6

Dissecting Generations of Migrant Identities within a Diaspora

Audra I. Mockaitis and Lena Zander

Introduction

"Our cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as 'one people,' with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history" (Hall, 1990: 223). In explaining the culture of a diasporic people, Hall emphasizes the oneness or sameness in a shared experience and shared history. In the context of ethnic diasporas, especially those that have formed through shared trauma (displacement and forced migration from their homelands), sense of identity, belongingness and loyalty in ethnic diaspora communities is especially strong and a shared identity is passed to subsequent ethnic generations through family and community socialization. However, the quote above also emphasizes the strength of these ties as unchanging and stable. Cultural identity in the collective sense is a set of traits that members of the group or community share; these traits include values and attitudes (Adler, 1977). Cultural identity reflects one's belonging

A. I. Mockaitis (✉)
Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland
e-mail: audra.mockaitis@mu.ie

L. Zander
Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
e-mail: lena.zander@fek.uu.se

A. I. Mockaitis (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Migration in International Business*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38886-6_6

to and identification with this group, whose values and worldviews are shared, stable and identifiable over time.

In this chapter, we aim to dissect the cultural values composition of a worldwide group of ethnic Lithuanian migrants. Some of these migrants belong to a worldwide diaspora, while others are more recent migrants from Lithuania. Although these migrants all technically belong to a single culture, migration in itself brings about the need to reconsider, restructure or even rebuild the cultural identity for migrants (Liu, 2015). Migrants' identities can change, to become even stronger representations of their homeland cultures, or become hybridized, depending on numerous contextual and personal factors. Some migrants enter a space "in between" cultures (Bhabha, 1990) forming a hybrid identity; some learn to effectively move between two cultures while keeping each separate. A question emerges about where one's cultural home is once the decision to migrate is made. In addition, how stable are diasporic communities in terms of their cultural values, and where do recent economic migrants fit in to long-established diasporas?

When we speak of national cultures in empirical terms, we render a group of individuals a single country score that we compare to other such scores across societies. Yet, we know that individuals within a culture, even when they identify with that culture, are not uniform. Values are the primary drivers of cultures and are standards by which people form their judgments, opinions, attitudes and behaviors (Rokeach, 1973). Individuals carry their own sets of values, and we tend to compare these sets of values across national culture groups. Past studies (Mockaitis, 2002a, 2002b) have identified Lithuanian national culture as high on uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and medium high on power distance and individualism (Hofstede, 2001). These findings of national values have been applied to comparisons of workplace attitudes across countries, such as leadership (Mockaitis, 2005), cooperation and communication (Moustafa et al., 2009, 2011) and ethical preferences (Ralston et al., 2009).

However, national-level measures of cultural values are rather poor representations of individuals (Steel & Taras, 2010). Recent studies have argued that values at the individual level are better predictors of individuals' attitudes and behaviors with respect to workplace factors across cultures (e.g., Ralston et al., 2014) as they allow for within-society or within-group analyses across countries or cultures (Lenartowicz & Roth, 2001; Fischer et al., 2011) and capture within and across group variability. In this study, we are interested in the personal values of migrant members of a worldwide diaspora. As the subgroups of migrants span multiple generations and periods of migration, a comparison of individual-level values (Sivadas, Bruvold & Nelson, 2008; Yoo

et al., 2011) will allow us to answer the following questions: How different are migrant groups that share an ethnicity? Are individuals who decide to emigrate from their home country different from nonemigrants? How similar or different in their cultural values composition are migrants representing different generations, and different emigration waves?

In answering these questions, we compare values within and across age cohorts, emigration waves and ethnic generation. We will explore the cultural values of migrants, who share a common ethnic heritage to examine the stability of their values over generations. It is expected that these within-culture findings will help to form a more accurate picture of current and evolving migrant ethnic identity than societal-level cultural values. Implications of the findings for international business are discussed.

Background

Diaspora Culture

Diaspora is defined as the worldwide dispersal of people with the same national origin (Dufoix, 2008) of an "expatriate minority community" (Safran, 1991), who maintain strong emotional and material links to their homeland (Shuval, 2002). A characteristic that distinguishes diaspora is the attachment that its members have to their previous homeland and culture (Kearney, 1995; Shuval, 2002). Diasporas have a collective identity that is defined by the relationship they have with their homeland (Clifford, 1994). And this sense of attachment to one's homeland through the diaspora community can be transmitted to several generations of (already) non-immigrant diaspora members, even though there may not be an intention (or possibility of) repatriating to the original homeland. In this sense, it is held that adjustment and acculturation to the host environment do not lead to loss of the group's original ethnic identity. Interestingly, although we often equate diasporas with assimilated communities in host cultures, Safran (1991) maintains that diaspora members believe that they will never be fully accepted by their host country, and this contributes to the reason that diaspora communities so strongly maintain their cultures. The collective memory of their homeland helps to kindle the hope of returning to it, and keeps the diasporic community active in maintaining solidarity, ties and the maintenance of the homeland (Safran, 1991). That does not mean that diasporic communities are always strong. They may

be characterized as more or less diasporic, as the relationship between them and their home and host countries changes (Clifford, 1994).

Clifford (1994) argues that we need not equate diaspora populations with immigrant groups. The differences between diasporas and immigrant groups lies in the different relationships each has with their homeland. Diasporas are marked by *traumatic* emigration, a collective memory of displacement and loss. Immigrants may also experience feelings of loss or nostalgia, but this is related more to the natural process of acculturation to their new host country. Diasporas experience a paradoxical duality of simultaneous cultural accommodation and resistance to host country cultures and norms. Diasporas maintain a connection to their homeland that is strong enough to resist "normalizing processes of forgetting, assimilating, and distancing" (Clifford, 1994: 310). Diaspora has both positive and negative aspects of their collective consciousness. The negative aspects are formed by memories of trauma, threat, exclusion, discrimination and marginalization. Often these facets are emphasized within the community and the trauma and wounds are "reopened" for decades. The positive aspects relate to a (re)identification with their homeland, the collective sharing in being 'other,' the need to maneuver between the past and the present, suffering (survival) and opportunity, all of which dynamically shape the diaspora culture.

The Lithuanian diaspora has been evolving and transforming over the past century due to various political and economic events adversely affecting the country. Although Lithuania has a vast history of migration, over the last century, relatively more Lithuanians have emigrated than from other European nations (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al., 2021). The late nineteenth century saw large numbers of Lithuanians move to the USA due to various economic and political factors and establish the first communities, mostly around the coal mining areas of Pennsylvania (Cadzow, 2020). This period was followed by the period between 1918 and 1940, during which economic migrants settled in Canada and South America, with fewer numbers in the USA. The Second World War brought mass exodus, deportations and exile. It was during this period that highly educated members of the intellectual elite fled for fear of deportation, to refugee camps, before finding new homes in the Americas, Australia and Europe. During the Soviet era, there was little movement beyond the Iron Curtain, except within the 15 Soviet republics (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al., 2021). Emigration was allowed only in exceptional circumstances. After the restoration of Lithuanian independence in 1990, migration increased and has continued to this day. Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al. (2021) have identified several key events during this period that have seen increases in emigration, marked by distinct waves: the

post-independence period (1990–2003), EU accession in 2004 and visa-free movement, the economic crisis in 2009, and joining the Eurozone followed by Brexit (2015 to the present).

A key difference between the post-war migrants and post-Soviet and EU-era migrants is that migration was a free choice for the latter. The displaced post-war migrant generation established cultural communities, ethnic schools and organizations to maintain their cultural identities, while balancing and nurturing a simultaneous identification with both the heritage and host country cultures. For the post-war diaspora, homeland attachment is expressed through what Shuval (2002) describes as a selective presentation and recovery of traditions that creates a longing for a time and place far-reaching in history and culture. Belonging to the diaspora community and speaking the language were matters of course for preserving the culture from which people were forcefully uprooted. For more recent economic migrants, diaspora belongingness is more of a pragmatic or instrumental choice that is not seeped in loss and longing. These emigrants of the post-independence period have left mainly in search of better opportunities (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al., 2021).

Migrant Identities

The different migrant groups are also national subcultures (Smith & Schwartz, 1997), born in different countries but sharing a common national or cultural heritage, some also identifying with the diaspora communities that have evolved over the generations in different countries. We might expect that given the length of time that migrant groups have spent away from their original homeland, they will have experienced different degrees of acculturation to their host countries and have assimilated to varying degrees. Though more generally, as argued by Schiefer (2013), immigrants are less likely, compared to host country nationals, to be influenced by the cultural values of their destination country, as they carry the values of their country of origin, we might expect to see differences according to when people migrated, their birth country and ethnic generation (i.e., whether they identify as first-, second-, third-generation members of the heritage culture).

People also hold different beliefs and exhibit different behaviors in different life stages (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Mockaitis et al., 2022). Slightly differently from life stages theory, which purports that each major period in one's life represents new developmental challenges and outcomes that continue throughout the life span (Baltes, 1987), generation subculture theory holds that age groups differ in their beliefs and values, and that the values define

generation subcultures or cohorts, as values acquired in people's youth remain stable over time. In his socialization hypothesis, Inglehart (1997, 2018) proposed that individuals acquire values that reflect the socioeconomic conditions of their formative years. As different generations are socialized under different historical, social and economic conditions, we would expect that their belief systems would reflect these differences. Inglehart (1997, 2018) proposed that people give priority to their most pressing needs, especially during early adulthood; generations that grew up under times of economic and social stress would reflect survival values (such as materialism, conformity, respect for authority), while generations during times of social and economic prosperity would reflect postmodern values, such as egalitarianism, individualism, tolerance and trust. Where political or economic change is great so too might be the generation effect; this may mean that different generations grow up in essentially different worlds (Mishler & Rose, 2007).

What could be starker than the drastic political and economic change in what was to become the Soviet Union? Lithuania was annexed into the Soviet Union in 1940 and endured Soviet occupation from 1944 to 1990. The first decade (1944–1953) witnessed the reign of terror under Stalin, followed by the Khrushchev-era "thaw" (1953–1964), followed by 20 years (1984–1984) of stagnation under Brezhnev, Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* (1985–1990), and Lithuanian independence post-1990. During Soviet times, individuals were taught from birth to live the attitudes, values and beliefs of the authoritarian regime (Mishler & Rose, 2007). Yet older generations were coming of age during the reign of terror. Younger generations would have had a different socialization experience during the *glasnost* period and beyond. In a society with such a turbulent history, we might expect value differences between these younger and older generations. Post-war migrants fled the country as young children with their parents. They will have acquired their values through primary socialization in a different environment than their parents did. Yet also, they will have transmitted their own values to their offspring.

Migrant identities and acculturation. Migrants naturally belong to multiple groups that shape their identities. These identities vary depending on the social context that individuals are in (Naujoks, 2010). Migrant identities have been discussed in terms of being finite (e.g., individuals must divide their identity among groups, where membership to one group reduces identification with another), hybrid or hyphenated (e.g., Lithuanian-American) in which identities are borrowed from the different groups with which one identifies. The strength of these identities and loyalty to different home (or homeland) and host cultures depends on the strength of the groups, but also on the

degree of the individuals' and their ethnic group's identity and acculturation, and the individuals' socialization into the group.

Acculturation occurs "when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups" (Redfield et al., 1936: 149). Berry (1992) suggests that this contact results in changes to one's personal and ethnic identity that verge toward attitudes, preferences and behaviors typical of the host country, depending on the extent of acculturative stress that individuals (and their groups) experience. According to Berry (2005), acculturation and the acculturation strategies that people adopt occur to varying degree depending on an individual's or group's attitudes toward the host culture (including their values) and their attitudes toward their home culture (i.e., the extent to which they maintain their home culture). Individuals and groups can opt to relinquish their cultural identities and adopt that of the new culture (assimilation), maintain some parts of their cultural identity while integrating into the host culture (integration), withdraw from the host culture while maintaining their own culture (separation), or relinquish their own and the host culture (marginalization). Thus, within migrant groups and diasporas, we may see different extents of culture change within individuals, as well as changes to their identity as their identification with their home and host cultures shifts.

The extent to which immigrants have contact with the host culture, as well as the attitudes of the host country toward migrants, determine the extent of the group's acculturation. Chand (2014) has argued that host country policies determine migrants' degree of integration, citing the assimilation policies of the USA compared with a policy of multiculturalism in Canada. In his study of Indian immigrants to both countries, Chand (2014) found that the host country policies influenced migrants' attitudes toward the host country. Indian immigrants in Canada were more likely to feel at home due to its policy of multiculturalism and were more likely to invest in Canada, compared to those in the USA (with an assimilation policy), who felt a greater affinity to their home country and directed more of their investments toward India.

Acculturation also depends on the migrant group. Migrants who voluntarily relocate with a greater emphasis on "pull" factors may assimilate more to the host culture than temporary sojourners (e.g., diplomats, expatriates), refugees or forced migrants, who are pushed out of their home countries and often have little choice of the society in which they settle (Berry, 2006). Long-established diasporas may be well-settled while maintaining a strong sense of identity.

Measuring migrants' values. Cultural values determine how individuals think about their identities (Ting-Toomey, 2005). Several studies to date have been conducted on Lithuanian values at the level of society, with most relying on variants of the Schwartz (2006) instruments of values. The European Social Survey (ESS) included a series of questions from the Portrait Value Questionnaire by Schwartz et al. (2001) at the individual level that were aggregated to country level. One of the questions asked about the importance placed on personal enjoyment. Lithuania ranked 19th out of 23 countries. Another ranked Lithuania 22nd on happiness. With respect to the Schwartz (2006) value dimensions, a study by Ralston et al. (2011) in 50 countries identified Lithuanian values as low on affective autonomy, high on embeddedness, low on mastery and medium low on harmony; its egalitarianism score is similar to that of China, India and Vietnam (35th of 50).

In the World Values Surveys (WVS) by Inglehart et al. (2014), Lithuania scores higher on secular values (22nd of 71 countries), and low on emancipative values (43rd). Mockaitis (2002a, 2002b) measured Lithuania at the country level on Hofstede's dimensions and found a medium high individualism and power distance and high masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. Mockaitis provides a full societal-level cultural portrait of Lithuania in Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al. (2021).

In a large study comparing generations of migrants with nonemigrants from EU and non-EU origins across 24 countries on attitudes toward others (enmity) and Schwartz's personal values, Schiefer (2013) revealed that Lithuania was second only to Ukraine on mastery. Lithuanians were the most hierarchical, and second to Israel on embeddedness. Attitudes of nonemigrant Lithuanians toward others were more like those of non-EU immigrants than of EU-immigrants. These findings may suggest that those emigrating from the country have values that are different from nonemigrants.

As we are comparing individuals in different countries of one national heritage, we explore individual-level group differences in values. Individual values are considered as "part of the self-concept and identity of the person" and "are influenced by individual experience during individual development in a sociocultural context" (Trommsdorff et al., 2004: 160). Individual values are more malleable; they are influenced by people's interactions with others and with one's environment (Trommsdorff et al., 2004). Hofstede's study does not directly replicate to the individual level, and his dimensions cannot be applied in individual-level comparisons (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). A few scholars have conducted studies at the individual-level in Lithuania by applying Schwartz's (2006) values (Ralston et al., 2014; Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al., 2022). Schwartz (2006) argued that values dimensions at the individual and societal

levels should appropriately reflect the characteristics of those levels. Fischer et al. (2010) found that values show structural similarity across individual and societal levels. Egri et al. (2012) have applied Schwartz's individual values in comparing respondents across countries, life-stages and gender to compare value orientations within and across societies. Ralston et al. (2014) concluded that individual-level values are far better predictors of people's workplace behaviors than values at the societal level. Individual-level values can be attributed to societal culture, they influence decision-making, behaviors and attitudes (Ralston et al., 2014) and are in turn influenced by demographic characteristics. Thus, individual-level values can be studied with respect to cohort differences among migrants.

We apply the individual-level value dimensions framework developed by Yoo et al. (2011) in assessing whether there are differences in values between migrant groups. Yoo et al. (2011) developed a measure of cultural orientations at the individual level, the Individual Cultural Values Scale (CVSCALE) to enable researchers to avoid linking Hofstede's metric to individual attitudes and behaviors, which has been shown to be unstable at the individual level (e.g., Hoppe, 1990). A focus on individual values will allow us to distinguish among groups of migrants with exposure to different environments, life events and socialization conditions. Specifically, we seek answers as to whether there are significant value differences between migrant groups, whether migrants differ from nonemigrants, and how values differ between more recent migrants and second- and third-generation migrant groups.

Method

Sample and Data Collection Procedure

Data for this study were collected from diaspora members of Lithuanian heritage worldwide. Participants were contacted via community organizations, chambers of commerce, and publications in Lithuanian language media (including newspapers, magazines, newsletters and social media). Participants chose whether to respond to the questionnaire in English or Lithuanian. Translation and backtranslation procedures followed recommendations by Brislin (1970). Items were initially translated from English by an English/Lithuanian bilingual native Lithuanian speaker. The Lithuanian version was reviewed by a second English/Lithuanian bilingual native Lithuanian speaker to check for clarity and any awkward or confusing wording. Items were then

backtranslated by a third English/Lithuanian bilingual native Lithuanian speaker. The original English version was compared to the backtranslated version, inconsistencies were discussed among the team of translators, and a final Lithuanian version was adopted based on consensus.

In all, 1538 responses were received; incomplete questionnaires were removed, leaving 1110 usable questionnaires. Nonresponse bias was checked by conducting T-tests to compare respondents of completed surveys to those who began the survey but did not finish. Groups were compared on gender, citizenship, and place of birth (Lithuania, other). No significant differences between groups were found on any of the variables apart from marital status, where the mean was slightly higher for the responding group. Given that this mean difference was only marginally significant (T = −2.016, p = 0.05), we may be reasonably confident that nonresponse bias was not an issue in our data.

The final sample was skewed on gender, with 75.5% female (N = 838). The mean age was 39.22 years (SD 13.59, min 18, max 84). Most of the respondents were married (73.2%) and Lithuanian-born (74.1%). The remaining respondents represented 16 birth countries, with the most born in the United States (N = 165), followed by Canada (N = 30) and Australia (N = 28). These individuals represented first- (11.9%), second- (4.1%) and third- (9.7%) generation born migrants of Lithuanian descent.[1] Most non-Lithuanian-born respondents indicated that they live in their birth country, and 65.1% of all respondents indicated that they live outside of their birth country. Most of the respondents (45%) emigrated in the last 18 years (post-2004). The post-Soviet era (1991–2003) saw 15.9% of our sample emigrate. A small percentage (1.8%) migrated during the Soviet era (1960–1990),[2] and 2.5% during the post-war period (1942–1958). Finally, respondents were highly educated, with 38.2% having a university degree, and 39.8% a master's degree or higher.[3]

Measures

We compared the values of migrant groups by emigration wave, native-born status and age cohorts. There are generally four major emigration waves represented by the respondents in this study: (1) 2004 to current (EU era), (2) 1991–2003 (post-Soviet era), (3) 1960–1990 (Soviet era), and (4) 1942–1958 (post-war era). Age groups were represented by birth cohorts in decades (up to 1949, 1950–1959, 1960–1969, 1970–1979, 1980–1989 and 1990–2000). Lithuanian-born migrants (LBMs) (N = 657) include only those born in

Lithuania who emigrated in emigration wave 3 or later, that is, it does not include post-war displaced person emigrants. This is because it is fair to assume that these individuals, despite being born in Lithuania, emigrated at a young age with their own parents. Foreign-born Lithuanians (FBLs) (N = 288) include post-war emigrants. There were also 165 nonemigrant nationals. In calculating differences in mean scores between groups of migrants, we controlled for gender (0 = female, 1 = male) and level of education (1 = unfinished secondary school, 6 = graduate degree).

Individual-level values were measured using the CVSCALE by Yoo et al. (2011), a scale developed to measure values at the individual level with similar labels to Hofstede's (1980) societal-level cultural dimensions. Items for the scale were drawn from individual-level studies such as Bochner and Hesketh (1994), Triandis et al. (1993) and others. A pool of 230 original items was reduced to 26 items on 5 dimensions and validated in cross-cultural samples (see Yoo et al., 2011). In our sample, the dimensions were tested across two groups of Lithuanian-born nationals (LBN) and foreign-born Lithuanian (FBL) respondents. Cronbach alphas[4] for the five individual-level values dimensions were as follows: Power distance α_{LBN} = 0.62, α_{FBL} = 0.70; Collectivism α_{LBN} = 0.79, α_{FBL} = 0.76; Uncertainty avoidance α_{LBN} = 0.82, α_{FBL} = 0.83; Masculinity α_{LBN} = 0.71, α_{FBL} = 0.78; Long-term orientation α_{LBN} = 0.78, α_{FBL} = 0.82. We examined the dimensionality of the CVSCALE and whether its components are invariant across the two groups of interest. A description of the procedure follows.

Factor Structure of the Individual-Level Values

Given that migrants are likely to have different value sets from home country nationals that are influenced by different environmental and situational factors (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al., 2021), we first assess whether the components of the CVSCALE model are invariant across groups, that is, whether the five-factor cultural dimensions model is equivalent for our sample of LBNs and FBLs. We measure whether the items comprising the cultural dimensions operate equivalently across the two groups; we also test the dimensionality of the individual-level cultural value model for equivalence. We test for measurement invariance of both the item scores and the underlying latent structure across the two groups. In our preliminary single-group analysis, we deleted one problematic item and proposed a model with 25 items as the baseline model for each group, and 2 error covariances specified. If the model fits the data well for both groups, it will become the hypothesized model used

for testing for equivalence across the two groups, or it will be modified accordingly. The model fits for LBNs ($X^2_{(262)}$ = 604.439; CFI = 0.935; RMSEA = 0.040) and for FBLs ($X^2_{(262)}$ = 421.401; CFI = 0.928; RMSEA = 0.046) were both excellent.

We next estimated the same parameters in the baseline model for each group separately within the framework of a multigroup model, or the configural model. We are interested in the extent to which the configural model fits the multigroup data (whether the same configuration holds across the groups) (Byrne, 2016). We find that configural invariance is achieved, with excellent model fit measures ($X^2_{(528)}$ = 1441.0; CFI = 0.924; RMSEA = 0.031). We thus proceed with the 25-item model in our group comparisons.

Analysis and Results

Comparing Values of Migrants and Nonemigrants

We ran a series of UNIANOVAs with the GLM procedure in SPSS on each cultural value dimension to plot marginal means for each migrant group and to assess any group differences. We plotted the results in Fig. 6.1, with age cohorts represented by decade of birth on the *X*-axis and cultural dimensions scores on the *Y*-axis. Significant differences were found on a few of the cultural dimensions between migrant groups. For example, both nonemigrants (mean difference 0.518, $p < 0.05$) and Lithuanian-born migrants (LBMs) (mean difference 0.450, $p < 0.001$) scored significantly higher on masculinity than FBLs. LBMs scored higher on power distance than FBLs (mean difference 0.302, $p < 0.001$). No significant differences were found between migrant groups on collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation.

We can see, generally, a similar pattern in value scores between the migrant groups across the age cohorts. For instance, a downward trend is observed on power distance from older to younger generations. A similar pattern occurs in masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, whereas collectivism slightly increases in the younger generations. There are some differences between age groups, however. In power distance, the age effect is strongest between the older (1950s) (mean difference 0.611, $p < 0.001$), 1960s (mean difference 0.615, $p < 0.001$), 1970s (mean difference 0.349, $p < 0.001$) and youngest (1990s) cohorts. Collectivism drops significantly between the 1960s and 1970s cohorts (mean difference 0.26, $p < 0.05$). The greatest differences on masculinity, driven by higher masculinity for both Lithuanian-born groups, is



Fig. 6.1 Cultural values of migrants and home country nationals

between the 1960s cohort and all others, except those born in the 1950s, for example, pre-1950 (mean difference 1.34, $p < 0.01$), 1970s (mean difference 0.521, $p < 0.01$), 1980s (mean difference 0.517, $p < 0.01$), and 1990s (mean difference 1.058, $p < 0.001$). No significant differences were found between age cohorts on uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, which both remain above average across all age cohorts.

Comparing Values by Emigration Waves

We also compared LBMs to FBLs with regards to when emigration took place. Foreign-born first-generation respondents indicated the year in which their parents immigrated to their birth country. We controlled for education, age and gender. In Fig. 6.2, we can see some trends in values over migration waves. Collectivism levels were slightly higher during the post-war and Soviet eras than the post-Soviet and EU eras, though not significantly so. There were also no differences between migrant groups. Similarly, in uncertainty avoidance values, there were no significant differences between groups, with relatively stable levels in different migrant groups and migration waves. Long-term orientation scores were likewise relatively high across migrant groups and waves with no significant differences.

With regard to power distance, there is a significant difference between migrants in the post-war era and both the post-Soviet (mean difference 0.721, $p = 0.01$) and EU eras (mean difference 0.487, $p < 0.05$). Overall, power distance has increased across emigration waves, but especially for LBMs, who exhibited a higher power distance in the Soviet-era migration waves and beyond. Differences in masculinity are driven by LBMs. The graph depicts a spike in masculinity in Soviet-era migrants, and a slight decrease no significant differences between mean scores in later waves. There are significant differences in overall scores between the post-war era and the post-Soviet era (mean difference 0.795, $p < 0.05$) and the EU era (mean difference 1.314, $p < 0.001$).

Comparing Values by Migrant Ethnic Generations

We also compared values across ethnic generations, that is, first-, second- and third-generation foreign-born respondents of Lithuanian descent, and Lithuanian-born respondents. Lithuanian-born respondents scored significantly higher on power distance than first (mean difference 0.318, $p = 0.001$)



Fig. 6.2 Cultural values of migrants by emigration wave

Table 6.1 Effect of group differences in individual values

	COL	UA	PD	MAS	LTO
Variables	*F*	*F*	*F*	*F*	*F*
Migrant group	0.39	0.09	6.60***	8.32***	1.49
Generation cohort	1.33	1.31	7.82***	10.11***	0.73
Emigration wave	0.58	0.78	2.14	2.67*	0.94
Ethnic generation	0.76	1.32	6.22***	12.12***	0.47

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

and third-generation (mean difference 0.245, $p = 0.01$) respondents, while second-generation (born to one Lithuanian-born parent) respondents did not significantly differ from Lithuanian born but scored higher than first ($p < 0.01$) and third-generation ($p < 0.05$) respondents. Lithuanian-born respondents scored significantly higher on masculinity than first- (mean difference 0.704, $p < 0.001$) and third- (mean difference 0.518, $p < 0.001$) generation respondents, and there was a significant difference between higher-scoring second (mean difference 0.532, $p < 0.05$) and first-generation respondents, and no differences between second-generation and Lithuanian-born respondents. There were no significant differences between ethnic generation groups on uncertainty avoidance, collectivism and long-term orientation. Table 6.1 presents the effect sizes of group differences in individual values.

Discussion

In this preliminary study of migrant diaspora values, we set out to examine differences in groups of migrants that share a cultural heritage. We applied the individual-level value framework developed by Yoo et al. (2011), and we compared individual-level values across generation cohorts, emigration waves and ethnic generations. Some of our findings are consistent with prior research on generation effects. But they also lend evidence both to the stability of values over time, as well as to differences between migrants and nonemigrants.

Trommsdorff et al. (2004) studied the transmission of values through three generations within families to address the question of cultural stability and change; individualism values increased with subsequent generations. Egri and Ralston (2004) likewise found that personal values changed over generations in a comparison of US and Chinese values. Younger generations of Chinese exhibited more modern values, consistent with Chinese political and economic reforms. Our findings point to a decrease in power distance and masculinity values across generation cohorts, with younger generations exhibiting

more egalitarian values. A change in these values was also consistent with political shifts in Lithuanian society as it moved from the Soviet to post-Soviet and EU eras. Specifically, individuals who migrated during the Soviet era exhibited higher levels of power distance and masculinity, reflecting the cultural context of the times. Higher levels of power distance among respondents born during the post-Soviet era abroad may suggest that these values were transmitted to them by their parents, who were of the Soviet political generation. Also, the observation that these values are held by individuals who emigrated from their home country between 20 and 60 years ago, reflects the enduring nature of personal values. Our comparison of ethnic generation cohorts revealed that LBMs exhibited higher levels of power distance and masculinity than second- and third-generation respondents, suggesting that subsequent generations born abroad are less like native Lithuanians.

Do individuals, who share a cultural heritage, share more similarities than differences in individual-level cultural values? Our preliminary findings based on one framework of individual-level cultural values might so suggest. We observed the greatest differences on the two value orientations discussed above. Yet, in explaining cultural value differences, it appears to matter less *when* migration occurred and more *that* it has occurred, lending support to what Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė et al. (2021) suggest as a phenomenon of migration culture in Lithuania.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

In our view, these findings expose the complexity of diaspora identity. The migrant groups in our study do not share the collective memory that defines diaspora. How do the similarities and differences identified in migrants' cultural values inform their identification with their heritage culture, diaspora identity, and host country cultures? Ward (2008) has suggested that more work still needs to be done generally on examining the processes by which groups and individuals integrate into a new culture. What elements of cultural identity are retained or merged or changed and how does this change take place over time? How do individuals manage identity conflict? How strong is cultural and ethnic identity within diaspora communities? How are these identities maintained and how do they change over medium-term and long-term group acculturation processes (Ward, 2008)? Importantly, given that diaspora communities are long-established across ethnic generations, how do newcomers to these communities integrate into them, and what are

the characteristics that determine whether an individual joins a diaspora community or chooses to integrate into the mainstream host country culture?

Berry's (1980) theory of acculturation asserts that an individual's degree of acculturation depends on the cultural distance between home and host countries. That is, individuals, whose values are very different from those of the host country will find it more difficult (or be less willing) to adopt its values and norms. However, other explanations, such as questions about how immigrants are treated by host countries and organizations, whether host country institutions promote assimilation or not (marginalization), the extent that migrants rely on members from their ethnic communities, personal characteristics of the migrants (such as their economic background, employment status, linguistic abilities), must be considered in the study of migrant identities and are future steps in providing a more detailed picture of diaspora values.

A limitation in this study is that we have not examined how individual values can shape people's personal experiences and identities depending on the above factors. In addition, first-, second-, and third-generation migrants are more likely to be assimilated, speak the language of their country of birth and perhaps do not speak Lithuanian as well if at all, whereas new immigrants have a different experience altogether. They may not speak the language of the host country, may rely on compatriots, and may have different levels of acculturation depending on whether they are skilled migrants, their language abilities, and other distinguishing characteristics that would place them into different groups that shape their experiences and identities. In this study, we also did not account for host country. Comparing individuals in narrower groups, such as destination countries of regions could reveal interesting and rich findings.

With the large exodus of migrants in the modern era due to the opening of societies (in the 1990s) and the removal of barriers for migration (2000s), we may revisit the concept of diaspora to assess whether and how we may speak of collective identity. Although collective identities are ever changing, and individuals' experiences within diasporas are determined by various demographic characteristics, diasporas as traditionally defined, perhaps have more in common than the masses of economic migrants of late. In the case of countries such as Ukraine, we see a new diaspora being formed of refugees again fleeing Russian invasion; the extent to which the shared memory and collective identity of this diaspora will differ from that of the old post-war diaspora is of interest.

Finally, for international business research, when we speak of national culture, we may question whether and how much the concept bears relevance in this new era of the migrant. We have shown that behind a national average

score, we see distinctions that are not considered, among subgroups with different migration histories and circumstances, whose values formed during vastly different epochs of terror, scarcity and prosperity, who fled or voluntarily migrated to countries all around the world, and whose values, for reasons unknown, differ more from the values of home country nonemigrants than from one another. Can we be comfortable as scholars in amalgamating these differences to a single score that we call 'culture'? We urge IB scholars to delve beyond the numbers to reveal the links between the many layers of identity within the many layers of culture. Future studies of migration in international business could consider the 'dissection' of these complexities in developing new frameworks of culture and identity.

Notes

1. First generation was defined as individuals born outside of Lithuania to both Lithuanian-born parents. Second generation are individuals whose either one parent was Lithuanian-born. Third-generation individuals were born to both foreign-born parents of Lithuanian descent.
2. This percentage is unsurprisingly low, given the almost zero migration policy during this era. Movement of people was limited to within the Soviet bloc.
3. Rates of tertiary education completion are traditionally higher in Lithuania than the OECD average (OECD, 2019).
4. The Cronbach's alphas were calculated after establishing the final factor structure.

References

Adler, P. S. (1977). Beyond cultural identity: Reflections on cultural and multicultural man. In R. Brislin (Ed.), *Culture learning: Concepts, application and research* (pp. 24–41). University of Hawaii Press.

Baltes, P. B. (1987). Theoretical propositions of lifespan developmental psychology: On the dynamics between growth and decline. *Developmental Psychology, 23*, 611–626.

Baltes, P. B., & Baltes, M. M. (1990). In P. B. Baltes & M. M. Baltes (Eds.), *Successful aging: Perspectives from the behavioral sciences*. Cambridge University Press.

Berry, J. W. (1980). Acculturation as varieties of adaptation. In A. M. Padilla (Ed.), *Acculturation: Theory, models and some new findings*. Westview.

Berry, J. W. (1992). Acculturation and adaptation in a new society. *International Migration, 30*(1), 69–85.

Berry, J. W. (2005). Acculturation: Living successfully in two cultures. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29*, 697–712.

Berry, J. W. (2006). Context of acculturation. In D. L. Sam & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology* (pp. 27–42). Cambridge University Press.

Bhabha, H. K. (1990). The third space. Interview with Homi Bhabha. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), *Identity: Community, culture, difference*. Lawrence and Wishart.

Bochner, S., & Hesketh, B. (1994). Power distance, individualism/collectivism, and job-related attitudes in a culturally diverse work group. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 25*(2), 253–257.

Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 1*(3), 185–216.

Byrne, B. M. (2016). *Structural equation modeling with AMOS*. Routledge.

Cadzow, J. (2020). *Lithuanian Americans and their communities of Cleveland. Cleveland Ethnic Heritage Studies*. Cleveland State University.

Chand, M. (2014). Diaspora identity, acculturation policy and FDI: The Indian diaspora in Canada and the United States. *Asian Business & Management, 13*(4), 283–308.

Clifford, J. (1994). Diasporas. *Cultural Anthropology, 9*(3), 302–338.

Dufoix, S. (2008). *Diasporas*. University of California Press.

Egri, C. P., Khilji, S. E., Ralston, D. A., Palmer, I., Girson, I., Milton, L., Richards, M., Ramburuth, P., & Mockaitis, A. I. (2012). Do Anglo countries still form a values cluster? Evidence of the complexity of value change. *Journal of World Business, 47*, 267–276.

Egri, C., & Ralston, D. A. (2004). Generation cohorts and personal values: A comparison of China and the United States. *Organization Science, 15*(2), 210–220.

Fischer, R., Milfont, T. L., & Gouveia, V. V. (2011). Does social context affect value structures? Testing the within-country stability of value structures with a functional theory of values. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42*, 253–270.

Fischer, R., Vauclair, C. M., Fontaine, J. R. J., & Schwartz, S. H. (2010). Are individual-level and country-level value structures different? Testing Hofstede's legacy with the Schwartz value survey. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 41*, 135–151.

Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), *Identity: Community, culture, difference*. Lawrence & Wishart.

Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's Consequences. In *International differences in work-related values*. Sage.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations*. Sage.

Hoppe, M. H. (1990). *A comprehensive study of country elites: International differences in work-related values and learning and their implications for management*. Unpublished PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (2018). *Cultural evolution: People's motivations are changing, and reshaping the world*. Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, R., Haerpfer, C., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-Medrano, J., Lagos, M., Norris, P., Ponarin, E., & Puranen, B., et al. (eds.) (2014). World values survey: Round three - country-pooled Datafile version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ WVSDocumentationWV3.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

Kearney, M. (1995). The local and the global: The anthropology of globalization and transnationalism. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 24*, 547–565.

Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, V., Duobienė, J., & Pinnington, A.H. (2022). Values in different career paths: Emigrants, returnees and immobile locals. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings.

Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, V., Liubinienė, V., Žičkutė, I., Duobienė, J., Mockaitis, A. I., & Mihi-Ramirez, A. (2021). *Migration culture: A comparative perspective*. Springer.

Lenartowicz, T., & Roth, K. (2001). Does subculture within a country matter? A cross-cultural study of motivational domains and business performance in Brazil. *Journal of International Business Studies, 32*(2), 305–326.

Liu, S. (2015). *Identity, hybridity and cultural home: Chinese migrants and diaspora in multicultural societies*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2007). Generation, age, and time: The dynamics of political learning during Russia's transformation. *American Journal of Political Science, 51*(4), 822–834.

Mockaitis, A. I. (2002a). *The influence of national cultural values on management attitudes: A comparative study across three countries*. Unpublished PhD dissertation. Vilnius University.

Mockaitis, A. I. (2002b). The national cultural dimensions of Lithuania. *Ekonomika, 59*(1), 67–77.

Mockaitis, A. I. (2005). A cross-cultural study of leadership attitudes in three Baltic Sea region countries. *International Journal of Leadership Studies, 1*(1), 44–63.

Mockaitis, A. I., Butler, C. L., & Ojo, A. (2022). COVID-19 pandemic disruptions to working lives: A multilevel examination of impacts across career stages. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 138*, 103768. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2022.103768. Advance online publication.

Moustafa, K. L., et al. (2009). Culture and communication: Cultural variations and media effectiveness. *Administration and Society, 41*(7), 850–877.

Moustafa, K. L., et al. (2011). Examining media effectiveness across cultures and national borders: A review and multilevel framework. *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 11*(1), 83–103.

Naujoks, D. (2010). Diasporic identity. Reflections on transnational belonging. *Diaspora Studies, 3*(1), 1–21.

OECD. (2019). *Country note: Education at a glance*. Accessed February 2, 2022, from https://www.oecd.org/education/education-at-a-glance/EAG2019_CN_LTU.pdf.

Ralston, D. A., Egri, C. P., Mockaitis, A. I., et al. (2011). A twenty-first century assessment of values across the global workforce. *Journal of Business Ethics, 104*, 1–31.

Ralston, D. A., et al. (2009). Ethical preferences for influencing superiors: A 41-society study. *Journal of International Business Studies, 40*(6), 1022–1045.

Ralston, D. A., et al. (2014). Societal-level versus individual-level predictions of ethical behavior: A 48-society study of collectivism and individualism. *Journal of Business Ethics, 122*, 283–306.

Redfield, R., Linton, E., & Herskovits, M. J. (1936). Memorandum for the study of acculturation. *American Anthropologist, 38*(1), 149–152.

Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. Free Press.

Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora, 1*(1), 83–99.

Schiefer, D. (2013). Cultural values and group-related attitudes: A comparison of individuals with and without migration background across 24 countries. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 44*(2), 245–262.

Schwartz, S. H. (2006). A theory of cultural value orientations: Explication and applications. *Comparative Sociology, 5*(2–3), 137–182.

Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., & Harris, M. (2001). Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different method of measurement. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32*, 519–542.

Shuval, J. T. (2002). Diaspora migration: Definitional ambiguities and a theoretical paradigm. *International Migration, 38*(5), 41–56.

Sivadas, E., Bruvold, N. T., & Nelson, M. R. (2008). A reduced version of the horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism scale: A four-country assessment. *Journal of Business Research, 61*(3), 201–210.

Smith, P., & Schwartz, S. (1997). Values. In C. Kagitcibasi & M. H. Segall (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology*. Allyn and Bacon.

Steel, P., & Taras, V. (2010). Culture as a consequence: A multi-level multivariate meta-analysis of the effects of individual and country characteristics on work-related cultural values. *Journal of International Management, 16*, 211–233.

Ting-Toomey, S. (2005). Identity negotiation theory: Crossing cultural boundaries. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), *Theorizing about intercultural communication*. Sage.

Triandis, H. C., Betancourt, H., Iwao, S., Leung, K., Salazar, J. M., Setiadi, B., Sinha, J. B. P., Touzard, H., & Zaleski, Z. (1993). An etic-emic analysis of individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 24*(3), 366–383.

Trommsdorff, G., Mayer, B., & Albert, I. (2004). Dimensions of culture in intracultural comparisons: Individualism/collectivism and family-related values in three generations. In H. Vinken, J. Soeters, & P. Ester (Eds.), *Comparing cultures: Dimensions of culture in a comparative perspective* (pp. 157–184). Brill.

Ward, C. (2008). Thinking outside the Berry boxes: New perspectives on identity, acculturation and intercultural relations. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 32*(2), 105–114.

Yoo, B., Donthu, N., & Lenartowicz, T. (2011). Measuring Hofstede's five dimensions of cultural values at the individual level: Development and validation of CVSCALE. *Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 23*(3/4), 193–210.