



Globalized Identities

The Impact of Globalization
on Self and Identity

Edited by
Iva Katzarska-Miller
Stephen Reysen

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Globalized Identities

“Globalisation is a journey, not a destination’. This observation by a journalist many years ago captures the essence of the messages in this new book. The contacts and interactions brought about by the processes of globalisation, whether regional or world-wide, have no single or clear outcome. Nor is the phenomenon new; past empires provide many lessons for us at present as we experience this great variety in how the process plays out. This book draws our attention to the complexity of the contemporary version of the phenomenon of globalisation.”

—John Berry, Ph.D., *Emeritus Professor, Queen’s University at Kingston*

“This is a terrific multidisciplinary edited book on globalization—an imperative topic of our time. Probing its impact on individual and collective identities, the international group of scholars take the reader on an illuminating tour of ways that globalization touches and transforms customs and values, consumption and education, immigration and civics, politics and power. It’s a tour de force on a topic that impacts us all.”

—Lene Jensen, Ph.D., *Senior Research Scientist, Clark University*

“This sophisticated book offers pioneering examinations of the impacts of globalization on self and identity development. Organized around methodologically diverse social-psychological perspectives, the essays collected in this volume reach across rigid disciplinary divides. Most importantly, the contributors manage to illuminate some major causes and manifestations of our contemporary age of the ‘Great Unsettling’—shorthand for intensification of uncertainty and insecurity in the concrete lives of ordinary people around the world. Highly recommended!”

—Manfred B. Steger, Ph.D., *Professor of Sociology, University of Hawai‘i*

“The book presents an exciting mosaic of research papers and reviews reflecting on the various ways in which globalization impacts conceptualizations and experiences of self and identity. It will provide the reader to discover related issues from a perspective of different fields and geographic locations. It also proves the importance of culture for attitudes toward globalization and shows the need to continue research on global identity in different cultural contexts.”

—Katarzyna Hamer, Ph.D., *Associate Professor, Polish Academy of Sciences*

“As the Covid pandemic seems to be the critical juncture of our period this is timely book. It is valuable contribution to the evolving interdisciplinary field that inspect the nexus between the self and global processes. The collections of chapters provide conceptual clarifications and empirical illustrations that can be used by scholars across different fields as well as by students in various courses.”

—Gal Ariely, Ph.D., *Professor, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev*

Iva Katzarska-Miller · Stephen Reysen
Editors

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The Impact of Globalization on Self
and Identity

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Editors

Iva Katzarska-Miller
Psychology
Transylvania University
Lexington, KY, USA

Stephen Reysen
Psychology & Special Education
Texas A&M University-Commerce
Commerce, TX, USA

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1

Introduction: Uncertainty in a Globalized World

Iva Katzarska-Miller  and Stephen Reysen 

In 2015, Shamima Begum, a 15-year-old woman born in England to Bangladeshi immigrant parents, left England to join the Islamic State in Syria. Along with two school friends, Shamima boarded a plane for Turkey, from where they traveled to the Syrian border. Less than two weeks later, she was married to an ISIS fighter. Today, at the age of 22, Shamima, speaking from a detention camp in Syria, begs forgiveness for her decision, and restoration of her British citizenship, which was revoked in 2019 by the United Kingdom government (Hassan, 2021). While Shamima Begum was figuring out her allegiances, Anastasiya Shpagina, a 28-year-old Ukrainian woman has accumulated over 3.3 million subscribers on her YouTube channel and over 1.9 million

I. Katzarska-Miller (✉)

Transylvania University, Lexington, KY, USA

e-mail: ikatzarskamiller@transy.edu

S. Reysen

Texas A&M University-Commerce, Commerce, TX, USA

Instagram followers. The reason for her fame is her transformation, through the power of makeup, into an anime character (Dumolga, 2021). And then there is the story of two brothers, Wu Wenqian, 16, and Xu Wenjue, 18, who left their small village in impoverished Guizhou Province in China and traveled over 500 miles to work at Huanya. In the factory, which supplies goods for Wal-Mart, the brothers reported working 12 hours a day, six days a week, for \$120–200 a month (Barboza, 2008). Although the three described experiences differ tremendously, they are all manufactured and made possible by globalization.

Globalization

Globalization has been conceptualized in a variety of ways across academic disciplines, frameworks, and researchers, without much consensus on a definition (Olivié & Gracia, 2020). Connotations also vary from references to positive aspects such as progress and intercultural cooperation, to negatives such as colonialism and deterioration of aspects of everyday lives (Al-Rodhan & Stoudmann, 2006). Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006) reviewed multiple academic definitions of globalization and concluded that the majority remained focused on a single aspect of globalization, usually related to the research focus of the author. Furthermore, definitions ranged in scope, with some being more abstract but inclusive of various aspects of globalization, and others more specific but narrower in scope. Many of the definitions captured globalization as a process (Mir et al., 2014), along with a condition, system, force, or age (Steger, 2020).

Despite the variety of conceptualizations and a lack of consensus in regard to what globalization is, one place of agreement is the existence of different dimensions of globalization along economic, political, social, technological, and cultural lines. Early studies on globalization focused on the economic facet, but with the proliferation of research on globalization in multiple disciplines, this is no longer the case (Olivié & Gracia, 2020). Although researchers do not disagree that there are different dimensions of globalization, there is some disagreement on how

to measure these dimensions. For example, Olivie and Gracia (2020) summarize some of the indicators of globalization used in research, falling into six categories: economic, human mobility, technology and information, diplomatic effect, military, and environmental. Within each of these dimensions, multiple indicators and globalization indexes have been proposed as the appropriate measures. This variability demonstrates that although there is an understanding of globalization as a multifaceted and multidimensional phenomenon, it has often been studied in a one-dimensional manner (Steger, 2020). And that one dimension is often seen as the essential one for the understanding of globalization. As Steger (2020) argues, the academic disagreement over the importance of the most essential dimension is a version of the ancient Buddhist parable of the blind scholars and the elephant:

Since the blind scholars did not know what the elephant looked like, they resolved to obtain a mental picture, and thus the knowledge they desired, by touching the animal. Feeling its trunk, one blind man argues that the elephant was like a gigantic snake. Another man, rubbing along its enormous leg, likened the animal to a rough column of massive proportions. The third person took hold of its tail and insisted that the elephant resembled a large, flexible brush. The fourth man felt its sharp tusks and declared it to be like a great spear. Each of the blind scholars held firmly to his own idea of what constituted an elephant. (pp. 14–15)

Another aspect of disagreement beyond what globalization is, how to measure it, and what dimension is the most essential one, is about the history of globalization, in particular its inception. Pieterse (2012) argues that globalization is seen by many as a relatively new phenomenon. Citing Wilkinson (2006), “the usual timescale in which ‘globalization’ is considered is at minimum post-Cold War, at maximum post-Second World War” (p. 63), Pieterse (2012) critiques the presentist view of globalization as presenting older structural patterns as novel, centering the West as the beginning of contemporary civilization, and overlooking non-Western globalization influences. He points out that some disciplines are more likely to endorse this presentist history especially those in the social sciences, while humanities are more likely to have a more distant time frame on the beginning of globalization. These differences

in the historical time frame of globalization appear to be based on the perceived causal relationship between the current manifestation of globalization and previous historical developments (Steger, 2020). Steger (2020) discusses that proponents of the most presentist view (globalization starting in the 1980s) base their arguments on the incredible rapid speed of the contemporary global exchanges. Others see current globalization as possible due to the advances that happened during the Industrial Revolution. Yet, others see globalization as a logical outcome of processes that emerged with the development of capitalism in the 1500s. The rest of the researchers see globalization as unfolding since the beginning of people. Thus, Steger (2020) places the current globalizing processes as one of five historical periods that are separated by shifts in the pace of cultural exchanges, beginning with the prehistoric period of 10,000BCE–3500BCE.

What makes the contemporary period distinct from the others is the speed of interconnectivity. Steger (2020) characterizes the current globalization wave as *the great convergence*, where “different and widely spaced people and social connections coming together more rapidly than ever before” (p. 36). This great convergence was recently demonstrated by both the swift worldwide transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (i.e., COVID-19), as well as the disruption in the global supply chain due to that transmission. Since December 31, 2019 when China alerted the World Health Organization (WHO) of unusual pneumonia caused by an unknown virus, it took only 3 months, on March 11, 2020 for the WHO to declare COVID-19 a global pandemic based on 118,000 cases reported globally in 114 countries (World Health Organization, 2020a). A year and a half later, as of November 2021, worldwide there have been reported over 262 million cases with 5.21 million deaths (Our World in Data, 2021). Beside the staggering human toll of the virus, global supply chains are facing unprecedented logistical challenges. The Institute of Supply Management in a survey done between February 22 and March 5, 2020 with representatives of U.S. companies reported that nearly 75% of the companies indicated supply chain disruptions (McCrea, 2020). And this was even before the WHO declared COVID-19 as a global pandemic. A year and a half later, as of October, 2021, the world’s supply

chains are collapsing, with increased prices for raw materials and shipping container rates, manufacturing companies not being able to satisfy demand, congested ports, and empty warehouses (Tea & Decker, 2021).

Despite these negative outcomes, the great convergence allowed for the same rapid exchange of life-saving medical equipment, human capital, and COVID-19 vaccines. When in March 2020, Italy was hit with an overwhelming COVID-19 wave, Chinese, Russian, and Cuban medical teams flew to Italy to provide help (Poggioli, 2020). In September 2020, COVAX, a multilateral initiative aimed at guaranteeing global access to life-saving COVID-19 vaccines (World Health Organization, 2020b) was established to secure funding, negotiate with vaccine manufacturers, and address logistical challenges to establish the largest and most complex vaccination program, serving multiple predominantly low- and lower-middle-income countries.

What these outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate is the nuanced implications of contemporary globalization. Research has examined the pros and cons of globalization regarding its different dimensions demonstrating that globalization is a process that has both positive and negative effects. In a literature review on the pros and cons of globalization, Osland (2003) examined outcomes in five areas: equality, labor, governmental, culture and community, and environment. Osland concluded that the impact of globalization is mixed with clear winners and losers within and between dimensions. For example, there is a trade off “such as economic development and jobs at the cost of environmental degradation and weakened labor protection” (p. 148). Similarly, in the realm of education, Bakhtiari and Shajar (2006) argue that while globalization may include advantages such as global sharing of knowledge, promoting international collaborations, and facilitating communications, it also creates negative outcomes for global-majority countries, such as increased technological gaps, increased inequalities between cultures, and the promotion of dominant cultures and values. Hamdi (2013) also demonstrates that “developing” countries have been affected by globalization both positively and negatively. For example, while the economies of such countries have improved due to outsourcing and direct foreign investments, violence and drug abuse have increased, along with changes in traditional clothing and language expressions.

Self and Identity Uncertainty and Globalization

The dramatic changes in terms of scale, speed, and cognition (Kinnvall, 2004) that globalization has brought about, have introduced a level of insecurity and uncertainty for both cultural spaces and individuals residing within these spaces. Research on uncertainty in general, not connected to globalization, has focused on the psychological and emotional states that uncertainty evokes, and the mechanisms through which people deal with the uncertainty. The general findings are that uncertainty evokes an aversive state, and if that uncertainty is important for the self, people will attempt to manage or resolve it (e.g., Hogg, 2007; van den Bos, 2009). Uncertainty due to globalization follows these general findings as well.

Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) define the experience of uncertainty as having four interconnected aspects: *complexity* is due to the presence of multiple interrelated parts; *ambiguity* is a result of the change of the meanings of these various parts as a function of their interconnectedness with other parts; *deficit knowledge* is the lack of overarching knowledge structure that can serve as an arbiter of any contradictions between parts; and *unpredictability* is the lack of being able to predict what the future holds. As Hermans and Dimaggio describe it:

the experience of uncertainty characterizes a global situation of multi-voicedness (complexity) that does not allow a fixation of meaning (ambiguity), that has no superordinate voice for resolving contradictions and conflicting information (deficit knowledge), and that is to a large extent unpredictable. (p. 34)

Although this uncertainty leads to an aversive state (Hogg, 2007), it does not necessarily result in negative outcomes. For some people it can provide a space for new possibilities of being in the world. However, when uncertainty permeates multiple areas of life, or when one's physical survival is threatened (e.g., terrorism, COVID-19 pandemic) that can lead to negative psychological outcomes such as anxiety and insecurity (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007).

Examining how increasing uncertainty due to globalization impacts young people's transition to adulthood ("a stepwise process in which young people adopt specific roles and participate in certain activities" p. 38), Blossfeld and Mills (2010) argue that increased uncertainty does not impact everyone the same way, and these impacts are filtered through societal institutions. The four institutions having the highest impact on young adults are employment relations, education systems, national welfare state regimes, and family systems. These institutional filters channel uncertainty to specific social groups, in their case youth, to impact quality of employment (e.g., employment stability), timing and ease of entering the market, safety net, and level of marital cohabitation. These conditions in turn influence individuals' decisions in terms of employment, committed partnerships, and parenthood. Using data from the GLOBALIFE international research project from 14 industrialized countries, Blossfeld and Mills (2010) found that the uncertainty produced by globalization, and filtered through institutions, delays youth commitments to long-term partnerships and parenthood across the majority of the countries. This study directly demonstrates not only the impact of globalization on youth transitions to adulthood, but also the way uncertainty is caused by globalizing forces and filtered through changes in institutions, which are similarly caused by globalization.

One of the important questions that follows, is how do people reduce uncertainty. Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007, 2012) argues that when people are in a state of uncertainty, they experience aversive feelings, which are evoked by the difficulty of anticipating future events and inability to plan future actions. This aversive state motivates them to engage in behaviors that reduce the uncertainty. Depending on whether the uncertainty is due to a positive challenge, or a threat, its reduction can be based on behaviors that are promotive or avoidant (Hogg & Adelman, 2013; van den Bos, 2009). Since cognitive capacity is the key resource for uncertainty reduction, and because uncertainty reduction can be cognitively taxing, people will only engage in uncertainty reduction if the domain that evokes the uncertainty is important to the self. In other words, self-uncertainty is particularly motivating. One way in which self-uncertainty is reduced is through group identification. Group identification, based on social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;

Turner et al., 1987) provides a sense of belonging, and impacts one's perceptions, values, and beliefs to conform to the prototypical group content. Because group identification provides a shared understanding about the world, it not only validates the self, but also provides a level of predictability and ability to plan future actions.

Since globalization creates such self-uncertainty, increased adherence to and identification with groups that can provide sense of belongingness and predictability, can be one way of uncertainty reduction. Indeed, following uncertainty-identity theory, Hogg and Adelman (2013) provide empirical evidence that self-uncertainty can lead to support for extremism and radical behaviors, whether for extreme campus protest groups, or the Israel-Palestine conflict. Similarly, Kinnvall (2004) demonstrates that nationalism and religion supply narratives that can convey a picture of security and minimize anxiety, by providing a meaningful connection to a territory or a sacred being. Thus, self-uncertainty reduction can partially explain the increased appeal of extreme nationalist or religious groups. Beyond radicalization, some people might be using consumerism and consumer lifestyle identities (e.g., Cleveland, 2018; Reese et al., 2019), or identification with a broader category such as global citizen (e.g., Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018), as groups providing perceived certainty and stability.

Returning to the three stories described in the beginning of the chapter, they demonstrate some of the positive and negative aspects of globalization, provide anecdotal evidence about the different ways in which globalization leads to self-uncertainty, and the different ways (both promotive and avoidant) that these young people use to manage that uncertainty. For Shamima Begum, joining the Islamic State (an extreme religious group) at the age of 15, a time when even without globalization at play, a young person is trying to explore who they are (Erikson, 1968), provided some sense of meaning. The fact that she was a person growing up with immigrant parents in a society with strong anti-immigrant attitudes (Andrescu, 2011), possibly because of globalization, could have been one source of self-uncertainty, that could have pushed her toward extremism. On the other hand, Anastasiya Shpagina, seemed to have a more promotive approach toward managing self-uncertainty by recreating and presenting herself as an anime character. The availability of

anime in Ukraine, as well as her worldwide following on social media, is both made possible by the technological advances characteristic of contemporary globalization. Lastly, in Wu Wenguin and Xu Wenjue's story the positive and negative impact of globalization is reflected in both the economic opportunity to work in a factory producing goods for Wal-Mart, while working in unsafe conditions and for low pay. The impact of globalization uncertainty here is filtered through their employment and will most likely have implications for their transition to adulthood.

Approach to the Book

Although in psychology there has been an increase in the amount of cultural research regarding self and identity, research on the globalization's impact on these topics has been more limited in scope. The primary goal of the present book is to present a review, and new research, of some of the impacts of globalization on self and identity. Initially, the aim was to do so from a social psychological perspective, but more research on potential topics to be included in the book revealed that researchers in other disciplines have studied some of the same impacts, or have used social psychological frameworks in their research. Thus, we (the editors) decided to be guided by topics rather than by academic discipline. Our contributors span the range of psychology (social, developmental), marketing, education, sociology, communication, and study abroad. This multidisciplinary nature of the book, we strongly believe, is one of its main strengths.

We have also attempted to have variety in terms of the content of the chapters. Some of the chapters are reviews of a specific topic within the broad theme of globalization's impact on self and identity, while others are more focused on specific study(s). Similarly, while some chapters rely heavily on quantitative empirical research, others include more qualitative work. Our contributors also vary in terms of their geographical locations. While most of them are located in the United States, the others are from Japan, Germany, Canada, and Denmark. Despite these international contributions, we need to acknowledge that, with exception of Japan, they are predominantly from WEIRD (Western,

educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) settings (Henrich et al., 2010). That partially applies also to the majority of studies that are being discussed across various chapters. This bias is an ongoing problem and has generated discussions within psychology.

For example, research on self and identity has been dominated by North American and Western European studies across psychology branches. Arnett (2008) has referred to this problem as the “neglected 95%,” advocating for psychological research representative of the populations from different parts of the world. Despite such calls, the majority of the current research published in the United States is still dominated by WEIRD samples. In 2008, Arnett showed that 95% of samples in six psychology journals, each of which is considered the flagship journal for their psychological area for 2003–2007 period, were WEIRD (68% from the United States). Similarly, among first authors, 73% were based at American universities, and 25% were from European or English-speaking countries. In 2020, Thalmeyer et al. used the same six flagship journals published in 2014–2018 and found that representations of samples and authors had not changed much. Although there was a small decrease in samples from the United States (62%), the percentage from other English-speaking countries was unchanged (14%) and there was an increase in European samples (17% up from 13%).

Although we are not insiders to any of the other academic disciplines represented in the book, we would not be surprised if this bias tends to be present there as well. Notwithstanding our wish that the majority of the contributions to the book would have opposed this trend, we need to acknowledge that the majority of it is still grounded in WEIRD traditions.

Overview of Chapters

This introduction marks the connection between globalization and its impact on self and identity, through the uncertainty that it creates in people’s lives. What the rest of the contributions in the book do is focus and expand on a particular impact of globalization on self and

identity and the various ways in which people negotiate the corresponding uncertainty. The aim of Chapter 2 is to provide a general overview of the ways in which globalization has impacted self and identity based predominantly on psychological research. Iva Katzarska-Miller and M Faucher focus on four main topics, beginning with a discussion of independent and interdependent self-construal, highlighting variation across cultures, issues with measurement, and the global trend of increased independence. Next, the authors review cultural identity through different theoretical lenses, such as acculturation strategies and bicultural identity integration, with a focus on the negotiation between local and global identity. The notion of consumer selfhood and acculturation to global consumer culture follows, showing how concepts such as self, materialism, well-being, and narcissism are intertwined. The fourth topic touches upon the emergence of inclusive global identities and their associated outcomes.

In Chapter 3, Angel Armenta, Jessica Bray, and Michael Zárte use the cultural inertia model to discuss the impact that cultural change due to immigration-introduced globalization has on self and identity. The cultural inertia model argues that stable cultures strive to remain stable, and dynamic cultures strive to remain dynamic, with anchors (e.g., national nostalgia) that resist change and propellers (e.g., openness to new experiences) to accepting change. Research that focuses on both positive (e.g., greater diversity leading to better decision-making, and immigration leading to greater financial benefits) and negative (e.g., perceived threat due to demographic shifts) consequences of immigration is used to support the model. One of the conclusions offered by the authors is that although immigration-induced globalization change is often threatening, it can be presented in ways that can foster higher levels of acceptance of that change.

Another globalization area of impact on one's self-concept and identity that is discussed in Chapter 4 by Mark Cleveland is global consumer culture. By weaving various social psychological, anthropological, and marketing concepts together, Cleveland demonstrates how through globalization a transnational set of values and consumer practices, mainly emanating from the United States, have been adopted by individuals around the world. Acculturation to global consumer culture, along its

seven dimensions, occurs to the extent that it is congruent with or viewed as a threat to one's cultural norms and values. Cleveland extends this discussion by noting how various forces (e.g., geopolitical events, meta-trends) impact global consumer culture and identity.

Threat, whether to demographic changes or one's cultural norms and values, seems to influence one's reaction to societal changes due to globalization. In Chapter 5, Simon Ozer and Milan Obaidi, examine another, and darker outcome of perceived threat—the rise of extremism and radicalization. When sudden sociocultural changes occur, individuals' sense of security may be threatened. One way to deal with this threat is to reject outside others and strengthened one's ethnic, religious, or cultural identity. Thus, globalization can be viewed as a threat to one's subgroup that can lead to radicalization against outsiders. The authors expand upon the individual differences that may predict extremist reactions to globalization and highlight recent events (e.g., Christchurch Mosque shooting) and research to support their analysis.

Although not as extreme as radicalization, national identification is also impacted by globalization. In Chapter 6, Nur Soylu Yalcinkaya examines the role of essentialism for dominant and marginalized groups and national identity in light of globalization and intercultural contact. Essentialist beliefs—perception of a social category as innate or fixed—can be used to reinforce one's national identity. With globalization and migration of people, a greater number of hybrid identities may lead to questions of who does or does not belong to the national ingroup resulting in prejudice and discrimination of non-dominant group members. Dominant groups may use essentialism to reject others, while marginalized groups may use essentialism to rally ingroup members to challenge the oppressive system. Soylu Yalcinkaya focuses particularly on the use of essentialism when the sociocultural dynamics within a society are changing.

Continuing with the impact of globalization on national identity, in Chapter 7, Sheila Croucher explores the rise of nationalism and national identity in the United States. While globalization suggests a lessening of the importance of national borders, under the U.S. President Donald Trump exclusion and nationalism became more dominant. Croucher draws distinctions between nationalism and patriotism, nation

and state, and answers the question of what it means to belong to a nation. Using events such as 9/11 and the COVID-19 pandemic to highlight the world's interconnectedness, Croucher demonstrates that in spite of it nationalism has surged, resulting in discrimination of groups traditionally marginalized in the United States.

Alongside one's national identity, globalization, and the resulting spread of information technology and movement of people, young adults are exposed to a variety of practices and values from around the world, which they can implement in the development of their identities. In Chapter 8, Jessica McKenzie, Emily Leighton, Macy Davis, and José Reyes examine how young adults in northern Thailand and central California manage and construct their identities. The authors introduce the notion of custom complexes—cultural practices and values are linked—and discuss both proximal (e.g., immigration-based) and remote (e.g., globalization-based) acculturation strategies. Through interviews with Thai and California-residing Hmong adolescents, they highlight the various ways in which local and global cultural streams are negotiated and integrated into the self.

In Chapter 9, Stephen Reysen presents an updated review of inclusive identities and their connection to globalization. Using social identity perspective framework, Reysen explores measures (e.g., identification with all humanity, global citizen) of inclusive identities and their relation to values (e.g., empathy) and behaviors (e.g., giving to charity). In general, the research suggests that identification with all-inclusive global category labels is related to prosocial values and behaviors. Next, research is reviewed showing an association between globalization and inclusive identities, such as engagement with diverse others, consuming artifacts from other cultural spaces, and perceiving globalization positively are related to greater global identification. The evidence tends to support a connection between having a positive attitude toward globalization and viewing oneself as part of a global community.

In contrast to the breath of the Reysen's review, in Chapter 10, Satoshi Moriizumi focuses in depth on research conducted in Japan regarding the associations between global citizenship identification, intergroup ideologies, local civic engagement, and well-being. Surveying adults interested in the concept of multicultural symbiosis, Moriizumi found that global

citizenship identification was positively related to endorsing multiculturalism and colorblindness, while the association with colorblindness was weaker, and negatively related to assimilation intergroup ideology. Global citizenship identification was also positively related to civic engagement and subjective and psychological well-being. Moriizumi presents a model of global citizenship identification predicting multiculturalism, multiculturalism predicting civic engagement, and civic engagement predicting well-being. Given the declining birthrate in Japan, and the relocation of more foreigners to work in the country, education concerning global citizenship is suggested as a method to reduce prejudice toward foreign workers.

In Chapter 11, Courtney Smith and Iva Katzarska-Miller review research concerning the impact of study abroad on identity development. Young adults are suggested to be formalizing their identities around the time they are undergraduates in college. The experience of study abroad at this period in one's life may contribute to expanding one's global awareness and worldview and may have a life long impact. The research supports the beneficial outcomes of study abroad for students. However, a variety of factors (e.g., country visited, types of interactions) can influence the outcomes for students' identity development. The authors use research on American national identity, to demonstrate how U.S. students negotiate that identity while and after their study abroad experiences.

Incorporating study abroad but in the context of global citizenship education, in Chapter 12, Nadine Etzkorn and Gerhard Reese explore the impact of global citizenship education on students' values and beliefs through the lens of transformative learning. The researchers suggest that current internationalization practiced at universities focuses more on business competencies rather than social justice, which moving toward global citizenship education can rectify. Study abroad, with an emphasis on intercultural contact, is suggested to encourage students to challenge their current worldview and construct new meaningful perspectives. The authors propose that through global citizenship education students may reflect on their experiences and assumptions to transform their identity toward greater prosocial values and behaviors.

Finally, in the conclusion chapter, we provide a topical analysis of some of the main impacts of globalization on self and identity (e.g., national identity, global identity, etc.) as examined in various chapters, discuss current issues, and future directions for research.

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2

Changes in Conceptualization of Self and Identity as a Function of Globalization

Iva Katzarska-Miller  and M Faucher

The earliest usage of the term globalization in English was in the 1930s, however, the term has only been used widely both in academic and popular discourse since the 1990s (Steger, 2020). Globalization is not a new phenomenon (Steger, 2020), but its speed, scale, and level of interdependencies is unprecedented in human history. Although definitions across disciplines abound, globalization is broadly conceptualized as “intensifying planetary interconnectivity” (Steger, 2020, p. 16). This interconnectivity impacts all domains of life (e.g., economic, political, cultural, etc.), including the discipline of Psychology and psychological functioning and experiences. Globalization, in Psychology, opened the door not only to opportunities for more international research and reconceptualization of WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich,

I. Katzarska-Miller (✉) · M. Faucher
Transylvania University, Lexington, KY, USA
e-mail: ikatzarskamiller@transy.edu

democratic) (Henrich et al., 2010) patterns as universal, but also examining the impact of globalization itself on psychological functioning.

One of the psychological domains that have been impacted by globalization is self and identity. Globalization has allowed researchers to examine self and identities across different cultural spaces, albeit still very much rooted in Western theorizing and sampling (Arnett, 2008; Thalmayer et al., 2020), as well as investigate how the process of globalization itself has impacted the construction and the content of self and identities. In this chapter, we focus on the latter: the globalization influence on the self, and the emergence of new identities as a function of globalization. In particular we review research focusing on whether globalization impacts construals of self, what are some of the challenges of globalization-based acculturation, and the emergence of all-inclusive global identities and consumer selfhood.

Independence and Interdependence

In a seminal paper Markus and Kitayama (1991) introduced the idea that different cultural spaces impact conceptualizations of self. They proposed the terms *independent* and *interdependent* self-construal to describe these differences. With the independent self, one's own thoughts, feelings, and actions are primary, therefore interactions with others lead to an experience of the self as bounded, unitary, stable, and autonomous from the social context and others. With the interdependent self, relationships with others are primary, hence interactions with others lead to an experience of the self as a relational entity that is fundamentally connected to, and sustained by one's significant relationships (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Some of the ways in which the independent self is manifested is through seeing the self as separate from social context, valuing one's personal goals, uniqueness, and self-expression, while the interdependent self is manifested in seeing the self as connected to the social context, valuing the promotion of others' goals, fitting-in, and being self-restrained. Markus and Kitayama's (1991) proposal spurred a whirlwind of research demonstrating the effects of the two self-construals on a variety of outcomes: from cognitive and communication styles to

emotion, motivation, and social behavior (for a review, see Cross et al., 2011). In early studies, self-construal was treated as having a trait-like quality that can be measured by self-descriptions and self-reports (Smith, 2011). Later papers (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 2010) specified that these self-construals are not properties of individuals but should be seen as properties of the cultural context that one inhabits.

The cultural spaces that Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued exemplified the independent view encompass considerable segments of American culture, and many Western European cultures. The interdependent is exemplified in Asian cultures, as well as African, Latin-American, and many Southern European cultures. Although they did not explicitly link their construals to two popular dimensions of culture, individualism and collectivism, Markus and Kitayama's, and later, other researchers' usage of Japanese and East Asian cultures in comparison to North American cultures, as well as the original mapping of cultural spaces to independence and interdependence, has led to an association of independent self existing predominantly in individualistic, and interdependent self existing in predominantly collectivist settings. The perceived relationship between self-construals and individualism and collectivism vary among researchers. For example, some have treated the two sets interchangeably (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2002), using independence and interdependence self-construals as equivalent to the cultural differences between individualism and collectivism (Smith, 2011), or independence and interdependence being caused by individualism and collectivism (e.g., Kim et al., 2001). Indeed, examining Triandis' (1995) definitions of individualism and collectivism

Collectivism may be initially defined as a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, coworkers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to members of these collectives. A preliminary definition of individualism is a social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives; are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and contracts

they establish with others; give priority to their personal goals over the goals of others; and emphasize rational analysis of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with others. (p. 2)

can lead one to see the conceptual similarities with independence and interdependence. However, individualism and collectivism have been theorized as cultural dimensions that encompass more cultural aspects than self-construals (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Smith, 2019). Vignoles et al. (2016), going beyond the East Asian and North American comparison, utilizing data from 55 cultural groups in 33 nations, demonstrated that cultural groups can be independent and interdependent in different ways, based on three factors: individualism–collectivism, national socio-economic development, and religious heritage. The researchers identified seven correlated but distinct dimensions, where individuals across cultural spaces can be independent or interdependent in different ways, without a need for these ways to co-occur.

Vignoles et al.'s (2016) findings also address one of the criticisms related to the measurement of self-construals. One of the most popular measures of independence and interdependence is Singelis' (1994) 24-item self-construal scale, which proposes that there are two distinct dimensions which coexist in individuals. Since early research studies failed to show the relationship between specific cultures and self-construals (Matsumoto, 1999), various scholars proposed modifications to the independent–interdependent dichotomy. For example, Singelis et al. (1995) came up with four self-construals based on the crossing of individualism and collectivism and Hofstede's (1980) dimension of power distance, creating a distinction between vertical and horizontal cultures and corresponding self-construals. Although Kagitcibasi (2005) did not use independence and interdependence as terms, her conceptualization of the autonomous-relational self combines elements of both relatedness (independence) and autonomy (interdependence). Vignoles et al.'s (2016) study also contradicts Singelis' (1994) two-dimensional structure by demonstrating that there are seven different

factors contrasting independence and interdependence within a particular domain. There have been concerns of whether the two self-construals can be measured adequately by using self-reported instruments (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2009), and other methods have been proposed. Markus and Kitayama (2010) argued that using measures that tap into how people describe themselves (e.g., the 20 statements test), together with measures that tap into implicit psychological tendencies that might be unconscious, but are manifested in psychological behaviors, might be more appropriate. Thus, using proxy measures of self, such as first-person pronoun usage, value endorsements, cognition and human development processes (Cai et al., 2019), and priming of self-construals (Smith, 2011) can provide insights into the psychological tendencies associated with particular selves.

How self-construals are measured becomes particularly relevant when using the framework of mutual constitution (Shweder, 2003), which argues that individuals and contexts mutually make each other up; people continually shape and are shaped by the environments they inhabit. Culture cannot be separated from people, because culture is a product of human activity. The context shapes the self through four interacting categories of culture—ideas, institutions, interaction, and individuals, and in turn the self incorporates and reflects these cultural patterns (Markus & Hamedani, 2019; Markus & Kitayama, 2010). In the words of Markus and Hamedani (2019) “people are culturally shaped shapers” (p. 14). This framework suggests that even if individualism and collectivism, and independent and interdependent selves are not the same, they are ultimately interlinked, and features of a particular cultural space impact the self-construal within that space. For example, Jetten et al. (2002) found that highly identified U.S. participants (individualistic culture) scored higher on independence than lower identified ones. Highly identified Indonesian participants (collectivist culture) scored lower on independence than lower identified ones. Furthermore, when participants were encouraged to identify with a group that was more individualist or collectivist, their self-construal changed as a function of the group, becoming more independent or interdependent, respectively. As demonstrated by this example and as theorized by the cycle of the mutual constitution, both culture and self are dynamic, in that they are

constantly in the process of being created, recreated, and changed over time. Thus, as cultural content changes, the self and the psychological functioning associated with the self also changes. This notion of change raises the question of what are some of the changes observed, as a function of globalization, in cultural spaces, and then in turn in constructions of self.

One of the broader cultural transformations seen in recent decades is that the world is becoming increasingly individualistic, while collectivism has been decreasing (Cai et al., 2019; Hamamura, 2012, 2018; Santos et al., 2017). This trend exists across cultural spaces regardless of whether their dominant culture is more individualistic or collectivist. For example, Grossmann and Varnum (2015), using social indicators such as divorce rates and household size, found that individualism has been increasing and collectivism decreasing in the United States. Using similar indicators, the same trend has been found in Japan (Hamamura, 2012; Ogihara, 2017), and China (Hamamura, 2018). Examining 51 years of data on individualist practices and values across 78 countries, Santos et al. (2017) further demonstrated the shift toward individualism even in countries that go beyond the few traditionally used in research. Multiple other studies using psychological measures beyond social indicators such as first-person pronoun usage, changes in values and personality, and changes in cognition and emotion (for a review, see Cai et al., 2019), have provided further evidence for the increasing individualism and decreasing collectivism trend. However, the changes are more complex than it might appear. As Cai et al. (2019) argue there are three complicating factors. First, change is not linear, the reason for which are the origins of the change. One of the major theories of rising individualism is economic modernization and growth (Hamamura, 2012; Ogihara, 2017). Thus, theoretically, economic collapses or recessions should impact change in the opposite direction. A second complicating factor is that any cultural changes due to globalization do not lead to eradication of the dominant cultural heritage culture and its culturally grounded self. For example, Hamamura (2012) showed that regardless of the increase of individualism in Japan, traditional values, such as unconditional love toward parents, friendship, and social harmony, have not changed over time, and even the importance of social

obligation has increased. The third factor, which Cai et al. (2019) argue can be seen within research on globalization and cultural identity, is that a society can have a coexistence of multiple cultures. This coexistence of multiple cultures can have implications (as discussed next in the chapter) for self-construals, but in particular concerning identity negotiations as pertaining to several cultures. To add to this last point, as Hermans and Kempen (1998) argue, because globalization involves complex social processes, dichotomies such as individualism and collectivism, independent and interdependent selves, are oversimplifications of the complexity and insensitive to the multifaceted relationships between cultural settings.

Globalization-Based Acculturation

Globalization has dramatically increased the psychological complexity of forming a cultural identity. The term *cultural identity* has been conceptualized in a variety of ways across different theoretical frameworks. For example, using social identity theory framework (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), cultural identity is defined as a special case of social identity (Padilla & Perez, 2003), related to the specific ingroup that one identifies with (Ozer, 2017). From a developmental perspective, based on Erikson's (1950) stages of identity development, forming a cultural identity involves the adoption of the beliefs and practices of one's cultural community (Jensen, 2003). Using both Erikson's and social identity theorizing, Schwartz et al. (2006) define cultural identity as "the sense of solidarity with the ideals of a given cultural group and to the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors manifested toward one's own (and other) cultural groups as a result of this solidarity" (p. 6). The components of one's cultural identity run the spectrum from everyday behaviors like diet and work to one's religious and moral beliefs. These shared values and behaviors are transmitted intergenerationally and reinforced through customs and day-to-day interactions with members of the cultural ingroup. However, there are variations within communities based on demographic factors such as gender, race, generation, etc. (Jensen, 2003). In recent years some theorizing on cultural identity has

been done in regard to the impact of globalization on its formation. The critical age for identity formation is seen during adolescence (12–18 years old) and emerging adulthood (18–25 years old), thus the influence of globalization on cultural identity might be most salient during these stages of development (Jensen et al., 2011). The impact of globalization on cultural identity is particularly studied in regard to acculturation.

When Erik Erikson (1950) first theorized his stages of identity development, he assumed that individuals developed their personal identities within the context of their singular local, or heritage culture, around key areas pertaining to ideology, love, and work. However, access to other cultures through media, travel, and the global economy requires adolescents and emerging adults to navigate multiple cultural streams during the process of identity development (Arnett, 2002; Jensen, 2003; Jensen & Arnett, 2012; Jensen et al., 2011). Because of the exposure and exploration of these diverse cultural streams, forming a cultural identity becomes a matter of deciding which cultural community one belongs to (Jensen et al., 2011). As Jensen et al., (2011) point out, these different cultural streams often have disparate or contradictory ideals regarding values, personal relationships, and work. Thus, globalization affords adolescents and emerging adults with a variety of potential cultural identities that they can choose from.

One model that has been used to provide some insights into how adolescents and emerging adults can negotiate different cultural identities as a result of globalization is John Berry's (1997) model of immigration acculturation. Berry identified four potential acculturation strategies for immigrants living in a receiving culture distinct from their heritage culture. These strategies are based on the interactions between two forces: the value a migrant places on preserving their heritage cultural identity, and the value they place on participating in the receiving culture. *Assimilation* is characterized by adopting the receiving culture as one's primary cultural identity. *Separation* is the opposite of assimilation: one maintains strong connections to their heritage culture and rejects the receiving culture. *Marginalization* occurs when a migrant lacks opportunities for the preservation of their heritage culture, but also avoids interaction with the larger receiving culture. *Integration* involves the reconciliation of both receiving and heritage cultures into one's cultural identity.

Although Berry's acculturation strategies were developed within the context of international migration, which includes a physical movement of people from one cultural space to another, due to globalization researchers have argued that they can also be applied to acculturative processes that do not involve physical relocation. The term *globalization-based acculturation* has been used to describe acculturation in the context of globalization (Chen et al., 2008). Globalization-based acculturation represents "direct and/or mediated exposure to new cultural practices that is not caused by international migration but rather through other channels such as media, trade, education, and tourism" (Ozer et al., 2017, p. 2). Thus, one of the issues for globalization-based acculturation might not be identity negotiation between a heritage and a receiving culture, but rather selectively choosing elements from various cultural worldviews as a result of exposure to multiple cultural streams (Chen et al., 2008). There are several ways in which globalization-based acculturation has been theorized and studied empirically.

Although not explicitly labeled as globalization-based acculturation, the four acculturation strategies have been reconceptualized in light of globalization. For example, Arnett (2002) proposed that many adolescents develop along with their *local identity* ("one based on local circumstances, local environment, and local traditions of the place where they grew up" p. 777), a *global identity* based on their exposure to a global culture. Global culture encapsulates all the non-heritage cultural influences people are exposed to due to globalization, which leads people to construct multicultural identities through indirect contact with other cultures. These cultural elements are frequently products of Western countries and the United States in particular, due to its dominance over global affairs (Arnett, 2002). In the context of globalization, assimilation manifests as a rejection of the local culture and adoption of the global one (Jensen et al., 2011). Separation is the rejection of the global culture in favor of preserving one's local culture. People using this strategy find that their local culture provides meaning and structure lacking in global culture, and consciously express their local culture in order to ward off globalization. There are also cases of marginalization, in which people find themselves alienated from both local and global culture. Frequently, globalization has modified the local culture, fostering a disconnect with

one's local identity, while simultaneously the global culture is rejected by or rejects them. The last strategy, and the one identified by Berry (1997) as the most adaptive, is integration, or a bicultural response. Integration produces a sense of belonging in both local and global cultures, where "in addition to their local identity, young people develop a global identity that gives them a sense of belonging to a worldwide culture and includes an awareness of the events, practices, styles, and information that are part of the global culture" (Jensen et al., 2011, p. 292). Frequently, people will draw a sense of stability and community from their local culture, while simultaneously viewing themselves as belonging to the global culture.

Although bicultural integration is seen as the most adaptive strategy, negotiating a bicultural identity can be a complicated process, partially based on the perceptions of the compatibility of the two cultures. Benet-Martínez et al. (2002) theorized that there are individual differences in the degree to which people view their different cultural identities as distinct and compatible, a process known as *bicultural identity integration* (BII). Examining Chinese American bicultural individuals, Benet-Martínez et al. (2002) found that those who perceived their cultural identities as compatible (high BII) were better at exhibiting cognitive patterns associated with each respective culture, than those who perceived their identities as oppositional (low-BII). This suggests that high-BII individuals are more adept at integrating multiple cultural streams into their cognitive processes, and can effectively identify and perform the behaviors most suitable to each cultural context, through the process of cultural frame switching (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002). Applying this to the negotiations between local and global cultural identities, the development of a bicultural identity is the acculturation strategy typical of high-BII individuals. Low-BII responses could include a much stronger affiliation with one's local than global culture (separation), vice-versa (assimilation), or a rejection of both cultures (marginalization). Low-BII individuals are more likely to perceive their local and receiving cultural streams as incompatible, and may feel that the two streams cannot meaningfully coexist.

Chen et al. (2016) proposed another individual difference bidimensional construct in relation to globalization-based acculturation.

Global orientation reflects the affective, cognitive, and behavioral reactions toward globalization, encompassing both integrative (multicultural acquisition) and exclusionary (ethnic protection) reactions. The integrative reactions involve an openness toward global influences, such as learning new languages, obtaining multicultural experience, and interacting with culturally diverse others, while the exclusionary ones contain protecting the local culture against foreign influences, believing in the superiority of the local culture, and feeling anxious about multicultural interactions. These global orientations are present among a variety of cultures (Eastern and Western) and groups (minority, majority, and immigrants) (Chen et al., 2016).

However, a bidimensional model of acculturation is often insufficient when describing the complexity of acculturation. Ferguson and Bornstein (2012) proposed the term *remote acculturation* to define a new form of acculturation across distance “by bringing geographically and historically separate people groups into meaningful contact, albeit indirectly or intermittently” (Ferguson & Adams, 2016, p. 104). The main facilitators of remote acculturation are media and the Internet (Ferguson et al., 2017). They allow for the transportation of other cultural spaces into local communities. Unlike migration-based acculturation models, remote acculturation can also be the product of intermittent or indirect contact with tourists, and foreign cultural products like food and other imports (Ferguson et al., 2017). In fact, Ferguson and Adams (2016) study of affiliations with American culture in young South Africans identified two major vehicles of remote acculturation: consumption of U.S. goods and food. Ferguson et al. (2017) argue that there are three ways in which remote acculturation is different from the Jensen et al.’s (2011) adaptation of Berry’s (1997) immigration-based strategies. First, it focuses on acculturation to specific cultures, and not a broadly defined global (or Western) culture. Second, the contact can be direct but rather sporadic (e.g., tourists). Third, it expands acculturation to more than two cultural streams. Indeed, several studies have demonstrated this multicultural acculturation. For example, Ferguson et al. (2014) showed a tridimensional acculturative process for Jamaican immigrant adults in the United States negotiating their Jamaican, European American mainstream, and African American cultures. Similarly, Ozer

and Schwartz (2016) found that among adolescents and emerging adults in the Indian territory of Ladakh youths embrace Ladakhi, Indian, and Western culture. Within the United States, Markstrom (2011) demonstrated that indigenous identity formation is a function of the interplay of ethnic, national, and global identities, the negotiations of the three producing different identity types. The terms *triculturalism* (Schwartz et al., 2006), and tridimensional or multidimensional globalization-based acculturation (Ozer & Schwartz, 2016), has been used to refer to situations with multiple heritage or receiving cultures.

Remote acculturation strategies are impacted by numerous factors. As Arnett (2002) points out, adolescents and emerging adults are more likely to explore multiple cultural streams than older adults, because of their relative lack of commitments and obligations. Furthermore, global consumer culture is largely oriented toward adolescents and young adults, and its proliferation due to globalization is leading to an increased opportunity to explore trends and ideas from a variety of cultural spaces. This global culture might be less impactful for adults who predate the development of global consumerism, so they are more likely to affiliate with their heritage cultures. Besides age, there are also significant urban–rural divides in affiliation with global culture. Cities tend to be loci of globalization and their residents have greater access to internet-based interactions with global culture, contributing to urban–rural differences in remote acculturation. For example, Huntsinger et al. (2019) found that adolescents in rural Armenia are more likely to embrace traditional Armenian values like deference to elders and family interdependence, while their urban counterparts embrace values like individualism, and report stronger ties to global culture. Other factors include geographical regions (Arnett, 2002), gender and social class (Croucher, 2018), as well as the intersectionality of these variables (e.g., Calasanti, 2010).

Consumer Selfhood and Acculturation to Global Consumer Culture

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, cultural exchanges, once a function of mostly warfare and religious conversion, have increased today

through distinctive cultural resources such as capital and international trade, media and technology, business travel, and tourism (Appadurai, 1990). In postmodern capitalist societies, a key aspect of people's interactions with society and others is through consumption (Lerman & Maxwell, 2006), which leads to the development of a consumer culture. *Consumer culture* is defined as "a social arrangement in which the relations between lived culture and social resources, and between meaningful ways of life and the symbolic and material resources on which they depend, are mediated through markets" (Arnould & Thompson, 2005, p. 869). As a result of globalization, the extension of businesses organized around market principles all over the world had led to the development of a *global consumer culture* (GCC), defined as a "cultural element not associated with a single country (local or foreign), but rather a larger group generally recognized as international and transcending individual national cultures" (Alden et al., 1999, p. 80). Consumer culture is understood as emphasizing and placing increased importance on individuals' pursuits to the expense of traditional (e.g., local, religions) values (e.g., Strasser, 2003). This focus on individuals' interests leads to people imbuing the material possessions that they own or consume with symbolic values that allows them to create their identities and maintain a positive self-image (Belk, 1988; Davies & Fitchett, 2010). In turn, businesses provide the necessary products and services that allow individuals to construct narratives of self (Arnould & Thompson, 2005; Belk, 1988; Featherstone, 2007). Reese et al. (2019) term this new form of self a *consumer selfhood*, and define it as "the structuring of who and what a person is, and should ideally be, by the mechanisms of consumer culture" (p. 43). Consumer selfhood is achieved and communicated through consumption. There is an expectation that consumers are aware of what brands, products, and services are relevant to the type of identity they want to exemplify, and they utilize them appropriately. Thus, consumer selfhood is reflected through consumer lifestyle identities, which are a mixture of consumer practices that designate identification with a specific group.

Reese et al. (2019) suggest that the underlying quality of the consumer selfhood is its inherent incompleteness. In view of this incompleteness, products are purposefully offered to create a sense of a coherent

self and identity. Companies are monetarily interested in perpetuating dissatisfaction in customers by offering images of the “good life,” which are often unobtainable. Because consumer selfhood is secured through consumer products and representations, it can never be achieved, but must be reconstructed continuously in order to adjust to the constantly changing nature of these products and representations. Another aspect of the inherent incompleteness of the consumer selfhood lies in the dependency on others to provide continuing validation of one’s self and lifestyle choices. The inherent incompleteness of the consumer selfhood is intertwined with specific psychological outcomes, such as increased self-esteem and narcissistic tendencies (see Reese et al., 2019).

Research in the United States has demonstrated that self-esteem has increased in younger cohorts (Twenge et al., 2017), while simultaneously psychological well-being and mental health has declined (Twenge et al., 2010). Reese et al. (2019) propose that this is due to the substitution of genuine self-worth with artificially inflated self-esteem, leading to narcissistic tendencies that are promoted by the consumer culture. Consumer culture promotes narcissistic tendencies through the need for constant validation and feedback from others, where the sole utility of other people is to reflect a positive and often overvalued image of the self. This in turn does not lead to a genuine, but a fragile and incomplete, sense of self-worth and well-being (Reese et al., 2019).

Similarly to Berry’s (1997) strategies of acculturation as applied to global and local cultural identities (Arnett, 2002; Jensen et al., 2011) and remote and globalization-based acculturation as discussed earlier in the chapter, Cleveland and Laroche (2007) proposed that there is an *acculturation to global consumer culture* (AGCC), which “considers how individuals acquire the knowledge, skills, and behaviors that are characteristic of a nascent and deterritorialized global consumer culture” (p. 252). Furthermore, consumer acculturation is one aspect of acculturation that occurs at the individual and collective levels (Cleveland, 2018). The AGCC has seven dimensions: cosmopolitanism, traveling experiences and attitudes, English language use, global mass media exposure, exposure to multinational marketing activities, openness to and desire to emulate GCC, and self-identification with GCC (Cleveland, 2018; Cleveland & Laroche, 2007). Multiple empirical studies have examined

AGCC across several countries (see Cleveland, 2018) and two findings in particular stand out as relevant to the concept of consumer selfhood. First, there are cohort effects in the levels of AGCC. For example, Carpenter et al. (2012) using a sample of U.S. consumers across four generations (Silent Generation, Boomers, Generation X, and Generation Y) found that younger generational cohorts were more open to globalization by scoring higher on self-identification with GCC, exposure to marketing, social interactions, and cosmopolitanism. In another study with a U.S. sample, Carpenter et al. (2013) found again a negative relationship between age and the same four dimensions (self-identification with GCC, exposure to marketing, social interactions, and cosmopolitanism). Similarly, in a sample from 28 nations, Steenkamp (2019) also found the negative relationship between age and AGCC.

Second, materialism is highly correlated with AGCC. Materialism can be operationalized in different ways, but it is an individual difference variable, where highly materialistic people tend to attach high importance to possessions and wealth (Lysonski & Durvasula, 2013), as well as “to strive for the related aims of an appealing image and high status/popularity, both of which are frequently expressed via money and possessions” (Kasser, 2016, p. 490). Since research has demonstrated that higher levels of materialism are neither unique to Western cultures nor associated with affluence, but rather associated with periods and spaces that are undergoing cultural changes (Ger & Belk, 1996), and globalization is a vehicle of such changes, a positive relationship between materialism and AGCC would not be surprising. Indeed, research demonstrates this positive relationship across various cultural spaces such as in Japan (Cleveland et al., 2015), United States, China, New Zealand, Nigeria (Durvasula & Lysonski, 2016), Iran (Naghavi, 2011), and Lebanon (Hallab, 2009).

So how are the above findings about AGCC and age, and AGCC and materialism relevant to consumer selfhood? Reese et al. (2019) argue that narcissistic tendencies are one characteristic of consumer selfhood and some research demonstrates that younger people tend to be higher on narcissism (Foster et al., 2003). This, together with the positive relationship between AGCC and age, could suggest that AGCC is related to narcissistic tendencies. However, existing research

on generational narcissism does not provide a clear picture for the hypothesized relationship. There has been a debate in regard to whether narcissism has been increasing in American culture. In their book *The Narcissism Epidemic*, Twenge and Campbell (2009) argue that there are five key causes to raising narcissism in the American culture: self-admiration, child-centered parenting, celebrity glorification, attention seeking promoted via the Internet, and easy credit. In several studies, Twenge and her colleagues also have presented evidence for increase in narcissism especially among Millennials (e.g., Twenge & Foster, 2010; Twenge et al., 2008). However, other researchers have argued that there is not a social generational increase but rather the already established association between younger generations and higher levels of narcissism (see Roberts et al., 2010; Trzesniewski et al., 2008).

Research examining the “narcissistic epidemic” across other cultural spaces demonstrates that although sociocultural changes contribute to increased level of narcissism, most variance in narcissism scores are occurring on individual, not national level (Johnson, 2020), and the negative association between narcissism and age appears to be pretty universal. For example, Cai et al. (2012) examined Chinese demographic factors and levels of narcissism and found that younger people, people from higher classes, only-children, and people from urban areas are more narcissistic than their respective counterparts. Wilson and Sibley (2011) found that increasing age was associated with higher narcissism scores across two general population samples from New Zealand, but concluded that the data provides only evidence for age-related differences in narcissism, and not for a cultural narcissism shift. A more recent study in New Zealand measuring entitlement showed no change in it over time (Stronge et al., 2018). Similarly, Hamamura et al. (2020) did a cross-temporal meta-analysis in Australia and Canada, and found no evidence of rising narcissism. We would like to note that research that examines the relationship between symptoms of narcissism such as vanity, uniqueness, entitlement, materialism, etc. (Twenge & Campbell, 2009) might provide different evidence for whether there is a global cultural shift in narcissistic tendencies.

Indeed the relationship between materialism, globalization, and consumer selfhood is better supported by empirical research. In fact,

Reese et al. (2019) call materialism “the most conspicuous form of consumer selfhood” (p. 52), and argue that measures of materialism can be used as proxies of conventional consumer selfhood. As discussed previously there is consistent evidence that higher levels of acculturation to the global consumer culture are associated with higher levels of materialism. Literature on materialism and psychological outcomes demonstrates that there is a negative association between materialism and personal well-being. Dittmar et al.’s (2014) meta-analysis on the association between individuals’ materialistic orientation and their personal well-being, including samples from multiple cultural spaces, demonstrated a modest negative correlation, but its size was dependent on the ways materialism and well-being were measured. A more recent meta-analysis (Moldes & Ku, 2020) examined the causal effects of materialism not only on individual but also on societal (“factors that contribute to the good functioning of a group and that will directly or indirectly affect the current and future welfare of the group and other members,” p. 1398) well-being, by examining studies that primed materialism and measured well-being. Multilevel modeling revealed that materialism had a negative effect on both individual and societal well-being, leading the authors to conclude that materialistic cues cause lower well-being. These findings are consistent with research in Norway (Hellevik, 2003) and the United States (Twenge et al., 2010) demonstrating that generational increases in individual materialism were correlated with national decreases in well-being. Although the relationship between materialism, AGCC, and well-being have been established across multiple cultural spaces, Gonzalez-Fuentez (2019) showed that cultural contexts (i.e., individualistic and collectivistic) have an impact on how materialism is formed. In a study with Japanese and American millennials, Gonzalez-Fuentez (2019) found that for participants from collectivist Japan, materialism was determined more by their national identity, while for participants from individualist United States, materialism was determined by changes enacted in their global identities.

Inclusive Global Identities

Beyond the impact on one's self-construal and cultural identity, the interconnectedness of cultures afforded by globalization can lead to the formation of an identity that can go beyond one's national or cultural identity (Arnett, 2002; Reese et al., 2019). That global identity "gives them [young people] a sense of belonging to a worldwide culture and includes an awareness of the events, practices, styles, and information that are part of the global culture" (Arnett, 2002, p. 777). Indeed, research supports the idea that people can see themselves as part of a larger global community (e.g., GlobeScan, 2016). Although researchers might not agree on what is the most appropriate term to describe the identification with a global community, the majority of empirical findings suggest that such identification tends to have positive associations with values and behaviors that are beneficial to the global community.

Although the idea of identification with all of humanity or the broader global community is not new and can be traced back to the concept of cosmopolitanism in ancient Greece (Inglis, 2014), research in psychology over the last two decades has arrived at different conceptualizations of belonging to and identifying with a community beyond one's culture or nation-state. While some researchers have retained the concept of cosmopolitanism (Driezen et al., 2021; Faulkner, 2018) and others examined the psychological sense of global community (Malsch, 2005), global humanity (Furlong & Vignoles, 2021), global identity (Türken & Rudmin, 2013), and global belonging (Der-Karabetian et al., 2014), still others have proposed terminology that measures the level of identification with all-inclusive global communities: identification with the world as a whole (Buchan et al., 2011), identification with all humanity (IWAH) (McFarland et al., 2012), global social identification (Reese et al., 2014), world citizen (Bayram, 2015), and identification with global citizens (Reysen & Kartzarska-Miller, 2013a).

Regardless of the terminology used, overall, research demonstrates that psychological identification with a global community is associated overwhelmingly with prosocial values and behaviors. For example, Reysen and Kartzarska-Miller's (2013a) model of global citizenship identification argues that there are six clusters of prosocial values that are

connected to the identity label of a global citizen: intergroup empathy (empathy for people outside one's ingroup), valuing diversity, social justice, intergroup helping (desire to help people outside one's ingroup), environmental sustainability, and felt responsibility to act for the betterment of the world. These six clusters have been replicated in multiple studies (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018), and other researchers have also found that identification with a broader global community is associated with the same or similar prosocial values. In regard to valuing diversity and social justice, Bayram (2019), using data from the World Value Survey (2010–2014), found a positive correlation between identification as a world citizen and priority to reducing poverty in the world and a belief that ethnic diversity enriches life. IWAH predicts commitment to international human rights and concern for global humanitarian needs (e.g., world hunger, HIV/AIDS) (McFarland, 2017) and valuing the lives of all human beings equally (McFarland et al., 2012). Psychological sense of global community was also found to predict concerns for human rights (Hackett et al., 2015).

Research on the relationship between environmental concerns and global identification has also shown consistent positive relationship. For example Rosenmann et al. (2016), using data from the World Values Survey (2005–2009, 2010–2014), found a higher degree of seeing the self as a world citizen predicted a greater chance of being an active than non-active member of an environmental group, and willingness to provide monetarily support for environmental causes. Similarly, Renger and Reese (2017) observed a positive association between global identity and environmental behavioral intentions (e.g., interest to engage in environmental activism). Der-Karabetian et al. (2014) found global belonging to be a positive predictor of engaging in environmentally sustainable behaviors.

If these inclusive global identities are associated with positive outcomes, how can people become global citizens, or develop the feeling of belongingness with a global community? Although this question has received some empirical attention, the answers are not definite, but they open the door to several potential pathways. Reysen and Katzarska-Miller's (2013a) model suggests that one's normative environment (whether family, friends, or school and work environments) will

promote global citizenship if the environment is supportive of global citizen values. Hamer (2017) found that American students who remembered having “opening up experiences” (e.g., parents teaching empathy and openness toward all; having experiences that led to connection with other groups) as children scored higher on IWAH measure. Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2017) examined whether global citizenship identification is mediated by the perception that one’s normative environment promotes a global citizen identity in Bulgarian and American contexts. First, they found that there are many more global versus domestic stories in Bulgarian print media than the American one. Second, results showed that Bulgarians’ frequency of media consumption was associated with self-reported global citizenship identification, and this relationship was mediated by their perception of their normative environment as prescribing a global citizen identity.

Following their model, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013b, 2018) have recommended ways in which global citizenship can be used in educational institutions to promote belongingness to a global community. Some research has supported that perceiving a university environment as prescribing a global citizen identity (Blake et al., 2015) and teaching empathy and compassion to adults (Brito-Pons et al., 2018) can promote increased global identification. Other research, however, has shown that not actual world knowledge rather than perceived one (Reysen et al., 2013) led to higher global identification, and that certain global activities might not increase identification (Reysen et al., 2021). Although psychological research on the topic is needed, in the discipline of education there is a significant amount of theorizing and research on global education that provides insights into educating global citizens.

Another important pathway to increasing global belongingness, as proposed by Reese et al. (2019), is international contact. Sparkman and Eidelman (2018) found that the quality and the quantity of intercultural contacts were positively correlated with IWAH. Röpke et al. (2019) demonstrated that German participants who interacted with a South American in a simulated web-based chat reported higher global identity than control participants. In another study using a 6-month follow-up, the actual amount international contacts students reported they had during that period predicted their global identity. Similarly, Loy et al.

(2021) observed that while the frequency and duration of international travel for German people in Europe was not related to global identity, the amount and perceived quality of contact with people in the other countries were positively related to global identity. Research on study abroad programs also demonstrates the role of intercultural contact on the development of global identity. Hendershot and Sperandio (2009) in a qualitative study of students participating in the Global Citizenship Program in Lehigh University found that the experiences with other cultures through the program-organized study abroad were perceived as the most important element in the development of participants' global citizen identity. Similarly, students who study abroad report greater endorsement of seeing themselves as world citizens (Miller, 2014), and a positive association between study abroad and IWAH (Belt, 2016).

Conclusion

Globalization has impacted how people construct the self and the availability of cultural streams that one can select elements from to construct one's cultural identity. Although empirical research has provided some answers, multiple other questions and considerations remain. The global shift to a more individualistic conceptualization of self and its associated values, cognitive and development changes, and practices, the acculturation to the global consumer culture, and the development of consumer selfhood, open up the question of whether the world is moving to a more Westernized and homogenized existence. Some of the findings discussed challenge such an interpretation. Recent trends of the increasing popularity of practices coming from more collectivist settings, such as yoga and Chinese medicine, bear the consideration of whether the values associated with these practices are impacting practitioners, or are rather subsumed by the consumer culture. The formation of global identity and overall experience of a psychological connection with a global community, and its association with prosocial values, raises the question of whether this could be the solution to some of the problems that are exacerbated by globalization (e.g., increasing wealth divide, climate change, terrorism and displacement of people). Although

psychological methodology does not lend itself easily to intersectional thinking (Goff & Kahn, 2013), as suggested by some of the theorizing on globalization-based acculturation, limiting identity negotiation strategies to navigating only two cultural streams, and examining construals of self as a function of predominantly geographical location, does not provide an insight into the nuanced ways in which people's lived experiences are an amalgamation of their multiple identities.

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3

How Globalization Introduced by Immigration Shapes Intragroup and Intergroup Relations

Angel D. Armenta , Jessica R. Bray,
and Michael A. Zárate

Globalization occurs when cultures within and beyond a society influence one another through trade and exchange of ideas and information (Arnett, 2002). One important driver of globalization is immigration. Immigration has steadily increased all over the world and, as a result, demographics, including the rise in racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants in the United States and elsewhere, have changed steadily over the past decade (Ax, 2021; Zárate et al., 2019). The White population in the United States, for example, has declined for the first time in history (Ax, 2021). These demographic shifts are a type of cultural change that produces cultural stress, but also benefits society in a variety of ways. Demographic shifts impact culture by diversifying and creating new businesses, and bring forth financial gains at the macro and individual level (Simonton, 1997). Globalization forces people to face cultural change

A. D. Armenta (✉) · J. R. Bray · M. A. Zárate
University of Texas, El Paso, TX, USA
e-mail: adarmonta@miners.utep.edu

and adapt to change. Some individuals endorse change while others resist it in an attempt to remain in a stable culture. Contextual factors such as local norms and population characteristics, and individual difference factors like liberalism/conservatism, can influence one's propensity to seek out change or stability. Those factors are described below.

In this chapter, we focus on immigration as an important driver of globalization. We describe the positive financial ramifications of globalization. Using the Cultural Inertia Model (CIM), we discuss how globalization is linked to negative consequences for intergroup interactions, as well as who is more likely to reject or accept cultural change brought upon by a diversifying world. Additionally, we discuss who is more likely to endorse/accept globalization as well as a global identity. We end the chapter by providing potential solutions for adaptation toward societal changes brought on by globalization, and future directions for research.

Positive Consequences of Globalization

Immigration is a driving force of globalization and demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019), thus leading to a more diverse social world. While diversity and globalization are distinct constructs, we draw heavily from work on diversity to make inferences about the effects of globalization on intergroup processes. By definition, globalization entails interacting with individuals from different groups, hence our generalization. Those interactions are theorized to benefit individuals at various levels. For example, globalization through increased immigration causes increases in diversity, which, in turn, leads to financial benefits.

Financial Benefits of Globalization

Immigration drives globalization and provides financial benefits to both the immigrants and the host society. When people move into new countries, they bring their culture, business ventures, and commerce.

Although immigrants make up only about 13% of the U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019a), they contribute to the U.S. economy beyond their population proportion. Immigrants fill key gaps in the U.S. economy by working in labor-based occupations such as fishing, construction, and grounds cleaning (Bellovary et al., 2020; Sherman et al., 2019). Racial/ethnic minorities and/or immigrants are more likely to start new businesses than native-born citizens (Joint Economic Committee, 2020). A recent report by the Joint Economic Committee (2020) detailed that in the United States, 75% of Asian-owned businesses, about 50% of Latino-owned businesses, and about 25% of Black-owned businesses are owned by immigrant entrepreneurs. All those numbers exceed the numbers of native-born owned businesses. Moreover, immigrant workers are also consumers who wield \$1.3 trillion in spending power. Immigrants with degrees in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) are responsible for 75% of new patents from top producing U.S. universities, which leads to increased job opportunities across the United States (Joint Economic Committee, 2020), and this has been a trend for over a decade. For example, for every 100 immigrants with advanced STEM degrees, about 262 jobs, on average, were created for native citizens (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research & the Partnership for a New American Economy, 2011). Thus, cultural change brought on by integrating immigrants into the United States has had positive effects on intragroup relations (i.e., immigrants financially benefit from other immigrants and U.S. citizens benefit from immigrant spending power), and positive effects on intergroup relations such as American job prospects and the United States economy (New American Economy, 2017; Zavodny, 2018).

Despite all of the aforementioned benefits of globalization caused by immigration, many people react negatively toward cultural change. However, change in and of itself is not positive or negative. In the face of change, one's cultural norms are potentially challenged, local interaction patterns are potentially changed, and new opportunities arise. How one handles the change determines whether the change will be stressful or encouraging.

The Cultural Inertia Model

As globalization increases, it is imperative that researchers study how individuals react toward cultural change and how cultural change affects intergroup relations and processes. We use the Cultural Inertia Model (CIM) to study change and its effect on intergroup relations. Generally, the CIM has only been utilized to investigate negative reactions toward cultural change. Thus, this section of the chapter uses CIM to discuss the negative ramifications of cultural change. The CIM has four tenants that are analogous to Isaac Newton's laws of motion (Quezada et al., 2012; Zárata et al., 2019). First, cultures at rest desire to stay at rest (i.e., a "stable" culture will strive to remain stable). Second, cultures in motion aim to continue moving (i.e., a "dynamic" culture will strive to remain dynamic). Third, and this applies to the first two tenets, cultures are theorized to react toward cultural change and globalization in an attempt to maintain their respective status quo (i.e., cultures will fight back against cultural change and those who enact it).

Fourth, the CIM contends that there are individual difference factors that exacerbate or reduce negative reactions toward cultural shifts. Variables that exacerbate negative reactions toward cultural shifts can be thought of as psychological anchors. An anchor *prevents* a vessel from moving forward. In much the same way, psychological anchors prevent cultural change. Obvious anchors include group identity and political conservatism. Individuals with a strong group identity resist change more so than those who are poorly connected to the group identity. Similarly, political conservatism acts as an anchor, where the very name suggests conserving the current norms. Research shows that individuals who are high on these two variables are more resistant toward change (Armenta et al., In Press; Zárata et al., 2019). On the other hand, variables that promote change or produce positive reactions toward change are considered psychological propellers. A propeller *allows* a vessel to move forward and onward. Those who score higher on psychological propellers are more likely to accept cultural change. Openness to new experiences produces a greater desire for change. Similarly, individuals high in political liberalism, sometimes called progressives, appear more open to change (Zárata et al., 2019).

Through all four tenets, the CIM provides an organizing model to study how people may react toward cultural change brought upon by the driving forces of globalization (e.g., immigration, demographic changes, etc.) at the macro and micro level, as well as who is more likely to reject or accept globalization (for a more detailed description of the model see Zárate et al., 2019).

Negative Consequences of Globalization

Static societies are defined as civilizations with relatively little cultural change. The CIM posits that stable (i.e., static societies) are the most reactant against cultural change (Zárate et al., 2019). Stable societies rarely introduce change to existing norms and practices because they enjoy their cultural lifestyles. Per the CIM, these cultural practices and lifestyles are theorized to become an extension of their self-concept, making it difficult for external forces, that introduce change, to be welcomed and accepted.

Societal or local norms can produce a greater resistance toward change. For example, in the United States, the Midwest continues to racially identify as White (over 70% identify as White), and these demographics have not changed in over a century. The lack of change over time produced a static society. As such, there has also been very little variation in political ideology in the Midwest (Pew Research Center, 2014). Recently, however, increased immigration has caused many static societies to experience increased globalization and, as a result, cultural change. For example, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, went from being 7% Latino in 2000 to 58% Latino in 2019 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019b). These demographic shifts have caused many White residents of Hazleton to feel increased anxiety and fear for their group's existence (Norris, 2018). These demographic shifts are also found elsewhere. The overall population in four states in the United States (Connecticut, Illinois, Vermont, and West Virginia) decreased, while the Latino population in these areas increased (Krogstad, 2020). While we focused on examples of static cultures in the United States, they are not limited to the United States. Per the CIM, these identifiable demographic shifts in

static cultures are theorized to generate stress, and in turn, generate intergroup strife (Zárate et al., 2019).

The CIM posits that static groups avoid cultural change because cultural change threatens the lifestyles, routines, and potentially the status quo of the societies that have become an extension of the “self-concept” (Zárate et al., 2019). For example, Armenta and colleagues (in press) examined how introducing cultural change in static cultures may lead to prejudice, by manipulating cultural change through vignettes. In one condition, participants read that cultural change was occurring in the United States, due to Latino immigrants, while in the second condition, participants believed that U.S. culture was remaining stable despite Latino immigration. Immigration was equally stressed in both conditions, but we manipulated how much change that immigration entailed. The findings demonstrated that White participants reported higher negative attitudes toward Latino immigrants and higher endorsement of anti-immigration policies when cultural change was salient in comparison to when cultural stability was salient. These findings showcase that people in static cultures react against cultural change caused by globalization presumably because cultural change challenges the status quo.

The aforementioned findings are not limited to White populations or majority groups. Minority groups also avoid cultural change when possible. For example, Latino people who reside in relatively homogeneous spaces are theorized to be in an existing state of rest. Latinos in these static cultures appreciate, endorse, and support their people, culture, and customs and avoid changing their cultural tapestry. When these cultural objects are threatened by an external force that introduces or threatens to introduce change (e.g., immigration, political campaigns, etc.), they react negatively against the cultural change, and those who are enacting it. For example, research has demonstrated that Latino people in El Paso, TX, a U.S./Mexico border city, increased their negative attitudes toward White individuals who were perceived to be introducing cultural change (Quezada et al., 2012). However, Latinos showed no changes in attitudes toward White people who were perceived to assimilate to Latino culture (i.e., produce no cultural change). Thus, static cultures fight to remain stable regardless of the cultural composition of the group.

In addition to challenging the customs and cultures of the majority and minority groups, globalization is perceived as threatening because it changes the prototypicality of the group's composition. In the United States, people often equate American with being "White" (Danbold & Huo, 2015; Devos & Banaji, 2005). When demographic shifts threaten America's White composition, people react against those changes. Danbold and Huo (2015) found that when majority groups are presented with data demonstrating that racial demographics are changing the group composition, participants were significantly less likely to endorse diversity initiatives. Other research found that demographic changes lead White individuals to endorse anti-immigrant legislation (Craig & Richeson, 2014). Thus, when presented with a change that is perceived as shifting the local culture (i.e., demographic changes, immigration), majority members' group identity is magnified, and subsequent behaviors aim to prevent significant changes to the existing cultural tapestry (i.e., endorsing anti-immigrant policies, forgoing support for diversity initiatives). These findings demonstrate that cultural change changes the group identity of majority members and the group prototype for the existing cultural landscape, and causes people to react against those changes through whatever methods they deem necessary. These methods, however, usually result in increased prejudice and discrimination against the relevant outgroup. Thus, research across multiple labs demonstrates that the agents causing cultural change as a result of globalization at the macro level (e.g., immigration, demographic shifts, etc.) influence negative reactions at the individual level.

Given that cultural change caused by increased immigration and globalization threatens the cultural tapestry of the quintessential American group (i.e., White people in the United States), one possible factor that may be driving negative reactions toward cultural change is extinction threat. Extinction threat is the perception that one's group can face extinction under certain conditions and may lead groups to seek ways to protect themselves (Bai & Federico, 2019). The CIM posits that making cultural change salient should increase one's fear about the future of their group. In line with this, our laboratory has found that when abrupt cultural change is made salient, majority of group members report higher extinction threat relative to when cultural stability is made

salient (Armenta et al., in press). Outten et al. (2012) reported similar results, where White Canadians and White Americans reported higher fear and sympathy for their group when cultural change was believed to be occurring due to increases in the numbers of ethnic minorities.

Psychological Anchors

The CIM posits that there are psychological anchors that exacerbate negative reactions toward societal shifts. While there is limited research on psychological anchors within the context of the CIM, we propose that national nostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a country's past) is one such anchor. In our lab, we have found that national nostalgia is linked to increases in negative attitudes toward Latino immigrants, greater ingroup protection (i.e., the extent to which individuals want to safeguard their ingroup from outgroup members), and outgroup derogation (i.e., the extent to which individuals want to devalue, diminish, etc. the outgroup). In a recent study, we investigated how societal shifts, such as the Black Lives Matter movement or creating a new normal following the COVID-19 pandemic, influenced support for changing one's life. We found that higher levels of national nostalgia predicted more negative reactions toward the Black Lives Matter movement and the creation of new social norms, presumably because the Black Lives Matter movement and the COVID-19 pandemic are perceived to be enactors of cultural change (Armenta et al., 2021).

Racial/ethnic identity is also conceptualized as a psychological anchor. The model predicts that those who are highly identified with their ethnic group will reject cultural change at higher levels than those less identified with their racial/ethnic identity. Morrison et al. (2010), for example, found that highly identified White Americans were more likely to report greater social dominance and greater disdain toward minority groups. Similarly, experimental research demonstrates that Latinos who highly identify with their ethnic group are more likely to report greater resistance toward cultural change, as well as greater prejudice toward those believed to be enacting that change (Quezada et al., 2012). Thus,

psychological anchors exacerbate negative reactions toward globalization. Considering that cultural changes are likely to continue, and as a result, intergroup strife is likely to increase, it is important for researchers to study possible methods of reducing intergroup hostility caused by globalization.

Solutions for Living in a Changing World

A growing body of research has investigated solutions for reducing negative reactions toward cultural change brought upon by globalization. The CIM posits that one potential solution for reducing negative reactions toward globalization is to frame cultural change as continuous (i.e., cultural change in the present is similar to cultural shifts from the past) than abrupt (i.e., the current cultural change occurring is sudden and distinct from past cultural shifts). For example, in our laboratory, we found that framing anti-immigrant policies proposed by President Donald Trump as a *continuation* of existing conservative policies proposed by the Republican party rather than an *abrupt* change from existing conservative policies proposed by the Republican party produced less severe negative reactions toward the policies in Latino participants. Similar to previous findings, identity was an important factor in understanding negative reactions toward cultural change. In the above mentioned experiment, highly identified Latino participants expressed more negative reactions, than less identified Latino participants (Armenta et al., in press). More importantly, as with basic inertia concepts, the abrupt change produced greater reactions than continual change.

We conceptually replicated and extended these effects in a second experiment with White participants. We manipulated whether the immigration population in the United States was constantly growing and always changing, or whether the immigration population had recently experienced a sudden spike in numbers. We randomly assigned participants to either receive presentations that described immigration trends in the United States as historically stable across time with an abrupt increase in the foreign-born population, or historically continuous across

time with dips and increases in the foreign-born population. Our findings demonstrated that abrupt cultural change produced more ingroup protection, outgroup derogation, and collective angst (i.e., fear toward the future existence of the ingroup). These effects were mediated by fear (Armenta et al., in press).

Overall, our findings demonstrate that abrupt change is significantly more threatening in comparison to continuous cultural change. One reason why abrupt change may be perceived as more threatening is that it risks the sudden loss of one's self-concept, while continuous cultural change suggests that the cultural objects, people, and routines that have become an extension of the self-concept will ultimately remain intact. Thus, one solution to reduce intergroup strife caused by globalization may be to frame the cultural change as continuous (which is arguably more accurate) rather than abrupt.

Psychological Propellers

In contrast to psychological anchors, propellers are theorized to drive or cause an individual to accept cultural change. We propose that openness to new experiences and need for novelty are traits that enable constant morphing. Openness to new experiences reflects a tendency to actively seek out new and cognitively challenging experiences, ponder new ideas, think creatively, and enjoy intellectual pursuits (McCrae & Sutin, 2009). Individuals high in openness to new experiences have greater access to a variety of feelings, thoughts, perspectives, and ideas, and, as a result, may be more adaptable to changing circumstances given the wider range of experiences encountered. They are generally more willing and able to come up with and think about new ideas that challenge the status quo (McCrae & Costa, 1997). On the other hand, people who are low on openness to new experiences are more conservative and demonstrate a greater liking for ideas and things that are familiar and conventional rather than novel and unique (Costa & McCrae, 1992).

Like openness to new experiences, research has shown that need for novelty facilitates changes in one's environment (Oreg, 2003). For example, one study found that innovative individuals generally exhibit a

greater need for novel stimuli (Goldsmith, 1984). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that people who resist change would exhibit a weaker need for novelty. It has also been reported that need for novelty is inversely related to harm avoidance (McCourt et al., 1993) and, as a result, those low in need for novelty often seek fewer new life experiences. In addition, because change often involves an increase in stimulation, those who prefer lower levels of stimulation may resist change. We posit that need for novelty is a natural propeller, such that those high in need for novelty possess the desire to seek continuous change and engage in constant transformation.

In line with the psychological propeller work, we propose that thinking about the future of the nation produces more positive feelings toward change and globalization. Future thinking has been linked to motivation and optimism (Vasquez & Buehler, 2007). It is also linked to increased mental well-being and goal planning (D'Argembeau et al., 2010). Thus, we contend that future thinking regarding one's country (what we call national prosthagia) may be a psychological propeller. We define national prosthagia as a sentimental longing for the future of one's country. At an empirical level, it is operationalized as conceptually the opposite of national nostalgia. In a recent paper (Armenta et al., 2021), we found that those higher in national prosthagia reported greater support toward the Black Lives Matter movement and the creation of new social norms. Similarly, we have found that national prosthagia was linked to lower prejudice toward Latino immigrants, lower ingroup protection, lower outgroup derogation, and lower odds of supporting President Donald Trump. Thus, national prosthagia may foster support for cultural change (Armenta et al., 2021). Future work should experimentally test whether promoting or fostering psychological propellers such as openness to new experiences, need for novelty, and national prosthagia *causes* reductions in negative reactions toward societal shifts.

Finally, the literature on intergroup strife has also identified other possible psychological propellers. For example, global identity may be considered a psychological propeller in the context of the CIM. Global identity (i.e., identifying with humanity as a whole) has been linked to a variety of pro-social outcomes such as increased empathy toward global crisis, donating to global causes (Reese et al., 2015), social justice, and

embracing cultural diversity (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). Thus, it is possible that global identity acts as a psychological propeller and fosters acceptance of cultural change caused by globalization.

Future Directions: Dynamic Societies

In contrast to static societies, a dynamic society is open and embracing of change. Dynamic societies are characterized by constant change, activity, or progress. In the United States, Silicon Valley, CA, Austin, TX, and New York City, NY are ranked among the top 10 most dynamic cities (Piperato, 2014). These cities share a capacity to embrace rapid change. Research has shown that personality traits predict migration within and between U.S. states, such that high openness and low agreeableness predicted increased migration (Jokela, 2009). Based on this evidence, we argue that the residents of the world's most dynamic cities are ready to create change that will continue shaping the urban experience and its' future. When a culture is dynamic, individuals and groups reside in a psychological state where more change is desired. For example, introducing change in New York City should not significantly impact New Yorkers since they are continuously exposed to gradual change. These characteristics relate to the second tenet of the CIM, which suggests that a culture in motion stays in motion with the same speed and in the same direction unless acted upon by an unbalanced force (i.e., a variable that goes against the existing norm). Despite growing research on diversity and globalization, few studies have focused on investigating the extent to which introducing an unbalanced force to a culture in motion affects group processes.

Unsurprisingly, the most dynamic cities are places with diverse ideas, demographics, perspectives, and predictive models, likely because dynamic societies are typically progressive (Page, 2007). The constant cultural change can easily produce a desire for more change. Diverse groups who are in an environment that is conducive to idea sharing can build on an initial innovative solution by suggesting improvements that were not originally included. As a result, environments in dynamic societies are continuously changing and transforming, most often, through

innovation. The most dynamic cities in America share several similarities. For example, the top dynamic cities take advantage of technology trends and provide fertile environments for innovation; are rapidly urbanizing; are growth hotspots; and are resurgent cities gearing up for events in the near future. These characteristics attract a variety of individuals from different backgrounds, resulting in demographic populations that are socially and educationally diverse (Piperato, 2014). Given the increasing diversity within dynamic and diverse cities, these cultures also facilitate an increasing amount of intergroup contact. Contact theory suggests that positive intergroup contact improves perceptions of “others,” resulting in reduced prejudice and social distancing (Barlow et al., 2012). However, limited research has investigated the societal context as a contributing factor toward improved intergroup relations. Thus, future work should investigate whether dynamic societies react differently to cultural shifts. If our predictions are supported, dynamic societies should react positively to cultural change and negatively toward cultural stability.

Additionally, dynamic cultures may be more embracing of global identities in comparison to static cultures. Research demonstrates that countries with higher globalization levels report stronger negative correlations between global identity and xenophobia, such that the higher you identify with global identity, the lower your anti-immigrant attitudes (Ariely, 2016). Thus, it is possible that dynamic cultures are more likely to embrace multicultural approaches, reject stability, and these effects should be exacerbated for those who report greater levels of global identity.

Conclusion

Globalization produces cultural shifts that have major consequences for peoples’ lives. Many of these cultural shifts are caused by increased immigration. Although globalization has positive impacts on peoples’ lives (e.g., increased financial growth), people tend to respond to change negatively. Those negative reactions have significant implications for psychological research and can be investigated through the CIM. Per the CIM, psychological anchors such as nostalgia may hinder people

from accepting change and lead to them reacting negatively in the face of change. Based on the CIM, we propose that shifting how change is presented can foster acceptance of globalization and cultural change. Additionally, psychological propellers, such as national prostaigia, and framing change as a continuation of previous policies may help those in static cultures accept the inevitable change brought upon by globalization.

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4

Globalization and Global Consumer Culture: The Fragmentation, Fortification, Substitution and Transmutation of Social Identities

Mark Cleveland

The forces of globalization, above all those connected to the movement of people across borders and the internationalization of markets and media, are loosening and reconfiguring cultural identities, and in some cases, stimulating resistance to globalization and promoting the reinforcement of traditional bonds. Cultural identity was once a straightforward concept, in that the indigenous (local) society was the primary impetus for the development of such an identity. Cultural identity formation nowadays is a more complex phenomenon, given that an increasing number of people identify with more than one cultural group, and they have to figure out how to navigate between these multiple cultures. Since these multiple cultures “can be incorporated into a person’s identity in many different ways depending on individual choices and the status or power of the different cultures in question,

M. Cleveland (✉)

University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada
e-mail: mclevela@uwo.ca

cultural identities take on highly diverse forms in a global world” (Jensen et al., 2011, p. 286).

Globalization is a popular theme in the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and political economy, and a burgeoning literature on the subject can be found in the international business and marketing literature. However, globalization has attracted little research attention in psychology (Chiu & Kwan, 2016). This is a curious omission since the psychological reactions to globalization, including the development of identities that transcend ethnic and national boundaries, challenges researchers’ assumptions “about the nature of community, personal attachment, and belonging” (Woodward et al., 2008, p. 207) at a time when the connections between cultures and countries have dramatically intensified (Arnett, 2002). Understanding the social impact of globalization and individuals’ acceptance or resistance toward global identities have important ramifications for theory and practice, and perhaps even for public policy.

This chapter focuses on how globalization and global consumer culture (hereafter, GCC) contribute to the formation and maintenance of cultural identity. GCC comprises a set of values and characteristics that may conflict with parochial values and characteristics, and it potentially represents a supplementary or substitute basis for cultural identity. Grasping the effects of globalization on identity requires the adoption of an interdisciplinary perspective, integrating theories from social psychology and cultural anthropology with insights acquired from marketing and consumer behavior. Following a synopsis of the globalization literature, I review social psychology theories that are relevant for discerning how self-concept and cultural identity are shaped by globalization. After elaborating on the character and evolution of GCC, I focus on the dissemination and acquisition of GCC. Next, I delve into contexts and conditions that encourage or impede the maintenance, integration and alternation of specific cultural identities. I will touch on the roles played by formal institutions (e.g., WTO), informal movements (e.g., populism, environmentalism), geopolitical events (e.g., Brexit), meta-trends (e.g., immigration, technology, social media) and

crises (e.g., COVID-19), in terms of how these independently and interactively foster pro-global and anti-global sentiments. The chapter closes with an appraisal of how these sentiments influence cultural identities, and their ramifications for global consumer culture.

Globalization: Definition and a Brief History

Globalization is a term that was first used in the 1930s, but which did not gain currency for decades (James & Steger, 2014). Since the mid-1990s, however, it has attracted a huge amount of attention in the popular press, and scholars have likewise published volumes of largely conceptual papers discussing globalization's effects on society (Cleveland, 2018).

Numerous definitions for globalization have been advanced. As stated by Harvey (1999), globalization represents the compression of time and space. Gilpin (1987) described globalization as a swelling "...interdependence of national economies in trade, finance, and macroeconomic policy" (p. 389). Waters (1995) alternatively defined globalization as "a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding" (p. 3). Albrow's (1997) definition explicitly notes the effect globalization has on individuals, describing globalization as the "...diffusion of practices, values, and technology that have an influence on people's lives worldwide" (p. 88). Both Giddens (1990) and Robertson (1991) describe globalization as being driven by multiple factors. Giddens speaks about the discontinuous globalization processes driven by capitalism, the inter-state system, militarism and industrialism; whereas Robertson stresses the dynamic interdependent factors of politics (Western imperialism), economics (capitalism), and culture (i.e., the global media system).

Taking these conceptualizations together, globalization is a pervasive, ongoing series of multi-layered processes or forces, each progressing at varying speeds in different parts of the world and differentially affecting sectors of the population (Cleveland & Laroche, 2007). Globalization is neither new nor complete; neither is it a coordinated movement nor

an accomplished fact, but rather it is best considered as representing a succession of waves. In reality, the concept of global human society predates the existence of most contemporary ethnonational societies, going back to the Roman Empire (Robertson, 1990). Periods of extensive economic integration have occurred for at least 2000 years, first under the Roman Empire and later, with trade networks like the Silk Road, which operated between medieval European kingdoms, and civilizations in Arabia, Africa, Central Asia and the Far East. Prior to the modern period, the world economy achieved peak integration before the 1900s, principally through the British Empire and other colonial domains. During the period corresponding to the two world wars and their aftermaths, global integration went into retreat and national identities were resurgent. It was not until the late 1960s, as the result of technological advancements in transportation and media, followed by trade liberalization efforts, that globalization began to increase once again.

Many people are unaware that the nation-state is relatively new construction, which, by bringing together disparate regions and cities under a centralized authority, started in Europe in the eighteenth century before spreading worldwide, particularly during the era of decolonization following the Second World War. These developments, in turn, gave birth to national cultures and identities that were fashioned from some mixture of truth and myth about the past of a given area and its peoples (Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019a), and further propagated by educational, religious, political and other formal institutions of the state—often by force or other means of coercion (Renan, 1882/2002)—in conjunction with its creative industries and broadcast media.

Forces that transcend nation-states are driving contemporary culture change. According to Appadurai (1990) global cultural flows are driven by five intertwined forces, which he labeled as (1) ethnoscapes (transfers of people), (2) mediascapes (the means for the worldwide dissemination of information), (3) technoscapes (the diffusion of technological processes and know-how, and the movements across supply chains) and finanscapes (denoting the financial plumbing of globalization, including the capital and ownership instruments).

Territorialization represents “the organization of human activities by fixing them to a spatial territory”¹ (a task usually led by the nation-state). Deterritorialization (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) signifies the obverse. Up until the last quarter of the twentieth century stiff national borders obstructed the flow of information exchanges across cultures, and the lives of the vast majority of people predominantly followed local values, customs and behavioral expectations. With globalization, culture is increasingly deterritorialized (Hannerz, 1992); that is, decoupled from the constraints hitherto imposed by geography. Deterritorialization concerns each of Appadurai’s driving forces. With respect to *ethnoscapes*, for example, laboring populations (immigrants and migrant workers) are increasingly being brought into the spaces of wealthy societies; executives travel and conduct business on five continents; global diasporas of Chinese, Indians, Jews and others can be found in many of the large cities of the world. The Internet, harnessed by multinational corporations, permits information and technology (i.e., *technoscapes*) of similar content and quality, to be increasingly available in all save for the remotest corners of the globe. Regarding *mediascapes*, there are new markets for film companies, television programmers, art impresarios and travel agencies, that have cropped up to accompany the flows of people and technology across borders. As these commodities are transferred, consumer tastes are transformed. In terms of *finanscapes*, investors are pursuing the best returns, increasingly regardless of national frontiers. In addition to the culture-shaping power of modern media, ideas (re: *ideoscapes*) are shared by the growing ethnic diasporas in many Western cities, as well as by voluntary associations of intellectuals (such as academics) working together across frontiers.

As I will detail in this chapter, globalization has a profound influence on people’s values, their self-concept, including their cultural identity or identities, and by extension, their level of attachment to local, national, global and perhaps foreign communities (Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019b; Grimalda et al., 2018; Hall & Du Gay, 1996).

¹ <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199599868.001.0001/acref-9780199599868-e-1864> (Accessed July 2021).

Globalization, Culture and Cultural Identity

For the purposes of this chapter, *culture* represents a system of values, norms and customs that are shared among a group of individuals and that, when taken together, comprise a design for living (Cavusgil et al., 2016). Interlaced with nearly every human activity, culture is regarded as the dominant regulator of personal thoughts, activities and ways of life (Berry, 1997). Incoming information percolates through the lens of culture, subconsciously affecting individuals' perceptual frameworks. Reference groups are those groups that serve as standards for self-appraisals, and as a foundation to guide appropriate attitudes and norms for conduct (Batra et al., 2000). Through the activation of reference group social norms, culture also has a semi-conscious regulating effect on personal priorities and behavioral expectations (Cleveland, 2015). The next paragraphs delve into several interrelated social psychology theories that are relevant for comprehending how globalization affects self-concept and cultural identity: (a) social identity theory, (b) cognitive dissonance theory, (c) congruity theory and balance theory, (d) optimal distinctiveness theory, (e) self-verification theory, and, most important, (f) acculturation theory.

The need to belong is an innate and culturally universal human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Maslow, 1943). Expressing one's communal membership and embracing the values and activities that go together with this community is a way to fulfill this need. Social identity is a sense of "we-ness": the part of a person's self-concept that derives from their involvement in social groups, including their investment in those socially constructed categories known as cultures. Culture provides people with a way of being, and when absorbed into their self-concept, culture serves to guide their thoughts and actions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). According to *social identity theory* (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people are motivated to preserve a positive self-concept. Such feelings of social belonging motivate people to develop attitudes and engage in behaviors that favor their ingroup(s), possibly at the expense of relevant outgroups. The general root cause of such ingroup favoritism relates to the psychological need for positive distinctiveness, meaning that people are motivated to differentiate their ingroup in a positive

manner from outgroups, thereby engaging in social comparisons. The individual may come to see their ingroup as superior, which can lead to prejudice, and if the person has the ability to exert influence on the outgroup, this can lead to discrimination. In some cases, a pathway for establishing positive self-concept is for people to identify with a group perceived to have a higher status (e.g., the global “jet set”), and to dissociate or distance themselves from low status groups (e.g., the parochial community).

What happens when a person belongs to two social groups that are at odds, or when the person encounters information that paints the undesirable outgroup (enviable ingroup) in a favorable (unfavorable) light? *Cognitive dissonance* (Festinger, 1962) is the mental discomfort experienced by a person having two or more contradictory beliefs, values or ideas at the same time. When experiencing dissonance, a person is motivated to reduce this psychological tension by either changing their perceptions or attitudes (e.g., about the cultural outgroup), or ignoring information (e.g., adverse material about one’s national history) that conflicts with existing beliefs. *Congruity theory* (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) likewise posits that individuals seek consistency in their thoughts. When a state of inconsistency exists, individuals are motivated to modify their thoughts as a way of restoring consistency. Also positing an inherent desire for cognitive stability, *balance theory* (Heider, 1958/2013) applies to systems involving three elements, typically signifying a triadic relationship between the self, another person and an object/event. Being attracted to the GCC while having a partner or best friend that is strongly nationalistic creates tension and is thus an example of an unbalanced structure. On the other hand, *optimal distinctiveness theory* (Brewer, 1993) proposes that people face ambivalence arising from the conflict between their intrinsic need to belong with some social group and satisfying their motivation to be distinct from that same group. There are cases when self-esteem may be enhanced by attaining a positively distinctive social identity, such as when an individual identifies with a group that is disadvantaged, or with a group that is usually seen by others as suffering from a negative intergroup comparison (Crocker et al., 1994), for example, when the person aspires to identify with an

outgroup culture (i.e., xenocentrism, the admiration or preference of an external cultural group over the ingroup; Kent & Burnight, 1951).

Other people's impressions are also important for social identity formation. According to *self-verification theory* (Swann, 2011), individuals desire coherence and stability with respect to their identity and want to be recognized and understood by others in ways that correspond to their firmly held beliefs and feelings about themselves. If necessary, they will take action to confirm and defend their identity. Such actions include developing attitudes that assist in identity self-verification, acquiring the symbols and signs (e.g., brands) connected to their identity, and maintaining relationships with groups that enable a sense of collective belongingness.

Social identity is affected by proximity and exposure to other cultural groups, and *acculturation* can occur firsthand and indirectly. The most prominent acculturation model is that promulgated by Berry (1997), in reference to his work on the cultural change patterns of immigrants and minorities vis-à-vis the mainstream society. His framework delineates four patterns arising from the permutation of two issues, concerning the value of (a) maintaining original cultural identity and traits, and (b) establishing contact with and participation in the host culture. The first pattern is *assimilation*, whereby immigrants and minorities gradually disassociate themselves from their original ethnic culture by embracing the mainstream cultural entity. Immigrants' motivation for assimilation is often due to their yearning to enjoy the benefits associated with acceptance by the host society (Triandis et al., 1986). The opposite pattern, *separation* (Berry, 1997), or *resistance* (Mendoza & Martinez, 1981) occurs when the ethnic minority reaffirms their identification with, and orientation toward their ingroup, while minimizing or excluding identification with the mainstream society. In cases when people experience alienation or stigmatization from the mainstream, upholding one's "need to belong" (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) through ethnic affirmation (Triandis et al., 1986) is a way of promoting happiness. Under the *marginalization* pattern, instead of championing the traditional culture the individual becomes alienated from it, while also distancing themselves from the mainstream, perhaps due to having experienced discrimination. With *integration*, a mingling of traits occurs,

drawing from native and alternate cultural groups. Integration implies a mixture without the loss of distinction and is the most frequently documented cultural adjustment pattern. The long-term effect of integration is *cultural transmutation* (Mendoza & Martinez, 1981), as the comingled elements eventually fuse into a unique, creolized cultural entity and related customs (e.g., the Cajun culture and cooking of Louisiana).

Importantly, and from a behavioral standpoint, research has shown that the enactment of these acculturation patterns is often contextual: individuals can exhibit integration for one set of activities, and separation, assimilation, et cetera for other sets of activities (Cleveland et al. 2009). Cultural identity can also be triggered or exacerbated by the presence of similar others as well as by environmental and consumption cues, particularly in culturally relevant contexts. As I will detail later, these patterns can be readily extended to exposure to GCC. Similar to how minority cultures experience acculturation with respect to mainstream societies, mainstream societies around the world are increasingly facing acculturative pressures from global consumer culture. Culture change is now principally due to the sheer quantity and intensity of instruments promoting intercultural exchanges, including tourism, business travel, immigration, international trade and finance, global media and technology.

Consumer Acculturation and Global Consumer Culture

The terms “consumer” and “consuming” have progressively become the bases for labeling the human experience (Firat, 1995). *Consumer acculturation* is a subcategory of acculturation occurring at both the individual and group levels, centering on the agents and processes underlying the adoption and modification of information, values and activities typifying modern consumer culture (Peñaloza, 1994), which includes the emphasis put on satisfying individual pursuits and other characteristics connected to embracing a consumer-oriented ethos. The prevalence of media propagating advertising themes like self-indulgence and upward social mobility entices people to own and conspicuously display status

symbols connected to consumption (Cleveland, 2015; Cleveland et al., 2009). Social class was typically hereditary in pre-modern societies; however, in today's market economy, status is increasingly perceived as something achievable through consumption (Izberk-Bilgin, 2010).

Materialistic passion is inseparable from consumption. Consumption itself is impregnated with social symbolism, in that “the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with others and the society” (Blumer, 1969, p. 2). According to Baudrillard (1970/1998), the meaning of consumer objects can only be understood when viewed as a constellation (assemblage). For example, the combination of a designer watch, bespoke suit, luxury sports car and country club membership is symbolic of the lifestyle of someone with status and power, and this consumption constellation serves as inclusion and exclusion standards to demarcate social class boundaries (Izberk-Bilgin, 2010). This example demonstrates how consumer objects are part of the “extended self” (Belk, 1988; McCracken, 1986): how objects are used by individuals for personal expression as well as to signal membership in or apartness from a social groups, and how consumption “is institutionalized and legitimized as a language that operates beyond the control of the individual, yet one in which individuals need to be literate, so that they know what to consume to distinguish themselves” (Izberk-Bilgin, 2010, p. 305).

Cultural identities are asserted through lifestyles, and lifestyles reinforce cultural identities. *Symbolic self-completion theory* (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 2013) predicts that—similar to how actors in a play use props—individuals acquire and display products that they perceive will assist them to achieve identity completion. The fact that consumers extract and project cultural meaning when consuming many consumer products reflects the notion that a person's identity is wrapped up in their possessions. Testifying the notion of the progressive commodification of culture, of the six motivations that Shrum et al. (2013) enumerated for materialism, three connect to social membership. The first of these, belonging, stems from what was described earlier as the inherent human need for belongingness. To enhance their chances of acceptance by his workplace colleagues, a Chinese immigrant dwelling in Vancouver could become an enthusiastic fan of that city's professional

hockey team, and demonstrate this devotion by donning a *Vancouver Canucks* jersey on game days. That same individual may also reveal the second motivation, continuity, which relates to the maintenance of one's social identity, which might include shopping at one of the many Chinese grocery stores or subscribing to one of the many locally published Chinese-language newspapers. Likewise, distinctiveness, the third form of "other signalling," showcases consumption rituals that signal ingroup membership as well as apartness from other groups, which might be revealed when the immigrant acquires Chinese-made products and exhibits traditional artifacts when celebrating Chinese New Year.

Theodore Levitt's, 1983 publication in the *Harvard Business Review* is generally seen as the genesis of the discussion on *global consumer culture* (GCC). A substantial literature on GCC has developed (see Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019b), which builds upon theories connected to acculturation, self-concept and social identity, and draws further inspiration from the broader discourses on how globalization is affecting culture, impinging value systems, and in due course, altering the social identities, dispositions and behaviors of peoples worldwide. GCC has been described as a "cultural entity not associated with a single country, but rather a larger group generally recognized as international and transcending individual national cultures" (Alden et al., 1999, p. 80). In their study of the social identities and consumption of ethnic Greenlanders now living in Denmark, Askegaard et al. (2005) distinguished GCC as one of three acculturative influences, together with contemporary Danish culture, and traditional Greenlandic society. They described global consumer culture as foremost representing a transnational set of values and consumption practices heavily influenced by the consumer culture which arose in the United States, but that has since been diffused worldwide. Cleveland and Laroche (2007) conceived and operationalized *acculturation to global consumer culture* (i.e., AGCC) as an instrument for assessing the manner and extent to which consumers' psychologies have been shaped by GCC (Durvasula & Lysonksi, 2016). Their conceptualization spans seven dimensions.

First-hand intercultural contact via tourism, along with media, marketing and other indirect vehicles and forms of global exchanges operate as "cultural intermediaries" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 359), relentlessly

intertwining societies. The movement of people across borders not only entails the migration of people to other countries, but also points to the prevalence of inexpensive transportation options that quickly whisk business travelers and tourists across oceans. These physical flows of people are accelerating the dispersion of cultural elements, and creating fragments of any one place in many other places. The AGCC dimension of *traveling experiences and attitudes* represents consumers' experiences traveling aboard, thus providing an indication of the direct contacts the individual has with other cultures and locales. Travelers inadvertently diffuse elements of their own culture to locals while they are abroad, and once they return to their home country, they recount their experiences and exhibit objects acquired during their travels, further dispersing GCC.

Physical propinquity and direct interactions are no longer obligatory for nurturing cultural exchanges. McLuhan (1962) prophesied the arrival "...of an electronic communications system that would figuratively shrink the globe, begetting a global village whose constituents would have a keen sense of their collective, cosmopolitan identity" (Cleveland & Laroche, 2012, p. 66). Nearly universal access to the Internet has radically boosted opportunities for virtual exchanges between individuals and cultures. This infrastructure means that entertainment, other media programming and marketing communications are now truly reaching a global audience. As a dimension of AGCC, the *global mass media exposure* provided by the Internet, satellite television, blockbuster films, global sporting events and other international happenings fosters the development, acquisition and diffusion of the ethos and behavioral activities characterizing GCC. Although cultural meanings (e.g., about objects, rituals, etc.) typically spring from some specific location in the social world, the flow of this meaning is shaped and channeled by various mediating agents—within the media, advertising, entertainment and fashion industries—who, in effect, decide "which cultural products or ideas would have currency in popular taste" (Izberk-Bilgin, 2010, p. 302; McCracken, 1986).

In some respects, popular culture represents a universal language (Schneider, 2006). Examples include the worldwide embrace of Hip Hop and K-pop, cartoons and cosplay and fast food and fast fashion.

The diffusion of popular culture is facilitated by commercial interests (Cayla & Arnould, 2008) including, for example, Netflix, HBO, Hollywood and its counterparts in India, Pakistan and Nigeria: Bollywood, Lollywood and Nollywood. The Internet has however empowered consumers, enabling them to challenge and reinterpret cultural objects and codes. Given the ubiquity of social media, individuals have a hand in shaping the contours of popular culture and exerting a distorting influence on its dissemination (e.g., YouTube, TikTok, Whatsapp, Facebook), in terms of what gets shared and seen among members of their social networks. In 2012, Gangnam Style, the K-pop single by PSY, became a global sensation, becoming the first online video to surpass 1 billion Internet hits.² The lyrics³ are loosely centered on the consumer lifestyle stereotyping the fashionably hip Gangnam district in Seoul.

As the culture of marketing is passed on clandestinely to consumers through global programming, it is also transmitted overtly, through advertising, product placement, lifestyle marketing, celebrity endorsements and other promotional activities (Peñaloza & Gilly, 1999). This meaning transfer is reinforced by the design and organization of virtual and physical retailing environments, as well as through transactions and customer loyalty programs. Using words, images, sounds and associations, multinational corporations transmit to individuals the attitudes, values, norms and traits that are implicit to GCC. The degree to which consumers are on the receiving end of this information represents *exposure to multinational marketing activities*.

Communication is indispensable for disseminating the non-concrete elements of culture across time, and between people and locations. The ability to communicate in a second (or subsequent) language provides the tools for understanding the values and rules for social engagement in places where that language is widely spoken (Cleveland et al., 2015). Hundreds of millions of people are learning and utilizing English as a second language, on top of the estimated half billion native speakers (i.e., *English language use and exposure*). Dominating popular culture, business

² <http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1483733/psys-gangnam-style-video-hits-1-billion-views-unprecedented-milestone>. Accessed January 2021.

³ <http://www.wetpaint.com/glee/articles/what-is-the-english-translation-of-psys-gangnam-style>. Accessed August 2021.

and the sciences, and used as the go-between tongue for international institutions and tourism, English is regarded as the lingua franca of the modern era (Graddol, 1997). English is extensively used for promotional appeals and on product signage, even in countries where few are fluent in the language, as a way of subtly conveying aspirations of modernity and upward social mobility (Alden et al., 1999).

Whereas the first four facets of AGCC represent exposure to external forces, the other three components of AGCC are internal, expressing individual traits. *Cosmopolitanism* is a favorable disposition toward foreign outgroups and cultures. Whereas tourists are content to be social spectators, cosmopolitans are eager to participate in daily life the way that locals do (Hannerz, 1990). Cosmopolitans have been characterized as “feeling at home when abroad” (Thompson & Tambyah, 1999): they not only readily engage with people of different backgrounds, they are confident that they have the proficiencies to negotiate varied cultural domains (Cleveland & Laroche, 2012). Seeking the very best cultural experiences that the world has to offer, cosmopolitans are well placed to introduce novel cultural components to the global community. The culture-sharing proclivity of cosmopolitans is motivated by their cultural curiosity and out of a desire to acquire cultural capital (Holt, 1998). Cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984) is a form of social status acquired by cosmopolitans through their accumulation of skills and knowledge, as they showcase their sophisticated tastes, aesthetics and customs. Cosmopolitans and locals share a common goal of maintaining cultural diversity, albeit with diverging motivations (Hannerz, 1990). The cosmopolitan ties together cultural differences without wanting to homogenize them, whereas the parochial rebuffs external influences to maintain ingroup distinctiveness but without concern for the cultural integrity of other groups.

Pursuing a common collection of symbolic consumption objects (e.g., H&M, Apple) and experiences (e.g., Hip-Hop, TikTok), so-called “global teens” epitomize the GCC (Alden et al., 1999) without ineludibly being cosmopolitan. *Openness to GCC* reflects the notion that individuals are able to selectively borrow from the global bazaar of ideas, objects and lifestyles. For these consumers, goal achievement is guided by a set of standards, drawn from this global forum as appraisal benchmarks (Robertson, 1992). The global marketplace, “through the myriad of

consumption choices it provides, presents the consumer with an opportunity to reproduce, resist, and transcend social standing” (Izberk-Bilgin, 2010, p. 309).

Self-identification with GCC goes beyond experimentation and transient participation with the symbols of GCC. Social identity theory argues that the stronger one identifies with a given group, the more this enduring attachment will shape their beliefs, principles and actions. Much like how parochial individuals cleave to indigenous traditions, the self-identified global consumer is motivated to act out their life in harmony with the belief systems and lifestyles that are perceived as inherent to GCC.

Never The Twain Shall Meet. How Does GCC Align, Comingle or Conflict with Other Social Identities?

Appadurai (1990) states that “the central problem of today’s global interaction is the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization” (p. 295). People observe globalization against the backdrop of their socio-historical circumstances, and these subsequently shape their worldview (Powell & Steele, 2011). Receptivity to GCC depends partly on the worldview of the receiving consumer, which in turn is a function of how GCC is congruent with his or her own society’s cultural norms and values, and whether GCC is sensed as a threat (e.g., cultural imperialism). To appreciate how GCC contributes to cultural identity, researchers must concurrently consider parochial cultural influences.

Chiu and Kwan (2016) differentiated exclusionary and integrative responses that people have to the altering landscapes of a globalizing world. Exclusionary responses occur when individuals deem outside influences as threatening. Ethnocentrism refers to the perception that the group to which one belongs is the most important, and that other cultures and groups are lesser than, or must be evaluated by, the standards of the ingroup (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). Due to their insecurities,

perceptions of superiority, or strong ties to the existing local order, ethnocentric individuals generally rebuff outside influences as incompatible with the domestic ethos. Exclusionary responses can also be episodic. As public opinion of the United States in other countries soured under President Trump (Wike et al., 2017), so perhaps too did receptivity to those aspects of GCC perceived as “American.” Integrative responses ensue in cases where outside influences are embraced as sources of valuable information and creativity. People that are enthusiastic about the opportunities to learn from other cultures (cosmopolitanism), that are only weakly connected to the local society (xenocentrism, or marginalization), or that aspire to reap the perceived benefits associated with membership in modern consumer culture (identification with GCC) have a predisposition toward integrative reactions (Cleveland & Balakrishnan, 2019).

Drawing from acculturation theory (Berry, 1997) we can extricate two patterns of exclusionary responses to GCC: separation and marginalization. Under separation, group members will be driven to resist globalization (and GCC) if it is perceived as menacing to their distinct identity and detrimental to ingroup cohesiveness (Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019b; Giddens, 1990). Some consumers equate GCC with Americanization (Kohut & Stokes, 2006); an increasingly outdated viewpoint that is nevertheless informed by the longstanding, disproportionate influence of American popular culture, media, and brands on the lives of many individuals around the world. Fears that their culture is being displaced or overwhelmed by the GCC motivate many individuals to resist globalization and to defend their unique ethnic and national practices and values.

Resistance

At the communal level, some groups seek to resist global consumer culture and engage in forms of neo-ethnicism; for example, in the form of religious orthodoxy (Barber, 1996). The belief that GCC essentially constitutes cultural colonialism provokes feelings of tribalism, and a

tendency toward ethnic or national reaffirmation, and possibly, fundamentalism. Psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) postulates that when the behavioral freedom of a person is constrained through elimination or the threat of elimination, that person will experience an unpleasant motivational state of arousal (reactance) that prompts them to retain the behavior that is threatened—to preserve their personal freedom. Research has also documented that people can experience vicarious reactance—a person can experience the feeling of having their freedom restricted, even if they are not personally implicated in the restriction but rather, as a spectator to the situation (Sittenthaler et al., 2015). This can explain why some people harbor antiglobalization sentiments (elaborated later) even when they themselves (or their own culture) are not immediately threatened with GCC, if they sense that the unique character of another society (e.g., an indigenous culture) is at risk. Arguably the biggest impediment to the development of global identity is when people collectively believe that their cultural identity is under threat of dilution or replacement. Perceived assimilation into GCC (Levitt, 1983) has triggered a strong counter reaction among some people, who become motivated to defend their local cultures; paradoxically leading to a reduction of homogeneity (Cleveland et al., 2011).

Marginalization

Some people may be unsuccessful at navigating the tensions at the juncture of globalization and local traditions. Rejecting adherence to the spatially based identities connected to GCC, and to ethnic or national society, they may instead pursue belongingness with counterculture entities. Although counterculture movements take root on the fringes of society (e.g., the 1960s hippie subculture, and later the inner-city movements of punk and hip-hop), features of them are often adopted and modified by the mainstream consumer culture (Sklair, 1995). Factions to refute GCC are led by individuals such as the iconoclast author Naomi Klein (2009) in her bestseller book, *No Logo*, by activists

like Greta Thunberg who rail against the wastefulness and environmental degradation accompanying materialistic consumer culture,⁴ and by groups such as Adbusters who describes itself as “anti-advertising.”⁵ However, the “...centrality of consumption to identity and to social life, combined with the diversity of consumers and types of consumption, present a difficult challenge to consumer activists seeking culture change” (Kozinets & Handelman, 2004, p. 698).

Cultural convergence is analogous to assimilation. Levitt (1983) contends that with globalization, cultural differences will inexorably wither away, and that individuals will come to identify more with GCC and less with ethnic, national, etc. social groups. World systems theory (Wallerstein, 2004) depicts a world divided into core countries and periphery countries. As the command centers of the global economy, the leading cities of the core countries—New York, London, etc.—have a disproportionate influence on the creation and flavoring of GCC. The periphery countries are dependent on the core countries which, because the latter are in control of the levers of capital and set the rules for international trade (Smith, 1979), are seen as importers of GCC. Also known as cultural imperialism (Wilk, 1998), Coca-colonization (Hannerz, 1992), or McWorld (Barber, 1996), this viewpoint assumes that most individuals are passive: easily beguiled by the materialistic values conveyed by mass media and advertising channels, local cultures stand little chance against the seductive, slick packaging of GCC.

Also contrary to Levitt’s (1983) prediction of inevitable cultural homogenization, the marketing literature has detailed that many consumers are constructing a bicultural or multicultural identity, drawing from global, local and perhaps foreign cultural narratives simultaneously (Cleveland et al., 2011, 2013). According to Kurasawa (2004), a defining characteristic of many people is that they simultaneously possess “multilayered local, national and global identities” (p. 240). Whether particular aspects of this heterogenic cultural identity are salient and operational depends on situational circumstances. Over time, the

⁴ <http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/youth-demand-climate-action-in-global-school-strike/>. Accessed August 2021.

⁵ <https://www.adbusters.org/> (Accessed August 2021).

co-presence of these multiple layers will result in *cultural hybridization*. As a contributing factor to the development of GCC, *glocalization* (Robertson, 1992)—essentially, a form of cultural hybridization—describes how local populations adjust to and indigenize GCC, as well as how components of local culture components are appropriated and recontextualized into global forms (Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019b). Kjeldgaard and Ostberg (2007) offer the example of Scandinavian coffee culture, whereby the *flâneur café* culture popularized worldwide by Starbucks—itself, loosely based on the traditional Italian café—has been modified to appeal to Scandinavian sensibilities and aesthetics. These authors argue that given the impracticality of isolating oneself from GCC, the inclusion of local aspects into global consumption is a way of projecting a distinctive collective identity.

GCC is essentially a creolized culture, constituted by the transmutation of multiple layers blended together in different quantities and speeds in different places. I foresee the emergence of several global consumer cultures, each of which represents how GCC has been variably indigenized to become compatible with local traditions and sensibilities, and each iteration possessing unique artifacts and lifestyles. In most places, one or several transfigurations of GCC will coincide (and sometimes clash) with cultures and accompanying social identities deeply ensconced in tribal and other territorial meanings, as well as with identities connected to one's gender, generation, occupation and even subcultures connected to pastimes and diversions (Schouten & McAlexander, 1995).

Reaching beyond the global bicultural identity position proposed by Arnett (2002) and others, Chen et al. (2008) claim that globalization nurtures the formation of creolized identity arising "...from the selective incorporation of cultural elements from the various cultural world-views and practices to which a person has been exposed during his or her life" (p. 806). *Creolization* is the least researched and thus most speculative outcome of cultural globalization. Historical analogues to creolization can however be found in relation to how various New World cultures, such as Mexican culture, developed over time through the fusion of European characteristics with indigenous traits (Diaz-Guerrero, 1976).

Post-assimilationist globalization has drawn the interest of interpretivist researchers (e.g., Askegaard et al., 2005; Cayla & Eckhardt, 2008) but given that creolization unfolds over decades, empirical research is thorny.

Antiglobalization

As the saying goes, “a rising tide lifts all boats.” Thanks to globalization, an unparalleled number of people have been lifted out of poverty (Bergh & Nilsson, 2014). While economic disparities between Western and developing countries have been declining, within countries, however, there are mounting pecuniary inequalities and cultural cleavages. Many people feel that they have been left behind at the dock by globalization and attending deindustrialization, becoming poorer while holding the belief that an elite few have profited enormously. This view has some truth because wealthy people are better able to move their assets to places that can yield the best returns. By many measures, the gap between rich and poor is growing, and there is a diminishing proportion of people occupying the middle ground (Piketty, 2014).

Globalization has become a shorthand for attributing many of the world’s most pressing problems (Green & Griffith, 2002). The intensification and consolidated influence of globalization have fuelled disquiet about its nature and economic impact, on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. Moreover, there is a growing belief that national sovereignty is being eroded and replaced by a global order that eludes government control and is seemingly unaccountable to individual citizens of countries (Goodhart, 2001). Populist politicians foment misperceptions or exaggerate the threats posed by globalization, international institutions, foreigners and neoliberalism, as a way of garnering support. These vituperative standpoints have found sympathetic ears, as evidenced at the ballot box (the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit referendum, etc.).

In his 1941 book, *Escape from Freedom*, Erich Fromm (1994) wrote about the innate need that humans have for order and security, particularly during times of perceived turmoil. Authoritarian politicians that promise the restoration of some (often imaginary) old order become

attractive to people looking to regain a sense of certainty and pride when experiencing feelings of insecurity and personal inadequacy. Such feelings are apt to occur among those experiencing economic displacement from the forces of globalization. Indeed, Broz et al. (2021) showed that the upsurge in populist voting was greatest in those American counties with declining economic and social conditions.

National cultures and identities are not at risk of imminent obsolescence due to globalization. When confronted with a threat, the natural instinct of societies is to circle the wagons. The COVID-19 pandemic and the attending economic freefall represent the single biggest threat to globalization that has been witnessed in decades. It may take a decade to get globalization back on the track it was prior to the pandemic, which ironically has served to emphasize how much the distances between different societies have shriveled, at least in a virtual sense. It is important to recall other recent periods where antiglobalization sentiments have been ascendant, such as after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, and the accompanying severe economic recession that wracked most countries. Much like earlier episodes of antiglobalization, perhaps many of the antagonists are not against globalization itself, but rather are frustrated about the disproportionate gains accrued by some and the harms and feelings of hopelessness experienced by others.

Globalization and GCC: Pull vs. Push Forces

GCC flourishes in places and during times when globalization is ascendant. Globalization itself is nourished or stalled by various factors (Table 4.1), which can be categorized into pull forces (those that favor globalization, that pull people toward GCC, and that foster a global identity), and push forces (those that are detrimental to globalization, that suppress GCC, and that discourage the development of a global identity). The push and pull forces are further classifiable into distinct causal elements.

At the top are forces driven by coordinated political bodies, including geopolitical, institutional and governmental factors (e.g., IMF, WTO). Next are forces driven primarily by profit-oriented entities (economic, technological, media, and corporate factors). In terms of the former,

Table 4.1 Pull vs. Push Forces of Globalization and Global Consumer Culture

Category	<i>Pull (Favorable) Forces</i>	<i>Push (Detrimental) Forces</i>
Geopolitical, institutional and government	Democracy	Autarky
	Neoliberalism	Customs
	Hegemony	Tariffs, protectionism
	WTO/IMF/UN/EU	Export controls
	Free trade	Censorship
	Open borders	Political tensions
	Transportation infrastructure	War
	GDP growth	GDP stagnation/decline
	Economies of scale/scope	Supply chain bottlenecks
	Foreign direct investment	
Economic, technological, media and corporate	Multinational corporations	
	Global brands	
	Global supply chains	
	Outsourcing	
	Containerization	
	Computerization/digitalization	
	Internet/connectivity	
		Social media
		Inequality
Societal, cultural and movements	Tourism	Antiglobalization
	Hybridization/creolization	Nationalism, neoethnicity
	Multiculturalism	Xenophobia/ethnocentrism
	Migration & mobility	Localism
	Education	Fundamentalism
	Emancipation	Repatriation
		Balkanization/secessionism
		Terrorism
Individual	Cosmopolitanism	Prejudice/racism
	Xenocentrism	Ethnocentrism
	Global identity	Insecurity/fear
Natural		Pandemics
		Anthropogenic climate change
		Resource shortages

many developments over the past five years have been detrimental to the goal of global integration. Examples include the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the punitive tariffs imposed by the Trump administration with the goal of easing the U.S. trade deficit, the expanding reach of the “Great Firewall of China” (describing pervasive forms of Internet censorship in that country), the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe and the strain on the passport-free

Schengen Area, the exclusion of Chinese firms such as Huawei from the construction of 5G technology networks in many Western countries, and recurring episodes of “rare earths” export restrictions imposed by China (and the crippling effect upon Japan’s high tech sector). Rising political tensions, such as between the United States and Russia due to election meddling and the annexation of Crimea, and an increasingly assertive China, have also put the brakes on globalization, further stoking antiglobalization sentiments (Steenkamp, 2019), nationalism, and xenophobia.

The business activities of transnational corporations (exporting, foreign direct investment, supply chain decisions, innovation, advertising, etc.) are powerful, interwoven forces driving globalization and the dissemination of GCC. Widely viewed as wielding disproportionate “economic, political, and cultural clout” (Thompson & Arsel, 2004, p. 633) relative to their local counterparts, multinationals serve as lightning rods for the discontent toward globalization. In places with lackluster economic growth, the appeal of GCC is waning. This has been corroborated by recent surveys that show that in the United States, Britain, France and numerous other countries, fewer than half of respondents believe that globalization is a “force for good,” with many believing that only the wealthy profit from globalization (Steenkamp, 2019).

Next are societal (including social movements) and cultural factors, which are less centrally coordinated; and individual factors, which take place in people’s minds. Philosophical movements from democracy to emancipation, and from #OccupyWallStreet to #BlackLivesMatter, have become global dialogues amplified by global media (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015; Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019b). Finally, there are natural factors, although the category term is probably a misnomer since these phenomena are typically caused by or exacerbated by human activities. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has stirred many people to look for a scapegoat: some may blame China, others the World Health Organization, but for many the biggest target of fury is the neoliberal global world order.

Several factors arguably span several categories and straddle the push/pull boundary, for example, social media and inequality, which traverse the social and economic realms, and which could plausibly

encourage or inhibit globalization and GCC. The ubiquity and pervasiveness of digital technologies (especially mobile phones) mean that the virtual world encapsulates most of the world's population, as opposed to the online world of two decades ago, which was prodigiously Western. In the West, ethnic minority communities expanding faster than the mainstream, and consequently the Internet population in Western countries is becoming increasingly multicultural. On the one hand, having most of the globe's people plugged into the virtual world vastly increases the opportunities for exchanging information across social groups. On the other hand, social media also promotes neo-tribalism (Robards, 2018), as people can retreat into online communities of affinity groups—be they ethnic, media, ideological and otherwise like-minded folk—that are relatively siloed from each other. While rising inequality provides a fertile ground for fostering materialism and the expression of social status through consumption, this disparity will also sow the seeds of discontent (antiglobalization, and repelling GCC). Given the threats posed to domestic security and to the economy, pandemics, resource shortages and climate change can exacerbate disenchantment with globalization and its proponents, yet the global nature of these problems, representing what Sherif (1956) labeled as superordinate goals, necessitate cooperative interaction among societies worldwide.

Conclusion

In marketing, researchers have embraced the notions of the extended self (Belk, 1988), symbolic consumption (Schouten & McAlexander, 1995), the material self (Bagozzi et al., 2020) and customer-based brand equity (Keller, 1993), indicating that many firms are moving toward implementing a customer-centric perspective about products and brands, and are dismantling the formerly dominant, company-centric standpoint. Companies do not choose their customers as much as customers choose their brands. By embodying cultural symbols, the consumption constellations held by consumers (comprised of products and brands), function as signals of cultural intricacies and transformation, not only in terms of how customers see and express themselves, but also, in terms of how they

wish for others to see them, which in turn, influences their self-concept. This is especially true for consumers having to navigate the crossroads of multiple social memberships.

Consumer-based brand equity is the additional value bestowed on products—including that which is connected to social identity—that is reflected in the way consumers think, feel and act *vis-à-vis* the particular brand. Customers prefer brands that they can relate to and that have meanings, including but not limited to, meanings connected to one's social identity or identities; customers are often willing to pay a premium relative to brands that are not connected, or that are connected to undesirable social groups (Winit et al., 2014). These meanings change over place and time, because of situational influences and accumulating life experiences, respectively. Of relevance to this chapter, the salience, and importance of one or several social identities fluctuate and evolve because of changing circumstances and the presence and types of other people present, as well as due to contexts and cues that serve as triggers.

Accompanying episodes of resurgent nationalism, a growing number of consumers are alarmed about the ascendancy of global brands and how these represent threats to or stir feelings of nostalgia about beloved equivalent domestic counterparts (Bartsch et al., 2019; Izberk-Bilgin, 2012). Research has demonstrated that consumers often strive to authenticate, re-center and express their traditional identity and heritage through the re-enactment of local customs and rituals, and the consumption of local brands (Arnould & Price, 2003; Askegaard et al., 2005; Zhou & Belk, 2004). By themselves, antiglobalization sentiments can adversely affect attitudes about global brands (Dimofte et al., 2008). However, what resembles an ethnocentric backlash by consumers may stem from economic fears and employment dislocations occurring due to technological innovations and the forces of globalization.

The paradox posed by globalization is that it “divides as it unites” (Bauman, 1998, p. 2). The major issue facing policy makers is to find ways of reconfiguring globalization, in order to preserve the benefits of relatively open economies and borders, while curbing the financial and environmental excesses of unrestrained global capitalism. At the individual level, in order to combat the appeal of xenophobes and antiglobalization populists, the psychologist Michele Gelfand argues that

people first need to “feel safe.”⁶ Research into individuals’ dispositions toward and affiliation with GCC can shed light on self-concept and identity, subjective well-being and belongingness, orientations toward cultural ingroups and outgroups (both at home and abroad), consumption behaviors, receptivity and resistance to cultural change, and perhaps, even inform voting patterns.

In a recent article, I stated that GCC “...is a reinforcing process shaped by global culture flows, acculturation, deterritorialization and cultural and geographic specific entities. This process allows individuals to indigenize GCC, and GCC to contemporaneously appropriate aspects from myriad localized cultures, producing creolized cultures” (Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019b, p. 556). This process does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is affected by sporadic events and long-term trends. Understanding globalization as a process rather than a destination (Legrain, 2002) makes it easier to see that there are many forces that encourage or impede it.

These forces similarly interfere with the adoption or rejection of GCC. As GCC interacts with geography, domestic cultural ingredients, social class and situational circumstances, it will increasingly fragment into distinctive forms. Moreover, the underlying personality of GCC (and its various permutations) is “progressively shifting from West to East, as the planet’s relative economic epicenter once again swings back to the Orient” (Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019b, p. 570). The present, partial pause of globalization opens up an opportunity for GCC in different world regions to become further indigenized. Over time, these distinct iterations of GCC will be exported to the global community, and the importing societies will impose further modifications to make them more palatable to locals. Notwithstanding periodic setbacks, the wheel of GCC will continue to turn and churn.

⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/02/authoritarian-leaders-people-safe-voters> (Accessed May 2021).

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5

Globalization and Radicalization: The Rise of Extreme Reactions to Intercultural Contact, Sociocultural Disruption, and Identity Threat

Simon Ozer  and Milan Obaidi 

Radicalized extremists employing violent means in promotion of their ideological or religious beliefs have increasingly become a global phenomenon spanning across a great diversity of causes, contexts, and histories (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011; Moghaddam, 2008). For example, although the concept of radicalized foreign fighters is far from new, the growth in the number of foreign fighters with various backgrounds who have been radicalized and left their home country to fight in the civil war in Iraq and Syria surpasses what has been gaged throughout history (Bakker & Singleton, 2016). Reflecting an example of globalized interconnectivity, people all over the world are becoming aware of and affected by events happening in distant locations of the

S. Ozer (✉)

Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

e-mail: ozer@psy.au.dk

M. Obaidi

University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

world, integrating global perspectives into their local rootedness (Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2018; Obaidi Kunst, et al., 2018). For example, the Islamic state's recruitment strategy has specifically focused on radicalized, Western-born Muslims because many identify with the concept of global Muslim suffering caused by Western foreign policy, and this perception strongly resonates with their personal experience of discrimination and deprivation in European societies (Sageman, 2008). Additionally, people are contemporarily experiencing extensive societal transformations and sociocultural disruption within their home country driven by globalization processes and new intercultural contact (Held & McGrew, 2007; Tomlinson, 1999).

Such processes of rapid sociocultural change might be perceived as threatening the traditional ways of living; consequently, they demand adaptation to the new circumstances, which in turn shapes individuals' reaction to globalized intercultural relations (Berry, 2017). As the world integrates toward an interconnected communal space of customs, values, and ideologies distributed through technological developments, the sense of self and belonging becomes increasingly challenged, initiating incidents of extreme reactions toward the vast plurality and uncertainty of globalization processes.

Whereas globalization can be associated with romanticized imagery of a harmonious and cohesive global village along with positive conceptions of global citizenship and creativity, the other side of the picture reflects struggles and frustrated reactions derived from such globalized intercultural and intergroup processes (Moghaddam, 2008; Ozer, 2019). Various religious, ethnic, and political groups have reacted to globalization, with political left-wing groups emphasizing freedom, equality, and internationalism as well as denouncing the unequal distribution of benefits from globalization. Furthermore, violent groups with right-wing ideologies (e.g., Koehler, 2014) embracing hierarchy, tradition, and nationalism have been reacting to the changing racial and cultural landscape, which they perceive to be a negative result of globalization. For instance, during the El Paso shooting in 2019, 23 people were killed and 23 injured by a perpetrator driven by white nationalism and anti-immigration motives expressed by targeting people of Latin American origin. The main motive behind the killing was the perception

that the “invasion” of people of Latin American origin was effecting a cultural and ethnic replacement of White Americans. Indeed, according to some scholars, modern terrorism has been one of the many reactions to globalization (Wilkinson, 2003). An investigation into the relationship between globalization and terrorism suggests that in the 1970s and 1980s, countries affected most by globalization reported more cases of terrorism (Lutz & Lutz, 2019).

The societal transformations associated with processes of globalization, such as intercultural and intergroup contact, are reflected within the individual’s self, necessitating the psychological challenge of reconciling diverse and often conflicting cultural positions and identities (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). Such psychological processes reflect a crucial contemporary, global challenge to stability and cohesion related to the management of intercultural relations (Berry, 2017). Whereas some local contexts become more culturally diversified and complex due to globalization, other local groupings have reacted to the disruption of their sociocultural traditions with a defensive and exclusionary approach by rejecting other cultural groups as well as by revitalizing local values and enhancing their ethnic and cultural identities. The experience of a threat to one’s ethnic or cultural identity has been associated with extremism, such as out-group hostility (Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2018; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2018; Obaidi, Thomsen et al., 2018). Furthermore, besides the extreme right-wing reactions to globalization, left-wing extremist groups have fought against neoliberalism, capitalism, and inequality that they associate with globalization (Held & McGrew, 2007). Overall, exclusionary reactions to globalization have been associated with extreme attitudes toward radical societal change, sometimes without concern for the well-being of others (Ozer, 2020).

In this chapter we investigate how the changes brought about by globalization can pose detrimental effects to the individual’s sense of self, as well as on intergroup relations between different ethnic, cultural, and religious groups. These processes can have far-reaching consequences, including extreme reactions to globalization that result in acts of terrorism. First, we focus on how globalization transforms local sociocultural contexts. Second, we demonstrate how these sociocultural transformations spur reactions within the individual. Third, we describe

how exclusionary reactions to globalization can become radicalized in association with identity issues. Finally, we describe the mutualism of globalized radicalization, which potentiates the risk of a vicious circle of retaliation.

Globalization, Interconnectedness, and Transformation of Local Sociocultural Contexts

Globalization has been described as “an intensification of worldwide social relations and interactions such that distant events acquire very localized impacts and vice versa” (Held & McGrew, 2007, p. 2). That is, globalization as a compression of time and space reflects a change from discrete yet interdependent local contexts to the emergence of the world as a shared social and cultural space (Held & McGrew, 2007). These processes emerge through the multidimensional nature of globalization, referring to a variety of areas such as political, economic, technological, and cultural dimensions, all of which proceed alongside globalization (Tomlinson, 1999). That is, the changes brought about by globalization have various interlinked material, cultural, and psychological impacts. Within the cultural dimension of globalization, the accelerating flow of ideas, goods, and people across and within national boundaries has not only yielded positive outcomes of diversification, but also profound consequences for identity processes by complexifying the individual’s gravitation toward multiple cultural and social affiliations (Jensen et al., 2011). For example, several scholars have proposed that globalization is a source of conflict among ethnically, culturally, or religiously diverse groups around the world. One such example often highlighted is the conflict between the Western and Islamic worlds (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 1990). It is assumed that the forces of globalization through consumerism have imported Western values and ideas to the Islamic world leading to the westernization of Middle Eastern societies. Some argue that these values and ideas are at times incompatible with—and at

odds with—Islamic values and traditions (Kepel, 2002), initiating defensive reactions among Muslims and leading to the possible emergence of radical Islamist movements (Roy, 2004).

Besides the identity challenge of reaching a coherent and stable sense of self and belonging in the globalized plurality, traditional ways of life and local sociocultural contexts have struggled as the transformative forces of globalization have disrupted and destabilized local and ethnic cultural traditions and social order (Ozer, 2019). For example, globalization that has initiated sudden intergroup contact has proven to hold devastating results among some indigenous peoples with the erosion of traditional cultures and the spread of global culture often originating in Western societies. Overall, the aversive, challenging consequences of globalization include increased competition, rootlessness and loss of stability, media overflow, liberalization, urbanization, unemployment, and forced migration (Kinnvall, 2004). Hence, some forms of radicalization and terrorism can be regarded as a dysfunctional reaction to the challenges of globalization, involving a perceived threat of extinction caused by sudden intergroup contact that challenges traditional identities (Moghaddam, 2008). For instance, like right-wing and left-wing groups, Islamist groups have also responded to threats that globalization represents to them. These groups frequently have opposed “modernization” and globalization not only because they see globalization as an attempt to westernize and undermine Islamic culture, values, religion, and identity, but also to supplant Muslim’s religious and cultural identity (Esposito, 2000), leading to strong threat perceptions and the motivation to defend Muslims and Islamic culture and religion with violence (Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2018; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2018; Obaidi, Thomsen et al., 2018).

Globalization transforms local sociocultural contexts and in turn, affects the psychological conditions and benefits that are derived from being an integrated part of a local sociocultural context. Overall, Moghaddam (2008) lists four psychological needs that are affected by the transformative powers of globalization. First is the social contract of being part of a collective and the collective being part of the individual, reflecting the importance of group belonging and the certainty derived from holding shared values and traditions. In globalized societies,

the adherence to sociocultural group membership has become partial and fluid, leading to individuals negotiating their individual cultural configuration (Morris et al., 2015) without the certainty provided by a well-established superordinate cultural position (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). Second, the local context provides a sense of trust and security. Indeed, the local context plays a significant role in defining who we are and where we come from. The fundamental trust in a local context is challenged by globalization through industrialization and increased mobility of populations related to a decline in family, ethnic, tribal, and local allegiances. The decrease of repeated personal relationships and community ties, along with a proliferation of intermittent and often superficial acquaintances, undermines the basic sense of interpersonal trust. Third, individuals crave the perception of being partly in control of their own and the collective's life. A sense of insecurity and anxiety may arise as globalization brings awareness of events happening in distant locations over which the individual has no control. Nevertheless, these events can influence the life of the individual as well as the local context in the interconnected world, sometimes initiating strong reactions to events about which people are only superficially informed. Fourth, the individual needs a positive and distinct identity associated with group membership. Consequently, an important psychological ramification of cultural globalization has emerged through the ways that individuals defend the integrity of their ethnic and cultural identities against what can be experienced as the culturally erosive effects of globalization (Chiu et al., 2011). Group membership centered on a salient collective identity may be a susceptible way of reacting to sociocultural distress (Ozer et al., 2020).

Globalization is popularly conflated with processes of homogenization, leading to the ascendance of Western culture and values in non-Western societies (Chiu et al., 2011), and in extreme cases to the imaginable replacement of ethnic majority populations (Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2021; Obaidi, Kunst, et al., 2021), opposing the prospect of culturally heterogeneous societies. For example, the influence of Western culture through mass media is seen by many Islamists in the Middle East to have more detrimental effects on Muslims and the Islamic cultural practices

than Western military occupation and subjugation because such westernization clashes with fundamental values within radical Islam (Kepel, 2002). Other movements oppose the centralizing power structure and global spread of neoliberal policies. Some left-wing organizations have countered capitalist consumerism and transnational actors associated with globalization by proposing localized, self-governing communities based on equality and environmental sustainability (Held & McGrew, 2007).

Other researchers have argued on the contrary that globalization leads to greater heterogeneity as local reactions to globalized cultural influences proliferate cultural diversity (Held & McGrew, 2007; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). Nevertheless, the experience of cultural erosion, loss of status, and perceived identity threat along with local sociocultural disruption and insecure local embeddedness has been found to be a central cause initiating various radicalization trajectories (Kinnvall, 2004; Moghaddam, 2008; Ozer et al., 2020). For instance, perceived or actual threats to traditional privileges caused by globalization have emerged as a critical factor in generating hostile and exclusionary reactions among majority populations. Many White Americans' reactions to the country's changing racial landscape manifest in outward hostility toward minorities (Jardina, 2019). In particular, violent groups with right-wing ideologies have reacted to increasing ethnoracial diversity and immigration of people from culturally and religiously dissimilar areas, which they perceive to be a negative result of globalization (Wilkinson, 2003). This is in line with early and recent theoretical propositions that the proliferation of group mobilization is often associated with social and political changes, including increases in the share of minority populations and loss of social status (Blalock, 1967; Craig & Richeson, 2017; Craig et al., 2018; McVeigh, 2009). Previous research has in fact demonstrated that both perceived and actual increases in immigration trigger right-wing mobilization (Karapın, 2002; Scheepers et al., 2002), support for far-right and extremist voting (Dinas et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2021; Vertier et al., 2018), violent intentions and prejudice toward minorities (Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2021; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2021), and domestic right-wing terrorist attacks (McAlexander, 2019).

Individual Reactions to Globalization Processes

Important psychological consequences of the transformative processes of globalization have been the alarms and excursions of fundamental psychological needs. Such needs are conditioned by the link between the individual and the sociocultural context (e.g., providing a sense of belonging, construction of shared meaning, and potentiality for developing competences and autonomy). That is, contextual transformations are inevitably tied to individual processes. Accordingly, an emerging psychology of globalization has approached individual differences in how people react to globalization and the proliferation of intercultural and intergroup contact (Chen et al., 2016; Ozer, 2019). Indeed, cultural globalization has initiated greater plurality within local contexts, and today most societies involve some degree of multiculturalism. Designated as the multiculturalism hypothesis, it has been suggested that a sense of security in one's place in society will facilitate acceptance of those who are different from oneself; conversely, when people feel threatened, they tend to react with exclusionary rejection of those who appear different (Berry, 2017). Besides individual differences in, for example, the need for certainty and personality traits such as an openness to experience, the perception of one's sociocultural embeddedness emerges as a precondition for intergroup harmony, while the lack of such embeddedness can predict extremist attitudes across diverse sociocultural settings (Ozer et al., 2020). Consequently, whereas globalization causes disruptive effects and experiences of threats to one's identity and local societal order, the individual reactions to globalization are situated in such perceptions of being securely and meaningfully embedded in the local sociocultural context (Ozer, 2020).

Reactions toward globalization have been dissected into two overall patterns of exclusionary and integrative ways of approaching interconnectivity and foreign culture through globalization processes (Chiu et al., 2011). Within integrative reactions to globalization, cultural frame switching is employed, by which different cultural meaning systems are activated in relation to contextual demands (Chen et al., 2016). Within this response pattern, the influx of globalized cultural elements is

regarded as intellectual resources that can facilitate creativity and innovation through reflective, integrative responses to globalization (Chiu et al., 2011). Such positive and adaptive outcomes of exposure to foreign cultural elements are particularly likely when local cultural identification is low and existential anxiety is absent, leading to the possibility of approaching foreign culture as a source of inspiration (Chiu & Kwan, 2016). Being securely and meaningfully embedded within one's sociocultural context has been associated with an integrative reaction to globalization (Ozer, 2020). Individual reactions to globalization are largely dependent on how globalization is experienced and what aspects of globalization the individual is reacting to. Experimental research has revealed that differences between framing globalization (1) positively as diversity and travel opportunities in work and (2) negatively as increased competition and outsourcing had a significant effect, with the positively framed group reporting greater global identification, intergroup helping, and less outgroup rejection (Snider et al., 2013). Accordingly, the destabilizing effect of globalization can lead people toward an imagined and romanticized imagery of the past through the reconstruction of symbols and cultural references (Kinnvall, 2004). That is, an attempt to recreate the lost sense of security can manifest as a rejection of the changes, together with an emphasis on local and traditional identity signifiers.

Whereas integrative responses to cultural globalization have been positively associated with tolerance, self-esteem, life satisfaction, and absence of psychological problems and anxiety, the exclusionary reaction of protecting one's ethnicity has been negatively associated with these measures (Chen et al., 2016). Experiencing globalized intercultural contact as a threat to one's cultural or ethnic tradition can promote emotional and reflexive responses of rejecting new cultural influences and protecting one's cultural or ethnic identity. Such a reaction pattern has been associated with xenophobic and exclusionary behavior (Chiu et al., 2011). When experiencing existential anxiety and mortality salience, people are likely to endorse and defend their cultural worldview, which can lead to encouragement of aggression toward those who seem to violate their cultural apprehension of the world. Indeed, such existential anxiety has in experimental research been found to hold a significant

impact on whether bicultural exposure is perceived as cultural contamination, consequently initiating defensive exclusionary reactions to a globalized plurality (Torelli et al., 2011). Additionally, research has found that exposure to mixes of foreign cultural elements and heritage culture—which happens during cultural globalization—may threaten a cultural identity and the need for epistemic certainty and security underlying exclusionary reactions to globalization (Morris et al., 2011).

Central to the relationship between globalization and radicalization, experiencing globalization processes as either a realistic (e.g., increasing financial inequality and competition) or symbolic (e.g., changes in traditional way of life and customs) threat can mobilize political engagement to defend and restore one's local sociocultural order. For example, the globalized mobility and the increase of immigration was utilized in arguments by former United States President Donald Trump, as well as proponents of "Brexit," resulting in attitudes toward revitalizing and protecting the nation against both realistic (e.g., terrorism, job scarcity, and crime) and symbolic (e.g., foreign values and cultures) threats (Rios et al., 2018). Moreover, various extreme reactions to globalization can evolve around cultural and political issues such as anti-neoliberalism of the extreme left, globophobia of the extreme right, and protection of one's religious or ethnic identity (Held & McGrew, 2007). For example, globalized interconnectivity is reflected in the unruly spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in escalated psychosocial disruption and psychological distress; together with an endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, this has been associated with radicalization across political orientations (Levinsson et al., 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic has also reinforced some of the key concerns of the radical left, such as anti-racism, anti-fascism, anti-capitalism, and perceived state repression. These concerns were accompanied by opposition to COVID-19 restrictions and lockdowns imposed by governments, leading to violent clashes (Vieten, 2020).

Globalization and Radicalized Exclusionary Identities

Along with the globalized proliferation of intercultural and intergroup contact, some essential challenges emerge regarding the individual sense of self and belonging related to the experiences of identity threat and the increased identity possibilities and intergroup relations. Such challenges are shaped by the disorderly uncertainty accompanying globalization as the traditional sociocultural order and values are disrupted, resulting in an absence of established and acknowledged identity trajectories inherited from birth and formed by the collective processes of socialization. Conversely, the globalized world provides an unlimited number of identity possibilities that need to be considered and negotiated in relation to the individual's numerous sociocultural affiliations (e.g., family traditions, globalized youth culture, and national culture; Ozer, 2019). Overall, rapid sociocultural changes can initiate self-uncertainty, which among some can motivate engagement with unambiguous and restricted radicalized group identities in order to reduce such uncertainty (Hogg, 2021). Consequently, identity development and negotiation become central and intricately during globalization and play a central part in contemporary radicalization and violent extremism (Ozer, 2019).

Radicalization describes the processes of adopting extreme normative societal attitudes that—in some cases—might occur alongside an acceptance of deploying illegal or even violent means to achieve one's goals of extreme changes in the individual or collective way of life. In this sense, radicalization refers to a generic process that can manifest in various forms such as political, religious, and environmentalist (Ozer, 2020). Such a universal conception of radicalization aligns with the generic understanding of globalization as a complex process that can result in numerous consequences (Berry, 2008). Accordingly, both globalization and radicalization can occur in various ways within the specific local context. This suggests that the link between globalization and radicalization emerges as a complex and multifaceted connection that should be studied within the specific context for an in-depth understanding of the dynamics in play. For example, whereas the result of globalization might

be perceived as multinational companies compromising the natural environment or undermining labor unions in one context, the consequence in another context could be an experienced threat to one's ethnicity with both cases initiating extremist responses. Nevertheless, the overarching theme of identity appears to be a central concept in globalization-initiated radicalization across sociocultural variety (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011; Moghaddam, 2008).

In the wake of globalization, individuals' sense of continuity and order is disturbed, causing unpredictability, uncertainty, and existential anxiety. Consequently, the strong endorsement of prescriptive religious, political, or cultural group membership can provide the identity needed to establish a sense of certainty and stability within the globalized plurality (Hogg, 2021; Kinnvall, 2004). Hence, normative and prescriptive group identities and behavior can develop as a defensive and exclusionary reaction to the uncertainty in and associated plurality of ways of living that emerge out of globalization processes. Such exclusionary identities are formed around an essentialist conception of a consistent and bounded set of values and behaviors, mitigating the contextual uncertainty, and evading challenging identity negotiation processes. Such foreclosed identity formation is often complemented by romanticizing and revitalizing an imagined past with an essentialist cultural or religious point of reference. It provides people with a firm sense of self and belonging often accompanied by an intense interest in defending and establishing one's way of life throughout one's sociocultural context. Cross-national research in Denmark and India has found poor sociocultural embeddedness to be associated with the endorsement of both violent and nonviolent extremism through ethnic protection as an exclusionary reaction to globalization centered around the purity and superiority of one's ethnic group as well as objection to intercultural contact (Ozer, 2020).

A central issue regarding identity development in the era of globalization concerns how ethnic and cultural affiliation is negotiated in the context of living among and in contact with other cultural and ethnic groups in plural societies (Jensen et al., 2011). Accordingly, the self is affected by the surrounding plurality in social, cultural, and religious

positions, which to various degrees are represented within the individual (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). Consequently, identities reflecting various aspects of both the local and the global context are present within the individual. Identities associated with several levels of categorization (e.g., local community, national, and global) are associated differently with endorsement of values related to peace and conflict. In one study, identification as a global citizen was associated with attitudes toward peace and diplomacy and negatively linked with endorsement of the war on terror, whereas American national identification was reversely associated with these variables (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2017). Consequently, the dynamics of global and local identifications during globalization can catalyze important differences in the individual's attitude toward societal development and coherence. For instance, globalization not only facilitates the emergence of transnational activism and ideological movements, but also makes grievances travel quickly across different contexts and populations. This is clearly reflected in how Islamist movements connect Muslims into a virtual community focusing on Muslim suffering and a sense of collective grievance and victimization (Wagemakers, 2008), which in turn creates a sense of global identification with Muslims worldwide or "Ummah." For instance, when Western-born Muslims identify with a global Muslim identity, they may not only respond vicariously with anger and aggression to the plight of those Muslims suffering under Western war and occupation, but they may also consider themselves as agents acting on behalf of the global Muslim community against the perceived perpetrators. Indeed, recent studies show that Western occupation and wars in Muslim countries are potent sources of anger, injustice, and violent behavioral intentions among Western-born Muslims with no direct personal experience of Western-led war and occupation (Obaidi et al., 2020; Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2018; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2018; Pape, 2003). In this sense, wars and conflicts are disconnected from a specific context, culture, or country, and the globalization process makes the transnational activism relevant and impactful at the local level (e.g., della Porta et al., 1999).

Exclusionary reactions to globalization are likely to occur when identity salience is high and a cultural threat is present. Individuals are also

motivated to defend their worldviews and ethnicity when they experience existential anxiety, leading to a search for meaning in established cultures and traditions (Chiu & Kwan, 2016). In research, perceived threats to one's nation have been associated with lower levels of global identification and indirectly linked with lower endorsement of prosocial values (Reysen et al., 2014). Moreover, social identity has been found to strengthen the association between an insecure local sociocultural embeddedness and both violent and non-violent extremism in majority populations (Ozer et al., 2020). As such, the composite of salient group identity and identity threats comprise the founding ingredients for radicalization trajectories fueled by globalization and the issues of intergroup contact.

Radicalization reflecting extreme reactions to the perceived threat to one's culture and ethnicity has been expressed as out-group hostility. Important for whether intercultural contact can emerge as a threat is how well the group is prepared for intercultural contact and how well the group adapts to such contact (Moghaddam, 2008). Within globalized societies, the proliferation of intercultural contact between diverse cultural and religious groups through both migration and media occurs in everyday life (Ozer, 2019). Whereas mediated and indirect contact is often voluntarily and selectively sought by the individual, the contemporary waves of migration and military encroachment have spurred globalized agitation. Such rather sudden contact among groups can result in extreme exclusionary reactions to the globalized societal development. Indeed, the perceived intercultural threat has been found to spur extremist out-group hostility across different ethnic groups and socio-cultural contexts (Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2018; Obaidi, Thomsen et al., 2018). In the extreme form, such threats to one's beliefs and values can reflect an actual fear of replacement of one's ethnic group. That is, in some Western contexts, narratives have been evolving around the understanding that non-Western immigrants are deliberately replacing ethnic white majority populations. This conspiracy theory titled "the great replacement," which is widespread on global social networks (Cosentino, 2020), has motivated not only right-wing political movements but also recent terror attacks, including the massacre at two mosques in New Zealand in 2019. Moreover, empirical research has found such fear

of replacement to be associated with ethnic persecution of Muslims, violent intentions, and Islamophobia through perceived symbolic threat (Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2021).

The Mutualism of Globalized Radicalization

The increased global connectivity and the proliferated use of media have intensified intercultural and intergroup processes beyond what has been witnessed throughout history (Held & McGrew, 2007). That is, information and disinformation about attitudes and treatment of other groups of people can easily spread to members of that group in other parts of the world. Consequently, radicalized narratives and networks providing alternative radicalized identities are transnationally available through social media, originating in and bridging dissimilar sociocultural contexts. This incessant global awareness of concomitant sociocultural events has incited the intergroup reactivity present in globalized radicalization.

The globalized interconnectivity with awareness of events in distant locations, as well as access to networks and (dis)information, has accentuated mutualism as the accelerating element driving the processes of globalized radicalization. For example, cartoons portraying and deriding the prophet Mohammed published by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* and later by the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* generated disturbance, aggression, and retaliation among Muslims around the world (Agius, 2013). Motivated by the insults against their religion, two Muslim brothers attacked the *Charlie Hebdo* office, killing 12 and injuring 11. The week after the terror attack, 54 anti-Muslim incidents were recorded in France, including shootings and attacks on mosques. In Denmark, a strong discourse has emerged stressing a narrow, exclusionary national identity that reflects a popular perception of the need to secure the country against foreign, non-Western radicalized individuals (Agius, 2013). Based on anecdotal accounts, the stated motive behind the Danish and French cartoons was the perception that core secular values of freedom of speech were threatened. Yet, the *Charlie Hebdo* and Copenhagen perpetrators in turn claimed their violent acts were

retribution for the cartoons disparaging the Prophet Muhammad. The *Hebdo* attacks are perceived to have provoked France into adopting a more aggressive role in the ongoing war in Syria. According to survivors of the Bataclan concert shooting in Paris, one of the terrorists blamed his impending killings on France's contribution to the war (Schwartz, 2016). This recollects the mutuality in threats to beliefs and values associated with religious and ethnic identities, which can initiate out-group hostility and group polarization (Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2018; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2018; Obaidi, Thomsen et al., 2018). Recent experimental and longitudinal studies show a mutual conflict escalation between Muslims and non-Muslims, where the negativity and hostility from one group provoke the other group to respond in kind (Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2021; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2021). Accordingly, the impact of globalization has drawn attention toward the dynamic interaction and interdependence between groups rather than viewing radicalization in isolated contexts (Moghaddam, 2018). For instance, in response to globalization processes, ideologies travel rapidly from one context to the other. This is reflected in the spread of extreme right-wing ideology and violence in the twenty-first century. The advance and the proliferation of the Internet and social media have facilitated the spread of white extremist ideology and violence to an extent that spans continents. Several recent terrorist attacks by white supremacists show that the perpetrators are deeply entrenched in the global far-right and have been inspired by each other. For instance, Tarrant (the Christchurch Mosque shooter who killed 51 people in New Zealand) claimed he was inspired by the right-wing terrorists Dylann Roof, Luca Traini, Anton Lundin Pettersson, and Darren Osborne, but his "true inspiration" presumably came from Breivik (Cai & Landon, 2019; Kingsley, 2019).

A central concept of mutual radicalization describes the polarization processes in which groups position themselves even more extremely in relation to the other group, leading to out-group hostility and attacks (Moghaddam, 2018). Globalization fuels such reciprocity by driving and accelerating the interaction between ethnic groups, which can escalate into a destructive vicious cycle of identity positioning, counter-positioning, and violence (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007; Moghaddam, 2008; Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2021; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2021). Within

such dynamics, social media plays an important role in bringing together people from various locations to form an echo-chamber in which ideology and hostility can be amplified and reinforced, narrowing the size of the argument pool and alternative perspectives in order to conform with a radicalized group. Opposing the main pillars of deliberative democracy with the inclusion of different viewpoints, enclave deliberation refers to discussions among the like-minded in which opinions tend to become more extreme by escaping reasonable criticism, resulting in group polarization. As a result of globalization and the affiliated technological development, online platforms can facilitate global meetings in which enclave deliberation can develop into an aggressive discussion climate regarding political issues (Strandberg et al., 2019). Many radicalized milieus are shaped by such online enclave deliberation, developing and fortifying narratives that justify extreme opinions concerning societal change as well as justifying the use of illegal or violent means to reach such goals. Research has found engagement with such online environments to be associated with increased violence when groups meet in the real world (Gallacher et al., 2021). As such, technological developments have made it possible to engage with the like-minded across geographical distance, in turn reshaping group affiliations to be centered around beliefs and values rather than the actual local community. The vast online interaction within and between religious or political groups can polarize the group's attitudes to extreme positions. Together with an awareness of relevant events occurring across the globe, these processes can initiate continuous chains of mutual retaliation.

To counter mutual radicalization facilitated by globalization, a social-ecological approach could prove useful in developing an environment that facilitates access to the resources necessary to navigate and adapt positively in the face of sociocultural hardship (Stephens et al., 2019). For example, interventions facilitating the development of general life skills (e.g., social skills, perspective taking, and understanding the political system) could strengthen individual as well as collective resilient trajectories during experiences of globalization-initiated threats or injustice (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2019). Consequently, in order to counter globalization-based radicalization, it is important to facilitate dialogue to depolarize the ideological positions as well as to develop interventions or

community awareness that promote a positive process of identity development that is not radicalized by the polarizing effects of globalization (Stephens et al., 2019).

Conclusion

Globalization appears to have disruptive and transformative effects on local sociocultural orders and traditions. Such effects of global interconnectivity can interrupt central psychological needs, motivating individual reactions to globalization processes. Indeed, many forms of radicalization grow out of dissatisfaction and exclusionary reactions to the way local contexts are being globalized.

Whereas many radicalized reactions to globalization center around the preservation and defense of ethnic or cultural identities and belief systems, others concern different dimensions of globalization. For example, radical environmentalism can emerge as a reaction to globalized materialism by promoting both the local ecology as well as global identification as the climate crisis pertains to the international level requiring global collaboration to reach sustainability on earth. That is, globalization comprises a highly complex phenomenon, and the present chapter is focused on the ramifications of cultural globalization and identity processes often central to religious and right-wing political radicalization. Nevertheless, these aspects of the globalization-radicalization nexus may prove relevant for other forms of extremism as well.

As the world integrates into an interconnected space of intercultural and intergroup contact accompanied by vast information exchange, radicalized, exclusionary reactions to such processes and events emerge around the local–global concession as an attempt to restore stability through essentialized and romanticized comprehension of religious, ethnic, and cultural identities. Such processes evolve around the dynamic site of identity construction, negotiation, and protection reflecting various detrimental reactions to global interconnectivity as people strive to establish a sense of self and sociocultural rootedness within a complex, uncertain, and convoluted globalized world.

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6

Globalization and Evolving National Identities: The Role of Essentialism

Nur Soylu Yalcinkaya 

Globalization has fueled immigration around the world, leading to increasingly diverse societies. One of the most important consequences of globalization has been greater mobility of populations around the world and greater contact between cultures than ever (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). With increased immigration, societies now host spaces that people with diverse racial and ethnic identities inhabit, where they get exposed to various cultural symbols, traditions, and practices (Chao et al., 2007; Chiu & Cheng, 2007; Chiu et al., 2009). The number of people who identify with multiple or hybrid identities is steadily increasing (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2020). These changes lead individuals and societies to question existing definitions of national identities (Verkuyten et al., 2019). As a result, racially and ethnically diverse societies in a globalizing world emerge as spaces of negotiation

N. Soylu Yalcinkaya (✉)
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: nur.soylu@boun.edu.tr

over the content and boundaries of the unifying national identity (e.g., Ariely, 2012; Reijerse et al., 2013). Questions regarding what criteria define the national identity, who truly belongs and who does not—or cannot—belong to the nation become increasingly relevant.

Changing societal dynamics may cause a variety of identity-related concerns. People may take different positions regarding how the society should manage cultural diversity depending on their own position in the society (Nortio & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2020). On one hand, dominant populations in immigrant-receiving societies may perceive immigrants as a threat to the nation, and strive to exclude them from the nation or force them to give up their cultural identities by assimilating (Verkuyten, 2006). On the other hand, immigrant populations are likely to strive to maintain and protect their own cultural identities, while seeking inclusion and acceptance as part of the nation. In the present chapter, I will consider the role of essentialism as an ideological tool that dominant and subordinated groups use to substantiate potentially conflicting visions of the national identity within racially or ethnically diverse societies.

Essentialism entails the tendency to attribute a natural, innate, and fixed essence to socially constructed categories (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Gelman, 2003; Gil-White, 2001; Haslam et al., 2000, 2002). Essentialist lay beliefs about social categories focus on distinct natures that define members of categories such as race and ethnicity, and underlie the assumed fundamental differences between these groups (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2000, 2002). Based on this perspective, social category membership is informative about people, since it reflects certain core and unchangeable characteristics they inherit through biology or culture (Bastian & Haslam, 2006). Whereas an essentialist perspective defines identities as separated by strict and impermeable boundaries, a non-essentialist (or social constructionist; No et al., 2008) perspective fosters more flexible and inclusive representations.

Essentialist ideas may be disseminated as part of the dominant discourse in a society (Ariely, 2012; Wagner et al., 2009). Such beliefs are generally selectively endorsed by individuals depending on their position within a particular sociopolitical context, as well as their personal experiences, needs, and motives (cognitive, epistemic, or ideological; Keller, 2005). In the following sections, I will lay out in detail how the

endorsement of essentialist or non-essentialist ideas can be used to reinforce exclusionary or inclusive definitions of a national identity, which can legitimize particular responses toward cultural diversity. I will then discuss how engagement with the changing composition of societies can organically shape essentialist beliefs among the public over time, feeding back into responses toward diversity. After analyzing this dynamic relationship, I will end by considering potential future trends and avenues for research.

Immigration and Construction of National Identities

Identities are constructed and reproduced within sociocultural contexts (Wagner et al., 2009). In a globalizing world, the perceived importance or relevance of national identities may weaken over time due to the increasing interconnectedness of societies across the world, and emerging superordinate identities such as global citizenship (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). However, it is also likely for people to cling to their national identities more strongly as a response to rapidly changing societal dynamics that evoke identity-related concerns or feelings of threat (Ariely, 2012). Given these circumstances, not only the importance or salience of the national identity, but also its content has inevitably been evolving. The changing composition of societies has exacerbated the need to reconsider the definition and boundaries of the unifying national identity (Ariely, 2012; Hong & Cheon, 2017). In a society where individuals come from various cultural backgrounds, have mixed-heritages, and identify with different, multiple, or hybrid ethnic and racial identities, the answer to the question of who truly belongs to the nation can become quite elusive (Lindstam et al., 2021).

Dominant groups may perceive an influx of immigrants and increasing cultural diversity as a threat to national unity (Rios et al., 2018; Verkuyten, 2009). Based on integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), dominant group members may experience different types of threat in response to immigration, including realistic (i.e., concerns about security and competition over financial resources or jobs)

and symbolic (i.e., concerns about changes related to national identity and cultural or social order). Of course, individuals who identify with dominant groups do not show uniform responses toward immigrants and minorities. Within dominant groups, stronger endorsement of nationalist ideology (i.e., beliefs about the superiority of one's nation) and identification with the national identity are likely to fuel perceived threat and negative responses toward immigrants (Ariely, 2012; Janmaat, 2006; Nortio & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2020). Likewise, stronger endorsement of a relatively inclusive or exclusionary construction of national identity can shape responses toward immigrants and other subordinated groups (Pehrson, Brown, et al., 2009; Perkins et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2019). Researchers have distinguished between civic and ethnic constructions of national identity, which focus on the fulfillment of civic or ethnic criteria for national belonging, respectively (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Shulman, 2002; Smith, 1991). Those in power may uphold a particular construction of the national identity (e.g., Ariely, 2012; Wright et al., 2012). The dominant representation of the national identity can be disseminated through political rhetoric, official history education, and mainstream media coverage (e.g., Ariely, 2012; Kurtiş et al., 2017). For instance, some nations define the national identity mainly based on civic markers, whereas others (e.g., most European nations) uphold an ethnic construction (Verkuyten, 2006; Wright et al., 2012). Conceptions of national identity are likely to be shaped by the dominant discourse to a large extent, but may also vary across individuals (e.g., Pehrson, Vignoles, et al., 2009; Perkins et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2019).

Based on a civic construction of national identity, citizenship, adherence to civic duties, and shared principles make up the basis of the national identity, independent of one's ethnic, racial, or religious affiliations (Reijerse et al., 2013). A civic construction of national identity is generally inclusive; it relates to more open immigration policies at the state level, and more positive attitudes toward immigrants among the public (e.g., Rothi et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2012). An ethnic construction of national identity emphasizes ancestry and common blood as determinants of national belonging, defining the national identity on the basis of the dominant ethnic identity in the society (Verkuyten &

Martinovic, 2015; Wakefield et al., 2011). An ethnic construction is less inclusive than a civic construction, since the assumption is that ethnically diverse immigrants cannot possibly achieve the criteria for national belonging. Relatedly, endorsement of an ethnic construction of national identity is associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Pehrson, Vignoles, et al., 2009; Shulman, 2002; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015; Wakefield et al., 2011; Wright, 2011). An ethnic (or ethno-cultural) definition may also include references to shared cultural traditions and practices; however, some researchers suggest that ethnic and cultural constructions of national identity are conceptually distinct (Pehrson, Vignoles, et al., 2009; Shulman, 2002). Although achievable cultural criteria could define the national identity in relatively inclusive terms (e.g., willingness to learn the language; Jones & Smith, 2001), cultural markers are commonly used to force cultural homogeneity within the nation (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2017; Reijerse et al., 2013).

Essentialism as an Ideological Tool for Identity Construction

Essentialist (or non-essentialist) ideas can serve as a means to justify and reinforce particular constructions of the nation, depending on group interests. Psychological essentialism is the tendency to attribute superficial similarities between members of a category (e.g., animals) to an assumed, underlying essence that makes them what/who they are (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Gil-White, 2001). Applied to human categories, essentialist tendencies can lead people to consider social categories such as race, ethnicity, gender, social class, and sexual orientation as reflecting a fundamental and distinct nature that defines members of such categories (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000). From an essentialist viewpoint, social categories such as race and ethnicity are determined by nature, and are stable across time and space (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2000, 2002; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). Racial and ethnic groups therefore reflect a meaningful source of natural division among humans based on an assumed essence that shapes them to the core (e.g., No et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2003; Williams & Eberhardt,

2008). In that sense, carrying one's group's essence is inescapable for an individual (Grillo, 2003; Wagner et al., 2009).

An essence is a rather elusive concept (Brescoll et al., 2013; Prentice & Miller, 2007). The assumed source of a group essence is commonly traced back to biology or culture. Biological and cultural forms of essentialism make the same assumptions about a deterministic group essence, but differ in terms of the source of the essence they assume. People may assume that the essence of social categories has a biological basis, such as genes, DNA, or hormones (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Keller, 2005). For instance, one may assume that race has a biological or genetic basis, which defines the personality characteristics, traits, and abilities of its members, and determines the kind of person they are (Byrd & Hughey, 2015; No et al., 2008; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). However, an essence does not have to be biological. People may also define the essence of a racial or ethnic group in cultural terms. Cultural essentialist lay beliefs suggest that racial or ethnic groups have static cultures that define who they are, and that being raised within one of those cultural worlds shapes individuals permanently (Grillo, 2003; Rangel & Keller, 2011; Verkuyten, 2003; Wagner et al., 2009). Verkuyten's (2003) definition of cultural essentialism suggests that "[p]eople are ... more or less passive carriers of their culture, whereby their attitudes, beliefs, and achievements are supposed to reflect typical cultural patterns" (p. 385). Therefore, from a cultural essentialist perspective, racial or ethnic groups would have distinct and stable cultures (e.g., values, beliefs, practices, and lifestyles), and their members would share a set of fixed, psychological characteristics. In contrast, a social constructionist viewpoint acknowledges the sociopolitical and historical roots of social categories such as race and ethnicity, which are arbitrary human constructions that vary across societies and time (No et al., 2008).

Endorsement of biological essentialism has commonly been associated with negative intergroup outcomes such as greater legitimization of existing social hierarchies (Jost et al., 2004; Morton et al., 2009), greater acceptance of racial inequality and less interest in social contact with racial outgroup members (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008), greater anti-Black prejudice among White Americans (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Condit et al., 2004; Jayaratne et al., 2006; Keller, 2005),

greater interethnic hostility (Kimel et al., 2016), more negative attitudes toward outgroups (Keller, 2005), and stronger endorsement of stereotypes (Bastian & Haslam, 2006). The studies that document the negative intergroup and interpersonal consequences of biological essentialism of race and ethnicity have been conducted with people who identify with dominant groups in the society. Indeed, endorsement of biological essentialism is typically greater among people with dominant identities (e.g., Kraus & Keltner, 2013; Mahalingam, 2003), whereas people with subordinated identities tend to endorse cultural essentialism more strongly (Mahalingam, 2003). Importantly, essentialism can have different consequences for intergroup relations depending on how and by whom it is utilized.

Allport (1954) considered essentialist thinking about categories as a natural cognitive tendency, which helps humans navigate their social world. Indeed, children show essentialist tendencies at very early ages (Gelman, 2003). Essentialism can serve cognitive or epistemic needs such as the need for structure, since it affirms a sense of stable societal order (Gil-White, 2001; Keller, 2005). However, researchers point out that even though essentialist tendencies may have cognitive roots, people's use of essentialist explanations depends on motivated reasoning processes (Brescoll et al., 2013). Essentialist beliefs can serve ideological motives such as justifying the existing social order (Brescoll et al., 2013; Keller, 2005), or become a means to challenge it (Grillo, 2003; Verkuyten, 2003; Wagner et al., 2009). Dominant and subordinated group members can strategically endorse or downplay essentialist ideas based on their position within a particular sociopolitical context (e.g., Figgou, 2013; Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2017; Morton et al., 2009; Verkuyten, 2003). In that sense, essentialist beliefs are dynamic and versatile; people can uphold or challenge essentialist ideas for social and political reasons (e.g., Morton et al., 2009; Verkuyten, 2003; Wagner et al., 2009). Essentialist ideas about the nation itself, as well as racial and ethnic identities, can thus form a basis for arguments regarding who truly belongs in a nation within diverse societies.

Dominant Perspectives: Essentialism as a Means for the Exclusion of “Others”

As a response to increasing diversity, dominant groups can endorse exclusionary constructions of the national identity in order to justify the argument that immigrants do not belong in the nation, thereby protecting their advantaged position in society. An ethnic construction of national identity represents a form of in-group essentialism, whereby people assume a blood-based or culture-based essence to the nation that only people from a particular ethnic group possess, and ethnically diverse immigrants simply do not (Moftizadeh et al., 2021; Pehrson, Brown, et al., 2009; Verkuyten et al., 2019). Such an essentialist construction of national identity represents immigrants as outsiders who undermine national unity (Lindstam et al., 2021; Pehrson, Brown, et al., 2009). For instance, Greek participants used biological essentialist representations of national identity (e.g., as based on blood and genes) to justify the exclusion of immigrants from the nation (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2017). Similarly, British participants who showed strong identification with the nation reported more negative attitudes toward asylum seekers, only if they endorsed a biological essentialist construction of national identity (Pehrson, Brown, et al., 2009). An essentialist perception of race among German participants was associated with greater prejudice toward Turkish immigrants (Keller, 2005). The dominant discourse in a society may also culturally essentialize immigrants by representing them as a homogeneous group with a set of fixed cultural characteristics that is not a good fit for the nation, such as the depiction of Sudanese immigrants in Australia as a violent or deviant group (Augoustinos et al., 2015; Hanson-Easey et al., 2014). Even when immigrants are accepted as part of the nation, this is likely to be on the condition of cultural assimilation (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2017).

Zagefka and colleagues (2013) suggest that people who endorse essentialist beliefs may be particularly threatened by cultural contamination. Expecting immigrants to assimilate to the dominant culture can be a way of dealing with the perceived threat of cultural contamination by outsiders (Tip et al., 2012; Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). Assimilation would require immigrants to adopt the dominant cultural patterns, and

give up their original culture (Berry, 1997). The assumption behind this response is that immigrants can only become part of the nation to the extent that they abandon their own cultural traditions, values, and practices (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). If dominant group members believe that immigrants wish to maintain their own cultural patterns instead of fully assimilating, this can lead to increased perceptions of threat, which is associated with more negative attitudes toward these groups (Tip et al., 2012). Perceived cultural threats and corresponding negative responses to immigrants are particularly likely to emerge if the dominant group perceives the cultural values and practices associated with immigrant groups as essentially different or contradicting their own (Reijerse et al., 2013). In a focus group study conducted in the Netherlands, Verkuyten (2003) showed that ethnic Dutch participants expressed essentialist beliefs about fundamental cultural differences in order to justify their support for restrictions on the entry of immigrants into the country. British participants who perceived British national identity in cultural essentialist terms were likely to be against minority cultural maintenance, which they perceived as a barrier against adaptation to the dominant culture (Moftizadeh et al., 2021). Ironically, essentialist thinking can fuel both the belief that immigrants should assimilate, as well as the belief that they would be unable to do so (Zagefka et al., 2013). As a result, the assumption that immigrants cannot fulfill expectations of assimilation can lead to negative reactions toward them (Zagefka et al., 2013). Interestingly, dominant group members may sometimes resort to non-essentialist beliefs to support arguments of assimilation. For instance, ethnic Dutch participants expressed non-essentialist ideas in order to argue that minority groups would be able to assimilate to the dominant Dutch culture, and therefore they should do so (Verkuyten, 2003).

Subordinated Perspectives: Essentialism as a Means for Identity Assertion

People with marginalized or oppressed identities might use essentialism strategically to induce political change through collective action (Spivak,

1988). They are most likely to turn to cultural, rather than biological, essentialism for this purpose (Mahalingam, 2003). In Verkuyten's (2003) study, ethnic minority participants in the Netherlands upheld cultural essentialist ideas in order to argue that complete assimilation to the dominant culture would not be possible for their group. Emphasizing the essential nature of a racial or ethnic identity can help minority groups to incite social movements, and fight for the recognition of their identity and rights (Grillo, 2003; Morton et al., 2009; Ngo, 2013; Verkuyten, 2003; Wagner et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2015). Minority group members who endorse cultural essentialism may show greater support for cultural inclusion of subordinated groups in the society in general (Soylyu Yalcinkaya et al., 2017). Indeed, minority groups that experience anxiety about losing their cultural identity as a result of assimilation may be particularly likely to endorse ethnic essentialism (Yang et al., 2015). On the other hand, in the face of prejudice and discrimination, racial or ethnic minorities may tend to challenge cultural essentialist notions that portray their group as a homogeneous entity with static characteristics (Verkuyten, 2003).

Importantly, endorsement of essentialist beliefs among minority group members has important consequences in terms of the psychological experience of their identities. Essentialist thinking may make the experience of hybrid or multiple identities more challenging; trying to reconcile cultural identifications that represent distinct essences can be difficult (Chao et al., 2007). For instance, among Asian Americans who endorsed racial essentialist beliefs, reminders of American culture led to the feeling that they were unable to become true members of the dominant culture (No et al., 2008). Similarly, minority group members who essentialized the British national identity themselves, or believed that dominant group members essentialized Britishness, reported that maintaining their own culture was not compatible with adapting to the dominant culture (Moftizadeh et al., 2021). Relatedly, to the extent that immigrants held essentialist beliefs, they were less likely to use the national identity to define their self-concept, and less likely to adopt the dominant culture (Bastian & Haslam, 2008). Indeed, essentialist beliefs can lead immigrants toward strategies that Berry (1997) defines as separation (i.e., holding onto own cultural identity without adapting to the dominant

culture) and marginalization (i.e., rejecting both cultures) during the acculturation process (Bastian & Haslam, 2008). Furthermore, bicultural individuals who endorse essentialist beliefs may experience difficulty switching between cultural frames (Hong & Cheon, 2017), feel disgust toward hybrid cultural representations formed through the fusion of stimuli from different cultures (Cheon et al., 2016), and show greater stress response when discussing issues related to their bicultural identities (Chao et al., 2007).

Implications of Cultural Diversity for Essentialist Beliefs

Just like essentialism can shape (or justify) responses toward diversity, experiences with diversity also shape essentialist thinking. Changing sociocultural dynamics can influence individuals' lay beliefs about social groups (Xu et al., 2021). Individuals inhabiting a multicultural environment are likely to be exposed to diverse cultures, and experience intergroup contact. Such experiences can challenge, or in some cases further reinforce, essentialist thinking, which, in turn, would feed back into people's responses to diversity.

Research provides evidence for changes in essentialist thinking as a function of diversity exposure. For instance, children raised in Hawaii, a state characterized by racial diversity and a large multiracial population, tended to show less racial essentialist thinking than children raised in continental U.S. states (Pauker et al., 2018). Moreover, White students who have moved to Hawaii from continental U.S. states showed a decrease in their endorsement of racial essentialism at the end of their first year in college (Pauker et al., 2018). This effect became larger as a function of the amount of interracial contact experiences they reported. American students who studied abroad reported less essentialist thinking than American students who studied in the United States, although this effect was not observed among Chinese students who studied in the United States (Xu et al., 2021). It is possible that American students had more (or more positive) instances of intergroup contact than did Chinese students, although this was not directly assessed in the study.

Working with children in Israeli settings, Deeb and colleagues (2011) have found that children from different backgrounds showed similar levels of essentialism as they started kindergarten, and their essentialist tendencies decreased over the years. However, the decrease in essentialism was more pronounced among children who attended integrated (ethnically diverse) schools rather than segregated schools, and was even stronger for majority (Jewish) children compared to minority (Arab) children.

Furthermore, the observation that people can identify with multiple racial/ethnic categories and form hybrid identities can challenge essentialist thinking, suggesting that these identities are not strictly mutually exclusive. For instance, exposure to mixed-race individuals who appear racially ambiguous reduced majority (Whites in the United States) participants' endorsement of biological essentialism about race (Sanchez et al., 2015). The reduction in essentialist thinking was particularly true for exposure to racially ambiguous people who were labeled as biracial, rather than those who were labeled with only one of the racial categories (Young et al., 2013).

As societal dynamics change with immigration, societies and individuals may recognize the positive consequences of diversity for society and embrace a multiculturalist ideology (e.g., Nortio & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2020). A multiculturalist ideology emphasizes the importance of recognizing, respecting, and celebrating cultural differences (Berry, 2011; Dovidio et al., 2015; Wilton et al., 2019). Multiculturalist perspectives stress the importance of awareness about, and sensitivity for cultural differences, which are deemed meaningful. Multiculturalism as an ideology corresponds to integration as an acculturation strategy, which allows minorities to maintain their own cultural traditions and practices while also adapting to the dominant culture (Berry, 2011). Immigrants tend to support multiculturalism more strongly than do dominant group members (Verkuyten, 2006). Multiculturalism allows members of these groups to develop hybrid or dual identities by protecting and asserting the cultural identities that matter to them, while simultaneously developing an identification with the nation (Dovidio et al., 2015). Being

able to maintain their own cultural patterns is associated with positive psychological outcomes among minority group members (Tip et al., 2012).

Multiculturalism is in accordance with cultural essentialist conceptions of racial/ethnic groups (Verkuyten, 2006). Multiculturalism assumes that each racial/ethnic group has a distinct culture of its own, which should be respected and celebrated (Yogeeswaran et al., 2021), and that the differences between these distinct cultures are fixed (Bernardo et al., 2016). For instance, an intercultural training intervention designed to teach university students about cultural differences led to an increase in cultural essentialism (Fischer, 2011). Among minority group members, endorsement of ethnic essentialism was related with greater support for multiculturalism (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Among dominant group members, however, endorsement of ethnic essentialism was related with less support for multiculturalism, potentially because essentialized representations of minority groups make them seem more threatening (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004; Yogeeswaran et al., 2021). Indeed, multiculturalism can have unintended negative consequences among dominant group members because of its association with essentialist thinking. For instance, in a mostly White U.S. sample, exposure to multiculturalist ideas led to greater endorsement of racial essentialism compared to exposure to a colorblind ideology, which emphasizes that racial/ethnic identities and group differences should be ignored, and commonalities should be focused on instead (Wilton et al., 2019). This effect, in turn, predicted greater acceptance of racial inequality.

Alternative approaches to diversity include interculturalism and multiculturalism. Interculturalism is similar to multiculturalism with its emphasis on the value of cultural differences (Yogeeswaran et al., 2021). However, it presents a more dynamic view of culture, rather than presenting it as an essentialized entity associated with a particular ethnic group (Yogeeswaran et al., 2021). It entails recognition of the interconnected and constantly evolving nature of cultural identities through intergroup interactions (Verkuyten et al., 2020). Intergroup dialog is expected to foster the achievement of unity and harmony in society through flexible and hybrid identities. Indeed, ethnic essentialism was negatively associated with the endorsement of interculturalism, in

contrast with its positive association with multiculturalism (Verkuyten et al., 2020). Finally, polyculturalism stresses how cultures have been historically connected and have influenced each other, in order to highlight the similarities as opposed to differences between them (Bernardo et al., 2016). Similar to interculturalism, polyculturalism is also associated with less essentialist thinking about racial groups (Bernardo et al., 2016).

In addition to exposure to diverse ideologies, engagement with certain cultural affordances can shape essentialist thinking. Cultural products, such as demographic information forms, can convey the message that identifying with multiple identities is accepted or discouraged. For instance, a demographic information question that allows people to choose multiple ethnic identities, as opposed to one that forces people to choose only one identity, can act as a non-essentialist cue (Lee et al., 2014). However, representations of various racial/ethnic groups as a uniform entity under the umbrella term “minorities” can reinforce essentialist thinking (Craig & Richeson, 2014). In a series of studies, dominant group members (i.e., European Americans) in the United States were exposed to information about expected changes in demographics that will lead non-White minorities to become the majority in the society in a few decades (Craig & Richeson, 2014). As a result of this manipulation, participants showed greater automatic racial bias and expressed negative attitudes toward various minority groups. An essentialized representation of minorities lumped together as a unified entity can potentially activate threat perceptions, and lead to negative responses (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Knowles et al., 2021). Among minority groups also, such an essentialized representation that disregards the plurality in ways of being can activate identity threats (Branscombe et al., 1999; Richeson & Craig, 2011). Furthermore, media coverage of immigrant groups can reinforce essentialized depictions of immigrants, particularly through an emphasis on fundamental cultural differences (e.g., Augoustinos et al., 2015; Hanson-Easey et al., 2014).

Conclusion

Culturally diverse societies are a reality within a global world. The realization that the world is becoming highly interconnected, and populations highly mobile, can lead to various reactions (Nortio & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2020; Verkuyten, 2006). One might expect that emerging ideas about global citizenship (e.g., Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013), which emphasize a unifying, superordinate identity as opposed to essentialized national differences, would challenge the importance attributed to the national identity over time. Global events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, or global climate change may make the interconnectedness of societies more salient, strengthening superordinate identities. However, such global threats may also lead to greater perceived intergroup competition, and increased xenophobia (Esses & Hamilton, 2021). Indeed, as nations become more diverse, and the world more interconnected, people may experience various concerns about their existing identities and their position within the social structure. In this sociopolitical context, assumed biological or cultural essences may help define the “Other,” who is denied inclusion or equal status in the society (Ålund, 1999). Over time, static, cultural essentialist views of immigrant populations can be used as an explanation for their subordinated status (Ålund, 1999). However, essentialism plays a versatile role in the process of identity construction (Yogeeswaran et al., 2021), since immigrant populations may use cultural essentialism strategically to assert their identities (Verkuyten, 2003), while also seeking acceptance into the nation.

People have long maintained beliefs in the biological essence of race, and the cultural essence of ethnicity, although race and ethnicity are not bounded entities but evolving representations of dynamic groups within changing sociopolitical contexts (Smedley & Smedley, 2005; Verkuyten, 2018). Since biological essentialism of race has historically been linked with racist arguments about the superiority or inferiority of particular racial groups (Grillo, 2003), genetic essentialist discourse with racist connotations may be less acceptable today. Still, the biological roots of race may be revisited in the age of the genomic revolution, given the popularity of tools such as commercial genetic ancestry tests (Phelan et al., 2014; Roth et al., 2020; Verkuyten, 2018). These tests estimate the

proportion of one's ancestors who originated from particular geographic regions using a DNA sample (Phelan et al., 2014). Since these regions of ancestry correspond to major racial categories used today, genetic ancestry testing can reinforce an essentialist conception of race as "written" in one's genes (Roth et al., 2020). For instance, being exposed to articles suggesting that these tests reveal the genetic basis of race increases racial essentialism (Phelan et al., 2014). However, such tests often reveal that people have mixed ancestry, which could potentially challenge reified notions of distinct racial groups (Roth et al., 2020). The implications of these tests for lay beliefs about race may depend on people's prior knowledge about genetics (Roth et al., 2020). For instance, in a sample of European American participants who took the test, racial essentialism decreased among those who had more prior knowledge, but increased among those who had less prior knowledge (Roth et al., 2020). This pattern suggests that knowledge about genetics help people make more informed interpretations of test results. Other research has shown that people can selectively embrace certain identities based on their ancestry test results, suggesting a strategic use of such tests for political motives (Roth & Ivemark, 2018). Future research may consider the role of genetic ancestry tests and genetics knowledge in shaping people's conceptions of race, ethnicity, and nationhood (Verkuyten, 2018). Lay beliefs in the biological basis of race can be weakened through interventions or educational programs (Tawa, 2016), as well as a more refined discussion of race in textbooks (Morning, 2008).

Experience with cultural diversity is likely to transform both dominant and subordinated populations over time (Berry, 2011; Wagner et al., 2009). Wagner and colleagues (2009) point out that people actively construct their own and others' identities in relation to each other within changing societies. Societies are dynamic, just like dominant representations of identities, and individuals' own perceptions and experiences of their identities (Wagner et al., 2009). Considering individuals as actors situated in different positions within particular sociopolitical contexts in a globalizing world helps illuminate the versatile role of ideologies such as essentialism in the construction of identities and corresponding responses to cultural diversity. Since cultural diversity, contact, and fusion are an inevitable consequences of globalization, engagement with such cultural

affordances will, in turn, shape essentialist thinking over time, feeding back into the ongoing process of identity construction.

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7

Contesting America in a Global Era

Sheila Croucher

“You know what? I’m a nationalist. Nationalist. Nothing wrong. Use that word. Use that word” (Blake, 2018, para. 3). Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s proud embrace and public promotion of “that word” during a 2018 campaign rally for Texas Senator Ted Cruz set off a firestorm of debate about what the terms “nationalist” and “nationalism” signify. Some Democrats, like Representative Gregory W. Meeks of New York, accused Trump of using “very dangerous language” that “reminds me of the kind of words that came from people like Hitler... repressive dictators — those are the individuals that generally use that kind of phrase” (Sonmez, 2018, para. 9). Other critics focused less on the authoritarian connotations of “nationalist,” generally, and more on the term’s close association with white nationalism specifically (Abedi, 2018). Describing nationalism as a “radical, racially-based dogma,” Jennifer

S. Croucher (✉)
Miami University, Oxford, OH, USA
e-mail: crouchsl@miamioh.edu

Rubin of *The Washington Post* wrote that: “nationalism is antithetical to America’s founding creed (‘All men are...’) and contrary to the principles of a multiethnic, multiracial democracy.” As to the most likely explanation for Trump’s embrace of the term, Rubin posited: “He knows exactly what it means, his base knows exactly what he means and he knows the strongest bond with followers is xenophobia” (Rubin, 2018, paras. 6–10).

Trump responded to the criticism by doubling down on his embrace of the term. After acknowledging, “we’re not supposed to use that word [nationalist],” he insisted, “I think it should be brought back” (Sonmez, 2018, para. 5). Trump defended his form of nationalism as a laudable desire to protect the United States against unfair international trade practices. When queried as to whether his comments were a nod (or “dog whistle”) to white nationalists, he denied any knowledge of that association, as he had done on previous occasions (O’Connor, 2018).

Trump’s pronouncements were not surprising, given the content (often exclusionary) and style (regularly combative) of the former president’s politics, but were intriguing in that: (1) “nationalism” as an unapologetic rallying cry has been largely absent from mainstream political discourse in the United States; and (2) the heightened emphasis on borders, boundaries, and bans on international travel and trade by Trump and his supporters seemed out of place in a twenty-first century world characterized by movement, mixing, and the remarkable compression of planetary time and space (Harvey, 1990; Pedersen, 2021). Regarding the former intrigue, even a cursory overview of U.S. history reveals that, in fact, nationalism has been evident, in its many guises, for much of the country’s history, although it is rarely named as such. In fact, prior to Trump’s remarks, the identifier “nationalist” had been “so out of circulation in American politics,” one observer noted, “that pollsters haven’t even tested it, outside the context of white nationalism, for decades” (Blake, 2018, para. 10). Most Americans prefer the term “patriotism,” seemingly to distinguish a civic form of national belonging rooted in a shared commitment to political ideals from “nationalism” as a darker, more sinister configuration of collectivity associated with racial and ethnic exclusion on the part of less “enlightened” polities in other parts of the world.

Not only did the former president's bold public appeals to nationalism deviate from common American practice, but the enthusiasm on the part of Trump and his supporters for fortifying borders, building walls, and erecting fences, also warrants examination, coming as it has at a time when so much else, whether in the realms of technology, economy, or culture, points to the transcendence of barriers—including those of the national community Trump professes to defend. Globalization is the term typically used to describe this “intensifying planetary interconnectivity” (Steger, 2020, p. 17), and for many scholars of nationalism, the evolution toward world-space and world-time was expected to mark the twilight of the national form. That we currently see nationalism invigorated, in the United States and elsewhere, confounds these predictions. But, more so than a contradiction to twenty-first century globalization, nationalism's pervasiveness, potency, and ethno-racial tint appear to be a consequence of that interconnectedness.

This chapter examines the interrelationship between globalization and the contemporary politics and practices of American nationhood. In doing so, it situates the not-new, but arguably heightened, tension over the nature of American national identity within the context of the concurrent contestation over the efficacy of belonging to nation-states in an era of amplified global interconnectedness.

Nation and Globalization

“Nation” and “globalization” are among the most widely used and difficult to define concepts in contemporary discourse. Each term, on its own, refers to powerful, pervasive, and multifaceted phenomena. Sorting through the interrelationship between national identification and globalization compounds this complexity, but is highly instructive in terms of making sense of contemporary social and political issues in the United States.

Trump's embrace of nationalism not only prompted criticism, but revealed public confusion regarding the meaning of “nationalist” and associated terms (Rubin, 2018). Similar confusion exists among scholars, some of whom have bemoaned the “terminological chaos” (Connor,

1978, p. 384), and characterized “nation” as “one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon” (Tilly, 1975, p. 7). Despite these challenges, one point that enjoys widespread agreement is that “nation” and “state,” although closely associated, are not synonymous. States are definable by objective criteria (bounded territory, established population, identifiable administrative structure, internationally recognized sovereignty; Connor, 1978). Nations, on the other hand, are portrayed in subjective terms: as “a soul, a spiritual principle” (Renan, 1882, p. 26), a “sentiment of solidarity” (Weber, 1948, quoted in Gerth & Mills, 2009, p. 172), an “imagined political community” (Anderson, 1991). Nations, then, are more intangible entities than states, but closely connected to them in that nations typically have, or desire to have, their own state. Anderson’s (1991) famous definition of nations as “imagined communities” is one of many that emphasizes the significance of sovereignty. “Nations dream of being free,” he writes, “the gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state” (p. 7). Meanwhile, from the perspective of democratic theory, acting on behalf of a constituent national community is, for states, what justifies their very existence. The nation, in other words, serves as an “ideological alibi” of the state (Appadurai, 1996, p. 159). This symbiotic relationship between nation and state is critical to understanding the effects of globalization on national identification and attachment.

In addition to persistent questions about the meaning of the terms, “nationalist,” “nationalism,” et cetera, debate also takes place around the nature of nationhood. As a form of group identification and attachment, is nationhood civic, liberal, and inclusive, or does it tend toward exclusion and ethnic chauvinism? In the former case, for which the United States is an oft-cited example, the national community is said to be united around shared political principles (liberty, equality, and democracy), and membership in the civic nation is open to those who share a commitment to those values. In the latter case, membership in the nation is determined by ancestry and ethnic lineage. Belonging is organic, not voluntarist. Japan is an oft-cited example, as was Germany prior to a series of reforms implemented in the mid-1990s. The problem with these ideal types is that, in practice, the distinction between civic nations and ethnic nations tends to be “bogus” (Ozkiirimli, 2005, p. 28). In

those countries purporting to be civic nations (the United States, France, Canada), ample evidence exists that national belonging has ethnic, racial, and religious undertones. As political theorist Bernard Yack (1999) writes:

[T]he civic/ethnic distinction itself reflects a considerable dose of ethnocentrism, as if the political identities French and American were not also culturally inherited artifacts ... The characterization of political community in the so-called civic nations as a rational and freely chosen allegiance to a set of political principles seems untenable, a mixture of self-congratulations and wishful thinking. (p. 105)

For proponents of the civic version of nationalism, “patriotism” is the preferred identifier. In a not-so-subtle rebuke of Trump’s explicit embrace of nationalism, French President Emanuel Macron, in a 2018 speech commemorating Armistice, asserted that: “Patriotism is the exact opposite of nationalism: nationalism is a betrayal of patriotism” (Baker, 2018, para. 3). Americans tend to share Macron’s assessment—hewing closely to a distinction articulated by George Orwell (1945), at the close of World War II:

By nationalism ... I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests ... By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. (para. 2)

But beyond characterizing patriotism as defensible and nationalism as not, the distinction between the two remains murky, and, similar to the civic/ethnic categorization, ignores the common roots of both (Wimmer, 2019).

A final issue of interest in the study of nations and nationalism, and one with important implications for understanding the effects of globalization, concerns the “when” of nations. Generally characterized as a debate between primordialists and modernists, the former conceptualize nations as seamless entities existing in nature since time immemorial, and

the latter group emphasizes the historical specificity of nations as forms of political and cultural belonging emerging during and unique to the modern era (Motyl, 2002). Over time, the modernist perspective came to predominate and gave rise to a rich body of scholarship detailing how the specific conditions and functional demands of the modern era led to the creation of national communities (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990).

Modernity, in this case, refers roughly to the period beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, including the onset of industrialization (and related technological innovations particularly in the realm of communications), urbanization, increased literacy and social mobility, and, notably, the consolidation of the modern state. The era of industrialization, as Ernest Gellner (1983) explained, demanded a high degree of literacy, cultural standardization, and political cohesion, which nations and nationalism provided. Other scholars attributed the rise of nations and nationalism even more specifically to the demands of modern capitalism, positing nations as part of the ideological superstructure used by elites to legitimate capitalist development (Nairn, 1977; Wallerstein, 1991). Modernity, all of these scholars agreed, created the conditions that made nationhood as a form of belonging both necessary and possible (Giddens, 1985). Particularly influential was Benedict Anderson's (1991) portrayal of nations as "imagined political communities." For Anderson, nations are cultural artifacts created toward the end of the eighteenth century when various modern mechanisms, including print capitalism (and the dissemination of newspapers and novels), maps, museums, and the census, made it possible, and functional, for individuals to *imagine* themselves members of a political community—even though few would ever actually know or meet their fellow members.

This emphasis on a specific historical time period as giving rise to the national form begs the question of what happens to nations in an era beyond, or different than, the modern one. Little consensus exists as to whether modernity has ended, or if so, what has replaced it: post-modernity, post-industrialism, late-modernism, a second modernity? In each case, the conditions depicted conform to general descriptions of globalization as the "multidimensional and uneven intensification of social relations and consciousness across world-time and world-space"

(Steger, 2020, p. 17). And a central theme running through this voluminous literature on globalization concerns the changing role and relevance of the modern nation-state. Sociologist Ulrich Beck (2000) illustrates clearly how globalization has weakened the modern state:

The national state is a territorial state: that is, its power is grounded upon attachment to a particular place (upon control over membership, current legislation, border defense, and so on). The world society which, in the wake of globalization, has taken shape in many (not only economic) dimensions is undermining the importance of the national state, because a multiplicity of social circles, communication networks, market relations and lifestyle, none of them specific to any particular locality, now cut across the boundaries of the national state. This is apparent in each of the pillars of sovereignty: in tax raising, police responsibilities, foreign policy and military security. (p. 4)

Because nationhood as a form of collective attachment is closely linked to the modern era and modern state, as the conditions of modernity that made the nation necessary and useful evolved, new more functional forms of political consciousness were expected to emerge. Indeed, scholars writing within the modernist frame explicitly anticipated the eventual demise of nations and nationalism (McNeill, 1986). “Nations are not eternal,” wrote French philosopher, Ernest Renan (1882); “They have begun, they will end. They will be replaced, in all probability, by a European confederation” (p. 29). A century later, historian Eric Hobsbawm (1990) reiterated the prediction: “Nation-states and nations will be seen as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed, or dislocated by the new supranational restructuring of the globe” (p. 182). And throughout the 1990s, a burgeoning scholarship on “post-nationalism” and “transnationalism” focused on that restructuring, and movement toward a “postnational global order:”

We are looking at the birth of a variety of complex, postnational social formations ... The new organizational forms are more diverse, more fluid, more ad hoc, more provisional, less coherent, less organized, and simply less implicated in the comparative advantages of the nation-state. (Appadurai, 1996, p. 168)

Despite some agreement regarding the finite lifespan of nations and nationalism, less clear was the forecast for what alternative social formations might replace nations. One common description of (and prescription for) a post-national order came in the form of cosmopolitanism. Resurrecting a worldview held by the Cynics and Stoics of Ancient Greece, cosmopolitanism calls for having as our primary allegiance “the community of human beings in the entire world” (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 4). The argument is a moral one, insisting on the equal worth of all humans, but also responding practically to material conditions wrought by globalization that necessitate collective consciousness beyond the level of the nation-state: global warming, international terrorism, pandemics (Held, 1997; Warf, 2012).

Evidence of globalization’s challenge to the sovereignty of states continued to mount throughout the first decades of the new millennium, as global terrorism, international financial crises, and the COVID-19 pandemic left the United States and countries around the world struggling to safeguard their national constituencies. Meanwhile, owing to unprecedented advancements in information, communication, and transportation technologies, the capacity for individuals and groups to imagine community within and across the boundaries of states expanded exponentially. Yet, despite conditions and capabilities arguably different than those that characterized the modern era, nationhood as a form of identification, and nationalism as a powerful political ideology, have persisted.

The United States and Twenty-First Century Globalization

The twenty-first century began with the promise of progress and change. The Cold War had ended; Russia was joining NATO; the Pope was visiting Cuba, and Europe was days away from adopting a common currency. Global travel had reached an all-time high, as had global Internet access. Automobile manufacturers were making electric cars, and scientists were closing in on the mysteries of the human genome. In the United States, unemployment was low, real hourly wages were growing

for all income levels (Mishel et al., 2015), inequality existed, to be sure, but not to the staggering degree it does today (Horowitz et al., 2020). Some analysts warned, presciently, of risk (Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1985), but as Americans embarked on a new millennium, few could have imagined the deadly scourge of international terrorism, a mortgage crisis that would spawn crippling worldwide recession, or a global pandemic that, by the end of 2021, would kill close to 800,000 Americans, more than those who lost their lives in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam combined. In these ways and many more, the twenty-first century has reminded Americans repeatedly that, for better and worse, they share a planet with close to 8 billion other inhabitants, and that their collective futures are intertwined.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, offered particularly powerful, and ironic, testament to the global condition. Waging war on what was arguably the epicenter of globalization, Al-Qaeda terrorists also made skillful use of globalization (namely a range of sophisticated information, communications, and transportation technologies). Although the militants killed many hundreds of U.S. citizens in the World Trade Center that day, owing to the global nature of the financial industry (and captured in the name of the iconic edifice) they also killed individuals from 80 other countries around the world. Americans, many of whom had long enjoyed a comfortable, albeit parochial, sense of national security, were left feeling newly vulnerable, and alerted to their interconnectedness with a broader world.

The U.S.-led war on terror would become a long-standing reminder of that global interconnectedness, as would the vagaries of economic neoliberalism that intensified as the decade wore on. George W. Bush's two-term presidency, which began with terrorists flying deadly planes into U.S. targets, ended with the United States and much of the world sliding ever deeper into the worst global economic crisis since World War II. Nor are the two episodes unrelated. In the weeks after the 2001 terror attacks, Bush encouraged Americans to carry on with life as usual, to go shopping with their families, to attend a baseball game, and to travel to Disneyland. Other leaders, like former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani did the same: "If you like to go out and spend money, I would encourage that. It's always a good thing" (Cannon,

2003, p. 3244). Although Bush addressed the importance of the war, he did not, as international relations professor Andrew Bacevich (2008) explained, call on Americans to sacrifice, as had previous U.S. presidents during times of national crisis. His administration sought no additional revenue to cover the costly and protracted wars, and instead delivered tax cuts, while simultaneously encouraging banks to offer easy credit; “As the American soldier fought, the American consumer binged” (Bacevich, 2008, para. 3). By 2007, fiscal recklessness in the United States manifested in a mortgage crisis, which quickly sparked “the recession felt around the world” (Roubini, 2008).

As with 9/11, the Great Recession of 2008 turned out to be less a death knell for globalization than a testament to its ubiquity. The United States, and other governments, did step in to address the economic fallout, but ultimately, transnational corporations (TNCs) and financial institutions ceded little of their global dominance. Approximately 80 percent of world trade continues to be controlled by TNCs, and they far outnumber countries on lists of the largest economic entities worldwide (Inman, 2016). In this context, the sovereignty of states has “fractured.”

Demands [on governments] are largely no longer answerable, because governmental tools and resources (material as well as symbolical ones), have withered or moved elsewhere. If you announce that you will tax capital, this will quickly vanish in thin air, moved with a mouse-click to some more hospitable realm. (Romero, 2019, p. 5)

The Great Recession was also a reminder of the inequity that globalization can unleash. Income and wealth inequality that had been growing in the United States since the 1970s, was exacerbated in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, and continues to grow (Kuhn, 2018). Today, experts agree that the wealth divide among upper-income families and middle and lower-income families is “sharp and rising” (Horowitz et al., 2020) and that globalization plays a key role in widening these gaps (Gould, 2019; Soergel, 2017). With regard to the implications for national belonging, Anderson’s conceptualization of nations as “imagined” gave great weight to the notion of “deep, horizontal comradeship,”

by which he meant that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail,” the nation is always conceived as a community (Anderson, 1991, p. 7). Such a myth becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of deep vertical inequalities.

It was in this context that candidate, and later President, Donald Trump identified “globalists” and “globalism” as his primary foes. Whether immigrants, the United Nations, international trade agreements, treaties, or alliances, Trump and his supporters maintained that globalization was not working for the United States, and “making America great again” would necessitate a more “go-it-alone” approach. When Trump delivered his first speech to the United Nations, he was clear regarding global threats: “International criminal networks traffic drugs, weapons, people; force dislocation and mass migration; threaten our borders.” He also made clear his solution: “strong sovereign states.” “The nation-state,” Trump declared, “remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition” (POLITICO staff, 2017, para. 24). In fact, Trump used the word sovereign or sovereignty 21 times. Obama, in his first address to the United Nations, used it once.

By early 2020, COVID-19 made it deadly clear that in a world where more people traverse longer distances more often and more quickly than ever before, options for isolation are limited. Speaking more than a year into the pandemic, at meeting of the G-20 countries, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned: “We are very concerned about the Delta variant and other variants that could emerge and threaten recovery.” The story of the pandemic is still being written, but what is clear is Yellen’s final caution: “What happens in any part of the world affects all other countries” (Rappeport, 2021, para. 3).

The globality Yellen evoked not only challenges the autonomy of states, it has shown the boundaries of collective identity, national and otherwise, to be both fluid and contentious. As American citizens and politicians react to repeated reminders of global interconnectedness what is revealed is ambivalence regarding both the *form* and the *nature* of American belonging. Regarding form, events from 9/11 to COVID-19 signal vulnerabilities for the American nation wrought by globalization, but left unclear whether the appropriate response was *more* global interconnectedness, cooperation, and identification, or *less*. Regarding

the nature of American nationhood, as the interplay between global and national belonging intensified, so did the battle between the ideal of America's civic nationhood and the persistent, seemingly galvanized, reality of ethnic exclusions.

Fluid Forms of Collectivity

Responding to an emotional crowd gathered at ground zero on September 14, 2001, then-President George W. Bush stepped up to avenge the attacks. Bush (2001a) shouted through a bullhorn: "I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you...the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon!" (para. 2). This now iconic proclamation foreshadowed the U.S.-led war on terror, but also reveals how globalization intensifies the ambiguity attached to configurations of "us" and "them."

The people Bush was referring to "who knocked these buildings down," turned out to be a complex global network of terrorists, hailing from more than twenty different countries, who had spread their organization across as many as sixty different states. "Were this a peaceful enterprise," observed political scientist Robert Jervis (2002), "we would celebrate it as showing the ability of people from different countries, social classes, and experiences to work together" (p. 40). That the aggressor was not a country complicated the U.S. response (and would do so for years to come), but it also exemplified one of many ways globalization facilitates forms of collectivity beyond, and other than, the territorially bounded nation-state.

Globalization also influenced the "we" who would actually wage the looming war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military forces are made up largely, but not solely, of "Americans," in the formal sense of the term. After 9/11, in order to enlist sufficient troop numbers to fight terror, the U.S. military turned to immigrants. To facilitate recruitment of non-citizen soldiers, the United States promised an expedited path to citizenship. By 2003, over 30,000 non-citizens were serving in the four branches of the U.S. military (Hattiangadi et al., 2005). Not only has that number continued to grow, but these non-citizen soldiers

comprise a disproportionate twenty percent of Congressional Medal of Honor recipients. One of those Medal recipients, Alfred Rascón, shared: “I was once asked by a reporter why as a non-citizen of the United States, I volunteered to join the military. I answered, I was always an American in my heart” (Citizen Path, 2020, “Quotes From Imminent Veterans” section). Some immigrants, like Rascón, volunteered for the U.S. military out of a commitment to the country they had come to call home. Others were motivated by an even more local sense of belonging. Upon enlisting, Alexandr Manin, a recent immigrant from Kazakstan, remarked: “It doesn’t matter that America is not my country. New York is my city” (Chen & Sengupta, 2001, para. 4).

Bush’s claim on September 14, 2001, that “the world” was listening, was accurate, and the response from around the world was overwhelmingly one of compassion for the victims of 9/11, and condemnation of the attacks. Even countries not friendly toward the United States (e.g., Cuba and North Korea) sent their condolences. The tragic events of 9/11 presented an opportunity for Americans to broaden their identifications, and for countries, groups, and individuals worldwide to make common cause in defense of innocent civilians worldwide. Cosmopolitan philosopher Martha Nussbaum advocated just this. Concerned that the terrorist attacks would lead Americans to the demonization of an imagined, evil “them,” and to wish for abasing, humiliating, and crushing anyone who crosses an imagined and superior “we,” Nussbaum (2002) characterized 9/11 as, “an occasion for expansion of our ethical horizons,” noting that “we can learn something about the vulnerability all human beings share,” and “extend our strong emotions... to the world of human life as a whole” (pp. xiii–xiv).

As formations of “us” and “them” took shape following 9/11, some did transcend the bounds of nation, but fell decidedly short of encompassing humankind. On September 12, 2001, French newspaper, *Le Monde*, ran the headline: “We Are All Americans.” That declaration might have signaled a world united in opposition to the brutal murder of innocent civilians, but shortly thereafter, French President Jacques Chirac hinted at a more limited configuration of “we.” “Today it is New York that was tragically struck, but tomorrow it may be Paris, Berlin, London” (Barrow, 2001, para. 10). Chirac’s “we” telegraphed less “the

world,” than a community of Western, liberal, democracies whose role in a global, postcolonial, economic network had lured large numbers of immigrants and diversified the ethnic, racial, and religious makeup of their populations. While Chirac insinuated a distinctly Western “we” that was threatened by a non-Western “they,” Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi asserted it: “We should be confident of the superiority of our civilization, which consists of a value system that... guarantees respect for human rights and religion. This respect certainly does not exist in Islamic countries” (Erlanger, 2001, para. 4).

Despite Bush’s efforts to clarify that the United States was not at war with Islam, he also portrayed the fight against terror as one of dueling civilizations. On September 20, 2001, in an address to Congress, Bush (2001b) declared the U.S.-led war on terror as “civilization’s fight” (para. 16), and just days before he characterized the fight as a “crusade,” evoking, for Muslims in particular, the bloody battles waged in medieval Europe by Christian soldiers to recapture the Holy Land from Muslim control (Bush, 2001c, para. 15). Bush would repeat this theme throughout this administration, characterizing his war on terrorism as “a struggle for civilization” (Bush, 2006, para. 13).

The U.S. media also adopted the civilizational frame, placing the events of 9/11 within the context “of Islam, of cultural conflicts, and of a Western civilization threatened by the Other” (Abrahamian, 2003, p. 531). Mainstream news outlets like *The New York Times* regular ran headlines the likes of “Barbarians at the Gates,” “A Head-On Collision of Alien Cultures,” and “This *Is* a Religious War” (Abrahamian, 2003, p. 531).

This civilizational thinking exemplified a worldview articulated years earlier. While many observers were celebrating the end of the Cold War as the dawning of a new more peaceful, global era, political scientist Samuel Huntington (1993) warned of globalization’s more ominous implications for identity:

The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominant source of conflict will be cultural. ... The

fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.
(p. 22)

Of particular concern was the civilizational fault-line between “the West” and “Islam.” Ultimately, civilizational thinking proved limited as an explanation for world affairs, but potent as a self-fulfilling prophecy: both “the West” and “Islam” fell into parroting simplified versions of the demonic other (Said, 2001).

Fear of terrorism persisted, but by the time Bush left office, Americans were more focused on economic threats to their security emanating from the Great Recession. Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama, inherited the recession-plagued economy, but also spent his two terms in office navigating signature complexities related to American nationhood. That Obama was America’s first Black president is widely recognized, but he was also perceived, by critics and supporters alike, as America’s “first global president” (Raasch, 2009, para. 1), “first cosmopolitan president” (Shataan, 2009, para. 3), and first political leader to “fit snugly into the skin of globalization with all its promises and contradictions” (Ngugi, 2008, para. 10). These characterizations of Obama stemmed not only from his personal background, but also from his public proclamations and policy proposals. During a 2008 speech in Berlin, then-candidate Obama declared himself a “citizen of the world” (Obama, 2008, para. 2). In that, and other speeches and writings, Obama spoke eloquently to the realities of global interconnectedness and the need to think beyond the confines of nation-states. In doing so, however, he encountered fierce opposition from critics who saw the U.S. President’s global vision as a betrayal of the American nation. *The Washington Times* columnist Frank Gaffney (2008) warned that, “Global citizenship amounts to code for subordinating American interests,” and voters should consider “whether they want a global citizen in the White House or a president of, by and for the American people” (p. A22). Conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh agreed: “Why isn’t it good enough to say, ‘I’m a proud U.S. citizen’... ?” (Limbaugh, 2008, para. 9).

Criticism of Obama’s global perspective mounted, and by his second term in office he was referring less often to “our common humanity,” and more often to “economic patriotism” and “U.S. exceptionalism”

(Croucher, 2015). That Obama's political rhetoric trended away from world citizenship toward a familiar form of civic patriotism ultimately said less about his personal convictions and more about the recalcitrance of nationhood as a potent source of identification. By the time Obama left office, globalization as a set of processes connecting the planet was in full swing, but nationalism as deep attachment to a bounded community, rather than waning, was resurging.

Embodying that resurgence was the 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump, who began his political career questioning whether his predecessor was, in fact, American. And if Obama was perceived as a global president, Trump left no doubt that he, himself, was not. His worldview was explicitly "America first," and his self-identification was explicitly "nationalist." Despite his proud personification of nationalism, Trump's four years in office came to a close amidst a vivid reminder of the reality of globalization. As Nussbaum had argued in relation to 9/11, the pandemic offered a "cosmopolitan moment" (Holley, 2020). As arguably the first global phenomenon in human history, the pandemic had the capacity to, and in some respects did, "open our eyes to a shared human experience across state borders and the boundaries of difference" (Holley, 2020, p. 3). Instances of positive solidarity and universal acts of kindness competed, however, with "health nativism" (DeGooyer & Murthy, 2020), vaccine nationalism, and the U.S. refusal to cooperate with the World Health Organization. This, along with Trump's commitment to labeling COVID-19 the "China-virus," surging hate crimes against Asians Americans, and U.S. leaders blaming immigrants for spikes in COVID-19 cases were a reminder of contestation over not only the appropriate scale of identification (global or national), but the nature of American national identity.

Contesting America [Civic v. Ethnic]

It doesn't matter if you came here rich or poor, if you came here voluntarily or involuntarily, ... All that matters is that you embrace America

and understand its ideals ... we're like a religion really. A secular religion. We believe in ideas and ideals. We're not one race, we're many; we're not one ethnic group, we're everyone; we're not one language, we're all of these people. So what ties us together? We're tied together by our belief in political democracy. We're tied together by our belief in religious freedom. (Giuliani, 2001, paras. 9–10)

Former New York City mayor, Rudy Giuliani, made these comments on December 27, 2001, just months after terrorists flew deadly planes into the World Trade Center. The man who would come to be known during that time as “America’s Mayor” was reinforcing a familiar narrative of the United States as an inclusive melting pot, welcoming the world’s tired and poor, and asking in return only that they adopt the shared values of liberty, equality, and justice for all. Twenty years later, Giuliani had become more widely known as Donald Trump’s embattled attorney, architect of the Muslim travel ban, cheerleader for the border wall with Mexico, and tireless defender of, and participant in, a mounting rhetoric of exclusion directed at ethnic, racial, and religious minorities in the United States.

This one man’s shifting views highlight a long-standing tension between both civic and ethnic elements of American national identity. At the time of the country’s founding, a group of White European men invoked declarations of liberty for which the new republic would stand, while enslaving other men, and deeming them only three-fifths human. Similar contradictions persisted over the course of U.S. history as the country honed a national narrative of enlightened, democratic inclusivity (“All men are created equal...”), while instituting national origins quotas, interning Japanese Americans, and perpetually exploiting and disenfranchising non-White Americans. In short, the U.S. rhetoric of civic belonging has always existed awkwardly alongside the opposing reality (and rhetoric) of exclusion; and this contradiction continues.

This equivocality regarding the nature of American nationhood was evident in official and unofficial responses to 9/11. As described above, then-President Bush endeavored to assure Muslims that the U.S. fight was not with Islam, and that they, too, belonged to the American nation. Speaking at the Islamic Center of Washington D.C. on September 17,

2001, Bush emphasized, “This is a great country... because we share the same values of respect and dignity and human worth. And it is my honor to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do.... They love America just as much as I do” (Bush, 2001d, para. 10). Various faith-based organizations reached out to Muslim Americans, and some U.S. citizens otherwise critical of the country’s broken promises fell in line behind the national community and the notion of civic belonging. “We’re supporting Bush, we’re supporting the USA,” said gangsta rap music mogul, and co-founder of Death Row Records, Suge Knight, shortly after the attacks; “At this moment there’s no such thing as ghetto, middle class, or rich. There’s only the United States” (The Economist, 2004, para. 5).

These gestures of national inclusivity were quickly over-shadowed by acts, official and otherwise, of exclusion. Congress moved with lightening speed to pass the USA Patriot Act—a sweeping piece of legislation that, with little regard for civil liberties, granted broad powers of surveillance to authorities and resulted in countless incidents of racial profiling, verbal harassment, and even physical assault against Arab and Muslim Americans (Ahmed & Senzai, 2004). Hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans surged, and public opinion polls pointed to widespread animosity toward these perceived outsiders. In 2001, 79% of Americans surveyed supported restricting the immigration of certain ethnic or religious groups. Thirty-one percent favored allowing the federal government “to hold Arabs who are U.S. citizens in camps until it can be determined whether they have links to terrorist organizations,” and 32% agreed that the United States “should put Arab Americans in this country under special surveillance” (Croucher, 2006, p. 188).

The “othering” of Arab and Muslim Americans persisted, and intensified, in the years to come. By 2011, as the United States commemorated the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, a Brookings Institution report, “What it Means to be American,” revealed a country in the midst of deep struggle over the implications of diversity for American society. While 88% of respondents surveyed nationally agreed that “America was founded on the idea of religious freedom for everyone,” 47% deemed Islam incompatible with American values, and 46% reported discomfort with the idea of a mosque being built near their home (Dionne et al., 2011). The

report concluded optimistically, predicting, “the arc of American history will, again, bend toward inclusion,” but cautioned that “we are in for some transitional turbulence,” owing in large part to the unprecedentedly partisan dimension of the diversity debate identified by the study (p. 38).

A deep partisan divide surrounding diversity in the United States solidified during the Obama administration (2008–2016). While Obama’s presidency was a testament to an American dream, reactions to him were reminders of the American dilemma of persistent obstacles to full inclusion for racial and ethnic minorities. As a candidate, and throughout his presidency, Obama was subjected to racist stereotypes, accused of being anti-White and anti-Christian, and asked to prove his birthright as an American (Dyson, 2016). As Yale history professor, Greg Grandin (2014), wrote:

No other American president has had to face, before even taking office, an opposition convinced of not just his political but his existential legitimacy. ... [This new kind of racism was] based not on theological or philosophical doctrine but rather on the emotional need to measure one’s absolute freedom in inverse relation to another’s absolute slavishness. This was a racism that was born in chattel slavery but didn’t die with chattel slavery, instead evolving into today’s cult of individual supremacy, which, try as it might, can’t seem to shake off its white supremacist roots. (paras. 9–10)

Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in 2016 elicited countless explanations, but research has shown that racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment were key determinants (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018; Sewer, 2017). Meanwhile, Trump himself, though not the first U.S. leader to use xenophobia and racism to win support, did so in what presidential historian Douglas Brinkley described as “surprising,” “Day-Glo fashion.” “Since the Civil War,” Brinkley exclaimed, “we’ve never had a president who tries to destroy the melting pot story” (Viser, 2018, para. 37). Trump’s rhetoric, including references to: “Mexican rapists,” “Islam hates us,” “good people” participating in a neo-Nazi march, “shithole countries,” et cetera, was shocking to many, but even

when the racism was not explicit, Trump's America First nationalism exposed deep-seated prejudices about who was truly "American."

The seemingly perpetual tension between an ethnic, and "chauvinist" (Lievan, 2016), version of American nationalism on the one hand, and a civic version on the other, shifted directions again with the election of President Joe Biden in 2020. Biden made this struggle explicit in a 2020 speech titled, "Battle for the Soul of the Nation," delivered at the same site where President Lincoln had delivered his famous, Civil War-era, Gettysburg Address. For Biden, reviving the civic nature of American nationhood was the best antidote to the dangers of a growing nationalist populism in the United States.

Today we are engaged once again in a battle for the soul of the nation. We cannot and will not allow extremists and white supremacists to overturn the America of Lincoln and Harriet Tubman and Frederick Douglas. To overturn the America that has welcomed immigrants from distant shores. To overturn the America that's been a haven and a home for everyone no matter their background. Lincoln said: 'The nation is worth fighting for.' So it was. So it is. (paras. 124–125)

That Biden's Presidency began with an angry mob of Trump supporters attacking the U.S. Capitol, some wielding confederate flags, suggests that the debate over the nature of the American nation is far from over.

Conclusion

"Arguing against globalization is like arguing against gravity," remarked former UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan at an international conference in 2000 (Anan, 2000, para. 9). Today, U.S. citizens and leaders are deeply divided on their views of globalization, but it is, as the twenty-first century attests, a fact of life. As to globalization's implications for identity, American nationhood as a source and site of belonging has been challenged by globalization, but also invigorated (particularly in its more exclusionary variant). Growing planetary interconnectedness has left the United States grappling with a state that is less able to guarantee the

welfare of its constituents, a degree of inequality that makes a mockery of Anderson's "horizontal comradeship," and an increasingly heterogeneous population whose options for collective identification are not delimited by territory. All of this calls into question the efficacy of nationhood as a form of belonging; but, contrary to the predictions of modernist scholars, neither nations nor nationalism appear in retreat. Conditions in the contemporary world are ripe for cosmopolitan imagining, and some elected leaders, organizations, and individuals have called for and enacted a form of global belonging that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state. Just as pervasive, however, are attempts to fortify national boundaries and seek refuge in an imagined community that draws firm distinctions between "us" and "them."

If modernists and postnationalists were zealous in crafting obituaries for the nation-state, current pronouncements of their immortality would also seem premature. We seem stuck in "a global interregnum, a time after the era of state sovereignty, but before the articulation or instantiation of an alternative global order" (Brown, 2010, p. 39). The centrality of the sovereign nation-state is waning, but viable alternatives for the organization of identity and belonging seem limited. It is this context that fuels more exclusionary forms of national cohesion. This was the case in the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump, but has also been evident in the rise of nationalist populism elsewhere. If the national form is here to stay, attention must turn toward the viability of making nations "good" (civic, inclusive, democratic) (Ozkirimli, 2005). For opponents of Trump's exclusionary nationalist rhetoric, reforming nationalism was the solution. Harvard economist and former Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers (2016), called for "responsible nationalism," by which he meant that "countries are expected to pursue their citizens' economic welfare as a primary objective but their ability to damage the interests of citizens of other countries is circumscribed" (para. 9). Former director of policy for the U.S. State Department, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2017) similarly cautioned against denying the legitimacy of love of country, and advocated working instead to build "a new narrative of patriotism, culture, connection, and inclusion" (para. 12).

As concerns the nature of American nationalism, the struggle between civic and ethnic elements is not new, but because globalization compromises the efficacy of the national form, the content of what comprises the national community comes into sharper relief. Ultimately, it is the malleability of the national form that both accounts for its unexpected persistence, and may offer opportunities for its redemption.

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8

Negotiating Identities in a Globalized World: From Southeast Asia to the San Joaquin Valley

Jessica McKenzie , Emily Leighton, Macy Davis,
and José J. Reyes

In a rural village in northern Thailand, the school day ends and a teenager hops on her motorbike to begin a 90-minute drive into the nearest city to practice Korean cover dancing. Though she does not have internet access at home, she learned about Korean cover dancing on Facebook and has lately spent school day breaks in the computer lab watching YouTube videos to learn the basic steps (McKenzie, 2014). In a Maya community in southern Mexico, cell phone service was recently introduced. A teenager wearing a t-shirt and track pants stands over her kneeling grandmother, who wears traditional embroidered Mayan clothing, showing her a photograph that is circulating through the community WhatsApp (Manago et al., 2021).

In New Delhi, India, a young Muslim woman rejects incessant Facebook friend requests from her brothers and their wives (Mishra & Basu,

J. McKenzie (✉) · E. Leighton · M. Davis · J. J. Reyes
California State University, Fresno, CA, USA
e-mail: jmckenzie@csufresno.edu

2014). Were she to accept their requests, they would see photographs of her wearing a *bindi* (which is traditionally only worn by Hindu women). Though she is just wearing the *bindi* for fashion, she is certain that her relatives would not approve. In Trinidad, a young man posts an image of himself on Facebook wearing sunglasses, low-slung jeans, branded clothing, and bling, invoking the “gangsta” image from U.S. hip-hop (Miller et al., 2016). A young South African “digital nomad” moves to central Vietnam. Under the moniker “Ninja Teacher,” he posts videos of his café- and beach-hopping to his YouTube channel, which has amassed 50,000 subscribers. In one such video filmed at a hidden beach, he waves to a woman who introduces herself as “Black digital nomad” (Ninja Teacher, 2021). She also has a YouTube channel.

As these snapshots illustrate, modern globalization shapes how young people around the world grow up. Intercultural contact—in person and via digital media—exposes youth to multiple sets of cultural practices and values, whether or not they have traveled beyond their hometown. How do young people negotiate multiple sets of cultural values to construct their identities? In this chapter, we address this question by discussing how youth, who are bicultural by way of globalization and immigration, manage multiple custom complexes. We begin by introducing the *custom complex* framework that guides this discussion.

Navigating Multiple Custom Complexes

As a result of globalization and immigration, young people around the world navigate multiple *custom complexes*. The term “custom complex,” introduced by anthropologists Whiting and Child (1953), addresses the link between cultural beliefs and practices. This term highlights that practices are laced with and informed by accompanying beliefs, values, and ideologies. For example, the Mayan teenager in Mexico who shares the image circulating through the community WhatsApp with her grandmother (introduced in the first paragraph of this chapter) likely does so because she values both digital media and connecting with her grandmother, and because she understands that her grandmother values being privy to local gossip.

Until relatively recently in human history, young people generally drew from custom complexes within their community to develop their identities. This changed, first, with the increasing feasibility of international travel in the latter half of the twentieth century (Dulles, 1966), and more recently, with the advent of Wi-Fi and the commercial availability and financial feasibility of mobile phone ownership at the turn of the twenty-first century (Anderson, 2003; Dyroff, 2018).¹ Today, young people are routinely exposed to multiple custom complexes in a way that cuts across racial, ethnic, and class lines (even if, to some extent, digital divides remain; see Manago et al., 2015; McKenzie et al., 2022). This exposure to the custom complexes of distinct and distant communities has complexified and extended the process of identity development.

Used in the context of globalization, the custom complex framing knits together research that emphasizes how globalization reshapes cultural values (e.g., Abu Aleon et al., 2019; Greenfield, 2009; Kaasa & Minkov, 2020) and practices (e.g., Correa-Chávez & Rogoff, 2009; Rogoff, 2003). In contrast with the more common categorical approach to cross-cultural youth development (e.g., via focusing on individualism /collectivism categories; Harkness & Super, 2020), we aim to capture how individual psychologies interact with their (changing) cultural contexts. Because ways of negotiating multiple custom complexes in the context of globalization and immigration overlap, we draw from both literatures. In particular, we draw from our fieldwork in northern Thailand and in central California. To set the stage for that discussion, we first provide background information on proximal (immigrant-based) and remote (globalization-based) acculturation.

Proximal Acculturation

The earliest conceptualizations of acculturation were unidimensional (Gordon, 1964), taking interest in whether an acculturating individual

¹ Although the first mobile phone was released by Motorola in 1983, its \$4,000 cost made it cost prohibitive for most (Dyroff, 2018). It was not until 2002 that more affordable mobile phones were released.

was or was not assimilated to a second culture. For example, Rosa's family immigrates to the United States from Mexico. The assimilation model is concerned about whether or not Rosa has adopted the custom complexes of U.S. culture. More recent conceptualizations of acculturation have moved away from the reductionistic assimilation model by recognizing that acculturation is in fact multidimensional.

Berry's (1997) acculturation model, for instance, recognizes that custom complexes from two cultural contexts can be simultaneously held. According to this model, *assimilation* is just one of four possible acculturation strategies that an immigrant or a person from an immigrant family can choose. That is, Rosa may *assimilate* to U.S. culture by exclusively valuing U.S., and no longer valuing Mexican, custom complexes. But she may also *integrate* the two cultures (by maintaining Mexican, while adopting U.S., custom complexes). Alternatively, she could be *separated* (by maintaining Mexican, and eschewing U.S., custom complexes) or *marginalized* (by feeling alienated from both Mexican and U.S. custom complexes).

Research has rather conclusively shown that: (1) individual variation exists in whether heritage and majority cultural values are endorsed, with people being classified as integrated (also known as bicultural), assimilated, separated, marginalized; (2) integration/biculturalism is the healthiest form of cultural adaptation; (3) adaptations are, to some extent, choiceful (e.g., Berry et al., 2006; Ferguson et al., 2020; LaFromboise et al., 1993; Sam & Berry, 2010). That is, youth are active agents in determining how they adapt to intercultural contact.

Remote Acculturation

More recently, Jensen and colleagues (2011) extended Berry's acculturation model to the context of globalization. This work argues, and research widely confirms, that globalization can similarly spur acculturation to remote or global cultures via direct (in person) and indirect (media-based) intercultural contact (e.g., Chen et al., 2008; Ferguson & Bornstein, 2012). Accordingly, globalization can influence young people in one of four ways: (1) an individual who "sheds" local custom

complexes in favor of global custom complexes would be *assimilated*, (2) an individual who maintains local custom complexes while integrating global ones would be *bicultural*, (3) an individual who maintains allegiance to local custom complexes and rejects global custom complexes would be *separated*, and (4) an individual who is connected to neither local nor global custom complexes would be *marginalized* (Jensen et al., 2011).

In contrast to acculturation spurred by immigration (henceforth referred to as “proximal acculturation”), acculturation spurred by globalization (henceforth referred to as “remote acculturation”) is a relatively younger field of study. And yet, the proliferation of digital media and the porousness of national borders renders this a pressing line of inquiry. Remote acculturation research suggests that young people in far-flung regions of the world can and do acculturate to geographically distant cultures by way of media (Ferguson & Bornstein, 2012; Ferguson et al., 2018). In emerging and developing world regions where technological change is particularly rapid, digital media confer risks (e.g., potential loss of cultural values, an emergent cultural gap between adolescents and parents) and opportunities (e.g., for young people to shape their development and reshape cultural values) (Manago & McKenzie, 2022).

In Jamaica, for example, one-third of urban adolescents take on bicultural identities as “Americanized Jamaicans”—endorsing both Jamaican and American practices and values (Ferguson & Bornstein, 2012). In northern India, Ladakhi young adults who move to the urban center of Delhi endorse three cultural streams: local Ladakhi, national Indian, and global Western (Ozer & Schwartz, 2016; Ozer et al., 2017). The vehicles of remote acculturation include exposure to U.S. media and food, as well as intercultural contact via tourism (Ferguson & Bornstein, 2015; Jensen et al., 2011). Research addressing the adaptiveness of remote acculturation has found that it presents challenges (e.g., culture gaps between adolescents and their parents or elders, greater adolescent-parent conflict, local culture loss, cultural identity confusion, poorer academic performance) and opportunities (e.g., behavioral frame-switching, preparation for career and travel) for young people (Ferguson & Bornstein, 2015; Ferguson et al., 2020; Jensen et al., 2011; McKenzie, 2018, 2019a; Ozer et al., 2017).

In both fields of study—proximal and remote acculturation—less is known about the processes through which youth manage multiple custom complexes (McKenzie, 2020; Ward, 2008). That is, we know little about *how* heritage and majority cultures are integrated or negotiated (in the case of proximal acculturation) and about *how* local and global cultures are integrated or negotiated (in the case of remote acculturation). Understanding how young people manage multiple custom complexes is important for at least two reasons.

First, this understanding promises to more clearly link the closely related fields of remote and proximal acculturation, which are typically treated and studied separately. (For a notable exception, see Ferguson et al., 2020.) Understanding how these fields overlap will aid the development of a guiding theoretical base for the study of acculturation in the twenty-first century. Second, some forms of negotiation may be more adaptive than others. As previously noted, research tends to suggest that “biculturalism” is the most adaptive of the four acculturation patterns (Berry et al., 2006; Sam & Berry, 2010). And yet, as we shall see, variation exists within that broad category in terms of how young people negotiate discrepant custom complexes. Understanding the diversity that lies within the bicultural category is likely to help us understand whether one form of integration is more adaptive than others.

Remote Acculturation in Thailand

In this section, we discuss northern Thailand as a remote acculturation case study. We draw from a series of studies that the first author has published over the last 5 years which center the perspectives of Thai adolescents living in the large metropolitan city of Chiang Mai. When relevant, we draw from studies that include their parents and adolescents living in rural Mae Kiaw, just 25 miles away.² These studies address current beliefs (about moral values and religion) and behaviors (pertaining to media, religion, diet, and language). In totality, they paint a picture of the custom complexes that Thai adolescents endorse, and

² In order to protect the identities of those in this small district, “Mae Kiaw” is a pseudonym.

how they navigate—at times discrepant—custom complexes to construct their identities.

Integrating Global Values, Reshaping Local Values

“Oh, my Buddha!”

This expression, which the first author overheard in a conversation among adolescents at a shopping mall in Chiang Mai, illustrates the power of global youth culture in the lives of modern Thai youth. On the one hand, the phrase speaks to global influence (an appropriation of the Western phrase commonly used by adolescents: “Oh my God!”). On the other hand, it illustrates local value maintenance (by adjusting the phrase such that it aligns with Buddhism, the predominant national religion).

Over numerous studies spanning an array of topics, evidence indicates that 16–18-year-old adolescents living in Chiang Mai are remotely acculturated to global cultures. Here we use the term “global cultures” rather than a specific nation or culture because evidence also suggests that Thai youth are influenced not by a single culture (as Jamaican adolescents are often acculturated to American culture, for instance). Rather, Thailand’s geographic location renders a variety of non-local cultures salient in the developmental trajectories of Thai youth (McKenzie, 2020).³ In Southeast Asia, Korean, Japanese, and Chinese influence is particularly notable. Many adolescents watch Korean and Japanese television programs and movies, listen to Korean and Japanese music, and adopt Korean or Japanese fashion and facial appearance (e.g., by lightening the skin and widening the eyes—achieved with makeup, injections, and/or facial reconstruction).

Yet Thai youth are also exposed to Western media, and therefore the influence of the United States and Western Europe is profound. In interviews, urban-dwelling Thai adolescents often shared dreams of traveling

³ Throughout this chapter, we use the term *remote acculturation* rather than *globalization-based acculturation*. While the latter field of study is also relevant, it has overwhelmingly focused on people’s identification with Western culture (Chen et al., 2008; Ozer & Schwartz, 2016; Ozer et al., 2017). As noted here, the “second cultures” with which Thai youth identify span Western and non-Western contexts.

and/or relocating to Western nations such as the United States, Canada, Europe, and Norway. But they also discussed potentially relocating to the wealthy Asian nations of Japan and Singapore (McKenzie, 2020). Because of this, in the Thai case—and likely elsewhere in Asia—it is appropriate to conceptualize remote acculturation to a broader “global youth culture” (Gidley, 2002) rather than to a specific culture.

Although urban-dwelling youth are particularly influenced by globalization (Arnett, 2002; Huntsinger et al., 2019; McKenzie, 2018), the wide-reaching availability of digital media has rendered globalization relevant in the lives of young people even in rather remote areas. In rural Mae Kiaw, adolescents are to some degree influenced by globalization. For example, during a private conversation with the first author, one high school-aged adolescent in Mae Kiaw shared that although it may appear that everyone in his class gets along, a schism had recently emerged between “the Thai group” (those who look and act Thai) and “the Korean group” (those who want white skin and wear makeup to achieve a lighter look). As another example, one high school teacher in Mae Kiaw shared with the first author that he had recently begun requiring that students submit their homework on Facebook. He reasoned that having social media would benefit them in the future, and so he required that every single student create and maintain a Facebook account in order to succeed in his course.

Yet most adolescents in rural Mae Kiaw did not have high-speed internet. Some did not have a phone signal in their homes. Many did not have access to a working computer. Rural adolescents spent fewer hours per day using new media than did urban adolescents (McKenzie et al., 2022). They were rarely exposed to foreigners as teachers, travelers, and neighbors (McKenzie, 2020), and were granted fewer opportunities to study global languages and to consume global foods (McKenzie, 2019a). In Mae Kiaw, then, globalization was less influential in the lives of young people because the vehicles of globalization—in particular, global media, languages, and foods (Jensen et al., 2011)—are simply less accessible.

We now discuss the global custom complexes that remotely acculturated youth in urban Chiang Mai endorse and the local custom complexes they maintain. We use the term “global custom complexes” to refer to the practices and values that scholarship has associated with globalization,

and the term “local custom complexes” to refer to cultural practices and values that are indigenous to the region of study—in this case, northern Thailand.

Global Custom Complexes

Among remotely acculturated Thai adolescents, global values of *autonomy*, *individual choice*, *self-fulfillment*, and the high-arousal positive affective state of *personal happiness* influence moral reasoning and religious practices (McKenzie, 2018, 2019b; McKenzie & Xiong, 2021; McKenzie, Tsutsui, et al., 2019; McKenzie et al., 2021). Autonomous values were the bedrock of urban adolescent reasoning when discussing both private moral experiences (McKenzie, 2018, 2019b) and public moral issues (of sex work [McKenzie et al., 2021] and transnational marriage [McKenzie & Xiong, 2021]). Quantitative research confirms that adolescents growing up in urban Chiang Mai reasoned more in terms of autonomy and less in terms of community than both their parents and their rural adolescent counterparts (McKenzie, 2018).

Research also points to urban adolescents’ uniquely autonomous approach to religion. One study found that urban adolescents framed their religious experiences as highly individualized, and as means to autonomous ends (McKenzie, Tsutsui, et al., 2019). For instance, one adolescent emphasized that he makes merit (engages in meritorious deeds, such as offering alms to monks) with hopes that “earning” good karma may help him test into a reputable university the following year. Another adolescent looked to the more distant future: her next incarnation. She explained that she tries to make merit as often as she can because it will increase the likelihood of her being born into a wealthy family in her next life (McKenzie, Tsutsui, et al., 2019).

These autonomous orientations toward religion—engaging in religious practices to benefit the self—serve as a stark contrast to rural adolescents, who framed their religious practices as fundamentally relational. As a point of comparison, rural adolescents shared that they make merit by donating time and money to their local temple. One adolescent explained that she makes merit at the temple on behalf of her parents,

who are often busy with rice farming and have little time to attend the temple. Another explained that he makes merit by temporarily ordaining as a monk in order to help his relatives live a better afterlife (McKenzie, Tsutsui, et al., 2019).

Individual choice and the pursuit of personal happiness are also heavily featured in the moral values of urban adolescents. When considering the taboo yet pervasive Thai practice of sex work, urban adolescents reasoned that sex work is morally acceptable if it is, and morally reprehensible if it is not, volitional (McKenzie et al., 2021). In contrast, rural adolescents tended to emphasize relational (versus individual) choice—reasoning that sex work is morally understandable if it is engaged in for the (financial) benefit of the family. Urban adolescents similarly prioritized the pursuit of personal happiness when considering their future goals (McKenzie, 2020) and the markers of “real love” (McKenzie & Xiong, 2021).

Other global values that urban-dwelling Thai adolescents endorse include: financial and material wealth, financial independence, equality, and self-development (McKenzie, 2020), and international travel, residence, and reputation (McKenzie & Xiong, 2021; McKenzie et al., 2021; McKenzie, 2019a). Importantly, these adolescents not only endorse global values; they also engage in global practices. In particular, they are skilled at navigating digital media (McKenzie, Rooney, et al., 2019), speaking global languages (e.g., English, Chinese, Japanese, Korean), and they frequently consume global (particularly Western fast) foods (McKenzie, 2019a).

Local Custom Complexes

Although remotely acculturated Thai adolescents invoke global values when discussing a range of issues, local values—particularly those pertaining to *family*, *gender*, and *religion*—are also featured. Even in the face of rapid sociocultural change, traditional Thai values appear to be, to some extent, maintained along these three domains.

Two studies have highlighted that filial piety (the responsibility to give back to and take care of one's parents) is a local value that remains prominent in urban adolescents' thought processes. This local value, though, is reconstructed to take on a more global(ized) form. One study found that the adolescent children of urban-dwelling parents demonstrate filial piety by brokering their parents' participation in digital media (McKenzie, Rooney, et al., 2019). They do this, for instance, by helping their parents access email and Facebook, introducing them to new computer games, and downloading Skype for them so that they can stay in touch when the adolescent travels abroad.

Another study (McKenzie, 2020) found that filial piety featured heavily in urban adolescents' plans for their future. Indeed, 70% of adolescents discussed plans they had to give back to their parents in 10 years' time, including giving their parents money, taking them traveling, and living nearby or with them (McKenzie, 2020). It bears mentioning that the maintenance of filial piety aligns with research in Greece (Georgas et al., 2006) and Mexico (Manago, 2014) that points to family obligation values as slow to change even in the face of rapid sociocultural change.

Although remotely acculturated Thai adolescents endorse gender equality (McKenzie, 2020; McKenzie et al., 2021), as do youth in globalizing regions of Central America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East (e.g., Abu Aleon et al., 2019; Huntsinger et al., 2019; Manago, 2014; Weinstock et al., 2015), local gender values are to some extent maintained. One study, for instance, highlighted that urban adolescents, like their rural adolescent counterparts, invoked the Thai *kulasatrii* woman ideal—reasoning that sex work is not a virtuous job because it contradicts cultural values of sexual restraint among women (McKenzie et al., 2021).

Thai religious practices are also, to some extent, maintained among remotely acculturated adolescents. Self-report measures indicate that urban adolescents were “equally” as Buddhist as rural adolescents (90% of adolescents in both contexts self-identified as Buddhist), and that urban and rural adolescents attended the temple (or place of worship) roughly “equally” (twice monthly on average; McKenzie, Tsutsui, et al., 2019). Yet as previously noted, the way that urban adolescents make

meaning of their religious practices differ rather substantially from their rural counterparts—with urban adolescents emphasizing an autonomous orientation and rural adolescents emphasizing a relational orientation. Other studies have revealed additional local values that guide urban adolescent thought processes and future plans, including: selfless generosity (*naam jai*), low-arousal positive affective states of relaxation and contentment (McKenzie, 2020), shame avoidance (*sia-naa*), and reputation maintenance (McKenzie et al., 2021).

How do remotely acculturated adolescents psychologically manage local and global values and practices? How are these custom complexes integrated, and what happens when integration is not feasible? This is a point to which we now turn.

Processes of Managing Multiple Custom Complexes

Several studies in our lab have pointed to three distinct processes through which remotely acculturated Thai youth manage local and global custom complexes: *integration*, *compartmentalization*, and *cultural brokerage*. The first two refer to internal strategies, and the latter refers to an external strategy, that youth employ to manage multiple custom complexes.

Integration

Remotely acculturated Thai youth often *integrate* global and local custom complexes. We note that “integration” (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Chen et al., 2008) has variously been referred to as “blended” (Nguyen & Rule, 2020; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997), “fused” (Chuang, 1999), “hybrid” (Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Jensen et al., 2011; Ward et al., 2018), and “remixed” (Rao et al., 2013). As previously noted, integration entails the combination of one’s local cultural identity with elements of the global culture(s) (Jensen et al., 2011). Here, we focus on the type of integration that three-quarters of remotely acculturated Thai adolescents employed when considering their envisioned futures: conceiving of global values as serving local values (McKenzie, 2020).

In the following example, one adolescent elaborates on her 10-year-plan, psychologically linking global values of financial wealth and international travel with the local value of filial piety. The interviewer (I) asks the participant (P):

- I: What goals do you have for your future?
 P: Like—rich.
 I: OK, rich. So in 10 years, how do you want your life to be?
 P: Rich.
 I: Why?
 P: Because it's convenient. I wanna take my parents to travel—sit in business class on the plane.
 I: OK, OK. And business class is better because—?
 P: It's wider.
 I: You're only a small person? [laughs].
 P: You can sit in comfort.
 I: [Laughs] OK, OK. Are there any other goals—anything else you want in your life?
 P: No [laughs], rich is my goal.

In this example, we see both *that* and *how* local–global value integration is made possible: her primary future goal of wealth accumulation is perceived as facilitating her giving back to her parents by taking them traveling in the comfort of business class: filial piety, reconstituted.

Others married their aim of financial wealth with the local value of generosity. One adolescent explained that his future wealth would enable him to donate to orphans. Another suggested that he would help beggars with his future wealth. Yet another envisioned her plan to travel the world (a global value) as helping her better determine how she can “make the world a better place” (local value of generosity).

Other work in northern Thailand similarly points to the blending of multiple custom complexes. When considering the morality of sex work, urban adolescents mapped local values of women's sexual purity and shame avoidance onto global frames of thinking, reasoning that sexual purity is an important foundation of romantic love (an ideal that has been heavily popularized and spread via Western-dominated media)

and that sex work is shameful for Thailand as it tarnishes international reputation (a global concern) (McKenzie et al., 2021). In contrast, rural adolescents commonly reasoned that women's sexual purity is mandated by Buddhist precepts and that sex work is shameful for the sex worker's family and community.

We posit that integration is psychologically adaptive for most remotely acculturated youth, as it allows for the preservation of local custom complexes and the adoption of global custom complexes. Importantly, though, the process of integrating global values in fact reshapes local values. Consider the example of remotely acculturated adolescents transforming filial piety such that it is achievable via global means (e.g., taking parents on trips abroad). As this example illustrates, even while local values are maintained, they are dynamically transformed as a result of global influence.

Compartmentalization

Some remotely acculturated Thai adolescents experienced local and global custom complexes as antithetical, resulting in *compartmentalized* selves. We note that "compartmentalized" biculturalism overlaps with "alternating" biculturalism (LaFromboise et al., 1993; Phinney & DeVich-Navarro, 1997; Ward et al., 2018), "frame-switching" (Hong et al., 2000; McKenzie, 2019a), "code-switching" (Ferguson et al., 2020), and "oppositional identities" (Ogbu, 1993). We use the term *compartmentalized biculturalism* to convey the co-existence of, but lack of unity in, local and global custom complexes. This is indeed a form of biculturalism, as young people endorse local and global custom complexes; yet it does not align neatly with Berry's (1997) conceptualization of integrated biculturalism, as these two custom complexes essentially operate in two distinct spheres. While some youth actively alternate between local and global spheres, for others, the incompatibility necessitates a choice (i.e., assimilating to, or separating from, global cultures). Still other youth may experience cultural identity confusion (Jensen et al., 2011) because they experience alternation-related barriers or because the "choice" to follow local or global custom complexes is not in fact experienced as choiceful.

In the study that examined urban Thai adolescents' envisioned futures (McKenzie, 2020), a sizable minority highlighted contradictions inherent in local and global value systems. As a result, some deemed it necessary to choose between the two value systems. For example, one female adolescent who wished to become a doctor explained:

- P:* If I decide to be a doctor, I—I don't need a [romantic] partner.
I: Oh, you don't want one?
P: Well, it's too high to get a partner.
I: Too high? What do you mean?
P: Good position in work—Thai people think if the girl has more prestige in work, it might not be good for men. Yea.
I: Why?
P: Because others will think that he doesn't have the ability to take care of his family.

Here she reasons that entering into the (male-dominated) medical field, thereby acting in accordance with the global value of gender egalitarianism, may require her to sacrifice romantic partnership because obtaining a high-powered job contradicts local gender roles of women's submissiveness to men.

Another participant similarly felt it necessary to choose between two distinct tracks for her future paths—one that aligns with local, and another that aligns with, global values. She explained:

I think I'll marry at 25, and I don't want to work. Oh, well—no, no, no—I have two ideas: That I'll have a family at like 25 and maybe take care of my children. And another idea is that I don't have children and just go traveling around the world with my partner.

This participant compartmentalized two potential future selves: one that aligns with local gender norms of child-bearing and care-taking and another that aligns with global norms of exploring the world.

Other adolescents planned to manage local–global contradictions by alternating between local and global custom complexes. Some engaged in *macro-level alternation*, shifting between cultural practices and selves

over large swathes of time, by divvying up the life course such that global values and pursuits are temporally distinct from local values and pursuits. One adolescent, for instance, suggested that after living abroad and accumulating financial capital for 10 years (global values and pursuits), she would move back to Thailand and work alongside her mother (local values and pursuits).

Other work highlights adolescents' *micro-level alternation*, or moment-to-moment shifting of cultural practices and selves based on context. One study found that urban adolescents shift between local and global practices based on interactional partner, engaging in global practices (speaking English and eating Westernized foods) with friends and reserving local practices (speaking Thai and eating Thai foods) for parents and teachers (McKenzie, 2019a). This alternation enabled adolescents to maintain adherence to local norms while obtaining social capital and peer acceptance via their global cultural participation.

Extant literature on the adaptiveness of compartmentalization as a result of globalization is mixed, with research pointing to it both as conferring advantages and as challenging or confusing (Ferguson et al., 2020; Jensen et al., 2011; McKenzie, 2019a). As seen in the present discussion, the forced choice between incompatible local and global value systems most certainly presents challenges. We posit that the compartmentalization of local and global custom complexes is positive when youth agentically alternate between them, and negative when that alternation is either forced (e.g., in the case of some urban Thai schools that disallow or discourage local language use) or when alternation is experienced as impossible (e.g., the adolescent girl who deemed it necessary to choose between becoming a medical doctor or having a romantic partner).

Cultural Brokerage

Here we focus on remotely acculturated adolescents acting as *cultural brokers* for others by facilitating other people's (most notably, parents')

participation in global cultures. We draw on the term “cultural brokerage” that has been used in immigration literature, which refers to youth from immigrant families mediating the host culture for their families. Research has commonly addressed the instrumental behavior of language translation, which entails the transmission of cultural knowledge (Jones & Trickett, 2005; McKenzie, Rooney, et al., 2019). In the context of globalization, young people around the world increasingly possess cultural skills that their parents may not (yet) possess, thereby rendering them cultural brokers for their parents. These cultural skills include expertise in global languages (such as English), as well as other skills that confer cultural knowledge (for instance, digital media expertise).

In one study, we found that remotely acculturated Thai adolescents mobilized their new media skills to assist their parents’ participation in global media-driven culture (McKenzie, Rooney, et al., 2019). Some parents reported that their adolescent child taught them how to turn computers on and off. One parent relied on her daughter to post photographs of sweets she baked to her Facebook page (which her daughter created for her). Still another adolescent curated and downloaded computer games for the family to play together. Although adolescents used their media expertise to assist their parents, their expertise also dislodged traditional power structures in the family.

Remotely acculturated adolescents’ skill in speaking global languages (particularly English and Chinese) and their consumption of global foods (particularly Western fast food) (McKenzie, 2019a) also rendered them brokers of global value systems wherein children are agentic and, to some extent, equals in the family dynamic. One adolescent, for instance, reported that she exercises her English-speaking abilities when she does not want her parents to understand what she says. Another denied his mother’s repeated requests to practice English with her at home. Still another explained that 7-Eleven’s rice is more delicious than her mother’s rice, and requested that her mother try a recipe that approximates the taste of rice obtained at a global convenience store.

In addition to being affected by global custom complexes, then, cultural brokerage renders remotely acculturated adolescents agents of cultural value change. Their participation in global cultures grants them

the agency and power to renegotiate traditional Thai age-based hierarchies (and accompanying values of deference and obedience) toward more Western family dynamics. Here we see the critical role that young people play in the dynamic reshaping of local values and practices.

Proximal Acculturation in the United States

We now turn to central California as a proximal acculturation case study by drawing from our recent research with 18–29-year-old Hmong emerging adults living in the San Joaquin Valley. This project broadly focused on Hmong American psychological experiences of biculturalism. Data were gathered using qualitative (cultural identity mapping and semi-structured interviews) and quantitative (pre-interview questionnaire and Phinney's Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure [1992]) methodologies. Findings illustrate the custom complexes that participants endorse, and how they navigate discrepant custom complexes to construct their identities.

Centering American Values, Confronting Heritage Values

I was constantly arguing with my parents. When everything they said would piss me off, that's when I started [realizing]—oh my gosh, I am NOT Hmong. Or at least my values are not Hmong. When you live in American society, all of these values are just clashing against each other...

In this excerpt, a Hmong emerging adult recounts her recent realization of just how American her values are. To her, being agitated with one's parents and (even internally) disagreeing with their perspectives is a quintessentially American quality that contradicts Hmong expectations of deference, obedience, and age-based hierarchy. This excerpt speaks to a common theme in our proximal acculturation data: the centering of American values and the resultant confronting contradictory Hmong values.

The San Joaquin Valley is home to a large Hmong population, who arrived as refugees in the 1970s and 1980s following the Vietnam War. Today, roughly 14% of Fresno's population is Asian; within that pan-ethnic category, the dominant ethnicity is Hmong (Statistical Atlas, 2018; U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). Of the 24 emerging adults that took part in this study, all but two were born in the United States. For all but one participant, both parents were born in Southeast Asia.

As we shall see, our Hmong participants were acculturated to American custom complexes—rendering theirs a classic case of proximal acculturation. Yet they were also often *remotely* acculturated to Asian cultures, even if they had not traveled to Asia and had no known relatives living in Asia. One participant, who studied Japanese language and watched anime in his free time, chose a Japanese pseudonym for the study. Another participant, who became fluent in Thai language and culture by watching Thai soap operas, chose a Thai pseudonym. Still another participant, who identified with Indian, Chinese, and Korean cultures, was enthralled with Bollywood and studied abroad in India. Hmong participants were often acculturated to U.S. culture (by necessity), and to Asian cultures via media (by choice). Aligning with various Asian cultures enabled the exploration and assertion of their Asian identity, in the face of a largely hidden and painful Hmong history.

At present, we focus on their proximal acculturation to U.S. culture. To that end, we now discuss the American custom complexes that Hmong youth endorse and the heritage custom complexes they confront and maintain.

American Custom Complexes

Hmong emerging adults overwhelmingly endorsed American values pertaining to *independence*, as well as corresponding values of *autonomous* (versus relational) *choice*, *freedom*, *exploration*, and *gender equality*.

Most Hmong emerging adults in our study valued individual concerns and choices. Participants centered autonomous choices in relatively small ways (e.g., dying one's hair, getting a tattoo, going to a party) and in more consequential ways (e.g., who to marry, whether and where to

attend college, what major to choose, where to live). They overwhelmingly strove to assert autonomous choices, but commonly encountered roadblocks given their family's prioritization of relational choice, age-based hierarchy, and collectivism. When speaking about their envisioned futures, Hmong youth centered goals of financial independence and career success, as well as wanting the freedom to choose their career and how they live their lives. Several participants dreamt of a future that enabled them to venture beyond the San Joaquin Valley, but suggested that this dream would likely remain unfulfilled because it contradicts obligations to their families.

Hmong participants also overwhelmingly endorsed gender equality. Participants spoke at length about believing that men and women, and boys and girls, should be treated equally—and female participants expressed frustrations with the fact that this does not happen in their own homes. Some spoke about specific practices that were symptoms of these gendered beliefs, such as their brothers sleeping in until 10 am while they awoke at 6 am to cook rice for the family. Female and male participants shared that gender equality and feminism, values in which they were steeped at university, were ideals toward which they strived. Those who discussed desires of having children of their own commonly expressed a wish to “break the cycle” of sons being placed on a higher pedestal than daughters.

Other American custom complexes that Hmong emerging adults endorsed included personality traits of confidence and extraversion, and of openness about emotional states, the pursuit of higher education, striving for the American dream, and the freedom to participate in a capitalistic society. Their endorsement of these personality traits and personal goals were commonly met with pushback, however, because they contradicted Hmong custom complexes, described below.

Heritage Custom Complexes

Many participants suggested that they felt proud to be Hmong and that they identified strongly with Hmong culture. Indeed, an eagerness to

talk about Hmong culture—in the face of what they deemed a striking absence and lack of representation in academic literature and popular culture—is what drove most participants to take part in this study. Yet once participants started talking about “Hmongness,” nearly everything they discussed were Hmong values and practices they wished to change.

The vast majority of participants pushed back against Hmong gender role expectations and gender inequality. Many further pushed back against Shamanism and animism, and personality traits of obedience, deference, and emotional stoicism. Interestingly, participants in some ways endorsed the custom complexes they critiqued. For instance, several female participants who were frustrated with rigid Hmong gender role expectations suggested that their cooking and cleaning skills would enable them to fulfill individualistic American ideals. Several participants who questioned the efficacy of religious rituals continued to participate in them. A few participants who expressed frustration with their parents’ stoicism neither shared their emotions with, nor inquired about the emotions of, their parents.

The Hmong custom complex that our participants universally endorsed was that of *family*. For our participants, family was a central organizing concept that informed every corner of their lives. At present, they prioritized and respected their family and their family’s wishes. Many framed their pursuit of college education as both motivated by their family (their parents value higher education) and serving their family (education will help them get a good job, which will enable them to support family financially and materially). In the future, participants typically wished to live with or near their family in order to offer support. Although our participants centered family, this was not without complexity. Participants often felt stymied by their parents (e.g., because they did not support their independence, exploration, and emotional expression). Yet participants still felt great indebtedness and duty to their parents.

For a great many of our participants, Hmongness was shrouded in mystery. Many expressed a lack of clarity about their parents’ past, their migration to the United States, and about Hmong history more generally. Yet nearly every participant expressed pride in being Hmong. That is, the prioritization of *community* also played an important role in

participants' lives. They reported feeling connected with, and protective of, other Hmong community members. Similarly, many participants prioritized cultural preservation—especially Hmong language and dress—for the next generation. This was deemed important because these practices, and the values encoded in them, were deemed at risk of loss in the near future.

Processes of Managing Multiple Custom Complexes

Integration

Most participants situationally integrated Hmong and American custom complexes. That is, they integrated specific behaviors or values in specific situations, as opposed to having an integrated cultural identity. Hmong youth at times integrated languages by speaking “Hmonglish.” Notably, they spoke Hmonglish with particular others: similar age peers who they deemed similarly as acculturated as themselves. In contrast, they reserved “pure Hmong” for speaking with elders, and “pure English” for speaking with younger generations. (Here too, then, we see compartmentalization and alternation, which we discuss later.) Though participants occasionally framed Hmong values as serving American values (consider those who framed traditional gender roles as fostering independence), integration overwhelmingly took the form of American values serving Hmong values. For many, integration was not deemed possible at present, but was reserved as a future ideal.

Participants commonly strove to integrate the American value of *education* with the Hmong value of *community*. Many participants framed their pursuit of higher education as enabling them to give back to their community. One participant, for instance, wished to become a dietician so that she could share with the local Hmong community what they should and should not eat to manage diabetes. Another participant wished to obtain a PhD in order to train faculty and staff at universities with a substantial Hmong student body to be more culturally competent. Still another participant envisioned her college degree as a prerequisite of

earning her parents' approval, which has otherwise been denied based on her gender.

Some participants mobilized the American value of *self-expression* to honor their *family*. One such participant described the significance of her tattoo:

P: My tattoo is a Pisces sign of yin and yang. I did it to represent my grandparents because they passed, so I did two Koi fish—but it's in a Pisces sign because I'm a Pisces. And I did the yin and yang because I like balance and I believe there's balance to everything, and good and bad things happen for a reason. It's really meaningful to me.

I: So tracing back to your ancestral heritage, but also infusing your meaning into it?

P: Yea. My meaning and the historical meaning.

I: When you told your mom the meaning of it, did she—

P: No, she was still mad. She was like, "I'm still gonna skin it off!" Hmong parents, they just don't like tattoos.

Here, she exercises her bodily autonomy as a vehicle to express her affection for her grandmother, while infusing both her American subcultural interest in astrology and Hmong beliefs in karmic cause-and-effect. In spite of the fact that her tattoo honors her heritage culture in two ways, her mother rejected it.

Another participant wanted to get a tattoo of lavender flowers to honor her recently deceased grandmother, with whom she was very close. Her father disallowed this, however, reasoning that doing so would make her a *poj laib* ("a bad, or disobedient Hmong, girl"). In these cases, Hmong values of age-based hierarchy and gender roles were roadblocks to their attempted integration. This speaks to the challenges that participants often experienced with attempting to blend Hmong and American custom complexes: finding themselves stuck between conflicting cultural ideologies. This is a point to which we now turn.

Compartmentalization

Every single participant in our study compartmentalized their Hmong and American identities in some rather deep ways. For the most part, compartmentalization was a necessary consequence of an inability to integrate incompatible value systems and expectations. Participants pointed to a wide array of heritage custom complexes that are not accepted in mainstream U.S. society (e.g., gender role expectations and restrictions, collectivism, relational choice, religion, deference, modesty) and American custom complexes that are not accepted at home (e.g., gender egalitarianism, individualism, autonomous choice, freedom, extraversion, strong opinions). Because one value system could not be brought into the other sphere, they were left with little choice but to compartmentalize.

All participants who compartmentalized their Hmong and American identities alternated between the two based on circumstance. Like remotely acculturated Thai youth, proximally acculturated Hmong youth engaged in *micro-level alternation*. This occurred with linguistic frame-switching—alternating language spoken based on their interactional partner’s ethnicity, age, and generation. It also occurred when transitioning from home to school spheres. At home, female participants invoked the “good Hmong girl” ideal—cooking for the family, cleaning the house, looking after siblings, and otherwise maintaining an air of deference to and respect of their parents. At school, female participants invoked another side of themselves: one that has and voices opinions, studies topics of personal interest, and talks freely with friends and peers. For this reason, several participants framed school as an escape from cultural expectations that they experienced as confining.

Highlighting the contradictions inherent in Hmong and American expectations, one participant explained:

At school, you always have to be the best. But in Hmong culture if you try too hard to be the best, then you’re being too much of yourself. So I always try to stay beneath somebody so that I don’t look like I’m trying too hard. But then if you just stay beneath somebody then you’ll always be below them.

At school, being “the best” and making yourself known are necessary to earn good grades, get to know professors and obtain positive letters of recommendation, and to obtain a good job. At home, humility and modesty is idealized for women. For her to successfully navigate both cultural streams, she must compartmentalize and alternate between these two very different custom complexes.

Some participants further engaged in *macro-level alternation*. One participant explained that her ethnic identity salience depends on time of year. She feels most Hmong in November and December—the month leading up to, and of, Hmong New Year. The other 10 months of the year, she “just focuses on herself.” Another participant goes through periods of dying her hair blonde when she “wants to be white” and then dying it back to black when she feels distant from her cultural roots. In this instance, hair color is a symbolic marker of her cultural identity, and modifying her hair color is a way of tuning her cultural identity based on her needs at the time.

This compartmentalization of and alternation between Hmong and American custom complexes left many participants feeling that they lived in a state of perpetual limbo. The constant alternation between wholly distinct identities represented a substantial barrier to the development of a unified identity. Participants described their cultural identity confusion in vivid language and imagery. One participant described being Hmong American as akin to living “in purgatory.” Another suggested that Hmong and American cultures are “like fire and water;” still another that they are “at war with each other.” One participant who felt caught between two worlds explained, “I just want to be me! But...who is me?” Hmong participants longed for an integrated identity, but largely experienced that as an impossibility.

Though fraught, compartmentalization offered a feasible route for participants to keep their Hmong heritage culture alive while fitting into largely European American society. This calls to mind LaFromboise et al.’s (1993) hallmark paper, in which they write that “...the more an individual is able to maintain active and effective relationships through alternation between both cultures, the less difficulty he or she will have in acquiring and maintaining competency in both cultures” (p. 402). Compartmentalization and alternation enable competency in

both cultures, even if they come with risks for individual cultural identity development.

Cultural Brokerage

The overwhelming majority of our participants engaged, or attempted to engage, in cultural brokerage. This included the brokerage of skills (most often, language translation) and the brokerage of values (e.g., ideal parenting strategies, gender egalitarianism, and an awareness of mental health) to scaffold their parents' participation in American culture.

Value brokerage commonly took the form of Hmong youth attempting to incorporate what they learned at school in the home environment. One participant invoked concepts she had learned in her college parenting course to share an alternative way of parenting with her father. She recalled one specific incident:

My dad, he doesn't approve of my brother's girlfriend. [My sisters and I] were telling my dad, "Maybe you should listen to him." So we're basically telling him—we're telling him to listen, we're telling my dad to listen to my brother. Because of the things we've learned in class, you know, like active listening and stuff like that. But my father, he was like, "No, I'm the parent, so he should listen to me."

As was the case for this participant, the attempted value brokerage was not always successful.

This example speaks to challenges associated with cultural brokerage: the conflict and stress that it engenders. Parents were not often open to hearing about alternative ways of parenting, approaches to gender roles, and views of mental health. They typically deemed their child's attempted brokerage as an affront to their parental authority, which caused tension in the family dynamic. Cultural brokerage was also stressful for youth who acted as brokers. Participants recounted childhood stories in which they were asked to translate complex documents and vocabulary. In some cases, they did not understand what they were being asked to translate but did not want to disappoint their parents, which caused stress and family conflict.

In the context of immigration, like globalization, cultural brokerage enables the maintenance and transformation of traditional power structures. Where Hmong youth obliged with language translation, they upheld their parents' wishes and age-based hierarchy. Yet the other forms of cultural brokerage in which they engaged point to their attempts at socializing their parents toward American practices and ideologies.

Lingering Questions and Future Directions

As a result of globalization and immigration, young people around the world endorse multiple custom complexes. When possible, custom complexes are integrated; when integration is impossible or undesirable, custom complexes are compartmentalized and brokered. In the paragraphs that follow, we note key takeaways and pressing questions facing the field of acculturation.

1. Remote and proximal acculturation are often treated and studied as distinct phenomena, but because parallel psychological processes underpin them, they are useful to study in tandem. Importantly, proximal and remote acculturation also co-occur. Particularly when barriers exist to remote enculturation (or learning one's heritage culture from afar; Ferguson et al., 2016), as it does for Hmong youth who do not have a "home country" per se, proximally acculturated youth may be inclined to remotely acculturate. (Consider here the example of Hmong youth acculturating to Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Thai, and Indian cultures.) We need to know more about how remote and proximal acculturation processes intersect to influence the cultural identity development of bicultural youth.
2. Young people often compartmentalize local and global custom complexes (in the case of remote acculturation) and heritage and majority custom complexes (in the case of proximal acculturation). Many young people engage in micro-level alternation, switching between cultural frames based on circumstance (e.g., language switching) throughout the day. Young people also engage in macro-level alternation, switching between cultural frames and identities

over much longer periods of time (e.g., by divvying up the year, or the life course). We need to know more about these forms of alternation and their adaptiveness. Research suggests that alternation and cultural frame-switching can be adaptive ways of managing multiple sets of expectations (Ferguson et al., 2020; LaFromboise et al., 1993). Based on evidence discussed in this paper, however, we expect that alternation (micro- and macro-level alike) is adaptive when agentic and maladaptive when imposed.

3. Although integration and compartmentalization are often treated as individual-level traits (e.g., Berry, 1995; Chen et al., 2008; Hsiao & Wittig, 2008), individuals in fact employ multiple identity styles, depending on the feasibility of integrating particular cultural practices or values. We suspect that the compartmentalization of a great many custom complexes engenders cultural identity confusion, and is therefore less adaptive than circumstantial compartmentalization.
4. Research suggests that cultural brokerage presents opportunities for proximally and remotely acculturated youth (Guan et al., 2014; McKenzie, Rooney, et al., 2019), yet this paper highlights that cultural brokerage is also a source of internal stress and anxiety and interpersonal problems. For whom, and in what contexts, is cultural brokerage adaptive?
5. What other psychological strategies do young people employ to manage multiple custom complexes? Are negotiation strategies domain specific? Do—and how do—negotiation strategies change across the life course?

Conclusion

This chapter draws attention to the shared psychological strategies that youth who are bicultural by way of globalization and immigration employ to manage multiple sets of custom complexes. When it is impossible or undesirable for two custom complexes to be integrated, young people compartmentalize and alternate between the two distinct custom complexes. Importantly, young people also effect (or attempt to effect) cultural change by brokering new custom complexes to their parents. In

totality, this chapter connects remote and proximal acculturation fields of study, and draws attention to opportunities and challenges facing remotely and proximally acculturated youth.

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9

Globalization and All-Inclusive Global Identities

Stephen Reysen 

With the ever-increasing interconnectedness of nations, the spread of cultures, and access to information, researchers suggest that globalization influences one's identity (Arnett, 2002; Reese et al., 2019). With such access to the cultures of the world, it is possible for individuals to consume and form an identity that goes beyond one's nation—a global identity. Indeed, schools have recognized the need to form such an identity and have slowly been moving toward greater inclusion of global education in their curriculum (Clifford & Montgomery, 2017; Smith et al., 2017). The present chapter provides an update to previously published reviews of global identities (McFarland et al., 2019; Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2015, 2018) with a focus on how globalization is connected to viewing the self as part of a global community. Following a

S. Reysen (✉)

Psychology & Special Education, Texas A&M University–Commerce,
Commerce, TX, USA

e-mail: stephen.reysen@tamuc.edu

brief overview of a social identity theoretical perspective I review recent research utilizing various measures of global identity. In particular, I focus on measures that have directly or indirectly supported a connection between globalization and identification with a world community. This is followed by a review of research showing an association between globalization and global identity. Readers should also be aware that if a particular sample has not been specified in this chapter, it can be assumed it was a U.S. sample of participants.

Social Identity Perspective

Researchers examining inclusive identities tend to rely upon a social identity theoretical perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). A notable exception to this is McFarland et al.'s (2012) identification with all humanity scale. However, despite an initial argument that the measure is based on theorizing (Adler, Maslow) that is different from a social identity perspective (McFarland & Hornsby, 2015; McFarland et al., 2012), the researchers have since revised their stance to now suggest that the measure is partly based on the social identity approach (Hamer et al., 2021). Social identity theory suggests that individuals at times think and act as individuals and at other times as members of a group. Self-categorization theory, social identity theory's subsequent expansion, posits that there are different levels of inclusiveness (or levels of abstraction) representing individual level (e.g., me vs. person next to me), intermediate (e.g., Texas vs. Oklahoma), and superordinate (e.g., humans vs. plants). Although there has been a significant amount of research on the individual and intermediate level, until recently there has been little empirical research examining the superordinate level of self-categorization (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018). The social identity perspective further posits that individuals can differ in their degree of connection to the group (i.e., ingroup identification), where greater connection to the group predicts adherence to the group's values, norms, beliefs, and behaviors. Based on this theoretical perspective one can posit that there is a possibility that some individuals view all humans as part of their ingroup. However, as discussed in the following section,

what prototypical group norms are associated with a particular label (e.g., human vs. global citizen) may differ. Greater connection with the world community should predict greater adherence to the norms of the group, which I suggest tend to be prosocial in nature (e.g., helping others, empathy). Much of the research to date has examined factors related to viewing the self as a member of a global community, and the engenderment of such an identity.

Global Identities

A variety of measures of global identities and orientations have been proposed over the years. For example, researchers have suggested tapping a psychological sense of global community (Malsch, 2005), global identity (Türken & Rudmin, 2013), global humanity (Furlong & Vignoles, 2021), cosmopolitanism (Driezen et al., 2020), while others have mixed identity labels (e.g., world citizen, people around the world) together in the same measure (e.g., Chan et al., 2020; López et al., 2019; Uluğ et al., 2021). Given the ever-increasing body of research on global identities, in the present chapter I focus on those that have either direct or indirect evidence of a connection with globalization. In the present section I review research associated with measures that are shown in the next section as related to globalization. Furthermore, I have strived to provide recent examples of research utilizing these measures (see past reviews for older research McFarland et al., 2019; Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2015, 2018).

Identification with the World as a Whole

Buchan et al. (2011) conducted a study examining globalization, identity, and the public-goods dilemma (token assignment to personal, local, and world accounts) in six countries (United States, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, Iran). As part of the study, the researchers included measures of expectations of other participants (their perception of what other people would have done in the token allocation task),

concern for global issues (e.g., global warming), and identification with the local community, nation, and the world as a whole. Identification with the world as a whole was shown to be a significant predictor of giving to the world account above and beyond local and national identification. Identification with the world as a whole was also positively correlated with the expectation that others would give to the world account and concern for global issues. Further results of this study are discussed in the globalization section. Using similar methods, Buchan et al. (2017), in U.S. and South Korea samples, found that less local identification interacted with greater concern for others to predict global cooperation through identification with the world as a whole. One of the unique features of these studies is that the outcome was a behavioral measure of giving, rather than intended or past behavior ratings, showing identification with the world as a whole as a predictor.

World Citizen

The World Values Survey is a large-scale survey conducted in numerous countries every five years by a network of social scientists. As part of the recent assessments (waves 5 and 6) of the World Values Survey, researchers included an item (“I see myself as a citizen of the world”) tapping a global identity. Bayram (2015) used the survey data (2005–2008) to examine Schwartz’s 10 universal values as predictors of identification as a world citizen. Self-transcendent values (e.g., universalism), self-interest values (e.g., hedonism), stimulation, and self-direction predicted greater identification, while power and more conservative values (e.g., conformity) were negative predictors. Additionally, income, age (younger), left-leaning political orientation, trusting others, and living in an urban setting were positively associated with identification. Ng and Batra (2017) suggest that when individuals’ global (vs. local) identity is salient, they will shift to an abstract (vs. concrete) construal that encourages promotion (vs. prevention) goals. This is evidenced in the World Values Survey data through world citizen identity (vs. local) predicting values similar to promotion goals (e.g., being successful, risk

taking). Bayram (2019) observed positive correlations between identification as a world citizen and items reflecting a priority to reduce poverty and the belief that ethnic diversity enriches life, and a negative correlation with the notion of imposing stricter limits on foreign workers. Identification was also positively associated with individuals' willingness to fight in a war for one's country.

Other researchers report that world citizen identification is positively associated with endorsement of aid to other countries, especially for individuals with weaker national identification (Alvarez et al., 2018), and supporting environmental causes (Rosenmann et al., 2016). Using a similarly worded item ("I see myself as a world citizen") for identification as a world citizen, Davis et al. (2020) found identification was a significant positive predictor of trust in NGOs in a sample of Canadians. Smith et al. (2017) tested a variety of macro and micro factors as predictors of identification with world citizens. The results showed younger age, more education, and less economic globalization to predict identification. Additionally, the researchers observed an interaction whereby education was more strongly associated with identification in countries that were more integrated in the global economy. World citizenship was also a positive predictor of life satisfaction for individuals in Turkey (Sönmez & Sönmez, 2018).

Identification with All Humanity (IWAH)

McFarland et al. (2012) proposed a measure of identification with all humanity (IWAH) based on Adler's (1927/1954) notion of the sense of oneness with humanity and Maslow's (1954) self-actualization. The measure contains two subscales, each four items, representing ingroup identification (also referred to as "bond" or "self-definition" in subsequent research) and a dimension reflecting self-actualization from Adler/Maslow (also referred to as "concern" or "self-investment" in later studies) (Hamer et al., 2021; McFarland & Hornsby, 2015; Reese et al., 2015; Reysen & Hackett, 2016). The IWAH is presently being used in various ways (one or two dimensions with either eight or nine items),

with different theoretical explanations, different factor labels, and sometimes with or without factoring in identification with subgroup identities (community, nation).

The IWAH scale is correlated with a variety of other constructs. For example, the IWAH (nine item average) was positively related to completing a compassion training program (Brito-Pons et al., 2018; Cho, 2020), solidarity with animals, perceived similarity between animals and humans, inclusion of animals in the self (Amiot et al., 2017), pride in animals, and collective action intentions on behalf of animals (Amiot et al., 2020), sincerity, fairness, and dimensions of humility (Banker & Leary, 2020), support for refugees (Bassett & Cleveland, 2019), hypothetical charity donation and empathetic concern (Conway et al., 2018), moral expansion (Crimston et al., 2018), and sympathy and willingness to help COVID affected people in other countries (Deng, 2021). IWAH (the four items tapping the ingroup identification factor) was a significant predictor of following health advice and desire to help others during the COVID-19 pandemic (Barragan et al., 2021). IWAH (nine items, accounting for community and national identification scores) was positively associated with belief in moral relativism (Collier, 2017), and negatively related to authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, generalized prejudice, and support for anti-Muslim policies (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018).

Researchers have also examined variables related to IWAH's two subscales. Loy and Reese (2019) surveyed participants at a German university who either participated in mind–body activities (e.g., yoga, meditation) or not. Individuals who participated in mind–body activities scored higher on ingroup identification but not the Adler/Maslow factor. Joanes (2019) examined the IWAH subscales as predictors of variables related to reduction in clothing consumption. The results showed the Adler/Maslow factor as a stronger predictor of variables in their model (e.g., awareness of need to reduce consumption, personal norm to reduce consumption) than ingroup identification. Takamatsu (2020) examined the IWAH subscales as predictors of moral concern for outgroup members in a sample of U.S. adults. The ingroup identification dimension was a negative predictor and the Adler/Maslow factor was a positive predictor of concern for outgroups. Together the results

suggest that when examined simultaneously in models the two dimensions can show different relationships with outcome variables, typically with Adler/Maslow dimension driving the results.

Global Citizenship

Building upon the notion of intentional worlds (Shweder, 1990) and social identity perspective, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013) tested a model of antecedents and outcomes of global citizenship identification (see Fig. 9.1). The extent to which one's normative environment promotes a global citizen identity and one's global awareness (perceived knowledge of the world and felt interconnectedness with others) predicts viewing oneself as a global citizen. The left side of the model is based on




Fig. 9.1 Model of antecedents and outcomes of global citizenship identification

the notion of intentional worlds in which one is embedded. In effect, if a person is immersed in an environment that contains pro-global artifacts (e.g., international news, global education, role models who promote pro-global ideas) then they should report identifying more strongly as a global citizen. Global citizenship identification in turn predicts six clusters of prosocial values that are suggested to be the prototypical group content that is connected to the identity label—global citizen. The right side of the model is based on a social identity perspective with identification predicting adherence to group content. The six outcomes include intergroup empathy (empathy for people outside one's ingroup), valuing diversity (appreciation and desire to engage with other cultures), social justice (concern for human rights and equity), environmental sustainability (concern for the natural environment), intergroup helping (desire to help people outside one's ingroup), and felt the responsibility to act for the betterment of the world (felt obligation to aid the world).

Researchers have sought to examine possible factors predicting the model, increasing global citizenship identification, and correlates of global citizenship identification. Factors such as taking a college course with global content, having a professor who promotes a global citizen identity, interdependent self-construal, belonging to a fandom that promotes the identity, a positive attitude toward technology, a liberal political orientation, and a quest for religious orientation have been shown to predict the model of antecedents and outcomes of global citizenship identification (for a review see Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018). Correlates of global citizenship identification have included openness to new experiences, exposure to global information, academic motivation, desire to protest unethical corporations, and a positive attitude toward peace and support for diplomacy (see Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018).

Prototypical Content

From the social identity perspective, groups have prototypical content that distinguishes one group from another. In a review of studies of lay perceptions of global citizenship, including participants who had

never heard the term, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2018) note that many of the themes that arose are components of the model (e.g., global awareness, social justice, environmentalism). This suggests that lay people associate the category label with these prototypical beliefs and behaviors, which may mean that different category labels (e.g., human) may have different prototypical content. As an example, Merle et al. (2019) found that tweets that included the hashtag #globalcitizen were related to nature, common good, and disadvantaged groups. In survey research with U.S. undergraduate students, Reysen et al. (2013) examined identification with different labels (global citizen, cosmopolitan, world citizen, international citizen, and human) as predictors of prosocial values. The results showed that global citizen was a significant predictor above and beyond identification with the other labels. Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2017a) examined global citizen and human identification simultaneously as correlates of variables related to peace (e.g., forgiveness, support for diplomacy). Again, identification with global citizens, and not humans, was a significant predictor of support for peace. In a sample of adults in Portugal, Carmona et al. (2020) asked participants to write about one of six different labels (all humans everywhere, people all over the world, people from different countries around the world, global citizens, citizens of the world, and members of the world community). Example themes revolved around diversity, multiculturalism, human nature, and mobility. The results showed that the themes indeed differed depending on the category label that participants were writing about. Furthermore, there tended to be higher order dimensions that differed between “human” and “citizen” related labels. Together, the results suggest that not all group/category labels are the same. Relatedly, future researchers may wish to use a single category label rather than mixing labels in their measurement of global identity (e.g., referencing all humans and world citizens in the same measure). Given that there are only a few studies examining group content of inclusive identity labels, more research is needed to examine what norms/values are associated with the different identities.

Summary

Although the present chapter has taken a selection of the variety of global identity research and measures, there is a clear theme to the results: global identities are related to prosocial outcomes. Regardless of the measure, researchers tend to find that greater identification is associated with variables such as a desire to help others (e.g., giving to charity, global cooperation, support for refugees), valuing diversity, environmentalism, empathy, and social justice concerns (e.g., fairness, protest unethical corporations). Indeed, researchers would be hard pressed to find a study with global identification linked to negative outcomes. However, as noted above, there may exist differences between identity labels with respect to prototypical group content. Yet, this may only be the case for labels that include the word “citizen” versus “human.” That said, the research thus far tends to point to the above measures as showing similar associations with prosocial outcomes. Although I have suggested that globalization has afforded individuals the opportunity to view oneself as part of the global community, in the next section I review research to support this claim. Similar to this section I have separated the research by the measure used.

Globalization and Global Identities

Identification with the World as a Whole

As noted earlier, Buchan and colleagues conducted a token assignment task with participants in six countries to examine the extent that individuals would give to a world (vs. personal and local) account. The researchers also assessed country level globalization (composite of economic, social, and political dimensions) and individual level globalization (e.g., contacting people in other countries, international travel, attending cultural events, watching international news). Buchan et al. (2009) reported that both country and individual level globalization predicted greater giving to the world. In essence, globalization encourages global cooperation. Buchan and Grimalda (2011) broke down their

measure of individual level globalization into economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions to predict giving to the global account. The results showed that all of the dimensions, excluding economic, predicted greater giving to the world. In a later paper, Grimalda et al. (2018) reported that identification with the world as a whole mediated the relationship between the composite measure of individual level globalization and contribution to the world account. In effect, globalization predicts greater identification with the world, and identification predicts global cooperation.

Global Human Belonging

Der-Karabetian et al. (2014) examined the associations between globalization, environmentalism, and identity in college student samples from the United States, China, and Taiwan. The researchers assessed a construct they termed global belonging (e.g., “I think of myself as a citizen of the world”) that is similar to measures of ingroup identification from the social identity perspective. Across the three samples, global belonging was positively related to one’s perceived positive impact of globalization in general (e.g., “Globalization contributes to the better economic conditions for everyone”) and on one’s country (e.g., “Globalization has impacted the economy of my country positively by raising the standard of living”). Global belonging was also a positive predictor (in two samples) of engaging in environmentally sustainable behaviors. Similar results were observed in a second study with college students in the United States, the Netherlands, and Brazil (Der-Karabetian & Alfaro, 2015), and another study in the United States (Der-Karabetian et al., 2018).

de Rivera and Carson (2015) conducted a series of studies to examine factors increasing global belonging. Although they used the same global belonging measure as Der-Karabetian et al. (2014), they termed it a global identity. In Study 1, U.S. college students rated their degree of global identification before and after reading a paragraph about people’s participation in a global community (e.g., part of interconnected system) and visiting websites that contained interviews from

geographically/culturally diverse individuals and stories from NGOs that work toward a culture of peace/justice. The results showed participants reporting higher global identity after the activity. In Study 2, global identity was positively correlated with a desire to celebrate global community in a sample of U.S. college students. In Study 3, graduate students and staff in Argentina rated global identity before and after a professor gave a lecture about peace and why people should celebrate the global community. The results showed an increase in global identity after the lecture. Although these studies do not reference globalization specifically, the interventions do highlight the interconnectedness that is a hallmark of globalization. Thus, the results suggest that interventions highlighting globalization (and I presume based on reference to celebrations of global identity) in a positive manner may impact identity.

World Citizen

Using the World Values Survey data, Ariely (2018) examined the influence of globalization on the association between national and world citizen identification. The results showed a negative association between national and global identification. The association was moderated by country level globalization, such that more globalized countries showed a weaker relationship than less globalized countries. However, in these samples, globalization (measured at country level) was not significantly associated with individuals' ratings of world identification. Ariely (2017) conducted similar analyses examining the relationship between global identification and xenophobic attitudes. The results showed a stronger negative association between identification as a world citizen and xenophobic attitudes in countries with greater globalization versus less globalization change.

IWAH

Although no research has directly examined the relationship between globalization and IWAH, researchers have provided indirect evidence that contact with people and consumption of material from other

countries is associated with IWAH. In a series of studies Sparkman and Eidelman (2018) examined the association between U.S. participants' multicultural experiences and IWAH. In Study 1 experiences with cultural elements (e.g., music) and people (e.g., travel, international contacts) were related to IWAH (one item, Venn diagram adapted from the inclusion of other in the self-scale Aron et al., 1992 that was eventually dropped from the IWAH measure). In Study 2, multicultural experiences were associated with IWAH (a combination of the ingroup identification factor, the Venn diagram item, and two novel items). Using the same IWAH measure in Study 3, the researchers replicated Study 2 and found that the quality and quantity of intercultural contacts were positively correlated with IWAH. In a sample of adults in Poland, Sparkman and Hamer (2020) found multicultural experiences were positively correlated with ingroup identification and the Adler/Maslow dimensions of IWAH. Furthermore, in a model predicting helping and intergroup attitudes the researchers observed the type of experiences differed in predicting IWAH dimensions: contact with others predicted both ingroup identification and Adler/Maslow, while experiences with cultural elements predicted only the Adler/Maslow dimension.

Belt (2016) surveyed university students to find that IWAH (nine item averaged) was positively associated with participation in study abroad, frequent interactions with people from a different culture, and having traveled/lived abroad. Röpke et al. (2019) assigned German students to participate in a chat with a purportedly foreign student or learn about a piece of art (control condition) prior to rating IWAH (nine item average). The results showed that intergroup contact (vs. no contact) was related to higher IWAH. Furthermore, in a second study, participants' self-reported international contacts were positively related to IWAH. Rowe and Post (2019) surveyed U.S. medical students who had either participated in global health experiences (or not). Students who had participated in global experiences rated IWAH (nine item average) higher than those who had not. Taken together, the evidence thus far supports the notion that engagement with others and consumption of global artifacts is related to higher IWAH scores.

Global Citizenship

Globalization is closely connected with the notion of global citizenship. Reysen, Pierce, et al. (2014) asked U.S. undergraduate students to provide a definition of global citizenship. The most frequently used words were then presented to participants in a reaction time task in which students categorized the words as either “global citizen” or “other.” The results showed that the word “globalization” was quickly and frequently categorized as associated with global citizen. There are also indicators that global citizenship identification is related to the consumption of culturally diverse content. For example, global citizenship identification is positively related to a desire to engage in diverse cultural experiences, using the internet to search for entertainment from other countries for U.S. participants (Reysen et al., 2013), and greater use of social media for Filipino students (Lee et al., 2017). In a study of U.S. and Bulgarian media (newspapers, magazines) Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2017b) found more global stories in Bulgarian media. Additionally, greater consumption of news/media was associated with higher global citizenship identification for Bulgarian participants.

There also is evidence that interactions with individuals from other countries are associated with global citizenship. Lenkaitis et al. (2019) asked students in a second language course to participate in virtual exchanges with people in another country and complete a measure of global awareness (an antecedent to global citizenship identification) before and after six weeks of interactions. Students reported greater global awareness after the virtual exchanges. Lenkaitis and Loranc-Paszylk (2021) conducted a similar study also finding that global citizenship identification increased after participating in virtual exchanges. In a sample of Canadian college students, Sherman et al. (2020) observed an increase in global citizenship identification after a short-term study abroad trip. However, Mule et al. (2018) observed no significant difference in global citizenship identification for students who completed a short-term study abroad (vs. a sample of students who did not travel abroad). In a study with self-identified Roma living in Slovakia, intergroup contact was found to predict greater global citizenship identification (Reysen et al., 2016). Together, these results tend to suggest that

interacting with culturally diverse others can promote viewing oneself as a global citizen, although the relationship may be more nuanced for study abroad (e.g., having a poor experience during study abroad may hinder identification).

In a series of studies, Reysen et al. (2020) examined the relationship between globalization and global citizenship identification. In Study 1, American participants completed various measures related to globalization (e.g., social globalization, globalization knowledge) and global citizenship identification. Identification with global citizens was positively associated with social globalization (e.g., talking to people outside the United States on the internet), globalization attitude (viewing globalization positively), globalization knowledge (knowledge of global institutions and issues), global openness (openness to other cultures), awareness of globalization (seeing the impact of globalization in one's life), and perceived impact of globalization on one's self. In Study 3, the researchers found that the perceived impact of globalization on one's self was positively correlated with identification in samples from the United States, Canada, Brazil, Vietnam, and India. In Study 4, the researchers tested the influence of the perceived impact of globalization on Reysen and Katzarska-Miller's (2013) model of antecedents and outcomes of global citizenship identification. The perception that one's life is impacted by globalization predicted global citizenship identification through one's perception that their normative environment is pro-global and global awareness. The perceived impact of globalization also predicted the six clusters of prosocial values through the antecedents and global citizenship identification. Together the studies show consistent associations between perceptions of globalization (e.g., viewing globalization positively) and global citizenship identification.

Individuals' perception of globalization can also have the reverse effect on identification. Snider et al. (2013) presented participants with either a positive (e.g., cultural diversity in job market, opportunities to travel when working for global companies), negative (e.g., outsourcing jobs make the job market worse), or no framing of globalization prior to rating global citizenship identification and other measures. Compared to the positive framing, participants exposed to the negative framing rated their degree of global citizenship identification lower. Participants

also reported lower happiness and academic motivation, less desire to help others, and less willingness to protest unethical corporations when presented with the negative (vs. positive) framing of globalization. The results suggest that one's perception of globalization has a direct impact on one's degree of psychological connection to the category label global citizen.

Koc and Vignoles (2018) posited that for gay men living in Turkey identifying as a global citizen would aid in being a gay man in a culture with traditional masculine norms, and subsequently bolster well-being. Participants were randomly assigned to read about positive, negative, or no information (control) about globalization, followed by completion of measures regarding global citizenship identification, gay-male identity integration, and well-being. The results showed that the pro-globalization (vs. negative portrayal of globalization) predicted greater global citizenship identification. Global citizenship identification predicted greater gay-male identity integration, and identity integration predicted higher subjective well-being. The results support those of Snider et al. (2013) in showing that manipulating one's view of globalization has an impact on global citizenship identification.

Summary

The research linking globalization and global identities thus far suggests that the two are related. Engaging with geographically and culturally diverse others, consuming artifacts from other cultures, and reading news from other countries all appear to contribute to viewing oneself as part of the global community. Furthermore, perceiving that one's life has been impacted by globalization is associated with greater identification. An additional theme that appears across studies is that the perception of globalization as positive (vs. negative) is associated with greater identification. Having a negative perception of globalization is related to less identification. Relatedly, viewing a threat to a subgroup (e.g., nation) can reduce identification (Reysen, Katzarska-Miller, et al., 2014; Reysen, Pierce, et al., 2014), while having a positive perception of humanity is associated with greater identification (Putra et al., 2021). One exception

to the notion that having a subgroup under threat can reduce identification is proposed by Gorman and Seguin (2018) who suggest that groups that are marginalized and under threat are likely to adopt a global identity when they perceive the existence of allies to aid them. In effect, the perception that one is connected with others in the world is associated with placing oneself within a global community.

Conclusion

Research examining inclusive global identities has been steadily increasing in recent years. In general, greater identification with a global identity is associated with prosocial values and behaviors. Following Reysen and Katzarska-Miller's (2013, 2018) model, these prosocial values tend to fall into six clusters of beliefs and behaviors. For example, solidarity with animals could fall under the umbrella of environmental sustainability, giving to the world account in a token assignment task could reflect felt the responsibility to act for the betterment of the world, and support for refugees could reflect intergroup helping. Further research is needed to examine whether the prototypical content associated with the identity labels differs, but the correlates in prior research tend to suggest that they are more similar than different (with the exception of human identity).

The results reviewed in the present chapter suggest that globalization (or related measures like intergroup contact with diverse others) is associated with identification with a global identity. Intergroup contact, consumption of culturally diverse artifacts, holding a positive view of globalization, and perceiving a positive impact of globalization on oneself is associated with greater identification. In effect, greater engagement with the global community is related to greater global identification. However, there is a caveat that the perception of globalization should be positive to be associated with a global identity. When participants are prompted to think of the negative aspects of globalization their degree of identification goes down (Koc & Vignoles, 2018; Snider et al., 2013).

Although the trends observed in the research reviewed suggest a general association between globalization and global identification, this

relationship is likely more complicated and deserving of further research. For example, future researchers may delve into the mixed results observed between participating in study abroad and global identity. There are a variety of factors that may enhance or limit an increase in identification such as what country the student visited (e.g., same or different from one's native language), length of stay, and the quantity and quality of the interactions with diverse others. Furthermore, a greater examination of what types of interactions and artifacts consumed is needed. For example, eating out at a Chinese restaurant is unlikely to shift global identity. How much, how diverse, and over how long do experiences need to be to increase global identification? Given this is a relatively new area of exploration there are many fruitful avenues for researchers to follow.

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10

Can Global Citizens Contribute to Japan's Local Society? Impacts of Global Citizenship on Intergroup Ideologies and Civic Engagement

Satoshi Moriizumi

In recent years, Western countries, such as Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have been tackling issues of social exclusion and inclusion due to the influx of immigrants and refugees. Statistics show that the number of permanent immigrants has been increasing steadily over the past decade, reaching five million in OECD countries (OECD, 2020). Citizens have mixed reactions to migration because immigrants have been perceived in complex ways: as necessary, welcoming, or threats to society.

As in Western countries, Japan has been facing an aging population and a declining birthrate; therefore, the number of foreign workers has

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S. Moriizumi (✉)

Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan

e-mail: moriizum@nanzan-u.ac.jp

been increasing drastically to compensate for the workforce shortage. In 2018, more than 100,000 people migrated to Japan on either a long-term or permanent basis, which was a 17% increase from the number of migrants in 2017, and even more short-term foreign workers migrated to the country (OECD, 2020).

As a relatively ethnically homogenous country, Japan has been reluctant to accept immigrants as part of its labor force and has been carefully conducting visa control for foreigners. However, as the Japanese immigration policy was changed in response to globalization and labor shortages in 2019, the number of foreign workers is expected to rise further. So far, many Japanese citizens have experienced minimal actual interactions with migrants; therefore, it is an opportune time to scrutinize the current situation and prospects around social integration and intergroup relations in the Japanese society.

To improve racial/ethnic relations within a larger society by overcoming their boundaries, one promising approach is to adopt global citizenship. Researchers and theorists have long studied the sense of being a global citizen (i.e., global citizenship) and advocated the advantage of this concept in promoting cultural diversity by overcoming ethnocentric attitudes toward people from other parts of the world, both within and across countries. Global citizenship is defined as “global awareness, caring, embracing cultural diversity, promoting social justice and sustainability, and a sense of responsibility to act” (Reysen et al., 2012, p. 29). It is a superordinate identity that represents the interconnectedness and complexity of the world rather than various cultural identities (e.g., nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, class). Numerous research findings suggest that global citizenship is positively associated with various prosocial values such as intergroup helping, intergroup empathy, cultural diversity, and responsibility to act (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018). By proposing a model of global citizenship identification, Reysen and his collaborators sought to determine the nature of global citizenship identification, its antecedents and outcomes. They found that the model provided adequate explanatory values to the global citizenship process (e.g., Katzarska-Miller et al., 2012; Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). Much of the research has been conducted in the United States to understand the importance of the relationships between global citizenship and

prosocial behaviors, such as cultural diversity and intergroup helping. However, little has been discussed on the relationships between global citizenship and interethnic/intergroup relations in Japan. Because each country has a unique background and history in interethnic/interracial relations, to build better relations with immigrants and foreigners, further research is needed regarding how people from different cultural backgrounds can lead fulfilling lives together.

This chapter discusses a study that aims to investigate how global citizenship identification promotes prosocial values, including intergroup relations and civic engagement in Japan, by utilizing and extending the model of global citizenship identification proposed by Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013). As the interdependent relationship between being global and local is coined as “glocalization,” the current study specifically investigates the relationships between global identity and social behavior in local communities. As the term global infers, global citizenship may promote civic engagement in global communities (e.g., participating in and donating money to international NGOs and helping the poor in foreign countries), while at the same time it may also promote it within the domestic society (e.g., doing volunteer work in a local community).

The current study also investigates how prosocial behavior influences individuals' well-being. Investigating individuals' social and psychological well-being in relation to social issues such as migration seems indispensable to foresee a society where everyone can exercise their full potential. In short, because further discussions on how to build a more socially equitable and multicultural society in Japan are acutely needed, this study investigates the relationships among global citizenship, attitudes toward other ethnic/racial groups, civic engagement, and well-being, with the potential to offer evidence for improving societal relations.

Contextualizing Migration and Intergroup Relations in Japan

Japan has been a relatively homogeneous society culturally/ethnically, and the government has long been reluctant to welcome immigrants. In the 1980s–90s, when the Japanese economy was booming and experiencing a shortage in the labor force, Japan changed the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act to only allow workers from overseas with Japanese ancestry backgrounds (i.e., Japanese Brazilians and Japanese Peruvians) (McKenzie & Salcedo, 2014). Conversely, they regulated people predominantly from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, such as entertainers from the Philippines and people pretending to be students in higher education institutions, who came to work in Japan. This was partly attributed to an increasing number of issues such as overstaying foreigners and abandoned children from international marriages; however, this further marginalized ethnic minorities (Ball & Piper, 2002). Since then, conversations regarding how Japan should deal with the social integration of new immigrants have been raised, as well as that of earlier immigrants comprising *Zainichi* Chinese and Koreans, who already resided in Japan before and during the Japanese occupation period from the early 1900s to the end of World War II.

Meanwhile, despite the reluctance to welcome unskilled foreign workers, Japan has been open to skilled foreigners such as professors and business experts. Additionally, since the 1990s, Japan has welcomed technical intern trainees, mainly from Southeast Asian countries, to develop their skills during their stay in Japan, then return to their countries and utilize these skills. However, this intern system has been controversial, and many suspected that some companies abuse it by forcing the interns to work for minimum wages. Ample evidence was reported that foreign workers were in such a predicament (Bélanger et al., 2011). In fact, an independent committee of the United Nations, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in their tenth and eleventh periodic report on Japan suggested that the foreign workers' issue, together with racial discrimination involving social and religious minorities (Ainu, Okinawan, and Muslims), needed to be resolved (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2018).

In 2019, the Japanese immigration policy was finally changed in response to globalization and labor shortages. Until then, foreign workers would enter Japan discreetly, but in 2019 Japan invited unskilled foreign workers officially (Mochizuki, 2019). The major change was that Japan officially welcomed lower-skilled foreign workers under its new Specified Skilled Worker visa program, even though Shinzo Abe, the prime minister at that time, stated “We are not pursuing what is commonly considered an immigration policy” (Nikkei Asia, 2018, para. 15), stressing that the program is designed to recruit foreign workers to help sectors with worker shortages for a limited time. While this is still controversial, it is well understood that the number of immigrants from overseas will increase, and future prospects around issues of social integration and intergroup relations need to be acutely discussed.

Regarding a social integration policy, Japan has at least attempted to take some actions even though they are far from enough. In fact, both national and local governments have been promoting *Tabunka Kyosei* (multicultural symbiosis) as a motto (Demelius, 2020). For example, Toyota city in Aichi prefecture, where the Toyota headquarters—a world-class car manufacturer—are currently located, has formulated a plan to promote multicultural symbiosis, such as support measures related to language, work, health, and community issues (Toyota City, 2018). In Toyota city, currently, nearly 4% of citizens are foreigners, which is a little beyond the average of 1.4% of foreign citizens out of the total population in Japan (Statistic Bureau of Japan, 2015). Depending on which school district they resided in Toyota city, as much as 24% of junior high school students are foreigners, predominantly Japanese Brazilians. Despite such efforts, the majority of Japanese people still lack intercultural experiences; therefore, promoting multicultural symbiosis is not a concrete strategic plan, rather an idealistic or armchair multicultural policy without multiculturalism imposed by the municipal government authority (Iwabuchi, 2016). This is partly because actual and deeper intergroup interactions between ethnic minorities and majorities are lacking (Kashiwazaki, 2016).

Intergroup Ideologies: Rejecting, Celebrating, or Ignoring Group Differences

Social psychologists in Western countries have examined social attitudes toward other ethnic/cultural groups, such as intergroup ideologies. To illustrate, at least three different intergroup ideologies have been identified (Guimond et al., 2014): assimilation, multiculturalism, and colorblindness. Assimilation is an ideology in which minority groups are expected to adopt the cultural values and language of a dominant group to create a shared national identity (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Contrastingly, multiculturalism is an idea that entails recognizing mutual cultural values and their differences, suggesting that all ethnic groups are equally valued by maintaining unique cultural characteristics. Finally, colorblindness is an ideology that underestimates or ignores the differences between races, ethnicities, and cultures by emphasizing the importance of individuals' similarities (Rattan & Ambady, 2013). This ideology emphasizes individual commonalities and overlooks group differences, treating people as equal. These ideologies can be summarized as either rejecting, celebrating, or ignoring group differences.

So far, extensive research has been conducted, particularly in the United States, to reveal how these ideologies influence intergroup relations in the larger society. For example, Levin et al. (2012) investigated types of cultural ideologies among American college students and their impact on attitudes toward other groups, such as prejudice toward different ethnic minorities. They found that an assimilation ideology was positively related to prejudice against immigrants and ethnic minorities, while multicultural and colorblind ideologies were not. Perhaps the most comprehensive metaanalysis to date, Whitley and Webster (2019), analyzed 97 studies on intergroup ideologies and prejudice within and outside the United States. They found that assimilation was positively related to prejudice, with a somewhat high effect size. Contrastingly, multiculturalism and colorblindness were negatively associated with prejudice, with a low effect size; however, compared to the relationship of prejudice with multiculturalism, the relationship with colorblindness was less clear.

Substantial evidence shows that assimilation and multicultural ideologies have somewhat opposite relationship to intergroup relations; however, the role of colorblindness in regard to intergroup relations has been unclear, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, colorblindness does not necessarily cause a decrease in prejudice against other groups because it downplays the existence of group distinctions and power relations in society (Neville et al., 2013). In other words, majority groups who adopt colorblind ideologies may ignore the predicaments and racial discrimination faced by minority groups by assuming that such situations do not exist and that everyone has the same opportunities (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). The colorblind ideology may further marginalize minority groups by blaming their underperformance at work because of a lack of engagement (Plaut et al., 2009). Colorblind ideology also has mixed impacts on both minority and majority groups. Conducting a series of studies on colorblind messages in social interactions between White and Black partners, Apfelbaum et al. (2008) found that majority group members tended to receive negative judgments from minority partners. In empirical studies, variations of questionnaire items to measure colorblindness also yielded mixed results. Some studies merely focused on the positive aspect of appreciating individual similarities, while others underscored the negative aspect, stating that the concept underestimated group differences (Whitley & Webster, 2019).

So far, in Japan, existent research, although sparse, has only focused on some aspects of intergroup ideologies. For example, multicultural ideology was found to promote cultural diversity with foreigners (Nagayoshi, 2011), while assimilation ideology was not necessarily related to prejudice toward foreigners (Richey, 2010). Furthermore, not enough research has tested the differences between the three forms of intergroup ideologies (assimilation, multiculturalism, and colorblindness) in a single study.

Global Citizenship and Its Link to Intergroup Relations

One hindrance to improving intergroup relations may be attributed to the social psychological process of distinguishing between ingroups and outgroups. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), ingroup favoritism, which is a common phenomenon, becomes problematic in intergroup relations when people start privileging ingroup members (Brewer, 1999). Alternatively, ingroup members may perceive the outgroup as a threat which may hinder intergroup relations (Riek et al., 2006). In terms of seeking better relations with outgroup members, such as migrants, theorists have proposed a superordinate construct that exceeds national boundaries. Although different names have been used, such as cosmopolitanism (Sobré-Denton & Bardhan, 2013), world citizenship (Friedman, 2000), and global citizenship (Dower & Williams, 2002), the shared idea behind the construct entails people from different backgrounds to have a sense of togetherness; a larger idea involving a sense of belonging to a group greater than one's nation. Compared to other related terms, the term global citizenship connotes a feeling of moral obligation to help others and a recognition of the complexity of the world (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018).

Research on global citizenship has been conducted based on its characteristics, antecedents, and outcomes. One promising model was proposed by Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013), who emphasized the process of identifying the self as a global citizen to predict prosocial values and thus mitigate global issues. They proposed and empirically tested a model of global citizenship identification, including its antecedents and outcomes. The model endorsed normative environment and global awareness as the two antecedents of global citizenship identification. In turn, global citizenship identification predicted six clusters of prosocial values, including intergroup empathy, intergroup helping, valuing diversity, social justice, environmental sustainability, and a responsibility to act. In contrast to previous literature on global citizenship and its related concepts, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2018) claimed that one advantage of their model is that it measures identification, rather than the content, of global citizenship because it is conceptually consistent with social identity theorizing.

Global citizenship content is varied across studies and thus an agreement on its content is yet to be reached.

Following Reysen and Katzarska-Miller's (2018) global citizenship identification model, the current study proposes the following relationship between global citizenship identification and intergroup ideology. Intergroup ideology can be hypothesized as an outcome of global citizenship, following Reysen and Katzarska-Miller's (2018) findings that global citizenship promotes both intergroup empathy and helping and valuing diversity. Among the three types of intergroup ideologies, multiculturalism respects the cultures of ethnic minorities, which seems to be related to prosocial values, including intergroup empathy and valuing cultural diversity. Subsequently, the assimilation ideology connotes unequal relations with minorities by asking them to adopt the mainstream culture, which is likely to be an opposite dimension of valuing cultural diversity. However, the relationship between colorblindness and global citizenship is unclear because the relationship of colorblindness with intergroup relations had produced mixed results. Therefore, two hypotheses and one research question are posed on the relationships between global citizenship identification and intergroup ideologies:

H1: Global citizenship identification is positively associated with multiculturalism.

H2: Global citizenship identification is negatively associated with assimilation.

RQ1: How is global citizenship identification related to colorblindness?

Civic Engagement and Its Link with Global Citizenship and Intergroup Relations

Commonly, citizenship and civic engagement are inextricably tied together. Being a good citizen may well imply an active involvement in the civic life of one's community. According to Ehrlich (2000), civic engagement is defined as "working to make a difference in the civic life of our communities and developing the combination of knowledge, skills, values, and motivation to make that difference," and it also means

“promoting the quality of life in a community through both political and non-political processes” (p. vi). Some researchers include participation in local and global communities (i.e., civic engagement) as a core component of global citizenship (Morais & Ogden, 2011; Schattle, 2008). Following Reysen and Katzarska-Miller’s model (2013), this study proposes that civic engagement is one of the outcome variables of global citizenship identification. It can occur in both global and local communities, but the current study specifically focuses on civic engagement within their everyday local community.

Given the close relationships between global citizenship identification and civic engagement, one question that emerges is: how are these concepts related to intergroup ideologies? Although few studies have focused on this relationship, the current study proposes that global citizenship identification is an antecedent of intergroup ideologies and civic engagement. Furthermore, intergroup ideologies serve as mediating variables between global citizenship identification and civic engagement. In other words, the types of intergroup ideologies (assimilation, colorblindness, and multiculturalism) are hypothesized as being related to global citizenship identification, and individuals’ attitudes toward different types of intergroup ideologies may predict their everyday civic engagement. Civic engagement is measured by individuals’ behavior in a community, such as donating money or helping the poor. It is theorized that the initiating factors of beliefs and values influence whether and to what degree people engage in civic activities (Pancer, 2014). In this study, beliefs and attitudes toward other groups (i.e., intergroup relations) may influence civic engagement.

The relationships between civic engagement and intergroup ideologies—multiculturalism, assimilation, and colorblindness—can be similarly predicted as the relationship between global citizenship and intergroup ideologies. Those with a strong multicultural ideology tend to participate in various civic activities such as volunteering, participating in, and donating to various NGOs/NPOs, based on the premise that people need to work together to improve society (Krings et al., 2015). In contrast, those with strong assimilation ideologies are not likely to be engaged in civic activities because they tend to think that minorities should adapt to society. They are likely to pursue their own benefits

and be less concerned about civic activities. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H3: Multiculturalism is positively associated with civic engagement.

H4: Assimilation is negatively associated with civic engagement.

As for relationships between colorblindness and civic engagement, two contrasting views are possible. On the one hand, some may be more engaged in civic activities to improve society by holding a colorblind premise that everyone should be treated equally because they are all human beings. On the other hand, others, particularly majority group members, are likely to resist change in society by ignoring cultural differences and inequality. If so, colorblindness might be negatively related to civic engagement. By considering these two conflicting ideas, the relationship between colorblindness and civic engagement cannot be hypothesized, and hence it poses a research question.

RQ2: Is colorblindness associated with civic engagement positively or negatively?

Prosocial Behavior and Well-Being

As noted in Ehrlich's (2000) definition, civic engagement promotes "the quality of life in a community" (p. vi). This quality of life is closely related to a psychological construct of well-being. Well-being encompasses multiple meanings, such as good human relationships and positive emotions. For example, Wray-Lake et al. (2017) conducted a daily diary study investigating the relationship between various types of civic engagement and subjective well-being. They found that certain types of civic engagement (i.e., helping and pro-environmental behaviors) were more strongly related to well-being than others. Furthermore, well-being is theorized as being enhanced by prosocial behavior, such as pro-environment behaviors (Venhoeven et al., 2013), and empirical evidence, based on both adolescents and adults, suggests a positive correlation between pro-environmental behaviors and well-being, including

life satisfaction and happiness (Brown & Kasser, 2005). Volunteering also has a positive effect on various aspects of well-being, such as happiness, life satisfaction, self-esteem, sense of control over life, physical health, and depression (Thoits & Hewitt, 2001).

Despite several dimensions of well-being discussed in the literature, there are at least two types of well-being: subjective well-being (SWB) and psychological well-being (PWB) (Burns & Machin, 2010). Subjective well-being refers to the perceived judgment of overall life satisfaction and fulfillment. It generally measures positive and negative affect, happiness, and life satisfaction, despite some incongruity (Lucas & Dyrenforth, 2006). Those with high SWB experience more positive affect and high life satisfaction. However, SWB has been challenged because of the weak predictability of long-term well-being (Ryff & Singer, 1998). In contrast, PWB focuses on social functioning with multiple concepts of well-being, including autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance, purpose in life, environmental mastery, and positive relations with others, which may well describe longer-lasting well-being (Ryff & Singer, 1998), as well as measures of social functioning, including social relationships with others.

Regardless of the differences in the well-being dimensions, empirical studies supporting a positive relationship between civic engagement and well-being have been well documented (Albanesi et al., 2007; Brown & Kasser, 2005; Wray-Lake et al., 2017); thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H5: Civic engagement is positively associated with both subjective and psychological well-being.

Method

Participants

In this study, participants included 470 Japanese adults (mean age = 52.17, $SD = 9.10$, 433 men, and 37 women). All participants were self-identified Japanese citizens. There were two criteria for the selection of

participants. First, only Japanese adults who were currently working in Japanese society were included. Second, the participants with little or no interest in *Tabunka Kyosei* (multicultural symbiosis) were excluded from this study because, given the fact that Japanese society is relatively ethnically homogenous, many participants might have fallen into this category, and their scores on citizenship and civic engagement might be skewed by floor effects; therefore, it may lower sensitivity of these variables (e.g., civic engagement) in statistical analysis (Keppel & Wickens, 2004).

Participants were recruited from a company that assisted in recruiting participants for an online survey on a first-come-first-served basis. They received a small point reward from the company that could be later used to purchase goods online.

Procedure

Participants received an invitation email from an online survey company. They were provided with a link that took them to the current study. First, messages regarding the current study's ethical guidelines (e.g., assurance of anonymity and voluntary participation) were provided, as well as questions about the two criteria (i.e., whether participants were currently working and whether they were interested in the concept of *Tabunka Kyosei* [multicultural symbiosis], which was defined briefly). The first question required a *yes/no* answer, and the second question was based on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (*not interested in at all*) to 5 (*interested in very much*). Those who answered "no" (I am not working) on the first question and indicated either 1 or 2 on the second question were directed to the end screen of the study without navigating to the webpage of the main study. Participants who met the two criteria moved on to completing the survey rating global citizenship identification, intergroup ideology, civic engagement, and well-being. Finally, participants provided their demographic information, such as ethnic background, nationality, age, and gender.

Measures

Global Citizenship Identification

The global citizenship scale (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013) was used to measure participants' global citizenship identification. The scale consists of 22 items, including the antecedent and outcome factors of global citizenship. The current study used two items to measure global citizenship identification ("I would describe myself as a global citizen" and "I strongly identify with global citizens"). Participants rated the item on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). Cronbach's alpha reliability was satisfactory ($\alpha = .85$).

Intergroup Ideologies

Participants' beliefs about intergroup ideology were measured using items by Levin et al. (2012). Originally, the scale comprised 12 items, including three assimilation, three multiculturalism, and six colorblindness items. Since Cronbach's alpha reliability of multiculturalism was reported to be relatively low ($\alpha = .59$) (Levin et al., 2012), the current study added an additional item for each factor to increase the internal consistency of each subscale. In total, 15 items measured the three types of intergroup ideology: (a) assimilation (e.g., "People who come to Japan should change their behavior to be more like the Japanese," "The unity of this country is weakened by people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways"), (b) colorblindness (e.g., "We should treat citizens of this country as Japanese and not as members of particular ethnic, religious, or sexual communities," "It's best to judge one another as individuals rather than as members of an ethnic group," "It is important to recognize that people are the same regardless of their ethnicity"), and (c) multiculturalism (e.g., "Immigrant parents must encourage their children to retain the culture and traditions of their homeland," "A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur"). Each item was rated on a five-point Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from 1 = *strongly disagree*

to 5 = *strongly agree*. Cronbach's alpha reliability was .65, .75, and .65, respectively.

Civic Engagement

The frequency of different civic engagement aspects was measured using nine items. These included participation in volunteer activities in communities and charitable organizations. Each item was rated on a six-point Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from 1 = *never* to 6 = *every week*. Exploratory factor analyses showed a single factor structure, and thus the score of the nine items was summed and then averaged to calculate the civic engagement frequency ($\alpha = .86$).

Well-Being

The Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985) and the Japanese version of the Flourishing Scale (Sumi, 2014), which was based on the original scale (Diener et al., 2010), were used to test individuals' subjective and psychological well-being. The satisfaction with life scale includes five items (e.g., "In most ways my life is close to my ideal," "The conditions of my life are excellent," "I am satisfied with my life") ($\alpha = .83$). The flourishing scale includes eight items that assess individuals' perceived success in social functioning (e.g., "I lead a purposeful and meaningful life," "My social relationships are supportive and rewarding," "I am engaged and interested in my daily activities," "I actively contribute to the happiness and well-being of others") ($\alpha = .87$). Each item was rated on a five-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*.

Results

Structural equation modeling was conducted to assess the overall relationships among global citizenship identification, intergroup ideologies, civic engagement, and well-being (see Table 10.1 for descriptive statistics

Table 10.1 Zero-order correlations and descriptive statistics among variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mean	SD
1. Global citizenship identification							3.94	1.15
2. Colorblindness	.11**						3.58	0.48
3. Assimilation	-.22***	.13***					3.07	0.63
4. Multiculturalism	.28***	.43***	-.12**				3.28	0.61
5. Civic engagement	.27***	.02	-.05	.22***			2.16	0.69
6. Flourishing	.32***	.25***	.09*	.23***	.29***		3.35	0.53
7. Life satisfaction	.25***	.08	.06	.12**	.22***	.56***	2.84	0.75

Note * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

and correlations among variables). The model hypothesizes that greater global citizenship identification is related to higher ratings of multicultural ideology. Consequently, higher scores on measures of multicultural ideology predict more frequent engagement in civic activities, which contributes to higher well-being in terms of life satisfaction and social fulfillment. The results showed that the hypothesized model presented had the best fit, $\chi^2(8) = 19.97$, $p = .01$, $\chi^2/df = 2.50$, GFI = .99, AGFI = .97, RMSEA = .058, thus supporting the hypothesized model (see Fig. 10.1).

The major findings were as follows: First, the relationship between global citizenship identification and intergroup ideologies was as predicted; global citizenship identification was positively associated with the multicultural and colorblind ideologies, while it was negatively associated with the assimilationist ideology. These results support H1 and H2. Second, regarding the impact of intergroup ideology on civic engagement, the stronger people's ideologies of multiculturalism were, the more frequently they tended to participate in civic engagement. However, colorblindness and assimilation were not significant predictors of civic engagement. The results for the relationship between intergroup ideologies and civic engagement supported H3 but not H4. Third, as




Fig. 10.1 Relationship among global citizenship identification, intergroup ideology, civic engagement, and psychological well-being. Note: All path coefficients are standardized and significant ($p < .01$)

hypothesized in H5, civic engagement had a direct and positive relationship with individuals' well-being with both flourishing and satisfaction with life. Additionally, global citizenship identification was positively associated with civic engagement and well-being.

Discussion

This study investigated whether global citizenship identification predicts intergroup ideology, civic engagement in the local community, and well-being. It presents three major findings: First, global citizenship identification was positively associated with both multiculturalism (supporting H1) and colorblindness (RQ1) but negatively associated with assimilation (supporting H2). Second, civic engagement was positively associated with multicultural ideology (supporting H3) but not significantly associated with assimilation (H4 was not supported). Additionally, no significant association was found between colorblindness and civic engagement (RQ2). Third, both subjective and psychological well-being were associated with civic engagement (supporting H5) as well as global citizenship identification.

Regarding the relationships between global citizenship identification and intergroup ideology (H1, H2, and RQ1), the current study confirmed the hypothesized patterns found in previous studies (e.g., Levin et al., 2012; Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018; Whitley & Webster, 2019). Following prior research on global citizenship that identified several outcome concepts, including intergroup helping and empathy and valuing diversity (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013), the current study advanced and extended the global citizenship model regarding (a) the outcomes of global citizenship identification, by including intergroup ideologies and (b) different contexts, by showing how the global citizenship model applies to non-Western cultures in Japan. This is notable because in Japan having social relationships with immigrants and foreign workers is prioritized compared to countries like the United States where interracial/ethnic relations are a focus of research. The current study is also the first to provide evidence that global citizenship identification could serve as a core concept in promoting

civic engagement, even in local communities. Furthermore, the present results highlight which intergroup ideologies are related to global citizenship identification. The current study suggests that the global citizenship model could also be beneficial in predicting and explaining the nature of intergroup behavior. Past studies have predominantly focused on relationships between intergroup ideologies and negative intergroup bias and behavior, such as prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Levin et al., 2012). However, antecedents of intergroup ideology, including global citizenship, help citizens to raise their awareness regarding appropriate social behavior and provide directions for a society, where both social minorities and majorities comfortably live together by maximizing their potential.

Regarding intergroup ideology and civic engagement, the current study demonstrated that multiculturalism is associated with civic engagement, while assimilation is not. One potential reason why assimilation was not related to civic engagement regards the types of civic engagement that participants rated. To illustrate, participants were asked to rate the frequency of their civic engagement in various sectors, such as volunteering, cleaning activities in the community, and whether they belonged to charity organizations, but not specifying civic engagement associated with ethnic minorities and foreigners. In other words, those with an assimilationist view of ethnic minorities are not likely to engage in activities that offer help to them; however, they might conduct other civic activities to support their local community. In contrast, those with multicultural beliefs tend to endorse helping others, regardless of which group they belong to, including ethnic, environmental, and political organizations. Because of the high applicability of these prosocial values to various social activities, multiculturalism had a robust and positive relationship with civic engagement, while assimilation did not.

The existing literature suggests that studies of colorblindness have produced mixed results regarding global citizenship identification and civic engagement (e.g., Levin et al., 2012; Neville et al., 2013; Whitley & Webster, 2019); therefore, the current study did not hypothesize a specific relationship with global identification and civic engagement. According to the current study's results, colorblindness had a positive but weak relationship with global citizenship identification but did not have

a significant association with civic engagement in the local community. Taking these results into consideration, the following two interpretations are possible.

First, considering its positive association with global citizenship identification, colorblindness might be perceived as a rather prosocial and egalitarian view, at least for the Japanese participants in the study. This result was consistent with the findings of a metaanalysis that colorblind ideology was weakly associated with a decrease in prejudice (Whitley & Webster, 2019). In fact, according to the descriptive statistics of colorblindness compared to other ideologies (see Table 10.1), having a colorblind ideology might be popular, acceptable, and even valuable in Japanese society, partly because Japanese society is relatively ethnically homogeneous and minority groups are virtually invisible, and they tend to follow a social norm that judging people based on individual similarities may be more moral than from social categories and skin colors. In contrast, among cultures where racial discrimination and perceived differences are evident, having a colorblind ideology has been criticized to mask the everyday realities of minority groups. Thus, a colorblind ideology tends to be viewed rather negatively as a conflicting idea against promoting cultural diversity.

Second, regarding the fact that colorblindness did not promote civic engagement, because Japanese participants might perceive colorblindness as an egalitarian and liberal ideology that everyone should be equal, participants were also less likely to be sensitive to social inequality. They may be less attuned to minorities' realities, therefore, were not motivated to engage in civic activities that better society. If those in mainstream cultures in Japan continue to endorse this colorblind view, it will be difficult to promote cultural diversity, as seen in studies with samples from Western cultures (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). On the surface, colorblindness seems important and ideal for dealing with individuals' differences in the current Japanese society; however, this may further marginalize social minorities, particularly because the lack of motivation of majority members to improve society, where social minorities remain lower in the social hierarchy. Since racial and ethnic discrimination has been ignored in Japan (Ryang, 2020), few Japanese are aware of the subtle but

negative nuances of colorblindness for the treatment of social minorities. As the Japanese society changes, future research on the relationship between colorblindness and intergroup relations is needed to understand the complexity of these relationships.

Concerning the relationship between civic engagement and well-being, the current study found a positive relationship with both subjective and psychological well-being. Despite ample evidence suggesting that Japanese people's well-being is lower and their psychological process of well-being might be different in comparison with Westerners', particularly European Americans (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2000; Oishi, 2002), the current study found relationships consistent with previous studies conducted in Western countries (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Venhoeven et al., 2013; Wray-Lake et al., 2017). Although it may be a similar process, political engagement has been quite low, but unique, in Japan compared to other Asian and Western nations (Chiavacci & Obinger, 2018); therefore, more detailed research is needed on types of civic engagement and well-being. Although this finding is tentative, civic engagement has been shown to have a positive relationship with individuals' psychological well-being. This finding is important in that people can enhance their well-being by participating in various social activities.

Implications

The main theoretical implication of the current study is that the model of global citizenship identification can be extended to explain the comprehensive relationships between intergroup ideology, civic engagement, and well-being. The current study demonstrated a more comprehensive process of the benefits of adopting a global citizenship identity to the social and psychological aspects of intergroup relationships and individuals' well-being. Another contribution is that the model can be applied to different national contexts where nuances and policies toward migration and intergroup relations vary. According to the results, global citizenship identity seems to be a superordinate identity that predicts prosocial behavior and civic engagement, even in local communities. However, concluding that global citizenship could be a cure for all social challenges

would be precocious; therefore, this concept should be further tested and examined in various contexts by conducting cross-national analyses.

As for the practical and educational implications of the current study, the findings may contribute to developing one's skills for global citizenship by describing relationships between global citizenship identification and outcome variables such as civic engagement and well-being. By learning these relationships, both educators and learners in global education can gain wider perspectives to understand the complexity of intergroup relations and reflect on their own awareness and behavior. Global learning may be beneficial in raising awareness and developing the adequate social skills needed to cope with intergroup relations with migrants and foreign workers. The current study may also contribute to developing a social integration policy. While Japan has had *Tabunka Kyosei* (multicultural symbiosis) policy, it has been criticized for being "without multiculturalism" (Iwabuchi, 2016). The current study may catalyze to discuss further how to implement a multicultural policy into action and thus make a society with social justice.

Limitations

Although novel, the present study has limitations. One notable limitation is that, despite some significant findings, this study only analyzed the correlational patterns of global citizenship and its outcomes; it did not utilize an experimental design nor a series of studies to check the robustness of the findings. Future research needs to scrutinize the causal relationships by implementing more sophisticated research methods (e.g., conduct a longitudinal study). Second, the current study utilized only three types of intergroup ideologies, although intergroup ideologies are far more complex. In addition to the three types, political ideologies such as being conservative and liberal, nationalistic ideologies such as nationalism and patriotism, and acculturation types such as separation exist, and they can have a differential outcome on global citizenship identification. More diverse intergroup ideologies should be explored to understand the complex relationships between the attitudes toward intergroup relations and a larger society. By entangling complex relationships,

social psychological research may contribute to a better understanding and building of societies where people can live together with sufficient well-being. Third, ecological validity needs to be improved. The majority of the participants in the current study were male adults who were working for a single company. Although the current study may successfully reflect the values and beliefs of people in Japanese business society, future research needs to take gender balance more seriously to reflect the current attitudes toward society.

Conclusion

Despite some limitations, the current study may further elucidate the benefits of global citizenship identification in Japan. Although discussions on how to build a more multicultural society are limited, the current study can serve as an initial step toward the future society, where an increasing number of migrants and foreign workers is anticipated.

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11

Study Abroad and Identity Development

Courtney Smith and Iva Katzarska-Miller 

Advances in technology in recent years have rapidly increased the interconnectivity of the world and the interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations. Globalization has promoted interactions between different people and geographic regions worldwide while opening borders to an increasing trade of goods, services, finances, and ideas. Increases in technology have allowed for swift and efficient travel, as well as greater international connections between people around the world through social media and the Internet. The individual context has quickly become global (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). Increasing globalization in the past few decades has affected many industries around the world, including higher education. These globalization-based changes have put an emphasis on new sets of skills and competencies. For example, Young et al. (2015) argue that cultural competence

C. Smith · I. Katzarska-Miller (✉)
Transylvania University, Lexington, KY, USA
e-mail: ikatzarskamiller@transy.edu

has shifted from a focus on multicultural competence (interaction with diverse groups) to intercultural competence, defined as “comprehension of cultural differences and similarities evoking a deeper sense of self-awareness and cultural awareness” (p. 176). In other words, a greater emphasis has been placed on students possessing global awareness and intercultural competence than at any other point in history. One of the vehicles that higher education institutions have promoted to develop these skills and competencies in students is study abroad and other intercultural exchange opportunities.

Students who participate in study abroad not only have the opportunity to develop intercultural competence but because of its timing (predominantly 18–22 years of age) students are also still developing their identities. Since study abroad experiences force students to navigate multiple cultures and identities at one time, it can result in transformations in identity (Arnett, 2002). In fact, when challenged to adapt to a new context, individuals often deepen their understanding of the “other” and equally their understanding of the self (Young et al., 2015).

This chapter delves deeper into these transformations in identity in students while studying abroad. Starting with a brief overview of the twenty-first-century globalized world and the related development of study abroad programming and participation, the chapter continues with a discussion of research (albeit limited) on the impact of study abroad on cultural identity while focusing on the importance of varying study abroad programs’ duration, destination, and type. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a review of research on how a specific cultural identity, American, is negotiated by U.S. students during and after their academic experience abroad.

Globalization, the Workforce, and Study Abroad

The twenty-first-century globalized world is one of increasing connectivity economically, politically, and socially (Steger, 2020). Globalization, with the increased technological and service-centered advancements, has led to a shift in the job market with employers seeking out recent

graduates with skills applicable to the twenty-first century. Using a three-domain framework proposed by the National Academy of Sciences (2012), Farrugia and Sanger (2017) clustered these skills in three competency domains: cognitive (e.g., cognitive strategies, knowledge, and creativity), intrapersonal (e.g., intellectual openness, work conscientiousness, and positive self-evaluation), and interpersonal (e.g., collaboration and leadership). They also demonstrated that these skills can be acquired through a study abroad experience. In a study conducted by the Institute for International Education, Farrugia and Sanger (2017) surveyed over 4,500 study abroad alumni who participated in study abroad between 1999–2000 and 2016–2017. Results of the survey showed that study abroad had an overall positive impact on the development of job skills for the twenty-first century across the three domains. Of the skills surveyed, the most significant developments were in intercultural skills, curiosity, flexibility and adaptability, confidence, self-awareness, interpersonal skills, communication, problem-solving, language, tolerance for ambiguity, and course or major-related knowledge. In addition to these skills, a general trend emerged in the survey findings that study abroad expands career possibilities as it gives students a broader understanding of what careers are available and the confidence to pursue them. This claim is further supported by another study conducted through the Institute for the International Education of Students (IES Abroad) that found that for American study abroad alumni (2012–2015), 93% of those who entered the workplace were employed within 6 months of graduation, and 89% were admitted into their first or second choice graduate or professional program (IES Abroad, 2015).

Since U.S. higher education institutions put a great deal of emphasis on preparing American students to secure jobs after graduation in order to be economically prosperous and successful, study abroad and its career benefits are becoming an increasingly common and important component of the higher education experience. Universities are increasing staffing and budgets for study abroad offices and programs of all types, duration, and location (e.g., Salisbury et al., 2009). Study abroad provider companies continue to grow and multiply and create new opportunities such as international internships and service-learning programs (Fisher, 2009). This increase is justified by the number

of students who participate in study abroad programs. For example, according to the Institute for International Education, in the 2018–2019 academic year 347,099 U.S. students earned academic credit abroad, up 1.6% from the year prior, and more than any other year in history (Martel et al., 2020). Not only has study abroad participation increased, but it is also becoming more diverse in program type and location. Students from all majors and minors are going abroad and to destinations all around the world. The data for the 2018–2019 academic year showed that while Europe still hosted 55.7% of all study abroad for academic credit, countries like China, Australia, Japan, and Costa Rica cracked the top 10 destinations for U.S. study abroad students (Martel et al., 2020). While the COVID-19 pandemic has stifled study abroad in the past two years due to health and safety concerns, the field remains optimistic that participation rates will continue to climb once borders begin to reopen (DiGiovine & Bodinger de Uriarte, 2020). As an increasing number of university students venture overseas for academic experiences, understanding the impacts above and beyond academic and career development is essential.

Emerging Adulthood¹ and Identity

Students often return home from a study abroad experience claiming that their time abroad was “life-changing.” While abroad, students are thrust into a new environment where their identity is destabilized, due to their cultural identities being challenged given exposure to a different way of being (Kinginger, 2013). This destabilization has the potential to push students to reconsider their own values and beliefs, renegotiate identities, and see themselves as national and global actors (Dolby, 2004). Examining identity development and study abroad is especially interesting given the average age and period of life that American university students occupy. Ranging on average between 18 to 22 years old, most

¹ Although we are using the term emerging adulthood, which was coined by Arnett (2000) to indicate a specific developmental stage, we are aware of Côté's (2014) criticisms of the term, and thus we are using it here descriptively to designate a transitional phase and not a life-stage.

university students have left home, are not married, do not have children, and do not have career jobs until at least their late twenties. They are at a transitional period in life with the freedom to explore different options, but the unsettled feeling of not knowing where this exploration will lead them (Arnett, 2014). These students are not adolescents, as they are often freer from parental control, nor young adults as they are usually unmarried and without children. Thus, they fall into a transitional phase that Arnett (2000) calls emerging adulthood. According to Arnett, emerging adulthood, which spans 18 to 25 years of age, has materialized in the United States due to the increase in length and spread of education, later age of marriage and parenthood, and a longer period before finding a stable career job. Emerging adulthood is not universal in young people's experiences during that period and will vary greatly across national, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts. Although previous work on identity development (Erikson, 1950) has argued that identity exploration and formation happens during adolescence, research shows that many adolescents have not yet solidified their set of particular beliefs and behaviors (Arnett, 2000; Côté, 2000). While not tied to parents and adult responsibilities, emerging adults have the time and space necessary to try out different ways of living. Their identities are still quite fragile and malleable. The experiences during emerging adulthood are key to identity development and the eventual maturity and understanding of individuals' belief systems and behaviors (Arnett, 2014).

Study Abroad and Cultural Identity

During emerging adulthood, study abroad students experience new cultures that can begin to challenge their current cultural identity. Forming a cultural identity involves adopting the beliefs and practices of one or more cultural communities and making choices about the culture with which one identifies (Jensen, 2003). Schwartz et al. (2008) argue that cultural identity focuses on three aspects: "cultural values and practices, the ways in which one regards the ethnic or cultural groups to which one belongs, and relative prioritization of the individual and of the group" (p. 636), and as such answers the question of who one is

as a member of their cultural group. Before the rapid interconnecting of cultures, economies, and politics around the world, cultural identities for many were relatively simple. Children were born into a culture, grew up in that culture, and learned the ways and basis of living according to that culture (Jensen et al., 2011). However, due to globalization, many individuals have a foot in more than one cultural space (Arnett, 2002). These cultural spaces often have separate or even contradictory values regarding life domains (Jensen et al., 2011). This allows emerging adults an opportunity to choose from a variety of potential cultural identities. Different lines of theorizing and research have explored the process through which adolescents and emerging adults form and negotiate their cultural identities. Some theorists have adapted John Berry's (1997) acculturation immigrant strategies and applied them to negotiations of local and global identities (Arnett, 2002; Jensen & Arnett, 2012; Jensen et al., 2011). Others have argued that young adults engage in multicultural acculturation, where they are negotiating or taking cultural elements from more than two cultural spaces (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2017; Ozer & Schwartz, 2016). The rise of intersectional theorizing also supports a multidimensional identity negotiation rather than a bidimensional one.

Encountering new worldviews and experiencing new cultures can lead to intercultural dialogues and learning experiences, but can also be challenging and surprising at times. Depending on their individual situation, some students will reject the new culture while others will navigate or accept it. Berry's (1997) model of adaptation to immigration can be applied to study abroad psychological adjustment. Berry (1997) proposed four possible patterns of acculturation : assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization. Reconceptualizing these acculturation patterns with regard to cultural identity formation in the context of study abroad can help understand how cultural identities may develop in study abroad students. Students who assimilate will reject their local culture and embrace the new one. Students in this pattern are the most likely to create an entirely new cultural identity. Students falling into the separation pattern will hold to their local culture and reject the adoption of the new culture. Oftentimes these students will socialize only with other study abroad students rather than explore and familiarize themselves with members of the host culture . Integration

will find students who merge together elements of the local and the new culture. Students in this pattern will often find themselves identifying as bicultural. Lastly, marginalization is when students have little interest in maintaining their local culture but also reject or are rejected by the new culture. Depending on where a student falls in line with these acculturation patterns, they may begin to view their cultural identity differently. Some students may find themselves feeling a greater sense of their national identity while others may begin to feel like they belong to the wider world.

Although in theory this reconceptualization makes sense, it brings multiple questions to the forefront. One question is whether the cultural negotiations are occurring between their local and the new host culture, or between their local and a global culture? For example, is an American study abroad student in France going to assimilate to French culture, or to a global culture, which incorporates both American and French elements? A second question is how feasible are some of the acculturation strategies? While separation and integration might be realistic strategies, assimilation appears to be less so. One reason for that is related to the third question: Does the relatively short amount of time that one spends abroad (in comparison to a permanent move) allow for acculturation to occur?

Because of similar questions the term “sojourner adjustment” has been applied in the literature to address populations that interacted with foreign environments in a shorter time span (Pedersen et al., 2011). Pedersen et al. (2011) argue that full acculturation cannot occur due to both limited exposure and lack of perceived importance of integrating into the host culture. Sojourner adjustment is defined as “the psychological adjustment of relatively short-term visitors to new cultures where permanent settlement is not the purpose of the sojourn” (Church, 1982, p. 540). Research on the relationship between sojourner adjustment and cultural identity has demonstrated that one’s cultural identity can impact sociocultural adjustment to the host culture. For example, research on New Zealand civil servants serving in other countries (Ward & Kennedy, 1994), Filipina domestic workers in Singapore (Ward et al., 1999), and foreign nationals residing in Nepal (Ward & Rana-Deuba, 2000), have

shown that stronger cultural identity was associated with psychological well-being, but identification with the host culture was unrelated to sociocultural adjustment. More interestingly, and applicable to the content of the current chapter, is the expressed level of some study abroad participants' cultural identity difficulty upon re-entry into the original culture (for a review see Ward et al., 2020). Confusion about cultural identity upon re-entry does support the idea that being abroad would impact one's perception of who they are.

Study Abroad and Cultural Competencies

While students in today's society seldom grow up without exposure to more than one culture through the globalization of social media and technology, engaging a new culture in person is a different experience. Several studies have demonstrated the effects of study abroad (in comparison with in-home learning) on cultural competencies. For example, Ball et al. (2012) found that engineering students who participated in study abroad versus students who participated in global virtual teams (GV), which relied on internet-based communication, scored higher on multiple global competencies than the GV students. Although globally infused in-home programs and classes increase intercultural competencies (Soria & Torsi, 2014), study abroad allows students to go beyond these competencies and impact their cultural identity. For example, Angulo (2008), in a longitudinal study, examined whether students who study abroad experience changes in their identities, beliefs, and feelings, and what personal, situational factors, and living arrangements would predict change. The researcher compared the University of Texas, Austin students who did a semester-long study abroad with an at-home group. The results indicated that the study abroad participants showed higher worldliness and marginally higher self-liking (which were the operational variables capturing identity). While identification with the host country and the United States did not change, ethnocentrism increased across time. Some of the changes in these variables were predicted by personal and situational factors. What this study reveals is that changes in identity can occur as a function of study abroad and that the interacting

factors contributing to that change provide a rather complex picture. In another study, DiFrancesco et al. (2019) asked students who completed a week-long study abroad with a service-learning component to reflect on their own identity as a result of the experience. Students indicated that they were more aware of multiple identities after their experience abroad. Maharaja (2018) examined changes in personal development, along with perceptions of the native and host cultures, in American study abroad students. All students participated in a semester-long program in both English and non-English speaking countries. In terms of personal development, 65% of students indicated that they became more independent as a function of the program; 58% reported developing higher levels of self-confidence; 72% said that they became more open-minded; and many students also reported exposure and learning of new things, leading to the development of different perspectives.

Study Abroad Programs

As mentioned before, students going abroad are thrust into a transnational consciousness which is “essentially composed of an awareness of multi-locality and an abstract awareness of one’s self” (Gu, 2015, p. 65). Even though study abroad is temporary, the immersive experience influences one’s cultural identity through exposure to a new worldview (Kinging, 2013). While certainly affected by the international experience, the experiences and the outcomes associated with study abroad will not be universal for all participants. Because study abroad programs vary by duration, depth, and destination of program, these differences can result in differential outcomes.

Before reviewing the empirical evidence on outcomes related to study abroad programs, the question of how one measures cultural identity and perceived changes to it needs to be addressed. Multiple scales have been utilized to measure cultural identity (see Science.gov topic cultural identity scales), and their dimensions vary as a function of the context and the population studied. In regard to cultural identity negotiations between different cultural streams, one of the most popular measures has been in regard to acculturation. In regard to both of these types

of measures (cultural identity and acculturation), one of the issues that emerges is that the majority of them are directed toward a specific group, predominantly various ethnic groups in the United States (Celenk & Van de Vijver, 2011). Research on study abroad predominantly measures the development of various competencies rather than identity changes. Some researchers make a distinction between the two, such as identity is seen as a sense of self, while a competency is seen as an ability that enables people to perform specific roles, complete tasks, or achieve specific objectives (Jarvis-Selinger et al., 2012). However, other research on identity demonstrates that competencies are interrelated with identity, because they can predict one's level of identification. For example, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller's (2013) model of global citizenship identification demonstrates that global awareness, which has been conceptualized as a competency in the study abroad literature, predicts identification with global citizens. Similarly, identity in some study abroad research has been operationalized through competencies (e.g., worldliness; Angulo, 2008). Thus, in the present review of the outcomes of the different types of study abroad programs, we have included both.

Program Duration

One way in which study abroad programs vary is duration. Study abroad programs typically range in length from one week to one academic year. In the past, study abroad was the traditional “junior year abroad” model, but now, short-term education abroad programs, ranging from a week long to less than eight weeks long, have increased in popularity (Donnelly-Smith, 2009). In fact, in the 2018–2019 academic year, 64.9% of all American study abroad students participated in a short-term program (eight weeks or less), 32.9% in a mid-length program (one semester, or one or two quarters), and 2.2% in a long-term program (academic or calendar year) (Martel et al., 2020).

Research on outcomes associated with short-term, mid-length, and long-term programs has shown interesting patterns. Students who study abroad in mid-length and long-term programs are likely to have a more similar experience than those in short-term programs. In fact, DeLoach

et al. (2021) conducted a longitudinal study across 80 study abroad programs from a single institution that measured global awareness pre- and post-abroad experience. Besides program length, the researchers also measured depth of programs, as related to genre, destination (English or non-English speaking country), common or uncommon destination, and type of program (island or non-island) (see the section on program type for more information on program depth). The researchers found that the duration of the program impacted students' global awareness, such that longer duration was associated with significant changes in intercultural awareness, for programs without depth. Interestingly, across some global awareness dimensions shorter programs with depth had a similar impact on students as longer programs. Antanakopoulpu (2013), in a study of two groups of American students studying in Greece (one group for four weeks and one group for a full semester), found that both short-term and mid-length study abroad students scored high in sociocultural adaptation on the Sociocultural Adaptation Scale. Medina-López-Portillo (2004) measured intercultural sensitivity, defined as "the worldview that establishes the way that he or she experiences or processes cultural differences" (p. 180), of American students who studied abroad in Mexico. One group did a seven-week and the other a sixteen-week program. The results showed that the participants in the longer program developed greater intercultural sensitivity in comparison with those in the shorter program. The researcher also conducted interviews and counterintuitively found that students in the shorter program showed more evidence of a change in their perceptions of their cultural identity before and after the program than students in the longer program. The explanation provided was that students who participated in the longer program already had strongly defined cultural identity prior to the program, which was not the case for the shorter term group.

Dwyer (2004) surveyed over 3,000 alumni who studied with the Institute for the International Education of Students (IES) for varying term lengths between the academic years of 1950–1951 and 1999–2000. One of the goals of the study was to measure the longitudinal correlation between the length of the study abroad and a variety of student outcomes, including intercultural development and personal growth. The results showed that, regardless of program length, a high percentage

of participants indicated that the study abroad experience “helped them better understand own cultural values and biases” and “contributed to developing a more sophisticated way of looking at the world” (p. 158), though full-year participants indicated this at a higher level (99% and 85%, respectively). Similar findings, with highest percentages for the full year participation, were indicated for personal growth items, such as increased maturity, lasting impact on worldviews, tolerating ambiguity, et cetera. However, some of the data also revealed that in some categories, summer abroad students were as, or even more likely, to benefit from the experience than one-semester students. The author’s explanation for this finding is that the key for successful short-term programs is well-developed pedagogical planning and resources.

Overall, although programs of all durations have a positive impact on student growth, when the programs are not carefully planned, longer duration appears to be more beneficial. One reason for that could be that prolonged exposure has a more profound effect, which, however, could be achieved in a shorter amount of time with in-depth planning around concrete learning objectives. Another reason could be due to the fact that many students who chose the longer programs are self-selecting (Dwyer, 2004) and they may already have higher levels of competencies that are associated with study abroad (e.g., global awareness, cultural sensitivity, etc.). While this is the case, program destination and type also play an important role in the level of associated student growth, as program length is not the only indicator of cultural identity growth.

Program Destination

Another way programs vary is in destination. In the 2018–2019 academic year, American students ventured to 194 countries and territories on all seven continents (Martel et al., 2020). Since the inception of study abroad, the most traditional destination for American students has been Europe (Wells, 2006). In recent years, however, there has been an increase in interest in nontraditional destinations. Wells (2006) defines nontraditional destinations as a country that has had

few American students studying there previously, summarizing classifications of such destinations by others as “non-industrial, third-world, or developing-countries” (p. 114). Wells refers to these nontraditional study destinations as those in Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East. In order to avoid value-laden descriptions of countries (e.g., third-world, developing, etc.) we use Wells’ (2006) label of nontraditional destinations.

Given varying cultural differences in countries around the world, students will have unique experiences. For example, an American student in Ireland is going to have a drastically different experience than an American student in Vietnam. Food, language, traditions, holidays, and religions are just a few of the many ways that countries around the world differ from one another and the United States. As such, cultural identity development will vary from student to student based on the destination of choice. Students going to an English-speaking destination may be able to communicate with locals and feel less culture shock than those going to a destination where they do not know the language. Additionally, students who go to countries that they have studied in the past or have a shared heritage may feel more of a connection with the culture than those who do not. However, some research suggests that study abroad in nontraditional destinations has more profound personal development benefits than in traditional countries. For example, Thompson et al. (2000) examined the experiences of North Ireland nursing study abroad students who traveled to both traditional and nontraditional destinations. The results showed that students who visited nontraditional countries reported more gains in terms of international perspectives (e.g., evaluation of world issues), personal (e.g., awareness of their own culture, tolerance of others), and intellectual development. Similarly, Cook (2004) found that students who traveled to Eastern Europe and Latin America expressed higher program satisfaction and personal growth in comparison to other regions. However, another study examining the development of cultural consciousness of American nursing students who participated in study abroad either in the Netherlands or Bangladesh, revealed that regardless of destination, students did experience an overall increase in cultural consciousness (Maltby et al., 2016).

Wells (2006), after acknowledging that there is no sufficient research on the impact of nontraditional study abroad destinations, discussed some of the purported goals of study abroad and the potential effect of the nontraditional destinations on these goals. One of the objectives is related to the development of personal growth, global citizenship, and transnational competence of students. Nontraditional locations would be more beneficial to this objective than traditional ones because they allow for greater flexibility, problem-solving skills, and a greater challenge to one's beliefs, values, and opinions. Furthermore, because the likelihood of encountering and experiencing global issues and problems is higher in nontraditional destinations, studying in these destinations could lead to better intercultural competence and higher global awareness. Davis and Knight's (2021) findings provide mixed support for Wells' (2006) suppositions. Davis and Knight (2021) examined the influences of seven international destinations of a common global program, on students' experiences and outcomes. The authors investigated this via analyses of students' journals while studying abroad. The researchers grouped the destinations into three tracks based on the cultural distance between the international destination and the United States. The journal coding yielded several dimensions with three—knowledge, identity, and affect—having the most variability between the three tracks. The high cultural distance tracks had the most knowledge codes and the low cultural distance track had the fewest. In contrast to knowledge, the identity dimensions had a negative relationship with cultural distance, such that the high cultural distance track had the lowest numbers of identity codes. Although some journals discussed cultural identity, the majority of identity mentions were in regard to engineering identity, which was the specialty of the students participating in the global program.

Overall, research on study abroad destinations is rather limited and deductive in nature. More research is needed on study abroad outcomes based on destination, especially between those highly visited and those more “off the beaten track” for study abroad students. However, it appears that destinations that are more culturally divergent from the native culture have more profound effects, either positive or negative, in that they can challenge one's cultural identity in deeper ways due to

increased cultural differences in language, food, religion, social norms, et cetera.

Program Type

A third way programs can vary is in type, defined by the learning context. Norris and Dwyer (2005) argue that these programs can be seen as a continuum. On one end of the continuum are programs that are fully immersive, and students are directly enrolled in the international institution. Norris and Dwyer (2005) emphasize that these programs do not provide extensive orientation for the study abroad students and any support services are provided through the host university. On the other end of the spectrum are programs that operate like an “island” and take American students overseas to an American study center with American faculty members. Island programs often limit interaction with local students and citizens. They require additional programming and effort to ensure effective host country interaction. In the middle of the continuum are programs labeled as “hybrid” “for which the home institutions offer support and services and which encourage students to take coursework offered by the program as well as courses taught by host-country faculty at the local university” (Norris & Dwyer, 2005, p. 122).

In addition to traditional study abroad programs, there are service-learning programs, internships abroad, and student teaching opportunities in certain instances. Students participating in programs will also have varying types of accommodations. Some students may live with a host family, some with other international students in dormitories, and others in apartments with other American study abroad students. The amount of cultural adjustment needed for each program type and living situation varies drastically and can have an impact on the amount of cultural identity growth that is possible over time. For example, Norris and Dwyer (2005) conducted a comparison analysis among hybrid programs (combined some features of island programs and direct enrollment programs) and fully immersive programs. In terms of cultural and personal development, the results showed that participants in the hybrid programs expressed greater interest in the host

culture, while the fully immersive had stronger ties with people from the host country and were more likely to maintain contact with them. Participants in the hybrid programs also expressed higher interest for another language and culture in comparison with the fully immersive ones. However, the majority of items related to cultural and personal development (e.g., a better understanding of one's own cultural values and biases, increased maturity, learning something new about the self, etc.) although not statistically different between types of programs were highly rated by participants in both types of programs. Pederson (2009) studied a year-long island study abroad program, with intercultural pedagogy intervention in Birmingham, England, with American students. Students' intercultural development was measured pre-departure and one month after the completion of the program. The researcher added two comparison groups: students who studied in England in the same year but did not receive the intercultural pedagogy intervention, and students who studied at home but were registered for study abroad for the upcoming year. The results indicated that the year-long study abroad program with the implemented intercultural pedagogy resulted in the most overall change in intercultural development in comparison with the other two groups.

What these studies reveal is that specific outcomes come not so much from the type of program, but how these programs are executed. While some direct enrollment programs do not include a comprehensive orientation upon arrival, others do, and some "island" programs allow for cultural immersion while others prevent full cultural interaction through structured daily itineraries. It is also important to note that home university preparation prior to departure plays an integral role in potential intercultural development of students while abroad on any type of program. In sum, intentional and carefully planned pedagogical features are more important than the specific type of program.

American Identity Salience

In recent years a major emphasis in education has been on global citizenship education. Even international organizations such as UNESCO and

The United Nations have highlighted the relevance of global citizenship education in terms of transforming the world by moving beyond knowledge development to the development of competencies and skills that are useful for the globalized world. Study abroad has been seen as a major component to the development of global citizenship and its associated skills and competencies (see Lewin, 2010). Although this is an important area of research, less empirical attention has been paid to how study abroad programs impact local cultural identities. Thus, the remainder of this chapter reviews research on how a specific cultural identity, American, is being negotiated by U.S. students during and after a study abroad experience.

When studying abroad, American students have the opportunity to see America and American culture through a new perspective. Seeing their home nation in a new light allows students to reformulate opinions on their own American identity, or outlook on America and where they see themselves in relation. As Dolby (2004) claims, “American national identity is neither simply discarded nor strengthened, but it is riddled with contradictions, as it is actively encountered and constructed outside of the physical borders of the United States” (p. 151). Dolby (2004) argues that national identity in the global context shifts from passive to active and American identity increases as students are in a cultural context that makes them feel like the “other.” Study abroad students are cross-examining their home country for potentially the first time. In a comparative study of university students from the United States studying abroad and students from a university in the Western United States that stayed home, Savicki and Cooley (2011) found that while the homegroup did not explore their American identity and were highly committed to it without much questioning, the study abroad group showed a similar commitment but also an increased exploration of their American identity. Part of study abroad students’ identities are rooted in how they define themselves in relation to this exploration and their sense of belonging to, and preference for their home country (Savicki & Cooley, 2011). Many students when they arrive abroad quickly realize that the United States is perceived differently in various parts of the world. How U.S. study abroad students view and see American history,

culture, and politics from the inside can drastically differ from how people see it on the outside.

Some study abroad destinations may be pro-American and place students on a pedestal, while other destinations may not favor Americans and students may for the first time feel like outsiders. One American student studying abroad in Australia commented that their study abroad group was often teased for being American, and it was one of the first times in their lives when they felt cast as the “other” (Dolby, 2004). That student recalled that “the tour bus drivers would make some comments about Americans on the sly. Or we’d pull up to a McDonald’s and they’d be, like, oh the American embassy. We’re, like, what are you guys talking about” (Dolby, 2004, p. 165). Another student mentioned that it was frustrating that in some cases Australians knew more about the United States than they did. It was through experiences like these that the students in Australia realized that their national identity is not just created in the United States, but people around the world have an impact on what defines an American (Dolby, 2004). While these students realized for the first time how their own identity is constructed by many, they also felt a stronger sense of their American identity as they often felt they had to defend their home nation from stereotypes and constant teasing (Dolby, 2004).

The sociopolitical climate of the study abroad experience has the potential to exacerbate American identity salience while abroad, especially if the experience is during a major political event or national crisis. During the 2016 presidential election, students studying abroad had to not only navigate a new cultural environment, but also how to talk about their home culture and nation in relation to the election. One of the most intense elections in recent history, 2016 pitted the potential first woman president—Hilary Clinton—and a career businessman—Donald Trump—against each other. During this time, students had the increased stress of navigating perceptions of the election as an American abroad. One study abroad student mentioned, “stereotypes of Americans were common, but most prominent was conversation around U.S. politics.... The main question I get asked is about what I think about Trump” (Sturm, 2017). Goldstein (2017), using the framework of stereotype threat, investigated U.S. study abroad students’ reactions to being targets

of American stereotypes. Stereotype threat “occurs when one expects to be judged negatively based on stereotypes of one’s social group and when one feels at risk of confirming these stereotypes” (p. 94). Goldstein (2017) measured predictors and responses to stereotype threat. Of the several hypothesized predictors only gender, exposure to Trump-related stereotypes, and motivational cultural intelligence were significant predictors. Of note, the level of national identification prior to the study abroad was not a significant predictor of stereotype threat. Depending on the level of stereotype threat, students engaged in different responsive strategies. The most common strategy for those experiencing stereotype threat was to show a decrease in national identity and even alter their appearance and behavior to appear less American. Although students who experienced stereotype threat were less likely to engage in conversations about positive or negative aspects of the United States, students who did not feel as much threat found themselves discussing positive aspects of the United States with members of the host culture. One student mentioned, “I think America is an amazing place and I do not understand why people are not proud of being from America... so when America, or where I come from comes up, I will talk very highly of it because I am proud” (p. 104). A similar pattern was observed following the 9/11 attacks. Students, even supporters of the Bush administration, felt discomfort abroad when confronted by the many questions about the U.S. government’s actions following the event (Sato, 2009). At the same time, they intensely identified as American given the nation’s patriotic response to the tragedy.

Further, American identity salience abroad can be impacted by heritage. Heritage can be defined as “any ancestral connections to [students] based on language, ancestry, race, or any other identities significant to them” (Naddaf et al., 2020, p. 252). In a study of eight heritage seeking study abroad alumni from a large public four-year university in the Midwestern United States, Naddaf et al. (2020) found that while heritage seekers felt a connection to their heritage identity while abroad, many recognized the strength of their American identity as well. Naddaf et al. (2020) observed that the most prominent factors in American identity salience in these eight students abroad were language barriers, feeling foreign, and historical influences. When

discussing language barriers, one student commented, “When I would open my mouth, that’s when it was given away. Like, Oh, you are not Italian, and you never will be” (p. 255). Another student commented similarly that “I look very German, appearance wise. Until I spoke, I fit in. Nobody noticed that I was an American until I was like “Oh hi! You could see their perceptions change” (p. 255). While language proficiency, a familiarity with the culture, a sense of belonging, the ability to navigate the culture, and family influence led these eight students to feel a heritage identity salience, negative interactions with locals, peers, or professors led to a stronger American identity salience and less of a connection with their host community (Naddaf et al., 2020). Block (2007) and Moreno (2009) bolster the claim that negative experiences with the host culture may lead to students strengthening their American identities. When study abroad students face challenges abroad they often retreat to the cultural norms of their home country and spend time with their American study abroad friends instead of locals (Block, 2007; Naddaf et al., 2020). While distinct for every study abroad student, understanding and shaping their American identity is an important part of the intercultural experience.

What research on American identity salience during and after study abroad shows is the impact depends on several factors, associated with individual student characteristics, destination’s conceptualizations of American, and the sociopolitical climate in the United States during the study abroad experience. Individual characteristics that lead to stereotype threats such as gender, and exposure to Trump-related stereotypes (during the 2016 election process), as well as one’s heritage culture and ability to speak the heritage language, impacted levels of American identification. Likewise, whether the study abroad destination has more positive or negative perceptions about the United States has an effect on one’s national identification, leading to increase in spaces in which students felt the need to defend it. Lastly, the U.S. sociopolitical events at the time of the study abroad experience impacted the ways in which members of the host culture interacted with the students, (e.g., students being constantly asked what they think about Trump during the 2016 election process) and increased their level of stereotype threat, therefore influencing their levels of American national identification.

Conclusion

Since the inception of study abroad for college students in 1923, when eight young men from the University of Delaware studied in Paris (Angulo, 2008), programs and destinations have proliferated throughout the years, amounting to close to 350,000 U.S. students in the 2018–2019 academic year earning academic credit abroad (Martel et al., 2020). Research on study abroad began in the 1960s with the initial goal of examining changes in study abroad students (Coelho, 1962). Since then research on study abroad has become relatively comprehensive and interdisciplinary, investigating a range of questions, with one of the most common ones related to personal growth (Angulo, 2008).

Personal growth, especially in the age of contemporary globalization, can have a variety of dimensions, ranging from cultural competencies and desirable skills for the workplace, to finding one's passion and understanding of who they are as a person. Although research in study abroad has concentrated on the former, there is some research that points out the ways in which one's cultural identity development can be impacted by study abroad. In the chapter, we have attempted to review the scholarship that demonstrates the impact of study abroad on identity development. In the process of doing so, there are several trends in the literature that stood out. First, much of the literature concentrates on U.S. study abroad students. Although this is not surprising given the high number of U.S. college students participating in study abroad programs (see Martel et al., 2020), according to the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China (2020), in 2019 the total number of Chinese nationals studying overseas was 703,500. While this is twice the amount of Chinese students studying abroad, a quick google scholar search reveals 2.44 times more articles about American study abroad students than Chinese. Second, despite the interdisciplinary nature of study abroad literature, there is a lack of measures directly assessing identity change. One of the difficulties that this presents is that other measures are used as proxies (e.g., development of competencies), and although they are related to identity, in that they can predict identity identification, there is little consensus on whether identity and competencies are distinct aspects of the self. Lastly, because of the heavy emphasis on global citizenship education in

recent years, study abroad has been seen as a major component of the development of global citizenship (e.g., Lewin, 2010). As such, much research has been focused on study abroad programs that can develop and produce global citizenship outcomes. While this is a timely and important area of research, with the recent global shifts in increased nationalism (Bieber, 2018), more research is needed on how national identity is impacted by study abroad.

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12

The Impact of Globalization on How We Learn: Global Citizenship Education as a Transformative Learning Approach Towards Global Identities

Nadine Etzkorn  and Gerhard Reese 

Globalization has a tremendous impact on our societies. It affects every single aspect of our everyday lives, from food intake, choice of clothing or working place, to smartphone use, or political responses to a global pandemic. Processes of globalization have changed the contexts in which we have lived over the last decades and thereby altered how we feel about ourselves and others (Reese et al., 2019). Ultimately, it has led to transformations of our identities (Arnett, 2002). At the same time, globalization is inextricably linked to global sustainability challenges, issues of global inequality, and contested democracy in Europe and various other

N. Etzkorn (✉)

University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany
e-mail: nadine.etzkorn@uni-bielefeld.de

G. Reese

University of Koblenz-Landau, Landau, Germany

parts of the world (e.g., Rosenmann et al., 2016). Against this background, we deem it vital to understand the educational contexts in which people become socialized in a globally connected world.

In this contribution, we focus on the meaning of international experiences for students, taking the example of student mobility, as a learning field of global citizenship. We argue that studying abroad can foster global citizenship by engaging learners in the complexities and challenges of pressing global issues and thereby nurture learners' capacity to take part in globally responsible action. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a new theoretical perspective on the process of global citizen learning in study abroad stays through bringing together educational and psychological research on global citizenship. We begin with a general introduction to the interlinkages between globalization, decolonization, and internationalization of higher education, followed by the educational concept of GCE, which we unfold in its potential to repurpose current mobility practices. Then, we review studies that have investigated the relationship between student mobility and global citizenship. Next, we introduce social identity theory and the importance of international contact in the development of a global identity. We continue by applying transformative learning theory to theorize the process of global citizen learning in study abroad programs. Finally, we combine social identity theory and Mezirow's (2009) theory of transformative learning to gain new insights into the meaning of international experiences in the context of global citizenship. In the end, we make suggestions for future work in this field of research.

Globalization, Decolonization, and Higher Education Transformation

Universities play a crucial role in offering an international, inclusive, and transformative higher education to empower, engage, and educate learners to act for a more just and sustainable world. In our understanding, universities can only fulfil this responsibility if they recognize their ongoing role in the reproduction of colonial and racial structures.

Decolonizing the university has multiple facets but “[s]ubstantive decolonization must have as one of its pillars the transformation of universities into spaces that actively foster and acknowledge epistemological diversity” (Dawson, 2020, p. 85). In the last years, the process of decolonizing universities has started to gain momentum (Bhambra et al., 2018; Jansen, 2019; Mbembe, 2016). In the context of the internationalization of higher education, this means to decolonize the curriculum (e.g., Meda, 2020), the pedagogies (e.g., Laing, 2021), and study abroad programs (e.g., Moreno, 2021).

There are critical voices questioning the value and meaning of current internationalization practices for a decolonial future of universities. For instance, Pashby and Andreotti (2016) have investigated the discursive orientation of internationalization documents of higher education. They found that these internationalization documents are placed within a modern-colonial imaginary that aligns with the global expansion of capitalism. Furthermore, the neoliberal orientation of internationalization practices acts in the cloak of international development and sustainability efforts and thus conceals the questioning of the aim of internationalization practices (Pashby & Andreotti, 2016). The way in which internationalization is practised at many universities is still linked to the rationale of developing human capital, competencies for innovation, leadership, and entrepreneurship in the global markets, but less to solidarity, anti-racism, and global social justice (Stein et al., 2016). Thus, Stein et al. (2016) argue for an anti-oppressive approach to internationalization that includes feminist, anti-capitalist, anti-colonial, anti-imperial, and anti-racist perspectives that aim at systemic change towards greater social justice. These changes require a deep questioning of the methodological (shift the means of the task or goal of internationalization—doing things differently), epistemological (consider the intended outcomes of internationalization—thinking about things differently), and ontological (shifting people’s sense of global interdependency—being different) layers (Stein, 2019). Against this background, universities have started to reorientate their internationalization strategies through, for instance, paying more attention to the qualitative dimension of internationalization such as global citizenship development (de Wit & Altbach, 2021).

One approach to transformative higher education can be found in the concept of Global Citizenship Education (GCE). International organizations such as UNESCO (2014) set GCE on their political agenda and emphasize the role of GCE “in moving beyond the development of knowledge and cognitive skills to build values, soft skills and attitudes among learners that can facilitate international cooperation and promote social transformation” (p. 9). Also, the UN highlights the relevance of global citizenship to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in its 2030 Agenda “Transforming our World” which was adopted in September 2015 by the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. The SDGs are the heart of the Agenda and outline a transformative and comprehensive framework for government, private and civil society actors to promote sustainable development. The SDGs address goals that are intended to ensure a sustainable, peaceful, prosperous, and just life for current and future generations. These include among others poverty (SDG #1) and hunger reduction (#2), good health and well-being (#3), quality education (#4), gender equality (#5), climate action (#13), peace, justice, and strong institutions (#16) (UN, 2015).

In particular SDG #4 Target 4.7 calls on all learners to acquire knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and the appreciation of cultural diversity and of cultures contribution to sustainable development by 2030 (UNESCO, 2016).

Global Citizenship Education as a Future Orientation of Internationalization Practices

The quest for students to become critical, active, and engaged global citizens draws attention to the field of global education. GCE has gained international attention and has become prominent in the discourse of governments, intergovernmental agencies (e.g., UNESCO), civil society organizations (e.g., Oxfam), and educational institutions. Setting GCE on the political agenda has led to multiple efforts to institutionalize

GCE in national educational contexts (e.g., Aktas et al., 2017). However, post- and decolonial scholars draw attention to the fact that colonialism continues to exist, and thus, educational concepts such as GCE that claim universal validity must critically examine whether they do (not) reproduce a certain Western idea of education. In the Latin American context, the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano (2000) developed the concept of coloniality of power to describe the structures of power, control, and hegemony that emerged during the modernist era. The coloniality of power has (1) produced racism, naturalized the introduction of “race” and cultural differences, and legitimized the racialized behaviour of colonizers, (2) made global capitalism possible and led to an unequal distribution of wealth, (3) fostered ethnocentrism, and is (4) expressed by the hegemony of subjectivity, culture, and the production of knowledge. The Argentinian literary scholar Walter D. Mignolo (2011) takes up Quijano’s thinking and argues that overcoming a Eurocentric knowledge perspective is a central element of decolonization. For Mignolo and Walsh (2018), a pluriversal society brings together “local histories, subjectivities, knowledges, narratives, and struggles against the modern/colonial order and for an otherwise” (p. 3).

Considering that many modern educational concepts are fuelled with Eurocentric perspectives, thereby reproducing colonial thought patterns that have led to global inequalities and crises, GCE scholars continue to develop a critical and decolonial global citizenship scholarship (for example see Abdi et al., 2015; Andreotti, 2006, 2011a, 2011b; Andreotti & de Souza, 2012; Stein et al., 2020). For example, Abdi (2015) argues for overcoming mono-locational and mono-epistemic constructions of global citizenship education (epistemic pluralism) and the co-construction of new possibilities of viable citizenships. In a similar vein, Andreotti and de Souza (2012) state that global ethnocentric hegemones are enacted in education “through initiatives that uncritically embrace the normative teleological project of Western/Enlightenment humanism, which is deeply invested in the production of rational unanimity and unequivocal knowledge regarding conceptualisations of humanity/human nature, progress and justice” (pp. 1–2). In terms of educational practice, Andreotti (2010) emphasizes the need to rethink structural frameworks for pedagogy and learning in education so that

both educators and learners can learn to critically engage with and be able to analyse the complexities, diversities, uncertainties, and inequalities of globalization and the multiple challenges humankind is facing today.

According to Stein (2020), one way to rethink structural frameworks for pedagogy and learning in Western higher education is to think about the current diagnosis of contemporary global challenges and to respond to specific approaches to global learning. Stein (2020) suggests three approaches to global citizenship: learning about difference, learning from difference, and being taught by difference. Concerning global citizenship, *learning about difference* is fuelled by the idea of solving global challenges with more sufficient knowledge, better information, or innovative technology. Thus, the aim is to educate global citizens who will take a position of leadership for the rest of the world and follow a path of universal progress. An approach to global citizenship based on *learning from difference* would appreciate shared qualities and differences to build mutual understanding and deepen relationships. Nevertheless, this approach has a bias towards seeing the world through a Eurocentric perspective. In contrast, *being taught by difference* opens up a way of developing global citizenship by being unsettled and transformed by difference. This approach to global citizenship

(...) faces the limits and harms of the promises of colonial modernity (including security, certainty, supremacy, autonomy and universality), and the colonial habits of knowing and being that they foster, and to encounter radically other ways of knowing, being and relating without trying to control the outcome of that encounter – that is, without projecting one's understandings, hopes and desires on to others and the world. (Stein, 2020, p. 71)

In particular, the last approach has implications for transformative learning processes as such an approach aims at challenging learners "onto-epistemological frames of colonial modernity" (Stein, 2020, p. 71). This approach can be understood as a pedagogical intervention that creates space for developing new modes of knowing, being and relating towards the self and others.

But what kinds of learning environments are appropriate or meaningful for learners to critically engage with global challenges and develop global identities? How can study abroad avoid being a neo-colonial activity that reaffirms “white subjectivities” (Heron, 2019, p. 4)?

The Potential of Student Mobility for Building Global Citizenship

Study abroad programs are increasingly expanded in higher education internationalization efforts. As noted in the literature, studying in a different cultural context can foster the development of varied student outcomes. There is a solid base of empirical evidence that reports about learning outcomes and settings of GCE in relation to study abroad experiences (for a review of GCE outcomes in higher education see Horey et al., 2018). For example, Killick (2012) examined outcomes of U.K. undergraduate students who participated in diverse international mobility activities such as a 2-week volunteering program, a single-semester study placement in Australia, or a full-year teaching program in Spanish universities. He found that relationships with significant others (not only those of the host culture) and international student communities were a driver for students learning about themselves, others, and the world, which he frames as an essential component of self-transformation processes. In another study, Wynveen et al. (2012) investigated students’ learning of global citizenship from U.S. universities participating in a 4-week study abroad program to either Australia or New Zealand. Results of the study suggest that the study abroad program had a positive impact on students’ pro-environmental behavior. In a more recent study, Blum (2020) explored what undergraduate students in an Arts and Sciences program in the United Kingdom, who studied abroad for a minimum of half a year in and outside of Europe, thought they had gained from studying abroad. Most of them described a greater understanding of themselves, a new understanding of a new/diverse culture, as well as a greater understanding of global issues/concerns. In terms of learning settings, Boni and Calabuig (2017) explored university students’ learning processes in three different learning spaces: electives devoted to

international cooperation, mobility programs in Latin American countries, and a student-led university group. In comparing the learning processes in these different learning spaces, the researchers concluded that strengthening the link between informal settings, formal curricular spaces, and international mobility supports student's self-transformation process. In particular, promoting dialogues, offering spaces for reflection on North–South interdependencies, and building agency among students before and after the mobility experience, can deepen students' learning processes.

However, there are also studies underlining the pitfalls of short-term study abroad programs that are intending to promote decolonial thinking. For example, Schulz and Agnew (2020) analysed the constructions of global citizenship of Australian undergraduate students who participated in a 4-week study abroad delivering sport development program (primarily cricket) to school-aged students in India. Schulz and Agnew (2020) pointed out that even if the Australian students were enthusiastic and well-intentioned about encountering people in India that they would likely not meet at home, they were broadly unaware of the consequences of their beliefs and practices. That has unintentionally led to Eurocentric constructions of global citizenship through modes of knowledge production and practices. The authors identified four discursive constructions of the white Self and how these identities produced knowledge:

'Coaches' tended to advance a paternalistic attitude that undermined their capacity to 'listen' (...). 'Travellers' were limited in their capacity to engage with different logics given the premium they placed on consuming cultural difference as commodity. 'Helpers' by and large conceptualised 'transformation' in terms of developing personal confidence or expanding empathy, which while laudable overdetermines divisions between benevolent West and needy East. (pp. 1175–1176)

Unlike the former three identities, the cricket "rockstars" construct themselves as normal white Aussies. These students were unaware of power relations and their own identity as raced, classed or gendered.

In a nutshell, it seems that although the study abroad programs differ in destination, length of the stay, discipline, and specific course objectives, the commonality of studying in another country lends itself to a unique learning environment for global citizenship as it surpasses traditional campus-based instruction. Being placed in a new social environment requires students to restructure or modify internal beliefs, norms, and values about the human–nature relationship (Tarrant, 2010). However, such programs can also lead to the reproduction of colonial structures and fail to transform Westernized identities into global identities.

The importance of international contact in these learning processes will be elaborated more in-depth next. To do so, we apply social identity theory and integrate current insights into the concept of global identity from a social psychology perspective.

International Contact and Global Citizenship Identification

Identity is a key concept in psychological research. It refers to the sense we have about our self, the sense of who we are. The social psychological perspective we adopt here distinguishes between a personal self that includes specific, idiosyncratic characteristics of a person, and a social self that is derived from a person's membership in social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The latter is also often referred to as social identity. According to the social identity approach, people can self-categorize on various levels of abstraction, from identifying with one's family or sports team up to identification with a country, a nation, or with the whole humanity. The concept addressing the latter level—a global identity—has long been neglected by social scientists. Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013) proposed a model of antecedents and outcomes of global citizenship identification. This model places a global identity into the core of global citizenship and links global identity to sustainability-oriented attitudes and behavior. The normative environment (e.g., friends, family, school) and global awareness (knowledge and interconnectedness with

others in the world) are the antecedents of global citizenship identification. Identification as a global citizen, in turn, predicts prosocial values such as intergroup empathy, social justice, valuing diversity, sustaining the environment, intergroup helping, and a responsibility to act.

The global citizenship identification model (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013) is in line with a social identity perspective on global identity that delineates how the content (in terms of values, norms, and beliefs) of this social category affects group members' behavior. In McFarland and colleagues' work (McFarland et al., 2012; for a review see McFarland et al., 2019) on identification with all humanity (IWAH), people who identify strongly with the superordinate group of all humans perceive other group members as part of one human family. Reese et al. (2015) differentiated between two underlying dimensions of IWAH—global self-definition and global self-investment. The former represents the sense of a cognitive, definitory self-categorization to the inclusive group of all humans (i.e., seeing all humanity as one family). The latter represents the content of caring and solidary helping with fellow humans (see also Reysen & Hackett, 2016).

The common core of these concepts can be subsumed within the social identity framework (Reicher et al., 2010). This framework describes conditions under which people identify with a specific group and the consequences that go along with group membership. In terms of social identity theory, ingroup identification is associated with commitment to one's group's goals and norms (Reicher et al., 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When one identifies with, for example, the Fridays for Future group, it is more likely that this person will act in line with the group's underlying norms (e.g., "we should decarbonize our lifestyle"). When people identify strongly with their ingroup "all humans", they should act in favor of all people within that group, in particular when corresponding norms or beliefs are activated (for a systematic model see Fritsche et al., 2018). While this sense of feeling like a global citizen is certainly a practical challenge (and a theoretical as well), there is some evidence demonstrating how to foster a global identity. This is probably one of the core challenges to a GCE approach, in particular in higher education internationalization.

One of the basic tenets of internationalization in higher education—the exchange of students—is one potential path to GCE. Exchange of students allows positive and goal-oriented contact, and literature on contact suggests that this may be key to sustainable and justice-oriented action. For example, Röpcke and colleagues (2019) tested in a series of studies whether international contact (i.e., contact with a person from a different cultural background) increased global identity. In their studies, students participated in an online chat with a partner and were asked to solve a problem together. Subsequently, global identity was measured. As expected, people who engaged in a common task with a partner from a different cultural background were more likely to show increased global identity compared to those in the no-contact control group. Röpcke and colleagues (2019) argue that cooperative contact with people from other national or cultural backgrounds result in a shift of perception from “us vs. them” to an inclusive “we”. Such an inclusive recategorization should then result in equal treatment of the former outgroup members (but see Reese et al., [2012, 2016] for potential perils of a human superordinate group). A single experiment by Reese et al. (2015) further suggests that merely depicting internationalism—through posters depicting many different flags or a globe held by differently colored hands—could also increase global identity.

Besides these antecedents of global identity, there is also a growing body of evidence suggesting that self-categorizing as a global citizen is associated with stronger pro-social and pro-environmental beliefs and values. They also have stronger behavioral intentions in favor of disadvantaged groups and the environment (for example see Loy et al., 2021; Reese & Kohlmann, 2015; Reese et al., 2014; Röpcke et al., 2019), pointing to the idea that global citizen education may indeed foster such sustainable actions.

Transformative learning theory (Mezirow, 1978, 2000) opens up an educational theoretical perspective on how international students make sense of their study abroad experiences to better understand the longer-lasting impacts of such endeavors on the development of global citizenship.

Transformative Learning Theory and International Experiences in Study Abroad

Several authors have already argued for fostering global citizenship through transformational learning processes in study abroad stays, but very few studies have explored the links between the study abroad experiences and the transformation of frames of references underpinning transformative learning theory (e.g., Killick, 2013; Lilley et al., 2015). Jack Mezirow was one of the pioneers working on a theory of transformative learning in adulthood education (Mezirow, 1978, 1991, 2000). For Mezirow (2003) “Transformative learning is learning that transforms problematic frames of reference—sets of fixed assumptions and expectations (habits of mind, meaning perspectives, mindsets)—to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, reflective, and emotionally able to change” (pp. 58–59). Mezirow (2012) states that the justification of one’s knowledge, beliefs, values, and feelings are related to their biographical, historical, and cultural context. Learning does not necessarily lead to transformations of one’s existing frames of reference, but it can lead to transformations when they are becoming critically reflective of their assumptions and in what contexts these assumptions are placed.

When applied to GCE, the goal of transformative learning is to empower students to move from perspectives that have allowed the formation of global ethnocentric hegemonies and continuing (colonial) power relations generated through Westernized knowledge production (Andreotti & de Souza, 2012), to the creation of new meaning perspectives. Thus, study abroad experience is about renegotiating students’ perceptions of the world and thereby their own and other peoples’ identity constructions. To understand the meaning of experience and to be able to develop new perspectives, one has to be a part of an active dialogue with others (Mezirow, 2000). Study abroad students are often part of these discursive spaces as they enter in dialogue with locals, other exchange students, and teachers with different biographical, historical, and cultural backgrounds. Participating in discourse involves “finding

agreement, welcoming difference, ‘trying on’ other points of view, identifying the common in the contradictory, tolerating the anxiety implicit in paradox, searching for synthesis, and reframing” (Mezirow, 2012, p. 80). However, engaging in these discursive spaces can be also an emotionally threatening experience for international students as they become aware of the underlying assumptions of their ideas and the connected emotions (Mezirow, 2012). In an empirical study, Lilley et al. (2015) conducted semi-structured interviews with students who had studied abroad for 6–12 months in a European Union-Australian mobility program. The researchers asked the students about their experiences of change (e.g., in terms of perspective/s or the way of thinking) resulting from the international mobility experience. In terms of participating in discourse, Lilley et al. (2015) found that “interpersonal encounters with diverse others” (p. 234) made students listening to other perspectives, questioning their assumptions, and considering alternative points of view. Also, dealing with “difficult interpersonal relationship situations” (p. 235) facilitated change as students learned to solve relationship dilemmas (e.g., shared housing). Learning about similarities and reflecting on differences are essential parts of the study abroad experiences as they are ways of questioning existing frames of references. Through interpersonal encounters in a study abroad stay, “ethical relationships with people across linguistic, regional, ideological and representational boundaries” can be established (Andreotti, 2010, p. 241). Through lived experiences of Otherness, students started raising themselves to consciousness as cultural beings, questioned their assumptions about Otherness and were better able to open their minds (Killick, 2012). Furthermore, Lilley et al. (2015) showed that experiences that take the student “out of their comfort zone” (p. 233), such as cultural differences, being away from family and friends, and language difficulties, facilitated change as it relates to any disorienting situation that creates a sense of uncertainty, personal discomfort, or dilemma.

These findings align with Mezirow’s (1978) conceptualization of a transformation process model, where a disorienting dilemma is a starting point for transformative learning. Irritations are very often present at the beginning of transformative learning processes as people realize that their previous meaning perspectives have been limited, or no longer

adequate to deal with the new situation, and then they start reflecting on these perspectives. According to Mezirow (1990), critical reflection is the core element of transformative learning as deep learning and changes in meaning perspectives require reflection. In line with Mezirow (1990), Dewey (1933) understands reflective thinking as a practice of being self-critical towards one's own thoughts. Reflective thinking emerges when a person interacts with their environment (other people, nature, idea of a book, etc.) (Dewey, 1938). The insights that result from reflection need to be experienced in new situations which in turn initiate new reflective thinking processes (Dewey, 1938). In Blum's study (2020) of what U.K. undergraduate students think they have gained from studying abroad, the students' perspective revealed the need for greater support for returning students to reflect on and integrate their learning back home, and to help students develop a critical sense of global issues and of their own identities. Also, in Lilley et al.'s study (2015), some students attributed their personal change to an inspiring teacher during their study abroad who functioned as a "cosmopolitan role model" (p. 233), whose teaching style made international and comparative learning more meaningful to students. From a decolonial GCE perspective, educators need to learn that their perspectives and constructions of their knowledge and identities are shaped socially, historically, and culturally and that they are therefore limited (Andreotti, 2010). In such learning environments, learners can become aware and reflective about the origins and implications of their own and other people's assumptions. Furthermore, they can learn to make ethical choices about their own lives and using their own position, privilege, and power in ethical and accountable ways (Andreotti, 2011b). In this regard, Bamber et al. (2018) point to the need to develop a transformative pedagogy for global citizenship in higher education.

A New Theoretical Perspective on International Experiences in the Context of Global Citizenship

Study abroad is a unique learning environment for global citizenship as it offers students the possibility to develop a global identity. GCE can serve as an alternative and future-oriented approach that opens up a different vision for the alignment and design of the internationalization of higher education and international student mobility. In this chapter, we have shown that considering global citizen learning in study abroad through the lens of transformative learning theory and a social identity approach opens up a new perspective on this phenomenon. We believe that three issues are particularly noteworthy here.

First and foremost, social identity allows us to understand why international experience is useful for global citizenship. Contact with people from cultures different from one's own may highlight the similarities between people and thus increase connectedness through recategorizing on a superordinate level (Römpke et al., 2019). The feeling of being a global citizen can reduce stereotypes and motivate stronger intentions and actions in favour of disadvantaged groups and attention to acting against inequality (Reese et al., 2014). International contact helps to further develop one's scope of experience and thereby increase openness to other peoples' assumptions and views. Through the reflection of the lived experiences, existing frames of reference and fixed assumptions (e.g., racist mindsets) about other people can be transformed over time (Dewey, 1933; Mezirow, 1990). To support a deep learning process of students who are part of an international learning environment, teachers can ask self-reflective questions and/or use a learning diary or weblog that prompts students to reflect on their lived experiences.

In this sense, the process-oriented perspective—i.e., a perspective focusing on the processes of learning, rather than mere outcomes—of transformative learning theory helps to understand why and how identification as a global citizen can be seen as a transformative learning process that can bring about changes in how individuals perceive and act in

the world. With a procedural understanding of a learner's transformation, educators can design their teaching practices accordingly, and better support learners' development of global citizenship (for a transformative learning model see Förster et al., 2019).

Second, (transformative) learning processes are inextricably linked to the social self. By focusing on the societal aspect of identity formation, social identity theory supports critiques about Mezirow's main focus of transformative learning theory on the cognitive transformation(s) of individuals (e.g., the deconstruction of taken-for-granted assumptions; Mezirow, 1991, 2000).¹ In this context, Illeris (2014) argues that the transformation process not only involves a change in the cognitive mental structures, which organize our understanding of ourselves and our life and world, but rather a change and development on the level of identity. For him, the concept of identity includes both the cognitive, emotional, and social dimensions of learning (Illeris, 2017). In the same vein, Bamber (2016) argues that transformative learning involves an ontological process concerning ways of being in the world and ways of knowing that world. In this sense, a global identity is also a motivator for social change and linked to collective efficacy beliefs. Collective efficacy is the belief that we as humans can achieve social change. According to the social identity model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008) identity, collective efficacy, and anger/injustice perceptions are strong predictors of collective action. For example, developing a global mindset through political participation in, for instance, global social movements such as Fridays for Future or Black Lives Matter may also help to change unequal (power)structures and mechanisms.

Lastly, when talking about transformative learning processes and global identity formation, one should be aware of not uncritically taking the promotion of a global mindset through study abroad as a given and desirable outcome. Post- and decolonial studies are helpful to raise awareness of colonial mechanisms that are still in play and point to the risk of an uncritical take up of global citizenship in study abroad programs that are informed by a Westernized, hegemonial, and universal

¹ Mezirow has later emphasised that emotional and social conditions are also important for the transformative learning process (Mezirow, 2006, 2009), but it has not been reflected in his definitions of transformative learning.

idea of citizenship. In relation to the educational practice, transformative learning theory emphasizes the need to support those learning processes of students (e.g., by offering spaces for reflection on North–South interdependencies; Boni & Calabuig, 2017). Without reflecting, the experience of dealing with other worldviews or other everyday practices can also lead to unintentionally reinforcing existing stereotypes and further alienating international students from global relationships and perspectives (Andreotti, 2011b). In this context, establishing a transformative pedagogy for global citizenship would be helpful to support the learning processes of international students (Bamber et al., 2018). A central component of this pedagogy would be to establish discourse spaces (Mezirow, 2000) where students can talk about and reflect on their international experiences. In these learning spaces, students can try out different perspectives, explore their reasoning, sense of self and reality, and formulate anxieties, desires, hopes, and visions for a different future (e.g., Amsler, 2019; Andreotti et al., 2018). At the same time, it elucidates the educational challenges in supporting international students in this reflective practice. According to Andreotti (2016), one challenge to invite international students into a conversation is to communicate dissenting perspectives that imply that student’s self-image and worldviews will likely not be affirmed as this may produce discomfort and resistance. One reason why learners resist reflecting on such perspectives can be explained by self-preservation. In her theory of edge-emotions, Mälkki (2019) explains that unpleasant emotions such as fear, anxiety, or anger arise when our assumptions are being challenged. Those reactions are rooted in the biology of emotions and cognitive functions of human beings. To foster critical reflection and transformative learning, the role of an educator would be one as a “cultural broker” (Andreotti, 2011b, p. 395) who challenges students to negotiate between different perspectives, existing worldviews, attitudes, and/or taken-for-granted assumptions. Such a learning environment makes it possible for students to learn from and through different ways of being and knowing (Andreotti, 2011b). Furthermore, educators would need to learn to embrace and elaborate on edge-emotions to support international students in developing new meaning perspectives.

Conclusion

The pressing social, economic, and ecological challenges reveal that society is on a transformation pathway. Crises are dangerous for the stability of societies but at the same time, they open a window of opportunity for structural change. In the context of the internationalization of higher education, this gives universities all over the world the chance to rethink the meaning and purpose of internationalization strategies. A decolonial approach to the internationalization of higher education for society seems promising to contribute to sustainable development, social cohesion, and global social justice. Proposing the SDGs as a possible guiding framework for internationalization efforts in general, and mobility practices in specific, makes clear that further empirical work needs to be done to broaden the conceptual foundation of global citizenship as a learning objective of educational practices in higher education. In this context, Rosenmann and colleagues (2016) argue that a global identity may be fuelled by values that are core to globalized Western culture—beliefs such as liberalism, free trade, and individual freedom. Do people from more collectivistic or economically insulated countries share this understanding? Do they assign the same priority to these values? It is a key question whether there are inalienable values and beliefs, or notions of recognition of multiple identities, multiculturalism, and valuing diversity that characterize a “truly global” identity, shared by all human societies (see also Reese et al., 2019). To avoid global citizenship becoming unintendedly part of the neoliberal imperative that characterizes much of the current internationalization efforts (e.g., Pashby & Andreotti, 2016), an international comparative research approach to global citizenship seems fruitful. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the learning processes of international students to avoid a unidirectional and decontextualized approach to GCE.

Further research is required to better understand the societal and emotional aspects of transformative learning in studying abroad. What role does empathy play in transformative learning processes? Does the ability to share another person’s feelings and emotions increase moments of irritation when being confronted with different lived realities? Does empathy help students in exchange programs build understanding for

unequal living conditions and even triggers the will to act against this? Psychological research suggests that dispositional empathy relates to global identity (McFarland et al., 2012). People with strong dispositional empathy also believe that global inequality is unjust and show strong intentions to act against global inequality (Reese et al., 2015). These insights could be used to develop international learning environments by considering how empathy can become an integral component of such learning processes. Concerning the societal aspects of transformative learning in study abroad, further investigation is needed to shed light on the transformative power of collective experiences and action. As social reality and (postcolonial) identities are socially constructed, entangling the learning processes on the individual and collective level (e.g., through identifying collective spaces where international students are engaged such as student initiatives at the university or outside of campus, e.g., in volunteering services) may prove useful.

On a methodical level, it seems necessary to shift the research focus from those willing to study abroad to those who are excluded from mobility practices and exchange programs. Especially students from a low social background and/or Black students and students of color are less likely to study abroad and thus remain excluded from mobility experiences.² Against the background of making mobility practices more inclusive, it is valuable to investigate pathways that encourage and allow those underrepresented groups of students to study abroad. One field of inquiry is the potential of blended mobility or even virtual mobility options for the development of global citizenship (e.g., Huish, 2021; Satar, 2021).³ Also, it would be interesting to design more research that compares different sites of student mobility. As lots of study abroad programs are exchanges between students from the Global North, it would be promising to shift the focus to international experiences that emerge from different North–South/South–North or South–South

² According to 2018–2019 data from the Institute of International Education (IIE), from 347,099 U.S. students who participated in study abroad programs, only 31% identified as students of color.

³ In the next Erasmus program years (2021–2030), the European Commission wants to provide 12 million people learning and mobility opportunities by using the possibilities of virtual exchange as a central element of the digital university of the future.

mobility contexts such as developmental voluntary service or service-learning opportunities.

Finally, it is important to examine student mobility with different methodical approaches. The combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, such as survey research assessing exchange students' global identity before and after the mobility experience followed by interviews and/or group discussions, could provide further insights into the transformative learning processes of international students. Acknowledging that Mezirow and others have recognized that individuals change their frames of references over time and sometimes even unnoticed, it is particularly relevant to conduct (biographical) narrative interviews to investigate the meaning and longer-lasting effects in perspective transformation and the identity construction of international experiences on the development of global citizenship. All these insights could be used to develop the design of study abroad programs and make future suggestions on how to improve the concrete pedagogical practice.

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13

Conclusion: Moving Forward

Iva Katzarska-Miller  and Stephen Reysen 

In the previous chapters our contributors have provided reviews or novel research on the various ways in which globalization impacts conceptualizations and experiences of self and identity. Although these conceptualizations and experiences can differ across theoretical lenses, geographical locations, age, and immigration status, it is an undeniable fact that globalization processes are changing both societies and people living in these societies. As discussed in Chapter 2, the framework of the mutual constitution (Shweder, 2003), which argues that contexts and people inhabiting these contexts make each other up, such that individuals continually shape and are shaped by the cultural spaces that they occupy, can be useful in analyzing the impact of globalization on cultural

I. Katzarska-Miller (✉)

Transylvania University, Lexington, KY, USA

e-mail: ikatzarskamiller@transy.edu

S. Reysen

Texas A&M University-Commerce, Commerce, TX, USA

contexts, and in turn the impact of these contexts on self and identity. The mutual constitution occurs through the interrelated categories of ideas, institutions, interactions, and individuals (Markus & Hamenadi, 2019; Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

Keeping in mind this framework in the conclusion chapter, we will review some of the topics and findings that emerged across contributions, by first providing a short discussion of how globalization impacts society and then how these societal changes impact people. These three broad topics include global, national/local identity, and acculturation.

Global Identity

The idea that one can have a focus and orientation to global rather local affairs is not new. The concept of cosmopolitanism is credited to the Stoics of ancient Greece (Inglis, 2014), with intellectual developments through the centuries, from Kant (Nussbaum, 1997) to the formation of the United Nations (Inglis, 2014). In recent years the theorizing on a more global inclusive orientation has revolved around the term global citizenship, which arose from discussions in education about global education—the inclusion of global content into school curriculum. And although global education began in 1920s in the United Kingdom, it did not gather much interest until the 1970s–1980s (Hicks, 2003). Indeed, the term global citizen was used sparingly in academic research until the early 1990s and since then it has exponentially increased (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2018).

One explanation for this increase in the usage of the term global citizenship is the increase in the academic theorizing and empirical research on globalization. Buckner and Russell (2013) note the increase of references to globalization starting in the 1990s, which corresponds to the surge in research on global citizenship. The question that comes to mind is what within contemporary globalization could lead to rethinking of how we see ourselves as “citizens?” As discussed in Chapter 1, contemporary globalization is seen as the great convergence (Steger, 2020), where geography seems to be no longer a limiting factor in people’s ability to connect with each other. Hernandez i Marti (2006) argues

that deterritorialization is a cultural component of globalization, “understood as a proliferation of translocalized cultural experiences” (p. 92). Deterritorialization involves the opportunity for social contact that transcends geographical locations, “which takes us to a closer involvement with the external, which generates closeness in distance, and to a relative distancing from what is close” (Hernandez i Marti, 2006, p. 93). In such a deterritorialized context, it becomes increasingly difficult for people to uphold a sustained sense of cultural identity. Deterritorialization allows for the development of a global imaginary, which Steger (2020) defines as “people’s growing consciousness of the world as a single whole” (p. 2). This global imaginary does not replace national and other local perspectives, but destabilizes and weakens them (Steger, 2020). Similarly, Castells (2006), using the example of the European Union, argues that because nation-states have been the main agents through which globalization is being carried, they have distanced themselves from their populations, leading to people feeling estranged from a state that no longer helps them sustain meaning in their lives. Hence, this deterritorialization of geographical confines, and the estrangement from the nation-state affords the opportunity for people to take on an identity that is not limited to a specific location or country, but spans the world. In other words, there is an opportunity for one to have a global identity.

Although we use the term global identity as an all-inclusive term here, as discussed in Chapter 9, there are multiple labels that have been used to designate identification with a superordinate category. While research demonstrates that greater identification with these categories, regardless of label used, is associated overall with prosocial values, the prototypical group content can differ. And that is particularly evident in the conflation between global and human identity. Future research may specify the various factors that are associated with these categories, or what the prototypical group content is for a specific label (e.g., human vs. global citizen).

The discrepancy in labels has also led to issues related to the measurement of said all-inclusive global identities. The measurement of ingroup identification has a long history (Reysen et al., 2013; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Early researchers strived to measure the three dimensions noted in the definition of social identity: self-categorization, evaluation of

one's ingroup, and emotional significance of the ingroup. However, a variety of dimensions and measures have been proposed over the years (e.g., ingroup homogeneity, centrality, embeddedness). Although longer measures have greater reliability, ingroup identification can be assessed with a single item—"I strongly identify with [*insert group*]" (Postmes et al., 2013; Reysen et al., 2013). Researchers can adapt prior measures of ingroup identification by inserting a superordinate identity category label.

Related to the issue of the content of global identity, Moriizumi's research on global citizenship in Japan in Chapter 10 brings to the forefront the issue of the impact of one's cultural context on both identification with and the different meanings of the same label of global citizen. Although more research is needed on the topic, mostly from non-WEIRD settings, several studies have previously examined and demonstrated different meanings of global citizenship across countries. For example, Katzarska-Miller and Reysen (2012) examined the meaning and associations of global citizenship in three countries: the United States, Bulgaria, and India. While the association between global citizenship identification and prosocial values was similar regardless of nationality, there were differences in conceptualization of what global citizenship is, and the level of identification. Furthermore, Chapter 10 also demonstrates the effect of culture-specific processes (e.g., multicultural symbiosis) on the relationship between global citizenship and endorsement of specific intergroup ideologies. Thus, more context-specific research on global identity will not only provide a more complete picture of people's conceptualizations and experiences with global identity, but may also be more successful if used to impact intergroup relations.

Armenta and colleagues in Chapter 3 also support the need for more context-specific research on global identity. Within the framework of the cultural inertia model, they speculate that because countries with higher globalization levels report a negative association between anti-immigrant attitudes and global identity (Ariely, 2017), more dynamic cultures, which are more open to change, would be more likely to endorse multiculturalism and react more positively to demographic shifts caused by immigration-based globalization. Thus, the nature of the culture, static

or dynamic, could impact not only reactions to change but also one's willingness to embrace a global identity.

In Chapter 12, Etzkorn and Reese challenge the contemporary internationalizing educational practices with their focus on business competencies, and advocate for transformative global citizenship education with an emphasis on social justice. The chapter raises the question of whether global citizenship education, and in turn global citizen identity, as currently implemented, is an identity that is only afforded to specific groups. While Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2018) raised the question of whether global citizenship is a privileged identity that is afforded to members of dominant groups without providing a definite answer, Heron (2019) argues that global citizenship represents a new manifestation of whiteness, such that “the notion that one is a global citizen potentially offers a particular fulfillment of the promise of whiteness for middle-class, white subjects in the global North, in particular through the efforts of Northern/Western postsecondary educational institutions to produce global citizens” (p. 1), with a focus on short-term volunteer trips to the global South. Exploring the way in which global citizenship education and study abroad perpetuate neoliberalism and colonial practices, by advantaging and disadvantaging certain groups, could provide a blueprint for challenging those very practices.

National and Local Identities

While deterritorialization and disaffection with the nation-state can afford the opportunity for identification with a global community, paradoxically, the same processes can produce the opposite reaction with an increased reification of national, or other local (e.g., ethnic, religious)¹ identities. Although definitions and conceptualizations of national identity vary, it “is a type of collective identity that is rooted in past symbols, memories, and values which are linked to a specific territory that distinguishes itself from other nations and projects into the future” (Ariely,

¹ Although ethnic and religious identities can span nations, there are distinctive local manifestations that are driven by local realities.

2021, p. 18). Building upon Smith's (2007) argument that national identity can withstand the impact of globalization, Ariely (2019) supposes that globalization in fact can intensify national sentiments. Several different explanations for greater identification with national identity are discerned in the literature.

The *cultural backlash* thesis suggests that due to increased progressive cultural values change, specific groups of people (e.g., older generations, white men, and less educated) are threatened by this progress, triggering a backlash resulting in identification with groups that endorse more traditional values (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that this backlash is seen predominantly in Western societies, given that the postwar decades have brought a shift toward more progressive values such as multiculturalism, support for left-libertarian parties, human rights, racial and gender equality. Globalization may also aid in spreading awareness of social movements (Ballard et al., 2005), environmentalism (Dunlap & York, 2008), and global education (Spring, 2008) that can further exacerbate negative reactions to globalization and associated values in some segments of the population. Pástor and Veronesi (2021) argue that rather than backlash against progressive change, the backlash is due to growing income inequality in rich countries, where strong economic growth promotes anti-elitism against the wealthy. Indeed, an examination of economic data demonstrates the existence of an association between inequality and nationalism, and protectionist attitudes (Pástor & Veronesi, 2021). Still others have suggested (e.g., Naoi, 2020; Walter, 2021) that the backlash against globalization is less about economics, but rather due to domestic politics and politicians politicizing globalization.

Some researchers have studied factors that can lead to bolstered national identity in the face of globalization. Tajun and Hu (2015) suggest that globalization can lead to ontological anxiety, but that through identification with one's nation individuals may ward off insecurity and uncertainty through daily life normative routines. Furthermore, they suggest three variables that support national identity including economic incentives, political value systems, and institutional organizations. Sun and Rong (2018) place importance on local language as supporting national identity. Chiang and Zhou (2019) propose that one

way in which the importing of Western culture can be prevented is through the transmission of local cultural norms at school. Zhuojun and Hualing (2014) suggest strengthening democratic governance, economic development, bolstering of cultural values, and community integration to support national identity.

However, the relationship between negative reactions to globalization and identification with a national identity is not as straightforward as it might appear. Ariely (2012) examined two large datasets including participants from 63 countries concerning the link between globalization and national identity. Overall, the results revealed that country-level globalization was largely unrelated to national identity, despite some relevant relationships such as globalization having a negative association with patriotism, expressions of national pride, support for ethnicity as a criteria for membership in one's nation, and willingness to fight for one's country. In terms of ethnic identity, Ariely (2019) found support for a negative association between globalization and ethnic identity. Furthermore, utilizing another large dataset, Ariely (2018) observed that in countries with greater globalization there is smaller negative association between global and national identities, than countries with lower globalization impact.

Within the present work authors have reported similar findings. Namely that immigration, and demographic shifts, can be perceived as a threat leading to uncertainty, anxiety, stress, and intergroup conflict (Chapters 3, 5 and 6). Based on the cultural inertia model (Chapter 3), there are likely individual differences, or cultural patterns, that promote acceptance or rejection of globalization. Future research may further explore variables that predict acceptance or rejection beyond those already identified (e.g., social dominance orientation; Naoi, 2020). Sevincer et al. (2017) recently proposed a measure of the perceived degree that a city is cosmopolitan (e.g., "Is a multicultural city," "Is an open-minded city"). Their measure was associated with intergenerational mobility, independence, openness to experience, and liberalism. Given the overlap between these variables and the dynamic cities described in Chapter 3, future researchers may find that these are similar concepts and offer other factors to predict dynamic cities. Additionally, would individuals embedded in such cities rate global identity higher than less dynamic

cities or does the strength of the relationship between national and global identities differ within these cities?

The authors of both Chapters 5 and 6 suppose that negative reactions to globalization and strategies to deal with these reactions, are partially driven by demographic changes due to immigration and increased intercultural contact. While in Chapter 6 Nur Soylu Yalcinkaya examines the effect of essentialism in the construction of national and racial/ethnic identities for both dominant and marginalized group members, in Chapter 5 Ozer and Obaidi, discuss radicalization as a defense against threats to one's ethnic, religious, or cultural identity. Ozer and Obaidi, also acknowledge the role of essentialism in the formation of exclusionary identities. One of the reasons is that essentialism provides the need for structure, and the sense of order, which is challenged by changes brought on by globalization. Given the central role of essentialism, future research may examine whether mitigation of essentialist beliefs can lead to lower levels of radicalization. For example, would education campaigns aid in reducing the likelihood of radicalization?

In considering the content of both of the chapters discussing study abroad (Chapters 11 and 12), one interesting question that emerges is the impact of study abroad, and in general the internationalization of higher education, on national identification. It appears that much of contemporary study abroad outcomes are about providing experiences that lead to open-mindedness, empathy, and overall appreciation of others, with a focus on producing a more engaged global citizen. However, experiences of "culture shock" (Oberg, 1960) might cause a bolstered adherence to one national identity. Hence, future research could examine individual differences, and host-country factors, that could impact national identification.

Acculturation

The study of the concept and process of acculturation is not new. Although studies on acculturation have increased dramatically in the last three decades, the topic has a long history, going back at least to Plato (Rudmin, 2003). Despite its ancient origin, it became a topic of

research in the nineteenth century, and proliferated in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Rudmin, 2003). Sustained efforts to encourage acculturation research are evident; for example in 1936 the Social Science Research Council appointed a committee to analyze what work has already been done on acculturation, as well as to explore ideas for further investigation (Redfield et al., 1936).

But what is acculturation? Although definitions vary among researchers, Rudmin's (2009) analysis of definitions of acculturation and their implications for how acculturating people and groups are perceived, suggests that the simplest and value-neutral way to define acculturation is as a second-culture acquisition. Initial investigations on acculturations have been in regard to immigrants, and the strategies that they used to negotiate their native and host-country identities. Nowadays, due to the increase of cultural interconnectivity created by globalization, acculturation processes have taken place without the necessary physical relocation of people across cultural spaces. Some researchers have taken John Berry's (1997) four immigrant acculturation strategies between native and host-country identities and have applied them to negotiations between one's local and global identity (e.g., Arnett, 2002; Jensen et al., 2011). Others have proposed the concepts of *globalization-based* (Chen et al., 2008) and *remote acculturation* (Ferguson & Bornstein, 2012) to describe the new nature of acculturation. Although definitions of the two concepts seem to somewhat overlap, in Chapter 8 McKenzie and colleagues make a distinction between the two in that globalization-based acculturation tends to be focused on people's identification with Western culture, while remote acculturation can span cultural contexts, not limited to the West.

Although McKenzie and colleagues demonstrate in Chapter 8 that there are certain acculturation strategies (e.g., integration, compartmentalization, and cultural brokerage) that young people use to navigate multiple custom complexes for both proximal and remote acculturation, one broad question that emerges is about which groups are expected to acculturate. Reviews of acculturation research in the United States have demonstrated that the expectation is that marginalized and immigrant groups are to acculturate (Rudmin et al., 2017). For example, Rudmin (2009) found that 60% of all acculturation research in the United States focused on Latinx and Asian people. In terms of remote acculturation,

research has also been predominantly about the impact of dominant cultures (whether Western, global, or dominant within a specific cultural space; for review of studies see Ferguson et al., 2017). Inadvertently, this focus on marginalized and/or minoritized groups and their acculturation to dominant culture reinforces a particular narrative about superiority and inferiority of groups (Rudmin et al., 2017). On a surface level this emphasis on studying acculturation mainly for marginalized groups, is somewhat paradoxical considering that the majority of research, at least in psychology, is done with American and Western samples (Arnett, 2008; Thalmayer et al., 2020). However, both trends are reinforcing implicit narratives of value-laden associations of dominance and subordination. Thus, while further research should continue to examine acculturation patterns in a variety of cultural settings, it should also branch out into whether, and if so, how, acculturation occurs for dominant group members.

Study abroad is another domain where research on acculturation is beneficial to be explored in more detail. In Chapter 11, Smith and Katzarska-Miller bring up the issue of whether acculturation strategies play a role in the cultural identity negotiations that study abroad students might have the opportunity to engage in. The authors theorize that Berry's (1997) acculturation strategies may apply, but currently there is no empirical evidence to support that notion. The authors bring up multiple questions about the feasibility of these strategies, the time needed for acculturation to take place, and whether it is a global or host-country culture that one is acculturating to. Although some researchers have suggested that full acculturation is not likely to occur due to the limited exposure and the limited importance of integrating into the host culture (e.g., Pedersen et al., 2011), an argument can be made that due to globalization upon return to the native culture, study abroad participants can continue immersing themselves in the host culture via consumption of media and products (similar to remote acculturation), which could impact one's cultural identity.

While both immigration-based and globalization-based acculturation are based on acculturation to geographical-based cultures either physically present, or remotely, via media, acculturation can also occur to a culture that is not confined by a physical location, and that is global

consumer culture (GCC). Defined as a cultural entity transcending individual cultures (Alden et al., 1999), global consumer culture, which originally developed in the United States, has spread worldwide due to globalization (see Chapter 4), with a current trend of shifting toward the East (Cleveland & Bartsch, 2019). In Chapter 4, in the process of discussing the impact of globalization and GCC on cultural identity, Cleveland, explicates on acculturation to global consumer culture (AGCC) and its seven dimensions (Cleveland & Laroche, 2007). In Chapter 2, Katzarska-Miller and Faucher, discussed Reese et al.'s (2019) conceptualization of consumer selfhood, AGCC and their relationship to cohort tendencies of narcissism and materialism. Although the authors are making the case for variables (age and materialism) that can be associated with both consumer selfhood and AGCC, there are no empirical studies that we are aware of that have directly examined the relationship between the two. Thus, future research can examine whether AGCC predicts consumer selfhood, and the predictive power of each of the AGCC's seven dimensions.

In Chapter 4, Cleveland also makes the argument that GCC should not be thought of as a static culture associated with predominantly Western consumerism, but rather as a creolized culture. Cleveland states: "I foresee the emergence of several global consumer cultures, each of which representing how GCC has been variably indigenized to become compatible with local traditions and sensibilities, and each iteration possessing unique artifacts and lifestyles." This potential existence of multiple GCC variations opens itself to the empirical possibility of examining not only how these variations are created, but the ways in which people negotiate multiple cultural identities to acculturate to a specific GCC.

Conclusion

As we end this book, we hope to have covered a fair share of scholarship with respect to the current research on globalization and self and identity. The primary goal of the book was to present a review, as well as new research of some of the impacts of globalization on

self and identity. Having contributors spanning a variety of disciplines, methodologies, and geographical locations, albeit some limitations (e.g., predominantly Western), we hope that this edited book fulfills its goal, alongside with providing stimulating conversations, and research ideas for further theorizing and empirical investigation.

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