of the terms true/false in the artistic field and, above all, indicates the inadequacy of the vague conceptions we usually refer to when applying these to the explanation of the social practices of authenticity certification. Available criteria appear inadequate for the foundation of a systematic

reflection on these categories.[4] To Goodman's (1968) question as to whether a perfect forgery, which can withstand every philological criterion, exists, Eco replies with the following story:

> In 1921, Picasso stated that he had painted a portrait of Honorio Bustos Domeq. Fernando Pessoa confirmed in writing that he had seen the portrait and praised it as the greatest masterpiece ever produced by Picasso. Many critics sought the portrait, but Picasso said that it had been stolen.
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> In 1945, Salvador Dalì announced that he had rediscovered the portrait in Perpignan. Picasso formally recognized the portrait as his original work. The portrait was sold to the Museum of Modern Art as: "Pablo Picasso, Portrait of Bustos Domeq, 1921."
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> In 1950, Jorge Luis Borges wrote an essay ("El Omega de Pablo") in which he stated that:
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> 1. Picasso and Pessoa had lied because no one in 1921 had painted a portrait of Domeq.
> 2. In any case, Domeq could not be portrayed in 1921 because this person had been invented by Borges and Bioy Casares during the 1940s.
> 3. Picasso had in reality painted the portrait in 1945 and had falsely dated it 1921.
> 4. Dalì had stolen the portrait and had copied it (impeccably). Immediately afterwards he had destroyed the original.
> 5. Obviously, the Picasso of 1945 had imitated perfectly the style of the early Picasso and Dalì's copy was indistinguishable from the original. Both Picasso and Dalì had used canvas and colours produced in 1921.
> 6. Thus, the work displayed in New York is the deliberate forgery of a deliberate forgery of the author of a historic forgery (Eco 1990, p. 189).

In 1986, Eco goes on to say, an unpublished text by Raymond Queneau was found, and the story becomes so complicated that the reader (perhaps even the mode) no longer succeeds in understanding: With this the author demonstrates to us the dubiousness of the certification of forgeries and the inadequacy of the criteria we commonly refer to.

Returning to Utitz's distinction and elaborating still further, we might surmise that perhaps it is precisely in the modification of the relationship between the quality of being an artwork (*Kunstsein*) and artistic value (*Kunstwert*) that we can discern a distinctive feature of the contemporary "art system." Benjamin (1955), regarding the reception of the work of art, underlines how, in the epoch of technical reproducibility, the nature of the art system has undergone a profound change. It could be added that, in mass society as well, the relationship linking artistic quality and artistic value seems to be changing, that is, the border between them tends to further disappear.

In mass society there appear on the art scene new participants in the act of consuming: these are new social groups which have economic, social, and cultural characteristics very different from the elites that have traditionally monopolized the consumption of artistic possessions. However, if we confirm the hypothesis that consumer practices have a constitutive and not an accessory nature with respect to

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[4]"Reflection on these objects more commonly counterfeited (artistic forgeries) should, however, tell us how risky our general identity criteria are and how concepts like Truth and Falseness, Authentic and False, Identity and Difference are defined circularly in turn" (Eco 1990, p. 192).

the art system as a whole, these new groups, although underestimated and ridiculed in somewhat archaic types of analysis (e.g., Ortega y Gasset 1930), have encouraged a structural change in the overall system. The fact that art is consumed by these new social groups as well, remote from the facile stereotypes of the "leisured Renaissance gentleman," already criticised by Eco (1964), seems to have triggered an overall process of change in art and a partial redistribution of power within the system. In particular, it changes the relative influence in the construction process of an artistic fact by a part of the context; the latter seems to be taking on growing weight.

We are witnessing a process of contextualization of art, in the sense that the places of art acquire a growing importance in the formation of the mental artefacts of the receivers and, consequently, in the processes of the attribution of artistic quality to particular products. Access, therefore, to a particular network of institutional relationships, access to a particular physical location (museum, theatre, etc.) become determining elements within the "artistic career" (Zolberg 1990) of a particular object. It is reasonable to assume that the advent of mass communications has caused changes that affect all artistic environments, even those relative to the reception of a theatrical performance which, in most cases, is typical of an event reserved for the happy few. The prominent role occupied, in the case of the television medium, by being inside the box, even to the detriment of what is being shown inside it, also affects the art system, but not banally discrediting or cheapening art as a whole, as a superficial interpretation of the phenomenon might lead one to suppose. This is, on the contrary, a much more complex process which leads to a modification of the intermingling and relative weight of categories such as *Kunstsein* and *Kunstwert*, amplifying the role of Bateson's (1972) "frames."

This process does not take place in an abstract way but through consumer practices; what has changed is the mind of art consumers, that is, the way in which they construct the relevant mental artefacts according to what is perceived.

4 The Social Construction of Artistic Value

Czech structuralism is responsible for the establishment in the artistic field of the analytical distinction between material object and aesthetic object: While the first term refers to production support materials (the painted canvas, the paper copy of the book), the second refers to the corresponding mental reproductions of the cultural consumers.[5] These reproductions are the complex mental images that different receivers elaborate before the same material object. A long tradition of cognitive studies has documented the fact that different subjects observing the same object

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[5]Also, the phenomenological perspective (Ingarden 1965, first published 1931) played a very important role in this direction.

see different things; this can also be extended to the reception of cultural products.[6] We shall therefore speak of "material object" and of "received objects or mental artefacts."

The multiplicity of mental artefacts is not infinite: We can reasonably assume that it can be categorized as a series of ideal types. In front of a specific material object, we shall therefore have the various types of mental artefacts elaborated. Once the plausibility of the distinction between material object and received objects has been established, empirical studies on reception acquire theoretical citizenship within a theory of artistic production, in that it is necessary to study the processes by which these mental artefacts are formed. A theory of artistic production that takes into account this distinction will analyse, with regard to the material object, the transmitters and, with regard to the mental artefacts, the "instructions for use" supplied by both the producers (the model spectator) and the organizational-institutional context (museum, theatre, and concert hall), and finally the effective reception activities. This detracts nothing from talent; it only enriches the understanding of the dynamics that makes it possible. In the next pages, we consider the theoretic implications of this approach for cases of "lack of recognition," those cases in which an already highly successful artist exhibiting or performing outside the contexts of institutional reception, or simply in different contexts, is either not "recognized" or not appreciated by the public. These cases, less rare than one is prepared to admit, function as "breaching procedures," (Mehan and Wood 1975, p. 113) where the breaching is in the first instance an ideological perspective in terms of which the researcher decides to reason.

4.1   Some Examples of Context

The term "context" is decidedly polysemous, to the point of being vague. Let us consider some examples:

1. The theatre. In this case, the context is made up of: (a) a series of cognitive artefacts, such as the programme, the theatre-bill, newspaper articles with the opinion of the critics, photographs of the actors or producer that have appeared in newspapers, possible interviews featured on radio or television, etc.; (b) the theatre building with its interior organization of spaces (separation of auditorium and stage, the arrangement of the seats, the positioning of the lights, etc.); (c) the reception conditions on that specific occasion (presence of the public in the foyer, queues at the box-office, price and difficulty of getting tickets, etc.).
2. A cassette of classical music listened to at home. This involves a series of extra-musical devices, such as for example the label and design on the cassette which refer to: (a) a particular person whose image and story we know through

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[6]In the cultural field see for example Baxandall's (1972) study on Piero della Francesca.

the mass media, biographies, school texts; (b) a record company that certifies the professional quality of the execution (this enables the piece of music to be distinguished from the one played on the piano by friends); (c) a certain conductor, etc.

3. An exhibition of painting organized in an old Venetian palace.

   The artistic nature of the event is certified: (a) by the city which, for the non-Venetian visitor, is a symbol of culture and art; (b) by the building and all the organization within the space. Let us consider for example that in the rooms of the building we are visiting there are normally pictures and furniture. The fact that in that building there are now just pictures informs us that the intended use is different. The fact too that some pictures are lit up more than others, or have a whole wall devoted to them, informs us about their greater importance; (c) from a whole series of cognitive artefacts such as the programme, the posters, and the articles that have appeared in the press. In this case the plaque bearing the name of the author of the work on display functions as a guarantee certificate in the same way as "pure virgin wool," and refers to all we know (or do not know) about that name. (d) Finally, there are a series of factors that are part of the context of a painting exhibition such as the names of the sponsor and the organizer, the period the exhibition is open to the public, the cost of the admission ticket, the exterior visibility of the exhibition through indicators like the queues of visitors at the entrance, etc.

4. The reading of a novel. When we are reading a book sitting comfortably in our favourite armchair, there is also a series of contextualization signals: As in the second example, the book's dust jacket refers (a) to the author and everything we know about him or her; (b) in addition, it also refers to a publishing house and its image. Lastly the effect of the "printed paper," which in itself gives authority to the text, should not be overlooked. All these signals play their part in the production of meanings; they are an active part of that process by which the reader transforms "the ink marks on paper" into a continuum which is coherent and meaningful.

In the case of artistic products, the underlining of the "communicative" aspect of these signals is particularly important because they function as a meta-communicative frame and tell the spectator: "This is theatre," "This is literature," and "This is art." The analysis of frames shifts the artistic reflection from the level of content to the pragmatic level of rules, in line with what Schmidt (1979b) has already advanced. The context therefore is that body of messages which organizes the receiver's perception of a given communicative event (the performance, the music, the book, and the exhibition). It is like the frame around a picture that Bateson speaks about:

> 'Pay attention to what is inside and ignore what is outside' . . . The picture's frame tells the observer that when he is interpreting the picture he must not use the lame kind of reasoning that he could use when interpreting the wallpaper outside the frame. (Bateson 1972, p. 228)

The examples of context quoted concern different types of reception, precisely because a contextual approach is theoretically applicable to different spheres of

artistic production. We can reasonably assume, in fact, that a contextual perspective, with suitable modifications, could be useful for the different types of study of the artistic product.

5   The Shifting Value of Artworks: Botticelli and Warburg

The way we can explain these cases where the same artwork is evaluated very differently over time is linked to the implicit conception of artistic production, that is, to how we reply to the question: "Who produces the work?" Each of the conceptions mentioned before (authorial theories, reception theories and sociological ones) implies a different explanation of the cases of non-recognition. The example of Botticelli is here considered. The Italian artist, held to be a mediocre painter until the middle of the nineteenth century, was considered "talented" thanks to the studies of Aby Warburg (1932) and Herbert Horne (1980). *La Primavera* and *La Nascita di Venere* were first shown in the Uffizi only in 1815, but during the 1860s it was still a widely shared opinion that Botticelli's talent was limited by his preference for very ugly women (Kermode 1985). The artist was in fact held to be a mediocre painter. His reputation was literally constructed thanks to the studies of Herbert Horne and Aby Warburg. Home was not an academic, but a great admirer of fifteenth-century art. In 1908 he wrote a long monograph on Botticelli entitled "Alessandro Filipepi called Sandro Botticelli, Painter of Florence." At that time, Horne moved to Florence, where he had an old palace renovated, which was to become the Home Museum. Warburg, who was 2 years younger than Home, is a sort of cultural legend but, as often happens with legends, his image has long been misinterpreted. The institute, which today still bears his name, became almost more famous than its founder. Warburg's students, such as Panofsky and Gombrich, re-interpreted the iconological perspective, but they also provided it with a new identity far removed from Warburg's original conception. The iconology has ended up by obscuring in some way Warburg himself. In 1893 Warburg wrote his study on "*La Nascita di Venere e la Primavera*" in order to document how Sandro Botticelli interpreted the ideas which were generally accepted at his time (Warburg 1932, p. 58). His aim was to analyse the influence of the classics on Botticelli's poetics. But the way in which he conceived this influence was to change with the passing of time: In "*La Nascita di Venere*" (the essay written in 1893), Warburg reproaches Botticelli for his compliant attitude and contrasts it with Leonardo's ability to follow the classics only when they appeared to him as models. The Florentine painters of the fifteenth century tended in general to seek inspiration in classical models, but Warburg differentiated between attempts, which were merely reproduction and those which succeeded in reinterpreting the pathos formulae of antiquity. Botticelli, who in the first essay is defined as "being too adaptable," (Warburg 1932, p. 58) is reconsidered in a second essay, "*Arte italiana e astrologia internazionale nel palazzo Schifanoja di Ferrara*," (1912) in which Warburg redefines the relation between the Florentine painter and classical models, acknowledging his ability to use the past for creative and original

production. In this way the new interpretative tradition of Botticelli's poetics was born: In fact, the successful creation of a new reputation of *La Primavera* and *La Nascita di Venere* is due mainly to Warburg's work.

Analysing the case of Botticelli and the modalities of his most recent recognition, Kermode introduces the concept of "forms of attention of art work" (Kermode 1985); his aim is to point out that the reputation of an artist can be subject to wide variations over time, due mainly to chance and therefore totally divorced from the value of the work itself. The rediscovery of Botticelli is an emblematic example of the shifting value of an artwork insofar as it makes possible to show the specific contribution of social and cultural contexts and of receptive processes in constructing the reputation of an artist. Warburg's studies on the Florentine painter are fundamental for understanding not only the ways in which Botticelli's reputation is sustained, but also those in which it is literally created. It is particularly relevant to note that, in this case as in that of Beethoven, studied by De Nora, in order to permit an artist's reputation to emerge, a change in the interpretative and receptive canons of an epoch is necessary. In Beethoven's case, beside the notion of master composer, a new modality in the reception of the concert of classical music emerges, which is much more deferential than the previous one (De Nora 1995). In the case of Warburg the construction of Botticelli's reputation even marks the advent of a new discipline. In both these cases, the emergence of a reputation is closely linked to a change in the interpretative canons of an epoch which, in the perspective of this study, represent a determinant factor in the elaboration of mental artefacts. The pathos formulae become the new key to understanding Botticelli's paintings: After Warburg not only have *La Nascita di Venere* and *La primavera* become two different art works, they have even changed the canons of art history.

While in the romantic ideology of artistic production lack of recognition is explained by resorting to the notion of incompetence, when adopting the contextual perspective, cases such that of Botticelli are fundamental in that they reveal dynamics by now deeply deposited in everyday acts and therefore visible only in extremely denaturalized situations.

The different body of contextual information (e.g., the new theoretical frame elaborated by Warburg in relation to the artist) produces, together with similar textual information (the same paintings), a different artistic event. The contextual information being changed, the visitors of the museum elaborate different mental artefacts and consequently they enjoy a different event: They observe to the same extent a different and "new" Botticelli. This diversity can apply to many aspects: In particular in the Botticelli case it is translated into the different artistic value recognized in the paintings. In fact, the objects received by the visitors are changed, and these objects include the symbolic values that we attribute to a certain event, the emotions associated with it, and also the artistic values we recognize. Hence according to the contextual interpretation the artistic value of a Botticelli is also produced by the museum room in which it is exhibited. The reception conditions of an artwork (e.g., the theoretical framework available to consider the reputation of an artist) are a part of the event itself.

It is necessary to reiterate that to point out the contextual nature of artistic production does not in any way diminish the role of talent, of genius, of the capacity, and value of the artist. This approach limits itself to underlining a very relevant aspect in studies on artistic production, which has something to do with the role of contexts in the processes of attribution of artistic value by observers. The fact that with changes of context the recognized artistic value also changes does not in any way disqualify artistic production, it merely modifies it.

6   Conclusions

This article has tried to argue the advantages of adopting a contextual conception of a work of art based, on one hand, on the notion of consumer conditions and, on the other, on that of the relation of production of meanings. It has been underlined that the consumer conditions of an artistic event are defined by the institutional context in which it takes place; this context organizes and predetermines the course of the reception through the enunciation of a series of "contextualization cues," (De Nora 1986) as, for example, the design of spaces used for staging a performance, the cognitive artefacts made available to the public, the arrangement of pictures in an art gallery, etc. It has also been confirmed that, while the social actor interprets these consumer conditions, he or she does not stop at fulfilling them passively, but has a series of degrees of freedom with respect to the instructions for use supplied.

The consumer conditions are fundamental in that they predetermine the relation of production of the meanings, that is, that body of processes through which a subject ascribes meaning to what he or she is enjoying. This meaning corresponds to what we have defined as "mental artefacts," which are nothing more than the mental images of material objects endowed with the meaning of these objects (as has been said, it is in the very acquisition of meaning that the passage of material objects to mental artefacts lies). It should be noted that, among the different "meanings" we produce, there is also that on which artistic judgment is founded, and it is for this very reason that it becomes important to study the consumer conditions of an artistic event. The consumer conditions of a museum exhibition, like those of other artistic events, greatly influence and condition production relations of the meanings of the event itself, to the point of inducing us to contend that they are part of it and, to reiterate the structuralist position, when they change, the work itself changes as well. Extending Norman's (1988) cognitive approach to art, we can conclude by saying that not all knowledge necessary to define something as art is in our head, a part of it is inscribed in the design of the spaces socially destined for its exhibition and in the practices traditionally codified for its aesthetic reception.

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Part II
Literature

Crossing the Finite Provinces of Meaning: Experience and Metaphorizing of Literature and Arts

Gerd Sebald

Alfred Schutz's theoretical work is not replete with references to literature or the arts, but there are enough of them to examine some relations between literature, social theory, and the life-world. Schutz uses literature as a quarry for examples and ideal types, as in "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality," and he shows his erudition and "*Bildung*" through a wealth of citations. And there is another kind of referring to literature and the arts: Metaphorizing it, using it, as may be said with Lakoff and Johnson, to understand and to experience one kind of thing in terms of another. According to Schutz's theory literature and the arts are certain kinds of "finite provinces of meaning," that means they are not easily accessible from the paramount reality of everyday life. Metaphorizing then is a specific kind of border-crossing across different provinces of meaning. The following considerations take up one of Schutz's metaphorical border crossings between the provinces of theory and literature, and using it as guideline to examine the theoretical status and the borders of these provinces of meaning, especially that of literature without going into the specific characteristics of this province.

In a first step the example is presented together with some elucidations concerning the concept of metaphor. After that, the development of Schutz's concept of the finite provinces of meaning is outlined. In a third step the phenomenological concept of experience on a prepredicative level is discussed in order to clarify the status of the borders of finite provinces. This process of constitution of meaning is further advanced in the discussions of explicating experiences in language and in

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writing and printing, the latter with reference to Husserl's fragment "The Origin of Geometry." In a conclusion the outcomes for a theory of constitution of the finite provinces of meaning are summarized.

1 The Example

The example is taken from a rather peripheral text, a letter to Felix Kaufmann regarding Schutz's first visit of Edmund Husserl, first published in the recent volume III.1 of the *Alfred Schutz-Werkausgabe*:

> Personally, I feel like Wilhelm Meister at the end of his apprenticeship: He arrives at the Tower Society and is given a scroll which records and solves all that weighs him down.[1]

What is happening here? An experience is made and described with a metaphor from literature. So far so good and so commonplace. In what sense is this example metaphoric, and not just a comparison? Metaphor is used here in a wider sense than just rhetorical (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Ricoeur 1996, 2003), as a connection between at least two different things, where one is used to illustrate, exemplify, and explicate the other.

Schutz is reporting his impressions of his first meeting with Husserl to his close friend Felix Kaufmann. The experience he had there was indeed exciting. Though he was first rather unmoved by Husserl's Phenomenology, he reacted enthusiastically to the "Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time" in 1928. Encouraged by Kaufmann he sent his first book, the *Sinnhafter Aufbau* (translated as *Phenomenology of the Social World*) to Husserl in 1932 and was immediately invited to Freiburg. There he got a glimpse into the life-world and the unpublished work of Husserl, for instance he read in a few days the manuscript then called *Logische Studien* (*Logical Studies*), a draft, that was published only after Husserl's death as *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Husserl 1973). Therein Husserl developed a very detailed description of experience and typification, both problems were of high relevance for Schutz all through his work until his last text "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," (1959) where he developed a thorough critique of the concept of type.

But what does it mean, using Wilhelm Meister to describe his experience? What does that involve? According to Schutz's later theory the metaphor used to describe his emotional state at that first meeting with Husserl could be characterized as a crossing between different provinces of meaning, between the paramount realityof

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[1]Translation by the author. The German original: "*Mir persönlich geht es wie Wilhelm Meister am Ende der Lehrjahre: Er kommt zur Gesellschaft vom Turm und man überreicht ihm eine Schrift, in der alles aufgezeichnet und gelöst ist, was ihn bedrückt*" (Letter from Schutz to Kaufmann, June 20th, 1932).

everyday life there in Freiburg and the finite province of literature. Therefore, in the next step the development of Schutz's theory of the finite provinces of meaning is outlined.

2   Schutz's Theory of the Provinces of Meaning

A first trace of the theory of the provinces of meaning is found in the text "Meaning structures of literary art forms" ("Goethe: Novelle"):

> Of course, the possibility of confusing the unity of action with the continuity of motivation in the conceptual-linguistic sense exists because 'motivation' is a specific category of the literary symbol function. Yet, it has nothing to do with the conceptual-logical motivation of daily life. If both are identified with one another, it is on the basis of the impossible notion that the relations between literary creations can be exchanged with the relations of our external life, and this without any adaptation. (Schutz 1982, p. 173)

A border is established between daily life and literary creations. The meaning of symbols and concepts is different on both sites of the border. When the border is crossed, adaptation of relations is necessary. This is the first hint to concept, that is, which later called finite provinces of meaning.[2]

Schutz developed this theory of the finite provinces of meaning in the thirties, while working on the problem of personality. In starting from the "world of working" (*Wirkwelt*) as the paramount reality, Schutz delimits various "worlds" as different and finite provinces of meaning ("*geschlossene Sinngebiete*"). The unity of one of those provinces is formed through a specific "style of being." (*Seinsstil*) The elements of meaning belonging to one province are compatible with each other and ordered. A province then is constituted by an integrative principle of regulation. All these provinces are not reducible to one another, that means, that there is no simple rule of transformation, and movement from one to another is only possible with a shock (see Schutz 1937, pp. 144ff).

This first draft locates these provinces of meaning within the sphere of personality: The shock brings another part of the personality, of the I, into play. Some of these provinces are completely solipsistic, for instance, that of dreams, but others are pre-constituted by others, like the province of theoretical contemplation. Later on Schutz uses the term "universe of discourse" (Schutz 1962, p. 250) to characterize that specific province. But of what kind is that preconstitution? A "world of theoretical contemplation" (Schutz 1962, p. 245) is constituted of findings made by others, of problems found by others and of solutions to these problems provided by others. How does one enter this preconstituted world? One has to start in the paramount reality, read a book, or talk about a scientific problem. These actions, communications, etc., remain a part of the everyday life, but they constitute

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[2]Maybe it is developed in following Max Weber's concept of spheres of value ("*Wertsphären*") or Husserl's ontological regions ("*Seinsregionen*").

specific time-objects, objects of meaning, that are elements which do not fit into the meaning structure of the paramount reality and which are used intentionally to create a scaffolding of literary, theoretical, etc., concepts. All actions that are necessary to share the results of such contemplations with others take place again back in the paramount reality, whether one writes thoughts down, types it, or talks about it.

In the text "On Multiple Realities," it is this very conception of the finite provinces of meaning that is outlined, however with a slight change: For the new scientific public the reference to James' subuniversa is added, which should "free this important insight from its psychologistic setting" (Schutz 1962, pp. 229f). There is also an explicit grounding of those provinces in the meaning of our experiences and not in an ontological structure of objects, as is perhaps the case with Husserl's ontological regions (see *Ideas I*).

What seems to be clarified in the discussion of the phenomenological paradoxes is the "location" of these provinces: They do not exist objectively beyond an individual stream of consciousness, but are forms of intersubjective experience, which allow a common "stay" inside those fields: e.g., talking to someone about a painting or social and literary theory or attending a performance in the theater together. The participants are at the same time both in the "world of working" and in the particular province of meaning (Schutz 1962, p. 258), one leg in the world of working and one in the world of literature. Could one then suggest using a metaphor by Matthiesen (1994), a constant change between the supporting and the kicking leg? Are then the activities of reading and writing theory or literature also two-legged in this sense?

Ten years later, in "Symbol, Reality and Society," an important extension is made to the theory of provinces by introducing symbols as relations of appresentation, in which the appresented part transcends the experience of everyday life. This implies that a symbolic transgression of the borders of meaning is now possible. A symbolic appresentation is a relation between at least two finite provinces of meaning, whereas the appresenting symbol is part of the paramount reality of everyday life.

> In symbolic as in all other appresentative relations [. . .] something immediately given refers to something absent, which is however copresentiated in experience by means of this reference. [. . .] The symbolic meanings attached to particular vehicles of meaning [Bedeutungsträger] are thus memories of experiences outside the everyday sphere, that have been brought back from other states to the normal everyday state. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, pp. 144ff)

So symbols involve a transgression of borders. The metaphoric phrase "bring back" insinuates the closing of borders after that transfer of meaning. Meaning as a temporal object, however, sustains its own past constitution at least for a certain time. Thus, symbolic appresentation establishes a more or less permanent relation between finite provinces of meaning.

To summarize, according to Schutz there are three modes of crossing the borders of a province of meaning:

1. The shock-like transgression in changing the mode of experience, in falling asleep, opening a book or word processor, etc.;
2. The simultaneous stay in two of those provinces in communicating about a specific context of meaning;
3. Symbolic appresentation.

Metaphors belong to the third category. They appresent a particular province of meaning in everyday life. But they do more: They link meanings of two different provinces permanently. If we know Wilhelm Meister, we can understand Schutz's theoretical enthusiasm at his first encounter with Husserl. The moment of the metaphor implies a new form of transgression that involves a new combination of already constituted elements of meaning. What this mode of transgression shows then, is that the finiteness of these provinces of meaning is not formed by sharply drawn, nearly insurmountable borders (as Husserl has built them around the consciousness and, accordingly, Luhmann around his autopoietic systems of meaning).

What has become clear is that the ground these provinces of meaning are built on is experience. So the next step is to take a look at that ground, the experiences, to clarify the state of these borders a little bit more, especially on behalf of sociality.

3   Experience

> Experience is the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being 'is there', and it is there *as what* it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it. (Husserl 1969, §94, p. 233)

According to Husserl experiences are constituted in passive *and* active operations of the consciousness. Experiences take place against a horizon of typified experiences made before. If a new experience is made, it is explicated with elements of that horizon. These types are used as explicates in a way of association when "this recalls that" (Husserl 1973, §16, p. 75). It is association according to similarity. The ground for any association between constituted objects is the common time within a stream of consciousness. What is separated is united on this ground of time (Husserl 1973, §42b, p. 177):

> But beyond this function of unification within a presence, association has a broader one, namely, that of uniting what is separated, insofar as this was ever at all constituted within a single stream of consciousness, thus, of uniting the present with the non-present, the presently perceived with remote memories separated from it, and even with imaginary objects: the like here recalls what is like there, the similar recalls the similar.

That is constituted in pre-predicative processing of experience is a unit of meaning, "actual and submerged intuitions" (Husserl 1973, §42b, p. 179).[3] That means: Some typified remnants of past experiences are connected to explicate a present and new experience. A specific relation between homogeneous or heterogeneous types is constituted. So to explicate one thing in the types of another is a usual processing of experiences. And this is, on pre-predicative level, what Lakoff and Johnson define as metaphor.[4]

Thus, constituting an experience seems to be (or: could be read as) a structured and rather stable form of processing objects of meaning. Husserl himself reserves the term "spontaneity" for the predicative level:

> Hence a unique reciprocal relationship takes place, though to be sure, in this sphere of passivity and in the sphere of receptivity which is constructed on this, it is not yet a relation in the logical sense of a spontaneous, creative consciousness in which a relation as such is constituted. (Husserl 1973, §42b, p. 177)

But this does not mean that experience itself is completely structured by a fixed past. Such a structuralist reading of Husserl (and following him, of Schutz) is misleading, as each experience has three horizons of constitution: the past, the present situation, and the future.

> That such "awakening," radiating out from the present and directed toward the vivifying of the past, is possible must have its ground in the fact that between the like and the similar a "sensous" unit is already passively constituted in advance [. . .] To be sure, this vivifying does bring in something new, in that now a new intention, radiating form the awakening situation, goes to what is awakened, an intention which this irradiance, changes its state to neutrality and thus to a phenomenal persistence. (Husserl 1973, §42b, p. 179)

Experience takes place on a structured ground of past experiences. But according to Husserl in the actual constitution of meaning a situational moment interferes. With Schutz it could be added, that there is even a future element in meaning, when future acts are anticipated "in the future perfect tense, *modo futuri exacti*." (e.g., Schutz 1962, p. 20) Instead of being closed and pre-structured, experience involves a complex interaction across different horizons of time.[5] And additionally it involves connections to other experiences: Both awakening and anticipating connect actual experiences with similar ones. Furthermore, this similarity does not stop short before the borders of the provinces of meaning.

So, experience, even on a prepredicative level, is rooted in metaphorizing as a basic mode of generating meaning. If this is true, the provinces of meaning inside one stream of consciousness have no clear-cut borders; instead James' metaphor of the fringes seems to be a more commensurate description.

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[3]A processing which involves a lot of failures, of detypifiying etc. as Gadamer (1990, p. 359) emphasizes.

[4]Lacan too, starting from completely different paradigms, has identified metaphor and metonymy as the two modes of the unconscious, see Lacan 1991, pp. 40ff.

[5]Many thanks to Hubert Knoblauch, who helped to make this point clearer.

4   Intersubjective Provinces

The next step in the constitution of meaning is to explicate the experience in translating it into language, making it explicit. To express a meaning linguistically is by no means just a representation or an identical copy of a *constitutum*. It is a transfer into a different system of relations. Instead of a meaning constituted in typified explication, there is a system of preconstituted inter- or trans-subjective meanings tied to sequentially organized phonemes, into which it has to be translated (for more on that process, see Renn 2006, pp. 221ff). This translation uses the closely bond relationship of action and language (Srubar 2003, pp. 95ff) as necessary common ground. The crucial role of metaphors in this relationship is shown by Lakoff and Johnson (2003). A metaphorical association according to an assumed analogy seems to be quite common, especially in the explication of implicit knowledge. The resulting explicit types are therefore again composed across the different provinces of meaning. So these relations easily cross the borders of the provinces of meaning and establish another set of more or less permanent associations in the unit of a single experience.

But talking about an experience opens up the option of intersubjective understanding. In the reciprocal actions of communication, including not only speaking itself, but also mimics, gestures, etc., according to Schutz, a common ground of time and meaning is built and becomes an essential part of the world of everyday life. And it opens up the option of externalization of those hitherto egological provinces of meaning. In constituting common meanings, or at least meanings *considered* as common and *referred to* as common, systems of relevances, attitudes, and cognitive styles are built on an intersubjective level, and thus emerge intersubjective provinces of meaning.

The borders of the subjective provinces of meaning become still more fringed in this process. Now they seem to have a quite homogeneous kernel and a rather ambiguous periphery, with a plethora of relations into other provinces. But in our example Schutz is not just talking to Kaufmann in a face-to-face interaction.

He is in fact writing a letter. So he has to translate his experience once more into written language. This involves another step of objectivation: The thought or spoken language is transferred into lines of ink; it loses the accompanying facial expressions, the prosodic elements, and the gestures, which are present in a face-to-face discussion. Therefore, it loses its common ground of time (fortunately for us, as we can establish a new one again and again in reading).

The experiences Schutz underwent in his first encounter with Husserl and his world of working are unique and new to him, and he grasps for similarities and invokes his typified interpretation of Wilhelm Meister. Thus, using the Meister-metaphor allows both partners of the communication to simultaneously inhabit the provinces of everyday life and of literature, each one in his own time. But that poses some additional questions on behalf of the provinces of meaning: What is the relation between the preconstituted intersubjective province and the individual consciousness? It seems that the stream of consciousness is the only uniting location

of these provinces, otherwise there would emerge the problem of the integration of scientific and everyday perspectives on the life-world. I want to suggest the solution of intersubjective communicative practices that *refer to* language and/or other media.

5   Writing and Printing

But is this province of literature really constituted by Schutz and Kaufmann? Didn't it exist before their birth and doesn't it still exist? It is indeed the "universe of discourse" that Schutz writes about in "On multiple realities." Husserl also describes the constitution of such a transsubjective universe of discourse in a famous manuscript, which was published by Fink as "The Origin of Geometry" and is now available as Supplement VI of the *Crisis*.

Husserl describes an "open chain of generations" (Husserl 1970, p. 356) inventing geometry in "spiritual accomplishments," that exist not psychically but as objective being-there for "everybody." Mathematics for instance then has "the manner of being of a lively forward movement from acquisitions as premises to new acquisitions, in whose ontic meaning that of the premises is included (the process continuing in this manner)" (Husserl 1970, p. 356). There seems to emerge an auto-logical dynamic of meaning. The basic element is "'ideal' objectivity. It is proper to a whole class of spiritual products of the cultural world, to which not only all scientific constructions [Gebilde] and the sciences themselves belong but also, for example, the constructions of fine literature" (Husserl 1970, pp. 356f).

This ideal objectivity is constituted in the face-to-face communication between geometricians, but this is not enough. It has to be separated from intentionality and fill in space actual intersubjectivity:

> What is lacking is the *persisting existence* of the "ideal objects" even during periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer wakefully so related or even are no longer alive. What is lacking is their continuing-to-be even when no one has realized them in self-evidence. The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, communication [*Mitteilung*] become virtual (Husserl 1970, pp. 360f).

But what is writing? Is it just embodied intentionality? And what happens to the meaning when it is translated into writing, written down, and, in a certain way, stripped off subjectivity?

> Written signs are, when considered from a purely corporeal point of view, straightforwardly, sensibly experienceable; and it is always possible that they be intersubjectively experience-able in common. But as a linguistic signs they awaken, as do linguistic sounds, their familiar significations. The awakening is something passive. (Husserl 1970, p. 361)

In writing a description down, the "original mode of being" (Husserl 1970, p. 361) is changed, the meaning "becomes sedimented," and comes to rest together with other related meanings. The problem in Husserl's analysis is that he assumes or

claims an univocal retrieval of the sedimented meaning, as Derrida (1978) criticizes in perhaps the only phenomenological text of his "Edmund Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry': An Introduction."

That suggests another insight into the constitution of the provinces of meaning: These provinces can be constituted in resting upon the persistent "materiality" of signs, that means in connecting those remnants of former connections to actual constitutional processes of meaning. Again, meaning is constituted in processes of awakening and association, but this time with an intersubjective recurrence to persistent and perceivable parts of signs.[6] So the possibility is opened to build up social institutions around that practice of writing and reading: Schools, libraries, and so on, creating isles of discourse within a society, where the referential schemes of interpretation are sufficiently co-ordinated.

The written meaning is transformed once more when it is printed, as we did with Schutz's letter in volume III.1 of the *Alfred Schutz-Werkausgabe*. With this mass re-production of signs that are perceptible and referable as being alike, the formations of meaning are open to a widespread anonymous public and this way makes them part of a universe of discourse spreading across society. The meaning formations are differentiated within themselves into provinces of discourse according to, as it seems, "autological" mechanisms or better: The rules of formation of meaning formations can no longer be ascribed to one individual or even a small group of individuals.

6   The Constitution of Provinces of Meaning

To summarize: What does that mean for the concept of finite provinces of meaning, and furthermore, if that is possible, for a theory of society based on Schutz's and Husserl's considerations?

1. Metaphors are a fundamental mechanism of experience, either on prepredicative or predicative level. They involve border crossings across different provinces of meaning. Maybe it could be said with Ricoeur (2004, p. 98), that the metaphor is the semantic kernel of a symbol. It therefore is able to link these provinces and constitute new sense. It achieves this with a transfer of meaning, a transfer, which affects both of the original contexts.
2. That means, these provinces of meaning are closed in a certain sense and at the same time they are interconnected and connectable in a certain sense. The borders are not as strictly closed as those of Luhmann's autopoietic systems, but they have got a certain auto-logical performance.

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[6]That does not state an objective reality, but just a kind of shared reference, sufficient enough for the hermeneutic purposes at hand.

3. All provinces of meaning other than the strictly individual have an inter- or trans-subjective character. They are founded in "material" objects of reference, a kind of medial substrate that is open for interpretation on the one hand and has the ability to stabilize meaning over time as semantics on the other hand. This way, writing and printing form specific temporal objects with transsubjective character.

4. These temporal objects then can be used for supporting intersubjective understanding. A finite province of meaning is then in a certain sense a universe of meaning but is rooted strongly in interactions, communications, and subjective processes of meaning constitution, as it is only valid in actualization. And it has to rely on available technical media and social institutions for its persistence.

These characteristics hold true for all provinces of meaning which are not exclusively individual. What can be said then on the specific province of literature? It has its own cognitive style, in accepting in temporally to a fictitious reality (see "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality"), its own types of They-Relations, its own personal types (authors, readers, and publishers), its specific symbol relations, its own types of genres, and its own social institutions (book trade). But this is another question beyond the scope of the present article.

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Sancho Panza and Don Quixote: The Documentary and the Phenomenological Methods of Analyzing Works of Art

Amalia Barboza

There are different methods and perspectives in the social and historical sciences for investigating art phenomena. According to Jochen Dreher and Michael D. Barber, in their introduction to this book, the subjective point of view of artists and interpreters is given special attention by the perspective of phenomenology. By contrast, emphasizing the historical and social conditions of art production and art acquisition is characteristic of the perspective of the social sciences. And art history tends to observe art from yet another perspective by analyzing the work of art itself, in terms of its contents and its formal components.

These different analytical methods of investigating art represent ideal-typical scientific attitudes that rarely exist in pure form. There are art historians, for instance, who are interested in the social conditions of the development of art works that require sociological analysis. And phenomenologists often consider not just the subjective point of view, but in addition also analyze the world of art as a province of meaning with its own rules independent of the subjective perception of the producers or the consumers. As Dreher and Barber point out, the significance of Alfred Schutz lies precisely in attempting to combine different methodological perspectives: a phenomenological and a sociological approach. In this essay I attempt to compare two different methods of analyzing works of art: the documentary method of the sociologist Karl Mannheim and the phenomenological approach of Alfred Schutz. These two sociological perspectives are, however, concerned with quite different issues. Both approaches not only take account of the subjective point of view regarding art, but also introduce the sociological dimension: While the method of documentary interpretation concentrates on the *Weltanschauung* of the subject, usually the artist, Schutz is especially interested in the way the subject becomes involved in the style immanent to art when entering its realm. As we will see, while both Mannheim and Schutz employ the concept of style, the actual meaning of their

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concepts of style is so different that comparing them may at first seem like a futile undertaking. I will nevertheless argue that contrasting Mannheim's and Schutz's sociological approaches, emphasizing their unique features, offers a good strategy to map the fundamental differences between them. I will first present the method of documentary interpretation, and then compare it with the phenomenological method of Alfred Schutz.

1 The Documentary Method of Analyzing Works of Art

The method of documentary interpretation was developed by the sociologist Karl Mannheim and has been applied in both sociology (Barboza 2005, Bohnsack 1991, 2009a, b) and in art history (Panofsky 1957). This method looks for a synthesis of methodological approaches. But the synthesis is not limited to just two approaches: phenomenology and sociology, as with Schutz. Documentary interpretation has the ambition to integrate a third perspective as well: the methodological perspective of the art historian. Documentary interpretation therefore aims to bring together three different perspectives of analyzing a work of art: The perspective of art history, the perspective of phenomenology, and the perspective of sociology. To put it in another way: style analysis of the work of art, analysis of the artist's intention, and analysis of the social and historical context. This synthesis must not be produced in a cumulative manner, for example by applying the three methods separately and then assembling the different investigations of the same phenomenon as different parts. Quite the opposite, the aim is a deeper understanding beyond those three approaches: the "documentary meaning," (Mannheim) or the "iconological meaning," (Erwin Panofsky) as it has become known in the history of art. This method, as we shall see, attempts to analyze a work of art in the manner of the art historian, not restricting itself to a formal description of a work, but also aiming to capture the deeper meaning, the *Weltanschauung* (world view) of the artist expressed in the work of art.

2 The Three Levels of Meaning of Works of Art

In "On the Interpretation of '*Weltanschauung*'" (Mannheim 1952 [1921–1922]. Karl Mannheim distinguishes between three interpretative levels: the objective meaning, the expressive meaning, and the documentary meaning.

1. The *objective meaning* is the interpretation typically provided by art historians. Comprehension of the objective meaning of a work of art requires familiarity with the "visual universe" (*visuelles* "System") (Mannheim 1952, p. 51) in which the work was created. This means to move immanently, within this system. In certain epochs, for example, representations of space cannot be represented by way of perspective, but only by respecting the rules of a hierarchical order. To

grasp the objective meaning of a work of art requires that the art historian knows in which "visual universe" the work was created. This involves visual analysis of a work of art, in which both its theme and its style are reconstructed.

2. The objective meaning can be expanded by a second level of meaning, the e*xpressive meaning*, if we see the "visual universe" as a carrier of an intentional meaning and of ideas and feelings the artist presumably wants to reveal. What Mannheim calls the "historical structure of consciousness" (Mannheim 1952, p. 55) makes possible the comprehension of this expressive meaning: Mannheim presupposes that there is a homology between the culture of the artist to be interpreted and the interpreter's culture that permits understanding the artist's mental and spiritual environment. If there were no such shared structure of consciousness, the scientist would have to be instructed by historical documents about the artist's mental and spiritual environment, in order to understand her intentions. We have here an interpretation that is of primary interest to phenomenology: the subjective point of view of the artist.

3. *Documentary meaning*: the interpretation of a cultural phenomenon does not conclude with the disclosure of the objective meaning and the intentions of the artist, but continues onto a third level. It is possible to reveal the fundamental principles of approaching reality in a work of art, so that the work becomes understandable as a document of a certain *Weltanschauung*. This deeper hidden meaning is called "documentary meaning" by Mannheim. The third level of meaning evolves when the objective meaning is not merely understood as an intended expression of an individual, but as documenting the *Weltanschauung* of the artist. With this third level of interpretation Mannheim aims for a sociological interpretation that transcends the objective and subjective meanings, in order to emphasize the sociological element that is documented.

The third level of interpretation is not just a matter of plain reference to the historical and social context of art. This context is included in the documentary interpretation because the third level of meaning includes as many documents of the time, the generation, or the artist's environment as possible. In all these materials that which is most characteristic is documented and can thereby be grasped. The more materials one possesses, the easier it will be to understand the artist's *Weltanschauung*: her fundamental attitude.

3 The Sociological Interpretation of Works of Art

Documentary interpretation has provoked a number of methodological debates. For instance, some authors have argued that it remains unclear what documentary meaning exactly is. Max Horkheimer and other representatives of Critical Theory (Lenk 1961; Neusüss 1968) have suspected a metaphysical entity behind this *Weltanschauung* (Horkheimer 1993 [1930]). From this point of view, Mannheim is charged with searching for metaphysical entities. Other authors, for example the art historian Ernst Gombrich, have interpreted the documentary meaning

psychologically, not as an explicit intention of an artist, an individual, but as explicit intention of a group of individuals, a group subject (Gombrich 1991). In Gombrich's view, Mannheim - like other cultural scientific interpreters of *Weltanschauung* such as Karl Lambrecht, Wilhelm Dilthey, or Alois Riegl- has psychologized the Hegelian *Geist* (Gombrich 1991, p. 64). According to Gombrich, these authors refer neither to the work of art itself nor to a spirit outside the work, but to a social psyche beyond the work.

Other critics, especially art historians, dismiss the method of documentary interpretation as mere sociology, concerned only with the historical and sociological background of the work of art, thereby neglecting the analysis of the actual work. These art historians, however, usually do not refer to Mannheim directly, but to the art historian Erwin Panofsky, who was influenced by him (Panofsky 1957). Here we are dealing with an indirect comment on Mannheim's method. As already mentioned, when Mannheim's paper on documentary interpretation was published, it did not attract the attention of many sociologists, but was instead embraced by art historians. It was the art historian Panofsky who introduced Mannheim's documentary interpretation to other art historians. Panofsky refers explicitly already in the 1930s to Mannheim's theory of interpretation when developing his famous method of "iconology."[1] Like Mannheim, Panofsky distinguishes between three spheres of interpretation: the pre-iconographical, the iconographical, and the iconological. The latter, iconology, corresponds to the interpretation of *Weltanschauung*, i.e., Mannheim's documentary interpretation.

Numerous critics of Panofsky's method have pointed out that iconology derives from a method developed by a sociologist, a method that does not analyze the work of art itself. Oskar Bätschmann (1985), for example, charges that Panofsky uses a genetic method that *explains* art by way of a *Weltanschauung* situated *outside* the work of art. Hence iconology cannot provide interpretations, but only explanations. The art historian Otto Pächt also criticizes iconology as a way of "unmasking occult things" *outside* the realm of works of art. He equates iconological interpretation with an "unacceptable disregard of the style aspect" and with an unwarranted engagement with matters peripheral to art (Pächt 1994, p. 356). For Pächt the analysis of style is in conflict with documentary interpretation.

4 The Documentary *Weltanschauung* as Interpreter´s Construction

Documentary meaning, this documenting *Weltanschauung*, is not so easy to understand. What exactly is this *Weltanschauung* that is to be comprehended by documentary interpretation? A metaphysical entity, as Horkheimer (1993 [1930])

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[1]It should be pointed out that Mannheim's theory influenced sociology only indirectly, through its reception by Panofsky. Bourdieu first adapted his notion of habitus from Panofsky's *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* (Panofsky 1976 [1951]), in his book *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Bourdieu 1984 [1979]).

and Critical Theory (Lenk 1961; Neusüss 1968) imply; or an intended group experience, as Gombrich (1991) argues; or something that proceeds behind the works, for example the social and economic conditions of their production, as the art historian Bätschmann (1985) or Pächt (1994) understand them?

The documentary *Weltanschauung,* I think, should be understood as originating from the interpreter's perspective. When an interpreter speaks, for example, about a "modern *Weltanschauung*," the reference is not to the spirit of modernity in some real sense, as a totality existing somewhere, but instead to particular stylistic characteristics that are seen as typical for modern culture (Mannheim 1952, p. 56). "Modern *Weltanschauung"* does not refer to a really existing collective subject, but to a *constructed subject*. We employ this interpretative method everyday, for example when attempting to show somebody that certain of his expressions or acts display a typically conservative attitude, although he has never thought of himself in that way. By using this interpretation, we "produce" a hermeneutic totality that allows us to comprehend the essential meaning of those acts. *Weltanschauung* is therefore a heuristic entity produced by the interpreter in order to name a characteristic attitude documenting itself in art, as well as in other related phenomena.

Art historians proceed in the same way when, because of certain stylistic features, for example they classify a work of art as "impressionist." They refer thereby neither to a particular state of mind of the artist nor to an existing totality in the sense of a substantialized spirit, but they employ a heuristic category in order to capture the essential characteristics of a work of art. The interpreter wants to come up with a precise interpretation and is convinced that the researched human group indeed lived according to the *Weltanschauung* described. But the resulting interpretation might not be infallible. It could well be that the behavior of a particular person is interpreted as a sign of a conservative *Weltanschauung*, but that this interpretation is in fact the result of misunderstandings by the interpreter. That is why documentary interpretation must be constantly verified anew. Taking additional documents into consideration can contribute to a better understanding of the *Weltanschauung* of a particular person, and an interpreter's interpretative skills are frequently subject to change. In a later stage of life an interpreter might, for example, have access to understanding a particular *Weltanschauung* inaccessible to him until then; or different circumstances might permit the interpreter to see a *Weltanschauung* from a different point of view and grasp it in a new way. Mannheim calls such interpretations that depend on the existential standpoint of an interpreter "conjunctive knowledge." (Mannheim 1982) This peculiarity should not be seen as a difficulty or as a problem, but rather as a particularity of all interpretative or qualitative methods.

5   *Weltanschauung* as Style

In order to understand the documentary method, it is also important to emphasize that it must be understood as an analysis of style (Barboza 2005). My intention here is to refute the claim of Bätschmann and Pächt, that documentary interpretation is

incompatible with an analysis of style. There is a profound difference between the merely formal analysis of style of the art historian and a sociological style-analysis aiming at establishing a documentary meaning. The documentary method performs a purely aesthetic analysis of style, in order to understand the formal characteristics of a work of art as document of a particular *Weltanschauung*. The documentary interpretation of style, in other words, is a methodological approach that focuses and builds on an analysis of style. It is more than a straightforward formal analysis, but emphasizes the sociological significance of formal differences.

To understand the sociological concept of style, it is also important to see it as a synthesizing category that refers to the documentary meaning of a work of art as well as to other cultural phenomena. That is why, after having grasped the underlying *Weltanschauung* in a cultural phenomenon such as a work of art, for example, the interpreter should take into consideration other cultural phenomena of the same period or of same social group. The aim is to uncover other cultural phenomena that document the same *Weltanschauung*. In this way the researcher may be able to trace the *Weltanschauung* of artists in their works as well as in their everyday lives and even in their religious beliefs.

The concept of *Weltanschauung* is a synthesizing category that refers to the documentary meaning of different cultural phenomena. With the concept of *Weltanschauung* and the concept of style, sociology has at its disposal synthesizing categories that trace different phenomena from various areas of life (religion, politics, art, economy, etc.) to a common denominator, insofar as the sociologist can detect the same stylistic features across these differences.

6   The Concept of Style of Alfred Schutz

Alfred Schutz too employs the concept of style.[2] Unlike in the documentary method, his concept of style is not used to describe the characteristics of a *Weltanschauung* in all areas of life. Rather, Schutz's notion of style refers to the characteristics of a particular area of reality or *Sinnprovinz* (province of meaning).

According to Schutz's theory of *Lebenswelt* (life-world), multiple realities consist of different "finite provinces of meaning." (Schutz 1962a, pp. 230ff, 340ff.) Schutz provides different examples for those provinces of meaning: the world of daily life, the world of art, the world of play, and the world of science. People

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[2]In "On multiple realities," Schutz refers to "style of existence." (Schutz 1962a, pp. 207, 229) Schutz's theory is based on William James' "Principles of Psychology." While James describes the spheres of reality as "sub-universes," Schutz prefers "provinces of meaning." Schutz thereby wants to underline that the issue is not an ontological structure of objects, as "sub-universe" seems to indicate, but rather the meaning of our experience of what constitutes reality. In this way it is made clear that we deal here with constructions of meaning and not with real facts (Schutz 1962a, p. 230).

move in their lives between these provinces of meaning. They mostly spend their time in the world of daily life, but they occasionally leave this sphere to enter other provinces of meaning. This is the case when they go to sleep and switch from the reality of everyday life to the reality of dreams, when they go to church to attend a mass and shift into the province of meaning of religion, or when they go to the theatre and the curtain falls and the world of dramatic art opens. For Schutz all those provinces of meaning involve different styles of existence (Schutz 1962a, p. 207), and people constantly jump from one province of meaning to another. In transiting from one province of meaning to another, they change the logic of their actions and thinking. The world of action and the world of "being awake" characterize the style of daily life, for example, and both belong to the standard time-consciousness that all people share with each other throughout their everyday lives.[3]

Other parameters apply to the world of art. That is why people, according to Schutz, experience a leap when they move from the world of daily life to the world of art. Such a leap occurs in the theatre with the opening of the curtains, or at an exhibition because the eye moves to an image that is separated from daily life through frames. The world of art transports us into a sphere where practical motives are no longer relevant. While we are engaged in admiring the work of art, no pragmatic motives play a role. This absence of any practical meaning characterizes the phenomenological structure of any aesthetic experience, according to Schutz. That is why people may forget all that moves them in their ordinary daily life and submerge themselves in aesthetic contemplation while being deeply involved in viewing a work of art.

Schutz sees the different provinces of meaning as distinct and closed areas that do not overlap. That is why we experience a leap or even a shock (Schutz 1962a, p. 231) when we move from one province of meaning to another.

Unlike Schutz, who builds his theory of multiple realities on a differentiation (*Ausdifferenzierung*) of the *Lebenswelt* (life-world) and uses the concept of style to describe the logic of each province of meaning, documentary interpretation tries to overcome this differentiation through the concept of style. Documentary interpretation wants to show that despite fundamental differences between the provinces of meaning (e.g., between religion, science, and art) there is a higher reality (the *Weltanschauung*, the style) that brings together all those provinces and moves them in a unified direction. For example, the perception and consumption of art differ when we consider art from the perspective of a highly qualified and well-paid art collector, who buys at important galleries, and from that of a farmer whose only pictures are probably family photos (Bourdieu 1996). Different *Weltanschauungen* are documented in different perceptions of art. Comparable

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[3]Schutz also mentions other stylistic features of the provinces of meaning of daily life: for example, "a specific tension of consciousness, namely wide-awakeness"; "a prevalent form of spontaneity, namely working (a meaningful spontaneity based upon a project . . .)"; "a specific form of experiencing one's self (the working self as the total self)"; "a specific form of sociality (the common intersubjective world of communication and of social action)"; and "a specific time-perspective (the standard time . . .)." (Schutz 1962a, p. 230f.)

dissimilarities exist also in other domains of their lives: in their religious beliefs, economic practice, daily life, etc.

According to documentary interpretation, it can be shown that different social groups experience and understand the provinces of meaning in different ways, depending on their *Weltanschauung*.[4] Schutz also considered this possibility of different social perceptions of the provinces of meaning. In "Symbol, Reality and Society" (Schutz 1962b, pp. 347–355) he remarks that the fundamental world of everyday life is not always understood in the same way by different people (Schutz 1962b, p. 347). While one's "own group" experiences the reality of daily life in a particular way, "other groups" may have quite different perceptions of daily life (Schutz 1962b, p. 355). Schutz refers to a number of possibilities of understanding social belonging: He speaks of social roles, gender, age, profession, and position and status (Schutz 1962b, pp. 350ff). Because of these social distinctions it could be, for example, that what a particular social group perceives as everyday life, belongs for another group to the area of religion or of art. In "Symbol, Reality and Society" we find only this one brief comment about the possibility of analyzing different social perceptions. In Schutz´s inquiry into "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality," (Schutz 1964, pp. 135–158) however, we can find a more detailed analysis of how two different persons belonging to different social groups can diverge in their perception of the provinces of meaning.

7 Don Quixote and Sancho Panza as Representatives of Provinces of Meaning

Schutz's analysis of "Don Quixote de la Mancha" concerns the problem why people perceive the same reality in different ways. The novel presents at least two ways of seeing the world. There is Don Quixote who sees the world in terms of his own *Weltanschauung*, his own sub-universe. And then there is Sancho Panza who perceives the world and the provinces of meaning that constitute it in a very different way. These different *Weltanschauungen* seem to be contained in one person and not to belong to different social groups. Though Schutz primarily

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[4]Along similar lines, Mannheim demonstrates in his sociology of knowledge inquiries that a competition between different styles is characteristic of modern society. He mainly analyses the competition between two important currents: between a conservative and a liberal style. And he shows how this competition takes place in different areas or provinces of meaning. In politics it is easier to locate the competition between the liberal and the conservative orientations. This competition also occurs, according to Mannheim, in science in the form of a competition between different scientific styles, and especially ideal-typically in the struggle between the natural sciences (as embodiment of a liberal way of thinking) and the human sciences (as embodiment of a conservative way of thinking). Instead of speaking of a style of science as Schutz does, Mannheim speaks of a plurality of scientific styles that can be traced back to social, economic, and cultural differences.

refers to single subjects, he also alludes that they may belong to different social groups: Don Quixote represents the knighthood, chivalry, while Sancho Panza is described by Schutz as "neo-positivistic empiricist" (Schutz 1964, p. 143) and as "the great methodologist." (Schutz 1964, p. 152) We are all "Sancho Panzas of the common-sense-world." (Schutz 1964, p. 150) The world of chivalry is described in Schutz´s short comment as a closed sub-universe, comparable to a *Weltanschauung* in the sense of the documentary method, the starting point for interpretations of *all* provinces of meaning. This sub-universe delivers a particular way of conducting life: The knight's divine mission in everyday life is to remedy and to mitigate affronts. The sub-universe of chivalry has its own scientific perception too. The knight can practice all sciences: He can be judge, theologian, physician, or meteorologist; he can master anything. He is armed with his own disposition towards the law and the economy. His thinking too, and his perception of space and time, follow their own logic: Worlds that are far apart can be moved closer together, time periods can be shortened or extended, and magic can bring disorder into regularities.

However, Schutz only assigns Don Quixote to a particular social or historical group in this particular instance. Don Quixote's sub-universe is almost always regarded by Schutz as a private sub-universe (Schutz 1964, p. 156). Don Quixote stands for those who do not perceive the world the way ordinary people do, thereby representing all outsiders. Schutz shows how this outsider takes different positions in the course of the story. The three expeditions of Don Quixote describe three different possibilities for the stranger to conduct himself in his relations with himself and with others. In the first expedition Don Quixote remains faithful to his sub-universe of the knighthood. He is "an undisturbed master in his sub-universe." (Schutz 1964, p. 141) In the second expedition he is forced to reveal his own world and he is compelled to harmonize it with the common-sense world of the others. It is mainly through Sancho Panza, who represents the world of common-sense, that Don Quixote is confronted with a different world perception and a different sub-universe, to which he must constantly react so that communication and understanding become possible. Schutz investigates the negotiations of the characters of the novel between their own sub-universe and that of the others in the different interpretations of the provinces of meaning and of everyday reality. Don Quixote's world of everyday life is for Sancho Panza a world of dreams or even madness. Some congruities become possible when, for example, Don Quixote realizes that what he has experienced as everyday life is perhaps not real after all, because it may have been the result of magic.

In the third expedition, Don Quixote no longer defends his own world and experiences a crisis: He becomes self-reflective and realizes that much of what he has believed is breaking apart, that it does not belong to the realm of reality, but instead to the realm of fantasy: "God pardon you my friends," says Don Quixote, "for you have robbed me of the sweetest existence and most delightful vision any human being ever enjoyed or beheld. Now, indeed, I positively know that the pleasures of this life pass like a shadow and a dream." (Schutz 1964, p. 156) Don Quixote now accepts that his sub-universe is a mere fantasy. Sociologically speaking, one might say that he discovers the reality of social construction or the

"ideological character" of reality. Schutz refers to Hegel's "unhappy consciousness" to describe Quixote's tragedy. What leads Don Quixote into crisis and eventual ruin is that he no longer believes in his own *Weltanschauung*.

But what is the referent of the different characters in the novel? Who are the ordinary people and who are the outsiders? Schutz's analysis makes evident that Schutz is not especially interested in locating these different characters in specific social groups. His real aim is to design a kind of grammar of the different possibilities of the coming together of the established and the outsiders. Moreover, Schutz remains faithful in his entire inquiry to his theory to the differentiated and closed provinces of meaning. That is why he is especially concerned with analyzing those parts of the novel where the characters leap from one province of meaning to another, from one style to another, and with how the different interpretations of the provinces of meaning are brought together by way of a discursive sub-universe. The sub-universes of Don Quixote and of Sancho Panza, furthermore, are regarded as representatives of the provinces of meaning: Sancho represent the world of everyday life and Don Quixote represents the world of phantasy. The passages where the social connectedness of these different sub-universes are discussed (Don Quixote as representative of chivalry and Sancho as representative of the common people), as already mentioned, occur as mere remarks in passing. But it is exactly here that a sociologist who works with the method of documentary meaning would begin his interpretative analysis.

8 Don Quixote and Sancho Panza as Representatives of Social Groups

For the method of documentary interpretation, the *Lebenswelt* (life-world) is not structured in terms of provinces of meaning, but as *Weltanschauungen* that depend on real social carriers and historical constellations. And those *Weltanschauungen* define how the provinces of meaning (of everyday life, art, religion, etc.) are perceived. The provinces of meaning are therefore not self-contained independent spheres, but different realms that depend on the *Weltanschauung* of a time or a social group. If Don Quixote and Sancho Panza are described as having two different *Weltanschauungen,* documentary interpretation would look for the real social actors and then show how these *Weltanschauungen* structure the whole *Lebenswelt* and all provinces of meaning from a particular point of view. There are a number of instances in sociology where the work of Cervantes is analyzed in a documentary way, inquiring about the different *Weltanschauungen* of the protagonists of the novel and of the social groups to which they belong.

In his sociology of literature, Georg Lukács (1994 [1920]) analyzes the work of Cervantes as a chronicle in which two historical epochs and *Weltanschauungen*, represented by the protagonists of the novel, are in competition with each other. Don Quixote represents an era and a social world, the one of chivalry, that has lost

its significance. An old world lies in ruins, but instead the arising of a new stable order, fall and decline become prevalent as a result of the rise of the bourgeoisie. The main protagonist of the novel is, for Lukács, someone in search of a new world while still longing for the old order. In a similar way, Leo Lowenthal analyzes the work of Cervantes in "Literature and the Image of Man." (1986)[5] Lowenthal understands the analysis of Cervantes in his book as a diagnosis of the historical and social transformations of his time. The novel depicts the rise of the bourgeoisie, the decline of aristocratic society, and the hope of some citizens, Don Quixote's as it were, for a new and better world. For Lowenthal Quixote is a figure who represents neither the past nor the present but a hoped-for future. The speech of the knight is understood as a "typical document of the intellectual of the Renaissance." His beliefs and ideals motivate Don Quixote to fight against the peasants and the emerging bourgeoisie whose lives are merely governed by common sense and by self-interest: "Merchants, minor functionaries in the government, unimportant intellectuals – in short, they are, like Sancho, people who want to get ahead in the world and, therefore, direct their energies to the things which will bring them profit." (Lowenthal 1986, p. 28)

In these two examples from the sociology of literature, the work of Cervantes is interpreted as a document of a time in which the intellectuals struggle against the petit bourgeoisie in an attempt to make their ideal world of books prevail against the everyday life of pragmatism. Cervantes is regarded as a chronicler and researcher of his time, as someone who analyzes the conflict between the intellectuals and the citizens in a fragmented society undergoing change. In our own world, art, economy, science, as well as the provinces of meaning also are perpetually changing, but they are perceived by competing social groups in different ways. While the ordinary citizen, for example, merely expects to be entertained by a theatre performance, Don Quixote sees art as potentially capable of changing life, as having emancipatory potential. In Cervantes' book there is a scene where during a puppet show Don Quixote fights with the puppets. This scene well captures Don Quixote's implicit attitude to art as an instrument for awakening people from their lethargy and as a call for justice.

The two main characters in Cervantes' novel could be also analyzed from the perspective of the documentary method, without reference to the concrete historical constellation of sixteenth century society that provides the novel's setting. Don Quixote and Sancho could be understood as representatives of our own modern society. This is what Pierre Bourdieu attempts to do in his important analysis of French consumer culture, in *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of*

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[5]It should be pointed out, however, that there are major methodological differences between the documentary interpretation of Karl Mannheim and the approach that was used by Lukács and Lowenthal in their sociologies of literature. Both are committed to a Marxist critical approach. According to such a methodological approach, the social scientist should not only analyze different *Weltanschauungen* in art, but at the same time show which of those *Weltanschauungen* allow a realistic representation of reality and which are based on false consciousness. On the argument between Critical Theory and the approach of Karl Mannheim in his sociology of knowledge see: Barboza 2009.

Taste (1987). Here Bourdieu shows that the perception of what is accepted as art is different in different social strata. Already in his work on photography as illegitimate art, written before *Distinction*, Bourdieu had discovered that the understanding and the use of photography as art differs greatly in the social classes (Bourdieu 1996). While the middle class conceives photography as autonomous and as not serving any particular purpose, for the lower classes and for farmers photography has a clear purpose: to portray the family and the family environment. The lower classes see art not as an autonomous realm without clear purpose, but instead as something that is tightly integrated into their living arrangements.

In *Distinction,* Bourdieu extends his inquiry into consumption to the most diverse arts and cultural heritages. But his main thesis remains unchanged. As an illustration of his work, Bourdieu uses the well-known figures of Cervantes' novel (Bourdieu 1982, p. 24).[6] Sancho and the peasants are described as representative of the lower class and Don Quixote as a representative of the intellectuals. Bourdieu refers to the episode where Don Quixote struggles with and destroys the puppets at a puppet theatre performance, as if the puppets were real. He sees this episode as a paradigmatic example of the controversial attitude of the people and the intellectuals towards fiction. He wants to show how such conflicting attitudes are manifest not only in the consumption of a work of theatre, but also in the consumption of other cultural goods. Popular taste takes interest in the pragmatic: The plates are filled with nourishing and inexpensive food. This contrasts with upper class taste, its reluctance to devour food unceremoniously and to eat until feeling full, and its greater concern with manners and with proper behavior at table (Bourdieu 1982, p. 26).

Aesthetics, in other words, is not understood as a closed province of meaning, but as a sphere that is perceived differently by different social groups. This also applies to the other provinces of meaning.

9   Conclusion

The fundamental difference between the documentary and Schutz's phenomenological method of analysis of art is that Schutz regards art as a closed province of meaning, and as an autonomous sphere, while for Mannheim art is a document of the time. And as a document of the time, art cannot be autonomous; it is in various ways linked to all other spheres. It may also be read as manifestation of a *Weltanschauung*.

Both methods aim at reading works of art in a sociological manner. While the documentary method overcomes the merely subjective point by reference to the *Weltanschauung* of the subjects, Schutz goes beyond the subjective perspective by pointing to the provinces of meaning as all-encompassing realities.

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[6]This reference to Don Quixote is not present in the "Preface to the English-Language Edition" of *Distinction*. In the English Edition I find only one reference to Don Quixote: Bourdieu 1984, p. 109.

The documentary method analyzes works of art to highlight the particular styles that can also be detected in other spheres. Schutz's phenomenological perspective views art as a closed system, as a province of meaning with its own particular style. Although the concept of style is employed in both approaches, the same term refers to different realities. Schutz's concept refers to provinces of meaning; the documentary method refers to *Weltanschauung*.

In regard to the work of Cervantes, we have seen that neither Schutz nor Lukács or Lowenthal analyze it directly. In order to analyze the work in a sociological manner, according to the method of documentary interpretation, the first step must be a content analysis and a formal style analysis, unlike the tendency of the art historian or the literary critic to remain satisfied with a straightforward style analysis, and to interpret the style too as documenting the *Weltanschauung* of a particular time and social group. Alfred Schutz could also have analyzed Cervantes´ book as a work of art to find out how readers experience this world of fantasy as soon as they open the book.

As we have seen, Schutz, Lukács, and Lowenthal do not offer an interpretation of Don Quixote as literature, instead, they use the novel to illustrate their own methodological approaches: as a way to investigate the competition between different *Weltanschauungen* (Lukács and Lowenthal) or to explain the concept of the provinces of meaning (Schutz). Schutz uses Cervantes' novel to exemplify his own idea of finite provinces of meaning and how the novel's figures move from one province of meaning to another. The documentary method uses the work of Cervantes in a different way: as a treatise on the competition between two *Weltanschauungen* on the sovereignty of interpretation (*Deutungshoheit*) regarding the reality of the world and its provinces of meaning. These two *Weltanschauungen* are so different that what is routine for one social group belongs to the world of phantasy for the other. The combat over interpretative predominance comes to a conclusion at the end of the novel, when Don Quixote, as the last representative of his class, is no longer able to defend his position, not even to himself. And what was all along phantasy in the eyes of others, now becomes phantasy also for him.

From the point of view of both sociological approaches presented here, there are different possible readings of the work of Cervantes. The most exciting moment is surely when both approaches begin to complement each other.

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Literature as Societal Therapy: Appresentation, *Epoché*, and *Beloved*

Michael Barber

1 Introduction

Wolfgang Iser's theory of aesthetic response (*Wirkungstheorie*), related to but distinct from the more literary-historically ordered reception theory of aesthetics (*Rezeptionstheorie*), represents a significant phenomenological contribution to broader discussions of the relationship of philosophy to literature (Iser 1980). While agreeing with much of Iser's views on the act of reading of novels, in particular, I will argue that a greater appreciation for the literary *epoché* and for a systematic understanding of the role of transcendencies and appresentation in novel-reading would enrich Iser's own approach. Such appreciation would show the continuity and discontinuity between the novel's appresentational levels and make clearer its event-like character and its distinctive cognitive nature. On the basis of this discussion of appresentation, which will be exemplified by *Beloved*, a novel about slavery in the pre-bellum United States by Nobel-prize winning author Toni Morrison, I will extend Iser's theory by arguing that one possible function for literature might be to effect societal therapy, as *Beloved* exemplifies.

2 Iser's *Wirkungstheorie*

Distinguishing himself from Roman Ingarden, who undertook the different phenomenological task of examining the text as an intentional object constituted of quasi-judgments in contrast with everyday reality, Iser, like Schutz, emphasizes that the text pertains more to the sphere of intersubjective communication insofar as it

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brings about an effect that is not to be measured against a search for truth. The text produces an experience, rather than offers an explanation; provides instructions for the production of what is signified rather than denoting an object; and instead of simply deviating from the norm of everyday life, it deviates "into sense" (Iser 1980, p. 90). Locating the author at the artistic pole and the reader at the aesthetic pole, Iser, in good phenomenological style, correlates object and subject, text-structures and reader's acts, and envisions texts as mobilizing readers' uptake and providing an array of signifiers to be received by readers, with the result that the literary work must be taken for the product of the interaction between text and reader. The text by reason of its indeterminacy allows for a variety of reader actualizations, which, nevertheless, are constrained by undeniable features of the text. Though segments of the text often release the reader's passive synthesizing activity,[1] Iser develops an active, creative role for the reader whose "wandering viewpoint" becomes entangled in the text, selectively noticing details, supplying lacks, ideating meanings, altering its views as it critically progresses from one character's perspective and event to another, and assembling a systematized aesthetic object. In his view we are so "caught up in the very thing we are producing" (Iser 1980, p. 127) that it is as if we are living another life as we read (Iser 1980).[2]

Fiction requires greater activity than is necessary in everyday life insofar as the reader must bring into existence what is already given in life, and Iser examines those features that support such activity, in particular, blanks (*Leerstelle*), which spur the reader's imagination. Blanks function when the empty horizons attract thematization, when never-anticipated supervening segments cast a new light upon previous segments, and when the broken threads of the plot or the entrance of a different narrator compel a reader to seek seemingly missing connections and heighten the liveliness of one's reading. Likewise, what is merely said draws the reader's attention beyond what is inarticulately meant, just as what is revealed points toward that which is concealed, as what is explicit refers the reader to what is implicit. The interconnections the reader develops pertain to a polysynthetic sequence in which the meaning of the whole text, the aesthetic object, emerges, and the intention of the novel itself is fulfilled, as is exemplified in the case of Tom Jones, the example used by Iser, in which the reader is to "acquire a sense of discernment" (Iser 1980, p. 187) based on the ability to abstract from his or her attitudes and to grasp an "intended picture of human nature" (Iser 1980, p. 199). Finally, Iser resists the view that texts end up being reflections of a reader's self; on the contrary, the difference between the text and the reader plays a critical, instructive role insofar as the text focuses on the excluded possibilities and fringes

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[1]See, Wolfgang Iser, *Der Akt des Lesens*, p. 168; the German is clear on these synthesizings.

[2]Each text, Iser observes, constitutes its reader (Iser 1980, p. 157). Though Ingarden's idea of "concretization" brought in the importance of the reader, the reader's role was a matter of "undynamic completion," filling in in imagination for example the color of a character's hair (Iser 1980, p. 178). Regarding Schutz's locating of literature within a communicative setting see Alfred Schutz (1982), "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms."

of the cultural system (if reader and author belong to the same system). If the author and reader are not contemporaneous, it is still the case that the differences between the text and the reader's cultural system are important since the text violates the norms of that cultural system, defamiliarizing what may be familiar to the reader, making visible the conditionality of her world, and promoting self-awareness (Iser 1980).

3 The Literary *Epoché* and the Life-World of the Novel

Several of the features Iser discovers in the act or reading, such as not measuring the activity against a search for truth, living another life in reading, and being caught up in what we produce, indicate that a kind of literary *epoché* has been enacted, which, according to Schutz, involves entering another reality-sphere via a *Sprung* (leap), and in this reality-sphere, another logic, other norms, govern. Hence, he observes, "There is a logic of the poetic happening (*Geschehens*) which runs against (*zuwiderlauft*) that of everyday life as well as that of rational thinking" (Schutz 1948, pp. 935–936). One need not conceive that this *epoché* is to be enacted as formally or rigorously as the phenomenological *epoché* is supposed to be, for instance, but it can simply involve the change in attitude one undertakes in opening the novel and commencing to read. This is especially so since in reading, one will be drawing on everyday life[3] rather than prescinding from its presuppositions to build up the "world" of experience that the novel guides one in forming, just as one makes use of elements of one's everyday experiences in dreaming, for instance, which commences with the informal "*epoché*" of falling asleep (Schutz 1962a).

The analogous use of the method of *epoché* for reading is helpful insofar as one both to a degree turns away from everyday life and turns toward a new reality-sphere, or, as Iser puts, it "deviates into sense." The "turning away" from everyday life becomes evident insofar as one is aware at some level of horizonal consciousness that the characters, actions, and events of the novel contrast with those of everyday life insofar as they possess only the "quasi-being" that results from having undertaken what Husserl has dubbed a neutrality-modification, whose contents are taken as neither existing nor not existing (Schutz 1962a; Husserl 1980). Of course, as with the phenomenological *epoché*, one's turning away from everyday life permits entrance into a new reality-sphere which becomes the center of one's focus and engagement, as if living another life. Within the reality-sphere of novel-reading, the "quasi-being," the existential status of the characters and

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[3]One perhaps ought to speak of the "world of working" rather than everyday life since literature, like dreaming and theorizing, is an activity within the world of everyday life, as Schutz's essay "On Multiple Realities" shows, however since Schutz in the just cited Goethe manuscript seems to equate everyday life with what should be the world of working, we will use the two terms interchangeably.

action, becomes irrelevant, however relevant such a consideration might still be to an inhabitant of the world of working, or to one inhabiting the theoretical reality-sphere, as Husserl does. If one fails to be aware of the *epoché* one has executed in opening a novel, one risks misunderstanding literature's cognitive nature, as we shall see below, and judging one reality-sphere by the standards of another as did Bertrand Russell when he notoriously claimed that the propositions in *Hamlet* were false because there was no such man. In addition, adopting the literary *epoché* supports the capacity of literature, with its differing normative standards, to place in question the norms of the reader's culture, since such questioning takes place not only at the novel's climax, but also from the very opening of the book, when one enters a reality-sphere distant from the world of working and opens oneself to the possible experience of being governed by different norms. Further, the literary *epoché* can dispose a reader for a therapeutic discovery of societal trauma that a novel might realize and that submersion in the pragmatic norms governing everyday culture hides and even denies (Russell 1962, p. 277; Gibson 2007).[4]

Readers through their imagination, shaped by the instructions of the author's textual schemata, build up a situation constituted by an interconnected set of images, what Iser calls a "parallel frame" to the system of everyday life, within which meaningful patterns form. This activity, which despite its representative function does not represent any empirical reality, constructs and enters into an imaginative life-world populated by characters acting through time in relationship to their physical world and each other. Paul Ricoeur recognized that reading consists in the creation of a fictive life-world when he claimed that a text is a "*proposed world which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of my ownmost possibilities*" (Ricoeur 1981, p. 142). Similarly, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, insofar as he scatters throughout *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* novellae that serve as literary reflections on the main action of the novel, begins to assimilate that main action to a kind of life-world, parallel to the reader's life-world, in relation to which the entire novel serves as a literary reflection (Iser 1980; Harrison 2007).[5]

4 Transcendencies and Appresentation in the Novel

The *Leerstelle* that Iser takes to spur the readers' imagination and to draw their attention can be understood as various kinds of transcendencies that are appresented by signs and symbols constituting the life-world of the text. Just as in perception, the front side of an object appresents a horizon of experiences that can be

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[4]John Gibson, in his book *Fiction and the Weave of Life*, argues that reading the novel is not a matter of making-believe that the sentences of the novel *are true*, rather, "we push aside the relevance of truth and belief when we appreciate literary content," see Gibson 2007, p. 169.

[5]On life-world nature of novel, see Bernard Harrison, "Aharon Appelfeld and the Problem of Holocaust Fiction."

fulfilling or confirming or not, so signs and symbols appresent transcendencies, and, like perception, the appresenting element brings what it appresents within reach, thereby, to a degree, "overcoming" the transcendency (Schutz and Luckmann 1989).

The various types of transcendencies and their correlative signs and symbols operate in important, interconnected ways, of which the mere term *Leerstelle* does not take adequate account. At a most basic level, in the everyday-life experience of passive syntheses of association, an appresenting member, such as something perceived or recolled or a fantasm or fictum, "wakens" or "calls" forth an appresented element, without the control of the ego.[6] Hence in *Beloved*, the sign-simile "chokecherry tree," which Sethe uses to describe the scars on her back, evokes Paul D's memory of, and thereby appresents, his favorite tree pertaining to the former, temporally distant, happier times at Sweet Home, where he and Sethe were slaves (Morrison 1987). Though perceived trees remind us of remembered trees in everyday life, in this case it is the signs Morrison has arranged that end up appresenting Paul's remembered favorite tree – an experience that is given in the life-world being produced within the novel through the reader's activity and that exemplifies how appresentation overcomes what Schutz and Luckmann call the "little transcendencies" of space and time (Schutz and Luckmann 1989, p. 106).

Of course, appresentation is not only a matter of passive synthesis since signs themselves also function in more deliberate ways to depict significantly something else of which one can have fulfilling or confirming experiences. Hence when Sethe describes the scars on her back as a chokecherry tree, thereby appresenting them, Paul, two pages later unlooses her dress and see them, overcoming the little transcendency of space that signitive intending presupposes. That signitive intending itself brings what it aims at within reach, but does not overcome the spatial transcendency to the same degree as Paul's fulfilling experience of going and seeing what it appresented. Of course, since Paul's "fulfilling" experience of seeing Sethe's back is itself appresented by Morrison's signs, the reader is getting Paul's experience "second hand," as it were, making it possible for the reader to conjure up images that might covey the horror of seeing the scars even more than the actual seeing of them. This example also discloses the iterative character of signs insofar Morrison's written letters appresent the sign that Sethe uses to appresent her scars and that also appresents through a memorative passive synthesis Paul's favorite tree (Morrison 1987).

Of course, not every overcoming of the little transcendencies of space and time is so simple. For example, Sethe, disgusted with her husband Halle, who was exemplary in every aspect except that he never showed up the day when she and her children were covertly fleeing Sweet Home, takes his absence as a sign of betrayal.

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[6]Of Sethe, in *Beloved*, it is said, "As for the rest, she worked hard to remember as close to nothing as was safe. Unfortunately her brain was devious," and various painful memories returned. See Toni Morrison 1987, p. 6.

Paul, though, informs her that he saw her husband after her flight sitting by the churn at Sweet Home with butter smeared all over his face. Paul speculates that he had been in the loft of the barn when the slaves' foreman's nephews had sucked the milk from pregnant Sethe's breasts on the barn floor and that, having seen the affair, he lost his mind. Sethe's mistaken interpretation is based on evidence available to her from her past spatio-temporal perspective, but since she had left Sweet Home she could neither have seen her deranged husband by the butter churn, nor from her angle on the barn floor, could she have seen her husband in the loft. Paul's signs appresent a past experience to which he had spatial access, which in turn makes plausible the hypothetical locating of Halle in the loft, thereby overcoming the transcendencies of space and time on the horizon of Sethe's past experience and "exploding" her mistaken belief, based on her limited perspective, that her husband had deliberately abandoned her. Sometimes signs, deployed by one party to a conversation, appresent and clarify spatio-temporally distant events that pertain to the vague and empty horizon appresented within another party's limited spatio-temporal perspective in such a way that the historical reconstruction of what actually happened depends upon intersubjective constitution (Morrison 1987).

Of course, this structure of appresentation of distant spatio-temporal objects or events draws the reader into the action of the novel in the way that the perceived object invites one to wonder about its concealed aspects. Further, what one sign appresents ends up appresenting something else, hence the reference to the chokecherry tree appresents Paul's favorite tree at Sweet Home, and the tree and the nebulous mention of Sweet Home appresent a vague horizon of the events and characters to be found there that the reader believes will explain the present from which they are remembered and that heighten the reader's increasing involvement in the reading, as Iser claimed that the *Leerstelle* do. Likewise Morrison's sign appresents Sethe's sign of the chokecherry tree that appresents the scars on Sethe's back that Paul sees, and those scars themselves appresent a whole sad story, a whole horizon, about which the reader now wishes to know. There may not be a closure, though, to a series of appresentations, and hence Paul's discovery of Halle by the churn appresents the hypothesis that he had seen from the barn loft his wife brutalized and lost his mind, but the tentativeness of the hypothesis appresents a horizon in which future information might undermine it.

Indeed, the fragmentation and rupture of spatio-temporal continuities that absorb the reader's interest but that at times can at best be only hypothetically reassembled gives the reader a taste of the experience of slavery itself. The fact that slaves ran off or were rented out, loaned out, bought up, won, stolen, or seized, prompts Sethe's mother to reflect poignantly on the seven children she had lost:

> Seven times she had done that: held a little foot; examined the fat fingertips with her own—fingers she never saw become the male or female hands a mother would recognize anywhere. She didn't know to this day what their permanent teeth looked like; or how they held their heads when they walked. Did Patty lose her lisp? What color did Famous' skin finally take? Was that a cleft in Johnny's chin or just a dimple that would disappear soon's his jawbone changed . . . All seven were gone or dead (Morrison 1987, p. 139).

Slave children appresented future horizons whose details were frequently never filled in (Morrison 1987).[7]

But if appresented, little transcendences intensify the reader's immersion in the text, the medium trancendencies do so all the more insofar as they present a boundary than can never be completely crossed, though one can "recognized the landscape on the other side in clear outlines" (Schutz and Luckmann, p. 110)[8]: the experience of other persons, which can never be directly experienced unlike the directly experienceable little transcendencies (Schutz and Luckmann 1989). These medium transcendencies are overcome only partially through signs that must be interpreted through interpretational schemes determined by the biographical situation and systems of relevances of the different interlocutors (Schutz 1962b). There remains, Schutz insists, "an inaccessible zone of the Other's private life which transcends my possible experience" (Schutz 1962b, p. 326).

These transcendencies are manifest from the start in *Beloved*, where, for instance, one finds Sethe making unclear references to the death of her much loved, 2-year-old baby and the child's tombstone and "ghost" (all of which appresent extensive horizons to be filled in) but, then, upon meeting Paul whom she hasn't seen in 18 years, when the topic turns to her family, she changes the subject. Similarly Paul promises that he would tell her anything he knew about her husband, but then, the reader becomes privy to his inner thoughts when the narrator intervenes, informing us, "Except for the churn, he thought, and you don't need to know that" (Morrison 1987, p. 8). Though the narrator enables the reader to overcome the transcendence of the characters' private lives in a way that the characters cannot do in relationship to each other, nevertheless that access yields often only vague appresentations with the consequence that the reader is in much the position of the other characters in relationship to the character whose thoughts are revealed, that is, both reader and other characters depend on the willingness of one character to communicate what he or she is thinking. Moreover, the contrast between what a character says and what he or she is thinking, which makes use of silences and even lies, appresents a content to which the reader has access through the narrator, but a content that in turn appresents horizons that entice the reader's interest. An interhuman drama, as engaging if not more so than the effort to overcome the little transcendencies, develops, in which the reader presses forward to find out (sometimes from the narrator) what secrets the other is concealing or when a character will reveal his or her inner private life to the reader or to other characters.[9]

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[7]See pages 23, 52, 142, 147. On this last page, Sethe's mother concludes that searching for missing loved ones was fruitless since "'you couldn't write to a man named Dunn' if all you knew was that he went West."

[8]Schutz and Luckmann rightly observe that there is a social dimension involved in the little transcendencies, as I have shown, and that this forms a transition to the medium transcendencies, and I am here showing that transition, too.

[9]This interest is aroused particularly when characters speak pull back from self-revelation, when, for instance, Sethe in a conversation with her daughter Denver reaches "the point beyond which she would not go," or when Denver (Morrison 1987, p. 37) finds herself unable to ask her mother

This transcendency between interlocutors that signs to a degree overcome is exacerbated in *Beloved* by the fact that the secrets not communicated have to do with the trauma and cruelty of slavery. The narrator informs us, for instance, that Paul put his memories of the brutalization of people he loved in "the tobacco tin lodged in his chest" (Morrison 1987, p. 113) and by the time he arrives at Sethe's "nothing in the world could pry it open" (Morrison 1987, p. 113). Similarly, the narrator asserts that for Sethe "every mention of her past life hurt. Everything in it was painful or lost" (Morrison 1987, p. 58). Overcoming the transcendency of the other when the other conceals the suffering of trauma requires a slow building of trust, spoken words inviting revelation, receptive facial expressions, even a caress – all of which Morrison presents so delicately and all of which begin to resemble the kinds of signals a psychotherapist might give to a client to promote the disclosure of trauma undergone and repressed (Morrison 1987). The conclusion of the book shows Paul and Sethe achieving a degree of mutual understanding since Paul "wants to put his story next to hers" (Morrison 1987, p. 273), something that has already happened insofar as the final two chapters carrying the main action of the novel (Chaps. 18 and 24) are narrated by each of them in the presence of the other, even though the early Chaps. (2, 8, 9, 15, and 16) carrying that main narrative were all narrated by different characters without Sethe and Paul ever being together on any of these occasions (Morrison 1987; Iser 1980).[10]

Finally, in the great transcendencies, the appresenting vehicle of meaning belongs to everyday life, but what is appresented pertains to an entire different province of meaning, unlike signs which appresent another's private life which belongs to the same province of meaning, namely everyday life, to which the signs themselves belong. In symbolization, a boundary is crossed and the "'other' reality is experienced immediately in intoxication, dream, mystical union" (Schutz and Luckmann 1989, p. 145). The idea appresented by a symbol, Schutz observes, transcends the experience of everyday life, and examples of what symbols appresent are such things as social collectivities, the cosmic order, a whole which transcends one's particular experience, or the numinous deity appresented by Jacob's stone. Schutz asserts, following Jaspers, that the symbol appresents vague transcendental experiences that are difficult to translate discursively with more or less precise denotations, something whose significance cannot be grasped in a rational way but rather must be existentially experienced (Schutz 1962b).

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about the murder for which she had been locked away (*Ibid.*, p. 104), or when Paul, after telling Sethe, about how his experience of having a horse's bit put in his mouth and having to pull a cart behind him, suddenly stops, since "Saying more might push them both to a place they couldn't get back from." (*Ibid.*, p. 72.)

[10]The climax of the novel, in which the foreman of the slaves and his nephews catch up with the fugitive slave, Sethe, and she beheads her two-year old daughter rather than allow that daughter to fall back under slavery, is narrated from the perspective of the foreman of the slaves and his nephews who regard Sethe with contempt and ridicule. This has a particularly chilling effect and accentuates the horror of the scene. Iser insightfully comments on the importance different narrator's perspectives, which are to be evaluated by the reader. On engaging the reader, see Iser, *The Act of Reading*, pp. 204–205.

To understand symbolic appresentation in *Beloved*, one needs to appreciate the structure of the plot. As mentioned, the early chapters involve various narrators tracing Sethe's flight from Sweet Home, her giving birth to her daughter Denver, and her eventual arrival at her mother's home, to which she is pursued by the foreman of the slaves and his nephews – a series of events each appresenting vaguely a future (which took place in the past that the narrating is recovering) and riveting the reader's attention. Upon their finding her, she, who had her breast milk stolen by the slave manager's nephews and then was beaten for informing the helpless woman governing Sweet Home about this barbarity, beheads another daughter (than Denver), 2 years of age and already at her mother's house, rather than allow that daughter to be subjected to life under slavery.

This symbol of a mother beheading her child rather than allowing that child to be enslaved serves as a crystallizing moment. Though readers have been horrified by earlier mentioned acts (stealing the milk, the scars on Sethe's back), the interest in building up the life-world of the text may not have allowed a space for focusing on such horror, which remains horizonal. But when this symbol appears at the climax of the novel's action, a Gestalt shift takes place, building up the text's life-world comes to a halt and the horror and cruelty of slavery come to the fore. In addition, the active pressing forward to find appresentational fulfillment yields to passive awe or contemplation, as one feels oneself standing face to face with a symbol appresenting an incomprehensible trauma that gathers together and sums up all the horror appresented in all the other events of the text. The previous appresentational threads, bringing into reach distant times and places, overcoming the boundaries between persons, and driving the reader forward to find out where the story leads, are all ingredients in the build-up of the life-world of the text and they take place *within* that life-world. But with the appearance of this symbol, a new kind of appresentation supervenes, insofar as it appresents something beyond the life-world of the text, a "great transcendency," on the level of the cosmos, an entire social collectivity, or the theophany appresented by Jacob's stone. With the emergence into prominence of this symbol, the life-world one had been building up suddenly is drawn together and *itself* becomes a symbol, appresenting something beyond itself: the utter cruelty, horror, and destructiveness of the institution of slavery, the disclosure of a trauma of unspeakable proportions. And the fact that my attempt here to express in hyperbolic language "what" the crystallizing symbol of *Beloved* appresents still falls far short of capturing that "what" simply indicates how correct Jaspers and Schutz are when they state that a symbol is not something to be grasped in a rational way but to be experienced existentially.

Different kinds of appresentations, which correlate with different transcendencies and different semiotic mechanisms,[11] point to a dynamics within literary texts that Iser's undifferentiated use of the term *Leerstellen* cannot sufficiently reveal.

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[11]We have discussed signs and symbols particularly. The passive synthetic appresentation of the "chokecherry tree" pointing to Paul's favor tree at Sweet Home, since the linkage is not a regular one and since the appresenting element is a sign, is not quite an "indication," though it functions

There is a continuity of appresentation, in which an appresenting element, from memory-evoking stimuli to signs between persons to the events of the narrative foreshadowing an indeterminate future, leads readers continually to surpass their present positions. This process of continually crossing the boundaries beyond which various transcendencies lie prepares the ground, disposes the reader as it were, for that moment when the textual life-world one has been building up *itself* will come to appresent a reality beyond that life-world (whether it does so through a single crystallizing symbol like that of *Beloved* or not). At the same time, the appresentation of the great transcendency of the meaning of the novel is discontinuous with the other appresentations that prepare its ground insofar as it interrupts the continual bringing within reach, including the passage through the narrative, in which readers feel themselves to a degree in control of the transcending action. In this final appresentation, readers find themselves faced with a transcendency that they seem not to control but that calls upon them to experience it existentially, to contemplate it, to be shocked or puzzled by it. The experience of the symbol appresenting the novel's meaning (which could be the whole novel itself) is the beginning point of rational dissection that follows on the reading of the novel, that moment when, as Paul Ricoeur has expressed it, "the symbol gives rise to thought" (Ricoeur 1967, p. 348). The appresentations that are the engines of eliciting the reader's involvement in the novel's action bring the reader to the point where that action unexpectedly appresents beyond itself. Although we are so used to reading novels that we may not notice it, at the heart of novel-reading, there is a structure of surprise when the appresentatively constructed novel itself appresents the novel's great transcendency.

5   Conclusion: The Cognitive Content of Literature

Schutz's approach to literature, which emphasizes existential experience rather than rational analysis and depends upon a literary *epoché* that places one within a different reality sphere than everyday life or rational thinking, is particularly appropriate for *Beloved*. Just as the novel shows the growing trust between Sethe and Paul that enables them to share the traumatic events that they have undergone and that until they are shared serve to keep them isolated from each other, so one could read the novel itself as leading readers by gaining their trust through story-telling to an existential experience of the trauma of slavery prior to any rational analysis of it. Present day "rational" analysis of slavery in the United States often issues in divisiveness, insofar as the call from some quarters for "reparations" or "apologies" is met with fierce opposition by others or insofar as some descendants of slaves and others argue that the effects of slavery call for rectifying affirmative

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similarly to one. There could be marks and indications in a novel, though they themselves would have to be appresented by the signs articulated by the text's author.

action and opponents reject such action claiming that they bear no responsibility for slavery since they never owned slaves. One could argue that present day "rational" debates about slavery are symptomatic of a society in need of societal therapy, of a society that has suffered from a trauma that has never been faced up to and that needs to be somehow experienced in all its affective horror, as a first step in psychological, societal healing and as a necessary stage prior to subsequent rational interpretations of its significance. Morrison's book, then, could be seen as an effort to lay bare a trauma in the depths of the United States' national psyche, and, the book would fulfill that purpose if it were approached in the way Schutz presents literature. Indeed, conceiving literature as trying to effect societal therapy by allowing readers to re-experience an underlying, repressed trauma also fits well with Iser's opinion that the literary text almost invariably takes for its dominant meaning "possibilities that have been neutralized or negated by the system" (Iser 1980, p. 72) and the "penumbra of excluded possibilities" (Iser 1980, p. 72). The text, as Iser puts it, "begins to activate that which the system has left inactive" (Iser 1980, p. 72).

The appresentative approach to literature developed here can also help resolve current questions regarding the cognitive content of literature. For instance, John Gibson has argued that in reaction to views of literature that might see its cognitive purpose as authoring propositions about the world, much as Russell did when he claimed that that *Hamlet* is full of false statements because no such man existed, a post-structualist position has developed that the text has nothing to do with reality, that its work ends at its own boundaries. Gibson's plea for a humanist position between these extremes that understands fiction as revealing something about reality can be answered by the view that a work of literature appresents a great transcendency, another reality, beyond the structure of the work itself, which, however, leads the reader through appresentative moments to that point. The disclosure of this other reality, though, we have argued must be a matter of existential experience and not rational analysis, though such analysis, which makes possible a diversity of interpretations, might be undertaken in relation to, that is, subsequent to, that existential experience, when one adopts a different attitude toward the text than that of the literary *epoché* that brackets rational analysis. Several contemporary authors, such as Peter Lamarque, Noël Carroll, Catherine Elgin, Luca Pucci, Wolfgang Huemer, and David Davies converge with this view of Schutz's and Japsers's. Though they admit that cognitive factors are inevitably involved in reading (e.g. following up appresentational references), they believe that literature puts us only in a *position* to obtain propositional knowledge, that it only facilitates knowledge, that it captures experience in its transition to language, or that it makes possible an emotional knowledge able to be conveyed in propositions (Gibson 2007; Lamarque 2007; Carroll 2007; Elgin 2007; Pocci 2007; Huemer 2007; Davies 2007). To be sure, it is always possible to slip into theorizing about an existentially experienced text, to abandon the literary *epoché* and examine the text theoretically, but such reflections, so close to the text being read, perhaps represent an enclave within the act of reading itself that the literary *epoché* inaugurates. This paper itself, however, and Iser's book represent higher levels of theorizing, insofar as, for example, Iser's discussion of the theme of *Tom Jones*, a paradigmatic text for him,

sounds quite rationalized, e.g. that it conveys an "intended picture of human nature" (Iser 1980, p. 199) or its purpose is seeing to it that that "the reader is to acquire a sense of discernment" (Iser 1980, pp. 186–187). It is no wonder that theoretical statements about the theme of a novel always fall short of the reading of the text and that they feel flat or trivial in comparison with that reading (Gibson 2007).

There is one final problem in that my development of the theory of the role of appresentation in literature seems limited to one book, namely Morrison's *Beloved*, and one can wonder how generalizable the conclusions drawn here are with reference to other literature. The analysis presented here is certainly generalizable, in my opinion, to other novels with which I am familiar, and my convergence with Iser, Schutz, Jaspers, and Gibson, and other authors who draw on other paradigmatic texts makes the position articulated here plausible. But if the theory itself contributes toward clarifying Morrison's Nobel-prize winning work, as I think it does, that in itself is highly significant.

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The Man Without Qualities and the Problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil Revisited

Martin Endress

1 Introduction

It has recently been stated that "Musil's works contain some of the most profound reflections on the state of modern society and modern consciousness ever written" (Harrington 2002b, p. 59). Harrington seems to be quite right in this assumption, and one also can agree with his further statement that, Musil "exploits the literary devices of irony, ambivalence and aesthetic distance in order to communicate a particular style of thinking about the social conditions, movements, ideologies and contradictory identities of modernity" (Harrington 2002b, p. 60). While through the voice of Ulrich, the central protagonist of his novel, Musil "*ironizes* our frequent perception of modernity as dominated by the evils of alienation, anonymity, fragmentation and occupational specialization," he "introduces a dimension of critical reflexivity into the leading discourses of modernism, long before anyone ever heard of such movements as deconstruction, post-structuralism or genealogical criticism" (Harrington 2002b, p. 61).

This "dimension of critical reflexivity," this potential of reflection has not found much consideration in former sociological analyses of Musil's works presented from a phenomenological point of view. And this especially is true for those about his main work *The Man Without Qualities*. This applies no less to Peter Berger's most prominent interpretation of Musil's novel through Alfred Schutz's concept of multiple realities. But it is not the present purpose to introduce Schutz as a postmodern social theorist here. Harrington himself does not refer to Schutz in his argumentation. Nevertheless, in the following I will try to point out, that particularly the theoretical approach Peter Berger chooses in interpreting Musil's *The Man without Qualities*, i.e., Schutz's analysis of multiple realities is suitable for

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a methodological analysis and presents further options of interpretation of Musil's novel even though Berger himself does not focus on this theoretical potential (see Endress 2005, 2006).

Peter Berger wrote two fine studies on Musil and his great novel *The Man without Qualities* by using Schutzian categories for his interpretation. While the first of these studies is devoted to Schutz's concept of multiple realities (Berger 1978), the second is concerned with the problem of identity (Berger 1988). Berger's interest especially in his first contribution is a mutual illumination and illustration of certain Schutzian concepts and Musil's novel (Berger 1978, p. 344). And this interest in Musil's novel is related to his overall thesis, that it was Musil's intention in his *The Man without Qualities* to bring out "certain key features of any society, that is, with the intention of delineating the essential structure of everyday reality" (Berger 1978, p. 346).[1] Ulrich himself in a clear-sighted moment has an idea that refers to the sense of a prototheoretical examination of the structures of life, because he feels that, as Musil puts it, "right down at their roots the diversities there are in life lie very close together" (Musil 1954, pp. 416f.) *("Die Unterschiede des Lebens liegen an den Wurzeln sehr nahe beisammen"* (Musil 1978a, p. 644.)). In the following remarks, I share this intention, but I want to use it for an analytical purpose in a somewhat different direction. I was always somehow unsatisfied with Berger's analysis, even though it hits an important dimension of Musil's work as well as illuminating aspects of the similarities between Schutz and Musil. In what follows, I will try to give this feeling an analytical expression.

Berger's general interest in using Schutz's conception of multiple realities to explore certain aspects of Musil's novel is to argue that "the other condition" ("*der andere Zustand*") Ulrich is searching for, in order to share it with Agathe, can be described as a multiple reality in the Schutzian sense. We should remind ourselves that it is Berger's aim to just demonstrate the usefulness of sociological conceptions to shed some light on a literary work. He does not intend to contradict or to correct other interpretations of this novel, that is, to engage in literary criticism, nor does he pretend to provide an analysis of its structure as a whole.[2] The following remarks will be guided by the thesis that the descriptions Berger uses to some extent do not fit with Schutz's idea and with Schutz's employment of the concept of "multiple realities" Berger introduces in his interpretation of Musil, which includes two possibilities: The cause of this could either be a result of Berger's exposition or of Schutz's introduction.

In order to give consideration to both alternatives I will (Sect. 2) start my analysis with a very short summary of the story Musil's novel tells us. This will be followed

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[1]See also Berger 1978, p. 343: "there are dimensions of the novel's world that have nothing to do with [its] location in space and time."

[2]For my actual purpose I will leave aside the question whether Musil here attempted to provide "a solution of the problem of reality from the perspective of modern consciousness" (Berger 1978, p. 343). For other studies on Musil's novel from a sociological point of view see: (Harrington 2002a, 2002b), Kuzmics and Mozetic (2003), and Wicke (1997).

(Sect. 3) by an analysis of Berger's study, by pointing out some of its aspects which I think to be of special relevance for my current purpose. I will then (Sect. 4) go back to Schutz's introduction of the concept of multiple realities in order to ask if Berger's analysis stands its test. The result of this analysis will give us the chance (Sect. 5) to leave the concept of multiple realities aside and try to give an analysis of the structure of the argument presented by Musil without reference to Schutz's concept. After having done so I will finally (Sect. 6) again return to Schutz and try to ask whether we – in a maybe revised form – can still use the concept of multiple realities in order to analyze some of the most important aspects of Musil's novel *The Man without Qualities*.

For this approach also applies what Berger already conceded for his own works: No claim can be raised for the following thoughts to submit an over-all construction of the opus or even competently interfere in literary criticism about the interpretation of the works or the arrangement of Musil's literary estate. Beyond a literary interest in the narrower sense, the interest of a social-theoretical interpretation is to provide additional explanations about the conceptual structure of Musil's novel. To quote slightly varying, Arnheim, Ulrich's great opponent, at this point: "[. . .] the pattern of reality [of the novel] is always richer than those mere outlines which we call principles [of interpretation]" (Musil 1954, p. 411; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 640).

2 Musil's Novel

Before starting with the actual analysis it will be helpful to shortly summarize the plot of Musil's novel.[3]

The novel *The Man without Qualities* depicts a labyrinthine structure of events, actions, and relationships during the course of a single year between August 1913 and August 1914, which is right before the beginning of World War I. It is mainly set in Vienna, the slowly decaying Emperor's city of the Kingdom of Austria-Hungary. Concerning the objective time covered by the novel, book one narrates the events between August 1913 and Winter 1913/1914, while the second one concentrates on the months up to summer 1914. The protagonist of the novel is Ulrich, a young man in his early thirties who decides to interrupt his quite successful university career abroad to return to the capital of the dual monarchy for 1 year. The said year is documented by the novel. That is the frame story presented by Musil.

The novel is not only formally split into two parts, marked by the separation into two books, the first one completed, the second one remaining unfinished. The

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[3] All subsequent numbers, unless otherwise stated, refer to the pagination of the German Edition of *The Man without Qualities* prepared by Adolf Frisé which first had been published in 1952 (Musil 1978a, b). The following English quotes of Musil's novel refer to: *The Man Without Qualities: A Sort of Introduction*, translated from the German by Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike, 1995 (Vol. I), *The Like of It Now Happens* (1954, Vol. II), and *Into the Millenium* (Vol. III, 1960), translated from the German by Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser.

separation is also maintained contentual across the novel, whose two parts are separated by the death of Ulrich's father, resulting in a distinctive mark concerning the structure of the novel. His death, of which Ulrich learns through a cable in the last chapter of book one (Musil 1978a, chap. 123, p. 654; cf. Musil 1954, p. 429), marks a turning point in the life of the novel's main protagonist. The departure for his hometown symbolically announces Ulrich's following transformation (Musil 1978a, p. 665; cf. Musil 1954, p. 441).

In the *first part* of the novel (consisting of book I with its two halves), the plot develops along two public events of entirely different characters, which Ulrich is either a part of or drawn into. There is the large-scale preparation for the celebration of the 70th year jubilee of the old Emperor Franz-Joseph on December 2nd, 1918. This event is referred to as a "parallel action," because it is planned as an opposing event to the German celebration planned for the 30th year jubilee of the German Emperor Wilhelm II. As a part of this project, the world-historical prominence of the Austrian Empire, even a "Universal" Austria ("*Weltösterreich*", (Musil 1978a, p. 423; cf. Musil 1954, p. 148)), is said to be emphasized and celebrated. The second event of importance is the murder of Moosbrugger.

The *second part* of the novel (consisting of book II with its unfinished third half) is structured by Ulrich's relationship to his sister Agathe, whom he meets again after years, on the occasion of his returning to their hometown because of their father's death and the distribution of the father's inheritance. Afterwards, Agathe follows Ulrich to Vienna where both share a household for the purpose of discovering what they call "the other condition" ("*den anderen Zustand*") together. This is, expressed by Musil, "a journey to the furthest limits of the possible," (Musil 1960, p. 121) ("*eine Reise an den Rand des Möglichen*", (Musil 1978a, p. 761)) which is the measurement of the historically grown and therefore the objectively possible horizon of multiple realities.

Since the following analysis deals with the problem of dimensions of reflexivity in Musil's novel, both parts of *The Man without Qualities* introduces different perspectives: The *first part* tells us of "the state that we live in," ("*der Zustand, in dem wir leben*") which "is full of cracks, through which, so to speak, another state, an impossible one, peers out at us," (Musil 1954, p. 449) ("*Risse hat, aus denen ein unmöglicher Zustand hervorschaut*") as Clarisse puts it, remembering one of Ulrich's sayings (Musil 1978a, p. 659; cf. Musil 1954, p. 435). At the end of this first part (which is also the end of book one), Ulrich's "state of sensation in his [Ulrich's] body [. . .] now passed over into a softer and larger condition" (Musil 1954, p. 449) ("*Gesamtgefühl seines Körpers . . . in einen weicheren und weiteren Zustand über*", (Musil 1978a, p. 663)) – a premonition to the *second part* of the novel concerned with "the other condition." Ulrich himself realizes this process of passing into an "other condition," after his father's funeral, when he ponders, over how "this last fortnight had rendered all the past invalid, and had tied up the threads of inner movement in one strong knot" (Musil 1960, p. 148) ("*Die letzten vierzehn Tage hatten alles Frühere außer Kraft gesetzt und die Linien der inneren Bewegung mit einem kräftigen Knoten zusammengefasst*", (Musil 1978a, p. 784)). After the days he spent with Agathe, he is now in a "restive state" (Musil 1960,

p. 190) ("*unruhigen Zustand*", (Musil 1978a, p. 821)). According to the composition of the story this state becomes plainly visible by Ulrich's transition in the second half of the first part of the novel. The transition starts with the chapter "A touch with reality," ("*Berührung der Wirklichkeit*", (Musil 1995, chap. 20)) which can be seen as a reference to Ulrich and the parallel action, and ends with the chapter "The turning point" ("*Die Umkehrung*", (Musil 1995, chap. 123)). This phrase is an allusion not only to Ulrich's ongoing transformation but also foreshadows his time with Agathe.

Keeping in mind the shaping social relationships for each narrative thread, these constellations result in the following: *Part one* can mainly be seen as a description of the more or less erotically charged relationships between the characters, who are involved in the parallel action, the case of Moosbrugger, or both. They are between Diotima and Arnheim, Diotima and Ulrich, Ulrich and Gerda, Rachel and Soliman, Walter and Clarisse, and Ulrich and Clarisse. The constellation between Arnheim and Ulrich is the kernel, i.e., the forming social relationship in this part of the novel: Ulrich, a man of possibilities, the "traveller", who "often imagined [. . .] the truly experimental life" (Musil 1960, p. 196) ("*das wahrhaft experimentelle Leben vorstellt*", (Musil 1978a, p. 826)) in contrast to Arnheim, the man of realities, a standard-person, who says about Ulrich: "[. . .] an activist with a head full of ideas how things could be done differently and better [. . .]." (Musil 1995, p. 292) ("*Ein Aktivist, der immer den Kopf voll davon hat, wie die Dinge anders und besser zu machen wären,*" (Musil 1978a, p. 270)). To Arnheim Ulrich is a "phantom of the man" (Musil 1995, p. 598; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 548): "[. . .] a dangerous man, with his infantile moral exoticism and his highly developed intelligence that is always on the lookout for some adventure without knowing what, exactly, is egging him on" (Musil 1995, p. 351) ("*Ein gefährlicher Mensch, mit seiner infantilen moralischen Exotik und seinem ausgebildeten Verstand, der immer ein Abenteuer sucht, ohne zu wissen, was ihn eigentlich dazu treibt*", (Musil 1978a, p. 324)).

Part two mainly consists of the interactive dynamics and multiple constellations between Walter and Clarisse on the one hand, and between Ulrich and Agathe on the other hand, as well as their being intertwined with each other.

At this point the brief reminder of the course of action in Musil's novel can be closed. I will now turn to Berger's analysis by pointing out some of its aspects which I think to be of special relevance for my current purpose.

3   Berger's Study

It is Berger's aim to apply Schutz's (1945) concept of multiple realities to Musil's description of the "other condition" in the second part of *The Man without Qualities*. According to Berger a "relativization of everyday reality" is the presupposition for entering the "other condition" (Berger 1978, p. 354). This seems to be a typically Schutzian strategy to analyze the shock taking place by moving from one multiple reality to another.

In doing so, Berger first argues that the paramount reality of everyday life "persists in its massive facticity even after various breakdowns in the fabric of 'normality'" (Berger 1978, p. 345). Furthermore, everyday life while "experienced as a totality" is divided into "different social worlds," (Berger 1978, p. 345) "the transition from one of its sectors to another can be experienced as a shock." (Berger 1978, p. 346). In addition to this "differentiation within everyday reality" Berger also identifies a world "beyond the domain of everyday reality," the transition to which causes an even greater shock (Berger 1978, pp. 346–348).[4] I agree with Berger that it is Ulrich's insight into the social construction of everyday reality through which this reality to him "becomes problematic as a whole," (Berger 1978, p. 348) while he reveals it "as a tenuous balancing act between a multiplicity of forces." (ibid.)

But while Berger tries to focus on "the other condition" ("*anderer Zustand*") as "Ulrich's central concern," (Berger 1978, p. 348) reading it as being in opposition to everyday life, he analyses Musil's novel under the premise that "all these transition points [i.e. all "possible transfer stations to the 'other conditions'"] have in common a violent breakdown of the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life." (Berger 1978, p. 348). According to this phenomenon Berger (1978, p. 348) also speaks of an "abolition," ("*Abschaffung*", see Musil 1978a, p. 365) an "absurdity" (Berger 1978, p. 349) of reality, of a distancing from the "*theatrum mundi*," (Berger 1978, pp. 348, 350) of "breakdowns of the fabric of normality," (Berger 1978, p. 345) of "violent" interruptions, and he argues that in the state of the "other condition" "no experiencing of the world" takes place (Berger 1978, p. 355) and that this "reality ... haunts the reality of everyday life." (Berger 1978, pp. 343f.) Berger's descriptions here imply several ontological connotations, which also become obvious when he argues that "the 'other condition' lies on the other side of this abolished reality" as a "novel and strange mode of being" (Berger 1978, p. 348).

Furthermore, Ulrich, who, as we learn in the beginning of the novel, "had returned from abroad sometime before," has now settled in Vienna and "for a certain exuberance" rented a "little château," (Musil 1995, p. 8; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 13) because, as he "could not conceal from himself that in all those years [. . .] he had merely been living against his grain. He wished something unforeseen would happen to him, for when he took what he somewhat wryly called his 'holiday from life' he had nothing [. . .], that gave him peace" (Musil 1995, p. 276; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 256) ("*jahrelang bloß gegen sich selbst gelebt habe, und er wünschte, daß etwas Unvorhergesehenes mit ihm geschehen möge, denn als er das tat, was er etwas spöttisch seinen 'Urlaub vom Leben, nannte, besaß er ... nichts, was ihm Frieden gab*" (Musil 1978a, p. 256)). In contrast to Berger's interpretation, in my opinion, the novel is therefore from the start permeated with ambivalence. Instead of calling Ulrich's developing life in Vienna his everyday reality, it could also be said,

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[4]According to Berger (1978, p. 347) the shocks within everyday life "are both quantitatively and qualitatively more moderate," because they "still take place within the same ontological coordinates."

that the world described in the course of the story is not his everyday reality, as his return from abroad heralds the start of a new phase, in which he claims, although in ironical distance, to take a "holiday from life" – indeed, for he even intends to "kill himself, if the year he was 'taking off' from his life were to pass without results." (Musil 1995, p. 654; Musil 1954, pp. 427f., 438f., 128f.) ("*er werde sich töten, wenn das Jahr seines Lebensurlaubs ohne Ergebnis verstreiche*" (Musil 1978a, p. 599; cf. Musil 1978a, pp. 653, 662, 767) – at the beginning of his living together with Agathe, "Ulrich realized that this experiment [to live together with Agathe] necessarily meant the end of his experiment in 'living on vacation'" (Musil 1960, p. 168) ("*Urlaub vom Leben*", (Musil 1978a, p. 801)). This beginning Ulrich marks by giving the hint to Agathe that they would now be "entering the millennium" ("*in das tausendjährige Reich einziehn*" (Musil 1978a, p. 801; cf. Musil 1995, p. 168)).

What strikes me here in the *first place* is the question whether one can use Schutz's conception of multiple realities for describing the ontological difference of realities Berger primarily seems to be concerned with. In the *second place* I would like to question whether, for example, the "absurdity" Ulrich experiences according to Berger (1978, p. 348) fits with Schutz's description of the modulation of states of consciousness in different multiple realities. Can these be adequately described as, for example, "pushing back the package of real world?" (Berger 1978, p. 350). In the *third place* Berger sometimes seems to use the concept of multiple realities in a twofold sense: on the one hand as a description of what can be called the functional differentiation of society, and on the other hand by referring to different types of subjective constitution of meaning. In the *fourth place* I have the impression that Berger does not take into account that there is a difference between the life-world and everyday life. This becomes obvious in his distinction between the worlds "within everyday reality" on the one hand, and the world "beyond the domain of everyday reality" on the other hand (Berger 1978, pp. 346–348). Both belong to the life-world, which according to Schutz is more encompassing than everyday life. And this distinction seems to be crucial for the argument Schutz has in mind when differentiating multiple realities.

Moreover, it is also Musil who clearly points to the difference in question by arguing, on the one hand, that even "[...] an evening at the theater, a concert, a church service, all such manifestations of the inner life today are similar, quickly dissolving islands of a second state of consciousness that is sometimes interpolated into the ordinary one" (Musil 1995, p. 119, cf. p. 131) ("*auch ein Theaterabend, ein Konzert, ein Gottesdienst, alle Äußerungen des Inneren ... rasch wieder aufgelöste Inseln eines zweiten Bewusstseinszustands [seien], der in den gewöhnlichen zeitweilig eingeschoben wird*", (Musil 1978a, p. 115; cf. p. 125). On the other hand, Berger insists that "the 'other condition' constitute a 'finite province of meaning'," (Berger 1978, p. 355) while at the same time stating that this condition implies an "'abolition of reality'" and that it "lies on the other side of this abolished reality" (Berger 1978, p. 348). *Finally*, it is conspicuous that Berger very rarely uses the term "interruption" (Berger 1978, pp. 349, 351) to characterize the phenomenon in question. In my understanding this term seems to be the most precise one to give an account of the transitions between multiple realities according to Schutz, but it

also definitely does not fit with Berger's original remarks. Moreover, the German translation of his essay (Berger 1983) eliminates the variety of concepts Berger uses in this connection by unifying them to the German term "*Unterbrechung*." ("interruption"). A decision not only implying a certain tension with Berger's other descriptions, but which also seems to eliminate the overall relevance of Musil's concept of the "other condition."

4 Berger's Analysis of Schutz's Concept of Multiple Realities

But before going into more detail, first of all, we have to ask, (1) whether the "other condition" can be described as a multiple reality according to Schutz's understanding of the concept and, secondly, (2) whether the "other condition" for systematic reasons can be understood as another multiple reality compared with the other multiple realities described in *The Man Without Qualities*?

1. I would like to start with a reminder of Schutz's criteria for analyzing the styles of meaning constitution in different multiple realities. Following Bergson, Schutz (1945, p. 537) combines the differentiation of "degrees of consciousness" with human beings' "varying interest in life," that is, their "attention a la vie" which we can describe as degrees of pragmatic involvement (or as degrees of relevancy). Because of this twofold reference to the constitution of meaning in everyday life, Schutz, instead of following William James' notion of "sub-universes," prefers to speak of a variety of "finite provinces of meaning" each of which showing "a specific cognitive style" or a different "accent of reality" (1945, pp. 551, 552). Let me briefly summarize the "basic characteristics" Schutz identifies accordingly to describe these multiple realities (Schutz 1945, p. 552). They are characterized by:

1. A specific tension of consciousness;
2. A specific *epoché*;
3. A prevalent form of spontaneity;
4. A specific form of experiencing one's self;
5. A specific form of sociality; and, finally,
6. A specific time-perspective.

Due to these characteristics, Schutz provides us with a working hypothesis for comparing different finite provinces of meaning: "A typology of the different finite provinces of meaning could start from an analysis of those factors of the world of daily life from which the accent of reality has been withdrawn because they do not stand any longer within the focus of our attentional interest in life" (Schutz 1945, p. 554). Following this advice (see also: Kersten 1998; Nasu 1999), Schutz in his classical study analyzes the "worlds of phantasms," (Schutz 1945, pp. 555–560)[5] the

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[5]Exemplified by a short analysis of Cervantes' novel *Don Quixote* (see Endress 1998) analyzing Schutz 1964/1953.

"world of dreams," (Schutz 1945, pp. 560–563) and the "world of scientific theory" (Schutz 1945, pp. 563–575) as those finite provinces of meaning characterized by a more or less modified pragmatic interest.[6] Having this exposition of the concept of multiple realities in mind, I think, the first question can be affirmed that Musil's concept of "the other condition" can be described with reference to these criteria provided by Schutz in order to analyze different finite provinces of meaning. But this is just a question of how to use the analytical framework Schutz offers for different scientific purposes and in a variety of fields of research.

2. Moreover, this leads to the second question mentioned above: Is the "other condition" just another multiple reality compared with the other multiple realities described in *The Man without Qualities*? To put it differently: Is it just the same to talk about "the quality of mathematics as an interruption of everyday reality" (Berger 1978, p. 351) and to analyze the "other condition" Ulrich is longing for as a different state of consciousness? Does the possibility of a mere description of "the other condition" as a multiple reality in the Schutzian sense meet the systematic interest Musil haunts for?

I would doubt this. As far as multiple realities can be entered, because they are placed within the life-world, the other condition cannot be entered, since, for Musil, it is beyond the life-world Ulrich is striving for – which is the reason why this project fails. According to Schutz, the life-world includes several multiple realities, each of which describes a certain type of meaning constitution. Thus, in my understanding, the descriptions Berger himself, for example, uses for characterizing of what happens while entering the spheres of sexuality or aesthetic experience as "violence" (Berger 1978, pp. 348, 349) are better used to describe what happens while entering the "other condition." With reference to this process Berger also uses the terms "abolition" (Berger 1978, p. 348) and "absurdity," (Berger 1978, p. 349) as mentioned before. At this point again my foregoing remarks come into play, pointing to the ontological connotations of Berger's analysis.

But there are some additional aspects to be mentioned. Comparing Schutz's conception of the worlds of phantasms with Musil's "the other condition", the latter is not "free from the pragmatic motive," it does not lack "the purposive 'fiat'," and living within "the other condition" is not "necessarily inefficient." (Schutz 1945, pp. 555f.) Agathe and Ulrich will not share "the other condition" with "merely a part of their total personality" (Schutz 1945, pp. 559, 567). Just as neither Ulrich nor Agathe will be "essentially lonely" in "the other condition" as Schutz states for the world of dreams as well as for the world of scientific theory (Schutz 1945, pp. 563, 571). Moreover, referring to two further aspects of Schutz's description of the world of scientific theory, entering "the other condition" does not mean to take up the "attitude of the 'disinterested observer'" or to "'put in brackets' one's physical existence" (Schutz 1945, pp. 565, 566f).

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[6]A peculiar problem which arises in this context is the "problem of indirect communication," that is, the "paradox of communication" (Schutz 1945, pp. 573–575). See also Endress (2003).

Consequently, we are confronted with an ambivalent result of our analysis: While the question whether "the other condition" can be described by the criteria Schutz indicates for describing the cognitive style typical for multiple realities can be affirmed, it conversely looks like that "the other condition" cannot be put in line with the realities of theater, dream, or sciences, because it moves beyond the entire life-world.

For this reason, at this point a further question comes up, namely, is an interpretation of Musil's novel by using the concept of multiple realities adequate in order to analyze the complexity Musil's novel consists of in this very reference? To make this clear, we might argue that according to Schutz Musil's novel as a piece of literary art belongs to a multiple reality, i.e., "the various worlds of phantasms" Schutz exemplifies by referring to Cervantes' novel *Don Quixote*. But such an answer clearly would ignore Berger's unique perspective looking at Musil's novel as a whole social world, which confronts us with different multiple realities. I will share this perspective here.

5   The Structure of Musil's Argument

In the following section I will try to plead for, what might be called, an extension of the concept of multiple realities.

One possible consequence we could draw from the foregoing ambivalent result would be arguing that we should use the concept of multiple realities *strictu* sensu in the Schutzian sense, i.e., as differentiating different provinces of meaning. But I do not think such a solution really would solve the problem we are faced with. And that is because Schutz's notion of the cognitive style which he thinks to be specific for these finite provinces of meaning should be reread in order to include levels of reflexivity in a somewhat more proper sense. I will try to illustrate this with reference to Musil's novel. Referring to the overall stream of action in *The Man without Qualities*, in my understanding, we can differentiate three levels of reflexivity, or let us say three levels of reference to multiple realities: The first one I would like to call the *descriptive level*, talking about the concrete social situating of the characters involved. On a second level, which I would suggest to call a *primary level of reflexivity*, we find the characters themselves talking about and analyzing their positioning, i.e., their social situating within the novel. Finally, on a third level, which might be called a *level of meta-reflexivity*, those reflections themselves are analyzed once again from a very different viewpoint as possibilities of literary art forms.[7]

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[7]This differentiation of levels of reflexivity to some extent might be comparable to Paul Ricoeur's differentiation between three models of mimesis, a prefigurated, a figurated, and a reflexive one. Here narration gets enacted again on a reflexive level.

To cut things short, I would like to suggest to differentiate first order multiple realities (*descriptive level*), second order multiple realities (*primary level of reflexivity*), and, finally, third order multiple realities (*level of meta-reflexivity*). Having this in mind, I would like to ask, in which of these levels "the other condition" ("*der andere Zustand*") is involved or situated. And my thesis will be, that we have to think of it as referring to the type of third order multiple realities (functioning as a somewhat regulative idea (in a Kantian sense) for the life-world as such). In what follows I will try to present at least some hints for illustrating this differentiation with reference to Musil's novel in order to demonstrate its potential of critical reflexivity.[8]

5.1   The Descriptive Level Presenting Some First Order Multiple Realities

On this descriptive level Musil presents several social settings and constellations focusing on the concrete positioning and situations of different characters. Such "finite provinces of meaning" described within Musil's novel are, for example,

– Diotima's "gathering of great minds (Musil 1995, pp. 289, 292) ("*Versammlung großer Geister*", (Musil 1978a, pp. 268, 271; chapters I.71 and I.80)): Diotima's salon is characterized as having "a reputation as a place where 'society and intellect' met" (Musil 1995, p. 100) ("*dass 'Gesellschaft und Geist' dort einander begegneten*", (Musil 1978a, p. 98)). For this reason it is described by Musil as a counter-institutionalization to Graf Leinsdorf's *palais* (Musil 1995, pp. 357f.; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 347).
– Tuzzi is the head of the section leading "his life in a [to his wife's world] separate but friendly adjoining world." (Musil 1995, p. 362, cf. pp. 445, 447) ("*abgeschlossenen freundlichen Nachbarswelt*", (Musil 1978a, pp. 334, 410, 411f.)), since the beginning of the "parallel action".
– Quite another outstanding example for the first descriptive level of first order multiple realities is the interlocking of spheres of meaning on the level of a person, taking on different roles throughout the novel (Musil 1995, p. 466; cf. p. 428).[9]

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[8]Therefore, mere description on the level of geographical and functional differentiation are excluded here, as for example Kakanien (see Musil 1995, pp. 392, 560 ff., 575 f.; cf. Musil 1978a, pp. 361, 514 f., 528 f. and chap. I.8, I.98), the "*Parallelaktion*" as such (chap. I.19, 21–23, 26, 36, 40, 42–44, 71, 81 and so on; see also chap. II. 34), various aspects according to which the "*Parallelaktion*" is differentiated in analogy to state affairs and societal strata (Musil 1995, pp. 421, 246; cf. Musil 1978a, pp. 224, 229), or the realm of sports (Musil 1995, pp. 436, 442, 459, 560; cf. Musil 1978a, pp. 402, 407, 422, 513).

[9]Possibly also the world of commemoration (i.e. with Agathe chapter II.13) might be mentioned. Here, memory (past) and expectation (future) fuse to a peculiar suffering in or from the present (Musil 1960, p. 120f.; cf. Musil 1978, pp. 759 f.). See also Musil's descriptions of the world of morals (Musil 1995, pp. 271 326, 351, 396, 442, 444, 485, 525, 552, 555, 616, 620, 624, 646,

5.2 The Primary Level of Reflexivity as Describing Second Order Multiple Realities

Here the characters themselves are talking about and analyzing their positioning. They are focusing on certain aspects of the social constellations they are involved in. Thus typically on this level the relationship between two multiple realities itself is discussed. Just to give some examples again:

– Diotima's affection for Arnheim carries her "from dreaming to waking," (Musil 1995, pp. 359f.) ("*vom Traum zum Wachen*", (Musil 1978a, p. 332)) and Arnheim as well, who in his daydreams, is searching for a solution, realizes that "the closer he approaches reality, the more troublesome the increase of inhibitions" (Musil 1995, p. 547) became ("*je mehr [er] … sich der Wirklichkeit näherte, desto unangenehmer wüchsen die Widerstände*", (Musil 1978a, p. 501)). As to put it in philosophical terms: clearly a kind of a pragmatic experience of an antagonism.
– Arnheim reflects on "living in a kind of dream, a condition abhorred by every thinker" (Musil 1995, p. 552) ("*einfach träumen; ein Zustand, den jeder Denker verabscheut*", (Musil 1978a, p. 506)).
– Ulrich is reflecting about the relationship between several states of mind, for example, dream and reality (Musil 1978a, pp. 581f.); and Musil describes it: "But this erotic transformation of the consciousness seemed only a special instance of something much more general: an evening at the theater, a concert, a church service, all such manifestations of the inner life today are similar, quickly dissolving islands of a second state of consciousness that is sometimes interpolated into the ordinary one" (Musil 1995, p. 119, cf. p. 131) ("*Es kam ihm [Ulrich] aber vor, daß diese Liebesverwandlung des Bewußtseins nur ein besonderer Fall von etwas weit Allgemeinerem sei; denn auch ein Theaterabend, ein Konzert, ein Gottesdienst, alle Äußerungen des Inneren sind heute solche rasch wieder aufgelöste Inseln eines zweiten Bewußtseinszustands, der in den gewöhnlichen zeitweilig eingeschoben wird*" (Musil 1978a, p. 115)).
– Another example is Ulrich's experience of the "spatial inversion" ("*räumliche Inversion*") during the demonstration in front of Leinsdorf's palace (Musil 1995, p. 689; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 632).
– It is rather sudden that Ulrich begins to read the mystics, reads them to Agathe, and then discusses them with her (Musil 1978a, chapter II., pp. 11, 12). Via this input the transition to "a condition different from the original one" is finally established (Musil 1960, pp. 115, 122, 129; cf. Musil 1978a, pp. 755,

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648, 697; Musil 1960, p. 91f; cf. Musil 1978a, pp. 251, 302, 324, 365, 408, 410, 446, 481, 506 f., 509, 564, 568, 572, 592–594, 639, 734f., referring here to Nietzsche's and Descartes' pleas for a provisional moral (Musil 1960, pp. 3, 97, 104ff., 123, 131f., 190ff., 246, 249, 251, 342, 347ff., 426f., 430f., 440) ("*provisorische Moral*", (Musil 1978a, pp. 739f., 746ff., 762, 769f., 821ff., 869, 871f., 873f., 952, 957ff., 1024f., 1027f., 1036).

761, 767). Consequently Ulrich thinks about the world as split "into these two components [. . .]: mathematics and mysticism" (Musil 1995, p. 133; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 770).[10]

5.3 The Level of Meta-Reflexivity, i.e., Third Order Multiple Realities

Here the aforementioned reflections of the characters themselves are analyzed again from a clearly different viewpoint. In Musil's novel the process of thinking itself is described. To put it differently, Musil tries to integrate the process of thinking in the form of literary art. Therefore, thinking itself becomes an object of literary art. In this respect we can remember the finite provinces of meaning which themselves are objects of Musil's novel: literary art and science (philosophy). That is, finite provinces of meaning which themselves are functioning as descriptions and analyses of finite provinces of meaning. Therefore, this meta-level involves reflecting multiple realities as well as thematizing the very notion of multiple realities itself. Here Ulrich takes the position Schutz is getting at in his essay on multiple realities. For example:

– At the sight of a demonstration in front of Leinsdorf's palace, Ulrich feels: "I can't go on with this life, and I can't keep on rebelling against it any longer [. . .]" (Musil 1995, p. 689) ("*Ich kann dieses Leben nicht mehr mitmachen, und ich kann mich nicht mehr dagegen auflehnen!*", (Musil 1978a, p. 631)). He in this way phrases a general resignation from the pragmatic motive, and its suppression ("*Ausschaltung*", (Musil 1978a, p. 762)) he describes likewise.
– Ulrich's reflections about the "two fundamental attitudes [in human history] [. . .]: metaphor and unequivocality" (Musil 1954, p. 353) ("*Eindeutigkeit und Gleichnis*", pp. 593f.) as well as his analysis of the difference between acting or thinking on the one hand and dreaming on the other hand are also characteristic for this type of meta-reflexivity.
– And here we also have to refer to "the other condition," as described before. Ulrich and Agathe enter "the other condition" just as "children of this world." (Musil 1960, p. 122) ("*als Menschen dieser Welt*", (Musil 1978a, p. 761)). Just to give some of Ulrich's statements here: the "other condition" to him is such a one, in which "one slips out of non-essential life" (Musil 1995, p. 123) ("*man dem unwesentlichen Leben entschlüpft*", (Musil 1978a, p. 762)): "[. . .]

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[10]See also the description in transition ("*Beschreibungen am Übergang*"): Ulrich imagines the "truly experimental life" (Musil 1960, p. 196) ("*das wahrhaft experimentelle Leben*", (Musil 1978a, p. 826)); Musil states that "every intense excitement alters one's picture of reality," (Musil 1995, p. 310) ("*jede heftige Erregung ändert das Bild der Wirklichkeit in ihrem Sinne*", (Musil 1978a, p. 924) and Ulrich reflects about the difference between sanity and insanity (Musil 1995, p. 423; cf. Musil 1978a, p. 1021).

we can assume the existence of a characteristic second, extraordinary condition, a highly important condition, that man is capable of entering into and which has deeper origins than the religions" (Musil 1995, p. 127) ("*Wir dürfen* ... *einen bestimmten zweiten und ungewöhnlichen Zustand von großer Wichtigkeit voraussetzen, dessen der Mensch fähig ist und der ursprünglicher ist als die Religionen*", (Musil 1978a, p. 766)). Therefore Ulrich, the man of possibilities, will start his "journey to the furthest limits of the possible," (Musil 1995, p. 121) ("*eine Reise an den Rand des Möglichen*", (Musil 1978a, p. 761)) through his meeting with Agathe.

Now, one possibly might ask, why these examples do not motivate to just speak of or refer to the difference between everyday life and the world of scientific thinking? The answer is: Because Ulrich clearly is looking for transcending the world of everyday-life and the world of scientific thinking as well as the life-world as such. To put things differently: "The other condition" seeks to overcome the human condition or the very idea of existence. We therefore also might say that "The man without qualities" is the man searching for the possibility of the impossibilities. Maybe that can be called the hidden ground for his self-description as a "man of possibilities" ("*Möglichkeitsmensch*") – maybe a possible man.

6   Conclusion

What are the consequences of this insight? Can we integrate or re-integrate the aforementioned idea of the conceptual framework of Musil's novel in Schutz's conception of the multiple realities? And one might also ask: Does this analysis of the internal structure of reflexivity within Musil's novel provide some insights which might give us certain evidence for slightly revising Schutz's concept of multiple realities itself? I will conclude my considerations at least with some preliminary answers to these questions.

Peter Berger provides a great idea of how a sociologist can look at Musil's novel (also: Kuzmics and Mozetic 2003). Nonetheless, his interpretation leads to several questions concerning the concept of multiple realities as well as the broader setting of Musil's novel which I tried to develop in the foregoing analysis. These can be summarized as follows:

1. While using Schutz's conception of the multiple realities Berger evens out or levels the difference between the world of everyday life and the life-world. The variety of multiple realities including everyday life on the one hand and the assumed realities of the life-world on the other hand should be distinguished according to Musil. The latter are not the worlds of dreams and mere phantasma because of Musil's underlying reflexive account.
2. Berger's analysis restricts itself to a one-level-analysis while using the multiple realities conception in a descriptive way. Therefore, he is not able to take into account the various levels of reflections described in Musil's novel, which I tried to differentiate in my foregoing considerations.

3. Because in its kernel Schutz's idea of differentiating multiple realities focuses on different "cognitive styles," in my view, it seems reasonable to extend its analysis according to various levels of reflexivity. This, I tried to argue, hopefully opens the path for a somewhat different mutual illumination of Schutz's concept and Musil's novel.

In summing up, one can say, that Schutz and Musil within their works offer different ideas of social reality. While Schutz focuses on the dimension of pragmatic motivation and consciousness (in German: *Bewusstsein*), Musil tries to overcome this primary human condition by reaching the dimension of awareness (in German: *Bewusstheit*). Surely, one might ignore this difference and restrict a comparison of both approaches to a mere mutual description. But realizing the theoretical potential of Musil's novel opens the chance to slightly revise Schutz's original contribution.

Therefore, a type of sociological reflexivity, a "dimension of critical reflexivity" as Harrington said (Harrington 2002b, p. 61), lies at the heart of Musil's novel *The Man Without Qualities*. And Musil himself in his later years seems to be aware of this. In his diaries the following reflection about his novel can be found, approximately phrased around 1940: "My mental equipping for this novel was poetical, psychological and partially philosophical. My present situation requires the sociological" ("*Meine geistige Zurüstung für den Roman war dichterisch, psychologisch, u. z. T. philosophisch. In meiner jetzigen Lage bedarf es aber des Soziologischen* [. . .]", (Musil 1983, pp. 963f.)).

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Entangled into Histories or the Narrative Grounds of Multiple Realities

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The topic *Phenomenology, Social Sciences, and the Arts* – or the ways of constituting, understanding, and interpreting structures of the life-world through works of art – begs the question about the relation between the fictitious, or respectively the imaginary, and the real in constituting our paramount reality: Might this ambiguous difference of paramount realities change realities and might they transcend finite provinces of meaning to a shared reality?

We can look at works of art as documents of social life or as manifestations of particular individual consciousness and try to comprehend how they display reality in contrast to other ways of expressing meaning; or we can analyze them under pragmatic perspectives of aesthetic response and historical perspectives of aesthetic reception. Yet, I want to suggest a further approach beyond the cleavage between fiction and facts or story and history in interrogating the genesis of meaning which fictitious art of memory exercises.

Narration as both pre- and self-reflexive action of a temporal being living in a world is *the important way* not only imagination but also our inter-subjective action space is constituted and enlarged: *There is no comprehensive action without narration*. In narration persons establish a common ground for comprehensive actions in the multiple realities we are confronted with in the every-day; narration mediates between past and future, where understanding of words and deeds is only possible in remembering: in reconstituting history in its biographical course – addressing a present or a future generation. And here, exemplarily literary narration can gain a discursive and comprehensive framework for configuration of memory.

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In the hermeneutical tradition of Wilhelm Dilthey meaningful context, continuity and unity of human life are configured and constituted as *Lebensgeschichte* – life history.[1] The historicity of biological "raw life" declining from birth to death and crystallizing in different "steps of life" is experienced and ascribed biographically: This comprises not only one's own life as it is apprehended, judged, and comprehended in a meaningful coherency from another person's point of view, but also one's personal experiencing one's own lived life in its temporal horizon – my subjective biography: The latter does not specifically have the form usually termed "autobiography," since such life history or life story may not only be retrospectively told ("*narrated*") as outcome or result of constituting one's own rounded biography from its end with "myself" as both author and subject, but it may also be discovered – struggled with – in living one's life within and towards unsettled possibilities, opportunities, and obstacles; then, this biographical life story is "*narratable*"[2] and prompts an ongoing process of mediating the discontinuous history of oneself with the continuity of time (both "cosmological" time and everyday routines) and ourselves integrating our history in this time.

As such, our biography is both "designed" by life plans and is "happening" to us, it is plot and story of what we experience as our life that manifests itself in words and deeds – as narration. Thus, by historicality – and by the ruptures of time – one's life is biographical since it gains its structure, its relevance, and meaning only in the order of time where singular events and the everyday life form a plot, a story, where somebody undergoing this flux gains identity in the roles explaining the probable and improbable developments.

Biography as lived and living life is shaped in social intercourse within horizons of meaning: Biography as narrated life story unfolds only within a reality I share with others: This reality constitutes structure and prompts structuring of its narration; also, biography refers both to the specification of the *individual* way of leading a personal life in becoming what one is and to the *social* frameworks of constitution and recognition of such biographical life.[3] Narration and the concept of narrative identity try to capture both: the individual and the social reality of life history, comprising the relation between Self and the reality of the world – present,

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[1]The concrete and singular expression of life gains coherency and unity in biographical courses of life. Presenting a unity according to selections in the relevance of biographical data, nothing could be added or taken away from a life's history without altering the uniqueness of it, at the same time a singular life mirrors historical universality in its meaning and intentionality: "*Der Sinn des Lebens liegt in der Gestaltung, in der Entwicklung; von hier aus bestimmt sich die Bedeutung der Lebensmomente auf eine eigene Weise; sie ist zugleich erlebter Eigenwert des Momentes und dessen wirkende Kraft. Jedes Leben hat einen eigenen Sinn. Er liegt in einem Bedeutungszusammenhang, in welchem jede erinnerbare Gegenwart einen Eigenwert besitzt, doch zugleich im Zusammenhang der Erinnerung eine Beziehung zu einem Sinn des Ganzen hat. Dieser Sinn des individuellen Daseins ist ganz singulär, dem Erkennen unauflösbar, und er repräsentiert doch in seiner Art, wie eine Monade von Leibniz, das geschichtliche Universum*" (Dilthey 1956, p. 199).

[2]Cf. below, pp. 178.

[3]Cf. Löwith's four implications of understanding life (Löwith 1979).

past and future – therefore also comprising the relation between Self and Time, and the relation between Self and Others by being entangled into history and in their stories. "Narration is the guardian of time," (P. Ricoeur) since the question "*who one is,*" can only be answered in telling a story: Narration appresents this "Who" beyond mere properties; in fact, it represents the genesis of how some person became in time from a subjective and also a phenomenological – genetical – point of view.

Hans-Georg Soeffner argues that documents of lived reality express both socially constructed reality and our knowledge about it, yet that such products are merely parts of reality, never reality itself (Soeffner 2004, pp. 92f.). Therefore, these parts of realities have not only to be analyzed but have to be brought in a frame for discourse; a frame where "phenomenological time," the lived life, is not merely evaluated in opposite to objective standards of an all-encompassing cosmological time, but is recognized in its representation of a variety of "methods," "styles," and "ends" by which we interpret our reality together with and in front of others; finally, by experiencing our biographical life in its temporality, we transcend finite provinces of meaning: Constituting the story of lived life means to bring into a structure the different traits and roles by which we experience ourselves and which are ascribed to us by others.

According to Wilhelm Schapp our anthropological entanglement with history and stories expresses a relation which is operative when instrumentally applied rational issues, and life's immanent ends are transcended by an ongoing search for meaning in a horizon of multiple and open possibilities. To understand oneself exposed to multiple realities also means to understand one's own temporal course in its entanglement in the histories of others; it means to relate oneself to other histories by starting a new story of my coming and being into relations: This initiative (re-)structures the multiplicity of perspectives already there and endows new ones.[4] Such self-understanding of a person in its temporal life-world, the ongoing process to integrate the roles she gains and develops into her individuality is not to be captured descriptively alone, but has to be narrated, since only narration is able to reflect and express temporality. Temporality cannot be expressed directly in phenomenological discourse of lived life, but requires the medium of narration (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 389).

To bridge the gap between individual (subjective) and social (shared and manifest) reality in understanding the life-world is one of the main targets of comprehensive sociology; life-world as a meaningful structure has to prove as a unity and as the constitutive ground of these two strains of understanding, the subjective and the social one. Furthermore, life-world becomes the ground for phenomenological reflection in general and of certain practices. Narrative identity

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[4]Cf. Schapp (2004, p. 126): "*Anscheinend können wir nur über unsere eigenen Geschichten, über ihre Art und Weise, wie wir sie bestehen, wie wir in ihnen verstrickt sind, wie die Verstrickungen zustande kommen, sich lockern oder unentwirrbar werden, zu uns selbst kommen. Es handelt sich dabei nicht um eine künstliche Selbstbetrachtung oder um das, was die Psychologen unter Selbstbetrachtung verstehen mögen, sondern um eine 'Versenkung' in die eigenen Geschichten in der Weise, daß auf diese Geschichten sich neue aufbauen.*"

draws from this potentiality: *Sinngebung* is its existential attitude which can be analyzed by looking at the everyday action space: Firstly in its words and deeds forming habits of biographical relevance in multiple realities and histories; secondly, it can by investigated theoretically on the transcendental grounds of temporality of self and other; but also such investigation can apply a "third way," (or a "third time"[5]) namely reflecting constitution and genesis of a cosmos where our perspective on stories, their various courses we feel doubtful about in memorizing the past or projecting the future, become entangled in such a way that their multiple realities challenge our relation to Self, shared reality, and to Time.

Here, in life stories struggled with and perpetuated in a somewhat *literary* way, self- and mutually reflected narration does not only throw light on the genetic aspect of biographical constitution of reality but also on a social and ethical claim.[6] In such "fictitious" stories we have to process the unfolding of a story as we learn to know it: Not as a result, but from its own development we have to go through, we have to constitute this story in its relevance and meaning by ourselves. Then, we get confronted with constituting our own existential attitude not only to the story but to the facticity of existential attitude which yields to a horizon of meaning and possibilities not lived before and not yet experienced ourselves; only this constitution we can comprehend and maybe judge. Then, narration can serve as an itinerary and grammar of subjective experience.

Literarily figured life histories as one form of artistic approach to understanding our entanglement in (hi)stories exemplarily disclose the narrative constitution of a Self in an eminent way; in fact, since they are not restricted to a simple form of narration as we often experience this in everyday discourse (or also in interviews heading for the "oral history" of our contemporaries), they refer to the openness of any narrative act to be taken up as a new starting point for dealing with life history: not only in an esthetic way as reader or listener but as someone experiencing her own life story, her own experiences in the light of other stories, as someone becoming involved into comprehending stories. Thus, literarily figured life histories exemplarily point at the phenomenological task about how *Sinngebung* and its horizons are never self-contained (cf. Haker 1999, pp. 228f.), and they point at the ways intentionality – and the givenness of its worldly correlates – is brought about in how we communicate with each other (cf. Iser 1993, p. 430).

The example I want to mirror phenomenological deliberation on narrativity with is Uwe Johnson's novel *Anniversaries. From the Life of Gesine Cresspahl*: *Anniversaries* (*Jahrestage*) was originally published in four volumes between 1970 and 1983, but gains its unity only in the accomplishment of the narration: this by enlarging and enriching itself in the course the narrative dialogue takes.

Uwe Johnson's novel frames time from Weimar Republic around the 1930's to the abatement of the Czech reform movements in 1968. Political events – national socialism, World War II, occupation, displacement, the German partition, the regime

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[5]Cf. below pp. 6 and 18.

[6]Cf. below: p. 19.

of East Germany, the reform of socialism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the Vietnam war – are reflected in an exemplary story of a family: narrated or better: refigured by Gesine to her daughter within the year 1968 during 366 days with an entry for each of them; thus, this way of narrating is both history and a story.

The situation of the stranger Gesine in the narrative setting of "Anniversaries" is the following: Gesine was born 3rd of March 1933 in Jerichow in Germany, in a part of the country that later becomes Soviet occupation-zone and afterwards East Germany. She is a single mother who moved to the United States when her daughter was four and who works for a financial institution. Her daughter Marie is a precocious and independent-minded 10-year-old who has readily and completely adopted New York as her home and who only speaks German (sometimes) with her mother.

I will start this coupling of phenomenology and literature under the perspective of narration, memory, and identity with a reading of Schutz and Ricoeur on (1) the problem of how we get access to and shift between finite realities, (2) the constitutive role of narration in social space, and finally (3) the reality history gains in narration as a restitution of memory.

1   What Could We Gain by a Narrative Access to Multiple Realities as Provinces of Meaning? – Mimetic and Symbolic Appresentation and Reference

Narration is always mediated for life-worldly practice and not only displays and states but also (re-)structures, reflects and re-establishes our social knowledge of the life-world in the temporal and perspective flux of reality. But under which conditions do pre-narrative sequences of everyday life become a narration integrating those events not simply taken for granted? Paul Ricoeur sketches out a criteriology of narrativity by his concept of appresentative mimesis of life in its historical ruptures: The everyday lived life as it expresses itself in acting already bears a relation to time which it has to present and represent mimetically; we have to acquit ourselves to time, thus we perform ourselves in time in our everyday action, and then have to restage this in memory, to represent it again which also means to present it anew, conceiving the representation as a potentiality of the narratable: In this process of presentation and representation narrative identity is constituted.

Mimesis as displaying our understanding of the world in our living aims at narrative identity, and it aims at the ways of constituting the self in its ambiguity of inner-, inter- and intra-subjectivity; finally, it structures life's temporal entanglement in histories as we relate ourselves to the multiple perspectives on self, its life-worldly reality with others and within time. Narration is the appropriation of these ambiguous multiple realities the self bears towards the social world and historical time; narrated time bridges the gap between inner, social, and historical time; time as narrated time figures a "third time" gained in relation of history and fiction, in the reception of narration becoming *a* – not the – history (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 397).

Such integrative processes of knowledge and meaning are performed in reflexive and especially in commemorative strategies communicated in narratives in a special way transcending the face-to-face relations of the everyday communications we lead in our world of working; we entangle our contemporaries and their realities with the past and with other persons in past and even future life – stipulating ways they will present and represent this narration within their own lives. Here, the exemplary mode of literature again comes into play: both as a narrated structure of our life-world and a narrative practice of constituting meaning; exemplarily this is, when "objective," everyday structures, their symbols and languages partially fail, and modes of narration have to search for other perspectives, different styles to capture this failure and the loss of structure. This "literary" approach in such broad and existential meaning reflects the habit of narration and the need to somehow invent one's own role as narrator anew.[7] Narration especially becomes relevant in such social structures "in which the meaning of subjective experiences (in memories, attitudes, and explications) is only mediately directed to others or to the results of their acts" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 257).

Thus, narrativity seems to span a large scope: not only of a certain discursive genre or a certain corpus of narrations, but also not a narrative program or praxis designating a course of action as narratives in continuous *narrated* sequences or fixed stories. Such sequential schemes, which are also potencies of performance, are latent narratives that are respectively *narratable*. We are able to narrate such schemes in our habitual, everyday patterns of action. The narratable distinguished from the narrated designates the poles of narrativity: The narratable as latent structure of our action-space, our *Wirkwelt*, mediates temporality in our understanding; and latently it aims at finding a narrated form.

This pre-narrative horizon is the structure of our experience we have in our everyday activity: It refers to a *Vorverständnis*, to a preconception, of the horizon we orient our action space in. Ricoeur terms these everyday habits "*figurating*" time in our everyday working space as "*Mimesis I.*" This pre-narrative horizon gains a more complex dimension by memory: It enters a conceptual, a fictional realm where temporality is *configured* by structures of causes, reasons, means, and ends, insofar as the subjective presence of action space and its immediate experience is expressed in a horizon of narrated memory, gaining a distance to its prefigured reality of action space; such configurations bear a mimetic reality ("*Mimesis II*") as it is narrated face to face.[8] Its refiguration in a temporal framework where constitution

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[7] I see here a concretization of Schutz's short notion on reconstitution of experience: "Besides, naturally intersubjective thematic relevances can be used again and again in the verification of the congruence of the schemata of experience and explication 'brought into' a We-relation by the partners. This plays an important role, especially in situations where (for one reason or another) language 'breaks down'" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 255).

[8] I hold forth about Ricoeur's analyses about the differences between historiographical and fictional types of mimetic narration: Both of them are similar in their basic structure of expressing reality, since both of them aim at reception of this figurate reality, taking it up and consummating it by relating the story to a realm of praxis in its temporality.

of memory becomes thematized itself and opens to collectively memorized time[9] finds its reality in the praxis of mutual reflection – or commemoration: "*Mimesis III*'" where subjective habits of expressing reality and action and narration gain a metaphorical reference over time and space, a context of interpretation (cf. Ricoeur 1988, p. 9) – a "third time." Here, the finite temporal horizons as they are closed as past reality or as an unalterable sequence of everyday routines of everlasting present, or even as routine anticipation of future events get transcended towards another way to present this past, present or future "Here and Now" in narration. As such a presentation it becomes relevant to our present world of working as a symbolical inclusion of something not present any longer or not yet present.

Thus, the intersubjective and especially the inter-generative life-world are constituted step by step in experience and its refigurations; only then, memory is constituted not only according to relevance but also to a historical horizon where the relevances of paramount reality fall prey to doubt. Only then does it get differentiated into the temporal horizon we situate ourselves in as contemporaries, predecessors, or successors, and it is differentiated into private and collective knowledge. Also, "finite provinces of meaning" differentiate themselves "upon which we bestow the accent of reality"; and only then can "we emphasize that it is the meaning of our experiences, and not the ontological structure of the objects, which constitutes reality" (Schutz 1962, p. 341).

Thus, reality means relation to our emotional (pathic)[10] and active (gnostic) life in our individual and collective habits and styles of living and leading our lives. But how are characteristics of this style linked to our experience? Schutz names a specific tension of consciousness, a specific perspective on time, an individual style of self-experience, and a social framework. There is a subjective and a collective side taking a share in these styles and habits, yet the focus lies on an inter-subjective participation in these finite provinces of meaning. As such we are always referred to a certain style of activity or better practice rooted in factual life-world:

> [I]n all cases in which such an inter-subjective participation in one of these provinces takes place, the existence of 'a material occasion or a material endowment' is presupposed. In other words, communication occurs by objects, facts, or events pertaining to the paramount reality of the senses, of the outer world, which are, however, appresentationally apperceived. This holds good also for symbolic appresentations, in so far as they are communicated or designed to be communicable. (Schutz 1962, pp. 342f.)

Yet, in memory, in differentiating the finite provinces of meaning – not only synchronically as "phantasy" opposed to "theoretical science," but diachronically as deferrals and adjustments in experiencing our lived life in its temporality – we

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[9]E.g. the commemorative act where such multiple realities are reflected in their incoherency and finally, in their possible relations.

[10]Cf. E. Straus: The gnostic moment is related to the qualitative side of perceiving objects, or the *what* of meaning being displayed in perception; the pathic moment is related to the *how* of the givenness of our world.

Sympathetic relationship is due to our sensing, prior to the gnostic intentional mode of perceiving. Cf. Straus 1956 esp. pp. 329–350.

also transcend particular finite provinces of meaning: They are no longer separated, but also entangled with the story of our life and in narration with the lives of others. Memory – now as a paramount (not only finite) reality – does not simply encompass the finite provinces of meaning, but means a further attitude towards their multiplicity: an attitude which has to deal with their finitude *and* the possibilities to counter their finitude in interpreting and rearranging them in narration.

Symbolic appresentation especially concerns our experiences in and with the past – or in Schutz's words:

> all appresentational references [. . .] are characterized by a specific transcendence of the appresented object in relation to the actual "Here and Now" of the interpreter. [. . .] The symbolic reference, however, is characterized by the fact that it transcends the finite province of meaning of everyday life so that only the appresenting member of the related pair (the symbol or the story recounted to appresent the past, A.H.) pertains to it, whereas the appresented member (the persons and facts, the past experiences being remembered in the story, A.H.) has its reality in another finite province of meaning. (Schutz 1962, p. 343)

Entering the past by the narrative, entering a narrative world means to enter another province of meaning – but now with the attitude to mark this change, this transcendence, to mark the genesis of rupture and transcendence.

Social collectives – and their stock of knowledge constituting cosmological history – are not within the province of meaning of everyday reality; they have their reality in another province – what William James calls "the subuniverse of ideal relations," or a comprehensive order we only gain in reorienting ourselves or in configuring our reality in a second order mimesis: This forms their symbolical status in apprehension (cf. Schutz 1962. p. 353). For our pre-narrative knowledge of reality (with us lacking our memories in order to reassure this knowledge)[11] does not simply mean translating meaning of everyday reality into somewhat analogous historical relations, but it presses to narratively operate with and communicate our memory.

The paramount reality the past has gained in the action of narrating seems to be "fictitious"; yet, the reality not only of a narrated world, but first of all as a mode of the world of working as long as we remember and narratively communicate it, gains its own right, relevance, and meaning: In engaging with the past, the paramount reality of the "Here and Now" – our working world, we do not put into question – becomes troubled itself. In engaging with the past, entering the "province of narration" we break the demarcation lines of separate finite provinces: Their orders, the relevance-principle of "First things first" lose their coherency, plausibility, and validity, which are necessary to maintain trust in them; but they are also necessary to communicate one's own reality to somebody else.

This appresentation of a past – providing a relevance for the present – is symbolical, substituting something missing – and has to be life-worldly rooted again via a practice by which we share past and future worlds in a narrative approach to provinces of meaning. It is especially the structure of generativity that links narrative

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[11]The face-to-face-relations of the past transcends the existence of consociates within the paramount reality.

and universal cosmological time: The line of successors is both a biological fact and an artificial figuration of remembrance. We enlarge memory via the line of memories of our predecessors or even further into the past in imagination; also it is possible to situate my time in the generative calendric time. The historically opened field of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors schematizes the anthropological relation of biological or cosmological time and cultural time of reconstruction of present, past, and future life-world (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 298).

The symbolical aspect of the generational line of succession relies in the appresentations of predecessors and successors, and its appresentations become operative in narration of the past: In representation, which is also a new presentation of a reality for the "Here and Now", it becomes an appresentation of the dead, and their presence is addressing next generations, as predecessors and successors replace the points of views of us contemporaries.[12] But this is achieved only as these generations are appresented in narration and its symbols, since only then, appresentation is inserted in a paramount reality of working, of a perpetuation of (commemorative) communication – configuring and refiguring time as Paul Ricoeur claims this for narrativity. One example we find in Johnson's novel where the place of birth, the house and hometown of Gesine – the narrator and character of this story – becomes a *lieu de memoire* which is narrated and thus alters time and again. These alterations track and incite her narration in order to gain a shared reality for the multiple identities she finds herself divided into within her life-story and not least for her young daughter Marie.

Yet, the demarcation line of the world of my present fellow persons and the world of the past, the temporal indices of proximity and distance become blurred; finitude which usually provides consistency and compatibility of the multiple coexisting provinces of meaning in the world of everyday life becomes troublesome itself. Here, the symbol – or the narrative mode of memory – baffles common structures of experience and their order of time.

Still, in remembering, constitutive structures of experience remain intact in so far as they might provide a ground for inter-subjective participation; remembering manifests narration, and narration on the other hand leads to further manifestations of interpretational and motivating relevances (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 256f.). In narration the mode of addressing attention to the stepwise constitution of provinces of meaning is symbolized itself by certain approaches the narration takes to introduce the past into the presences: In Gesine's case, this happens via a change of language – not only from English into German, but also in her local dialect, indicating her own relocation to the time she was a child living through the story she is telling; her daughter gets attentive to these switches, sometimes even prompts Gesine to take another turn when intuitively feeling that Gesine is not ready to confront herself with remembrance she has not come to terms with herself. An other example for narratively introducing the past into the presence is a

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[12]The anthropological archetype of biography is the commemoration of the dead – as fundament for cultural mnemotechniques but also as motivation for individual (autobiographical) memory (cf. Assmann 1992, p. 33).

certain ritual to start another part of the story by taking up photographs, depicting the persons on them, introducing new characters into the story, and step by step embedding them into a broader perspective. Here, symbolizing is not only rooted in "a material occasion or a material endowment" but in the sociality – time, space, and reality – constituted by the attention of a narrator and her listener (the We-relation); by their emotional tension and the way each of these two persons *becomes* involved in past experiences gained in narrating and listening. World and time of the past are *definitely* closed, but they become potent and fecund again for present horizons of meaning: They become relevant again.[13] Narration re-establishes simultaneity with the "world of predecessors, history, and generations" – but what does such kind of fictional province *by means of its entanglement with facts* or at least *by its inner drive to root itself in facts represented anew in narration* mean for a notion of reality transcending the presence of face-to-face in narration?

2   The Narrative Constitution of Social Space

"Under what circumstances do we think things real?" – This is the focal point of Schutz's discussion and of the problem of indefinite multiple realities and finite provinces of meaning. Each of these universes is claimed to have its separate style of existence which nevertheless can be grouped in a hierarchical order: The world of senses or physical "things" as experienced by common sense, which is the paramount reality; going down the order, there are "the world of science; the world of ideal relations; of 'idols of the tribe'; the supernatural worlds, such as the Christian heaven and hell; the numerous worlds of individual opinion; and finally, the worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also infinitely numerous" (Schutz 1964, p. 136).

I have cited these lines Schutz uses in several contexts; here in his essay on "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality", Schutz's application of his phenomenological method on a piece of literature. This particular place where Schutz makes use of his insight on multiple realities is important to me, since here is a possibility to give the role and range of "reality" a further perspective: Schutz continues in outlining his attempt to "analyze the problem of reality in Cervantes' *Don Quixote*": "This is not the place to investigate by what means mind bestows an accent of reality on one of these sub-universes and withdraws it from others; nor how the transition from one realm of reality to the other occurs; nor finally, what features of consciousness characterize the various provinces or sub-universes of reality" (Schutz 1964, p. 136).

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[13]Cf.: "The dividing line between the world of my contemporaries and that of my predecessors is not sharp. I can surely view all memories of my own experiences of Others as experience of past social reality. Indeed, as we have just remarked, the constitutive characteristics of these experiences are preserved in such memories. These are experiences in which Others were present in simultaneity with my life" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 88f.).

Schutz's interest is how Cervantes' novelistic structure deals and comes to terms with the experience of multiple realities and their plausibility, since Don Quixote's private reality neither is presented as a solipsistic one nor as unshareable with others. Both Don Quixote's sub-universe of madness and the paramount reality of the senses, in which the other persons of the novel live and act, contain "enclaves of experience transcending the sub-universes taken for granted by either Don Quixote or Sancho Panza and referring to other realms of reality not compatible with either of them" (Schutz 1964, pp. 136f.).

Cervantes presents a tableau of synchronous realities which become confronted with each other; nevertheless these differing realities find mutual structures and practices of co-existence or rather "workable interpretations of the everyday" – yet drawn from rather shallow explanatory patterns of shared knowledge, right at hand for a smooth way of doing away with a disturbing or even a "pathological" experience: Don Quixote's reality and the realities of his fellow persons get translated into each other by a simple immanent function of common knowledge: All irritations are due to the magical enchanters Don Quixote takes for granted, and Sancho Panza grants reality in adopting his master's habit; thus, it is a shared knowledge in their mutual practice travelling together, though the two of them deal with this reality differently. But this is only one pragmatic way to deal with the edges of common sense and to make it work convincingly, since this depends so much on a diligent rhetorical struggle and on the belief that our consociate *vis-à-vis* will react as we anticipate that he will – in Don Quixote's case this means he is stigmatized as a hopeless case of deceived perception and idiosyncratic habit.

The other side of convincing, comprehensive, and interpretive narrative structures is not only to make believe various persons into a shared reality where communication and joint action is possible, but also to provide a common ground on which we can explore this reality together: not only in making everyday action work, but also in sharing our task of narrating this reality and thereby to jointly reflect about what and how we share this narrative working. Only this would mean that both Don Quixote and Sancho Panza would enter the fictitious world as a (possible) paramount reality within their working world and not drop back into private fantasies (as Don Quixote in his delusional state) or into more or less patiently correcting a socially dysfunctional behavior (as Sancho Panza does or also Gesine when realizing her soliloquies in front of others[14]).

For mediating the past world appresented in memory with the present everyday world I am addressing my story to, this also means a struggle to regain a reality where action-space has lost its ground in stable identities of the person acting in it: Identities *seem* to regain *a narrated* plausibility, if the toil of commemorating is undergone. Such narration is a process of realizing the possibilities of existence in past, present and future – in a simultaneity of a life-world to be regained, whereas the respective realities remain in diachronous line as long as they only function as one particular finite province of meaning experienced by one person in her past

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[14]Cf. below., footnote 16.

(or her fantasy) and now are represented as one separate part of her biography. Only if they get presented as a paramount reality in communicated narration entangling others and their stories, entangling the action of listening and following the time lines, and finally achieving them as history as a mimesis of the past for the present: Only then they are shared multiple realities transcending their finite[15] meanings and constituting an awareness of the genesis Self, World, and Time in their relevant structures have undergone in this narrative process.

Thus, there is a narrative claim not only to the story-teller but also to the listener or reader: a claim to enter the narrative world and to introduce it into one's own reality, shaping one's own subjective attitude towards the narrative process. Again: It is narration as a process of memory and the collective activity of commemoration establishing the historicality of the world (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 92f.).

Thus, reality is not a final result of a narrative rhetoric, but narration as practice of commemoration is a particular and paramount reality as it becomes a world of working in its own right: We not only prompt an act of fictitious narration, but in narrating we also constitute a world of working, a world which taints our everyday life, which alters our everyday's attitudes and relevances and preoccupations as we go on with other tasks.[16] Gaining its style of existence and of experience measures up to a need, even to an urge to reconstitute not only a common ground for cognition and thinking (remember W. James' question "under what circumstances do we think things real?"); furthermore, it reconstitutes a ground for styles of existence where we are able to start to regain possibilities: possibilities to judge realities in order to act and to live on contentedly with the confrontations between the multiple realities we have to share in our life-world of the everyday.

Fiction does not necessarily find its limits in a closed province of meaning or an imagined compound of reality. Rather, it enables an imaginative power to root narration in and as reality, to entangle it with other perspectives; thus, it transcends finitude, without leaving reality behind. In this sense, the fictitious bears a reality in its interplay with imagination: the fictitious functions as an authority to exemplify the imaginary beyond its pragmatic use – and this without getting torn away by delusion as in dreams or hallucinations (cf. Iser 1993, p. 381). By this entanglement with other stories and its endeavor to manifest its place among and with them, narration is oriented to a Thou, not only mimetically to objects in the world; it is already pre-predicatively (prior to a particular story[17]) and pre-reflexively (prior

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[15]Finite insofar as this reality is attached to one intimate personality only or to a time gone by which is sealed within a person's memory.

[16]Sometimes, these different worlds merge into each other within our narrative preoccupation. Again, Gesine gives an example for this, looking for faces of her German past in the streets of Manhattan, arguing with characters of the story she told her daughter the last night, sometimes aloud; whenever she notices this, she ashamedly tries to explain to people present around her.

[17]The everyday life which is lived through pre-predicatively gains a temporal structure and a rough form by the means and ends of our acting. Nevertheless, it is not yet a story with a back- and foreground, against which it stands out as particular and memorable. Only then it would become a *fabula* – ready to be narratable.

to a particular plot[18]) directed to myself being with others: not only as direct communication, but on the grounds of transcending its closed finite province to prove reality for oneself and for others.

Narration – its quest directed to history of "what has been?", its quest directed to the personal life story of "how come that I am here and now and in such a state to place this question," finally its immanent problem to resolve such interrogation of personal identity into a narratable story – displays and enacts a care for life-world as a meaningful action space; narration gains force especially then when the handing down of structures of meaning no longer takes place by fixed symbols and roles; even more: It is a need and a care for trust in the narrated memory we share in commemoration. Here, narration needs composing as base for reflection. Thus, one realizes both in how far history and fiction concretize their intentionality towards a paramount reality in borrowing from each other faithfulness to facticity and trust in multiplicity or even plurality. History needs the narrative mode of fiction and fiction the historical intentionality of veracity (cf. Ricoeur 1991, p. 295). – What becomes manifest in literature is – following Ricoeur – on the one hand a reflection on pre-narrative reality (past and closed to subjective privacy) and the way we constitute identity in face of history of other lives and their stories; on the other hand, narrative communication has a repercussion on our understanding of life stories and shared life-worlds in general (cf. Haker 1999, p. 212).

3 Narration as a Restitution of Memory and the Multiple Realities of History

Uwe Johnson exemplifies this reflective narrative mode in his literary way to present life stories in performing the problematic act of narration; in fact, his novel narrates life stories as a reflection on how life story becomes narratable. The plot of Johnson's *Anniversaries* has its source in the commemoration of strangers; the place they have arrived at to leave their origins behind is "not a shelter but a field of adventure, not a matter of course but a questionable topic of investigation, not an instrument for disentangling problematic situations but a problematic situation itself and one hard to master" (Schutz 1964, p. 104). That it is hard to master is also due to the loss of regular patterns provided by the past: For Johnson's stranger Gesine, past is a potpourri of traumatic pieces she finds her memory and its recollections shattered into; her life history is full of kaleidoscopic realities she reluctantly tries to recount herself and to her daughter, tries to tell to someone with a lack of such

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[18]A plot is a discursive structure when the narratable story becomes narrated, when the simple structure of "inacted time" (b after a) becomes complex – not only due to reasons and effects but to possibilities of what has or might have happened, of what might happen in the future; and of course of what and why might be remembered or forgotten and of what might be narrated now and especially: what might be narrated how.

dialogical but occasionally interrupted by what she cannot explain to Marie: Shifting from recounted history in conversation to letters, to inner dialogues of Gesine, to a taped diary for Marie to listen in future time with Marie having another distance to her own past.

Extracting memory, configuring and refiguring time, Gesine tries to give reality to her childhood, her own pre-narrative time; she tries to document her doubts about what was told to her about her family, about people suddenly missing in her childhood world – secretly displaced by Nazi and Communist henchmen; she tries to document the various stories she was told, she tries to give her vague memories and her nightmares a background in narratives which are sound to her audience. Thus, Gesine aims at assuring her identity in time and space, in the framework of *possible*, *not merely fictional* reality. Finally this labor aims at Gesine's conviction to provide Marie with her own roots in the past, as there is nobody except Gesine to give a report about Marie's pre-narrative past. With time passing, Marie herself prompts her mother to narrate and record the seemingly infinite multitude of memorabilia to tell a story of how it has been or how it might have been, to reassure both about a past reality and what it can hold for in the present.[19]

At first, Marie only presses for stories as entertainment: "But what she wants to know is not a past, not even hers. To her it is an exhibition of possibilities, against which she believes to be immune; it is history in another sense" (Johnson 1993, p. 296). – Getting word of other realities – possibilities – does not trouble Marie's own reality and it does not transcend it. Thus, often there is wariness on both sides, about what might be revealed of the sheer weight of memories, about what both Gesine and Marie can stand and understand, but typically both of them are comforted by their agreement: To anchor a narration in the perspective "For when I am dead? – Yes. For when you are dead (and I will live on)." For this reason, Gesine tapes the confession why she might not be able to endure and about her suicidal thoughts, which she deposits for Marie until she has attained full age.

Finally, Marie shapes her own story (and her own symbols as a collection of newspaper-clippings of the present serving as "her present knowledge" of what is taking place around her, but at the same time it serves as images to relate to Gesine's stories) of Gesine's narration which has to stand the test to last as common ground for their investigation. If nothing else, narration gains its relevance in symbolizing the dead and the not bygone past; there are the dead of the past to be commemorated in their no longer speaking, yet nevertheless haunting the present memory: Commemorating them – providing a reality that transcends the past everyday life – might turn out to be more troublesome then the very "Here and Now." The dead and their passed away possibilities of meaningful reality place a demand on our care for this reality relevant for the here and now and for a critical

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[19] "*Du wirst von mit sagen können: Meine Mutter war eine ziemlich unordentliche Person. [. . .] Wäre aber gern ordentlich gewesen, unbeeinflußt von Biograpie und Vergangenheit, mit richtigem Leben, in einer richtigen Zeit, mit den richtigen Leuten, zu einem richtigen Zweck. Ich kenne die Vorschriften*" (Johnson 1993 II, p. 889).

approach to the closed province of meaning in the past. Marie has to adjust her view to the logic of narration – no longer being a simple pastime: She has to adjust to what, how, and when Gesine narrates, if she wants to find a way to criticize what she is presented as history; and in taking up the claim Gesine's story puts on her, she becomes a critical interlocutor: The history as "mere" and "raw facts" enriches doubts on what has happened; the stories' different perspectives get confronted with each other. In the end, history will only have its facticity as carefully plotted narration.

Other means of access to the past include photographs, letters, newspapers, and the voices of Gesine's dead family and friends, who live on in her mind. The daily life of New York is registered by such diverse means as the *New York Times*, television, photographs, and dialogues between Gesine and Marie explicitly on today's news and their demands.[20] Here, the present prompts the way of commemorating the past: As a blast in the neighborhood of Gesine and Marie leads to the story of how Gesine's cousins died and burnt in an allied air-raid; as a Manhattan gang slaughter prompts the story of the fist dead person relevant to Gesine's life: a child murdered at "Kristallnacht."

But in this diversity, all of it serves the shared attempt to explain the fact Gesine assures Marie of: "Where I have come from, this place does no longer exist" – since a stable base for commemoration is lacking. It is an attempt not to explain how things have been, but how they might have been; and the multiplicity of narrative and dialogical styles is constitutive for this it is only in narration that this multiplicity can gain meaning for a life with the index of an "every day's reality," which becomes paramount as both of them sit together telling stories and listening to them. Since this is a paramount reality for their times at night after Gesine has come back from work and at weekends of extended narrative settings, since it takes a ritual function for their mutual life, they also can leave it for going to work, going to school, trusting in entering again this past world. Thus, only as a stable reality with its own right, the fictitious gains such a shape to be differentiated into doubtful and trustworthy memories. Only as it gains shape, it can be bridged with daily life, and it can be left and re-entered voluntarily and not by traumatic force of sudden memory.

This narration of Gesine's course of life exceeds a mere autobiographical remembering: Gesine realizes how perspectives and speculations about the past become confronted with others. Her own strand of narrating is supplemented by conversations with her father and her mother she recalls or even invents as they might have been possible if there had been a longer time together with her dead mother and herself starting to talk to each other; finally, her own narration is supplemented with documentary facts she investigates for – and thus, perspectives confronting each other also give shape to the former end- and aimless imaginations. "There is no univocality in the process-related character of narration – and this keeps genesis of a life story between truth and fiction" (Haker 1999, p. 229).

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[20]Cf. Riordan (1989, esp. p. 65) for the documentary background.

Narration unfolds in the mode of the possible: It is a "possibility which nobody else than you could you could fathom out. What you think of your past is reality as well" (Johnson 1993, p. 671). – as Marie reassures Gesine. One reason for such merit of memory is the arduousness Gesine takes to link images of memory with her present commemoration of the past when she wants Marie to imagine what has happened; by this, she reconstitutes her own steps back into the past: She *invents* what might have been – not what has been; and thus, her story can be corrected, enlarged, and criticized, but this critique does not devaluate it; rather it reassures the trust in the narratable multiplicity of the fictitious which itself is able to assure reality.

Fiction is invention and imagination under the auspices of forced memory; it is not a question of make-believe, and it is not an aesthetization of imagination for multiplicity's sake. Only if we transcend imagination and the imagined to exemplary imagination as such – as is narration –, only then do we gain knowledge about "possible experience" and "reality"; only when living in experience and from there holding on to imagination, only when contrasting experience with imagination, one can have a concept of fictionality and reality. Such transgression of finite provinces of meaning in positing them as such distinguishes fictionality from delusion:

> Only if we phantasy and pass from the attitude of living in the phantasy [. . .] to the given realities, and if we, thus, transgress the single casual phantasying and its phantasm, taking both as examples for possible phantasying as such and fiction as such, then we obtain on the one hand the concepts fiction (respectively, phantasying) and on the other hand the concepts "possible experience as such" and "reality" [. . .] We cannot say that he who phantasies and lives in the world of phantasms (the "dreamer"), posits fictions *qua* fictions, but he has modified realities, "realities as if" [. . .]. Only he who lives in experiences and reaches from there into the world of phantasms can, provided that the phantasm contrasts with the experienced, have the concepts fiction and reality. (Schutz 1962, p. 238)[21]

Compared to this standard Don Quixote does not leave his finite province of meaning but replaces it with the world of working; he never trespasses the latter – this is his delusion (cf. Schutz 1962, p. 236). Yet, in Gesine's reconstruction, the past in order to explain inconsistencies between its "finite provinces" develops its own interpretative rules for narrating as the dialogue with Marie grows over the year: By this, it becomes their own province of meaning where they can test their doubts and reassure them.[22]

Experience of and not only *in* reality as in a pre-narrative orientation of everyday action leads to a capacity for distinguishing the narratable and the narrated according to a "specific time-perspective (the standard time originating in an intersection between *durée* and cosmic time as the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world)" (Schutz 1962, pp. 230f.). Narration as "third province,"

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[21]The German text has "experience" as a general noun: "*Erst wer in der Erfahrung lebt und von da aus in die Phantasie 'hineinfaßt', wobei das Phantasierte mit dem Erfahrenen kontrastiert, kann die Begriffe Fiktion und Wirklichkeit haben*" (Husserl 1999, Par 74a, S. 360).

[22]Cf. Schutz: "[. . .] in order to explain the inconsistencies between two sub-universes, we have to resort to the interpretational rules constitutive of a third one" (Schutz 1964, p. 155).

and narrative time as "third time," (what Ricoeur also terms "intersection" between the various claims of realities or concretely: the face-to-face-obligation between narrator and listener) constitute a field for intersubjectivity in its temporal and historical genesis. For example, this is the time of Gesine and Marie interrogating each other, being in touch with each other in the presence of constituting a world of the past reaching into past and its relevance for their present life being bound to the here and now. In this time, the narration opens a space for mirroring their affectivity, their involvement with the past. In this pathetic space both of them become sensitive for meanings the narration explicitly – and much more implicitly and latently – holds: meanings which have to become manifested within in this time and space – and beyond.

Exploring the narratable by narration in action and its works, the stories, in an ongoing project of both memory (of one) and commemoration (of at least two, getting entangled with the stories of their contemporaries, successors, and predecessors) is not merely the production of fiction but constitution of a life-world in its temporal and historical style not to be directly objectified – a life-world entangled in (hi)stories. This is a life-world we are bound to as we gain our identity from it to become a Self within the ruptures of time as it becomes historical. On the one hand with this runs that we are also historically *indebted* with an ethical condition of our Self as we gain it in narration. From this debt we gain our social reality not as simply constructed, but as a multiplicity that becomes a claim over and over again to challenge the foundations of our life-history, of its genesis and of the narrative communication by which it is presented: What does this multiplicity – not only what has been, but what might have been – mean to the present act of refiguring this story? How does this multiplicity prompt myself and others to refigure the time? How can this present narration be "guardian of time" in order not to be lost in paramount realities prevailing over this certain past? Passing on narrative frames for the possibility to discover both the temporal and historical dimension of our life-world is not only a duty imposed by a social reality but also by our personal condition to gain our own narrative identities – our life stories. This is the "third time" Ricoeur speaks of, and this is the reality narrativity constitutes as structure for social and individual categories of our biographical articulation.[23]

Such a structure, which Johnson unfolds and reflects on in the setting of his novel – and Gesine reveals in her narration both to herself and to Marie – is contrary to memory understood as mere storage. Such storage renders simply parts which seem to be variably at will and thus incongruent, but it is not invested for reproduction and reconstitution. Such memory might be effective, but will never be complete, coherent, or controllable, since exactly this would mean to expel the

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[23]Cf. Schutz on this difference: "The relative-natural world view, viz., the social categories of biographical articulation which are contained in it, are in contrast experienced by the individual as something in the life-world to be overcome, as belonging to the potential zone of operation surrounding his life. The categories of biographical articulation are thus not boundary conditions of the lifeworldly situation, but are possibilities for leading life within this situation" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 94).

past into a sealed mental compartment, where it remains devoid of life and feeling (cf. Riordan 1989, p. 115).

Quite contrarily, it is invention where memory is reconstituted as a long forgotten, even unknown story: Then its personnel, the person's actions, places and times get intrinsically involved with each other. In this case – with fiction coming into interplay with history – life stories exceed mere biographical remembrance and become the "guardian of time," become the guardian of the past with its "subjective meaning" and relevance it had, when itself was in *statu nascendi*; then, narration gains comprehensiveness in a reflexive sense. Now these parameters of a person's actions, places, and time perform in their own right: as they might and ought to have occurred and acted. But this only manifests itself as we feel obliged to these parameters – or better: to our very own personal stakes – in our narration, since the past of the dead become past relevant to our present. We draw on certain general, non-specific aspects of the present, on symbols, if necessary.[24] Those aspects are fictionally transformed. We are rendering them justice and our narration renders trust and a coherent ground to live with, if only narration becomes a mutual process along with a doubt in finite provinces of meaning easily transformed into each other as in Don Quixote's case.

Motivation for memory is extracted from the present and applied to the reconstruction of the past. Narration serves as inter-subjective reflection, covering not only attentiveness on "the same topic," but also on the way we develop such attentiveness and an interpretation (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 255).[25]

The history we gain in such labor of (com-) memoration is never a "mere fact," and facticity is not applicable as demarcation to memory and reality. Also, the biography, the narrative identity, is not an object we try to come close to in the narration, but it is a medium for understanding, since it consists of the processes as a "labor of narration": not only mirroring in a "general fashion" of articulation; no historicity without narration, without the shared activity of narrative interpretation in an inter-subjective situation of interest, critique, and last but not least: trust, ranging from the proximity of a "We" to the distant and anonymous "Them" of the dead commemorated.[26] With the narration unfolding, mother, daughter, and the readers

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[24]In *Anniversaries* the photographs displayed in the "New York Times" Gesine and Mary come by each day and discuss for their intention to display atrocities in Vietnam and their justification or abolishment, lead Gesine to choose occurrences of her life 30 years ago: refiguring this time, illustrating what she only has pre-narrative memory of and what also is out of range to experience for Mary herself (a dead body, burning houses after a bomb-attack).

[25]Cf. about the role which "intersubjective thematic relevances play in 'socialization' of the interpretational and motivational relevances": "even if we assume that the latter context, in which a particular theme is first given to partners in a we-relation, is different, not only is the attentional advertence (to the 'same' theme) co-apprehended in the processes of intersubjective mirroring, but so also is the kind of grasping and, at least in rudimentary form, the kind of interpretation on the part of the partner." (ibid.).

[26]Even those Gesine does not know about much but can only speculate about their histories, motives, perspectives in the narration that unfolds between daughter and mother.

not only invent but establish and broaden their own specific situation, their shared finite province of meaning where stories become both trustworthy and criticizable: Trust and critique secure this paramount reality for the possibility of a shared action-space, transcending again the commemorative practice towards other objects, aims, times, and places.

Here, we have "Narrative Transcendences" – from *Mimesis II* to *Mimesis III*, from the pathic endurance of a lived time in memory to reconfiguring new horizons for activity: a passage from the inflicted to the open elements of situation which I can change not only by action (as it might have been possible back in time when past was a working world of presence) alone but by and in all kinds of ways as wishes, hopes, and fears.[27] Narration answers to the problematic situation of the practices how to interpret memory in face of another Self (both myself and the other of myself); interpretation as a phenomenon of narrative practices clarifies the blurred dimensions of my life-world where and by which I encounter the tasks of the everyday. By narration we gain experience, since experience is not only a result of facts but for the most part imagination, reflection, and repetitive commemoration. Narration means to symbolize experience in order to render back a past, admitting one's guilt of the partiality of memory: A narrative redemption does not only soothe a stranger's memory of a shattered past but provides (social) knowledge of both facts and the multiplicity of realities we are confronted with.

Comprehensiveness aimed at by a sociology on phenomenological grounds can find its perspectives in the art of fiction, in the practice of fictionality as it is undertaken in our "living-in-stories." Phenomenology and Social Sciences analyzing how works of arts draw our attention towards the integration of multiple realities through time not only aim at special techniques applied by "*homo symbolicus*", but they aim at the central way our multiple realities constitute themselves temporally, historically, and biographically in narration. This is a way towards an assumed transcendence of finite provinces of meaning, sealed by time, yet also opened by the "third time" of narration.

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[27]Cf.: "Here we are at the transition from the imposed to the 'open' elements of the situation. I can no longer change the previous history of the situation, but within the present situation there are elements which I can influence, which I can change" Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p. 114).

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"The Universe that Others Call the Library": Reconstructing the Symbolic Mystifications of the World of Everyday Life

Jochen Dreher

1 Introduction

Reflections at the interface of phenomenology and the social sciences specifically serve for the interpretation of artistic works, especially literature, because of their potential to investigate the triangular relationship of author, aesthetic work and recipient. I will argue furthermore that this theoretical conception opens up a particular perspective to reconstruct the interference of diverse symbolically established reality spheres that are part of the artistic creation. This analysis aims at outlining reflections on the life-world on the basis of Alfred Schutz's phenomenological and sociological conception, to be able to establish a starting point for the interpretation of art works, in this case, literature. This perspective will serve to interpret the famous story "The Library of Babel" by the Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges.

The Schutzian theory of the life-world is based on the assumption that the individual's life-world divides itself into the dimensions of space, time, the social world, and various reality spheres which form the boundaries or transcendences the "I" has to understand and integrate. Experiences originating from everyday transcending multiple reality spheres, e.g. the world of arts, science, religion, imagination, dream, etc., can be communicated with the help of symbols (Schutz 1962/1955). That way, these realities are intersubjectively reached by means of symbols; this becomes especially obvious if the creation and experience of art works has to be explained. I will argue that such a conception of the life-world especially serves to understand the interconnection and mingling of reality spheres within literary works and functions as the basis to establish a specific conception for the interpretation of the art work as a holistic entity.

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My reflections are based on Alfred Schutz's interpretation of Goethe's favorite novel "Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travel," which start from the idea of an identification and reconstruction of different rationalities within Goethe's work (Schütz 1948). Schutz tries to describe the "logic of the poetic event," which contradicts the logic of everyday life as well as rational thinking. In this sense, "formal logic," or the "logic of the poetic event," is a variation out of a horizon of possibilities and does not have an absolute status. In relation to that, the literary work "Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travel" unites diverse reality spheres with different rationalities what can be perfectly demonstrated using a phenomenological theory of the life-world. Schutz's phenomenologically inspired analysis of the "Years of Travel" reconstructs the "logic" of this literary art work from a holistic perspective, defending Goethe against his critics who discredited this novel as the meaningless creation of an elderly genius. Schutz's methodical course of action applied to the interpretation of Goethe's work will now serve to analyze a short story by the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges with the title "The Library of Babel" (Borges 1962a/1941).

Starting from phenomenological and sociological assumptions, I will concentrate on the approach of a theory of the life-world and will use it to analyze this particular work by Borges which briefly speaking is characterized as an amalgamation of realism and fantasy. It will be demonstrated how phenomenological life-world analysis can be applied to decipher the internal "logic of the poetic event" being present within Borges' favorite essay "The Library of Babel." The application of a theory of the life-world to literary analysis will be achieved through a modification of this theory of the life-world in relation to the symbolically established inter-connection of reality spheres. These spheres cannot exclusively be separated from each other, but overlap and intersect, still contributing to the holistic establishing of the "logic of the poetic event." Alfred Schutz's general assumption in relation to a phenomenological-sociological analysis of the arts was that "art, among other things, is the conscious reinterpretation of structures of relevance in the life-world" (Schütz 1948, p. 49). Beyond that he was also of the opinion that the "imagined [. . .] is not bound to the borders, that are connected to the demand of enforceability in everyday life" (Schütz 1948, p. 49/936).

Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that Schutz's interpretative approach, based on his theory of the life-world and the symbol, is especially apt for the analysis of aesthetic forms, as it is capable of comprehending the interrelationship of the author, the artistic work, and the recipient. Therefore, it exhibits an affinity with the literary position of reception theory which is developed out of phenomenology as well. This direction of thought also emanates from the triangular relationship of author, work, and audience, whereas the latter is not to be viewed as passive: without the active participation of an addressee, a literary work would not be possible. Only with the help of reader's procurement does the work step into the horizon of experience of a continuity, in which a production exceeding established aesthetic norms by active reception takes place (Jauss 1982, p. 4). The specific participation of the reader within the functioning of the literary work is also highly relevant for Borges who plays with the reader presenting supposedly everyday situations and

objects while at the same time fictional or imaginary elements are introduced into the story. The real and the fictional cannot be separated from each other for Borges; diverse reality spheres within the literary work coexist and do have a comparable relevance.

2 "The Universe That Others Call the Library": A Life-World Theoretical Analysis of the Symbolism of Jorge Luis Borges' "Library of Babel"

> The universe (which others call the Library) is composed of an indefinite, perhaps an infinite, number of hexagonal galleries, with enormous ventilation shafts in the middle, encircled by very low railings. From any hexagon the upper or lower stories are visible, interminably. (Borges 1962a/1941, p. 79)

With these words Jorge Luis Borges begins one of his possibly most popular narratives, "The Library of Babel," which he published in his *Fictions* in 1941. The following analysis of how the symbolism represented in Borges' text functions aims to illustrate from a phenomenological-sociological perspective the different symbolic relations between reality spheres, which pertain to sub-universes, in which the author and reader immerse themselves. In principle, my aim is to demonstrate to what extent phenomenologically inspired sociology of knowledge can be useful for the understanding of Borges' work. By no means do I strive for a critical literary analysis of the text, even if the neighboring disciplines of phenomenology and sociology indeed lay claim to having something to say about Borges' fictional works.

In "The Library of Babel" Jorge Luis Borges presents a new narrative technique, which links the essay-like discourse with the fictional elements and distances itself from the genre-specific canon of narration. The library described by Borges constitutes a labyrinth, in which order, arbitrariness, and chaos prevail. For Borges the librarian is a "guardian of books," who administrates "the secret eternal laws, the harmony of the world," (Borges 1996/1969) and of books, which means that he "in a silent and modest manner" is busy practicing the art of literary critique (ibid.). In the "Library of Babel" the aware and distanced narrator equates the library with the universe and demonstrates its spatial infiniteness on the basis of its architectural form, which is equal to a honeycomb. The arrangement of the galleries is defined by the geometrical form of the hexagon, and there are 20 shelves of books within each hexagon. Each shelf consists of 32 books of equal size; every book has 110 pages, every page 40 lines, and every line 80 letters. The description of the architecture of the library, which appears frightening and sinister, is followed by the introduction of the first-person narrator, who traveled a lot during his youth, always in search of a special book, the "catalogue of all catalogues" (Borges 1962a/1941, p. 80). This book, the *Book of All Books*, the sacral book, can be understood as the primal book, which gives order to the universe. The distanced narrator proposes two axioms for

the library: "First axiom: the library exists *ab aeterno,* eternally. Second axiom: the number of orthographic symbols is 25" (ibid., pp. 80f.). The original manuscript of the book of all books contains no numbers and large letters, and the punctuation is restricted to periods and commas; the 25 characters are sufficient for the "unknown author." With this remark, Borges ironically alludes to his own concept of literature, which has little respect for originals and gives preference to anonymous authors (see Hanke-Schaefer 1999, pp. 60f.).

In demonstrative fashion, Borges presents a gesture of adoration toward the classics and astute knowledge of books in his later writings. While other contemporary authors argue that their works are the result of individual creative incidences and theoretical principles, Borges points with enacted resignation to the superiority of the models which are for him the basis of his own creative work (see Schlaffer 1993, p. 73). He admits that he falls back on the stock of books of the "library" during his literary work and turns against the conviction of his contemporaries who distance themselves from their predecessors. Until the eighteenth century there was a wide-spread view among authors that literature emanates from already existing literature. Ever since "original" or "authentic" works have been demanded of artists though, they must vouch for the uniqueness of their artistic creations. They are therefore forced to deny their commitments to tradition that is their association with the library. Borges, by contrast, reports of readings, mentions role models, writes about the works of others and his own works, explains the fictional character of his inventions, and admits that the "library" is the original place of his experiences. Already in his early narratives, which are about gangsters, western heroes, and gauchos, it is striking that Borges conscientiously names his sources, even when using this genre: the "History of the Gangs of New York (brought to light by Herbert Asbury in 1928 in a wonderfully endowed volume of 400 pages octavos)" owes its story of the "Purveyor of Iniquities Monk Eastman."

From such a perspective books form the background of every book; books are even the true author of the book, whose title page only pretends to depict the uniqueness of a work of art by stating the individual name of one author. The scholars from the imaginary land of Tlön located in another world – which is mentioned in a story in Borges' *Fictions* – admit without thinking twice that books account for the substance of a book, meaning that the respective author is only of accidental significance: "There is no such term as plagiarism: one assumes that all works are the work of a single author, who is timeless and nameless" (Borges 1962b/1941). Along these lines the library is a place of continuous transition from primary works into secondary works, which in turn are retransformed back into primary works: reading, commentary, and interpretation go hand in hand with emulation, parody, and variation (Schlaffer 1993, p. 75). Borges is thus continually in the process of excerpting books, to which he explicitly refers in his sources – the books justify the notion of describing and classifying fantasized figures as real phenomena. The library which of course must treat all books equally does not automatically distinguish between true and false, real and imaginary. For this reason it also attributes fantasies a kind of reality, or more specifically their own reality: that of paper, letters, legibility, and "quotability." Viewed from this angle, Borges

simultaneously regards himself as a scholar and poet, who recognizes in the library the concrete institution and the ideal image of the common origin of scholarly and poetic activity: both scholars and poets conjure up from books "imaginary beings"; some do so in order to critically comment on them, while others aim to ironically enliven them.

As a librarian himself, Borges worked for many years in the Biblioteca Nacional in Buenos Aires. The concrete design of libraries as an integral part of everyday reality, i.e. its building and its organization, is only seldom addressed. He uses the term "library" in fictional essays exclusively in the singular in a virtually allegorical manner, for example in order to make others aware of the state of literature in the modern age. Literature is marked by the quantitative and ideational superiority of written books over those yet to be written, the repetition of the same things in the vesture of things different, the unmanageability of things already existing, and thus the unpredictability of possible readings (see Schlaffer 1993, p. 76). The library is presented as an authority which unites the endless masses of books confronting the potential reader in one location. If our life is not long enough to read even a fragment of these books, the idea is comforting that there is at least one place at which they are united. The place is steady and confined and arranged from within. Its mere existence can console those who are unable to find a solution to the problem of the continuously growing difference between the desirable and the attainable scope of their knowledge.

If we follow the phenomenological considerations by Alfred Schutz, the fictitious text "The Library of Babel" by Jorge Luis Borges generates and unites different spheres of reality, through which the "narrative" as a whole gains its meaningfulness. In order to understand the text, the reader must accordingly be able to immerse him or herself into these spheres of reality, while each individual "province of meanings" constructed in the text acquires its own "accent of reality" (Schutz 1962/1945, 1962/1955). Borges' allegorical presentation of the library only conditionally draws on the "real" organization of libraries in general; the usual structure of a library with its corresponding order is "broken open." The author constructs the "total library" which comprises everything:

> *There are not, in the whole vast library, two identical books.* [...] Everything is there: the minute history of the future, the autobiographies of the archangels, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and thousands of false catalogues, a demonstration of the fallacy of these catalogues, a demonstration of the fallacy of the true catalogue, the Gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary on this gospel, the commentary on the commentary of this gospel, the veridical account of your death, a version of each book in all languages... (Borges 1962a/1941, pp. 82f.)

The library is so enormous in terms of size that any reduction of human origin is infinitesimal, is negligibly minor; every existing book is unique and irreplaceable, "but inasmuch as the Library is total, there are always hundreds of thousands of imperfect facsimiles – of works which differ only by one letter or one comma" (ibid., p. 73). To generate the different spheres of reality, Borges primarily uses factually possible objects of everyday reality, which one could come across within the domains of action, the world of working: he describes books, catalogues, and

commentaries on certain works and translations and mentions the library, which indeed becomes conceivable as a place in which numerous books are compiled and arranged. These objects of the everyday world which the reader can factually experience can evoke fantasies or fiction among readers; they bring to mind ideas and worlds of imagination, which are symbolically communicated in an indirect manner. The factually possible objects described in Borges' text "appresent," (Schutz 1962/1955, pp. 294ff.) that is to say, they enable individual minds to envision ideas at different levels, which are expressed by means of specific orders of experience. An everyday reality fictionally constructed within Borges' story can include again symbols which are able to transcend this literary everyday world with references to other extraordinary ideas with a reference to other realities within or outside the literary work.

It is especially Alfred Schutz's theory of symbols as part of his theory of the life-world which offers the theoretical instruments for the analysis of the arts; they allow reconstruction of the "logic of the poetic event" in this case in Borges' literature. Following these reflections, symbols have a "meaning clip function," (Srubar 1988, p. 247) i.e. that they are specific signs which present and communicate everyday transcendent ideas and visions within the pragmatic world of everyday life. The life-world of the individual actor is constituted and maintained as a meaningful whole with the help of symbols (cf. Dreher 2003), and therefore can also include literary realities which through symbolization become part of the individual's life-world. Furthermore, symbols possess a "meaning clip function" within the literary sphere of reality, since they establish connections between different areas of meaning and their enclaves.

If we describe the functionality of symbols from a phenomenological perspective, this results from the ability of the subjective consciousness of "appresentation," a concept which Schutz adapts in a modified version from Edmund Husserl. This concept is used by Husserl to describe a fundamental process of consciousness for the constitution of intersubjectivity in his *Cartesian Meditations*; with the term "appresentation" he categorizes the co-realization of the other as part of the experience of the other (Husserl 1965/1931, § 20). Schutz in contrast uses "appresentation" in a wider sense to describe analogue associations in which through perception of one object another is brought to mind – e.g. as memory, fantasy, or fiction (Schutz 1962/1955, pp. 294ff.; Dreher 2003, p. 145). It is important to emphasize that symbols as objects, facts, or events of our everyday life "appresent" or symbolize an idea which transcends our everyday experience, i.e. that it forms part of another reality sphere outside the everyday world (Schutz 1962/1955, pp. 331, 343; Dreher 2007, pp. 467ff.). This is of course also the case if these objects, facts, or events are – as argued before – fictionally described as everyday phenomena, so they function as symbols within the reality sphere of literature. This specific form of symbolic appresentation is of major importance for aesthetic creation and interpretation since the art work combines various levels of appresentation. In relation to symbolic appresentation within the art work, Schutz's theory of the symbol needs to be expanded to demonstrate how symbolization with symbolically established reality spheres functions.

The objects described in the narrative – e.g. in the short story "The Library of Babel" – thus have a symbolic character, and as symbols they make it possible that what is not really present obtains an actual presence within experience. The "symbolic representation" is thus a special case of appresentation: it is the direct presentation of conveyed experience which is to be actively made in perceptions and descriptions (Soeffner 2000, p. 190, 1990). Symbols mark life-world transcendences, border-crossings from one individual to another, from one mode of experience to another (from the dreaming to waking, from everyday practical common-sense to religious experience or ecstasy), and from one status passage to another (from childhood to youth, from adulthood to old-age, to death) (Soeffner 2000, pp. 196f.). By writing, the essence of appresentation indeed does not change, but its "triggering character" does: the words selected by the writer trigger an appresentation process in us, which is marked by a high degree of abstraction and arbitrariness. The reader is prompted to translate back the images previously translated into abstract characters, and evoke them again using these "artificial" triggers. Due to the arbitrary, "artificial" relationship between the present character and the description appresented by it, written characters contain an explicit invitation for appresentation (ibid, p. 197). In Borges' written text, the word "library" evokes diverse symbolically appresented ideas which are strongly differentiated from each other. As mentioned, it establishes an allegory to describe the present state of literature in the modern age in which any expression of literature written so far in its enormous cultural diversity – achieving Babylonic dimensions – surmounts human existence. In another context, the term "library" refers to and appresents the universe with a specific order, product of human objectivation that, at the same time, reaches far beyond human imagination.

3 The Appresentational Order of the Literary Work

By using everyday language as well as everyday ideas and/or the readers' existing knowledge of libraries and their stock, Borges thus generates fictitious worlds, which differ from everyday reality and/or transcend it. The "Library of Babel" described in the narrative typifies worlds of ideas by bringing to mind different symbolic "orders" of experience by means of appresentation. The peculiarity of the Borges Library is its unique architecture – it ideally consists of hexagons and in terms of its spatial structure it is impossible to identify a centre. The "total library" which appears to be infinite is similar to a labyrinth, which makes it extraordinarily difficult for the "librarians" to find the "book of all books" – even the first-person narrator was confronted with this hopeless problem: "I have squandered and consumed my years in adventures of this type. To me, it does not seem unlikely that on some shelf of the universe there lies a total book" (Borges 1962a/1941, p. 85). Besides the cyclical time – which is typified by Borges' concept of literature – the narrator introduces the cyclical space, while the architecture of the infinitely adjacent hexagons points to the endlessness of the spatial constitution

of the "total library." How can we now explain more accurately the function of this symbolism used by Borges from a phenomenological standpoint? If we follow the thoughts of Alfred Schutz with regard to the different orders of symbolic appresentation – which can be experienced simultaneously, it is possible to identify specific schemes for the functioning of characters and symbols: we distinguish between the "apperceptional," "appresentational," "referential," and "contextual or interpretational scheme" (Schutz 1962/1955, pp. 297ff.). The first two schemes are less relevant for explaining the impact of the symbols; the scheme of apperception discerns the white paper and the printing ink, with which Borges' essay was put in writing. The scheme of appresentation pertains to the words as characters, which the author uses to "explicitly" refer to objects of the everyday world. These characters create a reference to objects such as the library, books, as well as sentences, words, letters, periods, commas, etc., which we come across as elements of everyday reality.

If we focus on a higher order of the appresentative relationship which is exemplified by the fictitious essay by Borges, different *orders of the appresentational situation* become apparent: every book in Borges' "Library of Babel" corresponds with other books and is an integral part of a literary chain, which makes up the "total library." "[. . .] The Library will last on forever. Illuminated, solitary, infinite, perfectly immovable, filled with precious volumes, useless, incorruptible, secret" (Borges 1962a/1941, p. 87). In the essay a symbolic world of literature is created, which is equivalent to a nightmare and in which there is neither pleasure in reading nor a desire to read. This world is frightening and dismal. If this particular interpretation is put forward, the library symbolizes a prison, which is lacking an architectural center; it reminds us of a labyrinth in which the desperate librarian in captivity is searching for the "book of all books." Here a symbolic reference is made to a society, in which total control prevails, in which humans serve as puppets and their personal freedoms are deprived and at the mercy of the system (Hanke-Schaefer 1999, p. 62f.). "The library" stands for a strong understanding of authority and the design of the "library" alludes to the previously existing totalitarian regimes in Europe – Borges denounced totalitarian systems in his essays, speeches, and critiques time and time again. Along these lines, the library in terms of its symbolic usage is a metaphor for infinite hierarchies, which make slaves out of humans. On this appresentational level the described physical objects open up the path to the metaphysical. The library contains all books, all languages, all human knowledge, and several systems of organization (Piper 2001, p. 57). What is of course implicated with the story title "The Library of Babel" is a reference to the Holy Scripture describing Babel as the place with the enormous diversity of cultures and languages finally leading to murder, divisiveness, and insanity. The described library in its physical appearance is a labyrinth containing not only one Truth but all truths, and as Borges tells us, many of them are hoaxes, fallacies, frauds, and of imperfect facsimiles. Now, we need to concentrate on the next level of the appresentational order of Borges' story.

With regard to the *contextual or interpretational scheme* it is decisive for us to be able to identify how the symbolic appresentation reference originated altogether, i.e. in which context the appresenting and appresented elements of reference

are experienced. The library described in the text can thus become an allegory for the universe, because it "illustrates" its composition and (dis-)order with its unique structure. To understand this special symbolic relationship, it is imperative that the reader is capable of comprehending within the interpretative scheme this relationship of references between the "Library of Babel" and the universe, which Borges decidedly develops. The library proves to be the incomplete embodiment of a chaotic vision of the universe, although the library – of all places – is the unsurpassed epitome of order with its detailed letter-based arrangements of books, an order that appears almost grotesque and absurd (Niggestich 1976, p. 159). The architecture of the library creates a labyrinth – against this background the labyrinth can be understood as the fundamental spatial unit of human existence, which is an expression of chaos for those who find themselves in it. Moreover, the labyrinth of the library is a symbol for the cosmos of the creator, who sees through it and can understand its interrelations.

The path through the chaos of the labyrinth, which humanity must overcome in its search for the world formula, is signposted with metaphors from "language and writing". From the smallest to the largest unit, "letters," "words," "books," and "libraries" are used as metaphors, which however only pretend to contain the secret of the cosmos. As Niggestich argues, they are all only linguistic masks of inconceivability, apparent solutions, in which the puzzle is concretized in symbols. They serve as vanishing points for humans in their search, but behind them, at the semantic level which seeks to enlighten the metaphors, there is only a clue of what remains unspeakable. Just like Plato's man in the cave our knowledge remains restricted to silhouettes (Niggestich 1976, pp. 160–161). The library, in which infinite knowledge is regularly gathered and available in a distinctive order, becomes an allegory for the chaotic universe, in which human existence – whose freedom is in reality an illusion – meanders. The contextual scheme of the appresentational order of the "Library of Babel" refers to no less than the entire human undertaking of objectivating the known and the unknown universe into language, as well as all human efforts of cataloging, storing, and preserving the knowledge. The library is responsible for the propagation of the Word – "in the beginning was the Word, but it became many words" (Piper 2001, p. 57). Knowledge accumulated by human beings becomes independent and surmounts the human existence with the result that the individual is unable to understand, capture, and control not even parts of this knowledge universe.

It becomes highly relevant to focus on Borges' description of the book as the medium to help the self in its search for identity. Books (on the apperceptual and appresentational level) are not only inanimate objects of papers and leather – they are the living carriers of the Universal Spirit which animates all things if a religiously inspired interpretation is propagated. Books are keys to self and cosmos. At its highest, as Giskin argues, knowledge through the book is a mystical communion, in which the reader ceases to exist as mere subject and the book as object; a fusion process takes place in which both – reader and book – undergo change. For Borges, the book serves as a mirror and a bridge to self-discovery, because the reader becomes aware of the workings of Spirit (Giskin 1990, pp. 238f.).

In thematizing the "total book," the mystical nature of it becomes apparent, since it allows us to understand reality fully. The book is potentially a microcosm of the universe, and therefore, the absolute or total book would be an actualization of this idea. The "absolute book" established a metaphor for the mystical interaction of reader and book. "The book and reader are microcosms, opposing mirrors which endlessly reflect the other's true (and sometimes hidden) nature, revealing a reality which is infinite and yet contained in each" (ibid., p. 240).

A crucial aspect within the function of symbols becomes particularly clear here: symbols serve to define paradoxes, i.e. they broach the issue of the contradictions that human existence is confronted with and in doing so help individuals to confront and overcome these contradictions. This unusual property of symbols is used in order to link different and seemingly incompatible meanings, values, and tendencies into a pictographically shaped contradictory unit (Soeffner 1995, pp. 132f.). The "Library of Babel" is indeed a systematic collection of books and written materials on the basis of a precise order. However, it is at the same time a nontransparent labyrinth, in which it is by principle impossible to find the desired books, i.e. the required knowledge. Therefore the library symbolically appresents on the one hand the "ordered universe" as a product of a creator – as a cosmos with a subordinate order, on the other hand it represents the chaos, the labyrinth in which human beings are at the mercy of totalitarian systems and are really only manipulated.

My reflections on Borges' "Library of Babel" intended to demonstrate, how a phenomenologically inspired hermeneutical analysis can be used to interpret literary works. Taking into consideration the structure of the life-world and the fact that multiple reality spheres are interconnected through symbols, and referring to the significance in which the author's as well as the recipient's perspective is involved in the functioning of the literary work, a theory of the life-world can serve to reconstruct the "logic of the poetic event," the internal symbolically established structure of this particular work of art. With a narrating description of concrete objects of the everyday life, in Borges' text as well as fictionally constructed reality spheres, such as the library in its physical expression with a specific architecture, books with specific contents of written words, etc., Borges established a metaphorical system with which reality spheres on different appresentational levels are being symbolized. It is the task of the reader and interpreter to decipher these appresentational orders, as I have shown. The symbolical use of the objects of the everyday worlds – in the text and in the literary work – leads to their enchantment and serves to communicate everyday transcendent ideas, such as eternity, totalitarianism, the universe, human existence, infinity, etc. The essay by Jorge Luis Borges ends with the following words:

> *The Library is limitless and periodic.* If an eternal voyager were to traverse it in any direction, he would find, after many centuries, that the same volumes are repeated in the same disorder (which, repeated, would constitute an order: Order itself). My solitude rejoices in this elegant hope. (Borges 1962a/1941, pp. 87f.)

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Part III
Music

The Tuning-in Relationship: From a Social Theory of Music Towards a Philosophical Understanding of Intersubjectivity

Carlos Belvedere

1 Introduction

Alfred Schutz's interest in music was not exclusively theoretical. Helmut Wagner considers it as one of the "two avocations of his life" (Wagner 1983, p. 18) and reminds us that it was almost as important to him "as his scholarly commitments." (Wagner 1983, p. 17) One could also say, in a broader sense, that his thinking was never detached from his personal life. Music, just as other experiences of his own (for instance his status as an immigrant), gave him food for thought.

It is because music involves a basic fact in social relationships that it can enlighten the grounds of all forms of existence and knowledge. Schutz realized that and made his reflections on music a fundamental part of his ontology.[1] In my paper

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[1]Martin Endress notes that Schutz makes distinctive statements "that he is not concerned with ontological questions but with the analysis of (subjective) meaning constitution." (Endress 2009, p. 2) Even though, with some particular issues such as the "wakening" or "evocation" of the appresented member of the pair by the appresenting one, his claim is that it can "be clarified only ontologically, but not phenomenologically." (Schutz and Luckmann 1989, p. 270; see also p. 276) These kinds of statements should allow us to speak of an ontology in Schutz's latest work, especially if we take into account that the question of appresentation is crucial in understanding Schutz's stance on music and intersubjectivity. Also Richard Zaner notices that "intersubjectivity

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I will focus on his conception of music with a concern for ontology rather than for aesthetics. So I will present his conception of "the mutual tuning-in relationship" as an outstanding element of his ontology even though Schutz himself pointed out that it needs to be developed further. I will try to go one step further in Schutz's direction contesting Richard Zaner's critics and sharing Thomas Luckmann's description of the process of mirroring involved in intersubjectivity.

2 Music as a Polythetic Constitutional Process

Schutz's analysis focuses not just on music but more broadly on a character of all social interactions whose particularity consists in being a meaning structure that cannot be expressed in conceptual terms (Schutz 1964, p. 159). That is why Schutz suggests that his study of the social relationships connected with the musical process may contribute to illuminate certain aspects of the structure of social interaction as such (Schutz 1964, pp. 159–160). In this section I will focus on three features of music that are crucial for understanding Schutz's position on intersubjectivity: (a) the comparison of music with intersubjective tuning-in in being both pre-conceptual; (b) the monothetic character of music and intersubjective understanding as opposite to the polythetic character of other forms of phenomena; (c) the tuning-in relationship as the basis of all higher level communicative acts.

(a) Schutz states that all forms of communication presuppose the existence of some kind of social interaction which does not enter the communicative process and is not capable of being grasped by it (Schutz 1964, p. 161). He calls it "the mutual tuning-in relationship," and describes it as one in which "the 'I' and the 'Thou' are experienced by both participants as a 'We' in vivid presence." (Schutz 1964, p. 161) Music is, precisely, this kind of interaction. So it should be understood as "a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme" because, as all social interactions connected with it, it is not primarily founded "upon a semantic system used by the communicator as a scheme of expression and by his partner as a scheme of interpretation." (Schutz 1964, pp. 159, 166)

Schutz lists other examples of these forms of intercourse, such as "Scheler's perceptual theory of the alter ego, to a certain extent Cooley's concept of the face-to-face relationship, Malinowski's interpretation of speech as originating from the situation determined by social interaction, Sartre's basic concept of 'looking at the Other and being looked at by the Other'." (Schutz 1964, p. 161) All these are examples of the "endeavor to investigate [...] the 'mutual tuning-in relationship'

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was for Schutz 'the fundamental ontological category of human existence in the world and therefore of all philosophical anthropology'." (Zaner 2002, p. 4)

upon which alone all communication is founded" and "by which the 'I' and the 'Thou' are experienced by both participants as a 'We' in vivid presence." (Schutz 1964, p. 161) So "the study of the particular communicative situation within the musical process will shed some light on the nonconceptual aspect involved in any kind of communication." (Schutz 1964, p. 162)

(b) Schutz defines a piece of music as an "arrangement of tones in inner time" which is meaningful "because and in so far as it evokes in the stream of consciousness participating in it an interplay of recollections, retentions, protentions, and anticipations which interrelate the successive elements." (Schutz 1964, p. 170) Thus, the inner time is "the very form of existence of music." (Schutz 1964, p. 171) Even if playing an instrument, listening to a record, or reading a page of music are events occurring in the outer time (the time measured by metronomes and clocks), the inner time is "the very medium within which the musical flow occurs." (Schutz 1964, p. 171; 1996, p. 260) For instance, the beholder "is united with the composer by a time dimension common to both, which is nothing other than a derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face-to-face relation." (Schutz 1964, pp. 171–172)

Also in the relationship between the reader and the writer of any text (and in situations like this) there exists a reconstruction of a vivid present and a reconstruction of a quasi simultaneity of the streams of consciousness so that the single phases of the author's articulated thought are polythetically co-performed or re-performed by the recipient; but once having co-performed these polythetic steps of constituting the conceptual meaning of these sentences, the reader may grasp the outcome of this constitutive process in a single glance, monothetically, independently of the polythetic steps in which and by which this meaning has been constituted. "The meaning of a musical work, however, is essentially of a polythetical structure. It cannot be grasped monothetically. It consists in the articulated step-by-step occurrence in inner time, in the very polythetic constitutional process itself." (Schutz 1964, p. 172)

This means that "musical experience is based upon the faculty of the mind to recollect the past by retentions and reproductions and to foretaste the future by protentions and anticipations." (Schutz 1996, p. 260) Thus, the musical process of communication shows its peculiarity "in the essentially polythetic character of the communicated content, that is to say, in the fact that both the flux of the musical events and the activities by which they are communicated, belong to the dimension of inner time" (Schutz 1964, p. 173) so that performer and listener, tuned-in to one another, "are living together through the same flux, are growing older together while the musical process lasts." (Schutz 1964, pp. 174–175)

So "the musical content itself, its very meaning, can be grasped merely by re-immersing oneself in the ongoing flux, by reproducing thus the articulated musical occurrence as it unfolds in polythetic steps in inner time." (Schutz 1964, p. 173) As a consequence, "it will 'take as much time' to reconstitute the work in recollection

as to experience it for the first time. In both cases I have to re-establish the quasi simultaneity of my stream of consciousness with that of the composer described herein before." (Schutz 1964, p. 173) We have therefore two series of events in inner time – one belonging to the stream of consciousness of the composer, the other to the stream of consciousness of the beholder – both lived through in the simultaneity created by the ongoing flux of the musical process (Schutz 1964, p. 173).

What guarantees "the simultaneity of the ongoing flux of the communicator's experiences in inner time with the occurrences in the outer world, as well as the simultaneity of these polythetic occurrences in the outer world with the addressee's interpreting experiences in inner time," is the polythetic character of communication (Schutz 1964, p. 178). Hence, communication presupposes "the simultaneous partaking of the partners in various dimensions of outer and inner time – in short, in growing older together." (Schutz 1964, p. 178)

(c) This "sharing of the other's flux of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common" is what constitutes the mutual tuning-in relationship, which Schutz terms "the experience of the We" and takes it as the foundation of all possible communication (Schutz 1964, p. 173). Thus, "all possible communication presupposes a mutual tuning-in relationship between the communicator and the addressee of the communication" which is "established by the reciprocal sharing of the Other's flux of experiences in inner time, by living through a vivid present together, by experiencing this togetherness as a 'We'." (Schutz 1964, p. 177)

It is within this experience that the Other's conduct becomes "meaningful to the partner tuned in on him – that is, the Other's body and its movements can be and are interpreted as a field of expression of events within his inner life." (Schutz 1964, pp. 177–178) Furthermore, the process of communication itself "is bound to an occurrence in the outer world, which has the structure of a series of events polythetically built up in outer time" and "is intended by the communicator as a scheme of expression open to adequate interpretation by the addressee." (Schutz 1964, p. 178)

These remarks, according to Schutz, "refer to communication within the face-to-face relationship;" however, "all the other forms of possible communication can be explained as derived from this paramount situation. But this, as well as the elaboration of the theory of the tuning-in relationship, must be reserved for another occasion." (Schutz 1964, p. 178)

3 The Thou-orientation as Not Appresentational in Zaner's Criticisms of Schutz

So far, Schutz's conception of the tuning-in relationship and its implications for a phenomenological approach to music, as he himself states it, is no more than a preliminary consideration that requires further development. Albeit, as far as I

know, Schutz did not write much more on the subject.[2] Nonetheless, he believed his reflections on intersubjectivity were solid enough to support the Social Sciences (Schutz 1967, pp. 136–37; Schutz 1996, p. 108).

Anyway, Schutz considered himself not only a social scientist but also and above all a philosopher. Barber recalls that in his response to Leo Strauss' characterization of him as "a philosophically sophisticated sociologist" Schutz described himself as "a sociologically sophisticated philosopher." (quoted in Embree 2003, p. 3; see also Embree 2010, pp. 1–2) More specifically speaking, "Making Music Together" is not just a study of "applied theory." (Pedone 1995, p. 205) So even if we considered Schutz's position on this matter good enough for Social Sciences we should admit that the philosophical grounds of intersubjectivity still require further development. So let us take a closer look at Schutz's position through the prism of some of the criticisms that have been addressed to it.

To do so, (a) I will start by sketching out what I consider to be Richard Zaner's main criticism, showing that Schutz's position on this subject is not accepted by all phenomenologists and that it was questioned even by some of his close colleagues. (b) As Zaner's criticisms make a strong point against Schutz's appresentational approach to intersubjectivity, I will briefly define what "appresentation" means in *Collected Papers III.* (c) Then I will go back to Zaner's criticism, showing that it retrieves some of the main aspects of Eugen Fink's criticism of Schutz. (d) Finally, I will consider Schutz's response to Fink and Zaner's account of it.

(a) In the Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture at the meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences in 1997, Richard Zaner discussed Schutz's article "Making music together." In his comments, he focused on intersubjectivity alleging that music, as any form of communication, presupposes "the Other's existence and what Schutz later termed the orientation to the Other," which is found within a "living present." (Zaner 2002, p. 1) In this living present, the Other and self form a "We" and thereby make a kind of music while growing old together." (Zaner 2002, pp. 1–2)

According to Zaner, Schutz's idea of an inner time upon which the Thou-orientation is based, is an unexamined assumption; namely, that subjectivity is

> some sort of "inside" and, to make itself known (and even be experienceable) by the Other must "ex-press" itself on its "outside," literally press itself outwards to and by means of its body-surfaces and members which then are somehow transformed into "events in the outer world, occurring on or brought about by the Other's body," [. . . so that] the human sphere consists of persons each of whom supposedly has a sort of "inside" and an "outside." (Zaner 2002, p. 6)

So Zaner thinks that, for Schutz, "the 'self' (or, variously 'mind,' 'subject,' 'consciousness,' and the like) is consistently regarded as being 'inner' in a quite

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[2]Besides the paper we are discussing here ("Making music together"), we can find Schutz's ideas on this subject in "Fragments toward a Phenomenology of Music" (1996, pp. 243–275), where he describes musical experience in accord with the ideas herein exposed.

literal way as somehow inside self's own body, and the embodying body is regarded as having an 'outside' thanks to which what is 'inside' can be 'ex-pressed' and thus experienced and known by the Other." (Zaner 2002, pp. 6–7) So in order to be experienced by the Self, the Other must display "outward manifestations of inward life" and press "'to the outside' what is within its own inner *durée*, which, as events on the 'outside,' on his body-surfaces, are or can be then taken by Self as 'clues' or 'indicative symbols' that merely 'appresent' the Other." (Zaner 2002, p. 7)

Consequently, Zaner argues that, "since what is inside cannot in principle be apprehended for and as itself except by the Self whose inside it is, or who is coextensive with that 'inside,' it thus turns out that knowing and experiencing Other by Self is and can only be a matter of interpretation of symbols." (Zaner 2002, p. 7) Indeed,

> if it is accepted that the "inner durée" or "inside" life of Self is essentially closed to the Other, since the Other can in no way whatever apprehend Self's inner life but only what may be "ex-pressed" as symbols in the "external world," if all that is accepted, then the very notion of "fully successful communication" is *unsinnig*, as is the idea [. . .] that there is "an inaccessible zone of the Other's private life" (Zaner 2002, pp. 9–10).

Moreover, if "what is appresented (the Other) is never itself accessible, then in principle how would one know that there is even something appresented?" (Zaner 2002, p. 2) Zaner's interrogation requires, therefore, a previous consideration of what Schutz understands by "appresentation."

(b) Schutz defines appresentation in a Husserlian sense, based on *Cartesian Meditations* paragraphs 50–51. In this regard, appresentation "is a special form of mediate intentionality, the essence of which is that –in connection *(Verflechtung)* with a presentation *(Gegenwärtigung)* of an A – there is effected a co-presentation of a B (the 'appresented') that itself never comes to actual presentation but is continually interwoven with something perceived in self-presentation, the A." (Schutz 1966, p. 62) Accordingly, appresentation is "a special case of the universal problem of 'pairing' which itself is nothing else than a primal form of passive synthesis." (Schutz 1966, p. 62)

As a passive synthesis, appresentation is a specific kind of association. "It is characteristic of pairing association – that two salient data are intuitively given in the unity of one consciousness." (Schutz 1966, p. 62) They "provide the basis for a unity of *similarity* insofar as they appear as different. An intentional overlapping takes place between both elements of the pair," leading to a transfer of sense among the paired elements so that "the one is apperceived in conformity with the sense of the Other." (Schutz 1966, p. 62)

As just seen, "Schutz's reflections on intersubjectivity were profoundly shaped by Husserl's notion of appresentation even while at times he was severely critical of Husserl;" (Zaner 2002, p. 1) which is odd because the use of Husserl's notion of the "non-redeemability" of appresentation in this context is –just as Eugen Fink says- "metaphoric and unsuccessful." (Zaner 2002, p. 2)

(c) Since Zaner's criticism of Schutz retrieves some aspects of Fink's exchange with Schutz at the Husserl-Colloquium at Royamont in 1957, it is necessary to present his main idea related to the subject of our discussion.

After pointing out that "appresentation was taken up by Husserl in the analysis of perceptual objects," Fink asked Schutz:

> Is the appresentation, in which the Other is given, also determined by this fundamental sense of redeemableness or is it an appresentation which essentially cannot be redeemed? I can never and in no way originarily apprehend what is "within," what it is that acts in the living body of the Other *(das-Im-Leibe-Walten des Anderen)*; that is, I can never "redeem" this appresentation. The experience of the Other being of this kind, the use of the concept of appresentation is metaphoric – and unsuccessful at that – and I believe that Husserl has not commented in sufficient detail on the difference between appresentations which can and those which cannot be "redeemed." (Schutz 1966, p. 85[3])

Zaner retrieves Fink's position and draws his own conclusions stating that, since "I can never redeem" the appresentation of the Other, "there simply is no 'appresentation' here in any sense." (Zaner 2002, p. 12) That is to say, "the root relation to and experience of the Other *(the Dueinstellung)* is not appresentational in any sense" (Zaner 2002, p. 6) the experience of the Other being "the clearest case" of "appresentations where that redeemability is absent in principle." (Zaner 2002, p. 10)

(d) Schutz completely agrees with Fink "that appresentations that can be converted into perceptual presentations, and appresentations in which in principle this cannot occur, must be rigorously distinguished," and that consequently there are some "appresented aspects of perceptual things [. . .] which cannot, in principle, be converted into perceptual presentations." (Schutz 1966, p. 87) However, Schutz only partly agrees with "Fink's thesis that is impossible to bring another's appresented inner life to perceptual presence." (Schutz 1966, pp. 87) He suggests "to modify it somewhat [. . .] by saying that I can apprehend the Other's inner life only by means of indicative symbols (his gestures, his facial expressions, his language, his actions), that I can apprehend it only by appresentations. Indeed, it is a peculiarity of symbol-relationships in general that the symbol alone is present, whereas that which is symbolized is only appresented." (Schutz 1966, pp. 87–88) In this sense, Schutz believes "that Husserl's theory of appresentation, especially in its application to the theory of

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[3]In his new translation, Fred Kersten rephrases the paragraph quoted above in these words: "I would like to modify somewhat Fink's thesis that it is impossible to bring another's appresented inner life to perceptual presence by saying that I can apprehend the Other's inner life only by means of indicative symbols (the Other's gestures, facial expressions, language, actions), that I can apprehend the Other's inner life only by appresentations. Indeed, it is a peculiarity of symbol-relationships in general that the symbol alone is present, whereas that which is symbolized is only appresented. In this sense I said that Husserl's theory of appresentation, especially in its application to the theory of sign and symbol relations, remains indubitably important.

"That the constitutions of the transcendental experience of the Other cannot be reduced to appresentation alone is indeed likewise indubitable." (Schutz 2010a, pp. 49–50)

sign and symbol relations, remains indubitably important" but that it is also indubitable "that the constitutions of the transcendental experience of the Other cannot be reduced to appresentation alone." (Schutz 1966, pp. 87–88)

Zaner deems that, "in his response, Schutz notes that matters are even more complex than what Fink had indicated, for there are visually perceived affairs whose appresented other aspects cannot in principle be actualized." (Zaner 2002, pp. 5–6) Although Fink's distinction would be

> far more interesting than Schutz acknowledged, for if Husserl's usage is but an unsuccessful metaphor, one can surely wonder whether the root relation to and experience of the Other is appresentational in any sense. More to the point: although it is surely true that many encounters with Others involve many types of appresentation, the question is whether what Schutz termed the *Du-einstellung,* ("thou-orientation") is itself appresentational. [. . .] Only if the two of us are, if you will, always-already oriented toward each other within a living present does his crucial notion of *Du-einstellung* at all make sense, which means that it cannot itself be a form of appresentation (Zaner 2002, p. 3).

So, if the inner sphere exhibits itself "only in somewhat recondite ways" by indicative symbols which are "interpretable in the present by the Other," (Zaner 2002, p. 7) and if knowing and experiencing the Other by Self "can only be a matter of interpretation of symbols," then – deduces Zaner – the Other remains problematic though – even for Schutz – "nothing is more certain within daily life." (Zaner 2002, p. 7) Hence, Schutz "has not shown that, or how, a simultaneity of Self and Other [. . .] is possible." (Zaner 2002, p. 8) As he just took it for granted, he is inclined to suppose not only that there is the Other, but that the Other is a being, who like me, is endowed with an essentially private sphere that transcends my and thy possible experiences: "'I,' like Others, am Other to myself, and can be known by myself only symbolically." (Zaner 2002, pp. 10–11)

4   The Perceptual Theory of the Alter Ego in Scheler and Schutz (Zaner's Criticisms Continued)

Zaner points out that, although Fink didn't mention Scheler, in his response Schutz immediately embraced his perceptual theory of the alter ego (Zaner 2002, p. 2) because he was "long fascinated by Scheler's ideas." (Zaner 2002, p. 3) So before continuing to present Zaner's criticisms of Schutz and replying to them, some considerations on his relation to Scheler will be required. In the present section, (a) I will start by showing what ideas Schutz borrows form Scheler; (b) then I will focus on some critical remarks by Schutz, illustrating his discrepancy with Scheler; and (c) finally, I will briefly sketch Zaner's main critique to the Schutzian retrieval of Scheler.

(a) Schutz takes from Scheler the idea that it is impossible to perceive directly the Other's experiences of his body and consequently these bodily feelings "constitute the separation between man and fellow-man." (Schutz 1967, p. 163)

That is why we can only approach the Other's life by co-performing, pre-performing, and re-performing his acts, with no need of any kind of empathy (Schutz 1967, p. 164).

(b) In order to enhance this idea that he critically borrows from Scheler, Schutz intends to set aside the "overwhelming difficulties" due to transcendental problems and to turn back "to the mundane sphere of our life-world." (Schutz 1967, p. 167) Indeed something Schutz likes about Scheler's theory is that it is partly based on "references to empirical facts." (Schutz 1967, p. 165) That is one of the reasons why Schutz termed it a "perceptual theory of the alter ego." Subsequently, Schutz retrieved this perceptual theory to "his own long-held notion" that there is "a specific form of appresentation by means of which the Other is apprehended" where "the symbol alone is present, whereas that which is symbolized is only appresented." (Zaner 2002, pp. 2–3) Nevertheless, in order to make some of Scheler ideas his owns, Schutz has to redefine them. Thus, no matter how much he borrows from Scheler, there are main topics in which he emphatically criticizes him.

Schutz himself considers one of his remarks to be "a serious objection" against Scheler, namely, that although "only in reference to 'me', the individual who acts and thinks, do Others obtain the specific meaning which I designate with the pronoun 'we'; and only in reference to 'us', whose center I am, do Others stand out as 'you'; and in reference to you, who refer back to me, third parties stand out as 'they'." (Schutz 1967, p. 168) In daily life, I am not aware that the object of my acts and thoughts which I call "we" is "relative to my Self and that only my existence within this world as a Self makes this relationship and relativity possible" because in the naïve attitude of daily life "I am not aware of myself." (Schutz 1967, p. 168) That is why "my stream of thought seems to be an anonymous flux." (Schutz 1967, pp. 168–169) Nonetheless, I may always "stop and think," switching from the natural attitude to the "attitude of reflection." Schutz considers that, since Scheler disregards this attitude assuming "that intentional reflection upon acts is impossible," (Schutz 1967, p. 170) he cannot realize that we only live "rather in Others than in our own individual life" in the naïve attitude, not in the attitude of reflection. (Schutz 1967, p. 177)

Another main disagreement between Schutz and Scheler is that they do not give the same meaning to the term "perception." In contrast to the "restricted meaning" that it has for Scheler (as "adequate perception"), Schutz conceives it as "apperceiving a thing as present," (Schutz 1967, p. 176) considering that "all our perceptions of the Other's thoughts are outer or transcendent perceptions" in the Husserlian sense – although they must be considered as inner perceptions in Scheler's sense, that is as experiences that refer "to all the objects of psychical or mental life." (Schutz 1967, p. 176)

Consequently, Schutz argues that the experience of the existence of Others is an inner experience in Husserl's sense, "as our Self participates likewise in the vivid simultaneity of the 'We' which belongs, therefore, to our stream of consciousness. To this extent at least the 'We' is always and from the beginning connected with the

Self. But our experience of other peoples' *thoughts* is a transcendent one, and our belief in the existence of those thoughts, therefore, a principally dubitable belief." (Schutz 1967, p. 176) Although Schutz conceives the perception of the Other in a different way than Scheler, he found plausible his "belief in the inner (indubitable) perception of the other, if 'inner perception' refers to anything connected with mental life or if one locates the experience of living in the vivid simultaneity of the 'We' within his own conscious stream." (Barber 2006)

In that "vivid simultaneity" it is impossible "to doubt the other's existence." However, "one could still be mistaken about specific thoughts of the others, since by belonging to the *other's* stream of consciousness these thoughts share the dubitability characterizing outer perceptions, likewise transcendent to one's stream of experience." (Barber 2006) So even if Schutz distinguishes in a similar way as Scheler "between our experience of the *existence* of Others, that is, the general thesis of the alter ego, and our knowledge of or about the Others' specific *thoughts*," (Schutz 1967, p. 176) by attaching to perception in a mundane sense he does not try to get beyond the separation between man and fellow-man by any kind of spiritual perception; on the contrary, he becomes attached to bodily feelings, assuming as a consequence the impossibility (and even the futility) of such an attempt. That is why (among other reasons) Scheler's theory of the alter ego is for Schutz "just a first step into this enormous field open to phenomenological psychology." (Schutz 1967, pp. 178–179)

(c) As just seen, one of the key differences as regards to Scheler is that Schutz does not tend to go "beyond the separation between man and fellow-man," considering it impossible to do that. Well, Zaner argues that instead of being a solution, Schutz's position on this matter adds a new problem because, even he acknowledges that each individual experiences his own feelings (of grief, shame, and etcetera), he still thinks – with Scheler – that we share the same feelings (Zaner 1981, pp. 191–193). Zaner's claim is that Schutz's rejection of Scheler's idea of a collective *persona* should lead one to discard the concept of a common We and thus to reject the assumption that we can feel the same as others in a We-relationship.

5   The Institution of the Tuning-in Relationship in Zaner's Criticism of Schutz

Schutz's disagreement with Scheler is consistent with his disagreement with Husserl about the character of intersubjectivity; and so is Zaner's critique of the conclusions drawn by Schutz in his interpretation of both philosophers, the core idea being that he fails to demonstrate how the tuning-in relationship is established. In this section, (a) I will present Zaner's commentary to Schutz's criticism of Husserl; and then, (b) I will expose his arguments against Schutz's position.

(a) Zaner portrays Schutz as "especially troubled by Husserl's frequent insistence that intersubjectivity should be understood fundamentally as a problem at the transcendental level." (Zaner 2002, p. 2) He "insisted, 'the idea of a transcendental community of monads requires additional metaphysical assumptions which cannot be warranted by a philosophy whose idea it is to be a rigorous science.'" (Zaner 2002, p. 2) Instead, Schutz considered intersubjectivity as "a datum of the life-world." (Zaner 2002, p. 2)

Seeing it as a datum of the life-world, Schutz describes intersubjectivity based on the interpretation of signs which establishes the synchronization of the *durées* that constitute the common Now "and, with that, the 'We' of the 'We-relation' which is the core meaning of the 'tuning-in relationship' thanks to which the basic We is instituted." (Zaner 2002, p. 8) Schutz "alleges that, for instance, through events actualized in the outer world displayed by and on each person's own body, two streams of subjective life, for example, those of a speaker and a listener, are 'synchronized' as 'simultaneous:' you hear and understand my words synchronically as I speak them aloud." (Zaner 2002, p. 8)

Hence, the bodily displays and gestures are events "co- or re-performed" by means of the Self's own simultaneous polythetic conscious acts constituted as symbols for events in the consciousness of the Other. In his response to Fink, Schutz illustrates this point by describing the communication of language in the following way:

> the speaker builds up his discourse in his conscious, polythetic acts to which the successive acoustical events in the outer world are coordinated in strict simultaneity. These events in the outer world are perceived by the listener and interpreted in his own strictly simultaneous polythetic conscious acts as symbols for events in the consciousness of the speaker. By means of the speech, events in the external world, the two streams of consciousness are synchronized. This makes possible the constitution of a common Now and consequently, of a We. This, to be sure, is only one instance of a universal and essential state of affairs (*Wesensverhalt*). Since I can grasp in simultaneity your conscious processes occurring Now, while I can apprehend reflectively only those of my experiences which are, at best, "just past", the consciousness of the Other can be, indeed, defined as a consciousness whose processes the ego can apprehend in simultaneity (Schutz 1966, p. 88).

(b) Zaner's main objection to this aspect of Schutz's argument is that it is not clear what Schutz meant by calling intersubjectivity a "given" or a "datum" of the life-world and not a problem of constitution in the transcendental sphere. Since this is a major issue in Zaner's criticism of Schutz, I will quote *in extenso.*

> Just how this occurs, however, remains quite enigmatic. By virtue of this synchronization, in any event, a common Now is supposedly constituted, and, with that, the "We" of the "We-relation" which is the core meaning of the 'tuning-in relationship' thanks to which the basic We is instituted and you and I grow older together.
>
>   At just this point, Schutz's notion that within the "pure sphere of the 'We'," in the "vivid present" (also termed "vivid presence," though, as I've noted, this seems a confusion), gets him involved in what seems a plain, if unwitting, bit of legerdemain, on this, however, further consideration seems essential. By means of processes (*Erlebnisse*) going on within a speaker's inner *durée*, for example, she articulates or "builds up" her discourse

polythetically (one step at a time), "to which," Schutz says, "the successive acoustical events in the outer world are coordinated in strict simultaneity." But this strictly and only means that the speaker's "inner *durée*" is "simultaneous" with the speaker's "outer" bodily displays: the one is synchronically and simultaneously "expressed" by means of the other (Zaner 2002, p. 8).

So, Zaner argues that what the Self sees and hears (the Other's bodily displays as noemata) are strictly simultaneous only with the Self's acts of seeing and hearing "(as noetic correlates of those noemata)." (Zaner 2002, p. 8) Accordingly, this simultaneity is not between two streams of subjective life but within each individual's inner *durée* and the same individual's outer bodily displays understood as expressions. Therefore, for Zaner "all that we can conclude is that each individual's noeses are synchronized strictly only with the same individual's noemata." (Zaner 2002, p. 9)

Consequently, Zaner states that,

if we follow Schutz's own guides for understanding how intersubjectivity is at all possible, we are left with little more than what Fink points out is a "metaphor" merely and "unsuccessful" at that. For Schutz, then, each Self does indeed experience the Other in a sense directly and immediately, although only by means of what seems little more than an artifice, even trickery, albeit unintended. [. . .] There can be in Schutz's own terms no simultaneity between two subjective streams of experiences (Zaner 2002, p. 9).

Zaner's claim is, then, that Schutz

has not shown that, or how, a simultaneity of Self and Other, speaker and listener, is possible. Yet, for him, each person (self, mind, subjectivity, etc.) must not only be capable of "expressing" on the "outside," by means of the individual's own body, what can really and truly only be "inside". [. . .] Thus, when he attempts to establish the ways in which Self is aware of the Other, that crucial *Du-einstellung* which ultimately grounds communication and the social world, Schutz winds up presupposing what was to be established (Zaner 2002, pp. 8–9).

6 On "Taking for Granted": A Response to Zaner

Having exposed Zaner's criticisms of Schutz on intersubjectivity, some response to them is now required. For that I will (a) first summarize Zaner's criticisms in three main subjects; then in parts (b), (c), and (d), I will deal with each of these subjects separately; finally I will, (e) outline a fundamental question presupposed in Zaner's critique which I will deal with in the next section.

(a) Zaner's criticisms of Schutz's position on intersubjectivity can be summarized into three major issues.

    (i) Schutz's approach to intersubjectivity is based on the unexamined assumption that subjectivity is some sort of inside that only can be experienced by the Other by means of outward manifestations of his inward life. Thus, knowing and experiencing Other by Self can only be a matter of

symbolic interpretation. As a result, the very notion of "fully successful communication" is senseless because inner life is only accessible to oneself, since it cannot be presented but only appresented to the Other.

(ii) This means that I cannot redeem the appresentation of the Other. Only if the Self and the Other are always-already oriented toward each other within a living present does the notion of a Thou-orientation make sense. Zaner concludes from this that there is no appresentation; thus, the experience of the Other being irredeemable in principle, the Thou-orientation is not appresentational in any sense. Therefore, in Schutz's analysis, the Other remains problematic, although he claims that nothing is more certain in daily life.

(iii) It is not clear what Schutz means by calling intersubjectivity a datum of the life-world. Especially enigmatic is how this occurs. Schutz presupposes a common Now constituted and, with that, the We of the We-relation, which is the core meaning of the tuning-in relationship that constitutes the basic We.

The speaker's inner *durée* is simultaneous to the speaker's outer bodily displays. What the Self sees and hears (the Other's bodily displays as noemata) are strictly simultaneous only to the Self's acts of seeing and hearing (as noetic correlates of those noemata). Accordingly, this simultaneity is not between two streams of subjective life but within each individual's inner *durée* and the same individual's outer bodily displays understood as expressions. That is, each individual's noeses are synchronized strictly only with the same individual's noemata.

(b) As regards to the first issue, I will argue that considering subjectivity as an inward life is not for Schutz an "assumption" but an indubitable fact of our personal life. Obviously, the problem here is not one's own subjectivity but the Other's, which – just as Zaner shows – is far from being indubitable. But why would this be a problem? It seems to me that it is problematical for Zaner because he tends to take it as an unfounded premise of Schutz's argument. Because of that, he considers subjectivity in general, not distinguishing between mine and the Other's. One could say that, in his criticism of Schutz's considerations of subjectivity, Zaner deals with intersubjectivity in abstract, which is not admissible in phenomenological analysis. One should distinguish, as Schutz does, between my experience of my subjectivity and my experience of the Other. Consequently, that the Other's subjectivity is an inside would not be an assumption but a constatation. So even if this aspect of Schutz's position on the alter ego could eventually be considered unexamined, it must never be considered an assumption.

Although Zaner is right when he claims that I cannot experience the Other's subjectivity in the same way that I experience mine (indeed, Schutz himself says so), I don't think he is right when he concludes from there that, as knowing and experiencing Other by Self can only be a matter of symbolic interpretation, the notion of "fully successful communication" is senseless. Here, Zaner simply

seems to have a different idea than Schutz about what communication is, namely, that it is about perceiving the Other's *durée* and not just synchronizing my *durée* with the Other's meaningful bodily expressions, perceived by me as indicative of his apperceived (not perceived) *durée.* So Zaner has a more restricted concept of communication than Schutz.

(c) Concerning the second problem posed by Zaner, I will start by arguing counter to the idea – which he takes from Fink – that the use of Husserl's notion of appresentation by Schutz is senseless because it is metaphoric. I would rather say that this and many other terms of transcendental phenomenology are metaphorically used by Schutz in a very productive way, as he transfers them from the transcendental realm to the realm of the natural attitude. So I would call it an original and not an unsuccessful use. Even though I will accept that Schutz's conception of intersubjectivity needs further development, I do not believe that this is so because he could not make productive use of Husserl's ideas but, on the contrary, because of his originality.

Schutz himself claims (in his exchange with Fink, as seen before) that he is trying to modify somehow Husserl's notion of appresentation. From this perspective, that I cannot redeem the appresentation of the Other does not necessarily represent a problem for Schutz, since his claim is not that I can perceive his *durée* but only that I can comprehend his bodily signs and synchronize my *durée* with them. Although Zaner's argument goes way beyond the technical use of phenomenological terms by Schutz, he points also to a substantial (not merely formal) question: Schutz's alleged unsuccessful use of the Husserlian notion of appresentation would lead to a misunderstanding of the Thou-orientation as appresentational.

Zaner's point is that appresentation presupposes the Thou-orientation; consequently, it cannot itself be a form of appresentation. This would invalidate Schutz's conception of intersubjectivity. But this objection is erroneous because not all forms of appresentation presuppose the Thou-orientation. Although Zaner is right that, in this respect, Schutz's argument is rough, only that it is not a reason to discard it but to enhance it! I will try to do so by arguing that what remains problematic is only the contents of others' inner flow of thoughts but not the observation that the other, like me, has his own *durée.* How does this happen?

I perceive in straight presentation the other's body, not his inner stream of consciousness. Then, I relate his bodily gestures with my inner stream of consciousness realizing that they make sense to me. So far, no appresentation is involved: I simply notice that this interpretative process allows me to synchronize my own experiences with my perception of the existence of the other as a meaningful and resembling body based not yet on symbolic but on a non-conceptual and pre-linguistic "conversation."[4] Only then may I conjecture that the other might experience the same as me in simultaneity, even though I can't perceive his

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[4]As will be seen later (in point 6a.), this non-conceptual, pre-linguistic conversation takes place by means of a passive synthesis of our mind. At this point in our discussion, all we know is that, from

experiencing. That is the only thing that I cannot bring into direct presence but only appresent as an empty transcendence. All I know is that I can synchronize my inner time with my perception of someone who interacts with me in a meaningful way which makes me think of another's subjectivity similar to mine because subjectivity is the only source of meaning I know. As Paul Ricœur recalls, the sense of the ego is first constituted in the experience of one self and only then transferred to the alter ego (Cfr. Ricœur 1975).

(d) The third topic in Zaner's criticisms relates to the question: How do we know that the Other exists if his stream of consciousness is only appresented?

My answer would be: Because the Other is not just his stream of consciousness but also his bodily language whose signs –perfectly perceptible in the outer world– refer –as any symbol– to a transcendence which is never presented but always and irredeemably appresented, this irredeemability being the most outstanding feature of the Other, although it is not the appresentation of the Other's inner stream of consciousness which I take for granted, but his bodily signs, perfectly presented to my perception. So Zaner is right in saying that I can never originarily apprehend what is "within" the Other because it is impossible to bring his appresented inner life to perceptual presence.

Zaner also makes a good point in saying that what the Self really sees and hears of the Other is strictly simultaneous only with the Self's act of seeing and hearing. But he seems to assume that appresenting the Other means originarily apprehending what is "within" the Other, that is, bringing "another's appresented inner life to perceptual presence." (Zaner 2002, p. 6)[5] On the contrary, Schutz thinks that the Self cannot apprehend the Other's inner life directly, only indirectly by means of indicative symbols. Not that Schutz thought that the Self cannot apprehend the Other but that the Other is not just his inner life. To perceive the Other's body is in fact to perceive the Other, whose way of giving himself is to present his bodily signs and to only appresent (through them) his inner life. Hence, what is doubtless appresented is not what is inside the Other but the Other whose "inside" is irredeemable. Schutz would never admit that the Self can experience the Other in the same way as the Other experiences himself nor that the Self can experience him in the same way the Self experiences itself. As Levinas claims, intersubjectivity is asymmetrical (Cfr. Levinas 2000).

Finally, Zaner demands a clarification of what intersubjectivity is and how it happens to be a datum of the life-world. The idea that in daily life we take for granted that there is the Other does not seem fair enough. That is why he asks: "Is 'taking for granted' a 'solution' in any sense?" (Zaner 2002, p. 12)

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a phenomenological descriptive point of view, it is a "datum" of the natural attitude that the other is given in a pre-conceptual form of perception.

[5] Michel Henry addresses a similar objection to Husserl (Cfr. Henry 1990).

(e) Of course Schutz takes it for granted, like in daily life, that there is the Other, but not just by mistake but because he chooses to hold on to the natural attitude as a consequence of his rejection of the transcendental phenomenology. One should focus, then, on the broader and more fundamental Schutzian conception of phenomenology as description of the natural attitude. Zaner's objection here seems to ignore such a major issue in Schutz. In order to pose this question, I will retrieve what Zaner -and Schutz himself- called "a perceptual theory of the alter ego" (Zaner 2002, p. 3) trying to prove its potential to account for intersubjectivity.

7 The Process of Mirroring and the Phenomenological Experience: A Perceptual Based Approach to Intersubjectivity

Zaner believes that Schutz took Scheler's perceptual theory of the alter ego "a bit too literally." (Zaner 2002, p. 4) I agree with him on this point but I think that we should take it even more literally. That is what I will try to do next: to radicalize the perceptual theory of the alter ego by (a) sharing Luckmann's considerations of the "process of mirroring" as one of the preconditions of intersubjectivity; (b) drawing from it an interpretation of Schutz's perceptual theory of the alter ego; and (c) going back to Zaner's criticisms attempting to answer some of them by explaining what it means that the Other is a "given."

(a) According to Luckmann, "the 'mirroring' of a Self in another Self and vice versa" is one of the "general preconditions" on which intersubjectivity rests (Luckmann 2002, p. 83). This means that in the face-to-face situation I experience another human being "directly" and my fellow-man's body appresents his body and its movements apprehended "in an interpretive system which assigns subjective meaning to what is being observed." (Luckmann 1983, p. 83)

In doing this, appresentation is a main form of conscious activity. In turn, it presupposes the more elementary intentional processes of the "passive appresentative syntheses" which is "based on the most primitive passive syntheses of the mind, the syntheses of *associative pairing*." (Luckmann 1983, p. 73) This constitutes "the perceptual basis of speech" (Luckmann 1983, p. 79) involved in the "synchronization of inner time and outer event" that actively grasps typical sound patterns "in interlocking syntheses of recollection and anticipation." (Luckmann 1983, p. 80)

In this stratum, my experience of sound sequences "is automatically synthesized with an awareness that my partner can experience the same sound sequence in a manner that is substantially similar to the way in which I experience it." (Luckmann 1983, p. 81) So in the face-to-face situation, I have direct experience of my partner: "I see that he is paying attention to the event which is relevant to me at the moment.

Thus I am not only aware of the constitution of my experience of it. Sound sequences are experienced as 'objective' events, as independent of the subjective process involved in apprehending them. At the same time they refer for both partners to their own as well as the other hearer's subjective processes." (Luckmann 1983, p. 81) That is why "sound sequences that are emitted by a partner in a face-to-face situation are not experienced as mere 'natural' events" but "are grasped as indications about him." (Luckmann 1983, p. 81) In brief, what Luckmann discloses is that the "synchronization of inner time and outer event" –which we know is involved in any intersubjective relationship- has a "perceptual base," and that my awareness of my partner's ability to experience the same as me is related to this stratum. Let us then explore this "perceptual base" and its consequences for the "perceptual theory of the alter ego."

(b) As just seen, Luckmann claims (in a sense not contrary to Schutz) that the perception of another human being is based on a passive synthesis of the mind. Indeed, when I perceive another human being, I perceive a very special kind of entity: not an object but a living being, not just any living being but a human being which Schutz called a "fellowman." Just as Schutz discloses, none of these are by themselves conceptual but perceptual syntheses. One could say that only in the second place do we categorize reflectively a fellowman: in the first place we just perceive him as such due to a spontaneous and passive synthesis of our minds. Our perception is arranged in such a form that we just perceive, beyond any shadow of a doubt, our fellowman (Belvedere 2006, p. 105ff).

One of Schutz's main contributions on the subject is (regardless of Zaner's criticisms) to reveal that intersubjectivity relies on my perception of the other's body mediated by signs and objects of the outer world, i.e., that there is no perception of his inner time flow involved in intersubjectivity, even though I can experience the same flux of experience as others, not by grasping it through empathy but reproducing it on my own by a synchronization of our fluxes of experiences mediated by a pre-conceptual kind of "communication." Put otherwise, I do not reproduce other's experiences: I produce my own, in a similar way by means of communication mediated by signs, living in a We-relationship while growing older together.

Although Schutz does not say so, we could think of this as a non-intentional bond to the Other given that –just as Zaner argues– in Schutz's position the only intentional relationship is between my noesis and my noema –i.e., there is no intentional relationship between my noesis and the other's. So one could say that I do not experience the flux of experience of the other but I do experience the same as him, only not in his *durée* but in mine. Consequently, perception is a good enough fundament for stating intersubjectivity in the framework of a phenomenology of the natural attitude, which means that no empathy is needed.

For transcendental phenomenology, this kind of attachment to perception would give us no more than a subjective and relative experience and would lead us to reject philosophical certainty and remain in skepticism. On the contrary, for Schutz (and the author), perception is the ultimate fundament of all certainty. Our claim

here is not to drop back into relativism and skepticism but setting universalism on different grounds arguing that all certainty comes from the natural attitude, which shall be described not as mere subjective and relative but –in "thick description"[6]- as objective and absolute.

From this point of view, we could found intersubjectivity on perception acknowledging that it provides the one and only experience of my fellowman, based on a passive synthesis of our minds which gives us the Other as an alter ego whose body language is meaningful to me at a pre-conceptual level, this level being the ground of all intersubjective intercourse.

(c) This will help us understand (in response to Zaner) what Schutz meant by calling intersubjectivity "a given." He meant (and so do we) that the other is constituted in a passive synthesis of our minds; thus, our knowledge of the other is not the product of our active reflective grasp but it is imposed on our perception in a compelling and indubitable way. That is why our experience of the other is a given: an originary act of our perception of the fellowman.

Let us then summarize what we have found as given in our perception of the fellowman. We have shown that only his bodily gestures are given to straight perception (i.e., presented) and that his *durée* is merely appresented. Hence, what is originarily given is not the Other's flux of consciousness –that is why we just alleged that no empathy is needed in order to set the tuning-in relationship.

This does not mean –as Zaner claims– that the other stays irredeemable but that, in my experience, he is not another *durée* experienced from "the inside," like mine, but a resembling and meaningful body with whom I can start a *social* relationship. Thus, the given of the Other is not the appresentation of his inner stream of consciousness but his bodily signs, perfectly presented to my perception and which work along with mine in a pre-linguistic "conversation." And this is what we call "the Other" or –as I would prefer to say– "my fellowman."

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[6]By this we do not mean the shallow descriptions of perception undertook by a narrow minded positivism nor the account for a restricted sense of "sensible intuition," but a profound and multi-faceted description including not only sensorial data but also, and particularly, the types and categories that shape our perception of things.

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Mutual Tuning-In Relationships and Phenomenological Psychology

Chung-Chi Yu

1 Phenomenological Psychology: From Husserl to Schutz

Schutz came in contact with Husserl's phenomenology relatively late as he endeavored to work out the philosophical grounding for social sciences. The legend tells that he was first introduced to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* by his close acquaintance Felix Kaufmann, failing to see any relevance to his own need, he gave up reading Husserl, not until the coming up of *Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness* that was published by Heidegger in 1928 and *Formal and Transcendental Logic* in 1929 did Schutz resume the texts of Husserl that were accessible to him at that time. Partly inspired by Husserl's phenomenology he finished his earlier major work *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* in 1932. What counts as highlight of the legend is that during the time when Schutz was reading the proof of that book, he happened to read the *Nachwort zu meinen Ideen*[1] and inserted some appended texts after paragraph 6, in which he determines his own philosophical engagement as "carrying on 'as constitutive phenomenology of natural standpoint,' that phenomenological psychology which, according to Husserl, in the final analysis, nothing other than a psychology of pure intersubjectivity" (Schutz 1967, p. 44). Should one say that these appended texts are irrelevant to the whole volume of *Aufbau* only because it is written down in haste? Schutz's stance to phenomenological psychology is crucial in this context. Should he say nothing more about this doctrine, then one may not need to pay much attention to the appended texts. A brief survey of his publications after *Aufbau* can be of great help.

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[1]Husserl, E. 1971. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, Buch III (Hua V)*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

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In the paper "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," which Schutz published shortly after his exile in the United States in 1940, he indicated that the researches Husserl makes in the transcendental sphere remain valid in the psychological apperception of the natural attitude, the study of which is the main task of the psychology of intentionality, i.e., phenomenological psychology. The latter is a discipline that is both eidetic and mundane. It is precisely here that Husserl's phenomenology makes a lot of contributions to the foundation of social sciences. The point of view that Husserl's phenomenological thinking has great significance for the theoretical foundation of social sciences was maintained by Schutz until 1959, shortly before his death. In the article "Husserl's Importance for the Social Sciences," written for Husserl's centennial, Schutz repeatedly remarked that Husserl's research in the transcendental sphere retains its validity in the sphere of natural attitude and praised so much the founder of phenomenology for his significance in regard to the theory of social sciences as he did before. In other words, either in 1932, 1940, or 1959, we see the continuity in Schutz's thought in regard to Husserl's phenomenology, in particular the constitutive phenomenology of natural attitude, or phenomenological psychology.

Even between 1940 and 1959, Schutz expressed similar ideas in different articles, for example, "William James' Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted," (1940) "Realities from Daily Life to Theoretical Contemplation," (1943) "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology," (1945) "Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Social Sciences," (1953) additionally, also in some posthumous manuscripts collected in *Collected Papers* Vol. IV (Cf. Schutz 1996, pp. 158, 164, 172, 178).

On the basis of such chronicled facts, we cannot but conclude that phenomenological psychology turns out to be the essential part of our reading of Schutz. In order to understand why Schutz lays so much emphasis on phenomenological psychology, it will be necessary for us to return to Husserl in order to see how it was initiated and unfolded.

The starting point of Husserl's philosophical thinking lies in investigating the relationship between the human consciousness and objective knowledge. According to remarks of Joseph J. Kockelmans, Husserl attempts an enterprise that concerns psychology of human knowledge (Kockelmans 1967, p. 90). Husserl manages to make clear the objective validity of knowledge on the basis of consciousness without falling victim to relativism and skepticism. Such an enterprise leads Husserl to draw on psychology. We see this in the earlier phase of his philosophical career when he tried to work out the foundation of arithmetic on the basis of empirical psychology. He sharply criticized himself in this regard before long and made another attempt through the so-called "descriptive psychology" in *Logical Investigations*, in the second volume of which the terminology "phenomenology" was for the first time announced. No matter how slowly he developed the transcendental approach to his phenomenology from 1905 on, he just reintegrated psychology in his research and made a psychological approach to phenomenology in the 1920s and 1930s. The posthumous script *Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925* (See Husserl 1962; Scanlon 1977) shows that he gave a series of semester

lectures on this topic, and in 1927 he explicated its meaning in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. In 1929 as he gave lectures in Amsterdam (Husserl 1962),[2] phenomenological psychology was the focus. Even in the last publication of his life-time, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936) (Husserl 1954), a substantial part is devoted to phenomenological psychology as well. In view of all this we might just wonder: Why Husserl was so "obsessed" with the phenomenological psychology in his late thinking and what exactly is it all about?

Husserl aims to build up a sort of psychology that can uncover the psychical (*das Psychische*) as such (Husserl 1962, p. 304). In such an enterprise he meets with the impediment from naturalism which results in the naturalization of the psychical (Husserl 1962, p. 309).

The psychology in the modern age is heavily influenced by the development of natural science. Besides imitating the method of natural sciences, psychology also adopts the basic assumption of the natural science. It is thus assumed that all the events that happen in the world can be traced back to the natural factors. In this regard the psychological phenomenon can be viewed as the consequence of psycho-physical phenomenon by nature, which is ultimately founded on the purely natural phenomenon. Husserl is not agreeable to this kind of viewpoint, much less is he consenting that such is the only way to approach the psychical phenomenon.

He strongly believes that so long as we can work out the essential character of the psychical, we have the chance to view the psychical on its own ground.

For Husserl, the answer to this question lies in the notion of intentionality. His teacher, Brentano, brought up this notion to signify the essence of psychical phenomenon, yet Husserl claims that Brentano is still caught up in naturalism such that he loses the insight into the true significance of this notion (Husserl 1962, p. 310). Husserl contends that we require an appropriate method to help us free from the prejudice of naturalism. The method is no other than phenomenological reduction. Since *Ideen*, such a method has been advocated by Husserl to be the proper way to approach transcendental phenomenology. In the framework of phenomenological psychology, Husserl deems it a proper way to approach the psychic phenomenon as well. It is sometimes designated by him to be phenomenological-psychological reduction, and most of the time he just calls it straight as phenomenological reduction. Through it the psychologist "reduces to pure psychic subjectivity the subjectivity occurring there (but still within the world)" (Husserl 1962, p. 293) and uncovers the intentional life of the psychic subjectivity evidently.

Through phenomenological reduction everything appears as noema in the pure psychic. According to Husserl: "My personal being (*Menschensein*) in the world and my world living" (Husserl 1962, p. 314) appear as the phenomenon in my pure psychic. They just become the "thoughts of the thinking life" ("*Vermeintes eines meinenden Lebens*") (Husserl 1962, p. 314).

To be precise, the psychical phenomenon and acts of the personal subject (*Menschensubjekt*) as well as the personal subjects (*Menschensubjekte*) living in the

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[2]All the citations from this script are translated into English by myself.

natural attitude is what the phenomenological psychology is working on (Husserl 1962, p. 338). That means, these subjects are nothing but what phenomenological psychology aims to investigate and describe. "In the outer experience I experience myself as a person (*Menschen*)." Such a person, also coined by Husserl as "person-I" (*Mensch-Ich*) is comparable to the work of art or whatever kind of cultural object (Husserl 1962, p. 339), with the emphasis that the person-I is an existence in the space-time dimension of the outer world. The personal subject is thus duplicated; it is, on the one hand the phenomenologist, the investigator, and, on the other hand, the object for research. Such a duplication is more radicalized in the transcendental reduction, when the ego is not just an psychological phenomenologist, but an ego in the absolute sense, that is, transcendental ego. Different from transcendental ego, the ego of the psychological phenomenologist can be also incorporated in the noematic sphere.

The duplication of the phenomenological psychologist and the personal subject as object of research is crucial because only against such a distinction may we come to terms with Husserl's remarks that the beliefs that are bracketed in the *epoché* retain its validity and become "the phenomenological contents of experiences (*phänomenologische Gehalt des Erlebnisses*)" (Husserl 1962, p. 314). He looks to see how the ego or egos live concretely in the world, how they conceive of the world (Husserl 1962, p. 338), and "(a)s eidetic phenomenologist, he investigates the logos of the soul" (Husserl 1962, p. 340).

Besides, we have to add that the phenomenological psychology does not focus only on my own ego but also egos in the community, thus the experience of other ego, whom my own ego encounters in the world via empathy as well as the problem of community all fall under the scope of phenomenological psychology (Husserl 1962, pp. 308, 338).

As long as we find a path to catch the pure psychic of the personal subject or subjects, we will be sure to discover the essential characteristics of psychic phenomenon, which Husserl designates as intentionality. As he puts it:

> What is always accessible to us through reflection, has a remarkable common characteristics, that the consciousness of something, or correlatively, being conscious to be (*Bewusstes zu sein*)—we speak of intentionality. It is the ground character of psychic life in pregnant meaning, also definitely inseparable from it, e.g., of perception . . . that it is perception of something. (Husserl 1962, p. 307)

The essence of the psychic is got hold of with the method of what Husserl called eidetic reduction. Through this method, " . . . a thoroughgoing general eidetic form steps out in sequent self-overlapping of the variations, an invariation that necessarily remains through all variations" (Husserl 1962, p. 323).

The invariants make up the a priori structure of the psychic. A priori indicates that this sort of psychology seeks for the eidetic universality and necessity, without which the psychical phenomenon could not be recognized as such. The origin of the a priori lies in intuition. Only the analysis based on intuition can beget the universal necessity. In other words, the essence cannot be established out of speculation. The most essential characteristics of the psychic phenomena, that is, that which remains invariant throughout all variations, counts as the correlation between the experience

of the world (*Welterfahrung*) and the world that is experienced (*erfahrene Welt*) (Husserl 1962, p. 64), which is no other than intentionality, as already indicated above.

As we know, the phenomenological psychology in Husserl has certainly to do with the empirical sciences, particularly the empirical psychology. Yet overall he focuses more on the relationship between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. As a philosopher, Husserl is concerned mostly with the transcendental subjectivity which provides the original meaning. This leads to the consequence that the correlation between world and world-experience, which counts as core content of his phenomenological psychology, is not in his focus. This implies that Husserl does not acknowledge the full value of the phenomenological psychology. That is, phenomenological psychology is not at all acknowledged as a philosophical enterprise on its own at all.

By contrast, Schutz deals with phenomenological psychology only in the framework of his enterprise to lay ground to the social sciences. It is the relationship between phenomenological psychology and social sciences that is always focused on. He renders that phenomenological psychology provides a philosophical foundation of social sciences, or as Lester Embree puts it, the science theory of social sciences (Embree 2008, p. 143).[3]

On account of Schutz's indifference to transcendental phenomenology, the value of phenomenological psychology does not have to be measured against transcendental phenomenology. The phenomenological psychology in Schutz's view is already a philosophical enterprise on its own, the main task of which is, as indicated, to lay ground to social sciences.

Helmut Wagner, a famous Schutz-scholar, refers to three points regarding the difference of Schutz's phenomenological psychology from that of Husserl as follows:

1. Husserl concentrates more on the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology; whereas Schutz focuses more on the relationship between phenomenological psychology and the empirical social sciences (Wagner 1983a, p. 303).
2. Schutz adds an ontology of Man in his life-world to phenomenological psychology. This is precisely what Husserl does not do. The ontology of Man in the life-world is a matter of philosophical anthropology (Wagner 1984, p. 196).
3. The exclusive concern of phenomenological psychology is the study of intersubjectivity (Wagner 1984, p. 190).

As we point out at the beginning of this paper, Schutz determines more than once his own enterprise as phenomenological psychology and refers to Husserl as

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[3]According to Embree's explications, the essential parts of such a discipline are threefold: 1. reflecting on basic concepts; 2. reflecting on distinctive methods and 3. reflecting on definition of science. All these three layers are reflected in Schutz's own phenomenological psychology as long as we follow carefully what Schutz actually has done in this regard. See Embree 2008.

having made great contributions to the foundation of social sciences. In view of this, the appended notes to §6 in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* should no longer be treated as just as irrelevant. Instead, it offers an important clue to answer the question: To what extent Schutz's endeavor to lay ground to the foundation of social sciences has been related to Husserl's phenomenology? Yet how is Schutz's phenomenological psychology to be characterized? A look at the way he deals with musical phenomenon might help answer this question.

2 Schutz on Mutual Tuning-In Relationship

Throughout his academic career, Schutz never stopped his interest in the investigation of musical phenomenon. From the earlier phase through the later phase, he left altogether four manuscripts on music, "Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera," (original title: *Sinn einer Kunstform (Musik)*, 1924–1925) "Fragments toward a Phenomenology of Music," (Schutz 1944) "Making Music Together," (Schutz 1951) "Mozart and the Philosophers" (Schutz 1956). The first piece is composed of fragments which constitute part of the book titled *Theorie der Lebensform* (Schutz 1981; Wagner 1982). In this manuscript Schutz considers mostly the formal characteristics of opera. But he also expresses some musical thought therein that is to be unfolded in later manuscripts such as the question of the duration and the relation to alter ego, to *Du* in particular. The second manuscript is also fragmentary, which is written in 1944 and first published by Fred Kersten in 1976 as part of the second volume of *Man and Music*, recollected in the book *In Search of Musical Method* by F. J. Smith (1976) in the same year, and lastly published in the *Collected Papers IV* in 1996. The third paper counts as the most systematic writing among Schutz's works on music, which involves parts of the contents that were expressed in the previous writings and, in addition to that, Schutz inquires into the specific social relationship in musical phenomenon, which he renders highly relevant to his own philosophical enterprise–to work out the foundation to all kinds of communication and lay ground to the foundation of social sciences. The fourth paper concerns the relation of Mozart's opera and the solution to the philosophical problems of that time. So far as the present paper targets at the investigation of how Schutz considers the relevance of musical phenomenon to phenomenological psychology, it will mainly focus on the third essay "Making Music Together," and add brief discussions on the fourth essay "Mozart and the Philosophers."

Schutz intends to work out the ultimate presupposition or foundation for all kinds of communication by analyzing the phenomenon of making music together. In such a context the inner time plays an indispensible role, and what is remarkable is that Schutz talks about the inner time of two persons or more, rather than only of one single individual. It is so to speak the kind of inner time that happens in a social relationship. Between two persons that are doing sport together, be they pitcher and catcher in baseball, be they tennis players playing against each other, or be they

two wrestlers in competition, one can see apparently the common duration between persons. The involved persons are living through a period of time, without such a presupposition the common activity between these persons would never happen. Although the sportive activities serve as good examples for common duration, it is however the musical experience that Schutz relies on. The reason is simple and clear: Music is in itself the kind of phenomenon that is based on inner time. In the essay "Making Music Together," Schutz defines music as "a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time" (Schutz 1964, p. 170). Inner time, or put in Bergson's terminology, *durée*, is seen by Schutz as the very form of existence of music.

Undoubtedly, the music also involves the dimension of outer time, which can be measured objectively with instruments such as clock. But Schutz stresses that compared to inner time the outer time is simply unimportant. Suppose two pieces of music have the same length of time, but one has faster movement and the other slower movement, they would give listeners quite different impressions, as if they ran through two different span of time. Schutz explains:

> . . . let us imagine that the slow and the fast movement of a symphony each fill a twelve inch record. Our watches show that the play of either record takes about three and a half minutes. This is a fact which might possibly interest the program maker of a broadcasting station. To the beholder it means nothing. To him it is not true that the time he lived through while listening to the slow movement was of "equal length" with that which he dedicated to the fast one(Schutz 1964, p. 171).

Schutz also refers to the problem of musical notation in the essay. In his eyes, the musical notation is different from the signs used in sciences in that the former does not refer to specific conceptual objects. Their existence is purely conventional and is not at all the only vehicle for the musical thought. As something existent in the outer world, its significance is incomparable to the essential part of music, that is, the flowing process of inner time, in which a performer plays a piece of music made by a composer, or a beholder enjoys a piece of musical work performed by a player.

Schutz adds, such a process can be only polythetical, never monothetical (Schutz 1964, p. 172).

This fact is especially remarkable because it makes the difference between a musical work and a work in literature. It is true that by reading a book the reader has to proceed polythetically in order to catch the meaning the writer intends to convey to the reader, but once he finishes reading, he is able to reflect on the whole content of the book in a monothetical way and points out where lies the core thought of the book. By contrast it is impossible for a beholder of musical work to do the same when he wants to reflect on the musical work; he has no other way than to go through it all over again. Schutz stresses that we should not misconceive the nature of the name of a musical piece: It denotes not at all the concentration of the musical contents. We can never catch the core meaning of a musical work by merely analyzing the name of the music. In order to evoke the meaning of the piece, the beholder just has to repeat the process once again. As Schutz points out: " . . . it will 'take as much time' to reconstitute the work in recollection as to experience it for the first time. In both cases I have to re-establish the quasi simultaneity of my

stream of consciousness with that of the composer described herein before" (Schutz 1964, p. 173). Between the beholder and the composer there is a close connection in terms of inner time. Both of them are united. The former has to be tuned-in in the same duration as the latter, so that he can enjoy the piece of music composed by the latter. The truth holds even when two of them live in different centuries, as Schutz puts it:

> Although separated by hundreds of years, the latter (the beholder) participates with quasi simultaneity in the former's (the composer's) stream of consciousness by performing with him step by step the ongoing articulation of his musical thought. The beholder, thus, is united with the composer by a time dimension common to both, which is nothing other than a derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face-to-face relation such as prevails between speaker and listener. (Schutz 1964, pp. 171–172)

Schutz contends that the particular social relation between the beholder and the composer is that both are "united" by a time dimension common to both even though they may be separated by centuries. This situation is highly similar to the face-to-face relation between two persons who are speaking to each other. Even though it is just a derived form of vivid present, that is, quasi simultaneity, they share the stream of consciousness together and this kind of "we-experience" makes up exactly what Schutz calls "mutual tuning-in relationship." Why is it mutual? At the first glance, it appears that only the beholder is oriented to the composer, not the way around. Yet a deeper look shows that when the composer makes the piece of music, he has an intention to arouse a certain kind of emotion or feeling in beholders. He is quasi-disposed to make a potential communication. The musical work awaits the beholder to revive the emotion that the composer intends to convey. For this reason, the relation between the composer and beholder is reciprocal. And this reciprocity does not happen just at a moment, but in a span of time, and it is no other than an experience of "mutual tuning-in relationship." Schutz depicts this situation as such: "We have therefore the following situation: two series of events in inner time, one belonging to the stream of consciousness of the composer, the other to the consciousness of beholder, are lived through in simultaneity, which simultaneity is created by the ongoing flux of the musical process" (Schutz 1964, p. 173).

Such a living through a derived form of vivid present in common, constitutes what Schutz calls "mutual tuning-in relationship," and it is no other than "the experience of the 'We'" (Schutz 1964, p. 173). And this contributes to what is "at the foundation of all possible communication" (Schutz 1964, p. 173).

The mutual tuning-in relationship occurs not only between performer and composer, but also between performer and beholder, as well as between performers themselves. Schutz focuses particularly on the mutual tuning-in relationship between performers. In addition to the sharing of vivid present, they also share a section of space. As they make music together, they are in a genuine face-to-face relationships. According to Schutz, "[t]he Other's facial expressions, his gestures in handling his instrument, in short all the activities of performing, gear into the outer world and can be grasped by the partner in immediacy" (Schutz 1964, p. 176).

The activities in outer world are as essential as the inner sharing of common stream of consciousness for co-performers. He says: "Each of them has, therefore,

to take into account what the other has to execute in simultaneity . . . he has also to anticipate the other player's interpretations of his own execution" (Schutz 1964, p. 176). As long as people play music together, as long as they are in a true face-to-face relationship, they will affect each other with the slightest change in facial expression or bodily movement. Schutz distinguishes herewith between small group of performers and larger group of performers. Whereas "a close face-to-face relationship can be established in immediacy" among a small number of co-performers, a larger number of executors would require someone to assume the leadership, no matter if he is a song leader or a concertmaster.

Now I should like to raise the following question: How is the articulation of "mutual tuning-in relationship" that determines the foundation of all communications to be evaluated in the framework of Schutzian main theme, that is, his life-long project to provide a ground for the social sciences. As long as it is legitimate to regard this project as an enterprise of phenomenological psychology, we do need to know what sort of significance the "mutual tuning-in relationship" holds in the project of phenomenological psychology. I will deal with this question by comparing "mutual tuning-in relationship" with "pure we-relationship" which appears in *Aufbau.*

My point is that by making contrast of both of these concepts, the significance of "mutual tuning-in relationship" will become clearer.

Schutz distinguishes remarkably the world of the consociates (*soziale Umwelt*) from the world of the contemporaries (*soziale Mitwelt*) (Schutz 1967, pp. 163f.)[4] as he analyzes the structure of the social world. The former is the field of face-to-face relationships, in which the people who are involved share a common space and a period of time together. Because physically they share the same space, they experience each other as unique individual; they can understand, interpret, and anticipate the actions of each other without mediation. When they misunderstand each other, they have the chance to make corrections through communication. Such kind of direct access is not at all available in the social world of the contemporaries. People in this social relationship do not encounter each other face-to-face. They know each other solely by way of typification. Everyone in such a social relationship is regarded as the actualization of a certain type of social role, which is more or less anonymous. For Schutz the world of the contemporaries is by itself "a variant function of the face-to-face situation," and that "before we describe the situation of being a contemporary, we must first discover how this is constituted out of the face-to-face situation" (Schutz 1967, p. 177). In other words, a social role would have no meaning if there were no real persons interacting with each other.

Nevertheless the face-to-face relationship, what he also calls "the concrete we-relationship," is not at all the ultimate foundation of the social world. Schutz views the concrete we-relationship as founded on the pure we-relationship. "Pure" denotes conceptual abstraction that does not appear in the real world. Yet the pure

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[4]The world of the predecessors (*Vorwelt*) and the world of the successors (*Nachwelt*) are understood as transformations of the world of the contemporaries (*Mitwelt)* (Schutz 1967, pp. 207, 214).

we-relationship functions as necessary postulate for the concrete social relations. As Schutz puts it: "We may say that concrete social relations in face-to-face situations are founded upon the pure we-relation . . . The pure we-relation may be thus also considered as a formal concept designating the structure of concrete social relations in the face-to-face situation" (Schutz 1967, p. 28).

The distinction between the pure we-relationship and concrete we-relationship is thus quite obvious. But as long as this essential distinction remains unacknowledged for some interpreters (Cf. McDuffie 1998, p. 98; List 1993, p. 263; Gurwitsch 1996, pp. XXIII f.; Psathes and Waksler 1973, pp. 161f.), we need to illuminate "pure we-relationship" more intensively, especially in regard to the "pureness" of "pure we-relationship."

It was indicated beforehand that the pure we-relationship is viewed by Schutz as the basis of the concrete we-relationship and accordingly of all social relations. Yet Schutz sees still another constituent for the pure we-relationship, which he names "Thou-orientation." (*Du-Einstellung*) By orientation Schutz means the attending of one's consciousness to the other, and the other is revealed as the pure existence (*Dasein*) rather than the existence with specific characteristics (*Sosein*). Schutz explains: " . . . the Thou-orientation is the pure mode in which I am aware of another human being as a person. I am already Thou oriented from the moment that I recognized an entity which I directly experience as a fellow man (as a Thou), attributing life and consciousness to him" (Schutz 1967, p. 163).

In the reality of daily life-world, I experience the other as a person with specific characteristics, that is, when I am attending to the other, I am in the concrete Thou-orientation. In contrast the pure Thou-orientation is a formal concept that never happens in real life but functions solely as presupposition for experience in reality (Schutz 1967, p. 164). In addition Schutz determines the Thou-orientation as "prepredicative." He contends that encountering the other involves the condition that has nothing to do with predicative descriptions. In other words, prior to any concrete situation of encountering someone, I "encounter" him as an existence without any particular features. The pure "Thou-orientation" is namely a postulate, or formal concept, which he also designates as "limiting concept." (*Limesbegriff*) The limiting concept represents the ideal limitation that can never be realized in real social life. It is something other than lived experience.

When the other is also oriented to me, when he also has pure Thou-orientation, the "pure we-relationship" is established. Accordingly the pure we-relationship is based on the reciprocal pure "Thou-orientation" and the abstract character of the pure Thou-orientation holds also good for the formal concept of pure we-relationship.

Moreover, my Thou-orientation undergoes modification as long as I am certain of the other's orientation to me, and it is exactly this modified "Thou-orientation" of mine that constitutes the reciprocal social relation. Schutz says: "The social relationship in which we live is constituted, therefore, by means of the attentional modification undergone by my other-orientation, as I immediately and directly grasp within the latter the very living reality of the partner as one who is in turn oriented toward me" (Schutz 1967, pp. 156f.).

The reciprocal relationship so to speak renders the "togetherness of we" possible. In such situation people spend a period of time together, in the words of Schutz, they grow older together. When people play game, watch TV, make music together, or just talk to each other, they are in such situations. In the "togetherness of we," each participant is not thematically aware of himself as an individual. They live in "their" stream of consciousness that is undivided and the contents of which are always enlarging and contracting. In this sense the stream of consciousness of "we" resembles my stream of consciousness (Schutz 1967, p. 166). Nevertheless, such a stream of consciousness is something beyond my own stream of consciousness, even though "among all self-transcending experiences, the we-experience remains closest to the stream of consciousness itself." (Schutz 1967, p. 167) To the extent that our duration resembles my own duration, and just as I must step outside my own stream of consciousness and "freeze" my subjective experiences in order to reflect on them, the same requirement holds for the we-relationship. That is to say, in order to think about the experiences we have together, we must withdraw from each other.

Now the question comes up, how is the togetherness of we, that is, the common flow of each other, to be rendered? Should Schutz deal with this question only with help of the formal concept "Thou-orientation" as well as "pure We-relationship," he can hardly get rid of the criticism of hanging to "individualistic" (Embree 1991, p. 210) or "egocentric" (Waldenfels 1980, p. 210) position. Even though the individualistic position might be only methodological rather than ontological, and the egocentric is different from solipsistic, it is obvious that Schutz goes from *I* to *We* in this context. He inquires about the ultimate foundation of the social world and answers the question through "Thou-orientation" of a mundane ego, and it is the modified "Thou-orientation" through the other's orientation to me that constitutes the reciprocal social relation.

But is there an alternative? My contention is that Schutz in his later works takes up this problem with help of musical phenomenon, particularly mutual tuning-in relationship, as already explicated above. He works out a way to deal with "we" from "we," no longer from "I" to "we," such as the early work hints. It is also here that Schutz can best display what Wagner depicts the phenomenological psychology of Schutz: The exclusive concern of phenomenological psychology is the study of intersubjectivity (Wagner 1984, p. 190).

Relevantly, let me point to another of Schutz's article on music "Mozart and the Philosophers," in which he discusses the role of orchestra in Mozart's opera. After pointing out the shortage of explanation made by Dilthey, he adds: "Mozart's orchestra performs an additional function: with unfailing surety he uses this device for bringing about a simultaneity between the fluxes of inner time, that is, a simultaneity between the stream of consciousness of the persons on the stage and that of the beholder. He thus establishes a community of intersubjectivity between the two, since both participate in the same flux of inner time" (Schutz 1964, p. 198).

One sees obviously that Schutz uses music phenomenon again to explain what it means to be "we." During the play of orchestra the flux of inner time of the actors as

well as beholders are mixed up in the musical performance of the orchestra, which is a creation of Mozart. In the eyes of Schutz, the musician can play the similar role as the philosopher by indicating what is the "togetherness of we" all about. Mozart uses opera to show wherein all the social relationships are founded and such an awareness of social relationship can be rendered as the true foundation of all philosophical efforts to lay ground for the social sciences. As long as Mozart's main concern is "the encounter of man with man within the human world" as well as the exploration of "the metaphysical mystery of the existence of a human universe of pure sociality" (Schutz 1964, p. 199), the musician Mozart deserves being regarded as philosopher, since he "solves" the difficult philosophical problems of intersubjectivity by means of music.

Once again we see how the phenomenological psychology, which Schutz understands as a psychology of pure intersubjectivity (Schutz 1967, p. 44), is closely related to musical phenomenon, the core of which can be rendered as mutual tuning-in relationship such as Schutz discloses in the article of "Making Music Together."

3 Conclusion

The meaning of "mutual tuning-in relationship," as explicated above in the second section of this paper is depicted by Schutz as the belonging together of two series of events in inner time, either between composer and beholder, between performer and beholder, or between performers (Cf. Schutz 1964, p. 173). It is a unique experience of "We," from which no separation into two egos seems possible. In such a situation there is no longer the priority of "I" over "We", such as Schutz proposes in *Aufbau* through the formal concept of "pure Thou-orientation" and "pure We-relationship." Instead, the "We" is primordial, so that it constitutes the foundation of all possible communications. It is here that we see no signs of individualism or egocentrism that Schutz has been suspected of. The concern of the Schutzian phenomenological psychology–the study of pure intersubjectivity–can be best articulated by virtue of "mutual tuning-in relationship."

In sum, as long as the phenomenological psychology in Husserl's view is working on the structure of the psychic and the communities of the psychic (Husserl 1962, p. 290/E 291), and as long as the intersubjective aspect of the world is emphasized in Schutz, we may suggest that one of the main purposes of phenomenological psychology can be displayed through the "mutual tuning-in relationship" significantly. The notion of "mutual tuning-in relationship," as Schutz conceives of it, helps explicate how the social relationship, i.e., the core of the social world, gets constituted, how this social world is not first revealed through the consciousness of any single individual, but in the primordial experience of "We." Regarded as such, the musical thought of Schutz not only helps constructing his theory of social world and eventually his philosophical grounding of the social sciences, but also contributes to modify phenomenological psychology itself.

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Music, Meaning, and Sociality: From the Standpoint of a Social Phenomenologist

Andreas Goettlich

1 Introduction

The following article examines some rather fundamental thoughts on the connection of music, meaning, and sociality and to this end employs phenomenological reflections presented by Alfred Schutz in his writings about music. These texts reveal a specific epistemological interest which mirrors Schutz's professional background. As a social scientist he was interested in the social aspects of music, that is, he was primarily concerned with the act of intersubjective understanding by means of musical communication and he was considerably less concerned with the antecedent creation of musical meaning by the solitary individual. When regarded from this perspective, Schutz's reflections about music can be seen as instructive in adumbrating the general borderline between sociological and phenomenological research.

2 Music and Meaning

My reflections start with a simple observation: It is striking that two of the texts Schutz wrote about music – "Fragments toward a Phenomenology of Music" written in 1944 and "Making Music Together" written in 1951 – share a nearly identical beginning. "Fragments" starts with the assertion that "a piece of music is a meaningful context" (see Schutz 1996, p. 243) and the first sentence of "Making Music Together" is: "music is a meaningful context" (see Schutz 1964, p. 159). This

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statement, therefore, must have been of some importance for Schutz, and as such is a logical starting point for a consideration of his position vis à vis music and sociality.

"Music is a meaningful context" – how can one understand this assertion? On a formal level one can regard it as either an observation or a definition. As an observation it would refer to an inductive generalization; according to the rules of logic one could interpret it as the idea that all the phenomena subsumed under the term "music" are meaningful, as far as we have empirical knowledge of them. Such an interpretation would hardly be adequate. It would mean that there is the possibility of finding musical phenomena which are not meaningful. Such an assumption not only contradicts our common sense conception of music, it is also obviously an inadequate paraphrase of what Schutz wanted to express with his statement.

As an alternative one can regard "music is a meaningful context" as a definition. As such it would exclude a priori the possibility of finding musical phenomena without meaning; the statement would be irrefutable. This may seem rather self-evident, yet phenomenological reflection shows that the alleged essential connection between music and meaning is not as straightforward as it first appears. It is a rather complex matter into which this paper tries to gain some insight. To this purpose, Schutz's writings about music are used as a central point of reference, whereas at a certain point reflections will go beyond them.

If one looks at Schutz's statement as a definition, one must agree that it is deficient. Although it follows the formally correct structure of definitions (which is: *genus proximum*, *differentia specifica*), it fails in its content since it designates neither the nearest genus, nor the specific difference: "Context" is too broad a category, and "meaningfulness" is also true of other contexts. To clarify the former, one could try to further explain the definition, for instance: Music is a sound, or a sequence of sounds, provided with meaning. Since the same can be said of spoken language, one has to further clarify: Music is a meaningful sound, but the meaning is not expressed in words. Schutz himself makes an equivalent exception when he writes that "music is not bound to a conceptual scheme" (1964, p. 159).[1]

With reference to the *genus proximum* "sound" seems to be a more adequate concept than "context." But how about the *differentia specifica*? What exactly is the specific difference between sound and music? Mentioning meaning is not enough since this would imply that other sounds aside from music (and speech, which has already been excluded above) are not meaningful. This is obviously incorrect: The piping of my water pot means that the water is boiling, and the beeping of my computer means that it is about to give up the ghost. Accordingly, the definition needs to be made more precise and reflect the specific kinds of meanings of music in opposition to the meanings of mere sounds.

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[1]This seemingly self-evident containment may not be forgotten, as for example in Blaukopf's definition of musical action: "action aiming at the production of sonic incidents and containing a meaning which is oriented towards the behavior of others." (in German: "*das auf die Erzeugung von Schallereignissen gerichtete Handeln mit einem auf das Verhalten anderer intendierten Sinn*" (Blaukopf 1996, p. 3). This characterization is also true of speech and therefore unspecific.

Using Schutz's theory of signs and symbols as a basis (cf. Schutz 1962), one can differentiate between three possible meanings of music: an indicative meaning, an emblematic meaning, and a symbolic meaning. In the first case, music is understood as an indication, overcoming so-called "Small Transcendencies"[2]; in the second case as a sign, overcoming so-called "Medium Transcendencies"[3]; in the third case as a symbol, overcoming so-called "Great Transcendencies."[4] According to the "Principle of the Relative Irrelevance of the Vehicle" (cf. Schutz 1962, p. 303), music may be used as an indication as well as a sign or a symbol. As a means to overcome a "Small Transcendency" it is used for instance in the case of the clock radio: The music simply "reminds" me to get up and does not (necessarily) have any further meaning. However, there can be no doubt that this is not the original or specific meaning of the music. The clock radio is just a further development of the alarm clock and designates some kind of misappropriation of the intrinsic purpose of music. Hence we may treat the indicative meaning of music as derivative. Furthermore, this meaning would not supply a distinctive criterion since music shares this potential meaning with sound. The same applies to the emblematic meaning. A musical expression of my fellow-man tells me something about his actual state of mind, but in the same way the sound of his gnawing teeth may also give me a hint concerning his mental state. As a consequence, the distinction between sound and music must be sought in its symbolic meaning. Music, in opposition to mere sounds, has the principal capability to overcome a "Great Transcendency." In other words, music is an acoustic phenomenon occurring within the paramount reality and referring – at least potentially – to a transcendent sphere of reality, that is, the world of arts.[5] It is this third potential meaning which distinguishes music from mere sounds.

Now the talk of "potential" might be criticized as being airy and therefore unsatisfactory, but this vagueness actually refers to a fundamental issue. In order to distinguish whether a certain phenomenon falls under the category of sound or of music, it is not sufficient to look at the acoustic object alone. One rather has to consider the individual who experiences the phenomenon. This essential aspect is reflected in a verse by the German poet Wilhelm Busch: "music is often experienced as unpleasant since it is always connected with noise."[6] One may even expand on Busch's statement by saying that music is not only inherently connected with noise; it might even be experienced as mere noise, depending on the listener and his situation. The verse, then, reveals a critical consideration: What for some may be an aesthetic experience,

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[2]I.e., transcendencies of time and space (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1989, pp. 106ff.).

[3]I.e., transcendencies of intersubjective communication (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1989, pp. 109ff.).

[4]I.e., transcendencies of different spheres of reality (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 1989, pp. 117ff.).

[5]To be sure, there are sounds sometimes said to have symbolic meaning, such as, for instance, the singing of the blackbird. Yet, I would treat such modes of speaking as semantic derivations which, in the end, point back to music as the original phenomenon.

[6]In German: "*Musik wird oft nicht schön gefunden, weil sie stets mit Geräusch verbunden.*" (see Wilhelm Busch: *Der Maulwurf*).

can be pure annoyance for others. So in order to recognize an acoustic phenomenon as music – that is, as actualizing the third potential described above – the listener must adopt a certain attitude.[7] In asserting that listening to music presupposes the "decision to listen to pure music," (Schutz 1996, p. 258) that is, to interpret a sequence of tones as music and not as noise, Schutz reflects this consideration. As with spoken language, an intention to understand what one hears is the necessary precondition for becoming aware of the meaning of music. One important consequence of this reflection is that the question whether a certain acoustic phenomenon may be categorized as music cannot possibly be answered a priori but only empirically.

By now, reflection has arrived at an insight which can be identified as a phenomenological matter of course: An adequate analysis of the musical phenomenon must reflect the individual experiencing it. Such a reflection can take advantage of a basic differentiation between three typical roles within which an individual may deal with musical meaning: (1) as a listener, e.g., sitting in a concert hall or listening to his iPod; (2) as a musician, that is, as member of an ensemble or as soloist; (3) as a composer. Certainly, the listener, the musician and the composer are ideal types created for analytic purposes. In reality, the musical performer usually simultaneously listens to the music he and his fellow-musicians play, and the act of playing music may coincide with the act of composing as with improvised music. Nevertheless, the typification helps to structure a phenomenological reflection about music and will be used as a means of differentiation for the rest of this paper. In an implicit way, one can uncover this typification within Schutz's writings about music. "Fragments" is primarily concerned with the listener, whereas "Making Music Together" deals primarily with the musician. However, there is no text in which Schutz focuses solely on the composer.[8]

Converse to the "natural" order, I will begin with the listener, who, in a manner of speaking, stands at the end of the chain of musical activities. Afterwards I will discuss the musician as type and finally the composer, and, thereby, inevitably go beyond Schutz.

3 The Listener

Within the framework of ideal types, as explained above, the listener is conceived as an individual perceiving a piece of music which, in that very moment, is being or previously has been performed by someone else.[9] As such, the listener of music is

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[7]To do so is not always under the listener's command. Cultural knowledge, normative aesthetic reflections, and even physical condition are all also involved. We know, for example, that in the US-Prison at Guantanamo Bay, popular music, which a lot of people enjoy and pay for, was used to torture the captives.

[8]There are, however, widespread remarks concerning the composer in Schutz's texts.

[9]In the case of a live performance the acts of performing and listening may take place (almost) synchronically, thus the argument is logical rather than temporal.

concerned with the reconstruction of the meaning that was conferred on a piece of music by his fellow-man. He is not involved in the construction of this meaning.[10]

In "Fragments," Schutz develops a conception of how the listener becomes aware of the "correct" meaning of a piece of music. According to Schutz, the experience of listening to a piece of music takes place in the inner time of the listener, in his "*durée*" (cf. Bergson 1999). From the phenomenological point of view, listening to music cannot be adequately described by means of a natural scientific vocabulary: "the relations between sounds and mathematical proportions cannot even contribute anything to the questionable problem" (see Schutz 1996, p. 246). Instead, Schutz treats music as a kind of "ideal object," which, in a certain sense, exists independently of its physical features as they occur within outer time. To understand the reconstruction of the meaning of music, one must look at the inner procedures happening within the consciousness of the listener. For Schutz, the passing of time is a precondition for grasping the constituted meaning of a work of music; it can only be understood "by reconstituting the polythetic steps in which it has been built up, by reproducing mentally or actually its development from the first to the last bar as it goes on in time" (Schutz 1996, p. 248). In other words, in order to understand music in an emphatic sense, one must live through it, that is, one must synchronize one's inner time with that of the performer or composer, since by looking at a piece of music as a whole, one can only grasp the general content or mood of that piece.

Thus, the meaning of a piece of music constitutes itself in the stream of time, but we cannot recognize this meaning "as long as we follow the stream" (Schutz 1996, p. 267). Instead we have to step outside the stream. Schutz writes, "an experience while occurring, that is, while we are living in it, does not have any meaning; only the past experiences toward which we may turn back, are meaningful" (Schutz 1996, p. 271). Therefore, the constitution of musical meaning becomes a problem of a specific reconstruction by the listener. This line of reasoning leads to a problematic conclusion, namely, that one can understand music only after listening to it by directing the intentionality of one's consciousness back towards what has already happened in the past, while in the actual process of listening one does not understand the music in question.

This conclusion is wrong in the cursory sense, but right in a more subtle sense. Schutz's reasoning is that the listener is principally able to understand music while listening to it. The listener is enabled to do so with the use of "themes" or musical units, which imply "a feeling of virtual finality" (Schutz 1996, p. 270). Schutz's thesis states that a sequence of tones is experienced as a melody if it moves the beholder into a state of mind in which he can settle down and come to a rest. The completion of a musical theme or a melody provides a "resting place" (cf. James

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[10]N.B, this statement refers to the ideal type. The listener who communicates his interpretation of the piece of music after listening to it (e.g. as a critic) or even while listening to it (e.g. as a dancer), surely takes part in the construction of musical meaning; this, however, is outside the scope of this analysis.

1981, p. 236) from which the listener – whilst listening to the music – can "look back" at the elapsed time and make sense of it. As an example, Schutz refers to the theme of the last movement of Brahms' First Symphony:

> To me personally ... this peculiar theme is the key to the understanding of Brahms' First Symphony. That is what I know by previous experiences. If the first notes of the beginning of the first movement start, I am directed by my anticipations toward the French horn theme which will appear later on at the end of the introduction of the fourth movement. All the preceding occurrences in the symphony receive, to me, their peculiar meaning and significance because I know that they will lead to this theme, all the events that follow derive their meaning from it. ... Thus, to me, this peculiar theme functions as a kind of home-position which may be reassumed any time if I am listening to this symphony or reproducing it before my inner ear (see Schutz 1996, pp. 267f.).

4   The Musician

In discussing the musician, I am referring – as Schutz does in "Making Music Together" – to the ideal-type of an individual making music as a soloist or as member of a group, thereby interpreting a score that was written sometime prior, either by the musician himself or by someone else. I am neither concerned with the case of the improvising musician, who composes while he is playing, nor with the practitioner, who is primarily occupied with improving his motor skills.[11]

In considering this ideal-type, we can observe the construction of musical meaning as opposed to its reconstruction as performed by the listener. Schutz's core argument identifies the act of making music together as a paradigmatic example of a "mutual tuning-in relationship," (see Schutz 1964, p. 161) that is, a basic kind of relationship upon which the communicative process is founded. The constitution of such a relationship presumes that the individuals involved in it "are growing older together" (Schutz 1964, p. 175).

This is obviously true of the members of a band or an orchestra making music together. But for Schutz, this can also be said of the composer and the performer, even if they live in different epochs. This works because the "mutual tuning-in" in question does not so much refer to objective time but rather to inner time, to "*durée*," as mentioned above. This differentiation allows Schutz to conceptualize the relationship between composer and performer as derived from a face-to-face relationship.

Composer and performer, as well as fellow-musicians, both experience the evolving of a piece of music in time, they both experience its step-by-step occurrence. It is this polythetic process which constitutes the meaning of a piece of music and it is

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[11]A similar (I would say: ideal-type) exclusion is made by Schutz in "Making Music Together" when he assumes "that our piano player is equally proficient as a technician and sight reader and that consequently no mechanical or other external obstacle will hinder the flux of his performance" (see Schutz 1964, p. 167). It seems quite clear that especially the latter presupposition only holds true for a small minority of musicians and musical events.

irrelevant whether two individuals live through this process at the same (outer) time or at different (outer) times, notwithstanding the fact that "making music together is an event in outer time" (Schutz 1964, p. 177). The crucial point is that the partners live through the same process with regard to their "*durées*" and that they establish simultaneity between their streams of consciousness. Schutz's core thesis states "that this sharing of the other's flux of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common, constitutes ... the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the 'We,' which is at the foundation of all possible communication" (Schutz 1964, p. 173).[12]

Schutz's conclusions about the specific kind of social relationship existing between fellow-musicians or between composer and performer, which are only adumbrated here, sufficiently enough for our purposes, lead him to a more refined definition of music:

> [A] piece of music may be defined ... as a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time. It is the occurrence in inner time, Bergson's *durée*, which is the very form of existence of music. The flux of tones unrolling in inner time is an arrangement meaningful to both the composer and the beholder, because and in so far as it evokes in the stream of consciousness participating in it an interplay of recollections, retentions, protentions, and anticipations which interrelate the successive elements. (Schutz 1964, p. 170)

5   The Composer

Within the given context, the composer type is conceived as a person composing alone, not as part of a group.[13] This specific interest in the lonesome composer has to be viewed against the background of the ideal typification, since in this context we can observe the constitution of subjective meaning (*Sinn*) without the construction of objective meaning (*Bedeutung*) (cf. Luckmann 2007c, pp. 142f.). As observed above, Schutz's discussion of musical meaning has a specific focus; this becomes evident in the passage cited above (cf. Schutz 1996, pp. 267f.), in which Schutz writes about "previous experiences," "preceding occurrences," and "reproducing." All of these phrases most obviously refer to the listener of music who is trying to reconstruct a meaning that has previously been established. This latter feature applies analogously to the case of the musician who performs a piece of music using

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[12]Taking the listener into consideration as well, the relationship in question might be enhanced to a threefold correlation. In this context, the musician acts as a mediator between composer and listener (cf. Schutz 1964, p. 174).

[13]This is typical of much of the music relegated to the so-called classical music genre, be it from the Baroque period, Viennese Classicism, or Romantic period. In modern, especially popular music, things seem to be different as song writing credits are often given to several composers or even whole bands. However, when viewed more closely, the incidence of people composing as a team is smaller than the practice of credit-giving suggests. We know for example that the "congenital" writing team Lennon/McCartney wrote fewer songs in cooperation than has been supposed for a long time.

an already existing score (or reproducing from memory). Generally, one can say that the music Schutz is concerned with, as well as its meaning, is "already there" as it has been previously performed and composed. This observation raises a significant question: Can one view the constitution of the meaning of music as performed by the composer in the same way that one views the constitution of the meaning of music as performed by the listener? Does the finding of musical meaning proceed in the same way as its reconstruction?

As will be shown in the following, there is a specific difference, a difference that implies a general borderline between phenomenological and sociological research. I should warn that the following argument is based neither on empirical analysis, nor on the introspective reflection of a practicing composer, which I am not. So one could call what follows speculation, and justifiably so. Nevertheless, I hope (and think) it constitutes an educated guess.

The initial impetus for these reflections came from a Monty Python sketch in which John Cleese imitates Ludwig van Beethoven composing the musical theme of his Fifth Symphony, the so-called *Schicksalssymphonie*.[14] Although this sketch is certainly not meant to authentically depict the compositional act, it contains some thought-provoking implications for phenomenological reflection. Due to repeated disturbances by his wife, Cleese/Beethoven is not immediately able to arrange the tones in the right order. Sitting at his piano, he composes by trial and error and fails again and again in his attempts to complete the sequence G-G-G-bE F-F-F-.... In Schutz's words, one can say that Cleese's/Beethoven's failure to complete the melody means that he cannot provide a resting place in the sense of William James, that is, a place from which the listener could grasp the meaning of the music he is listening to. Therefore the compositional attempts of Cleese/Beethoven remain meaningless, for the time being.

Yet eventually, more or less by accident, the composer hits the right note on his piano: G-G-G-bE is followed by F-F-F-D – thus producing the Fifth Symphony's famous initial theme with the specific meaning it has attained for literally millions of listeners. In the same way that Cleese/Beethoven knew of the mistakenness of his previous efforts, he instantly recognizes that he has found the appropriate tone and shouts, "I got it!" The composer realizes his success in the very moment he hits the right tune. His exclamation is reminiscent of the one apocryphally attributed to Archimedes when he found what would later be known as Archimedes' Principle, and allegedly shouted, "Eureka!"[15]

As delineated above, the sketch conveys a twofold notion of composing. On the one hand, it is clear that the composer is creating something new: a sequence of tones played in a specific tempo and with specific phrasing; that is, a musical theme which comes into existence in the very moment the composer plays it for the first time; it is not there before. On the other hand, in a certain sense, the meaningful melody is already there before the composer manages to arrange the

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[14]*Monty Pythons Flying Circus*, Episode 21.

[15]"I have found it!".

precise tones in the right sequence. This is suggested by the fact that the composer can easily discriminate between those series of tones which are wrong and the one which is right. This circumstance could hardly be explained if we were to assume that the composer creates a meaningful melody *ex nihilo*, since, if that were the case, he would be completely free in his aesthetic judgment. Instead the notion of composition presented here is that of a melody already existing in some idealistic sense and waiting for its discovery by a composer.

Thus, two undertakings are referred to in the act of composing: creation and discovery. This somehow paradoxical situation was succinctly expressed by Ian Anderson, the noted rock musician, when he remarked that "music isn't there, it's bloody hard to find!" Thus, he expresses the idea that music is both the result of a creation of something totally new, as well as an "ideal object" which is already there – otherwise it would not make sense to search for it.

Given that this description of the compositional process is essentially correct,[16] the reflection raises the question of how one may conceive of an already existing musical theme even before it is composed, without stepping into the field of metaphysical speculation. The phenomenological concept of *epoché*, i.e., the bracketing of ontological statements about the world (cf. Husserl 1989, §32), offers an adequate platform from which to answer this question. The method of *epoché* remains within the limits of epistemological reflection so that the talk of an "existing" musical theme does not mean that this theme has some antecedent ontic existence. It merely means that the composer, in his mind, imagines the theme as something which is already there.

While it is not possible to present a causal explanation for this description of, what I hold to be, a key notion in the act of composing, it is still possible to give evidence in support of it. To that end I will leave the theory of Alfred Schutz and move to the anthropological theory of Helmuth Plessner as explicated in his book *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch*. Unfortunately there is not yet an English translation of this book, so the reader will have to be content with my imperfect translation of some passages from Plessner's book. In English the title of his book is roughly *The Stages of the Organic World and Man*. Plessner writes:

> The secret of creation, of the idea consists in the *fortunate grasp*, in the encounter between man and things. Searching for something which is predefined is not the prius of invention in the intrinsic sense, since he who is searching for something, in truth has already found. He falls under the law of that-which-is-being, according to which, discovery is only the fulfillment of a pursuit that is satisfiable by guarantee. The prius of searching and finding,

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[16]The description is directed against a conceptualization of composing as a mere following of rules. Of course there are musical structures, patterns, and forms, which, in a certain sense, determine the act of composing; once a composer has decided how to start a piece of music, many of the following decisions are already anticipated. For example, the symphony's form constricts the composer in how he can handle his musical theme. But in order to find such a theme, musical patterns, forms, and structures cannot help. They certainly aid in bringing the musical ideas together into an aesthetic whole, that is, in the act of composing in the literal sense. Yet there is no musical rule that says: "after G-G-G-bE, F-F-F-D has to follow." This parallels linguistic syntax since syntax prescribes how to build sentences out of words, but not how to find new words.

however, is the correlativity of man and the world, which refers back to the identity of his
excentric form of position and the structure of the material world. (Plessner 1975, p. 322,
the author's translation)[17]

In the part of his book from which the passage is taken, Plessner does not talk
explicitly about musical composition; he is more concerned with craftsmanship
in general. But one may apply his thoughts to the topic at hand without serious
theoretical problems. I will only give a very brief outline of the arguments behind
Plessner's anthropological theory. He distinguishes human beings from plants
and animals as the alternative forms of organic life on earth by referring to
their positionality which is different for each. According to Plessner humans are
characterized by their "excentric positionality," (cf. Plessner 1975, pp. 288ff.) that
is, they possess – in contradistinction to plants – a positional centre, through which
contact to the outer world is mediated. This mediation grants humans a form of
independence from their environment. The latter is also true of animals, but while
animals live in this mediation, a human being's positional centre relates not only
to the environment but also to itself, so that humans are able to become aware of
the mediation in which they stand. Walter Schulz, a pupil of Plessner, later spoke of
"mankind's fractured relation to the world," (cf. Schulz 1994)[18] thereby expressing
Plessner's idea that the relation of humans to the outer world and even to their inner
world is principally ambiguous and full of friction.

From these basic assumptions Plessner deduces three "fundamental anthropolog-
ical laws," one of which he calls the "Law of Mediated Immediacy" (cf. Plessner
1975, pp. 321ff.).[19] It states that human beings are able to find direct contact to the
outer and inner world only by mediating this same contact, that is, by making it an
indirect one. Since this ambiguity is based on the position of mankind in the world,
it is also valid in reference to the relation between the artist and his work of art. He,
the artist, conceives of this relation in a twofold sense: On the one hand, he thinks
of his artwork as something which originated from himself and is an outcome of his
own intentions. On the other hand, he reflects his artwork as some "ideal object," as
Schutz calls it, as an object which is imagined as something existing independently
of his doing, as something which he only materializes.[20] Only within this ambiguity
can the artist fulfill his artistic ambition, and only when his subjective intention and

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[17]In German: "*Das Geheimnis des Schöpfertums, des Einfalls besteht in dem glücklichen Griff, in
der Begegnung zwischen dem Menschen und den Dingen. Nicht das Suchen nach etwas Bestimmtem
ist das Prius der eigentlichen Erfindung, denn wer nach etwas sucht, hat in Wahrheit schon
gefunden. Er steht unter dem Gesetz des Seienden, nach welchem der Fund die bloße Erfüllung
eines garantiert erfüllbaren Strebens ist. Das Prius von Suchen und Finden dagegen ist die
Korrelativität von Mensch und Welt, die auf die Identität seiner exzentrischen Positionsform und
der Struktur dinglicher Realität … zurückweist.*"

[18]In German: "gebrochener Weltbezug."

[19]In German: "Gesetz der vermittelten Unmittelbarkeit."

[20]This notion of an artwork "being there" even before it is created is expressed quite clearly
by a famous dictum (allegedly) by Michelangelo that says that the secret of statuary consists in
removing those parts of the stone that are superfluous.

the configuration of the objective world collide can the artist find fulfillment. This is what Plessner means when he speaks of a "fortunate grasp." He therefore concludes: "what enters into the sphere of culture, shows ligation to human creatorship and at the same time (and to the same extent) independence from it. Man can only invent insofar as he discovers" (Plessner 1975, p. 321, the author's translation).[21]

6   Conclusion: The Borderline Between Sociology and Phenomenology

As the above discussion of the composer demonstrates, Schutz's reflections on music do not consider all three types of individuals who are concerned with the meaning of a piece of music. Indeed Schutz explains in a convincing manner the process of mediation of musical meaning in intersubjective contexts, that is, between the composer and performer, the musician and the listener, or between fellow-musicians, but his writings about music do not describe how this meaning initially comes into being. I therefore attempted to elucidate this creative act with reference to the positionality argument of Helmuth Plessner.

Yet Schutz's limiting his arguments and observations to only certain aspects of the phenomenon under scrutiny should not be viewed as some kind of deficiency; rather, I think that this limitation in the scope of his argument is for good reason. In his writings about music Schutz clearly stays within the realm of "Interpretive Sociology" in that he considers music primarily as a social phenomenon. The understanding of the meaning of a piece of music, therefore, has to be conceived as an act of interpersonal communication. The objective of an "Interpretive Sociology" of music is to find out about how this act of communication works. To this question, I think, Schutz has provided a worthwhile answer.

What lies beyond the realm of communication is the aesthetic act of composing, which here means creating or finding a meaningful arrangement of tones. This is not a genuine social action. According to the famous definition given by Max Weber, a certain action is to be called social "insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (see Weber 1978, p. 4). Weber's definition implies that composing is not first and foremost a social action, at least not if one focuses on the act of finding the "right" tune. This action is guided by aesthetic ideals, not by reflecting on the possible reaction of others to a subsequent musical performance which may never happen. Schutz certainly was aware of this when he wrote, "it is clear that from the point of view of the composer a musical thought may be conceived without any intention of communication" (see Schutz 1964, p. 164); the composer might create his work "only as an expression of his musical thoughts" (Schutz 1964, p. 170).

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[21] In German: *Was also in die Sphäre der Kultur eingeht, zeigt Gebundenheit an das menschliche Urhebertum und zugleich (und zwar in demselben Ausmaß) Unabhängigkeit von ihm. Der Mensch kann nur erfinden, soweit er entdeckt.*

Of course, when I maintain that composing is not a genuine social action, I am referring specifically to the primordial act of musical interpretation, that is, the finding of a meaningful sequence of tones, the "musical unit" to which Schutz attaches such great importance.[22] Certainly, the compositional processing of such a theme has to be conceived of as social action. The composer must reflect how an anonymous, or in some cases concrete, performer will interpret his score, be it a member of a band or an orchestra, or a soloist. He may also take into account the possible reactions of an audience. Moreover, the context in which composing takes place is always a social context and cannot be adequately conceived otherwise. The very moment a composer begins to implement his idea in the working world (*Wirkwelt*), he makes use of the activities of his fellow-men: The pencil he uses to write down his thoughts is a social product as is the paper on which he writes, the notation system he uses has been invented by someone else, and he presupposes that the appropriate knowledge required to decipher his signs is distributed within society or at least within the "society of musicians" (Schutz 1964, p. 163). Even if he does not produce a score at all, he uses an instrument that was built by a craftsman whose work rests upon the theoretical and practical knowledge of generations of instrument builders before him. Even the composer's "knowledge" about what can be regarded as an aesthetically adequate means of artistic expression is socially derived. Yet at the very moment of creating a musical theme as the core element of a song, symphony, or whatever, all these aspects do not have any relevance within the mind of the artist – he just wants to get tunes right.

According to this argument, it is understandable that Schutz was primarily concerned with the types of the listener and musician, and less with the type of the composer in his writings about music. As a sociologist, he was interested in music as a social phenomenon, that is, in the intersubjective mediation of musical meaning. In contradistinction, the solitary (in an ideal-type sense) act of finding a meaningful melody was not the focus of Schutz's sociological studies. This act is logically antecedent to musical communication, since meaning has to be created or discovered by a single person before it may be conveyed to others. Music first has to make sense to the composer before it can gain meaning within a musical community. Once again Helmuth Plessner provides an anthropological corroboration of the circumstance in question: "the creative grasp is an activity of expression," (Plessner 1975, p. 322, the author's translation)[23] he writes, and he adds that the necessity to express oneself at all necessarily comes prior to the forms of expression (cf. Plessner 1975, p. 323).

On a more abstract level the consideration of the topic of musical meaning illustrates the general borderline between sociology and phenomenology. Schutz draws from phenomenological reflections in order to solve sociological problems and this epistemological interest of his is what shapes his use of phenomenological propositions. In expanding of the theory of Alfred Schutz with aid of the writings

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[22] See his statement about Brahms's First Symphony above (Schutz 1996, pp. 267f.).

[23] In German: "Der schöpferische Griff ist eine Ausdrucksleistung."

of Helmuth Plessner, it becomes clear that phenomenology can continue where sociology loses the interest of its specific discipline, since phenomenology can be used to analyze all kinds of human phenomena, whereas sociology restricts itself to those which are of a social nature.[24] Thus, the border between phenomenology and sociology can be seen as the line where sociological investigation ends, and, as a consequence, sociological theory rests upon philosophical propositions for which it cannot offer any proof. For example, the fact that the listener is able to understand the subjective meaning that Beethoven connected with the theme of his Fifth Symphony – thereby constructing objective meaning – cannot be explained by sociological reflection alone. It rests upon the assumption that human beings approximately react in the same way when listening to a piece of music. It also rests on the assumption that they tend to accept the same melodies (in our case the succession of two thirds) as "resting places." It presupposes – as Schutz formulates with reference to George H. Mead – "that a prelinguistic 'conversation' of 'attitudes' is possible," (see Schutz 1964, p. 161) or in other words that there is some kind of reciprocity of perspectives. Why such reciprocity exists at all, is a question which goes beyond the explanatory scope of sociology.

On the other hand, phenomenology cannot provide the empirical knowledge that sociology as a *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* is able to give.[25] Sociologists possess the scientific instruments to empirically enhance the necessarily abstract theorems of phenomenology by applying them to concrete socio-historic situations. In order to make the otherwise rather vague concept of reciprocity concrete, one has to empirically describe social circumstances that bring forward (or do not) the supposition of reciprocity. Only this type of scientific work has the ability to yield real insight into empiric phenomena, to explain them in the strictest sense of the word. For example, the statement that a certain piece of music is designed to achieve a synchronization of the "*durées*" of the musician and the listener, cannot possibly explain why it becomes (or does not become) popular in specific cultures and at specific times. In order to explain this, one must leave the abstract level of phenomenological reflection and plunge into the cultural diversity of social life. In this sense, sociology goes on where phenomenology ends.

Having come to this conclusion, I would like to make my last point by commenting on an argument Thomas Luckmann provided some decades ago. In an article about the relation between phenomenology and sociology, he argues that the border between the two disciplines is drawn by a difference of both perspectives and methods. While the phenomenological perspective is egological, the sociological one is cosmological; and while the method of phenomenology is reflexive, the one of

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[24] It may be worth mentioning that this distinction does not collide with the one given by the editors in the introduction. Their definition focuses on the difference of methodological approaches, whereas here emphasis is given to the difference of subject matters.

[25] Nota bene: This statement refers to Husserlian phenomenology in the way it was performed by himself, that is, as a founding of the factual sciences (this is also Luckmann's understanding of Husserl; see below). Indeed, Husserl also mentions the idea of an empirical phenomenology that follows the eidetic one (Husserl 1962, p. 298).

sociology is inductive (cf. Luckmann 1979, p. 196). In light of the above arguments, one may also add that there is a third distinction and that is between different epistemological interests.[26] While phenomenology aims to describe general acts of consciousness and has an anthropological attitude, sociology is an attempt to understand and discover the ways of thinking of actual human beings who live in concrete socio-historic situations.[27] Therefore, Luckmann's metaphor of a "parallel action," (cf. Luckmann 2007a, p. 97; b, p. 131) meant to depict the interplay between phenomenology and sociology, is somehow twisted. The two disciplines do not share the same goal; rather, their different interests connect them in mutual amendment – perhaps a more promising relationship in the face of the necessity of the division of scientific labor.

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[26]Besides the incongruity of subject matters hinted at above, sociology is concerned with social phenomena, whereas phenomenology is concerned with all kinds of human phenomena. But since there is an overlap, this reflection does not offer a selective criterion.

[27]Granted, sociology uses typification, but as a means of perception, not as its purpose.

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Artistic Practice, Methodology, and Subjectivity: The "I Can" as Practical Possibility and Original Consciousness

Andreas Georg Stascheit

When in the *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty introduces the case of playing a musical instrument in order to show, how "habit has its abode neither in thought nor in the objective body, but in the body as mediator of a world," (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 167) he sketches with the following words the character of the musician's involvement in the process of "music in the making": "Between the musical essence of the piece as it is shown in the score and the notes which actually sound round the organ, so direct a relation is established that the organist's body and his instrument are merely the medium of this relationship." (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 168)

Without going into a critical discussion of the first clause of Merleau-Ponty's excursion into the field of musical praxis from the point of view of philosophy, I want to take up his characterization of what musicians have been dreaming of since generations: to establish a connection between the musician's body and his instrument so immediate that both act merely as the medium of music. Anyone who has tried to put this into practice has experienced that it cannot just naturally be done. It appears as an unsolvable problem to the beginner, transforms into a mystery for the advanced student, and remains posing a continuous open task to the most proficient performer. The "I can" (Edmund Husserl) has its limits.

In the context of Husserl's phenomenological analysis of subjectivity, the "I can" attains focal relevance. As Alfred Schutz has pointed out in his review of Edmund Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (Husserl

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1989)[[1]]: "The I as a unity is a system of faculties of the form 'I can.'" (Schutz 1966, p. 32) The "I" no longer is conceived as an "empty pole of identity:" (Bernet et al. 1993, p. 8) It is now understood as defined by capabilities, by positions taken, by convictions assumed, by the pregivenness of the world as the horizon of "I can" that is itself developing over time, pointing back to earlier experiences (see Bernet et al. 1993, pp. 199 ff).

"Now what does all that mean? What I can do, what is in my power, what I know myself capable of and am conscious of as such, that is what a practical possibility is." (Husserl 1989, p. 270) With these words, Husserl starts the section dedicated to the analysis of the "I can" in the second book of *Ideas*, titled "The 'I can' as logical possibility, as practical possibility and impossibility, as neutrality modification of practical acts, and as original consciousness of abilities (subjective power, faculty, resistance)." And a few sentences later he continues: "Then just what sort of modification is the 'I can,' 'I have the power to,' 'I am capable of'? In experience, the 'I can' is distinct from the 'I cannot' according to their phenomenological characters. There is a resistanceless doing of things, i.e., a consciousness of an ability that meets no resistance, and there is a doing as an overcoming of resistance, a doing that has its 'against which,' and a corresponding consciousness of an ability to overcome the resistance. There is (always speaking phenomenologically) a gradient in the resistance and in the power of overcoming it, a continuum in 'active power' versus the 'inertia' of the resistance. The resistance can become insurmountable; in that case we come up against the 'it won't budge,' 'I cannot,' 'I do not have the power.' Obviously, connected to this is the transferred apprehension of action and counter-action outside the sphere of my doings and my abilities. After all, things are 'active' in relation to one another, have 'powers and counterpowers' in relation to one another, resist one another, and perhaps the resistance one thing exercises is insurmountable, the other 'cannot surmount it.'" (Husserl 1989, pp. 270 f.)

As demonstrated by the praxis of music, dance, painting, etc., extending the horizon of the "I can," i.e., to open up access to something, which at the beginning of the endeavour is experienced as resistant to a degree that it lies beyond my ability to overcome the resistance, *can* be achieved by specific modes of praxis: Three ways to open up access to something that for the time being presents itself as not accessible have to be distinguished: to play, to train, and to practice (see Stascheit 2003). These modes differ with regard to the subject's involvement: While in playing it is the play that forms and in a way creates the player, as Gadamer has shown,[2] it is the acting and intending subject who forms the process of training and practicing. Both

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[1]For a brief overview of the history of this text see: Rojcewicz, Richard and André Schuwer 1989, p. XI-XVI.

[2]See the discussion in *Truth and Method*, particularly the section "The concept of play" (Gadamer 1979, pp. 91–99): "The real subject of the game (this is shown in precisely those experiences in which there is only a single player) is not the player, but instead the game itself." (Gadamer 1979, pp. 95f). "We have seen that play does not have its being in the consciousness or the attitude of the player, but on the contrary draws the latter into its area and fills him with its spirit." (Gadamer 1979, p. 98)

do share a common starting-point: practicing as well as training – in contrast to playing[3] – commence at a point where something cannot just naturally be done, but turns out to be a problem. However, practicing and training differ with regard to their goal-directedness and motivation: The objective of training essentially is to achieve assertiveness by developing the most perfect control and self-control. Where training seeks for achievements, practicing is done for the sake of its effects on the subject of practice. It requires an attitude characterized by the simultaneity of directed acting and, to put it in words of Ludwig Landgrebe, "discerning without intention to control".[4]

In this paper, I concentrate on practicing – a term very commonly used in music to designate the various methods and means aiming at the *intended development* of new potentialities of agency and the incorporation of new *ways and means* into one's repertoire of animate-bodily expressions. In phenomenological writings, "practicing," in the sense of a praxis that extends the horizon of the "I can," and that provides access to something resistant, something up to now inaccessible, is literally present in the context of the methodological questions essential to the phenomenological approach: the frequently discussed problem "of the phenomenological reduction as a method of access to the sphere of phenomenological research." (Bernet et al. 1993, p. 59)

The following six sections give an outline of a phenomenological analysis of practicing in the sense of – to put it in a Husserlian expression – the specific "mode of the 'I do'" (Husserl 1970, p. 106) that provides access to intentionally extending, modifying, or restructuring the "horizon of ability."

1   The Productivity of Reiteration

"Practicing and repeating belong together . . . ." this saying seems to be one of the most well-known matters of course regarding practicing. However, practicing is not defined as reiteration, but makes use of the productivity of a recurrent involvement. Thus, reiterating in the sense of re-doing, re-taking, and re-vising acts as an elementary instrument of opening up whole ranges of possibilities for acting and

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[3]"It is part of play that the movement is not only without goal or purpose but also without effort. It happens, as it were, by itself. The ease of play, which naturally does not mean that there is any real absence of effort, but phenomenologically refers only to the absence of strain, is experienced subjectively as relaxation. The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus takes from him the burden of the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence." (Gadamer 1979, p. 94)

[4]"Denn wenn sich zeigen läßt, daß das in der Unmittelbarkeit der Erfahrung sich erschließende Prinzip des Wirklichseins des Wirklichen, der Grund seines Seins, zwar kein im Entwurf der Vernunft Beherrschbares, darum aber doch ein Verstehbares und verbindlich Auslegbares ist, dann wird von daher die Aufforderung an den Menschen begründet werden können, diese Fähigkeit des Vernehmens, das nicht herrschen will, wieder auszubilden und sich einer Ordnung des Seins zu fügen, die eine ihm schlechthin und unverfügbar gegebene und auferlegte ist." (Landgrebe 1963, pp. 140 f.)

re-acting. However, a persisting "again" does not at all necessarily mean continuing "progress." It is connected or confronted with a specific resistance that is sometimes even only created in the course of this reiterated involvement and configures the variable dynamics of "practice history." This resistance is rooted in the physical realm and in the animate-bodily personality and history of the practicing subject.

As the described reiterated involvement takes place in "real practical life," the recurring effort of the practicing subject has the quality of a re-taking, or better: re-living. Certainly re-taking and re-living do represent an essential structure in everyday-life as well, and they even may be seen as a basis for the stability of the subject's day-to-day architecture. But what makes practicing differ fundamentally from simple "doing-something-again" is that the productivity of reiteration is applied intentionally, nonetheless both activities have in common that they result in the embodiment of certain habits, elements, and styles. However, getting used to or accustomed to something does not need any special attentiveness or intention; it happens in passing and is often even contrary to the intentions of the subject. Practicing – in contrast – cannot simply happen. It is based on a well mapped-out, purposeful, and directed commitment, which does not at all allow maintaining an indifferent attitude.

2   Variation

Reiteration at the same time means *variation*. On an *implicit level*, it is the permanent monitoring by supervising and analyzing, comparing and distinguishing that is essential and indispensable in practicing, which causes every repetition to appear *as* variation. On an *explicit level*, the intentional variation of issues represents one of the fundamental procedures to be performed in practicing. It is particularly the effort of varying influences, stimuli, and examples within a lived situation, a situation marked by the tension between "being-able" and "not being able," which distinguishes practicing from imitating and copying.

The procedure of variation is grounded in a dynamic previous knowledge that incorporates traditional and communicated experiences concerning the effects of certain measures of practice as well as pragmatic and aesthetic aspects.

Variation and history of variations in turn create progressive variability, as the repertoire of possible variations expands with the accumulation of experience.

3   Dialogue

The constitutive foundation and motor of the above mentioned "explicit variation" in practicing is *dialogue*, in the sense of demand and response. As no convergence between demand and response is possible, dialogue in the sense of demand and response inheres a fundamental asymmetry, as opposed to dialogue as a process that is oriented on common goals and follows common rules (see Waldenfels 2007, p. 31).

In musical practice, demand-and-response structures may be observed on various levels and scenes. First, there is the dialogue with the environment, particularly with regard to the fundamental relevance of room-acoustics in music. The acoustical environment not only determines the sound of the already produced tune, as the eminent conductor Furtwängler has pointed out. Rather, the acoustical qualities are already taking effect before the sound unfolds, namely, in the stage of its creation: The process of sound-creation is already a response to "how it will sound." This important result of a phenomenological analysis of music may serve as an example (with the potential to be practiced as a phenomenological exercise) in what Merleau-Ponty presents to us in a working note on music that was only recently published in 2001 in Chiasmi International (Merleau-Ponty 2001).

> The evidence in music:
>
> While listening to beautiful music, the impression that this movement that starts up is already at its endpoint, which it is going to have been, or [that it is] sinking into the future that we have a hold of as well as the past – although we cannot say exactly what it will be. Anticipated retrospection – Retrograde movement *in futuro*: it comes down towards me entirely done. (Merleau-Ponty 2001, p. 18)

Another level of dialogue in practice is the level of dialogue with the past. This reference to history only rarely has the form of an intended reflection or an explicit remembering. Primarily the past emerges within the present in the form of single subjects removed from their contexts, returning either as a souvenir or as a demand, making a claim for something.

Finally, in the context of listening-to-oneself and commenting-on-oneself, practicing acquires characteristics of a conversation-with-myself, ranging from a silent communication to an audibly pronounced monologue. The permanent installation of this "referring to oneself as other," accompanied by a recording attentiveness, pertains to the foundations and prerequisites of practicing. Such a recording activity – a kind of "mental tape-recorder" – is indispensable. It allows one to notice, when something decisive is going to happen; decisive in the sense of emerging new dimensions of "I can do this and that," in the sense of a restructuring, comparable to a key incident that does not take place *within* a certain structure but rather causes a new structure to emerge. Hence practicing reveals itself to be a practice of restructuring and transforming.

4 Transformation

We said before that "to practice" never simply happens, never takes its task or object without a specific interest or question, without treating the matter of practice as problematic in this or that respect. This results in a process of methodically cultivated differentiation that unfolds through selective focusing on specific single aspects. This intended placement of attention sets in motion a process of disengagement, which *transforms* its object and produces the paradox that what is to be practiced is not practiced as itself, but as something different.

To illustrate the counterpoint methodology of practice, the context of music offers spectacular as well as inconspicuous examples: The well-known technique to practice a certain, small section of the respective work of music in different tempi, particularly in slow ones, already represents such a transformation, as the microscopic effect of a slow tempo changes the musical meaning of a melody in such a radical way that one has to speak of a different piece of music. And the consequences such an alteration of tempo evokes within the domain of movement are as radical as the consequences on the level of musical meaning: A substantially differing tempo means different movements, not only a change in speed or mode. But at the same time, to practice a section in different slow tempi, even in slow motion, proves to be the fastest, safest and, in the end, most indispensable method to be able to perform a virtuoso passage with superior ease and competence. Thus, the described method of positioning the thematic focus on the other, which is applied with methodical consequence, develops up to a countermovement, a *counterpoint selectivity*.

5   Simultaneity of Actor and Spectator

To institute reflection, more precisely to institute the subject as actor *and* observer marks a further distinction between practicing as specific "mode of the 'I do'" and other varieties of "doing" that in contrast are often built on the avoidance of any reflecting activity during ongoing action.

The uncomfortable challenge of the simultaneity of actor and spectator cannot be defused by assuming an alternating change between the two. Acting in the mode of practicing implies the co-presence of the observing activity. Correspondingly the absence of co-present attentive observing causes a leap to acting in the mode of playing or training. On the other hand, the complete constriction of practice to observing and the corresponding operations of reflection and analysis would make practicing impossible. The spectator always implies the co-presence of the performer and vice versa.

As regards the spectator's *observations*, they typically will be the richer and more detailed detailed the more one dedicates enthusiastically to plain observing, the more one welcomes whatever is revealed in this process, and the less the observing activity is animated by expectations, hopes, and desires. This committed disengagement, this specific style of reflecting upon oneself during the process of performing, is synonymous with striving for a liberating distance, giving space to the unexpected, and producing a "disinterested" spectator insofar as the desire of the practicing subject to reach the goal "as quick as possible" fades out for the benefit of understanding the unexpected, the deviating, disordered, and extraordinary as something positive, something productive.

This committed disengagement implies liberation, excavation, and unveiling of what is given in all its surprising, unwelcome, or unknown diversity, while simultaneously implying the subject's disengagement from an involvement with

plans, intentions, expectations, desires, and objectives. The fact that the described disengagement never can develop to be total and complete belongs to its fundamental characteristics. Thus, the development of an unbiased perception cannot be the goal of striving for the liberating distance of a "spectator." By contrast, in the context of practicing, the innate implicit resistance against total transparency, which is essential to perception, comes to be an explicit resistance against any radicalism of surveillance, which would extinguish, together with any spontaneity, the ability to act and react in a differentiating way.

The intention of such committed disengagement is to develop a specific modification of the reflective attitude, to shape a style of reflection in which not only *what* is perceived becomes thematic but also the perceiving activity itself and how its flux unfolds. In this context, with the thematic focus resting on "me" and moving with my lived presence, there is no opposition of activity and passivity, of reception and production. In the first place, what is found is not reflection, neither in the sense of contemplation nor in the sense of analysis, and neither as reflection on something given within the horizon of "now and here" nor as reflection on remembered experiences. Rather, there is the attentive, careful, and conscientious following of a process of *generation* rooted in the animate body, without the process of acting being transformed into a *quasi-object*.

The process of practicing unfolds based on the simultaneity of permanent reflection and active commitment on the level of the animate-body, the link between acting and observing being immediate and inseparable. And in the course of a repeatedly renewed *somatic intention*, this process circumscribes and carves out the initially unknown and clandestine destination of practicing.

6 Practicing as Practice of Permanent Beginning

Whereas "progress" in the sense of linear stepping forward corresponds to the structural characteristics of training, which in contrast to practice is based on the mentoring activity of a trainer, the concept of "progress" is not applicable to the performance of practicing, which requires – as has been discussed – the bracketing of any explicit orientation towards goals and results.

This attitude–perhaps best described as "positive aimlessness"–is accompanied by an intensive concentration on what is given in present tense. It will not install itself on the basis of mere knowledge about its importance, and it requires an opening up through an intensive search, in the course of which the described productivity of reiteration may provide important contributions. "Positive aimlessness" – itself being a precondition of practice–is only developed *within* the process of practice itself.

Nevertheless, to practice necessarily implies an understanding about the theme, the direction and the destination of the process of practice, otherwise at best a "try and see" is possible. However, as revealed in retrospect, the understanding concerning direction and destination of practicing is not defined (or acquired) before, but

developed as part of the process of practice itself, by permanently re-starting from the beginning, permanently modifying the approach, thereby developing, in a more and more detailed shape, an understanding of practicing as "a mode of the 'I do'."

The motor of this *productivity of practice* may be found in the *Gestalt* of the established permanent beginning, where the relieved "feeling at-home" is repeatedly dispensed, but where at the same time even the failure and the inaccessibility of something by no means provide a definite proof for the conclusion that I might be facing something that I definitely will never be able to do or to access. Thus, practicing implies the continuous presence of incapacity, which not only marks the boundaries of ability, but at the same time makes ability possible. The implicit or explicit co-givenness of incapacity keeps the horizon of ability open.

With the risk of every new attempt, the horizon of ability again becomes a matter of redefinition and confirmation, thus provoking the dynamics of practicing as practice of permanent beginning.

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Musical Foundation of Interaction: Music as Intermediary Medium

Mototaka Mori

This essay is a contemplation of the notion of music as intermediary medium. Alfred Schutz takes up a function of music as a main example of sharing a vivid present in the face-to-face relationship, which was originally dealt as "the world of directly experienced social reality" or the "We-relationship" in his main book in Vienna (Schütz 1932, p. 313ff.; Schutz 1967, p. 163ff.), and which was consequently succeeded as "the symbolic appresentation of society" in his later works (Schutz 1962, p. 347ff.). If we know that Schutz learned piano in his youth,[1] and that he was a very good piano player,[2] it will not be altogether what we think that music has a specific meaning even for his whole theoretical work.

In his famous essay "Making Music Together" he focuses on the situation where we are tuned-in to each other through music while he is criticizing Maurice Halbwachs' analysis on musicians' communication. In this essay, Schutz sums up his objections to Halbwachs' theory: (1) He identifies the musical thought with its communication. (2) He identifies musical communication with musical language, which to him is the system of musical notation. (3) He identifies musical notation with the social background of the musical process (Schutz 1964, p. 164).

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[1] Schutz is entered as "piano student *Klavierstudent*" on his remarks column of the assignment information of the enlisted record in the Austrian State Archives (1917).

[2] His wife (Ilse Schutz) says in an interview, "He (Alfred) loved music, had piano lessons, but it was not mainly a piano teacher, it was a trumpeter in the orchestra who gave him piano lessons. Now, he didn't learn too much of piano technique, but what this man taught him was music."(Schwabacher, A. *Interview with Ilse Schutz* at Fordham University (November 10. 1981). Margit von Mises (1976, p. 93) also writes that Schutz was a passionate music lover and an excellent pianist.

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Halbwachs' theme (Halbwachs 1980, pp. 158–186) was on the collective memory of musicians. Of course, his famous theoretical framework of the collective memory comes from Durkheim's concept of the collective representation, which is known to be very closely related to his theory of the division of labor. Therefore, it may be natural, even if Halbwachs' theoretical attention was strongly paid on the communication between professional musicians. "Musical language is a language like any other; that is, it presupposes a prior agreement among those who 'speak' it." (Halbwachs 1980, p. 169)

Following this conception of musical language, music must function as a language system of signs and conventions. Such a system, which is constituted as a form of notation, coordinates sound as medium syntactically or grammatically, and changes sound physically to proper tones for a piece of music. In order to understand music, musicians as professional have to learn this language systematically. If they were always in a highly educated professional circle, it would be natural that they could not communicate to each other without such systematically learned knowledge. Architects design objects and they transform light into a form of art.[3] Composers and musicians do it using sound. Dancing and motion picture are related not only to sound but also to light.

Indeed Schutz criticizes Halbwachs' theoretical interest in music. However, we have to ask Schutz how we are tuned-in to each other through music, namely how music could mediate us without professional notation. In the above mentioned essay Schutz explains this thesis phenomenologically in detail. I would like to develop and transform his phenomenological setting to a theory of media. In this process I would like to present that music is functioning as a kind of intermediary medium which is coordinating the fundamental media: body, person, and language.

For this purpose, I have to firstly go back to his draft "The meaning of artistic form (music)" (Schütz 1981, pp. 279–316) in the late 1920s. Very interestingly we can understand there that body, language, and person expressed in opera are respectively functioning as each medium, and that it is music that can intermediate such three media. Secondly I have to touch on a phenomenological depiction of internal time structure, particularly on the dichotomy of "*monothetic*" and "*polythetic*" which Schutz often uses in his essay "Making Music Together." Thirdly I would like to interpret the musical notation as another form of description of internal world. Lastly I am going to present a theoretical sketch on the intermediary relation between music and three other media: body, person, and language.

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[3]In the late 1920s, an Austrian psychologist Fritz Heider (1959, p. 1; 2005, p. 23) took up two fundamental pair media of "sound-air" and "light-aether" (later "light-space") as the subject matter. In a sociological context, Niklas Luhmann (1997, p. 197) accepts this idea very positively: "The light which is incoming in the cathedrals becomes a form to be able to play with its columns and curves."

1 The Meaning of Opera

A draft of "The meaning of artistic form (music)," which young Schutz wrote in Vienna, is a very impressive and theoretically important work. His analysis of the opera as subject matter leads us to understand the intermediary function of music. As its title shows us already, each art has its own form. Music, literature, painting, etc. have respectively their own forms. While Schutz explains a historical background and development of the opera in this draft, he shows that opera also has its own form (Schütz 1981, pp. 281–283). Following his analysis on opera, I would like to focus particularly on a function of music. For music can be assumed to play the most important role in expressing and creating our human spontaneous activities.

Opera consists of drama and music. Drama consists of performances (acts), lines (words), and characters (persons). Various ego-alter relations are incorporated through these three components in a work. They are expressed as author-actor (actress), actor (actress)-actor (actress), actor-audience, author-audience, etc. In this point, drama could be thought of as a model of society. Every drama is filled with lots of imaginations. The really accomplished act is irrevocable and it must lead to the end apart from whether it has been successful or not. Imagination is always revocable and can be revised again and again (Schutz 1964, p. 77).

We know that every drama is full of interactions incorporated with acts, words, and ego-alter relations. However, each play would be very different from our everyday life itself. It would be an actual meaning of existence of dramatic art that we could realize something fantastic "more really" through our imagination in some dramas than in our everyday life. Nevertheless, to be sure fact is stranger than fiction.

Different from drama itself, opera is also accompanied with music. Therefore, Schutz clarifies some characteristics of music in detail. Some arts like dancing, motion picture, etc., are expressed with their continuous diversity or their diverse continuity. In the case of dancing, each bodily movement expresses its continuity and diversity. In the case of motion picture, each frame creates its continuity and diversity. These arts have often been accompanied with music.

It is well known that Nietzsche discussed the role of chorus in Greek tragedy. Schutz applies this topic to opera. That is, the role of orchestra in opera succeeds analogically that of chorus in Greek tragedy. Our everyday life is certainly different from the world on stage where the orchestra is performing. However, it is possible for us to understand imaginarily a sequential progress on stage as a result. As pointed out by Nietzsche, the chorus in Greek tragedy was not any ideal audience but an ideal interpreter on a series of events on stage. The musical character of orchestra, which is thought as a successor of chorus in Greek tragedy, exactly pulls us apart from the stage, and at the same time, it reconnects us to there again. We are re-embedded onto a stage through music and drama.

Music makes the actors' (and actresses') performances articulate each other. The meaning of words, which they express, is not so important. It is more important that this musical mood which the orchestra is performing is inherently related to the internal duration of the audience. In such a proceeding analysis by Schutz, he refers to an interesting difference between Mozart and Wagner while he is comparing their main themes of opera respectively: "Mozart just composed no figures, no characters, no action and, hence, no drama. He composed only situations, in spite of all individuation which he gives his figures on each scene and each situation. (. . .) On the other hand, the ideal of Wagner was a myth as tragedy, and a true myth. In his poetries something miraculous takes place always. It is just this miracle that he composes." (Schütz 1981, p. 305)

It is not a matter of which is more excellent, Mozart or Wagner. Rather, we have to find two important typical models that music accomplishes in opera. Certainly Schutz preferred Mozart to Wagner for his later works (Schutz 1964, pp. 179–200), because he found out that the main theme for Mozart's opera was always nothing but various expressions of the Thou-orientation and the face-to-face-relation in a situation.

In the case of Wagner, with the exception of the quintet in the *Meistersinger von Nurnberg* and the duet in the second act of *Tristan and Isolde*, each individual person as a hero is to be found out only successively on the stage. In the case of Mozart, everything in our world is expressed there. His theme is not any lonely world where only one person lived, thought, and acted. His theme is our world where we can and must live, think, and act with others together. Therefore, the theme of Mozart's composition was not just any love but the know-how about the Thou-relation and the vivid present of the face-to-face relation (Schutz 1981, p. 308; Schutz 1964, pp. 183 f.).

Our immediate and primordial world is constituted with internal lived experiences of the other. Therefore, Schutz referred to Mozart for his theoretical development. In other words, this motive leads to the above mentioned concept of the mutual tuning in relation and to the predominant function of the face-to-face relation for the constitution of the social world. Particularly in Mozart's opera, performer and audience are tuned-in to one another with his music. They can exchange themselves through the characters played on the stage. Performer and audience could share together a vivid present, although it were quasi-simultaneous. Even through CD or video they can experience the quasi-simultaneity between the stream of consciousness of the mediator and the listener. This is a model of our everyday life, where we can experience something as ordinary people. It may be different from the religious and miraculous world by Wagner.

Generally speaking, if we follow Mozart's type of social constitution, the vivid present of the face-to-face relation will be predominant in this social theory. In this case it will be more important how we can know the simultaneity (or the quasi-simultaneity) shared by lived experience with the other(s). As for Wagner's type, it will be more important how we could experience the belief in the hero, and the miracle and the relief by the hero.

2 Phenomenological Depiction of Internal Life

Originally "music is the lonesome art" (Schütz 1981, p. 295). Today each person can enjoy music alone with one's own i-pod, although a listener could be tuned-in with his/her favorite player. Every player expresses oneself with his own music, even if none could understand it. It is important to see these spontaneous activities of arts as the world of lived experiences. With other arts, "music is an event of our inner world. But it is proceeding independently of the events of our life." (Schütz 1981, p. 291) Therefore, I assume that music will be able to fulfill the role of mediating various expressions of one's mental events to others.

A perception of mental event is already a distinction. It must always be articulated from the other. It means we perceive a difference between a now perceiving moment and a previously perceived one. And this difference will be perceived again and again. Such a recursive relation develops the so-called internal temporality. Intuitively every distinction seems to be easily ordered onto a straight line. However, it will be a little difficult to presuppose that every distinction can be set onto a continuous straight line as points. Far from that, it is already doubtful whether a perceived moment could be marked as a point. A moment in our life can be even a long duration. In other words, what occurs at one point must be dependent on what occurred the previous moment at the neighboring point. These two points may be distinguished, but a demarcating line between the two points would not be clear. The difference can be perceived only as a temporal passing. The passed perceptions are being piled up as the layers of memory.

It is known that Bergson (1939, p. 169) uses a cone-model to describe memory, as Husserl (1928, p. 465; 1991, p. 117) uses a triangle-model.[4] Indeed, they are comparing the internal time as flow metaphorically to a straight line. However, at the same time, they describe the process of memories' sedimentation. In the end it means that the internal time could not be described only by a single straight line, because perceptions could not be linearly combined without memory. Perceptions themselves are intertwined with each other. And memory is recursively related to them. We could suppose the internal time as flow or more metaphorically as a straight line. However, it means that we could not help describing the internal time only metaphorically as flow or straight line. In other words, it means that we could not easily describe a recursive relation of perceptions and memory as a simple diagram.

Very paradoxically, even though there were not any breaks in a flow, we could mark each perception as a point of time onto a single straight line. Marking

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[4]The axis line of a cone is thought of as a subjective time line that, as it proceeds, expands as it grows toward the mouth of the cone, and the growth in its area or volume represents the accumulating memories acquired as time proceeds. A right triangle is a half part of plane surface formed by cutting across a cone. The major cathetus of its right triangle means a proceeding inner time like the axis line of cone, the minor is thought as a depth of memory, and the area of this right triangle is an accumulation of memory.

perceptions as points on it is exemplified not only in Bergson's cone-model and Husserl's triangle-model but also in Schutz's more complicated triangle-model. Schutz describes it as a combination of a straight line of pure duration and a wave line of memory-endowed duration, and he would explain memory as accumulation of triangles (Schütz 2006, p. 84). However, even such a complicated geometrical explanation is depicted only metaphorically.[5]

A perception, namely a perceptively lived experience, can be positioned as a distinction. Therefore, a perception can entail distinct differences. However, whether these positioned points can be put onto the same straight line or not, is dependent on each view point, from which man pays attention to something intended. Following the phenomenological explanations by Husserl and Schutz, the perceptively lived experiences are intertwined, so they will be firstly grasped only as a unitary complexity. It is called as a *polythetically* synthesized order. If a certain view point appears contingently, some parts or elements in such a complexity, which are positioned multitudinously, would be ordered on a single straight line. This is called as "*monothetic*." Originally these paired concepts were theorized as mental ordering within a single person's internal temporality by Husserl (1982, p. 246ff.). However, Schutz draws them onto the level of the concepts of simultaneity and quasi-simultaneity between two persons.

As above mentioned, performer and listener can be tuned-in to one another through music, and players and auditors can respectively exchange each one's own perspective through acts, words, and characters of persons. Although each stream of consciousness of us can be always *polythetically* preset, there will be a moment when we will be sharing together a vivid present in the face-to-face relation, or we will be sharing a quasi-simultaneity between us.

A serial generation of perceptions between two (or plural) persons also will be described onto a straight line as passed events. However, each person is assumed to have one's own internal temporality. Each inner world is originally differently ordered. The serial generation of perceptions between plural persons will bring about more complicated *polythetical* constellation. Although composers could grasp the wholeness of their own music as *monothetic*, they must be played in a *polythetical* constellation between plural persons. Therefore, "the meaning of a musical work is essentially of a *polythetical* structure. It cannot be grasped *monothetically*. It consists in the articulated step-by-step occurrence in inner time, in the very *polythetic* constitutional process itself." (Schutz 1964, p. 172)

It will be music that could intermediate such a *polythetic* flow of plural persons' conscious life. Such a complicated flow must be generated and mediated through some specific media; body, language, and person. At the same time, the relation between the three media itself could be intermediately coordinated again and again.

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[5]Schutz also uses a right triangle like Husserl. However, he adds a wavy line to the straight line that represents proceeding inner time. This wavy line means the oscillation of memory-endowed duration, which is interpreted as a series of intermittent perceptions (Schutz 1982, pp. 73ff.).

Particularly the meaning of opera makes us clear of the relation of the three media and music, which are mediating various lived experiences at various moments in the *polythetic* flow.

3 Form of Musical Expression

Music expresses and creates spontaneously ordered lived experiences which are composed of sensory perceptions and bodily movements. Melody, harmony, and rhythm are known as three elements of music. The specific constellation between these three elements makes up a form. The even interval perception as lived experience (e.g. beat, pulse, breath, blink, and step) constitutes a primordial rhythm, which creates an elementary subjective temporal axis in each one's own mental world. Melody is always closely related to such a temporal axis indivisibly. Harmony is related to the combination of various tones ordered onto its subjective temporal axis.

Sensory perceptions and bodily movements could be pointed at on a single temporal axis. But more important is that sensory perceptions and bodily movements can be closely and mutually related by a duality of rhythm. They make it possible to develop and unfold a (outer or inner) space with music.

Schutz was negative to the theoretical position of musical notation in his critical contexture to Halbwachs' theory. However, Schutz also assumes, like Husserl and Bergson, that music could be metaphorically compared to the internal temporality of consciousness. In this point, the notation as musical language seems to be one of the objectified forms, which should be very closely related to such a metaphorical expression. Probably notations will be assumed to keep much more expressiveness than some geometrical explanations with a straight line and triangles.

Let's sing "Little Rose on the Heath (*Heidenröslein*)." We know very well that we can write a phrase with score and lyrics (see Fig. 1).

We could depict a melody of our humming by this score. Of course, even if we could not professionally understand this score, we could hum this melody with our own memory, because we could remember this melody as a sequence or as a unity.[6] Therefore, it often does not matter whether the first tone is a tone of B or "ti." We don't have any idea that the frequency of this sound should be 466.16376151808991640720312977639 . . . Hz. This score has a one-eighth rest

Fig. 1 Little Rose on the Heath

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[6]Later Schutz (1964, p. 182) says, "Two melodies are never heard simultaneously."

mark. In spite of this rest mark, this melody is continuing, because we could grasp this melody as unitary including a one-eighth rest.

Japanese also know this German melody very well with its song lyrics translated into Japanese. They could easily imagine a scene "*Sah ein Knab ein Rößlein stehn*." It means that they will be able to understand a scene and they will be able to call it up to mind as unitary with its melody and lyrics.

Lyric is expressed by words. However, Schutz (1981, p. 294) says, "When we listen to the last movement of the Beethoven's 9th symphony, we never listen to Schiller's poem. Singing poems has nothing more in common with reciting or reading them." According to Schutz (1981, p. 297), who follows Nietzsche in this draft, the original musical basic mood exceeds the birth of song by poet.

This "Little Rose on the Heath" is composed simply in one-four time. But if it were done in one-thirty-two time, an atmosphere of this scene, where a little boy is seeing small roses, would be totally changed.

Melody is a unit which is generated and is disappearing as a flow of real life. Therefore, it will not be hardly objectified and plotted onto a temporal axis of straight line. It will always be perceived as unitary. On the contrary, rhythm is obviously nothing else than a distribution of melody in space-time (Schütz 1981, p. 295). Rhythm is preset in a proceeding perception of lived experiences as even interval. But at the same time, it could be posteriorly distributed in a flow of melody.

Such an ambivalent relation between melody and rhythm depends on the two-facedness of rhythm. On the one hand, every musicological rhythm could be evenly mathematically expressed. On the other hand, the rhythm of a poem and its words would be very closely related to bodily movements and mental feelings. The phonetic element of this rhythm "ain" in a sequence of "Sah ein," "Knab' ein," "Röslein," etc., which exists in the original German text, presents us a whole rhythm of this poem as a basic mood. We could imagine a kind of space-time extent with this phonetic repetition of "ain." It is neither any Euclidean space nor any Newtonian time, but it presents us a lived space-time. It would not be an objectified and measurable space-time but an imaginary and real situation.

"Rhythmical ordering of words is accompanied by bodily movements; verse to verse, foot's pace of walker, talk's pace of speaker. Such a rhythm comes from a temporal dimension and it is unfolding into a spatial dimension. We cannot sing a song without such a rhythm." (Schutz 1981, p. 297) For language expression also has two aspects. Firstly, it is related to the meaning, which is conceptually inherent in words themselves. Secondly, it is related to the sound of voice in speaking or singing, which mediates an emotion that expresses itself in words. For a poet, an original vocal mood would precede a song itself. A composer could catch the nature of rhythmical and melodic stimulation from a few words. The basic musical form is not only coming out of an intellectual content of meaning. It is not only coming out of an outer or inner rhythmical sequence of words, but it is also coming with some kind of metaphor.

Not only the sound of words but also their metaphor which is abstractly denoting something concrete could make a clue for composing a poem and a piece. Even some natural objects make it possible to create acoustic events. Various melodies

are found and created with such rhythms. A spatial and temporal dimension appears with such a proceeding musical mood. A musician tries to depict it musically. It is such a mood that could activate not only some acoustic aspects but also lots of visual ones (Schütz 1981, p. 298).

This means the words, of which this poem is composed, would have been already actually musical. This half-transcendental specificity of music, which is a priori creating and coordinating an order of lived experiences, depends very strongly on an experienced duality of rhythm. Therefore, a composer could make music while reading a poem. A singer songwriter could create a lyric while singing and playing something. On the other hand, they could design a melody and a harmony from words on the base of rationalistic objectified axis of time. Very paradoxically some composers could design music very rationalistically. For it would be possible to measure and design some relations between rhythm and bodily movements. Nowadays, we could know that music could depict and organize a quasi-lived time-space even as a technological medium.

4   Music as Intermediary Medium

Medium connects an event (en) with another event (en + 1). An event (en) is not equal to the other event (en + 1). But at the same time, an event (en) is equal to the other event (en + 1). This unity of paradox and tautology is supporting the logical foundation of medium. Light or sound mediates respectively each one's own events as each one's own object physically. In these cases events are grasped as waves or oscillations. Also, the natural events like earthquake, which we can perceive as the sense of touch, are expressed as numeral value of waves. Wave is grasped as a unity of the even interval and the not even one. Oscillation can be composed of regular interval of events. Therefore, this unity makes it possible to generate an attractor in a mathematical meaning for the temporality of itself.

We can feel the lived experience of even interval like beat of the heart, pulse, breath, blink, step, etc. It is such specific bodily perceptions that can constitute a fundamental axis of internal time. The lived experiences are originally mediated by something as temporal processing. It is firstly body as medium that is joining together such perceived senses.[7] A chain of perceived senses is similar to waves or oscillations. Body as medium is not processing only as mediation of perceived lived experiences. It can move itself by itself. While it is moving itself, it can perceive its own changes as events. This combination of moving and perceiving its moving, namely a sequence of behaviors, constitutes a temporal axis and unfolds a spatial extent. The difference between "*polythetic*" and "*monothetic*" is related to the complexity of this combination.

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[7]In this paper, I cannot explain the role of body as medium in detail. See my article "Person as medium." (Mori 2012) This conception comes from another draft of Schutz (2003, S.45).

It is not only lived experiences and behaviors that are mediated as element. "What distinguishes action from behavior is that action is the execution of a projected act." (Schütz 1932, p. 60; Schutz 1967, p. 61) Action is based on behavior, but it is ordered under a projected act. Action and act are the same and not the same. "What is projected is an act, which is the goal of an action and which is brought into being by an action." (Schütz 1932, S.59; Schutz 1967, p. 60) Such a recursive relation between action and act is also similar to wave or oscillation. Schutz explains action with a difference between action and act. Ordering under a projected act and coordinating articulated actions both depend on a certain perspective of the concerned observer(s), who can perceive, interpret, and explain. Every meaning of action is defined under a projected act, and every projected act can be another action on a different unitary set.

Every explanation of action refers to the understanding of the motive. An action and its motive both attribute to a proper actor in an occasional situation. Therefore, an actor is not always a human being. It is possible for an organization to be a juristic person. Actions and acts are respectively and contingently distinguished on each occasion. They are mediated by a proper actor in the situation. This actor may be a person, or some parts (character, habit, etc.) of him or her, or an extent of actor (cooperation, government, etc.). They could be generalized as medium "person."

The meaning of an action and its motive can be explored and explained. Sometimes we will be able to do it intuitively with the direct observational understanding, but we will often have to explain them with verbal utterances. Actions coordinated in a proceeding projected act as well as lived experiences are mediated by "body," "person," and "language."

A lived experience is experienced lively, namely only self-reflectively. A projected act is a chain of actions, which is constituted of a series of coordinated behaviors. A behavior is constituted of bodily movements, which is extent of lived experiences which are experienced lively. Our life is filled with such various self-references, which are originally the above mentioned unity of paradox and tautology. For this point, each self-reference is closed, namely, observed only by the elements themselves which are mediated. However, it is always possible that it is interrupted in a contingent situation. Even when it were ordered properly, oscillation could sometimes get out of order. It could be interrupted by a bit of specific differences between an event (en) and another event (en + 1). Such a paradoxical relation causes an interruption of the self-reference. This interruption has to be recovered by something mediated so as to get in order again.

Body, person, and language are fundamental media which can unfold a space-time continuum of the human world. However, the three media are incompatible with each other. We can express our own lived experiences or our own habits with our own words, namely in our own way of utterance. However, there can always be a discrepancy between the verbal expressions and something expressed by them. The plurality of media causes various interruptions and discrepancies. However, this intricate plurality makes it possible to bring us sometimes to an attractor. Therefore, the human world is always complicated and creative.

Music has various roles. Sometimes it recovers the intertwined media tired out in our everyday life. Sometimes it brings us a hope activating one of the three

media as a channel. In such cases, music can be functioning as if it were an intermediary medium between three fundamental media. It will be able to restore some discrepancies and some interruptions while it is creating new discrepancies and new interruptions which are to bring us to another aspect of our life.[8]

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[8]Schutz says, "It is melody, which plays the same role in music that design plays in painting: melody creates the contour; the chords, the harmony, furnish merely the color." (Schutz 1964, p. 182) I would like to assume that painting also is a medium.

Part IV
Film and Photography

Interpreting Film: The Case of Casablanca

George Psathas

1 Cultural Presuppositions and Film

In his book, *Philosophy of the Film*, Ian Jarvie (1987) argues that philosophy inserts itself into film. Such an insertion is not necessarily a matter of the filmmaker's intention but rather that philosophical questions and issues can be found in film and are being dealt with through the film's content.

Writers and directors do not put philosophy into film; philosophy puts itself in their films. i.e., in every work there always are "personal or cultural presuppositions about reality, morality, etc., implicit in thought and action. One job of philosophy is to expose and to criticize those presuppositions." (Jarvie 1987, p. 26)

Among the philosophical questions which Jarvie argues that film may raise, are such issues as what is beauty (i.e., questions of aesthetics); is it real (i.e., questions of social reality); and is it true or morally correct (i.e., questions of valid principles of human conduct)?

With regard to what is true, one might ask: Is the resemblance between the film world and our world a true resemblance? Do people in our world behave as do the people in the film world? Are the ideas uttered by characters in film true ideas? Is the message of the film a true message, i.e., one which conforms to morally valid principles of human conduct? Is the attitude of the film toward its message a correct one?[1]

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[1] And perhaps prior to this are questions of what sort of thing is film that we can think about it at all? By film he means the content or narrative or meaning of the film. This may be found in such matters as what are conventionally referred to as story, plot, theme, meaning, and content.

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The film's content, he states, can be made into an intelligible content or "a world." This world resembles the "real world" in that it has persons, relations, story, etc. The "film world" differs from and resembles "our world." But "film world" differs from "our world" in that we know it is "not real." "World" is taken to mean that the film world has "order not chaos, contents not void, is intelligible not meaningless." (Jarvie 1987, p. 7)

It is clear in such discussions that what appears on the screen is taken to be "a world" resembling "our world" or in keeping with Alfred Schutz's (1962) idea of multiple realities, the "filmic reality" resembles the "reality of the world of everyday life" or the "paramount reality."

Jarvie develops several analytic categories for the examination of film. These he refers to as "layers of meaning" for the question of "is it true."

1. The quest. What is the hero's (or main protagonist's or any other character's for that matter) quest for an answer to a problem? In the case of Casablanca, he says, it is what is the morally correct action to take.
2. The attitude of the film toward the problem and/or the hero's quest, e.g., is it approving, critical, romantic-ironic (as in Casablanca), or what?
3. The thesis of the film and the main positions or propositions used to advance the thesis of the film. For Casablanca, it appears to be that, in Jarvie's words, "cynicism and opportunism are presented as attractive but immoral philosophies; individuals caught up in these philosophies can redeem themselves, indeed will redeem themselves when the issue is presented to them in the right terms and someone exerts leadership." (Jarvie 1987, p. 7)
4. The philosophical framework, e.g., what are the general presuppositions that are made about the culture which are accepted or adopted by the film. As Jarvie (1987, p. 7) states:

> In Casablanca both individualism and romantic love between individuals are unquestioned values. ... By contrast, the total absence of connection to families of origin or to social class appears not to worry the characters or the filmmakers. Values exist independently of social context.... Furthermore, all the characters display one or more degrees of loyalty to nations, to France, to America, or to Germany. ... The characters are, still further, committed to bourgeois morality, ... these are only some of the presuppositions of the framework ...[2]

Clearly, Jarvie is engaged in the interpretation of film, an enterprise which today we would call hermeneutic. He insists, as would I, that any interpretation must be grounded in what is in the film, in what can be shown to be in the film by an examination of its content, plot, dialogue, and all elements that constitute it as film.

It is possible, it seems to me, to develop a sociology of film following Jarvie's ideas since we can also say that sociology inserts itself in film. It is not that

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[2]In an excellent discussion of how to examine film, Jarvie argues that one must: look at film as a whole including non-verbal elements as well as what characters say since plot does not exhaust content; attend to ambiguity since works of imagination utilize it; and that one must not expect a single correct interpretation but make a cogent case for the interpretation advanced.

the filmmaker intends it but rather that there always are cultural and social presuppositions about society, interaction, and social relationships that are found in any film. One task of a sociology of film would be to discover, explicate, and to examine critically these presuppositions.

In my view, philosophy and sociology should not be treated as though they are strangers to each other. Philosophy and sociology are interconnected. The questions philosophy asks about reality, morality, choice, etc., involve social relationships, culture, and meaning and belief systems as these may operate in particular socio-cultural-historical times. Sociology focuses more explicitly on the socially contexted meaning systems within which human actions are situated whereas philosophy may try to decontextualize these issues to analyze them as to their principles. For example, from a philosophical perspective, the film may show, as Jarvie (1987, pp. 25–26) says, that:

> ... the metaphysics of the person, distinct from the machine, capable of acting freely and perhaps contributing to the course of history. Rick admires Laszlo's work never suggesting that history is a mere product of forces grander than the individual. We get a classless utopia, where drinking, smoking, gambling and sexual adventures are a normal part of the lives of decent people as well as of criminals ... (It portrays) a metaphysics of love; the importance, pleasure and pain of an intense feeling between men and women which is not ruled by marriage and almost refuses to be ruled by a world war. (It shows issues of) right and wrong, not choice under uncertainty. We have a world conflict in which neither communism nor Jews are mentioned: a world which seems to have a future. These people know how to do right without the help of politicians or priests – no one brings in God.

What would a sociological analysis of these same matters possibly be like? It could still consider the main characters' quests, the thesis of the film, and the framework, but it would focus on cultural presuppositions, on the ways in which interaction and social relationships are depicted, and on the ways that film achieves its intelligibility.[3] The methodical practices, the methods of practical reasoning, which are involved, incorporated, embedded in, and relied upon for achieving its sense, are also subject to analysis. Cultural presuppositions will also be found to be interconnected and interrelated to all modes of sense making and meaning achievement.

For example, Casablanca opens with a brief depiction of events unfolding in Europe in early December of 1941, prior to December 7 (the date of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor).[4] How is this shown?

Opening scenes which are newsreel like in character and drawn from actual newsreel footage depict the Nazis occupation of the Low Countries and France;

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[3]In a sense, such an examination involves us in what may be called a certain form of bracketing, i.e., in carrying out such studies, the "filmic reduction" would be to "assume that all we know of the world is what we see in the film." That is, if we try to uncover the cultural presuppositions in the film we do not have to engage in a historical or sociological analysis of the actual "real" society at that time though such efforts may be of value in order to make comparisons and contrasts or to criticize the film's depictions. The film, examined as a text or cultural product, can be analyzed in its own right, to discover what it contains, represents, depicts, or assumes.

[4]One date shown on a chit that Rick initials is "December 2."

a resulting flood of refugees are shown seeking to escape; maps are shown with routes depicting some of these escape pathways as including a French territory in northwest Africa and the city of Casablanca and a pathway to Lisbon. These persons are described as being desperate, seeking freedom and escaping from the occupation of their home countries, as well as trying to save their lives. This French territory is described as ruled by the Vichy government (a puppet government collaborating with the Nazis) and mainland France is occupied by Nazi Germany. A poster with the face of Marshall Petain, the head of the Vichy government, is shown on a wall.

Thus, in the first scenes of the film, a social, political, and military history of a specific time period is presented and allusions are made to interconnected events.

What are some of the cultural presuppositions which are operative in this depiction? When an individual is shown, he/she is often clearly identified as to his/her nationality, e.g., as German, American, and French. He/she is sometimes dressed in a uniform of the military or police forces of his/her respective nation.

The assumption is that one aspect of individual identity which is of consequence for how that person acts and how others act toward him/her during wartime is nationality or citizenship. National identity also makes the actions of the character interpretable in terms of their relevance for political circumstances. Thus, in an opening scene, the French police officer, Renault (Claude Rains), shakes hands with the Nazi officer (Conrad Viedt) thereby indicating cooperation between the Vichy French and the Nazi Germans. In contrast, later, the American, Rick (Humphrey Bogart), refuses to shake the hand of the Nazi German thereby indicating non-cooperation between Germans and Americans.

In a synecdochal fashion, these characters are also interpretable as representing their respective countries. Thus, we can "see" that America and Germany are not on friendly terms with each other.

Such identifications or membership categorizations (Sacks 1989) connect individuals to depicted actions and also to their prospective or expectable actions. For example, the Nazi Gestapo chief can be expected to behave so as to advance the interests of his country, to seek the identity of those who killed the couriers and stole the "letters of transit," to make arrests, to question prisoners, etc.

Rick, identified as an American at the historical time period when America was still neutral and not at war, can be expected to be neutral officially ("I stick my neck out for nobody," he says) but nevertheless sympathetic and sometimes clandestinely aiding the cause of the Allies. That is, he acts and is expected to act "as an American" toward other nationally identified persons (characters) in the same way that his country is (or has been) acting in relation to those same nations. He therefore can be expected to give moral and covert support to the underground Resistance leader; to assist refugees who are trying to escape; and to refuse to extort money or sexual favors in payment for assistance. In short, to remain morally consistent with his country's own position in political and international relations.

Many other cultural presuppositions can be shown to be operative in this film. For example:

1. *Individual sacrifice and national purpose*. Individual desires are less important than national goals and purposes. Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) has sacrificed her love for Rick to remain married to Victor Laszlo (Paul Henreid) in order to assist him in his leadership of resistance movements against the Nazis.
2. *Romantic love and its effects.* A man can become weak when falling in love with a woman. If still in love, but feeling abandoned or rejected, he can become embittered, cynical and depressed, unable to have relationships with other women, or may use other women only to satisfy his sexual desires. When he learns that he is loved in return he can regain his lost hopes and ideals and can make rational decisions. Men are strong but not so strong that love for a woman cannot weaken them and make them unable to act decisively (This describes Rick's (Humphrey Bogart's) actions in the film.).
3. *Marriage and extra-marital affairs*. Extra-marital affairs are permitted provided the one having the affair is justified, i.e., Ilsa believed her husband to be dead. But when she learns he is alive she leaves her lover to return to her husband. She thus demonstrates loyalty to her husband and can be excused for her affair since her husband had been reported as dead.

   In this instance, we confront what appears to be a cultural presupposition that is historically situated. In wartime circumstances, in this case, World War II, a woman's extra-marital affair may require justification. In contemporary times this may no longer be true. Nevertheless, assumptions concerning men's extra-marital sexual affairs may be different from those for women, even in wartime. For example, men in uniform away from their wives for prolonged periods of time have been "excused" for their infidelities even during World War II.
4. *Gender relations: Women's weakness and men's strength.* Women, when having to choose between heart and head, will choose the heart. That is, Ilsa is shown as so conflicted because of her love for Rick and her marriage to Laszlo that she is unable to decide what to do. When she reveals to Rick that she still loves him and had left him only because her husband was found to be alive whereas she had thought him dead, her declaration leaves her emotionally weak. She says she has decided to return to Rick though she knows this is "wrong." However, she is willing to allow Rick to decide for her. Whatever he decides she will do.

   Men will make the tough decisions when women cannot. The hard decision, in this case, involves subordinating one's personal desires (love for one's woman) to a higher and nobler cause (saving a freedom fighter from certain death at the hands of the Nazis).
5. *Gender relations: loyalty.* That women are loyal to their men, that women subordinate their interests and desires to the man they love or respect and admire.

   We could argue that these are cultural presuppositions which are "outdated" today. Nevertheless, their recognition and acceptance by audiences of Casablanca

are what make the actions of the characters understandable. In gender relations in Western society, love and loyalty are presumed to be related, expected, and sanctioned.

6. *Hierarchy of values*. That there is a hierarchy of values in society such that personal desires are of a lower rank than loyalty to one's fellow human beings in a time when human freedom is threatened by ruthless forces of evil. Triumph over evil is more important than the satisfaction of one's passions or personal interests.

7. *Institutions and power*. That police can use their power for personal gain, e.g., to make money, to gain sexual favors in return for their favors. That crimes can be covered up if the police so desire. That any charge can be trumped up and used against a person for political or other reasons by the police, e.g., Renault orders Rick's place closed after the singing of the Marseillaise on the charge that gambling was going on although the police chief himself was involved in the gambling and is shown collecting his winnings.

8. *Heroes and heroism*. That great men are admired, respected, and supported by ordinary citizens when they fight for ideals and values which represent those of ordinary people. They also gain the respect and admiration of women and may easily obtain sexual favors if they so desire, but their ideals and purposes are so noble that they must hold themselves above such temptations. To succumb would damage their cause.[5]

Surely there are many more cultural presuppositions that enable us to "understand" the narrative of the film, the moral conflicts and the choices made by the characters as these are depicted. A sociology of film which focuses on the uncovering and examination of cultural presuppositions can be a contribution to the study of how film achieves its intelligibility. One of the problems the analyst faces is whether to consider the changes that have occurred in the society since the making of the film. In the present discussion we are concerned primarily with what is shown in the film rather than trying to consider the various changes in the society since (or before) the film was made. A more historical approach would perhaps focus on such changes. A more philosophical approach would perhaps focus on the ways in which the characters judge right and wrong, how the "rules" they reference reveal important "truths" about the actions and reactions depicted, how their ethical stances may enmesh them in particular stances and actions, how they may broach their own standards to act in line with standards that they wish to achieve, etc.. However, here we are focusing on the cultural presuppositions that are depicted in the film

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[5]Note that this form of analysis describes those actions which are presented in the film as appropriate actions for the characters. It does not raise questions or challenge the "correctness" of these actions or the value positions they may embody. We are therefore not engaging in a cultural critique. Nevertheless it is possible to raise questions concerning the "truth" of such depictions, that is, is it the case that in a society such as the one shown persons could or would be able to act in the way these characters do. It is my position that a careful description of what and how the characters are shown to be doing is necessary before any critical commentary can be undertaken.

and how these enable the audience to make sense of what they are seeing/hearing because it fits with what they already "know" about society, social relationships, cultural meanings, etc., This focus is intentional since we are concerned primarily with the film itself, as the characters act and react and scenes are depicted.

Film draws upon, incorporates, and depends upon cultural presuppositions without necessarily making them explicit in order to communicate. It is not, therefore, that a film is "whatever its viewers make it out to be." but rather that what they make it out to be is inextricably interrelated with what they already "know," "assume" to be "true," "expect" to "see," and are "able" to "understand."[6]

2   Methods of Achieving Intelligibility

For a further deepening of the analytic possibilities for a sociology of film, it is of value to examine some of the methods of practical reasoning which are drawn upon and utilized in an unreflective way in film. From such studies it may be possible not only to learn how practical reasoning is accomplished in film but how such methods are found in natural language, in cultural practices, and in everyday life as well.

Are there methods for producing sense, for making action understandable, intelligible? It is possible to examine specific scenes, sequences of action and dialogue, and meanings in action as it were, and to discover how practical reasoning is constituted and operates in film. Here I will offer one example drawn from the last scene of the film to indicate how such a sociology of practical reasoning in film is possible.

"Round up the usual suspects."

Scene from Casablanca

(Ilsa and Victor Laszlo have just boarded the plane)

Cut:

Renault: Well I was right you are a sentimentalist.

Rick: Stay where you are. I don't know what you're talking about.

Renault: What you just did for Laszlo and that fairy tale you invented to send Ilsa away with him. I know a little about women my friend. She went but she knew you were lying.

Cut: (Rick full face, takes cigarette from his mouth)

Rick: Anyway thanks for helping me out.

Renault: I suppose you know this isn't going to be very pleasant for either of us, especially for you. I'll have to arrest you of course.

Cut: (Rick full face)

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[6]These are all placed in quotes to indicate that serious study needs to be made to discover what they mean on any particular occasion, i.e., for any particular film.

Rick: As soon as the plane goes Louis.

Cut: (man closing plane door, prop wash blowing over him)

Cut: (car pulls in from screen left, around trees, and toward us and stops.)

Cut: (plane moves to screen left)

Cut: (Strasser gets out of car, comes around front of car from screen right, and approaches Renault)

Strasser: What was the meaning of that phone call?

Renault: Victor Laszlo is on that plane.

Strasser: (turns to look to screen right)

Cut: (plane taxis away. Rear of plane is visible, moving away from us into background)

Cut: (Strasser turns his face back to screen left, looks at Renault)

Strasser: Why do you stand here, why don't you stop him?

Renault: (looks to his right, toward Rick)

Renault: Ask Mister Rick.

Cut: (Rick's full face)

Cut: (Strasser looks at Rick [off screen] back at Renault. Camera zooms back, to show all three on screen. Strasser moves toward us)

Rick: Get away from that phone.

Cut: (Strasser full head and shoulders)

Strasser: I would advise you not to interfere.

Cut: (Rick, head and shoulders)

Rick: I was willing to shoot Captain Renault and I'm willing to shoot you.

Cut: (Strasser looks into distance, looks back, turns to go toward phone, and takes phone in left hand, places receiver on left ear. He is now facing screen right)

Cut: (Rick full head and shoulders)

Cut: (Strasser on phone)

Strasser: Hello.

Cut: (Rick full view facing us)

Rick: Put that phone down.

Cut: (Strasser head and shoulders, on phone)

Strasser: Get me the radio tower.

Cut: (Rick full view facing us)
Rick: Put it down.

Cut: (Strasser, full head, shoulders, down to waist. Takes something from right hand side pocket, a blur is visible, probably a gun in his right hand)

Cut: (Strasser's back, Rick at screen right, standing with gun in right hand. Sound of a shot. Gun flash is seen where Rick's right hand is)

Cut: (Strasser, full face and shoulders. eyes begin to close, body begins to fall, falls backward still holding phone receiver in left hand, hits the ground)

Cut: (car with five police officers pulls in from left side of screen, moving to right, on other side of a wire fence. Car stops, hands reach over side of doors, it is a convertible with no top, and men begin to get out.)

Cut: (plane is turning, taxiing ready for takeoff)

Cut:

Renault: Major Strasser has been shot.

Cut: (Renault looks at Rick)

Cut: (Rick looks at Renault)

Cut: (Renault with police officer. Renault faces forward, police officer's back is to us)

Renault: Round up the usual suspects.

Police: Oui mon capitain.

Cut: (Rick full face, with slight smile on face, slight nod)

In the famous last scene at the airport, we are shown that Rick has managed to give the letters of transit to Ilsa and Laszlo to enable them to board the plane to Lisbon. He has held Renault at gunpoint while they leave.

The Gestapo chief, Strasser, pulls up in a car, having realized from the phone call he received from Renault that something is amiss. When Renault informs him that Ilsa and Victor Laszlo are on the plane, he goes to a telephone to call the control tower to prevent the plane's take off despite Rick's warning not to do so. It is at this point that Rick shoots (and presumably) kills the Gestapo chief.

When several police officers then arrive on the scene, the police chief Renault, says to the officers, "Major Strasser has been shot. Round up the usual suspects." What I want to ask is how is it that we can hear this as a "hollow order," as a "cover up" of what happened, and also as an "exercise of his authority," i.e., as having multiple meanings. The utterance must be analyzed in the context in which it occurs, by attending carefully to prior and subsequent utterances and actions.[7]

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[7]An announcer at that time in the film reads into a microphone "To all officers. Two German couriers carrying important official documents. Murdered on train from Oran. Murderer and possible accomplices headed for Casablanca. Round up all suspicious characters and search them for stolen documents."

In another scene in a Casablanca street cafe, in response to two elderly persons' questions as to what is going on, a man says, "This is the customary round up of refugees, liberals and of course beautiful young girls for Mr. Renault . . . "

And, when the Nazi Gestapo officer lands at the airport and is met by Police chief Renault, Renault says: "we are rounding up twice the usual number of suspects." Another officer says, "we all know who the murderer is." The Nazi says, "Is he in custody?" and Renault says: "Oh there's no hurry. Tonight he'll be at Rick's. Everybody comes to Rick's."

First, it echoes prior similar statements one of which is made at the start of
the film when we first learn of the death of a courier and the theft of letters of
transit which would enable the possessor to escape to freedom from Casablanca (i.e.,
"round up all suspicious characters . . . "). A round up is a set of activities which the
police have authority to conduct. It is also something legitimately expected of the
police since "round up" implies the bringing in of many persons, the innocent and
the possibly guilty, for interrogation, out of which may come information relevant
for an investigation of the crime.[8]

This is another instance of categorical descriptions and the category related
activities which are conventionally presupposed to be connected to them.

The death of a courier and the disappearance of documents which the courier
reportedly was carrying, is categorized as a "murder" and a "theft'." This is to claim,
then, that the event was a "crime," rather than an "accident." Note that a "death"
could be of various kinds: natural causes, accident, suicide, drug overdose, etc. To
categorize it as "murder" is to ascribe it as due to human agency.

Therefore, a search for a person or persons who may have committed the
"murder" is an appropriate search. The types of persons to be "rounded up" would be
expected to include those categories of persons who would be motivated to commit
such a crime, would have the means to do so, and would possibly be in a position to
profit from the theft of "letters of transit" either to use them or to sell them. Within
the context of the film, this would include refugees, dealers in illegal or forged
documents, and their associates.

In the airport scene, Renault, the police chief, who is shown as witnessing
the death ("murder") of the Gestapo chief, knows who committed the act and by
virtue of having been present and knowing all the parties and their relationships
understands the perpetrator's motive, i.e., to prevent the Gestapo chief from calling
the control tower to stop the plane from taking off and to prevent Ilsa and Laszlo's
escape. For him to say, "round up the usual suspects" to his own police officers is
clearly witnessable (by us as the audience who have also witnessed all the same prior
actions and the "murder") as not only insincere but as a move designed to delay the
police from finding the culprit, to send them off the trail, away from the culprit, and
to divert them into irrelevant activities. "Irrelevant" because, no matter who they
round up, will not include the person who committed the act, namely Rick, who

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It is apparent that, in this sequence of utterances, to first say that a round up is being conducted
but then to say that the murderer is known, makes the round up an unnecessary and cynical act.
And to round up "twice the usual number" is therefore a display of police power which can be
considered a demonstration to the public concerning the seriousness of the crime.

[8]The command by the announcer is to "round up all suspicious characters and search them for
stolen documents". If he were to have said "round up the usual suspects" it would open the
possibility of interpreting the command as 'insincere' or 'pro-forma', i.e. as one that is not likely
to find the guilty parties but as demonstrating that the police are taking actions which others in
the community would find appropriate for the crime. That is, since a crime is something to be
investigated by the police and a 'round up' is part of the process of investigation, the police are
doing their job.

is standing right there near the police chief. Therefore the command specifically implies that the chief does not accuse Rick as the murderer.

Further, as a command given by an officer to his men, it requires certain relevant subsequent actions. These include removing the body, leaving the scene to search for the suspect, and to carry out a "round up." Such actions will provide the police chief and the perpetrator with an opportunity to leave the scene, to escape, and, if they so choose, to be able to do so with some time available to them since "round up" activities will presumably take time (This is in contrast to such a command as "arrest this man.").

Thus, we can see that the command to "round up the usual suspects" is a social action which has multiple meanings. First, it is a command and is received as a legitimate action by those to whom it is directed, i.e., police chiefs have the right to give orders to their men about what to do in reaction to a "crime." It is in contrast, for example, to a command such as "leave us alone for a while" or "go away" neither of which would be heard as relevant police actions under the circumstances and which could immediately cast suspicion on the chief himself.

We can also see that the action is a "delaying action" and an "evasion of duty" on the part of the police chief. Since the killer is known, the command will lead the police away from the killer and into activities which will not necessarily lead to his apprehension. Since police chiefs are expected to act to apprehend those who commit murder, we see the chief in this instance evading his duty and disclaiming any knowledge of who committed the crime.

The statement can also be characterized as to its sincerity and honesty. It is an insincere act.

Further, the command and the claim not to be knowledgeable about the perpetrator also make the police chief an accomplice and accessory to the killing. He becomes criminally liable for his inaction, for the diversion, and for a command which removes his men from the scene and reduces their chances of apprehending the real killer.

Thus we can see that the chief will now have a problem of covering up his own complicity in the act. The shift in his alliance to join Rick by leaving Casablanca to join the "Free French forces in Brazzaville" is then understandable as a solution to this problem though it may also mean that his allegiance has shifted. Whether it can be regarded as a change of heart on the part of the chief since we have seen him act cynically throughout the film may be doubted. Nevertheless, he now is in a different position since he is criminally liable for his actions in covering up the crime. His choice to leave with Rick is not necessarily "out of character" since his circumstances have changed by virtue of his action.

The command to "round up the usual suspects" has at least minimally signified an alliance with Rick to thwart the Gestapo, to allow Ilsa and Laszlo to escape, and to subvert any investigation of the murder.

Having acted by issuing the command, he cannot retract it. Nor can he later claim ignorance of the crime since this could be countered by the perpetrator who is in a position to say that the chief was present when the shooting occurred. The culprit has, in this sense, the possibility of extortion in relation to the chief just as the

chief has the power of extortion over the perpetrator. However, for the perpetrator to attempt to extort the chief that subjects him to the accusation by the chief of his having committed the murder. The chief's word is more likely to be believed by virtue of his position and his past associations with Rick. His having been a reluctant witness is supportable by the fact of Rick's possession of a weapon and that the same weapon was the murder weapon. Therefore, the chief remains in a position of having greater power over Rick than Rick does over him, now and in the future.

This kind of analysis of an utterance (or action) by a character in a particular scene requires: (1) examining the specific utterance (action); (2) in a sequence of utterances (actions); (3) retaining the context in which the utterance was produced which also includes the prior actions; and (4) connecting the analysis to what actually is shown and contained within the film.

The analysis of an utterance by a person, in a particular scene, in a sequence of actions (that includes the shot being fired, the death of the Gestapo chief, etc.) can be analyzed in terms of the ways in which actions are categorized by the characters (persons) in the film. The categorization made by the characters in the film can also be examined to see how these make certain actions relevant and other actions irrelevant.

Categorizing, classifying, identifying, and naming are all methods of practical reasoning. The examination of how these are used enables us to say how "film achieves its sense" or "intelligibility."

The sequential analysis of actions, a close examination of the details of action, who says what to whom in what circumstances(the "in-order-to" motives as Schutz describes them), and following what other actions, can lead to the development of a more rigorous analysis of the "logic of filmic actions." This is consistent with the position taken by Jayyusi (1988, 1984) to argue for a socio-logic of film i.e., a logic which includes the viewer's "common sense knowledge of the culture" as part of the active sense making practices involved in understanding how film achieves intelligibility.

3   Conclusion

The socio-logical analysis of meaning (and the "socio-logic of film") which is advocated here is then a mode of analysis applicable to all films and to any and all visual/audio productions. It is after all an aim of the social sciences to be able to show/analyze/describe how meanings are achieved/produced/constructed. Such analyses can reveal how films achieve their sense/meanings and also add to our understanding of the ways in which actions are organized so that we may be able to talk of a "logic of social actions."

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A Phenomenological Inquiry of *Rashomon*

Ken'ichi Kawano

1 Introduction

The Japanese film *Rashomon* directed by Akira Kurosawa in 1950, has been called "the best- known Japanese film ever made." (Richie 1987, p. 19) It won the Grand Prix (Golden Lion) at the Venice International Film Festival in 1951, and was the great breakthrough film for both Kurosawa and Japanese cinema.[1] And about 30 years later it was also awarded "the Lion of Lions" – as the best film of previous Golden Lion winners – at the 50th year commemorative Venice International Film Festival in 1982.

The film has been praised for the beauty and grace of its photography, the exquisite use of light and shadow in the woods, the simplicity of its compositions, and the realistic acting in it. The camera and composition is used to considerable effect. On the other hand, the director Kurosawa's reluctance to talk about the meaning of his film is well known. He had always insisted that the meaning of his film is there, in the film itself. This, it seems to me, also ignites our interest in the film *Rashomon*. Donald Richie points out, as follows,

> One of the most fascinating aspects of the film [*Rashomon*] is just that it is extremely difficult to determine *what* it means. It shares with other modern art (abstract painting, free form sculpture) an apparent lack of ostensible meaning which (in painting) returns to us our ability to see form and color, which (in sculpture) gives us our original vision—that of children—and lets us observe rock as rock, wood as wood . . . . (Richie 1987, p. 4)

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[1] *Rashomon* also won an Academy Honorary Award at the 24th Academy Awards in 1952. Before *Rashomon* won the prize, Japanese films had not been paid attention to outside Japan. At that time, Masaichi Nagata, the president of Daiei which was the Greater Japan Motion Picture Company, had been asked in United States: "Are movies made in Japan, too?" Since the success of *Rashomon*, the film has contributed to global recognition of Japanese films.

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The film has stimulated a great deal of commentary about what it means. Probably, more has been written about the film than about any of Kurosawa's other films. The film *Rashomon*, encapsulating a disturbingly relativistic or skeptical view of truth, leads audiences to ask: What really happened? Whose story is correct? What does the film mean? Actually, most commentaries on *Rashomon* refer to – or consider – "the relativity of the truth" in the film.[2]

The film *Rashomon* is based on the short story *In A Grove (Yabu no Naka in Japanese)* written by Ryunosuke Akutagawa in 1922. In short, both of them concern the death of a samurai told from different points of view (afterward, *Rashomon* for the film *Rashomon* by Kurosawa; *In A Grove* for the short story *In A Grove* by Akutagawa).[3] *Rashomon* and *In A Grove* commonly take up the death of the samurai and disturbingly different accounts of it. It is the reason why both of them (*Rashomon* and *In A Grove*) have been interpreted as the story of "the relativity of the truth" or "pluralism of the world." However, I would like to pay attention to the significant differences between them. In fact, Kurosawa adds a new confession (or account) by the woodcutter and an episode with an abandoned baby in the film. It seems to me that without the new confession and the episode he adds, *Rashomon* would not have stimulated such a great deal of commentary on it. Because of them, audiences watching *Rashomon* would consider several matters of the film in a more complex way than readers of *In A Grove*. In my opinion, whereas *In A Grove* provides us with the so-called relativity of the truth, *Rashomon* provides us with a "higher level" of an idea of the relativity of the truth.

In this paper, I wish to make clear one of the secrets that *Rashomon* has had a great impact on and stimulated audiences all over the world for over 60 years. In order to achieve this objective, I'll focus on relativistic views we can derive from it. To be sure, since the success of the film at Venice in 1951, the matter of "the relativity of the truth" presented in *Rashomon* has been repeatedly referred to by critics, philosophers, and sociologists. However, from my point of view, certain phases of the relativistic view in the film remain to be considered. To put it in advance, I have an idea that only when we can explicate these phases do we get to one of the secrets of the film which has not been referred to so far.

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[2]These include, Anderson and Richie (1982), Richie (1984), Javie (1987), Prince (1999), and Kamir (2006). It is also called "multi-perspectivism" (van Es 2002) or "plurality of the world." (Hama 1999)

[3]It is usually said that the film *Rashomon* is based on two short stories by Akutagawa: *In A Grove* (1922) and "Rashomon" (1915). But, actually, though the film *Rashomon* by Kurosawa has the same title as the short story "Rashomon" by Akutagawa, Akutagawa's "Rashomon" does not take up the murder case told from different perspectives at all. If one watches and reads them one by one, the film *Rashomon* would be seen as entirely different from Akutagawa's "Rashomon." Without knowledge about discussions which Kurosawa and Hashimoto (a scenarist) had had on the scenario of the film *Rashomon*, it is difficult to understand that the film *Rashomon* is "based on" Akutagawa's "Rashomon" with few exceptions. In the film *Rashomon*, only settings such as the devastated Rashomon gate and atmosphere of desolation in Kyoto of the era seems to be taken from Akutagawa's "Rashomon."

In the second section of this paper, comparing the story of *Rashomon* with that of *In A Grove* in brief, I'll present a synopsis of *Rashomon*. In the third section, I would like to shed light on certain phases of the relativistic view in *Rashomon*. These phases add something more than the so-called relativity of the truth to the film. In the fourth section, I'll explicate implications of *Rashomon* from a phenomenological point of view and, in conclusion, make clear the significance of phenomenological inquiry of *Rashomon* for those who are living in daily life, as well as for phenomenologists or sociologists.

2   *Rashomon* and *In A Grove*

Whereas both *Rashomon* and *In A Grove* concern a murder (or suicide) told from different perspectives, there are significant differences between them. As Fig. 1 shows, *Rashomon* consists of six different parts of the story, but *In A Grove* does not contain part (1), (5), and (6) of *Rashomon* which is actually added by Kurosawa. In this section, I'll illustrate each part of *Rashomon*.

2.1   *Part 1: Introduction*

The film opens at the dilapidated Rashomon gate. Under the gate, an unnamed woodcutter and a Buddhist priest recount their stories to a commoner while they are sheltering themselves from a rainstorm. The woodcutter claims he found the body of the samurai 3 days previously in the woods, and the priest states he saw the samurai and his wife a few days earlier on the road between Sekiyama and Yamashina. In the police court, before which the woodcutter and the priest testified earlier that day, they heard the strange tale about the murder (or suicide) of the samurai. About the incident, three widely different accounts are told in the murder trial by a brigand, the samurai's wife, and the samurai (through a spirit medium, because he passed away).

	the film *Rashomon* (by Kurosawa)	*In A Grove* (by Akutagawa)
Part 1	introduction: under the Rashomon gate	
Part 2	the account of the brigand	○
Part 3	the account of the samurai's wife	○
Part 4	the account of the samurai	○
Part 5	the confession of the woodcutter	
Part 6	the climax: under the Rashomon gate	

Fig. 1 The film *Rashomon* and *In A Grove*

2.2   Part 2: The Account of the Brigand

According to the brigand (Tajomaru), he killed the samurai. When he was falling asleep in the woods, the woman (Masago) and the samurai (Takehiro), who was leading the horse on which the woman – his wife – was riding, passed in front of him. First he saw her, he was struck by her beauty and decided he wanted her. He tricked the samurai into following him, and then tied him up with ropes. The samurai's wife, although she struggled against the brigand with her dagger, was raped by him in front of her husband. After that, as the brigand walked away to go off into the woods, she said, "Wait stop. One of you must die. Either you or my husband must die. I want . . . I will belong to whoever kills the other." The brigand cut the ropes binding the samurai, and they began to fight. In the resulting duel the brigand killed the samurai with his sword, but the woman ran away while they fought. The brigand told the court, "I sold the sword of the samurai in town on the same day, and then drank the money up. But, about her dagger, though I remember it looked expensive, I forgot it and walked off. That was the biggest mistake I ever made."

2.3   Part 3: The Account of the Samurai's Wife

According to the samurai's wife, she killed her husband. In the police court she took up the story after the rape, as follows: "After the rape, the brigand went up to her husband bound by the tree, took the husband's sword, and went away. As he made his get-away, she rushed to the bound husband, sobbing and throwing her arms around him. But he gave her a look of cold scorn." She told the court: "Even now I remember his eyes. What I saw in them was not sorrow, not even anger. It was . . . a cold hatred of me." Tormented by the husband's cold spurn, she retreated from her husband, repeating, as if in a trance: "Don't look at me like that. Don't! Beat me, kill me if you must, but don't look at me like that. Please don't!" Cutting his bonds with her dagger and releasing him, she offered him the dagger, and demanded: "Kill me at once!" And then, she fainted. When she opened her eyes and looked around, she found the dagger in her husband's chest. He was already dead with the dagger. She assumed that she had killed her husband with the dagger, and continued, "I didn't know what to do. I ran through the forest—I must have, although I don't remember. Then I found myself standing by a pond. I threw myself into it. I tried to kill myself. But I failed."

2.4   Part 4: The Account of the Dead Samurai

According to the dead samurai speaking through the voice of a spirit medium, he committed suicide. He explained that after the rape the brigand made overtures,

wanting to take the samurai's wife away with him. She did not merely agree, but also called on the brigand to kill her husband (the samurai). She told the brigand: "Kill him [the samurai]. As long as he is alive I cannot go with you. Kill him!" Even the brigand seemed to be shocked to hear that. The brigand was angry with her and threw her to the ground. He addressed the samurai: "What do you want me to do with this woman? Kill her? Spare her? Just nod if you agree." While the brigand asked the samurai, she seized the chance to escape and ran away. The brigand took his sword and cut the captive's bonds, and went into the woods. The samurai, left alone, found the woman's dagger and killed himself by thrusting the dagger into his chest. After he stated that he had killed himself, the samurai (−medium) added: "Everything was quiet—how quiet it was. It grew dark and a mist seemed to envelop me. I lay quietly in this stillness. Then someone seemed to approach me, softly, gently. Who could it have been? Then someone's hand grasped the dagger and drew it out."

2.5   Part 5: The Confession of the Woodcutter

The short story *In A Grove* by Akutagawa ends with the account of the samurai (-medium). However, in the film *Rashomon* Kurosawa adds the confession of the woodcutter. Whereas *In A Grove* mainly consists of accounts by the *three* persons involved in the death of the samurai, the film *Rashomon* includes another account of it by the woodcutter. In Part 5 of the film, under the Rashomon gate he confesses to the priest and the commoner that he witnessed what had happened from beginning to end. He did not merely find the body of the dead samurai. His confession is as follows. As he looked out from behind a bush, after the rape, the brigand was down on his knees in front of the woman and seemed to be begging her to forgive him, pleading with her to go away with him. The woman said that she could not decide, and that only the men could. Then she cut the samurai's bonds with her dagger and released him. The brigand and the samurai understood that she had asked the two men to fight each other. The samurai, however, refused to risk his life for his wife and told the brigand: "If you want her, I'll give her to you. I regret the loss of my horse much more than I will regret the loss of this woman." She was shocked by this, and the brigand lost his passion for her and was about to leave by himself. Then, suddenly, the woman began to curse out the two men. She condemned both men for not being real men. She continued: "A woman can be won only by strength—by the strength of the swords you are wearing." In the end, the two men began to fight and the brigand killed the samurai with his sword. The moment the brigand slew the samurai, the wife screamed and then rushed off into the woods in a panic. The brigand began to follow her but was unable, because he was tired out and limping. As soon as the confession of the woodcutter finishes, the commoner says "I suppose your [the woodcutter's] tale is supposed to be true among the accounts."

2.6 Part 6: The Climax

After the confession of the woodcutter, they find an abandoned baby crying in the environs of the Rashomon gate. The commoner rushes to where the baby is crying, takes off the baby's clothes, and is about to go off with them. The woodcutter follows him and accuses him of stealing them from the baby, while the priest holds the baby protectively. But in turn, the commoner cross-questions the woodcutter and reveals that the woodcutter had stolen the woman's expensive dagger after the samurai passed away. The woodcutter does not deny it. The commoner calls the woodcutter a really selfish man and turns to go. After the commoner goes out in the rain, the woodcutter approaches the priest and moves to take the baby away from him, but the priest resists allowing him to take the baby – probably because the priest does not trust the woodcutter. The woodcutter, shaking his head, tells the priest that he is ashamed of what he did (stealing the dagger) and has decided to bring the abandoned baby up with his six children at his home. The priest apologizes for distrusting him, thanks him, holds out the baby, and the woodcutter takes it. They bow to each other and the woodcutter leaves the Rashomon gate, holding the baby.

3 Certain Phases in *Rashomon*

The three persons, involved in the death of the samurai – the brigand, the wife of the samurai, and the samurai – all testify that they killed the samurai (the samurai said that he had killed himself). The woodcutter, from the viewpoint of an "objective" observer in the sense that he was not involved in the death of the samurai, tells the priest and the commoner that the samurai was killed by the brigand with his sword; but the film also shows that one should be suspicious of the woodcutter since he had stolen the woman's expensive dagger after the samurai passed away.

The opening scene (Part 1) of the film under the Rashomon gate leads audiences to ask: What really happened? Whose story is correct?[4] Watching the film, from the beginning to the end, we are induced to ask these questions and to seek answers to them. So far, however, it is reasonable to think that no one can find one and only one true account that would overrule the other contradictory accounts. Every account of it has at least one thing that is refuted by other accounts. Thus, it has been often said that the film suggests "the relativity of the truth."

On the one hand, I agree with the view that *Rashomon* suggests "the relativity of the truth." Those who hold the relativistic view usually think that, because we cannot find one and only one account of the death of the samurai in *Rashomon*, the film indicates a relativistic or skeptical view that there is no absolute certainty

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[4]In the opening scene, under the Rashomon gate, the woodcutter, priest, and commoner are engaged in a quest for knowledge about what really happened.

of truth. On the other hand, I wonder if a film which *merely* suggests this kind of (so-called) relativistic view would have had such a great impact, not only on audiences in general, but also on critics, philosophers, and sociologists all over the world. There must be other secrets, besides the "relativity of the truth" which would explain the film's appeal.

In order to unveil one of the secrets, I would like to pay attention to the difference between *Rashomon* and *In A Grove* on which the film *Rashomon* is "based." Kurosawa adds a new confession (or account) by the woodcutter and an episode with an abandoned baby. They make *Rashomon* more sophisticated than *In A Grove* from the viewpoint of epistemological or phenomenological implications. There are significant differences between the so-called relativistic view which one can read in *In A Grove* and a "higher level" relativistic view which one can derive from *Rashomon*.

If we are to make clear the differences between them, we need to advance another step. Imagine the case that we face with "the relativity of the truth" in daily life and, in addition, must make a choice and decision on that matter. I would like to think about a problematic situation in which we must make a choice among several incompatible alternatives in the everyday life-world.[5] To give an example, in a meeting, we must often make our choice on a matter, even if the opinion is clearly divided after we have discussed it fully. For another example, one may take a traffic accident. It often occurs that even after a police investigation there are differences between accounts by those who are involved in it. In such cases (or situations), after examinations of the incompatible alternatives or accounts themselves, we would seek for and have recourse to *other* criteria for making decision on the matter *than* the alternatives themselves. Among such other criteria, I would like to take up two examples (1) "the majority rule" and (2) "objective observation." For example, in the above cases, we often make a choice on a matter in a meeting in accordance with majority rule, and in the case of the traffic accident police usually appeal for anyone who witnessed the accident to contact them. In fact, *Rashomon* can be interpreted in terms of them.

3.1 Rashomon *and the Majority Rule*

As pointed out in the second section of this paper, *In A Grove* (by Akutagawa) does not contain the new confession of the woodcutter which Kurosawa adds as Part 5 of *Rashomon*. Whereas *In A Grove* takes up *three* different accounts of the death of the samurai, *Rashomon* deals with *four* accounts of it. Taking into consideration the number of accounts in *Rashomon* and *In A Grove*, we can take

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[5]Here, I take up the situation, which is concerned with "working" rather than (covert) performing, in a Schutzian sense. Unlike performing, working is irrevocable in the sense that it has changed the outer world (Schutz 1945, p. 217).

	the brigand	the samurai's wife	the samurai
the weapon	sword	**dagger**	**dagger**

Fig. 2 Two of three people had claimed that the dagger had been the weapon

	the brigand	the samurai's wife	the samurai	the woodcutter
the weapon	sword	dagger	dagger	sword

Fig. 3 The invalidation of the applicability of majority rule to the case

notice of certain implications in *Rashomon*. It has relevance to the majority rule. *Rashomon* neutralizes the applicability of the majority rule to the death of the samurai. To make the point clear, first, I deal with the three accounts (*In A Grove*, or Part 1–4 of *Rashomon*), and then with the four accounts (*Rashomon*) in turn.

Among the differences between accounts of the death of the samurai, I'll focus on the weapon with which the samurai was killed or committed suicide. Is it the sword or the dagger? The brigand tells the court that he killed the samurai with his *sword*. According to the samurai's wife, she killed her husband with her *dagger*. The samurai claims, through a spirit medium, that he kills himself by thrusting the *dagger* in his chest. Which weapon was used in the death of the samurai?

Watching from Part 1 to 4 of *Rashomon* or reading *In A Grove*, those who have the general commonsense tendency to favor as true what a majority of the supposed perceivers claim to be true may have recourse to "the majority rule." They would think that the weapon in the death of the samurai was "the dagger" in accordance with the rule (see Fig. 2). Two of three people had claimed that "the dagger" had been the weapon. As long as a decisive factor is not found, the three persons' accounts are to be treated equally. Thus, it is reasonable for them to regard the dagger as the weapon in the death of the samurai. They can apply to the case the majority rule as one of the criteria to make a decision about which weapon was used in the death of the samurai.

However, in Part 5 of *Rashomon*, Kurosawa adds the confession of the woodcutter. He tells the priest and the commoner that the brigand killed the samurai with his *sword* (see Fig. 3). It leads to the invalidation of the applicability of majority rule to the case.

After the woodcutter's confession in Part 5 of *Rashomon*, with regard to the weapon – is it the sword or the dagger? – even those who prefer "the majority rule" cannot apply the rule to the case. If they are to rely on the rule, after the woodcutter's confession, there is no longer a clear majority consensus on the weapon in the death of the samurai. This is one of the significant differences between *Rashomon* and

	the brigand	the samurai's wife	the samurai	**the woodcutter**
the samurai was killed with	sword	dagger	dagger	**sword**

Fig. 4 The privileged and objective position of the woodcutter

In A Grove. In this point, we can find one of the reasons why Kurosawa adds the woodcutter's confession in *Rashomon*. That is, Kurosawa takes into consideration the majority rule, and then *neutralizes* the applicability of the rule to the case. I have no idea about whether Kurosawa really intended to bring about such an effect in the film[6] when he decided to add it. But it brings to *Rashomon* something more than *In A Grove*.

3.2   The Woodcutter as an Objective Observer

The confession of the woodcutter has another implication. As interpreted by numerous critics and papers, Part 5 of *Rashomon* presents the woodcutter's confession as the account from the viewpoint of "an objective (or disinterested) observer."[7] After the woodcutter's confession, the commoner says that "I suppose your [the woodcutter's] tale is supposed to be true." It is likely that the audiences, having been seeking an answer to the question [What really happened?], will regard the woodcutter's confession as the true account of the death of the samurai.

Thus, the woodcutter's account of the death of the samurai has a privileged position as one from the standpoint of an "objective" observer (see Fig. 4). His position is "privileged" and "objective" because only he was not involved in the death of the samurai among the four persons. He had witnessed what happened from beginning to end from behind a bush.

Interestingly though, when the woodcutter's account is interpreted as one from an "objective" point of view, "the applicability of the majority rule" seems to be irrelevant for making a decision on that matter. Compared to *In A Grove*, the woodcutter's confession which Kurosawa adds in Part 5 of *Rashomon* has a function of invalidation of the application of the majority rule, and suggests the possibility of an account of the death of the samurai from an "objective" and "privileged" point of view.

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[6]Within my research, I cannot find any paper which points out this phase of *Rashomon*. In terms of the applicability of the majority rule, one may derive one of the interpretations from *Rashomon* that Kurosawa is conscious of the danger of the tyranny of the majority.

[7]With regard to the point, some critics maintain that the woodcutter's confession has the status of "a privileged position" and "a third party," too, or that the woodcutter's confession can be regarded – at least – more objective than the other three persons' accounts.

However, in Part 6 of *Rashomon*, the woodcutter's privileged position is to be questioned. For the commoner reveals that the woodcutter stole the woman's expensive dagger after the samurai passed away and the brigand and the samurai's wife had left. In the woodcutter's confession, he reveals that the brigand killed the samurai with his *sword*, and he does not refer to where the dagger is after the death of the samurai at all. And he does not raise any objection against what the commoner says. This indicates that, although the woodcutter was not involved in the death of the samurai, he did involve himself in the incident, by the theft of the dagger. Thus, the woodcutter's confession cannot be regarded as "objective" or disinterested observation any longer. Although it is likely that the audiences will be about to find the truth of the death of the samurai in the woodcutter's tale (in Part 5), but it is "suspended" by Kurosawa in the end.[8]

4 Phenomenological Inquiry of *Rashomon*: "Ambiguity" in *Rashomon*

The film *Rashomon*, as well as *In A Grove*, has been interpreted as the story of "the relativity of the truth" in the sense that no one can find one and only one true account of the death of the samurai.[9] But, there are also differences between *Rashomon* and *In A Grove*. Kurosawa adds the new confession of the woodcutter (Part 5) and the episode with an abandoned baby (Part 6) in *Rashomon*. As we have seen in the third section, the audiences of *Rashomon* can endeavor to determine the truth of the samurai's death in a more complex way than readers of *In A Grove*.

In *Rashomon*, the truth of the samurai's death can be inquired into in terms of "the applicability of the majority rule" and "objective observation" – although Kurosawa does not refer explicitly to them. If we consider thoroughly the significance of them to *Rashomon*, we can find one of the most interesting points of the film. I hasten to add that this does not mean the film presents us with one and only one answer to the question of what really happened. Nevertheless, "the applicability of the majority rule" and "objective observation" would take an effective role to stimulate the audiences' considerations of the death of the samurai. In my opinion, *Rashomon* indicates "the applicability of the majority rule" and "objective observation" as the grounds to judge "what really happened" *on the one hand* and it *also* requires us to invalidate them *on the other hand*.

With regard to the question whether the sword or the dagger is the weapon in the death of the samurai, if Kurosawa did not add the confession of the woodcutter

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[8]This implies that every description of an event by human beings depends upon the viewpoint from which it is illustrated. No one can stand in the position of God.

[9]If we are to make a judgment on whose story is true, we have to make a decision on it in spite of the fact that no evidence can be found in the film.

(Part 5), the dagger could be regarded as the possible answer to it in accordance with "the majority rule," for two of three people had claimed that it had been the weapon. But the confession of the woodcutter neutralizes and invalidates the applicability of the majority rule to the question. After the confession, we cannot rely on "the majority rule" any longer. And about "the objective (or disinterested) observation," in Part 5 (the confession of the woodcutter), the woodcutter's account can be interpreted as one from an objective observer in the sense that he was not involved in the death of the samurai and had witnessed the circumstances of the death of the samurai from behind a bush. As the commoner says, his account was supposed to be true. However, in Part 6 (the episode with an abandoned baby) the commoner revealed that the woodcutter had stolen the dagger in the scene after the death of the samurai. This invalidates the woodcutter's position as an objective observer, because he was involved in the incident. In *Rashomon* the audiences can find both the applicability and inapplicability of the majority rule and interpret the woodcutter as both the objective observer and as a person involved in the incident. In my interpretation, this brings to *Rashomon* something more than the so-called relativity of the truth.

I would like to compare *Rashomon* with *In A Grove*, with regard to the relativity of the truth. Both of them have been interpreted as the story of "the relativity of the truth" in the sense that audiences or readers cannot find one and only one answer to the question of what really happened. However, there are significant differences between them. It is reasonable to say that *In A Grove* does not offer any clue as to how to resolve the question of "what really happened" for the readers. It shows the so-called relativity of the truth about the death of the samurai. As for *Rashomon*, the audiences can find clues to resolve it. They find the effective clue of "the applicability of the majority rule" and are about to get to one and only one answer to the question on the ground of "objective observation (by the woodcutter)." But in the end, they have to invalidate them. In my opinion, this brings to *Rashomon* a "higher level" of the relativity of the truth. It is not the so-called relativity of the truth which presupposes the idea of the truth that there is *no* one and only one truth. In order to explicate the "higher level" of the relativity of the truth in *Rashomon*, it is helpful for us to consider the significance of the last scene in *Rashomon*.

In the last scene of *Rashomon*, the priest apologizes to the woodcutter for distrusting him and the woodcutter leaves the Rashomon gate, holding the abandoned baby. Some people interpret it as a happy ending in the sense that the woodcutter, repenting the theft of the dagger, must be going to bring the abandoned baby up with his six children at home. As the priest can trust him in the last scene, we can trust him too. However, others imagine that, after the last scene, the woodcutter may rob the baby of his/her underwear and then abandon the baby. Actually, either interpretation is possible; nobody knows what the woodcutter is really going to do after the scene. We can only imagine or interpret it. This means that, at least, there is the possibility that we can "trust" the woodcutter in the film (and that he is going to bring the baby up). In my interpretation, the last scene *suspends* the view of "distrust of human beings" which the audiences may derive from the film and fall into.

The scene may indicate the moment when social order arises on the basis of "trust."[10] However, if we trust him and adopt an interpretation of the scene as a happy ending, it implies that we reject the idea that there is *no* one and only one truth. Through *Rashomon*, we *can* get to the one interpretation of the film as a happy ending, despite the fact that we *cannot* find one and only one correct account of the death of the samurai. It seems to me that the last scene invites us to consider the matter of the samurai's death again and to find one and only one account of it. For if we could rely upon the view that there is one and only one truth about both the death of the samurai and the last scene, we would reach a logically consistent interpretation of *Rashomon*.

However, no one has found one and only one correct account of the death of the samurai in *Rashomon* for over 60 years after the film *Rashomon* was released.[11] Does this mean that in accordance with logical consistency we have to suspect the woodcutter in the last scene?[12] Or, can we find the one and only account of the death of the samurai by investigating *Rashomon* perfectly in detail? In this point, I think *Rashomon* has been very interesting to phenomenologists, too. In my interpretation, *Rashomon* invites audiences to "bracket" *not only* the idea that there is one and only one truth, *but also* the idea that there is *no* one and only one truth. We cannot rely entirely upon either idea. With regard to the death of the samurai, we cannot have found one and only one one account of it. This leads us to "suspend" the idea that there is one and only one truth. And on the other hand, an interpretation of the last scene as a happy ending induces us to seek an answer to the question of what really happened about the death of the samurai again. It means that after watching the last scene, we are induced to "suspend" the idea that there is *no* one and only one account of the samurai's death.

In sum, *Rashomon* requires the audiences to "suspend" the belief in the idea that there is one and only one truth on the one hand and, on the other, it also requires them to "suspend" the one and only interpretation that there is *no* one and only one truth at the same time. In this sense, in *Rashomon* we can find a "higher level" of the relativity of the truth, that is, "ambiguity."[13]

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[10]It is one of the sociological interpretations of the film (Hama 1999).

[11]As I refer to in the first section of this paper, the director Kurosawa's reluctance to talk about the meaning of his film is well known.

[12]It would be one of the interpretations of *Rashomon*. But then, another question of why the priest trusts the woodcutter in the last scene would be raised.

[13]I use "ambiguity" in the sense of Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1945). In this paper, I confine myself to show a novel interpretation of *Rashomon*, and only to indicate that my interpretation of *Rashomon* has relevance to "ambiguity." For whereas the concept of "ambiguity" can apply to an interpretation of *Rashomon*, considerations of *Rashomon*, it seems to me, have the possibility to develop an inquiry into "ambiguity" in turn. In my idea, in order to develop the study of "ambiguity," findings in Schutzian methodological postulates (Nasu 1997, 2005) are very helpful. His findings about Schutzian methodological postulates make clear "ambiguity" in social scientific constructs.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I confined myself to making clear, from a phenomenological point of view, one of the secrets in *Rashomon* which has not been discovered so far. I do not mean that *Rashomon* is to be fit into a philosophical Procrustean bed, but that one of the secrets in *Rashomon* can be found only when the film is investigated from a phenomenological point of view.[14]

If the audiences of *Rashomon* negated the one side of a dichotomy and supported the other side, there would be no consciousness of "ambiguity" for them.[15] However, *Rashomon* requires us to "suspend" (rather than to put in doubt in the sense of Cartesian methodical doubt) *at the same time* the two correlative ideas, the idea that there is one and only one truth and the idea of the truth that there is *no* one and only one truth. As I have shown in this paper, we cannot adopt either idea as the decisive interpretation of *Rashomon*. Then "ambiguity" appears to us. Thus, if *Rashomon* has been regarded as the story of the so-called relativity of the truth by some critics, philosophers, sociologists, and so on, they disregard that the themes of *Rashomon* is more complex than the mere relativity of the truth. We have no idea about whether we can get to the one interpretation of it or not. "Ambiguity" in *Rashomon* makes us waver between the two ideas. In the dynamics of thought processes between them, we are induced to continue to inquire into it. In my opinion, this is one of the secrets of *Rashomon* which has not been made clear so far.

What really happened with regard to the death of the samurai? Whose story is correct? Can we trust the woodcutter in the last scene? After the last scene, the audiences, who are conscious of the logical consistencies in interpretations of the film or the sense of strangeness which invades their thought, would ask these questions and examine them again and again. Then using our imagination, we attempt to comprehend what the characters in the film would think about in each situation, and to penetrate what the figure or the horizon of the four accounts is. In order to examine the questions, we need to imagine their stock of knowledge and what is taken for granted by them.

According to Schutz, the greater part of our stock of knowledge is socially derived and knowledge is socially distributed. Our stock of knowledge at hand is the sediment of our previous experiences in biographically determined situations. Whereas the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives overcomes the difficulty that

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[14]For this reason, I do not discuss such subject matters as the roles of temporality, transcendental intersubjectivity, and ethics in this paper. As Michael Barber suggested (in the International Conference: *Phenomenology, Social Sciences, and the Arts*), each theme which he deals with in his book (Barber 2004) is very interesting to me. *Rashomon* stimulates us to develop phenomenology. If we deal with and discuss these themes fully, another paper focusing on each theme is needed. I have reformulated the fundamental problem of sociology from the Schutzian point of view (Kawano 2012), in order not to fall into the disasters of the procrustean bed.

[15]"Ambiguity" of Merleau-Ponty can be understood from the viewpoint of Bataille's philosophy of nonknowledge. With regard to the relationship between Schutz's thought and Bataille's philosophy of nonknowledge, I have discussed in my earlier work (Kawano 2007).

my actual knowledge is merely the potential knowledge of my fellows and vice versa, the stock of *actual* knowledge at hand differs from individual to individual (Schutz 1953, pp. 13–14). The difference of the stock of actual knowledge at hand between us is one of the reasons why we are unable to understand (*Verstehen*) the intended meaning of the other people's act in the strictest sense (Schutz 1932). However, in the natural attitude of daily life "we are able to understand other people's acts only if I can imagine that I myself would perform analogous acts if I were in the same situation." (Schutz 1960, p. 13) This applies to considerations of the above-mentioned questions in *Rashomon*. Thus, examining the questions of *Rashomon*, we imagine the stock of knowledge of each of the characters and what is taken for granted by each of them. When I imagine a stock of knowledge or what is taken for granted by others, my stock of knowledge is used as a scheme of reference. In addition, I would "bracket" what I take for granted and reflect on it. This means that in examining the questions in *Rashomon* we have opportunities to "bracket" and examine the stock of knowledge at hand that we ourselves take for granted.

"Ambiguity" in *Rashomon* invites us to an open-ended inquiry. It leads us to "bracket" and examine *what is taken for granted* by us. *Rashomon* ignites our interest in considerations of the stock of knowledge at hand that we take for granted, and encourages us to persevere with and to enjoy our efforts to continue "bracketing" and reflecting on it. This must be one of the secrets on the basis of which the film has stimulated the audiences all over the world for over 60 years.

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The Art of Making Photos: Some Phenomenological Reflections

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Taking pictures with a digital camera or a mobile phone has become a widespread, ubiquitous activity. While some persons just take snapshots of particular scenes or events, it can be observed that many others also compose their photos to a certain degree by varying their position in different spatial directions, by using the zoom function and sometimes by giving advice to the friends they are photographing in regard to how they should pose. The common phrase of "taking pictures" suggests that the picture is already there and has just to be taken. The fact that each photo is the result of composing work to at least some degree is better captured if we speak of "making photos." This is even more relevant in the digital age where it has become common practice that layman photographers also edit their photos on the computer and increasingly on the camera and the mobile phone, too. The tools of the software programs that allow for editing pictures have become much simpler in recent years and more and more user-friendly. There are thus two processes of making photos: one of composing and photographing and a second of editing photos that have already been taken.

The goal of this chapter is – in line with Alfred Schutz – to reflect on the "doing" of making photos in a subjective perspective. I will focus on the first process only, the making of photos until the button of the camera is pressed. I attempt to describe some of my experiences and practices using phenomenological concepts. As I am a socialized human, my subjective perspective includes social and cultural influences of many sorts, shaped by my personal biography.

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1   The Autobiographical Context

Let me start with some information on my personal background: Photography has been my hobby for nearly all my life. I remember taking pictures already at the age of 9 or 10, with a simple camera but now and then guided by hints and tips of a semi-professional photographer, a friend of our family. My brother who was about 5 years older than me, continually motivated me by taking pictures himself, and he was the one who also advised me to strive for a SLR (mirror reflex)-camera "Pentax Spotmatic," the first camera that measured the light through the lens – a technical breakthrough at the time, in 1964, made in Japan. From then on I was well equipped and as the years passed by I made thousands of pictures, developing and editing my black and white photos in the darkroom myself. Later I used color-film, first diapositives (slides) and then color negative films. I changed cameras several times, buying each time an even more sophisticated model, and in 2001 I switched to digital photography, first with a compact, in 2004, also with a SLR camera. Over the years, however, the more I got involved in science as a profession, the less time I found for my hobby. It became a typical leisure time activity, something for holidays or for special occasions, like weddings or birthday parties of family members and close friends.

   An interesting question to start with is why and how I do photography. The "why" is a psychological, not a phenomenological question. But the why is closely linked to the how, as I will show, and the how can be partly analyzed by means of phenomenological concepts. Since a close friend of mine who is an outspokenly anti-sportive and anti-touristic sociologist, asked me why the hell do I like travelling – something he just could not understand, neither emotionally nor rationally, as travelling was just a pure nuisance for him – since then I began to question myself. Suddenly an activity that I had always and undoubtedly enjoyed became questionable. This probing question rendered something problematic which so far had been a natural fact of my life, a natural routine, and it suddenly destroyed the innocence of my unquestioned activity. In a similar vein, I now began to reflect on my activity of making pictures. Why do I make photos at all? If you are eager to take good pictures, photography is work, and administering, selecting, and putting them together in albums or slide shows are even more work. Why engage in such work in leisure time?

   That possessing a camera and making photographs are "good" practices was treated as an unquestioned truth in our family, but not so in the families of others, like my grandparents'. When my mother recently died I found nearly no photos of her childhood and youth. Her family owned only a very few photos taken by a professional photographer. It made me aware that in the 1920s and 1930s many families did not have a habit of making pictures themselves, and they did not have cameras of their own. The same was the case for my grandparents of both sides. By some unknown reason my father got a camera already as a boy and documented bicycle tours, hiking trips, and vacations, but not everyday life. So we have albums with photos of his parents, aunts and uncles, as well as some of his peers. And since

the day he met my mother he also took many pictures of her. Since their encounter she became visually documented. Thus my personal motivation to make photos is deeply embedded in my family tradition – working as because motives – and it was regularly reinforced when my peers and classmates enjoyed the photos I took of them at parties, excursions, and other special occasions. It was generally agreed that I was the one who took the best photos, so I was "the" photographer in class.

Looking back on my life regarding my activities as a photographer, I remember the wonderful time when I was a scientific assistant with a modest salary that allowed me to survive and which gave me plenty of time to do whatever I liked to do. In those years I took a lot of photos and spent much time in the darkroom, where I could work quite creatively with the negatives at hand, experimenting with different kinds of photo papers, chemicals, expositions, focus, and frames. Taking photos was intimately linked to making photos. It was in every aspect a cheerful hobby. When, however, the obligations of a serious academic career got hold of me, it implied a farewell to those happy times. I ended up taking thousands of pictures at rare occasions – at vacations and special events – but I hardly found time to make something of all these pictures. I could have made albums and exhibitions or even have tried to find publishers for the best of my pictures, but I just left them in boxes and usually never went back to them, unless a friend or a family member persistently asked for some of them.

This made me aware, that I have lived only one part of the whole process for many years now: the part of taking pictures, but not the part of sorting them out, modifying them, putting them together in different thematic series, arranging them in an album, and so on. A rational choice would suggest that I soberly analyze the situation in a realistic manner and conclude: If I never look at the pictures, and if I don't pass them on to other people, why the hell am I still taking pictures? I could as well let it be. – Of course, there always remains the general hope that you will have all the time of the world once you are retired – and then you will look at all these pictures, at an age where you start to prefer looking back instead of looking forward. But all my friends and colleagues who have retired seem to be busier than ever. A realistic assessment probably suggests that all those photos will remain in those boxes forever, and it will be the task of my heirs to throw them away.

2 Focusing on the Doing of Making Photos as an Activity in Its Own Right

So why the hell do I continue to take photos? Why all that hassle running around in search of good pictures, if I finally end up not even looking at them? I started to reflect on my photographing during a vacation with my wife. Once more, I took thousands of pictures. In the past, my wife was often ambivalent about my photographing as the focus of my attention was not directed to her and our common experience and enjoyment of an event. Indeed, I can get caught by a kind of hunting

drive and am not a normal human being anymore who socializes and interacts with others; instead, I find myself being on the prowl for good photos all by myself. Thus, my wife found herself often sitting alone much of the time when we were at parties. This was the downside for my wife. On the other hand, she also felt the enthusiasm and the excitement that I obviously displayed and this fascinated her, too.

Why this enthusiasm, where does it come from? The why has to do with the how. When contemplating on my doing photographing, I realized that there is a special attraction at work. I enjoy taking pictures even when I know that I possibly will never look at them again. *I enjoy taking pictures as an activity in its own right.* I try to capture the moment, the very moment in which I experience something remarkable – and so I photograph the blossoms of the cherry tree in our garden every year again. Not in order to produce a better photo than I made in the past years but in order to capture this very precious moment, this very unique experience.

A camera in my hand changes the mode of my perception: common-sensical everyday gazes are substituted by "photographic gazes" that focus on visual phenomena and are guided by the intention of taking "good" pictures. There is not "a" or "the" photographic gaze but there is a great variety of such gazes, focusing on different motives, themes, arrangements, perspectives, contexts, and so on. Gazes in search for photographs, however, have certain properties in common: They share a special "attention à la vie," are well aware of the noetic aspects of photographic phenomena, and have to come to terms with the givenness of their noema.

Taking pictures presupposes a photographic gaze, but also combines it with personal experience, technical expertise, and other kinds of practical knowledge. The photographer's intuition is coupled with more or less explicit, often highly routinized reflections on the choice of motives, their context and arrangement, proper perspectives, the degree of light as well as the interplay of light and shadow, the combination of different forms and shades of colors, the technical possibilities of the equipment at hand, and so on. Taking pictures also implies to press the button – and this is an act in time. Let us look at this in more detail.

3   The Photographic Gaze: A Special Cognitive Style?

When I am on the hunt, I have a special gaze: I am scanning the surroundings for possible pictures. I call it "the photographic gaze," in analogy to John Urry's "touristic gaze." (Urry 2002) Friends report that they recognize immediately when I put on my photographic gaze – it can obviously be seen from my way of moving and looking around, I obviously make it "accountable" in an ethnomethodological sense. Subjectively, I experience this way of looking as a *special cognitive style*. The photographic gaze shifts my subjective system of relevances of everyday life and draws my attention to the beauty of a landscape or to an interesting scene of actors or to special moments of any sort that are worth of getting captured. My "attention à la vie" (Schutz 1967) is much more intense, and the tension of my consciousness is high and often extremely focused. Doing photography is an embodied action, but

my senses are strongly reduced to the visual. Thus, participating in a party – to come back to the example I already mentioned – is a much more relaxed and multi-sensual, holistic experience then photographing the party. Many sorts of sensual and bodily experiences are just excluded from consciousness and my full attention is turned to the visual only. This way I experience a kind of *époche*. My doing photography has also a different form of sociality, my interaction with the people of a "natural" scene is – in contrast to photographing models, for instance – reduced to a minimum or even avoided totally in order to keep their behaviors "natural." In other words, I exclude myself from the community and take the role of a distant observer, watching the scene and trying to take pictures. My experience is mostly one of acting in solitude, being fully on my own and separate from the others. Even the time perspective is different as all my attention is directed to capturing the right moment, to making the perfect shot.

I definitely experience my photographic gaze as a different cognitive style. However, although the criteria that Schutz (1962a) developed to characterize multiple realities seem to be helpful for describing the subjective experience of doing photography, I am not in a different world in the sense of a "finite province of meaning." As a photographer, I am acting in the world of everyday life with the pragmatic attitude to make good pictures. My system of relevances directs my attention to the aesthetic side of my life-world, and with my pictures I contribute to the visibility of the beauty of this world. I also contribute to the aesthetic order when I focus on specific things that other people overlook or when I put things in a frame that fragments and orders the representation of my life-world. When experimenting or producing highly abstract photos of light and shadow, forms and colors, one recognizes that photography often involves a great deal of fantasy and fantasizing. But usually my photos do not belong to a world of fantasy but are representations of the everyday world, and my doing photography are pragmatic acts that bear the same accent of reality, too.

As I said, there is not only one photographic gaze, there are many such gazes. My brief sketch about photographing a party does not apply, for instance, to taking pictures of a model or to portrait photography. Here you interact with the photographed person, and making good photos depends very much on your social skills, on your ability to develop a warm, relaxed and easy-going working relationship with him or her. In addition, many other people may take snapshots at a party, not really worrying about the outcome and not really taking on a different cognitive style. My way of doing photography has a strong personal component.

4   Composing Pictures

With the photographic gaze I see everything in frames. Not only in natural and social frames in Goffman's (1974) sense but also in geometrical frames of a 4:3 proportion. Sometimes I would like to capture an exceptional "grand" experience, e.g., when standing in the forest or in a large urban space, but it is completely impossible to put

the visual whole into a frame. There are embodied experiences of aesthetic orders that you simply cannot photograph. Even when using wide-angle or fish-eye lenses it would only distort what appears so magnificent. Beyond that, most scenes can be captured in frames, in a macro- or a micro-perspective.

Seeing the world in frames is certainly a constitutive but quite basic and only superficial part of the photographic gaze. Much more important is *how you compose the picture*. And an interesting question here is if you just take a snapshot from where you are sitting or standing or if you actively compose the picture. If you do so you will choose deliberately the fore- and background and their relation, a certain combination of light and shadow as well as of forms and colors and you are guided by some aesthetic criteria. You are then not just *taking* pictures, but *making* pictures, and the photographic gaze includes an aesthetic gaze.

Sometimes I take photos and sometimes I make photos. It is not an either-or typology; the spectrum is fluid. I certainly do compose the photos, sometimes more, sometimes less carefully, and I do this quite intuitively, so there is also much experience and routine involved. There are *three basic constitutive dimensions* in which I compose: First, the *spatial* dimension. It has become a routine practice that I spontaneously see possibly "good pictures" and move around to arrive at a proper shooting position. I use stairways or chairs or kneel down, and sometimes I bend my back in such crazy ways to arrive at a proper shooting position, that I end up with pains in my back or even a lumbago. This spatial orientation is guided by my "aesthetic eye," by my ideas of what makes a "good picture."

A second constitutive dimension is *time, especially timing*. A photographer lives in his *durée,* in his inner time (Schutz 1967), and he is well aware that a photograph freezes an instant of a phenomenon or an event, captured in a tiny fraction of a second. If the photographed object is static in time, the instant of taking the picture is not of great importance – you then may want to choose the right time of the day where the interplay of light and shadow is optimized. What Claude Monet showed with his picture series of the cathedral of Rouen, produced in the years 1892–1894, applies also to photography of course. If the object is moving, or even moving fast, the crucial task of a photographer is capturing the "right moment." For example, when taking a photo of a "natural" scene of interacting people, you wish to avoid that persons have closed eyes or strange faces or that they make a gesture which covers their face or the face of others, or that somebody steps in between your camera and the targeted object right before you push the button, and so on. A good photographer has to be able to "tune in" with the natural and social rhythms of the phenomena that he intends to photograph. In contrast to the "tuning in" in a musical relationship (Schutz 1964), he does not have to hit the right tone. But he certainly needs to "tune in" with a developing sequence in order to choose the right moment for making the photo. In other words, he must be aware of the *sequence* of events, behaviors, and actions and their *rhythm*, their *temporal development*, and must base his actions on his retentions of the fading presence as well as on the protentions of what comes next. In Schutz's (1967) analysis, the retentions are filled while the protentions are empty – they contain the "that" and not the "what." But this is only partly the case. A photographer must anticipate what is going to happen

next, and coordinate his own acting with what he observes and what he anticipates to happen in the next few seconds. "Anticipate" is a word that is a little too strong here – Schutz says that anticipating is a reflective act, and I do not mean a reflective act here – protentions are rather experienced as a kind of "feeling" or a "sense" of what's next. In this respect protentions must at least hypothetically be "filled," based on experiences of how a given sequence of an event or course of action will "typically" develop.

A *third* constitutive dimension is the *social.* Insofar as I referred to social events and human behaviors, I implied the social dimension already when analyzing the temporal one, and also in some paragraphs before that. An additional point is this: Although my making photos is very intuitive and quite spontaneous, I act along *aesthetic criteria that are socially derived,* that are of *cultural origin*, and that are embedded in my routines. The interesting thing is that I have some difficulties to spell these criteria out. I have to do self-observation in action, or I have to look at my pictures and engage in a constitutional analysis, guided by *Husserl's technique of free variation*, as Schutz (1962b) described it in his Essay "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology." Basic principles are detected if one considers why one deletes pictures: Because they are blurred, too bright, or too dark; because the intended object is not any more or only partly in the picture; because the person or the animal has turned its back to you (which usually is not very interesting); because something or somebody got between you and your objects right when pressing the button; and many more.

However, as the world of photography is populated by many creative people, all existing aesthetic criteria are also challenged. Not even the principle of the "golden cut" (or the "golden means") is undisputed anymore, although many professional photographers were praised for that mode of composition. Nowadays it has become a common practice in many fields of (post-) modern society to break the rules. There exists now a rather complex multiplicity of different photographic styles, and a lot of experimenting with different modes and new styles is going on. Examining my personal aesthetic criteria is, then, nothing more than a reflection on my subjective stock of knowledge at hand, on the conscious and unconscious criteria I am applying when making photos. Comparing these with the multiplicity of other criteria that are used in photography reveals how specific my own criteria are, opening up new horizons and potential for personal change.

5   Technical Aspects

Composing pictures is strongly intertwined with handling the technical features of the camera. If you know how your camera works you can use some of its functions, deliberately strive for certain effects, and anticipate the results. The technical progress during the past decade has been enormous – most of my former skills as a "good" photographer have become irrelevant: The framing, the focusing, the right exposure, partly even the timing of the shot, the processing of film negatives

and paper positives in the darkroom, and so on. And more and more have been automatized, especially focusing and exposure, two crucial practices that formerly were quite challenging and that only a few people really managed well. Nowadays, people can take pictures with their automatic digital camera, make many shots in a series and thus ensuring they got the "right" moment, and even choose the frame later by editing the picture on the computer. Thus, many people make good photos nowadays just by pressing the button very often and varying the frame. And most of them do not even choose the predefined programs, e.g., for landscapes, portraits, nighttime, fast-moving objects, etc., which involve different constellations of aperture and time, but use their camera permanently in the same position: *automatic*.

In contrast, a professional photographer will still use his or her knowledge about the physics of light, the effect of different lenses, and the workings of the built-in electronics. Composing pictures is then intimately tied to the knowledge and the skills with which one handles one's camera. Due to the success of automatizing digital cameras, it has nowadays, however, become much more difficult to produce significantly better pictures than laypersons. Is making "good photos" still an art? Or is it an art only if the photos themselves are considered as art?

6 Photography as Art

Physical and technical knowledge and camera handling skills are only means but do not guarantee "good" pictures. Photos freeze a certain moment in time. Great photos tell a story, they display a great density, and they capture something that is considered as "typical" of an era or a social milieu. When are photos considered as art? This is not a phenomenological, but a sociological question and can be researched empirically. In any case, there has been a long discussion during the past decades if photography can be art at all, and recently it has been extended to the question if videos can be art. Many photographers considered themselves as artists but most of them had to make a living as photojournalists selling their photos to publishers. The American photographer Eugene Smith (1918–1978) is a good example of how much tension between the systems of relevances of an artist in contrast to that of a journal publisher can arise. After quarrelling with the editors of *Life Magazine* over their restrictive treatment of his photo series, he left in anger and joined *Magnum,* the famous cooperative agency founded by Robert Capa, Henri Cartier-Bresson, and others. By *Magnum* he was commissioned to produce a de luxe bicentennial volume of texts and pictures on Pittsburgh to be completed in a few weeks. Instead of delivering about a 100 pictures for a chapter of the book, he made tens of thousands photos and it took him 4 years due to his perfectionist professional attitude. "What kept him there off and on … was a fierce desire to break free of all external editorial constraints, to develop an alternative way of working as

an independent 'photo historian or journalist', and to produce an 'essay' true to his imperious vision." (Trachtenberg 1998, p. 174) He wanted to create a personal photographic essay, a goal he has never reached. He would just not deliver a less than perfect photo.

Nowadays, Smith is considered an artist, although he worked as a photo reporter. Besides Pittsburgh he did other great reportages, for instance, of a *Spanish village*, *A Man of Mercy* (which was Albert Schweitzer), or *Minamata*, the industrial waste scandal, and other great coverages (Smith 1998). Although he was a photojournalist, "Smith was to labor constantly to give his photographs the timeless quality that he admired so much in the [paintings of the – T.S.E.] Old Masters, which would free him from chance everyday events – though he still used them to advantage when necessary." (Mora 1998, p. 16) Painting has the power "to perpetuate an idea, using the symbolic overtones and strong aesthetic presence that can come from being able to construct the whole image." (ibid) "Photography however is handicapped by a limited time-scale, linked as it is to particular events and news." (ibid.) "Photojournalism inevitably loses its impact along with the events it records (its durability is limited to the 'factual impact' of photography), and Smith attempted to buy time with his pictorial allusions, creating images whose aesthetic relevance would override their factual one." (ibid.) In his own words, Smith says: "I have not been content to remain merely a 'seeing photographer' ... I believe ... that finally, though I be intimately truthful of an individual moment, I must be ... of symbolization of the universal . . . ." (ibid.) To fulfill this intention, "Smith embraced extreme manipulation without reserve." (ibid.) He carefully prepared the stage and arranged scenes, he hired trucks and herds of cattle and engaged the inhabitants of a village as supernumeraries, and he did castings in order to find appropriate proponents. Smith even comments on his war assignments: "Some say that [since] I am being forced to shoot on the fly the results will be truer. But this is false . . . One must observe and feel the surroundings and interpret them, translating them into finished work." (Hill 1998, p. 338) And the logical conclusion is: "That which escaped his control in front of the camera must be brought to account after the fact, mainly by painstaking printing techniques." (ibid.) Smith modified the pictures in the dark room as we do it on the computer today.

When doing a reportage, you try to capture "typical" scenes. Of course, *composing a picture can swiftly extend to arranging a picture*. The line between fact and fiction is fluid even in documentary photography. The history of documentary photography is full of arranged scenes. Even pictures that became famous global icons were later revealed as either reconstructions or fakes. Nevertheless, they documented something "typical," and many found their way into exhibitions at art galleries and photo museums because they are "great" pictures. It is difficult for a photographer to be in the right place at the right time when something happens, it is therefore tempting to arrange scenes you would like to capture. It is well known that even war photos were often arranged.

7   Conclusion

For myself, I hardly arrange pictures except when making group pictures of persons. I attempt to capture "natural" scenes and events that happen in my life-world anyway. I do not arrange but I do certainly compose my photos (more or less). Some phenomenological concepts proved helpful in analyzing this activity. When comparing my photos with certain (not so good) pictures that are exhibited at art museums, I sometimes ask myself: What makes these photos pieces of art? Maybe I also produce some photos that might be considered as art but I do not care. My main activity is making photos in the very moment things happen, and I consider doing photography as an activity in its own right. I enjoy making photos as it makes me look at things wide-awake and with great intensity: I see much more than many other people, I look at things more carefully and accurately, and it makes my life thereby richer. I can remember many things and events much better because I perceived them with my intense photographic gaze. Thus, making photos gives my life much more intensity, richness, beauty, and joy. It is an activity worth of doing in its own right.

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