Chapter 20
Centre-Periphery Relations Between Civil Society Organisations and External Funding Partners: A Case Study of South Kivu's Peace and Development Agenda

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Abstract Ideological control of peacebuilding efforts and sustainable development by International Non-Governmental Organiaations (I-NGOs) and funding agencies at the expense of Local Non-Governmental Organisations (L-NGOs) or indigenous initiatives has gained momentum in contemporary research. While acknowledging global peacebuilding efforts and the progress achieved in development projects, the "center-periphery" model of relations between donors, International-Civil Society Organisations (I-CSOs), I-NGOs and L-NGOs, and between these organisations and target populations is perceived as unbalanced and unfair. This study suggests a power-balance whereby CSOs can mitigate adverse effects of ideologies and orientations conceived and controlled by external partners with insufficient consultation and decision of L-CSOs and local communities. The findings of this study are largely drawn from the literature reviewed and from semi-directive interviews with 18 members of 13 NGOs based in South Kivu.

Keywords Civil society · Development theory · Center-periphery theory · Peacebuilding

20.1 Introduction

Peacebuilding processes as well as contemporary conflicts fuel political and scientific debates and encourage unearthed activism actions in the so-called post-conflict zones. Internal and external actors under the umbrella of civil society worldwide have been involved in various projects and agendas aiming to either prevent broad-scale conflicts or find peaceful resolution mechanisms for them. Where violent conflicts have destroyed infrastructure and the social fabric that is necessary for integral and

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durable development, international non-governmental organisations (I-NGOs) and locally born initiatives strive to save conflict-affected areas through rescue plans, coordinated development projects, and putting in place peace infrastructure to prevent the recurrence of violence and human atrocities.

It is important note that I-NGOs strive to network with local/domestic organisations—to advance development agendas and, similarly, promote peace issues and offer options for positions in official governments (The World Bank 2007). In their variety and diversity, NGOs generally work under stringent funding policies and their interventions are limited to areas pre-determined by their policies. I-NGOs that operate to promote development projects have different interests that are not beneficial to areas not supported by those I-NGOs' modus operandi. Hence, participation in localised peace and development projects is quite limited.

Several hurdles to peace and development efforts need to be cleared to comprehensively assist the populations in need of aid. While individual community ownership is now an accepted principle in development cooperation, in conflict settings the need for a participatory approach in the geographies and spatialisation of I-NGOs is stronger, and yet harder to achieve. The lack of input from intended beneficiaries and environments to leverage access to funds calls for a greater involvement of civil society to ensure that communities in need can call for funding despite their positioning vis-à-vis the predefined criteria and policies that govern I-NGOs' decisions to fund projects (or not) in areas that require assistance. Civil society is instrumental in post-conflict peacebuinding situation; however, it happens that certain norms and policies meant to address conflicts are inposed by I-NGOs that intervene to intervening I-NGOs (Verkoren/Van Leeuwen 2013). As a result, locally based NGOs' members feel ostracised from funding processes. For this reason, donors also apply rigorous criteria in selecting beneficiaries of peacebuilding projects. For instance, The World Bank (2007, p. 31) warns: "Without a thorough analysis of civil society, donors may inadvertently support spoilers and actors that are not working for peace and social cohesion".

The prospects for effective civil society action in South Kivu should be cognizant of the contradictions in the design of peacebuilding and development projects, the selection of beneficiaries, the nature of intervention, the choice of priorities and of internal and external partners to engage in the field. To address those difficulties raised above, this inquiry is guided by the following questions:

- What is the nature and extent of LNGO involvement in peacebuilding in South Kivu?
- What are the limitations of their interventions?

This study is conducted under the following assumptions:

- The participation of NGOs in peacebuilding and development projects is done through the execution of medium-range projects in various fields, which are grafted onto the philosophies, geographies, philosophies, and programs dictated by external donors.

- The assistance of external funding institutions depends on their organisational culture, philosophy, geographic areas of interventions and ideology, which often disqualify local initiatives that should be considered as genuine beneficiaries.
- The "center-periphery" relations between CSOs, comprised of I-NGOs and L-NGOs, and between these organisations and the needy populations are too unbalanced and unfair to accelerate peacebuilding and development actions.

To remedy the negative impact of this "center-periphery" relationship among peace and development interventions in South Kivu and globally, this study suggests power-balanced and fair relations between CSOs and their funding partners to mitigate the adverse effects of ideologies and orientations conceived and controlled by outsiders through which L-CSOs and local communities appear to be marginalised.

This inquiry focuses on the organisational approach to peacebuilding as a condition for development, while empirically linking this to the contradictions between I-NGOs' intervention policies, the credibility and resolve of L-NGOs to successfully undertake funded programs, and the relation between I-NGOs and L-NGOs in developing and implementing development and peacebuilding programs in a spirit of complementarity and partnership while respecting the principle of subsidiarity. This model of cooperation is expected to be overseen by civil society advocacy groups.

In the context of South Kivu's multifaceted conflicts, ranging from ethnic, identity, land, power, intra-state armed conflicts to cross-border armed hostilities (Vlassenroot 2013), peacebuilding is illusive without rebuilding the social capital and engaging civil society in initiating and strengthening efforts to grow and sustain social cohesion. According to the World Bank's 2007 report, the focus of actions that enhance social cohesion should seek cooperation among rival groups, and could encompass delivery of services, which is achievable via "mixed user committees or joint development committees" (The World Bank 2007, p. 21).

Peacebuilding starts from healing wounded relations, repairing the broken social fabric, building social capital, and creating further accountability measures and conflict prevention mechanisms. Civil society can be instrumental in this process.

This chapter is divided as follows: following the introduction, the literature on the links between civil society, peacebuilding initiatives, sustainable development, and funding processes is reviewed. A conceptual analysis of civil society, including its relation to social capital and peacebuilding, is discussed, and this opens up the conceptual framework, which explores development theory, center-periphery theory, and the "Local First" and "In-Between" models of engagement by civil society in peacebuilding. These paradigmatic frameworks are employed to guide this study and the linkages amongst them are sought and explained, and the extent to which they can slow or advance peacebuilding and development is also discussed. The next section deals with funding and program impact on peacebuilding and development in South Kivu. Study design and methods are explained; the results are tabled; and a discussion section follows, leading to the conclusion.

20.2 CSOs, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development in South Kivu

20.2.1 Historical and Geographical Background

The geographical field of this study is South Kivu. Spread over 69,130 square kilometers, South Kivu is one of the 26 provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This province is in the east of that country, and borders Rwanda and Burundi. It is divided into 8 territories: Fizi, Idjwi, Kabare, Kalehe, Mwenga, Shabunda, Uvira and Walungu. Its population, divided among several ethnic groups, is estimated at 5,772,000 (DRC National Institute of Statistics 2015). Rich in mining and forestry resources, the province has a low level of industrialisation and its economic sector is dominated by agriculture and informal trade and the tertiary sector. Its rural areas are plagued by insecurity orchestrated by national (Mayi-Mayi) and foreign (the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda [FDLR] and the National Liberation Forces [FNL]) armed groups. A study published in 2015 revealed the existence of 81 armed groups in North and South Kivu. Two years later, in 2017, a new study indicated an increase to 120 well-identified armed groups (Stearns/Vogel 2015). The conflictual background of the South Kivu poses serious concerns for development which requires a great many donor interventions. However, protracted conflict can paradoxically restrain the flow of aid from external partners. Thus, understanding the goals of funding partners is crucial to strategising the way to access funds from donors.

20.2.2 Program Goals and Funding

Peace projects carried out by several organisations worldwide follow the opportunities and vision of donors whose funding mechanisms, according to The World Bank (2007, p. 13), encompass "multi-donor trust funds for specific countries or single donor funds. Dedicated funds can be established at headquarters", such as the World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund or GTZ's Peace Fund, or at field level such as the UNDP Peace and Development Trust Fund in Nepal.

The objectives of donors are thus defined according to the general framework proposed by the so-called external partners, which are international organisations, vectors of the ideologies and cultures of others. However, the objectives of the programs refer to the degree of violence and social deconstruction and their consequences on individuals or communities. Unfortunately, prospective recipient populations for international aid are not involved in defining the objectives of the programs for which they are beneficiaries. Thus, the perceived needs that justify granting development subsidies are transformed into expressed needs, which unfortunately

are not the needs of the community, and such an approach results in internal inappropriateness of both funding and the programs for which aid is granted. Organisations deployed to implement received aid, act according to areas chosen by donors; that explains the downstream subventions to communities, and the course of action to obtain community members who commit themselves to the execution of the said programs. Organizational objectives hide the individual objectives of project designers and the ideological goals of external organisational and institutional partners.

20.2.3 Impact of Peace-Building Projects and Programmes

Measuring the impact of the actions of local civil society organisations in the construction of peace remains difficult to establish, given the resurgent dynamics of conflict, but also and above all because of the lack of evidenced variables to determine peace. For this reason, the organisations concerned face the challenge of establishing the impact of their peace interventions, and in defining the necessary qualitative and quantitative indicators. They are content to identify achievements against the objectives set in advance.

The interventions of non-governmental development organisations in South Kivu mainly address the cyclical problems which are a result of conflict and violence in order to alleviate their psychological, physiological, socio-economic and environmental effects such as trauma and diseases related to rape, the breakdown of social ties, crime, the social rejection of children from armed forces and groups, children without families, disinherited individuals, killings and massacres between communities, natural disasters, the schooling of children, under-disclosure or misinformation, etc. Considering some of the achievements made by these organisations, they play an essential but partial and insufficient role in the return of social peace to South Kivu.

Nevertheless, their strong? interest in the above-mentioned cyclical problems limits the impact of the programs implemented. The short duration of these programs, designed and implemented according to the rationales of the donors alone, cannot bring about expected structural changes such as improving attitudes and collective representations in relation to peaceful coexistence between different communities; rationalisation of productive capacity (industrialisation and large-scale production, large-scale processing); institutional reforms and improved governance (fair justice, reliable and competent political structures); etc. The development of peace is based on structural changes born of internal dynamics supported by international mechanisms integrated with local logics in a horizontal partnership horizontality.

20.2.4 Funding Peacebuilding and Civil Society

The seventy-fourth session of the UN General Assembly Peacebuilding Fund, (see Document A/74/688) made strides in its support of peacebuilding program, and it participated in efforts that aim at prevention of…, to which increasing funds have been directed through "cross -pillar strategies" (United Nations 2020, p. 3). The same documents states:

> The Fund contributed to further advancing the implementation of the United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations with a $4.4 million investment in the establishment of the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership Facility (United Nations 2020, p. 11).

In 2019, the DRC received USD7 971 886 for an immediate response facility towards peacebuilding (United Nations 2020). Funding was aimed at empowerment of women and young people via "innovative and bottom-up approaches", and this was held to be central to the Fund's portfolio: this sanctioned "the direct funding of $12.9 million to civil society organsations, including five national organisations in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Sierra Leone" (United Nations 2020, p. 3).

- A report by Broadbent (2020) explored the literature on global mechanisms by which donors financially support civil society actors. These are: "(a) Direct support to individual or umbrella organisations; (b) Via Southern government; (c) Via Intermediaries – largely Northern NGOs" (p. 1), and these could be facilitated through the following four fund-dispatching structures: "Core funding, 'Basket' funding, Umbrella funds, [and] Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs)" (Broadbent 2020, p. 2). In addition, financing capacity building of NGOs was an essential concern that a 2009 study singled out, as it is mentioned among two major themes that emerged from that study: Firstly, there exists the need for ongoing or scaling-up of civil society actors, and for recognition of the fundamental role that civil society plays in development. The concept of "partnership" is also widespread in the literature.
- Secondly, capacity building was identified as a crucial component of any support to civil society, whether that is "direct" (such as providing subsidies for organisational development) or "indirect" (like providing financial backing to any CSO to help it build the capacity for participation of more local actors) (Broadbent 2009).

Moreover, each of the four mechanisms of disbursing donations involves risks, not only for donors, but for recipients as well. Broadbent (2020) alludes to the following general risks:

- Marginalisation of smaller organizsation because of the bias of the centralised subsidising system towards larger or more professionalised NGOs.
- Dependency on donated resources becomes probable amongst NGOs who receive funds on regular basis.
- High risks of "funding delays and short-termism".

- Interference of Southern governments in allocations and channeling of subsidies to civil society actors are potentially risky to adequate financial management of funds, "as well as increasing the potential for governmental 'co-option' of civil society actors – thereby weakening their claims to autonomy and objectivity" (Broadbent 2020, p. 2).

According to Tembo et al. (2007) cited in Broadbent (2020, p. 5), the leading ways of backing civil society via multi-donor interventions (MDIs) encompass:

- Umbrella funds to support a variety of actors (e.g. Common Fund for Supporting Civil Society in Nicaragua)
- Sector programs (e.g. Multi-stakeholder forestry program in Indonesia)
- Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs)
- Basket funds for specific actors (e.g. Tanzania Media Fund)
- Core funding to individual CSOs (e.g. Ghana Research and Advocacy Program (Broadbent 2020).

It is evident that CSOs are well-supported financially by various structures at international level. Sad to say, the partnering between CSOs and institutions that fund their intervention programs is based on a "dependency theory" that sustains a dependent relation between the "periphery" representing CSOs in the South, and the "core", constituted of wealthy funding institutions in the North. For instance, the European Union (EU) is biased in promoting CSOs; it provides aid based on their funding ideology, as observed by Mahoney/Beckstrand (2009, p. 30): "It favors EU-level groups and groups that promote a European identity through pro-EU activities, EU integration promotion, democracy and civic engagement promotion and intercultural exchange and youth education and engagement". CSOs in the South are excluded in decision-making processes about funding. This situation needs redress through advocacy because many CSOs are dependent on subsidies from the EU, which represents >60% of their annual income (Haynes et al. 2019, p. 11). It is necessary to review the power balance between the North or the "center" that retains the monopoly of funding, and the South or the "periphery" whose operations and survival depend heavily on the "center". Approaches that may contribute to advance new relations between the "core" and the "periphery" would include, as mentioned earlier, empowering CSOs to build capacities that will boost self-reliance, and making them partakers in all strategic planning and funds disbursement policies before getting projects underway.

Through testimonies and examples, whether they are programs for raped women or child soldiers, the reader discovers with amazement the dilemmas and perverse effects of this outsourcing strategy. The proliferation of players fuels rivalries, dilutes responsibilities, leads to greater financial opacity, higher coordination costs and risks of corruption, loss of decision-making control and field knowledge, etc. Through this case study, international aid is an "ill-ordered charity" that urgently needs to be called into question.

As a result, local peace-building organisations are not consulted enough, that is, instrumental use in the service of 'outside' ideologies whose origin of resources

and real purposes they do not know. This imbalanced rapport between donors and L-NGOs stems from donors' philosophies and actions on the ideological and axiological determinants of the funding partners. The direction given by funders is reinforced by the non-subsidisation of the pacification actions of local NGOs by the Congolese state. Indeed, for lack of state support these local NGOs are exposed to the ideologies of the "outside" through aid in the construction of peace.

The relationships between donors and beneficiaries of peacebuilding and development projects are defined as a partnership from which two positions emerge: The donor position is occupied by international organisations and institutions such as La Benevolencya, CORDAID, International Rescue Committee (IRC), USAID, the World Bank, etc. They design projects, provide funds, direct activities within a specified time frame, and monitor the use of the resources granted. The position of executor concerns local organisations (local civil society). Their mission is to develop the projects and implement them. Respondents are unanimous on the need for flexibility of their donors to changing projects depending on the context, as long as prior notice is given. Funding is provided through the presentation of a project duly accepted by the donors. To some extent, local organisations are "beneficiaries' and donors are 'donors.'?

Funds destined for the implementation of peacebuilding programs are provided by international organisations as part of multinational cooperation. Some donors operate directly from their headquarters in the West, others indirectly through agencies seconded to South Kivu Province (IRC, CORDAID, UNDP, UNICEF, Women's Plus Foundation, International Alert, the European Union, the World Bank, etc.). Instead of playing its hegemonic role in civil society, the Congolese state aligns itself among the beneficiaries of the actions of organisations through programs of institutional capacity-building, material support, etc. given to certain state institutions such as the prosecutors, the provincial divisions of social affairs and justice, the Territories, etc. As a result, through uncontrolled external financing from within, the Congolese state and national peace-building organisations are embarked on an alienating system defined by "rigid external determinism," in the words of Touraine (1976, p. 59).

20.2.5 Relationships Between International Donors and LNGOs

Earlier in this study, we examined the seven functions of civil society in local peacebuilding (Paffenholz 2015). The 2007 Report by the World Bank's Social Development Department acknowledged the unique and distinctive contributions that civil society can make to peacebuilding; it recommended that the support for civil society should be broadened its conception and embrace structures outside NGOs and organisations that are formally constituted (The World Bank 2007). The same report underlines how direct external support can strengthen civil society at various levels and

states: "Local ownership and partner-led program identification are key, as are a solid understanding of the "intermediary chains" and "insider-outsider" partnerships" (The World Bank 2007, p. v). Alluding to the seven core functions of civil society (Paffenholz 2015), the World Bank's report can be very helpful in designing objective-driven initiatives that can make peacebuilding more productive; the programming should be grounded in a "rigorous analysis, including the conflict and political setting, civil society itself, its enabling environment; and its peacebuilding experience and constraints" (The World Bank 2007, p. v).

Reflecting on the functions of civil society as envisioned by Paffenholz (2015), Hayman (2013) argues that other dimensions such as mediation and the combatants involved in armed hostilities, should be considered and she emphasises the advantages that locally-led peacebuilding initiatives offer over internally-led actions aimed to foster self-help, sustainability, and relevance. She observes:

> A Local First approach looks primarily for the capacity within the country or society and only brings in external assistance where no local capacity can be found. But, Local First does not mean local only—very often the most effective solution involves a partnership between internal and external organizations (Hayman 2013, p. 17).

Besides Local First, there has been a model that Van Houten (2018) names as The In-between where local civil society organisations engage in partnership with community-based structures to develop locally based peacebuilding interventions that would open opportunities to access international funding aimed at peace efforts in South Kivu. Local First and The In-between do not preclude community agency and the principle of subsidiarity (communities or individuals achieve what they can by their proper means without totally relying on external agents to solve their problems).

According to Evans (2013, p. 47),

> [s]ubsidiarity advocates a social order for the more efficient functioning of society. Specifically, if individuals or "subsidiary organisations" are left to resolve the matters closest to them, larger organisations, such as the State, are better able to carry out their allocated functions.

International CSOs and networks have placed global issues on the international agenda, successfully launched international campaigns (e.g. to ban landmines and blood diamonds, publish-what-you-pay) and partnered in key international conferences and consultative processes. It is reported: "I-NGOs can provide valuable support to domestic CSOs, but in many cases are not considered as part of that country's civil society" (The World Bank 2007, p. 6).

Notwithstanding the contribution of external/international civil society actors in domestic affairs, the principle of subsidiarity is not antithetical to a globalised peacebuilding vision. It rather serves to empower local actors and awaken their conscience to take ownership of the vital issue of peace at the level of each community. Evans (2013, p. 54) notes: "Subsidiarity provides for the empowerment and moral enrichment of the individual through allowing the individual to help themselves without interference from a higher association". The emerging global consciousness about

local ownership of peacebuilding by either L-NGOs or community-based structures has the potential to lead each community or society to sustainable development and peace. Locals understand better the contours of their challenges and they should empower themselves to be the catalyst of solutions, the reason being that local conflicts are born of and supported by local actors who can ipso facto be partakers of reforms and transformative action. The intervention of international actors would then back up locally – generated peace and development agendas with supportive funding. This has been the vision of civil society organisation in South Kivu (Aembe/Jordhus-Lier 2017; Van Houten 2018).

The interaction between locals and outsiders is a salient premise of sustainable development in the sense that, as pointed out by Hayman (2012), development initiatives such as delivery of services and goods that are spearheaded by CSOs, private sectors and governments should be a continuous process, and such projects should be appreciated, since they leave local organisations stronger than before. Thus,

> Local First implies that outsiders engage with local perceptions of problems and solutions and seek out and build on pockets of effectiveness wherever they are found. Doing so can make maximum use of local knowledge, reinforce self-help and self-reliance, and offer encouragement and self-confidence to local organizations (Hayman 2012, p. 13).

However, when dealing with intercommunity conflict, the Local first approach can be limited in initiating and achieving durable peace when stakeholders in a particular conflict are entangled in an adversarial relation and hostilities. In such circumstances, local initiatives would yield limited results. This view does not undermine the action of I-CSOs to network with domestic organisations, as they strive to advocate development and offer alternatives to individual states' officials; they carry out their actions under the institutionalised UN system, and their influence continues to expand and grow (The World Bank 2007).

Domestic civil society tends to have little involvement in direct facilitation between parties in conflict, especially when it involves actual peace negotiations, as this role is primarily played by external parties, especially governments (e. g. Norway in Sri Lanka) or multilateral agencies (e.g. the UN in Guatemala). In some instances, this role can be taken up by international CSOs as in the case of Comunita di Sant'Egidio in Mozambique or the Geneva-based NGO Center for Humanitarian Dialogue which facilitated the first negotiations in Aceh (The World Bank 2007). Donor engagement with CSOs is often fragmented and short-sighted. External funding and support are often limited to a small sub-set of CSOs (particularly development-oriented NGOs), while many local-level and membership-based organisations are bypassed.

These sections dealt with the role of local civil society in North Kivu based on the referential framework of *Local first* and The *In-between* and established how such approaches enhance peacebuilding strategy and development, that is followed now by a discussion of the theoretical framework that guides this chapter, notably civil, society, development and peacebuilding, and center-periphery theory.

20.3 Conceptual Framework

Two theories are utilised to frame and guide this chapter, namely development and peacebuilding theory and center-periphery theory. These concepts are relevant to this chapter for several reasons. Firstly, most contemporary hegemonic conflicts occur in sub-Saharan Africa where development and democracy remain the key challenges of peacebuilding. Secondly, most peacebuilding projects in sub-Saharan Africa and around the Globe depends on foreign aid and capitals that are provided by donors in the North, also perceived as rich or prosperous countries and institutions. The connection between these two and civil society is obvious for the fact that NGOs that make one category of civil society (Paffenholz 2015).

20.3.1 Development and Peacebuilding

The domains of development and peacebuilding are embraced by CSOs; however, the accessibility of funds for projects related to these fields is stonewalled by funders' policies. In this regard, the The World Bank (2007, p. v) considers: "Civil society contributions to development and peacebuilding can be categorised in a variety of ways, but donors largely employ actor-oriented perspectives." It is worthwhile noting that the World Bank recommends a move toward "a functional perspective, centered on the roles that different actors can play in conflict situations" (The World Bank 2007, p. v). The same report states:

> Such a functional perspective would enable donors to better analyze existing and potential forms of civil society engagement in peacebuilding. In particular, it would help clarify policy and programming objectives, select civil society partners, and help to set outcome indicators to improve monitoring and evaluation (p. v).

The stance taken by the World Bank opens up a more realistic and effective approach to be adopted by funding institutions to make L-NGOs more productive as they make up one of the components of civil society.

However, in development studies, several scholars have produced the following arguments:

> The foreign penetration, diffusion, and acculturation of modern values, techniques, and ideas from the centers to the periphery does not necessarily produce development. In most of the cases, this process contributes to the subordination of the underdeveloped countries to the centers (Grosfoguel 2000, p. 360).

Militarised conflicts in the Kivu Province and the immediacy of the search for peacebuilding and sustainable development is well understood in the context of globalisation and democratisation, in which civil society reemerged with its multi-functional agenda. In the context of unstable sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic tensions, civil wars and xenophobia have assuaged the enchantment with democracy (Roniger 1994). The great mutations

and changes in the public and political sphere, the shattered ideological perceptions of the of the world in the twentieth century, have consolidated the "democratic and neoliberal 'readings of reality'" (Roniger 1994, p. 1). As far as power-balance is concerned, amidst these transformations, the relation between civil society and state was redefined, as noted by Roniger (1994, p. 1):

> These processes have focused attention on the emasculation of the state and the parallel empowerment of civil society, which in turn has often involved a dual trend of disengagement from the state and the subsequent reshaping of participation in the public sphere.

Globalisation and technology advancement in the Anthropocene have become critical questions that touch deeply on the future of our ecosystem. Global warming, the rising fear of nuclear and biological warfare, intra-state brutality and murderous conflicts have become ongoing concerns in our time. Most conflicts in Africa are militarised because of the easy inflow of weaponry that is legally and illegally traded to fuel interethnic armed conflict and regional wars. Speaking of development suggests engaging in an ambivalent discourse that evokes both the devastating effects of technology on the environment and the quest for human welfare. Pieterse (2010, p. 1) observes:

> The classic aim of development, modernization or catching up with advanced countries, is in question because modernization is no longer an obvious ambition. Modernity no longer seems so attractive in view of ecological problems, the consequences of technological change and many other problems.

It appears that the field of development has been in crisis, not only as the result of confronting ideologies such as "neo-Marxism and dependency theory" on the one hand, and "Keynesianism and welfare politics" on the other, but mostly, as Pieterse (2010, p. 5) remarks:

> There have been plenty of critical positions but no coherent ideological response to the neoliberal turn. The crisis is further due to changing circumstances including development failures, the growing role of international financial institutions, and conflicts in developing countries.

In response to this crisis NGOs require a new mode of engagement that has to be differentiated into various developmental fields, namely: (1) the "multi-level negotiation and struggle among different stakeholders"; (2) "the relationship between power and knowledge in development"; and finally, in the areas of "globalization, sustainability, gender, diversity, poverty alleviation […] [e]mergencies, such as humanitarian action, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction" (Pieterse 2010, p. 11).

The issue of geographical context where NGOs set their interventions is impactful on development and peacebuilding. For this reason, a study on how NGOs develop their actions and determine the sites where they ought to intervene may have serious effects, for instance, on rural poverty (Bebbington 2004). Their target sites, such as rural areas which, in most of cases, remain underdeveloped and vulnerable to recurring militarised conflicts should get civil society approval for more openness

and flexibility that could move NGOs and funding institutions beyond their policies and pre-established geographical areas of intervention.

In the context of South Kivu, due to the slow pace of the interventions by the Central DRC Government and the local/provincial government, efforts to build peace and accelerate developmental projects rely significantly upon civil society organisations via I-NGOs and locally-based non-governmental organisations (L-NGOs). As a matter of fact, there is an increasing number of I-NGOs and L-NGOs operating in the eastern part of the DRC; they are spread across all vital sectors of life (health, education, human rights, food security, etc.).

The center-periphery model is characterised as a continuum that deals with "the role played in the international market" (Grosfoguel 2000, p. 363); this is associated with financial relations between the donors and recipients to advance development projects. The weight on the balance of this relationship swings in favor of the funders who dictate their ideologies, philosophies and geographies to the recipient local organisations and their populations. According to Namkoong (1999) the scarcity of capital accumulation results in the connection of periphery and center; and here, dependence entails "the relations between centers and the periphery whereby a country is subjected to decisions taken in the centers" (Prebish 1980, cited in Namkoong 1999, p. 130).

20.3.2 Center-Periphery Theory

The *center-periphery* model is used in geography to explain a relationship of domination and dependency that exists between two types of places: the centers, which dominate and take advantage of this unequal relationship, and the peripheries, which are dominated and suffer (Encyclopædia Universalis 2021). For instance, Galtung depicts the center-periphery model in Fig. 20.1 as a complex web of relations between mainly the First World countries and the Third/Second World countries; and that is revealed in unequal living standards between cities, the rich, the elites and the multinationals on the one hand, and rural areas, workers, farmers, and the poor, on the other hand (Galtung n.d.).

A peripheral space is the inverse of the center. It is characterised by a lower standard of living and a more limited production and decision-making capacity (Encyclopædia Universalis 2021). Figure 20.1. represents the uneven type of relation and structure of the global society, the center portrayed as the *First world countries and the periphery as the Third world and since 1990, that has become the second world* (Galtung n.d.). This model (center-periphery) renders intelligible the uneven type of structure of the global society. Most of the beneficiaries of peacebuilding and development programs are in the periphery, in the Grand South whether in towns, cities or rural areas where we see an increasing need of external funds for peacebuilding ans sustainable development. The South is comprised of areas that are largely affected by underdelopment, poverty, precarious or inexisting infrastructure, and above all, by



Fig. 20.1 Johan Galtung, Center-periphery model. *Source* https://image.slideserve.com/265453/galtung-s-center-periphery-model-l.jpg

militarised conflicts, and negative peace—described as absence of personal violence amidst structural violence also discernible in social injustice (Galtung 1969).

The relation between the center and the periphery is marked by dependency and imbalanced decision-making power in which the center always prevails. External partner organisations that finance and guide peace-building programs keep upper-hand on funding processes while local organisations that carry them out and the beneficiary communities are not represented in the deciding structures; they constitute the periphery, while external funders remain the center. Aid to the peripheries is guided and defined by ideological orientations of the centre for the implementation of funded projects.

Power-balance can be leveraged by civil society's intervention, possibly because:

> social movements, voluntary associations, and intermediate institutions of civil society could affect an overall reconstruction of the political centers and reformulation of community through a strong emphasis on participation and the endorsement of an egalitarian vision of rights and entitlements (Roniger 1994, p. 2).

This argument is equally applicable to interrelations between funders or external partners, L-NGOs, and beneficiary communities. Failure to redress the "unevenness and injustice" experienced in the geographies of funding development where civil society is sidelined in decision-making processes (Bebbington 2004), will further disadvantage communities that most need peace and social and economic growth. The involvement of civil society is crucial in rethinking a more equitable and balanced relation between the center and the periphery to better address the needs of the munities weakened by conflicts and violence; and this constitute opportunities for the center to intervene.

The section that follows discusses the design and methodological approach adopted to conduct this study.

20.4 Design and Methods

This inquiry is designed as a single case study limited to the South Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A case study offers an interesting advantage to research, namely its versatility to take in the philosophical position of the inquirer and "presents a unique platform for a range of studies that can generate greater insights into areas of inquiry" (Mills et al. 2017, p. n.p.). This model of investigation provides an ample body of explanatory insights into the complexities of civil society's participation in peacebuilding and development projects, particularly in a volatile environment that is still vulnerable to militarised conflicts, thus frustrating peacebuilders and discouraging donors and I-NGOs.

Empirical data were compiled through disengaged observation and semi-directive interview with thirteen non-governmental organisations (local civil society) between July and September 2015. According to Dockès/Kling-Eveillard (2006), the semi-directive method provides the person being investigated the latitude to convey his/her opinions by giving answers to open-ended questions. For Huntington (2000, p. 1271), "[t]he semi-directive interview is more a conversation than a question-and-answer session". The semi-directive interview method offers several research advantages to both the interviewer and the interviewee. On the one hand, it opens a level of freedom for the person from whom information is sought to freely express his/her views (Dockès/Kling-Eveillard 2006). On the other hand, it is a useful approach to investigate a problem with which respondents or participants may not feel comfortable, especially in dealing with direct questions; and it is similarly advantageous to the investigator when s/he cannot ascertain that the questions asked are comprehended by the respondent as intended (Huntington 2000).

The main sources of data utilised to conduct this inquiry being texts or qualitative data, content analysis was applied as method of analysis and interpretation of qualitative data gathered via semi-directive data and documentary sources. A Discussion section follows the display of the findings where the views expressed by the interviewees are analysed and interpreted via the *Three Approaches of Content Analysis* (Hsieh/Shannon 2005). These encompass Conventional Content Analysis (observation), and Directed Content Analysis (developing theory), and Summative Content Analysis (identifying keyword), followed by an "[a]n analysis of the patterns leads to an interpretation of the contextual meaning of specific terms or content" (Hsieh/Shannon 2005, p. 1286).

To this end, eighteen resource persons, comprising 10 men and 8 women, were interviewed. An average of 60 to 90 minutes was devoted to each interview conducted using a previously established protocol. The organisations involved in this study were the Women's Caucus, Heir to Justice, the Olame Centre, the Diocesan Development Office, the Catholic Diocese of Kivu Justice and Peace Commission, the Network of

Human Rights Associations in South Kivu (RADHOSKI), the Jeremiah Group, the Action for Children in Difficult Situations (AFESD), the Guinea Pig Village (VICO), Let Africa Live (LAV), the Women's Network, the Office for the Coordination of Civil Society, and the Inter-Community Baraza.

The sampling was purposive; participation in this study was consistent with ethical norms that require voluntary/consented participation, confidentiality, upholding the principles of beneficence, justice, and freedom to withdraw one's participation, etc. (Bless et al. 2013).

The interviews conducted provided the empirical basis for this study. The qualitative and quantitative data were processed through content analysis. For the intelligibility of analysis, reasoning constructs a dialectical relationship between the following variables: actors (structures), actions and strategies; logics and representations. Thus, the analysis attempts to detect the multifaceted contradictions of the logics and peace processes undertaken by non-governmental organisations in South Kivu. These contradictions do not mean inopportuneness or lack of necessity, but rather a contradictory way of producing the new material and cultural bases for collective self-determination.

20.5 Findings

The first research question consisted in establishing the nature and extent of L-NGOs involvement in peacebuilding in South Kivu. The findings are presented in themes that encompass specific objectives of investigated NGOs, in relation to the construction of peace, the beneficiaries, fields of action, and themes of intervention; organisational collaboration, namely monitoring and evaluation of projects; conflict apprehension; monitoring and evaluating peace building projects; and building peace for development, which focusses on ideological orientations, targets and program goals in intervention zones. Interpretation of these findings is simultaneously backed by the literature reviewed.

The actions of local peace-building organisations are guided by organisational strategies reflected in the definition and determination of the apprehension of peace; goals, beneficiaries, and themes; organisational collaboration and monitoring and evaluation methods.

20.5.1 Goals, Beneficiaries, and Themes

Emerging objectives of the interviews we conducted include raising awareness on peace issues, leading advocacy, and direct interventions in favor of beneficiaries, such as legal assistance and psycho-social assistance, as evidenced by the following words: "We raise awareness, advocacy and assist victims" (Interview of 27/8/2015

with a VICO facilitator in Bukavu). Goals such as program intervention areas are dictated from "outside" and no longer meet donors' visions.

According to our investigation, none of these organisations contacted received financial support from the Congolese state. This suggests that the Congolese state has no structured policy of partnership and promotion of national civil society working in the field of peacebuilding. The state plays neither a regulatory role, nor a restorative or ideological role. On the contrary, instead of playing its hegemonic role in the face of civil society, the Congolese state aligns itself with the beneficiaries of the actions of organisations through programs of institutional capacity building, material support, etc. given to certain state institutions such as the prosecutors, the provincial divisions of social affairs and justice, the territories, etc. As a result, through uncontrolled external financing from within, the Congolese state and national peacebuilding organisations are embarked on an alienating system defined by "a rigid external determinism", citing Touraine (1976, p. 59).

20.5.2 Recipients, Areas, and Themes of Intervention

The themes and areas chosen are diversified according to the need and interests of donors as shown in the Table 20.1.

Areas of intervention selected by funding institutions are mainly rural settings of South Kivu Province and the city of Bukavu, but these are primarily determined by external partners. Rural communities are most affected by the effects of conflict and violence. However, the actions of the organisations appear to be quite limited in relation to the need for peacebuilding. In addition, according to our observation, 55% of the organisations contacted concentrate certain activities that target rural populations in Bukavu. This forces the "beneficiaries" to move from their villages to the city of Bukavu to come and solicit the interventions of the organisations (legal support, health intervention, etc.). Other beneficiaries go through relay structures at

Table 20.1 NGO Areas and Topics for Intervention shows different themes and areas of interventions by NGOs. *Source* The authors

Areas	Themes
Justice	Human rights Sexual violence Violence against women
Social	Peaceful cohabitation Integration of children out of armed forces and groups Transformation of land and inter-communal conflicts
Policy	Civic education and peace education Election education Women's political participation
Economic	Microfinance

the base (Justice and Peace Commission, Mediation Framework, etc.) which have an intermediary role to refer certain problems to the central organisational structures far from the applicants' services.

20.5.3 Organisational Collaboration

All respondents (100%) reject opposition between organisations even when working in the same fields of intervention. Rather, they believe that there is collaboration, partnership, complementarity and even synergy among organisations working in the field of peacebuilding. According to the respondents, organisational networks (such as the Network of Human Rights Associations in South Kivu, the Peace and Reconciliation Council and the Office for the Coordination of Civil Society in South Kivu) would promote close collaboration between the organisations. This collaboration is manifested in the commitment to joint actions such as the defense of an actor or an organisation threatened by the political system, participation in meetings convened by networks, etc.

Nevertheless, from a nuanced point of view of six interviewees (33%), it appears that conflicts of interest sometimes occur between certain organisations and their respective networks. Such conflicts arise because of the misuse of the network without consulting all affiliates, non-transparent management of finances and a struggle for leadership. In this regard, the survey recorded the following statements: "Some network coordinators use us to spread their own organisations and not all affiliates" (Interview of 08/7/2015 with a member of VICO); "To run the network, logic disappears to the benefit of tribes, odds or money" (Interview of 15/7/2015 with a member of AFSD); "On several occasions, we were almost caught up in the mismanagement of civil society finances" (Interview of 03/8/2015 with a member of the Women's Caucus). Various networks are maintained and constitute a maintenance strategy for organisations involved in the construction of peace.

20.5.4 Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Projects

Organisations recognise the importance of evaluation in the execution of any peacebuilding project. Evaluation is also a requirement of the funder. According to interviewees, follow-up is done throughout the execution of projects in order to comply with the guidelines. Evaluations are organised mid-term and at the end of projects. During the evaluation, respondents state that their organisations verify the progress of the project and its impact through the manipulation of qualitative and quantitative indicators. To do this, they use certain evaluation methods such as OPS, 3P and Canadian RPP. Only five organisations, or 28% of respondents, apply the objective-based assessment approach, i.e., the qualitative and quantitative measurement of achievements against pre-set targets. In fact, an evaluation of a project is not an impact

analysis as identified by 72% of our respondents. In addition, it was noted that it was difficult for all respondents to identify these specific indicators for their various peace-building projects.

20.5.5 Apprehension of Conflict and Peace

According to our observation, conflict is understood to be about the various categories of disagreement, misunderstanding, opposition, divergence, uncertainty, violence, exclusion and injustice. It manifests itself in a relationship of tension, rejection, or violence between two or more people, between communities or between states. Fifty-six percent of respondents believe that conflict is not only negative, because it can lead to a desired change. On the other hand, almost half of them consider any conflict to be a lack of peace, and therefore negative. According to the latter opinion, organisations in collaboration with the state must put an end to conflicts within the communities of South Kivu. The most cited examples of these conflicts are land conflicts, rape, war, massacres and killings, and displacement of populations. These manifestations and consequences of conflict are derived from the context of conflict in the east of the D.R.C., and particularly in South Kivu.

The second question of this inquiry sought to determine the limitations CSOs in their interventions.

20.5.6 Ideological Orientations and Targets

Several local civil society organisations in South Kivu are working to build peace as demonstrated above. Their approach to peacebuilding, referred to here as an "organisational approach," is defined by a set of philosophy, strategies, means and goals to bring peace to communities whose socio-economic fabric has been weakened by cycles of conflict and violence.

CSO's interventions in the construction of peace is based on a goal of bringing peace to communities in conflict or post-conflict situations/states. Peace is both the leitmotif but also the philosophical orientation that determines the pacification programs put in place. According to the organisations contacted, peace is the prerequisite for the development of post-conflict zones. In this regard, all the subjects contacted said: "Our motivation is peace"; "Peace is the overriding need in our areas of intervention." This philosophical orientation is theoretically justified by the hegemonic mission of civil society. However, the actions generated by this vision do not address the complexity of peace because they are limited to certain areas for which each organisation has obtained funding from an external donor. To this end, the ideological basis of the pacification actions of local organisations suffers from a lack of autonomy, because their ideological orientation is dependent on ideologies directed/indicated by external partners. Indeed, international organisations are

involved in the field of peacebuilding. Each carries its vision and mission, which it imposes on any local organisation seeking support, as evidenced by the following statement: "We guide our peace programs in the areas required by donors. Our organisation works in the field of ex-soldier children because that is what my partner is interested in this year until 2018" (Interview of 14/9/2015 with a member of the LAV staff).

Insufficient financial resources of the stakeholders were reported as cited here: "We cannot pretend to make peace at the level of the whole of Congo because we do not have the means" (interview of 28/8/2015 with a member of the Women's Caucus. Of course, civil society organisations do not have institutional assets to address peacebuilding at macro-social and/or mega-social levels. According to the respondents, the community level provides an in-depth understanding of the problems of individuals and communities and their needs sufficient to guide action. Generally, cyclical solutions include care for the sick or victims of sexual violence, the reintegration into society of unemployed children and ex-soldier children, advocacy, or legal assistance for victims of miscarriages of justice and social injustice, reconciliation between communities, etc.

The duration of program delivery is short and does not consider real time to provide sustainable solutions. According to our survey, the duration of the programs varies on average between four and six months. This time is that of the donor and not of the execution organisation. The organisations contacted acknowledge this lack of temporal realism in their peace-building programs. Interviewees stated that the duration of any program is imposed by funders: "The duration of a project is not up to us. It is the funder who sets the time according to the objectives he wants to achieve" (Interview of 23/8/2015 with a member of the staff of Heirs of Justice). For interviewees, the short duration imposed for the implementation of peace-building programs weakens the impact of interventions and does not allow for community ownership of philosophy and practice.

Peace-building programs carried out by civil society organisations appear to focus on cyclical solutions rather than structural changes in recipient communities. Structural change would mean communities benefiting from peace-building programs, changes in representations, practices, and structures to solve problems resulting from past conflicts and violence, but also the creation of resilient practices that can maintain social cohesion and collective economic progress. On the contrary, what is observed is the fragility of the beneficiary communities, even after the implementation of peace-building programs, and hence the permanence of non-peace. The intervening organisations contacted seem to be aware of this limitation, which is rightly or wrongly attributed to the inadequacy of financial resources as can be understood by the following statement: "We, as an NGO, are trying to solve certain problems such as the health of women raped or the microfinance in their favor, advocacy, etc., but unfortunately, we cannot do everything. Our villages are very fragile because of the conflicts and their consequences. True peace must be achieved by

everyone with the state at the head" (Interview of 28/7/2015 with a member of the RFDP)[1].

20.5.7 Program Goals and Intervention Zones

Recipient populations are not involved in defining the objectives of the programs for which they are a beneficiary. Thus, the perceived needs that justify the objectives of the programs are transformed into expressed needs whose effect is the internal inappropriateness of philosophy and peace-building actions. The deployment of organisations to the implementing areas chosen by donors consists of explaining downstream to communities the merits of the action to obtain their membership and commitment. Organisational objectives hide the individual objectives of project designers and the ideological goals of external organisational and institutional partners.

The organisations' areas of intervention are in rural areas of South Kivu Province and the city of Bukavu. But they are previously determined by international partners. Rural communities are most affected by the effects of conflict and violence.

However, the actions of the organisations appear to be quite limited in relation to the need for peacebuilding. In addition, according to our observation, 55% of the organisations contacted concentrate certain activities, that target rural populations, in Bukavu. This forces the "beneficiaries" to move from their villages to the city of Bukavu to come and solicit the interventions of the organisations (legal support, health intervention, etc.). Other beneficiaries go through relay structures at the base (Justice and Peace Commission, Mediation Framework, etc.) which have an intermediary role to refer certain problems to the central organisational structures far from the applicants for services. Goals such as intervention areas are dictated from the outsiders and no funds are granted if the program for which the subsidisation is required no longer meet the donors' vision.

20.6 Discussion

The organisations contacted state that they provide judicial assistance to victims of various injustices such as rape, inheritance problems, land problems (mainly by the Heir to Justice), material and psychological assistance to victims of sexual violence and atrocities by armed groups. This was reported by the LAV, Women's Caucus, VICO, RFDP, etc. All the organisations contacted claim to have made a significant contribution to the building of peace through the actions they carried out.

[1] RFDP stands for a local civil society organisation, *the Réseau des Femmes pour la Défense des Droits et la Paix* [Women's Network for the Defense of Rights and Peace]. For more on this, see Cyril Musila, Bukavu, June 2006, Réseau des Femmes pour la Défense des Droits et la Paix (RFDP), http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-acteurs-280_fr.html. Accessed 15 Oct 2021.

The organisations interviewed are interested in people of both sexes and of all ages, except for the Olame Centre and Women's Caucus, on the one hand, and Action for Children in Difficult Situations (AFESD) and LAV, on the other, which are aimed at women and children respectively. For specific groups of beneficiaries, a remarkable choice is reserved for female victims of sexual violence. Other beneficiaries identified are children in difficult situations, children exiting armed forces and groups, the poor, and vulnerable women. To these categories are added the political authorities, the judiciary, the police, and the Army through judicial police officers, magistrates, judicial police inspectors, police and military officers, customary authorities, mayors, and territorial administrators. They benefit mainly from various trainings to improve their governance capacities. On average, each organisation is interested in six categories of beneficiaries.

All the organisations surveyed claim to address the needs felt and expressed by the beneficiaries in relation to the construction of peace. They say they have knowledge about the areas of intervention and the needs of the beneficiaries. However, in most cases, knowledge about contexts is not the result of in-depth studies but of empirical observations by the leaders of organisations and relay structures at the grassroots level (local beneficiary community). Therefore, the knowledge that underpins the logics of intervention is imprecise, and can, in turn, reduce the effectiveness of actions. This observation shows that scientific research is not yet integrated into local organisational practices. However, the role of scientific research ahead of any intervention is unavoidable in view of the dynamics of conflicts in the East of the DRC. and in the Great Lakes region. Research can serve as the basis for peacebuilding actions by producing real knowledge of the socio-economic, political, and environmental contexts of the intervention zones.

Organisational actors in the construction of peace have different and even reductionist apprehensions and conceptions of conflict because of the identification of consequences, instead of the processes or dynamics that generate them. This shift in approach may be an obstacle to determining evidence of conflicting processes to be considered to induce structural changes rather than redressing the consequences. To this end, organisations would work more on the structural conditions that underlie the basis of rape, killings, exclusion between communities, etc. rather than only helping rape victims, ex-soldier children, and so on as is the case. The sociological apprehension of conflict emphasises processes. According to Bercovitch and Fretter (2004), the conflict is broad, as a process of interaction between two or more parties that seek to thwart, insult, or destroy their opponent because they perceive incompatible interests or goals. As for peace, it is considered by the respondents as a state of stability, of tranquility. For the organisations contacted, peace is general and not just the absence of war. It must be observed through the well-being of the people.

Moreover, the apprehension of peace is reductionist, especially since it essentially refers to the field or theme of intervention of each organisation, not allowing exploration of peace in all its complexity and in all its dimensions. Paradoxically, this reductionism is a strategic force, in that it directs organisations towards specific areas. One of the criteria of good health is that you do not feel your organs; the proper way of their proper functioning is that they go unnoticed, just as peace is mechanical,

if not unconscious (Bouthoul 1970). In fact, social conflict is easier to grasp than peace.

20.7 Conclusion

This chapter intended to investigate the link between peacebuilding and development and used literary and empirical evidence to expound the inconsistencies found in I-NGOs' intervention policies, and the credibility and determination of L-NGOs to efficiently embark on peacebuilding and development projects funded by external institutions. It also investigated the relation between I-NGOs and L-NGOs in developing and implementing development and peacebuilding programs in a spirit of partnership which does not hinder each organisation's autonomy and respects the principle of subsidiarity.

Even when discussing the principle of subsidiarity in relation to financial aid needed by L-CSOs, one should not misinterpret the balance between what one institution can afford in terms of its financial self-reliance and the openness to receive needed backing funds to operate; subsidiarity entails that *Local First* is not antithetical to receiving external assistance; it is rather a call to make local actors self-sustainable. To illustrate this point, Hayman (2012), remarks: "[Local First] is based on the idea that aid should consciously and assertively assist countries to move to self-reliance through a self-help process that is locally led and determined" (2012, p. 13).

It was found that the model of cooperation to be forged between I-NGOs and L-NGOs should be overseen by civil society advocacy groups to contain any negative effects resulting from external NGOs' policies, ideologies, or geographies, and from L-NGOs' obstacles to act as peacebuilders. The mobilisation of L-NGOs is dictated by the logics of international actors (funders) who define, according to their own visions, the operationalisation of peace-building programs. Funding for peacebuilding programs, as well as their ideologies and actions, is beyond the reach of local actors and targeted populations. It is an uneven system that serves the ideologies of donors and the individual and collective ambitions of so-called "local civil society organizations".

Nevertheless, the permanence and re-emergence of stereotypes and violent conflicts between groups or communities in the areas of intervention of non-governmental conflict transformation organisations remain a real challenge that deserves institutional attention, an ideological revolution for a change of attitudes and a lasting peace. That is a *sine qua* non condition for development as well. Effective socio-economic development, the reconstruction of social capital and societal harmony in the South Kivu Province rely significantly upon balanced relations between all stakeholders, namely, donors and CSOs (I-NGOs, L-NGOs, community-based initiatives); and rethinking the conditions for financially backing peacebuilding and development projects in various regions of the globe.

The complexities of peacebuilding in South Kivu Province in particular, resulting from two decades of violent intercommunity conflict and civil wars, demand the

restoration of the destroyed social capital—structures and infrastructure that maintained social cohesion—and accelerate the province's developmental agenda. Despite the contradictions, challenges, and limitations of the organisational approach to conflict transformation, it is, in the face of the failure of the Congolese state, a cyclical response to the fragility of communities affected by conflict and violence in South Kivu.

The intervention of organisations in the construction of peace is based on a goal of bringing peace to communities in conflict or post-conflict situations. Peace is both the *leitmotif* but also the philosophical orientation that determines the pacification programs put in place. According to the organisations contacted, peace is the prerequisite for the development of post-conflict zones. In this regard, all the subjects contacted said: "Our motivation is peace"; "Peace is the overriding need in our areas of intervention." This philosophical orientation is theoretically justified by the hegemonic mission of civil society. However, the actions generated by this vision do not address the complexity of peace, because they are limited to certain areas for which each organisation has obtained funding from an external donor.

To this end, the ideological basis of the pacification actions of local organisations suffers from a lack of autonomy, because their ideological orientation is dependent on ideologies crafted by external partners/outsiders. This situation needs to be remedied by civil society advocacy groups to ensure that this hurdle on the path of development and building durable peace is removed. I-CSOs' involvement in helping reimagine hardline ideologies, geographies, philosophy, and political economy of donors whose actions should not infringe the autonomy and performance of L-NGOs constitute the way forward to address the unevenness and unfair geography and targets of international civil society's donors.

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