

10 Activating Urban Planners for Fostering Urban Integrity: An Inroad into Curbing City Level Corruption

Laura Nkula-Wenz, Gilbert Siame, and Dieter Zinnbauer

Abstract

Corruption is one of the major hurdles to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) globally. Money is lost due to illicit financial flows and the lack of progress in updating policies and improving the technical capabilities of key departments at the national level. In addition to that, many African countries face the challenge of reforming colonial-era public administrations, making them more accessible and accountable to the people they serve. In turn, successfully localizing the SDGs requires a competent and ethical public service, including at the local government level, which is the primary state-citizen interface. This chapter sets out to connect the aims of SDG 11 and SDG 16 through exploring the potential of the urban planning profession as a key custodian of transparency, accountability, and, ultimately, urban integrity. Drawing on research among urban and regional planners in Zambia and South Africa, done as part of the Cities of Integrity project and funded by the Department for International Development (DFID), we argue that planners are among the key stakeholders to engage when addressing corruption and maladministration at the local level. We further maintain that it is worthwhile to move from a narrow focus on legalistic compliance with anti-corruption measures towards a more proactive promotion of professional integrity and collective accountability mechanisms. This is especially true in the African context. Finally, using a case study involving planning professionals in Lusaka, we explore the opportunities and challenges faced when addressing corruption and promoting integrity among the local community of practice.

Keywords

SDG 11 · SDG 16 · Local government · Corruption · Integrity · Urban planning · South Africa · Zambia

L. Nkula-Wenz (✉)
African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
e-mail: laura.nkula@uct.ac.za

G. Siame
Centre for Urban Research and Planning, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia
e-mail: Siamegilbert@yahoo.co.uk

D. Zinnbauer
Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: dz.msc@cbs.dk

10.1 Introduction

Across the globe, critical work towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is being hampered by corruption (Murshed and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022
S. Croese, S. Parnell (eds.), *Localizing the SDGs in African Cities*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95979-1_10

Mredula 2018). At the same time, SDG 16.5 commits countries to "substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms." These forms are many and span different scales, from grand corruption like state capture and international money laundering syndicates to the so-called "petty" corruption involving the solicitation of small bribes and favors by often underpaid public officials. This makes corruption a "wicked problem" because it requires context-specific, multiscale, and whole-of-society interventions.

Corruption and illicit financial flows are also hard to measure, which is why there is a lively debate around how to effectively devise and monitor corruption-related indicators within SDG 16 (Khan 2018; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2010). While some scholars see Africa as leading the way when it comes to adopting ways to measure SDG 16, a commitment to monitoring corruption-related indicators remains a blind spot (Cling et al. 2018).

Ultimately, SDGs cannot be implemented at a local level without paying attention to the pervasive issue of corruption. This chapter argues that SDG 11, in particular—which aims to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable—can benefit substantially from new perspectives on city level corruption, and the role of professional integrity in curbing it.

Generally, cities are high-stakes environments for development interventions. By the same token, cities offer unique opportunities to make critical headway in localizing the SDGs. Cities can be key drivers of local sustainable development if coherent urban development policies are in place that identify and exploit systematic synergies between the local economy, sociocultural and environmental parameters, and long-term infrastructural planning (Parnell 2016). At the same time, cities are also high-risk zones for corruption, for a number of interconnected reasons (Zinnbauer 2019):

- Population growth in cities increases competition for resources and infrastructure provision, while curtailing the enforcement of rules and regulations.
- In cities with a significant informal economy, poor and marginalized populations are more vulnerable to extortion and becoming victims of corruption (see also Zinnbauer 2020).
- The highest urban growth is projected for countries that already face high corruption risk, where "(e)ight of the ten countries forecast to experience the highest urbanization rates between 2014 and 2050 are perceived to be saddled with high levels of public sector corruption, and rank in the bottom half of countries globally when it comes to expert perceptions of the severity of public sector corruption" (Zinnbauer 2019, p. 3).
- The continuous influx of people looking for opportunities in cities, particularly from poor and marginalized groups, has historically lent itself to bolstering political patronage networks. This links political support to the supply of essential services and skews critical infrastructure development through political favoritism.

We argue that to effectively localize the SDGs, it is critical to tackle corruption at the urban scale. However, to do so, and to devise effective strategies to respond to it, we need a better understanding of the problem and how it presents itself in different contexts. Unfortunately, the city remains vastly under-researched in anti-corruption scholarship, which is traditionally situated in disciplines like public administration, political science, and behavioral economics. Urban studies have furthermore not engaged sufficiently with questions of urban corruption, even though it is a significant force shaping contemporary urban development across the globe (Chiodelli and Moroni 2015; Kim 2020). Over the past decade, the limited success of traditional legalistic anti-corruption measures has prompted a substantial reckoning in the anti-corruption advocacy space. This initiated an ongoing paradigm shift which Zinnbauer (2019, p. 6) summarizes as follows:

> A narrow, legalistic focus on direct anti-corruption measures and a largely punitive approach to step up monitoring, legal sanctions, compliance, and related reporting requirements are not sufficient and at times even counterproductive. Instead, what holds more promise is a more encompassing approach that embraces the broader ambition of strengthening integrity, rather than reducing corruption as its main guiding principle.

Recognizing this research gap and heeding the need to shift the paradigm to focusing on doing the right thing rather than just avoiding the wrong thing, the Cities of Integrity project was initiated as part of UKAid's Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Program. It focused on investigating the nexus between corruption, urban development, and professional integrity among urban and regional planners through in-depth research in South Africa and Zambia. The data collection ran from March 2019 to December 2020. It encompassed over 50 semi-structured interviews and focus groups with planning professionals in both public and private practice, as well as a Qualitative Action Experiment in the form of an integrity training for 40 planners in Lusaka, Zambia (see also Siame et al. 2020). Between February and September 2020, we also administered a detailed quantitative online survey among planning professionals in both countries in cooperation with the respective national professional association, which assisted in distributing the survey among their members. The survey solicited a sample of 211 complete responses (African Centre for Cities and Centre for Urban Research and Planning 2020).[1] The main research objectives were to examine the current integrity landscape in local urban development practice. It sought to expand on existing mechanisms and practices to develop, promote, and enforce integrity as a professional norm and to identify public roles and responsibilities that practicing planners in South Africa and Zambia see for themselves. It further considered the pressures they face at the intersection of the public and private sector and in light of high urbanization pressures in both countries.

The following arguments draw from this rich set of empirical data, and we will proceed as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of the dynamics of urban corruption in Africa before discussing the current state of the planning profession on the continent. In the second part of the chapter, we then hone in on the case of Zambia, discussing the specific pressures and repercussions planners face when trying to carry out their job in the face of widespread urban corruption pressures. We conclude by reflecting on some of our interventions that have sought to actively promote professional integrity in urban planning and what we regard as productive pathways to further engage with this pertinent issue.

10.2 Brief Overview of Urbanization and Urban Corruption in Africa

Corruption, and by extension urban corruption, is in no way a uniquely African problem. Indeed, it is a global phenomenon that is profoundly shaping cities across the globe. A case in point are the "million dollar ghost buildings" (Boles 2017) in high-end neighborhoods of London or New York, where all-cash purchases of luxury real estate have yielded ample opportunities for money laundering, while leaving behind underused houses and lifeless neighborhoods (Atkinson 2019; Fernandez et al. 2016; Glucksberg 2016). Across the world, urban real estate is one of the most coveted asset classes for money laundering, as a number of red flags indicate: in London more than 36,000 plots (5.7 km^2) are owned by shell companies (de Simone 2015); 30% of worldwide confiscated criminal assets are real estate (FATF 2013); in a recent World Bank study, a Kampala business representative divulged that "land prices have gone up very fast—it is overvalued because there's a scramble for land with the influx of migrants and corrupt officials who have a lot of cash and need to put it somewhere" (World Bank 2018).

[1] The full dataset, questionnaire and additional survey materials have been deposited with DataFirst at the University of Cape Town. They can be accessed and reused under a CC-BY-SA license by following this link: https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/catalog/871.

Corruption in Africa usually only makes global news in connection to large-scale state capture and national tender fraud, seen most notably with the investigation in South Africa by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (2018–2021)—the so-called Zondo Commission, named after its chairperson, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo—in connection with the tenure of former president Jacob Zuma. However, corruption on the continent is felt most acutely at the local scale. More than half (55%) of all African citizens think that corruption increased in the previous 12 months, and only 23% think it declined. More than one in four African citizens who accessed public services, such as health care and education, paid a bribe in the previous year (Pring et al. 2019). This is equivalent to approximately 130 million people. Finally, more than 60% of people polled in 34 African countries in 2017 thinking it is very likely that rich people can get away with paying bribes to falsely register land that does not belong to them, a number that rises to almost 67% in South Africa and 72% in Zambia (Afrobarometer 2018). This is particularly indicative when we consider the rapidly rising value of urban land and the large windfalls that can be generated by re-zoning rural land for urban expansion.

Tenure insecurity—measured as the perceived likelihood for eviction within the forthcoming 5 years—can be another red flag for corruption, indicating high levels of impunity when it comes to land grabbing. These rates of perceived insecurity are highest in sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa/Middle East, where 26 and 28% of respondents respectively feel in danger of being evicted. Tenure insecurity tends to be more pronounced in urban areas as compared to rural areas, with sub-Saharan Africa posing the starkest difference: 27% of respondents in cities feel insecure, compared with 22% in rural areas. A particularly strong indicator for the presence of corruption with impunity in relation to tenure insecurity is that even the possession of formal documentation does not offer protection or significantly increase the perceived level of security: in sub-Saharan Africa, 70% with formal documentation feel secure compared with 65% without formal documentation, the smallest difference of all regions (Prindex 2020).

Finally, there is widespread suspicion in the general public when it comes to the question of who benefits from urban development and policy initiatives: 77% of survey respondents in African cities and 61% in Asian cities believe public office holders benefit most from urban reforms due to corruption (UN-Habitat 2010). As two detailed case studies from South Africa illustrate (Olver 2017, 2019), this impression is either corroborated by direct party political meddling and graft, or by close relationships between local officials, political circles, and property developers, fanning suspicions of undue influence and favoritism.

Thus, the premise of the Cities of Integrity project is twofold: first, that urban development is not only a particular node for corruption but can also be a fulcrum for fostering integrity and ethical conduct and, second, that urban planners present a key professional group that could spearhead innovative anti-corruption and integrity practices. This is because planners sit at the nexus of complex public and private interests and must consistently navigate this treacherous terrain to safeguard the public good while also meeting developmental goals.

The aim of our research has therefore been to understand how to best sensitize and activate urban planners for tackling corruption. Before we share a few insights from our research in Zambia, we provide a brief overview of the African planning profession and why we consider planners as potentially potent custodians of urban integrity.

10.3 The Urban Planning Profession in Africa

Broadly speaking, planning deals with the location of rights and services within a legal spatial framework that is ideally committed to safeguarding the public good, as well as the long-term interests of the city and its inhabitants. This public interest focus is an essential pillar of for-

mal urban planning education across the globe, and in contrast to other spatial disciplines such as architecture, most planning graduates spend at least some of their professional life in public service (Sager 2009; Johnson 2010).

10.3.1 Urban Planning Education Programs

Standalone urban planning programs only developed in the early twentieth century in response to accelerating rates of urbanization, incorporating strands of civil engineering, architecture, landscape architecture, public health, and law. However, by 2017, over 600 planning education programs were offered in half of the world's countries (Frank and Silver 2017, p. 338). While Frank and Silver note that there remain gaps in some regions, the pronouncement of a now majority urban world and, in consequence, the recognition of urbanization as a crucial focal point for sustainable development—codified in SDG 11—is likely to only increase the demand for planning education. Internationally, the long-term need for capacity building in the urban planning sector has also been foregrounded in both SDG 11 and the New Urban Agenda within the broader commitment of signatory countries to building stronger and more inclusive urban governance institutions (Parnell 2016).

With regard to planning education, the recognition of widespread urban informality and socio-spatial inequality as primary markers of urbanization in most low- and middle-income countries has started to bring practical changes to the curriculum. Straddling both technical engineering and social science influences, planning theory, planning pedagogy, and planning practice are becoming more closely intertwined through joint discussions relating to how to implement participatory and inclusive planning practices and realize more just and equitable cities. Following the imperative that "planning educators and their students need 'to get their shoes dirty'" (Watson 2013, p. 9), many degrees are now offering regular practice courses and applied research studios from undergraduate level onwards. This allows students to hone both their technical and social problem-solving skills through real-life engagement with contemporary planning challenges, more often even in cooperation with local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or private planning firms (Balassiano 2011).

10.3.2 Urban Professional Associations

Alongside planning education programs, national professional associations have also proliferated. Among the largest and most influential are the British Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), established in 1914 with currently about 22,000 members (RTPI 2019), and the American Planning Association, established in 1978 with currently 46,398 members, of which 44% are also certified through its statutory arm, the American Institute of Certified Planners (American Planning Association 2019). Often, these professional associations also function as legal bodies at a national level, requiring planners to register and subscribe to professional codes of conduct before they can practice. In line with these codes, many associations have also defined self-regulatory mechanisms geared towards addressing professional misconduct, including corruption.

As town planning historically constituted a key practice of British colonial expansion, the RTPI has also been a model for many national planning bodies in its former colonies and across the Commonwealth. However, to be able to better respond to the planning challenges across the rapidly urbanizing continent, African planners adopted the so-called Durban Declaration in 2002, leading to the formation of the African Planning Association (APA) (UN-Habitat and APA 2013). Intended to strengthen the public voice of the profession and act as a platform to link African planners, by 2012 a total of 26 planning institutions had signed up to be part of the APA, though the organization has been largely dormant over the past 5 years, due to lack of

	Population (million) 2011	No of accredited planners	No of planners per 100,000	Year of Estimate
APA Countries				
Burkina Faso*	16,970,000	14	0.08	2011
Ghana	24,970,000	150	0.60	2011
Nigeria*	162,500,000	2,333	1.44	2011
Mali*	15,840,000	50	0.32	2011
Kenya*	41,610,000	194	0.47	2011
Uganda	34,510,000	90	0.26	2011
South Africa*	50,800,000	1,690	3.33	2011
Malawi	15,300,000	30	0.20	2011
Mauritius	1,286,000	27	2.10	2011
Tanzania*	46,200,000	158	0.34	2011
Zambia	13,400,000	60	0.45	2011
Zimbabwe	12,700,000	262	2.06	2011
Other countries				
United Kingdom	61,126,832	23,000	37.63	
United States	304,059,724	38,830	12.77	2010
Australia	18,972,350	4,452	23.47	2009/10
Pakistan	173,593,383	755	0.43	2010
India	1,210,193,422	2,800	0.23	2011

*Countries that regulate the registration of planning at a national level

Fig. 10.1 Ratio of planners to country population (UN-Habitat and APA 2013)

funding.[2] Moreover, many African countries do not yet have professional planning associations or dedicated higher education courses. Even in many of the countries that do, the number of professional planners is too low and thus insufficient to respond to the growing needs of their rapidly urbanizing populations (see Fig. 10.1).

For example, it is estimated that Burkina Faso has only about 14 accredited planners for a population of nearly 17 million people, while in Nigeria a mere 2333 planners serve 162.5 million people (UN-Habitat and APA 2013, p. 23). This sits in contrast to the United Kingdom which has 23,000 planners for 61.1 million people. Moreover, there is a lack of data regarding the share of female planners across the continent, but according to Olufemi (Olufemi 2008, p. 412), "their numbers remain negligible and their output unrecognized." This speaks volumes about the detrimental lack of and continued disregard for female perspectives and gender-based struggles in African cities.

Partly because of this scarcity of planning capacity, planners in African cities often alternate between working on publicly tendered projects and private development commissions, which increases the possibility for conflicts of interest to arise. The issue of so-called private jobs is particularly illustrative of the "conflicting rationalities" (Watson 2003). African planners are confronted within their daily practice. Our survey data[3] from Zambia confirms this (see Fig. 10.2): compared with South African respondents—of whom almost 80% have never found themselves working on two sides of a matter—almost half of all surveyed planners in Zambia indicate having

[2] This stands in contrast to the thriving Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS), established in 1999, which links planning programs across the continent and has a very active membership base, hosts a biennial conference as well as regular forums on curriculum development and academic exchange (Watson and Agbola 2013).

[3] These figures have been generated through an online survey targeted at practicing planners in both Zambia and South Africa.



Fig. 10.2 Survey responses to the question whether planners in South Africa and Zambia ever found themselves working on two sides of a planning matter at the same time (In % of $n = 211$, Cities of Integrity online survey 2020)

worked on the same job as both a private consultant and a public official, at least on occasion. Private jobs are typically done on tasks involving the preparation of site plans, building designs, reviews of designs, and lodging of document. Often the same planners who assisted with the private submission are then involved in assessing it and making recommendations for final decisions in their capacity as civil servants. Two areas of conflict emerge. The first area is regarding the question of whether the private job is done during the planner's personal off-duty time, or when the planner is on-duty and expected to do work in their official capacity. The second area is the conflict of interest that arises when one planner works on two sides of the same job.

Furthermore, our data also shows that early career planning professionals with less than 10 years of experience are more likely to engage in private jobs than older and more experienced planners. From our interview data, we can deduct several reasons for this. Firstly, young professionals are more likely to be directly exposed to developers, the public, and other clients, making them more easily noticed and targeted by potential clients. Secondly, more than 62% of Zambian planners are young, with less than 10 years' experience. This cohort also confided that they often receive orders from senior officials, such as directors of heads of local planning authorities, to achieve predetermined planning outcomes. This makes them more susceptible to private jobs and the associated integrity dilemmas.

A fierce debate is currently taking place among Zambian planners on how to address issues surrounding private jobs and potential conflicts of interest. The Zambia Institute of Planners (ZIP) currently seems unclear on how to guide planners on this emotive professional issue. ZIP acknowledges that private jobs clearly create a conflict of interest and it has sought to include guidelines in the draft Practice Manual for Planners in Zambia. Zambian planners are divided on the legality and morality of private jobs as Fig. 10.3 shows. About one third of the surveyed planners indicate that it is justifiable to work on the same job as both a private consul-



Fig. 10.3 Survey responses from Zambian planners indicating whether they find it permissible to work on two sides of a planning matter at the same time (In % of *n* = 98, Cities of Integrity online survey 2019)

tant and as a public official. Justifications brought forward for acting in this dual capacity include among other things the belief that, as trained professionals, they are able to maintain objectivity on the matter, even when working on both sides simultaneously; the critical shortage of qualified planners in Zambia, especially in rural municipalities where private planners are particularly scarce; and low and irregular salary payments, resulting in those planners in lower salary brackets feeling forced to accept private jobs to make ends meet. Some have even argued that maintaining a steady income through private jobs-on-the-side helps them resist the temptation of bribes and maintain their professional integrity.

These issues and dilemmas resonate across the African continent, with both planning education and professional associations representing spheres where collective ethics and professional value systems are forged and vividly debated. It is widely accepted that "[p]lanning is fundamentally an ethical activity as it raises questions about what should be done, for whom and by whom, and with what benefits or losses" (Watson 2003, p. 404). Like medical doctors whose fiduciary duty is helping their patient understand different treatment options and trade-offs between them, planners—through their specialized expertise coupled with their legal public engagement duties—support different urban actors in understanding the broader social, spatial, and economic implications of specific zoning decision, spatial development visions, and other urban policy tools.

At the same time, recent debates in planning theory have also challenged preconceived notions of universal ethics, particularly regarding the multitude of conflicting rationalities that practicing planners find themselves subjected to (de Satgé and Watson 2018), not least in places where urban realities regularly exceed ideals of Western modernity (Watson 2002; Robins et al. 2008).

Urban planning is often seen as a technical and bureaucratic process, decisions about where rights are granted, where and when infrastructure is installed or upgraded, as well as broader city-visioning and future urban policy processes. These result from highly political and contested processes that are often shaped less by rational planning ideals and more by local contexts and historic path dependencies.

10.4 Tackling Urban Corruption: Why It Matters

In practice, spatial and urban planning fundamentally support important political and jurisdictional decision-making on the location of key public infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, roads, public transport facilities, and so forth. Drawing on their specialized expertise, planners are deeply involved in implementing land-use regulations, thus shaping the allocation of development rights, and are entrusted with monitoring the supply of developable land through spatial development frameworks and other legislated plans. In turn, Chiodelli and Moroni (2015, p. 437) argue that "[c]orruption in the planning field is largely tied to the opportunities that land-use planning generates by allocating development rights and land uses (following a discretionary and differentiated logic)."

In other words, planning entails a constant balancing of diverse interests. In day-to-day practice, planners are forced to make trade-offs among conflicting objectives, such as environ-

mental protection, social provisions, and economic development. Their decisions thus directly impact the lives and livelihoods of different social groups, particularly in contexts marked by high levels of informality and inequality (e.g., in terms of gender, income, race, and ethnicity). Operating at the nexus of different state systems, private sector interests, citizen groups, and the public good, planners often feel the pressure from developers, land owners, political party representatives, other departments, and other urban actors to compromise the principles of their planning practice in favor of specific interests.

To make matters more complex, in many postcolonial contexts antiquated planning legislation and cumbersome regulatory frameworks clearly do not serve the public good (Watson 2009, 2011; Berrisford 2011). This makes it harder to ascertain a basis for just and fair decision-making and uncover potential corruption. While planning decisions that benefit or disadvantage particular groups or identities thus might not always be clear-cut cases of corruption, they nonetheless tend to further entrench existing patterns of socio-spatial inequality within the city.

10.5 Building Cities of Integrity in Zambia

Zambia records both high rates of urbanization and high numbers of alleged cases of corruption in urban development. The country ranked a lowly 150th in the world for effectiveness in registering property, and enforcing property rights through the courts is an often cumbersome and uncertain process (US Department of State 2017). There are numerous past and ongoing urban development projects that have been investigated by Transparency International Zambia, other civil society organizations, and public authorities for alleged corruption, fraud, and financial mismanagement (Chulu 2019). Moreover, the media is replete with reports that implicate the planning profession in compromised urban development and land administration processes (Phiri 2019). Thus, planners in Zambia are increasingly exposed, and sometimes also alleged as party, to corruption in local urban development processes.

Figure 10.4 illustrates how different factors affect the performance of Zambian planners on the job. A key impediment is the low level of funding for planning work. Typically, fieldwork is negatively affected, and clients often have to offer additional resources such as transport, fuel, allowances to facilitate site inspections, and final determination on planning submissions. When clients take charge of funding official planning work, the independence of the profession and objectivity of the decision-making process tends to be compromised. Planners have also indicated that they do not always have sufficient and guaranteed support from planning department directors and senior institutional managers. The lack of support is visible when directors or heads of planning authorities do not respect or adopt specific planning recommendations by planners and, in certain circumstances, might even request the planner arrives at a predetermined planning outcome. A further factor is that there is a widespread view among the public that planners are corrupt and demand bribes to do their job. Those planners who resist and reject bribes from the public are seen to be indirectly asking for bigger bribes. This results in mistrust and lack of public support, hence making it harder for planners to navigate the thin line between harsh public perception and fast-moving urban developments. Finally, with most planners being relatively young and inexperienced, there is a lack of familiarity with the latest planning laws and newly promulgated planning guidelines. Both our survey and interview data indicate that these factors, taken together, negatively impact the professional performance of planners in Zambia.

Zambia is a signatory of the three most important global anti-corruption conventions, the UN Convention Against Corruption, the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention Against Foreign Bribery, which has identified corruption as one of the major impediments to local growth and development (OECD 1997). Choosing Zambia as the



Fig. 10.4 Survey responses from Zambian planners regarding the factors that most negatively impact their performance at work (In % of $n = 98$, Cities of Integrity online survey 2020)

location for our research intervention was thus not primarily spurred by the mere prevalence of corruption in urban development but also—and perhaps more importantly—by the variety of local efforts to create an enabling environment for planners to make a positive contribution to national development. Taken together, these conditions create an exciting window of opportunity for administering integrity training, leveraged for research in the form of a Qualitative Action Experiment (QAE).

The practice of urban and regional planning in Zambia is regulated by the Urban and Regional Planners Act of 2011. The Act provides for the establishment of the Zambia Institute of Planners (ZIP), whose mandate is to register planners and planning firms, to regulate their professional conduct, and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to town planning. Thus, every planner in Zambia is required by law to be registered and regulated but is also entitled to be professionally supported by ZIP.

Until recently, ZIP failed to perform in accordance with its national goals, objectives, and vision. Poorly organized and lacking funding, the profession was performing very poorly (Taylor and Thole 2015), and practicing as a planner in Zambia was not sanctioned by any formal accreditation. In 2011, only 60 accredited planners were registered as members.

After the enactment of the Urban and Regional Planners Act of 2011, Zambia took further reforms, including the Urban and Regional Planning Act in 2015, and the introduction of a capacity building-focused Master's program in Spatial Planning at the University of Zambia and its support research center, the Centre for Urban Research and Planning (CURP). As a result, urban planning has recorded remarkable growth and assumed an important role and voice on mat-

ters of urban development in Zambia. As of 2019, the Institute records show over 800 accredited practicing planners (personal communication, Treasurer of ZIP, 2019).

Following these reforms, ZIP has achieved a powerful position from which to influence the collective development and sociopolitical positioning of the profession. Through its mandate to formally register planners, it regulates access to the profession, thus holding the opportunity to control quality, sanction irregular planning practice, and promote integrity in the profession. From 2017 onwards, ZIP has promulgated a Code of Ethics as a reference document for ethical and professional conduct of planners in Zambia. Further, ZIP is currently working to formulate the Planners' Practice Guide to operationalize the Code of Ethics. Used together with the provisions in the Urban and Regional Planners Act of 2011 and the Urban and Regional Planning Act of 2015, ZIP is a key stakeholder in developing and enforcing professional accountability mechanisms and proactively promoting integrity as a shared collective of planners in Zambia.

Unlike in the past, only qualified planners with full accreditation can now practice as planners in both the public and private sector in Zambia. ZIP has also recorded an increase in the number of private planning firms, with numbers currently standing at one international and seven national firms. There are now accredited planning firms offering planning services from consultancy and education, to community empowerment and civic development in the urban land and urban development sectors. Other reform efforts include the launch of an innovative forward-looking Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS) model planning program at the University of Zambia. This seeks to support the implementation of the new national efforts to reform and enhance the role of planning in Zambia and serves as a model for other planning schools in Africa to reform their planning curriculum and pedagogy. Watson and Agbola (2013, p. 7) characterize this program as "embodying content" and one that seeks to foster a pedagogy that can respond to current and future urbanization challenges and promote transparency in urban planning and urban development in Africa.

An overwhelming majority of 86% of Zambia planners surveyed indicate that planning institutes like ZIP have a direct role in promoting integrity in planning and urban development. Figure 10.5 shows that Zambian planners expect



Fig. 10.5 Survey responses from Zambian planners regarding the services that should be provided by their professional association regarding curbing corruption and promoting integrity (In % of n = 98, Cities of Integrity online survey 2020)

the ZIP to train planners in how to avoid corruption and uphold integrity. This is crucially important, as the majority of interviewees and survey participants indicated that their university training—mostly at bachelors level—did not adequately address corruption and integrity, making them feel ill-prepared for facing the harsh reality of corruption in the planning and urban development sector. The planners equally hold the view that ZIP needs to support moral professional behavior and punish wrongdoing. To be able to do this, the planners believe a practice manual must be formulated and promoted so that all planners are well-guided and that ZIP can effectively sanction corrupt and unethical conduct.

In sum, the outlook for planning in Zambia presents an opportunity to embed integrity both in the growth of the planning profession and in the profession's role in influencing the nature of urban development in Zambia. Presenting itself as a case with numerous opportunities for interventions to transform and enhance the role of planners in national development, Zambia struck the research team as a unique case that warranted the implementation of an action-driven research agenda.

10.6 Integrity Training as a Qualitative Action Experiment (QAE)

The status of planning in Zambia clearly illustrates the need to both increase the number of qualified planners on the continent and to equip them with the soft power skills to deal with complex issues in planning and urban development. The current status of planning in Zambia—characterized by a growing number of professionals, sometimes working in severely ethically compromised contexts—begs the question of how to equip professionals with adequate skills and values that champion transparency and ensure greater accountability. Similarly, measures to increase the number of qualified practicing planners must be matched by efforts to strengthen their professional integrity.

The Qualitative Action Experiment (QAE) in Lusaka, which took place in October 2019, sought to leverage professional pride and collective acumen, channeling it towards countering potentially corrupt practices and presenting an opportunity to empower Zambian planners to detect, report, and avoid corrupt practices (for more details on the research methodology, see Siame et al. 2020).

Taking the form of an intensive 2.5-day training workshop, the aim of the intervention was to offer a safe space for local planners from across the country to discuss their day-to-day encounters with corruption, share personal responses, think through possible collective support strategies together with the professional body, and build a community of practice around the positive notion of integrity. Translating our research principles into practice, this meant that the training:

- Placed a strong focus on practical mechanisms of lived professional integrity, rather than a narrow focus on anti-corruption compliance
- Adopted a systemic approach that takes seriously the positive influence of collective identities, social norms, and shared organizational cultures
- Allowed for the discussion of different and, at times, controversial perspectives in an inclusive non-judgmental manner

Some 38 registered and practicing professional planners from both the public and private sectors in Zambia participated in the Cities of Integrity QAE. In close cooperation with ZIP, the research team deliberately invited certain individuals considered to be in positions of influence, who are subjected to intense corruption pressures, and also ensured equal representation in terms of age, gender, seniority, and size of the administrative unit worked in (municipal, rural, or urban centers).

The following introduces some of the key aims and pedagogical elements of the training:

Raising awareness about the scale, scope, and consequences of corruption and debunking common corruption myths. Developed to kickstart the

discussion, this component honed in on the detriments of corruption and set out to debunk common myths about the causes and effects of corruption. For example, it is an often-repeated truism that corruption is only about a few bad apples that spoil the barrel. This has been challenged in multiple behavioral studies that show that we overestimate our ethical agency and that certain contexts might override our moral reasoning (Ashforth et al. 2008).

Sharing context-specific information about corruption risks in urban development and planning. Beyond general corruption dynamics, there are specific processes that are important to pay attention to when considering corruption in urban development, e.g., around re-zoning and building application and the financial windfalls that are often attached to them. Participants took the opportunity to compare their own experiences in the Zambian context, what common issues they face in their daily practice, and what specific consequences they or their colleagues have faced when calling out professional misconduct.

This conversation was further deepened through creating awareness about the practical challenges of ethical agency. This introspective session illustrated the subtle psychosocial mechanisms that can even lead well-intentioned people down a slippery slope of corruption. In interactive sessions, participants were asked to "make the call" on common moral challenges in the planning sector, with scenarios covering issues like the "revolving door" and cases of undue political interference with planning decisions.

Furthermore, in line with the action-oriented ethos of the research project, the QAE also aimed to equip participants with practical tools and support mechanisms for asserting integrity. Here, we drew on the expertise of Transparency International's Zambia chapter, whose president Rueben Lifuka joined the workshop to discuss local anti-corruption instruments and reflect on the potential of leveraging ZIP as a crucial integrity infrastructure in the profession. Lifuka's input also created the space for a heated discussion around issues of private planning jobs fulfilled by public servants—a widespread phenomenon in the Zambian context—which raised questions around how planners deal or fail to deal with conflict of interest.

Taken together, the aim of our QAE workshop was to catalyze action for behavior change and foster peer involvement, as well as commitment to champion institutional reforms in local planning departments. Thus, on the final day of the workshop, all participants were invited to commit to one or several activities (see Table 10.1). These exemplary commitments were derived from some of the micro-tactics and broader strategies for integrity promotion brought forward by

Table 10.1 Integrity commitments of Qualitative Action Experiment (QAE) participants (The number in brackets refers to the number of participants who committed to the specific activity. Participants were able to commit to more than one activity. Source: Siame et al. 2020)

- Meet with colleagues/mentees/subordinates to share the results of the workshop (24)
- Draft/develop service charter (9)
- Make service charter and procedures more publicly accessible/visible (9)
- Draft/develop checklists (7)
- Improve personal efforts and practices to be a person of integrity (7)
- Strengthen integrity of colleagues/workplace (6)
- Put sign up with integrity-focused message in office or visible public place of work/vehicle (4)
- Take steps to educate clients regarding processes/procedures (4)
- Be a resource on or champion for integrity and anti-corruption (4)
- Call out the corruption of others (2)
- Praise/reward demonstrations of integrity by others (2)
- Introduce regular work meetings to reflect on integrity (2)

participants over the course of the workshop and were further informed by a growing empirical literature on the efficacy of behavioral nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). To fully retain the voluntary aspect and avoid undue public pressure, participants made commitments to themselves in writing, sharing them with the course convenors in anonymous form. In our ongoing engagement with the QAE participants, the list serves as a reminder to participants of their individual promises and commitments, making them aware of the collective promises of the group and inviting them to reflect on potential challenges and progress made over the course of the research project.

While follow-up research with QAE participants suggests that integrity challenges have by no means eased after the training—with two-thirds stating that they were asked to approve a predetermined planning outcome—there is a prevailing commitment to champion integrity in local work environments, e.g., by drafting a departmental service charter and lobbying for the creation of integrity committees (Siame et al. 2020, p. 15).

10.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have argued that urban development is a particularly prolific turf for corruption, but by the same token, urban planning can be an equally potent node for combatting it and fostering professional integrity. This makes the sector particularly interesting for integrating SDGs 11 and 16 at the city level. Early impacts from our multifaceted, action-oriented research are promising, showing that promoting professional integrity among urban planners is an important lever for tackling urban corruption. At the same time, it is a piece of a larger puzzle when it comes to the quest of building cities of integrity, particularly in the African context.

At first glance, the big picture does not bode well. Rapid urbanization coupled with late industrialization presents a challenge to create economic opportunities for the growing, young urban populations on the continent (Pieterse 2008). Furthermore, climate change puts enormous strain on habitats and livelihoods, exacerbating existing corruption and creating new corruption risks (Transparency International 2011; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2016). Finally, the global COVID-19 crisis that hit the world full steam in 2020 pushed governments and populations to the brink of economic collapse, generating news about cases of procurement fraud in several African counties (Merten 2020; Schipani et al. 2020). In sum, meeting both SDGs 11 and 16 has become ever more challenging.

At the same time, there remain reasons for holding out hope. Cities have emerged as trail blazers for new standards of openness and transparency, for instance in local procurement and public contracting, with 56 new local municipalities particularly from Africa and Asia joining the global partnership to promote open government (Open Government Partnership 2019). While a universal leapfrog narrative for the continent has been rightly questioned (Alzouma 2005; Srinivasan et al. 2019), there are undeniably growing pockets of digital and technological innovation, not least in the civic tech and social innovation bracket. It is particularly the cities with a critical mass of young and well-educated entrepreneurs that are at the cutting edge of new data-sharing models and platform economies, as well as novel approaches for local democratic participation in Africa.

Finally, while urban life continues to present itself as messy, pluralistic, and experimental, this experimentation and “hustle” also continues to yield new political openings for local action and social justice (Simone and Pieterse 2018). In order to build cities of integrity and craft a sustainable urban future, it is therefore crucial that the process takes a context-sensitive approach that works closely with local actors, takes seriously their lived realities, and is open to experimentation.

References

African Centre for Cities, Center for Urban Research and Planning (CURP) (2020) Cities of Integrity online survey 2020 [dataset], version 1. African Centre for Cities, CURP [producers]; Cape Town, Lusaka; DataFirst [distributor], Cape Town. https://doi.org/10.25828/sy2r-y323

Afrobarometer (2018) Data from 2016/2018 survey (round 7). http://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online. Accessed on 20 October 2020

Alzouma G (2005) Myths of digital technology in Africa. Global Media and Communication 1(3):339–356

American Planning Association (2019) Annual Report 2019, APA Dashboard. https://www.planning.org/dashboard/. Accessed 21 October 2021

Ashforth BE, Gioia DA, Robinson SL, Treviño LK (2008) Re-viewing organizational corruption. Academy of Management Review 33(3):670–684

Atkinson R (2019) Necrotecture: lifeless dwellings and London's super-rich. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 43(1):2–13

Balassiano K (2011) Tackling "wicked problems" in planning studio courses. Journal of Planning Education and Research 31(4):449–460

Berrisford S (2011) Why it is difficult to change urban planning laws in African countries. Urban Forum 22(3):209–228

Boles JR (2017) Million dollar ghost buildings: dirty money flowing through luxury real estate markets. Real Estate Law Journal 476. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3518771. Accessed 20 October 2021

Chiodelli F, Moroni S (2015) Corruption in land-use issues: a crucial challenge for planning theory and practice. Town Planning Review 86(4):437–455

Chulu C (2019) Transparency International Zambia's statement on leaders' acquisition of land on Forest 27. https://tizambia.org.zm/transparency-international-zambias-statement-on-leaders-acquisition-of-land-on-forest-27. Accessed 21 October 2020

Cling JP, Razafindrakoto M, Roubaud F (2018) SDG 16 on governance and its measurement: Africa in the lead. Working paper DT/2018-2. https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers18-03/010072517.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Fernandez R, Hofman A, Aalbers MB (2016) London and New York as a safe deposit box for the transnational wealth elite. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 48(12):2443–2461

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2013) Money laundering and terrorist financing vulnerabilities of legal professionals. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20vulnerabilities%20legal%20professionals.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Frank AL, Silver C (2017) Urban planning education: beginnings, global movement and future prospects. Springer Publishing, New York

Fredriksson PG, Neumayer E (2016) Corruption and climate change policies: do the bad old days matter? Environmental and Resource Economics 63(2):451–469

Glucksberg L (2016) A view from the top: unpacking capital flows and foreign investment in prime London. City 20(2):238–255

Johnson BJ (2010) City planners and public service motivation. Planning Practice & Research 25(5):563–586

Khan MH (2018) Corruption and illicit financial flows. https://new.unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/stat2018_em_iff0620_session5_khanandreoni.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Kim H (2020) Corruption as infrastructure: rendering the new Saigon global. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 44 (6): 1057-1071

Merten M (2020) SIU probes R5.08-bn in questionable Covid-19 tenders, while lists of PPE contracts emerge. Daily Maverick, 20 August. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-08-20-siu-probes-r5-08-bn-in-questionable-covid-19-tenders-while-lists-of-ppe-contracts-emerge. Accessed 21 October 2020

Murshed M, Mredula F (2018) Impacts of corruption on sustainable development: a simultaneous equations model estimation approach. Journal of Accounting, Finance and Economics 8(1):109–133

Olufemi O (2008) Experiential and emotional encounters of women planners in Africa. Development in Practice 18(3):412–419

Olver C (2017) How to steal a city: the battle for Nelson Mandela Bay: an inside account. Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town

Olver C (2019) A house divided: the feud that took Cape Town to the brink. Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town

Open Government Partnership (2019) Global report volume 1: democracy beyond the ballot box. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Global-Report_Volume-1.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1997) Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. Signed 17 December 1997, entry into force 15 February 1999. http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm. Accessed 21 October 2020

Parnell S (2016) Defining a global urban development agenda. World Development 78:529–540

Phiri C (2019) The "mysterious" 48 apartments. Zambia Reports, 11 August. https://zambiareports.com/2019/08/11/mysterious-48-apartments. Accessed 21 October 2020

Pieterse E (2008) City futures: confronting the crisis of urban development. Zed Books, London and New York; UCT Press, Cape Town

Prindex (2020) A global assessment of perceived tenure security from 140 countries: comparative report. https://www.prindex.net/documents/537/PRINDEX-Comparative-2020.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Pring C, Vrushi J, Afrobarometer (2019) Global corruption barometer Africa 2019: citizens' views and experiences of corruption. https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/2019_GCB_Africa.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Razafindrakoto M, Roubaud F (2010) Are international databases on corruption reliable? A comparison of expert opinion surveys and household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa. World Development 38(8):1057-1069

Robins S, Cornwall A, von Lieres B (2008) Rethinking "citizenship" in the postcolony. Third World Quarterly 29(6):1069–1086

Royal Town Planning Institute (2019) The UK planning profession in 2019: statistics on the size and make-up of the planning profession in the UK. https://www.rtpi.org.uk/media/5889/theplanningprofessionin2019.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Sager T (2009) Planners' role: torn between dialogical ideals and neo-liberal realities. European Planning Studies 17(1):65–84

de Satgé R, Watson V (2018) Urban planning in the Global South: conflicting rationalities in contested urban space. Springer Publishing, New York

Schipani A, Cotterill J, Munshi N (2020) Africa's Covid-19 corruption: "theft doesn't even stop during a pandemic." Financial Times, 1 September. https://www.ft.com/content/617187c2-ab0b-4cf9-bdca-0aa246548745. Accessed 21 October 2020

Siame G, Nkula-Wenz L, Zinnbauer D (2020) Methodological considerations for researching corruption and building urban integrity: a qualitative action experiment in Zambia. Cities of Integrity working papers, no. 2. African Centre for Cities. https://www.africancentreforcities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GI_ACE_WORKING_PAPER_2_3.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Simone AM, Pieterse E (2018) New urban worlds: inhabiting dissonant times. Polity Press, Cambridge

de Simone M (2015) Corruption on your doorstep: how corrupt capital is used to buy property in the UK. Transparency International UK, London

Srinivasan S, Diepeveen S, Karekwaivanane G (2019) Rethinking publics in Africa in a digital age. Journal of Eastern African Studies 13(1):2–17

Taylor TK, Thole CB (2015) Re-thinking town and country planning practice in Zambia. Developing Country Studies 5(10):34–43

Thaler RH, Sunstein CR (2009) Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press, New Haven

Transparency International (2011) Global corruption report: climate change. Sweeney G, Dobson R, Despota K, Zinnbauer D (eds). https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2011_GCRclimatechange_EN.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

UN-Habitat (2010) State of the world's cities report (2010/11): bridging the urban divide. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/11143016_alt.pdf. Accessed 20 October 2020

UN-Habitat, African Planning Association (2013) The state of planning in Africa. http://unhabitat.org/the-state-of-planning-in-africa. Accessed 21 October 2020

United States Department of State (2017) Investment climate statement: Zambia. https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-investment-climate-statements/zambia. Accessed 11 October 2020

Watson V, Agbola B (2013) Who will plan Africa's cities? Africa Research Institute. https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ARI-Counterpoint-Who-will-plan-Africas-cities1.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020

Watson V (2013) The ethics of planners and their professional bodies: response to Flyvbjerg. Cities 32:167–168

Watson V (2011) Changing planning law in Africa: an introduction to the issue. Urban Forum 22(3):203–208

Watson V (2009) "The planned city sweeps the poor away…": urban planning and 21st century urbanisation. Progress in Planning 72(3):151–193

Watson V (2003) Conflicting rationalities: implications for planning theory and ethics. Planning Theory & Practice 4(4):395–407

Watson V (2002) The usefulness of normative planning theories in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Planning Theory 1(1):27–52

World Bank (2018) From regulators to enablers: the role of city governments in economic development of greater Kampala. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28459/119806-REVISED-PUBLIC-ADD-AUTHORS-P158599-GreaterKampalaFinalOutput.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y. Accessed 21 October 2020

Zinnbauer D (2019) Leveraging the role of the urban planning profession for one of the central policy challenges of our times. Cities of Integrity working papers, no. 1. African Centre for Cities. https://www.africancentreforcities.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GI_ACE_WORKING_PAPER_1_DZ_.pdf. Accessed 20 October 2020

Zinnbauer D (2020) Urbanisation, informality, and corruption: designing policies for integrity in the city. U4 issue 2020:6. https://www.u4.no/publications/urbanisation-informality-and-corruption. Accessed 6 October 2020