# Implication of Ukraine War on EU Migration Flows: Perspectives and Challenges



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Abstract Since the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Eastern Europe has experienced an unprecedented migration crisis. Most Ukrainians are internally displaced or have migrated to other countries, facing an uncertain and difficult future. Moreover, the outbreak of war in Ukraine has considerably affected various areas of the economic, social, and political life of European states, including on tourism. The main objective of this paper is to highlight the situation of the migrant crisis and the implications that this phenomenon has on the destination states. The implications of the current situation in Ukraine for mobility and migration are significant and have left a deep imprint on the socio-economic context of Europe. The first part of this paper highlights the contextual issues specific to the migration of Ukrainians, more precisely, the patterns of flows and the practices of their acceptance and reception. The second section outlines an overview of the stocks of immigrants that have been registered, and in the final section, it will be presented the main challenges facing European states from the perspective of destination states, but also of war refugees.

**Keywords** Migration · Socio-economic context · Tourism · Mobility · Crisis · War · Refugees

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#### 1 Introduction

The limitation of relations between Russia and the West in recent years has gradually led to the possibility of a new major war on the territory of Europe (Legvold, 2016). The conflict triggered in 2014 over Ukraine determined the development and imposition of economic and financial sanctions on Russia, by the United States of America through the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Union, an action that materialized through the intensification of the deployment simultaneously with the planning of the military forces to Russia for a possible war.

At the moment, as a result of the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine, the European Union is facing major threats from the perspective of security, but also of the global socio-economic context. The recent influx of Ukrainian citizens fleeing war zones to European states is undoubtedly an unprecedented case. The main destination countries considered by emigrants are the countries belonging to the former Soviet bloc, more precisely those that made the transition from a planned, centralized economy to a market economy, these being: Poland, Romania, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Hungary and not lastly, Belarus. However, part of the Ukrainian citizens used the neighboring states only as transit locations, given the fact that they migrated from Poland, Romania, and Hungary to Germany, the Czech Republic, Turkey, France, and Great Britain. In other words, since March 3, 2022, about a week after the Russian invasion, more than 1 million refugees, representing 2.3% of Ukraine's population, have emigrated from Ukraine to neighboring states. Although the flow of refugees may cause the biggest migration crisis in Europe since the Second World War, the response of the European states is paradoxically different compared to the one generated by the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 Martín (2022). Without a doubt, the influx of refugees is considerable, in the current context, bearing in mind that the United Nations Refugee Agency has estimated the number of refugees for the coming months at four to seven million people, this figure far exceeding the total number of emigrants who have crossed and taken refuge on European territory in the last seven years.

This time, the fate of the Ukrainian people seems to be much more troubling compared to the influx of refugees on European states. For this reason, the European Union aimed to manage the entire situation in optimal conditions and in real time, thus activating the provisions of the Temporary Protection Directive from 2001 for the first time on March 3, which refers to the unlimited admission of refugees during a crisis situation, with automatic acceptance of refugee status, avoiding the administrative process of recognition. Moreover, on June 23, 2022, in the framework of the European Council, the leaders of the European Union granted the Ukrainian state the right to be a candidate country for the European Union. Under these conditions, the leaders of the European Union reaffirmed their commitment to continue providing support to Ukraine from the point of view: economic, political, financial, humanitarian, and last but not least, military.

For this reason, the main objective of this paper is to highlight the crisis situation of migrants and the implications that this phenomenon has on the destination states. At the same time, this briefing analyzes the statistics regarding the impact of Ukrainian migration on European states, with the focus being on Ukraine's neighboring countries.

Tourism was particularly affected as a result of the state of uncertainty, but also of the increase in the number of refugees in certain areas.

#### 2 The Relationship Between Migration and Tourism

Migration and tourism are two of the most important manifestations of globalization. The migration process brings significant economic and social contributions to the destination states, culturally enriching their society as a whole, at the same time increasing the tourism product and providing labor for the tourism, travel, hospitality, and catering sectors Poiarkova (2022). Moreover, tourism and migration are often interconnected, as there is currently a significant overlap between infrastructure used for tourism and migration. It should be noted that, in practice, the differences between migration and tourism are blurred. Tourism often generates various forms of mobility, and international labor is fundamental to maintaining functioning tourism economies. While tourism is often viewed in a positive light, migration is recurrently politicized and seen as affecting social systems and cultural values, despite tourism's reliance on migrant labor.

Migration and tourism have complex interactions, in some situations driving each other, while in others, they become competing practices and phenomena (Poiarkova 2022; Dwyer et al., 2014; Hall & Williams, 2002; Pappas & Papatheodorou, 2017; Williams & Hall, 2000). Both, the migration and tourism come from a combination of economic, social, and political factors, which are influenced by context, uncertainty, and mentality (Carling & Collins, 2018). Economists have increasingly recognized the disparate forms that international migratory processes can take, with transient, incomplete, liquid, circular, seasonal, and temporary manifestations (Collins, 2012; Hall & Williams, 2002). Long-term migrants, for example, may become tourists while traveling back to their home countries for short trips, visiting friends and relatives, but also consider "return" migration. At the same time, the "short-term" structure is also a relative expression in tourism, because some tourists become temporary or permanent migrants depending on their lifestyle (Benson & O'Reilly, 2009). Consequently, migration and tourism both involve large-scale movements of people who engage with destinations in different ways and move between distinct categories.

Bearing in mind that both migration and tourism are production or consumption oriented, mobility regimes are also interconnected with other markets such as retail, education, entrepreneurship, finance, and health. At the same time, tourism, like migration, is a particularly complex process, each destination having different histories, actors, and mechanisms and where movement possibilities are closely related to ethnicity, wealth, class, and profession (Eisenschitz, 2016). While migrants and

tourists are alike, the global inequalities of border regimes and visa systems, respectively, ensure that their mobilities and experiences are, of course, different. Most destinations, at least until recently, have come to meet and support tourists from certain states, offering them visa-free or low-cost access and broad protections. Conversely, migration has been problematized by political debates and socio-political rhetoric. Therefore, migrant citizens often have fewer rights than tourists in many destinations due to deep inequalities (Abram et al., 2015).

In the current period, there are numerous studies that link the migration process and tourism in contemporary societies (Bianchi, 2000; Lugosi & Ndiuini, 2022). These examined topics are as follows: the role of globalized capitalism, border management, the welfare of migrant workers, social discrimination, inclusion, and settlement in host states (Bianchi, 2000; Choe et al., 2020; Ladkin, 2011; Eizenberg and Jabareen 2017). They derive the idea that migrant workers contribute significantly to economic development, innovation, entrepreneurship, and cultural diversity, along with knowledge transfer in tourist destinations. Tourism savings are mostly measured by tourist arrivals and receipts. Migration often generates tourist flows, through the "geographical extension of friendship and kinship networks" (Williams & Hall, 2002, p. 7). Moreover, migration, at the moment, is a determining factor of tourism, and the relationship between the two has increased progressively. An eloquent example can be represented by states such as Dubai and Macau, which cannot sustain their tourism sector without the involvement of migrant workers. As Macao's local labor force is not large enough to fill positions in the tourism sector, it has to attract a large number of foreign migrant workers (Choe et al., 2020). At the same time, migrant citizens conduct entrepreneurial activities using of course their cultural capital in the form of gastronomic knowledge, which often becomes part of the culture of the destination. As such, their contributions to destinations can gradually become heritage attractions and help destinations display "cosmopolitan cultures, which are then used in marketing and branding" (Lugosi & Ndiuini, 2022). Migration can thus transform a host society and impact its cultural heritage and lifestyle.

In conclusion, it can be stated that migration and tourism represent two fundamental concepts in the current economic context, closely interconnected and with similar forms, but which present different particularities.

## 3 The Context of the Increase in Emigration from Ukraine and the Measures Adopted at the European Level

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission has had to have a prompt and rapid response to this situation, a fact that has materialized through the creation of the European Union Migration and Crisis Preparedness Plan. It provides an operational framework to ensure, on the one hand, awareness of the current context and better preparation, and on the other hand, effective governance and obtaining an eloquent response in a timely manner.

In response to the exodus from Ukraine, the European Union has drawn up and implemented a series of legislative proposals to provide immediate protection to refugees, bearing in mind that this is expected to be Europe's biggest refugee crisis this century. Other measures adopted by the European Union were the creation of a solidarity platform, the offering of humanitarian aid packages, and the increase in the level of flexibility for European states in terms of obtaining EU funding. The solidarity platform was created to ensure the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive in close agreement with all parties involved in this process. Its main role is to monitor the identified needs and to coordinate the operational response at the level of the member states of the European Union, regarding the refugee crisis in Ukraine. The solidarity platform brings together: the member states of the European Union, EU Agencies, such as the European Union Agency for Asylum, Frontex, and Europol, the countries associated with the Schengen area and, last but not least, the Ukrainian authorities. The specific actions of the Solidarity Platform through which it differentiates itself in relation to the other instruments are the fact that it collects relevant information regarding the reception capacity, respectively, accommodation in the member states of the European Union, coordinates the matching offers received from these states regarding the acceptance of immigrants, and also aims at coordinating the transfer of persons from Moldova to the member states and those associated with the Schengen area. Moreover, the new proposals of the European Union regarding the management of borders are intended to create optimal conditions for entering the countries of destination and to accelerate the support offered to vulnerable people.

With the launch of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, approximately 2.5 million Ukrainian citizens had migrated from their country of origin by 11 March. Moreover, the European Commission supported the member states to use the financial funds belonging to the 2014–2020 cohesion in order to support refugees "in finding jobs, starting or continuing, depending on the context, education, as well as access to childcare". Also, the European aid fund for disadvantaged people will be used to provide basic material assistance and food. In addition to the aforementioned funds, the bloc is currently providing goods worth 100 million euros with the help of the European Union's Civil Protection Mechanism. Although the Republic of Moldova is not part of the European Union, it received approximately 20 million euros due to the high number of refugees it received. As a result of the intensification of the situation in Ukraine, the European Union proposed the consolidation of the budget for 2022 to the amount of 99.8 million euros from commitments. At the same time, the budget was increased by 176 million euros coming from payments. All these financial resources will be channeled through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Instrument for Border and Visa Management. Taking into account the information presented previously, it can be highlighted the idea that the total amount of funding that will be made available to European states to support migration and manage the situation at the borders is 400 million euros. The funds will be useful, mainly, to the member countries most affected by the costs of receiving and registering citizens emigrating from Ukraine. In short, the European Union is trying to ensure that financial resources are sufficient to meet the needs of immigrants from

Ukraine. Through the resources that belong to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund of the European Commission, it is intended to create optimal conditions for the reception of immigrants, more precisely the provision of shelter, clothing, food, medical assistance, legal and translation assistance, psychological services social, and of course, other necessary services that allow them to integrate and register in another state.

The funds belonging to the instrument for border and visa management, BMVI, will allow the rapid and efficient application of the necessary procedures at or near external borders, such as identification, registration, fingerprinting, and security checks of third-country nationals Dijkstra et al. (2022). Another eloquent example to highlight the solidarity of people in relation to the situation generated by the war is the global employment event, entitled "Stand up for Ukraine" through which the sum of 9.1 billion euros was collected to support the vulnerable situation of refugees. At the same time, starting from March, the decision of the European Commission to grant temporary protection to people migrating from Ukraine entered into force. This measure will provide immediate protection to Ukrainian citizens and third-country nationals who have refugee status or permanent residence on the territory of Ukraine. This protection allows access to health care, schools, housing, and jobs, but it only lasts for one year with the possibility of extension.

## 4 Research Methodology. The Impact of Migration From Ukraine–The Situation of Refugees in Neighboring Countries

In this article, the following research methods were used: systematization, comparison, analysis, and synthesis. These methods were used to investigate the current situation from the perspective of the migration process and the effects resulting from the war on the member states of the European Union. The information base of the research consists of scientific articles and specialized studies belonging to European institutions.

According to statistical data published by the United Nations Refugee Agency, the number of Ukrainian citizens who emigrated is estimated at approximately 12 million people amid the Russian invasion launched on February 24, 2022. This figure constitutes approximately a quarter of Ukraine's total population of 44 million inhabitants. Part of the population fled to other regions of Ukraine, away from the fighting, and the other part, more than 5.7 million people, emigrated entirely to seek refuge abroad. It must be stated that this war led to the outbreak of the biggest humanitarian crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The number of refugees crossing the border from Ukraine into a neighboring country each day peaked at around 200,000 on March 7, but has since fallen to around 50,000 in mid-July. Since the beginning of May, the number of people returning to Ukraine has been increasing and was around 30,000 per day in mid-July. The flow of refugees from Ukraine is

very different compared to other migration flows in the past, this is due to the fact that the people involved in the process are women and children, while the adult men had to stay in Ukraine to continue fighting in war. According to the statistical data published by the United Nations, more than 5.2 million Ukrainian citizens have been registered throughout Europe, and more than 3.5 million have applied for temporary residence in another state United Nations (2022).

However, the number of refugees changes rapidly from one day to the next, taking into account the complexity and extent of the phenomenon; for this reason, the statistical data to be presented are a series of indicative estimates on the number of Ukrainian emigrants who are found in the states of destination from Europe. Moreover, movements from one state to another are not necessarily officially registered. In some countries, Ukrainians are allowed to travel without a visa but, in other countries, they must apply for asylum.

#### Poland

In mid-February, Poland was expecting a possible Russian attack on the Ukrainian state, so the Polish government asked communities to prepare to receive almost 1 million refugees. According to statistical information published by the Statistical Institute of Poland, by July 19, 2022, approximately 4.8 million Ukrainian refugees had entered Poland. For this reason, Poland has removed some of the usual formalities regarding the entry of foreign nationals into the state and has claimed that different identity documents will be accepted to facilitate the whole process. Moreover, collection points have been implemented in every district of Poland, through which free accommodation, food, and other necessary supplies are offered to immigrants. In the light of the previously discussed, it can be emphasized that the Polish government is preparing a series of legislative changes in order to simplify the procedure for obtaining a job for Ukrainian citizens, given the fact that a work visa is currently required, because many Ukrainians come from outside the European Union. Another cause that supports the increase in the number of Ukrainian immigrants on the territory of Poland is the labor market open to numerous opportunities, the cities very accessible to foreign citizens, and the pre-existing diaspora has made this state a much more attractive alternative for Ukrainians.

So far, Poland has essentially faced two out of three possible migration waves. In the first wave, people arrived with family members or friends living in Poland or other EU member states. It should be noted that before the outbreak of the war, there were already approximately 800 thousand Ukrainians working or studying on the territory of Poland. As for the second wave, after the bombing of civilian facilities in major cities, people without family or friends living in Poland gradually began to arrive. For this reason, they need full assistance; thus, it is estimated that the next wave will be bigger compared to the previous ones. In the context in which the situation on the front is getting worse, and the repressions of the Russian troops are getting tougher, Poland could even face another two million

people who would leave Ukraine, especially young people, women, children, and the elderly.

#### • Romania

In May, the Romanian government reported that 989,357 Ukrainian citizens entered Romania, of which 80,000 remained in the country. Romania had a good organization and coordination of decision-making at all levels of government, in response to the refugee humanitarian crisis.

#### Russia

According to the information presented by the Ukrainian authorities, Russian troops in the territories of Ukraine occupied by the Russian state are forced to deport people from Ukraine to Russia, passing them off as refugees. According to Russian government statistics, 971,417 refugees left for Russia by May 26, 2022. At the end of April, the number of Ukrainian children from the east of the state who entered the Russian adoption system was reported to be around 150,000.

#### • Republic of Moldova

Moldova was one of the first states to receive refugees from Odesa and Vinnytsia regions. It should be noted that the Moldovan authorities have activated a current crisis management center in order to facilitate humanitarian aid and accommodation for refugees. On July 19, 2022, approximately 541,323 Ukrainian refugees had entered the territory of Moldova. Moreover, Moldova has received the highest number of refugees per capita of any country, despite being one of the poorest countries in Europe. This considerable flow of emigrants led to the emergence of social tensions, and international aid was considered crucial to support Moldovan institutions in their management. In accordance with the statistical data published by the Statistical Institute of Moldova, in the current period 4% of the total population of Moldova are refugees, the state government requesting financial aid to be able to deal with this emergency situation. Consequently, the European Union agreed to grant 695.5 million EUR in aid to Moldova.

#### Hungary


From the beginning of the Russian invasion until July 19, 995,637 refugees from Ukraine arrived in Hungary. There are no border controls in the Schengen area. Hungary does not know how many people have moved to other Schengen countries, but 500 people from third countries, mostly students or migrant workers from Asia and Africa who had lived in Ukraine, asked for help in Budapest.

#### Slovakia

Since the outbreak of the war on February 24, 2022, approximately 327,000 Ukrainian citizens have crossed the Slovak-Ukrainian border. In April 2022, 301,772 were Ukrainians and 12,817 were third-country nationals residing in Ukraine.

At the border, the International Organization for Migration provided support to Ukrainian immigrants and conducted a face-to-face survey with them to find out

### THE SITUATION OF THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF UKRAINE



**Fig. 1** The situation of the number of refugees in the neighboring countries of Ukraine. *Source* Processing based on data provided by the Operational Data Portal—Refugee situations—April 2022, European Commission 2022 a, b

the real context of the problem and the trend of the phenomenon as a whole. The survey was addressed to a number of 161 Ukrainian refugees on the territory of Slovakia. Among those displaced from Ukraine and arriving in Slovakia, women and girls are by far the vast majority, representing 88% of the sample surveyed. Most respondents traveled to Slovakia from Ukraine as part of a group (88%) and most (81%) with relatives. More than half (57%) of the refugees in the sample stated that Slovakia was their intended destination, especially Kosice (44%), Prešov (14%), Bratislava (5%). or Trenčín (4%). For 23% of those surveyed, the destination city was not known.

Other destinations considered by Ukrainian citizens were Germany (14%), Czech Republic (4%), Italy (4%), Poland (2%), and other European countries (12%). Some of those surveyed (7%) did not yet know their final destination (Fig. 1).

As can be seen from the graph presented above, a very large number of refugees were registered in Poland, this country being an easier platform for their movement to the developed countries of Western Europe.

## 5 The Consequences of the War in Ukraine—Economic, Social, Geopolitical

The war in Ukraine, in all its dimensions, is having alarming cascading consequences for the European economy already hit by the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, with a remarkable impact on developing states. The conflict in Ukraine has taken its toll on people, infrastructure, and the economic and political context. According to statistics published by the United Nations, about 3,000 civilians have

been killed or injured, 6.5 million people are internally displaced, and 4 million have been forced to migrate to neighboring states. The Ukrainian government has estimated the financial costs of the war at nearly \$570 billion, while the Russian offensive shows no signs of ending the fighting any time soon. As previously mentioned, the conflict in Ukraine has led to the emergence of reverberating effects at the European level, from the perspective of increased commodity prices, energy shocks, and last but not least, the emerging geopolitical consequences of a war in the heart of Europe, which was instigated by a nuclear-armed country and a member of the UN Security Council.

Historically, periods of high geopolitical risk have been associated with notable negative consequences for the global economic context. This also materialized in the case of European states, given the fact that the war affected physical and human capital, there was a transfer of resources to inefficient and unproductive uses, there was a diversion of international trade and capital flows, and last but not least, they global supply chains have been disrupted. Forbes and Warnock (2012) Moreover, changing perspectives on the outcomes of this geopolitical event have also impacted the economic sector by delaying investment, eroding consumer confidence, and tightening financial conditions.

#### Economic consequences

To the extent that the war, for now, is limited to the territory of Ukraine, its effects of economic propagation are felt at the global level, implicitly by the European states. Anayi et al. (2022) Ukraine and Russia together account for only 2% of gross domestic product and global trade, while the stock of foreign investment in and from Russia reaches almost 1% of the global total Federle et al. (2022). Thus, the two states are large suppliers of goods: corn, sunflowers, fuel, metals, wheat, fertilizers, and the prices of which have increased considerably since the outbreak of the war. Using a conservative assumption of a 10 percentage point increase in global prices for food, wheat, fuel, and metal products during 2022, it is estimated that the negative impact of the war through the economic and trade channels of these products on low- and middle-income states it will have a value of 18 billion dollars. However, the main states that are strongly affected by the negative effects of the war are those in the geographical and historical proximity of Russia, such as Belarus, Moldova, Romania, and Armenia.

The war in Ukraine risks affecting Europe's economic recovery, as high energy prices and trade disruptions have gradually destabilized EU firms, which were already weakened by the effects of the pandemic International Monetary Fund (2022). According to a study published by the European Investment Bank (2022), the everincreasing inflation rate will push many Europeans below the poverty line. Caldara et al. (2022) The economic situation in the European Union after the impact resulting from the pandemic was trying to recover when the war broke out, but the uncertainty increased simultaneously with the increase in food, energy, and commodity prices had a negative impact on the investment sector and on sustainable economic development and favorable to inclusion.

However, economic shocks are difficult to predict at the moment given the gradual expansion of the process, and the impact will be different for each member state of the European Union. In other words, after the situation generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine still remains an external economic shock that brings with it asymmetric consequences throughout Europe. Undoubtedly, the unequal distribution of economic difficulties between the member countries of the European Union is not only an economic problem, but also a political one. Ensuring that the member states of the European Union remain united in the coming months or years in the face of Russian aggression will involve sharing the burden so that certain states are not affected more than others. The current situation focuses on the one hand on direct trade exposure, as well as the potential costs of energy dependence on Russia, and on the other hand on vulnerabilities to rising energy prices in general Council of the European Union (2022).

This first insight reveals a number of important and relevant patterns. First, states located in Central and Eastern Europe present a high level of vulnerability from a number of factors. This implies export dependence, dependence on Russian energy imports, as well as a pronounced exposure to the general increase in energy prices. Second, Italy and Germany are known to be heavily dependent on Russian gas, but could also be affected by supply shortages in the automotive industries. Third, the overall effect of higher energy prices differs from country to country. Although it would be very difficult to bear for the poorer states located in Eastern Europe, which have colder winters and implicitly, energy-consuming economies, states located in Northern and Western Europe would of course also suffer disproportionately. Therefore, the European Union will have to share the economic burden equally in order to preserve political unity.

Moreover, the war between Russia and Ukraine is disrupting the existing trade relations between the European Union and Russia. The European Union's direct trade sanctions are relatively limited to certain sectors, such as dual-use goods, weapons, and the space industry. However, financial sanctions have significantly increased trade costs outside the energy sector. A comparison to underline the aforementioned point is that a complete SWIFT ban on Iran reduced the state's trade by a third. Moreover, many companies have reduced or severed their relations with Russia, even in areas not subject to sanctions, possibly due to the skyrocketing reputational costs of doing business in Russia. In general, trade relations with Russia play a minor role for Europe. The EU is Russia's main trading partner and accounts for almost half of the country's total exports.

From the point of view of tourism, a conflict situation affects tourism in the countries involved. In the neighboring countries or in the destination countries for emigrants, their large wave has created some imbalances in terms of tourism as well. In the first stage, the need to support immigrants caused some accommodation spaces to be earmarked for immigrants. For a period, this affected tourism in the respective areas.

On the other hand, at the end of the conflict, immigrants can contribute to the development of tourism in different areas, by contributing as cheap labor and by promoting the integration areas to those left in the country of departure.

#### Social consequences

In the past decade, the world has faced several refugee crises, stemming from conflicts in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. However, in the last seven months of 2022, a new migrant crisis has emerged, with Europe once again in the spotlight. For this reason, it can be said that the war in Ukraine triggered the highest migration rate since the Second World War, with children and women having the largest share in the total number of refugees. According to statistics published by the United Nations, approximately seven million Ukrainians have entered Europe since the beginning of the Russian invasion. Without a doubt, this war is a tragedy for the people of Ukraine, who are being resolutely targeted by the Russian aggressors. It is worth noting that these events are quite shocking and have not been encountered in Europe since the Second World War. However, for the member countries of the European Union and their societies, this war represents a major social and humanitarian challenge, resulting from the unprecedented movement of the Ukrainian population.

First, European societies have unconditionally shown their support for Ukraine. Also, the political elites within the European Union are unanimous regarding the political and economic support of the Ukrainian state and the permanent provision of assistance in military equipment. However, migration was a contentious topic prior to the Russian invasion, given that the rise of a populist tide was associated with social and political discontent with the migration process, as most clearly evidenced by the rise of Brexit Grzymski (2022).

However, to date, Ukrainian migration has manifested itself in a reaction of empathy and support from the citizens of European states, since no one questions the refugee status of Ukrainians.

Second, the bleak outlook for a possible political outcome of the war in the near future indicates that refugees may not return to Ukraine quickly. This aspect is influenced by the existence of several factors. The chances of a complete withdrawal of Russian troops beyond the pre-war borders of Ukraine are quite small; consequently, the possibilities of a return to pre-war normality are equally low. Of course, this return to normality also brings with it a series of preconditions. On the one hand, some Ukrainian citizens would return to rebuild their home state, and on the other hand, others would need certainty regarding the country's stability, and this is unlikely in the near future. Moreover, Ukraine has proven to be effective in its defensive resistance. Therefore, it is possible that Ukraine to remain in an unstable situation with some kind of volatile ceasefire and partially occupied territory. This would be a disincentive for many Ukrainian refugees in their decision to return. The other factor that can prevent the return of refugees is the nature of this mobility, consisting mostly of mothers with children and elderly people. Men between the ages of 18 and 60 cannot leave Ukraine. This means that many refugees will stay longer in their new places with deeper integration because, for example, children have to go to school.

#### Geopolitical consequences

The invasion of Ukraine by the Russian state is essentially a direct challenge to the post-war order in Europe, being present through multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union and supported by the power of the United States of America. European states' policies on migration and refugees are being highlighted more than ever, raising both practical and moral questions about states' responsibilities under refugee law.

There is also a very real and very high risk that conflict-induced instability and economic disruption will provide an opportunity for organized crime and human trafficking groups to use an alternative smuggling route into Europe. It should be noted that organized crime and corruption have been a major challenge in Ukraine for years and were underlying issues that led to the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005.

Less clear are the implications of this war at the global level from the perspective of the conflict and the breaking of the West's relations with the Russian state. While geographically this war is being waged in Europe, how the geopolitics of the conflict will play out in the coming months is likely to reshape not just the European land-scape, but the long-standing patterns of relations between Global North and Global South.

#### 6 Conclusions

The human costs of war are clear and unsettling. In addition to its direct impact, the war came as an additional unwelcome shock to global and national economies still dealing with the impact of the pandemic. Unlike March 2020, when countries faced a common enemy, the crisis in Ukraine has global reverberations that affect different countries in different ways.

Moreover, the crisis in Ukraine may also create labor market disruptions in neighboring states, mainly Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, and Slovakia. If hostilities continue, Ukrainian refugees would have to remain in other countries longer, putting more pressure on the labor market and social protection systems in these states, thus increasing unemployment in many of them. This situation in Ukraine also created a shock to the global economy, further complicating the recovery from the COVID-19 crisis.

In the short term, it is clear that tourism will be affected in conflict countries, or in the countries of destination of a large shoulder of refugees, as a result of the uncertainty and the pressure on the social protection and security systems.

The present research highlights the fact that the war in Ukraine brings with it a series of social challenges, such as increased mortality, migration, increased crime rate, increased unemployment, and exerting a negative impact on civil society. It is therefore particularly important to develop a constructive and pragmatic approach to help maintain peace and stability in Europe. In the long term, the integration of

refugees in the reception areas can bring advantages, through the cultural integration of refugees and the creation of new forms of tourism. We believe that such a policy must be based on the existence of some economic and social pillars, which, on the one hand, will determine the realization of a permanent dialogue between policymakers and, on the other hand, will contribute to the creation of a sustainable basis for stability and cooperation at the European level. Moreover, this policy should mainly focus on reducing dependence on natural resources from Russia and on implementing non-political forms of cooperation beneficial to all parties involved. These pillars and alternative bridges should be intellectual elites, cooperation of middle-class members, strengthening of interstate relations, cultural and environmental cooperation, business cooperation, supporting the labor market integration of immigrants, and scientific and educational cooperation between states to facilitate access of foreign and Ukrainian students to studies.

Therefore, it can be stated that the war in Ukraine considerably affects the geopolitical security, the stability of Europe, the balance of the labor market, and the general economic context and tourism.

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